HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 28 Jul 92 14:08:42 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <memo.544674@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:

|> results (capitalism?) is completely contrary to the assumption of the
|> Islamic fundamentalist, - namely that what is important is to live,
|> and if necessary to die, correctly and according to a spiritual code.

Shades of Aristotle!  The unexamined life is not worth living.  All men,
by nature, desire to know.  Striving for the golden mean, ... These
are hardly "non-Western" values or goals. (Also, of course, shades of
Aquinas, Kant, et al.)

|> 
|> So Gary (If you are still with me, and whoever else is left :-)) my
|> intention is not to preach 'I am right - I have THE correct
|> interpretation of reality' - but more to say :-

Yes, I did actually get this far.  It is nice to see someone outside
of academia devote so much time and effort at striving for a coherent
and precisely articulated account of his world view (though I think
this goes on much more often than most academics expect).  Much
of what you say of course echos a great deal of the history of
philosophy.  Reading it I recall bits and pieces of Aristotle,
Aquinas, Kant, Hume, Quine, ...  I point this out only as a
justification for not having any "response" to your remarks in
this venue -- though I think none is called for.

I would suggest that you are mistaken in one fundamental view,
and that is when you claim that your "forays into philosophy"
have not answered your questions.  To the contrary, it would
appear that *your* foray into philosophy has been of great benefit
to you in answering these questions, in even being able to
phrase the questions, and in making your views reasonably clear
to others.  This is what philosophy (as distinct from merely
reading the history of philosophy) is *supposed* to do for you.
To some significant degree, it appears to have succeeded.

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Subject: Re: Transrational substantiation
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 92 18:33:08 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

In article <memo.528081@cix.compulink.co.uk> shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk writes:
>
> "Transrational Substantiation"
>Andrew used that phrase in a posting aboiut mysticism.
>
>He then used Rational substantiation as his criteria for a
>non-mystical revelation.
>
>Is there any justification for the view that rational substantiation
>can never add any knowledge or information to a system, since it must
>derive from pre-existent models and data.
>
>And that therefore all real change, and all real new information must
>be transrational and therefore mystical?

Of course, if you accept this problem statement, and deny that there is 
such a thing as "transrationality" -- claiming instead that all "transrational"
experiences are merely confusion -- then you are faced with the problem
Socrates answers in the Menon. Answer: learning is a process of remembering.
Therefore, by implication, the soul is immortal. 

Tom

******************************************************************************
 Tom Price  |  Obscure Dropout  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************





Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:1353 alt.society.futures:216
From: caleb@cbmtoruucp (Caleb J. Howard)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,alt.society.futures
Subject: the Ascent of man
Keywords: oh, this and that
Date: 26 Jul 92 03:38:25 GMT
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: Commodore Business Machines (CANADA)


Hi, you are quite right.  I seem to have misrepresented my feelings on this
matter slightly here.  I was trying to respond to one person's claim that
because the human brain wasn't evolving, the human mind was also stifled.
The human brain may or may not be evolving, I have really no background in
that area of physiology.  Regardless of this, however, I do believe that
the human consciousness/culture/mind is evolving at an exponentially increasing
rate that is bound to go asymptotic within a generation.

>
> At this time in the history of science, we have yet no understanding
> of the energy that generates the mind;  we have no way to distinguish
> between the brain of a genius and that of a lesser gifted individual.
> So how would we be able to tell the evolutionary difference --if
> any-- between the child and the adult brain.

Hmmm, I suppose that I cannot defend my position adequately, so I will simply
say that there are ways of exploring the psyche, and the nature of the energy
that defines the mind that are not scientific, but are nevertheless valid.  I
have met people and had conversations with them to the point that I feel
comfortable in saying that they seemed to have a thorough understanding of such
matters.  With respect to the differences between brains, I cannot say much, not
being schooled in that area of science.  What I was referring to was the
difference between the mind of an adult as compared to that of a child.  The
mind does evolve throughout the lifetime of experience that goes into the
formation of that mind.  The cheif difference in the discussion I was leading
and that which I was trying to lead is the difference between the brain and the
mind - hardware and software.

> Tell me you doubt this or that, but don't tell something does not
> exist, simply because you lack sufficient knowledge to detect it.

Apologies, I did not intend to state that there was no evolution happening in
the human brain, but that it was not required for the mind to evolve.

> >"I have found an ocean of mind" - Enya
>
> INDEED!  I like this quote;  is it from the Watermark album?

I think so.  I'm not sure, though, I have four, and it's on one of them.

-caleb (eater of souls)

-- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key to surviving as an egoless entity within the computer industry is to 
                                 be insidious.
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 21 Jul 92 20:38:04 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk> shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk writes:
>From Astrology as reflection thread
>        andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) wrote

>>        I think what comes most to mind is Wolfgang Stegmuller's
>>        alternative, quoted here from Kung's _Does God Exist_:

	[...]

>Stegmuller has illustrated that there is no absolute standpoint: It
>is _always_ a matter of personal choice. It is a choice whether one
>believes or does not.

But it is not clear that Stegmuller means that there is no absolute truth.
You get to choose, and there will be no proof to support or refute you,
but that does not mean all of the choices are correct, or in fact that
any of them are.

>e.g. In order to 'do Science' a necessary precondition is the
>assumption of some separate and observable reality.

No. I think we've seen this claim before. You do not need a "separate"
reality to do science. You do need some kind of observation, but this
too is stretched by modern physics. It seems that science is sometimes
willing to settle for observable consequences and a heavy handed Ockham's
razor, which allows physicists to think things like John Wheeler's idea
that the laws of physics came into being with the universe. I would guess
that it's arguable if this can be considered science.

>The real question for me is what is the effect of carrying over this
>assumption into HUMAN ACTIVITY THAT IS NOT SCIENCE. It seems to me
>that this assumption is being applied far beyond the context in which
>it is effective, because it seems that we are uncomfortable with a
>'multi-valued' reality.

Are you trying to argue against something which you would admit cannot be
'proved'? 

I read in one of M. J. Adler's books that philosophy doesn't arrive at new
knowledge, it just clarifies that which you already have.

>So on the one hand we have the realists
>saying 'It must be real, because it works'

This sounds more pragmatic than realistic to me. 

>and the New Agers saying
>'But you have no rational justification for it, so we can choose
>any model we want'.

Someone who says this is relying more heavily on rationality than most
philosophers, in that this attitude expects that anything which will be
correct to affirm or deny will be capable of rational justification.

>In conclusion: although we 'have to believe' in order to act...is it
>valid and/or effective to suspend belief at the cessation of the
>action? Can a man believe in material reality in the working day, as
>he designs a mechanical structure, yet see it all as Maya as he
>meditates, and be considered a rational and consistent man, or is he
>condemned to be considered a hypocrite and inconstant, because he
>varies his beliefs according to his purpose?

He can do what he likes. But this use of belief is nothing new to philosophy-
not since Averroes. I do not think there are many adherents to this today.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Astrology as reflection
Date: 21 Jul 92 02:22:45 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <Brov10.4HH@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1082@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:
>
>A very good point -- and, of course, the sort of response I was hinting at
>in my query to McPherson regarding what she believes is the relation between
>Newton's and Einstein's theories.  I do think your characterization  of the
>phlogiston theory as providing useful explanations  in "only a very small
>arena" is not quite fair (considering available arenas at that time). 

I think I stand by it as fair, in that even after Newtonian physics was
starting to run into trouble (end of the nineteenth century), whole new
areas of application opened up - radio, heavier than air flight, etc.
Even now we have recently found more confirmations of Newtonian physics
(planetary rings, modern meteorology, etc.). After the phlogiston theory
started to fail, it quickly spiralled out of sight.

Now there may eventually come a time when people's experience is essentially
quantum mechanical or relativistic, but I do not expect this for a very
long time, if ever. Newtonian physics will _never_ look silly to humans.

>However,
>the primary point remains that the reason Stahl's theory was rejected was
>that it failed to acquire "inter-theoretic" support from other evolving
>theories (atomic theory, electrochemical theory, etc.) as did the oxidation
>theory.  (Well, maybe not *the* reason, but I think it is the major one.
>Even in Lavoisier's arguments based on simplicity there is an appeal to
>relations to other theories.)  In the end, Stahl's theory gets rejected
>while Newton's gets "subsumed".

But 'inter-theoretic support' is an integration of experience, if the
science is being done right. In which case it can be seen as a failure
of the phlogiston theory to acquire new arenas. In some sense there is
a probabilistic question - how likely were the people to do the _experimentum
crucis_ given that this likelihood depends on what people frequently
experience and what they _choose_ about what they experience.

>The other philosophy he does is primarily epistemology -- in the sense of
>criteria for the acceptance and rejection of beliefs and systems of belief.

Yes, he does philosophy of science because it's the only knowledge, and
epistemology to prove to himself (and others) that this is the case... :-)

>I don't quite know what you mean in saying that the positivist "only believes
>in science" unless "science" is taken in a very broad sense. 

This must be the evolutionary part of positivism. In the beginning, I think
they were hoping for it to be a narrow sense.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1992 12:57:08 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <BrvAMK.2C3@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
|> In article <BruMFG.MMC@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
|> > 
|> >In article <BruHGx.B2F@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
|> >|> In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
|> >|> > 
|> >|> >In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
|> >|> >|> 
|> >|> > 
|> >|> 
|> >|> [stuff deleted...]
|> >|> 
|> >|> >I'm not sure what the multi-valued reality stuff is, nor what other
|> >|> >contexts you have in mind where this assumption fails.  I have a vague
|> >|> >feeling that what is lurking behind these questions is old phenomena/
|> >|> >noumena or observation-statement/theoretical-statement distinction
|> >|> >together with the usual non-uniqueness problem in saving the phenomena.
|> >|> 
|> >|> >Anything else?
|> >|> 
|> >|> [stuff deleted...]
|> >|> 
|> >|> A label for everything....how nice and comfortable...
|> > 
|> >"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
|> >shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
|> >*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
|> >particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
|> [stuff deleted..]
|> 
|> Labels are also used to devalue something, so that it fits better 
|> into the realm of the common place and the "anything else."
|> 
|> - Peggy -

Could you expand on this?  For example, could you show how my question
to Leo either devalues or attempts to devalue anything?  In particular,
could you indicate how establishing something as based on (to pick
a single example) the phenomena/noumena distinction devalues it?  In
the process, could you please give an account of the labels *you* are
using?  For instance, what do you mean by "value", and how is this
affected by the question I asked?  And what is meant by "the realm of
the common place" and "the 'anything else'"?

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 17:16:07 GMT

Leo says:

>some way of distinguishing 'good' models from 'bad' models. For
>example Randall has said a couple of times that science is good
>because essentially - (and forgive me if I don't get the subtle
>nuances right here Randall) it gives power of the reality it
>describes, and is useful to prolong life and increase material
>living standards.

I am not concerned with whether science is "good"; I am concerned with
whether it is true (which, in its own terms, is the same thing, I
suppose).  I do not regard the argument from power as a proof; it is
merely a strong hint.  Science does not give power over "the reality
it describes"; it gives power over everyday reality, the real reality,
the one that counts.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 13:38:25 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1127@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:

|> Now an example or two doesn't prove anything, but I find any idea that the
|> practice of philosophy has a beneficial effect on one's life as unfounded,
|> but in the older traditions this was one of the explicit aims of philosophy.

Well, I do not want to make the strong claim that philosophy (or philosophical
reflection, or whatever) will *necessarily* have a beneficial effect on
one's life, as this is demonstrably false. However, it likewise seems clear
that such reflection and analysis has a beneficial effect on *some* lives.
I feel it has had a beneficial effect on mine, I think it has had a beneficial
effect on Leo's, and I bet it has had a beneficial effect on yours.  The
fact that one does not (or perhaps cannot) arrive at "ultimate answers" or
"first principles" does not imply that the attempt to do so fails compeletely
to be beneficial -- sometimes in very practical ways.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: gorski@pslu1.psl.wisc.edu (Tom Gorski)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Call for Articles -- ASCENT
Date: 22 Jul 92 13:55:28 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin Physical Sciences Lab

In article <539@cbmtoruucp> caleb@cbmtoruucp (Caleb J. Howard) writes:

[commentary on evolving minds via USENET deleted...]

>By this, we are able to communally persue the topic of mutual interest with
>greater speed due to the fact that we are all considering the same questions
>from different perspectives concurrently.  We are able to process the thoughts
                                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>much more efficiently as a group than we would be able to individually.
^^^^^^^^^^^***********^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This last statement sounds neat, but what exactly does it say?  The phrase
"process the thoughts" strikes me as extremely nebulous, and as for how
you measure efficiency, well I just don't know.

In the context of your previous link to evolution, I don't see how
electronics affects the situation that much.  If I'm participating in
a discussion with a group of people, it may seem extra keen that the
participants are strewn across the US and joined via electronic links, but
it's still just discussion, and folks have been having those for years and
years and years.

>This is how I view the evolution of man.  I think that the problems we face
>as a species now will be overcome when we learn to work together on solutions.

Maybe so, but I would hardly venture to call this "lesson" new in the
context of human experience, or even the animal kindom in general.

>We must leave the capitolist tendencies of secrecy and competition behind, and
>learn to function as individuals within the single consciousness of mankind.

Ahh, so then this is a political advertisement, yes?

>
>-caleb
>

--Tom Gorski
From: lee@wang.com (Lee Story)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 30 Jul 92 17:11:27 GMT
	<Bs1t0L.n2p@unx.sas.com> <1127@kepler1.rentec.com>
Distribution: usa
Organization: Wang Laboratories, Inc.

In article <1127@kepler1.rentec.com> andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:

   [...] I think that people who innovate in philosophy are a bit like
   people who innovate in religion - they're often pessimists who
   believe that the present understanding has no hope of success.
   Sometimes they're totally pessimistic like Marcuse or Nietzsche -
   they declare the larger questions insoluble, or arrive at
   horrifying solutions (Nietzsche's eternal recurrence).

Though there are "horrifying" aspects to Nietzsche's arguments when
thoroughly worked out (as in "Zarathustra" or "Beyond Good and Evil"),
I can't see that his eternal recurrence is the product of pessimism,
nor should it be a cause of same.  Indeed it seems positively
delightful when compared to will-less heavens filled with drugged
souls in the process of merging with godhead.  I don't see at all,
from the argument offers here, what the relevance of pessimism is to
innovation.

   Now an example or two doesn't prove anything, but I find any idea
   that the practice of philosophy has a beneficial effect on one's
   life as unfounded, but in the older traditions this was one of the
   explicit aims of philosophy.  Needless to say there is a value
   judgement here, and presumably any philosophy which abhors value
   judgements must fail to justify its practice, and it must even
   leave this failure unexplained. Is there any reason to expect that
   such a philosophy may leave us no happier than before?

This seems to confuse "a beneficial effect" with "happier", and to
invent the notion of the "practice" of a philosophy (in which "a
philosophy" must be quite different from mere "philosophy", where the
notion of "practicing" seems ridiculous; indeed, seems to me to be
better labelled "a religion", deistic or not).  Needless to say,
your paragraph has befuddled me completely.

This reply says "I don't understand" in so many ways that I hesitate
to post it, but I really found your comments, Andrew, more impenetrable
than the abstruse Wittgensteinian discussions which spring up from
time to time in these groups.  And usually you seem to me to make sense.

Regards,
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Lee Story (lee@wang.com) Wang Laboratories, Inc.
            (this email address disappears 14 August;
 I may be reborn as lee@bostech.com or something similar in September)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: arromdee@jyusenkyou.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 27 Jul 92 17:29:42 GMT
Organization: Johns Hopkins University CS Dept.

In article <Bs1tMH.w2@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>Someday I would like someone to give a reasonably precise account of
>what a "value judgement" is and how it can be distinguished from other
>sorts of judgements (apparently devoid of value or not based on value?).

A value judgment is a judgment where agreement on certain values is
important to the outcome of the judgment.  Although all judgments are in some
sense based on value, in many of them there's no significant disagreement
among people due to disagreements about value.
--
Hi! Ani mutacia shel virus .signature. Ha`atek oti letoch .signature shelcha!

Ken Arromdee (UUCP: ....!jhunix!arromdee; BITNET: arromdee@jhuvm;
     INTERNET: arromdee@jyusenkyou.cs.jhu.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1992 17:49:00 +0000

sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes..

>The anti-realist does not believe that *anything* goes, but rather
>that there is no particular mapping with a special claim to preferred
>status. The world is really out there -- under one or another
>description. There are a number of "right" descriptions you may pick.

At last: A clear definition.

>But there are *wrong* descriptions as well. Choose one that is wrong
>enough and you are dead meat. In this sense, indeed, "Right thinking
>or bust." -- Gary H. Merrill


Well right and wrong imply value judgement. So our anti realist has
assumed

               (i) A separate reality
               (ii) selection criteria for his worldview

before he gets on with the task of having such.  Are these necessary
preconditions?



Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta