HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
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Date:         Sun, 27 Sep 1992 18:46:06 EDT
From:         "(Martin Taylor)" <mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA>
Subject: Re: Dag's diagrams; impedance

[Martin Taylor 920927 18:30]
(Bill Powers 920926.1900)
>
>
>The "impedance" concept is sort of ingenious, but I can't see how to
>model it so that a particular output from a control system would be
>spread out among all the different possibilities -- what would keep
>all of them from trying to happen at once? It is really harder to
>drive a car than to ride a bicycle? When I try to reduce your clever
>idea to a specific case, I can't think of a way to make it work.

Well, I must have misinterpreted you some months or more ago, because I thought
it was your idea.  It's "always" been a part of my concept of PCT.  Anyway,
if it wasn't your idea, here's how I see it. They all DO try to happen
at once, but they can't. They inhibit one another.  It is the world that stops
them all happening at once.  If they could, they would.  Outputs are going
in all directions, but the world prohibits some percepts from actually being
controlled.  So the "taking bicycle" percept/reference cannot be satisfied
if you are sitting in the car.  I guess in the background there is another
point I meant to discuss at some time--"giving up."  When there is persistent
error, one possible and often used response of an ECS is simply to reduce its
gain to zero, to give up on a hopeless situation.  If that happens, the
"taking bicycle" reference is simply relegated to the scrapheap of unfulfilled
goals (don't take that seriously) when you start the car.

In general, if the world is such that the taking of some action precludes the
taking of another, only one will happen (or neither).  You have no choice in
the matter, and generally the one that happens is the one that seems easier
at the moment (i.e. involves the most readily satisfied lower-level reference
levels).

I don't see choices happening at the time of the event.  Only in the imagination
or preplanning operations, and in them you can imagine at the same time
bicycling, driving, and walking.  You could think of choices being made
then, possibly as a consequence of the overall error resulting from the
imagination of each (aching muscles and wet clothes from bicycling, for
example).  But imagination/planning is a whole can of worms perhaps best
left unopened for now.

Martin
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Date:         Tue, 6 Oct 1992 12:57:45 EDT
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      re: percept

[From: Bruce Nevin (Tue 92106 12:22:23)]

(Martin Taylor 921096 10:45) --

You probably haven't changed your use of "percept" since introducing it.
Evidently, the confusion is mine.  I can see how it came about.
Whenever you said "percept" I assumed that you meant something different
from "perceptual signal": neither expression is any more or less
unwieldy than the other, so the obvious motivation that I would have in
your place would be to make a terminological distinction.

Because of your background and training, I assumed "percept" must be a
neologism in the jargon of psychology, now being applied by you to PCT.
Because of its shape, it looks like a product nominalization to me,
denoting the product or result of the process ("perceiving") named by
the verb, e.g. on the following analogy:

	conceive : concept :: perceive : percept

It was because of this confusion that I took "percept" to refer to
something other than the perceptual signal itself (neural current in a
nerve fiber in an ECS).  I could make sense of the word only by
supposing that you were reifying a referent for the perceptual
signal--yet I couldn't believe that of you.

If there is a chance that others might be similarly confused, mightn't
it be better to stick with "perceptual signal," "reference signal
(stored memory of a perceptual signal)," and "desired" or "potential
perceptual signal (matching a reference signal)," respectively, for the
three senses you've identified?

	Bruce
	bn@bbn.com
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Date:         Wed, 30 Sep 1992 13:33:00 GMT
From:         Hortideas Publishing <0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Why 99%?

From Greg Williams (920930 - 2)

>Martin Taylor 920929 16:00

>My presumption is that you get the 99% prediction because the subsystems
>(perhaps ECSs) that are involved in the task are those that support very many
>different kinds of behaviour, and so are not readily disturbed by contextual
>differences.

I believe that the highly precise predictions which have been achieved by some
PCT tracking models are due to the condition of "good" control being
satisfied in the experiments to which the predictions are applied. That is,
the subject is able to track close to the target (because the disturbances are
"easy" to compensate for). ANY negative-feedback model with a reasonable
frequency response would predict tracking close to the target, yielding highly
precise predictions. But this is misleading, because the important question
(if you already believe in PCT) is how to choose BETWEEN different negative-
feedback models, and the only way to do this WITH HIGH PRECISION is by looking
at transient (temporarily "poor") control. The "good" control case data simply
don't allow sufficient sensitivity for comparing different models. But apply
some square-wave disturbances, and you'll see immediately whether, say, a
proportional-integral-derivative linear negative-feedback tracking model with
PARTICULAR values of parameters gives more precise predictions than the same
kind of model with DIFFERENT parameter values or than other kinds of models
with various parameters.

Best,

Greg
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Date:         Mon, 5 Oct 1992 14:18:48 EDT
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: Competing behavior

[Martin Taylor 921005 14:00]
(Bill Powers 921005.0830)


>If the competing behaviors do not inhibit each other inside the
>hierarchy, this means they must be mechanically interfering with each
>other outside of it.
>
Yes, that's right.  If they don't inhibit one another in the world, and
are provided with reference signals by the same higher-level ECS, they will
act simultaneously.
>
>But as only one of a mutually-exclusive set of
>behaviors can be occurring at one time, I fail to see how there can be
>more than one such behavior going on. If I take the car rather than
>the motorcycle, how can taking the motorcycle even occur, outside the
>hierarchy?

On other occasions, the car may not have been available.  On this occasion,
whichever behaviour had the lowest impedance would inhibit the other(s).  It
took reorganization for the hierarchy to develop in such a way that taking
the cycle was a possible way of reducing the perceptual error, equally with
taking the car.

This discussion revolves around whether it is a property of an ECS that it
"knows" what it is doing when it provides an output.  I have been taking the
position that each ECS is blind, in that all it knows is that it provides an
output when it has a non-zero error.  If the hierarchy has been effectively
reorganized, that output will reduce the error more probably than not (whether
it actually does is dependent on the momentary state and disturbances of
the world and on other control systems that affect components of its
feedback circuit, but the ECS knows nothing of that).  You seem to require
the ECS to know what lower-level ECSs are doing and to choose which one to
activate.  I will turn back on you your own frequent question.  What percept
does it control to do that?

Martin
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Date:         Wed, 30 Sep 1992 20:49:00 -0400
From:         psy_delprato@EMUNIX.EMICH.EDU
Subject:      Instructional Labs

[From: Dennis Delprato (920930)]

(From Rick Marken (920930.1100))

>>Dennis Delprato (920929)--

>>Any progress on the "Goal-Seeking with Random Consequences
>>of Responses" lab, Rick?

>Nope. My kid took my computer so I can only work on it at work -- but that
>would be wrong (to quote that great moral philosopher, R. M. Nixon).

I take that this also means  you are "not a crook."  Furthermore,
I'll trust you with my audiotapes any time.

>But I think I would like to do the following: I would like to write
>the lab in Basic. I would suggest that the lab be a study of
>"reinforcement" and discriminative stimulus theory. Have them collect
>data from a couple subjects; then have them try to explain the
>results. They could choose from several models in the computer. Then
>they could compare the behavior of the model to that of the subject.
>The goal of the lab is to help the student understand that the concept
>of reinforcement imples that there is a controlled perceptual variable --
>in this case, what is controlled is the relative position of the moving
>dot and one of the stationary dots on the screen.

>I think it could be fun -- especially if you have a condition which
>lets the experimenter manipulate the direction of the movement of the
>dot after each press; once the experimenter has discovered the
>controlled variable, he/she can then "control" the subject's bar
>pressing rate by making the dot tend to move away from the target
>dot after each press. So you can show that this kind of "control by rein-
>forcement" is a consequence of the disturbance resistance characteristics
>of a control system.

Go for it.  But, to me this is a step above the present version of
the lab based on your E. coli study.  The "Goal-Seeking With Random
Consequences of Responses" lab might best precede the one you have
just proposed.  By way, I have access to several IBM compatibles, as
well as to the Macs.

I do feel that for purposes of instruction, it is a good policy to
keep things as simple as possible so as not to obscure the really
big points of PCT with matters that are best considered by the
more advanced student.  Bill's Demo 1 and Demo 2 (not currently
in a form suitable for  labs) nicely illustrate a gradual
build up in complexity.

Dennis Delprato
Dept. of Psychology
Eastern Mich. Univ.
Ypsilanti, MI 48197
Psy_Delprato@emunix.emich.edu
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Date:         Wed, 30 Sep 1992 10:46:07 -0400
From:         psy_delprato@EMUNIX.EMICH.EDU
Subject:      Postulates

[From: Dennis Delprato (920930)]

(Greg Williams):

Thank you for your statement of PCT's fundamental postulates.

Your expression is such that each of Skinner's has a corresponding
one in PCT.  Another consideration is to identify what is most
central (what points) to PCT and begin from here.  The ones I
extracted from Skinner's written corpus were those that
in my evaluation of tha data appeared most central; furthermore,
some of his close followers made suggestions that I took into
account.

Either way, I think it is important to "get the cards on the
table" in matters scientific, thus exposing fundamental
(often hidden) assumptions to closer scrutiny.

I made  a typo in  VIII A.: Reeducations should be
Reductionism.  I might note here that one outcome of my efforts
was to show quite a bit of coherence in Skinner's assumptive
framework (in the absence of careful scrutiny).  His advocates
liked this.  What they did not like was his conflicting
statements on the reductionism-nonreductionism question.  I clearly
exposed this striking incoherence (through his most recent writing).
Advocates were displeased--more with him than with me, for the
data were undeniable--he was inconsistent.
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Date:         Sat, 26 Sep 1992 19:59:32 EDT
From:         "(Martin Taylor)" <mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA>
Subject: Re: Chjoosing actions

[Martin Taylor 920926 19:45]
(Bill Powers 920925 20:00)
>
>
>>Whoa, there.  One of the consequences of the PCT approach is the
>>idea that the same end can be achieved by many different means.  If
>>one possibility is blocked, another can be used.  And often the
>>various means are mutually exclusive in any case.
>
>This is a "levels" problem, which I was avoiding during the argument
>to keep from getting more complexities into the act.
>
>A control system that acts by choosing one action from a selection of
>others can't also choose the amount and direction of that action that
>ensues from disturbances. That takes two levels (more than one,
>anyway). Achieving the same end by variable means (which is required
>by disturbances of various kinds) is the result of a control system's
>reacting to error by altering its output.

I didn't mean to introduce a levels problem at all.  What I had in mind was
much simpler and more general.  For one thing, I haven't yet begun to think
seriously about ECSs that can direct their output to different supporting
ECSs.  I am still thinking of "blind" ECSs that simply produce more or less
output depending on the error.  But an outside observer can see that prior
reorganization has given this ECS several different parallel paths (which
I have called micro-loops or something similar) by which this output passes
through the outer world and affects the ECS's percept.  Normally, the path
with the lowest resistance (I like the word "impedance") in the outer world
provides most of the effect.  If the real-world situation makes the micro-loops
mutually incompatible, then only the one with the lowest impedance has any
effect at all--we choose the path of least resistance.  If the car is there,
we use it.  If not, we bicycle if that's available. Otherwise, we walk or take
the bus.  We can't do all at once, but all have at some time or other been
by reorganization made available as expressions of the output of the ECS.

If a low-impedance loop is not available, perhaps the ECS has to produce more
output to have any effect at all on its percept (these things are not linear
when we get to this kind of level).  But it may not have to do so.  The
alternate means may be used without any change in output level.

I don't think you need any "choosing" systems when you are actually acting in
the world.  I think you need them when you are imagining (planning), because
then there are no blocks to the execution of any path (they all have essentially
zero impedance).  And the whole issue of imagination needs a discussion like
the one you have been having with Greg.  I don't think it is clear (at least
not to me) yet.

Martin
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Date:         Wed, 30 Sep 1992 13:41:17 EDT
From:         "j. f. arocha" <CYBN@MUSICA.MCGILL.CA>
Subject:      skinner and reduction

[From Francisco Arocha, 920930;13:38]

(Dennis Delprato, 920925)

>                              VIII. A. Reeducations:
> The subject matter of psychology is reducible (at least to biology).
>
>                              VIII. B. Nonreductionism:
>   Behavior cannot be completely explained in terms of biology or any
>                        other "lower-level" discipline.

and (920930)

>   His advocates liked this.  What they did not like was his
> conflicting statements on the reductionism-nonreductionism question.
> I clearly exposed this striking incoherence (through his most recent
> writing). Advocates were displeased--more with him than with me, for
> the data were undeniable--he was inconsistent.

These two statements are not necessarily contradictory. This is simply
because there is more than one kind of reductionism. The most radical
being physicalism (everything is reducible to physics), but there are
more moderate forms, such as emergent reductionism, which involves
partial reduction, not total, because of the acknowledgement that
matter (at any given level) has properties that lower forms do not
posses. The way you phrased VIII.B: 'cannot be COMPLETELY
explained...' is coherent with this more moderate version of
reductionism. So you could always explain higher levels by using lower levels, w
properties. But, this may not be the way Skinner thought about it, in   ich case
which case, as you said, he was inconsistent.

Salut,

Francisco
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Date:         Mon, 5 Oct 1992 08:31:57 -0600
From:         "William T. Powers" <POWERS_W%FLC@VAXF.COLORADO.EDU>
Subject:      Competing behavior

[From Bill Powers (921005.0830)]

Martin Taylor (921002.2230) --

>I never intended to imply that the competing behaviours had any
>connection internal to the hierarchy other than that they all had
>references to which a higher-level ECS contributed. They certainly
>should not inhibit one another internal to the hierarchy,

If the competing behaviors do not inhibit each other inside the
hierarchy, this means they must be mechanically interfering with each
other outside of it. But as only one of a mutually-exclusive set of
behaviors can be occurring at one time, I fail to see how there can be
more than one such behavior going on. If I take the car rather than
the motorcycle, how can taking the motorcycle even occur, outside the
hierarchy? How can there be any other behavior to compete with the
actual behavior of driving the car? As far as I can see, the hierarchy
can accomplish its goal either by driving the car or by using the
motorcycle; whichever one is going on is the ONLY one. The other
behavior simply does not occur.

I'm not convinced that "competing behaviors" means anything. Perhaps
you can spell out the mechanism you mean in more detail.

>I see you still don't buy the notion that not all controllable
>percepts are at any one moment controlled, and that most ECS gains
>either are very low or the ECS is in some way disconnected from the
>physical world.

I'm not sure what I said that gave you this idea.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------   Best,

Bill P.  
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Date:         Tue, 6 Oct 1992 14:26:46 EDT
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      percept

[From: Bruce Nevin (Tue 92106 13:21:19)]

(Bill Powers (921006.0945) ) --

So, clearly, Martin did not introduce the term.  But in your usage it
seems to evoke our subjective experience ("qualia") rather than a neural
current in a nerve fiber:

>A _percept_ is the basic unit of experience. It is that "bit" of
>perception which is self-evident to us, like the intensity of a light,
>or the taste of salt.

In any case, I hope you can see that the typical reader, whether dipping
into LCS or into CGS traffic, is unlikely to bear the technical
definition in mind and might well be misled by the conceive : concept
analogy.  I am not the most hasty or careless reader you will encounter,
and I forgot.  It perhaps calls for frequent "by the way" reiteration of its
definition, like acronyms, when we really must use it instead of
"perceptual signal" etc.

>What I had in mind, I think, was to define
>control theory without any reference at all to an objective outside
>world. I obviously gave up on that as being impractical.

The effort founders I think on the fact that you want to communicate.
In order to communicate, we assume prior agreement about what appear to
be CEVs in the world, and in the process of communicating we verify and
negotiate these and other agreements.

It seems important to us to understand those CEVs as being in the public
world, external to all communicating parties (including the CEVs that
constitute the communicating parties ourselves).  This craving seems to
arise because such agreements are a prerequisite for cooperative action,
and a great many of our controlled perceptions are influenced by actions
of others (cooperative or not).

But public stability is an assumption, a meta-agreement that is part and
parcel of the "prior assumption" just mentioned.  But this is to say
only that we maintain reference signals for having agreements about CEVs
in the public domain, and when discrepancies result in error signals we
act to re-establish those agreements.  This seems to me to be what
compels negotiation and motivates the search for agreements.  For the
sake of the perception of public stability, these agreements once
attained are attributed to the world as being knowledge of the world.

Agreements, and the cooperation that they enable, may even be sometimes
more important to us than the "fidelity" of public-domain CEVs with
personal perceptions.  We may tolerate discrepancies.  Sometimes people
may compartmentalize or encapsulate systems of perceptions so as to
avoid perceiving inconsistencies (Rokeach: _The Open and Closed Mind_).

Oh dear, I wasn't going to say much.  I'll never catch up at this rate!

	Bruce
	bn@bbn.com
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Date:         Mon, 28 Sep 1992 17:31:00 BSC
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From:         gomide@FPSP.FAPESP.BR
Subject:      Apologies re: InterMeta course

PLEASE DO NOT SEND MONEY !
It is with regret that I perform this task. Dr. Gelson V. Gomes. a
professor of the University of Parana, Brazil, has exceeded this
privileges and announced a eletronic course:

> ____________________________________________________________
>        Mastering INTERNET Tools, Seizing METANET Power -
>                      The InterMeta Course
> ____________________________________________________________

I must apologize for this flagrant breach of network etiquette. Please
be aware that Dr. Gelson had no right to do so, since this is against
the rules of our ANSP network, and also against the Bitnet rules.
PLEASE DO NOT SEND MONEY!
I will not discuss what his motivations were. But his account has been
revoked, and there will be no such course through my network.

Please write by normal mail, to:
-> Gelson V. Gomes
-> 358, R. Alvaro Andrade - ap.1201
-> Curitiba PR BRAZIL 80610-240
to get more information on his objectives. He may want to give the
course by normal mail.  :-)

With regards,
--
Alberto Courrege Gomide | Fundacao de Amparo `a Pesquisa - (11)831-3357
Software Supervisor     | Rua Pio XI, 1500 - CEP 05468-901 - Sao Paulo
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Date:         Sun, 4 Oct 1992 16:50:54 EST
From:         "(Avery Andrews)" <andaling@FAC.ANU.EDU.AU>
Subject:      reality of rules paper

For anyone interested in such things, I have a paper draft on the
psych. reality of (some) linguistic rules, sort of a limited brief
for cognitivism.  Definitely no PCT in, but the stuff I talk about
will have to be faced by a PCT theory of language.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au
From: BAKANICV@ASHLEY.COFC.EDU
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Subject: test message
Date: 6 Oct 92 13:33:08 GMT
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Pardon the inconvinence , but this is only a test message.  I wish to see
if the gate between bitnet and internet has routed this to the correct
network. Thanks,  Von Bakanic BAKANICV@ASHLEY.COFC.EDU
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