From: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu (Andrew McRae,   ,,)
Newsgroups: soc.women,talk.politics.theory,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta,sci.classics
Subject: Re: Plato's Views on Women
Date: 6 Nov 92 21:36:03 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov6.163605.17172
Reply-To: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu
Originator: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu

In article <Bx9JK3.35s@quake.sylmar.ca.us>, brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>                            I would think that the first order of
> bussiness ought to be to seriously question whether "feminist philosophy"
> is a valid field of study.  In my view, to place sex at such a 
> fundamental position in one's way of thinking is simply absurd.

"Does he have any arguments for his views?", we wonder.

> If you think that feminist philosophy is a valid area of though, do 
> you also think that there ought to be such a thing as "black philosophy",
> "bald philosophy", "poor philosophy", "male philosophy", or "blue-eyed
> people who live in Hollywood philosophy"?  I don't.

"Does he have any arguments for his views?", we wonder again.

>                                                      Certainly one can
> use philosophy to understand issues like race, sex, baldness, economics, and
> one's unique characteristics, but the philosophical principles are universal,
> not particular to certain kinds of people.

Wow! An argument! What can we make of it?

Consider two views of "feminist philosophy". (I do not wish to insist that
these exhaust the alternatives, nor that they are independent, nor that
either is true.)

(1) It is a field of philosophy distinguished from other fields by its
subject matter -- it investigates issues of particular interest to women
and of relevance to women's position in the societies they live in.

(2) It radically differs from traditional philosophy in method and
approach; among other things, it mounts a challenge to presuppositions
that underlie traditional philosophy and that are responsible for much of
the oppression that women suffer in the societies they live in.

If the "universality of philosophical principles" (whatever _that_ means)
counts against the "validity" of feminist philosophy in sense (1) -- where
the field is distinguished by its subject matter -- then presumably it's
going to count against the "validity" of any other philosophical field
distinguished by its subject matter, such as the philosophies of mind,
language, mathematics, logic, religion, and so on and so on. I take it
that these count as "valid fields of study" in the required sense.

It might be that Brian Yoder considers that the content of "feminist
philosophy" in sense (1) is such that those "universal philosophical
principles" cannot usefully be applied to it. This would, it seems to me,
be an interesting criticism of the "validity" of feminist philosophy --
but no argument whatsoever has been offered for it here.

In large part, (2) is simply a denial of the "universality of
philosophical principles". Therefore, to use a mere unsupported assertion
of that "universality" -- and that's all the argument in question
consists in -- against (2) would simply be question-begging.

Therefore, Yoder's argument fails to work against either (1) or (2). 

> Feminist philosophy is in it's essence simplyexism, just as "black philosophy"
> of the kind exemplified by people like Louis Farakahn is simply racism,
> and (if it existed) "white male philosophy" would be both.  

What more can I say? Yoder's attempt to class feminism with Farrakhan
aptly betrays the contempt in which he holds both.


-- 
Andrew McRae                       Internet: mcrae@husc.harvard.edu
                                     BITnet: mcrae@HUSC
Newsgroups: soc.women,soc.men