From: hippee@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Abortion (was Vegetarianism)
Date: 27 Jan 93 21:25:34 GMT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <1993Jan27.044244.2582@news.eng.convex.com>, cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
> In article <1993Jan25.231311.46762@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> hippee@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
> 
> ...
> 
>>From a strictly pragmatic point of view (a view which I see is not often liked
>>here), the issues involved in potentiality of life are pitted between the 
>>sure potential of the host (mother) and the unsure potential of the parasite
>>(fetus).  While the verbiage may be foul, the sense in which it is used is not
>>intended to be so.  
> 
> The terminology isn't objectionable because it is "foul", but because it is
> tendentious. If you buy the notion that the fetus is a "parasite", then of
> course you've already made a judgment. Clearly, there's nothing wrong with
> nipping off a bit of parasitic tissue. But then isn't the propriety of
> doing this precisely what we're supposed to be debating?
> 

I fail to see how they are different cases.  One being living upon another is
called a parasite.  It is not a value judgement.  It simply is.  As to the
morality of the "nipping,"  if there were a way to remove the parasite without
harm to the parasite, that would certainly be preferable.  In the human case,
though, that is impossible for most of the period of gestation during which the
fetus is living off of the sources which are provided by the woman's body. 
Lower the resources and the fetus begins to feed from the body itself.  All, of
course, without permission.  The reason I used the term of "parasite" is to
illustrate the difference between pigs, higher-level mammals, and fetuses.
The others do not feed from a host in the same fashon.  Thus, it would appear
to me that the killing of a pig or ape is less morally credible than abortion.

>>In any runoff between actuality and potentiality, "a bird
>>in hand is better than two in the bush."
> 
> I think you might need an explanation and an argument here.
> 

In any choice between the actuality of the life of the mother and the potential
life of her offspring, the actuallity outweighs the potentiality every time.
I would be more willing to acceed to her wishes (to have an abortion) than to
gamble on the posibility of the fetus' existence.

> ...
> 
>>The position that you state is the one held by the majority ofcommon law
>>writings on the subject.  It is also the basis for the trimester method
>>that was espoused in RvW.  As to the existence (or lack) of sentience,
>>newer studies have given some reason to question whether the fetus has
>>sentience (the results of which are inconclusive).  Much of the research
>>concerns effects of pre- maternal stresses (divorce, father's death, etc.)
>>that the child might know after birth.  The problems concern the
>>reliability of post-natal recollection of a pre-natal occurence.
> 
> I fail to see what bearing either "sentience" or memory has on this issue.
> Everyone says this is important, so they are surely right, and I must be
> the only one who doesn't understand it.
> 

Sentience and memory (and the ability to express it in human terms) have always
been held to be the most basic of the qualities of life.  A machine has no
concept of self and so cannot be classified as humanly alive.  That which is 
not humanly alive is "ethically" manipulable.  Memory is another quidepost of
self-awareness (over time).  The bearing of these on abortion concerns whether
the fetus can be "ethically" manipulated to another's benefit to the detriment
of the fetus (i.e. abortion).

Hippee@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc