From: KARLIN@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (P.L. Cowan)
Subject: Re: Sickles (Was: Re: Lee-Longstreet)
Summary: Analysis of the terrane at Sickles's position at Gettysburg. 
Keywords: Gettysburg, Sickles, Cemetery Ridge, Peach Orchard
Reply-To: COWAN@ANL.GOV
Organization: BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1992 20:34:28 GMT
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.23

In <Uebfsdu00WBNM76lIg@andrew.cmu.edu> "Thomas writes:

:  
: As much flak that Sickles takes, I'd like to invite those who condemn 
: him to actually go to Gettysburg and survey the area [specifically 
: where his troops were engaged]. Look at the lay of the land. He 
: really had no choice. 
: 
: Tom Joyce 
: Carnegie-Mellon University Administrative Systems 
: (usual disclaimer et al)

To paraphrase Mae West, "I am not trying to show contempt for Gen. Sickles, I
am doing my best to conceal it." 8^)

As a matter of fact, I lived for 12 years within a 40 minute drive of the
Gettysburg National Battlefield and visited it many times. Since my
great-grandfather was in Gen. Sickles's 3rd Corps and wounded at the Peach
Orchard, I paid particular attention to the terrane to which you refer. 
The historical event have established the error of Gen. Sickles's decision much
better than I can, but it is fun to try to put oneself in his position and 
try to understand what went wrong.

I agree that when standing at Sickles's designated position (on the depression 
between Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top) the Peach Orchard looks like an
appealing position to take. However, standing at the Peach Orchard an looking
back at Cemetery Ridge-LRT the problems with the position are equally obvious.

1) The Peach Orchard (I'll refer to Sickles's line along Emmitsburg Road,
angling at the Peach Orchard and continuing to Devil's Den simply as the "Peach
Orchard" which was at its highest point) offers no particular advantage for
artillery or infantry relative to the ground to the west or south.

2) If forced back from the summit at the Peach Orchard down the slope toward
Plum Run, the Union would be fighting at a disadvantage (as they were in fact).

3) The Peach Orchard was significantly farther from the reserve forces
(artillery reserve and later the 5th Corps) that Meade was concentrating near
his right wing.

4) The Plum Run gully offered significant impedance to the movement of Union
support from the east (in addition to distance) and to Sickle's troops
retreating to the east, as it would have (and eventually did) to attacking
Confederate infantry from the west.

5) The Plum Run gully offered a northbound route through Devil's Den to 
Sickles's rear. I can believe that Sickles's could have had trouble imagining
an attack from the south was possible, but it did come to pass.

6) The line established by Sickles at the Peach-Orchard salient was about 50%
longer than the one Hancock had instructed him to occupy. Sickles's 3rd Corps 
had only 2 divisions and it was necessary for him to plug huge holes in his
line by diverting artillery batteries from elsewhere in the Union lines. 
Many of these guns were captured (if only temporarily) due to the difficulty in 
pulling them back.

7) Little Round Top was left uncovered. LRT was of little direct value to the
Union Army (other than for observation), but it could have been of immense
value to the Confederates (artillery could have enfiladed the whole of Cemetery
Ridge, would have commanded the Taneytown Road, one of Meade's remaining routes
for supply/reinforcement/retreat, and might have threatened his other route,
the Baltimore Pike). Hancock had instructed Sickles to relieve Geary's Division
of the 12th Corps. Geary had positioned 2 regiments on LRT, so Sickles with
twice as many men should have been able to position at least 4 regiments there.
That was about the number of men that were in Vincent's brigade that
successfully defended LRT through the worst of the fight. Sickles's men would
have had more time to dig in (than did Vincent's brigade).

8) Sickles's right was at least a mile in front of Hancock's left, leaving a
gap roughly as big as the one he would of created if he had put *ALL* his men on
LRT. The 1st Minnesota suffered close to 90% casualties when they were thrown
into that gap.

Off-setting these disadvantages were the three disadvantages that Sickles cited
for his designated position.

1) Confederate artillery at the Peach Orchard was in a position to dominate the
southern end of Cemetery Ridge due to the higher elevation.

2) An offensive attack by the Union left (up towards the Peach Orchard) would
be at a significant disadvantage.

3) Sickles had a supply train which he expected to arrive on Emmitsburg Road.

On July 3, the first two disadvantages were experienced (since Sickles had been
unable to hold his preferred position despite massive support from the 5th and 
2nd Corps). In fact, the nominal advantage that the Confederate artillery
enjoyed at the Peach Orchard may have worked against them. In the artillery
bombardment preceeding Pickett's Charge, the Confederate artillery consistently
overshot their targets. Perhaps this can be attributed to their "advantage" in
elevation.

Also on the 3rd, Sam Crawford's division of the 5th Corp (with cavalry support)
counter-attacked up the west slope of Plum Run with some success.

I believe Sickles's supply train found its way to Taneytown Road in any
event.



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P. L. Cowan     Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV   (I'm posting this from a friend's account)

     "I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall 
adopt new views so fast as they appear to be true views." 
  -  A. Lincoln, Letter to the Editor, New York Tribune, August 22, 1862

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