From: epetraki@.stern.nyu.edu (Emmanuel Petrakis)
Newsgroups: alt.news.macedonia,soc.culture.greek,soc.culture.europe
Subject: Bulgarian occupation of Greece during world War II and the macedonian Question (part 3)
Date: 25 Jan 93 15:30:17 GMT
Followup-To: alt.news.macedonia
Organization: NYU Stern School of Business

The Bulgarian occupation of Greece during World War II and the
Macedonian Question (part 3)



This is the third part of the situation in Northern Greece
during the Bulgarian occupation during World War II.  Its goal
is to present the events that shaped the Macedonian question
today in an unbiased way and to explain the role and motives of
the Yugoslav Communist Party in creating the Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia.



Part 3:  The Yugoslavian Communist party goals (continued)



As the result of the successful work of two members of the
Communist party of Yugoslavia (Lazar Kolisevski and
Vukmanovic-Tempo), Tito was able by 1943 to control the
situation in Yugoslavian macedonia. What was missing, however,
was the consent of the communist parties in Bulgaria and Greece.
 The task of winning the consent of the above communist parties
was assigned to Tempo.  Tempo, was responsible for negotiating
the Kossovo question with the leader of the communist party of
Albania, Emver Hodja.  As a framework for the solution of both
problems, Tempo suggested the founding of a Common Balkan
Resistance Headquarters that would coordinate the resistance
groups that were controlled by the communist parties of the four
Balkan nations.



After meeting with the leaders of the Albanian and Bulgarian
Communist parties in Yugoslav Macedonia, Tempo entered the
resistance-controlled areas in Northern Greece.  During the
period from June to August 1943 he had numerous meetings with
the leaders of the communist party of Greece (KKE) and EAM/ELAS
in Tsotili and Karidia in Greek Macedonia.   With unusual
confidence he presented the Yugoslavian proposal for the Common
Balkan Resistance Headquarters, as well as the Yugoslav solution
to the Macedonian question.



The Tempo Plan



In general terms, Tempo's proposal asked for the creation of 
the common Balkan Resistance Headquarters to coordinate the
armed resistance of the four Balkan communist parties, not only
against the occupying forces (Germans and Bulgarians), but also
against the nationalistic "reactionary" resistance groups.  This
had to be done in order to create the foundation for a new
political and social situation after the war, within the
framework of a Balkan confederation under the Yugoslav communist
leadership.  In Macedonia, the communist resistance groups would
neutralize the impact of Bulgarian nationalism on the Slavic
population of Macedonia.  The partisan groups were to move
freely around the borders, while the Yugoslavians would be
responsible for presenting to the slavophone population in
Greece the Yugoslavian proposal for the solution of the
Macedonian question.  This meant that the Yugoslavian communists
were free to present their propaganda on the "Macedonian"
nation, the "Macedonian" language.  In addition they were free
to make promises that the right for self -determination,
including that of secession, would be valid after the war to
all, including the Slavic population of Macedonia.  Finally, the
Slavic population were to have their own organizations and armed
groups.



Based on recent written evidence, it appears that Tempo did not
clarify the territorial question in Macedonia, and chose to deal
with it after the war.  If one judges from the numerous
statements of Yugoslav officials of the period, one can conclude
that the Yugoslavian Communist party had as their goal the 
creation of a large Macedonian nation, whose borders were almost
identical to those of Bulgaria after the San Stefano treaty. 
The only difference was that the borders were now baptized as
"the national historic borders of the Macedonian nation."  At a
minimum, the Yugoslav Communist Plan was asking for the
annexation of the areas in Northern Greece close to Yugoslavia,
including Thessaloniki, whose port was needed by Yugoslavia for
strategic reasons.  These thoughts, that are presented in
numerous documents of the period and recently published memoirs
of Yugoslavian partisans, were not being negotiated with the
leadership of the Greek communist party (KKE).  Tempo wanted to
have the consent of the ELAS/KKE for his plans without
explicitly discussing the territorial issue.  Thus, he wanted to
achieve the necessary conditions that would allow the
realization the Yugoslavian expansionist plans after the war
would be over.  Tempo defended his plan for the formation of
separate Slavic Macedonian resistance groups as a necessary step
to gain the trust of the Bulgarian sympathizers and to lure them
to the side of the communist cause. 



The Greek Communist (KKE - EAM) response



The Tempo proposals created a new situation for the Greek
communists, vis a vis the resistance movement and the political
future of Greece.  The leaders of KKE realized that, for the
first time, there was a alternative solution to that of British
domination.  Since they had been negotiating at the same time
with the British for Common Resistance Headquarters for the
Greek resistance groups, they had to reject Tempo's proposal.   



Nevertheless, the Greek Communists agreed to cooperate with the
other Balkan communist groups in the areas they controlled, and
to allow the formation of mixed Greek and Yugoslavian units that
would be active on both sides of he border to attract the
slavophones of Greece and the Greek population of Yugoslavia. 
Thus, the Yugoslavian commissars were permitted to enter Greece
without any problems and spread their propaganda regarding the
"Macedonian nation" to the villages in Greek Macedonia.  On the
other hand, the proselytization of the Greek minority in
Yugoslavia never materialized.  



The most important decision was the order to allow the formation
of a new Slavomacedonian political organization (SNOF =
Slavomacedonian National Liberating Front) and of
slavomacedonian armed units.  Nevertheless, the leaders of KKE
rejected the Yugoslavian proposal for renegotiating the
Macedonian question.  Pointing out the political cost that such
an action would have within their constituency, they remained
firm in the position they adopted in 1935.  Their only
concession was that all problems between the Balkan nations
would be solved through cooperation, according to the principles
of self-determination.



The implementation of Tempo's Plan



In practice, many of he resolutions KKE agreed with the Yugoslav
Communist Party were never realized.  These included the mixed
Greek-Yugoslav units and the independent Slavomacedonian armed
units.  Perhaps this was the result of strong opposition within
the ranks of EAM/ELAS, especially within the EAM/ELAS units in
Greek Macedonia.  On the other hand, many of the agreements
reached with Tempo took a different dimension.  This was true in
the case of agents and commissars that entered Greece through
Yugoslav Macedonia with the stated goal of recruiting the
slavophone population to the resistance movement.  In reality,
they worked openly for the unification of Macedonia under the
Yugoslav leadership.  The result was that Western Macedonia was
transformed into a battleground of ideological and armed
conflict between the different ethnic groups.  This situation
was unique throughout Greece.



The main reason for this situation was the concession by the KKE
to permit the creation of SNOF, the political organization of
the Slavomacedonians.  Between October and November 1943 with an
order of the Macedonian Central Committee of KKE (Leonidas
Striggos), SNOF was established in the Prefectures of Kastoria
and Florina in Western Macedonia.  SNOF was to function
independently from EAM/ELAS within the Slavomacedonian
population.  The leading figure within SNOF at that time was
Naum Peyov.  



The main goal of SNOF was the recruitment of all slavophones,
while simultaneously eliminating the agents of Bulgarian
propaganda and all those Slavophones who insisted that they were
Greek.  Towards the first group they tried peaceful persuasion
at first and resorted to violence only when everything else had
failed.  Towards the Greek Slavophone population, and especially
towards those that they called "graecoman followers of PAO" and
many "graecoman families with the principles of the Great Idea"
the attitude was very different and tried to exterminate them. 
This attempt to uproot any and all of the Greek dynamic elements
within the Macedonian Slavophone community, appears regularly in
the correspondence of the members of SNOF.  The SNOF tactics
were reminiscent of the tactics followed by the Bulgarian
"comitadjis" forty years earlier during the Macedonian struggle. 



The ideological direction behind SNOF was to present SNOF as the
heir to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(IMRO)  and 1944 was declared by SNOF to be the "second Iliden."
 At the same time, SNOF was exploiting the quest for the
unification of divided Macedonia with the founding of a
"Macedonian Republic."  In particular, this promise was the
overture in any proselytization.  Gradually, SNOF started to
smuggle weapons to Greece without the knowledge and permission
of EAM/ELAS and to arm the local slavophone population.  At the
same time, many commissars and agents crossed the border and
supplied propaganda materials to the population.  Finally, some
EAM/ELAS units defected to join the Yugoslav Communist units of
Yugoslav Macedonia.



(to be continued)