HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: g9110194@cc.uow.edu.au (farzad mahboubi)
Subject: HELP:INFO about "MAXIMA" HSLA STEEL
Organization: University Of Wollongong
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 02:08:02 GMT


I would appreciate any information about "MAXIMA" HSLA steel such as 

microstructure, thermochemical treatment, heat treatment, mechanical 

properties, etc.


Please send me information by e-mail or

at following snail:

F.Mahboubi
Dept. Materials Engg.
U of Wollongong
Wollongong
NSW 2500
Australia



Thanx in advance.


F.Mahboubi

Newsgroups: sci.materials
From: sch@eeserv.ee.umanitoba.ca (R+C Schneider)
Subject: STM/AFM mailing lists, newsgroups, etc?
Keywords: scanning tunneling microscope atomic force imaging
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 16:45:11 GMT


Does anyone know of any mailing lists, newsgroups, etc. that 
discuss scanning tunneling and atomic force (STM/AFM) microscope work?

Please reply to my EMail address.

Thanks!
--
Chris Schneider                          
University of Manitoba Electrical Engineering
Winnipeg, Canada
<sch@eeserv.ee.umanitoba.ca>
Newsgroups: sci.materials,soc.college.gradinfo
From: carter@ferrari.mst6.lanl.gov (Dave Carter)
Subject: Re: MatSci at Michigan State
Organization: Los Alamos National Lab, Group MST-6
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 18:37:12 GMT

In article <93011.105554U51519@uicvm.uic.edu> <U51519@uicvm.uic.edu> writes:
>I am currently an undergrad in the MatSci program, but I hope to attend
>graduate school to study in the composite materials area. I am particularly
>interested in the fatigue, fracture and mechanics aspect of composites.
>
>I know that the department which grants a MatSci degree also has a mechanics
>program. I was wondering if a double major in Materials & Mechanics is
>possible, if not is there a strong interaction between the materials and
>mechanics groups? I would appreciate any information about the composites

UCSB.  Contact Tony Evans, David Clarke, Bob McMeeking, many others...

						- dave
-- 
carter@mr2.mst6.lanl.gov
From: th2_oate@csd.uwe.ac.uk (Tom Oates)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Is PGP 2.0 compatible with PGP 2.1?
Date: 8 Jan 93 11:46:00 GMT
Organization: University of the West of England, Bristol

Here's a very simple question for readers. I'm about to download PGP 2.1

If someone sends me a message encrypted using v2.0, can I decrypt it
using v2.1? And vice versa.

Please post your answer on the net.

-- 
****************************************************************************** 
* Tom Oates (Univ. of West of England) * DISCLAIMER:I speak only for myself. * 
* Email to: th2_oate@uk.ac.uwe.csd     * PGP 2.0 Key available upon request. *
******************************************************************************
From: hagopes@works.uucp (Yinco Schmeer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: tripple encrypt
Date: 9 Jan 93 01:43:11 GMT
Organization: The Works BBS - Informational Archives - Est. 1985

>>They suggest using triple encryption for key distribution.<<
(Steven Bellovin)

I was under the impression that Double and Tripple encryption was no more 
secure than single encryption. I believe that there was a mathmatical 
proof of this...
                                        -Hagopes
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jones@pyrite.cs.uiowa.edu (Douglas W. Jones,201H MLH,3193350740,3193382879)
Subject: Re: Encryption plus compression (Was: Another well-intentioned novice's quest)
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 22:17:31 GMT
Organization: University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

From article <1993Jan6.215140.18753@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu>,
by butzerd@blanc.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer):
> 
> Sorry if this has been brought up, but don't many compression programs put
> some type of table at the start of the compressed file (defining what
> characters map to what uncompressed sequences, for example)?

Yes, and such programs shouldn't be used in the context of encryption, for
the reasons you suppose.

LZW and other adaptive compression algorithms don't put such tables there
because they start with an initial table that is fixed and then adapt this
table to the statistics of the data being compressed.  (As an aside, to
use such compresson algorithms to do encryption, make this initial table
a function of the key instead of a constant).

In the case of LZW, the initial table is typically a mapping from single
characters to themselves (but with a 9th bit tacked on to indicate that
the characters are sequences of length 1).  This makes LZW somewhat
vulnerable to analysis, but the simple expedient of prefixing the text to
be compressed with a fixed length string of random bytes (prior to
compression) and then discarding these when the string is uncompressed
can eliminate this problem.

In the case of LZW, I believe this string has to be fairly long.  In the
case of my splay-tree based compression algorithm, a fairly short string
will suffice.
				Doug Jones
				jones@cs.uiowa.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
Subject: Re: Motorola 'Secure-Clea
Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 15:24:00 +0000

 -=> Quoting Ted Dunning to All <=-

 TD> ......... simple speech inversion really shouldn't be called a
 TD> security device.



 Exactly so. I couldn't have put it better.


___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.11

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.politics.usa.misc,talk.politics.misc
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Followup-To: alt.politics.usa.misc,talk.politics.misc
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 20:45:00 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.074735.14802@qualcomm.com>, karn@servo (Phil Karn) writes:
>Shamir is an Israeli, living in Israel.

>controlled -- only actual implementations are. Therefore you're
>missing the mark by talking about whether non-Americans make
>significant contributions to the theory of cryptography. Even if only
>Americans made them they'd still be available worldwide.
>
>You ought instead to ask the question whether there are any
>non-Americans capable of turning an algorithm description into working
>code.  Evidently the US State Department doesn't think so and nor do
>you, since you defend this interpretation so strongly.

This discussion is silly in any case - it didn't matter whether
Noriega was an U.S. citizen, it doesn't matter if the people in
Somalia are U.S. citizens, it won't matter if the people in
Bosnia-whatever are U.S. citizens, it didn't matter that Shamir was an
Israeli citizen living in Israel when the patent secrecy order was
issued on him (on second thoughts, I guess it did matter in this case
since he isn't in jail now).  Also, just saw on the news today George
Bush saying that USA is the only superpower with the obligation to
take care of all the world's problems, by military force if necessary
of course.  The military were shown as the background of him, so I
guess I'll better go escape to Russia when they come and invade the
Helsinki area because of nic.funet.fi distributing munitions the US
government might not like.

Followups directed out of sci.crypt.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: RSA, RIPEM and David
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 00:21:36 GMT


Marc Thibault asks how to activate the kill file for me in rn.

I think the way to do it most efficiently is to hit Control-K while in
a message thread in the newsgroup he wants. This will bring up his
editor and create a new kill file or open the existing one, and he can
add the line:

/From: strnlght@netcom.com/h:j
and then save that kill file.

What that will do is cause rn to search headers (h) for my
userid, and then junk (j) any messages it finds with that header.

If he wants to kill replies to me as well, he can omit the "From:"

He can also make a global kill file as above (see the rn
documentation), instead, which will kill messages from me in any
newsgroup, but it's inefficient since it causes rn to search every
newsgroup it enters for those strings.

I invite others who don't wish to read messages from me for whatever
reason to do the same. This will make their lives easier in that they
won't have to send me complaints via e-mail, which I cannot honor
since they are counterbalanced by the "keep up the good work"
messages.

David
-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jhull@vulcan-gw.den.mmc.com (Jeff Hull)
Subject: What PKE is good for (Was: Anti-spoofing protocol?)
Summary: Assymetric encryption has value.
Reply-To: jhull@vulcan-gw.den.mmc.com
Organization: Martin Marietta Astronautics Group
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 20:25:11 GMT

In article 17258@netcom.com, rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
|>This all assumes that you have a secure means of getting your public key
|>to the other or an authenticated one.  Both seem equivalent in the end
|>to swapping a secret key to me.  This makes me question the fundamentals
|>of PK actually.

Although the early claims that PKE has the capability of establishing
a secure message channel without requiring the use of a secure key-exchange
channel have since been proven false, I suggest that PKE still offers
considerable value due to its asymmetric nature.

Asymmetric encryption (AE) provides the capability to digitally sign messages 
in a way that "cannot" be forged while allowing the recipient to verify the
signature.  Since the same key-pair can also be used to exchange secure
messages with the same "individual," my key management problem is more
tractable than if I had to maintain two keys (one for secure messages, which
could be symmetric or asymmetric, & one for suthentication, which *must* be
asymmetric).  In addition, the degree & kind of protection which must be
provided for the public part of an asymmetric key is *much* more easily
provided than that which must be provided for a symmetric key.

I suggest these are non-trivial advantages.


--- --- --- --- ---
	   _   _
    /_    / ) / ) Jeff Hull           j.hull@vulcan-gw.den.mmc.com
   //_) -/- -/-   1544 S. Vaughn Cir  
/_/ \_/ /   /	  Aurora, CO 80012    303-977-1061

No matter where you go ... there you are.
#include <standard.disclaimer.h>

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dnadams@nyx.cs.du.edu (Dean Adams)
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Organization: University of Denver, Dept. of Math & Comp. Sci.
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 16:22:08 GMT


mjr@TIS.COM (Marcus J Ranum) writes:
 >> the reason pictures of that quality were published is that one 
 >>of the "secrets" in this area is just how high the resolution 
 >>of reconnaisance satellites is. 

Estimates are somewhere around the 6" or better range...

 >>By publishing the pictures in as high quality as possible, 
 >>The Times was answering the question by implication
 > Those pictures were from a KH-11. 

The only ones I am aware of that were published, 
I thought came from a KH-9 series bird...

 >KH-11's are presumably quite obsolete. 

Not that obsolete...  KH-11-8 and KH-11-9 are probably still operating,
although we do now have at least two Advanced KH-11s on orbit as well.

 >If you extrapolate a little bit, based on the kinds of advances in 
 >commercial electronic imaging that we've been seeing, it's quite 
 >possible that far, far higher resolution pictures are possible. 

There are still certain inherent limits involved in imaging from
an 800 km orbit.  I believe that published KH-9 photo was supposed
to have a resolution of around 1 ft.  The current series can obviously
do better than that...

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: serdar@fawlty8.eng.monash.edu.au (Serdar Boztas)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 22:53:41 GMT

castor@grizzle.Stanford.EDU (Castor Fu) writes:

>Whatever "academician" means, it probably doesn't mean "member of the
>Soviet Academy of Sciences."  I just went to our library, and looked through
>the list of members of the Soviet Academy, and there was no V.M. Sidelnikov.
>This was a pretty recent list, (1991).

He may not be a member of the academy of sciences but there is a
well known coding theorist/mathematician by that name. He has developed
a tight lower bound on mutual correlations of sets of sequences 
over the complex numbers. He may or may not be the same V.M. Sidelnikov
referred to in the previous articles.

>--
>Castor Fu, (foo@leland.stanford.edu)

-- 
Serdar Boztas 
serdar@fawlty8.eng.monash.edu.au 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: Question from someone who's new to all this
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 00:56:17 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <1993Jan4.145637.5551@newstand.syr.edu>, greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield) writes:
> This sounds far too broad.  I would guess it's far more specific--somewhere
> along the lines of use of modular exponentiation with a modulus
> consisting of the product of two primes for cryptographic purposes.
> 
> Modular arithmetic was not at all new to cryptography when RSA was
> developed, so the patent would *have* to be much narrower than just that.

You're right.  Here's Claim 1 of the RSA patent:

1. A cryptographic communications system comprising:
  A. a communications channel,
  B. an encoding means coupled to said channel and adapted for
    transforming a transmit message word signal M to a ciphertext word
    signal C and for transmitting C on said channel,
    where M corresponds to a number representative of a message and

        0 <= M <= n-1

    where n is a composite number of the form

        n = p.q

    where p and q are prime numbers, and
    where C corresponds to a number representative of an enciphered
      form of said message and corresponds to

        C == M^e (mod n)

    where e is a number relatively prime to lcm(p-1, q-1), and
  C. a decoding means coupled to said channel and adapted for receiving
    C from said channel and for transforming C to a receive message
    word signal M'
    where M' corresponds to a number representative of a deciphered
      form of C and corresponds to

        M' == C^d (mod n)

    where d is a multiplicative inverse of e (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)).

It's very specific -- to infringe this claim, you'd have to use a device
with all three parts.  (N.B. -- before you start picking this apart,
and looking for the obvious ways around it, note two things.  First,
the RSA patent has about 40 claims, each covering a different variation.
Second, variations that are ``obvious to one skilled in the art'' also
infringe.)

Note, too, that RSA did *not* patent the equations themselves, nor did
they patent an algorithm.  They patented a ``cryptographic communications
system'' whose behavior is described by certain equations.  One way to
look at it -- in fact, the way I look at it -- is to regard this as
equivalent to patenting an electronic circuit whose behavior is described
by certain other equations -- as, of course, is generally the case.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: donovan@calvin.ee.udel.edu (Greg Donovan)
Subject: Re: Any way to *CREATE* Vcr+ (VCR PLUS) codes??? (please read)
Summary: We got code !
Keywords: VCR+ patent
Organization: University of Delaware, Newark
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 21:48:10 GMT

In article <1iaa91INNhgr@agate.berkeley.edu> shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) writes:
>In article <C0CED1.60H@metaflow.com> rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp) writes:
>>Is it really necessary to reverse-engineer the VCR+ algorithm?  I thought
>>that VCR+ is patented.  If you can obtain the patent number, then the patent
>>can be retrieved.  The patent _must_ disclose the method used.
>
>The patent doesn't include enough information to decode the VCR+ code.
>It explains how to make/decode _a_ VCR code, but not _the_ VCR+ code.  That
>is, there are a bunch of specific details you need that aren't included.  (As
>an analogy, the RSA patent won't help you decode a particular RSA-encoded
>message.)
>

Look in alt.sources or rec.video.  There is a posting containing a shar
of code to encode/decode numbers and times.  Here is the description 
from the header:

This ZIP archive holds three files
X      readme.txt
X      encode.c
X      decode.c
X
X
decode.c is source program that reads a VCRPLUS code
number value you find in the newspaper and calculates
X    date_of_the_tv_program
X    starting_time_of_the_tv_program
X    run_length_of_the_tv_program
X
X
encode.c is source program that reads a date, start time,
and run length then turns them into a VCRPLUS code number
like the ones in the newspaper.


Good luck,

Greg

These are my words and thoughts, no one elses.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: sl@wimsey.bc.ca (Stuart Lynne)
Subject: Re: NPR spot on encryption
Organization: Wimsey Information Services
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 01:30:59 GMT

In article <1ia4s2INNnks@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>
>Yesterday morning, NPR did a spot on the battle over ITAR, etc., on its
>Weekend Edition.  It was reasonable.  They left out the public availability
>of encryption S/W overseas but the rest of the argument seemed to be
>fairly represented.

It was interesting to hear such net luminaries as Mr. Bizdos and John Gilmore
and they where both seeming to put forth the same types of arguements. Something
that could never happen here.

-- 
Stuart Lynne <sl@wimsey.com> ......................... UNIX Facsimile Software
Wimsey Information Technologies ................... moderator biz.sco.binaries
uucp login:nuucp passwd:nuucp .................... ftp.wimsey.com:~ftp/ls-lR.Z
PD Software for SCO UNIX .................... ftp.wimsey.com:~ftp/pub/wimseypd
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 22:31:11 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan9.013936.24570@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>We have enought legitimate differences to discuss here without
>being subjected to posts by jerks.
	This is quite humorous coming from you.  I love ironic posts. ;-)


							smg

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: beezer@cc.utah.edu (BEEZER)
Subject: [QUESTION]:  PUBLIC-KEYS (ETC) FOR PUBLIC BBS NETWORK
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.4-b1  
Organization: Salt Lick, UT
Date: 12 Jan 1993 00:51 MST  


I can see that this kind of thing is discussed alot here, so
I'd prefer not to rehash old ideas in open forum, please
respond by email...

---

I would like to advise the author of a large public access
BBS network of adding public-key encryption to his s/w
as a regular feature (the BBS could be configured to keep
individual user's keys on-file by that user).

I would like referrals to comprehensive/novice sources
that could prime me on the issues on hand.  A common one
that comes to mind is, what legal responsiblities/conflicts
occur in a network setting - and would encryption such
as RSA (not sure what it stands for) be a perceived threat
to government such to the point of cracking down on the
said network?

I see the potential for legal abuses, and wonder if
mandatory storage of user's keys be required to protect
the sysop's butt...  Then again, encrypted communication
provided by some public access cellular phones could be
an appropriate model to argue over...

---

Fairly brief summary statements are appreciated, but
I'm also quite willing to dig for myself with a bit of
help from the technowizbangs present here.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 14:20:21 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <1993Jan5.030228.10817@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
> My impression is that the key modern breakthroughs are in public
> key crypto systems, including RSA, and that those were invented
> mostly by Americans (not sure if Shamir is Israeli or American).
> My impression is that the non-U.S. developments are essentially
> derivative, elaboration, etc.
> 
> This is not an argument but a request for information. Am I mistaken?

Yes, very much so.  Pick up any copy of CRYPTO 'nn -- or better yet,
EUROCRYPT, or AUSCRYPT, or -- well, you get the picture.  (And if you
don't get it, I'm sure most of the other readers of this newsgroup do,
especially those who aren't Americans.)

Yes, Americans have done well in cryptography.  So have a lot of others.
I won't bore -- and insult -- the readership by trying to assign proportional
credit to different nationalities.
From: juhel@gibbons.laas.fr (Philippe Juhel,179,6356)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Recherche adresse
Date: 9 Jan 93 15:01:52 GMT
Reply-To: juhel@gibbons.laas.fr
Distribution: fnet
Organization: LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse (France)


Bonjour,

Je souhaiterais connaitre les Universites, Centre de recherche et entreprises
travaillant dans le dommaine de la cryptographie.

Existe-t-il une telle liste ou bien aupres de quel organisme puis-je me la procurer?
(par exemple, existe-t-il une Societe Francaise de Cryptographie???)

D'avance merci.

Philippe JUHEL
email : juhel@laas.laas.fr
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Anti-spoofing protocol?
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 22:20:23 GMT

In article <1993Jan4.160546.11746@Princeton.EDU> dla@athena (Don Alvarez) writes:
>Digital signatures won't solve the problem Robert is posing.  The
>problem is how do two parties transition from an initial state of
>having no way to communicate securely to a final state of having a way
>to communicate securely.

Well yes, if you phrase the problem that way, you're quite right. But
I interpreted the question as dealing specifically with the
Diffie-Hellman key transfer phase, as it implied that D-H was useless.
It's not, as long as you have the necessary verified public keys to
verify your D-H exchanges.

By the way, I find the D-H/RSA hybrid *very* interesting because it
only uses RSA for signing -- not encryption. So the compromise of your
RSA secret key can, at worst, allow someone else to pretend to be you
in the future (assuming, of course, you aren't able to revoke your key
in time). It *cannot* compromise anything encrypted with an old
session key that was generated with the protocol, used and then
destroyed. A very useful property.

This scheme also has the advantage that it need not use RSA -- any
digital signature scheme will work. E.g., *if* the NIST DSS were to
become a freely usable, secure digital signature scheme, then you
could use it instead of RSA to sign your D-H exchanges. And since the
patent on Diffie-Hellman expires in 1997 while the patent on RSA
expires in 2000, you'd be able to freely use this combination three
years sooner than something based on RSA.

Phil


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: FAQ/good resource
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 04:11:37 GMT


Agreed -- this NIST publication is an excellent tutorial to public key
cryptography. One wonders how NIST could have come up with something
like DSS given that they obviously have at least *one* person in house
who actually understands this stuff... :-)

Phil
From: mjr@TIS.COM (Marcus J. Ranum)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: What's the overall ratio?
Date: 5 Jan 93 17:53:08 GMT
Reply-To: mjr@TIS.COM
Organization: Trusted Information Systems, Inc.


	This is probably a naive question, but..

	When designing cryptosystems I'd imagine it's desireable to use
algorithms that don't parallelize well. Is it feasible to somehow add
a step to a process like exponentiation that won't decompose well? Lenstra's
experiment with using loads of machines to factor primes shows us that
massively parallel attacks are just a matter of networking. ;) Is there
anything like factorization that also has the property of not parallelizing
well or at all?

mjr.