From: jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Larry Jewell)
Newsgroups: soc.veterans
Subject: 'NamVet Newsletter, Vol.5, no.10 (4/7)
Date: 22 Aug 92 02:23:04 GMT


     vets  may have been heroes to their families and friends,  but the 
     joy they felt coming home was soon dampened by their reception. To 
     be  blunt:  Vietnam vets were blamed by the hawks for not  winning 
     the  war,  and  by  doves just for taking part in  it.  Most  vets 
     reacted  to the tepid reception by turning inward and not  dealing 
     with their war experiences. 
       But even armchair psychologists can tell you that when traumatic 
     events  are  suppressed  they'll eventually rise to  the  surface. 
     That's  what  happened in the early '70s,  when the experts  began 
     identifying  what they started calling "  Vietnam syndrome"  among 
     many  combat vets.  Max Clelland,  the former head of the Veterans 
     Administration and himself a combat vet, describes the syndrome as 
     a "feeling of malaise or disaffection or alienation." Caputo calls 
     it  "combat  veterantis,"  which he describes as "an inability  to 
     concentrate,  a  childlike  fear of darkness,  a tendency to  tire 
     easily,  chronic  nightmares,  an intolerance of loud noises,  and 
     
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     altering moods of depression and rage that [come]  for no apparent 
     reason."
       In   1980   the  American  Psychiatric  Association   officially 
     recognized  the  condition  and gave it  an  official  name:  post 
     traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
       The experts are quick to point out that most of the vets in jail 
     today  would  be  there whether they had been to Vietnam  or  not. 
     "There  are Vietnam vets in prison whose problems have nothing  to 
     do  with  the  war,"  says Dr.  John P.  Wilson,  a  professor  of 
     psychology at Cleveland State University, who is recognized as the 
     nation's  leading PTSD expert.  The Vietnam veterans in prison are 
     "like  any other population,"  Wilson says.  "You'll find folks in 
     there who are just plain nasty. They just happen to be veterans."      
       However,  Wilson  and others who have studied the  psychological 
     makeup of Vietnam veterans believe that,  for a significant number 
     of  vets,  what  happened  to  them in Vietnam has  had  a  direct 
     relationship  to their criminal behavior.  "I think there are lots 
     of  people who are in prison who shouldn't be,  because when  they 
     were  found  in  this criminal activity,  it was  associated  with 
     Vietnam,"  notes Dr. Charles Figley,  a Marine Vietnam veteran who 
     is  a  professor  of family therapy and  psychology  at  Indiana's 
     Purdue University and a longtime expert on PTSD.
       In  the  last  decade,  experts  like  Wilson  and  Figley  have 
     testified  in  criminal  and civil cases around  the  country  for 
     combat vets who suffered from many types of PTSD.  Some are of the 
     classic flashback variety,  in which the veteran actually believes 
     he  is  back  in Vietnam while committing a crime.  But  the  PTSD 
     experts have recently uncovered more subtle forms of the disorder. 
     "These  are a kind of reactment in the form of thrill-seeking  and 
     sensation-seeking  -  what  I've  called the  'action  addict'  or 
     'action junkie syndrome'," Wilson says.  In these cases,  veterans 
     have   performed   a   variety   of   actions,"   consciously   or 
     unconsciously, that really are a repetition,  both psychologically 
     of  the state experienced during the trauma,  and the enactment in 
     behavior in a very complex form ," Wilson notes.
       For  example,  shortly after Chris Davis got out of the Army  in 
     1971,  he began associating with a revolutionary group,  the Black 
     Patriotic Party, in his hometown of St. Louis,  Missouri.  "We did 
     robberies, except we called them urban guerilla operations," Davis 
     says. "I found out I needed the fix;  I needed the adrenaline fix. 
     So it was a natural thing for me to do."
       But  there are other,  more subtle forms of PTSD,  and they have 
     affected  veterans quite unlike Davis,  who was born in the  inner 
     city and grew up in and out of trouble with the police even before 
     he  joined the Army and went to Vietnam.  There are many cases  of 
     men  who came from solid,  middle-class or even upper-middle-class 
     backgrounds, had a good education, lived in good suburbs,  went to 
     Vietnam,  and  came back and led seemingly model lives.  But then, 
     something happened.
       There  was  Peter  Krutschewski,  for  example,  a  former  Army 
     helicopter   pilot  who  did  two  tours  in  Vietnam.   In   1981 
     Krutschewski,  who  after coming home went on to make a fortune in 
     the  oil business,  was found guilty of smuggling 57,000 pounds of 
     marijuana into the country.  He was convicted and sentenced to ten 
     years in jail. Similarly,  Robert Mason,  who flew more than 1,000 
     helicopter missions in Vietnam and wrote about his war experiences 
     in  a critically acclaimed memoir,  Chickenhawk,  entered  federal 
     prison  in  1983 for smuggling a boatload of marijuana into  South 
     Carolina.  Both  men were diagnosed as having PTSD and  eventually 
     
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     were paroled.
       Then there's the case of Larry Fine (a pseudonym), a Vietnam vet 
     from  a  large Western city who,  until he was convicted of  stock 
     fraud  last  year,  had led a seemingly upright and  normal  life. 
     Larry  grew  up on a thriving family farm,  had been a straight  A 
     student  in  high school,  and was planning on becoming  a  priest 
     before he got drafted into the Army in 1967. He was a squad leader 
     in an infantry unit, enmeshed in heavy combat for most of his 1968 
     tour in 'Nam, but he survived the ordeal. Soon after he came home, 
     Larry  went  to  college,  graduated,  and started  his  own  very 
     successful  business.  He became a millionaire and then went  into 
     the stock-commodities business. He had a yacht,  a beautiful home, 
     a loving wife, and two kids.
       Larry  was  arrested in 1987 for stock fraud,  and nobody  could 
     figure out why he did it. While looking into his background at the 
     request of defense attorneys, John Wilson uncovered some startling 
     facts.  It  turned  out that Larry and a buddy had made a pact  in 
     'Nam that should either be killed, the survivor would write to the 
     dead  guy's  family and explain what had happened.  The buddy  got 
     killed,  but in his grief Larry could never write the letter.  "He 
     had  all  this  guilt  he'd carried around  for  years  about  not 
     following through," Wilson says.
       Then  Wilson  found  that Larry and his wife  were  not  getting 
     along,  primarily because Larry was acting very depressed at home. 
     It  turned out that Lary spent most of his nights crawling  around 
     the  house,  carrying  a gun and staring out a big picture  window 
     thinking  the VC were after him.  "He went to work with the Brooks 
     Brothers  suit  on  in the daytime and  he  became  Mr.  Community 
     Leader," Wilson says.  "He came home at night and the PTSD spilled 
     all over the place."
       Larry   eventually  was  convicted  of  the  felony  stock-fraud 
     charges.  But  the  judge  took into  consideration  his  military 
     experiences and his psychological evaluation,  and Larry was given 
     probation and ordered to undergo psychiatric treatment.
     
               - To be concluded in Part 3 ... Next Month  -
     
       Marc Leepson, who served in Vietnam with the U.S.  Army 1967-68, 
     is a freelance writer in Woodbridge, Virginia. He is columnist and 
     book  editor  for  The Veteran magazine,  which  is  published  by 
     Vietnam Veterans of America in Washington, D.C. 
     

















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     ==================================================================
                           Don't drink the water!
     ==================================================================

                         A History of Agent Orange
                         From an article entitled:
        Competing Paradigms in the Assessment of Latent Disorders:
                         The Case of Agent Orange
                  Wilbur J. Scott, University of Oklahoma
                           Input by Jim Ferguson
                    NamVet Agent Orange Section Editor
                        VETLink #1 - Pittsfield, MA
                              (413) 443-6313
     
     Note  From  Wilbur  J.  Scott -  I am deeply indebted  to  Malcolm 
     Spector  for inspiration,  guidance,  and encouragement.   I  also 
     thank  Michael  Sovic of the Oklahoma Agent Orange Foundation  for 
     reprints  and technical comments.   This paper is dedicated to the 
     memory of my brother-in-arms, Donald Alan James, Jr.   Such is war 
     that  the  casualties mount long after the  fighting  ceases.   On 
     October 31, 1984, he took his own life in order to find peace.   I 
     first  learned  of  Agent Orange as a veteran's  issue  from  him.  
     Address any correspondence to: Department of Sociology, University 
     of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019.
     
     Summary:  The  use  of the herbicide Agent Orange in  Vietnam  has 
     sparked  controversy and heated debate.   The controversy revolves 
     around  the individuals and interest groups who advance and oppose 
     the  claim that exposure to the herbicide has caused high rates of 
     cancer among Vietnam veterans and birth defects in their children. 
     In  this paper,  I identify the protagonists,  explore the claims-
     making activity, and review the varieties of evidence put forth in 
     the case. The case serves as a useful vehicle for illustrating the 
     politics of fact and certification.
     
       Nearly  220,000  Vietnam veterans have requested physical  exam-
     inations   from  the  Veterans  Administration  (VA)   to  confirm 
     suspicions  that  their health problems are caused by exposure  to 
     the herbicide Agent Orange (VA, 1986:6). They allege that exposure 
     to  the  herbicide  some 10 to 20 years ago  has  produced  health 
     abnormalities among them and their children.   The amount and type 
     of  exposure is virtually impossible to document and the  symptoms 
     in   question  include  many  conditions  that  are  not  uniquely 
     associated with exposure to a herbicide.  Further,  the scientific 
     evidence concerning the effects of exposure among humans is mixed. 
     Exposure  may  have  no significant long-term effects  or  it  may 
     contribute  to  the  growing list of so-called  latent  disorders: 
     environmentally produced,  degenerative diseases in which there is 
     a  substantial time lag between exposure and  consequence.   These 
     circumstances make the determination of cause and effect extremely 
     difficult.
       If all Agent Orange claims were worthy of payment,  compensation 
     could   reach   several  billion   dollars.    Vietnam   veterans' 
     organizations  have accused the VA of negligence in  investigating 
     the claims.   VA representatives have suggested that opportunistic 
     veterans  are  pushing  the  issue  to  qualify  undeservedly  for 
     disability  ratings and compensation payments.   Subsequent  liti-
     gation  includes  a  landmark class action suit  against  the  Dow 
     Chemical  Company and five other manufacturers of Agent Orange and 
     
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     a  third  party suit against the federal government filed  by  Dow 
     Chemical.  An  out-of-court  settlement which requires  the  manu-
     facturers  to  establish  a  $180 million  fund  for  compensating 
     veterans has produced grumbling and dissatisfaction on all sides.
        . . . . . . . . . . . .
     
     "ONLY WE CAN PREVENT FORESTS"
       Ideally  suited  for  guerilla warfare,  the dense  jungles  and 
     forests  of  South Vietnam allowed Communist troops to fight  when 
     they had the advantage and hide when they did not.  Therefore,  as 
     early  as  1962,  the  American military toyed with  the  idea  of 
     defoliating  combat areas by aerial spraying and purchased several 
     specially  prepared  herbicides.   Chemical  companies  mixed  the 
     ingredients  according to military specifications and packaged the 
     different  herbicides in color-coded fifty-five gallon drums which 
     gave them their names - Agents White, Blue,  Purple,  Pink,  Green 
     and Orange (ASCH, 1981,CSA, 1981; Lacey and Lacey, 1982).  Each of 
     the  six  herbicides  contained  compounds  that  were,   or  were 
     suspected  to  be,  poisonous.  The U.S.  Air Force  assigned  the 
     spraying mission to the 309th Air Commando Squadron and designated 
     the program, Operation Hades.   It subsequently was given the more 
     neutral designation of Operation Ranch Hand.  The squadron,  whose 
     members coined the motto,  "Only We Can Prevent Forests,"  sprayed 
     large  tracts of terrain from C-123 transport planes equipped with 
     storage  tanks  and high-pressure nozzles.  Other  military  units 
     sprayed  much  smaller  areas  using  helicopters,   trucks,   and 
     backpacks to transport the herbicide.
       The  most commonly used herbicide was Agent Orange,  a 50-50 mix 
     of  2,4-D (n-butyl-2,4-dicholorophenoxy-acetate)  and 2,4,5-T  (n-
     butyl-2,4,5-tricholorophenoxy-acetate;CSA,1981; Davis and Simpson, 
     1983; Galston, 1979).  U.S.  armed forces sprayed approximately 11 
     million  gallons of Agent Orange between 1965 and 1971.   About 90 
     percent of the spraying took place in jungle and forest regions to 
     deprive  enemy  troops of cover;  about 8 percent was  devoted  to 
     destroying  croplands  under  their control and  the  remaining  2 
     percent   was  used  to  clear  U.S.   base  camp  perimeters  and 
     communication lines.
       Although  the U.S.  Army originally developed 2,4,5-T during the 
     Second World War for chemical and biological warfare, the military 
     apparently  considered  it  safe to use as a  herbicide.  An  Army 
     training   manual  used  in  Vietnam  described  Agent  Orange  as 
     "relatively  nontoxic"  to  humans and animals (Department of  the 
     Army, 1969).  Further, farmers and ranchers,  the forest industry, 
     and  government  agencies had used phenoxy  herbicides  containing 
     2,4,5-T in the United States since the 1950s.  In 1969, however, a 
     scientific  study reported the laboratory animals exposed to trace 
     amounts  of dioxin,  an unintended byproduct of the manufacture of 
     2,4,5-T, developed cancer and had offspring with birth defects. At 
     about  the  same time,  Vietnamese officials received  reports  of 
     birth  defects  and other health problems in rural  areas  sprayed 
     with  Agent Orange.   In response to a growing public concern that 
     dioxin might pose a significant health hazard to human health, the 
     military  in  1969 restricted the spraying program in Vietnam  and 
     then  officially  discontinued it in 1970.  (Some units failed  to 
     receive word of the ban and continued spraying until 1971.) On the 
     homefront, the U.S.  Department of Agriculture placed restrictions 
     on  the  use  of 2,4,5-T in products or areas where  direct  human 
     contact was likely.
       In 1973, Dr.  Matthew Meselson of Harvard University developed a 
     
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     technique  for  detecting  dioxin at extremely  low  levels.   His 
     discovery  allowed scientists to question a large body of research 
     which failed to find evidence of 2,4,5-T's harmfulness.  They soon 
     concluded that dioxin was very toxic; doses of three or four parts 
     per billion killed some laboratory animals (ACSH, 1981; CSA, 1981; 
     Tschirley,  1986).  In  1974,  the  National Academy  of  Sciences 
     dispatched  a team to Vietnam to assess the defoliation  program's 
     effects on humans and the environment.  On-going military activity 
     made it difficult to collect valid, systematic data.  The team did 
     not  find enough evidence to draw conclusions about the effects on 
     humans but recommended a study of the long-term consequences (NAS, 
     1974).
     
     THE LULL BEFORE THE STORM
       The  military  withdrew  the last American  combat  troops  from 
     Vietnam in 1973 and left behind a small number of advisors.  North 
     Vietnam  took  Saigon  in  1975,   ending  the  American  military 
     presence.   With   this   event,   Vietnam  veterans   temporarily 
     disappeared from public view.  They lacked a national organization 
     dedicated  to  their  interests and,  further,  had  no  effective 
     advocate  in Congress.   The American Legion,  Veterans of Foreign 
     Wars   (VFW),   and   Disabled  American   Veterans   (DAV),   who 
     traditionally  have  provided veterans with fraternal support  and 
     political clout,  attracted few Vietnam veterans.   These powerful 
     organizations  lobbied Congress during the 1970s for pensions  and 
     expanded  health care in VA hospitals,  programs benefitting older 
     veterans comprising the bulk of their memberships.  In 1978, there 
     were  only  11  Vietnam-era  veterans  serving  in  Congress;   in 
     contrast, 92 Second World War veterans -  almost 20 percent of the 
     combined  House and Senate -  were in Congress by 1948,  two years 
     after  the  end of that war (Bonior et al., 1984:136).   In  1977, 
     President  Jimmy Carter appointed Max Cleland,  a Vietnam  veteran 
     and triple amputee, as Director of the VA. Cleland was an outsider 
     to  the  political  machinery  of  veteran's  affairs:  his  three 
     predecessors  were Second World War veterans and former commanders 
     of either the American Legion or VFW.
       Vietnam veterans had pressing, immediate needs. Like veterans of 
     all previous wars (Schuetz, 1980: Wector, 1980),  Vietnam veterans 
     experienced problems of readjustment upon returning home. However, 
     there were significant differences.   Unlike soldiers in the First 
     and  Second  World Wars,  who served for the duration of the  war, 
     most  soldiers  in Vietnam spent one year there then  returned  to 
     civilian  life.   Hence,  most Vietnam veterans entered and exited 
     the combat zone individually as the war dragged on.   The one-year 
     rotation system deprived them of the primary ties which ordinarily 
     bind  combat troops (Moskos, 1976).  Since the war lacked  popular 
     support, re-entry often took place in a divisive atmosphere.  When 
     the war ended, there was no triumphant return en masse,  and there 
     were no victory parades (MacPherson, 1984;54-64).
       Universal conscription during the Second World War also produced 
     a  veteran population drawn from the mainstream of American  life, 
     in  contrast,  those  who served in Vietnam were drawn  from  "the 
     ragged  fringes of the Great American  Dream"  (Caputo,  1977;26). 
     They  were on the average 19 years of age (compared to an  average 
     age  of 26 among Second World War soldiers),  and they were poorer 
     and  less  educated than the men of draft age who  avoided  active 
     duty.   Finally,  the  Vietnam War had a greater wounded-to-killed 
     ratio  than  any  previous  war,   producing  a  large  number  of 
     traumatized and disabled veterans (Kuramoto, 1980:298).
     
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       In  1971,  Senator Alan Cranston (California)  introduced legis-
     lation   to  provide  specialized  health  care  and  readjustment 
     counseling for Vietnam veterans.  Although the cost of the program 
     for  the  recommended five-year period amounted to less  than  one 
     percent of the VA budget for those years,  The American Legion and 
     the  VFW  opposed the legislation,  fearing that it  would  divert 
     funding from other programs favored by them (Bonior et al.,  1984: 
     131-33). The Senate passed the legislation,  but the House allowed 
     it  to  die.  Senator Cranston reintroduced the bill in  1973  and 
     1975, but it suffered the same fate. In 1977, Senator Cranston, by 
     then chair of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs,  endorsed 
     a House bill giving congressional veterans'  committees a voice in 
     choosing  sites  for VA hospitals in exchange for support  in  the 
     House for readjustment counseling.  The House bill failed,  taking 
     with  it the proposed programs for Vietnam veterans.   Attempts to 
     make  the  benefits of the Vietnam GI Bill comparable to those  of 
     the Second World War GI Bill encountered the same resistance.
       Almost  five  years  after the last combat  unit  returned  from 
     Vietnam,  legislation  to assist Vietnam veterans,  opposed by the 
     American Legion and VFW,  had yet to clear Congress.   The DAV did 
     provide about $250,000 for a study,  the Forgotten Warrior Project 
     (Wilson,  1977).  The  report  revealed  significant  problems  in 
     adjusting  to  civilian life among half of the veterans  surveyed. 
     However, the VA,  the agency responsible for providing assistance, 
     had  conducted no survey of their special needs.   This pattern of 
     neglect set the stage for a flurry of activity by Vietnam veterans 
     in which Agent Orange played a key role.
     
     AGENT ORANGE GETS WHITE-HOT
       The   VA  received  the  first  claims  contending  illness  and 
     disability  due  to herbicides in 1977.  By then a  scattering  of 
     Vietnam  veterans  had collected circumstantial  evidence  linking 
     their  health  problems  to exposure to Agent  Orange  in  Vietnam 
     (Wilcox,  1983).   Among them was Air Force veteran Charlie Owens. 
     Shortly  after  his retirement in 1977,  he complained of  stomach 
     pain.  His  doctors diagnosed it as cancer.  Owens attributed  his 
     cancer  to  the Agent Orange sprayed by his unit in  Vietnam.   He 
     expressed his concern to Maude DeVictor,  a counselor in Chicago's 
     VA regional office,  contending that the spray often was "so thick 
     it looked just like Los Angeles smog" (Kurtis, 1983:43).  Within a 
     month after the diagnosis, Owens died of stomach cancer.
       DeVictor had not heard of Agent Orange; she asked other veterans 
     if they recalled having been exposed to Agent Orange and requested 
     information  from  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  about  its 
     possible  harmful  consequences.  The  DOD sent  her  reprints  of 
     scientific  studies  concluding that there was no evidence of  the 
     herbicide's  harmfulness to humans.   She compiled files of  about 
     two  dozen  veterans  who  reported  exposure  to  the  herbicide. 
     DeVictor  turned  over the files to Bill Kurtis,  a  reporter  for 
     WBBM-TV, Chicago's CBS affiliate.
       Sensing  a big story,  Kurtis began work on a documentary  about 
     Agent  Orange (Kurtis,  1983:42-46).  He interviewed veterans  who 
     were  themselves sick or who had children with birth defects.   He 
     also  taped interviews with researchers,  including Dr.  Meselson, 
     who   testified  that  dioxin  was  a  suspected  carcinogen   and 
     teratogen.   Since  the documentary would be broadcast to a  local 
     audience late at night, Kurtis sought to increase its exposure. In 
     the  week  before  its  airing,   he  provided  each  senator  and 
     representative  from  Illinois with a transcript and videotape  of 
     
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     the documentary and, on the day before the showing, held a private 
     viewing for reporters from local newspapers.
       WBBM  aired  the documentary,  "Agent Orange:  Vietnam's  Deadly 
     Fog,"  at  10:30  p.m.  on March 23, 1978.   The  story  attracted 
     national  attention.  Hundreds of inquiries from veterans  flooded 
     into  the  VA  office in Chicago.  Representative Abner  Mikva  of 
     Chicago  arranged  for a subsequent screening of  the  documentary 
     before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs.  He invited other 
     interested  parties,  including  administrators from the  VA,  the 
     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),  and the chemical companies 
     who  manufactured  Agent Orange.   In one  dramatic  swoop,  Agent 
     Orange went from the private rumblings of a handful of veterans to 
     the center of national attention.
       In  April,  1978,  Representative Ralph Metcalf (IL)  asked  the 
     General  Accounting  Office (GAO),  the official research  arm  of 
     Congress, to elicit from DOD a review of herbicide use in Vietnam. 
     DOD  took  the  position that only the  approximately  1,200  par-
     ticipants  in  Operation Ranch Hand were at risk  but  nonetheless 
     started  compiling a computerized record of the spraying  missions 
     (called  the HERBS tapes).   Simultaneously,  the EPA announced it 
     would  revoke the registration of (and hence preclude the  further 
     domestic use of)  products containing 2,4,5-T unless manufacturers 
     could  document its safety for humans.   The EPA cited studies  of 
     laboratory  animals and of workers exposed to dioxin in industrial 
     settings and accidents.  The agency encouraged interested parties, 
     including  the  general public,  to submit information  concerning 
     exposure  to  dioxin  and health problems.   Residents  of  Alsea, 
     Oregon  reported a curious increase in miscarriages after a nearby 
     forest  was sprayed with Silvex,  a herbicide containing  2,4,5-T. 
     The EPA ordered an epidemiological study.
       In  1978,  the VA circulated a memorandum describing  procedures 
     for  dealing with Agent Orange-related inquiries.   The memorandum 
     stated  that  the effects of exposure to Agent Orange were  short-
     term  and fully reversible and urged the staff to reassure worried 
     veterans (Wilcox, 1983: appendix A).   In December,  1978,  the VA 
     also organized the Steering Committee on Health Related Effects of 
     Herbicides. The committee noted that the VA considers an injury or 
     illness  as  service-connected only if it arises  during  military 
     service.  Since  the symptoms did not occur during active duty  or 
     within a year of discharge,  the committee ruled that the ailments 
     were  not  service-connected.   The  committee  also  insisted  on 
     scientific  evidence  based on human subjects before  admitting  a 
     link  between  exposure to Agent Orange and harmful  consequences.  
     These  rulings  meant  that  veterans could  not  receive  medical 
     treatment from the VA for Agent-Orange related conditions and that 
     they could not qualify for compensation.
       If  the  CBS documentary thrust Agent Orange into  the  national 
     limelight,  a  lawsuit  initiated  in 1978 kept  it  there.   Paul 
     Reutershan,  a  Vietnam veteran dying of stomach cancer,  filed  a 
     claim  with the VA that year contending that his exposure to Agent 
     Orange while flying helicopters in Vietnam caused the cancer.  The 
     documentary  reinforced his belief in the herbicide's harmfulness. 
     The  VA  acknowledged  that he had cancer but denied that  it  was 
     caused by Agent Orange.
       Reutershan  explored the possibility of legal action.   Judicial 
     relief, however,  is not easy to obtain in cases like these.   The 
     doctrine of sovereign immunity and its related principle of intra-
     military  immunity,  the Feres doctrine,  prohibits veterans  from 
     suing  the government for damages incurred during military service 
     
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     (Feres  v.  United States,  1950:  Lacey and  Lacey,  1982:153-80; 
     Schuck, 1985:58-69).  Further, congressional legislation prohibits 
     veterans  from suing the VA over disposition of a case  (Phillips, 
     1980).  Therefore,  Reutershan filed a $10 million personal injury 
     suit  in New York state court,  naming Dow Chemical and two  other 
     manufacturers of Agent Orange as defendants (Reutershan v. the Dow 
     Chemical Company, 1978). Shortly before he died in December, 1978, 
     Reutershan  founded the Agent Orange Victims International  (AOVI) 
     and  pledged its handful of members to carry on the suit after his 
     death.
       In  the  fall of 1978,  two other organizations devoted  to  the 
     needs  of Vietnam veterans emerged.   Vietnam Veterans of  America 
     was  founded  in  Washington,  DC as a  national  organization  to 
     advocate  their  interests,  and  the 11 Vietnam-era  veterans  in 
     Congress formed an official caucus,  Vietnam Veterans in Congress. 
     Fledgling  organizations  already in existence,  such  as  Citizen 
     Soldier  and  Vietnam Veterans Against the War,  also formed  task 
     forces on Agent Orange.
     
     THE ISSUE BROADENS
       In January of 1979, a month after Reutershan's death, AOVI hired 
     Victor   Yannacone,   an   accomplished  attorney   in   workman's 
     compensation  disputes  and  a  passionate  foe  of  the  chemical 
     industry,  as  their "legal field  commander"  (Schuck,  1985:44). 
     Yannacone refiled Reutershan's complaint as a class-action suit in 
     federal court on behalf of all Vietnam veterans and their children 
     who  may have been damaged by the herbicide (Reutershan et al.  v. 
     The  Dow Chemical Company et al., 1979).   The suit named all  six 
     manufacturers of Agent Orange - Dow Chemical, Hercules,  Northwest 
     Industries,  Diamond  Shamrock,   Monsanto,   and  North  American 
     Phillips -  as defendants.   Yannacone estimated the damages at $4 
     billion.
       Recent  trends in the legal system favored the Agent Orange suit 
     (Schuck,  1986:26-34).   First,  a  series of decisions  gradually 
     extended  a manufacturer's liability to all individuals who use or 
     are exposed to its product.  Previously, the obligation to produce 
     and market nondefective goods - the duty of care - applied only to 
     the purchaser of a product.  In addition, strict liability without 
     fault   became   the  standard  for  assessing  a   manufacturer's 
     culpability  whereas,  in the past,  the plaintiff was required to 
     show   that   the  manufacturer  failed  to  exercise   reasonable 
     precaution.   The  courts also no longer required the plaintiff to 
     prove  that a specific defendant made the product which caused the 
     damage  so  long as some reasonable method existed for  allocating 
     the  damages.  (1)  Finally,  the amounts which courts and  juries 
     awarded in compensation for damages skyrocketed.  Awards in excess 
     of one million dollars became commonplace.
       Agent  Orange quickly proved to be no ordinary product liability 
     case.  From the moment it was filed, the Reutershan suit attracted 
     attention  and  notoriety in the media.   Attorneys on both  sides 
     felt  that this worked in favor of the veterans.   Even after  the 
     CBS documentary and its coverage,  very few veterans -  and even a 
     smaller  percentage  of  the American public -  knew  about  Agent 
     Orange.  Press  coverage  of  the  suit  developed  awareness  and 
     encouraged  veterans  who thought that they might be afflicted  to 
     initiate  claims and join the suit.   It also created sympathy for 
     the veterans and suspicion about the chemical companies.
       Early in 1979, Senator Charles Percy (IL) requested a second GAO 
     inquiry  into  herbicide  use  in  Vietnam.    This  investigation 
     
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     included  an initial assessment of the HERBS tapes (USGAO,  1979).  
     The  report  acknowledged  that  the Air Force  clearly  had  used 
     herbicides  without  proper precautions.  Spraying  from  aircraft 
     often  took place close enough to troops that wind drift may  have 
     exposed  them  to  the herbicide,  and  ground  troops  frequently 
     entered  contaminated areas shortly after  spraying.  Further,  it 
     stated  that  troops used empty herbicide drums  for  constructing 
     latrines  and even home-made hibachis.   The report concluded that 
     as  many  as  40,000  Army,   Marine,   and  Air  Force  personnel 
     experienced significant exposure the herbicide; it also provided a 
     listing of units whose personnel it considered officially at risk.
       The GAO report legitimated the concerns of worried veterans.  It 
     could  no longer be argued that defoliation took place under care-
     fully  controlled conditions in areas remote from American troops.  
     The  remaining  question concerned the consequences  of  exposure.  
     Agent Orange was now a point of conflict in three arenas:  the VA, 
     Congress and civilian regulatory agencies, and the courts.
       The VA,  the nation's single largest health care system,  caters 
     primarily  to  12 million veterans of the Second World  War  whose 
     average  age  in  1979  exceeded 60 years  and  who  have  chronic 
     ailments associated with aging.  At age 65,  veterans are eligible 
     to receive all their medical care from the VA free of charge. Only 
     30  percent  of  the  patients treated by  the  VA  have  service-
     connected  disabilities and,  of all medical treatment provided by 
     the VA,  only 16 percent is service-connected.   In contrast,  the 
     average  Vietnam veteran is 30 years younger.   They receive acute 
     treatment   and  physical  and  occupational  rehabilitation  from 
     injuries associated with warfare.  The largest single diagnosis in 
     VA facilities, alcohol abuse, is an especially acute problem among 
     Vietnam  veterans with combat experience.  The Agent Orange claims 
     involve  latent  disorders  which did not fit  this  profile.   VA 
     Director  Cleland  admitted that many in the VA simply viewed  the 
     Agent  Orange claims "as a big hoax,  like witchcraft"  (Bonior et 
     al., 1984:167).
       The  politics  of  veterans'  compensation belies  the  aura  of 
     administrative  rationality  that surrounds it.   In time of  war, 
     soldiers  incur risk of injury and death for which they cannot  be 
     repaid easily.  Compensation and other benefits - which are funded 
     by  Congress and executed by the VA -  stem from a recognition  of 
     this  altruistic  contribution  and stand as  visible  symbols  of 
     collective  gratitude  or  even guilt.   Two principles  serve  as 
     guidelines  for  compensating veterans  (House  Committee,  1956). 
     First,  the  highest  priority should go to programs which  extend 
     medical care for service-connected injuries or illnesses, ease re-
     entry  into  civilian  life,  and provide  adjustment  for  career 
     advantages lost while in the service. Second,  when there is doubt 
     about  a  claim,  the veteran should be given the benefit  of  the 
     doubt.
       In  June  1979,  the House Committee on Interstate  and  Foreign 
     Commerce held the first congressional hearings on Agent Orange and 
     its effects on Vietnam veterans (House of Representatives,  1979). 
     Veterans  with  cancer  or  who had children  with  birth  defects 
     testified  before the committee.   In response to this hearing and 
     the  growing  political  presence of  Vietnam  veterans,  Congress 
     enacted  P.L.  96-151 commissioning the VA to conduct an epidemio-
     logical study of veterans exposed to Agent Orange.  Significantly, 
     Congress  also  ratified  a bill -  first  introduced  by  Senator 
     Cranston  in 1971 and defeated on five separate occasions  -  that 
     established readjustment counseling for Vietnam veterans.  
     
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       The  VA,  however,  stood  firm  on its  position  of  requiring 
     scientific evidence based on human subjects.  By this time,  about 
     750  veterans  had submitted claims to the VA and about 5,000  had 
     requested  physical examinations or treatment for ailments related 
     to Agent Orange.   No conclusive evidence linked Agent Orange with 
     disease  or  with birth defects.   Evidence consisted of  personal 
     accounts and claims made by veterans, circumstantial evidence from 
     industrial   accidents,   and  inconclusive  scientific   studies. 
     Nonetheless,  to require scientific evidence as a precondition for 
     treatment and compensation ran contrary to the spirit of VA guide-
     lines  and  placed an extensive burden of proof upon Agent  Orange 
     claimants.
       In March 1979, WBBM broadcast a second documentary to update the 
     Agent  Orange  story.  This documentary stressed the  presence  of 
     dioxin  in many commonly used compounds and hence the exposure  of 
     many civilians in the United States to this toxin.   Kurtis (1983) 
     again  arranged  for  a  private showing of  the  documentary  for 
     members  of Congress.   In June,  the Senate requested a long-term 
     study  of  the effects of exposure to dioxin by the Department  of 
     Health,  Education,  and  Welfare.   The EPA and various  industry 
     groups and universities also had studies of dioxin under way.
       For  years,  agricultural and industry researchers had conducted 
     research on Agent Orange's active ingredients,  2,4,5-T and 2,4-D. 
     They  knew  that  the ingredients killed the plants  by  mimicking 
     natural  plant-growth  hormones.  The imposters caused  rapid  and 
     uncontrolled cell growth;  the plants literally grew themselves to 
     death.  But  the  early  studies by and large did not ask  if  the 
     active  ingredients  could produce unscheduled and unnatural  cell 
     growth  in  animals  or humans.   During the  early  1970s,  other 
     researchers  developed  an  effective  methodology  for  assessing 
     dioxin - an unintentional by-product in Agent Orange - and, by all 
     accounts, everyone involved soon considered dioxin to be extremely 
     toxic to laboratory animals (for summaries, see ACSH,  1981;  CSA, 
     1981; Davis and Simpson, 1983; Galston, 1979).
       In part because establishing toxicity is complicated, answers to 
     questions  about  dioxin's effects on humans  lacked  experimental 
     evidence and sparked debate (cf., Epstein, 1983; Tschirley, 1986). 
     Epidemiologists trace about 25% of all cancers to humanly produced 
     environmental and occupational exposures and the rest to voluntary 
     consumption  of foods,  drugs,  and stimulants,  and to  naturally 
     occurring  carcinogens (Katzman,  1986).  While common  foodstuffs 
     such  as  peanut butter or well-done steak may  contain  NATURALLY 
     occurring carcinogens in levels of parts per thousand,  regulators 
     try  to  protect the public from exposures to SYNTHETIC  chemicals 
     measured  in parts per million.  Exposure to dosages of dioxin  as 
     minute  as parts per billion have proved toxic to some  laboratory 
     animals (ACSH, 1981; CSA, 1981; Tschirley, 1986).
       Humans  have  been exposed to dioxin in several  well-documented 
     industrial  accidents or oversights.   The incidents date back  to 
     the exposure in 1949 of about 250 workers in the Monsanto chemical 
     plant  in  Nitro,  West Virginia.  The most  spectacular  accident 
     occurred in Seveso, Italy in 1976, where a plant explosion exposed 
     37,000 people to tricholorophenol (Whiteside, 1979).  In these and 
     other incidents, the most common initial symptom was chloracne,  a 
     blistering  of  the  skin (Taylor,  1979).   The  condition  often 
     subsided  in  a  few days but in some cases  lasted  indefinitely. 
     Other  symptoms  included nausea,  dizziness,  and numbing of  the 
     fingers and toes.   Time-lags between initial exposure and serious 
     disease  made  it difficult to establish long-term  effects.   For 
     
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     example,  follow-up  studies of Swedish workers exposed during the 
     1950s to compounds containing dioxin revealed higher than expected 
     incidences of lymphomas and soft-tissue sarcomas.  However,  time-
     lags of several years made it almost impossible to eliminate other 
     potential  causes  of  these  diseases.   Further,   the  diseases 
     allegedly  caused  by dioxin may be caused by factors  other  than 
     exposure to dioxin and, with the exception of chloracne,  exposure 
     to dioxin apparently does not produce one distinctive disease.
       Some  claims of illness lacked credibility because they were not 
     consistent  with prevailing medical opinion.   Medical researchers 
     simply  did  not  understand how dioxin worked,  and some  of  the 
     symptoms   attributed  to  dioxin  suggested  unfamiliar   disease 
     processes.   This  was especially true of claims by veterans  that 
     exposure  to  dioxin  may  have produced birth  defects  in  their 
     children: medical science thought mothers had to be exposed to the 
     toxin  during  pregnancy.  (2)  Even  this question could  not  be 
     assessed  in  studies  of the Seveso victims.   The  incidence  of 
     stillborn  births and birth defects was lower among women who  had 
     been  exposed  than  for matched controls because  of  therapeutic 
     abortions available by special arrangement after the incident.
       Amidst  this  confusion,  several states took the initiative  in 
     addressing  exposure to dioxin among veterans and civilians.   New 
     York  and New Jersey instructed state commissions to hold hearings 
     and conduct investigations. In late 1978 and early 1979,  the Love 
     Canal  controversy  -  in which chemicals from buried metal  drums 
     leaked  into  the ground water in Buffalo,  New  York  -  received 
     extensive media scrutiny in both states.  Investigators discovered 
     in  1979 that dioxin was one of the contaminants seeping from  the 
     drums.  Both states also have large numbers of Vietnam veterans.
       By  1979,  the slow and arduous task of moving the Agent  Orange 
     case  to trial was under way.   A Multi-District Litigation  Panel 
     assigned  the  case to Judge George Pratt of the Federal  District 
     Court in Uniondale, NY.  From the outset,  the case bogged down in 
     a stupefying array of legal entanglement.  Product liability cases 
     ordinarily fall under state tort law;   applying varied state laws 
     in   federal   court   would  be   complicated   and   burdensome. 
     Nevertheless,  the  chemical  companies  argued that  the  product 
     liability laws of each state in which individual plaintiffs reside 
     should  apply.   The plaintiffs maintained that federal common law 
     should govern the case in order to simplify matters.  Either way a 
     decision would be controversial.
       Meanwhile,  the  chemical companies filed third-party complaints 
     against  the  government for indemnity and sought immunity as  war 
     contractors.   They argued that the government had not simply pur-
     chased herbicides from them, but also had specified their content, 
     supervised  their production,  and controlled their application in 
     Vietnam.   Further, they noted that government regulations forbade 
     them  from  selling  the same mixtures in  civilian  markets.   In 
     November  1979,  [Judge  Pratt]  accepted  the case as  a  federal 
     question  and  refused to accept the chemical companies motion  to 
     dismiss  (in re "Agent Orange," 1979).   The companies immediately 
     filed an appeal.
       One  other  event  took place in November  1979.   Acting  on  a 
     request by a small group of Vietnam veterans,  twenty-six senators 
     co-sponsored  a  bill  which set aside land next  to  the  Lincoln 
     Memorial for a Vietnam veterans' memorial.  It had been a big year 
     for Vietnam veterans.
     
     INTO THE '80s: THE ISSUE WANES
     
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       The  CBS  documentaries and the lawsuit propelled  Agent  Orange 
     into  the limelight at a time when neither veterans nor the public 
     knew much about it. These events became vehicles for disseminating 
     information  and heightening awareness,  both about the  herbicide 
     and  its  potential  harm  to veterans and about  dioxin  and  its 
     potential danger to civilians.  In April 1980,  WBBM broadcast the 
     third installment of its series on the issue,  "Agent Orange:  The 
     view from Vietnam" (Kurtis, 1983;78-79).   It verified destruction 
     of  forests and croplands and reported Vietnamese cases of cancers 
     and  birth defects which Vietnamese health officials attributed to 
     Agent Orange.  Again, Congress received a private screening of the 
     documentary.  Although  the installment did not evoke the dramatic 
     responses  of its two predecessors,  it did help sustain congress-
     ional interest in the issue.  A number of congressional committees 
     held special hearings about Agent Orange, dioxin, their effects on 
     veterans  and civilians,  and the formulation of policies to  deal 
     with them (House of Representatives, 1980). In June 1980, Congress 
     passed  the bill which set aside two acres for a Vietnam veterans' 
     memorial.   Situated  prominently next to the Lincoln Memorial  on 
     some  of  the  most coveted real estate  in  Washington,  DC,  the 
     memorial  was an apt indication of how much the political power of 
     Vietnam veterans had increased in the past two years.
       Although the lawsuit continued to attract inquiries from worried 
     veterans,  it  suffered  a major setback in  November  1980.   The 
     Second  Court  of Appeals ruled that substantial federal  interest 
     was lacking in the Agent Orange case (In re "Agent Orange," 1980). 
     The  veterans  sought a higher ruling on the  appeal.   Meanwhile, 
     Judge  Pratt again certified the case as a class action and denied 
     the chemical companies motion to dismiss as war contractors.
       In  1981,  Congress  continued  its response to  initiatives  on 
     behalf of Vietnam veterans.   That same year,  however,  President 
     Ronald   Reagan  placed  a  hiring  freeze  on  the   readjustment 
     counseling  program established in 1979 and placed restrictions on 
     other  expenditures in the program.   A subsequent budget  message 
     recommended  getting  rid  of all outreach  programs  for  Vietnam 
     veterans, but in passing the 1979 bill,  Congress specifically had 
     exempted  programs  for Vietnam veterans from this kind of  budget 
     trimming.   Vietnam  Veterans  of America and Vietnam Veterans  in 
     Congress  both  filed lawsuits to overturn the illegal freeze  and 
     restrictions.   Congress  not  only  overrode  President  Reagan's 
     proposals,  but  also passed P.L. 97-72 which extended  G.I.  bill 
     benefits for job training, contained a small business loan package 
     for  Vietnam  veterans,  and  directed the VA to  provide  Vietnam 
     veterans  with medical care for any condition which might possibly 
     result from exposure to Agent Orange.  While the measure was under 
     consideration,  the  VA lobbied vigorously against  it.  President 
     Reagan  expressed his disapproval of the bill on budgetary grounds 
     before reluctantly signing it into law (Bonior et al., 1984:76-78, 
     152-54).
       In  June,  The  Supreme  Court sought the opinion  of  the  U.S. 
     attorney  general on the question of federal interest in the Agent 
     Orange  lawsuit.   After  consulting  with the  VA  and  DOD,  the 
     attorney general reported no special federal interest in the case. 
     The  Supreme  Court then declined to rule on the  appeal,  thereby 
     allowing  the decision of the appeals court to stand (in re "Agent 
     Orange,"  1981).   Yannacone  refiled  the suit in federal  court, 
     leaving  two  questions yet unanswered:  which state's law  should 
     apply,  and  which  choice-of-law rules would that  state's  court 
     apply? These issues were not resolved until February 1984.
     
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       Meanwhile,  newspapers  in St.  Louis revealed that streets  and 
     stable  areas in Times Beach,  MO had been contaminated mistakenly 
     with  waste  oil containing dioxin (Kurtis,  1983;  Science  News, 
     1983;  Time,  1984).  For  years a local contractor had  purchased 
     waste  oil  from  a nearby chemical plant to use in  tarring  dirt 
     roads  and arenas.  Reports of peculiar deaths among farm  animals 
     and  birds dated back to 1971,  when the same contractor tarred an 
     arena and stable areas in Moscow Mills, MO. In 1983, the EPA acted 
     quickly  and  decisively.   It evacuated and relocated the  town's 
     population at a cost of about $33 million;  it fenced off the town 
     and declared it a disaster area for the next 20 years.
       The  actions of the EPA stand in sharp contrast to those of  the 
     VA.  Students of formal organizations use the concept of the "lazy 
     monopoly"  to  explain the inertia of some large organizations  in 
     the face of demands for change (Hirschman, 1970;  Seidler,  1979). 
     The  concept is also useful in explaining the actions of the VA in 
     the Agent Orange controversy.   The lazy monopoly has control over 
     a  service  or  product.  Its executives are slow to  improve  the 
     quality  of  the  product,  change their policies,  or  alter  the 
     structure  of  the  organization.   They prefer  instead  to  lose 
     clients or personnel who criticize the organization.   The absence 
     of  competition encourages recalcitrance in the lazy monopoly;  it 
     invites  unsatisfied  clients to renounce their membership in  the 
     organization and obtain the product or service elsewhere.
       By 1983,  more than 100,000 veterans had requested physicals for 
     complaints  related to Agent Orange.  While this would be a  large 
     number of cases for most hospital systems,  the numbers were small 
     within  the VA's overall caseload.  However,  the inquiries repre-
     sented the wrong kind of patient for the medical care VA hospitals 
     typically  provide.  Caring  for  these veterans would  require  a 
     substantial cost and effort. Nevertheless, P.L. 97-72 required the 
     VA  to provide treatment for Agent Orange-related  conditions.  On 
     the  face  of it,  the VA was compliant.   It began a  newsletter, 
     Agent  Orange Review,  to summarize current information and proce-
     dures  for  receiving  treatment.   It had already  established  a 
     registry  from which to compile a listing of veterans who inquired 
     about  the herbicide and its effects.  (In 1982,  the registry was 
     found  to  have 89,000 names but no addresses.)  However,  the  VA 
     admitted  no  link  between Agent Orange  and  disease,  with  the 
     exception of chloracne. It defined a condition which may have been 
     produced  by  Agent Orange as one that was not congenital,  not  a 
     result  of  an  injury,  or  did  not have  a  specific  or  well-
     established cause (VA, 1983).
       Noting  that the VA opposed the legislation requiring it to pro-
     vide health care,  many veterans sought comprehensive testing and, 
     when necessary, treatment from private physicians - services which 
     they  paid for out-of-pocket or through private health  insurance.  
     Veterans  who  were sick and unable to work also found  that  they 
     could  file claims with the Social Security Administration  (SSA).  
     Compensation  by the SSA for a disabling condition did not require 
     that  the claimant prove how the condition came into  being,  only 
     that  it existed.  This process siphoned troublesome clients  away 
     from  the VA.  It stemmed the influx of claims whose  authenticity 
     was  debatable  and whose medical profiles were  not  synchronized 
     with the structure of services the VA typically provided.
       Ironically,  the  pensions and old-age health care which take up 
     the majority of the VA budget and medical activity,  and which the 
     American  Legion  and VFW previously supported at the  expense  of 
     programs  for  Vietnam veterans,  provide assistance and care  for 
     
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     conditions  which  are not service-connected.  As  noted  earlier, 
     these  organizations did not absorb significant numbers of Vietnam 
     veterans  and  consequently did not serve as their  advocates.  In 
     fact,   they   opposed  legislation  designed  to  assist  Vietnam 
     veterans.  With the Agent Orange controversy,  Vietnam Veterans of 
     America emerged as a strong national organization.  These develop-
     ments  meant that the VFW and the American  Legion,  organizations 
     with  aging  memberships,  were  in  danger of  losing  an  entire 
     generation  of  veterans  who very shortly would  be  a  necessary 
     source  of members.   It was time to adjust to changing  political 
     realities.   In  1982,  the  VFW adopted a  resolution  advocating 
     compensation  for Agent Orange-related conditions.   In 1983,  the 
     American Legion followed suit.
       Scientists  continued to chip away at the  problem.  Researchers 
     proposed  explanations of how dioxin and similar toxic  substances 
     cause  disease  in  laboratory  animals  (Matasumura,  1983)   and 
     possibly  humans  (Stoscheck  and  King,  1986).    Other  studies 
     reported  higher rates of soft-tissue sarcomas and lymphomas among 
     Swedish  workers exposed to dioxin in the workplace (Sterling  and 
     Arundel,  1986)  and  among  Kansas  farmers who  used  herbicides 
     containing 2,4,5-T (Hoar et al., 1986)  than for matched controls. 
     Finally  Ranch Hand  participants  (Lathrop  et  al.,  1984)   and 
     residents  of  Times  Beach, MO  (Hoffman  et  al.,  1986)  showed 
     physiological  abnormalities  not found among matched  samples  of 
     unexposed  persons,  although  the clinical significance of  these 
     abnormalities was not clear.
       As the Agent Orange lawsuit dragged into its fourth year,  Judge 
     Pratt  resigned  from the case.   It was reassigned to Judge  Jack 
     Weinstein.  Weinstein,  who  enjoyed a reputation as an innovative 
     judge  and  precocious  professor of law at  Columbia  University, 
     quickly reconceptualized the case. Taking the initiative, he ruled 
     one  by  one on the lingering legal issues and placed pressure  on 
     the  lawyers  to  proceed directly to trial or to  settle  out  of 
     court.  Of  the  two  outcomes,  Weinstein's  preference  was  for 
     settlement.  Schuck  (1986:143)  states:  "To  try  such  a  case, 
     (Weinstein)  felt,  would  consume an almost unthinkable amount of 
     time..., money, talent, and social energy, and with the inevitable 
     appeals and possible retrials,  the outcome might be uncertain for 
     many  years to come....  Finally,  a negotiated settlement offered 
     the prospect of everybody obtaining something rather than one side 
     losing everything."
       However,  even  a dynamic judge of Weinstein's caliber could not 
     easily induce a settlement. Agent Orange had become the basis of a 
     highly visible, emotionally charged,  symbolic suit;  accomplished 
     aggressive  attorneys were gearing up for the long-awaited day  in 
     court.  Through  a series of carefully crafted legal and  tactical 
     maneuvers,  Weinstein  skewed  the options and incentives  towards 
     settlement.  On May 7, 1984,  nine years to the day after the last 
     American  troops were evacuated from Saigon and only hours  before 
     the trial was to begin,  Weinstein extracted a cease-fire from the 
     lawyers  representing  the two sides.  The manufacturers of  Agent 
     Orange,  who  had already spent $100 million on legal fees in  the 
     case,  agreed to establish a $180 million fund from which veterans 
     harmed  by dioxin exposure would be compensated.  No payments have 
     yet  been  made  since aspects of the settlement are  still  under 
     appeal.   When  compensation begins,  the court estimates that the 
     maximum  payment will be $3,400 to survivors of deceased  veterans 
     who  were exposed to Agent Orange and $12,800 ($1,280 per year for 
     10  years)  to veterans exposed to the herbicide who are now  100% 
     
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     disabled (Kubley et al., 1985:85-86).  According to the agreement, 
     establishing the fund did not affirm that exposure to Agent Orange 
     caused  or  contributed to disease among the veterans and did  not 
     represent  an admission of liability by the chemical companies (in 
     re "Agent Orange," 1984).
       The   terms   of  the  settlement  are   (Schuck, 1985:165): (1) 
     Defendants  would pay $180 million plus interest running from  May 
     7.   (2) The  settlement  fund would advance moneys to  pay  class 
     notice   and   settlement  administration   expenses. (3) No other 
     distribution  of  settlement  would be made until appeals  from  a 
     final  settlement  order had been exhausted. (4) Defendants  could 
     obtain  reverse indemnification for veteran opt-out claims  upheld 
     by  state courts up to $10 million until  January 1, 1999. (5) The 
     class  definition  would be interpreted to include service  people 
     whose  injuries had not yet been manifested. (6) Plaintiffs  could 
     retain defendants documents for one year. (7) All parties reserved 
     all  rights  to sue the United States. (8) Defendants  denied  all 
     liability. (9) Defendants   reserved  the  right  to  reject   the 
     settlement  if a "substantial"  number of class members opted out.  
     (10) Any  class member who opted out would have an opportunity  to 
     opt  back in.  (11) Unclaimed funds would revert to the defendants 
     after twenty-five years. (12) The settlement agreement was subject 
     to  a  rule 23(e)  "fairness"  hearing.  (13) Although  after-born 
     claimants  were not included in the class and could therefore sue, 
     the  distribution plan would make special arrangements to  address 
     their  needs. (14) The  court would retain jurisdiction until  the 
     settlement fund was exhausted.
       Veterans  reacted to the settlement with varying proportions  of 
     disappointment and realism.   Particularly galling was the lack of 
     answers  to  questions  about dioxin's harmfulness  or  the  manu-
     facturer's culpability.  As Schuck (1986:256) observes:
          The  veterans  expected the law to provide  the  essential 
        elements of simple justice ... with comprehensible narrative 
        evidence, a clear determination of guilt or innocence, and a 
        swift, straightforward remedy.  Their lawyers knew, however, 
        that this view of adjudication was chimerical, ... that many 
        of  the  complex-technical aspects of the Agent Orange  case 
        contradicted their clients' intuitive notions of justice and 
        even  defied  common sense.   The intricacies (of the  case) 
        simply  had  no counterpart,  no coherent  meaning,  in  the 
        veterans'  experiences  ...  For  them,  the law had  become 
        mystifying, alien, and unjust.
     
     DISCUSSION
       . . . . .
       The case of Agent Orange encompasses all of these considerations 
     and provides an ideal historical incident for examining the socio-
     political  processes in which disease,  illness,  and sickness are 
     invoked, sustained or challenged.  The term "disease"  refers to a 
     disruptive  biological condition,  "illness"  to the perception by 
     the individual that he or she is not well,  and "sickness"  to the 
     recognition  by appropriate authorities that the individual indeed 
     has  a disease.   Evidence of disease,  illness,  and sickness  is 
     assessed in three institutional domains - science,  medicine,  and 
     law - each with its own decision rules for certifying them. 
       Scientific research is guided by the null hypothesis, i.e.,  the 
     proposition that the effect under investigation is NOT produced by 
     the suspected cause.  The null hypothesis here is that dioxin does 
     not  produce cancers in exposed subjects or birth defects in their 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                         Page 61
     Volume  5, Number 10                             October 24, 1991

     offspring.   By  focusing  on  the  null  hypothesis,   scientific 
     research   favors  type  II  (failing  to  reject  a  false   null 
     hypothesis) over type I (rejecting a true null hypothesis)  errors 
     (Hays,  1973).    If  an  error  is  going  to  made,   scientific 
     investigators  would rather accept a false null hypothesis than  a 
     false  alternate  hypothesis.   Hence,  it  is a  greater  sin  in 
     scientific  studies of phenoxy herbicides to conclude that  dioxin 
     harms  health,  when it actually does not,  than to conclude  that 
     dioxin is harmless to humans when it actually is.
       Medical  diagnoses  often carry the opposite bias. Two types  of 
     error may result here also. Well persons may be diagnosed as sick, 
     or diseased ones may be considered healthy. In general, physicians 
     are  socialized to believe that it is less of a sin to diagnose  a 
     well  person as sick than to fail to detect disease in a  diseased 
     person  (Scheff,  1972). Two considerations mediate this  posture.  
     One,  medical  knowledge retains a firm base in current scientific 
     consensus.   Physicians  who  act otherwise run the risk of  being 
     labelled "quacks" or of being sued.  Two,  the tendency to suspect 
     harm  until  doubt  is removed may be reversed  in  organizational 
     contexts  where directives endorse a particular position regarding 
     etiology, diagnosis and/or treatment,  or when diagnosing sickness 
     may   imply   organizational   culpability   for   treatment   and 
     compensation (Nathanson and Becker, 1981).  Although treatment and 
     compensation take place in separate administrative channels in the 
     VA,  the  cause of an injury or disease takes on a significance in 
     this  setting  beyond  that  usually required  for  diagnosis  and 
     treatment.   In this situation,  the patient's needs and interests 
     may  become divorced from those of the organization.  Certainly it 
     is necessary to ask, "Can the organization afford to define people 
     who report having illnesses -  and hence who may be diseased -  as 
     sick?"
       The  legal  system  provides  yet a third set  of  criteria  for 
     establishing  cause  and effect in personal injury  cases.   Rules 
     allow  for  the  introduction and evaluation of several  kinds  of 
-- 
#Larry W. Jewell (ex-USN)     WWII-L Listowner    jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu # 
#"Sunday's horoscope is noteworthy because of its strange, sudden and wholly#
#unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all phases of life." #
#--"Your Horoscope," L.A. Evening Herald Express, Saturday, Dec. 6, 1941.   #