HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu (Andrew Wing)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Date: 12 Jan 93 18:34:24 GMT
Organization: Temple University
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]


	Some thoughts on Joe Hooker:

1) Didn't he explain to Lincoln that "Joe Hooker simply lost track of what
Joe Hooker was doing" after Chancellorsville?

2) Grant in his memoirs called his assault on Lookout Mountain "brilliant"
but regarded Hooker as a dangerous vain person.

3) Cville wasn't the first time he was wounded.  Antietam was, so I don't
think he was as unnverved as he was disoriented.  Head wounds can do very
strange things to people, especially those with the burden of commanding
over 100,000 men in battle.

--
v2002a@vm.temple.edu     (preferred)
v2002a%templevm.bitnet@pucc.princeton.edu
agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu    (last resort)

Any disclaimer issued by me is subject to change without notice
From: tonyz@hpwrce.mayfield.hp.com (Tony Zugates)
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 00:21:48 GMT
Subject: Maj Sullivan Ballou 2nd Rhode Is Volunteers
Organization: the HP Mtn.View Resp. Cntr.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa

I have a copy of the words to Maj. Ballou's letter home
if it is not archived.  This is the eloquent piece of writing
featured in Ken Burn's Civil War.

I understand that it was very popular after the PBS special
and even read at weddings, etc.
From: jshaw@ua.d.umn.edu (Jeff Shaw)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: relatives
Date: 11 Jan 1993 18:32:49 -0600
Organization: University of Minnesota, Duluth
NNTP-Posting-Host: ua.d.umn.edu

>

Does anyone know anything about Brevet Major-General John C. Robinson?
I was at Gettysburg around New Years and found a statue of him.  I have
reason to believe that he may be an ancestor of mine.  He was in command of
the Second Division of the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac.  Any help
would be greatly appreciated.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: pdunn@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Patrick L Dunn)
Subject: Re: An answer, maybe (was: hooker)
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 07:23:38 GMT

In article <009664DC.E0A6AA00@OCTAVO> jthoppers@OCTAVO writes:
>This is all in the nature of hearsay...
>The women of dubious virtue who frequented Hooker's headquarters were
>originally referred to as "Hooker's girls". Also, at least on of the
>streets of Washington, D.C. was referred to as "Hooker's Division"
>(a play on the word, diversion?), due to the number of houses of
>ill fame. I have absolutely no documentation for this, but it does
>make for unique rumor.
>James T. Hoppers
>JTHoppers@OCTAVO.ucdavis.edu

I had heard before that the term "hooker" for use in reference to a prostitute 
predated the Civil War.  I looked for several days for the reference that 
backed this up....finally found it.

A footnote (yes, a freaking footnote--no wonder I couldn't find it) on page 156
of Gene Smith's excellent dual biography "Lee and Grant" states:

"Many people believe that the general lent his name to a term descriptive of a
certain type of woman, but the usage predates Hooker's rise to eminence."

However, there is still the use of the term "hooker" in reference to a large
drink of liquor, sans ice.  Does this come from good old Fighting Joe's name?

PDunn
From: turrell@violet.berkeley.edu (David Turrell)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: "Lincoln" TV special
Date: 7 Jan 1993 08:52:51 GMT
Organization: Cobol Pacific University
NNTP-Posting-Host: violet.berkeley.edu

In article <1i8q0aINNbjn@moe.ksu.ksu.edu>, 4 Jan 1993 07:46:18 GMT,
jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders) writes:

>Some of the changes were ... to make the text conform to what
>Lincoln said.  But at least one and perhaps two changes differ from
>the press reports.  The certain one is a "here" which the press accounts
>all agree he said, but which he apparently edited out of "official" copies.
>If memory serves the "here" appears in the line:
>  that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
>  cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion
>                       ^^^^

The text of the address in "An American Primer" (Daniel J. Boorstin,
editor), edited and with commentary by Allan Nevins, is 'quoted ...
from the "final" or Bliss copy', and it reads "which they here gave".
On the other hand, the text in my copy of the Encylopaedia Britannica,
which is also "from the final manuscript copy", reads "which they
gave"; and, except for differences in punctuation, that is the only
difference from Nevins' text. All other copies I checked agreed with
the EB text.

I don't think Nevins would have inserted the extra "here" without
noting the departure from Lincoln's final copy, but I can hardly
believe that the other sources all erred on the same point. Looking at
facsimiles of the five manuscript versions of the address might be of
some help at this point.

-David
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: zursch@whizkid.wpd.sgi.com (Jeffrey B. Zurschmeide)
Subject: Re: "Lincoln" TV special
Reply-To: zursch@whizkid.wpd.sgi.com (Jeffrey B. Zurschmeide)
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 19:02:33 GMT


I had to memorize the G.A. in the fifth grade......about 1975 or so. 

JZ
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes)
Subject: Re: More on Meade at G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 16:26:40 GMT


Remember also:

Armies are very slow things to get into motion after successful battles.
The units are dispersed, ammunition and supplies are depleted and the
men have usually been without sleep for two or three days. Also, it
takes some time to ascertain that the enemy is in retreat and the
pursuing army generally "feels out" the enemy positions very slowly, to
avoid being ambushed.
	The AotP had just been through the bloodiest battle of the
entire war and had taken anywhere from 15-25% casualties! Some regiments
took upwards of 60% percent casualties! Generally anything over 30%
casualties is enough to destroy a unit as a fighting force for some
time.  After a "disaster" of that magnitude, the survivors will want to
rest, regroup and recover. Also, a successful army is generally very
slow in pursuit. They "feel out" and occupy enemy positions very slowly
to avoid ambush, and might not realize that the enemy is in retreat for
some time after the enemy is gone.
	Meanwhile, the ANV (which was presumably a faster moving army
since since it was smaller and had fewer cannons and wagons to slow
it down.) was doing running for friendly territory, afraid that it would
be cut off and destroyed. 
	Outflanking and cutting off an army is a very tricky thing to
manage. The only time I can think of it being done successfully is
during the Appomatox campaign, but then the Union outnumbered the
Confederacy by 5:1 in manpower alone. It also had the advantage of
superior cavalry, morale, supplies and artillery. Hardly a "fair fight".
	After Gettysburg, the US had only about a 3:1 advantage in
manpower, slightly inferior cavalry and no real advantage in supply or
morale. They also didn't know where the rebs were going (at Appomatox,
Lee only had one logical way to go) and if the rebs had any fight left
in them.
	Managing an army on the ground with pre-modern communications is
a very difficult art. Using that army to defeat another army completely
is an art that few generals ever get to practice. Meade can hardly be
faulted for "not getting Lee".

Tom.
From: jthoppers@OCTAVO
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: hooker
Date: 8 Jan 93 17:57:13 GMT
Reply-To: jthoppers@OCTAVO

This is all in the nature of hearsay...
The women of dubious virtue who frequented Hooker's headquarters were 
originally referred to as "Hooker's girls". Also, at least on of the 
streets of Washington, D.C. was referred to as "Hooker's Division" 
(a play on the word, diversion?), due to the number of houses of 
ill fame. I have absolutely no documentation for this, but it does 
make for unique rumor.
James T. Hoppers
JTHoppers@OCTAVO.ucdavis.edu
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: pholland@iastate.edu (Paul J Hollander)
Subject: Re: Sherman and LSU
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames, IA
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 18:56:01 GMT

In article <1993Jan6.165339.13402@midway.uchicago.edu> cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>In article <1993Jan6.071627.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>>In Sherman's Memoirs he claims that the Lousiana State University is 
>>a reincarnation of the military institute of which he was first president
>>(and I suppose one could say, one of the founders). My questions is whether
>>this is accepted generally, and more specifically whether this is 
>>acknowledged at LSU?
>
>I don't have access to their catalog, but the LSU entry in the World of 
>Learning gives a founding date of 1860, which is when the military institute
>was created.  So I'd say they acknowledge it.  (Schools are always trying
>to make themselves appear older and more venerable.  The date of the founding
>of the University of Michigan is given as 1817, but the predecessor school
>that was created in that year was actually a high school.)
>--Chuck

I attended LSU in the late 60s.  They acknowledge Sherman as first president
of what eventually became LSU, but they try not to mention his later military
career.  8^)

Paul Hollander    pholland@iastate.edu
Behold the tortoise: he makes no progress unless he sticks his neck out.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 19:23:53 GMT

In article <1993Jan11.162335.4459@midway.uchicago.edu> cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
>>He [Hooker] also was nearly killed by a cannonball that smashed into a
>
>In fact, the force of the blast left him looking so obviously out of it that
>many of the soldiers who saw him reported him as having been drunk on the
>day of the battle.  I think the most egregious error that can appropriately 
>be laid at his feet after the shell struck is his refusal to relinquish
>command.  On the other hand, I don't recall that anyone even suggested
>that he should do so.  Does anyone out there know the military etiquette 
>for an underling to relieve an officer under these circumstances?

I don't know if anyone suggested that he do so, but certainly many people
expected him to do so. From _Glory_Road_, by Bruce Catton:

  Hooker was taken to a tent half a mile behind the crossroads, and he sent
for General Couch. Other officers took heart when this happened. Couch was
a desperate fighter, and if Hooker turned command over to him he would
unquestionably call some of the unemployed troops into action and turn the
tables. But Hooker did not do that. He instructed Couch to take temporary
command, but only for the purposes of withdrawing the men back to a new
defensive line back behind the crossroads, covering the road to Unites
States Ford. Couch came out of the tent, disappointment visible on his face.
Meade, who had been standing by hopeful that Couch would tell him to lead
his corps forward, turned away dejected.

A footnote in the paragraph references Battles and Leaders Vol II, 169-170.
Probably the place to go for more information.

As far as etiquette goes, I believe that a properly made diagnosis by a
medical officer than an officer is unfit to command entitles a subordinate
to take over the command. However, I rather doubt that anything like this
existed in 1863, though I don't know for sure. Probably the subordinate
could only take command if it was given to him or if the officer in question
was so visibly incapacitated that there was no doubt that he was unfit to
command.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: More on G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Followup-To: alt.war.civil.usa
Date: 9 Jan 93 08:31:21 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan8.161136.18699@starbase.trincoll.edu>,  () writes:
> Meade knew that the Union (I refuse to say it was because of Meade) won an
> important victory at Gettysburg and was content with that. As Lincoln said,
> he held the enemy in the palm of his hand but refused to close it. He could

Please pardon me if I am being a bore about this, but I believe Lincoln's
"held the enemy in the palm of his hand" remark refered to the fact that 
in addition to the AotP in Gettysburg, there were something like 20,000 
Pa Militia north of Chambersburg (appearently in position to attack Lee's 
rear or harrass his retreat) under Couch over whom Meade had authority.
Meade did not wish to see what Lee's veterans would do to this body of men, 
and I suspect Couch (who was normally rather agressive, and an intelligent 
commander) probably felt the same. IMHO the linear descendents of those who 
served under Couch should thank Meade.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
retract it, but also to deny under oath that I ever said it." Tom Lehrer
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: turrell@violet.berkeley.edu (David Turrell)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: "Lincoln" TV special
Date: 4 Jan 1993 07:15:58 GMT
Organization: Cobol Pacific University
NNTP-Posting-Host: violet.berkeley.edu

In article <1i38ubINN7ap@moe.ksu.ksu.edu>, 2 Jan 1993 05:24:27 GMT,
jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders) writes:

>... [Garry] Wills' book, "Lincoln At Gettysburg". ... does a very
>thorough job in giving the story of how the address came to be given and
>how the version we are familiar with came to be written (the one we are
>familiar with is a copy Lincoln made after the event and contains some
>changes that were not in the speech as he gave it at Gettysburg).

My understanding is that the changes were made to conform with the
address as actually delivered, incorporating Lincoln's departures from
his written text. Lincoln himself had to consult press reports of the
speech to find out what he had said.

-David
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau)
Subject: Re: More on Meade at G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 16:46:16 GMT

In article <C0p70G.I8x@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
>
>Remember also:
>
>Armies are very slow things to get into motion after successful battles.
>The units are dispersed, ammunition and supplies are depleted and the
>men have usually been without sleep for two or three days. Also, it
>takes some time to ascertain that the enemy is in retreat and the
>pursuing army generally "feels out" the enemy positions very slowly, to
>avoid being ambushed.

...text deleted...

>	Meanwhile, the ANV (which was presumably a faster moving army
>since since it was smaller and had fewer cannons and wagons to slow
>it down.) was doing running for friendly territory, afraid that it would
>be cut off and destroyed. 

I agree in general with your comments about the difficulty Meade faced
in going after Lee after Gettysburg.  I am not sure I agree with the
statement immediately above.  The ANV would have been heavily encumbered
both by ambulances and by supply wagons (remember that Lee's incursion was,
after all, a massive foraging expedition).

What I have always wondered about, assuming effective followup to have
been possible, is whether Meade should have "pursued" Lee or whether he
should have attempted to interpose the AotP between the AoNV and Virginia.
This would, in theory, allowed AoNV free rein to roam the North, but would
also have increased the odds of destroying it completely.

Having said that, remember what Wellington said:

"The saddest thing in all the world to see, next to a battle lost, is a
battle won."

- Gary Charbonneau
  charbonn@silver.indiana.edu
















Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Subject: Re: AotP Division insignia.
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 19:17:57 GMT

In article <1993Jan6.180554.6195@leland.Stanford.EDU> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>I Corps: Circle
>II Corps: Club  (like the deck of cards)
>III Corps: Diamond  (Kearny's division was in this corps, as was Hooker's)
>V Corps: Iron Cross (I'm sure that's not what they called it, but that's the
>		     best description I can give: it looks exactly like one.)

This is usually described as a maltese cross.

>VI Corps: X  (like the cross on the Swiss flag, rotated 45 degrees)

It is a Greek cross, but it is not rotated, but upright.  (You have probably
seen it represented on flags whipping in the wind, which may have given the
impression that it was on its side, like a St. Andrew's cross.)  I believe 
there is a memoir entitled "Under the Sign of the Greek Cross", recounting
one officer's experiences with the Sixth Corps.

>XI Corps: Crescent moon
>XII Corps: Five-pointed star
>
>IX Corps was not attached to Hooker's army: its corps badge was a shield with
>an anchor on it.
--Chuck
-- 
D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . ."
From: tecump@tangent.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Questions relating to ACW-era artillery.
Date: 4 Jan 93 19:55:25 GMT

tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:

>In article <1993Jan3.051647.29322@cronkite.ocis.temple.edu> agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu (Andrew Wing) writes:
>>: 2) How did a lanyard work?
>>
>>	A lanyard could either trip the lock like pulling a handgun trigger
>>or activate the friction primer.  There are several good photos and diagrams
>>of locks, primers, etc in Ripleys book.
>>

>It looked like a long rope with a handle on one end, with the apparatus
>for firing the fuse on the other. It allowed the cannoneer to stand
>behind the gun, out of recoil range of the carriage. The recoil of a
>heavy gun could easily crush a man's limb.

[stuff deleted]

ah. ah. ah.  NEVER, NEVER stand BEHIND the gun.  BEHIND and off to the RIGHT 
SIDE.  this is specified in the artillery manual.
the "range" of the carriage is often times greater than the length
of the lanyard.

        
dom


Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: M18709@mwvm.mitre.org
Subject: Lincoln's Generals: A Thought
Organization: The MITRE Corporation, McLean VA 22102
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 10:37:08 GMT

This might generate some interesting discussion.  Forgive me if this is a
commonly discussed topic.  I am a regular reader of this news group, but
not a very serious student of history.
 
After watching ABC's special on Lincoln a thought occured to me regarding his
relationships with his generals (e.g., the Army of the Potomac commanders).
It seems as though Lincoln was trying to win the war, while his generals were
trying to win battles (or in some cases trying not to lose battles).  Any
thoughts?
=====================================================================
"Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak out, and
remove all doubt" --Abraham Lincoln (1862)
=======================================================================
Andrew R. Lacher      | Center for Advanced Aviation System Development
lacher@mitre.org      | The MITRE Corporation
(703) 883-7182        | McLean Virginia 22102
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: dnewcomb@whale.st.usm.edu (Donald R. Newcomb)
Subject: Re: Return of Captured Confederate Battle Flags
Organization: University of Southern Mississippi
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 15:07:43 GMT

>In article <BzMFoq.HM7@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau) writes:
>Over the years, many of these flags were "returned" to the southern
>states (again, I presume to statehouses or historical societies).
>Can anyone provide information about these returns?  I believe that
>there was some kind of mass return of flags shortly after the turn of
>the century, while others, I think, have occurred quite recently.

A few years ago a town in Massachusetts returned the flag of a Mississippi
Militia unit that had been captured in a skirmish known as the "battle"
of Pass Christian. I could look into it and send the particulars if you
like.

-- 

Donald R. Newcomb                * Life only admits two states: 
dnewcomb@whale.st.usm.edu        * growing and dying. So what,
newcomb@usmcp6.bitnet            * if I've put on a little weight?
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes)
Subject: the "peter principle"
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 21:09:05 GMT

I think that one of the major problems with the AoP is that Lincoln
tended to promote men who were effective Corps commanders to Army
commander only to find that they weren't effective at a higher level of
command. All of the failed generals of the AotP were (or went on to
be) successful Corps (or small Army) commanders. MacClellan was very
efffective at breaking up the early war rebellion in West Va. Pope,
Burnside, Hooker and Meade had, or went on to have successes as Corps
commanders.
`	Lincoln/Halleck made the common mistake that success at one
level of command prepares one for success at another level of command.
In this regard the US civil war can be seen as a process where the Union
over a period of time found effective Division, Corps ad Army leaders,
while the Confederacy lost effective Division, Corps and Army leaders. 
	Being an army commander requires much more "sang froid" than the
role of Corps commander. Time and time again, Lincoln appointed a man
who lost his will to do battle with Bobby Lee at a critical time, or who
muffed the job in some other way.

Tom.