Newsgroups: bit.listserv.politics
Date:         Thu, 3 Sep 1992 12:19:00 EDT
From:         rf35 <Richard_A_FYFE@UMAIL.UMD.EDU>
Subject:      Re: To Missy: On Wrongness
Comments: To: Forum for the Discussion of Politics <POLITICS@ucf1vm.cc.ucf.edu>

Greetings:  To Missy


> What you are saying, then, is that good is determined by physical
> chemistry and biology.  So, if a society is populated by people
> with faulty brain chemistry and no aversion to, say, murder and
> mayhem, it is perfectly moral for that society to allow those
> things to go on unchecked.  Is that what you are saying?

        Not exactly.  First, the use of the term "murder" in this
question may be question-begging--"murder" is often understood as
"wrongful killing."  To ask whether this implies that it is per-
fectly moral for that society to allow wrongful killing to go un-
checked is like asking "do you still take drugs?"  The very ques-
tion contains a presumption which is under dispute.  In this case,
the question as phrased assumes that there is a "wrongful killing"
where the wrongfulness is independent of desires.

        Also, the use of the term "faulty" in this question faces
the same problem.  "Faulty" is a value-laden term (in calling
something 'faulty' one is making a value judgment that it contains
some type of badness.  Whether this form of mental functioning is
faulty depends upon whether it contributes to the thwarting of de-
sires, which has yet to be determined.

        The question could be rephrased in a way that avoids this
problem.

> What you are saying, then, is that good is determined by physi-
> cal chemistry and biology.  So, if a society is populated by
> people with a brain chemistry that allows for no aversion to,
> say, killing, then it is perfectly moral for that society to
> allow all forms of killing.  Is that what you are saying?

        Still, the answer is 'no,'  I have stated that moral
value depends upon both direct and indirection relationship to
other desires and aversions.  These beings may have an aversion
to death, and since one of the consequences of killing is death,
there are reasons to condemn killing.  Also, people tend to have
an aversion to the death of others with whom they have close
psychological ties.  Furthermore, death tends to make it diffi-
cult for an individual to fulfill other desires which that per-
son may have.  All of this suggests that there are a great many
reasons to condemn killing.

        However, it is a mistake to lump all types of killing to-
gether and say that they are all bad, for different types of
killing have different types of relationship to other desires.
One aversion which many of us share is an aversion to pain; and
death helps in fulfilling a desire to avoid pain.  Also, an in-
dividual whose body is such that she can no longer act so as to
fulfill her desires has no reason to avoid death.  In this case,
the killing would count as good, and people ought not to have
aversions to killings of this type.  [Warning: This is a simple
gloss of an argument for euthanasia.  Other considerations not
discussed here in detail will lead to further refinements.  In
particular, there ought to be a strong preference for appealing
to the person whose life it is as the ultimate authority on whe-
ther death is better than continued life.  This is a specific
application of a general principle that one ought to have the
willing participation of others in any act which directly con-
cerns them.]

        Other types of killing which may be admissible on these
grounds are suicides where the agent, though physically healthy,
can best fulfill his desires by death than by continued living.
People which I place in this category are certain prison inmates
who, because of limits placed on their liberty which make it
difficult to fulfill certain desires and strong aversions to
conditions unavoidable in prison such as the hostility of other
inmates, find that they can best of obtain that which they de-
sire and avoid that to which they have aversions by death.
Also, a person with a strong desire which, when acted on, leads
to the thwarting of other desires (such as an individual with a
strong drug addiction or a sexual preference that leads to harm
to self or others) where all possible choices lead to situations
against which he has strong aversions, may have sufficient
reason to commit suicide, and these self-killings would not be
bad.

        A willingness to kill and even preference for killing
certain types of people may be a good thing, in which case the
killing is not only permitted but required.  According to some
people, capital punishment would fall under this category.

        Now, there may be some sort of creature for which death
thwarts no desire, either directly or indirectly.  If a society
of such creatures exists, then that society would have no reason
for moral and legal restrictions on killing of any type.  How-
ever, these beings would not be human (though in saying they are
not human I am not implying that they are in any way defective).
If these creatures were to form a common society with humans,
then there would be morally relevant reasons (given the desires
which are thwarted by the killing of humans) to give them an
aversion to killing humans.  If they lack the capacity for a
direct aversion to killing humans, then this may be done by
giving them an indirect aversion, by tying the act of killing
humans with something which they do have a reason to avoid.
Criminal sanctions (punishment) may be justified in part by
reasoning along these lines.

                                                Richard A. Fyfe
                                                rf35@umail.umd.edu
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU