From: kapela@prism.poly.edu (Theodore S. Kapela)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin
Subject: Re: writing down root password
Date: 16 Nov 92 14:03:10 GMT
Organization: Polytechnic University, New York

In article <1992Nov11.220238.23297@grebyn.com> mfraioli@grebyn.com (Marc Fraioli) writes:
>
>our site was doing some fiddling with NIS, and accidentally overwrote
>/etc/passwd with the version NIS distributes.  Note that these are not
>the same-- NIS doesn't distribute all the daemon accounts, nor does it
>distribute the root account (at least not the way we use it).  He had
>saved a copy of /etc/passwd, but of course we couldn't restore without
>being root!  We had to L1-A, go to single user, and put it back.
>Without this ability, the fix would have been a much bigger pain.t te 

I may have misinterpretted this, but:
If /etc/passwd was indeed trashed, and the "root" entry was either missing
or wrong, what good would it do to have the root password at all?  If
you can't become root in multi-user, and the console is marked as not
being secure in /etc/ttytab, you can't become root via booting
single-user either, unless you boot from some other device (another bootable
partition, CD, tape, net, etc. . .)

More about passwords: (My opinions. . .)

In general, it is a *BAD* idea to write down passwords (at all).  I have 
heard of some sites where some executive *insisted* on having the root
password, in case the sys-admin wasn't around when there was a problem
(The executive could "find" someone else to take care of it).  There were
several solutions, but one which would probably work:  The sysadmin writes
down the password(s) on a piece of safety-paper (similar to what many
bank-checks are made of).  The paper is folded, placed into an envelope
(prefereably also made of safety-paper), and *sealed*.  The envelope
is then placed in a secure location (IE: a safe) where the executive
has access.  Occasionly, the sysadm will check to verify the envelope
is still intact.  If the executive ever needed to open the envelope, he
would notify the sysadm and the password(s) would be changed.

Just writing the password down and leaving it in your top desk drawer
is a *VERY*BAD*IDEA*.  I have seen people that actually do this.

Passwords should be something "not easily guessed" (Given enough time, 
any brute-force method would *eventually* discover a password.  The
question is would it be in our lifetime?  Pick a decent password and
it isn't likely to be).  The password should also be easy for the
person to remember.  If the password is easy to remember, there is
really no need to write it down.  Many people have come up with ways
of selecting passwords easy to remember.  These include using the
all of the first (or second, or third) letters of your favorite 
quote or saying (This should *NOT* be something common, such as
"To be, or Not to be. . .").  Some people use initials/birthday combinations.
Some people take two halves of two completely different words to form
a nonsense-word.

Another poster also mentioned clusters of workstations, where each
machine had its own root password.  If these machines are all administered
by the same person(s), why not have one root password for them all?
(It is true that if someone discovers the root password on one, they
are limited to that one machine if differents passwords are used).


Remember:  Security and Ease-of-Use/Ease-of-Administration are opposites.
It is part of the administrator's job to ensure that the right combination
is employed.  The most secure systems are the toughest to use/administer.
The easiest to use/administer are the least secure.


-- 
..............................................................................
 Theodore S. Kapela				kapela@poly.edu
 Center for Applied Large-Scale Computing	
 Polytechnic University