From: bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za (MR KR COMAN)
Subject: Re: Did sixteenth-century sailors discard cargo?
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 12:20:29 GMT


From bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za (MR KR COMAN)

In article <BvCC2v.3vK@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> mjd@saul.cis.upenn.edu (Mark-Jason Dominus) writes:
>
>    In _The Defeat of the Spanish Armada_, Mattingly tells
>of a Spanish carrack, heavily loaded with a rich cargo,
>captured by Sir Francis Drake . He says, ``her main deck was
>too crammed with merchandise for her gun-ports to be used.''
>
>    There were other reasons why the carrack surrendered
>without a serious fight, but it seems as though under some
>circumstances a captain might choose to throw some of the
>cargo overboard to get it out of the way.  Did this ever
>happen?
>
A couple of data points on this:

The National Geographic ran a feature on the "Manilla Galleons" about a year 
ago.  As I recall, the theme of overloading these vessels with cargo was
expressly addressed.
	In broad terms, the ship was owned and operated by the Spanish 
Crown, but local officials, traders and ships officers had plenty of scope 
and autonomy to conduct "under the counter" trading deals for their own 
account.  Human nature being what it is, and when everyone is in on the act (
so that enforcement of loading regs and manifests is effectively non-
existent), plus the fact that sailings were confined to certain times of the 
year between ports:  it all added up to a situation where contraband was 
packed into and onto every concievable space aboard ship.   
	High bulk and and weighty items like guns and ammunition were thus 
either consigned to the lower spaces of the ship -- often as part-
replacement for ballast-- and/or reduced by the simple expedient of leaving 
some behind.   Certainly the aim of clearing valuable deck space for cargo 
was met.
	Of interest, too is the writings of UK author Alexander McKee (most
famous for finding and recovering the Mary Rose), his early interest was in 
the Spanish Armada (1588).  He was puzzled by the generally low fighting 
quality of Spanish galleons -- despite being heavily armed and this time
prepared for a straight-up fight.  He was unsatisfied by Victorian legends
attributing this to, inter alia: "the cowardly Dons", the unseaworthy 
galleons, and their lack of maneouverability, etc....  He picked up the idea
that there might have been other causes based (as I recall) on the epic 
fight put up by (I think it was Captain Grenville) the British warship 
Revenge against something like 6 or more Spanish galleons.  The battle went 
on all day, the Revenge ultimately had to surrender but was still well 
afloat (sank only later), a couple of galleons were comprehensively smashed 
up tho.  McKee wondered whether there was a "hidden problem" with Spanish 
gunnery.  To cut a long story short, he hypothesised (and presented certain 
evidence) that the Spanish sources of cannon shot had not mastered the skill 
of suitably hardening and condensing their iron projectiles so that many 
such missiles either flew erratically or tended to shatter on impact with 
little penetration.   He also questioned the effective quality of Spanish 
gunpowder.
	A final observation: the Portugese in the 1500 and 1600's traded with
the Far East using a system of annual galleons.  Pretty much the same sort
of problems were experienced -- overloaded ships.  Here however was the added
snag that the galleons themselves were often not fully seaworthy, esp to 
withstand the rigours of a long voyage from India around the Cape.  There are
a number of recorded instances of rotten hulls, the use of green timber and
bad cargo stowage leading to disaster.  In one instance, the ship's hull was 
rotten, there was a gale and the pumps were clogged with pepper....

Cheers,
Keith Coman

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