HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: svanegmo@cantor.math.uwaterloo.ca (Stephen Van Egmond)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: University of Waterloo
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 06:49:40 GMT

Ayn Rand's view of rationality is evidently diametrically opposed to
emotionally-based approaches to philosophy.

However, in this context I think that "rational" refers to the method
one uses to derive one's morality.  One begins with a set of axioms that define
basic realities about life (a person's right to their own existence, etc.),
and from these basic axioms, one logically deduces (or induces, if you're 
insane) the rest of their moral code using the best logic that they have
available.  To an Objectivist, the principle that a person has the right
to keep what they've earned implies that taxes shouldn't exist in a free
society.

This is hardly a formal definition, it's a working one. Accepted?

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: the simplicities of freedom
Date: 17 Nov 92 01:05:24 GMT
Reply-To: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Pyramid Technologies, Mt. View, California.

In article <1992Nov16.161052.13413@kadsma.kodak.com>,
pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek) writes:
|> In article <37623@uflorida.cis.ufl.edu> jfh@reef.cis.ufl.edu (James
F. Hranicky) writes:
|> 
|> [stuff deleted]
|> 
|> >
|> >1) You are free to accept or reject advertisements.
|> >
|> 
|> No you're not. Advertising depends on this. You will be affected by
|> advertising in ways of which you are not consciously aware.
|> 

I tend to agree with this.  Many advertisments are "thrust" upon us when
we are in public places.  A good example is a billboard on a highway. 
It is true that we are not "forced" to look, but we would be foolish to
ignore the intent and the obvious consequences.  For personal reasons, I
have maintained a rather vigilant awareness of the effects of simply
being in contact with media, not to mention advertisment.  I often find
myself becoming aggressive and argumentative.

I have often wondered if television networks would be willing to "frame"
the video signals surrounding a commercial advertisment so that viewers
with a particular kind of device could detect incoming commercials.  Now
suppose that we were to propose hypothetical legislation that required
this.  Suppose also, that government agreed, for the sake of argument,
to make all costs associated with the implementation disappear.  Do you
suppose that networks and advertisers would be for it or against?  

In principal, the customer would be getting a service which would give
him more control over his destiny.  On what possible grounds could
either an advertiser or television network object?  Clearly, commercial
advertisements are like riders on a piece of favorable legislation. 
They are snuck into us when we are doing something unrelated but
enjoyable.  And that is an invasion. The notion that we could always
stop doing the enjoyable activity really misses the point.  For a real
person, in this world, to act so as to take him or herself out of
sensual contact with commercial advertising is, for all practical
purposes, impossible.

The best solution, is of course, non-commerical alternatives.  These are
becoming more viable.  In the SF area, we have four, count 'em, four
public, non-commercial stations, and it is a blessing.

Now what to do about public eyesores such as billboards, neon signs,
blimps, etc.  Does the right to freedom of expression guarantee that I
am allowed to make my point and do so without punishment, or does it
guarantee my ability to thrust it upon the unwitting?

Paul Collacchi
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:17:16 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov18.182842.14417@ncar.ucar.edu> gary@colossus.cgd.ucar.edu (Gary Strand) writes:
>pn> Peter Nelson
>
>pn> Choosing some alternative epistemology merely because it's too hard to
>    apply science to problems like these makes about as much sense as doing
>    animal sacrifices to cure AIDS because science hasn't succeeded at it.  
>
>  Is it really? Or is it merely recognizing that science does not, and cannot,
>  contain all the methods and theories for getting at the answers we seek? 


  One thing that could always make us skeptical about this latter
  conclusion is that there are many areas where science didn't
  *used to* have any answers but now it does.   Science continues
  to progress so we can't be sure that just because it can't answer
  a particular question now doesn't mean it won't in the future.

  But let's say that we conclude anyway that science is just
  "epistemologically unfit" to answer certain categories of 
  questions.    What then?   How DO you choose some alternative
  epistemology?    There have been a great many approaches to
  resolve ethical truths over the last few thousand years and
  all of them lack a critical feature of science: a means for 
  gaining closure.  In science if you say A and I say B we can
  devise a test to resolve the difference and get on with things.
  By what means does an epistemology without a means of closure
  prove legitimacy?   

  The other question, of course, is:  why should we assume that any
  "truth" in the universal, objective, or transcendent sense, 
  applies to ethics?   Trying to find a "true" ethics implies
  that there IS one.  It's not obvious to me why we should make 
  such an assumption.


---peter

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 15:48:21 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov21.101846.26529@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>In article <By0ppn.59F@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}In article <1992Nov20.083822.27475@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>}>In article <Bxz04G.LyL@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}>}>If it's impossible to apply the methods of the natural sciences, as Hayek
>}>}>and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
>}>}
>}>}  Are you saying *it's impossible* to round up thousands of newborn
>}>}  babies and divide them into study and control groups and perform
>}>}  experiments of their personality or social development
>}>
>}>No, I'm denying that any factor, X, could be proven to necessarily cause
>}>behavior, Y, because of the fact that humans are volitional, another thing
>}>you deny, not only making you a positivist but a believer in psychological
>}>determinism.
>}
>}  This is a nonsequitor.
>
>Translation: Peter can't follow it.

  It's a nonsequitor because determinism is not the only alternative 
  to free will.  I.e., the universe has nondetermistic events. 

  Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
  How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology?  If the 
  brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
  from?  I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
  where nondetermined events would arise; but free will?   An immortal
  soul, maybe?   


>  Suppose you conduct the "experiment" you propose, and you observe that
> some of them exhibit behavior X.  How cany you determine what caused it?
> How can you control for volition?  How can you then formulate a hypothesis
> of: If X, then babies behave Y?

  The same way you do in any other experiment.  What's the big deal?


---peter





Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: Nelson and Me
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 11:08:12 GMT

In article <By1EB9.GoK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
}First, we should recognize that it is possible to have knowledge
}of particular things in reality, without even having a formal 
}definition.  The role of definitions is epistemological clarification.
}Do you know what a table is?  Can you identify ordinary dogs?
}Do you have a formal definition of either?

An even better example is the shape of a holly bush.  This can be readily
identified, but defined quantitatively?  Not that I know of.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 21:02:34 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <Bxz48B.CoK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>Note that the 'it' which has never been tried (according to Nelson) in
>economics is 'positivism'.
>
>And note that I've restricted the newsgroups line to just talk.politics.theory,
>since this is moving too far from r.a.b. or t.p.m.
>
>Tim Starr writes:
>>Peter Nelson writes:
>>}
>>}  It's never been *tried* in economics, for exactly the reasons you
>>}  state!   It's too hard to set up the appropriate experiments.  And 
>>}  the results are obvious: economics as a science is a joke!
>>
>>Again you reveal your ignorance.  Milton Friedman is probably the most famous
>>person to attempt economics with a positivist method.  Many, if not most,
>>present economists are positivists.  They use historical case studies in
>>place of controlled experiments, assume a determinist rational utility-
>>maximizer theory of man ("homo oeconomicus"), make falsifiable and testable
>>claims, and are largely responsible for the sad state of economic illiteracy
>>we're in.
>
>Tim Starr is right here, about the modus operandi in the field of
>economics, for the most part.  A very large part of what economists
>do is to derive theories and test them. 

  So what is he right about?   The fact that someone has attempted to 
  apply a rigorous approach to economics and failed, or that it is 
  difficult to do the sorts of experiments that scientists employ
  does not in any way invalidate these approaches, much less 
  support any alternative approach.   Applying Rand's epistemology
  to economics does not result in stronger predictions about, say,
  macroeconomic statistics.


---peter
  

  





Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 15:50:59 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov21.102644.26783@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>In article <By0p1F.4Fy@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}>"Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
>}>provided by man's senses." (Rand, VOS, "The Objectivist Ethics, p. 20).
>}>Rand's full description of our rational faculty can be found in
>}>_Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_.
>}
>}  In other words you are not prepared to define "reason".
>
>Jimbo just gave the definition.  It's the sentence that begins with "Reason".
>Which words aren't you capable of looking up in a dictionary?
>
>}  Note that "a=a" would be optimized out of existence by any decent
>}  compiler because it's logically meaningless.
>
>I love it: the first law of logic logically meaningless!


   "First law of logic"?   I know about Newton's laws, Kepler's
   laws of motion, the laws of thermodynamics, etc.  Who's "first
   law of logic" is this?


---peter
  

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 17:42:28 GMT

In article <Bxr9Ew.1o7@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>In article <1992Nov13.211554.22112@eecs.nwu.edu> ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland) writes:
>>>In one sense, the actions are detrimental to the life of the organism.
>>>THAT is altruism.  In another sense, the actions of the organism amount
>>>to a "trade" in which the net benefit is helpful to the life of the 
>>>organism.
>
>>What do you mean by "helpful to the LIFE of the organism"?  
>
>Well, that depends on the organism.  For plants, water, soil, sunlight, and
>protection from being eaten (among other things) contribute to the plant's
>life.  For humans, food, tools, shelter, education, companionship, and a
>host of other things are helpful in similar ways.  I can't believe that you
>don't the difference between things that lead to life and the things which
>do not.  It sounds like you have a deeper question in mind.

I claimed that certain actions that are altruistic "in some sense" are
biologically advantageous.  You said some of those actions are a trade
which is not altruistic at all.  I should have made myself clearer:
the actions I'm talking about could not be a trade to benefit the
organism performing them.  I'm talking about people sacrificing their
own lives to save those of their children.  Is there some notion of
"helpful to the life of the organism" with respect to which you think
that this kind of behavior is helpful to the life of the organism?

>>In some
>>examples of the behavior this theory attempts to explain, the organism
>>literally destroys its own life.  This is helpful to that organism's
>>genotype, but it's not helpful to the organism's LIFE.  
>
>OK.  So what?  For ants to sacrifice themselves for the good of the colony
>makes sense from an evolutionary point of view.  I can understand why the
>genetics of ants would encourage such behavior.  But human beings are not
>ants.  What's your point.

Human beings are among the organisms I'm talking about.

>
>>At any rate, I think
>>there are more examples of illogical altruistic behavior than are
>>accountable for by sheer illogic among people.
>
>Sure, religion and peer pressure account for a lot of such behavior.

And what accounts for the existence of THOSE things, Mr. Yoder?
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The all too Endearing Rand
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 07:46:30 GMT

In article <By4CEx.40K@casper.cs.uct.ac.za> nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne) writes:
}>Introspect to see if you behave purposively; see if the behavior of others
}>matches the external characterstics of your purposive behavior.  If so, then
}>the subject being observed is behaving rationally.
}
}Sounds a bit like a half-hearted Turing test going on here. Surely
}"purposive" behaviour is neither unique (cf. the lives of higher primates,
}bees and ants) nor essential (e.g the "man on the Clapham omnibus", who commutesto and fro each day with little purpose other than the monthly acquisition of a salary cheque, and a little hedonism added in between) to "man". 

According to the strict definition of "purposive," it is essential to man.
No other species of animal has ever been shown capable of it as far as I know,
including attempts at chimpanzee sign language teaching.

}The objectivist characterisation of "man as a rational
}animal" is either too inclusive (if a weak notion of rationality is entertained)or too exclusive otherwise. At best, it could provide a statement of how we 
}*ought* to be, but the requirement of rationality (weak or otherwise) seems
}rather arbitrary. 

It isn't merely Objectivist, but Aristotelian, so this definition is shared
throughout the Aristotelian tradition, albeit with possible exceptions.  He
put it in Greek over 2 millenia ago: man is a "zoon logikon."

It doesn't mean that we're always totally rational, it means that we have
a rational faculty, the capacity or power of reason - conceptual identifi-
cation of the evidence of the senses.  With it, we can do syllogisms, create
Art, invent life-saving drugs, generate electricity, develop ethical,
legal, and political notions of rights, and recognize them.

Without reason, we'd be little more than hairless apes, and perhaps less.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:4932 talk.philosophy.misc:2482 rec.arts.books:20140
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 15 Nov 92 19:18:27 GMT
Article-I.D.: eecs.1992Nov15.191827.3045
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University

Brian Yoder, responding to someone (NOT Ian Sutherland):
>Tell me.  Let's say you have iron-clad proof that slave societies are 
>more stable or more prolific (genetically) than free ones, would you
>suggest that I submit to slavery even though my life under slavery is
>worse than as a free man?  What kind of arguments could you offer?  Why should
>I want to clamp on the manacles?  What's in it for me?

Let's say you have iron-clad proof that it's somehow "irrational" or
"immoral" for me to sacrifice my life to save that of my child.  Would
you suggest that I stand aside and let my child die even though it is
against my nature to do so?  You could of course say that the ultimate
benefit to me is negative if I stand aside but am miserable for the
rest of my life because I went against my nature.  This just amounts to
defining "altruistic" in such a way that such "superficially
altruistic" actions are in fact selfish.  I'd be perfectly happy with
this response.  I just want to know if this is your response or not.
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:5080 talk.philosophy.misc:2563 rec.arts.books:20482
From: nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: The all too Endearing Rand
Date: 22 Nov 92 13:06:33 GMT
Article-I.D.: casper.By4CEx.40K
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town

A bit of the thread, courteousy Tim Starr:

>}  If  Rand (or Starr or Wales) makes the claim
>}  that "man is rational", in the lack of a metric for rationality, 
>}  how do you propose this claim be verified?

>Introspect to see if you behave purposively; see if the behavior of others
>matches the external characterstics of your purposive behavior.  If so, then
>the subject being observed is behaving rationally.

Sounds a bit like a half-hearted Turing test going on here. Surely
"purposive" behaviour is neither unique (cf. the lives of higher primates,
bees and ants) nor essential (e.g the "man on the Clapham omnibus", who commutesto and fro each day with little purpose other than the monthly acquisition of a salary cheque, and a little hedonism added in between) to "man". 
The objectivist characterisation of "man as a rational
animal" is either too inclusive (if a weak notion of rationality is entertained)or too exclusive otherwise. At best, it could provide a statement of how we 
*ought* to be, but the requirement of rationality (weak or otherwise) seems
rather arbitrary. 

Neil Horne ( 'scuse the bad formatting )
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: Quake Public Access
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 04:25:15 GMT

In article <YAMAUCHI.92Nov16113937@yuggoth.ces.cwru.edu> yamauchi@ces.cwru.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes:
>Then why isn't it moral to initiate the use of force in order to save
>your life?  Suppose you are suffering from a potentially lethal, but
>treatable, disease and you can no longer afford the treatment.
>Wouldn't it then be rational to steal the money to pay for the
>treatment, assuming you were confident that you wouldn't be caught?
>Wouldn't it also be rational to lobby the government to provide
>funding to pay for your treatment?

I just thought os a good example of the same kind of mistake you are making.

1. One should act according to one's self-interest.
2. Nutrition is necessary for the maintenance of your life.
3. Human blood is a nutritious substance.
4. Therefore:  You should brink the blood of the next person you meet.

What is the error here?  It is the same error as underlies your implication
that initiating force against drug companies is morally acceptable.

--Brian
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 14:09:42 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov20.084750.27716@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:

>You've yet to make any breach in Objectivism to require any defense.  Your
>charge: things like rationality and reason can't be measured quantitatively.
>So what?  Why should they be?

  Because otherwise you have no way of verifying that your theories
  describe anything about the real world.   


>  Your answer to this: because that's what science is or should be.

  As you can see, above, this is incorrect.   

  If you don't define your terms precisely then how do you know whether 
  what Rand says has anything to do with reality?    If I make the 
  claim that e=mc^2 and someone expresses doubt about this, the fact
  that the terms and conditions are clearly defined create the conditions
  for verifying my claim.  If  Rand (or Starr or Wales) makes the claim
  that "man is rational", in the lack of a metric for rationality, 
  how do you propose this claim be verified?



---peter







Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books