From: nyt%nyxfer%igc.apc.org@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (NY Transfer News)
Subject: ANALYSIS:Yeltsin Loses Momentum
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: daemon@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: The NY Transfer News Service
Resent-From: "Rich Winkel" <MATHRICH@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 02:20:24 GMT


Via The NY Transfer News Service * All the News that Doesn't Fit


YELTSIN LOSING MOMENTUM
Congress of People's Deputies shows greater resistance

By Sam Marcy

December 1 marked a significant anniversary that one might have
expected would have been observed in the Russian Republic. From the
perspective of a year ago, Boris Yeltsin should have had a lot to
crow about. As it was, the anniversary passed with hardly any
publicity, at least not in the West.

A year ago, Yeltsin eagerly proclaimed Russia's imminent assumption
of the budget of the entire USSR. As president of the Russian
Republic, this put him in the position of making good the debts of
the USSR, including those of all the republics willing to join with
Russia in this financial agreement.

REACTION OF WEST

In the West, particularly in the United States, Yeltsin's
announcement was described as an effort to bail out the Kremlin.
"Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed today to bail out the
virtually bankrupt central government of Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev by taking over its budget and imposing across-the-board
cuts." (Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1991)

This could easily have been viewed as a very bold venture and, if
successful, as a turning point in the struggle to impose a
so-called free market economy on the USSR and restore the
capitalist system. Yeltsin's announcement came after a meeting with
Gorbachev and the head of the Soviet central bank, at which all of
this was agreed to.

Gorbachev's agreement was inevitable, considering the damage and
confusion caused by the so-called August coup and the beginning of
the dissolution of the USSR itself. The aim of this financial
agreement, it should be remembered, was to merge the budgets of
Russia and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, what had been the Soviet
Finance Ministry would now be put under Russian control.

Yeltsin acknowledged that in consolidating the budgets, he would
have to make tough decisions, but he boasted that Russia was the
biggest and economically strongest of the republics. It was pointed
out in the capitalist press that the Russian government had
recently taken control of Soviet gold, diamond and oil resources on
Russian soil.

Yeltsin also promised to absorb most Soviet ministries,
particularly those controlling the economy, and to discard others.
All in all, this agreement presumably meant that the Russian
Republic was willing, ready, and able to absorb not only the assets
of the former Soviet Union but also its considerable liabilities.

At the time the USSR was cast in the role of having become
thoroughly bankrupt, both politically and economically. However,
the process of the breakup of the USSR was not so much of an
economic as of a political character, flowing from the growing
assaults made upon the Gorbachev administration from both the
extreme rightists as well as from the working class population as
a whole.

YELTSIN, GORBACHEV AND SPEED OF REFORM

It is interesting to remember that the whole course of the struggle
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev reduced itself to the tempo at which
the so-called reforms should be carried out. The reforms were
bourgeois economic and administrative measures that supposedly
would hasten a capitalist market economy.

Day in and day out, the differences between Gorbachev and Yeltsin
were discussed. They were only supposed to be over how quickly the
market economy would be introduced. Yeltsin played the role of the
fast pace-setter, while Gorbachev was the laggard. This seemed to
go on endlessly.

When Yeltsin became president of the Russian Republic in the spring
of 1991, he seemed at last to have gotten the opportunity to prove
the merits of his case. He had been elected with a huge majority,
and his popularity had risen remarkably as a result of his
demagogy, especially his attacks on Gorbachev, whose star had
fallen. But within a short period, evidence began to accumulate
that his effort to introduce a capitalist market and to
decentralize state industry was meeting resistance all over the
county. He was confronted with problems in the conversion from a
socialist to a capitalist economy that he had not anticipated.

He changed personnel and shuffled around his top aides, but it did
nothing to bring the results he expected. The economic
deterioration continued.

What was Yeltsin to do? As long as he controlled only the Russian
Republic, important as that was, he could not effectively put his
reforms into place. The USSR, after all, had been a centralized,
multinational state with a planned economy in which each of the
republics was an integral part. The economics of the USSR was such
that it was quite impossible to separate out the Russian Republic
from the rest of the republics, especially the newly independent
Ukraine, which were going their own way.

Yeltsin had been thundering about how all that was needed in Russia
was a brilliant new innovator like himself to set everything
straight economically, politically and socially. Within a few
months, however, the same malaise that had afflicted the plans of
Gorbachev was making itself felt even more strongly. Inflation was
growing rapidly, and production was beginning to fall. The ugly
head of unemployment was raised.

THE QUICK FIX

There's nothing like a quick fix. Hurry. Take advantage of
Gorbachev's collapse and offer to take over the entire budget of
the USSR, including all the republics.

And so it was that Yeltsin made his move, which was hailed in the
Washington Post with the triumphant headline: "Yeltsin bails out
Kremlin," and the subhead: "Russia takes over Soviet budget,
expands own power."

The Washington Post wasn't the only one to consider this an
important development. The Dec. 1, 1991, Wall Street Journal said,
"The Russian Republic took control of the apparently bankrupt
Soviet government Finance Ministry, agreeing to pay the bulk of the
costs. Russian President Boris Yeltsin worked out a plan to
`consolidate the Russian and Soviet budgets into one.' As of
Sunday, the Russian president had assumed the payment of
Gorbachev's salary."

The following day, the New York Times had this to say: "[Yeltsin's]
agreement to finance the Soviet payroll and guarantee Soviet state
bank credits may have seemed a little routine after the dramatic
events" earlier. However, "Mr. Yeltsin's assumption of Kremlin
expenses was widely welcomed. Foreign governments and investors saw
a new chance for financial stability and therefore for payment of
debts and potential new investment."

By taking over the financial liabilities of the USSR, Yeltsin had
grown immeasurably in the eyes of the imperialist governments and
the big banks. His all-too-frequent assertions that he would
accelerate the pace of capitalist transformation of the USSR were
the most welcome of all his declarations.

Notwithstanding the high drama of the political developments in the
USSR, it is prosaic questions such as the failure to pay interest
on huge loans and the budgetary process that usually interest the
"investing public," the bankers and industrialists.

YELTSIN MIRED IN DIFFICULTIES

The Yeltsin government is now so mired down by the accumulating
financial and economic problems caused by his reckless attempt to
accelerate the privatization of socialist industry that no one can
be found to celebrate this glorious anniversary of the takeover of
the budget of the entire USSR.

Nor is there rejoicing in the journalistic fraternity of
imperialist apologists. If anything, they now want to hide their
original preference for Yeltsin as the quick pace-setter of
bourgeois restoration and counterrevolution over the laggard,
Gorbachev. Of course, it should be remembered that they also
preferred Gorbachev over the communist leadership in place before
March 1985.

Now the imperialists are faced with another dilemma. Their claim to
love democracy does not extend to the only authentic popular body,
the Congress of Peoples Deputies, as long as it resists the
imposition of the Yeltsin program of bourgeois restoration and
counterrevolution.

CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES

On Dec. 5, the Congress of Peoples Deputies voted 1,041 to 693 to
amend the Russian Constitution and thereby dilute some of the power
of the executive branch of the Russian government. This was only
one vote less than the two-thirds majority needed, and was a
significant rebuff to the Yeltsin counterrevolutionary cabal.

The vote demonstrated Yeltsin's growing isolation not only in the
Congress of Deputies, but far more significantly, throughout the
length and breadth of Russia itself. So catastrophic are the
effects of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the sabotage,
vandalism and outright robbery by new strata of the bourgeoisie,
that the anger produced had to find some echo in the Congress of
Peoples Deputies.

The Congress of Peoples Deputies is the only remaining
representative or popular institution in Russia today. The Yeltsin
cabal of bourgeois, counterrevolutionary politicians have arrogated
to themselves the role of the executive branch. Occasionally,
according to their own lights, they turn to the Congress of
Deputies or its standing committee, the Parliament, which votes and
acts on everyday matters between Congress meetings.

Recently, the course of the internal struggle in Russia, the rising
tide of resentment and opposition to the economic as well as
political behavior of the Yeltsin cabal, has given rise to what
historically has been called "dual power." The Congress of Peoples
Deputies is on one side and the utterly counterrevolutionary
Yeltsin-Gaidar forces are on the other. This duality has occurred
often in world history where there is an imminent outbreak of
struggle between two divergent classes in society.

HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF DUAL POWER

Historic examples of dual power include the struggle between the
ancient nobility in 18th-century France and the rising bourgeoisie.
The monarchy retained the semblance of power in one political arena
and the bourgeoisie, as the Third Estate, dominated another. It's
the best-known example in European history of the existence of dual
power, which ultimately leads to the destruction of one or the
other contending class.

An American version should be more familiar: the growing struggle
between the northern bourgeoisie and the southern slaveocracy in
the 19th century. The two classes kept contending with each other
over several decades until the "irrepressible conflict" broke out
into the Civil War.

In classical historical examples of dual power, one group or class
retains the legal or de jure power while de facto power passes to
the other class.

What is the historic class situation in Russia at the present time?
Who holds de facto power? And who merely holds de jure power?

In order to find the answer we have to look historically at the
Congress of Peoples Deputies. This body is the descendant of the
Congress of Soviet Deputies. That congress met and enacted a
constitution on July 10, 1918, which contains the following:

"Chapter I.1. Russia is hereby proclaimed a republic of soviets of
workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies. All power centrally and
locally is vested in these soviets.

"Chapter I.2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the
principle of a free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet
national republics....

"Chapter II.3. Its fundamental aim being abolition of all
exploitation of man by man, complete elimination of the division of
society into classes, merciless suppression of the exploiters,
socialist organization of society and victory of socialism in all
countries."

As many times as it has been amended, the essence of these
statements has been retained in the constitution. None of the laws
passed at a later date abrogated or abolished these paragraphs or
even amended them in such a way as to eliminate the essential
elements of the provisions.

The Gorbachev administration began the attempt to scuttle the
Congress of Soviet Deputies and whittle down its power. The aim was
to make the congress a mere rubber-stamp of the Gorbachev and
Yeltsin counter-revolutionary cabal of bourgeois politicians, who
had been nurtured in the arms of the bureaucratic state and party
apparatus. The congress's working-class social base was eroding and
being replaced by a new layer of bourgeois industrial managers.

Gorbachev reflected in part the collective farm aristocracy with
its inclination to the capitalist market. The industrial manager
Yeltsin more and more clearly reflected the privatization urge of
the industrial, technological and managerial aristocracy. Both
moved the country in the direction of counterrevolution. The
deepening crisis caused by Gorbachev's continued attempt to push
his capitalist reforms further and further accelerated the process
and lifted Yeltsin into the public eye as the new Soviet leader.

There then followed a series of very damaging steps by the Yeltsin
administration that foreshadowed the dismantling of Soviet industry
and the intimidation of the Congress of Peoples Deputies. For a
while it looked like the Peoples Deputies would remain a rubber
stamp for the Yeltsin cabal after Gorbachev's demise.

But the plight of the workers, the peasants, of the general
population has set the counterrevolution back.

Yeltsin's inability to improve on Gorbachev has been followed by an
even more severe setback. Not only has he failed to improve the
economic conditions of the population, but his effort to break up
the Soviet Union as a whole, as well as the Communist Party and
fraternal organizations, has helped to discredit him. Thus arose
the specter of dual power, as the Congress of Peoples Deputies
regained some confidence.

Here it is necessary to discuss the character of the structural
changes attempted by the Yeltsin cabal and the attempt to undermine
the congress.

MODEL OF PARIS COMMUNE

Since the day when the Congress of Soviet Deputies established the
power of the workers and peasants, Soviet power was based on the
model of the Paris Commune.

The Commune was a vastly superior, more revolutionary form of
state. One of the fundamental bulwarks of the Commune was that it
combined legislative and executive authority in one common body
politic, the Commune, the workers' parliament. Separating executive
from legislative work, as in most bourgeois governments, removes
the executive branch from the authority of the masses.

A critical examination of the historic evolution of parliamentary
as against executive branches of the capitalist state evinces a
clear tendency. The executive grows at the expense of the
legislature and tends to reduce the legislature, however democratic
it may be, to the level of a talking shop.

This is particularly evident in the most powerful capitalist
countries, like the U.S., where even today the executive can send
off an entire army, once again in an undeclared war, without the
sanction or even a hearing at the legislative level. This has
happened without deviation from the wars in Korea and Vietnam to
the interventions in Yugoslavia and Somalia.

Karl Marx's foresight in his brilliant analysis of the Paris
Commune was in recognizing the seemingly innocuous provision of
combining these two functions. Lenin equally took note of it.

The Commune was elected by universal suffrage, but it did not hold
an election for a president or executive. The democratic
imperialist bourgeoisie usually hold an election for president,
whose term in office is generally longer than the term of those
elected to the legislative branch. Such a president holds the real
authority.

The Commune had none of that. Neither did the Congress of Soviet
Deputies in its early days. It did not establish an executive over
and above the legislative branch. Of course, like the Commune, the
congress could be abused illegally.

During sessions of the Congress, the representatives establish
bodies and choose governing deputies to function in-between
sessions. Every ranking national official of the Soviet government
was a deputy of the Congress, subject not only to reelection or
ouster but to recall at any time during his or her tenure.

Notwithstanding the decay of Soviet institutions, there was no
separate, independent executive branch elected over and above the
Congress of Soviet Deputies until the arrival of the
counter-revolutionary destruction and dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Thus, from a strictly legal point of view, holding a
presidential election for Yeltsin outside of the constitutional
framework of the Congress of Deputies is illegal and contrary to
the framework and constitution of the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

Yeltsin's role as president, plus his amassing of a growing number
of bourgeois politicians in a so-called executive branch, is a
break from the fundamental organization of the Soviets as a
workers' state.

CONGRESS POPULAR BUT VACILLATING

The Congress of Peoples Deputies is still the pole of attraction so
far as the masses go in the struggle against blatant, open
counterrevolution. The masses still look to the Congress.
Otherwise, Yeltsin would have dissolved it or, in case of its
recalcitrance, moved to rule altogether by decree, that is, by
personal dictatorship.

This by no means signifies that the Congress of Peoples Deputies is
a thoroughgoing, consistent representative of the proletariat and
the collectivized peasantry. Far, far from it. It compromises the
interests of the proletariat. But it is the <MDBO>legal repository
of the socialization of property<MDNM>, of the socialized state
sector, of the ownership of the means of production by the workers.


Despite all the ravages and destruction of socialist practices and
the elimination of economic and political gains, there is this one
indispensable element of socialism that remains: the socialization
of the property, that is, of the means of production. Yeltsin
himself recognizes this only too well.

In a remark calculated to be derogatory of socialism, he says, "If
one puts the theory and practice of socialism side by side and
compares them with an unprejudiced eye, it becomes clear that of
all its classic elements, the only one that has been put into
effect is the socialization of property." (<MDBR>Against the Grain,
<MDNM>by Boris Yeltsin)

Indeed, no matter how he tries to discredit socialism, he knows
that the socialization of property, meaning of the basic means of
production, is what the struggle is about right now. This is the
bone that sticks in his throat. It is this that he and he
counterrevolutionary cabal are trying to overcome.

This is what the struggle is about between the Congress of Peoples
Deputies and the outright counterrevolution. The struggle is about
who owns the property, the assets built up by the workers. The
workers have not yet been dispossessed of them. They are still the
legal owners via the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

In its current ideological and political expression, the congress
speaks the language of the bourgeoisie and not the language of the
proletarian class struggle, with the exception of some deputies who
are not heard very much. Yet the congress opposes the outright
counterrevolution and its robbery of the workers' and collectivized
property.

The congress has made numerous concessions in the course of its
dealings with the Yeltsin cabal. It deals with them as one branch
of government to another branch, instead of acting as the political
expression of the workers' state, the legal descendant of the
Congress of Soviets of Workers and Peasants. Moreover, it appears
that the congress at this time does not seek to rally the masses,
to confer with them. It is not a revolutionary tribune.

The congress has all the inconsistencies of a timid, bourgeois
parliament in fear of the repressive action of the military and
bureaucratic apparatus of an old nobility. Yet it has revolutionary
potential if it rallies, if it seeks to address the masses, to urge
them on, instead of secretly caucusing with the workers' class
enemy.

Now that it has rebuffed a Yeltsin-Gaidar assault, it cannot rest
on its laurels. It has many ready-made initiatives at hand that do
not go beyond the framework of its legal authority, which is the
authority of a workers' state.

It can deprive the Yeltsin counterrevolution of any and all
expenditures and stop all further appropriations. It must openly
declare that all the economic, financial and banking authority,
including all monies and gold, are under the jurisdiction of the
Congress.

To take such a decisive step would also clear up the congress's
relationship to the military, the police, and internal security
forces. It would say that the congress alone holds the power of the
purse, even as a bourgeois parliament does. And it will not
cravenly surrender this power to the so-called executive branch of
unelected bourgeois officials.

This is a transitional period. The class character of the
transition is from the proletarian state to the bourgeoisie. But
the bourgeoisie finds itself incapable, as the last six years has
made it abundantly clear, of making the transition to a bourgeois
state, to bourgeois ownership. The stumbling block is the
collective ownership of the means of production, which the
individual industrialists cannot disgorge.

COUNTING ON THE BANKERS

To understand Gorbachev, and even more so Yeltsin, it must be
remembered that their plans have always counted on one
indispensable element: the support of the imperialists for the
capitalist transformation of the USSR. Not just support and
sympathy in the abstract, but massive loans and credits from the
bankers in particular. The bankers would open up their purses
rather generously, in the view of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, since
it is so much in the interests of the bankers to do so.

What they apparently did not take into their calculations is that
this is precisely the hope of neo-colonialist elements throughout
the world. They think banks just lavishly lend, without calculating
the net return. However, the process of borrowing and lending is
part of the circulation of world finance capital and is intimately
tied to the capitalist mode of production for profit.

There is not an iota of sympathy or antipathy in their calculation.
Profit is the motive force.

Members of the Congress of Peoples Deputies have given hundreds of
speeches protesting that the process of reaching out to the banks
will ultimately mean that the territory of the former USSR will
become a raw materials base for the imperialist monopolies.

But as rich as the USSR is in natural materials, it is not the only
place on the planet where they can be obtained. They have been
obtained elsewhere for decades. And the cost of labor in the
less-developed countries is much lower than in the USSR, which, in
the opinion of the bankers, is still encumbered with socialist
restrictions.

The principal selling point used by both Yeltsin and Gorbachev to
the imperialist governments, especially the United States, is the
peaceful, cooperative policy of their administrations. But this has
been oversold, not only by them but even by the previous
administrations. The imperialists are only interested in the
destruction of the socialist economy and not in its rehabilitation
as a capitalist rival.

Dusko Doder, in his book "Gorbachev" (Penguin, 1990), said the
capitalists are afraid that a developed capitalist economy in the
USSR could also become a challenger, although on different terms
than the Soviet government was. They fear the USSR could
reconstitute itself and present the same formidable challenge, but
change the nature of the competition with the imperialist West from
socialism to capitalism.

Whatever the bourgeois politicians disseminate in the way of
propaganda for consumption of the broad masses and of unwary
political leaders who represent them, the one undeviating objective
and motivation of capitalist imperialism is superprofit. And this
will not change unless the workers and oppressed peoples rid the
planet of it.


(Copyright Workers World Service: Permission to reprint granted if
source is cited. For more info contact Workers World, 46 W. 21 St.,
New York, NY 10010; "workers" on PeaceNet; on Internet:
"workers@mcimail.com".)


 NY Transfer News Service * All the News that Doesn't Fit
 Modem: 718-448-2358  *  Internet: nytransfer@igc.apc.org
Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive