From: mccd@rosie.uh.edu (Reza Golshan ACUS 743-1587)
Subject: Iran and US relationship(Dept. of Defense)
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Keywords: Informative
Organization: University of Houston
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 18:55:00 GMT


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Defense Issues Vol. 7 No. 49

The Prospects for  Iranian Foreign Policy

Based on remarks delivered by Zalmay M. Khalilzad, assistant 
deputy undersecretary of defense for policy planning, to the 
Washington (D.C.) Institute for Near East Policy, April 27, 1992.

     While tensions with Iraq now dominate our attention, the 
future role of Iran is just as important for long-term stability 
in the Persian Gulf.  
     Ideologically hostile to the West and increasingly powerful 
militarily, Iran is destined to be a central regional player.  As 
its leaders come to terms with the new post-Cold War realities of 
the gulf region, the key question is the ultimate nature of Iran's 
aspirations.  Will Iran, acting on its traditional nationalistic 
aspirations, seek to dominate the Persian Gulf, or will it 
cooperate with other states to enhance mutual and regional 
security?
     The direction Tehran chooses will to a large extent determine 
the character of U.S.-Iranian relations.  The United States would 
like to establish good relations with Iran.  But despite recent 
shifts toward pragmatism in its foreign policy, Iran continues to 
pursue policies, such as state sponsorship of terrorism and 
development of weapons of mass destruction, that preclude better 
ties with the United States.  Only if Iran becomes a normal state 
-- one that respects the norms of international conduct -- will 
such relations become possible.  The ball is in Iran's court.
     To understand the implications of Iran's foreign policy for 
the United States, we must assess not only Tehran's record, 
motivations, objectives and policies, but also the position of the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East in U.S. strategic thinking.
     In a recent wide-ranging review of U.S. defense policy over 
the last two years, the Department of Defense has reassessed U.S.  
regional interests and recalibrated U.S. military forces to meet 
today's potential threats.  Our findings confirmed the validity of 
the policy themes announced by President (George) Bush on Aug. 2, 
1990, ironically the same day that Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
     In contrast to Cold War strategy, which focused on containing 
a global challenge by the Soviet Union, the new defense strategy 
concentrated on regional threats and placed primary importance on 
preventing potential aggressors from dominating regions of 
critical interest to the United States.  In addition, the 
reassessment of U.S. policy confirmed the continuing importance of 
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East to the United States.  These 
represent critical regions in which the United States retains 
important security interests and will pursue policies to ensure 
that no hostile, nondemocratic power is able to assert hegemony.

Iranian .MDUL/.MDNM/Intentions
     Our ability to improve relations with Iran will depend on 
Iranian actions and intentions.  From the U.S. perspective, Iran's 
record remains mixed.  Although Tehran has taken steps that defuse 
tensions in the region, it also engages in activities that make 
improving our relations difficult.
     Under President (Hashemi) Rafsanjani's leadership, Iran has 
sought to improve its relations with its neighbors and the West.  
Tehran supported the objectives of the U.S.-led coalition during 
the Persian Gulf war, although some of its actions immediately 
after the war were not as constructive.
     Under prodding from Iran, the last Western hostages in 
Lebanon were finally set free.  Tehran continues to participate in 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague and has encouraged 
increased trade with the United States.  And the Iranians have 
adopted a seemingly constructive role in working to negotiate a 
settlement to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh.
     Despite these positive developments, fundamental obstacles to 
better U.S.-Iranian relations still exist.  Iran is pursuing 
programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile delivery systems for such munitions.  It 
continues to rely on terrorism, including the assassination of 
opposition figures, as an instrument of national policy.  Tehran 
is a leading opponent of the current Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations.  It provides support to terrorist organizations, 
such as Hezbollah and certain radical Palestinian groups, that are 
working to disrupt the talks now taking place.  It is also in the 
middle of a five-year, $10 billion military acquisition program 
that will provide it with potentially destabilizing offensive 
capabilities.  And despite the growing influence of so-called 
moderates in its leadership, Iran continues to have a deplorable 
human rights record.
     To some extent, Iran's adoption of a more pragmatic foreign 
policy is not unexpected.  Historically, the radical fervor of 
revolutionary government is eventually abandoned in favor of more 
pragmatic behavior.  This pattern has been evident in the 
willingness of Rafsanjani to adapt to four key realities that he 
faced at the end of the 1980s.
     First, as a result of Iran's defeat at the hands of Saddam 
Hussein in 1988, Iran became a second-class regional military and 
economic power.  Its economy in shambles, real per capita income 
has dropped to less than two-thirds of the prerevolution level.  
In response, Tehran has now placed top priority in the short term 
on economic reconstruction, as well as developing a long-term plan 
to rearm its military forces.
     Second, with the declining fortunes of the former Soviet 
Union, Iran lost the primary external counterweight to U.S. and 
Western influence in the Middle East and has had to adapt to a 
world in which the United States is the only superpower.
     Third, Rafsanjani recognized that Iranian policies were 
antagonizing virtually all of its neighbors.  By adopting a more 
conciliatory approach -- by becoming a more normal actor on the 
world scene -- he hoped to eliminate some of the tensions that had 
turned most of Iran's neighbors into adversaries.
     Fourth, Iran found that its brand of revolutionary Islam did 
not attract the broad support in the region and the Muslim world 
that its proponents had expected.  Iran was too Shi'i and too 
Persian to become a political center of gravity in the Middle 
East.
     In essence, Rafsanjani and his supporters decided that they 
could not afford to adhere rigidly to the tactics adopted in the 
wake of the revolution in 1979.  Yet, while Iran's new foreign 
policy is more pragmatic than it was even a few years ago, its 
ultimate direction and aspirations remain unclear.  The key issue 
is whether Iran will continue to pursue its traditional goal of 
dominating the Persian Gulf or whether its current pragmatic turn 
will evolve into a long-term accommodation with other gulf powers.

Influence-Building Strategy
     At the moment, Iran still appears to be pursuing dominance in 
the gulf region.  It has been pleased with the weakening of its 
Iraqi rival.  At the same time, it seeks to minimize the influence 
of the United States and in fact would welcome the ejection of the 
U.S. presence from the region entirely.
     But many factors diminish the prospects of Iranian success.  
After Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield/Storm and Provide 
Comfort, Tehran can harbor no illusions about U.S. willingness and 
capability to protect American interests and those of our friends 
and allies in the region.  In light of the high-tech destruction 
of an isolated Iraq by the forces of the U.S.-led international 
coalition, a still militarily and economically weakened Iran 
should be acutely aware that it would receive no significant 
external help should it precipitate a new gulf crisis.  Also, 
having absorbed the huge costs of the Iran-Iraq war without 
external assistance or compensation, Iran is not in the position 
to undertake costly adventures.
     Tehran has therefore sought to build its influence by more 
cautious means.  It will likely avoid any adventurous moves that 
would oblige the United States to increase its military presence 
in the region.  It has worked to improve relations with the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, though the level of 
distrust of Iran among GCC members remains high.  And Iran has 
begun to look beyond the gulf in efforts to expand its influence.
     Among the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, 
Iran has worked to strengthen ties by supporting Islamic 
activities in these new countries and proposing expanded economic 
cooperation.  Yet there are limits to what Iran can accomplish.  
     While the Central Asian states are hungry for foreign aid and 
investment, Iran has no appreciable surplus resources to donate to 
them.  Also, the predominantly Sunni and Turkic character of the 
people of Central Asia significantly limits the appeal of the 
Iranian example, with Turkey likely to serve as a more attractive 
role model.  Moreover, Tehran has reason to support stability in 
Central Asia.  Iran's fear of ethnic divisiveness and unrest from 
the former Soviet Union infecting its own multiethnic society 
creates an Iranian interest in political stability to the north 
and tempers its approach toward the Central Asia republics.  Iran, 
for example, has cultivated good relations with Armenia as it 
works to mediate the conflict with Azerbaijan.  In addition, the 
desire to preserve positive relations with, and to continue 
conventional arms imports from, Russia may further dissuade Tehran 
from making trouble in Central Asia.
     Iran's policies have had more success in Sudan.  The 
influence of the Sudanese National Islamic Front represents the 
only success in Iran's decade-long search for other ruling elites 
that govern on the basis of Islamic principles.  Khartoum, 
financially hard pressed and struggling with an insurgency in the 
south, has been receptive to Iranian offers of assistance, 
including oil supplies, military equipment and training, and other 
largesse.  This link in turn has created a foothold for Iran in 
Africa from which it can strengthen support for radical Islamic 
elements in Egypt, the Maghreb and the Saharan states.
     Iran's rearmament programs -- and particularly its efforts to 
develop weapons of mass destruction -- represent the most 
troubling aspect of its long-term influence-building strategy.
     Tehran already has a chemical weapons capability and is 
working to develop biological and nuclear weapons.  At present, it 
possesses only a short-range chemical weapons delivery capability.  
But it is expected to deploy chemical warheads for its ballistic 
missiles in the next few years.  Chemical agents more lethal than 
those currently available may also enter production.  Iran's 
biological weapons program might be able to develop deployable 
weapons later in the decade.  
     In the nuclear field, Iran is concentrating on acquiring 
technologies needed to master the nuclear fuel cycle, though it 
will take years before Iran can build up the cadre of people 
needed to operate a credible nuclear program.  Unlike Iraq, Iran 
is reluctant to send students abroad to receive scientific and 
technical training.  However, it could boost its program by 
diverting disenchanted or enterprising scientists and technicians 
from the former Soviet Union.
     Also, Iran is working to increase the range of its delivery 
systems.  North Korea already has sold to Iran large numbers of 
Scud-B missiles and some longer-range Scud-Cs, as well as Scud 
missile production technology.  China has also provided short-
range ballistic missiles and additional ballistic missile 
production technology.
     Rebuilding the Iranian armed forces after the shattering 
defeats of 1988 has been a high priority.  Since the early 1980s, 
Iran relied on the former Soviet Union as the main source of arms 
imports.  Moscow in recent years provided modern combat aircraft -
- including MiG-29 fighters and Su-24 strike aircraft -- surface-
to-air missiles, tanks and several submarines.  After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Iranians struck arms 
deals with both Russia and Ukraine.  They have also diversified 
their sources, purchasing weapons from China, North Korea, Eastern 
Europe and other countries.  In 1991, Tehran imported $1.5 billion 
in arms, as well as acquiring control of more than 100 Iraqi 
aircraft flown to Iran by Iraqi pilots during the Persian Gulf 
war.
     Despite the extensive purchases of new equipment, the 
Iranians have not yet replaced all the weapons lost during the war 
with Iraq.  Nevertheless, some of the systems acquired by Iran 
reflect a more aggressive strategic posture.  The Su-24s, which 
are the Soviet equivalent of U.S. F-111s, provide Iran with deep-
strike capabilities, extending its reach, for example, to targets 
far into Saudi territory.  From a regional perspective, these 
aircraft -- if armed with chemical bombs -- create a formidable 
strategic strike force.  Equally disturbing, Iran's acquisition of 
Soviet-built Kilo-class submarines have only one potential use -- 
to operate against ships sailing in the Indian Ocean or the 
Straits of Hormuz -- and constitute a new threat to vital 
international tanker traffic and U.S. naval operations in the gulf 
region.

Policy Prospects 
     At the moment, Iran manifests neither the intent nor the 
capability to undertake any major aggressive military moves 
outside its borders.  Tehran may approve tactical forays for 
limited purposes, such as the air strike on Mujahadin-e-Khalq 
facilities in Iraq in April 1992, but these initiatives are likely 
to be episodic, punitive or pre-emptive measures rather than an 
integral part of any broader, bolder strategic design.
     Indeed, internal factors may force Iranian leaders to shorten 
the horizons of their strategic thinking.  Given the continuing 
struggle for power within the Iranian leadership, it is 
questionable whether an internal consensus has existed on a formal 
national security strategy and on a timeline for its 
implementation.  Iran's conventional rearmament and strategic 
weapons programs will take years to bring to fruition.
     A long-term strategic assessment depends on the success of 
Tehran's economic recovery program, a critical requirement for any 
assertion of regional dominance.  Iran remains substantially 
dependent on its exports of oil, and despite the emphasis placed 
on promoting economic growth, its economy continues to falter.  In 
addition, a demographic time bomb threatens Iran's potential 
prosperity.  In the 1980s, Iran's population grew 3.5 percent per 
year.  While experts predicted only a few years ago that Iran's 
population would not reach 100 million before 2025, present 
projections indicate that it will do so by 2010, at which point 
Iran will be the world's 12th most populous country.
     Tehran has not been able to sustain the investment needed to 
support its increasing population.  Economic growth rates have 
lagged behind Iran's high population growth rates, causing living 
standards to decline precipitously.  To exacerbate problems, 
expenditures on education and health have declined substantially.  
If these trends continue, Iran will become more like its South 
Asian neighbors to the east than the oil-rich, people-poor Arab 
oil sheikdoms to its west.
     Although economic weakness reduces the ability of Iran to 
become a regional hegemon, it may not reduce the threat that Iran 
might come to pose.  A powerful military capability, growing 
economic distress and weak neighbors are a potentially explosive 
combination.  Downstream, the danger exists that a government in 
Tehran, pressured by compelling domestic political crises, may 
attempt to take advantage of the military weakness of the Arab oil 
states.
     Iran's future course -- its transformation into a normal 
state or its pursuit of regional hegemony -- depends on decisions 
by its leadership that no one can confidently forecast.  At this 
juncture, no definitive evidence exists that Iran has abandoned 
its traditional nationalistic desire to dominate the gulf region 
or its revolutionary impulse to propagate its brand of radical 
Islam.  However, even with its military buildup and its influence-
building efforts, it is unlikely that Iran will be able to realize 
these aims.
     Despite its assertive aspirations, there are strong 
indications that Iran has modified its means.  The Iranian regime 
has apparently concluded that it must adopt a more patient, less 
provocative strategy to achieve its objectives and that to do 
otherwise would alienate the very nations from which it must 
obtain the investment and technology necessary to achieve regional 
primacy in the longer term.  
     Through improved international conduct, Iran may be able to 
persuade Europe and Japan that they can do business with Tehran.  
While probes are possible, it seems less likely that Iran 
currently is willing to make similar overtures to the United 
States or to take the additional foreign policy steps, such as 
terminating its support for terrorist groups or curtailing its 
weapons development programs, needed to make those overtures 
credible.
     Nevertheless, the United States recognizes Iran's importance 
and welcomes initiatives demonstrating a willingness to conform to 
the norms of international community and to contribute to regional 
peace and stability.  Should such tangible steps be forthcoming 
from Tehran, the U.S. could participate in and encourage Western 
cooperation with Iran's reconstruction efforts and its programs to 
better the living standards of its people.
     If Iran remains bent on regional domination, the United 
States will remain committed to taking whatever steps are 
necessary to check Tehran's ambitions.  The heart of the new 
defense strategy -- preventing the domination of a critical region 
by a hostile, nondemocratic power -- would mandate an activist 
policy against a newly assertive Iran.  
     We would pursue a policy of containment based on 
strengthening our friends, through arms sales and encouraging 
regional security cooperation.  We would also maintain a greater 
American military presence in the gulf region than we did before 
the Persian Gulf war, including not only naval forces but also the 
pre-positioning of U.S. weapons and supplies.  This combination -- 
U.S. forward presence and U.S. crisis response capability -- 
proved effective against Iraq.  It is our hope that our actions in 
Iraq would deter those Iranian leaders who might be tempted to 
pursue regional hegemony vis-a-vis their neighbors in the future.

Published for internal information use by the American Forces 
Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C.  
This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced 
without permission.



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