From: thedemon@world.std.com (Dan C Duval)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Anti-Patriot media is at it again
Date: 29 Sep 92 12:59:00 GMT
Organization: NCR Corporation - Law Department


From Dan C Duval <thedemon@world.std.com>


> Summary: Do these dolts know anything?
> Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 16:36:24 GMT
> >From viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson)
> 	I was unable to watch the show in question, but on A&E
> last night there was supposed to be an "Investigative Report"
> item on the effectiveness of the Patriot missile system during
> Desert Storm.  I'm hoping somebody did watch it and can post a
> synopsis of what was seen as the flaw.
> 
> 	Based upon the short previews given, though, the big gripe
> seems to be that the Patriot did not, in fact, intercept the
> inbounds but instead merely exploded near them.  Gee, and I thought
> nearly all anti-air missiles did this.  Last I heard, it is much
> more likely to disable or destroy an inbound if you explode near it
> and send chunkies into its vital areas than if you try to actually
> hit the thing and then explode.  I suppose these same journalists
> think that the tracers from machine guns shown sweeping over
> Bhagdad were more effective than standard flak because they require
> a true hit to do damage.  <sigh!>
> 
> 	If I'm wrong on this, I'm sure somebody will elaborate, but
> if the media starts reporting this sort of thing without doing the
> very minimum of homework on it, one wonders who has an axe to grind.
 
I watched the A&E report and it did not appear anywhere near as biased
as your article did.

The gist of the program was not that the Patriot exploded near the missile
(as it was designed to do) to rather more often exploded far away from
the target than near. One bit of footage most frequently seen in the report
was of the sortie of three Patriots against a single Scud. Raytheon officials
pointed out how each Patriot exploded near the missile, as intended, and how
from at least one of the "hits", debris was apparently scattered (though
they implied that the debris was of the Scud rather than of the Patriot
itself --either choice is complete supposition.) The "anti-Patriot" expert
pointed out that the warhead apparently got through, continued on course, and
exploded (indicated by a flash of reflected light as the warhead struck.) --
making this one event three "misses" rather than the three successful
interceptions it had been scored as.

Three major parties were used to debate the Patriot's effectiveness in
combat: the single "anti-Patriot" expert, Raytheon officials, and US Army
spokesmen. In addition, the history of the Patriot (including its evolution
from an anti-aircraft missile once it became obsolescent) was traced,
showing video of tests made against aircraft (for the most part, older
planes such as the F-102) and a quick clip of what is supposed to be a
missile interception. The phased array radar system was explained and how
it limited not only the arc of coverage of the system, but that it was
also unable to distinguish between warheads, debris, and undamaged missiles.

Raytheon's position was that the Patriot is an unqualified success. The
anti-Patriot expert (whose name I cannot remember) felt that the system
was at best 40% successful. The Army reps said that they were too busy
fighting the war to count hits and misses and that, regardless of the score,
Patriot was better than having nothing.

My conclusion after watching the program: any system that lets a functional
warhead through even after three "hits" (according to Raytheon) is at best
a qualified success. On top of this, it doesn't matter to me if I'm hit by
an active warhead or or by 1000 lbs of debris traveling just under the
speed of sound. If the warhead contains (contained) chemical or biological
agents, I'm probably still screwed when the debris arrives. The only time
it appears that the debris is a better choice is when the missile was
carrying a nuclear weapon, when I might be willing to give a Patriot its
40%+ shot rather than do nothing at all.

In terms of efficiency, exchanging three Patriots for one Scud is a losing
proposition, when each Patriot lauching costs more than the launching of a
Scud (I do hope you are including the radars, launchers, crews. etc when
computing the cost of a launch.) This exchange rate might be fine for a war
of attrition with a third-rate power, but loses when your enemy has equal or
greater resources in the theater of operations or can force the Patriots to
be scattered out over a large area of protection.

If the A&E program was biased reporting, the bias was lost on me. I had
assumed that the Patriot had done all that was claimed for it -- I'd heard
no other opinion. But this program showed me information that indicated that
the Patriot was not the proof of SDI, and barely proof enough to justify
its own existence, even though the program included long explanations from
both Raytheon and the Army (basically unconvincing after seeing the flash
of the Scud warhead when it hit after three "successful" interceptions.)

A&E did end with the observation that the US Army is continuing its efforts
to improve the Patriot, and actually managed to not sound as if the effort
was doomed from the start (which I imagine will surprise Mr. Sorenson to
no end.)

I can't say that I've found all of A&E's Investigative Reports all that
credible but this one seemed to be pretty legitimate journalism.

In my humble opinion, of course.

Dan C Duval
thedemon@world.std.com
Newsgroups: sci.military,soc.history