From: beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver)
Subject: Re: Does Nyikos Hold that Abortion is Murder?
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 17:35:14 GMT

In article <1992Sep25.204458.15934@wdl.loral.com> bard@cutter.ssd.loral.com writes:
>beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver) writes:
># drieux@wetware.com (drieux, just drieux) writes:
># >Also, as you will note, we are back to the Point
># >of resolving why Person A should be allowed to
># >Murder Person B for the actions of Person C toward Person A.
># >
># >That is the case of allowing abortion in the case of
># >rape or incest.
># 
>  [ ...]
># 
># >Do you hold the proposition 'Abortion is Murder' to be
># >an intelligible proposition that can be exported into
># >Law in a consistent and meaningful Manner?
># 
># I don't know about Peter Nyikos, but I believe the proposition can
># be "exported into Law" in a consistent and meaningful manner.
># Rape/incest/unhealth changes the balance of rights between woman 
># and fetus, permitting her to remove the fetus from her body.
>
>I'd say it would hinge on, among other things, why and more
>importantly *how* rape/incest/`unhealth' changes the `balance of
>rights' between woman and fetus.  What consistent criteria can you use
>to establish what conditions are necessary for a fetus to be deprived
>of its right to life under these increasingly hypothetical laws?

I don't see how these are +increasingly+ hypothetical.  Anyway,
let us be +very+ concrete.

THE FOLLOWING IS PRESENTED FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT.
(Do not delete this disclaimer.)

Stipulate:  A fetus is a person.

Assumption 1:  The basic rights of a person are inalienable,
insofar as they do not infringe upon the basic rights of others.

Assumption 2:  Any person may voluntarily restrict his/her
basic rights (ie. they are voluntarily "alienable").

Assumption 3:  All persons have the right to life.

Assumption 4:  All persons have the right to "bodily privacy."


Law A:  Voluntary sex shall be taken to be an implicit acceptance 
of restrictions to the right to bodily privacy, to the degree that 
the right to life of any resulting fetus shall dominate.

Law B:  Involuntary sex does not implies any acceptance of a 
restriction of rights.

Law C:  A woman who carries a pregnancy to the third trimester shall
have voluntarily accepted a restriction to her right to bodily privacy 
as in Law A (in particular, regardless of rape/incest).

Law D:  A woman's basic right to life exceeds the right to life 
(support) of a fetus.

Law E:  A woman's basic right to bodily privacy exceeds the right to life
(support) of a fetus.

Law F:  The taking of the life of a fetus shall be illegal, except 
where the rights of the woman exceed the right-to-life of the fetus.


Criterion for establishing necessary conditions:
------------------------------------------------

  Does the fetus' right to life exceed the sum of the woman's rights to 
  bodily privacy and to life?


Criteria for making decision:
-----------------------------

a. Woman's life-threatened?                [woman-life always dominates]
     Yes --> abortion legal.
     No  --> consider criteria below.

b. Rape/Incest?                            [woman-privacy voluntarily reduced?]
     No  --> abortion illegal.
     Yes --> consider criterion below.

c. Third Trimester?                        [woman-privacy voluntarily reduced?]
     Yes --> abortion illegal.
     No  --> abortion legal.


WHETHER THESE *SHOULD* BE LAW IS A SEPARATE QUESTION.
(And I won't argue it.)

Another separate question, which I would discuss:  this scenario 
is one of the few that are consistent with enforcing child-support 
obligations on (unmarried) men.

Don
-- 
beaver@cs.psu.edu                       Opinions from the PC-challenged
Newsgroups: talk.abortion,alt.abortion.inequity