HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 6 Nov 92 10:23:44 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Nov6061350@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <1992Nov6.001206.17116@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >But, of every possible state of affairs,
>   >is it the case that it obtains or does not?  This is the question of
>   >the status of the Law of Excluded Middle.
>
>  This again is a piece of Dummett-style mystification. Let me be blunt:
>there is no "law of excluded middle" in this sense. There is only a very
>natural tendency to use tautologies in expressing metaphysical convictions.
>Saying "every possible state of affairs obtains or does not" is at best
>only a way of suggesting what one is getting at, and it's a poor way of
>doing this.

But, how do you avoid this "mystification", Torkel?  How do you describe
what you are really "getting at" without introducing some kind of 
metalogical machinery?  Dummett's terminology happens to be at hand, so
I use it.  Show me a better analytic machinery, and I will adopt it
instead.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 10 Nov 92 10:35:33 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In <TORKEL.92Nov9215154@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>And sticking to actual languages, how do you propose to explain what 
>"expresses a true proposition" means applied to English sentences, in a
>way that makes this locution any clearer than those sentences themselves?

Propositions could be any number of things:  Abstract objects like Fregean
senses, the meanings of sentences, or they could be identified with some
class of sentences.  I don't have an opinion on which of these possibilities
(or others) is the best.  Each has its difficulties.  What is an abstract
object?  How can it be the sense of a sentence?  In what does the meaning
of a sentence consists?  How do we pick out the class of sentences in the
case of ambigious locutions and assertions?

>After all, to speak of "the totality of true English sentences" is not to
>make any obvious sense, unless one is able to provide an explication (based
>on whatever considerations) of every possible English sentence.

This is a job for the linguist.  I don't think I have to give an exhaustive
characterization of every possible English sentence before I can refer
to such a totality in a philosophical theory.  Nor, for that matter, is
it necessary for me to provide a full account of the nature of propositions
before I can make use of them in my theorizing.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 6 Nov 92 10:18:42 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Nov6055054@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <1992Nov5.235132.16787@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >If one considers realism to be the thesis that there
>   >is an objective, mind-independent reality, then it seems natural to
>   >me that this metaphysical goal is in some sense the totality of
>   >all true propositions about the world.
>
>  Well, to me it seems natural to couple the thesis that there is an objective
>mind-independent reality with a rejection of the idea of a "totality of
>true propositions about the world" as confused and unjustifiable. Eating a
>banana, I have no doubt about its mind-independent reality. The assertion
>that there is a "totality of true propositions" about the banana, on the
>other hand, is not so much doubtful as senseless.

OK, this is your view.  I understand it.  Allow me to add another quotation,
this time from the Hintikka paper I referred to.

  One partial way of seeing the relevance of [a definition of truth in a
  logic that avoids Tarski's Truth Theorem] is to recall the extremely
  strong, albeit partly tacit tradition or trend in philosophy (not only
  in the philosophy of language) that maintains that semantics is ineffable,
  at least the semantics of our actual working language.  This tradition
  is represented by no lesser figures than Frege, Wittgenstein, the
  Vienna Circle of 1930-32, Quine and Church, and similar views frequently
  rear their ugly heads elsewhere in contemporary philosophical discussions.
  And if semantics at large is inexpressible, then the key concept of all
  semantics, the concept of truth, will _a fortiori_ be ineffable,
  according to this tradition.  Furthermore, we are not dealing here with
  a sect of analytic philosophers, either.  Martin Kusch has shown that
  a similar view is one of the key ingredients of Heidegger's philosophy.
  This entire multiple tradition comes to a screeching halt if truth turns
  out to be definable after all in a nontrivial way.

Now, I'm not saying I underline everything Hintikka is saying here, nor
does Jaakko think that what I focus on in metaphysics is "central".
But, I cite this passage as further evidence of the importance of truth
definitions for philosophy at large.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Plato's Views on Women
Date: 10 Nov 92 15:25:42 GMT
Article-I.D.: unx.BxIAuv.3CM
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <1992Nov09.220747.135547@Cookie.secapl.com>, frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
|> In article <1992Nov8.204839.415@news.wesleyan.edu> RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:
|> >Now, as a professional philosopher whose specialty is feminist philosophy, let
|> >me give the following advice:  To those who *think* they disagree with feminist
|> >philosophy a priori:  why don't you follow your own philosophical method and
|> >actually let us know what particular argument(s) you disagree with, and on what
|> >basis (invalid inferences? false premises?).  BTW, it is only fair that you
|> >take on arguments which actually have been put forth -- no straw or imaginary
|> >arguments, please.  I *THINK* this means that you might actually have to read
|> >some of the literature;  come back & we'll talk after you have...

First, accepting this challange would be a Herculean (no sexism implied) effort
since there are so *many* examples of outrageous silliness in the literature.
However, for those so inclined, what surely must be representative of the
genre is to be found in the APA Newsletter (or those sections of it devoted
to feminist philosophy).  This contains papers by contemporary writers who
are (even as you read this) doing fundamental research in the disputed area.
Read it and weep.  Draw all the examples you like from this source and no
one can accuse you of attacking a straw man (woman?).  (Oh, I see.  The new
Politically Correct term is "straw argument".  Kind of loses the metaphor,
doesn't it?  I mean an actual *straw* argument would be even *more*
substantial than your average argument.)

Second, accepting the challange is of course playing directly into the
hands of those who want to manufacture a discipline from thin air.

What's most fun about the PC crowd is how *easy* it is to irritate them.
These things come and go.  Anyone remember Paul Weiss and the "philosophy
of sport"?  This too shall pass.



-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov5.165309.7636@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov5201244@echnaton.sics.se>
	<1992Nov5.203945.12450@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 21:47:50 GMT

In article <1992Nov5.203945.12450@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >I think we already covered all this two months ago.  I don't see
   >why realism about scientific theories (which is what I have in
   >mind here) can't include a belief that science approaches some
   >sort of ultimate truth about reality.

  Realism about scientific theories "can include" all sorts of things,
for example the belief that the universe is a banana being eaten by
the Composite Principle of Aloofness. But why associate these ideas
with realism?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Date: 11 Nov 92 20:05:53 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov11.150554.17351
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <BxKAF7.JLw@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> 
jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:

>[...]

>My question to Ruth is as follows:  What is 'feminist logic'?  
>In what way is it different from ordinary 'human logic'?  What are
>the attributes of 'feminist logic' that allow us to differentiate
>it from other logic?  Is there a distinction 'feminine/masculine'
>along the lines of 'modal/deontic'?

You must be joking, son.  There is no way Dr Ruth is going to answer
these questions in any venue that would open her miserable logophobic
career to the imminent danger of conclusive intellectual cornholing.
They don't call us The Phallogocentric Cabal for nothing!

>I ask my question in a spirit of true desire to know and understand,
>and I hope that you will take my request seriously.  I simply don't
>have the time or resources to look into the subject extensively, so
>it would be very nice to have a professional in the field give me
>a thumbnail sketch.

I would answer your question myself, but for my abject inability to
come up with a charitable description of the putative subject.  Your
local academic bookstore is likely to have a sheaf of remaindered
copies of a "feminist logic" tract by Andrea Nye.  Read it, and draw
your own conclusions.

>--Jimbo
>
>p.s. Note well that my presumption is that there is no coherent concept
>of 'feminist logic'.  This isn't a sexist presumption (quite the opposite,
>actually) and isn't intended as an insult against the people doing it.

By contrast, my own attitude of similar content is certainly intended
as an insult to the careerist trash who would divide mankind (that's
`man' as in `anthropos' for you, Dr Ruth) into mutually hostile,
incomprehending factions.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Rights
Date: Mon, 09 Nov 1992 21:45:29 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <29OCT199222351076@vax2.concordia.ca> eamon@vax2.concordia.ca (Eamon Egan) writes:
>In article <1992Oct28.180058.89467@Cookie.secapl.com>, frank@Cookie.secapl.com
> (Frank Adams) writes:
>>I think rights are, first of all, social constructs (or institutions).  In
>>this, they are similar to Mondays.  What makes a particular day a Monday is
>>that, by consensus, people agree that it is a Monday.  There are rules for
>>deciding it, but those rules were created, not discovered.
>> 
>[other examples deleted]
>
>>Likewise, rights exist because there is social agreement that they exist.
>>It is the commitment of the society to enforce the right which makes the
>>right real; with no enforcement, there is no right.
>> 
>>I conclude that the concept of a "natural right" is nonsense.
>
>A distinction I make is between "right" in a normative sense,
>and "right" in the sense of something actually enjoyed.  Saying that a 
>certain right exists in the normative sense is the same as saying that the
>same right _ought_ to exist in the "actual" sense.  It seems to me that
>perhaps you are concluding that rights don't exist in the normative sense,
>though you haven't really argued this position.

I will agree that rights in your "normative" sense exist, but they depend to
some extent on the society.  In a modern democracy, the right to vote should
be extended to all adults of reasonably sound mind.  This does not mean that
when England first allowed commoners to vote, they were wrong to only extend
it to people with property -- the system probably wouldn't have worked if so
extended at that time.

>To take a concrete example, consider the proposition that everyone has
>the right not to be arbitrarily picked up and executed.  Obviously this
>statement is false if "right" is understood in the sense of that which is
>*enjoyed*: alas there are places in which people are arbitrarily executed.

There is another sense of a right, which is closer to what I had in mind --
a right is what is generally accepted to be a right.  Such rights may fail
in the sense of being actually enjoyed.  For example, most countries where
people are arbitrarily executed are signatories to treaties prohibiting such
things, and have laws against it.

Consider the right of a medieval lord to execute disobedient serfs.  This
right certainly existed.  We would not consider this a normative right --
the lord should not have had the right.  Yet neither was it truely a right
only in practice: on the one hand, it was socially recognized; and on the
other, it was at times unenforceable in practice, due to the balance of
power between the nobles and the peasantry.

I am claiming that not only is this a meaning of "right" distinct from
either of Eamon's, but that it is the principle meaning.
From: cxm7@po.CWRU.Edu (Colin Mclarty)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Date: 13 Nov 1992 15:49:25 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)
Distribution: inet
Reply-To: cxm7@po.CWRU.Edu (Colin Mclarty)
NNTP-Posting-Host: slc5.ins.cwru.edu


	Will someone who HAS read Andrea Nye's book endorse it?
The net is surely not the most sympathetic environment for her
ideas but it would be good to hear from someone who read and liked
it.

	I went to it with real interest.  I still think there has to
be more to know about logic and gender than just what you can get
out of Sheila Tobias's _Math Anxiety_.  But I did not find it in Nye's 
book.  I have two friends who read it (not counting the redoubtable
Mr. Zeleney who I just found out read it).  One of them, a joint
religion-philosophy Ph D., herself believes that to study formal logic
is a symptom of a clinical associative disorder.  But both of them
were also disappointed.

	Anyone who can give me a more usable slant on the book than I
have found so far, would be appreciated.

Colin McLarty    
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: what can't be verified/falsified in mean
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 14:24:26 GMT

In article <10292317.13025.12234@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz 
(Hakki Kocabas) writes:

   >Also sprach Russell "What cannot be verified or falsified is meaningless."

   Actually he didn't, although the quoted sentence occurs in his
writings - a subtle distinction.

   Another example of a sentence that occurs in Russell's writings was

    The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out
    of His kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity,
    and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing
    and gnashing of teeth.

   To forestall further installments of Wittgensteinian wisdom, I feel
I should point out that Russell did not assert the truth of this
sentence either.
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:50:26 GMT


Marko, I suggest that you fall back from "proposition" to "sentence"
in a suitable language.  I think that "sentence of first-order logic
in a language which has constants for every object" is a good
approximation to "proposition".  It can be established that this is a
consistent totality (it exists in NFU), while the set of "truths"
(true sentences in a language of this kind) is an inconsistent
totality under any reasonable assumptions.

This would answer the objection of vagueness in the notion of
proposition.  It also shows that Grim's argument for the inconsistency
of the totality of propositions is wrong; his argument appeals to no
feature of propositions which is not found in my nonce notion of
"proposition".

In ZFC, the collection of sentences of a language of this kind is a
definable proper class; the collection of true sentences of a language
of this kind will fail to be even definable.   Once again, the notion
of the set of all propositions seems to make sense, while Truth
remains inconceivable.  (Once again, without posing any problem for
the truth of particular sentences in this language or for definability
of truth for sentences of smaller languages in our large language).

The problem with Truth (the class of true sentences) is that its
definition for an initial segment of the iterative hierarchy cannot be
carried out predicatively (without use of quantifiers ranging over
classes) in the next level of the hierarchy.  Definable "Absolute
Infinite" notions are those which can be defined predicatively in the
"next" level (this is how proper classes work).  Truth can be thought
of as present in the metaphorical realm of the Absolute Infinite, but
it is more elusive than the universe or the Russell class, which are
definable proper classes.  The collection of _sentences_ of a language
with a constant for every object in the universe is predicatively
definable, while the collection of _true_ sentences is not.  Making
the theory of classes impredicative does not help; one can make truth
for predicative sentences (those without quantification over classes)
definable (I think) but one now cannot define truth for the new
impredicative sentences.  It does appear that Truth can be constructed
iteratively ("subsists in the Absolute Infinite", Mikhail) but the
construction is in principle indescribable.  This is frustrating, but
true (with a small "t", note).

In NFU, there are analogous considerations which I will not bore you
with; they rest on the fact that in TT it takes at least n+1 types to
define truth for sentences which use n types.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 16:30:59 GMT

In article <TORKEL.92Nov13102037@isis.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1992Nov11.220209.22072@cltr.uq.OZ.AU> gar@cltr.uq.oz.au
> (Greg Restall) writes:
>
>   >Isn't this self-refuting?
>
>   >The use of proper names such as "the Absolute Infinite",
>   >"the Truth" and forms such as "it" seem to indicate
>   >that a rather direct means of reference is in use.
>
>  This is an old problem which essentially has no solution. In many
>religious traditions what is recognized as self-refuting is rather to
>try to refer to what cannot be referred to. (As in the Tao Te Ching
>and the Diamond Sutra.) However, by the same token, it doesn't really
>matter what words we use: "the absolute infinite", "the truth", "the
>buddha mind": such terms are all quite arbitrary, and the essential thing is
>only to keep this in mind.
>
>  This traditional point of view carries over naturally to the
>cumulative hierarchy. The cumulative hierarchy is of course ineffable,
>and any attempt to refer to it is doomed to failure! Of course those
>who lack the requisite religious faith may well take a dim view of
>this notion, but it has a mathematical point as well, since it leads us
>to the reflection principle "any mathematically sensible assertion
>true of the universe is true of some set". Of course this principle
>itself vainly attempts to refer to the universe! But from it we get
>mathematically formulated reflection principles.

I concur.









-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 8 Nov 92 20:24:54 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov8.184850.1742@guinness.idbsu.edu>
holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>In article <1992Nov7.052154.17197@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Nov6.184703.16761@guinness.idbsu.edu> 
>>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

RH:
>>>I don't think that "Reality is the Truth about the world".  Reality is
>>>the world itself; Truth is what can be said about the world.  Of
>>>course, what can be said about the world is part of the world, and
>>>when we start considering what can be said about that aspect of the
>>>world, we get into trouble.  Thus Tarski's paradox, etc.

MZ:
>>Let me see if I am getting this straight.  You, Randall, are
>>presumably "part of the world" itself, and _ipso facto_ part of
>>Reality.  Consequently, what I can say about you is Truth.
>>
>>So we have that
>>
>>	Randall Holmes is a wood duck
>>
>>is part of Truth, insofar as I can, and indeed do say it right now.

RH:
>It would be an element of the set of true propositions in your
>language, 

Am I hearing the term `proposition' from a self-professed extensionalist?

RH:
>	   i.e., an element (not a part) of what I am terming
>Truth[MZL] (where MZL is your language); but all of this depends on my
>being a wood duck, which does not hold.

What do you mean by "does not hold"?

RH:
>AHHH!  I see that I did goof here!  Of course, Truth is not merely
>what can be said about the world, but what can be said _correctly_
>about the world.  Thank you!

Now all that remains is for you to explain the meaning of the adverb...

MZ:
>>Did I get your proposal right, or is there anything more profound to it?

Same question once again.

>-- 
>The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
>above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
>opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
>or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Computer Science (was Re: Natural Kinds)
Date: 9 Nov 92 21:58:00 GMT
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk

Aha: I see Gary Merrill is attempting to define Computer Science.

Neville Shute (Norway) I think once defined an engineer as

'Someone who can do for sixpence what any damned fool can do for a
pound'


Following in a similar vein I would propose that a Computer Scientist
is:-

'Someone who, with twenty weighty theses and ten years of academic
funding can do what any damn software engineer can do with ten lines
of assembler code'

Or so it often seems to me :-(

Leo
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 14 Nov 92 15:29:59 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

if women have a different form of life and have developed different 
language than men, then why shouldn't they have their own logic of their 
language ?
don't you see that even the common word for both language of men and 
women such as "pr*ck" has different use in corresponding languages ?
|-| /-\ |-< |-< |||

Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:2397 sci.logic:1952