From: pecampbe@mtu.edu (Paul Campbell)
Subject: Re: Traveling with a gun
Organization: Michigan Technological University
Distribution: usa
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 00:46:41 GMT

In article <C0MpJH.M0F@news.cso.uiuc.edu> cbl@uihepa.hep.uiuc.edu writes:
>In article <1993Jan10.065611.21174@mtu.edu>, pecampbe@mtu.edu (Paul Campbell) writes:

[much stuff about whether or not states recognize weapons permits from other
states deleted]

>>This is ludicrous. The constitution REQUIRES them to recognize the
>>laws and proceedings of other states.
>	And the constitution requires that congress pass no law
>	funding the military for more than two year, and . . . 

Neil Sherman from Tennessee who is relying on USC 5(2) as his gun permit
actually attempted to count up the number. I couldn't verify exactly
how he went about doing it, but the results were as follows:
 27 deviations from the Declaration of Independence
 40 Violations of the Constitution including
  4 Violations of intent
 24 Violations of Article 1
  4 Violations of Article 2
  2 Violations of Article 3
  3 Violations of Article 4
  3 Violations of Article 6
 16 Violations of the Bill of Rights.

>	The 'privlidges and immunities' section you are reffering
>	to has been changed into a very strange beast over the
>	years by S.C. decisions. It's one of the things
>	I'll be looking into in the future.

No. That's not what I meant.

Article IV, Section 1:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given to each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. ...

Article IV, Section 2:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

I did not say "privileges and immunities". Perhaps saying Article 4
would have been more appropriate.

The Supreme Court cannot alter the MEANING and INTENT of the law
makers. Further, I hope you are considering the following:

The Constitution is a written instrument.  As such, its meaning
does not alter.  That which it meant when it was adopted, it
means now."  South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448
(1905)

The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary, as
distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is
clear, there is no room for construction, and no excuse for
interpolation or addition."  Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat
304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 419; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat
419; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet 10; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117
U.S. 139; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1; Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628; The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655; (Justice) Story on the
Constitution, 5th ed., Sec 451; Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 2nd ed., p. 61, 70.

The values of the Framers of the Constitution must be applied
in any case construing the Constitution.  Inferences from the
text and history of the Constitution should be given great
weight in discerning the original understanding and in
determining the intentions of those who ratified the
constitution.  The precedential value of cases and
commentators tends to increase, therefore, in proportion to
their proximity to the adoption of the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights, or any other amendments.  Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 547 (1969)

The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely,
except where reference to common law and to British institutions
as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted.  The
statesmen and lawyers of the convention who submitted it to the
ratification of conventions of the thirteen states, were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and
spoke in its vocabulary...when they came to put their conclusions
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they
expressed them in terms of common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood.  Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 108.

It cannot be assumed that the framers of the constitution and the
people who adopted it, did not intend that which is the plain
import of the language used.  When the language of the
constitution is positive and free of all ambiguity, all courts
are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal
learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid the hardships
of particular cases.  We must accept the constitution as it reads
when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the
sovereign power.  Cook vs. Iverson, 122, N.M. 251.

Where the words of a constitution are unambiguous and in their
commonly received sense lead to a reasonable conclusion, it
should be read according to the natural and most obvious import
of the framers, without resorting to subtle and forced
construction for the purpose of limiting or extending its
operation.  A State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P.
190.

If the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional
provision, the frequent repitition of the wrong will not create a
right.  Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619

A long and uniform sanction by law revisers and lawmakers, of a
legislative assertion and exercise of power, is entitled to a
great weight in construing an ambiguous or doubtful provision,
but is entitled to no weight if the statute in question is in
conflict with the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.
Kingsley v. Merril, 122 Wis. 185; 99 NW 1044

Disobedience or evasion of a constitutional mandate may not be
tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least
temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the
public.  Slote v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12;
112 ALR 660.

When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the
Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey
it.  (See 16 Ma. Jur. 2d 177, 178) State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147,
65 NW 262, 30 L.R.A. 630 Am. St. 459.