From: positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: [misc.activism.progressive] Clinton Office Requests Comments
Date: 26 Jan 93 19:38:44 GMT
Organization: University of Michigan EECS Dept., Ann Arbor

mrh@centerline.com (Mike Huben) writes:
>positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas) writes:
>>mrh@centerline.com (Mike Huben) writes:
>>> positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas) writes:
>>>> mrh@centerline.com (Mike Huben) writes:
>>>>> positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas) writes:
>>>>>>Except when human beings are left to play a series of prisoner's dilemmas,
>>>>>>the most common outcome is nearly always mutual cooperation... without
>>>>>>any sort of coercion or government whatsoever. This is without a doubt
>>>>>>the lamest justification for an authoritarian society I've heard yet.
>>>>>
>>>>>If you examine your own statement, one flaw in your argument stands out.
>>>>>See the word "series"?  There is no good strategy if you may not interact long.
>>>>
>>>>But real life *is* a series of prisoner's dilemmas. That changes the
>>>>payoff matrix significantly and that's what makes it in an individual's
>>>>best interest to cooperate rather than defect. Defecting will pay off
>>>>more in the short run, but will make it less likely that others will
>>>>cooperate in the long run. It's not necessary to have government intervention
>>>>to make people cooperate... they will do it themselves, knowing that
>>>>in the long run it is in their best interests.
>>>
>>>Let me give you two simple examples where a tit-for-tat strategy fails.
>>>
>>> [examples omitted]
>>>
>>>Yes, in real life we're always running into prisoner's dilemma games.
>>>However, tit-for-tat is not an optimal strategy except under exceedingly
>>>stringent conditions.
>>
>>Did I *once* claim that tit-for-tat was an optimal strategy?
>
>Maybe indirectly.  Let me state my point more clearly.  We KNOW that
>tit-for-tat cooperation is not the optimal solution for many series of
>prisoner's dilemma games, two of which I presented.  We know from real life
>that in cases such as these, cooperation is disadvantageous.  Hope that
>"It's not necessary to have government intervention to make people
>cooperate... they will do it themselves, knowing that in the long run it
>is in their best interests" is naive.

Is it? Several studies have been run on people playing a prisoner's dilemma
game, and even *without* changing the payoffs, even *without* government
intervention, mutual cooperation is by far the most common outcome. Shall
I cite some studies, or will you concede the point?

>
>>>One way to solve the prisoner's dilemma is to change the payoffs so that
>>>defecting doesn't have a better payoff than cooperating.  That's the purpose
>>>of most laws with penalties, be they libertarian or statist.  Another way is
>>>to make the conditions meet those stringent requirements (perhaps by
>>>restricting entry to and from a small system of players) so that cooperation
>>>is the optimal strategy.
>>
>>I agree that the way to ensure mutual cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma
>>is to change the payoffs so that unilateral defection is no advantage. I
>>disagree that government coercion is necessary to change those strategies.
>
>Changing the payoffs boils down to modifying the environment.  You're right
>that government isn't the only way to do that.
>
I didn't say that government isn't the only way to do that... I said that
government is *not necessary* to do that. And I stand by that.

>>Let us consider a prisoner's dilemma we encounter every day: cashing checks.
>>Why do people not regularly kite checks at the local supermarket? You
>>can get away with a whole cartload of groceries for free if you do. It
>>seems that the payoff for cooperation (writing a good check) is [value
>>of groceries - amount of check] whereas the payoff for unilateral defection
>>(writing a bad check) is [value of groceries]. Clearly, defection conveys
>>an advantage. Why don't more people defect, then? Because of a few things
>>which detract from the defection payoff. One, most people are brought up
>>to be honorable. You wouldn't be able to sleep nights, knowing you defrauded
>>a shopkeeper.
>
>You're not much in touch with the world if you think that troubles most people.
>
Doesn't it? Go up to as many people as you like, and give them the following
hypothetical scenario:

  You're walking down a dark, lonely street at 4:00 AM, when you see a little
  old lady clutching a purse. You know for a fact that the purse contains
  ten million dollars in gold bullion and perfect diamonds. You're holding
  a gun with a silencer. There is nobody else around. Because this is a
  hypothetical situation, we can make it a "perfect" scenario: if you use
  the gun, you will definitely wind up with enough money to set you up
  for life, and you will definitely never get caught. Do you use it?

I don't have any studies to cite, but I'd bet my last dollar that most people
will look at you as though you were crazy and say, "Of course not!" I'd bet
even that most people who say they *would* use the gun, if they ever actually
*did* find themselves in that situation, would find themselves unable to pull
the trigger. Why wouldn't people do it? They have different reasons. "Because
I believe murder is a sin." "Because I don't want to go to hell." "Because I
don't want blood on my hands." "Because wasting little old ladies isn't
*nice*." It all boils down to the same thing: "Because if I killed her, I would
be unable to sleep at night."

Note that this example is not a true prisoner's dilemma. It's just intended
to illustrate that the "sleep at night" factor is much stronger than you,
Huben, think.

>>But more importantly, you'd never be able to shop at that store again.
>
>So what?  There are enough stores that I would never need to shop at the
>same one again if I lead a nomadic life.  Not to mention that it would be
>extremely difficult for shopkeepers to keep track of all the people who
>stole from them given the calculation below.
>
So the stores voluntarily set up a check clearance network, so if you kite
a check at one store, you can't ever shop again. In fact, this is what
the shopkeepers *do*... and the government doesn't even force them to. Strange,
huh?

>>That's a major disadvantage. The payoff for mutual defection
>>is really [value of groceries - ability to sleep nights - ability to shop
>>at store]. Even considering the case of the man who takes sleeping pills,
>>most people would consider the ability to shop at their neighborhood
>>grocery store the be worth more than one cartload of groceries. Thus,
>>defection has a negative payoff, and most people cooperate. As it happens,
>>kiting checks is illegal. But I contend that even if it were not, it would
>>happen rarely. (This contention is helped along by the fact that a good
>>check kiter is very hard to catch.)
>
>More likely it's due to the care shopkeepers exercise in whose checks they
>accept.  You know, like asking for identification.
>
...which again, is not required by the government.

>What planet do you come from that these everyday facts of life are not
>apparent to you?

Let's get back to your original post. You said, in effect, "Life is a series
of prisoner's dilemmas. A society whose people cooperate in prisoner's
dilemmas will do better than a society whose people defect. Left to their
own devices, people will defect, so therefore, government coercion is necessary
to *make* people cooperate." I agree with the first two sentences and disagree
with the last. Studies and real-life experience have shown that left to
their own devices, people confronted with a prisoner's dilemma usually
cooperate. There may be a good argument for coercion, but this is not it.

-- 
__/\__  Jonathan S. Haas         | Jake liked his women the way he liked
\    /  University of Michigan   | his kiwi fruit: sweet yet tart, firm-
/_  _\  positron@eecs.umich.edu  | fleshed yet yielding to the touch, and
  \/    Finger for PGP key       | covered with short brown fuzzy hair.