HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Date: 13 Aug 92 14:31:51 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Aug13.112211.3386@sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1992Aug13.082047.23332@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >I don't know
>   >about influence, but to me the greatest philosopher of the century was
>   >Frank Ramsey.
>
>  Ramsey was a remarkable person to be sure, but your evaluation of his
>philosophical work is highly eccentric. Could you explain your attitude
>further?

I'm not alone in thinking highly of Ramsey's philosophical writings.
Hugh Mellor's blurb to Ramsey's _Philosophical Papers_ reads
"Frank Ramsey was the greatest of the remarkable generation of Cambridge
philosophers and logicians which included G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell,
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maynard Keynes."  So if my elevating Ramsey
above Russell and Wittgenstein (who Hilary Putnam, eg., says are "in a
class of their own" in 20th century philosophy) qualifies me as
"highly eccentric" then so be it (it wouldn't be the first time...).
I like Ramsey because like Peirce he is highly original and clear.
But let's not continue with this "who's the greatest of them all"
silliness further (I already regret joining the fray).

>
>   >This is a test to see if I can post more successfully than my previous
>   >embarrassing attempt.
>
>  Your article here arrived with a senseless "Followup-To: %r" line.

Yeah, I know.  I'm trying to learn how to use these darn % things.

Marko Amnell
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Heidegger and Nazism
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 22:06:15 +0000

zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes...

[ ...]

>I an puzzled by your claim, especially since the compatibility of
>Nazism with Christianity was claimed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_, while
>the compatibility of Crhistianity with Nazism was claimed by the vast
>majority of German clerics of the period.

On that I will not comment, save to say that in my experience in
South Africa, vehement racism was often the bedfellow of vehement
Christianity. The explanation?

'Well you do realise, don't you, that these blacks don't have
_souls_.......'

(Afrikaaner farmer from Cape Province).

Christianity has been bent round many objectionable attidudes and
used as justification for them. All that is necessary is to a priori
take that which you wish to discredit, and associate it with
Anti-Christ in some way - be it black man, homosexual, womankind or
the democratic party :-)

I am not sure where this leaves us, except with even more distaste
for the politics of religion, and the religion of politics.

Nazi Germany was looking for somewhere to lay the blame for its
problems, needing a unifying myth that didn't offend the Christian
principles of the Volk. Nazism flattered the German pride in
efficiency: If one thing has emerged from the holocaust, it is the
realisation that the world is riddled with prejudice and bigotry, for
which there is no answer but information and free discussion.

I don't blame Germany for Nazism then: But I would blame a german for
espousing the cause after realising where it lead.

In some ways the Nazi dream was like the American Dream. To bring
peace, prosperity and democracy to the world, German style (or US
style). Both have proved to be empty dreams built on narrow colonial
ideas, and requiring the suppression of alternative cultures to bring
them about. Of course we British are well qualified to comment on
this, having built an empire on a purely commercial basis, and
relinquished it as too expensive to maintain. At least we never _had_
any Good Intentions ...... :-)


Sometimes good old fashioned greed is a lot less damaging than
idealisim and national pride.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: "Is truth good?" or "Is good truth?"
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 14 Aug 92 03:40:16 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

> In article <78535.2249223057@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz   
> (Hakki Kocabas) writes:  
>   
>    >I don't know what you mean, tell me exactly what you mean, or else  
>    >I may be cheated.  
>    >I need to know how it is used, do you know how to use it ?  
>    >When do you need to ask "Is truth good?" ?  
>   
>   But how do you ask this and when? Why, Man! Why you need to know when  
> what we say when is not or is it? How much of use is this?  
>   
  
Don't get excited Man ! Listen to this:  
  
In your use of it is time enter into "Is truth good ?" ?  
  
Do you use "Is truth good?" to make forecasts/predictions ?  
  
Tell us all about it, such that we do not get caught in your   
timeless :-> illusions Man !   
  
Don't get us wrong, we are not here to take you out of your paradise,   
but just to show you that it is no paradise here, where you don't need no   
"When?"..and where you utter things like "Is truth good?" and we    
answer you at once.....  
  
Down to the earth Man!  
  
Here on the earth...:-> We don't go for fishing words, and then questioning;  
"Have I at last, really caught it?"... "Is truth good?", "Is it really a fish?
..".What if it slips away?; Shall I call it "It was a big fish !" then ?"   
hahahahhahahhhahahahahhahahaaaaa...
From: bcushman@lust.reed.edu (Ben Cushman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 20 Aug 92 21:31:24 GMT
Article-I.D.: reed.1992Aug20.213124.27227
Organization: Reed College, Portland, OR

In article <403@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca> skataria@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca  
(skataria) writes:
> 
> WHAT IS LOVE? 
> Can somebody give me a convincing answer?

Here is a first attepmt at a reading list--

Plato			The Symposium
Irving Singer		The Nature of Love (3 volumes)
Ralph Harper		Human Love, existential and mystical
Rollo May		Love and Will
Russell Lammoy		Sex Without Love, a philosophical exploration
John V. Fleming		Reason and the Lover
Jacques Fischer		Love and Morality
Jean Guitton		Essay on Human Love
Guy Sircello		Love and Beauty
Robert Brown		Analyzing Love
Howard Lee Miller	Loving, a psychological approach

Soren Kierkegaard	Works of Love
Saint Teresa of Avila	The Way of Perfection
Alexander Decomy	The Heresy of Courtly Love

Bernard Murstein	Love, Sex and Marriage through the ages
L.T. Tropsfield		Troubadours and Love
Pitirim Sorokiv		The Ways and Power of Love
Sydney Mellon		The Evolution of Love
Bernard O'Donaghue	The Courtly Love Tradition
William A. Nielson	The Origins ans Sources of the Court of Love

Andre, le champelain	The Art of Courtly Love
Erich Fromm		The Art of Loving

Niklas Luhmann		Love as Passion
Alan Soble		The Structure of Love
Denis de Rougemont	Love in the Western World
Denis de Rougemont	Passion and Society


						Ben Cushman
						Reed College
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence  
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 17 Aug 92 11:26:48 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

  
> >zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):  
  
[a cart-full of palavra deleted]  
   
> I find the question of the nature of meaning to be the second most  
                             ^^^^^^  
you mean the grammar of the meaning, don't you Michael? :-)  
  
> important classical philosophical question, the first being that of the  
> structure of reality.  The contributions of Frege, Russell, Cantor, Tarski, 
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  
you mean the grammatical structure of "reality", don't you Mikhail ?  
  
> Church, et al. to one or both of them, as the case may be, could hardly be  
> overestimated.   
  
however, "meaning" and "reality" are just another couple of words among  
thousands of words of our language...they have no magical nature to be  
hooked on...but those people were looking for magical solutions to the  
problems which are deeply rooted in language and which can be solved by   
hard work and patience of a fish-line un-tangler...:->  
  
If you really want to discover the order of importance (if there is  
such an order) of our words, perhaps you may start from "will" which   
would lead you to the most intimate corners of our language...and I bet  
you would love that trip...it is not because 'the question of the nature   
of' "will" to be the most important, but just because it is a knot head...  
  
[another cart-full of palavra deleted]  
  
> cordially,  
> mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu  
> eleven more days and counting...  
> "Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."  
  
le Chevalier des Mots.
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 19 Aug 92 08:02:57 GMT
	<1992Aug18.135945.7450@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Aug18.194122.14877@tamsun.tamu.edu>
	<1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista

In article <1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >On a realist reading of mathematical truth, a proposition such as
   >Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false.  What I suggest is 
   >that even if a proof one way or the other is never found, it still
   >exists (this is what I called a 'noumenal truth' in my note).

  What exists?

  As for realism and a "set of all truths", it is quite obscure what
connection you have in mind. Could you set this out more informatively?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 20:45:45 GMT

In article <1992Aug8.052404.15379@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>Gary Merrill (sorry about the missing reference, I'm new to Internet) writes:
>
>I take it you mean that
>
>	x e {x}
>
>represents something like "x expresses the proposition that x"
>(excuse use/mention errors for a moment please).  But what does
>
>	x e {x, y}
>
>mean?  
>
>--Nothing.  The idea is that only singleton sets of urelements are
>propositions.  The other sets are not considered.  I suppose this is
>harmless.
>
>...
>
>Further, I don't think you can just say that when we are looking
>at urelements, '=' means 'expresses the same proposition as'.
>Consider
>
>	x e z & y e z
>
>which says, under your interpretation, that x and y express the
>same proposition.  Now since z is (must be? vide my confusion
>above) a singleton, it follows of course that
>
>	x = y
>
>which you would like to interpret as "x and y express the same
>proposition".  But however you would *like* to interpret this,
>given the underlying set theory, it still means that x and y are
>the same *thing* (same urelement).
>
>--I'm not sure about this since Forster tells me that the in/discernability
>of the urelements of NFU is unknown.  Naturally, some might take this to be
>a good reason for eschewing any use of such a logic.  Personally, I'm not
>sure what to make of it.  I guess I'm still thinking about it.  Maybe
>somebody out there knows more about this stuff?
>
>Thanks for your reply!
>
>Marko Amnell

I know all about NFU, but I don't see how you are trying to apply it.
Could someone send me copies of earlier postings in this series?




-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Understanding out of context
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug10.234128.14256@news.eng.convex.com>
	<1992Aug11.190030.19907@sics.se>
	<1992Aug12.175353.11241@news.eng.convex.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 10:46:48 GMT

In article <1992Aug12.175353.11241@news.eng.convex.com> cash@convex.com 
(Peter Cash) writes:

   [About "the better man flies the rake":]

  >So I can't even say whether it's a grammatically correct English sentence.
  >Can I tell what it means? Whether it's tautologous or not? I don't think
  >so. I can think of _possibilities_, yes; but I can't say anything for sure.

  I guess this is a test? Some statements have meaning in a very large
context, and "the better man flies the rake" is one of them. I'm sure
you would recognize this statement, even if it came fluttering out of
the sky, as one of Wittgenstein's most famous aphorisms. Of course, we
may still ask ourselves what Wittgenstein meant by it.

  (For those who are not witterheads: Wittgenstein cryptically states,
in his Englische Bemerkungen, "The good man rides the flake, but the
better man flies the rake.")
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Huh?!?  
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 17 Aug 92 20:56:25 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

  
In article <78535.2249223057@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz   
(Hakki Kocabas) writes:  
  
HK> I don't know what you mean, tell me exactly what you mean, or else  
HK> I may be cheated.  
HK> I need to know how it is used, do you know how to use it ?  
HK> When do you need to ask "Is truth good?" ?  
  
torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:  
  
TF> But how do you ask this and when? Why, Man! Why you need to know when  
TF> what we say when is not or is it? How much of use is this?  
  
Josh Barinstein - josh@Tekelec.com wries:  
  
JB> Say what???  
  
torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:  
   
TF> I take it you haven't learned Kocabas-speak yet. It will come to you.  
TF> Just relax, and let your eyes look in opposite directions.  
  
Hakki Kocabas responds:  
  
no, no, no, no...Torkel ! take it as:  
"What can be questioned, can be questioned clearly."  
not mumbling like you do here:  
  
TF> what we say when is not or is it?
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger and the Nazis
Date: 18 Aug 92 18:02:15 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <1992Aug18.155120.24195@ccu.umanitoba.ca>, feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:

|> You might like to read (or re-read) _Heidegger_ in the "Modern
|> Masters" series for a taste of just how Heidegger's nazi-ism tied
|> intimately to his metaphysics.
|> As to the tie to religion (and I steal this inspiration from the same
|> text), substitute "God" for "Being" throughout _Being and Time_, and see
|> how little difference it makes.

Thank you, and I will attempt to read this some time in the near
future.  But pending that, I wonder if you (or anyone else) would
care to steal or speculate a bit more.  Specifically, if, as you say,
Heidegger's nazi-ism was tied intimately to his metaphysics while
_Being and Time_ can be taken to be in some fundamental sense "about
God", what is the consequence of the natzi-ism for the resultant
concept of God?  And if there is such a consequence (as the alleged
connection of nazi-ism to metaphysics seems to imply), how can so
many self-proclaimed Christians embrace a theology with such a basis?
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 19 Aug 92 11:55:45 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Aug19.102530.12000@sics.se> torkel@sics.se
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <1992Aug19.094252.7977@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >The proof of FLT (in the _nous_ of God, see below).
>
>  How does realism imply that FLT if true has a proof?

I take it we agree that the sign of a true statement in mathematics is
the existence of a proof.

>
>   >I quote Michael Dummett in _The Logical Basis of Metaphysics_ (pp.348f):
>
>  Dummett natters on in his usual style, but I can't find a word in
>the passage you quote about realism requiring a "set of all truths".
>Could you be more explicit as to what you have in mind?

I think Dummett quite explicitly says that metaphysical realism requires
that there be a collection of all true propositions ("[God's] knowledge
[of all truths]...guarantees that [reality] is as it is, independently
of whether we know it or not").  As I said to Menzel, Grim's argument is
categorical:  What he is saying is that there can be no set, class, 
universal closure, bunch or whatever of all truths.  Are you suggesting
that we can have (metaphysical) realism without such a totality.  If so, how?

Marko Amnell
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 21 Aug 92 06:00:51 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1189@kepler1.rentec.com> andrew@rentec.com 
(Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:

>In article <1992Aug19.094252.7977@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>In article <1992Aug19.080257.4921@sics.se> 
>>torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>>
>>>In article <1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>>>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>>
>>>   >On a realist reading of mathematical truth, a proposition such as
>>>   >Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false.  What I suggest is 
>>>   >that even if a proof one way or the other is never found, it still
>>>   >exists (this is what I called a 'noumenal truth' in my note).
>>>
>>TF:
>>>  What exists?
>>
>>The proof of FLT (in the _nous_ of God, see below).
>>
>
>OK. Does a solution to the Halting problem for Turing machines "exist"?
>Does a bijection from the reals to the integers exist? I would guess you
>want to say no.
>
>So if the statement "The Fermat Conjecture is decidable" is either true or
>false, why can't it be false? In which case a proof will never be found,
>and I would prefer to say that a proof didn't exist.
>
>I don't think you can arbitrarily assert that the FC is decidable, which
>is what you appear to be doing. If you can prove it is, I can send you
>an application form for a Fields medal.
>
>Later,
>Andrew Mullhaupt

Fields medal ... tempting... tempting...
Actually, you're absolutely right (I guess I just really love proofs...)
I have to give philosophy of math more thought (and reading).
(But, of course, I will think about trying to prove FC is decidable...)

Sensing a lull in the discussion of my paper, I want to take this
opportunity to personally thank all readers and participants in the
debate.  I have enjoyed this opportunity enormously and hope
my humble efforts have provided you with some enjoyment.  I know I have
learned a lot already!

I will be offline for a few days of R&R.
(I've been working on this stuff non-stop for four months, ever since I
first had the idea for the article)

'Just a humble grad student wishing you all the very best!!!

Marko

amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Non-Existence of Existence (and God,too).
Date: 13 Aug 92 19:41:43 GMT
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.

In article <Bsrs4n.As8@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1157@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:
>|> In article <BsKGMA.JFK@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>|> >One of the properities of the part/whole relation is that it is reflexive:
>|> >everything is a part of itself (note that "part" does not mean "proper part").
>|> 
>|> But my reference to set theory alluded to inclusion. Although every set
>|> contains itself, it may not be a member of itself. So part of seems to be
>|> the subset relation. OK. This is why I find it necessary to ask why it makes
>|> no sense for the universe to "be in" itself as Minsky claims. You have to say
>|> _why_ it makes no sense, or what is the same thing, to explain what you mean
>|> by "is in".
>|> 
>|> Later,
>|> Andrew Mullhaupt
>
>The nominalistic part/whole relation is *not* the inclusion relation (though
>it is a partial ordering).  I'd rather not get into a detailed explication
>of various nominalistic systems here, since it gets awfully technical awfully
>fast.  (By the way, I omitted mention of Lesniewski's systems -- protothetic,
>ontology, and mereology -- which correspond *roughly* to (quantified) sentential
>logic, predicate calculus, and set theory.)  My point, in support of yours,
>was that there is a problem in claiming that something (the universe, anything)
>'is in' itself only if 'is in' is interpreted in certain ways (membership),
>but not if it is interpreted in others (which others have a as substantial
>a claim to clarity and precision).  I think we agree in all of this.
>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

There is no problem with the universe being "in" itself in the sense
of membership, either.  NFU is a consistent and practical set theory.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Aug19.080257.4921@sics.se>
	<1992Aug19.094252.7977@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 10:25:30 GMT

In article <1992Aug19.094252.7977@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >The proof of FLT (in the _nous_ of God, see below).

  How does realism imply that FLT if true has a proof?

   >I quote Michael Dummett in _The Logical Basis of Metaphysics_ (pp.348f):

  Dummett natters on in his usual style, but I can't find a word in
the passage you quote about realism requiring a "set of all truths".
Could you be more explicit as to what you have in mind?