From: sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: Spoken Like a True ProLifer
Date: 5 Jan 93 21:17:03 GMT
Organization: University of Arizona UNIX Users Group

From article <1icfejINNsnv@meaddata.meaddata.com>,
by johnt@meaddata.com (John Townsend):

> |> = Robert S. Parker

[deletia]

> |> I have to smile, that was very cute.  Unfortunately, it fails
> |> because the unborn (especially those that are at a point in
> |> development where abortions are not uncommon) are *not* "people".
> |> You see, I am a person; Mark Cochran is a person; you are a person.
> |> How can you tell?  Because we are having this silly argument,
> |> that's how.  Only people are capable of such things.  Non-
> |> people are not.  The unborn are not capable of anything even close
> |> to an argument, or any other conversation or meaningful
> |> communication, and thus are not people.

Our participation in this silly argument argues against our possession
of any sort of self-restraint, and perhaps calls into question our
intelligence, while at least pointing to the fact that we have far
too much time on our hands.  I'm not sure I agree that it establishes
our personhood.

Rob, I know you have formulated a more sophisticated theory of
personhood than what you've outlined above.  Nevertheless, I
must ask you just how sure you are that "the unborn are not capable
of ... meaningful communication."  While we can be reasonably sure
they aren't able to participate in arguments or conversations,
how can you know that they are incapable of "meaningful communication"?
What, after all, is meaningful communication?
More importantly, do these criteria distinguish the unborn from
the just-born?  Our 7-week-old son Joseph is quite a noisemaker
but seems largely incapable of "meaningful communication".  How
must I amend your statement above so that Joseph can be recognized
as a person?  It seems that we must either 1) exclude Joseph due
to his inability to communicate meaningfully, or 2) include any
unborn child who may possess the same crude communication
capability as Joseph (i.e., the ability to detectably respond to
a situation).


> |> The unborn are not capable of deciding for themselves as they can
> |> not even comprehend what is taking place.

What on earth has this got to do with personhood?  See the important
objections raised below by Townsend.

> Talk about failing logic.  If a man kills his wife while she is asleep,
> is he not guilty of murder because she was not able to debate the
> issue with him?  If I kill a Frenchman, am I not guilty of murder
> because he couldn't speak English to meaningfully communicate with me?
> If a person were comatose, and the doctor knew for certain that she
> would revive in nine months, would it not be unethical to disconnect
> her from the respirator, regardless of the expense or
> whether her family wanted her or not?  I submit to you that an X week
> old fetus is capable of reacting negatively to painful stimuli, and is
> thus capable of communication regarding it.

I submit further that any doctrine of personhood that is based on what
a potential person can and cannot do must also deal with the inherent
reversibility of personhood as they define it.  Can we deal with
people falling into and out of personhood?  Death is a reasonable end
to personhood.  Can we accept others?  Are we really prepared to live
with the logical consequences?

> And since when do only
> people's lives deserve respect?  If I run a live cat through a wood
> chipper, I'm breaking the law against cruelty to animals.

How about if you anesthetize it first?


--

Steve Matheson   Program in Neuroscience   University of Arizona
sfm@neurobio.arizona.edu
Newsgroups: talk.abortion