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Date:         Mon, 25 Jan 1993 12:45:32 -0500
From:         "John A. MacDougall" <apakabar@ACCESS.DIGEX.COM>
Subject:      ID: Labor Rights in Indonesia

Forwarded by hrwatchnyc@igc.apc.org:

News from Asia Watch
January 23, 1993
Vol. 5, No. 2

INDONESIA: CHARGES AND REBUTTALS OVER LABOR RIGHTS PRACTICES

Analysis of Submissions to the U.S. Trade Representative

I. INTRODUCTION


        In June 1992, Asia Watch and the International Labor
        Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), a
        non-governmental organization based in Washington,
        petitioned the United States Trade Representative, Carla
        Hills to review Indonesian labor rights practices. Under
        U.S. law [Section 502(b)(7) of the Trade Act of 1974.],
        the President, at the recommendation of the Trade
        Representative, must end tariff benefits to a U.S. trading
        partner under a program known as the Generalized System of
        Preferences (GSP), if the country in question is not
        "taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker
        rights."  The rights in question include freedom of
        association, the right to organize and bargain
        collectively, ban on forced labor, a minimum age for the
        employment of children and acceptable conditions of work.


        The Office of the Trade Representative agreed to review
        the Indonesian case, and a hearing before the GSP
        Subcommittee of that office was held on October 16 at
        which both Asia Watch and ILRERF testified. On November
        16, the Indonesian government submitted a 170-page
        response to both petitions, drawn up by the law firm White
        and Case, with over 100 attachments. Both petitioners were
        given a chance to respond, and in December, an Indonesian
        delegation led by Dr. Payaman Simanjuntak of the Ministry
        of Manpower met in Washington with the GSP Subcommittee
        and representatives of Asia Watch and ILRERF. President
        Clinton will announce a decision in April 1993. If GSP
        benefits are cut as a result, the annual cost to Indonesia
        of the rise in tariffs on Indonesian exports coming into
the U.S. will be about $400 million.

        This report summarizes the major allegations made by Asia
        Watch in its original petition to the U.S. Trade
        Representative and in subsequent materials submitted, and
        the Indonesian rebuttal. Asia Watch, as an organization
        concerned with the defense of civil and political rights,
        focused on restrictions of freedom of association and
        evidence of forced labor, rather than working conditions,
        including wages and safety, per se. It believes, however,
        that securing the right of workers to organize is a key
        step toward the improvement of working conditions in
Indonesia.

II. SUMMARY OF CHARGES AND REBUTTALS


        The main Asia Watch (AsW) charges and Indonesian
government (GOI) rebuttals can be summarized as follows:

AsW: Indonesia restricts the right to freedom of association by
allowing only one government-controlled trade union, the Serikat
Perburuhan Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI). While other unions are in
theory permitted, requirements to obtain legal recognition are so
onerous as to make recognition impossible. Those attempting to
form independent unions have been harassed.

GOI: SPSI was formed by and for workers without government
interference. It is not the only legally recognized union; the
Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) was recognized in April
1990. A new Ministry of Manpower regulation, now in draft, will
substantially ease requirements for obtaining recognition. Many
other organizations effectively function as unions, even without
recognition, such as the civil servants organization, KORPRI.
There has been no government attempt to hinder the formation of
new unions.

AsW: The right to bargain collectively is restricted by the lack
of independent unions, controls on the right to strike, and
military interference. Management often only agrees to negotiate
if workers make a credible threat to disrupt production by work
stoppages or strikes. SPSI units at the workplace, where they
exist, often side with the company. The presence of soldiers and
police during negotiations between workers and management serves
as form of intimidation and robs the process of any meaning.

GOI: The Ministry of Manpower vigorously promotes collective
bargaining, but such bargaining is consultative, not
confrontational as in the West. SPSI workplace units have been
effective in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Strikes
are permitted; they are only declared illegal when established
procedures are violated. The petitioners fail to understand the
dual political/military role of the Indonesian armed forces and
the role of the army in protecting against internal disturbances.
The threat of communist insurgency through labor disputes is a
serious national security problem, not merely a labor problem.


AsW: The Indonesian government has engaged in forced labor by
luring East Timorese laborers to Java on false pretenses, paying
them substandard wages and forcing them to undergo military
training. Logging companies, with some government involvement,
have effectively created a system of bonded, unpaid labor in the
Asmat area of Irian Jaya.

GOI: Indonesia is bound by the ILO Convention No.29 Concerning
Forced Labor. Allegations about East Timorese workers were based
on inadequate, inaccurate and untrue information. The workers
volunteered for the positions, were paid the minimum wage and were
provided with transportation to return to East Timor if they
chose. The Indonesian military assists with training but that
training is not "military" per se.  The government has no record
of officials in Irian Jaya cooperating with timber companies to
compel Asmat tribespeople to cut down trees.

        The Indonesian government's assertions do not stand up to
scrutiny, as the following analysis will show.

III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION


SPSI and Government Control

        SPSI remains the only legally recognized trade union which
        claims to negotiate with employers on behalf of workers,
        the recognition of the Indonesian Teachers Association
        (PGRI) notwithstanding. In the 1991 Country Reports on
        Human Rights Practices, the State Department noted, "The
        Government and employers have considerable influence over
        SPSI affairs; a retired military lieutenant colonel and
        GOLKAR district chairman with some prior union experience
        is chairman of the largest provincial branch of SPSI,
        primarily due to government backing. The Minister of
        Manpower is a member of the SPSI Consultative Council.
        SPSI officials are pressured to join GOLKAR and GOLKAR
        members dominate the SPSI leadership." [Country Reports on
        Human Rights Practices for 1991, U.S. Department of State,
February 1992, p.870.]

        The Indonesian government states that SPSI has a total
        membership of 1,016,562 workers organized into 10,000
        workplace units (PUK SPSI). This represents less than six
        percent of the workforce. The greatest obstacles to
        forming more units, the government asserts, are "lack of
        worker familiarity with trade union practices, employer
        resistance, employee apathy and employee fear of possible
        employer retaliation."[Statement of the Government of
        Indonesia before the Office of United States Trade
        Representative, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Generalized
        System of Preferences Subcommittee, (hereafter referred to
as Indonesian Statement), November 16, 1992, p.71.]

        But in those units which do exist, SPSI often fails to
        represent worker interests. In May 1992, for example, an
        agreement was reached by the district head of Bekasi
        (outside Jakarta), the district leader of SPSI and the
        local head of the employers association, APINDO, to ban
        all strikes in Bekasi until the session of the People's
        Consultative Assembly (MPR) to elect the President was
        concluded in March 1993. There was no consultation with
        workers about this 10-month ban on strikes, as the number
        of strikes in Bekasi after May amply indicates. The
        Indonesian government, however, maintains that, "Rather
        than harming the workers by agreeing not to strike, the
        SPSI supported the desire of the workers and worked to
        improve their welfare...The majority of the workers, after
        experiencing the disruption of frequent strikes in the
        region, sought this agreement as an alternative means to
        address their demands...The tripartite agreement thus
        represents a carefully considered decision on the part of
        workers to enter an agreement to settle labor disputes
        peacefully through negotiation and thereby avoid
        potentially harmful strikes and lock-outs."[Indonesian
        Statement, p.44 and p.83] There is no indication of how
        this decision of the "majority" was reached or "the desire
of workers" ascertained.

        Another indication of SPSI's links to the government may
        be gleaned from the widely-publicized strike at the PT
        Evershinetex textile factory in Ciluar, Bogor (West Java)
        on May 14. After workers went on strike and security
        forces were called in, the factory issued a statement
        ordering workers back to work the next day, saying
        negotiations would begin if they obeyed. The statement was
        signed by the personnel director of the company, the head
        of local office of the Ministry of Manpower, the
        subdistrict chief, the Bogor police chief, the subdistrict
        military commander -- and the head of the SPSI unit at the
        plant ["Kronologi Kasus Pemanggilan dan Pemecatan Buruh PT
Evershinetex oleh KOREM 061 Bogor."].

        It is true that in many of the strikes called over the
        past year in West Java, workers have demanded that an SPSI
        unit be set up in their plant. But it is also clear that
        the main reason workers without an SPSI unit demand to
        have one is that it is the only way they feel they can get
        their grievances addressed by management. Ad-hoc
        negotiating groups formed by workers in the aftermath of
        wildcat strikes are not taken seriously by management, and
        agreements reached by such groups are often ignored. But
        when SPSI units do exist, workers often demand that it be
dissolved for failing to protect their interests.

        In its original petition, Asia Watch cited the case of the
        PT Star Angkasa metal factory in Surabaya, where in 1991,
        workers had protested mandatory payment of SPSI dues and
        asked for the SPSI unit to be dissolved on the ground that
        it did not defend their interests. The Indonesian
        government called the case material presented "at best
        incomplete and at worst inaccurate." According to the
government's account of the same strike,

On July 16, 1991, the workers went on strike to demand an increase
in wages and to be informed about the terms of their collective
bargaining agreement. In response to the strike, the company
negotiated with representatives of the company SPSI unit and
agreed to institute a pay raise in March 1992 when the new minimum
wage provisions went into effect.

        The following day, the workers went on strike again to
        demand the replacement of the executive board of SPSI in
        the company. The workers were unhappy with the board
        because they believed it did not accurately present the
        union's financial report and did not fight for improvement
        in the workers' welfare. Contrary to the petitioners'
        allegations, the workers did not request that the SPSI be
        dissolved or request any money to be returned. Rather,
        they were unhappy with the executive board...Their demands
        did not include objections to the payment of SPSI dues
        [Indonesian Statement, p.46.].



Requirements for Registration

        The current requirements for legal recognition as a union
        are that the organization in question have representation
        in 20 of Indonesia's 27 provinces [Indonesia forcibly
        annexed East Timor as its 27th province in July 1976; that
        annexation has not been recognized by the United Nations
        and was illegal under international law.], 100 districts
        and at least 1,000 workplaces.

[Regulation PER-05/MEN/87 on Worker Union Registration.] The
Indonesian government maintained that a new draft regulation,
which surfaced for the first time in response to the GSP
petitions, would reduce that requirement to five provinces, with
at least 25 district-level branches, 100 workplace unions and
10,000 members.

        ILRERF examined the draft more closely and discovered that
        a union which registers based on the new regulation would
        have to have a recommendation from an existing federation
        of worker unions -- i.e. from SPSI. Moreover, if workers
        wished to form not just a new union but a new trade union
        federation, they would have at least ten registered unions
        as members, all of which would have had to meet the
        individual and branch-level membership requirements and
        each of which would have to obtain approval of the
        government union to register. [International Labor Rights
        Education and Research Fund, Rebuttal of ILRERF to the
        Statement of the Government of Indonesia,December 3, 1992,
        p.12.] The new draft, then, hardly constitutes an
improvement.

        It should be noted that any effort to ease the
        registration process must be accompanied by respect by the
        government for freedom of assembly. If workers interested
        in forming a new union are not permitted to meet freely to
        discuss their plans, without government obstruction or
        surveillance, reform of the registration process is
        meaningless.



Setiakawan and SBSI

        Two independent unions have emerged in the last two years,
        Setiakawan (Solidarity) and the Worker's Union for a
        Prosperous Indonesia (SBSI). "In recognition of the right
        to organize and associate, the Government did not take any
        action in connection with the establishment" of either
        organization, and both are free to apply for recognition
        as a union, according to the Indonesian government's
        November 16 statement to the GSP Subcommittee.In fact,
        while it is true that neither was outlawed, both
        organizations have faced harassment and surveillance since
        they were founded, Setiakawan in 1990, SBSI in 1992. The
        nature of the harassment virtually precludes either
        organization being able to hold the meetings that might
        result in the recruitment of the necessary number of
members for recognition.

        The Indonesian government now claims, citing a October 7,
        1992 statement from the Setiakawan Management Council,
        that Setiakawan was not attempting to become a union and
        considered itself an educational organization. But this
        may reflect a response to government pressure. In July
        1991, the Secretary General of Setiakawan, was abducted by
        armed men believed to be members of military intelligence,
        and held for three days. The abduction followed a series
        of training meetings for workers that Setiakawan had held
        under the watchful eye of security forces. A year later,
        on July 6, 1992, workers at the PT Astari Niaga plant in
        Tangerang went on strike, demanding a wage increase
        retroactive to April. On July 7, the head of the SPSI unit
        and the company announced a settlement, but the workers
        rejected it, saying there had been no consultation with
        them beforehand and SPSI had never attempted to gather
        them together to explain the agreement. When the workers
        refused to settle, the company called in the police, who
        investigated one of the workers and accused him of being
        manipulated by Setiakawan. ["Pengunjuk Rasa, Tolak Hasil
        Kesepakatan Kenaikan Upah", Kompas, July 8, 1992.]  It is
        not known what happened to the worker.



        The SBSI has fared little better. On October 28, 1992,
        police in Tangerang, West Java, broke up a meeting in
        which nine members of SBSI, headed by their General
        Chairman, Mochtar Pakpahan, were discussing how to open a
        branch office in Tangerang. Greg Talcott, the U.S.
        embassy's labor attache, was present as an observer.  All
        ten men were taken to the Tangerang police station;
        Talcott was released after an hour. The others were
        interrogated overnight and released the following morning.



        On October 29, at about 10 p.m., Mochtar Pakpahan was
        picked up at his home by Sergeant Peter Sihotang of the
        military intelligence agency BAIS and taken to an unknown
        destination on the outskirts of Jakarta where he was
        interrogated for four hours by Colonel Dadang Supriadi in
        the presence of three other BAIS officers before being
taken back to his house at about 4 a.m. on October 30.

        Pakpahan was questioned about what information he provided
        Talcott and what assistance Talcott had given him. He was
        also questioned about why he decided to establish SBSI,
        since the SPSI was already in place; what funds he had
        obtained; and from whom. He was told by Colonel Supriadi
        that SBSI was an illegal organization and that the SBSI
        bulletin that it had produced was subversive in content.
        [Asia Watch provided the details on the SBSI incident to
        the U.S. Trade Representative on December 1, too late to
        be included in the material sent to the Indonesian
government for a response.]

The Indonesian Teachers Association and Other Professional
Organizations

        The Indonesian government claims that the Indonesian
        Teachers Association is a legally registered union with
        completely voluntary membership which functions to
        "protect the rights and welfare of teachers."[Indonesian
        Statement, p.5] The State Department, in its 1991 report,
        noted that PGRI "has not...attempted to bargain over wages
        and working conditions, preferring its traditional role of
        working with the Government to pursue the interests of its
        members. Some PGRI officials are employees of the Ministry
        of Education."

[Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, p.871.] The
Indonesian government refutes that assertion, saying PGRI has
represented teachers in negotiations for increased salaries,
promotions and pension benefits. "Neither PGRI nor the Government
has to negotiate using Western methods in order to comply with the
ILO Convention or retain GSP benefits."[Indonesian Statement,
p.55]

        But not only has PGRI not functioned as a union -- its
        leaders have actually forced teachers into actions which
        are detrimental to their interests. In January 1992, the
        head of the PGRI branch in Yogyakarta, Sawal
        Hardjoprijitno, said that a deduction should be taken from
        teacher salaries to contribute to the success of GOLKAR in
        the 1992 election campaign. He told a reporter that
        teachers were at once members of KORPRI, the civil
        servants association, and GOLKAR, and that they should
        take an active role in seeing their organization
        succeed.["Untuk Dana Pemilu, Wajar, Gaji Guru Dipotong",
Bernas, January 23, 1992, p.1.]

        The Yogyakarta officer's remarks reaffirm a statement in
        the PGRI General Program for 1989-94, attached to the
Indonesian Statement as Exhibit 26:

In keeping with the principle and strategy of the New Order
approaching the 1992 General Elections, PGRI is determined to
continue upholding the struggle of the New Order and working
toward bringing victory to the Functional Group [the ruling party,
GOLKAR] which has the same principle and aspirations and
historical ties."

        ILRERF points out that nowhere in the PGRI Five-Year Plan,
        published in 1989, is there any hint that PGRI itself
desired recognition as a union.

Rather than representing the success of a labor union or worker
organization in leaping over the high wall of eligibility
standards which the Indonesian law requires, [recognition as a
union] illustrates the autocratic power of the government to
create "labor unions" by fiat as well as to prevent them from
being created.[ILREF Rebuttal, p.8.]

        The Indonesian government asserts that a number of other
        state-sponsored professional associations are
        "quasi-unions" and are in the process of increasing their
        memberships to apply for formal recognition as unions.
        These include KORPRI; the Indonesian Journalists
        Association (PWI); the Indonesian Seamen's Union (KPI);
        and the Indonesian Workers' Cooperative Alliance
(INKOPAR).

        It is particularly inappropriate to call KORPRI a trade
        union. In August 1991, almost a year before the national
        parliamentary elections took place, members of KORPRI in
        the Javanese district of Purworejo were complaining that
        they were being forced to pay "tactical dues" at the
        neighborhood, village, subdistrict and district level in
        order to build a campaign chest for GOLKAR. All members of
        KORPRI were also members of GOLKAR, according to the
        district secretary who was also head of the Purworejo
        KORPRI unit.["Dikeluhkan, Pungutan untuk Pemilu", Bernas,
        August 7, 1991. In fact, members of KORPRI are not legally
        obligated to be GOLKAR members; the pressure to join
        GOLKAR, however, can be intense.] Likewise on June 2,
        1992, the head of the KORPRI unit at Gajah Mada University
        in Yogyakarta sent around a letter urging all members to
vote for GOLKAR.

        If Indonesia were a country in which free and fair
        elections took place, the fact that an organization
        claiming to be a union campaigned for a particular
        political party would not be remarkable. In a country
        where elections are manifestly not free or fair, and the
        party in question represents the government, pressure to
        support that party takes on a much different coloring. If
        KORPRI is a "quasi-union", the interests of labor and
        management are difficult to distinguish.



        Not even the Indonesian government takes seriously the
        notion of any non-SPSI organization functioning as a
        union. In a letter dated October 5, 1989 from the
        Indonesian embassy in Washington to Foreign Minister Ali
        Alatas regarding the GSP petition of the AFL-CIO that
        year, the ambassador says, "Our lawyers asked our help in
        several matters on which we need confirmation from the
        government, as we have already conveyed to you by
        telephone. Among these matters is the notion that SPSI is
        not the only labor union in Indonesia but one of 21
        professional associations on the attached list which have
        been permitted to operate. In case SPSI has objections, we
        suggest that, for foreign consumption, the letter to the
        U.S. Trade Representative be approved, without sacrificing
        the government's domestic policy." [Letter from Ambassador
        Abdul Rachman Ramly to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, 5
        October 1989, No.132-DB-1989. The Indonesian text reads:
        "Dalam kaitannya dengan konsep surat kami diatas, pihak
        pengacara kita meminta bantuan kami beberapa hal yang
        perlu mendapat konfirmasi dari Pemerintah RI seperti yang
        telah kami sampaikan kepada Bapak Menteri per telepon
        antara lain bahwa SPSI bukan satu-satunya Serikat Pekerja
        di Indonesia namun masih ada sekitar 21 serikat pekerja
        profesional yang diizinkan di Indonesia sebagaimana daftar
        terlampir. Sekiranya pihak SPSI berkeberatan, kami
        sarankan kiranya untuk konsumpsi luar negeri khusus
        mengenai surat kepada USTR tersebut dapat disetujui, tanpa
        mengorbankan kebijaksanaan pemerintah di dalam negeri."]


        But the government goes further and maintains not only the
        unions but all social organizations as defined by Law
No.8/1985 can function as unions:

The difference between unions and social organizations or other
associations that perform union functions is that only unions
registered with the Ministry of Manpower may negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. In practice, however, this distinction is
without a difference because a social organization can negotiate
agreements concerning working conditions...Further, these
associations function like unions in other ways: all can recruit
workers and all represent workers and negotiate on behalf of
workers concerning working conditions.[Indonesian Statement,
p.36]

        Law No.8/1985, the Social Organizations Law, further
        restricts freedom of association by forcing yet another
        category of organizations to register with the government
        and pledge adherence to the state philosophy, Pancasila.
        The law increases state control over non-governmental
        organizations by Article 13, giving the government the
        power to dissolve any organizations which disturb general
        security and order, receive foreign aid without permission
        from the government and "render assistance to foreign
        parties detrimental to the interests of the Nation and
        State." Further, Article 8 is an indication of the
        government's determination to force non-governmental
        organizations (NGOs) into joining single umbrella
organizations which would then come under its control:

In order to be better able to discharge their function, Social
Organizations having one and the same character [are obliged to]
unite into one fostering and developing body.  [Law No.8/1985,
quoted in Ben Witjes, "The Indonesian Law on Social Organisations:
A Study of the Sociopolitical Context and the Consequences for
Indonesian and Foreign NGOs", Nijmegen (Netherlands), April 1987,
p.50.]

        SPSI is thus the umbrella organization for workers the way
        PGRI is for teachers. Similar organizations exist for
        youth, women, doctors and so on. The government's failure
        to see any real difference between unions and other
        professional and mass membership organizations in
        Indonesia underscores how lacking in independence the
"unions" really are.

IV. RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY AND STRIKE


        The right of workers to organize themselves to bargain
        collectively with their employers about wages, benefits
        and working conditions is the essence of trade union
        activity, and it is a right the Indonesian government
        formally recognizes. According to the Indonesian
        government, workers are to be represented by officers of
        the trade union, and the company by senior officers; if
        they are unable to resolve a dispute on their own, they
        may request the Ministry of Manpower to appoint a
        "conciliator" or submit the dispute to a Tripartite
        Regional Committee, usually referred to by its Indonesian
        acronym of "P4D", consisting of five people each from
        "labor unions, employer groups and representatives from
        government agencies." [Indonesian Statement, p.64. The
        disputing parties can also submit the dispute to binding
        arbitration, according to Indonesian law, but this almost
        never happens.] Given the level of unionization, these
        provisions, even if they guaranteed an impartial process
        which they do not, would affect only a tiny minority of
        workers. Among the existing SPSI units, only half have
        produced collective bargaining agreements, and the extent
        to which union negotiators actually represented worker
demands must be questioned.

        The Indonesian government also notes, however, that there
        is provision in Indonesian law that if a company with at
        least 25 employees has no union, a delegation of workers
        may be appointed to negotiate a "company regulation" with
        the employer about conditions of employment and rules of
        conduct. The Indonesian government maintains that these
        "company regulations" are basically the same as collective
        bargaining agreements. But without genuine freedom of
        association, there are no checks on who represents the
        workers, the extent to which a real bargaining process
        takes place or how well the agreement is implemented. In
        many of the labor disputes that took place in the
        Tangerang and Bekasi areas in 1992, workers were reluctant
        to come forward to negotiate because they feared being
fired after publicity about the dispute died down.

        On October 14, 1992, a strike involving 5,000 workers took
        place at six factories belonging to the Yasinta group of
        textile manufacturers, demanding increases in wages and
        benefits. The workers claimed they had conveyed their
        demands three times to their SPSI unit, but that the unit
        was on the side of the factory. When police and military
        forces were called in, reportedly because the workers were
        blocking traffic, they and the company urged the strikers
        to send representatives to negotiate a settlement. No
        worker would go, because all feared retaliation. The fear
        was based in part on the fact that after 70 workers had
        gone on strike earlier on September 29, four of them had
        been fired. The next day, the workers marched to the
        district parliament to seek its help. A parliamentarian
        persuaded them to send representatives to the local office
        of the Ministry of Manpower to negotiate with the
        company.

["Ribuan Pengunjuk Rasa Mendatangi DPRD," Kompas, October 16,
1992; "5000 Karyawan Unjuk Rasa," Media Indonesia, October 16,
1992.]

        The fear felt by the Yasinta workers is a direct
        consequence of lack of freedom of association; workers are
        all too well aware of the consequences of challenging the
        established order. If the SPSI units are often
        unrepresentative of workers when the boards of these units
        are ostensibly "democratically elected", the worker
        committees chosen to negotiate "company regulations" must
be even less so, as no such claim is made.

Strikes

        Precisely because existing procedures for resolving labor
        disputes do not, for the most part, allow for a real
        expression of worker demands, many workers have resorted
        to strikes and work stoppages to draw attention to their
        grievances, particularly in West Java and the industrial
        area around Jakarta. These are wildcat strikes. While the
        Indonesian government does have a law governing the right
        to strike, it requires that workers attempt to negotiate
        first, by the same procedures which effectively block
        their interests from being heard. A new draft law outlines
        a procedure so cumbersome and detailed that workers would
        have to specify exactly what slogans they would put on
signs they wanted to carry.

        The Indonesian government maintains that the spectacular
        rise in wildcat strikes from 20 in 1989 to over 156 in the
        first 10 months of 1992 (a non-governmental source lists
        294) is due to its own enforcement of minimum wage laws
        and increased awareness by workers of their rights, thus
        implying that frequency of strikes is a sign that the
        labor rights situation is improving. [Indonesian
Statement, p.83.]

        It is hard to see how the strikes could reflect better
        enforcement of minimum wage laws since most of the strikes
        are over failure of companies to pay the minimum wage.
        Increased awareness of rights is probably a factor, but
the main reason is probably desperation.

        In one case, women workers at a Tangerang-based
        electronics factory called PT Automen, owned by South
        Koreans, went on strike in September 1992. They said they
        were forced to work 11 hours sitting down with a one-hour
        break and no overtime. They complained of physical
        side-effects from the work and also of sexual harassment
        on the part of the Korean managers. There was no SPSI unit
        allowed in the factory, because the Korean owner said he
        knew from the Korean experience that if unionization was
        allowed, workers demands would escalate. When the women
        finally went on strike, the Tangerang office of the
        Manpower Ministry said it was not aware of any problem.
        Plants are supposed to be regularly visited by inspectors
        from the Ministry to ensure they meet Ministry
        regulations, but no inspector had visited since the
        factory opened two years before, even though there has
        been a history of problems with South Korean-owned firms.
        After the case was publicized, the local Ministry office
        said it would send an inspector to the plant.["Ribuan
        Karyawati Dipaksa Lembur Bila Terlambat Dihukum,"
        Jayakarta,  September 10, 1992; "Depnaker Akan Teliti
Pemaksaan Lembur", Jayakarta, September 26, 1992. ]

Military Interference in Negotiations and Strikes

        The Indonesian government says, "When strikes occur, the
        workers are usually successful in obtaining their
        demands."[Indonesian Statement, p.2.] It is true that it
        is often only these strikes which force employers to the
        bargaining table, and in many case, the workers come away
        with a promise of increased wages. There have been several
        instances of subsequent strikes because the company in
        question failed to live up to the agreement. More
        worrisome, however, is the fact that the Indonesian
        military often interferes with strikes and oversees the
negotiations.

        The Indonesian government acknowledges military
        involvement but says that the claims of Asia Watch and
        ILRERF as to the extent of that involvement are
        inaccurate. It first notes that the military's presence is
        to "protect public safety and prevent destruction of
        property or civil unrest" and that its involvement is
        justified by Law No.5/1967 on internal security. "One of
        the military's roles with respect to strikes," according
        to the government, "is to determine if there are any
        outside forces at work...One possible inroad for communist
        subversion is through worker unrest. The Government
        especially fears that the communist ideology might be
        attractive to young people who did not live through the
        national distress of the 1960's, and many of those young
        people can best be reached on the job through labor
        disputes."[Indonesian Statement, pp.87-89.]  Asia Watch
        notes that there has been no serious political threat from
        communism since the Indonesian army encouraged a pogrom
        against suspected supporters of the Indonesian Communist
        Party in 1965-67, in which an estimated 500,000 people
were killed and over one million arrested.

        In gathering information to respond to the cases raised by
        Asia Watch and ILRERF, the Ministry of Manpower relied on
        information from companies and documents relating to the
        negotiations. In virtually all cases where Asia Watch
        cited specific arrests or detentions by the military,
        confirmation could only have come from the military. The
        Manpower Ministry, however, was apparently either
        unwilling or unable to interview military sources in
        preparing its response. Indeed, in many of the cases, it
        appears as though neither the company concerned nor the
        Ministry of Manpower had any ability to influence the
nature or extent of military involvement.

Two Accounts of the Same Strike: The Case of PT Gajah Tunggal

        Asia Watch and ILRERF both cited several examples of
        military interference in labor disputes. The Indonesian
        government responded to each of these cases in detail. One
        of these cases was the massive dispute in August 1991 at
        PT Gajah Tunggal, a conglomerate consisting of 14
        factories in Tangerang making everything from tires to
        fanbelts to sports shoes and involving some 14,000
        workers. A comparison of specific points in the Asia Watch
        (AsW) and Government of Indonesia (GOI) versions of the
        Gajah Tunggal strike is instructive. In some cases, the
        Indonesian version provides helpful additional details.
        The most interesting differences, however, are those in
        which both accounts agree on the facts and differ in the
interpretation.

Beginning of Strike

AsW: Workers went on strike after an announcement on July 30, 1991
that the wages of workers employed less than three years would be
adjusted upwards to meet the minimum wage standard, but those
employed for more than three years would not receive raises. The
workers demanded the minimum wage, insurance and paid vacation
leave; they also demanded that the SPSI unit be dissolved, as they
believed it was being used as a tool to control the workers.

GOI: Workers who were already earning above the minimum wage
initiated the strike after new employees who were earning 10
percent below the minimum had their wages adjusted upward. The
long-term employees demanded the same percentage increase. Workers
said they no longer wanted to be represented by the SPSI unit
which represented the entire conglomerate, but asked for a
separate unit to be set up in each of the 14 factories.

Arrival of Military

AsW: On the morning of August 1, after workers on the night shift
in one of the factories had refused to work, truckloads of troops
from the subdistrict military command (KORAMIL) were called in.
The soldiers in combat gear fired plastic bullets into the air and
ordered the workers to choose their representatives then and there
to negotiate with the Gajah Tunggal directors. Workers refused on
the grounds that anyone they chose would be fired. Management
produced a letter that no one would be dismissed, witnessed by the
Ministry of Manpower, SPSI and members of the police.

GOI: By 10:00 a.m., thousands of workers were gathered inside and
outside the fences of the complex. The workers became disruptive
and began to destroy property.

Because of the size and uncontrolled nature of the protest, the
company notified the local office of the Ministry of Manpower, as
required by law, and also notified the local police.

At about 10:15 a.m., members of the Indonesian military (KORAMIL
Battalion 203) arrived at the strike. Contrary to Petitioners'
allegations, these soldiers were not dressed in combat gear but
were equipped with standard riot control gear, including crowd
control sticks and guns loaded with plastic bullets. In order to
stop the destruction of property and control the large crowd, two
or three soldiers fired warning shots into the air.

At this point, the workers began shouting that they wanted to meet
with the management of the company...The head of the local SPSI
asked the workers to choose representatives to negotiate with
management. Fearing that their representatives would be penalized,
the workers demanded that management sign an agreement promising
not to take any action against the representatives. The management
signed the agreement, which was then acknowledged by the
Department of Manpower, SPSI, APINDO (local office of the
employers' association) and an officer from KODIM [district
military command]. [Indonesian Statement, p.92].

Initial Negotiations

AsW: Negotiations began at 3 p.m., with one worker representing
each factory in the complex and with the police, the district
military command and the subdistrict military command in
attendance. The police commander reportedly threatened the workers
that if they continued to strike, they would be charged with
subversion. An agreement was announced at 6 p.m.

GOI: Negotiations began in utter confusion, because instead of 140
worker representatives, about 400 were present.

As Petitioners note, all parties who were present at the strike
also attended the negotiation. This included members of the
police, the district military command and the subdistrict military
command. Contrary to the Petitioners' allegations, however, these
parties were present at the negotiations only to provide
constructive comments and to observe...Petitioners' allegation
that a police commander threatened to charge the workers with
subversion if they continued to strike is completely false...By 9
p.m., the company had agreed to all the workers' demands related
to the company regulations.[Indonesian Statement, p.93]

Arrest of Strike Leader

AsW: The agreement fell short of the original demands and the
strike continued. The worker representatives were called in by the
security forces and government representatives and interrogated
about how they had conveyed the agreement to their colleagues.
They were then sent back to the factories to get the acceptance of
their fellow workers. They returned to work on August 3, but
continued to press their demands in a letter signed by one
Zulkifli Saleh, the man who had become their chief spokesman. On
August 16, Zulkifli was arrested without a warrant by the district
military command (KODIM). Eight other workers were taken to the
KODIM on August 19 and interrogated from 1:30 p.m. until just
after midnight. They saw Zulkifli but were not allowed to speak to
him and were accused of being communists, subversives and
saboteurs.

GOI: About 20 percent of the workers did not start work on August
2, and a second strike began when workers from Plant A, who were
dissatisfied with the agreement began to demonstrate. They then
forced other workers to join in, often using physical force and
threats. By 8 a.m., all the workers had left the factories and
gathered outside. Shortly thereafter, management announced that
the factory was closed and asked the workers to go home. Members
of the  police assisted with the exit of the workers and by 10
a.m. the plant was closed. Management announced that the next day,
the plant would operate as normal and any worker who did not
appear would not be paid. There was no threat of firing.

On August 9, 1991, personnel was informed that Mr. Zulkifli, one
of the worker representatives, had been absent from work for four
days for health reasons. When an employee is seriously ill, the
company usually sends someone to the employee's home to see if the
family needs assistance. When the representative from management
went to Mr. Zulkifli's home, however, he was informed that Mr.
Zulkifli was out attending a meeting.

On August 14, the President Commissioner of the company came to
the complex to meet with one worker representative from each of
the 14 factories. However,...one hundred workers crowded into the
room. Then, Mr. Zulkifli appeared in the crowd and produced a list
of demands. His demands were taken under advisement and work
resumed as usual. After that day, Mr. Zulkifli never returned to
PT Gajah Tunggal...The Government has no information of any arrest
or detention of Mr. Zulkifli.

[Indonesian Statement, pp.94-95.]

Second Strike

AsW: After workers heard about the arrest of Zulkifli, workers at
PT Gajah Tunggal assembled at 1 p.m. and decided to go on strike
immediately, demanding that Zulkifli be freed, that their demands
be met and that the SPSI unit be dissolved. Four truckloads of
combat-ready soldiers from Battalion 203 and other units were
called in and all exits of the complex were sealed off. Soldiers
started beating the strikers who fought back, throwing stones and
destroying one vehicle.

GOI: On August 20, after the lunch break, employees of Plant A
refused to go to work but never informed management of the
reasons. Petitioners' allegation that workers were striking to
demand that Zulkifli be freed is not true.

Management immediately notified the Ministry of Manpower and the
local police...While approximately 60 members of the KORAMIL
Battalion 203 arrived at the complex, they were not called by
management and they did not enter the complex until forced to do
so in response to the violent acts of the protestors.

Petitioners allege that KORAMIL officers beat the strikers. When a
large group of demonstrators gained unauthorized access to the
complex through the portion of the fence that had been destroyed
earlier, management informed military and police of the trespass.
Members of the military began to remove demonstrators, using
retaliatory force in some instances to secure the removal of all
the demonstrators.

Interrogation by Military

AsW: The next day, August 21, more than 5,000 workers marched to
the local parliament building in Tangerang but were prevented from
entering by fully armed troops and riot police. Troops marched
around the Gajah Tunggal complex, firing shots int the air and
beating up some of the workers they accused of insulting the
military and engaging in vandalism. Four workers were detained in
the local police headquarters; by September 4, two of the four had
resigned. Two other worker representatives, Sam'un and Sulawan,
were summoned to the KODIM at 3 p.m. on September 4, where they
were beaten up. They returned to the factory the next day. On
September 7, another worker, Sunardi, was arrested at the factory
and taken to the BAKORSTANAS or internal security agency's
headquarters in Jakarta where he was interrogated about who had
instigated the strike. He was released around midnight and
resigned the next day. Five others were called in by the military
and released; they, too, resigned immediately after their release,
suggesting they were pressured to do so during interrogation.

GOI: Disturbances began again on August 21. In attempt to control
the crowd before violence broke out, police fired into the air.
Thousands of workers marched to the local parliament building
where they were met by the head of the Parliament on the steps and
discussed their demands. Some 85 percent of the workers returned
to work on August 22. The company assured workers of their safety
and almost all returned the following day. Two or three employees
from Plant A decided on their own not to return to work. Over the
next several days, two officers from the local Tangerang police
department (POLSEK) came to the personnel office of PT Gajah
Tunggal requesting permission to question employees suspected of
being directly involved in the destruction of facilities during
the most recent demonstration. These workers were brought to
POLSEK and returned the same day. The police always reported back
to the personnel office after the employees had been returned to
work. No workers were arrested or fired as a result of this
questioning. By the beginning of September 1991, all of the
workers' demands had been successfully negotiated.

Other Cases of Military Involvement

        Asia Watch had also raised a case in Bekasi where the
        chief of police was called in to witness the negotiations
        between workers and management of PT Daimi Azis, a
        ready-to-wear garment factory. Some 900 workers had walked
        off the job in November 1991, demanding they be paid the
minimum wage. According to the Indonesian Government,

Petitioners allege that the police took part in negotiations
between management and workers as a coercive tool to "intimidate
the workers to accept what management offers." This
characterization is inaccurate. While police attended the
negotiations, they served only as witnesses to the negotiations.
In addition, the results of the negotiations themselves
demonstrate that company management granted the workers' demands.
Police intimidation would be both an unnecessary and inappropriate
element in the cooperative tenor of negotiations.[Indonesian
Statement, p.100.]

        It should be noted that the workers were only demanding
        what was rightfully theirs. The government response fails
        to recognize that the very presence of security forces can
        be a veiled threat to the workers and a reminder that
failure to come to terms can have serious consequences.

        Asia Watch had also cited the case of the Medan Canning
        Company where workers, most of them women, went on strike
        in February 1992, demanding higher wages. The strike was
        successful, but on February 16, after the strike was
        settled, five women involved in the strike were detained
        overnight by the district military command, KODIM 0201 as
        a means of punishing them for striking. On February 29,
        four men, including two workers and two labor organizers
        from a local non-governmental organization were arrested
        and held for questioning until March 7, when they were
        released. In response, the Indonesian government merely
        states, "The company did not request this action, and it
        does not have any knowledge of any military
        activity."[Indonesian Statement, p.102.] It is quite
        possible that the company did not request the action, but
        this does not lessen the fundamental violation involved:
        an effort by the military, using a variety of techniques
        including arbitrary detention, to pressure workers into
        refraining from any public expression of grievances or
associating for the purposes of collective bargaining.

        Another case indicates that when security forces detain
        and interrogate workers, they do so not to determine
        criminal liability for actions such as vandalism but to
        ascertain political motivation. On June 8, 1991, after the
        strike at the Evershinetex textile plant in Bogor in May,
        three workers were called in by the regional military
        command, KOREM 061, and interrogated in what they termed a
        threatening manner about their involvement in the strike,
along the following lines:

-- why do you like the New Order [the Suharto government]?

-- why don't you like the Old Order [the Sukarno government]?

-- write out the five principles of Pancasila [the state
ideology].

-- do you believe in Pancasila?

-- which political organizations do you support?

-- which political organizations have been authorized by the
government?

-- what ideology do you favor?

-- what was your purpose in holding a clandestine meeting?

-- who usually calls the clandestine meetings?

...A few minutes later, the head of intelligence for KOREM 061
threw out the following questions:

-- did you hold a clandestine meeting?

-- who told you that such a meeting was being held?

-- who invited you to the meeting?

-- who led the discussion at the meeting?

-- who was present?

-- what were you assigned to do during the strike?

-- who did you know at the clandestine meeting?

-- how many people attended?

-- is it true a factory employee was almost lynched?

-- why did you try to protect that employee and the head of SPSI?

-- who instigated you to go on strike?

After answering these questions, each worker was asked to sign a
sheet of paper, saying:

-- I am ready to resign from Evershinetex.

-- I organized the clandestine meeting and instigated other
workers to strike.

-- I broke the windows of the factory.

-- I wrote anti-Chinese graffiti.  ["Kronologi Kasus Pemanggilan
dan Pemecatan Buruh PT Evershinetex oleh KOREM 061, Bogor," p.3.]


        The three workers, Marsidin, 23; Dedi, 22; and Sarmin, 24,
        were formally dismissed on June 10, 1991. On June 18, a
        group of Evershinetex employees went to the local office
        of the Ministry of Manpower to protest the actions of
        KOREM.  Three days later, three of those employees, Mikun,
        30, who had worked for the factory for 10 years; Ujang,
        30, a five-year employee; and Kasturi, 27, a 12-year
        employee, were summoned to KOREM headquarters on June 22
and forced to sign a letter of resignation.

        On June 26, three more men, Wardoyo, Latif, and Syamsudin
        were summoned, and they went to the KOREM the next day. In
        its original petition to the US Trade Representative, Asia
        Watch quoted sources saying the three were beaten until
        they agreed to resign and sign statements admitting guilt
        in the strikes. The Indonesian government denied the three
        were beaten. In new material obtained by Asia Watch, the
        workers suggest they signed the statement out of fear
        rather than because of physical abuse. Wardoyo was
        interrogated for three hours about what materials had been
        submitted to the Ministry of Manpower; who had led the
        delegation to the Manpower office; why he had become a
        spokesman for the group; and why he had contacted an
        intelligence agent in a rival military unit, KOSTRAD. He
        was then locked in a room. Five hours later, he was taken
        out and asked to sign a statement that he confessed to
        breaking windows, engaging in anti-Chinese activity; and
        holding a clandestine meeting. He was also asked to state
that he had resigned from the factory. [Ibid, p.4.]

        The Indonesian government version is that Wardoyo, Latif
        and Syamsudin tried to return to work but the company
        refused on the grounds that they had been involved in
        vandalism. They were dismissed, according to the
        government, with approval of the Ministry of Manpower. The
        government version made no mention of the role of the
military.

Defense of Workers and Press Coverage of Strikes

        Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are actively
        discouraged from defending workers arrested in labor
        disputes. In late 1992, an NGO called the Jakarta Social
        Institute, which has assisted workers in Tangerang,
        encountered difficulties in getting authorization for its
        staff to defend garment industry workers. The Institute
        was told that there was an agreement involving SPSI
        Tangerang, the local office of the Ministry of Manpower,
        district military and civilian leaders at the district
        level (MUSPIDA) and the Tangerang branch of the national
        employers' association, APINDO that NGOs should be kept
        away from detained workers because they hindered the
        settlement process. [Communication from the Legal Aid
Institute, Jakarta, November 29, 1992.]

        Newspaper and magazine editors were also reportedly urged
        in late 1992 not to "blow up" stories about labor
        disputes, although Indonesian press coverage has generally
been fairly good.

V. FORCED LABOR


East Timorese Workers

        One of the most detailed exchanges between Asia Watch and
        the Indonesian government involved Asia Watch's
        allegations that the Indonesian government in late 1990
        and 1991 had lured hundreds young East Timorese workers to
        Java with promises they would receive vocational training
        and high-paying jobs when in fact they were given menial
        jobs at substandard wages. Many were kept under the
        watchful eye of the Indonesian military and suspected of
        being supporters of the East Timorese resistance when they
        protested about their treatment. The Asia Watch charges,
        published in a May 1992 report entitled "Deception and
        Harassment of East Timorese Workers" were based on
        interviews and several statements signed by the East
        Timorese concerned. The Indonesian government went to
        great lengths to refute the charges, including getting one
        of the signers of the statement published in the Asia
        Watch report, Dominggus Soares, to claim that his name had
        been used without his knowledge. Asia Watch has since
        learned that some of the East Timorese were summoned
        without being told why to the provincial office of the
        Ministry of Manpower in October 1992. They were then asked
        about the accusations that East Timorese were unhappy with
        their work, in the presence of the deputy head of the
        provincial Manpower office, representatives from the
        factories employing the East Timorese, and an attorney
        from White and Case. Under the circumstances, it is
        possible the East Timorese felt they had no choice but to
claim job satisfaction.

The Original Charges

        In its report, Asia Watch noted that in December 1990, a
        daughter of President Suharto, Siti Hardijanti Hastuti,
        better known as Tutut, went to Dili, East Timor, with an
        offer of jobs and vocational training for young East
        Timorese workers. The program was to be run jointly by
        Mrs. Tutut's philanthropy, the Tiara Foundation, and the
        Ministry of Manpower. Hundreds of East Timorese ranging in
        age from 15 to 25 were recruited to take part in what they
        were told would be a three-month skill-training program,
        leading to high-paying jobs on Pulau Batam, an industrial
        development site off the coast of Sumatra. They found
        themselves sent not to Pulau Batam but to enterprises in
        Java and Bali where they worked as unskilled labor, doing
        everything from hauling crates in Semarang, Central Java,
        to cleaning chicken cages at a poultry farm in Bogor, West
        Java. One group of 100 workers who arrived in Surabaya,
        East Java on June 6, 1991 and were then transferred to
        Jakarta, ended up being sent to what was in effect a boot
        camp run by KOPASSUS, the Indonesian special forces. They
        were under constant surveillance, and in at least one
        case, workers were detained and beaten for protesting
        about their working conditions. Many of those who wished
        to return home found themselves stranded. While there was
        no question that the young people had left East Timor
        voluntarily, Asia Watch argued that because they were
        deceived as to the true nature of the jobs and training
        they would be getting and because they did not have the
        money to return, the whole project became tantamount to
forced labor.

The Indonesian Response

        The Indonesian government strongly denied the charges.
        East Timor, it said, with its population growing far
        faster than its economy, has a major unemployment and
        underemployment problem. The local government together
        with the Ministry of Manpower thus developed the East
        Timor Worker Program to improve skills, increase income by
        allowing workers to work in the industrial rather than
        agricultural sector, and reduce the burden on the local
        government to provide employment opportunities. With
respect to the specific charges,

Neither the Government nor the Foundation made any promises with
respect to wages and work location when it agreed to place the
workers... Due to the workers' low skills, the Government found
that it was inappropriate to place the East Timorese on Batam
Island because of the relatively high technology employed there


In 1991, East Timorese workers were placed at the following
locations through the Government's Worker Program:

Location of Assignment                  Number of Workers

Bali                                             60

East Java                                       160

Central Java

        Semarang and vicinity    67

        Solo                                     40

        D.I. Yogyakarta          40


West Java

        Bandung                          23

        Tangerang                                64

        Bekasi                           35

Indocement                               34

DKI Jakarta                             200

South Kalimantan                         39

East Kalimantan                  59

TOTAL:                                          821


[Indonesian Statement, pp.109-110. On pp.112-115, the government
lists some of the companies employing East Timorese, including PT
Gemala Container, North Jakarta; PT Hasi (shoe factory),
Tangerang; PT Kanindotex  (textile), Semarang; PT Suaco (cable
factory), West Jakarta; PT Indah Jaya Textiles, South Jakarta; PT
Indocement (cement plant), Bogor; PT Tunggal Yudi Sawmill Plywood
(logging), in Samarinda, Kalimantan; PT Pamindo Tiga (automobile
part); PT Superior Coach (automobile assembly); PT Bakri Brothers
(steel pipes); PT Gunung Garuda (steel); PT Delta Santa Wood; PT
Kedaung Group; PT Wono Kayo Rojo Koyo (poultry) in Malang, East
Java; PT Kali Jaya Putra (rattan), Surabaya.]

        In 1992, the government notes, 31 more workers were sent
        to Solo and 30 to South Kalimantan, raising the total
        placed to 882. The Tiara Foundation, for its part, placed
        208 East Timorese, with 71 in the textile factory, PT
        Kanindotex in Semarang; 78 in PT Barito Pacific in the
        Moluccas; 24 in PT Kedawung, Jakarta and 17 in the poultry
        farm, Cipendawa in Bogor, West Java. (A communication Asia
        Watch received from eight East Timorese at Kanindotex,
        dated December 7, 1992, notes that in fact, only 38 of the
original group remain.)

The Foundation worked together with the Ministry of Manpower in
the recruitment and selection process, and applicants were chosen
from a list of job hunters compiled by the regional office of the
Ministry of Manpower in East Timor. [Indonesian Statement,
p.111.]

        Asia Watch had called the jobs "menial." The government
called that characterization misleading.

Because workers received the majority of their training on the
job, they all started with simple assignments usually taking
positions in the production unit.[Indonesian Statement, p.111.]


        The government also termed "completely false", the charge
        that the workers were receiving substandard wages, saying
        the wages exceeded the minimum wage applicable in the area
        where they were working. The workers at Kanindotex
        acknowledged in December 1992 that they were now receiving
        above the minimum wage for Semarang. In August 1991, when
        they first made public their complaints, however, their
        wages met the minimum only with the addition of a
        temporary subsidy from the Tiara Foundation and even then,
        room and board, which the workers had thought was promised
        by the company, was deducted. The remainder was inadequate
        to meet basic needs.  Moreover, the workers complained in
        December 1992 that those among them who had been outspoken
        in expressing grievances were receiving Rp.1000 (50 cents)
        a day less than their silent colleagues, a major
        discrepancy when wages are only $1.20 to $1.70 to start
with.

        For its statement to the GSP Subcommittee, the government
        also had 29 workers in the logging company, PT Tunggal
        Yudi Sawmill Plywood, fill out a questionnaire saying how
        much they enjoyed working there. The workers had to give
        their name and employee number and were asked four
        questions: Do you like working for PT Tunggal Yudi Sawmill
        Plywood? How is your relationship with your fellow workers
        or your supervisor? Is it difficult for you to communicate
        with your co-workers or your supervisor? What do you do
        with your wages? No worker far from home at the lowest
        level in the factory is going to say on a form requested
        by the government that he or she is unhappy and has poor
        relations with supervisors -- even if there were not the
        history of human rights abuses by the government against
East Timorese.

        But there is also a history of East Timorese workers being
        forced to make statements about job satisfaction. At the
        PT Kanindotex factory in Semarang, 65 workers signed a
        letter to the then governor of East Timor, Mario
        Carrascalao, that an employee of the Tiara Foundation had
        pressed them into signing a statement the previous May
        that work was going well and there were no major problems.
        "Because the statement was basically forced on us and
        accompanied by threats, that if we refused to sign, none
        of our complaints would be addressed, some of us felt
        forced to sign." [The full letter is published in Asia
        Watch, Deception and Harassment of East Timorese Workers,
4:16, May 19, 1992, p.6-7.]

        The Indonesian government also obtained a statement by
        Dominggus Soares, one of the workers whose signature
        appears on the 1991 letter to Governor Carrascalao,
        disavowing any knowledge of the letter and saying that he
        was happy working for Kanindotex. According to the
        government, "This casts doubt on the veracity and accuracy
of the alleged letter."

        Asia Watch managed to check back with eight of the workers
        at Kanindotex who not only reiterated their original
        charge but said that on August 30, a week after the letter
        was written, "we were forced to denounce our own
        aspirations" in the National Parliament Building in
Jakarta.

        In response to Asia Watch's assertion that one group of
        100 East Timorese were given military training and were
        under surveillance by KOPASSUS, the army special forces,
        the Indonesian government said the charge was based on
        inaccurate information. The workers, according to the
government, were given physical and vocational training.

        The physical training consists of marching, saluting,
        obeying commands, standing at attention, and running
        obstacles courses. The Indonesian military assists with
        this training, which is received not only by workers from
        East Timor but also by workers from all over the country.
        It is thought that this combination of training eases the
        transition from an agricultural environment to a
        industrial one and prepares the trainees for work in an
        industrial environment. Thus, the training that is
        provided to East Timorese youths, although it may contain
        some military elements, is not "military training."
[Indonesian Statement, p.118.]

        As supporting evidence for this remarkable statement, the
        government attached a letter from one Lieutenant Colonel
        Sutrisno, a navy officer in charge of the West Java
        training program. Colonel Sutrisno notes that the military
assistance used in the training centers

comes from the various branches of the Indonesian Armed Forces
including the Marine Corps and Kopassus, a special combat-trained
force which is exceptionally suited to train young job-seekers
from a variety of backgrounds. [Sutrisno letter, Exhibit 98 in
Indonesian Statement.]

        It is KOPASSUS, Asia Watch notes, which has been
        responsible over the years for some of the worst human
        rights abuses in East Timor, including torture,
disappearances and summary executions.

        According to some of the East Timorese in Colonel
        Sutrisno's training center, two youths, Luis Maria Lopes
        and Nuno V. Pereira, discussed their frustrations in a
        meeting with Sutrisno on August 3, 1991 and Sutrisno said
        he would study the problem and meet them again on August
        9. On August 8, however, the two were picked up from their
        Jakarta workplace and taken back to the Training Center
        where they were interrogated by two KOPASSUS officers. The
        following day, 13 other East Timorese then undergoing
        training at the Center were lined up in the area used for
        flag-raising ceremonies and beaten and kicked by three
        soldiers, include one KOPASSUS sergeant and one Marine
        officer. The youths were then interrogated by Colonel
        Sutrisno himself, accused of being political activists and
        threatened with electric shocks if they did not answer
properly.

        The Indonesian government's version is that of the 100
        East Timorese who entered Sutrisno's training program,
        only nine were unhappy with their jobs which consisted of
        loading, unloading and storing rattan. Two of these
        workers were Luis Maria Lopes and Nuno V. Pereira. Colonel
        Sutrisno met with them on August 3 to discuss their
        grievances and told them he would try to find them new
        jobs, "although it would be difficult because they had not
        finished elementary school." He asked them to be patient.
        The next day, Luis and Nuno returned with the other seven
        and met with Sutrisno and the Training Center placement
        officer. The latter asked the East Timorese whether they
        wished to return to East Timor, and they said no. As a
        result, four returned to their jobs, three returned to
        East Timor at government expense "because they caused
        disruption in the workplace," and Nuno and Luis dropped
        out of the program. "Asia Watch's allegations that the
        East Timorese youths...were beaten, kicked and threatened
        with electric shock are completely untrue." [Indonesian
Statement, p.119.]

Irian Jaya

        Asia Watch did not include material on Irian Jaya in its
        June 1992 petition to the Trade Representative. ILRERF
        alleged that some of the indigenous Asmat people were
        forced into labor by Jakarta-based logging companies, a
        charge the government dismissed as founded. Part of the
        difficulty of verifying reports of forced labor in Irian
        Jaya is the lack of access. It is far more difficult to
        get a travel permit into the Asmat area than it is to go
to East Timor.

        Asia Watch has received two reports about Irian Jaya since
        June which need to be investigated. One concerns the PT
        Phoenix company. In July 1992 in Uus, near Agats, a group
        of Asmat workers went to collect wages for several months
        logging and were told that their credit was overextended,
        so they received nothing. Sources said many of the workers
        had effectively become bonded labor, following a
        well-established pattern in Irian Jaya. Companies like PT
        Phoenix reportedly offer a kind of "credit card" to their
        employees to use at company stores, so the workers can
        purchase goods against income from their wages. The goods
        are at the store are usually not available elsewhere and
        the workers have no way of checking, and are often too
        unfamiliar with the process to ask, how their individual
        accounts are kept. They wind up in permanent debt to the
        company store and thus become bonded labor for the
company.

        Another tactic reportedly used by logging companies in the
        Asmat area is to have government inspectors declare logs
        brought in by workers to be below standard because they
        are less than 50 centimeters in diameter. The rejected
        logs are then shipped out anyway as local officials look
        the other way, but the logging companies do not pay the
        workers who felled them. According to one Asia Watch
        source, in February 1992, workers in the villages of Sa,
        Er, Erma and Sona were instructed by the district officer
        working with a company called Artika Optima, a subsidiary
        of the Djajanti Group, to bring in logs no less than 35
        centimeters in diameter. When the government inspector
        rejected the logs as too small, according to this source,
        two months' work of the indigenous clans involved went
uncompensated.

VI. CONCLUSIONS


        Asia Watch maintains that Indonesia is not "taking steps
        to afford internationally-recognized worker rights" as the
        U.S. Trade Act requires. The documentation provided by the
        Indonesian government in rebutting the petitions of Asia
        Watch and ILRERF is voluminous, but selective. While the
        government goes to great lengths to get detailed
        descriptions from different companies about strikes held
        on their premises, it simply denies or professes ignorance
        of beatings, arrests or detentions. The government has
        provided no convincing evidence to suggest that SPSI is an
        independent union or that the Indonesian government is
        willing to allow full freedom of association; on the
        contrary, there is ample evidence to suggest that the
        government has no intention of relaxing its control over
the labor movement.

        The material cited in this paper also indicates that the
        primary agency for exercising control is not SPSI nor the
        Ministry of Manpower but the Indonesian armed forces. As
        in China in 1989 where the demands for autonomous student
        organizations and labor unions, free from Party control,
        became impossible for Chinese authorities to grant without
        calling into question the entire power structure, it is
        virtually impossible for the Indonesian government to
        recognize autonomous labor unions without generating
        demands for autonomy elsewhere. At stake is the role of
        the military in society, the "dual function" which grants
        the armed forces a major role in political life. Real
        progress toward the protection of labor rights will not
        and cannot be made by changes in Ministry of Manpower
        regulations. Full freedom of association will have to
await more far-reaching political change.

                                      * * * *

For More Information

Sidney Jones (212) 972-8400

Mike Jendrzejczyk (202) 371-6592

Asia Watch is an independent organization created in 1985 to
monitor and promote internationally recognized human rights in
Asia.  The Chair is Jack Greenberg, the Vice Chairs are Harriet
Rabb and Orville Schell, and the Executive Director is Sidney
Jones.

Asia Watch is a division Human Rights Watch, which also includes
Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and Middle East
Watch.  The Chair of Human Rights Watch is Robert L. Bernstein and
the Vice Chair is Adrian DeWind.  Aryeh Neier is Executive
Director; Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director; Holly Burkhalter,
Washington Director; Susan Osnos, Press Director.
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU