HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.math
Subject: Re: Numbers and sets
Date: 29 Dec 92 00:46:51 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <BzzHDI.2Bv@umassd.edu>
pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) writes:

>In article <1992Dec28.155555.21505@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
>holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>>In article <Bzsrvt.167@umassd.edu> 
>>(Stephen Grossman) pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:
SG:
>>>Is there a relationship between sets and Plato's Forms?

RH:
>>Plato's Forms were ideal exemplars of
>>mundane objects; sets do not have this character (the set of all
>>natural numbers is not a perfect natural number).  

SG:
>Perhaps I should have asked about Kantian, subjective forms. I am starting 
>"Plato, Kant and Aristotle in Math" by Glenn Marcus (2nd Renaissance Books,
>1991, audio) and should have some wisdom on math soon.

Indeed, you should.  Alas, you will not.

You will not have any "wisdom on math" for the same reason you will
not have any on "Kantian, subjective forms".  The reason is that your
hallowed sourses of holy Objectivism lie.  There are no such things as
subjective forms; moreover, Kantian philosophy is not concerned with
the question of forms, period.  End of this discourse.

SG:
>Marcus says scientists (excepting computer scientists w/info theory) use
>only pre-20th century math and quotes a leading mathematician on the 
>impracticality of math. Comments?

Sure thing, I will give you comments.  Modern mathematics is widely
used in physics, chemistry, and biology.  Consequently, Marcus is a
fraud or an ignoramus; most likely, he is both.  You, on the other
hand, are a tiresome, gullible fool.  It takes all kinds.

>================================================================================
>	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
>you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
>tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
>                                                              AYN RAND
>================================================================================
>Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASS.EDU>
>================================================================================

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Subject: Re:Numbers and sets
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Fri, 25 Dec 1992 04:16:38 GMT

    Is there a relationship between sets and Plato's Forms?
================================================================================
	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
                                                              AYN RAND
================================================================================
Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASS.EDU>
================================================================================
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4642 sci.math:17496
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: What is a property?  (was: No Reification Here)
Followup-To: sci.logic,sci.philosophy.tech
Date: 30 Dec 1992 11:41:12 -0600
Organization: CS Dept, University of Texas at Austin
NNTP-Posting-Host: im4u.cs.utexas.edu

-*----
Does everyone in this discussion have the same notion of
property?  Perhaps just to make sure, or to enlighten me, one of
the participants would be kind enough to tell me what this notion
is. 

If I were asked whether every meaningful predicate expresses a
property, my first answer would be "yes, of course." Even an
expressive or attitudinal predicate such as "yummy" expresses a
property that some things have, namely, eliciting the attitude or
expression from the concerned speaker.  (Of course, to say this I
must either reify the predicate or relativize my logic.  Is this
Zeleny's point?)

Russell
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4631 sci.logic:2486
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 10:23:17 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
>PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>
>>But, I don't understand how using unreified predicates instead of
>>objects helps avoid set theoretic paradoxes. Grelling's paradox
>>uses only a predicate, and (unless I'm very confused) does not
>>require reification.
>
>You are very confused.  If Grelling's paradox is regarded as purely
>syntactical, then it is unproblematic on a Quinian view that requires
>stratification (as spurious as such a requirement might be); if, on
>the other hand, it is regarded as semantical, then the contradiction
>depends on the assumption that the predicate "...is heterological"
>expresses a _bona fide_ property.

Well, if I was confused before, I am more confused now.

First of all, if a view (Quinean or otherwise) requires stratification
to deal with a purely syntactical predicate, then the issue of
reification is not the salient one. Stratification is a strategy
for eliminating the paradoxes whether the predicates are reified or not.

Second, I have no idea whether "is heterological" expresses a bona
fide property. I care only that whether it is a meaningful predicate.
(What would it express if not a bona fide property? A trope?)

My point was that the Grelling paradox doesn't depend on any
quantification over properties, nor on a semantics that
assigns objects to predicates. It's solution is (must be)
independent of the question of reification.

Jamie
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 18:40:28 GMT

In article <1992Dec29.114844.18880@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1hpqgkINNmi6@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> 
>PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>
>>>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
>>>PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>
>J:
>>>>But, I don't understand how using unreified predicates instead of
>>>>objects helps avoid set theoretic paradoxes. Grelling's paradox
>>>>uses only a predicate, and (unless I'm very confused) does not
>>>>require reification.
>
>MZ:
>>>You are very confused.  If Grelling's paradox is regarded as purely
>>>syntactical, then it is unproblematic on a Quinian view that requires
>>>stratification (as spurious as such a requirement might be); if, on
>>>the other hand, it is regarded as semantical, then the contradiction
>>>depends on the assumption that the predicate "...is heterological"
>>>expresses a _bona fide_ property.
>
>J:
>>Well, if I was confused before, I am more confused now.
>
>You have my sympathies.
>
>J:
>>First of all, if a view (Quinean or otherwise) requires stratification
>>to deal with a purely syntactical predicate, then the issue of
>>reification is not the salient one. Stratification is a strategy
>>for eliminating the paradoxes whether the predicates are reified or not.
>
>Correct.  Stratification is a purely syntactical trick.  Rage away,
>Randall.

For Quine, it was; for me, it is not.

>
>J:
>>Second, I have no idea whether "is heterological" expresses a bona
>>fide property. I care only that whether it is a meaningful predicate.
>>(What would it express if not a bona fide property? A trope?)
>
>A predicate is meaningful, if and only if it expresses a property.
>
>J:
>>My point was that the Grelling paradox doesn't depend on any
>>quantification over properties, nor on a semantics that
>>assigns objects to predicates. It's solution is (must be)
>>independent of the question of reification.
>
>Well, that depends.  I suggested two interpretations of Grelling's
>paradox.  A purely syntactical one is blocked by stratification;

I think the analysis of the syntactical version of the paradox can be
exactly the same in NFU as in the usual set theory; I have proposed a
way to use stratification to avoid the paradox, but it isn't necessary
unless one is trying to pack a lot of strength into the language one
is using.

 on
>the other hand, the semantical one does not get off the ground, until
>and unless one comes up with a semantics that assigns a predicate
>object to the adjective `heterological'.  So there you are.

Precisely!

>
>>Jamie
>
>cordially,
>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."



-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4635 sci.logic:2491
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 14:45:19 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)

>Hey, 115 grains of jacketed hollowpoint at 1365 feet per second works
>fine against a headache; however I would advise other techniques, in
>the absence of an independent motivation.

Thanks, doc.

>Well, the difference is, if you reify the predicates, you stratify the
>properties.  This is known as type theory.  On the other hand, if you
>do not reify predicates, you stratify the syntax.  This is known as
>vacuous word games, excuse me, the New Foundations.

Oh. Well, yes, there's THAT difference.

>>I'm not sure I agree, by the way, that a predicate is meaningful if and
>>only if it expresses a property.
>
>Well, make up your mind then.

I'll try.

>>I can think of a couple of types of example. For one, one might agree
>>that a predicate is meaningful even though one thinks it should be
>>paraphrased out in a good, logical language. I suppose "yummy" might be
>>like that.
>
>Why would "paraphrasing out" eliminate the expression of any property?

Well, suppose someone suggested that "X is yummy" should be
paraphrased as "MMMMM, X!" Along the lines of emotivism.

As well you know, Simon Blackburn thinks that MANY predicates
should be paraphrased out that way. He thinks these predicates
express NO property, and yet that they are meaningful.

Even if you hate Blackburn, there are more respectable examples.
De Finetti was an expressivist about probability predicates, for
example. Allan Gibbard has a pretty good expressivist theory of
normative judgments.

>>"occurred yesterday" DOES express a property. So perhaps that isn't a
>>counterexample at all. But it expresses different properties on
>>different occasions.
>
>So what?

Ok, ok. So indexicals do express properties.

I suppose what I was thinking was that there is no property of
Yesterday Occurrence. Nevertheless, "Occurred yesterday" does
express a property on each occasion of utterance.

>Perhaps all words are best thought of as indexicals; this, after all,
>is one lesson of pragmatics.  However, I fail to see in what way this
>view would vitiate my claim that predicates are meaningful, iff they
>express a property.

Perhaps they are.

So I'm left with the Expressivist example.

Why don't you think that's a counterexample? Is it,
(a) because Expressivism is false,
(b) because a predicate with an Expressivist analysis is meaningless,
(c) because a predicate with an Expressivist analysis nonetheless
    expresses a property,

or something else?

Jamie
Organization: TECHNION - Israel Institute of Technology.
Date: Sunday, 20 Dec 1992 16:43:58 IST
From: Uri Zakai <RPR1ZAK@TECHNION.BITNET>
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: einstein and bergson

in 1925 bergson met einstein at the uni. of paris.
the two discussed each other uniqe preception of time (among other things).
the transcript of that meeting is essential to me - can anyone help me
find it - or point me in the right direction towards its location ?

thanks
uri zakai
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4659 sci.logic:2511
From: farris@ruhets.rutgers.edu (Lorenzo Farris)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Buddhism & Science
Date: 2 Jan 93 14:05:31 GMT
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.

In article <AG.92Dec31142758@bast.sics.se>, ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson) writes:
[lots deleted, including a discussion of a perceived
self-contradiction in the texts of Buddhism]
> 
> In my view then the idea (if meaningful at all) that the world
> can be understood through pure logic has nothing at all to do
> with Buddhism. 
> 

In my understanding of Buddhism, logic is quite integral. When one
begins to make a prelimary examination of the texts of Buddhism, one
will certainly find such inconsistencies. The reason for this, IMO,
goes as follows.

Buddhism is not simply a branch of philosophy. It is not meant to be a
coherent and logical system of thought. Upon detailed examination, it
may turn out to be, but that is not its primary function.

Buddhism is a complex of techniques and philosophy for the purpose, in
the short term, of ending mental suffering, and in the long term, of
direct perception of Reality. (Both of these ideas are indeed vague,
but the content of these ideas is not central to my argument.;)

The various scriptures of Buddhism are geared towards different levels
and temperaments of students of Buddhism. A 'beginning Buddhist' may
be recommended to read the sutras regularly, as a means of learning
proper conduct and attitude.

A 'pedantic Buddhist' would get railed against, as his attachment to
words keeps him from true wisdom.

In Buddhism, logic is used in the beginning to get people to live
rationally and in harmony.

Later, it is used to discrimate between what is real and what is
transient. A Buddhist logician says "this is not real, and that is not
real."

In esoteric buddhist teaching, certain knowledge cannot be transmitted
by words, it must be given by a teacher, who transmits that knowledge
through non-verbal means.

The above is not meant as a statement of the truth of Buddhism, or
anything else of the sort. I simply hoped to put into perspective some
of the perceived inconsistencies  in Buddhist scripture. If one really
wants to get into Buddhism as a rational endeavor, s/he should study
up on Buddhist logic, which I may have seen, but not in any formal
sense.

			-Lorenzo
-- 
Happiness is just a                     ******************************
remembrance away.                       *  Lorenzo Farris            *
                                        *  farris@ruhets.rutgers.edu *
                                        ******************************
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: MINDWALK - An exercise in Passionate Thought
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 1993 23:48:32 GMT

In article <memo.836293@cix.compulink.co.uk> shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk writes:
>In-Reply-To: <1992Dec31.165646.18294@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
>
>>In article <memo.834818@cix.compulink.co.uk> shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk >writes:
>>>In-Reply-To: <1992Dec21.172430.14371@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Ran
>dall Holmes)

[...]

>>>
>>>Randall, How can you assert that a model is reality?
>
>>How do you think science works if it does not refer to things as they
>>are?  (perhaps with some inaccuracies at any given time...)
>
>Good God! You are actually serious aren't you? You actually believe 
>that science deals with realities rather than with observations and 
>models! all that has puzzled me in your postings now becomes clear.

What frightens me is that my (obviously true) position has become
nearly impossible to communicate to some people.


[...]

>
>And if you must stick to determinism, and come up with some Bohm-like 
>implicate structure, all of these phenomena are but ripples on the 
>face of something more complex!

When did I advocate determinism?  The fact that everything is "a
ripple on the face of something more complex" does not indicate that
we are not talking about reality; it indicates that we can't do so as
precisely as we would like or that the way reality looks is
counterintuitive.  Moreover, the expression of this thought seems to
indicate that you think science _is_ attempting to discuss reality.

[...]

>
>>>
>>>And I alwways took you for an educated man. Tsk Tsk.
>
>>I am.
>
>That is waht frightens me ....

[Left in reference to my comment above]



-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: MINDWALK - An exercise in Passionate Thought
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 16:50:57 GMT

In article <memo.834815@cix.compulink.co.uk> shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk writes:
>In-Reply-To: <1992Dec23.233605.10674@fulcrum.oz.au> steve@fulcrum.oz.au (Steve Taylor)
>
>>I love that phrase. "Wrestling with phantasmal pigs" perfectly describes
>>the experience of trying to interpret new age science. I wish I could >remember whic
>h physicist to attribute this to (Fermi?), but "That`s 
>ot >right. That's not even wrong" also describes the confusion of 
>trying to >decode new age thinking.

Nice quotes!

>
>
>The trouble that I have, is that no thought is considered to be 
>worthe considering unless it has been published, and preferably years 
>ago by someone that some other academic has made a career out of 
>discussing:-)

For the record, any _thought_ is worth considering.

>
>
>The dilemma that anyone has who is trying to introduce new ideas is 
>this :-)
>
>           1/. Should he do the degree course, learn the jargon and the
>           BS and end up with all the originality knocked out of him, and 
>           become a teacher or computer scientist?
>
>           2/. Should he read Ayn Rand or Bohm,


I am stunned by this juxtaposition.  Let me pause to clear my head...

 and attempt to use some of           
> their less arcane concepts to make a point that Kant o
> Russell
>          may have missed, and thereby be labeled irretrievably as a 
>          'New Age' lunatic.

Rand can hardly be described as "New Age" (frequently wrong, but not
New Age!).

The capsule description of how to get new ideas also leaves me bemused. 

>
>          3/. Write it all down and make a popular film about it.
>
>          4/. Go back to masturbation in disgust.
>
>
>I have a 'strong intuition' that those who espouse Occam, would do 
>well to examine ALL the conceptual models of the universe - not just 
>the mediaeval time/space/matter/determinism of Newton, or the 
>Rational Forms of the greeks and latterly logicians.
>
>That way we might just come up with some simpler and cleaner views of 
>the universe, and ourselves.
>
>It is right to be critical of sloppy thinking. That is a logicians 
>pregogative. I think it is dangerous to refuse to consider 
>alternative possibile models of the universe.
             ^^^^^^^^^ 


>

We do consider as many _possible_ models of the universe as we can lay
our hands on.  We do not consider _impossible_ ones, and we do not have
the time or energy to talk all the advocates of impossible ones out of
their confusions.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: nar20@cas.org ()
Subject: Re: MINDWALK - An exercise in Passionate Th
Reply-To: nar20@cas.org
Organization: Chemical Abstracts Service
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 23:57:40 GMT


Erich Vandenloos writes:

>Nick insists:
>
>>Now some more enlightened scientists, are coming to a greater conscious 
>>realisation of this "Wholeness and the implicate order" and are beginning 
>>to develop theories/methodologies that will     point the way to more
>>coherent ideas in all fields.
>
>Wrong! Which enlightened scientists are you referring to, Terrence McKenna
>or Wilhelm Reich? Or maybe R.A. Wilson, high priest of cheap bourgeois self-
>indulgence and penny-ante mysticism for the lumpen-intellectual classes?
>That's about the only examples I can come up with, since most scientists
>are too busy doing real work to sit around dropping acid and "feeling."

Nick is probably referring to Dr. David Bohm (highly respected quantum physicist, 
former protege of Einstein's, and author of the classic textbook on Quantum Physics
used by most universities around the world) and a host of other scientists who 
have been following his lead with the "holographic" model of the universe.

For a good laymen's introduction to this model, try reading "The Holographic Universe"
by Michael Talbot, which can be found in most bookstores in the Science section.

- Neil
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Philosophy Departments in New England...
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 10:24:00 +0000


>        If you know of a philosopher with more wisdom than Ayn >Rand please enlighte
n me.

This appears to be a statement that cannot be complied with.

We do Stephen, we do, but it also appears that we cannot.

:-(

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder)
Subject: Re: MINDWALK - An exercise in Passionate Thought
Organization: Quake Public Access
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1993 07:48:50 GMT

In article <gaboy.725907423@well.sf.ca.us> gaboy@well.sf.ca.us (Gerald Boyack) writes:

>The only interesting aspect is to try to figure out why so many
>people clutch at any pseudo-science mysticism concocted by
>Capra/Penrose ilk.

>To say that the pseudo-science mysticism writers are snake oil
>salesmen does not answer the question of why so many people, in
>this day and age of education and information availability, buy
>the stuff.

I would say that this explains why they are so effectively spread, but it
doesn't explain why people are attracted.  It's certainly a good point though.

>As is the case for many questions, there is probably a
>combination of answers.  There is probably is an element of the
>need for the mother's breast, and for dreams of power to survive,
>but I feel that there is also a strong element of anti-science
>obsession.  Those who do not think deeply believe that the
>development of the atomic bomb caused the worrisome and expensive
>cold war, and that the development of pesticides caused all the
>ills of the body extant, and that the engineers who developed
>motors caused the oil spills.  Anything that suggests that
>scientists and engineers are both demonic and stupid has appeal
>to the unthinking, of whom there are seemingly more than there
>are homeless people on the news.

I think there's more than a little anti-science and anti-achievement
sentiment at work here.  If you are a fairly ineffective person (or see
yourself as essentially pathetic), every scientific discovery, engineering
achievement, or business success is seen as a slap in the face.  When such
people are confronted by the obvious evidence that others are bettwe
in certain ways than they are, the need to deny this is often strongly
felt.  Ayn Rand called it "Hatred of the good for being the good"...something
more evil than envy.

>I wonder why the modern mysticism muddlers have not organized
>into some sort of formal religion.  Perhaps they have and I do
>not know about it.   Anyone know of such a religion?

It's what is loosely called the "new age" movement.  It's sort of a mishmash
of every kind of irrational and anti-scientific belief.  If you visit one
of those new age book stores, you'll find the works of people like 
Capra, Penrose, and their friends displayed prominently.

--Brian
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta