From: SKLEPZI@SSB1.SAFF.UTAH.EDU (Steven Klepzig)
Subject: Re: Viruses in Novell installation.
Organization: University of Utah
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 92 15:21:10 GMT

In article <haverkam.99.725624816@uni-duesseldorf.de> haverkam@uni-duesseldorf.de (Wilhelm Haverkamp) writes:
>In 1991 the system administrator of a small company in Duesseldorf area 
>detected the VASCINA virus and the 1701/1704 virus. His Novell version was
>SFT 286, V. 2.15.  The system administrator believes that his network was 
>infected by a demonstration disc given to him by another person. 
>Unfortunately he used for demonstration purposes one of his network PC's.
>The system administrator is arguing that he had needed about 36 hours to 
>run COMPSURF and some more hours to restore the programm files. Now his 
>company wants compensation from the person who gave them the
>demonstration disc.
>The demonstration took place in the late afternoon, the viruses were found 
>the next morning. The owner of the demonstration disc had taken the disc 
>with him after the demonstration was finished.
>By using a pretence the system administrator asked that person 2 days later 
>to send him the demonstration disc again. The viruses were found on the 
>disc, too.

My questions are:
1. Why did the sysadmin COMPSURF the server?
2. Is there definite proof that the virii came from the demonstration disk?
3. What was infected by the virii?  Why were executables left unprotected
   from infection by network users?  Or was the demo run from a supervisor
   login?  If so, why?
4. If the network was previously infected, perhaps the demo disk was infected
   from the server.  Why couldn't the person with the demo disk ask for
   compensation from the company?
5. How were the virii found?  What prompted the search?

>My questions are:
>
>- Who has got experiences with the above mentioned
>  viruses in Novell networks with SFT 286, V. 2.15?

Nope.  I don't have any.  The closest I've come is discovering Michelangelo 
on ONE computer - before the "deadline".

>- What would have been an adequate reaction of the
>  system administrator when he detected  VACSINA and
>  1701/1704 viruses? For my opinion the "number of passes 
>  for the sequential test" (which takes much time)
>  within COMPSURF could have been restricted to 1; do you agree?

I don't see a reason right off for ANY compsurf at all.  The infected files 
could possibly be disinfected by F-PROT or CLEAN or ...; at most they could/
should be deleted and restored from the original diskettes.  If (big IF)
NET$OS.EXE was infected (how did it get infected?) then perhaps just a regen/
reload of NET$OS.EXE.  I think that compsurf is a drastic and quite radical 
fix for the problem.  It should be the extremely last thing done, IMO.

>- The owner of the disc is argueing that his disc was free of
>  viruses when he took it to the demonstration. He says
>  that perhaps by other events the viruses came into the
>  network; later on the owner of the network could have
>  infected the disc by himself.
>  Is there a doubtless method to find out at what time 
>  the disc was infected? My opinion is that the date-informations
>  in the directory of the disc could have been manipulated.   

I doubt that the date/time of infection could be fixed with any certainty.  
I don't remember the particulars on these virii but most non-trivial virii 
do manipulate any/all information possible to hide themselves.  However, I 
suggest that you post your questions to comp.virus and see what is said on 
that group.

HTH...
Steven Klepzig (sklepzi@ssb1.saff.utah.edu)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.novell