From: ydobyns@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (York H. Dobyns)
Subject: Re: Logic and God (was: Young earth creationist logic NOT!)
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1992 22:59:05 GMT

In article <1992Aug28.164252.15984@acuson.com> lawson@aldia.UUCP (Drew Lawson) writes:
>In article <1992Aug27.230446.28643@Princeton.EDU> ydobyns@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (York H. Dobyns) writes:
[part of example deleted]
>>The "researcher" who bases his choice
>>on faith (doctrinal learning) has no such excuse. If he happens to
>>make the wrong choice, he's wrong for the wrong reasons;
>
>And what if he's right?
>
>Consider dropping the religious vocabulary.  Joe Scientist, with 20
>years research experience says, "I have a hunch I should check out A."
>
>What is your reaction?

"Good for him." Joe Scientist fails to be a counterexample, because a
"hunch" is simply a way of informally summarizing the information from
long experience. If someone demanded that he formalize his sentiments,
he would say something like "My years of experience in research area X
make me confident that Y is so, based on empirical observations...." The
religious "researcher," on the other hand, has only his faith and
religious doctrine to fall back on.

Moreover, making a right prediction doesn't prove a theory right the
same way that making a wrong prediction proves a theory wrong. All it
offers in incremental verification.

>>So look at it this way: If you, (Drew or any other firm believer in a
>>doctrinal religion) made a scientific prediction based on some element
>>of your religious faith, and that prediction proved *wrong*, would you
>>then recant your faith and adopt a different religion, or none at all?
>
>That would depend strongly on the nature of the situation.  If you have
>a scientific theory and find a counter example, do you recant science
>entirely?  There is the possibility in either case of misunderstanding
>the situation.

I see that I didn't pin things down firmly enough. Obviously, if I make
an observation that disconfirms a particular theory, the only part of
scientific knowledge that I need to discard is the part that entails the
false prediction. In my challenge paragraph, I made the unspoken
assumption that "some element" of the faith in question was an element
*so fundamental* to the religion's basic assumptions that a disproof of
that element would invalidate the entire religion. 

In any case, the question, in modified form, still stands. If you find
that the consequences of a particular piece of your religious doctrine
are empirically false, will you be willing to discard that particular
bit of doctrine?

>>The essence of this argument, at least on the side against Drew, is
>>simply that *faith is not a valid criterion for determining matters
>>of fact.*
>
>That is a sound metaphysical view.  But it is not the only one
>possible.  That is all the original posting was intended to point out.

It's all well and good to realize that other metaphysical views are
possible. But are they compatible with continuing to learn about the
nature of reality? There seems to be something unique about the
scientific, empiricist worldview; no earlier culture, as far as we can
tell, approached either our level of understanding of physical reality
or our degree of control over it. Can a view based on the validity of
faith do as well in increasing our understanding? If you believe so,
explain how such a view will deal with contradictions between prior
faith and observed results. Or is it your contention that there will be
no such contradictions if one has the "right" faith? Caveat: An answer
along the lines that "There will be no contradictions, because any
observation that seems to contradict my faith is obviously wrong and
I will ignore it," will not be acceptable.

York Dobyns		ydobyns@phoenix.princeton.edu
Newsgroups: sci.skeptic