From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 16:38:08 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.213254.426@news.wesleyan.edu> RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:
>In <BxKAF7.JLw@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu writes:
>
>> 
>> My question to Ruth is as follows:  What is 'feminist logic'?  
>> In what way is it different from ordinary 'human logic'?  What are
>> the attributes of 'feminist logic' that allow us to differentiate
>> it from other logic?  Is there a distinction 'feminine/masculine'
>> along the lines of 'modal/deontic'?
>
>First of all let me say that I am reporting what I have published re. feminist
>logic, which is not the primary work in the field.  I guess I'd suggest Andrea
>Nye's new (1992) book on feminism & logic (I forget the title) as more recent
>and probably more representative.  Or Genevieve Lloyd, THE MAN OF REASON: 'MALE
>AND 'FEMALE' IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1985 or so).
>
>Anyway, in a paper titled "Teaching Feminist Logic" I suggested that
>phenomenological redescription (see below for explanation) is a form of the use
>of human reason.  I suggested that it is what Thomas Kuhn was trying to explain
>when he stumbled around trying to explain "paradigm shifts" and/or why they
>were, in the end, rational.  I also suggested that it is a form of reasoning
>first described by Marx & later appropriated by feminist activists, known as
>"consciousness raising."
>
>Basically, I argued, phenomenological redescription is the activity of
>redescribing a state-of-the-world in a way which accounts for more of the
>phenomena.  Examples: Kuhn's "paradigm shifts", the transformation of the
>hapless Winston's perceptions in the scifi novel "1984" (i.e., brainwashing),
>Marxist class-consciousness raising, feminist gender-consciousness
raising.

Much better (because more credible) examples are found in science.

>I suggested that this was *NOT* unique to women or feminists in any essential
>way, but that it did tend to act as a sort of "affirmative action" w.r.t.
>reasoning, because those who were able best to REdescribe the phenomena tended
>to be those who were least well served by current descriptions of it, i.e., the
>epistemically disenfranchised,

The concept "epistemically disenfranchised" boggles the mind.  This is
not to say that I cannot imagine a referent for it.  Unfortunately, I
don't think that the actually "epistemically disenfranchised" are
capable of fundamentally re-thinking things; I think it is morely
likely to be accidentally "epistemically franchised" members of
normally "epistemically disenfrnachised" groups who act as their
spokesmen who are more likely to do this.  (All use of apparently
gender specific terminology follows the OFFICIAL line on gender
neutrality in English found in style manuals.  This is what my mother
taught me to do (I'm not kidding)).

Certainly those who are "disenfranchised" will be more interested in
constructing intellectual systems which justify action on their
grievances.  They are more _motivated_ to do so; I see no evidence
that this makes them better at it.  In fact, history suggests to me
that the Establishment is usually better served (not necessarily that
it is right, but it has the better armed intellectuals working for
it).  When the Establishment is _not_ better served, it can be in
serious danger, as the case of the Enlightenment illustrates...

 politically disenfranchised, etc.  I suggested
>that while this IS some use of human reason, it certainly is not deductive or
>inductive reasoning, but some yet other kind.  I proposed that it needs to be
>studied, that research needs to be done on learning about the parallels to
>validity, soundness (etc.) in phenomenological redescription, and that CLEARLY
>it is subject to both validity isomorphism and fallacy isomorphism, and that
>rather than ignoring or pooh-poohing it, it needs to be researched.

It is a previously recognized application of human reason; it is the
application of deductive and "inductive" techniques all over again
when you discover that you are wrong, while saving as much of what you
or others have already done as possible.  In preparation for this
necessity, it is always a good idea to have alternate explanations of
the same phenomena on hand; some may fare better than others in this
process.  It is certainly a legitimate topic for philosophical study.
"Logical and epistemological damage control?"  But it does not involve
the application of a different kind of reason.


>
>Now you might ask:  what makes this FEMINIST philosophy?

Nothing.

>
>Answer:  The fact that the motivating philosophical question arose out of a
>feminist research concern:  namely, "Why is it that (anecdotally, any way)
>fewer women than men are attracted to careers in math and science?  Why is it
>that at puberty, scores on standardized tests (SAT, GRE, etc) begin to diverge
>with women's scores dropping behind men's scores on shat is supposedly a
>measure of math *aptitude*?

I fail to see the relevance of this to the (quite legitimate)
philosophical issue discussed above.  The sociological reasons for
these phenomena are fairly obvious.

  Why do so many women and men report (anecdotally,
>any way) that women's reasoning and men's reasoning seem different? [even Kant
>& Aristotle & many of the GreatPhilosophersOfRationality made this
observation]

I would rule out this testimony (which is not as a rule supported by
argument or evidence) as reflecting prejudice.

>What would happen if, instead of asserting that this is incorrect, we tried
>accounting for the phenomena in some other way?  The result suggested was that
>perhaps politically and epistemically disenfranchised people engage more often
>in a form of reasoning that is not yet *recognized* as reasoning, thus making
>it look as though they "just don't reason as much" or "as well" or "in the same
>ways."  This was my proposal.

I see no evidence for new kinds of reasoning in these cases.  New
premises seem a much more likely explanation.

>
>--------------------------
>(note: nothing here has anything to do with what women philosophers have
>already said, or with what gender the author or discoverer of axioms might be,
>etc.  it is not historiography; it is philosophy)
>
>------------------------
>Ruth Ginzberg <rginzberg@eagle.wesleyan.edu>
>Philosophy Department;Wesleyan University;USA


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu