HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Hidden Variables
Date: 17 Aug 92 14:24:38 GMT
Reply-To: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Organization: The Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology
In-reply-to: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)

In article <1992Aug16.203826.10685@galois.mit.edu>, tycchow@riesz (Timothy Y. Chow) writes:
>1. How accurate is Peebles' claim?  To what extent can it be proved that
>nobody will ever devise a local hidden variables theory?

It can't be, as Pitowsky has devised such.  Unsurprisingly, it has certain
features that fit in the "cure is worse than the disease" category.  He
uses non-measurable sets and the continuum hypothesis to construct his
spin models, thereby evading one of the basic assumptions of the proof.
In short, quantum indeterminacy is a byproduct of our inability to ever
get a grasp on non-measurability, and that the EPR correlations are really
due to extended objects interacting locally.

(Note that "non-measurable" here is the Lebesgue notion, and it is not
related to the quantum notion of "measurement".)

>2. Are there any plausible non-local hidden variables theories around?

Not really.  The people who peddle them are under the delusion that
determinism is so inherently overwhelmingly plausible that no one will
notice the tons of raw sewage rotting in the far corner.  It doesn't
work that way.

>I frequently encounter technically naive philosophers who have a strong
>feeling that nature is fundamentally deterministic, and so I'm interested
>in seeing how strongly one can argue against hidden variable theories.

Such are not just technically naive.  They are also philosophically naive.
The job of philosophy is not to demonstrate right or wrong but validity
or invalidity.  It's not enough to have one particular strong feeling
about nature--you have to show how it fits in with everything else.
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu)
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2973 sci.philosophy.meta:1597
From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger and Nazism
Date: 19 Aug 92 19:24:09 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Aug19.152410.14895
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

Please observe the Followup line.

In article <1992Aug19.161512.27386@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:

COO:
>>  However, I see no justification, on the other hand, to your second
>>claim when compared to the first.   I think that you will have to 
>>select which you feel is more adequate.  If you select the first, 
>>I am all ears as to how you can arrive at Nazism from his text--even
>>Derrida, whose methods may be questionable, failed to convience me of 
>>anything on this regard.  If you select the latter, you have to
>>be careful when thinking of God in this way.  There is always the
>>issue of time which puts forth a significant stumbling block to those
>>who would like to reduce _Sein und Zeit_ to a simple theological 
>>treatise.  However, to maintain both propositions simulatneously seems
>>undeniably absurd.

I an puzzled by your claim, especially since the compatibility of
Nazism with Christianity was claimed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_, while
the compatibility of Crhistianity with Nazism was claimed by the vast
majority of German clerics of the period.


>>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
>>Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
>>University of Chicago
>>------------------------------------------------------------------------

MF:
>Before I try to meet this legitimate challenge (that is, risk making
>(more of) a public spectacle of myself), let me just check on one
>crucial point:
>
>I take it that we all agree that Heidegger was a Nazi for a
>significant portion of his Professorial career?  So the challenge is
>to show either the compatibility of _Sein & Zeit_ with Nazism, or that
>the text is itself nazi-istic?  Failing that initial understanding,
>I've no inclination to play.

I agree with Michael's claim, and refer all interested parties to
Victor Farias' book _Heidegger et le Nazisme_.  I further state that
te facile response to Charles' challenge consists in observing that
the ethos of authenticity resolves into that of sincerity, recently
described by me at some length elsewhere.  Thus the least charge that
can be made with respect to Heidegger, is that his metaphysics
precludes a priori any principled opposition to Nazism.  Having said
that, I defer to Michael for more profound observations on the same
subject.

>-- 
>Michael Feld                         | E-mail:  <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
>Dept. of Philosophy                  | FAX:     (204) 261-0021
>University of Manitoba               | Voice:   (204) 474-9136
>Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada	                     

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Fossil Paradox (was: Structure of Time)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 04:17:48 GMT

In article <Bsvvwx.G0x@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

>A number of years ago David Lewis was writing some papers on the logic
>of time travel.  I seem to recall that this was when he was visiting
>at some university in Australia.  I did not manage to read any of
>these, but I have a vague recollection of seeing at least one
>published version.  It may have been in _Nous_ or the _Australasian_
>Journal_of_Philosophy_.  Anyone familiar with this?  (Or with any
>unpublished stuff he might have done?)

Perhaps you are referring to the Gavin David Young lectures that Lewis
gave at the University of Adelaide (my alma mater) in 1971?  These
turned into "The Paradoxes of Time Travel", published in the American
Philosophical Quarterly in 1976, and reprinted in the second volume of
his collected papers.  (This is fun, but personally I prefer Michael
Dummett's paper on time travel, which gives a novel picture of what
it would look like.)

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
From: snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Subject: invention of time
Date: 19 Aug 92 05:14:11 GMT


      One of the most profound (and absurd) assumptions of the new
physics is the existence of time _as real_. Einstein was aware of the
tenuous nature of this assumption, as he made clear in his statement
that 'time is what clocks measure'. In fact, clocks don't 'measure'
anything, they are just physical systems which we judge to be more or
less periodic by comparing them with other periodic systems. But if we
take five atomic clocks and synchronize them (itself only approximate)
we will find that they do not remain synchronized. Now, if one clock
is very much off from the others, we will say this clock is wrong, and
yet that may be the only one (if we had an even _more_ accurate clock)
which is right. The point is, we have no way to tell, no matter how
accurate our clocks are -- and, in fact, evidence shows us that no motion
is likely to be _perfectly periodic_: so where do we get this concept of
absolute time?

      Where we get it is from mathematical description. The measurement
of motion is obviously important, and so the variable of time (as measured
by a clock) enters into many useful equations. With Einstein, however,
we get time elevated beyond a representative of a clock reading to a
universal, along with space, to become spacetime. This happened subtley,
as the origins of the 't' variable were forgotten, and the abstract notion
disconnected from reality, then turned around and used to _project a reality
onto the world_! This, in fact, is the story of the new physics, in a
nutshell. Mathematical constructs reified. Geometry projected onto the world
as a non-physical cause of physical events. And time, in this absolute
'fourth dimension' sense, comes into being.

      With our entire cosmology wrapped around it, it is amazing to realize
that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever for the existence of time.
(Space in the geometrical sense is the same way.) This makes such notions
as 'time dilation' even more absurd, since they are predicated on something
else which itself has not been demonstrated. Of course, this doesn't stop
anyone from believing in it. Human beings are far more used to believing
in what they are told, and repeating it mindlessly, than in the skeptical,
questioning approach to forming a view of the world. That's why the world
of physics is dominated by relativists: the urge to believe, even in the
most absurd, groundless notions, far outweighs the urge to place even the
simplest analysis, as I demonstrated above, onto the objects of one's belief.

      John E. Snodgrass
      -----------------
      snodgras@crash.cts.com

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: gardner@cs.monash.edu.au ()
Subject: Re: invention of time
Organization: Computer Science, Monash University, Australia
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 1992 02:39:54 GMT

>In article <snodgras.714201251@crash> snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:

>      With our entire cosmology wrapped around it, it is amazing to realize
>that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever for the existence of time.
>(Space in the geometrical sense is the same way.) This makes such notions
>as 'time dilation' even more absurd, since they are predicated on something
>else which itself has not been demonstrated. Of course, this doesn't stop
>anyone from believing in it.

Huh? I must have missed something here. I thought that experiments in the
'60's confirmed relativistic predictions of time-dilation by showing that
the half-lives of radioactive particles travelling at relativistic speeds
were time-dilated (relative to our frame of reference, that is, and perhaps
this is all you mean when attack the concept of absolute time).

We're probably just talking about different things, is all.

*******************************************************************************
* __  ___  ___ \    /  ___  |  * "We have no choice. We must believe in free  *
*|__   |  |__   \  /  |__   |  *  will."                                      *
*___|  |  |___   \/   |___  o  *           Isaac Bashevis Singer              *
*gardner@bruce.cs.monash.edu.au*                                              *
*******************************************************************************
From: gunther@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Gunther Wenz)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Time Journey
Keywords: free will, time journey
Date: 20 Aug 92 20:39:23 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept, QMW, University of London, UK.
Originator: gunther@whistler

If we could travel to the future, this would result in the following
problem:

1. We do the journey twice: would we find the same future in
the first and in the second journey?

If this would be true, this would result in the statement,
that we have not really a free will.

If we traveled back into the past, then the return journey
is a journey into the future and we would have the same
problem of the possibility of free will.

So, if timetravel is possible, we would not find the same future again,
ie the present has changed, or we don't have a free will.

In the first case, there must be an infinite number of 'presents', or
in the second case we would have no free will. I would like to
choose the solution, that there is no possibility for a time
travel machine.


Gunther
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Hidden Variables
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 92 20:38:26 GMT

In _Quantum_Mechanics_ be P.J.E. Peebles he states that a local hidden
variables theory is wrong and gives a convincing argument.  ("Local" means
that is satisfies certain locality assumptions---that the hidden variables
are not coupled to the choice of measurements made.)  My questions:

1. How accurate is Peebles' claim?  To what extent can it be proved that
nobody will ever devise a local hidden variables theory?

2. Are there any plausible non-local hidden variables theories around?

I frequently encounter technically naive philosophers who have a strong
feeling that nature is fundamentally deterministic, and so I'm interested
in seeing how strongly one can argue against hidden variable theories.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
From: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: invention of time
Date: 19 Aug 92 13:03:41 GMT
Reply-To: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Organization: The Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology
In-reply-to: snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)

In article <snodgras.714201251@crash>, snodgras@crash (John Snodgrass) writes:
>      One of the most profound (and absurd) assumptions of the new
>physics is the existence of time _as real_.

Where is this assumption made?  If anything, the new physics rejects
the reality of time.

>as 'time dilation' even more absurd, since they are predicated on something
>else which itself has not been demonstrated. Of course, this doesn't stop
>anyone from believing in it.

Probably because it has been experimentally checked millions of times.
Of course, it helps to know what you're talking about.
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu)
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Re: invention of time
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 92 16:48:19 GMT

In article <gardner.714364794@bruce.cs.monash.edu.au> gardner@cs.monash.edu.au () writes:
<>In article <snodgras.714201251@crash> snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:
<>      With our entire cosmology wrapped around it, it is amazing to realize
<>that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever for the existence of time.
<>(Space in the geometrical sense is the same way.) This makes such notions
<>as 'time dilation' even more absurd, since they are predicated on something
<>else which itself has not been demonstrated. Of course, this doesn't stop
<>anyone from believing in it.
<
<Huh? I must have missed something here. I thought that experiments in the
<'60's confirmed relativistic predictions of time-dilation by showing that
<the half-lives of radioactive particles travelling at relativistic speeds
<were time-dilated (relative to our frame of reference, that is, and perhaps
<this is all you mean when attack the concept of absolute time).

There are two possibilities I see for interpreting Snodgrass's statement.

1. "Time dilation" is a poor choice of terminology.  It suggests that
absolute time is being stretched out somehow relative to another absolute
time, or something like that.

2. The experiments conducted to verify time dilation were not "pure"
observations but were "theory-laden."  The design and the interpretation
of the experiment were drenched with assumptions about the existence of
absolute time and other similarly dubious philosophical assumptions.  What
is needed is a total revamping of all our scientific concepts (a paradigm
shift) that removes all traces of imposing mathematics on reality.  After
this revolution the experiments in question will be seen in a totally
different light and we will wonder why on earth we ever referred to them as
"verifications of time dilation."

I can accept 1, but 2, which from reading some of Snodgrass's other
articles seems to me to be the more accurate reading, is a bit much for me
to swallow.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
From: zeleny@husc8.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Date: 14 Aug 92 04:13:57 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Aug13.154426.28735@uwm.edu>
hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu writes:

>> zeleny@husc8.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>>martinc@grover.cs.unc.edu (Charles R. Martin) writes:

CRM:
>>>>I dunno, MZ... the overwhelming importance of Goedel-Roesser and via
>>>>them Turing on philosophy I think would be hard to overestimate.  (I
>>>>agree with you about Heidegger et al -- I suspect that by 2092 they'll
>>>>be about as well known as the Thomists and neo-Platonists, but no longer
>>>>an active influence.) 

MZ:
>>>Let me begin that I am in no way interested in belittling the importance of
>>>the incompleteness results, to which you are alluding.  However, it is
>>>quite clear to me that their philosophical influence is far inferior to

MP:
>[...]
>
>etc....
>
>
>This got me to thinking...  I would have said Nietzsche was the major
>philosopher of the 20th century.  Or maybe Henry Ford.

They are both right up there, though Ford's contribution would be better
represented by Taylor.

MP:
>But more to the point....
>
>It's interesting to remember that back around, oh, 1795 to maybe 1817,
>Fichte was thought to be considerably more important than Kant and for
>a while there Immanuel was all but forgotten.  I just *know* that more
>of you have read Science of Knowledge than Critique of Pure Reason....;-)

"All but" is quite right; Immanuel seems to have been second only to
Jean-Jacques among certain radical elements of the period.  In any case, I
do not propose to concern this discussion with questions of popularity.
Some value judgments just don't have any factual content, don't you agree?

MP:
>In any case, this is what I think of every time I hear (or see, I
>guess) these discussions.  It would be interesting if, in 2092, it was
>Jacques Ellul and Levinas that are remembered from the 20th century.
>Or one of y'all... hmm.

Interesting indeed.  However, if you are prepared to accept this
possibility, I would like to hear more about your reasons.  By the way, I
am glad to see that you haven't joined the crowd in dismissing this subject
as philosophically unimportant, if not outright frivolous.  Contrary to the
heartfelt prejudice of certain philosophasters, I regard the history of
philosophy, up to and including the present moment, as inseparable from
philosophy itself.  Naturally, questions of influence are of paramount
importance for any historical enterprise.

>hiho
>-- 
>mark ce peterson   | uw-washington county  | hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu 
>dept of philosophy | west bend, wi.  53095 | (414) 335-5200        
>
>     The shorter the tether, the sooner the goat starves.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Wittgensteins Logic Contributions
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug22.102046.4759@sics.se> <1992Aug22.160048.11994@sics.se>
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 16:38:32 GMT

In article <1992Aug22.160048.11994@sics.se> ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson) 
writes:

   >Doesn't W comment on this matter in the "W lectures on
   >the foundations of mathematics" (ed. Diamond)? I don't have the
   >book here but I recall that W says that Frege invented the truth tables but
   >that he used them for actually defining the logical constants. 

  You're right that Wittgenstein mentions this, but what he says (or rather,
what he is reported as having said) is something different. I quote:


        Incidentally, this kind of schema [i.e. truth tables] is not
        my invention; Frege used it. The only part of it which is my
        invention - not that it matters in the least - was to use this as
        a symbol for the proposition, not as an explanation of it
        (like Frege).

--
"When I said autumn, autumn broke."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 21 Aug 92 15:06:33 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Aug21.000152.10763@reed.edu> bcushman@lust.reed.edu (Ben Cushman) writes:
>In article <1992Aug20.221402.12691@news.eng.convex.com> cash@convex.com  
>(Peter Cash) writes:

>>What kind of love? As any classical scholar knows, the ancients had
>>several different words that are today regrettably subsumed under the same
>>English word. For example, "eros" was quite different from "caritas"--only
>>in modern times does one use the same word for teenagers who are smitten
>>by one another and for Mother Theresa's regard for humanity: we call both
>>"love". No wonder we're confused, and puzzle about the meaning of "love".
...
>	What I would like to primarily address is Mr. Cash's assertion  
>that this subsumption is "regrettable."  I believe that the conflation of  
>teenage infatuation and saintly faith captures a real unity to the  
>passions that the ancients negelected in their treatment of love in its  
>varieties.  In fact, from our modern perspective, we are uniquely  
>empowered in our use and treatment of love as a concept.  If we want to be  
>precise, and deal only with (for instance) sexual or romantic love, we can  
>use the word "eros."  Further, when we want to deal with love in its  
>multiform unity, we can use the word "love".  This turn is language is far  
>from regrettable, it is empowering.

"Empowering?" [Ah, is there no limit to the uses of this fatuous word?]
Mind telling me how erasing the distinction between a lust-crazed teenager
and Mother Theresa is in any way illuminating or [swallow gorge]
_empowering_?



-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta