From: cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok)
Subject: Re: Taxation as Theft (was Re: Negative Income Tax)
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 03:35:25 GMT

In article <93011.130109SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> John G. Spragge <SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> writes:
>Obviously, we can't find out where we disagree about property until we
>understand each other's a definition of property. I will include mine,
>and I would like to see yours.
>
>Property, noun, 1) a relationship between people and material items,
>regulated by a system of law and custom, 2) the material that forms
>a part of this relationship.
>
>As I have said in other posts, I agree that some relationship to the
>material world constitutes a necessity of life, but I don't accept that
>the current "system of law and custom" represents the only arrangement
>compatible with "human life" (as either I or objectivists would define
>that expression).

i think the only difference we have is how the relationship between
people and material items is defined. i still don't see the essential
point you are trying to make. i apologize (no sarcasm intended here).

>>however, its irrelevant where the property comes from. it only
>>matters what is and what is not considered a legal form of obtaining
>>ownership. by your definition we have no rights to our own bodies
>>either, and therefore no moral reason to object to slavery. after all,
>>we didn't "make" our bodies, or our minds for that matter.
>
>Well, we do "make" ourselves to some extent; I consider myself (flawed
>as I am) at least partly a product of my own moral choices.

true; though you will admit that that comment in no way reduces
the validity of my point above. this is a problem with your definition of 
property, is it not? do you own your body or not?

>>the concept of ownership based on effort is used to explain one
>>reasonable method of obtaining ownership. gift might be another,
>>or inheritance, and perhaps theft and extortion are considered
>>not reasonable. no doubt you will have a problem with the use of
>>the word reasonable. fine--next round. but "where it comes from"
>>makes no difference unless you want to abolish the concept of
>>ownership altogether. is that what you are getting at?
>
>But you link property to life through the concept of effort. Take the
>fruits of my work, and you take the part of my life that that work
>represented. You can extend that to gifts and to trade; I have, after
>all, the right to dispose of the fruits of my work (my life) as I
>wish. Inheritance constitutes a more problematic case.
>
>But you can't claim to "own" the sun, the wind, the air, the patent on
>the photo-synthesis reaction, or the rights to William Shakespeare's
>plays. All these form (inevitably, I would argue) a common pool of
>resources.

it depends on how you look at it. i own the air in my house. intellectual
property law is a complex subject about which i refuse to argue from a 
position of ignorance. and the sun, well, no-one owns it, but does that
mean if i generate electrical power i don't own that as well?

>Look at it this way. A farmer sows and reaps, and brings in a crop.
>That crop exists partly because of the farmer's effort, and you I
>do not question the moral right of the farmer to profit from the
>work involved. But the crop also exists because of a multitude of
>factors which the farmer did not create: farmers do not, after all,
>create crops from nothing. And many of the raw materials (such as
>the sun and the air) they use "belong" to nobody.

i see your point, but i don't think it makes any difference. i look at
it this way: ignore all the factors that are common to all humans,
and all natural factors, because only humans can own property. now,
examine the situation and say "of all the humans involved, who
is responsible for the production of the item? that person should
own it". all persons who are involved should either own it or
be compensated in some way.

in your example above, the crop exists because of a multitude of
factors which the farmer did not create; true enough. but the essential
question is: without whom would the crops not have been created? the answer
is the farmer. the crops would have been created fine if *i* ceased to
exist; and i have the same access to all the resources the farmer does.
but the farmer is the one who did the work. somewhat simplistic, but
OK for a preliminary explanation. does that make any sense at all?

>>>And there we see the flaw in your definition of "individualism". I
>>>consider the obligations I have to others a fundamental part of my
>>>individuality.
>>
>>why do you have these obligations? who imposed them? how are they
>>justified?
>
>God imposed them. That's my short answer. If you don't believe in
>God, well, God still believes in you.

well, i may or may not. or i may believe in a different one. i don't
want to broach the subject personally.

>But I can argue for the sense of obligation without proving the existence
>of a deity. Consider this: the sum of my property includes many (in fact
>most) things I did not create and have little control over. I acquired
>these things partly through my own effort, partly through the effort of
>others (as gifts or commerce), but largely through the operation of nature.
>I can't justify my "ownership" of the part of my property the represent as
>a consequence of my effort. I therefore believe that if I use resources I
>did not (by my own effort) create, I have an obligation to share them.
>I understand this in a Christian sense: God made the universe and me, and
>God's Law demands I not neglect the poor and helpless. But I can justify
>this attitude without referring to my religious faith. I accept that we
>own the products of our efforts. I assert an obligation to share that
>which we have that does not stem from our efforts.

OK, now we are getting somewhere.
i think i understand what you are getting at. and i can respect your
position. i just don't agree with it. and as i have said in other
posts, arguing against God is pointless.

>>first, you are justifying your position by likening it to
>>something about which i have never commented, as if i had. for all you
>>know, i don't support copyright law.
>
>Copyright law forms the basis for an existing type of property; in
>fact, (Canadian) copyright law justifies its property claims in
>exactly the same form that you do:

does the law form the property or simply acknowledge it?
i see your point but not the implied causality.

>Canada defines copyright as "a right
>inherent in creation".

this is just a politician's opinion--i don't think it matters much
to this discussion.

>But copyright expires fifty years after the death of the author, which
>means that the work enters the public domain (read: social property).

another politician's whim. surely you can see that. the "magic number"
is a dead give-away.

>If you don't support this interesting arrangement (why should books
>revert to the public domain fifty years after their creation? Houses
>and factories certainly don't), then you don't completely agree with
>the notion of property as we currently define it. In which case, going
>back to the start of this discussion, how do you define property?

that's quite circular. i already admitted that i don't agree with
the current definition of property. in a communist country, there
is no right to property. does that mean property does not exist
in those countries? well, in a way, yes. but in another way, no --
the property exists, but the state confiscates it, based on a 
bogus definition of property they invented to justify the act.

>>if you are claiming that no-one has the right to any property, which
>>you seem to be doing, the best you can do is argue that no-one has
>>the right to define it, not that the government should because no-one
>>else would be better.
>
>Nope. Even if we recognise property as a right, we still have to decide
>what we can (and can not) consider property (human beings no, ideas yes),
>exactly what rights attach to property, what sanctions we intend to
>impose for violating these rights, and so on. Even objectivists accept
>that governments may legitimately express and enforce these decisions.
>By doing so (with laws against burglary, trespass, etc.), governments
>do shape, and to that extent define, property. And since nobody else
>can legitimately use the kind of force that governments do, only
>governments can define property in that sense.

i have had recommended to me the book "The Enterprise of Law" by Bruce
Benson which describes a paradigm of anarcho-capitalism which may
show otherwise. i haven't read it yet myself. but i just found myself
on the other end of a (well-argued) discussion where some others
were suggesting that even less government than objectivists would
like may be possible. check it out.

--
charles
Xref: sparky soc.culture.canada:9768 can.politics:11198