From: predrag@isy.liu.se (Predrag Pucar)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.yugoslavia
Subject: HW-report on Bosnia-Hercegovina
Date: 29 Dec 92 09:43:22 GMT
Reply-To: predrag@isy.liu.se (Predrag Pucar)
Organization: Dept of EE, University of Linkoping

If anyone would like a soft copy of the previous posted
pages, do not hesitate to contact me.

Predrag
--------------------------------------------------------------

In October 1991, Muslims and Croats in the Bosnian legislature
joined forces to adopt "a memorandum which, falling short of
declaring independence, supported the republic's sovereignty and
[its] neutrality" with regard to the war in Croatia [footnote 16].
Serbian members of the Bosnian parliament refused to support the
measure. Rather, in November 1991, the Serbian Democratic Party
(Srpska Demokratska Stranka -- SDS) of Bosnia-Hercegovina
"organized its own referendum on remaining in a 'common Yugoslav
state,' in which a substantial number of Serbs ... participated and
voted favorably" [footnote 17]. 
After the elections and declaration of sovereignty, ethnic tensions
in parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina increased for several reasons.
Troops belonging to the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska
Narodna Armija --JNA) and Serbian irregular forces stationed
throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina (particularly those from the Mostar
and Banja Luka corps) launched attacks on Croatia from Bosnian
territory [footnote 18]. Moreover, JNA 

----- footnotes ------

[16] U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Hercegovina:
February 29 - March 1, 1992, March 12, 1992, p. 8. 

[17] Ibid. 

[18] For example, the Croatian city of Dubrovnik was attacked from
Serbian positions in and around the cities of Trebinje and Mostar
in Hercegovina. (Attacks also were launched from the sea and from
the republic of Montenegro.) According to a western diplomat
interviewed by Helsinki Watch in December 1991 and March 1992,
problems in Mostar began after JNA reservists from Montenegro and
the Uzice corps in Serbia were sent to the city in mid-September
1991. According to the diplomat, the JNA reservists were
responsible for "terrorizing Muslim and Croatian villages" in the
Mostar municipality. See also "Mostar Garrison Denies Troops Put on
Streets," Tanjug Yugoslav News Agency report of December 2, 1991,
and "Army Command in Mostar on Peace Problems," 

------ end of footnotes --------

                                                      24

troops with_drawing from Croatia stationed themselves throughout
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Bosnia's Muslim, Croatian and portions of its
Serbian communities were alarmed by the escalating military
presence of the JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Clashes between Serbian and Montenegrian forces and
Bosnian residents occurred throughout 1991 and early 1992. Most
notably, JNA reservists in Mostar [footnote 19] and in other parts
of Hercegovina were accused of harassing non-Serbs and looting and
burning property that belonged to Muslims and Croats [footnote 20].
In late 1991, the predominantly Croatian village of Ravno [footnote
21] was pillaged and burned by JNA reserve soldiers and Serbian
irregular troops footnote 22]. 

------- footnotes ----------

Tanjug Yugoslav News Agency report of December 3, 1991, as reported
in FBIS, December 6, 1991. 
  
[19] The population of the municipality of Mostar numbered 126,067.
Muslims were 34.8 percent of the population, Croats 33.3 percent
and Serbs 19.0 percent. Ten percent of Mostar's population declared
itself to be Yugoslav. Prior to the break-up of the former
Yugoslavia, some people preferred to call themselves "Yugoslavs"
instead of identifying with a particular national or ethnic group.
Children of "mixed parentage" frequently referred to themselves as
Yugoslavs. Since the break-up of the country, most people now
identify as a member of a particular ethnic group, although some
still prefer to think of themselves as Yugoslavs. An effort will be
made to identify the ethnic make-up of each area throughout this
report. The figures cited hereafter reflect the results of the
former Yugoslavia's April 1991 census or witnesses' recollections
of their villages' demography. 

[20] "Tensions Remain High in Bosnia," Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Daily Report, March 17, 1992, No. 53, p. 6. 

[21] Ravno was a predominantly Croatian village in the
predominantly Serbian municipality of Trebinje. Recent census
results indicate that the municipality of Trebinje (in eastern
Hercegovina) was 69.3 percent Serbian, 19.9 percent Muslim and 4.0
percent Croatian. 

[22] Helsinki Watch interviewed several foreign diplomats and
journalists who had visited the area. They confirmed that Ravno had
been destroyed. See also "Destruction of Ravno by JNA Described,"
Vjesnik, November 10, 1991, as reported in FBIS, December 5, 1991,
p. 36. 

------ end of footnotes -------------
                                                     25


        
In late 1991, Serbia launched an economic blockade against Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The delivery of agricultural products from Serbia and
the flow of trade and money between the two republics ceased
[footnote 23]. Many Bosnians believe the blockade was used as a
bargaining chip by the Serbian government to force Bosnia-
Hercegovina to remain a constituent part of a Serbian-dominated
Yugoslavia. 
In late December 1991, Muslims and Croats in the Bosnian government
agreed to ask the European Community to recognize Bosnia-
Hercegovina along with Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia on January
15, 1992. Serbs insisted that they wanted to remain part of a
federal Yugoslavia and on January 9, 1992, Bosnian Serbs declared
that they were forming their own state within the republic, called
the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbs claimed
territory in six regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina where they are the
dominant ethnic group and declared that Sarajevo would become their
capital [footnote 25].
        
On February 29 and March 1, 1992, a referendum on independence was
held in Bosnia-Hercegovina. While Muslims and Croats participated
and overwhelmingly agreed to Bosnia's secession from 

------- footnotes ----------
    
[23] "Social Democrat on Effects of Economic Blockade," Tanjug
Yugoslav News Agency report of December 3, 1991, and "Assembly
Plans Reciprocal Measures Against Blockade," Sarajevo Radio
broadcast of December 4, 1991, as reported in FBIS, December 5,
1991. 

[24] Richard Balmforth, "Serbs in Bosnia Declare Own Republic,"
Reuters Information Services, January 9, 1992. 

[25] Richard Meares, "Bosnian Leader Vows Not to Allow Serbs to
Split His Republic," Reuters Information Services, January 10,
1992. On March 27, 1992, the Serbian Parliament of Bosnia-
Hercegovina accepted a constitution for the new Serbian Republic,
which was to become a "constitutive element of Yugoslavia, together
with Serbia, Montenegro and the 'krajinas"' in Croatia." (See
Zeljko Ivankovic, "Il Faudra L'Inventer," East European Reporter,
May-June 1992, pp. 4-5.) On April 16, 1992, the Presidency and the
Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina announced
that it would seek recognition from the European Community and
membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). It also declared the establishment of diplomatic and
economic relations with the Serbian government in Belgrade. (See
"EC Recognition Sought," Tanjug Yugoslav News Agency report of
April 16, 1992, as reported in FBIS, April 17, 1992, p. 35. 

------- end of footnotes ---------
                                                      26


Yugoslavia, most Serbs boycotted the voting and subsequently
claimed that the results of the referendum were invalid [footnote
26]. 
        
Both during and after the referendum, armed conflict erupted in
parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 


# On the second day of referendum voting, violence broke out      
during a Serbian Orthodox wedding in Muslim Bascarsija in
downtown Sarajevo [footnote 27]. The groom's father, carrying a   
Serbian flag, was shot and the priest was wounded. This triggered 
the establishment of barricades, manned by local Serbs, at        
entrances to the city. Armed Muslims, referred to as "Green
Berets," also erected barricades in and around Sarajevo.          
Barricades were erected near Banja Luka [footnote 28] and Serbs   
there threatened the local television station, demanding that     
they adopt a pro-Serbian political stance [footnote 29]. Armed    
Serbs at a barricade in Doboj [footnote 30] shot a motorist.      
Twelve people were killed before the fighting died down the       
 evening of March 2 [footnote 31].

-------- footnotes --------
    
[26] 1,997,644 people (approximately 63.4 percent of the republic's
3.15 million eligible voters) participated in the referendum. 99.7
percent voted in favor of independence and 0.3 voted against. (See
The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Hercegovina: February 29 -
 March 1, 1992, U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, March 12, 1992, p. 23.) 

[27] Prior to the war, Sarajevo was divided into ten
municipalities. In total, Sarajevo's population numbered 525,980
people, of whom 49.3 percent were Muslims, 29.9 percent Serbs, 6.6
percent Croats, and 10.7 percent Yugoslavs. 

[28] The municipality of Banja Luka numbered 195,139 people, of
whom 54.8 percent were Serbs, 14.9 percent Croats, 14.6 percent
Muslims and 12.0 percent Yugoslavs. 

[29] "Bosnian Leader Vows Not to Allow Serbs to Split His
Republic," Reuters Information Services, January 10, 1992. 

[30] The municipality of Doboj included 102,546 people, 40.2
percent were Muslim, 39.0 percent Serbs, 13.0 percent Croats and
5.5 percent Yugoslavs.

[31] Dusko Doder, "Stopping the Bloodshed in the Balkans," New York
Newsday, March 15, 1992. 

----------- end of footnote -------
                                                      27

# During fighting on the evening of March 3-4, at least 27 people 
 were killed [footnote 32] in the towns of Bosanski Brod [footnote 
33] and Kupres [footnote 34]. It is believed that forces from     
Croatia participated in the March battles in Bosanski Brod        
[footnote 35].

#  On March 17, after a Muslim funeral was attacked by Serbian    
troops, [footnote 36] fighting broke out between Serbian forces
who were reportedly members of the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi)
paramilitary group and Croatian and Muslim troops.

# On March 12, two Muslim police officers were killed near the city 
of Tuzla [footnote 37]. The attackers were unidentified.

--------- footnotes -------
    
[32] Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in
Bosnia," The New York Times, April 4, 1992, and Chuck Sudetic,
"Ethnic Clashes Increase in Bosnia as Europe Recognition Vote
Nears," The New York Times, April 6, 1992. 

[33] The municipality of Bosanski Brod numbered 33,962; 41.0
percent were Croats, 33.8 percent Serbs, 12.2 percent Muslims and
10.6 percent Yugoslavs. 

[34] The population of the municipality of Kupres numbered 9,663;
50.7 percent were Serbs, 39.6 percent Croats and 8.4 percent
Muslims. 

[35] Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in
Bosnia," The New York Times, April 4, 1992, and Chuck Sudetic,
"Ethnic Clashes Increase in Bosnia as Europe Recognition Vote
Nears," The New York Times, April 6, 1992. 

[36] Zeljko Ivankovic, "Il Faudra L'Inventer," East European
Reporter, May - June 1992, p. 4.                                  
    
[37] Slobodan Lekic, "Two Policemen Killed in Bosnia, Barricades
Back Up," The Associated Press, March 13, 1992. The municipality of
Tuzla numbered 131,861 of whom 47.6 percent were Muslims, 15.6
percent Croats, 15.5 percent Serbs and 16.6 Yugoslavs. 

------ end of footnotes -----------
                                                      28


#  In early April, Serbs in the Bosnian police announced that they 
would no longer recognize the Bosnian government's command
and would form an all-Serbian police force [footnote 38].

#  On April 4, the presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina announced a   
general mobilization of the territorial defense, which is comprised
of local militia units [footnote 39].

#  On April 5, fighting broke out in Sarajevo. Serbian policemen  
attacked police stations and then an Interior Ministry training
school. The attack killed two officers and a civilian [footnote
40]. The Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina declared a state of
emergency the following day.

#  On April 5, thousands of peace marchers in Sarajevo were fired 
upon by Serbian gunmen inside a captured building. One       
demonstrator was killed and ten were injured [footnote 41]. That
evening, local news media reported that an oil truck packed
with explosives exploded near a Yugoslav army barracks,
killing two people and injuring at least forty [footnote 42].

----------- footnotes --------

    
[38] Patrick Moore, "Fighting Continues in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 65,
April 2, 1992, p. 5. (The current police force in Bosnia-
Hercegovina is predominantly Croatian and Muslim, although many
Serbs have remained and continue to work with their non-Serbian
colleagues.) 

[39] Zeljko Ivankovic, "Il Faudra L'Inventer," East European
Reporter, May - June 1992, p. 5.

[40] Chuck Sudetic, "Ethnic Clashes Increase in Bosnia as Europe
Recognition Vote Nears," The New York Times, April 6, 1992. 

[41] Chuck Sudetic, "Shelling by Serbs in Bosnia Intensifies," The
New York Times, April 7, 1992, and "Factional Battling Intense in
Bosnia," Reuters report published in The Washington Post, April 6,
1992. 

[42] Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia Calls Up Guard and Reserve," The New
York Times, April 5, 1992. 

-------- end of footnotes ------
                                                      29

        
Some observers believe that Serbian forces initiated hostilities
throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina in an effort to dissuade the
international community from granting recognition to Bosnia-
Hercegovina. However, on April 6, Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence
was recognized by the European Community. The United States
followed suit on the next day. Croatia also recognized Bosnia-
Hercegovina on April 7 and offered Bosnian Croats dual nationality
[footnote 43]. Members of the international community, including
the Arab world, also extended recognition to the new state in early
April.  Full-scale armed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina commenced
almost simultaneously with Bosnia-Hercegovina's recognition by the
international community. On April 7 in Banja Luka, Bosnia's Serbs
declared the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, claiming two thirds of the new state's territory.
Serbian irregular forces from Bosnia-Hercegovina and paramilitary
groups from Serbia proper attacked areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina in
the hope of preventing all or parts of the republic from seceding.
JNA units stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbian-controlled
territory in Croatia and Serbia proper also launched, or
participated in, attacks with Serbian irregular forces throughout
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Attacks by Serbian and Yugoslav forces were
resisted by Muslim forces of the Bosnian government, Bosnian
Croats, and Croatian Army units sent from neighboring Croatia
[footnote 44].

On April 27, 1992, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro
proclaimed the establishment of a new, truncated Yugoslavia shorn
of Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, all of
which had proclaimed their independence from the old Yugoslav
state. A new Yugoslav constitution was proclaimed on the same day.
In a separate declaration, the leaders of the new nation stated
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "has no territorial claims"
on neighboring republics [footnote 45].

-------- footnotes ------------
   
[43] Zeljko Ivankovic, "Il Faudra L'Inventer," East European
Reporter, May-June 1992, p. 5 

[44] The following section describes in further detail the parties
to the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 

[45] See John F. Burns, "Confirming Split, Last Two Republics
Proclaim a Small New Yugoslavia," The New York Times, April 28,
1992. 

-------- end of footnotes -----------
                                                      30

        
On June 16, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic announced a formal
military alliance with neighboring Croatia [footnote 46] against
Serbian and Yugoslav forces [footnote 47]. On June 20, 1992, the
Bosnian government formally declared the country to be in a state
of war. A general mobilization of troops, including the draft of
all men of fighting age, and compulsory work obligations for public
and private enterprises were announced on the same day [footnote
48]. 

------- footnotes --------

    
[46] Croatia's role in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is discussed
in subsequent sections pertaining to parties to the conflict and
positions of the various sides. 

[47] Blaine Harden, "Bosnian Leader Declares Alliance with
Croatia," The Washington Post, June 17, 1992. The agreement between
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegovic reads, in part, as follows: "The Republic of Croatia
supports the efforts of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the preservation
of its independence and its resistance to the aggression and is
extending, and will continue to extend, help to the Republic of
Bosnia and Hercegovina in this respect. The Republic of Croatia
also endorses the efforts of the legal Government and the
Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina in consolidating the defense
of the Republic by joining all forms and components of armed
resistance into united armed forces under the command of the
Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina." (See "Press Release No.
271," Ministry of Information, Republic of Croatia, June 17, 1992.)

[48] "Presidency Declares Bosnia in 'State of War,'" Sarajevo Radio
broadcast on June 20, 1992; as reported in FBIS,June 22, 1992. 

------ end of footnotes -----------
                                                      31


                     PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

        
Various military and paramilitary forces are parties to the armed
conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Generally these forces operate on
two opposing sides: the Bosnian -- predominantly Muslim/Croatian --
side and the Yugoslav/Serbian side. However, a variety of troops
operate on each side and the political aims and chains of command
of each armed force are complex. 


Bosnian and Croatian Forces


        
Bosnian forces are represented by the republic's territorial
defense (teritorijalna obrana - TO) structure, which includes
local-level militias [footnote 1]. Many of the TO's combatants are
Muslims, although Croats 

------------ footnotes -----------

   
[1] The armed forces of the Bosnian government are the republic's
territorial defense (teritorijalna obrana - TO) units, which
comprise local defense forces separate from the federal Yugoslav
army. After World War II and during Tito's reign, the official
Yugoslav position maintained that Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned
state, was surrounded by external enemies, such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the west and the Warsaw Pact
to the east. In light of these "threats," Yugoslavia had to be
prepared to defend its "territorial integrity, unity and
independence." In preparation for possible attacks from "outside
enemies," weapons for the general population were stored at the
local level throughout the country. The weapons were purchased from
workers' revenues at local enterprises and kept in various storage
areas throughout each locality. Each of Yugoslavia's six
constituent republics maintained a territorial defense structure,
which included a civilian security force (civilna zastita) and a
local reserve militia. All former soldiers who served in the
federal army could be called up to serve as reserve police officers
for the republican police force or members of the local territorial
defense unit. The TO's weapons could be distributed by the
republican government, in consultation with the federal army and
the federal government. Most of the weapons stored in territorial
defense arsenals in Croatia were confiscated by the Yugoslav Army
(JNA) prior to the outbreak of war in that republic. The TO
arsenals in Serbian-controlled areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina also
have been confiscated by Serbian paramilitaries and the Yugoslav
army. With the escalation of armed conflict throughout Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the Bosnian Presidency announced a general
mobilization of the territorial defense units on April 4, 1992. The
current TO units fighting on behalf of the Bosnian government are
armed, in part, with weaponry taken from local TO weapons caches.

------- end of footnotes ------
                                                      32


and some Serbs also fight with Bosnian TO forces. Bosnian troops
nominally are commanded by the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina,
whose seat is in Sarajevo. However, because the Bosnian capital
remains surrounded by Serbian troops and communication has been
severed with much of the rest of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the local TOs
usually operate under the command of local or regional officers. 
        
Fighting alongside the Bosnian TO's forces are 30,000 Croatian
Defense Council (Hrvatska Vijece Obrane -- HVO) troops in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Most HVO troops are armed and trained by the
government of Croatia [footnote 2] and are Bosnian Croats. Most of
the HVO troops are concentrated in areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina
where Croats constitute a majority. HVO and TO forces often
cooperate both militarily and otherwise. 
Despite Croatian government protests to the contrary, forces from
the Republic of Croatia have participated in hostilities in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska -- HV) is present
in western Hercegovina and in the northern Posavina area,
particularly in the Bosanski Brod municipality. Most of the HV
troops within Croatia are based along the border with Bosnia-
Hercegovina but are dispatched to Bosnian areas in which
hostilities have commenced. Armed troops of the Croatian Party of
Rights, known as the Croatian Armed Forces (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage
- HOS), also operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 3]. HOS troops
are, in fact, paramilitary forces which the Chief of Staff of the
Croatian Army claims to have placed under Croatian government 

-------- footnotes ---------
    
[2] John F. Burns, "Croats Claim Their Own Slice of Bosnia," The
New York Times, July 6, 1992. 

[3] Leaders of the ultra-right wing Croatian Party of Rights
(Hrvatska Stranka Prava - HSP) have frequently criticized the
Croatian government for its alleged ill-preparedness for, and
laxity toward, Serbian armed forces in Croatia. The Croatian Party
of Rights formed an armed wing called the Croatian Armed Forces
(Hrvatska Oruzane Snage - HOS), which engages in military
operations against Serbian forces in Croatia and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Although these troops operate under the name of the
"Croatian Armed Forces," they do not represent the legitimate
military forces of the government of the Republic of Croatia.
Hereinafter, troops belonging to the Croatian Party of Rights will
be referred to by their Croatian acronym, HOS. 

------- end of footnotes -----------

control. To date, the visibility and activity of HOS troops in
Bosnia-Hercegovina appear to be minimal. 
        
In general, soldiers from the Croatian Army (HV) and the Croatian
Armed Forces (HOS) cooperate with soldiers belonging to the Bosnian
Territorial Defense (TO) and the Bosnian-based Croatian Defense
Council (HVO). It is not uncommon to drive through Croatian and
Muslim-held territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina and encounter members
of some or all of the aforementioned Bosnian and Croatian troops at
the same roadblock. In many cases, Bosnian and Croatian forces
operate together in military operations. The Bosnian police force,
which is primarily made up of Muslims and Croats, operates as a
single force but conducts certain police duties in conjunction with
any of the aforementioned military forces. 

The Croatian government denies that Croatian army troops have been
dispatched to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Rather, it claims, Croatian army
soldiers originally from Bosnia-Hercegovina who wished to return to
defend Bosnia-Hercegovina when war broke out in that country have
been honorably discharged from the Croatian army at their request.
According to the Croatian government, these former Croatian army
soldiers have since returned to their homes and joined the Bosnian
Territorial Defense (TO) or the Bosnian-based Croatian Defense
Council (HVO). 

Despite such statements, Helsinki Watch spoke to Croatian soldiers
in Bosnia-Hercegovina who claimed that they had been born and
permanently resided in Croatia, specifically in the municipalities
of Split, Zadar, Slavonski Brod and Zupanja. All but one of these
soldiers wore insignia belonging to the Bosnian-based HVO forces,
not the Croatian army. These soldiers included new recruits from
Croatia and active members of the Croatian army who claimed that
they were fighting on behalf, and in support, of the Bosnian
government. However, they were unclear as to whether their military
orders were delivered from, and their chain of command resided in,
Zagreb, Sarajevo or Grude [footnote 4]. The extent to which forces
from the republic of Croatia continue to participate in the
fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina remains unclear as of this writing.
Nevertheless, because its armed forces are actively engaged in
fighting in 

-------- footnotes ---------

   
[4] Grude is a town in western Hercegovina. Most of the current
civilian and military leaders of Bosnian Croats are currently based
in Grude. 

-------- end of footnotes ---------
                                                      34


Bosnia-Hercegovina, and because it has armed and trained indigenous
forces, the Republic of Croatia is a party to the current conflict. 
        
Since the outbreak of armed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina, troops
and weapons have arrived from Croatia with the knowledge and
blessing of the Bosnian government. Since a formal military
alliance between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina was forged on June
16, 1992,[footnote 5] the short-term goal of all Croatian and
Bosnian armed forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina appears aimed at
regaining territory lost to Serbian and Yugoslav forces. The
ultimate disposition of any regained territory is crucial: if
territory regained by Croatian forces is not returned to the
control of the Bosnian government but, rather, is annexed to
Croatia, the role of the Croatian troops must be seen as that of an
occupying armed force rather than of a military ally [footnote 6]. 



Serbian and Yugoslav Forces


         
Bosnian and Croatian forces are fighting against local Serbian
armed groups from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Paramilitary groups from
Serbia and the regular and reserve forces of the JNA have
participated in hostilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
        
Prior to May 19, 1992, JNA forces stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina,
Serbian-occupied areas of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro directly
attacked Muslim and Croatian positions throughout Bosnia-
Hercegovina. In many cases, the JNA attacks were coordinated and
launched in conjunction with Serbian paramilitary groups which
either were indigenous or from Serbia proper.  The nominal
withdrawal of JNA troops from Bosnia-Hercegovina took place on May
19. However, the Belgrade authorities claimed that 80 percent of
the Yugoslav Army troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina were Bosnian Serbs
who would be free to remain in Bosnia-Hercegovina and fight on
behalf of Serbian forces in the republic after the JNA withdrew 

------- footnotes -------
    
[5] The alliance between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina was
confirmed on July 21, 1992. John F. Burns, "UN Resumes Relief
Flights to Sarajevo," The New York Times, July 22, 1992. 

[6] Concern that the Croatian and Serbian governments may seek to
partition Bosnia-Hercegovina is discussed in the following section.

--------- end of footnotes -----------
                                                      35

on May 19. The result was that "a force of at least 30,000 men with
tanks, artillery, multiple-rocket launchers and large stocks of
ammunition" was left to fight for the Serbian cause [footnote 7].
These Bosnian JNA soldiers and their weaponry were absorbed into an
army of Bosnian Serbs, the creation of which Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS) President Radovan Karadzic and his associates had
proclaimed on May 12, 1992 [footnote 8]. Despite their alleged
withdrawal, it is widely believed that both active and reserve JNA
soldiers continue to operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina on behalf of
Serbian forces in the country. In particular, JNA troops from the
Uzice corps in Serbia and JNA reservists from Montenegro continue
to attack Bosnian and Croatian positions in Bosnia-Hercegovina
[footnote 9]. Because its armed forces are actively engaged in
attacking territory belonging to another state, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro) is a party to
the armed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
        
A host of Serbian paramilitary groups also are parties to the
conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The self-proclaimed army of Bosnian
Serbs -- most of whom are members of the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) of Bosnia-Hercegovina -- is a predominantly indigenous
paramilitary formation. Paramilitary groups from Serbia proper also
have participated in hostilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. These
paramilitaries include forces commanded by Zeljko Raznjatovic
(widely referred to by his nom de guerre, Arkan), which are most
active in the eastern parts of Bosnia. Other paramilitary units are
loyal to Vojislav Seselj, the ultra right-wing leader of the
Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka) and the Serbian
Cetnik Movement (Srpski Cetnicki Pokret). Seselj's group of
paramilitaries operate throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina. The so-called
White Eagles (Beli Orlovi) paramilitary units, loyal to Mirko
Jovic, also operate throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina, as do
paramilitaries commanded by Dragoslav Bokan. Helsinki Watch
interviewed combatants in eastern Bosnia who claimed that they were
being trained by yet another Serbian based paramilitary leader
Dragan Vasiljkovic (a.k.a. "Captain Dragan). 

--------- footnotes --------

    
[7] John F. Burns, "Cease-Fire Brings Bit of Calm but No Confidence
to Sarajevo," The New York Times, May 14, 1992. 

[8] Ibid.

[9] John F. Burns, "A Last Bastion Raided by Serbs in East Bosnia,
"The New York Times, July 12, 1992.

----------- end of footnotes ---------
                                                      36

All the aforementioned paramilitary groups participated in
hostilities in Croatia. Helsinki Watch has documented cases in
which several paramilitary groups have committed severe violations
of the rules of war, including the summary execution of hundreds of
civilians [footnote 10]. 
        
Several points should be made about the identification and level of
activity of Serbian-based paramilitary units in Bosnia. First, the
ability to distinguish between the various paramilitary units has
become blurred. Although many Serbian combatants wear uniforms
belonging to the Yugoslav army, they do not identify themselves as
members of the Yugoslav military. Others wear insignia belonging to
one paramilitary group but identify themselves as another group.
For example, combatants who wear insignia belonging to the White
Eagles will identify themselves as members of Vojislav Seselj's or
Dragoslav Bokan's forces. Originally, such forces were commanded by
Mirko Jovic. Similarly, the term Cetnik, originally used to
identify Seselj's forces, now is widely used to refer to
paramilitaries belonging to Jovic's, Bokan's and, to a lesser
extent, Arkan's and Dragan's forces. Many of those who purport to
be members of a particular paramilitary group are local Bosnian
Serbs/combatants. 

There are two reasons why local Serbs identify themselves as
members of such paramilitary units. First, these paramilitary units
are widely known for their brutality and ruthlessness and local
Serbian combatants frequently assume these identities to evoke fear
and terror among the non-Serbian population. Secondly, some of the
paramilitary commanders have been exalted to "hero" status by the
Serbian media and, therefore, identification with such men is
viewed as honorable and patriotic. In sum, although combatants may
identify themselves as members of a given paramilitary group and/or
their victims might do the same, this identification may not always
be correct. 

The current level of activity of Serbian-based paramilitary groups
in Bosnia remains unclear. When fighting broke out in early April,
most of the five aforementioned paramilitary groups -- which are
otherwise based in Serbia -- were actively fighting on behalf of
Serbian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina. When Helsinki Watch
representatives drove through Bosnia-Hercegovina in early April,
the presence of Serbian-based paramilitary groups was quite evident
and there was little doubt that they 

---------- footnotes ---------
    
[10] See Helsinki Watch letter to Slobodan Milosevic, President of
the Republic of Serbia, and General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Minister
of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army,
January 21, 1992. 

-------end of footnotes ---------
                                                      37


were commanding and arming local Serbian forces in some areas,
including Banja Luka and Zvornik. The extent to which they remain
in Bosnia-Hercegovina as of this writing is unclear. During a visit
to Serbian-controlled areas of eastern Bosnia in early June,
Helsinki Watch representatives interviewed combatants who
identified themselves as members of one of the Serbian-based
paramilitary groups but, in fact, were local Serbs who had taken up
arms. In other cases, Helsinki Watch has interviewed Bosnian Serbs
in Zvornik and Bijeljina who claim to have been armed and trained
by Dragan and Arkan, respectively [footnote 11]. The combatants in
Bijeljina claimed that when fighting broke out, Arkan was
commanding them but that he had since left the area under the
control of Bosnian Serbs whom he allegedly armed and trained. 
        
Although the Serbian government has stated that it will "take
measures against illegally armed civilians and groups,"
paramilitary units continue to operate, recruit and train
throughout Serbia [footnote 12]. Paramilitary leaders freely roam
the streets of Belgrade. For example, Arkan operates a pastry shop
near his home in central Belgrade, which is guarded by armed
paramilitaries dressed and equipped with full military regalia. 
Moreover, it is widely believed that Serbian paramilitary groups
conduct military operations in conjunction with, in the presence
of, or with the knowledge of JNA forces and commanders. Indeed,
almost all displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina
interviewed by Helsinki Watch representatives pointed out that the
JNA played a key role in attacking their town or village, either by
directly taking part in the hostilities or by the a priori arming
of Serbian paramilitary units. 

----- footnotes --------
    
[11] These interviews were conducted by Helsinki Watch
representatives during visits to Zvornik and Bijeljina in early
June 1992. 

[12] Blaine Harden, "Serbian Leader Retreats from Bosnian
Aggression," The Washington Post, April 25, 1992. Although Serbian
police arrested paramilitary leader Dragoslav Bokan on April 24, he
was subsequently released. 

------- end of footnotes -----------
                                                      38


          Positions OF THE VARIOUS SIDES

        
Helsinki Watch takes no position on the territorial claims of the
various parties to the conflict. This section describing the
positions of the various sides is intended to set a context for
understanding the actions of the participants. 


The Cantonization of Bosnia-Hercegovina

       
In mid-1991, the European Community began negotiations on the
future of Yugoslavia. The EC's efforts were aimed at achieving a
peaceful resolution to a variety of crises. The wars in Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina, combined with the status of Albanians in Kosovo
and Serbs in Croatia, presented a daunting task for the aspiring
peace-makers. During an EC-sponsored meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina
held in Brussels from March 7-9, 1992, Croatian and Serbian
representatives -- both of whom represented the extremist faction
of their constituencies -- favored a division of Bosnia-Hercegovina
into various ethnic "cantons." The cantonization of Bosnia-
Hercegovina would reorganize the state into three autonomous ethnic
regions, one each for Muslims, Serbs and Croats which would
maintain a loose con-federal association. 

Conversely, Muslim representatives argued in favor of a single
state for all of Bosnia-Hercegovina's citizens. Muslim
representatives were opposed to the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina
along ethnic lines. In general, Muslims fear that the division of
Bosnia-Hercegovina into three national regions eventually would
result in the incorporation of Croatian and Serbian cantons into
Croatia and Serbia proper. Most moderate Serbs and Croats support
this view. 

A March 9, 1992, document, signed by European Community official
Jose Cutilheiro, supported Bosnia-Hercegovina's sovereignty but
endorsed the concept of national cantonization [footnote 1]. The
plan did not 

--------- footnotes --------
    
[1] Zeljko Ivankovic, "Il Faudra L'Inventer," East European
Reporter, May-June 1992, p. 4, and Judy Dempsey, "Bosnian Carve-Up
in the Making," The Financial Times, July 8, 1992. 

                                                      39


[To be continued ...]
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