From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 1/7
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:04 GMT

The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
 
     Z Magazine, September 1992
 
and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
 
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thinking on  political, cultural,  social, and economic life in 
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=================================================================
 
Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 1 of 7, 12.5KB)
========================
 
In the July/August issue of _Z_, several articles dealt with
the deterioration of conditions of life in American society and
the loss of hope, trust, or even expectations for the political
system.  Reviewing some of these all-too-obvious elements of the
current scene, I wrote that "The public is not unaware of what is
happening, though with the success of the policies of isolation
and breakdown of organizational structure, the response is
erratic and dangerous: faith in ridiculous billionaire saviors
who are little more than `blank slates' on which one can write
one's favorite dreams, myths of past innocence and noble leaders,
conspiracy cults..., unfocused skepticism and disillusionment --
a mixture that has not had happy consequences in the past."
 
At times of general malaise and social breakdown, it is not
uncommon for millenarian movements to arise to replace lost hopes
by idle dreams: dreams of a savior who will lead us from bondage,
or of the return of the great ships with their bounty, as in the
cargo cults of South Sea islanders.  Some may yearn for a lost
golden age, or succumb to the blandishments of the new Messiahs
who come to the fore at such moments.  Those more cognizant of
the institutional causes of discontent may be attracted to an
image of hope destroyed by dark and powerful forces that stole
from us the leader who sought a better future.  The temptation to
seek solace, or salvation, is particularly strong when the means
to become engaged in a constructive way in determining one's fate
have largely dissolved and disappeared.
 
The billionaire savior has retreated from the scene.  But it is
surely striking that his challenge to the one-party, two-faction
system of business rule, with its broad popular appeal, should
have coincided so closely with the revival of fascination with
tales of intrigue about Camelot lost.  The audiences differ, but
the JFK-Perot enthusiasms are similar enough to raise the
question whether the imagery of the leader maliciously stolen
from us has more of a claim to reality than the promise of the
figure who suddenly appeared, quickly to fade away.  The question
is an important one, particularly to the left (broadly
construed), which has devoted much of its valuable energy and
resources to the Kennedy revival at a time when it has been
successfully removed from the political arena, along with the
large majority of the public that is its natural constituency.
 
The core issue in the current Kennedy revival is the claim that
JFK intended to withdraw from Vietnam, a fact suppressed by the
media; and was assassinated for that reason, it is prominently
charged.  Some allege further that Kennedy was intent on
destroying the CIA, dismantling the military-industrial complex,
ending the Cold War, and opening an era of development and
freedom for Latin America, among other forms of class treachery
that led to his downfall.  This 1991-2 drama proceeded at several
levels, from cinema to scholarship, engaging some of the
best-known Kennedy intellectuals as well as substantial segments
of the popular movements that in large part grew from opposition
to the Vietnam war.  Much as they differ on parts of the picture
and other issues, there is a shared belief across this spectrum
that history changed course dramatically when Kennedy was
assassinated in November 1963, an event that casts a grim shadow
over all that followed.
 
It is also striking that the withdrawal thesis, which is at the
heart of the Camelot revival of 1991-2, gained its prominence
just on the 30th anniversary of Kennedy's steps to escalate the
Indochina conflict from international terrorism to outright
aggression.  The anniversary of Kennedy's war against the rural
society of South Vietnam passed virtually without notice, as the
country mused over the evil nature of the Japanese, who had so
signally failed to plead for forgiveness on the 50th anniversary
of their attack on a military base in a US colony that had been
stolen from its inhabitants, by force and guile, just 50 years
earlier.
 
There are several sources of evidence that bear on the withdrawal
thesis: (1) The historical facts; (2) the record of public
statements; (3) the internal planning record; (4) the memoirs and
other reports of Kennedy insiders.  In each category, the
material is substantial.  The record of internal deliberations,
in particular, has been available far beyond the norm since the
release of two editions of the _Pentagon Papers_ (_PP_).  The
recent publication of thousands of pages of documents in the
official State Department history provides a wealth of additional
material on the years of the presidential transition, 1963-4,
which are of crucial significance for evaluating the thesis that
many have found so compelling.  What follows is an excerpt from a
much longer review of the four categories of evidence in a
broader context (_Year 501_, South End, forthcoming).
 
While history never permits anything like definitive conclusions,
in this case, the richness of the record, and its consistency,
permit some unusually confident judgments.  In my opinion, the
record is inconsistent with the withdrawal thesis throughout, and
supports a different conclusion.  In brief, basic policy towards
Indochina developed within a framework of North-South/East-West
relations that Kennedy did not challenge, and remained constant
in essentials: disentanglement from an unpopular and costly
venture as soon as possible, but _after_ victory was assured
(by the end, with increasing doubt that US client regimes could
be sustained).  Tactics were modified with changing circumstances
and perceptions.  Changes of Administration, including the
Kennedy assassination, had no large-scale effect on policy, and
not even any great effect on tactics, when account is taken of
the objective situation and how it was perceived.
 
1. Kennedy's War
----------------
 
When JFK took over in 1961, the US client regimes faced collapse
in both Laos and Vietnam, for the same reason in both countries:
The US-imposed regimes could not compete politically with the
well-organized popular opposition, a fact recognized on all
sides.  Kennedy accepted a diplomatic settlement in Laos (at
least on paper), but chose to escalate in Vietnam, where he
ordered the deployment of Air Force and Helicopter Units, along
with napalm, defoliation, and crop destruction.  US military
personnel were sharply increased and deployed at battalion level,
where they were "beginning to participate more directly in
advising Vietnamese unit commanders in the planning and execution
of military operations plans" (_PP_).  Kennedy's war far
surpassed the French war at its peak in helicopters and aerial
fire power.  As for personnel, France had 20,000 nationals
fighting in all of Indochina in 1949 (the US force level reached
16,700 under JFK), increasing to 57,000 at the peak.
 
As military operations intensified, concerns arose over the
effects of "indiscriminate firepower" and reports "that
indiscriminate bombing in the countryside is forcing innocent or
wavering peasants toward the Viet Cong" (_PP_).  Kennedy's more
dovish advisers, notably Roger Hilsman, preferred
counterintersurgency operations.  The favored method was to drive
several million peasants into concentration camps where,
surrounded by barbed wire and troops, they would have a "free
choice" between the US client regime (GVN) and the Viet Cong.
The effort failed, Hilsman later concluded, because it was never
possible to eliminate the political opposition entirely.  Other
problems arose when the wrong village was bombed, or when bombing
and defoliation alienated the peasants whose hearts and minds
were to be won from the enemy whom they supported.
 
Kennedy's war was no secret.  In March 1962, US officials
announced that US pilots were engaged in combat missions (bombing
and strafing).  In October, a front-page story in the _New York
Times_ reported that "in 30 percent of all the combat missions
flown in Vietnamese Air Force planes, Americans are at the
controls," though "national insignia have been erased from many
aircraft...to avoid the thorny international problems involved."
The press reported further that US Army fliers and gunners were
taking the military initiative against southern guerrillas, using
helicopters with more firepower than any World War II fighter
plane as an offensive weapon.  Armed helicopters were regularly
supporting operations of the Saigon army (ARVN).  The brutal
character of Kennedy's war was also no secret, from the outset.
 
The specialist literature, notably province studies, generally
agrees that the US-imposed regime had no legitimacy in the
countryside, where 80% of the population lived (and little enough
in the urban areas), that only force could compensate for this
lack, and that by 1965 the VC had won the war in much of the
country, with little external support.
 
At first, JFK's 1961-2 aggression appeared to be a grand success:
by July 1962, "the prospects looked bright" and "to many the end
of the insurgency seemed in sight." The US leadership in Vietnam
and Washington "was confident and cautiously optimistic," and "In
some quarters, even a measure of euphoria obtained" (_PP_).
 
In his semi-official history of Kennedy's presidency, Arthur
Schlesinger observes that by the end of 1961, "The President
unquestionably felt that an American retreat in Asia might upset
the whole world balance" (_A Thousand Days_, 1965).  "The
result in 1962 was to place the main emphasis on the military
effort" in South Vietnam.  The "encouraging effects" of the
escalation enabled Kennedy to report in his January 1963 State of
the Union message that "The spearpoint of aggression has been
blunted in South Vietnam." In Schlesinger's own words: "1962 had
not been a bad year:...aggression checked in Vietnam."
 
Recall that Kennedy and his historian-associate are describing
the year 1962, when Kennedy escalated from extreme terrorism to
outright aggression.
 
Turning briefly to the second category of evidence, public
statements, we find that Schlesinger's report of the President's
feelings is well-confirmed.  JFK regularly stressed the enormous
stakes involved, which made any thought of withdrawal
unacceptable.  To the end, his public position was that we must
"win the war" and not "just go home and leave the world to those
who are our enemies." We must ensure that "the assault from the
inside, and which is manipulated from the North, is ended"
(Sept., Nov. 1963).  Anything less would lead to the loss of
Southeast Asia, with repercussions extending far beyond.  As the
"watchman on the walls of world freedom," he intended to tell his
Dallas audience on Nov. 22, the US had to undertake tasks that
were "painful, risky and costly, as is true in Southeast Asia
today.  But we dare not weary of the task." The internal record,
to which we turn next, shows that he adopted the same stance in
his (limited) involvement in planning.
 




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