From: Lawrence Crowl <crowl@jade.cs.orst.edu>
Subject: Re: Joint Commands vs General Staffs
Organization: Computer Science Department, Oregon State University
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:35:27 GMT


From Lawrence Crowl <crowl@jade.cs.orst.edu>


In article <Bwy40D.DA6@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> fsjfz@acad3.alaska.edu writes:
>[In the Grenada invasion] I fully believe that those two Marine companies
>could have secured the entire island on their own, without airborne/ranger
>battalions(!) dropping from the sky.

Yes, but in how long?  Landing at the beach and driving to the center
will be slower than dropping in on the center.  By its very nature, the
deliberate unstoppable amphibious assault was not what the situation
called for.

>By definition, island campaigns are Navy/Marine `turf' and it was the
>Army who really didn't belong there.

If you say amphibious assaults are Navy/Marine `turf', I'll agree.
However, a parachute drop by the army may be appropriate even when the
landing zone is on an island.  (This does not excuse the fact that
neither air drop had the equipment to take out an APC.)  This "island
implies marines" thinking is a product of not having officers whose
job is to evaluate the need for different services on a case-by-case
basis.

>  Luttwak's arguement to the contrary, I have seen various joint exercises in
>action, and generally, the services cooperate when they have to.  In Saudi
>Arabia, ...

The problem is not the cooperation when the bullets start flying, but
cooperation before the action, when this year's budget has more reality
than next year's possible contingency.

>  IMHO, a National Defense Staff would simply add another link to the chain of
>command, that might not be beneficial.

Luttwak's proposal didn't add another link, it changed the existing
links.  In fact, he was quite careful to not change existing links.
The current "unified" and "specified" commands would be turned over to
NDS officers.  He did suggest some reorganization; as I recall the big
ones were consolidation of the air force and navy strategic nuclear
systems into a single command and creation of a serious transportation
command.

>  Service officers would not necessarily
>trust their NDS superiors- after all, an Army battalion commander who finds
>himself under an NDS general officer who was previously a Navy Captain might
>feel that the NDS officer doesn't fully understand his position, etc.

If an NDS officer is directly commanding an Army battalion, the
combined operation is very small, possibly more appropriate to the
marines.  In any event, the NDS officer's job is to understand the
battalion commander's position as well as understanding and integrating
the destroyer commander's and the F-111 squadron commander's
positions.  NDS officers will have incentive to be widely literate,
as current officers are not.

>To be effecitve, NDS officers would either have to be equally proficient in
>all types of warfare- a jack of all trades and master of none, or else
>specialize.

NDS officers would specialize in coordinating and commanding inter-service
actions.  They would not be jacks of all trades, but specialized for the
combined effort.  This is not something current officers get much training in.

>Also, the selection of officers for the NDS would be problematic.  If the NDS
>selected officers itself, there would be two problems: 1) the services would
>copmplain about all their best officers being taken for NDS duties ``never to
>return''- that means that substandard Colonels are left to provide a leadership
>pool for that service at the top.  That means substandard Generals and Admirals
>down the line.

Luttwak's proposal was to have the NDS officers _invite_ officers from
the services.  An officer is free to refuse, meaning competent officers
will rise in both service and NDS areas.  My guess is the selection
will be driven primarily by the interest of the officers.  Officers
with strong service loyalty will stay in the service.  Officers with a
burning desire to get involved in national defense strategy will go to
the NDS.

>2) The NDS could easily become clique ridden.  A preponderance
>of Army officers with their service loyalties would attempt to recruit mainly
>Army candidates into the NDS.  ...

Any reasonable system would recruit from the services in proportion to
their size.  The clique problem won't be any worse than it is now.

>  If the services assigned officers to the NDS, it would quickly become a
>backwater for the very same colonels that are deemed not quite general officer
>material.  ...

Any institution that has someone else define who the employees are is doomed
to problems.  The NDS has to choose (ask for) its own officers.

Remember, the NDS will never be very large.  You need only enough officers
for the various commands and the policy and planning staffs to support them.

-- 
  Lawrence Crowl		503-737-2554	Computer Science Department
			   crowl@cs.orst.edu	Oregon State University
	      ...!hplabs!hp-pcd!orstcs!crowl	Corvallis, Oregon,  97331-3202

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