From: dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska)
Subject: Re: Nuclear Power and Climate Change
Organization: VEXCEL Corporation, Boulder CO
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 1993 00:16:16 GMT

In article <51729@seismo.CSS.GOV> stead@skadi.CSS.GOV (Richard Stead) writes:
>In article <1992Dec31.164259.22040@vexcel.com>, dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
>> In article <51726@seismo.CSS.GOV> stead@skadi.CSS.GOV (Richard Stead) writes:
>> >In article <1992Dec30.161607.25113@vexcel.com>, dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
>> The study was for replacing only coal electricity generation since it
>> is the dirtiest form of fossil fuel.  Oil and natural gas were not
>> included to keep the cost down.  The increased use of oil and
>> natural gas over the 40 year period made up for the savings from
>> not using coal.  Transportation contributions were not included.
>
>But if the study really did use favorable numbers for nuclear power, then
>it would be cheaper to add nuclear capacity than new oil and gas capacity.
>However, it is not so clear that the study's number really were favorable
>to nuclear power.  Perhaps the costs quaoted are reasonable for the cost
>to construct a single nuclear plant today.  However, if nuclear power were
>given serious consideration, then we could look forward to lower costs due
>to economy of scale (building many plants would establish an efficient
>industrial infrastructure to support such construction), greatly reduced
>time of construction and licensing, and an improved legal environment.
>Nuclear plants used to be very cheap to build, and would be on-line within
>a few years after the first spade of dirt was turned.  In today's climate
>of anti-nuke hysteria, it is completely infeasible to construct a nuclear
>plant, and certainly not to do so economically.

The cost estimates were based on claims by organizations supporting
increased use of nuclear power, so I think they are reasonable.
>
[extensice discussion of 1%/year figure deleted]
>
>I would, but you posted it and are using it to support your position.
>I think I have posted sufficient argument to cast significant doubt
>on this claim.

The quote was a 1% decrease in effectiveness.  You have interpreted
this as absolute consumption. You argue that that is unreasonable
over 40 years and I agree.  I think that effectiveness meant
intensity, as in energy consumed per $GNP, but since it was a quote
from a different study, it was not clarified.  It also was not
central to the calculations in the study I quoted.  Just to
clarify, the study I have (from _Energy Policy_) quoted another
study (from NSF/MIT) to get this figure.  This figure was not
used in the EP study.
>
>> 40 years.  I am glad you are so optimistic that the money is available.
>> Considering that the good citizens of Colorado passed a strict tax
>> limitation initiative, turned down a sales tax for schools (but approved
>> a baseball stadium), I am not so optimistic.
>
>First, the development would not be funded by taxes, but rather by utility
>rates.  But beyond that argument, the main thing here is that if you have the
>money to build all the nuclear capacity needed in the absence of conservation,
>then all you have to do is take the cash that would have been used to build
>a nuke plant, and use it for conservation.  Your original argument claimed
>conservation was cheaper per kW, so this practice should more than replace
>the power that the nuke would have produced.  Just continue that process until
>diminishing returns prevents it from working anymore.  Then you have both
>conservation and nuke capacity.

If we use money that otherwise would have been used for new capacity
(nuke or otherwise) for efficiency, then we do not have money to
build nuke capacity until efficiency has been played out.  At that
point, we will need to decide on a source for new capacity.  If the
only reasonable choices are fossil and nuclear, I would support
nuclear.  Since that point is years away, I will reserve judgement
until the decision is needed.  While utility rates are not taxes, they
are publicy controlled and have similar limitations.
>
>> Noone claims these gains can be made indefinitely.  They can be made
>> for quite some time (1 or 2 decades) at reasonably expected levels of
>> investment.
>
>But money does not control the technological gains possible.  Basically,
>after the simple stuff is done (currently a boom industry), costs will
>go up exponentially for each additional kW saved, (and will approach
>infinity as energy used runs up against thermodynamic limitations, etc.)
>So we can't expect a linear relation between money invested and energy
>saved.  As for investing in efficiency, most of the big electric utilities
>currently have programs to pay their major consumers to upgrade to more
>efficient equipment - mostly replacing older fluorescent lighting and
>ballast with modern fluorescent lighting and a few other upgrades.
>The savings are nowhere near the 50% argument I made above, but the 50%
>argument is the only thing that will keep us at the same power use
>2 decades from now if we include modest economic growth.  If we assume
>20% efficiency gains and 5% economic growth, we will need new electric
>capacity in only 5 years assuming total conversion to the more efficient
>technology!  That is a reasonable scenario.

You obviously missed my posts (months ago) from an EPRI study that
indicated that if there was 100% market penetration of the best
existing technology today, we could get about a 54% decrease in
consumption in the U.S.  Obviously, it won't happen today.  I am
suggesting that it will take a decade or two.  But the technology
will also improve.  By the way, the biggest effeiciency gain
would be from industrial motors, according to the study.  How long
will it take for our electricity service needs to increase by 54%?
Certainly more than 5 years.
>
>The US and Europe did not come complete with power grids when people
>first started using electricity.  Part of developing a country includes
>developing infrastructure.  They have no power grid, because they are
>not generating or using electricity.  Both use of electricity and the
>power grid will develop together as it did in this country.  And they
>better use centralized production for the efficiency and reduction in
>emissions.  If they generate on-site (normally a co-generation system),
>the efficiency would be lower and increases in CO2 output will wipe out
>any reduction in CO2 output in developed countries.
>I don't know why you argue that nuclear power has a poor cost record
>in the third world.  The two leaders of the third world - China and
>India - have a lot of nuclear capacity and are building more, and they
>do it very cheaply.

The study gave some case histories of enormous cost overruns.  And
when the U.S. started developing its power stations and grid, was
it using GW plants?  My efficiency arguments clearly apply most
for the U.S. and then Europe.  I have done much less research for
the cases of the LDC's.  I will not oppose then using nuclear if
that is what they decide.
>
>That is a perfectly valid rebuttal.  If the methodology is flawed, then
>so are the numbers.  If not flawed, then why would the numbers be suspect?
>Of course I attack the methodology.

Okay, I misinterpreted your meaning (or you, mine).  I think we are
mostly arguing around the edges and there are a number of nuclear
advocates who seem to be in general agreement, with some minor
differences.  And the rebuttals are continuing....
>
>But you stated that electricity cost is independent of product cost and
>provided no reference for that.  It was simply stated.  I then presented
>a case that is a significant rebuttal, since while I do not know the
>numbers, it is well-known that energy cost is the most significant cost in
>the production of aluminum.  While aluminum alone probably amounts to no
>more than a couple percent of total electric capacity in this country,
>it is only one example (though, admittedly, it is the best).  As for
>percentage of capacity that it uses, I don't know, but I do know that
>a moderate-sized aluminum refinery uses 100's of MW, and because of this
>the plant and a generating facility are usually built together and the plant
>uses the majority of the electricity generated.  So if we new how many
>aluminum plants there were and how many electric plants, the plant ratio
>would be close to the fraction of energy used to produce aluminum.
>Other metal-refining processes do not use as much electricity (most notably
>steel, where a lot of the energy comes from coke), but it is still a
>significant contribution to the cost of the metal produced.  This would
>not be true of precious metals where most of the cost is mining.

I didn't say it was independent, I stated that it was not dominant. 
The exact effect of this economics-based argument is an open question
since neither of us know the exact figures.  However, it would not
apply to residential or commercial usages.  I have a copy of the
response to the economics argument so I will see if it has any hard
numbers.
>
>Not according to my calculations.

My sources are described earlier.  I can e-mail you a summary of
my EPRI post (if I still have it).  Many studies indicate enormous
savings are possible in the U.S.  More than seems intuituvely likley,
based on the responses to my original EPRI post.
>
>> industry likes it.  The best likelihood for the fast scenario, IMO,
>> would be for strong and unambiguous proof for climate change, similar
>> to what is now available for ozone depletion, to become available in
>
>There is not "unambiguous proof" of ozone depletion.  There are the polar
>"ozone holes" every winter, but it is not known if the holes existed or
>not before the first measurements of them were made.  It is possible that
>a certain amount of chlorine has always made it to the stratosphere, and
>the ozone holes (even if very small) have always been a polar winter feature.
>Summer measurements of ozone at mid-latitudes do not show an unambiguous
>reduction.
>
>In stating this, I do not mean to claim that there is no problem with the
>ozone.  I just want to put things in perspective.  I do not believe all
>is well with the ozone, but I also do not think the problem is the dire
>end-of-the-world catastrophe certain groups would have us believe.  Likewise
>with global change.  I think the evidence for global change is currently
>every bit as convincing, if not moreso, as the ozone evidence.  Ocean
>temperatures definitely seem to point to global warming.  The variations
>are very small and the noise is very large, but I'm convinced.  Waiting
>for "unambiguous proof", you will wait forever.

I believe the evidence for ozone depletion (shown to exist over the
continental U.S., though at lower levels than in Antarctica) is
stronger than for climate change.  But I don't want to get into that
here.  Maybe the use of the term "unambiguous proof" was inappropriate.
The world community has responded forcefully to the ozone problem, but
not to the climate change problem due to this level of differing
proof.  My point is that the kind of convincing proof that got us a
Montreal Protocol (and recently strengthened it) could lead to the
fast scenario I mentioned above.
>
>Anyway, it doesn't matter how fast the conservation occurs.  It may lead
>to a temporary drop in required capacity, but in 5 or 10 years we will
>require more generating capacity than today.  If we do not invest in nuke
>power, then this means CO2 emissions will go up.
>
Our only area of disagreement seems to be how long efficiency can
control increased electricity demand.  If I am correct, based on the
EPRI study (and also the NSF/MIT study), then we can wait before
deciding what will provide our new capacity.  If that decision had
to be made now (or in 5 years), then I would agree with you.

>
>--
>Richard Stead
>Center for Seismic Studies
>Arlington, VA
>stead@seismo.css.gov


-- 
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	- Benjamin Franklin			dean@vexcel.com
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