From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Human motivation and true altruism
Organization: WP Group
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 01:53:44 GMT

From article <1993Jan4.042125.11988@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@clpd.kodak.com (Rich Young):
>>You're arguing against your own position, Rich.  Would you care to 
>>explain how a thinker's intellectual understanding of the suffering of 
>>another entity is somehow bound up in "good feelings" or "bad 
>>feelings", in accordance with your motivation theory?  To give you a 
>>specific example, if a man were to study the workings of a desktop 
>>computer and conclude that the computer experiences neither pain nor 
>>pleasure when it's abused, would his conclusions be motivated by his 
>>own "good feelings" or "bad feelings" as you say?  Alternatively, if 
>>the same man were to study the behavior of a dog in a pain-avoidance 
>>experiment and conclude that the dog clearly experiences pain, would 
>>you be inclined to argue that his conclusions are determined by "good 
>>feelings" or "bad feelings"?  
> 
> Oh good grief!  His examination of the computer is what's driven
> by one or both of my "principles," not his conclusions upon completing
> the examination, for crying out loud.  His conclusions are presumably 
> driven by what he finds in his examination.  It is the anticipated 
> pleasure of satisfying his curiosity that drives him to remove the 
> first screw.  By the same argument, it is the anticipation of 
> satisfying his curiosity about canine pain that drives him to 
> experiment...his conclusions are presumably dictated by what he 
> observes.
>
> I had hoped for better from you, but it's clear that you have
> absolutely no understanding of my meaning, else you'd not offer 
> such inane and completely irrelevant arguments.  "Conclusions" are
> not "motivations."

I agree.  And hence, it's a mistake to confuse altruistic conclusions
with selfish motivations.  

>>Once again, you're assuming your conclusions.   Let's suppose, just
>>for the sake of argument, that a man would, indeed, feel remorse
>>about killing a bear... yet feel no remorse about killing a chicken
>>egg or a brain-dead comatose human.   If the mindfulness of bears
>>and chicken eggs and brain-dead humans isn't a factor, why would he
>>have qualms about one act of killing, but not about other acts of 
>>killing?
> 
> Can you not think of such a list yourself?  Perhaps such a man
> simply enjoys killing chickens because it gives him a sense of
> power over another creature, or perhaps he's amused at the sight
> of the headless corpse racing aimlessly about his yard, or perhaps
> he just likes to eat chicken dinners.  All of these demonstrate
> a desire to increase pleasurable feelings.  Note that I used
> chickens rather than chicken eggs here because it is impossible 
> to kill that which is not alive: the average store-bought chicken
> egg.  It doesn't alter the point, however, and the point is that
> there are as many self-centered reasons for killing as there are
> for not killing; some may be ethically acceptable in our society
> and some may not, but that doesn't change the fact that the motivation
> is basically the benefit of the actor, not the acted upon.

The topic at hand is whether or not it's possible for a man to
engage in thinking that isn't selfish.

If the mindfulness of the bear or the live chicken egg isn't a 
factor, why would the man feel remorse in one case but not in the 
other?

>>Be that as it may, Rich, be advised that I've killed hundreds of 
>>conscious animals and many thousands of unconscious chicken eggs, 
>>yet harbor no feelings of guilt over those actions.  As such, I'm 
>>not convinced by your assumption that other individuals are 
>>driven by the same motivations that drive Rich Young.  
> 
> Fine, then give me an example of a human action whose motivation
> cannot be explained by my principles.

You've already admitted that conclusions aren't motivations, Rich.

If memory serves, your initial argument involved the claim that 
there's no such thing as altruistic thinking, and you went on to 
say that one individual behaves as he does toward other 
individuals solely because of his desire to experience good 
feelings or avoid bad feelings.    Is that still your contention?

>>> True altruism, on the other hand, would be, upon observation of a
>>> starving grizzly, to demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice yourself
>>> so that it might live.
>>
>>If you're going to limit our use of the term "altruism" to such extreme
>>examples, please specify a word that the rest of us can use to describe
>>the behavior of individuals who take into account the consequences that 
>>their actions will have on others without necessarily deciding to commit
>>suicide.
> 
> No need to be so parochial about the definition: 
> 
>    altruism, n., unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of
> others.
> 
> I merely ask for an example of the above definition, and in so
> doing, claim that there is no such thing as an unselfishly
> motivated act.

Do you think you can rightfully dismiss altruistic intellectual 
conclusions as "selfish" by simply asserting that the thinker was 
initially prompted to consider the problem by some selfish urge?  

>>> How about you departing from tradition and supplying a thought
>>> for once instead of simply asking a question?  Please explain
>>> to us why a proscription regarding rape has arisen in some 
>>> societies.  I'm sure we'd all be interested in your reasoning.
>>
>>Sure.  It seems to me that such prohibitions initially arise when 
>>a small group of thinking individuals manage to figure out that 
>>rape is unpleasant for the victims, and hence, unjust.
> 
> And what, exactly, was it that clued in the original group,
> Russell?  

Observation, Rich.  It's not difficult for an observer to witness 
an act of rape and conclude that it's harmful to the victim.  It
seems to me that the "bad feelings" that you continue to fall back 
on are one of the consequences of fact-gathering followed by 
rational conclusions.  You, on the other hand, seem to think that
the observer's rational conclusions depend, not on the facts, but
on the secret workings of your mysterious "good feelings" and
"bad feelings" principle.

> Or as you so cleverly put it, "what motivated the
> one who came before you?"  If the idea of rape didn't cause 
> them some mental discomfort, why would they have bothered to 
> formulate a proscription against it?

Why would a man conclude that it's ok to bang the keyboard of
a computer but not ok to bang the face of a dog?   Answer: 
because he realizes that computers, unlike dogs and rape 
victims, don't feel pain.

>>It'd be
>>silly to assume that such individuals were driven to such conclusions
>>by "good feelings" or "bad feelings", just as it would be silly to 
>>assume that "good feelings" or "bad feelings" necessarily motivate 
>>a man's conclusion that computers don't feel pain. 
> 
> Indeed.  As I've shown above, it'd be silly to assume that 
> conclusions have any relevance to this discussion at all.  It's
> motivations we're discussing.

Yet, you'd have us believe that altruistic ideas are somehow bound
and determined by motivation.

>>>>Your "theory" is a circular argument, Rich.  
>>> 
>>> Then prove it, Russell.  Sure, I can see what you're trying to show:
>>> "I feel bad because there's a taboo, but there's a taboo because I
>>> felt bad."  Is that about it?
>>
>>Yep, that's about it.
>>
>>> As usual, you're in error.  It goes like this: "I avoid this 
>>> behavior because there's a taboo, and if I violate it I may suffer;
>>> the taboo exists because someone before me judged this action and 
>>> was capable of enforcing that judgement either through consensus or
>>> by force."
>>
>>What motivated this particular individual who came before you, Rich?
>>Are you going to tell us that he formulated the taboo because he had
>>guilty feelings?  
> 
> No, but I'm going to tell you, for the umpteenth time, that he
> did it because the idea of rape resulted in unpleasurable feelings,
> which may include, but are not limited to, guilt...

Why would he have experienced unpleasurable feelings,  Rich?   Once
again, you seem to be neglecting the fundamental notion that rape
is bad, not because it makes the rapist feel guilty, but because
it hurts the victim.   Guilt isn't a primary consideration, but
a secondary one.

> Please note
> that the unpleasurable feelings which were responsible for the
> creation of the taboo in the first place are not necessarily the
> same ones which cause adherence to the taboo in those who follow.
> That is, the taboo creator may have felt rape to be an abomination,

If all thinking is driven by selfish intent, why would he have 
broken with prior tradition by concluding that rape is an abomination?

> but you might adhere to the taboo not because you find rape to be
> such a heinous deed, but because the thought of 20 years in a cell
> should you happen to get caught is decidedly unpleasant.

The taboo creator in your example would be immune to such
pressures.  You yourself have mentioned that such a man would have
had the power to force his views on others (in your hypothetical
example.)  I'm still waiting for you to explain how his decision
to implement a taboo was bound to his own selfish "feelings".

> The "taboo" argument is bankrupt, Russell; a taboo is simply one 
> person's ideas either adopted by, or forced upon, a group.  Arguing
> from a group standpoint doesn't make my principles any less valid.

So you say.

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals