HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Colours - which theory before observation ?
Date: 12 Jan 1993 13:20:37 -0600
Organization: CS Dept, University of Texas at Austin
NNTP-Posting-Host: tokio.cs.utexas.edu

-*----
In article <1993Jan12.152736.16617@samba.oit.unc.edu> Charlie.Creegan@launchpad.unc.edu (Charlie Creegan) writes:
> CF Wittgenstein on the difficulties inherent in ostensive 
> definition; you have to know what kind of thing is being
> pointed at before you can know what is being pointed at.
> Thus a conceptual scheme logically precedes a particular
> usage. ...

Logically, yes, but not always temporally.  When the islander
points and says "floop," he could be giving the word for
"finger," or "points," or that to which he points, or several
other things.  So the stranded sailor makes a guess at a
conceptual scheme.  If the guess is right, further dependent
communication becomes possible; if it is wrong, the two remain
confused by later interactions and try yet again.  Undoubtedly,
the ability to guess at and try conceptual schemas is part of
what we are able to do and part of what is required to learn
language.  It may even be that there is some innate preference to
some conceptual schemas over others.  But sometimes the knowledge
that we have guessed the right one comes after its use. 

> ... Wittgenstein probably rolls in his grave at having this
> called or assimilated to "theory" ...

I'm still choking on that one.

Russell

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 03:04:52 GMT

In article <schiller.726741786@hpas5> schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>
>>The fact that you put the question by requesting an example of how
>>a theory is necessary to observe something indicates a lack of
>>understanding and sensitivity to the real issues.  I don't need a
>>theory to observe *something*.  But to say (in a coherent manner
>>and with a clear intersubjective sense) that *what* I have observed
>>is an *electron* requires substantial theoretical superstructure.
>
>
>No. It requires only to show that what you see here is the *same*
>as what you saw in your previous experiments. No theoretical structure
>is necessary, just the list of jour previous observations.
>
As with your your use of "similar" in an earlier posting, the term "same"
does all the work here, but is ill-defined. Which features are relevant
to two observations being the "same"? Certainly not *all* of them. Presumably
they are allowed to take place a different time, and in different places.
They can be observed by different people. So how much the "same" need they
be?

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: ns14@crux3.crux2.cit.cornell.edu (Nathan Otto Siemers)
Subject: Re: Inappropriate rejections in science  (was: Truzzi Lecture)
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.tech
Organization: Department of Chemistry, Cornell Univ.
Date: 9 Jan 93 19:00:20

>>>>> On 9 Jan 1993 11:30:50 -0600, turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell
 Russell> Turpin) said: Followup-To: sci.philosophy.tech
 Russell> NNTP-Posting-Host: im4u.cs.utexas.edu

 Russell> -*---- Cross-posted and redirected to sci.philosophy.tech.

 Russell> -*----
 Russell> (Jon Noring) writes:
>
> Here's an excerpt from Truzzi's lecture which follows in whole, just
 Russell> to give
> you an idea of its' contents:

 Russell> I thank Jon Noring for posting this excerpt.  All remaining
 Russell> single-indent text is from this excerpt, i.e., Truzzi's
 Russell> words, not Jon Noring's.

> The history of science is full of some very notable rejections.
> Some of them are now even silly sounding.  Lord Kelvin said that
> x-rays would prove to be a hoax.  Thomas Watson, once chairman of
> the board of IBM, said in 1943, "I think there is a world market for
> about five computers".  This got so bad that in 1889, Charles Duell,
> who was then the commissioner of the US Office of Patents, wrote a
> letter to president McKinley asking him to abolish the Patents
> Office since "everything that can be invented has been invented".
> [See note at end of this post for a later clarification of this
> fact.]  Ernst Mach said he could not accept the theory of relativity
> any more than he could accept the existence of atoms and other such
> dogmas, as he put it.  Edison supposedly said that he saw no
> commercial future for the light bulb.  When the phonograph was first
> demonstrated at the French Academy of Science, one scientist leaped
> up, grabbed the exhibitor, started shaking him, and said, "I won't
> be taken in by your ventriloquist!"  Rutherford called atomic power
> "moonshine".  The history of science is full of such crazy stories.

 Russell> Yes, the history of science *is* full of these crazy
 Russell> stories.  But I do not think any of these stories
 Russell> illustrates Truzzi's point very well.  He gives two



	[stuff deleted]


	How about the tetrahedral nature of the carbon atom?  The idea
and subsequent notions of stereochemistry were first posited by Van
Hoft and Lebel  (sp?).   Wohler,  widely considered to be the "father"
of organic chemistry,  denounced them as mystics quite publicly.


	Slightly more specialized is the decades long argument about
hypervalent carbon,  fought to the death, literally, by H.C. Brown and
the late Saul Winstein.  Winstein happened to be correct, but it
wasn't conclusively demonstrated until after his death.  Literally
MILLIONS and MILLIONS of dollars were spent fighting this chemistry
"war". 

I could think of more...

Nathan Siemers
--
--
/  | / /__|  /  /---/ /__| /  | /    nathan@chemres.tn.cornell.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Philosophy before science ? (was : Seman
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 14:57:31 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <schiller.726316570@hpas5>, schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:

|> However my son ! Facts are never presecribed by theory, facts are the 
|> results of observation.

I don't have much of a clue what "prescribed" means here.  Perhaps
what is meant is that the range of "possible facts" or the range
of "descriptions of facts" is limited by theory.  That wouldn't be
*so* bad a claim.

|> For example, electrons were there much before quantum mechanics
|> (at least 30 years before) when they were observed in Braun tubes

Ummm.  Something was there.  But were they *electrons*?  Phlogiston
was there much before the phlogiston theory.  Then it seems to have
disappeared post Priestley and Lavoisier.  Of course oxygen was there
prior to the oxidation theory as well.  Hasn't disappeared yet.

|> and similar devices. By the way, your TV and your terminal
|> (except if LCD) is a Braun tube, and a
|> ray of electrons produces the image. No quantum mechanics is
|> necessary to observe this fact ... :-)

Which fact?  The images on the screen or the "fact" that it is
a ray of electrons that produces the image?  (Actually, I don't
like talking about observing facts.  Better to observe phenomena
and treat the descriptions of these phenomena as facts.)

|> Your (wrong) statement that "if we didn't invent QM then we wouldn't have   
|> electrons" is a nice example which shows the difference between a
|> fact (based on observation) and a speculation "prescribed" by 
|> what you (but not scientists) call a "theory", namely your 
|> conviction that theories precede facts ... :-)

Well, I'm not sure the claim was that theories *precede* facts
(certainly not in a temporal sense, perhaps not in a logical sense).
The more sophisticated form of this claim is that the relation of
fact to theory is a kind of mutually parasitic one.  Certainly,
for example, whatever *sense* the term "electron" now has, it has
in virtue of QM.  This doesn't mean that if we didn't have QM
we wouldn't have electrons, but it does mean something to the
effect that if we didn't have *some* theory in which "electron"
appears as a term, then it wouldn't make much sense to speak of
electrons.

However electrons are observed, this is not precisely in the same
manner as cows are observed (you don't need much of a "cow detecting
imaging aparatus" under normal circumstances).  A great deal of
*theory* needs to come into play in order to describe how an electron
is observed (if indeed we want to say that this is possible) or
what "observed" *means* when applied to electrons.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: Schools, philosophy of science, epistemology
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1993 23:47:52 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan10.113932.605@news.wesleyan.edu> RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:
>In <C0M726.Jo7@umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>> >  I am currently an undergraduate student of psychology and am
>> >interested in exporing the philosophical underpinings of this field
>> >(and epistemology in general).  For this reason I am looking for
>> >schools, or people, who have developed an expertise in this area.

[some nitwit wrote:]

	 The mainstream of contemporary philosophy is profoundly nihilist
	and anti-system despite its technical sophistication and appearance
	of rationality.  The psychological application of this witch's brew
	can be found in the culture of Weimar Germany or in the "lifestyle"
	of any drug addict.

>Oh, for Pete's sake!  If this isn't one of the most sweepingly unhelpful
>comments I've seen on the net, then I don't know what is.  The poster is an

A mild and restrained reaction. Congratulations, Ruth! 8^)

>TO THE ORIGINAL POSTER:

>Here's what I suggest to my students who are looking for philosophy graduate
>programs, or even undergraduate programs to which they might transfer:

>[Very good advice deleted]

Ah, but do you ask them why they want to get a graduate degree in
philosophy? I would caution all and sundry that your motives had best not
include making a living as a philosopher. For every philosophy Ph.D. who is
successful at doing this (like our very own Dr. Ruth), there are dozens who
must resign themselves to lesser lives, toiling among the masses (such as
your humble correspondent). 

Does this mean that you shouldn't study philosophy? By no means! I, for
one, am happy that I did--I had a good time, learned some important basic
skills that have stood me in good stead, and learned things that are worth
knowing. Besides, philosophical training never becomes obsolete. ;^)



-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Philosophy before science ? (was : Seman
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 16:51:53 GMT

In article <schiller.726316570@hpas5> schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
>
>However my son ! Facts are never presecribed by theory, facts are the 
>results of observation.
>
And, as Father Putnam and Grandfather Eddington before him pointed out, 
observations are informed by theories. Thus contrary to phenomenalist
twaddle, we've got a real chicken-egg problem here that will not be cleared 
away easily.



-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
From: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Inappropriate rejections in science  (was: Truzzi Lecture)
Date: 10 Jan 93 19:23:36 GMT
Reply-To: weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Organization: The Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology
In-reply-to: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)

In article <1in24aINNb2f@im4u.cs.utexas.edu>, turpin@cs (Russell Turpin) writes:
>Does anyone want to volunteer examples?  Such errors would be
>particularly interesting in the hard sciences.  To avoid controversy,
>it would be best if such proposed errors were ones that are now
>widely recognized as errors.

The chemical reactivity of the heavier noble (fka inert) gases is
something that anyone could have detected for decades, but didn't
since everyone knew it simply could not happen.  Another case of
bad theoretical thinking was the universal acceptance of Mercury's
rotation period as being the same as its revolution period.  Between
it being extremely difficult to observe and the apparently not
so well-known looseness of periodic data, somebody should have
realized other periods were consistent with the known data before
radar observations.  But the utter simplicity of the 1:1 resonance,
and the lack of interest in Mercury anyway, kept this error alive
for a very long time.

I forget the name of the geologist who spent most of his lifetime (and
he lived quite long) proving that megafloods had occurred in the Pacific
Northwest.  Catastrophism was so anathema that anything that gave off
the slightest whiff of it was ignored.

Meteorites in general have had a hard time gaining acceptance, either
back in the days of proving their existence, or recognizing ancient
hits after the fact.
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 15:52:46 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <C0p0LA.CpH@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> 
|> In article <schiller.726741489@hpas5>, schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
|> |> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
|> |> 
|> |> >>In article <schiller.726487694@hpas5> schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
|> |> >>>My position as a scientist is that facts, i.e. the  results of observation,
|> |> >>>are the basis of theories. There are no "well-known" flaws of this position. 
|> |> >>>
|> |> >I'm afriad that this is simply ill-informed. The observation-theory distinction
|> |> >has long been a matter a controversy in philosophy of science. The best-known
|> |> >"flaws" are put forward in Putnam's "What theories are not."  The position
|> |> >outlined there is a little technical, but the central example is that one
|> |> >cannot establish, through obsevation, that a thing is red unless one has
|> |> >a conceptual scheme for colors that includes red in advance.
|> |> 
|> |> You are right: one needs a concept of red. But a concept and a theory
|> |> are two different things. Red is a concept formed by children
|> |> before they are six months old, and it gives a name to certain class 
|> |> of colours. When a child says: "it is red", it just says, "it has a similar
|> |> look than all the previous things I have observed, which I call red".
|> |> The statement "It is red" therefore just compares different observations.
|> |> Not much of theory there.
|> |> 
|> |> 			Christoph Schiller
|> |> 
|> 
|> You are right: one needs a concept of electron. But a concept and a theory
|> are two different things. Electron is a concept formed by physicists
|> before they are given degrees, and it gives a name to certain class 
|> of particles. When a physicist says: "it is an electron", it just says, "it has a similar
|> look than all the previous things I have observed, which I call an electron".
|> The statement "It is an electron" therefore just compares different observations.
|> Not much of theory there.
|> 
|> I wonder why the physicists need so much more funding than do the children.
|> Facts are facts?
|> 

I originally posted this as a kind of reductio of Schiller's position.
However, given his latest posting I see that it will have little force
since he actually *embraces* this view.  There is definitely a problem
when you strive to reduce the other guy's position to an obviously absurd
one and he just says "Okay."  Back to the drawing board.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c)
Subject: Which theory before observation ? 
Organization: Philips Research Laboratories Eindhoven, Netherlands
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 10:08:14 GMT

sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:


>|> If in physics one had always dismissed "simplistic" arguments,
>|> one would have got nowhere. On the contrary, the textbooks are 
>|> full of "simplistic" solutions to difficult problems.

>By *definition*, a *simplistic* solution is not a solution (think
>along the lines of "false friend").

>I did, by the way, not merely *label* the position as simplistic,
>but went on at some length to indicate its flaws (which in any
>event are well known).

My position as a scientist is that facts, i.e. the  results of observation,
are the basis of theories. There are no "well-known" flaws of this position. 

Some in the discussion quoted scientists (e.g. Eddington) saying that every 
observation needs a preceding theory. Well, some scientists are 
unsatisfied by the approach to the world that science pursues,
and Eddington surely felt this very deeply to be so. I can follow his 
unsatisfaction, but do not agree with it. He resolved it by 
saying that science is somehow wrong, and he concluded that 
this is due to the theoretical framework which supposedly, he says,
brings people to mix facts and personal prejudices, leading to 
his statement that theory preceds fact.

The discussion would become more interesting if somebody of the opposing camp
would  give a precise example of which "theory" is necessary to observe
something ! (Eddington surely was not able to do so ...)

		Christoph Schiller



		




Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.math
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Subject: Re: Those funny secret old words
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 12:29:02 GMT

In article <1ipt4lINN5af@titan.ucc.umass.edu> danco@titan.ucc.umass.edu (DANIEL F COHEN) writes:
>
> miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
>>PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>>>>From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
>>> 
>>>>    SG         Zeleny has perfected the argumentum ad loudmouth. 
>>> Jamie         I wonder if Grossman actually knows what "ad" means, or if he
>>>               only *mistakenly* called himself a loudmouth?
>>> Miner         Apparently you don't know what it means either, unless you're
>>                kidding...<:-)

The "argumentum ad baculum" is not an argument directed at or to a stick,
but means: arguing by appeal, not to reason, but to force ("say that again
and I'll infect you with this here baculus"); an "ad hominem" is
reasoning by reference to one's opponent's supposed defects, rather
than by reference to any flaws in this argument.

So: "ad loudmouth" means "Zeleny has only a loud voice, but no
argumentive support".  Strikes me that that flame is your standard bit
of ad hominem itself: nasty and undeserved.
-- 
Michael Feld                  | E-mail: <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy           | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba        | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Colors, Schemes, Theories
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 19:47:59 GMT

In article <1ius3kINNltg@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>Christopher Green:
>
>> (Note that many cultures do not have the same color scheme as us.)
>
>I would like to know what this means.
>
I mean exactly what is contained in Berlin and Kay (1969?/1991?).
That we all have the same visual apparatus, and therefore make the
same similarity judgments is not at all to the point.  I mean simply
that different cultures divide up the spectrum (a theoretical claim,
by the way) in different ways. E.g. they call two shades species of the
same color where we call them different colors. No controversy here.


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 03:01:11 GMT

In article <schiller.726741489@hpas5> schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>>>In article <schiller.726487694@hpas5> schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
>>>>My position as a scientist is that facts, i.e. the  results of observation,
>>>>are the basis of theories. There are no "well-known" flaws of this position. 
>>>>
>>I'm afriad that this is simply ill-informed. The observation-theory distinction
>>has long been a matter a controversy in philosophy of science. The best-known
>>"flaws" are put forward in Putnam's "What theories are not."  The position
>>outlined there is a little technical, but the central example is that one
>>cannot establish, through obsevation, that a thing is red unless one has
>>a conceptual scheme for colors that includes red in advance.
>
>You are right: one needs a concept of red. But a concept and a theory
>are two different things. 

In what way? I didn't say you need a *theory* of red, anyway. I said
you need a conceptual scheme for colors that includes red (actually Putnam
said it). This sounds to me like a color theory, and certainly Putnam meant
it that way.

>Red is a concept formed by children
>before they are six months old, and it gives a name to certain class 
>of colours. 

I can only say that I think this is an indefensibly simplistic theory of
color-name development. But even if it weren't, your statement is compatible
with the idea that six-month old children develop such a theory of colors.
(Note that many cultures do not have the same color scheme as us.)

>When a child says: "it is red", it just says, "it has a similar
>look than all the previous things I have observed, which I call red".

"Similar" is a notoriously slippery term that does *all* of the work here.
Moreover, for any finite set of data (e.g., a finite number of observed
things called "red") there are infinitely many theories which are perfectly
confirmed by it (e.g., it could be that they are all made of wood, or not
elephants, or contain carbon).  Thus "red" could mean one of these things.

>The statement "It is red" therefore just compares different observations.
>Not much of theory there.

Noth much a theory indeed. But a theory nonetheless.
>


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,rec.arts.sf.written