From: dxb105@huxley.anu.edu.au (David Bofinger)
Newsgroups: soc.history
Subject: Re: _Target Hitler_ a book review
Date: 8 Jan 1993 00:53:12 GMT
Organization: Australian National University
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: 150.203.3.11

In <1993Jan7.191800.4471@island.COM> fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:

> I also remember reading that, among Hitler's blunders, his one-month
> invasion of Greece (to bail out Benito) may have proved, if not
> decisive, at least significant in keeping the Germans from taking
> Moscow before the Russian winter set in.

It's worth asking what choice he had here. Imagine the position he would
have been in if he had gone into Russia in early May, as he wished to.
Assuming the weather was OK (the thaw came late that year, didn't it?)
he would have had a little longer in Russia, and hence got a little
further and mangled a bit more of the Russian army. He probably would have
taken Moscow, which may or may not have had a significant effect on the
Russian desire to continue fighting.

Meanwhile a combined Anglo-Greek-Yugoslav-ANZAC force of about a million men
would have been pushing into Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary etc. The Wehrmacht
would have had the interesting experience of fighting a mobile war across
the great plains of Russia without half their minor allies and possibly
without Rumanian oil. (I wouldn't expect these places to fall, but at a
minimum all the local armies would have to go home to defend and the RAF
would make life at Ploesti very interesting indeed. And without oil from
Ploesti the Wehrmacht could barely function.)

Historically the Greeks, Yugoslavs, etc. went down pretty easily, mostly
because the Greek army was misplaced and the Yugoslav one was still in a
post-coup malaise. They would have been a real nuisance to contain. I think
the net delay was about six weeks.

> had the Germans behaved toward the conquored 
> Russians as they did towards the French, the Russians may not have been 
> galvanized into such an heroic war effort just to save their dictator's *ss.

There's a scene in Guderian's memoirs where he meets a White Russian
ex-general just after Barbarossa. Guderian seems to expect him to be happy
that the Wehrmacht is here to save the Russians from communism. The general
replies that if the Germans had turned up twenty years ago everyone would
have been delighted (which seems an odd statement, since the Germans _were_
there twenty years ago, and people weren't). However, since then they have
painfully built up a decent life under communism, and now they don't want
to have it destroyed all over again, so they will have to fight.

In article <vzhivov.726437511@cunews>, vzhivov@alfred.carleton.ca (Vladimir
Zhivov) writes:

> I agree with [Mike] on the Greece/Yugoslavia mistake; my point is that
> the German commanders were no less enthusiastic then Hitler about
> taking on the Russians. The reasons for this were faulty intelligence
> on the part of the Germans (they grossly underestimated the size of
> the Soviet Army and Air Force), racism ("a German is worth several
> Russians"), overconfidence based on the triumphant march through
> Europe and the Eastern Front experience of WW I.

The "racism" was probably accurate, throughout all WW2 one German (or at
least one German led by the likes of von Manstein et al) tended to be
worth several of most people. An intelligence failure not noted here was
the complete German ignorance of the existence of tanks like the KV and
the T-34. It took quite a while for the Panthers and Tigers to level out
this advantage.

>          In conclusion, the military men may have disliked Hitler for
> his manner, his origins, his violence or whatever, but the point is
> they stuck with a winner until the writing was on the wall.

His treatment of von Brauchitsch (? the old army CINC) probably didn't
win him any friends.

> I am not criticizing them for failing to oppose Hitler, surprising as
> that may sound - what I object to is the post-war fabrications and
> self-effacing excuses.

The other line you hear from German generals is "if only Hitler hadn't
interfered with our military decisions we could have lost World War Two
much more slowly than he did." :-) i.e. Hitler insisted on
counteroffensives when the generals wanted to defend. The point is that
Hitler kept trying to win when it was hopeless, while the generals knew
it was hopeless, and just kept fighting without any real aim in mind.
Freeman Dyson wrote of Lieutenant-General Hermann Balck that he kept
fighting (and, often, winning) because it never occurred to him to do
anything else.

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David Bofinger                                       dxb105@phys.anu.edu.au
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