From: meyers@leonardo.rtp.dg.com (Bill Meyers)
Subject: Re: Gun control in California
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 92 22:49:32 GMT
Organization: N/I

In article <2sefcxt@Unify.Com> perry@Unify.Com (Perry Clarke) writes:
>andy@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (Andy Freeman) wrote:
[ ... ]
>You are making this sound as if sometime in the recent past "gun control"
>(by whatever definition) was legally enacted in the UK and everyone's
>guns were taken from them.  This not so; it has always been difficult to
>license a hand gun the UK (it is now almost impossible because of the
[blah, blah, ... :-]

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>Path: dg-rtp!dgcad!amdcad!ames!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!sdd.hp.com!hplabs!hpda!hpcuhc!rterry
>From: rterry@hpcuhc.cup.hp.com (Ray Terry)
>Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
>Subject: Re: Gun Control in the UK works?
>Message-ID: <7070006@hpcuhc.cup.hp.com>
>Date: 24 Jan 91 20:40:12 GMT
>References: <8120113@hprnd.rose.hp.com>
>Organization: Hewlett Packard, Cupertino
>Lines: 1141
>
>>Has there ever been any proof that gun control works in the UK?
>>I'm interested in a comparison of violent crime before and after
>>gun control was instituted in the UK in the 1920's(?).  It's quite
>>possible that gun crimes went down, but if other violent crimes
>>increased, then I'd claim that gun control has not really worked in
>>the UK, assuming non-gun violence increased as much as gun violence
>>decreased.
>
>The following doesn't specifically address your question, but it does imply
>that violent/gun related crime was very low prior to the Firearms Act of 1920.
>
>Ray
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                FIREARMS LEGISLATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
>                        (by Jan A. Stevenson)
>
>
>        Most people of retirement age, though they may not  realize
>   it, were born at a time when there was no  firearms  legislation
>   to speak of in this country.  Nor had there ever  been, for  the
>   first Firearms Act of any substance was that of 1920.  The  1920
>   Act was a comprehensive one and gave Britain an extensive system
>   of controls that have  rarely  been  exceeded  in  a  democratic
>   society. Subsequent enactments have put more flesh on the bones,
>   but the structure of controls that the  government  of  the  day
>   devised serves us still.
>
>        From the  point  of  view  of  social  history,  as  recent
>   research  has  made  clear,  the  1920  Act  is  a  particularly
>   important  document.  It  marks  a  profound  shift  --indeed  a
>   reversal-- in the British state's attitude toward its  citizens.
>   In 1900 the Prime Minister said that he would "laud the day when
>   there was a rifle in every cottage in England."  The Lord  Mayor
>   hosted a meeting at Mansion House, attended  by,  among  others,
>   the Duke of Westminister, the Archbishop of York  and  the  Lord
>   Mayor of Liverpool, with the purpose of founding a, "Society  of
>   Working Men's Rifle Clubs, for facilitating rifle shooting, more
>   especially  in  the  evening,  with  small   bore   rifles   and
>   inexpensive ammunition, as an ordinary branch of  recreation  by
>   working men's and working boys' clubs and institutions."
>
>        The Duke of Norfolk undertook to chair the new  Association
>   while Lord  Roberts,  then  Commander-in-Chief,  had  agreed  to
>   accept the presidency on his retirement from the Army.
>
>        According  to  The  Times:  " ... the  scheme  would  be  a
>   cooperative one, that is the  gentlemen  of  the  country  would
>   contribute to  the  funds,  whilst  the  working  men  would  be
>   expected to join the clubs and make themselves efficient in  the
>   matter of rifle shooting."
>
>        This was very different from the purpose of the  1920  Act,
>   which was precisely to ensure that working men would not be able
>   to lay hands on a rifle or make  themselves  proficient  in  its
>   use. It was not deemed politic, however, to say so, and the bill
>   was put through as a  crime  prevention  measure.  Its  progress
>   through  parliament  had  been  carefully   prepared,   and   it
>   encountered very little opposition.
>
>        Police Superintendent Colin Greenwood who,  as  a  Cropwood
>   Fellow at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge,
>   during 1970-71, was the  first  to  conduct  serious,  scholarly
>   research in this field, recalled some years later how baffled he
>   had been by the motivation of the 1920 Act.
>
>        "The question troubled me for some time because I was naive
>   enough  to  accept  the  assurances  of  the  day   that   their
>   legislation was aimed at the armed criminal...During the  period
>   1911 to 1913, firearms were involved in an average of 45  crimes
>   of all types per year.  During  the period  1915  to  1917,  the
>   average had fallen to 15 cases per year.  Would to God  that  we
>   could have  such  figures  today.  Why,  then,  was  legislation
>   introduced? ... It was not until I read the diaries of the  then
>   Cabinet Secretary  that  the  truth  emerged."  [Speech;  Rhodes
>   House, Oxford, June 1983.]
>
>        The truth, as Colin Greenwood belatedly discovered, and  as
>   recently released Cabinet papers have underlined, was  that  the
>   Government was extremely  concerned  by  the  possibility  of  a
>   Bolshevik  style  revolution  in  Britain.   The   police   were
>   insufficient to deal with the anticipated  troubles;  the  Army,
>   after demobilization, of conscripts, would  be  insufficient  as
>   well.  According to the Chief  of  the  Imperial General  Staff,
>   there would soon be only 38 Regular Army battalions in Britain.
>
>        "On the assumption that an  adequate  police  force  is  in
>   existence, it is considered essential to maintain  the  infantry
>   garrisons in Great Britain at not less than 40,000 men in  order
>   to give a minimum strength  of  30,000  effective  bayonets  for
>   employment in an emergency." [PRO CAB 24/96 XCH 62903]
>
>        The Chief of the I.G.S. was unable to guarantee this beyond
>   March of 1920 and added that, "Further, an adequate police force
>   does no apparently exist."  He warned  that  if  the  Army  were
>   called upon at an early stage of civil disturbances, "it will be
>   dispersed, and thus  the  last  reserve  in  the  hands  of  the
>   Government will be dissipated."
>
>        Sir Eric Geddes, Minister  of  Transport,  complained  that
>   there were only eight battalions in the north,  and  he  feared,
>   "...a revolutionary outbreak in Glasgow, Liverpool or London  in
>   the early spring, when a definite attempt may be made  to  seize
>   the  reins  of  Government ... It is not  inconceivable  that  a
>   dramatic and successful coup d'etat  in  some  large  center  of
>   population might win the  support  of  the  unthinking  mass  of
>   labour..." [PRO CAB 25/20]
>
>        The Home Secretary reminded the Cabinet that the Bolsheviks
>   had staged a revolution in Winnipeg, and now  that  the  wartime
>   blockade was dismantled, their emissaries could be  expected  in
>   Britain, doubtless bearing vast quantities of forged  five-pound
>   notes such as had been discovered  in  Odessa,  when  the  White
>   Russian Army had taken the city.
>
>        Geddes proposed: "...a  meeting  of  Mayors  of  provincial
>   cities (to) ascertain from them how far  they  are  prepared  to
>   create skeleton organizations locally  for  dealing  with  civil
>   disturbances when they occur, such skeleton organizations to  be
>   of a secret nature." [PRO CAB 25/20]
>
>        A committee chaired by Sir Nevil  Macready,  Commission  of
>   Metropolitan Police,  recommended  that  each  regimental  depot
>   throughout the country should  hold  1,000  stand  of  arms  and
>   appropriate quantities of ammunition  as  "the  best  method  of
>   making  them  available  to  loyalists  in  the  event   of   an
>   emergency."  Bonar Law had urged the month before that, "weapons
>   ought to  be  available  for  distribution  to  friends  of  the
>   Government."
>
>        The Prime Minister had been told in Cabinet that,  "A  bill
>   is needed to license persons to bear arms.  This has been useful
>   in Ireland because the Authorities know whom  was  possessed  of
>   arms." The bill was soon forthcoming. It was introduced into the
>   House of Lords on the 19th of April and sent to the  Commons  on
>   the 6th of May.
>
>        The Home Secretary, Mr. Edward Shortt, gave no hint of  the
>   matters that were  so  tormenting  the  Cabinet.  The  bill,  he
>   assured the House, was, "...designed to maintain greater control
>   so that, as far as possible, criminals or weak  minded  persons,
>   and those who should not have firearms  may  be  prevented  from
>   having these dangerous and lethal firearms.  As far as possible,
>   we have provided that legitimate sport should not be in any  way
>   hampered, and so  that  any  person  who  has  good  reason  for
>   possessing firearms, or to whom there is no  objection,  may  be
>   entitled to have them; but we hope, by means of  this  bill,  to
>   prevent criminals and persons of  that  description  from  being
>   able to have revolvers and to use them."
>
>        These words sound  remarkably  similar  to  those  recently
>   uttered by today's Home Secretary, Douglas  Hurd.  Mr.  Shortt's
>   reassuring tone, as he described to the  House  his  concern  to
>   protect the public from  armed  crime  whilst  safeguarding  the
>   legitimate interests of shooting  sportsmen,  was  no  doubt  in
>   contrast to the atmosphere in the Cabinet Room in Downing Street
>   where he and his colleagues anxiously discussed the  possibility
>   of strafing the working  class  from  the  air  whilst  fielding
>   30,000 bayonets against them on the ground.
>
>        What happened to Lord Salisbury's hope, expressed only  two
>   decades earlier, of  having  a  rifle  in  every  cottage?  What
>   happened to the  absolute  trust  on  the  part  of  the  ruling
>   classes, as exemplified  in  the  founding  of  the  Society  of
>   Working Men's Rifle Clubs, in the patriotism and decency of  the
>   working class?  The view then was that if  Britain  should  have
>   need to raise a mass army of national defense, the working class
>   would form the infantry, and that the defense of the realm would
>   depend on their ability to use their individual weapons with the
>   expertise born of years of practice.  That view,  as  it  turned
>   out, was to be vindicated within fifteen years in  the  trenches
>   of Northern France.  And finally, what made  the  Government  so
>   determined  to  truncate  one  of  the  essential  liberties  of
>   freeborn Englishmen that they would legislate  that  liberty  to
>   extinction?
>
>        Clearly,  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  in  Russia  and   the
>   formation of  the  "Third  International"  with  the  object  of
>   exporting insurrection, had provided the panic element.  But  it
>   would  be  oversimplistic  to   suggest   this   as   sufficient
>   explanation, for there had been several bills during the pre-war
>   period that had presaged the 1920 Act. During the second reading
>   debate  in  the  House,  the  Member  for  Hull,  Lt.  Commander
>   Kenworthy, expressed great concern: "In the  past,  one  of  the
>   most jealously  guarded  rights  of  the  English  was  that  of
>   carrying arms ... It has been a well  known  object  of  Central
>   Government of this country to deprive people of their weapons."
>
>        The bill itself was based on the secret report of a "purely
>   departmental" committee chaired by Sir  Ernley  Blackwell,  KCB,
>   who had been charged on the 6th December, 1917, to consider  the
>   "restrictions  which  should   be   imposed   upon   possession,
>   manufacture, sale, import and export of firearms in  the  United
>   Kingdom after the war."  Blackwell was Assistant Under Secretary
>   of State for the Home Department, and his  committee  recognized
>   two  main  sources   of   postwar   danger:   the   "savage   or
>   semi-civilized  tribesmen  in  outlying  parts  of  the  British
>   Empire" and "the anarchist or 'intellectual' malcontent  of  the
>   great cities whose weapon is the bomb and the automatic  pistol.
>   There is some force in the view that the latter will  in  future
>   prove the more dangerous of the two."
>
>        We might tentatively suggest  that  the  Bolshevik  spectre
>   served to focus the anxieties aroused by the prewar  anarchists.
>   The anarchists, however, were regarded  for  the  most  part  as
>   foreign malcontents rather  than  as  a  direct  threat  to  the
>   domestic body politic:  Communism, on  the  other  hand,  risked
>   infecting the lower classes across a broad spectrum.
>
>        One of the documents that Blackwell's committee  considered
>   was the draft pistols Bill of 1911, with which Blackwell himself
>   had been closely involved, but that had never  been  put  before
>   the House.  It had, for the first time, incorporated a system of
>   certificates to be administered by  the  police,  and  had  been
>   intended to stiffen the Pistols Act, 1903, which  had  succeeded
>   in its passage  through  Parliament  only  by  virtue  of  being
>   anodyne.  There had been previous attempts to legislate in  1887
>   and 1893, but these had been soundly  rejected  on  the  grounds
>   that they represented an unconstitutional infringement of  basic
>   rights.
>
>        Of  that,  there  should  be  little  doubt.  Sir   William
>   Blackstone's  Commentaries,  first  published   in   1765,   had
>   meticulously   described   the   development,   substance    and
>   significance of  "...the  rights,  or  as  they  are  frequently
>   termed, the liberties of Englishmen...": "And we have seen  that
>   these rights  consist,  primarily,  in  the  free  enjoyment  of
>   personal  security,  of  personal   liberty   and   of   private
>   property...And lastly, to vindicate these rights, when  actually
>   violated and attacked, the subjects of England are entitled,  in
>   the first place, to the regular administration and  free  course
>   of  justice  in  the  courts  of  law;  next  to  the  right  of
>   petitioning  the  King  and  Parliament  for  the   redress   of
>   grievances; and lastly, to the right of having  and  using  arms
>   for self preservation and defense."
>
>        The right to keep arms no doubt developed as a corollary of
>   the natural law right of self defense, and by Anglo-Saxon  times
>   a corresponding obligation was clearly defined.  All able-bodied
>   freemen were expected to take part in the "hue and cry" to bring
>   criminals to justice, and to serve in the army in time  of  war.
>   For both of these purposes, they were expected to maintain  arms
>   according to their rank and station.  A twice yearly  inspection
>   insured that the arms concerned were  kept  in  good  order  and
>   ready for use.
>
>        The Normans retained this system, and  indeed  refined  it.
>   Henry II's Assize of Arms of 1181 detailed the types of  weapons
>   which persons of various rank were expected to have on  hand,  a
>   question that was updated in 1285 by the Statute of  Westminster
>   [13 Edw I c6].  The  greater one's  wealth,  the  greater  one's
>   contribution, but even the poor were under  obligation:  "...and
>   all others that may shall have bows and arrows."
>
>        Indeed, firearms were at first regarded  by  the  Crown  as
>   noisome, inefficient things that might tempt people to  neglect,
>   "...the good and laudable exercise of the longbow  which  always
>   heretofore hath been the surety, safeguard and continual defense
>   of this Realm of England." [33 Hen VIII c6]
>
>        By the end of the 16th century, the  musket  had  displaced
>   the bow as the primary  infantry  weapon,  and  by  Blackstone's
>   time, the right to bear arms, and specifically firearms,  was  a
>   well recognized element  of  the  Constitution,  existing  quite
>   separately from the obligational aspect.
>
>        This was  clearly  enunciated  during  the  debate  on  the
>   Seizure of  Arms  Bill  of  1820,  in  response  to  a  fear  of
>   insurrection in the industrializing North.  The Luddite violence
>   of 1811 and 1812 had required 12,000 troops to put down,  and  a
>   resurgence had led to the "Peterloo Massacre" of 1819  in  which
>   eleven people were killed and hundreds injured as  the  Yeomanry
>   dispersed a crowd estimated at some eighty thousand.  There  was
>   much talk of revolution and reports, no  doubt  exaggerated,  of
>   secret stores of arms and men drilling or training with them.
>
>        The Seizure of Arms Act was to authorize  justices  of  the
>   peace to issue warrants for the seizure and  detention  of  arms
>   that might be used  by  revolutionaries.  Parliament  recognized
>   that it was on delicate  ground  and  clearly  had  no  wish  to
>   abrogate a right.  The Act applied only to the  two  cities  and
>   eleven counties in which there was a real fear  of  unrest,  and
>   would lapse after two years.  Moreover, firearms (unlike  pikes)
>   could only be seized if it could be demonstrated that they  were
>   kept for a purposed dangerous to the peace.
>
>        Despite the carefully circumscribed terms of the bill,  Mr.
>   T.W. Anson contended, during the debate on  the  14th  December,
>   1819, that, "The principles on which it (the  bill)  is  founded
>   and the temper in which it is framed appear to me to be so  much
>   at variance with the free spirit of our  venerated  constitution
>   and so contrary to the undoubted right  which  the  subjects  of
>   this country have ever possessed -- the right of retaining  arms
>   for the defense of themselves, their families and properties  --
>   that  I  cannot  look  upon  it  without  loudly  expressing  my
>   disapprobation and regret."
>
>        After a lengthy debate in  which  Mr.  Anson  found  strong
>   support, Mr. George Canning, later Prime Minister, summed up for
>   the Government:  "I am perfectly willing to admit the  right  of
>   the subject to hold arms laid down by the Honorable and  Learned
>   Gentleman (Mr. Anson), having stated it on the authority of  Mr.
>   Justice Blackstone.  The doctrine so laid down, I am willing  to
>   admit,  is  no  other  than  the   doctrine   of   the   British
>   Constitution.  The Bill of Rights, correctly quoted and properly
>   construed, brings me to the construction of the Bill  which,  in
>   fact, recognizes the right of the  subject  to  have  arms,  but
>   qualifies that right in such a manner as the  necessity  of  the
>   case requires."
>
>        It was generally accepted that Mr.  Canning  had  made  his
>   case, and that by tailoring the bill  to  meet  a  specific  and
>   tightly circumscribed  problem,  the  extent  to  which  he  had
>   infringed the rights of  the  subject  was  acceptable  and  met
>   Blackstone's  prescription  of,  "...restraints  so  gentle  and
>   moderate, as will appear on further  inquiry,  that  no  man  of
>   sense or probity would wish to see them slackened."
>
>        Subsequent  legislative  proposals  were  less  clearly  in
>   accord with this principle, and it was to be  nearly  a  century
>   before a measure restricting firearms ownership or use was again
>   enacted.  The possible exception that one might cite was the Gun
>   License Act of 1870, which required anyone who wished  to  carry
>   or use a gun outside the  curtilege  of  a  dwelling  house,  to
>   purchase a ten  shilling  license  at  the  post  office.  This,
>   however was strictly a revenue measure;  it  remained  in  force
>   until 1967.
>
>        Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, made it an offense  to
>   be in possession of an offensive weapon with intent to commit  a
>   felony.  But providing he was free of felonious intent and  paid
>   his ten shillings to the post office, the Englishman's right  to
>   acquire, possess and carry firearms was uninhibited by law until
>   the twentieth century.
>
>        There had been several measures proposed toward the end  of
>   the  19th  century,  but  all  fell,  generally  on  grounds  of
>   unconstitutionality.  The Pistols  Bill,  1895,  made  it  to  a
>   division, where it failed by 183 votes to 75. Mr. C. H. Hopwood,
>   Member for South East Middleton, would appear to have  reflected
>   the feeling of the House when he suggested that,  "To  say  that
>   because there were some persons who would make  violent  use  of
>   pistols, therefore the right of purchase or possession by  every
>   Englishman should be taken away, is monstrous."
>
>        A much diluted bill, however, was to  succeed  eight  years
>   later.  The Pistols Act, 1903, provided  that  before  one could
>   purchase a pistol or revolver  at  retail,  one  had  either  to
>   produce a gun license or game license,  available  at  the  post
>   office, or give reasonable proof  that  one  was  a  householder
>   intending to use the pistol in or within the  curtilege  of  his
>   own house, or present a letter, countersigned by  a  justice  of
>   the peace or a police officer of the rank of inspector or above,
>   that one was departing abroad for a  period  of  six  months  or
>   more.  There was also a bar on retail sales to persons under the
>   age of 18; private sales were outside the scope of the Act.  The
>   only effect of the Act was to oblige retail customers  who  were
>   not householders to pay a ten shilling tax at the  post  office.
>   The burden of the law was minimal and therefore tolerable.
>
>        The purpose of  the  bill,  according  to  Mr.  Hulme,  its
>   sponsor, was not to prevent crime  but  hopefully  to  eliminate
>   some of the accidents, particularly involving young people, that
>   one heard of from time to time.
>
>        Mr. Hulme's intentions notwithstanding, the  1903  Act  was
>   soon criticized for not  accomplishing  what  it  had  not  been
>   intended to accomplish, and a much stiffened version  was  ready
>   for introduction in 1911.  Soundings may have indicated  that it
>   would encounter the same sort of resistance  that  had  scuttled
>   the 1893 and 1895 bills, however, since  it  was  never  brought
>   before Parliament.
>
>        This persistent legislative activity from 1893 onward,  for
>   all of its lack of success, suggests the emergence of a feeling,
>   in administrative circles, that the Constitution was outmoded in
>   this respect, and that some beneficial effect would accrue  from
>   restricting the legitimate private ownership of firearms.
>
>        The effect anticipated is not always easy to deduce for, as
>   Greenwood belatedly discovered, legislative proposals  sometimes
>   sail under false  colours.  This  could  be  the  said  to  have
>   particularly been the  case  of  the  Firearms  Act,  1920,  the
>   Criminal  Justice  Act,  1967,  (which  introduce  the   shotgun
>   controls) and perhaps the current bill as well.
>
>        The  Firearms  Act,  1920,  established  the  framework  of
>   controls that has characterized the British system  ever  since.
>   This was strictly and administrative confection:  the  Blackwell
>   Committee, upon whose recommendations the Act was based, met  in
>   secret and their report was never published.  The  chairman, Sir
>   Ernley Blackwell, was a senior Home Office official,  while  the
>   secretary, who was also a member of the committee, was Mr.  F.J.
>   Dryhurst, recently Commissioner of  the  Prison  Service.  Other
>   members represented the  Metropolitan  Police,  the  County  and
>   Borough Police Forces, the board of Customs, Board of Trade, the
>   War Office and the Irish Office.
>
>        The committee proceeded on  the  assumption  that  controls
>   were  desirable  and  that  they   would   be   effective.   The
>   Commissioner of Police for  the  Metropolis  had  reported  that
>   during the three years 1911-1913 there had  been  123  cases  in
>   which firearms had either been used in crime or had  been  found
>   in the possession of persons who had come into the hands of  the
>   police. For the corresponding period, 1915-1917, there had  been
>   47 cases. Blackwell ascribed this decline, from an average of 41
>   cases  per  year  to  15.6  cases  per  year,  entirely  to  the
>   beneficial  effects  of  the  wartime  Defense  of   the   Realm
>   Regulations, which required a license for the retail purchase of
>   rifles, pistols, and ammunition. Blackwell anticipated that when
>   the Regulations  expired,  instances  of  armed  crime  "may  be
>   expected  to  rise  to  or  above  their  former  level."   With
>   hindsight, and armed crime rate in the Metropolis  of  47  cases
>   per year  sounds  Utopian.  Blackwell's  contention,  "That  the
>   control of firearms should be made far more stringent than it is
>   now is a proposition  that  hardly  anyone  could  be  found  to
>   question,"  [Blackwell, page  1] might  best  be  taken  in  the
>   context of the secrecy with which the  Committee  undertook  its
>   deliberation  and  its  exclusively  civil  service  and  police
>   composition.
>
>   Blackwell submitted his report on the 16th of November, 1918. On
>   the same day, he wrote to  Sir  Maurice  Bonham  Carter  at  the
>   Ministry of Reconstruction, who had been responsible, along with
>   Sir Edward Troup, for setting the committee up.
>
>        Of the report, Blackwell wrote in a  covering  letter,  "It
>   will be better not to publish it.  There is a good  deal  in the
>   Arms Traffic Report that could not be published  and  a  regards
>   our Report, any prolonged discussion with the 'trade' is  to  be
>   avoided." [PRO REC1/342/55946] "You will see," he assured Bonham
>   Carter, "that we have arrived  at  framing  a  fairly  stringent
>   system of control."
>
>        Stringent it was. Indeed, the certification procedure  that
>   Blackwell's committee designed has been recognized as  about  as
>   stringent as can be effected short of an  outright  prohibition.
>   The  distinctive  features  are  the   wide-ranging   discretion
>   accorded to chief  constables  and  the  burden  laid  upon  the
>   applicant to "satisfy"  the  chief  constable  both  as  to  his
>   personal suitability and as to his  legitimate  requirement  for
>   the firearms or ammunition applied for.
>
>        Complaints  of  overzealousness  were  almost   immediately
>   forthcoming.  The  first  appeal  against  a  chief  constable's
>   decision was  heard  at  Middleton  Police  Court  the  20th  of
>   December, 1929; the Act had come into  effect  the  1st  of  the
>   month previous.  The Rev. Henry Evans, vicar of  Tonge, appealed
>   against the refusal of  the  chief  constable  to  issue  him  a
>   certificate for a Winchester rifle which he had owned  for  many
>   years for sporting purposes and for the control of vermin in his
>   poultry yard, as he had repeatedly explained to police  officers
>   on the occasions of their recent visits.
>
>        When making out the application form, the  Rev.  Evans  had
>   indicated that his reason for requiring a certificate was so  as
>   to comply with the law. The chief constable  refused  to  accept
>   this, and the Rev. Evans  refused  to  fill  out  another  form,
>   noting that there was no requirement in the law for him to  have
>   made out the first one.
>
>        The court found in Rev. Evans' favour. The Home Office,  in
>   an internal note, complained that, "The police chose a  case  in
>   which they were  very  likely  to  lose,  and  covered  by  H.O.
>   instructions to issue certificates freely to  reputable  persons
>   already in possession." [PRO HO45/11024/408571]
>
>        The instructions referred to had been promulgated the  24th
>   of  November  and  were  supplemental  to  extensive  notes  for
>   guidance issued to chief constables on the 5th of  October.  The
>   fact that the Home Secretary found it necessary, within weeks of
>   the Act's taking effect, to bring the constabularies'  attention
>   to, "...the  following  observations,  which  may  assist  Chief
>   Constables in enforcing the Act without unnecessary interference
>   with persons who were properly in possession of firearms at  the
>   time of the passing of the Act, and  are  not  likely  to  abuse
>   permission to retain them," [HO Circ.  406,571/76]  is  probably
>   indicative of a substantial volume of complaints.
>
>        The chief constables were less  than  appreciative  of  the
>   Home Secretary's assistance in these  matters.  Their  Districts
>   1,2,& 3 Conference forwarded a resolution  to  the  Home  Office
>   expressing, "...regret that the Home  Office  has  seen  fit  by
>   their circular 408,571/76 of the 24th November, 1920, to  modify
>   the previous instructions issued to  Chief  Constables  in  Home
>   Office circular 408, 571/33 of 5th October, 1920, as such action
>   had placed Chief  Constables  in  a  difficult  position."  [PRO
>   HO45/11024-62971]
>
>        They asked that the avenue  of  appeal  to  the  courts  be
>   abolished, and that complaints be referred to the  Secretary  of
>   State for adjudication.
>
>        By 1934, the Act, and the system of  controls  over  rifles
>   and pistols  which  it  incorporated,  had  "run  in,"  and  the
>   Government felt  that  it  was  time  for  a  review.  The  Home
>   Secretary  appointed  a   Departmental   Committee   under   the
>   chairmanship  of  Sir  Archibold  Bodkin,  a  recently   retired
>   Directory of Public Prosecutions, "...to  consider  the  various
>   types of firearms and similar weapons ... and to report whether,
>   in the interests of public safety, any amendment of the  law  is
>   necessary  or  desirable  in  respect  of   such   weapons   and
>   ammunition." [HMSO Cmd. 4758.1934]
>
>        Bodkin's committee was somewhat  more  broadly  based  than
>   Blackwell's  (it  included  three  Members  of  Parliament)  and
>   invited submissions. It heard oral evidence  from  38  witnesses
>   representing   21   organizations,    and    received    written
>   communications  from  ten  departments  and  organizations.  The
>   report (Cmd.  4758)  was  published  in  December  of  1934  and
>   reprinted in 1968.
>
>        The Bodkin Report is  interesting  in  many  respects,  not
>   least in its use of  statistical  evidence.  The  Committee  had
>   requested an elaborate report from each chief officer of  police
>   in Great Britain concerning, "...cases known to  the  police  in
>   which certain types of weapons had, during the three years ended
>   28th February, 1934, been "a) used by or found in the possession
>   of persons engaged in crime  (including  cases  of  suicide)  or
>   avoiding arrests, (or)  b)  the  cause  of  accidents  involving
>   personal injuries." [Bodkin, page 2]
>
>        The information thus gathered was tabulated and broken down
>   so that details such as the age of  the  user,  the  calibre  or
>   gauge of the weapon, the type of cartridge, and  the  degree  of
>   injury were immediately accessible.  These  tables  cover  seven
>   pages and are extraordinarily  well  set  out  and  useful.  The
>   survey  covered:  shotguns,  sawed-off   shotguns,   smooth-bore
>   pistols, toy or dummy pistols converted to fire,  toy  or  dummy
>   pistols not converted, air pistols, and air guns or rifles -- in
>   other words, those types of firearm that were not covered by the
>   Firearms Act, 1920.
>
>        The committee's decision to  seek  no  data  regarding  the
>   types of firearm controlled by the 1920 Act meant both that  the
>   effectiveness of that Act could not be  evaluated  and  that  no
>   case for deregulation could be supported by quantitive evidence.
>   This was the more unfortunate in that they were quite clear that
>   deregulation was within their terms of reference  [Bodkin,  page
>   3].
>
>        The Committee's use of evidence  (or  lack  thereof)  opens
>   them  to  criticism  on  several  points.  They  professed  much
>   sympathy for the gun trade, which had been decimated by the 1920
>   Act but whose remaining members had  "borne  their  losses  with
>   resignation  and  have  loyally  cooperated  with  authorities."
>   [Bodkin, page 10]
>
>        Moreover, "It seems quite clear,"  they  report,  "that  in
>   1920 Parliament intended to abstain, as far  as  possible,  from
>   discouraging the formation of rifle clubs  and  target  practice
>   generally." [Bodkin, page 15]. They were  earnestly  pressed  by
>   the trade to deregulate .22 rifles, but declined to do so on the
>   perhaps significant grounds that, "...it would be  a  retrograde
>   step after 14 years of restriction  if  all  control  over  such
>   weapons were abolished." [Bodkin, page 16]
>
>        According to the evidence collected, ordinary shotguns  had
>   been used in 94 crimes over the three years of the  study.  Shot
>   pistols had been used in 25 and  sawed-off  shotguns  in  eight.
>   Bodkin recommended placing the latter two types of weapon  under
>   firearm certificate control, but favored leaving normal shotguns
>   outside the Act. They may have been quite correct in  suggesting
>   that shotguns so outnumbered shot pistols  that  a  roughly  4:1
>   ratio of use in crime was not disproportionate. But they made no
>   attempt to quantify the number of either  type  in  circulation,
>   nor did they address their minds to the  question  of  what  was
>   achieved by restricting sawed-off shotguns  when  both  shotguns
>   and hacksaws were unrestricted.
>
>        The Bodkin Committee collected a great deal of  information
>   and did an impressive amount of work, but their line of argument
>   is not always persuasive. One often suspects that  the  evidence
>   is  decorative  and  that  the  report  actually   reflects   an
>   administrative class view of what a well-ordered universe  would
>   be  like.  Their  conclusion,  that  the  system   of   controls
>   established by the Firearms Act,  1920,  "...lying  as  it  does
>   largely in the hands of responsible officers of police, has,  in
>   our opinion, been  well  administered  and  forms  an  efficient
>   system of controlling the  sale  of  firearms  and  ammunition,"
>   [Bodkin  page  9]  ignored  the  question  of  what  the  system
>   accomplished. The members of the committee no doubt assumed that
>   the controls were of some public benefit, but they did not  pose
>   the question and sought no evidence that would have permitted an
>   answer.
>
>        The Bodkin Committee  suggested  a  number  of  changes  of
>   detail in the 1920 Act, but none  of  structure.  Perhaps  their
>   most notable proposals were that shotguns with barrels less than
>   20 inches in length be subject to firearm  certificate  control,
>   and that  machine  guns  be  removed  from  firearm  certificate
>   control  and  be  reclassified  as   prohibited   weapons.   The
>   reclassification of machine guns was at the  suggestion  of  the
>   British Field Sports Society.
>
>        The Bodkin committee recommendations were  incorporated  in
>   the Firearms Act, 1936, which turned out to be longer  than  the
>   act it amended. The following year,  the  1920  and  1936  Acts,
>   along with  the  intervening  Firearms  and  Imitation  Firearms
>   (Criminal Use) Act, 1933, and the Firearms Act, 1934 (regulating
>   the sale to persons under seventeen of firearms and  ammunition)
>   were consolidated in the Firearms Act, 1937, which was to remain
>   in effect, virtually unamended, for thirty-one years.
>
>        The Firearms Act, 1937, carried Britain through the  trauma
>   of the Second World War, across the flat and tranquil decade  of
>   the 1950's, and into an  era  of  spiraling  crime  and  quantum
>   increases in criminal violence. The 1937 Act,  perhaps,  was  no
>   more responsible for the latter phenomena than it  was  for  the
>   period of remarkable repose that preceded it.
>
>        In the absence of directly comparable statistics, all  that
>   can be said with confidence is that the 1950's marked  the  last
>   time, and perhaps the only time, that armed crime  had  been  as
>   rare as it had  during  the  Belle  Epoque  when  there  was  no
>   restrictive legislation at all.
>
>        However, few people retained a clear memory of  the  period
>   prior to  the  First  World  War,  and  across  the  intervening
>   decades, the feeling had taken root that the low level of  armed
>   crime must be due to the rigour of statutory restrictions.  When
>   violent crime began its vertiginous rise in the mid-1960's,  the
>   understandable  feeling  of  many  was  that  more   restrictive
>   legislation was needed. The police were less prone to  such  and
>   instinctive reaction, for chief  constables  realized  that  the
>   degree of control  which  they  exercised  over  the  legitimate
>   ownership of rifles and  pistols  left  little  to  be  desired.
>   Shotguns remained uncontrolled, but  were  comparatively  rarely
>   used in crime.
>
>        The question,  nonetheless,  was  repeatedly  posed  as  to
>   whether any benefit would be derived from drawing them into  the
>   system. Invariable, the answer was that  would  not.  Sir  Frank
>   Soskice, as Home Secretary, gave the matter close  consideration
>   and told the House, on 11 February, 1965, while  announcing  the
>   provisions of the forthcoming Firearms  Act,  1965,  that,  "The
>   Government  have  considered  carefully   the   possibility   of
>   extending to shotguns the  firearm  certificate  procedure,  but
>   have decided against it. There  are  probably  at  least  50,000
>   shotguns in legitimate use throughout the country and the burden
>   which certification  would  put  on  the  police  would  not  be
>   justified by the benefits which would result."
>
>        Sir Frank was replaced at the Home Office toward the end of
>   the year, and on the 3rd of March, 1966, Roy  Jenkins,  the  new
>   Home Secretary, announced that he was reconsidering the  matter.
>   He was,  he  said,  "actively  considering  new  legislation  in
>   relation to shotguns." By the 23rd of June, the review had  been
>   completed, and Mr. Jenkins reported that, "The type  of  shotgun
>   which is freely available and which can be used without  special
>   exemption was considerably restricted under the Firearms Act.  I
>   must pay some regard to the burden of inspection which would  be
>   put on the police. The police do not consider that it  would  be
>   right to make an extension at this time."
>
>        In other words, the matter had been looked into repeatedly,
>   and the conclusion was that  it  was  simply  not  worth  doing.
>   However, only seven weeks later, an incident occurred  that  was
>   to lead Mr. Jenkins to reverse his position entirely.
>
>        At 3:15 P.M. the 12th of August, a Metropolitan Police  "Q"
>   car turned into Baybrook Street, Hammersmith. Foxtrot 11  pulled
>   to the side, and two officers, DS Head and DC Wombell, left  the
>   vehicle to approach a  parked  Vanguard  estate  car  containing
>   three men. As they drew near, Harry Roberts shot  both  of  them
>   dead with a .38 Enfield revolver. John Duddy leapt out  and  ran
>   to the Q car, where he killed the driver,  PC  Fox,  with  three
>   shots from a .380 Colt pistol. Britain's  greatest  manhunt  was
>   on.
>
>        John Duddy and an accomplice, John Witney, the owner of the
>   Estate car,  who  had  been  present  at  the  time,  were  soon
>   arrested. But it was three  months  before  Roberts,  a  Malayan
>   veteran, was finally tracked down  and  captured  near  Bishop's
>   Stortford, Hertfordshire. He had gone to ground in Epping Forest
>   and worked his way north on foot.
>
>        Meanwhile, the case  dominated  the  news  absolutely;  the
>   gratuitous brutality of the crime aroused  widespread  revulsion
>   and on the 6th of September, a memorial service  for  the  slain
>   officers drew a thousand-strong  crowd  to  Westminister  Abbey,
>   carrying  banners  calling  for  the  restoration   of   capital
>   punishment in such cases.
>
>        Hanging had only been finally abolished in November of 1965
>   and Mr. Jenkins, whose feelings on the matter were  well  known,
>   was under  heavy  pressure  from  press  and  public  alike,  to
>   reintroduce it. On the 12th of September, less than a week after
>   the demonstration at Westminster Abbey,  he  announced  that  he
>   was, "...endeavouring to draw up plans to end  the  unrestricted
>   purchase of shotguns. They can be purchased far too  easily,  by
>   mail order or other  means,  and  there  is  evidence  that  the
>   criminal use of  shotguns  is  increasing  rapidly,  still  more
>   rapidly than that of other weapons." [Daily Telegraph 13.9.66]
>
>        The "evidence" Mr. Jenkins referred to was the  records  of
>   "indictable offenses involving firearms," a  disparate  category
>   consisting mostly of damaged  property,  poaching,  threats  and
>   assaults and so forth, rather than the  sort  of  "armed  crime"
>   that most people would think of. However, this body of data,  as
>   well as more relevant statistics,  had  been  available  to  Mr.
>   Jenkins, as indeed it had been to  Sir  Frank  Soskice,  and  no
>   doubt  had  been  carefully  studied  before  each  reached  his
>   conclusion that proposals to further restrict shotguns were  not
>   justified by the evidence.
>
>        If one discounts the possibility that Mr.  Jenkins  thought
>   that restricting shotgun ownership was  a  relevant  legislative
>   response to and incident in which police officers were shot with
>   pistols,  then  an  explanation  of  why  the   Home   Secretary
>   completely reversed his policy is still needed.
>
>        The  evidence  suggests   that   Mr.   Jenkins   introduced
>   legislation against shotguns in hope of deflecting the  pressure
>   for a reintroduction  of  capital  punishment.  If  so,  he  was
>   successful, albeit at the cost of approximately half  a  million
>   man hours of police time, per year, over the past twenty years.
>
>        Rather than introducing a Firearms  (Amendment)  Bill  that
>   might have attracted focused opposition, Mr.  Jenkins  used  the
>   forthcoming Criminal Justice Bill, 1967, as the vehicle for  his
>   proposed  measures.  This  was  an  immensely  significant   and
>   controversial bill which, among other things, did away with  the
>   requirement  for  a  full  hearing  of  evidence  at   committal
>   proceedings,  instituted  a   parole   system,   abolished   the
>   requirement for a unanimous verdict in criminal  trials,  placed
>   restrictions on newspaper reporting of  committal  hearings  and
>   introduced suspended prison sentences. Part V of the bill, which
>   introduced licenses for shotguns,  was  well  camouflaged  in  a
>   thicket of portentious and far reaching reforms to the  criminal
>   justice system. Opposition to Part V, therefore, was  fragmented
>   and diffuse.
>
>        The next year, the Firearms  Act,  1968,  consolidated  the
>   1937 Act and Part V of the Criminal Justice Act, along with  two
>   intervening measures, the Air Guns and Shot Guns, etc.,  Act  of
>   1962 and the Firearms Act, 1965. The former had originated as  a
>   private  member's  bill,  introduced  Mr.  Brian  Harrison,  and
>   regulated the circumstances under which young people between the
>   ages of 14 and 21 might lawfully purchase, use or have in  their
>   possession airguns, shotguns and firearms, as well as ammunition
>   and pellets for them. The latter act was more interesting.
>
>        The Firearms Act, 1965, was designed to strengthen the hand
>   of the police against criminals, or suspected criminals, and  as
>   such was supported by most of the shooting organizations, though
>   some  of  its  provisions,  notably  a  clause  enabling   chief
>   constables to attach conditions to the registration of  firearms
>   dealers, have led to problems not then anticipated.
>
>        Other  clauses  created  the  offense  of  armed  trespass,
>   regulated the carrying of firearms and ammunition  in  a  public
>   place, gave the police wider powers of search and arrest without
>   warrant, penalized the carrying of  a  firearm  with  intent  to
>   commit an indictable offense, increased the  minimum  length  of
>   shotgun barrel  from  20  inches  to  24  inches  and  generally
>   increased penalties overall.
>
>        The most notable feature of the 1965 Act, however, was  the
>   haste with which it was carried  through  Parliament.  The  Home
>   Secretary did not intimate that he had it in mind  to  legislate
>   until the 21st of January. Proposals were announced on the  11th
>   February; the bill was introduced on the 28th  of  February  and
>   given a second reading only two days later, on the 2nd of March.
>   Third Reading was on the 12th of May and Royal Assent was  given
>   the 5th of August.
>
>        Significantly, the Murder (Abolition of the Death  Penalty)
>   Bill was already at the committee stage before the Firearms Bill
>   was introduced, yet did not become law until three months later.
>   The haste with which the Firearms Bill had been patched together
>   was reflected in the great  number  of  amendments  required  to
>   eliminate anomalies and unintended effects.
>
>        The Government were clearly anxious that the  abolition  of
>   hanging might herald a new willingness on the part of  criminals
>   to use violence of all forms and firearms in  particular.  Their
>   anxiety was not  misplaced.  And  midway  through  the  Firearms
>   Bill's passage, Roy Jenkins took office as Home Secretary. It is
>   possible that  this  precedent  conditioned  his  actions  eight
>   months later after the Shepherd's Bush murders, as the  incident
>   in Baybrook Street became known.
>
>        The Shepherd's Bush affair may also have contributed  to  a
>   hardening  of  attitude  on  the  part  of   chief   constables.
>   Certainly, in retrospect, 1967 seems to mark the beginning of an
>   overt hostility toward the shooting sports on the part of  chief
>   officers that  had  not  been  manifest  before.  Police  Review
>   magazine described it this way: "There is an easily identifiable
>   police attitude towards the possession of guns by members of the
>   public. Every possible difficulty should be put in their way. No
>   documentation can be too rigid,  no  security  requirements  too
>   arbitrary,  which  prevents  guns  coming  into  the  hands   of
>   criminals." [Police Review 8.10.82]
>
>        People who wished to comply with the law  found  themselves
>   subject to bureaucratic harassment as chief  constables  pursued
>   an often acknowledged policy of "reducing the number of firearms
>   in the hands of the public to the absolute  minimum."  Over  the
>   next fifteen years, more than a  quarter  of  rifle  and  pistol
>   certificate holders had been eliminated.  In  1968,  there  were
>   216,281 firearm certificate holders in  England  and  Wales;  by
>   1983, that figure was down to 159,804, a reduction of 56,477, or
>   26%. The policies that achieved this substantial result involved
>   a great deal of ultra vires activity  and  generated  resentment
>   and animosity among those affected.
>
>        In 1973, the Government decided  to  legislate  again,  and
>   issued a Green Paper, The Control of Firearms in  Great  Britain
>   (Cmd. 5297), which was to  achieve  some  notoriety.  The  Green
>   Paper was based on the report of a working party chaired by  Sir
>   John McKay,  then  H.M.  Chief  Inspector  of  Constabulary  for
>   England and Wales. The rest of the  committee,  which  consisted
>   exclusively of members of the police, the Home  Office  and  the
>   Scottish Office, have not been identified; the report has  never
>   been released. One can only judge it through the Green Paper.
>
>        The McKay Committee gathered some  interesting  statistics,
>   but the Green  Paper  used  them  in  a  manner  so  casual  and
>   self-serving that the argument, rather than being  bolstered  by
>   the evidence, was discredited. Professor  Richard  Harding,  who
>   studied the Green  Paper  with  great  care,  described  it  as,
>   "...statistically defective...scientifically quite useless;  the
>   data are presented in a way which precludes objective evaluation
>   by any one else." [1979 Crim LR 772]
>
>        Nor was the Green Paper well served by its tone, which  was
>   sanctimonious and authoritarian. Its  premise  was  simply  that
>   armed crime was increasing,  therefore  more  restrictions  were
>   needed. Bodkin was cited as an authority for his proposition: "A
>   Departmental Committee set up in 1934 found that  the  1920  Act
>   had reduced the likelihood...of criminals  obtaining  possession
>   of the more dangerous firearms  (rifles  and  pistols)."  [Green
>   Paper, page 3]
>
>        In fact, the Bodkin Committee had "found"  no  such  thing,
>   but had simply asserted it, having avoided, perhaps consciously,
>   gathering any evidence that might  have  permitted  testing  the
>   hypothesis.
>
>        The Green Paper met a hostile reception in  Parliament  and
>   in the press, and was soon withdrawn by the Government. Some  of
>   its proposals, however, were adopted as "force policy" by  chief
>   constables, and were applied as if they were law.
>
>        Shortly after the  Green  Paper  was  withdrawn,  the  Home
>   Office began increasing  the  fees  for  grant  and  renewal  of
>   firearm and shotgun certificates in a manner that many  regarded
>   as punitive, though this was denied by ministers. There had been
>   inflation adjusting increases in 1969 and  1971;  the  increases
>   begun  in  1973  were   therefore   on   top   of   an   already
>   inflation-adjusted figure. Over the ensuing give years, the fees
>   for grant and renewal of a firearms certificate were  raised  by
>   714% and 800% respectively; the increases for grant and  renewal
>   of a shotgun certificate were 1,200% and 800%. The  Home  Office
>   conducted several "costing exercises," each of which in turn was
>   thoroughly discredited.
>
>        The twenty  years  following  have  been  characterized  by
>   legislative stability, offset by an increased willingness to use
>   extra-legal means for imposing  a  preferred  policy  line.  The
>   latter part of this period is also distinguished by  more  overt
>   hostility toward private firearms ownership on the part of chief
>   officers, and by a far more  active  participation  in  pressure
>   politics by the police.
>
>        The Association of  Chief  Police  Officers  determined  in
>   December, 1982, to push resolutely to have shotguns placed under
>   the same controls as rifles and pistols. With the assistance  of
>   the Superintendents Conference and the Police  Federation,  they
>   have since  undertaken  three  "campaigns"  characterized  by  a
>   carrot and stick approach. An hysterical press campaign would be
>   followed by an invitation to the Home Secretary to legislate  in
>   the manner desired.  The  most  recent  campaign  has  used  the
>   Hungerford incident as a  platform  and  has  proved  imminently
>   successful. As the Home  Secretary  has  several  times  stated,
>   Hungerford had provided the opportunity to "move  forward,"  and
>   the police were among  the  foremost  "urgers  forward"  in  the
>   matter.
>
>        The Firearms (Amendment)  Bill  indeed  represents  a  move
>   forward in the sense that legislation in this  field,  in  Great
>   Britain,  represents  a  linear  progression  from  liberty   to
>   prohibition. As we have demonstrated, the  position  up  to  the
>   outbreak of the First World War was that the right to keep  arms
>   was one of the elementary liberties of  freeborn  Englishmen,  a
>   fundamental part  of  the  Constitution.  This  right  has  been
>   progressively circumscribed, limited,  eroded,  discounted,  and
>   finally repudiated. The effect  of  the  present  bill  will  be
>   finally to eradicate it. It subsists, at present, in relation to
>   shotguns, provided that one is of good character. The effect  of
>   the present bill is that no matter how good one's character, one
>   will not be permitted  to  possess  a  shotgun  unless  one  can
>   demonstrate an administratively approved "good  reason"  for  so
>   doing.
>
>        But if Mr. Hurd meant to imply that "moving forward"  meant
>   enhancing the social good by addressing effective legislation to
>   a defined problem, he needs to make his case. Perhaps his is the
>   right policy to pursue, but that has  yet  to  be  demonstrated.
>   Indeed, one of the remarkable things about firearms  legislation
>   in this country is that, not only have its benefits  never  been
>   demonstrated, but that the government of  the  day,  throughout,
>   has been careful to avoid looking objectively at  the  question.
>   There has been a series  of  committees,  operating  in  various
>   degrees of secrecy, assuring us and themselves that  the  policy
>   being pursued was the correct one, while somehow  neglecting  to
>   demonstrate it.
>
>        Blackwell, in 1918, baldly  asserted  that  "hardly  anyone
>   could be found to question" the proposition that "the control of
>   firearms should be made far more  stringent  than  it  is  now."
>   Bodkin, in 1934, said that the Firearms  Act,  1920,  "forms  an
>   efficient  system  of  controlling  the  sale  of  firearms  and
>   ammunition," but did not  question  the  assertion  and  avoided
>   gathering evidence that would have allowed it to be tested.  The
>   Green Paper of 1973 merely  accepted  Bodkin's  assumption  that
>   controls work, and said that circumstances called  for  more  of
>   them.
>
>        With the 1987 White Paper, the Government  appear  to  have
>   moved beyond  the  feeling  that  an  increase  in  restrictions
>   requires justification. Controls seem to be regarded as  an  end
>   in themselves. As one senior  civil  servant  recently  put  it,
>   "Controls are good."
>
>        The  Firearms  (Amendment)  Bill  now   before   Parliament
>   consists of an enumeration of measures which the officials  find
>   congenial. Both they and the ministers are quite open in  saying
>   that no research was undertaken and that they could  provide  no
>   evidence of probable benefit from and of the  proposals  in  the
>   Bill.
>
>        In fact, all but four of the proposals  in  the  1987  Bill
>   were lifted from the 1973 Green  Paper.  Greenwood  was  perhaps
>   uncharitable but not inaccurate when  he  described  Mr.  Hurd's
>   proposals as "emptying Whitehall's rubbish bin into Parliament."
>   Parliament rejected the Green Paper  in  1973  for  its  "police
>   state" approach and its alleged irrelevance to the  problems  it
>   purported to address.
>
>        If it is to be accepted into law fifteen years later,  then
>   prudence would dictate that each of its provisions  be  analyzed
>   objectively. If this is not done, the likelihood of Parliament's
>   enacting sound and equitable law is remote. We shall indeed have
>   moved  a   long   way   from   Blackstone's   prescription   of,
>   "...restraints in themselves so gentle  and  moderate...that  no
>   man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened."
>
>        There have been two further  enactments  since  1968  which
>   must be mentioned for the sake  of  completeness.  The  Criminal
>   Justice Act, 1972, increased the penalties for  criminal  misuse
>   stipulated in the 1968 Act. The penalty for possessing a firearm
>   with intent to endanger life or using a firearm to resist arrest
>   was increased from fourteen years to  life  imprisonment,  while
>   that for carrying a firearm with intent to commit an  indictable
>   offense, or while committing  certain  specified  offenses,  was
>   increased from ten and seven  years  respectively,  to  fourteen
>   years.
>
>        The Firearms Act, 1982,  was  a  Home  Office  measure  put
>   forward as a private member's bill with bipartisan  support.  It
>   was  sponsored  Mr.  Eldon  Griffiths  (later  Sir  Eldon),  the
>   Parliamentary representative of the Police Federation, with  the
>   objective of enacting the proposal in paragraph 121 of the  1973
>   Green Paper, banning realistic  replica  or  toy  firearms.  The
>   problems of definition,  however,  proved  insuperable  and  the
>   bill, when published, related instead to replica firearms  which
>   were capable  of  conversion  to  fire  a  shot.  Mr.  Griffiths
>   contended that his bill would help to stem, "the rising tide  of
>   crime  and  terrorism."  He  was  no  doubt  referring  to   the
>   unpublished draft, for no one could recall a  crime,  much  less
>   and act of terrorism, committed with a converted replica.
>
>        The law would be better served, and would  command  greater
>   respect, if it could be shown to address a problem. One  of  the
>   most conspicuous features of firearms legislation in Britain has
>   been a persistent refusal to undertake any objective analysis of
>   its utility or consequences in terms of social benefit or effect
>   on specified mischiefs, either prospectively or retrospectively.
>
>        The danger is twofold. In the first place, if a law  cannot
>   be demonstrably justified, those who have thus  far  voluntarily
>   complied with it may cease to do  so,  and  will  moreover  find
>   their respect for the law  in  general  diminished.  This  is  a
>   result that wise government should avoid. In the  second  place,
>   if a law is irrelevant, resources committed to enforcing it  are
>   at    best    wasted    and    at    worst    counterproductive.
>   ================================================================
>
>   ****************************************************************
>                          A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
>   ****************************************************************
>
>        Several  dozen  statutes  govern   the   possession,   use,
>   transport and trade in firearms in  the  United  Kingdom,  often
>   quite tangentially. The Cemetary Clauses Act, 1847, for example,
>   made it an offence to discharge firearms in  certain  cemetaries
>   and  burial  grounds,  except  in  connection  with  a  military
>   funeral. The Town Police Clauses Act of the same year  penalizes
>   the wanton discharge of firearms in the street to the  annoyance
>   of residents or passers by, while the Wildlife  and  Countryside
>   Act of 1982 distinguishes, for no readily apparent reason, among
>   shotgun action types that  may  be  used  for  game  and  vermin
>   species. Then there are the various Game Acts, Deer Acts,  Night
>   Poaching Acts and so forth on the one hand, and the Police Acts,
>   the International Headquarters and  Defence  Organizations  Act,
>   the Gun Barrel Proof Act and Diplomatic Privileges  Act  on  the
>   other. One could go on in this vein for many more pages,  and  a
>   digest of firearms law, if complete,  would  be  compendious;  a
>   case of firearms misuse often attracts charges from a number  of
>   statutes.
>
>        The purpose here is merely to give a concise chronology  of
>   the  most  important  statutes  relating  to  private   firearms
>   ownership. No mention will be made of failed  bills,  peripheral
>   acts, war emergency regulations or acts  relating  to  Scotland,
>   Ireland or Northern Ireland. The Channel Isles and the  Isle  of
>   Man of course have separate legislation. The  1973  Green  Paper
>   appears because of its topical significance.
>
>        Those who wish to look more  deeply  into  the  matter  may
>   consult: *Gun Law* by  Godfrey  Sandys-Winsch  (London:  Shaw  &
>   Sons, 1979, 3rd ed.),  *Firearms  Control*  by  Colin  Greenwood
>   (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), and *The Law Relating to
>   Firearms*  by  P.J.  Clarke   and   John   W.   Ellis   (London:
>   Butterworths, 1981).
>
>        GUN LICENSES ACT, 1870 - required anyone wishing  to  carry
>   or use a gun elsewhere than in, or within the  curtilege  of,  a
>   dwelling house, to purchase a licence, for ten  shillings,  from
>   the Post Office. Strictly a revenue measure. Repealed in 1967.
>
>        PISTOLS ACT, 1903 - Prohibited the retail sale  of  pistols
>   to those under 18 years. Required other  purchasers  to  produce
>   either a Gun Licence or Game License (see above), or  reasonable
>   proof that the purchaser was a householder intending to use  the
>   pistol  within  the  curtilege  of  his  house,  or  a   letter,
>   countersigned by a justice of the peace or a police  officer  of
>   the rank of inspector or above, that  the  purchaser  was  going
>   overseas for a period of not less than  six  months.  Defined  a
>   pistol as a firearm with a  barrel  less  than  nine  inches  in
>   length. Required dealers to  keep  records.  Did  not  apply  to
>   private sales. Repealed in 1920.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT, 1920 - Established the framework of  controls
>   still  in  use.  Enacted  the  recommendations  of  the   secret
>   Blackwell Committee report. Fear  of  revolutionary  activity  a
>   principal motivation. Made  possession  of  a  rifle  or  pistol
>   dependent on a certificate issued by chief constables, who  were
>   given  wide  powers  of  discretion.  Dealers  were  subject  to
>   registration. There were  exclusions  for  various  professional
>   categories. Shotguns, air weapons and antiques excluded.  Appeal
>   to Petty Sessions against chief constable's  decision.  Repealed
>   1937, except for ss. 16 and 19(1). Incorporated in FIREARMS ACT,
>   1937.
>
>        FIREARMS and IMITATION FIREARMS (CRIMINAL USE) ACT, 1933  -
>   Created  offence  (maximum  sentence  14  years)  of  using   or
>   attempting to use a firearm  or  imitation  firearm  to  prevent
>   lawful  arrest  or  detention.  Created  offence  of  being   in
>   possession of  a  firearm  or  imitation  firearm  either  while
>   committing  or  when  apprehended   for   committing   specified
>   offences. Maximum sentence seven years, to be served in addition
>   to any sentence for the primary offence. Burden of proof on  the
>   defence. Repealed and incorporated into the Firearms Act, 1937.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT, 1934 - Raised the minimum age for  purchasing
>   or hiring a firearm from 14 to 17 years and created  appropriate
>   offences. Repealed by and incorporated into  the  Firearms  Act,
>   1937.
>
>        FIREARMS   (AMENDMENT)   ACT,   1936    -    Enacted    the
>   recommendations of the Bodkin Committee report  (Cmd  4758:HMSO,
>   Dec., 1934,  reprinted  1968).  Shotguns  and  other  smoothbore
>   firearms with barrels  less  than  20  inches  made  subject  to
>   firearms certificate, as were shotgun  cartridges  with  pellets
>   greater than .36" diameter. Machine guns  removed  from  firearm
>   certificate control and made subject to Admiralty, Army  Council
>   or Air Council authority. Sound moderators  subject  to  firearm
>   certificate control. Extensive regulations  concerning  firearms
>   dealers. Chief constables empowered to add conditions to firearm
>   certificates. Appeals transferred from Petty Sessions to Quarter
>   Sessions. Repealed by and incorporated into Firearms Act, 1937.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT, 1937 - Consolidated the four preceding  Acts.
>   Repealed by and incorporated into the Firearms Act, 1968.
>
>        AIR GUNS and SHOTGUNS, etc., ACT, 1962 - A private member's
>   bill,  introduced  by  Mr.   Brian   Harrison.   Regulated   the
>   circumstances under which young people aged 14-21 may  purchase,
>   use  or  have  in  possession  firearms,  shotguns,  airguns  or
>   ammunition  or  pellets   therefor.   Repealed   in   1968   and
>   incorporated into the Firearms Act, 1968, as ss.22-24.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT, 1965 - Intended  as  legislative  prophylaxis
>   against an anticipated upsurge in  criminal  violence  following
>   the forthcoming abolition of capital  punishment.  Substantially
>   increased the penalties for Firearms Act offences.  Created  new
>   offences  of  armed  trespass,  possession   of   firearms   and
>   ammunition  in  a  public  place,  and  carrying  a  firearm  or
>   imitation firearm with intent  to  commit  a  criminal  offence.
>   Extended the prohibition  of  firearms  ownership  by  convicted
>   persons. Created extensive new regulations for firearms  dealers
>   and authorised chief constables to attach conditions to  dealers
>   registrations. Minimum length for shotgun barrels increased from
>   20" to 24". Absolute prohibition on shortening the barrels of  a
>   shotgun to a length less than 24" except by a registered dealer,
>   and then only  for  purposes  of  resleeving.  Repealed  by  and
>   incorporated into the Firearms Act, 1968.
>
>        CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 1967, PART V - Placed  shotguns  with
>   barrels of 24" or more under certificate control. Introduced  in
>   response to an incident in which police officers were killed  by
>   criminals armed with illegal pistols. A shotgun certificate  was
>   based on the personal suitability of the applicant and  was  not
>   restricted to designated guns. Repealed by and incorporated into
>   the Firearms Act, 1968.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT, 1968 Gave the Home Secretary power  to  alter
>   fees charged by order.  Consolidated  the  1937  and  subsequent
>   Acts.
>
>        CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 1972 - Increased  the  penalties  for
>   criminal misuse stipulated in the Firearms Act, 1968.
>
>        1973 GREEN PAPER CMND  5297  -  entitled  *The  Control  of
>   Firearms in Great Britain: A Consultive Document. Based  on  the
>   secret report of Sir John McKay's working party of  1971-72,  it
>   proposed  draconian  restrictive  measures  unsupported  by  any
>   verifiable  evidence.  Rejected  by  Parliament.  All  but  four
>   clauses of the current Firearms (Amendment) Bill are drawn  from
>   the Green Paper.
>
>        FIREARMS ACT,  1982  -  Subjected  to  firearm  certificate
>   control  replica   or   imitation   firearms   deeped   "readily
>   convertible" to discharge a projectile.  Creates  a  defence  of
>   innocent ownership. A code of  practice  agreed  upon  with  the
>   trade governs new production.
>   ****************************************************************
>                            END OF ARTICLE
>