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Subject:      LIBRES 3.1 Feature Article (Part 2)

LIBRES 3.1 Feature Article - Part 2  (876 lines)

LIBRES:  Library and Information Science Research
(ISSN:  1058-6768 published monthly)
January 19, 1993

====================================================================

       US Administration Perspectives

       American receptiveness to Third World desires tended to vary
with the government of the day. After a relatively tolerant
treatment of Third World aspirations under Kennedy, (Preston, et
al. 1989: 94-98), Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, America tended to
revert to the "domino theory" of Soviet expansionism during the
Reagan era. In retrospect, Richard Nixon observes:

       "Poverty and bad government are nothing new. What is new
       is that millions who endure poverty and bad government
       can now know what they are missing. To see how the other
       half lives, all they have to do is switch on their
       television sets. Their realization that those who live in
       the West are far more wealthy, far more comfortable, and
       far better fed, has created enormous frustration and
       tension throughout the developing world." (Nixon,
       1984:73).

       In characterising the less developed nations as "frustrated"
at the speed of development, Nixon's observation recalls Daniel
Lerner's 1954 statement:

       "These societies-in-a-hurry have little patience with the
       historical pace of Western development; what happened in
       the  west over centuries, some Middle Easterners now seek
       to accomplish in years. Moreover, they want to do it
       their own way." (Lerner, 1954: 47).

       Daniel Lerner proposed that Third World "modernization" would
follow inevitably from urbanisation and exposure to the media - a
notion which perhaps underlies Nixon's view. Both assume that the
developing nations want to become more "modern" or "Western", and
are understandably anxious to have it happen faster.

       By contrast, Ronald Reagan saw in the restlessness of the
Third World, a confirmation of the "domino theory" policy of
piecemeal but ongoing conquest for socialism. MacFarlane cites the
following Reagan observation:

       "Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union is behind
       all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged
       in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hotspots
       in the world." [1]

       The theory that the Soviet Union was promoting Third World
causes as a means of isolating the United States figured strongly
in administration thinking during the Reagan years. It is reflected
in statements made by other members of staff, such as Jean
Kirkpatrick and George Shultz, both of whom expressed fears of
Soviet "encirclement" from bases Nicaragua, the Caribbean and
Central America. (MacFarlane, 1989b: 179).
                 MacFarlane, and others concluded however, that the Soviet
Union was reluctant to become involved in the region. (Kramer,
1989: 66). Eugene B. Rumer of the Rand Corporation suggested that
the Soviet military had "not shown much interest in the Third
World", and predicted that under Gorbachev, the trend would
continue. (MacFarlane, 1989: 126-128).

       Soviet Perspectives

       Although perhaps exaggerated, US administration concerns were
not without foundation. Long after the American withdrawal from
Unesco, during subsequent debate about the possibility of rejoining
the organisation, Reuter moved a story entitled "Soviets accept
blame for UNESCO pullout."

       "PARIS (Reuter) - The Soviet Union accepts a share of the blame
       for the decision by the United States and Britain to quit the
       United Nations cultural agency UNESCO, the Soviet foreign
       minister said yesterday. The United States, Britain and Singapore
       left in 1984 and 1985, alleging financial mismanagement under
       former director-general Amadou Mahtar M'Bow. Eduard
       Shevardnadze said Moscow helped to pave the way because it felt
       ideas were being imposed on his country that were unacceptable."
       (Toronto Star, Thu 13 Oct 88: A9).


       Soviet bloc commentators such as Alimov (1987), and Bulatovic (1978),
affirmed the importance of the NWICO to the Non-Aligned movement, the
congruence of aims between the NWICO and a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), and the Soviet influence upon both. Citing the economic declaration of
the 1976 Colombo conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Alimov
affirmed that in his country's view, the NIEO was essential to equitable
distribution of wealth.

       From a socialist point of view, the less developed countries are not
"poor", since they possess ample resources and populations - which, in
Marxism, are regarded merely units of capital. Rather, these nations are
"backward", because they are unable to exploit their wealth.  In a Marxist
theory of value, capital is just "uncrystallized labour," and labour is capital
turned productive. (P. Sloan, 1973: 38). Thus, Alimov could say that the
underdeveloped nations were "wealthy", because they contained vast human
resources. Socialists could argue that it is in the interests of imperialist
and neo-imperialist forces to maintain the condition of imbalance, as
capitalist expansion demands the existence of sources of cheap resources and
of consumer sales which the Third World nations represent.

       As Alimov acknowledged, the West had claimed that the Non-Aligned
Movement did not represent "genuine non-alignment". The NAM countries did not
maintain "equidistance" between the two contending ideologies - capitalism and
communism, nor between the two competing superpowers. The West alleged that
the NAM represented a process increasingly 'politicised' and Eastward-leaning.
However, to Soviet theorists like Alimov, the concept of "genuine non-
alignment" was merely an ideologically inspired imperialist myth. Nor did he
deny the Soviet Union's influence upon the NAM.

       "It would be naive to deny the direct ideological influence of the
       Soviet Union on the development of the national liberation
       movement today. The ideas of the great October Socialist
       Revolution and the Soviet policy of peace meet the aspirations of
       the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania... They have
       also influenced the evolution of the anti-imperialist concept and
       policy of non-alignment. This is a commonly recognized fact."
       (Alimov, 1987: 160).

       This acknowledgement of the Soviet role highlights the gulf in
understanding between East and West during the period. Alimov, Shevardnadze,
and the others freely admitted the Soviet agenda - not because they wished
to confirm Western conspiracy theories, but because from a Marxist-Leninist
stance, that agenda was desirable.

       At the time, both superpowers supported client regimes and "liberation"
movements in potential or existent states. From Alimov's stance, the actions
of imperialist military forces, or of neo-imperialist ones such as multi-
national corporations, could not be equated with those of the "progressive
forces", namely, the socialist community. Whether by arms or by trade, they
sought to maintain economic hegemony in the place of 19th Century style
colonialism, while his side promoted the genuine liberation and self-
determination of peoples. (Alimov, 1987: 167). Thus, from the Soviet point of
view, Western economics could be held to blame for hegemonic activities in
business as well as for "aggressive wars" and for supporting "tyrannical
regimes" in order to protect bourgeois interests.

       Soviet leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev maintained that it was not
really necessary to promote of revolution in the less developed countries.
Brezhnev's policy assumed the character of "resisting Western export of
counterrevolution." (MacFarlane, 1989a: 10). However, Brezhnev asserted that,
while maintaining peace generally, the Soviet Union had the right to intervene
to protect communist regimes by any means including force, and to assist in
otherwise sovereign states wherein tendencies toward capitalism indicated
attempts to subvert communism. This statement came to be known as the
"Brezhnev Doctrine". (Safire, 1978: 177).

       MacFarlane remarks that the Soviet Union tended to view American
criticism of this policy as hypocritical. While America supported repressive
regimes such as Pinochet's in Chile, the US raised "an absurd noise ... about
'expansion', when the forces of progress aid freedom-loving peoples subjected
to imperialist and racist aggression." [2]

       Information was explicitly recognised in the Unesco Media Declaration
and MacBride Report as a prerequisite for economic development. By corollary,
the structure of world information flow must necessarily be viewed as
supportive of the global economy. In Non-alignment and Information, the
Yugoslavian writer Bulatovic asserted that the imbalance in communication
flow was merely an extension of economic inequity:

       "The existing imbalance and inequality in the sphere of political
       and economic relations has also gained full expression within the
       domain of information, the non-aligned countries having noted with
       concern `the vast and ever growing gap between communicatoin
       [sic] capacities in the non-aligned countries and in the advanced
       countries which is a legacy of their colonial past' at the summit
       conference in Colombo." (Bulatovic, 1978: 10).

       In Bulatovic's analysis, the term "information" was used almost
exclusively to refer to "news", and domination in the information sphere to
refer to the de facto monopolies of the major wire services. For Bulatovic,
AP, UPI, Agence France-Presse, Reuter, TASS and Deutsche Press Agenture
(DPA):

       "...practically constitute the exclusive sources of information
       used by the mass communication media in the insufficiently
       developed countries including also the national agencies which
       have a monopoly position in their countries with regard to the
       dissemination of news, and are in actual fact mere affiliates of
       the aforementioned agencies." (Bulatovic, 1978: 11).

       As well, the allocation of radio frequencies by the WARC was considered
detrimental to the less developed countries (Surprennant, 1983 and 1989). By
keeping the best radio frequencies to themselves - those upon which signals
propagate easily -  the developed nations force their poorer neighbours to
install more expensive and powerful equipment, widening the gap yet further.
(Bulatovic, 1978: 17). Cooperative ventures such as the establishment of the
non-aligned countries' News Agencies Pool sought to marshall collective
buying power to offset the effect of media monopolies.

       Given the frank admissions of Eastern commentators that the goals of
the NAM were tied to those of the NWICO and NIEO, and that all were beneficial
to the cause of world socialism, coupled with the inclusion of Marxist-
sounding phrases such as "hegemony", "neo-imperialism", and "domination", in
the literature, it is easy to see how Western, particulary American, alarms
could have been raised about Unesco's politicization. It remains to be seen how
seriously Western interests could in fact have been jeopardised by Third
World activism.

       Western suspicion of any Unesco agenda supported by the Soviets served
to enmesh the NWICO further in the political web. While the ideological
bickering and "vitriolic name calling" continued, the genuine needs of the
developing nations persisted. It is important to note, however, that the
critics of the existing information regime included not only Soviet bloc
commentators, but also Western scholars.

       The Controversy over M'Bow

       The NWICO agenda was complicated further by controversies over the
character of Unesco's Director-General, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow. An educator
with and earned Licentiate from Paris, experience as an education minister,
and a great many honourary degrees, M'Bow was repeatedly characterised by
the Western press as being "personally extravagant", a poor manager,
"wasteful", given to patronage, anti-Western in outlook and deficient in
academic credentials.

       In what was itself a remarkable example of selectivity in the media,
 M'Bow
was repeatedly referred to as Unesco's "controversial", leader, and the
organisation as "beleaguered", during his thirteen-year tenure, and during his
unsuccessful 1988 bid for re-election. These ad hominem attacks against the
Unesco leader were applied with dubious logic to critiques of the
organisation's programme.

                 After 1985, Unesco's efforts to persuade the United States to
 return
to the organisation included changes to budget and fiscal policies, election
of a compromise candidate for Director General, and rewording of the
controversial media charter. Sections of the media charter most offensive to
the West, such as "Item 12", had already been dropped by the time of the
MacBride Report, as noted by the Executive of the US Commission to Unesco,
and well before the 1984 American pullout.

       Simultaneously, however, M'Bow attempted to sue the United States to
obtain the 1985 funding it had withheld. In 1986, jurist Karel Vasek called
M'Bow's stance "legal nonsense" and resigned from his Unesco advisory
position. On October 2 of that year, Reuter carried a story which quoted Vasek
as "accusing Director-General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow of conducting a private
war against the United States and Britain, and of harming international
relations." [3]

       M'Bow attempted to retaliate. The Western powers were merely using
Unesco and the United Nations as a convenient scapegoat, he charged in a
Reuter item of 21 October, 1987:

            "Some people have sought to make the failings of the
            U.N. system  responsible for the most flagrant flaws
            in international relations," M'Bow said at the start of
            a full meeting of UNESCO's  158 member states. "But it
            can only reflect the dilemmas of the international
            community." [4]

       While M'Bow had stated in 1986 that he would not seek re-election as
Unesco's head, he changed his mind two years later. A plethora of Reuter and
UPI reports criticized him for seeking an "unprecedented" third term in office
during the November 1988 campaign.

       While Canada remained in Unesco, its media followed the American line in
opposing M'Bow's re-election. "Controversial M'Bow seeks third term as UNESCO
head", proclaimed a 1987 Toronto Star headline.[5]

       The article, derived from the Associated Press wire, portrayed M'Bow's
action as "challenging Western governments that have criticized his
leadership for the past 13 years." M'Bow's nomination had been proffered by
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the article reported. An un-named
Canadian External Affairs spokesperson voiced Canada's belief that "it would
not be in the interests of UNESCO" for M'Bow to be given a third term."
According to this official, Unesco needed "methods of "modern financial
control." [6]

       Another article dubbed M'Bow "dangerous", and to suggested his re-
election "could spell the end of the cultural agency." The story quoted
"Western diplomats and observers", who contended that electing M'Bow "could
lead to financial and political disaster, causing new departures by Western
nations and further aggravating UNESCO's budget problems." It presented an
itemized list of M'Bow's failings, charging that "his call for new world
 economic,
information and communications systems also offended the West".

                 "He lives rent-free on a $159,000 salary and travels
 extensively...
       He is wasteful of UNESCO's resources, his critics say, signing
       over 70 per cent of the budget to staff. M'Bow's opponents also
       feel his academic qualifications are insufficient for the post of
       director-general." [7]

       It is interesting that these stories repeatedly criticized M'Bow for his
fiscal control without dwelling upon the politicization of Unesco, and made the
NWICO appear to be part of his own personal agenda instead of the result of
consensus reports. Western readers were presented with credible reasons for
the Western pullout, but not all the reasons - perhaps not even the foremost
reasons.

       Nor did the controversy end with M'Bow's defeat. A compromise candidate,
Spanish biochemist Federico Mayor Zaragoza, became Unesco leader in 1988. [9]
"Diplomats hailed the result", according to press accounts, "as signalling a
new spirit of reconciliation" at Unesco. However, Mayor began to draw the
familiar Western criticisms almost immediately. Reproaches varied from
accusations of his being "too slow" in conducting reforms, to claims of
extravagance in employing "hundreds of consultants" and seeking to create "44
senior posts at a cost of $6.5 Million, figures which Mayor repeatedly denied.
[8]

       Western displeasure with Unesco persisted throughout the 1980s. The
Reagan and Bush administrations continued to criticise Unesco for fiscal
ineptitude, while admitting that "vitriolic name calling against the West" had
"largely been eliminated". [10]

       However, US administrations had other reasons to defer. One further
source of dissatisfaction was the application of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation for full membership in various UN bodies, including Unesco, in May
of 1989. At this point, both the United States and the PLO were both sending
"observers" to Unesco. The US observer, Terry Miller, remarked in a Reuter
story: "I think it's clear that the admission of the PLO as a member would make
it much more difficult for the U.S. to consider rejoining the organization."
Omar Massalha, the PLO observer replied that "Arab states were studying ways
of compensating for the U.S. threat." [11] In the event, the PLO settled for
"observer" status. Nevertheless, the issue lent fresh fuel to administration
charges of Unesco's politicization.

       Meanwhile, Mayor, instituted cuts in Unesco's staffing, meeting and
travel budgets. Since Unesco's mandate includes facilitating consultation
among specialists of various nations, this revelation might appear unnerving.
More disturbing yet was Mayor's 1988 assertion that "documentation of all
sorts had been cut by 50%" since he came to office. If the provision of
documentation has indeed been curtailed to such a degree, it is clear that the
US withdrawal has had drastic consequences for Unesco effectiveness as a
provider of scientific and technical information. [12]

       Finally, some concessions to the liberal theory of free flow of
information seem to have crept back into the text of a revised Media
Declaration. In November of 1989, a Reuter story announced a compromise: "The
freedom of the press has returned to the halls of UNESCO," said Canadian
delegate Tom McPhail. [13]
                 Stating that the debate had "dogged the life of the U.N. agency
 for
years", the story continued: "Critics of the original charter, the New World
Information Order, said it was anti-Western and muzzled the press." Despite
repeated reassurances from commentators with as widely diverging views as
Masmoudi and Sussman, the notion of the NWICO as a proposal for licensing
journalists persisted.

       The warm reactions of various unnamed "Western delegates" to the
revised charter's language may be accounted for by its adoption of two key
stances. First, the new wording enshrined the liberal concept of freedom of
information, though in a somewhat backhanded manner:

            "The new text maintains the old charter's call for
            balanced information but adds `without any obstacle
            to the freedom of expression'." (ibid.)

       As well, the revised charter addressed a key liberal concern - that
Third World governments might seek to nationalise more of the news media,
either overtly, or by limiting funding and concessions.

            Amendments put in by Western delegates are aimed at
            ensuring that UNESCO funds will flow both to private
            and public media. (ibid.)

       In 1990, US State Secretary James Baker announced that the United
States would continue to observe the organisation, but would not rejoin
Unesco. [14]  A report to the Senate drafted by John Bolton, recommended
staying out of Unesco, in order to enjoy "The leverage we retain as a
sought-after non-member." Bolton's report criticised Unesco for spending "70
per cent of its money on a "top-heavy bureaucracy" in Paris and only 7 per
cent on fighting illiteracy." Unesco, in the administration view, still suffered
from "the same poor management and political bias" which led to US withdrawal.
In this analysis, Unesco remained "excessively politicised."

       It seems clear, therefore, that the "politicization" of Unesco was merely
part of a broader phenomenon. In the years since the Second World War, a great
many new countries had come into being as the British, French, and Dutch, for
example, dismantled their empires. There were many new voices in the United
Nations and in Unesco, and as Surprennant observed, the United States could
simply no longer rely upon consensus or upon its own technical sophistication
to carry motions in these fora.

       If the NWICO debate of the 1980s is viewed in this historical context,
then attacks on the character and ability of M'Bow as Unesco director seem
strident and misleading. The United States had found fault with M'Bow's
predecessor, and would do so with his successor. The politicization of Unesco,
while real, was not an isolated phenomenon. It was merely part of an historical
trend. Preston suggests that America could not come to grips with its sudden
numerical disadvantage in the General Assembly, and therefore reacted badly.
(Preston et al., 1989: 193).

       Theoretical Challenges

                 Whatever the political inspiration of NWICO claims, two facts
 remain.
First, concern over development information results from the ongoing
"frustration" of Third World nations noted by Richard Nixon. Second, the truth
of the claims remains a fruitful area for study. The imbalance in the
production and flow of cultural products remains, whether good or bad for the
receiving nations.

       The validity of NWICO claims about of media ownership went largely
unchallenged on both sides. After all, corporate ownership can be established
easily from sources like Who Owns Whom. However, liberals and structuralist
were sharply divided about the adverse effects of media concentration.
Numerous works such as Smith (1980), the MacBride Report (Unesco, 1980), Meyer
(1985), and Herman and Chomsky (1989), established the concentration of news
flows in the hands of the "big five" agencies (AP, UPI, Reuter, AFP, and TASS),
sometimes with the addition of other smaller agencies.

       Herman and Chomsky, for example, referred to some 34 media agencies.
However, most studies have focused on the established concerns of news flow,
bias in the news media, the effects of advertising, the actions of multi-
nationals, and trans-border data flows. The effects of elites - such as non-
media oriented multi-nationals with branch offices in the Third World, or
privileged groups within such nations, go largely unexplored, despite studies
of the "elite press", which have received some attention. (Mazharul Haque,
1988).

       This may be due to the fact that the sorts of information which pertain
most to development (financial, technical, scientific), are proprietary or
restricted, and hence more difficult to study. Some confirmation of this
notion comes from the management literature. For example, one paper on
transborder management speaks of the "flow of intelligence, ideas and
knowledge" as being essential to multi-national operations. (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1987). The most difficult problem for one company, the study says, was
"the quick transfer of proprietary knowledge within the company." The solution
for another - to transfer people, rotating senior staff worldwide, "thereby
strengthening the web of interdependence." While it may be argued that high-
tech companies such as Xerox and Geac, which maintain internal electronic mail
services, move documents, software, and management reports across borders
with ease and in virtual secrecy, the management skills required to implement
new products, strategies, or techniques cannot be transmitted electronically.

       The most rigorous examination of specific NWICO hypotheses is to be
found in William Meyer's work (Meyer, 1988). Beginning with an outline of the
neo-colonial nature of contemporary news-flow patterns, Meyer specifies and
tests the structuralist thesis and the theory of cultural dominance following
accepted social science methodology.

       Meyer's typology of conservative, reformist [liberal], and structuralist
NWICO schools is worthy of note, as it forms the basis for an understanding
both of the NWICO and of the objections to it which have been raised. The
conservatives, represented by Leonard Sussman of Freedom House, and
dissenting MacBride Commissioner Elie Abel, see imbalance in news flow as a
"natural characteristics of information gathering and dissemination." He
quotes Abel's objection:

                 "At no time has the commission seen evidence adduced in support
       of the notion that market and commercial considerations
       necessarily exert a negative effect [upon societies]." (Meyer,
       1985: 7).

       The reformist doctrine readily recognises the imbalance in
communications flow, and acknowledges its adverse effects. According to
Meyer, Sean MacBride represents the reformist school in proposing concepts
such as "development journalism", and "development information", which would
emphasise the training of indigenous personnel and the establishment of
regional press agencies as a remedy for "spot news" and inadequate Third
World coverage. As well, the reformist agenda includes amplification of the
range of sources currently considered credible by the Western press, de-
emphasising government sources as the sole "experts" on political events, and
allowing the inclusion of "unofficial as well as official sources". (Meyer,
1985:9).

       However, while the terminology may be relatively new, the earliest
Unesco documents emphasised training of indigenous personnel, free flow of
information, and mutual appreciation of cultural values. (Unesco, 1947, 1960).
While Meyer (and Masmoudi) might well argue that it was not until the 1970s
that the current labels became attached to these activities, their origins in
the optimism of the post-war period should not be overlooked.

       Meyer also notes that Galtung's theory can be extended well beyond the
issue of news flow imbalance, to include the study of tourism, corporate
presences, and other social or commercial relations which currently exist
between former colonising and colonised nations. As well, he is fully cognizant
of the major difference between the structural theory and its competitors -
the structuralist tenet that information should be considered a social good
rather than a commodity.

       It is of note that liberal notions of technology transfer and
development information, ideas which follow in the tradition of Daniel Lerner,
include the training of librarians and information specialists, and the
establishment of regional document delivery centres, repatriation of archival
and cultural collections, and other mechanisms of improving development
information delivery to the Third World as well. Working within the system,
liberals would seek to improve Western knowledge of the less developed
countries (development education), while improving the flow of information
needed for development to the LDCs and of exchanging it "horizontally" among
them. CIDA's development education schemes, and Unesco's library training
activities can be understood in this sense.

       Structuralist accept liberal proposals to some degree, Meyer asserts,
but only as precursors to more fundamental changes. Meyer points to
proposals for Third World training centres "condemned by [Herbert] Schiller
as tools of economic neo-imperialism". (Meyer, 1985: 10) quoting (Schiller,
 1976:
11).

       Meyer concludes that while the "framework" of Galtung's schema is
essentially correct, in that it accurately reflects the pattern of information
flow, he has been unable to relate the actions of Western media to "cultural
hegemony", the persuasiveness of their advertising contents to consumer
behaviour, nor the effect of their portrayal of violence upon Third World
crime. (Meyer, 1985: 58, 90, 108).

       It may be objected that Meyer is testing isolated components, rather
than evaluating an entire system. For example, advertising expensive consumer
products in nations with low per-capita income will not likely produce much of
a cash result, although it may occasion expectations about the "good life"
which Meyer, using financial data, is unable to measure.

       Collins (1990), challenges the very notion of cultural sovereignty in a
recent book about Canadian culture. While freely admitting the overwhelming
imbalance in consumption of cultural products, he argues that national
identity depends more upon legal and political institutions than upon culture
or communications. Collins sees the structuralist model of centre-periphery
relations as the "dominant paradigm" among Canadian dependency theorists.

       Collins' major argument with regard to media dependency is to be found
in his criticism of Dallas Smythe (Smythe, 1981), by recourse to the "active
audience" theory of Eliu Katz (Katz and Liebes, 1985). The refocussing of
attention to audience interpretation rather than transmitter value loading,
is reminiscent of conciliatory passages in the MacBride report, to the effect
that the consumer nations are free to reject cheap foreign imports.
According to Barbara Roach such efforts represent an ideologically motivated
attempt by writers "such as Eliu Katz and John Fiske... to undermine both the
notion of cultural imperialism and ideology." (Roach, 1990: 5).

       Additional challenges to the NWICO and calls for a reformulation of the
its basic goals have recently come from sources within the movement as well
as from its traditional opponents among the liberal economic school. Salinas
(1986), argues that it is time to recognize the congruence of NWICO and NIEO
goals and concepts, and to shift the movement's focus from attention to media
flow and toward the more crucial development issues of unequal access to
scientific, technical, and financial information. Roach (1990), advocates a
position which pays increasing attention to the democratic socialist agenda
of the NWICO. Edwards (1990), suggests that the termination of the NWICO is
essential to US interests, and that rejoining Unesco would be "premature",
while Surprennant (1987), argues that US interests would best be served in a
new climate of "mutual trust and good faith."

       Surprennant reasserts that the issues of the NWICO, WARC and TBDF are
inseparably linked, and suggests that concrete steps to ensure fairer access
to radio frequencies and satellite parking orbits, and some indications of a
US trend toward flexibility, the "information war" between developed and less
developed nations has escalated during the years since the MacBride Report.
The issues of trans-border data flow and media imbalance remain largely
unaddressed, Surprennant claims, citing Unesco sources. Maintaining that
resolution of these problems would be in the interests of both camps, he too
suggests that the NWICO debate should be abandoned and further negotiations
conducted under a new rubric and in a "spirit of mutual trust".

       Roach (1990), argues that the NWICO debate has now been largely
abandoned by Unesco, as part of Federico Mayor's attempt to appease the
West, but points out that the agenda has been taken up by such groups as the
Union for Democratic Communication, and the International Federation of
Journalists. As well, she outlines persistent efforts by liberal theorists
such as Eliu Katz, and conservative spokespeople such as Leonard Sussman,
to undermine the movement. Meanwhile, she suggests, the problem of
information disparity has grown worse, while the liberal idealism of Toffler,
Bell, and the "information society" school remains unrealized.

       Moreover, she maintains that the NWICO principle is insufficient to
address the issues of cultural domination, and suggests a new formula which
would abandon the concept of national sovereignty entirely. Arguing that the
statist bias of the NWICO programme of "inter-national" development merely
perpetuates Third World elites and neo-colonial relations, she proposes
adoption of a democratic socialist notion of popular sovereignty. Integral to
Roach's reformulation would be recognition of the interests of women and
other minority groups, and of the effectiveness of mass political action.

       Cautioning that the breakup of East bloc means increasing privatisation
of the media, and creating wider markets for American cultural industries, she
warns that the North-South focus of the NWICO debate, "always too narrow",
is no longer even adequate. The new programme must address the problems of
"have nots" regardless of geography. Roach argues that even among
structuralist such as Kaarle Nordenstreng, a hidden bias against women and
minority groups exists, indicative of an elitist attitude in general.
Nordenstreng erred, Roach charges, when in organising a conference on the
NWICO in 1990, he failed to invite any women. (Roach, 1990:4).

       Roach's reminder that the "North-South" terminology is simply one of
convenience is well taken. As early as 1979, Rein Turn had published an
"Atlantic triangle" diagram to demonstrate that the flow of raw data arrives
in the US from countries to the East as well as the South, while cultural
products and processed information flow the other way. (Becker, 1985: 133).
With the recent changes in Eastern Europe, the "bonanza for US media
transnationals" forecast in that region, increased traffic over the eastward-
leading branch of the triangle should occur.

       While Masmoudi and other Arab spokespeople have paid tribute to the
"liberation of women" in NWICO speeches for some time, there remain broad
gulfs between Western and Islamic interpretations of that particular issue.
The Islamic notion of freedom - freedom to practice what Westerners might see
as restrictive religious practices - is typologically similar to the pre-
Glasnost Soviet idea - freedom from reactionary influence. Losev's 1980
charge that NWICO literature is "too westernised" could be reiterated with
some justification as terms like "greening of the NWICO" and "grass roots
politics" creep into the documents of its proponents.

       Viewed from the "development information" perspective, the inclusion of
concerns for women and minorities expressed in the Roach article, and in the
agenda of the Union for Democratic Communication in which it appears, seem to
complicate the NWICO agenda by interjecting Western interests. From the
"development information" angle, however, Roach's agenda seems worth
considering. If the NWICO platform can be revitalized as a Western
"consciousness-raising" tool, it may achieve its unrealized goal of affecting
the "deontological code" of media producers and controllers.

                 As early as 1986, former ardent NWICO supporter Raquel Salinas
suggested in a brief Information Development article that the agenda had
produced no results. Lamenting that the NWICO concern over domination of news
media obscured crucial role of business, trade, and international relations
information, she suggested that the time had come to scrap the NWICO and
"start all over". Contending that the NWICO and NIEO were identical, she
suggested that the Third World nations band together to promote increased
horizontal sharing of business information which would enable them to
renegotiate mounting and unrepayable debts.

       The sorts of information required by the debtor nations - namely,
business information designed to "reduce uncertainty" and to "aid in decision-
making" - are precisely the sorts of "restricted" information shared by
creditor nations to their great advantage. The information required for
development is not, Salinas argues, the type of information conveyed by the
news media. Thus, no amount of flow redirection in that sphere can address the
crucial issues of development.

       If Surprennant's dialogue of trust and cooperation were to occur within
Unesco or the ITU, a reassessment of American policy would be required. During
the Gorbachev era, conservative perceptions of Unesco and the NWICO remained
largely unchanged. A Gorbachev-era article by Lee Edwards, vice-chair of the
US National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, repeated many
of the traditional administration concerns over Unesco " it was financially
mismanaged, riddled with KGB spies, and neglected practical concerns in favour
of ideology. (Edwards, 1990).

       In Edwards' view, a serious flaw lay in Unesco's continued emphasis on
the collective right to communicate. As well, Unesco programmes such as
support for "national liberation movements" ran contrary to American
interests. While acknowledging that M'Bow and Mayor had "instituted a few
reforms", Edwards cited the Heritage Foundation's Edwin J. Feulner's charge
that Mayor still recognized "the legitimacy of calls for a new world
information and communication order", itself a "cause for alarm." He pointed
to Unesco statements advocating "the overhaul of the role and the messages
of the mass media through the prism of the state rather than the individual
journalist," as evidence of the agency's continued politicization, and
challenged Unesco to institute "its own Glasnost and Perestroika". (Edwards,
1989: 117).

       As readers will no doubt have noted, some of the NWICO and NIEO jargon
has survived. In a 1991 New York Times Magazine article, language columnist
William Safire commented on US President George Bush's repeated use of the
phrase "New World Order". [15] Safire provided a brief recapitulation of the
introduction of the terms "New International Economic Order" and "New World
Information and Communications Order", mentioning their introduction in the
United Nations, but omitting reference to the Non-Aligned Movement. He noted
that Bush's notion of a new order bore similarity to the NIEO idea, and
remarked that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's concurrent use of the
phrase marked the first time both superpowers had adopted identical terms for
major agendas. So far, Safire quipped, no one had picked up on the idea that
Bush's "new order" was to be led by the "new world", that is, by America.

       Conclusions
                 Despite the controversy, concrete steps have been achieved
 toward
implementing selected NWICO goals through Unesco itself, other UN agencies
such as the ITU, regional groups of Third World nations, and professional
organisations such as IFLA, FID, and various groups of journalists computing
and communications workers. As well, technological advances during the 1980s,
especially in microelectronics and satellite communications, have removed
some of the constraints operative at the beginning of the decade; chiefly
because the price of computing has dropped dramatically, and perhaps also
because of increased competition among communication satellite launch
vendors.

       New rules regarding communications satellites and radio frequencies
were introduced in the WARC conferences. The Non-Aligned Press Agencies Pool
(NAMEDIA) became operational. Unesco continued to publish practical
guidebooks for librarians in the Third World, to make library and document
processing software available to them for no charge, (Unesco, 1989), and to co-
sponsor conferences and training programmes.

       On the development education side, agencies such as the Canadian
International Development Agency, the National Film Board of Canada, the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Public Broadcasting System in the
United States, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, have produced many
excellent programmes about the problems of the Third World intended for
viewing in the West.

       In development information provision, advances have occurred as well.
Canada's Northern Network beams television into the Arctic, while radio
networks in Cameroon's and the Caribbean, and India's satellite broadcast
systems provide health, agricultural, and technical information in rural
areas. Perhaps most importantly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
"East-West" political orientation has evaporated. It would seem to be an
appropriate time to renew activity along the North-South axis.



The decade of the 1980s has been the occasion of widespread improvements in
communications and computing technologies. These included innovations in
information processing methods and infrastructures such as high speed packet
switching networks, cheaper satellites, faster processors, cheaper disks, and
fibre optics, and integrated digital and voice communications.

Consequently, it is even more feasible today to conduct business on a 'centre
- periphery' basis. It may be argued that decentralized decision making is
largely illusory. Allowing branch managers to make more decisions locally
poses less of a corporate risk because of the possibility of continual
monitoring of resources, processes, and results by home office. Thus,
ultimate control has not really been decentralised at all. In fact, quite the
opposite may be said to have occurred.

Multinational corporations (MNCs), willingly set up branch plants in the Third
World, where labour and materials are cheaper and government regulations
less stringent. It is arguable that because of today's improved
communications technologies, home office can retain much better control over
the activities of MNCs world wide. The MNC thus becomes one of the principal
sources of transborder data flow.

       Marie-France Plassard pointed out in her annotated bibliography
(Plassard, 1990), that Third World material is still hard to access from Western
databases, citing S. Bandara's 1987 article in Information Development.
Bandara "states that only a few of the scholarly journals considered
important enough to be indexed are produced in developing countries, and that
many of the scientists prefer to communicate through journals published in
developed countries." (Plassard, 1990: 357-358). However, since the latter
1980s, database publishers such as Dialog have introduced new products such
as the Arab Information Bank, (Dialog file 465), which may eventually help
rectify this situation.

       Some theorists such as Johan Galtung suggest that the corporate
organisation of the American conglomerate has become the pattern of
intergovernmental relations as well. Relations between America and the less
developed countries, they argue, can be viewed in the light of the centre-
periphery paradigm. America, viewed as a corporate centre, retains its
proprietary knowledge and technology, while conducting low level resource
procurement and manufacturing activities abroad, but channels the profits
home.

       It has been suggested that protectionist policies, which would seek to
exert national sovereignty by imposing restrictions on the volume or price of
transborder data flows, could become a means of retaining information
sovereignty. The counter argument is simply that restrictions either on cash
flow or data flow from any particular one of the less developed nations will
be ineffective.

       Another point made by critics is that commercial transborder data flow,
like cultural communication, is predominantly one way. Home office gathers raw
information from the periphery, to support decision making at home. Rarely
does useful knowledge flow back to the periphery nations, and when it does, in
likely concerns the introduction of proprietary processes or products. The
sorts of information which would help Third World nations reach the stage of
'adequate development', are not those likely to be passed their way by the
MNCs. (Salinas, 1988). In addition to being material "have-nots", inhabitants of
the periphery nations have become "know-nots" when it comes to possession
of important decision-making knowledge, since raw data is increasingly
processed into knowledge in the centre.

       In summary, major reasons for the difficulties which have been
experienced in implementing the NWICO scheme included muddled Unesco politics,
the rejection of the agenda by successive American administrations, and in
the inability of its supporters to arrive at consensus positions.

       The NWICO debate tended to focus on press freedom, to the detriment of
more urgently needed development information plans. It can be argued that
Unesco may have been an inappropriate forum for the NWICO, since the Western
administrations were already predisposed against various UN agencies. It may
well be that the time has come for the NWICO proposals to be acted out by the
professional organisations. With the advent of the so-called New World Order
of the 1990s, the time is certainly ripe for the abandonment of rhetoric
and the reasoned examination of the sorts of requirements identified by
Salinas, Surprennant and the others.

       On the beneficial side, however, the NWICO debate at least served to
focus government attention upon information in a way hitherto unwitnessed.
It produced general agreement on the structure of the contemporary world
information situation, and engendered some willingness to restructure that
system for the benefit of developing nations.

       Incorporating suggestions from Salinas, Roach, and Surprennant, we can
begin to outline the basics of a post-NWICO model. Since there is little
argument with the structuralist model of information flow itself, this part of
the paradigm will likely remain intact. The new model should pay less attention
to the news media, which constitute a minor percentage of all information
flows across borders.

       Proprietary information is unlikely to be disclosed by the multi-
nationals, so attention to trans border data flows may prove another blind
alley. However, developing nations could study the corporate information
exchange structures which enable creditors to conduct their business so
successfully, and should consider emulating them.

       A post-NWICO agenda should pay more attention to other aspects of
cultural exchange as well - to tourism, the activities of non-governmental
organisations, and to ways to popularize development education schemes.
Rather than shielding tourists from the harsher conditions of Third World life,
governments should consider ways of acquainting visitors with them gently yet
impressively.

       Finally, a New World Order should emphasise development information in
its broadest and most practical senses. Planners should concentrate upon
identifying and implementing the information technology truly required at the
present time. If information is indeed a pre-requisite to economic growth,
then for the underdeveloped nations, information technology is truly
appropriate technology. In short, it is time to reclaim the NWICO for
information science and to get on with the job of implementing it. Trans-
national professional organisations can be of assistance in promoting
appropriate information technology.

       The political alliances formed after the Second World War resulted in a
bi-polar world divided into east and west. Meanwhile, technological and
economic developments superimposed a North and South polarisation which has
resulted in uneven growth and may have perpetuated the gap between affluence
and poverty.

       The emerging political reality of the 1990s will force the adoption of a
new synthesis. This synthesis must combine the "Lerner hypothesis" - that
`modernisation' is inevitable, with the structuralist paradigm - that
inequality is a basic feature of the system. Only when both sides deal with the
logic of each argument rather than the ideologies, will the dialectic of
information inequality find its resolution.


 Notes:


[1] Ronald Reagan. quoted in Schlesinger, A. (1983). "Foreign policy and the
American character". (Foreign Affairs LXII, Winter: 3, cited in MacFarlane,
1983b).

[2] 'Obozrevatel: Opasnaya kampania' [Commentator: dangerous campaign].
Pravda, 14 May, 1976:4, cited in: (MacFarlane, 1989a: 11).

[3]  "U.N. agency's chief biased against West resigning jurist says." Toronto
Star, Thu 2 Oct 86, p. A16.

[4]  "Critics making U.N. a scapegoat M'Bow charges" Toronto Star, Wed 21 Oct
87, p. A19.

[5]  "Controversial M'Bow seeks third term as UNESCO head"  Toronto Star, Fri
25 Sep 87, p. A16.

[6]  "Canada opposed to re-election of controversial UNESCO head". Toronto
Star, Wed 7 Oct 87: A3.

[7]  "Bid by M'Bow for re-election called dangerous to UNESCO"  Toronto Star,
Fri 16 Oct 87, p. A26.

[8]  "Big majority gives Spaniard UNESCO post" Toronto Star,  Sun 8 Nov 87, p.
H3.

[9]  Geddes, Diana. "Expansion sparks flap at U.N. agency". Toronto Star, Fri 25
May, 1990. p. A18.

[10]  "Not ready to rejoin UNESCO, U.S. says". Toronto Star, Tue 17 Apr 90: A3.

[11]  Toronto Star, Wednesday 10 May, 1989.

[12]  "UNESCO spending down, chief says." Toronto Star,  Tue 22 Mar 88 p. A12.
"UNESCO Head Defends Pace of His Changes." Washington Post, 10 Oct 89, p.27.
Wood, Nancy. "U.N. agency chief won't alter reforms." Toronto Star,  Thu 05 Apr
90, p. A22.

[13]  "West praises changes in U.N. media charter"  Toronto Star, Sat 11 Nov 89,
p. A13.

[14]  "Americans reject rejoining UNESCO" Toronto Star, Wed 18 Apr 90, p. A5.
"Not ready to rejoin UNESCO, U.S. says" Toronto Star,  Tue 17 Apr 90, p. A3.

[15]  Safire, William. "The New New World Order", New York Times Magazine,
Sunday 17 Feb 1991, p. 3-5.

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