From: yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken)
Newsgroups: sci.energy
Subject: Re: Nuke Stupidity Rebuttal
Date: 27 Sep 92 00:14:55 GMT
Organization: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

In article <1992Sep26.170409.29413@nuchat.sccsi.com> kevin@nuchat.sccsi.com (Kevin Brown) writes:
>In article <53981@dime.cs.umass.edu> yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken) writes:
>>Not my assumption, tacit or otherwise. I've been arguing that people who
>>actually know something about this problem are not as enamored of 
>>over-simplified models as are some of our friends here on the net.
>
>This may be the case, but are they as unwilling to use these models as you
>seem to be?

I have not seen any claims in the scientific literature that risk models
invalidate subjective concerns such as doubts about the efficacy of 
the NRC or doubts about whether probability estimates are correct
within an order of magnitude. Note that the AEC's own review of the 
Wash-1400 report produced some predictions of a major accident every
50 years of 200 reactor operation (or something like that, perhaps even
more). 

>Are they as insistent on concentrating on the worst-case scenario as you are?
>
>I doubt it, but that is mere speculation on my part.

I strongly suggest you look at the literature. 

>>From my, limited, readings of the PRA literature, I have the impression
>>that there is a lot of reasonably  clever research going on and that
>>people are experimenting with models. I don't claim to have any special
>>insight into what models should be used. I do claim that, contrary to
>>what some people have claimed here, PRAs  are limited tools which should be
>>regarded as data points, but not as definitive answers. And I claim that
>>it is a grave error to imagine that a linear risk model can be used to 
>>obtain an objective answer to the question of whether or not it is a good
>>thing to develop nuclear power.  
>
>You have made a stronger claim than this.  You have claimed that *no* risk
>model can be used to obtain an objective answer, since you have claimed that
>no objective risk model exists.

Yes.

>It is not a question of whether we should be using nuclear power.  It
>is a question of how nuclear power fares when compared with viable current
>alternatives, e.g. coal power.  The need for power generation is there.
>*Something* has to be used to generate that power.
>
>You can't have your cake and eat it too.  If you *insist* that linear
>models don't apply to nuclear power, then you must also insist that they do
>not apply to the alternatives, unless you have a good, solid argument to
>back you up for the coal power case (one which *cannot* apply to the nuclear
>power case, i.e. the two must be somehow fundamentally different in a
>significant, with respect to the choice of risk models, way).

It seems obvious to me that the risks posed by coal are of a different
kind than the risks posed by nuclear fission. Coal has many obvious
problems, but given current technology, no coal plant can cause the
same level of devastation that we see at Chernobyl (unless we want to
take the improbabilities of statistical mechanics into account and
thus render the whole discussion futile). So the question
with nuclear (one question anyway) is whether US PWR/BWR plants can fail
on a similar scale. My current belief is that such a failure is possible,
even though I realize that US reactors are far better designed and
maintained than XSSR ones (partly because the Soviet nuclear power designers
never had to deal with the "irrational and hysterical" fears of the populace).
My belief is based on a deep skepticism of the design, construction,
and siting process used for US plants, suspicion of the abilities of 
the utilities and NRC to properly manage the plants, and concern over 
the long-term management of nuclear mishaps (i.e. what happens 100 years
after a meltdown has caused us to entomb an entire reactor building in
concrete.) For examples of why I'm skeptical of the design process,
consider the failure to orient turbines properly in some plants, the
nutty Brown's Ferry control cabling and the TMI hidden displays (on the
back of the panel where the operators could not see it). For examples
of construction and siting problems, see Okrent's "History" and the 
Union of Concerned Scientists "Safety Second".  Safety Second provides
some very well documented reasons to be suspicious of the NRC/AEC's
vigilance, and Okrent's book also illustrates how concern for public
relations and keeping the very politically powerful manufacturers happy
was allowed to override engineering concerns, time and again.

Since there appears no pressing need for immediate construction of
new generating capacity, my belief is that it pays to be cautious here.
I'd rather spend money on solar, conservation, insulation, natural
gas, fancy pollution control equipment ....  For detailed descriptions
of alternate energy paths see proposals by the UCS, EPRI, and the 
Rocky Mountain Institute. In these you will find in depth analysis of
comparative costs.


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yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu