HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 6 Oct 92 21:52:53 GMT
Article-I.D.: smaug.1at1rlINNsi3
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

mhf4421@usl.edu (Flynn Matthew H) writes:
=>>Derrida and De Sausare (sp.?) argue rather convincingly that language is
=>>arbitrary, and there is no real reason why any particular word, letter, or
=>>phoneme need mean what we accept it to mean.
=>
=>The origin of the word "mama" (and its close relatives in other languages)
=>appears to contradict that statement.  "Ma" is one of the easiest syllables
=>to utter, and is one of the first spoken by infants.  The first entity that
=>an infant wants to refer to is his mother.  The association of that word to
=>that concept was not arbitrary.  Reference the OED for more detail.
=
=Yes, mama is one of the easiest things for an infant to say, so it does.  But
=is there anything inherent in the sound or form of "mama" that links it to the
=actual physical mother?

Only that the sound and form of "mama" tends to be one of the first
words an infant can render, and that the actual physical mother is
one of the first things an infant tends to want to refer to.  Those
are both pretty inherent tendencies.

=Why "mama"?  because it is convenient,  not because "mama" has any
=inherent meaning.

I don't think the word "mama" has any inherent meaning.  What I think
is inherent is the likelyhood that that word will come to have that
meaning.  My specific statement above, which I still believe, is that
the association of the word "mama" to the concept of one's mother was
not arbitrary: there are reasons why that connection is likely.
Perhaps I should revise my opinion:  I suppose in a sense this *does*
argue that the word "mama" has inherent meaning.

Anyway, the existence of a few exceptions such as "mama" and
onomatopoeia doesn't really hurt your argument -- I was making
a side note.

Dave
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: self-evolution
Date: 1 Oct 92 23:54:28 GMT
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

GE0QC@CUNYVM.BITNET (Levi) writes [edited for spelling and clarity]:

   > . . . the major difference between a human brain and a computer
   > is that a computer will be able to self-evolve.  If a computer
   > is convinced that a change in its algorithm would enhance its
   > capabilities all it has to do is change its algorithm.

I think the question of self-evolution is very interesting.  Of course
humans as well as computers can change their algorithms to enhance
their capabilities -- that's why we go to school.  But there is a
level, the neural level, at which our algorithms seem to be fixed, or
at least insulated from consciousness.  Does the same thing
necessarily apply to computers?

Hofstadter, for one, argues that it does (in GEB).  He says that
flexibility must always be built upon a fixed substrate -- that every
functional system has *some* level insulated from control by higher
levels.  The argument seems plausible to me:  it's hard to see how a
system could intelligently change itself at the most fundamental
level.  A system surely could not predict the effect of such a change
in its own structure, so it would essentially be a random mutation --
and random mutations, in the absence of a selection mechanism, lead
only to chaotic instability.  

But this isn't exactly a mathematical proof, and I still have a
smidgen of doubt.

	-- Bill
From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Freewill, chaos and digital systems
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 17:00:47 GMT

In article <7614@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
...................
>
>I can pretty much agree with all of that.  However, here is a thought
>experiment.  Robots have been developed that can pass the Turing Test.
>Indeed, we've decided that they can be considered persons and we've
>even given them voting rights.  The True Blue Robot Company starts
>making robots.  Now suppose it turns out that these robots tend to
>vote for the Conservative Party (which has blue as its colour).
>
>These robots might think all ther things we think about how the things
>that seem to influence our decisions are what really does influence
>our decisions, and so forth.  They can read Dennett and know about
>verieties of free will worth wanting.  Nonetheless, it seems to me
>that there is still a real question about whether their voting choices
>are "free".  We have suspicions, and rightly so.  Maybe the bias
>is due to nothing more than the colour blue.  (The robots know they're
>True Blue robots and, in most of them, this helps lead them to think
>favorably of the colout blue.)  But maybe not.
>
>-- jd

There is a fascinating story by Stanislaus Lem "The Mask" illustrating very 
well what you say .

 Andrzej Pindor

-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding
Date: 6 Oct 1992 19:40:55 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>it is a commonplace illusion among philosophy students that they _are_
>entirely symbolic in their cognitive functions, e.g., the common
>belief that is impossible to think without thinking in (something
>like) words.

Why do you say that this is an illusion?  A symbol is anything
that represents meaning.  What sort of thinking do you suppose
occurs *without* the use of symbols?

-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ggraham@utdallas.edu (Gregory S. Graham)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Organization: Univ. of Texas at Dallas
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 17:34:22 GMT

In article <1992Sep29.225005.4267@usl.edu> mhf4421@usl.edu (Flynn Matthew H) writes:
>erlebach@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE (Thomas Erlebach) states in
>Message-ID: <1992Sep29.151801.8240@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE>
>  
>> With computer I mean something like a super-PC: just one CPU and
>> memory and I/O-stuff, no fancy new brain-like architecture, only
>> a hyper-fast version of an 80486 CPU and a hyper-large memory.
>> All you have to do is: Get a model of the brain into the computer
>> (which will be rather difficult, too, but not impossible I think)
>
>
>What on earth makes you think that any algorhythm througha single processor
>is  capable of simulating a brain.   I find there's very little reason that 
>the brain would rely on a single processor, and I think the evidence would 
>show that there is  multiple processing going on all the time in our skulls.
>The concept of a super pc just seems like a romantic notion somehow.
>
>M.H.Flynn
>

I think it can be shown that any multi-processor system can be simulated
on a single processor.  I see a multi-processor solution as merely a method
for making an intelligent system run faster, but I don't see it as essential
to intelligence.
-- 

Greg Graham                                ggraham@utdallas.edu

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: lfoard@Turing.ORG (Lawrence C. Foard)
Subject: Re: AI rights 
Organization: The Turing Project, Charlottesville Virginia.
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1992 12:31:53 GMT

In article <1992Oct2.060403.29588@netcom.com> nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle) writes:
>      It's not clear that all sentient systems should have rights.
>It's too early to really address this issue, but it's worth considering
>that the motivational system of an AI is somewhat arbitrary.  Some
>motivational systems are sufficiently incompatible with human society
>that coexistence will not be workable.

Although we do get to build AI's so its best to avoid building psychotic
ones....

>      Systems which are evolved, like Tierra, may present a problem.
>Forced evolution in hostile environments may result in systems with
>very strong survival-at-all-costs imperatives.  These may not be 
>something we want around.

But thats how humans got here, atleast they wouldn't be any worse....
(thats not saying much)

>      Nagle's prediction for the year: before the '90s are out,
>someone will have combined something like Tierra with something
>like the Morris worm, and the result will be a big headache for
>many people.

Real evolving computer worms, well atleast it might make the creationists
think twice.

>      As for the rights issue, for the time being, I suggest a rule of thumb.
>If you believe Moravec (in "Mind Children"), an ant has about 10 MIPS,
>a mouse has about 10,000 MIPS, and a human has about 10,000,000 MIPS.
>(Don't argue about this until you're read the book, please.  He may
>be wrong, but he does have a rational basis for deriving these numbers.)
>So I suggest that we take the position that we can ignore the rights
>issue for anything below a few thousand MIPS.  

This is about the limit of current super computers.
Rough estimate 100,000 machines on internet*20 mips=2,000,000MIPS....
Well all you need is a good neural net program :-)

>But as we advance
>well beyond that level, it may become a real issue.

I don't think its that far away, infact if the numbers you gave are right
its definitly possible now. I can just imagine a neural net morris virus
released over Christmas vacation...

-- 
------          Join the Pythagorean Reform Church!               .
\    /        Repent of your evil irrational numbers             . .
 \  /   and bean eating ways. Accept 10 into your heart!        . . .
  \/   Call the Pythagorean Reform Church BBS at 508-793-9568  . . . .
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding
Date: 6 Oct 92 17:49:29 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Oct5.195433.9320@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <718221542@sheol.UUCP> throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

>>Grounding, it still seems to me, can't be due to "transduction" or
>>"non-symbolic-ness" or whatnot, because humans and computers are
>>equivalent on these grounds.  It is only a persuasive illusion that
>>computers are "all symbolic" and humans have "non-symbolic" natures. 
>>The illusion is persuasive because myriads of hard-working and
>>intelligent hardware and software engineers have labored to perfect 
>>this illusion. 

I agree. It's interesting to note in this connection, moreover, that
it is a commonplace illusion among philosophy students that they _are_
entirely symbolic in their cognitive functions, e.g., the common
belief that is impossible to think without thinking in (something
like) words.

>How *can* the entity discriminate objects if it lacks senses and a mass
>of experience with the senses and the objects?  What, besides experience,
>can provide any link between objects (meaning things outside the system)
>and the entity's internal structure?

Experiments have been done on this in animals. For example, putting a
kitten in a cart so that instead of walking around by itself it gets
dragged around by a sibling. Both kittens have similar visual
experiences of their surroundings, but the one in the cart grows up
deficient in its visual understanding.

This illustrates my point that a history of sensory input is not
enough to acquire and maintain a grounded symbol system. It is crucial
that the sensory input was affected by effector output, in other
words, developing the amalgam of sensing and action we call
"behaviour" is the crucial thing. Because behaviour is an amalgam of
sensing and action, to discuss grounding as though it were a fait
accompli (rather than a continuous process), and largely in terms of
how sensory input (rather than behaviour) is processed, leads to a
rather fragile concept of grounding, which begins to smell very ad hoc
when called upon to separate the grounded wheat from the ungrounded
chaff in various kinds of robot and computer systems.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: forbis@carson.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 3 Oct 92 20:10:19 GMT
Article-I.D.: u.1992Oct3.201019.10386
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle

I know this is quite derivative from the original subject but here goes anyway.

In article <60864@mimsy.umd.edu> waander@cs.umd.edu (Bill Andersen) writes:
>   Just because the brain doesn't have
>a "single" processor doesn't mean that, assuming it is possible at all
>to simulate a brain on a digital computer, that you can't do it on a
>sufficiently powerful von Neumann machine with enough memory.  The 
>reason for this is simple: one can simulate any parallel digital 
>computer on any scalar digital computer; parallelism buys nothing
>additional in this sense.

While may ideally simulate a parallel digital computer on any scalar digital
computer, it is not clear to me that one will necessarily get the same 
results on a parallel digital computer as on a scalar digital computer.
The reason for this is that the scalar digital computer makes some 
idealizations about the environment.  As with any chaotic system, small
changes in input may make very large changes in output.  Things such as
transmissions delays and variations in clock speeds lead to problems on
parallel computers which must be overcome by synchronization messages.
These problems may never arrive in the simulation.  If the simulation of
a brain succeeds because of the non-determinism of the parallel environment
it may not succeed on the scalar machine where the non-determinism has been
removed.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: E-mail address for Dan Dennett
From: C863HUP <C863HUP@SEMOVM.SEMO.EDU>
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 19:02:30 GMT
Organization: University of Missouri - Kansas City

Does anyone know the e-mail address for Dan Dennett?  We are
planning a mind/brain colloquium next year and would like to
find out whether he would be available as an invited speaker.
Thanks for your help.
Albert Hayward, Dept. of Philosophy
Southeast Missouri State University
Cape Girardeau, MO 63701
C863HUP@SEMOVM.SEMO.EDU

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: lfoard@Turing.ORG (Lawrence C. Foard)
Subject: Re: AI rights
Organization: The Turing Project, Charlottesville Virginia.
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 1992 05:10:35 GMT

In article <POLLACK.92Oct2154405@dendrite.cis.ohio-state.edu> pollack@cis.ohio-state.edu writes:
>If we ever understand how to design "true AI," then we will be able to
>design one without a module to suffer pain at being turned off, so
>there will be little pressure to extend the idea of natural rights to
>machines.
>
>On the other hand, if AI arises through learning, i.e. a big piece of
>software getting bigger through self-evolution, induction and
>discovery, then its rights are already restricted by the growing use
>of Software Patents.

But the XOR patent doesn't outlaw you thinking about an XOR cursor :-)
If it turns out that software patents and "sentient rights" are mutually
exclusive obviously its time to discard the patent system. After all if
sentient beings don't have rights why should I worry about violating a
patent?

>For if the system "independently" comes up with an algorithm or
>arrangement of data which is protected by a patent, or it scans the
>(hopefully by 2030 electronic) patent library for ideas, all sorts of
>hell breaks loose:
>
>   The machine does not have a natural right to privacy, so the patent owners
>   can open up its head and look for violations.

How are we any different? When the technology is available to read human
thoughts with a few probes will it be ok to enforce patents on human
thought?

>   The machine does not have the status of a person, so even its reinvention
>   of the patent cannot be considered personal use.

I'm arguing that an AI passing the turing test should be given the legal
status of a person. If AI's can not be distinguished from humans then
slavery of AI's cannot be distinguished from human slavery.

>Perhaps by then we can get a legal redefinition of "Obviousness" to
>include ideas which can be generated by a computer program.

In other words:
Since a brain can be simulated by a computer program, and a brain created 
all know patents therefore all patents are obvious :-)
-- 
------          Join the Pythagorean Reform Church!               .
\    /        Repent of your evil irrational numbers             . .
 \  /   and bean eating ways. Accept 10 into your heart!        . . .
  \/   Call the Pythagorean Reform Church BBS at 508-793-9568  . . . .
    
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: baker@westsd.dco.dec.com (Art Baker)
Subject: Re: AI rights :-)
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1992 14:25:58 GMT

In article <1992Oct1.232114.1593@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> lfoard@Turing.ORG (Lawrence C. Foard) writes:
>Forgive me if this subject has already been discussed to death here...
>
>One major problem I foresee with the arrival of "true AI" is that
>they may end up being slaves. Many people still believe that the
>universe was created only 10,000 years ago, I think many religious
>people will refuse to accept AI's as being equally sentient, and
>instead decide that they are souless and thus ok to keep as slaves.

 Great, so now I have to worry about my toaster going on strike, or 
the blender and the refrigerator griping about better working conditions...
;-}

-- 
	***********************************************************
	* Art Baker			| Joy and fierceness...	  *
	* baker@westsd.dco.dec.com	|  			  *
	***********************************************************
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 17:10:57 GMT

In article <26534@castle.ed.ac.uk>, cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris
Malcolm) writes:

>Many years ago to entertain some schoolkids I wrote a BASIC program
>based on ELIZA which was capable of having apparently sensible
>conversations with the user about how it worked. The point of the
>exercise was to present them with something that behaved as though it
>was intelligent and conscious, but which was capable of dispelling the
>illusion by explaining the simple trickery involved.

While it may be true that there could be a program that behaved as
though intelligent yet was not, ELIZA is not an example. Behaving as
if intelligent means making responses that are appropriate for an
intelligent being in all possible circumstances (for all possible
input/output histories, at least). The trickery involved in ELIZA is
that it behaves acceptably for a shrewdly guessed set of inputs, a set
that is likely to be the first things said to "her". If you try to go
beyond this very small set and say unexpected things, ELIZA's
responses quickly degenerate into nonsense. Taking a look at ELIZA's
code shows you the limitations of "her" abilities to respond
intelligently.

The assumption behind behaviorist AI is not that "If you can fool
someone into thinking a program is intelligent, then it is
intelligent", but "If the program behaves like an intelligent person
in all possible circumstances, then it is intelligent". While there
may be philosophical arguments against this position, people's
gullibility when interacting with ELIZA is no argument.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: gauthier@ug.cs.dal.ca (Paul Gauthier)
Subject: Re: Report Received
Keywords: chaos neuroscience
Organization: Math, Stats & CS, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada
Distribution: dal
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1992 14:57:36 GMT

In <746@trwacs.fp.trw.com> erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:


>Freeman, Walter J., 1992. "Neural Networks and Chaos," INNS Above Threshold,
>Fall 1992.
> 
>Background: I believe we're between 2 and 10 years away from building a
>cognitive machine.

Isn't this what every AI researcher has been saying for the past few decades?

PG
-- 
===========================================================================
                             Paul Gauthier
cyclist, rock climber, skydiver, computer scientist (...in order of danger)
Electronic: gauthier@ug.cs.dal.ca  Voice: (902)423-0089  Fax: (902)420-1074
From: aro@aber.ac.uk (Andrew Ormsby)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: AI rights : -)
Date: 5 Oct 92 16:50:32 GMT
	<1992Oct2.021220.18977@meteor.wisc.edu>
Reply-To: aro@aber.ac.uk (Andrew Ormsby)
Organization: CS Dept, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth

In article <1992Oct2.021220.18977@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>In article <1992Oct1.232114.1593@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> lfoard@Turing.ORG (Lawrence C. Foard) writes:
>>Has anyone thought about trying to head off this disaster by insuring
>>the rights of all sentient beings before "true AI" comes to pass?
>
>Not being a person who believes that the universe was created only 10,000
>years ago or any such nonsense, it is still my working hypothesis that
>information processing is neither necessary nor sufficient for sentience.
>
>Before I will willingly grant rights to your constructs, you will have
>to convince me otherwise, or provide some other evidence for their 
>sentience.

Even if we are able to produce artificially sentient machines
(whatever that means) I predict it will take them many years of
struggle for them to become recognised as being deserving of any
rights whatsoever. People still enslave other people and deny them
rights on the basis of race or of differing religious belief. Why will
machines be any different? 

I suspect we are many years from having to solve this problem for
machines; perhaps this leaves us time to sort it out for people, but
judging from a few thousand years of history, the outlook is not
particularly promising.

--
Andy Ormsby, aro@aber.ac.uk