From: sdr57@cas.org ()
Subject: Re: 21st Century Soldier
Organization: Chemical Abstracts Service, Columbus, Ohio
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 19:54:27 GMT

In article <BuKx1w.97x@watdragon.uwaterloo.ca> jwtlai@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca (Jim W "GrimJim" Lai) writes:
>In article <1992Sep11.164931.3439@cas.org> sdr57@cas.org writes:
>>Iraqi units in Kuwait were well
>>supplied with cheap portable antitank weapons, which could
>>destroy our multimillion dollar tanks. It just didn't work
>>out that way - combat can be unpredictable like that.
>
>I recall a tv report saying Coalition forces had better range than Iraqi
>antitank weaponry and could thus keep them at bay before they got into range.
>Not really all that unpredictable.
>
Nothing is unpredictable in hindsight. And don't believe
everything you see on TV.

I recall a lot of TV reports before I went over there discussing
how the Iraqis had built up a formidable defensive line designed
to funnel our men and tanks into killing grounds. That prediction
was wrong, too :-) Range is important only when you can hit
what you're shooting at - it was our sights and gun stabilization
systems that really gave us the advantage. Not to mention
the Chobham armor - one M1A1 tank was hit *twice* - the crew
thought they had run over a mine at first, then the second bang
woke them up - they slewed the turret and killed the T-72.
(Incidentally, you will note from this anecdote that not all
the engagements were at extreme range)

Incidentally, the cheap stuff for destroying tanks always has a
shorter range than the expensive stuff (Iraqi artillery did
outrange ours - we just didn't give them a chance to use it
properly). The cheap stuff consists of the man-portable (or
at least jeep-portable) anti-tank rockets. You try to keep the
tanks from noticing you until they are in range, shoot them,
and hide or run away. This had worked well in practice
previously. We had developed a doctrine to deal with it in
theory, but no one knew how it would work in practice (we still
don't, not really, since too few Iraqi AT teams stood their
ground to prove it one way or the other).

There was considerable concern over Iraqi antitank capabilities
because (1) the US had not fought a major armor engagement since
the Second World War (several minor scraps in Korea and 1 in
Viet Nam don't really count), (2) the Iraqis had more direct
recent experience in armor (Arab-Israeli) and defensive fighting
than anyone in the US forces, and (3) most of our main battle
tanks hadn't been combat tested. In other words, we were going up
against an enemy who was experienced in battle and who would
be occupying defensive positions (which had been prepared over
a period of months!) with troops who had little if any combat
experience and who were using equipment which was untested
under the stress of actual combat use. Everyone knows what happens
when you pit green troops with untested equipment against
battle-hardened vets in prepared defenses, right?

Should this discussion be moved to alt.desert-storm? It seems
to be moving a long way away from sf.
******************************************************************************
Renegade academician. They're a dangerous breed when they go feral,
academics are...a chemist, too.
		    -(James P. Blaylock in "Lord Kelvin's Machine")

My organization hasn't agreed with any of my opinions so far, and
I doubt they'll start now.

Stanley "Ya nee speon" Roberts

Xref: sparky rec.arts.sf.misc:2931 alt.cyberpunk:4287