HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: root@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa)
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand
Organization: RGM *nix - Sacramento, CA
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 04:32:28 GMT

mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate) writes:

>Ray Mendonsa writes:

>>From my readings in Atlas, Fountainhead, and A.R. Lexicon, I gathered the
>>point was that nothing observed points to the existence of the supernatural
>>in such a way that one can even postulate upon its nature.

>As I think I said to someone else, the existence of religion is sufficient
>to provide evidence that renders this position untenable.  By no means do I
>want to argue that it requires belief in a supernatural, but at least some
>refutation is required.

I'm not quite sure what you're getting at.  The position IS a refutation of
religion.  In one's stating that they have experienced nothing that would
allow them to postulate on the existence or nature of the supernatural,
one has no need to address the matter further.  For one with this lack of
experience to address the supernatural in his world view would be, plainly,
ridiculous.  It would be an excercise in "If everyone jumped off a cliff, I
would too."
-- 
------------------------------------------------------------->
Ray Mendonsa ---- root@rgm.com ---- Admin., rgm.com --------->
916/923-5013 8n1,HST -- login: new -- Public access Usenet -->
"I've voted and I can't get up!"
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 15:37:19 GMT

This post is in 2 parts.  In the first part, I talk very briefly
about the relationship between Rand's epistemology and the philosophy
of science.  In the second part, I issue a plea for calmness.

>  Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are:  testability, 
>  falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
>  Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
>  false.  

The above exhibits a rather mistaken notion of Rand's ideas.  

Rand completely rejected any kind of 'theoretical/practical' dichotomy.
She made what I think is a very important point: it is senseless to say
that something 'works in theory but not in practice'.  Such a
statement would mean that there is some criterion for 'works' that
has nothing to do with 'practice', i.e. reality.

Rand's theory of concepts includes (inter alia) an implicit theory
of science, including such notions as 'testability', 'falsifiability',
etc.  Her theory of measurement omission as foundational to valid
concept formation fits well with what I understand of your notion
of 'objective metrics'.  As for _operational_ definitions, Rand would
settle for none other!

Take a look at Rand's _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_, before
you jump to unwarranted conclusions.

------------

Now.

Let's please discuss things calmly.  Non-Objectivists, please
realize that we Objectivists are rather sensitive... it gets a
little old to have to repeatedly defend against charges of
'sophomore!' and 'MADMAN!' everytime we open our mouths.

(By the way, Peter Ny. sent me a very nice letter about his
'madman' quote.  He said (basically) that he got carried away
with his 'cute' quote about arguing with madmen.  I'm convinced
that he is sincere.  Heck, I guess we do sound pretty mad sometimes.
*grin*)
    
Objectivists, please realize that there are plenty of rational
opponents of Objectivist ideas who simply will NOT be convinced of
ANYTHING if you accuse them of 'irrationality' or 'not even
believing in true and false' at every turn.  Don't jump to
conclusions.

And for goodness sake, both sides, learn a little bit about your
opponent's position before jumping in with a fiery attack.

--Jimbo
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: FREE WILL won/one
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 17:44:31 GMT
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc14.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov5.025119.11918@midway.uchicago.edu> dsoconne@quads.uchicago.edu (Daniel S OConnell) writes:
>From: dsoconne@quads.uchicago.edu (Daniel S OConnell)
>Subject: Re: FREE WILL won/one
>Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 02:51:19 GMT
>(David Spurrett) sketches:
>
>>     o----------------------------------------------o
>>     |          Determinism:                        |
>>     |                                              |
>>     | Past ------------------ Actual Future        |
>>     |                                              |
>>     |                                              |
>>     |          Voluntarism:                        |
>>     |                                              |
>>     |               _________ Possible Future `a'  |
>>     |              /                               |
>>     | Past -------<                                |
>>     |              \_________ Possible Future `b'  |
>>     |               \                              |
>>     |                \_______ etc...               |
>>     o----------------------------------------------o
>
>>  The question, therefore, is _which_ of  the two is true.  The  prob-
>>lem, therefore, is to look into  the credentials of each doctrine.   I
>
>And what about:
>
>                 _________ Possible Future `a' ___
>                /                                 \
>   Past -------<                                   >--------->>
>                \_________ Possible Future `b' ---/
>                 \                               /
>                  \_______ etc..._______________/
>      
>

Huh?  What about it _indeed_ in the absence of any indication of what you 
mean by it?  If (as it is essential to assume if the discussion is to have 
any point, and as I did assume) the possible futures are mutually exclusive 
what is the point of your armageddon point where all join up?  Even well 
down that line, the pasts of some would be different, surely.  And if all 
you are saying is that the middle area is irrelevant, how is it different 
from the sketch of determinism?  Ho Hum.

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,alt.politics.libertarian
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: OBJECTIVISM
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 09:19:33 GMT

In article <92315.212245LIB031@uicvm.uic.edu> <LIB031@uicvm.uic.edu> writes:

   >Yes, somebody please create an alt.objectivism or even sci.objectivism
   >group?  Thnak you!

  "Anybody" can create an alt.group. With the "official" hierarchies,
things work differently - proposal, discussion, voting. Some time ago,
a proposal to create "sci.philosophy.objectivism" was voted down,
whereas a proposal for "talk.philosophy.objectivism" apparently went
through, although the group was never created (for partly obscure
reasons).
From: mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand
Date: 13 Nov 92 11:28:04 GMT

Ray Mendonsa writes:

>>>From my readings in Atlas, Fountainhead, and A.R. Lexicon, I gathered the
>>>point was that nothing observed points to the existence of the supernatural
>>>in such a way that one can even postulate upon its nature.

>>As I think I said to someone else, the existence of religion is sufficient
>>to provide evidence that renders this position untenable.  By no means do I
>>want to argue that it requires belief in a supernatural, but at least some
>>refutation is required.

>I'm not quite sure what you're getting at.  The position IS a refutation of
>religion.  In one's stating that they have experienced nothing that would
>allow them to postulate on the existence or nature of the supernatural,
>one has no need to address the matter further.

That is not true.

In the first place, it is reasonable to assume that you have had some
contact with organized religion-- maybe the Mormons showed up on your
doorstep.  If the religious body is what it says it is, then you have indeed
had personal experience of the supernatural.  The issue here is plainly
whether the organization's claims are true.  This leads into the issue of
verification, which I consider hopeless.

In the second place, your personal experience isn't necessarily as good as
anyone else's.  Indeed, with respect to conversion, someone else's
experience typically starts out having priority, in much the same way that
any other information passed on authority-- like the morning paper--
initially has priority.

The evidence is that people convert, and hence move from not experiencing to
experiencing.  Hence, simple lack of personal experience is not necessarily
good evidence by itself.
-- 
C. Wingate        + "The peace of God, it is no peace,
                  +    but strife closed in the sod.
mangoe@cs.umd.edu +  Yet, brothers, pray for but one thing:
tove!mangoe       +    the marv'lous peace of God."
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: Rick.Horowitz@launchpad.unc.edu (Rick Horowitz)
Subject: Spanish-language Philosophy
Organization: California State University, Fresno
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 10:03:07 GMT

I'm interested in reading philosophy in languages other than English. 
The only languages I have any hope of understanding are Ancient Greek
and Modern Spanish.  

My interests are primarily with philosophy of language, philosophy of
mind, epistemology...and I guess I'd be considered a tepid supporter of
the analytic school of thought.  Additionally, I've been studying
linguistics of late, and have considered doing some graduate work in
that field before moving on to my Ph.D. in philosophy (I'm in my last
semester of undergrad work).  With respect to linguistics, I'm
interested in the phenomena of creoles, pidgins, and what Lehiste calls
"loanshift".  I'm primarily interested in these things for insights I
feel I'm gaining into philosophy of mind.  I've read articles
by Misia Landau concerning the idea that humans are primarily
story-telling animals, and P.S. Churchland's article called
"Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept", and am interested in
what I see as similarities between the two with respect to
epistemological concerns.  Finally, I'm interested in ideas like those
expressed in Burkitt's _Social Selves_, and Hawkesworth's comments about
atomistic versus socialized individualism. 

Can anyone recommend anything interesting to read in Spanish?  One thing
that worries me is that I know that the Spaniards exported philosophy to
South America before the "modern" turn, and I've been told that
because of this, much of the philosophy of Spanish-speaking countries
might be considered "medieval" in nature to me.

At any rate, if anyone has suggestions for Spanish-language works which
seem like they might fit in with the meager guidlines I presented above,
please e-mail at "rhorowit@mondrian.csufresno.edu" if at all possible.

Thanks very much. 

rick horowitz

P.S. If Steven Harrington is reading this group:  Please contact me.
--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  laUNChpad.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Roy Bhaskar - Fishing for interested netpersons.
Date: 11 Nov 92 06:48:31 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.33.721464511
Distribution: inet
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za


                      R O Y   B H A S K A R.

My current research has resulted in my reading a fair volume of work by
Roy Bhaskar.  He is a British philosopher who spent time at Edinburgh and
is now at Linacre College, Oxford.  His books include:

 `A Realist Theory of Science' (1975)
 `The Possibility of Naturalism' (1979)
 `Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation' (1986)
 `Reclaiming Reality' (1989)
 `Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom' (1991)
 `Dialectic' (1992).

I find his work exceptional; powerfully original and rigorously systematic
in a way continually reminiscent of Kant.  I would like to hear from anyone
who has read Bhaskar's work and would like to pursue discussion/debate by
email.  Also if anyone has seen his name popping up in any of the newsgroups
I'd like to hear which.


Thanks,
From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 1: Compatibilism sucks!
Date: 5 Nov 92 11:47:22 GMT
Reply-To: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Organization: University of Oslo, Norway

Don4t you assume that Causality goes in only one
time-direction when you make your argument? It
might fail if Causality was 2-way, you know.


Solan
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand
Keywords: Rand Atlas Patent Industry
Organization: USC  Department of Computer Science
Date:  4 Nov 92 21:01:18 GMT

In <yXeeTB1w165w@momad.UUCP> siphon@momad.UUCP (Stimpson J. Katz) writes:

>Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
>Subject: Re: ayn rand

>Stephen Grossman writes:


>        As for your comments on why Objectivists win debates, I think it 
>should be noted that not only do objectivists win debates but new 'converts' 
>win debates right and left almost immediately. If Objectivism allows its 
>followers to concoct "quick rebuttals .. [that] prove to be weak and full 
>of flaws," I must ask you if these rebuttals have a common thread or are 
>unrelated?

>        If they have a common thread, everyone would quickly arm themselves
>aginst the common flaws and weaknessess to the common thread, yet observation
>shows the same people losing the same debates for the same reasons over and
>over, despite consulting with their ideological allies for battle plans. 
>If they have no common thread, then tell me how Objectivism empowers
>people to generate new, unique, quick rebuttals spontaneously (without
>appealling to a higher power)!

Look at the word after "MoDeM" below, then read below the third line.

>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>---------------MoDeM MaDnEsS BBS------------(516)-295-9435------------------
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I wonder what Ayn Rand had to say about G. K. Chesterton.  A whole 
chapter of _Orthodoxy_ is given over to the relation of reason to
madness.  The following passage is typical, and also addresses your
last two paragraphs.

	  If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you
	will get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the
	quicker for not being delayed by the things that go with good
	judgment.  He is not hampered by a sense of humour or by charity,
	or by the dumb certainties of experience.  He is the more logical
	for losing certain sane affections.  Indeed, the common phrase
	for insanity is in this respect a misleading one.  The madman
	is not the man who has lost his reason.  The madman is the man
	who has lost everything except his reason.
		--from the chapter, "The Maniac" [p. 29 in the 1959
		  Image Book edition]

Now I do not want to start a flamewar with these words, I just want to
call your attention to them, and ask whether Ayn Rand or any other
Objectivist has had anything to say about "The Maniac" in particular
or Chesterton in general.

Peter Nyikos


Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2428 sci.philosophy.tech:4071
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 12 Nov 92 22:43:26 GMT
Organization: Boise State University


I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
Moreover, one can apply logical arguments to show that one _cannot_
get sufficient information to lose "free will" in this sense, for
reasons which do not have anything to do with a failure of
determinism.  One will never be able to predict one's own behaviour,
and if one can predict the behaviour of B under all circumstances, he
will not be able to predict your behaviour under all circumstances
(otherwise you would know how to predict your own behaviour!), which
implies that one cannot predict the behaviour of beings of the same
order as oneself.  This provides a ground for regarding one's peers as
agents who make choices, which does not conflict with determinism as
the actual state of things.

I am not a determinist, since I think that this is incompatible with
the experimental evidence; but I think that free will does not depend
on loopholes in the laws of physics.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 1: Compatibilism sucks!
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 17:40:42 GMT
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc14.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov5.114722.18634@ulrik.uio.no> solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
>From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
>Subject: Re: FREE WILL 1: Compatibilism sucks!
>Date: 5 Nov 92 11:47:22 GMT
>Don4t you assume that Causality goes in only one
>time-direction when you make your argument? It
>might fail if Causality was 2-way, you know.
>

Huh?  I'd need you to be a lot more clear about what you mean by `2-way' 
causality before I could respond with any clarity of my own.  Do you mean 
something like that there are _two_ sets of initial (or one `initial' and 
one `final') conditions, one at the beginning of time and one at the end, 
and that they interpenetrate the temporal space between them?  How is being 
pulled towards some future state significantly different from being pushed 
out of a present one?  Do you mean that prediction becomes impossible? (ie. 
that we cannot know the future unless we know it already?)
From: lunatic@diku.dk (Philip Hoelgaard)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Sexual drive
Date: 7 Nov 92 13:44:15 GMT
Organization: Department of Computer Science, U of Copenhagen

It seems to me that people are confused about their sexual identity.
I feel that this is due to the blurring of the differencies between
men and women. 
Everything has become so complicated - the old conventions and role-
playing rules made it easy for both parties to settle down into roles
that were of mutual benefit.

The man, the provider of the family - the one with the formal power
of decission and consequently having the power to be generous.

The woman, the raiser of the children and the island of love and 
security - in an ocean of ambition and hostility.

That things are not that simple any more are probably to blame for
the extremely high divorce-ratios in all the industrialized 
countries. 

Furthermore the marriage-frequencies are at an all-time low, and people
get married much later than before - not only due to the level
of activity of both parties, but because young people are uncertain
of each other, confused about their roles.

I feel that it is wrong that women should compete with men in the
job-market. I do not doubt that they can manage careers - but
blurring out the differencies destroys the sexual drive of both
man and woman - 
the woman needs to admire and respect her husband and to be protected
by him -
the man needs her admiration and her warmth and to feel protective.

I really think that things are exactly as simple as that.

I personally would have liked things different - how do you feel, 
honestly?
 
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2408 sci.philosophy.tech:4044 sci.philosophy.meta:2507
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Roy Bhaskar - Fishing for interested netpersons.
Date: 11 Nov 92 12:52:34 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <spurrett.33.721464511@superbowl.und.ac.za> 
spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:

I mentioned these two books in rec.arts.books recently in my "More philosophy
of science tomes" post.

>                      R O Y   B H A S K A R.

> `A Realist Theory of Science' (1975)
> `Reclaiming Reality' (1989)

I think I referred to Bhaskar as "the last die hard modal realist".
I've read parts of his first book, and also found him quite original
and refreshing.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Free Will and Morality
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 09:57:27 GMT
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc15.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov5.124350.21109@ulrik.uio.no> solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
>From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
>Subject: Free Will and Morality

This posting seems incomplete, but that is the version which I have seen on 
the net for a few days, so will reply to what I can get.

>There has been some discussion of "moral agents", and whether
>these are dependant on having a Free Will or not. The
>discussion has managed very well to steer clear of the
>central question: "What is morality?"

No doubt the prophets and evangelists of pragmatism will jump me for this, 
but then they are rarely anti-determinist, so don't like me already.  You 
ask "What is morality?"  I say, `No problem':

  Morality is concerned with principles; principles of character, principles
  of what is right and wrong, good and evil, admirable and base.  Morality is
  about _value_.  It is about what _should_ and should not be the case, or be
  done by anyone with moral awareness.

Where (and even if) you divide morality and aesthetics is optional, since 
both are to do with value.  Indeed it is even possible to regard either of 
the two as primary.  It should also be clear that in any situation where 
evaluation is not relevant, where there are no _values_ that morality cannot 
apply.  Also where there is regared as being no possibility for something's 
having being different, it is also unintelligible for it to be morally 
evaluated.  (ie. If a piano falls on my head I can say `it would have been 
better if gravity had worked diagonally that day', but I cannot accuse 
gravity of a crime, or call it wrong, any more than the person who threw 
the piano at me can praise gravity or call it good.)  Therefore, in brief, 
morality and `free will' are _intimitely_ connected.

>I propose, again with my favourite philosopher Stirner, that
>we drop all illusions about morality as something existing
>apart from our own bringing it into the world. We might as
>well dissolve the idea of Morality when it no longer is what
>we want.

Huh?  What do you say `we' want?  Who is `we'?  What is morality now?  _HOW_ 
do we `dissolve' the idea?

>When we still retain Morality, it must be because we find
>some reason to let it continue its existence. Bu

How about it's impossible not to retain it?  What more reason do we need 
than that? What about the question of its being a matter of the true 
understanding of the world?

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o