From: pralmo01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu
Newsgroups: alt.atheism
Subject: Re: The "God Does Not Exist" Proof
Date: 7 Apr 92 01:10:58 GMT
Organization: University of Louisville

In article <9204052219.AA13936@CSUFresno.EDU>, davidch@ZIMMER.CSUFRESNO.EDU (David Choweller) writes:
> Newsgroups: alt.atheism
> Subject: Re: The "God Does Not Exist" Proof
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> References: <1992Apr3.135846.1@ulkyvx.louisville.edu> <4APR199219553704@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> <1992Apr5.150659.1@ulkyvx.louisville.edu>
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> In article <1992Apr5.150659.1@ulkyvx.louisville.edu> pralmo01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu writes:
> |In article <4APR199219553704@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu>, lippard@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
> |> In article <1992Apr4.201457.1@ulkyvx.louisville.edu>, pralmo01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu writes...
> |>> 
> |>>Since the free will I am talking about means free will to do evil,
> |>>and since the number of chances men and women have to make choices
> |>>to do good or evil is in fact infinite (since time is continuous)
> |>>the only possible way for people to not do evil is for the probability
> |>>of doing evil to be identically equal to zero.  Since this contradicts
> |>>the notion of free will, I conclude that God cannot create people
> |>>who have free will and who will, in fact, not do any evil whatsoever.
> |> 
> |> This "free will" seems to have nothing to do with "will" at all, but
> |> rather is randomness.  Why should anyone accept that in order for
> |> a person to be free with respect to a choice between x and y, given
> |> enough time, that person will choose x on some occasions and y on other
> |> occasions?  Why can't I be free to choose between x and y yet never
> |> choose y (because of my own desires not to choose y)?  Does that
> |> make me unfree?  If so, then the freedom you are describing is
> |> a disconnection of my desires/intentions and my actions, which seems
> |> to be a distinct *lack* of freedom{  It seems to me that it is because
> |> my actions *are* determined by my desires and intentions that my actions
> |> are free.
> |
> |First of all, I am not addressing individual events.  The question is:  could
> |God create a world of beings able to freely choose between good and evil
> |and *guarantee* that no evil will be chosen.  The x and y analogy is in my
> |view a poor test case since we are in fact talking about a world of beings
> |and non just joe test-case.  It seems to me that one must realize that the
> |number of opportunities to do evil in a world such as ours, including all 
> |people, is in fact without bounds  (in fact, for any person it is without
> |bounds).  Now tell me, just what sort of free will
> |is God supposed to give people such that God can know, a priori, that no
> |evil acts will be commited?  
> |
> 
> God can contemplate the creating of a soul, and can fortell if the soul
> would do evil or not (since God is omniscient).  If the soul would do evil,
> god should not create the soul, and try creating another one.  If you
> say its impossible to create souls that only do good, then you're saying
> that it is inherent in souls that they have to do *some* evil.  How can you
> judge souls, then?  How can you blame souls for doing something that it is
> inherent in them to do?  On the other hand, if it is possible to create
> souls that cannot do evil, God should only create those types of souls.
> 

First of all, I deny that WE KNOW that God can foretell what an uncreated
but potential being will do, as I say in another post.

More importantly, free will is still viewed as a mechanism whereby people
can choose in some sense what they want their lives to be about (it is
not necessary for theology that all acts be completely undetermined by
psychological, sociological, historical factors).

The doctrine of original sin does indeed seem to predict that 'all
have fallen short', and all will fall short.  

As I said before, there does not seem to be a type of soul associated
with free will which can be guaranteed not to sin.  Or rather, it is
not clear that there is such a type.


> |
> |
> |> 
> |>>> Your last sentence also contains the weird implication that an "autonomous
> |>>> universe" must, necessarily, contain evil--in which case the heaven of
> |>>> the Christians must either contain evil or be non-autonomous.
> |>> 
> |>>Heaven is certainly viewed as non-autonomous in traditional theology.
> |>>it is "The Kingdom of God".
> |> 
> |> Below, you say that "something crucial appears to be sacrificed" in
> |> a non-autonomous universe.  So is that true of heaven?  Doesn't that
> |> make heaven an imperfect place?
> |> 
> |No.  Theology views heaven has having a different role than creation.
> |
> 
> How, different?  If something is sacrificed in a non-autonomous universe,
> then heaven is a less than ideal place.
> 

It is different, theologically.  
I don't have a complete theology of heaven just yet,
so I'll refrain from any more on this point.  

I will say that Christianity envisions a positive development towards a 
differentiated unity in God.  Just *exactly* what this is nobody claims
to know.


> |>>>    A final criticism is that the above paragraph does not address
> |>>> the question of non-human-caused evils.
> |>>> 
> |>>That's what the last sentence is about:  A physical universe which
> |>>bends and flows to keep all harm away from mortals is not really a 
> |>>physical universe, it has no autonomy.  Something crucial appears to
> |>>be sacrificed if we contemplate a universe without finite limitations,
> |>>i.e. where one could attempt everything with impunity.
> |>> 
> |>>>>Furthermore, christians do not understand good as simply the opposite
> |>>>>of evil.  i.e, there is no law of excluded middle:  something is good
> |>>>>or evil but not both.  Example: the crucifixion was good and evil.
> |>>>>This amounts to denying 6.
> |>>> 
> |>>> It's not clear to me that most Christians would accept this.
> |>>> 
> |>> 
> |>>The most canonical statement of this principle is by Saint Paul in
> |>>Romans: 'All things work to the good of those who love the Lord.'
> |>>Saints have always taught that trials have a cleansing and positive
> |>>effect *if* suffered in a spirit of acceptance.  Today I asked a
> |>>friend who is a sister of Divine Providence this same question about
> |>>evil and good and whether they are incompatible in the same event and
> |>>she said the best example is that of the crucifixion, which leads to
> |>>the resurrection.
> |> 
> |> That doesn't mean that bad things are good things, but only that
> |> bad things can be outweighed by good consequences.  But that can
> |> only be true if there aren't alternative means of getting the
> |> same good consequences without the bad.  And an omnipotent being
> |> should have access to such alternative means.  (Several months ago,
> |> several people described scenarios in which people could have been
> |> created free in a world without evil.)
> |> 

Let me repeat:  it is a fairly standard christian idea that even things
recognized as evils *might* have a good side.  In turn, good things are
seldom viewed as having utterly no imperfections.  

In my view, acceptance, rather than judgement, is key in life. 



> |Sorry I missed those scenarios, I'm sure they were interesting.  
> |Anyone want to fill me in?
> |
> |The statement 'an omnipotent being should have access to such alternative
> |means' is precisely the point in question.  I say it has not been 
> |demonstrated.  I certainly don't have any sort of metaphysical proof that
> |sainthood can be achieved just as well with a non-evil universe
> |as with an evil universe.
> |
> 
> But why does sainthood need to be achieved?  What is the purpose of 
> achieving sainthood.  If it's just for God's pleasure, then God is not
> benevolent.
> 

If you listen to the saints, they'll tell you there's nothing like it.
It's great.  It's better than sex.  They 'get a lot out of it'.

> |Also, you're introducing the classification of ends and means.
> |Does this mean that you are in fact assuming that every means must 
> |be classified as either good or bad?  Or can you demonstrate that in
> |fact every means is either good or bad or neither?  I would be 
> |interested in that demonstration.  Now here we are embroiled at just
> |the point I thought would be crucial:  just what are good and evil?
> 
> I would say that good and evil are just arbitrary rules that God defines.
> 

I thought you didn't believe in God?  Also, the original debater said:
'by human perceptions'.
                       
> |As an experimentalist, if an experiment LEADS in the right direction, 
> |I say to myself "that setup was good" even if it didn't work quite right.
> |I may also say:  It was botched.  In my experience, Christians often 
> |take a similar view of EVENTS:  they are often good and bad, depending upon
> |what aspect is concentrated on.  Acceptance of the diminishments (evils)
> |of reality as a part of a greater good is no side issue.  The theologian
> |Karl Rahner insists that acceptance of reality is in fact the ultimate
> |task of the Christian.
> |
> 
> But what is the greater good?  If you *define* greater good as what is wanted
> by God, then there's no way anyone can argue against you.  If this greater
> good is, say, the glorification of God, then it does not, to me, justify 
> the horrendous evils that have been perpetrated to get to it.
> 

I'm not the one who introduced the terms.  Christians accept *on faith*
that there will be a greater good.  Reason, in my view, supports this by
showing that there may be reasonable grounds for accepting that there is
a greater good.


> |Now reality is made up on a basic level not of 'goods and evils' but of
> |events in a continuum.  I deny that on a theoretical OR practical
> |level that one must classify EVENTS as good or evil but not both.  In fact,
> |I live my life classifying many things as good and evil both.
> 
> Evil events are those that cause suffering.  An evil person is someone who
> causes suffering when it could have been prevented.  Since god is omniscient,
> So he could forsee all the suffering his creation of souls would create.  But
> he went ahead and created souls anyway, so he is not benevolent.
> 

I thought you said God defines good and evil?  When I went up for a 
jumpshot last thursday and got pocked in the eye, I was suffering.  I
certainly didn't think it was *entirely* evil.  Similarly, when and if
I become a parent there will be times when I let my child suffer when 
I could be handing them an ice-cream cone.

> |  
> |> It is sufficient for the argument to show that there is a single
> |> instance of an event which is evil which could have been prevented
> |> by God without creating greater evil as a consequence.  
> |
> |As I pointed out above, the argument should be based on the structure of 
> |the universe, rather than the individual events which arise therefrom, since
> |the individual events are IN FACT non-predictable individually soley from the
> |structure of the universe.  The structure of the universe implies, at most,
> |distributions of types of events.  Remeber, I am arguing from the point of
> |view that God wants to give us some autonomy.
> 
> Why does God want to give us autonomy?  I prefer lack of suffering to 
> autonomy.  I'm sure the people in heaven are perfectly happy, even though
> they have no autonomy.
> 

Autonomy may be essential to letting people live their own lives,
as pointed out by another poster.

Well, I think they excercised their autonomy to get their, they chose to
go there.

> 
> |
> |In my opinion, the argument should be formulated as:
> |Could God create the good things of life without creating the 
> |bad things too, since given the choice, I want the good things even if
> |I have to have the bad things.
> |                                                              


> The answer is yes, since God is omnipotent.  He defines the good things of
> life, and he defines the bad things of life.  What are the good things
> of life?  They are things that make his creations (which, I remind you, didnn't
> ask to be created) happy.  Since God made his creations, he defined their
> natures, and defined what makes them happy.  What are the bad things of life?
> They are the things that make God's creations unhappy.  Again, since God
> his creatures, he defined their natures, and defined what makes them unhappy.

I didn't know God had such a capable mouthpiece! :-)

> As to "I want the good things even if I have to have the bad things," I doubt
> you would say that if you knew you would have to die of starvation, or
> would have to be tortured to death by a right wing death squad in El Salvador."
> |

Don't you know that the most famous killings in the long bloody
war of El Salvador are of Priests:  The six Jesuits and their housekeepers
at American University of San Salvador, murdered by a military death
squad, afterwards having their brains removed;  and the assasination of
the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero???  All of whom knew that
their lives were in danger by their carrying out of their religious 
vows as they saw them.  Or do you merely disregard those examples as
being inconvenient?   

                     
> |>>Lastly let me add that I think what the post does disprove is 'The
> |>>Nice Guy Theory of God':  God is such a nice guy, he wouldn't do anything
> |>>to hurt me.  In my opinion, that's just a different version of a dysfunctional
> |>>psychology. 
> |> 
> |> If you add "intentionally" to the above, then "the nice guy theory of
> |> God" seems like a logical consequence of the claim that God is
> |> perfectly good.  And the problem of evil still goes through.
> |
> |
> |Sure, sure, if you want to DEFINE a perfectly good being as one who is only
> |associated with perfectly good things, then in fact God is not perfectly 
> |good.  He wouldn't like most of the people I know.
> 
> Well if he doesn't like them, it's his fault, since he created them.
> 

And, in my opinion, we have disproved the existence of the NICE-GOD.
                                                                
> |In my view, this argument against the existence of God is weak primarily
> |because it doesn't deal with the purpose of creation.  Now, if you could
> |show that God had a certain good purpose in creating the world, and it was
> |possible to attain that good purpose, and God has in fact, or will in fact,
> |fail to attain that purpose, now that would be something!
> 
> You are right.  We must finally go to the purpose of creation.
> The way I see it, no purpose can justify much of the suffering that takes
> place in the world.  The problem is, you're not saying what this good
> purpose is.  Some theists say it is the glorification of God. Well, this
> doesn't cut it.  Putting sentient beings through torture so that they
> will be better able to glorify you isn't benevolent; it's downright
> nasty.
> 

After we die we'll know more, I do believe.

Joe Deasy  
         
Newsgroups: alt.atheism