From: whangj@aix.rpi.edu (Junho Whang)
Subject: Re: What Did We Lose?
Organization: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 14:22:31 GMT

>Sounds to me like you haven't looked at what caused the US to have problems.
>It directly links in to why we had so easy a time with Iraq.  No, I am not
>talking about a military reason, anyone who bothers to check their facts
>realizes that the US did not lose any major battle in all of vietnam.  
>What I am talking about is the %(##!&^ Press.  How many times in Vietnam did
>the press come in and accompany soldiers on _patrol_!  How often did they
>steal military vehicles to go and see the _real_ story.  Look at how

   If what you say is true, that U.S. was licked in Vietnam
due to press, then why did it take U.S. 7 years to manage 
something less than stalemate in Vietnam, whereas U.S. crushed
Iraq in less than few months?  (Also don't forget to add in
the French effort against N. Vietnam which ended in defeat).

  Even if the press were somesort of demons, they could not have
done what you purport:  Iraq was a regional superpower with 
formidable weapons, whereas N. Vietnam had no oil and no such great
stock of military hardware.

  Rather than contrasting vietnam with Iraq, try comparing with 
Korean war.  The similarities are obvious: both N. Korea and
N. Vietnam had fanatical communist leader who were bent on conquering
the southern portion of their country.  Just as Ho Chi Minh labored
for decades to bring entire vietnam under his domain, so did (and 
still does) the Kim Il Sung of North Korea.  Both leaders were
supported by China with material and personnel during their conflict
with U.S.  

  Now the result of these two conflict were stunningly different -
how come?  Why were N. Korean army whipped by U.S. troops in just
few months whereas the Ho Chi Minh army successfully fought French
& U.S. for decades?  Even with help of millions of Chinese troops
and total support of Chinese economy and million chinese casualties,
Kim Il Sung barely hung on to his northern portion of Korea.  There
was no question of his continuing to fight the war with U.S.  That
depended entirely upon Chinese, and the Chinese were exhausted by 
1953, largely due to exhaustion of material supply (their entire
war supply production amounted to just 1/10 th needed to keep fighting
in Korea.  Rest came from U.S.S.R., at unspecified cost).
Why such a different outcome?  I'll get to that in a minute. 
Just one aside - it's not because of U.S. fighting limited war in
vietnam.  General Ridgeway also fought limited war in Korea, 
restricting himself below the "Iron Triangle", and managed to
extract such a heavy cost on Chinese attackers that communists 
were forced to forget their revolutionary fervor and
sign armistice which remains unbroken to this day.  The real 
reasons were two fold:

   Geography was one major factor.  Open terrain and seas surrounding
three sides of Korean peninsula allowed U.S. to bring full might 
of its arms quickly and effectively.  Division can maneuver as 
divisions, and trenched defence lines can be established.  Air 
interdiction eradicated 3/4 of communist war supply.  DMZ can 
be created across the narrow of the peninsula to seal out communist
infiltration.  In contrast, Vietnam jungles and 1000 miles of 
border area negated much of U.S. superiority in conventional arms, 
and the task of establishing defendable DMZ was much more 
difficult.  When Chinese invaded Vietnam in 1979, they also found 
conventional divisional strategy unworkable, despite 3-1 advantage 
in manpower.
   More than geography, the quality of the indigenous people and 
government was the most critical factor.  While not exceedingly 
patriotic, the S. Korean people in general despised communism and
were solidly behind the Rhee government.  Given adequate arms and 
training, South Korea was a viable country, fully willing and able 
to defend itself.  Cultural unity, tradition of nationhood, 
peoples trust in and patriotic support of the government is often 
very easily underestimated quantity.  It seems intangable, flimsy 
quantity, but without this, no nation can survive. - and South
Vietnam lacked this.
   One continuing problem in S. Vietnam was vietcongs, majority of 
whom were south vietnamese, and received active support from 
populace.  Now how can you save a country if you have to shoot 
everyone in it to save it?  When americans went into Vietnam, they 
were essentially filling a vacuum - becoming the government, 
soldiers, and the only supporting framework of the country.  S. 
Vietnam was in a continual state of decline, without a stable and 
viable government, populace dispirited by with 20 years of continuing war.
Departure of americans in 1973 left just a husk of a country, 
which collapsed more from internal implosion rather than invasion 
of NVA.  The successful invasion was more of symptom than cause of 
demise of S. Vietnam.
  In end, despite similarity, Korean war and Vietnam was two
entirely different class of engagment.  Former a deflection of 
massive external agression to otherwise fully viable country, and 
latter, an attempt at prolonged intensive resusitation of dying 
fragments of a country.  If victory for americans meant leaving behind
a secure, stable and vibrant nation, americans could and did win 
in Korea.  But americans could never have won in Vietnam.
Newsgroups: alt.war.vietnam