From: ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay)
Subject: Re: Crowley's Significance?
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 00:06:50 GMT

In article <BsqpAq.9xr@well.sf.ca.us> friday@well.sf.ca.us 
(Carol Anne Ogdin) writes:
>If _this_ is your definition of Magick, then every act, no matter
>how humble, is Magick. 
[...]
>This global assertion of your (or Crowley's) definition of Magick merely
>equates the ordinary with the Magickal, illuminating neither.  

Here is a point which I think may be gained from the definition.
Crowley appears to be suggesting to us that we think about various
things (including "ordinary" things) as being instances of the same
general phenomena ("magick"). And if you look at what else he says,
you find that there is indeed a particular manner of thinking about
things being suggested. (I'm not in a position to vouch for its
usefulness, but that's a different story.)

Now this seems, for some reason, unsatisfying. I think the question we
have to ask ourselves is: why? What is it that we were hoping to get
out of the term "magick"? Why differentiate the "ordinary" from the
"unusual"?

>If we can
>agree that Magick is _not_ ordinary, (and, hence, there is a reason for
>this newsgroup in the first place), then subsuming all ordinary acts under
>the Magick umbrella is erroneous.  If we were to assume Magick _is_ ordinary,
>then what's all the fuss; everybody does it all the time anyway, so what's
>the discussion about?

I think you've asked just the right question, if you look at it in the
right way, but I suggest you re-think the previous parenthetical
claim. Why is it necessary to the point of magick that one is doing
something not-ordinary? And why erroneous to include the ordinary?
Perhaps Crowley's methods are useful for the ordinary.

I think a lot of us are intrigued by the unusual. We are familiar with
certain "no nonsense" materialist views, which may seem rather ho-hum,
and I think some of the intrigue behind "magick" for many of us is the
idea that maybe, possibly, we can find a kind of smoking-gun
refutation of some form of this "scientific materialist" view.

But in any case, I think a key point is to clarify one's intent.
Intention, we are told, is key. In what way would one's plans be
spoiled, if it turned out that "magick" could all be accounted for in
"ho-hum" terms? Answering this question may serve to clarify one's
intent. Is it "I want to impress my friends by doing things they find
hard to believe", or what? Do you have some use in mind for a
particular thing, which, incidentally, is not "ordinary"? Then perhaps
you can try focussing your intention on that objective, and
disregarding the alleged "weirdness" or "ordinariness" of the methods
you may be contemplating using.

I think it is also worth considering that the line between "ordinary"
and "not-ordinary" is probably quite arbitrary, and varies from person
to person. Perhaps the object is to get one to re-think the idea that
one's own idea of where the distinction lies is a natural one. Try
thinking of the unusual plans you may have as being just an extension
of the ordinary processes of life, or vice-versa.

I have thought about these things a little, and I find that most of
the time either my intentions are ones that could potentially also be
satisfied by "ordinary" means, or that my interest lies in finding out
for sure whether this "ho-hum, materialist" view is, in fact, correct
(or, admittedly, doing weird things which my friends find hard to
believe :-) ). I haven't had any luck so far with the latter, but
we'll see.

Keith Ramsay            Even if a proof from given axioms can, in
ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca     principle, be found mechanically, is it not
                        often found in ways not all that different
                        from finding a new axiom? -Georg Kreisel