HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 18:01:12 GMT

First of all, I think Mr. Yoder has left some attributions out of this
dialogue.  I did not say "Mr. Yoder speaks of that which he does not
know", or indeed most of the rest of the text he replies to.

In article <BxrALE.1wq@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>The concept of 
>>biological altruism has been strongly attacked by reductionists, who believe 
>>that an altruistic genotype will simply eliminate itself from the gene pool.
>
>That will be true for anything but critters like social insects where 
>everyone is geneticall related and intellectual action is unimportant.

You are now making a scientific claim Mr. Yoder.  Would you please
tell us your arguments for why there won't be selection for altruistic
behavior in anything but social insects or "critters like" them?
Also, could you please be more specific about what "critters like"
them means?  Exactly what biological characteristics determine, in
your view, whether a species can develop a biological disposition
towards altruism?

>Tell me.  Let's say you have iron-clad proof that slave societies are 
>more stable or more prolific (genetically) than free ones, would you
>suggest that I submit to slavery even though my life under slavery is
>worse than as a free man?  What kind of arguments could you offer?  Why should
>I want to clamp on the manacles?  What's in it for me?

I almost wish I had saved the postings which started all this, because
I can't remember what led me to bring up the topic of the biological
advantage of altruism in the first place.  It certainly wasn't an
attempt to show that a biological predisposition to altruism had any
moral consequences.
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:05:02 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov14.092637.9286@epas.toronto.edu> hanus@epas.utoronto.ca (Peter John Hanus) writes:
>In article <BxoExA.1tq@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>  You are welcome to come out of the woodwork and try to make some
>>  sense of her ideas or even to offer operational definitions of
>>  her terms, specify what metrics we might use in measuring "rational",
>
>While I know that I am not directly involved in this debate, and
>neither am I a great fan of Rand's epistemology, but I believe when
>Rand speaks of rationality she is speaking of the possession of the
>faculty of reason: "Rationality is the recognition and acceptance of
>reason as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values
>and one's only guide to action" (The Virtue of Selfishness, p25).

  And how do we test for this?  What do we mean by "source of
  knowledge"?   By this metric, if one man observes a situation and
  reasons about it (Aristotelianism) and another man forms a theoretical
  model, sets up an experiment, and feeds the results of the experiment
  back into his model, is one more "rational" than another?  Does
  a consciously-designed model that is wrong count as more rational
  than an unconsciously-formed one that is right?  (e.g., a farmer
  may "know" more about what the weather will do than a trained
  meteorologist; it is well documented that some investors have
  much better track records based on their particular "gestalt" of
  the market than most formal models, etc).

  The definition you provide really illustrates the problems with
  her thinking very well.   It is too vague to be useful for anything.


>  She views reason as the only thing separating man from animals, animals
>react through biological preprogramming, man through his ability to
>reason.

  There are two problems with this:

  1.  It's not true -- plenty of primates and many other higher
  mammals clearly engage in learning and thinking, and forming 
  general models (e.g., any houscat figures out a concept for
  "door" and doesn't have to relearn it for every new door it 
  encounters.)

  2.  Why is separating man from animals relevant to anything?  
  This seems like a totally arbitrary standard.



---peter
From: ddrumm@amiganet.chi.il.us (Daniel Drumm)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Ayn Rand
Date: 18 Nov 92 07:59:34 GMT
Organization: Amiga Network Information Systems


        I am looking for any information regarding clubs, organizations
or any other information including newsletters concerning the work
and life of Ayn Rand. If you have any information about clubs, rare
books and any other collector's items, please leave me email. 


Daniel Drumm      _#      **MMp     g#00   `N##0"    _agN#0P0N#           _#L
                 g##       jN##    j##F     J##    _dN0"      "          g##L
Chicago        _#]##      _0 ##L  jN##F     ###   g#0"                 _03##L
Bulls         gE_j##      #  0## jF ##F    j##F  j##     ______       gE_j##L
3-Peat!     _0"""N##     d"  J##L0  ##F    0##   0##     "9##F"     _0"""5##L
          _gF    ]##    jF    ##0   ##F    ##F   `##k     d##     _gF    j##L
        _g#_    _j##L__g#__   ]N  _j##L_ _d##L_   `#Nh___g#N'   _g#_    _j##L_
       `""""    """""'""""'    "  """""" """"""      """""""   `""""    """"""
Usenet: ddrumm@amiganet.chi.il.us                         Fido: 1:115/300
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,soc.history,alt.activism,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject: Re: [ACLU] Guardian of Liberty: American Civil Liberties Union
Organization: Syracuse University, CIS Dept.
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 20:32:26 EST

In article <1992Nov19.065325.26510@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:

>>Why are Justices chosen by elected
>>leaders if these elected leaders aren't supposed to use their own
>>judgement?
>
>The Persident choses Justices, not the Senate. The Senate offers
>their "advice and consent." I take that to mean a veto over
>completely unqualified nominees, or those who are _aboslutely_
>and totally in conflict with senatorial opinion (e.g. to the 
>extent that the Senate doesn't think the Constitution could
>survive the appointment.) Simply disagreeing on debatable political
>issues does not, in my opinion, fall within the Senate's "advice
>and consent" powers.

Can you give us a reason of why you attribute this particular meaning
(which certainly is not obvious from the text of the Constitution)?

I mean, is it based upon some historical documentation of the founders'
original intent, or something of that nature?  Or is it just your gut
feeling?


BTW, I'm kind of disappointed that there have been no responses to my
previous posts in this thread.  Are my posts not making it to the outside
world, or are they so convincing that everyone agrees with me?! :)


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 23:47:22 GMT
Organization: mydog in exile

Jeremy Caplan wrote:
| > Peter, the differences between humans and animals is that humans MUST use
| > their mind to survive.

esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) writes:
| Even this is arguable.  Ever heard of feral children?

Feral children have minds.  So, as far as I can see, do
dogs and cats.  Possibly use of languages exhibiting
a certain level of syntax is meant?  The way in which
humans use language to survive seems unique among the
species we are familiar with.  
-- 

 )*(    Gordon Fitch    )*(    gcf@panix.com    )*(
( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta.,  NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:4985 alt.politics.libertarian:1949
From: mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 20 Nov 92 02:52:51 GMT
Followup-To: talk.politics.theory

Peter Nelson writes:


> This [Tim Starr's observations on economics] is a bit like saying that
> science doesn't work because we don't have a cure for AIDS.  Just because
> someone has attempted and failed to grasp something scientifically does
> not invalidate science.

One might observe that, on these terms, science cannot be "invalidated" (i.e.,
no area of knowledge can be put outside the scope of natural science).
Surely this means that such invalidation is beside the point.  In the case
of economics, one might argue quite strongly that the economy is necessarily
a moving target and that as such it is not truly amenable to scientific
study.  One might also point to Galbraith's observations that economic
theory finds itself in a tension between affirming the prosperous and
cleaming up after the messes they leave.

>  Logic does not represent a set of scientific *conclusions* so it doesn't
>  HAVE to be.

The *use* of logic, however, is predicated on assertions about the
orderliness of the domain of its use.  It's also dependent on putting one's
cards on the table.

-- 
C. Wingate        + "The peace of God, it is no peace,
                  +    but strife closed in the sod.
mangoe@cs.umd.edu +  Yet, brothers, pray for but one thing:
tove!mangoe       +    the marv'lous peace of God."
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: gary@colossus.cgd.ucar.edu (Gary Strand)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Climate and Global Dynamics Division/NCAR, Boulder, CO
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:20:26 GMT

pn> Peter Nelson
gs> Gary Strand

gs> If you're looking for some grand formula that you can use to predict the
    behavior of whole societies, you won't ever find it. Similarly, if you're
    looking for some grand formula to predict the weather at any given place
    at any given time, you won't ever find it. 

pn> Except that in the case of weather I presume that the precision with which
    our models match reality continues to improve, i.e., our ability to predict
    the weather 24 hours from now is probably better now than it was in 1967, 
    and that was probably better than in 1942.   

  True. However, predicting what the weather will be two weeks from now has
  as poor record in 1992 as it did 25 or 50 years ago. BTW, most of the long-
  term predictions (like the 3-month precipitation and temperature forecasts)
  aren't based on models so much as they're based on historical records.

pn> I don't see any evidence of this in ethical philosophy  -- i.e., people
    seem to be debating the same issues they were 2500 years ago.

  As if cosmologists aren't debating the same issues that they were 2500 years
  ago.

  Part of the problem facing theories based on individuals is that they are
  analogous to basing a scientific hypothesis on atoms. A scientist isn't 
  going to get very far if she tries to accomodate the state (and predict the
  future states) of every atom in a ball dropped off a cliff. In some ways, 
  that's the real problem, ie, the detail required is so great as to make the
  solution intractable. Then again, ethical theories that start off with a 
  group of individuals don't seem to work either. For one, I don't like being
  modelled as inconsequential parts of a greater whole. Atoms don't mind.

  My main point is that perhaps we're approaching this from the wrong angle.
  The rules for determining whether or not a scientific theory is correct
  are applicable only to science, and we need some other metrics for judging
  ethical theories. I certainly wouldn't use the scientific method to judge
  whether or not the "Mona Lisa" was a good painting, and I don't see that
  we *necessarily* have to use it to judge theories about ethics. Perhaps
  you're trying to put a square peg in a round hole.

--
Gary Strand                      Opinions stated herein are mine alone and are
strandwg@ncar.ucar.edu            not representative of NCAR, UCAR, or the NSF
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 08:47:50 GMT

In article <BxzEyx.IF7@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}  I notice this as a recurring theme of both Mr. Starr and Mr. Wales:
}  they attack posters who criticize their views but make no attempt to 
}  defend Rand's positions.    They have had ample opportunity here
}  to try to construct a cogent defense of her ideas, methods, or even
}  any one particular term or definition.  Note, for instance, that both
}  have completely retreated from any effort to define "rational" or
}  "reason" in any terms that can de measured or even detected.

You've yet to make any breach in Objectivism to require any defense.  Your
charge: things like rationality and reason can't be measured quantitatively.
So what?  Why should they be?  Your answer to this: because that's what
science is or should be.  We've cited evidence which disproves, even falsifies
this desriptive claim, and proceeded to the implicit normative claim, which
has no justification that I know of, nor have you attempted to provide any.

You merely reiterate some of the cliche ritual cant of positivism dogmatically,
perfectly fitting the stereotype of a member of your school of thought.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 14:03:22 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov20.083822.27475@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>In article <Bxz04G.LyL@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}>If it's impossible to apply the methods of the natural sciences, as Hayek
>}>and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
>}
>}  Are you saying *it's impossible* to round up thousands of newborn
>}  babies and divide them into study and control groups and perform
>}  experiments of their personality or social development
>
>No, I'm denying that any factor, X, could be proven to necessarily cause
>behavior, Y, because of the fact that humans are volitional, another thing
>you deny, not only making you a positivist but a believer in psychological
>determinism.

  This is a nonsequitor.  Neurological systems are not closed loops and
  according to QM theory the universe contains nondeterministoc events, 
  so I cetrainly can't be accused of "psychological determinism".  Actually,
  since I claim there is no decent science of psychology I can't be accused
  of any position about what determines human behavior.



>Lets review: you claimed that positivism's never been tried in economics.

  Really?  Quote the posting in question.   What I said was that there
  is/was no science of economics.  The fact that people have tried and
  failed to generate rigorous economic models in no way invalidates my
  claim.  Science, as I said before, is nothing more than an effort
  to create conceptual, theoretical models of the real world and
  verify/refine those models with appropriate tests or experiments.  
  Positivism is not science; it's just an occasionally employed philo-
  sophical underpinning.  That's why I refer to it and it's cousin,
  logical empiricism, as "fellow travelers" of science.


>cited evidence which refutes your claim.  Thus it has been, dare I say it,
>FALSIFIED!

  Since I never claimed that it had never been tried, it is your
  refutation that is false.


>Quantitative prediction is outside the scope of economics.  However, history
>combined with the theory of human action does lead to the prediction that
>we'll be looking at double-digit price inflation within a few years.

  Except that any of a number of models make the same prediction.   And
  all of them are predicated on the same assumption: that the national
  debt will be monetized.  If the assumption holds true then the prediction
  is trivial, and no more validates the Austrian school than predicting
  a sudden decline in the deer population on a tiny island following the 
  detonation of a thermonuclear device on it, would validate some ecological
  theory. 


---peter


 




Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:5054 alt.politics.libertarian:1975
From: Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: 20 Nov 92 18:05:56 GMT
Organization: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU

starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>}I'm responding to Peter Nelson in private e-mail, because I think that
>}his lack of knowledge of that which he critiques is too embarassing to
>}parade in public.

>On the contrary, since he's hopeless, it's worthwhile to ridicule him so that
>others won't be as tempted to associate themselves with him in word or deed.

Oh dear.  And here I was enjoying watching him put jimmy donal wales
on the spot.  I'm not usually tempted to associate myself with
Peter Nelson, but he's good at seeing problems (e.g. the lack
of a conservative solution to the medical crisis, and the lack
of a usable axiomatic basis for objectivism).  So can I be ridiculed
too? :-)

>}On the rationality of animals question, it should be pointed out that
>}there _are_ valid contexts in which we should take into account the
>}differences between humans and other animals.  In particular, we must
>}recognize that our powers of conceptualization are vastly more powerful
>}than those of any other species.  The crude reasoning done by animals
>}is not sufficient to allow them to philosophize, for example.  Nor to
>}allow them to choose an ethical theory in the same way that humans
>}can.  The Rand quote that was posted here was from an essay on ethics,
>}in which Rand was making precisely this point: unlike other animals,
>}humans can choose a code of values.

>Beasts can't even do the most basic syllogism: if A impies B and B implies
>C, then A implies C.  Their lives aren't dependent upon reason, as those of
>men are.

Does this suggest that before the Greeks formalized syllogisms, people's
lives weren't dependent upon reason?  Certainly not.  Does it
imply that understanding a formal definition of transitive, reflexive
relations helps people reason about living their lives?  Not really.
Can we even be certain that "beasts" cannot apply the given syllogism
above?  Remember the experiments with teaching chimpanzees language;
and consider that "conscious" reasoning may similarly be a social
phenomenon that some beasts could indeed learn.  How do we know
they can't?  And even if they can't, what makes it a necessary
rather than a contingent truth?

[laughable flames of Peter Nelson deleted]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk      Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Systems design flourishes best when it is half a trade and half an art...
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 17:53:10 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov17.155659.2275@news.acns.nwu.edu> jcc@casbah.acns.nwu.edu (Jeremy Caplan) writes:
>Peter, the differences between humans and animals is that humans MUST use
>their mind to survive.

  What is your proof for this?    Since a great many animals learn 
  survival behavior from their parents (for instances, a cat must be
  taught to hunt by its mother, instinctively it doesn't have a
  clue what a mouse is for.   Monkeys and other primates are social
  animals but have to learn social behavior -- unsocialized monkeys
  of most species will not survive long in the troop.   Etc.)


>rational: of, based on, or derived from reasoning.  Abile to reason.

  You still haven't defined "reasoning".  How do I test for it or
  measure it?    Why do you have such a hard time understanding the 
  concept of a rigorous *or* operational definition?!   I can detect
  or measure charge, mass, EM radiation, etc.   That's because
  those things have clear, agreed-upon, and *objective* definitions
  and metrics.   If you're going to have a philosophy called "object-
  ivism" you should at least have some objectively-defined terms.
  

>reasoning and logic is something only humans can use.      

  Again, you offer no evidence.  Can all humans use it all the time?
  Can any human use it all the time?  (Evidence?)  How do we tell
  whether a particular human can use, or is using, "reason"?

  Also if you think "logic" is a basic human trait you should see
  research by Cosmides (USC, I think).

  But of course, the larger question is: so what?  Even if "reasoning"
  has some objective definition (thus far not supplied) why should we
  care whether it is unique to humans?   There are thousands of 
  biochemical, morphological, or genetic features (e.g., the human
  genome -- no other species has our precise genome) that are unique
  to humans, as there are to any species.  Else there would be no
  concept of "species".   Many of them have survival value.   And
  regardless of whether they have survival value they are still part
  of "man as man", in the sense that they are uniquely human.

  So what?


---peter


Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Educating Peter
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 20:19:09 GMT

If you don't like snideness, please don't read this and please
don't send me nasty mail.  On the other hand, if you like
vicious pomposity: this one's for you!

What an exciting day!  First I got to help Peter learn to spell
'non sequitur'.  And now...

Peter Nelson writes:
>   "First law of logic"?   I know about Newton's laws, Kepler's
>   laws of motion, the laws of thermodynamics, etc.  Who's "first
>   law of logic" is this?

A long time ago in a land far away, there lived a great man.  He
was a philosopher.  He was the pupil of another great man, who was
also a philosopher.  The teacher's name was Plato.  The great man
was Aristotle.  You might have heard of them before.

Many years later, another man wrote a book about Aristotle.  This
man's name was Mortimer Adler.  The name of the book is "Aristotle
For Everybody".  Mr. Adler wrote the book for boys and girls to
learn more about the great man named Aristotle.  

The book is a very good simple summary of Aristotle's ideas.
It is a little bit complicated in places, but the ambitious youngster
can learn a lot from it.  And Mr. Adler makes learning exciting and
fun!  

--Jimbo

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.politics.misc,alt.feminism,alt.conspiracy
From: gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch)
Subject: pointer to "NY Times Reports Furor at Univ. of Mich.
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 16:26:45 GMT
Organization: mydog in exile
Followup-To: alt.feminism

I've posted most of a rather lengthy news report from the 
_New_York_Times_ in soc.feminism  about a recent set of events 
at the University of Michigan involving censorship, feminism,
and some familiar _dramatis_personae_, which may be of
interest to readers of these newsgroups.

I assume soc.feminism has pretty good distribution, but if
you can't get it and want it I can either email copies, or,
if there are a number of such requests, post the article in
other newsgroups.  NOTE: if the article has not shown up
at your site, give it a few days.
-- 

 )*(    Gordon Fitch    )*(    gcf@panix.com    )*(
( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta.,  NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory