From: tedward@cs.cornell.edu (Edward [Ted] Fischer)
Subject: An expected runs table and some thoughts
Organization: Cornell Univ. CS Dept, Ithaca NY 14853
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 21:42:14 GMT

>From: jpalmer@uwovax.uwo.ca (The Econoclast)
>
>Steve Stein recently sent me a table from a Pankin article which
>corresponds with the situational expected runs scored in table 8-1
>from Thorn and Palmer (the other one):
> 
>"Here's a nifty table from a Pankin article in GABSB 88.  A table
>of frequency of on-base/out situations and what the runs scored expectation
>is for each situation."
 
AL 1986 Avg Runs after each situation		

Bases     #   # of   avg #
occupied out Observ  Runs 

      0    0  21081  0.52
      0    1  15000  0.27
      0    2  11962  0.10
      1    0   5556  0.90
      1    1   6480  0.55
      1    2   6456  0.24
      2    0   1449  1.16
      2    1   2822  0.72
      2    2   3363  0.32
      3    0    289  1.39
      3    1    931  0.98
      3    2   1378  0.39
     12    0   1271  1.49
     12    1   2383  0.91
     12    2   2927  0.46
     13    0    500  1.85
     13    1   1099  1.16
     13    2   1478  0.55
     23    0    329  1.99
     23    1    761  1.40
     23    2    844  0.65
    123    0    310  2.65
    123    1    779  1.49
    123    2    872  0.81
              90320

Comparing these results with other studies (other years, and a
simulation study), I would be very surprised if any of the numbers
were as much as 10% off from reality.  And especially in the
situations with 2000+ observations, I would think these numbers would
be dead-on accurate.

Now I'm sure you've all seen these tables before.  People have used
them to "prove" that a sac fly hurts the team (though not as much as a
strikeout), and walks are beneficial.

But these numbers are averages over the entire lineup, over the entire
league.  What do they mean when we are talking about Fielder and
Thomas?

Both Thomas and Fielder have above-average hitters (and particularly
above-average RBI men) behind them.  I would expect all of these
figures to be increased.  More than .27 runs will score if Fielder
leaves the bases empty with one out, and more than 2.65 runs will
score if Thomas walks to load the bases.  But I would expect this
difference to be greater in the "high leverage" situations; those with
more baserunners and fewer outs.

Consider the situation of first-and-third with one out.  A successful
squeeze bunt results in a run scored with the runner on second and two
outs (worth 1.32 runs by the table).  A walk results in the bases
loaded with one out (worth 1.49 runs by the table).  Not much of a
difference.

But if the next batter is above average, that bases-loaded-one-out
situation will be worth *much* more than 1.49 runs.  Maybe as much as
1.75 or 2.00 runs.  While the runner-at-second-two-out situation is
still worth less than .5 runs.

In the context of our discussions, I think this table overestimates
the urgency of getting the run home *now*.  Not that Thomas doesn't
look pretty good even using *these* numbers.  But when given
reasonable lineup support (like Ventura/Bell/Johnson batting behind
him), he is even more valuable than they indicate.

Fielder tends to leave lower-leverage situations than Thomas, and so
the table more fully estimates his value.

Cheers,
-Valentine
-- 
Make outs, not walks!					tedward@cs.cornell.edu
Clemens four Cy Young!
Newsgroups: rec.sport.baseball