HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning)
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 01:13:49 GMT

I believe that Fleming made the patent for penicillin public, which delayed
development for many years.  No drug company wanted to invest the $
on development and clinical testing when anybody else could ride on
the investment and undercut their prices.  A sure route to bankruptcy.

This is a system design issue.  You guys are argueing about waves,
not wave-generation mechanisms.

Lew
-- 
Lew Glendenning		rlglende@netcom.com
"Perspective is worth 80 IQ points."	Nils Bohr (or somebody like that).
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4894 sci.math:15088 comp.theory:2442
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 23:05:46 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <PHR.92Nov15203840@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin) writes:
>It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
>is dead

This isn't true.

You don't have to have an algorithm whose inversion is in NP to have it
be unbreakable.  All you need is a lower bound on the power of the
security parameter.

Ie., if the space-time required to break some algorithm is guaranteed
of order at least k^5, then you know how big to choose k so that a computer
using all the atoms of the universe would take billions of years to
do the inversion.

Of course, I'm told that that's a problem perhaps as hard as P=?NP.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ted@nmsu.edu (Classic Ted)
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
Reply-To: ted@nmsu.edu
Organization: Computing Research Lab
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 01:20:02 GMT


In article <BxztIC.BJ1@world.std.com> ariel@world.std.com (Robert L Ullmann) writes:

   Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: nmsu.edu!lynx!fmsrl7!destroyer!gumby!wupost!tulane!ukma!cs.widener.edu!eff!world!ariel
   From: ariel@world.std.com (Robert L Ullmann)
   Organization: The World in Boston
   References: <1992Nov14.195515.27178@leland.Stanford.EDU>
   Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 02:27:48 GMT
   Lines: 26

   kocherp@leland.Stanford.EDU (Paul Carl Kocher) writes:
   > It sounds to me like this "encryption" system just involves XORing
   > random numbers onto the plaintext, which would explain why the program
   > is very short, cannot use keys, and produces different cryptotext when
   > run multiple times (different random number seeds stored at the beginning
   > of the cryptotext).

   Ah, very good. Does indeed sound like that.

   Perhaps the originator (whom, after all, may be misrepresented by the
   poster) has not designed security-by-obscurity, but simple obscurity-
   by-obscurity, a perfectly valid and useful concept. But not what we
   mean by cryptography.


actually xoring with a random stream is a completely viable method, if
the actually random stream is selected from a relatively small subset
of the total possible number of random streams.  decryption could be
done by trial or could be keyed by the first few bytes of the message.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 12:39:17 GMT

In article <PCL.92Nov18102622@black.oxford.ac.uk> pcl@oxford.ac.uk (Paul Leyland) writes:
>In article <PHR.92Nov17033415@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin) writes:
>   Regarding RSA in particular, remember also that the motivation of
>   patents is to provide an incentive to invent: the public gets the
>   benefit of the invention in exchange for the inventor getting a
>   limited monopoly.  But RSA was invented without this incentive (we
>   know this because nobody thought to apply for patents until after the
>   invention was already published, which is why it is not patented in
>   Europe, where applications must be filed before the invention is
>   published).  So in exchange for the monopoly, the public in this
>   case got *nothing*.
>
>Oh, I don't know about that.  The European public got rather a lot,
>and don't even have to pay royalties.  Come to that, PKP don't even
>have a monopoly.  A limited monopoly, limited to within the US, yes.
>
>"The public" != "The population of the US".

Which makes the the RSA patent even more absurd -- foreign nationals
get to use RSA for free while US taxpayers, who helped fund the
research, have to pay royalties!

		--Ken Pizzini
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
Date: 17 Nov 92 09:42:16 GMT
Article-I.D.: nwnexus.1992Nov17.094216.23085
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service

Sigh.  I'm getting quite tired seeing Terry Ritter get ripped to
shreds by people who aren't understanding his intent.  Let's see
if I can explain his position any better:

We can assume that some day, probably in the not too distant
future, there will be a Congressional Committee Hearing on
the regulation of cryptography.  Law enforcement officials
will probably testify as to why they need to be able to
decrypt everyone's encrypted traffic.  Some nonsense hysteric
such as "drug dealers..." will likely be raised.  Our
mission is to come up with arguments that will be understood
by non-technical politians, and the general public, as to
_why_ crytography should be free.  Further, we should devise
a scale of compromises, should they become necessary, to
offer in the event that too-strong legislation becomes
introduced.

In the latter category, Terry was suggesting key-logs as
an improvement over key-registration.  He was not suggesting
that this is the be-all solution, just that it is an
improvement.  By all means improve on it, but keep in mind
that so far the following ideas have already been suggested
(in order of increasing preference):
	key registration
	key logs
	unrestricted crypto

Constructive contributions to this discussion would be to add
to the above list, especially in the gap between logging and
unrestricted, and to give arguments to J. Q. Public -- who
thinks that RICO and civil forfeture laws are great ways of
dealing with drug dealers -- convincing her/him that crypto
should be unregulated/minimally regulated.

		--Ken Pizzini
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5086 sci.math:15306 comp.theory:2488
From: mab@wdl39.wdl.loral.com (Mark A Biggar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 20 Nov 92 19:06:49 GMT
Organization: Loral Western Development Labs

In article <1992Nov19.193036.26711@rchland.ibm.com> lwloen@vnet.ibm.com writes:
>Surely, it can't be this easy.  I get squeamish whenever I see clocks and
>numbers on arguments of this kind.  Is the cardinality of the set of
>P algorithms == number of natural numbers?  Why doesn't Cantor's diagonal
>argument crop up somewhere and spoil everything?  (I don't necessarily mean
>the original, but an appropriate analog of it).
>Or, does the cardinality N (that is, of natural numbers)
>arise elsewhere in this problem?  I suppose some really smart people have
>already covered this ground; it is all very counter to my intuition.  Maybe
>it's time for me to take a class on all of this stuff. . .

The set of P-algorithms is a proper subset of the set of turing machines and
the set of turing machines is countable, because by definition both the state
set and the tape-symbol set for a turning machine are finite.

P-algorithms by definition halt with a known bound on running length.

--
Mark Biggar
mab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: rips - sh script for sending ripem messages
X-Quoted: 50%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 16:51:40 -0500

Thus said boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher):
>----------------- clip clip --------------------------
>#!/bin/sh
># rips filename recipient_user_id "subject matter"
># Mails a RIPEM-encrypted file.
># Edit the following variables to reflect your situation before using this script.
>ripem="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/ripem"
>pubkeys="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/pubkey.ripem"
>seckeys="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/seckey.ripem"
>user_id='boucher@csl.sri.com'
>tmp_crp="$HOME/bin/r_${$}.crp"

Why not just let RIPEM use the environment variables for this stuff?

BTW, if anyone is interested, I have a couple perl programs which allow
RIPEM use with MH reasonably cleanly, although there are a few minor warts.
They provide intelligent handling of headers, however, which most other
scripts I've seen don't do.  I uploaded them, and Mark may make them
available when RIPEM is released.  (I hope it'll be released in time for
computer security day. :-)  Feel free to ask me for them.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted
"If it were not for the First Law of Thermodynamics, all bright students
of mechanical engineering would want to work on perpetual motion!"
		- Maurice Wilkes on AI
From: leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Attack Methods
Date: 18 Nov 92 13:34:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: qiclab.1992Nov18.133412.23654
Reply-To: Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
Organization: SCN Research/Qic Laboratories of Tigard, Oregon.

phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin) writes:

>   So what are some of the methods used to attack an encrypted text, when the
>   encryption method is unknown?

>One method used in WW2 was to send divers to recover encoding equipment,
>codebooks, etc. from sunken enemy ships (perhaps sometimes ships
>that were attacked specifically for the purpose of getting the
>crypto stuff).  Another method is to capture the sender or receiver
>of the messages and demand the encryption keys etc. at gunpoint.

>There are also cryptanalytic methods, but I mention the WW2 story to
>underscore the fact that sci.crypt readers responding to "challenges"
>are fortunately NOT likely to use ALL of the methods that a real world
>codebreaker would use.  Any purely cryptanalytic challenge to
>sci.crypt, in order to be fair, must provide as much info as an enemy
>spy agency would be able to obtain by hook or by crook---this includes
>a complete description of the algorithm, plus some known plaintext of
>the same nature as the challenge messages.

As I note in another message, in a "real" test, you have people exchanging
messages in the cipher. And if they aren't careful, they'll compromise
it. 

-- 
Leonard Erickson		      leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com
CIS: [70465,203]			 70465.203@compuserve.com
FIDO:   1:105/51	 Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
(The CIS & Fido addresses are preferred)
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Weak cryptography >> Key registration
Date: 23 Nov 92 19:09:13 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov20.212058.1454@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Carl Ellison, in discussing weak systems which can be broken by the NSA
>but not Joe Mobster, misses the point.
>
>Many of us are worried not about Joe Mobster, but about Mitsubishi,
>or the Government of France, or a Russian competitor with friends in
>their equivalent of the NSA.


OK -- so I shouldn't have stressed the word "weak".

It has to be medium strength -- just strong enough to defeat the
intelligence services of all governments except our own.  :-)

However, I still claim that key registration is *weaker than* weak
cryptography -- because Joe Mobster doesn't need any cryptanalysis to
defeat it -- just an offer the registration person can not refuse.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4854 sci.math:15037 comp.theory:2433
From: clong@remus.rutgers.edu (Chris Long)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 08:59:05 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.

In article <1992Nov15.110945.19939@ringer.cs.utsa.edu>, Daniel Jimenez writes:

>> This proves that P=NP and all NP-complete and all other NP problems thus
>> have polynomial time algorithms.

Anyone who believes P=NP is an idiot.

Case closed.
-- 
Chris Long, 265 Old York Rd., Bridgewater, NJ  08807-2618
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tomrice@netcom.com (Tom R. Rice)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 01:33:40 GMT

gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) writes:


>	and public key cryptography. ;-)  Maybe we need a war on
>	gonads. ;-)

	We already have it: see alt.feminism  ;-)
	
	trr
-- 
"Start off every day with a smile and get it over with."  --W.C.Fields
Tom R. Rice   WB6BYH                   Holler Observatory - 
tomrice@netcom.com                     Longitude:  121 d  30 m  20 s W 
CIS: 71160,1122                        Latitude:    37 d  25 m  10 s N 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Triple DES
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 13:36:00 GMT


>1.  My understanding is that "Triple DES" is encryption using one
>    key, decryption using another, then re-encryption using the
>    first key.  Is this correct?  i.e., E3(P,K) = E(D(E(P,K1),K2),K1)

No.  You got the message but missed some of the meaning.

That is what IBM does.  It is only double DES.  That is, you
still have only a 112 bit key even though you have triple complexity.
The purpose of this implementation was to preserve compatibility
between this hardware implementation and earlier software implementation.
This implementation has the special property that if the second half
of the 112 bit is equal to the first, then steps one and two cancel
each other.  That is why the second step is a decrypt; it adds just
as much complexity as an encrypt while having this special case.

Note that this is a hardware implementation using three chips in series.
While it double the effective key length, it adds only two block times
to the operation, regardless of how long the message (for reasons of
export control, IBM uses this implementation only for protecting the
key table, i.e., 64 bit blocks.)  If you were to implement the same
mechanism in software, you would triple the message encrypt time.
If you were not trying to solve the special problem of backward 
compatibility, you would likely use two encrypt steps.  This would 
give the same protection and only double the time.

I have heard Martin Hellman recommend three steps using a 168 bit key.
However, my own assessment is that this is overkill for most 
applications.


>2.  Has triple DES actually been proven to be stronger than a single
>    DES encryption?  I guess this boils down to whether DES has been
>    proven to be a group.

No.  The inventors assert that DES is composable under most circumstances.
(See Matyas and Meyers).  However, the independent evaluators are
silent.  IBM notes in passing that an exhaustive attack against a
112 bit would require all of the energy from all of the coal and oil
likely to recovered in the continental US for the next five hundred
years. 

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pcl@oxford.ac.uk (Paul Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Date: 18 Nov 92 10:26:22 GMT
	<PHR.92Nov17033415@napa.telebit.com>
Organization: Oxford University Computing Service, 13 Banbury Rd, Oxford, OX2
	6NN
In-reply-to: phr@telebit.com's message of 17 Nov 92 03:34:15 GMT

In article <PHR.92Nov17033415@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin) writes:

...
   Regarding RSA in particular, remember also that the motivation of
   patents is to provide an incentive to invent: the public gets the
   benefit of the invention in exchange for the inventor getting a
   limited monopoly.  But RSA was invented without this incentive (we
   know this because nobody thought to apply for patents until after the
   invention was already published, which is why it is not patented in
   Europe, where applications must be filed before the invention is
   published).  So in exchange for the monopoly, the public in this
   case got *nothing*.


Oh, I don't know about that.  The European public got rather a lot,
and don't even have to pay royalties.  Come to that, PKP don't even
have a monopoly.  A limited monopoly, limited to within the US, yes.

"The public" != "The population of the US".

Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Date: 17 Nov 1992 20:06:20 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: physics.ubc.ca

rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>: 
>: >Bob Cain    rcain at netcom.com   408-358-2007:
>: 
>: >The only thing that really sticks in my craw is the fact that all the
>: >work was funded by taxpayers.  This is a fundamental flaw in the system
>: >and we should be working to change that.  Any country's citizen should
>: >have unlimited rights to use any patent resulting from its government's
>: >funded work!  That could still be made law and should be.
>: 
>: Be careful what you ask for, you might get it. "UNLIMITED rights to
>: use" might result in no patent at all.

>I'm prety close to being ready to bite that bullet with publicly funded
>work.  Further consideration after my posting shows me many problems in
>determining just who exactly, when you begin considering corporations,
>should have those rights.

There is a balance between the recovery of "public money" and not
removing the incentive to comercialise an invention. Remember that the
public also gets money back ( thorugh taxes etc) when an invention is
successfully developed and sold. It's little different from having
provided you with with your education- should your salary  and all your
property from high
school on be put into the public pot because the public provided you
with the education to enable you to work? 
Some government contracts do put limits on what can be done with work
carried on under them ( Recall the huge fuss re SMP by Wolfram (of
Mathematica fame) which was deveoped under govt funds.)Why should RSA
try to develope and comerdialise their work if everything is to go into
the public domain anyway?
From: jbs@watson.ibm.com
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 92 21:05:20 EST
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Government regulation of cryptography

         I believe much of the discussion of the key registration pro-
posal has been ill-considered and based on a false understanding of
what the government's objective is.
         The government's main objective is to forstall a future in
which common carriers routinely encrypt all traffic in a form the
government cannot read.  Any other objectives are secondary and will be
sacrificed to preserve the main objective.
         The government is not greatly worried about private individuals
arranging to use crypto among themselves.  The government is well aware
that, contrary to some statements in this group, effective crypto is
sufficiently inconvenient that most people will not voluntarily use it.
This is true even when the hazards of not using it are obvious as the
government has found in attempting to get its own armed forces to use
crypto.
         Common carriers are unlikely to voluntarily adopt encryption.
Hence if crypto proponents wish to defeat the government they should
press for legislation requiring common carriers to use encryption (or
alternatively for holding common carriers liable for any damages caused
by failure to use encrytion).  Based on what happened with celluar
phones prospects for this do not seem great.
                       James B. Shearer
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt)
Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy
Organization: Gordon Burditt
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 20:33:07 GMT

> If government agents *have* a warrant, would an attempt to prevent
> their entry into a house be considered "legal"?  Is secretly-held

Yes.  Attempts made to prevent their entry into the house *BEFORE*
the warrant was presented are certainly legal.  Or did you intend
to outlaw door locks?  Or doors?  Safes?  Walls with holes in them?
Yards with dirt that you can bury something in?  I think encryption 
falls into this category.  

Quickly encrypting the data when you hear the police demanding entry
may be illegal (obstruction of justice, or some such charge).  Nobody
does that anyway.  They destroy the evidence.

					Gordon L. Burditt
					sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: pseudo one time pad...
Date: 18 Nov 92 13:31:21 GMT
Article-I.D.: qiclab.1992Nov18.133121.23563
Reply-To: Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
Organization: SCN Research/Qic Laboratories of Tigard, Oregon.

butzerd@blanc.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer) writes:

>Nope.  I was just using DES as an example, since its output in CFM is
>unpredictable as well as statisctally random.  The real question was: If
>you have a good enough PRNG (or try URNG - unpredictable random number
>generator), why is a pseudo one time pad bad?

Because your key depends *totally* on the starting value. If the
"enemy" knows the *system* (which they will, sooner or later), then
once they crack *any* message they can read them all. 

Output from *any* "generator" depends on input/starting values. So
*those* are the "key". And for a "brute force" attack *they* become the
"key space" that needs to be searched. So I just feed all the 
starting conditions in and see which ones give reasonable messages.

-- 
Leonard Erickson		      leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com
CIS: [70465,203]			 70465.203@compuserve.com
FIDO:   1:105/51	 Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
(The CIS & Fido addresses are preferred)
From: castor@drizzle.Stanford.EDU (Castor Fu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: 20 Nov 1992 15:50:20 GMT
Organization: Stanford University
NNTP-Posting-Host: drizzle.stanford.edu
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5

With all the talk about "suspected" child molesters, etc. I thought I
would bring up one point. How do people feel about restricting cryptographic
privileges of people once they have been convicted of a particular
set of crimes?

It seems to me that  once a person has violated certain rules, e.g.
child molestation, insider trading, etc.  one might restrict their
access to tools which are particularly useful towards those ends,
e.g. guns, crypto etc.

After all, in the case which is being discussed, hadn't this person
been previously convicted of child molesting?

--
Castor Fu, (foo@leland.stanford.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt