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Date:         Tue, 5 Jan 1993 16:19:14 -0500
From:         Andrew Allen <E7L8ALL@TOWSONVX.BITNET>
Subject:      In case Kerry needs some more convincing... B)
Comments: To: politics@ohstvma.bitnet

I have been wading through scads of posts since I got back from
vacation and so far I haven't seen any notification that Kerry has
been convinced, so I thought that I'd throw in my $.02 here... B)

Jamie says:

>The legislature isn't directly punishing offensive thought. It has
>said that the same crime performed with one sort of intention is
>more odious than if performed absent that intention. That is
>precisely the distinction between (some) kinds of manslaughter.

Joe responds:

>Sure it is.  That is what you just said -- the same crime performed is
>more odious because of the intention of the criminal.

I think that the distinctions that Joe (and others probably) are using
here as a result of the way that these hate crime statutes are written
(as "add-on" penalties) may not hold up if we look at the idea of
hate motivated crimes separate from the statutes in question.

These statutes are likely written as they are because many people feel that
a crime that is perpetrated for the primary purpose of creating an atmosphere
of fear, passivity or servility is "worse" than committing the crime for
other reasons.

It is unfortunate that these statutes are written in this manner, since
this places the focus upon the difference in penalties rather than the crimes;
it invites comparison to other types of "add-on" penalties (such as the
additional penalty for the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime)
rather than other types of similar crimes.

It could be reasonably (and probably successfully) argued that hate crimes
are a "different" kind of crime as opposed to a judgement of being "worse."

It is obvious to most that the motivation for and intention of political
assassination is somewhat different than the average-run-of-the-mill,
heat-of-passion bar room murder; it is generally accepted that the courts
should treat these as seperate classes of crime despite the fact that the
result of both crimes is the death of a victim. The same (dare I use the
word) logic can be applied to the discrimination (no pun intended) between
hate motivated crimes and those with similar results.


>>again for manslaughter it is intent, not the opinions of the killer.

>"Intent" IS a specific kind of opinion of the killer.

There are lots of different reasons why people kill others (mind you I
take a *very* dim view of the killing of others B) ); anger,
revenge, personal gain, to hurt people other than the victim...

The severity with which we view a murder depends on many factors, and
in general these are all taken into account when an individual is
prosecuted/penalised for the murder of another, the belief structure
of a murderer would not seem to be out-of-bounds for review. This
would particularly seem to be reasonable if it could be shown that
the object of murdering a given individual is to alter the behavior
of other people/groups.

Joe says:

>the opinion leads to a discriminatory act, it is that act which is
>punished, not the opinion itself.

If someone who happens to be a devout racist murders someone and it
the action cannot be shown conclusively to be an act calculated to
promote his/her brand of racism, then the person should not be in
any way penalised for their racist opinions/beliefs.

On the other hand if the same person were to, for instance, murder
a civil rights leader and terrorize a community, the scope of
the murderer's intent would warrant consideration and perhaps the
current range of charges that can be brought by prosecutors is
found to be lacking...


-other Andy
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU