From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1992 19:59:24 GMT


Russell Lawrence writes:
rl> I agree with you that "life" is "life".  Isn't it also true that 
rl> pain is pain, emotions are emotions, and intentions are 
rl> intentions?

From article <1992Aug13.220741.1696@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> Absolutely, and a rose is a rose is a rose (thank you, Gertrude Stein,
ry> by way of The Bard).  The point is that we humans have no inherent
ry> right to decide arbitrarily that Bambi's life is "worth more" or of
ry> a "higher status" than that of an alga.  Or to put it on a more
ry> homespun basis: that the life of a cow is somehow more valuable
ry> than that of an ear of corn.  

Yet, you apparently think that your life is somehow more valuable 
than both.  Do you have an inherent right to decide such matters 
"arbitrarily", as you say?  

In any case, you're the one who's invoking the "life" criterion, not
me.  It's my contention that rights, to be meaningful, must stem 
from mental abilities rather than purely physical attributes that 
are meaningless in themselves.  As such, I reject the "red 
herring" claim that rights ought to be granted to humans alone or 
otherwise extended to every single class of self-replicating 
proteins, or even more absurd, that rights must be granted to humans
alone or extended to every class of chemicals in the universe.

Whereas "life" _is_ an arbitrary criterion, mental abilities form 
the very basis of meaningful experience, without which both 
"good" and "bad" would be meaningless words.  

To illustrate my point: would a brain-dead comatose human give
two hoots if you were to shoot him squarely in the foot?  Probably
not, since brain-dead men are neither sentient nor likely to
become sentient in the future.   In spite of the fact that such
an entity is a living organism, the notion of his "right" not 
to be shot would be meaningless from his perspective.  It would
be equally meaningless to us if we ourselves lacked sentience
and sapience.

Would an ear of corn mind if you rip off a few kernels?  Probably 
not, since corn stalks (like brain-dead humans) do not appear to 
be sentient organisms.  

On the other hand, would any alert, conscious mammal (whether 
human or non-human) mind if you were to shoot one of its limbs.  
Probably so, since most mammals are fully capable of experiencing 
the pain that is likely to ensue from such an event.   [This 
pain-sensing ability is just one example of "sentience". Others
would include sight, hearing, smell, etc.]

Of course, you're still free to believe that sentience is purely 
arbitrary, and you're also free to point out that we don't positively, 
absolutely, cross-our-heart-and-hope-to-die know for sure that 
corn and brain-dead humans don't have minds, but logic still 
favors the view that distinctions between "good" and "bad" could 
not possibly exist in worlds that are totally senseless and 
thoughtless.  And the factual evidence still suggests that 
brain-dead humans and ears of corn exist in a senseless state,
unlike normal whales, and normal dogs, and normal cats, etc.

ry> Now, as far as sentience and sapience are concerned, it is true that
ry> "life" which includes these capabilities is certainly more highly
ry> organized, but it would be an unwarranted assumption to assume that
ry> a certain level of organization automatically carries with it some
ry> pre-determined niche of status or importance on any absolute scale.

Yet, I'm sure that the absence of "absolute scales" would not 
prevent you evaluating facts and relationships in a meaningful 
way in accordance with meaningful criteria.  

ry> Who are we to say that insects are not of the same status as birds,
ry> etc.?  They are surely not as complex, but this is no better a
ry> criterion for "an (sic) rational ethical position" than many other,
ry> equally reasonable, criteria...all of which are arbitrary human
ry> assignments which have little basis except in our own desperate
ry> attempts to classify and pigeonhole our environment into comfortably
ry> familiar categories.

If sentience is an arbitrary criterion, as you say, please
explain how meaning could exist in a universe that lacks both
sentience and sapience.

rl> To the extent that reptiles, birds, and mammals possess such 
rl> capacities, it's not the consequence of a human assignment by any
rl> means.  Rather, it's the consequence of their evolutionary heritage,
rl> which we just happen to share in common.

ry> It is true that the mere possession of such faculties is not the
ry> result of human action, but the assignment of value based on these
ry> attributes most assuredly is...

Again, how could any values exist in a universe that lacks both 
sentience and sapience?  Whether I happen to be an intelligent 
plant from Venus, or a smart lizard from Mars, or an ordinary 
human, the fact would remain that sentience and sapience lie at 
the foundation of all the value judgments that I might make.  

ry> Why should the fact that humans share some specific attribute, 
ry> such as sapience, with some other non-human life form be 
ry> important?  

It shouldn't.  It's the possession of such attributes, not the
sharing of such attributes, that truly counts.

If humans were as mindless as carrots, and carrots were as 
mindful as humans, sentience and sapience would still have the 
same importance, albeit unbeknownst to humans.  The importance of 
sentience and sapience would not simply go away if humans 
magically lost the capacity to sense and perceive and think.  

ry> Isn't the fact that the non-human life form is alive sufficient?  

For what reason?  

> ... [much deleted]
rl> Is the "badness" of pain a function of your abstract notions of
rl> "moral relevance", or is it a function of neural structures that 
rl> are not uniquely human?  

ry> Pain is not inherently "bad".  Your mother may have been in great
ry> pain when you were born, was that a "bad" thing?  [I mean no flame
ry> here, only what might be a particularly moving example.]

Yes, the pain was a bad thing.  However, my mother wanted to have 
a child and had no alternative but to endure the pain of 
childbirth.  If you were evaluating the total event, it would be 
reasonable to say that she regarded the childbirth as a "good" 
thing, but in such a case, you're no longer evaluating the pain 
per se.  Your notion that pain is good because childbirth is good
is a good example of equivocation. [no offense]

> ...
rl> Most AR advocates that I know would readily respect the rights of 
rl> a sentient/sapient organism from Outer Space, regardless of 
rl> his/her/its structural similarity to humans.  Of course, this 
rl> assumes that we could recognize the sentient/sapient capabilities 
rl> of such an organism, given its dissimilarities in terms of 
rl> anatomy and behavior.
rl> 
rl> In the case of mammals and birds, such dissimilarities don't exist.  

ry> Irrelevant.  Similarity of structure is a false god, born of
ry> anthropocentrism, not of thought, analysis, and knowledge.  You
ry> said it yourself: the simple fact that we cannot recognize certain
ry> capabilities in an organism does not mean that those capabilities
ry> are not there.

As you know, or ought to know, it's impossible to prove a negative.

We'll never be able to prove for certain that unicorns do not 
exist or that sidewalks cannot feel pain when we step on them.  
However, this inability doesn't prevent us from showing that deer 
certainly appear to suffer under certain kinds of conditions...  
unlike sidewalks.  

If you really believe that similarity of structure and function 
is a false god, as you say, why do you advocate drug testing on 
mammals?  If you're going to tell us that it's reasonable to test 
the effectiveness of analgesics on rats...  given the similarity 
between rat brains and human brains, it won't make much sense for 
you to turn around and pretend that rats cannot suffer and that 
the similarity between humans and rats is a "false god".  

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals