From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 15:46:32 GMT

In article <vx_pxtg.kmc@netcom.com> kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty) writes:
>In article <1992Sep28.151204.4333@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>By asking for an "entailment", you _assume_ a difference between the
>>two sets of phenomena.  I claim that there is no reason to assume such
>>a difference.  I can imagine worlds in which it would be reasonable to
>>conclude that there was such a difference; but we do not live in one
>>(so far as I can tell).  Being able to imagine something is not the
>>same as constructing a logically possible world.  I assume that there
>>is no difference between the phenomena until I see some way in which
>>they behave differently (in the most general sense of "behave"; I am
>>not talking "behaviourism").  This is not "fiat" unless there are
>>points of difference between the events already established; but there
>                                                              ^^^ ^^^^^
>>are no such points of difference established; there are, of course,
> ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^ ^^^  ^^ ^^^^^^
>>obvious differences in our information about the two classes of events
> ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^                              ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^
>
>I find the assertion before the semicolon to be in flat-out
>contradiction to the statement after the semicolon.  In the latter
>statement you are allowing that there are two classes of events
>which you admit have obvious differences.

The things which are different are our two sets of information about
the one class of underlying events; I misspoke here.  The fallacy of
Chalmers's argument is that he provides a general technique for
deducing that in _any_ situation where we have two bodies of knowledge
which are actually about the same referents, the referents must be
different; as long as we do not realize that the objects of the two
domains are the same, we can imagine a world in which they turn out to
be different, which is a logically possible world, so the two subjects
are different (although they may supervene in the actual world).  The
fallacy is that "imaginable" is not equal to "possible"; the world
"imagined" in this kind of argument is actually usually "possible",
but the way in which we would correlate phenomena in that world with
phenomena in the actual world would change as soon as we had
sufficient information about the actual world (see my "strangeness"
example).


  Can we then take these
>as established points of difference?  It seems to me that the
>explanation of those points of difference are what is at issue here.

No, I misspoke.  It is easy to do; it is the basis of Chalmers's
argument.  A better way of saying it is that there are two different
domains of discourse, one talking about "subjective experiences", and
on talking about "certain physical events in the brain".  Chlemers
admits that the facts about these two domains of discourse are exactly
parallel.  He nonetheless insists that their subject matter is
different; I insist that that the two domains are precisely the same.
I can imagine circumstamces under which I would conclude otherwise,
but Chalmers does not claim the existence of such circumstances.

The differences between the domains of discourse are not the subject
here (although they perhaps should be analyzed); the point is that
none of these differences establish a difference between the subject
matters of the two domains.

>
>>but using these to conclude that the events themselves are
>>different is unsound, even if you dress it up with talk about possible
>
>In watching you argue this for days, you appear to resist admitting
>that "events themselves" give rise to different phenomena because you
>seem to think that's the same thing as saying the "events themselves"
>are different.  But my understanding of the term "phenomenon" is that
>it denotes how things appear to us, not how things are.  Now I can
>remain puzzled about whether dualism is true in its catalog of the
>ontological furniture of the universe, but I am utterly baffled how
>anyone can maintain that there aren't at least two classes of
>phenomena in the world (never mind where they come from).

In this sense of "phenomena", I might say that there are two classes
of "phenomena" (ways in which certain objects are "apprehended") under
discussion, but that the "noumena" (the actual objects underlying
these two sets of "appearances") are precisely the same.

>
>You look like you are admitting that, but whenever the specific question
>is put to you, you seem to deny it.  So let me draw attention to
>the words that have come out of your mouth and ask you again:
>how many classes of phenomena do you count?

I count two "domains of discourse"; I assert that the referents of the
two domains of discourse are actually the same.  Is that clearer?

>-- 
>Kevin McCarty (kmc@netcom.com)


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
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