From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Are sentience and sapience arbitrary ethical criteria?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 00:17:22 GMT


In article <1992Oct12.154221.5619@ncar.ucar.edu> chuck@sage.cgd.ucar.edu writes:
cda> Rich, while my synopsis may be "close enough at first glance to 
cda> suffice for any discussion" we might have, perhaps you should 
cda> state your position in your own terms.  

From article <1992Oct12.205442.7948@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> Fair enough.  Sentience and sapience are arbitrary criteria for
ry> assigning status (or "ethical relevance") to non-human species.
ry> I say this because ethics are a creation of the human mind and
ry> have no significance outside the bounds of human society.  

Can the average dog feel pain?  Or, would you say that sensitivity 
to pain cannot exist in an individual that doesn't engage in ethical 
argumentation about pain?

ry> Indeed, particular ethics may not have universal acceptance 
ry> WITHIN human society.  In the case of our treatment of 
ry> non-human species, the arbitrary nature of using sentience and 
ry> sapience to assign status to non-human species stems from the 
ry> fact that there is no absolute, significant-to-all-species 
ry> criterion for the principles of "right" and "wrong." 

Does the truth or falsity of an idea depend on universal agreement?
For instance, if I were to say, "Dogs do not like pain", would my
statement be rendered false if a certain percentage of humanity
disagrees with my observation?  

It seems to me that the likes and dislikes of dogs ought to be 
determined by observing or interrogating dogs, not by polling
the opinions of humans, giraffes, cosmoses, etc.  

ry> Since assignment of ethical relevance is a uniquely human activity,
ry> and since there is no absloute standard for "right" and "wrong,"
ry> the use of ANY criteria to perform such classification and make
ry> such judgements must be arbitrary machinations of the human mind.

When we acknowledge the impact that our actions have on thinking/
feeling individuals, we're not necessarily classifying those 
individuals, nor are we imposing the machinations of our own
minds.  As I've said previously, a cow will suffer or not 
suffer in response to a given event, regardless of the ability 
or willingness of Rich Young's mind to recognize her condition.

The notion that her suffering can exist only in our human minds is 
comparable to the notion that trees in the forest never fall down
when no human is around to see and hear.  

ry> NOTE: This does NOT mean that such criteria are not VALID for
ry> use within human society; only that the choice of these
ry> criteria is ARBITRARY, since other criteria could be used
ry> just as well...and often are.  Jains apparently espouse
ry> the use of an "alive/not alive" test; sentience and
ry> sapience are not the determining factors to them.

Would a brain-dead man care if you smash his foot with a hammer? 
It's clear that no action can be good or bad to an individual that
is neither sentient nor sapient.

ry> The implication of this is that it is intolerant to insist that
ry> these arbitrary criteria be universally adopted within human
ry> society.  Or, to put it more succinctly, your opinion is no better
ry> than mine in this area.

You're assuming that all opinions must be accepted at face-value,
without regard for the underlying facts and arguments.

cda> I think we would at least agree that the difference (whether or 
cda> not relevant) between sentience/sapience and the other 
cda> distinctions does exist.  

ry> I'm not so sure we WOULD agree.  Sentience and sapience is simply
ry> another set of biological properties with which we might classify
ry> non-human life.  These characteristics have no more inherent
ry> significance than the ability of an animal to regulate its internal
ry> temperature, for example.  Sentience and sapience are simply
ry> characteristics which apply to one group of living things and not
ry> another.

Would a bacterium or a brain-dead comatose man agree with the
alternate criteria that you're imposing arbitrarily?   Or would 
they simply not mind?    

> ...
ry> If ethics are strictly a human concern, and if they stem from
ry> opinions rather than extra-species absolutes, then the opinions
ry> of one human regarding food choices are as valid as the opinions of
ry> another and AR people have no business making ethical pronouncements
ry> regarding the morality of other people based on their own opinions,
ry> as in, "it's WRONG to eat meat."

You often remind me of a friend of mine who has a hard time 
understanding the difference between a pointer and the pointer's
object.  The fact that a cow may not have concepts (ie pointers)
dealing with pain and suffering doesn't mean that her pain and 
suffering are non-existent.

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ