From: The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings at dusk <JALLAIRE%MACALSTR.bitnet@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>
Subject: Oppose U.S. Military Intervention in Somalia
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: daemon@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Resent-From: "Rich Winkel" <MATHRICH@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 23:42:45 GMT

Oppose U.S. Military Intervention in Somalia
By Jeremy Allaire

For most people, the recent decision by the United Nations to
support the deployment of 28,000 U.S. troops to Somalia has been
greeted with great enthusiasm, albeit a bitter and cynical
enthusiasm.  Yet, such a massive use of military force by the U.S.,
especially in the context of months of neglect, may, in fact, serve
to exacerbate the crisis.

The crisis in Somalia was de facto caused by the United States.
Somalia has long been a strategic interest of the United States.
With it's position on the edge of the Red Sea (where some 15% of
the world commerce passes each year--mostly oil to Europe), the
United States promptly moved to back Siad Barre is his war against
Soviet backed Ethiopia.  The United States gladfully promoted Siad-
Barre, despite harsh and graphic reports from Africa Watch and
Amnesty International detailing the extent of human rights
violations through institutionalized death squads, torture, and
imprisonment.  Barre's National Security Service, who carried out
most of these atrocities, were trained by the United States.
According to U.S. Representative Sam Gejdenson, "U.S. foreign
policy toward Somalia uniformly ignored the institutionalized
nature of human rights violations by the Siad-Barre regime.  U.S.
rifles and ammunition were used by the Somali government against
it's own people."

But, Barre's attacks against his own people accomplished more than
quelling a fervent opposition.  Historically, Somalia clans have
used sophisticated systems of negotiation, conflict resolution, and
cooperation to solve inter- and intra-clan disputes.  With
encouragement from the United States, these clan rivalries were
exploited and the traditional methods of adjudication and mediation
were stifled by Barre.  The current conflict between rival clans
were fueled consciously with United States support.  Combining
these tensions with hoards of U.S. armaments left after Soviet and
U.S. withdrawal in 1991, and this century's worse famine and we are
faced with today's crisis.

Government and media neglect of the crisis (an accumulated airtime
of 22 minutes on the major U.S. TV networks from Jan. 1991 to
August 1992), has left the country on the verge of destruction.

The fundamental question is, however, whether 28,000 U.S. troops
will enable the distribution of food and facilitate a peaceful
resolution to the conflict.  I believe the answer is a clear no.
While there are an enormous number reasons for possible failure, I
will focus on only a few.

On December third, the prominent international human rights group,
Human Rights Watch, fired the executive director of its Africa
Watch program.  Rakiya Omaar, a Somali native and Africa Watch
founder, was dismissed "for insubordination and failure to abide by
our internal procedures on establishing policy."  Omaar has come
out strongly opposed to the U.S. deployment.

Omaar is convinced that such a deployment would disrupt peacemaking
efforts by traditional Somali clan and community leaders and
international relief workers.  These groups have been making
progress, she says, and a major intervention will both break these
talks and force relief organizations under the gun and out of the
country.

Furthermore, under the current situation of neglect, the Somali
population may well interpret the intervention as an invasion,
which would only serve to fuel support for clan rivalries in their
attacks against international agencies and relief organizations.

Most experts agree that the original decision to send a 3,500
person U.N. force would easily be sufficient to insure food
delivery and the continuation of peace talks.  This original plan,
says Omaar, "was very well prepared on the ground by the former
representative of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Mohammed Sahnoun," who was fired from his post by Ghali for
criticizing the Security Council's unwillingness to force Clan
leaders to accept the intervention.  She comments that Sahnoun "was
working with everyone, with Somali society, as part of a larger
effort of political negotiation and reconciliation."

It is local initiatives, she says, and the use of traditional
Somali rituals that have enabled many relief groups to deliver food
with relatively high degrees of success.  Save the Children,
Catholic Relief Services, and the Intl. Red Cross, which have used
the local structures, have been able to deliver food and negotiate
with the militias.

Thus, both the former executive director of Africa Watch and the
ex-director of the UNOSOM operation agree that the previous plan
would be sufficient given the sort of political strength we saw
exercised by the U.S. last week.  Furthermore, they agree that in
the short-run U.S. forces will prevent looting and get some food to
the population.  Accordingly, however, they point out that the
3,500 already allocated could accomplish the same task, and that
this would prevent the breakdown of local initiatives and peace-
talks.

The result could be tragic.  Basic relief structures may well be
destroyed, clan rivalries may well consolidate against what appears
to them to be a U.S. invasion.  The U.S. will be faced with the
difficult decision of whether to withdrawal, leaving open a power
vacuum over unsolved political disputes.  Under such circumstances,
the U.N., led by the U.S., may well attempt to institute a U.N.
protectorate.  State Department officials have already hinted that
such a program may well be best directed and operated by the United
States, putting Somalia in a pseudo-colonial status.

United States military intervention is another fine example of our
ability to overlook and misunderstand peacemaking processes that
don't accord with our "poised hammer" approach to solving any major
crisis.

The United States is certainly obligated to help solve this crisis.
It can begin by withdrawing the majority of its forces, and by
pushing for a much smaller U.N. supervised force (ideally
constituted by Muslim and African nations).  By doing this, we can
ensure the safe delivery of food and can facilitate the appropriate
peace-settlements through localized channels.  Furthermore, for a
mere fraction of what the military operation would cost, the United
States alone could donate many times more food to the country.

This will only happen if popular pressure is exercised on domestic
and international governing bodies.  The following list of e-mail
addresses operate as faxes.  An organization in Sweeden has donated
this service, so anyone who uses e-mail may send free faxes to
these leaders and offices pleading for a non-violent, peaceful
resolution to this crisis.

James Kunder, director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance:
     James_Kunder@009f12026475269.fax.sunet.se

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali:
     Boutros_Ghali@f0092129634879.fax.sunet.se

Bureau of African Affairs of the U.S. State Department:
     HJ_Cohen@f00912026476301.fax.sunet.se

Bureau of East African Affairs of the U.S. State Department:
     Mark_Johnson@f00912026470810.fax.sunet.se

President-elect Bill Clinton:
     Bill_Clinton@f00915013722292.fax.sunet.se

Also, call the following by phone:

Presidential Comment Line:  202-456-1111
Congressional Switchboard:  202-224-3121 (ask for your senators or
reps)


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