HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us
Subject: Re: WWII: Why Japan didn't invade Hawaii
Summary: Yamamoto and the size of the USA
Organization: :
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 17:25:15 GMT


From mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us

In article <Bww8wv.G7J@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) writes:
> From swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)
 
> You may want to buy a paperback that just came out: "Yamamoto," by
> Hoyt (?).  Yamamoto tried to explain to nearly everyone what the typical
> American was like, how the Detroit factories pour out thousands and
> thousands of cars, the immense resources that the United States had, 
> etc., but to no avail.  ...

In all fairness, China is larger than the US and had a much greater
population, and Japan was walking all over China.  Japan was also
getting its military way with the USSR.

Raw numbers are important, but so are will to fight and the ability
to put together an effective military machine.  The Japanese quite
conciously copied the Prussian model, which seemed to be the most
effective.  The quiet contributions of men like Marshall, Nimitz and
Chafee and the abilities of the few hundred men who knew how to set
up a giant factory are hard to factor in, even if you see them.
(_Smithsonian Air and Space_ had an article a few months ago on a
factory Ford built to build bombers.  At one end was a machine shop
with dies for over a million parts; at the other end bombers rolled
out at a rate that reached about 1/hr around the clock.)
-- 
 (This man's opinions are his own.)
 From mole-end				Mark Terribile

 mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us, Somewhere in Matawan, NJ

Newsgroups: sci.military
From:     "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>
Subject:  Re: Battleship Potemkin
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:16:45 GMT


From     "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>



Tony Buckland writes:
#In a review of a show of art from the Soviet period, I recently saw a
#poster depicting the Potemkin.  If this was accurate, the Potemkin had
#a turret - well, some sort of a housing - with at least four guns
#_above_ the aloft fire control.  Hard to tell how big they were, but
#they looked at least 10 cm.  I shudder to think of the stresses generated
#by firing both of the guns on one side.  It also doesn't look like a
#very stable gun platform, and that after all is what a battleship _is_.
#Anyone know if this is the way the real ship was?  And if so, what the
#point was?  The gain in range by lifting the guns that high seems
#unlikely to be significant (and the problem of getting the ammunition
#up there sounds big).  Of course, if you could depress enough, they
#would be great for repelling boarders or attacking the dock you were
#berthed at :-)


You're seeing an exaggeration of something real. At the turn of the
century it was common to have some of a warship's smaller weapons (like
the US 1 and 6 pounders) aloft, the better to deal with torpedo boats.
The fields of fire were better, aiming was simplified, and more deck
targets could be engaged. Remember this was before Tsushima showed how
long naval combat ranges really were. Ammunition supply was a bother, as
it had to be hoisted up to the weapons.

The KNIAZ POTEMKIN TAVRICHESKEY (POTEMKIN - renamed PANTELEIMON after
the mutiny) had the following armament:

     4     12 inch 40 cal
    16      6 inch 45 cal
    14      3 inch
     4     47mm
     2     MG

The 12 inch guns were of course in the two turrets, the 6 inch guns were
in casemate batteries amidships, and the three inch guns were in casemate
mounts fore, aft, and amidships as well as in open shielded mounts near
the ends of the superstructure. The 47mm and MGs were mounted aloft as I
described above.

PANTELEIMON was renamed POTEMKIN by the Kerensky government, and later
BORETZ ZA SVOBODOU. She had her machinery destroyed by the British while
in Sevastopol in 1919, was used as the set for Eisenstein's "Battleship
POTEMKIN" in 1921-2, and was scrapped by 1924, before the film was
released.


Ed Rudnicki     erudnick@pica.army.mil     All disclaimers apply
"War must be looked upon as a business, and subject, like any other business,
to business principles. War is the business of destruction of life and
property of an enemy.....The most deadly and destructive implements of war
are the most humane, and the producers of them may justly be looked upon as
humanitarians."     ----- Hudson Maxim (the other Maxim)

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: bwise@hemlock.mitre.org (Barry Wise)
Subject: Re: 106mm Recoiless Rifle - Rocket or Gun?
Organization: The MITRE Corporation
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:32:51 GMT
Full-Name: News Service


From bwise@hemlock.mitre.org (Barry Wise)

In article <Bx97D9.1s3@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com  
(T.M.Haddock) writes:
>  Over on the sci.physics newgroup, there was a discussion of 
>  recoil and the subject of a recoiless rifle came up.  One
>  person claimed it was a GUN, another said it was a ROCKET.
> 

A rocket operates by expelling mass in one direction to cause the rest of the  
rocket to go in the other. A gun operates by causing an expanding gas to push  
the projectile out of the barrel. If you look at a recoiless rifle you have a  
shell casing full of holes to let the gas out, but the rear of the casing is a  
flat plate like a normal shell. The gas expands faster than it can exit the  
rear of the gun which causes the shell to be pushed out the front, but enough  
gas is expelled though the rear to counteract the recoil. 

--
Barry Wise
(bwise@hemlock.mitre.org)


Newsgroups: sci.military
From: phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au (Stephen Harker)
Subject: Re: Focke Wulf's in Europe (was:The Hawker Fury)
Organization: Physics Department, Monash University, Australia
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 17:25:25 GMT


From phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au (Stephen Harker)

In article <Bwzp2u.4oI@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, "Charles K. Scott" <Charles.K.Scott@dartmouth.edu> writes:
> 
> From "Charles K. Scott" <Charles.K.Scott@dartmouth.edu>
> 
> In article <Bwu9vz.Bt4@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
> phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au (Stephen Harker) writes:
> 
>> Could you give a further reference for this.  It seems surprising
>> given the continued use of the Spitfire V for low level attacks over France
>> (rhubarbs) and their use as fighter cover for the Dieppe raid.  The British
>> certainly admitted that both the Bf 109F and FW 190 had considerable
				    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> superiority over the Spitfire V, but don't seem to have stopped offensive
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> use of the Spitfire as far as I am aware.
> 
> I took the reference from "JG 26" from which the following excerpt
> occurrs:
> 
> [Description removed]
> 
> I can't emphasize this enough, German tactics and equipment were
> superior to the British at this point in the war. The introduction of
> the Spitfire IV closed the gap, but only in equipment.  The German
	       ^^
> tactics were superior for another year yet and had the advantage of
> picking a fight when they wanted to.  British fighter losses during
> this period are frequently glossed over, but they were horrific.  The
> British were still experimenting with formations at that time while the
> Germans knew what worked and used it to great effect.
> 
> The book JG 26 is written by Donald L. Caldwell with a forward from
> Adolf Galland.

	This does not answer the question I asked, though it is interesting
in its own right.  As I said it is generally admitted by the British even
at the time, but this dates back to 1941 when the Bf 109F, FW 190 and
Spitfire V were introduced.  I presume you meant Spitfire V when you said
IV, however I was talking about the introduction of the Spitfire IX to
squadron service which began in July 1942 according to the reference I
quoted, thought the numbers only became significant later in 1942.  The
quote you gave that I asked for a reference for is the following (taken
from my posting):--

> This was probably the low spot in RAF moral for the war.  They had this
> Focke-Wulf and tested it and found out just how superior it was.  The
> result of the testing was an immediate recommendation that anyone
> encountering it should flee to the British coast and commence tight
> circles (perhaps the one thing the Spitfire could still do a little
> better) until the Focke-Wulf ran low on fuel and had to go back to
> France.  Not a recommendation calculated to raise moral much for pilots
> trained to be aggresive.

-- 
Stephen Harker			phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au
Monash University		Baloney baffles brains: Eric Frank Russell
From: "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>
Subject: 106mm Recoiless Rifle - Rocket or Gun?
Organization: Ham Radio Operator, Houston Tex.
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:29:22 GMT


From "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>

hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com (T.M.Haddock) writes:

> 
> From hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com (T.M.Haddock)
> 
>  Over on the sci.physics newgroup, there was a discussion of 
>  recoil and the subject of a recoiless rifle came up.  One
>  person claimed it was a GUN, another said it was a ROCKET.
> 
>  I also said I thought it was a GUN in that the only difference
>  between it and a 105mm howitzer was that the 106's shell casing
>  had holes in it which bleed off pressure and propellant which
>  escaped rearward through holes in the breech.  But others said
>  it was a rocket powered warhead that was ignited and "launched"
>  from the tube like a LAAW.  Having fired several of these while
>  in the Marines, I don't ever recall the term "rocket" used.
> 
 You are basically correct. The shell of the 106 had holes that 
allowed the gases to escape out the back of the gun. This was 
designed in such a way as to "balance" the recoil of the firing. 
In a way though, it does apply the "rocket" principal though. 
There is consdierable difference between the 105 howitzer round 
and the 106 so a real comparison there isn't valid either. The 
recoiless rifle is really neither rocket nor gun in a sense, 
that's why they came up with "recoiless rifle" :-)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
	     Gene Kennedy - Ham Radio Operator, N5ABI -
			 gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)
Subject: Re: WWII: Why Japan didn't invade Hawaii
Organization: University of Houston Administrative Computing
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 19:52:16 GMT


From HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)

In <Bx7CE3.EBA@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us writes:

> 
> From mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us
> 
> In article <Bww8wv.G7J@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) writes:
> > From swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)
>  
> > You may want to buy a paperback that just came out: "Yamamoto," by
> > Hoyt (?).  Yamamoto tried to explain to nearly everyone what the typical
> > American was like, how the Detroit factories pour out thousands and
> > thousands of cars, the immense resources that the United States had, 
> > etc., but to no avail.  ...
> 
> In all fairness, China is larger than the US and had a much greater
> population, and Japan was walking all over China.  Japan was also
> getting its military way with the USSR.

  While I have seen articles on this group which suggest otherwise about 
Russia, I don't believe China was an industrial power even remotely in the
class of the US and Japan at this time.  It was not merely the *size* of the US
that bothered Yamamoto, but its industrial might.  It was much easier for 
America to convert its factories than for the Chinese to start from near 
scratch, with little or no supporting infrastructure already in place.


semper fi,

Jammer Jim Miller 
Texas A&M University '89 and '91
********************************************************************************
* Speak for my employers?  They don't even know I exist!		       *
*"Become one with the Student Billing System. *BE* the Student Billing System."*
* "Power finds its way to those who take a stand.  Stand up, Ordinary Man."    *
*      ---Rik Emmet, Gil Moore, Mike Levine: Triumph 		               *
********************************************************************************

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Daniel Shoham <shoham@ll.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Existence of THAAD (Was: Re: Need help finding datalink simulations (THAAD contractor))
Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 15:55:51 GMT


From Daniel Shoham <shoham@ll.mit.edu>

In article <Bx5Cy3.J1K@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Fengxi Zhou <fengxi@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca> writes:
>
>From Fengxi Zhou <fengxi@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca>
>
>readingj@nic.cerf.net ("John D. Reading") writes:
>: 
>: The winning team on THAAD had Lockheed as the prime, and Litton
>: Data Systems (of which I am an employee) as one of the subs (I
>: don't know if there are other subs).  Basically, the program is
>: to develop an area missile defense (where the Patriot is a point
>: missile defense).  We are supposed to intercept ballistic missiles
>
>Does that violate Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty?  Is it part of SDI?  Is it
>for "strategic" air defence or a bigger and better umbrella for advancing
>ground forces or both?
>

THAAD, should it ever be deployed, will protect against *TACTICAL* ballistic
missiles (like SCUDs) not ICBMs (like the MX {Peacekeeper} or the SS-18).
As such it does not violate the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty language carefully
distinguishes what missiles constitute ICBMs and that anti-ballistic capability
is defined as a capability against *ICBMs*. 
The distinction is mostly a question of range; tactical ballistic missiles
have a range of about 300-1000 km while ICBMs have ranges above 5000 km. Thus,
the distinction is not hard! (the intermidiate range, by a seperate, more
recent, treaty are totaly outlawed {INF treaty 1987} by the US and the {F}USSR).

THAAD (as of now) is not a part of SDI. There are no announced plans to change
that (but people are always speculating).

THAAD is not for strategic air defense (i.e. defending cities and industry
from ICBMs) but for *theater* tactical ballistic defense. As such it is an
umbrella for advancing (or defending, or even retreating) ground forces. It
also defends fixed military sites (air-bases, ports, etc.) and *theater*
civilian targets. (like frontline cities).


THAAD is basically a much-much-improved Patriot! 

Dan Shoham
shoham@ll.mit.edu

(the usual disclaimer)
From: janm@minsk.docs.uu.se (Jan Mattsson)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Saab 32 Lansen
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:23:33 GMT
Organization: Uppsala University


From Jan Mattsson <janm@minsk.docs.uu.se>

Urban F <urf@ki.icl.se> writes:


>I'd like to know, does the book make clear if 1/4 had radars at delivery,
>or all the time until retirement in 1976? (Some of other versions are
>still in service.) That radars were in short supply at that time is also
>evidenced by the fact that the first batch of the first version of Saab
>35 Draken had neither sights nor radars -- but they were all rebuilt
>later on, and did good duty to familiarize crews with the new aircraft.

It says that "only a few planes in each division" had radar, and
"only one plane in each group had radar". No retrofit is mentioned.
It is stated that all planes were retrofitted with RWRs during the 60s.
I think it's reasonable to assume that a radar retrofit would have been
mentioned.
All S32s (the reconnaissance version) were delivered without radar,
and without cameras! The planes had to wait approx. 1 year for
these things to be fitted. The book says "unlike the A32, all S32s had
radar".


>If you plan on never attacking with fewer than four aircraft, the path-
>finder concept can save some money. And the fewer aircraft in a mission
>that uses radars, the less information you give away to the target.
>Presumably the rest of the package kept at low altitude, and the path-
>finder popping up to do quick radar sweeps, and if several widely 
>separated aircraft make radar sweeps, the target cannot know from which
>direction the real attack will come.

A group (4 aircraft) was the smallest unit used.
That all planes have radar doesn't necessarily mean that all of them
have to use their radar all of the time. If your pathfinder gets shot
down, you're in trouble the next time you want to do a strike, but if
all aircraft have radar the loss is not so severe.

--
Jan Mattsson, CS student, Uppsala University, Sweden
janm@bern.docs.uu.se or janm@minsk.docs.uu.se
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Ethan L Mckinney <mckinney@athena.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Saab 32 Lansen
Keywords: pathfinder, Lansen, A32
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:29:21 GMT


From Ethan L Mckinney <mckinney@athena.mit.edu>

What is the book??!!
From: Steven.Schultz@mixcom.mixcom.com (Steven.Schultz)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Russian sale to Turkey
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:20:21 GMT
Organization: Milwaukee Internet Xchange BBS, Milwaukee, WI U.S.A.


From Steven.Schultz <Steven.Schultz@mixcom.mixcom.com>

In <BxEvz8.1GB@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Urban Fredriksson
<urf@ki.icl.se> writes:

>So, anybody _what_ sort of military equipment Russia has sold Turkey?
>(I only heard it was worth about US$70M.)
 
I have heard that included in the sale were Armored Personnel Carriers
(APCs) and Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters. I haven't heard anything else.
 
-- 
Steve Schultz     Steven.Schultz@mixcom.com
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: John Dimogotsis <jd@latcs1.lat.oz.au>
Subject: Re: Marine Aircover <was New Carrier Plan>
Organization: Comp Sci, La Trobe Uni, Australia
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:08:55 GMT


From John Dimogotsis <jd@latcs1.lat.oz.au>

	There is only one reason why "battleships" still exist and that is to
	provide support during a landing operation.

	Sure it can perform other tasks as well, but other ships can perform
	these too, and in most cases more capably.

	But with respect to supporting an amphibious landing, the battleship
	has the advantage of delivering " 2 1/2 " times the amount of ammo
	to a target than an attack carrier can. 
		It seems logical to use a battleship for such a role if it
	can free 2 1/2 carriers for other tasks !
	
	I don't know how long this difference in rate can be kept up but it
	is true that in 1 hour of continous bombardment a battleship will
	deliver 2 1/2 times the ordinance a carrier can with all its fighter-
	bombers continously launching sorties without respite.

	Sure the battle ship has to get a bit close, but then a landing is not
	performed unless there is an advantage for the assaulting side,
	i.e. that side is strong anyway, or has achieved local temporary
	superiority through the element of suprise, in such circumstances
	the battleships chances are quite good, at least as good as any other
	forces also involved in the landing. And by the way what will the AAW
	ships be doing through all this plus don't forget aircover.

	So this specialised role does justify the battleship although
	only for a Navy the size of the USNavy and with the global scope of
	its operations.
									jd



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Joseph F Baugher <jfb@ihlpl.att.com>
Subject: Number Thirty-Four in the Series--the Wedell-Williams XP-34
Keywords: never left the drawing board
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories -  Naperville, Illinois
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:35:22 GMT


From Joseph F Baugher <jfb@ihlpl.att.com>

The Curtiss company had demonstrated that it was possible to evolve a 
successful pursuit design from a racing aircraft.  It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that the Wedell-Williams Company, one of the 
best-known manufacturers of racing planes during the 1920s and 1930s, 
would attempt to adapt its racing designs to a fighter proposal.  

The Wedell-Williams company submitted a cantilever, low-wing monoplane 
powered by a 700 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1535 Twin Wasp radial housed in 
a tightly-fitting cowling that looked too big for the rest of the 
airframe.  The landing gear retracted inward to be stowed under the 
fuselage, and the cockpit was fully enclosed by a rearward-sliding 
canopy.  The cockpit was situated well-aft, reminiscent of the 
manufacturer's racing planes from which the design was evolved.  A 
maximum speed of 286 mph was anticipated.  

The proposal was sufficiently appealing to the USAAC that on October 
1, 1935 they ordered that a set of construction drawings be prepared 
under the designation XP-34.  However, by 1936, fighters were already 
flying with performances exceeding that of the proposed XP-34.  When 
confronted with this reality, the Wedell-Williams company proposed 
that the engine be switched to the 900hp Pratt & Whitney XR-1830-C 
radial in the pursuit of better performance.  However, this revision
failed to interest the USAAC, and the whole program was cancelled 
before anything could leave the drawing board.  

Source: 

  The American Fighter, Enzo Angellucci and Peter Bowers, Orion Books, 
  1987.  

Joe Baugher       AT&T Bell Laboratories    2000 North Naperville Road 
		  Naperville, Illinois 60566-7033.   (708) 713-4548

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Chad Barret Wemyss <chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu>
Subject: Re: desert storm operations
Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 19:55:29 GMT


From Chad Barret Wemyss <chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu>

In article <Bx7C34.Dv5@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> fengxi@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca (Fengxi Zhou) writes:
>
>From Fengxi Zhou <fengxi@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca>
>
>while talking about desert storm, i somehow feel it is not as huge a victory
>as it sounds,  iraq. though armed to teeth, isn't a first class military
>power.  their training and tactics are primative, never mind their logistical 

While the Iraqi army at the time was the fourth or fifth(?) biggest in the 
world, there is a huge difference between 1 and 2, and an even bigger one 
between 2 and 3, etc.

Also, there is a tremendous difference in training and equipment between the US
Army (and other services) and their Iraqi counterparts.  

As far as an analogy, I'd say that a fight between the 82nd Airborne and a Boy 
Scout troop would be comparable.

Chad Wemyss
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: livesey@solntze.wpd.sgi.com (Jon Livesey)
Subject: Re: Jutland
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.  Mountain View, CA
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:32:49 GMT


From livesey@solntze.wpd.sgi.com (Jon Livesey)


In article <BxICus.L1w@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, "Edward J. Rudnicki" writes:
> 
> One can look at the results of Jutland in a couple of ways.
> 
> In terms of ship count, it was a clear-cut German victory:

Only if you think of naval battles in terms of ship count.
Fortunately, Admirals don't.

> Strategically, Jutland was a clear-cut British victory:

Which, since strategy is the reason for fighting battles,
is the only thing that counts.

jon.



Newsgroups: sci.military