From: sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: How would free market anarchism work?
Date: 9 Jan 93 22:49:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <1993Jan9.044437.382@athena.mit.edu>, cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes...
>In article <1993Jan8.223721.29219@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>>cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes:
>
>to set up a system that protects individual rights, one has to
>violate individual rights... the answer is that if the government
>is responsible for defending rights, then competing police forces
>are the ones who are initiating force, because they have no basis
>in law.

	Initiating force against whom?  Against the government?  Against
a legal code?


>>First, lets assume that we abolish the notion of the criminal law.
>>With the abolition of government, there is no longer any sense in
>>refering to something as a crime against the state, as there is no
>>state -- there are only torts against people, for which we must
>>compensate them. This is how most traditional anarchist legal
>>frameworks like the one in Iceland functioned -- in Iceland, for
>>instance, if you killed a man, you owed his family wergeld, literally
>>"man gold".[...]
> 
>i would have to admit that in most cases jail time is a waste
>of resources which accomplishes nothing. but the problem with
>your suggestion is what you do with willful or insane criminals,
>who aren't rational, don't want to be, and don't care.

	Interesting question.  I'm not sure what the Icelanders would
have done.  Perhaps this wasn't a big problem for them.  There is
no reason to believe that this problem is insurmountable in a "modern"
customary law system.


>>This is the difficulty Ayn Rand
>>couldn't see further than. Anyway, getting on with the example,
>>company A will now call up company B and inform them that there is a
>>potential conflict arising here. In all likelyhood, if this happens
>>with any degree of regularity, and it doubtless would, the companies
>>would have made an agreement between each other on how to deal with
>>such matters.
> 
>so to answer my own question, *my* company would ask to search my house.
>i'd fire them. i was accused falsely!

	You'd become a outlaw.  You wouldn't be able to find anyone
to protect you.  There are tremendous incentives against your being
so flippant.


>>Lets assume there is an agreement, and that it is that
>>representatives of company A will present evidence for the crime in
>>front of an arbitrator selected by representatives of both company A
>>and company B, and that you (the criminal) will have a chance to
>>defend yourself in this proceeding.
> 
>if company B even *tries* to search my house, they're fired. end
>of problem. i'll hire someone more interested in serving my needs.

	Wouldn't happen.  If you were such a problematic customer, you
wouldn't be worth the risk.  This is what actually happened in
customary law systems.  There really were very strong incentives
to only protect people who understood that this protection was
offered as a TRADE.  There were reciprocal benefits, and so there
were also reciprocal responsibilities.

	BTW, this was what I meant by calling customary law a different
paradigm of law.  You won't understand what we are talking about until
you understand the full paradigm.  Also, if you understood the history
of customary law, you would not be so likely to propose problems that
never existed.  (Another problem we have here is that Perry's example
does cross paradigms a bit.  He does talk as if we have "competing
governments" which is a misunderstanding of the situation.  It might
be difficult to avoid when talking to governmentalists.)


>who are these arbitrators? how do we know they can be trusted?

	You would know.  Such things are not secret in a market for law.
Reputation is very important for arbitrators.  You would make sure that
if your protection agency picked the arbitrators, you would have chosen
a protection agency that chose arbitrators well.

	BTW, how do I know that government judges can be trusted?!?
Saying, well, they are the impartial third party in our theory of
government don't cut it.


>who is *their* security company?

	Who cares?  Untrustworthy arbitrators are selected against.


>>If you don't cough up the
>>money, presumably company B has preagreed that in case of an
>>adjudication against you that you refuse to comply with they will no
>>longer defend you against force, and company A will then extract the
>>money for me.
> 
>this puts me at the mercy of this company for *any reason*.

	No, it does not.  Actually, Perry is still paradigm tripping,
but remember that there are rules being employed here.  You were
found guilty of a crime and refused to cooperate.


>how does that protect my right to life, freedom and property?

	What do you mean?  You were found guilty of a crime in an
arbitration.  The same situation could have occured with government.
You could be found guilty of a crime by a judge, and if you refused
to cooperate, men with guns would stomp into your house anyway.
The very same outcome.

	How does it protect your rights?...  The
answer is not a simple one, but it has to do with the process by
which laws are created and accepted in a customary legal system.
(The paradigm problem again.)  Ultimately, it is the process by
which laws evolve that really determine whether you will be protected
or not, not the presence of a government or protection agency.  Might
does not make right -- even for an Objectivist government.  You will
NOT find in Perry's simple example the explanation of how laws evolve.
So you are attacking the wrong argument.


>what if they just say "pay ten times what you did before or
>we'll let company X come after you"?

	What if the goverment says it?  What if I put a gun to your
head and say it?

	The point is that they would have powerful incentives NOT to
say it.  They are in business, remember.  Their reputation is important.
The situation you describe did not happen in reality.


>how do you deal with bad people getting in control of these companies?
>and before you say "that's how it is with the government now", i don't
>believe that. i think one can still get a *reasonably* fair trial.
>and the government is not banging down my door.

	Not your door, perhaps.  But what about government agents who
bang down people's doors because of the mere HINT that there may be
drugs on their premises?  It's real.  It's scary.  You could be next.


>i see *much* more room for abuse with private companies.

	Why don't you tell us the mechanism by which government
repells "bad people"?  What is it that limits the "room for abuse"
of governments?


>i have no doubt that the companies will protect their interests just
>fine. i am concerned about the people.

	It is in their interest to protect people and maintain a good
reputation.  There is no dichotomy.


>this sounds fine as long as everyone gets along. you really think
>that companies won't get into situations where they don't agree?
>i really don't think this makes as much sense as i did a few
>paragraphs ago. try to defend a worst-case scenario. to me
>it ends up in complete chaos. and people are generally *not* very
>good at getting along.

	Try to defend a worst case scenario of major governmental
conflict.  Ends up in complete chaos, right?

	It is EASY to think up worst case scenarios for anything!

	The point here is that the incentives under customary law are
different than under monopoly law.  Customary law evolves such that
rules are generated which reduce the chances of conflict.  Its built
into the very nature of the system.  Governments aren't so fortunate.


>your example about Robert's rules of order don't pacify me much.
>the book could have just as easily been "Mein Kampf". over-dramatic?
>perhaps. but what do you do about the people who can't get any
>company to protect them? what if 99% of the people decide they
>want to take out the 1%?

	Again.  Under government, the 1% has even less protection.
The reason why the chances of this are reduced under customary law
is a deep paradigmatic one.  Read the exerpt I posted from
_The Enterprise of Law_ over again.  The key is the nature of
reciprocity in such a system.  


>>Presumably, common reference works, the common law, and custom will
>>form a fairly commonly understood legal base in a system such as the
>>one I am refering to. 
> 
>i don't want my life protected by "custom".

	You don't understand the implications of custom yet.
You are thinking that custom could be just about anything.  This
is simply false.  Customary law evolves in a single direction
due to its very nature.  For instance, customary legal systems
from very different cultures have evolved very strong (and somewhat
similar) private property rights.  Believe me, you WANT to live
under these systems even though you don't realize it yet.


>persecution of the minority is a popular sport on
>this planet. and you also ignore the brainwashing potential of companies
>this big and powerful.

	I'm sure we are just so helpless.  Does a monopolistic court
system protect us in any way from this problem?


>but on what basis is this law created? just the whim of these
>companies and arbitrators.

	Nope.  Whim is selected against.


>this stuff is *dangerous*.

	Read _The Enterprise of Law_ before you make any firm conclusions.


>i am more concerned about Gates being the abusee than the abuser.
>people don't like the rich. so there would be a "market incentive"
>for a security company which advertises "we screw the rich".
>etc., etc.

	Historical evidence of customary legal systems does not
support this view.


>this is not holding much water for me. too many holes. too many
>special cases. too many optimistic assumptions. i know you are just
>starting, but even after looking at your explanations, all i see
>is *chaos* when i think about this system in operation.

	The paradigm problem.  Of course you see chaos.  You don't
understand the incentives that will exist in such a system.  You
are used to thinking of a government defining all of the rules.
The problem with that view is that it ignores that government
*also* operates according to incentives.


>>There is a lot more on this topic
>>discussed in Bruce Benson's brilliant (and extremely scholarly) book,
>>"The Enterprise of Law".
> 
>i wish i had time to read it.

	You should anyway.  I doubt that either Perry or myself is
willing to type in enough of _The Enterprise of Law_ to convince you.


Mark Sulkowski
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism