HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 14 Nov 92 01:25:01 GMT
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: na
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org> 
(Terry Ritter) writes: 

> 
>  Although the discussion of key registration has been interesting,
>  it does seem a bit like shooting fish in a barrel.  Discussing the
>  proposition on a computer network invokes an inherent bias in most
>  readers.  So, suppose we give the issue a different environment:
> 
>     The police bust an alleged child molester, and take possession
>     of his PC.  They believe that the hard drive contains a full
>     database of young kids who have been *or may be* assaulted.
>     That database is enciphered.

        They SAY they believe. Actually, one of the cops is upset that
        this guy has been fooling around with his wife, and he arrived
        with the encrypted file. The key will be "discovered" a little
        later. (Sorry. Unintegrated personal experience intrudes....)

        I have a program in my machine called PARK. It writes random
        garbage over my keyrings and encrypted files, and then itself.
        Can YOU tell the difference between random garbage and
        encrypted data? Are you going to send me to jail for having a
        file of random data on my disk because some cop "believes" it
        was incriminating evidence that he destroyed? It may just
        have been love letters from your mother.

        Cheers,
                Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Consulting Systems Analyst  |  The PC: Colt '45
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  of the information
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |   frontier
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4850 sci.math:15024 comp.theory:2431
From: ramsay@math.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 1992 06:43:57 GMT
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: riemann.math.ubc.ca

In article <PHR.92Nov15203840@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com 
(Paul Rubin) writes:
>It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
>is dead; but at this point I wouldn't take Swart's claims seriously
>without seeing some consensus among complexity efforts that unlike
>his previous attempts, his latest effort is free of bugs.

Mathematics would also be placed in a surprising position by P=NP.
P=NP implies that there is an algorithm which, given a theorem
expressed formally in ZF, say, and a number n, either gives a formal
proof of the theorem of length at most n, or shows that there is none,
and which would take time bounded by some polynomial in n. It wouldn't
*necessarily* put us all out of the math research business, but....

Keith Ramsay
ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Organization: Sorcerer's Apprentice Cleaning Services
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 23:33:27 GMT
	<1dm50cINNcse@transfer.stratus.com>
	<1992Nov9.213013.20970@csi.uottawa.ca>
	<1dokdlINNd4l@transfer.stratus.com>

In article <1dokdlINNd4l@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
   Yes, the gov't can break it -- but is much less likely to abuse it if it
   knows that a log of all taps is being recieved by the ACLU and the NYTimes
   and the heads of both major political parties prior to any session key
   being released (as part of the protocol for session key release).

Only the two (identical) major parties?  Boring!  And the NY Times is
scarcely better.  At least the ACLU is a start.
You really need to give it to the Libertarians, the Greens, the Reds,
Pacifica News, Ralph Nader, the Weekly World News, and enough
rabidly independent organizations that the government won't abuse it.
--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
# Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Nov 12 - Anniversary of Indonesian massacre in East Timor, 1991
# Indonesia first invaded in 1975, and about 1/3 of the people have been killed.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Help Wanted Solving Large Boolean Systems
Keywords: nonlinear, equations
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 09:35:54 GMT


 Can anyone recommend any choice references (as many as possible)
 for the solution of large (5,000 or more terms) systems of
 nonlinear Boolean equations?

 Thanks for your help.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dbrillha@dave.mis.semi.harris.com (Dave Brillhart)
Subject: Where is the FAQ - new reader
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 18:37:29 GMT
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Reply-To: dbrillha@dave.mis.semi.harris.com
Organization: Harris Semiconductor
Keywords: FAQ RSA PRIMES
Summary: FAQ for a new reader

Two quick questions from a new reader (and new to encryption) ...

1.) Were can I get the most recent FAQ?

2.) I am playing around with understanding RSA. Pretty simple.
    (IMHO someone, someday, will find a fast way to factor huge primes)
    Anyway, the unencrypt step requires huge (x^y mod z) calculations.
    Testing using 2-digit prime numbers still leads to computations such
    as 1014^613 mod 1147 = 385. Can you point me to a fast numerical
    algorithm for performing this type of computartion.

Thanks,

-- Dave
From: James_Zuchelli@qm.claris.com (James Zuchelli)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Digital Telephony is a Joke?
Date: 16 Nov 92 20:14:24 GMT
Organization: Claris Corp

You mean the FBI proposal is a joke?  I gave it to a friend at Associated Press,
it should be in the the nation-wide news feed by now....:) :)  :)

(Yes this is a joke, but even so some people fail to see the humor in things,
or see it too late.)

James Zuchelli
-------
This is my personal opinion and not that of Claris Corp. or my Employer. 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ted@nmsu.edu (Classic Ted)
Subject: Re: Triple DES
Reply-To: ted@nmsu.edu
Organization: Computing Research Lab
	<1992Nov19.150019.19072@news.nd.edu>
	<1992Nov19.150611.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> <1ehqrdINN1f9@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 00:08:14 GMT



In article <1ehqrdINN1f9@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:

   leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:
   >....  (Actually, "meet in the middle"
   >attacks show that double encryption, done this way, cannot be MUCH stronger
   >than single encryption - though it may be SOMEWHAT stronger.)

   >							-- Jerry
   Since the total number of possible encrypting functions of 64 bits is
   something like (2^64)!, and there are only 2^56 DES encryption
   functions and multiple DES is half the set of all encryptions, I would
   expect (naively) that double encryption would essentially be as strong
   as a key with 2*56=112 bits, unless DES is almost a group ( ie most
   double encryptions yield the same encryption as some single DES). Why is
   this argument wrong, or is DES almost a group in the above sense?



================================================================


des^2 could well be a simpler system than des.  as leichter mentioned
in his posting, this would mean that des itself was weak because the
attacker could add a secondary encryption and then attack the
concatenation.  on the other hand, only an attacker who knew that
des^2 was weak would ever think of making such an attack.
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: rips - sh script for sending ripem messages
Date: 19 Nov 1992 21:45:06 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com


----------------- clip clip --------------------------
#!/bin/sh
# rips filename recipient_user_id "subject matter"
# Mails a RIPEM-encrypted file.
# Edit the following variables to reflect your situation before using this script.
ripem="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/ripem"
pubkeys="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/pubkey.ripem"
seckeys="$HOME/bin/src/ripem/main/seckey.ripem"
user_id='boucher@csl.sri.com'
tmp_crp="$HOME/bin/r_${$}.crp"
if [ -n "$3" ]
then
	if $ripem -e -r $2 -u $user_id -p $pubkeys -s $seckeys < $1 > $tmp_crp
	then
		if elm -s "${3}" $2 < $tmp_crp
		then
			echo "mail sent"
		else
			echo "elm -s ${3} $2 < $tmp_crp"
			echo "ELM failed: mail not sent"
		fi
	else
		echo "$ripem -e -r $2 -u $user_id -p $pubkeys -s $seckeys < $1 > $tmp_crp"
		echo "RIPEM failed: mail not sent"
	fi
	rm -i $tmp_crp
else
	echo "Usage: $0 filename recipient_user_id subject"
fi
----------------- clip clip --------------------------


-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Re: Where is the FAQ - new reader
Keywords: FAQ RSA PRIMES
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 21:15:59 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.183729.16527@mlb.semi.harris.com> dbrillha@dave.mis.semi.harris.com writes:
>Two quick questions from a new reader (and new to encryption) ...
>    as 1014^613 mod 1147 = 385. Can you point me to a fast numerical
>    algorithm for performing this type of computartion.
>
All knowledge can be found in Knuth.

Bruce
From: boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher Program.  Comments?
Summary: Already Invented Elsewhere
Date: 23 Nov 92 21:59:18 GMT
Organization: UB

In article <1eqi8sINNbmt@roche.csl.sri.com> boucher@csl.sri.com 
(Peter K. Boucher) writes:
> If you assume that the three key arrays are full of unpredictable
> PRNs and that the seed is an unpredictable PRN, and that zipkeys
> fills up the three arrays with more unpredictable PRNs, what is the
> weakness of this algorithm?
[...]
> Is there a reason why this won't work?

Given your assumptions, it works fine -- but the way you've stated
your assumptions are contradictory.  There is no such thing as an
'unpredictable PRN' (pseudo-random number).  If it's a PRN, then it's
predictable.  If it's not predictable, then it's not PSEUDO.

You have to get your random numbers from something quantum-mechanical
(a geiger counter and radioactive material works well).  You can't
generate them from scratch -- you're not allowed to assume that the
enemy can't figure out how the PRNG works.

And once you've got a quantum noise source like that, you might as
well XOR with it directly.  It's faster and it's just as secure.

So given that you're getting key1, key2, and key3 from some
inexhaustible fount of randomness, what's left that's new or useful?
Well, the idea of using three smaller streams of random noise in order
to get one longer stream to XOR with is old -- it was discovered by
Vernam himself -- and it only postpones the time when you have to go
get more random noise in order to stay secure.

Nice try; it shows you're thinking -- but it's been tried.

-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
From: zeke@fasttech.com (Bohdan Tashchuk)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: why isn't there a sci.crypt.politics?
Date: 21 Nov 92 08:42:13 GMT
Article-I.D.: fasttech.1992Nov21.084213.21229
Organization: Fast Technology

In <Bxz4An.FtH@chinet.chi.il.us> schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes:

>I second the proposal for the creation of sci.crypt.politics.  Let's get the
>politics off of this newsgroup!

No. Let's give this a few weeks to blow over. It will move out of sci.crypt of
its own accord. Especially if we (occasionally) remind people to move.

I've already seen LOTs of discussion about the privacy and political
ramifications in other existing groups. We don't need a new one. Alternately,
someone might want to create an alt group for the duration.
From: dswartz@sw.stratus.com (Dan Swartzendruber)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: 20 Nov 92 22:41:12 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Inc.
NNTP-Posting-Host: redondo.sw.stratus.com

In article <1ejj8fINNlt@porthos.csl.sri.com>, boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher) writes:
> One simple way for criminals to safely and easily get around any

[good points deleted]

> I don't see why people who distrust the Gov't get so emotional about
> key registration.  They can legislate all they want.  It might be
> inconvenient and/or costly, but not dangerous to your privacy.  It
> might help catch lazy or casual criminals - perhaps even enough to
> justify the cost and inconvenience.

We get upset about it for a couple of reasons:

1. Expense.  If they don't bother trying to enforce it, it's useless.
   If they do, it ties up a tremendous amount of law-enforcement time
   and money (paid for by our taxes) and is still useless for stopping
   the dangerous criminals.

2. Principle.  Not to keep harping on the same theme; but it's been shown
   time and again (at least to my satisfaction), that if you give gov't
   power which can be abused with little or no accountability, they *will*
   do so, sooner or later.  Look at the so-called war on drugs.  In the
   name of an allegedly good cause, we have had some laws passed that if
   I had been told about 10 years ago, would have laughed and said "they
   could never do that here!".  We're having enough problems keeping our
   civil liberties from eroding any further without this kind of nonsense.

> -- 
> Peter K. Boucher
> --
> RIPEM public key available upon request.

-- 

#include <std_disclaimer.h>

Dan S.
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Stream Cipher Program.  Comments?
Date: 23 Nov 1992 12:19:40 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com

Following is the heart of the program (though not necessarily
the most important part).  If you assume that the three key 
arrays are full of unpredictable PRNs and that the seed is an
unpredictable PRN, and that zipkeys fills up the three arrays
with more unpredictable PRNs, what is the weakness of this 
algorithm?

Note:
  KLEN1 = 1013
  KLEN2 = 1019
  KLEN3 = 1021
  PRIME(X) = the (X % 613)th of a list of 613 prime numbers
             (which are stored in a pseudo-random order).

Also note:  The PRN generator is salted with nine bytes of
            data (4 from keystroke latency, 2 from time of
            day, 2 from process id, and 1 from the cleartext).
            These are all jumbled together (so that each of
            the nine salts is partially a function of each of
            the rest), and then stored, encrypted (of course),
            as the first nine bytes of cipher text.

The idea is to generate ~3K bytes of computationally expensive
PRNs, and milk ~1M byte of cheap-but-unpredictable key stream.
Is there a reason why this won't work?

----------------------- clip clip ---------------------
void scramble(seed)
uint seed;
{
    rint   inc;
    ruint  outc;
    ruint  i1=(PRIME(seed)*PRIME(KLEN2))%KLEN1;    /* index into key1 */
    ruint  i2=(PRIME(seed+i1)*PRIME(KLEN3))%KLEN2; /* index into key2 */
    ruint  i3=(PRIME(seed+i2)*PRIME(KLEN1))%KLEN3; /* index into key3 */
    ruint  prev_feedback = seed;
    ruint  feedback;

    while ((inc=fgetc(inf)) != EOF)
    {
        feedback = prev_feedback;

        outc = (inc ^ key1[i1++] ^ key2[i2++] ^ key3[i3]);

        i3 = (i1+12+i3+feedback) % KLEN3;
        if (i1 >= KLEN1) i1=0;
        if (i2 >= KLEN2) i2=0;

        if (!i1 && !i2)
        {
            zipkeys(feedback);
        }

        prev_feedback = ((ENCRYPT) ? outc : inc);

        fputc(outc, outf);
    }
}

----------------------- clip clip ---------------------

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: 23 Nov 92 19:59:29 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1579.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us> john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (John Eichler) writes:
>I, for one, agree completely with Mr. Fu.  Once a person has been convicted
>of a crime the government could outlaw their use of cryptography as a means
>of communication.


So -- when my company switches over to encrypting all network and inter-office
telephone traffic, we wouldn't be allowed to hire any person who has served
his time and wants to go straight????

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: ghenzie@phad.hsc.usc.edu (Gregory M. Henzie)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Future of US crypto export regulations
Date: 18 Nov 1992 04:39:53 -0800
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
NNTP-Posting-Host: phad.hsc.usc.edu

In article <1992Nov5.010142.15906@leland.Stanford.EDU> kocherp@leland.Stanford.EDU (Paul Carl Kocher) writes:
>
>P.S.  Does anyone know whether crypto exports to Britain and Canada
>are still prohibited?
>

Actually as of August 29, 1991, the Commodity Control List allowed GDTR letter
of assurance licensing to COCOT, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Switzerland
only.  I had to verify this for a DES program a friend of mine wrote, DESHEL20
(check archie for a list of sites).  Basically that covers most of the free
world.

There were some Senate hearings on the matter this year, although I really
didn't have the time to follow them.  Anyone out there know any more about
the results (if any, hehheh) of the hearings?

Btw: for those of you out there with a copy of the August 29, 1991 Federal
Register Vol 56, No 168, please refer to pages 42875 and 42876...  In 
in particular Section 5E11A Advisory Note 5.  Under that, DES could possibly 
(I haven't verified this interpretation) be shipped legally to the People's
Republic of China, provided that it is for civil use. (I personally oppose the
export of encryption technology to the PRC).

Granted, a lot of people are still ignorant of even the exportability of 
crypto technology in the "new world order".

As far as I know, the only countries that the GDTR letter of assurance does
not allow are as follows (this may be out of date):

Group   Countries
-----   ------------------------------------------------------------------

        Afghanistan, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, People's Republic of China, Syria

  Q     Romania

  S     Libya

  W     Czechoslovakia, Poland

  Y     Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Estonia, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania,
        Mongolian People's Republic, Geographic area of the former 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (includes Armenia, Azerbaijan,
        Belorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Maldovia, Russia, Tajikistan, 
        Turkmanistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)

  Z     Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

That was transcribed from the sample letter of assurance that the author of
DESHEL20 had shown me, and that was sent to him by the Bureau of Export Admin.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-- 
--
  "No matter how much you shake it, the last drop always goes down your leg."

                           ghenzie@phad.hsc.usc.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Triple DES
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<1992Nov19.150019.19072@news.nd.edu>
	<1992Nov19.150611.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> <1ehqrdINN1f9@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>
Date: 20 Nov 92 18:33:39

    Since the total number of possible encrypting functions of 64 bits is
    something like (2^64)!, and there are only 2^56 DES encryption
    functions and multiple DES is half the set of all encryptions, I would
    expect (naively) that double encryption would essentially be as strong
    as a key with 2*56=112 bits, unless DES is almost a group ( ie most
    double encryptions yield the same encryption as some single DES). Why is
    this argument wrong, or is DES almost a group in the above sense?

1. It's not known (that I've heard) that multiple DES is half the
set of all encryptions.  What's known is:
  1) (single) DES is not a group.
  2) The *single round* DES functions generate half of the set of
     all encryptions (i.e. permutations of the 2^64 text blocks).

2. I don't see a simple argument that even if DES generates A_(2^64)
(i.e. half of all the permutations), double DES contains anything
like 2^112 of those elements.  It's a reasonable thing to guess, but
I'd like to hear some actual evidence...
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4920 sci.math:15108 comp.theory:2447
From: janm@Minsk.docs.uu.se (Jan Mattsson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 17 Nov 92 09:00:17 GMT
Organization: Uppsala University
Distribution: inet
Reply-To: janm@bern.docs.uu.se
NNTP-Posting-Host: minsk.docs.uu.se
Organisation: CS Dept., Uppsala University, Sweden

pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes:

>If such an algorithm was found, I wouldn't trust RSA further than I
>could throw it without a proof that factoring is something on this
>order of hardness, and such a proof doesn't exist at the moment.

Can you prove that breaking RSA requires factoring?
--
Jan Mattsson, CS student, Uppsala University, Sweden
janm@bern.docs.uu.se or janm@minsk.docs.uu.se
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: New Encryption - a Challenge
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov 17 1992
Date: 18 Nov 92  21:45:52

Writes Ken Pizzini:
 
 > > You are absolutely wrong.
 >
 > Oh, c'mon now.  If the scheme is to be used by more than a small 
 > handful of people then at least the executable will be available 
 > for analysis.  And with a suitible effort at disassembly/
 > decompiling it can be analysed for the underlying algolrithm.
 
 You are thinking in very conventional ways. Perhaps we use a
 hexadecimal Ouija board to point at letters and don't really know 
 WHAT it'll do next... :-)  It's determined by the spirits. 
 A spiritual key. (Actually, I have been authorized to say now that
 NuCrypt relies on the use of embedded 2048-bit shifting keys.)
 
 > Your proposed modification of the prize to include airfare in 
 > addition to dinner is much better incentive -- before you were 
 > suggesting that someone spend their time breaking your system and 
 > spending hundreds of dollars of their own money in order to claim 
 > a "free" dinner.  Didn't sound like much of an inducement to me.
 
 OK, I think you're right, it wasn't attractive. Such mercantile 
 minds. Sheesh. No cryptolibido.  All those limp mental muscles.  
 So, we'll make the prize a little better, then.
 

--- Maximus 2.00
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: a7657@mindlink.bc.ca (Stephen H. Kawamoto)
Subject: Re: UNIX Mail with PubKey Encryption
Organization: MIND LINK! - British Columbia, Canada
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 21:49:32 GMT

You could use cosmic ray detection for the random source too.
Or change keys every encryption session and forget about using
anything other than the simple encryption (XOR). Your key would
just be a 32bit slice of the random bit stream. Heck, we could
even use an ANSI escape code sequence to hold it, seeing as it's
a little hard to remember non-alpha-numeric sequences.

--
Stephen Kawamoto <a7657@mindlink.bc.ca>
    "It is the very mind itself
     That leads the mind astray;
     Of the mind,
     Do not be mindless."
     (an old Japanese folk song)