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Date:         Wed, 6 Jan 1993 15:58:34 EST
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: non-revolutionary two-step

[Martin Taylor 930106 15:30]
(Bruce Nevin 930106 12:54)

>It seems to me that problems and solutions are theory-dependent.

Yes; I think that is a generally agreed position.

>What constitutes a "problem" depends one's ignorance that one is
>aware of.  Ignorance of which one is unaware is the blissful kind
>(even if error results that is not blissful--no connection to the
>ignorance can be made, and pain is often misattributed).

This latter is central to the Powers form of reorganization.  One
determines that there IS error in something that matters (i.e. an
intrinsic variable), but one knows not what to do about it.  So a
random change somewhere in the behaving hierarchy alters some aspect
of control, and maybe that fixes the problem.  This method should always
work, if slowly, and it demands no apparent connection between the place
where uncorrectable error is noted and the place in which a modification
fixes the error in the intrinsic variable.

When there is a known "problem"--ignorance that one is aware of--my local
type of reorganization may be more appropriate.  An ECS in the hierarchy
cannot control its error, and some local modification may be appropriate
to fix the problem.  Perhaps the Perceptual Input Function (PIF) is
modified (seeing the situation differently), perhaps some output connection
has its sign switched (doing something different about it), perhaps
a new output link is made or one eliminated.  These changes are local to
the ECS, based on a local determination that it is not in good control.

>Awareness of ignorance has to do with gaps in the constructs
>(themselves perceptions, of course) by which we try to organize
>our perceptions (mostly remembered and imagined perceptions).

I would call these constructs PIFs rather than perceptions.  The result
of the PIF depends on the incoming sensory data, and is a perception.

>This is how I put it in (Fri 921218 13:24:41):
>
>-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-
>> The perceptions to which we pay attention are more clearly
>> defined and longer lasting in memory than those we disregard.

There is a phenomenon psychologists call "the Zeigarnik effect" (or
used to, when I was in graduate school).  What is remembered best is
an unfinished task.  Now knowing about PCT, I would translate that to
say that what is remembered is a perception that continues to differ
from its reference.  I'm not clear whether this has anything to do with
"attention," or even what "attention" means within PCT.  I have my own
notion of what it means, but that is within the construct of the alerting
system, which is (so far) not accepted as part of orthodox PCT.

As a side-note, I don't like the use of the term "aware" in all of this,
but I can't really think of a better term.  "Aware" invokes the notion
of consciousness, which isn't relevant to this discussion.  What is
necessary is that appropriate information about the existence of an
uncorrectable error be available at suitable points in the main hierarchy
or in the reorganizing system.  To say that the person is "aware" of this
information is to ask the homunculus to get working.  And that's someone
I'd like to exclude.

But subjectively, much of what you say, using "aware" and similar terms,
is true of conscious experience (mine, anyway).  How that aspect works is
part of the mystery of teaching as opposed to learning.  In your self-quoted
passage, you refer to this, and I'm not trying to criticize that part of your
posting. I'm only noting that the issue exists without bringing consciousness
into it.

Martin
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