From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence
Date: 17 Aug 92 02:42:16 GMT
Organization: Oklahoma State University

From article <1992Aug16.043209.14785@husc3.harvard.edu>, by zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):

> 
> COO:
>>				        Now, I will ask you a
>>simple question and hope that you will answer it:  In what way
>>do you find Heidegger to be any of these things?  Do you not
>>understand the methodology that he, among others like himself
>>such as Ortega Y Gassett and Kierkegaard, employ?  Or is it that
>>you find that that sort of methodology is an unfruitful one?  If so,
>>in the latter, how?  I can not respond to your claim because I can not
>>begin to understand in what fashion you arrive at such a conclusion.

MZ:
> 
> Well then, try reading my article until you get its point.  I feel that I
> have been quite explicit in stating my grievance; however it is evident
> that you didn't get it, and I don't feel like belaboring the obvious.

 Vacuous statements do not a point make..

MZ: 
> 
> This hackneyed dichotomy may well apply to a master chef; however I find a
> philosopher's ideas to be inseparable from his political life.  And on the
> subject of the latter, the final word on Heidegger has been written.  Too
> bad for his ideas.

  Aha, so you are more Derridian than you want anyone to believe...
However, I am attempting an argument based on Heidegger's text, not
Heidegger's life--now if I am not mistaken, these two things are different and
to argue against the first by means of the second is a fallacy.  Since
you are the one who teaches the logic classes, be my guest to give
it's official latin lable.  Further on the latter, you have no case.


> COO:
>>Last, the reason why I find representational theories to be "crap"(and
>>I leave it to you to determine the precise meaning of this--am
>>I really refering to feces?) is that it attempts to categorize and
>>as such remains bound to the ontical.  

MZ:> 
> Only if you believe that sign must remain bound to the thing signified.
> Having said that, I must confess to holding that reality is utterly
> exhausted by the ontical.

Only the ontical is utterly exhausted by the ontical--the question 
of reality can not arise without pressuposition.

> 
> 
> COO:
>>Second, it comes as no surprise that you find the
>>second task of philosophy as that which concerns meaning--this point
>>and your first task go hand in hand.  It turns out, Mikhail, that the
>>two tasks you have set forth, as divided in two, can not
>>be seperated.  Confused?  Always look to the function of the sign,
>>the function of the sign is to structure.  Since it was the structure
>>you were looking for, and since the sign is to structure, your first
>>task should have stated "find meaning."  And finding meaning, Mikhail,
>>is the purpose of philosophy--See...Heidegger isn't so bad, now is he?

MZ:> 
> You seem to be confusing the function of the sign with its structure.  The
> function of the sign is to denote; otherwise, I assure you, we wouldn't be
> having this conversation.

And what does denotation do Mikhail?  Structure..  Denotation and structuring
go hand in hand unless you would like to 
explain why they do not--I would be much appreciative. Mmm. Now you
are back to square one.  
> 
> COO:
>>Your next question is probably "so what's wrong?"  The answer is:
>>nothing, so long as you don't pressupose reality in the finding of meaning
>>and here I say "reality" not "being" because being is always presupposed..

MZ:> 
> I don't presuppose much of anything these days, -- doctor's orders.
> Instead, I deduce things, as far as I can, and no further.  Reality of
> meaning is one of them; being, though decidedly not a big deal, is another.
> Have I mentioned Parmenides yet?
> 
  First, Being can not be deduced--it is always presupposed.  Second,
meaning can be deduced, as it has been, but it is not limited to a simple
deduction.   Ontically, meaning is deductable.  Third, you fail to
address the reality issue--the pressupposition of reality was made in
your first task stated as "find the structure of reality."  The problem
which Plato had, which Heidegger brings up again, is that we are
not clear what "Being" is nor do we have any idea of what reality is either.
Now, being is that which must be pressuposed in any case, ie Descartes
went to far to add the "je pense" to his equation.  Now, to avoid a confusing
equivocation of Being and Reality, we must seperate the two so that
they will not be confused.  On this point, reality is a world in which
we search(appropriate as I was reminded by Professor Dreyfus once).
Now, the realitivistic flag may be tripped in your mind--but you must 
realize that we are not certain what you mean by truth, nor are we
certain what you mean by reality. 
   A propos the relativistic elements, Heidegger reduces the looming
philsophical problem down to a simple determinite which is pre-analytical:
it claims "there is."  It claims that "truth" is that which denotes the
world as such.  Since the world is "in each case mine."  And since we
all are, the truth is a universal--not too terribly relativistic now
is it. 
> MZ:
>>>>>"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
> 
> COO:
>>Ca, c'est vrai et tres evidement.
> 
> You still have to do something about that grammar...

Oui, Ca, c'est vrai et tres evident.  (finally....)
However, I am confused about this "jurer Dieu" doesn't there need
to be an "a" in there?  The construction you used looks more like 
english.

BCnya,
 Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
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