HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ice@skynet.uucp (Ice)
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Keywords: nanotechnology, replicator, assembler
Organization: Industrial Cybernetics
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 17:11:51 GMT

In article <9R5NPB5w164w@cybernet.cse.fau.edu> tomh.bbs@cybernet.cse.fau.edu writes:
>
>He discusses these issues and give a mathematical proof that simple
>mechanisms cannot replicate themselves without infinite regress.

Ummmmmm. I thought John Von Neumann proved that automata of sufficient
complexity can reproduce themselves. What is Rosen saying that Von
Neumann did not?

Ice()
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 92 08:02:42 GMT

In article <TORKEL.92Aug28055802@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)  
writes:
> In article <1992Aug28.014351.4993@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu
>  (Barry Merriman) writes:
> 
>    >The fact that Einstein let his philosphical biases prejudice him
>    >against QM is an excellent example of the perils of the philosophical
>    >way of knowing things.
> 
>    The theory of relativity was the outcome of "philosophical prejudices".
> Or do you think that the convictions on which he proceeded in the case of
> relativity were somehow more "scientific" just because he succeeded in that
> case?


I'm not so sure relativity was an outgrowth of his prejudices. I
don't recall any quotes of young Einstein saying ``God does
not fill the universe with Aether'', or ``God does not distinguish
among reference frames''. I assume relativity was an outgrowth of his
understanding of electrodynamics plus a few key physical insights.
(Relativity is essentially contained in Electrodynamics if you 
allow yourself to interpret the theory correctly.)


--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug26.112309.18272@math.ucla.edu>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 08:09:51 GMT

In article <1992Aug26.112309.18272@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu 
(Barry Merriman) writes:

   >Yes, more or less. I have nothing against the "philosophies" that arise
   >from the development and use of theories, a la Bohr, Einstein, etc.

  Actually the relation between philosophy and physical theory is not
that straightforward.

   >Those philosophies are more for practical application (i.e. giving
   >you a powerful way to think about the new methods) than they are
   >philosophy in the academic tradition (trying to understand the 
   >True Nature of things).

  The philosophy of science is concerned with, among other things,
1) understanding what science is, and 2) understanding what, if
anything, science tells us about the world. Naturally, if you have
no interest in these questions, there is no reason for you to
pay attention to philosophy. Very many scientists want just to do
science and not reflect on these things, which is fine. However,
instead of explaining that this is their attitude they often say
very silly things about what science is and what it tells us
about the world.

   >But still, why should I not be irritated with academic philosophers?
   >I view them as intellectual parasites.

  There are lots of intellectual parasites around. Some of them are
philosophers, and very many more are scientists.


  
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 27 Aug 92 13:13:56 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <1992Aug27.080951.1870@sics.se>, torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

|>   The philosophy of science is concerned with, among other things,
|> 1) understanding what science is, and 2) understanding what, if
|> anything, science tells us about the world. Naturally, if you have
|> no interest in these questions, there is no reason for you to
|> pay attention to philosophy. Very many scientists want just to do
|> science and not reflect on these things, which is fine. However,
|> instead of explaining that this is their attitude they often say
|> very silly things about what science is and what it tells us
|> about the world.

Unfortunately, a number of people who call themselves philosophers
of science do not seem to be interested in these questions.

This is *one* view of what the philosophy of science is.  There is
another (more recent) approach in which the philosophy of science
reduces to the sociology and history of science (generally this is
in reaction to the posititivists).  The degree of parasitism increases
with this sterile approach, and Barry would be (is?) quite right
to be distressed by it.

|>    >But still, why should I not be irritated with academic philosophers?
|>    >I view them as intellectual parasites.
|> 
|>   There are lots of intellectual parasites around. Some of them are
|> philosophers, and very many more are scientists.

Virtually all *academics* can be looked upon as intellectual parasites
in this sense.  I don't think it's possible to single out philosophers
of science, or philosophers, or humanities faculty.  But if you look
at education as a product that universities provide to customers,
and if you favor a free market approach, then the appearance of
parisitism disappears (let's ignore the boondoggle of government
grants for now since it doesn't fit into the free market scenario
very well).  People pay for philosophy courses in the same way
(and perhaps for the same reasons -- or similar ones) that they
pay for courses in biology, physics, mathematics, or great minority
artists of the 17th century.  If more academics looked at things
this way, perhaps their product would be better and they would give
less of a parasitic impression.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 92 08:04:13 GMT

In article <TORKEL.92Aug28060221@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)  
writes:
> 
>   My only objection to this remark is that it is completely vacuous. What
> is the point of discussing "philosophy" in terms that presuppose or
> draw on no knowledge whatever of anything having to do with philosophy?

Spoken like a true philosopher :-)

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug27.140443.14075@sics.se> <BtnLK2.9t@unx.sas.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 21:42:47 GMT

In article <BtnLK2.9t@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
 writes:

   >I did not mean to (and don't think I did) characterize the history of
   >science as sterile -- certainly this would be incompatible with some
   >of my other remarks.  What I object to is the "historicist" (or
   >socoiological) approach to the philosophy of science exhibited
   >largely by the likes of Kuhn, Lakatos, Fred Suppe, et al.

  What is "historicist" or "sociological" about Lakatos's doctrines
regarding "the methodology of scientific research programs"?

  >The claim about parasitism was perhaps a bit gratuitous, but if
  >(philosophy of science) = (history of science), it would appear
  >that the philosophers of science are parasitic not only on science
  >but the historians as well -- and can't even *claim* to have anything
  >to add.

  I don't follow your reasoning. Let us assume that philosophy of science =
history of science. Then philosophers of science = historians of science.
You are saying, then, that historians of science are parasitic on science -
which makes about as much sense as saying that ichthyologists are parasitic
on fish - and that historians of science are parasitic on historians of
science.

  Actually the people you refer to don't at all claim that philosophy of
science = history of science, but that we need to know the history of science
in order to do philosophy of science.
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 28 Aug 92 17:53:10 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Aug28.133107.8402@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
>I might add that this is another thing that separates philosophical
>study from scientific study. We don't worry about reading the
>original works, or dwelling on the lives and miscellaneous writings
>of the originators of physical theory. 

But if you want to now how particular bits of science were done,
that's what you have to do.

>For some reason that I don't
>understand, philosphers still devote much time to original 
>works from Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, etc, etc, 
>rather than merely focusing on the concepts themselves, divorced
>from their proponents (and their proponents generally inferior
>original presentations).

Part of the reason is that there's often something in the original
that was distorted in earlier attempts to extract the concepts themselves.  
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: invention of time
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 13:30:24 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Aug26.074234.17369@math.ucla.edu>, barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
|> 
|> When will philosophers realize that "sounding right", "sounding reasonable",
|> "is this _science_", "is this the way nature works", "beauty", 
|> and all these other subjective criteria have no bearing whatsoever on
|> whether a physical theory is valid or useful. If it matches experiment
|> and is convenient to work with, its a good physical theory. Case closed.

While in general I have sympathy with your reaction here, you would
do well to examine some of the history of science with an eye toward
the criteria that can be and have been used *by scientists* in the
process of theory acceptance and rejection.  A good place to start
is _Harvard_Case_Studies_in_Experimental_Science_.  While your claim
that 

	If it matches experiment and is convenient to work
	with, its a good physical theory.

can be defended, a successful defense will expose that "matches
experiment" and "is convenient to work with" must have much broader
meanings than the simplistic ones that one is initially inclined
to give them.  You will discover even that "beauty" may enter the
picture in such forms as the "elegance" of a representation, the
manner in which one theory fits with other theories, or the relative
lack of "clutter" that one theory provides relative to another.
These are issues dealt with not only by philosophers but by scientists
as well.

|> Mr Snodgrass seems to epitomize the classic philosopher, whose main goal

I do not believe that anything could be much further from the truth.

|> is to have a theory they can feel cozy with, that fits into their 
|> limited world view, abides by their prejudices. 
|> 
|> Fine, but abandon all hope of making useful contributions to science. 
|> I hope you just do this stuff for a hobby.

It's nice you have a hobby too -- critical analysis of philosophy
and the philosophy of science.  But even a hobby is worth doing well.
Your own prejudices are getting in the way of what might otherwise
be quite able analysis.  You have a theory of philosophy and philosophy
of science that you feel cozy with, but it doesn't match the facts
(though it may be convenient for you to work with).  Apply your
own criteria for good theories to your theory of philosophy of
science.  To do this you will need to go back into the lab and
get some more (and more reliable) data.

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: invention of time
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 14:53:17 GMT

In <snodgras.714777577@crash> snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
writes:

>      If you look into the 'overwhelming' support for relativity,
> you'll find that once you subtract out the self-reference, the
> assumptions, the handwaving, and the enthusiastic proponents, you're
> left with -- nix. But if you really want to believe, with all your
> heart, just tap your ruby slippers. "There's no theory like
> relativity."

I don't understand why you are picking on relativity in particular. By
your criteria, all support for *any* theory is suspect, since the
evidence depends on theory and assumptions for its interpretation.

However, you are wrong that support for relativity is
self-referential. Relativity makes predictions for the results of
experiments whose interpretation can be done within non-relativistic
physics. The support for relativity is not circular in the sense that
you seem to be implying.

> In fact, evidence for relativity is all in the realm of the obscure,
> or if it's not, it is evidence capable of another interpretation.
> For instance, decay of cosmic ray muons is cited as evidence for time
> dilation, because they last longer travelling down through the
> atmosphere at relativistic speeds than they do when observed in labs
> at slow speeds. Now, in an otherwise normal way of looking at it, one
> might tend to attribute the difference between the decay rates to the
> numerous environmental or source factors related to these different
> muons. But because it has been explained away by invocation of the
> mystical 'time dilation', no one is even investigating such
> alternative causes. ("But that would contradict relativity," is often
> heard as an argument against some hypothesis, which should give some
> idea of how ingrained such notions are.)

I don't know what you are driving at here. When you say that the
behavior of cosmic rays is "explained away" by invoking relativity,
you act as if there were something suspicious about that. On the
contrary, the fact that relativity explains much of the observed
behavior of particles is the reason that we say that there is
overwhelming support for relativity. A scientific theory is said to
have support to the extent that it explains observations better than
rival theories.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: vincent@reg.triumf.ca (pete)
Subject: Re: invention of time
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: dept. of theophysics and cosmogyny
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 10:45:00 GMT

In article <snodgras.714772480@crash>, 
snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass) carries on his one man
campaign against 20th century physics...


It seems to me if you are going to object to the basic 
philosophical assumptions underlying the worldview of 
modern physics ( which are not always implicit to its
practitioners), you are going to have to provide a
viable alternative. As far as working physicists are 
concerned, don't fix it if it ain't broke. It is well
understood that the present model of the universe
is incomplete, but that doesn't prevent it from
providing a staggering amount of practical, useful
results. 20th century technology springs directly
from 20th century physics. 
  [  Now if you say that your quarrel is only with 
relativity, and you have no problem with QM, from 
which springs electronics etc., I can only say that 
the QM world is at least as wierd, if not moreso, 
as that of relativity. In fact, in many ways,
relativity is much more comfortable than QM, in that
it only undermines our naive notions of time, space,
and motion, rather than the more challenging concepts
like causation and determinacy. Certainly Einstein
felt that way. ]
     If you object to the prominent place that mathematics
has in relativity, it seems to me that you are simply
objecting to how the world is built. Math wasn't parachuted
arbitrarily into physics for the gratification of some
math nerds out there - it's there because it works so
well. And math remains simply a tool of the physicist:
just ask a mathematician about the way physicists abuse
math. But surely you know all this. I guess I'm
wondering whether you aren't just having us all on? 
     By the way I don't see anything arcane about the
arenas where relativity applies, though working at
a particle accelerator might qualify me for having a bias.

     Finally, I wonder whether you intent to bring back the
aether? In a universe where energy can be transmitted by
field disturbances which propagate at a finite velocity, 
without a medium, but yet aren't observed to accelerate to 
that velocity, special relativity must fall out of any attempt
to model the world. Similarly, in a universe where a
centrifugal force distinguishes a rotating from a non rotating
object, some sort of theory resembling general relativity
must appear ( at least in any universe where clocks and
metre sticks are dependably reproducible ).

===========================================================================
A cynic's world is comprised                          Pete Vincent
of fools and other cynics

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 92 04:44:37 GMT

In article <BtpA01.KJ@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)  
writes:
> 
> In article <1992Aug28.133107.8402@math.ucla.edu>, barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu  
(Barry Merriman) writes:
> 
> 
> Why not give us an idea of the scope of your knowledge and study
> in these areas?  At least this would enable the participants to
> communicate a little more efficiently with you.  I bet I've taken
> more courses in (and done more reading of) science than you have
> of philosophy.  Geez, my wife (who used to be a philosopher of
> science [biology]) has a degree in biology and was second author
> of a paper in _Nature_ as an undergraduate.  You seem to think that
> philosophers of science don't know any science and have never been
> in a lab.  Not so.
> -- 
> Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]

Im not a philosopher---I don't even play one on TV :-)
I'm a scientist. My knowledge of philosophy stems from 3 or 4 phil
courses I took as an undegrad, reading a lot of existential philosophy,
an occasional glance at books on the philosophical aspects of QM and 
Relativity, and whatever one absorbs in the course of learning science

As far as modern phil, I took a (senior level) course on theories
of personal identity. Much of the work presented there was modern
stuff (at least the last 30 years or so). I was thoroughly dissapointed
in their philosophical approach, by the way---the want to copy 
the gedanken exp style from physics, but the experiments they propose
as just a vague as the issues they are trying to clarify, unlike the
case in physics. (they propsoe all sorts of exotic brain transplants
and stuff to probe the nature of identity---but they have no way of
knowing the outcome of such procedures, so they seem to be probing their
own preconceptions...)

That taste of modern philosophy, which deals with a somewhat scientific
issue (personal identity), was plenty to convince me that philosophers 
have not learned their lessons since the "I think therefore I am" days.

By the way, I note that you are not a practicing philosopher either.
In fact, you seem to work on compiler development. I'm happy about
that, since we need good compilers more than we need philosophers.

But this makes it easy for you to _talk_ about philosophy and science, as you
have no professional, personal stake in either. On the other hand, 
I am a practicing scientist, and so the philosophy of science has
some coupling  to my work. 

You might be ticked off yourself if there were a bunch of "Philosophers of  
Compilation" spouting of about the philosophical aspects of compiler
design, the history of compilation, etc, etc, yet they had never written
or even compiled a program! Agreed?


--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 05:15:22 GMT

In article <1992Aug26.144221.28971@hubcap.clemson.edu> steve@hubcap.clemson.edu  
("Steve" Stevenson) writes:
> 
> It seems that it takes both---the philosopher to criticize and the scientist
> to counter with a better theory.
> 
===============================================================================
> Steve (really "D. E.") Stevenson           steve@hubcap.clemson.edu

I take that as an insult. We don't need the philosophers to criticize
things that they don't appreciate anyway. There are plenty of vigorous 
critics within the scientific ranks. The criticisms of philosophers
fall on deaf ears, as they pale in comparison to the critics from 
within the fields.

Philosophers would like to project the image that they are 
the vanguard of criticism and logical scrutiny. The history
of science does not bear this out, tho. Where are instances 
of key scientific criticisms originating from the philisophy departments?

If anything, their criticisms tend to focus on the least interesting 
aspects of the theory, from the scientists point of view.


--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech