HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Public Key Ciphers
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 02:25:15 GMT

In article <PCL.93Jan22150156@rhodium.ox.ac.uk>, pcl@ox (Paul C Leyland) writes:
>My fiquestion is: how do I get kerberos source code, with all the DES
>code and hooks in place?  Does your answer vary, depending on whether
>I'm in the US or the UK?

I think nic.funet.fi has a version of kerberos, if not complete then
at least without the hooks and the diffs to apply to make it complete.
But it is not the latest version - I don't think the latest version
has been distributed widely outside USA.

Perhaps now that the U.S. president has changed the export rules will
change as well and you will be able to just ftp the code without fear
of an U.S. smart bomb dropping down your chimney the next day.  I
certainly won't be holding my breath, though.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner
From: kudzu@netcom.com (Michael Sierchio)
Subject: Re: AT&T news release
Organization: True Love, and Home-Grown Tomatoes
Distribution: usa
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 00:31:26 GMT

In article <1993Jan26.205625.8258@src.honeywell.com> 
	hadden@src.honeywell.com (George D. Hadden) writes:

>In article <neal.727712295@hp536> 
>	neal@hp536.even.ge.com (U-E59382-David Neal) writes:
>
>dn> Lest we forget, this is Lt. Commander (correct rank?) Grace Hopper's
>
>uh, admiral, i believe.
>

Commodore, or Rear Admiral Lower Half.
-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  Michael Sierchio                          1563 Solano Avenue, Suite 123 |
|  kudzu@netcom.com                                Berkeley, CA 94707-2116 |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jkapson@ad-29.Naitc.Com (John Kapson)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's
Organization: AC Nielsen Co., Bannockburn IL
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 19:58:41 GMT

In article <unruh.72796636@unixg.ubc.ca> unruh@unixg.ubc.ca (Bill Unruh) writes:
>In <1993Jan25.115302.27951@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:
>
>>	Polaris tests (late 50's-early 60's).  How many stories of
>>	U.S. astronauts being lost in flight can you remember.  I can
>>	remember one, and that had to do with faulty plumbing.
>
>In flight none before the Shuttle. On Launchpad ( not during a launch but
>during a dry run) three, in an Apollo capsule fire. (Grissom,,, and the two 
>others I can't remember).

Roger B. Chaffee was one of the other two.  The third... White, maybe?
I can't remember for sure.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
|      John Kapson      |                                                     |
| NRA               ILA |      "...to disarm the people (is) the best         |
| jkapson@nis.naitc.com |      and most effective way to enslave them..."     |
|                       |      George Mason, 3 Elliot, Debates at 380         |
|                       |                                                     |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
|                  PGP Public Key available via email                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Spycatcher
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 18:29:06 GMT

In article <fraserdt.727978978@unixg.ubc.ca> fraserdt@unixg.ubc.ca (David T.S. Fraser) writes:
>In <1993Jan25.154016.10434@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:
>
>>In article <1993Jan23.181520.18783@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes:
>>>
>>>Both books are great reads!  (Ever wonder why regular typewriters are
>>>not used to type crypto messages...Read SPYCATCHER for that and much more.)
>
>>	That's regular ELECTRIC typewriters, regular manual typewriters
>>	are very popular with the security-conscious.
>
>Same goes for PCs, too.

I understand from my current reading, including a recent and excellent book
on the CIA, apparently published with CIA cooperation to help with their
more "open" image, and filled with revelations not previously seen, that
manual typewriters are no more secure than electric. One simply uses
different techniques for eavesdropping. In the case of "golf-ball"
electrics, the motor is on for different lengths of time depending on the
characters typed. In the case of manual ones, the sound is different
depending on the key being struck.

The book (sorry I haven't a pointer--I returned it to the library) has a
particularly fascinating account of how the Soviets installed eavesdropping
transmitters in the vertical support bar of U.S. typewriters in such a way
that the workmanship was completely undetectable visually and the bugs had
the same X-ray density as the support bar and thus didn't show up via
X-ray. It took newer scanning techniques to spot the anomalies in the
support bars and lead to the detection of the hidden bugs.
-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:7088 alt.radio.scanner:3885
From: neal@hp536.even.ge.com (U-E59382-David Neal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner
Subject: Re: AT&T news release
Date: 22 Jan 93 14:18:15 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: GE Corporate R&D Center

In <13935@optilink.COM> walsh@optilink.COM (Mark Walsh) writes:

>In article <1993Jan14.021852.22341@news.eng.convex.com> gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) 
>writes:

>> EM radiation propogates at 1/299792458  sec per meter or
>> 33.3 ns per meter. In one microsecond the wave travels about 30m.

>Reminds me of a programming class in college.  Our teacher
>held up a foot long piece of wire and said, "Does anybody
>know what this is?" [stuff deleted]
> *This* is a nanosecond!"
>-- 
Lest we forget, this is Lt. Commander (correct rank?) Grace Hopper's
trademark. Many of us, I'm sure, still treasure the 'nanoseconds' she
distributed at her public appearances.
-- 
   David A. Neal, Information Security  Telephone: AT&T 1+513.583.3586
   GE Aircraft Engines                         GE DialComm  8*330.3586
   1 Neumann Way  Mail Stop A301                 FAX AT&T 513.583.3652
   Cincinnati, OH 45215 USA                                 8*330.3652
   internet:  neal@hp536.ae.ge.com               PROFS AEEC13T:EINDCPS

--
   David A. Neal, Information Security  Telephone: AT&T 1+513.583.3586
   GE Aircraft Engines                         GE DialComm  8*330.3586
   1 Neumann Way  Mail Stop A301                 FAX AT&T 513.583.3652
   Cincinnati, OH 45215 USA                                 8*330.3652
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Date: 21 Jan 1993 23:03:08 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com

cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes:

>If it "only" costs $56, then they must have some CHEAP ways to break
>DES, unless they're COMPLETELY ignoring the cost of computer
>resources.  In short, for $56 a pop, they can't be using brute force.
>Maybe they can use differential analysis.  Maybe they can use
>something analogous to D.A.  But for $56 per pop, they're either
>lying, or they have SOME "silver bullet."

Of course, the risk of a trap door has never been completely 
negated.  However, notable experts disagree with you about the
cost of a brute-force attack.  Dr. Hellman (see my previous post)
maintains that it costs between $10 and $100 to break a DES key
by brute force (if you can afford the $1M to $10M startup costs,
and if you keep the DES-breaking machine continuously busy).  

Dr. Ron Rivest (the "R" in RSA) also gave a talk where he showed
the following:

          DATE 
BUDGET       | 1993   2003   2013
      -------|------|------|------
      $25K   | 47   | 52   | 57
      -------|------|------|-----
      $25M   | 60   | 65   | 70
      -------|------|------|-----
      $25G   | 73   | 78   | 83

The cells represent the bit-size of the largest key that an
organization with a certain-size budget could afford to break
by brute force.  It was assumed that decryption times would be
about the same as for DES.  Thus, a small country, a drug cartel,
or anyone else with $25M to spend could afford to brute-force
attack DES (which has 56 bits - less than 60).

Interestingly enough, exportable crypto implementations (40 key-
bits or less) can be broken by the local cops, a group of grad
students, or anyone else with $25K to spend.

The French equivalent of NSA has made it public that they consider
it their duty to spy on American firms and give the data to French
firms.  They could afford the $25G.

He made a similar table for RSA keys:

          DATE 
BUDGET       | 1993   2003   2013
      -------|------|------|------
      $25K   | 400  | 450  | 550
      -------|------|------|-----
      $25M   | 600  | 700  | 850
      -------|------|------|-----
      $25G   | 900  | 1050 | 1200

So, 512-bit RSA keys aren't looking so great anymore.  1024-bit
keys seem barely adequate in this light.  2K- to 3K-bit RSA keys
seem prudent to protect any data that you are seriously 
concerned might be attacked by a big-budget ($25G) enemy.

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
From: pcl@ox.ac.uk (Paul C Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Digital cash references  wanted.
Date: 27 Jan 93 18:34:35 GMT
Organization: Oxford University Computing Services, 13 Banbury Rd Oxford OX2
	6NN


I would like to put together an article about Digital Cash -- the
concept, how it is implemented, how one can prevent forgery and
similar fraud and so on.  The audience is assumed to be intelligent
but not to have heard of digital cash before.

Can anyone help me with references please?  If the source documents
are available electronically, so much the better.

Either posting or email is fine.  If I get enough email responses, I
will summarize to the net.


Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
Finger pcl@black.ox.ac.uk for PGP key    |
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Automatic lang. determination of titles/subj. lines?
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 01:53:33 GMT

In article <2216@blue.cis.pitt.edu>, wbdst+@pitt (William B Dwinnell) writes:
>Actually, it would be interesting to know whether anyone has letter, digram
>and trigram frequency tables for various languages, Anyeone?

Use FOIA and get them from NSA?
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Subject: Re: Automatic lang. determination of titles/subj. lines?
Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 11:37:51 GMT

In article <1993Jan20.163448.17017@daimi.aau.dk>, lhp@daimi.aau.dk (
Lasse Hiller|e Petersen) writes:

> Rather than reinventing the wheel, I'd like to know whether someone knows
> of a program for the automatic determination of the language of short
> sentences, titles or subject lines.

An effective solution to this problem was found by a chap called Trevor Coates
who ran a translation agency in London in about 1980. The trick is to look at 
the short words (up to three letters). Each language has a unique set of these
and the decision process is extremely fast - three or four words are enough to
specify the language uniquely.

Trevor's system was not even implemented on a computer, but on a single sheet 
of paper. That's how fast and simple it is.

I don't have a copy of the sheet of paper but I expect you could reinvent it
without too much trouble.

Hope this helps

Ross
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:7183 alt.security.pgp:609
From: wack@ariel.ncsl.nist.gov (John Wack)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: authentication tokens
Date: 28 Jan 93 14:33:02 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology


I've got a question for the net.wisdom out there.  We're currently using
some challenge - response authentication tokens on our Interneted host.
I've decided to stick with the same vendor and order their newer tokens,
which display only one-time passwords - no challenge from the host, you
just type in the password generated by the token.  To keep the host
system's software and the token in sync, some sort of event-synchronous
method is used.  This, of course, has some disadvantages if the token
gets out of sync, because the host has to either look ahead or look
back to resynchronize.  Disadvantages, however, only if this is awkward
for the user or presents big vulnerabilities.

Another vendor offers a similar one-time password card that is
synchronized with the host based on time.  This also has problems if
clocks drift, and has some problems associated with it as well if this
happens.

I've already decided to use the first vendor, since their system permits
other brands of tokens as well as their own, which is important to us.
But I'm wondering whether there are significant advantages/disadvantages
to either method of keeping the tokens and host in sync - i.e., is one
method inherently more secure than the other?  I've spoken to some of
the folks in our cryptography group about this, and they seem to say
that both methods have their drawbacks, but if they both are implemented
well, one is no better than the other.  I guess "implemented well" means
the token requiring a pin and a narrow look-ahead/behind window when out
of sync, among other factors.

Would anyone knowledgeable about this care to comment on the above?  I'd
be more than interested if there are real differences in security 
between the two methods.

Regards,
John Wack
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP messages readable by more than one person
X-Quoted: 36%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1993 21:33:41 -0500

Thus said ted@nmsu.edu (Ted Dunning):
>perhaps a more interesting (in the sense of puzzle solving) problem is
>how to extend pgp so that you can send a message that ALL of a group
>have to agree to read.  of course, it isn't that much harder than the
>previous puzzle, but it is fun.

An interesting generalization of the above is how to cryptographically
create a situation whereby any m people in a group of n (of course,
the problem is only hard when n > m > 1) must cooperate to read a
message.  I seem to recall having heard that it's possible, but I
don't remember the details.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted


The number of millionares in the U.S. has increased fourteen fold since 1980.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:7154 alt.security.pgp:602
From: unruh@unixg.ubc.ca (Bill Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's
Date: 25 Jan 93 18:30:36 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
NNTP-Posting-Host: unixg.ubc.ca

In <1993Jan25.115302.27951@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:

>	Polaris tests (late 50's-early 60's).  How many stories of
>	U.S. astronauts being lost in flight can you remember.  I can
>	remember one, and that had to do with faulty plumbing.

In flight none before the Shuttle. On Launchpad ( not during a launch but
during a dry run) three, in an Apollo capsule fire. (Grissom,,, and the two 
others I can't remember).
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner
From: hadden@src.honeywell.com (George D. Hadden)
Subject: Re: AT&T news release
Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center
Distribution: usa
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 20:56:25 GMT


In article <neal.727712295@hp536> neal@hp536.even.ge.com (U-E59382-David Neal) writes:

dn> Lest we forget, this is Lt. Commander (correct rank?) Grace Hopper's

uh, admiral, i believe.

-geo
---
George D. Hadden, Honeywell Systems and Research Center
      *** Where "Research" is our middle name! ***
3660 Technology Drive, Minneapolis, MN 55418 -- (612)951-7769
hadden@src.honeywell.com -or- hadden@umn-cs.cs.umn.edu

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Subject: How to do filelength permutations
Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 12:07:59 GMT

In article <1993Jan27.025903.27664@ole.cdac.com>, ray@ole.cdac.com (Ray Berry) 
writes:

|>    It seems to me that permuting the order of characters [bytes] in an
|> encrypted file would be valuable in hiding the structure, e.g. fixed
|> headers, 'magic' characters, etc., which might otherwise facilitate a
|> "chosen plain-text" decryption attack.
|>
|>    To that end, can anyone offer guidance on efficient algorithms which 
|> can generate file-length permutations which could be seeded by a password?

Sorting and shuffling are in some sense inverse operations, so if you have a 
good sorting routine, you can adapt it quite simply to shuffle a file.

For example, perform the algorithm `mergesort' with the modification that
whenever the algorithm needs to make a decision, you just use the next bit
of your key rather than checking whether a < b for some a and b.

If your file is n characters long, this uses nlogn key bits (exactly what you 
need to specify an element of S_n) and O(nlogn) operations, so it's fairly
efficient. It also lets you reuse existing code.

This idea occurred to Roger Needham and myself one day while waiting for the
lift. It didn't seem a big enough idea to publish on its own, but it might be
useful as part of some bigger system,

Ross

(PS: now you probably have to lie about any sorting software you take through 
US customs, as well as about modular arithmetic routines!)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mjohnson@netcom.com (Mark Johnson)
Subject: Disagreement with cost of crackmachine for DES
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1993 15:21:52 GMT

In article <1jmumhINNe3d@roche.csl.sri.com> boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher) writes:

   > In 1976, given economies of scale, each [custom built DES] Integrated
   > Circuit would cost ~$10 ([therefore] $10M/machine).  Allow a factor of
   > two, for other hardware and you pay $20M/machine.  Amortize costs over
   > 5 years, and you pay $10K/day.
   > [ ... ]
   > These are 1976 figures.  Even if we are optimistic by an order
   > of magnitude, the cost of computation falls in 5 years by a factor 
   > of 10; in 15 years (by now) by 1,000.


But you're talking about hardware design, not computation.


Have a look at a hardware budget for your chip, which holds
one copy of DES circuitry.  A swag at such an accounting is
shown below.  It is wrong (optimistic) because it assumes
the cost of the permutations and shufflings is zero, whereas
on silicon, gates are cheap and wires are expensive.

  a.  56 bit register for key bits                        336 gates
  b.  64 bit input register                               384 gates
  c   16 ranks of   32b  register pairs                  6144 gates
  d.  16 ranks of   (32  2-bit-XOR)                      1024 gates
  e.  16 copies of  (32b scramblers using S boxes)        480 gates
  f.  64 bit output register                              384 gates
                                                     -----------------
               TOTAL                                     8752 gates


Your $10-per-chip-in-1976 figure, divided by your "computation
cost reduction factor" of 1000, gives today's cost per chip of
$0.01.  Balderdash! Not in this universe in the year of our lord 1993.

But in today's practice we'd of course use high levels of integration,
putting (say) 32 DES hardware widgets on a single chip.  The
resultant VLSI device would have 280,000 logic gates (about the
complexity of the Intel 486 microprocessor).  Your cost figure
for this device would be $0.32.  Not in this universe in 1993.

Hire some genius to optimize the holy snot out of the hardware,
assume Allah is on your side and the gate count drops by 4X.
Now you can get 128 DES widgets on an i486 sized chip and
you pay the silicon fab $1.28 for this IC.  Good luck Mr. Phelps.


   --- Mark Johnson
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: satellite??
From: <BUSCHMAN@NDSUVM1.BITNET>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 19:18:33 CST
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computer Network

Can I find info on satellite encryption here?

I see many interesting discussions here, where can one obtain the FAQ?

I'm very interested in satellite television.  I would love to exchange and comp
are ideas in the field.  I would also like to obtain the source code for GI bus
ter / phaser or any other related software.
I hope I am allowed to discuss these topics?
                                     Buschman@vm1.nodak.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rory@wri.com (Rory Murtagh)
Subject: Archive site or FAQ?
Organization: Wolfram Research, Inc.
Distribution: na
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 14:55:36 GMT


Is there an archive site for this group?

Could someone possibly send me, or tell me where to get FAQs for this group?

Any help appreciated,
- rory@wri.com
From: tweek@netcom.com (Michael D. Maxfield)
Subject: Re: AT&T news release
Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest)
Distribution: usa
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 16:22:55 GMT

In article <13935@optilink.COM> walsh@optilink.COM (Mark Walsh) writes:
>Reminds me of a programming class in college.  Our teacher
>held up a foot long piece of wire and said, "Does anybody
>know what this is?"  I blurted out "It's solid copper,
>26 gauge, with an insulation breakdown of 300 volts."
>She tried not to laugh and said, "No!  *This* is a
>nanosecond!"

Did you take a programming class from USN Admiral Grace Hopper?

Thats her line... or did someone steal it from her?


Newsgroups: sci.crypt