From: briand@anasaz (Brian Douglass)
Newsgroups: alt.desert-storm
Subject: Re: Stupid Question
Date: 6 Apr 92 05:45:04 GMT
Organization: Anasazi, Inc.  Phoenix, Az

In article <1992Apr5.214551.22044@sequent.com> dickwin@sequent.com writes:
>Bush was politicly correct to not drive on to Bagdad as he was
>operating with allies and under U.N.  sanction.  I think he did the
>right thing by not going to Bagdad.  I believe he did make a mistake
>when he let the republican guards escape with signifigant amounts of
>equipment. By stopping the allied forces short of the Iran/Iraq
>border and leaving a highway open for escape, the Republican Guards
>were able to salvage alot of stuff for use on the Kurds later.I think
>when the shooting started, Bush even issued a statement ot the effect
>that the Iraquis were free to leave the war zone unmolested if they
>left their equipment. Too bad he did not follow up more completely.

The following are excerpts from Command Magazine (A journal dedicated to
Military history, tactics and strategies) article on the Gulf War,
specifically concerning one more day.  I think their analysis will provide
some insight.

	"The decision to call a cease fire, effectie at 0800 hours on the 
28th, was a political one--just as it should have been.  The decisions to send 
forces to Saudi Arabia, to initiate and enforce an embargo, and--when that
failed--to go to war, had all been political.  The decision to end the
operation was also rightly the call of the civilian leadership.  The issue
concerns the matter of that decision's timing."
	"...Yet the command of CENTCOM (Schwarzkopf) still had a fighting enemy
force to his front, shielding a retreating army.  Until they were all
either killed or captured, his mission--from a purely miltary
perspective--was NOT over."
	"There were, however, other factos weighing heavily on the decision to
stop.  The overriding geo-politcal consideration for the Bush
administration was a restoration of stability to the region.  An
emascualted Iraq--unable to control its territory from within or protect it
from without--would not contribute to that stability."
	"Iran, still viewing the US as the "Great Satan," looked on Basra 
Province as culturally and religiously aligned with them.  Indeed, many of the
Shi'ite Moslem holy shrines are located there.  Teheran would be tempted to
annex the area by force if they felt Iraq could not defend it.  It is
unlikely President Bush would lead a "Second Crusade" to liberate that area
for the benefit of Baghdad."
	"To the north, Turkey coveted the oil rich industrial area around
Mosel.  Syria wanted several secotrs across its eastern border."
	".... If a revolt were to occur, we preferred it be carried out
internally and expeditiously by the Iraqi army--and that could not happen
if we destroyed that army's means to conduct such an operation."
	"Had the Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings not erapted even as the last
shot of the war were being fired, and had they not been so bloodily put
down, under worldwide media scrutiny, the wissue of the cease fire probably
would never have been raised.  It would have been considered, as Gen.
Schwarzkofp related, "a very humane decision, and a very courageous
decision," made by magnaminous victors."
	"A Kurdish stat in northern Iraq would have destabilized a portion
of Turkey, which also has a sizable Kurdish population.  Of all our allies
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Turkey suffered the most economic
hardship next to Kuwait itself.  On the southern end of Iraq, the only
nation that would have benefited from a successful Shi'ite revolt was Iran,
which would have gained an Islamic-Fundamentalist beachhead on the Arabian
penninsula.  Over the long haul, the Gulf states fear those religious
zealots as much as they did Saddam Hussein.  The last thing the West needs
is an Ayatollah in Riyadh."
	"The Bengalis and Moroccans never did cross the border; neither did
the Pakistanis.  The Syrians did, but only in a follow-and-support role,
while the only units that actually entered Iraq were those of France,
Britain and the United States.  The Arab objective was not to overthrow
another Arab government, nor to wantonly kill other Arabs--both would set 
dangerous precedents."
	"The first reports from Mutlaa Ridge seemed to indicate that was
precisely what we were in the process of doing.  What the media were never
allowed to see was the bloodbath inflicted on the Iraqis as their
compressed formations piled into the Basra salient and tried to cross the
river and escape north.  Another day of active operations would have
intensified the slaughter and certainly taken the patina off the golden
victory wreath, once the whole scene was videotaped and televised."
	"The basic moral question surrounding the cease fire is this:
could we have prevented the disaster that befell the Kurds and Shi'ites had
we pressed forward from one more day?...  As it was, those units were
immediately used to put down the rebellions in Basra and elsewhere in the
south--but were they really needed for Saddam to accompish that?  Probably
not."
	"...Iraq's fleet of over 150 attack helicopters...had been kept
completely out of the theater of war and were the best anti-rebel weapons
of all.  Then, too, the entire Iraqi army was not located in Kuwait and
Southeastern Iraq.  Sizable forces were still positioned along the Turkish
and Syrian borders, as well as on the eastern border with Iran."
	"To have prevented the slaughter of the Kurds, we would have had to
have marched northwest and taken Baghdad--in essence occupying Iraq and
overseeing its dismemberment."
	"We had been to a Lebanon once before--President Bush did not want
to repeat that experience."

There's really nothing to add.  I thought this to be very clear analysis of
the situation devoid of political axe grinding or extremist
humanitarianism.  The entire article as well as others covering operation
Desert Shield/Storm can be found in the Nov-Dec issue of Command Magazine.

-- 
"You want to know what's scary?  The Third World has 12 new members and
some of them are nuclear armed!"  Former US intelligence officer.

Brian Douglass			briand%anasaz.UUCP@asuvax.eas.asu.edu
				602-870-3330 X657