HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:22:06 GMT


 In <1992Nov11.194933.8724@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com
 (Perry E. Metzger) writes:

>Why stop there? Why not outlaw the computer itself? Obviously, without
>the computer, no harm could have been done, right?

>There is a key problem that the sensationalizers have -- they only
>consider one half of a problem. They note that cryptography can be
>used to aid in criminal activity -- they don't, however, look at the
>benefits.

 Apparently you have mistaken this thread for some other.  This
 thread is not about winning some sort of scholastic debate, nor is
 it about diddling around while waiting for the courts to throw out
 any law affecting cryptography.  Maybe they will, but I doubt it.

 This thread is the place to consider how to confront legislative
 arguments, and thus prevent or influence legislation.


>Using the "only look at the harm" argument, I could showt
>that steak knives should be outlawed -- after all, people get murdered
>with steak knives.

 Get prepared for that argument; the opposition will use any argument
 which is effective.  Personally, I did not find your counter-argument:

>When will people learn that not everything can be fixed by a law, but
>that much can be destroyed by one?

 to be nearly as effective.


>Similarly, no law banning cryptography will make the world
>into the place you want.

 The issue is not "banning" cryptography (or computers!); the issue
 is the ability of law-enforcement to access secret material (which
 was presumably passed on regulated lines or public "airwaves")
 *after* due process.  Maintaining future access might be the
 responsibility of the user (in return for the right to use
 cryptography on public or regulated facilities); the inability to
 give access might itself be considered a crime.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4633 comp.org.eff.talk:6946 alt.privacy:2196 talk.politics.guns:24001
From: dlo@druwa.ATT.COM (OlsonDL)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 11 Nov 92 20:19:30 GMT



In article <1dp5mpINNfat@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
} > If you simply don't like handguns, fine.  Don't own one.  
} 
} I don't know about the original poster but I don't like them in your, or
} other peoples hands. Like you I feel that I am infinitely responsible
} and would never never misuse any gun I owned Unfortunately I do not
} have the same confidence in you, or others , and am willing to give up
} my utterly responsile freedom in order to help protect me from other's
} irresponsibility.

I don't accept that.  I could not care less, if you want to give up your
*own* freedom, but I have a huge problem with your denying them to others
just because of your own fears.

Besides, such a ban does not give you the protection you seek.  For
instance, Washington D.C. denies the freedom of law-abiding citizens to
obtain handguns legally.  Yet, its murder rate is the highest in the
country (~80/100,000).  Compare that to, say, Colorado Springs Colorado
where a resident of that city can walk into any gun shop and purchase
any gun that's there, and walk out with it -- no waiting period, no FOID
card, no registration, nothing.  Yet the murder rate there is ~4/100,000.

} > If you feel that they are just too dangerous for people to own, consider the
} >  numbers - there are about 200 million handguns in the US, and about 12000 
} >  firearms homicides per year, and 1400 accidental firarms deaths.  That makes
} >  firearms safer than automobiles.  
} > 
}  Uh, hardly. divide the number of deaths by the number of times they
} are used, not by the number.

Ah, then the danger really isn't the firearms themselves, but rather in
*how they are used*.

--
David Olson   dlo@druwa.ATT.COM
"Keep in mind that I am speaking from Cambridge Massachusetts, which is
 about as far out as you can get."  Robert Reich, economic advisor to
 Bill Clinton, on "This Week with David Brinkley" 11/08/92
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: dmartin@blackcat.stortek.com (Dennis Martin-x2935)
Subject: "Coding" algorithms
Organization: Storage Technology Corp.
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 21:30:18 GMT

I'm looking for some sources on "coding" (as opposed to
bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte) algorithms.  Would you all 
please point me in the right direction (books, papers,
etc.)?  

My apologies if this question has been asked recently.

Thanks in advance,
Dennis Martin
Storage Technology
Dennis_Martin@stortek.com

*** opinions expressed are my own and not those of my employer ***
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4488 comp.org.eff.talk:6875 alt.privacy:2157 talk.politics.guns:23783
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 9 Nov 92 12:52:40 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: icat.larc.nasa.gov

starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:

>In article <palmer.721081324@news.larc.nasa.gov> palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) writes:
>}By the way, a MAJOR HUGE difference between automobiles and guns/crypt
>}is that driving a car on the highways of a state is a privilege, whereas
>}bearing arms in defense of self/family/country and communicating with
>}others privately are RIGHTS guarranteed (not granted) by our constitution.

>Actually, this is a statist myth.  In common law, the law of the land, driving
>is indeed a right, not a privilege, the cant of drivers' ed teachers, traffic
>cops and judges notwithstanding.

Hmmm, maybe you're right.  I'll have to try to find references concerning
freedom of movement, right to use public conveyances, etc.  Any pointers
would be appreciated.

It may well be that as long as we observe the necessary rules of behavior
for driving (like using your own lane, not driving drunk and endangering
others exercising their own rights, etc) that we do indeed have the RIGHT
to use the roads we paid for.  Seems fair enough.

I guess auto registration is just for taxation, then.

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 6 Nov 92 19:46:42 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <lfjmkiINNa74@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber) writes:
>    Require: (for-all p)( (c=E(p)) is a text which appears to be
>                                   a plaintext)


The problem here is that both c and p must carry information and be
believable both in style and as a real communication.  ("The pen of my aunt
is on the table" doesn't pass as a real communication even though it parses
correctly.)  So, the encrypted text must be hidden in the free choices of
the cover communication.  Since that cover communication needs to be
uniform in style, so as to fool the censors, you have very few choices.
This means that the bit rate is rather low...or, in other words, the
ciphertext will be much larger than the plaintext.
-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy
From: feustel@netcom.com (David Feustel)
Subject: Re: this week's illegal wiretap
Organization: DAFCO: OS/2 Software Support & Consulting
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1992 04:16:55 GMT

cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:


>Does anyone have details of this week's illegal wiretap (by the FBI
>against the Dept. of State official who had Clinton's and Perot's files
>searched)?

>Does anyone know how the FBI happened to tap this person?  Unless there's
>a time machine out there, how would it have known to tap? ...or does it
>just tap everybody and decide later to admit it, if something interesting
>was said?

Also note that this action by the FBI is precisely what the FBI said
they wouldn't do with their proposed universal wiretapping ordinance.
-- 
Dave Feustel N9MYI <feustel@netcom.com>
 
If convicted felons can't own firearms, then why in Hell
do we let GE make nuclear weapons?
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4672 comp.org.eff.talk:6968 alt.privacy:2213 talk.politics.guns:24043
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 1992 08:18:44 GMT

In article <gilchr.720707142@ee.ualberta.ca> gilchr@ee.ualberta.ca (Andrew Gilchrist) writes:
>If digital cellular ever gets off the ground, real-time data encryption
>via computer algorithms would become feasable.  'Til then, scrambling
>will be the way to go.

It may be feasable, but you'll have to do it yourself on an end-to-end
basis -- thanks to the NSA, the current digital cellular standards
provide "privacy" in name only. Nor is this likely to change.

Phil


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jdailey@dadd.ti.com (Jim Dailey)
Subject: Attack Methods
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Reply-To: jdailey@dadd.ti.com
Organization: Design Automaton Div., Texas Instruments, Inc.
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 21:35:35 GMT

In article 3997@randvax.rand.org, jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) writes:
>
>And another word of advice: don't try constructing new ciphers for some
>niche unless you have practical experience in breaking them.  There's no
>way you will anticipate the kinds of attacks that are available without
>starting from the cryptanalysis end.

So what are some of the methods used to attack an encrypted text, when the
encryption method is unknown?

Jim  jdailey@dadd.ti.com
   TI pays absolutely no attention to me or my opinions; therefore,
   the foregoing posting cannot possibly represent TI's viewpoint.
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption System - Challenge!
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 92 10:14:45 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: na
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <n0deft@ofa123.fidonet.org> 
Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes: 

>  anywhere...  I know I can't, but then I am no expert. The challenge I
>  posted was addressed to the experts here, but no one seems to have 
>  accepted, and that saddens me. I had hoped to have at least several 
>  expert cryptanalysts here accept the challenge and show him how 
>  wrong he is.  But no one has accepted so far... 

        Once you get past doing those little substitution ciphers
        in the back of crossword magazines, what becomes interesting
        is algorithms. For a method to be used, it has to be
        published (knowingly or otherwise, since dissassembling
        programs is duck soup these days). For an encryption to
        present a challenge, it has to be robust under plaintext
        attack when the attacker has a copy of the mechanism.

        Whether he is just being cute, or thinks he has patent
        possibilities, the sad fact is that the only way Erik's friend
        will get anyone's attention is by publishing his method.

        There may be a way out: He can claim that the method is the
        key. In that case he should publish the technique used to
        generate a very large number of cryptographically different
        methods. I've already proposed something very much like that
        in this group, which (strangely|sadly) didn't stimulate any
        discussion.

        Cheers,

                Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Consulting Systems Analyst  |  The PC: Colt '45
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  of the information
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |   frontier
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4401 alt.politics.usa.constitution:925
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.politics.usa.constitution
Subject: Re: Finally! We're getting somewhere.
Date: 6 Nov 92 08:30:32 GMT
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Followup-To: alt.politics.usa.constitution
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland

In article <1992Nov5.102744.28493@fasttech.com>, zeke@fasttech (Bohdan Tashchuk) writes:
>The written U.S. Constitution is the essence of what makes the U.S.A. a far
>safer democracy than the U.K., and by far the freest country in the world.
>It is a truly magnificent document.

I agree it is a very good document, and I envy it - the country I live
in doesn't have such a constitution.  I just wish you guys would _use_
it.  Your assertion about "the freest country" fails because you don't
- it would perhaps be true if the system would work according to the
constitution.  But it does no good to have such a document just
rotting away locked up somewhere, after even banning the material it's
printed on.

Followups directed to alt.politics.usa.constitution.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 6 Nov 92 19:12:27 GMT
 <Bx7v6J.1wD@portal.hq.videocart.com> <1992Nov5.214347.27535@netcom.com> <PA146008.482.721071372@utkvm1.utk.edu>
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <PA146008.482.721071372@utkvm1.utk.edu> PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu (David Veal) writes:

>       The major difference between guns and cars are that licensing and 
>registration have not been suggested as a way to reduce the numbers of cars 
>in private hands.  This has been said a number of times for guns.

Are you sure?  Wasn't one of the EPA and California AQMD/ARB proposals a
buyback of old cars?
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
From: zeke@fasttech.com (Bohdan Tashchuk)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
Date: 11 Nov 92 22:18:34 GMT
Article-I.D.: fasttech.1992Nov11.221834.21184
Organization: Fast Technology

In <n0e07t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:

> In my experience in the technical world, I've found that prouncing 
> some idea to be unworthy _ex cathedra_ gathers applause only among 
> the NIH (Not-Invented-Here) crowd.  The rest of the world sees only 
> their arbitrary pronouncement, and doesn't give much credit to the
> rejecter(s). 

You're completely wrong about this. People are simply telling you that you
don't have a beginner's clue about cryptography. You refuse to listen to what
they're saying. It's not NIH. Let me try to explain it differently.

Why don't you post to sci.physics, telling everyone that you've developed a
perpetual motion machine. Then you can whine the same way when experts "post
theoretical considerations" about why they won't waste time with you.

Even better, why don't you post to rec.autos.tech and tell them you've
developed a new carburetor that lets cars run on tap water. You might find
a few people there who would believe you.

> The most peculiar thing about your rejection, and that of the other
> person who replied, is that both of you are rejecting the challenge
> _without having ever seen the product you are rejecting!_.  This 
> worries me immensely.  Makes me wonder if you may not simply be 
> avoiding the challenge under some pretenses.  Am I mistaken?

There's nothing wrong with posting here. Perhaps you will find beginners who
will accept the challenge. Just don't get all huffy when experts dismiss it
out of hand. At least they told you what your friend needs to do for them to
be interested.

It's not a conspiracy. But if it were, nobody would be allowed to admit it.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: ujacampbe@memstvx1.memst.edu (James Campbell)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: pseudo one time pad...
Date: 11 Nov 92 14:49:08 -0600
Organization: Memphis State University

In article <1992Nov11.173642.29608@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu>, 
     butzerd@columbia.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer) writes:

> In the FAQ (Thanks to Larry Loen for this... it is informative...), the
> following is stated about pseudo one time pads:

>   and so permits cryptanalysis.  "Random number generators" are
>   frequently dreamed up by newcomers as a "pseudo one time pad",
>   but they are notoriously vulnerable to analysis, all
>                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>   independent of whether the pseudo-random stream satisfies
>   randomness tests or not.
> 
> My question is, why?  Now before I get roasted & told to "read the
> literature..." and "your an idiot...", I have read the literature.  I've
> sufficiently random (ie. NOT some type of feedback shift register or linear
> recurrence equation, but something random in a cryptographic as well as a
> statistical sense), and you follow the one time rule (ie. only use any key
> ONCE - never encrypt 2 files with the same key), this should be pretty
> secure.  For example, would the following be "vulnerable to analysis"?
> 
> 1) DES a file of ASCII 0's (of the same length as the plain text) with
> some key - this gives you a pseudo-random bit stream.
> 
> 2) XOR this with the plain text ---> cipher text.
> 
> This is pseudo one time pad that I don't think would be "easy" to break.

    Dane, do you happen to have a working implementation of the DES handy?
Good.  Now, make a file of ASCII 0's and encrypt it with some key.  Lookee,
Lookie, you get a list of random bits!  64 BITS LONG, to be exact, and the
same list is repeated for the length of the ciphertext file.  That's a big
reason why cryppies don't use BLOCK CIPHERS like the DES for one-time-pad
generation.  Of course, it would work fine if you limited your messages to
a length of 8 bytes... ;-)
    Using cypher-block chaining would create a more random-LOOKING bit
stream, but intuition tells me that it would have similar faults, and would
be reasonably easy to break as well (of course, I could be wrong...).
    I think you're probably looking at the one-time-pad scheme as a way of
IMPROVING on the DES.  Remember, though, that only OTP ciphers that use
truly random numbers are perfectly secure (in transmission, anyway), and
using a PRNG will always reduce this security to some degree.  To break any
encryption scheme like this, your adversary need only break the PRNG to do
it.  If this generator is the DES, then your OTP cipher scheme is no more
cryptographically secure than the DES itself.
    Finally, if you're going to use it as a generator, why not just encrypt
the plaintext with the DES in the first place, and skip the XOR step?

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - A Challenge!
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 23:53:10 GMT

In article <n0e49t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
>Writes lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen):
>> You could be asking for dozens to thousands of hours of 
>> work under the conditions you cite. 
> 
> Really??!! It might take that long for a professional cryptanalyst
> to decrypt ONE SINGLE SHORT ENGLISH WORD in the midst of hundreds
> of English words whose plain and encrypted forms are both released?
> 
> Do you mean that? If that's the case, what is the purpose of all
> the DES and RSA and PGP and all the other stuff? If it's so hard
> to decrypt ONE WORD encrypted by our "junky" and worthless method, 
> why do we need all those "non-junky" and "worthy" methods???? 

First off, the "dozens to thousands of hours" is the time to break
the whole _method_.  Once that is done the specific messages become
close to trivial.


>> Moreover, in any real-world situation of any importance whatever, 
>> the algorithm WILL be known. 
> 
> You are absolutely wrong.

Oh, c'mon now.  If the scheme is to be used by more than a
small handful of people then at least the executable will
be available for analysis.  And with a suitible effort at
disassembly/decompiling it can be analysed for the underlying
algolrithm.


Your proposed modification of the prize to include airfare in
addition to dinner is much better incentive -- before you
were suggesting that someone spend their time breaking your
system and spending hundreds of dollars of their own money
in order to claim a "free" dinner.  Didn't sound like much
of an inducement to me.

As to why I'm not picking this up:  I'm a crypto-protocol
kinda guy; I take secure encryption as an abstrict axiomatic
primitive and work from there; I'm not well versed in
traditional cryptanalysis.

		--Ken Pizzini
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: MDC cipher code (long)
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Sun, 1 Nov 1992 22:38:36 GMT

In article <5830005@hplsla.hp.com> ericb@hplsla.hp.com (Eric Backus) writes:
>I was under the impression that a secure cipher could be obtained from
>a message digest algorithm, by using several passes of a message
>digest algorithm and using the user's key as part of the input to the
>digest algorithm.  I don't think the message digest algorithm needs to
>be altered in any way for this.  I think Phil Karn proposed something
>like this awhile back.  (Phil, did you make this work?)

I proposed it, but I never actually followed through with the
definitive implementation. But you're right, all you need is three
Feistel rounds with the nonlinear transformation 'f' in each being a
strong hash function like MD-5.  It is important that each round be
separately keyed, although the three subkeys can be derived from a
single input key (e.g., by appending the input key to a
round-dependent constant and hashing).

MD-5 does have a lot of baggage from its role as a hash function that
can be removed when it is to be used as the nonlinear primitive in a
cipher. E.g., there's no need to pad out each input block with the
input length. All you need is the internal "transform" function, the
routine that crunches 64 bytes to 16 bytes on each iteration.  You
design your cipher to work with these block sizes, which admittedly
are inconveniently large for some applications.

Phil
Newsgroups: sci.crypt