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Date:         Mon, 4 Jan 1993 03:45:08 -0600
From:         "VALENTINE M. SMITH" <CDELL@UMKCVAX1.BITNET>
Subject:      Responses to Mideur-L posts on the Balkans, #6 of 8
Comments: To: mideur-l@ubvm.bitnet, val-l@ucf1vm.bitnet, jwales@iubvm.bitnet,
          olsenj@stolaf.edu, kousen@rayleigh.res.utc.com, klur@maristb.bitnet,
          srdjan%cathy@kri.fer.yu

Date: 31 Dec 1992 11:08:50 -0600
From: Gottfried Mayer-Kress <gmk@PEGASOS.CCSR.UIUC.EDU>
Subject: RE: More books and films

On Thu, 31 Dec 1992 10:43:42 EST James Sheldon writes:

>> the reason many UN efforts have been unsuccessful is the fact
>> that the deployed military elements operate under
>> constraints more akin to the police paradigm than the military
>> one.  In most instances, they've specifically been prohibited
>> from taking any offensive action, and almost no defensive
>> action.

> I strongly disagree with this analysis: the military paradigm is
> that of national defense against external threats to security
> interests. This is not applicable for the UN operations in Croatia or
> B-H. In the Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations
> (RSCUN) 721 (11/91), 724 (12/91), only peace keeping operations are
> mentioned. (Within one nation that is the dominant task of the
> police: to keep peace among the citizens, so that not everybody has
> to walk around with a .45 to protect himself and his family as in the
> US western movies). In RSCUN 743 (2/92) it was decided to establish a
> United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and in RSCUN 749 (4/92)
> the talk is about "to bring about a cease-fire and negotiated
> political solutions." Is this a military objective? I think I am in
> agreement with the planning officers at NATO in Brussels as well as
> with the US joint chiefs of staff: It is basically impossible to
> define a MILITARY goal in the Balkan conflict. It is not as clear and
> easy and well defined as in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

I think that is what Mr. Sheldon's analysis said, that a "military
paradigm" is NOT operable in Bosnia or Croatia, that the role of UN
troops in those places, and in Somalia, and on Cyprus, for examples
IS more a reflection of a "police paradigm" than a military one. I
think that Sheldon and Mayar-Kress are in agreement on this question
of military versus police roles, though they appear not to be. Most
military thinking I've heard about agrees that fighting in the
Balkans would be a much tougher nut to crack than either Iraq or
Somalia.

> From this identity crisis it is understandable why the restrictions
> of using physical force led to the miserable role UNPROFOR had to
> play and basically cooperate with the violators of international
> humanitarian law.

Because, as Sheldon pointed out, the UN role has traditionally been
"defensive," more police than military in action, with basic
prohibitions in orders given to field commanders about "offensive
force."

> The job of military units is NOT law enforcement! Law enforcement
> is a police function and the international system has to adapt to the
> post cold war situation in finding ways to enforce international
> humanitarian law in regional conflicts.

This may be a cdorrect view. However, *UN* forces have
"traditionally" been used more as police functionaries than military
units. I agree that in the "post-Cold War" era that new methodologies
for "peace-keeping" need to be embraced.

>> As I noted in a previous reply on this issue, most military
>> experts, including the former UN Force commanding general
>> from Canada, have assessed the manpower requirements to
>> successfully execute a military operation in Bosnia at a level
>> so high that most UN members would find the costs, political and
>> economic, to be unacceptable.

> Now, what do you mean by "execute a military operation in Bosnia"?
> Define who are the enemy forces and give us (at least in loose terms)
> a military objective and what it would take to achieve it.

As I perceive the UN's resolutions, Serbia-Montenegro is the "enemy,"
"executing a military operation operation in Bosnia" to my my mind
means neutralizing the "Yugoslav" air force, Serbian irregulars and
regulars wherever, and I suspect the political-military "objective"
would be two-fold: 1) restore Bosnia and Croatia to their
pre-invasion borders, and 2) the capture and trial of ALL commanders
and political leaders who were "known" (by whatever process) to have
promoted, advocated, led, directed, or participated in decisions or
acts that led to violations of law and basic human rights. Mind you,
I doubt this would actually occur like this, but it could.

>> If the full miltary option were adopted, would the UN have the
>> fortitude to hold Serbian population centers as hostages or
>> targets of air strikes, etc.?

> you understand into what kind of paradoxes you get when you try to
> apply 19th century concepts to today's regional crisis?

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Sheldon's analysis was not "19th
century," but a pretty pragmatic look at what is actually occurring,
and might occur, in Bosnia.

>> James Sheldon

> Gottfried Mayer-Kress

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