From: lbn@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (generic fellow)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Morally good necessary possible sometimes possible reproductiveness
Date: 23 Dec 92 03:28:00 EST
Distribution: rec,talk
Organization: Cornell University

a duplicate of this article may appear or may have appeared from a
different site.  it's not my fault.

MZ:
>>>Shall we then dismiss popular consensus
>>>as irrelevant, because irrational?

RJ:
>>Not at all.  Popular consensus can change over time as a result of
>>ongoing dialogue and access to accurate information.  I am working
>>to bring about just such a change.

MZ:
>So far, all you can oppose to my arguments, is your say-so, augmented
>by transparent emotional propaganda.

i take it that emotion, along with rationality, sexuality, and
mortality, is also essential to human nature.  your perfunctory
snivelling at such matters thus constitutes a notably dismal neglect
within your moral reasoning.  while you might in due course conclude
that this consideration is unbalanced by the others you insist
upon, your failure to even attempt an accounting for the emotional
essences of some millions of individuals immediately dulls the
integrity of your argument.  and the discreet suggestion that
the existence of your erstwhile queer bestest buddy is at
all indicative of the social concerns and emotional constitutions of
homosexuals in general is not only irrational -- it is also absurdly
crude.

MZ:
>Since none of these will affect
>the moral basis of the issue, and since at this time I am not at all
>interested in pursuing its political implications, 

how very convenient.  by dismissing consideration of social or political
implications, you thereby avoid accounting for possible moral ones,
such as the undue restriction of personal liberties and the taking of
happiness, freedom and life by philosophically empowered queer-bashers,
that might follow from the successful wishing-on of your position.

what, mikhail, is your position on the _material_, ie. actual,
injunction against homosexual activities that your argument entails?
in what way does a moral imperative grounded against a modal reality
(the damping off of the interminable flow of babies) permit an
actualization of said imperative which involves such tangible (though,
i will assume here, 'modally' justifiable) infrigements upon competing
moral imperatives as mentioned above?

and why does modal logic not reject your assumption of an indefinite
compulsion to procreate as an impenetrable moral axiom, on the grounds
that indefinite procreation might eventually (as though it has not
already!) result in reductions in the quality and quantity of human
life due to, for instance, ecological disintegration, or economic
rarefication and ensuing social tensions and famine?  please expound
not only upon the applicability of modal logic, but also upon the
'trashing of Consequentialism' that dismisses such considerations.


MZ:
>I am not interested
>in continuing this exchange.  However, I suggest that if you really
>wish to effect a change in *moral* attitudes, you had better learn to
>justify your preferences with a *moral* argument.

i do hope your ability to parse my tedia has improved enough for you
to observe that i have done so.

regards,
dave

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,alt.politics.homosexuality