HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
Date: 27 Aug 92 09:29:36 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

copper@WATSON.IBM.COM (Don Coppersmith) writes:
: Andrew Haley ( ahaley@eoe.co.uk ) writes:
: 
: >                                    There's no point in using any more
: > key bits, because differential cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in
: > 2**47 operations whatever the key length.
: ........----------
: 
: The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
: not just that many operations.  Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
: the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
: that many operations on your own machine.  This respresents massive
: data that you've got to get out of your opponent's machine!

Yes, I should have mentioned that, but as a design principle of
cryptosystems I would have thought that there shouldn't be any
possible chosen text attacks which involve less encryptions than
exhaustive search.  There should not be more key bits than needed to
prevent the opponent's best atack, simply as a principle of economy.

Anyway, my original point is still valid; DES is secure as far as any
of us know (and I'm sure you know better than most) and dual key
triple encryption usefully extends the key of DES for long term use.

Andrew.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dla@raven (Don Alvarez)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 14:22:34 GMT

In article <1992Aug27.131849.13130@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de () writes:
>
>my site knows me well.  Your site knows you.
>
>Therefore your site can certify (sign) your public key.  Mine can
>certify mine.  ALL THAT IS REQUIRED NOW IS FOR OUR SITES TO CROSS 
>CERTIFY EACH OTHER'S KEYS.                        [emphasis added]

And _that_ is the trick.  Sure, islands of trust do exist, but unless
that island of trust is large enough to encompass both your site and
mine, then, then neither you nor I can trust the identity of each
other's *site*.  All you have done is pass the certification problem up
one level from the individual to the site.  All the same fundamental
issues occur at the site level as occur at the individual level.

-don
From: silvia@rcf.rsmas.miami.edu
Subject: Re: NEW CIPHER-SYSTEM
Reply-To: silvia@rcf.rsmas.miami.edu
Organization: RSMAS
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 92 15:44:25 GMT

In article <AA13MfgaP7@vntic.msk.su>, aistmain@vntic.msk.su (Dispatcher of AIST-EuroAIST-RELCOM Boris I. Tarakanov) writes:
>              New cipher-system
>
> 1. When the original information is euciphered every bit is
>    treaded and redundancy of this information is absent
> 2. The amount of variants of eucipher may be so much great,
>    for example n=10**91
> 3. The quantity of encipher operations for 1 bit are <=22,
>    but decipher operations are <= 9 for case n=10**91
> 4. Ecodered file is deciphered in turn bit from the end  of
>    the text.
>
>    This new cipher-system may be  used  for  protection  of
>    information  from   unauthorized  access  and  for  data
>    communications by communication chanels.
>
>    Relation by electronic mail.
>
>
>

Is this new cypher able to be implemented in C++? If so reply as to where or
whom i can get this from.




            Manolo
From: frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de ()
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Organization: Siemens-Nixdorf AG
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 13:28:35 GMT

dla@iso (Don Alvarez) writes:
: The problem has NOTHING to do with encryption.  No matter how you
: encrypt/sign/etc your message, we are still faced with the fact that
: you and I have never met and know nothing about each other.  I could
: call you on the phone or walk up to you on the street and you still

You could show me your passport (for example), then I'd know who you 
are.  Enough to associate you with the key you give me. Enough
to know you weren't skippy...

: You might want to look at the literature on Key-distribution protocols.
: THAT'S where the problem is.  How to START the communications link.
: Once we each have copies of each other's public keys, then it's easy.
: 

And *you* might want to mention that this problem is well known
and has known scalable solutions, rather than implying it's 
impossible.

X.509, PEM,....

Frank.
--
Frank O'Dwyer		       			Disclaimer: 
Siemens-Nixdorf AG 	                        I will deny everything
Tel.  : +49 (89) 636-40639                      Fax.  : +49 (89) 636-45860
e-mail: Frank.ODwyer@sniap.mchp.sni.de
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: DES source code for Aliens
Date: 30 Aug 92 05:04:28 GMT
Organization: IR

In article <1992Aug29.214902.27422@cbnewsh.cb.att.com> wcs@cbnewsh.cb.att.com (Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 erebus.att.com!wcs) writes:
> Various people have pointed out that the US Government's [alleged]
> justification for banning crypto software export is that it's "armaments",
> and that US Law does allow the government to restrict trafficking in
> armaments.

Yep. The snuffle saga continues: sci.crypt readers may recall that at
the end of June I was about to ask DTC in the State Department to
transfer jurisdiction over my snuffle 5.0 encryption package to BXA in
the Commerce Department.

I did so. The answer just came back. DTC said no. According to DTC
Director William B. Robinson, snuffle 5.0 ``is designated as a defense
article under U.S. Munitions List Category XIII(b)(1).'' It remains
under DTC control.

There's an appeal procedure which I plan to try, but unless something
changes I'll have to register as an arms dealer in order to send snuffle
outside the country---and even then it'll be a pain. Stay tuned...

---Dan
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: where is GCHQ?
Date: 28 Aug 92 04:53:59 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)


Dunno where GCHQ or its museum is today, but the last published reference
I saw was to the town of Bletchely Park. Maybe it's still there.

You could also inquire at the Imperial War Museum in South Kensington,
London--they're sure to know where the crypto museum is, assuming
it's open to the public.
From: jim@cs.strath.ac.uk (Jim Reid)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Government secrecy (was Re: GCHQ's location. No big secret!)
Date: 2 Sep 92 11:42:35 GMT
	<1992Sep1.225348.4590@cbnewsh.cb.att.com>
Organization: Computer Science Dept., Strathclyde Univ., Glasgow, Scotland.
In-reply-to: wcs@cbnewsh.cb.att.com's message of 1 Sep 92 22:53:48 GMT

In article <1992Sep1.225348.4590@cbnewsh.cb.att.com> wcs@cbnewsh.cb.att.com (Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 erebus.att.com!wcs) writes:

   In article <1992Aug31.105853.17069@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:
   ]	This pales in comparison to that legendary statement in
   ]	the "Spycatcher" trial when the U.K. attorney-general admitted
   ]	that although Sir Martin Hollis hade been head of MI6 "it did
   ]	not mean that the organization existed before he was director-
   ]	general or that it existed after he retired from the position."

This is a masterful example of the British Civil Service at its best.

   I forget if it's the same scandal or a similar one, but in about 1986 a
   British politican was quoted as saying that his organization hadn't
   been lying,  but "we were being economical with the truth" :-)

Actually, it was the the head of the British Civil Service (a
non-political, career civil servant) who said in court that he
personally "had been economical with the truth" wrt to his previous
day's evidence. This was because he was trying to avoid political
embarrassment for Mrs. Thatcher during the Spycatcher.

BTW, the British government is coming close to formally acknowledging
the existence of its security services. New offices for MI5 and MI6
are being built across the River Thames from the Houses of Parliament.
This "disclosure" is also remarkable in identifying their offices.

What's all this got to do with sci.crypt?

		Jim
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: User authentication
Date: 27 Aug 92 00:31:16 GMT
Organization: IR

If you never ask the question ``Who are you?'' then you will never be
given a false answer.

For *the overwhelming bulk* of human communication it has not proven
necessary to ask the question. So it is silly to design a ``public-key
infrastructure'' which forces people to ask the question---and suffers
all the attendant problems of false answers.

When you use a public-key system, think of your messages as being sent
*from one key to another*. Accept that you don't know ``who'' controls
the keys that your keys are communicating with. You'll find that you
don't need to know.

For *special cases* such as credit transfers the credit-granting
organization can and should set up an association between what it
considers ``real people'' and keys. And for hunting down criminals one
certainly wants link-level security, so as to be able to trace any
signal to its source. But there is no need for global identities, or
even identities shared between two organizations.

If you hear that IBM just did something, do you care what *real people*
are involved in making that decision for IBM? You might, but IBM doesn't
have to tell you, and business will go on even if you don't know. The
only problem---the problem that public-key cryptography solves---is that
somebody else might pretend to be IBM, the IBM you already know, without
IBM's approval. If IBM signs its messages then this problem disappears.

---Dan (or so je m'appelle in this forum)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith)
Subject: Re: Secure network: what form?
Organization: SCTC
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 14:45:29 GMT

This thread should really be called "secure email" not "secure
network" since the poster really only commented on email and the
latter has all sorts of other implications.

The more I learn about secure email the more I'm convinced we're going
to have to try it a while before we can wring the bugs out.  One can
make a laundry list of features one might want, but I don't think
there's a good basis for doing a cost/benefit tradeoff on the various
alternatives. Until we've had some pilot systems fielded and get to
'kick the tires' for a while, the technical community isn't going to
have the experience needed to make good engineering decisions.

Rick.
smith@sctc.com        arden hills, minnesota
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: User authentication
Organization: The Ohio State University Department of Computer and Information Science
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 17:20:00 GMT

Carl writes,
> That's a different point, though.  What I'm trying to point out is that you
> deal with me in a very real sense but you've never met me and aren't likely
> to.  Therefore, we don't need physical contact in order to communicate.
...
> If I can move money around with only my key and get caught in a love
> triangle with only my key, what more do I have to do?  :-)

I disagree with the strong form of your claim, Carl, but agree with a
weak form.

If your claim is "It doesn't matter if someone is intercepting all our
messages; one electronic entity is the same as any other," then I disagree.
Many people trust their ability to tell "what kind of person" is on the other
end of the wire, after they've corresponded for a while.  There's a world of
difference, to such a person, between "you" and "you plus a thousand people
listening in, including the FBI and the Washington Post".

But I agree with the weaker claim, that it's reasonable to correspond
with and trust an electronic persona.  We should therefore strive to 
provide a means by which each persona-owner can make sure that his or
her persona is being accurately transmitted to the world.  My secure
newsgroup, if it works, could do this.  "Persona Certificates", as 
proposed for the PEM project, are another way.  They would allow people to
register "persona" public keys, labeled as such, using the same certificate
mechanisms as for personal or organizational use.

I think personas reliably associated with public keys are a good thing.
However, I believe there are times when it's still a very good idea to
require a person's physical presence.  It takes 20 years to create a person.
It takes 20 minutes, or perhaps 20 hours or 20 days, to create a fictitious 
electronic person complete with a history of correspondence.  It all depends
on how much stability you need, I guess.


[ Marc Ringuette | Cranberry Melon University, Cucumber Science Department  ]
[ mnr@cs.cmu.edu | 412-268-3728 |      ".surivorter erutangis a ma I"       ]
[ ripem public key:                                                         ]
[   MFkwCgYEVQgBAQICAgADSwAwSAJBALu5OFJmAZ4hhNMBXyA5YeMBQFZhbXJ7yapG        ]
[   VkAqMMGmyAx2k2A7EfLgwu9NRqDYCyTdwDXU5lvPLG7o36Lnw6UCAwEAAQ==            ]
[ ripem is unix-based, using RSA and a PEM-like format; send mail for info. ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de ()
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Organization: Siemens-Nixdorf AG
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 13:18:49 GMT

dla@raven (Don Alvarez) writes:
: Note that any proposed solution to the above problem which claims to
: find an answer using any of the words DES, RSA, public-key encryption,
: or private-key encryption is a non-solution.  Those are all encryption
: techniques.  The problem here has nothing to do with encryption
: techniques.  The problem here has to do with cryptographic protocols,
: or more importantly with the lack thereof.  It is a fundamentally unsolved
: and (I believe) unsolveable problem.  There is no way to propagate trust
: across the entire network.
: 

wrong.  islands of trust already exist, it's a matter of 
building bridges between them.  

my site knows me well.  Your site knows you.

Therefore your site can certify (sign) your public key.  Mine can
certify mine.  All that is required now is for our sites to cross 
certify each other's keys.  

Or we could set up a CA hierarchy. There's nothing new here. Look 
at X.509.  

Oh, I almost forgot.  I haven't said DES, RSA, or public-key
encryption yet.  I'll say it now. RSA. Funny, but the solution
still works.  

(btw, what *is* unsolveable is a secure exchange of pks on a single 
insecure channel, not the prop. of trust.  Of course, pks can be exchanged
securely using a secure channel, such as a face-to-face meeting
where we show passports, or some other acceptable id.).

: -don

Frank.
--
Frank O'Dwyer		       			Disclaimer: 
Siemens-Nixdorf AG 	                        I will deny everything
Tel.  : +49 (89) 636-40639                      Fax.  : +49 (89) 636-45860
e-mail: Frank.ODwyer@sniap.mchp.sni.de
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: GCHQ's location. No big secret!
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 92 08:55:47 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)


Marcus Ranum claims the Sovs wouldn't have revealed their estimate of
CIA employees because: "The sovs were too professional and too
closed-mouthed to give out information like that, and if they knew,
the fact that they knew would be information they wouldn't want to
reveal."

Perhaps he knows something I don't. I've worked with the Soviets for
many years, been invited to Moscow by the Academy of Sciences to
give seminars and to meet privately with their leadership (including
Gorbachev's Science, Energy, and Economics advisors) on a regular
basis. They've often told me stuff they knew that we thought was secret.
Often it's the Russian sense of humor in twitting us about our
"secrets" as long as it doesn't reveal their sources and methods.

The number of employees at the CIA is not a piece of information that
would reveal Soviet sources and methods by itself.

Ranum appears also to hold the Washington Post in contempt. My understand
of the facts is different.

David
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith)
Subject: CIA story (was : GCHQ's location ..)
Organization: SCTC
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 1992 20:25:21 GMT

Every so often I tell the story (or someone else tells the story)
about the real estate developer who found out the number of employees
at the then-new CIA headquarters in McLean by calling the then-Soviet
embassy...

mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) responded to a recent retelling:

>	This story made my brand new Capt. Kelly bullshit detector
>explode violently, ...

I've always based my own telling of the story on the mid-60s report I
read in the Washington Star when the building was under construction.
I don't recall if they actually named the real estate developer (I
think they did), but I definitely recall that they quoted the numbers
and attributed them to a source in the Soviet embassy.

This doesn't guarantee that the story is factual, just that (at least
in my case) it's based on something more than the National Enquirer
or garbled netnews.

The "real truth" behind this story could be anything. Maybe it's true
as stated, though I don't know why the Soviets would be so helpful.
Maybe the developer made up the numbers and wanted free publicity. It
could even be that the developer got the info from a "real" source in
the Govt and attributed it to the Soviets. Then he could publish it
and not get in too much trouble. In any case, published numbers could
help convince investors to loan him money for his housing development.

Rick.
smith@sctc.com        arden hills, minnesota
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de ()
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Organization: Siemens-Nixdorf AG
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 92 13:14:23 GMT

schow@bqneh3.bnr.ca (Stanley T.H. Chow) writes:
: In article <1992Aug27.131849.13130@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de () writes:
: >wrong.  islands of trust already exist, it's a matter of 
: >building bridges between them.  
: >
: >my site knows me well.  Your site knows you.
: 
: Wrong. You know your site well. Your site has no knowledge of anything.

My "site" knows me pretty darn well.  They have issued me with a
id card with photo and mag stripe to enter the building.  They
provided this on production of my passport.  In security terms,
they "know" me.

: The administrator of your site probably does not know you well. There
: are certainly many people who does not trust their site because they
: know their site (and/or administrator) well.

It doesn't have to be your site admin.   Anybody that I trust, 
who can vouch for your identity (and your key) will do.

: 
: >Therefore your site can certify (sign) your public key.  Mine can
: >certify mine.  All that is required now is for our sites to cross 
: >certify each other's keys.  
: 
: you have merely moved the
: problem to estrablishing trust between my site and your site.
: In what way is this problem easier than establishing trust between
: you and I?

It's not.  We still need face to face meetings.  Just much less
of them.  Making this type of solution more scalable to a large
community of users.

: --
: Stanley Chow            InterNet: schow@BNR.CA
: Bell Northern Research  UUCP:     ..!uunet!bnrgate!bqneh3!schow
: (613) 763-2831
: Me? Represent other people? Don't make them laugh so hard.
--
Frank O'Dwyer		       			Disclaimer: 
Siemens-Nixdorf AG 	                        I will deny everything
Tel.  : +49 (89) 636-40639                      Fax.  : +49 (89) 636-45860
e-mail: Frank.ODwyer@sniap.mchp.sni.de
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de ()
Subject: Re: User authentication
Organization: Siemens-Nixdorf AG
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 92 11:30:23 GMT

brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes:
: In article <1992Aug28.140033.466@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de () writes:
: > So if this is interesting, how come more people don't post anonymously?
: > Why is your message signed Dan Bernstein, not Guess Who?
: 
: Where do you get the idea that people don't often post anonymously?

I can't imagine.  Reality?

I have been working with computers for about 10 years, and I
don't even *know how* to post anonymously.  I know how to
find out, but I've never bothered.   Never felt the need. 
Like most people I know.  

: (In the July 1992 Bulletin of the AMS, Shreeram Abhyankar says that
: Peter Neumann said that William Snow Burnside, who worked on the theory
: of equations, is not the same as William Burnside, who worked on the
: theory of groups of finite order. Both obtained a D.Sc. from Dublin
: around 1890.)

Same name != Same person.  We know. 

: > But I also see applications for secure newsgroups based on
: > real world identities.
: 
: I do not. In fact, unless you have an application which depends on the
: difference between one real person with two names and two people who
: happen to cooperate (overtly or secretly), an obvious isomorphism
: argument shows that your application *cannot* depend on ``real world
: identities.'' Except for certain government functions (such as voting) I

Say what?  Think of email firstly.  Think of the applications
for Non-repudiation, for example, that that offers.  Think of EDI.  
Think of digital contracts.

Now generalise email, and get conferencing and netnews.  Why
shouldn't generalised email have the same applications?

: see no such applications; and those functions won't be carried out on
: newsgroups any time this millenium.

Here we agree.
--
Frank O'Dwyer		       			Disclaimer: 
Siemens-Nixdorf AG 	                        I will deny everything
Tel.  : +49 (89) 636-40639                      Fax.  : +49 (89) 636-45860
e-mail: Frank.ODwyer@sniap.mchp.sni.de <--Use this, reply-to is broken