Organization: Computer Science Department,  Stanford University.
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.politics
Date:         Sat, 12 Sep 1992 12:38:23 -0700
From:         Andy Freeman <andy@SAIL.STANFORD.EDU>
Subject:      Re: Andy, Leader and maybe Dave on the Environment

>>>Oh!  I get it (finally :)).  Hm.  It seems, from experience, that this
>>>ownership strategy would only work if individuals own the resources -- not
>>>the state (or, rather, the state or federal governments).  Also, it will
>>>only work for those resources that have an immediate market value.
>>
>>Even if the short-term expenses exceeds the revenues.  Remember
>>orchards.
>
>What about resources whose value is currently unknown, or for which markets
>haven't been developed?

Not an issue with elephants....

>>>And for some resources, at least, it will only work if people can perceive a
>>>benefit that might accrue after their deaths
>>
>>That isn't required at all.
>
>Huh?  Why would the average person (or business or govt) want to invest
>money in something that will provide no return over their own lifetime?

You tell me; why do old people plant orchards and buy long-term bonds?
There's no return, only expenses, until after they're dead, but they
still do it and it's even economically rationally for them to do so.
Why?  There's a market for such investments, and the value doesn't
depend on the age of the owner.

>>Hunters are; they've done it repeatedly.  How are elephants different
>>from mountain sheep or other species that hunters have brought back?
>>(Note that elephants are easier, because there are thriving
>>populations, but there won't be if the ivory ban continues because
>>those populations are held by folks who did hunter-style management
>>and they can't afford to keep that up without the hunter-revenues.)
>
>Hunters have made the market strategy work for those species that are
>attractive and/or profitable to hunt.  No problem there.  What I don't see
>is how this model can be extended to resources like fresh water, wetlands,
>species with no current market or trophy value (liverworts, anyone?), etc.

It works for any habitat that supports game, and any species that shares
those habitats.

>Now, all these resources have obvious current economic value.  All are
>potentially renewable, and I don't see how we can avoid seeing that our
>best long-term interest is to harvest them sustainably and maintain
>whatever other conditions are necessary for their long-term survival.  And
>in all three cases, we're failing.  All three are being exploited faster
>than they can be replaced, such that the resource base is declining.  We're
>eating the seed corn, killing the golden goose, etc.
>
>How do we fix it?

All three are characterized by "no one can benefit from expressing
a long-term interest."  They're not "owned"; they're all poached.

In the case of timber and grazing land, it's easy to fix that problem.
(Commercial timber interests take great care of their land, and so do
ranchers who own.  People who rent treat rented property like rented
property.)  It isn't obvious how to do so for ocean resources.  If we
could PERMANENTLY sell fishing interests, the buyer would have an
interest in getting a decent return on that investment, an incentive
in making sure that the resource can be harvested indefinitely.
A "rental" doesn't work because the renter has no interests after
the term of the agreement.

-andy
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