From: kevin@nuchat.sccsi.com (Kevin Brown)
Subject: Re: Nuke Stupidity Rebuttal
Organization: I can't see any in the immediate vicinity...
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 07:07:24 GMT

In article <53930@dime.cs.umass.edu> yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken) writes:
>In article <1992Sep24.205410.7405@nuchat.sccsi.com> kevin@nuchat.sccsi.com (Kevin Brown) writes:
[...]
>>While this may be true, I was under the impression that the only types
>>of severe failure that would be of any concern at all involve breaches
>>of containment.  I would think that this would simplify the problem
>>space considerably.
>
>Not really, small failures can add up to big failures. For example,
>suppose that a backup power system fails during a SCRAM, the loss
>of a battery or the improper care of a diesel or the misinstallation
>of lightning surge protectors .... could all impact on probabilities
>of big failures.

Okay.  Well, let's suppose that the things you're talking about happen.
What sort of "big failure" are we talking here?

My point is this:  I don't see how the kind of scenario you're so concerned
with can occur without some kind of release of highly radioactive material
from the reactor.  And as far as I know (this could be sheer ignorance on
my part, of course), the only way such a release can occur is when the
containment is breached.  After all, the *job* of the containment is to
prevent such a release, yes?

>>Yes, we *do* pay more attention to accidents with terrible consequences
>>than those with minor consequences.  I do not question that this is so.
>>I question that this is wise.

I wanted to reiterate this.

We humans have a fascination with the spectacular or the unusual.  That
we have a tendency to emphasize such things in no way indicates that we
should base our decisions on those tendencies.  For some reason, however,
you seem unable to keep yourself from doing just that, at least with
respect to nuclear power.  Why is it that you seem inconsistent in this
regard?  Why is it that your decisions with respect to transportation
(to name one example) are not similarly based primarily on the spectacular?

>>As for your car, what *I'm* saying is that you're probably better off
>>using the reliability of your headlight system than the reliability of
>>your brakes as the prime determining factor in the decision of what
>>form of transportation to use (note, however, that *neither* is probably
>>a good factor to use in the decision.  It's a relative thing).
>
>Did you learn to drive in Boston? 

No.  I learned to drive in Houston.  Is there a significant difference?

By the way, I have experienced electrical system failure that took the
headlights with it before.  The danger such a failure presents should not
be underestimated.  It is quite possible that the danger is very close to
the danger presented by a brake system failure.

>>Interesting stuff.  I would ask, then: what is the proper metric to use for
>>deciding which risk model to use (note: there may not be a good or simple
>>answer to this one, in which case references would be appreciated)?
>
>Look at the EPRI book previously referenced. Also see Brittle Power by
>Lovins for another view of risk. 

Okay.  These are views, though, correct?  Are they considered definitive?

If not, then please direct me to something that *is* considered definitive
(by the scientific community).  If no such thing exists, then I must
conclude that there *is* no single proper metric to use.

>>>You claim that n deaths distributed over 10 years are equivalent to n
>>>deaths over 3 days embedded in 10 death free years.
>>>I disagree. Who's being objective?
>>
>>Whether or not these are "equivalent" depends on how you're measuring them.
>>In terms of the numbers alone, they are quite obviously equivalent.  Dead
>>is dead, no matter how it's concentrated.
>
>Right, but we can easily tag on other numbers which expose the difference.
>Suppose that there are 100 people living in my village and that we
>chose between the risk of losing 20 people in one disaster and losing
>20 people over 10 years. Clearly, the village itself may not be able to
>survive a sudden loss of 1/5 of the population, but it may be able to
>cope with a longer term loss. 

Change the data the model has to work with, and you change the model.  What
you've done above is provide additional information to work with.  So, with
the additional information, I agree that the two cases (losing 20 people in
one disaster, with no deaths during  the remaiing time and losing 20 people
over a period of 10 years) are not equivalent.

But this is only because you've provided a more detailed context.

If you're trying to say that our decisions must account for the specific
circumstances surrounding them, you'll get no argument from me.  However,
the discussion of nuclear power versus coal power has thus far been one
without such detail.  It has thus far been about the "general case".  As
such, there is no such detail of the type you provide above, and as such
the models will necessarily seem somewhat simplistic.

>>So: you ask who is being objective.  Well, the only *objective* difference
>>between the two scenarios is the distribution, and they are otherwise
>>equivalent, at least in objective terms.  And that is as far as I'm willing
>>to go in terms of damage assessment, because I realize that any further
>>meaning that is assigned is purely subjective.  Inasmuch as you brought
>>this point up, presumably to demonstrate a case in which the two options
>>are equivalent in terms of the numbers but are "really" much different, I
>>would have to say it is myself who is being objective, and you who is
>>being subjective.
>
>No. You are chosing to ignore factors which are not accounted for in your
>model. A more complete model might have terms for economic disruption,
>emotional trauma, .... 

Yes, yes, I realize this.  But note that these factors occur as *consequences*
of the difference in distribution, which the objective includes implicitly.

>The real world is very complex, and we cannot
>hope to capture it all in any formula. 

Ah, but this was not my intent.  Rather, my intent is to capture the basic
essence of the real world, and to do so with as little reliance on my own
value set as possible.

>Your choice to value what your
>model can calculate over the subjective, but real, phenonemna which your
>model ignores, is not an objective choice.

Come again?  You think it's not an objective decision to place less
significance on that which you cannot determine objectively?

This may be.  Ultimately, the desire to attempt to model the real world as
accurately as possible is a value judgement.  However, I would argue that
at the very least it is a *useful* value judgement (which, one may argue,
is in itself a subjective term).

[on risk]
>>>There is no analytical model which will allow us to make an unbiased and
>>>objective judgement.
>>
>>THANK YOU.  You have put into words something that I have observed to be
>>the case for quite some time.
>>
>>Since the danger ("risk") presented by each type of plant cannot be assessed
>>in an unbiased and objective fashion, but the benefits and costs *can* be
>>assessed in an objective and unbiased fashion (reasoning: we have large
>>amounts of data on the amount of power produced by each type of plant, the
>>operating expenses for each, the building costs for each, and the pollutants
>>produced by each), and since the real world doesn't give a damn about how we
>>feel about things, I argue that we would be better off, in real-world terms,
>>making the decision *primarily* based on the objective cost/benefit
>
>Presumably, we make decisions in order to make ourselves happy, not
>to maximize some arbitrary indicator. The "real world" may not give
>a damn about how we feel, but  we do (or should). We invent 
>mathematical models of the world to help us understand it, and to
>help us understand the consequences of our decisions. We do not, or
>should not, come to believe that these models should dictate our
>decisions.


Right.  But note that this doesn't contradict what I'm saying.

That we care about our own happiness is precisely why we attempt to model
the real world, just as you say.  The object is to control our own actions
such that the feedback we receive from the real world maximizes our
happiness.  The assumption is that the more accurate our models are, the
closer we can get to this maximum (i.e., the happier we'll be).  Inasmuch
as the models we use are basically our best guess about how the real world
actually works, it seems obvious to me that if you care so much about our
happiness, you'll rely on those models as the primary determining factor
in your decisions (reasoning: the models predict real world behavior based
on the decisions you make.  While no model is 100% accurate, most are
better than chance.  Not using them is, I would argue, equivalent to relying
on chance.  You might get lucky, but you probably won't).

Should the models dictate (i.e., be the primary determining factor in) our
decisions?  If you care about happiness, then I think the answer is a
resounding "yes".  Unless, of course, you happen to have a better (i.e.,
more accurate) model.  But in *that* case, your model should replace the
one currently in use, and thus become one of "the models".

>>If the judgement of the danger presented by the various power-plant options
>>is a subjective one, why is it that the anti-nuclear people insist on
>>concentrating on that judgement?
>
>"Subjective" judgments are not necessarily content free. 

True.  But because they depend primarily on your value set, they are, in
essence, random, and thus ill-suited to the task of making decisions about
the real world.

>In any case, it's >the best we can do for many issues.

Yes, it *is* the best we can do for many issues.  The problem is that, at
least with respect to the issue of nuclear power, it *isn't* the best we
can do.  In the case of nuclear power as an alternative to coal power, we
have behavioral models and cost/benefit models which have real-world data
to support them, and that means that, if we choose to base our decision on
them, we can do better than chance in getting the results we want.  Basing
our decision purely on subjective judgements, however, is effectively the
same thing as relying on chance to make the decision.

Most decisions are a combination of objective and subjective judgements.  I
think that decisions about power-generation technology are no exception.  My
primary argument is that these decisions should be based *primarily* on the
objective judgements and *secondarily* on the subjective judgements.  At
least then it's not as likely that you'll be fighting the real world (a
fight which you're guaranteed to lose, inasmuch as you are subject to its
laws and not vice-versa).

>yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu



-- 
Kevin Brown					kevin@nuchat.sccsi.com
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