HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 17:36:41 GMT

In article <1992Dec14.033936.11786@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>In article <1992Dec12.230911.24220@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>
>>he himself takes, at least to some extent).  In that case, the question
>>of whether something is conscious or not is epistemically indeterminate,
>>although consciousness itself is ontologically real.
>
>This is where I draw the line!  I'm enough of a pragmatist/logical positivist
>that I don't believe it *means* anything to talk about something being
>ontologically real but epistemological indeterminate!!  Now where did I put
>that Razor? :)

Well, to take the old chestnut of qualia, how do you objectively determine
that what I see as red is the same sensation of colour as what you see
as red?  How do you know that I don't see red things as being blue?  As
far as I (and most philosophers) can tell, there is no objective criteria
to rule out the possibility of "inverted spectra".  Yet, presumably you
agree that I do *in fact* have a sensation of colour, and that this could
in principle be different from yours, even though we respond behaviourally
in exactly the same way.  This is a case of something real (namely experience)
being inaccessible to objective observation.  I would argue that *all* of
consciousness is like this.  

>>This may not be a satisfactory state of affairs for those who want
>>answers to everything, but it is also certainly no justification for
>>then defining consciousness in a way that is epistemically accessible
>>but wrong, as I take it Searle believes that functionalists have done.
>
>Ummm...  I'd rather have a theory that worked a bit, that we might learn
>something from disproving, than bury my head in the sand and say "we
>cannot know".

I'd rather have a theory that was right, even if it meant we cannot know.
If you want to "learn something", isn't it more efficient to study the
"something" rather than an intractable problem?  (You must have supported
the space program primarily because of its spinoffs like Velcro and Tang :-)

>We MUST know, we SHALL know.

Why?  No law says that all of the universe has to be explicable.  Look at
quantum phenomena...

- michael

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 00:08:38 GMT

In article <BzEvzJ.1s1@cs.bham.ac.uk> ard@cs.bham.ac.uk (Antoni Diller) writes:
>In article <1992Dec15.173641.17791@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>In article <1992Dec14.033936.11786@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>
>>Well, to take the old chestnut of qualia, how do you objectively determine
>>that what I see as red is the same sensation of colour as what you see
>>as red?  How do you know that I don't see red things as being blue? 
>>- michael
>
>So long as we can successfully communicate, then it doesn't matter
>if your experience of the sky is similar to mine.  

It matters to anyone who doesn't adopt the rather crude pragmatism that
you have just endorsed. Some of us are interested in truth, not just
whether or not something "works"

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 00:36:50 GMT

In article <1992Dec18.000838.26936@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <BzEvzJ.1s1@cs.bham.ac.uk> ard@cs.bham.ac.uk (Antoni Diller) writes:
>>In article <1992Dec15.173641.17791@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>So long as we can successfully communicate, then it doesn't matter
>>if your experience of the sky is similar to mine.  
>
>It matters to anyone who doesn't adopt the rather crude pragmatism that
>you have just endorsed. Some of us are interested in truth, not just
>whether or not something "works"

This entire discussion should be moved to sci.epistemology :)
I'm curious just what kind of theory of truth you have...  I think
my position is probably pretty close to what you call Michael's 
"crude pragmatism", I've never been able to find a coherent alternative.

Danny.
From: charles@capmkt.COM (Charles Neveu)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: John Searle
Date: 12 Dec 92 06:29:32 GMT
Organization: Capital Market Technology

michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>In article <1992Dec10.003409.12095@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>Basically I fail to see any reason whatsoever that the material out of 
>>which something is made needs to be considered when deciding whether it
>>has intentional properties.
>Indeed, since you are invoking Dennett you must be an instrumentalist
>about intentionality, in which case the only "deciding" to be done is on
>the basis of utility of the ascription, and not ontological fact.  Searle
>is a realist about intentionality - he believes that there is fact of
>the matter whether something has it or not. 

Right! And he believes that the CR doesn't have it. I want to know how
to analyze other 'somethings', and to be able to potentially conclude
that they do have intentionality. So what do I look for?

Charles Neveu   neveu@milo.berkeley.edu
Neurology Unit
UCBerkeley
From: jrp@netman.Widener.EDU (Joshua R. Poulson)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Possible FAQ, Essential Bibliography of Cognitive Science
Date: 16 Dec 1992 19:35:34 GMT
Organization: Widener University Dept. of Computing Services
Distribution: world
Reply-To: Joshua.R.Poulson@cyber.Widener.EDU
NNTP-Posting-Host: netman.widener.edu

Hello everyone.

I've stumbled upon the discipline of cognitive science by reading the book
_The_Computer_and_the_Mind_ by P. N. Johnson-Laird and I'm interested in
more reading. I would like to gather together what you folks consider the
essential reading list for Cognitive Science and hit my local library.

I'll post a summary of email responses, but I'm sure that posting to the
newgroup with precipitate discussion... which I feel is healthy. :)

Thanks for your help! --JRP

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: qualia
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1992 05:24:45 GMT

In article <1992Dec19.052247.25070@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>"Somehow" leaves an awful lot of slack, and does *not* rule out principled
>problems. In fact, the most popular analysis of the mind-brain relation
>poses just such a principled problem. If you're a token identity materialist
>(as all functionalists are) then although mind stuff supervenes on brain
>stuff, brain stuff will never tell you about brain stuff. There's another
                                              ^^^^^
                                              ?!?!? 

NO NO NO YOU NINNY!!! under functionalism, brain stuff will never tell you
about MIND stuff. (Whata dope!)

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 01:36:27 GMT

In article <1992Dec8.005705.29789@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>I *am* going to be extremely intrigued about the internal causal
>>structure of this black pebble, ...
>
>It contains a miniature low-power radio transceiver (and rock).  Are you
>still convinced it is conscious?

I will be 100% convinced that whatever is on the other end of the radio
transceiver (plus other possible causal links) is sentient/conscious.  But
lets say for the sake of argument that we did the communication in such a 
way that the radio wasn't possible (ie inside an EM shielded lab).

Danny.
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 23:09:11 GMT

In article <773@capmkt.COM> charles@capmkt.COM (Charles Neveu) writes:
>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Dec10.003409.12095@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>>Basically I fail to see any reason whatsoever that the material out of 
>>>which something is made needs to be considered when deciding whether it
>>>has intentional properties.
>>Indeed, since you are invoking Dennett you must be an instrumentalist
>>about intentionality, in which case the only "deciding" to be done is on
>>the basis of utility of the ascription, and not ontological fact.  Searle
>>is a realist about intentionality - he believes that there is fact of
>>the matter whether something has it or not. 
>
>Right! And he believes that the CR doesn't have it. I want to know how
>to analyze other 'somethings', and to be able to potentially conclude
>that they do have intentionality. So what do I look for?

The hell if I know.  I think that, if Searle is right, we may simply not
be able to determine what it is that causes consciousness (although I
haven't yet read his new book, I gather that this is a position that
he himself takes, at least to some extent).  In that case, the question
of whether something is conscious or not is epistemically indeterminate,
although consciousness itself is ontologically real.

This may not be a satisfactory state of affairs for those who want
answers to everything, but it is also certainly no justification for
then defining consciousness in a way that is epistemically accessible
but wrong, as I take it Searle believes that functionalists have done.


- michael 

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 03:39:36 GMT

In article <1992Dec12.230911.24220@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>he himself takes, at least to some extent).  In that case, the question
>of whether something is conscious or not is epistemically indeterminate,
>although consciousness itself is ontologically real.

This is where I draw the line!  I'm enough of a pragmatist/logical positivist
that I don't believe it *means* anything to talk about something being
ontologically real but epistemological indeterminate!!  Now where did I put
that Razor? :)

>This may not be a satisfactory state of affairs for those who want
>answers to everything, but it is also certainly no justification for
>then defining consciousness in a way that is epistemically accessible
>but wrong, as I take it Searle believes that functionalists have done.

Ummm...  I'd rather have a theory that worked a bit, that we might learn
something from disproving, than bury my head in the sand and say "we
cannot know".

Danny.

Wir mu:ssen wissen, wir werden wissen
We MUST know, we SHALL know.

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 00:34:27 GMT

In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:

>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
>colour is the same as mine.  What's the point in postulating some additional 
>property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
>for the Razor :)

The point is that there is no *necessity* that our sensations be
equivalent, and indeed, that there is no way of telling if they
*are*.  There is simply *no* objective, scientific way for you
to address my claim that what you see as a sensation of red I
see as a sensation of blue.  This is the problem... 

>I am not arguing we should stick with a false theory.  I am arguing that
>we may at least learn something from the failures of such a theory, the
>alternative you suggest is not an alternative: to say that consciousness 
>has ontological status but is epistemologically intractable is NOT a theory, 
>it is basically saying there is no such thing as consciousness!!  -  or 
>rather that there is something called consciousness, but we can't ever know 
>about it, so it obviously it has no observable consequences and plays no 
>causal role in the universe.  What's the point?  How on earth is this any 
>use at all? I think that Razor needs sharpening!

*No* popular account of consciousness (assuming dualism isn't popular)
gives a causal role to it.  Functionalism certainly doesn't - there is
no reason to ascribe "consciousness" to certain functional arrangements
except for sake of discursive simplicity (i.e., "intentional stance").
*Nobody* who's a materialist has a clue how consciousness could have
causal efficacy.  (This may be all the worse for materialism, but
that's another story...)

- michael

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 07:34:35 GMT
Followup-To: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny Yee)

In article <Bz26Fy.ICq@gabriel.keele.ac.uk> csa33@keele.ac.uk (H.S. Nwana) writes:
>Mentioning the name Searle seems to provoke so much bashing.
>
>Isn't it the case that it just comes down to what we "believe"? We can always
>come up with arguments to support our belief and others will rubbish it. 
>Some believe in God, others do not.

Fine...  I can't really argue with you if you are a complete 
relativist/solipsist!  But do you think the same way when comparing
astrology and general relativity?  Is it all just a matter of "belief", 
or do some theories actually work better than others?

>Searle started with his Chinese room argument, then to the Chinese gym, because
>others attempted to prove a weakness in that, then to whatever his arguments now are? 
>Doubtless, he will dream up "better" arguments to support his belief.

Doubtless :).  My argument is that he is driven to do this because he 
accepts certain beliefs (that machines can't think) as axioms and
therefore has to try and justify them.

>Some of these arguments will be better than others; rational to some and irrational to others as we have different belief systems due to our cultural
>religious, etc diversity.
>
>We all know these arguments will go on and on. Perhaps spelling out the implications of whatever belief/view we hold will be of more use.

I guess this is what my original post was about.  Does anyone out there 
know anything about Searle?  I had a tentative idea that he might be 
motivated by strong religous beliefs, but someone has said that isn't the 
case.

Danny.
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: qualia
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1992 18:00:31 GMT

In article <1992Dec19.052445.25173@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>NO NO NO YOU NINNY!!! under functionalism, brain stuff will never tell you
>about MIND stuff. (Whata dope!)

Even apart from the typo, this is just silly.  Presumably we're all
functionalists about car engines (to be a car engine is to be something
that plays the appropriate sort of causal role in a car), but you can
find out an awful lot about engines by looking under the hood.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: dbrown@newssun.med.miami.edu (Daniel Brown)
Subject: Re: Possible FAQ, Essential Bibliography of Cognitive Science
Organization: University of Miami, School Of Medicine
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 14:06:21 GMT

In article <1go0e6INNl5n@cs.widener.edu> Joshua.R.Poulson@cyber.Widener.EDU writes:
>Hello everyone.
>
>I've stumbled upon the discipline of cognitive science by reading the book
>_The_Computer_and_the_Mind_ by P. N. Johnson-Laird and I'm interested in
>more reading. I would like to gather together what you folks consider the
>essential reading list for Cognitive Science and hit my local library.
>
>I'll post a summary of email responses, but I'm sure that posting to the
>newgroup with precipitate discussion... which I feel is healthy. :)
>
>Thanks for your help! --JRP
>


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 00:36:55 GMT

In article <BzEvzJ.1s1@cs.bham.ac.uk> ard@cs.bham.ac.uk (Antoni Diller) writes:
>In article <1992Dec15.173641.17791@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>In article <1992Dec14.033936.11786@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>
>>Well, to take the old chestnut of qualia, how do you objectively determine
>>that what I see as red is the same sensation of colour as what you see
>>as red?  How do you know that I don't see red things as being blue? 
>>- michael
>
>So long as we can successfully communicate, then it doesn't matter
>if your experience of the sky is similar to mine.  Colour blind people
>can learn how to use colour words and so, for that matter, can people
>totally blind from birth.  The fact that such blind people cannot distinguish
>red from blue does not mean that they don't understand the meanings of
>those words.

The question is not one of objective communication, but one of subjective
experience.  A blind person could be hooked up to a sophisticated
"vision" machine that used sound to indicate color difference to
the person, and thus the person could be as accurate as I am at
telling the difference between colors.  But this person would not
have the same sensation of color that I do.

- michael

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 00:33:46 GMT

In article <1992Dec18.000631.26201@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>
>>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
>>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
>>colour is the same as mine.  
>
>And what, pray tell, would be your warrant for that conclusion.
>Assuming you're limiting "causal consequences" to behavioral ones,
>you've only looked a half the story. If you don't, on the other hand,
>limit to behavioral consequences, then I'll claim (from personal
>experience) that you're just wrong.

I am not limiting "causal consequences".  You can claim that I'm wrong,
but since from your own position there's no way of telling who's right,
and since your position require extra properties, I win by application
of Occam's razor...

>>What's the point in postulating some additional 
>>property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
>>for the Razor :)
>>
>The point is that it just might be true, which is far mor important 
>than Occam's rather pitted and badly worn razor.

What do you mean "it might just be true"?  You are claiming that
there is intrinsically NO WAY of telling whether it's true or not, so what 
would it mean to say it is true?

As I said before, there is an invisible and intangible pink elephant that
follows you around everywhere.  There is no way you can ever tell whether
this is the case or not, but "it might just be true"...

Danny.
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 22:51:53 GMT

In article <1992Dec12.072642.551@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>
>In short I still don't see what biology has to do with intentionality.  
>I know Searle THINKS the latter is somehow dependent on the former, but 
>he doesn't seem to be able to give any coherent definition either of 
>what intentionality is or of how it depends on biology.  Appeal to 
>mysterious "causal properties of biological systems" is more than a 
>little unhelpful!

Well, the structure of the argument goes like this:

1) Brains cause minds.
   (This is trivially true, as we all have brains and, presumably, minds.
    Note that this does not rule out *other* things causing minds, but
    only says that there is at least one thing that we know that
    causes minds, namely, brains.)

2) Syntax is in itself not sufficient for semantics.
   (Searle argues this is true by the definition of the terms.  AI-types
    often object to this claim, but not for any good reasons that I
    can see, except to save the project of Strong AI.)

3) Entities defined in purely computational functionalist terms are
   solely syntactic machines. 
   (This follows directly from the way computational functionalism is
    usually described, i.e., in terms of a Turing machine, which is a 
    purely syntactic engine, that is, its functions are defined
    solely on the basis of syntactic rules.)

Therefore:

4) The brain cannot cause minds simply on the basis of its functional
   relations (i.e., abstract structure).

Therefore:

5) There must be something important about the *material* of the brain
   which generates minds. 


This is the argument, somewhat reconstructed, in a nutshell.  I am not
defending it (at least, not here), but merely laying it out for you.

- michael
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 00:06:31 GMT

In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>
>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
>colour is the same as mine.  

And what, pray tell, would be your warrant for that conclusion.
Assuming you're limiting "causal consequences" to behavioral ones,
you've only looked a half the story. If you don't, on the other hand,
limit to behavioral consequences, then I'll claim (from personal
experience) that you're just wrong.

>What's the point in postulating some additional 
>property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
>for the Razor :)
>
The point is that it just might be true, which is far mor important 
than Occam's rather pitted and badly worn razor.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny)
Subject: John Searle and physics
Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 00:33:23 GMT

Hmmm...  Searle thinks that consciousness is not just result of the 
*structure* of the brain but the result of the *material* out of which
the brain is made.  Now if you look at modern physics, it seems more and
more likely that there is no such thing as material substance - that
everything is some kind of structure, that a formal mathematical 
description is the ONLY meaningful way of looking at the universe.
This would seem to pose some serious problems for Searle's argument.

If the universe is "purely syntactic" (whatever that means), then 
obviously all parts of it are "purely syntactic", and by Searle's 
argument can't have any semantics and therefore can't be conscious.

Danny.