From: nbadie@rd.hydro.on.ca (Navid Badie)
Subject: Re: A humble response to Mojahedins 
Organization: "Ontario Hydro - Research Division"
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 17:03:02 GMT

javad@hplabsz.hpl.hp.com (Agha Javad) writes:
: In article <1992Dec17.174403.3006@rd.hydro.on.ca> 
: nbadie@rd.hydro.on.ca (Navid Badie) writes:
:
: >army had another role, namely the infamous role of "gendarme of the region",
: >i.e. to defend the interests of the U.S. in the region, not necessarily
: >those of Iran.  That is why the army was by far the largest and best 
: >equipped in the region, and why it was over equipped compared to the 
: 				^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
: >defensive needs of Iran.
: ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
: 
: Iran had three external threats:  Soviet Union, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf.
: If you consider the formidable challenges facing our military in just
: each of these arenas, especially the first two, you will conclude that
: we were not "over equipped compared to the defensive needs of Iran"

Well, this is a very complicated issue, and to be honest with you, I 
do not have enough detailed technical information about weapons
of war to be able to carry this discussion very far. But I can 
try to give more of my general view on this matter, if you care 
to read on (and on, and on, and on :-).

I will start by addressing some of the points you raise in your 
comparison of the military power of Iran and Iraq in the 1970's.

: Iran had roughly 450 combat aircraft, 300,000 strong army, and a navy with
: 3 destroyers and some other surface ships (frigates, etc.).  Iraq had
: roughly 369 combat aircraft (including long range bombers such as Tu-16
: and Tu-22, whereas Iran didn't have any long range bombers), an army of
: roughly the same size, with more and better tanks than Iran had.  We had
: roughly 750 Chieftains, and a few hundred Scorpion and M48 light tanks,
: very few of which helped in the subsequent war with Iraq.  They had
: more tanks, among which were the T-62 and T-72 tanks, which were considered
: some of the world's best tanks at the time.  Also, they had a formidable
: surface to surface missile force, including Frog-7's and Scuds, which was
: much more capable than our SSM force.  

Without arguing with your specific numbers, I think it was a matter of
consensus at the time that Iran's armed forces were clearly superior to
those of Iraq. You take pains to mention the state-of-the-(soviet)-art
weapons of Iraq, but fail to mention the state-of-the-(American)-art
Iranian weapons, such as the F14 fighters. There was also, I seem to remember,
a tank which was custom-ordered by Iran to Britain, which was the state
of the art at the time. Further, the Shah had more grandiose plans for the
Iranian armed forces and would have expanded them at a rate which would
have been unmatched by any of our neighbours (except the USSR, of course).

The undisputed military superiority of Iran is what forced Iraq to agree to
the 1975 Algiers accord. You may say that this is proof that the Shah's
military strategy worked. I say that any accord which is reached
because of one side's fear of the other is bound to be unstable and
subject to unilateral abrogation once the balance of power changes, as
happened with Iran and Iraq. 

: offensive posture, not to mention Most of Iran's wealth and lifleine
: was right on the border with them.  

Read this line aloud and think about it from an Iraqi citizen's viewpoint.
ALL of Iraq is right on the border with Iran! I hope you will forgive my 
impudence, but this sounds a little like "going to the judge alone, and 
returning happy". 

: Iran's military was much more defensive,

A military which was by far better equipped than that of every one of our
neighbours (again, except the USSR) could not be viewed as defensive.

: focussing on air superiority and antitank helicopters, and was an excellent
: deterrent to any Iraqi/Arab aggression, and it WORKED, which is more than I 
: can say for the IRI's strategy.
:
: As far as being gendarme of the region, I don't see what is wrong with 
: defending your country's interests in your own backyard.  

The concept of "your own backyard" is exactly what I am objecting to!
Please, amoo, forgive me, for I am about to sin, but your own backyard
is part of your property, it is IN your house. The Persian Gulf is not 
Iran's backyard, it is an international waterway which we share with
several of our neighbours as our main access to the open seas.

: It's certainly 
: better than letting foreigners do it for you.  

Alright then, how about we get together with the other countries which
have a shore line on the Persian Gulf, define a common set of interests,
and defend those interests together? This requires, first and foremost,
for us to realize that other countries also have interests which can be
as legitimate as Iran's.

: Iran was patrolling the 
: Persian Gulf, which was a key waterway and its economic lifeline.  It did 
: a great job of holding the Iraqis back, and provided at least a first line 
: of defense against any possible Soviet invasion (Believe me, they would 
: have done it if they had the chance, like they did in Afghanistan).  

Oh, Agha Javad, this is an entire topic (or three!) by itself. I am prepared
to open a separate thread for this interesting issue (defending ourselves
against the former USSR) but for now, I will just offer the opinion that 
Iran's military might would not play a large role (if any) if the 
Politburo was considering whether or not to invade Iran. Geopolitical
factors had much more to do with Soviet military strategy in the region
than Iran's army.

:Except 
: that the Shah's gov't was friends with the US, so this was an easy label to 
: put on him.  It just turns out that the US and Iran had many common interests
: at the time- to contain Iraq, to keep the Soviets where they were, and to 
: keep the Persain Gulf open to traffic and commerce.  Which one of these was 
: not in the interest of Iran?

This is the core of your argument, and I must admit, it is a very hard
question for me to answer. But let me try to, anyway.

First, why do you think that other Persian Gulf countries had no interest
in keeping the Persian Gulf open to traffic and commerce? This is one of
those common interests I was referring to above. Iran didn't need a to
adopt a confrontational posture to reach this particular goal.

Second, the US had an interest to keep military pressure on, and obtain 
military information about, the former USSR. This was not an interest of 
Iran. Again, this belongs in its own thread, since it can quickly take 
over this whole debate.

Third, "to contain Iraq"... Your basic assumption here seems to be that
Iran has always had a quiet, mind-its-own business, peace loving government,
and more importantly, that it has always been viewed by all of our
neighbours to be that way. Well, I do not think this assumption is valid!
This gives rise to a vicious circle to end all vicious circles: a 
regional arms race. One country feels threatened by another, starts
arming itself up. A third country now feels threatened by the second one,
and arms itself,... you get the picture. Every country wants to be in
the ideal situation where even if attacked by all of its neighbours
combined, it can defend itself. And, it is impossible for every country
in a small region to be in that ideal position. Thus the spiral
will never end.

Finally (wow!), the Shah's army was destined to be the real guardian of
US interests in the Persian Gulf region, whether or not they happened
to coincide with Iran's own interests. A preview of things to come
was when the Shah sent troops to Oman to do a little dirty work for
the US. In my mind, this kind of "mission" was one of the main reasons 
for the build-up of the Iranian armed forces under the Shah. 

If you still have not hit the 'n' key, congratulations, you have reached 
the end!

: moaffagh bashee,
: 
: Agha Javad

Shomaa ham be hamchenin, Agha Javad. And I thank you for presenting
your point of view so eloquently.

Navid
nbadie@rd.hydro.on.ca