From: exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell)
Newsgroups: sci.econ,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Economic Discrimination was Outgrowing Libertarianism...
Date: 29 Sep 92 16:19:03 GMT
Organization: Ericsson Network Systems, Inc.
X-Disclaimer: This article was posted by a user at Ericsson in North America.
              The opinions expressed are strictly those of the user and
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In article <qeaf1bg@zola.esd.sgi.com> thant@void.esd.sgi.com (Thant Tessman) writes:
>From: thant@void.esd.sgi.com (Thant Tessman)
>Subject: Re: Economic Discrimination was Outgrowing Libertarianism...
>Date: 28 Sep 92 22:54:57 GMT


>In article <Bv6KvK.6B@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:

>> > Your behavior today is conditioned by many years of struggle, 
>> 
>> That sounds like so much marxist/Skinnerian abti-free will claptrap.  I
>> have the beliefs I do because I can think and I have looked at the facts
>> and I have drawn certain conclusions.

>In article <BvB6qr.L42@apollo.hp.com>, nelson_p@apollo.hp.com writes:

>>  Ahh, the self-made-mam!   Mr. Yoder seems to think that if he were born
>>  with different genes, in a different time, in a different culture, that
>>  he would have reached the same conclusions about the world, or at least
>>  reached them in the same way.   Perhas he would care to provide some 
>>  evidence for this.

>An avoidance of the need to discuss any possible substance in the ideas
>themselves worthy of Marx himself - only more legible.

>thant

It does not follow from the fact--if it is a fact--that *if* certain
counterfactuals were true about my history I would think and act
differently from the way I do now, that the way I think and act now
is not to some extent the result of my free choices.  Certainly, if
I were born a fish I should 'think' and act very differently than I do now,
but that proves nothing about my thoughts and actions as things are.  

The refutation of this marxist version of determinism about belief is well 
known to philosophers.  As J.R. Lucas put it, "it blows itself up with its
own petard."  Consider:

(a)	"If you had a different historical experience and development
	 you would not believe p".

(b)	 "Hence, that fact you believe p is a foregone conclusion for
	  from your causal history"

We then ask, Why does the determinist himself think that (a) is true? Can
he show that he has freely chosen to evaluate the evidence for it, and 
believes (a) *for those reasons*?  No, he cannot.  To be consistent he 
must say that he believes (a) because of certain historical conditions 
which have determined him to believe (a) and which are presumably beyond his 
control. So why should anyone pay any attention to (a)?  On the determinists 
own view (a) itself is not something that could have been arrived at by a 
rational consideration of evidence. So, he has to say that his reasons for 
believing (a) having nothing whatever to do with his evaluation of the 
evidence, and so are no more worthy of belief than anyone elses, since his 
believing (a) was just as predetermined by his causal history as anyone 
else's beliefs. 

So, what reason can the determinist offer us for believing in determinism?
Apparently, he can't offer any reasons, only historical-causal explanations.
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