From: KARLIN@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (P.L. Cowan)
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Lee-Longstreet
Organization: BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 15:06:14 GMT
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In <1992Aug19.183616.9133@leland.Stanford.EDU> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU writes:

: In article <1992Aug19.065832.6466@bnlux1.bnl.gov> KARLIN@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (P.L. Cowan) writes:
: >
: >No one knows the time of the attack precisely, for the simple reason that the
: >official reports of the various commanders report times ranging from noon to
: >4PM. Even those from one point along the line disagree by several hours.
: 
: You can read a book called "Gettysburg: The Second Day" by Harry Pfanz which
: reconstructs Longstreet's attack and gets "best estimate" times for the
: various events. I think he figured the attack started about 1 or 1:30pm,
: although it's been a while since I saw the book. It's a very interesting
: exercise in reconciling the timing problems in Civil War reports.

I have read this book carefully, but I don't tend to trust reconstructions
made over a century later. I'd rather take the commanders's reports as only
reliable, but in this case ambiguous, source.

: >
: >Col. Chamberlain and the other regiments of that Brigade only went to Little
: >R.T.  because the attack was underway. Brig.Gen. Warren realized its importance
: >and diverted  Col. Vincent's Brigade as it was on its way to join the melee in
: >the Wheatfield.
: 
: Didn't realize Chamberlain by himself constituted an entire regiment. :)
: How about "20th Maine and the other regiments?"
: OK back to serious discussion...

Obviously I meant to type "Chamberlain's and the other ..." the spell utility
doesn't pick up those mistakes.

: >
: >Had the Confederates attacked early in the morning (as many claim Longstreet
: >should have) Vincent's Brigade would still have been on the road (from Hanover
: >I believe) with the rest of the Fifth Corps. The trouble is that that early 
: >the Union Third Corp was still in position on Cemetery Ridge, and in principle
: >could have defended Little R.T. Lee's other problem was that Longstreet simply
: >did not have enough troops in the vicinity of the Battle to launch an attack
: >that early.
: >
: In Vol. II of Lee's Lieutenants, Freeman goes over the timing of Longstreet's
: attack. He reaches two conclusions: 1. Longstreet could not conceivably have
: attacked early in the morning and 2. Even if he had the attack would have
: failed. However, I don't see how III Corps could have defended Little Round
: Top; the corps had only two divisions and not nearly enough troops to stretch
: their line that far (which was why Sickles moved forward to begin with). They
: could only have reached LRT by opening a gap between them and II Corps,
: which would have been worse.
: 

Longstreet only attacked with two divisions. Admittedly, Confederate infantry
divisions were 30% - 50% bigger, but Sickles would have had the advantage of
terrain and artillery. Artillery ultimately saved the Union's collective butt.

It was Hancock's opinion that they should have been in position to defend 
Little R.T. (Meade had delegated Hancock to instruct Sickles where to 
form). There has been some speculation that Sickles was insulted that he 
had to take instructions from Hancock, who was his junior, and changed his 
position for this reason.

: >Lee's problem at Gettysburg was that he was unable to follow through with 
: >his early advantage.He committed Ewell's Third Corps to an attack on the Union
: >right that Ewell did not make (at least not at the right time).
: 
: Well, Second Corps, not that it really matters.
: 

I remembered it was Hill-Second, Ewell-Third. (I'll trust you until I get 
home next week.)
 
: > In retrospect 
: >he should have swung Ewell's men around to his right and attacked the union 
: >left. Ewell was in charge of most of Jackson's "foot cavalry" and this is the
: >sort of fancy maneuver that Lee and Jackson were famous for. I doubt that
: >Meade,who had been in command for less than a week, would have picked up what 
: >Lee had done any better that Hooker at Chancellorsville etc.
: >
: After Ewell's failure on the first day, I can't agree that Lee should have
: trusted the main attack the next day to him. His troops were much farther
: from the right than Longstreet's; what is to be gained by marching them
: around? Also, Ewell's troops were opposite the Union I, XI, and XII Corps
: on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. If you move Ewell's corps off, those
: troops become free to either reinforce the Union left or to attack Lee's
: left flank, which is not anchored on any particular thing. Given the Union's
: interior lines, they can do either of these things before Ewell's corps
: reaches the Confederate right.
: This move only works if you are willing to gamble on Meade's complete
: inactivity. On the one hand, he never showed such inactivity at other
: times in the war, and you'd like to think they learned SOMETHING from
: Chancellorsville. On the other hand, gambling on Union mistakes was how
: the Confederacy had been winning battles, so why not? Tough call to make.
:
: Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

I think your assessment is sound, but I judged it was a gamble consistent
with Lee's past record. I don't want to push the speculation too far but let me
justify my assertion.

Ewell's Corps was not in a position to do anything useful once the Union was
dug-in on Culp's and Cemetery Hills. (Using 20-20 hindsight) Lee's best chance
for victory was to take advantage of his numerical superiority on late July 1
and early July 2.

Ewell's corps was not in a very good defensive position, yet Meade still did not
attack. On July 4, Lee did pull this corps back to Seminary Ridge, yet I
don't recall that Meade moved forward even then. (I should probably be more
careful since I am on vacation sans references).

Ewell's position on the CSA left was roughly equally distant from Little R.T.
as the First Corps's camp at Marsh Creek. However, Law's Brigade (First Corps) 
was much farther from the point of attack than Johnston's division (which was 
farthest to Ewell's left).

I also disagree that Ewell screwed up so badly that there was a justifiable
loss in confidence in him. Ewell basically followed the advice of his division
commanders, Rhodes and Early, not to attack. Everyone suffered from a lack of 
scouts and unfamiliarity with the terrain. 

My feeling is that Lee was himself in a pretty good position to defend, and
could have anchored his left on McPherson's Ridge with one of Ewell's divisions
while the other two swung around. Also, Longstreet could have been used to 
shore-up the left (and/or support the attack from the right) with the troops he
had at hand.

I also think that the chance that Meade would have attacked through the town
(through which he had just retreated, and in which many of his troops were
captured in blind alleys) was slim. The Union 1st and 11th Corps were badly
used up (the 1st because of killed and wounded and the 11th due to many being
captured). 

Also, Meade knew that CSA troops had moved in from the north (as well
as the west) and Culp's and Cemetery Hill's were the best place to defend
against attack from that direction. That Meade was worrying mainly about his
right, is indicated by the fact that he initially sent his 5th Corps there.
Meade's philosophy seems to have been to hold on until he brought up his entire
army. 

My bet is that the gamble would have worked and the rewards outweighed the
risks.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan	Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV 	(I'm posting this from a friend's account)
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan	Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV 	(I'm posting this from a friend's account)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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