HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: what can't be verified/falsified in 
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 16 Nov 92 21:08:48 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

> In article <10292320.14832.21064@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz   
> (Hakki Kocabas) writes:  
>   
>    >Oh Bogey's Messenger Russell ! tell us the truth ! for Bogey's sake !   
>   
> Actually Wittgenstein would never have made the bizarre mistake of  
> assuming that Russell held that "what cannot be verified or falsified  
> is meaningless". Imitating Wittgenstein's style is all well and good,  
> but why not pay some attention to the issues as well?  
  
Torkel, you are right, Russell didn't receive such a revelation from  
Bogey. But then don't believe half of the sentences you read on the net...  
and the other half might be distorted by line noise...
From: ghh@clarity.Princeton.EDU (Gilbert Harman)
Subject: Princeton Philosophy & Literature Conference Nov 21
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University Cognitive Science Lab
Distribution: nj,pa,ny
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 19:13:12 GMT


PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
        SATURDAY


SEVEN PERSPECTIVES ON

LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY




           Betts Auditorium                 November 21, 1992
           Architecture School              10 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.

                            Princeton University


10:00   Alexander Nehamas, Philosophy
         "What Should We Expect From Reading?  (There are
          Aesthetic Values)"
10:45   Laura Quinney, English
         "Naivet and Skepticism in the Romantic Sublime"
11:30   Susan Brison, Philosophy
         "Literary License and the Law"

12:30 - 2:00  Lunch

2:00    Richard Moran, Philosophy
         "Philosophy, Criticism, and 'The Linguistic Nature of Literature'"
2:45    Billy Flesch, English
         "Ordinary and Extraordinary Language: Thinking and
        Knowing in Wittgenstein, Blanchot, and James"

3:30    Coffee Break

3:45    Catherine Elgin, Philosophy
         "Fiction's Functions"
4:30    Thomas Trezise, Romance Languages
         "Descartes, Proust and the Construction of Self"


                 For information or directions:

                 Bas van Fraassen or Anne Marie De Meo
                 Philosophy Department, Princeton University

                 phone:  (609) 258-4304, 258-5603
                 email:  fraassen@pucc.princeton.edu, anned@pucc.princeton.edu
                     fax:   (609) 258-1502
--

	Gilbert Harman, Princeton University Cognitive Science Lab
	221 Nassau Street, Princeton, NJ 08542
	ghh@clarity.princeton.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Philosophical fact (was Platos views)
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 22:25:00 +0000

brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes..

[..]

>Yes, I meant exactly what I said. Perhaps a few examples will make
>this clear.

>EITHER reality is another dimension of ideal forms dimly reflected by
>the reality we perceive OR it isn't.

Hmm... I think you are not necessarily right here...

>EITHER knowledge of reality is possible OR it isn't.

No, wrong.

>EITHER morality derives from the dictates of a supreme being OR it
>doesn't.

>EITHER art is anything anyone chooses to call art, or it isn't.

>EITHER capitalism is the best political system OR it isn't.

>Which ever side of these positions you take, you can't say that BOTH
>sides of the issue are true.

I think you can.

Is it true to say that an oscillationg medium exhibits amplitude/time
fluctuations, or amplitude frequency? The two are analgous, linked
via the Fourier transform.

Similarly, I could make a case for saying that there is no ultimate
morality, but all morality is an expression of social and political
power and pragmatism; BUT if I delve deeper into that, and discover
that the forces that drive political power and pragmatism are deeply
imbedded in humanities nature, and that that nature in itself is a
function of some hypothetical underlying structure and order in our
world (which is the prime tenet of Science) then it is not too far
fetched to modify the viewpoint and call the totality of Creation a
Supreme Being (which in a sense you have to say it is) who ipso
facto is the ultimate source of morality. So the one view leads into
the other at a deeper level.

I think all this confusion stems from the fact that people want to
believe that their simplistic logics are in fact superior to the
world they attempt to describe: They are not. The real world has no
sharp boundaries. Only mathematics does. Propositions may have truth in
Philosophy and Logic. In the real world they are more or less useful
- that's all.

We make statements like 'his hair is shorter than hers'. Which hair?
How many have to be shorter. Where do we measure from. Even a simple
everyday statement is fraught with difficulty. Philosophers IMHO have
struggled for two millenia nad have YET TO COME UP WITH *ANY*
PROPOSITION THAT IS UNEQUIVOCALLY AND SELF EVIDENTLY TRUE.

The best I have heard is 'existence exists' Very nearly true, and
practically quite, quite useless :-)

>.........In doing so, you have to first assume
>the law of identity, which establishes the objectivity of knowledge.
>If you don't understand why that is, just assert that the answers to
>philosophical questions are NOT matters of objective fact, and I'll
>show you what I mean.

I do so assert. Please show me. I think it will be most illuminating.
Leo


--Brian
From: hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark Peterson)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Platos views on women
Date: 19 Nov 1992 21:50:02 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
Distribution: inet
Reply-To: hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.7.4
Originator: hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu

From article <Bxz6ps.45v@unx.sas.com>, by sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill):
> 
> In article <1eghvsINN113@uwm.edu>, hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark Peterson) writes:
[...}
> |> Hmm.  Tricky.  My immediate reaction is to agree with you here Gary.
> |> But if all knowledge begins with experience....  
> |> 
> 
> Yeah, but my wife's *horses* have *experience*.  I'm pretty sure they
> lack *knowledge*, and I'm certain that they lack deep philosophical
> insight.  Experience is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
> for insight.  The key phrase is "begins with".  The horses never get
> any further than this.


Glad you remember your Aristotle.  ;-)  And just as there, knowledge
begins with the senses but, as you note, it doesn't end with them.

The argument I was alluding to, I guess too obliquely, was that if
experience in any way conditions knowledge, then the experience of
women, to the degree that it is distinct from that of males, may also
produce a different flavour of knowledge.  

This is, naturally, one of the themes a number of social construction
theorists have used to bolster their views for a feminist approach to
philosophical questions.

So I suppose that, depending on your wife's horses, the APA may have
to hold a special session next year on equine epistemology.  Shades of
Gulliver.  Unless, of course, experience is not a necessary condition
of knowledge.


hmmm.


hiho
-- 
mark ce peterson   | uw-washington county  | hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu 
dept of philosophy | west bend, wi.  53095 | (414) 335-5200        

     The shorter the tether, the sooner the goat starves.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Platos views on women
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 14:21:13 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <memo.758259@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:

|> Agreed. Also agreed that the trauma of bereavement, of childbirth, of
|> war, of almost any major key experience of an individual gives deep
|> philosophical insight.

I am not, on the basis of my own personal experience, prepared to concede
this.  Perhaps this is because I'm not at all sure what "deep philospohical
insight" is.  However, having suffered a few experiences that count
as traumatic, I have never attained from them anything I would regard
in any way as deep philosophical insight.  I think that whatever
deep philosophical insight is, it results from deep and rather intense
*study* rather than from an emotional reaction to experience.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Rights
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 16:01:51 GMT

In article <Bxyvnq.Bsz@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <Bxy5sx.Dw4@quake.sylmar.ca.us>, brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>|> In article <1992Nov16.092859.1@woods.ulowell.edu> cotera@woods.ulowell.edu writes:
>|> >No one is born with inherient rights.  Rights are given solely by the
>|> >government.
>
>This is, of course, just an expression of a certain ideology.  In
>fact, I think it reflects a fundamental difference in perspective
>between so-called "liberals" and so-called "conservatives" (at least
>in the U.S.).  This cleaves along the lines of:
>
>	Rights are given to the people by the government (which
>	retains any rights not explicitly so given).
>
>	Rights are given (or "given up" is probably better, ala
>	Hobbes, Locke, et al.) by the people to the government,
>	and any rights not so explicitly given up are retained
>	by the people.
>
>Phrases such as "We the people ..." in our (U.S) fundamental documents
>generally are taken as an expression of the second view.
>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

One of the amendments in the Bill of Rights says this explicitly.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Rights
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 18:12:19 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Nov19.160501.25046@guinness.idbsu.edu>, holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
|> 
|> I think that neither liberals nor conservatives in the US "officially"
|> accept the original poster's account of rights, which contradicts
|> explicit and implicit principles of our constitution (in the broadest
|> sense) which are accepted by everyone in the mainstream of our
|> political system.

True.  It is interesting (sometimes amusing, sometimes frightening) to
listen to discussions (as frequently found, for example, on National
Public Radio) about what rights we *have* and what rights we should
or should not be *given*.  It very often appears that underlying
these discussions is the view that a right is not really *there*
until it is *given* explicitly by some act of the government.

I have in my possession the draft of an official document of the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (that I was asked
to review and comment upon) that asserts "rights" to the following:

	Equal access to education
	Appropriate employment
	Support services
	Social leisure activites
	(The right) to learn
	(The right) to work in a positive, supportive environment

And of course the idea is that these "rights" must be ensured by
means of appropriately specific legislation.  Well, it's *one* view
of the role of government.
	
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel)
Subject: Re: Extensionalism (was re: Russell's Paradox)
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 21:07:29 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.162034.22328@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>In article <1992Nov16.220925.28271@tamsun.tamu.edu> cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel) writes:
>>In article <1992Nov15.215724.21897@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>>>>RH:
>>>>>_Contra_ Harter (miscellaneous quibbles):
>>>>>
>>>>>The Good Russell may have admitted the possibility of "intensions",
>>>>>but the Exalted Quine has liberated us from the influence of those
>>>>>"creatures of darkness".  Extensions are adequate for all admissable
>>>>>purposes.
>>>>>
>>>>CM:
>>>>Really, Randall?!  Could you then please give me an extensional
>>>>analysis of the sentences in the following arguments that explains why
>>>>the first is valid but the second is not:
>>>>
>>>>1)  John believes there are spies.
>>>>    Mary believes whatever John does.
>>>>    Therefore, Mary believes there are spies.
>>>>
>>>>2)  John believes that 2+3=5.
>>>>    Necessarily, 2+3=5 iff first-order logic is undecidable.
>>>>    Therefore, John believes that first-order logic is undecidable.
>>>>
>>>>Or is a purpose admissible just in case it is amenable to
>>>>extensionalist analysis?
>>
>>[Florian's response and lengthy intensional response in which
>>that-clauses are takent to denote propositions deleted.]
>>
>>>But the extensionalist does have a simple recourse; let proposition =
>>>sentence throughout.
>>
>>But *surely* this won't work; nothing in the first argument, for
>>example, presupposes that John and Mary even speak the same language.
>>But under those conditions that argument (or perhaps a similar one
>>where the beliefs under consideration don't include beliefs about
>>language) could still have true premises (hence a true conclusion as
>>well).
>>
>>Not to mention problems with ambiguity, anaphora, etc. that aren't
>>resolved at the level of sentences.
>>
>>--Chris Menzel
>
>I would then start talking about sentences in different languages and
>translation.  If Mary speaks German but not English and believes that
>it will rain, then Mary believes a sentence in German which translates
>to a sentence in English which asserts that it will rain.  

And what, exactly, is it for a sentence in German to "translate to" a
sentence in English on your extensionalist program?  And what makes a
translation correct?

>Ambiguity
>and anaphora are taken into account by considering the effects on
>context on the interpretation of sentences, etc.  It is a truly
>horrible program, but nothing is added to it by adding intensional
>objects...

Well, the intensionalist certainly wouldn't want to add to your
program, at least not without first removing your account of belief...

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Subject: Re: Rights
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 11:20:03 GMT
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences

In <Bxz6KJ.3zJ@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:


>In article <1992Nov19.160501.25046@guinness.idbsu.edu>, holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>|> 
>|> I think that neither liberals nor conservatives in the US "officially"
>|> accept the original poster's account of rights, which contradicts
>|> explicit and implicit principles of our constitution (in the broadest
>|> sense) which are accepted by everyone in the mainstream of our
>|> political system.

>True.  It is interesting (sometimes amusing, sometimes frightening) to
>listen to discussions (as frequently found, for example, on National
>Public Radio) about what rights we *have* and what rights we should
>or should not be *given*.  It very often appears that underlying
>these discussions is the view that a right is not really *there*
>until it is *given* explicitly by some act of the government.

>I have in my possession the draft of an official document of the
>North Carolina Department of Public Instruction [ . . . ]

Is the implication that neither people who discuss things on National
Public Radio nor the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction
are in the mainstream of our political system?  If they're excluded,
who's in it?

As to official positions of American liberalism and conservatism, I
don't think such things exist.  Whatever may have been the case in
1787, rigorous thought about politics or anything else is not now one
of our national characteristics.
-- 
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Alles Erworbne bedroht die Maschine, solange
sie sich erdreistet, im Geist, statt im Gehorchen, zu sein."  (Rilke)
From: zlsiida@fs1.mcc.ac.uk (dave budd)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Rights
Date: 19 Nov 92 16:40:23 GMT
Organization: Manchester Computing Centre

In article <1992Oct30.021034.2101@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:

>It would be silly for someone to ask himself "I know that in my society
>people say that October 26, 1992 is a Monday, but is it *really* a
>Monday?"  In your view, would it be equally silly to ask a similar

Would it really be all that silly?  Ethiopia is 7 years and 8 months out 
from the rest of the world: is Monday here the same as Monday there?


  From the UK phone book Yellow Pages:  BORING - see Civil Engineers   

  Dave Budd, MCC, Oxford Rd, Manchester, England   (44|0)61-275-6033  
  D.Budd@mcc.ac.uk                                          fax 6040
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Rights
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 16:05:01 GMT

In article <Bxyvnq.Bsz@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <Bxy5sx.Dw4@quake.sylmar.ca.us>, brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>|> In article <1992Nov16.092859.1@woods.ulowell.edu> cotera@woods.ulowell.edu writes:
>|> >No one is born with inherient rights.  Rights are given solely by the
>|> >government.
>
>This is, of course, just an expression of a certain ideology.  In
>fact, I think it reflects a fundamental difference in perspective
>between so-called "liberals" and so-called "conservatives" (at least
>in the U.S.).  This cleaves along the lines of:
>
>	Rights are given to the people by the government (which
>	retains any rights not explicitly so given).
>
>	Rights are given (or "given up" is probably better, ala
>	Hobbes, Locke, et al.) by the people to the government,
>	and any rights not so explicitly given up are retained
>	by the people.
>
>Phrases such as "We the people ..." in our (U.S) fundamental documents
>generally are taken as an expression of the second view.
>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

I think that neither liberals nor conservatives in the US "officially"
accept the original poster's account of rights, which contradicts
explicit and implicit principles of our constitution (in the broadest
sense) which are accepted by everyone in the mainstream of our
political system.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel)
Subject: Re: Extensionalism (was re: Russell's Paradox)
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 22:09:25 GMT

In article <1992Nov15.215724.21897@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>>RH:
>>>_Contra_ Harter (miscellaneous quibbles):
>>>
>>>The Good Russell may have admitted the possibility of "intensions",
>>>but the Exalted Quine has liberated us from the influence of those
>>>"creatures of darkness".  Extensions are adequate for all admissable
>>>purposes.
>>>
>>CM:
>>Really, Randall?!  Could you then please give me an extensional
>>analysis of the sentences in the following arguments that explains why
>>the first is valid but the second is not:
>>
>>1)  John believes there are spies.
>>    Mary believes whatever John does.
>>    Therefore, Mary believes there are spies.
>>
>>2)  John believes that 2+3=5.
>>    Necessarily, 2+3=5 iff first-order logic is undecidable.
>>    Therefore, John believes that first-order logic is undecidable.
>>
>>Or is a purpose admissible just in case it is amenable to
>>extensionalist analysis?

[Florian's response and lengthy intensional response in which
that-clauses are takent to denote propositions deleted.]

>But the extensionalist does have a simple recourse; let proposition =
>sentence throughout.

But *surely* this won't work; nothing in the first argument, for
example, presupposes that John and Mary even speak the same language.
But under those conditions that argument (or perhaps a similar one
where the beliefs under consideration don't include beliefs about
language) could still have true premises (hence a true conclusion as
well).

Not to mention problems with ambiguity, anaphora, etc. that aren't
resolved at the level of sentences.

--Chris Menzel
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cotera@woods.ulowell.edu
Subject: Rights
Organization: University of Lowell
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 14:28:59 GMT

No one is born with inherient rights.  Rights are given solely by the
government.
--Ray Cote
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: what can't be verified/falsified in 
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 16 Nov 92 04:07:12 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

> In article <10292317.13025.12234@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz   
> (Hakki Kocabas) writes:  
>   
>    >Also sprach Russell "What cannot be verified or falsified is meaningless
>   
>    Actually he didn't, although the quoted sentence occurs in his  
> writings - a subtle distinction.  
>   
>    Another example of a sentence that occurs in Russell's writings was  
>   
>     The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out  
>     of His kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity,  
>     and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing  
>     and gnashing of teeth.  
>   
>    To forestall further installments of Wittgensteinian wisdom, I feel  
> I should point out that Russell did not assert the truth of this  
> sentence either.  
  
ahh then, if Russell did not baptized it as the truth then it must be false,  
or neither false nor true, or even better meaningless :->  
Oh Bogey's Messenger Russell ! tell us the truth ! for Bogey's sake !  
Only you and MZ have the power of logico-magic to turn the falsehood to   
the truth by your crowd of words... Come show us your logico-magical power,   
Oh Great Master of Words !  
  
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cotera@woods.ulowell.edu
Subject: Re: Chaos and causelessness
Organization: University of Lowell
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 14:24:37 GMT


In article <1992Nov2.211512.4304@spcvxb.spc.edu> 4chua_l@spcvxb.spc.edu writes: 
>Chaos implies causelessness:  true or false
>I am very curious about people's responses to this statement.
>					from BORED BEYOND BELIEF

Actually, I think you are confusing chaos and randomness.  Randomness implies
causelessness.  Chaos, on the other hand, relies heavily on initial conditions,
i.e. causes.  Chaos is structured but unpredictable.
--Ray Cote