From: Greenpeace via Jym Dyer <jym@mica.berkeley.edu>
Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive,alt.activism,talk.environment
Subject: NEWS: French Letter Leaked -- Questions Plutonium Ship's Safety
Followup-To: talk.environment
Date: 12 Nov 1992 17:08:34 GMT
Organization: The Naughty Peahen Party Line
NNTP-Posting-Host: remarque.berkeley.edu
Summary: (Sorry about the pun.)

[Greenpeace Press Release from Environet -- Redistribute Freely]

FRANCE RAISES LAST-MINUTE QUESTIONS ABOUT PLUTONIUM SHIP'S SAFETY 

International Protest Against Shipment Grows
  
PARIS October 27, 1992 (GP) A French government letter leaked
to Greenpeace indicates that France is not convinced of the
adequacy of Japan's safety preparations for the imminent
plutonium shipment.
  
In a letter of October 19 to his counterparts in Japan (1),
the Director of the French Institute for Nuclear Safety and
Protection (IPSN) formally requested that Japan answer eleven
critical questions on fire safety before the plutonium freighter
"Akatsuki Maru" arrives in France. (2)
  
The questions cover such basic issues as: how would fires be
fought on the vessel, how could fuel be dumped from the ship
in the event of a fire and even what kind of fire detection
equipment exists in the engine room and cargo areas of the
"Akatsuki Maru".
  
"It is inconceivable that these questions are being asked at the
very moment the plutonium ship is set to arrive in France," said
Greenpeace's Jean-Luc Thierry.  "While the French Government has
been assuring the public of these shipments' safety, one of its
key agencies has been questioning the basic fire provisions for
the shipment."
  
In the leaked letter, IPSN Director Vesseron recommended that
all 11 questions be answered "before the arrival of the ship
in France."
  
These questions imply that the IPSN is concerned about the
adequacy of the plutonium packing containers, or 'casks',
to withstand the effects of a serious fire.  Following
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations,
the "Type B" containers used for plutonium transports have
been designed and tested to withstand a fire lasting up to 30
minutes at a temperature of up to 800 degrees Centigrade.  But,
International Maritime Organization (IMO) statistics show that
ship-board fires burn on average between 20 and 23 hours at
temperatures in excess of 1000 degrees Centigrade.  Accordingly,
the IAEA recommendations have been widely condemned as
inadequate. (3)
  
This revelation coincides with the passing of the October 26
deadline for the arrival of the plutonium ship announced on
October 12 by COGEMA, the operator of the French plutonium
factory at La Hague.
  
During those two weeks, international protest against the
shipments has flourished:

* Following indications that the shipment could go around Cape
Horn, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
announced that the shipment was banned from their waters;

* The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) called for a United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) assessment of the shipment's threat
to the environment;

* The Philippines President Ramos banned the shipment warning
that an accident involving the ship could be devastating to his
country's people and marine environment; and

* In a letter of October 21, Sri Lanka also announced a ban on
the shipment entering its waters.
  
As the Monday deadline passed, the International Maritime
Organization's committee on marine environmental protection
(MEPC) was convened in London. The transport of plutonium,
irradiated nuclear fuel and high level nuclear waste will be
discussed during the five-day meeting.
  
NOTES:

(1) The letter from IPSN was addressed to Mr Yuichi Mori,
Director for Safety Transport of Dangerous Goods, Maritime
Technology and Safety Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of
Transport.
  
It was copied to: the Japanese Science and Technology Agency
(STA); Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation (PNC); and France's COGEMA.
  
(2) IPSN is responsible for evaluating Japan's safety plan for
the plutonium shipment.  This safety evaluation is required
under the terms of the France/Japan Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement.  With such basic questions on fire safety still
outstanding, it would appear that the required safety review
is still incomplete.
  
(3) For example, concern about the inadequacy of the IAEA design
and testing recommendations for the plutonium containers lead,
lead the US House of Representatives to pass legislation in May
which would ban the plutonium shipments from US waters and ports
unless new credible tests are conducted which comply with the
circumstances of serious accidents at sea.
Xref: sparky misc.activism.progressive:8221 alt.activism:18505 soc.culture.latin-america:4192