From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 19:04:09 GMT

In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
>It seems to me that Hooker gets something of a raw deal in history
>books. His strategic plan and tactical positioning before
>Chancellorsville was pretty good. He managed to get on Lee's flank with
>the bulk of the AoP pretty much undetected and had Lee seriously worried
>on the first day of Chancellorsville.

In addition, he had the luck that Longstreet and two divisions of his corps
had been detached from Lee's army. I agree completely up to this point.

>He only lost on the second day due
>to two factors:
>
>	1) The incredible daring and skill of Lee and Jackson. A
>"reasonable" commander doesn't split an outnumbered army into two pieces
>and march it in march column paralell to an enemy line. A "reasonable"
>commander would consider it idiocy to throw half of his force on a long
>flanking maneuver through virtually impassable forest, then have it turn
>so it catches the enemy on the flank and then commit that force to a
>headlong attack through that same inpeneratable terrain. Yet, this is
>exactly what Lee/Jackson did and managed to carry off with complete
>tactical suprise! There are so many cases of similar attacks coming to
>grief that it's a miracle that this one worked so well.

It's no miracle: it's the fact that Hooker wasn't doing anything to prevent
it. ANY military action works if your opponent doesn't counter it. When your
opponent is making a flank march across your front you have to attack with
more than one division.
>
>	2) Incredible bad luck. He never got or never acted on reports

Neve acted on. That's not bad luck, that's bad generalship. Equally bad
generalship on the part of O.O Howard, who also heard and ignored reports,
also contributed. Catton's _Glory_Road_ gives detail on what reports were
coming into Howard's and Hooker's headquarters and how they were laughed
off. Virtually every officer in XI Corps with a rank of colonel or lower
knew what was going on to some degree, but HQ didn't want to hear it.

>that rebel troops were marching parallel to his lines and were flanking
>him. He also was nearly killed by a cannonball that smashed into a
>pillar that he was leaning against. I think that this last bit of info
>was especially important. Hooker was shaky and indeciscive for the rest
>of the battle. IMHO he might well have had a head injury that 19th c.
>medicine wasn't advanced enough to detect, like a concussion.

He did in fact have a concussion; was unconscious for a few minutes, I
believe. I think medical science could have diagnosed this in 1863... I am
not sure.
>
>	I will make no defense of Hooker as a "great" commander, and he
>might well have been promoted beyond his capacity, but I certainly don't
>think that he is the idiot he is sometimes made out to be.

The real unfairness to Hooker (and also Howard) is that nobody remembers
that they were excellent commanders under Sherman after being sent West
in 1863. Once they were placed under a general who knew how to command
effectively they both proved to be very good subordinate commanders. But
they are remembered principally for their mistakes with the Army of the
Potomac.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!