From: dsg@impmh.uucp (Dave Gordon)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Integrated Micro Products Ltd
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 16:53:46 GMT

In <1992Nov13.075603.8557@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
>
> In <1992Nov13.012545.29228@news.eng.convex.com>
> gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Nov12.230445.25742@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org
>>(Terry Ritter) writes:
>>> Computer cryptography makes it possible for those who accumulate
>>> information to avoid the due-process search which is expected
                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>> when people accumulate things.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Huh?  Accumulating 'things' is reason for a search??

>>    Good memory that is sufficiently selective during a trial
>>    makes it possible for those who accumulate information to
>>    avoid the due-process search which is expected when people
>>    accumulate things.
>>
>>    Do you see what is wrong with this sentence?  Think about it.
>>    Then . . . repeat after me: Information is not a thing.
>>    Information is not a thing.
>
> Actually (wearing my hat as a computer engineer), I directly dispute
> the statement that "Information is not a thing."  I am unaware of
> any concept of "information" which is not held by some "thing."

Subtle difference in those last two sentences - yes, information can
be HELD in things, but the information itself is NOT a THING.
		Storage != data != information.
      a 'thing' ^^^^^^^    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ these are not 'things'

Also:	Good enough memory makes it possible for those who
	accumulate information to avoid any disclosure, at
	least until your society condones torture,
	brainwashing, 'truth drugs', etc

> Molecules, atoms and electrons are things.  Brain cells are things.
					      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Yup, best damn way in the world of storing information; massive
capacity, built-in redundancy, associative lookup, *and* totally
immune to decryption (so far).

> To return to the point, society has agreed that a person should
> not be compelled to testify against his or herself for any reason.
> (Presumably, this was intended to eliminate some of the abuses of
> torture which occurred in Spanish, English and American societies
> of that period.)  But this fact provides no basis for arguing that
> society does not indeed lay claim to any and all *other*
> information, under legal warrant.  The Constitution testifies that
                                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> society does have such a claim.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I certainly hope it doesn't!  But even if it does, it still doesn't
allow anyone to force disclosure of my *personal* encoding scheme,
which is stored *in my brain* (nowhere else).  The government may
be entitled to look through all my files, but that doesn't mean
they'll be able to understand them!

Of course, they would *believe* they understood them; they're not
even PGP-encrypted.  But the 'plain-text' doesn't necessarily
mean what they think it does!

For example, I have on my system at home (note: it's not on the
net - sorry, any potential crackers out there) a list of all my
credit cards, with the matching PIN numbers - but encoded by a
personal algorithm.  Even if someone were to steal my cards and
a printout of this file together, it wouldn't be the slightest
bit of use to them; they would have just as good a chance of
getting the correct PINs by using random numbers.  There are
an *infinite* number of algorithms which will map one 4-digit
number to another, and they would have no clue as to which one
I've chosen.

>>> The difference is that what was once rare and easily breached by
>>> the authorities is now on its way to becoming common and
>>> impenetrable.  Cryptography really is different from a wall safe.
>>
>>    It will still be impenetrable for law enforcement in the case of
>>    criminals.  Unless you make the "crime" of [possession of] an illegal
>>    encryption device (ie. a computer with the appropriate software)
                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Or a brain with the appropriate knowledge!

>    1. Require users to register their keys in advance; presumably,
>       creating or transmitting enciphered information which could
>       not be accessed by a registered key would itself be a crime.
>
>       This could be surprisingly tricky to prove.

You ain't kidding!
Imagine this:
	I register my encryption key, as required.
	Some government agency decides to tap my communications,
	and sees a whole string of innocuous-looking messages,
	encrypted with my registered key.  But my accomplice
	decodes those same 'innocuous' messages using *our private
	protocol* to obtain the secret information (and she does
	it in her head, so there is no record).  What 'evidence'
	can the government agency present?  You cannot even
	prove that *this post* has (OR doesn't have) a hidden
	message of this type embedded within it.

>    [second alternative deleted]
>
> Note that neither of these cases make computers, cryptographic
> software, or cryptography itself, illegal.

Nor are they effective against people who wish to conceal information!

> I see very well that criminals would not register keys, and would
> not provide access to enciphered information.  This would be a
> crime in itself, and if this were the only thing the authorities
> could prove, it would at least be something.  Probably, failure to
> disclose enciphered information would be a fact disclosed to the
> jury in the larger case, and so would have an effect there as well.
>
> The defendant would still have the right to not testify against
> (him/her)self without prejudice.  But failure to "open his/her
> books" *could* be used against him/her.

Go ahead, my books are open; but they have *meaning* only to me.

> *IF* we find that society *does* have an unexpected ultimate
> "right" to access private information, we may want to find some
> least offensive way to provide such access, as opposed to being
> forced to accept whatever proposal the 3-letter agencies would
> prefer.
>
> ---
> Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

They would probably prefer a brain-probe, cos that's the only
*effective* means of extracting information from someone who
doesn't want to disclose it ;-}
-- 

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Dave | dsg@imp.co.uk | +44 753 516599 | "C^i tio ne estas .subskribo"
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