HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 03:37:23 GMT

cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:

>>For the first case, I suggest an examination of siamese twins, or twins who
>>have never been separated.  Many such cases exist, and I would claim tend to
>>support this hypothesis.

>True. Some twins who have spent their lives together behave like one
>person, claim to think as one, and prefer to be treated as one person.

>>For the second case, take people with damaged brains, especially those who
>>have (for one reason or another) so-called 'split brains'.  Behaviour patterns
>>here seem again to support the hypothesis.

>True. In some circumstances two different consciousnesses, with
>different perceptions, and different purposes, can be discerned.

>>If you think this is hugely counter-intuitive, you're right.  I don't like
>>admitting any more than you do that there is no clear distinction between me
>>and everything else.  But if there isn't, then consciousness becomes so
>>changed as a concept that it's hardly worth using the term any more.  Rather
>>like phlogiston, in fact.

>You seem to argue that the changes in the concept of consciousness
>necessary to encompass these phenomena are so unpalatable that you
>prefer to heave the bathwater, baby and all, out of the window. I'm
>very sorry to hear this. Have you consulted a philosophical therapist
>about this problem?

Well, I couldn't find any listed in the yellow pages.  Seriously, I didn't
intend to throw the baby out.  It's just that almost all discussion (here and
in other places) seems to ASSUME that consciousness is very much first-person
stuff, very unique to each individual, and that everyone has a different
one....what I am arguing is that such a concept doesn't appear to me to stand
up to much scrutiny - and if it doesn't, I'm not sure its meaningful to talk
about whether or not a particular machine "has" consciousness.

Maybe I'm not expressing myself all that clearly...


Tim
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avl0@cine88.cineca.it
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Meaning of (A) Life
Date: 17 Nov 92 09:50:07 +0100
Organization: CINECA, Italian Interuniversity comp. centre

In article <1992Nov15.230048.26012@u.washington.edu>, 
zzz@byron.u.washington.edu (Sample) writes:
> Logic can only be produced from a 
> subjective view point.  Scientists 
> claim to be objective when, in fact, 
> they're just putting themselves
> "in others shoes".
> 
> Good and bad, black and white, only
> have meaning from =A= subjective view.
> 
> The meaning of =A= life is it's "subjective view"
> 
> To ask "what is the meaning of life?" is to
> hope to be objective -- and no logic, no 
> information, can come from objectivity -- so
> the question can't be answered.

The question "what is the meaning of *MY* life" is the most important for
anyone. The conclusion you reach ("can't be answered") does'nt mean
that it can't be asked. "... we can't avoid dealing with this dangerous
and unknown sea, better would be if a god come to us from the other side ..."
(Plato + some faults in my memory)

More over. In order to decide if there's or not a meaning, you need a
criterion. A minimal criterion must concern effects of a life.
From the "subjective view" before my life there's nothing, after it there's
nothing too. Then no chenges so no meaning for *MY* life.
This is clearly an absudity then the meaning of *MY* (*YOUR*) life it's not
just a "subjective view".
The Meaning that I subjectively need it's something of objective.
And that question strictly concerns the Fundamental Goal of my life.

Really, often scientists fall into a trap believing that math can describe
all the realty, while just an aspect of it can be known by math.
Nevertheless, you can't claim that every knowledge (good and bad, black and
white) it's totally subjective. To know something implies that something does
exist, everyone that knows it can share with the others its knowledge.

Science, communication, and the life it self as human activities imply
some objectivity and an objective Fundamental Goal.  

+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"To be or not to be, that is the problem" W.S. 
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 13:46:45 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Nov18.051456.24550@u.washington.edu>, petry@corona.math.washington.edu (David Petry) writes:
|> In article <BxtBwx.LvH@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> >
|> >In article <1992Nov14.151559.13227@oracorp.com>, daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
|> >
|> >|> 
|> >|>     This sentence is false.
|> >|> 
|> >|> refers to an unrestricted notion of falsity, and is therefore
|> >|> meaningless. We can replace "false" by a restricted notion of falsity
|> >
|> >This sort of thing has been tried before.  One problem is that the displayed
|> >sentence is *not* meaningless in any normal sense of this term.  We
|> >know perfectly well what it means -- and that's the problem.
|> 
|> Well, we think we know perfectly well what it (the paradoxical sentence)
|> means, but we humans use non-monotonic logic.  That is, we are willing to 
|> reject our previous conclusions in light of new knowledge.
|> 
|> For example,  if you found out that I had just written down the sentence
|> "2+2 = 5" and was pointing to it while I exclaimed "This sentence is false",
|> you would quickly change your belief about the meaning of that exclamation.
|> 
|> I've always felt that that observation is crucial to the understanding of
|> the so-called paradoxes.

Really?  How?  What you point to is that the meaning of a sentence is
dependent upon context.  My claim remains that given the original
context of the example (in which the subject of the sentence refers
to the sentence itself), we know what the sentence means.  The fact
that the sentence *could* mean something else in *another* context
hardly allows us to escape the paradox.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx (Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A linguistical reformulation of the problem of consciousness
Date: 17 Nov 92 22:40:05 GMT

sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan) writes:

>In article <iordonez.721351866@academ01> iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx (Ivan O
>rdonez-Reinoso) writes:
[...]
>>In other words, Why am I?


>Why are you 'what' ?
Your question is valid only if you believe existence precedes being. Do
I need to be _something_ in order to be?

>See, models dont do that. The best answer is somthing like 'ta da'.:)

>Understand all and every thing will make sense. otherwise the best we can do
>is take notes... are you writing this down?

How is this philosophical position called? Functionalism? Behaviorism? I
am not sure. Anyway, all I know is that what you asserted above is an
opinion, and not an established fact.

Am I asserting something by asking questions? :)

--Ivan Ordonez
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 21:15:37 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov17.152753.13786@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>When you try to understand what G means, by interpreting the "diagonalizing"
>>operator, you get an infinite regress (in fact, a simple self-reference, but
>>it is not difficult to construct examples using diagonalization where the
>>references are not self-referential, but do produce an infinite regress).
>
>There is no infinite regress! To understand what G means, you only
>need to know (1) what diagonalization means, and (2) what it means for
>David Chalmers to believe something. [...]
>
>The only way that G becomes paradoxical is if we assume that David
>Chalmers is so smart that he believes something if and only if it is
>true. In that case, G reduces to the Liar Paradox, which I admit does
>cause problems.

IMO, it is sufficient to make G paradoxical that the meaning of G is
*relevant* to whether David Chalmers believes it.  (Actually, "paradoxical"
is not quite the right word; 'This sentence is true.' is not precisely
paradoxical; but it (on most accounts, including mine) shares the
unacceptability of "This statement is false.".)
Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:6841 sci.logic:2101
From: vidalnaq@alcatel-alsthom.fr (G. Vidal-Naquet)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Date: 19 Nov 92 09:37:36 GMT
Organization: Alcatel-Alsthom.recherche

In article <1992Nov14.151559.13227@oracorp.com>, daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> 
> In comp.ai.philosophy, we were discussing the meaningfulness of
> self-referential sentences, and I noticed that many people seem to
> think that such sentences are inherently invalid, or meaningless, or
> paradoxical. The paradigm example, of course, is the liar paradox
> 
>      This sentence is false.
> 
> Another paradoxical phrase is (I think it's called Richard's paradox):
> 
>      The smallest number that cannot be defined in fewer than twenty
>      words.
> 
> (It seems to define a number, and only takes twelve words to do it,
> contradicting the definition of the number.)
> 
> In my opinion, the problem with such sentences are not with their
> self-referential character, but with their use of an unrestricted
> notion of truth (or falsity).
> 
...
> Daryl McCullough
> ORA Corp.
> Ithaca, NY
In my opinion the problem with this type of ssentences is the level  they
 deal.  In my course on logic, I learned that formula expresses a property
 of a given structure, or of a class of structures, and that the truth value
of a formula can be determined from the structure.  Now the important point
is that there is a distinction betweeen the formula and the structures that
they reference. Such paradox as the liar come from mixing the structure
obtained by formulas and the truth values, with the semantic function that
 gives the value of a given formaulas with respect to a structure. That is 
essentially mixing a set with functions.
From: gowj@novavax.UUCP (James Gow)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 21 Nov 92 05:25:41 GMT
Reply-To: gowj@novavax.UUCP (James Gow)
Organization: Nova University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida

In article <BxL64n.J2B@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr) writes:
>In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
>1. That which thinks must exist.
How do we define think?


-- 
Linc, James Internet: Gowj@novavax.nova.edu; UUCP: gatech!uflorida!novavax!gowj
Songs of Solomon 2:12 "...the voice of the turtle is heard in our land."
James Gow P.O. Box 700585 Miami, Fla. 33170. Disclaimer [Is this really
necessary? I have a hard time getting people to understand this!]
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 14:22:09 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Nov14.151559.13227@oracorp.com>, daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:

|> In my opinion, the problem with such sentences are not with their
|> self-referential character, but with their use of an unrestricted
|> notion of truth (or falsity).

Of course this was Tarski's idea as well.

|> 
|>     This sentence is false.
|> 
|> refers to an unrestricted notion of falsity, and is therefore
|> meaningless. We can replace "false" by a restricted notion of falsity

This sort of thing has been tried before.  One problem is that the displayed
sentence is *not* meaningless in any normal sense of this term.  We
know perfectly well what it means -- and that's the problem.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: avl0@cine88.cineca.it
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Search within
Date: 16 Nov 92 11:16:13 +0100
Followup-To: comp.ai.philosophy
Distribution: world
Organization: CINECA, Italian Interuniversity comp. centre

In article <Stafford-131192112127@stafford.winona.msus.edu>, Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford) writes:
> In article <qHm2TB1w165w@pinn.nacjack.gen.nz>, glex@pinn.nacjack.gen.nz
> (glenn dillon) wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> We all know ourselves, our own minds much better than we can ever learn 
>> from the minds of other people or animals. We are continually with 
>> ourselves, we can continually examine our own reactions, mistakes, and 
>> anylyse them (If we are honest enough with ourselves).
> 
> Not so.  Consider it possible that there are persons who are
> outer-motivated
> and outer-directed who will never introspect to a _significant_ extent and
> that some of these people find a comfortable and respectable career in
> the hard sciences.

Are you joking? Nobody can be outer-motivated or -directed without having
dicided and deciding continually to behave in this way.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr)
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 01:17:05 GMT

In article <4250@novavax.UUCP> gowj@novavax.UUCP (James Gow) writes:
>In article <BxL64n.J2B@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr) writes:
>>In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
>>1. That which thinks must exist.
>How do we define think?

I think (ha, ha) that the word "think" is a primitive insofar as it is
ill-definable with other words.  For example, how would one describe
the color red?  One could describe a certain frequency of light or
describe the physical process observed in an eye, but these would not
really describe the experience that one tries to convey when using the
word "red."  



-- 
Lincoln R. Carr, Computer Scientist-Philosopher    lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
"Treat all rational autonomous moral agents, whether in the form of yourself
or another, never as means solely, but always as ends in themselves."
                  Immanuel Kant, from "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals"
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 13:58:10 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Nov19.000227.9652@u.washington.edu>, petry@pythagoras.math.washington.edu (David Petry) writes:

|> The question is, how do you know that in the original context the subject
|> refers to the sentence itself?  The answer is that you have been taught
|> to "see" paradox.  Many, perhaps most, people that have not been taught
|> to see the paradox will ask the question "What sentence is being referred
|> to?" when they see the sentence "This sentence is false."

I simply do not believe this last claim since it does not conform to
my experience (gathered in part from seeing how innumerable undergraduates
respond to such examples).  Moreover, no one has any more trouble with
the referent of the subject in the pathological examples than in

	This sentence contains five words.

I have yet to encounter anyone who had difficulty understanding this.

|> Anyways, I find that most people who defend the paradoxes have at their
|> command laws of logic which I never even imagined could exist.

Yeah, right.

|> I will
|> probably drop out of this discussion.

Okay.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 01:05:34 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov13.194948.8061@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <1992Nov11.230802.132235@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com 
>(Frank Adams) writes:
>>In article <1992Nov10.232454.14032@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>>>First, how much is enough?  The amount required obviously depends on the
>>>design of your algorithm.  Do you have a design in hand, so you can be sure
>>>how much memory is needed?
>>
>>We can estimate the AI's rate of sensory input, allow a factor of 10 for
>>memories of thoughts, and provide enough for 1,000 years.  Will this do?
>
>OK, let's start with a million bytes a second of sensory input.  Pitifully
>small, really, but I suppose we could live with it.

Absurdly large, rather.  At least if data compression algorithms are used.
We only need to store enough information so that the consciousness can be
presented with a rendition of the original which *it* can cannot
distinguish.

>>>Second, how do you know you won't be deleting memories?

More directly to the point, I don't have to delete the memories relating to
grounding in some one particular area if I have some reason to remain
grounded in that area.  So the hypothesis that the grounding *must* decay
for this reason is unfounded.

Loss of grounding due to changes in the area one is grounded in are, as we
have already agreed, a separate case.

>>>Check out the chapter on shrews from Konrad Lorenz's _King Solomon's Ring_.
>>>Shrews apparently memorize every physical detail of their habitat.  Exploring
>>>new terrain, they go slowly, building their mental map as it were.  When
>>>they reach places they know they zip along like dervishes, following their
>>>memorized knowledge.  Indeed, they are more apt to believe their memory than
>>>their senses: they have been known to jump into pools that are no longer
>>>there...
>>
>>So the shrews use an inferior algorithm.  This is an argument for using a
>>better algorithm, not for throwing out the memories.
>
>Throwing out old memories *is* a better algorithm.

Only given a particular set of tradeoffs.  The shrews would probably *not*
be better off if they threw away those memories, and used the additional
brain capacity for higher thought processes.  They don't have enough brain
capacity to be very smart, and are probably better off as they are.

My only claim is that it will be possible to build an AI which can remain
grounded in spite of an extended period away from an area, if that area does
not change.  I do *not* claim that this will be the *best* tradeoff of
resources for the AI -- although I think it very likely that the best
tradeoff for the AI will result in *better* retentention of memories than
what we have.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech,talk.philosophy.misc
From: John Wilkins <john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au>
Subject: Re: talk.philosophy.language?
X-Xxmessage-Id: <A72EA49E99022434@manager.ccc.monash.edu.au>
X-Xxdate: Tue, 17 Nov 92 21:31:10 GMT
Organization: Monash University, Melbourne Australia
X-Useragent: Nuntius v1.1.1d12
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 02:30:57 GMT

In article <1durs4INN9hl@sequoia.ccsd.uts.EDU.AU> Chris Chesher,
cchesher@uts.edu.au writes:
>And let's talk about Foucault, Baudrillard, Lyotard too!

Oh, please, let's not. Create a talk.philosophy.continent or something.

John Wilkins
Manager, Publishing & Advertising
Monash University, Melbourne Australia
Internet: john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au
Tel: (+613) 573 2099
--Monash and I agree on several matters: this may, or may not, be one of
them
From: sahle@csgrad.cs.vt.edu (Eskinder Sahle)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: HAL systems survey--help!
Date: 20 Nov 92 21:21:08 GMT
Organization: VPI&SU Computer Science Department, Blacksburg, VA


Hello all:

Regarding the the feasibility of building a competent, Turing-test proof
computer system a la HAL: can anyone suggest references where the
argument is made that such a system cannot be built?  I'm compiling a
survey and I'd appreciate any help in the matter.

Also of help would be suggestions about interface NLP systems that
attempt to pass the Turing test by faking it (using template rules
and manipulating syntax).

Thanks,

A. Bouzid
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Self_Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human Intelligence...)
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 16:39:31 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <2931575640.1.p00122@psilink.com> "Bernd Finkemeyer" <p00122@psilink.com> writes:
>Forget true or false, try yes or no.
>
>This sentence is false.
>     NO, absolutely, the true/false test can not be applied here.
>
And how do you respond to:

The response to this sentence is no.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: It is AI when...
From: system@codewks.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 08:31:04 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke) writes:

> You'll get papers like:
> "Hypothesis as to the functioning of modules VI and VII of the IBM genetic
> neural intelligence."
> 
> "Correlation of storage node acitivity with external stimuli in the DEC
> evolutionary AI Mark 8."

Assuming you can get the AI's to consent to having their innards poked 
around with.

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: It is AI when...
Date: 16 Nov 92 17:40:59 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <Stafford-131192111721@stafford.winona.msus.edu> Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford) writes:

>There is an interesting philosophy which asserts that one cannot
>completely know the tool which is knowing.

There is another which asserts that one can.

There is a third which asserts that it doesn't matter, since we are
fortunately able to build things which work without having to
understand them properly.

There is a fourth which says that since science is a collective social
endeavour, just as is any large scale engineering enterprise,
therefore a society of people working according to the scientific
method and good organisational principles can, as a society,
understand and build things in principle quite beyond the
comprehension of any individual members of that society.

There is fifth which points out that since a totally blind, ignorant,
accident-prone, and severely constrained mechanical brute search of
the design possibilities was able to "design" people (aka evolution),
that creatures capable of understanding (aka people) ought to be able
to do better.

>There is an interesting philosophy which asserts that one cannot
>completely know the tool which is knowing.

I'm saving up statements like this to feed to the first artificial
intelligence with philosophical pretensions, in the hope that they
might cause it to explode, or even to believe them!
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic