From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Timor: TAPOL statement to Decol'n Commission
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1992 00:55:53 GMT

/** reg.easttimor: 348.0 **/
** Topic: TAPOL statement to Decol'n Comm. **
** Written  9:43 pm  Jul 28, 1992 by gn:tapol in cdp:reg.easttimor **
TAPOL  statement to UN Committee of 24
 
The following the the full text of the statement submitted to
the UN Decolonisation Committee (Committee of 24) in New York
on Monday, 27 July 1992 by Liem Soei Liong, on behalf of
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign:
 
                 ---------------------------
 
Mr. Chairman and honourable members,
 
On behalf of TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, I
thank you for the opportunity to petition your Committee about
East Timor. Our organisation has followed events in East Timor
since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. I would like to make an
assessment of recent developments in East Timor, in particular
since the Santa Cruz Massacre of 12 November.
 
The international outcry and its impact on the Jakarta
Government
 
The massacre in Santa Cruz was not an 'incident', as the
Indonesian authorities claim, but part of a history of mass
killings in East Timor. It was the presence of foreign
journalists and a British cameraman when Indonesian soldiers
opened fire on a defenceless crowd that made all the
difference. The Suharto government, which has one of the worst
human rights records, faced an unprecedented wave of protests.
 
 
Also unprecedented was President Suharto's decision to set up
two commissions: a National Inquiry Commission and a Military
Inquiry Commission. The commissions were created for two
reasons, to resist strong demands for an independent inquiry
by convincing world opinion that the matter was being taken
seriously; and to use the tragedy to 'clean out the stable' by
adjusting policies, punishing and replacing military
personnel, and so on. It is well known that Suharto's policies
in East Timor had been encountering opposition at army
headquarters for some time. Suharto's efforts at damage
limitation resulted in several governments welcoming the
measures as "credible", "evenhanded" and "encouraging".
 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The preliminary
report of the National Inquiry Commission (KPN) served to deny
access to an international inquiry into the killings. Members
of the Commission which was led by a retired general hardly
spoke with the victims. A deep-rooted fear among the Timorese
would have made it impossible even for a genuinely Indonesian
commission to get at the truth. The KPN ignored graphic
evidence in the film, Cold Blood and statements by foreign
eyewitnesses, Allan Nairn, Amy Goodman, Max Stahl and Russell
Anderson.
 
Jakarta's 'evenhandedness' meant that both peaceful Timorese
demonstrators and Indonesian military were tried. Timorese
students demonstrating in Jakarta a week after the massacre
were sentenced to up to 10 years; Timorese tried in Dili for
participating in the 12 November memorial procession got from
6 years to life. In contrast, responsible military commanders
were 'punished' by being sent to the US for further studies
while low-ranking soldiers who admitted to shooting at the
innocent crowd received sentences averaging less than one
year. 
 
Mr. Chairman and honourable members,
 
In this post Cold War period, the role of the UN has been
greatly  enhanced. We therefore welcomed the initiative of
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to send Dr. Amos Wako
as his special representative to Indonesia and East Timor in
February and to talk to people on the spot. We look forward to
publication of Dr Wako's report in the belief that it will
contribute to a proper understanding of the real situation in
East Timor. 
 
Regarding the Wako visit we must draw your attention to grave
restrictions. Although official visits to East Timor are
routinely stage-managed, the Wako visit was unique. The newly
appointed commander of East Timor, Brig.General Theo Syafei
treated the visit as a test case. No effort was spared to
control the entire region. Several layers of military patrols
were stationed round Dr. Wako's hotel to prevent anyone
approaching him. The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH)
reports: 
 
"... repressive measures were taken. The local apparatus
arrested and detained about 120 youngsters who had previously
been held in connection with the 12 November 1991 event. The
arrested youngsters were 'invited' by their respective village
head and the local army NCO to attend compulsory courses. The
invitation told them to bring enough clothes for several days.
In fact, they were taken to the KODIM (Military Subdistrict
Command) and told to sign statements that they would make no
attempt to meet Amos Wako. According to a witness who met
them, the 120 youngsters were then taken to the barracks of
Infantry Battalion 744 in Taibessi, Dili and split into 3
groups of 40. Nobody was allowed to meet them. Then, on 15
February, they were taken for several days to Same sub-
district, about 100kms from Dili".
 
Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei boasts of being a hardliner and blames
his predecessor, General Warouw, for being too soft on the
Timorese. This same Theo Syafei has warned the Timorese that
if a demonstration like the one on 12 November were to happen
during his commandership, there would probably be even more
casualties.
 
The other newly installed commander is Major-General Mantiri,
responsible for the Nusa Tenggara region which includes East
Timor, has also shown the true face of the Indonesian army. In
a recent interview he said of the Santa Cruz massacre:
 
"....We don't regret anything. What happened was quite proper.
As military this is so. They were opposing us, demonstrating,
even yelling things against the government. To me that is
identical with rebellion, so that's why we took firm action".
 
Last week the Indonesian army revised its casualty figure for
the Santa Cruz massacre. The official number of dead is now
said to be 19 (the figure first given by General Try Sutrisno
but later dismissed as 'too low' by the KPN); 31 of the 115
'missing' persons have now allegedly been found 'alive and
well', leaving a total of 66 persons 'unaccounted for'. Who do
the Indonesians think they can fool with such concoctions? Why
has the army still failed to produce the name of a single
victim? Why have no bereaved families been able to bury their
loved ones? And, as if to mock the grieving Timorese,
Brig.Gen. Syafei said on 20 July that he hopes all the 66 are
dead. 
 
Mr. Chairman,
 
TAPOL has made statements to this committee on many occasions
primarily to inform this august body about the military
situation in East Timor. We want to continue this tradition.
 
Ever since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, East Timor has
been run like a military operation. A special military
structure was designed with a direct line of command to
military headquarters in Jakarta. In June this year, Brig.
General Theo Syafei announced that changes would be likely to
occur in East Timor in September when combat troops would be
withdrawn and the special military structure Kolakops would be
dissolved. Let us take a closer look at the so-called
demilitarisation of East Timor. 
 
Firstly, the withdrawal of combat troops. Anybody familiar
with the 16-year history of East Timor's occupation knows that
the major, traditional battles between ABRI (the Indonesian
armed forces) and Falintil (the armed wing of the East
Timorese resistance) took place from 1975 to 1978.  ABRI,
superior in weaponry and the number of men under arms,
gradually took control of large parts of the country. Falintil
adjusted its strategy and diversified into small guerrilla
units, while ABRI's role became increasingly territorial, to
control the majority of the population in the cities and
resettlement camps. The entire eighties was taken up by a huge
territorial effort by the army to pacify the East Timorese.
Commander Theo Syafei has said in recent interviews that the
main security threat is not the small, roaming guerilla units
but the expanding anti-colonial movement among young East
Timorese. The withdrawal of combat troops only highlights this
strategy but it does not mean that armed resistance has ceased
to be a threat. Only this month, Brig. General Syafei admitted
that between 7 and 10 clashes occur every month. 
 
The withdrawal of some combat units from East Timor should
also be assessed against the background of increased guerrilla
activities in Aceh and West Papua, the two other trouble-spots
for Jakarta. General Edi Sudradjat, the army chief-of-staff,
has warned that insurrections in these three areas are an
obstacle to economic development:
 
 
"That's why all kinds of separatist movements led by any group
of extremists that want to divide the unity of the Indonesian
Republic must be wiped out"  
 
In recent months, territorial operations have been reinforced
by a huge increase in the number territorial troops in the
area. In trouble spots such as the villages around Dili, as
many as five platoons have been stationed in each village. As
with combat troops, territorial troops from all parts of
Indonesia are usually stationed for between 6 months and 2
years. 
 
Should Falintil step up guerilla activities, army head-
quarters can always dispatch KOSTRAD rapid deployment forces
which have two combat-ready battalions in Java. The new terri-
torial strategy is explained in a paper, "Perspectives for
territorial operations in the development of human resources
in East Timor" by the Kolakops commander, Theo Syafei. 
 
Implicitly, the paper admits that they have lost the hearts
and minds of the youth and see the short- and medium-term task
as being to create a sense of security - in other words,
protecting the population from pro-independence elements.
Another task is to create cadres, in other words, to make
Indonesians out of the East Timorese, and to establish desa
binaan (guided villages), in other words, villages with a
heavy presence of territorial soldiers, controlling and
indoctrinating the villagers. General Syafei said that he
would take four approaches: persuasive, educational, preven-
tive and repressive:
 
"To implement persuasive and educational methods, a certain
supportive condition is needed to help villagers develop their
village wholeheartedly and with full concentration. Therefore,
preventive measures will be taken, including setting up
security posts, patrols and compulsory nightwatches. These
measures are intended not to frighten the population but
protect them and allow justice to prevail. These measures will
also be taken against foreign visitors who use the hospitality
of the East Timorese to spread issues and vilify East Timor 
 
The dissolution of KOLAKOPS is a cosmetic measure. Even
without a formal structure, East Timor will continue to be a
special military project for the army. Strong emphasis on the
territorial structure will minimise the use of special command
units; in emergencies Brig.General Theo Syafei will be able to
rely on special combat units from Java.
 
Mr. Chairman and honourable members,
 
Much has changed in the world today, good things as well as
bad things. So it is with East Timor. The tragic events in
Santa Cruz had a positive result by bringing East Timor onto
the international agenda. Far more people realise that a
political solution for East Timor is crucial. As East Timorese
say, wherever they are - in East Timor, in Indonesia or in
exile in Australia and Portugal - peace negotiations are long
overdue. It is for the international community, the United
Nations, to take the initiative and bring the parties
concerned to the negotiating table. The Timorese resistance is
prepared to talk with the Indonesians without preconditions,
in the international spirit of today, an offer the Indonesians
cannot reject. We are convinced that this Committee will take
the important step of advising the Secretary General to
accelerate this peace process.
 
Thank you.
 
 
** End of text from cdp:reg.easttimor **

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