From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Extensionalism (was re: Russell's Paradox)
Date: 18 Nov 92 10:09:29 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov18.050931.17563
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov17.162034.22328@guinness.idbsu.edu>
holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>In article <1992Nov16.220925.28271@tamsun.tamu.edu>
>cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel) writes:

>>In article <1992Nov15.215724.21897@guinness.idbsu.edu>
>>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

RH:
>>>>>_Contra_ Harter (miscellaneous quibbles):
>>>>>
>>>>>The Good Russell may have admitted the possibility of "intensions",
>>>>>but the Exalted Quine has liberated us from the influence of those
>>>>>"creatures of darkness".  Extensions are adequate for all admissable
>>>>>purposes.

CM:
>>>>Really, Randall?!  Could you then please give me an extensional
>>>>analysis of the sentences in the following arguments that explains why
>>>>the first is valid but the second is not:
>>>>
>>>>1)  John believes there are spies.
>>>>    Mary believes whatever John does.
>>>>    Therefore, Mary believes there are spies.
>>>>
>>>>2)  John believes that 2+3=5.
>>>>    Necessarily, 2+3=5 iff first-order logic is undecidable.
>>>>    Therefore, John believes that first-order logic is undecidable.
>>>>
>>>>Or is a purpose admissible just in case it is amenable to
>>>>extensionalist analysis?

CM:
>>[Florian's response and lengthy intensional response in which
>>that-clauses are takent to denote propositions deleted.]

RH:
>>>But the extensionalist does have a simple recourse; let proposition =
>>>sentence throughout.

CM:
>>But *surely* this won't work; nothing in the first argument, for
>>example, presupposes that John and Mary even speak the same language.
>>But under those conditions that argument (or perhaps a similar one
>>where the beliefs under consideration don't include beliefs about
>>language) could still have true premises (hence a true conclusion as
>>well).
>>
>>Not to mention problems with ambiguity, anaphora, etc. that aren't
>>resolved at the level of sentences.
>>
>>--Chris Menzel

RH:
>I would then start talking about sentences in different languages and
>translation.  If Mary speaks German but not English and believes that
>it will rain, then Mary believes a sentence in German which translates
>to a sentence in English which asserts that it will rain.  Ambiguity
>and anaphora are taken into account by considering the effects on
>context on the interpretation of sentences, etc.  It is a truly
>horrible program, but nothing is added to it by adding intensional
>objects (as a new kind of object; now there is a good case for
>constructing "intensional objects" by extensional techniques from
>sentences).

I find it truly amazing how often this hoary bit pops up.  There is a
classic, much-anthologized paper by Church, "On Carnap's Analysis of
Statements of Assertion and Belief" (Analysis 1950), which rather
conclusively deals with this sort of proto-inscriptionalist nonsense.
Observe that your semantic analysis, when *correctly* formulated to
avoid circularity in reducing "that" clauses to other "that" clauses,
depends on an additional item of factual information about the meaning
of a certain English sentence.  Aside from that, once you admit a
notion of synonymy (as presupposed by that of translatability) into
your theory, there is but a short reach, as per my argument elsewhere,
to quantifying over equivalence classes of synonymous sentences.  This
is all the intensionalism I need for my rabid realist theory of
propositions, under any reasonable criterion of ontological
commitment.  End of this discourse.

>-- 
>The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
>above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
>opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
>or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta