From: David Banisar <Banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Subject: CPSR Letter on Crypto Policy
Organization: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
X-Useragent: Nuntius v1.1
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 12:35:58 GMT



The following is the text of a letter Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR) recently sent to Rep. Jack Brooks,
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.  The letter raises several
issues concerning computer security and cryptography policy.  For
additional information on CPSR's activities in this area, contact
banisar@washofc.cpsr.org.   For information concerning CPSR generally
(including membership information), contact cpsr@csli.stanford.edu.

======================================================================

August 11, 1992

Representative Jack Brooks 
Chairman 
House Judiciary Committee 2138
Rayburn House Office Bldg. 
Washington, DC 20515-6216

Dear Mr. Chairman:

     Earlier this year, you held hearings before the Subcommittee on
Economic and Commercial Law on the threat of foreign economic
espionage to U.S. corporations.  Among the issues raised during the
hearings were the future of computer security authority and the
efforts of government agencies to restrict the use of new
technologies, such as cryptography.

     As a national organization of computer professionals interested
in the policies surrounding civil liberties and privacy, including
computer security and cryptography, CPSR supports your efforts to
encourage public dialogue of these matters.  Particularly as the
United States becomes more dependent on advanced network technologies,
such as cellular communications, the long-term impact of proposed
restrictions on privacy-enhancing techniques should be carefully
explored in a public forum.

     When we had the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security in May 1989 on the enforcement of
the Computer Security Act of 1987, we raised a number of these issues.
We write to you now to provide new information about the role of the
National Security Agency in the development of the Digital Signature
Standard and the recent National Security Directive on computer
security authority.  The information that we have gathered suggests
that further hearings are necessary to assess the activities of the
National Security Agency since passage of the Computer Security Act of
1987.

The National Security Agency and the Digital Signature Standard

     Through the Freedom of Information Act, CPSR has recently learned
that the NSA was the driving force behind the selection and
development of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).  We believe that
the NSA's actions contravene the Computer Security Act of 1987.  We
have also determined  that the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) attempted to shield the NSA's role in the
development of the DSS from public scrutiny.

     The Digital Signature Standard will be used for the
authentication of computer messages that travel across the public
computer network.  Its development was closely watched in the computer
science community.  Questions about the factors leading to the
selection of the standard were raised by a Federal Register notice, 56
Fed. Reg. 42, (Aug 30, 1991), in which NIST indicated that it had
considered the impact of the proposed standard on "national security
and law enforcement," though there was no apparent reason why these
factors might be considered in the development of a technical standard
for communications security.

     In August 1991, CPSR filed a FOIA request with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology seeking all documentation
relating to the development of the DSS.  NIST denied our request in
its entirety.  The agency did not indicate that they had responsive
documents from the National Security Agency in their files, as they
were required to do under their own regulations.  15 C.F.R. Sec.
4.6(a)(4) (1992).  In October 1991, we filed a similar request for
documents concerning the development of the DSS with the Department of
Defense.  The Department replied that they were forwarding the request
to the NSA, from whom we never received even an acknowledgement of our
request.

     In April 1992, CPSR filed suit against NIST to force disclosure
of the documents.  CPSR v. NIST, et al., Civil Action No. 92-0972-RCL
(D.D.C.).  As a result of that lawsuit, NIST released 140 out of a
total of 142 pages.  Among those documents is a memo from Roy Saltman
to Lynn McNulty which suggests that there were better algorithms
available than the one NIST eventually recommended for adoption. If
that is so, why did NIST recommend a standard that its own expert
believed was inferior?

     Further, NIST was required under Section 2 of the Computer
Security Act to develop standards and guidelines to "assure the
cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive information in
federal systems."  However, the algorithm selected by NIST as the DSS
was purposely designed to minimize privacy protection: its use is
limited to message authentication.  Other algorithms that were
considered by NIST included both the ability to authenticate messages
and the capability to incorporate privacy-enhancing features.  Was
NSA's interest in communication surveillance one of the factors that
lead to the NIST decision to select an algorithm that was useful for
authentication, but not for communications privacy?

     Most significantly, NIST also disclosed that 1,138 pages on the
DSS that were created by the NSA were in their files and were being
sent back to the NSA for processing.  Note that only 142 pages of
material were identified as originating with NIST.  In addition, it
appears that the patent for the DSS is filed in the name of an NSA
contractor.
 
     The events surrounding the development of the Digital Signature
Standard warrant further Congressional investigation.  When Congress
passed the Computer Security Act, it sought to return authority for
technical standard-setting to the civilian sector.  It explicitly
rejected the proposition that NSA should have authority for developing
technical guidelines:

     Since work on technical standards represents virtually
     all of the research effort being done today, NSA would
     take over virtually the entire computer standards job
     from the [National Institute of Standards and
     Technology].  By putting the NSA in charge of developing
     technical security guidelines (software, hardware,
     communications), [NIST] would be left with the
     responsibility for only administrative and physical
     security measures -- which have generally been done
     years ago.  [NIST], in effect, would on the surface be
     given the responsibility for the computer standards
     program with little to say about the most important part
     of the program -- the technical guidelines developed by
     NSA.
 
Government Operation Committee Report at 25-26, reprinted in 1988
U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News at 3177-78.  See also Science
Committee Report at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.N. 3142.

     Despite the clear mandate of the Computer Security Act, NSA does,
indeed, appear to have assumed the lead role in the development of the
DSS.  In a letter to MacWeek magazine last fall, NSA's Chief of
Information Policy acknowledged that the Agency "evaluated and
provided candidate algorithms including the one ultimately selected by
NIST."  Letter from Michael S. Conn to Mitch Ratcliffe, Oct. 31, 1991.
By its own admission, NSA not only urged the adoption of the DSS -- it
actually "provided" the standard to NIST.

     The development of the DSS is the first real test of the
effectiveness of the Computer Security Act.  If, as appears to be the
case, NSA was able to develop the standard without regard to
recommendations of NIST, then the intent of the Act has clearly been
undermined.

     Congress' intent that the standard-setting process be open to
public scrutiny has also been frustrated.  Given the role of NSA in
developing the DSS, and NIST's refusal to open the process to
meaningful public scrutiny, the public's ability to monitor the
effectiveness of the Computer Security Act has been called into
question.

     On a related point, we should note that the National Security
Agency also exercised its influence in the development of an important
standard for the digital cellular standards committee.  NSA's
influence was clear in two areas.  First, the NSA ensured that the
privacy features of the proposed standard would be kept secret.  This
effectively prevents public review of the standard and is contrary to
principles of scientific research.  The NSA was also responsible for
promoting the development of a standard that is less robust than other
standards that might have been selected.  This is particularly
problematic as our country becomes increasingly dependent on cellular
telephone services for routine business and personal communication.

     Considering the recent experience with the DSS and the digital
cellular standard, we can anticipate that future NSA involvement in
the technical standards field will produce two results: (1) diminished
privacy protection for users of new communications technologies, and
(2) restrictions on public access to information about the selection
of technical standards.  The first result will have severe
consequences for the security of our advanced communications
infrastructure.  The second result will restrict our ability to
recognize this problem.

     However, these problems were anticipated when Congress first
considered the possible impact of President Reagan's National Security
Decision Directive on computer security authority, and chose to
develop legislation to promote privacy and security and to reverse
efforts to limit public accountability.


National Security Directive 42

      Congressional enactment of the Computer Security Act was a
response to President Reagan's issuance of National Security Decision
Directive ("NSDD") 145 in September 1984.  It was intended to reverse
an executive policy that enlarged classification authority and
permitted the intelligence community broad say over the development of
technical security standards for unclassified government and
non-government computer systems and networks.  As noted in the
committee report, the original NSDD 145 gave the intelligence
community new authority to set technical standards in the private
sector:

     [u]nder this directive, the Department of Defense (DOD)
     was given broad new powers to issue policies and
     standards for the safeguarding of not only classified
     information, but also other information in the civilian
     agencies and private sector which DOD believed should be
     protected.  The National Security Agency (NSA), whose
     primary mission is one of monitoring foreign
     communications, was given the responsibility of
     managing this program on a day-to-day basis.

H. Rep. No. 153 (Part 2), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987).  The
legislation was specifically intended to override the Presidential
directive and to "greatly restrict these types of activities by the
military intelligence agencies ... while at the same time providing a
statutory mandate for a strong security program headed up by [NIST], a
civilian agency."  Id. at 7.

     President Bush issued National Security Directive ("NSD") 42 on
July 5, 1990.  On July 10, 1990, Assistant Secretary of Defense Duane
P. Andrews testified before the House Subcommittee on Transportation,
Aviation, and Materials on the contents of the revised NSD.  The
Assistant Secretary stated that the "the new policy is fully compliant
with the Computer Security Act of 1987 (and the Warner Amendment) and
clearly delineates the responsibilities within the Federal Government
for national security systems."

     On August 27, 1990, CPSR wrote to the Directorate for Freedom of
Information of the Department of Defense and requested a copy of the
revised NSD, which had been described by an administration official at
the July hearing but had not actually been disclosed to the public.
CPSR subsequently sent a request to the National Security Council
seeking the same document.  When both agencies failed to reply in a
timely fashion, CPSR filed suit seeking disclosure of the Directive.
CPSR v. NSC, et al., Civil Action No. 91-0013-TPJ (D.D.C.).

     The Directive, which purports to rescind NSDD 145, was recently
disclosed as a result of this litigation CPSR initiated against the
National Security Council.

     The text of the Directive raises several questions concerning the
Administration's compliance with the Computer Security Act:

     1. The new NSD 42 grants NSA broad authority over "national
security systems."  This phrase is not defined in the Computer
Security Act and raises questions given the expansive interpretation
of "national security" historically employed by the military and
intelligence agencies and the broad scope that such a term might have
when applied to computer systems within the federal government.

     If national security now includes international economic
activity, as several witnesses at your hearings suggested, does NSD 42
now grant NSA computer security authority in the economic realm?  Such
a result would clearly contravene congressional intent and eviscerate
the distinction between civilian and "national security" computer
systems.

     More critically, the term "national security systems" is used
throughout the document to provide the Director of the National
Security Agency with broad new authority to set technical standards.
Section 7 of NSD 42 states that the Director of the NSA, as "National
Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security," shall

     * * *

     c. Conduct, *approve*, or endorse research and
     development of techniques and equipment to secure
     national security systems.

     d. Review and *approve* all standards, techniques,
     systems, and equipment, related to the security of
     national security systems.

     * * *

     h. Operate a central technical center to evaluate and
     *certify* the security of national security
     telecommunications and information systems.

(Emphasis added)

     Given the recent concern about the role of the National Security
Agency in the development of the Digital Signature Standard, it is our
belief that any standard-setting authority created by NSD 42 should
require the most careful public review.

     2. NSD 42 appears to grant the NSA new authority for  information
security.  This is a new area for the agency; NSA's role has
historically been limited to communications security.  Section 4 of
the directive provides as follows:

     The National Security Council/Policy Coordinating
     Committee (PCC) for National Security Telecommuni-
     cations, chaired by the Department of Defense, under the
     authority of National Security Directives 1 and 10,
     assumed the responsibility for the National Security
     Telecommunications NSDD 97 Steering Group.  By
     authority of this directive, the PCC for National Security
     Telecommunications is renamed the PCC for National
     Security Telecommunications and Information Systems,
     and shall expand its authority to include the
     responsibilities to protect the government's national
     security telecommunications and information systems.

(Emphasis added).

     Thus, by its own terms, NSD 42 "expands" DOD's authority to
include "information systems."  What is the significance of this new
authority?  Will it result in military control of systems previously
deemed to be civilian?

     3. NSD 42 appears to consolidate NSTISSC (The National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee)
authority for both computer security policy and computer security
budget determinations.

     According to section 7 of the revised directive, the National
Manager for NSTISSC shall:

     j. Review and assess annually the national security
     telecommunications systems security programs and
     budgets of Executive department and agencies of the U.S.
     Government, and recommend alternatives, where
     appropriate, for the Executive Agent.

     NTISSC has never been given budget review authority for federal
agencies.  This is a power, in the executive branch, that properly
resides in the Office of Management and Budget.  There is an
additional concern that Congress's ability to monitor the activities
of federal agencies may be significantly curtailed if this NTISSC, an
entity created by presidential directive, is permitted to review
agency budgets in the name of national security.

     4. NSD 42 appears to weaken the oversight mechanism established
by the Computer Security Act.  Under the Act, a Computer Systems
Security and Privacy Advisory Board was established to identify
emerging issues, to inform the Secretary of Commerce, and to report
findings to the Congressional Oversight Committees.  Sec. 3, 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 278g-4(b).

     However, according to NSD 42, NSTISSC is established "to consider
technical matters and develop operating policies, procedures,
guidelines, instructions, and standards as necessary to implement
provisions of this Directive."  What is the impact of NSTISSC
authority under NSD 42 on the review authority of the Computer Systems
Security and Privacy Advisory Board created by the Computer Security
Act?

Conclusion

     Five years after passage of the Computer Security Act, questions
remain about the extent of military involvement in civilian and
private sector computer security.  The acknowledged role of the
National Security Agency in the development of the proposed Digital
Signature Standard appears to violate the congressional intent that
NIST, and not NSA, be responsible for developing security standards
for civilian agencies.  The DSS experience suggests that one of the
costs of permitting technical standard setting by the Department of
Defense is a reduction in communications privacy for the public.  The
recently released NSD 42 appears to expands DOD's security authority
in direct contravention of the intent of the Computer Security Act,
again raising questions as to the role of the military in the nation's
communications network.

     There are also questions that should be pursued regarding the
National Security Agency's compliance with the Freedom of Information
Act.  Given the NSA's increasing presence in the civilian computing
world, it is simply unacceptable that it should continue to hide its
activities behind a veil of secrecy.  As an agency of the federal
government, the NSA remains accountable to the public for its
activities.

     We commend you for opening a public discussion of these important
issues and look forward to additional hearings that might address the
questions we have raised.


                                       Sincerely,



                                      Marc Rotenberg, Director
                                      CPSR Washington Office
Newsgroups: sci.crypt