HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Testing AIs
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 14:02:09 GMT


In article <C0CJzC.5ss@spss.com> ,
markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:


>I hate to defend the Turing Test, which is the reddest of herrings, but 
>I have to point out that it is supposed to test intelligence, not
>hireability or romantic charm. 

I suspect that it's going to be very difficult to separate what we
generally call intelligence from the set of qualities that we apply to
humans.

Even if we say an animal is intelligent, I think to some extent we are
anthropomorphisizing the poor best.

It has a lot to do with relationships.  Cat lovers will swear that their
pet is intelligent, but the critters sure are hard to train.  I don't
believe I've ever heard of a cat fetching the evening paper, does that make
them less intelligent than dogs or more intelligent.

Back to computers.  I think most people concede that chess playing
computers can do things that once was considered to require a great deal of
intelligence.  So now the argument has shifted to "grounding".  (Chess
playing computers are intelligent? So what, they're not grounded.)

I still think the issue is essentially "Is the computer human-like"?

If it passes the Turing test, it seems human-like from one perspective. 
But if we get inside the program we see that it isn't composing sentences
the way we compose sentences, so it's not grounded.


When we listen to a human speaking, we have a sense of commonality.  We
think we can use his words as a cue and duplicate his thought processes. 
Not so with a turing tested computer, unless we happen to be intimately
familiar with the program.

In my mind, the issue of "grounding" boils down to defining the particular
qualities of our own mind that we would like to see duplicated in the
computer, the degree of commonality.

If a computer were programmed to play chess the same way I play chess,
using the same algorithms, I would feel a sense of commonality.  I would
think the computer was grounded w.r.t. chess.

With regard to language, I think for us to build a computer that we feel is
grounded, we need to look very closely at our own mind and see what else is
going on besides word generation when we compose and interpret speech.



--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Date: 5 Jan 93 15:33:52 GMT
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

   > If a genuine AI were to come on USENET and admit the fact and
   > convince us of it, once the novelty wore off I submit we'd start
   > ignoring it.  It's only a machine after all, we're interested in
   > talking to real people. 

Interesting.  I don't feel this way at all -- I'm eager to talk to
anybody who can say things that surprise me, be they man or machine.
In fact, I'd much rather talk to a clever machine than some of the
people I know.  :-(

	-- Bill  
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 18:03:46 GMT

In article <C0Lsn8.JKx@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>
>This whole argument stems from my pronouncement to Mark Rosenfelder to the
>effect that if we think computer/algorithm explains AI better than computer
>alone, the computer/algorithm/programmer can explain AI even better.  My
>point here is that AI is a creation of man, and we must keep in mind that
>it's being developed to serve one or another of man's needs.

You should also remember that man is a creation of man.  Or, more
precisely, civilized man is very different from primitive man.  But the
difference is accounted for by culture, which is the product of man.
From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 17:50:56 GMT

In article <C0BCnA.1A7@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>
>I think the Turing test, and the whole Chinese room argument WITH responses
>is a crock.
>
>All who agree say aye.
>
Nye

>If you take a Chinese room or the winner of a Turing contest and subject it
>to the real world, the idea simply breaks down.  Could either one "pass" an
>employment interview, or pick up girls at a bar.
>
Your are asking for too much at the present state of the game. By the same 
token you would dismiss Wright brothers contraption saying: look at the birds, 
how gracefully they fly, how they sail in the wind. This contraption is upset 
by the slightest puff of the wind!

>My point here, is that we humans are constantly subjected to all kinds of
>tests, and as likely or not we fail.  How is any machine using only symbols
>and syntax going to beat us at our own game.
>
If it is allowed to gather an experience about the outside world (or is
downloaded such experience) why couldn't it? Admittedly we do not know how
to do it at present but do you see a principal reason that it cannot be done?
...
>I think you're still leaving out a vital component, the computer/algorithm
>combination should read computer/algorithm/programmer combination.  At the
>current state of technology, a programmed computer is simply an extension
>of the programmer (admittedly a faster running, better remembering
>extension).  
>
You are wrong. There are many programs nowadays which are so complicated that
the programmers who wrote them have problems understanding the program's
overall behaviour in many circumstances. And to give another, but a very
telling example: Did John Conway, when he invented the Game of Life, had any
idea of the richness of structure his simple rules would lead to?

>--
>Ken Easlon                |  Hello! I'm a .SIC Virus. Copy me and spread 
>ken@holonet.net           |  the fum.
>Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
>
>

Andrzej Pindor
-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca
From: coonstot@quads.uchicago.edu (charles orville onstott)
Subject: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic
Reply-To: coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 20:52:45 GMT

This is an invitation to participate in an email reading group.

I am interested in reading Heidegger's _The Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic_("Logik").

The cover description of the book is as follows:

"Offering a full-scale study of the theory of reality
hidden beneath modern logic, _The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic_,
a lecture course given in 1928, illuminates the transitional phase
in Heidegger's thought from the existential analysis of 
_Being and Time_ to the overcomming of metaphysics in his later
philosophy.  In a searching exposition of the metaphysical
problems underpinning Leibniz's theory of logical judgment,
Heidegger establishes that a given theory of logic is rooted
in a certain conception of Being.  He explores the
significance of Western logic as a system-building technical tool
and as a cultural pheomenon that is centuries old."

Insofar as I am concerned, I will be approaching this text
from a cultural angle.  However, other approaches are encouraged.
My agenda is to check the validity of the argumentation and
assess the consequences on both a description of
"modernity" and on autonomous theologies.  However, other
agendas are encouraged as long as validity is a part of it.

If you are interested, please reply by email so that I can
add you to the list.  I will be mailing out the "reading assignments"
in about 1 week along with the publication information.

Thank You,

Charles O. Onstott, III

-- 
Charles O. Onstott, III                         (coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu)
Graduate Student in Religion and the Human Sciences
The University of Chicago Divinity School
           "For [the study of] history, too, has its fashions."  (Anouilh)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Testing AIs
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 21:46:21 GMT



In article <C0CJzC.5ss@spss.com> ,
markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:

>In article <C0BCnA.1A7@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
>writes:  

>>My opinion is that people who seriously think a word mongering machine
>>can duplicate any but the most superficial activities of the human mind 
>>probably haven't taken a close look at the working of their own mind. 
 
>But then you must have some idea of what besides "word-mongering" is
>necessary to duplicate human cognition.  What is it?  I hope you have
>better luck with this question than Searle has had. 

Please scan and comment on my new thread "The Easlon Model of
Consciousness".  The current draft is long and sketchy, and I'm sure you'll
find it incomplete, particularly with regard to language processing which I
have purposely avoided.  Tell me where I should start in with fuller
explanation.

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: The Easlon Model of Consciousness
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 03:41:27 GMT


In article <C0Lzp8.Lwz@iat.holonet.net>, I introduced a model of
consciousness that passes the Easlon test i.e it makes sense from both
subjective and objective points of view.

Perhaps "introduced" is too strong a word, I made a few remarks.  I'm
planning on expanding, with priorities given to topics brought up by
readers.

The rationale behind the (Easlon test) requirement is that (I believe) we
can best understand consciousness from a subjective point of view, and we
can best understand models from an objective point of view.

Several readers have responded by email, and one response was to the effect
that the article seemed to be talking about the body's physical interaction
with the world rather than the mind's structure and processes.

This is encouraging, since I was thinking about mental structures when I
wrote the article.  If my description of mental structures sounds like a
description of a physical interface with the real world, then I'm meeting
at least one of my objectives.

Now for a more proper introduction, rather a brief overview.

The Easlon Model of Consciousness is composed entirely of mental phenomena
that can be translated into physical phenomena.  When it comes time to do
this translation, to actually build a machine based on the model, the
machine will consist entirely of physical phenomena that can be translated
into mental phenomena.  

In a sense, this may be true of all machines and their conceptual
counterparts.  The difference with a model of consciousness is that the
translation from mind to machine will include emotions and other undeniably
subjective phenomena.   I expect the translation from machine back to mind
to be by way of an operational example of artificial intelligence that is
convincing enough to be called an emulation of consciousness.

Pretty neat ambition, huh?  Anybody want to dare me to pull it off?

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: mualla@extro.ucc.su.OZ.AU (Mualla Akinci)
Subject: Is it intelligence or fitness: A research objective?
Summary: Garb
Organization: Sydney University Computing Service, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 05:10:06 GMT

Reading through these posts, I get the impression (one dimensional) that
there are two main thoughtstreams in many discussions.

1: Research should seek to create synthetic "intelligence"

	Emphasis to note the language and anthropomorphic distortion

2: Research should seek to create synthetic "life"

	.. aka ..

I've just read some of Prof Tom Ray's ideas on "fitness". This is a nice
aim in my limited reading to date.

Ma 
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Subject: Re: How to Build a Person (book by John Pollock)
Keywords: strong ai
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 20:59:47 GMT

You will have to argue with the dualists. I don't know all of the
theories, but Eccles believes that the point where the mind interacts with
the brain is the synapse. He notes that there appears to be an extremely
fast quantum process (~femtosecond) that operates to restrict the number
of synaptic vesicles released at a given synapse to the set {0,1}. On the
average ~1/6 of a vesicle is released per nerve impulse, but the value
appears to be modulated by physical processes that occur at the synapse
perhaps associated with microtubule growth/destruction. (My belief is that
this process, if it occurs, evolved to decouple the signal presented to
downstream neurons from the availability of transmitter at the synapse.)
In any case, Eccles proposes that the probability of release is modulated
by the "mind" in addition to the known physical processes.

My take is that if you are a dualist, this is as good a point to couple
the mind to the brain as any. Evidence from brain lesions seems not to
support dualism--the state of the individual does not appear to be an
undamaged mind trying to run a damaged brain; rather it appears to be a
mind whose damage parallels that which has occurred to the brain. (IMHO)

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 18:23:35 GMT

In article <C06KHq.2qw@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>
>In article <1992Dec31.223448.28663@news.media.mit.edu> ,
>minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>
>>1).  The notion of "understanding" is itself defective if we try to 
>>define "A understands X".  Read Chapter 30 of The Society of Mind. 

>I think if we apply enough tests we can determine for all practical
>purposes whether or not A understands X, per a standardized definition of
>"understand".

In article <C0BCnA.1A7@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

>I think the Turing test, and the whole Chinese room argument WITH responses
>is a crock.

Sorry, Ken, but you seem to be contradicting yourself.  On the one hand
you say that you can test understanding, then in your next posting you
say that such a test is a crock.  Which is it to be?
From: axs@cs.bham.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Colbys-Weizenbaum and Overcoming Depression 2.0
Date: 11 Jan 93 01:23:18 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle) writes:

> Date: 9 Jan 93 17:36:13 GMT
> Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest)
>
>       It seems a bit much for a system with no capability for living in the
> real world to issue advice on how to do so.
>
> 					John Nagle

I can't see why people make such a fuss about expert systems giving
psychiatric or any other kind of advice. They don't make a similar
fuss about *books* giving the advice, and there are plenty of those.
(E.g. there's lots of advice in books on how to bring up children
for example, but no book has lived in the real world or brought up a
child.)

In both cases all that is happening is that information and advice
has been compiled and presented to readers or users, and sometimes
it will be good advice and sometimes not so good, or possibly even
bad.

The difference is simply that when the information is presented in
the form of an expert system, finding the relevant advice is far
more convenient than searching through tables of contents or indexes
of books.

That's similar to the reason I'd rather get email than paper
letters: using simple string searching routines (grep) I can get the
machine to find who wrote what to me when in a fraction of the time
that it takes me to do the same with paper mail in my filing
cabinet.

An expert system is marginally more sophisticated than that.

Of course, if the expert system purports to be doing any more than
effectly expressing opinions of its authors, or consequences of
opinions of its authors, then there's some misrepresentation going
on, and legal action should be taken when harmful consequences
follow.

But that's no different from a book on how to deal with depression
that makes false claims about how successful its techniques are.

When the advice is given not by an AI package of the sort that's
generally available now, but by an autonomous artificial agent, with
its own sources of motivation, which has distilled generalisations
and advice from years of experience of interacting with people in
trouble then we'll have something qualitatively different.

It will take many years before there are convincing examples of
this, though intermediate cases (semi-autonomous machines) may come
earlier.

In the mean time we are talking only about "interactive" documents,
so why make a fuss about them?

Aaron
-- 
Aaron Sloman,
School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, England
EMAIL   A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk  OR A.Sloman@bham.ac.uk
Phone: +44-(0)21-414-3711       Fax:   +44-(0)21-414-4281
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 05:09:23 GMT


In article <C0E9wu.GEK@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> ,
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

>In article <BILL.93Jan5083352@cortex.nsma.arizona.edu>
>bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes: 
>ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes: 
>> 
>>   > If a genuine AI were to come on USENET and admit the fact and 
>>   > convince us of it, once the novelty wore off I submit we'd start 
>>   > ignoring it.  It's only a machine after all, we're interested in 
>>   > talking to real people.  
> 
>>Interesting.  I don't feel this way at all -- I'm eager to talk to 
>>anybody who can say things that surprise me, be they man or machine. 
>>In fact, I'd much rather talk to a clever machine than some of the 
>>people I know.  :-( 
> 
>Hear, hear. That's exactly my reaction but you have beaten me to it. 


I'm discovering there's a double edge to being provocative.  On the one
hand you do get responses, on the other hand it takes a lot of writing to
keep from appearing the total fool (sort of a reverse Turing test).

Anyway,  I was projecting into the future when AI's become more commonplace
than real people (as artificial things are want to do).  As long as AI's
are a novelty they'll always attract the gee whiz crowd even if they don't
have anything interesting to say.  

The idea that AI's might have something interesting to say didn't really
occur to me because I was thinking of them as rather like contemporary
Turing contestants.  

I think you've turned me on to another key quality that would be necessary
to win the Easlon grant of consciousness: having something interesting to
say.

I think this ties in with another idea I've been mulling over: the
communications web.

When I think of an entity that has been isolated in a room its whole
"life", I can't say the idea of conversing with it arouses any passion on
my part.  However, if I perceive the entity to be a node in the web, then
it takes on new life.  It's not really the entity itself that's the item of
interest (to me), but the stuff it can tell me from it's communication with
other entities.  

Eventually these interconnecting nodes must connect with an entity whose
experience is compatible with mine, otherwise the messages are meaningless
(to me), but I now have a new appreciation for the possibility of seeing an
AI as a mailbox.

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: what it means to be grounded
Date: 7 Jan 1993 20:56:01 GMT
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
NNTP-Posting-Host: stein.u.washington.edu

In article <C0Hx49.GBw@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>Human symbol systems are of course not *inherently* grounded-- "runny nose"
>might mean "tasty breadfruit" in Maya-- but human beings *are* grounded:
>when we make noises about noses or fire we aren't playing with arbitrary 
>symbols, but really referring to noses or fire. 

I may be mistaken but the first part of this sentence means "human symbols
are arbitrary."  When I make noises about noses or fires I associate some
symbols with noses and fires but my noises are not noses and are not fires.
The symbols themselves are no more grounded when I use them than when a 
computer uses them.  

Suppose I accept your assertion that "human beings *are* grounded."  What
makes computers any less grounded?  When I use the word "pi" and mean the
ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter I don't go through
some infinite regress of definitions.  It could be the case that I define
"circle" as "four sided polygon with each side having equal length."  Can
you truthfully say you define each and every concept you use to define
the words you use when you use them?  Haven't you ever played the game where
you ask a person to define a word he or she uses then recursively ask her
or him to define a word used in the prior definition?

What does "in a pig's eye" mean and why?

I will propose the following definition for grounding:

An entity may be said to be grounded with respect to an environment when,
using its model of the environment, it can make a plan to achieve a goal
in the environment and then, adjusting the plan as necessary, have an
effect in the environment and achieve the goal.  The symbols in the model
may be said to be grounded to their corresponding entities in the environment
when the entity having the model refers to them when acting upon the
corresponding entities in the entity's environment.

--gary forbis@u.washington.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 12:58:34 GMT

forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:

>Today (not yesterday and maybe not tomorrow), I believe behavior isn't 
>sufficient to determine intelligence. I base this believe on my image of 
>an HLT which serendipitouslly passes the Turing Test even though its output 
>is not causally connected to the input.

I'm not sure what you mean by "serendipitouslly". Do you mean that a
HLT can pass the Turing Test by chance?  That is certainly a
possibility, but as the length of the test (and its complexity) grows,
the chances of such accidental passing should go to zero.

Also, it is not clear what you mean by saying "its [the HLT's] output
is not causally connected to the input". It seems to me that the outputs
are causally produced by (1) the input, and (2) the database. In what
sense are its outputs not causally produced by the inputs?

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY

Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:7224 sci.philosophy.meta:2943 talk.philosophy.misc:3188