HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ziane@nuri.inria.fr (ziane mikal -)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Set of all sets + correcting MZ's syntax
Date: 3 Sep 92 17:25:27 GMT
Organization: INRIA Rocquencourt,Le Chesnay, France.

In article <1992Aug25.120515.15090@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>Greetings,
[...]
>Je suis pr\^et \`a partir pour Paris jusqu'a 17 septembre; par
>cons\'equent, il me sera impossible de tenir mes propos provocants.
>Veuillez envoyer vos messages concernant mes defauts personnels \`a ma
>adresse not\'ee ci-dessous.
[...]

I cannot resist. Correcting MZ is such a pleasure.
It's "mon adresse" and not "ma adresse".
I confess however that the rest of his French looks better
than my English.

BTW, Mishka, si tu passes par l'inria, viens donc me faire
une petite visite au batiment 9 ou appelle moi a paname.
Je suis dans l'annuaire.


Since this can hardly justify a posting by itself here is something 
more interesting I hope.

Russel's paradoxical set is the set of normal sets, i.e. sets which
don't belong to themselves.
However, the set of all sets, let's call it S, is often considered 
paradoxical because of the following, with P(S) the powerset of S:

P(S) is included into S, then Card(P(S)) <= Card (S)
which contradicts a theorem saying that
Card(P(S)) > Card(S)

However, looking back to the proof for Card(P(S)) > Card(S)
it appears that the proof uses a set might quite be paradoxical !
The idea is to consider a function from S onto P(S).
If you take the identity the dubious set is indeed Russel's set !

Thus you might as well reject the proof rather than the concept
of set of all sets. However if you define sets with ZF it seems
that you must accept the proof. The separation "axiom" which is
in facta theorem of ZF, implies that the above dubious set be
a proper set. (Am I wrong ?)

The question is now, whether or not alternative axiomatizations
have been proposed that are consistent with the existence of the
set of all sets ?

Also, I don't know anything yet about categories. I have heard
though that the category of all the categories is not a pb.
Does category theory have similar paradoxes though ?

Do the problems with the set of all sets prevent the possibility
to properly define an Abstract Data Type "set" ? Set of anything
of course.

Finaly, for computer scientists, is it problematic to have a
universal type. I think of hierarchies in Object Oriented
languages, where you have a root like Object or Class.

Mikal Ziane.
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: solovay@math.berkeley.edu (Robert M. Solovay)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: ZFC+~Con(ZFC)
Date: 27 Aug 1992 21:06:11 GMT
Organization: U.C. Berkeley Math. Department.
NNTP-Posting-Host: math.berkeley.edu


>>In article <1992Aug20.171630.18667@ariel.ec.usf.edu> Gregory McColm,
>>mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. writes:
>>>The standard (ie, wellfounded) models all satisfy Con(ZFC)
>>
>>Can someone clarify for me the term "standard model"?  Is this a concept
>>with a formal definition, or is a "standard model" of a theory, simply a
>>model which satisfies the intuitions which inspired the axioms of the
>>theory?
>>
>>
>
>	I do not know what all "standard" might mean, but in a lot of
>contexts including this one it means "not non-standard" where "non-
>standard" is used as in "non-standard analysis".  In short, a model is
>"standard" in this sense if all the sets it takes to be finite are
>actually finite.
>

	The usual terminology in set-theory is as follows. A model is
standard if it is a transitive set (i.e. every member of it is a
subset of it) and it's epsilon relation is just the restriction of the
usual epsilon relation.

	By the Mostowski collapse theorem, a model of ZFC is
isomorphic to a standard model iff its ordinals are well-ordered.

	A model of ZFC is "correct for finiteness" iff it has no
non-standard integers. Such models are precisely those which are
isomorphic to models whose integers are literally the usual integers.
Models of this latter type are known as omega models.

	Every standard model of ZFC is an omega model. If there is an
inaccessible cardinal, then

(a) there is a countable standard model of ZFC.

(b) there is an omega model of ZFC whose ordinals are not [externally]
well-ordered. 

	I haven't bothered to track down references for this (it's all
standard stuff) but I suspect this material is somewhere in Kunen or
Jech's opuses on set-theory.
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: DUENTSCH@dosuni1.rz.uni-osnabrueck.de
Subject: Re: ZFC+~Con(ZFC)
Organization: University of Osnabrueck, FRG
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 10:00:51 GMT

In article <7160@charon.cwi.nl>
jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) writes:
 
>
>In article <1992Aug20.171630.18667@ariel.ec.usf.edu> Gregory McColm,
>mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. writes:
>>The standard (ie, wellfounded) models all satisfy Con(ZFC)
>
>Can someone clarify for me the term "standard model"?  Is this a concept
>with a formal definition, or is a "standard model" of a theory, simply a
>model which satisfies the intuitions which inspired the axioms of the
>theory?
>
>--
>Richard Kennaway     SYS, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk               uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk
 
In some areas of algebra, I think that the answer to your second
question is "Yes":
Each Boolean algebra has a standard model as an algebra of sets via
Stone's theorem, each group has a standard model as a permutation group
via Cayley's theorem. Standard models of relation algebras are algebras
of binary relations, and there are non-standard models (i.e. non -
representable relation algebras) by a theorem of Lyndon.
 
Ivo Duentsch
Rechenzentrum
Universitaet Osnabrueck
 
duentsch@dosuni1.rz.uni-osnabrueck.de
From: gupta@nmsu.edu (Gopal Gupta)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Logic Programming as an Introductory Programming Paradigm
Date: 26 Aug 92 15:45:24 GMT
Organization: NMSU Computer Science


		       Call for Participation

		Logic Programming as an Introductory
			Programming Paradigm

		Informal Birds-of-a-Feather Session
		
		Joint International Conference and 
		Symposium on Logic Programming '92

		      Tuesday, Nov 10th, 1992
			   6:00PM -- 8:30PM

		  Organizers: J. Reinfelds and G. Gupta

This informal session is  devoted to  discussion on  using  the  logic 
programming  paradigm to teach programming to beginners. The  emphasis 
is on  teaching  logic  programming (rather than Prolog), and  the aim 
is to induce beginners to learn ``declarative thinking." This approach 
can be  contrasted with  the functional programming  approach that has 
been becoming increasingly popular recently.

The discussion  is open to  all the participants in the conference who 
are  invited  to present  their  views on  (but  not  limited  to) the 
following issues:

1) Why is  Logic  Programming  a  more  suitable paradigm for teaching 
	programming to beginners?
2) Is there a need for  using LP for this purpose, or is FP enough, or
	is some other approach better?
3) How to evaluate the success of such an enterprise?
4) Your  experiences  related  to  using  LP  to  teach programming to
	beginners.

Dissenting views are specially welcome.  

As part of the session  we will  relate our  experience  with using LP 
(and a closely co-ordinated  sister course in discrete Math and Logic) 
to teach programming to Freshman students  at New Mexico State. Others 
are welcome to relate their experiences too. 

Please note  that the primary focus of the session will be on teaching 
logic programming to beginner programmers. Discussion related to teach-
ing Logic Programming to people other than beginners is not encouraged.

Please  send email (to gupta@nmsu.edu  or  juris@nmsu.edu) if  you are 
interested in participating. Please indicate in your email if you just 
want to attend the session or  whether you  intend to  present a short 
position paper too.


---------------------------------------------------------------------
Gopal Gupta
Department of Computer Science	   email: gupta@nmsu.edu
Box 30001, Dept. 3CU		      	  gupta@compsci.bristol.ac.uk
New Mexico State University	   Ph: +1 (505) 646 6236 
Las Cruces, NM 88003-0001	   Fax: +1 (505) 646 6218
USA
---------------------------------------------------------------------
From: zachr@solb1.essex.ac.uk (Zach R)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Axioms for *Skolem* arithmetic
Date: 27 Aug 92 16:23:48 GMT
Reply-To: zach@csdec1.tuwien.ac.at
Organization: University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Jamie Andrew's recent request for axioms for Presburger arithmetic
started me thinking: What about  (natural) axiomatizations of
Skolem arithmetic, ie arithmetic with only 0, 1, and multiplication.
(Note there is no successor). This theory is decidable as well,
but what axioms would you give for times, if you cant define
it recursively from plus?

If noone has an answer, maybe someone knows the email address of
C Ward Henson (currently in Tuebingen, as far as I know), I
think he worked on that back in the 70s.

(BTW: Pre"sburg (Bratislava) is spelled with a sharp s)

Richard Zach
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: bouchard@ireq.hydro.qc.ca (Marco Bouchard ETUDIANT sept-dec 92)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: enigma
Date: 4 Sep 92 14:50:44 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Institut de recherche d'Hydro-Quebec, Varennes, Canada

Hi there!I just joined your newsgroup a few days ago and I had fun to solve the
parachutist and the handshake enigmas.I've got some, I just hope that they were
never asked before.So, here's the first one:

You have 10 vending machines to fill out with chocolate bars. In fact, after finishing
to put the chocolate, you remember that you had 9 boxes of chocolate bars of 100g. and
one box of bars of 90g and you gotta know in which machine you put those of 90g. You  
cannot tell just by looking on the paper on the bar if it has 90 or 100 g. But, beside the 10 
vending machine, you have an electronic weighing machine. When you put a quarter in it
, it tells you the weight (it makes only one measure). The problem is that you have only a 
quarter (only one try) and you gotta know , just by one try, in which machine you put 
the chocolate bars of 90g. You don't have access to the money of the vending machines.
You can weigh as much bars as you want, but you can take one measure.    

How can you do this (it's mathematic)?

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marco Bouchard                    Soyons EXPOS-itifs!
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: logic@gacvx2.gac.edu
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: Logics for empirical science.
Date: 1 Sep 92 16:38:17 GMT
Organization: Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minnesota

In article <BtuuGE.7Fr@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
> 
> In article <1992Aug31.142217.14509@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE>, gemenis@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE (Theodor Gemenis) writes:
> |> 
> |> 
> |> I am interested in logics appropriate for empirical science 
> |> (or logics for knowledge), that is logics for axiomatize theories 
> |> such as newtonian mechanics, electrodynamics, etc. theories also 
> |> beyond mathematics. 
> |> I know the work of R. Carnap, P. Suppes, J. Sneed on this field 
> |> and the work of N. Nilsson in AI (logic for knowledge representation).
> |> 
> |> I would be thankful for any indication concerning recent work
> |> in this domain. Information on implemented systems for such logics 
> |> is also from interest to me.
> 
> 
> Your phrases "logics appropriate for empirical science", "logics
> for knowledge", and "logics [to] axiomatize theories ..." would
> seem to cover pretty diverse ground and do not, to my mind,
> necessarily share a meaning.
> 
> I haven't played with this stuff for a long time.  In addition to
> the names you mention, the other one that comes to mind is Richard
> Montague.  See, for example, "Deterministic Theories" in _Formal_
> Philosophy_ (Yale University Press, 1974).  (His stuff may be dealt
> with by Sneed, but memory fails me.)  I believe that Clark Glymour
> (still at Pitt?) was drifting in this area (perhaps in conjunction
> with the Pitt CS or AI departments).  You might contact Henry
> Kyburg (kyburg@cs.rochester.edu) who is spending virtually all of
> his time in the Cog. Sci. program there now instead of in philosophy.
> He has been doing a lot of stuff in the area of non-deductive methods
> in AI.
> -- 
> Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
> SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

I'd like to add Carl Hempel and Nelson Goodman (Fact Fiction and Forecast)
to the list..  Their stuff is pretty old now but definitely deserving of 
the title "classic works".

regards,
al hart
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: naturman@uctvax.uct.ac.za
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: Modal logic Correction
Date: 28 Aug 92 11:44:04 +0200
Keywords: modal logic
Organization: University of Cape Town

In article <1992Aug28.114007.202560@uctvax.uct.ac.za>,
naturman@uctvax.uct.ac.za writes:

Sorry the correct question is as follows:


 Does anyone know if the modal logic with the following axioms has been
 investigated ever?
 
 p(A v B) <=> (pA v pB)
 ppA => A v pA
 
 and with deduction rule
 from A infer nA
 
 where p is the possibilty operator and n is the necessity operator.
From: dandy@sys6626.bison.mb.ca (Daniel Mutch)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Alice some more
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 92 16:31:33 CST
Organization: system 6626 BBS, Winnipeg MB

My opinion;
  Be what you appear to be.
 
    The second clause papraphrased would say this;
 
       Never imagine (or act on the belief). that you are something other 
than what you appear to be. Or others will think that you are deceiving 
them with your appearence or.
 
       Never be different from what you appear to be for then others will 
see as different than that which you seem.
  
     I coudn't decide on which one so I mentioned them both.
 
   As for how in the world this could happen well the English language is 
(or seems to be) one of the most nonsensical on earth...

    |) /\ |\| |) \/
                 /  (dandy@6626.bison.mb.ca)
From: snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Date: 28 Aug 92 22:45:02 GMT
Keywords: nanotechnology, replicator, assembler

In <1992Aug26.171151.1898@skynet.uucp> ice@skynet.uucp (Ice) writes:

>In article <9R5NPB5w164w@cybernet.cse.fau.edu> tomh.bbs@cybernet.cse.fau.edu writes:
>>
>>He discusses these issues and give a mathematical proof that simple
>>mechanisms cannot replicate themselves without infinite regress.

>Ummmmmm. I thought John Von Neumann proved that automata of sufficient
>complexity can reproduce themselves. What is Rosen saying that Von
>Neumann did not?

      Can you even give the broadest outlines of how Von Neumann proved this?
I think not. Moreover, whatever the type of logic he utilizied, the only
real proof would be to build one. Since size is not really relevent to the
design process, I would like to know ballpark how many parts such a machine
would have? Don't forget, the more parts it has, the more parts it must have
to build those parts -- since all the parts cannot be the same.

      The argument is that it is _very_ complicated, but not impossible.
But it seems to me we should at least be able to characterize this complexity
as deriving from a certain problem. I invite someone to try it, and yet
stay clear of infinite regression.


>Ice()


      John E. Snodgrass
      -----------------
      snodgras@crash.cts.com
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 28 Aug 92 01:39:28 GMT
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department

In article <exukjb.97.714929511@exu.ericsson.se> exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken  
bell) writes:
> 
> Intellectual parasites indeed!  Science was born from womb of philosophy!
> 

Yes, and so what. An offspring can exceed the capabilities of its parent.

Essentially, there was a time when math, science and philosophy
were all all mixed together. Folks like Newton, Liebnitz, Descarte,
etc were of that era. This made it difficult to separate out
the effects of these three fields at the time. 

However, in retospect its clear these folks greatest contributions
were as mathematicians and physicists. Their philosophical efforts 
were of little import, although it does give early philosophy a
bit of a boost to be able to claim these great scientists as philosophers.






Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay)
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 03:45:26 GMT


snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:
|> Ummmmmm. I thought John Von Neumann proved that automata of
|> sufficient complexity can reproduce themselves. What is Rosen
|> saying that Von Neumann did not?
|
|	 Can you even give the broadest outlines of how Von Neumann
|proved this?  I think not. 

Why not?

In article <BILL.92Sep2120437@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>
bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
|Well, *I* can.  He gave a mathematical proof that a self-duplicating
|structure exists in the Game of Life (which is a finite-state
|automaton).  He proved it by showing how to construct one.  The
|structure he describes is very large.

I think Conway's "Life" post-dated von Neumann. It was other people
who found a way to implement the idea in a "life" cellular automaton.

The basic idea is quite simple. The machine has certain equipment for
producing other machines from a "blueprint". In the case of living
things, this includes the cellular "machinery" for translating DNA
into proteins; in the "life" cellular automata, it involves sequences
of gliders being collided so as to give rise to other automata.

The machine is then instructed to manufacture a machine according to a
blueprint, and then copy the blueprint into a designated "blueprint
slot" in the other machine. The machine is then equipped with a
blueprint of itself (aside from the blueprint). This side-steps the
need for an infinite regression of blueprints.

It is a popular pastime of programmers to write programs which
generate their own source code, by essentially this method.

Keith Ramsay
ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jgn@vixen.uucp (22122-niederberger)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Bellcore, Livingston, NJ
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 14:27:30 GMT

In article <Btn8r8.8LK@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

>of science, or philosophers, or humanities faculty.  But if you look
>at education as a product that universities provide to customers,
>and if you favor a free market approach, then the appearance of
>parisitism disappears (let's ignore the boondoggle of government
>grants for now since it doesn't fit into the free market scenario
>very well).  People pay for philosophy courses in the same way
>(and perhaps for the same reasons -- or similar ones) that they
>pay for courses in biology, physics, mathematics, or great minority
>artists of the 17th century.  If more academics looked at things
>this way, perhaps their product would be better and they would give
>less of a parasitic impression.

If education is a product offered to consumers, then we should judge
it by how happy the customers are.  Universities that teach
"creationism" and such nonsense are only to be judged by the
marketplace.

I for one would be happy to keep a few philosophers around if only to
counterbalance this consumerist rubbish.

Peace,

Joe N.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 92 16:21:15 GMT

In article <1992Aug28.133107.8402@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
>For some reason that I don't
>understand, philosphers still devote much time to original 
>works from Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, etc, etc, 
>rather than merely focusing on the concepts themselves, divorced
>from their proponents (and their proponents generally inferior
>original presentations).

I missed this last phrase in my previous article.  How do you divorce the
concept of "Being-in-the-world" from Heidegger, or "Absolute Spirit" from
Hegel?  Such divorcing is not as easy as you seem to make it out to be.

Secondly, if the originals are inferior, where can we find these superior
presentations that you seem to imply exist?  In Cliffs notes, perhaps?  Or
in modern journal articles?  Much of what appears in modern journals is
decidedly inferior to the work of the philosophers you cite.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: e343mh@tamuts.tamu.edu (Michael Hand)
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1992 19:24:27 GMT

In article <1992Sep4.040504.3673@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
  >Why can't philosophers understand this simple proposition: 
  >
  >YOU CAN'T PROVE ANYTHING ABOUT THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE THROUGH PURE 
  >CONTEMPLATION.

Oh, everyone *understands* it: the issue is whether it's true.
And your screaming it doesn't *make* it true!  
(Why do I need to tell this to a mathematician?)
B-o} Michael
_______________________________________________________________________
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Hand                     phone (409)845-5660, fax (409)845-0458
Dept of Philosophy, Texas A&M Univ, College Station TX 77843-4237 U.S.A.
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Report on Philosophies of Physicists
Date: 3 Sep 92 18:20:38 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Sep3.075010.24370@u.washington.edu> billiksh@u.washington.edu writes:
>4. Have you read The Tao of Physics by Fritjof Capra and / or seen
>his movie, " Mindwalk? " If so, do you find validity in his ideas?

>	One physicist suggests Capra overemphasizes the subjective nature
>of quantum physics when he discusses the role of the observer in
>experiments. Just because the observation is in part subject to the
>observer does not mean that different people doing the same experiment
>will get different results. There are limits to this subjectivity, which,
>according to this physicist, Capra does not recognize. 

Fair enough.

>        Another physicist
>agrees with the previous one and berates Capra for adhering to the
>subjectivist / " Primacy of Consciousness " argument, which states that
>consciousness precedes existence. The physicist, who classifies himself as
>a realist / objectivist, argues that Capra follows a corruption of Western
>philosophy perpetrated by Immanuel Kant, a philosophy which holds that man
>creates reality. It is in this manner that Capra is able to make
>connections between a Kantian view of science and Eastern religions. The
>problem, according to this physicist, is that this Kantian view is based
>on a logical fallacy and is a self - refuting argument. Existence must
>precede consciousness, he argues, in order for consciousness to exist,
>because consciousness must be aware of something first in order to be
>conscious.

This physicist sounds an awful lot like someone who's under the
influence of Ayn Rand.  Clues: (1) an attack on Kant as the source of
error, and in those terms.  (2) "Existence must precede consciousness
in order for consciousness to exist, because consciousness must be
aware of something first in order to be conscious", which is standard
Objectivist (ie, Randian) talk.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech