From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Timor: Military Trials and the Truth Behind Dili Massacre
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1992 03:45:44 GMT

/** reg.easttimor: 349.0 **/
** Topic: Another look at the courts martial **
** Written  7:27 am  Jul 21, 1992 by gn:tapol in cdp:reg.easttimor **
Another look at the courts martial
 
The following is an article that will appear in TAPOL
Bulletin No. 112, August 1992, which is due out in ten days time:
 
THE MILITARY TRIALS AND THE TRUTH BEHIND THE DILLI MASSACRE
 
Short sentences were meted out to soldiers by military
courts in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre. A
Timorese student at the trials felt sure they were held to
satisfy foreign governments. They took only 8 days to
complete. But more seriously, the question of which
military unit fired first at the defenceless crowd is still
unresolved.
 
The military trials took place as a result of Suharto's
decision to adopt several measures after the massacre. The
installation of the DKM (Dewan Kehormatan Militer, Council
of Military Honour) to investigate and take disciplinary
action in the army was unprecedented in the 26 years of
Suharto's rule. In the face of stinging criticism, Suharto
realised he had lost his grip over the military, especially
in East Timor. The DKM had to sort things out. Disciplining
officers and punishing soldiers would impress foreign
governments and restore Suharto's hold over the military.
Suharto knew he could not take things into his own hands so
needed the DKM as broker. 
 
Cleaning the stable
It is no accident that Lt.General Feisal Tanjung was chosen
to chair the DKM. Known as one of the few intellectuals
among the today's generals, he is not loyal to General
Benny Murdani in the Hankam group. A common feature of the
members of this group are their interest in East Timor.
Practically the entire top brass of ABRI has done combat
duty in East Timor or won rapid promotion because of this.
Some have retired from active army and hold senior posts.
Lt.General Sugiarto is Minister of Transmigration, Major-
General Sembiring Kami Meliala is a member of the People's
Congress (MPR), Major-General Dading Kalbuadi is Inspector-
General at the Defence Ministry. Lt.General Sahala Rajagu-
kguk and Lt.General Harsudiono Hartas are top ranking
officers at ABRI headquarters.
  The relative independent Feisal Tanjung is Dean of SESK-
OAD (the Army Higher Staff School). The rather messy job of
cleaning the stable (the army command in East Timor) needed
to be done by someone outside headquarters. 
  The DKM findings were spectacular: six officers disci-
plined, three dismissed from the army and the three removed
from their positions. The entire top echelon in East Timor
was removed. On top of that, the DKM ordered the court
martial of nine soldiers and a police officer. Suharto
risked open revolt in the army. The DKM's proposals were
devastating for the rank-and-file. Officer corps discontent
bordered on the brink. 
  To repair the damage, Suharto this month invited all 121
battalion commanders to his private ranch in West Java
after chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat, likely to
become the next commander-in-chief, gave 11.2 billion
rupiahs (about US$3.5m) to the commanders to improve
conditions for the troops. President Suharto addressed the
commanders as a father-figure, concerned with the economic
welfare of the soldiers. To boost morale, Sudradjat told
the officers: "The Dili incident should not make you afraid
or hesitant in taking decisions". 
 
The military trials
All the military trials were held at military courts in Den
Pasar or the regional police headquarters. They were open
to the public and British and Japanese embassy staff were
present. Press reporting was extensive. 
  The ten defendants can be divided into four groups. Three
were NCO officers: Sergeants Udin Syukur, Aloysius Rani and
Petrus Saul Mada and two were privates, Mateus Maya and
Afonso de Jesus. The third group consisted of low-ranking
officers: 2nd Lieutenant Mursanib, 2nd Lt. John Arlan
Aritonang and Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo. The others, Lt
Yohannes Alexander Penpada and Police Corporal Marthin Alau
(see box) are the fourth group. 
  The three sergeants had been assigned to stay at the
subdistrict military command, KODIM 1627. According to
their testimonies, they went into action on seeing their
superior, Major Gerhan Lantara and his aide Private Domin-
ggus carried in, bleeding, after being stabbed by demon-
strators. They all admitted shooting at demonstrators. None
was wearing full military dress when they rushed to the
scene of the demonstration.
  The two privates were assigned to drive Major Lantara to
the hospital and admitted shooting at random at
demonstrators from the car.
  The three sergeants were in command of three platoons (72
men) as riot control units for the demonstration. The front
line was a Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit, while platoons II
and III were from Battalion 303. At one point the two pla-
toons moved forward, as instructed by Lt. Mursanib and
after hearing shooting from other, unidentified forces,
they also opened fire.
  The fourth group were assigned to monitor the
demonstration. Lt Penpada, deputy intelligence officer at
the district military command KOREM 164, after learning
about the stabbing of Major Lantara, rushed to grab his
pistol. He said he slapped demonstrators but denied using
his gun. 
  Marthin Alau was the only police officer put on trial
(see Box). 
  All were tried under Article 103 section 1, for dis-
obeying orders, despite the fact that nine admitted
shooting at the crowd. 
 
Frame-up?
Till now, all the burning issues regarding the massacre
remain unresolved. With the exception of the 19 graves, no
other graves have been disclosed. The first official
casualty figure of 19 dead was changed to 50 dead and 90
missing but no names have been revealed. The KPN, the
National Inquiry Commission, issued its final report which
is yet to be made public by Suharto. 
  There is every reason to be suspicious of the military
trials. How were the ten defendants selected? Everybody in
platoons II and III had fired at the demonstrators (93
rounds). The defendants gave the impression of a chaotic,
poorly disciplined Indonesian army. This reinforces the
amok theory propagated by the army. Though admittedly, a
demonstration of 5,000 high-spirited people can throw
troops into a panic, the truth lies elsewhere. 
 
Portuguese Parliamentary Visit
Preparations for the visit of the Portuguese MPs (PPD) were
proceeding at a high pitch. Months in advance, fresh troops
had arrived in East Timor as if a second invasion was under
way. In 1991, a new intelligence operation, Operasi Elang
(Operation Eagle) was installed to deal with the Frente
Clandestine, the Clandestine Front of youth in the cities.
From captured documents the aim was to expose clandestine
networks in Dili, Baucau and elsewhere and discover the
plans for the MPs' visit. The intelligence operations were
coordinated by BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency) which
had been created by Benny Murdani to consolidate his power
base.
  Besides BAIS, there is the older BAKIN. But in East Timor
things are even more complex as several lines of command
exist side by side.
 
Kolakops
Unlike other territorial commands, East Timor has Kolakops
interposed between KODAM, the Area Military Command, and
KOREM, the Regional Military Command. With KOLAKOPS,
territorial forces in East Timor can bring in
reinforcements from other military commands. KOLAKOPS is
both territorial and operational and divides East Timor
into three regions - A in the east; B, centre and west; and
C, Dili. East Timor is also classified into zones, 'red'
zones where guerrillas are active, 'green' zones where
guerrillas are less active, and 'yellow' zones where they
are practically non-existent. The red zone, mostly in
mountains, are battle zones where skirmishes take place.
The yellow zones require a combination of territorial and
combat operations.          Military units in East Timor
include troops from KODAM Udayana in Bali and units from
other KODAMs. The battalions brought in are territorial or
combat. 
  In November 1991, the Dili Military Command, KOREM 164
Wiradharma, was run by Colonel J.B.Sepang (since removed)
with 6 territorial and 4 combat battalions, including Bat-
talion 744 (mainly East Timorese) an Udayana battalion,
Battalion 303 from West Java, and Battalion 700 from South
Sulawesi. The latter are combat forces who were stationed
in the red B zone but were transferred to Dili for the
expected demonstrations. Battalion 303 is from KOSTRAD, the
elite reserve troops. Together with Battalion 700 (an
airborne battalion) they were given a 10-day crash course
in riot control.
  Law and order are now taken care of by the police so Dili
has well-trained Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit and anti-riot
police squads.
 
Who fired first?
The trials of 2nd Lts Sugiman Mursanib (SM) and John
Aritonang (JA) produced some far from conclusive bits of
evidence. SM was in command of an anti-riot force
consisting of Brimob platoon 5486 and platoons II and III
from Battalion 303, in that order. His task was to monitor
and report every move of the demonstration. JA was com-
mander of platoon II. When they arrived at the cemetery,
they faced thousands of demonstrators. SM told the court
that, confronted by an uncontrollable crowd, he ordered the
303 platoons to ahead of the Brimob troops and claims that
the first command to shoot did not come from him. As his
troops neared the cemetery, they heard shots from the main
gate. "There were unidentified troops. We only heard the
shots" [Editor, 13.06.1992]. SM said the order to go to the
cemetery were so hasty, he had no time to dress properly. 
  When Yorkshire's Cold Blood  was shown on TV, Timorese
refugees in Lisbon recognised SM, in a T-shirt, giving
orders to troops around the cemetery. Former prisoner
Donaciano Gomes told Channel Four News that SM had interro-
gated and tortured him.
  Besides this shooting, a hail of bullets came from the
southern side of the cemetery. JA confirms that shooting
came from two directions and identified the troops as
coming from A Company, Sector C of Battalion 303. He said
some wore uniforms while others wore a variety of clothing.
  On hearing the shooting, the two 303 platoons joined in.
People were falling to the ground but the shooting con-
tinued, especially from the unidentified troops. The judges
did not probe further. The unidentified pasukan liar
(irregular troops), as the Indonesian press calls them,
remained liar (the word also means 'wild').
 
Provocation and amok theories
The trials of Lt. Mursanib and Lt. Aritonang support the
amok theory but ave many questions unanswered. Both spoke
about the unidentified troops. The other defendants also
stuck to the amok theory with no suggestion of provocation.
 
  The provocation theory suggests that the Santa Cruz
massacre was premeditated murder, a traditional
intelligence operation of letting the enemy (here, an
unarmed crowd) come into the open so as to strike. The
killings in Tanjung Priok in 1984 had the same ingredients.
They give the military justification to hit hard. Another
justification for the use of violence in Dili was the claim
that the demonstrators were carrying weapons and started
the shooting. 
  The prosecution took care in the trials of the East
Timorese to produce evidence to support this version. In
Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha's trial, it was claimed that
some demonstrators were carrying firearms and grenades.
They dragged along Afonso Gomes, father of the murdered
Sebastiao Gomes, to say this as a witness, though he was
clearly under strain; one press report said that his words
were scarcely audible. 
  A hearing in Gregorio's trial was held at the police
weapons depot to display the weapons which had been
confiscated; when Gregorio asked for the Yorkshire film
(where no-one is seen bearing weapons) to be shown the
judge said it was not relevant.
  Mursanib claimed that there was shooting from the crowd.
But the crucial point is not whether some demonstrators
were carrying firearms, but whether they were genuine
demonstrators or intelligence plants. Reliable sources
insist that intelligence agents were in the crowd and
behaved provocatively. The verdict against Gregorio listed
firearms - Mauser and Garrand rifles, FN 46 and Colt 36
pistols, Korean hand- grenades and ammunition - as having
been confiscated; no evidence was produced about who from. 
 
What happened to Battalion 700?
The missing link is Battalion 700, in particular because
the trials pinned the blame squarely on Battalion 303. But
this only reinforces the amok theory. It was shown that
shooting came from from three directions; two from 303
troop. But the crucial shooting, starting first and ending,
last remain a mystery. 
  The first version claimed that troops were infuriated on
hearing that Major Gerhan Lantara had been stabbed, rushed
to the scene and started firing at random. This can only be
part of the story, as the shooting from the unidentified
troops seems to have been less 'accidental'. The Timorese
Battalion 744 was not on the spot, while Battalion 700 was
on duty that day as confirmed by Brig.General Rudy Warouw
who was then in charge of East Timor. 
  Major Gerhan Lantara, deputy-commander of Battalion 700,
is a very interesting figure. His battalion was sent to
East Timor on special assignment to deal with the
clandestine front. Unlike most soldiers who regard service
in East Timor, Major Gerhan accepts his tours of duty in
East Timor with missionary zeal. As a young cadet from the
military academy, he spent time fighting the guerrillas.
After graduation, he was assigned to East Timor and has
altogether spent eight years there. 
  During the demonstration Major Lantara got into a scuffle
with demonstrators after taking out a camera to make
photos, and was allegedly stabbed.  Private Second Class
Dominggus, who rushed to help him, was also hurt. The next
day Lantara was rushed to the Army Hospital in Jakarta and
was seen on the plane by some eyewitnesses. Four days after
the massacre, Battalion 700 was quietly withdrawn from East
Timor. Two weeks later, Battalion 303 left East Timor amid
great fanfare. Why was Major Lantara never summoned as
witness? Why were all the military defendants from 303? Why
did Lantara and Battalion 700 disappear?
 
The disputed 'opening up'
A detective story always needs a motive. If Battalion 700
was involved in the premeditated killings, what was the
motive? To find the answer we must look at the conflict in
Jakarta over military rule in East Timor between Suharto
and his kitchen-cabinet and the HANKAM group. 
  For external reasons Suharto was in favour of
"keterbukaan" (opening up) in East Timor. Access to East
Timor became easier but with negative consequences for the
military. The flow of information from East Timor became
easier, the clandestine movement became stronger and
bolder. The visit of US ambassador John Monjo when a well-
publicised demonstration took place, was an embarrassment
for the security forces. The military knew that
preparations were under way for a huge rally originally
intended for the Portuguese MPs and replaced by the Santa
Cruz demonstration, and used it to make their point. Their
message to Suharto was: the people have become uncontrol-
lable, we had to step in. What we do in East Timor is our
business, don't let foreigners interfere.
  The final word has not yet been spoken. The several
groups are still at odds and, as one Indonesian
oppositionist says: "East Timor can become Indonesia's
Mozambique". 
 
Further reading:
Who gave the order?, FITUN no.6, Jan.1992, pp 1-8
East Timor, the Courts-Martial, Asia Watch, vol.4 no.16.
Whatever happened to Gerhan Lantara?, Tim Kell, Jan.1992
** End of text from cdp:reg.easttimor **

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