From: gall@nexus.yorku.ca (Norm Gall)
Subject: Re: Wittgenstein, P.I.
Organization: York University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 21:18:08 GMT

torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

|In article <gall.722543832@yorku.ca> gall@nexus.yorku.ca (Norm Gall) writes:

|   >How about the illusion that all nouns refer to objects in the world?
|   >How about the illusion that there are 'mental objects' like physical
|   >objects and can be disussed as such?

|  Are these illusions - assuming there are such illusions - problems
|in the use of language?  

Well, that _is_ the project of the fist 180 sections of PI. This is
W's main contention  that we are bewitched by certian uses of certian
words in illict contexts... hence the 'science' of cognitive science.

|If we are at all to relate them to "the use
|of language" I would think it more reasonable to say that they are
|(somehow connected with) problems arising from a particular use of
|language, although I don't recall that Wittgenstein said this either.

Please refer to the text more carefully.

|In describing Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is to my mind a very poor
|idea to say such things as "To Wittgenstein, the supposed problems of
|philosophy are just problems in the use of language." It's a poor idea
|for several reasons, one being that it misrepresents (not just oversimplifies)
|the complexities of Wittgenstein's shrewd philosophical waffling.

Your use of the term 'waffling' seems to indicate an general
intolerance. 

|   >Well, metaphysics is clearly intimated to be in some way an illict
|   >discourse and the battle is to bring words (and concepts, as the case
|   >may be) back to the everyday use where they get their meaning.

|  Aha, but, to employ your own methodology, would Wittgenstein have called
|this a battle against metaphysics? In particular, is it at all similar in
|its intent to the "battle against metaphysics" of Ayer et al?

Yes he would call this a battle against metaphysics:

"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes,
and are irresistably tempted to asks questions in the way science
does.  This tendancy is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the
philosopher into complete darkness." BB18

"The question as we put it is already the expression of several
confusions.  This is shown by the mere fact that it almost sounds like
a question of physics; like asking: "What are the ultimate
constituents of matter?" (It is a typically metaphysical question; the
characteristic of a metaphysical question being that we express an
unclarity about the grammar of words int eh _form_ of a question.)"
BB35

"Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality
is to be found in the grammar of the language" Z55

"Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations.  The
essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction
between factual and conceptual investigations." Z458

"On mathematics: 'Your concept is wrong.-However, I cannot illumine
the matter by fighting against your words, but only by trying to turn
your attention away from certain expressions, illustrations, images,
And _towards_ the _employment_ of the words." Z463


I think that these quotes that I plucked in 10 minutes underline my
claim well.  Please provide text to support your claims from here on
in. 

norm gall
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