HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
From: john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (John Eichler) 
Date: 22 Nov 92 06:38:00 GMT
Reply-To: john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (John Eichler) 
Distribution: world
Organization: The GrapeVine BBS *** N. Little Rock, AR *** (501) 753-8121


In article: <palmer.722276991@news.larc.nasa.gov> (Michael T. Palmer) states:

>Hmmm, an interesting point.  But how do you restrict access to tools that
>they can construct themselves?  Sure, it is illegal for a convicted felon
>to own (or fabricate) a firearm, but the only reason they don't all do it
>is because it takes expensive milling machines and considerable talent.
>But how do you prevent someone from coding up an RSA program?  Prevent them
>from purchasing a computer?  A compiler?  Restrict their access to books
>which have the algorithm?  I think the pervasiveness of the information
>and tools necessary to create encryption programs will make your suggestion
>impossible to implement.
>
>Remember, if they're already convicted criminals, they probably won't
>pay too much attention to such laws anyway, so you'd have to find some
>way to physically prevent them from getting what they want.  Literally
>impossible.  The corner drug/gun dealer will now carry floppy disks
>with PGP 2.0 on it for those that can't get it legally (and can't program
>it themselves).

That all is true however by making it illegal for them to do this gives
LE agencies one more useful tool to combat crime.  With the relatively
high rate of individuals committing more than just one crime here is one
element of society where it might make good sense to arrest someone who
is in possession of an illegal key.

Any comments?
---
 . SM 1.06 ----- . Email: john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: 20 Nov 1992 12:53:35 -0800
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
NNTP-Posting-Host: porthos.csl.sri.com
Summary: Easiness of evasion eliminates objections to key registration
	(other than cost and/or inconvenience of registering keys).

One simple way for criminals to safely and easily get around any
key registration is the following:
  1) Use a non-registered "bad" key only occasionally (when really
     incriminating data is sent).  Then encrypt again, with the 
     registered "good" key before sending.
  2) Always reply to every message received that was encrypted
     with the "bad" key, saying that the message was totally
     garbled and unreadable, and could they please resend.
  3) Resend a "sanitized" version, encrypted only with the "good"
     key.

Using this method would allow a competent lawyer to prevent your
being convicted of "crypto-evasion."  Of course they couldn't
decrypt the "garbled" message.  (It was caused by a glitch ;-)
Their own tap records will back up your story.

Given that one can safely and easily get around any such legislation,
the only reasonable objections to it are it's cost and inconvenience.
If these can be minimized, then why not register keys?  Of course,
an equally valid question is "why register keys?"

I don't see why people who distrust the Gov't get so emotional about
key registration.  They can legislate all they want.  It might be
inconvenient and/or costly, but not dangerous to your privacy.  It
might help catch lazy or casual criminals - perhaps even enough to
justify the cost and inconvenience.

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Factoring Large Primes,
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 03:59:00 GMT


>2.) I am playing around with understanding RSA. Pretty simple.
>    (IMHO someone, someday, will find a fast way to factor huge primes)

I already know how to factor huge primes.  Factoring huge primes is
trivial.  By definition, primes no matter how large, only have two
factors.  I even know, by definition, what the factors are.  It is
factoring other large numbers that is difficult.  It is particularly
difficult if the large numbers only have a limited number of factors.

Indeed, the community is already good at factoring the product of large
primes.  However, it is very expensive.  The difficulty is a function of 
the size of the number.  It is not important that it always be as difficult
as it is today.  It is only important that we know how expensive it is.

If you are suggesting that we will ever have a method of factoring the 
product of large primes that is independent of the size of the number, 
that is a question of a different order.  It belongs on the same list as
the question of whether we will ever be able to travel faster than light.
In both cases, the available evidence is against it, but we can always
hope.  

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jwh@mother.sodor (James "Oolon Colluphid" Hawtin)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: crypt
Date: 19 Nov 92 03:12:34 GMT
Reply-To: jwh@mother.sodor
Organization: School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, UK


You someone tell me where to get the source for the crypt command or a sun4 4.1.3 binary.


		Thanks

				James.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 19:19:44 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov19.193036.26711@rchland.ibm.com> lwloen@vnet.ibm.com writes:
>In article <1992Nov19.172719.1540@fid.morgan.com>, sethb@fid.morgan.com (Seth Breidbart) writes:
>|> In article <1992Nov18.193900.20199@rchland.ibm.com>
>|> >Do all programs of class P halt?
>|> 
>|> Each program in P runs in polynomial time, so it must halt.
>
>Or is it, rather, P runs in polynomial time when it finds an answer?  I 
>realise this is very basic, but I have yet to have encountered any significant
>sub-set of programs that are not trivial that can be counted on to halt.

No; algorithms in P *must* halt in polynomial time.  A non-trivial set of
programs that can be counted on to halt is the set of programs which have
been proved to always halt.

One proves things in the first place about all programs in a class like P or
NP by taking an unspecified Turing machine which is assumed to implement a
program in the class.  One does a formal construction on that Turing
machine, and proves that, if it is in fact in the class, the construction
works.  (Once some basic theorems have been proved, it is rarely necessary
to return to this level.)

>|> Number all the polynomial-time machines (by adding a clock to each
>|> Turing Machine); do this in such a way that machine k runs in time < n^k.
>|> The "universal algorithm" consists of running machine i until it halts,
>|> and checking to see if an answer is found.  If machine k solves the
>|> problem, then this algorithm runs in time k n^k.  If P != NP, then
>|> this universal machine might not halt.  (More likely, it will always
>|> halt, but not within any polynomial time bound.)

This construction contains a misstatement.  One is not numbering all the
polynomial-time machines; rather, the construction builds a sequence of
machines which will implement all polynomial-time algorithms.  (The set of
all polynomial-time machines is not effectively enumerable.)  However, by
taking *all* Turing machines, and modifying the kth one so that it halts
with failure if it would otherwise have taken more than time (n+1)^k, you
will get each polynomial-time algorithm.  (The quoted n^k has a problem with
n=1; this can be fixed more directly, but it does not affect the remainder of
the argument.) The key point is that every algorithm occurs infinitely often
in any effective list of all Turing machines; one can always add some extra
"overhead" to the machine.

(There is also a problem with the stated bound; given a problem in NP with a
non-deterministic time bound of n^j, if j > k, the actual bound will be
k n^j, not k n^k.)

Given a problem which actually is in NP, this universal machine will in fact
solve it in polynomial time if P=NP -- indeed, it will solve any problem in
P, given an NP formulation, in polynomial time.  If the NP problem is in not
in P, it will always halt, but will not necessarily run in polynomial time.

As a practical algorithm, it doesn't make it; a run time of O(n^10^20),
which could well happen, is not practical.


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: scharle@lukasiewicz.cc.nd.edu (scharle)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Triple DES
Date: 19 Nov 92 15:00:19 GMT
Reply-To: scharle@lukasiewicz.cc.nd.edu (scharle)
Organization: Univ. of Notre Dame

In article <1eg516INNrrq@uniwa.uwa.edu.au>, markd@uniwa.uwa.edu.au (Mark Diamond) writes:
|> The question arose in a previous reply to this posting of whether
|> triple, double or any other repeated DES encryption was stronger than a
|> single encryption.  The previous reply indicated that the question was
|> still open.  It is not open ... it has been settled and the results
|> presented at CRYPTO 92.
|> 
|> Essentially the question about the strength of double encryption is the
|> same as the question about whether DES is or is not a group.
|> 
|> If DES were a group then for two keys K1 and K2
|> 
|>        DES( DES(Plaintext, K1), K2) == DES(Plaintext, K3) for some
|> 
|> K3 which presumably the eavesdropper is trying to discover ... the point
|> being that they would not have to find K1 and K2, but only a kind of
|> "combination" K3.
|> 
|> The recently demonstrated fact that DES is *not* a group indicates that
|> a double encryption *is* stronger than single encryption.

    Excuse me, for I am really an amateur in this subject, but I
don't see the chain of reasoning here.  If I am just being particularly
dense, please keeps the flames low, and I'll shut up.

    What has been shown is that iteration of DES with different keys 
results, in general, in encryption which is different from DES.  I 
believe that that is different from showing that iteration results
in something _stronger_.  As far as I can see, it is consistent
with someone discovering that two applications of DES could result
in a encryption which is in fact easier to break -- for example,
there could be some interaction between keys, that would result in
an easy cipher to break, so that there would have to be some care
in choosing keys.  It is also consistent with it being discovered
that iterations of DES are _equally_ difficult to break as single 
uses, perhaps just a different method has to be used.

-- 
Tom Scharle                |cm65n6@irishmvs(Bitnet)
Room G003 Computing Center |scharle@lukasiewicz.cc.nd.edu(Internet)
University of Notre Dame  Notre Dame, IN 46556-0539 USA
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: idealord@dorsai.com (Jeff Harrington)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Organization: The Dorsai Embassy, New York's Computer Consulate. +1.718.729.5018
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 14:04:25 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

> 
> Jeff Harrington says he and his wife are under surveillance, phone tapped,
> mail opened, etc.
> 
> I don't know Jeff, and it would be interesting to hear how he knows this.
> 
> It would also be interesting to know if he was notorious in some way.
> 
> -- 
> David Sternlight
> PGP public key on request; RIPEM public key on server
> 
> 

 
Rather than wasting more bandwidth on politics - I'm more than
willing to email a text file to anyone interested in my/our activities -
coded - or non-coded...(send me your PGP 2.0 key if you want...)
 
This is not the place to prove or dis-prove my knowledge of my 
continuing surveillance.  
 
-- 
Jeff Harrington             PGP 2.0 Public Key Available via Email
idealord@dorsai.com
From: srt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Stephen R. Tate)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 23 Nov 92 16:43:34 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: Duke University Computer Science Dept.; Durham, N.C.

In article <By2v5F.DCM.2@cs.cmu.edu> jmount+@CS.CMU.EDU (John Mount) writes:
>Assume an enumeration of all Turing machines.  Suppose we want to
>solve SAT.  Let ALG be the Turing machine that simulates one step of
>machine i every 2^i steps (so it runs machine 1 every other step, 2
>every 4th , 4 every 8th).

Ah...  very cute.  I'm not sure why I hadn't seen or didn't remember
that construction.   Anyway, I hereby publically chastise myself for
not seeing this.

Now a question:  decision problems in NP are shown to be NP-complete
by many-to-one reductions, so the decision problems would all be
solvable by this technique.  However, some optimization problems use
Turing reductions, so you have to have an algorithm that always halts,
even for negative instances (this construction does not halt in these
cases).  Are there ways around this?  It seems that since verifying
prime factors is in both NP and co-NP, that's the saving grace for
factoring.  What about other problems?

-- 
Steve Tate srt@cs.duke.edu | The reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem,
Dept. of Computer Science  | above all other sciences, is that its laws are
Duke University     | absolutely certain and indisputable, while those of all
Durham, NC  27706   | other sciences are to some extent debatable. (Einstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cet1@cus.cam.ac.uk (C.E. Thompson)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Organization: U of Cambridge, England
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 23:02:07 GMT

In article <Nov.16.03.59.05.1992.2368@remus.rutgers.edu>, clong@remus.rutgers.edu
(Chris Long) writes:
|>
|> Anyone who believes P=NP is an idiot.
|> 
|> Case closed.

Anyone who believes the earth goes round the sun is an idiot.

Case closed?

Chris Thompson
JANET:    cet1@uk.ac.cam.phx
Internet: cet1@phx.cam.ac.uk
From: boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption - a Challenge
Date: 21 Nov 92 19:40:14 GMT
Organization: UB

Mr. Lindano:

Your challenge certainly sounds interesting.  I'd take you up on it
but I don't have a lot of time right now.  Maybe next semester before
the work gets too heavy.  I'm kind of interested in the 'embedded
keys' idea -- does that mean that the keys for each message are
somehow embedded in the message itself?  That sounds like a clever
idea.  I wonder how you hide the message key so the eavesdropper can't
find it -- maybe that key is useless to the eavesdropper otherwise.

Anyway, we can talk about that later, but right now could I ask a
question?

Suppose two people, A and B, are using your NuCrypt to encrypt their
messages.  Suppose an eavesdropper manages to get a copy of NuCrypt.
(Say he copies A's floppy.)  Can the eavesdropper now listen in to the
messages between A and B?


-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Public key challenge
Date: 16 Nov 92 22:27:21 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov14.153536.9930@infodev.cam.ac.uk> rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes:

>Call a public key cryptosystem coercion-resistant if an opponent who 
>monitors the channel between two parties, and some time thereafter 
>obtains the cooperation of one of these parties, cannot recover the 
>session key.
>
>If you have an online system, coercion-free designs are easy. Use 
>Diffie-Hellman to set up a session key, and delete it once you're 
>finished. 


>However it's a bit more difficult to make a store-and-forward system,
>such as electronic mail, coercion-resistant.

You can still do it, at least with regular communication partners.

For each partner, you generate as many rannos as you expect to have
messages in transit, times 2 (one batch for each direction).

You exponentiate each.

Each gets an ID and is sent ahead to the partner.

The partner has done the same.  You save the partner's (ID,a^s) and your
own (ID',s').  When you want to send a message, you choose one of your
and one of your partner's IDs -- use a^s^s' as your session key and
identify the message with (ID,ID').  You delete your memory of a^s, s'
and a^s^s' before releasing the encrypted message.

This has the disadvantage that it works only for regular communicating
partners and, worse, that it requires storing future key pieces where they
might be compromised.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: linnoise@bigboy (LineNoise)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: why isn't there a sci.crypt.politics?
Date: 19 Nov 92 01:39:14 GMT
Organization: Temple University

Given the number of messages here concerning the moral, political, and
ethical issues concerning cryptography there is a clear need for a
another news group dedicated to it.

It is difficult to wade through all the politics to find discussions
dealing with coding, methods, and etc.

There are many groups out there that do not seem as active as the
sub topic of ethics/politics of cryptography.  I apologize for posting
this here -- I didn't know where else to direct this message.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4870 sci.math:15055 comp.theory:2439
From: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 14:52:03 GMT
Reply-To: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: The Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology
In-reply-to: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)

In article <PHR.92Nov15203840@napa.telebit.com>, phr@telebit (Paul Rubin) writes:
>It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
>is dead;

Why?  Assuming you mean public-key, the question of whether there
exist one-way functions is not dependent on P!=NP, right?
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc_North@mindlink.bc.ca (Marc North)
Subject: Where is PGP 2.0?
Organization: MIND LINK! - British Columbia, Canada
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 01:04:34 GMT

Can someone point me to an FTP site where I can get PGP 2.0? I don't need the
source code, but that would be nice if available.

Thanks,

Marc North


--
Marc North  --  The Lanceholder's Group
From: res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli)
Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy
Organization: Little to None
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 03:52:54 GMT

In article <Bxs7Gu.9xx@wimsey.bc.ca> sl@wimsey.bc.ca (Stuart Lynne) writes:
>On the other hand it seems that other elements of encryption might be of
>interest to the same goverment agencies. Digital signatures are good evidence
>of authorship. If they where required on all electronic transactions it becomes
>easier for them to follow the audit trail. No sense in claiming that a record
>didn't originate from you if it was signed with your digital signature.

Two diverse points here:

1. I am in the process of drawing up a will.  Throughout the entire process
   I have been thinking:  Gee, wouldn't it be great to be able to register
   a public key with the court of jurisdiction and use digital signatures
   to validate the will.  I could change it easily any time I want without
   having to involve witnesses.  Or, just use it to append codicils to a
   conventinal will without a lot of hassles.   But, alas, the legal system
   hasn't evolved to the point where this is yet possible.  Maybe in my
   lifetime, though...

2. I've also been wondering lately what it really means (or should mean)
   to put a digital signature on a file.  If the file contains a legal
   document, it could probably be inferred that the responsibility to the
   digital signor is the same as had he signed a physical copy.  But should
   it be the same as a witnessed or notorized signature?  The latter provides
   allows for some later testamony about state of mind and coersion that is
   lacking with a digital signature.  Also, what if I sign, say, a tax
   assessment form?  Does this mean that I agree with it and waive the right
   to dispute it later, or does it merely indicate I acknowledge having
   seen it personally.  Even though digital signatures are a powerful tool,
   it seems there is still a great deal of legal framework remaining to be
   built around them.
   I 
-- 
Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ariel@world.std.com (Robert L Ullmann)
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
Organization: The World in Boston
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 02:27:48 GMT

kocherp@leland.Stanford.EDU (Paul Carl Kocher) writes:
> It sounds to me like this "encryption" system just involves XORing
> random numbers onto the plaintext, which would explain why the program
> is very short, cannot use keys, and produces different cryptotext when
> run multiple times (different random number seeds stored at the beginning
> of the cryptotext).

Ah, very good. Does indeed sound like that.

Perhaps the originator (whom, after all, may be misrepresented by the
poster) has not designed security-by-obscurity, but simple obscurity-
by-obscurity, a perfectly valid and useful concept. But not what we
mean by cryptography.

Cheers,
Rob

--
Robert Ullmann		Ariel@World.STD.COM	+1 508 879 6994 x226
Quand Maigret poussa la porte du Tabac Fontaine, vers une heure et demie,
le patron du bar, qui venait de se lever, descendait lentement un escalier
en colimaon qui s'amorait dans l'arrire-salle. ... Arriv derrire le
comptoir, il repousa le garon d'un geste ngligent de la main, saisit
une bouteille de vin blanc, un verre, mlangea au vin de l'eau minrale et,
la tte renverse en arrire, se gargarisa.  -- Simenon

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4899 sci.math:15095 comp.theory:2444
From: annan@vax.oxford.ac.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 08:45:03 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: Oxford University VAX 6620

In article <1e7fvdINN87s@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>, ramsay@math.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay) writes:
> In article <PHR.92Nov15203840@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com 
> (Paul Rubin) writes:
>>It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
>>is dead; but at this point I wouldn't take Swart's claims seriously
>>without seeing some consensus among complexity efforts that unlike
>>his previous attempts, his latest effort is free of bugs.
> 
> Mathematics would also be placed in a surprising position by P=NP.
> P=NP implies that there is an algorithm which, given a theorem
> expressed formally in ZF, say, and a number n, either gives a formal
> proof of the theorem of length at most n, or shows that there is none,
> and which would take time bounded by some polynomial in n. It wouldn't
> *necessarily* put us all out of the math research business, but....

And remember, proving P=NP doesn't necessarily mean finding such an algorithm,
merely proving it exists.

-- 
James Annan.
                [--------------------------------------]
                [  "The only good Tory is a lavatory"  ]
                [--------------------------------------]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt