From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Re: Lee-Longstreet
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 92 18:36:16 GMT

In article <1992Aug19.065832.6466@bnlux1.bnl.gov> KARLIN@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>
>No one knows the time of the attack precisely, for the simple reason that the
>offical reports of the various commanders report times ranging from noon to
>4PM. Even those from one point along the line disagree by several hours.

You can read a book called "Gettysburg: The Second Day" by Harry Pfanz which
reconstructs Longstreet's attack and gets "best estimate" times for the
various events. I think he figured the attack started about 1 or 1:30pm,
although it's been a while since I saw the book. It's a very interesting
exercise in reconciling the timing problems in Civil War reports.
>
>Col. Chamberlain and the other regiments of that Brigade only went to Little
>R.T.  because the attack was underway. Brig.Gen. Warren realized its importnce
>and diverted  Col. Vincent's Brigade as it was on its way to join the meley in
>the Wheatfield.

Didn't realize Chamberlain by himself constituted an entire regiment. :)
How about "20th Maine and the other regiments?"
OK back to serious discussion...
>
>Had the Confederates attacked early in the morning (as many claim Longstreet
>should have) Vincent's Brigade would still have been on the road (from Hanover
>I believe) with the rest of the Fifth Corps. The trouble is that that early 
>the Union Third Corp was still in position on Cemetary Ridge, and in principle
>could have defended Little R.T. Lee's other problem was that Longstreet simply
>did not have enough troops in the vicinity of the Battle to launch an attack
>that early.
>
In Vol. II of Lee's Lieutenants, Freeman goes over the timing of Longstreet's
attack. He reaches two conclusions: 1. Longstreet could not conceivably have
attacked early in the morning and 2. Even if he had the attack would have
failed. However, I don't see how III Corps could have defended Little Round
Top; the corps had only two divisions and not nearly enough troops to stretch
their line that far (which was why Sickles moved forward to begin with). They
could only have reached LRT by opening a gap between them and II Corps,
which would have been worse.

>Lee's problem at Gettysburg was that he was unable to follow through with 
>his early advantage.He committed Ewell's Third Corps to an attack on the Union
>right that Ewell did not make (at least not at the right time).

Well, Second Corps, not that it really matters.

> In retrospect 
>he should have swung Ewell's men around to his right and attacked the union 
>left. Ewell was in charge of most of Jackson's "foot cavalry" and this is the
>sort of fancy maneuver that Lee and Jackson were famous for. I doubt that
>Meade,who had been in command for less than a week, would have picked up what 
>Lee had done any better that Hooker at Chancellorsville etc.
>
After Ewell's failure on the first day, I can't agree that Lee should have
trusted the main attack the next day to him. His troops were much farther
from the right than Longstreet's; what is to be gained by marching them
around? Also, Ewell's troops were opposite the Union I, XI, and XII Corps
on Culp's Hill and Cemetary Hill. If you move Ewell's corps off, those
troops become free to either reinforce the Union left or to attack Lee's
left flank, which is not anchored on any particular thing. Given the Union's
interior lines, they can do either of these things before Ewell's corps
reaches the Confederate right.
This move only works if you are willing to gamble on Meade's complete
inactivity. On the one hand, he never showed such inactivity at other
times in the war, and you'd like to think they learned SOMETHING from
Chancellorsville. On the other hand, gambling on Union mistakes was how
the Confederacy had been winning battles, so why not? Tough call to make.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

"We have met the enemy and he is us" - Walt Kelly
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa