From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: El Salvador: Proceso 531: IDHUCA Report
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 00:34:16 GMT

/** reg.elsalvador: 122.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 531: Human Rights **
** Written  5:10 pm  Sep 26, 1992 by cidai@huracan.cr in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: cidai@huracan.cr (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 531: Human Rights

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador
 
PROCESO 531
September 23, 1992
 
IDHUCA Report:
The report of the Ad Hoc Commission
 
     As these lines are being written, the Ad Hoc Commission -with
all due formality and, especially, confidentiality- has just handed
in its report, on which it has been working since May 19. By now,
President Cristiani and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali have in their hands the final evaluation of the active duty
officer corps of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, performed by Eduardo
Molina Olivares, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl and Abraham Rodriguez. As
the peace accords stipulate, the report is part of the process of
cleansing the military and contributes to the "supreme objective of
national reconciliation." Given this transcendental event for the
future of the nation, we would like to express a number of
concerns.
     The first is based on a simple arithmetical calculation. The
"active duty list of chiefs and officers of the Armed Forces"
totaled 2,203 men on May 22, 1992. Of this number, no more than 240
were interviewed by the commissioners or their staff. The numbers
are of interest in this case, since the peace accords conditions
the implementation of the report's conclusions "on interviews with
those affected." Thus, the decisions taken by the Commission were
only related to 10.89% of the total of active duty officers, who
range from second lieutenants up to generals. The bulk of the
information on the individual conduct of the officers, which the
Commission obtained with some difficulty, and on the basis of which
it organized its interviews, comes from domestic and international
non-governmental human rights organizations. The information did
not include aspects such as drug trafficking and corruption. What
will happen with the other 89.11%? Will they automatically be
cleared by the commissioners, the President of the Republic, the
international community and the Salvadoran people? We do not
believe that the entire officer corps of the Armed Forces should be
disqualified a priori in this evaluation, but we also refuse to
believe that that immense proportion of officers who were not
interviewed are free of all guilt.
     The other concern arises from the extreme degree of
confidentiality with which the final result of the Commission's
work will apparently be handled. Paragraph J, number 3, Chapter I
of the Chapultepec accords, referring to the cleansing of the armed
forces, provides that: "The administrative decisions corresponding
to the conclusions of the evaluation will be adopted within 30 days
following the date on which they are communicated to the government
by the Ad Hoc Commission, and will be implemented within 60 days of
that date." Nowhere is it mentioned that the people may not have
access to that information.
     Given the supreme objective of the Commission's work, that of
"national reconciliation", it would be good if the Salvadoran
people could find out which officers, in the Commission's opinion,
have not respected "the legal order, with particular emphasis on
respect for human rights"; which ones are not professionally
competent and, finally, which do not possess "an aptitude for
functioning within the context of [the] democratic society" which
El Salvador is trying to build. But, furthermore, the Salvadoran
people and the international community deserve to have access to
information regarding the difficulties encountered in carrying out
this delicate and transcendental investigation, principally with
regard to how problematic it was to obtain information capable of
establishing precisely what has been the "personal conduct" of each
officer with regard to human rights, and the "rigor with which he
has ordered the correction and sanction of irregular acts, excesses
or violations of human rights committed under his command."
     In a constructive spirit, and with the hope of making the most
of this unique opportunity which has arisen in this stage of our
national history, we would like to make two suggestions aimed at
satisfying the concerns expressed above. The first concern is to
resolve the problem of confidentiality in a context in which it is
of the utmost importance of break with a tradition of impunity,
based fundamentally on the concealment of the truth and on the lack
of punishment. We therefore propose that the report be made known
both inside and outside of El Salvador, by having it presented to
the Legislative Assembly and published by the United Nations. In
the second place, given the problem presented by that 89.11% of
officers who were not interviewed by the Commission, we ought to
consider the possibility of creating an institutional mechanism
which provides continuity to the Commission's work, based on
specific requests for information from victims, their relatives and
human rights organizations, or from other agencies which deal with
corruption and drug trafficking. We believe that this would
contribute to the goal proposed by Mons. Oscar Arnulfo Romero over
ten years ago: that those who "ordered, permitted, or even
entertained themselves, as in a Roman circus, with capturing,
disappearing, torturing and murdering," be made to hear "the voice
of justice."
     Nevertheless, our fears do not end here. Since the Ad Hoc
Commission was set up, the reactions on the part of the military
and its civilian spokespersons have not coincided with the spirit
and letter of the peace process. For example, Gen. Juan Orlando
Zepeda made a request to "take into account the ideology of the
sources of the information provided, since in many cases the goal
has been to discredit the military" (El Mundo, 6/4/92). An
editorial writer in one of the afternoon newspapers cried out on
June 4, "The forces of evil want to pounce upon our glorious Armed
Forces!" (6/4/92). Col. Julio Cesar Grijalva, currently director of
the Military Academy and responsible for the training of new
officers, claimed that no officers have been involved in human
rights violations, since they have only struggled against "the
aggression imposed by the FMLN" (Diario Latino, 6/8/92). Gen.
Mauricio Vargas, second-in-command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said, "I believe that the truth must shine through, that lies
cannot be allowed to conceal the truth. Here, for 12 years, black
was called white, and white, black; good was called evil and evil,
good" (El Mundo, 7/14/92). More recently, another editorial writer
on a well-known morning daily, after "analyzing" the three civilian
members of the Commission, declared them not credible, and said it
was "obvious" that the Commission "could not be considered
impartial; on the contrary, one is led to believe that the military
will come out looking very badly in the evaluation."
     The greatest concern over the last few weeks was generated by
an official Armed Forces communique issued in response to "recent
public accusations made by the non-governmental Human Rights
Commission." In its statement, the military does not ask the Human
Rights Commission for further information to back up its charges,
as a way to clarify them, nor does it present arguments to disprove
the charges, which would have been healthier given the current
context; the military merely limited itself to calling the Human
Rights Commission's attitude "tendentious, irresponsible and based
on unspeakable intentions, since ever since it was founded, it has
taken entirely biased positions in order to harm the Armed Forces."
     Such a response recalls times which (probably with well-
intentioned naivete) we thought were behind us. Just to mention an
example, let us recall the period just after the UCA massacre of
November 16, 1989. On December 18, in the morning daily La Prensa
Grafica, a story reported Col. Orlando Montano saying that he
wished to make it understood that "it is inconceivable that any
member of the Armed Forces would choose to kill, in cold blood,
innocent religious citizens and their employees... It is almost
certain that the murders of the six Jesuit priests and their two
employees were committed by members of some special [FMLN] commando
in order to... blame the Armed Forces." Let us examine military
communication number 006012, also dated December 18, signed by
then-colonel and head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rene Emilio
Ponce, called "Report on enemy activity registered in the general
area of the UCA" on November 16. "D/T (in military jargon,
terrorist delinquents), using combined weaponry, assassinated
Jesuit priests Ignacio Ellacuria (rector of the UCA), Armando [sic]
Lopez, Ignacio Martin Baro, Segundo Montes, Juan Ramon Moreno,
Joaquin Lopez y Lopez, Mrs. Elba Julia Ramos (employee) and her
daughter Celina Ramos, on the grounds of the 'Jose Simeon Canas'
Central American University (UCA), San Salvador." This report, sent
to the Special Investigative Commission, was meant as a show of
"interest" in collaborating with justice in the search for the
truth. Finally, although this time the spokespersons are civilians,
the version presented by the head of Foreign Relations (responsible
for explaining the massacre to the rest of the world) is revealing.
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Pacas Castro called the massacre "a
desperate act by the left" (Diario de Hoy, 11/17/89); one day
later, in La Prensa Grafica, the vice-chancellor claimed that the
FMLN was trying to "make the government's situation more difficult
by murdering the six Jesuit priests."
     Given these attitudes, the outlook for true national
reconciliation is quite complex. That legitimate aspiration,
national reconciliation, can only be attained if at least four
basic conditions are met: establishment of the truth; the legal or
moral judgment of society; reparations for harm done; and a sincere
attitude of repentance on the part of those responsible for the
crimes that have been committed. Hopefully the work of the Ad Hoc
Commission helps to establish the truth, and its report will be
made known to all; hopefully the victims of human rights violations
can somehow see their tormentors acceptably brought to justice, and
can receive just reparations; hopefully, for the good of the
Salvadoran people and the military, the mistakes made in the past
can be acknowledged, and clear signs of repentance will emerge. The
future of El Salvador depends on it.
 

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