HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc
Subject: New Journal
Date: 2 Sep 92 10:41:15 GMT
Reply-To: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK

Here is a pre-launch announcement of a new journal, which may be of interest
to members of this newsgroup. Please feel free to propagate it.

Ross

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\documentstyle[a4,11pt]{article}
\pagestyle{empty}
\parskip 12pt
\begin{document}
\begin{center}
{\Large \bf Computer and Communications Security Abstracts\\}
\vspace{3.5ex}
{\Large \noindent Pre-launch Announcement}
\end{center}

Keeping up with research in computer and communications security is
becoming a very time-consuming activity. A conscientious researcher in 
the field would have had to read well over 600 papers last year; and 
as the amount of research activity grows, the problem can only get worse.

We are currently developing, with Cambridge University Press, an abstracting
service designed to solve this problem.

{\bf `Computer and Communications Security Abstracts'} will summarise 
research in computer security topics such as access control, database 
security, formal methods, distributed systems, biometrics, security 
management, risk management, contingency planning, legal issues, audit, and
applications; and in communications security topics including stream and
block cipher techniques, public key cryptography and computational number
theory, complexity and theoretical cryptography, cryptanalysis, 
authentication, protocols, and applications.

Our mission is to provide abstracts of as much published research and
development work as possible. This includes not just conference and journal
papers, but also research reports and theses. We will make a particular
effort to report work which is published in languages other than English,
or which for other reasons might escape the notice of the research
community.

We expect that the first issue will be published in March 1993. It will be
quarterly to begin with, and become bi-monthly once a sufficient flow of
abstracts has been established. These should be a dummy issue out at the 
end of 1992, which will be circulated with subscription information.

If you could be able to help us with abstracting work (particularly in
foreign languages), then we would be very keen to hear from you.

Material published in the main periodicals (IEE and IEEE journals, Journal
of Cryptology, Mathematics of Computation, Journal of Computer Security,
Computers and Security, Cryptologia) and the main conference proceedings, 
will be reviewed automatically. However, if you are publishing material 
elsewhere - such as in the form of a departmental research report, or in a 
provincial journal - we would suggest that you sent us an offprint to 
ensure coverage. This should be mailed to:

\noindent Ross J. Anderson (rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk)\\
University Computer Laboratory\\
Pembroke Street\\
Cambridge CB2 3QG\\
England\\
 
\end{document}
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pierre@prpa.philips.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: User authentication
Organization: Philips Research Palo Alto
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 18:34:17 GMT

In <5906@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

>In article <1992Aug26.021824.930@decuac.dec.com> mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) writes:
>>cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>>
>>>If I give you an RSA key, that's all you need.  I'm the only one in the world
>>>who knows the two primes in N.  That defines *me*.
>>
>>	With the usual caveat that he has to meet you or something so you
>>can give him the RSA key. Otherwise I can give him *my* RSA key and ask
>>you nicely for yours and just unwrap and rewrap everything that goes past.


>That doesn't work.  You could just as easily meet him personally, present
>an ID card saying you're me and hand him your RSA key.  To combat the
>impersonation attack, we need to make sure that we have the equivalent of a
>true broadcast which both the intended recipient and the sender can read.

The problem seems to me the authentification of the couple or relation:
(name (or person) and key (or signature)).

In some cases you are only interested in knowing that you have been
talking to the same person from the beginning of the conversation (like
in the problem of impersonating netnews posters), whereas in some cases
you want to make sure that you are indeed talking with John Doe, of
SmallTown (32 W, 16 S). In the first case you don't need the name-key
coupling, you are just "talking to a key". In the second, you need it
as you want to talk to a "name". (Thus the suggestion, lets give up our
names, and just use keys :-)

But rather than the One True Broadcast, or certifying agency, I was
thinking, couldn't you use the method suggested by the idea "you know
many friends, they know many friends, etc, so transitively you know
everybody in the world (6 times removed)"

This is a method studied for operating systems/networking security. See
for example:

%A Butler Lampson
%A Martin Abadi
%A Michael Burrows
%A Edward Wobber
%T authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice
%J Operating Systems Review (ACM SIGOPS Review)
%J Proceedings of the 13th ACM symposium on operating systems principles
%C Pacific Grove, CA
%D Oct. 13-16 1991
%V 25
%N 5
%P 165-182
%K transitive authentication, operating systems, DES, RSA, security,
channel, RPC, remote procedure calls, public key encryption, name
lookup, groups, access control, delegation, revocation, principals

This may be applicable for a "secure netnews" mechanism, as everybody
knows everybody on the net even more than eveybody knows everybody in
the, ahem, "physical" world.

Pierre.
-- 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
       Pierre Uszynski, Philips Research Palo Alto, CA, USA
            USA-415-354-0328, pierre@PRPA.Philips.COM
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: User authentication
Date: 30 Aug 92 04:52:15 GMT
Organization: IR

In article <1992Aug28.140033.466@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de () writes:
> So if this is interesting, how come more people don't post anonymously?
> Why is your message signed Dan Bernstein, not Guess Who?

Where do you get the idea that people don't often post anonymously?

I have forged all but a small fraction of the messages I have ever
posted. Many of them appear under the name ``Dan Bernstein''---which,
you should note, is shared by at least three different real people who
post to USENET. Many of them do not, and if I don't choose to point out
that those other names are controlled by the same real person, then you
will never know. Who cares?

Public-key cryptography gives you the opportunity to maintain a key
which everyone knows but only you (and whoever you share needles with,
so to speak) can use. This gives a *continuity* to keys which neither
requires nor benefits from an association between keys and ``real
people.''

> I assume that you would be peeved
> if 10,000 people started placing "secure" posts associated
> with the name Dan Bernstein, for example.  

If public-key cryptography weren't kept out of the public's hands by a
small group of people, I would be able to choose my own keys and have
them be recognized as *mine*. I'm not peeved about the existence of
multiple people with the same name---that's just a fact of life.

(In the July 1992 Bulletin of the AMS, Shreeram Abhyankar says that
Peter Neumann said that William Snow Burnside, who worked on the theory
of equations, is not the same as William Burnside, who worked on the
theory of groups of finite order. Both obtained a D.Sc. from Dublin
around 1890.)

> But I also see applications for secure newsgroups based on
> real world identities.

I do not. In fact, unless you have an application which depends on the
difference between one real person with two names and two people who
happen to cooperate (overtly or secretly), an obvious isomorphism
argument shows that your application *cannot* depend on ``real world
identities.'' Except for certain government functions (such as voting) I
see no such applications; and those functions won't be carried out on
newsgroups any time this millenium.

---Dan
From: gwyn@smoke.brl.mil (Doug Gwyn)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: corrected Kryptos transcription
Keywords: CIA Kryptos sculpture cipher transcription update
Date: 1 Sep 92 17:28:04 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: U.S. Army Ballistic Research Lab (BRL), APG, MD.


EMUFPHZLRFAXYUSDJKZLDKRNSHGNFIVJ	 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD
YQTQUXQBQVYUVLLTREVJYQTMKYRDMFD		AKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYP
VFPJUDEEHZWETZYVGWHKKQETGFQJNCE		BRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPT
GGWHKK?DQMCPFQZDQMMIAGPFXHQRLG		CYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTO
TIMVMZJANQLVKQEDAGDVFRPJUNGEUNA		DPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOS
QZGZLECGYUXUEENJTBJLBQCRTBJDFHRR	ETOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSA
YIZETKZEMVDUFKSJHKFWHKUWQLSZFTI		FOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSAB
HHDDDUVH?DWKBFUFPWNTDFIYCUQZERE		GSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABC
EVLDKFEZMOQQJLTTUGSYQPFEUNLAVIDX	HABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCD
FLGGTEZ?FKZBSFDQVGOGIPUFXHHDRKF		IBCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDE
FHQNTGPUAECNUVPDJMQCLQUMUNEDFQ		JCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEF
ELZZVRRGKFFVOEEXBDMVPNFQXEZLGRE		KDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFG
DNQFMPNZGLFLPMRJQYALMGNUVPDXVKP		LEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGH
DQUMEBEDMHDAFMJGZNUPLGEWJLLAETG		MFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHI

ENDYAHROHNLSRHEOCPTEOIBIDYSHNAIA	NGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJ
CHTNREYULDSLLSLLNOHSNOSMRWXMNE		OHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJL
TPRNGATIHNRARPESLNNELEBLPIIACAE		PIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLM
WMTWNDITEENRAHCTENEUDRETNHAEOE		QJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMN
TFOLSEDTIWENHAEIOYTEYQHEENCTAYCR	RLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQ
EIFTBRSPAMHHEWENATAMATEGYEERLB		SMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQU
TEEFOASFIOTUETUAEOTOARMAEERTNRTI	TNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUV
BSEDDNIAAHTTMSTEWPIEROAGRIEWFEB		UQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVW
AECTDDHILCEIHSITEGOEAOSDDRYDLORIT	VUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWX
RKLMLEHAGTDHARDPNEOHMGFMFEUHE		WVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZ
ECDMRIPFEIMEHNLSSTTRTVDOHW?OBKR		XWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZK
UOXOGHULBSOLIFBBWFLRVQQPRNGKSSO		YXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKR
TWTQSJQSSEKZZWATJKLUDIAWINFBNYP		ZZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRY
VTTMZFPKWGDKZXTJCDIGKUHUAUEKCAR		 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD

? are actual question-mark characters

transcribed from photos by PHOENIX, published in The Cryptogram MA92
retyped into this machine-readable file by Doug Gwyn
slight edits made by Gwyn based on CNN video supplied by Harry Carter
resulting draft visually checked on site and corrected by Gwyn
Gwyn's estimate of probability of any residual transcription error: 0.6
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum)
Subject: Re: User authentication (was Re: secure netnews)
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Washington ULTRIX Resource Center
Distribution: sci
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 02:18:24 GMT

cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

>If I give you an RSA key, that's all you need.  I'm the only one in the world
>who knows the two primes in N.  That defines *me*.

	With the usual caveat that he has to meet you or something so you
can give him the RSA key. Otherwise I can give him *my* RSA key and ask
you nicely for yours and just unwrap and rewrap everything that goes past.

mjr.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum)
Subject: Re: GCHQ's location. No big secret!
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Washington ULTRIX Resource Center
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 1992 02:54:28 GMT

>Marcus Ranum's bullshit detector is badly in need of psychoanalysis.
>I believe the CIA story came from the Washington Post.

	Oh, good! Read it in the paper: must be true. Do you believe
the bit about the aliens backing Perot's candidacy that I read in the
Enquirer, too?

	The sovs were too professional and too closed-mouthed to give
out information like that, and if they knew, the fact that they knew
would be information they wouldn't want to reveal. Unless, of course
the Post had it wrong, and that the developer had asked Elvis...

mjr.
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: User authentication
Date: 26 Aug 92 06:00:16 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <1992Aug26.021824.930@decuac.dec.com> mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) writes:
>cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>
>>If I give you an RSA key, that's all you need.  I'm the only one in the world
>>who knows the two primes in N.  That defines *me*.
>
>	With the usual caveat that he has to meet you or something so you
>can give him the RSA key. Otherwise I can give him *my* RSA key and ask
>you nicely for yours and just unwrap and rewrap everything that goes past.


That doesn't work.  You could just as easily meet him personally, present
an ID card saying you're me and hand him your RSA key.  To combat the
impersonation attack, we need to make sure that we have the equivalent of a
true broadcast which both the intended recipient and the sender can read.



That's a different point, though.  What I'm trying to point out is that you
deal with me in a very real sense but you've never met me and aren't likely
to.  Therefore, we don't need physical contact in order to communicate.  In
fact, I don't need a flesh and blood body at all.  I could be a computer
which is demonstrating that it has passed the Turing test.  You don't know
and I submit that you don't care.  You'll have the same conversation with
me in any case.


Something like a personal meeting during which keys are exchanged does only
one thing:  establish a relationship between keys and some physical appearance.
If my physical appearahce doesn't mean anything to you, then that relationship
has added nothing to the authentication process.  Therefore, there's no
need to establish it.


So:  what relationships are important to establish?

Eg., if I change keys (aka change names), I can establish the relationship
by announcing the change in a public message which lists both keys and is
signed in both.

If Alice is talking to Bob and Cathy is also talking to Bob, Alice and
Cathy should be able to establish that they're both talking to the same
person by sharing signed messages to/from him with each other.


More practically, it's important to establish a relationship between *me*
and some money in a bank.  If the money is deposited electronically (as
my paycheck has been for over 10 years), it can be deposited to *me* --
ie., to my RSA key.  There doesn't need to be a name or address or any
of that nonsense on my bank account -- just my RSA key.


If I can move money around with only my key and get caught in a love
triangle with only my key, what more do I have to do?  :-)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman)
Subject: Re: RSA-129 contest
Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 11:16:39 GMT

In article <19122.Aug2700.12.0192@virtualnews.nyu.edu> brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes:
:In article <1992Aug26.132003.5928@linus.mitre.org> bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman) writes:
:> Actually, estimating how long the general number field sieve
:> will take with respect to the quadratic sieve CAN be done without factoring
:> any numbers with GNFS.
:
:Of course---that's exactly what you and Adleman have been doing. The
:problem is that you haven't been doing it *accurately*. Here, for the
:benefit of sci.crypt readers, I'll run through the inaccuracies in the
:above article.
 
All you are doing is gainsaying my data without posting data of your own.

:Your general statement about 6-7 digits corresponding to a 2x speedup
:for 130-digit numbers is not accurate; even a casual analysis of
:Dickman's rho function (why do you call that ``the Knuth-Schroeppel
:function''? Dickman is the one who defined it) would show that the
 
you are confusing the two functions. go ask Arjen about the 
Knuth-Schroeppel function.

:speedup is more than 5. Why are you trying to discourage people from
:entering the RSA-129 contest, Bob?

Now this last accusation really is obnoxious, because it puts words
in my mouth that I have never said.

:You say that ``if many small primes split completely in the extension
:field, this is beneficial to factoring the algebraic side''---but the
:truth is that *any* small prime splitting *at all* in the extension
:field provides a noticeable speedup. *Complete* splitting is rare.

Not that rare. the frequency is 1 over the degree of the Galois closure
of the field.
 
So, Dan, if you can do better, why don't you display your obviously
superior knowledge of such things by giving us your data and estimates.
--
Bob Silverman
These are my opinions and not MITRE's.
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Date: 28 Aug 92 05:47:09 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <1992Aug27.132835.13294@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de writes:
>You could show me your passport (for example), then I'd know who you 
>are.  Enough to associate you with the key you give me.

You don't know me so you have no way of knowing if I'm the one who handed
you the key and showed you the passport with my name on it.

On the other hand, if we had a true broadcast mechanism -- eg., amateur
radio? -- something which can't be spliced into so that the imposter could
trap all your traffic or mine -- then we don't need to meet.  All I have to
do is broadcast my key and monitor my own broadcast.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Seminar on Future Directions in Cryptography - 10/15-21/89
Summary: Did anyone attend?
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 05:03:10 GMT

On October 15-21, 1989, there was a seminar on Future Directions in
Cryptography as part of the Monte Verita Seminar, in Switzerland.

Did anyone here attend?  Were the papers presented at the conference
ever published as a proceedings?

Bruce

****************************************************************************
* Bruce Schneier
* Counterpane Systems         For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1
* schneier@chinet.chi.il.us
****************************************************************************
From: Butch_Anton@transarc.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: where is GCHQ?
Date: 27 Aug 92 14:11:58 GMT
Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA

Folks:

I'm going to be traveling to the UK this weekend and was wondering
where GCHQ and the crypto museum were located.  Can anyone tell me?
Is it worth the time to go to the museum?  What's the cost (if any)?

BTW, I'm leaving tomorrow afternoon, so please respond directly to me
via email.  Thanks for the info!

Butch Anton     | Psycho Racing (Novice Sprints)    | butch@transarc.com
Transarc Corp.  | '87 EX-500 WERA #623 AMA/CCS #811 | DoD #0124   AMA#485814
707 Grant ST    | M&N Racing (WERA Natl. Endurance) | '83 Seca 650 Turbo
Pgh, PA  15219  | '89 CBR-600 WERA #83 Novice       | '89 FZR 600
+1 412 338 4442 | "You have to be crazy to race this piece of shit!"
From: unijbm@uts.uni-c.dk (J|rgen B. Madsen)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,bit.listserv.security
Subject: UFC (Ultra Fast Crypt) on CM200
Summary: Who got the fastest password cracking program
Keywords: UFC, crypt, CM200
Date: 2 Sep 92 19:47:20 GMT
Organization: UNI-C, Danish Computing Centre for Research and Education



Dear fellows,

The project: The implementation of UFC (Ultra Fast Crypt) on UNI-C's
CM200 is now finished.

The work was done by Michael Glad, who is also the auther of UFC.
The CM200 is a small Connection Mashine (parallel computer)
with 8K CPUs from Thinking Machines Corporation.

Below are the results:

  - The C* (C-star) version of UFC can crypt 55,000 words pr. second.
    It is higly optimized and uses special PARIS functions in all the
    time comsuming parts.

  - The Fortran version af UFC can "only" crypt 25,000 words pr. second.

  - The C* version implemented as the standard crypt() function
    can crypt 53,000 words pr. second.
        
The task is embarrassing parallel and is therefore linarly scalable.
So on the largest CM200 (64 K processors) the crypt() function can
crypt 424,000 words pr. second.

At the moment, the Fortran version of UFC can crypt 85,000 words pr.
second on a small CM-5 (128 nodes) with vector units and it is NOT
optimized yet.


Does anyone know who is running the fastest password cracking program
(crypt() function) on a SINGLE machine?

Please do * NOT * respond if your answer cant'be documented or verified!
There are just too many rumors around . . .


Thanks in advance
Jorgen Bo Madsen

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
!   Jorgen Bo Madsen,  Security Consultant                              !
!   UNI-C Lyngby,  Danish Computing Centre for Research and Education   !
!   DTH,  Building 305,  DK - 2800 Lyngby,                              !
!   Phone  : +45-45-938355                                              !
!   Telefax: +45-45-930220                                              !
!   E-Mail : Jorgen.Bo.Madsen@uni-c.dk                                  !
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schow@bqneh23.bnr.ca (Stanley T.H. Chow)
Subject: Re: GCHQ's location. No big secret!
Organization: Bell Northern Research Ltd, Ottawa
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1992 19:48:51 GMT

In article <1zhng-h.strnlght@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Then there's the famous story about the time they were building CIA
>headquarters, and a local real estate developer wanted to know how
>many employees would be housed there, so he could plan some residential
>developments nearby. He was completely stonewalled, so he called the
>Soviet Embassy and they told him. They had it just about dead on.

Remember, the reason for classifying information as "Secret" is 
usually to hide it from your friends/citizens/boss/etc. The "Enemy"
is just the most convienent excuse. Why else would the US DoD want
to classify satelite pictures that the Soviets were selling? 

To bring this back to sci.crypt, this is the reason why people have
the idea that NSA is trying to make sure crypto-systems weak enough
for NSA to crack. 


--
Stanley Chow            InterNet: schow@BNR.CA
Bell Northern Research  UUCP:     ..!uunet!bnrgate!bqneh3!schow
(613) 763-2831
Me? Represent other people? Don't make them laugh so hard.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de ()
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Organization: Siemens-Nixdorf AG
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 92 13:31:00 GMT

cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
: In article <1992Aug27.132835.13294@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de writes:
: >You could show me your passport (for example), then I'd know who you 
: >are.  Enough to associate you with the key you give me.
: 
: You don't know me so you have no way of knowing if I'm the one who handed
: you the key and showed you the passport with my name on it.

Come on, the passport identifies you.  That's what it's for.
Argue about possible attacks on a passport if you like,
but this is absurd.  The point is that real world id
methods exist, and can be used to authenticate a key, 
in the sense of associating it with a real world individual.

: On the other hand, if we had a true broadcast mechanism -- eg., amateur
: radio? -- something which can't be spliced into so that the imposter could
: trap all your traffic or mine -- then we don't need to meet.  All I have to
: do is broadcast my key and monitor my own broadcast.

This is a nice idea.

--
Frank O'Dwyer		       			Disclaimer: 
Siemens-Nixdorf AG 	                        I will deny everything
Tel.  : +49 (89) 636-40639                      Fax.  : +49 (89) 636-45860
e-mail: Frank.ODwyer@sniap.mchp.sni.de