HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Request for critiques of Objectivism, and for intro's to philosophy
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 22:30:23 GMT

In article <92Sep14.171823edt.48042@neat.cs.toronto.edu> cbo@cs.toronto.edu (Calvin Bruce Ostrum) writes:
>In article <1992Sep14.171912.21763@guinness.idbsu.edu>
>     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>| >"A Theory of Justice" by John Rawls - Judge for yourself whether Rand's 
>| >critique was correct.  Typical modernist muddled thinking on social
>| issues.
>| I agree; loony.
>
>While Rawls's work may contain serious flaws, I don't understand how it
>is muddled or loony.  Aside from the redoubtable Ms Rand's, I wonder what
>modern writing on ethical and political theory is *not* muddled or loony,
>in these opinionated commentators' opinion?

I'll apologize for this, actually.  I regard the basic idea of Rawls's
book as dangerously wrong, since my ethics is individualistic; the
book is fine technically.  It is certainly not muddled.  It draws
unacceptable conclusions from unacceptable premisses, that's all.  And
I at least do not have a high opinion of Rand's writing on any
theoretical topic,  although I sometimes agree with her conclusions.
Read what I said about her in recent postings!

>
>| (the applications to daily life are not clear).  Quine never wrote
>| about ethics, alas.  Read Karl Popper on philosophy of science.
>
>Quine did not write much on ethics, but he did write some.  Perhaps the
>most significant piece is the essay "On the nature of moral values",
>which is reprinted in his collection "Theories and things". 

I've read that essay.

>
>Karl Popper ain't so hot.  I would recommend also reading some criticism
>of his work, such as the short paper "The 'Corroboration' of theories',
>by Hilary Putnam.  On philosophy of science, I would recommend more modern
>writing.  An overview that I particularly like, despite its highly 
>opinionated nature, is Richard Boyd's "On the current status of scientific
>realism"; it nicely situates scientific realism in opposition to modern
>empiricist and contructivist views.  Both of these papers are reprinted in
>the recently published collection edited by Boyd et al., "The Philosophy
>of Science".
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Calvin Ostrum                                            cbo@cs.toronto.edu  
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>I mean, if all you want to do is to be able to predict your experiences, 
>the rational strategy is clear: Dont revise your theories, just *arrange
>to have fewer experiences*; close your eyes, put your fingers in your ears,
>and dont move. Now, why didnt Newton think of that?
>        -- Jerry Fodor, "The Dogma that Didnt Bark"
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 16:24:26 GMT

In article <1992Sep12.180353.4264@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>>[W]hen you _act_, you must apply your current [ethical] standard (and
>>if you do not, it is not actually your standard!)
>
>Does this mean wrongdoing is always caused by ignorance of the correct
>standard?  Or would you say that it is possible to know a standard to
>be correct without that being your standard?  The latter possibility
>seems even more paradoxical than the former if "standard" is taken to
>mean "standard for judgment".
>-- 
>    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)

What I said is not _always_ true; it is possible to know what is right
and be too afraid (angry, tired, etc.) to do it.  But a consistent
failure to live up to a professed standard can indicate that one's
adherence to it is not genuine.  Wrongdoing is _not_ always caused by
ignorance of moral standards; I do believe in the possibility of
deliberate evil or moral default.  "Your" standard means not only
"standard which you recognize as correct" but "standard which you try
to follow".

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Objectivism
Organization: Oklahoma State University
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 92 02:35:24 GMT

From article <Bu320C.Cqn@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, by jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales):
> Just for the record...
> 
> As the owner of the Moderated Discussion of Objectivist Philosophy
> discussion group, I have met and talked with many people who call
> themselves Objectivists.
> 
> I have been studying Rand's ideas for a number of years now.  I
> have read virtually every book and article written about her and
> her ideas.  I think that I am therefore well qualified to make
> the following statement.
> 
> Stephen Grossman's ungrammatical and ill-mannered musings have almost
> nothing to do with Objectivism or with Rand's thought.  Frankly, I
> think he ought to cease using the label for himself; it does not fit.
> 
> Grossman's writing style is so astoundingly bad that it is difficult
> to ascertain what his position actually IS.  I suspect that his
> scattered writing style serves to reveal a rather scattered and
> shallow understanding of the things about which he writes.
> 
> --Jimbo

  Although I am generally opposed to Objectivism, I think you for the 
clarification on the matter.  I was deeply concerned that Randian 
philosophy was actually _WORSE_ than I had originally thought it to be.


BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
 
"N'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas trop"
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology?
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 1992 07:22:50 GMT

Is the emphasis of evolutionary epistimology on scientific theory, or
is that just this thread?  It seems to me that religion, for example,
fits the genetic selection metaphor better than the process of
science.  For example, evangelism is centered around replicating the 
religion, ie converting souls  -- "go ye into all the world and preach the
gospel to every creature."  Religions also have strong emotional
power, which may tie in to actual epigenetics (the innate neural structures
produced by actual genetic evolution). We might also compare the low 
copy-fidelity of religions communicated orally with the high copy-fidelity 
of religions communicated in writing.  Science may be too specialized,
new, and narrow in scope to be described well by a metaphor intended
for all of human knowledge and beliefs. Religion may not be very
interesting to epistimology, perhaps, but it seems like an easier and
more fruitful field for applying the evolutionary metaphor.

That said, what work has been done applying the genetic selection
metaphor, or memes, to religion?


-- 
szabo@techbook.COM  	  Tuesday, November third  ##  Libertarian  $$  vote
Tuesday  ^^ Libertarian  --  change  **  choice && November 3rd @@Libertarian
From: rpiercey@kean.ucs.mun.ca
Subject: Steiner's _Real Presences_
Organization: Memorial University. St.John's Nfld, Canada
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 01:33:29 GMT

I've recently got my hands on George Steiner's recent book, 
_Real Presences_. While I haven't read the entire thing yet, 
the book is largely a critique of contemporary views of
language--Derrida and so on. It also argues that 
art reveals the "real presence" of a transcendent reality
of some sort. 
It seems to me that this is an extremely important work. Is 
anyone out there familiar with it? Comments? Criticisms?
Thanks in advance
Robert
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: What is Love?  _The Story of O_
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 15:33:56 GMT

The _Story of O_ is a work of fiction.  It would be easier to accept
it as evidence if it were a piece of biography.  From the synopsis, I
would rule it out of court on the basis that it is not realistic
(although it might represent actual consequences of the adoption of a
false moral standard -- it could be rejected on these grounds even if
it were biography).
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:1818 sci.philosophy.tech:3150
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology
Date: 8 Sep 92 19:00:54 GMT
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <Bu22t5.BBp@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>This is outside the subject of this news group, but ...
>
>  But I don't know
>of any such general prohibitions concerning speaking, teaching,
>or publishing.  Is this in fact true of Chardin?  Do you know the
>real details?

de Chardin _was_ prohibited from publishing, and was essentially exiled to
a retreat in New York State by the Catholic Church. You can get the details
(as usual) from Hans Kung. As you might expect, Kung has a negative view of
the Church's handling of de Chardin, but he does give the details. I think
that _Does God Exist?_ has this stuff.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
From: jrupert@fraser.sfu.ca (Jason David Rupert)
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology
Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1992 18:37:16 GMT

John Wilkins <john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au> writes:

>The Popper/Campbell/Bartley view fails to distinguish between the
>developmental aspect of hypothesising (the parallel of organismic
>development) and the selection processes that occur in the population of
>scientific practitioners. For that reason, it is basically a lamarkian
>view of change.

This last statement is untrue, at least with respect to Campbell's
evolutionary epistemology which is explicitly based on a "blind
variation/selective retention" model (ie. a Darwinian model).  His
central claim is that all knowledge gains are the result of
variation/selection processes.  'Knowledge gains' in Campbell's terms
would include the development of physical sensory equipment, like
eyes that allow for adaptive interpretation of the environment, as
well as individual learning and science.

A paper that is quite complementary to (but apparently independent of)
Campbell's "Evolutionary Epistemology" paper (which is in Schilpp 1974
and Plotkin 1982) is Doug Lenat's (of CYC fame) "The Role of Heuristics
in Learning by Discovery" which was in Machine_Learning (Michalski,
Carbonell and Mitchell 1983).  Lenat's paper is very much an elaboration
of Campbell's notion of a "nested hierarchy" of blind variation/selective
retention processes, it shows how blind variation at one level can lead
to the 'appearance' of directed variation at a lower one. 
 

>John Wilkins
>Manager, Publishing & Advertising
>Monash University, Melbourne Australia
>Internet: john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au
>Tel: (+613) 573 2099


Jason Rupert
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology?
Organization: Oklahoma State University
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 92 03:21:22 GMT

From article <1992Sep13.072250.20653@techbook.com>, by szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo):
> Is the emphasis of evolutionary epistimology on scientific theory, or
> is that just this thread?  It seems to me that religion, for example,
> fits the genetic selection metaphor better than the process of
> science.  For example, evangelism is centered around replicating the 
> religion, ie converting souls  -- "go ye into all the world and preach the
> gospel to every creature."  Religions also have strong emotional
> power, which may tie in to actual epigenetics (the innate neural structures
> produced by actual genetic evolution). We might also compare the low 
> copy-fidelity of religions communicated orally with the high copy-fidelity 
> of religions communicated in writing.  Science may be too specialized,
> new, and narrow in scope to be described well by a metaphor intended
> for all of human knowledge and beliefs. Religion may not be very
> interesting to epistimology, perhaps, but it seems like an easier and
> more fruitful field for applying the evolutionary metaphor.
> 
> That said, what work has been done applying the genetic selection
> metaphor, or memes, to religion?
>

   I have no idea, but if you find anything, let me know!  There
are several authors who are theologians who work with evolutionary
theory but mainly they are either working with biology or
working in evolutionary epistemology with an emphasis on the Divine.
In terms of an analysis of migration, dispersion, and life
and death of religious ideas, I haven't seen a thing.  This is, actually,
quite interesting.  I can think of several possibilities for
the anthropology of religion in this case.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
 
"N'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas trop"
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Date: 12 Sep 92 18:03:53 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>[W]hen you _act_, you must apply your current [ethical] standard (and
>if you do not, it is not actually your standard!)

Does this mean wrongdoing is always caused by ignorance of the correct
standard?  Or would you say that it is possible to know a standard to
be correct without that being your standard?  The latter possibility
seems even more paradoxical than the former if "standard" is taken to
mean "standard for judgment".
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Subject: E address
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 20:39:32 GMT

Does anyone know the E address of this group or a source which might know.
I had some computer problems.
From: choy@skorpio.usask.ca (I am a terminator.)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Why is the Mona Lisa a masterpiece?
Date: 11 Sep 92 22:20:17 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada


Why?  ?yhW

Henry Choy
choy@cs.usask.ca
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Heidegger and Nazism -- one more time
Organization: Oklahoma State University
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 92 01:54:08 GMT

From article <1236@kepler1.rentec.com>, by andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt):
> In article <Bu9EB0.GsL@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>>
>>recent journal articles this weekend I stumbled across the
>>following in the latest volume of _Philosophia_ :
>>
>>	What Price Deconstruction?  Derrida on Heidegger
>>	and the Question of Nazism:  A Critical Study
>>
>>	_Philosophia_, Vol. 21, 183-199
>>
>>I though others might be interested in it.  Unfortunately,
>>I seem to have neglected to jot down the name of the author.
> 
> In a similar vein, a novel has recently been published based on Paul de Man
> which poses the possibility that his disconnection of author's intent from
> text is a clever way of disowning things he wrote for the Nazis in Vichy
> France. I can't remember the author's name, since all I know is the review
> of it on the BBC World Service (Meridian/Books show).
> 
> Later,
> Andrew Mullhaupt

  Although this sort of argument has been made towards providing some
sort of understanding as to "why" de Man would have worked with deconstruction
I think it is impotent. First of all, it makes the rash assumption that
de Man was more concerned with his own Nazi involvement and an attempt to
remove it than it is with the possibility that de Man might actually 
have believed that deconstruction, etc, were valid methods.  

  ON a personal account, a friend of mine received his PhD from yale 
university and was a personal friend of de Man.  My friend is also a 
Jew.  He claims that in all of his conversations with de Man in reference
to Nazistic writings, de Man seemed to feel certain remorse for those
actions regardless of any failure to publish them openly.  Becuase my
friend works in literary theory, is brilliant, is a Jew, and 
was a personal friend of de Man, I see know reason to set de Man up
for something that may not have had any relevance to his Nazistic 
writings.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
 
"N'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas, n'y pensez pas trop"
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 20:08:31 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <_wtn_qk.anson@netcom.com>, anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:
|> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
|> 
|> >The _Story of O_ is a work of fiction.  It would be easier to accept
|> >it as evidence if it were a piece of biography.  From the synopsis, I
|> >would rule it out of court on the basis that it is not realistic
|> >(although it might represent actual consequences of the adoption of a
|> >false moral standard -- it could be rejected on these grounds even if
|> >it were biography).
|> 
|> Question:  What is a "false moral standard?"
|> -- 

I have observed over time that Randall has a writing style that I
would call something like "polished".  It is easy to read, and it
flows quite smoothely.  Indeed, he appears to strive for smootheness
and readability rather than a stilted or pedantic kind of precision.
In accordance with such a goal he can be seen to use such phrases
as 'false moral standard' which has a rather clear sense and has
been used by many before him.  In it, 'false' does not mean 'false'
in the sense that it is false that 2+2=5.  Rather, something more
like 'faulty' is meant.  Randall, I presume, knows this, for he
has used the phrase in its traditional sense.  If he used the
phrase 'false friend', would he be subject to similar queries?
I hope not.  'False' can have a number of nuances in English.
Its use in 'false moral standard' is perfectly acceptable and
well established.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 92 15:31:35 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 

sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

>Sorry.  I thought this phrase so common that I took your question
>as an implied criticism.  If you are indeed asking in what sense
>a moral standard can be faulty (or outrightly false, as Randall
>suggests in a more recent posting), then there are some fairly
>lengthy and detailed answers to be had.  It is probably better for
>you to scan the abundant literature on this subject than to be
>subjected to some half-baked lecture from me in this medium.

Actually, I am more interested in discussion than in lectures.

>However, some quick suggestions that may serve as no more than
>hints:  If you set out to either develop a moral standard from
>scratch or to decide among a set of competing moral standards
>it is wise (if not necessary) to first establish some pre-systematic
>criteria of adequacy -- either conditions which any acceptable
>moral standard must satisfy or "defeaters" which would require the
>rejection of any moral standard that implied them.  I will not
>attempt to be more specific than this since I think it would only
>stimulate arguments over the particular examples I might give.

Yes, I am aware of these sorts of criteria.  This implies that there
is a group of criteria which would define a "higher" moral standard
by which other standards are to be judged.  So acceptable standards
compose a set which share certain common traits.

The faulty ones are those which lay outside that set.  But can there
be another, equally valid, set of criteria which would define a set
in which the faulty standards are now acceptable?

>A moral standard failing any of these criteria is faulty -- in
>precisely the same way that (for example) an inconsistent mathematical
>theory is faulty (consistency being one of the criteria of
>adequacy) or a scientific theory that fails to predict phenomena
>in the appropriate domain is faulty.

Interesting that you should use the term "appropriate domain."  This
seems to me to be the central point:  Judging the moral standards
expressed in _The_Story_of_O_ presupposes that it is in the appropriate
domain.  But what if its domain is so different from the one being used
to judge it that any comparison is invalid?

Or is the issue so black and white that you can have only two sets:
acceptable standards and false ones?
-- 

Anson Kennedy                                                   anson@netcom.com
Secretary of the Georgia Skeptics (but don't even THINK I speak for them!)

"If you don't watch the violence,    \           "If I had been the Virgin Mary,
you'll never get desensitized to it."  \                I would have said 'No.'"
-Bart Simpson                            \  -Margaret "Stevie" Smith (1902-1971)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: brownd@hg.uleth.ca
Subject: Re: Causality and exceptions
Reply-To: brownd@hg.uleth.ca
Organization: University of Lethbridge
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1992 21:21:07 GMT

With regards to the question of effects without causes, one
might argue that some human action can be understood as an effect
that anticipates a future cause. e.g. "Why are you going to 
university? Because it will make my parents happy." But 
even here we find a determination of action by cultural rules,
meanings, definitions of the situation, and expectations.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: srm@world.std.com (Stevens R Miller)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 13:34:04 GMT

anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:
>Let me rephrase:  What, then, is a "faulty moral standard?"

One that is internally inconsistent.

Hypothetical example:  "Love means doing what your lover wants and
love means being faithful to your lover."  This is inconsistent because
a lover can ask (as in "O") that love be shared with another.
-- 
Stevens R. Miller, J.D.		E-mail to srm@mw.sbi.com