HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>
Subject: Re: CAS: Commo w/FM, UHF
Organization: Ham Radio Operator, Houston Tex.
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:29:28 GMT


From "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>

> From MikeHot Wire DeSimone <hotwire@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
> 
 (Ideas abuot using AWACS for CAS control deleted to save space)

> 
> > Also, being an ex-gunship pilot myself, I not surre I can agree 
> >that turning to their helicopter gunships is such a bad idea :-)
> 
> Gunships today are nothing like what they can be.  The rotary wing
> is neat; now we need to make it smart, so the gunship can react as
> fast as a fixed-wing jet.  Still, the above-mentioned zone system
> should work with gunships, and would work best by eliminating the
> AWACS and giving each zone its own "CAS frequency".
> 
> Mike DeSimone   hotwire@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
> 

 I, for one, don't like parts of your idea abuot using AWACS for 
CAS control. The very *last* thing you want is CAS that does not 
have some dirrect link to the troops they are supporting who has a 
visual on *both* the ground troops and the CAS. This is *exactly* 
what happened when the A-10s attacked the British troops in DS and 
killed several. 

 Remember, the current FAC system includes two types of FACs. The 
airborne kind that fly over the area and the ground FACs that move 
on the ground with the troops. In both cases, the FAC is the one 
who is responsible for keeping track of the location of the 
friendly ground troops and being sure that the aircraft don't fire 
on friendlies. Sometimes even this breaks down (the AH-64's that 
hit U.S. troops), but no pilot worth his salt will drop ordinance 
near friendlies without being sure of where the friendlies are.

 Another problem with you idea is that the "on station" time of 
most modern jets would restrict the system severely unless we had 
several times the numbers of aircraft we now have. I personaly saw 
many *tons* of ordinance dropped on useless targets because the 
aircraft was getting low on fuel and didn't want to carry all that 
stuff back with them.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
             Gene Kennedy - Ham Radio Operator, N5ABI -
                         gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: scw@ollie.seas.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Supply convoy safety
Organization: UCLA School Of Engineering & Applied Science
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 19:45:20 GMT


From scw@ollie.seas.ucla.edu


In article <Bww8Lu.FMD@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> schiangkw01@cc.curtin.edu.au (Eric Chiang) writes:
>
>From Eric Chiang <schiangkw01@cc.curtin.edu.au>
>
>I need some opinions and suggestions regarding a point some of my friends
>and myself were discussing.
>
>Hypothetically speaking, if you have a 4 lane highway which is vital as a 
>supply route and is heavily wooded on both sides, (tropical forest like 
>vietnam) and is about 500+ miles long, how would the US Marines and/or the
>US Army secure it?


(1) Clear back the brush/woods for ~400 meters on each side of the road.
(2) Agressive patroling and ambushes away from the road.
(3) Armed escort for convoys.
(4) Daily road sweeps looking for mines.

     To cover a 500 mile road would take ~2 Light Infantry divisions.


-----
Stephen C. Woods; UCLA SEASNET; 2567 BH;LA CA 90024; (310)-825-8614
UUCP: ...{ibmsupt,ncar!cepu}!ollie}!scw  Internet:scw@SEAS.UCLA.EDU
"Non, je ne regrette rien"--1er RE de Para 1963

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>
Subject: Re: Marine Aircover <was New Carrier Plan>
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:36:20 GMT


From MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>

In article <BxGrME.6qA@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> thornley@micro.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley) writes:
>From: thornley@micro.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley)
>Subject: Re: Marine Aircover <was New Carrier Plan>
>Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:32:38 GMT
>
>From thornley@micro.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley)
>
>In article <BxB8u0.LC7@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib) writes:
>>From ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)
>>In article <Bwu9Ku.B4K@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> erudnick@pica.army.mil (FSAC-SID) writes:

>>>AP bombs require high velocity to punch through the armored deck, and
>>>also need to be going nearly straight down so as to encounter the least
>>>armor. The attack profiles needed to get the bomb into this attitude
>>>are high altitude level bombing (hit prob. ---> 0) 
>
>>Wasn't the Prince of Wales sunk by Japanese level bombers? The
>>difference was that the B-17 did it from a very high altitude.
>>
>Torpedo bombers.  What really got the PoW was an early torpedo hit that
>twisted one of the prop shafts; before that prop could be stopped, it had
>torn up the back part of the ship pretty badly.
>
>

As I recall the Japanese attack on the Repulse and the PoW was a *combined*
effort on the part of torpedo and high-level bombers.  There was at least one
bomb strike on one of these ships -- it took out the aircraft hanger on the
Repulse (I think), but apart from the resultant fire from burning aviation
fuel did not affect the ship's fighting ability.  

*The primary damage to both ships was thru torpedo attacks*.  The PoW was hit
first in the propellor/rudder area, causing it to lose speed and become
locked into a turn -- not under the helm.  Thereafter, subsequent torpedo
hits knocked out the ring main electrical circuits: AA laying and traverse
servo-motors were thus rendered inoperative.

>From what I recall, lookouts sighted the torpedo bombers first at long range 
and at medium altitude, they were certainly the first to be engaged by AA 
defenses.  The presence of high altitude bombers was only remarked upon when 
their bombs started to hit the water -- the h.a. a/c were then estimated to 
be at around 15000 feet and barely visible to the unaided eye.  I guess that 
they might have had a better chance if the torp a/c hadn't been seen first, 
cos naturally the ships started manoeuvering like mad thereafter.

Cheers,
Keith Coman

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Condemning a research report on the basis of :  Dept of Management
 invalid and unreliable methodology is the    :  Rhodes University
 cheapest shot in the book."                  :  Grahamstown, 6140
                                              :  Rep of South Africa
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Maurice Blok <mgjblok@cs.vu.nl>
Subject: Re: Kilo-class submarines
Organization: Fac. Wiskunde & Informatica, VU, Amsterdam
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:35:29 GMT


From Maurice Blok <mgjblok@cs.vu.nl>

Kilo class SS

Displacement:	2,300/2,900 tons
Speed:		12/20 kts
Dimensions:	73.0x9.9x6.5
Armament:	6 x 533mm TT (12 Reloads)
Elec. Equip:	Radar: Snoop Tray
		Sonar: LF Suite
Machinery:	2 diesels, electric drive, 1 x 6 bladed prop, ? hp
Man:		approx 60.

Average US SSN (L.A. Class):

Displacement:	6,080/6927 tons
Speed:		30+ kts
Dimensions:	109.73x10.06x9.75
Armament:	4 x 533mm TT Mk67 (22 reloads)
		SSN 719 > 12 VLS Tomahawk
Elec. Equip:	Radar: BPS-15A
		EW:    BRD-7 direction finder, WLR-8(V)2, WLR-12
		Sonar: BQQ-5A(V)1 or BQQ-5D, BQS-15, BQR-15
Machinery:	G.E. S2G pressurised-water reactor, 2GT; 1 x 7 bladed
		prop: 35.000 hp
Man:		12 officers, 115 to 127 men


  /-------\        /-------------------------------\
  |04:23am|        | Let's hit the sack!.....Naaah |
  \-------/        /-------------------------------/ 
     ____         / 
    /   #     /---\           ------
---/    #     |o  |           Maurice Blok <mgjblok.cs.vu.nl>
|       #    <__  |           Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 
---\____#     \___/           ------

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: "Jeffery Capt. Shue" <mclno@oasys.dt.navy.mil>
Subject: Re: desert storm operations
Organization: Carderock Division, NSWC, Bethesda, MD
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:32:55 GMT


From "Jeffery Capt. Shue" <mclno@oasys.dt.navy.mil>




>
>In article <Bx7C34.Dv5@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Fengxi Zhou <fengxi@prancer.eche.
>ualberta.ca> writes:
>>while talking about desert storm, i somehow feel it is not as huge a victory
>>as it sounds,  iraq. though armed to teeth, isn't a first class military
>>power.  their training and tactics are primative, never mind their logistical
>>support.
>
It looks like a cakewalk now but at the time it didn't look like it
would be that easy. Remember that Iraq had just fought a war with Iran
so their troops were supposed to be veterans. The United States hadn't
fought a major war since Viet Nam and most of the junior officers and
troops had no combat experience. The intelligence guys with the satellites
simply counted noses, tanks, APCs, aircraft and other hardware. (Which
points out the problem with relying solely on electronic means of gathering
intel.) With the combination of alot of 1st class hardware and supposedly
veteran troops it looked (on paper) like the coalition forces were in
for a fight. The fact that Iraqi forces simply collapsed and their will
was broken is extremely difficult to predict.  The rapid destruction
of Iraqi forces  was due to a combination of factors including the technologica
l edge and the doctrinal edge (also the fact that the majority of Iraqis
in Kuwait thought it was wrong for them to be there).

Yes we walked all over them but we were also very lucky and in some
cases they were very stupid. If Saddam had invaded Saudi Arabia in August
1990 before we had sufficient troops there the story would have been
vey different.

J.P. Shue
Standard disclaimers apply.



Newsgroups: sci.military
From:     "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>
Subject:  Re: 106mm Recoiless Rifle - Rocket or Gun?
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:20:23 GMT


From     "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>


Gene Kennedy writes:
#There is consdierable difference between the 105 howitzer round
#and the 106 so a real comparison there isn't valid either. The
#recoiless rifle is really neither rocket nor gun in a sense,
#that's why they came up with "recoiless rifle" :-)

Others have posted on the operating principle of an RCL gun, so...

There is NO ambiguity as to the nature of an RCL gun. It is a gun. It
is not a rocket. Period. The confusion arises because in most RCL
weapons the countermass is propellant gas of equal momentum to the
projectile. However, at least one weapon, the ARMBRUST, uses a solid
countermass composed of plastic chips. The early RCL weapons used lead
shot. One wonders what was worse, the backblast of gas, or "super
shotgun" :)

It is a bit difficult to compare the 105mm howitzer and the 106mm RCL,
because the former is a direct support indirect fire field artillery
weapon system, while the latter is an infantry close support system.
The 106's primary munition, the fin-stabilized HEAT round, is too
specialized for the howitzer, which in turn fires a whole plethora of
munitions not relevant to a direct fire RCL gun. However.... both systems
have a HESH cartridge available, and (surprise :) they are very similar
in size. The RCL's round has a bit more HE, due to the lower firing
stresses, but the folks on the receiving end probably wouldn't notice
the difference :)

The big difference between the two weapons is in the size of the
propelling charge, with the 106 using twice as much propellant as the 105,
with a lower MV (direct comparison of the HESH rounds - yes, I know
about zoning on the other 105 rds :). The 105's propellant has the sole
function of propelling the projectile, while in the 106 RCL it does 3
things: propels the projectile, forms the countermass, and propels the
countermass. More than half goes into forming the countermass.

While on the subject of things recoilless, does anybody have information
on the Swedish 20mm M42 recoilless antitank rifle??? Please post if you
do - I have none.


Ed Rudnicki     erudnick@pica.army.mil     All disclaimers apply
"War must be looked upon as a business, and subject, like any other business,
to business principles. War is the business of destruction of life and
property of an enemy.....The most deadly and destructive implements of war
are the most humane, and the producers of them may justly be looked upon as
humanitarians."     ----- Hudson Maxim (the other Maxim)

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Chad Barret Wemyss <chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu>
Subject: Re: Basic Training
Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:12:28 GMT


From Chad Barret Wemyss <chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu>

In article <BxGrGt.6H0@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> SEAN R MCINTOSH <srmcinto@eos.ncsu.edu> writes:

>Hi!  I am thinking of joining the Army and I have a few questions.  I would 
>like opinions on what to expect in Basic training.  I would also like so 
>suggestions on how to get into shape before reporting to Basic.  

Lots and lots of push-ups!!!!

They're a favorite punishment throughout the military, and besides, they give 
you a great upper body workout.

Also, try to run a few miles every day.  This will help your endurance, and 
that will help all your other exercises.

If you're going to work out in boots, try to get running inserts for them.  
They make it much easier on the shins (no shin splints).  Also, make sure 
they're well broken in, because if you don't, you'll get blisters from hell.

Chad Wemyss



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)
Subject: Re: 106mm Recoiless Rifle - Rocket or Gun?
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:29:32 GMT


From ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)

In article <Bx97D9.1s3@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com (T.M.Haddock) writes:

>
> I also said I thought it was a GUN in that the only difference
> between it and a 105mm howitzer was that the 106's shell casing
> had holes in it which bleed off pressure and propellant which
> escaped rearward through holes in the breech.  But others said
          ^^^^^^^^ forward. You want the thust to conteract recoil.

> it was a rocket powered warhead that was ignited and "launched"
> from the tube like a LAAW.  Having fired several of these while
> in the Marines, I don't ever recall the term "rocket" used.


It is indeed as you describe. The things were developed towards the
end of WWII and gave the infantryman the power of artillery at short
ranges. 

One interesting thing I read was that as the weapon aged, the holes
in the breech would get larger, and you would actually get "negative 
recoil".

The jets were also canted to prevent rotation of the barrel, which is 
at that moment causing the projectile to start turning.





-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iskandar Taib                          | The only thing worse than Peach ala
Internet: NTAIB@SILVER.UCS.INDIANA.EDU |    Frog is Frog ala Peach
Bitnet:   NTAIB@IUBACS                 !

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: "david.r.wells" <drw@cbnewsg.cb.att.com>
Subject: Re: WWII: Why Japan didn't invade Hawaii
Organization: AT&T
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 19:45:25 GMT


From "david.r.wells" <drw@cbnewsg.cb.att.com>

In article <Bwy3uu.Cyv@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au> writes:
>
>From Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>
>
>
>>Not compared to American battleships (or even heavy crusiers).
>
>Lets compare gun barrels then. The Japanese Yamoto had (from memory)
>18 inch guns. The comparable US ships 16 inch. Would you care to tell
>me about the US heavy cruisers?

The Yamato's 18.11" guns were in some ways inferior to the American
16" L50 mk VII. For example, armor penetration. According to Dulin
& Garzke, the mk VII could penetrate more armor than the Japanese
gun at all but the shortest ranges. Add to this the fact that the
Americans had better radar, and the advantage could easily go to
the Americans. Further, some report that the American gun had a better
rate of fire. Other sources dispute this. Also, the Japanese gun did
not have a great advantage in shell weight, 3200 lb for an AP round
as opposed to 2700 for a US 16" AP round. Some interwar designs for
18" guns had far superior shell weight than the Japanese 18.11".
The British 1921 battleships (AKA "N3" class) would have fired a
3700 lb shell from an 18" gun, (if memory serves) had they been built.
   As for heavy cruisers, I have to give the advantage to the 
Japanese. Face it, those Long Lances were MEAN! (witness the
Java Sea & Savo Island battles). I suppose by late in the war
when we had the really good radars, the Japanese advantage diminished,
but early in the war, the Japanese heavies were the best in the world.

			David R. Wells

Disclaimer: My opinions, not AT&Ts.

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Russ Black <ucla-cs!netcon.smc.edu!rblack@cs.ucla.edu>
Subject: Japanese Navy Strategy WWII
Organization: Santa Monica College, Santa Monica, CA
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:32:37 GMT


From Russ Black <ucla-cs!netcon.smc.edu!rblack@cs.ucla.edu>

   Battleships and howmany the US had I think played somewhat in the thinking,
but it was more of a need to just take out the US.  They had other places to
go to and they had to take out their primary foe first.  

   Invading Hawaii was probably thought of, but the supply lines would have
been thin.  Adm. Nugumo should have gone for the fuel depots.  That would have
changed everything.  No fuel ships don't go anywhere.  Little know fact about
that aspect is that many in the Japanese intellegence field though it would havenot made much of a difference.  They thought the US was so big we had so much
that it would be useless to destory the fields.

   Adm Nugumo was given command of 1st Air Flotilla.  Admirals of that time
were battleship men and did not have expirence with aircraft carriers.  It
was Nugumo's failure to exploit his advantage.  That shows up in the attacks
at Pearl Harbor and Midway.


Russ Black
rblack@netcon.smc.edu
From: mckinney@athena.mit.edu (Ethan L Mckinney)
Subject: Re: Former Soviet Navy Post Number 6:  Typhoon class SSBN
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:29:29 GMT


From mckinney@athena.mit.edu (Ethan L Mckinney)

Type 65 is a long-range, wake-following "cruise torpedo."
  Americans have been aboard the Typhoon class, and I've seen their slides.  It
is definitely, *absolutely* not capable of 60 kts. and has no boundary layer
control.  In fact, the top of the fin is *open*, producing lots of drag and
noise.  The Typhoon is designed to sedately sale under the ice-cap and then
nestle up  under the ice, actually in contact with it, until it gets a launch
order.  Anyhow, size and lack of hydrodynamics combine to make the Typhoon a real
pig.  I doubt it can actually make 30 kts.  Oh, yeah, it definitely has no SAMs. 
Not only have we seen all the locations they could go, they would be useless
under the ice-cap.  Besides, how is an ASW plane going to find you, much less
attack you with all that ice in the way?
  The Typhoon also has a swimming pool!

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: gawne@stsci.edu
Subject: AWACS driven CAS (was Re: CAS: Commo w/FM, UHF)
Organization: Space Telescope Science Institute
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 19:11:38 GMT


From gawne@stsci.edu

In article <Bx97DB.1t3@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, 
MikeHot Wire DeSimone <hotwire@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> writes:

[replying to several previous postings concerning CAS practices,
especially between Army and Air Force assets.]
 
> What you need is to be able to assign an aircraft to a "Random
> CAS" mission. Basically, the AF commander assigns the aircraft or
> flight a coverage zone (much larger than S&D), and it's off his
> mind until the aircraft go home for some reason.  At this point,
> you need an AWACS station or two to coordinate these zones, which
> takes the CAS requests from the ground (on VHF), organizes them,
> and assigns the targets to aircraft assigned to the zone. This
> requires no new equipment on the CAS aircraft (no info on what
> gets changed in the AWACS) and keeps the pilots from getting
> confused, missing things, etc. and the aircraft can switch zones
> if needed without having to juggle a bunch of frequencies while
> dodging bullets en route. The big part of the workload is on the
> back of the AWACS man, however, CAS should be all that that person
> has to worry about.

[then responding to a mention of helicopter gunships he says:]
 
> Gunships today are nothing like what they can be.  The rotary wing
> is neat; now we need to make it smart, so the gunship can react as
> fast as a fixed-wing jet.  Still, the above-mentioned zone system
> should work with gunships, and would work best by eliminating the
> AWACS and giving each zone its own "CAS frequency".
> 
> Mike DeSimone   hotwire@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu

Please, oh great gods of the sky, let me call in my CAS strikes from the
ground.  While I lay in the mud and the numbness spreads thru my feet
from the freezing of the water in blisters let me at least talk to the 
pilot who is about to drop the napalm 50 feet in front of my position.

And oh, ye great and powerful Air Force gods, might we with feet of clay
implore of ye to realize that we occassionally have some good reasons for
wishing direct contact with ye great and powerful beings?  That our desire
for you to drop WHERE WE TELL YOU is more than just a casual whim?

[Sarcasm off]

The idea is that the acronym stands for Close Air Support.  If the AWACS is
telling some jet jock to kill anything that moves in such-and-such a box
defined by such-and-such grid coordinates it has ceased to be Close in 
the coordination sense and is only Close in that the ordnance falling from
the sky may be entirely too Close to me!  

Oh, if the problem is that the human pilot can't pay adequate attention
how about just loading up big UAV's with bombs and letting the Arty fly
them by remote control over the drop zone, where control of the UAV is
then handed off to the ground commander who needs CAS?  He dumps the bomb 
load where he wants it and the UAV goes home.  (I know this idea will never
get very far because pilots feel threatened by UAV's.)

-Bill Gawne,  Space Telescope Science Institute
 GySgt USMCR

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Joseph F Baugher <jfb@ihlpl.att.com>
Subject: Number Thirty-Six in the Series--the Curtiss P-36 Hawk (Part 5 of 6)
Keywords: 5 of 6      The Hawk in Dutch Service
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories -  Naperville, Illinois
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 19:08:11 GMT


From Joseph F Baugher <jfb@ihlpl.att.com>

Twenty Hawk 75A-7s with Cyclone engines were ordered by the 
Netherlands, but the German occupation of Holland caused all of the 
A-7s built to be diverted to the Netherlands East Indies starting in 
May 1940.  They served with the 1st Squadron of the Royal Netherlands 
East Indies Army Air Corps, where they were caught up in the Japanese 
advance from December 8, 1941.  They were outnumbered and outperformed 
by the nimble Japanese Zero fighter.  By February 1, 1942, they had 
all been destroyed by the enemy.  

Sources: 

  Curtiss Aircraft, 1907-1947, Peter M Bowers, Naval Institute Press, 
  1979 

  The Curtiss Hawk 75, Aircraft in Profile No.  80, Profile 
  Publications, Ltd.  1966 

  War Planes of the Second World War, Fighters, Volume Four, William 
  Green, Doubleday, 1961.  

  Air Enthusiast, Volume 1, William Green et al, Doubleday, 1971.  

Joe Baugher       AT&T Bell Laboratories    2000 North Naperville Road 
		  Naperville, Illinois 60566-7033.   (708) 713-4548

Newsgroups: sci.military