Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 22:43:17 CST
From: "Roy M. Silvernail" <roy@cybrspc.uucp>
Newsgroups: comp.society.privacy
Subject: The UPS clipboard
Organization: Villa CyberSpace, Minneapolis, MN
X-Submissions-To: comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
X-Administrivia-To: comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil
X-Computer-Privacy-Digest: Volume 1, Issue 115, Message 3 of 9

I'm going to pull together several responses, in the interest of saving
bandwidth...

Brian Bousman <bbousman@zeus.muse.rockwell.com> writes:

>    It seems to me that if you are worried about your signature being
>digitized and used for other purposes then you cannot sign *anything*
>because all it takes is a scanner to get it from a paper version of
>your signature.

and volpe@bart.nosubdomain.nodomain (Christopher R Volpe) writes:

>Why is this new gadget any more dangerous than the status quo? Anyone
>can digitize a signature from paper using your average image scanner.

That's a valid point.  I have the feeling that UPS' old paper records
were handled a bit more securely than the clipboards, by virtue of the
physical paper itself.  Everyone associated knew it was the only copy
existing.  But that's just a feeling, so I can't press it too far.

The problem I saw was not so much the actual risk (which, since I've
seen no abuses, is probably as small as everyone at UPS claimed), but
with their attitude.

Consider that instead of a physical paper trail, you have valuable data
being stored electronically.  No one at UPS could tell me if that data
was stored in the clear.  The most knowledgable person I spoke to did
not know the term 'encryption'.  Given that I'm familiar with the
company building the clipboards, if this product follows their usual
design practices, it's implemented around an 8051 derivative processor
and static RAM.  It may, in fact, store data in EEPROM to avoid
inadvertant power loss.  Both memories' contents can be recovered by a
skilled tech, regardless of the wishes of the host processor.  Even if
they have gone to a more powerful processor, the memory must be held
static for the duration of the shift.  The stored data are therefore
vulnerable.

Consider, also, that the signature may actually be the least valuable
piece of information in that record.  How much could you tell about a
competitor if you had access to their UPS shipping records?  In many
cases, even the insured value of packages is recorded.

No one at UPS knew of any audit trail established for the clipboards.
The one rep told me the boards were 'dumped and cleared' at the end of
each shift, but could not confirm that residual data was actually
overwritten.  He also didn't know if a board could be dumped more than
once.

That brings up the next scenario, which made the UPS folks bristle the
most.  The most vulnerable point for stored data on these clipboards is
when the board is in the posession of the driver.  A reasonable man
cannot arbitrarily discount the possibility of crooked employees.
What's to stop a scrupulously challenged (tm) driver from stopping by a
contact point and dumping his board in exchange for a not-so-small
gratuity?  The data is copied, but UPS still gets it as usual.  They're
none the wiser, the driver is some the richer, and my company's shipping
habits are being studied by my competitor.

I need a better answer than "That will never happen."  But that's the
only answer UPS had for my questions.

Finally, Ed Ravin <eravin@panix.com> writes:

>Do what many of us techno-troublemakers are already doing with junk mail
>lists -- sign an extra middle initial or two, or otherwise alter your
>moniker so that you can identify "the signature I use on UPS clipboards".

I do this already.  I don't actually sign my name at all, and there's no
danger of what I do write being mistaken for my legal signature.

>>But UPS hasn't started dumping the clipboards' contents by radio, yet.
>
>Don't worry, be happy, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act makes it
>illegal for anyone to "listen" to the stuff :-) :-)

Gosh, I feel so much more secure now!  :-)

I wouldn't have been so peeved, but the flat refusal of anyone to even
grant the existance of a risk really got me.  This really goes for the
netters, as well as UPS.  The risks may not be greater than those of the
paper records, but they are _different_ risks and need to be
specifically addressed.  The fact that no abuses have come to light may
mean the system really is secure.

Or it might just mean the guys getting those extra dumps tip really
well.
--
    Roy M. Silvernail   | #include <stdio.h>                 | "press to test"
 roy%cybrspc@cs.umn.edu | main(){                            |     <click>
 cybrspc!roy@cs.umn.edu |  float x=1;                        | "release
                        |  printf("Just my $%.2f.\n",x/50);} |    to detonate"