From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Hunters: Legitimate concern?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1992 07:41:20 GMT


Robert Straubinger writes:
rs> Maybe a clarification of the usage of 'offended' would be in 
rs> order here;  there exist in nature very some tight, highly 
rs> specific predator-prey relationships;  one could surmise that 
rs> extinction of the prey could lead to extinction of the predator.  
rs> With some twist of the word, such a happening might be considered 
rs> to 'offend' the dependent species.  

Russell Lawrence writes:
rl> Only if you're willing to treat a class-construct as though it's
rl> a thinking/feeling entity, endowed with some sort of personal agency.
rl> 
rl> What sort of mental qualities would a given entity need to have
rl> in order to take offense in some meaningful way?  Surely a car is
rl> not "offended" if we smash it to bits, nor is a head of cabbage 
rl> offended if we chop it into cole slaw.   To the extent that we
rl> pretend otherwise, we're guilty of personifying impersonal things.
rl> 
rl> I can understand why a thinking/feeling animal might be able to
rl> take offense at our treatment of him/her, but I don't understand how
rl> an abstract concept like a "species" is capable of taking such
rl> offense.  

From article <Bs15Bv.AtJ@acsu.buffalo.edu>, by rms@acsu.buffalo.edu (Robert M. Straubinger):
rs> From your response, I take it that the word 'offense' is being used in 
rs> the most common sense.
rs> 
rs> I understand better your point of view, which is (I think) that it is the 
rs> experience of the individual (member of a species) that is most important
rs> to the individual; 'species' is a human construct of no meaning to the
rs> individual. Thus extinction of the species is no more important than
rs> would be the death of the individual.

Not exactly.  

rs> It would seem then that the 'biodiversity' argument is completely distinct
rs> from this point of view. Many people would argue that when a species 
rs> becomes extinct, something irreplaceable is lost -- the genetic heritage
rs> of that species and its function in the ecological system it occupies.
rs> Also lost, possibly, is any other life that may have evolved an
rs> interdependence with that species. In this respect, extinction
rs> would be something that could be a disaster to many life forms,
rs> not just to the humans who have the sentience to worry about such things.

You say that a particular extinction might be a disaster to many life
forms, but if such disasters are not perceived in any way, they would
be neither good nor bad.  To illustrate, if Mars were inhabited by
zillions of totally mindless life forms, and Mars were to explode 
tomorrow, would it be reasonable to say that the explosion of Mars
was a "bad" thing for these mindless entities?   Without some sort
of sentient ability, such events would have no meaning.  Mental 
ability is a ground-of-being, so to speak, without which "goodness"
and "badness" would be meaningless terms.

rs> In a way, your point of view would almost seem to be that nothing
rs> beyond the experience of the individual is of any import to the 
rs> individual, thus is irrelevant?

Not exactly.  What I'm saying is that it's silly to pretend that
a class-construct is sentient, while overlooking the very real
sentience of individuals.

>... [deletions]
rl> As you know, many of the contributors to this newsgroup choose to 
rl> treat non-human animals as mindless entities.  Yet, they'll turn 
rl> around and treat a "species-as-a-whole" as though the "species" 
rl> is a person with some sort of collective mind.  Do you consider 
rl> such turnabouts to be reasonable?  

rs> I'll consider this a rhetorical question that requires no response.

No, it's not a rhetorical question.   

rs> First, you created a series of conclusions to fit your thesis, 
rs> then you created a yes/no question that validates your 
rs> conclusions no matter how it is answered.  

If you'll be kind enough to specify precisely what it is that
you think I created, I'll respond by quoting some material.  If
I recall, the thread arose when someone stated that non-endangered
whales are "just food", and then turned around and said something
to the effect that whales deserve to be protected from extinction.

If whales are sentient animals, then it's a grotesque half-truth
to say that they're "just food".  On the other hand, if whales are
not sentient, then it would make no difference to them, either 
collectively or as individuals, whether we treat them with
the greatest possible respect or put every last one of them 
through the meatgrinder.

rs> On top of that, you ask me to interpret the beliefs of an 
rs> exceedingly diverse newsgroup readership, and you ask me to do 
rs> this in a way that presupposes as true an unflattering 
rs> characterization of people with whom you don't agree.  Let's not 
rs> get into crap like this;  nobody learns anything from it.  

You're free to disengage from the discussion, but I strongly
disagree with your presumptuous allegation that the topic is
devoid of merit.   The ability to identify the distinction
between personhood and personification is crucial, not only
to the animal rights debate, but to the human rights debate
as well.

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals