From: miklg@acuson.com (Michael Goldman )
Newsgroups: soc.history,soc.culture.japan
Subject: Re: The Russo-Japanese War (part 2)
Date: 19 Aug 92 14:17:58 GMT
Organization: Acuson; Mountain View, California

fsars@acad3.alaska.edu (Allen R Sparks) writes:

>In article <1992Aug17.145824.10478@acuson.com>, miklg@acuson.com (Michael Goldman ) writes:
>> 	Another possibility may simply be that arrogant samurai military men
>> 	can't think of anything except military aggression, regardless of whether
>> 	it makes any sense.
>> 
>> 	- Michael Goldman

>Could it also have been because they were factoring in Germany's
>participation in the war also?  That's the only weakness in your
>speculations.  You didn't consider both theatre of operations when
>considering their decision to gamble in attacking the U.S.
>                    === Al Sparks

	Kind of you to reply.  I wasn't sure anyone was reading the postings.
	I am sure that there was some hope that Germany might cause the US
	to lose interest in the Pacific.  However...

	The plans for attacking the US began being taught and discussed in
	the Japanese war college in the mid-twenties, predating Hitler's
	Germany.  The "Great White Fleet" was sent to Japan by President
	Teddy Roosevelt partly with the idea of intimidating the Japanese
	so that they would honor the territorial integrity of China.  While
	TR had been very pro-Japanese in the beginning of the R-J war, by the
	end, he was becoming concerned with Japanese expansionist policy.
	The situation between the US and Japan by the 20's was such that there
	was a book written in 1926 by Bywater outlining the "coming war" in
	great detail and with considerable accuracy.  That book was discussed
	in this group earlier.

	The whole point of the London Naval Treaties was to limit the
	arms of potential belligerents, including Japan and the US.  The
	US position was that they needed greater limits because they had
	_two_ oceans to defend against aggressors while Japan only had one.
	The implication was clearly that Japan was a threat.  That the US
	didn't build up to their quota, while Japan cheated on hers was more
	an issue of money - the US wanted to save it, while Japan wanted
	ships with which to acquire it..

	One of the things I learned in reading about the R-J war was that
	most of the popular treatments about the beginning of WWII in the
	Pacific start much too late.  Beginning with the 1930s is waaaay
	too late to get any sort of understanding of the origins.  By that
	time, things had been moving towards war for quite some time
	and only picked up momentum in terms of territorial acquisition
	but not in general thrust of Japanese expansion.

	This invalidates, for me, most of the discussion of whether Japan was
	"tricked" into attacking the US by FDR.  The Japanese in command were
	simply going along the course that had been started in 1868, and
	accelerated in the R-J war.  The crises of the 1930s were a matter of
	when the war would begin, not if.

	- Michael Goldman

-- 
"History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have
exhausted all other alternatives." - Abba Eban
	Disclaimer:  All views are solely my own & not the views of Acuson.
	<sun!sono!miklg>  or  [miklg@acuson.com]