From: josip@src.umd.edu (Josip Loncaric)
Newsgroups: soc.history,soc.culture.yugoslavia
Subject: Re: Irony continues in our history
Date: 12 Aug 92 22:02:17 GMT
Organization: Systems Research Center, Maryversity of Uniland, College Park

In article <1992Aug12.154054.14665@husc3.harvard.edu> stojanov@husc10.harvard.edu (Milan Stojanovic) writes:
>In article <1992Aug12.170142.9743@src.umd.edu> josip@src.umd.edu (Josip Loncaric) writes:
>
>>(2) The ethnic composition of Partizans would be discussed in a more
>>    extensive presentation of WWII in former Yugoslavia.  I'd suggest
>>    you look up relevant entries in "Enciklopedija Jugoslavije".
>
>Here it goes again. Last time you have posted it, and it was for 1944,
>not for before.  Why Mr. Loncaric?

Because by 1944 Tito's Partisans had grown to a serious force.  If you
wish to look up "Enciklopedija Jugoslavije" yourself, you're free to do so.
Why don't you?  I'll even give you the call number: DR1209.E52 --- Harvard 
ought to have a copy.

>>(3) If you have a point to make, make it: you are completely free to
>>    claim whatever you wish.  But note that others may remain unconvinced,
>>    depending on what you say.
>
>Excellent.   I have to say that the extent of Croatian participation 
>was negligible in any resistance movement during first two years of 
>WWII in Yugoslavia, except in the commanding structures of communist 
>resistance.  There is a reason for that.  Croats felt NDH is their country,
>and they were ready to live with "minor" incidents such as extermination
>of Serbs and Jews.  

I disagree with you completely, and you have not produced anything convincing.

Croats had complex feelings about NDH.  On one hand, they wanted to live
in their own country; on the other hand, they did not want to be ruled
by Ustashe (installed in power by Axis forces which created NDH).
Croats supported the leading Croatian Peasant Party, but this party had
refused to form a puppet government, so Croats got Ustashe instead.

Ustashe were an extremist group who turned to violence in response to
Serbian dictatorship; they were outlawed in Yugoslavia and given support
by Mussolini in Italy.  These were bitter, angry people, who would have
made a pact with the Devil himself to get rid of the Serbian rule.  In fact,
the bargain that the 300 or so of them who returned to rule NDH had made 
with the Axis forces was not much better.

Ordinary Croats, and even the Croatian elite, did not know immediately what
Ustashe would become.  But their reign was brutal, and the first ones to
experience it were local Serbs.  Under such pressure, local Serbs had
no choice but to join resistance; while Croats joined out of principle.  

There were two choices: Serbian Royalists led by Draza Mihajlovic (a Serb) 
and the Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito (a Croat).  But, for non-Serbs, 
Serbian Royalists were simply not an option, because their victory would 
continue Serbian domination over non-Serbs.  

This became even more clear when Mihajlovic's forces (known as Chetniks)
turned to terror over non-Serbs and to collaboration with the Nazis.
(Some Serbs dispute this, but the British were so displeased with 
Mr. Mihajlovic that they shifted their support entirely to Tito, whose
anti-fascist results were much more impressive.)

My claim is that Tito's forces won precisely because they were the only
option for non-Serbs who wanted to resist fascism.  Tito's Partisans
recruited regionally among local people.  In Croatia, they were
supported by Croats; in Slovenia, by Slovenes; in Serbia, by Serbs; etc.

If Mr. Stojanovic wants to claim that only Serbs resisted, then he
has to explain how come Draza Mihajlovic did not win.  The truth is 
that Tito won precisely because he was effective in recruiting non-Serbs.
Later, as the end of the war approached, Serbians who had supported
Draza Mihajlovic started shaving off their beards and joining Tito's 
forces.

To conclude: Tito won because he had the support of everybody, including
Croats, from early on.  Had Tito not been able to demonstrate that
his forces were more effective than Mihajlovic's, the British might
have not switched their support from Mihajlovic to Tito.  Maybe Tito
would have won anyway because the foundation of Mihajlovic's program
was rotten, but the point is that without massive support from everybody
Tito could not have done it.  And this support was based primarily
on Tito's anti-fascist message: he found early on that communist
indoctrination repelled people, and ordered it suppressed until the end
of the war.

Josip
Newsgroups: soc.history