HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: paxton@cs.montana.edu (John Paxton)
Subject: Limited Lexicon Sought
Organization: CS
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 19:29:50 GMT


I am trying to locate a lexicon that contains the 10,000
or so most common words in the English language, along with
the category of speech to which they belong.  (I do not
need word definitions and/or synonyms.)  So far, none of
the public domain thesauri, etc. that I have looked at contain
this information.  Does anyone know where this information
can be obtained?  Thank you.
From: hcl@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Helen Lowe)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Distance Learning IKBS courses
Date: 7 Oct 92 11:20:52 GMT
Reply-To: hcl@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Helen Lowe)
Organization: Dept of AI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

Does anyone know of any distance learning master's level courses
in IKBS or AI generally?
From: vchk@monet.cc.rochester.edu (Vidya Chakaravrthi)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Natural Language Processing
Summary: Help Requested.
Keywords: NLP
Date: 7 Oct 92 13:21:55 GMT
Organization: University of Rochester - Rochester, New York

Hi, my name is Vidya Chakaravarthi. I am working on a Natural
Language prototype in 'C'. I had posted for some help earlier
and I did get some very useful replies. Thanks a lot. I am
wondering if any of you know some ftp sites, where I can get
some useful stuffs on NLP. I have been hunting for some papers
and hints on this topic.

Any hints or suggestions would be greatly appreciated.
My e-mail address is vchk@gauguin.cc.rochester.edu

Thank you.
From: milan@bcsaic.boeing.com (Milan Richter)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Natural Language to SQL systems
Keywords: SQL, QMF
Date: 6 Oct 92 16:36:29 GMT
Organization: Boeing Computer Services

In article <1992Oct4.234858.16404@samba.oit.unc.edu> Herman.Woltring@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Herman Woltring) writes:
>In article <524@ssdc.UUCP> cmac@ssdc.UUCP (Chris McNeilly) writes:
>>I'm in search of commercial systems that are natural language front
>>ends for relational databases.  The user enters english queries and
>>the system kicks out sql.  Does anybody have any experience with any
>>of these systems and can recommend one?  Currently I'm using a system
>>from Natural Language and it seems to have problems dealing with some
>>of the things we need to do.
>>
>>Thanks,
>>
>>Chris
>>
>>----------------------------------
>>
>>Chris McNeilly                        
>>Sterling Software
>>Work         703-356-3551
>>FAX          703-821-1485
>>email        cmac%ssdc@uunet.uu.net        
>>	     uunet!ssdc!cmac
>>
>
>You could try the SQL/QMF facilities of Philips Communications & Processing
>Services, Building VA-181, Philips, P.O.B. 218, NL - 5600 MD  EINDHOVEN, The
>Netherlands, Tel. +31.40.785 767 / 782 400 (Mr T. Bulle) for details and
>further contact information.  QMF is a report generator used in connection
>with QSL.
> 
>Herman J. Woltring <woltring@nici.kun.nl>

Another product is called (not sure exactly) "Language Access", developed
by IBM in Sweden. Contact the nearest IBM office. I believe it was developed
in Prolog.

==========================================================
== Milan Richter                                        ==
== Boeing Computer Services     milan@atc.boeing.com    ==
== M/S 6C-04                    tel.: 206-865-3277      ==
== P.O. Box 24346               fax.: 206-865-2965      ==
== Seattle, WA 98124-0346                               ==
==========================================================
Newsgroups: comp.ai
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 05:14:12 GMT

In article <burt.718665726@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>
>  I find it interesting tht people who support what is called "strong AI"
>are now trying to get out of the Godel argument against this by saying
>that Godel's theorems only apply to consistent systems and it is clear
>that any machine which matches human capacities would have to be running
>on some sort of inconsistent system.

Relatively few people use this "inconsistent" argument.  Those who do
so probably don't think it a very serious point.  The idea that Goedel's
results have anything at all to say about AI is utterly preposterous.

Xref: sparky comp.ai:3886 comp.ai.neural-nets:3896 comp.ai.philosophy:6400 sci.psychology:4107
From: kanazawa@cs.ubc.ca (Keiji Kanazawa)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 12 Oct 92 09:23:10 GMT
Organization: UBC Department of Computer Science
	<1992Oct11.200006.685@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU>
	<26777@castle.ed.ac.uk>
NNTP-Posting-Host: boreal.cs.ubc.ca


Could people please drop comp.ai from this thread?

There was a reason that comp.ai.philosophy was created, and posting to
both groups is just counterproductive.

--

Keiji Kanazawa
kanazawa@cs.ubc.ca
From: levinson@cse.ucsc.edu (Bob Levinson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Ai and Creativity Symposium - Final Call for Papers
Date: 13 Oct 1992 01:39:40 GMT
Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz (CE/CIS Boards)
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: pal.ucsc.edu



                         FINAL CALL FOR PARTICIPATION

                    ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CREATIVITY

		                  AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM

			     STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 23-25 MARCH 1993


We are sending out this Call in case you missed the Call in AI 
Magazine.  Abstracts of 1000-2000 words should be sent to Fay Sudweeks 
(fay@archsci.arch.su.edu.au) by 23 October 1992.

Description of Symposium

The symposium will provide a forum for exploring current research in, or
relevant to, artificial intelligence and cognitive science which
pertains to creativity.  It will draw together researchers from diverse
disciplines as well as practitioners and managers engaged in projects that
require creativity.

Relevant disciplines include AI, cognitive science, computer science,
psychology, philosophy, logic, design, engineering, and others.

Topics include, but are not limited to

-	philosophical issues in the computational study of creativity
-	psychological theories and models of creativity
-	conceptual and formal models of creativity
-	representational change and redescription 
-	analogy and abduction
-	theory generation and discovery
- 	hybrid architectures (e.g., classical and connectionist hybrids;
	hybrids	using genetic algorithms to evolve neural nets;
	interplay of deterministic and probabilistic strategies)
-	use of AI and other computational techniques to enhance creativity
-	application areas (e.g. science, engineering, architecture and design,
	business, government)

The symposium will maintain a balance between theoretical issues and
descriptions of implemented systems to promote synergism between
theory and practice.


Co-chairs

Terry Dartnall
Computing and Information Technology
Griffith University
Nathan, Brisbane, Queensland 4111
Australia

Steven Kim
Design Research Institute
Cornell University Theory Center
Ithaca, NY 14853


Organizing Committee

Robert Levinson
Computer and Information Sciences
University of California at Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz CA 95064

Fay Sudweeks
Dept of Architectural and design Science
University of Sydney
NSW 2006
Australia

Devika Subramanian
Computer Science Department
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853


For further information, please contact:
Fay Sudweeks
fay@archsci.arch.su.edu.au


Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.psychology
From: axs@cs.bham.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,sci.cognative,alt.consciousness,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 11 Oct 92 12:44:45 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

bruce@uxb.liv.ac.uk (Bruce Stephens) writes:

> Date: 5 Oct 92 17:04:21 GMT
> Organization: Centre for Mathematical Software Research, Univ. Liverpool, UK
> ......

> There's a nice collection by Margaret Bowden (sp?) the name of which
> escapes me.  Something like "Philosophy of AI".
> --
> Bruce Stephens.  Centre for Mathematical Software Research, Liverpool Univ.
> Internet: bruce@uxb.liv.ac.uk     JANET: bruce@uk.ac.liv.uxb

It's Boden, not Bowden

The book is
M.A. Boden (ed)
    The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
    "Oxford Readings in Philosophy" Series
    Oxford University Press,1990.

Aaron
-- 
Aaron Sloman, School of Computer Science,
The University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, England
EMAIL   A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk  OR A.Sloman@bham.ac.uk
Phone: +44-(0)21-414-3711       Fax:   +44-(0)21-414-4281
Xref: sparky comp.ai:3919 comp.ai.neural-nets:3941 aus.ai:159 aus.computers:364 comp.theory:2195 comp.speech:125
From: xin@csadfa.cs.adfa.oz.au (Xin Yao)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,aus.ai,aus.computers,comp.theory,comp.speech
Subject: CFP of ICYCS'93
Keywords: computer, conference
Date: 16 Oct 92 05:16:31 GMT
Organization: Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia


			CALL FOR PAPERS

The 3rd International Conference for Young Computer Scientists (ICYCS'93)
		Beijing China, July 15-17,1993

Sponsored by

CFF 	(Chinese Computer Federation)
CICCST 	(China internatonal Conference Center for Science and Technology)

Co-Sponsored by 

ACM, HKCS (HONG KONG), IEEE, IEICE (Japan), IPS (Japan), NZCS (NEW ZEALAND),
and SCS (Singapore)

This conference is mainly devoted to the computer professionals under 40 
and provides them an opportunity to present their ressarch achievements and
communicate with other researchers. This is the third bi-annual conference for
young computer scientists, after two successful conferences in 1989 and 1991.
The ICYCS'91, held at the Fragant-Hill  hotel in Beijing from 18-20 July 1991,
was attended by 200 delegates form 12 countries. The proceedings of the 
conference, published by International Academic Publishers, is about 800 pages.

The focus of the ICYCS'93 is "Towards Future of Computer Science and 
Applications". Topics of interests include the following areas:

Architectures
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Neural Networks
CAD & CAE & CAI & CAM & computer Graphics
Computer vision & Robotics 
Database
Foundation of Computer Science
Networks & Distributed Processing
Pattern Recognition & Image Processing
Software Engineering & Tools, Applications 

The authors are requested to submit 4 copies of a full paper, not published 
elsewhere, up to six pages in length, in English, with related key words to one
of the program Co-Chairmans indicated below. The deadline of submission is 
15 November 1992.

Prof. Wen Gao                             Prof. Jianping Wu
Dept of Computer Science                  Dept of Computer Science
Harbin Institute of Technology            Tsinghua university
Harbin 150006,china                       Beijing 100084
P. R. China				  P. R. China
Fax: +86 451 32-1048                      Fax: +86 1 256-2768

Prof. Charles X. Ling
Department of Computer Science
University of Western ontario
London,Ontario
Canada N6A 5B7

All submitted papers will be subject to peer review by three referees and all 
accepted papers will appear in proceedings distributed in US, Europe and other 
areas.

IMPORTANT DATES
Submission deadline: Nov. 15, 1992
Notification of acceptanceor rejection: Jan. 20, 1993
Camera-ready version on special sheets: March 15, 1993

For conference information please contact to :
Dr. Yamin Li
Dept of Computer Science
Tsinghua University
Beijing 10084
P.R. China
Fax: +86 1 256-2768

For post conference tours information, please contact:
Ms. Jin Fang
CICCST/CAST
32 Baishiqiao Lu
Beijin 100086
P.R.China
Fax: +86 1 831-6091
Telex: 222337 iccst cn
From: sn13+@andrew.cmu.edu (S. Narasimhan)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Subgroup for announcements??
Date: 8 Oct 92 11:56:55 GMT
Article-I.D.: andrew.Iep9_7_00WB8Ef=mwp
Organization: Doctoral student, Civil Engineering, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA

Considering the number of conference, sysmposium and other announcements
on this bboard creating a sub-group netnews.comp.ai.announcements might
be appropriate. I'd like to know what other netters feel (Please post on
the bboard).

--Narasimhan
From: cmp0118@sys.uea.ac.uk (S. Green)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: HELP ON XiPlus
Date: 13 Oct 92 11:33:34 GMT
Organization: UEA School of Information Systems, Norwich, UK.

Can anybody give me any references in books/journals to the expert systems shell
XiPlus?
   Thanks....
   Steven Green
   cmp0118@uk.ac.uea
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.psychology
From: sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com (Mark S. Riggle)
Subject: Re: Ginsberg & Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Originator: sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 13:35:17 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc. Cary NC
Keywords: penrose, church-turing hypothesis


In article <1992Oct11.200006.685@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU>, ginsberg@t.Stanford.EDU (Matthew L. Ginsberg) writes:
|> 
|> I don't want to get involved in this, really I don't.  Let me only
|> state what I think the argument is about:
|> 
|> By "strong AI" is meant, I believe, the view that an algorithm can
|> respond to stimulus in a way exhibiting intelligence.  Strong AI is
|> important because -- among other things -- it provides the fundamental
|> justification for the continued support of our field.
|> 
|> Penrose says that the strong AI thesis is wrong.  His argument, very
|> briefly, is that Godel's theorem is the linchpin in a proof that the
|> behavior of mathematicians cannot be duplicated by algorithmic
|> methods.  
<stuff deleted>

|> 
|> 						Matt Ginsberg
|> 
|> 

I believe that Godel's theorem is NOT the linchpin in Penrose's
argument.  It is important, but he merely uses Godel's theorem
to show the limitations of the computablity of currently
realizable computers. His linchpin conjecture is that
consciousness is based on the collapse of the quantum
probability distribution.  You know, Schrodinger's cat and all
that. In schrodinger's cat thought experiment, consciousness as
part of the measurement process causes the collapse.  Penrose
turns this around and conjectures that the collapse is
responsible for providing the 'ultra-computation' required for
consciousness and the collapse is caused by quantum gravity
effects.  He then needs to claim that the effects of this
collapse are not computable in a fundamental way.  In his view,
it is not a problem of precsion in computing the physical
states.  It is fundamentally not computable, and he does offer
some weak evidence of that.  He also allows that it could be
done outside an organic brain by a quantum computer and he
indicated that someone (I forgot who) was actually making
progress with that approach.  So in a sense, Penrose has made a
strong AI claim of his own, just deeper and more obscure and
needing a special physical process.

This argument of his really takes about 5 pages in the book,
the rest is all basic education needed to understand the
argument.

-- 
=========================================================
Mark Riggle                         | "Give me a  LAMBDA large  enough
sasmsr@unx.sas.com                  |  and a place to put it, and 
SAS Institute Inc.,                 |  I can move the world"
SAS Campus Drive, Cary, NC, 27513   |   Arthimedeth 
(919) 677-8000                      |   (Archimedes on a lisp machine)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets
From: ianr@syma.sussex.ac.uk (Ian Rogers)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: University of Sussex at Brighton
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 17:32:42 GMT

[I've trimmed down the Newsgroups: list as this response is not
appropriate for comp.ai.philosophy or sci.psychology - Ian]

ginsberg@t.Stanford.EDU (Matthew L. Ginsberg) writes:
> In article <MOFFAT.92Oct7105034@uvapsy.psy.uva.nl>
> moffat@uvapsy.psy.uva.nl (Dave Moffat) writes about rebuttals to
> Penrose's book.
>
> >Now finally here's what I originally meant to say.
> >There's an extensive paper by Aaron Sloman in the latest AI journal
> >doing exactly this -- refuting Penrose, point by point.
>
> This paper is -- my opinion only, of course -- one of the worst
> responses to Penrose that has been published.  It is rife with
> technical inaccuracies (such as Sloman's belief that multiple
> processors somehow avoid the Church-Turing hypothesis), and

Any machine which has more processors than processes (ie. nodes
in a search space) will linearise (or better) *any* algorithm.

The brain is a pattern-matching machine based around squintillions
of processors. Simple processing, like the recognitions that get
performed in the visual cortex, are performed in constant time even
though it takes the computer in the lab O(n**"something bigger than
one") time to complete.

Human computations that require the use of memory (in this case
analogous to a process stack or job queue) take a lot longer. But
computations, of this sort, that can be "compiled" into pattern                    
recognition become linearised again (cf. the difference between novice
chess players and experts).

Ian.
Xref: sparky comp.ai:3854 comp.ai.neural-nets:3865 comp.ai.philosophy:6363 sci.psychology:4078
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.ai.neural-nets,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 10 Oct 92 17:38:50 GMT
Followup-To: comp.ai

>>Dave Moffat writes [amongst other things]:
>>    ...
>>   Searle and Penroe were both surprised by the strength of
>>   the reaction from the AI community that engulfed them.

>>Really? I am not trying to be facetious, but my impression is that both
>>of them are being ignored for the most part. I suppose Searle's Chinese
>>room is probably still good for undergraduate papers and a few articles
>>in the popular press, but he doesn't seem to have the sort of impact [say]
>>Fodor has, and I thought Penrose has been getting the same reaction great
>>actors and actresses get when they decide to sing; A few admirers listen,
>>applaud and exclaim how great a performance it was, while everyone else
>>groans. :-]

>>oz

  Really?  I was just resently sent a list of 38 references to papers
about the Chinese Room, all in major technical journals, with an appended
comment that this was only a partial listing of all the papers which have
been written on this.  The fact that every AI proponent who srites about
machine intelligence seems to feel it necessary to try and refute the
Searle argument to me indicates that this is still a }iok                       
e     point of some interest.  
  As for Penrose, I think that most AI people just don't know how to
reply to him.  Other than attempting to down play his book, of course.
bvl
Xref: sparky comp.ai:3870 comp.ai.neural-nets:3881 comp.ai.philosophy:6379 sci.psychology:4089
From: rgopu@cs.tamu.edu (Rangarathnam Gopu)
Subject: Help - BB Clips
Organization: Computer Science Department, Texas A&M University
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 18:35:40 GMT

Hi,

I am posting this for a friend. She has an email account but can't access
this newsgroup. If you have done one or more of the following, I would 
really appreciate it if you can send me any info to either of the following
two addresses:

	rgopu@cs.tamu.edu

	or

	n343cj@tamvm1 (BITNET)


(1) has any one developed any application in bb_clips (this is
the blackboard extension to clips developed by NRC-canada)

(2) has any one developed any scheduling application in clips?

(3) has anyone incorporated aspects of truth maintenance in their
clips/bb_clips application?

Thanks.
--
------
Gopu
rgopu@cs.tamu.edu			ParukkuLE nalla naadu
Texas A&M University			EngaL Baaratha naadu
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 7 Oct 92 16:16:40 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Oct6.171057.26199@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>In article <26534@castle.ed.ac.uk>, cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris
>Malcolm) writes:

>>Many years ago to entertain some schoolkids I wrote a BASIC program...

>The assumption behind behaviorist AI is not that "If you can fool
>someone into thinking a program is intelligent, then it is
>intelligent", but "If the program behaves like an intelligent person
>in all possible circumstances, then it is intelligent". While there
>may be philosophical arguments against this position, people's
>gullibility when interacting with ELIZA is no argument.

Your comments are perfectly correct but irrelevant.

The people in question were were _schoolkids_. The point of the
exercise was to demonstrate to them their own gullibility. And the
point of my posting was to query someone whose rather original
definition of "conscious" seemed to include such a simple device as
this trivial program.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Grounding
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 20:47:44 GMT

In article <1992Oct12.203359.8713@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>
>Grounding isn't something like a credit rating or a membership in the ACLU, 
>which you have to actively maintain.  Once you've got it you keep it.  
>
I beg to disagree. Grounding arises from experiences with an object (or a 
notion) in various contexts. These experiences are recorded in memory. If 
memory fades (by lack of exposure to the object or notion and its context), 
so will grounding fade too. To think otherwise would mean claiming that there 
are things which we remember forever without any loss.
>
Andrzej Pindor


-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Word Mechanics (was: parts of "Brain and Mind")
Date: 12 Oct 92 21:14:55 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>The infant may not have much of an "object
>concept" yet, and might first form a functional-representation for
>"whatever-helps-stop-being-wet-or-hungry-or-cold,etc."  And it is
>conceivable that there could be a hardware "OR" for several such
>discomfort-detectors, and that they have better-than-chance
>connections to some vocal actions.  Virtually all other mammals do!

I suppose one could call it an OR at some level, but I don't
usually think of it that way.  I model the understanding going
on in the infant's mind as not yet having the necessary
appreciation of forms of discomfort to be able to distinguish
between them.  It's like having a thesaurus with not very many
entries, so concepts are only expressable at a course-grained
level.  One could say I "OR" many different colors into "red",
but what's really going on is that I don't have a decision
process or criterion to distinguish among them -- my process
has no "OR" involved, but I only pay attention to the high bits.

Dave
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.