HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: locatech@tron.gun.de (Joerg Loehn)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: re: non-US S/W
Organization: TRON Public Mailbox, Neurath, Germany
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 07:32:00 +0100

GIDEONY%MICROSOFT.COM@USENET.ZER schreibt in einer Message vom 09.10.92 18:44 Uhr:

> What good encryption software is commercially available outside
> the U.S. & Canada? I am particularly interested in strong
> bulk-encryption.
> 
> Thanks

I don't know if there's any commercial encryption-software.  I've 
only  heard of PGP.  I've used PGP 1.0 for long time and I  think 
there's no better encryption-software.

What  in  the  world  means  "strong  bulk-encryption"?  I  don't 
understand (maybe because I'm german?).

Is there any commercial encryption-software from Microsoft?


All the best to Seattle...
                              Joerg


## net_sh v1.4 (sb)
ERROR 0815: Programmer not found !   Press <ESC>
From: tk@ai.mit.edu (Tom Knight)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
Date: 12 Oct 92 17:10:52 GMT
Organization: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
In-reply-to: pearson@angmar.llnl.gov's message of 10 Oct 92 05:25:28 GMT

You would think that a single photon could be amplified, for example
in a laser-like structure to produce additional copies.  Measuring one
of the copies in one polarization, and another in the orthogonal
polarization, would give the complete answer to the question of the
state of the original particle, destroying the cryptanalytic basis of
quantum cryptography.  Unfortunately (or fortunately if you are a
cryptographer), there is intrinsic noise associated with the
amplification process, in just the amount required to prevent this
process from succeeding.  If you want to look at the details of the
quantum mechanics, look at e.g. "Quantum noise in linear amplifiers"
H.A. Haus and J.A. Muller, Phys. Rev. Vol 128 pp 2407-2413 (1962).  It
is perhaps most easily accesible in the excellent collection "Quantum
Theory and Measurement" edited by Wheeler and Zurek, Princeton U.
Press, 1983.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cs108069@pandora.sdsu.edu (John DeRose)
Subject: Re: query: how to synch crypto streams
Organization: San Diego State University, College of Sciences
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 21:44:13 GMT

There's an interesting article in the October, 1992 Scientific American
regarding Quantum Cryptography.  Anyone interested should check it out.

:-)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: elahde@tnclus.tele.nokia.fi
Subject: Re: .. and these days ??
Organization: Nokia Telecommunications.
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 11:41:20 GMT

In article <54546@dime.cs.umass.edu>, shri@freal.cs.umass.edu (H.Shrikumar) writes:
>   with so much hue and cry being raised today over privacy issues
> in public telecom, and tapping of cellular phones .. I wonder
> if some group is looking into adaptation of any digital encryption
> schemes, esp. two key schemes for cellular phone use, esp the
> newer digital cellular phone standards. 

The GSM system that is already in small commercial use in Europe uses
digital encryption. GSM is a digital cellular system that will cover
the whole Europe in a few years. GSM systems from Nokia Telecommunications
are in commercial use at least in England and Finland.

Eero
From: locatech@tron.gun.de (Joerg Loehn)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: I need help... (PGP 2.0)
Date: 10 Oct 92 14:19:00 GMT
Organization: TRON Public Mailbox, Neurath, Germany

Hi...

Is there anybody who uses PGP 2.0 on an Atari ST?
I've got the sources of PGP 2.0 and I've got a Turbo C-Compiler, 
too, but I'm not familiar with the C-Language and so I'm not able
to compile it. Could anyone here tell me what to do?

so long...
              Joerg

## net_sh v1.4 (sb)
ERROR 0815: Programmer not found !   Press <ESC>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mch@sqwest.wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Subject: Re: DES Encryption/ Encrypting more than once.
Organization: SoftQuad Inc., Surrey, B.C. CANADA
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 18:45:55 GMT

In article <ARI.HUTTUNEN.92Oct13203817@cardhu.cs.hut.fi> Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Huttunen) writes:
>In article <wa6JsB7w165w@works.uucp> ferret@works.uucp (Dave Ferret) writes:
>
>! Just a sidenote to 'Hackers' words...
>
>!   There are also encryption algorithms that when used to encrypt the 
>! plaintext over and over and over, will yield the un-encrypted text. (Ie: 
>! Its a circular encryption -- Sorry, I don't know the correct term here)
>
>Any encryption scheme that has a fixed block length *must* do this. Think
>of a series of encryptions:
>	x_1 -> x_2 -> x_3 -> ... -> x_k -> ... -> x_n -> ...
>If 'n' is greater than the possible number of messages that can be encoded
>in the fixed length block, there must be some blocks in the chain that
>are the same (pigeonhole principle). Let x_k and x_n be the same blocks.
>Then by encrypting x_k (n-k)-times yields x_k.
>
>(n-k) might be quite large, though. ;-)

However there is nothing in your argument to say that (k,n) are not
dependent on the original block being encrypted.

for "circular", we want something more like:

there exists n such that

 n
E (x) = x   for all blocks x  

where E is the encryption function in question.

Mark
-- 
Mark Henderson, SoftQuad Inc, 108-10070 King George Hwy, Surrey, B.C. V3T 2W4
Internet:   markh@wimsey.bc.ca, mch@sq.com
UUCP: {van-bc,sq}!sqwest!mch Telephone: +1 604 585 8394  Fax: +1 604 585 1926
RIPEM public key available by Email/finger markh@wimsey.bc.ca/keyserver
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: DES generates A_(2^64)?
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<unruh.719169829@unixg.ubc.ca> <1992Oct15.211300.27098@bnr.ca>
Date: 15 Oct 92 17:45:30

    Michael Wiener and I submitted a paper to Crypto '92 entitled "DES is not
    a Group". The principal argument is as follows.

    Consider the closure of DES encryptions under composition.  Our claim is
    that this group must include permutations which are not equivalent to DES
    encryption with any key.  Each of the n_i collected above must divide
    the order of the group.  Compute n = lcm( n_i, i=1..k ).  If n > 2^56 then
    the group must be larger than the set of DES encryptions.

    The paper includes the lengths of several hundred cycles of DES.
    The lcm of those lengths exceeds 10^2499.  It is clearly not practical
    to use E^n(x) to recover x for such large n.

I heard that someone in Eastern Germany recently proved a stronger
result, that DES generates the alternating group on 2^64 letters.
This had been conjectured a while ago, though I don't know what the
evidence for it was.  Anyone know more about this?
From: leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
Date: 13 Oct 92 18:26:39 GMT
Organization: Rutgers University Department of Computer Science

In article <1992Oct13.061724.25758@netcom.com>, rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
writes:
> leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:
| : 
| : The attack against the *cryptosystem*, as opposed to the attack against QM,
| : goes like this:  The eavesdropper clones the photons and SAVES them - he
| 
| How does he do this?  I know of no way to "save" a photon.  Somehow mirrors
| would be involved and I think interaction with a mirror would alter the
| polarization state.
| 
Why?  How do you think Alice sends the photons to Bob in the first place?
Do you think they can only be propagated in a vacuum, with no mirrors,
lenses, or other objects in the way?  If so, this is hardly a very useful
system.

You should be able to transmit these photons through a fiber (which
contains them by total internal reflection) without losing the important
information.  The fiber can be wrapped into a ring; you need an optical
switch to get it into the ring at the start, and out at the end, but
such things exist.

Admitedly, keeping a photon going around a ring of fiber for, say, an
hour is pretty unlikely.  But remember that you can keep amplifying the
signal while retaining its information by using a laser - that was the whole
basis by which we cloned the original photon!  In effect, you are coupling
the original information to a laser pulse that you can keep feeding energy
into to make up for the energy it loses.  I see no fundamental reason why
you can't keep the information stable as long as you like this way.

							-- Jerry
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: moore@cs.utah.edu (Tim Moore)
Subject: Unerasable digitital signatures?
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept
Date: 13 Oct 92 14:20:21

There seems to be a lot of info available on digital signatures using
public key cryptography. Typically, these encode a hash of a message,
and maybe a timestamp, using the author's private key. The combination
of the document and signature guarentee authenticity.

However, this scheme has some problems. If an author wishes to remain
anonymous but wants to certify the integrity of a document as it
leaves his machine, he can't sign using his private key. Also, if an
author is not widely known, someone could delete the author's
signature from the plaintext, possibly make changes, and then sign the
document as his own. While a digital timestamp would resolve any
confrontation between the original author and the plagiarist, the
altered document could be widely distributed before the forgery was
discovered.

So, are there any techniques for creating unerasable digital
signatures that are inseparable from their documents? Methods for
implementing electronic money might be applicable.

--
Tim Moore                    moore@cs.utah.edu {bellcore,hplabs}!utah-cs!moore
"Wind in my hair - Shifting and drifting - Mechanical music - Adrenaline surge"
	- Rush
From: halpin@vax.oxford.ac.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: FAQ, anyone?
Date: 7 Oct 92 12:44:10 GMT
Organization: Oxford University VAX 6620

Can anyone point me, a complete amateur as far as cryptography is
concerned, to a FAQ or other electronically available
primer/glossary on the subject?

Also, where are the PGP 2.0 files available for ftp?

Thanks

Brendan

Brendan Halpin                    Email: HALPIN@VAX.OXFORD.AC.UK
Nuffield College                  Phone: +44 865 278642
Oxford OX1 1NF
United Kingdom
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jthomas@access.digex.com (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 04:34:24 GMT

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
Summary: 
Expires: 
Followup-To: 
Distribution: 
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
Keywords: 

In article <141@lorien.OCF.LLNL.GOV> pearson6@llnl.gov writes:
>Recent exciting and ingenious articles on "quantum cryptography" [1,2]
>seem to bring this interesting field close to practical fruition.
>One thing bothers me, though, and I wonder if it bothers anybody else.
>Explanations of the technique's strength rely heavily on the
>fact that measurements made on a single photon cannot possibly give
>a complete knowledge of its original state of polarization.
>While this basic fact is true, the articles seem not to consider the
>possibility of "amplifying" the photon into a large number of identically
>polarized photons, and then making many independent measurements on those
>duplicate photons, from which the original state of polarization can
>indeed be deduced with the necessary precision.

You quite correcly state that photons can be "amplified" or "cloned" 
in the process of stimulated emission.  Stimulated photons posess
all the properties of the original photon, including phase and
polarization information.  One would think, classically, that one
could perform different measurements on each of the cloned photons,
put all thte results together, and say with precision all the 
properties of the original photon.

Quantum mechanics doesn't let you do this, however.  In stimulated
emission, the incident and stimulated photons have the same wave 
function, so a measurement on one photon can destroy information 
and randomize behavior of all the "clones" as well, no matter where 
they are.

The fact that this happens simultaneously over distances appears to
contradict either relativity or causality or both, and was noted by
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen as a \"paradoxical" prediction and
thus a flaw in quantum theory.  Experiments have proved the effect real,
however, and it has become known as the EPR effect.

(To further digress, the philosophical implications of this "spooky
action at a distance continue to be debated.  See Richard A. Healey`s
article in the June `92 Philosophy of Science.)

In article <67497@cup.portal.com> Hal_-_Finney@cup.portal.com writes:
>You can't clone photons.  If you could, faster-than-light communication
>would be possible through the Bell's theorem experiment.

Strangely, this doesn't seem to be true.  I never quite understood the 
proof, but apparently, no "information" is passed between the
photons, even though their future behavior is altered by tests on
other photons.  The effect cannot be exploited for faster-than-light
communication.  I'm sure someone on sci.physics could give a decent
explanation, but I don't have any citations handy.

Joe Thomas
jthomas@access.digex.com
From: bx017@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Michel Aubin)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Pgp... version 2.0
Date: 11 Oct 1992 22:19:52 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (USA)
NNTP-Posting-Host: hela.ins.cwru.edu


Hello
Ime ask a Question.... The PGP20 Program  it's really Securly.. (yes or no)?
please answer me...
 
				Michel Aubin

My decrypt key  is always available on demand...
-- 
Address Internet-=>Bx017@po.cwru.edu
Address Internet-=>Maubin@heartland.bradley.edu
Address Fidonet.-=>1:240:507  (My Name is Michel Aubin)  (On Bab-O-Manie)
From: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Random vs. exhaustive search
Date: 13 Oct 92 13:59:54
Organization: /accounts/hughes/.organization
NNTP-Posting-Host: soda.berkeley.edu
In-reply-to: jgarland@kean.ucs.mun.ca's message of Tue, 13 Oct 1992 14:20:32 GMT

In article <1992Oct13.115032.1@kean.ucs.mun.ca>
jgarland@kean.ucs.mun.ca writes:

>Also to search an entire keyspace when sampling _with_
>replacement--which is the case in at least the one implementation of
>genetic algorithms that I've seen--would be inordinately
>time-consuming.

Incorrect.  The expected time of a random search is N.  The expected
time of an exhaustive search is N/2.  There is no upper bound on the
time of a random search.  The upper bound on exhaustive search is N.

Hence it really only takes twice as long.  See the article on the
Chinese Lottery I mentioned earlier.  It is exactly this argument.

Eric
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: craig@jido.b11.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Subject: Re: DES Encryption/ Encrypting more than once.
Reply-To: craig@jido.b11.ingr.com
Organization: Intergraph Corporation, Huntsville, Alabama
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 17:45:05 GMT

In article <wa6JsB7w165w@works.uucp> ferret@works.uucp (Dave Ferret) writes:
   Just a sidenote to 'Hackers' words...

     There are also encryption algorithms that when used to encrypt the 
   plaintext over and over and over, will yield the un-encrypted text. (Ie: 
   Its a circular encryption -- Sorry, I don't know the correct term here)

Cyclic, as in subgroup. The question is often phrased, "Is DES a
group?" (under composition of encryption). Last I read (Crypto '90?),
it was strongly suspected but not conclusively proven to contain no
cycles* (recall that a finite group must contain at least one cycle).
A common suggestion for using DES as a superencipherment for itself is
E_k1(D_k2(E_k1(P))), where E_k1 = encrypt with key k1, etc.  If
encrypting twice with the same key were a lot stronger than encrypting
once, then no doubt the algorithm would just do that (bearing
performance limits in mind, of course). If you get FIPS pub 46 (and
81) or an intrology to cryptoduction and read through the algorithm,
you will see that it already contains 16 rounds with key
transformations and that things get pretty messy in there :-)

   Also, the reasons for tinkerig with DES could possibly be for one reason, 
   it was claimed 'unreversable' (Right?) and also that its the basis for 
   Unix' CRYPT(). 

Eh? It is used in Unix password encryption to _create_ a one way
function -- a random 12-bit salt value is added in to the password,
then that is used as a key to encrypt a 64-bit constant 25 times. The
multiple encryption is not there to strengthen the algorithm as much
as to slow it down, to make dictionary attacks less feasible.

The account on pp. 30-31 of Garfinkel and Spafford, _Practical Unix 
Security_ (O'Reilly & Assoc., 1991) is brief and complete.

I'm sure this will be in the promised FAQ, either in all its 
gory detail or by reference to G&S or equivalent.

-- Craig Presson
* - here's a reference I haven't read yet, that should be definitive:
@inproceedings{campbell,
  author = "Campbell, K.W. and Wiener, M.J.", 
  year = 1993,
  title = "Proof that {DES} is not a group",
  booktitle = "Advances in Cryptology --- Crypto '92",
  publisher = "Springer-Verlag",
  address = "New York",
  note = "To appear"}
Note to me: call & see if this is out yet.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3833 alt.security:4589
From: annan@vax.oxford.ac.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Re: Letter Frequency
Date: 16 Oct 92 15:08:06 GMT
Organization: Oxford University VAX 6620

In article <1992Oct15.160846.146853@watson.ibm.com>, uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal) writes:
> Hi,
> 	Letter frequencies for 50,000 letters:
> 
> 	A - 3,683
> 	B -   487
> 	C - 1,534
> 	D - 2,122
> 	E - 6,498
> 	F - 1,416
> 	G -   819
> 	H - 1,694
> 	J -    82

..etc

> 
> This is old (WWII) and computed for telegrams. "Literary" plaintext 
> might differ...

In particular, it might include the letter "i".

I think the sequence goes etaoinshrdlu... but I'm not sure. Somebody else's
dictionary count seemed to disagree with this. Try looking at any simple codes
and cyphers book.

-- 
James Annan.
                [--------------------------------------]
                [  "The only good Tory is a lavatory"  ]
                [--------------------------------------]
From: James_Zuchelli@qm.claris.com (James Zuchelli)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: How do you know if your crypt is safe?
Date: 8 Oct 92 22:12:21 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Claris Corp

How do you know if your encryption method is safe (unbroken?)
Say you develope a method and you send messages.  How do you know whether or
not someone has broken it? 

Do you post messages and challenge people to break the code?
Do you send a message out of the country with a provocative content and 
then wait for the FBI to pay you a visit?

If you don't know that your code is secure, then you really don't
have a secure method, you just have to hope what you send isn't going to be
monitored by anyone who wants to and can crack it.

James Zuchelli
ps I'm a novice at all this.
------------------------------
The above is my personal opinion and does not represent the opinion of Claris
Corp. or my employers.
From: STDN%MARIST@VM.MARIST.EDU (Dan Newcombe)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Just what is the DES crypt()
Date: 7 Oct 1992 23:52:36 -0500
Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu

Well , the subject really says it...

  what is this DES crypt function, and why is it so important?

Sorry for being ignorant.
  -Dan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: sethb@fid.morgan.com (Seth Breidbart)
Subject: Re: Letter Frequency
Organization: my opinions only
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 14:53:39 GMT

In article <1992Oct15.140918.27296@emr1.emr.ca> nyelle@ccrs.emr.ca
(Norman Yelle) writes:
>In article <1big1qINNrnq@matt.ksu.ksu.edu> holland@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Rich Holland) writes:
>>I'm in dire need of a letter frequency chart for the English language.  I
>>remember as a kid reading books on basic cryptanalysis and seeing these
>>charts of the most frequently used letter (like "E" is most often used,
>>then "S" or "R" or something, etc).

>If you have an on-line copy of the dictionnary, then you can do the
>following:
>
>  grep -i e /usr/dict/words | wc
>
>... to find how many words contain the letter 'e'.  You can do this for all
>26 letters.  This is the results I got with a dictionary of 25144 words:

However, that is _not_ what was asked for.

Exercise for the reader: Identify two errors in the methodology.

Seth		sethb@fid.morgan.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dblack@seas.gwu.edu (David K. Black)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: George Washington University
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 03:38:35 GMT
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Plebeian Cryptologist
Date: 9 Oct 92 18:03:09 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

There is a FAQ being edited for this newsgroup.
There is another prepared by RSA Inc. avbl by FTP from rsa.com


Here's my list of books, etc., for beginners.  This list is heavy on
the cryptanalysis side, rather than the cryptography side, on purpose.
It is a rule of thumb that no one should attempt to design a
cryptosystem without having practiced breaking them.

	David Kahn, The Codebreakers, Macmillan, 1967
		(definitive history of cryptology up to WW-II)

	Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story, McGraw-Hill, 1982
		(excellent description of his WW-II crypto work
		 (breaking the German Enigma); discussion of modern
		 cryptological implications)

	H. F. Gaines, Cryptanalysis, Dover, 1956 (originally 1939)
		(pre-WW-II cryptanalysis)

	Abraham Sinkov, Elementary Cryptanalysis, Math. Assoc. of Amer., 1966
		(pre-WW-II cryptanalysis; more mathematical than Gaines)

	D Denning, Cryptography and Data Security, Addison-Wesley, 1983
		(mostly modern systems; more cryptography than
		 cryptanalysis; protocols; ...)

	Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma, Burnett Books Ltd., 1983
		(biography of Turing; some coverage of his crypto work
		 in WW-II)

	The entire list of publications from the Aegean Park Press
		P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, CA 92654-0837
		(mostly pre-WW-II reprints; very expensive; good sources)

	Various volumes from Artech House, 610 Washington St., Dedham MA
	02026; including:

		Deavours & Hruh, Machine Cryptography and Modern Cryptanalysis
        	        (operation and breaking of cipher machines through
			 about 1955).

		Deavours, et al., CRYPTOLOGY Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
			(Cryptologia reprints -- 1st volume)

		Deavours, et al., CRYPTOLOGY: Machines, History & Methods
			(Cryptologia reprints -- 2nd volume)

	Cryptologia:  a cryptology journal, quarterly since Jan 1977.
		Cryptologia
		Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
		Terre Haute Indiana  47803

	Journal of the International Association for Cryptologic Research
		(quarterly since 1988).

	The RSA paper: The Comm. of the ACM, Feb 1978, p. 120

	Claude Shannon's 2 1940's papers in the Bell System Tech Journal.

	Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber, Bobbs-Merrill, 1931
		(1st hand history -- WW-I era)

	Edwin Layton, "And I Was There", William Morrow & Co., 1985
		(1st hand history -- WW-II era)

	W. Kozaczuk, Enigma, University Publications of America, 1984
		(1st hand history (Rejewski's) -- WW-II era)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt