From: cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne)
Subject: Re: Political Arguments for Private Crypto
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Ottawa
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 22:40:09 GMT

In article <1992Nov20.202421.16963@rchland.ibm.com> lwloen@vnet.ibm.com writes:
>Until there is a sci.crypt.politics, here is my summary of arguments
>to help us keep crypto legal.
>
>Thus, if one argues that an encrypted file can shield a child molester,
>then point out that a match lit against a paper copy can also shield
>a child molester.  Drug dealers burn their records all the time.  Shall
>we outlaw matches?  What's the difference?

Or, similarly, commercially available products like the program
PCSecure, which is part of PC Tools, can "Shield" a child molester.
(Of course, since it uses DES, then it's breakable.  Or is it?...)

I mention this because PC Tools, unlike PGP, is a software package
that an enormous number of PC Drones^H^H^H^H^H^H I mean
Lusers^H^H^H^H^H^H I mean Users already have installed on their
computers.

"Forbidding" in any essential way the use of crypto would essentially
require that anything like PC Secure be "taken back."  Which could be
even more of a difficulty than taking PGP out of circulation...

>I think we can get attention if the argument is couched in those
>terms. 

Which is the all-important goal of this whole process.  To make sure
that the arguments are heard, and not merely brushed off as "computer
nerd radical stuff."

>Defense 2.
>Innocent people will be harmed.
>
>An encrypted file can be indistinguishable from a mere garbage file.
>Suppose some bit of software produces a garbage file.  The police grab 
>an alleged felon's computer. 
>How can the person free themselves from the _false_ charge?
>...
>The answer is:  you can't.

Another classic case where people get harassed a lot is if a child
dies.  If it's not OBVIOUS that it was some sort of medical condition,
the parents will go through the grill.

They essentially are asked to PROVE that they didn't kill the kid.  If
they did, it may be impossible to prove their guilt.  If they didn't,
it may be impossible to prove their innocence.  One of the reasons for
"Innocent until proven guilty," but it doesn't necessarily work...
Innocent people may have gone to prison over this one...

>What are fair and appropriate penalties?  Are they great enough to be
>worth the bother?  If not, why are we selling out our privacy to the
>cops?  Conversely, if they are great, will we turn petty thieves into
>felons needlessly?  And, why is a great penalty justified.  In itself,
>the deed hurt no one.

Important point!  The punishment is supposed to fit the crime.
Cryptography isn't intrinsically a crime at all.

>Defense 5
>Talk about expansion
>
>Can the government define _and limit the definition of_ an encryption system?
>Will they claim that any data compression mechanism is an encryption?  Can
>we really be sure the imagination of a prosecutor can be limited?
>
>Will they demand that "objects" in an object-oriented programming system
>that are stored in binary form be revealed and "cracked" at will?  

And how about an executable program?  Does this mean that only source
code can be transferred about?

How about your financial spreadsheet.  That .wks file certainly looks
like an encyphered version of the spreadsheet, doesn't it?

-- 
Christopher Browne                |     PGP 2.0 key available
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca           |===================================
University of Ottawa              |  The Personal Computer:  Colt 45
Master of System Science Program  |  of the Information Frontier
Newsgroups: sci.crypt