From: parker@ehsn5.cen.uiuc.edu (Robert S. Parker)
Subject: Re: Pro-choicers must condone infanticide
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 08:05:16 GMT

sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:

>From article <1992Dec29.160413.11977@hemlock.cray.com>,
>by mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson):
>> In article <1992Dec29.200040.23450@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:
>>>From article <1992Dec24.160149.23624@hemlock.cray.com>,
>>>by mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson):

>>>> In article <1992Dec23.212832.10957@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>>>> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:

>>>>>From article <1992Dec23.104329.21553@hemlock.cray.com>,
>>>>>by mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson):

>I just can't go with you on this one.  Please help me understand.
>What is it about being a fetus that renders one less morally
>significant than when one becomes a neonate?

>Is it:	1) Dependence upon the mother for sustenance?
>	2) Anatomical connection to the mother via the placenta?
>	3) Occupation of (and expansion of) one of the mother's
>		pelvic cavities?
>	4) Alteration of the mother's metabolism?
>	5) Danger to the mother resulting from impending parturition?
>	6) Some combination of all or none of the above?

Well, I would say (1), from that list.  (There are a couple of other reasons,
but they have less to do with the "bodily autonomy" being tossed about here.)

>>>Here's an example of what I'm thinking in this situation:
>>>
>>> A person is being held prisoner in a field.  Another person arrives,
>>> assesses the situation, considers the risks to his or her safety as
>>> well as the risks to others in a nearby field, and decides to attempt
>>> a rescue.
>>>
>>> Another person is being held in a fortified building.  After careful
>>> consideration, the would-be rescuer decides against a rescue attempt,
>>> concluding that the risks involved do not justify the potential benefit
>>> (i.e. saving the captive's life).
>>>
>>>I maintain that the difference between the 2 captives has nothing to
>>>do with moral differences between them: they're both equally valuable
>>>and equally worthy of consideration for being rescued.  The difference
>>>lies in the moral climate inherent in the situation.  The lives of others
>>>are considered equally, but separately.

>Please don't mistake analogy for equation.  I thought that the analogy,
>by including the risk experienced by people in the nearby field, was a
>pretty good one.  Please explain to me why it isn't.  I suspect that
>your objection will be based on a contention that the fetus is not
>*morally* separable from the mother.  In this case, the analogy loses
>badly-needed parallelism.

My objection would be in the assumption that the two humans (being rescued)
were assumed to have equivalent pasts.  The unborn would be more analogous to
a child held in a small closet with no light, and a dispenser tube that keeps
them alive.  (we'll ignore waste disposal for now)  Outside there is no one to
hear, but there is a TV or a radio or something that provides various sounds.
(a fetus can't talk but they can hear) And this *for their entire life so far*.
This compared to a young child being put in the care of people who only speak
a language that the child doesn't know.  (The child *will* learn the language
and eventually communicate quite well.  On the other hand, if you go to the
closet would you really expect to have any sort of conversation?)  If your
mission was to kill each child, which would you feel worse about?  On the
other hand, if you knew that each child was going to be killed and could only
save one of them, which would you feel more important to save?

Even that attempt isn't great, because the unborn are in a unique situation
that can not be duplicated with more developed individuals.


>As for the consequences of granting rights to fetuses, I suppose
>you're right.  Certain "rights" would be compromised.  This sort
>of thing happens a lot, doesn't it?  I mean, don't my rights have
>to be continuously balanced against the rights of others?  We'd have to
>agree on some sort of hierarchy of rights between the fetus and mother.
>But we do that every day, don't we?

Which is why some of us argue that the point is that a fetus is not a person.
But that's another thread.

>Steve Matheson   Program in Neuroscience   University of Arizona

-Rob
Xref: sparky talk.abortion:55091 alt.abortion.inequity:6384