HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Grounding morals
Date: 26 Jan 93 22:58:57 GMT
	<C1F6p9.AE7@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>	<1993Jan26.032035.13300@news.eng.convex.com>	<C1G6Ct.HJ8@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>,<AG.93Jan26133304@anhur.sics.se>
	<C1H5L0.Mtv@umassd.edu>
Organization: GRAMMA

In article <C1H5L0.Mtv@umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
(Stephen Grossman) writes:


   In article <AG.93Jan26133304@anhur.sics.se>, ag@sics.se 
   (Anders G|ransson) writes:
   >In article <C1G6Ct.HJ8@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>
    jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.eu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:

   >Heisenberg suggested that intellectual arguments was part of the problem
   >and that morality must be based in something beyond rational
   >arguments. 


   SG	Heisenberg's culture was influenced by Kant to think that reason is 
        subjective and that morality is split from reality. However,
        reason is based in reality and morality is application of
        reason to surviving in reality. 
        Heisenberg is also a liar since explicit calls for irrationality were 
        culturally popular in the disintegrating Weimar Republic.
        _Mein Kampf_ has many such calls for irrationality. 
        Besides he was a scientist, not a philosopher.



'Heisenberg's culture'
'morality is split from reality'
'surviving in reality'
'a liar since' 
'scientist, not a philosopher'


Something on this comes from afar!
Imagine!


best regards Anders
--


If you see Saint Annie, please tell her - Thanks a lot.
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: Vegitarianism
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1993 21:14:22 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan23.104458.3247@cnsvax.uwec.edu> nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye) writes:
...

>Thus, it can be moral for the lion to eat the gazelle because he is
>ecologically important as a predator and an obligatory carnivore,
>whereas humans are neither (our raising of animals for food is not
>beneficial to the environment).

Why is that? Why are our activities somehow hostile to "the environment",
while the activities of the lion are not? Why is "the environment" somehow
worse off if I start a sheep ranch? If I plant wheat instead of grass? You
seem to have a very precise idea of what "the environment" ought to be
like, and anything _we_ do seems--almost by definition--to be evil in your
view.



-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai.philosophy
From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: supervenience refs please
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 08:42:07 GMT

Can anyone supply me with any references to the subject of supervenience,
especially in relation to consciousness ?

Many thanks to anyone who replies....

Tim
tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au


Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: dove@leland.Stanford.EDU (The White Blackbird)
Subject: Re: Grounding morals
Organization: Absolute Zero
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 22:41:12 GMT

In article <C1F6p9.AE7@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> 
	jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:

= >>Why should we think that an argument is _required_ to prohibit murder,
= >>or that a criterion must be found that confers a right to live?  Where
= >>did we get the idea that philosophy ought to give us _reasons_ for the
= >>simplest things?
= 
= The notion that an argument is required (desirable, good) to support
= any particular course of action is grounded in the recognition that
= humans a beings of a finite consciousness, able to make errors, and
= not possessed of an automatic code of values.  Simply put, we are
= human, we must decide what to do.
= 
= It is of course true that we could choose to pursue any old random
= course of action, some course of action for which we can give no 
= reasons.  But the nature of huamn life (conditional, often precarious)
= on this planet (a nice place, but not a Garden of Eden where survival
= is guaranteed) is such that random courses of action will not
= likely be productive of anything other than pain, suffering, and
= (ultimately) death.
= 
[rest deleted]

This reminds me of a quote I heard once, which goes something like
this:


	I have come to the conclusion that my subjective account of my
	own motivation is largely mythical on almost all occasions.  I
	don't know why I do things.

			    			-- J. B. S. Haldane

Sometimes I am of the opinion that reasons for human actions do not
occur until after the experience of that action.  In other words,
reasoning is not a way of deliberating, but rather a way of
rationalizing actions that have already been performed.

Any thoughts?



= 
= --Jimbo

dav

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: cdminter@icaen.uiowa.edu (Corey D Minter)
Subject: Re: Vegitarianism
Organization: Iowa Computer Aided Engineering Network, University of Iowa
X-Newsreader: NN version 6.4.19
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 01:35:55 GMT

cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:

>In article <1993Jan16.180706.3126@cnsvax.uwec.edu> nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye) writes:

>>>I have been struggling with these questions lately.  I see no
>>>qualitative distinction between the consciousness of man and other
>>>higher mammals, only a quantitative one.  
>>>[stuff gone]
>>>  Yet I feel vaguely guilty about both of these positions.
>>>Is there a philosopher in the house?

>You're asking some very important questions, and you're caught in a
>dilemma. 

>If I may paraphrase your position, it's something like this: You
>want to justify abortion on the basis of some criterion--some quality that
>the fetus lacks, but the infant posesses. You think that "sentience" or
>"consciousness" may be appropriate terms for this quality. 
>[stuff deleted]
>Is a child more valuable than a chicken? "Valuable" in what sense? Things
>have value _to_ someone; I don't understand the notion of "intrinsic"
>value. I don't think this question has anything to do with value.
>Why should we think that an argument is _required_ to prohibit murder, or
>that a criterion must be found that confers a right to live?  Where did we
>get the idea that philosophy ought to give us _reasons_ for the simplest
>things?

I agree and...
How would you react if I suggested that your morality is nothing more than
an evolved habit and a result of a culture propagating much like genetic dna
on its ability (no personification intended) to propagate?  However despite
the origin of my morality, I still have the desire to be what majority opinion
will label as 'good'.  I really can't pinpoint the source of that desire, but
I see no theistic authoritative origin either.  I would guess that culture's 
idea of morality evolved because it predated a good ability to reason deeply
and the enviroment favored that direction.  Actually to undo that may not be
a good idea, it is still true today that not all people have the ability to 
reason very well, but are very good at following moral codes that are simplified
for them.  (this is just an observation, not something I hope is really true)
    I hope that someone replies to this.  I suppose someone will acuse me of
some nasty things because of my view of morality.  Please do, but be specific.

-- 
cdminter@icaen.uiowa.edu / cdminter@eng.uiowa.edu (Qlink: EarthsWake)
"The face of a child can say it all, especially the mouth part of the face."
"We tend to scoff at the beliefs of the ancients.  But we can't scoff at them
personally, to their faces, and this is what annoys me."  -Jack Handy, SNL
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: mfragass@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Michael Fragassi)
Subject: Re: Abortion (was Vegetarianism)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 16:28:16 GMT

I agree - one must admit that a zygote, unlike a flea or a tick, will grow into
a being capable of very un-tick-like behaviors, such as musical composition, 
scientific research, and even posting to internet news.  This, it seems to me,
would be a more sensible ground for pro-life arguments - not that a zygote/
embryo/fetus _is_ a full human being, but that it will _become_ one, in a way
that no other bit of human tissue (like a fingernail, an appendix, or a tumor)
nor any other parasite ever will.  (Of course, this is presuming that human
life is more important than flatworm life.  Which I guess is going to anger
animal rights activists, but let's try to keep this discussion civilized :)
	But then, the issue becomes whether one believes preservation of this
potential is more important than the quality of the life of the mother and the
child-to-be.  This is the big philosophical difference in the
abortion debate, that reduces the whole thing to yelling matches - the
pro-life/anti-abortion side will not consider any other position but the
preservation of the life (or soul or, as I put it, potential), and the
pro-choice/pro-abortion side is founded upon the woman's right to evaluate for
herself whether bearing the fetus is the better thing to do.  It seems to me
that there is no "logical" way to argue that the latter is more important than
the former, to someone who religiously adheres to the former view (and who may
even believe that they will be personally damned for NOT crusading against
abortion).  Which is a shame, because it would be a damn good thing if more 
discussions about abortion were as calm and rational as this one is.  
-- 
_____________________________________________________________

Mike Fragassi                        mfragass@ucs.indiana.edu
Cognitive Science Program 
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: amc@wucs1.wustl.edu (Adam Costello)
Subject: Re: Vegitarianism
Organization: Washington University, St. Louis MO
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 21:51:31 GMT

In article <1993Jan24.231236.3267@cnsvax.uwec.edu> nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye) writes:
> 
>Whenever you bring a domestic animal to be raised for
>food into a pristine environment, you change it, usually drastically.
>For example, much of the Amazon rain forest is being burned off to grow
>beef.  If you take all the lions *out* of their environment, you change
>it, again drastically, as the former prey now multiply out of control
>and start to outgraze their food supply, sometimes to the point of
>permanently altering the flora, then begin to die in large numbers from
>starvation and disease.  I'm not saying that it is impossible to raise a
>herd of some domesticated animal without noticably damaging the
>ecosystem (notice that I said "is not beneficial", not "is detrimental")
>but I can't think of any ecologic benefit.

You talk as if the "environment" is some sort of being with its own
desires.  "Environment" just means "surroundings".  Surroundings have
to surround someone, namely the person uttering the word "environment".
This person is the one who has desires.  If this person can change his
environment, drastically, to better serve his desires, isn't that a
good thing?

Put another way, you seem to think that the environment has value
which is maximized when the environment is completely unaffected by
humans.  But for something to have value, there has to be someone who
values it.  Humans value their environment more than any other animals
do, because humans make the most use of it.  Therefore, the value of
the environment can be increased by the efforts of humans.

To show that humans are "damaging" the environment, it is not enough
to show that they are changing it drastically.  You have to show that
they are changing it into something that is less valuable *to them*.

AMC
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Subject: Re: Abortion (was Vegetarianism)
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1993 15:25:43 GMT

In <1993Jan27.150732.46798@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> hippee@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:

>My position is that a human life is no MORE worth any other.

The objection to restrictions on abortion about which people usually
feel strongest that such restrictions are restrictions on human
autonomy.  Is it also your position that human autonomy is worth no more
than (to use your examples) the autonomy of a louse, tick or worm?  If
so, on what do you base your apparent opposition to such restrictions?
Not on human welfare, I assume, unless you are similarly concerned about
the welfare of lice, ticks and worms.

>The point,
>however, does not hinge on this.  Instead, the point is that the individual
>who is doing the living on someone else (the parasite) should have the 
>permission to do so or face the prospect of an attempt by the host to be 
>removed.

Would it be relevant if the relationship of absolute dependency (the
parasitic relationship) were the reasonably forseeable consequence of
the host's voluntary actions?  It seems to me that in that case the
host's knowing and voluntary conduct could do the work of consent, and
her obligations could depend on the nature and value of the parasite.

For example, if someone does something that makes a tapeworm dependent
on her, too bad for the tapeworm.  On the other hand, if someone
knowingly and voluntarily does something that has the reasonably
forseeable result that I am dependent on her for my very existence for 9
months, it doesn't seem unfair to say that she has to put up with me for
that period.
-- 
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Alles Erworbne bedroht die Maschine, solange
sie sich erdreistet, im Geist, statt im Gehorchen, zu sein."  (Rilke)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai.philosophy
From: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Subject: Re: supervenience refs please
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 12:16:59 GMT

In article <tim.727605727@giaeb> 
	tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
>Can anyone supply me with any references to the subject of supervenience,
>especially in relation to consciousness ?

This book discusses varieties of supervenience in detail:

	William Seager,
	Metaphysics of Consciousness
	(Routledge; London, 1991);
	viii+262 pages.
	ISBN 0-415-06357-4.
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: Intelligent?
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1993 07:32:48 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1jp731INNn9u@bigboote.WPI.EDU> rosemary@joseph.WPI.EDU (Rosemary Irene Braun) writes:
>Hello fellow thinkers!
>
>Two friends and I recently got into a discussion concerning the definition
>of intelligence... I was just wondering what you thought, because there seems 
>to be a lot of ambiguity in the concept of intelligence. 

Well for starters, what makes you think there is any? In other words, what
makes you think that there is _one_ thing that we call by this name?
"Intelligence" might appear less mysterious if you thought about the way we
commonly use this word.

-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: tigger@nbrwh72.bnr.ca (Jeff Skinner)
Subject: Mother Nature (was : Vegetarianism)
Reply-To: tigger@x400gate.bnr.ca
Organization: Northern Telecom Public Switching, Bramalea Product Tech. S908
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 18:54:11 GMT

 Peter -

Thanks for your comments on my last effort.  If I may quote your original
 post with respect to the definition of environment : 

_]>"Environment" just means "surroundings".  Surroundings have
_]>to surround someone, namely the person uttering the word "environment".
_]>This person is the one who has desires.  If this person can change his
_]>environment, drastically, to better serve his desires, isn't that a
_]>good thing?
_]
_]You're right, of course--that's the sensible, though prosaic, way to look
_]at it. But you won't find the greens agreeing with you. On the face of
_]it, their convictions seem odd to you and me--why should a merely physical
_]system somehow have its own value, its own justification; why should "the
_]environment" be a good in itself, quite apart from man?
 
Websters definition reads as follows :
 
 ENVIRON - v.t. to surround, to encompass, to encircle, to envelop. -MENT
           n. that which environs, external conditions which determine
           modifications in the development of organic life.
 
Apparently "just surroundings" is a little short as a definition of the 
"E" word. I think "just surroundings" might be a fair description of
, say, a room in a Best Western hotel on I95. (Although once you turn 
on the TV it would certainly be fair to describe it as an Environment)
Is the placenta to fetus perhaps a more sufficient  metaphor for the 
relationship of the human race to their home planet than a travelling
salesman to motel unit ? Isn't describing the global biosphere as 
a "merely physical system" kind of like calling St. Peter's in Rome
"an old bungalow" ?
 
I take your point regarding the Gaaian hypothesis as a kind of neo
pagan religious movement. This is probably a fair description. I would also
like to make it clear that I find it intriguing, but DO NOT subscribe to
it as some kind of dogma. We are running into the old question here
of what is and is not science? It's usually tackled experientially :
i.e : Quantum Mechanics is science (who would disagree with that ?),
medicine is science (some murmurs of dissent from the gallery) psychology
is a science (a deafening chorus of raspberries from down front). No
dispute from me that Biosphere as sentience is not only NOT science NOW
but probably never could be . The problem for me
is that this disclaimer also applies (IMHO) to ANY philosophical
statement which engages at a level of meaning (metaphysics). So if we
can only get respect for propositions that qualify (by consensus) as
science things are going to get a tad dry here.
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Grounding morals
Date: 26 Jan 93 18:48:35 GMT
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.

In article <AG.93Jan26133304@anhur.sics.se>, ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson) writes:
>In article <C1G6Ct.HJ8@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:

>Heisenberg suggested that intellectual arguments was part of the problem
>and that morality must be based in something beyond rational
>arguments. 

SG	Heisenberg's culture was influenced by Kant to think that reason is 
subjective and that morality is split from reality. However, reason is based in 
reality and morality is application of reason to surviving in reality. 
Heisenberg is also a liar since explicit calls for irrationality were 
culturally popular in the disintegrating Weimar Republic. _Mein Kampf_ has many 
such calls for irrationality. Besides he was a scientist, not a philosopher.
________________________________________________________________________________
	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
                                                              AYN RAND
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASSD.EDU>
================================================================================
From: drake+@cs.cmu.edu (Drake)
Subject: Re: Abortion (was Vegetarianism)
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 01:16:41 GMT

cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:

>You are saying that because you are in some way confused about the status
>of unborn children, everyone should make up their own minds about whether
>it's OK to kill them. That's a little disquieting--what if it turns out
>that it's really _not_ OK to kill the unborn? After all, you say that you
>don't know. Perhaps it would be better to err on the side of caution? 

What do you mean by "OK" or "not OK?"  If it "turns out that it's really
_not_ OK," fine, then I'll stop.  I honestly doubt that that's going to
happen though...I mean, it hasn't yet.

-- 
Love and Laughter,             | NOTE: Private mail must go explicitly
Xeper and Remanifest,          | to drake@seismo.soar.cs.cmu.edu
                       DRAKE   | or it'll bounce back to you...
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:3410 comp.ai.philosophy:7359
From: lee@neural.hampshire.edu (Lee Spector)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: supervenience refs please
Date: 22 Jan 1993 15:24:49 GMT
Organization: Hampshire College, Amherst, MA
NNTP-Posting-Host: neural.hampshire.edu

In article <tim.727605727@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
>Can anyone supply me with any references to the subject of supervenience,
>especially in relation to consciousness ?

My recent dissertation, "Supervenience in Dynamic-World Planning",
contains an extended discussion of supervenience and its application
to AI systems. It also contains a bibliography with many pointers
into the supervenience literature. It is available as a tech report
or through University Microfilms International. I have included the
abstract below.
 
Hope this helps,
  -Lee
 
Lee Spector
Assistant Professor of Computer Science
School of Communications and Cognitive Science
Hampshire College
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002-5001
e-mail: lspector@hamp.hampshire.edu
 
 ---
 
Abstract
 
This report investigates the utility of abstraction for agents living
in complex, dynamic environments. The generation of intelligent behavior
in such environments requires the integration of deliberative and
reactive processes. Modularity and hierarchy have proven to be valuable
organizational principles in this context, and the notion of "levels
of abstraction" has played a particularly important role. This report
presents a form of abstraction called \underline{supervenience},
of which other common forms of abstraction are special cases. Supervenience
is based on epistemological "distance from the world," and is particularly
useful for integrating deliberative processes with actions in a changing
environment. Supervenience is discussed in relation to the literature
of AI planning systems, the literature of cognitive psychology, and
the philosophical literature in which the term originated. Supervenience
is described in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning systems, and
is compared to related formal constructs. A program based on the
concept of supervenience is described, and its performance in a dynamic-world
planning domain is demonstrated. This report is a reformatted version
of the author's doctoral dissertation.
 
Spector, Lee. Supervenience in Dynamic-World Planning. Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Maryland (College Park), Department of Computer Science.
Technical report CS-TR-2899, UMIACS-TR-92-55, May 1992.
 
Also available as University of Maryland Systems Research Center
technical report Ph.D. 92-5.
 
Also available through University Microfilms International, Order
Number 9234663.