From: U15231@uicvm.uic.edu
Newsgroups: soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna,soc.culture.europe,soc.culture.usa
Subject: STOP SERBIA. BOMB SERBIA
Date: 15 Oct 92 15:58:27 GMT
Organization: University of Illinois at Chicago

From: BOSNET@math.lsa.umich.edu
Subject:    New.York.Times-October.13
Reply-To: Iztok.Hozo@math.lsa.umich.edu
Organization: BOSNET (Bosnian Electronic Network)

Contribution by: Stela

This is editorial from The New York Times, which was mentioned in
media and nets these days.


STOP SERBIA. BOMB SERBIA.  by  Don M. Snider

	from The NYT Tuesday - October 13, 1992

Don M. Snider, deputy director of political military studies at the
Center for the Strategic and INternational Studies, served on the
staff of the National Security Council in the Reagan and Bush administrations.



---  The risks of doing nothing are greater.


     Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia has been impeded
by a lack of agreement on long-term goals and by the urgency of
attending to humanitarian help. In Sunday's debate, president
Bush repeated that he was opposed to committing U.S. forces to the
region.
     But the ends that Mr. Bush and other Western leaders should
seek are now clear   , if they were not earlier.  With Serbia
prepared to move on two new fronts - against the Hungarian minority
in the Voivodina region of northern Serbia and the Albanian
majority in the Kosovo region - the West cannot just provide
another hapless negotiator with no power to back up its words.

	To keep the conflict from spreading  a coalition of
democratic powers under the U.N.  should use a military
force against Serbia, including a strategic air campaign, along
with economic and political pressures.  Fortunately, U.S.
technological strength makes this undertaking possible, in concert
with our allies.
     Make no mistake: this would be a campaign to isolate Serbian
leaders from the civilized world and inflict maximum destruction
on their military.  The aim is not simply to punish, but to
demonstrate to Serbian leaders that only through accommodation can
they avoid such continuing pain in the future.  Exploiting this
ability to hurt creates bargaining power for ultimate diplomatic
resolution.
     The campaign would have three components.  First, the
coalition should tighten the U.N. economic and  arms embargo to
quarantine Serbia.  All commerce must stop, including
telecommunications and transportation links to other countries.
The coalition would need a naval contingent for the Danube as well
as ground forces on major transportation arteries.  The militaries
of our European allies have the means to do this.
     Second, since Western powers are wisely unwilling to join an
unconventional ground war, the coalition should arm - and perhaps
train the Bosnian forces willing to fight and sacrifice for their
freedom.  Right now, the Yugoslav Army backing the Serbs in Bosnia
has an uncontested military advantage.  Banning Serbian military
flights in the region would negate Belgrade's overwhelming air-
power advantage within Bosnia.  At the same time, U.N. forces
should greatly  increase   humanitarian   aid.
     The third component is a strategic air campaign by the
coalition against Serbian military targets, wherever they are
located.  These would include airfields, military installations,
arms depots, power plants and communications lines.  As they did
against Iraq, American and coalition air forces, with Stealth
aircraft and cruise missiles, can quickly neutralize Serbian air
defenses.  The allied air forces could then strike with relative
impunity from bases close by in NATO countries, as well as from
offshore carriers and other vessels.
     Such a military plan certainly carries risks.  The Serbians
may respond by stepping up their brutal "ethnic cleansing" in the
near term.  There may be more casualties among civilians and U.N.
forces in Bosnia.  The air campaign would put American fliers in
danger.  But there will be no risk of escalation, since coalition
forces will use maximum force from the start.  Perhaps the
greatest risk of this campaign is that it sets up a potentially
protracted contest of political will between the coalition and the
renegade nation.  The West must be prepared to inflict punishment
longer than Serbian leaders can tolerate.
      Yet these risks are less of a threat to U.S. interests than
doing nothing and allowing Serbia, and every other renegade
nation, to flout norms of international and human relations.
     The objectives are clear as are the measures of success.  And
most important, this plan emphasizes the strengths of the U.S. and
coalition military forces.  We need to respond to the crisis now
and fight on our terms, not theirs.