From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 22:46:10 GMT

This letter is rather long.  I am addressing this as a kind of
open letter to the bystanders in this discussion who may be wondering
if Nelson's repeated claims about Rand's 'tautological' approach are
perhaps true.  I will be happy to continue the discussion with Mr.
Nelson, provided that he is as willing to confront the original
sources in as up front a manner as I have done in this essay.  But
this essay is not written primarily to him.  Instead, it is addressed
to the rest of you.  I hope you find it interesting.

Peter Nelson writes:
>  I notice this as a recurring theme of both Mr. Starr and Mr. Wales:
>  they attack posters who criticize their views but make no attempt to 
>  defend Rand's positions.    They have had ample opportunity here
>  to try to construct a cogent defense of her ideas, methods, or even
>  any one particular term or definition.  Note, for instance, that both
>  have completely retreated from any effort to define "rational" or
>  "reason" in any terms that can de measured or even detected.

Peter's primary criticism is that Rand's theories are 'untestable'
in some positivist sense.  Of course, I'm sure that we will all
agree that any theory of science is but one component of an _overall_
theory of knowledge.  That is, formal scientific knowledge is one
type of knowledge, a type that is very important and which must be
integral to any comprehensive theory of knowledge.  "Epistemology
is a science devoted to the discovery of the proper methods of
acquiring and validating knowledge." <Rand, ITOE, 47> 

So Peter's request for 'testability' is a request made at a relatively
high level of assumed theory.  But I think that we can just interpret
his question as asking: to what in reality do Rand's concepts refer?
Is there any sensible means by which we could verify her claims?

Let's take, as one example, Rand's definition of human being.
"The valid definition of man, within the context of his knowledge
and of all man's knowledge to-date [is]: "A _rational_ animal.""
<Rand, ITOE, 58>

Man is a rational animal.  What does this statement mean?  Can we
relate this statement to the facts of reality in such a way that
we can verify if it is true or not?  

A full answer to these questions would require a thorough explanation
of Rand's theory of concept formation.  I refer interested readers
to her _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_ for a complete
exposition of that theory.  But I can sketch the answer here in
a manner sufficient to answer Nelson's critique.

I'll take it as given that we can all agree upon what a human being
is.  You are a human.  I am a human.  There are humans in China,
etc. etc.  Mentally handicapped people are human.  Neo-Nazis are
human, too.  Peter Nelson is a human.  How do we form the concept
'human'?  We observe the world.  We notice differences and similarities
among different entities in the world.

We can look at the world and see that there are certain 'commensurable
characteristics'.  We measure these characteristics (in the case of
a child forming the concept 'human' these measurements need only be
precise enough visual observations to distinguish humans from dogs,
cats, tables, etc.) through some means.  We form a group of similars
based on the distinguishing characteristics.  We then can regard
each of the concretes as a separate member (unit) of the group.  That is
to say, we can say 'this thing is like these other things'.  We can
then integrate the units into a concept, by omitting the particular
measurements of each.  We may then associate the concept with a word,
and then conclude by making a definition which identifies the most
essential (fundamental, explanatory) attributes of the existents
subsumed under the concept.

Note well that the definition of a concept is contextual.  If we
were scientists interested in sorting our samples of DNA, we might
well use a more technical definition of human.  Note too, the
interesting feature of Rand's definition that the _definition_ does
not (necessarily) serve as the criterion for inclusion.  A definition,
in Rand's epistemology, serves to identify the fundamental (contextually
fundamental, recall) attributes of the existents.

What does 'reason' mean?

"Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
provided by man's senses." (Rand, VOS, "The Objectivist Ethics, p. 20).
Rand's full description of our rational faculty can be found in
_Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_.

So what does it mean to say that 'man is a rational animal'?  

What this statement means is that, based on our current state of knowledge
about human beings, the attribute that does the most to explain all the
other attributes of human beings is that mankind has a conceptual 
faculty.  That is, humans are what they are.  Every human being is
what that human being is.  We form the concept human being by omitting
measurements along all the commensurate characteristics (the conceptual
common denominator).  We then note that rationality is the characteristic
that explains the most about humans, IN THE CONTEXT of ordinary day to
day discussion of humans, as well as discussions of ethics, etc.

"In the Objectivist view, the proposition that man is the rational
animal does not mean that men always follow reason; many do not.
Nor does it mean merely that man alone possesses the faculty of reason."
<Leonard Peikoff, _Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, 195>

Now, the reader may judge the extent to which Rand's definition
of man as rational animal may be related to reality.  Take a look
around at the people around you.  Are they always rational? No, of
course not.  Do they possess a mental ability to make abstractions?
Are they able to understand such high-level abstractions as 'love',
'justice', 'reason'?  Do humans possess the ability to form concepts?
Is this ability significantly different from that of animals?  Whether
you agree with Rand's definition or not, you can certainly agree that
it is open to comparison and test against reality.

Rand's statements about reason in humans are not tautological.  This
is very important.  Rand's theory of concepts (and in particular, her
theory of definition) is able to avoid the trap of 'nontestability'
which theories which allow for the construction of 'analytic' statements
fall prey.  In a sense, every truth is a tautology... and every
falsehood is a self-contradiction.  A true proposition states
that 'man is: one or more of the things that he is'.  A false
proposition states that 'man is: one or more of the things that he
is not'.

For any proposition, it must be possible to 'test' it.  It must
be possible to ask of the constituent concepts: to what in reality
does this concept refer?  And then to ask: does this proposition
correctly identify reality?

For an interesting look at how scientists are working to determine
the cognitive capacities of animals, I highly recommend the article
in the current issue of _Scientific American_ about monkeys.  That
article describes scientific tests which have been done to examine
the extent of 'reasoning' abilities in various speciies of monkey.
In particular, it is found that monkeys do have some rudimentary
concepts, that certain 'cries' and 'chatters' can be interpreted
as words.  They further find that (at least one species of) monkeys
have no 'theory of mind', which is to say that they do not seem
to understand that different members of their species may have
different knowledge from themselves.

I consider this scientific work to be a challenge to some of Rand's
strongest sentences about the conceptual abilities of monkeys, but
I also find that it does give confirmation to other of her claims.
She was no biologist, so we shouldn't find this surprising.  (By
the way, the existence of reason in other species would in no way
challenge or alter Rand's ethical theories...)

>  Both have also retreated from any effort to defend Rand's utter
>  *leap* to the conclusion that removing what is central to one's 
>  survival (reason, freedom, oxygen, whatever) has any moral
>  significance at all in an absolute or transcendent sense.

Well, there is, quite simply, no reason at all to retreat from
a statement which one has never made.  There IS no 'absolute'
or 'transcendent' sense... if 'absolute' and 'transcendent' are
supposed to mean 'without context'... in which anything is moral.

Objectivism does not contain any categorical imperatives.  Rand's
ethical theory is purely teleological.  See Binswanger's book
_The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts_ for an excellent
explanation of this.  Or, just read Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics",
to see for yourself what she says on the matter.  All ethical statements
are hypothetical imperatives.  Reality's only command to humans is
'you must, if...'  You must eat, if you are going to live.  You must
think, if you are going to prosper.

>  I've argued with religionists (Christians, Moslems, etc) about
>  contradictions, silliness and so forth in their religions who 
>  would claim that my arguments meant I "didn't understand"
>  their religions, either.   Because to a follower of a True
>  Faith to "understand" something is to have internalized their
>  belief.   It has nothing to do with being able to mount a cogent
>  defense of it.

I think that I have herein mounted a cogent defense.  Let me summarize.

1. Does Rand's epistemology allow for a philosophy of science in which
'testability' is an important criterion?  Yes.  Indeed, in Rand's
theory of knowledge, all statements must be 'testable' in the sense
that they must be related to reality.  Even axioms may be
tested in this sense... what differentiates axioms from other 
statements is that every cognition presupposes them.  Any supposed
'axiom' which does not connect to reality is no axiom.

2.  Does Rand's ethical theory contain deontic oughts?  No, it does not.

I think that the above is sufficient to establish Rand's theory
as 'testable' in the sense that it can be connected to reality.
And, it turns out that at a very high level of abstraction, Rand's
theory is consistent with much of the way science is done.

I would appreciate hearing comments from anyone who has bothered
to read this far!  I would like feedback on my presentation.  Did
this post clarify my previous statements?  Did this post adequately
demonstrate why I insist that Peter's original statements appeared
to display a lack of knowledge about what Rand's theory says?

--Jimbo



Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:4961 talk.philosophy.misc:2510 rec.arts.books:20267