From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Semantics of Set Theory
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 17:42:09 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.230354.26799@timessqr.gc.cuny.edu> JDK@cunyvms1.gc.cuny.edu (KASTIN JONATHAN) writes:
>In <1992Dec31.112231.18915@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu writes:
>> 
>> I do not understand this appeal to inscrutability; surely it is not
>> justified by anything claimed by Quine ("Ontological Relativity"), --
>> each Quinean native is perfectly capable of articulating the
>> disquotational scheme
>> 	"Gavagai" refers to gavagai.  
>> If Quine argues that inscrutability of reference is not limited to the
>> cases of radical translation between different languages, and that "we
>> can reproduce the inscrutability of reference at home", he does so in
>> the context of analyzing the case of "homophonic translation" of his
>> neighbor's idiolect.  Surely this is a far cry from blithely claiming
>> that "reference in one's own language is inscrutable to oneself", --
>> one is generally not required to homophonically translate his own
>> idiolect.  Randall, I entreat you to abstain from non-standard
>> philosophical use of technical terms.
>
>Randall is quite correct in his exegesis of Quine. Quine's behaviorism,
>and its attendant denial of the individual's privileged access to his
>own internal states, implies that in order to understand his very own
>utterances, the speaker must engage in (homophonic) translation. Radical
>translation begins at home. (Take this as a reductio if you like.)

Eh?  First of all, Quine's behaviourism is a part of his philosophy
which I do _not_ agree with (see, Mikhail?).  I do have privileged
access to my internal states (Quine probably would agree that I do,
actually; his "behaviourism" is methodological), and I'm willing to
exploit this access (which Quine is not).  It's not so easy to
exploit, though.  I certain don't agree with the statements you make
here; the sense in which I was saying that reference is inscrutable is
quite unrelated to claims about translation; I assert (backed by
formal logical results) that we cannot successfully define the
relation of reference between the terms of the language we are using
and the world in that same language; this is quite a different issue.
But I don't think that we need to understand (the whole of) our
reference relation; this is taken care of externally to us.  Can I
call it the "ineffability" of reference, Mikhail?  This is also an
issue which Quine discusses, by the way; I may have goofed on
terminology.


>
>Jonathan
>
>
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>| Jonathan Kastin              I would say that my views are entirely my own, |
>| CUNY Grad Center             but that would be ridiculously ahistorical.    |
>| Philosophy Department        Besides which, it might presuppose a viewpoint,| 
>| jdk@cunyvms1.gc.cuny.edu     and thus an objective Reality.  :)             |
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu