From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Date: 7 Apr 92 22:36:01 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Apr7.183603.10809
 <1992Apr4.015204.10671@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Apr4.175511.24556@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.

In article <1992Apr4.175511.24556@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes: 

>In article <1992Apr4.015204.10671@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: 

MZ:
>>Again, the degree of necessity is the last, if not the least of your
>>problems (for, if functionalism is true, biological necessity is the same
>>as physical necessity); the first one has to do with giving an appropriate
>>semantics for your conditionals.  That your conflicting requirements simply
>>won't allow you to do: you can either stipulate trans-world identity
>>conditions for mind-brains, or for their properties, but not for both.
>>Choose the former, and you lose the conditionals; choose the latter, and
>>you lose personal identity.

DC:
>As I've made clear on a number of occasions, I subscribe to Parfit's
>treatment of personal identity, so that there need not be determinate
>facts about personal identity across worlds.

Regardless of the dubious relevance of Parfit's position on personal
identity to the issue of reducing functionalism to behaviorism, it should
be clear to you that the lack of rigid personal identity, as determined by
functional organisation, ipso facto denies you the opportunity to
estabilish truth-conditions for the strong conditionals in question.

Haecceitism is a fundamental assumption of Kripke semantics; if you keep in
mind that anti-haecceitist modal systems like Church's Alternative (2) will
at the most allow you identity conditions for state-tokens, but not the
automata themselves, you will see the utter futility of your appeal to
modal logic.  Please make an honest effort to review the relevant technical
issues before making another attempt to gainsay my objections, for
otherwise I would have to conclude that the means of your argument
drastically outstrip your competence.

MZ:
>>You seem to be assuming that nomological connection carries no metaphysical
>>import.  I suggest that you revise your ideas about ontological commitment;
>>Quine's "On What There Is" makes for an excellent antidote against your
>>metaphysical horror.

DC:
>I have no idea why you think I think this.  I'm a dualist, remember?

I am not sure just what you are saying here; if you are implying that
"mere" nomological supervenience in conjunction with a full ontological
commitment to the ranges of the existentially quantified variables of the
formal expressions of the supervenience laws in question can be
meaningfully distinguished from metaphysical supervenience, then, on the
face of it, you are making a ridiculous claim.  I don't see just how your
dualism could help you out of this predicament, other than by reducing your
supervenience theses to mere parallelism.

`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:4141 sci.philosophy.tech:2069