From: I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau)
Subject: Re: Arguments for the existence of God
Organization: Technical University Braunschweig, Germany
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1993 14:26:15 GMT

In article <1993Jan21.015708.13574@rp.CSIRO.AU>
ahaig@rp.CSIRO.AU (Albert Haig) writes:
 
(Big deletions)
>No! The issue *is* that any coherent universe (I use this term loosly
>to include what you call worlds e.g. non-law governed universes) *is
>possible*.
>
 
Logically possible maybe. But these worlds have only an abstract form
of 'existence', that of being logical possible.
When I define possible as possibly interfering with the world as I can
perceive it, most of them vanish instantly.
 
>
>> The universe we are in may indeed be very improbable. However, there is
>> nothing special about it. It is not, as you put it, "remarkable". It just
>> annother universe. This particular one contains a planet with some
>> hairless primate lifeforms that discuss this sort of thing, but there
>> is nothing special about any of that. What we are (human, that is)
>> is not relevant- we could be philosophical dust and nothing
>> important to this argument changes.
>>
>> Sure, this particular universe is improbable. But so is _every other
>> one_. This is the point of my 10-dice example- ANY result from the
>> dice is very improbable. Yet something always comes up. Nothing unusal
>> seems to be going on here.
>>
>
>O.K. This is all I need. Whether you regard this universe as remarkable or
>not, (and I think it is rather implausible not to), it nevertheless
>does belong to a subset of the total set of possible universes which
>is the subset of universes which God would have reason to create. There
>are two main theories under consideration here, one of which says
>that God exists and hence that any universe should be a member of this subset,
>and the other of which denies that God exists and can give no reason
>as to why any possible universe should be more or less likely then any
>other. Given that the universe is a member of the subset mentioned, this
>constitutes evidence for the existence of God, the strength of the evidence
>depending on the size of the subset in relation to the whole set. And,
>I think it is clearly the case that the subset is much smaller than the
>whole.
>
>If I walked into a room, and there were 1000 coins on the floor, all tails,
>and a friend told me he had just tossed them only once each and they had
>come down that way, I would be faced with (at least) two options. 1) He is telling
>the truth. 2) He is lying/deluded. I would certainly argue that a rational
>person should adopt 2), because the probability of a person lying or
>being decieved is higher than that the event actually occured (hey, this
>is just Hume's argument against miracles!). If there were no other possibility
>but that he had tossed them, then, OK, I accept it, but in this case in
>question this means assuming athiesm is certian.
>
 
The point is that the are zillion other ways that this world might exist.
 
Just move and switch things at random. And I wouldn't say that it is necessary
in the strict sense that for instance the mouse lies exactly there where
it is now. And then there is the point that the universe is big enough
to together with the possibility of autocatalytic processes, such things
as our life possible. Ans since we identify our life and being with only
a small subset of processes, it is NECESSARY that they are rarely found.
However, the simple notion that I define me as one instance of such a
unlikely class induces that this unprobable thing has taken place.
 
>> Surely not every one does, but I'd wager most of them do. Remember, there
>> is one hell of a lot of time and space in a universe for something like
>> this to form in.
>
>What? For every universe with lots of time and space there are just as many
>with hardly any. I think you grossly underestimate the peculiar conditions
>required for intelligent life to exist in a law-governed universe.
>
 
So? Do you have a definition of intelligent life? Or do you mean forms of
being that you can necessarily identify as intelligent life?
 
And there are systems which are fully consistent with physics that say
that self-organization is a necessary effect as long as the universe is
not in a state of equilibrium (if I have worded it wrongly, please
correct me).
 
And the universe is BIG, and OLD. I am not impressed with taking chances
on such a realm.
 
 
>>
>> This is totally garbage. There is no reason to presume that YOUR God
>> is there instead of some other. (or... is there? Show it to me if there
>> is one.)
>
>Oh yes there is. Incidentally, He is not my God, I do not own Him. The
>reason is that the thiestic hypothesis is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient,
>and so on is simpler than any other and therefore more likely - there being
>no other reason to suppose one particular God rather than another. The
>only way that we could have a God and not have thiesm would be to limit
>something - say to make Him limited in power. But this would be arbitrary -
>why just so much power, no more and no less? If one is to have a God, the
>most likely one is the thiestic one. Incidentally, there could only be
>one such being of logical necessity (who would over-rule who in case of dispute)
>so I think that anyone whether Jewish, Christian, Islamic or whatever who
>refers to such a being is refering to the same dude. I just think they hang
>a whole lot of extra attributes on Him which complicate the matter.
>
 
You miss the point, it does nowhere follow from your thesis that that what
created the universe is the theistic god. It is just something that created
the universe, the rest is not implied. At least not by the set of axioms
presented so far.
 
 
(Deletion)
>
>`If you say: "It (God) has always existed", I'll ask: "If you can
>accept the possibility of the FCE having always existed, why can't you
>postulate the same about the Universe?".'
>
 
And you don't answer it. Your set of axioms allows you to let something
be without cause. However, it does not follow that it cannot be the universe.
It is just one of your favorite beliefs.
 
>I guessed as much!
>
>> > One or two people challenged the idea that a simple hypothesis
>> >is more likely than a complex one where the evidence is equally explained
>> >by both; I am not going to bite into this since it raises the whole problem
>> >of induction - suffice to say that, if you're right (and I don't think
>> >you are) your belief in science or any other knowledge appart from your direct
>> >experience and logic is unfounded. Don't expect the sun to rise tommorrow!
>>
>> :) I also agree here, but I dont seem to remember this argument
>> being made. (Either I missed a lotta posts, or you're going after a lot
>> of straw men)
>>
>
>Particularly silly quote from a post included here:
>
>`Golly, I really wish the simplest answer was always the right one.  But
>its not!  The square root of a negative requires an imaginary number.
>Imaginary numbers are NOT simple.  If you're driving your car, and you
>hear a thumping noise, perhaps the simplest answer is that you have a
>flat tire.  But that may not be true, and that would not neccesitate the
>existence of god.'
>
 
What makes it so silly? It shows that one can build quite complex systems that
still allow to make valid predictions. Infinity is one of them.
 
 
The point is that it that assuming that we have two systems which explain
the same thing, and make the same predictions, that which is more 'likely'
should be chosen. To be harsh, it is not generally possible to say which
is more likely. But it is generally accepted that when we have two
similar systems, one consisting of 4 axioms, and the other of those four
axioms and a fifth one, and both fit that data equally well/make the same
predictions, the first system should be chosen.
 
 
In the case of the god argument I see it the following way:
 
We have the proposition that nothing is without cause.
So the universe must be infinite.
 
Then you introduce something which allows you to violate the
first proposition, namely god. And then you say, 'hey! I don't
need infinity of the universe as is.' That's no miracle, you have
left the argument.
 
 
(Deletions)
>In terms of the first cause argument, we are considering the simplicity of
>the first cause. The thiest does not need to have the universe in this
>consideration at all, just God, there being no universe. It is thus
>God vs the universe in simplicity. And I think God wins out here.
>
 
Your concept of a god who is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent
loses. You are still falling prey to the creator of the universe ==
theistic attributes of a god fallacy.
 
I don't see why something has to be omnipotent to cause this universe.
It suffices that it causes the universe, if the universe has to be
caused.
 
>>
>> The one with a god is still an uncaused universe! It simply says
>> "The universe starts out with a god in it, and he makes the rest."
>>
>
>Not unless
>you are rapidly changing the definition of universe, (an unfortunate tactic
>sometimes employed by athiests), from `the physical time-space universe'
>to `everything that exists', quite a different thing, at least to a thiest!
>
 
I think he is trying to say that you replace the view of the universe through
another one. A system that is without cause. And it is your major gripe that
the system with the universe is without a cause. But we still have to systems,
both without a cause. The one without god is definitely smaller.
 
 
(Deletions)
>> Theim ITSELF ->is<- coherent. It is *omnipotence* (and maybe omniscience too)
>> that is incoherent. This is NOT INTEGRAL in Theism!
>
>I suppose this is an argument over definitions, but I think omnipotence is
>integral to thiesm.
>
 
Is it another axiom or does it follow out of those represented so far? Just
for simplicity's sake, you know?
 
(Deletions)
>>
>> >     Re perfect goodness, it can be proven that God must be perfectly
>> >good if He is perfectly free and one accepts one (controversial) extra
>> >premise: that moral statements (e.g. `you ought not murder') have truth
>> >values, i.e. can be said to be true or false. I am not going to bite into
>> >this (largely irrelevant) debate here.
>>
>> Me neither. Its demonstrably false that this omnipotent, omnicient being
>> is omnibenevolent anyway. Such a one would be able to, and would
>> wish to, fix all the flaws in the world. Anything causing suffering.
>
>This is all highly contentious.
>
 
It is very simple, in fact. Our world is not benevolent to everyone all the
time. It is caused by your god. End of reasoning.
 
>>
>> You mean you believe in a God that does not intervene, right?
>> Or do you really mean YOU do not intervene? If this is so,
>> how do you manage it?
>>
>
>I am generally not in the mood to intervene. If you need gravity
>suspended sometime, let me know 8-)
>
 
Still hoping that you are going to tell us where you got the information
about an afterlife and how you can explain this information without
interference of your god. Is it some physical law?
 
I don't think it is by chance that one needs just two or three axioms more
to get the god most Christians I know believe in. In other words, you have
lost only some axioms in the process. And you waste a lot of axioms on
things that make no measurable prediction.
   Benedikt