From: budaraju@cae.wisc.edu (Srinivas Budaraju)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.indian
Subject: Sardar Sarovar Project - An Overview - 3/7
Date: 12 Oct 92 19:06:27 GMT
Organization: U of Wisconsin-Madison College of Engineering

I.3.	Resettlement and Rehabilitation 

The project will require displacement of 100,000 people 
living in 245 villages in the submergence zone.  In addition 
140,000 people will be affected by the canal and irrigation 
system.  This does not include people living downstream of 
the dam whose lives are also liable to be significantly 
affected.  A number of agreements and regulations specify the 
minimum requirements that must be satisfied by the 
Rehabilitation  and Resettlement (R&R) plan.  In this 
section, we first list these agreements, then briefly discuss 
the R&R plans of the three state governments, and finally 
present the available data on the status of the oustees.

1.3.1. 	Mandatory Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Requirements

The Central and State Governments of India and the WB are 
duty-bound to implement a proper R&R plan by the following 
national and international agreements:

o	The 1957 covenant (number 107) of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) which India ratified in 1958, 
commits the government to not remove indigenous and tribal 
people from their habitual territories except by providing 
them with "lands of quality at least equal to that of lands 
previously occupied by them, suitable for their present needs 
and future development"

o	The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) ruling of 
1979 that requires compensation for the property lost, for 
civic amenities, house plots and most important, agricultural 
land of equal size for every displaced family losing more 
than 25% of its holdings, with minimum of two hectares for 
each family which is defined so that any son of 18 or above 
is treated as a separate unit.

o	The World Bank's (WB) policy of 1980 on involuntary 
resettlement which requires that the displacement be minimal 
and the displaced "regain at least their previous standard of 
living."  It also stipulates that compensation must go beyond 
"fair market values" because the true worth of assets may 
exceed those.

o	The WB's policy of 1982 on tribal people which states 
that it will "not assist development projects that knowingly 
involve encroachment on traditional territories being used or 
occupied by tribal people, unless adequate safeguards are 
provided". The statement also emphasizes tribal participation 
in decisions affecting them and "detailed, contemporary 
knowledge of the people to be affected".

o	The credit agreement of 1985 with the WB extends the 
definition of "oustees" to include all those affected by the 
project, not just by submergence, and also says that the 
rehabilitation plan must ensure that the oustees "improve or 
at least regain the standard of living they were enjoying 
prior to the displacement." Each oustee must be given choice 
to settle in any of the three affected states and "be 
entitled to at least two hectares of irrigable land, 
acceptable to him". This applies to landless people as well, 
and

o	The WB operational directive of June 1990, which 
emphasizes minimization and the avoidance of displacement 
even to the point of reducing the dam height.  It also calls 
for special treatment of tribals and grievance procedures.


I.3.2.  Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan

While the Gujarat government has provided plans for those in 
the submergence area, it failed to draw up plans for those to 
be affected by the canal and the people living downstream of 
the dam.  While Gujarat's record is better than the other two 
states in respect of resettling some of the oustees (it 
broadened its policy in 1987-88) it has violated major norms, 
particularly by scattering families and villages, by not 
buying adequate land at resettlement sites, and by its 
failure to consult the oustees, in particular tribals.

The MP government shows no interest in rehabilitation and has 
failed even to draw up an elementary plan.  In Maharashtra, 
the record of resettlement remains appalling, despite the 
highly controversial allocation of the Taloda forest land.  
The government has shown no commitment to rehabilitate anyone 
and is only too glad to be able to get rid of oustees, and 
drive them into Gujarat.  MP and Maharashtra have together 
ensured that 60 per cent of the oustees will suffer a 
lowering of their standard of living [Bidwai 1992].

To this day, Maharashtra and MP governments refuse to 
recognize all adult sons of the tribals as families and to 
accept that while the tribals may not have a legal title to 
the land, they must be compensated.


I.3.3	Status of Oustees in SSP

Estimates by private agencies show that the number of oustees 
is far greater than government figures.  In fact, as many as 
300,000 people living in the submergence zones will be 
rendered homeless.  Already more than 50,000 people living in 
the submergence zones of the Tawa and Bargi projects on the 
Narmada have had to flee with nowhere to go [Amte 1990].

Even according to Government figures reported by the Times of 
India (see Table), out of a total of 30,142 'Project Affected 
People' (PAP), as of January 1992, only 2,766 have been 
provided residence plots, and less than 4,000 have been 
allocated agricultural land.  Of the three states, Gujarat is 
the only one where an appreciable fraction (about 50%) of the 
oustees have been provided for. In comparison, the record of 
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh are abysmal, with less  than 
10% and 1% of the people having been provided for, 
respectively. Furthermore, these figures do not include 
approximately 60,000 people who will be affected by the canal 
works have not been given the status of PAP and are therefore 
not eligible for compensation [SNS 1992]. 


Another serious shortcoming in the implementation of the 
resettlement plans is that the little information that people 
have here is either untrue or incomplete.  Their knowledge of 
submergence is not up to date.  No one has informed them that 
as per their latest lists, they will come under direct 
submergence nor have the villagers coming under backwater 
effect have been told anything[MARG 1987].  

While the above facts tell  a familiar story of governmental 
apathy, the  government's attitude to oustees of this project 
has in fact  been much worse.  Today the government and the 
Sardar Sarovar Nigam (SSN) are engaged in coercing oustees 
into vacating their lands through the use of force.  In 
Manibeli, the first village to come under threat of 
submergence, the police tried to forcibly evict villagers, 
and numerous villagers who resisted were beaten and jailed. 
Elsewhere, some people who have already given up land say 
they were cheated by the government, or forced to live in 
cramped, dirty shacks far removed from the lives they once 
knew.  The Indian press calls them the "nowhere people [SNS 
1992]."

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This report on the Sardar Sarovar Project is available through 
anonymous ftp from nacho.cs.wisc.edu (128.105.8.15) in directory pub.
If you want a hard copy of the report, send me e-mail.

-Srinivas				budaraju@cae.wisc.edu
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