HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West
Date: 17 Dec 92 22:37:14 GMT

charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau) writes:

>I think that is the real issue -- would it have made a FUNDAMENTAL
>difference to the outcome of the war if the Confederates had taken
>Washington for a few days or weeks, rather than permanently?  Surely
>it would have given the Union cause, and the Lincoln administration
>in particular, a real black eye.  On the other hand, it might just
>have mad the folks up north even more determined....

>- Gary Charbonneau
>  charbonn@silver.indiana.edu 

YES, YES, YES.  even if Early had taken DC, could he have held it?  that wasnt
his goal anyway, it was more of a big raid, perhaps burn DC to the ground.

The washingon defenses were stripped! Lincoln let grant do what he refused
to let McClellan do.  a good question is WHY?  More faith in grant to get
the job done rather than sit on the army.

it should also be remembered that the transportation in the Union lines
was pretty good.  the two divisions that saved DC were sent up from 
Petersburg that morning, were they not (i have to find this, because i
have said this before - look in Elish Hunt Rhodes _All for the Union_)
never had they fought so well before, knowing the President was watching.


As for the West, and the "War being won" at the fall of atlanta, etc, etc.,
i think that circumstances were such that the result was inevitable, but
the war wasnt over until "the fat lady sings".  People often give a 
"turning point" in the war, as if it is something that can be pinpointed.
i.e.
July 4, 1863
	-the fall of Vicksburg
	-Lee's retreat from G-burg
There is something Providencial here - two major victories on the 4th of
July, the anniversary of the Declaration.

But there was still a whole lot of fight left in the Aof NV and the A of Tenn.
Things were brighter, but it wasnt over yet.

if asked to give a turning point, i would say it was the Charge of the
Army of the Cumberland up Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga.  Why.
	1. it drives a confed army from the field
	2. Grant is thereafter promoted to overall command, and lincolns
		goals will now be carried out.
	3. The A of the Cumb has regained respect (even if Grant threatened
		Courtmartialling the person responsible for them not stopping
		but kept on going up the hill - kinda hard to Ct martial
		the men of an entire army.  :)

	4. The army of tennessee would never fight as effectively has it 
		had in the past

:)

d
From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: The offer of command to R.E. Lee
Date: 17 Dec 92 22:04:26 GMT
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations

In article <1gqn8qINNjpm@menudo.uh.edu> HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.) writes:
>I remember a line in the first part of Ken Burn's _The Civil War_, supposedly
>uttered by Gen. (Scott? -- suddenly my memory fails me big time -- but he was
>the ranking general in charge of the Army) that went something like "I know of
>one man best suited to save the Union, and let it be Robert E. Lee."
>
>Burn's history has occasionally taken a bit of a pounding in this group, so I
>guess this is suspect, but since we're just throwing logs on the fire for the
>moment...
>
Burns may be suspect, but he didn't generally fabricate quotations from
whole cloth.  I believe Scott actually said this well before the War began,
but I haven't been able to pin the source.

Whether Scott said this or not, it probably is an accurate reflection of the
way he felt.  Lee's performance in the Mexican War evidenced not only heroism
but an aptitude for command, and he worked closely with Scott throughout
the campaign.  He was also a fellow Virginian, and it was far from inevitable
that Lee would go with the Confederacy.  After all, (to bring this thread full
circle) nearly half of the old army officers of Virginian birth fought for
the Union, Thomas being one of the most visible examples.
--Chuck
-- 
D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . ."
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: European Intervention (speculation)
Date: 18 Dec 92 08:19:19 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <18DEC199207463619@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov>, stocker@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (ERICH FRANZ STOCKER) writes:
-------------------- Much deleted -----------------------------
> Spectulating what would have happened if they had intervened is certainly
> the grist for novels but not particularly productive historically -
> although it is fun.  
> 
> Erich

I am obviously not a historian, but it seems to me that speculation about 
alternative courses of events could be more than "fun" or "grist for novels".
The people who lived through those events had to act upon their own 
speculation on the future consequenses. Our speculation on alternative
histories seems (to me) to be a useful mechanism for understanding these 
decisions. 

On the other hand, saying, "if such-and-such, then so-and-so..... and Bill 
Clinton would now be president elect of the CSA," (as I admit to having done)
is so obviously silly that it is only done for fun. ;-)

- Paul - 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan     Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV   "I've been to one World's Fair, a picnic and a rodeo, but
                that's the stupidest thing I ever heard..."_Dr.Strangelove_
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: European Intervention (was "exit")
Date: 14 Dec 92 10:59:21 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

The recent threads concerning what was needed for either side to win
the War have made frequent allusion to European (i.e. English and
French) intervention on behalf of the CSA. There is strong evidence
that the English came very close to doing this after 2nd Manassas
(before the E.P.). My question is what form would such intervention
likely have taken (Just ambassidors? A naval attempt to force the
blockade? Infantry crossing the Niagra?) and what would the likely
consequences have been? Some discussion has already started comparing
the new Union navy to Britania's older (newly obsolete?) fleet. 

I think the timing of such intervention must also be considered. In
the summer/early-fall of 1862, the Union and CSA armies were still
pretty evenly matched, and most Union ironclads were (at best) on the
drafting table.

There is the precident of the War for US Independence that foriegn
intervention would be decisive in favor of independece, but another
issue to consider is the effect on morale on either side. The
enlistment rate on behalf of the Union was much lower than the CSA,
but had the war been seen as one for/against England, monarchy, etc,
would these ratios have changed?

-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan     Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV   "I've been to one World's Fair, a picnic and a rodeo, but
                that's the stupidest thing I ever heard..."_Dr.Strangelove_
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: spencer@panix.com (David Spencer)
Subject: Re: Stonewall at Gettysburg (was Jackson at the Seven Days)
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 13:32:37 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix, NYC

In <tecump.724463213@sulu> tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello) writes:

>the "capture" of the mississippi was a key objective since the beginning
>of the war - it was part of Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan (a plan which
>not many appreciated but the same idea was used to win the war).
>the mississippi was the vital waterway, and it helped to make the west
>the West before the war by giving it a trade route.
>thus, it was the key link in civil matters as well as military.

>the capture of Vicksburg:
>1. cut off the Trans-Miss from the rest of the Confederacy, keeping supplies
>and men from going either way.
>2. enabled the federal navy to navigate up and down.

>Importance of both:
>1. the first chapter in splitting the confederacy into pieces (see the
>Anaconda plan and of course sherman's march.

And it made the Mississippi a secure base for raids into the interior.
After Vicksburg, Grant sent Sherman and others out on tours to
methodically destroy stores and factories in Mississippi and Alabama.
That, by the way, is where Sherman got his idea for the march through
Georgia.

It had the additional benefit of providing a haven for escaped slaves
from the most slave-intensive area of the South.

>2. Supplies could now be run up and down the mississippi.  The Union
>could [now] easily move entirely around the confederacy.  opening the
>mississippi allowed better campaign support on other possible campaigns
>along ajoining rivers.  Rivers and Railroads were key to this war.
[I fixed your typo - dhs]

This is an essential, and often overlooked, point. The Mississippi was
cheapest and most effective trade route for the whole area bounded by
the Appalachians, the Rockies, the Great Lakes and Northern Alabama.
Water traffic was far cheaper than rail. Remember that as a young man
Lincoln ran riverboats, and read your Mark Twain. (As well as Fogel's
seminal work on rails and canals.)

Reopening the Mississippi to Northern traffic reopened an economic
lifeline from the counry's most productive farmland to the outside
world. And it denied the rebels their cheapest internal transit.
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: artillery organization
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 19:05:26 GMT

In article <14DEC199212232827@lims02.lerc.nasa.gov> afallen@lims02.lerc.nasa.gov (E. Allen Arrington) writes:
>My father-in-law asked me a question yesterday that I could not completely 
>answer.  How was artillery organized in the army structure during the Civil 
>War?   
>
It varied considerably over the course of the war. Artillery on both sides
was organized into batteries, typically 4 guns on the Confederate side and
6 guns on the Union side, and this is fairly stable throughout the war.
  At the start of the war, each infantry brigade was assigned one artillery
battery which was under the orders of the brigade commander. Any leftover
artillery was left at the discretion of the army commander. This organization
was too decentralized: it made it impossible to create massed batteries, and
often brigade artillery couldn't be employed effectively simply because the
brigade didn't have a decent place to mount artillery in its front. So the
batteries were taken away from the infantry and seperately organized into
units of three batteries each, which are called battalions in the Southern
army and brigades in the Northern (just to confuse things, I guess). These
units were at first assigned to division commanders (both sides at Antietam
had this structure) and later to corps commanders (Confederates at Gettysburg)
and then to an Artillery Reserve under the army commander (Union at
Gettysburg), although I don't know if the Confederates ever went to an
army artillery reserve system, and even after the corps and army level
organizations came into effect, most infantry divisions still retained one
or two batteries of artillery under the control of the division commander,
on both sides. There is also the horse artillery attached to the cavalry
and as far as I know, this was pretty much under the command of the cavalry
commander throughout the war, on both sides.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: spencer@cwis.unomaha.edu (Tom Spencer)
Subject: Re: Original Union Generals
Organization: University of Nebraska at Omaha
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 19:34:27 GMT

cwa@sgfb.ssd.ray.com (Carlton W. Andrews) writes:
>                      USA Generals  1/1/1861

[stuff deleted]
>          David E. Twiggs         B.G. 6/30/1846
>                [Twiggs was dismissed 3/1/1861 for handing/surrendering all
>                 men and equipment in Texas to the state of Texas]
[more stuff deleted]
>                                                Carlton Andrews

I read somewhere that Twiggs' second in command was a certian R. E. Lee.
This source also claims that there is no way that Lee would have
surrendered to the confederates.  Makes for an interesting alternate
history if you assume that Twiggs is absent Texas demands the surrender
of the Federal forts in Texas.
					-Tom Spencer



Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: cthorne@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Charles E Thorne)
Subject: Re: exit
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 17:42:10 GMT

In article <1992Dec14.074917.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>The recent threads concerning what was needed for either side to win
>the War have made frequent allusion to European (i.e. English and
>French) intervention on behalf of the CSA. There is strong evidence
>that the English came very close to doing this after 2nd Manassas
>(before the E.P.). My question is what form would such intervention
>likely have taken (Just ambassidors? A naval attempt to force the
>blockade? Infantry crossing the Niagra?) and what would the likely
>consequences have been? Some discussion has already started comparing
>the new Union navy to Britania's older (newly obsolete?) fleet. 

>I think the timing of such intervention must also be considered. In
>the summer/early-fall of 1862, the Union and CSA armies were still
>pretty evenly matched, and most Union ironclads were (at best) on the
>drafting table.

>There is the precident of the War for US Independence that foriegn
>intervention would be decisive in favor of independece, but another
>issue to consider is the effect on morale on either side. The
>enlistment rate on behalf of the Union was much lower than the CSA,
>but had the war been seen as one for/against England, monarchy, etc,
>would these ratios have changed?

I suspect that the real difference would not have been an actual invasion.
In the 19th century (after Napoleon was defeated and up until WWI), Britain's
principal means of power was at sea and in playing the other countries against
each other.  Britain really didn't want another land war in Europe (or the U.S)

Britain would possibly have protected the South's exportation of cotton (if 
they had any to sell), to the point of protecting their ports.  It also might
have sold them munitions on credit and of course protected the shipment of
war goods to the South.  I doubt if they would have done anything serious
about a blockade.

After the Napoleonic wars Britain drastically reduced their need for massive
land armies as well as the need to provide able-bodied seamen for their
sailing ships.

Charlie
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau)
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 13:51:23 GMT

In article <1992Dec12.081448.23645@leland.Stanford.EDU> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:

>>Why is DC less important than Richmond?
>>It does not look good if you are trying to supress a rebellion and the 
>>rebels take your capital. That's why all the troops were there in the
>>first place.
>
>I agree here. If DC falls, the rebellion has succeeded, whereas the
>rebellion can survive the loss of Richmond (though with greatly reduced
>odds).
>
>>Actually Grant has taken a lot of those troops with him during the
>>wilderness campaign, It wasn't quite as lopsided as all that, But I do
>>agree it was probably a hopeless task to take DC.
>
>Oh, but Early could have made one heckuva raid: burn the White House and
>Congress, take as many Senators prisoner as he could, etc. etc. (And Early
>was mean enough to do it, too.) By this point in the war I don't think it
>would affect the outcome, though, and he could never have held DC for more
>than 48 hours.

I think that is the real issue -- would it have made a FUNDAMENTAL
difference to the outcome of the war if the Confederates had taken
Washington for a few days or weeks, rather than permanently?  Surely
it would have given the Union cause, and the Lincoln administration
in particular, a real black eye.  On the other hand, it might just
have mad the folks up north even more determined....

- Gary Charbonneau
  charbonn@silver.indiana.edu

Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Subject: Re: BATTLE IN VERMONT?
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 14:41:42 GMT

In article <17DEC92.02222243@vax.clarku.edu> earon@vax.clarku.edu writes:
>
>             I'm taking a really nifty class on the Civil War, and I heard that there was some sort of battle in St.Alban's Vermont.  Anybody know anything about that?

More a raid than a battle, it was intended to make New Englanders far removed
from the War feel some of its effects.  The raiders burned a few buildings, 
killed a few people, took lots of money, and retreated to Canada.  This 
seriously strained relations with Britain, because Canadian authorities 
refused to surrender them to the United States, choosing to regard the
raiders as belligerents and interning them for the duration of the War.
--Chuck
-- 
D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . ."
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: afallen@lims02.lerc.nasa.gov (E. Allen Arrington)
Subject: artillery organization
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: 1st Kentucky Cavalry Co. C
Date: 14 Dec 1992 12:23 EST  

My father-in-law asked me a question yesterday that I could not completely 
answer.  How was artillery organized in the army structure during the Civil 
War?   

I know that the artillery org changed during the war, but I'm not sure of 
the exact organization throughout the war.  My understanding (which is 
generally foggy) is that the big guns were assigned to each corp and were 
under the direction of the corp comander (or artillery staff officer).  
What differences were there in organization between the CS and US forces?

E. Allen Arrington  
        Trooper, 1st Kentucky Cavalry, Co. C 
        Mounted Memorial Unit                 
and Mason (a darn fine horse)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: earon@vax.clarku.edu
Subject: BATTLE IN VERMONT?
Organization: Clark University
Date: 17 DEC 92 02:22:22 GMT


             I'm taking a really nifty class on the Civil War, and I heard that there was some sort of battle in St.Alban's Vermont.  Anybody know anything about that?
From: stocker@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (ERICH FRANZ STOCKER)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: European Intervention
Date: 18 Dec 92 12:46:00 GMT
Organization: NASA - Goddard Space Flight Center
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

The British, French and Austrian politicians were certainly sympathetic to
the South's rebellion.  After all it was in their best interest to ensure
that the US didn't get too powerful or economically too strong. What better
way than to assure the destruction of the country and set the two nations
now occupying the same area to constant bickering and perhaps fighting as
westward expansion proceeded from two nations rather than one. Also, they
would gain economic advantage by selling into a southern market with no
or lower tariffs than under US control.  It was equally likely that these
two nations would so hate each other, at least in the short term, that 
the south would buy no finished goods from the US and that would have
eliminated effective competition for the European nations.

However, in spite of the politicians desires, the bulk of the Europeans
especially in France and England but even to some extent in Austria totally
objected to the idea of slavery. It is unlikely that either France and
England would have fought to support slavery in the south given this 
situation.  

Spectulating what would have happened if they had intervened is certainly
the grist for novels but not particularly productive historically -
although it is fun.  

Erich
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Is it time to rm this group?
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 00:15:10 GMT

In article <1992Dec14.224908.9279@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> pdunn@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Patrick L Dunn) writes:
>
>Readership and posting seem to be increasing in a.w.c.u., so should this group
>be moved into a mainstream hierarchy?  What does everyone think?
>
I disagree for two reasons:

1. as of now, this bump is only a week or two old. In two months we might
be back to near-zero traffic again (though I hope not...)

2. I don't think we have 100 posters+lurkers yet, so would lose in a call
for votes even if no one voted against. I think we need to wait and build
a larger base. Maybe try to crosspost on issues of more general interest
and try to hook some more readers.

-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: casper@vxcrna.cern.ch (CASPER,DAVI./PPE)
Subject: Re: Three Generals of the "Old Army" (was Re: Grant in the East)
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 21:14:00 GMT

In article <1992Dec15.120024.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu>, cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes...
>In article <tecump.724370535@sulu>, tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello) writes:
> 
>--------------------- Bulk of message deleted -------------------
>> There were only 3 generals in the Fed army prior to the War.
>> dom
>> : 
> 
>I never heard this before. Obviously one was Lt.Gen. (Brevet) Scott and 
>another was the Quartermaster General, Brig. Gen. Joe Johnston. Was the other
>one Sumner?

What about Henry Halleck?


Dave