From: black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236))
Subject: Re: Hypocrisy.  Was Re: The right-to-kill...
Organization: Clinical Products Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Distribution: talk
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 19:39:16 GMT

In article <dv8xyvp@rpi.edu> you write:

[...]

>>jsve:
>>>I would not ever want to be killed in a war, yet I would shoot the
>>>enemy with the intent to kill.  So I will simply never fit your
>>>standard, nor can I therefore advocate it.
>>
>>Good point.  I have never opposed the exercise of self-defense, as I've
>>mentioned in earlier posts but not this one, since I believed it can be
>>taken for granted (though I've heard that there are extreme Augustinians
>>who would differ).
>>
>>So granting this important exception: that self-defense permits us to do
>>to others what we would not wish on ourselves, do you have any other
>>objections to my standard?  Can you appreciate that I'm making a sincere
>>effort to define a non-arbitrary standard?  Can you point out other
>>areas where you believe my standard is still deficient? 
>
>I think you've misunderstood what I was trying to say here.  I do not
>consider an *offensive* action in war to be self-defense.  I'm trying
>to say that I would indeed charge the enemy or ambush them when they
>were unaware, and kill them.  They would not have to be aware of my
>presence nor have any intent to kill me specifically at the time in
>order for me to shoot first.  Perhaps you consider offensive actions
>to actually be defensive during a state of war?  In that case we
>disagree on the definition, 

I do consider your example of "offensive actions" to generally be
defensive during a state of war.  Not always, though.  Questions like
the following would need to be analyzed: "Are you ambushing those who
would do likewise to you if given the chance or are you ambushing
obvious noncombatant civilians?" "To what degree did fear and concern
for your own safety play in a pre-emptive attack?"

If your own safety or that of those you're defending is at stake, then
my non-arbitrary standard accepts this.  Now it's certainly possible
that without knowing all the facts, we may not be able to form an
accurate evaluation for specific incidents based on this standard.  In
no way, however does that jeopardize the legitimacy of the standard or
present a case against it.  It merely acknowledges that there exist
situations for which we sometimes lack the necessary facts and
information needed in order to insure a valid evaluation, ...  that we
therefore run the risk of misjudging the ethicallity of some actions due
to lack of information, not due to any inherent defects of the
standard itself. 

I've indicated agreement with your proposition that certain wartime
situations merit exemption from the stricter criteria that would
normally be imposed my non-arbitrary standard.  In doing this I've
strengthened my claim to non-arbitrariness by showing that the standard
is capable of certain key distinctions.  Thanks to your input, my
standard is now even less arbitrary than before :-). 

Do you agree that my standard is not arbitrary and is worthy of serving
as a universal guide to ethical conduct? If you disagree, then I think
you need to explain why it would be okay for you to do to another what
is not okay for another to do to you (excepting the wartime and defense
type of situations). 

>but in my mind, I still could never fit
>your viewpoint because *I* would still consider it an offensive act of
>killing and not self defense, despite a state of war.

I think you've misinterpreted me a little here.  I'm not out to
determine whether you (or for that matter whether I) can always live up
to the standard, or whether we like the standard.  That's not
necessarily a valid test of legitimacy for an ethical standard.  In
fact, if the standard were easy for us to comply with, it probably
wouldn't be a very good standard.  Instead I'm interested in what you
would find arbitrary about it. 

Secondly, although this introduction of wartime activities makes for
interesting discussion, it doesn't really affect our original point
of contention, which was my claim that drawing an ethical line between
sentient/non-sentients is less arbitrary than your line between
human/nonhumans.  (No doubt this has become somewhat obscured because
of my slowness in responding, but I can't control that right now.)

[...]

---
Robert Black 
black@serum.kodak.com  - The ONLY email address that MIGHT work.
These views are not necessarily the views of my employers.

Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals