From: nyt%nyxfer@igc.apc.org (NY Transfer News)
Subject: Barricada:1992 in Review
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: NY Transfer News Collective
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1993 08:10:15 GMT

Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit

excerpted from:
                    News Direct from Nicaragua

                     BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL
                        Electronic Edition
                           January 1993

                             Contents

1992: YEAR IN REVIEW
     Ay, Nicaragua, Nicaraguita!
     Never-Never Land
     Facts and Desires: Nicaragua in 1992 and 1993

NICARAGUA NEWS:
   The Stability That Never Comes
   Politics & the Military: News Roundup
   Unconstitutional Legislative Actions: Judiciary Rules in Favor
       of Sandinista & Center Assembly Representatives
   The Resurgence of the Northern Triangle Against Nicaragua:
       Interview with Nicaraguan Ambassador to Mexico
   Nicaragua Newsbriefs

NICARAGUA AND THE US:
   Are Times Changing? Expectations for the New US Administration
   Opinion: Let's Not Mark Time

NICARAGUAN ECONOMY:
   Crawling Like a Crab
   Misery in Numbers
   The Struggle for Work and Wages
   Nicaragua Labor Roundup

EL SALVADOR:
    Once Peace is Reached, Then What?
       The FMLN After the Peace Accords
    The Next Challenges:
       Interview with ERP Member Ramon Medrano
    Uncertain Future for FMLN Women

REGIONAL NEWS:
   Guatemala: Obstacles to Peace
   Paraguay: Corruption Before Elections

                 Excerpts from this issue follow:


                   AY, NICARAGUA, NICARAGUITA!


Nineteen ninety-two was a tortuous year for this small country of
lakes and volcanos, where the political polarization that gave
root to the war of aggression during the '80s has yet to cease.

As if the people had to atone for a sin, and on top of the
consequences of the Chamorro government's rigid neo-liberal
economic plan, Nicaragua had to overcome the natural disaster of
the Cerro Negro volcanic eruption in April, which directly
affected some 50,000 Nicaraguans.

The country had not fully recovered from that tragedy when, five
months later, the ocean brought a wave of pain when the September
1 tidal wave crashed into most of Nicaragua's Pacific Coast,
destroying a number of costal towns and taking the lives of dozens
of children.

Along with the natural disasters came the lack of scruples by
right-wing politicians -- headed by National Assembly president
Alfredo Cesar -- who, indifferent to the country's situation, took
it upon themselves to create an atmosphere of political
instability and uncertainty, leading to the withholding of US$116
million in US economic aid approved for 1992.

The most lamentable actions by Cesar and company led to a virtual
shut-down of the National Assembly, and they chose to legislate in
a confrontational manner against the Sandinistas, seeking revenge
for social achievements still standing after the revolutionary
decade.

Cesar also joined with Vice-President Virgilio Godoy and the
Managua Mayor Arnoldo Aleman, travelling throughout the country
demanding a plebiscite and promoting "a national consultation," in
order to break the so-called "co-government" that the Chamorro
government has with Sandinistas.

Thus, a year which could have helped set the foundations for a
harmonic and democratic coexistence between the different
political players of Nicaragua was instead, in political terms, a
wasted year.

Meanwhile, the Sandinista social base -- unions, student
movements, community movements and women's groups -- has learned
how to walk on its own and to demand and fight even when their
struggle may not politically favor the FSLN.

With things this way and despite the good intentions expressed by
many, Nicaragua continues to be a bag of surprises as well as a
jigsaw puzzle which no one can put together. In the following
pages, we offer a review of what we consider to be the most
important events in Nicaragua of 1992.

                               -30-


                         NEVER-NEVER LAND

War still brewing

On the first day of 1992, several thousand armed Nicaraguans
roamed the country's northern mountains -- despite repeated
government statements that the war which battered the country
during the '80s was over -- bringing back horrible memories to
local residents. Nonetheless, the end of the war was presented as
the "democratic" government's main achievement to date.

Grouped in their former bands, men and women skirmished during the
first four months of the year, also squaring off with the army and
the police. Dubbed "re-contras" and "re-compas," they took up arms
once again to pressure the government to fulfill its promises to
hand over lands and construction materials to former Sandinista
and contra soldiers and, they said, to guarantee their personal
security.

The government was able to dodge the situation by making new
promises, though some demands had to be met due to the
insurrectional atmosphere in several cities -- like Esteli and
Ocotal -- caused by re-compas and re-contras who decided to unite
demands and actions, as part of a movement that came to be known
as the "revueltos" (mixed group).

Nevertheless, some re-contra leaders -- headed by "Indomable" (the
untamable one) -- proved that their actions were not motivated by
a desire to improve the well-being of their former companeros, and
were instead seeking political revenge against Sandinistas. In
addition, to please the far right, they demanded the resignations
of Gen. Humberto Ortega and Minister of the Presidency Antonio
Lacayo.  "Indomable" disarmed after receiving US$150,000 in
compensation from the government, but after rearming in July, was
killed in a confrontation with the Sandinista army.

The National Assembly

While peasant life in the countryside was ruled by an ongoing
struggle for land and survival, with the pendulun swinging from
situations of armed conflict to relative peace, and then back
again to hostility, the Nicaraguan National Assembly was
characterized by intolerance and capriciousness on the part of a
group of politicians who refuse to accept the fact that the
Sandinistas are a legal and influential force in Nicaragua.

In what has become a sick obsession, the extremist sector of what
is still-called the National Opposition Union (UNO), in line with
the desires of National Assembly president, Alfredo Cesar, tried
to bring a new property law up for discussion. The law basically
recommended massive-scale lawsuits and confiscations. The aim was
to return properties -- handed over by the Sandinista government
during its final days to thousands of Nicaraguans through laws 85
and 86 -- to their former owners.

The initiative by Cesar and his group was unsuccessful, but just
the mention that such a project existed created a situation of
tension and instability among the thousands who benefitted from
those laws. Many of these people promised to defend "to the end"
the only material good they had received from the revolution.

However, Cesar, former political leader of the counterrevolution,
was not satisfied with his failure. Running the National Assembly
as his own little fiefdom, Cesar changed session agendas at his
whim, so as to avoid elections for two assembly leadership seats.
Early in the year the assembly's executive was left with two empty
seats, because a Sandinista representative resigned while an UNO
representative left to become the Nicaraguan ambassador to London.

Cesar had his reasons: the candidates most likely to win
leadership seats did not see eye-to-eye with him. One was a
Sandinista and the other a member of the so-called "UNO center
group," which strongly supports the executive branch, a power that
Cesar has staunchly opposed since he took the post of National
Assembly president.

On several occasions Cesar's maneuvers provoked the Sandinista
and center blocs to walk out of sessions; as a result, a good part
of the 1992 legislative agenda remained unfinished.

Yet one of the biggest national problems Cesar caused was the
freeze of US economic aid. Playing to those US sectors who do not
support Violeta Chamorro's policy of coexisting with the
Sandinistas, Cesar publicly accused the Nicaraguan government of
"misspending" and financing Sandinista organizations with US
funds.

The longest parliamentary crisis began on September 2, when Cesar
-- without the required quorum -- decided to elect the new members
to the executive council. The Sandinista and center deputies
responded by refusing to attend further sessions, and presented an
appeal before the Supreme Court in order to declare invalid all
legislative actions taken after September 2.

In late 1992, the Supreme Court declared that Cesar had to either
observe the appeal or risk facing a lawsuit. (See the article 
"Unconstitutional Legislative Actions" in this issue.)

The good and the bad government

The executive branch kicked off 1992 by purging many officials who
gave validity to the many rumors of governmental corruption.
However, its decisions still left many people unsatisfied, given
that none of those suspected in the most talked-about cases were
sanctioned.

And just when it seemed that the executive branch's reputation was
clearing, accusations surfaced that the government was bribing UNO
deputies, allegedly so they would join the center group. Although
proof was never presented, doubts remained.

Accusations of corruption and bribery were not the only things
worrying Chamorro and her cabinet. There were also pressures from
the United States and its old political allies to replace army and
police officials with a known Sandinista history.

Likewise, the government had to confront strong grassroots
movements, which demanded that the properties handed over during
the revolution be respected and that the economic program be
modified or, at the least, measures taken to alleviate the
harshest consequences of the neo-liberal adjustment policies.

With regard to the National Police, the executive branch gave in
to pressures and, in September, replaced police chief Rene Vivas
along with several well-known leaders and founders of the
Sandinista police.

In other areas, what the government signed with one hand was later
erased with the other. While in certain instances it agreed to
respect the workers' right to shares of companies being
privatized, and agreed as well not to return properties to Somoza
supporters, in practice it did in fact return many factories to
their former owners and ignored workers' participation altogether.

Then, faced with grassroots protests and hunger strikes, the
executive branch reacted by ordering police repression or army
occupation of the streets.

Nevertheless, given the strength of the grassroots movement the
executive branch had to cede to many demands. Examples of these
include the El Caracol company which was handed over to workers,
the university students' strike that won 6% of the national
budget for the universities, the strike by bus drivers as well as
the hunger strikes by telecommunications workers, lottery vendors
and retired soldiers, among others.

At year's end, it was evident that the government was once again
turning to its old political allies, by holding a series of
meetings with one sector of the UNO. This group, although opposed
to the government in parliament, did not parrot the intransigent
position taken by Cesar and Vice-President Godoy. All of this
implied a distancing from and a confrontation with the
Sandinistas.

The army and the National Police

Gen. Humberto Ortega not only had to call on the Sandinista
Popular Army (EPS) to put down the armed groups, but also came out
in defense of the government, with statements and speeches that
caused embarrassment both within the executive branch and the
armed forces.

Ortega first spoke out against Alfredo Cesar, whom he accused of
setting "legislative stumbling blocks" and putting into action a
plan that would cause the European Economic Community to suspend
its economic aid.

The general also made a "patriotic call" to both leftists and
rightists, to give "active support to the government" and its
economic plan, which he believes to be the only viable political
and economic alternatives for the country.  Right-wing
politicians reacted angrily, accusing the general of "usurping the
duties of President Chamorro" and interfering in the internal
matters of other state powers.

Nonetheless, Ortega's most controversial statement stressed that
he would remain in his post until 1996, when the
professionalization process of the army is finished. He firmly
stated that he will not allow the armed forces to be eliminated,
and denounced plans by the Civil Movement and Alfredo Cesar to do
away with the EPS by slashing its budget or applying international
pressures.

His statements came after reading a long armed forces communique,
where he reiterated his loyalty to the government and his
constitutional post.

Perhaps Gen. Ortega's greatest accomplishment in 1992 was
remaining in place as head of the army, overcoming pressures from
the United States and the Nicaraguan right-wingers who tried to
replace him during the course of the year.

The National Police leadership, however, did not fare as well, and
several high commanders were retired as the much-denounced plan to
restructure and professionalize the police was put into practice.

Once the restructuring process began, the National Police showed
its new face -- similar to that of other Latin American armed
institutions -- by trying to quiet all grassroots protests through
physical repression.

The most serious incidents occurred during the November and
December demonstrations, when one worker died after being detained
in a police jail. No adequate explanation was offered on the
matter.

The Sandinistas

The award granted by Gen. Humberto Ortega to a US military attache
posted at the US embassy in Managua detonated the first conflict
of 1992 among Sandinistas. Here, there was both support and
repudiation of the gesture by Ortega.  Some who supported Ortega
pointed out that a new medal should have been created, instead of
awarding a US military officer with the same medal given to
Sandinista soldiers for outstanding courage and heroism in the
contra war. All sectors agreed that Gen. Ortega was seeking US
approval with regards to the constitutionality of the Nicaraguan
armed forces.

Meanwhile, in other Sandinista matters, the Sandinista Assembly,
the highest decision-making body within the FSLN in between party
congresses, took a clear stance demanding that the government
modify its economic plan, and alleviate the burden that has hit
grassroots sectors the hardest. These Sandinistas made concrete
proposals in the search for a solution to the country's acute
economic crisis.

The FSLN's importance was proven once again when the Sandinistas
accompanied the government in its meetings with European donor
countries. Thanks to FSLN support, the government received pledges
totalling US$1.2 billion for 1992 and 1993.

Another controversy was sparked during the discussion of whether
or not the FSLN should seek full membership in the Socialist
International -- the party's national directorate began this
debate without informing or consulting the rank and file -- but
this was apparently resolved when the Sandinista Assembly came out
in support of the idea. Despite the victory of those who were in
favor of applying, the Socialist International had the last word,
and opted to allow the FSLN in as an observer-member with the
right to voice an opinion but not to vote, a position not
drastically different from the one held before it applied.

Another matter exposing some of the different positions among
Sandinistas had to do with the Sandinista news media, which were
criticized by the FSLN's general secretary, Daniel Ortega.

The former president accused the Barricada daily newspaper and the
Sandino radio station, among others, of giving more coverage to
the government than to the grassroots movements. Another member of
the Sandinista national directorate, Bayardo Arce, voiced his
disagreement with Ortega and defended the Sandinista media. This,
in turn, created the biggest public controversy among Sandinista
leaders.

Although the controversy did not last long, the debate did bring
up the question of who gets to administer the party's goods --
made up, among other things, of numerous companies. This issue has
yet to be cleared up for the Sandinista rank and file. And this is
exactly why the report by the FSLN's ethics commission -- which
made public the violations that took place after mid-1991 -- could
not have been more timely.

The commission revealed how some former Sandinista officials left
a great deal to be desired by the work they did during their last
days in government and how some took advantage of their positions
of power. Nevertheless, most cases have yet to be dealt with.

Also, the different currents of opinion within the FSLN continued
to express their positions with regard to the role that the
Sandinista Front should play as an opposition party. In this
ongoing debate, which is mainly carried out through the
newspapers, there were two main points of view: those who stated
that the FSLN should openly support the government and its
economic plan as the only way to improve conditions, and those who
feel the Sandinistas need to be more militant in their opposition.

Finally, and going beyond the debate, as 1992 came to an end, FSLN
leaders clearly expressed their support for grassroots sectors and
energetically demanded that the government rectify the course of
its economic plan. They also demanded stability and guarantees for
the thousands of urban and rural residents who received properties
through laws 85 and 86. Furthermore, they called for an end to
violence against peasants and the excessive use of police force
against protesting workers.

At the end of November, after meeting with the government, the
Sandinistas agreed to form a team with the government that would
solve the complex property question. However, they underscored
that they would not allow goods to be returned to well-known
supporters of the Somoza dictatorship.

Perhaps, for Sandinistas, the most important thing in 1992 was
that the FSLN firmly declared its support of grassroots demands,
even though there is no consensus on the means to carry out the
plan. This distanced it from the government and brought it closer
to the poorest sectors, precisely where it should be.

                               -30-


                      
                        FACTS AND DESIRES:
                   
                    Nicaragua in 1992 and 1993

Although 1992 was much like a via crucis for the country, the year
also proved that the Nicaraguan grassroots movement still has
great strength, despite the severe blows dealt by the neo-liberal
economic adjustment policies.

There was the student victory that forced the government to
recognize the universities' constitutional right to 6% of the
national budget; the governmental acceptance of the worker's right
to become part owners of companies in the process of
privatization; the ability to force the government to negotiate
the demands of the demobilized army members, the agricultural
workers, state employees and the transport workers. All in all,
these achievements cannot be underestimated because they show the
level of maturity and consolidation that Nicaraguan grassroots
organizations have reached -- something only explained by the
revolutionary process of the 80's.

Although on repeated occasions the government dodged promises and
commitments that it made in order to quiet protests, this also
fired up a grassroots movement that proved to be untiring.

The only way to end the ongoing rounds of protests and achieve
real social stability is by having government officials break with
their policy of making promises to the people and their not
keeping them. They must give up their dogmatic application of
economic guidelines as outlined by the large international
financial organizations.

It is time for the Nicaraguan government to understand that the
neo-liberal model has failed throughout the continent -- as proven
by the political-economic crises in Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Costa
Rica and Ecuador, among others -- and that this model has only
served to further impoverish the majority of the population.

In this sense, even the victory of Democratic candidate Bill
Clinton in the US presidential elections is a sign of the
neo-liberal failure. It shows that people are not willing to
continue sacrificing social benefits for the sake of statistics
that do not improve their lives.

We can only hope that the Democratic electoral victory will help
inspire Nicaraguan government leaders to make decisions that favor
all Nicaraguans, instead of continuing to govern in favor of the
interests of the World Bank, the IMF and that minuscule but
economically powerful sector of Nicaraguan society.

At the very least, the Nicaraguan far-right should desist in its
attempts to destroy even the most insignificant vestiges of the
Sandinista revolution and its social achievements.

If this occurs, and moreover, if the Clinton administration --
breaking with longstanding US imperialist tradition -- respects
the will of Nicaraguans to chose the political path that they deem
best or the right to build an economic model different from the
one designed by Washington, then Nicaragua truly will have the
great possibility of solving its problems and taking off as a
nation.

                               -30-

.................................................................
Copyright (c) 1993 by Barricada Internacional.
Barricada Internacional is published monthly in English by South
North Communication Network, P.O. Box 410150, San Francisco, CA
94141-0150. The Spanish-language edition is printed and
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