HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: atokosum@titcc03.cc.titech.ac.jp (Akifumi Tokosumi o-2262)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.psychology,comp.ai
Subject: Symposium: Cog Sci of Emotion
Date: 15 Nov 92 09:46:15 GMT
Reply-To: atokosum@cc.titech.ac.jp (Akifumi Tokosumi o-2262)
Organization: Tokyo Institute of Technology

Hullo,
     The JCSS symposium is an annual symposium providing in-depth
understanding on recent issues in cognitive science. The 1992 symposium
is devoted to emotion. All talks will be in Japanese (with no
interpretation facilities). If you happen to be in Tokyo on the day of
the symposium, please join us.                           -aki.

Japanese Cognitive Science Society Symposium 1992
Cognitive Science of Emotion

12th December 1992
Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

Part 1. Tutorials: Perspectives on emotion research.
     Three tutorials will summarize recent findings in emotion research.  

10:30-11:10  Computational theories of emotion.
	Akifumi Tokosumi, Tokyo Institute of Technology

11:10-11:50  Machine recognition of six basic emotions.
	Fumio Hara, Science University of Tokyo

11:50-12:30  Study of affect in cognitive science: Social psychological
        approach.
	Hideki Ohira, Tokai Women's College

Part 2.  URGE theory and its implications.
     The recent publication of Masanao Toda's URGE theory of emotion
(The emotion, 1992, Tokyo University Press) is a major milestone in the
history of cognitive science.  Discussants from ethology, psychology
and AI will explore the implications and possibilities of the theory.

13:30-14:15  Lecture: Structure of Toda's URGE theory: Emotion and
        cognition in primitive and industrialized societies.
	Giyoo Hatano, Dokkyo University
        Keiko Takahashi, University of the Sacred Heart

14:15-15:00  Lecture: What's new about the URGE theory.
	Masanao Toda, Chukyo University

15:05-17:00  Panel Discussion: Prospects for the URGE theory
  Chair Yasuaki Kobashi, Highway Development, Co. &
        Science University of Tokyo
   Human evolution and the URGE theory.
	Osamu Sakura, Mitsubishi Kasei Institute of Life Sciences
   Prosocial behavior research and the URGE theory.
	Akio Kikuchi, Tokyo Institute of Technology
   Contribution of Toda's URGE theory to research on emotions.
	Keiko Takahashi, University of the Sacred Heart
	Giyoo Hatano, Dokkyo University
   Artificial emotion generation by Harmony theory.
	Fumio Hara, Science University of Tokyo
   Expectations and apprehensions for the future of the urge theory.
	Yasuaki Kobashi, Highway Development, Co. &
	Science University of Tokyo

REGISTRATION: No registration required.  Admission free.
Proceedings (in Japanese) will be available at 1000 yen for JSCS
members, and at 2000 yen for non-members.

DIRECTION: The Lecture Hall, the symposium site is on the Ookayama
campus of the T.I.T.  Five minutes walk from the Ookayama station
of Tokyu Ooimachi/Mekama Line.

For further details, write to:
Akifumi Tokosumi
Centre for Humannities and Social Sciences
Tokyo Institute of Technology
Ookayama 2-12-1, Meguro-ku, Tokyo  152, Japan
e-mail:  atokosum@cc.titech.ac.jp
fax:     +81-3-3729-1229
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: khj@cray.com (Ken Jopp)
Subject: Re: the conjunction effect (was: Logic and stuff)
Organization: Cray Research, Inc.
Date: 18 Nov 92 13:41:59 CST

Perhaps related to the conjunction effect:

I recall in a psychology course an experiment in which 
subjects tended to answer "yes" to the question, "Is it 
OK to pray while smoking?"  but tended to answer no to,
"Is it OK the smoke while praying?"



Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Organization: University of Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 15:05:39 GMT

In article <1992Nov20.201258.17652@husc3.harvard.edu>, zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:


> 
> Great.  Instead of promulgating my doctrinaire image, perhaps I can
> ask you to elucidate your [censored] comments.  In what sense, and by
> what kind of argument has the Whitehead and Russell (note the correct
> order) claim that mathematics is reducible to logic been proved false?
> What is its relation to the formalist program, and what is the
> connection between the latter and Montague's proposal?

As far as I know, the paradoxes in set theory and Goedel's work are generally
accepted as showing that mathematics cannot be derived from logic and
set theory - thus killing Hilbert's formalist programme. It would appear
that *formal* logic and set theory are actually simply just bits of
mathematics with no special status. (I write this as a complete amateur).
Why do you think that what won't work for math will work for natural language
(which you believe to be just another formal language)?


Philip Swann
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Planning within a Context
Date: 18 Nov 92 15:30:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: ils.1992Nov18.153012.27577
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences

In article <rzkqhzp@lynx.unm.edu> you write:
> I am interested in references pertaining to Neural Networks and
> Strategy or Planning within Context or Reference Frames.  I am doing a
> literature review for my masters thesis and I am interested in training
> networks within an offensive/defensive/neutral strategy in a
> competitive environment.

If research in "planning" did not take account of context, it would be called
"immediate wish fulfillment".

	-dp-
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.psychology
From: altenbur@plains.NoDak.edu (Karl Altenburg)
Subject: Re: Physiology & Psychology (Q)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 18:50:16 GMT
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computing Network

Tom Rocklin wrote:

>There is an argument that says, roughly, that knowing the details of the
>neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of an organism (I'm particularly interested
>in humans) will still leave you ignorant  of important details
>of the psychology of that organism.
.
<stuff deleted>
.
>much about Unix itself.  Similarly, knowing the details of the brain (and
>the rest of the relevant system(s)) will tell you some constraints on the
>psychology of an organism, but not much more.

>I'd be happy to hear comments on this argument (which I'm neither endorsing
>nor rejecting), but more importantly, I'd appreciate pointers to published
>versions of the argument (and related arguments).                ^^^^^^^^^

There have been studies of this sort using lower animals (i.e. insects)
as models.  The argument in these systems is that it might be possible,
given an accurate enough model of the animal, its anatomy and physiology,
along with an accurate model of its environment, one could accurately
model the behavior of the animal.  This also assumes that you can 
condition the model to have the same learned behaviors found in the 
animal, something that should be possible in the insect model (given its 
limited memory and greater dependence on instincts/reflexes) but much harder to
do with something as complex as a human.

Some published work for this argument would be:

Vehicles, experiments in synthetic psychology / Valentino Braitenberg.
	Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1984.

Braitenberg memoirs: vehicles for probing behavior roam a dark
	plain marked by lights. (Valentino Braitenberg; Computer
	Recreations) by A.K. Dewdney, Scientific American March 1987, 
	v256, p16(5)

An artificial insect. (computer-simulated insects) by Randall
	D. Beer, J. Hillel Chiel and Leon S. Sterling, 
	American Scientist Sept-Oct 1991, v79, n5, p444(9), 


-- 
Karl R Altenburg				altenbur@plains.NoDak.edu
North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND  58105

All things are artificial, for nature is the art of God.  SIR THOMAS BROWNE
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:715 sci.philosophy.tech:4195 sci.lang:8123 sci.philosophy.meta:2657
From: rcj@engin.umich.edu (R o d Johnson)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 15:36:32 EST
Organization: Lost Tribes of Gazebo

In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs> erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:
>Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
>considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
>the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof).

"Are considered" by who?  Says who?  Suppose I were to say "two
statements are considered equivalent if they hold in exactly the same
possible worlds."  Why is my claim any less definitional than yours?
(Note: this isn't about which one is *correct*; this isn't an
empirical question.)

-- 
       Rod Johnson  *  rcj@caen.engin.umich.edu  *  (313) 764-3103
    
                "What I do doesn't happen in a warehouse"
                                          --Jim Dickinson
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:663 sci.philosophy.tech:4150 sci.lang:8080
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 18 Nov 92 03:15:41 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov17.221542.17555
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov17.092016.28202@news.unige.ch>
swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:

>In article <1992Nov16.120727.17500@husc3.harvard.edu>,
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>> P.S.  Is anybody out there objecting to transitivity of synonymy?

PS:
>I would object to the assumption that synonymy is a property of
>human language. Trivially, if we believe that two expressions
>"mean the same thing" then we have some meaningful criteria to
>distinguish them and some reason for doing so and, unless you want
>to multiply abstract entities endlessly, they therefore do not "mean
>the same thing".

This is a silly objection.  Surely non-trivial synonymy obtains
between syntactically different expressions; hence to adduce
syntactical difference as evidence of corresponding difference in
meaning is to beg the question against the possibility of synonymy.
On a deeper level, I am content to reiterate Church's solution to
Mates' puzzle: the mere possibility of doubt concerning identity of
meaning does not entail its difference.

PS:
>		  More concretely, for any pair of human language
>expressions that you claim to be synonymous in a given context, I
>claim that I can produce another context in which they are not
>synonymous.

Even granting your alleged ability, it is obvious that it does nothing
to exclude the context-dependent theories of meaning.  Think in terms
of _ceteris paribus_.

PS:
>	     Finally, while genuine synonymes *might* exist as
>transient phenomena in human language, surely one would quickly
>be driven out by the other for simple reasons of efficiency (would
>you want to keep two identical copies of the same procedure in
>a program?).

Contextual considerations make the difference non-trivial; aside from
that, there is no _a priori_ need to limit the notion of synonymy to
single-language domains.  The best NL examples are furnished by good
translations.

>Philip Swann
>
>P.S Yes, of course I also object to such weird ideas as the
>    transitivity of synonymy and meaning preserving transformations
>    - insofar as you claim they apply to empirical phenemona in
>    human language; in formal stuff you can do what you like and
>    use any old labels you like. 

Following Montague, I believe that deicticaly disambiguated natural
languages *are* formal languages.

So who teaches philosophy in the University of Geneva, besides Jean
Starobinski?  Does it have a decent school of formal philosophy,
linguistics, logic, or mathematics?

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: goer@ellis.uchicago.edu (Richard L. Goerwitz)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Followup-To: sci.cognitive
Reply-To: goer@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 00:00:40 GMT

zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes (I believe in English):
>
>This is a bogus objection, Chris.  Once your theory identifies the said
>transformations, it is a short step indeed to characterize restricted
>versions thereof, which will be bijections in extension.  Then you will
>want to talk about equivalence classes under the induced relation,
>thereby committing yourself to abstract propositions and concepts.
>
>In general, reification is unavoidable under any reasonable view of
>ontological commitment.  Even that classic would-be example of gratuitous
>reification of "sakes" from the use of locutions like "for the sake of
>X", or "for its own sake" is perfectly reasonable, nay, unavoidable, in
>any systematic discussion of teleological theory of value.

Please!  Try to resist the temptation to address topics, using highly
specialized terms, in newsgroups not likely to be familiar with them.
Perhaps it's just my inadequate education, but I (a sci.lang) reader
have absolutely no idea what the poster is saying....

-- 

   -Richard L. Goerwitz              goer%midway@uchicago.bitnet
   goer@midway.uchicago.edu          rutgers!oddjob!ellis!goer
From: rmr@acsu.buffalo.edu (Richard M. Romanowski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Logic and stuff
Date: 18 Nov 92 06:47:02 GMT
Organization: UB

frank@i1.msi.umn.edu (Loren Frank) writes:
>this sort fails to capture a number of intuitive notions like causality.
>	On the other hand there is also the less formal logic of "if I
>step in front of a speeding bus, I will get hurt." (I think someone said
>something like that recently) This makes sense, and seems logical, but it 
>cannot be demonstrated formally without the addition of a number of 
>premises having to do with the implications of stepping in front of,
>speeding, and so on. We do not think of that sort of everyday statement
>as logical in the formal sense, if for no other reason than we do not tend
>to think of things in the language of P and Q's and strict implication and so
>on. 

	If we step in front of a bus, we will get hit
	if we get hit, we get hurt
	If we step in front of a bus, we get hurt

	Fairly logical ... but it assumes prior knowledge of the
world, not gained by direct experience -- most people who have stepped
in fron t of busses have not lived to tell of it.


>	On a slightly related topic, when people are given the following
>scenario :Linda has been very active in social concerns for most
>of her life. During college she was involved in a number of organizations
>whose aim was to bolster the rights of the underrepresented. 
>People are then asked "which of the following is more likely:
>1) Linda is a bank teller.
>2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement."
>People almost always choose 2) even though the likelyhood of a conjunction
>is always less than the likelyhood of one of the conjuncts.

>I am not quite sure what that means, but it is true...


	I do not know anything, but I THINK it means that people don't
care about the bank teller part -- whether or not it is true is irrelevant
to them, because the part about feminism seems so intuitively correct.

	Conclusion: confronted with a pattern that seems to reflect 
reality, people toss logic out the window, which is perhaps why we pretend
that math is unemptional.  If we believed it related to reality,
perhaps we would not be able to do it.

Luck
Rick
From: jdevlin@pollux.usc.edu (Joseph T. Devlin)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Alzheimer's disease
Date: 22 Nov 1992 15:27:12 -0800
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: pollux.usc.edu
Summary: Any effect of verb semantics?
Keywords: verbs, semantics, alzheimers

Hello all,
  I've been looking into the literature on Alzheimer's
disease to see what is known about the affect of the
disease on verb semantics and lexical access.  While
there is a substantial body of information on noun and
object degradation in AD, I have found only a single 
reference which even examined verbs - action verbs only
in this case.
  Martin and Fedio (1983) reported that AD patients were
as capable of naming simple action verbs as their normal
counterparts from line drawings.  Contrasted with object
naming, which AD patients do fairly poorly at, this was
perhaps surprising.  On the other hand this was only 
a small part of a larger experiment and it was not treated
in any detail.
  If anyone knows of references or informatoin related to
this I would appreciate hearing from you.
  Thank you all for your help.

						- Joe

*************************************************************************
Joseph Devlin                      * email: jdevlin@pollux.usc.edu
University of Southern California  *
Department of Computer Science     * "The axon doesn't think.
Los Angeles, CA 90089              *  It just ax."  George Bishop
*************************************************************************

%A Martin and Fedio
%T <I can't find the name of the paper right now>
%S Brain and Language (1983) 19: 124-141.
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:656 sci.philosophy.tech:4145 sci.lang:8075 sci.philosophy.meta:2610
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning
Date: 17 Nov 92 22:28:54 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov17.172855.17544
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov17.152113.6891@psych.toronto.edu>
christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>In article <1992Nov16.122343.17501@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>If you don't feel that being bound by
>>logic is a *moral* obligation, would you still have any basis for a
>>reasonable expectation that your tooting your car's horn at a bunch of
>>Samoan Hell's Angels does not *mean* your informed consent for them to
>>peel off your skin and rip out your heart?  Do you have a glimmer of
>>understanding that your human rights are not worth the market value of
>>the chemicals that comprise your anatomy, *if* there be no such things
>>as matters of fact about meaning?
>>
>>cordially,
>>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>>" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."

CG:
>Succintly put, Mikhail, but an English quotation in your sig file? <gasp>
><:-O

Pending the incorporation of the eighth bit into the Internet signal,
I have taken the liberty to translate this Russian quotation into
English.  To allay your discomfort, look below.

>-- 
>Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
>Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
>University of Toronto
>Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:699 sci.philosophy.tech:4186 sci.lang:8108
From: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 19 Nov 92 17:34:54 GMT
	<1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1992Nov18.132612.8892@news.unige.ch>
	<1992Nov18.134406.17573@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: Human Communication Research Center
In-reply-to: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu's message of 18 Nov 92 18:44:04 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.134406.17573@husc3.harvard.edu>, Michael Zeleny (mz) writes:

mz> You are not even close.  The point is that a *correct* and
mz> *comprehensive* normative description will _ipso facto_ have full
mz> descriptive adequacy. 

And a contradiction implies anything, and if you hypothesise a
completely implausible object you can ascribe whatever properties you
like to it.

mz> Ah, "philosophy at Harvard"... thank you for answering my query about
mz> the state of scholarship at the University of Geneva [etc.]

Ad hominem as `rationalism'. Hm, what a novel idea. Can we have
sticking your tongue out at people as nominalism next. :-)

--
rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk				_O_
						 |<
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov17.214321.18500@psych.toronto.edu>
	<1992Nov18.164042.2001@athena.cs.uga.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 19:52:49 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.164042.2001@athena.cs.uga.edu> mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.
edu (Michael Covington) writes:

  >Of course it's contingent and is arrived at BY LOGICAL REASONING FROM 
  >PREMISES.

  But surely anything can be arrived at by logical reasoning from premisses,
for example that I will not be harmed if I run out in front of a truck. Just
what was the point of your original posting?
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:03:13 GMT


In article <flamer.720978731@mithril> flamer@mithril.intel.com 
(Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:

   >mnemonic tricks

  A katakana syllabary! Think now how much you really want to learn it!


  (ka sa ta na ha ma ya ra wa)
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: randrews@bnr.ca (Rob Andrews)
Subject: Re: Shuttle computers
Organization: Bell-Northern Research
Distribution: sci
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 21:15:16 GMT

    The shuttle computers and software systems were discussed in an issue
of the Communications of the ACM (Assoc of Computing Machinery) a few years
ago.  I saw it around my desk a few days ago, when I find it again, I'll
post the relevent reference.
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Dyson Spheres, again
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 20:52:14 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology

In article <1992Nov23.020045.15067@dartvax.dartmouth.edu> Frederick.A.Ringwald@dartmouth.edu (Frederick A. Ringwald) writes:
>> Well, Dyson himself did not actually propose a solid sphere...
>> What he invisioned was a large number
>> of habitats in orbit about a star which, together, would completely 
>> encircle the star in a ball-of-twine formation...
>
>Have you read Dyson's original article? I have it here in front of me...
>This sounds like a solid sphere to me...
>...the idea of a swarm of independent space habitats wasn't
>Freeman Dyson's, it was Gerard O'Neil's, circa the late '60s...

Sorry, not so.  Dyson's *original* paper demonstrated the adequacy of the
supply of materials by postulating a solid sphere, but he followed up on
that with more detailed discussions which specified a swarm of smaller
bodies.  See his paper "The Search for Extraterrestrial Technology" in
Perspectives in Modern Physics (R.E. Marshak, ed.), published in 1966.
(I've seen references to the same material appearing in a talk given
by Dyson somewhat earlier.)

O'Neill's key contribution was not so much the idea of space colonies, but
the observation that space is a *better* place to live than the surface of
a planet -- that an industrial civilization would *prefer* operating in
open space even if planets were available.
-- 
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s.      | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
              -Hal W. Hardenbergh (1985)|  henry@zoo.toronto.edu  utzoo!henry
Newsgroups: sci.space