From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Nelson and Me
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 22:54:45 GMT

Well, I'm about done.

There gets to be a point beyond which continued discussion becomes
pointless.  I think that I've proven my case beyond any reasonable
doubt.  I will just finish with a couple of interesting thoughts.

First, we should recognize that it is possible to have knowledge
of particular things in reality, without even having a formal 
definition.  The role of definitions is epistemological clarification.
Do you know what a table is?  Can you identify ordinary dogs?
Do you have a formal definition of either?

The answer is, obviously, no.  For these simple concepts, an
ostensive definition (meaning: pointing to some examples) is all
that is really necessary.  It is not necessary to come up with
a formal description.

Second, we should recognize the role of context in scientific
knowledge.  Contrary to Nelson's bizarre claim, definitions in
science _are_ contextual.  If he were only trying to make the point
that _some_ definitions are more precise than others (i.e., our
definition of 'mass' is much more precise than our definition of
'self-esteem), then we would have no quarrel.

Definitions in science are contextual in (at least) two different
ways.  First, scientists recognize that what are taken to be the
fundamental attributes of particular existents may change over time.
(Thus my example of mass/weight.)  Second, we can think of the
concept 'diamond'.  What is the fundamental attribute of a 'diamond'?
It will vary, of course, across disciplines.  To the geologist, 
the concept diamond may well have a different definition than the
definition used by a chemist, a physicist, etc.  All are referring
to the same entities in reality, but each will wisely focus on the
most important attributes for his purpose.  

But the careful reader will see that, for the most part, Nelson's
postings are deliberate (or else shockingly dense!) misinterpretations
of what I have said.

Nelson has conceded, for example, that the definition of 'man' used
by a geneticist may be different from the definition of 'man' used
by a psychologist, or an ethical philosopher, or the man on the street.

His most recent claim is that my method is either arbitrary or
subjective.  But the answer to this claim is clearly contained in
my earlier postings.  The definition of concepts is contextual,
not arbitrary.  It is possible, and wise, for humans to agree to
use specific definitions.  It is possible, and wise, to realize that
what is 'fundamental' in a certain context is a matter for investigation
of reality.

Peter is fond of saying that 'saying it doesn't make it so'.
So I'll turn that phrase back at him.  Peter, just saying it
doesn't make it so.  It is your turn to make your case.

I don't really plan to respond to Peter anymore on this topic.
But I really want to encourage anyone who has been 'on the
sidelines' to ask me any questions.  My sincere desire is to
explain my position and make myself understood.  If there is
anything I can do to further that goal, please let me know.


--Jimbo

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