HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: grady@public.BTR.COM ( )
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: pgp 2.0
Date: 7 Oct 92 01:04:46 GMT
Organization: BTR Public Access UNIX, MtnView CA. For info contact: info@BTR.COM

The mail server source of pgp2.0 was corrupt;
the Northern Lights version of pgp source
via xmodem was non-existent.

I am offering a $10 reward to the first
person who sends me a disk containing
the pgp2.0 source and executable.

I'll even return the postage and the
disk!

Grady Ward
P.O. Box 52137
Pacific Grove, CA  93940

And on the return disk I'll put
a fast table driven DES source
and two (count em), two versions
of Lucifer.

Tnx ahead of time.

-- 
Grady Ward  grady@btr.com  Moby Lexicons
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Paradox database encryption
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 02:22:31 GMT
Distribution: sci.crypt
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <Bv7Fr8.F5p@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu> kellmeye@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (kellmeyer steven l) writes:

>I am planning on using Borland's Paradox for storing information of 
>a highly personal nature (part of our expanding net will soon be
>linking in a counseling center).  Does anyone know if the security
>level of this software is reasonably good?

Appallingly bad.  If you....

>I already downloaded PGP 2.0

Ah, I see you've already got it.  grep for 'Paradox' in part 1 of the docs for
a whole list of commercial packages whose encryption can be broken in a fraction
of a second.  Paradox is one of them.

Peter.
--
    pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz || peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz || peter@nacjack.gen.nz
			    (In order of preference)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: mycroft@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu (Charles Hannum)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Organization: MIT Laboratory for Computer Science
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 10:56:11 GMT


In article <1422@eouk9.eoe.co.uk> ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
writes:
>
> On the other hand, AFAIK PGP only uses a 128 bit hash to protect its
> key certificates, so an attack on the hash function would be easier
> than attacking the modulus.  Am I wrong about PGP in this respect?
> Does PGP use some extra method to protect its certificates?

The signature is also encrypted with the signer's secret key.  Thus,
you'd need to attack the modulus anyway.

--
 \  /   Charles Hannum, mycroft@ai.mit.edu
 /\ \   PGP public key available on request.
Scheme  White heterosexual atheist male (WHAM) pride!
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Snefru cracked
Date: 4 Oct 92 14:40:03 GMT
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX

Someone here asked about Snefru.  Biham and Shamir's differential
cryptanalysis was ableto crack Snefru with two passes in minutes.
Details are in the various papers (and presumably the book when it
comes out).

Eli Bihman received the prize from Ralph Merkle at a Crypto rump
session, either 1989 or 1990 (I forget).

Bruce
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: Using genetic engineering for exhaustive DES key search
Organization: AT&T Bell Labs Random Organization Generator
Distribution: na
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 04:46:11 GMT
X-Nsa-Bait: This technique has not yet been reduced to practice

   lou@Cadence.COM (Louis K. Scheffer) writes:
   >The basic approach would be to build a bacteria that acts as a DES key search
   >machine.  Each bacteria generates keys at random, decrypts the encrypted block 
   >with the key, and compares the result with the plaintext.  If there is a match,

A real computer virus, eh?  The difficult part is to gen up an enzyme
that generates _random_ numbers, represented as e.g. random proteins.
(OK, I'm not sure getting a bacterium to do DES is really that
straightforward either, but ....)  Enzymes like to always do the same thing.
The obvious approach is to use mutations to create the randomness,
but the mutagen would also presumably affect the compare-the-results genes.
So you've now got a very large number of very small monkeys typing away,
and another crowd of monkeys randomly yelling "This stuff is Shakespeare!" :-)
--
				Pray for peace;      Bill
#Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Trickle-Down Economics: Giving money to government bureaucrats 
#	and hoping some will trickle down to the people who need help.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: tye@spillman.uucp (E. Tye McQueen)
Subject: PGP weak on long messages (was: Re: pgp2.0 ... key length?)
Date: Sun, 04 Oct 1992 08:49:00 GMT
Follow-Ups: alt.security.pgp
Organization: Spillman Data Systems

Well, this is probably too basic for sci.crypt and cross-posting
to alt.security *and* alt.security.pgp doesn't make much sense to
me so follow-ups have been directed to only alt.security.pgp.

lewis@aera8700.mitre.org (Keith Lewis) writes:
)PGP is essentially RSA performed on a bitmask which is used repeatedly on
)a single message.

Doesn't reusing the (encrypted) bit mask make long messages fairly
easy to crack if you have ideas as to the content of the plain text?
I guess the message would best be several times the length of the
bit mask for this to work.

Is it done this way to save computation time when en/decrypting?
Or is this to get around silly NSA restrictions?

Thanks,
 tye@spillman.com                         Tye McQueen, E.
----------------------------------------------------------
 Nothing is obvious unless you are overlooking something. 
----------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<1992Oct1.181246.25177@dickens.com>
Distribution: usa
Date: 1 Oct 92 13:25:31


    Why not just go buy an HP-48 and replace the chip with your own chip
    that has everything you want.  C'mon you need to watch more 007
    movies ...

Because only techno geeks carry around HP-48's and techno geeks are
automatically suspicious characters.  Also, if by "replace the chip"
you mean "replace the processor", it means you are carrying around
a modified calculator, which is *really* suspicious.  If you just
program the encryption into the HP48, that means you're carrying
around an HP48 with a crypto program, which is incriminating if
they've captured a similar unit from another spy. 

You want to use an unmodified, non-fancy, non-techno-geek, consumer
calculator identical to those used by millions of innocent people.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: alanf@cs.monash.edu.au (Alan Grant Finlay)
Subject: Re: Differential cryptanalysis and random headers
Organization: Computer Science, Monash University, Australia
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 07:02:21 GMT

Graham.Shaw@newcastle.ac.uk (G.D.Shaw) writes:

>Some questions:

>Is differential cryptanalysis exclusively applicable to situations
>where a chosen plaintext attack is possible?

Yes.

>If so, does the use of a random header followed by encryption in a
>chaining mode defeat such an attack?

I'm not sure, I expect it does if the header is long enough.

>Finally, is vulnerability to differential cryptanalysis (or indeed
>chosen plaintext attacks in general) believed to imply vulnerability
>to other types of attack?

Nobody knows, what is known is the reverse:

invulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack implies invulnerability to
known-plaintext or ciphertext-only attack (unless there are some weak keys
or plain text being used etc).

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dc91jld@brunel.ac.uk (John L Davies)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: More on cracking DES algorithm
Date: 1 Oct 92 11:32:18 GMT
Organization: Brunel University, West London, UK

shulick@indiana.edu (Sam Hulick) writes:
>
>NOTE: Yes, you may have noticed I'm posting a lot about breaking DES/UNIX
>encryption.  I am not a hacker, I'm merely trying to understand the way it
>works and learn exactly how secure this algorithm really is.  I gave up hacking
>a long time ago. (:
>
>Let's say someone retreives the DES source code, which is easy enough.  Why
>WOULDN'T they be able to take every single mathematical operation, reverse each
>one, and then have a "decrypt()"?  I know it's not that simple, but how has DES
>made it so even a good mathematician can't just reverse all the operations?
>

Obviously, if you know the key used, then DES is reversible - how else, can
the plaintext be retrieved.  However, if you mean is it possible to reverse 
the process to produce the plaintext & key from the ciphertext, then the answer
is NO.

Why not?  Each of the subkeys is used in an XOR operation, you can't reverse
this one to one.  A XOR B = C, if you know C you can't be sure what A and B are.

OK?

-- 
"Therefore was the name of it called Babel;  because Jehovah
 did there confound the language of all the earth." -Genesis 11:9
.
  John L.S.Davies          dc91jld@brunel.ac.uk
.
.
From: s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 6 Oct 92 15:58:04 GMT
Article-I.D.: exnet.BvpJ0t.1z3
Organization: ExNet Systems Ltd Public Access News, London, UK


Well, now you've said it three times slowly and loudly I think I'm
begining to get the point!

How does this analysis sound to you?

   - The only person who can verify my key with reasonable certainty is
me.  (Leaving aside the real paranoiacs in the other thread talking
about PGP having been spoofed).

   - The other element in the system that needs verification is the
communications path between me and the net.

   - So, if I have access to more than one route I can test my local
mail system by sending a copy of my key from one of my mailboxes to
another and comparing.  (The userids on the different systems are
different so are spoofer doesn't know what I'm about).

   What can I tell you?

   - "My mail system is verified. Use it with confidence"?  This message
can be spoofed but to what end?  If the spoofer isn't substituting my
key then he hasn't gained anything and if she is then I know and she
gains nothing but a sex change.

   - "My mail system is compromised.  Do not talk to me."  We now have
the same security as the write-only file (called "NULL:" on dos
systems).  But I presume I can take measures - sue the network
administrator for negligence or something.

   If this works can I extend it to users with only one net link: you
send me your key (ASCII format) and I print it and post it to you?  Then
somebody steams the envelope open!!

   Any good?

Richard

[ "Hey baby, you should be in real life!" - Zaphod Beelblebrox I ]
From: igb@fulcrum.bt.co.uk (Ian G Batten)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Date: 6 Oct 92 14:29:31 GMT
Organization: Fulcrum Communications

I was thinking about this are recently.  It occured to me that the
bottom bit of each sample on a CD or DAT tape is an obvious channel.

Suppose I have an ``ideal'' random bit generator, of a quality
sufficient to use as a one-time pad.  Suppose I strip off the bottom bit
of each sample in a piece of music on CD and replace it with my ideal
random bits, and press the CDs.  [[ Notice that Russia and other Warsaw
Pact countries made much foreign exchange by selling cheap CDs. ]]  The
sound will be essentially unaffected, and may even be improved because I
have just applied excellent quality dithering.  It's trivial to extract
the bottom bit out again.  In fact, I could ship messages to all my
agents on a known CD (they just go and buy it!) and they decode it with
another CD.

But how would they send messages back?  Just do the same trick on DAT or
DCC --- ship some music with the bottom bit dithered.

Excellent!

And the gear required beyond a standard CD machine and standard DAT
machine would fit on a single 1" square ASIC.

ian
From: lane@duphy4.physics.drexel.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Message interception
Date: 4 Oct 92 10:46:06 GMT
Distribution: all
Organization: Drexel University Physics

Obviously one way that messages could be intercepted is by tapping off
of a line (phone or RS232) between a terminal and the mainframe it is
connected to....no doubt this is part of the reason why PGP is discouraged
on mainframe systems.

Wasn't there some mention a while back of "secure" terminal-to-mainframe
session software (I vaguely recall KA9Q tcp/ip ....) ?  It seems to me
that transferring session keys for securing a terminal line would be
easiest using public-key cryptography.



--

 Drexel University       \V                     --Chuck Lane
----------------->--------*------------<--------lane@duphy4.hepnet
     (215) 895-1545      / \  Particle Physics  lane@duphy1.bitnet
FAX: (215) 895-5934        /~~~~~~~~~~~         lane@duphy4.physics.drexel.edu
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3537 alt.security.pgp:55
From: ahn@ac.wfunet.wfu.edu (Dave Ahn)
Subject: fastDES
Organization: J. Random Misconfigured Site
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1992 06:17:02 GMT
X-Posted-From: ac.wfunet.wfu.edu
NNTP-Posting-Host: sol.ctr.columbia.edu

Perhaps this is not the right place to make this posting...

I am looking for publicly available data encryption software
that implements DES. I remember seeing a package called "FastDES" but I am
unable to locate this program. Any help would be appreciated.

Thanks. Please reply by Email to ahn@wfunet.wfu.edu or post to sci.crypt.

-dka

-- 
Dave Ahn
ahn@wfunet.wfu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: flagg@blind-lemon.cs.unlv.edu (Scott Cunningham)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Organization: UNLV
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 92 02:48:37 GMT

In article <BvpEx7.7Iq@fulcrum.bt.co.uk> igb@fulcrum.bt.co.uk (Ian G Batten)  
writes:
 "Suppose I strip off the bottom bit
 "of each sample in a piece of music on CD and replace it with my ideal
 "random bits, and press the CDs.

Why go to all the trouble.  If you really want to make it complex encrypt a  
short message into decimal characters and use the resulting number as a measure  
for a piece of non-heat expansive material.  Put this material into a common  
item and ship.  The receiver removes the material and measures it with an  
electron microscope, figures out the measure and decodes the message.  if there  
are any errors in his measure it would only effect the last few characters of  
the code.  But again this is pointless.  Why do you need to transmit one  
message thousands of times?

--

________________________________________________________________________
Scott Cunningham \ We're the NSA                                        \
Username: flagg  \ So your the ones I hear on the other end of my phone \
                 \ No, that's the FBI                                   \
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: keith.willis@almac.co.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: sorry guys!
Date: 5 Oct 92 12:01:18 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: ALMAC BBS Ltd



        Due to a fault on a the BBS through which I send and receive
        this stuff, a bunch of mail sent some weeks ago was recently
        re-sent.

        My apologies for the wasted bandwidth, and my thanks to those
        who took the trouble to respond.


---
 ~ PQ 2.15 194 ~  It's just a jump to the left.... 
--
ALMAC BBS Ltd. 0324-665371
Dos based USENET access,  call for details!
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: RSA claims 33 and 37 of U.S. patent 4,405,829
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 21:09:00 GMT

It has been pointed out to me that Julius Ceasar used the polynomial

	C = M+1(mod n)

where M are the alphabet message chunks and n is the size of the
alphabet.  For english n=26 which is the composite of the two primes
2 and 13 so I believe that prior art (very prior) has been established.
Any comments?

Bob

-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

                ____________________________________________
               \                                           /
                \ Flames to /dev/null    Advice by email! /
                 \                                       /
                  \ PGP public key available on request /
                   \                                   /
                    -----------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mirage1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Robert Ames)
Subject: PEM question
Keywords: RSA PEM
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1992 07:53:44 GMT

A number of people have replied to my question about the PEM protocol,
pointing out that even if the private key involved in one message
exchange were to be discovered, this would only have the effect of a
"known plaintext attack" on the RSA encryption used to exchange the
keys.  In other words, the sender's private RSA would remain secure.

Thanks for the response.

-- 
Robert Ames mirage1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca  P.O. Box 724, Station 'A', Toronto
From: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: My public key
Date: 2 Oct 92 04:03:00 GMT
Reply-To: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel)
Organization: The GrapeVine BBS *** N. Little Rock, AR *** (501) 753-8121


First I would like to say thank you  to all the folks that pointed me in
the right direction  for obtaining the PGP files.  Especially the person
that Emailed  it to me. I  am posting my public  key to be added  to the
keyrings.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQCNAirL/AEAAAEEAL2SX+Tudr9l/QNQO6+iGjEK1M9HTOCE8uXtXUegFODqAmts
nbIp5dj22x7L/6tujfGoExqU/56AF9KSOcWQ4tUImFLtVSWnkBDkFEXkEibfFld8
vyhfCSe+v5V1liE2bpoAeuCc1fg3XCxk12HC9KIdJ3JxM8TvOXDoubQ2GCRxAAUR
tCtKaW0gV2VuemVsIDxqaW0ud2VuemVsQGdyYXBldmluZS5scmsuYXIudXM+
=vIxq
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

---
 * SM 1.06 A0059 * I have NO solution, but I DO admire the problem!
                                                                      
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Secure 32-bit checksum needed
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date:  2 Oct 92 19:25:13 GMT

cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

> >I need a 32-bit cryptographically strong checksum.

> This is a contradiction in terms.

> If all you keep is 32 bits, then it's too easy to find a collision for any
> given checksum (ie., by brute force search).  Therefore, it's not
> cryptographically strong.

It seems that I didn't express my question well enough. By
"cryptographically strong" I meant that there is no other way to forge
it than brute force.

Anyway, several people replied by privete e-mail. Their opinions can
be grouped into two groups:

1) That any consecutive 32 bits of the result are equally good.

2) That I should use a 32-bit hash function of the result - like a
CRC-32, or divide the result into 32-bit chunks and XOR them together,
and so on.

Interestingly, everybody who supported opinion 2) mentioned in their
message "I am not a crypto expert". :-)

Well, I guess that I'll use the 32 least significant bits of MD4, MD5,
or SHA.

For those of you that are curious, I don't need this checksum for
strong authentication purposes. I am writing a utility that creates
"maps" of the constant areas of the different computer viruses and
keeps the checksums of these areas. The checksums are further used for
exact virus identification. I just wanted to make difficult enough for
the virus writers to forge them, i.e. to create a virus which has the
same map with the same checksums of the constant areas, but the virus
is different. 32 bits are strong enough for my purpose.

Again, thanks to everybody who responded.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.0 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
From: shulick@shoshone.ucs.indiana.edu (Sam Hulick)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Time to crack/decode DES/UNIX passwds
Date: 30 Sep 92 21:35:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: usenet.BvEuMK.FoC
Reply-To: shulick@shoshone.ucs.indiana.edu
Organization: Vallen Software
Originator: shulick@shoshone


As known, DES encryption source code is available publically.  If someone got
this code and after some work, figured out how to reverse it in some way, how
long would it take, on the average, to crack a DES-encrypted password? (via a
program)  10 minutes?  days?

-- 
Sam Hulick          | "The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to
shulick@indiana.edu | hate them, but to be indifferent to them: that's the
(NeXTmail welcome)  | essence of inhumanity."  --George Bernard Shaw
From: nevries@accucx.cc.ruu.nl (Nico E de Vries)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Secure 32-bit checksum needed
Date: 5 Oct 92 10:19:04 GMT
Organization: Academic Computer Centre Utrecht

In <bontchev.717961294@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) writes:

>Hello, everybody!

>I need a 32-bit cryptographically strong checksum. I guess that I
>could run MDx or SHS on my message and get 32 bits from the result
>(which is 128 and 160 bits respectively). The question is - which 32
>bits should I take? Obviously, there are a few options:
>1) The least significant 32 bits.
>2) The most significant 32 bits.
>3) 32 bits from the middle.
>4) 32 bits, collected from random positions.
>I "feel" that all of the above are equally secure, but I need a more
>knowledgeable opinion.

I "feel" you are right. BUT what usefull would it be. It would
be very easy to falsify since only 2^32 possible files are needed
to find a matching one.

>Comments, anyone?

Just use all the bits. They are not there for nothing.

>Regards,
>Vesselin

Nico E. de Vries
 _ _
 O O  USENET nevries@cc.ruu.nl This text reflects MY opinions, nothing else.
  o   This text is supplied 'AS IS', no waranties of any kind apply.
 \_/  Don't waste your time on complaining about my hopeless typostyle.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: tsf@CS.CMU.EDU (Timothy Freeman)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Originator: tsf@U.ERGO.CS.CMU.EDU
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University
	<Bv7ID5.BHw@ibmpcug.co.uk>
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 17:15:41 GMT

In article <Bv7ID5.BHw@ibmpcug.co.uk> gtoal@ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal) writes:

   May I ask an ignorant newbie question please?  It was my understanding that
   the two primes used in most of these public key systems weren't real primes
   at all, but were usually pseudo-primes that had been picked at random and
   tested with statistical methods to give a high *probability* of being prime.

If the probability of the alledged primes being composites is small
enough, the chances of nonprimality compromising security are less
than the chances that someone will simply guess the key, so it doesn't
matter.

It would be interesting to know how hard PGP works to ensure that the
apparent primes are really primes.


--
Tim Freeman <tsf@cs.cmu.edu>    CompuServe ID 71045,2267 checked occasionally.
When they took the fourth amendment, I was silent because I don't deal drugs.
When they took the sixth amendment, I kept quiet because I know I'm innocent.
When they took the second amendment, I said nothing because I don't own a gun.
Now they've come for the first amendment, and I can't say anything at all.
From: pcl@oxford.ac.uk (Paul Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Kahn's Codebreakers wanted.
Date: 5 Oct 92 13:00:09 GMT
Organization: Oxford University Computing Service, 13 Banbury Rd, Oxford, OX2
	6NN


I would like to purchase a copy of the first edition _The Codebreakers_
by David Kahn.

If anyone has one to sell, please get in contact and we'll arrange a deal.

Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt