HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: solomon@cns.nyu.edu (Joshua Solomon)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: selective attention
Date: 17 Aug 92 19:26:51 GMT
Reply-To: solomon@cns.nyu.edu
Organization: New York University

In article 714074066@ferrari, rosauer@fzi.de (Bernd Rosauer) writes:
> Is there a good introductory/review/survey paper on selective attention?
> 
> --Bernd


Probably not.  The first thing I read about it was Shiffrin's chapter in
Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology 2nd ed.
My favorite model is Cave & Wolfe's (out of MIT).  Sorry, I don't have
a specific reference for it, but I'm sure it's been published somewhere;
I read a preprint two or three years ago.
js
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,alt.self-improve
From: malcolm@portia.csu.murdoch.edu.au (Hugh Malcolm)
Subject: Re: NLP - what exactly is it?
Organization: Murdoch University
Date: 17 Aug 92 03:27:59 GMT

greg@ccc.govt.nz (Greg West) writes:

>I keep hearing about neurolinguistic programming.
>What exactly is it and what is it used for?

I don't know (wasn't that helpful?) but, as a good librarian, I urge
you to go to your nearest sizable library and look up a good
dictionary of psychology, or even education. And try the subject
catalogue under neurolinguistic prog. or neuro linguistic - the
catalogue might treat those two entries differently. If the catalogue
offers keyword searching then try that 'cos that will bring up any
books with NLP in the title as well. Two leading authors in the field
are Richard Bandler and John Grinder, look for works by them in the
author catalogue.
	Then, when you have done all that, summarise what you learn
and post it here and we'll all know!
				   All the best

--
=================================================================
| Hugh Malcolm / Social Sciences Librarian / Murdoch University |
|  Perth, Western Australia. (Edge of the world, Network ends)  |
| Internet: malcolm@portia.murdoch.edu.au                       |
|                                                               |
| "Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Tor"                             |
=================================================================
From: alansz@cogsci.Berkeley.EDU (Alan Schwartz)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re:  Application to the Softer Sciences
Date: 21 Aug 1992 21:54:12 GMT
Organization: Institute of Cognitive Studies, U.C. Berkeley
NNTP-Posting-Host: cogsci.berkeley.edu

In article <1992Aug21.072608.22299@uwm.edu> spice@convex.csd.uwm.edu (James G Spice) writes:
>I am a graduate student in Political Science, a field not well known
>for its mathamatical or modeling sophistication (though exceptions
>certainly exist).  Does anyone know of any applications of cognitive
>science methods in the softer social sciences?  My field is notorious
>for borrowing techniques from more mathamatically advanced disciplines
>and scaling them down a bit to be more accessable to mainstream
>political science.  

A great deal of work on the application of cognitive linguistics to
political science and the social sciences in general is going on here
at UC Berkeley, under George Lakoff. We've been studying things like
how conceptual systems (including conceptual metaphor, contested
categorization, etc) and everyday understandings influence the expert
theories of social scientists (for example, how harm is understood by
legal theorists, the structure of the concept "democracy", the 
conceptual system motivating the application of game theory to politics,
etc.) For more information about specific topics, feel free to email me.
(For metaphor-related inquiries, email metaphor@cogsci.berkeley.edu).

>Secondly, how user friendly is the software available on the market.
>BrainMaker and Neuralyst are two packages that I have seen advertised.

I have worked with BrainMaker and found its abilities adequate, but its
user interface is truly awful and difficult to use. Neuralyst I've never
seen.

  Hope that helps.

 - Alan 


-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Alan Schwartz                    | Disclaimer: I represent no one
alansz@cogsci.berkeley.edu       |
UC Berkeley                      | "Life is what happens to you while
Cognitive Psycholgy              |  you're busy making other plans"
                                 |          - J. Lennon
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
From: murphyg@Software.Mitel.COM (Gary Murphy)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: NLP - what exactly is it?
Date: 18 Aug 92 12:16:11 GMT
Organization: Applications Software II, MITEL Corporation, Kanata, Ontario,
	Canada
In-reply-to: pautler@ils.nwu.edu's message of 17 Aug 92 17:46:06 GMT

In article <1992Aug17.174606.14547@ils.nwu.edu> pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler) writes:

   If you've heard cognitive science researchers talk about "NLP" they're
   probably referring to "natural language processing" not "neurolinguistic
   processing".  Natural language processing is the subfield of AI concerned
   with the interpretation and production of text in English and other
   natural languages.  It's closely allied with computational linguistics.

This came up before, and y'know, I've been in AI, an admittedly huge
field for 17 years and I have only ever seen NLP refer to natural
language in this posting and in the similar complaint from the last
time; this must be a cultural thing.

The good news is neurolinguistic programming is also closely allied with
computational linguistics!  I will grep my library for the exact string
"Natural Language Processing" and look into what they are doing --- from
this and the previous posting, I rather suspect the two NLP's may have a
lot to say to each other.  It may even lead to an ELIZA program that
simulates talking to Bandler ;-)


--
Gary Lawrence Murphy - Gary.Murphy@software.mitel.COM - (613) 592-2122 x3709
              Poison Ivy and snakes illuminate the woods
From: cyberoid@milton.u.washington.edu (Robert Jacobson)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Toy discipline, and the future of cog sci? (was Re: Observer effect)
Date: 16 Aug 92 20:37:41 GMT
Organization: WORLDESIGN, Seattle


I was the original poster on the Observer Effect item.

I was not trying to paint cognitive science as an artifact of techno-
trends.  Perhaps it is.  But what I was getting at was the question,
does the use of technological metaphors -- hydraulics, neural networks,
chaos theory, etc. -- actually affect the methods of thought by human
beings who are conversant with these theories, either directly or
through the press, grapevine, etc.?

In my own case, I find myself employing a heuristic matrix to evaluate
decision options.  Would I have done this without knowing about heuris-
tics?  This is the gist of my original posting.

Bob Jacobson
From: slusk@falcon.aamrl.wpafb.af.mil
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Question on fetal brain development
Date: 14 Aug 92 18:47:30 GMT
Distribution: sci.cognitive
Organization: USAF AL/CFH, WPAFB, Dayton, OH

In article <HUNTER.92Aug6114358@work.nlm.nih.gov>, hunter@work.nlm.nih.gov
(Larry Hunter) writes: 
> 
> I have a question about fetal brain development.  Just to be clear I am
> talking about an unborn fetus, starting at approximately eight weeks into the
> gestational cycle.  I am not interested in pro-life or pro-choice sentiments
> here just factual knowledge.  It is my understanding that at about eight
> weeks an unborn fetus has beginning brain activity as measured by an
> electrocardiogram (?).  I am unsure at to whether this, indeed, is true or
> not but would be interested in knowing.

Some literature I've read states:
	   3 wks -- baby's heart is beating
	** 6 wks -- brain waves can be measured
	   8 wks -- stomach, liver, kidneys and brain are functioning.  
		    Fingerprints have formed.

They reference the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for
Disease Control for this information.

Regards,
Steve
-- 
Internet e-mail				    slusk@falcon.aamrl.wpafb.af.mil
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| "The opinions and views expressed here are strictly my own and do not   |
| necessarily reflect the official position of either the U.S. Air Force  |
| or its contractors."                                                    |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Subject: Re: Similarity in Problem Solving
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1992 15:18:19 GMT

In article <seWmin_00WBK86=W9a@andrew.cmu.edu>, Daniel Read <dr3u+@andrew.cmu.edu> writes:
> PREVIOUS CLAIM (by David Pautler, me):
>  
> There is little collaboration or agreement between the cognitive psychology
> researchers I mention in the first paragraph and the CBR folks.  The primary
> point of disagreement, I believe, is that CBR researchers believe similarity
> judgements are highly goal-dependent, while the cognitive psychologists
> (and Hofstadter) think they are highly automatic.
>  
> RESPONSE:
> 
> There are two curious elements in this posting.  First, the notion that
> automaticity and goal-dependence are opposite!  They are, as should be
> evident on even a moments reflection, orthogonal dimensions. 

I did perhaps fudge the meaning of automaticity.  What I meant was that
similarity judgements, like low-level perception, do not depend on
strategic guidance.  Every CBR researcher I've spoken with has claimed
that current goals play a primary role in selecting the 'base' representation.
No cognitive psychological research into similarity, with the possible
exception of Thagard & Holyoak, claim there is any such interference,
I believe.

> Second, most cognitive psychologists who study similarity (or closely
> related topics like categorization) emphasize that the similarity
> between two objects is completely dependent on the WAY in which they are
> similar.  It does not make sense to say that A and B are similar, but
> only that they are similar "in such-and-such-a-way".  The particular
> similarity judgements that are made depend very much on the reason that
> the judgement was made.

I don't dispute your point.  I wasn't claiming that goals couldn't be a part
of the 'base' or 'target' representations; just that the judging process
is not more sensitive to one kind of predicate than another.

[no disagreement over Tversky, either]

> Kahneman and Miller (Psych Review, 1977) give an even more
> dynamic, goal-based account of similarity.

Are you referring to Norm Theory?  If so, I don't see why you would call it
"goal-based".  In the 1986 Psych Review paper, they say:

	The elicitation of a norm has been described here as a process
	of parallel activation of multiple representations that are recruited
	by a stimulus or by a category.  We have assumed that the process
	of recruitment is rapid, automatic, and essentially immune to
	voluntary control after its initiation.  In particular, it is not
	possible for the individual to sift through activated elements
	and discard irrelevant or misleading ones.  (p. 148)


But my original point was that there *is* a fundamental disagreement between
cognitive psychologists and CBR researchers.  At the recent Cognitive Science
conference, Dedre Gentner and Douglas Hofstadter agreed that this is so.
And every student of Roger Schank and Chris Riesbeck that I've spoken to
about it (all CBR folks) have claimed the cognitive psychologists are wrong
to "ignore" the influence of goals in similarity judgements.

	-dp-
From: cavekr@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu (Kyle Cave)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: selective attention
Date: 17 Aug 92 21:11:27 GMT
Followup-To: sci.cognitive
Organization: Vanderbilt University

In article <1992Aug17.192651.17830@cmcl2.nyu.edu>, solomon@cns.nyu.edu
(Joshua Solomon) wrote:
> 
> In article 714074066@ferrari, rosauer@fzi.de (Bernd Rosauer) writes:
> > Is there a good introductory/review/survey paper on selective attention?
> > 
> > --Bernd
> 
> 
> Probably not.  The first thing I read about it was Shiffrin's chapter in
> Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology 2nd ed.
> My favorite model is Cave & Wolfe's (out of MIT).  Sorry, I don't have
> a specific reference for it, but I'm sure it's been published somewhere;
> I read a preprint two or three years ago.
> js

Wow, you made my day.  The reference is:

Cave, K. R. & Wolfe, J. M.  (1990).  Modeling the role of parallel
processing in visual search.  Cognitive Psychology, 22, 225-271.

Kyle Cave
cavekr@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu
From: kpc@pluto.arc.nasa.gov (k p c)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Toy discipline, and The future of cog sci?
Date: 15 Aug 92 23:00:27 GMT
	<FURRY.92Aug13120504@frabjous.hitl.washington.edu>
	<3098@isgtec.isgtec.com>
Reply-To: kpc@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov
Organization: NASA Ames Research Center AI Research Branch (Sterling).

In article <3098@isgtec.isgtec.com> mike@isgtec.com (Mike Sellers) writes:

   2) Startling progress in cognitive science will come unexpectedly
   and quickly, when someone achieves a new descriptive, predictive,
   and manipulable understanding of the principles of mind ranging
   from sensory apparatus to cortical organization and symbolic flow.

i am interested in ways to evaluate this claim.

does anybody know how to make further claims about what type of theory
such a theory would be?

what lesser theories have we seen so far?  (dualism?  grammars?  state
space search?  information theory?  connectionism?  materialism?)

what type of theory has each one been?  how successful has it been?
why was it successful?

just thought i'd start a metadiscussion....
--
i'm open to comparing career notes with other ai and cogsci people.
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Heuristic Dynamic Programming
Date: 14 Aug 92 15:58:31 GMT
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

>However, I would not claim that the
>cerebellar cortex was the action network.

Thanks for the comments. I didn't claim the CC was the action network. (I
suspect the C nuclei.) I claimed it stored plans that could be selected by
the adaptive critic for feeding to the action network.

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com

Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:353 sci.bio:2992 bionet.neuroscience:393 comp.ai.neural-nets:3266 sci.physics:13252 sci.med.physics:342
From: jones@pyrite.cs.uiowa.edu (Douglas W. Jones,201H MLH,3193350740,3193382879)
Subject: Re:  Application to the Softer Sciences
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 1992 16:23:15 GMT
Organization: University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

From article <1992Aug21.072608.22299@uwm.edu>,
by spice@convex.csd.uwm.edu (James G Spice):

> I am a graduate student in Political Science, a field not well known
> for its mathamatical or modeling sophistication (though exceptions
> certainly exist).  Does anyone know of any applications of cognitive
> science methods in the softer social sciences?

I can't help in the area of political science, but I'm involved in
developing a system for simulating the behavior of small groups of
people confonting crisis situations, known as Icarus because it is
a bit of a high-risk venture.  Icarus uses a discrete-event simulation
framework (as commonly used in operations research) with small expert
systems used to model each human participant in the group.

One aim of Icarus is to allow simulation models to express the contents
of the "rule books" for such contexts as nuclear reactor control rooms
in order to ask the question "if people played by these particular
rules through this scenario, what is the likelyhood of a successful
outcome."  The cost of such experiments using human subjects can be
outrageous, but cased like Three Mile Island and the Stark incident
make such experiments quite valuable.

A second aim is to allow the formulation of more nearly formal theories
about small group behavior in the form of simulation models.  The use
of simulation methodology can give such a theory a predictive value
comparable to the predictive value of traditional theories in the hard
sciences, and this can significantly reduce the number of experiments
needed to explore the behavior of such a group.

The Icarus simulator is extremely limited in what it can accomplish!
It cannot model learning, metaknowledge (that is, my knowledge about
what I or others know), complex concepts, or convoluted reasoning, and
we cannot handle more than a handfull of people in one of our models.

Without learning, Icarus can be used to model crisis situations where
the feedback on which learning could be based happens too late to
influence the outcome.  We can deal with simple quantitative knowledge,
including, eventually, fuzzy quantities, and this should be quite
adequate for many purposes, for example, the reactor control example
where things like water pressure, temperature, and level are the key
bits of knowledge exchanged by the participants.

Currently, our work on Icarus is bogged down in some interesting
technical problems that arise when you try to combine expert systems
with discrete-event simulation.  We now know two or three ways to fix
these problems, but we don't know which is right way to go.  When we've
solved these problems, we'll start to try to attract a user community
from among small-group sociologists and the management science
community.
				Doug Jones
				jones@cs.uiowa.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Subject: Re: Cognitive Science and Moral Reasoning/Discourse
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 14:45:44 GMT

In article <1992Aug18.025637.9266@midway.uchicago.edu>, rsb2@ellis.uchicago.edu (ronan surtida bernas) writes:

> I am looking for literature that investigate the use of such cognitive tools
> as schemas and knowledge structures in moral reasoning and discourse.
> Likewise, are there any studies that dwell on "cultural models" of abortion,
> capital punishment or any other social issue?

I started to look into this last year, but didn't get very far before other
demands took me away.  The best lead I found was the work of C. R. Snyder
on excuses.  Michael Cole and A. Bandura also looked promising.  For a look at
how moral reasoning has shaped the legal code, look at Hart and Honore (and
Fincham, I believe).

One thing that interested me in particular was that after a summer of
collecting excuses, the hundreds of examples all seemed to fall under
a set of about twenty excuse schemas, e.g. "I wasn't aware of those
facts", "I didn't intend that outcome", etc.  I'd like to go back to
it someday.

	-dp-


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: rsb2@ellis.uchicago.edu (ronan surtida bernas)
Subject: Cognitive Science and Moral Reasoning/Discourse
Reply-To: rsb2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 02:56:37 GMT

I am looking for literature that investigate the use of such cognitive tools as schemas and knowledge structures in moral reasoning and discourse.  Likewise,
are there any studies that dwell on "cultural models" of abortion, capital
punishment or any other social issue?

Thanks so much.

Ronan Bernas (rsb2@midway.uchicago.edu)


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: furry@hitl.washington.edu (Jeff James)
Subject: Re: Observer effect in cog sci?
Reply-To: furry@hitl.washington.edu
Organization: Human Interface Technology Laboratory
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 20:05:04 GMT

Bob,

You're right, cognitive science follows technological fads, applying
whatever theory is currently popular to the modelling of the mind.  I
believe this is representative of minimal progress on an exceedingly
difficult problem.  Any reasonable progress would provide a foundation for
future work that is more compelling than the current trends of thought.  In
my opinion, cognitive science will remain a 'toy' discipline until a
significant breakthrough provides that foundation.

Jeff James
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: spesau@acs.ucalgary.ca (Shane P Esau)
Subject: Re: selective attention
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 20:10:13 GMT
Organization: The University of Calgary, Alberta

In article <1992Aug17.192651.17830@cmcl2.nyu.edu> solomon@cns.nyu.edu writes:
>In article 714074066@ferrari, rosauer@fzi.de (Bernd Rosauer) writes:
>> Is there a good introductory/review/survey paper on selective attention?
>> 
>> --Bernd
>
>
>Probably not.  The first thing I read about it was Shiffrin's chapter in
>Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology 2nd ed.
>My favorite model is Cave & Wolfe's (out of MIT).  Sorry, I don't have
>a specific reference for it, but I'm sure it's been published somewhere;
>I read a preprint two or three years ago.
>js

The reference for Cave & Wolfe's Guided Attention THeory is:

Cave, K.R. & Wolfe, J. M. (1990).  Modeling the role of parallel
processing in visual search.  Cognitive Psychology, 22, 225-271.

The only problem I see with the theory (other than little things)
is that he does not go into target absent reaction time.  That
is, he says that either, viewers stop processing the display
based on a time limit *OR* an overall activation are reached.  

I would really like to discuss this and other visual search
theories with people as this is what my thesis is on.  Any
takers?

Shane Esau
Univ of Calgary

Organization: Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 23:42:43 -0400 
From: Daniel Read <dr3u+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Similarity in Problem Solving

PREVIOUS CLAIM:
 
There is little collaboration or agreement between the cognitive psychology
researchers I mention in the first paragraph and the CBR folks.  The primary
point of disagreement, I believe, is that CBR researchers believe similarity
judgements are highly goal-dependent, while the cognitive psychologists
(and Hofstadter) think they are highly automatic.
 
RESPONSE:

There are two curious elements in this posting.  First, the notion that
automaticity and goal-dependence are opposite!  They are, as should be
evident on even a moments reflection, orthogonal dimensions. 

Second, most cognitive psychologists who study similarity (or closely
related topics like categorization) emphasize that the similarity
between two objects is completely dependent on the WAY in which they are
similar.  It does not make sense to say that A and B are similar, but
only that they are similar "in such-and-such-a-way".  The particular
similarity judgements that are made depend very much on the reason that
the judgement was made.

Amos Tversky, for example, observes that the context of a similarity
judgement affects the judgement because it determines which features are
relevant.  Kahneman and Miller (Psych Review, 1977) give an even more
dynamic, goal-based account of similarity.  (Examples could be
multiplied).

daniel