From: olson@anchor.esd.sgi.com (Dave Olson)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.sgi
Subject: Re: Security hole in default /etc/passwd file under 4.0.x
Date: 8 Apr 92 05:55:47 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.  Mountain View, CA

In <Apr.7.23.35.48.1992.24569@psi.rutgers.edu> scooper@psi.rutgers.edu (Simon P. Cooper) writes:

| olson@anchor.esd.sgi.com (Dave Olson) writes:
| 
| ...stuff deleted...
| 
| >You aren't reading what I wrote carefully. I said "as shipped" we want
| >the system easy to use.  I personally feel that anybody whose machine
| >is accessible directly over the internet is crazy to run with any
| >accounts unpassworded.  A reasonably large number of our more 'unix naive'
| >customers are not in this environment, though.
| 
|    I am sorry, but I think you are viewing things through your
| _fire_walled_network_ rose spectacles :)

No, note that I said *the internet*, not "a network".  These don't
even come close to being the same thing.  Also see below.

|    Your low end machines are targeted as personal workstations, possibly
| instead of a "PC" on a desk.  I quote from the cover of an Indigo glossy,
| 
| "I thought I told you to buy a PC.
| 	This runs like a workstation."

Hey, I never said that *I* liked the name RISC PC :)

|    These machines are supposed to run out of the box for people, who in all
| probability have little or no unix experience.  This class of user cannot be
| expected to understand concepts they have never been previously exposed to.
| 
|    If you are supplying a null password for lp to allow easy access for remote
| printing that means that you *must* be expecting the machine to be connected
| to a network.  Networks are promiscuous by their very nature, why not protect
| a naive user?
| 
|    SGI is the vendor, you are supposed to know what you are doing.  Why not
| take that responsibility?  I can assure you that customers will be far more
| irritated at SGI if a "cracker" gets onto a machine and erases their work than
| the potential problems caused by having to read documentation to get remote
| printing to work.

OK, for about the 4th time: SGI *does* have plans to ask customers at
first boot from the factory, and after software installs, if they
want a "secure" system, and then do the obvious things like password
or '*' out all accounts, prompting for passwords, etc.  It might also
turn on login, rsh, etc. logging.  This just hasn't been perceived as
a high priority item.  We *do* ship documentation that addresses the
issues (yes, I know must people don't read documentation).  Doing so
implies we will probably have to fix or add functionality to other
programs, such as the system manager.  It might also wait until we have
the SVR4 print spooler, which has a different mechanism for network
printing (note that I am not promising anything about this).

I think we have gone about as far as we can go on discussing this issue,
as I find I am repeating myself.  Those who care about this should lobby
the TAC, and/or their salespersons.  That is the way to change our
development priorities.

|    A bad analogy (hmm, I wonder why I thought of this :) might be;
| <<
|    A car salesman just sold me a "ready to drive" car with two cans of oil.
|    on the back seat.  When my engine blew up the only comment the salesman
|    made was, "Oh, didn't you know that you were supposed to install the oil?".
| >>

No, that is when we "forget" to install sash, so you have to boot from
tape or CD all the time :)
--
Let no one tell me that silence gives consent,  |   Dave Olson
because whoever is silent dissents.             |   Silicon Graphics, Inc.
    Maria Isabel Barreno                        |   olson@sgi.com