HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu (Marc VanHeyningen)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 11 Nov 92 20:23:59 GMT
Article-I.D.: news.1992Nov12.012409.26925
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
X-Quoted: 45%

Thus said jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) :
>
>
>    I  have been  reading this   newsgroup for  several weeks  with keen
>    interest. And  for one am in  favor of the privacy  that it permits.
>    However, recently (yesterday) I had  the opportunity to speak with a
>    law enforcement official who had quite a different view.
>
>    He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
>    from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molestor who encrypted
>    his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molestor will
>    more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence. This  has caused me

So, there's some guy who they suspect might be a molester who has some
encrypted files.  How do they know he's one?  How do they know the
encrypted stuff pertains to molestation?

>    some  concern   because  we  have  agreed   (volunteered)  to  be  a
>    distribution site  for PGP (logon as  PGP USER pw: PGP).  Yet, I for
>    one would hate to think that there is anyway we could help such scum
>    in receiveing PGP or similar encryption technology.

Well, tell your law enforcement friend that, if nothing else, they could
try to bust the guy for using unlicensed software...

More seriously, PGP is normally used to communicate with other people,
not to store stuff personally.  They should find out with whom it was being
used to communicate (probably possible) and subpoena the information from
them.

(It's not clear to me what sorts of things it would be used for anyway.
Did the guy encrypt a diary of his crimes?  Was it being used to arrange
meetings with others for the purpose of molesting kids?  Poetry composed
after the foul deed was done?  What?)

>    At  this point  I am  curious as  to what  others think.  Both about
>    distribution  and about  it's use   by the  underworld. I  have read
>    'Dennings' report  and though I  disagree with it  on several points
>    this particular  case does raise some  real-life issues pertinent to
>    the discussion. If a  law was to be passed (and you  can bet that if
>    cases like  this one in particular  continue one will be)  how would
>    you like it to read?

"The right to free speech includes the right to speak in a fashion not
easily understood by others."

(Disclaimer:  I do not think that the Right to Keep and Bear Keys (RKBK)
has much of anything to do with RKBA.)
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted
"I cannot recommend this candidate too highly or say enough good things about
him.  In my opinion you will be lucky to get him to work for you.  I urge you
to waste no time making him an offer.  No one would be better for the job."
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cplumb@nyx.cs.du.edu (Colin Plumb)
Subject: Re: Polynomial Deduction
X-Disclaimer: Nyx's hardware; my words.
Organization: Nyx, Public Access Unix at U. of Denver Math/CS dept.
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 92 06:43:07 GMT

In article <69133@cup.portal.com> lordSnooty@cup.portal.com (Andrew - Palfreyman) writes:
> On reading a couple of texts on error-correcting codes, the
> following question occurred to me:
> 
> What is an efficient method for deducing the checksum generating
> polynomial, given many examples of a block code with an appended checksum?

The simplest application of an error-checking polynomial (mapping other
cases, like preset to all 1's as in FDDI, to this is simple) is that
the valid messages are all multiples of some check polynomial c(x).
Given a number of message polynomials, m_i(x), their GCD will contain
c(x) as a factor, and if there are enough, there will probably be no
other factors.

It is not too difficult to extend this to handle a small number of
erroneous messages, by taking various subsets and applying sanity checks
to the GCD's to find the erroneous ones.

In summary, it's not a hard problem.  I can also deduce unknown (but
constant) preset strings by subtracting messages to cancel the constant
leading parts and applying this algorithm to the differences.  I can't
think of a difficult variation.  CRC's have *lots* of exploitable
mathematical structure to use in analysis.
-- 
	-Colin
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: flaw in my suggestion
Summary: transparent balloon?
Date: 12 Nov 92 18:31:55 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com


In response to the original lead balloon, I suggested that if *all*
circuits were encrypted (in addition to any private encryption), then *all*
wiretapping attempts would have to go to some central registry for session
keys.  This would verify (in a protocol, not by assumed personnel honesty)
the existence of a court order.

It would also leave an audit trail.

By splitting this work up among multiple, mutually-antagonistic political
entities, any attempt to pull a Nixon would result in whistle blowing.

So I proposed this to a lawyer/friend last night and she was horrified.
This audit trail opens up all of these entities for bribery by the Mafia.

So -- I have to back down.  I suggest instead that the entities seeing the
audit trail be entirely within the judiciary (a review panel of judges
overseeing the combined wiretapping orders of all judges).  It would be up
to them to determine if some political entity (or just criminal entity)
within the Executive Branch was misusing the ability to wiretap (eg.,
tapping a large number of NYTimes reporters or tapping members of the
opposing political party).

The audit trail to those judges could be delayed, perhaps, but not long
enough to allow someone to get re-elected if he was tapping his opponent.
The judges would have the power to release portions of the audit trail to
the news media and the target of investigation.


Any more problems with this?  (Again, this is a use of cryptography to
enforce honest in wiretapping, assuming that we're stuck with wiretapping.
This doesn't constitute an admission on my part that wiretapping is a
good thing.)

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Bill of Rights
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 20:56:00 GMT


>.....strong cryptography changes the whole game:  
>From the relatively small amount
>of information most individuals can hold entirely in their memories, 
>we are suddenly in a world where essentially unlimited amounts of 
>information can be protected.  This changes the basis on which we made 
>the original social tradeoff - every bit as much as more powerful
weapons 
>change the basis of whatever social tradeoff you believe is implied by 
>the Second Amendment. 

Perhaps it does, but the fact remains that the change is fundamental,
technological, and economic.  "All the king's horses and all the king's
men," all of the legislation in the world cannot undo it.  If the
proposed laws could make pi equal to three, then there would be some
point to discussing the convenience that would result.    

Please permit the injection of personal opinion:

Whatever you may believe about the Second Amendment, I do not believe
that the Fifth Amendment represented a "trade off."  The founders were
not far removed from a time in which people were burned at the stake on
no more evidence than their own testimony elicited under torture.  They
understood the potential for abuse of government power that only a few
in this time and place can appreciate.  I believe that the Fifth Amendment
represented a fundamental and unequivocal choice to tolerate any 
individual behavior rather than to tempt the state to torture.

The "magic words," as Jyrrki calls them, have changed.  We can no longer
be manipulated by the fear of witchcraft, heresy, treason, or Communism.
But the current ones are no less potent.  Those that appeal for more and
more powerful government in their name are no more enlightened than those
who burned the witches and heretics.  Those that suggest that we are
only being asked to surrender a little freedom had better be careful what they
ask for, they might get it.


William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
203 966 4769, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption System - Challenge!
Date: 8 Nov 92 21:00:24 GMT
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov  5 1992


 
 > Your acquaintance doesn't know ANYTHING about cryptography.
 > He is ignorant of the Fundamental Assumption Of Cryptography:
 >
 >       "The security of a system lies only in the keys."
 >
 > Given your description, NuCrypt doesn't even use a KEY.
 
 I tend to agree. I told him so myself. However, neither your comment 
 nor mine seem to deter him.  He insists that neither you nor I can 
 break his encryption. I know *I* can't. How about you?? Do you feel
 you could crack such a thing?
 
 (In the back of my mind, a thought on this is: in the final analysis, 
 is the purpose of encryption to encrypt securely, or to conform to 
 some particular rule or method..? )
 
 
 > Send the guy to the library.
 
 Yeah, I told him that. For all I know, he may have actually done so, 
 but the challenge stands.  Do you think YOU could break his 
 encryption? If not, perhaps you have no right to send him 
 anywhere...  I know I can't, but then I am no expert. The challenge I 
 posted was addressed to the experts here, but no one seems to have 
 accepted, and that saddens me. I had hoped to have at least several 
 expert cryptanalysts here accept the challenge and show him how 
 wrong he is.  But no one has accepted so far... 
 

--- Maximus 2.00
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4715 alt.society.civil-liberty:6551 alt.politics.usa.misc:577
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty,alt.politics.usa.misc
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
From: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Date: 12 Nov 92 10:32:00 GMT
Reply-To: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Distribution: world
Organization: The GrapeVine BBS *** N. Little Rock, AR *** (501) 753-8121


Jyrki Kuoppala * they do  doesn't injure anyone  - but it  is well known
                 and well documented that  pornography makes people rape
                 innocent little girls and reefers make the XXXX XXXXXXX
                 go  after  ordinary  XXXXX  women  and  rape them. Even
                 bullets won't work against the people under influence
                                 = = =

     I surely  hope your post was  'tongue in cheek' however,  I for one
     did not see  any humor in it. Besides being  bigoted, racist, it is
     also inflammatory and based on half truths. I for one wish that you
     would refraim from  postings such rantings or at  least temper them
     with some truth and common decency.

*  Jim Wenzel,  SysOp,  The GrapeVine BBS,  (501) 753-8121  5.6 gigs  *
*  RIME, Use-Net, ForthNet, SmartNet, MetroLink, Intelec , RecoverNet *
*  ThrobNet and MediaNet message echos.  Large IBM, Amiga, Adult and  *
*  Programming file areas. PGP 2.0 public key available upon request  *

---
 * SM 1.06 A0059 * My taglines are improving since I started stealing them
                                                                          
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 08:29:20 GMT

In article <1992Nov5.214347.27535@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
}
}Karl Denninger asserts that registration is a prelude to confiscation.
}
}In most of the world cars have been registered for many years, yet no
}democratic government has used that as a way to confiscate cars
}(except for those used in law violations).

And to find their owners, and to seize them, and...

What makes you think that the confiscation (called "civil seizure" or "civil
asset forfeiture" when practiced by minions of the USA) of guns wasn't done
of guns that were "used" in violation of the legislation of the jurisdiction?


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4691 alt.privacy:2227 comp.org.eff.talk:6979
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 12 Nov 92 17:27:26 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <1992Nov12.042549.11780@clarinet.com>, brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:
> Sorry to join this too-voluminous-to-read thread at this point, but I
> don't understand why people are proposing registration of encryption keys.

So far as I know, the only people who have floated the idea are Ron 
Rivest, Silvio Micali, and myself.  In my case, I was looking for a 
way that would allow LE to have the capability to decrypt a line with
a court order, but not without one.  My goal was a method that would
provide people with more security than, say, requiring that they use
weak crypto or crypto with trapdoors known to the government.
I am not pushing the idea of key registration.  Many good arguments
have been presented suggesting that it would be unworkable, and
then there is the more general issue of whether crypto should be
even regulated at all.  I don't have answers to these questions.
> 
> The implication seems to be that this is to placate law enforcement people
> who want to continue to be able to tap/intercept/read private communications,
> perhaps to stop them from trying to ban encryption altogether?
> 
As near as I know, there is no attempt on the part of LE to ban 
encryption outright and no proposals are on the floor to limit its
use.  The government folks I know all agree that encryption
is essential to protect communications.
>  
> Is this some sort of joke?  Do people seriously suggest such sort of
> placation is necessary or a good idea?  Or is it law enforcement that's
> pushing for this registration?
>
LE has not asked for registration so there's nobody to placate.
> 
> There is no need to compromise.  Law enforcement is just going to have to
> face a hard fact -- in a few years they won't be able to wiretap.  It is
> a heavy price for them to pay, but the other options are simply too much of
> a burden on either our freedoms, or our industries.   I think the chance of
>
You might be right, but let's make sure we know and understand the 
options and their implications before deciding.  There is also a price
to be paid for LE losing the ability to wiretap that I don't think is
well understood.  I have been trying to understand these implications
while at the same time looking to see if there's some middle ground that would
make it harder for criminals but at the same time protect communications from 
unwarranted taps by LE or anyone else.  

> Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366

Dorothy Denning,
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 10 Nov 92 15:45:16 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov3.083903.15724@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
>In article <1992Nov2.084229.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:

>>Or imagine that Ollie North's famous deleted mail messages had been
>>encrypted.  Or, to take a recent example, that Caspar Weinberger had
>>used a palmtop to keep his personal diary, and all entries in it
>>were encrypted.
>
>This comes with the territory. Either everyone has the right to encrypt,
>including slimy politicians, or no one will.

Of course, everyone has the capability and right to encrypt -- at home and
for personal use or for personal communication.  However, we have some
control over those politicians, since they work for us.  We can require
them to register all keys (archive all messages) for traffic done during
their government work.  We can even require that their systems be built in
such a way as to automatically archive all traffic -- not just rely on
backup tapes of encrypted messages which were used against Ollie in his
hearing before Congress.

>What about all of the face-to-face conversations Ollie had that were
>never recorded anywhere? Isn't that a loophole? Perhaps we should
>require everyone to carry personal bugs 24 hours/day.

Perhaps we should require all government officials to do so, but the real
criminals like Ollie North would find a way around that, too.  The answer
I'm afraid is that we'll always have criminals in government and we just
have to make sure that they will be found out eventually and will never
have the power to really hurt us.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rmich@Siri.Unit.NO (Rolf Michelsen)
Subject: Mailing list for sci.crypt
Organization: University of Trondheim
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 92 12:37:48 GMT

Does anyone know if sci.crypt is available from a mailing list?  Where??

-- Rolf

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: /usr/local/lib/news/organization
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 18:14:33 GMT

gilchr@ee.ualberta.ca (Andrew Gilchrist) writes:
>While I don't argue that such a sampling/compression/encryption/
>transmission/decryption/decompression/reconstruction could be done virtually
>in real time on a typical phone line with a lot of funding, I will need
>some math and some specifications for devices capable of carrying this out
>reliably on an analog cellular network before I am convinced.

As I've said, you can buy the equipment from AT&T today. Really. No
joke. No need for you to contemplate "a lot of funding" -- you can
just go out and buy the equipment any time you like. AT&T is the only
vendor I know of that packages this all with a cellular transmitter,
but you can buy similar phones from Cylink, Motorola and other
vendors. And this is just the list of DOMESTIC manufacturers of such
things -- doubtless there are folks outside the country that make
them, too.

Its all really easy. CELP compression can be done with cheap DSPs --
you can buy the code if you don't feel like writing it yourself. The
encryption can be done an order of magnitude faster than you need even
on conventional processors.  V.32bis modem modules are a dime a dozen.
You don't need to be AT&T to do this -- any talented EE with a few
weeks of work could put a system to do this together.

>I don't have
>bandwidth specs or s/n values for cellular transmissions, so I can't do this
>for myself.

Analog cellular phones handle the standard 300-3000Hz phone band
perfectly well. V.32bis modems operate just fine on them.

Perry
--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
"They can have my RSA key when they pry it from my cold dead fingers."
Libertarian Party info: Phone 1-800-682-1776, E-Mail 345-5647@mcimail.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: cellular
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 03:07:04 GMT

perez@mgr.hjf.org (Charles Perez) writes:

>In article <1992Oct30.033830.24244@netcom.com> gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
>>On the other hand, I don't think a seven-year-old boy is about
>>to shoot his six-year-old sister with an encryption key because
>>he didn't understand death.

>Or feed her Drano? Uh oh, it's time to start registering and regulating
>assault drain-openers! :->

How many movies and cartoons have there been in the last few
decades glorifying Drano? How many do you expect there to be?
How likely do you think it might be that a child understands
that Drano is a poison? The very reason you use it as an example
is that children sometimes eat it because they *don't* know.
So no, I don't think we should regulate Drano in that context.
Pick another example. Try kitchen knives. I've got an answer
for that one, too.
-- 
 Pete Gontier // EC Technology // gurgle@netcom.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 13:43:14 GMT

In article <ARI.HUTTUNEN.92Nov11145925@cardhu.cs.hut.fi>, Ari.Huttunen@hut (Ari Huttunen) writes:
>I always thought a man is innocent until proven guilty...

Not when you utter the magic word.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Organization: Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:44:34 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.090133.1707@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
>Whatever regulation, if any, might be considered, it would seem that
>it would have to be aimed mostly at crypto products, not use.

That is, it would affect law-abiding people who just want to use
off-the-shelf black-box GTE KryptoFones.  It would not affect anyone
who has the incentive -- e.g. fear of jail -- to hack together a
system from a few PC's and modems, and some crypto software snarfed
from Finland.

Sure, if the bad guy talks in the clear on a standard phone line,
your third-party listening scheme can nail him.  But we can do that
anyway -- and according to the government's numbers, we only do it a
trivial number of times a year.

ObCrypto: Assuming government good-faith in an eavesdropping
	  protocol is like assuming algorithm secrecy in a
	  cryptographic protocol.

>Dorothy Denning

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk