From: roger@crux.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.german
Subject: Re: Germany's Power Play in Europe
Date: 8 Sep 92 15:05:25 GMT
Reply-To: roger@astro.princeton.edu (Roger Lustig)
Organization: Princeton University
Originator: news@nimaster

In article <1473000039@igc.apc.org> Christic Institute <christic@igc.apc.org> writes:

>-----------------------------------------------------------------
>GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE BALKANIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE (REVISED)

>By ANDY LANG
>Tuesday, September 8, 1992

>I had a very interesting conversation last week with an old
>friend who used to work in the German government. He startled me
>with his interpretation of Germany's role in the splintering of
>Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the former USSR. I want to share
>his views with the other readers of this conference.

>Note that many of the new states that have risen from the ruins
>of the socialist bloc were formerly allied with, or dominated by
>Nazi Germany. [But don't worry: I'm not about to equate the BRD
>with the Third Reich, or Helmut Kohl with Adolf Hitler!]

Well, let's keep that clear.

But then, how much of Europe was *not* "allied with or dominated by
Hitler"?  The British Isles, Sweden, Switzerland, and perhaps 
Portugal, depending on how you count.  How fascinating that many of the
new states in Europe are in Europe!

>Examples: In 1939 Slovakia broke away from its federation with
>the Czechs under the pressure of post-Munich German diplomacy,
>and until the collapse of German power in Europe was ruled by a
>pro-German government.

>Slovenia and Croatia were provinces of the Austrian Empire before
>World War I. Bosnia-Hercegovina was an Austrian protectorate, and
>its formal annexation by the Austrians was one of the events that
>precipitated the war. Serbia, on the other hand, was never part
>of the German sphere of influence. During World War II the
>Germans destroyed the Yugoslav Kingdom and, exploiting historic
>ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Croats, organized a fascist
>puppet state in Croatia.

>The Nazis did not restore the independence of Lithuania, Latvia
>and Estonia after Hitler's armies marched east in June 1941, but
>in general their citizens hailed the Wehrmacht as liberators. The
>Nazis treated the Baltic states with relative leniency and
>believed their populations [except the Jews] were racially
>suitable for Germanization.

Nu?  So the Nazis treated some areas differently from others.  Yet the
independence and democracy movements, and other changes of government,
have happened in *all* the areas occupied first by the Germans and
then, after WW II, by the Soviets or other Communist movements.  What's
the point here? 

>After less than 50 years of Soviet domination (excluding
>Yugoslavia) all of these states have reappeared on the map of
>Europe. 

And others have not.  In the case of the Baltics, they had existed as
independent states for decades *before* the Nazis, too.  The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was a post-WW I creation; Churchill referred to it in his 
crack about "the Europeanization of the Balkans."  

As for the Nazis as liberators of the Baltics, that's not entirely
impossible to understand--given that Stalin had taken them over the
year before.  

It is preposterous to point to the Nazi map as a parallel for the current
one.  Some of these borders are based on pre-WW I lines, some on Versailles
and other post-WW I lines, some on lines drawn during or after WW II.

>The new states are anti-Russian and pro-German, and look

Oh, right.  Specifically pro-German, eh?  C'mon.  Are you willing
to say this for each and every one of the new states?  Are you going
to include the other ex-Soviet republics? Some of those were occupied
by Hitler, too.

>to Germany, rather than the United States, for investment and
>material aid.

This surely has to do with Bush's dithering as much as anything.  Also,  
the US has far less economic interest in getting those economies moving, 
to say nothing of pressing social needs along that line.  

> What role, if any, did Germany play in their rebirth?

>First, West Germany's annexation of the German Democratic
>Republic in 1990 

You got something against the word "unification"?  

>signalled to the fledgling nationalist movements
>in Eastern Europe that the state boundaries inherited from the
>Cold War--or even from the Versailles system established after
>the collapse of the German, Austrian and Russian Empires in 1918
>--were not necessarily permanent.

Oh, for heaven's sake: it signalled the exact opposite, and explicitly
so.  It AFFIRMED the permanence of the German-Polish border.  Nobody
had ever viewed the German-German border as being of the same quality
as any other European border -- it certainly was not treated as such by
either the two Germanies or the Four Powers in the 40 years it existed.

>Second, the new conservative and nationalist parties in Eastern
>Europe were supported materially and financially by conservative
>foundations in Germany--including the party foundations of the
>Christian Democratic Union and its right-wing Bavarian partner,
>the Christian Social Union.

While the SPD offered not a nickel, right?

>Third, German diplomacy accelerated the disintegration of
>Yugoslavia. The foreign policy of the United States, England and
>France aimed to preserve the Yugoslav federation in some form--
>and thus prevent civil war.

Sounds like a non-sequitur.  Even without complete dissolution (something
that a large portion of the people wanted), there would have been huge
amounts -- there *were* huge amounts -- of violence.

> But the German government decided
>unilaterally (and prematurely, some believe) to recognize the
>independence of Slovenia and Croatia--a fait accompli that forced
>the hand of the other EC states. Is there any question that the
>Slovenian and Croatian governments would have compromised with
>the Serbs if Germany had pressured them to adopt a more moderate
>policy?

Yes.  Next question.

>This analysis does not suggest that Germany orchestrated the
>``Balkanization'' of Eastern Europe, or that German foreign
>policy is the sole cause of the new political order that is
>taking shape in the East. The Baltic republics, for instance,
>have always resented their forced incorporation into the Russian
>Empire--whether Czarist or Soviet. In the case of the
>Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federations, there were inherent
>tensions that for years had been papered over by authoritarian
>governments. In the political vacuum left by the collapse of
>communism, these conflicts probably would have risen to the
>surface in any event. But Germany has played a role, and since
>the annexation of the GDR has become the dominant political and
>economic power in Eastern Europe.

Well, can you imagine a scenario in which the largest, and by far
the economically strongest country in a region *doesn't* play
a role?  I'm not sure what your point is.

Also, "since the annexation of the GDR" is, to put it mildly, 
tendentious.  Try "since the annexation of the GDR and the collapse,
first of the Warsaw Pact, then 
of the Soviet Union."  Or had you forgotten about that?

>There are historical and political reasons for Germany's policy.
>Since the early Middle Ages Germans have fought to expand their
>territory and influence into the East. 

Oh, Jesus H. Christic!  Give me a break!

(Besides, I don't exactly think of Yugoslavia as being east of Germany.)

Now, could you please point to a single country on the map that is
NOT interested in improving commerce with the countries around it?
That is NOT interested in doing more, rather than less, business?

>Conquest, however, has not
>been the only means Germany has used to assert its national
>power. 

Would you please be so kind as to explain to us how all the things
you mention Germany as doing (or, in the case of the Baltics, of
their supposed attitudes toward Germany) are "assertions of national
power"?  I sense a leap in your argument.

>The international system created by Bismarck relied as
>much on diplomacy as on war, and in fact political alliances with
>the Austrian and Russian Empires were the keystone of German
>policy in Eastern Europe. Bismarck warned that Germany must never
>allow its interests to conflict with Russia's--advice that was
>ignored, with tragic results, by German governments in the 20th
>century.

>Since World War II Germany, like Japan, has relied on economic
>rather than military power to expand its sphere of influence. But
>German influence in the East was blocked by the division of
>postwar Europe into competing military blocs. Now that Russia has
>abandoned the outposts of its empire, no barrier remains to
>Germany's economic and political domination of the region.

Economic, perhaps, in the short term.  Political?  That sounds a bit
hysterical.  Seems to me that those countries have their own 
governments.

Now, it's almost universally true that small countries will align
with their larger neighbors -- and I don't think we should hold up
Albania as a model counterexample.  So what's your point?  So far,
ass I can see is that you've noted that Germany has a large population,
a central location, and a prosperous economy.  This is news?

>Bismarck believed that ``sorting out the tribes'' would create
>the most rational international system for Europe. In effect, the
>tribalization of Europe has been the result of Soviet collapse
>and German diplomacy. In place of the large federal states
>created after World War II, Eastern Europe is becoming a
>checkerboard of small nations. My German friend described this
>development in one phrase: ``Divide . . . and rule.''

Paranoid drool.  Unless your German friend is willing to show that
Germany actually caused those divisions -- an especially diffcult 
task in the ex-SU, but also in the other countries: did Germany 
*encourage* Slovakia to secede, for instance? -- the first half
of the epigram is nonsense.  As for the second half, I don't see
much ruling going on now, nor do I detect much German interest in
doing so.  Less involvement in foreign affairs, rather  than more,
is the interest of many Germans.

Let's re-read this paragraph.

>Bismarck believed that ``sorting out the tribes'' would create
>the most rational international system for Europe. 

Implication: current affairs are a continuation of Bismarck's plan,
and we all know what *he* stood for.

>In effect, 

Effect?  What's the point of these two words?

>the tribalization of Europe has been the result of Soviet collapse
>and German diplomacy. 

Horse-and-rabbit stew, wouldn't you say?  Take away the Soviet
collapse, and no amount of German diplomacy has any effect.  Take
away German diplomacy and The Baltics, Ukraine, Belorussia, etc., are
still free, Slovakia is still itchy to split (as always), Yugoslavia
is, at best, held together with string, but most likely collapsing,
and ethnic unrest in Romania continues as it has for years.   

>In place of the large federal states
>created after World War II, Eastern Europe is becoming a
>checkerboard of small nations. 

I like that: "large federal states."  Kinda leaves out one component:
Soviet domination.  You haven't been hanging around with Gerry Ford,
have you?

>My German friend described this
>development in one phrase: ``Divide . . . and rule.''

Well?  Do you believe him?  

>This does not imply that Germany has decided to dominate the
>``East'' at the expense of its relationship with Western Europe.

This does not imply that Germany has "decided to dominate", period.

>The German government is still committed to the political and
>economic integration of Europe--a goal its foreign policy has
>steadfastly pursued since the first Western European economic
>structures were created in the 1950s. But the unravelling of the
>Versailles system in Eastern Europe

Not to mention the Warsaw Pact system...

>could give Germany the upper hand in future dealings with its EC partners.

Is that a good thing or a bad thing?

>How? Europe can be classified into states that are historically
>anti-German and pro-German. This is a simplistic division, of
>course, 

No shit!

>but nevertheless some countries--France and England, for
>example--have historically resisted German domination of the
>European continent. 

When it suited them.

>Other states--especially Poland and Russia,
>but also Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, the Czech lands and
>Serbia--still remember vividly the brutality of German occupation
>during the war years.

States have memories?  I wonder what happens when states fall.  Do
the memories disappear?  I'd say the *people* have those memories.
Anyway, it hasn't stopped most of them from working closely with 
the new Germany, which, after all, isn't the state that occupied their
country.

>On the other hand, several states are closely aligned with
>Germany and do not fear German influence. Sweden, despite its
>tradition of neutrality, has an ancient economic and cultural
>relationship with Germany. Austria, of course, is a south German
>state. Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria were German allies
>in World War II. 

Of course.  What about it?  So was Italy.  I haven't noticed anything
about Italy in your article -- perhaps it doesn't fit.

>But above all the new states in Eastern Europe--
>Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and
>Bosnia-Hercegovina--look toward Germany for economic aid and
>political support.

And you think this is because of historic relationship, not because of 
simple geography and the relative unwillingness and inability of 
everyone else to help.

>All of these nations will eventually qualify for membership in
>the European Community. Why is this important from the German
>standpoint? Germany's economic power in the EC has not been
>matched by political influence. England and France continue to
>resist German preeminence in the new federal structures that are
>taking shape in Europe. Germany therefore needs allies, and as a
>result of the Balkanization of Europe, Germany now can count on
>the support of at least 14 Northern and Eastern European states
>that are historically ``pro-German''--some of which owe their
>independence in part to German influence.

And Germany can, of course, expect all these quarrelsome, independent-
minded states (most of which owe their independence in hardly any
part to German influence) to remain on their side in future EC politics,
just like that.  Yeah, right.

>My friend predicts that Germany will preach the equality of
>nations in federal Europe.  The German government will argue that
>every state should have an equal number of votes in European
>bodies--like the system adopted by the United States for its
>Senate. 

Or the UN for its General Assembly.

>The support of 14 small nations would then be decisive.

And do you suppose that, when all these other countries apply for 
membership, one by one, the current EC countries will not themselves
take active, scrupulous interest in each of them?  Your story seems to
suggest that all the other EC nations are simply walking in their sleep.

>I am not suggesting that Germany is conspiring to enslave Eastern
>Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany is not the Third Reich,
>and Helmut Kohl is not Adolf Hitler. The German government is
>playing by the rules of international diplomacy and power
>politics. But it believes that in a united Europe, its economic
>power entitles Germany to a decisive political voice.

Fine.  Could you show us just a tad bit of evidence for that "belief"?

>This may be a simplistic analysis, or it may simply be self-
>evident to some of you. But I would appreciate your thoughts.

It's simplistic, tendentious, and pointless.  It's also a little
insulting to more than one  party, and simply ignores large parts 
of the story, to say nothing of the map.  Many of the historical
coincidences you list are merely that.  Ethnic division existed in
Europe long before German unification; borders have changed on
many occasions; and you vastly underplay the role of Gorbachev in
first allowing the regimes in the Warsaw Pact countries to fall, then
allowing the SU to disintegrate.  Germany is reacting to the disappearance
of a power -- the SU; given its geography, it *must* take a more active
stance than other countries. 

Finally, to suggest that German unification ("annexation" is a little
tacky, given the strange division of Germany from 1945 to 1989) signalled
that borders were not permanent ignores the long debate that resulted in
the German recognition of its Eastern border.  The ethnic tensions that
have resulted in teritorial splits (*not* the redrawing of existing
borders, btw.) were there long before German unification; the Baltics have
the same borders they have long had.  The only real territorial disputes
are in Azerbaijan, etc.; there, former Soviet states are operating
in a relative power vacuum.  German power, in any case, is not decisive there.
(The territorial disputes in the Balkans are long-standing ones; moreover,
the power most interested in redrawing boundaries -- Serbia -- is the one
"historically outside the German sphere of influence.")

>[This article reflects only the opinions of my conversation-
>partner supplement by my own personal opinions.]

That's a good thing, I suppose.  Andy, your (and your friend's) view
of history is pretty weird.

Roger
Newsgroups: soc.culture.german