From: schuck@fraser.sfu.ca (Bruce Jonathan Schuck)
Subject: Re: Senate Interrogation
Reply-To: Bruce_Schuck@sfu.ca
Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Distribution: can
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 22:46:34 GMT

John G. Spragge <SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> writes:

>In article <schuck.721543654@sfu.ca>, schuck@fraser.sfu.ca (Bruce Jonathan
>Schuck) says:

>>Does the alternative hold true for the US?
>>
>>Was the US war production efforts impaired because nobody was bombing
>>civilian businesses in LA, Detroit, San Diego, New York?
>>
>>Ha ha ha ha. I find such a theory laughable.

>I do not think your response involves the level of serious reflection
>or respect the issue demands. To give your sneer a serious answer: if
>the axis powers had bombed the production centres of the US, the
>American government could have diverted additional resources to the
>production of armaments, at the expense of rebuilding and civilian
>lives. That would have had no relevance, because of enormous
>American industrial system completely overshadowed Germany's, and
>because the US government would not redirect resources with the
>totalitarian ruthlessness of the Germans.

"totalitarian ruthlessness" is the point. Germany did *not* need the
excuse of businesses destroyed by allied bombing to divert civilians
to war material production. Whatever labour they needed they
conscripted. They used slave labour where necessary. 

>>Returning to Germany's war production: Wasn't it harmed by the bombing
>>of rail yards, and transportation centres because it took longer to
>>get raw material to the factories? I think so!

>You think wrongly. The CEP (circle around the target within which
>the bomb falls) assumed by Air Marshall Harris amounted to half
>a mile for night bombing. The aim of the night bomber offensive
>had little to do with damage to specific installations; it involved
>killing workers, destroying cities, and breaking civilian morale.

Only that? They didn't try for areas with rail yards and factories?
Did they specifically leave them alone? I think they tried for them
but didn't have the technical expertise to guarantee greater accuracy.

>>I could go on and on.

>I am sure you could, but without mentioning the most important
>issue: the cost. The cost in resources amounted to up to a third
>of Britain's war effort. Directed elsewhere, that might have
>meant faster progress in North Africa and Italy, more complete
>air cover for the North Atlantic convoys, and more ships and
>planes to cover the infamous "Murmansk run". We will never know
>the full meaning of the cost in lives. Merely showing that
>the bombing offensive did the Germans no good does not come close
>to doing justice to the men who died. We dare not call the sacrifice
>of their lives justified without certainty that the British had no
>other way to accomplish what the bombing offensive intended. 

Certainty? Hindsight is 20/20. Where is the evidence that the British
*knew* the results of the bombing offensive before they happened?

>>Let's remember -- after Dunkirk, until the invasion of Italy, the only
>>front's in Europe Germany was fighting on was:

>[list deleted]

>You left out North Africa. 

I said "Europe". Reread it.

>You also left out the naval and air battles
>of the Mediterranean, the British East Coast Convoy battles, 

I mentioned the convoys. Didn't you read the list you deleted?

>>1) The disruption of war material production. The bombing campaign
>>didn't stop it, and production probably went up, but thats not
>>*because* of the bombing campaign, but in spite of it. US war material
>>production increased tremendously during WWII and they weren't being
>>bombed!

>Whether in spite of or because of the bombing, war production went up.
>We will (obviously) never know whether it would have gone higher if
>not for the bombing.

Thats right. It's just revisionism without evidence. Lay out the
information the Politicians and Generals had *at the time*, and they
were justified.

>>so the only way to fight back was on the sea and in the air. And if
>>the enemy is bombing your cities into rubble you can't just defend,
>>because then you lose. The RAF almost lost in 1940 during the battle
>>of Britain because defending is almost impossible.

>Your assumptions come from the Douhet theory, which informed the
>decisions of Bomber Command in the war. But civilian bombing did
>not have the effect that Douhet predicted. 

I am not familiar with Douhet. But again I repeat -- hindsight is 20/20.

>And during the Battle
>of Britain, the British defence did far more damage to the Luftwaffe
>that Bomber command could possibly have done to Germany during the
>same period 

What you are saying is that Britain should have just sat there
defending. It should not have taken offensive operations against Germany.
I think that is wrong. The politicians and Generals had to strike back
if capable. Look at the morale boost the Doolittle raid gave the US.

>>The bombing campaign was necessary. It was *not* a war crime.

>As far as I know, nobody on this group has called it a war crime.

Yes they have.

> A tragic mistake, perhaps; and I have quoted veterans who believed the
>men who directed it acted as callously toward the lives of their own
>airmen as they did toward the German civilians. 

Thats is very debatable. Too bad there was no debate on the V & H.

>But the bombing did not fit anyone's definition of a war crime.

I'm not sure Brian Mckenna thinks that way.

Xref: sparky can.politics:9495 soc.culture.canada:8395