From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 21:12:39 GMT

In article <BuFECs.GAw@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <lrvn5xk.anson@netcom.com>, anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:
>
>|> Yes, I am aware of these sorts of criteria.  This implies that there
>|> is a group of criteria which would define a "higher" moral standard
>|> by which other standards are to be judged.  So acceptable standards
>|> compose a set which share certain common traits.
>
>This is not implied by my description of the function of such criteria.
>I described a *methodology* which is required in order to evaluate and
>compare moral standards.  Choosing such criteria in no way implies a
>"higher" moral standard -- or any moral standard at all, unless you
>extend the concept of moral standard to cover virtually anything.  I
>think it virtuallly certain tha acceptable moral standards do in fact
>share common traits, but this is a matter for investigation and not
>an axiom with which we start.
>
>|> The faulty ones are those which lay outside that set.  But can there
>|> be another, equally valid, set of criteria which would define a set
>|> in which the faulty standards are now acceptable?
>
>There is room for argument concerning both the specific criteria and
>the nature of these criteria.  There is also room, once you have progressed
>far enough and have a complete or partial moral system to reconsider the
>original criteria.  However, this is not to say that the criteria are
>arbitrary or should be modified or replaced without good reason.  Also,
>keep in mind that (certainly at the level of abstraction that my
>description has had thus far) it is still possible for there to be
>different (perhaps even incompatible in certain ways) moral standards
>that are all members of the "acceptable" set.  (Astute readers will note
>the similarity of this approach to the development of moral standards
>with the issues concerning theory development, acceptance, and rejection
>in general.)

As the person who originally attracted the fury of moral relativism, I
should say that Gary (here) and Peter Cash (elsewhere) have been doing
such a fine job of responding that I haven't felt the need to reply.
I want to note here that this is how I think moral standards should be
built (without admitting any taint of anti-realism -- I firmly
maintain that there is moral truth -- without maintaining that I know
what it is!).  I think that our position in ethics is like
pre-scientific knowledge of the world of material objects; there are
various basic things that we know or assume, but there hasn't yet been
an effort to build "empirically testable" large theories (but there
are "systems" built in other ways, just as there were in
pre-scientific "physics").  I put "empirically testable" in quotes,
because I don't know exactly what this would mean in ethics; there is
a well-known notion of "empirical testing" in science, and a carefully
concealed notion of "empirical testing" (which is somewhat hidden from
view) in mathematics, which is rather different; the ethical analogue
would presumably also be different.  But I do suspect that systematic
ethics, analogous to mathematics and natural science, is possible.
Just as in mathematics and science, the attempt to get "infallible
knowledge" of the foundations is likely to be unproductive; it is
better to start out with what we firmly believe, build systems, see
where they fail, and use this to revise our systems, possibly
eventually abandoning some of our initial firm beliefs.  When multiple
sets of "acceptable" moral standards are arrived at, there are two
possible answers (one due to the peculiar nature of ethics): the two
systems can be based on fundamentally different notions of what human
basic aims should be, in which case they may _both_ be "true" (this is
analogous to the situation of mathematical systems with different sets
of axioms) or, if this is not the case, it needs to be determined
whether there are "observable" situations where the standards dictate
different actions, and testing needs to be carried out, if practical.
The latter situation leads to "reasoning together"; the former
situation leads (in the fullness of time) to war, ethics being the
practical discipline that it is.

>
>Can there be a separate but incompatible set of *criteria*?  Of course
>there can, but then we can argue about the acceptability of this set
>of criteria.  I think that unless you work very hard at avoiding it,
>it is possible for any group of individuals to arrive at a mutually
>acceptable set of criteria.  People who cannot participate in such
>an agreement are called "sociopaths".  Then you can decide whether
>such people are "evil" or "sick" or "dysfunctional" or whatever.
>(I prefer "evil", but I won't defend that right now.)

"Evil" is a nice word.

>
>|> Interesting that you should use the term "appropriate domain."  This
>|> seems to me to be the central point:  Judging the moral standards
>|> expressed in _The_Story_of_O_ presupposes that it is in the appropriate
>|> domain.  But what if its domain is so different from the one being used
>|> to judge it that any comparison is invalid?

The point is that your own moral theory is the one you use to judge
good and evil.  You do not admit the equal validity of all
"acceptable" theories, any more than you do your science using the
competing theory of Professor X, unless you are convinced of its truth
(or are trying to get results which test it).  The methodology of
ethics, as described here, stands apart from a particular ethical
standard, but it is the nature of an ethical standard that it dictates
your actions and judgements as long as you affirm it.  When you ask
whether a system of ethics is coherent, you are in the realm of
method; when you _act_, you must apply your current standard (and if
you do not, it is not actually your standard!)  Coherent ethical
systems may also be abhorrent.

>
>I don't understand what your point or question is here.  (I may be
>at a disadvantage in not having read the story, but I don't think
>I'll run out and get a copy.)
>
>|> Or is the issue so black and white that you can have only two sets:
>|> acceptable standards and false ones?

>
>Isn't that what "standard" *means*?  You can argue about which standard
>to have, but if you allow *anything* as a standard, then you have none.

This is why the prevalence of relativism is a moral crisis.

>
>Anyhow, what I did in my prior posting to say what "faulty moral standard"
>*means*.  I did not attempt to suggest any specific criteria, or to claim
>that one or another standard is acceptable or not.

And neither have I (except in expressing my initial "naive" horror at
the story -- I am not being self-deprecating, but indicating the
"pre-scientific" nature of my "observation".  But observe what my
basic standpoint is: I am _not_ saying that there is a moral standard
which is true (which we obviously all know to be ..., except some of
us are wicked relativists, etc., etc., etc...); I am saying that there
is a moral standard which is true; I do NOT know what it is (as a
whole); certain things impress me as being very far from what it could
reasonably be.  In my pre-scientific understanding of the world, I can
assert that there is a true physics, I don't know what it is (say,
whether the sun goes around the earth or vice versa), but the sun WILL
rise tomorrow morning.  Analogously, I flatly assert, without caring
in the least whether I offend anyone, that I will NOT, and you will
NOT, find moral enlightenment on alt.sex.bondage.

>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta