From: MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>
Subject: Re: Helos vs. tanks (Was Re: info wanted : tank tactics used in post WWII)
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 17:30:39 GMT


From MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>

In article <Bz3v2n.2r3@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> eric remy <edremy@leland.stanford.edu> writes:
>Subject: Re: Helos vs. tanks (Was Re: info wanted : tank tactics used in post WWII)
>From eric remy <edremy@leland.stanford.edu>
>In article <Bz20nI.8t7@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> grant@psych.toronto.edu (Stuart Grant) writes:
>>From grant@psych.toronto.edu (Stuart Grant)
>>Here is a more refined question. What sort of situation must a nation
>>be in, to responsibly forgoe main battle tanks, and depend on other
>>systems?
>I could think of a few: (Assuming the country is only defense oriented.)
>
>1) Terrain not suitable for tanks: I.e., heavily forested/jungle/swamp, 
>very mountainous, etc.
>
>2) Not enough money to fund MBTs, especially since jeep mounted ATGMs
>can be so effective.  (Ask the Libyans.)
>
>3) No MBTs in surrounding (potential) hostile countries.
>
>Anybody got any others?
>

Consider....

1.
Where extreme ground mobility is required.  Specifically: extended range
-- say 200 plus miles between refueling; high average top speeds -- say 30 
mph with bursts of speed up to 45mph or more for an hour-plus at a time.

2.
Low-grade driver/operator skills -- untraumatic multi-learning 
between all members of the crew is absolutely non-negotitable.

3.
Premium is placed upon minimum down-time occasioned by servicing and repair 
requirements.  Repair, servicing and vehicle recovery must be capable of 
being handled by front-line technical crews with limited workshop 
facilities -- ideally much can be done by the crews themselves.

4.
Landmines are a real battle-area risk such that a lost track could quite 
easily lead to the loss (by abandonment) of the entire tank.

5.
Enemy may enjoy periods of air superiority -- thus ease of concealment, 
avoidance of excessive ground tracks and dust are important.

6.
Need for a low noise profile -- especially for night manoeuvers mandated 
by (5) above.

7.
Enemy forces may operate MBT's but his equipment is basically 
obsolete, crews are third rate and generally lack "situational awareness" in 
battle conditions.   Enemy ground forces are, in the main, poorly trained 
and lack high-tech anti-armour weapons, depending upon visual target 
aquisition as per 1940's era AT guns and 1st generation TOW's.

There must be other factors, but the above points support the view that,
if they apply, a modern well-gunned 6 or 8 wheeled armoured car should
get to the top of many countries' letter to Santa Claus rather than a snazzy
incubus of a MBT.

Cheers,
Keith Coman

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"Condemning a research report on the basis of :  Dept of Management
 invalid and unreliable methodology is the    :  Rhodes University
 cheapest shot in the book."                  :  Grahamstown, 6140
                                              :  Rep of South Africa
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