HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: prc7@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu (Paul  Constance)
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Originator: daemon@eff.org
Reply-To: Paul Constance <prc7@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu>
Organization: EFF mail-news gateway
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 17:59:39 GMT


For an article on encryption policy, I would appreciate any information on
how to reach Phil Zimmerman and/or any copies of his statements about his
motivation and experience in writing PGP. 

Thanks,

Paul Constance
Graduate School of Journalism
Columbia University
prc7@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu
(212) 724-8747
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M. Kadie)
Subject: [alt.censorship]  Right to Free Speech on Computer Networks
Followup-To: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.censorship
Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 21:16:22 GMT

[A repost - Carl]

Newsgroups: alt.censorship
From: ad815@yfn.ysu.edu (John S. Kennedy)
Subject:  Right to Free Speech on Computer Networks
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 05:01:46 GMT


As some of you may know, there is a computer system in Cincinnati, Ohio
called "Tri-State Online".  It is operated by Cincinnati Bell Directory. 
They advertised TSO as a "community access BBS", and yet it is anything but
...

The entire story is a tremendously long one that I do not have the time to
do into here, but, the jist of the story is that I was removed from
Tri-State Online ostensibly because I used some of the "Carlin Seven" words
in a private email mailing list that happened to include some individuals
under the age of 18.

Up until recently, no one thought that I had a chance of fighting my
banning.  Someone suggested that I take my story to the ACLU.  I bumped
into someone from the ACLU on GEnie and he said that they are only
interested in cases involved GOVERNMENT restrictions on personal liberties.
Someone else suggested that I post here.

I have speculated that I may be in a shaky position under current law ...
but ... the question would therefore be ... can the law be changed?

Any ideas would be greatly appreciated.

                   John
-- 
** John S. Kennedy (513) 541-3078 axinar@tso.uc.edu 72217.416@compuserve.com
The opinions expressed in this message are those of the person speaking,
and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of St. E's Med Center, or the
NPTN, but Mr. Kennedy's opinions SHOULD be made federal law!
-- 
Carl Kadie -- kadie@cs.uiuc.edu -- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
From: ckincy@mcs213f.cs.umr.edu (Charles Kincy)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 15 Nov 92 23:53:54 GMT
Article-I.D.: umr.1992Nov15.235354.21215
Followup-To: talk.politics.guns
Organization: University of Missouri - Rolla

Follow-up set to talk.politics.guns.  Please respect it.

In article <19724.2B06AED3@puddle.fidonet.org> Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org (Zhahai Stewart) writes:
>
> OK, enough of this nonsense about the second amendment's "true" meaning,
> based on quoting selected factional advocacy pieces from contemporary 
> sources.  Interesting stuff, and not totally irrelevant, but they often 
> represent minority positions, even if from famous men.  To see what the 
> framers as a whole meant by "militia" we can turn to the Constitution 
> itself:

O, yes, O Great Arbiter of Original Intent, let's.
 
>  "Section 8: The Congress shall have power: ...
>  15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of 
>  the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
>  16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, 
                      ^^^^^^^^^^
>  and for governing such of them as may be employed in the service of 
>  the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the 
>  appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the 
>  militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"

This means that Congress can provide for the organizing of the
militia, and the arming and disciplining of the militia once it has
been called forth.

> This is the clearest and most authoratative (as well as most binding) 
> evidence of what the Constitution means by a "militia", and what "well
> regulated" meant.  Read it for yourself if you think I've taken it out
> of context (as others sometimes do with the second amendment).

Yes, it meant that the general population is the militia, to be 
called forth by Congress when it deems necessary.  Once it has been
called forth, it is subservient to Congress.  And not before.

Sorry, you lose, thanks for playing.

Follow up to talk.politics.guns, please.

cpk 

Note that I am no great Scholar of Original Intent, either.  But
I am quite disgusted by your authoritarian attempts to "end this 
silly discussion right here and now."
Xref: sparky comp.org.eff.talk:7158 sci.crypt:5108
From: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Is there an EFF position on the Assault Key balloons?
Keywords: balloon, public key registration
Date: 21 Nov 92 01:18:36 GMT
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation
Originator: mnemonic@eff.org

In article <1992Nov18.001959.8145@gmuvax2.gmu.edu> pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell) writes:

>To: Official EFF spokensperson
>
>Subject: various proposals to regulate private encryption
>	 technology
>
>Is there an official EFF position on the regulation of private
>use of encryption technology?

Yes. We are opposed to restrictions on the private use of encryption, and
we are actively working to prevent such restrictions.


--Mike



-- 
Mike Godwin,    |"I can solve this Orient Express thing without
mnemonic@eff.org| breaking a sweat. It's that simple."
(617) 864-0665  | 
EFF, Cambridge  |                           --Hercule Perot
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 18 Nov 92 15:28:23 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <20498.2B09F9FC@puddle.fidonet.org>, Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org (Zhahai Stewart) writes:
> 
>  > I don't understand why people are proposing registration of encryption 
>  > keys.
> 
>  Dorothy Denning writes:
> 
>  d> So far as I know, the only people who have floated the idea are Ron 
>  d> Rivest, Silvio Micali, and myself.  
>
>  Then the following may interest you, from last May, as published in
>  Newsbytes (Story by Barbara E. McMullen, 5/15/92, Newsbytes).  You may
>  want to add at least one more name to the list, this time an official.
> 
>  Donald Delaney, New York State Police senior investigator spoke (along 
>  with EFF's Mike Godwin) to the New York Amateur Computer Club's May 1992
>  meeting: 
> 
>  "During the question and answer period, Delaney suggested that a method
>  of resolving the encryption debate would be for third parties, such as 
>  banks and insurance companies, to maintain the personal encryption key 
>  for those using encryption.  A law enforcement official would then have 
>  to obtain a judge's ruling to examine or "tap" the key for future use to 
>  decipher the contents of the file or message."

Obviously my memory leaves something to be desired since I discovered 
that Jim Bidzos (of RSA Data Security) also suggested the idea on a
panel (that I chaired!) at the March Computers,Freedom, and Privacy Conf.
Don Delaney was at the conference, so he might have picked it up from
Jim (his talk was in May).
 
>   (1) suggests private key depositories rather than a gov't agency

I think we're all in agreement on this.

>  I don't know if this suggestion predates or postdates your own; it may

It predates mine.  The first time I publicly mentioned this (that I 
can remember at least :-) was at the National Computer Security Conf.
in October.

>  be independent in any case, given the differences.  I would be interested
>  in whether you think this represents an earlier proposal for key 
>  registration to resolve the conflicting goals, the spread of your
>  proposals into law enforcement, or independent but later thought.

I'm clearly not the first.  It's possible that others have suggested
the idea as well.  It's not particularly "innovative".

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
From: brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton)
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Organization: ClariNet Communications Corp.
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 21:24:22 GMT

Imagine somebody was able to build a safe that was so good that nobody
could get into it without the combination, not even the police.   Imagine
there is fear that criminals will keep evidence of their crimes in these
safes, though the vast majority would be used simply to protect the privacy
and safety of law-abiding folk.


How would the public react to laws that:

	a) Ban the import, sale or ownership of these safes, or

	b) Require that all safes have a special panel only the police
	   can open, or

	c) Require that a copy of the combination for any such safe be kept
	   on file with the police or some central storehouse.
-- 
Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,comp.org.acm,alt.privacy,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M. Kadie)
Subject: On-line Proceedings for "Computers, Freedom and Privacy II"
Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 05:03:50 GMT

The database contains the ASCII text of the proceedings from "the
Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy II," courtesy of the ACM.

The proceedings has 11 sections:

 1.  KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Freedom in Cyberspace: New Wine in Old
 2.  WHO LOGS ON?
 3.  ETHICS, MORALITY, AND CRIMINALITY
 4.  FOR SALE: GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
 5.  FREE SPEECH AND THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORK
 6.  WHO'S IN YOUR GENES?
 7.  PRIVATE COLLECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
 8.  PRIVACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN THE DIGITAL LIBRARY
 9.  COMPUTERS IN THE WORKPLACE: ELYSIUM or PANOPTICON?
 10. WHO HOLDS THE KEYS?
 11. PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE 21st CENTURY

It is available via WAIS, an internet tool. The "*.scr" file is
enclosed. If you don't have wais, but do have telnet, you can
    telnet quake.think.com
and sign on as "wais" and run WAIS there. The database is about source
106. Searching for the word "computer" will produce a list
of all 11 sections.

- Carl


========== computers-freedom-and-privacy.scr ================
(:source 
  :version  3 
  :ip-address "192.31.181.1"
  :ip-name "quake.think.com"
  :tcp-port 210
  :database-name "/proj/wais/db/sources/computers-freedom-and-privacy"
  :cost 0.00 
  :cost-unit :free 
  :maintainer "jonathan@think.com"
  :description "Server created with WAIS release 8 b6 on Nov 16 13:40:50 1992 by jonathan@quake

This database contains the ASCII text of the proceedings from \"the
Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy II,\" courtesy of the ACM.

The proceedings has 11 sections:

 1.  KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Freedom in Cyberspace: New Wine in Old
 2.  WHO LOGS ON?
 3.  ETHICS, MORALITY, AND CRIMINALITY
 4.  FOR SALE: GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
 5.  FREE SPEECH AND THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORK
 6.  WHO'S IN YOUR GENES?
 7.  PRIVATE COLLECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
 8.  PRIVACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN THE DIGITAL LIBRARY
 9.  COMPUTERS IN THE WORKPLACE: ELYSIUM or PANOPTICON?
 10. WHO HOLDS THE KEYS?
 11. PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE 21st CENTURY
"
  )
-- 
Carl Kadie -- kadie@cs.uiuc.edu -- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
From: ameline@vnet.ibm.com (Ian Ameline)
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 92 18:12:48 EST
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Organization: C-Set/2 Development, IBM Canada Lab.
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not those of IBM

In article <1eq9fsINN2fd@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu> aq817@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Steve Crocker) writes:
>
>   Some on this thread appear to believe that because they live outside
>   the U.S. and are not U.S. citizens, that their actions need not comply
>   with U.S. law. Permit me to remind you that the Supreme Court of the
>   U.S. has upheld the legality of U.S. agents arresting foreign nationals
>   on foreign soil for crimes against U.S. law committed on foreign soil.
>   Unless anyone expects their government to go to war against the U.S.
>   to protect them, you had better think twice about violating U.S. law,
>   whoever you are and wherever you might be.


   I believe that Canada has successfully prosecuted and convicted two US
bounty hunters of unlawful confinement and kidnapping for their seizure
of a Canadian, on Canadian soil who was alleged (not yet convicted) to
have comitted crimes on US soil.

   The answer seems simple -- if kidnapping is illegal, just catch the
perpetrators in the act, and send them to jail. I suppose that if the USA
is willing to go to war with another western nation to retrieve 4 or 5 US
citizens who have clearly violated the law of that nation, there is not
too much you can do about it.

   If the penalty for kidnapping isn't high enough to deter foreigners
just create a new offense -- attempted cross-border transportation of
unlawfully confined persons -- with a mandatory life sentence upon
conviction.

   If they're not going to play the game by the rules (legal extradition
processes) make it expensive to ignore the rules.

Regards,
Ian.
From: spp@zabriskie.berkeley.edu (Steve Pope)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 21 Nov 92 18:05:20 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: U.C. Berkeley -- ERL
NNTP-Posting-Host: zion.berkeley.edu

brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:
>Imagine somebody was able to build a safe [..]
>
>How would the public react to laws that:
>
>	a) Ban the import, sale or ownership of these safes, or
>
>	b) Require that all safes have a special panel only the police
>	   can open, or
>
>	c) Require that a copy of the combination for any such safe be kept
>	   on file with the police or some central storehouse.

I can think of a couple ways in which this situation is not
analogous to the laws giving law enforcement access to privitized 
communications.

(1) Traditionally, LE agencies collected large amounts of information
from wiretaps.  From their point of view, the proliferation of communications 
privacy jeapordizes a significant existing collection ability.  Far
less information has been gathered from safes, so it is less of an issue
for them.

(2) Collection of information from safes is generally not a surreptitious
activity.  So it doesn't have the paranoia aspect of wiretaps, intercepts,
key registration etc.

To answer Brad's question, I don't think there would be much of
a public reaction to new laws regulating safes.

Steve
From: Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org (Zhahai Stewart)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 11 Nov 92 19:45:38 GMT
Article-I.D.: puddle.19722.2B06AED0
Organization: FidoNet node 1:104/93 - Adelante, Boulder CO


 > D: I apologize for the insult.  What led me to say what I 
 > D: said was that many people had said things that I 
 > D: interpreted as disrespectful of all law enforcement. 

 RF>  Or, to put it another way -- many of us do not trust 
 RF>  the modern Gestapo that calls itself "law enforcement." 

 At least some of "us" are not quite so polarized.  I figure that the
 majority, ninety some odd percent even, of law enforcment folks are
 OK, and are just trying to do the job we pay them to do.  That still
 leaves a small minority percentage wise, but many thousands of folks
 in absolute terms, who will abuse their position of power in some way.
 Whether this is personal vendettas, corruption, or just a disdain or
 insensitivity towards civil liberties issues, it can be a serious
 problem.  There is no need to be against law enforcement in general,
 in order to oppose creating tools which one believe likely to lead to
 serious abuse by a small minority of law enforcement officials.

 Take Roger's concerns not as a description of the 50 percentile mark
 in regards to law enforcement, but as enumeration of the reasons that
 many citizens have to not have anywhere near perfect faith that there
 won't be major abuses of such a system, even if only by a fraction of
 the folks in law enforcement.

 For example, in regards to abuse of police information systems, one 
 crooked cop out of a hundred is enough to leak all the information
 which private investigators, information brokers, and criminals 
 desire from the supposedly secure databases.  Thus one can advocate
 very stringent internal and procedural safeguards (or even not keeping
 certain information in the database, like protected witness names)
 without being "disrespectful of law enforcement".  Respect does not
 equate to blanket trust.
     ~z~


--  
uucp: uunet!m2xenix!puddle!104!93!Zhahai.Stewart
Internet: Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org
From: "cloyd laporte iii" <cloyd.laporte.iii@execnet.com>
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: cdc/nintendo
Date: 13 Nov 92 17:53:51 EST
Reply-To: "cloyd laporte iii" <cloyd.laporte.iii@execnet.com>
Distribution: comp
Organization: Executive Networks Information

CDC responded to Nintendo's Mass Mailing:

Dear PCBoard Customer:

We have discovered that Nintendo of America has issued a press
release to all of our customers concerning the legal action against
a BBS operator in the Washington DC area.  If you have not already
received a copy of the newsletter, I suspect you will shortly.

I would like to take this opportunity of explaining our position on
the newsletter [sic].  First, we *STRONGLY* [emphasis in original]
object to the method in which the law firm of Arter & Hadden
obtained our mailing list and also to their use of that mailing list
in distributing their press release.  We do not condone the actions
on the part of the law firm and we are agressively working with our
legal consul [sic] to investigate and resolve the matter
satisfactorily.  We did not knowingly make our customer list
available to Nintendo.

Second, we at Clark Development are not a party in any way to the
legal actions indicated in the Nintendo press release.

I want to personally apologize for any concerns or inconvenience the
news release may have caused you.  As soon as I get additional
information about the resolution of this matter, I will pass it
along.

If you have any specifice questions on the newsletter, please give
our office a call.

Sincerely,
Fred Clark
---
  DeLuxe 1.26b #23bt  A civil litigator is an oxymoron.
--
Executive Network Information System  (914) 667-4567
International ILink Host
From: Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org (Zhahai Stewart)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: Patents:  What they are.  What they aren't.  Other factors.
Date: 11 Nov 92 19:11:42 GMT
Article-I.D.: puddle.19720.2B06AECE
Organization: FidoNet node 1:104/93 - Adelante, Boulder CO


 >``A mathematical algorithm is not made statutory by `attempting to 
 >limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.'
 >_Diehr_, 450 U.S. at 191, 209 USPQ at 10.''

 SM> I assume that Bernstein interprets this quote as being at odds with my
 SM> statement. If Bernstein is correct in his interpretation that RSA is
 SM> nothing more than a mathematical algortithm, limited to a particular
 SM> technological environment, then I would conclude that an infringer
 SM> such as Zimmerman is at no risk from the RSA patent and may act
 SM> accordingly, as the courts would undoubtedly strike the patent down in
 SM> a court case with Bernstein's reasoning as justification

 First off, Zimmermann's (two n's by the way) PGP program may not 
 represent an infringement; the intellectual property attorney whom 
 he consulted thinks not.  Now, some users of the program may or may 
 not be infringing on the claimed patents, depending on the type of 
 usage, but that is between them and Public Key Partners (PKP).

 Let's look at your main assertion tho: that the courts would undoubtedly
 strike the patent down in the hypothetical case.  PKP has boasted of
 having a million dollar legal "war chest" with which they plan to clobber
 anyone who infringes their patent claims.  Mr. Zimmermann does not.  I
 doubt the issues are so open and shut that a summary judgement against
 PKP could be had for a mere ten grand or such; one had better plan to
 spend many hundreds of thousands, or not bother.

 Given the thousand to one difference in legal resources, and the fact
 that Mr. Zimmermann would not earn a dime whether he wins or loses,
 I don't think that one can reverse the logic to imply that unless Mr.
 Zimmermann overturns the patent, it must be valid, and the quoted
 excerpt regarding algortithms must be inapplicable.  Until someone has
 an adequate legal budget and incentive to use it, we won't know.
      ~z~


--  
uucp: uunet!m2xenix!puddle!104!93!Zhahai.Stewart
Internet: Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org
From: dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin) 
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Info Wanted on Project IR
Date: 16 Nov 92 17:23:00 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: Advanced Computer Concepts BBS, New Rochelle, NY 914-654-1981
Reply-To: dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin) 

<K> . Can anyone throw somelight on what is happening to Motorola's PROJECT IRI
  > . (a global positioning system), ""implementationwise"", or any of the othe
  > . satellite based global positioning systems which were announced a few mon
  > . back.

IRIDIUM is primarily a comm sat system, but also will include
positioning.  I haven't seen anything on it recently.

The US and Russian GPS systems are more than a few months old, and have
been in limited operational use for quite a while.  GPS was used
extensively during Desert Storm, and the FAA expects to have some
"overlay" approaches developed within the next few months.  The full
constellation of GPS satellites will be up by next summer.  (20 or 21 of
the planned 24 are up now.)  GLONASS (the Russian system) is also in
limited operational use.  Far fewer SVs, and lower accuracy.

You can buy a hand-held GPS unit from several manufacturers.  The price
is down around $1200, and falling rapidly.

        D/

 * OLX 2.2 * Bring back A-N airways!!    Dick.Zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com
                                                                                                            
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk
From: greeny@eff.org (J S Greenfield)
Subject: Re: right to have .plan
Originator: greeny@eff.org
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 04:25:40 GMT

In article <Bxxno4.Ktw@cs.uiuc.edu> kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M. Kadie) writes:
>
>Universities are not automatically required to allow personal
>experssion in .plans. But if they do (most seem to), they are legally
>required to be evenhanded and consistent about what they allow.

I missed the original article, so perhaps I'm taking this out of context,
but it looks as though you left out the "Public" before "Universities"
in the above.

Barring any contractual obligations from a private school's own regulations,
I'm not aware of any such legal obligations on the part of private
universities.


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here,                            greeny@eff.org 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"
Xref: sparky comp.org.eff.talk:7177 alt.privacy:2390 sci.crypt:5154