Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Tue, 15 Sep 1992 20:49:00 GMT
From:         Hortideas Publishing <0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Influence/purposive influence/controlling others

From Greg Williams (920915 - 2)

>Bill Powers (920915.1000)

>It often seems to me that you are lumping together "having an effect"
>with "having a particular intended effect."

I think the confusion arises largely because TWO arguments are going on in
parallel here: one about whether purposive influence is possible and, if so,
common and significant; and one about whether organisms in some important
sense are completely self-determining (not counting heredity). There are
common threads in both arguments, but they ARE different. In the former
argument, I am mainly concerned with purposive influence; in the latter, with
more general sorts of environmental influence (including influence due to non-
living parts of the environment).

>But simply showing that one person's action results in a change of action by
>another is not sufficient to show purposeful control, even if the person doing
>the disturbing wanted to see the action that the other took, even if that
>action satisfied a goal in the disturber. That wanting, that goal, is
>completely irrelevant -- it's just a lucky guess -- unless the controller can
>VARY the disturbance and KEEP the other's action in the form desired, either
>for a long time or on repeated occasions.

I agree. I am claiming that purposive influence as you have just defined it is
common and results in important effects as judged by both influencer and
influencee. I do NOT claim that it ALWAYS works. That depends not on luck, but
on the influencer's having an adequate model of the influencee's controlling,
so that the influencer is able to keep perceiving what he/she wants to
perceive, as the influencee's actions change.

>You say " The organism doesn't 'work' (thanks, Dennis) autistically!"
>But this means nothing with respect to PURPOSEFUL influence. If an
>organism is in an environment, it must control in order to keep its
>perceptions as it wishes them to be, whether the disturbances that
>interfere were generated purposefully or naturally (that is, not by
>control systems).

Right. Here I was (or thought I was) considering the second argument.

>There are far more influences unrelated to anyone's goals than influences
>aimed at producing a particular intended change in behavior.

Sure.

>The question before us is not whether disturbances of perceptions can
>alter actions, but the extent to which an external agent can use
>disturbances in a systematic way to make other people behave to suit
>the disturber's goals. You claim that this extent is far greater and
>far more significant than I am yet willing to admit (absent coercion,
>which I do see as a serious problem). That's what we're arguing about,
>in my opinion.

That's argument 1. Argument 2 is about the significance of environmental
influences in general, and here, I also claim that it is "far greater" than
you -- I think.

BP>>>So in order to retain control in general, the external agent has to
BP>>>give up control of that action and pick a higher-level aspect of
BP>>>behavior to control.

GW>>No, the external agent just has to be skilled enough to not NEED to
GW>>pick a higher-level aspect.

>That's impossible. If you're controlling at one level, there is no way
>you can keep a higher system from changing the reference signal in the
>system you're taking advantage of.

You don't HAVE to, if you have a good model of the influencee. The kids WANT
good-tasting food. If they don't WANT to change that reference signal, Pat
will never need to worry about the possibility. She doesn't MAKE them not
change the signal, she just guesses that they won't want to. She could be
wrong, but hasn't been to date.

Pat implores me at this point to make the point that most day-to-day
interactions involve purposive influence which works without the influencer
having a very sophisticated, detailed model of the influencee. Simple
instances like "pass the salt, please." Give-and-take. The success of the
influence is presumed -- such behavior is "civilized." Won't work if the
influencee doesn't know English, true. But it works almost always, otherwise.

>It's impossible from another standpoint, too. To be "skillful enough" to
>avoid disturbing any variable of the same or higher level that matters to the
>controllee, the controller would have to understand the controllee in complete
>detail, and also predict every independent disturbance that is going to
>happen. I don't think this will ever happen, but more to the point, I don't
>think it is likely to HAVE HAPPENED.

Perhaps we have reached an impasse. This is an empirical issue: how detailed a
model of someone's controlling is necessary for, and how important are
independent disturbances in interfering with, purposive influence. I look at
the evidence and say, "in many cases, not much detail, not very important."
You -- looking at the evidence? sometimes I wonder -- say, "always, too much
detail, overwhelmingly important." I can cite cases from family life,
education, advertising, politics, crime, etc., etc., all day and I doubt
you'll change your opinion. (In fact, I have cited several examples to no
avail.) From the other direction, your theoretical arguments strike me as
unpersuasive. So, where to from here? It certainly makes no sense to go on as
we have, although I suspect that some in our (rather deafeningly silent)
audience have been swayed to a degree one way or another by what we've said.

>And lastly, I think that anyone with enough understanding of human nature to
>know another person's hierarchy in the necessary detail (not to mention
>predicting all events in the natural world that could disturb the process)
>would be wise enough to have given up the goal of controlling other people.

Ah. Now I see that you are STILL laboring under the misconception that
purposive influence has "the goal of controlling other people." That would be
impossible, Bill. One can control another person only by employing physical
force (or threat of same), and we've been disallowing that in our discussion
of the last several posts. A purposive influencer INFLUENCES an influencee so
that the influencer can perceive what he wants to perceive. PCT says that the
best way to try to do this is to do The Test and thereby figure out what the
influencee wants, which, with the appropriate context provided by the
influencer, will result in the influencer perceiving what he/she wants to
perceive. (Sometimes you'll figure out that nothing the influencee wants has
much chance of giving the result you want, and you give up on purposive
influence -- and THEN maybe pick up a gun, send the kid to "experts," or just
walk away and give up your goal). The purposive influencer who is aware of the
PCT basis of what he/she is attempting HAS INDEED GIVEN UP THE GOAL OF
CONTROLLING OTHER PEOPLE. In fact, it could be argued (on the basis of
pervasive ideologies, including the Judeo-Christian heritage) that purposive
influence is an ethically superior alternative to control of others.

>One last general observation. I've seen the term "controlling for"
>being used inappropriately on the net. If your enemy trips and falls
>down, you oughtn't say you're happy because you're controlling for
>misery for your enemy. Wishing and controlling aren't the same thing.
>If you're controlling for A, then you're acting in a way designed to
>bring A to some reference level A*. You're not just hoping A will turn
>into A* all by itself. If you mean hoping for or wishing for, say
>hoping or wishing, not controlling. Let's not dilute our technical
>language.

I agree.

Best,

Greg
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