From: smezias@rnd.GBA.NYU.EDU (Stephen J. Mezias)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: DODIE spews the usual logical vomit.
Date: 15 Dec 92 17:14:42 GMT
Organization: NYU Stern School of Business

In article <1992Dec15.025342.12892@ncsu.edu>
dsholtsi@csl36h.csl.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger) reposts the same tired
BS he's been peddling as long as I've been monitoring t.a:

>Pro-choicers will often argue that even if the child is 
>considered to be a person, the woman should still have the 
>right to separate herself from the child, and that this 
>right stems from the so-called "right to bodily autonomy",
>or the "right to bodily privacy".

What does so-called mean here, DODIE?

>This right of separation does not lead to an unrestricted 
>right to abortion, since most abortion procedures directly
>violate the child's "right to bodily autonomy".  In their
>defense, pro-choicers will argue that the woman should have 
>a right of separation which guarantees that all associated 
>risks of the abortion should be carried by the child, and 
>not by the woman.

I personally have never made any such argument.  There are two
entities: A and B.  B is demanding a right to use A's body.  A has the
right to refuse without regard for the consequences to B of that
refusal.  This is why you do not have to donate your kidneys to save
the life of some other person or even your own child.  
 
>But since both parties are assumed to be "persons", with 
>presumably an equal right to bodily autonomy, it would appear
>difficult to justify this particular assignment of risk. 
>One could justify it on the grounds that the child will die
>anyways after separation, but this rationale would also 
>justify intentional homicide in situations where a person 
>can choose between leaving someone to die, or helping them 
>to live.

There is no assignment of risk.  It is a right of refusal without
regard for consequences.  In the case of a non-viable /z/e/f/, there
is no risk to the /z/e/f/: Removal and death are perfectly correlated.
In the case of viable /z/e/f/s, I have no problem with the argument
that there should be attempts to save the life of the /z/e/f/ as long
as the right of A to refuse B without regard for the consequences to B
is honored.  Thus, if there are equivalent procedures in terms of the
consequences to A, I see no reason why the procedure that helps to
save B should not be chosen.  More importantly, I see no reason why
the medical profession would not impose this procedure as a matter of
good practice.

>Alternatively, pro-choicers might say that the woman should 
>not bear any risks during the abortion procedure since her
>bodily resources are being used by the child, and the child
>is endangering the woman's health.  But this argument could
>also be used to justify "aborting" the woman when the child's
>health and life are threatened by the woman's ingestion of
>drugs and alcohol.

How is that, DODIE?

>Clearly, pro-choicers who support unrestricted abortion-on-
>demand must argue that the child should not be considered
>as a person.  This position implies that newborn infants 
>are not persons, since there is no difference between a 
>late-term fetus and an infant, and hence these pro-choicers 
>must condone infanticide.

Oh that final leap.  I believe there should be no legal restrictions
on the right to abortion.  My position is in no way affected by the
status of the /z/e/f/ as a person.  A five year old has no claim on
its mother's body, why should a /z/e/f/?  The /z/e/f/ is not being
aborted because it is not a person; it is being aborted because it is
using the body of a person against that person's will.  No entity in
our society is allowed to do that.

SJM