From: kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie)
Subject: Computers and Academic Freedom News 02.64 (Digest)
Originator: kadie@eff.org
Organization: The Electronic Frontier Foundation
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 14:30:09 GMT

Computers and Academic Freedom News
Vol. 02, No. 64


----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Subject: Article 0 -- Abstract of CAF-News 02.64

Topics:

   1      about a Secret Service Raid
   2-4    on legal aspects of bulletin boards
   5-6    on property rights
   7-8    on chain letters
   9      on pornography
   10-11  on network policy
   12     on censorship


Abstract:

[For the two weeks ending January 3, 1993

========================== KEY ================================
The words after the numbers are a short PARAPHRASES of the
articles, or QUOTES from them, NOT AN OBJECTIVE SUMMARY and
not necessarily my opinion.
===============================================================

Note 1 is about a Secret Service Raid.

1. The Secret Service seized computers from a dorm room at Texas Tech
University, alleging the equipment was used to steal software over the
Internet.  The three men involved were not arrested, but they are
expected to be charged with computer crime, interstate transport of
stolen property, and copyright infringement.  Texas Tech computer
operators contacted the Secret Service after noting credit information
in the software that was filling their data storage devices.  Although
the USSS normally doesn't pursue software piracy, they do pursue using
"using electronic access devices such as passwords in the commission
of a crime".  The current investigation falls under a revision of
copyright laws which allow felony charges to be brought against anyone
who pirates more than 10 copies of copyrighted software.
    <fwd.BzMzto.HC5@cs.uiuc.edu>

Notes 2-4 are on legal aspects of bulletin boards.

2. The legal aspects, rights, and responsibilities of computer users
and system operators are addressed in SYSLAW, a book which attempts
"to explore the gap between statutes and case law on the one side, and
technological reality on the other."  The courts have yet to rule on
many of these topics, so the authors approach answers with fundamental
principles of constitutional and communications law, avoiding
inventing the law where it doesn't exist.
    <fwd.BzMzwC.HG5@cs.uiuc.edu>

3. SYSLAW contains a comprehensive summary of legal liabilities and
obligations of bulleting board operators, as well as a compendium of
laws and practices relevant to all users.  Topics covered in the book
include contracts, intellectual property, speech and the First
Amendment, privacy, sysop liabilities, and sysop/user relations.
Included are several federal statues on pornography, computer crime
laws, and federal fraud and abuse acts.
    <fwd.BzMzwK.HHB@cs.uiuc.edu>

4. A sample BBS contract is provided, which includes: describing
access and services available, price and payment accepted, system
rules, privacy, editorial control, ownership of materials, limitation
of liability and indemnity, choice of law (for out of state and
foreign users), and general information.  In addition to stating do's
and don'ts, the contract tries to explain or give justification for
certain policies.
    <fwd.BzMzwn.HI8@cs.uiuc.edu>

Notes 5-6 are on property rights.

5. Property rights apply to things government-owned or considered
public property.  Thus, much like a private citizen or company, the
administering agency of "public property" has the appropriate property
rights over their system.  This is in relation to the CERT advisory on
keystroke monitoring and whether it applies to private computer
systems, public ones, or all systems.
    <1992Dec22.150816.13247@qiclab.scn.rain.com>

6. However, the government derives its rights from the people, who
should have a say in what the policy concerning public property should
be.  "If it's publicly funded the general public has a right to have a
say on the policy."
    <1992Dec22.235726.23374@nntp.hut.fi>

Notes 7-8 are on chain letters.

7. Deciding what is and what is not a chain letter is difficult to
describe, but easy for a person to determine empirically.  Two workable
definitions of a chain letter are: something equivalent to what the
Post Office considers a chain letter; letter distribution solely for
the sake of distributing the letter.
    <1992Dec21.173054.18939@eff.org>

8. It's pointless to use an absolute definition for chain letters
since the definition will ultimately describe a particular chain
letter, and not be broad enough to describe all chain letters.
    <1992Dec23.030644.26358@pegasus.com>

Note 9 is on pornography.

9. Photography of child pornography itself should not be a crime,
since it is merely the evidence of the crime.  Also, punishing the
purchasers of such material doesn't punish the criminals themselves.
Finally, FoxVog Douglas contends that there is little or not child
pornography; rather, most distribution attempts are made by government
agents for the purpose of entrapment.
    <1992Dec23.123731.9243@ousrvr.oulu.fi>

Notes 10-11 are on network policy.

10. The NSF considered Dialog (a commercial user of ANS) as an
acceptable research and education user, although Dialog would not
guarantee that all their traffic would adhere to NSFNet Acceptable Use
policies.  Also, Dialog's customers were never given the chance to
pledge their user of Dialog would be research and education oriented.
    <9212121748.AA06273@tmn.com>

11. The NSF allows use of its NSFNet backbone to any information
provider that states it expects the only use made of its resources
will be in support of research and education.  However, the NSF asks
the information provider to cooperate in tracking down violations when
reported. 
    <9212302019.AA06836@ncri>

Note 12 is on censorship.

12. A user at the University of Miami threatens to forward posts he
considers offensive, racist, or intolerable to the poster's system
administrator, for further action.
    <1993Jan3.135950.14274@umiami.ir.miami.edu>

- Karl]


Contents:

Joe Abernathy    86  File 2--Secret Service Raids Dorm
Mike Riddle      78  File 4--SYSLAW (Review #1)
Jim Thomas      126  File 5--SYSLAW (Review #2)
Lance Rose      288  File 6--Model BBS/User Contract (from SYSLAW)
Leonard Erickson 41  >CERT and the Dept. of Justice on keystroke monitoring
Jyrki Kuoppala   48  >
J S Greenfield   56  >Chain letters?
Tom Leylan       39  >
Foxvog Douglas  201  >[UPI] "FBI probes computer child porn at Cornell"
Gordon Cook      38  What *IS* Current AUP Policy for Information Providers?
Stephen Wolff    19  -
                 35  DEADLINE TO STOP OBSCENE POSTINGS!


Computers and Academic Freedom News:

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------------            

------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 21 20:35:53 1992
From: Joe.Abernathy@HOUSTON.CHRON.COM(Joe Abernathy)
Subject: Article 1--File 2--Secret Service Raids Dorm
Message-Id: <fwd.BzMzto.HC5@cs.uiuc.edu>

Federal Agents Raid Dorm, Seize Computer Equipment
By JOE ABERNATHY Copyright 1992, Houston Chronicle

The Secret Service has raided a dorm room at Texas Tech University,
seizing the computers of two Houston-area students who allegedly used
an international computer network to steal computer software.

Agents refused to release the names of the two area men and a third
from Austin, who were not arrested in the late-morning raid Monday at
the university in Lubbock. Their cases will be presented to a grand
jury in January.

They are expected to be charged with computer crime, interstate
transport of stolen property and copyright infringement.

"The university detected it," said Resident Agent R. David Freriks of
the Secret Service office in Dallas, which handled the case. He said
that Texas Tech computer system operators contacted the Secret Service
when personal credit information was found mixed with the software
mysteriously filling up their fixed-disk data storage devices.

The raid is the first to fall under a much broader felony definition
of computer software piracy that could affect many Americans. This
October revision to the copyright law was hotly debated by computer
experts, who contended that it sets the felony threshold far too low.

Agents allege that the three used a chat system hosted on the Internet
computer network, which connects up to 15 million people in more than
40 nations, to make contacts with whom they could trade pirated
software. The software was transferred over the network, into Texas
Tech's computers, and eventually into their personal computers. The
Secret Service seized those three personal computers and associated
peripherals which an agent valued at roughly $5,000.

The software Publishers Association, a software industry group
chartered to fight piracy, contends that the industry lost $1.2
billion in sales in 1991 to pirates.

Although these figures are widely questioned for their accuracy,
piracy is widespread among Houston's 450-plus computer bulletin
boards, and even more so on the global Internet.

"There are a lot of underground sites on the Internet run by
university system administrators, and they have tons of pirated
software available to download -- gigabytes of software," said Scott
Chasin, a former computer hacker who is now a computer security
consultant. "There's no way that one agency or authority can go
through and try to sweep all the bad software off the Internet,
because the Internet's too big."

The mission of the Secret Service does not normally include the
pursuit of software piracy, but rather the use of "electronic access
devices" such as passwords in the commission of a crime. This gives
the service purview over many computer and telecommunications crimes,
which often go hand-in-hand, with occasional bleedover into other
areas.

Freriks said that the investigation falls under a revision of the
copyright laws that allows felony charges to be brought against anyone
who trades more than 10 pieces of copyrighted software -- a threshold
that would cover many millions of Americans who may trade copies of
computer programs with their friends.

"The ink is barely dry on the amendment, and you've already got law
enforcement in there, guns blazing, because somebody's got a dozen
copies of stolen software," said Marc Rotenberg, director of Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, in Washington, D.C. "That was
a bad provision when it was passed, and was considered bad for
precisely this reason, giving a justification for over-reaching by law
enforcement."

Freriks noted that the raid also involved one of the first uses of an
expanded right to use forfeiture against computer crime, although he
was unable to state from where this authority evolved after a civil
rights lawyer questioned his assertion that it was contained in the
copyright law revision.

"One of our complaints has always been that you catch 'em, slap 'em on
the wrist, and then hand back the smoking gun," he said. "Now all that
equipment belongs to the government."
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 21 20:35:54 1992
From: Mike.Riddle@IVGATE.OMAHUG.ORG(Mike Riddle)
Subject: Article 2--File 4--SYSLAW (Review #1)
Message-Id: <fwd.BzMzwC.HG5@cs.uiuc.edu>

SYSLAW (Second Edition). By Lance Rose and Jonathan Wallace.  Winona
(Minn.): PC Information Group, Inc.  306 pp. $34.95 (paper).

The old truism that law follows technology comes as no surprise to
readers of the Computer Underground Digest.  Many, if not most, of the
(horror) stories we hear about "evil hackers", or the (sometimes)
excesses of various law enforcement agencies, can be understood much
better when we realize the lack of computer knowledge within society
at large.  System operators, be they sysadmins at a large university
or commercial site, or sysops of a PC-based bulletin board in a
basement or closet, increasingly have questions about their legal
rights and responsibilities.  Can I delete that user?  Should (or can
I legally) censor or delete that message or file?  How can I protect
myself from civil or criminal liability?  Can my equipment be seized
because of something a user does?

SYSLAW is an attempt to explore the gap between statutes and case law
on the one side, and technological reality on the other.  Since the
law works slowly, many of the questions about the intersection of law
and technology do not have textbook answers.  But "the smallest
journey begins with a step."  Messrs. Rose and Wallace have made a
substantial step down that path.

While the courts have yet to rule on many of the questions posed by
sysops, sysadmins, and others, we still have fundamental principles of
constitutional and communications law to rely upon.  Rose and Wallace
begin by exploring Sysop rights within the traditional framework of
Constitutional law, particularly the First Amendment.

After discussing the Constitutional principles that apply to Sysops,
they then go on to explore the contractual nature of computer
communications.  Contracts are legally enforceable agreements, and we
find them everywhere in daily life.  Sometimes we even realize that a
contract is involved, and a small fraction of those contracts are
important enough to be written down.

Bulletin boards are the same way.  Explicit or implied contracts are
established when a user logs on to a bulletin board.  Rose and Wallace
suggest the wise sysop recognize this reality, and explicitly lay out
a contract for use.  They also include a sample as an appendix.

Another area of concern is the law of intellectual property.  Who owns
the posts?  Does a moderator (either usenet or Fido style) have any
ownership in the overall newsgroup or echo?  When can messages legally
be copied?  What about files and executable code?  While the context
may be new, many of the questions are old and have relatively
well-established answers.

What about "injurious materials" on a bulletin board?  Is the sysop
liable?  What did _Cubby v. Compuserve_ really decide?  What are the
rules on search and seizure, and what has actually happened in the few
cases we know about?  Does the sysop have an obligation to search for
and/or warn about viruses?  What about sexually explicit material?

Many of these areas do not have clear answers, and one of the
strengths of SYSLAW is that the authors do not attempt to invent law
where it doesn't exist.  But in the places where the law is unsettled,
they do a good job explaining the legal, social and sometimes moral
considerations that a court would consider if the question arose.
They sometimes tell you what they think the result might be, or what
they think it should be.  They caution at the start that until courts
consider several cases, and/or until we get appellate decisions, the
users and  operators incur some degree of risk in engaging in certain
activities.  The reader is left with a better understanding of the
issues involved, and reasonable actions sysops might take to insulate
themselves from liability of one sort or another.

SysLaw is available from PC Information Group, 800-321-8285 or
507-452-2824, and located at 1126 East Broadway, Winona, MN 55987.
You may order by credit card or by mail.  Price is $34.95 plus $3.00
shipping and (if applicable) sales tax.  Price is subject to change
after January 1, 1993.  For additional information, please
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 21 20:35:55 1992
From:  Jim Thomas <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
Subject: Article 3--File 5--SYSLAW (Review #2)
Message-Id: <fwd.BzMzwK.HHB@cs.uiuc.edu>

The U.S. Secret Service's "crackdown" on hackers in the past two years
has included seizures of computer hardware running BBSes.  This raises
significant questions for the legal obligations of both users and
sysops.  The "Phrack trial," Operation Sun Devil, and--more
recently--the alleged USSS involvement in disrupting law-abiding 2600
meetings underscore the importance of establishing unequivocal
Constitutional protections of BBSes.  SYSLAW, a comprehensive summary
of the legal liabilities and obligations of BBS sysops, is mistitled:
It's not simply a legal handbook for sysops, but a helpful compendium
of laws and practices relevant to BBS users as well.  Although both
Lance Rose and Jonathan Wallace (R&W) are attorneys, the volume is
written clearly and without overwhelming legal jargon, and even the
casual BBS user should derive sufficient information from the volume
to understand the problems sysops confront in running a board.

Rose and Wallace accomplish their stated goals (p. xxii) of
familiarizing readers with the kinds of legal questions arising in a
BBS context, providing sysops with a legal overview of laws bearing on
BBS operations, and identifying the legal ambiguities in which the law
appears to provide no clear guidelines for operation, yet may place a
sysop at legal risk.  Syslaw is divided into nine chapters and 10
hefty appendices.  The core issues in the book are 1) First Amendment
and speech, 2) privacy, 3) sysop liabilities to users, and 4)
sysop/user relations.

In the first chapter, the authors emphasize that the question of the
relationship of a BBS to the First Amendment remains unsettled, and
this relationship generates considerable discussion in BBS forums and
on Usenet (eg, comp.org.eff.talk). While noting that BBSs create new
challenges or Constitutional interpretation, R&W identify two reasons
why BBSs deserve "the full protection from legal interference granted
by the First Amendment under its express protections of "speech,"
"press," "peaceable assembly," and "petitioning the government" (p.
2).  First, BBSs are focal points for creating, collecting and
disseminating information, and as such, electronic speech is
"perfectly analogous to printed materials which are universally
acknowledge as protected under the First Amendment." Second, R&W argue
that BBSs are analogous to physical printing presses and promote the
growth of alternative publishers with diverse points of view.  Just as
technology has expanded rights from print media other media, such
broadcast radio and television, BBSs also reflect an emergent
technology that functions in much the same way as the older media:

          BBS's ((sic)) powerfully fulfill the goal of the First
     Amendment by enabling effective publishing and distribution of
     diverse points of view, many of which never before had a voice.
     Protecting BBS's should be one of the primary functions of the
     First Amendment today (p. 3).

R&W argue that there are three main ways that the First Amendment
protects BBSs:

     (1) it sharply limits the  kinds of speech that can be considered
     illegal on BBS', (2) it assures that the overall legal burdens on
     sysops will be kept light enough that they can keep their BBS'
     running to distribute their own speech and others', and (3) it
     limits the government's ability to search or seize BBS' where it
     would interfere with BBS' ability to distribute speech.

The authors identify three kinds of BBS operations that, for First
Amendment purposes, qualify for various types and amounts of
protection (p. 8-17): They are simultaneously publishers, distributors,
and shared message networks.

The authors emphasize that speech protections are an issue between the
government and the citizens, not the sysops and their users. Sysops,
they remind us, can--within the law--run their boards and censor as
they wish. The danger, R&W suggest, is that over-cautious sysops may
engage in unnecessary self-censorship in fear of government
intervention. Their goal is to provide the BBS community with
guidelines that help distinguish legal from illegal speech (and
files).

The remaining chapters address topics such as sysop liability when
injurious activities or materials occur on a BBS, the sysops
obligations when obviously illegal behavior is discovered, the
"problem" of sexual explicit materials, and searches and seizures.  Of
special interest is the chapter on contractual obligations between
sysop and users (chapter 2) in which they suggest that one way around
many of the potential legal liabilities a sysop might face with users
is to require a binding "caller contract" that explicitly delineates
the rights and obligations of each party. They provide a sample
contract (Appendix A) that, if implemented at the first-call in screen
progression format (any unwillingness to agree to the terms of the
contract prevents the caller from progressing into the system) that
they judge to be legally binding if the caller completes the contract
by agreeing to its terms.

The Appendixes also include a number of federal statutes that provide a
handy reference for readers. These include statues on child
pornography, state computer crime laws, and federal computer fraud and
abuse acts.

My one, in fact my only, objection to the book was to a rather
hyperbolic swipe at "pirate boards:"

          Only a tiny minority of BBS's operate as "pirate
     boards" for swapping stolen software, computer access codes,
     viruses etc. When these criminal boards are seized and shut
     down by the authorities everyone benefits (p. 6).

This rather excessive and simplistic view of "piracy" seems to
contradict both their intent to improve understanding of new
technology and corresponding behaviors by avoiding such extreme words
as "stolen software" and to clarify the nuances in various forms of
behavior in ways that distinguish between, for example, casual
swapping of copyright files and profiteering.
This, however, is a minor quibble (and will be taken up in future
issues of CuD focusing on piracy and the Software Publishers'
Association).

Syslaw should be required reading for all BBSers. Unfortunately, it is
available *only* from PC Information group, Inc. Those wishing to
obtain a copy can write the publisher at:
1125 East Broadway
Winona, MN  55987
Voice: (800-321-8285 / 507-452-2824
Fax: 507-452-0037

If ordering directly, add $3.00 (US) to the $34.95 price for shipping.
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 21 20:35:56 1992
From: Lance Rose <72230.2044@COMPUSERVE.COM>
Subject: Article 4--File 6--Model BBS/User Contract (from SYSLAW)
Message-Id: <fwd.BzMzwn.HI8@cs.uiuc.edu>


Appendix A

Sample Caller Contract (from SysLaw)

The following sample contract provides some guidelines for a sysop's
contract with his or her callers. Everyone's BBS and services are a
little different, so it is not recommended that readers use this
sample in "plain vanilla" form as their own contract. If possible, ask
a lawyer comfortable with online activities to review the form and
recommend any changes necessary for your particular BBS.

BULLETIN BOARD SERVICES AGREEMENT


A.  Introduction

We start every new caller relationship with a contract.  It spells out
what you can expect from us, and what we expect from you.  We do not
know each caller personally, so it is important to set out the ground
rules clearly in advance.

If you agree to what you read below, welcome to our system!  An
instruction screen at the end of the contract will show you how to
sign up.

If you have any questions about any part of the contract, please send
 us an e-mail about it!  We will be glad to explain why these contract
 provisions are important for our system. We are willing to work with
 you on making changes if you can show us you have a better approach.

Please remember - until you and we have an agreement in place, you
will not receive full access to our system.

B.  Access and Services.

(1)  Access - We will give you full access to all file and message
areas on our system. Currently, these include:

Public message areas - reading and posting messages.  We are also a
member of Fidonet, which means you can join in public discussions with
callers of other bulletin boards around the world.

File transfer areas - uploading, downloading files and browsing files

E-mail - sending and receiving messages (please see the section on
privacy, below)

Chat areas - real-time discussions with other callers who are online
at the same time as you

Gateways - permitting you to send e-mail to systems on other computer
networks. Currently, we have an Internet gateway in place, and we
operate as a Fidonet node.

(2)  Services - We offer a variety of services to our callers, and are
adding more all the time. Our current services include:

Daily electronic news from nationally syndicated news services. Free
classified advertising for our callers, in an area subdivided into
different product categories.

Virus hotline - an area with frequently updated news on computer virus
outbreaks, new forms of virus detected, new ways to protect your
computer, and other matters of interest.

QMail (TM) services, allowing you to upload and download all messages
you are interested in batch form.

If you would like to set up a private discussion area on our system
for a group, we will be glad to do so for fees and terms to be
discussed.

(3)  We may change or discontinue certain access or services on our
system for time to time. We will try to let you know about such
changes a month or more in advance.

C. Price and Payment

(1)  We will charge you a monthly fee for using our system.  For $15
per month, you can use our system each month for up to 40 hours of
connect time, and you can send up to 200 electronic mail messages. For
additional use, you will be required to pay additional charges of 50
cents an hour, and 10 cents per electronic mail message.

(2)  Certain services on our system require additional fees.  Please
review the complete price list in the Caller Information area before
signing up for any such services. The price list will tell you which
services are included in the standard monthly fee, and which are
extra.

(3)  You may pay by check or by credit card.  You will be given the
opportunity to choose the payment method when you sign up.

If you choose to pay by credit card, we will automatically bill the
amount due to your credit card account at the end of every month.

If you choose to pay by check, we will send you an invoice at the end
of every month. Payment is due within twenty days after we send your
invoice.

(4)  We can change the prices and fees at any time, except that our
existing customers will receive two months notice of any change.  All
price changes will be announced in opening screen bulletins.

D.     System Rules

Besides payment, the only thing we ask from you is that you follow the
rules we set for use of the system.  You will find our rules in two
places:  in the following list here in the contract, and in the
bulletins posted at various points in the system.

Here are some of the basic rules for our system:

Respect other callers of the system.  Feel free to express yourself,
but do not do anything to injure or harm others. In particular, if you
dislike someone else's ideas, you can attack the ideas, but not the
person.

We want people to speak freely on our system.  But if you misuse that
freedom to abuse others, we will take the liberty of cutting that
discussion short.

Do not use our system for anything that might be illegal.  This system
may not be used to encourage anything to do with illegal drugs,
gambling, pornography, prostitution, child pornography, robbery,
spreading computer viruses, cracking into private computer systems,
software infringement, trafficking in credit card codes, or other
crimes.

People sometimes have trouble figuring out whether certain activities
are illegal. It's usually not that hard. If it's illegal out there,
it's illegal in here! Using a bulletin board system to commit a crime
does not make it less of a crime. In fact, if you use a bulletin board
system to commit a crime, you're exposing the operators of the system,
and its other callers, to legal risks that should be yours alone.

If you genuinely do not know whether something you'd like to do is
legal or illegal, please discuss it with us before you proceed.  And
if we tell you we do not want you to pursue your plans on our system,
please respect our decision.

Respect the security of our system.  Do not try to gain access to
system areas private to ourselves, or to other callers. Some callers
try to crack system security just to show it can be done. Don't try to
demonstrate this on our system.

E. Privacy

We offer private electronic mail on our system as a service to our
callers.  We will endeavor to keep all of your e-mail private,
viewable only by you and the person to whom you address it, except:

We, as system operators, may need to look at your electronic mail if
we believe it is necessary to protect ourselves or other callers from
injury or damage.  For example, if we have reason to believe a caller
is involved in illegal activities, which creates a risk that our
system could be seized by the authorities, we will review his or her
electronic mail for our own protection.  We will not, however, monitor
electronic mail unless we believe it is being misused.

We will not deliberately disclose electronic mail to other callers.
If we believe certain electronic mail is connected with illegal
activities, we may disclose it to the authorities to protect our
system, ourselves and other callers.

Remember that the person to whom you send electronic mail does not
need to keep it secret. The sender or receiver of electronic mail has
the right to make it public.

If the authorities ever search or seize our system, they may gain
access to your private electronic mail. In that case, we cannot assure
they will not review it. Remember that you have personal rights of
privacy that even the government cannot legally violate, though you
may have to go to court to enforce those rights.

F. Editorial Control

We want our system to be a worthwhile place for all of our callers.
This does not mean everyone can do whatever they choose on this
system, regardless of its effect on others. It is our job to
accommodate the common needs of all callers while striving to meet our
own goals for the system.

We will not monitor all messages and file transfers.  We want to keep
the message and file traffic moving quickly and smoothly - this goal
would be defeated if we monitored everything on the system. However,
if we see (or hear about) messages or other activities that violate
the rules, threaten the order or security of the system, or use the
system in ways we do not agree with, we will take appropriate action.

Our editorial control includes normal housekeeping activities like
changing subject headers and deleting profanities in public messages
and selecting among uploaded files for those we wish to make available
for download. It also goes beyond that.

If a caller persists in posting messages or transferring files that we
previously warned him should not be on the system, those messages will
be deleted, and he or she may be locked out. If we discover any caller
violating the rules, especially the prohibition against illegal
activities, we will act firmly and swiftly. Depending on the
circumstances, the caller involved will be warned, or simply locked
out. If the caller has done anything to put us or other callers in
jeopardy, we may contact the authorities.

We do not plan on doing any of these things.  If all callers act with
respect and regard for us and for other callers, there will never be
any problems.  But if problems arise, we will assert control over our
system against any caller who threatens it. And in this Agreement, you
acknowledge that control.

G. Ownership of Materials

You shall retain all rights to all original messages you post and all
original files you upload. Likewise, you must respect the ownership
rights of others in their own messages and files. You may not post or
upload any messages or files unless you own them, or you have full
authority to transmit them to this system.

We own certain things you will find on this system, including the
"look and feel" of the system, the name of our system, and the
collective work copyright in sequences of public messages on our
system. You cannot reproduce any message thread from our system,
either electronically or in print, without our permission and the
permission of all participants in the thread.  This is not a complete
list - other things on the system are also our property.  Before you
copy anything from our system with plans of reproducing it or
distributing it, contact us about it.

H. Limitation of Liability and Indemnity.

The great danger for us, and for all operators of bulletin board
systems, is that we might be held accountable for the wrongful actions
of our callers.  If one caller libels another caller, the injured
caller might blame us, even though the first caller was really at
fault. If a caller uploads a program with a computer virus, and other
callers' computers are damaged, we might be blamed even though the
virus was left on our board by a caller.  If a caller transfers
illegal credit card information to another caller through private
electronic mail, we might be blamed even though we did nothing more
than unknowingly carry the message from one caller to another.

We did not start this system to take the blame for others' actions,
and we cannot afford to operate it if we must take that blame.
Accordingly, we need all callers to accept responsibility for their
own acts, and to accept that an act by another caller that damages
them must not be blamed on us, but on the other caller.  These needs
are accomplished by the following paragraph:

You agree that we will not be responsible to you for any indirect,
consequential, special or punitive damages or losses you may incur in
connection with our system or any of the data or other materials
transmitted through or residing on our system, even if we have been
advised of the possibility of such damage or loss. In addition, you
agree to defend and indemnify us and hold us harmless from and against
any and all claims, proceedings, damages, injuries, liabilities,
losses, costs and expenses (including reasonable attorneys fees)
relating to any acts by you or materials or information transmitted by
you in connection with our system leading wholly or partially to
claims against us or our system by other callers or third parties.

I.  Choice of Law

Our bulletin board system can be reached by callers from all fifty
states, and around the world. Each of these places has a different set
of laws.  Since we cannot keep track of all these laws and their
requirements, you agree that the law of our own state, ________, will
apply to all matters relating to this Agreement and to our bulletin
board system. In addition, you agree and consent that if you ever take
legal action against us, the courts of our own state, _______, will
have exclusive jurisdiction over any such legal actions.

J.  General

This agreement is the entire understanding between you and us
regarding your relationship to our bulletin board system.  If either
you or we fail to notify the other of any violations of this
agreement, this will not mean that you or we cannot notify the other
of future violations of any part of this agreement.


[Contract sign-up process]
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 22 11:22:11 1992
From: leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,comp.security.misc,alt.privacy,alt.society.civil-liberty
Subject: Article 5--Re: CERT and the Dept. of Justice on keystroke monitoring
Date: 22 Dec 92 15:08:16 GMT

jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala) writes:

>Earlier I said that property rights are not an issue wrt the CERT
>advisory, and that it was not related to companies.  This was based on
>my mistaken reading of the advisory - as it was based on the U.S. Dept
>of justice advice (order?) to all federal agencies, I though that the
>"all systems" on the advisory referred to "all federal systems".
>However, it appears I was mistaken - when I asked CERT about this the
>answer was that CERT expanded the scope of the advisory and thus it
>seems that CERT really means _all_ systems, no matter whether private,
>public, government-owned, etc.

But "goverment-owned" or even "public property" *still* involves property
rights. City Hall is public property, right down to the supplies in the
storeroom. That does *not* mean that the public can walk in and use the 
supplies.

"Public property" generally has some purpose or reason for existence. And
the administering agency has property rights, not all that different from
those a private person or company would have.

>A part of my argumentation was based on this misunderstanding of the
>advisory (for example the claim where I said that property rights are
>not involved).  I apologize for the resulting failure of
>communication.  However, my argumentation still applies for systems of
>federal agencies and many education sites.

Nope. At the federal agencies, you do *not* have a right to access on
their system anymore than you have a right to access any *phsyical*
property they have. And at educational sites, the *students* may
have access rights but not the general public. Just like with the
classrooms and labs. 

-- 
Leonard Erickson		      leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com
CIS: [70465,203]			 70465.203@compuserve.com
FIDO:   1:105/51	 Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
(The CIS & Fido addresses are preferred)


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 22 20:21:44 1992
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,comp.security.misc,alt.privacy,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Article 6--Re: CERT and the Dept. of Justice on keystroke monitoring
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 23:57:26 GMT

In article <1992Dec22.150816.13247@qiclab.scn.rain.com>, leonard@qiclab (Leonard Erickson) writes:
>But "goverment-owned" or even "public property" *still* involves property
>rights. City Hall is public property, right down to the supplies in the
>storeroom. That does *not* mean that the public can walk in and use the 
>supplies.

Actually, it doesn't involve property rights, ie. government doesn't
have rights.  What is involved is a policy of what the public property
should be used for and the issue of how the policy is made.  If the
policy decided by the public on City Hall is that it is for use by
hired workers only, the public doesn't have a right to walk in and use
them.  If the policy is that everything is for public use, then they
have a right to do so.

>"Public property" generally has some purpose or reason for existence. And
>the administering agency has property rights, not all that different from
>those a private person or company would have.

I think they're very different.  When a private person owns something,
she need not give any reason for anybody else on why she decides to do
something with the thing.  But as you say, public property has a
purpose - and the duty of the administering agency is to use the
property for that purpose.  The agency has no right to use the public
property in a way the heads of the agency like - the policy should
come from the public.

>At the federal agencies, you do *not* have a right to access on
>their system anymore than you have a right to access any *phsyical*
>property they have.

You are right, if the policy is that it's not for public use.  But the
citizens do have a right to have a say in the policy.

>And at educational sites, the *students* may
>have access rights but not the general public. Just like with the
>classrooms and labs. 

Again, if it's publicly funded the general public has a right to have
a say on the policy.  Also, via academic freedom I'd say there are
some privacy (and other) rights involved.

(by the way, where I live the lectures at universities are public, the
law says they must be)

//Jyrki


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 21 12:31:03 1992
Newsgroups: alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk
From: greeny@eff.org (J S Greenfield)
Subject: Article 7--Re: Chain letters?
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 17:30:54 GMT

In article <1992Dec21.020050.24688@pegasus.com> tleylan@pegasus.com (Tom Leylan) writes:
>greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield) writes:
>
>>Carl's making a serious point.  I think you're just being silly...
>>
>>How about if I email my resume to a friend saying, "Feel free to
>>send a copy of my resume to anyone you know who may be interested."
>
>>Is this a chain letter?
>
>>How about one sayin, "Here's a good joke I just heard..."
>
>>I believe this demonstrates the point that Carl was trying to make.
>
>J.S., I was being silly in response to silliness I believe that is
>covered under the "fair response clause" of Law 21-FW-5.
>
>Now you want me to believe that you can't determine the differences
>between a resume, a joke and a chain letter.

*I* can.  But the *definition* in question clearly could not.  That is what
Carl said in his post.

To my eyes (and apparently to others, including Carl's) what you and others
have termed a "chain letter" was clearly a joke.

I'd say it's you and those others who are having trouble with your definitions.
Otherwise, one of you would have long ago produced an alternate definition for
a "chain letter" that *doesn't* include lots of stuff that we all seem to
agree are *not* "chain letters."


>Thanks for playing todays exciting episode of "why not spend forever
>trying to legally define the entire world before we act".

Clearly, you use silliness to make up for your lack of any reasoned
response.

I've seen at least two workable definitions of a "chain letter" posted.
(One equivalent to the US Postal regulation, and one including all letters
distributed solely for the sake of distribution, itself.)

It is *your* side, which insists that those definitions are insufficient,
but which has failed to produce a definition that is not overly-broad
(including things like resumes and jokes) that is responsible for the
extended length of this discussion.


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here,                            greeny@eff.org 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 22 23:38:42 1992
Newsgroups: alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk
From: tleylan@pegasus.com (Tom Leylan)
Subject: Article 8--Re: Chain letters?
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 92 03:06:44 GMT

greeny@eff.org (J S Greenfield) writes:

>I've seen at least two workable definitions of a "chain letter" posted.
>(One equivalent to the US Postal regulation, and one including all letters
>distributed solely for the sake of distribution, itself.)

>It is *your* side, which insists that those definitions are insufficient,
>but which has failed to produce a definition that is not overly-broad
>(including things like resumes and jokes) that is responsible for the
>extended length of this discussion.

J.S.,  It's probably best if I drop out of the thread because I don't
honestly know what you want.  I thought this was about chain letters
and someone's insistence that without a legal definition we wouldn't
recognize one if it poked us in the eye.

You clarified it right up by introducing "resumes" and "jokes" and
suggesting (I think) that any definition of a chain letter that let
jokes and resumes slip through isn't worth the paper it's printed on.

In a nutshell, I believe that my position is that the only way you
can arrive at "absolute definitions" is to pare it down to a point
where you have described _a_ chain letter but not all chain-like
letters.

If somebody's definition includes "a solicitation to send money" then
clearly a letter which suggests you should send an article of clothing
and explains how a 4th century monk didn't and died is NOT a chain
letter.  Great then we can invent new terms for all the chain-like
variants, a great use of time and resources....

You're probably correct in whatever point you're trying to make I just
don't see the point behind it all.

tom



------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 23 07:55:57 1992
Newsgroups: alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,news.admin.policy,comp.admin.policy,alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.d,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: dfo@tko.vtt.fi (Foxvog Douglas)
Subject: Article 9--Re: [UPI] "FBI probes computer child porn at Cornell"
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 12:37:31 GMT

In article <1992Dec07.145438.36263@wap.oau.org> bdixon@wap.oau.org (Bill Dixon) writes:
>In article <1992Dec3.100123.17431@ousrvr.oulu.fi> dfo@tko.vtt.fi (Foxvog Douglas) writes:

>>The problem is right here.  Having the child engage in sexual acts
>>should be the crime, not the taking of photos.  The photos are EVIDENCE
>>of a crime and taking of them is just creation of that evidence.  

>Should we then issue the message that it is perfectly all right to take
>the pictures?  Does this then extend to the procurement of someone to
>sexually abuse a child so that we can then take pictures of them?

Obviously not.  Straw man.  The taking of the pictures should not in 
itself be a crime.  It is evidence of what happened: of the crime and of
the photographer witnessing, failing to deter, and failing to report a
crime.

>>This way we stay away from slippery words like "pornography" which can
>>mean many different things to different people and just ban ACTS of
>>child abuse.

>For the sake of this discussion, I am going to use as a working definition
>of pornography "the taking of pictures, or the pictures themselves, of
>children engaging in sexual acts".  Note that this wording is based on you
>statement above.

Unfortunately, people's definitions vary greatly.  This thread started 
with complaints about child pornography on the net, which turned out to
be a photo of a single (almost) naked child, with an inset blow up of
the genitals.  Someone reported that the kid looked unhappy.

>>But it should be the abuse that should be punished not the picture.

>I would like to put in my two cents worth. 

>You state that you consider child sexual abuse (having a child engage in
>sexual acts) should be (and is) a crime.  I would like to explain why I
>believe that taking and distributing photos should also be considered a
>crime.

>The person that causes the child to perform the sexual acts directly
>abuses the child.  Even you admit that.
                    ^^^^
I take exception to this slur.

>The person taking the pictures is just as guilty.  In many cases, they are
>the same one.  If different people, however, the photographer either
>requests or condones the abuse.  If they request the action, they are just
>as guilty as the one abusing the child.  At best, they passively watch and
>photograph.  But even then, there is an implicit agreement to the abuse,
>or they would have reported the crime.  Therefore, they are also guilty of
>child sexual abuse.  

Thus they have committed a crime without any additional law about taking
pictures.  Get them on that.  Let the case lie upon whether there has
been child abuse.  

>(Note that I exclude two classes of people from this:
>undercover detectives obtaining information for prosecution; 

Do you wish to allow undercover detectives to engage in child abuse?  I
would oppose that.

>and people
>taking the pictures unawares [such as the ridiculous example given by
>someone else about parents taking pictures of their teenage kids while
>they are away for the weekend] PROVIDED they destroy the pictures as soon
>as they realize what is on them.)

What is the need for destroying the photos?  

>The person distributing the pictures is also guilty, in that they are
>paying someone to take the pictures, which IMO is the same as paying
>someone to abuse the child.

If they are not paying for the pictures (as in the case on the net) this
is not applicable.  If they buy pictures showing evidence of a crime and
do not report that evidence, they may be guilty of covering up that
crime, unless they are doing it as part of a journalistic investigation
in which they would have the right to protect sources of information.

If they are previously published photos, there is no problem.

>The person buying the pictures is also guilty, because they are helping to
>fund the entire process that caused the child to be abused.

So is that person's employer for providing money to that person to spend
on the process.  So are the customer's of that employer's business since
they provide funds to the business to pay the purchaser which ends up
funding the business, so are their employers....

>I will agree that the punishment should be lessened as the distance from
>the actual abuse increases, but there should be punishment nonetheless.

Actually, if you wished to stop this kind of child abuse and a picture
showed evidence of it, a purchaser of a publication could report the
matter to police if they would not themselves be liable for charges.

>If you punish the people purchasing the pictures, and thereby reduce the
>number of purchases, this reduces the revenue of the distributors.

But you are not punishing criminals.  You are giving a strong punishment
against someone for buying a piece of paper (or magnetic tape) in order
to hurt someone else.  If you find such people, request from them
evidence that you believe that they have indicating the commision of a
crime and leads to the criminal(s).  Thank the people for being good
citizens and follow the case towards the child abusers.

>If you punish the distributors, this will reduce their purchases, and
>reduce the revenue of the photographers.

Same comment as above.  If they are hiring people to abuse children in
order to get the pictures, they are guilty of conspiracy to commit child
abuse.  You have a handle on them to get cooperation.

>If you punish the photographers, in many instances you will also be
>punishing the abusers.  If not, you will reduce the number of requests for
>abuse.

Photographers of child abuse are most likely conspirators in the abuse
(unless, for example, they take their shots from hidden locations).  

>I would also like to make a couple of points.  The above description of
>the effects of punishment will only hold true if the punishment is severe
>enough.  If you, for instance, fine the distributors a couple hundred
>dollars, they will not be inclined to limit their activities.  On the
>other hand, if you fine them a significant portion of their income, it
>will become a financial liability for them to deal in child pornography.
>Keep in mind that they are in it for the money.  Take away the money, and
>they will stop.

If you use them to go after the abusers you will be able to stop the abuse.

>Also, the above description will only hold true if child pornographers are
>consistently investigated and prosecuted.  It will not work to only
>prosecute if enough people complain about a particular distributor.  Law
>enforcement must aggressively pursue these people, for the sake of our
>children.

Let me make a few points.  From what i understand, there is little or no
child pornography (defined as above) being produced in the US.  Most of
the attempts at distribution are made by government agencies, solely for
the purpose of entrapment.  It has been many years since anyone was
arrested for suborning children to engage in sex in order to be
photographed.  The whole thing is a manufactured issue in order to give
the police (local through national) more powers.

The major distributer of child pornography in the US is the US govt.  I
challenge anyone to provide documentation stating otherwise.

This witch hunt against "child ponographers" casts it's net wide.  It
has caught nudists for taking home photos and others who accept young 
children's wishes to be devoid of clothing.  

"Child pornography" is defined by the government to include photographs
which depict a child's genitals.  It does not use the definition you
provided above.  From previous discussions on the net, it appears that
a non-pornographic picture can be changed to a pornographic one in the
photo lab.  Thus, if you equate "pornography" with abuse you end up 
with the position that a child can be abused in a photo lab by actions 
taken against his/her picture.  This is absurd.

>Finally, I would like to stress that each time a person is prosecuted for
>child pornography, at whatever level, their prosecution should then serve
>as the basis for going after the person/organization higher up the chain.

If there is evidence of child abuse, they certainly should follow the
chain of evidence towards the abuser.  There need not be proscecution of
someone who hasn't abused any children or caused them to be abused.
For most prosecutions, from my understanding, the "next
person/organization higher up in the chain" is the government.  I.e. the
proscecution does NOTHING against child abuse, just against someone 
entrapped to buy something from government agents.

>As with all other posts, the above views do not necessarily reflect those
>of my employer, although I sincerely hope so.

>Bill

>P.S.  I hope and pray that none of my five children ever come in contact
>with you and/or those other posters that are arguing for the protection of
>people dealing with child pornography at levels other than the actual
>abuse.  I am not sure you would have any reservations in causing them to
>be abused as long as you were not the one inflicting the abuse.

You are very nasty.  You have read me write strongly against child
abuse.  You seem to be merely interested in appearances, i.e. photos.
I am not sure that you would have any reservations in causing your own
children to be abused as long as noone saw photos of the abuse.
[My feelings about this statement parallel what i expect yours to have
 been when you wrote your similar statement above.]

>Bill Dixon
>bdixon@wap.oau.org


-- 
doug foxvog     
dfo@tko.vtt.fi   


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 30 22:47:21 1993
From: cook@tmn.com (Gordon Cook)
Subject: Article 10--What *IS* Current AUP Policy for Information Providers?
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 17:48:04 GMT



I have been rereading com-priv and other files relating to the flap over 
Dialog as a commercial user of ANS in December of last year.

On December 10th 1991 Steve Wolff wrote:

"For whatever reason(s), Dialog would not commit to guaranteeing that all 
their traffic would adhere to NSFnet Aceeptable Use; as an ANS customer 
apparently their alternative was to declare themselves "commercial."

A bit later in the discussion someone pointed out that Dialog's customers 
had never been given the opportunty to pledge that they would make only 
research and education use of Dialog.

Eventually the NSF blessed Dialog as an acceptable research and education 
user and in January ANS switched their status from commercial to R&E.

QUESTION:  what is current NSF policy for information providers lie dialog 
that wish to attach to the NSFnet?

I surmise that if an information provider tells the world that it expects 
that the only use that will be made of its resources by its intenet 
connected customers is use in support of research and education, it is 
free to attach and send its bits accross the NSFnet bbone as AUP 
conformant?

Do I surmise correctly?

And to name 3 info providers:  Orbit, Dow Jones, and BRS.  Are librarians 
reading this list able to telnet successfully to all three? On second 
thought maybe I should not restrict the last question to librarians.
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me.
 =kadie@eff.org, kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Dec 30 22:47:27 1993
From: steve@cise.cise.nsf.gov (Stephen Wolff)
Subject: Article 11--What *IS* Current AUP Policy for Information Providers?
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 20:18:51 GMT

->QUESTION:  what is current NSF policy for information providers lie dialog 
->that wish to attach to the NSFnet?
->
->I surmise that if an information provider tells the world that it expects 
->that the only use that will be made of its resources by its intenet 
->connected customers is use in support of research and education, it is 
->free to attach and send its bits accross the NSFnet bbone as AUP 
->conformant?
->
->Do I surmise correctly?

Yes.  We also ask the information provider to cooperate in tracking down and
trying to halt violations if/when they are reported.  -s
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me.
 =kadie@eff.org, kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =


------------------------------

From caf-talk Caf Jan  3 17:26:52 1993
Newsgroups: soc.culture.indian
Subject: Article 12--DEADLINE TO STOP OBSCENE POSTINGS!
Date: 3 Jan 93 13:59:50 EST

				MEMO
				----


TO:	Deepak Bose, Deb Chatterjee, Mustafa Ibrahim, anonymous obscene posters,
	others who post *really* obscene and offensive material

FROM:	D. Pereira and others,
	Indignant and frustrated readers

REF:	DEADLINE TO STOP POSTING OFFENSIVE OR RACIST MATERIAL ON 
	SOC.CULTURE.INDIAN


After Tuesday, January 5, 1992 at midnight, if I see *any* postings or replies
to postings that are offensive, racist or intolerable to me, I will forward 
copies to your respective system administrators, who will then decide what 
action, if any, to take against you.  In effect, it will be your sys ads who 
will then determine if the material is unsuitable for public medium, not me.
He/she may then decide whether you should be denied write access to USENET or
be further penalized. (Some of the postings seen recently may even be used as
evidence for civil/criminal litigation.)

If any other sci readers out there decide to support this action, then please
express your opinion.  A suggestion: extract this memo and post it again under
your own name.  Do please take the effort to type the SUBJECT heading over,
rather then doing a REPLY.  This way you will convey to the offenders that you
feel as strongly about this.

A final note to the persons mentioned above - please take this very seriously.
It is NOT a joke.

-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =




------------------------------

End of Computers and Academic Freedom News (Digest)
************************************
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me.
 =kadie@eff.org, kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =