HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jones@ils.nwu.edu
Subject: New Ph.D. Program
Organization: institute for the learning sciences
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 20:18:43 GMT

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a m


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The Learning Sciences 
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phone: 708-491-8152
fax:    708-491-5258
email: jones@ils.nwu.edu
  
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning
Reply-To: gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 23:21:51 GMT

In article <agnar.aamodt-101192192202@129.241.164.107>,
agnar.aamodt@ifi.unit.no (Agnar Aamodt) writes: 

>Several philosophers of science and AI researchers (among others)
>have taken the stance you are asking for.  The difference between
>this view and a mathematical-logical one lies basically in the
>perspective on semantics which is taken - a perspective leaning
>towards syntax, or towards pragmatics, respectively. 

What do you mean by "leaning toward" syntax or pragmatics? For that
matter, what do you mean by "pragmatics"?

I'm not really sure, but I'm guessing that you're talking about
which way to push the grey area between syntax and pragmatics. In
other words, Is semantics more like pragmatics or syntax? Can we
describe it in terms of rigorous rules or do we have to resort to
fuzzy generalizations and hand-waving?

But these questions are not what I'm driving at just yet. In fact, the
syntactical theories I've encountered (basically McCawley's, go
figure) succumb to the same problem as any other theories of meaning
based on symbolic primitives. This follows if you suppose that
transformational rules bear meaning. (If not meaning, then what?)
I mean, if you have a declarative utterance S1, it will convey a
different meaning than S1 transformed into a yes/no question S2 by
transformation T. A syntactic analysis of S2 does not describe this
difference adequately merely because it contains "--> T -->" (though
of course it does manage to contrast this meaning with that of S1). I
see this as exactly the same problem that plagues any theory of
meaning based on symbolic primitives, including semantic primitives,
including truth functional logic.

This is speculation, but I think that pragmatic theory is so fuzzy and
hand-wavy in comparison simply because (so far (as I know)) we have
not even managed to analyze situations / contexts into neat isolated
atomic concepts that we can name with symbols. I believe the same is
true to a lesser extent for semantic theory.

Let's face it, or at least let me posit: Whatever STUFF the meaning of
a speech act consists of, some of it is syntactic, some is semantic,
and some is pragmatic. Though we have some theories that name some
proposed quanta of meaning, we don't really have any clear idea how
this thing works yet.

I'm quite open to feedback, and now have lots of books to read that
might quiet me down.

By the way, I'll post an annotated bibliography as soon as I don't
think I'll receive any more reading suggestions.

Jake.

-- 
"What's so interdisciplinary about studying lower levels of thought process?"
				  <-- Jacob Galley / gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on symbolic representation
Organization: University of Hawaii
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 10:09:25 GMT

SWANN Philip (swann@divsun.unige.ch) wrote:
:...
: Perhaps you can explain why such a bizarre thing as a theory of meaning should
: exist?

People can recognize paraphrases, and we'd like to have a theory to
describe that ability.  Paraphrases are expressions that mean the
same thing, so there must be a thing that they mean, and once we've
found it, we'll know why they are paraphrases.

: What would it look like? What would it be used for?

It would be a relation between language expressions and meaning-things,
such that paraphrases have the same meanings.  An important application
would be in the philosophy of language, where we need many different
ways to state each obvious fact. 

: What would it mean? (could it mean anything?)

I'll have to think about that.

: Philip Swann

--
Greg Lee <lee@uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu>
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Any refs to quantum neurodynamics?
From: kfree@netlink.cts.com (Kenneth Freeman)
Date: Sat, 07 Nov 92 01:03:15 PST
Organization: NetLink Online Communications, San Diego CA

agnar.aamodt@ifi.unit.no (Agnar Aamodt) writes:

> In article <7233@kielo.uta.fi>, fiteva@uta.fi (Tere Vaden) wrote:
> > 
> > Am I mistaken, or did someone mention quantum neurodymamics
> > in this newsgroup? Any references?
> > 
> 
> I don't know about that, but I was just reminded of Lenat and
> Feigenbaum's remark a few years ago 'suggesting' a replacement term 
> for "artificial intelligence" - at least as seen from the knowledge-based 
> paradigm perspective: Quantum cognodynamics. 
> 
> Maybe we are about to come up with a set of terms that will help clarifying
> 
> scientific matters somewhat...
> 
> Agnar Aamodt
> Dep. of Informatics
> University of Trondheim
> Norway
> (agnar@ifi.unit.no)
> 
>  

 
Has Roger Penrose had a hand in this? :)

--                    
INTERNET:  kfree@netlink.cts.com (Kenneth Freeman)
UUCP:   ...!ryptyde!netlink!kfree
NetLink Online Communications * Public Access in San Diego, CA (619) 453-1115
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley)
Subject: Theories of meaning not relying solely on symbolic representation
Reply-To: gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Bcc: jake@amber
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 20:28:12 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.005957.7189@midway.uchicago.edu> I write: 
>Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that do
>not postulate that some kind of truth functional logic is at the
>foundation of meaning?

And I have already gotten several good responses about modern /
cognitive research in this area:

James Allen, _Natural Language Understanding_.

J. Barwise & J. Perry (1983), _Situations and Attitudes_, MIT Press.

Collins & Quillian (1969?).

Collins & Loftus (1972?).

Ray Jackendoff (1984), _Semantics and Cognition_, MIT.
	(1991), _Semantic Structures_, MIT.

P.N. Johnson-Laird (1983), _Mental Models_, Harvard.
	(in press?), _Deduction_.

Steven Levinson, _Pragmatics_.

Thanks, these look worthwhile. (I would give credit to those who
supplied this info if it was anything more that just bibliographic.)
I'll be off to the library to check out situation semantics and mental
models more closely.

Now I think my original question was not specific enough. What bothers
me about the theories of meaning that I have seen is that they do not
adequately account for how meaningful symbols are linked to WHAT THEY
MEAN. Ie, while we have made a good amount of progress in syntax and
taxonomic classifications, which describe how meaningful signs
interact with and relate to each other, I have not encountered any
theories of how the signifier is linked to the signified.

It seems to me that employing symbolic representations (and nothing
else) in theories of meaning bypasses this whole issue. This gets into
the well-worn argument of meaningless infinite regress. So I will
refine my question:

Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that manage
to link symbolic / categorical representation to any form of
nonsymbolic / noncategorical representation? What kinds of nonsymbolic
representation are there?

John Haugeland, in "Representational Genera" in _Philosophy and
Connectionist Theory_ (forgot the year & publisher), does a good job
differentiating symbolic (he says "logical") representation from
iconic representation (eg, the kind used in pictures and analog
recordings). He goes on to suggest that the kind of representation
done in "neural-nets" (etc) is different from either of the first two.

Has anyone else done anything similar?

Thanks for reading (and answering)!

Jake.

-- 
"What's so interdisciplinary about studying lower levels of thought process?"
				  <-- Jacob Galley / gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: agnar.aamodt@ifi.unit.no (Agnar Aamodt)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning without formal logic
Followup-To: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Organization: University of Trondheim, Department of Informatics
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 92 18:48:50 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.005957.7189@midway.uchicago.edu>,
gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley) wrote:
> 
> 
> Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that do not
> postulate that some kind of truth functional logic is at the
> foundation of meaning?
> 

Several philosophers of science and AI researchers (among others)have taken
the stance  
you are asking for. The difference between this view and a
mathematical-logical one
lies basically in the perspective on semantics which is taken - a
perspective leaning 
towards syntax, or towards pragmatics, respectively. If you by your
question indicate
an interest in the latter perspective, you may want to take a look at Paul
Thagaard's book 
"A computational Philosophy of Science" (MIT Press, 1987), and into some AI
papers 
arguing against the syntactic-semantic view. Prominent exemplars of general
treatments 
are Drew McDermott's paper "A critique of pure reason", in Computational 
Intelligence 3 (1987) 151-160, and Larry Birnbaum's "Rigor mortis: a
response to 
Nilsson's 'Logic and artificial intelligence'", in AI Journal 47(1991)
57-77. 

Agnar Aamodt
Dep. of Informatics
University of Trondheim, Norway
(agnar@ifi.unit.no) 
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: peterson@CS.ColoState.EDU (james peterson)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 19:16:33 GMT
Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department

In article <1992Nov11.232151.17295@midway.uchicago.edu> gal2@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>
>This is speculation, but I think that pragmatic theory is so fuzzy and
>hand-wavy in comparison simply because (so far (as I know)) we have
>not even managed to analyze situations / contexts into neat isolated
>atomic concepts that we can name with symbols. I believe the same is
>true to a lesser extent for semantic theory.
>

It seems to me a suspicious, if not fallacious, assumption that context
can be reduced to context-free elements.  I don't see this kind of "analysis"
going anywhere.

Just a thought......

-- 
james lee peterson				peterson@CS.ColoState.edu
dept. of computer science                       
colorado state university		"Some ignorance is invincible."
ft. collins, colorado  (voice:303/491-7137; fax:303/491-6639)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 14:34:29 GMT

In article <11379@scott.ed.ac.uk> guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Guy Barry) writes:
>flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:
>
>>    1.  The man "Roy G. Biv" allows you to remember the colors of
>>	the spectrum: Red-Orange-Yellow-Green-Blue-Indigo-Violet.
>
>Or "Richard of York gained battles in vain".
>
You know, it always amazed me that people needed a mnemonic for the order
of colors in the spectrum.  Their order always seemed pretty intuitive
to me (e.g., what comes between red and yellow? orange of course. Would
anyone think blue?). I must be misunderstanding the context in which
mnemonics are traditionally used. Could someone enlighten me?

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
From: alansz@cogsci.Berkeley.EDU (Alan Schwartz)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 7 Nov 1992 08:25:31 GMT
Organization: Institute of Cognitive Studies, U.C. Berkeley
NNTP-Posting-Host: cogsci.berkeley.edu

In article <9BA=#Z+@engin.umich.edu> jxm@engin.umich.edu (John Murray) writes:
>Also, count the letters in the following 
>to obtain the first eleven digits of e 
>
>"To express e, remember to memorize a sentence to simplify this"
>
>Neat, cos it kinda self-referential! 
>I'm sure there are plenty of similar
>ones for the digits of Pi.

Here's one from (if I recall) "The Gentle Art of Mathematics" by Dan Pedoe:

"Sir, I bear a rhyme excelling
	in mystic words and magic spelling
 celestial sprites eludicate
	all my own striving can't relate."

First 20 digits of pi, and the comma after Sir serves as the decimal point.

 - Alan Schwartz

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
         Alan Schwartz           | Disclaimer: I represent no one
                                 |
alansz@cogsci.berkeley.edu       | "Life is what happens to you while
UC Berkeley                      |  you're busy making other plans"
Cognitive Psychology             |          - J. Lennon
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
From: ard@cs.bham.ac.uk (Antoni Diller)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 10 Nov 92 11:03:10 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

There's always the rime to remember facts about the calender:

       Thirty days has Sepetember, April, June and November,
       All the rest I can't remember.
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: viktor@mks.com (Viktor Haag)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Mortice Kern Systems Inc., Waterloo, Ontario, CANADA
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 21:29:58 GMT

In article <KRULWICH.92Nov5150451@zowie.ils.nwu.edu> krulwich@zowie.ils.nwu.edu (Bruce Krulwich) writes:
>
>flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:
>
>> I was thinking about the cute mnemonic tricks that I was taught in
>> school over the years, and was wondering if others would share
>> their own experiences.
>
>The provinces of Canada are "bazmo" -- British Columbia, Alberta, Zaskatuwan
>(sp), Manitoba, and Ontario.
>
> 


WHAT???? ( <----- righteous indignation)

I believe you mean "basmoqnpnn'yn".

It does lose something in the translation to American, doesn't it?


-- 
Viktor Haag					viktor@mks.com
Mortice Kern Systems				(519) 884-8469
35 King North, Waterloo, Ontario		ext. 41
"we are not thugs. we are vitamin supplements to justice ..." | a selector
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: rowe@engin.umich.edu (Steven Rowe)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 92 01:04:49 EST
Organization: University of Michigan Engineering, Ann Arbor

Planets:
Mary's Violet Eyes Make Johnny Stay Up Nights Pouting

Notes of the treble clef staff:
Every Good Boy Deserves Fudge (lines)
FACE (spaces)


-- 
Steve Rowe: B0 f- w- c g+ k+ s- e+ r-
     These folks who don't believe in evolution
are the ones who look the most like they could use some.
                                   -Frank Allison
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril)
Subject: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Intel Corporation
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 15:52:11 GMT

[Maybe this is too low-tech for this group, but here goes...]

I was thinking about the cute mnemonic tricks that I was taught in
school over the years, and was wondering if others would share
their own experiences.  What I am talking about is short ways of
remembering otherwise complicated sequences for those of us who
are not eidetic.

Examples:

    1.  The man "Roy G. Biv" allows you to remember the colors of
	the spectrum: Red-Orange-Yellow-Green-Blue-Indigo-Violet.

    2.  In Chemistry, part of the Periodic Table was represented
	by "Al Sipsclar" (Al-Si-P-S-Cl-Ar) and his girlfriend 
	"Phoebe Bicnofne" (Fe-Be-B-C-N-O-F-Ne).

    3.  There was one in Biology I can't remember completely any
	more for remembering the order of Kingdom-Phylum-etc. that
	was a sentence like "King Phillip something something ...".

    4.  And another sentence for remembering the sequence of the
	planets: Mercury-Venus-Earth-etc.

Any others to add to the list?

--
--Jim Trethewey, $WORK = flamer@mithril.intel.com, $HOME = flamer@alfirin
 5200 NE Elam Young Parkway HF3-73, Hillsboro OR 97124-6497 (503)696-5444
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: jford@aisun1.ai.uga.edu (Jamie Ford [MSAI])
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Summary: another way to remember pi
Keywords: pi mnemonics
Organization: AI Programs, University of Georgia, Athens
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 04:26:47 GMT

Here's another mnemonic for pi (you must supply your own 3):

I need a drink, alcoholic of course, after our class covering theoretic
1  4   1   5       9      2    6       5    3    5      8        9


quantum mechanics.
   7       9


I got this from a lecture in number theory many years ago.  Unfortunately
the professor just rattled it off and I didn't write it down, so I'm
constructing this from memory.  I think the original was lengthier.



jamie
From: quigley@acs.ucalgary.ca (Martyn Thomas Quigley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 11 Nov 92 05:40:07 GMT
Article-I.D.: acs.92Nov11.054007.13743
Organization: The University of Calgary, Alberta

christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>>
>>Or "Richard of York gained battles in vain".
>>
>You know, it always amazed me that people needed a mnemonic for the order
>of colors in the spectrum.  Their order always seemed pretty intuitive
>to me (e.g., what comes between red and yellow? orange of course. Would
>anyone think blue?). I must be misunderstanding the context in which
>mnemonics are traditionally used. Could someone enlighten me?

Presumably when that-which-is-to-be-learned means absolutely nothing
at all to who-is-learning-it.  But maybe I'm missing something too.

Mart
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning without formal logic
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 14:29:04 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.005957.7189@midway.uchicago.edu> gal2@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>
>Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that do not
>postulate that some kind of truth functional logic is at the
>foundation of meaning?
>
Take a look at semantic theories in psychology. They are almost all
network-based or "model"-based, and logic is virtually unheard of. I find 
them most unsatisfying, personally, but they are all the rage.

Sorry I can't be more specific but you might look up citations of the 
following in Social Science Citation Index.
Collins & Quillian (1969?)
Collins & Loftus (1972?)

Also, take a look at the semantics chapter in Philip Johnson-Laird's
book, _Mental Models_.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:38:56 GMT

In article <92Nov11.054007.13743@acs.ucalgary.ca> quigley@acs.ucalgary.ca (Martyn Thomas Quigley) writes:
>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>>>
>>>Or "Richard of York gained battles in vain".
>>>
>>You know, it always amazed me that people needed a mnemonic for the order
>>of colors in the spectrum.  Their order always seemed pretty intuitive
>>to me (e.g., what comes between red and yellow? orange of course. Would
>>anyone think blue?). I must be misunderstanding the context in which
>>mnemonics are traditionally used. Could someone enlighten me?
>
>Presumably when that-which-is-to-be-learned means absolutely nothing
>at all to who-is-learning-it.  But maybe I'm missing something too.
>
I was sent e-mail by someone who said the mnemonic is needed because
color are psychologically circular (e.g. red-violet-blue) and Roy G Biv
reminds you what the endpoints are. I occurs to me that it would be easier
just to learn one endpoint, however, than a mnemonic for the whole spectrum.
Oh well...

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1