From: hiraga@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Yuzuru Hiraga)
Subject: Re: The Northern Islands
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 09:51:31 GMT

# Sorry for the sloppy reply...

In article <1992Sep25.145337.20776@acuson.com> miklg@acuson.com (Michael Goldman ) writes:
>	I don't know why else the USSR would go to Potsdam if not to
>	meet with allies against Japan.

I still don't see why you are still pulling on this.

>	I think the problem is that I see the terms of surrender in a
>	more general context than you seem to.

That's true.

>	As I see it, the Potsdam declaration was on the order of
>	"Japan gives up, and the allies will run the country as they wish."
	...
>	The allies could have divided Japan up anyway they wanted.

I don't see what you're suggesting by this, but it shouldn't mean that
the allies had absolute freehand on doing anything.  The proclamation
itself presents conditions of surrender(?: is this the proper wording?),
which obviously presents a point of restraint to the allies themselves.
On territorial issues, this reads the enforcement of the Cairo Declaration
(to give up all the Pacific islands obtained since 1914, all territories
in China including Manchuria and Taiwan to be returned to China,
and to achieve independence of Korea), and that the sovereignty of Japan
is to be restricted to the four main islands and peripheral islands that
the allies designate.  Had the allies gone beyond this, then regardless
of whether or not Japan fights back (she won't), they would be biting their
own hands.  Japanese surrender is an act of diplomatic agreement,
no matter how one-sided it may be.

>	Japan was in no position to bargain, so whether or not
>	the Kuriles or the USSR were mentioned is irrelevant.

Thus this can't be agreed.

>	In fact, the USSR entered the war before Japan accepted Potsdam so I
>	don't see where the surprise comes from.

Surprise of what?
The fact is that USSR was not among the initial signers of the proclamation,
and Japan accepted it as was presented.

>	On August 8, 1945
>	Ambassador Sato met with Molotov who informed Sato that the
>	Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact had been canceled years
>	before by Japan's assistance of Germany.

Agreeing this is subsidiary, doesn't this sound like a typical excuse
one gives for self- (and only self) justification?  Just like the
many excuses Japan gave for invading/occupying Korea and China.

>	But to me, this seems like petty legalistic arguments.

Well, see below.

>	Perhaps Japan can consider the Kuriles as a permanent
>	memorial of the errors of their leaders prior to 1945.

No.  There's no denying that Japan has commited many errors and criminal acts,
and that they are yet to be compensated for, both economically and from
humanitarian aspects.  But that doesn't mean that any act against Japan
is permissible or could go unopposed.  Drawing on a hypothetical (and
highly provocative) example, had China or Korea occupied some islands as
a means of compensation or retaliation, I would consider it quite differently.
This is not the case with USSR/Russia and the northern islands.
(And further drawing a provocative analogy, you don't sound much different
from saying that the US should give up Hawaii to Japan or any other nation
because of its misdeeds to its natives, as well as to the mainland native
Americans.)

>	Possession is the reality.  Legalisms can be debated endlessly
>	but if Japan wants the islands back, arguing on what was or
>	wasn't included in treaties won't do it.

Hmm... I hope you're not advocating for sheer power politics (or are you?).
If possession is the reality, then weaker nations are completely at the
mercy of stronger ones with no means for claiming their rights.
(And does this "debated endlessly" mean between you and me, or Japan and
Russia?)
What I can say is that we are seeing things from a completely different angle.
Debating on legitimacy is only the bottom line.
If one has abandoned appealing to military means, or is in no position of
doing so, then what other way is there but negotiation (including offers
of alternatives in return)?  And if one can't establish its legitimacy,
how can one even ground such a claim as a right?
If there is no legitimacy in the claim, then I see absolutely no reason
that Russia should give the islands back.

And, may I ask, are you, in your opinion, granting any legitimacy to
Japan's claim? (I would think so, or otherwise you wouldn't have
mentioned the slightest possibility of Japan getting the islands back).
# And can anyone explain the difference between "legality" and "legitimacy"?
# which is the appropriate in this case?

>	- Michael Goldman

- Yuzuru Hiraga

# BTW: your appologies heartily accepted - no hard feelings.
# (actually, there was none from the beginning.)