HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: v066ram3@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark J Stuhlmiller)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: The search for Truth and the Good
Date: 13 Oct 92 22:16:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <memo.679277@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk writes...
>v066ram3@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark J Stuhlmiller) writes..
> 
> 
>> **   What is the purpose of being alive?
> 
>Is there one at all?
>If so whose?
>Or What's?
> 
>Lets get the basic premises right before we argue over details.
> 
>And what do you mean by being alive? Are you implying that _you_ are?
>What gives you that impression?
> 
>Etc. Etc.
>:-)

     Thank you for your further questions Leo, I'll keep them in mind 
as my search for truth continues.  However, I am not really looking
for questions, just an answer.  So, if you proclaim to know the answer
or any premises which concern it, please feel free to respond.  Oh, Leo,
please try to write a tad more unambiguously next time you reply.
     I am not concerned with textbook logic, I am only concerned with
the insight into the purpose of being alive.  I would love to hear you
elaborate on these fine points as long as I can comprehend them.

                            The gadfly of New Haven.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Oct6.172157.15686@netcom.com> <BvpxwL.9pK.1@cs.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 10:45:06 GMT

In article <BvpxwL.9pK.1@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:

   >As stated here, this is G.E. Moore's "common-sense" view. Wittgenstein
   >cut it up neatly in his final book, _On Certainty_.
   >I reply simply to offer pointers to relevant literature. Sorry, I can't 
   >enter a discussion at this time -- busy, busy, busy.

   Just some supplementary comments, for those who are not witterheads.
Wittgenstein did not publish any other book than the Tractatus, although
he wrote copiously and did produce book manuscripts. I don't think
"On Certainty" was ever regarded as a book manuscript by Wittgenstein,
though. What Thomas Price means is that it was the last set of notes
Wittgenstein wrote, but I'm not sure about that - wasn't the stuff
that appeared as "Remarks on Color" later?

  Anyway, Wittgenstein doesn't cut up anything neatly in "On Certainty",
but rambles on in his usual style. Wittgenstein both appreciated and
was critical of Moore's "proof of the existence of the external
world" and its surrounding philosophy.
From: exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: The search for Truth and the Good
Date: 16 Oct 92 15:37:40 GMT
Organization: Ericsson Network Systems, Inc.
X-Disclaimer: This article was posted by a user at Ericsson.
              The opinions expressed are strictly those of the
              user and not necessarily those of Ericsson.

In article <1992Oct15.163900.9834@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
>Subject: Re: The search for Truth and the Good
>Date: 15 Oct 92 16:39:00 GMT

>In <exukjb.320.719094799@exu.ericsson.se> exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:

Achievement of a meaningful life=appropriation of the highest human
good[, which consists in:]

       (A) Character - development, or consciousness, of a will
           which wills only the good.
       (B) Relationships with other persons.
       (C) Unlimited Aims & Purposes -- pursuit of a "cause" extending 
           beyond some narrow finite interest.

Jim responds:
The first is circular until we know what is good apart from a good
will.  The second and third seem to lack something as well -- the
divine Marquis depicted characters who displayed exemplary devotion to
goals that included intimate relations with other persons (the people
they were torturing to death) and unlimited aims and purposes (the
achievement of perfect evil, for example), but somehow his characters
don't seem to me to have achieved the summum bonum.

Kenny's Response:
Let's not forget I intended only a rough outline, a general sketch of
a line of approach to answer the Big Question. Not that this caveat
absolves me of the need to defend the line I'm developing. It doesn't.
But I think you have to consider the level of generality at which I
am attempting speak to the problem. As for one more attempt to fend off
what [very insightful] criticisms you present here, here's what I'd say
in defense of what I've said so far in light of the criticisms that have
been raised to it:

You're right, (1) is circular, but only because I haven't attempted any 
account of what the summom bonum is yet; and frankly, I'm a little 
reluctant to do that here. Moreover, I shouldn't have attempted any 
definition of "character" at this point. But--question: Do you have a 
general objection to my inclusion of character [left undefined] in the 
list?   	 

About (2). Are you saying I'm wrong to identify interpersonal relationships
as a component of the highest human good? 

About (3), I find it difficult to see--"the divine Marquis" notwithstanding--
what your general problem is with my inclusion of alignment with some 
unlimited aims and goals on the list. Again, I haven't said what those aims
should be, yet. I'd suggest, respectfully, waiting until I have pontificated
on exactly what those aims should be, if indeed I should even try to specify
their content at all.
//////////////////////////////////////
/* Kenny  *   Welcome to Mind Wars! */
//////////////////////////////////////
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Date: 7 Oct 92 19:32:37 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

In article <TORKEL.92Oct7114507@isis.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <BvpxwL.9pK.1@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:
>
>   >As stated here, this is G.E. Moore's "common-sense" view. Wittgenstein
>   >cut it up neatly in his final book, _On Certainty_.
>
>  ...
>  Anyway, Wittgenstein doesn't cut up anything neatly in "On Certainty",
>but rambles on in his usual style. Wittgenstein both appreciated and

Torkel, you are quite right. I said "cut up neatly" because when I read it it 
seemed very clear to me -- but I realize now that that's not relevant.

What I should have written was "Wittgenstein poked it up messily in his 
final notes, published as _On Certainty_, and I liked them."

Terribly sorry.

Tom

******************************************************************************
         Tom Price  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************
 plutoniumsurveillanceterroristCIAassassinationIranContrawirefraudcryptology
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:2109 sci.logic:1691
From: martinc@grover.cs.unc.edu (Charles R. Martin)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Russell's Paradox (was re: Of apples and their skins)
Date: 11 Oct 92 00:07:31 GMT
	<1992Oct10.011243.16219@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1992Oct10.105913.9955@samba.oit.unc.edu>
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Organization: UNC Department of Computer Science
In-reply-to: Robert.Vienneau@bbs.oit.unc.edu's message of 10 Oct 92 10:59:13 GMT

I love it.  We have had, in roughly a month and in one news group, the
formalist, "realist", Platonic, and intuitionist approach to
foundational issues espoused.  Can't we find a good constructivist to
jump in and complete the set?
--
		Charles R. Martin/(Charlie)/martinc@cs.unc.edu
     Dept. of Computer Science/CB #3175 UNC-CH/Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3175
	    3611 University Dr #13M/Durham, NC 27707/(919) 419 1754
		 Remember what the little cake said to Alice.
From: v066ram3@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark J Stuhlmiller)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: The search for Truth and the Good.
Date: 11 Oct 92 22:15:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41


	I have just recently subscribed to this newsgroup and I was 
pleased to find the numerous concerns with death.  It is nice to know
that philosophy has not deviated too much from the concerns of its 
forefathers.
        I would appreciate it very much if somone would help me on my
quest for the search of truth in this life and, if an agreement can be
made on the meaning of the Forms, the dissection and search for the 
Good.
        For the sake of convolution, I would just like to let you know 
that I do not profess to have any enigmatic or detailed knowledge on 
these topics.  So when you do respond, please do not assume that I know
anything.
        To begin this, hopefully enlightening, trip I would merely 
like an answer to this question:

 **   What is the purpose of being alive?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
From: Robert.Vienneau@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau)
Subject: Re: Russell's Paradox (was re: Of apples and their skins)
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Organization: Extended Bulletin Board Service
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 10:59:13 GMT

[Discussion by Randall Holmes and Mikhail Zeleny of Russell's Paradox
and set theory deleted.]

You both obviously have a much better grasp of the technical issues than
I do. Perhaps you can help me with what has always been my problem with
set theory.

I, and I daresay many other not very advanced mathematicians, have an
intuitive notion of sets and numbers. As far as I can tell, when one
tries to rigorously express these notions in a consistent manner, one
needs to introduce some sort of aesthetically displeasing complications
that are no part of my intuition. For example, Russell's theory of
types, with its extensive hierarchy and distinctions. (Even with
Ramsey's simplifications, which I do not understand, I do not think the
theory can be said to agree with any simple intuition). Or one has a
distinction between propositions that can define a set and those that
cannot. I leave out such craziness as Godel's theorems and the
Skolem-Lowenstein (sp?) theorem. I do know that I need the Axiom of
Choice for much useful applied math. Yet the A.C. has consequences that
seem silly. I cannot decide if the A.C. accords with my naive intuition
or not. 

So what's the upshot? That mathematicians (and all others) must abandon
their naive intuition about the most basic entities they use everywhere?
That we do not have any consensus about what we are are talking about
when we are doing math? Does mathematics need a foundation? Am I right
to think the current situation is comparable to Quantum Mechanics in
physics: "if you do not think the theory is crazy, you have not been
paying attention" (Niels Bohr, probably I'm misquoting)?

In short, I find most engineers and mathematicians (!) are sleepwalking.
They think there some's basis for their manipulations, and they think
they know what they're doing. On the other hand, specialists in logic
and set theory have been producing a century's worth of unreadable technical
monographs showing that the practitioners have no understandable basis
for their practice. Is something drastically wrong here? Am I right
to feel uncomfortable? Is the current situation unsubstainable?

                                  Robert Vienneau
                                  rob@kaman.com
--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  bbs.oit.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: steveth@netcom.com (Steve Thomas)
Subject: Re: Of apples and their skins
Organization: VisionAire, San Francisco, CA
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1992 15:17:00 GMT

In article <TORKEL.92Oct7213511@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1992Oct7.190125.9953@netcom.com> steveth@netcom.com (Steve Thomas)
> writes:
>
>   >I would liken this to Bertrand Russel's "The sentence and am now making is
>   >false.", what does he mean?
>
>  Why is the Liar like the statement "This is an apple"?



In the context of the post, I was comparing two philosopher's statements
that I thought were similar in motive--obviously, they were probably talking
about two different subjects.  (I'd better reread my post--I whipped it
up in a big hurry: perhaps it's not very clear...).


______________
Steve Thomas
steveth@rossinc.com
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: coonstot@quads.uchicago.edu (charles orville onstott)
Subject: Re: The search for Truth and the Good
Reply-To: coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Distribution: usa
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 07:18:55 GMT

In article <1992Oct15.162409.9528@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>In <183877@pyramid.pyramid.com> pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:
>
>>Campbell suggests that All world mythology points the way
>>toward our having a profound and continuing experience of connection to
>>the river of Life, our own inherent completeness.
>
>If I am inherently complete, why do I need an experience of connection
>to the river of Life or to anything else?

  This question is only valid if you do not consider Life(ignoring
the poetic metaphor of the river) to be a part of your completeness.
Further, that you do not consider Life to be an inherent part
of you.


>-- 
>Jim Kalb 		"The trouble with the modern world is that
>(jk@panix.com)		 stupidity has begun to think."  (Cocteau)

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III                    (coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu)
Graduate Student in Religion and Human Sciences
The University of Chicago Divinity School

"Les dieux existent : c'est le diable." (Cocteau)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: The search for Truth and the Good
Date: 15 Oct 92 16:39:00 GMT
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences

In <exukjb.320.719094799@exu.ericsson.se> exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:

>Achievement of a meaningful life=appropriation of the highest human
>good[, which consists in:]

>	(A) Character - development, or consciousness, of a will
>	    which wills only the good.
>	(B) Relationships with other persons.
>	(C) Unlimited Aims & Purposes -- pursuit of a "cause" extending 
>	    beyond some narrow finite interest.

The first is circular until we know what is good apart from a good
will.  The second and third seem to lack something as well -- the
divine Marquis depicted characters who displayed exemplary devotion to
goals that included intimate relations with other persons (the people
they were torturing to death) and unlimited aims and purposes (the
achievement of perfect evil, for example), but somehow his characters
don't seem to me to have achieved the summum bonum.
-- 
Jim Kalb 		"The trouble with the modern world is that
(jk@panix.com)		 stupidity has begun to think."  (Cocteau)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: Of apples and their skins
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 15:25:16 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Oct6.172157.15686@netcom.com> steveth@netcom.com (Steve Thomas) writes:
...

>How about a novel thought: when you see an apple in your hand, how about
>postulating that: YOU, SEE (with your eyes), a red-roundish object (you've
>seen one of these before, you and your friends call it an apple).  Simply
>looking at the outside of an apple doesn't tell you anything about quarks
>and leptons and apple seeds--it just tells you about the outside look of
>the apple (integrating past knowledge about apples might tell you more,
>however--but in the immediate context, what you see is what you see--see
>Aristotle's dicussion of the bent stick in water...).

[ I assume my G.E. Moore persona...]

So what I really see is the surface of the apple? I don't see the insides
of the apple--the flesh, or the seeds, for instance. The presence of the
apple's insides is left to inference. So as far as I can _see_, this apple
might have no insides--it might just be an (unusually heavy and very thin)
apple skin. I know the apple's surface, but not its insides. Oddly, when I
quarter the apple, I still have no certain knowledge of its insides--once
again, I see nothing but the surface (though this time it's the surface of
the apple slices). Even if I see a seed, I can't know that it's really a
seed (better: what I infer a seed to be like)--it might just be a husk.

But do I really see the apple's skin--or even the surface of the skin? 
What do I really see? I mean _really_? Isn't it a roundish blob of
reddish color? And isn't this blob something no one else--even in
principle--can ever see? And doesn't this roundish blob disappear from
existence when I close my eyes? So even the apple's surface is an object
derived from inference, and not something _really_ seen.

[ Exit G.E. Moore ]

When Moore holds up an apple, and asks, "Do you see this apple?"--then one
should wonder what he is asking. It _sounds_ like a grammatically correct
question--one that could be asked in a variety of circumstances.  But what
does Moore mean when he asks it, standing behind his lectern?


-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Date: 7 Oct 92 12:24:35 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Oct7114507@isis.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <BvpxwL.9pK.1@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:
>
>   >As stated here, this is G.E. Moore's "common-sense" view. Wittgenstein
>   >cut it up neatly in his final book, _On Certainty_.
>   >I reply simply to offer pointers to relevant literature. Sorry, I can't 
>   >enter a discussion at this time -- busy, busy, busy.
>
>   Just some supplementary comments, for those who are not witterheads.
>Wittgenstein did not publish any other book than the Tractatus, although
>he wrote copiously and did produce book manuscripts.

Further supplementary comment for all you witterheads.  Georg Henrik von
Wright and Heikki Nyman haved dipped once again into Ludwig's _nachlass_
and produced a further volume.  Part 2 of _Last Writings on the
Philosophy of Psychology_.  Avoid the rush.  Buy yours today.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: Robert.Vienneau@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Summary: Wittgenstein did want to publish On Certainty as a book?
Date: 9 Oct 92 22:05:41 GMT
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: Extended Bulletin Board Service

In article <TORKEL.92Oct7114507@isis.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <BvpxwL.9pK.1@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:
>
>   >As stated here, this is G.E. Moore's "common-sense" view. Wittgenstein
>   >cut it up neatly in his final book, _On Certainty_.
>   >I reply simply to offer pointers to relevant literature. Sorry, I can't 
>   >enter a discussion at this time -- busy, busy, busy.
>
>   Just some supplementary comments, for those who are not witterheads.
>Wittgenstein did not publish any other book than the Tractatus, although
>he wrote copiously and did produce book manuscripts. I don't think
>"On Certainty" was ever regarded as a book manuscript by Wittgenstein,
>though. What Thomas Price means is that it was the last set of notes
>Wittgenstein wrote, but I'm not sure about that - wasn't the stuff
>that appeared as "Remarks on Color" later?...

It's my recollection that W. marked off the notes in a separate section
the notes later published as On Certainty. I do not claim that means W.
wanted it published as a separate book, but it does give the book a lot
more coherence than many of the other books generated out of W.'s later
notes.



--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  bbs.oit.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<TORKEL.92Oct7114507@isis.sics.se> <BvrnMM.GGM.1@cs.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1992 08:30:47 GMT

In article <BvrnMM.GGM.1@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:

   >What I should have written was "Wittgenstein poked it up messily in his 
   >final notes, published as _On Certainty_, and I liked them."

  Well, you were right about these being his final notes. Apparently
he wrote the last "Certainty" remark the day before he lost
consciousness.
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Date: 10 Oct 92 22:40:11 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1b7fnkINNpt8@uwm.edu> 
hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu writes:

>From article <1992Oct9.121245.16202@husc3.harvard.edu>, by
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):

>>In article <1b428rINNcdr@uwm.edu>
>>hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu writes:

>>>From article <Bvto3K.D3J@umassd.edu>, 
>>>by pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman):

MP:
>>>And just in case the horse 

MZ:    		    ~~~~~~~~~
>>Is this a reverse synecdoche, or what?

MP:
>Synecdoche?  ;-)  Nice to see you too Mikhail....

You know, toto pro pars(e), rather than the other way around.

(I swear, Leonard Peikoff made me do it.)

MP:
>>>[...]
>>>of.  Unless, perhaps, you are referring to Immanuel Kant's lesser
>>>known, and illegitimate son, P.D.Q. Kant.  This sounds more like him.  ;-)

MZ:
>>Would he be the issue of his legendary sole instance of sexual intercourse,
>>allegedly self-described to his students as "an irregular progression of
>>aimless movement"?

MP:
>Yes.  That's him.
>
>On the other hand, you know, Kant really takes it in the neck as being
>a real stick in the mud -- probably as a result of his prose, ahem,
>style -- but if you read letters from his students and reports of
>colleagues, the old boy was really a wild man and terribly funny in
>lecture.  I still have not been able to make these add up.  A bit like
>Descartes and his melons.

Was Descartes and his melons anything like Portnoy and his liver?
(Cf. Roberto Benigni's confession in _Night on Earth_)

MP:
>Why are y'all still talking about the Randian heresy in here anyways?  ;-)

Just waiting for you to show up and clear up the mess, I guess.

>hiho
>-- 
>mark ce peterson   | uw-washington county  | hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu 
>dept of philosophy | west bend, wi.  53095 | (414) 335-5200        
>
>     The shorter the tether, the sooner the goat starves.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta