From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Subject: Re: Lee-Longstreet
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 16:38:02 GMT

In article <1992Aug16.213302.6195@leland.Stanford.EDU> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>Having just read _From_Manassas_To_Appomattox_ in the last week,
Yipes! You must have polished off Foote's little
treatise over Xmas vacation.

> I would
>say I didn't find it particularly vitrolic, certainly not when compared
>to the things said by Early and others about Longstreet. Longstreet's
>book is also milder than the section of Hood's book which is in reply to
>General Johnston's criticisms of Hood.
Well, maybe acerbic would have been a better word.  I have to agree that 
Hood could really sling it.  Try reading his letters to Sherman after
the Atlanta campaign, when Sherman ordered the town vacated.

>As I understand it, all of the allegations raised against Longstreet at
>Gettysburg are false. That said, it has always seemed to me that he was
>guilty of not allowing Hood to move one brigade to the right of Little
>Round Top. Hood believed that this brigade would have taken the Union in
>rear and found itself among the Union trains, and I've never seen anyone
>claim otherwise. In his book he is quite explicit about it.
>Longstreet only replied "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg
>road" and never gave any reasons why not to move one brigade right. It seems
>to me that such a move would be entirely within the discretion Lee allowed
>his corps commanders in battle.
>Why doesn't discussion of Longstreet's role at Gettysburg touch on this
>issue? Is there some aspect of it that I don't understand? It seems to me
>that one brigade in the Union rear on the second day of Gettysburg could
>quite possibly have changed the outcome of the battle and I've never heard any
>reason not to blame Longstreet for refusing Hood permission to send it there.

I think the terrain answers some of these questions.  If you are talking 
about a flanking attack through the saddle between Little Round Top and 
Big Round Top, that is essentially what did happen, and it failed.  If you
mean that a brigade should have been sent all the way around the south
end of Big Round Top, I doubt that it could have been in the rear in time
to have made a substantial difference in the outcome.  The brigade (Laws?)
would have been in plain sight in making such a march, and with the Union
Fifth Corps already rushing reinforcements to the south end of the 
battlefield, it seems likely that it could have fended off a brigade.
Remember that Longstreet originally wanted to send his entire corps 
around the Union left flank.

While it's true that Lee typically left his corps commanders a lot
of discretion (too much, according to some people) Old Pete had argued
repeatedly for a flanking attack, and been repeatedly and very
specifically rebuffed by Lee.  Carrying out a miniature version of the
attack that Lee had rejected would probably have been grounds for a
court martial, at least in Longstreet's mind.  (Did Lee ever place one
of his officers under arrest?  If he didn't censure Stuart after this
battle, it would be hard to believe he would ever censure anyone.)  
It would also have jeopardized the entire battle plan for the day;
with Lee calling for an attack en echelon from the right, throwing your
right-most brigade on a detour would be a poor idea.

That said, I have to agree that, when I first viewed the battlefield, 
an attack around the Union's left flank looked mighty tempting.
--Chuck


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