From: bergman@afpan.pa.af.mil (CMSgt Mike Bergman)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: DoD News 12/17/92
Date: 18 Dec 92 21:29:16 GMT
Organization: Hq Air Force News Agency/SCC


From CMSgt Mike Bergman <bergman@afpan.pa.af.mil>

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  <<>> Assistant Secretary Of Defense                                    <<>>
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  <<>>  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS      13  14  15  16  17  18  19       <<>>
  <<>>                                  20  21  22  23  24  25  26       <<>>
  <<>>   THURSDAY, DEC. 17, 1992        27  28  29  30  31               <<>>
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  <<>>               Courtesy of Air Force Reserve                       <<>>
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[ ] HEALTH CARE SURVEY SENT TO MILITARY BENEFICIARIES
[ ] MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS      December 14, 1992
[ ] MILITARY STRENGTH FIGURES FOR OCTOBER 31, 1992 
[ ] MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS      December 14, 1992
[ ] CENTCOM News Briefing
[ ] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT AWARDS
    
=====================================================================

    
                                                      No. 539-92
                                                      (703) 695-0192 (info)
                                                      (703) 697-3189 (copies)
IMMEDIATE  RELEASE         December 15, 1992      (703) 697-5737 (public/indus-
                                                  try)


            HEALTH  CARE  SURVEY  SENT  TO  MILITARY  BENEFICIARIES

     The DoD Health Care Survey has been mailed by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel to 42,000 active duty
members and retirees worldwide.  The sample of active duty members and retirees
was scientifically drawn to be representative of beneficiary families among the
four Services and retirees.

     The purpose of the survey is to evaluate access to and use of inpatient
and outpatient medical care services and beneficiaries' attitudes and knowledge
regarding the military medical care system's policies, benefits and costs.  The
questionnaire asks beneficiaries for their opinions about their health care
benefits and their recent medical and dental history.  Active duty members and
retirees are urged to discuss the questionnaire with their spouses and depen-
dents.  Spouses may fill out all or parts of the questionnaire.

     The Department is conducting the survey as part of a comprehensive
two-year review of the military medical benefit, which was directed by the
Congress in the FY92 Defense Authorization Act.  In his letter to survey
participants, Assistant Secretary Christopher Jehn states, "As the Department
of Defense reduces the size of its military force, the quality of health care
benefits for military members, retirees and their families is a top priority.
We are undertaking a special survey to learn how beneficiaries view the quality
and availability of their  health and dental care."

     The survey can be completed in about 10 minutes by a single person who has
not had any recent health care.  Families and those with recent health care
requirements may need up to 35 minutes.

     A report analyzing the survey results is scheduled to be completed and
available in December 1993.

                                     -END-







                                                                      No. 356-M
MEMORANDUM  FOR  CORRESPONDENTS                               December 14, 1992

     The Department of Defense (DoD) today announced results of a U.S. investi-
gation and the joint Peruvian/U.S. review of the April 24 interception of a
U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft by Peruvian Air Force aircraft approximately 60
miles off the coast of Peru and its subsequent forcing down.  A U.S. Southern
Command investigation was conducted to determine the causes and problems
leading up to the incident.  A cooperative review was completed by the govern-
ments of the United States and Peru to determine what steps, if any, need to be
taken by either or both governments to revise procedures to ensure that a
similar incident does not recur.  The incident is still under U.S. review to
determine if any further U.S. action is necessary.   

     As previously announced, the USAF C-130 was on a mission within the
framework of U.S./Peruvian counterdrug programs when it was intercepted and
subsequently fired on by two Peruvian Air Force SU-22 aircraft while in
international airspace off the coast of Peru, in daylight, forcing it to land
at El Pato Air Base in Peru.  One crew member was blown out of the aircraft
when an observation window was destroyed by the gunfire.  He was not recovered
and, after a diligent U.S./Peruvian search, was declared dead.  Four other USAF
crew members were injured by shrapnel from the gunfire.  The C-130 managed to
land safely at the Peruvian El Pato Air Base near Talara, escorted by the
Peruvian aircraft.  

     The interception incident occurred about two hours after an initial
attempt by other Peruvian aircraft to intercept the C-130 as it was nearing
completion of its mission over the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru.  After the
initial intercept attempt, the C-130 crew terminated its mission in accordance
with established DoD/USAF operational guidance.  

     The government of Peru, at its highest level, immediately regretted the
incident and expressed its condolences to the family of the missing U.S. crew
member.

     In the U.S. view, the investigations show that several factors contributed
in some degree to this tragic incident, including: 

     (1)   The Overflight Clearance:  The U.S. pilots and other U.S. authori-
           ties understood they had authorization of the government of Peru for
           the U.S. Air Force C-130 counterdrug operations.  The Peruvian
           authorities stated during the cooperative review that, although a
           flight was initially approved by Peruvian authorities two days
           before the flight, the clearance was nullified when U.S. authorities
           did not confirm the flight within 24 hours of its scheduled time.
           U.S. authorities understood that notice of the flight was required
           not later than 24 hours before the flight, and such notice was
           given.





                                    (more)

                                    - 2 - 


     (2)   Communications Problems:  Although the U.S. crew attempted to
           communicate on international distress frequencies 121.5 and 243.0
           MHZ, the U.S. aircraft and the Peruvian aircraft did not communicate
           by radio.  The C-130 crew members did not transmit on Peruvian
           frequencies; they used international distress frequencies.

     (3)   The Sovereignty Issue:  According to Peru, its territorial sover-
           eignty extends 200 nautical miles from its coast.  U.S. and interna-
           tional law recognize 12 nautical miles.  Note:  Aircraft operating
           in international airspace are not subject to the jurisdiction or
           control of the coastal state.

     (4)   Language Difficulties:  Following the first attempt to intercept and
           thereafter, U.S. authorities contacted the jointly manned radar
           sites in Peru in an attempt to request that Peruvian authorities
           terminate the intercept.  Similarly, Peruvian authorities attempted
           to identify the aircraft by contacting these radar sites.  Due to
           the absence of fully bilingual personnel on duty at the time, from
           either side, U.S. and Peruvian attempts were not effective.  

     The United States/Peruvian cooperative review resulted in recommendations
for revising operating and coordinating procedures to assure the safety of
future joint counterdrug air operations.  Those recommendations, which were
included in a joint statement signed by both chiefs of the investigative
committee on July 24, focus on:  

     (1)   Clearly defining future government of Peru/U.S. government counter-
           drug operations and the types of missions that will be conducted so
           that both countries will understand the scope of the operations and
           precisely what will happen on each mission.

     (2)   Developing a clearance approval process which clarifies for both
           countries when and where the specific missions will be flown.

     (3)   Developing in-flight procedures and communications protocols for
           both normal and emergency situations.

     The governments of the United States and Peru expressed their intentions
to continue counterdrug cooperation vital to the interests of both countries in
combatting the scourge of narcotics trafficking and are taking steps to ensure
the safety of all aircraft flying in the region.  

                                     -END-



















                                                  No. 538-92
                                                  (703) 695-0192 (info)
                                                  (703) 697-3189 (copies)
IMMEDIATE  RELEASE         December 14, 1992      (703) 697-5737 (public/indus-
                                                  try)


             MILITARY  STRENGTH  FIGURES  FOR  OCTOBER  31, 1992 

                 SUMMARIZED  BY  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE

     Total numerical strength of the Armed Forces on October 31, 1992, based on
preliminary reports, was 1,794,664.  This was a decrease of 12,513 from
September 30, 1992, and a decrease of 179,049 from the same time in 1991.

     These figures represent full-time military personnel comprising both
regulars and reserves on active duty and officer candidates including cadets at
the three military academies.

     Excluded from these figures are approximately 67,850 full-time military
personnel who are paid from other than active duty military personnel appropri-
ations.  This group is funded from appropriations for reserve components and
Corps of Engineer civil functions.  A comparable figure for Fiscal Year 1992
was approximately 70,250.

     October 1992 strength figures for each service with month-ago and year-ago
figures for comparisons are:

                      10-31-92         9-30-92
                      Preliminary      Actual           10-31-91
TOTAL DOD             1,794,664        1,807,177        1,973,713
ARMY                    608,567           610,450          708,434
NAVY                     535,315          541,883          565,857
MARINE CORPS             184,404          184,529          193,669
AIR FORCE                456,379          470,315          505,763
                                     -END-

















                                                                    No.  358-M 
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS                                 December 14, 1992


     The Department of the Navy has finished its review of the A-12 deferment
agreement with the General Dynamic Corporation and the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation.  

     Based on the review, the Navy determined that it is in the best interest
of the government to continue the agreement at this time. The deferment
agreement calls for the next review in December of 1993.  

     Meanwhile, while the deferment agreement is in effect, the two corpora-
tions will maintain sufficient assets or available credit to pay the unpaid
balance of the principal sum of $1.352 billion, plus accrued interest, repre-
senting the government's claim under the A-12 Contract. The Navy will require
the contractors to provide quarterly financial submissions and monthly notifi-
cation of any changes to those submissions. In addition, the Navy will require
timely prior notice of any special distribution to stockholders or any repur-
chase of a material amount of stock.  

     Consistent with the executive order governing civil litigation, the
government and the Contractors have agreed to pursue settlement negotiations as
a possible alternative to extended and expensive litigation.  

                                         -END- 




CENTCOM News Briefing
General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
Monday, December 14, 1992 - 1:30 p.m.

     General Hoar:  Good afternoon.  I thought I was going to have some room to
put my notes here, but apparently it's going to be more difficult.

     I'd like to make a couple of opening remarks, and then open it up for
questions, if I can.

     As many of you know, particular those of you that are from the Tampa area,
Central Command has been directly involved with the goings-on in Somalia now
since August, after the President authorized relief aid.  We set up Joint Task
Force Provide Relief, and have been flying relief some 1570 missions into
Somalia and northern Kenya since then.

     In addition to that, we lifted a Pakistani battalion into Mogadishu this
fall, as you'll recall and continue to support those efforts today.

     As we moved closer to what appeared to be a catastrophe in Somalia, and
the movement in Washington was towards a commitment of U.S. forces, we began to
do some planning.  After the decision had been made in Washington and in New
York relative to the commitment of forces, we recommended at that time that we
needed a few days, five days in particular, before certain things had taken
place, before we could put the troops ashore.

     There were two aspects of this five days in advance.  One was a political
effort led by Ambassador Bob Oakley, and I'll talk to that in a moment.  But
the other part was the establishment of the air bridge.  To date, about 12
countries have signed up to assist us on overflight rights, basing rights,
refueling rights, in order to bring forces to Mogadishu.  The reason that I
mention this is because it has been extraordinarily difficult to put this
together in a relatively few days.  A great effort on the part of the State
Department and a great effort on the many countries that have come to our
assistance.

     To give you an idea of the problem, I'd like to point out that if you were
flying from Camp Pendleton to Mogadishu, you would need to refuel three times
on the way, and change crews once in order to get to Mogadishu.  Then the
slightly closer ones, from the East Coast, involve at least two refuelings and
a crew change.  So during all of this period, five days before the actual
landing, and even the days after that, we have been establishing this air
bridge which is now fully functioning, and we're moving quite well, in my
judgment.

     In that same period before the operation was approved and we actually
began to move forces, Central Command had forces in the Indian Ocean and in the
Gulf.  The carrier battle group Ranger was in the Gulf; the amphibious task
force with the embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, was sailing west in the
Indian Ocean, going to the Gulf, and, of course, we had the pre-positioned
ships from Diego Garcia.

     Before the landing we moved the carrier down into the Mogadishu area, we
had already diverted the amphibious task force with the embarked Marines to the
Mogadishu area, and begun sailing pre-positioned ships -- both those to support
the Marines and the Army.  During the same period, the U.S. Air Force was
pulling together the required airplanes and support materiel to support the air
bridge, and of course, the planning went on here in the United States, and
soldiers were also planning to leave and depart for the area.

     As a result of the UN declaration, I believe you know that there has been
an overwhelming degree of support from many countries.  To date, it's over 30
countries, over 13,000 troops.  Many of those are coming, more will come later,
some are offering help, but here's a quick list which I think you also have, of
the countries that are physically present in Somalia and environs that are
assisting us today in our efforts.

     Finally, I want to, once more, look at Somalia.  Everyone knows that
Somalia is about the same size as Texas, but let me give you another insight
geographically.  If you put that lower corner on Tallahassee, Florida, and the
far corner, up here, in Albany, New York, you would get this corner in Lansing,
Michigan.  It's a large country.  The area in the central and southern portion,
the area that we contemplate operating in, again, if it were overlaid on a U.S.
map, it would cover significant portions of Florida, Alabama, Georgia,
Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Carolinas.  I want you to know that, because this
area is quite large.

     Let me speak for a moment about Mogadishu, which is a city about the size
of Dallas, Texas.  About a million people, many of whom are refugees.  There
has been no running water for some time in that city, there is no electricity,
there's no police force, there are no court systems.  Mogadishu is important to
us because it's the center of gravity of the country.  It's where two of the
important factions are.  There are 25 non-governmental organizations that are
located there, with several hundred workers that are from outside Somalia, and
these non-governmental organizations employ about 10,000 Somalis as well.  So
it was very important to arrive in Mogadishu first.

     I mentioned earlier that we needed to take five days to get ourselves
organized before we actually put troops ashore.  I talked about the air bridge.
The other part that was so very important was the political runner.  The
President's envoy, Bob Oakley, went first out to Addis Ababa to the meeting of
all the factional leaders, then went on down to Mogadishu to begin the
political work of explaining to the faction leaders what was going to happen
next.  To pass word on to the non-governmental organizations and the private
organizations of how the introduction of U.S. forces would begin.  All of that
took several days, and it bore great fruit, in retrospect.  The now celebrated
landing that took place in Mogadishu was not opposed, largely through
Ambassador Bob Oakley's efforts.  So we saw this procedure of political
efforts, psychological operations, and then the introduction of troops, which I
think is very important, because it will be discussed again and again as we go
on in the future.

     I want to show you now, briefly, how we see the operation unfold.  The
first phase of the operation is Mogadishu; Bale Dogle, which was preceded by
the same psychological, same sort of political activity with the local elders
in the area, leaflet drops, discussion of when the U.S. forces were going to
arrive.  They in fact arrived, met no resistance.  Bale Dogle, then Baidoa.
This process is underway today -- the political, the psychological operations
at Baidoa.

     After Baidoa is secured, we will move into the second phase, which is
generally to work in the countryside in that same southern central area.
Again, moving into the countryside, setting up in the provincial towns, working
through the AID representative with the non-governmental organizations and the
private organizations that are providing relief effort.  It's important to note
that we are going to work in these areas with the agencies that have been there
for some time.

     The third phase will be a replication, only this time going south to
Kismayo and environs.  The final phase will be a consolidation of this activity
at an incremental handoff to UN forces.

     With respect to all of this, notwithstanding bad weather in the
northeastern United States; notwithstanding the problems that we have had in
some cases securing all the political requirements for overflight rights and
bases; we are doing very well.  The success of this, first of all, is the fact
that it is, first and foremost, a political activity supported by military
power.  The kinds of things that Ambassador Oakley is achieving, in my
judgment, could only be done if the military were present, as well, to help
implement it.

     The joint task force that has stood up is largely out of the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force.  It contains servicemen and women from all services.  The
1st Marine Expeditionary Force has been training to do this sort of mission for
the past year.  Many of the people that served on the Joint Task Force Provide
Relief, came out of that organization, although the airplanes all came out of
TransCom, flown by Air Force officers and enlisted people.  All the services
are contributing, bringing their unique capabilities to this operation.  

     Finally, there has been an overwhelming response from other countries, as
I mentioned earlier, over 30, with large expectations for assistance in the
future.

     With that start, let me take your questions, please.

     Q:  General, apparently there was a letter from Secretary Boutros
Boutros-Ghali sent to the President, indicating that he understood the American
role to include disarmament of Somali gunmen.  General Johnston apparently says
that our mission is to get food safely to the hungry.  I would like you to
outline to me, if you would, what you believe our actual mission is, and
specifically in respect to disarming the gunmen in Somalia.
     A:  Sure.  You've heard this about four times in one fashion or another.
Let me try.

     The first thing is, of course, the UN Resolution 794 which cites Chapter 7
of the UN Declaration, and authorizes all reasonable means to create a secure
environment.  That's where that term first appears, is in the Security Council
declaration.  It further suggests that member nations can band together to
carry out this task.

     The mission that we have received is to conduct joint combined operations
to open the ports, the airfields, the lines of communication, assist the
non-governmental agencies, help them to work in their feeding centers, and
assist in the countryside.

     Within those tasks, you can see them unfolding already in Somalia, there
is no specific mention of disarming the country.  While we perform all of those
tasks there will be, clearly, a degree of disarmament that takes place, but
bearing in mind that this is a political issue, one that needs to be settled
first and foremost by the Somalis with the help of the UN, and Ambassador
Kittani is present in Mogadishu, he's the Secretary General's representative.
Bob Oakley is there to help with the political side.  We are there to underpin
that process.

     Bear in mind that there are probably thousands of people in Somalia that
are hired by the non-governmental organizations to guard them.  The recent
activity that took place in Bale Dogle is instructive.  We learned that when
the elders knew we were coming and knew we bore them no harm, they offered to
turn in their weapons.  That was reported, and I believe everyone had that.
The condition was, however, that we would protect them.  So when the Marines
arrived, the decision was since the militia in Bale Dogle was clearly under the
effective control of the elders in that area, and we didn't have the resources,
at that time and may indeed never have them, not to disarm them.  So there are
some very difficult questions about who should remain armed.

     I think we're all in agreement that the technicals, the heavy weapons,
need to be brought under control.  It's my understanding that the major
factional leaders are, indeed, doing that right now, despite the fact that the
48-hour deadline has passed.  But there is noticeable reluctance, as you might
guess, after some time in which there was great distrust among these various
factional leaders.  My guess is that there is progress in this regard.  I think
everyone that has been in Mogadishu in the last few days has seen progress.  I
think it will continue.  We'll see it shortly, in various places in the
countryside.  I think, as an adjunct to the task that the force has right now,
as you will see, a significant reduction in the violence, and therefore, the
arms.

     Q:  General, can you tell us (inaudible) going well.  Will we (inaudible)
President Bush's deadline of January, or will there be some movement to have
some forces stay for an extended period of time?
     A:  I don't think there's any intention with anyone that I've spoken to in
Washington, that all the forces will be out by mid-January or thereabouts.
Clearly, the reduction of U.S. forces will be dependent on the progress because
one of the most heartening aspects of this is the number of UN countries that
have offered assistance.  Our hope is that we move out into the countryside and
achieve a degree of security fairly soon, and I'm not going to give you a date,
but fairly soon.  That we could ask other countries to come in and assist us
and begin withdrawing forces.  If I had to set a priority, I'd say, first of
all, combat forces, then support forces, then perhaps, finally, command and
control.  But we won't leave overnight, and we'll leave incrementally as the UN
can assist us.

     A related issue is one that has come up several times about training of
militia.  This is clearly a task that's going to have to be done.  But as I
mentioned earlier, the UN, in the form of Ambassador Kittoni, is there.  We see
that that process will go forward, but probably will not be done by U.S.
forces.

     Q:  General, you mentioned the international forces that are coming in.
Are they coming in to complement the initial American force, or are they going
to be the stay-behind peacekeeping force that will be there after the American
forces have left?  And a related question, what is going to be the American
role in managing and sustaining the logistics for the forces that are going to
stay behind in Somalia?
     A:  This is the reason why we've just listed the countries that are
physically present.  Some countries have signed up for peacemaking, others for
peacekeeping, others have offered to provide assistance in other fashions.  So
it's difficult right now to craft a coalition operation that has all the
ingredients of the peacemaking.  We're working on that incrementally.  We're
clearly interested in having whatever countries that want to be present and
assist us to come on out with a small team right away to assist us and expedite
the introduction of their forces later on.

     Clearly, we would like to see some of these forces introduced after the
first of the year.  The expectation is that those countries, particularly that
need lift, that can't provide airlift and sealift, will have to come after the
first of the year.

     Under ideal circumstances, we would like to see an arrangement in which we
have some forces right away to help with peacemaking.  Sequentially, after
that, some peacekeeping forces.  Then as Mr. Gordon pointed out, we need to
think about the combat service support.

     When we briefed this plan in Washington, we pointed out that the place
where we anticipated some growth on the U.S. side was in the combat
support/combat service support area.  These are the truck companies, the
medical organizations, the engineer organizations, the people that unload
ships, the people that run airports.  We are probably the only country that can
do these things with large numbers of forces.  So it's reasonable to assume
that throughout this peacemaking process, and at least for a portion of the
peacekeeping forces, we're going to have to perform some of those tasks.

     It's too early to tell you exactly which ones will go and which ones will
stay.  As you know, the Secretary said that he thought we would be able to keep
an amphibious ready group and a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked off the
coast for security during this period.  But there will have to be an orderly
transition.  Most of the countries that are coming are offering combat units.
Light infantry battalions, motorized battalions or companies, all of which
we're delighted to have, but they all need to be underpinned by combat service
support units to feed them and make sure that they have potable water, that
they have communications, and that the equipment and the supplies that are
generated by their presence move through the airfields and the ports.

     Q:  There have been reports over the last couple of days of refugees in
both Kenya and Ethiopia now at least considering moving back into Somalia with
the confidence that U.S. forces are there to protect them.  Can you give us, in
your perspective, the reason why we are there -- are we accepted, are we
wanted?  And can we really accomplish anything in the long run to better the
country?
     A:  I think the answer is yes to all of those.  Let me begin by saying
that the United States has been regarded by Somalia as a friend.  This is a
political process.  That belief has been bolstered, in my view, first of all by
Ambassador Oakley, then by our young men and women that are serving out there.
The political process needs time.  It needs the added impetus of the presence
of a military force in order to give a degree of security that allows some of
these other things to take place, principally, the feeding of these people that
are dying every day, that's the great catastrophe of this.  So the U.S. forces,
in the short term, can assist in that regard.  In the longer term, there has to
be a handoff to UN forces that are prepared to stay for the long-haul to assist
in the nation building.

     But everyone knows that in the final analysis, the Somalis are going to
have to rebuild their country themselves politically.  There's a lot of other
things that can be done to help them, but clearly, they're going to have to do
it themselves.  

     We have the good will, in my judgment, of most of the people in Somalia,
and it's important that we keep it.  It will be critical to our success.

     Q:  General, (inaudible) how long it's taken the Marines to get to Baidoa?
I guess I had a few questions.  One is, I know you said the PsyOps people were
already on the ground there and are starting the process.  How long will it be
before there are combat Marines there?  And do you have any kind of personal
frustration that there's pressure being brought to bear for emotional reasons
that might make you move more expediently than you'd like to?
     A:  Yes.  I think, first of all, I mentioned that the vast majority of the
Somali people favor our presence there.  There are elements in that society
that view us as outsiders.  For that reason, I'd prefer not to put a date on
when we're going to Baidoa.  The process is pretty straight forward, the same
as in Mogadishu and Bale Dogle.  A political and psychological effort and
advance to make sure that the young men and women in the U.S. armed forces and
people armed in the countryside don't find themselves in a circumstance where
we have bloodshed just by accident.  So that process has worked out fairly
well.  I'm confident that we'll be in Bale Dogle pretty quickly.

     With respect to the frustration that has been expressed by some of the
young workers that work for non-governmental organizations, I think that's
understandable.  I was enormously impressed by the youngsters that I saw out
there in September that are devoting a good portion of their time, a year or
more of their lives, to the care of these unfortunate people.  And clearly,
we're sympathetic to what they're doing.  But I think that all of you
understand that in a city of a million people in which we're driving ships and
airplanes into the airfield, in which airplanes are fired on routinely, that
there has to be security in those areas for our forces as they arrive.  First
and foremost, we can't afford to have some sort of catastrophe overtake us in
Mogadishu.

     As those forces become available, we'll move to the countryside as quickly
as we can, consistent with the process that I just described to you.  Baidoa is
key to this, and will happen shortly.  There is no outside pressure that I'm
aware of to make this happen any faster than it's moving right now.  Although
we wish we could do it faster.

     Q:  Is it more dangerous in Baidoa now because the movement into Mogadishu
is pushing some of these forces inland?
     A:  There is clearly that perception in Baidoa.  But let me give you
another view of that.  I mentioned earlier that we've been flying airplanes
into Somalia now since August.  We have flown over 700 flights into Baidoa.  We
have flown airplanes into Baidoa every day, save two, in the month of December.
That was the 11th and 12th in which no airplanes went in, and that was because
the airplanes couldn't make radio contact with anybody at the air strip.

     We have averaged better than six flights a day.  We flew six planes in
today.  Clearly, the whole country is in a state of anarchy.  But I mention
that to put it in perspective.  The day goes on, we continue to fly supplies,
we continue to have airplanes on the ground, we continue to have people meet
the airplanes and offload them that represent the non-governmental agencies,
and take the food off.  It's a very difficult situation, the NGO's are
understandably anxious.  But I think that gives you another perspective of
what's going on there.

     Q:  Talk about preparation, psychological and political, dropping
leaflets.  Can you be a little more detailed of what else can you do then to
prepare to move into Baidoa?  What's going on right now?
     A:  Let me deal with the leaflet first, because that's an interesting
question.  A U.S. representative in Mogadishu yesterday was told by a Somali
that the material written on the leaflet was gibberish or something to that
effect, that it didn't make any sense.  The information was prepared by a
Somali that works for the United States.  We sent it to another Somali this
morning in the United States.  He said it makes sense to me.

     Now the fact of the matter is that the other side of that leaflet has a
Somali and a U.S. serviceman with an American flag up on his shoulder, shaking
hands.

     The leaflets are working.  Does it mean that there is clear, prose on the
back side?  I don't know yet.  We still have a disagreement as to what is on
there.  We have two people, independent analysis, I'm told, that says it makes
sense.  I don't know.

     With respect to your question, this is an easy way to make contact with
large numbers of people.  In addition to that, there are psychological
operations people that are already in theater, working for the joint task
force, that have broadcast systems, that have vehicles with loudspeakers on
them.  So in this process, other kinds of psychological activities will be
done.  The themes are basically the same.  We're here to help you, we want to
assist you, we want to get the food out into the countryside.  That's the theme
that has been largely accepted every place we've gone.

     Q:  These individuals, are they possibly some of the technicals that you
hired to go out there, or what are they?
     A:  No, no.  They're U.S. servicemen.  We have not hired any technicals.

     Q:  General, when one talks to people who are headed for Somalia, very
often the outside time frame they expect to be there is six months, at least
that's what they're hoping, I guess perhaps that's what they were told.  Do you
see this handoff to UN forces taking place in that time frame?
     A:  I think for the majority of the forces that are going to be going out
there it's going to be less than that.  That's speculative, and it's always a
mistake to speculate about those kinds of things.  We haven't established any
kind of a rotation policy, because we don't yet know how it's going to go.  But
it seems to me, because of the austerity of the country, the difficulty that we
will experience getting creature comforts into the area, that a short tour
would be the appropriate thing.  But I'm confident that the normal sort of
short tour assigned in the difficult area will not apply because we'll have
most of our people out.

     But as I mentioned on the front end, there are certain functions that we
perform that perhaps nobody else can.  The Secretary mentioned the continued
presence of ships off-shore with embarked Marines.  There is also the issue of
MEDEVAC, the issue of command and control.  There are certain kinds of
technical functions like water purification, where we have organizations that I
suspect very few other countries have that can do those kinds of tasks.  So
it's entirely possible there could be some small residual forces there for some
time.  I don't know what some time means.  But it would be clearly under the
rubric of peacekeeping, rather than peacemaking, and that's a different sort of
thing, because we would see the UN as having the lead under those
circumstances.

     Q:  What percentage of your total forces are there?
     A:  Let me let you do the arithmetic, because I hadn't thought of it in
those terms.  There's about 4,500 people ashore, and there's something close to
7,000 or 8,000 aboard that carrier battle group and the amphibious ship and the
other ships.  So the numbers of people that are actually present on the ground
in Somalia are still relatively small, despite the fact that we've been there
for six days.  The reason is because of this air bridge.  It takes time to set
it up, to get it going.

     We now have two airfields that are 141 capable, in Bale Dogle and
Mogadishu.  We have a C-5 capability in Mogadishu as well, and we're going to
fly troops in in wide-bodied commercial airliners as well.  So I'm confident
that in the next few days we're going to see the numbers go up quite rapidly.

     Q:  The total force will be around 7,000?
     A:  I think that's a good number.

     Q:  And the other nine countries that (inaudible)?
     A:  They're relatively small, and I have them written down.  The Belgians
have a company; the French have a company; and then there are liaison groups
from the Canadians, the Italians, the Saudis, and some Botswani.  In addition
to that, there's a Canadian ship and a French ship off the coast; and the
United Kingdom is providing airlift out of Kenya.

     The reason some of this has taken place the way it has, because I'm sure
that's going to be the next question, why these and not others, is first of
all, the French forces have come out of Djibouti.  As you know, the French
maintain a fairly sizeable military presence in Djibouti.  It was easy on D-Day
to fly them down with their 130's, they deployed with their own aircraft.  The
Canadians and the Belgians have been standing-by since August as part of the UN
peacekeeping force to come, already had all their forces ready to go, had
substantial portions of those forces ready to sail.  So those are the principal
ones that have come in already.

     We expect within the next day or so that those countries that I listed
that have liaison teams there now, will begin to flow into the region.  The
plan is a liaison office first, because we need to make arrangements about what
tasks they'll perform, what they're going to bring, who's going to pay for it,
how can we be reimbursed for those things that we provide that are expended.
So those things are being worked out in detail, both here in Tampa, and out
there.  We'd like to try and do the largest part of it here, but clearly, some
of it has to be worked out on the ground in Somalia.

     Q:  Do you have any plans to go yourself?
     A:  Yes, I hope to go soon.

     Q:  Do you know when?
     A:  I'd rather not say specifically, but yes, its pretty soon.

     Q:  General, looking at your ongoing relationship with General Johnston,
(inaudible) operation.
     A:  General Johnston is the Marine component commander for CENTCOM, and is
now a joint task force commander.  He works directly for CENTCOM.  CENTCOM
works directly through the Chairman of the National Command Authority.  So that
won't change.

     Q:  Will you be running the operation from here?
     A:  Yes.

     Q:  So it possibly (inaudible)?
     A:  I see.  I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question.  No intention to
move the CENTCOM headquarters out there as General Schwartzkopf did.

     Q:  Any reason why?
     A:  The size of the operation just doesn't justify it.  The joint task
force is ideally suited for an operation of this size.  Clearly, the last thing
we need out there is another big headquarters.

     Q:  General, how long have you anticipated this?  I remember at a press
conference, I think it was the Chairman said you mentioned as far back as a
year ago that General Johnston (inaudible).
     A:  I think it became apparent in the dissolution of the Soviet Union that
our aims in the Horn of Africa were clearly different than they had been in the
past.  When I had been at CENTCOM before, it was not unusual to see 20 Soviet
ships in the Indian Ocean.  There was a significant Soviet presence in Ethiopia
and in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.  In other words, both sides
of the Bab el Mandeb.

     That has clearly changed.  Our principal interest in this part of the
world is humanitarian.  With all of the unfortunate things that have been
happening in the last two years -- famine, civil war -- it was clear that we
needed to be prepared to conduct humanitarian relief operations in this area.
So because of the things that were going on in the Gulf at the time, the
continuing presence of naval forces, the Air Force working in that area, I
designated 1st MEF as the organization that should claim and plan for
humanitarian relief operations.  General Johnston conducted an exercise, not
exactly along these lines, but a humanitarian relief exercise at Camp Pendleton
in June, that included representation from the State Department and AID.  As I
mentioned earlier, because they were the designated force when we first sent
people out to man the staff of Provide Relief, we sent people from 1 MEF as
well.  So they're back on the ground again.  In fact, the colonel that was the
Chief of Staff of Provide Relief, Kevin Kennedy, is now the U.S. representative
in a combined operations center that includes non-governmental organizations,
AID, disaster relief, and people like that.  He had just returned from a
three-month trip in which he had been working directly, every day, with
non-governmental organizations.  So he was very well prepared to do the task
that he's got laid out ahead of him.

     Q:  What types of (inaudible) evacuate people from embassies?  The type of
exercise (inaudible)?
     A:  No, it was a disaster relief, natural disaster, and I'd rather not
talk about which country it was placed in, because it wasn't Somalia.  But it
was in the Horn.

     Q:  General, we (inaudible) of Somalis assisting U.S. forces in clearing
the port area.  They had large (inaudible) and they were rounding up and
escorting people out.  Even though you mentioned earlier this is the political
end of the operation, but are U.S. forces at this point beginning the initial
phases of trying to reestablish (inaudible) some phase of Somali authority?
     A:  We don't have that mission, nor the authority.  There's law in this
country that prescribes particularly what you can do with regard to training
police forces.  We don't have that authority, and we're not doing it right now.
But I'll share a story with you that I think was very good that Bob Johnston
told me today.  He said an older gentleman in a police uniform was on the
corner directing traffic, and someone asked him what he was doing here, he
said, "I'm directing traffic."  He said, "who do you work for?"  He said, "I
work for the government."  His interlocutor said there is no government.  Then
this older gentleman said, well, then I work for the people.  So there is a
spontaneous effort on the part of the Somalis to find a solution to this
problem, and I believe the political effort and the military effort that
underpins it is contributing to that.  But right now we are not training any
police.

     Q:  Are we going to begin relying more and more on the local Somalis to
give us some sort of assistance in the operation?
     A:  I think that's an answer that is more properly answered by Ambassador
Oakley because it represents a political dimension that I'm not able to speak
to, because I'm not there on the ground.  But clearly, these factional leaders
have large numbers of people under arms, and we believe under their effective
control.  They must be a factor in the political solutions that are going to be
achieved in the future.

     Q:  What is your assessment of the military power there, I don't know what
you call them, the enemy or factions or...
     A:  Not the enemy.  I think there are factions that have military forces.
They are largely armed with small arms.  The most visible aspect of their
military power is the vehicle described as the technical.  It has a recoilless
rifle on it, or a heavy machine gun, or perhaps an anti-aircraft gun.  There
are some artillery pieces in the country.  There are some tanks.  Their numbers
are relatively small, and we have reason to believe that shortages of spare
parts will not make them terribly effective.

     Q:  Speaking of the heavy equipment, is anything being done to keep
weapons from being brought back into Somalia, or to stop the flow?  And
secondly, of those confiscated, how many are U.S. made, how many Soviet made,
etcetera?
     A:  First of all, with respect to collecting weapons, I think I mentioned
earlier, the factional leaders have, indeed, begun to collect them in several
different sites.  I've not seen any reports yet on the types of weapons.  The
weapons that we are getting, of course, have been tagged and taken back into
the port area and stored.  

     There appears to be a collection of both U.S. and Soviet weapons, and
European weapons as well.  I'm sure everyone knows that during the Cold War
there was a period in which the Soviet Union was preeminent in their
relationship there, then followed by the U.S. relationship.  So there is
military equipment from both the Soviet bloc and the U.S. in the country.  This
is further complicated by nearly 30 years of war in Ethiopia.  So any effort to
disarm in Somalia is going to be affected by the ability of weapons to move
freely out of Ethiopia into Somalia as well.  It's really a regional problem,
and in my judgment, very complex.

     Q:  Are you doing anything to try to stop this kind of flow?
     A:  I think incident to the tasks that we have now, that we would probably
do so.  But it will come as we get out into the countryside, which is where I
suspect the major problem will be.  In the Ogedeen region, the Ethiopian
government is very concerned about the possibility of Somalis, for example,
taking the weapons and moving over onto the Ethiopian side, and then at some
later time coming back in.  So we need to do some political work with the
Ethiopians to see how best we're going to handle that.  I think there are
similar concerns, though I've not seen it in writing, but I think there are
similar concerns in Kenya about the same possibility.

     Q:  (Inaudible), can you compare it to any other similar operations in the
past?
     A:  I think it would be dangerous to try and make a comparison.  Our
presumption as we begin the planning was that there would be no organized
resistance from the major factional leaders, and that's true.  What we have
thought right from the beginning was the serious threat posed to the young men
and women in Somalia that are representing the country, the young Somalis that
are armed, that are not under anyone's protective control, who, for whatever
reason, might feel that they should become engaged militarily with the
coalition forces.  We feel that's the significant danger.

     We have reason to believe that the event that took place the other day,
which it's been reported a Cobra was fired on and in fact returned fire, was
exactly that.  We do not believe that those people were under the effective
control of either of the major factional leaders.

     Q:  There's been some cynical people in the United States who suggest our
motivation behind this might be to get some kind of permanent military presence
in the Horn of Africa.  It's long been known that Central Command has had the
desire at some point to at least have a forward headquarters over there.
     A:  Clearly not in Somalia.  (Laughter)

     Q:  I guess the question is, is there still any type of discussion in
Somalia or elsewhere in the AOR to have a forward element of CENTCOM
permanently based there?
     A:  During the Cold War, we had made arrangements with Somalia to use,
under some mutually agreeable circumstances, the port and airfield at Berbera,
which is all the way up north.  That port, you can see right here, it's about
165 miles from the Bab el Mandeb.  Our interest and our concern at that time
was to be able to keep that very narrow strait open since there were Soviet
forces on both sides.  That threat has clearly diminished.

     I think it's fair to say that our principle national interest in the
central region is focused on the Gulf, the free flow of oil, and the moderate
Arab states with which we work every day.  With respect to a forward
headquarters, as you know, day in and day out since the end of Desert Storm
we've had a significant naval presence there.  We've also conducted a very
ambitious exercise program in most of the countries in the Gulf area.  So I
believe that that sort of presence will continue after this humanitarian
operation is completed.  That will satisfy our requirements.

     Clearly, Central Command, under General Schwartzkopf, demonstrated the
ability to move forward when necessary, and conduct military operations.  I
think in a time of reduced budgets, it doesn't make a lot of sense to try and
think about moving our headquarters, since we've been able to operate very
effectively from Tampa.

     Q:  Speaking of (inaudible) appear to be partially on the cutting block in
military cutbacks.  Does it make it more viable, or...
     A:  I don't think there was ever any intention of closing down the portion
of MacDill that included the Central Command headquarters and the special
operations...

     Q:  But if you close down an air strip, it virtually closes you down.
     A:  Not necessarily.  The Central Command headquarters is largely in place
here.  It would make our operations more difficult in the sense that when we're
sending people on short notice to Operation Provide Relief, and we tell them on
Saturday morning they're leaving on Sunday morning and they bring a big
airplane in here, it's much more convenient to bring it here than some place
else.  But as you can see, it's not absolutely essential.  We're very much in
favor of saying, yes, we'll stay open, and I have no reason to believe that it
won't.

     Q:  (Inaudible) the end of the Cold War and the mission of the military
(inaudible)?
     A:  I think it's hard to say.  I think this sort of operation clearly was
in the capability of the U.S. armed forces.  I think we've demonstrated it time
and again.  The young people in the military today are capable of doing
multiple types of missions.  They're very bright, they're well disciplined,
they think on their feet.  All you need to do is give them the mission and the
task and prepare them in advance for the type of environment in which they're
going to be sent, and they'll be able to handle the job.  I think we've seen
that again and again.

     The military stands ready to perform these kinds of functions.  The 10th
Mountain Division that's partially in Somalia now was one of the major units
that was here in Florida to help after the devastating hurricane in south
Florida.  So we have that capability, and we'll continue to have it, and if
it's in the best interest of the United States to conduct these kinds of
operations, the U.S. military will be able to do it.

     Q:  (Inaudible) very upbeat?
     A:  I think that the very nature of this operation, notwithstanding the
fact that it comes just before the Christmas holiday, it's the sort of thing
that most everybody would want to sign up for.  After seeing on television the
devastation and the heartbreaking pictures of youngsters and old people dying
for lack of food, I don't think we're going to have any trouble getting
volunteers to go on out there.  My observation both among the reservists and
among the regular forces is that they're very upbeat about it.

     Thank you very much.

                                     (END)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT AWARDS
(NOT FOR USE BEFORE 5:00 P.M. EST DECEMBER 12, 1992)

                                     NAVY

	Loral Defense Systems, Akron, Ohio, is being awarded a modification to
restructure contract N00024-89-C-3204 primarily for the purpose of adding
additional Foreign Military Sales requirements.  The contract modification
total is $49,311,000.  This is a fixed-price-incentive contract for the
production of the Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA) missile.  Work will be performed
in Akron, Ohio, and is expected to be completed by August 1994.  This contract
was not competitively procured.  Contract funds will not expire at the end of
the current fiscal year.  The Naval Sea Systems Command is the contracting
activity (N00024-94-C-3204).

                                     ARMY

	McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company, Mesa, Arizona, is being awarded a
$20,455,500 modification to a firm fixed price contract for program systems
support for Apache Attack Helicopter production, including software, training,
and engineering support for the helicopter, and manufacturing support for
aircraft being purchased for Egypt.  Work will be performed in Mesa, Arizona,
and is expected to be completed by June 30, 1994.  Of the total contract funds,
$7,273,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  This is a sole
source contract initiated on November 1, 1988.  The contracting activity is the
U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri (DAAJ09-89-C-A003).

	Sletton Construction Company, Phoenix, Arizona, is being awarded a
$6,645,000 firm fixed price contract for the construction of the Applied
Instruction Building, a concrete masonry building (approximately 34,000 square
feet), with standing seam metal roof (includes office space, maintenance bays,
a vault for classified payloads, IDS, approximately 6 1/2 miles of water, gas
and sewer lines, fire protection and alarm systems, parking, paving, storm
drainage, information systems and site improvements, as well as support
facilities including electrical service, security lighting and fencing and
upgrading an existing metal building).  Work will be performed at Fort Hua-
chuca, Arizona, and is expected to be completed by May 19, 1994.  Contract
funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  There were 35
bids solicited on August 13, 1992, and 7 bids received.  The contracting
activity is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles, California (DA-
CA09-93-C-0014).

                                   AIR FORCE

	Rockwell International Corporation, North American Aircraft, Los Angeles,
California, is being awarded a $46,139,628 (Estimated) face value increase to a
fixed-price-incentive contract for Lot III of the B-1B Overwing Fairing (OWF)
Fire Prevention modification, consisting of the acquisition of 54 Group A kits
and installation of 31 kits.  Contract is expected to be completed August 1995.
Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, is the
contracting activity (F34601-92-C-0278, P0004).
:END


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