HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: BrianT@cup.portal.com (Brian Stuart Thorn)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Saturn history
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 17:50:37 PST
Organization: The Portal System (TM)
Distribution: world
  <71518@cup.portal.com> <12DEC199216245144@judy.uh.edu>


>The Saturn I/Centaur configuration is the original Saturn I multistage vehicle
.
>I confirmed this when re-reading General Medaris's book. He specifically
>names the Centaur as the Saturn I upper stage.

>The Centaur was considered as the upper stage (4th) for the Saturn V. That was
>to support the Grand Tour by the original Voyagers. This little beastie had
>the Nerva as the Third stage with the Centaur as the 4th! Man Talk about
>Delta V or lift capability! I saw this scenario carefully laid out in one of
>the Marshall books on what was called the "Apollo Applications Program". This
>little configuration could lift two Voyager class full up ground tours. Would
>have been cool wouldn't it.
>
>Dennis, University of Alabama in Huntsville

 Thanks, Dennis.
 But I believe the previous message said that Centaur had actually
 flown on a Saturn 1. You point out that Medaris planned this, but
 I don't think it ever happened.
 
 -Brian
 
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: fast-track failures
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 09:48:18 GMT

In article <ewright.724531687@convex.convex.com> ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) writes:
>In <1992Dec14.145351.14521@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>>Yeah, bad line of argument, most of the systems that made it as far
>>as being assigned a number weren't technical failures even if they
>>were market failures. Actually I was thinking of the P-39 when I
>>wrote that. That aircraft made it into production, but was a dismal
>>failure... This was an example of
>>fast tracking from a prototype to production without working out
>>all the bugs required to make it a practical fighter.
>
>And how long did it take before the P-39 was succeeded by a fast-track 
>replacement? And how many generations of fighters did the US go through
>in the next 15 years (the time it takes to develop one fighter today)?
>
>There's a moral here.  Do it fast, do it quick, do it cheap.  Take
>risks and being willing to *accept* an occassional failure.  If a
>project does fail, forget the finger pointing, the blame casting,
>and the Congressional investigations, just get on with the next one.
>Don't put all your eggs in one basket.  And staff your projects with
>competent people motivated by *success*, not failure-oriented "engineers" 
>who spend all their time generating cover-your-butt paperwork. 

When fighter development from concept to flying prototype cost less
than $100,000, normally funded internally by the company, and took
less than a year, planes were simpler then, that was an acceptable 
approach. Now with development costs running into the billions, and 
usually taxpayer funded, the financial risks of a failed project have 
become too high to take such a cavalier approach.

The P-39 was a dismal failure, but they were able to sell it anyway
in the desperation of the early war years, but Bell wasn't a major
fighter company anymore after that experience. Republic and Lockheed 
became the dominant fighter builders for the rest of the war. Giving
your customer a lemon doesn't make him think of lemonaide.

You wouldn't do a cheap and dirty Hoover Dam or Golden Gate bridge
saying that if it failed you'd just shrug and go on to the next
project. Aerospace has become like civil engineering. The costs
of projects, and the effects of failure, have become high enough
that you have to test extensively and have contingency options
when subsystems don't meet their test requirements. You can't
just say "oops" and drop the project if your cables are too thin
to support the weight, or you get a galloping gertie in a breeze.

Gary
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 17:39:06 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In <Bz6AAL.Byz@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:

>(Maybe I'm just cynical, but I suspect we'd know more about hypersonic
>flight if we'd flown the X-30 through X-35 as fast-track experimental
>hypersonic craft, instead of spending ten years on the ground "preparing"
>for an X-30 that will never fly.)  

At the very least, we might now if those multibillion-dollar computer
models are right.
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: shafer@rigel.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Organization: NASA Dryden, Edwards, Cal.
	<1992Dec10.192026.16340@ke4zv.uucp>
	<ewright.724096589@convex.convex.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 19:36:06 GMT

On Fri, 11 Dec 1992 17:56:29 GMT, ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) said:

D> In <1992Dec10.192026.16340@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:

>They're also heavy as I recall, something you don't need in a SSTO.
>I appreciated the summary you gave earlier, Henry. It looks like they
>have a better test program planned than what has been outlined here
>before. I still think their schedule is extremely optimistic and
>success oriented, but we'll see.

D> I'd be curious to know the exact date, sometime in the last 20 years,
D> when "success oriented" became a pejorative phrase.  Yeah, the project
D> is success oriented.  Just like Project Apollo.  The alternative, I
D> guess, is for a project to be "failure oriented."  I like success better.

I can't tell you the exact date, but I can assure you that it happened
some time during the "success-oriented" Space Shuttle program.

Being success oriented is a wonderful idea if you're not depending on
the developement of cutting-edge technology for your success.  The
YF-22/YF-23 program was an outstanding example of how very well it
works to be success oriented.  They were integrating elements that
were somewhere between off-the-shelf and state-of-the-art into those
aircraft.

But suppose that they were depending on the timely development of
several new technologies?  Maybe new engines _and_ new structural
materials _and_ passive sensors _and_ flight control computers?
Then every slip in every new technology would slip the program.
And by assuming that each development effort will be completely
successful and timely, you've guaranteed that you have absolutely
no fallback position.  If you've specified the weight of the 
aircraft based on the thrust of the unsuccessful engine, you're
stuck (a fairly common event, by the way).


--
Mary Shafer  DoD #0362 KotFR NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA
shafer@rigel.dfrf.nasa.gov                    Of course I don't speak for NASA
 "A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all."  Unknown US fighter pilot
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 18:28:43 GMT

In article <ewright.724096589@convex.convex.com> ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) writes:
>In <1992Dec10.192026.16340@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>>I appreciated the summary you gave earlier, Henry. It looks like they
>>have a better test program planned than what has been outlined here
>>before. I still think their schedule is extremely optimistic and
>>success oriented, but we'll see.
>
>I'd be curious to know the exact date, sometime in the last 20 years,
>when "success oriented" became a pejorative phrase.  Yeah, the project
>is success oriented.  Just like Project Apollo.  The alternative, I
>guess, is for a project to be "failure oriented."  I like success better.

Success oriented has always been a pejorative phrase in any complex
developmental program that isn't tolerant of major program slippages
and that doesn't have practically unlimited funding to fix problems
as they appear. IE any non-military or commercial program. Any realistic 
development program *expects* problems along the way and plans for 
alternative approaches if one of the developmental technologies fails 
to live up to it's promise. Apollo took extraordinary risks in the 
Saturn booster program and suffered near catastrophe at least twice, 
either of which could easily have been like the Soviet N-1 failures 
instead of the successes they were.

Massive funding and manpower were thrown at the program in an all out
high risk race with the Soviets with no backup if anything were to
go wrong during development that couldn't be rapidly bandaided. We
were good, but we were also incredibly lucky to have a program that
resulted in only one failed mission and one ground fire causing
loss of a crew.

There are numerous examples of aircraft programs where the fast 
track success orientation led to unacceptable aircraft. Look at
all the gaps in the P and F series aircraft. Those gaps represent
aircraft that never made it past the prototype stage because of
unacceptable problems that cropped up with the design as development
progressed. Either weight targets were grossly missed, promised 
engines didn't materialize with the required performance, or just
that the handling characteristics turned out to be lousy. Ask Mary
about developmental programs. You develop dozens of different
prototypes and hope *one* will be successful in meeting it's performance
goals.

Gary
From: lindsay+@cs.cmu.edu (Donald Lindsay)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: "trivial engineering"
Date: 13 Dec 92 18:44:39 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.Bz7o2G.6yn.2
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts) writes:
>Somebody (I think it was Goldin) commented recently on a jet engine
>company's recent design of the new engine. The design process cost
>something around a billion dollars - they hope to sell enough to pay off
>the design cost in 20 years. And it wasn't a radical new design

Surely, a commercial jet is harder to develop? For a jet, fuel
efficiency is now crucial, but that's probably at the point of
diminishing returns. Plus, the jet has to be tested across a large
parameter space - different throttle settings (including idle),
different air densities, humidity (and rain), bird ingestion.

I would assume that a rocket engine has slightly different problems
(full tanks vs empty, acceleration vs liftoff, air vs vaccuum) but
that the parameter space is smaller?
-- 
Don		D.C.Lindsay	Carnegie Mellon Computer Science
From: BrianT@cup.portal.com (Brian Stuart Thorn)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Re : Relay to Follow Galileo?
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 21:25:54 PST
Organization: The Portal System (TM)

>But we're talking about a multi-Billion dollar program here. I just
>wouldn't want to take that risk. That is a lot of money the throw away
>because the "stupid" antanna won't open.. And this will further make the
>image of NASA tarnish even more. Yet another American blunder.. we don't
>need it. How are we going to argue that we need to go to this planet and
>that planet if we can't build the hardware to do the job???
>
>
>        -- Ryan Korniloff
>        -- rkornilo@nyx.cs.du.edu

Let me try again.
 
The folding, umbrella-type antennae have been used at least ten times
in space (that is, two each on TDRS-A, TDRS-C, TDRS-D, and TDRS-E, one
on ATS-6 (late-70s pathfinder comsat) and one on Galileo.
 
Only the one on Galileo failed to open on command, and there is still
hope it will be coaxed open. (They haven't tried brute force yet.)

Lesson:  OPEN THE DAMNED ANTENNA IMMEDIATELY AFTER LAUNCH!!!

-Brian
From: cunniff@hpfcso.FC.HP.COM (Ross Cunniff)
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 16:25:54 GMT
Subject: Re: Re: Cassini Undergoes Intensive Design Review
Organization: Hewlett-Packard, Fort Collins, CO, USA
Newsgroups: sci.space

hayim@locus.com (Hayim Hendeles) writes:
>>     After flybys of Venus (twice), Earth and Jupiter as it loops
>>around the sun to pick up energy, Cassini will arrive at Saturn
>>in November 2004, beginning a four-year orbital tour of the
>>ringed planet and its 18 moons. The Huygens probe will descend to
>>the surface of Titan in June 2005.
>Pardon my asking an ignorant question, but I can't understand why it
>should take 7 years to get to Saturn. When Voyager went to Jupiter and
>Saturn, it took (if I recall correctly) 4 years and a Jupiter flyby to
>make it to Saturn. Here, you are using 4 flybys, and it's taking you 7
>years!

You have to consider that Cassini (and Galileo) are *HUGE* interplanetary
probes.  Voyager was a lightweight - a Titan II launch sent it on a direct
orbit to Jupiter, and then it used a gravity assist to Saturn and beyond.

Now, Galileo WAS originally slated for a direct-to-Jupiter launch aboard
a Centaur upper stage; however, post-Challenger safety requirements mandated
an IUS (originally, Interim Upper Stage, now Inertial Upper Stage :-) as
the final boost for it.  An IUS is not nearly energetic enough for a direct
route, so they went for the Venus-Earth-Earth-Jupiter trajectory.  It
looks like Cassini has similar weight problems, and so they're going
Venus-Venus- Earth-Jupiter-Saturn.

>Thanks for your help.

You are quite welcome.

>HAyim Hendeles

Ross Cunniff
Hewlett-Packard Graphics Software Lab
cunniff@fc.hp.com
From: roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: liquid fuels
Date: 12 Dec 92 01:37:22 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.Bz4Hx9.BD9.1
Distribution: sci
Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology formerly National Bureau of Standards
X-Added: Forwarded by Space Digest
Original-Sender: isu@VACATION.VENARI.CS.CMU.EDU


-From: fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
-Subject: Re: Cassini Undergoes Intensive Design Review
-Date: 11 Dec 92 18:28:29 GMT
-Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder

-After the Challenger failure, NASA added a safety requirement that 
-nothing launched in by a space shuttle may use liquid fuels. That
-means Cassini must use lower-energy solid rockets instead. 

I think you mean *cryogenic* fuels. Magellan, Galileo, and Ulysses all
use liquid fuels.

As I mentioned earlier, some of the post-Challenger Shuttle safety rules
are being relaxed (following intensive review, of course). Perhaps this
rule will eventually be one of them. Henry has indicated he would favor
such a change.

John Roberts
roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov
From: prb@access.digex.com (Pat)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
Date: 18 Dec 1992 17:53:17 GMT
Organization: UDSI
NNTP-Posting-Host: access.digex.com

In article <71781@cup.portal.com> BrianT@cup.portal.com (Brian Stuart Thorn) writes:
>>>In the history of spaceflight, that has seldom been the case.
>>
>>True, but that has far more to do with the design process we use for
>>spacecraft. Shuttle is the most complex vehicle ever built according
>>to NASA PR (I have no idea just why NASA thinks that is worth boasting
>>about). There is no reason to think that building for simplicity won't
>>work. That is why everybody who has studied the problem believes that
>>a SSTO can be built either now or in the near future. Even NASA internal
>>assessments say it can be done.
>>
>>  Allen
>
> That it can be done, I am more or less with you. (But I fully expect
> a design problem or two to slow things down...) That it can be done
> at the price you quote, that's another story. Say I'm from Missouri.
> Show me.
> 
> -Brian
>  



I believe in point of fact, that is the whole point of the DC-Y.
DC-X will prove the operations and technology.  DC-Y will push the
envelope to LEO, and test the new engines.  DC-1 is then production.

Given the low cost of the DC-X,Y test program, we should be advocating
the completion of the test program.  If it succeeds,  then we should
all feel good.  if it costs too much,  we should head back to the
drawing boards.  God knows,  maybe HTHL is the way to go for cheap
space flight and gary gets to say "I told you so"  1x10(6) times.




My gut feel, is that SSTO will always be cheaper then Stacked rockets.
Now if there is some way to get useful payload to orbit in an SSTO,
we will see.







.
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro,alt.sci.planetary
From: baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov (Ron Baalke)
Subject: Mars Observer Update - 12/11/92
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.3-4   
Keywords:  Mars Observer, JPL
Reply-To: baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov
Organization: Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 02:59:27 GMT

Forwarded from:
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
PASADENA, CALIF. 91109. TELEPHONE (818) 354-5011

                  MARS OBSERVER MISSION STATUS
                        December 11, 1992

     All spacecraft subsystems are performing well.

     The radio science flight sequence is winding down and
scheduled for completion on Dec. 14, 1992.  The next flight
sequence will prepare the spacecraft for its transition to the
outer cruise flight mode in which the high-gain antenna rather
than the low-gain antenna will be used.  The outer cruise
attitude transition begins on Dec. 15, 1992.  The Mars Observer
camera "bakeout" to prepare the instrument for operation will
continue in this next sequence through Dec. 28, 1992.  

     A science experiment to observe Earth's geotail at a greater
distance than has been performed by other spacecraft started on
Dec. 9, 1992.  The geotail is the region of space in which the
solar wind is disturbed as Earth moves in its orbit around the
sun.  The experiment will use Mars Observer's magnetometer and
electron reflectometer to gather data on solar and magnetic
particle disruption in this region. 

     Star-ephemiris tables, uploaded about once a week, continue
to adjust the spacecraft's solar panels so that they are
beginning to point more directly at the sun and the high-gain
antenna is pointing more directly at Earth.  These adjustments
are planned to continue through Jan. 2, 1993, when the high-gain
antenna is pointing directly at Earth.

     Today the spacecraft is about 25 million kilometers (16
million miles) from Earth, traveling at a speed of about 23,500
kilometers per hour (15,000 miles per hour) relative to Earth. 
The spacecraft is traveling at a heliocentric velocity of about
105,000 kilometers per hour (66,000 miles per hour).

                             #####  
     ___    _____     ___
    /_ /|  /____/ \  /_ /|     Ron Baalke         | baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov
    | | | |  __ \ /| | | |     Jet Propulsion Lab |
 ___| | | | |__) |/  | | |__   M/S 525-3684 Telos | The 3 things that children 
/___| | | |  ___/    | |/__ /| Pasadena, CA 91109 | find the most fascinating:
|_____|/  |_|/       |_____|/                     | space, dinosaurs and ghosts.

Newsgroups: sci.space
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: liquid fuels
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 01:39:07 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology

In article <1992Dec12.191157.22663@ee.ubc.ca> davem@ee.ubc.ca (Dave Michelson) writes:
>>-After the Challenger failure, NASA added a safety requirement that 
>>-nothing launched in by a space shuttle may use liquid fuels...
>>I think you mean *cryogenic* fuels. Magellan, Galileo, and Ulysses all
>>use liquid fuels.
>
>The major problem with cryogenic fuels is that they boil off and the
>gas must be vented.  This becomes a real problem if the upper stage
>is located inside the shuttle cargo bay.  The modifications that must
>be made to the shuttle are non-trivial.  

Sorry, wrong.  Cryogenic fuels fly in the payload bay on every extended-
duration shuttle flight.  The shuttle's fuel cells use liquid hydrogen
and liquid oxygen, and the extended-duration pallet for the cargo bay
(first flown recently) is basically a set of LH2 and LOX tanks.

Shuttle/Centaur, the launch system originally meant for Galileo (as well
as the other two, but it was the massively-overweight Galileo mission
that drove its specs), died partly because of an acute attack of timidity
after Challenger, partly because people distrusted some aspects of Centaur's
construction, and partly because Centaur+Galileo was so heavy that it led
to problems like needing to jettison its fuel before an emergency landing.
A somewhat smaller LOX/LH2 stage with more conservative construction could
probably be certified for shuttle use even now, but nobody wants to try.
-- 
"God willing... we shall return."       | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
       -Gene Cernan, the Moon, Dec 1972 |  henry@zoo.toronto.edu  utzoo!henry
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright)
Subject: Re: DC vs Shuttle capabilities
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 17:37:36 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In <g9g2v_p@rpi.edu> strider@clotho.acm.rpi.edu (Greg Moore) writes:

>	You missed my point.  If your crew compartment is in the cargo
>bay, where do you put the satellite?

If your cargo bay is full of troops, where do you put the transport 
vehicles? 

Answer: In the other airplane.


>	Granted, but that's not what I meant.  Will you have enough time
>to rendevous and capture the satelite?  It took what 3 days for the
>shuttle to capture Intelsat VI? That's aday more than DC-?.
>Also, what type of fuel margin would DC-1 have for IN-orbit
>manevours?

That's what tankers are for.


>	Use it yes, but use it for what it can be used for economically.
>Let's see, we've added an airlock, an arm, additional on-orbit capacity.
>Hmm, that adds up, and add complexity.  Yes, let's ok at possibilities,
>but not claim t they are definites.

Take a look at the C-130 Hercules.  How many variants are flying,
in both military and commercial service?  Hint:  It's a lot more
than four.


>	I have a question about this.  EOT and LM should require roughly
>the same amount of fuel, no? (as I recall, the energy to get into lunar
>orbit is about the same as GEO? I'm ignoring landing here).  But how
>economical is it to transport that fuel TO orbit?  Am I correct in 
>remembering you saying about 10 DC-1 flights?

Depends on your assumptions.  I've done some back-of-the-envelope
calculations.  If you can set up an oxygen-extraction plant on the
Moon, your costs go way down if you land the DC with its LOX tank
dry.  (This would allow the DC to carry extra cargo, probably
using external attach points.)  It might even be advantageous
to put payloads into GEO from the Moon instead of directly from
the Earth.


>	Also, does it make sense for the DC1-EOT and OMV and LM the same.
>The requirements for landing gear are different.  The requirements for
>fuel transfer MAY be different.  

This depends on how many lunar missions you're going to do.  However,
replacing landing gear shouldn't be too difficult as a field modification.
If the vehicle is rugged enough, you can add attach points for external
fuel tanks.  (And if those tanks are used only in space, the vehicle
shouldn't need to be that rugged.)  And you don't *have* to top off
the fuel tank for every mission if you don't need it.


>What about thermal protection.  LM won't require any to land on 
>the moon, but what about reentering earth orbit or earth landing?

But the DC-LM will require periodic maintenance and, until you
have a fully equipped service station on the Moon, that will
require bringing it back to Earth.