From: mike@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas)
Subject: Re: Individualism & the Common Weal
Organization: Gordian; Costa Mesa, CA
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 19:50:18 GMT

In article <1992Nov5.164606.3898@macc.wisc.edu>, anderson@macc.wisc.edu (Jess Anderson) writes:
> 
> In article <1992Oct27.041904.5915@gordian.com>
> mike@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas) writes:
> 
> What I think we're talking about has focussed *primarily* on
> the individuals; in some regards (least restraint, self-
> responsibility, etc.) we are probably not far apart.  But I
> think the core of the problem is in adapting our social and
> political institutions to work better.  I don't profess to
> have answers to most of the questions (nor indeed to know
> what all the best questions are), but what I get again and
> again from things you say suggests too great a focus on
> individuals *to the detriment* of the group.  So I think
> that's the crux here.

  Indeed. The point all along is that the "group" is merely
a collection of individuals which takes no larger life beyond
that. Problems of a group of people are merely problems of
individual people who (assumedly) share common traits. Because
a group of people can be categorized (say gay) does not give
it a new larger set of rights (or non-rights as the case
were) -- it is still a set of individuals.
  If you are going to convince me of anything, you will need
to satisfy me as to why a group of individuals should wield
rights above and beyond the rights of the individuals. Where 
does a group of people derive these rights from?

> Sounds the same to me, which is why I want to get rid of it.
> 
> Then you *are* willing to give up some portion of your
> sovereignty as an individual so that you and others who are
> doing likewise can co-operate?  Is that right?  If it is,
> then what we're talking about is which portions and to what
> ends, I think.

  If you asking whether I'm willing to give up my "right"
to jungle law, of course. Eat or be eaten does not qualify
as society.
 
> >My contentions have been along the lines of what a proper
> >government should do and not do.  This is not the same
> >question as what an individual or individuals in a society
> >should strive for.  You agree that there is a difference
> >don't you?
> 
> I'm sure we can agree that the government does things it
> shouldn't and doesn't do things it should.  While I agree
> there's a formal difference between the people and their
> institutions, it's also true that these things are
> indissoluably linked.  If I say: individuals should strive
> for themselves only, we agree that's not enough.  I think
> that ineluctably means that individuals must also strive for
> their institutions, which are in effect extensions of
> themselves and others, the common ground.

  Perhaps you misunderstood my previous paragraph. What I meant
is that there is a vast difference between what is moral and
what a government ought to pursue. My contention is that a
proper government's pursuit of morality should be strictly
limited to intrahuman relations and specifically in the area
of regulating coerced behavior.
  The catch, I think, to the entire argument is whether this
striving for the good of society ought to be strictly voluntary
or whether there should be some sort of institutionalized compulsion 
(aka governmental) to achieve those ends. Certainly, I'm sure you'll
agree, voluntary effort is far better than force. The question
is whether force is *ever* the right means to achieve any social
ends. 

> >Basically, self-interest which takes into account the long
> >term interest of that person.  Rational/enlightened self
> >interest (I use the two pretty much interchangeably if that
> >is any help) implies that your total whole is considered
> >when making value judgements about particular things.
> 
> Including the interests of others, or not?  I keep coming
> back to this shared part, because I think that's where the
> wicket gets sticky.

  It can, but not necessarily. Without a particular context
it is impossible to say whether one's rational self interest
would *necessarily* include others in the equation. 
  Suffice it to say, in the long term the health of society
is *always* in our long term best interest. Short term interests
(like our own mortality) may preclude doing the Right Thing
overall though. This is not necessarily a Bad Thing unless
we are supposed to think of ourselves as nothing more than
worker bees where the hive is the almighty and our individual
lives are inconsequential.

> 
> >Because something is distasteful in the short run does not
> >necessarily mean that it is not a worthy long term goal.
> 
> Under here, presumably, might be belt-tightening in
> less-flush times.  That leaves us with the question of whose
> belts and how much tightening, of course.  So you have a
> lot, let's say: can we take more belt from you than from
> somebody who doesn't have enough to eat (leaving aside for
> the moment how they got that way)?

  Shouldn't that be a matter of individual conscience? Why
do we need some sort of centralized authority (as you seemingly
imply) to determine this?

> If you say yes to that (I hope you do, but I don't know what
> you'll say), then must we depend only on your good will to
> offer it up, or is there some way (one that you would agree
> to) that we can arrange things so hungry people aren't so
> anxious about such basic things as food, shelter, and
> security?
> You see, what I'm after here is this: what will you allow as
> reasonable and fair government programs to offset or remedy
> inequities that have heretofore been systemic?


  Good will. The opposite choice (which is force) is illegitimate,
and does not work. I don't mean to sound heartless here, but
systematically looting from the haves to the havenots does
nothing more than give disincentive to the haves to produce
more. The net effect of this is to reduce everybody to the
same level of poverty. 
  Our goal, I assume, is to rise everybody up to an acceptable
level of comfort. At the point you start removing incentive
to be productive (and worse, to give incentive to be *unproductive*)
is the point where society degenerates. Even though capitalism 
does not hold the greater good as its explicit goal the net
effect is exactly that. Socialism /etc/etc, which does hold that
goal, does not produce.
  So which do we choose? One that promises nothing but produces
in reality or one that makes the promises and produces nothing
in reality?

> >Not suprisingly, rational self-interest ends up coming to
> >many of the same conclusions which other forms of ethics
> >come to but minus any nebulous duties to God or Society on
> >which most other ethics are hinged on.  The distinction is
> >very far-reaching though.
> 
> Somewhere along the line, I think, we will have to come to
> grips with deities in other forms; since time virtually
> immemorial, philosophers have grappled with the idea of
> Good.  Most of the time they spell it with fewer o's, but in
> the end some such idea has always proved necessary.  It is a
> central ethical issue, isn't it?

  Historically, I believe you are correct. However it seems
to me that we really have many standards on what the Good
could be based:

  1) God	(plain old mysticism)
  2) Society	(the greatest good for the greatest number, etc)
  3) Individual	(man is an ends unto himself)

  The question is which should be the unit be the basis of ethics
and morality. I am clearly number 3. You are probably number 3 to
a degree but number 2 when expedience is required. 
  I don't think it is at all necessary to have to introduce
the concept of G*d to validate the necessity of ethics.

> >It is the "against their will" part which is paternalism --
> >ie, I know what's better for you, so just obey.
> 
> I don't want us to get too abstract here.  Being nurturing
> (to put a more inclusive and arguably kinder light on what
> you call paternalism) doesn't imply, necessarily, such
> absolute subordination of the other person's will.  For
> example, we have to work in the case in which the other
> person really *does* "know better." Maybe the kid has to get
> burned to know what hot really is, but we don't let him or
> her learn this by pulling a vat of boiling water off the
> stove onto their head.  Friends don't let friends drive
> drunk.  Someone is enraged enough to go get their gun; we
> really should try to talk them out of using it.

  I just can't see how you can have it both ways: if you
impose your idea of right and wrong on another person
(regardless of the truth of the matter), you are being 
paternalistic. There is no doubt that some people do
know better what is good for another person. But, and
that is a big but, how do you transcribe this obvious
truth into a workable system? And, is that system worse
than the problems it would obviously solve?
  Note, I couch all of this in terms of concentuality.
It is the question of what one does when, beyond all
reason, a person is going to behave irrationally. Do
you step in and force the person not to behave that
way or stand by and allow them to be responsible
for their actions. The former is paternalism (regardless
of whether it is done by an individual or group of 
individuals).
  I do not see how there can be any other alternatives.

> >This doesn't mean that you stop being a friend as necessary,
> >and shake your head when somebody does something foolish.
> >It just means that people have to be responsible for their
> >own actions.
> 
> There's an important subtext here, I think.  I certainly
> agree that people should be responsible for their own
> actions.  The thing is, quite a lot of the time, no part of
> that really computes.  You're assuming rationality in all
> contexts, and there's plenty of evidence that many contexts
> (and arguably the more important ones, in our discussion) are
> not ultimately rational.  Yet our political and social
> ethics must still provide for such cases.  Quite a lot of
> the time, people you might see as making a bad mistake are
> doing nothing more than responding to their environment as
> best they can, "because that's the way it is." Saying they
> should be more responsible simply does not address them in
> any meaningful way.

  No, I don't expect rationality in all contexts -- that
would be silly. It is the expectation that people will be
rational a reasonable amount of the time, since it is in
their self interest, that I expect. 
  I should turn this around though: if people are not
normally rational, why should I expect that a large
group of people will behave in that manner. In my
experience, large groups of people have a tendency
to magnify irrationalities, not rationality.

> I have little problem with any of that.  I would amend the
> Declaration to say (paraphrased) "that all people are equal"
> (replacing "men" and dropping "created").

  Fair enough. I'm not wild about the "endowed by their
Creator" part either.

> On the latter point, I would (don't faint) embrace the
> *principle* that that government is best which governs
> least, 

  [Picks self off floor, blood rushes back to brain]
  Too late :-)

> but I would expect that principle *not* to preclude
> the government governing *as necessary* to secure equality
> for all its citizens, even if that comes at the expense of
> *some* of them.  The underlying principle is sovereignty.  Each
> individual must be willing to give up *some* for the use and
> benefit of others in the society; basically, it's the glue
> that bonds a society together.

  I expect by equality, you mean some form of *material* equality.
Political equality is not at the expense of some of them. How 
does one determine what this median of material necessity is?
Why must an individual be willing to give up (by force that is) 
some for the benefit of others, and how does this substantially 
differ from robbery?
  It is interesting that you used the word "bonds". What you 
are describing here is a society which is held together by forcing
some people to be sacrificed to the alter of another body's nebulous
"need". The truly bonded are those who have the misfortune of being
the producers rather than the consumers.

> Our debate is about who gives up what and for what purposes,
> but before we can have that debate, we really must agree on
> the preceding.  Do we?

  No. I see no redeeming value in forcing the sacrifice of some
to the needs of the many (or the few, for that matter). The ends
never justify the means. Period.

> >Well, I wouldn't count on that.  True human rights are
> >rights of potential, not substance.
> 
> Food is a right of substance.  And we are talking about
> hunger as systemic, not about hunger as incidental or
> something a person chose.  Neither the Declaration nor the
> Constitution mentions food or hunger, but hunger is a real
> problem, and what we are talking about is ultimately
> concerned with addressing that problem, I think.

  Because a need is necessary for survival does not elevate
it in nature to the freely available. Material necessities
must be produced. This is not a matter of debate; it is a 
fact of nature. No amount of hoping and pleading will alter
this fact. 
  The Constitution and DoI does not mention food as a right
because the founders knew the difference. Rights cannot
exist which are by definition at odds with another persons
rights. To visualize such rights is a logical contradiction.
(providing we are talking about "rights" which are equal
for all)
  Rights to material goods are clearly in this category since
the other persons "right" of need can only be at the expense of
another persons labor. Rights cannot be tools of enslavement.
-- 

		Michael Thomas	(mike@gordian.com)
	"I don't think Bambi Eyes will get you that flame thrower..."  
		-- Hobbes to Calvin
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