Newsgroups: bit.listserv.qualrs-l
Date:         Fri, 24 Jul 1992 17:43:25 +0100
              <QUALRS-L@UGA.BITNET>
From:         mf1@UKC.AC.UK
Subject:      Qualitative-Quantitative
Comments: To: Multiple recipients of list QUALRS-L <QUALRS-L@uga.cc.uga.edu>

It is to the detriment of many research programmes that these are
categorised (quantified) as 'quantitative' or 'qualitative'. Quantitative
analysis can be
considered a subset of qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis
always rests on a bed of qualitative conceptions, and qualitative
analysis must necessarily be quantified to achieve its ends.

There is a bit of confusion in my mind about what people are referring
to when they use these terms; is the object, subject or both
qualitative (quantitative)? Or is the information relating to the
object, subject or both qualitative (quantitative)?

Quantitative research is almost always thought of as being related to
numbers. Numbers are, of course, simply a special case of symbol, and
the members of the culture of quantitative analysis employ a special
case of symbolic quantification and analysis of parameters derived from
a representation.

All members of the culture of qualitative analysis quantify their
research material, at least, by finding instances that conform to
particular notions they form. It is not necessary to count the
instances; merely matching instances to a schema is adequate to 'brand'
research as quantitative, even more so when one quantifies ones ideas
by representing them in a convenient code such as Chinese, English or
Urdu.

There is also some kind of apparent notion that 'quantitative' and
'positivistic' are somehow linked, as are 'science' and
'quantitative'.  Likewise it appears that 'qualitative' and
'non-positivistic' and 'qualitative' and 'non-science' (I apologise for
not knowing the reciprocal terms) are linked in many people's minds.

I personally have a lot of problems with these divisions, certainly
with tossing 'science' in. Scientific knowledge is, more or less,
knowledge relating to repeatable events, phenomena or structure such
that there is some (not total) preknowledge relating to any such
repetition (eg prediction). It is only privileged in the case that
this is the sort of knowledge that one needs for a particular purpose.
It need not be numerical knowledge, or even other quantitative
knowledge such as categories or sets or naming, but can relate to
fundamental structural aspects as well (eg qualitative).

Thus if one is describing a object, subject or both, either
quantitatively or quantitatively, with no intent to compare,
generalise, draw conclusions or interpretations or explanations, one is
engaged in a non-scientific enterprise, although it may be positivist.

Positivism in the strong sense of the term is virtually irrelevant as a
descriptor (quantification) of anyone's research enterprise, because
although some individuals may be concerned with pure description, most
research work is intended for extension into a wider research arena
which will attempt interpretations and explanations.


'Bean counters' do not count beans in a vacuum; they count beans
corresponding to a particular structure, and the bean count contributes
to refinements to that structure (eg the analyst's conception of a
problem area). The subject or object of the research may not usefully
be based on number-valued categories at all, say investigating marriage
choice, but the problem area, acknowledged by certified bean counters,
is not causal (nor is it random -- preknowledge to some degree is
possible) ; there is considerable variation, and a description of the
variation can be useful in arriving at a greater understanding of the
problem. Likewise, 'navel gazers' do not, for the most part, randomly dream
up chatter; they select, according to some criteria some parameters and
attempt to extend these and quantify these with 'meanings', a linkage
into some abstraction be it the analyst's, indigenous or both.

All of this, of course, ignores the debate on power relations. On this, as you
might expect (eg show preknowledge), I am rather mixed. At any one time it does
appear to be the case that the consensus of the 'powerful' can set the agenda.
If part of that agenda is a purpose for the agenda, then this is overcome over
time because some means of establishing preknowledge are better than others for
that purpose, and this leads to change. This too, may be a fiction, but I have
to believe it to retain my own little seat of power. The real problem emerges
when the purpose itself is thought to be incorrect by some researchers, since
this requires the presences of at least a meta-agenda  if there is to be
change), and it is very difficult (if at all possible) tos establish that one
purpose is 'better' than another purpose.

Michael Fischer
Centre for Social Anthropology and Computing
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU