From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Medicine & the Mall
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 22:33:33 GMT

In article <1992Dec12.161139.18050@pixel.kodak.com> young@serum.kodak.com writes:
>In article <1992Dec11.170208.22219@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>>As Ronald Reagan used to say, "There you go again."  I made no claim that
>>worthiness of ethical consideration is a discrete, dichotomous category.
>
>	Yes, you did.  You said that "it is not unreasonable to assume that
>	there is some similarity in response between ourselves and those
>	species closely related to us."  I merely ask which species you
>	include in the category "closely related to us" and how you make
>	the determination.  In the span of one's life, one will surely be
>	called upon to make such decisions regarding many different life
>	forms...please tell us how YOU have reduced this to consultation
>	of a simple list, so that we may follow in your footsteps.

I fail to see how saying that there is similarity in response is equivalent
to saying that ethical consideration is discrete.  As far as your
question as to how I make my ethical considerations, I generally adopt the
rule of not killing or causing undue pain to any animals.  This errs on the
side of caution.

>>In practice we are willing to accept fuzziness in it for other domains
>>of ethical behaviour (e.g., we all agree that killing a fully functioning
>>human being is wrong, but there is disagreement about fetuses, severely
>>mentally retarded infants, etc.).  [...]
>
>	In the first place, your examples are not non-human, and we are
>	talking about similarities between species, not abnormal or immature
>	examples of the same species.

We are talking about ethics, which is not restricted to cross-species    
interactions.  Unless you have a good argument to the contrary, I see 
no reason why aspects of ethical arguments found in other domains don't
also apply here.  In any event, it seems to me that the issue at hand is
whether or not species is a morally relevant concept.  To say that interactions
between humans of different qualities (many of which are shared by animals)
are not the same as interactions between humans and animals is to beg the
question.

>	In the second place, your comments make no allowance for fuzziness,
>	except, apparently, when you are asked to define and describe your
>	decision-making process in detail.  If I give you an example, by
>	name, of a non-human species, will you tell us whether that species
>	is ethically relevant and describe for us the method you used to
>	arrive at that conclusion?
>
>	I thought not.

Honestly, Rich, meaningful communication is not fostered by such insults.
I note above the principle I follow in everyday life.  This is derived from
more foundational ethical considerations, such as the ability to feel 
pain, and the ability to form plans, have goals, feel desires, etc.  While 
contrary to your implication I'd be happy to discuss any particular 
example you care to name, I don't see what good that will do.

In any case, let's take future interactions to email, since this
thread doesn't belong here, and I don't read talk.politics.animals.

- michael