From: Mark Goodman <mwgoodman@igc.apc.org>
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Date: 20 Aug 92 08:56 PDT
Subject: Re: Russia/India Sanctions (2 of 2)
Nf-ID: #R:n0778t@ofa123.fidonet.org:-775048669:cdp:1600000006:000:3731
Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!mwgoodman    Aug 20 08:56:00 1992


To:    talk.politics.space From:  Mark Goodman (mwgoodman@igc.org)
Re:    ISRO Date:  8/20/92

Wales Larrison (WL) has posted a lengthy discussion of the rocket
engine deal between Glavkosmos (Russia) and ISRO (India).  I will
not try to quote from it, but I would like to raise a few
questions.

WL argues that cryogenic liquid fuel rocket motors can be and have
been used for ballistic missiles.  This is true, but it does not
address the question I raised.  Why would India use cryogenic
motors for ballistic missiles, which of all rocket motors are the
worst suited to that task, when it knows how to make solid fuel
motors, which are ideal?

WL argues that the Administration was required by the Missile
Technology Control Act to impose sanctions on ISRO and Glavkosmos
for any deal which violated the terms of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), to which neither India nor Russia are
signatories.  WL claims that Russia is a signatory, but last I
heard Russia had agreed to abide by its terms without formally
signing.

WL is probably correct, although I haven't seen the precise
language of the law.

WL claims that Glavkosmos and ISRO ignored repeated attempts by
the Administration to discuss its concerns over the deal.  That is
not how I read the news.  As I understood it, ISRO and Glavkosmos
tried to engage the Administration in a dialogue over its
concerns, and the Administration refused to budge.  I am told that
ISRO and Glavkosmos offered inspections and safeguards to verify
that the motors would not be used for missiles, but that the
Administration did not take them up on it.  In any case, neither
side showed any sign of flexibility in their basic positions, that
the sale must/must not go through.

Finally, WL ignores some important issues.  He does not respond to
my contention that this type of export control is viewed by
developing countries as part of a technology cartel, in this case
designed to prevent them from competing in space industries.  Are
the sanctions fair?

WL also raises the question of whether U.S. policy has been
consistent.  It has been consistent regarding ballistic missiles,
but does not apply the same logic to advanced ground-attack
aircraft, which most analysts believe are much more militarily
significant.  Ballistic missiles are not "weapons of mass
destruction."  The Administration has actively promoted exports of
military aircraft, for obvious commercial reasons.  Is this
consistency?  Doesn't this reinforce the view that U.S. export
controls are technology cartels?

I was not aware of how closely liked Indian launcher and missile
programs had been.  It remains to be seen whether India will place
the cryogenic motor program in close contact with its missile
programs, but if it does, the United States may have itself to
blame for not pursuing the issue of safeguards.

In short, I continue to believe that the sanctions were a mistake
and a bad precedent.  Does it make sense to make India, which is
already well along in developing missile and launcher
technologies, the target of these technology constraints?  It will
certainly not prevent India from building more and longer-range
missiles.

The offer of verification and safeguards for this deal suggests an
alternative approach: technology sharing, combined with safeguards
to discourage the use of that technology for military purposes and
to make its end uses transparent to all.

+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+
|       Mark W. Goodman       | What a terrible thing it is |
| mwgoodman@igc.org -- econet | to lose your mind.          |
| goodman@ksgbbs.harvard.edu  |                             |
+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+