From: jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Larry Jewell)
Newsgroups: soc.veterans,alt.war.vietnam
Subject: 'NamVet Newsletter, Vol.4, no.12 (2/7)
Date: 4 Oct 92 16:57:21 GMT
Followup-To: soc.veterans
Organization: Purdue University


     Agency's Special Office for POW/MIAs,  was saying that "If we look 
     at  everything  we collected during the war and  everything  we've 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     collected since the war, we don't find any evidence that Americans 
     are captive."
        Furthermore, as late as October, 1990, an unnamed "senior State 
     Department  official"  was quoted in the press as saying the  U.S. 
     Government  has  "no  evidence"  of living American  prisoners  in 
     Southeast Asia.
        However, to say that the U.S.  Government has "no evidence"  is 
     not the same as saying that no evidence exists.  After all,  there 
     have  been  nearly  11,700 reports relating to POW/MIAs  over  the 
     years,  including  1,400 first-hand,  live-sighting reports.   The 
     question  is  whether  every single one of these  reports  can  be 
     dismissed from the category of credible evidence.
        The  U.S.  Government position makes sense only if every single 
     one  of  these  reports  can be shown  to  have  been  fabricated, 
     erroneous,  or not relating directly to a POW/MIA --  for example, 
     some  reports may relate to Europeans in the area.   In fact,  DIA 
     analysts  have rejected the evidence of all these reports,  except 
     for a small pool of less than 150 still considered "unresolved."
     
        The  preliminary  conclusions presented by staff for review  by 
     Senators are as follows:
          1.  After the conclusion of OPERATION HOMECOMING in April, 
        1973, brought the return of the 591 POWs, official U.S. 
        Government policy internally adopted and acted upon the 
        presumption that all other POWs were dead, despite public
        assertions that the government was still open to 
        investigating the possibility of discovering the existence
        of living prisoners.
          2.  Following the adoption of an internal policy in April, 
        1973, that all POW/MIAs were presumed dead, the U.S. 
        Government, convened commissions in each military service to
        consider each case on the POW/MIA list in order to make a 
        statutory declaration of presumption of death.
          3.  While there is no reason to believe that the majority, 
        if not most, of the declarations of presumptive death are 
        incorrect, staff review of live-sighting report files at DIA 
        found a disturbing pattern of arbitrary rejection of 
        evidence that connected a sighting to a specific POW/MIA or 
        U.S. POW/MIAs in general.
          4.  The pattern of arbitrary rejection resulted in a 
        declaration of presumptive finding of death for every such
        individual case, except one.
          5.  The internal policy that all POW/MIAs were presumed 
        dead resulted in an emphasis on finding and identifying 
        remains of dead personnel, rather than searching for living 
        POW/MIAs.
          6.  The desire to identify specific sets of remains
        with specific names on the POW/MIA listed led DOD to an
        exaggeration of the capabilities of forensic science, and
        identification based on dubious presumptions and illogical
        deductions rather than actual physical identification -- a
        process which resulted in numerous misidentifications of
        remains.
          7.  Despite adherence to internal policies and public 
        statements after April, 1973 that "no evidence" existed of 
        living POW/MIAs, DIA authoritatively concluded as late as 
        April, 1974 that several hundred living POW/MIAs were still 
        held captive in South East Asia.
          8.  Although the Pathet Lao declared on April 3, 1973, 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

        that Laotian Communist forces were holding American POWs and 
        were prepared to give an accounting, nine days later a DOD 
        spokesman declared that there were no more American 
        prisoners anywhere in South East Asia.  No POWs held by 
        Laotian Communist forces ever returned.  The evidence 
        indicates that the U.S. Government made a decision to 
        abandon U.S. citizens still in the custody of the Socialist 
        Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, at the conclusion of 
        U.S. involvement in the Second Indochina War.
          9.  U.S. casualties, including POW/MIAs in South East 
        Asia, resulting from covert or cross border operation, may 
        not be included on the list of those missing.
         10.  The executive branch has failed to address adequately 
        the concerns of the family members of the POW/MIAs, and has 
        profoundly mishandled the POW/MIA problem.
     
     DEFINITION OF POW/MIA
        The  subject of POW/MIAs requires some definitions.   After the 
     Second Indochina War --  popularly known as the Vietnam War,  even 
     though Thailand, Burma,  Laos and Cambodia saw U.S.  combat action 
     --   hundreds  of  POWs  returned  alive,   notably  in  OPERATION 
     HOMECOMING, which concluded in April, 1973.
        Those  who did not return home are classified by the Department 
     of Defense into two categories:   POW/MIAs --  that is,  those for 
     whom there is some documentation that they were captured but never 
     repatriated; and KIA/BNRs -- that is,  those believed to have been 
     killed  in action,  but whose bodies were not recovered.   For the 
     latter,   there  is  no  evidence  of  their  death  except  DOD's 
     evaluation of the circumstances,  even though no physical evidence 
     of death may be available.
        In  April,  1973,   DOD  reported  that  2,383  personnel  were 
     unaccounted for: 1,259 POW/MIAs,  and 1,124 KIA/BNRs.   This study 
     assumes  that  both  categories  of the  unaccounted  for  deserve 
     review.   Since  1973 DOD has announced the return of 280 sets  of 
     remains, diminishing the overall number by that amount.
        In  addition,  there could well be an equal number of  military 
     personnel  missing  in  action from various  U.S.  covert  actions 
     during  the war.   Since DOD files on covert actions have not been 
     opened,  and  the  participants  in such  actions  never  publicly 
     identified, this inquiry could not establish any number for covert 
     POW/MIAs.   However,  public  source  books  and  interviews  with 
     participants  suggests that the issue of covert operations adds  a 
     substantial, but unknown,  dimension to the MIA question which has 
     received no scrutiny.
     
     REVIEW OF LIVE-SIGHTING DOCUMENTS
        In this inquiry, staff has reviewed hundreds of U.S. Government 
     classified, declassified, and open-source documents.  In addition, 
     Senator  Grassley  and Committee Minority Staff were given  access 
     to,  and  have reviewed personally,  hundreds of classified  live-
     sighting  reports  (accounts by Southeast Asians of live  POWs  in 
     Southeast  Asia)  in the files of the Defense Intelligence  Agency 
     (DIA).   According  to DIA,  this is the first time that either  a 
     United States Senator or any United States Congressional Committee 
     staff  have been given access to the raw intelligence contained in 
     the 1,400 live-sighting reports.
        Out of the 1,400 live-sighting reports, approximately 1,200 are 
     considered  by  DIA  to  be "resolved."   Each  of  the  so-called 
     "resolved"  sightings  was  resolved by concluding that the  live-
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     sighting report did not pertain to U.S.  POWs present after April, 
     1979.   Staff  felt  that  in  some cases such  a  conclusion  was 
     correct, but that in many it was not supported by the facts.
        Staff  began  by  first examining so-called resolved  cases  in 
     order   to  study  DIA  methodology  by  which  a  conclusion   of 
     "resolution"  was  reached.   Since the guidelines set by DIA  for 
     access to the files were extremely restrictive, the time available 
     allowed   review  of  only  about  one-quarter  of  the  so-called 
     "resolved"   cases,   and   none  of  those  in  the  category  of 
     "unresolved."   Nevertheless,  staff  concluded that a significant 
     number  of  the  "resolved"  cases reviewed showed  that  the  DIA 
     methodology  was faulty,  or that the evidence did not support the 
     DIA conclusion in the case, or both.
        The  information  collected and reviewed to date by  the  staff 
     shows  that  the position held by the United States Government  -- 
     namely,  that  no  evidence exists that Americans are still  being 
     held  against  their will --  cannot be  supported.   Rather,  the 
     information   uncovered   during  this  inquiry  provides   enough 
     corroboration  to  cast  doubt  upon  the  veracity  of  the  U.S. 
     Government's conclusion.
     
        Without  revealing classified information,  staff believes that 
     the review of the classified live-sighting reports reinforces that 
     doubt.   Although  more  information remains to be  reviewed,  the 
     evidence this inquiry has thus far uncovered shows that:
     
        1) living U.S. citizens, military and civilian, were held in 
     Southeast Asia against their will after the U.S. Government's 
     statement on April 13, 1973, that no prisoners remained alive; and
        2) the information available to the U.S. Government does not 
     rule out the probability that U.S. citizens are still being held 
     in Southeast Asia.
     
        In fact, classified,  declassified and unclassified information 
     all confirm one startling fact: That DOD in April, 1974, concluded 
     beyond  a doubt that several hundred living American POWs remained 
     in  captivity in Southeast Asia.   This was a full year after  DOD 
     spokesman were saying publicly that no prisoners remained alive.
        Evidence  uncovered in the several hundred cases reviewed  thus 
     far  clearly demonstrates that,  in a disturbing number of  cases, 
     DOD  made  significant errors in drawing conclusions  about  live-
     sighting  reports,  the  presumed death of individuals,  or  about 
     individuals  that  were unaccounted for at the conclusion  of  the 
     war.  Although many cases resolved correctly based upon the files, 
     there  were  too  many  errors apparent to rule out  the  need  to 
     undertake and complete the review of the "unresolved" cases.
        Staff  also  concluded  that DOD spent an excessive  amount  of 
     effort  in discrediting live-sighting reports,  while exaggerating 
     or  mishandling  forensic data in order to confirm  a  presumptive 
     finding  of death.   DOD appeared to be more anxious to declare  a 
     presumptive  finding  of  death than in following  up  reports  of 
     sightings with creative investigative work.
        Furthermore,  there is evidence of insensitivity on the part of 
     the Executive Branch of the U.S.  Government in providing complete 
     and  accurate  information to the next-of-kin of missing  American 
     servicemen.
        The  classified  evidence in DIA files suggests a pattern by  a 
     few   U.S.   Government  officials  of  misleading   Congressional 
     inquiries  by  concealing  information,   and  misinterpreting  or 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     manipulating  data in government files.   Interested Senators  and 
     staff  with  proper  clearances no doubt will want to  review  the 
     classified files themselves and draw their own conclusions.
     
     THE 1973 POLICY DECISION
        Those  who  have not dealt with the POW/MIA issue may  find  it 
     difficult  to  understand  how DOD's analysis of  the  information 
     could  be in error.   Unfortunately,  staff believes that DOD  has 
     allowed  its  procedures to be dictated by a  preconceived  policy 
     finding.
     
        The New York Times reported on April 12, 1973, as follows:
            WASHINGTON,  April  12 (AP)  --  The  Pentagon,  two 
            months  after  the first American prisoners  of  war 
            began  coming  home,  said  today  that  it  had  no 
            evidence  that  there were any more prisoners  still 
            alive in all of Indochina.
               Despite   the  fact  that  interviews  with   all 
            returning prisoners are nearly complete,  a Pentagon 
            official, Dr.  Roger Shields,  said that none of the 
            1,389   Americans   listed  as  missing   were   now 
            technically  considered  prisoners.    "We  have  no 
            indication at this time that there are any Americans 
            missing alive in Indochina,"  Dr.  Shields said at a 
            news conference.
               Dr.  Shields was at that time Assistant Secretary 
            of Defense,  but he was following guidance issued on 
            that date by the Department of State in a memorandum 
            DOD  which stated that "There are no more  prisoners 
            in  Southeast  Asia.   They  are  all  dead."   This 
            directive was issued immediately after the return of 
            the last POWs in OPERATION HOMECOMING.  This finding 
            was  made  despite  that the fact that none  of  the 
            hundreds  of  POW/MIAs that the Pathet Lao  publicly 
            acknowledged  holding were ever returned from  Laos.  
            There were hundreds of live-sighting reports on file 
            in  1973.   Thousands of such reports have continued 
            to be received since then.
     
     PROCESS FOR "PRESUMPTION OF DEATH"
        Since it was official policy, then, that all MIAs were dead, it 
     became  a bureaucratic necessity for all "unresolved"  cases to be 
     resolved in favor of a presumed finding of death.
        Each respective military service from time to time convenes its 
     own special commissions to pronounce on individual cases.   Such a 
     commission has before it at least three categories of information: 
     The  first  is  intelligence-related  information  concerning  the 
     individual.   The second is eyewitness accounts of the loss event.  
     The  third  is the so-called "incident  report"  --  the  official 
     report of the loss incident.
        If  a  year  passes without  new  information,  the  respective 
     military  service can convene a commission to determine whether  a 
     presumptive finding of death should be declared.
        The April, 1973, statement of policy was a political statement, 
     rather  than  a finding according to statutory  authority.   As  a 
     result,  the military services subsequently review each individual 
     case of those who previously had been declared dead en masse.
        And   in  every  case  except  one,   the  commissions  made  a 
     determination of a presumptive finding of death.
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

        Because of this procedure, the bureaucratic necessity arose for 
     discrediting  any  evidence  that  might cast doubt  on  the  mass 
     presumptive  finding of death of April 1973.   From the standpoint 
     of  law and military regulations,  the procedure followed in  each 
     case gave a legal affirmation to the original political statement.
        Therefore,  in  order to discredit any information which  might 
     undermine the political thesis, the analysis of intelligence files 
     fell  into a systematic pattern of debunking information  contrary 
     to the thesis.
        The  systematic  debunking  included discrediting  of  reports, 
     possible intimidation of witnesses, dismissal of credible evidence 
     through technicalities, and -- if all else failed -- the arbitrary 
     disregard of evidence contrary to the thesis.
     
     DOD's WORKING HYPOTHESIS
        An  analysis  of DOD's working hypothesis for fully  accounting 
     for  American  MIAs  is the key to undertaking  the  discrepancies 
     between DOD's position on the POW issue and the evidence uncovered 
     by the staff.
        DOD's  premise,  beginning in April,  1973,  has been that  all 
     MIA's are dead; the corollary,  therefore,  is that DOD must never 
     find  any evidence that any MIA is alive.   The best evidence,  in 
     DOD's opinion, is a set of physical remains that can be identified 
     as  a  specific  individual on the POW/MIA  list.   Once  such  an 
     identification  has been made,  the case of that individual can be 
     removed  forever  from the list.   This is an easier task than  to 
     accept  live-sighting  reports that might point to a  living  POW, 
     thereby necessitating appropriate follow-up action.
        It  is a reasonable assumption to remove POW/MIAs from the list 
     when  remains  are identified,  if the identification is  correct.  
     But  the  fact  is that in a significant  number  of  cases,  such 
     identifications have been made on the basis of inadequate physical 
     evidence,  using  presumptive  deductions that may or may  not  be 
     true.   The pressure to identify sets of remains even has resulted 
     in  specific  cases  where  caskets have  been  buried  with  full 
     military honors as the "remains" of the individual when,  in fact, 
     the casket is empty.
        Therefore,  DOD acts on its premise by vigorously investigating 
     for  the  remains of dead MIAs.   The list of MIAs  presumed  dead 
     following  the  conclusion  of the war totalled  2,383.   DOD  has 
     received  and  claimed to have identified a total of 280  sets  of 
     remains since 1973.
        Any  full  accounting  of  MIAs,  according  to  DOD's  working 
     hypothesis,  would  necessarily involve only those cases in  which 
     either a presumptive finding of death could be made,  or else full 
     or  partial  remains  could be discovered.   As  each  presumptive 
     finding of death is declared or set of remains is identified,  DIA 
     would  remove,  as accounted for,  the names that matched those on 
     the original MIA list.   In this respect,  DOD claims that DIA has 
     vigorously investigated and resolved hundreds of such cases.
        The policy of DOD is to focus attention on the cases where some 
     evidence,  no  matter  how  small,  of  physical  remains  can  be 
     recovered.   But  even  while DOD enthusiastically and  vigorously 
     investigates remains case -- no matter how fragmentary --  it just 
     as vigorously discredits live-sighting and other witness accounts. 
     Throughout  the  1970s and 1980s hundreds of thousands  of  Asians 
     fled  Vietnam,  Cambodia and Laos.   These refugees provided  many 
     first-hand reports, or knew by second-  or third-hand reports,  of 
     American prisoners being held in their respective countries.
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

        To date, over 11,700 accounts have been received by DOD;  1,400 
     of  these are first-hand,  live sighting reports.   DIA claims  to 
     have  analyzed fully each of these live-sighting reports,  and  to 
     have  left "no stone unturned"  in searching for living prisoners.  
     After analyzing the live-sighting reports,  DIA has concluded that 
     the  majority  are not related to living American POWs,  with  the 
     possible  exception  of  a small percentage of  reports  that  DIA 
     describes as "unresolved."
        However, no "resolved" case has ever concluded that an American 
     POW remains captive in Southeast Asia.   In this way DIA concludes 
     that  there  is  no  evidence of Americans  currently  being  held 
     captive  in  Southeast Asia.   This contention is consistent  with 
     both  the  working  hypothesis  described  above  and  with  DIA's 
     apparent  success  at  removing MIA list names that  involve  only 
     those cases in which remains are identified, or a finding of death
     declared.
        Insofar  as these discrepancies relate to the 1,400  first-hand 
     reports  of  living prisoners,  DOD's original premise comes  into 
     question.   Numerous  live-sighting reports have been  erroneously 
     discredited  by  DIA  analysis.   Moreover,  staff has  reason  to 
     believe  that DOD has misidentified the remains of scores of MIAs, 
     and has incorrectly presumed dead many others.
        This  analytical  bias is typical of bureaucracy  defending  an 
     established  policy  at all costs,  even if it means  denying  the 
     obvious.   It  is  also  typical  characteristic  of  an  outmoded 
     paradigm  that can no longer explain the real world or real facts.  
     If  the original premise of DOD had been that at least some of the 
     2,383  MIAs  were  alive,  then  DOD would  have  been  forced  by 
     circumstance  to  view  the  evidence  collected,   including  the 
     hundreds  of live-sighting reports,  from an objective standpoint.  
     The  relevance and validity of each report could have been  judged 
     on  its  own  merits  rather  than whether  it  supported  a  pre-
     determined hypothesis that no living POW/MIA remained.
        Unfortunately,  DOD  chose  to make its own  analysis,  without 
     proper  legislative oversight.   Claiming extreme sensitivity  and 
     possible threats to sources and methods of intelligence gathering, 
     DOD  evaded  the  proper  oversight that would  have  assured  the 
     objectivity of their process,  The result has been a disservice to 
     the POW/MIAs, their families and the American people.
     



















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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     
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                       " Bring them home --- NOW !!! "
     












     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 20
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

                         WASHINGTON SELLS OUT POWS
     HELMS AND GRASSLEY BLOW THE WHISTLE ON PLAN TO SELL OUT U.S. POWS.
                  From: The Spotlight - November 5, 1990
                               By Mike Blair
                         Submitted by: Terry Hayes
                         VETLink #1 - Pittsfield, MA
                              (413) 443-6313
     
     EXPLOSIVE SENATE REPORT
       The  Spotlight  has  learned that the Senate  Foreign  Relations 
     Committee  is preparing to issue a report that will blast official 
     U.S. government handling of the issue of American prisoners of war 
     and missing in action still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia from 
     the Vietnam War.
       There  are currently 2,296 Americans still missing from the war, 
     which  ended  in  1975  with the takeover  of  South  Vietnam  and 
     neighboring Laos and Cambodia by the communists.
       For several months an investigative team, directed by Sen. Jesse 
     Helms, (R-NC) and Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)  has been quietly 
     delving into the matter of the missing Americans.
       Helms  is  ranking  minority  member of  the  Foreign  Relations 
     Committee.  A source close to the investigation told The Spotlight 
     that  the  report is "explosive"  and "devastating"  on  the  U.S. 
     government's official policy regarding the POWs and MIAs.
     
     LEFT IN CAPTIVITY
       The  source  said that the report will indicate  that  Americans 
     were left behind in communist captivity, that the U.S.  government 
     was  aware of it,  and that the action taken by the government  to 
     account for the missing Americans has either been incompetent or a 
     political agenda in Southeast Asia in which the POWs and MIAs were 
     a liability.
       The  report  will include an appraisal critical of  the  methods 
     used  by  the U.S.  Department of Defense to identify  remains  of 
     supposed  MIAs recovered from Southeast Asia with the  cooperation 
     of the communist governments led by Hanoi.
       It  will  detail  and  question  how some  of  the  missing  are 
     identified by a single tooth, a method questioned by most experts, 
     and  how  some  remains have not been  adequately  identified  and 
     buried in communal graves.
       Helms    recently   criticized   the   Pentagon's   methods   of 
     identification  of  remains in a speech on the Senate  floor.  His 
     findings will be further detailed in the report.
       In  a  related issue,  the panel's investigators have  carefully 
     probed the connections between Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths, executive 
     director  of the National League of Families of Missing in  Action 
     and Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, and the U.S. government.
       During  the  course  of the investigation,  Helms  and  Grassley 
     requested  from  the Department of Defense,  files regarding  live 
     sightings of U.S.  POWs in captivity and other material concerning 
     the fate of the men.
       An attempt to block them was made by Mrs.  Griffiths,  who has a 
     unique  security clearance to examine such files as a member of an 
     "interagency group"  working on the POW/MIA issue,  granted her as 
     the  league's  representative.  The security clearance  is  unique 
     because Griffiths has no official U.S. government affiliation.
       In  a memorandum to Undersecretary of Defense,  Paul  Wolfowitz, 
     Griffiths stated:
       "On  any  matter  of highest national priority  [the  government 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     claims  the  POW-MIA  issue  is  of  highest  national  priority], 
     sensitive  information  is not subject to  indiscriminate  release 
     outside of the parameters established by the Congress itself".
       
     GRASSLEY FURIOUS:
       "I  have  to go to the Pentagon myself and camp out there  if  I 
     want  to  review these documents,"  an angry Grassley said on  the 
     Senate floor.
       "I  am  not  allowed to bring in my  own  staff,  regardless  of 
     [security]  clearance  they have.  Instead,  I have to bring staff 
     from one of the three committees,  even though I do not sit on any 
     of them. Furthermore, if I leave,  the staff has to leave as well. 
     Needless  to say,  this is a maximum inconvenience for a member of 
     the  United States Senate for documents that are classified mostly 
     as "Secret", "Confidential", of "For official use only",  which is 
     not a category of classification at all".
       Referring to Griffiths, Grassley explained that in spite "of her 
     non-governmental status,  she has been given a security clearance. 
     That  clearance  has enabled her to review the very documents  she 
     has  lobbied  strenuously to deny members of Congress  access  to, 
     those eyewitness accounts of U.S. prisoners in Southeast Asia."
     
     SENATORS UNTRUSTWORTHY???
       "She told me", Grassley continued,  "in a meeting I had with her 
     in my office in April, that she has read those eyewitness reports, 
     and  that  they show no evidence that American citizens were  left 
     behind  in  Southeast Asia after the war in Indochina.  Why is  it 
     then . . .  that this quasi-government official would want to deny 
     United States Senators an opportunity to review these documents as 
     well?"
       "Could  it  be that she simply has a misunderstanding about  the 
     role   of   the  United  States  Congress  as  laid  out  in   the 
     Constitution? Could it be that after years as a quasi-governmental 
     official,  that  she has become afflicted with a disease known  as 
     "bureaucratitis"?
       Grassley accused Griffiths of having a "lack of awareness of the 
     line  between  advocacy  of  a principle  or  an  issue,  and  the 
     government's  own  position.  When a self-declared  POW  advocate, 
     which  Griffiths is in her non-quasi-governmental role,  begins to 
     take  the government's position at face value",  as Ms.  Griffiths 
     declares in her memo [to Wolfowitz]  that she has done,  then that 
     line is crossed. . ."
       
     WHO'S PANDERING? 
       Griffiths,  who  stated  the decision to allow the  senators  to 
     peruse  the documents is "seeking to pander to Congress",  is  the 
     object of considerable criticism by other POW-MIA activists and is 
     accused  by  many  of  pandering  herself  to  the  official  U.S. 
     government position on POW-MIAs, as Grassley pointed out.
       The  Senate  panel  has  also investigated the  part  played  by 
     Griffiths  in  the funnelling of about $200.000 to Southeast  Asia 
     for supposed efforts to obtain information about POWs and MIAs but 
     which  instead  allegedly ended up in the hands of  anti-communist 
     guerrillas in Laos.
       The  money was supposedly donated by several Texan  contributors 
     including Nelson Bunker Hunt of Dallas, Ellen St.  John Garwood of 
     Austin  and Robert Perry of Houston ---  some of the same  private 
     contributors to the U.S.  backed Contra rebels in Nicaragua.  They 
     were  under the impression that their money would be used to  seek 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 22
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     information about POWs and MIAs.
       The  money was funnelled in 1982 and 1983 through a  California-
     based  organization,   Support  Our  POWs/MIAs,   reportedly  with 
     Griffith's  instructions  and  with  the  full  knowledge  of  the 
     National Security Council, to the bank account of an individual by 
     the name of Mushtag Ahmed Diwan in Bangkok, Thailand.
       A  source  in Thailand reported that Diwan "is a shadowy  figure 
     with Middle East connections and no substantial involvement in the 
     POW-MIA issue".
     =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
     (Note From Terry Hayes)  Although we have already seen the report, 
     I  thought this was a rather extensive article and thought it  was 
     of much interest.  It shows a picture of "Annie" with her hand out 
     and  looking  a  bit thin.   Do you suppose it is  from  Sampley's 
     process  servers  or  this  article???   I bet  she  has  to  walk 
     backwards as she better watch her back! 
     
     Uploaded by Marsha
     
     This  is (The Spotlight)  a paper that a neighbor of mine gets and 
     he is aware of my consuming interest and involvement in the issue, 
     so he brought it over for me to read.
     




































     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 23
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

              Legacy of Covert War - The Boys We Left Behind
             By Monika Jensen-Stevenson and William Stevenson
                          Input by: David Stager
                   Sonoma Online, RFE! - Santa Rosa, CA
                              (707) 545-0746 
     
        ONE  OF  THE high costs of covert operations in Southeast  Asia 
     has  been  the  denial  of normal  rights  to  U.S.  armed  forces 
     personnel  taken  prisoner  during the Vietnam  War.  If  American 
     military men and women become involved in secret operations in the 
     Persian  Gulf,   their  rights  as  prisoners  may  be  no  better 
     protected.
     
        The  Paris peace accords of 1973 resulted in the homecoming  of 
     591  U.S.   servicemen  whom  communist  authorities  admitted  to 
     holding.  However,  according to an interim Senate staff report to 
     be released today (see Page C4),  an April 1974 Defense Department 
     intelligence document concluded that several hundred POWs remained 
     in  captivity.  This  intelligence remained classified  until  now 
     under the rationale of protecting U.S. covert activities.
      
        The  Pentagon in 1973 listed 317 Americans as missing in  Laos, 
     and  government  spokesmen  were quoted as saying the  figure  was 
     actually  much higher.  The communist Pathet Lao claimed it had  a 
     detailed  list  of prisoners but would hand this over only if  the 
     U.S. government were willing to negotiate.  The government,  which 
     was still conducting covert operations against the Pathet Lao, did 
     not negotiate.
      
        Some  of the young men recruited from the U.S.  armed forces to 
     participate  in covert warfare obeyed orders  reluctantly;  others 
     entered  secret agreements in the belief they would be entitled to 
     the usual guarantees that the U.S. government, in return for their 
     services,  would  make  every effort to bring them home or give  a 
     full  accounting  of their fate to their families.  Few,  if  any, 
     members of the armed services expected to be treated as "plausibly 
     deniable"  in the manner of Central Intelligence Agency controlled 
     assets, and yet they were.  Here are two of their stories:
      
        Air  Force  Sgt.  Peter Cressman was a Morse  systems  operator 
     assigned to an EC-47Q "Flying Pueblo" reconnaissance aircraft.  On 
     Feb. 5, 1973,  while on a mission on the Vietnam-Laos border,  the 
     EC-47Q was shot down.  The shoot-down occurred nine days after the 
     Paris peace accords were signed. Cressman had realized that he and 
     his  colleagues  were flagrantly violating the peace in a  neutral 
     country. Worried about the possibility of becoming responsible for 
     war crimes,  he had visited the base legal office to find out what 
     his rights and obligations were. He was told he had no right to do 
     anything but obey orders, even if they were illegal.
      
        Cressman's  family  would  never have known about  their  son's 
     mental  anguish  in the days before his shoot-down if he  had  not 
     written  several  drafts  of  a  letter,  addressed  to  a  public 
     official,  outlining  his dilemma and asking for help.  If he ever 
     completed  an official letter,  there was no public record of  it. 
     Instead,  the  draft letters were returned to his family with  his 
     belongings.   Evelyn  Cressman felt that someone in her son's unit 
     wanted  his  family to know the truth,  and that this was how  the 
     drafts escaped the notice of military censors.
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 24
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     
        After  the crash,  it seemed unlikely there would be survivors. 
     Air Force sources later told the Cressmans there was little chance 
     of  skilled  specialists  like  their son  being  taken  prisoner. 
     Because  of  the  sophisticated  electronic  equipment  on  board, 
     arrangements  existed  for the immolation and destruction  of  the 
     aircraft before it could fall into enemy hands,  and it was almost 
     impossible for the men to bail out.
      
        The  unlikely occurred.  Shortly after the shoot-down,  another 
     U.S.  reconnaissance aircraft intercepted enemy communications and 
     ascertained  that at least four members of the EC-47Q had survived 
     and been captured. This information was conveyed to U.S. officials 
     almost immediately.  A few days later,  a U.S.  search party found 
     more  evidence that crew members were taken captive.  On Feb.  17, 
     four crew members were seen and identified about 15 miles from the 
     crash  site,  in apparent good health and under the guard of their 
     captors. U.S.  officials were again made immediately aware of this 
     information.
      
        The Cressmans and other families of the EC-47Q flight crew were 
     told  none  of  this although Air Force  directives  ordered  that 
     families  of  such  men  be given the  most  complete  information 
     possible.  Seventeen  days  after the shoot-down,  the  Air  Force 
     declared all of the men dead.
      
        Long after the war was over,  Evelyn Cressman and Mary Matejov, 
     the  mother of Sgt.  Joseph M.  Matejov,  one of Cressman's fellow 
     crew  members,  went to see POW Task Force Director Roger Shields. 
     He told them, they said, that their sons' names had initially been 
     placed  in  the U.S.  list of POWs to be returned in  1973  (i.e., 
     those  for whom the United States insisted on an accounting  based 
     on  its  own  intelligence  that they  were  alive).  The  mothers 
     reported  that  Shields told them the names had then been  crossed 
     off  the  list.  Shields wanted them to know,  he  said,  that  he 
     himself had not made that decision.  Then-congressman Billy Hendon 
     (R-N.C.)  later  told the Cressmans he personally saw their  son's 
     name  penciled in the official Operation Homecoming Bluebook.  The 
     name was crossed through and marked over with "Killed in Action."
      
        To Hendon,  it seemed that the government was indicating to the 
     former enemy that the United States was abandoning the men and the 
     communists could therefore treat them as badly as they wanted. The 
     Cressmans, like many other families, vowed to find out what really 
     happened.
     
        It took them years to find out that two months after the shoot-
     down, the four captives were sighted again, still in apparent good 
     health,  about  40  miles  from  the  crash  site.   Again,   such 
     information  was known immediately by U.S. officials but  withheld 
     from the families.
      
        The  Cressmans also found there were persons in the  Department 
     of  Defense  who  strongly objected to what was done,  but  to  no 
     avail. These dissenters did succeed in having a written memorandum 
     of  their protest included in official files.  Those files  remain 
     classified.  When we first spoke to Evelyn Cressman,  she told us, 
     "Some  of those dissenters told me privately what  happened.  They 
     say they can't go public because it will hurt the country. It will 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 25
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     damage  national security.  Whose security?  The security of  boys 
     like my son, Peter?"
     
        She  sent us a voluminous file on her son.  It included clearly 
     stated  "live  sighting"  intelligence  reports on her son  and  a 
     lengthy  correspondence with government officials.  The  Cressmans 
     explored  every  avenue in an attempt to get their  government  to 
     take  action to bring back its own men.  The best answer they ever 
     got  was an evasive admission that information indicating some  of 
     the crew might have survived had been received and withheld by the 
     government. The information was not, however,  enough to warrant a 
     reconsideration of the determination of death.
      
        Mel  Holland was an American Air Force sergeant with a  special 
     talent  for electronic intelligence and high-tech warfare who felt 
     trapped in a covert operation in Laos. "They lied to us about this 
     operation," he had written to his wife, Ann.  "We'll talk about it 
     on my next leave."  But there was no next leave.  He was lost soon 
     after  in a communist command strike everyone said was impossible. 
     "They lied to us," he wrote, "real bad."
     
        What did he mean? The question had gnawed at Ann Holland during 
     her  long years of struggle to raise five children alone.  She was 
     warned by U.S. officials to drop the issue.
     
        Melvin Holland had disappeared in 1968. He had been assigned as 
     a technician to a remote mountain top in Laos:  Site 85,  one of a 
     chain of bases in the CIA's war in Laos, where, supposedly, no war 
     was going on. Officially,  he was based in Thailand.  Each time he 
     was flown from Thailand into Laos,  he was "sanitized"  and turned 
     into  a civilian in a secret war.  If he was captured,  or if  his 
     unit  threatened  to become a political  embarrassment,  the  U.S. 
     government would deny all knowledge of them.
     
        In  March  1969,  Ann  was told he was missing.  She  must  say 
     nothing,  not  even to her five small children.  Two years  later, 
     President Richard Nixon denied the loss of any Americans in ground 
     combat  in  Laos.  Ann  had then asked her  case-officer,  "If  my 
     husband wasn't lost in Laos, where was he lost?"
     
        Holland  contacted us after hearing about the POWs story Monika 
     had  produced for CBS News's "60 Minutes."  The segment,  entitled 
     "Dead  or Alive,"  aired during the Christmas season of  1985.  We 
     knew  who  she  was  because Site 85 had cropped  up  in  Monika's 
     research.  Monika  had even come across a report that at one  time 
     the  U.S.  government had put $6 million in a Hong Kong bank as  a 
     ransom payment for six Site 85 technicians. But we could never get 
     a   handle   on  what  really  happened  because  every   bit   of 
     documentation  was  classified and most family members of men  who 
     had  disappeared there were afraid to talk because they had signed 
     secrecy  oaths.  Ann  understood the frustration because  she  had 
     struggled  for  years  to learn the truth about what  happened  to 
     Melvin.
     
        We  felt Ann had a right to find out what happened -  the truth 
     might hurt national pride, nothing more. We were also intrigued by 
     Site 85.  Monika told her she'd look into her husband's case,  and 
     our education in irregular warfare took a new turn.
     
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 26
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

        We heard, for instance, about "sheep-dipping"  -  a process for 
     building  the secret CIA army.  An American serviceman,  like  Mel 
     Holland,  would go through the motions of formal resignation,  his 
     records  would  be  transferred to a  top-secret  file,  and  some 
     convincing story would be invented to explain his sudden return to 
     civilian  life.  In Mel's case,  the story was that he was working 
     for  Hughes  Aircraft.  However,  he would continue to pursue  his 
     military  career,  though officially "off the books."  He was then 
     ready for clandestine activities.
     
        Pensions  and insurance had to be somehow covered,  and the CIA 
     ran  its own proprietary companies to deal with such problems.  In 
     some  cases  the  families  of MIAs who  were  sheep-dipped  still 
     receive  two  pensions -  one from the military and one  from  the 
     civilian  "cover"  company.  It was thought by some that this  was 
     considered a good way to keep the families quiet, since they could 
     be threatened with losing one pension.
      
        In the summer of 1986,  Ann came to Washington from her home on 
     the  Pacific coast to ask a former helicopter pilot who had  flown 
     her  husband and other men on and off the peak for rest breaks  in 
     Thailand, "Were they captured?"  
     
        "That's something I cannot, absolutely cannot, talk about,"  he 
     said.  She demanded a better answer, and he said, "Ann,  those men 
     did not technically exist then.  They do not technically exist now 
     . . . . But you're on the right track. Don't give up now."
     
        Ann  got  a copy of a top-secret intelligence analysis  of  the 
     seizure of Site 85 during a brief period when it was declassified.
     
        What  she  saw  made it clear that her husband and  other  U.S. 
     airmen were prized by the enemy as "special talents." In 1968,  at 
     Site  85,  they  ran  highly secret equipment  to  guide  American 
     bombers onto targets around Hanoi, 160 miles to the east.  The CIA 
     said  the  enemy could not possibly pierce the heavily  fortified, 
     narrow  path  to the top,  or scale the steep  5,600-foot  cliffs.  
     Despite such assurances, the enemy took the garrison in a surprise 
     assault, using tactics developed by the Soviet Union's "Spetsznaz" 
     special-operations regiment.
     
        Ann sent us her own painfully acquired documents. They revealed 
     an extraordinary effort by friends in the armed forces to help her 
     dig out facts.   A senior U.S.  Army officer,  who had served with 
     distinction  in  combat and military intelligence in  three  wars, 
     said, "Remember, lots of areas in Laos, like Site 85,  are remote. 
     Communists come seldom,  and then to collect taxes and rice.  Even 
     in  that one cave where American captives have been reported,  the 
     communists don't have much communication equipment . . . . One CIA 
     rescue  effort  was  abruptly  cancelled.  There were  to  be  six 
     prisoners rescued. One died of a bleeding ulcer. They were Site 85 
     personnel.  They  were  separated from another three prisoners  in 
     another cave. ALEX (code name for a ground observer)  has a friend 
     there captured in 1978, three years after Saigon fell, and was set 
     up to be captured, but that's real low profile.  The six Air Force 
     guys captured are on the mountain at Phou Pha Thi . . . ."
     
        Cmdr. Hugh Taylor, a retired U.S. Navy pilot who later became a 
     newspaper  editor and spent many years seeking answers to the Site 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 27
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     85 mystery,  claimed,  "The U.S.  government lied,  threatened and 
     purposely  withheld information from the wives and families of the 
     men  left behind at Site 85.  Families were prevented from finding 
     out  each other's identities to foil any attempt to correlate what 
     little they knew,  and were warned to stop trying to find out what 
     happened.  There are reports the Americans at the site were denied 
     defensive  support because their presence posed a threat to  local 
     CIA-supported drug operations"
     
        Hugh Taylor had a personal interest. During the Vietnam War, he 
     had been approached to fly unspecified missions. Those who advised 
     him against the seductive offer of intrigue and adventure - he was 
     very  young then and admired the secret services -  later told him 
     he  was  lucky.  Had he volunteered to be sheep-dipped,  he  would 
     likely  be  counted  among the missing,  his fate  concealed  from 
     friends and family.
     
        Just like Melvin Holland.
     








































     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 28
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

                 "Vietnam Veterans Hold Candlelight Vigil"
                              author-unknown
                        Submitted by: Ron Triplett
                           VVA 31 - Muskegon, MI
                           Input by: Joyce Flory
               NamVet's Incarcerated Veterans Section Editor
                    Desert Dolphin BBS - Las Cruces, NM
                              (505) 523-2811
     
       Sunday evening, on September 18, at  8:00 p.m., residents at MCF 
     (Joyce's note:  Muskegon Correctional Facility)  were treated with 
     the  sight  of two columns of Vietnam Veterans of America  leaving 
     the  school building with lit candles in their hands.  The candles 
     represent that undying spirit that we hold for those who fought in 
     Vietnam and are still Missing In Action (MIA)  or are Prisoners Of 
     War (POW)  to this very day.  The solemn procession marched to the 
     MIA/POW  Memorial near the visiting yard to honor those brave  men 
     and women who are still unaccounted for.
       As  they  approached  the memorial from behind  ,  each  veteran 
     placed his candle on the mantle, on either side of the flagpole.
       Ron  Triplett,  MCF's VVA Chairman,  gave a welcoming address to 
     the residents gathered there, and a few special guests, and acting 
     chaplain,  Guy  Blondin,  gave  a  prayer for those we  refuse  to 
     forget.
       VVA Coordinator at MCF, John Kemme, Chapter #31,  then delivered 
     his   address.    Following   Kemme,    Michigan   State   Council 
     Representative  Lupe Alivar,  Chapter #31,  spoke to the assembled 
     veterans about current MIA/POW issues.
       As  the  membership stood quietly by,  with their hats in  their 
     hands, almost in an unconscious state of "attention," Ron Triplett 
     read  the roll call of those Michigan MIAs and POWs represented on 
     our Memorial. Following the roll call, the acting chaplain read an
     emotional benediction and the vigil came to an end.
       This  solemn  ceremony  was received well,  not  only  by  those 
     participating, but from the MCF staff and residents as well. Today 
     we  salute those MCF veterans who so proudly paid tribute to their  
     "brothers in battle" who seem to have been forgotten by far too 
     many.
       This  special  day  for MIAs and POWs was celebrated  with  such 
     solemn occasion all across the country, with the ultimate hope and 
     prayer that "Someday we WILL bring them home!" "
     











-- 
#L.W. Jewell Moderator at the Veterans Information Site (veteran@cc.purdue.edu)#
#& WWII-L Listowner: "Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange,#
#sudden and wholly unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all   #
#phases of life." "Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41  #