Newsgroups: sci.med
Subject: Re: Prescientific Traditions, again (was: Re: Her
From: RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg)
Date: 7 Jan 93 14:22:20 EDT
 <1993Jan6.144320.587@news.wesleyan.edu> <1iho59INNhtq@im4u.cs.utexas.edu>
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Organization: Philosophy Dept., Wesleyan University
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In <1iho59INNhtq@im4u.cs.utexas.edu> turpin@cs.utexas.edu writes:

I ("Dr. Ruth") wrote:

> > Could you please define what distinguishes prescientific 
> > traditions from scientific traditions, preferably without 
> > using the term 'science' redundantly?

To which Russell responded

> Of course.  In the last three centuries, there has developed an
> extensive study of how to go about investigating general empirical
> phenomena, what kinds of mistakes are likely in observation,
> experimentation, and relating evidence to claims, how to minimize or
> avoid these mistakes, and how to discuss and disseminate results with
> an eye toward finding out the truth.  This has resulted in a better
> understandings of such investigation and better techniques for doing
> so, most of which did not exist previously.  Performing investigation
> and research applying this better understanding and using these better
> techniques is science. 

I'm sure you don't mean to say that there was no science prior to the last
three centuries.  You indicate pretty clearly in other parts of your article
that you do not believe that.  Perhaps the problem is in your interesting and
unusual concept of a 'definition'.  Let me be more clear:  Could you give me a
*procedural* definition of science such that I can then look at practioner P
within tradition T and determine correctly whether or not what s/he is doing is
science?  After all, it is this distinction which is causing you and the
various alt.advocates continually to be at odds with one another.  If you could
agree on this procedural def., then applying it to particular practitioners of
particular traditions should be merely a matter of factual accuracy.

Russell then allows that:

> Drawing lines is a pragmatic activity.  I am not going to argue
> vehemently with anyone that, for example, Copernicus counts as
> science but that Galen does not.  

However you *DO* argue vehemently with others on the net about various other
practitioners. Why is it OK with you to allow that Copernicus & Galen might be
difficult cases, but that virtually any living, or non-Western, practitioner is
*not* a difficult case, but rather an obvious one (& that those who make this
determination differently than you do are obviously incorrect)?

> It is important in doing this kind of political analysis to
> realize that impure motives do not always prevent progress in
> discovering empirical truth, and that pure motives do not
> guarantee it.  The last refuge of many quacks is to use the broad
> label of politics to cover the investigative and analytic
> mistakes they make.  That dog doesn't hunt.  

I certainly hope you don't think I am making that mistake.  I am just looking
to discover the basis for your certainty about your judgements on these
matters.  Surely your knowledge isn't going to boil down to the same claim as
U.S. Supreme Court's waffle on pornography ("I can't define it, but I know it
when I see it.")...

------------------------
Ruth Ginzberg <rginzberg@eagle.wesleyan.edu>
Philosophy Department;Wesleyan University;USA
Newsgroups: sci.med