HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Charlatan or Ignoramus? You decide! (was re: "Consciousness Explained")
Date: 8 Oct 92 19:32:00 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Oct8.153202.16177
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <26646@castle.ed.ac.uk> 
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <burt.718400899@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca>
>burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:

>>wadley@mullauna.cs.mu.OZ.AU (Gregory Robert Wadley) writes:

CRW:
>>>I'm reading "Consciousness Explained" by Dan Dennett.

BV:
>>  I can tell you my reaction ...
>>exercise of his ego .... sell me a bill
>>of goods ... rather patronizing attitude ... offensive ...
>>arguments ... not convincing .... agree with ...
>>Zelaney that the book was intellectually dishonest.

CM:
>Despite promising us a detailed review, and being asked detailed
>questions by a number of posters, Zeleny in the end refused to make
>any detailed criticisms, contenting himself with his usual well-turned
>sneers. Care to give some examples of why you found the book
>unconvincing and dishonest, or did you just want to share your
>feelings with us?

This is hardly fair, Chris.  In between my usual sneers, I managed to cite
Dennett's ludicrous way of dealing with objections from McGinn, Nagel, and
Searle, giving both page numbers and reasons for my thinking so (e.g his
bizarre qualitative distinction between a computer program and a "mere"
look-up table, of which a great deal was made in subsequent conversation).
In the ensuing discussion, I made a more substantive point, by observing
that Dennett's underlying idiom of "intentional stance" rests on precisely
the same kind of representational opposition between subject and qualia, or
sign and object, as the one his theory implicitly denies.  While the former
observation substantiated my charges of intellectual dishonesty, and
eventually mutated into an inconclusive debate on implementation between
Dave Chalmers and myself, the second one, in my opinion, constitutes an
even better way of refuting Dennett's reductionist views than the alleged
_reductio ad absurdum_ by way of gainsaying his denial of qualia.  For a
logical self-contradiction is a far greater offence to reason than a
paradoxical, counterintuitive conclusion.  Thus I contend that I fulfilled
my obligation by substantiating my characterization of Dennett as a
charlatan or an ignoramus.

>-- 
>Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 14 Oct 92 19:16:57 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <Bv4C3v.GCK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>Well, obviously all these beliefs and desires must be characterized
>holistically.  Nobody thinks, any more, that you can define a
>belief by a straightforward behavioural definition irrespective
>of the contents of other beliefs and desires.  Many beliefs will
>never exhibit themselves in behaviour, but it seems that there
>are always counterfactual circumstances under which they *would*.

Can these counterfactuals involve changes in beliefs and desires?
Because if not I don't see why there should always be such
counterfactuals.

>Further, it just seems logically or conceptually impossible
>that something could have the same functional organization as me,
>but lack beliefs entirely, or have substantially different
>beliefs.  In what could the relevant difference consist (apart
>from a possible lack of consciousness, but let's set that aside
>as a separate issue)?

Why should anyone agree to that?

Anyway, I would say a duplicate zombie would have no beliefs,
because belief has a conscious aspect and it's missing.

-- jd
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: "Consciousness Explained"
Date: 7 Oct 92 20:12:24 GMT


  Just a personal reaction.  I'd give some specifics but the book and I
are in different provinces at present.  What was most irritation was the
feeling I got that the book (and hence author) did not respect his
readers. burt voorhees
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: oz@nexus.yorku.ca (Ozan Yigit)
Subject: Charlatan or Ignoramus? You decide!
Keywords: zeleny, c.a.p. archive, ignoramus
Organization: York University
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 06:45:41 GMT

Michael Zeleny writes:

			... Thus I contend that I fulfilled
   my obligation by substantiating my characterization of Dennett as a
   charlatan or an ignoramus.

Those interested in the complete transcripts of above mentioned
bit of zelenyana may be pleased to note that comp.ai.philosophy
archives start (oct 91) with the related articles. I attach the
necessary information below.

enjoy...	oz
---
A partial [1] archive of comp.ai.philosophy starting from late oct 91
is available for anonymous ftp under nexus.yorku.ca [130.63.9.66], in
pub/c.a.p.

total 5768
-rw-rw-r--  1 oz       13             87 Feb 28 17:33 README
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13         461963 May 13 15:32 apr.92.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13         979121 Feb 21 16:06 dec.91.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13        1138282 May 13 15:32 feb.92.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13        1287861 Feb 21 16:06 jan.92.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13        1102027 May 13 15:33 mar.92.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13         841332 Feb 21 16:06 nov.91.tar.Z
-rw-r--r--  1 oz       13          22849 Feb 21 16:06 oct.91.tar.Z

each tar file for a specific month contains a directory of individual
articles posted within that month, as received by our main news host.
[filenames are numbered in article reception order, which may/may not
correspond to the posting order.]
---
[1]: I have 6 more megs of c.a.p to unpack and include in the archive.
ps: as an internetworking courtesy, please try to avoid ftp transfers
    during peak working hours, i.e. 9.00am-5:00pm EST.
---
postings are long, life is short.    |    internet: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
                    -- anonymous     |    phone: 416 736 2100 x 33976
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 18:55:16 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <3078@news.cerf.net> snodgras@cyber.net (John E. Snodgrass) writes:
>In article <1992Oct06.011603.121346@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>In article <3027@news.cerf.net> snodgras@cyber.net (John E. Snodgrass) writes:
>>> Without the purpose of attempting to survive, organisms
>>>would not evolve. (But one cannot logically assert this purpose
>>>also evolved.)
>>
>>The depth of misunderstanding in this statement boggles the mind.  The
>>ESSENSE of the Darwinian theory of evolution is that no "purpose" of
>>attempting to survive is required for evolution.  Mutating, self-replicating
>>entities evolve, purpose or no.
>
>      My intent was not
>to regurgitate what someone else said about evolution, including Darwin.
>My intent was to argue that purpose IS behind the operation of systems, and
>that by recognizing this purpose we move toward understanding these systems
>better. This is not unscientific. You can say that 'the purpose of survival
>is not necessary for evolution', but that is an empty suggestion. You know
>that organisms do have the purpose to survive, because you are an organism,
>and that is your purpose! If this is not true, then I fail to understand
>what you mean by purpose!

As an intelligent entity, I have a number of purposes, one of which is to
survive.  Why should I single out this purpose as my purpose *as an
organism*?

And yet, Darwinian evolution, by its very mechanism, selects for survival.

>      When we look at organisms, in terms of structure or behavior, we
>do analyse them in terms of purpose. Why does such and such a finch have
>a tougher beak than this other finch on another island? Because, in order
>to surive it had to crack this other, harder type of nut (or something).
>Now, you can suggest that no purpose (i.e. to get food) is involved in
>this analysis, and therefore an assessment of the better beak for this
>purpose is somehow projecting ideas onto what is happening, but that is
>fake objectivity. Internally you think purpose, while externally you
>say 'mechanism'. This posturing itself _serves no purpose_.

I have no problem with saying that the purpose of the beak is to crack the
harder type of nut.  But I will insist that this is *not* exactly the same
meaning of the word purpose as I have when I say, for example, that my
purpose in writing this is to get people to agree with me.  One "purpose"
derives from the evolutionary dynamic; the other is inseparably part of the
behavior of an intelligent entity.
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 15 Oct 92 17:42:37 GMT
Article-I.D.: mp.1992Oct15.174237.1730
Organization: Northern Illinois University

In article <7708@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>I think that's a factor.  But, for instance, supposing it's true that
>Daryl McCullough is a (the only?) behaviorist.  Why is it that so few
>people on the "pro-AI" side take issue with his arguments?

Daryl presents this point of view as a casual side remark, and does not
use it as the basis for any argument.  Thus there doesn't seem to be
anything worth taking issue with.

>Now, I'd be happy to be wrong.  If, in fact, most people on the
>net, or in AI, think the Turing Test is bogus, that would be great.

I don't believe they think it bogus.  More likely they think it an no
more than a crude ad hoc test until we understand intelligence rather
better.  The problem seems to be that you are reading much more into
the TT than others intend.

>For instance, I said the other day that students in Edinburgh
>would argue that the Eliza program had a small amount of real
>understanding, and that the person teaching the course might
>argue on the same side.  Can they really be thinking of the
>functional organization of Eliza?

People are often fooled by stage magicians too.  So what? Does it occur
to you that perhaps these people are using the word "understanding" in
a different way from you?

>Or consider all the people who express the systems reply as "the
>system understands".  This is a minor detail, but what are people
>thinking when they say it?  Are they thinking `a la McDermott
>that the reason for saying the system understands would be the 
>theory used to construct it?  If so, why didn't they say so?

Why should they say so?  This is a natural implicit assumption.  Searle
allows us to assume that a suitable system exists, so it is natural
to implicitly assume that this system has the "right" functional
organization.
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 12 Oct 92 18:32:27 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <BvzuxI.Hqv@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7653@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>                 it's clear that my zombie
>twin would go around *claiming* to have qualia, even though he
>didn't, and one can ask similar questions about the justification
>of those claims.

Well, this is true, but it's not clear that is shows anything
interesting in itself.  That is, I don't think it shows very much
that a zombie _claims_ to have qualia.

>>>On the first question, though, it seems to me that the functional
>>>explanation of why we think we have qualia may actually be
>>>quite straightforward.  In fact, it seems to me that any
>>>system with a reasonable capacity for perceptual discrimination,
>>>say between different waveforms of light, as well as a reasonable
>>>capacity for reflection, would have such beliefs.  They make
>>>certain discriminations (causally) between different kinds of
>>>waveforms, A and B, and then you ask them how they made the
>>>discrimination.
>>
>>Where do the qualia come in?
>
>The qualia don't come in to this explanation, as this is an
>explanation of *behaviour*, and as such is entirely physical.

I thought it was supposed to be at least "the functional explanation
of why we think we have qualia" (and not just of why we behave as
if we think we do).  

Anyway, I, at least, think I have qualia, and I don't just behave as
if I think so.  Moreover, the reason I think I have qualia is that I
have them and can tell that I do.  Qualia are therefore part of 
the explanation of my behaviour, but wouldn't be part of the
explanation of a zombie's behaviour (because a zombie doesn't
have qualia).

-- jd
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: oz@ursa.sis.yorku.ca (Ozan Yigit)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: York U. Student Information Systems Project
	<SMAILL.92Oct13181836@tummel.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <7708@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 18:39:05 GMT

Jeff Dalton writes:

   Part of the reason may be another factor which we might call
   "temporary alliances of expediency" or "the enemy of my enemy
   is my friend". [etc]

Jeff, really, have we not had enough of this "conspiracy theory of
the philosophy of mind" bit of yours, not to mention your "diagnosis"
of our would-be problems, and the recurring discourse on the alleged
alliances of the materialists, those in the grips of ideologies and
the so-called anti-searle side, ad nauseam?

Please, this is not getting us anywhere.

oz
---
... it isn't always necessary to have as your aim the winning of
arguments (by one side or another).  A sometimes more reasonable
aim is to obtain information. -- Jeff Dalton
From: miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: The Cosmological Bad Dream
Date: 8 Oct 92 06:57:25 CDT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <1992Oct07.184641.129725@Cookie.secapl.com>, frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
> In article <1992Oct7.013230.20350@tamsun.tamu.edu> e343mh@tamuts.tamu.edu (Michael Hand) writes:
>>Frank Adams writes:
>>>If I assert, "I saw the man come in.  He was tall, thin,
>>>brown-haired, wore glasses, and smoking a cigar.", and it turns out his hair
>>>is actually black instead of brown, you don't necessarily conclude that my
>>>assertion was "false".  It *do* conclude that it was not correct in every
>>>detail.
>>
>>No, you don't *necessarily* conclude this, but it's true anyway -- 
>>assuming the definite description successfully denotes.  The second
>>claim is a conjunction, and is thus false if even one conjunct is
>>false.
>>Does this really need pointing out in sci.philosophy.TECH, for x's sake?
> 
> It is correct that a literal interpretation of my statement is false (under
> the given assumptions).  But the essential import of my statement is not
> this literal interpretation, but rather more like, "he looked approximately
> like this".  And *this* is not falsified by my being incorrect about some
> details.
> 
> This kind of imprecision is very common in ordinary discourse.  Any theory
> of human utterances which fails to take it into account is grossly
> insufficient, and it is not surprising that such a theory might produce
> absurd results like "scientific theories are not assertions".

You're absolutely right to bring up imprecision (pragmatic theories do
take it into account; in fact it's a central idea; see my remarks on the
original thread).  But the example you chose (the black hair and the
brown hair) doesn't work in any context *I* can imagine.

-- 
-Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> {Sometimes you have to look reality straight
 OPINIONS ARE MY OWN            {in the eye, and deny it. - G. Keillor
From: snodgras@cyber.net (John E. Snodgrass)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 11 Oct 92 03:49:16 GMT
Organization: The Cyberspace Station

In article <7657@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>One of the things that completely surprised me when I came to
>the Edinburgh AI Dept was that some students would defend the
>idea that ELIZA wasn't just a "trick", and that (so far as
>I could tell) they really thought this was the case.  That is,
>they weren't just defending it for the sake of argument.
>What surprised me even more was that members of the faculty
>were prepared to defend the same position.
>
>I still don't know what to make of this.

      As I mentioned earlier to Chalmers, the cause of these claims of
consciousness in machines is just the flip side of the suggestion that
living systems are themselves machines -- a sort of nerdy scientific
creationism. Presumably in this philosophy, in other words, living things
are fashioned by 'physical laws' acting on 'matter'. A better way to look
at it, which clears up both issues, is to recognize that living structures
and material systems have organized themselves, built up themselves. We
have no trouble with this when we look at human society -- human beings
created the cities and technology which is integral to our lives. Evolution
created (through the energies of living things) more complex, larger and
more 'advanced' organisms. Thus within the scope of easy observation we
see that self-organization and development are a fact. Creationists, on
the other hand, want to assert that these structures were created by some
_external_ agency. In the case of modern physicists, this agency takes
the form of 'physical laws'.

      It is the equivalence of 'created by physical laws' and 'created by
humans' that gives the machine the status of the living thing, i.e. its
own creator. Both are simply mechanisms created by an external agency, so
why couldn't machines be conscious? However, looked at the other way, i.e.
in terms of self-organization, machines are profoundly different from
living systems. Living systems, in this view, created themselves. Therefore
they must possess an infinite or indefinate regression of some sort to
have accomplished this. Machines, on the other hand, are merely matter
which already exists in its own right, being pressed into the service of
self-organizing systems for the purpose of enabling them to further self
organize. Thus there is no equivalence at the basic level. And this, IMO,
eliminates any basis for suggesting machine consciousness, e.g. as a function
of program complexity.

>
>-- jd



      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net]
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Assumptions vs. assertions (was: Re the Cosmological Bad Dream)
From: snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 23:20:45 PDT
Organization: NetLink Online Communications, San Diego CA

frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:

> >to the Cosmological Bad Dream) there are scientific utterances that
> >I don't know whether to assign to (a) or (b), such as a detailed
> >description of the first three minutes in the existence of the
> >universe.
> 
> I think these things are clearly in category (a).  Why should a detailed
> description of the first 3 minutes of the universe be any less of an
> assertion than a detailed description of Paris last summer?  In neither case
> can we go back and look.  We make the best guess we can based on the
> evidence; we are prepared to modify it if new evidence disproves it; and
> there will always remain some residual doubt, since the evidence is
> necessarily incomplete.  The evidence in the case of the first 3 minutes of
> the universe is more sketchy, and so the amount of doubt is higher; and it
> may indeed be the case that the public does not understand the appropriate
> level of doubt and inexactitude for these kinds of statements.  But this is
> a conventional problem of misunderstanding, not anything fundamental.


      "The public" is hardly the only ones who don't understand the
appropriate level of doubt for these things. As I said in my original
post, Freeman Dyson, a physicist of some note, presenting himself as
public interpreter on these matters, plainly _does not himself believe
these matter ARE in doubt_! And don't tell me he's the only one. The
big bang model is highly dubious in every way that a model COULD BE,
yet if you go over to sci.physics and start casting asperions, you will
probably be deluged with the annoyed remarks of _true believers_, not
casual observers. To claim that the public is experiencing a
"conventional problem of misunderstanding" is stretching it a bit. What
we have is a self-serving group of people, i.e. cosmologists, who would
like nothing better than to be taken seriously in these pronouncements.
And they are.

      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net]

--                    
INTERNET:  snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
UUCP:   ...!ryptyde!netlink!snodgras
NetLink Online Communications * Public Access in San Diego, CA (619) 453-1115
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 05:45:25 GMT

In article <7652@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <Bup1Hs.Dxn@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>It seems flase to me that we can explain anything we say or believe
>about consciousness without postulating consciousness itself.  Why
>do you think it is the case?

Because we can explain behaviour in physical terms, in principle,
and the things we say about consciousness are part of our
behaviour.  If one believes (as I do) that consciousness does not
logically supervene on the physical, the conclusion falls out.

>>Given that the explanatory basis of our claims about
>>consciousness can be given in entirely functional terms,
>
>Um, how do you know that?  I've yet to see such an explanation,
>or even hear of one.

An explanation exists in principle for the above reasons.  As for
a very tentative example of how such an explanation might go, see
my paper "Consciousness and Cognition", or the sketchy summary
in previous articles.  The details of such an argument don't
need to be given for the in-principle point to remain valid,
however.  Behaviour is physically caused, so one can explain
behaviour (in principle) in terms of patterns of physical causation.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech