HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Message digests and key security
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 16:57:50 GMT


One scheme to prevent spoofing is to enclose a message digest encrypted
with one's private key, which can be verified by the recipient by
using one's public key.

This provides a digest which reflects encryption with one's private key.
If a recipient can then produce a new digest, encryptied with the sender's
public key, he now has two streams of cipertext, one representing the
private key and one representing the public key, he has the plaintext,
and he has the public key.

Does this make it any easier to crack one's private key than if such
message digests weren't used at all (ignoring for the moment their
main purpose)? In particular, does it significantly weaken things?

David

-- 
David Sternlight
(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)
From: gjm11@cus.cam.ac.uk (G.J. McCaughan)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 18:15:17 GMT
Organization: U of Cambridge, England

In article <Nov.16.03.59.05.1992.2368@remus.rutgers.edu> clong@remus.rutgers.edu (Chris Long) writes:
>In article <1992Nov15.110945.19939@ringer.cs.utsa.edu>, Daniel Jimenez writes:
>
>>> This proves that P=NP and all NP-complete and all other NP problems thus
>>> have polynomial time algorithms.
>
>Anyone who believes P=NP is an idiot.

Like Bela Bollobas, then. Right. This sort of idiocy I could live with.
On what basis do you make this assertion?

(Incidentally, I guess P!=NP, but without knowing enough about complexity
theory to make assertions like the above one.)

-- 
Gareth McCaughan     Dept. of Pure Mathematics & Mathematical Statistics,
gjm11@cus.cam.ac.uk  Cambridge University, England.    [Research student]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: watt-alan@net.yale.edu (Alan Watt)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Originator: swatt@mickey.CS.Yale.Edu
Organization: Yale University, Computing & Information Systems
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 17:27:35 GMT


In article <1e1j01INNu7@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>, unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
|> donb@igor.tamri.com (Don Baldwin) writes:
|> 
|> >In article <1duqtuINNor2@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
|> >writes:
|> >>Certainly when they framed the constution, they did not mean "free
|> >>speach" as "You can keep any secret you want to keep". It means that I
|> >>can in public say things and not be brought to court for saying them.
|> 
|> >Why not?  I can send any secret that I want through the physical mails.
|> 
|> Because of legislation, not because of the consititution, ( or perhaps
|> under the "unreasonable search" clause, but then unreasonable does not
|> mean never)

The Constitution is silent on the subject of cyphers.  However, a reasonable
argument barring government restriction on encryption technology could be made
under the protection against forced self-incrimination.

I think Mr. Baldwin's point is you can send a letter full of gibberish,
and not be compelled to translate it for the authorities.  The legislation
you refer to derives directly from the Constitutional provisions barring
unreasonable search&seizure, self-incrimination, etc., etc.  It is clear
that you can keep any information in your head, and not be compelled to
reveal it.  If you keep information on paper or a computer disk, the law
permits the state to seize them as evidence, but it does not compel you
to cooperate with the state in making a case against yourself.

Further, If we're going to discuss what the framers might have meant based
on the technology known at the time, then "unbreakable" codes were freely
available to anyone.  It wasn't until the work done by Friedman
prior to WW-II that there was an effective attack on so-called "di-alphabetic
cyphers", which were known going back (I think) to the Crusades.

If you're going to argue that the same activity sheds Constitutional
protection when it is carried out with new technology, then freedom of
the press is only granted for goose-quill manuscripts and cold-set type
in hand presses.
-- 
  Alan S. Watt
  Yale University			Computing and Information Systems
  Box 2112 Yale Station			(203) 432-6602
  New Haven, CT  06520-2112		Watt-Alan@Yale.Edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: unpredictable random generators (terminology)
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 21:57:22 GMT

In article <CH28NFT@minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de> pom@anke.imsd.uni-mainz.DE (Prof. Dr. Klaus Pommerening) writes:
>In article <1992Nov12.171127.2162@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu>  
>
>In the literature there is a certain confusion as to how call this sort
>of (unpredictable) pseudo-random generators. Examples are:
> - secure
> - unpredictable
> - cryptographically strong
> - perfect
>I prefer the latter term, because it is so short, and, more
>important, the cryptographic strength implies that the generator
>passes all efficient statistical tests -- truly perfect, isn't it?

"Perfect" randomness suggests "true" randomness to me.  In
particular, the restriction to "efficient" statistical tests
does not seem implied.
"Cryptographically strong" is well defined and is actually
descriptive of what is needed, but tends to be a mouthful to
say and a bother to type.
"Unpredictable" is fine, although explinations are sometimes
needed.
"Secure" has connotations that may color discussions.

So all in all, I prefer "unpredictable" followed by
"cryptographically strong", and the latter in cases
where clarity is more important than convenience.

		--Ken Pizzini
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5211 sci.math:15428 comp.theory:2518
From: hoey@zogwarg.etl.army.mil (Dan Hoey)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 23 Nov 92 18:52:33 GMT
Followup-To: comp.theory
Organization: Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC

With regard to the question of whether a proof for P=NP would yield a
polynomial-time algorithm for NP problems,

sethb@fid.morgan.com (Seth Breidbart) writes:

>Number all the polynomial-time machines (by adding a clock to each
>Turing Machine); do this in such a way that machine k runs in time < n^k.
>The "universal algorithm" consists of running machine i until it halts,
>and checking to see if an answer is found.  If machine k solves the
>problem, then this algorithm runs in time k n^k.  If P != NP, then
>this universal machine might not halt.  (More likely, it will always
>halt, but not within any polynomial time bound.)

Yes, P=NP implies such a machine i exists.  But you might not be able
to prove it can recognize an NP-complete language, in spite of the
fact that it does.  In fact, you might not be able to prove of any
particular machine that it recognizes an NP-complete language in
polynomial time.

You might not even be able to prove of any particular polynomial that
it is the time bound for such a machine, even though you have proven
that the machine and the polynomial must exist.

Dan Hoey
Hoey@AIC.NRL.Navy.Mil
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: 17 Nov 92 08:26:37 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <BxKLDM.Mss@sneaky.lonestar.org>, gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt) writes:
>>1.  Caller activates call.  All 3 parties generate a random x and
>>exchange their values y = a^x mod p for some a and p.  All 3 parties
>>generate the key k in the style of DH but with 3 exponents instead
>>of 2.
> 
> You're proposing enough telephone-company equipment to be involved in
> EVERY telephone call in progress at once.  This is VERY expensive.  If 

I'm not so sure.  Switches are involved in every call right now.  
Also, the majority of calls are unlikely to be encrypted and key 
negotiation only takes  place at the beginning of a call.  But this
is a good point.

> the caller has to indicate that the call is encrypted, then he's not 
> going to do it. 

Wouldn't the calling device have to send a bit saying "I'm starting an
encrypted call" so that the called device would know that it's 
receiving an encrypted call anyway?    

> Also, this prohibits (or doesn't handle) bulk, non-interactive encryption,
> where the encryption is done well before the transmission.  This sort

Yes, the technique seems to mainly applicable to real-time phone calls.
I believe this is the area of greatest concern to LE.  
> 
> Would you care to suggest a cryptographic protocol for activating
> the devices only if there is a VALID warrant?  Assume that the government
> 
Let's say that a warrant has been obtained.  Then the telco would set
a flag in the switch, say, indicating that your communications stream
was to be intercepted.  The software in the switch would use this to
determine whether to send a copy of your stream to the government
monitoring station.  A similar strategy could be used to activate the
crypto device.

> It would also appear that the 3rd party devices could be used to perform
> a traffic analysis of all encrypted traffic, possibly without a warrant.
> 
The switches can do this already.  Indeed, I would suppose they do 
some traffic analysis anyway for the purpose of resource analysis and 
capacity planning.

> This proposal STILL doesn't deal with the possibility of encrypted
> "plaintext", the possibility that the sender doesn't USE the agreed-on
> session key, but uses a different one, and that you have to decrypt
> the transmission to catch someone doing this.

Yes, this is a problem.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 16 Nov 92 22:51:22 GMT
Article-I.D.: cactus.1992Nov16.225122.2607
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx


 In <TSOS.175.721929857@uni-duesseldorf.de>
 TSOS@uni-duesseldorf.de (Detlef Lannert) writes:


>In article <1992Nov13.075430.8494@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org
>(Terry Ritter) writes:
>> Prior to the advent of personal computers and strong cryptography,
>> anything beyond what one could remember was, in the end, open to
>> examination by society.  As far as I know, this was a traditional
>> and accepted basis for much or most of Western society.  

>NO.
>
>"Prior to the advent of personal computers and strong cryptography,"
>even simple codes (from today's point of view) were de facto unbreak-
>able.

 While strictly true, this a little deceptive:  In the past, as
 now, most cryptographic systems which novices devised could indeed
 be penetrated, at the time, with simple cryptanalysis.

 The problem is as much the wide availability of computers as it is
 the development of new cryptography.  Prior to PC's, few people
 would know how to make a good cipher, and many fewer still would
 take the time to use one.  Now that we have PC's, ordinary people
 can take advantage of serious ciphers without knowing much about
 cryptography, and can use good cryptography with very little
 time or expense.

 Conclusion:  Strong cryptography as a social issue is indeed a
 modern situation.


>Why should this suddenly be a problem?
                 ^^^^^^^^
 See above.


>Why do you want special legislation right now?

 I'm not sure I do.

 What I want is for people who are interested in cryptography to
 be prepared to answer a call for legislation, should it occur
 (as I expect that it will).

 Presumably, if we understand the issues, we will be better placed
 to influence legislation.  And it really is impossible to truly
 understand issues without paying the opponents the respect of
 trying to understand their point of view.  And there is always
 the chance that, when we do this fairly, we may find that they
 actually see something which we have missed.  Since we have to
 live here too, if there are problems, we may need to address
 them in our own interests.

 I believe there is at least a potential for some serious social
 problems which are a direct consequence of the widespread use of
 serious cryptography.  I believe we would be well advised to
 seek out these problems and understand them and propose solutions
 we can live with, as opposed to waiting for the rest of society
 to encounter problems and then impose *their* solutions on us.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 21:26:27 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1ej1fsINN5ad@morrow.stanford.edu> castor@drizzle.Stanford.EDU (Castor Fu) writes:
>With all the talk about "suspected" child molesters, etc. I thought I
>would bring up one point. How do people feel about restricting cryptographic
>privileges of people once they have been convicted of a particular
>set of crimes?
	Impossible to enforce.  Such restrictions don't even work with
	guns and guns are somewhat controled.  Computers are not purchased
	only from "licensed dealers" like guns are.  



							smg
From: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Philip Zimmermann)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption - a Challenge
Date: 22 Nov 92 03:46:12 GMT
Organization: Climate and Global Dynamics Division/NCAR, Boulder, CO

If you are so sure your code is so good, why not put up the deed to your
house as the prize for breaking it?  This shouldn't even make you sweat,
since there is absolutely no risk of losing your house this way, right?
From: oppedahl@panix.com (Carl Oppedahl)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: VCR+ code cracking: help!
Date: 16 Nov 92 19:51:31 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix, NYC

In <1992Nov15.125926.1@oread.cc.ukans.edu> dseaman@oread.cc.ukans.edu writes:

>Has anyone cracked the VCR+ codes? I am interested in getting the
>algrthym that I could use in a BASIC program. Any info would be
>appreciated. 

An article in the July 1992 issue of Cryptologia describes how some
people cracked the codes that are 1 though 6 digits.  The authors
are Ken Shirriff (shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu), Curt Welch 
(curt@kcwc.com), and Andrew Kinsman (kinsman@ssd.kodak.com).

The VCR+ system is described in some detail in patent applications that
were filed for patent protection outside of the US.  For example, 
see PCT patent application PCT/US89/05806, published in publication
WO 90/07844.  It was published July 12, 1990.

I hope this is helpful.


Carl Oppedahl AA2KW  (intellectual property lawyer)
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY  10112-0228
voice 212-408-2578     fax 212-765-2519
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: New Encryption - a Challenge
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov 17 1992
Date: 18 Nov 92  21:47:04

Writes rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp):
 
 > I think you are discounting time value here.  The cryptologists 
 > who hang out here are probably not terribly interested in carrying 
 > out even a known plaintext attack on something encrypted with an 
 > unknown algorithm -- they just don't have the time to waste.  
 
 Well, if that's the case, then that's the case! :-(  I just thought 
 they might be thrilled at the opportunity.  I know I would've been. 
 
 
 > They would much rather look at and analyze the algorithm in order 
 > to assess its characteristics (security, speed, patent 
 > infringement, etc.).
 
 Eh, sure, of course they would.  But we can do the speed tests 
 ourselves and search the patents also. We only wanted to know whether
 anyone here could decrypt our test file.
 
 Data encryption is not a theoretical exercise.  If the purpose of 
 cryptoanalysis had been limited to pontificating on known algorithms,
 life would be sweet and simple, wouldn't it? 
 
 > To assert a NIH attitude is absurd, given that there is no _here_ 
 > here. 
 
 Oh yes, there is!  Gosh, we even have a FAQ post and everything...
 We have people who support each other against newcomers.  There is a
 remarkable solidarity among the "in" crowd.  FAQ + solidarity 
 creates a definite "here" place.  Don't you think?  ;-)
 
 
 > The problem is that neophytes show up with "unbreakable" code 
 > challenges in sci.crypt on a regular basis (about every other 
 > month, or so). 
 
 Really? I'll take your word for it, although I've been reading 
 this newsgroup for a while and have not seen a large number of 
 such challenges.
 
 
 > If your friend is truly interested in having experts assess the 
 > security of this algorithm, s/he must submit the _algorithm_ to 
 > the experts -- not the _output_ of the algorithm.
 
 We certainly don't want to do that. The output is the challenge,
 not the algorithm. 
 

--- Maximus 2.00
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5122 comp.org.eff.talk:7173 alt.privacy:2383 talk.politics.guns:24352
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Risks of Using PGP 2.0
Date: 21 Nov 1992 05:37:00 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com
Keywords: legal, patent, export, ITAR

In article <kPRHuB8w165w@mantis.co.uk>, mathew <mathew@mantis.co.uk> writes:
|> boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher) writes:

[stuff deleted]

|> >                                PGP is not licensed.  A license to
|> > the maker of PGP has always been (and still is) available, but it
|> > would not be free (which would be unfair to other licensees, whose
|> > licenses were not free).
|> 
|> According to the author of PGP, Philip Zimmermann, PKP have stated that they
|> will not offer a license to any user of PGP.  (See the PGP manual, volume II,
|> "Legal Issues".)  Someone is not telling the entire truth.  Who is it?

[stuff deleted]

Ooohhh...  Somebody's lying!  Well, maybe we're both right and nobody's lying...

They won't license PGP users, but they would sell a license to Philip Zimmerman.
He doesn't want to pay their price for something he's giving away.  Would you?

What would happen if all the places that want to _buy_ PGP licenses (I assume 
that there are lots of companies that would pay a reasonable price for a 
license) would pool their money and give it to Zimmerman, so he could buy the 
license (and continue giving PGP away for free)?

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: skimmel@amex-trs.com (Steve Kimmel)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: American Express Travel Related Services
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 04:57:38 GMT

In article <1duqtuINNor2@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
>williamt@athena.Eng.Sun.COM (Dances with Drums) writes:
>
>>	As for registering keys...why do law enforcement officials think
>>they have a right to know what I am saying to another person.  It seems
>>like this is an infringement on *freedom* of expression -- if my expression
>>to another person *must* be subject to monitoring, is it really free?
>
>Certainly when they framed the constution, they did not mean "free
>speach" as "You can keep any secret you want to keep". It means that I
>can in public say things and not be brought to court for saying them.

Err...maybe he ment the 4th amendment: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."  
"Your honor, we want to fish through Mr. Drum's correspondence because he
is known to communicate with known adgitators and subversives"
-- 
Steve Kimmel   N7ULW           Phoenix, AZ      |                         
Internet skimmel@amex-trs.com                   | my views only, in no way
UUCP	 uupsi!amexphx!skimmel                  | the views of my employer.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - A Challenge!
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 01:30:58 GMT

In article <n0e48t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
> 
> Well, I said I wouldn't, but I went and read Loen's long FAQ post 
> anyway. Just to show that I am equanimous. According to what I glean 
> from his words, decrypting NuCrypt output should be an absolute, 
> total, unmitigated pea-soup task for any self-respecting 
> cryptologist (-grapher?). The challenge opened widely nearly every 
> fundamental avenue of attack, as mentioned in Loen's post: 
> 
>  1. "Cipher text only" attack. Unnecessary. See below.
>      
>  2. "Known plaintext" attack.  The NuCrypt challenge offers complete 
>      availability of the original plaintext, except one word or two. 
>      You are only asked to decrypt this ONE WORD or TWO, nothing 
>      more! Plain English. Eight chars. Piece of cake.
>      
>  3. "Chosen plaintext" attack. Analysts have been invited to submit 
>      plaintext of their own choosing - 99%!  Only ONE unknown word 
>      would be ebedded in your own plaintext, and the whole then
>      encrypted. You are only asked to decrypt this ONE WORD having
>      both the plaintext and ciphertext of ALL OTHER WORDS. What 
>      could be easier?

All of those attacks presuppose knowledge of the algorithm.   In the real
world, a cryptanalyst has access to the algorithm.

Bruce

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Honest People Have Nothing to Hide
Date: 18 Nov 92 16:01:17 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com


I just saw another reference to this thought.

Honest people *do* have something to hide -- from dishonest people.

That's the bulk of the reason for personal cryptography, in my opinion.
-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: sean@cobra.dra.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
Date: 18 Nov 92 02:05:00 CST
Organization: Data Ressearch Associates, Inc.

In article <1992Nov17.103439.19143@cactus.org>, ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
>  This program was not a success (they "ran it up the flagpole" and
>  nobody saluted), but, clearly, NSA *is* prepared to support the
>  concept of data encryption for business.  Not unexpectedly, there
>  was no proposal to provide low-cost consumer encryption, a topic
>  which has been at the heart of the argument here for the past week.

This forum just got finished with toasting a student for doing exactly
what the NSA did with their proposal.  We've got this great crypto
that we think is secure, but we won't tell you how it works, or show
you the algorithm.  You put these special chips that you can't examine
in your equipment, and we promise they don't have any special "features."

In response to last weeks challange by a student, professional, after
professional said it wasn't even worth their time to examine a cryptographic
system unless it was published.  How could NSA's proposal have been
taken as a serious proposal if they don't even follow the minimum requirement
for a professional to even consider the system?

-- 
Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO
Domain: sean@sdg.dra.com, Voice: (Work) +1 314-432-1100