HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: B.Kumar@cs.ucl.ac.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Available Speed for MD 4/MD 5 / RSA
Date: 8 Sep 92 09:46:25 GMT


I would be very thankful if somebody can point to me any reference
where I can find the typical rates (in bits/sec) for computing hash
with MD4 or MD5 and then applying public key encryption/decryption
with RSA (or any other PKCS) on SUN4 - SLC type machine in software.
I am looking rates for 1kbyte data packets. Any hardware plateform
other than SUN will also do as I am looking for average figures for
generating digital signatures using PKCS.

What are the average (or claimed) speeds for computing MD4/MD5/RSA
using specialised hardware (such as Cylink CY1024 (?) public key
processor) chips? What is the state of art hardware for cryptology
these days?

Similarly, What are the comparable (to PKCS), DES computation speeds 
and if you know any reference please...

I am sorry if this issue has been discussed in the past on this 
news group. I just came to know about sci.crypt only five minutes ago
 
Thanks

--
B. Kumar

Department of Computer Science
University College London
London WC1E 6BT(U.K )

Email: bkumar@cs.ucl.ac.uk

(Please send me email, if you can, as it will reach me faster than a posting
on bulletin board. If there is interest, I will summarise the responses.)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman)
Subject: Re: RSA's faq hosed up?
Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 00:09:57 GMT

In article <1992Sep14.163511.204@news.uwyo.edu> jimkirk@news.uwyo.edu writes:
:I recently obtainted the faq from rsa.com, but the postscript file seems
:messed up.  When viewed with DEC's dxpsview utility (DECstation 3100,
:Ultrix), I first get an error message about no enough memory, then
:dxpsview hangs when I try to view the next page.
:
:If sent to an HP laserjet with PacificPage cartridge, I get the title
:page and table of contents, then the printer hangs.  The title page
 
I get the same exact problem.
--
Bob Silverman
These are my opinions and not MITRE's.
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
From: Henrik.Johansson@nexus.comm.se (Henrik Johansson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PGP 2.0 and GNUEmacs
Date: 10 Sep 92 12:31:04 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: Communicator NEXUS AB, Uppsala, Sweden


What about adding PGP security to email in GNUEmacs?  Has it been done
yet, or will I have to write it myself?  It would make it much easier
to use PGP if there was a simple interface to it when I want to send
and receive mail...

/hj
--
Real life:   Henrik Johansson            Email:  Henrik.Johansson@Nexus.Comm.SE
Snailmail:   Communicator Nexus          Phone:  +46 18 171811
             Box 857                     Fax:    +46 18 696516
             S - 751 08 Uppsala, Sweden
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 15:31:58 GMT

>Indeed. I suppose that Tanenbaum's book "Computer Networks" must now
>also be classed as munitions since the first edition included Pascal
>source code for a DES implementation.

Hmm.  So when a law enforcement agent comes and tries to rob your cash
with civil forfeiture, it is a good defense to carry "Computer
Networks" with you all the time so you can shoot the robber with it,
and since the government has decided that the book indeed is munition
the robber who is working for the government must abide by the
government's decision and die?

Does this also mean that there are minimum waiting periods and
background checks required before you are allowed to buy "Computer
Networks?"

Inquiring minds want to know.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Juhani Huttunen)
Subject: IDEA cipher (was: PGP 2.0 Announcement)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1992 23:59:36 GMT

In article <1992Sep7.202207.12500@fwi.uva.nl> lankeste@fwi.uva.nl (Branko Lankester) writes:

! The new faster
! conventional cipher, called IDEA (International Data Encryption
! Algorithm), was developed at ETH in Zurich by James L. Massey and
! Xuejia Lai.  Preliminary evidence suggests that IDEA may be more
! resistant than the DES to Biham & Shamir's highly successful
! differential cryptanalysis attack.  Biham and Shamir have tried 
! unsuccessfully to find any weaknesses in the IDEA cipher.

Has the IDEA cipher a longer key than DES and is it thus more resistant
to trying out all possible keys? Does the IDEA cipher use transpositions
interleaved with substitutions or some other algorithm? Is a paper 
describing IDEA generally available? (I'm not interested enough to order
a copy by mail from Switzerland.)
--
...............................................................................
Ari Huttunen   			       Any similarity to other alien life forms
				          is purely coincidental.
					      <Alien 3 misquote>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PGP 1.0 -> PGP 2.0 keyring converter
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 07:35:44 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

There's been a bit of debate recently about validating PGP 2.0 keys, the
following may help a bit....

I've just put a file called keycvt.zip on ghost.dsi.unimi.it (the same place as
PGP 2.0).  This contains the source + MSDOS executable for a PGP 1.0 ->
PGP 2.0 keyring converter.  I've tested the DOS executable but don't have
any PGP 1.0 keys handy to test the Unix version (just type 'makecvt' to build
it under gcc, it's nothing fancy).  Running it with no args gives a help
message.

This shouldn't really be used as a replacement for generating new keys with
PGP 2.0 (in fact it shouldn't really be used at all).  However there are a lot
of PGP 1.0 keys floating around out there, and keycvt can be used to boot-
strap a distribution of PGP 2.0 keys - generate a 2.0 key and sign it with your
converted 1.0 private key.  The recipient can then test it using your converted
1.0 public key.  Your old keys *do* still have some life left in them...

Again, please *don't* use converted 1.0 keys as your working keys - you
should generate new keys in the 2.0 format rather than reuse old ones...

Peter.

Useless historical note: I wrote keycvt a while back for converting keys from
  the older 1.0 format to newer transitional formats used by PGP as it
  evolved.  It wasn't really meant to be distributed, but it looks like there
  may be some use for it....
--
    pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz || peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz || peter@nacjack.gen.nz
		       (In order of preference)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Lyon_Jim@Tandem.Com (Jim Lyon)
Subject: Re: ATM fraud
Followup-To: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,local.crypto
Organization: Tandem Computers, Inc
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 02:13:25 GMT

In article <ARI.HUTTUNEN.92Sep9013737@supergirl.hut.fi>,
Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Juhani Huttunen) wrote:
> 
> 
> It just shows that the current idea of an 'ATM card' is no good. We need
> intelligent tokens and pretty damn fast. By 'intelligent token' I mean
> a card that can be challenged by the computer of the bank. I've seen this
> talked about in many books, so it's nothing new. What I would like to know
> is that how soon such devices will be available? Will the patents on
> public encryption prevent such devices for another 10 years?


It's not patents that holding up smart ATM cards, it's cost and benefits.
In order to find the *maximum* amount that any rational bank[1] would spend
on a smart ATM card, divide the amount of fraud that you expect that
technology to prevent by the number of cards outstanding.  The last I
heard, for the kinds of things that smart cards might possibly prevent,
this amounted to about $0.10 per card.

-- Jim Lyon                          "... where the work is NonStop,
   Lyon_Jim@Tandem.Com                    and we do everything twice."

[1]  A contradiction in terms, I know.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern))
Subject: PGP 2.0 files removed from ftp.uni-kl.de
Summary: PGP 2.0 source distribution has been removed from ftp.uni-kl.de
Keywords: PGP,ftp
Organization: University of Kaiserslautern, Germany
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 11:03:42 GMT

Hi.

Yesterday, I announced that PGP 2.0 was available for anonymous ftp
from ftp.uni-kl.de.  I had downloaded the UNIX files from
ghost.dsi.unimi.it, but there were apparently some problems during the
carriage return elimination.  I have deleted the files from
ftp.uni-kl.de and will upload them again when I get a clean version.

In the words of Douglas Adams: We apologize for the inconvenience.

Have fun.

-- 
Stephan <neuhaus@informatik.uni-kl.de>
sig closed for inventory.  Please leave your pickaxe outside.
From: jimkirk@news.uwyo.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: RSA's faq hosed up?
Date: 14 Sep 92 23:35:11 GMT
Organization: University of Wyoming - Laramie, WY

I recently obtainted the faq from rsa.com, but the postscript file seems
messed up.  When viewed with DEC's dxpsview utility (DECstation 3100,
Ultrix), I first get an error message about no enough memory, then
dxpsview hangs when I try to view the next page.

If sent to an HP laserjet with PacificPage cartridge, I get the title
page and table of contents, then the printer hangs.  The title page
in two places has characters overprinted (the "k" and "e" of "Asked"
and the "h" and "y" of "Cryptography"), and it looks like the file
was actually generated this way, suggesting a bad run of TeX to
PostScript.

Has anybody gotten their .ps file to print/view correctly?

Jim Kirkpatrick
jimkirk@corral.uwyo.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: henderso@netcom.com (Mark Henderson)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 signature security problem
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 92 19:17:32 GMT
Organization: Netcom

In article <1992Sep12.174358.11564@colnet.cmhnet.org> res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes:
>I recently had a chance to play around with pgp2.0 on a sVr2 Unix machine.
>There appears to be a big security problem with the signature mechanism:
>If you "sign" a file, and then add additional information to the end of
>the signed file, pgp includes this additional information as part of what
>it says you signed.  For instance:
>
>echo 1 2 3 4 5 | pgp -fs >xyzzy.pgp
>echo 6 7 8 9 10 >>xyzzy.pgp
>pgp xyzzy.pgp
>
>pgp now tells me I have signed the phrase:
>
>	1 2 3 4 5
>	6 7 8 9 10
>
>when I have in fact only signed the first line.
>-- 
>Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
>614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.

The following may be a fix. I haven't tested it extensively, it may
very well screw something else up.

Mark

*** crypto.c.orig	Mon Sep 14 10:31:12 1992
--- crypto.c	Mon Sep 14 10:31:48 1992
***************
*** 1494,1505 ****
  		}
  		CONVERSION = (lit_mode == MODE_TEXT) ? EXT_CONV : NO_CONV;
  #ifdef CANONICAL_TEXT
! 		copyfile(f,g,-1L);	/* copy rest of file from file f to g */
  #else
  		if (lit_mode == MODE_BINARY)
! 			copyfile( f, g, -1L );
  		else
! 			copyfile_from_canon( f, g, -1L );
  #endif
  		CONVERSION = NO_CONV;
  
--- 1494,1505 ----
  		}
  		CONVERSION = (lit_mode == MODE_TEXT) ? EXT_CONV : NO_CONV;
  #ifdef CANONICAL_TEXT
! 		copyfile(f,g,text_len);	/* copy rest of file from file f to g */
  #else
  		if (lit_mode == MODE_BINARY)
! 			copyfile( f, g, text_len );
  		else
! 			copyfile_from_canon( f, g, text_len );
  #endif
  		CONVERSION = NO_CONV;
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Calling Jim Reid
Date: 10 Sep 92 23:00:13 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK

I'm sorry to post this, but I can't think of any alternative.
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

I've been trying to reply to mail sent to me by Jim Reid on the
subject of DES, but there's an utterly broken mailer between here
(England) and there (Scotland).  Goodness knows, there's no problem
sending mail around the world, but Cambridge to Strathclyde?  No way!

So Jim, if you see this, I've tried to reply...

Cheers, Andrew.
From: neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern))
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PGP 2.0 available again from ftp.uni-kl.de
Summary: PGP 2.0 is again available from ftp.uni-kl.de (problem solved)
Keywords: PGP,ftp
Date: 14 Sep 92 12:26:51 GMT
Organization: University of Kaiserslautern, Germany

Hi.

I had to remove the version of PGP 2.0 because the version from
ghost.dsi (which I had uploaded) had problems.  I have now retrieved
the zip file from nic.funet.fi and removed the carriage returns with a
shell script of my own devising.  Now, PGP 2.0 is available from
ftp.uni-kl.de again as

	pub/atari/incoming/pgp20src.zip		(unmodified from funet)
	pub/atari/incoming/pgp-2.0.tar.Z	(CRs removed, UNIX format)

I'm sorry I created such a confusion but I didn't know that the
distribution was somehow screwed up.

Have fun.

-- 
Stephan <neuhaus@informatik.uni-kl.de>
sig closed for inventory.  Please leave your pickaxe outside.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,local.crypto
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Subject: Re: ATM fraud
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 17:43:50 GMT

segr@nessie.mcc.ac.uk (Simon Read) writes:
> Why don't they provide more advice on when to use your PIN and
>when not to? How to prevent the guy behind you in the ATM queue from seeing your
>PIN?

The design of the machine's keyboards makes it virtually impossible to
prevent people from seeing you enter your PIN if they really want to.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3144 alt.security:4290 comp.security.misc:1192
From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,local.crypto
Subject: ATM fraud
Date: 8 Sep 92 11:50:50 GMT
Reply-To: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK

A new type of ATM fraud has just arrived in London.

An auction was advertised at which video cassette recorders and other
consumer electronic goods were for sale at very low prices. A lot of
people turned up and were asked to provide identification at the door -
this is normal enough at auctions in Britain - and the preferred means
of identification was a bank or credit card (you had to swipe it in a 
reader and enter your PIN at a nearby keypad).

This sort of `false terminal attack' was first reported in the USA in
about 1988. You'd think the banks would warn people about it, but
instead they seem determined to introduce PIN pads in retail outlets 
here. The idiots seem to believe that this will cut fraud from the 
current \pounds 200 million plus, but in practice it means that every 
bent merchant in the country will be able to collect card and PIN data.

What's the point of designing wonderful cryptographic systems when the
customer corporations think they know it all and build implementations 
that are trivial to break even without cryptanalysis? And what should
we taxpayers believe about the government's systems? Are civil servants
better at system design than bankers, despite earning half the salary?

Ross
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: victor@watson.ibm.com (Victor Miller)
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems?
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 15:03:29 GMT
Reply-To: victor@watson.ibm.com
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM, T.J. Watson Research Center

>>>>> On 5 Sep 92 20:14:53 GMT, mcs@wet.UUCP (Gil Nardo) said:


Gil>   I'm trying to find out more about Elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Gil>   Has anybody published anything comprehensible on these systems?
Gil>   The only reference I have is 
Gil>       "A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography"
Gil>   by Neal Koblitz (Springer-Verlag).

-->Pre-Thanx for useful net wisdom
Gil> -- 
Gil> Gil Nardo                  | mcs@wet.com
Gil> Migrant Computing Services | (415)664-1032
Gil> 1032 Irving Street, #435   |-----------------
Gil> San Francisco, 94122       | Supernova = *!

Gil, I introduced Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems: see my paper "The Use
of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography" in CRYPTO '85, Springer LNCS #218.
There have been a number of other papers about them.  You might start
looking the in the proceedings of the the CRYPTO and EUROCRYPT
conferences.  You also might get in touch with Scott Vanstone
(savanstone@water.waterloo.edu) whose group at Waterloo actively works
in that area.  He has written a nice survey paper.


--
		Victor S. Miller
		Bitnet: VICTOR at WATSON
		Internet: victor@watson.ibm.com
		IBM, TJ Watson Research Center
		"Great artists steal; lesser artists borrow" Igor Stravinsky
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc
From: styri@hal.nta.no (Haakon Styri)
Subject: Today's conspiracy theory (was: ATM fraud)
Reply-To: styri@nta.no
Organization: Norwegian Telecom Research
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 92 12:21:25 GMT

In article <1992Sep14.085441.28829@nessie.mcc.ac.uk>, Simon Read writes:
>
> Unfortunately the banks are not interested in security. [project story deleted]

Of course they are, but if they don't loose anything (themselves) they cannot
secure that <nothing>, can they?  :-)   I guess what we need is some legal
case, some really bad publicity (on the behalf of banks) and maybe a law or
two to make this security "worth the cost" for banks. Who should pay the cost,
however, the customers or the owners, that's outside the charter of this group
to discuss.

> The only security a bank customer has is the security of his PIN. The banks do
> say "TREAT THIS CARD LIKE CASH" (from an ATM here); they don't provide advice on
> keeping your PIN safe though. The naivete of Joe Public is immense, as is
> illustrated by password/PIN frauds; but the banks and others must have some duty
> of care surely? Why don't they provide more advice on when to use your PIN and
> when not to? How to prevent the guy behind you in the ATM queue from seeing your
> PIN?

Well, why don't CNN or any other tv station make some feature on the topic?
The naive Joe Public v. the "hear no evil, see no evil, say no evil" banks
should make an interesting show.

(For a good story about a related problem, read Forbes Magazine, Aug. 3, 1992.)


In article <BuL2pH.6s3@visix.com>, Ken Mayer writes:
>
> Face it, no matter how sophisticated you make your authentication
> scheme, if the end user doesn't know how to take adavantage of it,
> they're going to get ripped off. You are much better off trying to
> educate them (a lost cause, but far cheaper than technological slight
> of hand), in hopes that someone learns something.

That's maybe a related problem to the above. John Doe doesn't understand
how "open" the system is today, and there's a limit to how advanced the
systems can be before he's unable to use them.


Btw., can anybody out there give one or two really good reasons for using
only 4 digit PINs? Why do all these cards have 4 digit PINs? Even my one
time password cards use a 4 digit PIN. (Ok, I wouldn't feel much safer
with a 6 digit PIN. Maybe there's some logic there after all - at least
the public isn't fooled into believing that a longer PIN would be safer.)

---
Haakon Styri				*** std. disclaimer applies  ***
Norwegian Telecom Research
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3154 alt.security:4303
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Date: 8 Sep 92 18:42:47 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
: who@gandalf.UMCS.Maine.EDU (William H. Owen) writes:
: 
: 
: >	There is a nice version of DES in pascal included in "Computer Networks"
: >by Andrew S. Tanenbaum. Anyone have a version of DES with a 128 bit key size? Or
: >alternative choices for S-boxes? Or just maybe the NSA doesn't want you to crypt
: >something that the gov't can't uncrypt.
: Uh, read your first line. You have the source- change the Sboxes to your
: heart's content. 

NO!  Don't change the S-boxes or the ordering of the S-boxes because
it greatly weakens DES.

: Double, triple, qudruple encrypt with different keys,
: and different permutations. If NSA had really wanted to make sure you
: couldn't use anything but their weak(???) DES, they would never have
: agreed to release the details of DES for you to change them.

Over the years, DES has proved to be very resistant to attempts to
crack it.  Many "improvements" have been proposed which have later
been broken.  Unless you are an expert cryptologist you shouldn't
change the algorithm at all.  

By all means use multiple encryption, though.  Double encryption
probably isn't worth bothering with because of "meet in the middle"
attacks.  Two key triple encryption is a good bet.  This is done by:

    plaintext -> enc(a) -> dec(b) -> enc(a) -> ciphertext

where enc(a) is enciphering with a, dec(b) is deciphering with b.  The
reason for this arrangement is that if the keys a and b are the same,
this process is equivalent to single key encryption.  This is
convenient for compatibility with other (single key) programs.

There is mounting evidence that IBM, in conjunction with the NSA,
really did design a secure algorithm.  I realise that this won't
satisfy conspiracy theorists, but then, by definition, they won't ever
be satisfied, however much evidence there is.

Andrew.
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: IDEA cipher (was: PGP 2.0 Announcement)
Date: 8 Sep 92 18:53:45 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Juhani Huttunen) writes:
: In article <1992Sep7.202207.12500@fwi.uva.nl> lankeste@fwi.uva.nl (Branko Lankester) writes:
: 
: ! The new faster
: ! conventional cipher, called IDEA (International Data Encryption
: ! Algorithm), was developed at ETH in Zurich by James L. Massey and
: ! Xuejia Lai.  Preliminary evidence suggests that IDEA may be more
: ! resistant than the DES to Biham & Shamir's highly successful
: ! differential cryptanalysis attack.  Biham and Shamir have tried 
: ! unsuccessfully to find any weaknesses in the IDEA cipher.
: 
: Has the IDEA cipher a longer key than DES and is it thus more resistant
: to trying out all possible keys? Does the IDEA cipher use transpositions
: interleaved with substitutions or some other algorithm? Is a paper 
: describing IDEA generally available? (I'm not interested enough to order
: a copy by mail from Switzerland.)

Yes, IDEA has a 128 bit key.  It's rather beautiful algorithm,
involving multiplications mod 65537 (which is prime, so the
multiplications are invertible because every number (except zero) has
an inverse mod a prime), additions mod 65536, and XORs.  These
operations are combined in a network which thoroughly scrambles the
data.  There are no table lookups or bit permutations at all.

It's described in the proceedings of EUROCRYPT '91 (at least I think
it was that one, but I haven't got a copy here).

BAD NEWS: It's PATENTED.  Not just in the USA but in Europe as well.
If enforced, this patent will probably prevent the widespread adoption
of this algorithm.  A great shame.

: --
: ...............................................................................
: Ari Huttunen   			       Any similarity to other alien life forms
: 				          is purely coincidental.
: 					      <Alien 3 misquote>

Andrew.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt