From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: More on Meade at G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Date: 10 Jan 93 00:43:05 -0800
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In article <1993Jan9.202303.16605@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
> In article <1993Jan8.222047.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>>I don't think it is correct to say that Meade decided "not to pursue".
>>He did in fact pursue. However, Meade had left his train in
>>Westminster, MD during his rapid concentration upon Gettysburg. Lee on
>>the other hand had his wagons with him (perhaps to his regret). Lee
>>was therefore in a better position to move quickly.
> 
> I think I disagree with this. Wagons are a butt-slow thing to have drag
> around with you, especially when you are going over mountains. Since Meade
> is moving south, he's marching back towards his wagons yet isn't slowed
> down by them. (At least I think so: I can't find Westminster on my Maryland
> map.) I think Meade can move very rapidly down to his wagons, gaining some
> distance on Lee, and from then on can move as fast as Lee, keeping his head
> start. (At least in theory, he can. In practice the Union usually marched
> a lot slower than the Confederates, for strange reasons.)

Well, my assertions were basically a second hand opinion from Coddington, 
but Westminster (part of my old stomping ground) was rather far to the 
east of the line between Gettysburg and Williamsport. Also, Lee gave his 
wagon train a head start on July 4. Also remember Lee had a choice of 
route south and Meade had to ascertain what his crossing point might be.

>>Also, with Stuart
>>back with the Army, Lee was able to cover the South Mountain passes
>>effectively (as usual) with cavalry.  Meade had sent most of his
>>cavalry off (I don't know why, but perhaps it was to locate the then
>>absent Stuart before he could pull and unpleasant surprise).
> 
> The cavalry of both armies was on the field of Gettyburg on July 3rd so I
> don't think that this is the reason. Perhaps Stuart's men marched off
> somewhere and Meade's cavalry tried to follow and failed? Or maybe Meade
> didn't really understand the use of cavalry? More distinguished infantry
> commanders (JA Early to name one) didn't.

I said "most". Meade certaily had Custer to battle Stuart on the 3rd and 
at least one other cavalry brigade (under Farnsworth, as I recall, who 
attacked Longstreet) but Buford was with the wagons in Westminister.

There was a cavalry clash in the vicintiy of Chambersburg as Lee retreated,
but the CSA had the best of it.

>>Still, if Buford thought that Cemetery Hill was such a great
>>defensive location, why did he deploy his own men all the way out on
>>McPherson Ridge?
> 
> Probably to cover the town and road junction. If he is on Cemetary Hill
> the road junctions, which are still important when both armies are
> scattered and it isn't clear where the battle will be fought, are all
> in Confederate hands. I don't have any evidence for this thought but it
> seems like a reasonable one.

I agree that Buford was covering the town. I am skeptical that he had in mind
protecting Cemetary Hill etc. as Shaara implied. 

> Some of the replacement commanders were fairly good generals. Newton 
> commanding
> I Corps comes to mind. I don't know who took over II Corps when Hancock was
> wounded. His senior division commander is apparently either Caldwell or
> Gibbon, but the senior division commander of I Corps (Doubleday) didn't get
> that command. I think the loss of Sickles has to be counted as a gain for
> the Union.

I agree with all of this. My point was that a big fraction of the command
structure (in addition to Meade himself) was unproven. As for Sickles, 
although he was out of the picture, his actions on July 2 certainly must 
have shaken Meade's confidence that his corps commanders would act 
according to his (Meade's) plans.

I am almost without references this week (on travel), so I might be off 
base. I don't have the resources to account in detail for Meade's actions 
between Lee's evacuation of Gettysburg on July 5, and his (Lee's) escape 
(under fire) across the Potomac on July 16 (as I recall). My thesis is 
that Meade was the best commander that the AotP ever had (although my 
opinion of McClellan and even Joe Hooker is also probably higher than most).
I would be willing to accept some criticism of Meade for the Mine Run 
campaign, but the rampant criticism of him for the immediate aftermath of 
Gettysburg (including Lincoln's) seems unreasonable IMHO.

> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
-- 
Paul Cowan     
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