HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 15 Nov 92 17:15:23 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <spurrett.37.721583229@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:

>    It  is  clear  the  `possibility  for  being otherwise' condition is in-
>compatible with determinism. 

This is not clear to me, since the status of "could have been
otherwise" is not clear. We usually use this linguistic form as a way
of discussing causal chains, e.g., "if the rock hadn't fallen on it
the beetle would have been alive". That is a perfectly reasonable
observation to make in a determinisitc universe, regardless of whether
the rock fell because it was loosened by rain, or because I pushed it.

It is equally clear that tha condition that we
>be the authors of our own actions, that our actions follow from our desires,
>and choices, is incompatible  with indeterminism

This is equally unclear to me, unless by "indeterminism" you mean such
a radically indeterminate universe that cause and effect nevr hold and
everything happens randomly. All we need for voluntarism is that
sufficient causes usually produce the expected effects.

>    Here is one other option:   Immanent causation.  (The term is  medieval,
>  and the opposite term is  `transeunt' causation.)  An event  is immanently
>  caused where it  is caused by  a thing, rather  than another event.   This
>  means that the event  is caused, but could  not have been predicted.   The
>  `thing' which does the causing we  could call the `agent' and the  causing
>  could be a way of its exercising its power.

But this is simply the usual way of expressing naive voluntarism,
i.e., passing the causative buck back up the causal chain has to stop
when you get to an agent, because that's what being a (free) agent by
definition is -- an originator of causes.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2516 sci.philosophy.tech:4156
From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Subject: Re: World and the Mind
Reply-To: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Organization: University of Oslo, Norway
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 13:58:28 GMT

Interesting article, that "World and the Mind". In particular,
the observations on what Self or Subject is, were correct.

BUT:

Since when when have  Himalayan Yogis used the New Testament
as a guide to the truth? I found Jesus solipsism most unfitting.

Second, if the world is just illusions made by the Subject,
I guess that means Me, My Subject. How the Hell did I get this
paper into my hands. From another Subject? No! Thats just an
illusion ... Sorry: The illusion theory dosnt allow for communication
between different Subjects. Thus it is either false, or there are
really no persons out there to answer this.


Solan
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2557 sci.philosophy.tech:4211
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
Date: 21 Nov 92 16:38:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.58.722363888
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc11.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov18.202733.32173@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
>Subject: Re: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
>Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:27:33 GMT
>In article <spurrett.49.722073557@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>
>>  Looking directly at the issue of `what difference' it would make for
>>an act to be  caused by an agent,  and to be random,  the most obvious
>>point is that the  two would not be  the same in the  consciousness of
>>the agent.
>
>You might indeed be aware whether an event is random rather than a result
>of free will.  But it may not be possible to be aware of whether an
>event has some external cause rather than being a result of free will.
------------->
Why?  I can tell the difference between a chosen act and a reflex one, for 
example, with reasonable skill.  (You do not make clear what you mean by an `
external' cause, so a reflex may be a poor example.  As an alternative, I 
can tell the difference between a _trained_ reaction (I fence 
competetively) and a reasoned one.)


>>            (Just  as  deliberately kicking  my dog is different  from
>>kicking it when  somebody taps my  knee with a  little rubber hammer.)
>>If I _am_ the  cause then I would  probably know it.   Unconscious mo-
>
>But in the question of an external cause, rather than free will, you
>must consider that the external cause which resulted in your kicking
>the dog would also have resulted in your believing that it was deliberate
>act for which you were personally responsible.
------------->
Why would it have done that?  What is the relationship between external 
causes and beliefs?

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 92 03:53:47 GMT

Maybe I missed it, but what exactly is the definition of "free will" that
the participants of this discussion have in mind?
Mr. Holmes suggests that free will involves the notion of choosing an action
and having the possibility (or at least thinking one does) to have chosen
otherwise. But in this case we still have to know what is meant by "choose"
and "possibility".

I would venture to guess that any such definition would allow examples of
simple mechanisms that would meet the definition and which noone would
say had free will.

In any event without such a clear definition (or for that matter a clear
definition of determinism) the argument over whether free will is incompatible
with determinism seems somewhat pointless to me.

Larry Edwards
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:11:39 GMT

In article <spurrett.58.722363888@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>In article <1992Nov18.202733.32173@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
>>Subject: Re: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
>>Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:27:33 GMT
>>In article <spurrett.49.722073557@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>>
>>>  Looking directly at the issue of `what difference' it would make for
>>>an act to be  caused by an agent,  and to be random,  the most obvious
>>>point is that the  two would not be  the same in the  consciousness of
>>>the agent.
>>
>>You might indeed be aware whether an event is random rather than a result
>>of free will.  But it may not be possible to be aware of whether an
>>event has some external cause rather than being a result of free
will.

The alternative to "free will" (in the acausal sense) is not
always an external cause; it is much more likely to be an internal
cause or a mixture of internal and external causes.

>------------->
>Why?  I can tell the difference between a chosen act and a reflex one, for 
>example, with reasonable skill.  (You do not make clear what you mean by an `
>external' cause, so a reflex may be a poor example.  As an alternative, I 
>can tell the difference between a _trained_ reaction (I fence 
>competetively) and a reasoned one.)
>
>
>>>            (Just  as  deliberately kicking  my dog is different  from
>>>kicking it when  somebody taps my  knee with a  little rubber hammer.)
>>>If I _am_ the  cause then I would  probably know it.   Unconscious mo-
>>
>>But in the question of an external cause, rather than free will, you
>>must consider that the external cause which resulted in your kicking
>>the dog would also have resulted in your believing that it was deliberate
>>act for which you were personally responsible.

The cause is put in the wrong place; it is internal, at least in part.

>------------->
>Why would it have done that?  What is the relationship between external 
>causes and beliefs?
>
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
>| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
>| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
>| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,talk.religion.misc
From: ldh@eedsp.gatech.edu (Lonnie D Harvel)
Subject: Re: Proving Life after Death? (was Re: Ayn Rand on Religion [Was: Reply to Wingate])
Keywords: Rand Religion Wingate
Organization: Georgia Institute of Technology - DSP
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 18:29:55 GMT

In article <1992Nov21.081157.22525@s1.gov>, lip@s1.gov (Loren I. Petrich) writes:
|> 
|> 	I believe that my consciousness will end at death because it
|> seems too closely tied to my body. So if my body goes, it will go too.
|> 
|> 	But if I wake up in some other realm, then I will have to
|> accept the fact that I did, and I will attempt to find out how this
|> remarkable event happened.
|> 

PE1 4:6  For for this cause was the gospel preached also to them that are dead, 
that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to G
od in the spirit.


-- 
     The comments and spelling herein are mine and nobody
                     else lays claim to them.
================================================================
Lonnie D. Harvel                 |  ldh@eedsp.gatech.edu
From: mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: The Voice of Experience
Date: 20 Nov 92 02:37:29 GMT

Someone named dave writes:

>> The evidence is that people convert, and hence move from not experiencing to
>> experiencing.  Hence, simple lack of personal experience is not necessarily
>> good evidence by itself.

>never mind the matter of _what_ they are experiencing.

Well, I DO say "never mind".  Taken at face value, evangelism has some of
the qualities of giving a favorable review of a restaurant or a movie.  Here
it is very much a matter of one's confidence in the reviewer.  Atheism is
prone to an attitude of "all us enlightened, right-thinking, clear-minded
people of course see through that silly backwards religion stuff".  At the
same time, I suspec that atheists ask other people for advice and opinions,
which pretty clearly falls in into the heading of authority.

>as for the question of authority, which i addressed in a previous post
>which either died or was ignored, that of Faith, unlike the others you tend
>to mention, permit no grounds whatsoever within their domain for refutation.

I'm having trouble making sense out of this, but if I understand it
correctly, you are asserting that faith allows no grounds for refutation
(I'm not sure what this "domain" is).  I don't know what to make of such a
statement in the face of the abundant evidence that people lose faith.

>other authorities are found incapable of denying, even in their own
>missives, their fallibility.  consideration of the supernatural, therefore,
>requires the mere acceptance or rejection of knowledge, rather than an
>interaction with the process of knowing, which you seem to abdicate with a
>throwing up of hands.

I don't follow this at all.  I cannot see a separation between acceptance/
rejection and this "process of knowing"-- and is knowing a process or a
state?

-- 
C. Wingate        + "The peace of God, it is no peace,
                  +    but strife closed in the sod.
mangoe@cs.umd.edu +  Yet, brothers, pray for but one thing:
tove!mangoe       +    the marv'lous peace of God."
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: The Lighter Side
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 16:22:50 GMT

In article <00963A4A.A920FA20@Msu.oscs.montana.edu> oopcv@Msu.oscs.montana.
edu writes:

   >To do is to be.

    Phronochrustos.

   >To be is to do.

    Friedrich Stippelhofer

   >Do be do be do.
   >--Sinatra

   More properly, Francus Sinatricus.

   >Thank you.

   You're welcome.
From: lbn@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (generic fellow)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand
Date: 17 Nov 92 04:04:44 EST
Distribution: talk
Organization: Cornell University

In article <62020@mimsy.umd.edu>,
mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate) writes: 

> In the second place, your personal experience isn't necessarily as good as
> anyone else's.  Indeed, with respect to conversion, someone else's
> experience typically starts out having priority, in much the same way that
> any other information passed on authority-- like the morning paper--
> initially has priority.
> 
> The evidence is that people convert, and hence move from not experiencing to
> experiencing.  Hence, simple lack of personal experience is not necessarily
> good evidence by itself.

never mind the matter of _what_ they are experiencing.

as for the question of authority, which i addressed in a previous post
which either died or was ignored, that of Faith, unlike the others you
tend to mention, permit no grounds whatsoever within their domain for
refutation.  other authorities are found incapable of denying, even in
their own missives, their fallibility.  consideration of the supernatural,
therefore, requires the mere acceptance or rejection of knowledge, rather
than an interaction with the process of knowing, which you seem to abdicate
with a throwing up of hands.

regards,
dave

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:08:22 GMT

In article <spurrett.56.722363066@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>In article <1992Nov18.175136.9373@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>(1)
>>Physical objects are (complexes of) events and have causes.
>--------------->
>What do events happen to unless there are some `things' in the world?
>What do they happen with for that matter?  Are you saying that there
>are no `things' at all?  (Independent of their reduction to the flow
>of events, that is.)

I don't think that there are "things" independent of events, and I
think that physics bears this out to some extent.  I think that
"events" are themselves entities and "things" are made up of them.

Please give an account of how "things" come into being and pass away
which reveals how it is that they fail to have causes.  "Things"
certainly do exist; they both cause and are caused.  But they are made
up of events; they are not a substratum for events which can provide a
new kind of causality.

>
>(2)
>>This is re Spurrett's attempt to use causation by things to avoid
>>determinism.
>--------------->
>I think that this description is slightly misleading.  I find that
>determinism is unequal to the task of describing/explaining certain
>feautres of the world, and look for an ontology which does.  I am not
>attempting to `avoid' anything, but rejecting a defined thesis with
>clear reasons.
>
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
>| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
>| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
>| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: nat@sumax.seattleu.edu (Nat)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Nuclear and our society...
Date: 15 Nov 92 18:43:35 GMT
Organization: Seattle University


	Hi Guys,

	I am doing my paper about the nuclear and our society.  I agree that we
should have it, but I need to find someone who disagree(or don't want to keep
it ) 
	If you disagree with me please email to the address below, and tell me
what do you think and why you think so.

	Thank you in advance.

	Panaipon Uawithya<Nat>

Internet:   nat@sumax.seattleu.edu   <prefer> 
	    panaipon@carson.u.washington.edu
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: jcc@casbah.acns.nwu.edu (Jeremy Caplan)
Subject: Re: Consciousness
Organization: Northwestern University, Evanston Illinois.
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 00:38:58 GMT

In article <1992Nov23.213323.29413@news.acns.nwu.edu> jcc@casbah.acns.nwu.edu (Jeremy Caplan) writes:

>....... the article continues with many intersting descriptions which you
                                         ^^^^^^^^^^
>may find intersting, but for purposes of brevity I shall omit...
          ^^^^^^^^^^         
>
>automatically.  Man, the higherst living species on this earth-- the being
>                         ^^^^^^^^
>...... more intersting stuff....
>            ^^^^^^^^^^
>yet more intersting stuff...
>         ^^^^^^^^^^

Maybe if I learned how to spell my arguments would be a little stronger.

Sorry,

Jer
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:51:36 GMT

Physical objects are (complexes of) events and have causes.

This is re Spurrett's attempt to use causation by things to avoid
determinism.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: edwardc@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Edward Carter)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Proving Life after Death? (was Re: Ayn Rand on Religion [Was: Reply to Wingate])
Keywords: Rand Religion Wingate
Date: 22 Nov 92 13:39:27 GMT
Reply-To: edwardc@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Edward Carter)
Organization: Dept of AI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Nov21.192703.16527@noose.ecn.purdue.edu>,
muttiah@thistle.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah) writes:
 
# While, I don't disagree with a lot of what Loren has written, I wish
# to speculate on the connection between consciousness and death (my
# previous tid bit didn't seem to have reached here).
# **************** Leave reality for a minute ***********
# 
# Just say that consciousness is some complete unit.  The question is, does
# consciousness prevail as it is ?  Does it break up ?  Does it get destroyed
?
# Does it get transformed into something else ?  Regardless, *something*
happens
# to it.  Let me speculate on each of these.
# 
# Does consciousness prevail as it is ?
# 
# If by consciousness we mean the collective workings of the neurons in
# our body, then it would seem that whenever those chemical transmitters
# cease to be manufactured, that is the end of the story.  This is what
# most skeptics would accept. Now back to the part about the unit.
# This would mean that consciousness has gone to nothingness.  Can a 
# unit be transformed in this way ?  Now it exists, and then it vanishes;
# no decaying, nor gradual wear down.  So no, consciousness doesn't prevail,
# but goes somewhere...even to nothingness.
#
# <<<<lots of stuff deleted>>>>
# 
# ***************** Entering reality, ********************
# 
# I'm just glad to be alive!!!

"Consciousness as a complete unit" seems to imply that it's a physical
object. This, in turn is something that you deny when you claim that
it's "the collective workings of the neurons...". It can't be both
a complete [ie enduring, physical] unit and the output of a working
machine [ie dependent upon the machine keeping working for it to
exist].

This `it's got to go somewhere' argument can only be reconciled with the
idea of consciousness as the result of the brain's workings if the
physical brain somehow makes the transition to the astral plane, surely?

More generally, I often hear this kind of argument about consciousness
and Life After Death where people say "it's got to go somewhere", but 
this always implies consciousness as a physical entity rather than as
a property of a physical entity. Is there any basis for the `physical'
viewpoint, or is either me or everyone else just confused?

Ed Carter

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2494 sci.philosophy.tech:4115
From: vrkaramc@mtu.edu (Karamchedu)
Subject: Re: Being and Time
Organization: Michigan Technological University
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 12:09:33 GMT


solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:


	What is the connection between Being and Time?

 ..............

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The study of traditional metaphysics concerns with, among others, the enquiry
into the origin of knowledge.  This questioning starts with entities and    
proceeds in the line of what, why and how these entities are. During the course
of this inquiry, the word Being usually takes the meaning of something 
representing an ultimate being, or rather The Ultimate.  In any sense, the
object of the inquiry, the one which is predicated upon, is usually posited 
as a thing, or a concept (however ill-defined at first) and then probed into.
In this context, the explication (or exposition of) of Time has always been
in terms of either cognitive (in which case the method of enquiry is more or
less psychological) or scientific (in terms of the quantum nature and the 
relation of mind-matter, etc).  

Neither of the above lines of enquiry regarding Being and Time can lead us to
the ultimate depths of what human reality is.

In order for the ultimate answer for the question of the origin of knowledge,
the human being, the primary subject who performs the act of enquiry, must 
be able to understand the importance of the question `what it means to be ?',
whether this `means to be' is with regard to entities or the different states
of being the human himself can be.  In other words, before we ask the question
`what is this entity ?', we should ask the question `what it means to be this
entity ?'.  Once this emphasis is realized, an entire world of human 
existentials open up before us, inducing a sense of intuition into the method.


The moment we ask `what it means to be ?' we are in a peculiar kind of tension
with our own state of being.  This relation between the existential and the 
being which is asking the question is an emergence along with Time.  Again,
this relation is revealed only in temporality, through the act of the        
questioning itself.  This relation is care.  Hence it is care and temporality
that defines the human being in the light of Being.



- Raj


 
-- 

-----------====================-------------=================------------------

Instruments and moods are two facets of Being. Hence `thinking cuts furrows
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2556 sci.philosophy.tech:4210