From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 4/7
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:32 GMT

------------------------------------------------------
The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
     Z Magazine, September 1992
and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
------------------------------------------------------
 
Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 4 of 7, 7.5KB)
========================
 
4. LBJ and the Kennedy Doves
----------------------------
 
Kennedy's more dovish advisers recommended the policies that
Johnson pursued, and generally approved of them until the 1965
escalation, often beyond.  They lost no time in making clear that
JFK's commitment to victory would not be abandoned.  On December
10, Forrestal, Ball, Harriman and Hilsman, reiterating JFK's
consistent stand, assured Lodge that "we are against neutralism
and want to win the war." The same unwavering commitment was
reiterated by Ball, who informed Lodge on Dec. 16 that "Nothing
is further from USG mind than `neutral solution for Vietnam.' We
intend to win."  A year later (Nov. 1964), Ball held that the
Saigon regime must continue to receive US aid until the Viet Cong
is defeated and that "the struggle would be a long one, even with
the DRV out of it." Ball and other doves continued to support
Johnson's policies, which they regarded as a continuation of
Kennedy's.  On May 31, 1964, Ball praised "the President's wise
caution" and refusal to "act hastily."
 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, later portrayed as an
advocate of withdrawal, had raised only tactical objections to
JFK's escalation.  He advised JFK to abandon "rhetorical
flourishes" about the great stakes (advice that the President
rejected, as noted).  And recognizing that Diem was not fighting
the war effectively, he advised withdrawal of some advisors "as a
symbolic gesture, to make clear that we mean business when we say
that there are some circumstances in which this commitment will
be discontinued." Mansfield generally supported Johnson's
policies.  At an NSC meeting on April 3, 1964, LBJ rejected
Senator Morse's proposal for "using SEATO and the UN to achieve a
peaceful settlement" in favor of McNamara's view that withdrawal
or neutralization would lead to a Communist takeover and
therefore remain unacceptable options.  Mansfield agreed, urging
"that the President's policy toward Vietnam was the only one we
could follow." He firmly rejected the withdrawal option and the
diplomatic moves counselled by Morse.  In January 1965, Mansfield
publicly supported "the President's desire neither to withdraw
nor carry the war to North Vietnam" (_PP_).  Later, he bitterly
condemned critics of Johnson's escalation.
 
Quite generally, Kennedy's most dovish advisers sensed no change
at the transition and lent their support to Johnson.  Some
praised his "wise caution," while others called for more
aggressive action.  By mid-1964, Forrestal was coming to support
escalation of actions against the North.  Hilsman's position was
similar.  In a March 14 memorandum he stressed the need "to take
whatever measures are necessary in Southeast Asia to protect
those who oppose the Communists and to maintain our power and
influence in the area," including "whatever military steps may be
necessary to halt Communist aggression in the area" (crucially,
VC "aggression").  We should station a Marine battalion in Saigon
on the pretext of protecting American dependents.  Attacks
against the North might be "a useful _supplement_ to an
effective counterinsurgency program," but not "an effective
_substitute_" for it.  We must "continue the covert, or at
least deniable, operations" against the North in order to keep
"the threat of eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind."
Recall that he had made the same recommendations in April 1963,
in virtually the same words, including the advice to "continue"
the ongoing covert operations against the North with their
implicit threat of destruction.
 
The support for LBJ among the Kennedy doves comes as no surprise,
given their familiarity with the internal record, which shows no
deviation on the President's part from Harriman's judgment that
"there are no quitters here." As the optimistic predictions of
1962-3 collapsed after the coup that overthrew Diem, undermining
the precondition for withdrawal, they advocated a change of
tactics to achieve the "fundamental objective" always sought.
 
We might note, at this point, that the military leadership was
divided over the war.  General Douglas MacArthur and his
successor as Army Chief of Staff, Matthew Ridgway, were strongly
opposed to the use of combat troops.  The top US military
commander in Vietnam, MAAG Chief General Lionel McGarr, informed
JFK on February 22, 1962 that "in providing the GVN the tools to
do the job," the US "must not offer so much that they forget that
the job of saving the country is theirs -- only they can do it."
General Taylor and Pacific Commander Admiral Henry Felt shared
these qualms about combat troops.  As plans to overthrow the
Diem-Nhu regime were underway in September 1963, Taylor expressed
his "reluctance to contemplate the use of U.S. troops in combat
in Vietnam," while agreeing with the President and his other top
advisers that "our sole objective was to win the war." A year
after the assassination, agreeing with McGarr, Taylor continued
to urge that the US keep to the "principle that the Vietnamese
fight their own war in SVN" (Nov. 3, 1964).  He therefore opposed
sending logistical forces for flood relief because that would
require dispatch of "US combat troops in some numbers to provide
close protection." Two weeks later, he informed President Johnson
directly that he was now "quite certain [US combat troops] were
not needed...as the estimates of the flood damage diminish." In
September 1964, Taylor had explained that the military command
"did not contemplate" committing combat forces because Commanding
General Westmoreland, also echoing McGarr, felt that use of
American troops "would be a mistake, that it is the Vietnamese'
war."
 
In later years, great import has been attributed to JFK's public
reiteration of the McGarr-Westmoreland-Taylor "principle" in his
Sept. 1963 statement that "In the final analysis it is their war.
They have to win it or lose it." It is, therefore, worth
stressing that the "principle" was standard throughout in
internal and public discussion, through 1964, including LBJ's
public statements.
 
General David Shoup, Marine Commandant through the Kennedy years,
reports that when the Joint Chiefs considered troop deployment,
"in every case...every senior officer that I knew...said we
should never send ground combat forces into Southeast Asia."
Shoup's public opposition to the war from 1966 was particularly
strong, far beyond anything said by the civilian leadership,
media doves, or others who later presented themselves as war
critics.
 
These observations add further weight to the conclusion based on
the record of internal deliberations, in which JFK insists upon
victory and considers withdrawal only on this condition.  Had he
intended to withdraw, he would have been able to enlist respected
military commanders to back him, so it appears, including the
most revered figures of the right.  He made no effort to do so,
preferring instead to whip up pro-war sentiment with inflammatory
rhetoric about the awesome consequences of withdrawal.
 



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