From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: talk.religion.misc
Subject: On faith  (was: ... least common denominator)
Date: 14 Dec 1992 12:52:54 -0600
Organization: CS Dept, University of Texas at Austin
NNTP-Posting-Host: im4u.cs.utexas.edu
Summary: Authorial dialogue with Dave Davis.

-*----
I wrote, as the first point in an introduction to a book that
rationally reconstructs Christianity, of which Dave Davis will
author the body:

>>  o  It is better to retain one's intellectual integrity than 
>>     take *any* belief on faith.

In article <1992Dec11.150539.9961@cass.ma02.bull.com> ddavis@cass.ma02.bull.com (Dave Davis) writes:
> This is Clifford vs Wm James again. The usual examples are
> the faith one has in in one's parents (who, despite their protestations,
> may not have the relationship they claim with one), and 
> the faith one has in a spouse ('Is she true to me? How do I know?')

In my view, James relied on amphibolies over the meaning of the
word faith, much to the detriment of future discussion of the
subject.  For example, one may (from observation) judge an
acquaintance (or one's car!) to exhibit certain characteristic
behavior, and then act in a manner that takes this into account.
This requires *no* assumption at all, and adds to one's belief
only an empirically verified account of the acquaintance's past 
behavior.  Nonetheless, this very empirical practice is called 
faith.  

It is also called faith is when one extends in action trust to a
friend or lover (regardless of whether it is deserved).  This has
little to do with what one believes, and a lot to do with how one
decides to conduct one's affairs. 

None of these above meanings of faith have anything to do with
the kind of faith required for religious belief.  There *are*
pedestrian meanings with overlap.  For example, a mother may have
faith that her son did not commit the murders of which he is
accused, *despite* the evidence, including what she knows about
his character.  I think this is somewhat related to the way
people stick to their religion.  But it is clearly irrational.
It is a kind of faith we should condemn. 

A second related faith concerns parent and child.  When we are
young, we believe what our parents tell us about the world.  That
man walked on the moon is not much different (epistemologically) 
to a young child than that Jesus watches over him in his sleep.
But as we mature, we develop a critical discrimination of various
claims, and stop believing things merely because our parents (or
other adults) assert them.  This is also a kind of faith that is
related to religious belief.  Because of the nature of childhood,
it is a necessary kind of faith.  But it is a kind of faith that
we should outgrow and leave behind.

When faith is discussed as a route to or foundation for religion,
it is important to (1) define carefully what one means in this
context by faith and (2) make sure that faith, in the way
defined, supports religious belief.  *Every* time I have seen
a writer allude to faith for religious faith, either:

  o  the writer commits an amphiboly, justifying faith in one
     one sense but using it in a different sense,

  o  fails to find a kind of faith that would support religious
     belief, or

  o  finds such a faith, but it is a kind that we would call
     irrational in any other context, for example, if its 
     target were fairies instead of the gods.

The universal failure of apologists to find a kind of faith
that supports religious belief without being contrary to reason
makes it a word that should raise flags for any critical and
rational reader.  

Given the above section in my introduction, perhaps as commentary
on my first point, how will Dave Davis now proceed?  Can we make
any progress as co-authors? 

Russell
Newsgroups: talk.religion.misc