From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: The Criterion for Ecocentrism
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 05:56:28 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.172217.2590@vexcel.com> dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
>In article <1992Nov9.012422.28509@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman) writes:
>>In article <1992Nov4.230816.5394@vexcel.com> dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
>>>>
>>>The basic dichotomy seems to be that Gary believes that the commons
>>>are there for anyone to use as they wish and they must be compensated if
>>>this use is prevented.  Others of us believe the commons are already
>>>a collective property and that if someone wishes to degrade them for
>>>their personal gain, then that person should pay the rest of us for
>>>the degradation they are causing to the commons.  Or, since we are
>>>the property owners, we have the right to prevent the degradation.
>>>
>>>I would claim that Gary's position is that an individual may seize
>>>collective property for personal use and then demand payment when
>>>those who already "own" it don't want its value or services degraded.
>>>Gary might claim (others certainly would) that there is no such
>>>thing as collective property, but this contradicts the true
>>>situation and (IMO) is simply an attempt to fit reality into ones
>>>own perceptions and models.
>>
>>You are misrepresenting my position. What I'm saying is indeed that
>>the commons is treated as if it had no owner, *and* that that makes
>>it impossible to assign it a meaningful value. My contention is that
>>to properly assign costs, we must capitalize the commons and distribute
>>it's costs and benefits among those who benefit and lose from it's use
>>or disuse. That brings it's value down to the individual pocketbook
>>directly where cost decisions are best done. The government is not an
>>effective surrogate for individual economic decisions.
>>
>>Gary
>>
>Well, you didn't respond directly to the point about collective
>property.  I could infer from your last sentance that you reject
>collective property because "the government is not an effective
>surrogate for individual economic decisions."  While this is true,
>I would respond that individual economic decisions are not an
>effective surrogate for the collective.  Your methods have the
>effect of taking property from the collective and giving it to
>individuals and then forcing the collective to buy it back - 
>all for the purpose of assigning a value to it.  What is the goal
>here?  To protect collective property, or determine its value?
>If the propert is collective and society wants to preserve it,
>then it does not need to determine a quantitative value.  This
>is only necessary when society wishes to "take" individual
>property, as in the case of eminent domain to build a freeway.
>Do you feel that protection of clean air is analogous to
>eminent domain?


I do reject the idea of collective property. A collective is an
abstract fiction that can have no rights or responsibilities.
Only individuals can have rights, property or otherwise, and
only individuals are responsible for their actions. As far as
I'm concerned, "public" property is a synonym for *unowned*
property. Thus no one has a right to it, and no one has a
responsibility for it. That's why it's so often and so easily
abused.

What I'm advocating is a capitalization of the commons so that
it no longer *is* an unowned commons, but instead is owned by
individuals who use it in response to a rational open market.
In that way, the value of the commons is fairly determined by
those who wish it used in one way as opposed to another in an
open bidding process.

For land, there are already established ownership methods. For
the air, such methods have not been established and will require
creative thinking to do so. Current proposals that depend on
regulation or pollution taxes are inherently backwards because
they neglect opportunity costs and try to protect a "free"
resource when that resource is not free and when the protection
is not free either. The burdens of protectionism fall 
disproportunately on some while they fall lightly or not at all 
on the primary *beneficiaries* of the regulated resource. This
is poor economics and poor equity. The guiding principle should
be that those who benefit most should pay most. In that case,
the marginal utility of each protective measure can be evaluated
on an individual level as to it's worth. This results in a better
balancing of the myriad desires and needs of people.

Gary
Newsgroups: sci.environment