From: cuhes@csv.warwick.ac.uk (Malcolm McMahon)
Newsgroups: sci.nanotech
Subject: Surviving
Date: 12 Jan 93 05:07:54 GMT
Organization: Computing Services, University of Warwick, UK


I  am  a  newcomer to this newsgroup,  and to some  extent  to  the 
feeling  of the immanence of nano-technology.  However from what  I 
have read it seems to me that there is little progrees on what,  to 
me  is  overwhealmingly the most important  question:  How  are  we 
going  to  survive acquiring this technology?  There is  a  feeling 
that   the  answer  is  education.   This  feeling  seems  to   say 
"everything will be fine if people listen to us." Yet if people  do 
start listening;  if they ask "OK,  so what should we do to get  as 
much  of  the cheese as possible while avoiding the  trap?"  do  we 
have good answers? So far I haven't seen many I find convincing.

     Erik Drexler, in "Engines", discusses several ideas in general 
terms.  It seems to me all these ideas have a common problem.  They 
violate  the  most  basic  law  of  safety  engineering,   the  KIS 
principal:  Keep It Simple. Complex systems are unpredictable. They 
are cannot be subjected to failure path analysis.  The more complex 
a system is the more likely that the engineer will fail to  foresee 
and block all the ways it can be defeated.

     The  active shield idea seems to fly in the face of  precedent 
and common sense. Compare the sophistication needed for anti-misile 
technology with that of misile technology. Why? because a misile is 
a  far harder target than the city it is sent to destroy.  Worse  a 
destructive agent needs succeed only once;  a defensive agent  must 
succeed every time. Suppose you applied evolutionary engineering in 
an  attempt  to co-evolve the ultimate  destructive  and  defensive 
nano.  Which  do  you think would win?  My money would  be  on  the 
destructor  every time.  (And I'd want to watch the contest from  a 
safe distance; say, from another universe :-) ).
  
     Now  consider the sealed laboratory idea.  Let's grant  for  a 
moment that it can be made genius-proof (foolproof is easy).  Still 
it  seems  to me that is would satisfy only some of  what  I  would 
expect  to  be the smallest group of would-be  nano  experimenters; 
those  interested  in  the  mechanics  of  nano  manipulation   and 
reproduction. It is also proposes a whole new burocracy.

     I  would  imagine  nano  experimenters  would  fall  into  the 
following   classes  in  decreasing  numbers.

1)   Those  who  wanted  to  use  nano  to  experiment  with  novel 
     macroscopic  artifacts  and would probably be content  with  a 
     large  but  finite  range of  available  material  properties. 
     Engineers, artists, cooks, architects and ordinary people.

2)   Those who wanted to experiment with the biological aspects  of 
     nano-technology.

3)   Those who wished to experiment with novel molecular structures 
     which  might have new and exciting bulk  properties,  such  as 
     high  temperature superconductivity.  Those who wanted to  use 
     nano-machines on novel substrates.

4)   Those  who  wished to experiment with novel  nano-machine  and 
     nano-computers architecture and programming.

     The sealed lab concept might take care of most of catagory  4) 
(though  you  can bet there will be those that want  to  play  with 
elements not included in the lab).  The cost would be burocracy and 
frustration and the resultant incentives to cheat.

     For  catagory  1)  and  those who simply  want  to  use  nano-
technology  as a manufacturing tool (which is going to be  everyone 
on the planet) a replicator with a limited programability might  be 
an answer.

     Imagine  a nano-machine with two CPUs.  One can be  programmed 
with  instructions  downloaded from a CAD setup but has  no  direct 
access  to the replicator's effectors.  The other CPU controls  the 
effectors and contains instructions for replication and for  making 
a  large  but  finite range of  molecular  structures  and  perhaps 
certain  type  of  nano-components.  This  system  CPU  is  heavily 
protected.  The user CPU sends requests to the system CPU concerned 
with creating a volume of a particular molecular structure or  with 
replication,  communication and adhesion. The resolution of "build" 
commands  is  limited  so  as  to  preclude  making  "unauthorised" 
molecular structures such as explosives.

     This  does not actually prevent your next door neighbour  from 
making  a  fleet of helicopter gunships in his back garden  but  it 
does, at least, require him to go shopping for the ammo.

     Yes,  OK,  it's  too complicated.  Are there better ideas  out 
there? Has anyone got a clue about classes 2) and 3).

Malcolm McMahon