From: pesetsk@athena.mit.edu (David M Pesetsky)
Subject: Re: Cognitive linguistics [was Re: Prototypes]
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 15:46:34 GMT

In article <92Aug26.100040edt.47888@neat.cs.toronto.edu> mstede@cs.toronto.edu (Manfred Stede) writes:
>peeters@tasman.cc.utas.edu.au (bert peeters) writes:
>
>>I'd like to hear from those who could tell me the difference between
>>"linguistics" and "cognitive linguistics", if there is a difference.
>
>In 'The Invariance Hypothesis: is abstract reason based on image schemas?',
>Cognitive Linguistics Vol 1 No 1, p. 40, George Lakoff defines cognitive 
>linguistics as being motivated by two 'primary commitments':
>
>* The generalization commitment: the task is to ``characterize the general
>principles governing all aspects of human language.''
>* The cognitive commitment: ``make one's account of human language accord
>with what is generally known about the mind and the brain, from other
>disciplines as well as our own.''
>
>The first commitment I presume is uncontroversial.
>The second one emphasizes the CogSci-affinity of this branch of linguistics:
>we shouldn't build models of language processing without taking other results
>about human cognitive behavior into account.  Lakoff discusses various 
>examples like prototype theory, conventional metaphor, mental images.
>He furthermore contrasts the cognitive commitment with those underlying
>classical linguistics (which he himself used to adhere to some time ago):
>
>* Symbol manipulation: Language must be explained within the generative
>symbol-manipulation paradigm.
>* The Fregean commitment: Meaning must be explained in terms of truth and
>reference.
>
>When one's thinking is grounded in principles like these, Lakoff says,
>clashes with cognitive observations are inevitable, which lead him to 
>abandon them and adopt the cognitive linguistics perspective.

Yes, this is in accord with my reading/knowledge of Lakoff.  Two points
then.  First, the "cognitive observations" important to Lakoff with
which I am familiar shockingly underdetermine his conclusions.  For
example, nothing empirical in his entire metaphor book with Johnson (nor
anything I know about the later book) in any way contradicts, clashes or
otherwise undermines symbol-manipulation linguistics or the "Fregean
commitment", except insofar as Lakoff's notion of the "Fregean
commitment" incorporates the dubious notion "must be explained" and some
semi-private notion of how we should understand the term "meaning".  I
can (and do) accept the observations about the function and
systematicity of metaphor as important, yet see no reason to abandon
those ideas that Lakoff feels we should abandon.

Secondly, the notion that we must take into account "what is generally
known about the mind and the brain, from other disciplines as well as
our own" presupposes a generality of opinion concerning the mind and the
brain which does not exist.  From some I hear that specialization of
function is a property of the brain, yet there are other results that
some people interpret as evidence for diffusion of certain functions
(Ojema).  Furthermore, there is a presupposition here that results
concerning, say, vision should immediately tell us something about
language.  But this is at best a research topic, not something to be
presupposed.  Maybe yes, maybe no.  You have to show it.

In linguistics, the symbol-manipulation paradigm is the only one that
has achieved results, and what is more, even Cognitive linguists, if
they speak of morphemes, nouns, declensions, sentences [as they do] work
within this paradigm, whether they like it or not.

-David Pesetsky
Newsgroups: sci.lang