HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 09:58:27 GMT

In article <183662@pyramid.pyramid.com> pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:

>...has not successfully added any synthetic
>difference between "moral" and "fit."  How can we tell the difference
>between a "real" moral success and a false, temporary non-moral fit?
>The one will allegedly survive in virtue of its morality and the other
>is on its way out.  How to tell the difference?

We analyze evolution of a morality over time, determine the
consequences of that morality for its own propagation, and estimates 
the future propagation.  Ideally this is done by using the scientific 
method to find trends linked to causes, but more practically by using the 
scholarly methods of humanities to track the trends of moral ideas.
In many cases -- extinction, birth control practice, teaching of
children, etc. -- the demonstration of major differences in morality
requires only straightforward reasoning from the basic conclusion
of m.p.  I've done that in previous posts, and will continue to
do that, and feel free to point out any errors in reasoning.  
Moral propagationism is theoretically capable of judging all
moralities, and in practice is very productive in judging
the many kinds of morality under many circumstances.


-- 
szabo@techbook.COM  	  Tuesday, November third  ##  Libertarian  $$  vote
Tuesday  ^^ Libertarian  --  change  **  choice && November 3rd @@Libertarian
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Free will or Can Life After Death be Proven
Date: 30 Sep 92 20:37:46 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

diener@namu01.gwdg.de (Immo Diener) writes:
>THINKING is a process you do not know. You just do it, but you
>do not observe what you do when you think.

I don't know about you, but I've done quite a bit of observation
of my thought processes.

Dave
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Free will or Can Life After Death be Proven
Date: 30 Sep 1992 23:06:33 GMT
Organization: x
Distribution: usa
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:
=|> One might ask similar questions about a computation occurring
=|> in a digital computer.  One difference is, we understand enough
=|> about that domain to realize that those questions hardly make
=|> sense, and trying to answer them doesn't lead to much in the
=|> way of insight into what a computation is.
=
=The point here is not to ask admittedly dumb questions, but to point out
=that the supposed underlying "thing-in-itself", in this case thought, is
=a not a  traditional thing in the Scientific sense.

Still, it is possible to study computation "Scientifically" (well,
mathematically) without it being a "traditional thing".  One does
not study computation by examining the signals going down the bus.

=|> Yet computers continue to compute, and cars continue to run into
=|> each other.
=
=But, not with deterministic certainty gleaned from knowing the initial
=position of the universe and the laws of motion.  The initial "position"
=of the universe is not defined.  All attempts to define it will yield
=uncertainty.

But despite this uncertainty, computations can be studied and they
are generally pretty deterministic at the macroscopic level, which
is all that really counts in the vast majority of cases.  I see no
reason to believe that thought is any different in this respect.

Dave
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
From: brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder)
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Organization: Quake Public Access
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 10:38:54 GMT

In article <exukjb.229.717269191@exu.ericsson.se> exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:
>
>No, I meant, What are we saying of x when we say of x that "it exists" or
>"has being"?

I don't think Grossman's definition was really addressing your question either,
he was defining "existence".  Regarding what it means to say that "X exists.",
the objectivist position would be that such a statement is fundamental.  By that,
I mean that there is no further explanation possible.  If you ask a question
like "Why is A true?" and you answer "Because B and C are true." eventually
you come down to some kind of concrete facts which simply are true and cannot
be further explained.  To deny this would be to have an infinite regress of
explanations of what X is.

In another context, you might be asking a variant of the question "What is the 
relationship between consciousness and existence?".  The Objectivist position
there is that entities exist apart from consciousneses (in other words, facts are
still the facts whether someone knows them or not) and that consciousness can be
aware of these facts by sense perception and reason.  Is that the sense in which
you were asking the question?

Some common alternatives to this view are that facts are indeterminate until
they are perceived by a consciousness, or that there are no real things at all
and that everything that exists is created by consciousness.  Another is that 
of idealism where there are things out there, but that consciousnesses cannot 
really be directly aware of them.  Another is that facts are social constructs.
Another is that existence is "that which God has decreed" and this knowledge is
only reliably available via revelation, and could change if God changed his
mind.

Do you have someplace you are trying to go with this question, or are you just
trying to find out what the Objectivist position is?

--Brian

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: strat@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Free will or Can Life After Death be Proven
Date: 5 Oct 1992 03:25:19 -0500
Organization: Kansas State University
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: matt.ksu.ksu.edu

torstein@itekiris.pvv.unit.no (torstein hansen) writes:

>2) Every chemical reaction is predictable.

No.

It is impossible to have enough information about the specific
quantities of specific reactions in specific areas of the human
nervous system to predict the output of the system.  Take into
account:

	1) Entropy - Information inputs may be lost at any point.
	2) Randomness if quanta a is given two neural pathways (though
	   there are usually many more than just two), which is it
	   going to take?  It may be possible to make a statistical
	   analysis for a given neural pathway, but how could you
           identify EVERY possible combination of neurons that a might
           encounter and then determine which path a takes?

The problem involved here is very similar to the problem that we have
predicting weather.  We can make system models for ever and put
measuring equipment on every city block and every mountain top on the
planet, but we don't know what the weather does until it does it.

>OK, I know there might be some big holes in my logic, but could anyone
>point them out? And PLEASE, don't use any special terminology, as I am
>just a humble guy without any special knowledge in philosophy.

The problem here is two fold.  First, the brain system is too complex
for us to make sweeping generalizations with regards to its function.
We can make models of different parts of a brain, but we haven't built
a brain yet.  The second problem is that we have no specific knowledge
of what happens to information quanta.  Some will dissapate (cat >
/dev/null), some will get lost on the way to a part of the brain that
would understand the output, and some will produce an unexpected
'return value' inside a neuron for any number of reasons.

Stratocaster

-- 
	   Steve Davis (I'm a student, not a spokesperson!)
      strat@cis.ksu.edu - Kansas State University - Manhattan KS
				   
   "I *AM* Doctor Spin!" - The Vice President of the United States
From: tmhoff@oogoody.Corp.Sun.COM (Todd Hoff)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Date: 26 Sep 1992 19:47:58 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Distribution: world
Reply-To: tmhoff@oogoody.Corp.Sun.COM
NNTP-Posting-Host: oogoody.corp.sun.com

In article 5611@klaava.Helsinki.FI, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>I wonder how much experience you've actually had with people who choose
>to follow a 'different morality'.  Consider carefully your reaction to the
>following passage, quoted by Rai Gaita in his book _Good and Evil: An
>Absolute Conception_:
>

Please don't confuse my arguments against an absolute moral system with stating 
that people should not follow a moral system. Real cruelty starts when groups
of people start seriously believing they have a lock on absolute truth and
are willing to codify their beliefs into an absolute system of morals. The 
Nazis in your passage are one such exmaple. Also read the old testament for 
many more examples of such cruelty.

>But I cannot even begin to comprehend why anyone would think
>that this demonstrated that what the Nazis did was not evil.

Please quote where I said evil does not exist in the world. But
does your sensibilities ragarding what is evil in the world give
you the power to decide for me what is evil? If so how are you different
than the Nazis?

>Good and evil are not timeless things, they are human concepts.
>To understand what evil is is central to being a human being.  I do not
>appeal to a god to support this -- I appeal to contingent human
>experience. 

OK, let's turn it around a little. Let's say you have the power to
stop the Nazis from killing 6,000,000 jews, but the only way you can do it
is to break the mind of the one person who has the power to stop
the killing. Would you do it? 

Now let's say the most prize possession is this Nazi is an autographed 
copy of Hitler's Greatest Speaches, it is his Torah. Let's also say this 
Nazi has a phopia about having others spit in his mouth.
Your psychologists tell you the only way to save the millions of not
just Jews, but Gypsies, homosexuals, retarded, and handicapped people
is to spit in this guys mouth and make him spit on his favorite book.
Would you do it? 

If you do not millions would die. If you did you would be violating your 
own moral code. Either way you lose.

I expect you'll say this is more sophistry.


>Can you not understand the distinction between this
>observation about life and your own academic sophistry?

I'm quite far from academic glad to say. And sophistry is
in the eye of the beholder. But if that helps you more easily
discount what I say then more power to you.
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Date: 26 Sep 92 10:58:26 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <lc6qf8INNo6l@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM> tmhoff@oogoody.Corp.Sun.COM
(Todd Hoff) writes:

>In article 151@unx.sas.com, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>>I'd like to know what "best program" *means* in this case.  Perhaps it is
>>simply a matter of taste.
>>
>Yes. That is the point. As are moral systems.

I wonder how much experience you've actually had with people who choose
to follow a 'different morality'.  Consider carefully your reaction to the
following passage, quoted by Rai Gaita in his book _Good and Evil: An
Absolute Conception_:

  A rabbi in Lodz was forced to spit on a Torah scroll that was in
  the Holy Ark.  In fear of his life he complied and desecrated that
  which was holy to him and his people.  After a short time he had no
  more saliva, his mouth was dry.  To the Nazi's question, why did
  he stop spitting, the rabbi replied that his mouth was dry.  Then
  the son of the 'superior race' began to spit into the rabbi's
  mouth and the rabbi continued to spit on the Torah.

I can understand that a Nazi would not feel outraged and shocked by
this.  But I cannot even begin to comprehend why anyone would think
that this demonstrated that what the Nazis did was not evil.  We say
that what they did to the Jews was evil precisely _because_ they 
chose to follow a 'different morality'.  But can you not see that the
existence of false views about morality does not change the
fact that what is wrong is still wrong, in an absolute sense?

Good and evil are not timeless things, they are human concepts.
To understand what evil is is central to being a human being.  I do not
appeal to a god to support this -- I appeal to contingent human
experience.  Can you not understand the distinction between this
observation about life and your own academic sophistry?

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Free will or Can Life After Death be Proven
Date: 30 Sep 92 23:49:34 GMT
Reply-To: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Pyramid Technologies, Mt. View, California.

In article <1adbtpINN64i@smaug.West.Sun.COM>, dab@ism.isc.com (Dave
Butterfield) writes:
|> pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:
|>  
|> Still, it is possible to study computation "Scientifically" (well,
|> mathematically) without it being a "traditional thing".  One does
|> not study computation by examining the signals going down the bus.
|>

Ok Dave, I'll byte :).  What do you mean by "computation" and why do you
think it related to "thought".  Remember, if you're studying something
"mathematically" you have abstracted to an ideal system which may no
longer accurately reflect what you were originally studying.  You can
never prove that it is unless you construct some kind of mapping that
preserves elements and leaves relevant operations invariant.  You can't
create this morphism from thought onto a formal system because you can't
denumerate the set of thoughts, because you can't even define what a
thought is.  Modeling is fun, we learn a lot from it, and it keeps us
off the streets during the day, but it usually doesn't have all that
much predictive power relative to the empirical phenomena which gave
rise to it in the first place.
 
|> 
|> But despite this uncertainty, computations can be studied and they
|> are generally pretty deterministic at the macroscopic level, which
|> is all that really counts in the vast majority of cases.  I see no
|> reason to believe that thought is any different in this respect.
|> 

I agree that "close" is good enough in horseshoes and hand grenades, but
"pretty deterministic" might not be any determinism at all!  The
original poster had submitted a quasi-proof of determinism and asked us
to point out any faulty reasoning.  "Close" isn't a very good proof.

Paul Collacchi
From: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Date: 28 Sep 92 21:15:23 GMT
Reply-To: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Pyramid Technologies, Mt. View, California.

In article <BvAu0w.84q@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary
Merrill) writes:
|> 
|> I think it is pretty clear at this point that the position of "moral
|> propagationism" is simply a restatement of the most thoroughgoing
|> moral relativism -- and offers us nothing more than the original
|> position.  It is strikingly similar to a simple-minded statement
|> of what many people think is Darwinian evolutionary theory:  The
|> fit surive.  How do you know which ones the fit are?  They're the
|> ones that survive of course!  What is the measure of a moral system?
|> Its success at propagation?  That moral system is best which is
|> capable of the most propagation.  And by the way, this implies
|> moral relativism.
|> 

Exactly.  In this sense he has essentially defined "moral" to mean 
"prolific" or "fit", but has not successfully added any synthetic
difference between "moral" and "fit."  How can we tell the difference
between a "real" moral success and a false, temporary non-moral fit?
The one will allegedly survive in virtue of its morality and the other
is on its way out.  How to tell the difference?

Paul Collacchi

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: jamiller@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Phil.of Language (Ok Here or Not?)
Date: 29 Sep 92 01:31:35 CDT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

Is there a more appropriate group to discuss Phil of Language issues
such as "private languages?"  I would be interested in hearing
responses to Krikinstien -) (Kripke or Wittgenstien's) sceptical
paradox issues.  (ie. No way to prove one is operating under any
specific linguistic rule)
-- 
jamiller@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
James Miller

_chicchai .sig no ho ga ichiban iin janai ka..._
             Enlightenment Happens?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 00:37:04 GMT


><1992Sep27.091323.4956@techbook.com>, (Nick Szabo) writes:
>
>|> [Extinction] happens to all species, but it need not happen to a
>|> morality if it can construct a successor species or artifact to
>|> match or improve on the human mind.  In the meantime, extinction of 
>|> the human species is immoral, because it would exterminate the morality
>|> that instructs such a thing.


I should add to that extinction is _not_ inevitable for genes;
they are practically immortal.  The same is probably also true for memes,
albeit they are subject to change of a less well-defined sort than
are genes.

<BvAnCq.n2@unx.sas.com> (Gary Merrill) writes:

>Just a quicky here.  It has seemed to me that most of the objections
>raised against singling out one morality (or a restricted set of moralities)
>has really centered around the view that in justifying such a choice
>we are reasoning circularly (having to depend upon moral principles to
>evaluate the choice we are making).  However, it would appear that
>nothing could be much more circular than the above.

How are you parsing the logic?  This sounds suspiciously like 
objections to natural selection as being "tautological".  I don't
see any circularity. I'm holding as axiomatic that a morality
which does not exist is and was not moral.  The rest of moral
propagationism is derived from that base case.   Have you found
an error in the proof of moral propagationism?  

(Here's a new version with the wording of the conlusion corrected):

That morality which is or will be more prolific, is more moral.

Proof by induction:
Base case: A morality that cannot survive will not exist, and
	therefore will not provide moral guidance, therefore cannot
	be moral.
Step: A moral system that propagates more widely than another has
	(all other things being equal) a greater chance for ongoing
	survival.  It provides moral guidance to more people, and 
	ultimately more success for the memes that are symbiotic 
	with it (the society in general).


-- 
szabo@techbook.COM  	  Tuesday, November third  ##  Libertarian  $$  vote
Tuesday  ^^ Libertarian  --  change  **  choice && November 3rd @@Libertarian 
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 17:19:54 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <183668@pyramid.pyramid.com>, pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:
|> 
|> Remember, the proof of the pudding in science is that you must be able
|> to predict and replicate.
|> 
|> Paul Collacchi

I think perhaps this is where the "scholarly methods of the humanities"
come in.  If so, we will soon begin to see such claims as "this isn't
an exact science", or "the scientific method is too limited to apply
to these issues."  It is always amusing to see a toiler in the vinyards
of the humanities first try to improve the perception of his position
by cloaking it in the trappings of science, and then -- when under
scrutiny such cloaking fails -- to denigrate the very methods he
originally hoped would lend credance to his view.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 10:39:16 GMT

In article <1992Sep25.193927.22023@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>But note that moral debate is only possible in a common moral
>framework.  If different moral standards are being appealed to, there
>is no ground for persuasion or for negotiation.  Force is
>_necessarily_ the final arbiter.  This is a necessary consequence of
>moral relativism.  Even the supposition that there is a universal
>moral standard (but we don't know what it is) at least sets the stage
>for civilized discussion.  

Either you or me is confusing relativism with nihilism.  Moral
propagationism is a relativistic common framework that can be used to 
judge morality in all situations.  It implies comparable differences,
not universal standards of behavior. Various kinds of conflicts can 
result; they don't either necessitate or rule out force since there are 
a wide variety of persuasive techniques: teaching, writing, music, art, 
film, raising children, etc.  Neither technique is inherently more moral 
or persuasive than any other; it depends on the consequences for propagation 
of the morality in that situation.


-- 
szabo@techbook.COM  	  Tuesday, November third  ##  Libertarian  $$  vote
Tuesday  ^^ Libertarian  --  change  **  choice && November 3rd @@Libertarian 
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 09:47:07 GMT

In article <Bv3L2o.2y@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>Besides, the above "proof" leaves open the possibility of two or more
>moral systems that are equi-propagational.

Such a situation is less likely than identical snowflakes.
Two similarly fecund moralities would be optimized for at least 
slightly different societies; what is moral in one society might 
not necessarily be moral in another.  A rational moral relativism, 
not nihilism.

>But suppose that those moral systems conflict?  What does
>one say? 

One might find, by analyzing the propagational potential,
that X is moral in situation 1, and Y is moral in situation 2.  
Alternately, one might find that X is best for both situations, 
and successfully substitute X for Y, improving the second moral 
system.  Or vice versa, or one might try interchanging X and Y.

>We have equally moral systems that differ in their pronouncements
>of what is moral.  Now we can't determine the relative moral worth of a system
>based upon its moral pronouncements. 

One cannot determine worth based on the pronouncements alone; their
context is important.  In the real world, there will always be differences 
in fecundity, if not in the moralities as they exist than in their recombined 
parts.  Thus, their relative moral worth can always in theory, and often
in practice, be determined.


-- 
szabo@techbook.COM  	  Tuesday, November third  ##  Libertarian  $$  vote
Tuesday  ^^ Libertarian  --  change  **  choice && November 3rd @@Libertarian