From: fester@island.COM (Mike Fester)
Subject: Re: _Target Hitler_ a book review
Organization: /usr/local/rn/organization
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 17:43:19 GMT

In article <1iij9pINN6i5@manuel.anu.edu.au> dxb105@huxley.anu.edu.au (David Bofinger) writes:
>In <1993Jan7.191800.4471@island.COM> fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:
>
>> I also remember reading that, among Hitler's blunders, his one-month
>> invasion of Greece (to bail out Benito) may have proved, if not
>> decisive, at least significant in keeping the Germans from taking
>> Moscow before the Russian winter set in.
>
>It's worth asking what choice he had here. Imagine the position he would
>have been in if he had gone into Russia in early May, as he wished to.
>Assuming the weather was OK (the thaw came late that year, didn't it?)
>he would have had a little longer in Russia, and hence got a little
>further and mangled a bit more of the Russian army. He probably would have
>taken Moscow, which may or may not have had a significant effect on the
>Russian desire to continue fighting.

According to several sources (ie, myabe true, maybe not), Stalin was considering
giving the Germans territorial concessions if Hitler had taken Moscow. Also,
Hitler might have made it within bomber range of the Ural factories Stalin had
had built earlier, making the war/winter that much easier for the Wehrmacht.

>Meanwhile a combined Anglo-Greek-Yugoslav-ANZAC force of about a million men
>would have been pushing into Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary etc. The Wehrmacht
>would have had the interesting experience of fighting a mobile war across
>the great plains of Russia without half their minor allies and possibly
>without Rumanian oil. (I wouldn't expect these places to fall, but at a
>minimum all the local armies would have to go home to defend and the RAF
>would make life at Ploesti very interesting indeed. And without oil from
>Ploesti the Wehrmacht could barely function.)

It is difficult to imagine such a combined effort, given that it took the
Germans only a month to take Greece. And one would have to suppose that such a
combined effort GREATLY exceeded previous efforts by those countries in (esp
the British) to counter the Germans.

>Historically the Greeks, Yugoslavs, etc. went down pretty easily, mostly
>because the Greek army was misplaced and the Yugoslav one was still in a
>post-coup malaise. They would have been a real nuisance to contain. I think
>the net delay was about six weeks.

Again, the Italians weren't able to do much, even against such misplaced troops.

>> had the Germans behaved toward the conquored 
>> Russians as they did towards the French, the Russians may not have been 
>> galvanized into such an heroic war effort just to save their dictator's *ss.

>There's a scene in Guderian's memoirs where he meets a White Russian
>ex-general just after Barbarossa. Guderian seems to expect him to be happy
>that the Wehrmacht is here to save the Russians from communism. The general
>replies that if the Germans had turned up twenty years ago everyone would
>have been delighted (which seems an odd statement, since the Germans _were_
>there twenty years ago, and people weren't). However, since then they have
>painfully built up a decent life under communism, and now they don't want
>to have it destroyed all over again, so they will have to fight.

Well, an interview with a general who survived Stalin's purges cannot (IMO)
be taken as proof of the Russians' willingness to fight for Stalin. Remember,
in the early stages (ie, before the Germans started their roundups of citizens)
people were throwing flowers to the Wehrmacht forces entering their towns.
That would soon change.

>In article <vzhivov.726437511@cunews>, vzhivov@alfred.carleton.ca (Vladimir
>Zhivov) writes:

>> I agree with [Mike] on the Greece/Yugoslavia mistake; my point is that
>> the German commanders were no less enthusiastic then Hitler about
>> taking on the Russians. The reasons for this were faulty intelligence
>> on the part of the Germans (they grossly underestimated the size of
>> the Soviet Army and Air Force), racism ("a German is worth several
>> Russians"), overconfidence based on the triumphant march through
>> Europe and the Eastern Front experience of WW I.

>The "racism" was probably accurate, throughout all WW2 one German (or at
>least one German led by the likes of von Manstein et al) tended to be
>worth several of most people. An intelligence failure not noted here was
>the complete German ignorance of the existence of tanks like the KV and
>the T-34. It took quite a while for the Panthers and Tigers to level out
>this advantage.

Uh, sort of, but the German armored tactics at the time proved sufficient to
overcome most of their technical disadvantages. And when the Germans built
superior tanks, the Russians simply out-produced them. Not, by any means, a
bad position to find oneself in.

Mike
-- 
Disclaimer - These opinions are not so much opinions, as pearls of wisdom. Any-
one disagreeing is obviously either a) a snivelling, whining, mentally-
deficient, weak-willed, inconsequential, namby-pamby tool of some vague but
conveniently defined conspiracy, or b) my wife.