HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Followup-To: alt.society.civil-liberty
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 13:39:51 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org>, ritter@cactus (Terry Ritter) writes:
>    The police bust an alleged child molester, and take possession
>    of his PC.  They believe that the hard drive contains a full
>    database of young kids who have been *or may be* assaulted.
>    That database is enciphered.
>
> Now, your mission, should you decide to accept it, is to defend
> cryptography to ordinary voters, congress people and newspaper
> reporters.

To do this, there's a need to take away these magic words like "child
molesters", "pornography", "drug users", "child pornography" and so
on.

In Finland I think I would have little trouble with this example, as
"child molester" is not one of the magic words here.  Neither is
"pornography" or "child pornography".  "Drugs" is, and even that's an
import from USA.  In USA, you can legally steal all possessions from
anyone if you say the magic word "drugs" - in Finland you can keep
someone arrested a couple of days.  "Family values" is a recent
example of a magic word that didn't work in USA.  Something quite like
it did work in Germany a few dozen years ago.

The magic words only work if we let them.  Break the spell of the
magic words.

Followups directed out of sci.crypt.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy
From: amirza@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Anmar Caves)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 15:51:02 GMT

In article <1992Nov12.070004.1556@netcom.com> gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
>amirza@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Anmar Caves) writes:

gun-related talk followed up to in t.p.g by popular request.
-- 
Anmar Mirza   # Chief of Tranquility  #My Opinions! NotIU's!#Purveyor of
EMT-D         # Base, Lawrence Co. IN # Legalize Explosives!#nontraditional
N9ISY (tech)  # Somewhere out on the  # Politicians prefer  #family values
Networks Tech.# Mirza Ranch.C'mon over# unarmed peasants.   #Space For Rent
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 13 Nov 92 16:38:02 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Nov13.075430.8494@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:

> "Agents of the government" do arrest people *under the authority*
> granted by *social institutions*.

No evidence.  Agents of the government arrest people under *their own* authority.

> Well, there seems to be a lot of "fuzzy thinking" going around.

> Consider the wording of The Fourth Amendment:

>      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
>      papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
>      seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
>      but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
>      and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
>      the persons or things to be searched.

> Clearly this protects a "right of the people."  But it *also*
> implicitly recognizes (in my terms) a "right" of government to
> search and seize, provided only that a specific warrant issues
> based on probable cause.

Actually, not.  It was legally assumed, prior to the US Constitution, that
government had the "right" to do whatever they want to.  The constitution
limits that "right"; it does not say necessarily that non-unreasonable
searches should be allowed.
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: gak@wrs.com (Richard Stueven)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Reply-To: gak@wrs.com
Organization: Wind River Systems, Inc.
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 17:52:07 GMT

In article uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us, jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel)  writes:
> [in response to Jyrki's rant]
>
>     I surely  hope your post was  'tongue in cheek' [...etc...]

For those of you who don't get out much, Jyrki Kuoppala is one of the
most hardcore fanatical libertarians on the net.  For him to post a
SERIOUS bigoted racist etc tirade would require nothing less than a
complete brain transplant.

If you'll read his article again, you'll notice (I hope) that he's
merely parroting the excuses our government uses to rationalize their
increasing stranglehold on our personal lives.  THEY are the bigoted
racist etc pigs you should be angry at.

Get a clue, folks.

thx
gak

---
Richard Stueven       AHA# 22584 |----------| He has erected a multitude of new
Internet:            gak@wrs.com |----GO----| offices, and sent hither swarms
ATTMAIL: ...!attmail!gakhaus!gak |---SHARX--| of officers to harass our people,
Cow Palace:            107/H/3-4 |----------| and eat out their substance.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.folklore.urban,alt.politics.usa.constitution
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: U.S. Constitution
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 12:17:45 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <WCS.92Nov4184054@rainier.ATT.COM>, wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes:
> There's been one Amendment since then, restricting Congress's ability
> to raise its own pay.  Originally proposed in the early 1800s,
> and not having a time limit for its adoption, it was finally approved
> by 3/4 of the states a few months ago.

Yes, and I think it's going to make for an interesting Supreme Court case.
I seem to recall an earlier court ruling that ratifications be ``substantially
contemporaneous'', which sure doesn't apply here.  And a lawsuit has been
filed under that amendment, charging that a recent Congressional pay
raise violates it.
From: silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: A new encryption problem?
Date: 6 Nov 1992 02:38:10 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Mt. View, Ca.
NNTP-Posting-Host: orfeo

 PROBLEM:
    create a secure encryption algorithm which has the following
    characteristics:

    Let 'p' be the plain text.
    Let 'E' be the encryption transformation.
	Let 'c' be the cipher text.

    Require: (for-all p)( (c=E(p)) is a text which appears to be
                                   a plaintext)

    That is, the ciphertext does not appear to be a cipher text.

    Also, there are no auxillary indices or auxillary data of any kind.

    (not being a cryptologist, i'm sure this is not a new problem,
     i just haven't heard of such a tool as the 'E' i'm speculating 
    about here)

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.conspiracy
From: burke@Turing.ORG (John R. Burke)
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon on Registered Keys
Organization: University of Virginia
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 04:07:57 GMT

 
Followup-To: 
Distribution: 
Organization: The Turing Project, Charlottesville Virginia.
Keywords: 

I take offense to your article. I love my country, I pay may taxes, and yes
I am a gun owner.. not all gun owners are rednecks or anarchists.
But I do defend your right to make stupid statements.

-- 
					   	


			         John Burke

       			Never underestimate the power
			     of human stupidity.
				Lazarus Long.

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4431 comp.org.eff.talk:6834 alt.privacy:2131 talk.politics.guns:23718
From: lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org (Mr. Lyn R. Kennedy)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 7 Nov 92 07:37:08 GMT
Organization: Radio Amateur k5qwb

ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud) writes:

> From: morpheus@entropy.mcds.com (morpheus)
> >
> >I believe in being able to protect my data. (note period) ...
> >
> >Hypothetically say I have all my data encrypted with 'mega-DES ]I[' - how wi
> >an "ummm... I can't remember the key, sorry" hold up in court (assuming said
> >court had the papers they need, etc).  Would that be perjury?  Can they
> >subpeona a mental construct?  What could they legally do?  (legally as in pe
> >constitution, etc.  Not the FBI's version..)
> >
> 
> If you want to deal with lying under oath to a court, go ahead.  And would yo
> also refuse a court order to search your house?  If not, then why not?  The
> only difference between searching a house and a disk drive would seem to be
> that it's a lot easier to defend a disk drive against legal search.

You don't have to lie under oath if they are prosecuting you. You can 
refuse to take the stand as a witness against yourself. You can't 
refuse a court ordered search but you can refuse to help.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 
73,            internet     | lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org
Lyn Kennedy    packet radio | K5QWB @ N5LDD.#NTX.TX.US.NA
               pony express | P.O. Box 5133, Ovilla, TX, USA 75154

-------------- "We have met the enemy and he is us."  Pogo --------------
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4717 alt.privacy:2235 comp.org.eff.talk:6998
From: jfarrell@cloudbase (Jerry Farrell)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 13 Nov 1992 08:45:45 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems Inc., Mountain View, CA
NNTP-Posting-Host: cloudbase
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

In article <1992Nov11.195934.14474@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David
Sternlight) suggests that an appropriate response (to a hypothesized
attempt to discourage use of public-key cryptography) might be to enlist
litigious allies such as the ACLU, in the hope that the responsible
agencies would shy away from a court decision which might rule out some of
their current activities.  Perhaps.  Certainly, having allies like the
ACLU, CPSR, and EFF should be useful.  But, given the current makeup of the
Supreme Court, I would much prefer to fight the battle on an earlier front
-- if we can prevail (whatever that means) in Congress, we don't have to
worry about what Justices O'Connor and Souter are thinking today.

jf
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cbarkley@alex (The DarkMage)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Computer Science, Trinity University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 09:21:41 GMT

I think that this whole business of making unregistered keys illegal is
somewhat foolish.  I would regard governmental restriction on the use of
cryptography (including making it useless by requiring keys to be divulged)
as intolerable.  However, a court can simply demand access to either keys
or plaintext the same way it demands any other information.  Refusal to
comply with the demand constitutes contempt of court.  If you think that
the court's demand was unjustified, appeal it.  I don't believe a new
policy is required in order to deal with our hypothetical child molester.


-- 
Christopher Barkley
The DarkMage
cbarkley@tusol.cs.trinity.edu
Reality is a State of Mind
From: nevries@accucx.cc.ruu.nl (Nico E de Vries)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Double MD5 security.
Date: 7 Nov 92 16:38:45 GMT
Organization: Academic Computer Centre Utrecht

If I remember correctly a while ago there was an article about a
prove MD5 can (in theory) been broken but a double aplication
can be proven to be unbreakable.

I have two questions, first is who knows more about this subject,
second is whet exactly does double use mean. Does in mean
callinf the MD5TRANS function twice with the same block of
64 bytes?

I need this information for an archiver I am working on. I use the
MD5 for authenticy verification and for encryption.

Nico E. de Vries  (nevries@cc.ruu.nl) |------------------*   AA   III  PPP
_ This text is supplied AS IS, no warranties of any kind |  A  A   I   P  P
| apply. No rights can be derived from this text. This   |  AAAA   I   PPP
| text is likely to contain spelling and grammar errors. |  A  A   I   P
*---------------------------( Donate to GreenPeace! )----*  A  A  III  P

"The IBM PC is still waiting for a version of the CP/M OS.", G.M. Vose, 1982.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:27:19 GMT


 In <1992Nov11.163215.29116@news.eng.convex.com> gardner@convex.com
 (Steve Gardner) writes:


>        I don't have to defend cryptography to anyone.

   Not now, no.  Someday it may be too late to try.


>The point
>        isn't that they won't outlaw cryptography but that it won't
>        do any good for what they think they are trying to do.

 The point is that such a law could put you in jail if you cross it.
 Any view that such a law would not be good for society must be
 *made*, and not just *assumed*.


>        The problem here is that people are assuming that the law
>        enforcement types know something about computers.  NOTHING
>        could be further from the truth.  My 10 year old daughter
>        knows more about computers than the D.A.

 Long ago, and far away, a guy I knew in high school had the same
 idea.  He was selling dope out of his house and "dating" the
 underage daughter of a local muckety-muck when she got off school
 every day.  He said, "What can her old man do about it?"  He said,
 "The police couldn't find their a__."  The last I heard, he was a
 "three time loser" doing hard time in the state pen.

 Betting your future on the incompetence of authority is a fool's
 bet.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: lcmyu@crypto2.uwaterloo.ca (Luis Ola Toshio Chi-Ming)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: University of Waterloo
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 06:50:52 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.181433.12025@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>gilchr@ee.ualberta.ca (Andrew Gilchrist) writes:
>joke. No need for you to contemplate "a lot of funding" -- you can
>just go out and buy the equipment any time you like. AT&T is the only
>vendor I know of that packages this all with a cellular transmitter,
>but you can buy similar phones from Cylink, Motorola and other
>vendors. And this is just the list of DOMESTIC manufacturers of such
>things -- doubtless there are folks outside the country that make
>them, too.
>
>Its all really easy. CELP compression can be done with cheap DSPs --
>you can buy the code if you don't feel like writing it yourself. The
>encryption can be done an order of magnitude faster than you need even
>on conventional processors.  V.32bis modem modules are a dime a dozen.
>You don't need to be AT&T to do this -- any talented EE with a few
>weeks of work could put a system to do this together.

Can someone tell me how these digitally encrypted phones provide
reasonable security in light of the following problem.  Phones lines
can tolerate raw data rates of 9.6 kbps whereas voice requires 
64 kbps.  Let's say the CELP compression reduces the voice
requirement down to 9.6 kbps (voice becomes noticibly choppy thereafter).
Where do they allocate the bandwidth needed for sycronization and error
correction.  Assuming the phone uses a strong block cipher such as DES
in code book mode (stream ciphers would have error propogation problems)
this would imply blocks of duration 6 seconds.  An uncorrected channal bit
error would result in white noise for 6 seconds.  Voice is redudant but
NOT that redudant.  From this discussion, either you increase the signalling
bandwidth through use of multiple phone lines or ISDN, or you improve
compression technology or you use a weaker cipher.  Perhaps someone can
post the specs for one of these digital encryption phones which I've
never come across.

%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%
| Luis Toshio Yu                | "Now, if only I have something clever to  |
% lcmyu@crypto2@uwaterloo.ca      % say about that..." :-)                  %
% Electrical Engineering          % Opinions expressed here are mine, so    %
| University of Waterloo, Ontario | credit me for your happiness.           |
%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%=%

From: ericb@hplsla.hp.com (Eric Backus)
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1992 17:17:52 GMT
Subject: Re: Simple hardware RNG
Organization: HP Lake Stevens, WA
Newsgroups: sci.crypt

rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes:
> ericb@hplsla.hp.com (Eric Backus) writes: 
> > Fundamentally, I think this idea works.  I have built a zener-diode
> > noise source similar to this, that I then xor'ed into a hardware
> > feedback-shift-register PRN generator.  The noise coming out of this
> > appears to be quite random.
> 
> You have to be a bit careful here. The bitstream from the feedback shift
> register will look random even if there is not a lot of noise coming out
> of the zener, or if the entropy of the noise source is being killed by a
> circuit resonance somewhere.
>
> Ross Anderson

Agreed.  The analog noise source must first be verified before hooking
it to the digital noise source.  One thing to verify is that the
high-frequency cutoff (whether due to an explicit filter or due to
bandwidth limit of your op-amp) is much higher than the frequency at
which you will sample the noise source.  Another thing to verify is
that the frequency spectrum of the noise output doesn't contain any
suspicious peaks, especially at frequencies related to the frequency
at which you will sample the noise source.
----------
					Eric Backus
					ericb@hplsla.hp.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Ottawa
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 92 21:30:13 GMT

In article <1dm50cINNcse@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>In article <1992Nov7.142220.1683@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
>>I'd like to suggest another possibility, which for want of a
>>better name I'll call the "copper balloon".  It's quite clear that key 
>>registration goes over like a "lead balloon".  My question is: is this 
>>any better?  worse?  I would also like to suggest that we keep this
>>thread focused on this proposal and not on the merits/demerits of
>>wiretapping in general.
>
>One way to separate this conversation from privacy in general is to view
>the copper balloon as a proposal for a nationwide, encrypted voice and data
>service.  In this plan, the phone companies would provide encrypting wired
>phones, cellular phones and modems using the 3-way DH key exchange which
>Dorothy proposes.  These phones (due to volume production) would be cheap
>enough that all business and many personal phones would use encryption.
>The encryption, meanwhile, would be high quality: 1000+ bit DH, 3-fold
>DES-CBC (with a full 360 bits of key).
>
>This has the advantage of cutting down on industrial espionage.
>
>This undercuts companies like Cylink or Racal-Guardata -- doesn't put them
>out of business because you would need their current products to provide
>privacy even from the Gov't -- but you would presumably take away from them
>the business of people who just want to avoid non-gov't espionage.
>
>
>So:  what if the entire national communications infrastructure were
>well encrypted?  People could add their own encryption, of course,
                                                         ^^^^^^^^^^ (+)
>but most wouldn't.  Most are lazy or don't see the need.

Having a system of this sort would probably be acceptable to people,
with the IMPORTANT caveat that people ARE permitted to add their own
encryption.

That "of course" that you put in there (+) is a VERY important one;
those that want private communications legislated out of private hands
rephrase it "of course NOT."

There are a couple of little problems with the system:

- While it may eliminate problems of industrial espionage and the
likes, it doesn't eliminate governmental espionage.  This is pretty
much a given, and IF extra encryption may be added, the "problem"
probably CAN get eliminated.

- People may trust it too much.  It DOES have a big weakness in that
government CAN break it.
-- 
Christopher Browne                |     PGP 2.0 key available
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca           |===================================
University of Ottawa              |  The Personal Computer:  Colt 45
Master of System Science Program  |  of the Information Frontier
From: se_schn@pavo.concordia.ca [ Ranfry ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Cryptology and criminals
Keywords: Cryptology, Crime
Date: 12 Nov 92 05:02:00 GMT
Article-I.D.: newsflas.BxL7DM.7n
Organization: Concordia University, Montreal, Canada

A lot of talk as been heard about banning cryptography because
crimminals can use it to hide their business.  Okay, I can see
the logic behind this.  So, in the same spirit I propose the 
following messures to hamper criminals.
Organization: Concordia University
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    

1) Ban the use of cars and other private transportation systems.
   Tis a proven fact that many criminals use private transportation
   in order to do their unlawful activities.  Without these
   private means, many criminal activity will be stopped.

2) Ban private housing.  Have everyone live in communal dwellings.
   If criminals don't have private places to hide and keep
   their equimpment and stash, well they won't be able to do much.

3) Ban cloathing.  Who can hide a weapon if clothes are not worn?

4) Ban .....Arrrghhh.  I think you get the point.  Tis stupid to 
ban something solely because some criminal activity will be
enhanced.  You people seem to think that crimminals will actually
stop using crytography?  Get real.  There are plenty of systems 
around that cannot be broken, as long as the keys and algorythms
are kept secret.  Lots of groups, both legal and unlawful, have
used these for centuries.  If you really think these laws will
make any difference you need a reality check.

As someone pointed out, the only people that will be affected are
those who obey all laws.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date:  6 Nov 92 15:22:01 GMT

From: morpheus@entropy.mcds.com (morpheus)
>ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud) writes:
>
>> I believe in being able to protect my data, until I am presented with a court
>> order to allow it to be searched.
>
>I believe in being able to protect my data. (note period) ...
>
>Hypothetically say I have all my data encrypted with 'mega-DES ]I[' - how will
>an "ummm... I can't remember the key, sorry" hold up in court (assuming said
>court had the papers they need, etc).  Would that be perjury?  Can they
>subpeona a mental construct?  What could they legally do?  (legally as in per
>constitution, etc.  Not the FBI's version..)
>

If you want to deal with lying under oath to a court, go ahead.  And would you
also refuse a court order to search your house?  If not, then why not?  The
only difference between searching a house and a disk drive would seem to be
that it's a lot easier to defend a disk drive against legal search.

 - Ron Sharp.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt