From: baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov (Ron Baalke)
Subject: Security Concerns at Ames
Followup-To: sci.space
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.3-4   
Reply-To: baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov
Organization: Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 06:06:37 GMT

Bill Livingstone
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
(Phone:  202/453-1898)                        November 17, 1992

RELEASE:  92-207

NASA RELEASES FINDINGS OF REVIEW TEAM ON SECURITY CONCERNS

        In July 1992, a Management Review Team (MRT) was established,
after a classified briefing was presented to NASA Headquarters management
by Ames Research Center (ARC) management located at Mountain View,
Calif.  The briefing identified potential national security problems.

        NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin determined that the situation at
ARC warranted a special one-time review to determine whether the issues
and problems existed and, if so, what type of corrective action should be
taken.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice
and the Department of Defense were consulted on the national security and
foreign counterintelligence aspects of the problems identified.

        "Upon learning about the potential security problems, I immediately
ordered a review of the situation," Goldin said.  "Based on the review,
information has been forwarded to proper authorities.  The
recommendations of the review are being taken very seriously and I intend
to promptly implement them."

        Based upon the review and discussions with senior management, the
MRT does not believe that the problems encountered at ARC are occuring at
other NASA centers.

Findings of Review

        ARC is considered "high risk" for hostile intelligence operations.
ARC exacerbated a marginally effective security posture by not focusing
appropriate management attention on the handling of sensitive technology.

        Structural and functional weaknesses existed in the way the ARC
security office worked in relation to other center operations.  In addition to
security concerns, processes and practices in the areas of personnel, legal,
procurement, and data and technology protection are contributing to the
potential risk rather than serving as controls over the risk.

        The ARC culture and environment were found to be the underlying
cause of NASA's vulnerability;  the culture is strongly biased toward
maintaining an academic reputation, rather than meeting U.S. industry and
national needs.

        Generally accepted management controls, as well as security, legal,
personnel, and procurement policies, are often viewed as impediments and
are sometimes sidetracked or avoided.  Lax procedures and attitudes were
identified that set the stage for widespread dissemination of commercially
valuable applied technology being developed by ARC personnel.
-
        ARC's credibility with the U.S. aerospace industry has been damaged
as a result of these problems.  Some of NASA's customers and partners are
reluctant to share important data with NASA for fear it will be disseminated
with little or no regard for its sensitivity.  In order to regain credibility,
specific processes for the identification and handling of sensitive and
commercially valuable technologies at ARC must be developed and fully
implemented by ARC employees.

        To resolve the conflict between NASA's desire to share technology
internationally and the need to place U.S. interests first, an environment
and culture must be developed at ARC and elsewhere at NASA, which
focuses NASA's attention on the needs and expectations of U.S. industry and
the taxpayer.

        Basic science efforts actively involve and will continue to involve
the international community but applied technology, developed at U.S. taxpayer
expense, must be protected for U.S. industry use in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations.  NASA must work internally, and externally
with appropriate members of the Administration and Congress to address
the problems and develop long-term solutions.

Information Referred to OIG and FBI

        The MRT found a number of specific discrepancies in the areas of
procurement, misuse of government equipment and apparent violations of
the law and/or NASA policy.

        The MRT referred this information, as appropriate, to the NASA Office
of Inspector General (OIG) and the FBI, which has jurisdiction over foreign
counter intelligence issues resulting from the review.  Cases were opened up
by both the OIG and the FBI.

        It is anticipated that the OIG effort will be completed in December
1992.

Review of the MRT Team

                Because the review was unexpected by the ARC workforce and
employees of Asian-Pacific ancestry appeared to be disproportionately
affected, there was a significant adverse reaction to the review among some
of the ARC workforce.  The NASA Administrator took immediate action to
address employees' concerns.  He met with representatives of the ARC Asian
Pacific Island Advisory Group to discuss their concerns.

        The Administrator also appointed an Assessment Panel on Aug. 26,
1992, to assess the approach and process used by the MRT.  The
assessment panel was charged with examining the concerns that could have
unnecessarily increased the levels of employee discomfort or organizational
disruption flowing from the review.

        It was also tasked to make recommendations that would alleviate
employee concern about the process, and minimize difficulties, should a
similar review be required in the future.

        The Assessment Panel concluded that "the scope and objective of the
management review were legal and that individuals were not selected for
interview and search of their workplaces based upon their race or national
origin."

        "The Panel further concluded that there was a confluence of factors
prior to, during and after the management review, some of which were
avoidable and some not, which caused negative reactions within the
workforce."

-end-
     ___    _____     ___
    /_ /|  /____/ \  /_ /|     Ron Baalke         | baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov
    | | | |  __ \ /| | | |     Jet Propulsion Lab |
 ___| | | | |__) |/  | | |__   M/S 525-3684 Telos | Learn to recognize the
/___| | | |  ___/    | |/__ /| Pasadena, CA 91109 | inconsequential, then 
|_____|/  |_|/       |_____|/                     | ignore it.

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