From: apakabar@IGC.APC.ORG (Indonesia Publications/Task Force)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.seasia-l
Subject: IN: Alatas East Timor Speech
Date: 15 Oct 92 11:49:56 GMT
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU

/* Written  4:48 am  Oct 15, 1992 by apakabar in cdp:reg.indonesia */
/* ---------- "Area Studies: East Timor" ---------- */


Forwarded from indoz-net:


                         EAST TIMOR

  DE-BUNKING THE MYTHS AROUND A PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION

                          Remarks

                             by

                    H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas
         Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia

                           Before

             Members of the National Press Club
             Washington, D.C., 20 February 1992



              ********** ---------- **********



                         EAST TIMOR

  DE-BUNKING THE MYTHS AROUND A PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION


     Since so much time has  elapsed,  the  history  of  the
decolonization  of  East  Timor  17  years  ago has for many
become a blurred recollection  and  for  some  a  convenient
opportunity to try to re-write that story according to their
own ideological inclinations or preconceptions or to  server
their  particular political ends.  However, basically and in
a nutshell, the East Timor issue,  irrefutably,  a  case  of
decolonization  utterly mishandled by the erstwhile colonial
power. Portugal, in complete contravention to the  fundamen-
tal  human  rights  of a people, oppressed and neglected for
over four centuries.


     When in April 1974 the dictatorial Caetano  regime  was
overthrown  and the new Portuguese government proclaimed its
intention to decolonize all its  "overseas  provinces",  the
Indonesian Government wholeheartedly welcomed that decision.
Having over the years consistently supported the  people  of
East  Timor  to  exercise their right to self-determination,
Indonesia reiterated its off-stated position that it had  no
territorial  claim  to East Timor and that it would abide by
any decision taken by the East  Timorese  as  regards  their
political  future  through  a  proper  and  fair  process of
decolonization.  As the fact show, since  before  and  after
the  proclamation  of  its  own  independence, Indonesia had
scrupulously maintained its stand that its  national  terri-
tory  only  comprised the former Netherlands East Indies, no
more and no less.  This, in spite of the fact the Portuguese
East  Timor  was  half  an island right in the middle of our
archipelago.  If we ever had expansionist  designs  or  ever
coveted  that territory, as Portugal now alleges, then would
it not have been easier to realize such  an  ambition  at  a
time  when  Portugal under the Salazar/Caetano regime was so
universally unpopular as to foreclose any international cen-
sure, as in the case of Goa in 1964?


     As originally planned, the people of East Timor were to
decide  on  their  political  future  through  a  form  of a
referendum, appropriately adapted to and in conformity  with
their   traditional   democratic  practices.   The  proposed
referendum would, in line with UNGA Resolution 1541, present
the people of East Timor with three options:

     *  to become an autonomous territory in  federation  or
        association with Portugal;

     *  to become a separate, independent state;

     *  to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia.


     Towards this end, the colonial authorities allowed  the
setting  up of political parties in East Timor and five par-
ties were formed in 1974.


     The  U.D.T.  (Uniao  Democratica  Timorese)   was,   by
Portugal's  own  admission  and  is  widely  acknowledged by
unbiassed observers, the largest party among the five as  it
enjoyed  the  support  of  230  out of 472 existing sukus or
clans in the territory, comprising approximately 50% of  the
total  population.   It  also  drew  large support from East
Timorese civil servants.  The  U.D.T.  initially  opted  for
association  with  Portugal, but later supported integration
with Indonesia.


     The FRETILIN  (Frente  Revolucionaria  de  Timor  Leste
Independente)  opted  for  the  independence  of  East Timor
although it had never opposed, let alone participated in the
struggle against Portuguese colonialism.  In fact the FRETI-
LIN has always played exactly the opposite role, that  of  a
favourite collaborator of the colonial administration.  As a
curiously concocted melange of, on the  one  hand,  a  small
group  of  young  radicals and, on the other, the worst ele-
ments of the Portuguese colonial army (TROPAZ) it never  had
any  roots  in East Timorese society.  Instead, as described
by the Far Eastern Economic Review (October  17,  1975),  it
desperately tried to "acquire a Frelimo-type image through a
vague, collectivist ideology, a  flag  and  an  anthem"  and
sought  for years, but failed to get recognition by the Non-
Aligned Movement as a "liberation movement". And until  this
very  first  day,  their remnants and their long-discredited
cause are being sustained under the  protective  custody  of
Portugal.


     The APODETI (Associacao Popular Democratica  de  Timor)
originally  called  itself  AITI  (Associacao Integraciao de
Timor Indonesia), which reflected the  long-standing  desire
of  the people of East Timor for integration with Indonesia.
As a political grouping which has waged a persistent  strug-
gle  against  Portuguese colonialism for which many of their
leaders were jailed,  tortured,  exiled  or  executed,  this
party  indeed deserved to be identified as a true liberation
movement.  From the outset, APODETI  opted  for  integration
with  Indonesia,  based on the conviction that the people of
East Timor, inhabiting the same island as the people of West
Timor  and  sharing with them the same ethnic ancestry, cul-
ture and language, should rightfully be re-united, thus end-
ing their separation by an artificially drawn colonial boun-
dary line.


     The two  other  parties  the  KOTA  (Klibur  Oan  Timor
Aswain),  deriving  its strength mainly from the traditional
leaders or chieftains and TRABALHISTA  (Labour  Party)  also
came out in favour of integration with Indonesia.


     Indonesia again welcomed these  developments  and  only
sought assurances from Portugal that the process of decolon-
ization and  the  act  of  self-determination  be  conducted
fairly so as to reflect the true aspirations and will of the
East Timorese people.  Indeed,  more  than  just  welcoming,
Indonesia  at  the  request  of Portugal extended its active
cooperation to the process as inter alia  evidenced  by  the
series  of  meetings held between high-level representatives
of the two  sides  in  New  York,  September  1974;  Lisbon,
October  1974;  London, March 1975; Jakarta, August and Sep-
tember 1975; and Rome, November 1975.   AT  those  meetings,
Indonesia  again  and again reaffirmed its readiness to sup-
port Portugal in the peaceful and orderly implementation  of
the  decolonization  process, on the basis of Portugal's own
plan, subsequently promulgated as Constitutional Law  number
7/75 (1975).


     Unfortunately, however, things went woefully wrong from
the  start.   The FRETILIN persistently refused to cooperate
in a peaceful and orderly decolonization  of  the  territory
and  attempted  in  various ways to circumvent the envisaged
democratic procedures.  Aided and abetted by elements of the
local colonial administration and fortified by the extensive
military backing provided by the members of the former colo-
nial army (TROPAZ), the FRETILIN  subsequently embarked upon
acts of terrorism, intimidation,  abduction  and  assassina-
tions  against  their  political  opponents,  in  particular
against leaders of the APODETI.  They  boycotted  the  Macao
meeting of June 1975, called by Portugal and attended by the
four other political parties, to ensure a peaceful  transfer
of  power.  It thus became increasingly apparent that FRETI-
LIN was bent on seizing power by force rather than through a
democratic  referendum.   As  a  result,  the  territory was
plunged into a situation of rising tensions, political chaos
and  in  the  end armed confrontation and civil war, pitting
the FRETILIN against the  other  parties,  representing  the
overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  of  East Timor, who
refused to submit themselves to  the dictation of a  violent
minority.


     The Portuguese colonial administration in Dili made  no
serious  effort  to stop the fighting and bloodshed.  On the
contrary, it compounded the strife by clandestinely  turning
over  its  arms  and  munitions  to the FRETILIN.  In August
1975, at the height of the  turmoil  and  strife,  the  then
Governor  of  East  Timor and his staff simply packed up and
left -- in  the  same  way  and  under  quite  similar  cir-
cumstances  as  Portugal did in Angola and Mozambique.  With
the complete breakdown of governmental authority, the  civil
war  raged  on causing a massive influx of tens of thousands
of refugees into Indonesian West Timor, thus posing  serious
political,   economic,  social  and  security  problems  for
Indonesia.  By October 1975 more than 3,000 people had  lost
their  lives  in the civil war and more than 42,000 refugees
had crossed the border into West Timor.

     Despite this unforeseen and deplorable train of  events
Indonesia continued to urge Portugal to exercise its author-
ity and responsibility in  conducting  a  just  and  orderly
decolonization  and  ensuring that no single political group
be allowed to impose its will upon the rest of  the  people.
As late as in November 1975, the Indonesian Foreign Minister
agreed to meet with his Portuguese counterpart in Rome.   AT
the  end  of  that  meeting a joint communique was issued in
which both sides concurred on the  urgent  need  to  restore
peace  and order in the territory so as to enable the people
freely to decide their own future.  Towards this end, it was
decided that a meeting between Portugal and all five politi-
cal parties be held as soon as possible.   While  the  other
four  parties  agreed, the FRETILIN again refused.  Instead,
on November 28, 1975, it unilaterally declared the  indepen-
dence  of East Timor, thereby blocking all avenues towards a
peaceful solution to the problem.


     After Portugal's precipitate and irresponsible abandon-
ment  of  the territory and its abject failure to fulfil its
responsibilities as administering authority, and in the face
of  FRETILIN's mounting reign of terror against its own peo-
ple, the four other political parties considered  themselves
no  longer  bound  to  any decolonization convenant with the
erstwhile colonial power.  They intensified  their  struggle
against  the  FRETILIN  forces and in response to FRETILIN's
U.D.I. they in turn proclaimed  on  November  30,  1975  the
independence  of  East  Timor  through  integration with the
Republic of Indonesia to take the necessary steps to protect
the  lives  of the East Timorese who had declared themselves
to be part of Indonesia.  It was only at this point, with no
action taken by anyone to stop the mass killings and atroci-
ties perpetrated by the FRETILIN against the  East  Timorese
people that Indonesia became inexorably involved in the East
Timor crisis.


     Although the Indonesian people welcomed  the  expressed
desire  of  the  East  Timorese  people for integration, the
Government declared that it would not  accede  to  it  until
after  a  proper exercise of the right to self-determination
had been conducted.  Hence a provisional  People's  Assembly
of East Timor was formed whose members, representing all the
districts of East Timor, were dully elected according  to  a
system  closely  similar to the plan originally conceived by
Portugal itself (i.e. Constitutional Law number  7/75).   In
the  capital city of Dili on May 31, 1976, this Assembly, in
a public session which was also attended by members  of  the
diplomatic  corps  accredited  in  Jakarta  as  well  as  by
representatives of the local and international  media,  for-
mally  cast its vote to choose independence through integra-
tion with the Republic of Indonesia.  A formal  request  for
integration  was presented to the Indonesian Government by a
delegation of the People's Assembly on June 7, 1976.  Before
approving  this  request,  Indonesia  decided  to dispatch a
fact-finding mission to the territory to  determine  whether
the  request accurately represented the wishes of the major-
ity of the people.  It was only after receipt of a  positive
report from the fact-finding mission that Indonesia's Parli-
ament acted and approved a draft statute of  integration  on
July  15,  1976.   Subsequently, the statute was signed into
law and formally promulgated by the President  of  Indonesia
on July 17, 1976.


     By that act, four centuries of  Portuguese  colonialism
and of oppression and suffering for the people of East Timor
and months of fratricidal strife and bloodshed had  come  to
an end.

                        *** ---- ***


     In their attempt at re-writing or otherwise  distorting
the  history  of  decolonization in East Timor, Portugal and
the small band of FRETILIN  remnants  under  their  tutelage
have habitually accused Indonesia of having "by its invasion
of East Timor brutally stopped the  self-determination  pro-
cess  in  the  territory", thereby also causing Portugal "to
cease being able to carry out its responsibilities as the UN
recognized  administering power".  The facts as shown in the
foregoing expose and  as  distinct  from  the  fictions  and
disinformation  spread by Indonesia's detractors, present an
entirely different picture.


     Firstly, what was  left  on  an  orderly  and  peaceful
decolonization  came  to  an abrupt halt when in August 1975
the Portuguese colonial administration abandoned East  Timor
in a most irresponsible manner, after allowing the situation
in the territory to deteriorate to the point of  civil  war,
in fact, after practically instigating civil war by clandes-
tinely turning over its arms and munitions to one particular
group,  the  FRETILIN.   In  doing  so,  Portugal  in effect
relinguished its responsibility as administering powers.  By
failing in its responsibility, Portugal in our view has for-
feited any right, morally and  legally,  to  be  still  con-
sidered  the  administering  power in East Timor.  We cannot
but be astonished that there are still those who would  wish
to  set  the  clock back and return East Timor to its former
colonial master in order for that country to re-do  what  it
miserably  failed  to do 17 years ago.  Secondly, it was the
FRETILIN which from the outset refused to participate in any
orderly  and  peaceful  process  of  decolonization.  It was
FRETILIN's attempt to seize  the  power  by  force  of  arms
rather  than  through  democratic methods and the consequent
refusal by the majority of East Timorese  people  to  accept
fait-accompli  that plunged the territory into violent civil
war. Again, it was the FRETILIN which on  28  November  1976
unilaterally  declared independence, without bothering about
any semblance of an exercise of popular self-determination.


     In August and November  1975  Indonesia  was  not  even
involved  in  the  tragic  events  unfolding  in east Timor,
although it had to bear  the  consequences  of  the  turmoil
inter  alia  in  the  form  of 42,000 east Timorese refugees
streaming across the border into West Timor. Thus, there are
no actual backgrounds whatsoever to accuse Indonesia of hav-
ing disrupted East Timor's  decolonization  process  and  no
amount  of obfuscation or convoluted arguments can erase the
responsibility that Portugal and the FRETILIN must  bear  in
this regard.


     Indonesia's subsequent involvement in  East  Timor  can
therefore   be   seen   as   endeavouring   to  respond,  as
restrainedly as possible, to the  chaotic  and  tragic  cir-
cumstances  which  unfortunately accompanied the decoloniza-
tion process in East Timor. Far from invading, occupying  or
annexing   each   other,  independent  country--as  happened
elsewhere--Indonesia's role in East Timor was one of contri-
buting  to  the  process  of  decolonization  of a non-self-
governing territory, inter alia by helping  to  ensure  that
the  democratically  expressed  will  of the majority of the
people not be overruled by the unilateral  imposition  of  a
ruthless minority.


     Much  has been made of the fact that the  UN  was  "not
involved" in the process of decolonization of East Timor. It
is a matter of public record, however, that throughout  1976
the  Provisional  Government  of  East  Timor had made every
effort to have the UN participate in the process. In fact, a
delegation  of  the  Provisional  government was sent to New
York and Geneva with the sole purpose of  meeting  with  and
inviting  the  relevant UN organs, the Security Council, the
Committee of 24 of the UNGA, the Special  Representative  of
the  UN  Secretary  General,  to  participate  in  the self-
determination exercise. Regrettably, all  of  these  invita-
tions  were accorded a negative response as Portugal and its
supporters blocked every attempt in this direction. In spite
of these disappointments, the Provisional Government of East
Timor never failed to report each and  every  stage  of  the
decolonization  process  to the relevant UN organs mentioned
above.


     In any case, what is also often ignored or  not  suffi-
ciently  known  is  the fact that principle IX of Resolution
1541 (1960) states that with regard to integration  "the  UN
could,  when it deems necessary, supervise these processes".
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of the UN  in
the process of decolonization, while laudable, is not manda-
tory. Moreover, no two cases of decolonization  are  exactly
the  same,  subject as they are to the geopolitical and his-
torical realities prevailing in the  territories  concerned.
As  to the exercise of the right of self determination, many
erstwhile non-self-governing territories have  gained  their
independence  without resort to Resolution 1514 and 1541 and
this was also the case with all other ex-colonies of  Portu-
gal. In some of these countries, civil war and conflict con-
tinue even to this day.


     Growing international recognition of the correctness of
the  decision of the people of East Timor to become indepen-
dent through integration  with  Indonesia  is,  inter  alia,
reflected  by  the  fact that the 37th UNGA session in 1982,
the resolution on East Timor submitted by Portugal  and  its
supporters passed only by a margin of two votes (50 votes in
favour against 48, with a large number of countries abstain-
ing).  At  each  subsequent annual UNGA session until today,
discussion of the question of East Timor has  been  deferred
as  efforts  to  find an acceptable solution to the question
since 1983 moved into  a  process  of  tri-partite  dialogue
between  Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the UN
Secretary General. In many other international  forums  too,
the  question of East Timor self determination has ceased to
be an issue, reflecting the growing understanding among  the
international  community of the true circumstances surround-
ing the process of decolonization and the  actual  situation
in the province.


     Since integration, Indonesia's sincere intent  to  give
substance  to the freedom won by the people of East Timor is
reflected in its continuous efforts towards the  accelerated
development  of East Timor in all spheres of life--economic,
political, social--as well as the protection of cultural and
religious rights.


     Agriculture, health, education, public housing, commun-
ications and other infrastructures have been and continue to
be the priorities of development.  From  being  a  perennial
food  deficit  area  since colonial times, East Timor is now
reaching self-sufficiency in rice production.  More  asphalt
roads,  bridges, schools, hospitals and health centres, pub-
lic markets and places of worship have  been  built  in  the
sixteen  years  since integration than during the entire 450
years of colonial rule.


     Through daily scheduled  airline  conditions,  improved
sea communications and a link-up with the nation-wide telev-
ision and telephone network via Indonesia's  own  satellite,
East Timor has also been to end its erstwhile isolation.


     Since 1977, the annual budget allocations by  the  cen-
tral  Government  for  East  Timor has been, per capita, the
largest among all  of  the  provinces  of  Indonesia,  which
demonstrates  the  strong  determination  of  the Indonesian
Government and the people of  East  Timor  to  overcome  the
backwardness  and  neglect  of  the  colonial  period and to
achieve parity with the rest of the nation.

The Indonesian Government maintains a  policy  of  providing
access to East Timor on a regular basis to foreign represen-
tatives,  parliamentary  missions,  international  agencies,
journalists and others.


     With regard to humanitarian assistance, UNICEF,  UNHCR,
UNDP,  WHO as well as the ICRC and the CRS have been operat-
ing in East Timor, some since 1979.


     Indonesia's record on the question of freedom  of  wor-
ship,  religious tolerance and respect for and active promo-
tion of the cultural heritage of each of its diverse  ethnic
groups,  is well established and beyond contention. There is
complete freedom of religion in East  Timor.  There  are  no
restrictions  placed  on  the  clergy's pastoral duties. The
catholic church has full authority over the parochial school
system  and  has  been  steadily  expanding  its educational
activities. In addition, the catholic church in  East  Timor
participates with other humanitarian organization in provid-
ing assistance to the population. The Provincial and Central
Governments  have  allocated  and are continuing to allocate
significant resources, financial and otherwise,  to  facili-
tate  the  unfettered  development  of religious life in the
province.


     There is complete freedom  of  cultural  expression  in
East  Timor. The ethnic, linguistic and cultural heritage of
the province is being protected,  including  its  traditions
and  values,  language and customs. Legislative and adminis-
trative measures have been invited to ensure  the  continued
flowering of the East Timorese culture. Not only is the cul-
tural heritage of  East  Timor  being  preserved,  but  also
awareness  of  East Timorese culture is being fostered among
all other Indonesians, while at the same time the people  of
East  Timor  are being made aware of the other regional cul-
tures of the country. Essentially, this process  of  enrich-
ment  of  the national culture is and has always been at the
very core  of  Indonesia's  national  motto  "Unity  through
Diversity".


     For the past seventeen years, the UN and  the  interna-
tional  community  at  large  have  been subjected to a per-
sistent effort of disinformation and distortion on the ques-
tion  of  decolonization of East Timor as well as to a mali-
cious campaign of slander and innuendo against Indonesia  on
this  subject,  launched by Portugal and the remnants of the
FRETILIN. It is high time  to  put  an  end  to  this  state
affairs.


     By continuing to give credence to the myth that a hand-
ful  of political agitators abroad, who call themselves FRE-
TILIN or Convergencia or whatever, could  represent  anybody
else but themselves; by sustaining the unwarranted hope that
there might be a chance to reverse the expressed wish of the
overwhelming  majority  of  East  Timorese  in favour of the
obsessions of an unrepresentative minority, will  not  do  a
great  disservice to the real interests of the East Timorese
people.


     By desperately trying to keep alive a non-issue,  built
around  a  long distance credited cause, Indonesia's detrac-
tors are merely prolonging the turmoil  and  agony  in  East
Timor.


     The question arises: how long can and should the UN and
the  international  community at large continue to entertain
the demands of a small,  unrepresentative  exile  group  for
sanctioning of their vision of decolonization in East Timor,
no matter how unjustified and irrational those demands are ?


     It is high time for those who profess to  champion  the
humanitarian interests and welfare of the East Timorese peo-
ple to understand, that their concerns are not being  served
by allowing a malicious, strident anti Indonesia campaign to
be waged by those obviously intent on political rather  than
human rights or humanitarian objectives.


     It is high time for those who espouse the principles of
self  determination  and  democracy, which imply respect for
the wishes of the majority, to realize that they  cannot  at
the  same  time  support  the  unreasonable  and  irrational
demands of a minority.


     It is high time for Indonesia's detractors to  appraise
the  decolonization  process  that  has  taken place in East
Timor with at  least  modicum  of  objectivity  rather  than
through  the  prism  of  their own preconceptions, political
prejudices or ideological inclinations.  To  them  I  should
like  to suggest: please consider the facts rather than per-
sists in fictions or myths. Assess objectively the  histori-
cal  process,  the  geopolitical, cultural and socioeconomic
realities pertinent to the East Timor issue. For  then  they
may  be  able  to  accept  the truth that the people of East
Timor have chosen, have determined  their  fate,  through  a
process  of  decolonization fully in accord with the essence
and spirit of the relevant UN Resolutions, i.e.  Resolutions
1514  (XV), 1541 (XV), in particular Principles VI, VIII and
IX, and Resolution 2625 (XXV); and that what the  overwhelm-
ing majority of the East Timorese people really desire is to
develop their own province in peace and freedom.



Washington, D.C., 20th February 1992
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU