From: Jeffrey D Koperski <jkopersk@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Newsgroups: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: RE: FAQ, 2/2
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 17:56:54 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: The Ohio State University

Jeff:
>>First, any good scientist
>>believes in the existence of entities that are undetectable.
>
Reply:
>Wrong.  Any theory that a scientist constructs about entities that are not
>directly observable is based (ultimately) upon entities that *are* observable
>and understood.

If these constructed entities are essentially undetectable and 
yet exist, then you have granted all I want.  The FAQ rules 
essentially undetectable entities to be non-existent.  My claim 
is simply that scientists also believe in such entities.  I care 
not how they arrive at these existential claims.

>>That is, no one
>>holds that the only things that exist are objects within Earth's light-cone.
>
>If no one holds this, why are you bringing it up?  Do you hold otherwise?  If
>so, I (and any scientist) would ask for evidence and reasons why matter does
>not exist outside Earth's light cone.  The onus of proof would be on you to
>prove the assertion.

I think you simply missed my point.  Also, one of the other 
responses to my original post seems to be making this very claim:  
all and only those things that enter Earth's light-cone exist.  
I'm trying to show this is not the majority view.

>>Objects outside the cone as well as, say, whatever is inside a black-hole, are
>>not dectectable, yet we ascribe existence to them.
>
>What "we"?  If you have no information about these entities, you cannot make
>statements about them (statements that you would assert as "fact").  Since
>knowledge is contextual and hierarchical, you could construct a theory about
>such entities based on what you have observed "within Earth's light-cone".
>But you would be mistaken to construct a theory that is not consistent with
>your existing knowledge.

I'm not sure we have an argument here other than to say 
scientists do make existence claims about things inside a black 
hole.  The original theory that gave us black holes predicts what 
is inside them, which is identical to that thing which causes 
them, viz., highly dense neutron stars.

>>Second, numbers, sets, and a host of universals are undetectable when
>>uninstantiated, but many philosophers and most mathematicians believe in the
>>existence of (at least) some mathematical entities (see, for example, Roger
>>Penrose, _The Emporer's New Mind_).
>
>You are impeaching existence by attacking the only means we have of
>understanding existence, our conceptual faculty (and mathematics is
>essentially a conceptual science).  A "set" or a "universal" (such as
>"man") is a construct of the human conceptual process.  By observing many
>"men" we build a concept of "man".  The universal "man" is not an existent,
>but is an abstraction of a set of existents.

Interesting.  Just to put you on the philosophical map, you
espouse here an intuitionist philosophy of mathematics and 
a nominalist approach to universals (although 'abstraction' can 
mean many things).  That is fine.  The point is that 
realism/platonism is the majority view among mathematicians, 
including Penrose.  They claim that mathematical entities exist 
tout court.  In fact, W.V. Quine, an arch empiricist and 
the top philosopher in the world today, believes in the existence 
of one abstract object: sets.  I don't care to critique your 
personal metaphysical views.  My point here is that the majority 
of philosophers, mathematicians, logicians, and physicists do not 
share your strict empiricism, not even those who are considered 
very severe in the regard.  If you're interested (and from 
your next remark you are probably not but others might be), a 
contemporary philosopher who defends such a view is Bas van 
Fraassen in _The Scientific Image_.  As a footnote, this is van 
Fraassen's most important work to date.  Interestingly enough, he 
became a Christian after writing it--evidence that even a very 
strict empiricism is not in conflict with theism.

>>A short review of 20th century philosophy will show that attempts to rule out
>>theological discourse as "non-cognitive" (Carnap's term) or otherwise
>>essentially flawed have always come back to haunt science.  That is, applying
>>the same criterion to the "good discourse" of theoretical science rules out
>>part of that discourse.
>
>It's not surprising that 20th century philsophers have been unable to
>accomplish the obvious (the FAQ would call this comment argumententum ad
>hominem).
        
There are a number of therapeutic replies I could make here, but 
I'll refrain. 

Jeff Koperski
Dept. of Philosophy
Ohio State