From: young@clpd.kodak.com (Rich Young)
Subject: Re: Let them eat grass!
Followup-To: talk.politics.animals
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@clpd.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 22:20:39 GMT

In <altar.724542481@sfu.ca>, Ted Wayn Altar writes:
>
>Peter Westlake writes:
>>The recent post on ethics by Ted Wayn
>>Altar sums up this position rather well, along with the stronger
>>position that it is wrong to deprive what he refers to as a
>>"subject-of-a-life" of that life. Now consider: if you hold
>>beliefs like this, what is wrong with killing and eating a higher
>>animal: is it the fact that *you* do it (or it is done one your
>>behalf),  or is it the consequential effects on the animal; and
>>if the latter, then what does it matter to the animal who or what
>>kills it?

[...]

>Consider the following question:  What would it mean for a hermit
>to be civil or honest?  It would mean nothing since these are
>qualities only effected in our interactions with others.  The
>hermit who lives in isolation from other people is neither civil
>nor honest with respect to others, as these are SOCIAL virtues.
>
>Similarly, kindness, compassion or respect for subject-of-a-life
>are social virtues in which it is beholden to Beings who are
>capable of such virtues to exercise those virtues as they
>interact with any "subjects" deserving or owed such kindness,
>compassion or respect.  It is therefore a moral duty of "moral
>beings" to exercise their moral capacities, but it is not a moral
>duty for "non-moral beings" to exercise that which they are not
>capable of realizing.  Thus, we have excusing conditions under
>the law (e.g., insanity) when even a human being is not competent
>to exercise moral conscience.

	On the other hand, by the same logic that determines the
	hermit to be neither civil nor honest, we may say that he
	is neither UN-civil nor DIS-honest.  Indeed, we may say
	nothing at all about his social interactions, since he
	doesn't have any.  In the case of our hermit, the inability
	to attribute one set of values does not automatically
	create validity for a different set.

	Again with the same reasoning, we may as easily conclude
	that social virtues which we hold in high regard do not,
	should not, and cannot apply to those outside our social
	structure, especially since we cannot objectively determine
	which beings other than ourselves are "deserving or owed
	such kindness, compassion or respect."  Such a determination
	is, by definition, subjective, which confines it to the
	realm of personal opinion.  That we make allowances for
	other humans is to be expected...we are, after all, of
	the same species...but to extend this to some personally
	selected sub-set of non-human species is a triumph of
	anthropomorphism over analysis.

>Ok, you would at least agree that the lions eating the zebra are
>not morally culpable.  That humans, however, who do have the
>choice to do otherwise, would be responsible or culpable for
>their killing of non-human animals.

	The mere fact that humans CAN make such a choice in no way 
	provides an imperative that we MUST, and culpability, even 
	"moral" culpability, need not always assume the most 
	pejorative connotations.  The question is not whether we
	are culpable, but whether such culpability requires, or even
	deserves, the weight of such pejorative judgements as some
	would place upon it.

>Indeed, this responsibility
>would extent to even persuading or legally stopping other fellow
>human beings from killing non-human animals.

	And what is this but the fundamentalist call-to-arms saying,
	"we are right, and they are wrong?"  There is no respect for
	the opinions of others here; no allowance that a fundamentally
	different perception of the world might result in a fundamen-
	tally altered view of what is "ethical" and what is not.  There
	is no admission that variances in moral structure within human
	society may not only be acceptable, but in some cases, desirable.

	By what standard can one opinion be judged "right" and another
	"wrong?"  Opinions are, by their very nature, both "right" and
	"wrong," aligning not with some absolute standard, but with the
	agreement or disagreement of other opinion-holders.  The closest
	we may approach any absolute standard is an opinion which is
	enforceable upon other either by agreement or by force.  Even
	then, such a standard remains, at its base, an opinion.

>Indeed, this might even extent to a consideration of the
>behaviours of those animals in our care or under our ward.  Aside
>from the ethics of keeping lions in zoos, one could ask if indeed
>we should feed zoo lions meat if equally nutritionally healthy
>and enjoyable vegetarian substitute was available.  I don't see
>any reason why not.

	Yet, it is surely patent that no benefit accrues to the lion from
	such a practice.  It is merely salve to the conscience of the
	keeper.  If, as has been said, lions eating zebras are not "morally
	culpable," then why engage in such an effort?  Clearly, Man simply
	imitating that which the lion practices in its natural habitat
	cannot be accused of moral turpitude when feeding the lion.  It
	may, indeed, be possible to feed lions without killing animals, but
	what have we gained?  What has the lion, as a non-moral being, 
	gained?

	The human has gained peace of mind, perhaps, but the lion has
	gained nothing.

>But why would it be somewhat different to go futher and suggest
>that there is even a moral duty to interfere with the
>interactions of non-moral beings in the wild?

[...]

>But let us say that no such intervening values are sufficient to
>delimit our interest in converting lions into grazers.  Aside
>from the hubris of presuming what our future predecessors might
>view as important or not, I must admit to seeing no reason why
>such a human intervention into the natural world would be prima
>facie wrong.

	Such quasi-puritanical interference belies the very heart of the
	argument [which purports to equate animals with humans] by assuming
	that humans are somehow "better" or "more qualified" to interfere
	with the normal processes of Nature.  That we are certainly different
	from other forms does not make us automatically more qualified
	to interfere in their existence.  To attempt to bring morality to
	a non-human world which neither has nor needs such a thing is no 
	more or less than simple, unjustifiable, anthropocentric hubris.

	In point of fact, it is our moral duty to CEASE such interference
	whenever and to the greatest extent possible.

>>What difference does it make to the cow whether it is
>>killed by the butcher or the lion?  Any of us in the cow's place
>>would consider the distinction unimportant compared to the danger
>>of a violent death.
>
>I would guess that it does make a difference, given the quite
>different conditions of factory farming and living in the wild.
>
>What would a cow choose if a cow had a choice?   What if the
>choice were one of living in the wild where an untimely death is
>highly possible versus the certain death after only having lived
>1/4 to 1/5 of its potential lifespan corralled in conditions
>where branding, dehorning, castration and overcrowding are the
>norm.  I think we can sensibly guess what the choice might be.

	Of course, this assumes that the cow in question has some
	foreknowledge of its future, a premise which has little in
	the way of support.  It is not at all clear that a cow is
	aware of its inevitable demise in any way similar to humans.
	Thus, it is certainly not clear that a cow's life is spent
	in horrible anticipation of this event, any more than is the
	life of a small human child.  To speculate about the choice
	a cow might make, as in the paragraph above, is to engage in 
	an anthropomorphic fantasy.


-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)


P.S. Note follow-up.
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