From: golchowy@alchemy.chem.utoronto.ca (Gerald Olchowy)
Subject: Re: Taxation as Theft (was Re: Negative Income Tax)
Organization: University of Toronto Chemistry Department
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 11:42:58 GMT

In article <93008.021603SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> John G. Spragge <SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> writes:
>In article <1993Jan8.003543.29505@alchemy.chem.utoronto.ca>,
>golchowy@alchemy.chem.utoronto.ca (Gerald Olchowy) says:
>>
>>I'll have to think about this...I don't really think my view of property
>>is Platonic...I see property as only one right in a spectrum of
>>individual rights, and not a Platonic form.  The "ideal" for any
>>particular individual rights can never be realized, because various
>>individual rights ultimately have regions of conflict which constrain
>>each right to less than the "ideal".  My argument would be that
>>the exercise in line-drawing undertaken by a society through
>>advocacy, the courts, and legislatures leaves a protected
>>kernel with a roughened boundary for the rights which it defines,
>>but that these kernels are not empty and not ideal.  Property
>>is one such kernel.
>
>But earlier, you said that slaves did not constitute property,
>despite the tradition (handed down from the earliest states we
>know of) which says they did. And that ideas do constitute
>property, so that presumably Shakespeare did have a right to
>royalties from his plays, even though no court from his time would
>have upheld that right. This means you must have some notion of
>property distinct from the social consensus of any particular time.
>

This is true, but I don't want to overemphasize property in relation
to the other rights which form the basis of liberty, which is what
is the true "ideal".  The notion of rights is sort of just a
decomposition of the "ideal" of liberty into a set of basis functions
or rights.  Liberty is the forest...the particular rights, the trees.

>In other words, you do not simply believe in property rights, you
>believe in the concept of true (as opposed to simply legislated)
>property. And I agree with you. To put it at its simplest, if we
>had no rights to physical material, the state (or our neighbors)
>could simply strip us naked and throw us in a snowbank.
>
>But once we get past the undoubted right to provide ourselves with
>our basic needs, what more can we claim, and on what basis? To use
>your terminology, we have two basis for a "kernel" of rights over
>the physical world: our needs, and our propensity to alter the
>physical world to make it more congenial to us (what we call
>creating or building).

I see the right to property arising out of the notion that human
fulfillment arising out of their work or creativity, and that
individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labour or imagination. 
But an individual's "production", for lack of a better word, arises
in a society using the resources of the society...so what is legitimate
property is a carefully drawn line, that recognizes which balances the
entitlement of an individual to what they create, which is essential
for liberty and human fulfillment, and the resources of society they
consume.  The lines to define what is legitimate property should be
defined so as to maximize liberty and human fulfillment, not maximize
property (as an Objectivist or libertarian would argue) or to minimize
property (as a Statist or socialist would argue).  Property is
a component of liberty, and not vice versa.

>>
>>We do differ in interpretation.  Legitimate government must be limited
>>government.  There is a protected kernel of liberty, which includes
>>a dimension of property around the individual.   Governments cannot
>>legitimately do anything they please.  It may be an amorphous kernel
>>whose boundaries are rough and often difficult to get a handle on,
>>but it is important to realize that the kernel exists, that governments
>>must concern themselves with the issue that what it is legitimate
>>for governments to do.  Property is part of this kernel of liberty...
>>it is not just a tool of the state.
>>
>If you define "property" as the actual rights (based on fundamental
>human characteristics) we have over the world around us, then I agree.
>If you define "property" as the sum of the rules that govern our
>relationship to our tools, houses, ideas, etc., then I would only
>agree if you could convince me that the former coincided with the latter.
>I have already given my reasons for not believing that the statist
>idea of "property" and the basic human rights over the world coincide.
>

I think we have a measure of agreement...a third notion of property
that is different and distinct from the extremes of how an Objectivist
or a socialist would view property.

>If I understand your argument, you think of property as important
>because it creates a zone of privacy and security around the
>individual (preventing the state from throwing me in the snowbank).
>If so, I agree that represents an important dimension of our freedoms;
>I just don't agree that the current definitions of property (enforced
>and promulgated by the state) represent the only or the best way to
>safeguard that essential zone around the individual.
>

The problem is that Objectivists see governments as being unable
to do anything (essentially), and statists and socialists
asserting that the government can do (essentially) anything it
well pleases, when the question governments should almost always
ask first, is what is it legitimate for government to do without
overstepping bounds which we know exist...and unfortunately,
our governments almost never ask this question before they act.

Gerald
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