From: ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: New Carrier Plan
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 16:40:06 GMT


From ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)


From ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)

In article <Bvyqqp.5vt@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>Let me help.  There seems to be *no one* who thinks that I make any
>sense at all.  Perhaps there is some sort of "silent majority", but
>that didn't work for Nixon so I won't even try it.

You are definitely marching to a different drummer. :-)

>However, I did learn a few things, so I guess it was worthwhile.  This
>is what I think I learned:
>
>
>- There is little interest in talking about what sort of cuts are
>needed in the military.  I'm not sure if this is because the people
>don't think the cuts are needed (yet they will happen) or if this is
>because people think that the politicians will do the cutting with
>regards to politics and not military matters (so why worry about it).

Discussing cuts without discussing missions is useless. First you
define what missions you want the military to carry out, then you
can start structuring and costing the forces necessary to carry
out those missions. 

Currently, the US military is tasked with having a two ocean war 
fighting capability. Those two are a combination of a European war 
and war in Korea or other Asian hotspots. Both very high intensity, 
and with significant first world opposition. That mandates a sea lane 
control strategy and an expeditionary force capability as well as major 
air/land battle elements. Many planners feel that today's military is 
only capable of a 1 1/2 ocean war and desparately needs more sealift 
and airlift to gain a full two ocean capability.  

The world is different today than it was 4 years ago. The threat of
strategic nuclear war is less, and the need for things like Stealth
bombers, Midgetman missiles, Ohio class boomers, and the like has
been significantly lessened. However, in the conventional arena the
world is a more dangerous place today than ever before. There's a
brushfire in the area of Europe that once started a world war. There's
continuing trouble in the Middle East. Fingers are still on triggers
across the DMZ in Korea. Carriers, modern attack aircraft, and capable
conventional submarines are being introduced into SE Asia at an alarming
rate, and Vietnam is a major military power. The CIS is a potential mass 
of feuding and fighting countries with the troubles in the SE region only 
the beginning of a crumbling of empire. Africa is a mass of low intensity 
conflict that could flare up into major fighting at any time. South America 
seems relatively calm today, but it did before the Falklands war too.

Even for minor conflicts like Desert Storm, the logistic requirements
are enormous and integrated fighting units are more important today
than ever due to the need to rapidly deploy, and to minimize staff 
coordination requirements. Integrated forces can be controlled by a 
single staff.  Logistics can be handled by a single section. Close air 
support can be coordinated with ground forces and with air cover by a 
single commander.

Coordinating action between different services requires separate staffs
for each of the services, *and* liason staff at every level to keep
things together. Cost effective military forces have a maximum of
teeth for a minimum of tail. Separate commands trying to work together
have maximum tail, and maximum confusion, for a given amount of teeth.
Splitting command responsibility is a sure recipe for maximum cost
and minimum effectiveness on the battlefield. Looking at weapons
systems instead of looking at integrated fighting doctrine is a
serious mistake that costs war fighting ability, and that costs
extra money. Frontline to staff and support ratios in the Army
and Air Force run as high as 8 support for 1 warrior. In integrated
units like the Marines, the ratio is more like 1 to 1.

The path to cost effectiveness is not to strip the Marines of their
air arm. The path to cost effectiveness is to integrate commands
along the lines of the Marine forces. Thus air/land battle groups
need single service control of their forces. Sea lane control and
logistics forces need single service control of their forces. 
Strategic nuclear forces need single service command of their
facilities. Etc. The idea is that forces should be *mission* 
oriented rather than weapons systems oriented. That's the road
to a cost effective military force.

>- Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
>much.  Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
>forces.  This seems to be a huge mistake to me.  IMHO, the total
>budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.

Few people who understand the tasks assigned to the military believe
that military forces should be cut. Indeed, many feel that the resources
available to the military are inadequate *today* to meet the missions
that they are responsible for *today*. Any President or Congress who
take a meat axe to the military budget without rescoping the tasks 
assigned to the military is a positive danger to the Republic and would
be committing malfeasance in office by doing so. The primary Constitutional
responsiblity of the President and Congress are to provide for the defense
of the nation. All other responsibilities are secondary. They must make
an informed *political* judgement about what threats face the nation and
define military mission requirements accordingly. *Then* the military
must design doctrine and forces to meet those missions. It costs what
it costs. Any other course is nothing short of treason. The military
budget can't be cut without reducing the mission tasking assigned to
the military, else the nation becomes a paper tiger ill served by it's
military and political forces.

Gary


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