From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Sat, 5 Sep 1992 22:57:02 GMT


Rich Young writes:
ry> The question asked you to define "meaning" as you've used it in
ry> this context.  You have not yet complied.  You have, instead,
ry> continued to resort to using the term without defining it.  You've
ry> said that a "meaningful existence" isn't possible without sentience/
ry> sapience but you have yet to tell us exactly what constitutes a
ry> "meaningful existence."

Russell Lawrence writes:
rl> These terms are defined in the dictionary, Rich.  "Sentience" 
rl> designates sensory abilities, namely the ability of an entity to 
rl> gather information about its own being as well as its 
rl> environment.  "Sapience" designates the cognitive abilities that 
rl> permit an entity to process and analyze information.  The word,
rl> "meaningful", is a catch-all term that designates significance 
rl> or purpose.

From article <1992Sep5.153351.8534@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> The question was not about dictionaries or the words "sapience" and
ry> "sentience," Russell.  It was about your constant insistence that
ry> "meaning" is necessary.  I am asking you to define for us exactly
ry> what you think is "meaning" IN THIS CONTEXT.  And, by association,
ry> the definition of a "meaningful experience."

If you reread my statement carefully, you'll notice that I used 
the phrase, "meaningful existence", whereas you've introduced the 
term "meaningful experience".  There's quite a difference between 
your phrase and mine.  

In the context of the previous conversation, I'd be inclined to 
argue that all experience is meaningful in some small way, so the 
use of the word "meaningful" as a qualifier isn't necessary.  On 
the other hand, it's entirely possible to have existence that 
isn't meaningful at all.  A ball-bearing exists, but its 
existence is meaningless to the ball-bearing itself since the 
ball-bearing lacks both sensory and cognitive abilities.  

In deference to your misunderstanding of the word "meaningless", 
we could alternatively say that existence has zero significance 
for the ball-bearing since the difference between existence and 
non-existence is null as far as the ball-bearing is concerned.

Incidentally, it'd a half-truth to say that a ball-bearing lacks 
meaningful experiences.  The full-truth is that a ball-bearing 
has no experiences whatsoever.  

rl> Let's review the ethical importance of "meaningful" existence...

ry> No, Russell, let's not.  Let's define the term "meaningful" first,
ry> as you've attempted to use it IN THIS CONTEXT; that was, after all,
ry> the question that was asked.

Rich, I defined "meaningful" previously, and I elaborated on the 
definition in the text that you edited out.  I'm going to edit
my comments back in.  Please re-read them carefully to see if 
they answer your questions about the difference between 
meaningless existence and meaningful existence: 

=====================================================================
rl> Let's review the ethical importance of "meaningful" existence.
rl> Without the qualities of sentience and sapience, existence would 
rl> be perceptually and cognitively meaningless to a ball-bearing, 
rl> and hence it would be impossible to deprive it in any way.  We 
rl> could do it no harm if we whack it with hammers, or melt it down, 
rl> or deal with it as we choose.  On the otherhand, existence is 
rl> meaningful to a healthy chimpanzee, who possesses the ability to 
rl> perceive his own being as well as the world around him.  Hence, 
rl> we ought to think about the impact that our actions may have on 
rl> him or her.  
=====================================================================

ry>  2. By what authority do you presume to assign "status" to non-human
ry>     species based on sentience/sapience?

rl> You're the one who's been assigning "status", Rich.  Not me.

ry> The question, Russell, did not ask what you think is moral or
ry> immoral, ethical or unethical; rather, it asks by what presumption
ry> of authority you make these decisions for other species, based on
ry> certain criteria.

rl> And my answer is that you're the one who's been making hierarchical
rl> claims about the role of status and authority, not me.   As an
rl> example, I consider pain to be unpleasant in itself, and hence, I
rl> think we have an obligation to the thinking/feeling individuals
rl> in our environment to think twice before we engage in actions that
rl> may cause them to experience unnecessary pain.  You, on the other
rl> hand, apparently believe that pain is diminished or perhaps not 
rl> important when it's experienced by a "lowly" being like a rat
rl> or dog, in spite of the neurological and behavioral evidence which
rl> shows that pain hurts rats and dogs just as much as it hurts humans.

ry> You cannot prove this and you know it, Russell.

Do you seen any difference between the use of chimps and the use 
retarded humans in medical experiments?  If so, do you accept one 
but not the other because of some difference in "assigned status" ?

Do you see any difference between the killing and consumption of 
corn plants as opposed to the killing and consumption of animals 
like dogs or cats or deer?  Or, would you say that both sets of 
actions are ethically similar by virtue of your assumption that all
non-human organisms have identical, non-human "status"?

ry> Show some integrity here and stop trying to confuse the issue.  
ry> The thread startes [sic] with your defense of the following 
ry> statement, reproduced here in part: 

=====================================================================
twa> From <altar.713493440@sfu.ca>:
twa> Insects are not of the same status as birds, reptiles,
twa> and mammals...
=====================================================================

You're lifting this quote out-of-context, Rich.  Rather than 
quibble about your misinterpretations, let's get on with the 
conversation and try to reach some sort of agreement about the 
difference between ethical judgments based on sentience and 
sapience versus ethical judgments based on abstract notions of 
status.  

If you still believe that sentience and sapience are irrelevant
concepts, how would you evaluate the following actions:

   -- roasting fully functional ball-bearings
   -- roasting freshly pulled carrots while they're still alive
   -- roasting conscious pigs while they're still alive 

ry>  3.Why is your criterion of "sentience" any more valid than a criterion
ry>    of "life," or "ability to jump sideways," or "ability to 
ry>    synthesize glucose?"
rl> 

rl> Without the qualities of sentience and sapience, an action would
rl> have no meaning whatsoever.  And without meaning, an action could
rl> hardly be "good" or "bad".  As an example, the notion of "torture"
rl> would be meaningless if the object of our actions were incapable
rl> of feeling pain.  If you choose, you're free to point out that the
rl> object in question may be a living bacterium or a self-propelled pogo 
rl> stick capable of jumping sideways, or a lab machine capable of 
rl> synthesizing glucose, but the fact will remain that the "torture"
rl> of such an entity would be a meaningless concept.

ry> And once again, we have a retreat into the undefined "meaning".
ry> Might I humbly suggest that you re-read the section of your book
ry> on logic that describes circular reasoning?  You've just said that
ry> without sapience, there is no "meaning" (whatever THAT is), but
ry> without "meaning" (whatever THAT is) there is no sapience (as in
ry> understanding the concepts of "good" and "bad").

rl> No, that's not what I said.  What I said was that existence would
rl> be meaningless without sentience and sapience, not that "meaning" is
rl> a precondition of sentience and sapience.
rl> 
rl> It's important to remember that sentient abilities are "primitives".
rl> If you were to ask, "why is pain bad?", most people would respond 
rl> that pain is bad because it hurts.  This isn't a circular 
rl> argument by any means.  To the contrary, such people are citing 
rl> an experiential fact that non-contrary, non-argumentative people 
rl> would readily accept as truthful.  If you were to deny that pain 
rl> is bad, we could set your mind at rest by kicking you in the 
rl> shins or extinguishing a cigarette on the skin of your 
rl> outstretched palm.  

ry> Let us review your statements:
ry> ...
ry>    "Without the qualities of sentience and sapience, an action would 
ry>      have no meaning whatsoever."
ry>
ry> This certainly matches the first part of my objection to your logic.

Not at all.  If we were to say that "torture" is meaningless 
without "pain", we're not engaged in circular argumentation.  As 
I said, pain is an experiential fact, not an argument.  Think about
it, Rich. 


-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ