From: billb@owlnet.rice.edu (William Stenson Blackwell)
Subject: Re: Convoys (was Re: Bush's position on Bosnia)
Organization: Rice University
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 18:10:51 GMT

In article <1992Aug18.075056.23622@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>, buckley@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (BUCKLEY  CHARLES RAY) writes:
|> The way I pictures the B-52 working was that after a unit was engaged a B-52
|> on sentry over the Med. would come over the enemy unit and drop a load of HE.
|> The idea I have is a deployment in depth along both sides of the Road to the
|> depth of several miles. A group infiltrating from the outside would have to
|> go through numerous levels of depth (ala Korea). Other units would operate
|> with the convoy with a number of units posted in each village along the way.
|> Other units would be posted every few miles along the road. Response times
|> to an attack would be very short and the attacking units would have very little
|> time to severely damage the convoy. I am talking about a deployment and 
|> intervention on the order of a division for every ten miles of road. This would
|> equate to about 10-12 divisions. The force would be composed of the US's light
|> infantry divisions (7th, 10th, 25th) among others. Special forces like you
|> envision would be tasked to operate outside the valley. France would sure as
|> hell better send more than their 1,100 man offer. (I have read every on of
|> the Falkenberg series as well as all of Pournelle's other books - including
|> his collaborations). The idea behind what I plan is that it will make it
|> much more difficult to strike at the convoy. The downside is that there will
|> be a lot more potshots taken at the troops defending the convoys.
|> >
|> Viet Nam is an iffy allusion here. The US spread itself very thin within
|> the country side itself. I remember a statistc were some guy claimed that
|> there were at most 50,000 combat troops operating in the field at any given
|> time. The rest were general support. This gave a lot of room for the VC to
|> manuever. If you exemine the current state of training, you will find that
|> low intensity warfare is one of the more common types of training now
|> being used for the units I mentioned. A pass system and a registration of
|> everyone who lives in the region are quite possible. With the availibility
|> of laptop computers and modems, a checkpoint could quickly evaluate a
|> persons pass. A date would be given for the surrender of all arms in the
|> towns locted along the road. An attack would result in a house to house
|> search any firearm found would be confiscated and the residents arrested
|> (not effective except as a deterent for some people -  any moron would
|> store the gun elsewhere). A general martial law would be installed.
|> Since this is the UN, some form of liberty must be maintained so, Residents
|> wishing to travel after hours could call for UN approval. A pass would be 
|> delivered to the resident. The pass would be in the form of a credit card
|> type material with a magnetic strip encoding the information about the pass.
|> Anyone caught without a pass or with a counrtfeit pass would be arrested.
|> 

I think one thing that you're overlooking is that IF we send in enough troops
into B-H to accomplish your plan, the need for convoys will be obviated.  If
there are enough troops to cordone off that much area, then there are enough
troops there to stop the fighting.  A question arose in my mind, though.  Are
you talking about 10-12 divisions total, or 10-12 divisions of purely combat
troops?  If the latter, then you will end up sending over, roughly 450K troops,
with an additional complement of similar proportions to provide logistics,
artillery, medivac, maintenance, etc.  This is a prohibitively large force,
especially in light of the nastiness that our dear George is planning for
Saddam.  I still don't think this is worth it.  I think a better approach
would be to set up hardened posts every 20 miles, with a complete firebase and
CAS/gunship refuelling station.  Then, send a limited amount of troops
(a battalion of Cav and Mounted infantry) with each convoy.  Then, the night 
before you send out the convoy, let a full team of SEALs loose, as well as 
a Bn. of Rangers and the 10th SOF Group.  This in turn would allow for an 
effective convoy system.  The tanks can provide immediate support for the 
MI, while the convoy itself will never be out of range of the arty.  If 
significant trouble erupts, you'll have a platoon of gunships standing by (with
spotters already "in the woods") to provide point-of-fire suppression.  Besides
which, the SpecWar troops are awfully good at this sort of Recon/Search-and-
Destroy sort of thing.  However, this is only going to be effective (albeit
with casualties) as long as it remains Serbian Guerrillas vs. Muslim vs. etc.
As soon as Serbia proper enters into it (i.e. with ground troops) then the 
scale of involvement that you advocate becomes necessary, but in an offensive
manner, rather than as an occupying force.  I just don't know.  I don't
think this is worth our involvement.  If we end up doing something, I'd just
as soon it were a spanking to the ones responsible, rather than devastating a
country were trying to protect.  As I continually disclaim, I'm not very good
with strategic thinking (esp. in an area where I haven't been/seen recon for).
There may be a way to pull this off, but I say let's go with what our experts
say and economically isolate the place.  I know it's hard ignoring the death
wails of orphans, but let's not create too many orphans of our own.

-- 
Bill Blackwell             P H P <==me!   "A just request is to be met
billb@owlnet.rice.edu     F L L F       in silence, by the act."
Houston, Texas, USA          8       -Dante Alighieri "Inferno" XXIV ln.77-78
"My opinions are mine, no one else is that stupid"
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