From: dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska)
Subject: Re: Criteria for Sustainability
Organization: VEXCEL Corporation, Boulder CO
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 17:07:37 GMT

In article <1992Oct10.230132.27325@cs.rochester.edu> dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz) writes:
>
>In article <1466601789@igc.apc.org> alanm@igc.apc.org (Alan McGowen) writes:
>
>
>>	14) Seeks to understand "human nature" and "human society" within 
>>	the larger context provided by evolutionary biology, so that we do
>>	not again make the mistake of supposing that humans are beings apart 
>>	from nature who can be expected to flourish in any artificial world 
>>	of engineers' whims - or of moral philosophers' intuitions. 
>
>
>McGowen's a hopeless case, but perhaps some other readers
>would like to read this excerpt, to be exposed to some actual
>philosophical inputs:
>
>From Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Environmental Ethics and Global
>Imperatives":
>
>  Althought stirring appeals for recognition of the inherent value
>  and inalienable rights of all beings have been made, much
>  of the apparent persuasiveness of the expanded-rights claim
>  will not hold up under rational scrutiny.  For one thing,
>  the position often relies on calls to end "human chauvinism"
>  and thus aligns itself with every group that has wished to end
>  some "-ism," whether racism, sexism, or speciesism.  But merely
>  to call for an end to human chauvinism is to beg precisely the
>  question at issue.  Why should human chauvinism, or better,
>  sentient chauvinism, be ended?  What must be proved is that there
>  is a nonanthropocentric reason for ending it.  From a moral point
>  of view, it is unclear why one should respect a thing -- for
>  example, a rock or a river -- if it experiences no pain, elation,
>  or suffering?  Why, apart from anthropocentric considerations,
>  should poison oak have rights?  Why, other than for anthropocentric
>  reasons, should one not dump toxic wastes in places where they
>  will pollute groundwater?
>
>  Of course, there are sound anthropocentric reasons why persons
>  should not destroy rare plants or despoil landscapes.  I, too,
>  believe that one should revere all things.  My reason for this
>  belief, however, is not that rocks or rivers have rights but that
>  needless destruction bespeaks human callousness, myopia, and
>  perhaps greed, all of which are wrong on anthropocentric grounds.
>  The point of view of the expanded-rights theorists appears
>  to be that there is some other, inherent, nonanthropocentric
>  reason for not picking flowers or destroying rocks.  But such a
>  notion of inherent value is puzzling.  What would it mean to
>  say that everything has rights.  How then, would any action
>  be possible that did not "harm" something?  If everything has
>  equal status and there were no sentient or human chauvinism,
>  then would there be a realistic way to adjudicate controversies
>  over rights? ...

I would generally speak of value more than rights.  That I believe
the entire ecosphere has inherent value does not mean that it cannot
be used for utilitarian purposes for humans.  It means that humans
should look at the impact they have and should minimize that
impact to the more essential needs they have.  Defining these needs
in a diverse culture will be no easier than deciding that there is
inherent value in the biosphere, but it would frame the discussion
differently.
>
>  Yet another problem with the expanded-rights position, insofar
>  as it calls for recognition of the alleged rights of nonsentient
>  beings, is that it fails to take into account that all values are
>  necessarily values for us; there is no such thing as a value in
>  and of itself, without a valuer.  [PFD: I would go further and say
>  there is no such thing as a value without a social context in
>  which we hold that value.]  If nonsentient beings cannot have values,
>  what would it mean to assert their value?  How can one visit good
>  or evil on something that has no thoughts or feelings, even in a
>  potential sense, as does a human zygote or comatose person? ...
>  The problem is their position provides no conceptual or nontheological
>  rationale for extending the range of human relevance, short of question-
>  begging appeals to inherent value.

The practical point in arguing this is understanding first the
interdependence of the nonsentient with the sentient, and secondly,
the ignorance humans have about this interdependence. There are long-
term dependencies between these elements of ecosystems that we cannot
predict. If one only accepts inherent value in sentients, and does not
have a thorough understanding of their dependence (through many levels)
on non-sentients, then we would still need to at least minimize our
impacts on non-sentients.

The deeper issue seems to be more of a value judgement.  Whether one
labels it theological or something else, it (apparently) is within
some, and not within others.  Is not the total respect for sentient
life theological on some level?
>
>  Other difficulties with the expanded-rights position have to do
>  with conceptual problems of individuation, interspecies comparisons
>  of utility, and justice among nonhumans. ... [these difficulties
>  suggest] that, [expanded rights ... are] unlikely to be defensible
>  as a rationally justified ethical obligation.
>
>  ... The ecosystemic versions of environmental ethics fall victim to
>  the same sorts of problems as the expanded-rights position.  According
>  to proponents of holistic environmental ethics, recent industrial
>  history is a biotic hemorrhage, to be remedied by judging all human
>  action in terms of their effects on all ecosystems of the planet.
>  According to this view, whatever promotes ecosystemic well-being
>  is said to be good and right, whatever jeopardizes is to be bad and
>  wrong.  A basic problem arises, however: why consider a whole that is
>  not a conscious, sentient being?  What reasons are there, apart from
>  human well-being, for ascribing moral worth to some ecosystemic whole?

The whole should be considered as such because the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts, as I mentioned when discussing interdependence
above.
>
>  In response to such questions, a proponent of ecosystemic ethics
>  is likely to respond that the earth has a beauty, a balance of
>  nature, that is inherent in it.  But the problem with such a
>  response is that these are values that the earth and its ecosystems
>  have only as objects of consideration by conscious, sentient human
>  beings.  It is not clear that the earth has these alleged properties
>  apart from some viewer or valuer.  Hence, it is not clear that there
>  is some nonanthropocentric basis for affirming an ecosystemic ethics.
>  Moreover, even if there were inherent value in ecosystems, apart
>  from human or divine ascription, it is not clear what this might be.
>  ...  The difference cannot be merely that what happens naturally
>  is good and that what happens through human interference is bad, for
>  this would be to sanction a purely stipulative definition of ecological
>  and moral goodness and badness.

Since we are discussing limitations of anthropogenic activities, it is
not unreasonable to consider anthropogenic values. Why is it that the
lack of self-value by non-sentients prevents sentients from investing
these "things" with inherent value?
>
>  Perhaps the main difficulty besetting ecosystemic ethics is that it
>  somehow derives an ethical `ought' from a scientific or ecological
>  `is'.  In other words, some natural characteristics of ecosystems
>  are taken as normative, as things that should be preserved.  It is
>  widely held by moral philosophers, however, that one cannot legitimately
>  deduce some moral duty from an existing state of affairs. ...
>  Thus the inference of ecosystemic ethicists from `is' to `ought'
>  must be mediated by value judgements -- for example, preserving
>  diversity is good.  But to the extent that the tenets of
>  ecosystemic ethics rest upon value judgements, then to that same
>  extent they are open to question.  One such question is why a
>  different, but equally plausible, value judgement should not be
>  made. ...

It can be, and is, made, as this discussion shows. These values _are_
open to question, and are frequently questioned.  To suggest that
absolute proofs, as are the method in science, can be applied to all
issues that confront humanity is, IMHO, naive and simplistic.   Some
decisions that confront us appear to have the qualities that suggest
that they _could_ be answered scientifically, but aren't because we
don't have the knowledge and/or scientific technique to do so.  Others
appear not to be appropriate for scientific examination at all. Is the
difference qualitative, or just a matter of degree?  Do readers of this
forum consider it a high  goal that one day humanity might be able to answer
all questions with an equation?

>
>  The problem of specifying criteria for a balance of nature is as much
>  a central difficulty for ecosystems ethicists as it was for
>  medievalists to specify criteria for what was "natural," and
>  hend allowed, under natural-law ethics.  [ examples of
>  controversies about homosexuality and contraception being
>  deemed "unnatural" ]  It is difficult to see how proponents
>  of ecosystemic ethics could avoid similar difficulties...
>
I am not sure that we can avoid such difficulties.  Humans have limitations
of knowledge and perceptions.  Since we will never be perfect beings,
these limitations will _always_ plague us and limit the wisdom of our
choices.  Historically, the lack of human wisdom was dealt with by
trusting the words that supposedly came from deities.  This absolved
the human from choosing among difficult choices.  Today science absolves
us from making intuitive choices when adequate information is present.
To believe that this method can apply to _all_ human decisions, is to
once again abdicate the reason our thinking minds gives us.  The answers
that science provides to us today are qualitatively different than those
provided by the supposedly omnicient.  Nevertheless, there is, and always
will be, a class of issues which will not be answered by 
objective and scientific methods.
>
>Kristin goes on and argues that an anthropocentric ethics, with real
>consideration of inter-generational equity, would be sufficient
>justification for avoiding damage to ecosystems.
>
>	Paul F. Dietz
>	dietz@cs.rochester.edu


-- 

		dingo in boulder	(dean@vexcel.com)
Newsgroups: sci.environment