HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Subject: Re: Microelectronic Fabrication
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 92 11:20:23 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

The etching should leave no Boron residue, and the amount of Boron
in the oxide would not be sufficient to form any acid otherwise all
Boron doped device structures would be vulnerable. 

The phenomenon is well known in macro studies of fracture mechanics
of glass and quartz, called "static fatigue" in that material tested
immediately after fabrication is weakened by time, actually due to
the stress-corrosion of the glass by water absorbed from the ambient.
See Doremus's books and papers for details.
Newsgroups: sci.materials
From: danube@dirac.physics.sunysb.edu (Dan Koller*)
Subject: High Vacuum Epoxy
Organization: Institute for Theoretical Physics, SUNY at Stony Brook
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 15:46:26 GMT


   Does anybody know the absolute ultimate lowest obtainable outgass
rate of Varian's "Torr-Seal" high vacuum epoxy?  Varian Spec. sheets 
only list confusing figures, after short 130 degree bakeouts.  I would
like to know if baking out for a week or so at 130 deg. C will help
bring the outgass rate below 10e-8 Torr-liter/cm^2/second.
   I would like to use the epoxy to seal sapphire windows to a small
(1 cm^3) glass chamber, pump it down to better than 10e-7 torr, and then
seal it off.  The problem is that the epoxy seems to be outgassing at
a rate high enough to bring the pressure to 1 mTorr in a minute or so.
This is to be expected from Varian's published outgass rates, but my
question is, can I do better?
   Finally, if epoxy won't work, is there a better way of attaching 
sapphire or Silicon windows to glass?
   Thanks in advance.
							Danube







Xref: sparky sci.materials:643 trial.rec.metalworking:217
From: bd@fluent@dartmouth.EDU (Brice Dowaliby)
Newsgroups: sci.materials,trial.rec.metalworking
Subject: Re: ISRI
Date: 19 Aug 92 14:48:55 GMT
Reply-To: bd%fluent@dartmouth.EDU
Distribution: usa
Organization: Fluent Inc., Lebanon NH


Roupen:

I have a listing for:

Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries (ISRI)
1627 K St., N.W. Suite 700
Washington, DC  20006
Phone:  (202) 466-4050
Fax:    (202) 775-9109

The biggest metals group I know is:

ASM Int'l.
Metals Park, OH  44073
Phone:  (216) 338-5151
Fax:    (216) 338-4634

These listings are from a 1990 directory, so I can't guarantee accuracy.
Good luck.


-- 
   Brice Dowaliby, Fluent Inc., 10 Cavendish Court, Lebanon, NH  03766
                         bd%fluent@dartmouth.edu        
             I don't speak for them, they don't speak for me
From: IFF291@DJUKFA11.BITNET (Stephan Petersen)
Newsgroups: sci.materials
Subject: Re: Superconducting Gallium Arsenide... what's the latest?
Date: 14 Aug 92 11:36:15 GMT
Organization: KFA  Forschungszentrum Juelich

In article <13409@creare.COM>, kwg@creare.COM (Kent Goeking) says:
>
>I recall reading in Science Mag. (I think) that this claim of
>superconductivity
>in GaAs was retracted.  I believe the authors later discovered that it was the

Could anybody give me a complete reference for this Science Mag. and the
original Phys. Rev. Lett. article?

Thanks!

Stephan

[I'm pulling GaAs-crystals from an extreme As-rich melt to investigate
the maximum As-solubility. We just found the precipitates, about 200nm
in size, so I'd like to know about this thing.... ;-)  ]




+------------------------------------------------+
| Stephan Petersen                               |
|                                                |
| Bitnet/EARN: IFF291@DJUKFA11                   |
| Internet:    IFF291@zam001.zam.kfa-juelich.de  |
+------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.materials
From: bob_erck@qmgate.anl.gov (Bob Erck)
Subject: Microelectronic Fabrication
Followup-To: sci.materials
Organization: Argonne National Laboratory
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 16:04:44 GMT

From: Robert Erck
bob_erck@qmgate.anl.gov

I have a question concerning microelectronic fabrication.  The questions
spring from an article recently published in Science. (12 June, p. 1537.)  
In the article, the authors describe a vibrating cantilever beam apparatus
that they constructed by etching Si which they use to measure crack
propagation.  As a crack slowly proceeds into the arm supporting the
device, the resonant frequency falls.  Crack growth rates in the supporting
arm <<1 angstrom/hr can be studied in this manner. 
When the device is exposed to humid air (70%RH), the resonant frequency
drops quickly (~hours), and they attribute this to "immediate crack growth"
upon exposure to moisture.  The resonant frequency subsequently decreases
at a much slower rate.  
I have concerns about this interpretation however.  The method of
fabrication of the cantilever beam was specified as an anisotropic etch of
B doped Si.  I know that exposure of boron to the moisture in humid air
results in the formation of visible films of boron oxide/ boric acid.  If
there is any boron on the cantilever beam, it might react with the moisture
and form an oxide.  A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that only a
few dozen layers  of oxide would account for the frequency drop on this
micron-thick device.  I wonder if that's what's happening?  
So my three questions are: 
1) does an anisotropic etch of B doped Si leave unetched material that
contains B?  2) would boron oxide/acid would form?  
3) or, alternately, does semiconductor-grade Si itself have a tendency to
adsorb a film (10 nm) that could cause such a weight gain?
Newsgroups: sci.materials
From: snyder@henry.ece.cmu.edu (John Snyder)
Subject: Re: Insulator with good heat conductivity
Organization: Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 1992 21:27:52 GMT

In article <4857@dove.nist.gov> rosentha@bldrdoc.gov (Peter Rosenthal 303-497-5844) writes:
>In article <1992Jul28.075319.9973@fs7.ece.cmu.edu> snyder@henry.ece.cmu.edu (John Snyder) writes:
>>In article <7926@dirac.physics.purdue.edu> parks@gibbs.physics.purdue.edu (Chris Parks) writes:
>>>
>>>What is a good material (good=price + availability) which is
>>>an electrical insulator and a good conductor of heat?
>>>
>>>It will be used at temperatures as low as 4.2 Kelvin and it needs
>>>to hold up to about 200 volts / mm, heat conductivity needs to
>>>be comparable to copper.  Does it exist?
>>>
>>>Note: Diamond may be ideal but not practical!
>
>
>>Sapphire has been mentioned to me as such a material.  You do not mention in
>>what form: shape, size this material must be or how much of it you need.  
>>I believe that you can get man-made sapphire substrates.  They are probably
>>not cheap, but surely cheaper than diamond.
>>
>
>Actually, Sapphire is quite cheap.  A polished two-inch wafer costs
>about 125 bucks.  It is used in UHV viewports up to at least 4 inch 
       ^^^^^^^^^

I guess I should also have said, "It depends on your definition of cheap."
I generally work with 1 inch diameter wafers, either Corning 0211, 7059,
Silicon wafers, or polished fused silica.  The latter is most expensive,
and costs, (as of about 2 years ago, about $16.00 each).  So compared
to them, sapphire is not cheap.


>diameters.  Berylium oxide is another option.  Not transparent, but
>a great heat conductor.  Deadly toxic though.
>
>Peter Rosenthal
>
>
>-- 
>Peter Rosenthal       Email rosenthal@cmg.eeel.nist.gov
>
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: WANTED: MS-DOS PD program based on RSA Public Key
Date: 13 Aug 92 02:43:28 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

hgpeach@ms.uky.edu (Harold Peach) writes:
: I am looking for an MS-DOS based, public domain program that with
: do public key encryption based on the RSA standard.  Does anyone
: know the name of such a program and/or an ftp site where it could
: be obtained?  

RIPEM is such a program.   It has been undergoing Alpha testing
and will soon enter beta testing.  RIPEM is not, strictly speaking,
public domain because it uses technology licensed free of charge
from RSA Data Security.  The license agreement precludes commercial
use and has some other provisions, but is probably generous enough
for most sci.crypt purposes.  (The code in RIPEM that I wrote is
public domain.)

Persons genuinely interested in becoming beta testers can
send me email at  mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu.  I will only take
about 10 more testers before releasing the program, though.
I've learned my lesson and will not make a public prediction
of the date of final release!

Mark R.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dla@iso (Don Alvarez)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 17:25:55 GMT

In article <9208191619.AA25204@news.cis.ohio-state.edu> Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes:
>dla@raven.princeton.edu (Don Alvarez) writes,
>> There is no way to defend against this because there is no way to prove
>> who sent the message stating that machine foo has received an article.
>
>Sorry, Don, but you're just totally 100% wrong.  Digital signatures exist!
>They are practical, and they work.
>
>You might want to have a look at any tutorial on RSA, which will tell you
>how to do secure authentication (digital signatures) assuming RSA is secure.

I am well aware that RSA exists, and that you can use it for digital
signatures.  RSA is an encryption technique.  It happens to be a
particularly good one, but it is still just an encryption technique.

The problem has NOTHING to do with encryption.  No matter how you
encrypt/sign/etc your message, we are still faced with the fact that
you and I have never met and know nothing about each other.  I could
call you on the phone or walk up to you on the street and you still
wouldn't be able to trust whether I sent a message, because you just
plain don't know who I am.  That's why it's hard to be a spy, and
that's why it's hard to authenticate mail on the net.  Multiply this
problem by the tens of thousands of people using the net who have
never met each other, and you realize why authenticating messages on a
net-wide basis is a highly non-trivial task.

If you don't believe me, tell me how you and I can use RSA to let us
authenticate messages we wish to send to one another.  Remember that
(to the best of my knowledge) we have never met, and assume that
George Bush's evil twin Skippy wishes to prevent us from communicating
(which I personally doubt, but without an adversary we have no need to
authenticate anything).  We each have the suite of RSA code, as well
as any other software you think would be helpful.  You will quickly
find that we still can't communicate securely.  

If you think you have a way, post it, and I will post a way for Skippy
to spoof the method.  Skippy _doesn't_have_to_crack_RSA_.  Skippy only
has to figure out a way to prevent us from getting a bona-fide copy of
the other's digital signature validator.  Cracking RSA is hard.
Preventing us from getting bona-fide copies of each other's digital
signature validators is easy.

>You might want to have a look at any tutorial on RSA, which will tell you
>how to do secure authentication (digital signatures) assuming RSA is secure.

You might want to look at the literature on Key-distribution protocols.
THAT'S where the problem is.  How to START the communications link.
Once we each have copies of each other's public keys, then it's easy.

-don
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
Date: 16 Aug 92 04:38:22 GMT
Organization: IR

In article <9208151459.AA06736@iecc.cambridge.ma.us> johnl@iecc.cambridge.ma.us (John R. Levine) writes:
> Rivest et al. make no secret of their affiliations,

False. John, please retract your statement.

Nowhere in the July 1992 CACM issue is there any hint of Rivest's
association with RSADSI.

In CACM Rivest states ``DSS is different from the de facto public key
standard (RSA).'' Of course RSA is not the de facto standard; see the
letter by Stallman, Minsky, et al. in prep.ai.mit.edu:pub/lpf/bidzos.r*.
And Rivest does not point out his financial interest in claiming that
RSA is a de facto standard.

Rivest states ``Public Key Partners (PKP) asserts that DSS infringes
U.S. patents #4,200,770 and #4,218,582.'' Needless to say, PKP and
RSADSI are for all intents and purposes the same company---but Rivest
doesn't point this out. Rivest also does not point out his financial
interest in the two patents he cites.

---Dan
From: keith.willis@almac.co.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: random values
Date: 20 Aug 92 21:25:01 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: ALMAC PC Board


        If there is a more appropriate group for this, perhaps a
        stats newsgroup, please let me know.

        An aquaintance has a requirement for a large quantity of
        truly random values.  I believe the application for which
        they are required is a genetic mutation simulator.

        The way he has gone about getting this random data is a method
        used in several encryption programs, namely asking the user to
        type keys, and recording the intervals between keystrokes with
        a hi-res timer.  In fact, I believe he threw together a TSR
        which trapped keystroke intervals over the course of a day or
        so, in order to get a sufficient quantity of data.

        This is fine as a random bitstream, but for his application,
        he needs a set of random _values_, in a defined range, with
        the constraint that there must be at least one of each
        possible value.  I am completely useless at stats, so could
        people suggest how this might be achieved?

        Thanks in advance.


---
 ~ PQ 2.15 194 ~ 

----- PGP v1.0 --- public key ------ keith.willis@almac.co.uk

section 1 of uuencode 5.15 of file willis.pub    by R.E.M.

begin 644 keith.pub
MF;``0A8U*BI7:6QL:7,L($ME:71H("`@("!K96ET:"YW:6QL:7-`86QM86,N
M8V\N=6O>`^5^EYDE<?D,&>2!MNH>T+*/9_\.1-=WDSF_;.]<THIK/X]5R[T"
MY41S!CX_EE1=E;&V8PN<9*5?9],UV,J/(7S=`C-3S+>*+7`1T[8-8Q*@_@"I
LIR(5-E1Z*\@=1W42HU<X*^WG'GXL8#R0C@;=](&@IQ>0#2,4G@F9FS<%`!$%
`
end
sum -r/size 40780/274 section (from "begin" to "end")
sum -r/size 57997/179 entire input file
--
ALMAC BBS Ltd. 0324-665371
Dos based USENET access,  call for details!
From: limonce@pilot.njin.net (Tom Limoncelli)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Summary: Oh nothing important.  I just have this Perl script that I use to generate this stream of posts whenever someone posts the silly suggestion that netnews could be made secure.
Keywords: silly automated
Organization: New Jersey Intercampus Network
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 23:15:56 GMT

In <f11@drew.drew.edu> tlimonce@drew.drew.edu (Tom Limoncelli) writes:

> Then do it. Design and implement secure news. Since TCP isn't entirely
> secure, you'll have to add some authentication protocol on top of that.
> Since UUCP is spoofable, you'll need to use it there as well. It's not
> going to be easy.

However, Brad Templeton is always looking to take a dare and
would respond to this paragraph.  He'll suggest his cancel-password
scheme.  Though he'll admit something like way back in
<1992Jun24.065423.17252@clarinet.com> he <brad@clarinet.com> wrote:

> I pointed out back then the flaw in my own scheme.  The concept of
> a cancel daemon *is* useful for things like renaming groups, deleting
> groups, post-moderating groups and yes, even the legitimate control of
> crossposting.  (For example, if the charter of alt.cascade had read,
> "cascades are not to be crossposted to other groups" then a properly
> working cancel-daemon would be appropriate.)
> 
> Cancel passwords would make all this difficult or impossible.

Tom
--
There is nothing wrong with talking to yourself...
at least you know you're going to win any arguments!
-- 
Tom Limoncelli -- tal@warren.mentorg.com (work) -- tal@plts.uucp (play)
"Oh! I thought it was one of those useless demos of everything that
    a GUI builder could do." -Anonymous person watching demo of
         Solaris 2.0's graphical tool for managing NIS+
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSA-129 contest
Date: 21 Aug 92 23:46:06 GMT
Organization: IR

In article <9208202353.AA21728@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> jbs@WATSON.IBM.COM writes:
  [ Bob Silverman writes: ]
> > I estimate that to be competitive with the Quadratic sieve they need
> > to find coefficients of 'about' 14 digits.  I am not sure it is
> > possible.
> Well, let us estimate how many numbers between 10**128 and
> 10**129 can be so represented.

Keep in mind that---even if Bob's pessimistic estimate of 14 digits is
close to reality, which I very much doubt---f(m) can be any multiple of
n, and two-variable polynomials f(m_1,m_2) also work for GNFS. If we
were to allow 10^5 multiples of n, 10^24 choices of m_1, 10^24 choices
of m_2, and 10^14 choices of each c_i, then there would be roughly 10^9
sufficiently small polynomials for RSA-129. So from a theoretical point
of view there's no problem.

In practice, of course, finding a good polynomial takes a lot of work,
which is why we're running this contest. Obviously it doesn't make sense
to spend more time searching for good polynomials than it would take to
actually run GNFS, but the latter will take months or years on high-end
hardware; we certainly haven't reached the break-even point.

Anyone who missed the original contest announcement two weeks ago can
send mail to factor@src.dec.com with the two lines

  path#yourname@your.host
  rsastatus#

---Dan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Puzzle answer: Cruptography & Data Security
From: denning@chair.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning )
Date: 13 Aug 92 11:52:59 -0400
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University, Washington DC


My intended answer to the puzzle in my book was "Do not break this."
Jim Gillogly was correct that I had pulled the "k" out of the middle of
a word since no word began with "k".

Dorothy Denning
Georgetown University
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
From: mab@wdl39.wdl.loral.com (Mark A Biggar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Math Induction (was Re: tabulation of primes)
Date: 12 Aug 92 21:32:21 GMT
Organization: Loral Western Development Labs

I have seen two different definitions of induction:

method 1
	prove p(0)
	prove (p(0) & p(1) & ... & p(n)) -> p(n+1)
	therefore p(x) holds for all positive integers

method 2
	prove p(0)
	prove p(n) -> p(n+1)
	therefore p(X) holds etc.

Are these of equal strength, in other words can I prove some things with 1
that I can't prove with just 2?  Which of these is equivalent to the last
peano axiom?

--
Mark Biggar
mab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:2973 alt.security:4196 misc.legal:16184
From: dla@raven (Don Alvarez)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 22:15:06 GMT

In article <9208182108.AA09132@news.cis.ohio-state.edu> Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes:
>
>The basic technique I propose in order to achieve this is a two-stage news
>distribution process, where first the news is distributed to the entire set
>of receiving machines, then signatures are collected from all receivers and
>distributed in the same way as a regular news article.  
>
>Machines must register themselves by posting to the newsgroup, and must agree
>to respond to signature requests within a reasonable window, or they will be
>removed from the set of participating hosts.  
>
>What do you think?  See any gaping holes?  Want to flesh it out and 
>give it a try?
>
>    --Marc Ringuette, mnr@cs.cmu.edu

Gaping holes?  *YES*

There is no central authentication server, so every subscriber must be
able to determine authentication themselves.  That means every
subscriber needs a list of the names of all of the other subscribers.

Any subscriber can fraudulently "authenticate" any posting simply by
greping through the list of subscribers and announcing "subscriber foo
received article 754", "subscriber bar received article 754", etc.

There is no way to defend against this because there is no way to prove
who sent the message stating that machine foo has received an article.

Worse, there is no way for any machine even to know that it has a complete
or accurate list of subscribers because there is no way to distribute
such a list in a trusted manner.

Providing a centralized server for doing the authentication wouldn't
help, because there is no way for it to know who is sending the
subscription messages or who is sending the receipt messages.  There
would also be no way for the individual subscribers to know who sent
the "article 754 authenticated" message.

If you had a mechanism that allowed you to prove who sent a message,
then you could solve not only the secure newsfeed problem but a whole
host of more serious problems.  Unfortunately, such a mechanism doesn't
exist.

Note that any proposed solution to the above problem which claims to
find an answer using any of the words DES, RSA, public-key encryption,
or private-key encryption is a non-solution.  Those are all encryption
techniques.  The problem here has nothing to do with encryption
techniques.  The problem here has to do with cryptographic protocols,
or more importantly with the lack thereof.  It is a fundamentally unsolved
and (I believe) unsolveable problem.  There is no way to propagate trust
across the entire network.

-don
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: limonce@pilot.njin.net (Tom Limoncelli)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Summary: Oh nothing important.  I just have this Perl script that I use to generate this stream of posts whenever someone posts the silly suggestion that netnews could be made secure.
Keywords: silly automated
Organization: New Jersey Intercampus Network
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 23:14:56 GMT

In <f5@drew.drew.edu> tlimonce@drew.drew.edu (Tom Limoncelli) writes:

> At which time Geoff will post a short message showing how simple it
> is to subvert such a system.

Of course, this whole process will take a week because someone will
misunderstand Geoff or how netnews works, and start posting about
how such a system actually *would* work.  This person will eventually
be proven wrong also.
 
All the while someone will write a script that checks various
parts of a post message to be a little more sure that the post
wasn't forged.
 
Of course, that just means that forgers will only need to be a bit
more careful when crafting their forgeries for them to work.  After
a few iteration of attempts, they'll have perfected their technique.

Tom
--
There is nothing wrong with talking to yourself...
at least you know you're going to win any arguments!
-- 
Tom Limoncelli -- tal@warren.mentorg.com (work) -- tal@plts.uucp (play)
"Oh! I thought it was one of those useless demos of everything that
    a GUI builder could do." -Anonymous person watching demo of
         Solaris 2.0's graphical tool for managing NIS+
From: pacolley@ember.UUCP (Paul Colley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Date: 18 Aug 92 02:32:24 GMT
Reply-To: pacolley@ember.UUCP (Paul Colley)
Organization: Ember---private system

In article <9208172116.AA20035@news.cis.ohio-state.edu>
Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes:

>Thanks for the pointer, Ken.  His scheme looks good.  Here's a sketch:
>
>  The election takes place between voters and k candidates, at least
>  one of whom is assumed honest.  Each voter communicates with all of
>  the candidates in order to register and vote.  [...]

Ah, if only we could find an honest politician!

- Paul Colley
University:  colley@qucis.queensu.ca
Home:        pacolley@ember.uucp   watmath!ember!pacolley  +1 613 545 3807
"Every now and then, an honest man is sent to the legistlature" (unknown)