From: pires@vxcrna.cern.ch (ALVES)
Subject: Lawyer's View of Timor History
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 02:49:00 GMT


As I have seen too many misunderstandings from both sides (Portuguese 
and Indonesians) on the events preceding East-Timor's invasion by 
Indonesia, I decided to re-post a text recently appeared on SEASIA-L 
(bit.listserv.seasia-l).  It was originally posted on IGC reg.indonesia 
conference.  Brian Brunton is a lawyer and university lecturer in 
Australia.

This should give a much more detailed description of the events and 
of the legal situation.

---Rui Pires (pires@vxcern.cern.ch)



__________Begin forwarded message from Brian Brunton__________

Topic 353Area Studies: East Timor
Brian.Bruntonreg.indonesia11:28 pm  Oct 22, 1992
(at f204.n900.z90.pegasus.oz.au)(From News system)

John has said he has not seen a substantial rebuttal of the
formal statement by Foreign Minister Alatas.

This is an extract from a paper presented by Dr. Sam Blay, Senior Lecturer in
Law, University of Tasmania, presented at a seminar on the Legal Aspects of
the East Timor Conflict, held at the Faculty of Law, University of New South
Wales, earlier this year. Dr. Blay, a Ghanian by birth, presented a view of
the right of East Timor to self determination, that was in sharp contrast to
the Australian opinion, which forms the argument of substance before the
International Court of Justice, Portugal V Australia. I have extracted Dr.
Blay's historical analysis, to show that there is another view of history,
quite different from that represented by the Indonesian Government.
Dr. Blay's historical account was written before that of Mr
Alatas, and is not a response to Mr. Alatas, Nevertheless it
points towards a different view of history, thus -:

"The East Timor Question: Background"

Most of the history of East Timor has been dealt with extensively elsewhere.
However for a proper understanding of the issues to be canvassed in this paper
it is necessary to discuss briefly some aspects of the history of the
territory that may be relevant for the discussion.

East Timor was one of the last Portuguese colonial territories. Portuguese
rule over the territory started in 152O. As was typical of Portuguese colonial
policy, East Timor was regarded by Portugal as part and parcel of metropolitan
Portugal. But in spite of this, the political, economic and social
infrastructure provided by Portugal for the benefit of the colony and its
people was minimal. Political activity that bordered on nationalism was
generally discouraged. Even though there was some nationalist activity in 1912
and in the late l95O's during the inception of the period of decolonization,
Portugal did not permit the formation of political parties as such in the
colony. The only political party that was permitted to operate was the Accao
Nacional Popular (ANP), the official party sanctioned by Lisbon Portugal under
the Caetano regime which did its best to ensure its continue political control
over its colonies despite persistent calls from the UN to decolonize.

In 1974, events changed considerably both for the Portuguese colonies and for
Portugal.

After the so called Carnation Revolution, the Caetano administration was
overthrown in a military coup. The new administration in Lisbon under General
Spinola embarked on a program of decolonization. The prohibition on the
formation of political parties and nationalist political activity in East
Timor were removed. Several political parties were subsequently formed and
the scene set for democratic political activity in optimistic preparation for
eventual exercise of self-determination. As is usually the case in most
colonies in transition from colonial rule to self-government, there were
divisions among East Timorese on the preferred political future of the
territory. While sections of the community favoured complete independence
from Portugal, some favoured some form of continued association with it.
Some East Timorese on the other hand favoured integration with neighbouring
Indonesia. These divisions were reflected in the political parties that came
to be formed in the territory. The Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) that was
formed in the period was pro Portugal, and favoured some form of closer links
with it. In many respects the UDT came to replace the official ANP. Apodeti
which was also formed in the period on the other hand advocated integration
with neighbouring Indonesia. The Associoacao Social Democratica Timorense
(ASDT) later to become the Frente Revolucionaria Timor Leste Independente
(FRETILIN) which was officially formed in May 1974 however favoured and
advocated complete independence.

Towards the end of 1974, the pro-Lisbon UDT changed its nationalist policy in
favour of complete independence for the territory. The change made the UDT and
FRETILIN obvious allies and isolated APODETI. Not surprisingly, in January
1975, the UDT and FRETILIN came together to form a pro-independence coalition
in their quest for self-determination. The coalition between the two parties
was however short-lived. In May 1975, UDT quit the coalition. Worried about
the events in the territory and in an effort to prepare the East Timorese
parties for a self-determination exercise, Portugal organised decolonization
talks aimed at bringing the parties together to discuss the timetable for the
elections or the referendum on the future of East Timor. In what must have
been a miscalculation at the time, FRETILIN boycotted those talks which were
held in Macao in the last week of June 1975.

The Macao Agreement

Despite the absence of the FRETILIN, the Macao talks proved useful and indeed
promising, and won the consensus of all the parties including the FRETILIN. It
was agreed at the talks that in preparation for self-determination, Portugal
would appoint a High Commissioner for the territory assisted by five deputies
three of whom would be East Timorese. There was also to be an elected Advisory
Council that was to be representative of the people. More significantly, the
talks agreed that there would be general elections in the colony in 1976 to
elect a constituent assembly to draft the constitution for East Timor and to
decide on the future of the territory.

The Civil War

The Macao agreement was an important milestone in the politics of East Timor
and could have marked the beginning of the decolonization process for the
territory if it had been given the chance. Before the agreement could become
operative, the UDT staged a military coup aimed at dislocating FRETILIN and
ensuring its own control of the territory. The coup brought the UDT into direct
military confrontation with FRETILIN and plunged the colony into a civil war
which in many respects was to contribute towards East Timor's present
predicament. When attempts at peaceful negotiations failed, the Timorese
colonial army joined ranks with the FRETILIN and with their assistance, the
UDT forces were defeated after three weeks of fighting. FRETILIN gained control

of the territory by mid-September 1975 and immediately set out to form a
'provisional administration'. The exact significance of the provisional
administration was rather minimal for legal purposes. Portugal still remained
in control of the colony with the governor having moved his seat of
administration to the island of Atauro, off the East Timor coast as a result
of the civil war. The Portuguese flag flew over government buildings with
FRETILIN doing its best to maintain law and order . FRETILIN's efforts to get
Portugal to resume the decolonization process as envisaged under the Macao
agreement failed.

Indonesian Assault on East Timor

From September 1975, FRETILIN appeared to be the de facto government of East
Timor as a result the defeat of the UDT and the unwillingness of the Portuguese
government to take effective control of the colony following the civil war.
Given the prospects of FRETILIN controlling the whole of East Timor, the UDT,
KOTA and the Partido Trabalhista joined forces and declared their desire for
integration with Indonesia. They subsequently concluded a declaration
requesting the Indonesian state to accept the integration of East Timor.
Between October 6 and 16, 1975, Indonesian troops assisting the troops of the
new coalition launched a series of assaults on East Timor capturing a number
of towns including Batugade, Balibo and Maliana. The incursions into East
Timorese territory and the responses they provoked from FRETILIN defence
forces gave the appearance of continued civil strife in East Timor. The
appearance of continued civil strife was made to look real by the failure
of Portugal as the legitimate colonial administrator to react to the
incursions into the territory and by its implicit acceptance that a state
of civil war existed at the time. The 'civil strife' and the corresponding
instability in the colony were to provide an excuse for Indonesian
intervention and eventual annexation in 1975.

The Rome Meeting

Given the 'unstable state of affairs in the colony, Portugal initiated
a meeting in Rome in November 1 1975 to discuss the situation in the
colony. The Rome talks however were held only between Portugal and Indonesia
to the exclusion of the parties in East Timor. Indonesia had insisted that it
would only participate in talks with Portugal as the administering power. The
involvement of Indonesia was based on its interest as a state sharing borders
with a colony in strife and the influx of refugees forced to go into Indonesia
as a result of the 'civil war'.

At the talks, the two states expressed their `adherence to the principles of
decolonization ... and to the scrupulous safeguarding of the principle of
respect of the will of the people of Portuguese Timor' and agreed `on the
necessity to convene at the earliest possible time, a meeting between Portugal
and all political parties in Portuguese Timor simultaneously and aimed at
ending armed strife and bringing about a peaceful and orderly process of
decolonization in Portuguese Timor' .

Today Portugal would have to admit that with hindsight, even though the Rome
meeting may have been well intentioned and aimed at the resolution of the East
Timor conflict, the exclusion of any of the East Timorese political parties was
a disservice to the East Timorese people. If Indonesia was invited to the
meeting because its interest were affected by the civil strife and instability
in the colony, then basic logic dictated that the East Timorese political
parties which were supposedly engaged in the civil strife should have been
invited to the meeting as of necessity. The involvement of Indonesia and the
exclusion of the East Timorese parties amounted to a recognition of Indonesia
as a principal actor in the decolonization process of East Timor and paved the
way for Indonesia intervention.

The Declaration of an Independent State of East Timor

In the face of Indonesian assaults on East Timor, the obvious failure of the
Portugal to act to safeguard the colony's territorial integrity, and the
prospects that the colony may eventually be overrun by the invading forces,
FRETILIN made plans for a unilateral declaration of independence. It set
December 1 1975 as the date of independence. The logic of the UDI was that as
an independent state, East Timor had a better chance of dealing with Indonesia
aggression with the assistance of the United Nations and indeed the
international community.

Continued Indonesian incursions into the colony, and in particular the capture
of the strategic town of Atabai made the independence more pertinent and forced
a change of date for the UDI. On November 28 1975, FRETILIN issued the
following declaration:

Expressing the highest aspiration of the people of East Timor and to safeguard
the most legitimate interest of national sovereignty, the Central Committee of
Fretilin decree by proclamation, unilaterally, the independence of East Timor,
from OO.OO hours today, declaring the state of the Democratic Republic of East
Timor, anti-colonialist and antiimperialist. Long live the Democratic Republic
of East Timor! Long live the people of East Timor, free and independent! Long
live Fretilin!

Two days after the UDI on November 30 1975, the remaining political parties in
East Timor, UDT, APODETI, KOTA and the Partido Trabalhista, in a joint
statement in the town of Balibo also proclaiming the independence of the
colony and its simultaneous integration with Indonesia. The parties also
announced the formation of a `Provisional Government of East Timor' in Dili
and further called on the government of Indonesia to supply them with
economic and military assistance. For all practical purposes there were t
wo governments for the now independent state of East Timor: one under the
FRETILIN and the other under the four party coalition. A fundamental
difference between the two governments however was that whereas FRETILIN
sought to exercise self-determination through total independence, the four
parties opted for integration with Indonesia.

The Reaction of Portugal and Indonesia to the Declarations

Faced with the competing claims for independence and integration, Portugal
issued a statement on November 29 rejecting both claims and noting that it
still considered itself the legitimate administrator of the colony. It however
admitted that it was unable to deal with the situation effectively. Indonesia
on the other hand was not so constrained. In a number of statements issued in
the first week of December 1975, Indonesia deplored the FRETILIN UDI and the
general state of confusion in the territory, but of course welcomed the desire
of the four parties for integration. At this stage Indonesia took no steps to
integrate or accept the request to integrate the territory. The House of
Representatives however called on the Indonesian government to take steps to
restore peace and security in the region, 'to enable the people of East Timor
to exercise their right to self-determination in a free and orderly manner'.
The House also urged the government to further take `stern and concrete
measures in all fields and forums so as to find a solution to the Portuguese
Timor problem'. With this statement from the House, the stage was set for a
full scale Indonesian intervention in the territory. Indonesian assisted
attacks against FRETILIN positions in the territory intensified. The capital,
Dili was captured on December 7 and a 'Provisional Government of East Timor'
installed ten days later on 17 December 1975. For all practical purposes, the
Portuguese administration of the colony ended on this day.

UN Responses to Crises in East Timor

The 'final' invasion of East Timor in the first week of December 1975 took
place while the United Nations General Assembly was in session. In fact during
the period of the invasion, the UN Fourth Committee was considering the issue
of East Timor. The invasion therefore prompted a quick response from the UN.
On December the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly adopted a resolution
'deploring' the Indonesian invasion and calling for the withdrawal of
Indonesian forces. A day later the General Assembly also a adopted a similar
resolution by 69 to 11 votes with 38 abstentions. The Security Council adopted
a resolution by unanimous vote calling for the withdrawal of the Indonesian
forces and reaffirming the right of East Timor to self-determination. Beyond
these calls for withdrawal of Indonesian troops, the United Nations did little
to help resolve the situation. Far from withdrawing its troops, Indonesia
consolidated its military position in the territory to pave the way for its
incorporation.

Upon its installation, the new Provisional Government of East Timor extended
an invitation to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, the
Security Council and the UN Secretary General to attend the first meeting of
the Regional Popular Assembly in Dili on the 31 May 1976. All the invitations
were declined. The Chairman of the Special Committee based the Committee's
refusal to accept the invitation on three principal grounds: the General
Assembly's Resolution 3485, the Security Council remaining seized of the
matter as per its resolution 389 and more significantly the fact that the
Committee 'has in no way been involved in the proceedings leading up to the
announced "meeting of the Regional Popular Assembly that will be convened..."'
The absence of UN officials notwithstanding, the Regional Assembly met on
the 31 May as scheduled. Among other matters, the Assembly adopted a petition
as follows:

By the Grace of God Almighty, We, on behalf of the People of East Timor, after
having testified the decision of the plenary session of the East Timor
People's Representative Council held on May 31, 1976, which by nature was the
manifestation of the wishes of the people as had been expressed in the
Proclamation of Integration of East Timor on November 3O, 1975, at Balibo,
urge the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to accept and legalize in the
shortest possible time the integration of the people and the territory of East
Timor as a whole with the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia without a
referendum.

A day after the meeting the Provisional Government of East Timor cabled the
Secretary General of the UN and the Chairman of the Special Committee
requesting their 'good offices to persuade the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia to accept immediately [the] petition'. The cable also noted that the
advice of the UN officials 'concerning the successful implementation of self-
determination by the people of East Timor towards integration with the
Republic of Indonesia will be highly appreciated'. On the 8 June 1976, the
Provisional Government submitted the petition to the Government of Indonesia.

Unilateral Efforts by Indonesia to Implement Self-Determination in East Timor

Given Indonesia's support for integration and as evidenced by its military
presence in East Timor, there was no doubt that the 'plea' by the Provisional
Government for integration would be more than accepted by Indonesia. However
in an apparent effort to add a cloak of legitimacy to the integration process,
Indonesia decided to send a mission to East Timor for the purpose of 'making
an on-the-spot assessment of the wishes of the people of East Timor, as
formally expressed in the petition'. Indonesia subsequently extended an
invitation to the Secretary General of the UN to visit the territory
concurrently with the mission. Similar invitations were extended to the
Security Council and the Special Committee on Decolonization. As must have
been expected by Indonesia, the United Nations rejected the invitations on
the bases of Security Council resolutions directing Indonesia to withdraw
from the territory. The visit of the mission to East Timor took place on the
24 June 1976, as scheduled by Indonesia. Indonesia was later to report that
the mission 'provided convincing evidence that the people of East Timor truly
and independently have a strong desire to integrate East Timor into the
unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia'. On 17 July 1976, the Indonesian
parliament consequently passed a law incorporating East Timor into Indonesia.
By a cable dated 6 August 1976, the government of Indonesia notified the
Secretary General of the UN that effective from this date (ie 17 July) the
Territory of East Timor has thus become an integral part of Indonesia.'"

--- FD 1.99c
 * Origin: B.Brunton (90:900/204)
--

_________End forwarded message by Brian Brunton__________