HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Systems Reply I (repost perhaps)
Keywords: AI Searle Dickhead Barf
Date: 11 Apr 92 00:10:14 GMT
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine

In article <6589@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
|
|No, but if we have good reasons to conclude that it can't
|be duplicated by a computer, we still have these good reasons
|even if we can't say how it's done in humans.

But such reasons can only be good if they can be shown definitively *not*
to apply to the human brain.  So far no set of arguments against implementing
a brain in digital circuits has been such as to preclude its applicability
to humans as well.

|Unless you are willing to accept this point, there is no
|point in continuing to discuss these matters with me,
|because I am never going to agree that showing how it's
|done in humans is necessary.

It is because it is the only way of showing that the reasons you have advanced
do *not* apply to humans.

|Several people have offered reasons why it cannot be.
|They may be wrong, but they're not wrong just because
|they haven't said how humans do it.  Address their
|arguments rather than demanding they they do things
|that are unnecessary!

But since everything I have heard them say is eqally applicable to neural
processing, I do not see how they can make the conclusions they do.

This is why I demand research into actual mechanisms.

-- 
---------------
uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 03:28:59 GMT

In article <1992Apr8.155954.10355@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Apr8.073244.29543@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>>
>>
>>Here you are mistaken. There are such things as small minds
>>and big minds. Would you not agree that small animals have
>>small minds, insects have even smaller minds. The problem
> 
>It seems you haven't been paying close attention. The question is not
>whether there are "small" anbd "big" minds. The question is whether
>an answers to that question has any bearing whatsoever on the
>question of whether something can be said to have a mind at all.
>I have argued that it does not. A small mind is just as much a mind
>as a big mind is.
>
There is no need to insult me, I have been paying attention,
and you seemed to be saying that SHRDLU cannot "have" a mind
because (and this is where you lose me. I don't know why you
deny a very small mind to SHRDLU?). My opinion is that if
it acts enough like a mind, then it is a mind - because that
is what a mind is (the ability to solve problems, feel, etc -
note: not inclusivly)

I think that we (all) have been approaching the problem 
from the wrong side, sometimes humans need to back up and
look from the other side. (here goes)
QUESTION: What does it mean to NOT HAVE A MIND? I think
that we will find that everyone is much more in agreement
with this.

OPINION: My personal view is that not having mind means that
the object:
1) cannot solve basic problems about the real world.
2) cannot react with learned behaviour! (yes that means no memory
	-> no mind!)
3) cannot ... Please everyone fill in this list.

Note that there is no mention in the above of Thinking, 
understanding, feeling, etc.. All of these terms are 
inherently contained in what a mind can do (as opposed to
what it cannot.)
>
>-- 
>Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
>Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
>University of Toronto
>---------------------


-- 
*****************************************************************
*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
*****************************************************************
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: The Chinese Room (or Number Five's Alive)
Date: Mon, 06 Apr 1992 16:47:25 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <1992Apr5.210553.11966@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <6737@pkmab.se> ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:
>>
>>Surely, no-one has suggested that SHRDLU is advanced enough to have a mind?
>>
>Under strong AI, one would be committed to such a view. 

This is an absurd claim.  Strong AI claims that minds can be created by
implementing an appropriate program.  It does not claim that minds are
created by implementing *any* program.  (Maybe some people think that,
but it is not a consequence of Strong AI.)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 1992 15:17:31 GMT

christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher D. Green) writes:

> Surely whether SHRDLU, thermostats, and rocks have minds is an
> empirical question.

Surely not. It is a philosophical question, which is the reason that
we have this newsgroup. It isn't an empirical question because it
doesn't have any observable consequences.

We already know all the empirical facts there are to know about
SHRDLU, and we still do not agree on whether it has a mind. What sort
of empirical discovery do you think could ever be brought to bear on
that question? What would constitute empirical evidence that something
does or does not have a mind? Until we have an answer to that
question, the theory of mind is not an empirical theory.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY
From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 8 Apr 92 07:43:16 GMT
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

In article <1992Apr7.222046.16470@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>What *empirical* evidence would count?  Remember that we are arguing over
>whether having the appropriate behaviour is sufficient evidence for
>having a mind.  I may be wrong, but I see *no* way in which this is
>amenable to empirical investigation.  

It can be investigated using the same techniques we use
to determine whether a newborn infant has a mind, or not.
Let us make the supposition that a alien lands in your yard
now, how would you determine whether this being has a mind?
Or do you still insist that there is no way to make this
determination?
>
>
>The difference between the brain and computers is that we *know* the 
>brain produces meaning.  We *don't* know that computers do.  Even if we
>don't know *how* the brain does it, we *can* rule out ways in which it
>doesn't, e.g., angels dancing on pinheads.  The claim being made is that
>we have independent reasons for ruling out functionalism as well, namely,
>that syntax is insufficient of itself to yield semantics.  The truth of this
>claim is independent of whether we *do* know how the brain does what it does. 
>
Every time someone says something like this it makes me
a little queasy. What you want to say in the above is
"I KNOW *MY* BRAIN PRODUCES MEANING. Fuck your brain,
because I have no evidence that it produces meaning!"
Another thing, we cannot rule out angels dancing on
pinheads as the cause of minds.
	You have been accused of Solipsism in the extreme!
How do you plead?
>
>- michael


-- 
*****************************************************************
*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
*****************************************************************
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: What counts as the "Right" functional organization?
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 1992 14:22:39 GMT

In article <1992Apr14.064526.16723@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Apr5.210553.11966@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>>Under strong AI, one would be committed to such a view. Surely, if McCarthy
>>believes is thermostat has beliefs, he believes that SHRDLU does. Same
>>goes for any other thorough-going functionalists. Right Dave...?
>
>No, not necessarily.  A functionalist need only hold that beliefs result
>from the *right* functional organization, not from any old functional
>organization.  The question of what organization suffices will get
>different answers from different functionalists.
>
Okay, then you'd better start specifying what counts as the "right" functional
organization lest you slip into a Davidsonian circle.  Actually, snarkiness
aside, I'm honestly interested in what might count as right and not right.
Presumably, recourse to human behavior is out of bounds. Presumably, phrases
such as "sufficiently complex", or anything else countaining relative terms
such as "sufficient", "enough", "necessary", etc., are all off bounds as
well. What sorts of criteria are you going to use to explicate "right"? I
would think, though I have trouble imagining how it will be done, that you
will have to divide functional architectures into something like "natural
kinds", and then argue that some of these are "intelligent".
Ready, set, go!

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: What counts as the "Right" functional organization?
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 1992 22:53:42 GMT

In article <1992Apr15.173215.20588@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Apr14.181138.8475@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>
>> I hope we can avoid discussions of "what is the right functional organization
>>for belief (or understanding, etc)."  A discussion of "what is the right
>>functional organization" might be ok.  But once you pin it to terms such
>>as 'belief' or 'understanding' or 'semantics' you run into the problem of
>>these terms not being sufficiently well defined, and the discussion will
>>quickly degenerate into arguments about issues that are not really central.

>It's hard to tell, but it sounds like you're trying to avoid discussion of
>what might be the "right" functional organization because you believe it
>will ultimately be fruitless.

  Not necessarily.  I'm not against discussing functional organization.  I
just against pinning it on "understanding" or "belief" or "semantics" because
that only leads right back to the Chinese room which we surely agree is
fruitless.

  Obviously you are not going to design anything via usenet disputes, but
an open discussion of functional organization might indicate what directions
people are thinking in.  But if you insist on "understanding" as a required
part of the discussion, you bias it toward a fruitless search, partly because
this prejudges whether "understanding" is cause or effect, and partly because,
in spite of all the protestations to the contrary, "understanding" is very
slippery and hard to define.

-- 
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Date: 9 Apr 92 15:14:32 GMT
Organization: ORA Corporation

bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:

>  I think we have more or less a consensus that you're right about
> what it means for two (finite) state machines to be equivalent.  But
> the difficult question is what it means for a particular *physical
> object* (such as a computer, or a human, or a rock) to implement a
> finite state automaton.  Is there a definition strong enough to make
> implementing a particular FSA imply something about mental properties?

Well, physical objects have inputs, outputs, states and state
transitions, too. The only problem is that, unlike finite automata,
physical objects have continuously varying states, inputs and outputs.
In order to compare a physical object with some discrete-state finite
automaton, we have to first discretize it. All that this means is
picking a coarse-grained way of looking at the inputs, outputs, and
states. We identify inputs that are sufficiently similar, and likewise
identify states that are sufficiently similar. Then, under the
assumption that most physical processes are fairly continuous, it will
probably be the case after this identification that there are only a
discrete number of different states and a discrete number of different
inputs and outputs. Then the laws of physics, together with our
coarse-graining procedure uniquely determines a (generally
nondeterministic) finite state automaton.

The approach I have outlined above unfortunately has a flaw: the
coarse-graining necessary to obtain a finite state automaton from a
physical object is not unique: depending on exactly what features you
ignore as insignificant, you get a different automaton. For example,
if you consider outputs at the level of sounds, you get a vastly
larger set of outputs from human speech than if you consider only
words, since in the first case you would include "umm" as a legitimate
output, while such sounds would be dropped as irrelevant if you
consider only full words.

Even if we could get a clear idea about which finite state automata we
consider to be conscious, we still wouldn't know which physical
systems we should consider to be conscious until we have some
principles for deciding what kind of coarse-graining is permitted.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 9 Apr 92 19:38:26 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <6586@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>Well, is the AI side willing to agree that the systems reply should
>not be "the system understands", because no one has shown that the
>system does understand?

I'd be willing to say "That the man in the CR doesn't understand doesn't
prove that the system doesn't understand; and if anything understands
in the CR, it's the system."  But it's not very snappy.

>(NB my position is that the CR fails to show the impossibility
>of strong ai but that it's useful nonetheless, in part because
>it shows we should question the Turing Test.)

If you want a philosophical objection to the Turing Test I don't see how
you can beat the roomful of monkeys.

I'm not sure what the CR proves, except that CPUs can't think.  Of course,
maybe this is a point that needs making, given the frequency that people
talk about "computers" being intelligent.  (It may also be effective
as an attack on Schank.)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 20:11:57 GMT

In article <1992Apr8.081207.1027@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>In article <1992Apr7.203327.516@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

[in response to "SHRDLU has a *little* mind..."]

>>OK, so what are the moral consequences of this belief?  
>>

>Moral consequences??? What is being talked about here?
>Are you telling me that you don't step on ants? You
>don't eat meat and plants? (hundreds of other examples
>omitted) I am not attempting to answer this for KE, but
>the moral consequences are the same as when you first
>realized as a baby that animals have feelings, but we
>still use them, we still consume them.

Well, Antun, that won't wash with me.  I'm vegetarian.

>Please make this clear, why do we attribute a moral
>agency to things with minds? My belief as to why we
>do this is because things with minds can be influenced
>in behaviour (NOT BECAUSE THEY INFLUENCE!), Thus a moral
>agent is a being that fits your mental model of that
>being. Thus a human is a moral agent, a animal is
>less so, and a rock is practically a non-agent.

This is nonsense.  Why wouldn't HAL fit your "mental model"
of a moral agent?

>	To be a little more explicit, the human being
>attempts to match his behaviour to what he thinks you
>expect. The animal does this to a degree less, and the
>rock does not attempt to change its behaviour in any
>way to match your mental model of itself.
>	Examples: You say "Nice weather", I reply
>"Sure is!" --> I am a moral agent.
>You say "Nice weather", I beat your brains in! --> I
>am not a moral agent!
>
>You say "nice doggy", the dog comes to you and whines.
>--> it is a partial moral agent.
>You say "nice rock", the rock does nothing! --> It is
>not a moral agent.
>
>To be a moral agent, it comes down to being capable
>of being such.

Now if this ain't circular, I don't know what is...

> Even the law takes agency into account
>with its insanity plea, in effect it is a plea that
>that person was not a moral agent.
>
>So what makes me more of a moral agent than the dog?
>In a word, capability! I have in mind what you expect
>of me, while the dog only has a partial knowledge of
>expectation, the rock has no such knowledge!

What prevents an instantiated program from having the crucial qualities
you identify?  If the answer is "nothing," then we have to worry about
the moral status of our creations.  

>(Incidently, if this sounds like some theory from
>somewhere, be assured that it is only coincidence.
>My thought processes are being transcribed directly!)

Hmm...I thought so...

- michael
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 13:29:31 GMT

In article <1992Apr10.032859.25669@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:

>My opinion is that if
>it acts enough like a mind, then it is a mind - because that
>is what a mind is (the ability to solve problems, feel, etc -
>note: not inclusivly)

Then you are a behaviorist. Moreover, because of your inclusion of the term
"enough" you turned this into an analytic statement, as Davidson showed
decades ago. I'm neither a behaviorist, nor do I think psychology is
a matter of definition. It's a science.
>


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
Date: 10 Apr 92 16:01:16 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Apr9.174840.3407@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>In article <92099.194744JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu> 
>JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu writes:
>>The point is not that what computers do is _necessarily_ meaningless, just
>>that, at the machine level, there is no inherent meaning (or reference).  It
>>is we who come along and project reference upon the formal manipulations that
>>the computer has carried out. 

>  I don't agree with this analysis (if I understand it).  In a brain,
>at the neuron level, there is also no inherent meaning or reference.

He shouldn't have said "at the machine level", because that obscures
the point by making it seem analogous to "at the neuron level".
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Robert Rosen & Physical form of Church's Thesis
Date: 14 Apr 92 12:37:53 GMT
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

I consulted with an expert last night (my wife) and a number of points
were made.

1. Church's Thesis is that the standard characterizations (Turing, etc.)
are equivalent to the informal concept of function computable by
algorithm. The algorithm proposed earlier in this sequence of messages
(Initialize an analog computer, run it, and take measurements) is not an
algorithm in the sense recognized by mathematical logicians.

2. It is not clear that an analog computation of a chaotic or turbulent
process avoids the problems that the digital computation encounters. If
the process is chaotic, errors in initial conditions should grow
exponentially. In addition, if the process is dissipative, it should be
non-stationary, implying that even the statistics will vary over time.

On the other hand, if there is chaos in the brain (as Paul Rapp claims),
and if it is useful (if only as a starting point for pattern recognition),
the implication is that the brain is not equivalent to a Turing Machine...

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
From: atten@phil.ruu.nl (Mark van Atten)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Godel's Incompleteness Theorm
Date: 16 Apr 92 14:17:03 GMT
Organization: Department of Philosophy, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands

wlfong@logos.waterloo.edu (Philip W. L. Fong) writes:

>I am interested in knowing more about Godel's Incompleteness Theorm, especially
>the proof and its implication on the limitation of human/artificial 
>intelligence.  However I am not a theory person and I don't think I will
>understand Godel's original document.  Is there any easy-to-comprehend 
>text/reference (for an average CS student) which covers the proof and 
>discusses the implication of the theory?

>Philip

The best explanation I have found is in 'Infinitiy and the Mind ', by Rudy
Rucker. It contains both an explanation by analogy (story) and a technical
(hence more precise) explanation (also easy to comprehend, but take your time)

From Goedel's original paper, I recommend the non-technical introduction.

Contrary to general opinion, I do not believe Hofstadter's book is the best
introduction or explanation of Goedel's argument. But once you grasp the
argument, read it for some interesting suggestions. But it is too general.

A very good discussion of the use of mathematical/logical results in arguments
about human/artificial intelligence can be found in 'From mathematics to
philosophy' by Hao Wang.

Best wishes,

Mark.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: sosic%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Rok Sosic)
Subject: on Turing-Church hypothesis
Date: 7 Apr 92 05:01:17 MDT
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept

Taking a chaotic process, arbitrary small deviation at the
beginning will be amplified to great proportions.

Assuming that space and time are continuous, then, due to its
finiteness, a Turing machine cannot exactly represent an arbitrary
dynamical system. 

It follows that most chaotic processes cannot be simulated by 
a Turing machine.

The strong interpretation of the Turing-Church hypothesis is that 
any physically realizable dynamical system can be simulated by a 
Turing machine.

The hypothesis seems to be false for chaotic processes.

Where is an error? 

Thanks a lot

Rok

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy