From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Subject: Re: Objectivism and "good" emotionalism?
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 18:12:45 GMT

dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Daniel R Cosley) writes:
>It's not guaranteed that you can be happy with someone else.  In fact, if you
>value *this particular relationship* enough, you may decide you really wouldn't
>be happy with anyone else, knowing that you had given this person up.

This is, of course, very human thinking.  Not rational, but human

>You're missing my point -- if you place a particular value on another person,
>value enough that you would rather take the chance of dying to save that person
>than stay alive and start with another, then it is rational to risk your life.
>It depends on how much you value that particular person.

No, I'm saying such an opinion is irrational -- placing such value on someone
else and believing that relationships are "irreplaceable" is still one of the
fundamental irrationalities of humans.  Think of the teen years.  How many
times did you think "I'll never again have a relationship like this one", or
really feel like the world was coming to an end over that one date who dumped
you or stood you up or whatever?

>You are using a straw definition of rational objective selfishness here, which 
>ignores the information in my last message about the subject.  Your "benefits 
>of risking myself to save my wife" is woefully incomplete (she probably will 
>feel gratitude, also, as well as all the other feelings that one has for that
>which one loves/values).  Don't forget the costs, too: Costs of not risking
>yourself to save your wife include a lack of integrity and moral courage, loss
>of your wife, etc.

"Integrity and moral courage" implies that I value my wife above risking my
life.  Such might not be the case.

>Your argument requires that any one person or relationship is replaceable with 
>an equivalent, and that a rational person will have equal value for such a 
>replacement.  This is not the case.  Rationally, one can attach so much value 
>to a person or relationship that it is very high in one's ranking of values.  
>It is rational to achieve one's high values even at the expense of some lower 
>ones.  This is one of the costs of the business of life.  Please reread my last
>message before you respond because this information is better-explained there.

I disagree with your use of "rationally" before "one can attatch".  I still
believe placing some sort of inherent superior value on people in one's life
is no more "rational" than placing an inherent value on life in general.
Basically what I'm saying is justify "you value your wife but you do not value
the guy down the street " (assuming you don't know the guy down the street),
as a *rational* conclusion.

Yes, I agree with you that an Objectivist would have to live up to his values.
But I disagree that valuing people in your life above your life is an inherent
*rational* value of Objectivists.

>>Probably.  But any guesses as to what a rational self-interested society
>>would be like and why it wouldn't degenerate into a bunch of selfish,
>>self-preoccupied people acting rationally to preserve their own skins at the
>>expense of everyone else?  To put it simply, why should people value each
>>other in a rational, self-interested world?

>Because part of rational self-interest includes the knowledge that in order to
>have one's own rights respected, one must respect the rights of others.

This does not just deal with "rights" (which the law enforces) but things
like me saving you from drowning and such.  If you believe that I "should",
to form an effective society, then a rational conclusion of Objectivism is
goodwill towards all.  It sounds like you've rationalized that people have a
duty, an obligation to each other.

>Dan  ***  dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism