From: mss2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Michael S. Schiffer)
Subject: Re: God and Science:  The Ramblings of The Nightstalker
Reply-To: mss2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 02:07:48 GMT

In article <1drqamINNgu1@gap.caltech.edu> lydick@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU writes:
>In article <1992Nov11.043814.795@midway.uchicago.edu>, mss2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Michael S. Schiffer) writes:

>=	"Well... but science works that way too, to a certain extent.
>=`Where did the Earth come from?'  `Condensation from a cloud of dust,
>=with the rest of the solar system?' `Where did the dust come from?'
>=`Supernova explosions adding to interstellar hydrogen and helium.'
>=`Where did the original matter come from?'  `The Big Bang.'  `What
>=caused the Big Bang?'  `Ummmm ...'  The question is whether the
>=explanation gives greater understanding than we had before, not
>=whether it explains _everything_.  Religion _may_ explain human
>=beings' purpose in the world-- but it won't and doesn't need to
>=explain the purpose of quasars or radio galaxies or sea anemones or
>=aliens billions of light years away whom we'll never meet.

>The problem is that MANY religions PURPORT to explain human beings' purpose in
>the world.  This would not, of course, be a problem execept for the fact that
>they don't all agree on just WHAT that purpose is.  So we're left with a number
>of apparently purely arbitrary and conflicting claims as to what that purpose
>may be.  How does one choose?

	"How indeed?  By thinking about it, and considering which
answers seem more reasonable don't contradict what one already knows
about the world, both material and moral.  What do you expect me to
say?  Wait till you see a flaming symbol in the sky?  Even if you saw such
I'm sure that either of us could come up with a perfectly logical
explanation for that.  Figure out what your axioms are and find the
system or non-system which fits them.  But after all, your axioms, by
definition, are no more _logical_ than anyone else's-- it's just a
question of whether they satisfy _you_.  Clearly, that doesn't mean
that I don't believe in the existence of a real world or a real
distinction between truth and falsehood-- but both of those are pretty
close to being axiomatic for _me_.  If someone chooses solipsism or a
belief that the world is an illusion, I can't disprove that-- but
conversely it's unlikely that I'll be convinced otherwise."

>=Why are we here?'  Christianity claims it's `Because God wants us to become
>=more like Him-- to become closer to Him because He's the source of all
>=things good, and distance from Him hurts us.'

>Other religions say it's because one or more gods expect to end up involved in
>a huge war and they'll need all the help they can get.  Again, none of these
>religions seems to have any greater claim to truth than the others.

	"Well, actually _each_ of them _makes_ a greater claim to
truth.  (Actually, I exaggerate-- there are syncretic religions which
presume truth to be entirely subjective.)  Clearly, none of them has
convinced you they have a greater claim to the truth.  Equally
clearly, each of them has convinced _some_ people that they do.
Again, unless one presumes that all of these people are fools, it
would seem that agnosticism is the best one can do until and unless
one finds a compelling reason to accept a hypothesis.  And what
constitutes a compelling reason probably depends on one's axioms--
after all, the power of any method of finding truth, including
deductive and inductive logic, cannot itself be proved without making
unprovable assumptions."

>=	But those are all just more questions.  And, of course,
>=getting to them requires accepting the hypothesis advanced-- which in
>=turn means considering the Christian answer to the `whys' more
>=compelling than other answers to the question of `Why are we here?'
>=Many don't consider the question meaningful at all.  I do, because I
>=think most people can't help but assign moral meaning to their actions
>=(i.e. believing certain acts committed by them or against them to be
>=unjust) and I consider a mass delusion of meaning and free will to be
>=a less compelling hypothesis.

>Why do you consider it a less compelling hypothesis? 

	"I have direct experience of exercising free will-- more
direct than my experience of the real world itself, which is after all
filtered through sensory experience before reaching my consciousness.
I _could_ be wrong about this, but since no one has yet devised a
means to prove or disprove the hypothesis, and I don't think it's
irrelevant (since I would consider it unjust to hold people
responsible for their actions if they had no choice in the matter) I
have to choose one position or the other."

>=	"Maybe, maybe not.  After all, some believe that conscience is
>=in part a communication from God.

>Then they must, I assume, believe that dogs also receive the same sort of
>communication from God?  After all, dogs have been known to exhibit behavior
>which in a human would be ascribed to a guilty conscience.  So, do dogs have
>souls?

	"I haven't the foggiest idea.  But ascribing a guilty
conscience to dogs may merely be a matter of anthropomorphism-- like
calling some animal's facial expression a "smile" because it
superficially resembles our smile, without any knowledge as to whether
the source is the same.  We know humans from the inside, and hence
have some experience what internal mental processes cause the external
behavior described.  We don't have the same knowledge about dogs.
Nor, in any case, do we concern ourselves with the moral culpability
of dogs.  Should we?  Anyone want to argue that social mores and moral
theories should encompass dogs (as moral actors, that is, not as
possible targets of moral or immoral actions)?"

Michael
-- 
Michael S. Schiffer, LHN, FCS	"Indeed I tremble for my country
mss2@midway.uchicago.edu	 when I reflect that God is just."
mike.schiffer@um.cc.umich.edu	 -- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on
mss2@amber.uchicago.edu		    Virginia (1784)