HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: drears@pica.army.mil (Dennis G Rears (FSS) <drears>)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: why isn't there a sci.crypt.politics?
Date: 20 Nov 92 16:17:43 GMT
Organization: U.S. Army  Armament Research Development & Engineering Center, Dover NJ

In article <1992Nov19.013914.9590@cronkite.ocis.temple.edu> linnoise@bigboy (LineNoise) writes:
>Given the number of messages here concerning the moral, political, and
>ethical issues concerning cryptography there is a clear need for a
>another news group dedicated to it.
>
>It is difficult to wade through all the politics to find discussions
>dealing with coding, methods, and etc.
>
>There are many groups out there that do not seem as active as the
>sub topic of ethics/politics of cryptography.  I apologize for posting
>this here -- I didn't know where else to direct this message.

   There is a newsgroup called comp.society.privacy, that deals with the
effect of technology on privacy.  The recent discussion on registering of
keys would have been appropriate for that newsgroups.  I am the moderator
of it.  I am enclosing a little info on the group.

Dennis
----------------------------------------------------------------------  
   I am the moderator of the Computer Privacy Digest.  The computer 
   Privacy Digest is an Internet mailing list that is dedicated to the 
   discussion of how technology impacts privacy.  This list is gatewayed 
   into the moderated USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy.  In lot of 
   ways it is a subsection on the risks digest but it concentrates on 
   the risks of technology on privacy.  The charter is: 
  
   comp.society.privacy    Effects of technology on privacy (Moderated) 
  
   This newsgroup is to provide a forum for discussion on the effect of 
   technology on privacy. All too often technology is way ahead of the 
   law and society as it presents us with new devices and 
   applications.  Technology can enhance and detract from privacy. 
   This newsgroup will be gatewayed to an internet mailing list. 
  
   Submissions go to: comp-privacy@pica.army.mil and administrative 
   requests go to comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil. 
  

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
			Dennis G. Rears
		Moderator: Computer Privacy Digest
			   comp.society.privacy
MILNET:   drears@pica.army.mil     UUCP:  ...!uunet!cor5.pica.army.mil!drears
Phone(home): 201.927.8757    	   USPS:  Box 210, Wharton, NJ 07885
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: URNG
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 16:12:16 GMT

What follows is the core of the IDEA cipher system.  Starting with a
random key and a random dataIn and then feeding back the dataOut
successively as dataIn, a pretty strong URNG should result.  It generates
16 bytes at a time.  I don't think much is known about its statistical
properties but it is known to be a strong cipher.


/******************************************************************************/
/* encryption and decryption algorithm IDEA                                   */

void  Idea(dataIn, dataOut, key)

u_int16 *dataIn, *dataOut, *key;
{
	register u_int32 round, x0, x1, x2, x3, t0, t1, t2;

  x0 = (u_int32)*(dataIn++);
	x1 = (u_int32)*(dataIn++);
  x2 = (u_int32)*(dataIn++);
	x3 = (u_int32)*(dataIn);
  for (round = nofRound; round > 0; round--)
	{
    x0 = Mul(x0, (u_int32)*(key++));
    x1 = (x1 + (u_int32)*(key++)) & ones;
    x2 = (x2 + (u_int32)*(key++)) & ones;
    x3 = Mul(x3, (u_int32)*(key++));
    t0 = Mul((u_int32)*(key++), x0 ^ x2);      
    t1 = Mul((u_int32)*(key++), (t0 + (x1 ^ x3)) & ones);
    t0 = (t0 + t1) & ones;
    x0 ^= t1;
		x3 ^= t0;
    t0 ^= x1;
		x1 = x2 ^ t1;
		x2 = t0;
  }
  *(dataOut++) = (u_int16)(Mul(x0, (u_int32)*(key++)));
  *(dataOut++) = (u_int16)((x2 + (u_int32)*(key++)) & ones);
  *(dataOut++) = (u_int16)((x1 + (u_int32)*(key++)) & ones);
  *(dataOut) = (u_int16)(Mul(x3, (u_int32)*key));
} /* Idea */
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

"There are some strings.  They're just not attached."
                                                    Victoria Roberts


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.sys.next.misc
From: andrew@cubetech.com
Subject: Re: UNIX Mail with PubKey Encryption
Organization: Cube Technologies, Inc.
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 19:46:09 GMT

In article <1e6jpsINNi71@ni.umd.edu> louie@sayshell.umd.edu (Louis A. Mamakos) writes:
>In article <1992Nov15.135015.19748@cubetech.com> andrew@cubetech.com writes:
>
>>I just use ForYourEyesOnly that came as a 2.0 Demo app...  It's a
>>NeXTSTEP app, you can insert files (but not directories, sigh) and use
>>different fonts like NeXTmail, you can mail the ciphertext from the
>>services menu, and...... it's legal to use in the US (whereas PGP
>>(Pretty Good Privacy) is very ILLEGAL in the US).
>
>If FEE is legal to use in the US, then why did it mysteriously
>disappear from 3.0?  Is NeXT afraid of a legal challange from RSA?
>I've been very curious about this since the early 3.0 announcements
>made a really big deal about this capability.

NeXT could not export 3.0 if it included FEE.  In this case it was
"all or nothing."  There was no point in trying to deal with all the
hassles of exportable and non-exportable versions just for FEE.

>Also, while you may trust ForYourEyesOnly to not have any trap doors
>in it, I don't.  Will NeXT tell you how it works?  Will you believe
>them?  For example, the "Secure" application that's on the Educational
>Software Sampler CDROM looks rather cool.  Its description claims:
>
>	Description:
>
>	Secure provides private single key encryption to user files.
>	It can be used either as a standalone or Services menu
>	application.
>
>It in fact does this.  But if you are the paranoid type (and it pays
>to be if you're talking cryptography) and you "strings" your way
>through the application, you find that is uses the UNIX 'crypt'
>command!  While crypt makes your file unreadable to the naked eye, it
>certainly has no real degree of security that I'd want to depend on;
>certainly not compared to DES, which is what I expected to find.
>Search "archie" for cbw, the Crypt-Breakers Workbench.

FYEO uses either FEE or EE.  EE is a well documented algorithm and it
is recognized as secure.  While the mathematical speedups in FEE may
weaken the algoritm, it comes down to "how secure must this really
be."  Crypt is not secure.  I would say that DES is not secure as well
if you want to talk about theoretical absolutes.  I would say that DES
is "secure enough" unless you need to keep things secure from
governments with the resources to break it.


andrew
-- 
andrew@cubetech.com     | "Carpe Nocturn - I get more work done after
Andrew Loewenstern      |  2 a.m. than most people do all day."
Cube Technologies, Inc. |                          - Simson Garfinkel
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
From: lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 19:39:00 GMT
Distribution: inet
Reply-To: lwloen@vnet.ibm.com
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM Rochester

In article <BxvEF3.Kqw.2@cs.cmu.edu> Jiri Sgall writes:

>(partial quote of James Annan):

>|> And remember, proving P=NP doesn't necessarily mean finding such an algorithm,
>|> merely proving it exists.
>|> 

>Once you have the proof, you can easily run a kind of universal algorithm,
>which will be guaranteed to be polynomial

OK, I don't know beans about P and NP.  So, an elementary question:

Do all programs of class P halt?  Your "universal algorithm" seems perilously
close to the "halting" problem and I have never been able to eliminate it
from far simpler cases than P or NP.  Or, is the halting issue kind of a
separate point/issue (ie, the solution is "P" when it works)?

-- 
   Larry W. Loen        |  My Opinions are decidedly my own, so please
                        |  do not attribute them to my employer
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 23:27:06 GMT

In article <4022@randvax.rand.org>, edhall@rand (Ed Hall) writes:
>Let me make one thing clear:  I personally believe that there should be
>no restriction of cryptography.  But in many people's minds this means
>that I'd "let the {terrorist,child-molestor,...} go free!"  It's an
>emotional argument, but an exceedingly potent one.
>
>How do you folks propose to overcome it?

Try to convince the person - I'll call him him - that witches, demons,
ogres, communists, drug dealers, drug-crazed Supermen, terrorists
and other purely evil liveforms don't exist.

It would help a lot if you had a common acquaintance who is one of the
witches, communists or terrorists.  Like for example a neighbour both
of you knew and who seemed like he was a nice enough guy, up until the
police came and confiscated all his property telling you he was a drug
dealer.  Or a satan worshipper, or a child molester.

Perhaps it would help if you had smoked some pot in high school with
friends.  Then you could take yourself as an example - tell him you
once shared a joint with a friend which you bought, putting the money
together, so you're technically a drug dealer.  Ask him if you look
like one of the evil drug-pushers who make millions of dollars who
need to be locked up just on suspicion and the key thrown away.  Ask
him if you look like one of the witches who need to be tested whether
they float.

Never mind if you haven't ever smoked pot.  A big percentage of people
have - it's plausible.  Just tell him you're one of those he wants to
be locked up.

Better yet, make him realize he's one of those witches himself,
perhaps by using his favorite vice and telling him about the people
who think all people who have that particular vice are
satan-worshippers and should be locked up and the key thrown away.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.sys.next.misc
From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal)
Subject: Re: UNIX Mail with PubKey Encryption
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 23:47:34 GMT
Reply-To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization:  Get lost.

In article <1e98rlINNndq@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
|> I had the same thought and checked with RSADSI.  The answer is that
|> PGP has problems other than RSA license and they won't license it.
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Maybe you, or somebody from RSADSI would bother to post the 
descriptions of those problems here,  so we know what it is
all about?
-- 
Regards,
Uri.		uri@watson.ibm.com
------------
<Disclaimer>
From: jbs@watson.ibm.com
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 92 19:34:42 EST
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: freedom vrs security

         Steve Gardner writes:
>    . . .              People who give up freedom for security
>never get either. Look what happened in Germany.  Is it so long
>ago that we have forgotten?  Look then to Argentina or Chile.

         This is nonsense.  There are numerous historical instances
where people have sucessfully traded freedom for security.  For example
Finland after WWII gave up some freedom to the USSR in exchange for
security from invasion.  The English people gave up some freedom during
WWII in order to better fight the Nazis.
         In the case of Germany it is ludicrous to suggest that the
German people elected Hitler out of a desire for security.  They chose
Hitler as the best man to overturn the Treaty of Versailles.  It was
obvious even at the time that this would involve grave risks.
         In the case of Argentina and Chile the people did not give up
freedom it was taken from them.  In the case of Chile at least I see
little reason for those who backed the coup to regret the result.
         The pro-crypto people would do well to come up with some argu-
ments that do not depend on eccentric quasi-religous views of how the
world works.
                       James B. Shearer
From: srt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Stephen R. Tate)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 20 Nov 92 15:29:46 GMT
Organization: Duke University Computer Science Dept.; Durham, N.C.

In article <1992Nov20.100712.7550@nntp.nta.no> klaus@hal.nta.no (Klaus Gaarder FNI) writes:
>In article <722206613@pike.cs.duke.edu>, srt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Stephen R. Tate) writes:
>|> To re-iterate:  programs that cannot
>|> be counted on to halt are very, very, very rare.  Most people will never
>|> see one.
>
>Unless Mr Tate has a fairly restriced view of 'programs' I must say:
>
>"Surely you're joking Mr Tate?"...
>
>I DO hope my Unix instance never halts...so 
>in fact most computer users see a program never halting EVERY SINGLE DAY,
>namely their favourite OS!!

Ok, ok.  Several people have pointed things like this out to me.  But
remember the context of my comment.  We're talking about P vs. NP, and
algorithms for decision problems.  In other words, the entire point of
running the algorithm is to arrive at a single answer.  In fact, most
definitions of algorithm include the condition that the algorithm halt
in a finite amount of time.   An OS may not halt, but it's not a program
designed to get an answer, and is not in the least considered an
"algorithm" in the sense of algorithms studied for complexity theory.

I used the term "program" rather than algorithm trying to be informal,
and because it's what the original poster used.  I suppose it was a
mistake....


-- 
Steve Tate srt@cs.duke.edu | The reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem,
Dept. of Computer Science  | above all other sciences, is that its laws are
Duke University     | absolutely certain and indisputable, while those of all
Durham, NC  27706   | other sciences are to some extent debatable. (Einstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: What secrets do you have?
Date: 23 Nov 92 19:52:02 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

Floating around on sci.crypt this past weekend, there seems to be another
round of the taunt: "what secrets could an individual have which could
warrant cryptography?"


Let's try some scenarios:

a husband and wife, separated by a business trip, talking intimately and
privately (they think) over a cellular or wireless phone (or even a normal
wired phone (eg., in a hotel))

two members of any of the thousands of *.Anonymous groups (a.k.a. 12-step
groups) in this country

someone who is HIV positive, employed by a company which would fire him/her
if they knew, talking to another HIV positive friend

two free-lance engineers, separated by a distance, cooperating on an
invention which will revolutionize <X>

[borrowed from earlier on sci.crypt] an incest surviver getting counselling
while going through the turmoil of the flood of memories when the initial
memory log-jam breaks

			------------------------------

It might be good to make an even more complete list.  However, I believe
that we need *only one*.  Each of these is innocent.  Each requires
privacy.  In none of these cases is it the business of any government
agency what is being discussed.  Therefore, they have no right to listen
in.  It is especially not good for any criminal organization to tap these
conversations (phone, e-mail, FAX, videoconference, ...).

As I said, all it takes is one.  I've listed 5.

Let's hear no more of this "what could innocent people have to hide?" 
nonsense.
-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 21:36:03 GMT
Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department

In article <lgdbbbINNrfv@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM>
jfarrell@cloudbase (Jerry Farrell) writes:
>Post-facto demands for a key could be met by
>stonewalling or legitimate ignorance of a session key; a simple "I
>don't rmember" sufficed for James R. Hoffa, and would likely reappear
>as needed.  And the penalty for failure to provide a key on (warranted)
>demand would very likely be less than the penalty for the hidden crime;
>we could expect some people to accept jail for contempt (or whatever)
>in lieu of revealing the keys LE would *really* like to see.

Another claim that could be made, which would likely avoid a contempt
citation, would be "That? Oh, that's random noise I stored to mess
the minds of snoopy officials."

If this (key registration, whatever) comes to pass, I suspect civil
libertarians would make a point of storing noise in their personal
files (or at least claim to do so).

-- 
    Randolph Bentson                 Colorado State University
    bentson@CS.ColoState.Edu         Computer Science Department
    303/491-5792                     Ft. Collins, CO 80523
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: 17 Nov 92 03:34:15

    Not within "modern" times.  Mr. Sternlight has pointed out that it
    was debated and settled publicly in the '50s.  I was in high
    school then and missed the debates.  I would appreciate a
    reference that sumarizes them, what parties were involved and how
    the decisions were made that detemined existing policy regarding
    public use of publicly funded invention.  It may well have
    compelling logic behind it but it sure isn't obvious from here.

Reference: Owning Scientific and Technical Information, edited by
Vivian Weil and John W. Snapper, published by Rutgers University
Press.  Contains a number of articles/essays on the history and ethics
of the patent system.  Highly recommended.  Brief description of the
1950's change: through the 19th and first half of the 20th century,
the novelty requirement for getting a patent became more and more
stringent.  Around 1950 an invention had to have been born in a "flash
of genius" to be patentable (I believe that doctrine came from Oliver
Wendell Holmes).  Congress then legislated the current "not obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art" criterion.  There is also
pretty good article in the American Heritage magazine of Science
and Technology from a couple years ago but I don't remember the
specifics.  (That's actually not a bad magazine by the way).

Regarding your (Rcain's) discussion of university inventions, I feel
you don't go far enough in saying the public should have rights to the
invention if public money paid for the development.  Unlike
corporations, universities are tax exempt, which means they're
effectively taking money from the public whether or not the invention
was developed with grant money.  In my opinion, if universities want
to collect patent royalties from the public, they should be taxed just
like any other for-profit corporation.

Regarding RSA in particular, remember also that the motivation of
patents is to provide an incentive to invent: the public gets the
benefit of the invention in exchange for the inventor getting a
limited monopoly.  But RSA was invented without this incentive (we
know this because nobody thought to apply for patents until after the
invention was already published, which is why it is not patented in
Europe, where applications must be filed before the invention is
published).  So in exchange for the monopoly, the public in this
case got *nothing*.

For info on why software patents in general are bad for almost everyone, 
write league@uunet.uu.net and ask for a copy of the position
paper "Against Software Patents", or ftp it from 
prep.ai.mit.edu:/pub/lpf/patents.texinfo.


	Paul Rubin
	Member, League for Programming Freedom.

Disclaimer: my opinions not Telebit's, etc.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: c1dje@watson.ibm.com (David Edelsohn)
Subject: Re: address, phone # list of congress
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 23:30:32 GMT
Reply-To: c1dje@tweetie (David Edelsohn)
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Followup-To: sci.crypt

In article <1992Nov20.031114.29511@eff.org>, David Banisar <Banisar@eff writes:
>All Senators can be reached at:
>
>Sen. Blowhard
>US Senate
>Washington, DC 20510
>
>
>Congressman can be written to at:
>
>Congressman Bigmouth
>US House of Representatives
>Washington, DC 20515

	And all members of Congress can be reached via the Congressional
Switchboard:

		(202) 224 3121


				David
===============================================================================
David Edelsohn                                      T.J. Watson Research Center
c$dje@watson.ibm.com                                P.O. Box 218
+1 914 945 3011 (Tieline 862)                       Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
"A good theory should fit on a T-shirt" -- Astronomer at Jan 1992 AAS meeting
From: TSOS@uni-duesseldorf.de (Detlef Lannert)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 16:04:17 GMT
Organization: Universitaetsrechenzentrum, Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet, Duesseldorf
NNTP-Posting-Host: lannert.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de

In article <1992Nov13.075430.8494@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:

 [...]
> Prior to the advent of personal computers and strong cryptography,
> anything beyond what one could remember was, in the end, open to
> examination by society.  As far as I know, this was a traditional
> and accepted basis for much or most of Western society.  Personal
> computers and cryptography have changed the ability of (the agents
> of) society to perform that function, which might challenge the
> relationship between law enforcement and society at large.

NO.

"Prior to the advent of personal computers and strong cryptography,"
even simple codes (from today's point of view) were de facto unbreak-
able. A combination of a few of the 'cryptographic procedures' which
we used as kids and which have been around for centuries was enough
to make it impossible to decrypt a message: Without computers, even
a bunch of experts would have had a hard time to crack such a silly
cypher (unless they had sufficient plain/crypt text pairs etc.).

I'm sure many criminal offenders who encrypted their secret messages
using such a system got away unpunished because no ingenious master
mind such as Sherlock Holmes or Hercule Poirot happened to find out
the keys and algorithms by mere intuition.

Today a lot of attacks to all known cryptosystems can be done with
minimum resources within a few hours. Bad luck for the kids who want
to hide something from their mathematically skilled parents ...

But at the same time there are better algorithms around, and again the
experts have a hard time cracking them.

Why should this suddenly be a problem?
Why do you want special legislation right now?

Just wondering.
--
Detlef Lannert      DC3EK      E-Mail: tsos@rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
"Gedanken sind nicht stets parat,
man schreibt auch, wenn man keine hat."             Wilhelm Busch
Newsgroups: sci.crypt