From: covici@ccs.covici.com (John Covici)
Reply-To: covici@ccs.covici.com
Newsgroups: alt.activism
Subject: Unauthorized Biography of George Bush: part 26
Date: 1 Oct 92 20:59:17 GMT
Organization: Covici Computer Systems

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{XVII: Iran-Contra} 

In July 1985,
Vice President George Bush was
designated by President Reagan to lead
the {Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism}. 
   Bush's task force was a means to
sharply concentrate the powers of
government into the hands of the Bush
clique, for such policies as the
Iran-Contra armaments schemes. 
   The task force had the following
cast of characters: George Bush, U.S.
vice president: chairman; Admiral James
L. Holloway III: executive assistant to
Chairman Bush; Craig Coy: Bush's deputy
assistant under Holloway; Vice Admiral
John Poindexter: senior NSC
representative to Chairman Bush; Marine
Corps Lt. Col. Oliver North: day-to-day
NSC representative to George Bush;
Amiram Nir: counterterror adviser to
Israeli Premier Shimon Peres; Lt. Col.
Robert Earl: staff member; Terry
Arnold: principal consultant; Charles
E. Allen, CIA officer: Senior Review
Group; Robert Oakley, director, State
Department Counter Terrorism Office:
Senior Review Group; Noel Koch, deputy
to asstistant secretary of defense
Richard Armitage: Senior Review Group;
Lt. Gen. John Moellering, Joint Chiefs
of Staff: Senior Review Group; Oliver
``Buck'' Revell, FBI executive: Senior
Review Group. 
   The Terrorism Task Force
organization, as we shall see, was a
permanent affair.@s2@s7 
   {August 8, 1985:} 
   George Bush met with the National
Security Planning Group in the
residence section of the White House.
Spurring on their deliberations on the
terrorism problem, a car bomb had blown
up that day at a U.S. air base in
Germany, with 22 American casualties. 
   The officials discussed shipment
of U.S.-made arms to Iran through
Israel--to replenish Israeli stocks of
TOW missiles and to permit Israel to
sell arms to Iran. 
   According to testimony by Robert
McFarlane, the transfer was supported
by George Bush, Casey and Donald Regan,
and opposed by Shultz and
Weinberger.@s2@s8 
   {August 18, 1985:} 
   Luis Posada Carriles escaped from
prison in Venezuela, where he was being
held for the terrorist murder of 73
persons. Using forged documents falsely
identifying him as a Venezuelan named
``Ramon Medina,'' Posada flew to
Central America. Within a few weeks,
Felix Rodriguez assigned him to
supervise the Bush office's Contra
resupply operations being run from the
El Salvador air base. Posada personally
ran the safe-houses used for the CIA
flight crews. 
   Rodriguez explained the
arrangement in his book: ``Because of
my relationship with [El Salvador Air
Force] Gen. Bustillo, I was able to
pave the way for [the operations
attributed to Oliver] North to use the
facilities at Ilopango [El Salvador air
force base].... I found someone to
manage the Salvadorian-based resupply
operation on a day-to-day basis. They
knew that person as Ramon Medina. I
knew him by his real name: Luis Posada
Carriles.... I first [sic!] met Posada
in 1963 at Fort Benning, Georgia, where
we went through basic training together
... as U.S. Army second
lieutenants....'' 
   Rodriguez neglects to explain that
agent Posada Carriles was originally
recruited and trained by the same CIA
murder operation, ``JM/WAVE'' in Miami,
as was Rodriguez himself. 
   Felix continues: ``In the sixties,
he reportedly went to work for DISIP,
the Venezuelan intelligence service,
and rose to considerable power within
its ranks. It was rumored that he held
one of the top half-dozen jobs in the
organization.... 
   ``After the midair bombing of a
Cubana airliner on October 6, 1976, in
which seventy-three people were killed,
Posada was charged with planning the
attack and was thrown in prison....
Posada was confined in prison for more
than nine years....''@s2@s9 
   {September 10, 1985:} 
   George Bush's national security
adviser, Donald Gregg, met at 4:30 P.M.
with Oliver North and Col. James
Steele, the U.S. military official in
El Salvador who oversaw flights of
cargo going to the Contras from various
points in Central America. They
discussed information given to one or
more of them by arms dealer Mario
DelAmico, supplier to the Contras.
According to the entry in Oliver
North's notebook, they discussed
particularities of the supply flights,
and the operations of FDN commander
Enrique Bermudez. 
   Elsewhere in the diary pages for
that day, Colonel North noted that
DelAmico had procured a certain 1,000
munitions items for the Contras.@s3@s0 
   {November 1985 :} 
   George Bush sent Oliver North a
note, with thanks for ``your dedication
and tireless work with the hostage
thing and with Central America.''@s3@s1 
   {December 1985:} 
   Congress passed new laws limiting
U.S. aid to the Contras. The CIA, the
Defense Department, and ``any other
agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities''
were prohibited from providing
{armaments} to the Contras. The CIA was
permitted to provide communications
equipment and training.
``Humanitarian'' aid was allowed. 
   These laws, known together as
``Boland III,'' were in effect from
December 4, 1985 to October 17, 1986. 
   {December 18, 1985:} 
   CIA official Charles E. Allen, a
member of George Bush's Terrorism Task
Force, wrote an update on the
arms-for-hostages dealings with Iran.
Allen's memo was a debriefing of an
unnamed member of the group of U.S.
government officials participating in
the arms negotiations with the
Iranians. The unnamed U.S. official is
referred to in Allen's memo as
``Subject''. 
   Allen wrote: ``[Speaker of the
Iranian Parliament Hashemi] Rafsanjani
... believes Vice President George Bush
is orchestrating the U.S. initiative
with Iran. In fact, according to
Subject, Rafsanjani believes that Bush
is the most powerful man in the U.S.
because in addition to being Vice
President, he was once Director of
CIA.''@s3@s2 
   {December 1985-January
1986:} 
   George Bush completed his official
study of terrorism in December 1985.
John Poindexter now directed Oliver
North to go back to work with Amiram
Nir. 
   Amiram Nir came to Washington and
met with Oliver North. He told U.S.
officials that the Iranians had
promised to free all hostages in
exchange for more arms. Reportedly
after this Nir visit, President Reagan
was persuaded of the necessity of
revving up the arms shipments to
Iran.@s3@s3 
   {December 27, 1985:} 
   Terrorists bombed Rome and Vienna
airports, killing 20 people, including
five Americans. The Crisis Pre-Planning
Group (CPPG), supervised by Bush's
office and reporting to Bush, blamed
Libyans for the attack and began
planning for a military strike on
Libya. Yet an unpublished CIA analysis
and the Israelis both acknowledged that
the Abu Nidal group (in effect, the
Israeli Mossad agency) carried out the
attacks.@s3@s4 
   Bush's CPPG later organized the
U.S. bombing of Libya, which occurred
in mid-April 1986. 
   {December 31, 1985:} 
   Iranian arms dealer Cyrus Hashemi
told Paris-based CIA agent Bernard
Veillot that Vice President Bush was
backing arms sales to Iran, and that
official U.S. approval for private
sales to Iran, amounting to $2 billion,
was ``going to be signed by Mr. Bush
and [U.S. Marine Corps commandant] Gen.
[Paul X.] Kelley on Friday.''@s3@s5 
   Loudly and publicly exposed in the
midst of Iran arms deals, Veillot was
indicted by the United States. Then the charges
were quietly dropped, and Veillot went
underground. A few months later, Hashemi
died suddenly of ``leukemia.''@s3@s6 
   {January 2, 1986:} 
   Israeli counterterrorism chief
Amiram Nir met with North and
Poindexter in Washington. The Bush
report on terrorism had now been issued
within the government but was not yet
published. Bush's report was urging
that a counterterrorism coordinator be
named for the entire U.S.
government--and Oliver North was the
one man intended for that slot. 
   At this meeting, Nir proposed
specifically that prisoners held by
Israeli-controlled Lebanese, and 3,000
American TOW missiles, be exchanged for
U.S. hostages held by Iran. Other
discussions between Nir and Bush's
nominee involved the supposedly new
idea that the Iranians be overcharged
for the weapons shipped to them, and
the surplus funds be diverted to the
Contras.@s3@s7 
   {January 6, 1986:} 
   President Reagan met with George
Bush, Donald Regan, McFarlane and
Poindexter. The President was handed a
draft ``Presidential Finding'' that
called for shipping arms to Iran
through Israel. The President signed
this document, drafted following the
discussions with Amiram Nir. 
   The draft consciously violated the
National Security Act which had
established the Central Intelligence
Agency, requiring notification of
Congress. But Bush joined in urging
President Reagan to sign this
``finding'': 
   ``I hereby find that the following
operation in a foreign country ... is
important to the national security of
the United States, and due to its
extreme sensitivity and security risks,
I determine it is essential to {limit
prior notice, and direct the Director
of Central Intelligence to refrain from
reporting this finding to the Congress
as provided in Section 501 of the
National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, until I otherwise direct}''
[emphasis added]. 
     ``... The USG[overnment] will act
to facilitate efforts by third parties
and third countries to establish
contacts with {moderate elements}
within and outside the Government of
Iran by providing these elements with
arms, equipment and related materiel in
order to enhance the credibility of
these elements....'' 
   Of course, Bush, Casey and their
Israeli allies had never sought to
bolster ``moderate elements'' in Iran,
but overthrew them at every
opportunity--beginning with President
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.@s3@s8 
   {January 7, 1986:} 
   President Reagan and Vice
President Bush met at the White House
with several other administration
officials. There was an argument over
new proposals by Amiram Nir and Iranian
arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar to
swap arms for hostages. 
   Secretary of State George Shultz
later told the Tower Commission that
George Bush supported the
arms-for-hostages deal at this meeting,
as did President Reagan, Casey, Meese,
Regan and Poindexter. Shultz reported
that he himself and Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger both opposed
further arms shipments.@s3@s9 
   {January 9, 1986:} 
   Lt. Col. Oliver North complained,
in his notebook, that ``Felix
[Rodriguez]''  has been ``talking too
much about the V[ice] P[resident]
connection.''@s4@s0 
   {January 15, 1986:} 
   CIA and Mossad employee Richard
Brenneke wrote a letter to Vice
President Bush giving full details,
alerting Bush about his own work on
behalf of the CIA in illegal--but U.S.
government-sanctioned--sales of arms to
Iran.@s4@s1 
   {Mid-January, 1986:} 
   George Bush and Oliver North
worked together on the illegal plan. 
   Later, at North's trial, the Bush
administration--portraying Colonel
North as the master strategist in the
case!--stipulated that North ``prepared
talking points for a meeting between
Admiral Poindexter, Vice-President
Bush, and [the new] Honduran President
[Jose Simon] Azcona. North recommended
that Admiral Poindexter and
Vice-President Bush tell President
Azcona of the need for Honduras to work
with the U.S. government on increasing
regional involvement with and support
for the Resistance. Poindexter and Bush
were also to raise the subject of
better U.S. government support for the
states bordering Nicaragua.'' 
   That is, Honduras, which of course
``borders on Nicaragua,'' was to get
more U.S. aid and was to pass some of
it through to the Contras. 
   In preparation for the January
1986 Bush-Azcona meeting, the U.S.
State Department sent to Bush adviser
Donald Gregg a memorandum, which
``alerted Gregg that Azcona would
insist on receiving clear economic and
social benefits from its [Honduras's]
cooperation with the United
States.''@s4@s2          
   Two months after the January
Bush-Azcona meeting, President Reagan
asked Congress for $20 million in
emergency aid to Honduras, needed to
repel a cross-border raid by Nicaraguan
forces against Contra camps. Congress
voted the ``emergency'' expenditure. 
   {January 17, 1986:} 
   George Bush met with President
Reagan, John Poindexter, Donald Regan,
and NSC staff member Donald Fortier to
review the final version of the January
7 arms-to-Iran draft. 
   With the encouragement of Bush,
President Reagan signed the
authorization to arm the Khomeini
regime with missiles, and keep the
facts of this scheme from congressional
oversight committees. 
   The official story about this
meeting--given in the Tower Commission
Report--is as follows: 
   ``[T]he proposal to shift to
direct U.S. arms sales to Iran ... was
considered by the president at a
meeting on January 17 which only the
Vice President, Mr. Regan, Mr. Fortier,
and VADM Poindexter attended.... There
was no subsequent collective
consideration of the Iran initiative by
the NSC principals before it became
public 11 months later.... 
   ``The National Security Act also
requires notification of Congress of
covert intelligence activities. If not
done in advance, notification must be
`in timely fashion.' The Presidential
Finding of January 17 directed that
congressional notification be withheld,
and this decision appears to have never
been reconsidered.''@s4@s3 
   {January 18, 1986:} 
   Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger was directed to prepare the
transfer of 4,000 TOW anti-tank
missiles to the CIA, which was to ship
them to Khomeini's Iran. Bypassing
normal channels for covert shipments,
he elected to have his senior military
assistant, Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell,
handle the arrangements for the arms
transfer.@s4@s4 
   {January 19-21, 1986:} 
   George Bush's deputy national
security aide, Col. Samuel Watson,
worked with Felix Rodriguez in El
Salvador, and met with Col. James
Steele, the U.S. military liaison
officer with the covert Contra resupply
organization in El Salvador.@s4@s5 

   Bush Sets Up North
 
   {January 20, 1986:} 
   Following the recommendations of
an as-yet-unofficial report of the
George Bush Terrorism Task Force,
President Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207. 
   The unofficial Bush report, the
official Bush report released in
February, and the Bush-organized NSDD
207, together put forward Oliver North
as ``Mr. Iran-Contra.'' North became
the nominal, up-front coordinator of
the administration's counterterrorism
program, hiding as best he could Bush's
hand in these matters.  He was given a
secret office and staff (the Office to
Combat Terrorism), separate from
regular NSC staff members. 
   George Bush now reassigned his
Terrorism Task Force employees, Craig
Coy and Robert Earl, to do the daily
work of the North secret office. The
Bush men spent the next year working on
Iran arms sales: Earl devoted
one-quarter to one-half of his time on
Iran and Contra support operations; Coy
``knew everything'' about Project
Democracy. North traveled much of the
time. Earl and Coy were at this time
officially attached to the Crisis
Management Center, which North worked
on in 1983.@s4@s6 
     FBI Assistant Director Revell,
often George Bush's ``hit man'' against
Bush's domestic opponents, partially
disclosed this shell game in a letter
to Sen. David Boren (D-Ok.), explaining
the FBI's contacts with North: ``At the time [April 1986],
North was the NSC official charged by
the President with the coordination of
our national counterterrorist program.
He was responsible for working closely
with designated lead agencies and was
responsible for participating in all
interagency groups, maintaining the
national programming documents,
assisting in the coordination of
research and development in relation to
counterterrorism, facilitating the
development of response options and
overseeing the implementation of the
Vice President's Terrorism Task Force
recommendations. 
   ``This description of Col. North's
position is set forth in the public
report of the Vice President's Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism, February
1986. There is an even more detailed
and comprehensive description of Col.
North's position in the classified
National Security Decision Directive
#207 issued by the President on January
20, 1986.''@s4@s7 
   The Bush Terrorism Task Force,
having completed its official work, had
simply made itself into a renamed,
permanent, covert agency. Its new name
was {Operations Sub-Group}
(OSG). 
   In this transformation, CIA
Contra-handler Duane Clarridge had been
added to the Task Force to form the
``OSG,'' which included North,
Poindexter, Charles Allen, Robert
Oakley, Noel Koch, General Moellering
and ``Buck'' Revell. 
   According to the Oliver North
diaries, even before this final phase
of the Bush-North apparatus there were
at least 14 meetings between North and
the Bush Task Force's senior members
Holloway, Oakley, and Allen, its
principal consultant Terry Arnold, and
its staff men Robert Earl and Craig
Coy. The North diaries from July 1985
through January 1986, show one meeting
with President Reagan, and four
meetings with Vice President Bush:
either the two alone, North with Bush
and Amiram Nir, or North with Bush and
Donald Gregg. 
   The Bush counterterrorism
apparatus had its own communications
channels, and a global antiterrorist
computer network called Flashboard
outside of all constitutional
government arrangements. Those opposed
to the arming of terrorists, including
cabinet members, had no access to these
communications.@s4@s8 
   This apparatus had responsibility
for Iran arms sales; the private
funding of the Contras, from
contributions, theft, dope-running; the
``public diplomacy'' of Project
Democracy to back these efforts; and
counterintelligence against other
government agencies and against
domestic opponents of the policy.@s4@s9 

   {January 28, 1986:} 
   George Bush met with Oliver North
and FDN Contra Political Director
Adolfo Calero in the Old Executive
Office Building.@s5@s0 North and Calero
would work together to protect George
Bush when the Contra supply effort blew
apart in October 1986. 
   {January 31, 1986:} 
   Iranian arms dealer Cyrus Hashemi
was told by a French arms agent that
``[a]n assistant of the vice
president's going to be in Germany ...
and the indication is very clear that
the transaction can go forward''
referring to George Bush's supposed
approval of the private arms sale to
Iran.@s5@s1 
   {February 6, 1986:} 
   Responding to the January 15
letter from Richard Brenneke, Bush aide
Lt. Col. E. Douglas Menarczik wrote to
Brenneke: ``The U.S. government will
not permit or participate in the
provision of war materiel to Iran and
will prosecute any such efforts by U.S.
citizens to the fullest extent of the
law.''@s5@s2 
   {February 7, 1986:} 
   Samuel M. Evans, a representative
of Saudi and Israeli arms dealers, told
Cyrus Hashemi that ``[t]he green light
now finally has been given [for the
private sale of arms to Iran], that
Bush is in favor, Shultz against, but
nevertheless they are willing to
proceed.''@s5@s3 
   {February 25, 1986:} 
   Richard Brenneke wrote again to
Bush's office, to Lt. Col. Menarczik,
documenting a secret project for U.S.
arms sales to Iran going on since 1984. 
   Brenneke later said publicly that
early in 1986, he called Menarczik to
warn that he had learned that the
United States planned to buy weapons
for the Contras with money from Iran
arms sales. Menarczik reportedly said,
``We will look into it.'' Menarczik
claimed not to have ``any specific
recollection of telephone conversations
with'' Brenneke.@s5@s4 
   {Late February, 1986:} 
   Vice President George Bush issued
the public report of his Terrorism Task
Force. In his introduction to the
report, Bush asserted: ``We firmly
oppose terrorism in all forms and
wherever it takes place.... We will
make no concessions to
terrorists.''@s5@s5 
   {March 1986:} 
   According to a sworn statement of
pilot Michael Tolliver, Felix Rodriguez
had met him in July 1985. Now Rodriguez
instructed Tolliver to go to Miami
International Airport. Tolliver picked
up a DC-6 aircraft and a crew, and flew
the plane to a Contra base in Honduras.
There Tolliver watched the unloading of
14 tons of military supplies, and the
loading of 12 and 2/3 tons of
marijuana. Following his instructions
from Rodriguez, Tolliver flew the dope
to Homestead Air Force Base in Florida.
The next day Rodriguez paid Tolliver
$75,000.@s5@s6 
   Tolliver says that another of the
flights he performed for Rodriguez
carried cocaine on the return trip to
the U.S.A. He made a series of arms
deliveries from Miami into the air base
at Agucate, Honduras. He was paid in
cash by Rodriguez and his old Miami CIA
colleague, Rafael ``Chi Chi'' Quintero. 
   In another circuit of flights,
Tolliver and his crew flew between
Miami and El Salvador's Ilopango air
base. Tolliver said that Rodriguez and
Quintero ``instructed me where to go
and who to see.'' While making these
flights, he ``could go by any route
available without any interference from
any agency. We didn't need a stamp of
approval from Customs or
anybody....''@s5@s7 
   With reference to the covert arms
shipments out of Miami, George Bush's
son Jeb said: ``Sure, there's a pretty
good chance that arms were shipped, but
does that break any law? I'm not sure
it's illegal. The Neutrality Act is a
completely untested notion, established
in the 1800s.''@s5@s8 

   Smuggling Missiles
 
   Trafficking in lethal weapons
without government authorization is
always a tricky business for covert
operators. But when the operatives are
smuggling weapons in a particular
traffic which the U.S. Congress has
expressly prohibited, a good deal of
criminal expertise and certain crucial
contacts are required for success. 
   And when the smugglers report to
the Vice President, who wishes his role
to remain concealed, the whole thing
can become very sticky--or even
ludicrous to the point of low comedy. 
   {March 26, 1986:} 
   Oliver North sent a message to
Robert McFarlane about his efforts to
procure missiles for the Contras, and
to circumvent many U.S. laws, as well
as the customs services and police
forces of several nations. The most
important component of such
transactions, aside from the purchase
money, was a falsified document showing
the supposed recipient of the arms, the
{end-user certificate} (EUC). 
   In the message he wrote, North
said that ``we have'' an EUC; that is,
a false document has been acquired for
this arms sale: ``[W]e are trying to
find a way to get 10 BLOWPIPE launchers
and 20 missiles from [a South American
country] ... thru the Short Bros.
Rep.... Short Bros., the mfgr. of the
BLOWPIPE, is willing to arrange the
deal, conduct the training and even
send U.K. `tech. reps' ... if we can
close the arrangement. Dick Secord has
already paid 10% down on the delivery
and we have a [country deleted] EUC
which is acceptable to [that South
American country].''@s5@s9 
   Now, since this particular illegal
sale somehow came to light in the
Iran-Contra scandal, another
participant in this one deal decided
not to bother hiding his own part in
it. Thus, we are able to see how
Colonel North got his false
certificate. 
   {April 20, 1986:} 
   Felix Rodriguez met in San
Salvador with Oliver North and Enrique
Bermudez, the Contras' military
commander. Rodriguez informs us of the
following in his own, ghost-written
book: 
   ``Shortly before that April 20
meeting, Rafael Quintero had asked me
to impose upon my good relations with
the Salvadoran military to obtain
`end-user' certificates made out to
Lake Resources, which he told me was a
Chilean company....''@s6@s0 
   The plan was to acquire false
end-user certificates from his contacts
in the Salvadoran armed forces for
Blowpipe ground-to-air missiles
supposedly being shipped into El
Salvador. The missiles would then be
illegally diverted to the Contras in
Honduras and Nicaragua. 
   Rodriguez continues, with
self-puffery: ``The Salvadorans
complied with my request, and in turn I
supplied the certificates, handing them
over personally to Richard Secord at
that April 20 meeting.''@s6@s1 
   While arranging the forgery for
the munitions sale, Rodriguez was in
touch with the George Bush staff back
in his home office. On April 16, four
days before the Rodriguez-North missile
meeting, Bush national security adviser
Donald Gregg asked his staff to put a
meeting with Rodriguez on George Bush's
calendar. 
   Gregg said the purpose of the
White House meeting would be ``to brief
the Vice President on the war in El
Salvador and resupply of the Contras.''
The meeting was arranged for 11:30 A.M.
on May 1.@s6@s2 
   Due to its explicitly stated
purpose--clandestine weapons
trafficking in an undeclared war
against the rigid congressional
prohibition--the planned meeting was to
become one of the most notorious of the
Iran-Contra scandal. 
   {April 30, 1986:} 
   Felix Rodriguez met in Washington
with Bush aide Col. Sam Watson. 
   The following reminder message was
sent to George Bush: 
   {Briefing Memorandum
for the Vice President}
   Event: Meeting with Felix
Rodriguez 
   Date: Thursday, May 1, 1986
   Time: 11:30-11:45 a.m.--West
Wing 
   From: Don Gregg
   I. PURPOSE
   Felix Rodriguez, a
counterinsurgency expert who is
visiting from El Salvador, will provide
a briefing on the status of the war in
El Salvador and resupply of the
Contras. 
   III. [sic] PARTICIPANTS
   The Vice President 
   Felix Rodriguez 
   Craig Fuller 
   Don Gregg 
   Sam Watson
   IV. MEDIA COVERAGE  
   Staff photographer. [i.e.
internal-use photographs, no media
coverage]@s6@s3
   {May 1, 1986:} 
   Vice President Bush and his staff
met in the White House with Felix
Rodriguez, Oliver North, financier
Nicholas Brady, and the new U.S.
ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin Corr. 
   At this meeting it was decided
that ``private citizen'' Felix
Rodriguez would continue his work in
Central America.@s6@s4 
   {May 16, 1986:} 
   George Bush met with President
Reagan, and with cabinet members and
other officials in the full National
Security Planning Group. They discussed
the urgent need to raise more money for
the Contras. 
   The participants decided to seek
support for the Contras from nations
(``third countries'') which were not
directly involved in the Central
American conflict. 
   As a result of this initiative,
George Bush's former business partners,
the Sultan of Brunei, donated $10
million to the Contras. But after being
deposited in secret Swiss bank
accounts, the money was ``lost.''@s6@s5 
   {May 20, 1986:} 
   George Bush met with Felix
Rodriguez and El Salvador Air Force
commander Gen. Juan Rafael Bustillo at
a large reception in Miami on Cuban
independence day.@s6@s6 
   {May 29, 1986:} 
   George Bush, President Reagan,
Donald Regan and John Poindexter met to
hear from McFarlane and North on their
latest arms-for-hostages negotiations
with Iranian officials and Amiram Nir
in Teheran, Iran. The two reported
their arrangement with the Khomeini
regime to establish a secure covert
communications network between the two
``enemy'' governments.@s6@s7 
   {July 10, 1986:} 
   Eugene Hasenfus, whose successful
parachute landing would explode the
Iran-Contra scandal into world
headlines three months later, flew from
Miami to El Salvador. He had just been
hired to work for ``Southern Air
Transport,'' a CIA front company for
which Hasenfus worked previously in the
Indochina War. 
   Within a few days he was
introduced to ``Max Gomez''--the
pseudonym of Felix Rodriguez--as ``one
of the Cuban coordinators of the
company.'' 
   He now began work as a cargo
handler on flights carrying military
supplies to Contra soldiers inside
Nicaragua.@s6@s8 
   {July 29, 1986:} 
   George Bush met in Jerusalem with
Terrorism Task Force member Amiram Nir,
the manager of Israel's participation
in the arms-for hostages schemes. Bush
did not want this meeting known about.
The vice president told his chief of
staff, Craig Fuller, to send his notes
of the meeting only to Oliver
North--not to President Reagan, or to
anyone else. 
   Craig Fuller's memorandum said, in
part: 
   1. SUMMARY. Mr. Nir indicated that
he had briefed Prime Minister Peres and
had been asked to brief the V[ice]
P[resident] by his White House
contacts. He described the details of
the efforts from last year through the
current period to gain the release of
the U.S. hostages. He reviewed what had
been learned which was essentially that
the radical group was the group that
could deliver. He reviewed the issues
to be considered--namely that there
needed to be ad [sic] decision as to
whether the items requested would be
delivered in separate shipments or
whether we would continue to press for
the release of the hostages prior to
delivering the items in an amount
agreed to previously. 
   2. The VP's 25 minute meeting was
arranged after Mr. Nir called Craig
Fuller and requested the meeting and
after it was discussed with the VP by
Fuller and North.... 
   14. Nir described some of the
lessons learned: `We are dealing with
the most radical elements.... They can
deliver ... that's for sure.... [W]e've
learned they can deliver and the
moderates can't....@s6@s9 
   {July 30, 1986:} 
   The day after his Jerusalem summit
with Amiram Nir, Vice President Bush
conferred with Oliver North. This
meeting with North was never
acknowledged by Bush until the North
diaries were released in May 1990. 
   {Early September, 1986:} 
   Retired Army Maj. Gen. John K.
Singlaub sent a memo to Oliver North on
the Contra resupply effort under Felix
Rodriguez. Singlaub warned North that
Rodriguez was boasting about having
``daily contact'' with George Bush's
office. @s7@s0 

   The Scandal Breaks

   {October 5, 1986:} 
   A C-123k cargo aircraft left El
Salvador's Ilopango air base at 9:30
a.m., carrying ``10,000 pounds of small
arms and ammunition, consisting mainly
of AK rifles and AK ammunition, hand
grenades, jungle boots.'' It was
scheduled to make air drops to Contra
soldiers in Nicaragua.@s7@s1 
   The flight had been organized by
elements of the CIA, the Defense
Department, and the National Security
Council, coordinated by the Office of
Vice President George Bush. 
   At that time, such arms resupply
was prohibited under U.S. law. 
   The aircraft headed south along
the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, turned
east over Costa Rica, then headed up
north into Nicaraguan air space. As it
descended toward the point at which it
was to drop the cargo, the plane was
hit in the right engine and wing by a
ground-to-air missile. The wing burst
into flames and broke up. Cargo handler
Eugene Hasenfus jumped out the left
cargo door and opened his parachute.
The other three crew members died in
the crash.@s7@s2 
   Meanwhile, Felix Rodriguez made a
single telephone call--to the office of
Vice President George Bush. He told
Bush aide Samuel Watson that the C-123k
aircraft was missing and was possibly
down. 
   {October 6, 1986:} 
   Eugene Hasenfus, armed only with a
pistol, took refuge in a small hut on a
jungle hilltop inside Nicaragua. He was
soon surrounded by Sandinista soldiers
and gave himself up.@s7@s3 
   Felix Rodriguez called George
Bush's aide Sam Watson again. Watson
now notified the White House Situation
Room and the National Security Council
staff about the missing aircraft. 
   Oliver North was immediately
dispatched to El Salvador to prevent
publicity over the event, and to
arrange death benefits for the
crew.@s7@s4 
   After the shoot-down, several
elaborate attempts were made by
government agencies to provide false
explanations for the origin of the
aircraft. 
   A later press account, appearing
on May 15, 1989, after Bush was safely
installed as President, exposed one
such attempted coverup: 
   Official: Contras Lied to
Protect VP Bush 
   By Alfonso Chardy, Knight-Ridder
Newspapers  
   WASHINGTON--Nicaraguan rebels
falsely assumed responsibility for an
arms-laden plane downed over Nicaragua
in 1986 in an effort to shield
then-Vice President George Bush from
the controversy that soon blossomed
into the Iran-Contra scandal, a senior
Contra official said in early May 1989. 
   According to the Contra official,
who requested anonymity but has direct
knowledge of the events, a Contra
spokesman, Bosco Matamoros [official
FDN representative in Washington,
D.C.], was ordered by [FDN Political
Director] Adolfo Calero to claim
ownership of the downed aircraft, even
though the plane belonged to Oliver
North's secret Contra supply
network.... 
   Calero called (Matamoros) and
said, ``Take responsibility for the
Hasenfus plane because we need to take
the heat off the vice president,'' the
Contra source said.... 
   The senior Contra official said
that shortly after Calero talked to
Matamoros, Matamoros called a reporter
for the {New York Times} and ``leaked''
the bogus claim of responsibility. The
{Times} ran a story about the claim on
its front page.@s7@s5
   {October 7, 1986:} 
   Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tx.)
called for a congressional
investigation of the Nicaraguan air
crash, and the crash of a Southern Air
Transport plane in Texas, to see if
they were part of a covert CIA
operation to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government. 
   {October 9, 1986:} 
   At a news conference in Nicaragua,
captured U.S. crew member Eugene
Hasenfus exposed Felix Rodriguez, alias
``Max Gomez,'' as the head of an
international supply system for the
Contras. The explosive, public phase of
the Iran-Contra scandal had begun. 
                                         
Notes for Chapter XIX
 

   27. 
{CovertAction,} No. 33, Winter
1990, pp. 13-14.
   On Amiram Nir, see Armstrong, {op.
cit.,} pp. 225-26, citing {Wall Street
Journal} 12/22/86, {New York Times}
1/12/87. 
   On Poindexter and North, see
Menges, {op. cit.,} p. 264. 

   28. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} pp.
140-41, citing Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, ``Report on
Preliminary Inquiry,'' Jan. 29, 1987. 

   29. 
Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} pp. 239-41. 

   30. 
Oliver North's diary, since
edited and partially declassified,
entries for ``10 Sep 85.'' Document no.
01527 in the Iran-Contra Collection. 

   31. 
{Washington Post,} June 10,
1990. 

   32. 
Charles E. Allen ``Memorandum
for the Record,'' December 18, 1985.
Partially declassified/released (i.e.
some parts are still deleted) by the
National Security Council on January
26, 1988. Document no. 02014 in the
Iran-Contra Collection. 

   33. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} pp.
226-27, citing {Wall Street Journal}
12/22/86, {New York Times} 12/25/86 and
1/12/87. 

   34. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 231,
citing {Washington Post} 2/20/87, {New
York Times} 2/22/87. 

   35. 
{Ibid.,} p. 232, citing {Miami
Herald} 11/30/86. 

   36. 
Interview with Herman Moll in
{EIR Special Report:} ``Irangate...,''
pp. 81-83. 

   37. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 235,
citing {Washington Post} 12/16/86,
12/27/86, 1/10/87 and 1/12/87; {Ibid.,}
p. 238, citing Tower Commission Report;
Menges, {op. cit.,} p. 271. 

   38. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} pp.
240-41, citing {Washington Post}
1/10/87 and 1/15/87; Sen. John Tower,
Chairman, {The Tower Commission Report:
The Full Text of the President's
Special Review Board} (New York: Bantam
Books, 1987), p. 217. 

   39. 
{Ibid.,} pp. 37, 225. 

   40. 
North notebook entry Jan. 9,
1986, Exhibits attached to Gregg
Deposition in Tony Avirgan and Martha
Honey v. John Hull, Rene Corbo, Felipe
Vidal et al., 29 April 1988. 

   41. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 258,
citing the Brenneke letter, which was
made available to the National Security
Archive. 

   42. 
U.S. government stipulations
at the North trial, in {EIR Special
Report:} ``Irangate...,'' p. 22. 

   43. 
{Tower Commission Report}, pp.
67-68, 78. 

   44. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 266,
citing {Washington Post} 1/10/87 and
1/15/87. 

   45. 
Chronology supplied by Office
of Vice President Bush; Armstrong, {op.
cit.,} p. 266, citing {Washington Post}
12/16/86. 

   46. 
Deposition of Robert Earl,
{Iran-Contra Report}, May 2, 1987, Vol.
9, pp. 22-23; Deposition of Craig Coy,
{Iran-Contra Report}, March 17, 1987,
Vol. 7, pp. 24-25: cited in
{CovertAction,} No. 33, Winter 1990, p.
13. 

   47. 
Oliver Revell to Sen. David
Boren, chairman of Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, April 17,
1987; {Washington Post} Feb. 17, 20 and
22, 1987; {Wall Street Journal} Feb.
20, 1987: cited in {CovertAction,} No.
33, Winter 1990, p. 13. 

   48. 
 {Newsweek,} Oct. 21, 1985, p.
26; Earl Exhibit, nos. 3-8, attached to
Earl Deposition, {op. cit.}: cited in
{CovertAction} No. 33, Winter 1990, p.
15. 

   49. 
Earl Deposition, {op. cit.,}
May 30, 1987, pp. 33-37; May 15, 1987,
pp. 117-21 (Channell and Miller); May
15, 1987, pp. 131, 119 (private
contributors). 

   50. 
Donald Gregg Briefing
Memorandum for the Vice President, Jan.
27, 1986; released by the National
Security Council March 22, 1988.
Document no. 02254 in Iran-Contra
Collection. 

   51. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 275,
citing {Miami Herald} 11/30/86. 

   52. 
{Ibid.,} p. 280, citing the
Menarczik letter to Brenneke which was
made available to the National Security
Archive. 

   53. 
{Ibid.,} citing {Miami Herald}
11/30/86. 

   54. 
{New York Times,} Nov. 30,
1986, Dec. 4, 1986. See Gregg
testimony: Brenneke had M's number. 

   55. 
Quoted in Menges, {op. cit.,}
p. 275. 

   56. 
Deposition of Michael Tolliver
in Avirgan and Honey, {op. cit.}  

   57. 
Allan Nairn, ``The Bush
Connection,'' in {The Progressive}
(London: May 18, 1987), pp. 21-22. 

   58. 
Nairn, {op. cit.,} pp. 19,
21-23. 

   59. 
{Tower Commission Report,} p.
465  

   60. 
Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} pp. 244-45. 

   61. 
{Ibid.}  

   62. 
``Schedule Proposal,'' Office
of the Vice President, April 16, 1986,
exhibit attached to Gregg Deposition in
Avirgan and Honey, {op. cit.} 
 
   63. 
Office of the Vice President
Memorandum, April 30, 1986, released
Aug. 28, 1987 by the National Security
Council. Document no. 02738 in the
Iran-Contra Collection. 

   64. 
Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} pp. 245-46. 
   See also Gregg confirmation
hearings, excerpted {infra,} and
numerous other sources. 

   65. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} pp.
368-69, citing Senate Select
Intelligence Committee Report, Jan. 29,
1987. 

   66. 
{Ibid.,} p. 373, citing
{Washington Post} 12/16/86. 

   67. 
{Ibid.,} p. 388-89, citing
McFarlane testimony to the Tower
Commission. 

   68. 
Affidavit of Eugene Harry
Hasenfus, October 12, 1986, pp. 2-3.
Document no. 03575 in the Iran-Contra
Collection. 

   69. 
{Tower Commission Report,} pp.
385-88. 

   70. 
{Washington Post}, Feb. 26,
1987. 

   71. 
Hasenfus Affidavit, pp. 6-7. 

   72. 
{Ibid.} 
 
   73. 
Hasenfus Affidavit, p. 7. 

   74. 
Armstrong, {op. cit.,} p. 508,
citing the chronology provided by
George Bush's office, {Washington Post}
12/16/86; {New York Times} 12/16/86,
12/17/86 and 12/25/86; {Wall Street
Journal} 12/19/86 and 12/24/86. 

   75. 
{Laredo [Texas] Morning
Times,} May 15, 1989, p. 1. 



----
         John Covici
          covici@ccs.covici.com

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