HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 13:04:09 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Aug27.191548.9076@klaava.Helsinki.FI>, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> In article <BtnLty.JC@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> >
|> >In article <1992Aug27.143116.16970@dcs.qmw.ac.uk>, arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
|> >|> In <1992Aug26.095740.17255@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
|> >|> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> >|> 
|> >|> >it's not at
|> >|> >all clear that philosophical problems are amenable to scientific
|> >|> >solutions.  Having said that, one of the reasons I'm using set theory in
|> >|> >metaphysics is to try to bring some objectivity into the field.
|> >
|> >Objectivity, no.  Precision, yes.
|> 
|> I meant here objective as opposed to _subjective_ (and should have said
|> so).  If philosophers agree to use the same formal language then at
|> least they agree on something...

I *know* that's what you meant!  But we *don't* all agree on the
same formal language ('theory' would be better than 'language'
here, by the way).  E.g., which set theory turns *you* on?  ZF,
VGB, NF, ML?  Why not transfinite type theory?  Why not category
theory?  Mereology, anyone?  Is your choice based perhaps on
comparing the ontologies of these theories?  The sets of theorems?
The ease of use? Again, you get precision, and not objectivity.
The history of set theory is the history of class struggle.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 11:48:40 GMT

In article <1992Aug28.080242.7042@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu 
(Barry Merriman) writes:

   >I assume relativity was an outgrowth of his
   >understanding of electrodynamics plus a few key physical insights.
   >(Relativity is essentially contained in Electrodynamics if you 
   >allow yourself to interpret the theory correctly.)

   I was mainly referring to GR, which he worked on for a decade.
I get the impression that you're basing your comments entirely
on preconceived ideas, in which case I suggest the book by Pais,
"Subtle is the Lord", as a source of factual information.
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 3 Sep 92 10:42:24 GMT
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department

In article <1992Sep3.035320.25221@unixg.ubc.ca> ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith  
Ramsay) writes:
> In article <1992Aug30.044437.19426@math.ucla.edu> 
> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
> |[...] I was thoroughly dissapointed
> |in their philosophical approach, by the way---the want to copy 
> |the gedanken exp style from physics, but the experiments they propose
> |as just a vague as the issues they are trying to clarify, unlike the
> |case in physics.
> 
> I think the use of thought-experiments originated in philosophy, so I
> am not sure it is fair to say that it is "copied" from physics.

Well, lets just say its been very succesful in physics, mainly because
the thought experiments were built on top of a very true theory
(Electromagnetism in the case of SR). The problem in phil is the 
thought experiments are often based solely on the biases of the experimenter,
not anything objectively true.

> I also
> think that the burden of proof is on you to that there is a sensible
> "cure" to the vagueness of these philosophical questions.

The ''cure'' is that their is no cure. That is, philosophers need
to realize that many issues defy precise definition and precise 
resolution. For example, trying to precisely define what 'life' is, or
'intelligence', etc, not to mention ethical and theological issues.

One simply needs to admit the intrinsic vagueness of these things, because
in all likelyhood they lack a precise definition (why should
'intelligence', for e.g., have a precise mathematical definition. Its
an evolved quantity---it need not have any concise description.)
This means one needs to simply ask different types of questions, and
look for different type of answers---only look where answers 
seem possible.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Date: 4 Sep 92 15:39:46 GMT
	<TORKEL.92Sep4100904@isis.sics.se> <Bu22I4.AyF@unx.sas.com>
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista

In article <Bu22I4.AyF@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) 
writes:

   >|>   This would make as much sense as sending scientific papers to
   >|> real philosophers to referee.

   >Come on guys, I know for a fact of two areas in which this *does*
   >happen.

  I didn't say that it makes no sense. It's a good idea in some cases.
My point is just that it makes as much sense to let real philosophers
check the philosophy of scientists as it does to let real scientists
check the science of philosophers. Of course, in most cases, scientists
have no particular competence to pronounce on the contents of philosophical
papers, and conversely.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 17:50:26 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Aug27.140443.14075@sics.se>, torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
|> In article <Btn8r8.8LK@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
|>  writes:
|> 
|>    
|>    >There is another (more recent) approach in which the philosophy of science
|>    >reduces to the sociology and history of science (generally this is
|>    >in reaction to the posititivists).  The degree of parasitism increases
|>    >with this sterile approach, and Barry would be (is?) quite right
|>    >to be distressed by it.
|> 
|>   What is sterile about the history of science? And why is it any more
|> "parasitic" than other historical studies?

I did not mean to (and don't think I did) characterize the history of
science as sterile -- certainly this would be incompatible with some
of my other remarks.  What I object to is the "historicist" (or
socoiological) approach to the philosophy of science exhibited
largely by the likes of Kuhn, Lakatos, Fred Suppe, et al.  I have
argued rather strongly against this in previous publications.  History
of science is great.  But philosophy of science is more than this,
and I think you and I agree fundamentally on what more it is.

The claim about parasitism was perhaps a bit gratuitous, but if
(philosophy of science) = (history of science), it would appear
that the philosophers of science are parasitic not only on science
but the historians as well -- and can't even *claim* to have anything
to add.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Date: 2 Sep 92 19:04:37 GMT
	<1992Aug26.171151.1898@skynet.uucp> <snodgras.715041902@crash>
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:

   >> Ummmmmm. I thought John Von Neumann proved that automata of
   >> sufficient complexity can reproduce themselves. What is Rosen
   >> saying that Von Neumann did not?

   >	 Can you even give the broadest outlines of how Von Neumann
   > proved this?  I think not. 

Well, *I* can.  He gave a mathematical proof that a self-duplicating
structure exists in the Game of Life (which is a finite-state
automaton).  He proved it by showing how to construct one.  The
structure he describes is very large.

   > Moreover, whatever the type of logic he utilizied, the only real
   > proof would be to build one. 

No, Life is a mathematical structure, so the existence can be shown by
a mathematical proof.

But this is mostly a historical curiosity nowadays.  The workings of
DNA are now understood sufficiently to make it clear how
self-replication can arise.  For a nice brief explanation, look at the
chapter about DNA in Douglas Hofstadter's "Metamagical Themas".  (I
don't remember the chapter title offhand, and the book is at home.)

	-- Bill
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 28 Aug 92 22:28:20 GMT

In <1992Aug28.133107.8402@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:


>I admit to not having studied the life of Einstein in detail. What I 
>know about it was tangential information picked up during the 
>numerous courses I've taken on SR and GR, and reading Einstein's
>little book on understanding relativity, plus a documentary on PBS.

      If you suspected that Einstein's ideas might not be correct, you'd
feel differently about this, because you would wonder how his ideas were
arrived at. Conversely, if you were required to understand the historical
context in which these ideas arose, instead of merely being presented with
the finished product as the truth, you might not be so certain his ideas
were arrived at in a valid way, and you might have more appreciation for
the assumptions which were made, and are now ignored.

      This, IMO, is a grave mistake on the part of society in structuring
education. Naturally, when a school of thought arises, its adherents wish
to teach it and spread it. This leads to a desire not to introduce questions
into the cirriculum which might create doubt on the part of students. This
in turn leads to either ignoring, or selectively presenting a version of
history. Whenever a dogma is promulgated, this is part of the process.


>I might add that this is another thing that separates philosophical
>study from scientific study. We don't worry about reading the
>original works, or dwelling on the lives and miscellaneous writings
>of the originators of physical theory. For some reason that I don't
>understand, philosphers still devote much time to original 
>works from Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, etc, etc, 
>rather than merely focusing on the concepts themselves, divorced
>from their proponents (and their proponents generally inferior
>original presentations).

      You have identified far too closely with your social function,
and ignored your own personal search for the truth. Your concept of man's
struggle to understand the universe does not seem broad enough, IMO, for
you to contribute creatively in any but the most narrow technical endeavor.
You should read more history of science -- you may find it much more
interesting than you imagine.


>--
>Barry Merriman
>UCLA Dept. of Math
>UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
>barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


      John E. Snodgrass
      -----------------
      snodgras@crash.cts.com
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Hitler, Racism and logic.
Date: 26 Aug 92 09:07:06 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Aug26.075508.12595@sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1207@kepler1.rentec.com> andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) 
>writes:
>
>
>  >Is he actually much heavier duty than I know?
>
>  Yes. The importance of his (highly original and profound) work in
>logic has been immense.

Just as one example, Dummmett makes extensive use of Gentzen's sequent
calculus to analyze the logical constants in _The Logical Basis of
Metaphysics_.  So this guy was really a serious Nazi?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Subject: Re: Obj, Exist
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 20:13:49 GMT

In article <1992Aug23.060831.29580@samba.oit.unc.edu>, Bijan.Parsia@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Bijan Parsia) writes:
>
>--
>   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
>     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
>        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
>           internet:  bbs.oit.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
    
    What opinions and where are they???
From: danoc@earlybird.Eng.Sun.COM (Dan O'Connell [CONTRACTOR])
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 4 Sep 1992 18:58:47 GMT
Organization: Subvert the Dominant Paradigm, Inc.
NNTP-Posting-Host: earlybird

(Randall Holmes) writes:

 [theistic mode ON]
 
 Certainly God "loves" the world (and notice that this "love" is
 disinterested and not an emotion; God does not have emotions!); He
 "takes care of it" (not necessarily for _our_ sake).  But God is not
 the attribute of "loving"; God is the attribute of "being".  If God is
 to be identified with a relation rather than a predicate, I would
 think that the appropriate one is the universal relation (the one
 which everything has to everything else); this is not love.
 
If god "loves" the world, god must have an interest in the 
world, and so could not be disinterested.

I agree with god = being, god != love

 [theistic mode OFF]
 
 The notion of God introduced in the bracketed text should be
 understood to be a philosophical notion.

Dano
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 31 Aug 92 23:06:18 GMT
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.

In article <la4rq6INN41i@appserv.Eng.Sun.COM> danoc@earlybird.Eng.Sun.COM (Dan O'Connell [CONTRACTOR]) writes:
>(Randall Holmes) writes:
>
> >Hampshire's point is, I take it (long time since I last read him too),
> >to get rid of the idea that things like love, respect, hate, contempt,
> >etc. are 'merely' feelings (some kind of inner sensations, or whatever),
> >and that seems to me an important thing to do. 
> 
> Exactly!!!  I don't think that love is actually a feeling at all.  It
> is a _policy_.  So is hate.
>
>Hmmm. Perhaps love/hate/etc are not "merely" feelings, but I do not
>see how one could deny that love can manifest itself in feeling, i.e.,
>that one *feels* love.

Feelings may be among the manifestations of love, but love is not
itself a feeling.  Of course, this violates English usage.

 Also, I do not think you can truly separate
>love and hate.

I can.

>
>Apparently several people here believe love to not be a feeling.
>Perhaps we are using several unarticulated definitions simultaneously,
>and hence the confusion.
>
>To say that love and/or hate is a "policy" would imply to me that
>one had control over what one felt, i.e., love or hate;

But, of course, what I am saying is that love or hate is not how you
feel, but a principle informing your actions which may be caused
(partially) by your feelings or have effects which are feelings.

 I do not
>think this is the case, unless one uses a defense mechanism and
>this would imply dealing with the feeling that gets felt, rather
>than controlling at the source, what one feels.
>
>I think that it is possible of course, to determine what one's
>attitude towards a feeling or set of feelings can be and then
>one can act from that basis.

Precisely.  Although this is not the only reason to love (or hate).

>
>  So the 
> >>question, "Am I in love?" is really to be interpreted as a request for 
> >>help in deciding what one's feelings are to be, not what they are.
>
>It seems that one is deciding (in this case) what one's *response*
>to those feelings should be. The question "Am I in love" could be
>two fold then: first: what are my feelings? and second: based on
>what I believe my feelings to be, what is my response?
>
>Note that none of this need be "rational", that is our motivation
>can be based on "feeling" rather than intellect.

It always has an intellectual element, however badly thought out.

>
>>Again, when does one ever _decide_ what one's feelings are?
>
>Good question. Perhaps when it becomes important for one to do
>so. I think it is important to discriminate here though, between
>feelings and opinions.
>
>Certainly at some un/sub conscious level, we *know* what our
>feelings are. Whether we know and/or ALLOW that knowledge to
>creep into consciousness is another question.
>
>Dano


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: danoc@earlybird.Eng.Sun.COM (Dan O'Connell [CONTRACTOR])
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Obj/Exist
Date: 2 Sep 1992 22:34:33 GMT
Organization: Subvert the Dominant Paradigm, Inc.
NNTP-Posting-Host: earlybird

Perhaps I don't really understand what Objectivist thought 
is supposed to be about: does it posit an objective
viewpoint? Would someone deign to educate me?

Thanks,

Dano
From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: The Cogito is mistaken
Date: 23 Aug 92 19:31:44 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <9208211944.AA14290@lenny.kaman.com> 
rob@KAMAN.COM (Rob Vienneau) writes:

>Why Descartes' cogito argument is mistaken:
>
>Consider the proposition "I think" or "Thinking is occuring."
>
>Either it is in a language or it is just some vague feeling. If the
>latter, one cannot draw any logical implications from its truth, and
>Descartes' project fails.

Propositions, for a rationalist, do not have to be "in a language" in the
way words and sentences are.

>If the former, a natural question arises. How do words mean? Thus, a
>theory of meaning is needed prior to Descartes' axiom.
>
>Now suppose one accepts that for a word or sentence to have meaning, a
>distinction must exist between what I feel that word means at any
>given time and what that word does mean. There's a difference between
>thinking one is following a rule and following a rule.

So far, so good.

>From this, it would seem that the use of a language is a social
>process. 

A clear _non sequitur_ from a rationalist standpoint.

>	  Thus, to state "I think" presumes the existence of other
>minds and a whole social world.

Only if meaning is socially determined.

>				 But Descartes whole purpose was to
>show what is self evident when everything is doubted (because, after
>all, a demon may just be giving us illusions). Thus, Descartes is
>mistaken in taking the cogito as an axiom.

Descartes doesn't take the _cogito_ as an axiom.

>Putnam, in _Reason, Truth, and History_, has a refutation of the
>possibile existence of Descartes' demon. His argument also takes the
>theory of meaning as central.

Putnam's theory of meaning is deflationary.  He wants to follow Dummett in
claiming the priority of semantics over epistemology, but also wants to
discredit Tarskian semantics by appealing to the consequences of "Skolem's
paradox" and elementary equivalence of all isomorphic models.  However, a
rationalist clearly doesn't have to limit himself to extensional semantics
in the manner of Davidson; a Fregean intensionalism provides a clear way
for rehabilitating semantics, and incidentally, for vitiating your claim
that the _cogito_ must somehow depend on its syntactical form.  If, pace
Frege-Church propositions are taken as extralinguistic entities whose
structure is irreducible to an atomic Boolean algebra, and likewise for
their terms, then Putnam's argument in the aforementioned book has no
force.

>                                     Robert Vienneau
>                                     rob@kaman.com

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: vincent@reg.triumf.ca (pete)
Subject: Re: What Is Love?
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: dept. of theophysics and cosmogyny
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 1992 10:18:00 GMT

Hi all:

I"ve been resisting commenting on this thread for quite a while,
and not just because I've been very busy. I'm afraid I have some
very strongly held opinions about love, and no detectable rational
justification for them. That's not to say that these ideas are
unexamined, far from it; just that it's never been a rational
analysis. I thought perhaps someone more thoughtful
and erudite might express a similar view, but none has been
forthcoming, so I will venture to throw in my 2 bits...

   First, I hold that love is a name for the ground of being
(one of many) in the manner of the bible's `god is love'.
Further, that love is also the name applied to any experience
which affords a glimpse of this. Thus, there is only one
kind of love, but there are many forms of baggage that 
surround the experience. As the ground of being, love exists
within ourselves, but is something we allow ourselves
to experience only when we have achieved the right set of
external conditions, as when we are in the company of a
person who, for reasons of biology and social conditioning,
brings out this experience in us. 

    ...Love is also attention. To be captivated by something
is to experience some small fulfillment, and thus to be in a
state where one is allowing oneself to experience love. In
this sense falling in love is seen as encountering someone
who is so fascinating that they demand from one an extraordinary
amount of attention. 

   The opposite of love is fear, in the same way that cold
is opposite heat, and darkness is opposite light. that is, 
fear is the absense of love. Love is the state which evokes
security.

   There are many pathological manifestations of love, but
these have nothing to do with the nature of the genuine item.
Rather, they reflect various self deceptions about the set
of circumstances necessary to yield the experience.

   As I say I can justify none of this, I have no logical
defense. My authority is simply my experience of life and
introspection. Make of it what you will. 

=====================================================================
Only love is real; everything                          Pete Vincent
else is illusion.  
                    -Carole King 
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: Brennan.J.Murphy.53@nd.edu (Brennan J. Murphy)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Paper topic help.
Date: 25 Aug 92 17:47:50 GMT
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: University of Notre Dame

I am a Junior Philosophy major at the University of Notre Dame.  In my
Metaphysics 424 classs, I am required to to write 2 8-10 page papers
dealing with any aspect of metaphysics. There are 3 restrictions: 1)the
papers have t be about Metaphysics, 2) they have to be original papers and
3) they have to be not merely descriptive but critical.
Can anyone offer suggestions as to what would be an interesting topic and
where I can find background information on the topic?  I am interested in
Alvin Plantinga's work and as of now I would like to focus on some of the
questions he deals with.
Thanks for your help,
Brennan
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Hitler, Racism and logic.
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug24.103950.16097@sics.se> <1207@kepler1.rentec.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 07:55:08 GMT

In article <1207@kepler1.rentec.com> andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) 
writes:


  >Is he actually much heavier duty than I know?

  Yes. The importance of his (highly original and profound) work in
logic has been immense.