From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 3/7
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:24 GMT

------------------------------------------------------
The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
     Z Magazine, September 1992
and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
------------------------------------------------------
 
Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 3 of 7, 20KB)
========================
 
3. JFK and Withdrawal: the Denouement
-------------------------------------
 
By the end of August, JFK and his most dovish advisers (Averell
Harriman, Roger Hilsman, George Ball) agreed that the client
government should be overthrown.  On August 28, the President
"asked the Defense Department to come up with ways of building up
the anti-Diem forces in Saigon," and called on his advisers to
devise actions in Washington or "in the field which would
maximize the chances of the rebel generals." Harriman said that
without a coup, "we cannot win the war" and "must withdraw."
Hilsman "agreed that we cannot win the war unless Diem is
removed," as did Ball, while Robert Kennedy also called for
efforts to strengthen the rebel generals.  Secretary Rusk warned
JFK that "Nhu might call on the North Vietnamese to help him
throw out the Americans."
 
Hilsman urged that if Diem and Nhu make any "Political move
toward the DRV (such as opening of neutralization negotiations),"
or even hint at such moves, we should "Encourage the generals to
move promptly with a coup," and be prepared to "hit the DRV with
all that is necessary" if they try to counter our actions,
introducing US combat forces to ensure victory for the coup group
if necessary. "The important thing is to win the war," Hilsman
advised; and that meant getting rid of the Saigon regime, which
was dragging its feet and looking for ways out.  The President
concurred that "our primary objective remains winning war," Rusk
cabled to the Saigon Embassy.
 
The basic principle, unquestioned, is that we must "focus on
winning the war" (Hilsman).  On September 14, Harriman wrote to
Lodge that: "from the President on down everybody is determined
to support you and the country team in winning the war against
the Viet Cong... there are no quitters here."
 
In particular, JFK is no quitter.  There is not a phrase in the
internal record to suggest that this judgment by a high-level
Kennedy adviser, at the dovish extreme, should be qualified in
any way.
 
On September 17, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador Lodge to
pressure Diem to "get everyone back to work and get them to focus
on winning the war," repeating his regular emphasis on victory.
It was particularly important to show military progress because
"of need to make effective case with Congress for continued
prosecution of the effort," the President added, expressing his
constant concern that domestic support for his commitment to
military victory was weak. "To meet these needs," he informed
Lodge, he was sending his top aides McNamara and Taylor to
Vietnam.  He emphasized to them that the goal remains "winning
the war," adding that "The way to confound the press is to win
the war." Like Congress, the press was an enemy because of its
lack of enthusiasm for a war to victory and its occasional calls
for diplomacy.
 
McNamara and Taylor were encouraged by what they found.  On
October 2, they informed the President that "The military
campaign has made great progress and continues to progress." They
presented a series of recommendations, three of which were later
authorized (watered down a bit) in NSAM 263: (1) "An increase in
the military tempo" throughout the country so that the military
campaign in the Northern and Central areas will be over by the
end of 1964, and in the South (the Delta) by the end of 1965; (2)
Vietnamese should be trained to take over "essential functions
now performed by U.S. military personnel" by the end of 1965, so
that "It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S.
personnel by that time"; (3) "the Defense Department should
announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to
withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963" as "an
initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel
with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort."
 
Their report stressed again that the "overriding objective" is
victory, a matter "vital to United States security," but that
withdrawal could not be too long delayed: "any significant
slowing in the rate of progress would surely have a serious
effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S. effort." They
anticipated victory by the end of 1965.  The withdrawal plans
were crucially qualified in the usual way: "No further reductions
should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become
firm," that is, until battlefield success is assured.
 
Note that lack of popular support for the war was not perceived
by JFK and his advisers as providing an opportunity for
withdrawal, but rather as a threat to victory.
 
The NSC met the same day to consider these proposals.  The
President's role was, as usual, marginal.  He repeated that "the
major problem was with U.S. public opinion" and, as he had before,
balked at the time scale.  He opposed a commitment to withdraw
some forces in 1963 because "if we were not able to take this
action by the end of this year, we would be accused of being over
optimistic." McNamara, in contrast, "saw great value in this
sentence in order to meet the view of Senator Fulbright and
others that we are bogged down forever in Vietnam." The phrase
was left as "a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as
predictions of the President," who thus remained uncommitted to
withdrawal, at his insistence.
 
A public statement was released to the press, and prominently
published, presenting the essence of the McNamara-Taylor
recommendations.  The statement repeated the standard position
that the US will work with the GVN "to deny this country to
Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported
insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible," continuing
with "Major U.S. assistance in support of this military
effort," which is needed only until the insurgency has been
suppressed or until the national security forces of the
Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it."
 
These decisions were encapsulated in NSAM 263 (Oct. 11), a brief
statement in which "The President approved the military
recommendations" 1-3 cited above, weakened by one change: that
"no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to
withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963." The
final provision of NSAM 263 is JFK's personal instruction to
Ambassador Lodge to step up the military effort along with
training and arming of new forces, so as to enhance the prospects
for victory, on which withdrawal was conditioned.
 
Note that read literally, NSAM 263 says very little.  It approves
the McNamara-Taylor recommendations to intensify the war and
military training so that "It should be possible to withdraw the
bulk of U.S. personnel" by the end of 1965, and includes JFK's
personal instructions to Lodge to intensify military action.  It
does not call for implementing a 1,000 man withdrawal, but rather
endorses the third point of the McNamara-Taylor proposal
concerning plans for such withdrawal "as an initial step in a
long-term program" to be conducted "without impairment of the war
effort," deleting their call for formal announcement of these
plans.
 
Presumably, the intent was to implement the withdrawal plans if
military conditions allow, but that intent is unstated.  The fact
might be borne in mind in the light of elaborate later efforts to
read great significance into nuances of phrasing so as to
demonstrate a dramatic change in policy with the Kennedy-Johnson
transition.  Adopting these interpretive techniques, we would
conclude that NSAM 263 is almost vacuous.  I stress that that is
not my interpretation; I assume the obvious unstated intention,
only suggesting that other documents be treated in the same
reasonable manner -- in which case, widely-held beliefs will
quickly evaporate.
 
The picture presented in public at the time requires no
significant modification in the light of the huge mass of
documents now available, though these make much more clear the
President's unwillingness to commit himself to the withdrawal
advocated by his war managers for fear that the victory might not
be achieved in time, his concerns that domestic opinion might not
stay the course, his insistence that withdrawal be conditioned on
military victory, and his orders to step up the military effort
and to replace the Diem regime by one that will "focus on
winning" and not entertain thoughts of US withdrawal and peaceful
settlement.
 
Through October 1963, problems with the GVN continued to mount.
Nhu called openly for the Americans to get out completely, only
providing aid.  Another problem was the lack of "effectiveness of
GVN in its relation to its own people." Asked about this,
Ambassador Lodge responded in an "Eyes only for the President"
communication that "Viet-Nam is not a thoroughly strong police
state...because, unlike Hitler's Germany, it is not efficient"
and is thus unable to suppress the "large and well-organized
underground opponent strongly and ever-freshly motivated by
vigorous hatred." The Vietnamese "appear to be more than ever
anxious to be left alone," and though they "are said to be
capable of great violence on occasion," "there is no sight of it
at the present time," another impediment to US efforts.
 
Small wonder that JFK was unwilling to commit himself to the
McNamara-Taylor withdrawal proposal.  Note that the same defects
of the US clients underlie the critique of the strategic hamlet
program by Kennedy doves.
 
Washington's coup plans continued, with Ambassador Lodge in
operational command.  The only hesitation was fear of failure.
When the coup finally took place on November 1, replacing Diem
and Nhu (who were killed) by a military regime, the President
praised Lodge effusively for his "fine job" and "leadership," an
"achievement...of the greatest importance." With the generals now
in power, "our primary emphasis should be on effectiveness rather
than upon external appearances," the President added.  We must
help the coup regime to confront "the real problems of winning
the contest against the Communists and holding the confidence of
its own people." The "ineffectiveness, loss of popular
confidence, and the prospect of defeat that were decisive in
shaping our relations to the Diem regime" are now a thing of the
past, the President hoped, thanks to Lodge's inspired leadership
and coup-management, with its gratifying outcome (Nov. 6).
 
Two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, there is not a phrase
in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal
without victory.  JFK urges that everyone "focus on winning the
war"; withdrawal is conditioned on victory, and motivated by
domestic discontent with Kennedy's war.  The stakes are
considered enormous.  Nothing substantial changes as the mantle
passes to LBJ.
 
The post-coup situation had positive and negative aspects from
the point of view of the President and his advisers.  On the
positive side, they hoped that the ruling generals would now at
last focus on victory as the President had demanded, gain popular
support, and end the irritating calls for US withdrawal and moves
towards a peaceful settlement.  On the other hand, there was
disarray at all levels, while at home, advocacy of diplomacy was
not stilled.  Furthermore, evidence that undermined the
optimistic assessments was becoming harder to ignore.  The new
government confirmed that the GVN "had been losing the war
against the VC in the Delta for some time because it had been
losing the population." A top-level meeting was planned for
Honolulu on November 20 to consider the next steps.  The US
mission in Vietnam recommended that the withdrawal plans be
maintained, the new government being "warmly disposed toward the
U.S." and offering "opportunities to exploit that we never had
before." Kennedy's plans to escalate the assault against the
southern resistance could now be implemented, with a stable
regime finally in place.  McNamara, ever cautious, was concerned
by a sharp increase in VC incidents and urged that "We must be
prepared to devote enough resources to this job of winning the
war."
 
At the Honolulu meeting, a draft was written by McGeorge Bundy
for what became NSAM 273, adopted after the assassination but
prepared for JFK with the expectation that he would approve it in
essentials, as was the norm.  Top advisers agreed; Hilsman made
only "minor changes." The State Department history states
correctly that the draft "was almost identical to the final
paper," differing only in paragraph 7.
 
Both documents reiterate the basic wording of the early October
documents.  On withdrawal, the version approved by Johnson is
identical with the draft prepared for Kennedy.  It reads: "The
objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of
U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House
statement of October 2, 1963," referring to the statement of US
policy formalized without essential change as NSAM 263.  As for
paragraph 7, the draft and final version are, respectively, as
follows:
 
     "_Draft_: With respect to action against North Vietnam,
     there should be a detailed plan for the development of
     additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially
     for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate
     the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new
     level of effectiveness in this field of action."
 
     "_NSAM 273_: Planning should include different levels of
     possible increased activity, and in each instance there
     should be estimates of such factors as: A. Resulting
     damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility of denial;
     C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other
     international reaction.
 
     Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher
     authority."
 
There is no relevant difference between the two documents, except
that the LBJ version is weaker and more evasive, dropping the
call for "a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of
action"; further actions are reduced to "possible." The reason
why paragraph 7 refers to "additional" or "possible increased"
activity we have already seen: such operations had been underway
since the Kennedy offensive of 1962, apparently with direct
participation of US personnel and foreign mercenaries.
 
No direct US government involvement is proposed in NSAM 273
beyond what was already underway under JFK.  The plans later
developed by the DOD and CIA called for "Intensified sabotage
operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel," with the US
involved only in intelligence collection (U-2, electronics) and
"psychological operations" (leaflet drops, "phantom covert
operations," "black and white radio broadcasts").
 
These two NSAMs (263 in October, 273 on Nov. 26 with a Nov. 20
draft written for Kennedy) are the centerpiece of the thesis that
Kennedy planned to withdraw without victory, a decision at once
reversed by LBJ (and perhaps the cause of the assassination).
They have been the subject of many claims and charges.  Typical
is Oliver Stone's Address to the National Press Club alleging
that a "ten-year study" by John Newman (_JFK and Vietnam_)
"makes it very clear President Kennedy signaled his intention to
withdraw from Vietnam in a variety of ways and put that intention
firmly on the record with National Security Action Memorandum 263
in October of 1963," while LBJ "reverse[d] the NSAM" with NSAM
273; Kennedy was assassinated for that reason, Stone suggests.
Zachary Sklar, the co-author (with Stone) of the screenplay
_JFK_, also citing Newman's book, claims further that the draft
prepared for Kennedy "says that the U.S. will _train South
Vietnamese_ to carry out covert military operations against North
Vietnam" while "In the final document, signed by Johnson, it
states that _U.S. forces_ themselves will carry out these
covert military operations," leading to the Tonkin Gulf incident,
which "was an example of precisely that kind of covert operation
carried out by U.S. forces" (his emphasis).  Arthur Schlesinger
claims that after the assassination, "President Johnson,
listening to President Kennedy's more hawkish advisers..., issued
National Security Action Memorandum 273 calling for the
maintenance of American military programs in Vietnam `at levels
as high' as before -- reversing the Kennedy withdrawal policy."
As further proof he cites a paragraph from NSAM 273: "It
_remains_ the _central objective_ of the United States in
South Vietnam to _win_ their contest against the _externally
directed_ and supported communist conspiracy." He highlights
these words to show that LBJ was undertaking "both the total
commitment Kennedy had always refused and the diagnosis of the
conflict" that Kennedy had "never quite accepted."
 
These alleged facts are held to establish the historic change at
the assassination.
 
The claims, however, have no known basis in fact, indeed are
refuted by the internal record, which gives no hint of any
intention by JFK to withdraw without victory -- quite the
contrary -- and reveals no "reversal" in NSAM 273.  Newman's book
adds nothing relevant.  The call for maintenance of aid is in the
draft of NSAM 273 prepared for Kennedy, and was also at the core
of his tentative withdrawal plans, conditioned on victory and
"Major U.S. assistance" to assure it.  Furthermore, Kennedy's
more dovish advisers approved and continued to urge LBJ to follow
what they understood to be JFK's policy, rejecting any thought of
withdrawal without victory.  The final version of NSAM 273 does
not state that US forces would carry out covert operations in any
new way; nor did they, in the following months.  There were
covert attacks on North Vietnamese installations just prior to
the Tonkin Gulf incident, but they were carried out by South
Vietnamese forces, according to the internal record.
Schlesinger's highlighted words appear regularly in both the
public and private Kennedy record, as does the diagnosis, along
with JFK's insistent demand that everyone must "focus on winning
the war." The hidden meanings are in the eye of the beholder.
 
The two versions of NSAM 273 differ in no relevant way, apart
from the weakening of paragraph 7 in the final version.
Furthermore, the departure from NSAM 263 is slight, and readily
explained in terms of changing assessments.  Efforts to detect
nuances and devious implications have no basis in fact, and if
pursued, could easily be turned into a (meaningless) "proof" that
LBJ toned down Kennedy aggressiveness.
 
The call in NSAM 273 (both the draft and the weakened LBJ
version) for consideration of further ARVN operations against the
North is readily explained in terms of the two basic features of
the post-coup situation: the feeling among Kennedy's war planners
that with the Diem regime gone, the US at last had a stable base
for Kennedy's war in the South, with new "opportunities to
exploit"; and the increasing concern about the military situation
in the South, undermining earlier optimism.  The former factor
made it possible to consider extension of ARVN operations; the
latter made it more important to extend them.  In subsequent
months, Kennedy's planners (now directing Johnson's war)
increasingly inclined towards operations against the North as a
way to overcome their inability to win the war in the South,
leading finally to the escalation of 1965, undertaken largely to
"drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its
cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency,"
using "its directive powers to make the Viet Cong desist"
(Taylor, Nov. 27, 1964).
 



Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive