From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Rational Debate, Axioms, and Arguments
Date: 8 Jan 93 12:25:10 GMT
	<1993Jan7.181518.4285@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista

In article <1993Jan7.181518.4285@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> dcosley@magnus.
acs.ohio-state.edu (Daniel R Cosley) writes:

   >As far as producing a little lemma, Rand talks about the primary ethical
   >responsibility of living beings.  Basically her argument is:

  You give a good example of the kind of reasoning one may expect to
find in Rand's writings. Now the first thing to note is that the
arguments are not logically valid in any strict sense - as in
predicate logic or geometry. But of course it is only in the fevered
imagination of the hard-core believers that any similarity is to be
expected between Rand's arguments - or indeed philosophical arguments
in general - and logically valid arguments in any strict sense. We can
still consider the arguments from a logical point of view, that is to
say, ask ourselves to what extent the conclusion is supported by, or
follows informally from the premisses, or follows from the premisses
together with other assumptions that may reasonably be assumed to be
implicit.

  The first argument in the suggested lemma is

    1) Living things exist
    2) Continued existence requires a certain course of action
    ----
    3) Living requires a certain course of action

  In asking ourselves whether 3 follows from 1 and 2 (in the sense
suggested above) we are at once confronted with a number of
ambiguities and uncertainties. What is meant by saying that living
requires a certain course of action? At a guess, it means that for any
entity X, if X is to live (continue living), X must pursue a certain
course of action. Or possibly there should be some restriction on the
range of X (e.g. including people but excluding bacteria). But there
is a further ambiguity, in that the scope of "a certain course of
action" is not clear. 3 might mean that there is a course of action
that all X must pursue in order to live, or it might mean that for
each X there is a course of action that X must pursue in order to
live. Keeping this ambiguity in mind and looking at the two premisses,
2 might be interpreted similarly, as meaning that for any entity X
(possibly with restrictions), if X is to continue existing, then X
must pursue a certain range of action, with the same possibilities
regarding the scope of "a certain course". Premiss 1 confronts us with
the problem of what is meant here by using "exist" as a predicate. Is
it presupposed in 1 that only living things exist, or is it a predicate
applicable also to (actual) stones and sticks? There seems no way of
resolving these ambiguities merely on the basis of the formulation of the
argument, but at least we can come up with some interpretations that make
the argument a valid one (in an informal sense). For example


     1) For any X, if X lives then X exists.
     2) For any X, if X exists there is a course of action Y such that if X
        is to continue existing, then X must pursue the course of action Y.
     ____
     3) For any X, if X lives then there is a course of action Y such that
       if X is to continue existing, then X must pursue the course of action Y.

Now to say that the argument is valid on this interpretation is of course only
to say that the conclusion follows from the premisses. Whether the premisses
are true, or make sense, is a different question.

  Although the ambiguities and uncertainties can't be resolved on the basis
of 1)-3) alone, we may perhaps expect some clarification to result from the
continuation of the argument:

    4) In order to have any values at all, a living thing must first continue
    to live
    ----
    5a) The primary value of a living thing is its life
    5b) A living being's primary value should be (must be, is?) to follow the
       course of action required to maintain its life.
    5c) A person's primary value should be to preserve his life.

Here I have included the three different conclusions suggested. At this point
it becomes very difficult to interpret the argument so as to make it a valid
one, whichever conclusion is chosen. Clearly something is assumed concerning
the concept "primary value", but what? In fact looking at the argument I
don't see any point in speculating on possible interpretations, since the
gap between the premisses and the conclusion(s) is just too wide.

  Now there is nothing in this that is peculiar to Rand's arguments.
Philosophical arguments, whether in fifth-rate philosophy or
first-rate philosophy, are always very difficult, very slippery things.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism