HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
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Date:         Thu, 12 Nov 1992 07:51:58 EST
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      consensual reality

[From: Bruce Nevin (Thu 921112 07:25:24)]

(Avery Andrews 921112.1238)

>	    there is another rather interesting sense of `meaning' in
>which your meaning is *wrong*.  E.g. if you used it as a basis for
>teaching in a Classics department, it would be quite in order for you
>to be sacked for incompetence.

Demonstrating competence as an employee is a special case of
demonstrating membership.  One must demonstrate to others (those who
matter) that one controls certain perceptions to their satisfaction.

Ah yes: one controls one's own perceptions so that those others
experience no error in their own perceptions.  One controls one's
perception of their experiencing no error . . . . Lots of room here for
illusion, delusion, projection, reification.  But I agree: there does
seem to be some supra-individual collective creation that persists over
time and is shared across persons.  Sapir's view I think (though he
obscures things when he waxes poetic, as he likes to do), and Harris's,
is that such entities as "the grammar" of "the language," "the culture,"
and indeed "the Iliad," are artifacts of the science or other study that
investigates them.  Investigators into (their private) perceptions of
some particular thing negotiate agreements about that thing, and then
reify their negotiated agreements as the thing itself.  The consensus-
perceptions are felt to be different from the private perceptions, and
indeed they are unless one happens to agree with the consensus utterly.
In particular, negotiated consensus is much more stable than are ongoing
subjective perceptions.  This stability and other sensed differences are
attributed to the thing that is perceived as apart from one's subjective
perceptions of that thing; but the consensus is itself a perception, and
not the Ding an sich.

>I'm not denying that all this is ultimately based on perception, but I'm
>trying to emphasize a social aspect of meaning that PCT maybe puts a bit
>too much in the background.

What I have been trying to say about this:  while we imagine that we are
learning it, we create it.  In the course of acting in concert with
others, while imagining that we or others had failed to learn it
adequately, we test, renegotiate, and refine it.

(BTW, is Lord's work on oral-traditional bardic performance in
Yugoslavia and Macedonia now passe'?)

	Bruce
	bn@bbn.com
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Date:         Tue, 10 Nov 1992 03:11:00 GMT
From:         Dag Forssell <0004742580@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Study PCT first. Then make revolution.

[From Dag Forssell (921109)]

(penni sibun 921109.1630)  in response to Hank Folson (921109)

>if pct were anchored in how the mind works, then the latter w/b an
>excellent strategy.  however, whether pct has a handle on the brain
>is strictly a matter of faith at this point.  one way to strengthen
>pct's claim to the brain w/b to show it could account for language.

PCT shows clearly that people attend to that which they are concerned
about. To a person primarily concerned about language, who does not know
or care about PCT, Penni's suggestion appears to make sense.

Even on this CSGnet, which is dedicated to the study of PCT, there
appears to be relatively few people who have studied PCT seriously, as
an engineering science. Those who have, recognize and visualize the
phenomenon of control. They have studied the book: Behavior: the Behavior
of Perception and other works. They have applied the lessons of PCT in
their own lives, can see control operate everywhere and have no doubt
that PCT has a handle on the brain.

PCT lives up to rigorous levels of testing and verification.
Demonstrations with real human beings having to use their brain routinely
demonstrate 95-98% correlation between prediction and actual. Does
linguistics? Bill noted today the absence of a clear model in the
discussions of linguistics. Without a model, you can't begin to test any
validity of what you talk about. You cannot possibly live up to any
rigorous standards, can you?

I have no doubt whatsoever that PCT can account for language. And well.
But it may not account for it on the presently popular terms of a
descriptive science of linguistics. To ask PCT to explain the present
state of the art in linguistics is backward. Instead, use PCT to develop
a new, rigorous, engineering science of linguistics. To do that, the
descriptive linguist must be prepared to think in terms of the physical
or engineering sciences, learn PCT first, adopt new and much higher
criteria of verification and finally (perhaps hardest of all) be prepared
to follow the evidence, even when it may suggest the abandonment of
cherished descriptive principles of contemporary linguistics, no matter
how famous.

If you learn PCT first, everything will fall in place, your special
interest included, whatever it is. If you ask PCT to prove to you what
you already think you know (but that may not be so at all), without
learning PCT first, you will go round and round but never learn anything
from your encounter with PCT advocates, except perhaps that PCT is
nonsense and makes excessive claims.

PCT offers the opportunity for a scientific revolution in all the
branches of descriptive life sciences. A transition from a maze of
descriptions based on each other to an engineering science based
ultimately on physics.

PCT is much more than a matter of faith. There is a lot of very hard
evidence for those who are willing to look. PCT is knowledge, more
certain than most.

Best to all, Dag
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Date:         Fri, 13 Nov 1992 12:45:28 EST
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      propositions

[From: Bruce Nevin (Fri 921113 12:34:38)]

(Martin Taylor 921113 11:15) --

>                                  three useful levels of feedback about
>a proposition (possibly a very complex one):
>
>1) to repeat the words back assured the original talker (O) that the
>   recipient (R) had received the correct words.

>2) To paraphrase the proposition assured O that R had understood the
>   interrelations (syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) of the words, and

Thanks for this about Pask, whom I too have always found needlessly
obscure.  Henry Hiz also wrote about paraphrasing to demonstrate
understanding.

>3) To describe the effect of the proposition in another way (O said "circle"
>   and R says "you mean the locus of points equidistant on a plane from a
>   given point") means that R understood the proposition.

To "describe the effect of the proposition" is to describe the
perceptions with which one associates the proposition, no?

>Pask argued that third-level feedback gave an iron-clad guarantee that
>R had received what O intended to send.  Such an agreement seems to me
>to be more than a simple agreement about a simple perception, and far
>more than 'an agreement like "yes, we employed that string of words."'

But (3) is not an agreement about a proposition, unless you mean
"proposition" in some prelinguistic sense, e.g. a supposed mentalese.
Perhaps I misunderstood what Bill Cunningham meant by the word.  If we
are interposing some third sort of entity between language perceptions
and nonverbal perceptions, please elaborate.

        Bruce
        bn@bbn.com
From: marken@aero.org (Richard Marken)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Subject: fundamentals
Date: 13 Nov 1992 23:36:07 GMT
Organization: The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA
NNTP-Posting-Host: aerospace.aero.org

At the rate things go on the net, this might be an oldie but
goodie; nevertheless:

Bill Powers (921110.1430) --

>Unchangeable belief is the enemy of control.

Yes. A nice clarification of PCT slogan # 2.

> I don't think anyone changes a system concept without turmoil,
>pain, and confusion, and the result is not likely to be predictable.

I agree. But system concept references do change -- probably as a 
result of reorganizations aimed at controlling intrinsic variables. 
My point WRT Ed's claim (about forsaking system concepts for social
acceptance) was just that it implies that system concept references can 
be varied to achieve other goals (in Ed's example, social acceptance). 
Thus,  Ed is placing control of system concepts lower than control of
social acceptance in a control hierarchy. That's fine -- the point (which,
of course, you agree with) is simply that references for perceptions
that can be varied in the service of controlling other perceptions
(and Ed implied that this could be done with what he called "system 
concepts") MUST be able to be so or there will be no control.

>This is why PCT is slow to be appreciated as a new system concept. Much 
>easier to see it as a couple of new principles, or a set of clever
>calculations.

This is a VERY juicy point -- worth much more discsussion, I think.
PCT is not appreciated as a new system concept until one sees
that it is really about themselves -- and their own experience; it
is about life -- the only one that is really experienced from the point
of view of the model itself -- one's own.

Have a nice weekend.

Rick


     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)









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Date:         Wed, 11 Nov 1992 11:58:00 EST
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      meaning, meaning, who's got the meaning?

[From: Bruce Nevin (Wed 921111 11:48:22)]

(Avery Andrews (Wed, 11 Nov 1992 13:22:28 EST) ) --

>	   So meaning depends on perceptions, but not necessarily
>perceptions of any of the people actually involved in a linguistic
>communication where the meaning figures.

This is "meaning" understood from the perspective of a supposed external
observer.  I believe that as we each create meanings we presume that
they are external, universal properties which we are (imperfectly)
learning.

Per the "kicker" in my aside to Bill, I believe that in our cooperative
activities we are in fact collectively creating commonalities of
meaning, though there is no way of being certain of that, and the
process never reaches closure, so it is not imperfect learning but
rather never completed creation.  This I think is close to Sapir's
perspective, refs and quotes if you want (but not right away).

	Bruce
	bn@bbn.com
From: eprince@LYNX.DAC.NORTHEASTERN.EDU ((Eileen Prince))
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Subject: Re: dear Rick
Date: 6 Nov 92 00:35:03 GMT
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How much does it cost to be a paid-up member of the CSG?

Eileen
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Date:         Fri, 13 Nov 1992 09:55:56 EST
From:         "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
Subject:      Bill Cunningham: hidden agendas

[From: Bruce Nevin (Fri 921113 09:53:34)]

From Bill Cunningham (921112.2030)

>Having gone through all this, a Hamming distance can be defined since a
>difference in individual proposition weights is only difference between the
>proposition sets held by the two protagonists.

A Hamming distance can be defined internally for each participant wrt
that participant's perceptions of their agreements.  (An observer is
also a participant.)

> many disagreements were fueled by failure to generate the union
> set as the first protocol layer.  The LPT recursion can deal only with
> the mutual set of propositions.  Unfortunately, if each party associates
> these with other (privately held) propositions, each recursion can only
> produce a major error signal to each party.  The result:  "YOU'RE NOT
> LISTENING TO ME!!"   In other words, hidden propositions are downright
> disruptive, whether intentionally hidden or not.

There are ALWAYS hidden propositions.  Rather, there are always
perceptions associated with a given agreement in one person that are not
associated with that agreement in the other.  An agreement is itself not
an agreement about propositions, it is a (perception of) agreement
about perceptions.  (An agreement that was only about a proposition
would be an agreement like "yes, we employed that string of words.")
The difficulty of making propositions "binding" is what keeps contracts
specialists, lawyers, and the like busily employed.  The effect is based
upon the fact that some propositions are performatives (they ar
constitutive).  "I pronounce you man and wife."  "Let there be peace
between our nations from this time forth."  But that they should be
performatives (when uttered and perhaps signed by some duly constituted
representative, ruler, etc.) is itself a function of agreement, as is
indeed the "power vested in" the one uttering the performative.  Child's
play, really.

        Bruce
        bn@bbn.com
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Posted-Date: Fri, 13 Nov 92 08:38:13 PST
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Fri, 13 Nov 1992 08:38:13 PST
From:         marken@AERO.ORG
Subject:      o tell me where is meaning bred

[From Rick Marken (921112.0830)]

Just got back to a s**tload of mail. Before I try to comment
on some of this stuff, a quick BRAVO to Bruce Nevin for his
(Wed 921111 10:59:45)ppost on meaning. Bruce ends with:

>I am sure that sometime in the future I will be able to put all this
>more clearly and succinctly.

I think you made a hell of a great first stab at it in this post.

Best regards

Rick


     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)
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Date:         Mon, 9 Nov 1992 15:38:41 PST
From:         Penni Sibun <sibun@PARC.XEROX.COM>
Subject:      Re: Language
              9 Nov 1992 06:54:00 -0800 <92Nov9.105437pst.11769@alpha.xerox.com>

(penni sibun 921109.1630)

   [From Hank Folson (921109)]

   My feeling is that to understand language, rather than starting from the
   spoken word and working backwards, it will be easier to start from how the
   human mind functions and work forward using PCT.

if pct were anchored in how the mind works, then the latter w/b an
excellent strategy.  however, whether pct has a handle on the brain is
strictly a matter of faith at this point.  one way to strengthen pct's
claim to the brain w/b to show it could account for language.  but how
can we show that?  by having a clear picture of what has to be
accounted for when we ``account for language'' w/ any theory.  in
other words, you have to approach a pct theory of language from both
directions.

i, on the other hand, would rather approach language from the point of
view of interactionism.  i'm certainly having to work both sides of
the issue myself, in the hopes that i'll ever have a coherent theory.

				--penni
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Date:         Tue, 10 Nov 1992 14:20:16 EST
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: PCT slogans

[Martin Taylor 921110  14:15]
(Rick Marken 921109.0900 and 921110.0900)

>While walking with me wife this weekend she challenged me to
>come up with some surprising conclusion derived from PCT that
>might grab the interest of a layperson. Here's what I came up with.
>
>"You can't tell what people are doing by watching what they are doing".

A reference discussed a few months ago:
Vallacher, R.R. and Wegner, D.M. (1987) "What do people think they're doing?
Action identification and human behavior" Psychological Review, 94, 3-15

I guess they aren't laypersons, but they aren't PCT persons either.  They would
agree with PCT slogan number one.

>PCT slogan # 2:
>
>Belief is the enemy of control.

I would have thought belief to be the essence of control.  Belief, to me, is
a short word for "perception of the current state of whatever is being
controlled for by this ECS."  Alternatively, belief is the concatenation of
possibly many percepts of the same level.  I don't understand the sense in
which Rick means PCT slogan #2.  It is obviously different from what I mean
by it.

Martin
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Date:         Thu, 5 Nov 1992 12:42:31 PST
From:         Penni Sibun <sibun@PARC.XEROX.COM>
Subject:      Re: language
              4 Nov 1992 14:47:23 -0800 <92Nov4.163443pst.12160@alpha.xerox.com>

(penni sibun 921105.1300)

   [From Rick Marken (921104.1400)]

   penni sibun (921103.1600) on the relation between her model and pct model

   >i think the major difficulty in mapping bet. yr model and mine is the
   >``intended meaning'' part.

   I agree -- intentions (reference signals) ARE the ONE BIG difference
   between PCT and ALL other models of living systems.

nonsense.  intentions are one of the many banes of traditional ai.

re: below.  i can't make much sense of yr cryptic equations.  i don't
think you answered my question.  i didn't ask whether you thought
there were hidden loops in my model.  i asked how you could make a pct
model that accounted for the same phenomena.  obviously, i believe
that the phenomena my model captures are important.  i'd like to see
how you think pct could account for the same process.  could you
please try again?

   > this is a basic sketch of my model: i cast
   >the issue as deciding what to say next.
   > another way to characterize this might be 1) where are we in the
   >linguistic structure (ws) and 2) where are we in the structure of
   >``meaning(s)'' (?) we are talking about.

   In order to be able to answer these two questions, doesn't the model
   have to be able to perceive the state of ws and "where we are in
   the structure of meanings"? That is, 1) and 2) describe perceptual
   variables, right?

sure.  that's not the issue.  i'm not interested in quibbling whether
something is a perception or a perception of a perception.

   >  ignoring the rest of the
   >context for the nonce, what is said next is determined both by 1) and
   >by 2).  this implies that it is *not* the case that the ``meaning'' is
   >selected and then the linguistic structure is found to fit it, and the
   >next bit of language is produced.

   Your second sentence is not a correct description of the PCT model of
   meaning generation as I described it in my diagram; the PCT mdoel
   says that a linguistic structure (ws) is generated which moves perceived
   meaning into a match with reference (selected or intended) meaning.
   You say that 1) and 2) [the questions quoted avove] determine what is
   said next. To me, it sounds like the perception of 1) where you are in
   the linguistic structure (call this p.ws) and 2) where you are in the
   structure of meanings (call this p.m) determines what you say next
   (call this o). So, your model seems to be o = f(p.ws,p.m) -- definitely
   not a control model. But you may have a control model without knowing
   it; what you say next may be ws and m rather than o -- so (p,m) =
   f(p.ws,p.m) AND (p.ws,p.m) = g(p,m) -- closed loop.

cheers.

				--penni
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Date:         Fri, 13 Nov 1992 22:48:14 EST
From:         Avery Andrews <andaling@FAC.ANU.EDU.AU>
Subject:      meaning

[Avery Andrews 921113.1047]
  (Bill Powers (921112.0900))

 >"The Iliad" is a phrase we use to refer to (a) something that we
 >have heard or read that Homer dictated to someone, (b) a particular book
 >with the marks "The Iliad" printed on the cover, and with printed words
 >inside like those that Homer purportedly said, although in most cases
 >not the same words (a translation).  So "The Iliad" is the name of a
 >collection of perceptions, some of which are word-like objects, some of
 >which are book-like objects, some of which are memories, and some of
 >which are imagined scenes or people.

I'm unsure about how all this really gets grounded out in
perceptions, considering that the book has to contain what Homer
putatively said, probably translated into some other language etc., &
that people can use the word successfully without having much of a notion of
what is in the book (as when the lit. teacher assigns it as reading to
a group of students have never heard of it before).

The consensual element seems to be being left out.  Here's an example
that might help to fill it in. Aeschylus wrote a play, Seven Against Thebes,
which I have not read in any language, & so don't have much of a
concept of.  Suppose I go to the book store, & buy a book which says
on the cover that it is Seven Against Thebes by Aeschylus.

But when I start reading, something seems odd (maybe all the action
seems to about a war of independence being fought on the Moon).
So I take my book down to the library & compare it with the
appropriately titled books there, & find it quite
different.  I conclude that I've been the deliberate butt of a wierd
joke, or an accidental victim of a bookbinder's error.

So, I speculate, part of a normal person's concept of literary works is
that there are these places that have `standard copies' of works by
given authors.  They include libraries, and other collections maintained
by supposed experts.  How do we know that they are experts?  Mostly,
I guess because they say the more or less the same thing, for a wide
range of cases, and, partly, because they give a general impression of
knowing what they are talking out.

So I'll contend that to get a perceptually based concept of the Iliad
we need to invoke (a) some kind of social perception of expertise
(b) perceptions of the apparent experts agreeing on whether a given
book is a copy of the Iliad.  And even people who would trust themselves
to recognize copies of the book base their trust on these
considerations, except that they encountered the experts first (or
just happily assume that their bookseller did gull them
once upon a time).

I get the sense that there's some kind of `second order' perception
going on, tho definitely not in the standard PCT sense.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au
From: andaling@FAC.ANU.EDU.AU ((Avery Andrews))
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Subject: linguistics and modelling
Date: 11 Nov 92 15:17:05 GMT
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[Avery Andrews 921111.1015]

Pre-molecular genetics might be a good analog of what I suspect will
be the relationship between linguistics and `core' PCT for some time
to come.  People knew quite a lot of useful things about genes,
without knowing exactly what they were.  This knowledge was genuinely
scientific, and essential to identifying them correctly, but of course
things were much better when people actually knew what genetic
material was.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au