From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 16 Nov 92 19:00:15 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.44.721940415
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc11.superbowl.und.ac.za


SUMMARY: There's been a lot of activity following my original posting, at
least by the standards of my earlier efforts.  In this posting I attempt to
clarify some confusions and respond to a few criticisms, and also offer an
analysis of the debate intended to characterise the fundamental issues.

PART I: Clarifications

(1) In article <1992Nov12.224326.6870@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
> I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
> chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
> incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
> correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
> that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
> sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
> [.....]

I disagree fundamentally.  Certainly there are many senses of possibility, but
the sense relevant to `free will' is not what is sometimes called `epistemic'
possibility, as suggested by Holmes.  This is, perhaps, well illustrated by
looking at the way we deal with attributions of responsibility.  If I believe
of a person who stole my watch that that person _thought_ s/he could have
chosen not to take the watch, but was in fact mistaken then I cannot con-
sistently hold him/her responsible.  If we believe that determinism is true
with respect to our actions then we cannot hold ourselves, or anyone else,
responsible for _anything_.

Rather than waste space here I refer those not already following it to the
`Free Will and Morality' thread in talk.philosophy.misc which is dealing with
this question in reasonable detail.  I recommend that _this_ thread look at
the technical aspects of the immanent causality question, which is a less
tired topic anyway.

(2) In article <1992Nov12.224326.6870@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
> I am not a determinist, since I think that this is incompatible with
> the experimental evidence; but I think that free will does not depend
> on loopholes in the laws of physics.

Anyone who thinks that `free will' depends upon `loopholes in the laws of
physics' is just being opportunistic, and I certainly do not think that for a
moment.  Insofar as physics is the project of establishing the truth about the
physical world it is co-extensive with philosophy, and whether we have `free
will' or not will be a matter of the nature of that world, not about ways that
nature is cheated.  That is why I am attempting to draw a distinction between
determinism and causality, and to preserve the latter.  I am not offering any
sort of `exceptionalism' where our choices break or bend the laws of physics,
I find such theories ridiculous and dualistic.

(3) In article <1992Nov13.023243.24641@leland.Stanford.EDU>
ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards) writes:
>In article <1992Nov12.224326.6870@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>
>>  I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
>>  chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
>>  incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
>>  correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
>>  that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
>>  sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
>>  [.....]
>
> It seems to me that with this one is just back to arguing that indeterminism
> allows free will ... as pointed out by many when examined closely this
> argument does not fair very well.

I agree completely, and it was a major objective of my original posting to get
away from equating freedom with indeterminism as quickly as possible to get at
the _problem_.

(4) In article <1992Nov13.165608.21531@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
> [Deletions, Holmes' major argument linking `free will' to limitations on
>  self knowledge.]
>
> This is a version of the Penrose-Lucas argument; I don't think that
> the argument can prove anything about physical determinism or the lack
> thereof (the presence or absence of absolute free will), but I think
> that it _can_ prove that we will look to ourselves as if we have free
> will, which is fine with me; that is the form of free will we actually
> need.  I think that this is real free will; I am not really concerned
> if others won't recognize it as such.

`Real free will'?  This seems to be no free will at all, and I have no idea
what you mean by your contrast with `absolute free will' here.  If I believe
that my actions are determined in principle (leaving QM aside for now) then
even though I do not know the details of any given action, or even of all of
them, I cannot approach them in the same way as if I thought they were really
up to _me_.  Ignorance about X is surely not adequate reason to assert that
not-X.  This is certainly not what you are saying, but I cannot see what the
logical difference is.  Also:  What do we `need' this form of free will for?

PART II: Analysis

    There are at least two major strands of discussion here, (1) about
  the definition of free will, and (2) about the relationship between
  any and all of the definitions and determinism.  Some discussion of
  what constitutes responsibility is also coming up, but the `Free
  Will and Morality' thread is still active, so I will not repeat
  myself here.

(1) Definition.

    My original definition was:

 >   Voluntarism (the thesis that we `have' free will, or are free, or
 > whatever) holds that we _choose_ our actions, that we cause them to
 > take place, _AND_ that we are capable of acting other than we do in
 > at least some cases.  It is in these cases that we are responsible.

    which nobody has directly attacked here.  Holmes line of argument,
  however, opens up a range of crucial questions about our _knowledge_
  of what we do, and actually or allegedly could have done.  This
  changes the discussion, since what we can know of a situation is not
  necessarily the truth about it.

A number of questions arise here:

  - Is the question as to whether or not humans have `free will' a fac-
  tual/ontological one, or is it rather a matter of our partial and
  perhaps subjective self-knowledge?

  - If the question is said to be to do with our self-knowledge, then
  what is the relationship between specific parts of that knowledge,
  and our general beliefs about the nature of the world?  [ie. between
  my belief that I could have done other than I did in some case, and
  my belief in determinism, or indeterminism.]

  - If, on the other hand, the question is ontological then what sort of
  ontolgy can do justice to both our experience of the physical world,
  and that of ourselves?  [ie. which does not have the ridiculous con-
  sequence, eg, that when I drop my pencil it could choose to fall
  sideways.]

(2) `Free Will' and in/determinism.

    I think that a central point here is that responsibility is
  meaningless unless we are the authors of our actions, and unless we
  could act other than we do.  To hold a person responsible for some-
  thing they did not cause is as ridiculous as holding them
  responsible for something they could not have prevented.  That ac-
  tion is causal rules out indeterminism.  That it involves pos-
  sibility rules out determinism.  I think that anyone trying to
  equate free will with randomness is not worth talking to, which
  leaves two major options:  (1) I am correct, and `free will' either
  does not exist, or another ontology is needed, or (2) I am in-
  correct, and responsibility is in some sense compatible with
  determinism.
    
    Those who follow option (2) should provide an analysis of the
    flaws (there are many) in the proto-ontology I offered, and/or ex-
    plain a deterministic view which fully deals with the problem.
    
    Those who favour option (1) should try to make a lot more sense of
    the proto-ontology, and deal with the criticisms which arise from
    the determinists.  OR they should explain how we can come to be-
    lieve we have `free will' when in fact we don't.  [Note that this
    option is conditional.]
    
    In both cases a central question is `what is it to be an agent?'
    ie. `is an agent a thing of some sort, which can truly be said to
    cause acts to take place?'
    
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc