From: Christic Institute <christic@igc.apc.org>
Newsgroups: soc.culture.german
Date: 07 Sep 92 16:25 PDT
Subject: Germany's Power Play in Europe
Nf-ID: #N:cdp:1473000039:000:8506
Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!christic    Sep  7 16:25:00 1992


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GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE BALKANIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE (REVISED)

By ANDY LANG
Tuesday, September 8, 1992

I had a very interesting conversation last week with an old
friend who used to work in the German government. He startled me
with his interpretation of Germany's role in the splintering of
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the former USSR. I want to share
his views with the other readers of this conference.

Note that many of the new states that have risen from the ruins
of the socialist bloc were formerly allied with, or dominated by
Nazi Germany. [But don't worry: I'm not about to equate the BRD
with the Third Reich, or Helmut Kohl with Adolf Hitler!]

Examples: In 1939 Slovakia broke away from its federation with
the Czechs under the pressure of post-Munich German diplomacy,
and until the collapse of German power in Europe was ruled by a
pro-German government.

Slovenia and Croatia were provinces of the Austrian Empire before
World War I. Bosnia-Hercegovina was an Austrian protectorate, and
its formal annexation by the Austrians was one of the events that
precipitated the war. Serbia, on the other hand, was never part
of the German sphere of influence. During World War II the
Germans destroyed the Yugoslav Kingdom and, exploiting historic
ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Croats, organized a fascist
puppet state in Croatia.

The Nazis did not restore the independence of Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia after Hitler's armies marched east in June 1941, but
in general their citizens hailed the Wehrmacht as liberators. The
Nazis treated the Baltic states with relative leniency and
believed their populations [except the Jews] were racially
suitable for Germanization.

After less than 50 years of Soviet domination (excluding
Yugoslavia) all of these states have reappeared on the map of
Europe. The new states are anti-Russian and pro-German, and look
to Germany, rather than the United States, for investment and
material aid. What role, if any, did Germany play in their
rebirth?

First, West Germany's annexation of the German Democratic
Republic in 1990 signalled to the fledgling nationalist movements
in Eastern Europe that the state boundaries inherited from the
Cold War--or even from the Versailles system established after
the collapse of the German, Austrian and Russian Empires in 1918
--were not necessarily permanent.

Second, the new conservative and nationalist parties in Eastern
Europe were supported materially and financially by conservative
foundations in Germany--including the party foundations of the
Christian Democratic Union and its right-wing Bavarian partner,
the Christian Social Union.

Third, German diplomacy accelerated the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. The foreign policy of the United States, England and
France aimed to preserve the Yugoslav federation in some form--
and thus prevent civil war. But the German government decided
unilaterally (and prematurely, some believe) to recognize the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia--a fait accompli that forced
the hand of the other EC states. Is there any question that the
Slovenian and Croatian governments would have compromised with
the Serbs if Germany had pressured them to adopt a more moderate
policy?

This analysis does not suggest that Germany orchestrated the
``Balkanization'' of Eastern Europe, or that German foreign
policy is the sole cause of the new political order that is
taking shape in the East. The Baltic republics, for instance,
have always resented their forced incorporation into the Russian
Empire--whether Czarist or Soviet. In the case of the
Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federations, there were inherent
tensions that for years had been papered over by authoritarian
governments. In the political vacuum left by the collapse of
communism, these conflicts probably would have risen to the
surface in any event. But Germany has played a role, and since
the annexation of the GDR has become the dominant political and
economic power in Eastern Europe.

There are historical and political reasons for Germany's policy.
Since the early Middle Ages Germans have fought to expand their
territory and influence into the East. Conquest, however, has not
been the only means Germany has used to assert its national
power. The international system created by Bismarck relied as
much on diplomacy as on war, and in fact political alliances with
the Austrian and Russian Empires were the keystone of German
policy in Eastern Europe. Bismarck warned that Germany must never
allow its interests to conflict with Russia's--advice that was
ignored, with tragic results, by German governments in the 20th
century.

Since World War II Germany, like Japan, has relied on economic
rather than military power to expand its sphere of influence. But
German influence in the East was blocked by the division of
postwar Europe into competing military blocs. Now that Russia has
abandoned the outposts of its empire, no barrier remains to
Germany's economic and political domination of the region.

Bismarck believed that ``sorting out the tribes'' would create
the most rational international system for Europe. In effect, the
tribalization of Europe has been the result of Soviet collapse
and German diplomacy. In place of the large federal states
created after World War II, Eastern Europe is becoming a
checkerboard of small nations. My German friend described this
development in one phrase: ``Divide . . . and rule.''

This does not imply that Germany has decided to dominate the
``East'' at the expense of its relationship with Western Europe.
The German government is still committed to the political and
economic integration of Europe--a goal its foreign policy has
steadfastly pursued since the first Western European economic
structures were created in the 1950s. But the unravelling of the
Versailles system in Eastern Europe could give Germany the upper
hand in future dealings with its EC partners.

How? Europe can be classified into states that are historically
anti-German and pro-German. This is a simplistic division, of
course, but nevertheless some countries--France and England, for
example--have historically resisted German domination of the
European continent. Other states--especially Poland and Russia,
but also Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, the Czech lands and
Serbia--still remember vividly the brutality of German occupation
during the war years.

On the other hand, several states are closely aligned with
Germany and do not fear German influence. Sweden, despite its
tradition of neutrality, has an ancient economic and cultural
relationship with Germany. Austria, of course, is a south German
state. Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria were German allies
in World War II. But above all the new states in Eastern Europe--
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina--look toward Germany for economic aid and
political support.

All of these nations will eventually qualify for membership in
the European Community. Why is this important from the German
standpoint? Germany's economic power in the EC has not been
matched by political influence. England and France continue to
resist German preeminence in the new federal structures that are
taking shape in Europe. Germany therefore needs allies, and as a
result of the Balkanization of Europe, Germany now can count on
the support of at least 14 Northern and Eastern European states
that are historically ``pro-German''--some of which owe their
independence in part to German influence.

My friend predicts that Germany will preach the equality of
nations in federal Europe. The German government will argue that
every state should have an equal number of votes in European
bodies--like the system adopted by the United States for its
Senate. The support of 14 small nations would then be decisive.

I am not suggesting that Germany is conspiring to enslave Eastern
Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany is not the Third Reich,
and Helmut Kohl is not Adolf Hitler. The German government is
playing by the rules of international diplomacy and power
politics. But it believes that in a united Europe, its economic
power entitles Germany to a decisive political voice.

This may be a simplistic analysis, or it may simply be self-
evident to some of you. But I would appreciate your thoughts.

[This article reflects only the opinions of my conversation-
partner supplement by my own personal opinions.]
Newsgroups: soc.culture.german