HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: The Complexity Required for intelligence
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1992 04:10:03 GMT


In article <BzFM3w.ItD@iat.holonet.net>, I wrote:

>...the objective is to figure out an expandable digital conceptual way of
>modeling time, that seems plausible from both the subjective and the
>objective point of view. 

This is not an easy problem.  I think a useful concept toward this end is
the idea of a potential field, much like the various fields in physics, but
one which is purely subjective.

As per usual, it's a concept that has to be broken down into objective
slices for transmission, with the possibility of being reassembled into a
dynamic whole at the reception point.

Consider the individual engaged in this communication (take the subjective
view) at the present moment.  There is a well defined body shape. 

Now think about all the possible moves or changes in posture that could
happen over, say the next second.  All the possibilities form sort of blur
around the present position.

Now think about all the possible moves or changes in posture that could
happen over, the next two seconds.  The blur expands and become even less
defined.  Also, since we're dealing with a larger volume of time and space,
the probability of any given position at any given time is diminished.  

In other words, as we look further into the future, the total set of
possible positions becomes larger and less defined, and the probability of
any given instance of the set diminishes.

If there were no complicating factors like habit or laziness, the potential
for any possible body position would probably taper off with the inverse
square of time from the present.

The concept/problem can be more clearly defined/visualized if we think
about a formal game, like chess.   Take a given piece and plot out all the
possible positions it could be in after one move, two moves, etc.

Anyway, the field of potential body positions stretches out from the
present on a temporal axis, but much of the concept can be visualized by
thinking of it as a spatial axis.

If we were in the middle of an empty warehouse (with no particular plans),
the potential field would taper off smoothly in all directions.  In a more
confined space however, the field comes to an abrupt halt at barriers, like
walls.   If I try to imagine all the moves I could possibly make over the
next ten seconds, the potential field assumes the shape of the interior of
the room, with some of it leaking through the door into the next room.

I suspect that a great deal of our subjective awareness of the tangibility
of things like walls is tied in with an intuitive perception of the
potential for bodily movement (or lack thereof).

I believe the concept is digitizable and potentially useful, but it still
has a ways to go before being fully developed.

Comments?

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 18 Dec 92 16:34:06 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <BzBp05.Koy@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

>In article <Bz9xGB.69n@spss.com> ,
>markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:

>>You haven't written anything I disagree with, but I don't see that you've 
>>answered the question: where do you draw the entity/environment boundary 
>>and on what basis?   

>... the entity environment boundary could be along the contours
>of maximum information "exchange".

On that basis the boundaries of my body definitely include my retina
and cochlea, and maybe not my back. A better basis seems to be to base
it on the notion of ownership, which is decided on the basis of
current and historical experience of successful command. This permits
the inclusion without ambiguity of tools both sensory and effector,
since there are many kinds of ownership.

-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: New electronic magazine
From: x91007@phillip.edu.au
Date: 14 Dec 92 12:53:30 EST
Organization: RMIT (Bundoora Campus)

Announcement: New Electronic Magazine 'Psyche'.

I am interested in starting up a electronic magazine 
exploring broad issues relating to consciousness and the 
mind. I hope to explore these issues in an interdisciplinary 
way - using approaches and insights from psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology, computer science and mathematics.

Examples of some of the general areas that Psyche will cover 
are: the mind-body problem; altered-states-of-consciousness; 
psychoactive drugs; shamanism; dream states; hypnosis; 
artificial intelligence; meditative states; ecstatic 
religious states; blindsight; language and mind. 

In an attempt to offer a grounding in some of the central 
themes of Psyche, major review articles of influential 
ideas/books/movements will also be solicited. Examples of 
what these might be are: John Searle's Chinese Room Problem; 
Daniel Dennett's book 'Consciousness Explained'; Gordon 
Wasson's theories regarding Soma; Roger Penrose's book 'The 
Emperor's New Mind'.

While Psyche will not be peer-reviewed this does not mean 
that it will become a haven for New Age/Lunatic Fringe ideas. 
I have just completed a BSc Honours majoring in psychology, 
and I am currently studying the way the brain codes the 
position of objects. I would like to balance by skills with 
others and so am particularly interested in getting in 
contact with people with backgrounds in either computer 
science, philosophy or anthropology to act as sub/co-editors.

While the date is obviously tentative I would like to get the 
first issue of Psyche out by March 1993. It will be produced 
in ASCII and hopefully postscript. As tends to be the nature 
of electronic journals clarity, rather than length, will be a 
critical factor in deciding which articles are accepted.

So if your interested in: helping, supplying copy, 
subscribing (at least for the first edition), or simply 
offering advice please contact directly me at the address 
below. In your reply please let me know where you read about 
Psyche.

Yours sincerely,
			 Patrick Wilken

x91007@phillip.edu.au
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: causal powers
Date: 18 Dec 92 03:19:46 GMT

: From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
: Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
: OK, I think [..Searle..] is only objecting to the limitations of trying to
: duplicate consciousness with abstract symbols.  I'll go along with that.

Me too.  I don't think "abstract symbols" can ever "be" intelligent.
But that's not what computers running a program are.  Searle likes
to point to the example of a hurricane.  The computer process that
simulates a hurricane prints numbers and/or displays graphics.  It
doesn't emit spray and high winds.

But intelligent people don't emit spray and high winds (or at least,
not as an relevant feature of their intelligence).  They emit
structured sounds and marks on papers and so on.  A computer
simulating an intelligent entity ALSO emits structured sounds
(assuming a vocoder) and marks on papers and so on.

Searle thinks the fact that the effect-domain of computer processes
overlaps so well with that of intelligent entities is simply
misleading.  I think that far from being misleading, it captures the
difference between simulation and emulation.  Consider the goal of
artificial dialysis for a moment instead of artificial intelligence.
Just as a simulated artificial dialysis that prints out numbers
relating to new uric acid levels won't help a kidney patient, but an
emulated artificial dialysis that actually results in blood with lower
uric acid levels WILL help.  The difference is one of effect-domain.

Of course, my point of view still leaves fuzzy areas, such as
whether SHRDLU-like entities simulate or emulate.
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle's World and Computers
Keywords: Searle Realism Computers
Date: 18 Dec 92 03:19:40 GMT

: From: colby@oahu.cs.ucla.edu (Kenneth Colby)
: Message-ID: <1992Dec16.193307.11902@cs.ucla.edu>
: Searle [...] confuses the listing of a program - what he calls "pure"
: symbols and syntax [...] with an up-and-running program, a causal agent
: [...]

Yes, this seems to me also to be Searle's basic mistake.

For another problem, Searle's focuses on "simulating" intelligence, and
says that "simulated" things aren't "real" things.  The problem I see is
that AI workers aren't trying to simulate intelligence, but to emulate
it, and emulated things ARE real things.  This is related to the above,
in that Searle seems to suppose (falsely it seems to me) that "symbolic"
implies "simulated" to the exclusion of "emulated". 

: Searle's foundational-assumptive mistake is to try to get by with a
: simple two-category carving of "features of the world" into "intrinsic"
: and "observer relative".  For example, he claims (p.211) the expression
: "mass" names an intrinsic feature of the world.  But "mass" is a highly
: theory-relative, partially human-mind dependent construct.  Newtonian
: mass is not Einsteinian mass which is a function of velocity. 

Uh... unfortunately, "mass" is still (or "again") viewed as
observer invariant.  Relativistic physicists for a while now have
used "mass" to mean what for a while was called "rest mass", because
it turns out to be a better way of thinking about these things.  So,
this turns out to be a not-so-good example of something that violates
intrinsic-feature-of-the-world-ness.

On the other hand, we can look at things related by uncertainty
relations, like position and momentum, or time and energy.  Or
things like "spin" and other features of particles.  In QM, it's
much closer to the way physicists think of things nowadays to say
that particles don't really "have" these properties that we think
of macroscopic object "having".  (Though it's hardly uncontroversial.)

But I think the bottom line is, the property which "features of the
world" have of being "intrinsic" or "observer relative" is itself
"observer relative" (or model-relative).  That is, there is not a fact
of the matter about whether objects have mass, or whether gravitation is
a "force"...  it's all in the model one uses. 
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: causal powers
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 00:24:07 GMT

In article <724315603@sheol.UUCP>,
throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

: From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
: Message-ID: <1992Dec8.003639.4101@psych.toronto.edu>
: Searle says that a mechanical brain could indeed think, but not merely
: because of its *structural* similarity.  It has to be built of material
: with the same "causal powers" as the brain (and no, I don't know what
: the hell that is supposed to mean).

>Of course, it may be that some "causal powers" that "meat" brains
>have are not computable.  But that's more Penrose's argument than
>Searle's.  But with this view of "program" in mind, it is hard for
>me to see why a computer running a program lacks "causal powers".
>
>Perhaps someone can explain to me why this view of what a program
>is is in some way inappropriate or misleading.

Having never read Searle, it might seem a bit pretentious for me to
interpret him, but I've never let that stop me before.

I would venture that there may be properties in meat critters that have
been created by billions of years of evolution, and which will contribute
to future evolution in ways that we don't understand, YET. 

However, if our program is simply to emulate one example of human
consciousness, and is not designed to replace the whole biosphere, I don't 
agree with Searle (as quoted) that the emulating computer need be "built of
material with the same 'causal powers, as the brain."

--
Ken Easlon
ken@holonet.net



Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: C-Word Terminology
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 21:13:36 GMT



In article <Bz0zp0.EAv@iat.holonet.net>,
ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)writes:

>In view of the ongoing difficulty in achieving any kind of meaningful
>communication on the subject of consciousness, I would like to propose
>that we the readers of this newsgroup make an attempt to grope our way
>toward a standardized terminology.  I propose that emotionally charged
>poorly defined words, such as the "C" word either be omitted, or
>systematically qualified when they are used.

While I'm waiting for your response, I would like to add the "R" word
(reality) to the proposed list.  

--
Ken Easlon
ken@holonet.net
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: causal powers
Summary: programs are formal descriptions of causal powers
Date: 14 Dec 92 05:42:13 GMT

: From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
: Message-ID: <1992Dec8.003639.4101@psych.toronto.edu>
: Searle says that a mechanical brain could indeed think, but not merely
: because of its *structural* similarity.  It has to be built of material
: with the same "causal powers" as the brain (and no, I don't know what
: the hell that is supposed to mean).

I don't either.  But it seems to me that a good way of looking at
what a program IS, is as a formal description of the causal powers
of a given process running on a computer.

Of course, it may be that some "causal powers" that "meat" brains
have are not computable.  But that's more Penrose's argument than
Searle's.  But with this view of "program" in mind, it is hard for
me to see why a computer running a program lacks "causal powers".

Perhaps someone can explain to me why this view of what a program
is is in some way inappropriate or misleading.
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Easlon Test
Date: 17 Dec 92 19:50:38 GMT
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem


In article <1992Dec15.233126.9591@Csli.Stanford.EDU> ,
avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman) writes:

>In article <Bz0Hvr.8Mn@iat.holonet.net> ken@holonet.net (Ken Ealson)
>wirtes:  
 
>| I have arrived at last at the ultimate final true formulation of the  
>| Ealson test. 
>| 
>| FOR A STATEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED TRUE, IT MUST SEEM PLAUSIBLE TO EALSON!

>Hmmm...  I think I agree with the basic idea behind your test, but there
>is one revision I would like to make. 
 
>FOR A STATEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED TRUE, IT MUST SEEM PLAUSIBLE TO FADERMAN!

>:-} 

Sounds OK to me.  I think it's safe to say that within the context of a
group discussion, for a statement to even have a chance at being considered
true, it must have unanimous plausibility.

This raises some interesting consequences.  As the size of the discussion
group grows, the probability of unanimous plausibility diminishes.  It
becomes more likely that the group will include a dissenter.  

To stay in the running for truth-hood, a statement must become more vague
and hard to define (or the dissenter must become convinced or
excommunicated).  Hence we come up with such gems as "reality really
exists", or "consciousness really exists" or "cogito ergo sum".

To really get a really precise statement passed as true, I suspect it must
be formulated by a discussion group of one, and then sold to others in a
one way discussion.  This is the classic form of truth, an enlightened
master teaching his followers.

I'm not too much into the classical style, either as master or follower,
and hence not too much into the idea of absolute truth.

--
Ken Easlon
ken@holonet.net
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Date: 16 Dec 92 23:54:37 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <BzBp05.Koy@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes
>I can see the basis of drawing the boundary along the minimum information
>contour if we bring in the idea of a physical interface that is neither
>entity nor environment.
>
>In a world of distended AI systems and a large range of possible
>environments, the interface would work something like this.  You could have
>an S/E cluster especially designed for a given environment, which would
>plug into your AI system via the standard interface.   Your AI system could
>use the interface to plug into different kinds of S/E clusters in different
>kinds of environments.  

Whoa!  You're begging the question, by calling one object in your scenario
an AI *system*.  The question is how you know what *is* a system.  The ideal
would be to have some criteria we could use to decide whether the S/E
cluster is part of system or external to it.

I also don't know what you mean by a "standard interface".  It suggests
that some information processing is going on in the sensory unit; it's not 
obvious to me that this processing too doesn't belong to the system.

This question of what a system is isn't merely my own hobbyhorse; it 
underlies the famous Systems Reply as well.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: swf@tools3teradata.com (Stan Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Date: 17 Dec 92 20:36:17 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: NCR Teradata Database Business Unit

In article <1992Dec9.193523.9560@ariel.ec.usf.edu>, mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. (Gregory McColm) writes:
|> 
|> Being lazy, I skipped over the logic parts of Penrose's book.  
|> Two logicians I know claim that the logic part is a mess, and 
|> some of the scientific reviews are very negative.  While I 
|> can't comment on the physics (I suspect that he knows what he 
|> is doing there, but I am completely non-expert), I can say that 
|> his discussion on ethology (animal psychology) is uninformed 
|> and decades out of date.

And I (with my biology training) say the same thing about his neurobiology.

-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 20 Dec 92 20:30:52 GMT
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem


In article <29744@castle.ed.ac.uk> ,
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:


>In article <BzBp05.Koy@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
>writes: 
 
>>... the entity environment boundary could be along the contours 
>>of maximum information "exchange". 
 
>On that basis the boundaries of my body definitely include my retina 
>and cochlea, and maybe not my back. A better basis seems to be to base 
>it on the notion of ownership, which is decided on the basis of 
>current and historical experience of successful command. This permits 
>the inclusion without ambiguity of tools both sensory and effector, 
>since there are many kinds of ownership. 

"Ownership" is good, but I like drawing the line around function or job.

The meaning of your phrase "ownership, which is decided on the basis of
current and historical experience of successful command"  depends heavily
on the meaning of "successful", and this involves describing the nature of
the interaction with the environment.

If I send out a command to bring up another spoonful of soup, and the spoon
comes up empty, it seems to me that we haven't called into question my
ownership of the spoon or the bowl.  Perhaps we question my ownership of
the soup, but it seems to me that the soup is part of the environment until
it becomes part of me.  

The point at which the soup becomes part of me is open to debate:

     when it's in the bowl
     when it's in the spoon
     when it's in my mouth
     when it's in my stomach
     when it's been digested, and it's molecules intertwine with mine

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Date: 18 Dec 92 23:33:00 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <BzG29C.2vr@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>My point is that there are criteria for deciding where to draw the line
>other than minimum information exchange, criteria such as function. Just
>how does the entity act on the environment, and how does the environment
>act on the entity.

I don't see that you've given a criterion here.

>>I also don't know what you mean by a "standard interface".  It suggests 
>>that some information processing is going on in the sensory unit; it's not 
>>obvious to me that this processing too doesn't belong to the system. 
>
>That's my point exactly.  A little processing power in the S/E cluster
>could reduce the bandwidth of the information exchange with the undisputed
>entity, to the point where the linkage could be over a standard narrow band
>interface like RS-232.  This narrow band interface could very easily be the
>point of minimum information exchange, without being the obvious place for
>drawing the line between entity and environment.

Let me step back a bit and try to explain what I'm going on about.  I'm
interested in what it takes to make an AI grounded-- to make its use of
language meaningful rather than "merely syntactic"-- to have it know what
it's talking about.  Placing Harnad, Lakoff, and my own musings into a 
blender and pressing "Liquefy", I come up with this: For an entity to be
(statically) grounded it must have high-bandwidth sensorimotor experience 
with the real world; it's less grounded to the extent that the experience
is of low quality or quantity, or not really its own, or is weakly
integrated with its internal architecture.  Dynamic grounding would depend
on a capacity to maintain this experience and function in the world.
I trust you can see how this formulation leads to a concern with what is 
or isn't part of the system.

Your RS-232 interface risks being too low-bandwidth to develop human-type,
high-bandwidth grounding; I'd say the system you describe is minimally
grounded, at best.

It's probably worth repeating that grounding is a separate issue from
other aspects of cognition: an AI could be intelligent, conscious, useful,
or real-world-interactive without being grounded.  (I suspect grounding
and qualia are related, however.)

I won't be able to continue the argument till January, since I'm taking
some vacation time.  Happy holidays, all.
Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:7104 sci.logic:2458