From: fayegh@cs.ubc.ca (David Fayegh)
Subject: US navy nuclear accidents in foreign ports
Organization: Computer Science, University of B.C., Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 92 16:49:39 GMT

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PRESS RELEASE, April 2 1992

o---US Navy prepared to hide nuclear accidents in foreign ports
o---diplomatic assurances worthless.
 
 
A secret US Navy document instructs commanders that they don't necessarily
need to contact all the relevant authorities, like foreign governments, when a
nuclear powered vessel has an accident in a foreign port.  This violates the 
"Standard Statement" of assurance offered by the US government to any foreign
government which hosts a visit by a nuclear powered warship.
 
The document, "OPNAVINST 3040.5B, Nuclear reactor and radiological
accidents;procedures and reporting requirements for", is issued by the Chief 
of Naval Operations and is labeled "For Official Use Only, Special Handling 
Required, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals".  A copy has been submitted to 
the New Zealand Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion by a local academic, 
Dr Peter R Wills.
 
Dr Wills says that the document makes nonsense of the assurances made by
the US government in the "Standard Statement on the operation of U.S. Nuclear
Powered Warships in Foreign Ports", another document which the US government
refuses to release to the public.  (Dr Wills made this document public in a 
submission to the New Zealand Parliament five years ago.)  One of the 
assurances offered in the Standard Statement says "the appropriate authorities 
of the host government will be notified immediately in the event of an 
accident involving the reactor of the warship during a port visit".
 
However, the Navy Instruction leaves commanders free to use their "judgment
as to the nature and extent of an accident" and tells them that "Emergency 
Action Levels" should be used only as "general guidelines".  If a commander 
judges that panic and stoppage of vital services may have more serious 
consequences than exceeding specified levels of public exposure to radiation, 
then civilian authorities need not necessarily be notified.  "Public
reaction" is noted as a specific factor for consideration in relation to
deciding what actions should be taken when Emergency Action Levels are 
exceeded.  The document expresses concern about public reaction in the event 
of even a minor accident and the serious impact that this could have on the 
operation of US Navy nuclear powered warships throughout the world.
 
The US Atomic Energy Act forbids officials from discussing information
about nuclear accident contingency planning and the US Navy refuses to 
release any details of plans to deal with a nuclear reactor accident.  After 
conducting a three-year enquiry, the Australian Senate concluded that "there 
is a total lack of knowledge of the contingency procedures that the US 
authorities would implement in the event of a reactor incident".  It is 
precisely this information which Dr Wills has made available to the New 
Zealand government-appointed committee.
 
The Navy document OPNAVINST 3040.5B supplied by Dr Wills is listed as
current in the latest US Navy Consolidated Subject Index of Instructions by 
Washington Headquarters Organizations, 1 October 1991, although a small 
modification (CH 1) was issued at an unspecified date after 1 April 1985. 
(Any major modification would require reissuance of the entire Instruction 
OPNAVINST 3040.5B with the designation "C" instead of "B".)
 
Before a nuclear powered warship is allowed to visit a foreign port, the
Chief of Naval Operations makes a "reactor safeguards evaluation" and issues 
a clearance. The criteria used in making this evaluation are secret.  A 
clearance request or notification for a nuclear powered warship visit to a 
foreign port must include the "berthing or anchorage requirements, preferred 
and alternative (if available)".  The title of the document (OPNAVINST 
C3000.8H) specifying this requirement is classified, making it unique
among approximately 2000 "Instructions" issued by the Chief of Naval
Operations. "Whatever they are up to when they send a nuclear powered warship 
into a foreign port, it is much more secret than spying on foreign 
governments," said Dr Wills.
 
When it comes to developing accident contingency planning, the Navy will not
cooperate with local authorities.  There is greater concern that events which 
have international implications or which are likely to give rise to inquiries 
by the public or press should be reported promptly to higher authorities 
within the Navy.
 
In the event of an accident, the release of information would be limited to
that required for public safety, and there would be no discussion of the 
apparent reasons for the accident. In any case, a loss of radioactivity from 
a warship does not constitute a "radiological accident" until projected public 
exposure to radiation reaches some specified limit.  The Navy may determine 
that no public notification is necessary in the event of an accident.  In
such a case the government hosting a visiting nuclear powered warship is
unlikely to be informed either.  Information may be passed on later from the 
Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.
 
If it is judged that immediate protective actions are recommended for the
local population, ships' captains are authorized to issue notification to 
civil authorities and to offer an assurance that every possible precaution has 
been or is being taken to reduce the potential hazard to a minimum.  However,
notification is more likely to come later from a Fleet Commander.
 
At the first sign of an accident, radioactivity surveys would be ordered by
the captain within the ship and the immediate vicinity of the ship.  On this 
basis he would assess whether or not, in his view, an "accident situation" 
existed.  If the situation was defined to be an accident, the captain would 
notify his superiors and dispatch a radiological monitoring team ashore to 
survey the downwind situation.  Assistance would be requested from nearby, if 
it was available, and once results of the onshore monitoring became available, 
they would be reported to an "Area Commander" at Fleet Headquarters.  (There
are five Pacific Fleet Area Commanders with responsibilities related to
reactor accidents: Commander Third Fleet, Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander 
Submarine Force Pacific, Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific and Commander 
Naval Air Force Pacific.)  It is the responsibility of the Area Commander to 
arrange for a radiological assistance team to be dispatched, but this would 
not be done until he had decided that an accident situation actually existed.  
This judgment would be based on information coming in from the captain of the 
stricken warship.
 
Action to protect the public would not be taken until it was determined
that the situation was serious enough to require notification of civil 
authorities.  It would take time to carry out the measurements and assessments 
of the radiological hazard.  Initial measurements might produce results 
falling below the criteria which determine the first "Emergency Action Level", 
and then civilian authorities would receive no immediate notification.  Only
after these criteria were exceeded could the public expect notification of
the accident condition.  In a remote port where Navy off-hull monitoring is not
available from a nuclear support organisation, all of the measurements would 
have to be made by ship'screw, many of whom may be absent on shore-leave.
 
Beyond the actions which a ship's captain could take to monitor and control
an accident situation, the mobilization of personnel and the co-ordination of 
resources would be directed from an "emergency control centre" set up by the 
designated Area Commander. The Navy document specifies that it is from this 
remote location, rather than the accident scene, that "decisions are made, 
results of radioactivity and radiation surveys are evaluated, and 
communications with off-site authorities and other commanders are
conducted".  The Area Commander would assess the radiation dose the public
is likely to receive by relying on information reported by 15 personnel 
dispatched ashore from the ship.
 
The Area Commander is also responsible for deciding whether or not a ship
should be moved in the event of an accident.  The considerations are complex. 
They involve the potential for further danger to the reactor core, the ability 
to control release of radioactivity at the current location, the radiation 
levels at the scene, the ship's propulsion capability,the population density 
in the surrounding area and along towing routes and the navigability of towing 
routes.  Nevertheless, the views of local authorities would not be
sought, not even to confirm that they coincide with the judgments of the US
Navy.
 
"The standing instructions to US Navy commanders usurp the authority of
those responsible for public safety and are irreconcilable with assurances
offered to foreign governments in the Standard Statement," said Dr Wills after 
analysing the secret papers.
 
Peter R Wills
Centre for Peace Studies
University of Auckland
 
tel	64 - 9 - 630 4889 (home)
	64 - 9 - 373 7599 ext 8889 (work); ext 8805 (secretary)
fax	64 - 9 - 373 7445
e-mail	p.wills@aukuni.ac.nz
 
 
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The following is a list of contents of the 30-page document that forms 
the substance for the press release. I shall send it to you on request.
  
 
SUBMISSION TO THE N.Z. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROPULSION
 
 
by  Peter R Wills                   March, 1992
    Centre for Peace Studies
    University of Auckland
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
1.  BACKGROUND
	1.1  Previous submissions	3
	1.2  Research into military nuclear technology	3
	1.3  The current enquiry	4
2.  OVERVIEW
	2.1. Safety and Environmental Record	5
	2.2  Regulation, codes and liability regimes	6
	2.3  Contingency plans and emergency procedures	7
3.  AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
	3.1  Confidential information	8
	3.2  US Navy documents about nuclear propulsion	10
4.  NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPPING
	4.1  Nuclear Powered Vessels	12
	4.2  NPWs and military strategy	13
	4.3  New Zealand's role	15
	4.4  Environmental considerations	16
5.  THE HAZARDS OF NPW VISITS
	5.1  Risk assessment	18
	5.2  Accident Consequences	19
	5.3  Regulatory regimes	20
6.  US NAVY ACCIDENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING
	6.1  General	22
	6.2  Notifying civilian authorities	23
	6.3  Execution of the plan 	26
	6.4  Vessel salvage	27
	6.5  Provision of assistance	27
7.  OTHER CONTINGENCY PLANS
	7.1  New Zealand AEC 500	29
	7.2  Murmansk/Kola Plan	30
8.  CONCLUSION
 
APPENDIX I	Previous submissions
APPENDIX II	OPNAVINST 3040.5B
APPENDIX III	Murmansk/Kola contingency plan
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