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Posted-Date: Wed, 19 Aug 92 10:07:53 PDT
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Wed, 19 Aug 1992 10:07:53 PDT
From:         marken@AERO.ORG
Subject:      Drivers, cognition, & PCT and perception

[From Rick Marken (920819.1000)]

penni sibun (920818.2000)

>  going from the retinal map to
>seeing objects is not a higher cognitive function--the process of
>perceiving, even in the eye, never mind the brain, is extremely
>complex,

Of course. I assume that the functions that transform sensory inputs into
perceptual signals are extremely complex. If the computation carried out
by these functions are the "work" of which you speak then we are in
violent agreement. This idea of "work" is certainly not new; since at
least the mid 60s we've had a pretty good idea that the neural activity
that corresponds to perceptual experience is the result of complex
functions carried out at many layers of the nervous system. Look
at the work of Hubel, Weisel,Ratliff, Letvin, Hartline,  -- to say nothing
of Ernst Mach. To call these neural computations "work" seems to add little
to the notion; the functional computations that are carried out deliver (to me,
a least) a continuous, uninterrupted flow of experience. It was in this
sense that I rejected the idea that "work" was involved. Sure, there are
complex computations, requiring activity in lots of neurons, and certain
functions may involve more neural firing than others -- so in that sense
there may be differntial amounts of "work" -- but I don't think work is
a particularly helpful way to look at perceptual processing. I like to think
of it as a functional relationship p = f (s) -- neural firing,p, ( that is
the perceptual signal) is a function of the sensory signals, s. The function
operates continuously over time -- so p is a time varying function of s
(where s is a vector, not a scalar). And f() can be quite complex.

> and not at all a matter of passing an uninterpreted signal
>down the line.  at least, so say the tons of literature, and our
>resident psychologist, whom i consulted just in case i had missed a
>major shift in the field.

What is an "interpreted" signal? All there are in the brain, as far as
we know, are signals. The only possible "interpretation" of the signal
is the function, f(), that produced it. The signal is always just a
signal; but what it "means" depends on how it was derived. How do you
imagine that perception works? Do you think the neuron's carry "interpreted"
signals? What are these? Are they like names -- "Here comes a flower
perception". Something like that?

>not really.  remember, i started out denying that there was such a
>thing as an ``environment.''  and i also denied that there is a locus
>of control anywhere.

Well, then it's going to be real hard to get you interested in control
theory. Your assumptions obviate the need to explain the basic
phenomenon of control.

>as an aside, i don't think behavior is ``what *needs* to be done.''  i
>think it's what *is* done.

I have spent the last ten years trying to develop demonstrations that
would show that precisely that assumption is wrong. The idea the behavior
is "what *is* done" is the fundemental assumption of ALL psychologies --
behaviorism, cognitivism, psychoanalysis, psycholinguistics and, apparently,
interactionism. You seem to be committed to this point of view -- so I don't
imagine that it will be possible to sway you. Most people feel the same
way -- at least tacitly. If you are willing to try to see our point of view,
I would recommend reading about (and, better yet, doing) what I call my
Mind Reading program (described in chap 2 of my book of the same name).
The program shows how a person can clearly and unequivocally be "doing"
five different things (moving five objects on the screen) but only
doing one thing "intentionally".  An observer cannot see which of the
five behaviors is intentional so any one or all could be called the
behavior (doings) of the subject. But, from the subject's perspective, he or
she is only doing one thing -- moving one of the objects. The computer,
using "the test for the controlled variable", can tell which of these behaviors
is being done intentionally -- so it is reading the subject's intention
(mind) -- hence, the program does "mind reading".

Have a good time with the interactionism.

Regards

Rick


     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)
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