From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Human motivation and true altruism
Organization: WP Group
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 01:19:36 GMT

From article <1993Jan3.195037.22962@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@clpd.kodak.com (Rich Young):
> In <C096un.7GF@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:
>>Your use of the phrase, "suffer bad feelings", clearly indicated that
>>you were using the word, "sympathy", to label a state of emotional
>>involvement rather than an intellectual understanding of the plight of
>>a particular victim.
> 
> Bull.  The word "sympathy" denotes either emotional OR intellectual;
> you simply ASSUMED that I meant strictly emotional.  You are, as 
> usual, in error.  This is becoming an unfortunate habit with your
> postings.

You're arguing against your own position, Rich.  Would you care to 
explain how a thinker's intellectual understanding of the suffering of 
another entity is somehow bound up in "good feelings" or "bad 
feelings", in accordance with your motivation theory?  To give you a 
specific example, if a man were to study the workings of a desktop 
computer and conclude that the computer experiences neither pain nor 
pleasure when it's abused, would his conclusions be motivated by his 
own "good feelings" or "bad feelings" as you say?  Alternatively, if 
the same man were to study the behavior of a dog in a pain-avoidance 
experiment and conclude that the dog clearly experiences pain, would 
you be inclined to argue that his conclusions are determined by "good 
feelings" or "bad feelings"?  

> ...
>>Let's hope you can learn from my candor and perhaps come to an 
>>understanding of the fact that other individuals may not suffer 
>>from your particular limitation...  namely your apparent 
>>inability to appreciate that other minds do, indeed, exist, and 
>>that other minds are, indeed, capable of experiencing unpleasant 
>>mental events.  
> 
> Where do you get this stuff!?  I have no such "inability" and you
> would be hard-pressed to show otherwise...  

You'd be far more hardpressed to show that your claims about human
motivation are truly universal.

> Indeed, it is precisely 
> BECAUSE I can "...appreciate that other minds...are...capable of
> experiencing unpleasant mental events" that I am motivated to
> act.  It is BECAUSE I sympathize that I feel uncomfortable in not
> acting and therefore move to assuage this mental discomfort.  It is
> because I do not wish to bear the burden of mental discomfort
> associated with inaction that I donate to The Nature Conservancy, 
> for example.

Yet, you seem to be saying that you wouldn't bother donating if 
you weren't driven to do so, solely by your own emotional 
pleasure and pain.  Please don't assume that other individuals 
share this particular limitation.  

> ...
>> I wouldn't sacrifice myself to feed a starving grizzly.  On the 
>> other hand, I wouldn't kill a grizzly simply to satisfy a childish
>> quest for funfilled sports.  Why?  Because I can appreciate the fact 
>> that grizzlies aren't mindless automata and that grizzly 
>> existence is meaningful to the grizzlies themselves.  
> 
> [I am sorely tempted to ask you for a description of what it is about
> the bear's existence that makes it "meaningful," but I'll resist, 
> since it's not relevant to the topic.]

It's good that you resisted in your own small way, Rich.  Had you 
actually posed the question I suppose I would have responded by 
pointing out that bears experience sights, sounds, tastes, 
smells, touch, emotions, and so on.  As such, bears are capable 
of appreciating their own existence, unlike mindless ball 
bearings and wheat seeds, for instance.  As you say, however, 
your question was irrelevant to the thread at hand, and would 
probably devolve into another endless round of hypocritical 
skepticism centered around the questions like: "What does the
word 'meaning' signify when it's used by our opponents, but not
by us?", and, "Is there such a thing as 'truth' when we're discussing
the ideas of our opponents, but not our own ideas?"

> I, too, would neither sacrifice myself to a starving grizzly nor
> kill it for trophy.  But what prevents YOU from doing so?  The con-
> viction that the grizzly isn't "mindless?"  No.  It's the knowledge 
> that, if you DID do one or the other of these things, you would 
> either be dead (and I assume you don't WANT to be dead) or feel 
> remorse (and I assume you don't WANT to go through life knowing that
> you've killed a grizzly bear).  It really has very little to do with
> the grizzly bear.

Once again, you're assuming your conclusions.   Let's suppose, just
for the sake of argument, that a man would, indeed, feel remorse
about killing a bear... yet feel no remorse about killing a chicken
egg or a brain-dead comatose human.   If the mindfulness of bears
and chicken eggs and brain-dead humans isn't a factor, why would he
have qualms about one act of killing, but not about other acts of 
killing?

Be that as it may, Rich, be advised that I've killed hundreds of 
conscious animals and many thousands of unconscious chicken eggs, 
yet harbor no feelings of guilt over those actions.  As such, I'm 
not convinced by your assumption that other individuals are 
driven by the same motivations that drive Rich Young.  

> True altruism, on the other hand, would be, upon observation of a
> starving grizzly, to demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice yourself
> so that it might live.

If you're going to limit our use of the term "altruism" to such extreme
examples, please specify a word that the rest of us can use to describe
the behavior of individuals who take into account the consequences that 
their actions will have on others without necessarily deciding to commit
suicide.

>>rl> Please explain the appearance of taboos without assuming your 
>>rl> conclusions, ie without assuming "feelings of guilt", perceptions 
>>rl> of "disharmony", and various other states that are meaningless 
>>rl> without the norms that you're trying to explain in the first 
>>rl> place.  
>>
>>ry> taboo, n., 1: a prohibition against touching, saying, or doing
>>ry> something for fear of immediate harm from a mysterious
>>ry> superhuman force; 2: a prohibition imposed by social custom
>>ry> or as a protective measure.
>>
>>ry> Now, Russell, why don't YOU talk about "taboos" without reference
>>ry> to "feelings of guilt", or "disharmony?"  Next time, look up the
>>ry> word before you presume to get "clever."
>>
>>I'd be pleased to talk about taboos that don't depend on "good 
>>feelings" or "bad feelings".  Are you prepared to do the same?
> 
> Interesting.  Note, Gentle Reader, this is how Russell attempts to
> extricate himself from a sticky situation.  He clearly screwed up
> when he challenged me on the "taboo" issue on the grounds of 
> "feelings of guilt" and societal "disharmony", so now he pretends
> that "good feelings" and "bad feelings" are the same thing, hoping
> against hope that I won't notice and that his earlier faux pas
> regarding the definition of "taboo" will be forgotten.
> 
> News flash: "feelings of guilt" and societal "disharmony" are hardly
> congruent with "good feelings" and "bad feelings."  Make up your mind,
> Russell.
> ...

As I've pointed out, Rich, your argument is blatantly circular.  Using
the notion of "good feelings" and "bad feelings" in an equivocal
sense won't make the circularity disappear.  

> How about you departing from tradition and supplying a thought
> for once instead of simply asking a question?  Please explain
> to us why a proscription regarding rape has arisen in some 
> societies.  I'm sure we'd all be interested in your reasoning.

Sure.  It seems to me that such prohibitions initially arise when 
a small group of thinking individuals manage to figure out that 
rape is unpleasant for the victims, and hence, unjust.  It'd be
silly to assume that such individuals were driven to such conclusions
by "good feelings" or "bad feelings", just as it would be silly to 
assume that "good feelings" or "bad feelings" necessarily motivate 
a man's conclusion that computers don't feel pain. 

>>Your "theory" is a circular argument, Rich.  
> 
> Then prove it, Russell.  Sure, I can see what you're trying to show:
> "I feel bad because there's a taboo, but there's a taboo because I
> felt bad."  Is that about it?

Yep, that's about it.

> As usual, you're in error.  It goes like this: "I avoid this 
> behavior because there's a taboo, and if I violate it I may suffer;
> the taboo exists because someone before me judged this action and 
> was capable of enforcing that judgement either through consensus or
> by force."

What motivated this particular individual who came before you, Rich?
Are you going to tell us that he formulated the taboo because he had
guilty feelings?  

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals