From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' the first
Date: 5 Nov 92 10:47:45 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.23.720960465
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za

DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' number one.

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  Here is one  possible argument to  the effect that  determinism cannot be
true.  It is not a `physical' argument (see `refutation' number two for one
of them) and has a few slightly contentious assumptions, but does serve  to
illustrate a  basic conflict  between determinism  and the  way we normally
think of ourselves:
    
    The argument  starts from  a factual  observation.   Our legal  systems
  (this is not  a modern Western  point, it seems  universal) acknowledge a
  distinction between  `do-ers' and  `do-ees' in  a fundamental  and strong
  way.  For example when one  person pushes another over a cliff  we direct
  our criticism/ revenge/ abuse/ rehabilitation/ whatever at the person who
  `did' the pushing.  Some archaic legal systems had different economies of
  `do-ers' and, for example, tried crows for crop damage.  NO LEGAL  SYSTEM
  HAS EVER `TRIED' A LAW OF NATURE, OR A MECHANICAL DEVICE.  Certainly any-
  one wanting  to haul  the gravitational  attraction which  exists between
  bodies possessing mass  before the bench  would look stupendously  silly,
  despite the fact that that  attraction would have been an  essential part
  of the total cause of the death of a person pushed off a building.
    
    An  analysis  of  the  workings  of  the proceedings shows that what is
  presupposed of a `doer', what  defines him/her is that there  is believed
  to be someting like a `possibility for having done otherwise.'  (ie  Free
  Will)   Indeed if  it is  possible to  prove that  the person who did the
  pushing could not have done otherwise (they were hypnotised, compelled by
  another person etc) then that counts as a defence.  The defence works  by
  showing that with respect to that act they were not free; that they were,
  in that respect, like the attractive force.
    
    If we allow only the assumption that the world be in some way which al-
  lows our  legal procedures  to be  grounded in  truth (which we certainly
  seem to assume when using them)  then the _way_ in which they  work seems
  to  constitute  an  argument  against  determinism.    This  is   becuase
  determinism holds, in  effect, that there  are no `do-ers',  that nothing
  has the possibility of being other than it is.
  
  The intelligibility of our  legal systems can thus  be seen as a  sort of
_reductio ad  absurdum_ of  determinism.   Any thoughts?   [especially  any
other arguments of this sort, and, of course, refutations.]
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| David Spurrett, department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
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Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech