From: parrish@ecn.purdue.edu (Stephen L. Parrish)
Subject: Peace Dividend
Keywords: realizable and feasible... the only true "dividend"?
Organization: Purdue University Engineering Computer Network
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 16:18:58 GMT


From parrish@ecn.purdue.edu (Stephen L. Parrish)

Found in _ATOM_, an AEA Technology Journal

_ATOM_  #424
September/October 1992

(Picked up at the ANS Winter Convention in Chicago last week)

"Managing the Products of the Peace Dividend"

The following is a review of papers presented at a Uranium Institute 
Symposium, 1992:

--  Thomas Neff, "Disposition of HEU and Plutonium from Nuclear Weapons"
--  Julian J. Steyn, "Potential Impact of Arms Reduction on LWR Fuel Cycle:
                      An Update."

...

In both the US and Russia, nuclear weapons are deployed by military agencies,
but weapons assembly and dismantling are handled by civilian or quasi-civilian
agencies:  in the US by the DOE and in Russia by Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom).  Both agencies are involved in commercial fuel cycle activities.

Following a series of US-Soviet agreements to reduce strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons, culminating in the START II agreement of 17 June 1992, the
dismantling of warheads is set to proceed apace, with, it is expected, 
considerable US help for Russians.  On 12 December 1991 a bill became law in
the US giving the President discretionary authority for, but not mandating,
the expenditure of up to $400 million to assist in resolving technical problems
associated with former Soviet weapons destruction and proliferation.  The
legislation permits the CIS to reimburse the US with energy resources, for
example, natural uranium, enriched uranium, and possibly plutonium.

Dismantling in the US is projected by DOE to proceed at about 2000 warheads
a year.  Russian officials estimate their capacity at about 1500-2000
warheads a year.  Both estimates were based on single-shift working, Neff said.

At these rates, the US and Russia will each 'mine' 15-20t of high enriched
uranium (HEU) and 5-8t of weapons grade plutonium a year.  The precise figures
depend on the type of warhead being dismantled, but the amount of plutonium,
for example, will be comparable to, if not greater than, that from 
scheduled civilian reprocessing.  However, the weapons plutonium has a higher
energy content, suffers less from the presence of non-fissile isotopes and 
the build up of americium in storage, and would probably be easier and cheaper
to fabricate into mixed oxide fuel (MOX).

The HEU from weapons can be blended through one of several routes to make 
low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in civilian reactors.  Each kilogram of 
HEU can produce as much LEU (at 3.6% U-235 and 0.2% tails) as 144.5 swu of 
enrichment services and 226kg of natural uranium (net of the natural 
uranium blending stock).

Thus, if 10t of HEU are 'mined' annually, it would be roughly equivalent to a 
mine yielding about 6 million lb (2.7 million kg) of uranium a year and an 
enrichment capacity 1.45 million swu.  At about 4% and 5% respectively of 
world reactor requirements, as estimated by the Uranium Institute, this was 
comparable to the anticipated effect of civil reprocessing and the recycle 
of uranium and plutonium, Neff said.

skipping....
[Little discussion about the economic benefits of this plan-- the obvious
drawback being flooding the market with U, but this is addressed, as well,
later]

...

Current estimates of the total amount of HEU that could conceivably become 
available due to the dismantling of warheads are put by Julian Steyn of 
Energy Resources International at minimum of 300t of HEU and 56t of 
plutonium in the US; and 400t of HEU and 75t of plutonium in the CIS.  

The reduction of 100t of HEU (94% U-235) to LEU (4% U-235) equates to 
approximately 60 million lb (23 million kg) U3O8 and 15 million swu, Steyn
said, in a calculation similar to that of Neff.  The dismantled HEU is 
therefore equivalent to 420 million lb (190 million kg) U3O8 and 105 million
swu entering the LWR fuel marketplace.  If spread over 20 years this would 
correspond to 16% of the Western World annual requirements, Steyn notes.

There has always been an incentive for both Russia and the West to use some
of the HEU to provide funds that would finance and stabilise the Russian
dismantlement process.  A proposal was made by Neff in October 1991 in which 
it was estimated that as much as 20t of HEU, 10t of which might come from
the Soviet sources, could be purchased and used by DOE to displace electricity
consumption in its enrichment activities without significantly affecting those
activities or commercial markets.

By displacing electricity consumption and being delivered under DOE enrichment
contracts, HEU would have no net effect on enrichment markets, which are 
currently the most sensitive to oversupply.  To avoid impact on U markets,
DOE would have to absorb the U-235 content.  It could do so either by stock-
piling excess natural U feed, or by using it to continue overfeeding the
enrichment cascades (ie, operating at higher tails assays than nominated by
utilities) as it has already been doing to reduce costs, Neff argued.

Following the proposal,  commercial entities sought to act as intermediaries
to facilitate a government-to-government agreement, and a protocol was
signed in July 1992 by Allied Signal and Nuclear Fuel Services of the US
and Minatom and the Russian Academy of Sciences, which envisaged the sale of
10t of HEU/year.  Finally, on 31 August President Bush announced an agreement
to negotiate the terms under which DOE would by at least 10t of HEU/year for
5 years, and at least 30t/year after that.  Sales of 10t/year, based on DOE
avoided costs, would have a value in the vicinity of $100 million/year, Neff
said.

Calculations by Steyn suggest that while the net value of HEU may currently
appear to be of the order of $9000/kg, it could range up to about $23000/kg
later in the decade.  This suggests that the 400t that could become
available from the CIS might be worth up to $9 Billion-- a hefty incentive,
given the economic problems in the CIS, to begin to introduce HEU into
the market as soon as possible, he said. 

Steyn found that in 1995 the net value of weapons grade Pu for making 4.0%
MOX may be of the order of  $20000/kg.  This corresponds to $700/kgMOX, which 
is less than current typical costs for MOX fuel fabrication.  Even the 
neutronic differences which favour Pu-239 over U-235 "may still not by 
sufficient to justify investments," Steyn thought.

___________________________________________________________________________


So there you have it.  A nice summary of possibly the best "Peace Dividend",
and arguably the only "Peace Dividend".  Of course this is at the cost of
National Security-- but apparently the world has become a brighter and safer
place recently (seemingly as recently as Nov. 3....). 

The summary is from a British Journal, therefore the eco-unfriendly and short-
sighted reference to "...but the amount of plutonium, for example, will be 
comparable to, if not greater than, that from scheduled civilian reprocessing"
obviously is in reference to the Europe's ability (desire) to optimize the 
nuclear fuel cycle (with Japan soon to join their ranks...)-- not the US's 
critically (intelligently?) established stance in concern to reprocessing. 



-- 
Stephen Parrish              |  "Do not speak to me of good men, bind them
Purdue University            |   with the chains of the constitution"
School of Nuclear Engineering|   --  Thomas Jefferson  (roughly) 
parrish@gn.ecn.purdue.edu    |  KEMP/Powell '96   (If the US survives '92-96)

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