From: kkniaz@eniac.seas.upenn.edu (Krzysztof W. Kniaz)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.polish
Subject: Re: What the Poles could have done
Date: 27 Sep 92 20:09:09 GMT
Followup-To: soc.culture.jewish
Organization: University of Pennsylvania

Warning: The text presented below is quite long and deals with
the painful question "What the Poles could have done". If you're
not interested in amounts of amunition and guns handed over to
the Jewish resistance by the Polish home Army, and the detailed
history of relationship between both sides, please press "j" now.
IMHU it is a very intersting piece of history (told honestly).



==================================cut here=============================

From: "The Forgotten Holocaust" by Richard C. Lucas, University Press of
Kentucky, Lexington, 1984.



One of the most controversial aspects of Polish-Jewish relations
during World War II concerns the role of the AK prior to and during
the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in April 1943. Prevailing historiography
depicts the AK as a nest of anti-Semites reluctant to help the Jews
and implies that had the AK given substantial assistance to them,
the outcome of the struggle would have been different. As has been
seen, the AK was a large umbrella organization housing numerous
military organizations, reflecting, in political terms, a 
variety of attitudes. The extreme right-wing anti-Semites, the NSZ.
were not members of the AK during the greater part of the war. The
leadership of the AK, like the Polish government in London, was not
anti-Semitic, and its decisions concerning the Jews of the Warsaw
Ghetto were influenced by considerations that, unfortunately. have
not been given the emphasis they deserve.


During the deportation of the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto in the
summer of 1942, the Polish underground press sympathetically
chronicled the grim event. But the obvious passive acceptance of
inevitable death by the Jews did little to inspire confidence among
the Poles and especially the AK to initiate any kind of military
operation on their behalf. "After all, how could the AK initiate
operations without the knowledge and will of the Jews themselves?",
declared Henryk Wolinski, a liberal humanitarian who headed the 
Jewish Bureau of the AK. Responsible Jewish leaders at the time,
like Feiner and Berman, did not expect a military response by the
AK during the Warsaw deportations. According to a Polish courier,
Jerzy Lerski, "I heard no complaints against his [Rowecki] military
inaction in the July-September 1942 period from any of the Jewish
leaders whom I met in Poland in the 1943-44 period." He added: "And
this was the case, because the alleged possibility of such
`military actions' in mid 1942, on the part off the Polish 
underground was non-existent." The Polish Communists, who had
strong contacts with Jewish groups that eventually decided to
resist the Germans, urged the Jews on August 1, 1942 not to accept
slaughter passively and "to save thousands and tens of thousands,
though this will cost victims."


There was substantial division among the Warsaw Jews themselves
concerning what policy should be followed toward the Germans.
Shortly before the deportations from Warsaw, Zionists despite
massacres that had occurred elsewhere, still believed it
"unthinkable" that the Nazis would attempt to liquidate their
ghetto, the largest in Poland. Bundists talked about maintaining a 
"psychological self-defense" and waiting for the Allied second
front. "We should not be chauvinists - not only Jews suffer and
perish," a Bund representative declared. "Thousands of Poles are
also led to their deaths." The representative of the conservative 
Agudah Israel proclaimed faith as the solution to the Jewish
problem. "I believe in God and in a miracle, God will not let his
people be wiped out," he said. "War against the Germans is
senseless. The Germans can put an end to us within a few days," he
added. Even the leader of the General Zionists, Dr. Itzhak Szyper,
believed that resistance would mean the destruction of the entire
Warsaw Ghetto, while passivity would save at least a core of Jews
from the Germans. Only the left-wing Jews, especially the left-wing
Zionists and Communists favored armed action against the Nazis.
Though the attitude of Jewish residents toward the idea of
resistance changed somewhat after the deportations in the summer of
1942, even then, when Jewish resistance groups were organized, only
3 to 5 percent of the population of the Warsaw Ghetto participated
actively in the uprising of April-May, 1943. By then there should
have been no doubt among Jews anywhere in Poland what their fate
would be.


After the trauma of the deportations, the Jews in October 1942
organized the Jewish National Committee, which was under the
influence of left-wing Zionists and Communists. That was the reason
the Bund refused to join it. As a result, the committee and the
Bund established a Coordinating Commission which later represented
them in their dealings with the Polish underground. The Jewish
Fighting Organization (ZOB), originally organized late in July
1942, was expanded on a broader political base in December 1942,
and headed by Mordechai Anielewicz, a representative of the
left-wing Zionist-Marxist group, Hashomer-Hatzair. There were
several Jewish Communists on the staff of the Coordinating
Commission and the Jewish Fighting Organization, including Michael
Rosenfeld and Ephraim Fondaminski, who was the ghetto secretary of 
the Polish Workers Party. Immediately prior to the Ghetto Uprising
in the spring of 1943. The Communists organized four or five combat
units, about the same number the Bund put together. The remaining
fourteen units were organized by the Zionists, but many of these
were also under Marxist influence. Little wonder the AK regarded
the Jewish resistance groups with suspicion and questioned their
loyalty: after all, left-wing Zionists and Communists had been less
than friendly toward the Polish government and its representatives
in Poland. 

It was in these circumstances that the Jews sought to make contact
with representatives of the AK. General Bor claimed in his book
"Secret Army" in 1951, and again in an interview three years later,
that "Waclaw," one of several pseudonyms used by Henryk Wolinski,
had been sent by Rowecki in July 1942 to establish contacts with
Jewish leaders in the ghetto and to offer AK support if the Jews
decided to resist. The Jews refused the proffered help, said Bor,
on the grounds that they did not believe the Nazis would deport and
kill all the inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto. Wolinski, on the
other hand, has pointed out that he had no contact with Jewish
representatives until October 1942 . This discrepancy, added to
Bor's unconfirmed claim that Rowecki ordered an intensification of
sabotage on German lines of communication to hamper or delay the
deportations has led several historians to conclude that Bor's
claims were his own invention, made to improve the Polish image
concerning wartime aid to the Jews.


Wolinski, however, does not deny that such a meeting between Polish
and Jewish representatives may have taken place during the early
stage of the deportations from Warsaw. In defense of Bor's claim,
Wolinski has suggested that the Jewish Bureau, the agency in the AK
that he headed, was not the only source of information about the
Jews available to the High Command of the AK, and that Bor had a
wider range of information about the Jews than he did. Furthermore,
a courier of the AK confirmed Bor's claim in a statement that read:
"In the initial stages of this appalling slaughter the Commander of
the Secret Army proposed, through his agents, immediate help to a
number of outstanding representatives of the Jewish community,
should they intend to take action in self-
defense. This proposal was not accepted by the Jews at the time."
In view of the lack of unity among Jews themselves concerning
resistance, a fact again dramatically illustrated shortly before
the ghetto uprising when a member of the Judenrat approached AK 
authorities *not* to give the Jewish Fighting Organization weapons,
it seems that Bor's claim cannot be entirely ignored.


In any case, sometime during the Warsaw deportation action, a
representative of the Bund contacted the Jewish Bureau, requesting
that a cable be sent to Zygielbojm in London. The Bund simply
requested that money be sent. The cable was dispatched and $5,000
was sent from London. It was not until October 1942 that Wolinski
met with Aryeh Wilner (known as "Jurek") who represented the Jewish
National Committee, and requested that contact between Jewish and
Polish military and civilian representatives be established to
coordinate their efforts and to secure Polish military help for the
Jewish Fighting Organization (ZOB). It was during that meeting that
Wilner said he had tried earlier - in August - to make contact with
the AK, but that effort failed to produce results. The reason it
failed to materialize was, according to Wolinski, not because AK
authorities rejected the request but because Wilner "approached a
person who was a civilian and that person didn't want to assume the
task of putting him in contact with the A.K." Wilner's frustrated
initial attempt to make personal contact with the AK was not
regarded by Jewish leaders at the time as a major issue, and none
of them - Wilner, Feiner, or Berman - made any allegations about
the Poles to Wolinski on this matter.


On November 11, 1942, Rowecki took Jewish requests under
advisement, praised the battle readiness of the ZOB, and authorized
them to organize into units of five resistance fighters. Polish
cooperation initiated with the Jews was tentative and reserved. In 
December, the Poles gave only ten pistols and a small amount of
ammunition to the Jews. In order not to deepen Polish suspicions
about Communist influence in the Jewish resistance movement, Wilner
submitted a code of regulations which included all Jewish
organizations, except the Communists. that functioned under the
Jewish political and military structure in the Warsaw ghetto. Prior
to January 18, 1943, when the Warsaw Jews initiated their first, if
spontaneous armed resistance against the Germans, the AK gave the
Jews an additional ten pistols instruction in diversionary actions,
and directions to make Molotov cocktails. From the beginning of
December 1942, members of the Jewish resistance regularly visited
secret quarters of the AK on Marszalkowska Street, where they
received military training:


"There, Captain "Szyna" himself was giving fighting-subversive
training, aided by one of the devoted officers of the Sappers,
Lieutenant "Gryf" (Leon Tarajkowicz). The men from the Ghetto were
handed various printed instructions on how to use the arms and 
explosives, studied the techniques of fighting in town, were
acquainted on the spot with various anti-tank weapons effective at
close range, and were initiated into the manufacture of typical
incendiary materials, mines and grenades. The ZOB fighters 
showed tremendous ardour, lively interest, and a great deal of
military ability, as confirmed many years later by the officers of
the Home Army Sappers."


The reserve of the AK in supplying the Jewish resistance with arms
is pointedly brought out in Rowecki's message to London on January
1, 1943: "Jews from various groups, including Communists, turn to
us for weapons as though we have full arsenals. I gave them a few
pistols on trial but I have no idea whether they will use them. I
will not give more arms because, as you know, we don't have them
ourselves and are waiting for you to send them. Inform me what kind
of contact local Jews have with London."


After the armed resistance of the Jews during the period January
18-22, 1943, the attitude of the AK toward giving additional arms
to the Jews changed. This change reflected the positive views of
Poles who praised Jewish heroism and even inflated Jewish
achievements against the Nazis. According to the official Polish
history of the AK, Rowecki's organization gave the following arms
and supplies to the ZOB prior to the Ghetto Uprising of April 1943:
90 pistols with magazines and ammunition, 500 defensive hand
grenades, 100 offensive grenades, 15 kilograms of explosives with
fuses and detonators, 1 light machine gun, 1 submachine gun, and
material to make Molotov cocktails and sabotage material such as
time bombs and safety fuses. The AK and its affiliates aided the
ZOB in purchasing arms on the black market, a practice in which the
AK also engaged. Zegota also allocated some of its funds for the
purchase of arms for the Jewish resistance.


In addition, two organizations, part of the AK - the Polish
People's Independence Action (PLAN) and the Security Corps (KB) -
gave the Jewish Military Union (ZZW), an independent Jewish
resistance group, aid in acquiring arms and ammunition. According
to Henryk Iwanski, who distinguished himself along with other
members of his unit, the KB provided the ZZW with 2 heavy machine
guns, 4 light machine guns, 21 submachine guns, 30 rifles, 50
pistols, and over 400 grenades. The PLAN also managed to supply the
ZZW with an assortment of pistols, rifles, ammunition, and on one
occasion a case of 60 grenades. The aid of the People's Guard was
the most modest: 25 rifles and 2 boxes of ammunition. The Jews
themselves produced a large number of Molotov cocktails, the
primary weapon of the ZOB, and electronically detonated mines. Just
how large Jewish production was came to light in 1944, when in the
course of construction work on a street in the former ghetto, the
workmen uncovered 100,000 detonators for Molotov cocktails.


In comparison to the existing supply of arms in the AK, the amount
of arms and ammunition given by the AK to the ZOB was small. In the
city of Warsaw, the AK had immediately prior to the Ghetto Uprising
25 heavy machine guns, 62 light machine guns, 1182 rifles, 1099
pistols, and 51 submachine guns. But the AK had only a few
anti-tank rifles and anti-tank guns in its arsenal in Warsaw, and
these were the types of weapons the Jews needed in order to prolong
their struggle. Even Schwarzbart saw clearly that it was not merely
a matter of giving the Jewish resistance more weapons. The critical
problem for the Jews and the AK was the lack of heavy arms: "It is
obvious that whatever the quantity of arms at their disposal, the
Jewish fighters were doomed to be defeated eventually by the
formidable war machine of the Germans. The only thing which could
have been achieved by the possession of more and particularly of
heavy arms would have been the inflicting of greater losses upon
the German forces in the ghetto."


It would have been unreasonable to have expected the AK to divest
itself entirely of these few heavy weapons that it would obviously
need for launching the long-planned general uprising when the
Germans were at the point of military collapse. To be sure, the
Poles could have given more pistols and rifles to the Jews, but
smaller weapons of this type would not have altered the military
situation in Jewish favor against the Germans. Moreover, it is not
entirely clear how many of these guns were the personal weapons of 
members of the AK who, like soldiers anywhere, would have been
reluctant to part with them.


Despite what appears to be impressive numbers of weapons in the AK
in 1943-44, a large amount of these arms that had been buried after
the September campaign were unusable. There were perennial
shortages of ammunition in the AK, too. Air drops of arms and
supplies had no appreciable impact on weapons shortages until 1943.
As Bor said, "The quantity of weapons at our disposal was always a
small amount in comparison with the number of men to be armed; so
we had to supplement armed action by attacks on the enemy's morale
which would not require dynamite or guns." As late as 1944, many of
the AK's combat operations were at least partially intended to
secure more arms and ammunition. Finally, the extensive shortage of
weapons in the AK was dramatized when it launched the Warsaw
Uprising on August 1, 1944, more than a year after the ghetto
insurgency: only 10 percent of its soldiers were properly armed.


Although recent historians have been critical of the amount of AK
aid to the Jews prior to the Ghetto Uprising, Wilner and Berman
considered the help, in Wolinski's words, "generous and honest," a
view confirmed by General Bor's contacts with Jewish emissaries
from the ghetto. Michael Borwicz, a Jew who fought in the AK,
remarked later, "The cooperation of the AK was real and substantial
even though it did not measure up to the enormity of the events."
Responsible Jewish leaders in Warsaw were fully aware that by
resisting the Germans, the Jews had no chance to survive if they
remained in the ghetto. As Wilner told Wolinski, "We do not wish to
save our lives. None of us will come out alive. We wish to save our
human dignity." Before Karski left on his mission to the West,
Feiner told him that a defense of the Ghetto was to be "a
demonstration and a reproach"; there were no Jewish illusions about
defeating the Germans. Shortly after the uprising was launched in
April 1943, Jewish representatives radioed Zygielbojm and
Schwartzbart in London: "The result of the battle was decided from
the outset... We will fight to the last."


At no time did responsible Jewish leaders of the Warsaw Ghetto,
except perhaps Anielewicz, expect the AK to squander its strength
and join the Jews in a suicidal uprising. Nor did they have the
right to do so. As Wolinski aptly suggested, any uprising by the AK
at the time would have been "pointless." This view was obviously
shared by Sikorski, because as Poland's commander in chief he did
not order major AK involvement in the Jewish insurgency. The only
reasonable option open to the AK was to initiate diversionary
attacks when the Jewish uprising began. Before the uprising began,
the AK apprised the Jews of what it would do in this regard. To
have attempted to do anything more would have unnecessarily eroded
AK strength, depriving it of the men and resources they needed to
take power in Poland at the time of German military collapse and
before the Soviets took possession of the country. After all, the
purpose of the Polish underground was not only to engage in
anti-German conspiracy but also to help the Polish people survive
the occupation into the postwar era.


Rowecki, apprehensive that a Jewish uprising in the ghetto might
trigger a premature insurgency of the city of Warsaw, which would
have invited a slaughter of the entire population, sought to get
the agreement of the Jewish Fighting Organization (ZOB) to evacuate
from the city with the help of the AK to eastern Poland where they
had a better chance to survive than in the environs of the capital.
It simply was not practical to absorb these Jewish units around
Warsaw. Besides. it is possible that the AK preferred armed 
Jewish units not to be in a sensitive area where they could
initiate an armed insurrection in close collaboration with the
Communists; this would certainly be detrimental to the plans and
interests of the AK and the supporters of the Polish
government-in-exile. In any case. the Jewish resistance fighters
refused to leave the Ghetto. Even after the Jewish uprising began
and AK officials offered to get armed fighters out of the ghetto,
Icchak Cukierman, who belatedly replaced Wilner as the Jewish
liaison with the AK, replied. "The combat companies will not leave
the ghetto as long as they have a single bullet left in [their]
rifles to shoot themselves with."


The fears of Rowecki and the High Command of the AK concerning a
premature uprising in Warsaw in early 1943 were not without
foundation. When the Poles finally decided to launch their own
insurrection in Warsaw more than a year later in August 1944 - a
far larger enterprise that involved more people and resulted in
greater casualties and destruction than the Jewish rising - they
found that even in the more favorable circumstances of that time,
the Germans could not be overcome without substantial Allied
assistance, which never came.


Prior to and during the Ghetto Uprising, there was understandable
fear in AK circles concerning the extent of Communist influence in
the Jewish resistance movement. As one AK spokesman allegedly told
Cukierman: "We believe that the ghetto is no more than a base for
Soviet Russia. A plan exists, and [we] Poles know what it is. The
Russians were the ones who prepared the revolt in the Warsaw
Ghetto, and you have far more weapons than you let on; and I am
sure that on May 1, 1943 [May Day], they will land Dessant [sic] in
the Warsaw ghetto." A well-known apologist for the Jews pointed up
the problem when he wrote: The direct relationship between the
Communist ranks and the Jews in the ghetto was one of sincere
comradeship and was free of the reserve and suspicion that marked
the ties with the... AK." The exaggerated suspicion in official 
Polish circles that the Soviets were intimately involved in the
Jewish insurgency is revealed by the query of the Polish minister
of defense, Marian Kukiel, even after the Jews had been subdued:
"Was the resistance of the Jews during the liquidation of the 
ghetto really led and organized by Soviet officers and
noncommissioned officers parachuted into the ghetto and were arms,
ammunition, and anti-tank guns supplied in the same fashion?"


The Ghetto Uprising that began on April 19, 1943, pitted 1,500 to
2,000 poorly armed Jewish fighters against approximately 2,100
enemy troops who had heavy weapons, including tanks, armored
vehicles, and aircraft at their disposal. This struggle, in
Ringelblum's words, was "between a fly and an elephant" and the
result was a foregone conclusion. Estimates of the strength of the
Jewish Fighting Organization (ZOB) and the Jewish Military Union
(ZZW) vary: Gutman says there were 750 in the ranks of the ZOB and
250 in the ZZW, while Ainsztein estimates 600-800 in ZOB and 
400 in the ZZW. The remainder of the armed Jews who participated in
the struggle were wildcat groups which were not part of the ZOB or
the ZZW. Estimates of their strength differ widely - from a few
hundred to 2.000. In any case, if one accepts the estimate that
there were 70,000 Jews in the ghetto prior to the uprising, no more
than 3 percent of the Jewish inhabitants actually took part in the
struggle against the Germans. If one accepts the estimate of Gutman
that there were as few as 40,000 Jews in the ghetto before the
insurrection, then not more than 5 percent of the Jews participated
in combat against the enemy. Thus the overwhelming majority of Jews
were not combatants during the uprising; most of them hid in
bunkers and remained passive. The heroic struggle of the Jews
evoked sympathy and support among most Poles. The day the Jews
launched their insurgency, Korbonski immediately radioed London,
informing Polish authorities there of what was going on and urging
them to speak on the radio to the brave defenders. On April 30,
1943, the government delegate stated: "The Polish nation is right
in showing compassion to the persecuted Jews and helping them. We
should continue to help them." Sikorski was preoccupied with the
Katyn affair, which resulted in Stalin's severing diplomatic
relations with the London Poles shortly after the Jews rose up in
revolt in Warsaw, but Sikorski declared in a radio broadcast on May
5, 1943: "The greatest crime in human history is being perpetuated.
We know that you are helping the suffering Jews as best you can. I
thank you on behalf of my government and myself. I beg you to give
them all possible aid and to resist this terrifying barbarity."


The Polish clandestine press gave thorough and compassionate
coverage to the Ghetto Uprising. SWIT broadcast extensive and
sympathetic accounts of the Jewish struggle. Mrs. Korbonska, who
played a critical role with her husband in getting the information
to London for broadcast to Poland, said dolefully at the time, "It
will be easier for them [Jews] to die with the knowledge that the
world hears how they are dying." The Polish press was nothing more
than a reflection of the prevailing view's of most Poles.  
Ringelblum was highly critical of Polish reactions. But contrary to
expressions by Ringelblum, who was the beneficiary of Polish aid
that enabled him to live on the Aryan side before he and his Polish
protectors were killed by the Nazis, other testimonies give a
different impression of Poles who witnessed or heard of what went
on in Warsaw in the spring of 1943. The picture is not only of fear
and shock among most Poles, impressed by Nazi toughness in
responding to the insurgency, but also of sympathy and friendship 
for the Jewish people. Yes, there were anti-Semitic publications
which delighted in the massacre of Jews, but these did not
represent a predominant view.


During the uprising there were several combat actions undertaken by
units of the AK and GL to help the beleaguered Jews. According to
one account, there were twenty-six actions, including combat,
supply, and evacuation actions, during the period extending from
April 19 through May 10, 1943. For example, on April 19, 1943, a
unit of AK sappers, headed by Captain Jozef Pszenny ("Chwacki"),
tried to break through the ghetto wall on Bonifraterska and
Sapiezynska streets. Heavy enemy gunfire prevented the unit 
from destroying the walls. Two AK soldiers were killed and four
were wounded. On April 23, 1943. AK units again attacked the
Germans at several points. Four days later, an eighteen-man unit of
the AK's Security Corps took part in fighting the Germans within
the ghetto itself. Headed by Captain Henryk Iwanski, the unit had
entered the ghetto through a tunnel under Muranowski Square, which
they also used to bring guns and ammunition to the fighters of the
Jewish Military Union. Iwanski's brother and two sons were killed,
while Iwanski was seriously wounded. There were also several
operations initiated by the GL. For example, one unit eliminated a
German heavy machine gun nest on April 20, and several units of the
GL attacked the enemy near the ghetto walls on April 23. SS 
General Juergen Stroop, who commanded the German forces against the
Jews, referred several times to "Polish bandits" in his reports to
headquarters. In one of his reports early in the insurrection,
Stroop wrote: "It must be further stated that since yesterday, some
of our formations have been repeatedly shot at from outside the
Ghetto i.e., from the Aryan part. Assault units immediately entered
the area in question and in one case succeeded in apprehending 35
Polish bandits, Communists, who were liquidated at once. At
executions, which became necessary today, bandits repeatedly
collapsed shouting "Long Live Poland! and Long Live Moscow!"


The AK and GL also participated in several successful efforts to
evacuate Jews from the ghetto. The AK gave Jews the plans of the
municipal sewer network and put them in touch with Polish guides.
According to one high-ranking officer of the AK, "Several 
dozen Z.O.B. fighters" were rescued by the AK through the sewers
and later found refuge in nearby forests. Iwanski's unit helped
evacuate thirty-four resistance fighters, about the same time that
a GL unit rescued forty Jewish soldiers. Thanks to units affiliated
with the AK, as many as 140 ZZW fighters made it out of the ghetto
to the Michalin Woods; unfortunately, about one-third of them died
in combat later in a nearby forest. There were uncounted numbers of
Jews who made it to the Aryan side of the ghetto walls during these
tragic days. Ringelblum noted: "Other Ghetto inhabitants besides
the Ghetto combatants also escaped to the Aryan side, though those
who were unarmed rarely succeeded. I was told as an authentic fact
about a group of sixty Jews who made their way over to the Aryan
side across the ruins of a block on Grzybowska Street through
barbed wire. People living in this block saw the tragic scene and
fortunately no one betrayed these Jews escaping from the Ghetto."
Zegota also played a role in moving a unit of ZOB righters from
Warsaw to Cracow and tried to link them up with partisans in the
area. Conspicuously absent was Soviet help to the Jews. Since there
was an obvious Communist presence in the ghetto, one would have
expected something more than an air attack by the Soviet Air Force
on the night of May 12, 1943, that ended up killing more Poles and
Jews than Germans.


Toward the end of May 1943, Stroop revealed that 56,065 Jews in the
ghetto had been "apprehended" of that number, 19,929 had died in
the struggle. He claimed his own losses were only 16 killed and 85
wounded, a likely downplaying for obvious reasons. But regardless,
the Jews of the ghetto had embarrassed the Germans. As Rowecki
wrote, "The continuation of the resistance for such a long time is
viewed as a disgrace by certain German circles." More importantly,
as one Jewish historian has aptly observed: "The Warsaw Ghetto
Uprising had a real influence not only in stimulating the
resistance in other ghettoes and camps, but also in encouraging the
activity of the Polish underground."






--

Krzysztof Kniaz, University of Pennsylvania |Due to circumstances beyond
Lab for Research on the Structure of Matter |your control, you're master of 
Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA                |your fate and captain of your soul
Newsgroups: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.polish