From: daniel@vtserf.cc.vt.edu (Daniel Kranowski)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Objectivism/Existence
Date: 27 Aug 92 21:29:18 GMT
Organization: Virginia Tech (VPI & SU)


In article <l9q63nINNriv@appserv.Eng.Sun.COM>, danoc@earlybird.Eng.Sun.COM (Dan O'Connell [CONTRACTOR]) writes:
> 
> (Daniel Kranowski) writes:
>  
>>  (1) Humanity cannot know what it is; "to know" and "to be" do not cover
>>      the same ground.

> Some possible qualifications -
> 
> But cannot an individual "know" who s/he is just as much
> as they can "know" anything? 

I would hold that humanity cannot know *anything* for certain, but--

>                                Also, doesn't saying that 
> humanity can't know what it is imply an objective knowledge
> of what humanity is that humanity itself can't know?

GOOD POINT!  Excellent!  I'll admit this is kicking my own ass, but when 
I say "Humanity can't know anything objectively," this is itself an 
objective statement I cannot presume to make!  When you dive straight 
to the heart of the matter, I cannot prove that we don't know anything 
any more than a realist can prove that we do know things.  So if I know
that I am right about the true laws of epistemology, then I am wrong!
Great paradox, eh?  In a way, though, that's still anti-realist.
     But the reason I lean towards anti-realism, then, is not so much to
stamp on the feet of those saying "A rose is a rose is a rose" and
inform them it's really a transdimensional phonelink to late night
burger marts on Saturn (although it damn well could be :), but to give
myself breathing room next to Strong Opinions.  Why do people cling so
strongly to objective reality?  Not so much to prove the physics they've
learned, but to give the mark of approval to their daily life, to hear
the inner voice saying, "I don't always get what what I want, but at
least I know what's right," which grants much more security than an
inner voice that says, "You know, all my struggles and pains haven't
meant diddly-squat."  An understanding of the _motivation_ of people's
alleged opinions is very often more interesting to me than the opinion 
itself, especially when the opinion is being given the hard sell.
     I'd like to ramble on in that direction, but I don't have much more
time today so I'll reply to the other things Dan said: 

> Would you agree that one can "know" something "un" or "sub"
> consciously which still informs the consciousness? (Probably
> just a side issue)

As far as objectively understanding the universe goes, I'd say the 
subconscious is subject to the same limitations as consciousness.

> Cannot there be a priori knowledge? "Natural" knowledge inherent
> in a being's genetic makeup that is not based on experience?

My opinion is that if Immanuel Kant were in a void, bereft of sense, he
wouldn't know a damn thing.  (Aside from self-awareness, that is.  Don't 
get me wrong, I think Kant was a very cool guy with some very cool ideas!)
     A better answer: a cow instinctively "knows" that if it eats this
grassy stuff, it will survive; but it can't use that to prove that the
grass exists or that survival is a worthwhile goal.  Genetics is an
important factor in determining who you are and what you want, but it's
not "knowledge" as I've been talking of it.

>>                                                       I've said repeatedly 
>>  on this thread, the *thought* of a thing is not identical to the *thing 
>>  itself*.  An easy proof of this I mentioned earlier: we can conceive of 
>>  time travel and sentient flamingo beings, but that does not guarantee 
>>  their existence.  Therefore I also disagree with his lumped definition 
>>  of the science of metaphysics.
>> 
> Another example would be the paintings of Matisse, where in 
> one instances he makes the point that a representation of
> a thing is not the thing itself; i.e, a picture of a 
> pipe with the words "This is not a pipe."

Very nifty!

>> Ayn Rand writes...
>>	Since axiomatic concepts refer to facts of reality and are
>>	not a matter of "faith" or of a man's arbitrary choice [...]
>
> I thought axioms by 
> definition were a matter of "faith".

That they are.  First principles are very handy, 'cause without 'em you 
couldn't prove anything, but I just wish that the Strongly Opinionated 
persons I talk to would remember that their first principles had no 
more logical validity than anyone else's.

>>                            I like the way Rand says facts of reality 
>>  "are not a matter of 'faith'," so therefore, we are to understand, if 
>>  you don't believe the facts of reality the way she interprets them, you 
>>  must be stark raving mad.
> 
> Precisely.
> 
> Dano

Daniel Kranowski
email: daniel@vtserf.cc.vt.edu

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.philosophy.tech