HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Weak cryptography >> Key registration
Date: 20 Nov 92 19:06:40 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com


Current policy is to allow export of cryptosystems of a certain weakness
provided they can't be strengthened.  I believe that this is a superior
policy to that of key registration.

The real concern isn't lawful interceptions and decryptions.  It's unlawful
ones -- by organized crime, criminals within the gov't, criminals with
"friends" in the gov't, ....

If the system is weak but the key is private, then the NSA can break the
system if there's a demand for it but it's unlikely that Joe Mobster can
break it.  I trust the NSA not to be in the pay of the mobs.  Meanwhile,
I'd be surprised if the NSA would bother breaking weak systems (eg.,
straight single CBC DES) just for fun (eg., as a favor to someone (like the
local police) legally authorized to do the interception).

If the system is strong but keys are registered, then Joe Mobster doesn't
have to build a decrypting machine or try to get a friend inside the NSA.
All he has to do is pay off someone at the registration center or otherwise
gain access.  He might, for example, get hired by the FBI (as a cover --
and for some side income -- and as a spy), use a judge who was bought by
the mob and walk up to the key registration center with a valid warrant.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5057 sci.math:15277 comp.theory:2483
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 20 Nov 1992 04:41:21 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: physics.ubc.ca

Could someone please remind us what P and NP mean? And what is being
varied to get "polynomial time" -- ie what is polynomial in time , or
what is time polynomial in?
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: My encryption program.  Comments?
Date: 21 Nov 92 01:00:43 GMT
Article-I.D.: nwnexus.1992Nov21.010043.4210
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service

In article <1ejpp5INNdef@roche.csl.sri.com> boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher) writes:
>1) It generates a stream of pseudo-random numbers, based on a pass-phrase
>   typed by the user (between 13 and 1019 characters).  The first 
>   ~million bytes of pseudo-random numbers are generated when the program
>   starts up.  Call it "key_stream."
>
>2) A separate, single pseudo-random byte is also generated at the start.
>   It's value depends on generating the entire initial key_stream.  Call
>   it "zipper."
>
>3) the program executes a loop containing the following (pseudocode)
>   to encrypt a file:
>	inchar = getchar(infile)
>	outchar = inchar ^ key_stream[counter] ^ zipper  <-- "^" means xor
>	counter = counter + 1
>	zipper = outchar
>	putchar(outfile, outchar)

I don't see thay your "zipper" does anything but help protect the
first byte:
	outchar[2] = inchar[2] ^ key_stream[2] ^ outchar[1]
where outchar[1] is sitting right there in front of the cryptanalyst.

So the whole thing depends on how strong your keystream generator is.

		--Ken Pizzini
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 07:55:48 GMT


 In <1455.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us>
 john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (John Eichler) writes:


>>In <1992Nov17.065526.15487@cactus.org> Terry Ritter states:

>> Nonsense.  My proposal is that, given the ciphertext, the user
>> would be required to make it plain.  This means that there would
>> be a responsibility to log old *keys*, not conversations.

>I must be missing something here.  I agree with what Terry says but if I
>were to have a copy of a plaintext message to Terry and were to encrypt it
>with his public key, just how would I go about making such plaintext plain
>again WITHOUT his secret key even if I wanted to for any purpose.


 RSA gives public-key capability, but is slow.  Typically, a
 "public key" cryptosystem will only pass a session key under RSA,
 and then use a faster private-key system to encipher the data.
 Logging the session key would give the ability to recover the
 plaintext at a later date.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4896 comp.org.eff.talk:7094 alt.privacy:2312 talk.politics.guns:24204
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Date: 17 Nov 1992 02:10:13 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com
Summary: PGP may appear to be "freeware," but there are two areas
        of legal risk for those who use it: patent law, and export
        law.
Keywords: legal, patent, export, ITAR


DISCLAIMER:  The following information is provided as a public
service.  It is explicitly NOT a commercial advertisement, and
does not in any way represent, express or imply any policy or
viewpoint of SRI International.

First, it is illegal to "make, use, or sell" a patented device
without a license.  PGP's disclaimer does not protect anyone making,
distributing, or using PGP.  PKP owns the patent and sells licenses
to companies who want to make and sell products that use RSA and
other public-key cryptography.  PGP is not licensed.  A license to
the maker of PGP has always been (and still is) available, but it
would not be free (which would be unfair to other licensees, whose
licenses were not free).

Second, PGP may be illegal with respect to US export law.  The
author states in the documentation that he "guided" its development
overseas.  This might be construed an export of "technical know-how"
under the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations).  By
distributing or using PGP 2.0, you may be involved directly or
indirectly in an illegal act.  Ignorance before the law, of course,
is no excuse.  It's the responsibility of every one to seek their
own legal advice.  I strongly urge potential PGP users to have their
company's lawyers read the ITAR and read the PGP statement before
making a decision.  It could be a serious mistake to assume that
because this software "appeared" in the US or elsewhere, it and those
who use it are not at any risk of violating export law.

The risks to those actively promoting PGP, and/or distributing it, are
of course, greater than those for simple users, but even simple users
would do well to seek an acceptable alternative, such as RIPEM.
RIPEM is built on a piece of software called RSAREF.  RSAREF contains
an embedded patent license, and is perfectly legal to use for
non-commercial purposes.  Any software whatsoever can be built on
RSAREF, even PGP-like programs, and distributed freely.  RSAREF does
carry strong restrictions on export.  RIPEM source and executables can
be found using archie.



-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: 18 Nov 92 15:10:34 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <1ecnkuINNbut@gap.caltech.edu>, hal@cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney) writes:
> Could someone explain how three people (e.g. two plus the phone company)
> generate a session key "in the style of DH"?  I don't see how Diffie-
> Hellman generalizes naturally to three participants.  Thanks.
> 
Imagine that the 3 parties are in a circle.  Each generates a random x
and computes y = a^x mod p for a given "a" and prime p.  All three 
parties pass their y values to the right.  Using their received value 
of y, they compute z = y^x mod p and pass that to the right.  Finally, 
using their received values of z, they compute the shared session key
k = z^x mod p, which will be "a" raised to all three exponents.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney)
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Keywords: legal, patent, export, ITAR
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 10:37:37 GMT

In article <a_rubin.722037007@dn66> a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:
> ...
>(3) Distributing source code with appropriate disclaimers (possibly as RSA
>claims) is exactly what patent law was intented to encourage...
>experimentation with concepts/ideas to create new ideas.

Au contraire.

The patent law says that "whoever without authority makes, uses or
sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent" and "whoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer".

Distributing copies of a patent is aok.

Writing a book about it, discussing the whys and hows is aok.

But, once you have a program, things are different -- perhaps unclear,
but at least different.  Executing the program is clearly using the
patented invention and potentially an infringement.  Nothing in the
patent law encourages experimentation by infringing.  It is clear
that the purpose of distributing such source code is to USE the
patent.

Again, if you want to understand the ideas, or help others to understand
them, then go write a book.  There is NO WAY that a book can be
construed as making or using a patented invention.

Plus, any site making the code available might also find themselves
infringers.

Note that just because nothing is sold does not mean that the patent
owner can't get damages including royalties.



-- 
Glenn Tenney
voice: (415) 574-3420      fax: (415) 574-0546
tenney@netcom.com          Ham radio: AA6ER
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 20:08:48 GMT

PKP is not in the business of selling individual end user licenses thus
it should be no surprise that they have no desire to do so for PGP.
Their business is selling licenses to manufacturers of hardware and
software.  They would, I am sure, be happy to sell a license to Phil
but I doubt Phil would want to pay the royalty (quite modest as you
would know if you have ever actually inquired) for each of the users of
his package.

Now, if Phil had decided at the start to sell his package, approached
PKP for a license and been refused or given prohibitive terms there
might be something here to wonder about but at this point that is
hypothetical.  Even if they had, there can be ethical business
reasons for doing so based on agreements with other competing
licensees.  That's business.

I still don't like that the public must purchase rights to use work
done by tax-exempt, non-profit (I'm getting more specific here) groups
like MIT and Stanford funded signifigantly by public taxes but that's
reality at the moment and another issue.

Bob

-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

"There are some strings.  They're just not attached."
                                                    Victoria Roberts


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 17:44:22 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: world
Organization: Thibault & Friends

Canadian Version:

        I've done a little checking, and the story for Canadians
        appears to be this:

        (a) The RSA patents do not apply in Canada, so PGP should not
            present any problems wrt use and distribution.

        (b) Canada has a "monkey-see-monkey-do" pact with the USA wrt
            export controls, so it would not do to send PGP out of the
            country.

        (c) As in the USA, there is nothing preventing its import
            from Europe (eg. ghost or garbo).

    The usual caveat about getting your own lawyer applies...

    Cheers,
                Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Consulting Systems Analyst  |  The PC: Colt '45
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  of the information
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |   frontier
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: 15 Nov 92 20:38:40

>Professor E.R. Swart of the Computer Science Department at the University
>of Guelph, has recently developed a polynomial-sized linear programing
>formulation of the graph isomorphism problem and he has been able to show
>that with minor modifications, this same formulation can be used to solve
>the Hamilton tour, clique and other subgraph isomorphism problems.

Fortunately or unfortunately, Swart's stuff is like the "proofs"
of Fermat's last theorem that turn up from time to time.  He
first released his P=NP "proof" in the early 80's and has been
trying to patch up the mistakes ever since.

Also, nobody has ever proved that graph isomorphism is NP-complete,
unlike those other problems.  There is a clever argument by Goldwasser
and Sipser from a few years ago that graph isomorphism is probably
*not* NP-complete.  (I don't keep up with this field and don't
know what's been happening since then.).

It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
is dead; but at this point I wouldn't take Swart's claims seriously
without seeing some consensus among complexity efforts that unlike
his previous attempts, his latest effort is free of bugs.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Keywords: legal, patent, export, ITAR
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 08:49:09 GMT


Arthur L. Rubin asks if sources to RSAREF are available, and worries about
the possibility of a "back door."

Yes, the sources are what RSAREF is. ripem beta testers, for example,
need to compile RSAREF before compiling ripem.

I have not checked the sources personally, so I can't rule out a back
door, but they are there for anyone to check.

-- 
David Sternlight
(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)
From: linnoise@bigboy (LineNoise)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Compact encryption source needed
Date: 18 Nov 92 23:22:50 GMT
Organization: Temple University

I'm looking for Unix C source for a small encryption program.  It doesn't
have to be anything elaborate. I'd like to encrypt almost all my files in
my account when I log out and decrypt them (interactively) when I log on.

If you've developed such a program and you'd like to share it with me,
please send me email.  Please keep in mind that I'm a relative newcomer
to Unix, C, & cryptography so simplicity and compactness is important.
Compactness to me is source code that is less than 500k and executable
under 175k (in uncompressed states).  Thanks in advance.
  
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: X.509 Protocols
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 15:08:30 GMT

Does anyone have a copy of the current version of the CCITT X.509 protocols?
I have reference to a 1987 draft, and am interested to know if there is
anything more recent,.

Bruce


*****************************************************************************
* Bruce Schneier            2,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,002,000,000,000 
* Counterpane Systems       000,000,000,000,002,000,000,002,293 
* schneier@chinet.chi.il.us The largest prime number...alphabetically!
* (708) 524-9461            Two vigintillion, two undecillion, two trillion,
* 730 Fair Oaks Ave.        two thousand, two hundred and ninety three.
* Oak Park, IL  60302
*****************************************************************************
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Weak cryptography >> Key registration
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 21:20:58 GMT


Carl Ellison, in discussing weak systems which can be broken by the NSA
but not Joe Mobster, misses the point.

Many of us are worried not about Joe Mobster, but about Mitsubishi,
or the Government of France, or a Russian competitor with friends in
their equivalent of the NSA. Thus cryptosystems used by Americans in
international business need to be robust against other well-endowed
and technically skilled organizations, not the NSA.

I, too, trust the NSA, but they're not the threat to many of us.

-- 
David Sternlight


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: nmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren)
Subject: Re: unpredictable random generators (terminology)
Organization: U of Cambridge, England
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 13:23:10 GMT

In article <CH28NFT@minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de>, pom@anke.imsd.uni-mainz.DE (Prof. Dr. Klaus Pommerening) writes:
|> In the literature there is a certain confusion as to how call this sort
|> of (unpredictable) pseudo-random generators. Examples are:
|>  - secure
|>  - unpredictable
|>  - cryptographically strong
|>  - perfect
|> I prefer the latter term, because it is so short, and, more
|> important, the cryptographic strength implies that the generator
|> passes all efficient statistical tests -- truly perfect, isn't it?

I am afraid that this isn't true.  Consider the following generators:

    1) A multiplicative congruential generator with known modulus of the
order of 10^1000 and a known multiplier that is near-optimal in the spectral
test, sense.  This would be excellent for simulation (if fast enough!) but
useless for serious cryptographic work.

    2) An effectively independent random number generator that delivers
numbers with an unknown relative error in their uniformity of O(10^-3).  This
would be excellent for most cryptographic use, and is useless for most
simulation.



Nick Maclaren
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory,
New Museums Site, Pembroke Street,
Cambridge CB2 3QG, England.
Email:  nmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk
Tel.:   +44 223 334761
Fax:    +44 223 334679
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: New Encryption - a Challenge
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 09:31:43 GMT

In article <n0ee5t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
>Writes boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher):
> 
> > 3) A person would be foolish to use an encryption product whose 
> >  algorithm is unknown, because the provider might have a way to 
> >  always see cleartext.
> 
> Yes, I have heard something like that about the DES and RSA 
> algorithms. Have you?

I've never heard this of RSA, but during the development of DES there
was some question about the selection of the S-boxes that made some
wonder if there was a trap-door lurking there.  This concern was
also raised over the marginal key-lengthof 56 bits.  But while the
selection criterion used was kept secret, the whole algolrithm
was made public and has withstood attack (in the public arena, anyway)
for over a decade.  And when differential cryptanalyasis was
explored it was revealed that the S-boxes chosen for DES were
stronger than likely by chance, and that longer keys don't add
anything useful to DES's security.

But the point is that both DES and RSA's algolrithms have been public
and have withstood great scrutiny by the crypto field, and so far
have resisted attack (save, perhaps, a few bits of DES).

		--Ken Pizzini
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: New Encryption - a Challenge
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov 17 1992
Date: 18 Nov 92  21:36:28

Writes cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison):
 
 > We are cryptologists (those of us who have experience in the 
 > field).  We have done cryptanalysis but we aren't the puzzle wonks 
 > who just love to get their teeth into some new ciphertext to 
 > break. 
 >
 
 OK. No sweat. The challenge is obviously not addressed to you then. 
 If you refuse to even look at the product of a new and unusual 
 encryption method, you are obviously not the intended subject of 
 our challenge.  You don't have the curiosity or initiative. You
 are not a suitable participant for us.
 
 > This phrasing is again that of a taunt.  You come across as a high 
 > school kid when you talk like this.  If you were to expect any 
 > help at all, this would guarantee your losing it.
 
 Carl, the world throws challenges everyone's way at every minute. 
 You cannot reasonably demand to exist in an environment where 
 unexpected challenges do not rise at every moment.  Mine was just 
 an added one.  Like all the others that come your way, you may: 
 1. refuse it; 2. accept it;  3. ignore it.  Your choice.
 
 > Any success in avoiding cryptanalysis from ciphertext only 
 > does not imply quality of the system.
 
 But one thing is absolutely certain: success in avoiding a given 
 cryptanalysis is a definite proof of ability to withstand it! 
 That's NOT debatable. I wonder whether it is this realization 
 that motivates some of the negative comments here.
 
 > Therefore, even if you were to find a puzzle hacker on this 
 > newsgroup who would like to take a stab at what you're 
 > suggesting, you would have proved nothing about the quality 
 > of the system (unless it got broken, of course :-).
 
 Interesting how you use denigrating terms against third parties to 
 suggest the appearance of worthlessnes in NuCrypt.  Old propaganda
 technique.  Effective for the general public but in _this_ 
 environment, definitely cheap.
 
 I am just a very simple person who'd like to see whether anyone 
 here, whatever his name, title or professional status, can break 
 our encryption.  A prize was offered to s/he who can. 
 

--- Maximus 2.00
From: palmer@cco.caltech.edu (David M. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Beale Cipher FAQ?
Date: 19 Nov 1992 14:11:13 GMT
Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
NNTP-Posting-Host: alumni.caltech.edu

I am sure this is an FAQ, so E-mail responses might be appropriate.

What is the status of the Beale ciphers and attempts to crack it?
Have NSA people dropped a few Cray-years on it with the Library of
Congress as the source of potential keys? 

Is the historical record clear on whether T.J. Beale ever actually
existed, whether he went on a mining expedition, etc.?
Is a list of the names of the people in Beale's expedition available?

Is it all a hoax?

Anyway, stuff which would be helpful is appreciated.  I already have the
FAQ from rec.games, which gives the ciphers and a decryption of Beale 2.
I have sent away to the Beale Association for a couple of their pamphlets.

It sounds like fun, but I don't expect to crack it easily.  It's going
to take DAYS :-).

-- 
		David Palmer		 palmer@alumni.caltech.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt