Organization: Queen's University at Kingston
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 12:12:00 EDT
From: John G. Spragge <SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA>
Newsgroups: can.politics
Subject: Re: Senate Interrogation
Distribution: can
 <schuck.721165680@sfu.ca> <LABACH.92Nov9083820@acs5.acs.ucalgary.ca>
 <92316.135417SPRAGGEJ@QUCDN.QueensU.CA> <schuck.721543654@sfu.ca>

In article <schuck.721543654@sfu.ca>, schuck@fraser.sfu.ca (Bruce Jonathan
Schuck) says:

>Does the alternative hold true for the US?
>
>Was the US war production efforts impaired because nobody was bombing
>civilian businesses in LA, Detroit, San Diego, New York?
>
>Ha ha ha ha. I find such a theory laughable.

I do not think your response involves the level of serious reflection
or respect the issue demands. To give your sneer a serious answer: if
the axis powers had bombed the production centres of the US, the
American government could have diverted additional resources to the
production of armaments, at the expense of rebuilding and civilian
lives. That would have had no relevance, because of enormous
American industrial system completely overshadowed Germany's, and
because the US government would not redirect resources with the
totalitarian ruthlessness of the Germans.

>Returning to Germany's war production: Wasn't it harmed by the bombing
>of rail yards, and transportation centres because it took longer to
>get raw material to the factories? I think so!

You think wrongly. The CEP (circle around the target within which
the bomb falls) assumed by Air Marshall Harris amounted to half
a mile for night bombing. The aim of the night bomber offensive
had little to do with damage to specific installations; it involved
killing workers, destroying cities, and breaking civilian morale.

>I could go on and on.

I am sure you could, but without mentioning the most important
issue: the cost. The cost in resources amounted to up to a third
of Britain's war effort. Directed elsewhere, that might have
meant faster progress in North Africa and Italy, more complete
air cover for the North Atlantic convoys, and more ships and
planes to cover the infamous "Murmansk run". We will never know
the full meaning of the cost in lives. Merely showing that
the bombing offensive did the Germans no good does not come close
to doing justice to the men who died. We dare not call the sacrifice
of their lives justified without certainty that the British had no
other way to accomplish what the bombing offensive intended. And
many respected historians believe it did not and could not
achieve what it set out to do.

>Let's remember -- after Dunkirk, until the invasion of Italy, the only
>front's in Europe Germany was fighting on was:

[list deleted]

You left out North Africa. You also left out the naval and air battles
of the Mediterranean, the British East Coast Convoy battles, the cross-
channel raids, and (not least) the partisan warfare in the Balkans.

>1) The disruption of war material production. The bombing campaign
>didn't stop it, and production probably went up, but thats not
>*because* of the bombing campaign, but in spite of it. US war material
>production increased tremendously during WWII and they weren't being
>bombed!

Whether in spite of or because of the bombing, war production went up.
We will (obviously) never know whether it would have gone higher if
not for the bombing, but (as I have said above) a lot of historians
do not think it would. Therefore, the bombing had little effect on
German War production. And to be worth the effort the British put into
it, even in strictly "economic" terms, it would have had to knock out
a third of German military production (at least) the justify the cost.

>2) Morale. Day after day, and night after night, Germany struck at
>London and other major cities. News was pouring in of losses in North
>Africa. Britain had to fight back. It wasn't strong enough to invade
>so the only way to fight back was on the sea and in the air. And if
>the enemy is bombing your cities into rubble you can't just defend,
>because then you lose. The RAF almost lost in 1940 during the battle
>of Britain because defending is almost impossible.

Your assumptions come from the Douhet theory, which informed the
decisions of Bomber Command in the war. But civilian bombing did
not have the effect that Douhet predicted. And during the Battle
of Britain, the British defence did far more damage to the Luftwaffe
that Bomber command could possibly have done to Germany during the
same period (1940-1941: see William Shirer's Berlin Diary for an
account of life in Berlin during this period). Air defence (against
bombing planes armed with ordinary high explosive bombs) does
work, and the level of (non-nuclear) bombing that will cow a civilian
population has never yet been reached. (See Richard Nixon's "Christmas
bombing" campaign in Vietnam for example).

>The bombing campaign was necessary. It was *not* a war crime.

As far as I know, nobody on this group has called it a war crime. A
tragic mistake, perhaps; and I have quoted veterans who believed the
men who directed it acted as callously toward the lives of their own
airmen as they did toward the German civilians. But the bombing did
not fit anyone's definition of a war crime.

Your culture will adapt to service ours - Columbus to Natives, 1492
Your culture will adapt to service ours - Borg to Captain Picard, 24th C.

standard disclaimers apply ----------------------- John G. Spragge
Newsgroups: can.politics