HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu (Andrew Wing)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: the "peter principle"
Date: 12 Jan 93 18:38:49 GMT
Organization: Temple University
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]


	And how about Hood in the CSA?  He was the spearhead of the Texans
during the seven days, breaking the Union left.  He was a competent corps
commander under Joe Johnston, but when he got command of the AoT, well we
all know what happened at Spring Hill/Franklin/Nashville...

			Andy Wing

--
v2002a@vm.temple.edu     (preferred)
v2002a%templevm.bitnet@pucc.princeton.edu
agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu    (last resort)

Any disclaimer issued by me is subject to change without notice
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Date: 11 Jan 93 15:11:34 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan11.190409.6173@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
> In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
> The real unfairness to Hooker (and also Howard) is that nobody remembers
> that they were excellent commanders under Sherman after being sent West
> in 1863. Once they were placed under a general who knew how to command
> effectively they both proved to be very good subordinate commanders. But
> they are remembered principally for their mistakes with the Army of the
> Potomac.

I would say that Hooker was a pretty effective subordinate commander in the
AotP too.

At Chancellorsville, he had some bad luck, he faced the combined master stroke
of two geniuses, but he also screwed up (BIG TIME) what had been a good plan
up to the point when he ordered Couch to retreat to Chancellorsville
when he first encountered fighting marching out of the Wilderness toward
Fredericksburg. Going into his shell against Lee and Jackson just didn't make
any sense (and that was BEFORE he was stunned by the cannon shot).


> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

-- 
Paul Cowan     
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   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: PAPAI@kcgl1.eng.ohio-state.edu (Jonathan Papai)
Subject: Re: Grant's Memoirs
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 14:55:22 GMT

dickwin@sequent.com (Dick Winningstad) writes:
>I just finished the Library of America edition of Personal Memoirs of
>U.S. Grant.
>   [....]
>Now what to read next, Sherman's memoirs or Longstreet's.  I think
>Longstreet's to get a balanced perspective.

I'd go with Sherman's.  I don't think it was quite as good as
Grant's, but what is?

Grant's book ends with the end of the war.  Does anyone have info
if he planned to write about subsequent events and died too soon,
or was stopping at that moment the original plan.

-J.
From: HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: the "peter principle"
Date: 11 Jan 1993 22:10:36 GMT
Organization: University of Houston Administrative Computing
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: uhad2.admin.uh.edu
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.20

In <C0pK36.G1y@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu writes:

> I think that one of the major problems with the AoP is that Lincoln
> tended to promote men who were effective Corps commanders to Army
> commander only to find that they weren't effective at a higher level of
> command. All of the failed generals of the AotP were (or went on to
[deletions]
> `	Lincoln/Halleck made the common mistake that success at one
> level of command prepares one for success at another level of command.

  I disagree.  I'm not sure what other criterion you could use for success.
Success at lower levels certainly does not insure that you will get it at 
higher ones -- but I know of no better indicators one could use in judging
military potential.  You have to crawl before you can walk, and walking is no
gauruntee you can run, but you have to walk before you can run!


semper fi,

Jammer Jim Miller 
Texas A&M University '89 and '91
********************************************************************************
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* "Power finds its way to those who take a stand.  Stand up, Ordinary Man."    *
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From: am339@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Michael J. Logsdon)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Battle of Monocacy
Date: 11 Jan 1993 14:54:25 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (USA)
NNTP-Posting-Host: slc10.ins.cwru.edu


I am searching for information on the battle of Monocacy, near
Frederick MD, July 9, 1864.  I am specifically looking for
first hand accounts, especially confederate, on the battle, 
or Early's Washington campaign.

Kevin Casey   am339@cleveland.freenet.edu
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: "Lincoln" TV special
Date: 4 Jan 93 07:46:18 GMT
Organization: Department of Physics, Kansas State University, Manhattan KS, USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: bohr.phys.ksu.edu

In article <1i8o7eINN9n4@agate.berkeley.edu> turrell@violet.berkeley.edu (David Turrell) writes:
>In article <1i38ubINN7ap@moe.ksu.ksu.edu>, 2 Jan 1993 05:24:27 GMT,
>jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders) writes:
>
>>... [Garry] Wills' book, "Lincoln At Gettysburg". ... does a very
>>thorough job in giving the story of how the address came to be given and
>>how the version we are familiar with came to be written (the one we are
>>familiar with is a copy Lincoln made after the event and contains some
>>changes that were not in the speech as he gave it at Gettysburg).
>
>My understanding is that the changes were made to conform with the
>address as actually delivered, incorporating Lincoln's departures from
>his written text. Lincoln himself had to consult press reports of the
>speech to find out what he had said.

Some of the changes were, as David says, to make the text conform to what
Lincoln said.  But at least one and perhaps two changes differ from
the press reports.  The certain one is a "here" which the press accounts
all agree he said, but which he apparently edited out of "official" copies.
If memory serves the "here" appears in the line:
  that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
  cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion
                       ^^^^
If you look at the sentence where that line appears and in the preceding
couple of sentences, the word "here" is used with almost annoying
repitition, and Lincoln apparently decided he could do with one less.
--
Justin M. Sanders    
Dept. of Physics     "I could not fail to disagree with you less."
Kansas State Univ.                           -- Gabriel Weinreich
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: More on Meade at G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)dir
Date: 11 Jan 93 06:47:27 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan10.091031.29407@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>Although the Union Army was not in the best
> of shape, the Confederates were so badly off that I think Lee's army could
> have been destroyed by an active Union commander. > -- 
> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

I guess the point I was trying to make is that independent of the relative
distruction to the two armies, Meade may have felt that his army was reduced 
in effectiveness to the point that another hard march and another hard battle
were too much to ask (although he did ask it). Lee arrived at Williamsport 
well in advance of Meade, and had errected pretty strong defenses while
he waited for the river to go down. I am sure Meade was well aware of what 
even a hand full of CSA could do (had done) to frontal assaults. 

I'll concede that Meade may have made a mistake. It's just that it does not 
seem to me to be such a clear cut issue that Meade should have suffered (is
still suffering) such infamy.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: hooker
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 19:58:08 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.203126.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:

>I don't have my references, but I'm pretty sure that the 105th PA (ggdad's
>reg.) was in the 3rd Corps, 2nd Division (Kearney's), 1st Brigade (3,2,1)

Hmm. At what time was this organization?

The only OOB I have that contains III Corps is for Gettysburg. (Another
irrelevant question: Why wasn't III Corps at Antietam?) It shows the 105th
PA in III Corps, 1st Division (Birney's), 1st Brigade (Graham's). The AoTP
was reorganized quite a few times between the Peninsula and Gettysburg so
this isn't suprising that a regiment might have changed divisions...

Wishing I had an OOB for the Seven Days battles.

-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: More on Meade at G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 09:10:31 GMT

In article <1993Jan10.004305.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>I agree with all of this. My point was that a big fraction of the command
>structure (in addition to Meade himself) was unproven. As for Sickles, 
>although he was out of the picture, his actions on July 2 certainly must 
>have shaken Meade's confidence that his corps commanders would act 
>according to his (Meade's) plans.

I agree; however, I think the corps command situation was probably worse in
the Rebel army, where Ewell has just proven himself a washout, Hill was sick
and also unproven, and Longstreet was sulking.
In terms of division and brigade officers, I have to think that the Union Army
was in better shape than the Confederates. I believe Pickett's division was
down to Pickett and some lieutenant colonels. Obviously that's the most extreme
example, but all of Lee's divisions had had hard fighting, Confederate officers
exposed themselves much more than Union officers tended to do, and the Union
had one completely fresh corps (VI) and two pretty fresh ones (V, XII) while
the Confederate army was wrecked. Although the Union Army was not in the best
of shape, the Confederates were so badly off that I think Lee's army could
have been destroyed by an active Union commander. Especially as they were
nearly out of supplies and merely getting between them and Virginia would
have compelled them to make a costly attack or surrender. I do agree that
this would have meant blocking several routes; but I think the Rebels
pretty much had to cross the Potomac between Harper's Ferry and Williamsport
so it wasn't impossible to do.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Senior Union Officers at Start of War
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 07:49:57 GMT

In article <28DEC199212040954@lims01.lerc.nasa.gov> afallen@lims01.lerc.nasa.gov (E. Allen Arrington) writes:
>Possible confusion here; I think that Philip St. George Cooke was a Union
>Cavalry officer during the war (and father-in-law to Jeb Stuart); Philip St
>George Cocke was a Confederate general. (I'm working from memory, so this
>may very well be all wrong; I may have the two reversed)

Eek, you're right. Cocke was the Confederate. Serves me right for not
checking me sources first :(
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Date: 11 Jan 93 14:43:22 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan11.162335.4459@midway.uchicago.edu>, cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink) writes:
> In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
>>He also was nearly killed by a cannonball that smashed into a
>>pillar that he was leaning against. I think that this last bit of info
> 
> In fact, the force of the blast left him looking so obviously out of it that
> many of the soldiers who saw him reported him as having been drunk on the
> day of the battle.  I think the most egregious error that can appropriately 
> be laid at his feet after the shell struck is his refusal to relinquish
> command.  On the other hand, I don't recall that anyone even suggested
> that he should do so.  Does anyone out there know the military etiquette 
> for an underling to relieve an officer under these circumstances?
> --Chuck

As I recall at some point (perhaps late in the day or next morning) he did
transfer command to Couch. Couch wrote that he immediately began to worry 
about how he could possibly recover the situation, when Hooker went on to 
give detailed instructions as to what to do.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: hooker
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 06:42:07 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.034914.24395@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> PAPAI@kcgl1.eng.ohio-state.edu (Jonathan Papai) writes:
>
>	In another group, discussion turned to whether Genl.
>Hooker had anything to do with the popularization of the term for
>prostitute, with some evidence the term pre-existed acw, but may
>not have been widely used.  I know I've read about this
>authoritatively somewhere, but can't put a finger on it.  Any pointers?

I'm almost certain it's mention in Catton, either in Glory Road or possibly
in Mr. Lincoln's Army. A two-minute search doesn't reveal it, but the index
entry for "Hooker, Joseph" is rather long and I'm sure it's in there somewhere.
>
>Thanks millions
>J.

You're welcome!
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: ACW etomology questions (was hooker)
Date: 7 Jan 93 17:40:09 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan7.064207.26662@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>>	In another group, discussion turned to whether Genl.
>>Hooker had anything to do with the popularization of the term for
>>prostitute, with some evidence the term pre-existed acw, but may
>>not have been widely used.  I know I've read about this
>>authoritatively somewhere, but can't put a finger on it.  Any pointers?

I always enjoyed learning some etomology, although I haven't actively 
pursued it. Burnside's name is also given as the source of "sideburns", 
but I've wondered about a couple of other phrases which might have 
originated in the ACW.

Prolong - was a rope used to pull a cannon. When an artillery piece was 
being withdrawn (retreating) the prolong was sometimes tied to the 
"limber" (or trailer hitch) so the cannon could contine to be fired as 
it went. Is this the origin of the use of "prolong" to mean extending 
something which is about to end? 

Limber up - Normally a cannon was transported with the limber raised 
above the ground and hooked onto a caisson (I hope this is right).
In this position the cannon could not be fired but was situated for 
the most rapid transportation. Is this where he get "to limber up"
as preparation for running or exercise?

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Date: 11 Jan 93 10:15:29 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
> It seems to me that Hooker gets something of a raw deal in history
> books. His strategic plan and tactical positioning before
> Chancellorsville was pretty good. He managed to get on Lee's flank with
> the bulk of the AoP pretty much undetected and had Lee seriously worried
> on the first day of Chancellorsville. He only lost on the second day due
> to two factors:
> 
> 	1) The incredible daring and skill of Lee and Jackson. A
> "reasonable" commander doesn't split an outnumbered army into two pieces
> and march it in march column paralell to an enemy line. A "reasonable"
---------- good stuff deleted ----------
> 	2) Incredible bad luck. He never got or never acted on reports
> that rebel troops were marching paralell to his lines and were flanking
> him. 
---------- good stuff deleted ----------
> Tom

Jackson supposedly said to Lee, "Hooker's mistake was sending his cavalry
away."

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau)
Subject: Re: Battle of Monocacy
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 17:04:32 GMT

In article <1is1n1INNdpc@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu> am339@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Michael J. Logsdon) writes:
>
>I am searching for information on the battle of Monocacy, near
>Frederick MD, July 9, 1864.  I am specifically looking for
>first hand accounts, especially confederate, on the battle, 
>or Early's Washington campaign.
>
>Kevin Casey   am339@cleveland.freenet.edu

The most recent issue of Civil War Times Illustrated has an article on the
battle.

- Gary Charbonneau
  charbonn@silver.indiana.edu

Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: More on G'burg (was Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS)
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 20:27:54 GMT

In article <1993Jan9.083121.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>Please pardon me if I am being a bore about this, but I believe Lincoln's
>"held the enemy in the palm of his hand" remark refered to the fact that 
>in addition to the AotP in Gettysburg, there were something like 20,000 
>Pa Militia north of Chambersburg (appearently in position to attack Lee's 
>rear or harrass his retreat) under Couch over whom Meade had authority.

Hm. How did he acquire this authority? I know that Couch was commander of
the Department of Pennsylvania, which would not normally have been under
Meade, and that Couch was senior to Meade. Was there a special order placing
Pennsylvania militia under Meade during the invasion, or did Meade acquire
the authority just by moving his army into Pennsylvania?
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Date: 11 Jan 93 15:22:01 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan11.194105.7616@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
> So far, the discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign has left out a
> description of events following May 2nd. On May 3rd, Hooker hid his army
> behind trenches and ordered Sedgewick's corps at Fredricksburg to march
> to his rescue. 
-- ------- rest deleted --------
> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

The reason I find this so baffling is that origonally Hooker had assigned
three Corps to Sedgwick for the lower river crossing. It seems absurd that 
he first stripped Sedgwick of first Meade's, then Reynolds's, corps,
then he expected Sedgwick to take the major burden of stiking Lee.

I've read that the subsequent criticism of Sedgwick (presumably by Hooker)
is the reason that Sedgwick was passed over when Meade (whom he outranked)
was given command.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
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