From: pshyvers@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Peter Shyvers)
Subject: Re: The Luftwaffe
Organization: Pyramid Technology Corp., Mountain View, CA
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 13:23:40 GMT


From pshyvers@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Peter Shyvers)


In article <BuDF4v.Ftu@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> dasher!patter@uunet.UU.NET (24224-guthrie) writes:
>
>From dasher!patter@uunet.UU.NET (24224-guthrie)
>
>In article <BuBLLn.GC1@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Mark Miller <msmiller@ctbu.rational.com> writes:
>
>>It would not, however, have changed the outcome of the war. Only the
>>amount of time it took.
>
>This is *highly* debateable*. There is considerable evidence to indicate
>that Germany would have had the atomic bomb several months before the
>U.S. did, were it not for resources diverted to the Luftwaffe for use
>against the bombers. Imagine an a-bomb on a V-2 for a couple of seconds.

If we're going to postulate this, then we might as well throw in the
British and US experiments on jets, AND speculate that the US lead in
A-weapons would have borne fruit earlier, and *then* where would the
Luftwaffe have been?

Even if the Me262 had been deployed earlier, it's likely that der Fuehrer
would have (still) insisted on equipping them as Jabos - which in fact
*did* delay the Me262 as an interceptor - and pouring them into the
Russian front...

And remember that there's some opinion out there that claims the daylight
industrial bombing did squat to reduce Germany's output; the most-often
cited evidence is the virtually constant increase in industrial output.
(Yes, that begs the questions as to reliability of stats, and what the
output *woulda* been without bombing.)

The Germans' *real* Achilles heel was always petroleum, and the Russian
ground troops slowly retook oil fields. Remember one of the key reasons
for the Stalingrad campaign was to reach the Baku fields. Given this,
one would imagine Hitler being even more insistent in using the Me262
as ground support. (After all, the Ju87 was getting a little dated!)
 
>The most likely scenario is that Britain would have surrendered in late
>1945. Since plans were also on the drawing board at Dornier for a "New
>York" bomber, the U.S. would probably have been accessible by 1947.
>

Porsche also had plans and a prototype for a 200-ton tank, the "Maus";
it was a hog in a wallow. Like the Elefant before it, it could take
terrific punishment but necessary supporting infantry couldn't follow
it. It would've gotten walloped by sappers and guys with satchel charges.

Just 'cause there's a design on the board doesn't say it's going to work.
Remember the "Beethoven", or was it "Mistral" - a warhead-laden JU88 with
a monoplane strapped on via a derrick on the topside of the JU88?  The
fighter pilot was supposed to fly the thing to hardened targets and then
disconnect - and orbit until he radio-guided it to the target? Stunning
unsuccess...

>In addition to this, Eisenhower regarded the bombing campaign as a means
>to eliminate the Luftwaffe as a threat to his forces on D-Day. The entire
>series of raids known as the "Big Week" was designed to ground the German
>fighters (at least temporarily). Without the daylight bombing raids in this
>period, D-Day would not have occurred - ever.
>
I think you missed an important point - railways were pounded as well.
Planes can deny airspace, but infantry (and tanks) deny beaches. The
point of Big Week was to limit the shifting and resupply of Wehrmacht troops
in the area by destroying the rail lines and marshalling yards.



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