HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: tripple encrypt
Date: 10 Jan 93 13:42:57 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <oye4wB7w165w@works.uucp>, hagopes@works.uucp (Yinco Schmeer) writes:
> >>They suggest using triple encryption for key distribution.<<
> (Steven Bellovin)
> 
> I was under the impression that Double and Tripple encryption was no more 
> secure than single encryption. I believe that there was a mathmatical 
> proof of this...

Not to my knowledge.  In fact, the only mathematical proofs I know of
go the other way.

Originally, there was some concern that DES was a group.  That is,
encrypting first with A, and then with B, was equivalent to encrypting
instead with some third key C.  That is now known not to be a problem.
It has been proved that DES is *not* a group.

Now, for simple double encryption, one would think that 2^112
operations were needed for exhaustive search.  But there's a
time-memory tradeoff that will cut that to an effective key length of
2^56 operations and 2^56 words of memory.  This attack would work even
for ``encrypt with A, decrypt with B''.  Hence, the suggestion is to
use ``encrypt with A, decrypt with B, re-encrypt with A''.  IBM uses
this scheme to protect master keys.  Merkle and Hellman showed an
attack that can defeat even this scheme, but it required 2^56 chosen
plaintexts.  That doesn't seem to be feasible.  They suggest using three
different keys in either encrypt/encrypt/encrypt mode or
encrypt/decrypt/encrypt mode.

favorite general-purpose reference); Merkle and Hellman, ``On the
Security of Multiple Encryption'', CACM July 1981, pp 465-467; and the
RSA FAQ on cryptography.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.1 source posted to alt.sources
Organization: Little to None
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 16:47:44 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.115335.1216@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
>I have posted the PGP 2.1 sources to alt.sources - see the posting itself for
>more details (I assume everyone knows what PGP 2.1 is :-).
> 
>Peter.
> 
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.1
> 
>iQCVAgUBK0wZd/oRqumdmX1HAQH54wP+NxF1ydxSAnfq2Hu4SaaA+nPE5hUO5hlL
>m+sNxfNO21vF4F+PWbBnDPG54RkZt5yLXQFdrJUrqvO1mupbohvpS5idxjGifNxu
>ReRCrYxrTrjyZoF1NPnp1hoXfo+VF2UK1v98HfaA8E0hsloaQJJA/Q5RSiU5iNIG
>wjg5TF7GIX4=
>=bsVc
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Like about half of the signed postings I have seen, Peter's arrived here
corrupted (NULL lines converted to lines with a single space in them).
This causes the messages to fail the signature check (it doesn't even
strip the armor correctly) until manually massaged.

Is this a problem for anyone else?  If so, perhaps the next release of pgp
should consider automatically stripping trailing blanks on "+clearsig" type
signed msgs, and perhaps try to account for other "mailer" type anomalies.  
-- 
Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6623 alt.security.pgp:484
From: Christopher_C_Lapp@cup.portal.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: discussion desired
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 18:06:57 PST
Organization: The Portal System (TM)
Distribution: usa

What is interesting about this article is that the
major points raised still assume that a cryptographic
system has to be "cryptographic" in the sense that
it is a computational algorithm (a computable function)
and that because the PGP 2.0 system is not a perfect 
uncrackable computable function.  Here is a perfect
non-computable function that would give the ole' Russkis
a run for their money.   Here are the steps:
1) encrypt a recipe for apple pandowdy using PGP 2.0.
2) Take the raw encrypted file, and make up a table
of bit patterns in seqence and map them to a real 
message.
Now, with the mapped table create a computer program
that accesses the mapped table at given sequences, and
adds a bit-string at the end of the apple pandowdy
encrypt which will give the reciever the seqence of bit
patterns in the raw encrypt which are relvant to the real message.

Here is how it will work:
Here is the recipie encrypted in a known algorithm:

011 110 111 110000
Now the real encryption would take this output and
map an english database to it.  So, say the real message
is
"This is a pen"
and the entry numbers of the words "this" "is" "a" "pen" are 
written in binary and the string that these binary numbers represent
is subracted using binary math from the apple pandowdy encrypt
and attached to the applepandowdy encrypt.  Thus, somebody with the
ould take the applepandowdy encrypt
decrypt it, and determine the excess bits, after the decrypt, and
mathematically, determine the words from the record numbers produced
by adding the applepandowdy encrypt string to the excess string, and
dividing the string in to equal 32-bit hunks.
The Mita copier on the 26th floor of the McNamara Building needs paper,
and also new semiconductors.
Chris Lapp.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 20:31:17 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Mark Henderson, writing from Canada, advises a Bulgarian National
>writing from Germany on how to get the RSAREF and RIPEM files
>without reading or agreeing to the license agreement.
>
>I think this is both a disgrace and a violation of ITAR. I would
>not be surprised if it is also a violation of Canadian Law.

Just one thing, David; in a very large fraction of the jurisdictions
in the United States virtually any sort of sexual activity other than
the missionary position engaged in by a married couple is against the
law. Do you go about haranguing young couples you see on the street
who aren't married (either heterosexual or homosexual) telling them
that if they are having sex they are breaking the law and what they
are doing is a disgrace?

>Since I take this personally, given the efforts of many to provide a
>free, usable, legal public key system for non-commercial use in the
>U.S. I have copied Mark's message to the President of RSA, for what
>action he may wish to take.

Tell me, David, Do you go about finding married couples engaging in
oral sex and turning them in to the cops? Do you go around turning
gays in to the local District attorney? You honestly seem like the
type.

As you may have surmized by now, although you are a prudish bluenose,
no one else here gives a damn about the ITARs. Any official of the US
Government who actually believes that the ITARs serve to keep the "bad
guys" from getting cryptography has to have taken more LSD in the
hours before coming to that conclusion than Dr. Leary has taken in his
lifetime. All the information needed to construct cryptosystems is
available in the public domain and can be "exported" with an ordinary
phone call, or even just by memorizing a few simple facts and crossing
the border.

Given the fact that the ITARs are next to useless, and that in
fact there is no way whatsoever to stop the bad guys from getting
cryptosystems (as has been demonstrated), most of us have long since
chosen to regard the exportation of public information, regardless of
the attitude of the US Government, in the same light as premarital sex
or "sodomy", i.e., something we societally tolerate regardless of
putative legality. You, of course, are the equivalent of the
fundamentalist christian who harangues people even for having
lascivious thoughts. Fine. Go off and preach to the walls. Leave the
rest of us alone. You haven't a single supporter on this newsgroup.
Obviously all your harangues have served to do nothing other than
assure that you will never get a job at any company that anyone
reading sci.crypt works for again. Now that you've successfully
wrecked your own reputation, why not go off and bore some other
people. We frankly no longer care.

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date:  6 Jan 93 17:12:59 GMT

bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) writes:

> markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson) writes:

> > The following just came in on rsaref-users mailing list.

> > >RSAREF is now available via anonymous FTP to 'rsa.com'. Along with

> Sorry, the information is not true. I just tried and the directory
> /rsaref contains only the README file and a subdirectory called
> 'dist'. This directory is not readable for the anonymous user. I knew
> what to look for, but got the message that the file is not a plain
> file or something like that. Seems that it is still USA-only product.

Ooops, silly me, I just figured out what "not a plain file" means...
Please, pardon my silliness and don't pay attention to my previous
message... :-(((

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
From: ericb@hplsla.hp.com (Eric Backus)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 19:13:59 GMT
Subject: Re: Privacy -- encrypt/decrypt devices on Wireless phones
Organization: HP Lake Stevens, WA
Newsgroups: sci.crypt

> Patrick W. P. Dirks writes:
> 
> As other posters have pointed out, monitoring cordless phone links is *NOT*
> illegal in the US.  I believe monitoring cellular phone calls is not
> against the law, either, except that you cannot disclose the contents of
> anything you monitor or use it for your own gain.  Congress recently passed
> a bill that prohibits the sale of scanners that can receive (or be "easily
> modified to receive") the 800 MHz cellular band.  That doesn't make
> listening illegal, however, and doesn't remove existing scanners from the
> market.

You are correct that it is legal to monitor cordless phones in the US.
You may not disclose what you hear or use it for gain, which is true
of most things that you can legally monitor in the US.

However, it is not legal to even monitor cellular phone calls.  The
cellular phone people asked for and received a special rule for
cellular phones.  Older scanners picked up the 800 MHz band.  I've
heard rumors that some newer scanners can be easily modified (by
removing a jumper or something) to again receive the 800 MHz band.

> The real lesson, I'm afraid, is: don't expect *ANY* privacy on cordless or
> cellular phones.  You stand a good chance of being disappointed if you do.

This is of course still true.
--
					Eric Backus
					ericb@lsid.hp.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
Subject: Re: [legality of PGP etc.
Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 15:23:00 +0000

 -=> Quoting Steven Bellovin to All <=-

 SB> Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis) writes:
 > It is disingenuous to suppose that the *national only* 
 > patenting was just an unfortunate happenstance. What about the 
 > similar lack of international patenting of DES? Has any US 
 > organisation ever chosen to seek worldwide patents on ANY 
 > cryptographic product?

 SB> ...... If you want, I'll supply the U.S. patent numbers; someone with
 SB> access to the appropriate databases can check whether or not non-U.S.
 SB> patents were ever applied for.

 SB> As for your second question -- yes, I know of several instances where
 SB> non-U.S. patents on cryptographic devices have been applied for by
 SB> U.S. companies.  One caveat -- NSA (well, the Department of Defense,
 SB> but NSA in reality) is empowered to file secrecy orders against
 SB> cryptographic patent applications, which would block foreign patent
 SB> applications from being filed.  .......
 
Many thanks for the informative and helpful reply. In fact, I believe the 
issue to be sterile. The paragraph was included in   my original posting to 
elicit from a U.S. source information that, as a European, I felt it
inappropriate to raise myself in a matter of primarily US concern. Namely, 
that what may be patented is, in fields affecting national security, often 
dictated by a govermnent agency in the interests of the State.

Where the element of disclosure associated with a patent application 
is permitted, it seems reasonable to assume that one of the following would 
apply:
                a. The matter is already sufficiently compromised so that a 
patent application will not worsen the situation. If granted, the patent 
may even allow an element of control no longer possible by other and more 
thorough means. However, in particular circumstances, international patenting 
might not be possible or at least seem the greater of two evils.
                b. The matter is not considered sufficiently to affect 
national security and, consequently, a would be patentee may be left to 
pursue his commercial interest as best he sees fit. 
                
I don't wish to state the obvious by further elaboration. The corollaries 
to less than complete commercial or governmental protection of interests are 
- for any party and any nation  - inevitable.

Owen Lewis



.. Facts are stubborn little bastards, be careful with them.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.11
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: RSA, RIPEM and David
Date: Sat, 09 Jan 93 21:39:43 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: world
Organization: Thibault & Friends


        Does anybody know how to activate the twit filter in rn? I
        want to add sternlight to it. Is the volume of news still
        responding to his rantings an indication that there is no twit
        filter in Unix mail software?

        ,Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Automation Architect        |  All we are saying
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  is give global
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |  warming a chance.
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
From: crs5@quads.uchicago.edu (charles robert stone jr)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Winword 2.0 passwords
Date: 12 Jan 93 01:14:41 GMT
Reply-To: crs5@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations


Charles Stone
 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 01:33:00 +0000

 -=> Quoting Lyle_seamanAllransarc.com to All <=-

 (Owen Lewis) writes:
 > Does the US government (use DES)?  I believe not.

 Ly> I would bet that this is because they want classified material to be 
 Ly> safe for a hundred years or so.  They recognize that DES (while it may
 Ly> be relatively safe for the near future) will be highly vulnerable to
 Ly> brute-force attack within 50 years, and they have a lot of secrets
 Ly> they'd rather no one found out about.   It doesn't have to be because
 Ly> there are hidden flaws in DES.

 But not all govt material requires (or is given) protection that should 
 last for 50 years. While some information may be of crucial importance 
 for several days (say) it will become worthless shortly thereafter. Isn't the
 point that breaking a cypher - be it DES or any other - would endanger vital 
 short term information too. Information should be classified by its 
 sensitivity alone (though automatic declassification should be possible once 
 it has passed its 'sell by' date.  
 
 Therefore, no highly classified material ought to be entrusted to any system 
 where there is doubt as to its medium term security. It would seem that the 
 US and other major governments take that view. In my opinion, commercial 
 users bearing appreciable levels of threat to their information security 
 (e.g. hi-tech R&D, financial institutions, pharmecutical  and 
 bio-engineering companies) would be well advised to take a similar view.

___ Blue Wave/QWKv2.11

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tim@ais.org (Tim Tyler)
Subject: Re: Motorola 'Secure-Clea
Organization: UMCC
Distribution: na
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 02:03:06 GMT

In article <1993Jan6.225744.17312@linus.mitre.org> hal@venus.mitre.org (Hal Feinstein) writes:
>In article <1993Jan6.133347.310@clark.dgim.doc.ca> nur@mars.dgrc.doc.ca writes:
>>In article 7026@netcom.com, rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>>
>>What about the modern analog devices that use split band inversion where
>>one of 32 programmable split points in the voice band may be selected
>>and changed at 60 Hz or faster at "random?"  Two separate inversions
>>are performed, one for the lower sideband and one for the upper
>>sideband around the split point.  This seems *much* harder.  This topic
>
>
>These analog voice systems are considered really difficult to break.

   The are difficult to process in real-time.

>scanner crowd out.  When local law wants privacy they usually use 
>something better then rolling code or voice inversion with fixed 
>split bands.  The ones I've used were made by a company called

   Unfortunately, this isn't always true.  Many of the LEAs I've dealth with
who use speech inversion thought it was 'secure,' although some individual
officers who have used CBs thought the inversion was single sideband.  It is
not uncommon for some agencies to still have the belief that the 'Private
Line' ('PL') setting on their radios will scramble the communications.

>Transcript and they seem to use a combination of rolling code

   *Transcrypt* has a lot of nice systems which they've sold to everyone
from the newsmedia to the National Guard & even some foreign military sales.
I think you referenced their 'Stealth' product, which is a slow, direct-sequence
analog audio system using a variable hop-rate (max of ~50/sec) system.

 
     I disagree with your asserting that most LEA SWAT, narcotics, or other
'high-risk' units use digital voice -- let alone ANY -- voice privacy
systems.  I wish it were the case...



-- 
 Tim Tyler      Internet: tim@ais.org  MCI Mail: 442-5735 
P.O. Box 443    C$erve: 72571,1005  DDN: Tyler@Dockmaster.ncsc.mil
Ypsilanti MI    Packet: KA8VIR @KA8UNZ.#SEMI.MI.USA.NA
48197
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Organization: Little to None
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 17:20:46 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.173701.8858@ncar.ucar.edu> prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Philip Zimmermann) writes:
>>    - the  sequence  of  random numbers has strong prevalences on
>>bytes (up to 0.05 ...  0.1 on material of 10000 byte) and  strong
>>correlation dependence between contiguous bytes;
>
>Really?  How so?  What does "strong prevalences" mean?  Is he talking
>about the internal random number source in random.c, used for making
>RSA keys?  Or is he talking about the output of the IDEA cipher?  In
>either case, evidence should be presented that allows others to
>reproduce his results.  The random.c code for getting randomness from
>keyboard latency has been tested pretty well, and it uses MD5 to
>enhance the raw randomness from the keyboard timings.  It looks
>pretty good to me.  Does the IDEA cipher running in CFB mode output
>text that appears nonrandom?  This is disturbing, if true.  Biham and
>Shamir have thus far not succeeded in finding weaknesses in the IDEA
>cipher.  Perhaps Dr. Sidelnikov has found one.  I'd like to see some
>evidence of this claim.  

It is not my intent to add fuel to any fire, but this seems like a good
springboard to voice a potential concern I have had with the Unix port of
pgp.  Pgp seeds certain random number vectors by asking the user to type
some characters at the terminal and then measuring the times between
keystrokes. I know Phil gave some thought to this for pgp1.0, and it
probably works well in a DOS environment.  However, some flavors of Unix do
not have the ability to measure time to the same granularity as DOS, and,
combined with the multiprocessing environment of Unix, the times gathered
may not be representative of the typist's true signature.  I have not looked
at the code, but, empirically, I have gotten quite a few instances of '?'
when performing this ritual, which I believe means the number was thrown
out because it was too small.

Has anyone indeed paid any consideration to the randomness of the numbers
so generated under Unix?  It would be comforting to know that someone has
looked into this, and even more comforting to know they concluded that
this is, indeed, not a problem.
-- 
Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Date: Tue,  5 Jan 1993 11:25:51 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1b31

David, perhaps you misunderstand what I mean by "natural" superiority; I am 
saying that any such superiority is a matter of circumstance, not something 
magic about the USA...


Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 8 Jan 93 00:09:02 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1993Jan7.230942.12698@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:


>Perry Metzger, who purports to be a libertarian, posts a fascist message
>in which he:

>1. Moves from making assertions to representing them as facts.

>2. Attempts to assert that everybody but me shares his views.
He's right.  Everybody but you shares his views on exportability of
publicly available software.

>3. Wraps himself in the royal "we". (I guess he's a crypto monarchist
>as well).

>His message speaks for itself.
It does.  Because it's correct -- the ITARs restriction on export of
software serve no purpose whatsever.
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.