From: haji@polari.com
Subject: Re: Right and Wrong
Organization: Seattle Online Public Access Unix.  (206) 328-4944 (all lines telebit-equipped)
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 1992 23:44:21 GMT

> Sounds like you're creating the physical boundaries of the ideas with
> the terms you use and not discussing the ideas, except for those that
> fit the boundaries you created.

     I'm not creating any boundaries.  Every sentence has a subject, this
is a theory for subjects themselves.  It wouldn't be metaphysics if you
discuss specific ideas. 

> How would you define happiness based on aesthetic appreciation?  Would
> you consider it intrinsic since the object of the appreciation is 
> appreciated for its own sake and valued as is?  Would you call it 
> extrinsic because the happiness derived from the appreciation can be
> quantified by the perceiver as greater than if the relationship of 
> aesthetic appreciation did not exist?

     Interesting question.  Happiness is never extrinsic or intrinsic,
only subjects are.  Aesthetic appreciation, I would say, has to do with
fashion.  Fashion is where a subject is on a relation.  The happiness 
from aesthetic appreciation only occurs if there is another subject in
relation with the object.  If the relation changes then leverage happiness
occurs.  Also, a subject above fashion is pride.

> Are you going to say that when the gradations of happiness get beyond
> some arbitrary point then it automatically defines the happiness as
> extrinsic?  Would that arbitrary point be different from person to 
> person?
  
     Happiness is never extrinsic.  If the gradations of happiness get
combined together and is related to another subject, let's say the 
gradations of unhappiness, then that would be happiness of a higher
league than the gradations of happiness themselves.  No, the theory is
the same for any person or subject.

> Are there some forms of happiness that would be considered more ethical
> than others?

     I'm not sure what you mean by forms of happiness.  The types of 
happiness in the theory are all just as ethical as each other.  Instances
of happiness that occur in life are either ethical or not.  Silliness
is the combination of subjects that are not within the same extrinsic
subject.  

> Can everybody tune to the same stations, so to speak, to perceive the
> same kinds of happiness be it extrinsic or intrinsic.  Can a form
> of happiness be both?

     I think you are referring to the subject of conversation (extrinsic
subject).  The subject of conversation changes so that the happiness
is always from local subjects.  Happiness from one league is no different
from happiness from another league, except in intensity.  

> If by deriving pleasure from happiness is it automatically extrinsic
> or does it have to be sought for that purpose?

     To seek happiness is philosophy.  Again, happiness is never extrinsic
or intrinsic.  One can have pleasure in relating the subject of happiness,
as we are doing now, but the happiness itself is from local subjects.
Only in the theory of Shurism is happiness a local subject.  Someone
dismissed the theory on the grounds that it implies one should never marry
someone who has the same eye color, hair color, etc.  Eye color and hair
color are intrinsic subjects of people.  Showing what the theory implies
is difficult thing, it should only be done if you understand it.  I want
to understand it better.  For example, I can show you how sadness relates
to embarrassment in any league, but I don't have a clue about how anger
relates to unhappiness.  Anger must be explained by the theory somehow.
I also have difficulty with empathy.  I know what these emotions are, I
just don't know what parameters are used to relate them with the theory.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta