From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 19:46:46 GMT

In <Bw12rG.6Ao@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:
rl> Without referring to "cosmoses", collective lives, giraffes, etc,
rl> please explain how/why you consider sentience and sapience to be
rl> "arbitrary" criteria in determining the goodness or badness of
rl> actions involving other beings.

From article <1992Oct13.153853.15782@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> In other words, limit myself to an anthropocentric view, as you do?
ry> No problem.  Without an explanation, a description, of that which
ry> constitutes "meaning", assignments of status based on these criteria,
ry> even WITHIN human society,  begin to be somewhat random, or
ry> "arbitrary."

I'm not "assigning status" to Rich Young when I recognize that he 
has thoughts and feelings that deserve my respect.  To the 
contrary, I'm merely recognizing capabilities that exist within 
Rich Young.  Nor would I be "withdrawing status" from a cabbage 
if I were to point out that cabbages appear to be mindless 
entities that couldn't care less whether they live or die.  The 
"mind" of the cabbage would exist or not exist within the 
cabbage, just as Rich's mind would exist or not exist within the 
body of Rich, regardless of my thoughts and perceptions on the 
matter.    

The fact that I cannot know with absolute certainty that Rich 
Young has a mind with thoughts and feelings (ie meaning) doesn't 
prevent me from treating him with respect, regardless of the
particular "meanings" that may be running through his mind.  Nor 
could my lack of certainty permit anyone to reasonably conclude
that my respect for Rich's mind is "arbitrary".   

I'd be the first to point out that our knowledge of other minds, 
whether human or otherwise, can never be definitive, but this 
doesn't mean that our respect for other minds is random.  And 
while it's true that we cannot know with absolute certainty that 
a carrot does not feel pain of some sort, this weakness on the 
part of our own finite minds should not prevent us from 
recognizing that dogs apparently do feel pain, and hence, ought 
to be treated kindly rather than cruelly.  

ry> ...
ry> Sentience and sapience are no more important to other species than
ry> a variety of other characteristics.  

No characteristic would be important to an individual lacking 
sentience and/or sapience.  Metaphorically speaking, of course, 
we might say that warmth is important to a bacterium, just as we 
might say that oil is important to a ball-bearing, but in truth, 
there's no reason for us to believe that either bacteria or 
ball-bearings really care one way or the other.   

As for the notion that sentience may not be important to 
non-human animals, I can assure you that pain (just one form of 
sentience) would be the major thing on a dog's mind if you were 
to zap him with a cattle prod or spray cayenne pepper in his 
eyes.  The fact that the dog, like many humans, may not have the 
mental capacity to articulate a "philosophy" of pain, doesn't 
mean that his pain is unimportant to him.  His pain is just as 
objectively real as your pain or my pain.  In fact, it may be 
more objective since the dog may not have the intellectual 
capacity to conjure up the sort of mental rationales and mental 
escapes that humans often employ to distract themselves during 
moments of agony.  

ry> Human use of them to make ethical judgements is arbitrary.  

To the contrary.  To not recognize sentience and sapience is 
arbitrary.  If we fail to respect the ability of animals to think 
and feel, we'd be ignoring the only grounds for ethical judgments 
that exist within the animals themselves.  To say, for example, 
that it's wrong to burn dogs alive because dogs feel pain is 
clearly not arbitrary or random.  After all, we have good reason 
to believe that most dogs (if not all dogs) don't enjoy being 
burned alive.  On the other hand, it would be arbitrary if I were 
to assert that it's ok to burn dogs with white fur but not black 
fur simply because I prefer the color black.  After all, my 
preference in such a case is based on a whim that exists in my 
mind and, in pursuing such a course, I'd be misusing dogs to suit
my own selfish purposes.

Of course, it'd be easier for us to base an ethical decision on 
something simple like the whiteness or blackness of fur, but the 
simplicity of this definitive approach would reflect stupidity,
not intelligence.

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ