HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
From: jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu (jason 'Think!' steiner)
Date: 10 Nov 92 15:38:21 EST
Distribution: world
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
> 
> Whatever regulation, if any, might be considered, it would seem that
> it would have to be aimed mostly at crypto products, not use.

here we have another basic problem with registration: there is nothing
wrong with the products themselves, just the abuses. regulating products
is easier, but it doesn't solve any problems. regulating use solves
problems, but it's very difficult to enforce. the costs of either
method greatly outweigh the benefits. of the two, the former has the most
potential for violating personal privacy.

jason

--
`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`
`,`              PGP 2.0 public key available on request.               `,`
`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,` jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu ,`,`,`
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: pngai@adobe.com (Phil Ngai)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: Adobe Systems Incorporated
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 21:48:59 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.151529.14633@cci632.cci.com> sjo@cci632.cci.com (Steve Owens) writes:
>In article <1dp5mpINNfat@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
>>No sane person
>>believes that the registring/ banning / whatever of guns would sole all
>>problems. Neither does medicine solve the problem of death. But even
>>bandaids help ( or don't yo own any of those since they aren't the
>>complete solution)/
>
>	No, I'm interested in a band-aid that addresses the problem.
>Medicine does this (it cures a disease that could cause death).  Waiting
>periods and bans only serve to take firearms out of the hands of
>law-abiding.  The criminal can still get the firearms he/she wants on
>the black market.  No waiting.  No background checks. No limitation on

Even if it were possible to make all 200 million or so guns in private
hands disappear and prevent new ones from being made or imported
(compare to success of US War on Drugs), is this what we want? Is a
woman free from rape simply because criminals now have only knives,
clubs and their two strong arms to use? Or are people like Unruh simply
insensitive to the situation of women and the elderly as long as *he*
can have a "fair" fight with the criminals? Has Unruh ever considered
that criminals can work together so that it might be two of them
against one of him?

-- 
My opinions are my own.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
From: feustel@netcom.com (David Feustel)
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Organization: DAFCO: OS/2 Software Support & Consulting
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 23:39:43 GMT

What's wrong with key registration? You write as though the government
doesn't have the right to know everything about you. You probably
think that the Constitution limits the government's powers to those
explicitly enumerated in that document too. :-).
-- 
Dave Feustel N9MYI <feustel@netcom.com>
 
If convicted felons can't own firearms, then why in Hell
do we let GE make nuclear weapons?
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Reply-To: karn@chicago.qualcomm.com
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 23:02:53 GMT

In article <1992Nov7.142220.1683@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>, denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
|> I'd like to suggest another possibility, which for want of a
|> better name I'll call the "copper balloon".  It's quite clear that key 
|> registration goes over like a "lead balloon".  My question is: is this 
|> any better?  worse?  I would also like to suggest that we keep this
|> thread focused on this proposal and not on the merits/demerits of
|> wiretapping in general.

Worse. I agree with the wag that suggested that this would be better
called a "uranium" balloon. What do you do about direct two-way
conversations, such as those provided by direct telephone calls with
modems? Again, how would you enforce your requirement? Routinely
tap all calls looking for "suspicious" data streams?

Furthermore, I flatly refuse to "keep the thread focused on this
proposal" because to do so would be to concede that what it attempts
to accomplish is a worthwhile goal. Sorry, Dorothy, you don't get off
that easily.

Dorothy Denning does deserve some credit, however. Because they came
from a technically literate person who should have known better, her
misguided proposals have lit bonfires under the "cypherpunks" like
nothing else could have. Cryptography (especially PGP) was the topic
of *intense* interest at last weekend's Hackers Conference. The
enthusiasm for implementing and widely deploying highly secure
cryptography was the highest I've ever seen anywhere. Many of the
participants commented that they were particularly motivated by a
strong desire to head off any potential attempt by the government to
regulate private cryptography. Rumor has it that PKP is also greatly
concerned by these proposals and may loosen up on the private use of
RSA for the same reasons.

Perhaps this was your true intention all along, Dorothy, and we
haven't given you enough credit. If so, please accept my apologies for
all the nasty things we have said about you lately.

Phil
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4459 comp.org.eff.talk:6848 alt.privacy:2140 talk.politics.guns:23742
From: ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date:  7 Nov 92 15:14:52 GMT

From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
>
>Karl Denninger asserts that registration is a prelude to confiscation.
>
>In most of the world cars have been registered for many years, yet no
>democratic government has used that as a way to confiscate cars
>(except for those used in law violations).
>
>-- 
>David Sternlight
>(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)

Registering a car means the government has a computer file with car
information.  Registering an encryption key mean that the government (or
anyone who hacks/steals it from them) can reach out and 'touch' any of your
data that they can get their hands on.

I wouldn't say the two are quite the same.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4686 comp.org.eff.talk:6975 alt.privacy:2222 talk.politics.guns:24055
From: cdt@sw.stratus.com (C. D. Tavares)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 12 Nov 92 21:36:04 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Inc.
NNTP-Posting-Host: rocket.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov12.071135.2216@netcom.com>, gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
> sjo@cci632.cci.com (Steve Owens) writes:

> An aside: why is it that terms like "law-abiding" creep into
> these descriptions? Are criminals unable to derive the same
> recreational satisfaction?

It's a "technical term."  The police abbreviate it to "LAC."  It 
differentiates American citizens who are minding our own business,
exercising our own rights, and not hurting anybody else, from criminals.

It creeps into these discussions because gun owners tend to believe that
there is no reason to prevent a law-abiding adult from owning an arm.
As opposed, obviously, to a criminal, who has surrendered that right by 
his actions, or whose rights the government is allowed to suppress because
of his crime (however you want to look at it).

> >Since there is no evidence to support the claim that a ban would work, 
> >there is no reason to support such a ban.
> 
> Name just about any country in the EC. Remember, we're talking
> about kids finding Daddy's gun and shooting each other with it out
> of ignorance. That's *all* I'm talking about.

Oh.  Is that all you're talking about?  Then read on.

  Number of children under 5 who drown in swimming pools per year: 380+

  Number of children under five who die in residential fires caused by
  adults who fall asleep while smoking, per year: 432

  Number of children under 5 killed in gun accidents during 1984: 34 [Center for
  Disease Control]

  Number of children under 15 killed by handgun accidents per year: 50 to 55

  All data from the National Safety Council, except as noted.

So you want to ban a country's worth of guns, leaving a lot of otherwise
innocent people defenseless, for roughly one kid per state?

> >If you realize a handgun ban doesn't address the problem, then
> >for what reason do you support a handgun ban?
> 
> A band-aid *does* address the problem. Just not very well.

No, sorry.  It hides the problem, it makes you think you're solving
the problem.  But the real problem -- violent crime -- is a sucking 
chest wound which tends to bleed through, and then there you are with 
that ugly, visible problem again.

> >If you really want to solve the problem, try studying the problem
> >and comming up with real solutions instead of supporting a band-aid that 
> >will only effect law-abiding citizens like you or me.
> 
> I'm too cynical for that. Maybe when I have lots of money I'll
> start thinking about solutions. For now, band-aids'll do fine.

Here's some free advice.  If you ever need a vasectomy, try not to
let the doctor get away with just using a tight rubber band.
-- 

cdt@pdp.sw.stratus.com      --If you believe that I speak for my company,
OR cdt@vos.stratus.com        write today for my special Investors' Packet...
From: lallemen@fridrich.loria.fr (Yannick Lallement)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: where can I find Unix crypt/des sources ?
Date: 6 Nov 92 12:26:57 GMT
Distribution: sci.crypt
Organization: INRIA-Lorraine / CNRS - CRIN - Nancy - France


Well, the subject says it all... Is there any ftp site whre I can
retrieve it ?

thanks

--
----------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Emacs is a good opera-
   Yannick Lallement -   ting  system,  but  I   - lallemen@loria.fr
                         prefer Unix.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: Deterring plaintext attacks
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 15:46:02 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <1992Nov5.000740.1755@qiclab.scn.rain.com>, leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson) writes:
> gilchr@ee.ualberta.ca (Andrew Gilchrist) writes:
> 
> 
> >What are theoretic ways to deter a plaintext attack?
> 
> >i.e. The opponent is given two ciphertext messages, the plaintext of
> >the first message, and the encryption method.
> 
> 
> >Now, obviously the longest key in the world will not help.
> 
> >How does one protect the key, so that it can be reused.
> 
> You *can't*.
> 
> Reusing keys *will* compromise the key if the enmey has the known
> plaintext. 

That's not true at all.  Rather, it's not true for most types of
cryptosystems.  Consider DES -- as far as the non-classified world
knows, it's immune to known-plaintext attacks.  Even if you run DES
in output feedback mode, generating an XOR stream similar to what
the original poster asked about, the *key* is the 56 bits you fed
into the DES engine, not the output from DES acting as a cryptographically
strong random number generator.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Futility of Resisting the use of Crypto
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 15:18:00 GMT


Steve Gardner asks:

>This is such a fool's errand though.  As has been pointed
>          out, the technology is too pervasive.  How are you going to
>          stop it?

Bureaucracy thrives on fools errands.  What better occupation than
fighting crime, poverty, ignorance, and sin?  If one is permitted to
define what they are, then one is guaranteed a living.  If one is
in danger of succeeding, one can simply raise the bar.

If one makes one's living by reading other people's mail and one is in a
position to outlaw strong envelopes, then one is in a no loose position.

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
0 700 968 7729, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: wkb@cbnews.cb.att.com (wm.keith.brummett)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: AT&T
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 23:31:34 GMT
Followup-To: talk.politics.guns


    Folks,

    I'm reading this in 'alt.privacy', and I don't think that's quite
    appropriate.  Ditto on 'world' distribution.  Could we move this to a
    more suitable group (only ... no cross-postings).  Thanks much.

    However, while I'm here ...  :-)

    In article <1dp5mpINNfat@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>, unruh@physics.ubc.ca
    (William Unruh) writes:
    > 
    > Clearly you are a believer in the maxim that if a solution is not
    > final and complete it is not worth implimenting at all.  ...

    I think what he was saying was more along the lines of this: your
    suggestion is not only not a final solution, it is itself a problem as
    bad or worse than the one you propose to solve.  Given the choice
    between the disease and your medicine, I'll choose the disease.

    > I don't know about the original poster but I don't like [guns] in
    > your, or other peoples hands.  ...  and [I] am willing to give up
    > my utterly responsible freedom in order to help protect me from
    > other's irresponsibility.

    Hmmm.  What if I don't feel you can be trusted with, say, a butane
    lighter?  Or a butter knife?  Can I ban those from all people?  Sorry,
    but I'm not willing for *you* to give away *my* rights.

    > > ... That makes firearms safer than automobiles.  
    >
    >  Uh, hardly. divide the number of deaths by the number of times they
    > are used, not by the number.

    Help me out here.  If I keep, say, a revolver in my nightstand drawer
    for protection, how often can I be said to have "used" it for that
    protection?  Every night?  Every hour?  Every minute?  Once in my
    lifetime?  Over a million U.S. crimes per year are thwarted by armed
    citizens, and in over 990,000 of them, the gun is not fired.

    Just keepin' things boilin'  :-)

    -- Keith

-- 
    | (614) 860-3187         Copyright (C) 1992, by       AT&T, Room 3B202 |
    | att!cblph!wkb  or,     W.K. Brummett and AT&T      6200 E. Broad St. |
    | wkb@cblph.att.com       All rights reserved.      Columbus, OH 43213 |
    `----------------------------------------------------------------------'
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4353 comp.org.eff.talk:6779 alt.privacy:2095 alt.society.civil-liberty:6457
From: spongebo@cithara.UUCP (Gary Seven)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,alt.society.civil-liberty
Subject: Re: "To ensure the continuing access of law enforcement.."
Date: 5 Nov 92 04:34:14 GMT
Organization: Local Testbed for network mail, we trust!

jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala) writes:

> The Russian government is going to pass a law requiring furniture
> manufacturers to build microphones and radio transmitters inside every
> sofa, chair and table manufactured.  A high official from the Russian
> 
> The law also requires that if anyone sitting on a sofa or a chair, or
> at a table, speaks any other language than Russian she or he must be
> able to provide an interpreter who will translate his talk to Russian
> if the law enforcement decide there's a legitimate need to listen to
> the tape of the conversation.  To make this possible, the name and
> address of the interpreter must be clearly said aloud in Russian near
> the table/sofa/chair before each conversation in a language other than
> Russian.
> 
> //Jyrki

Hmmmm, I always thought that old woman next door was crazy. Now I 
realize.... SHE'S RUSSIAN! :-)

Owen
Newsgroups: sci.crypt

shri@unreal.cs.umass.edu (H.Shrikumar) writes:
>Hi,
>
>In article <1418.42.uupcb@gate.micromed.com> 
>   edgar.swank@gate.micromed.com (Edgar Swank) writes:
>
>>/PDGET  /public/msdos/pgp20.zip [UUENCODE | XXENCODE]
>
>This is what I got back ... pls assist !
>
>>From szebra!Saigon.COM!uuspies@sonyusa.sony.com Sat Oct 24 00:59:37 1992
>>Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 07:10:33 GMT
>>From: listserv@spectrx.saigon.com
>>Sender: VMS-Daemon@spectrx.saigon.com
>
>>Mail server request status.
>>> /PDGET /public/msdos/pgp20.zip UUDECODE
>>  -- Command failed: /PDGET /public/msdos/pgp20.zip UUDECODE
>
>No further debug or reasons so I am at a loss, with this Snafu.
>Many thanx ....

I don't know anything about this, except that you wrote "UUDECODE",
while the directions say to use "UUENCODE".  Try that.
----------
					Eric Backus
					ericb@hplsla.hp.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Secure Attention Keys
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 20:16:00 GMT


>I completely agree with Dan on this issue.  (No, it's not the first
>time...)  One of my biggest gripes against the Orange Books is that
>it doesn't require a secure attention key until B2, while I think it
>should be mandatory in B1, and maybe even C2.

Secure attention keys work only with closed systems or trusted terminals.
These account for such a small part of the world as not to be
interesting.  My problem with the Orange book is that it is too archaic
to recognize this.  

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
203 966 4769, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: RSA marketing weakness or lack of demand?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:50:47 GMT

David Sternlight (strnlght@netcom.com) wrote:

: If the Democrats obtain a second term, absent new laws, unrestricted
: use of public key systems without PKP's legal interference will
: be possible at that time. Who knows, by then personal computers may
: even be fast enough to permit full RSA use, rather than RSA key encryption
: of DES/IDEA messages. In any case, the issue would need to be confronted
: by both intelligence and law enforcement.
: 
: I predict that unless a key registration law is "sneaked in" there's
: going to be a bitter public battle over this issue during the current
: Clinton administration. Hone your arguments and your
: intervention/lobbying/testimony techniques now, whatever side of this
: you're on.

Crypto was a very hot topic at this year's Hackers Conferene. The
Denning key registration trial balloon came up several times. Mike
Godwin of the EFF told me he expects something similar to the Denning
proposal to be used, even in a Clinton Administration. 

He's talking to folks around D.C. and the consensus is that the
various agencies are pressing for something along these lines.


--Tim May
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version.
From: mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu (Marc VanHeyningen)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 13 Nov 92 02:35:11 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
X-Quoted: 42%

Thus said ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter):
>
> I write:
>>"The right to free speech includes the right to speak in a fashion not
>>easily understood by others."
>
> Certainly we can agree that "speaking" via wires or on public
> "airwaves" is not, ultimately, free.  Given that resources are
> consumed, there will be regulations for use.

Public airwaves are a limited resource, and thus there are stronger
regulations imposed upon them.  Speaking via wires, of course, depends
on who owns the wires (or fiber or whatever) and whether it is a common
carrier or what.

> But does society have the right, *after* due process, to see behind
> any secrecy veil a private citizen may erect?  While a citizen may
> not be compelled to testify against himself, his or her "houses,
> papers, and effects" are only protected from *unreasonable* "search
> and seizure" (that is, without a warrant issued for probable cause).
>
> Since society *did* have an existing right to penetrate secrecy
> (*after* due process) under The Constitution, we would have to
> argue that there is no social need for such access under new
> security technology.  Can anyone believe that no cases will exist
> under which society will require such access?  Thus, is punishment
> for failure to allow access (*after* due process) somehow not
> a legitimate law?

If you search my apartment for evidence to use against me and find a
document written in Chinese, can you force me to translate it into
English for you?

How about if it's in an obscure dialect, and nobody versed in it can be
located?

In the case above, you can subpoena the plaintext.  Of course, you can't
subpoena it from the guy himself, since that would be self-incrimination.
Because such a law would violate Constitutional protection against
self-incrimination, yes, it would be "somehow not a legitimate law."
Of course, if anyone other than the guy in question knows the plaintext,
or key, or something else about the material, you can always make
him(her) testify.

The govt can issue a warrant to search your premises, but you don't have
to help them find things or understand the meaning of what they find.

> I think it would be easier to argue for legislation setting higher
> standards for warrants than it would be to argue that all personal
> information is ultimately private under all circumstances.

No, it isn't.  However, personal information which is not obtainable
without my cooperation (such as facts I have memorized) cannot be
obtained without my consent for use against me.  If you disagree with
the Founding Fathers on this one, OK, but don't expect others to like
that position.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted


Art is experimental, or it isn't art.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns