HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Anarcho-objectivism (was Re: Thoughts on the group)
Date: 12 Jan 93 19:14:00 GMT
Organization: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU

sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski) writes:
>Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes...
>>Do you really think that a protection agency is subject to the
>>same kinds of constraints and accountability as a government?

>	No, protection agencies are subject to *different* and much stronger
>constraints and accountability than government.

Different, yes.  Much stronger?  The closest real-world analogies
we have, I think, are mafia-style gangs and large corporations,
none of which are really willing to accept the principle of
non-coercion.  How do you intend to ensure that the imagined
protection agencies will submit so readily?  [Accountability is
only internal, and not visible to the outside world; but that's
a different issue.]

> The constraints are
>visible if you understand the system of incentives involved.

Oh, I understand the incentives.  Maximum rate of return.  The
time scale depends on the vision of the managing board of directors.

>If you
>aren't thinking of the incentives, then protection agencies can do
>'anything' in your mind.  (Though you will tend to give governments the
>benefit of the doubt because you are used to them and hold their incentives
>for granted.)

Morality plays little part when one is concerned with the bottom line.
Open governments have different problems, to be sure.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk      Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Some ideas are frost giants: pouring cold water on them helps them to grow.
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Date: 8 Jan 93 17:30:33 GMT
	<MERRITT.93Jan7100008@macro.bu.edu> <TORKEL.93Jan7180729@lludd.sics.se>
	<MERRITT.93Jan7142129@macro.bu.edu> <TORKEL.93Jan7211409@bast.sics.se>
	<MERRITT.93Jan8103208@macro.bu.edu> <T
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista

In article <MERRITT.93Jan8120405@macro.bu.edu> merritt@macro.bu.edu 
(Sean Merritt) writes:

   >Please provide the meanings of "logic" , "axiom" and "theorem" in the
   >context of maodern logic for comparison.

  I did that in the original article (TORKEL.93Jan6231516@bast.sics.se), in
sufficient detail to enable a comparison with Rand.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 19:23:31 GMT

torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>   For a presentation of Godel's theorems, I recommend the recent book by
>Raymond Smullyan, _Godel's Incompleteness Theorems_, which is very readable
>and presupposes only some slight familiarity with predicate logic. To
>explain why Godel's theorem does not apply to Objectivism, it is quite
>sufficient to point out that that there is no mathematically defined set
>of "theorems of Objectivism", and so we can prove nothing mathematically
>about what is or is not a "theorem of Objectivism".

If it has axioms, and uses logic to turn axioms into theorems, it's a formal
system.  If not, it bases its conceptions on things other than logic, which
is a shaky thing for a "rational" system to do. 

By claiming that there is no "set of theorems of Objectivism" you either
say that there are no axioms, or that there is no way of going from one
provable statement to another, logically.  This latter part is most likely
the case, since rationality involves things other than logic, HOWEVER in
this case the question of whether it is inconsistent or not becomes debatable.

Mathematical definition of the set of "theorems of Objectivism" is not
required.  All that is required is a logical definition, including any
structure you like: words, sentences, ideas, etc., as long as they can be
interpreted in an "A is A" manner, that is, the structure must be interpretable
only in one fashion.  Note: Objectivism *is* *forced* to stick to objective
definitions since it *assumes* "A is A".  If necessary, define new terms.

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: Thoughts on the group
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 01:48:16 GMT

cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes:
>In article <7JAN199316314132@mivax.mc.duke.edu> seth@mivax.mc.duke.edu (Judge Not) writes:
>>At any rate, I think it's possible to be an anarchist *and* an objectivist.
>>Anyone agree?  Why or why not?
>
>ok, i will bite this worm.
>i do not deny that objectivism and anarchism have many similarities, and
>are close on the spectrum, compared to such things as socialism.
>but there is a significant difference.
>objectivists feel that there is a role for government in protecting
>the individual rights of the people. anarchists do not.

I'm a small-o objectivist, and also an anarchocapitalist.

I see no contradiction. From my perspective, being a small-o
objectivist means that I believe in things like the virtue of
selfishness, capitalism, and the non-coercion principle. I don't see
any reason all those can't be promoted by an anarchist system, and
indeed, I believe that they would be promoted MORE effectively in such
a system. My reading and research over the last few years has lead me
to conclude that there is no more reason to believe that you need or
even desire a government to manage law courts than there is to believe
that you desire or need a government to manage supermarkets.


--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: burke@tss.com (Jim Burke)
Subject:  Foundations of Objectivism
Reply-To: burke@tss.com (Jim Burke)
Organization: Teknekron Software Systems. Inc.
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 01:56:38 GMT

I have often heard proponents of objectivism state that the fundamental
axioms of objectivism include:

	1. A is always equal to A
	2. Human reason determines ultimate truth in terms of good and evil.

Since objectivism claims to be the end-all philosophy, I have a few problems
with these axioms.

First, let's examine the statement that A is always equal to A.  This does
actually sound intuitively correct.  A few years ago, nobody would have
argued this point.  Then along came this new field of physics called
quantum mechanics.  And suddenly, seemingly irrational truths emerged - 
a thing could be both true and not true at the same time.  A particle
could occupy two different points in space at the same time.  No longer 
can we be so sure that a is always equal to a.  Physicists now turn to
mysticism, or sometimes even to religion, to explain the fundamental
nature of the universe.

Second, there is the argument that human reason is the ultimate
teller of good and evil.  What Ayn Rand really meant was that it was
_her_ reasoning ability that was the ultimate.  In fact, she was so
convinced that her own reasoning ability was flawless that she would not
tolerate anyone who questioned any point of her "philosophy", as has been
pointed out in other discussions here.  While we may in fact recognize
that human intelligence is all we have to go on, how many times have you
encountered a person who had less than perfect reasoning abilities?  Were
they self aware enough to realize their flawed logic?  Have you yet met
a perfect person?  Was Ayn Rand's reasoning ability perfect?  As it
turns out, very well thought out logic can be argued very compellingly
on both sides of an issue.  And until the very last variable has been
examined under the logic of both sides, the winner is often the more
skilled debater and not necessarily the one who is arguing for the
truth.  And yet how many times do you get to examine every single
variable?  On most issues, most of us do not have the time or inclination
to become experts and thus we rely on the interpretation of the facts
as given to us by others.  Certainly, reason is the best we have but it
is by no means perfect, and no one individual's reasoning ability is
perfect.




-- 
***********************************************************************
 Jim Burke	"Life is uncertain - eat dessert first!"
 Teknekron Software Systems		... burke@tss.com
 phone:(415) 617-2432			... uunet!tekbspa!burke
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: srogers@teenwolf.mcc.com.mcc (Steve Rogers)
Subject: Re: Rand's Personality vs Objectivism
Reply-To: srogers@teenwolf.mcc.com.mcc
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 16:01:11 GMT

From smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith) writes:
> Before we arbitrarily reject "ad hominum" agruments let us remember
> what such an argument is. The classical argument goes like this:
> 
>  Joe has flaws; therefore Joe's work has flaws.
> 
> Such arguments are clearly nonsense when Joe's work concerns music or
> electron spin or biology or celestial mechanics. But that's not what
> we're discussing here. In this case the flaws are directly related to
> the work being examined. In short:
> 
>   Ayn Rand's personal behavior was flawed, and
>   Ayn Rand claimed her behavior reflected proper Objectivist ideals.

I agree that this is not an ad hominum argument, with some reservations.
If your claiming AR's behaviour was flawed by her own standards, who is
making that judgement?  You need to add "I am competent to apply AR's
standards to her life and have sufficient specific information about
her life to do this".

and cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes in response to

>>In article <1993Jan11.183735.4477@sctc.com> smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith) writes:
>bil@okcforum.osrhe.uoknor.edu (Bill Conner) writes:

> i think the point some O/objectivists are making is that her flawed
> behavior and her claim that her behavior reflected proper O ideals
> do not necessarily mean O is flawed. there are two possibilities:
> 
> A. Rand was right that her behaviour reflected objectivist ideals
>    and since her behavior was flawed, objectivism is flawed;
> 
> or
> 
> B. Rand was *wrong* that her behavior reflected objectivist ideals
>    and so the flaws in her behavior are irrelevant.

I think this is generally right, but it is more important to ask what
those who would closely examine Rand's life what exactly they hope to
prove.  I personally think that this argument is an excuse to shift the
focus from the philosophy to Rand herself, and ultimately ad hominum.
In the end, its not really relevant what Rand herself did, even if she
claimed to be 100% in accord with Objectivism.

A person who does not understand Objectivism will not be able to
understand how Objectivism motivates a person and certainly won't be
able to understand Rand's actions or judge whether her personal
behaviour was flawed by her own standards.  It would be much more
instructive to concentrate on the philosophy and comparatively simple
examples.

---
| Steven Rogers  MCC/ESL  3500 West Balcones Drive
| Austin, Texas 78759-6509  (512) 338-3691 srogers@mcc.com

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 18:09:03 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.171632.17379@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com
 (Robert Baruch) writes:

   >In any case, I fail to understand the significance of these.  I started out
   >by claiming the usefulness of "A=A", because it tells you to analyze
   >the meaning of something before you use it in an argument.  I presented
   >an example where not invoking the law of identity leads you to accept 
   >the example as valid, when it is not.  Do you not understand the example?

  What this means is that you thought you spotted an equivocation that rendered
the argument invalid. You then attributed this achievement to the power of
the principle "A=A", which when properly invoked will reveal all such
equivocations.

  This is a nice example of the homage paid to "A=A" by Objectivists. However,
it would have been more impressive if you had been prompted by "A=A" to
think a bit more about the argument to understand why Smullyan thought it
was so interesting. After all, Smullyan=Smullyan, that is, it is not to be
expected that his examples and puzzles turn on simple equivocations. You
might then have discovered that there is no equivocation in the intended
argument.
From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: (A=A -> objectivism): Where's the Beef?
Date: 6 Jan 93 13:45:32 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

In article <2m8VwB3w165w@momad.li.ny.us> siphon@Momad.LI.NY.US (Stimpson J. Katz) writes:
>ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:

>> Here's a person looking for a rational justification of this
>> rather grotesque social doctrine, and what does he get? "A=A". Yeesh.

>        Mr. Hayes demonstrates his ignorance of the power of axiom 
>systems. All reasoning based on logic requires that certain axioms be 
>used to derive subsequent principles. ...
>        If you complain that little can be drawn from this axiom, then I 
>submit you would be demonstrating further ignorance. Euclidean Geometry 
>proceeds from amazingly few axioms.

All right, Siphon, then would you please be so kind as to enlighten us all
by presenting a FORMAL PROOF of "objectivism"? Since you are obviously
not in need of instruction regarding the nature of such proofs, it will
not be necessary to remind you that statements like: 

    >"A is A", is a demand the concepts have clear meaning
    >before they are subjected to logical manipulations.

are clearly not acceptable in such a proof, relying as they do on
unsupported reinterpretation of the axioms ("... is a demand ...")
and undefined terms of central significance ("clear meaning").

The above-quoted statement was not being offered as part of a formal
proof, of course, and so cannot be held to the same strict standards
as one. I look forward to the unambiguous, non-question-begging,
formally rigourous demonstration of the truth of "objectivism" that
we have been promised.

I'm obviously being sarcastic, here, but it is not inappropriate,
given the kind of purple rhetoric we've seen over and over again
alluding to the logical indisputability of "objectivism".

So how about it, Randites? You talk the talk, but do you chalk the chalk?

Can you provide a set of axioms, a set of tranformation rules,
a set of definitions (no cheating, now!), and a set of valid
inferences showing how to get from premises like "A=A" to
conclusions like "I have no responsibility to help a little old
lady who just fell down in front of an oncoming truck", or whatever
your favorite illustration of the glory of selfishness is? (This
particular example comes from an actual conversation I once had
with a Net-Randroid, who admitted, however, that she might help
the little old lady on the off-chance that she was rich).

We're waiting..........
From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Letting Someone Drown
Date: 12 Jan 93 23:21:11 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

In article <1993Jan12.210150.12133@athena.mit.edu> cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes:
>helping others is in your self-interest if you genuinely want
>to help them, for any reason and you act voluntarily.
>this is true by definition.

Would you also agree that drinking poison is, by definition,
in your self-interest if you genuinely want to drink it,
for any reason, and you act voluntarily?

Of course, drinking poison is generally a bad thing to do, whereas
helping others is generally a good thing to do. My point is that
calling it "in your self-interest by definition" is quite false,
and merely attempts to subsume a non-selfish class of actions
under the class of selfish actions as an inexpensive way of
allowing real-world objectivists to behave nonselfishly
without appearing to violate their principles.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: sa114984@longs.LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Steven Arnold)
Subject: Re: Libertarianism and Religion?
Date: Mon, 04 Jan 1993 19:32:49 GMT
Organization: Colorado State U. Engineering College

In article <1993Jan3.053202.1416@news2.cis.umn.edu>, rob@dexter.psych.umn.edu (Robert Stephens) writes:
|> 
|> I first profess no real knowledge of exactly
|> what the difference between Objectivism and Libertarianism
|> is.  I AM vaguely aware of the accusation that Libertarianism
|> does arrive at some conclusions on the basis of religion.
|>  
|> If this is true then I could see why Objectivists would want
|> to distance themselves from Libertarianism.
|> 
|> Would anyone care to enlighten me on the facts?

	I have heard something like this as well, and I tend to think it is
unnecessarily Puritanistic.  I see nothing wrong with irrationality if it does not
involve violating anybody else's rights.  I include religion in that statement,
which is, objectively speaking, irrational -- even so, it could possibly be true,
just as "revelation" might be a valid way of knowing.  But unlike reason,
revelation cannot be objectively demonstrated to everyone: hence, as a guide for
government, it is woefully inadequate.

Steve
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: A=A
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 14:01:07 GMT

In article <106151@bu.edu> ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:

   >By they way, "contradictions do not exist" is perhaps not the best
   >way of interpreting the logical axiom "A=A". A better way would be,
   >"for any object A, A is identical with A". Less sexy, I know,
   >but much less likely to invite argument or misuse.

  Alas, such an interpretation would spell the end of Objectivism as we
know it. It is essential that wonderful consequences must flow from
"A is A".
From: julieh@noao.edu (Julie Heynssens)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Letting Someone Drown
Date: 13 Jan 93 00:30:26 GMT
Organization: National Optical Astronomy Observatories, Tucson, AZ, USA


In article <up1iinc@zola.esd.sgi.com> erik@westworld.esd.sgi.com (Erik Fortune) writes:
>
>In article <1993Jan12.031646.2043@eplrx7.es.duPont.com>, cristy@eplrx7.es.duPont.com writes:
>> Concerning the drowning man.  Rand answers this question in her writings:
>> 
>>    Never sacrifice a higher value for a lesser value
>> 
>> That is, if the person is a stranger and it is quite clear that you will
>> probably die trying to save the drowning victim then it is moral not to
>> attempt the rescue.  However, if the person is your lover and you feel
>> your own life would be incomplete without this person then risking
>> one's life is moral.
>> -- 
>> cristy@dupont.com
>
>That's all well and good for the two extremes you list.   What if the
>person is a stranger but there is no (or minimal) risk to you?  Is it
>moral (by objectivist standards) to walk away?
>
>-- Erik

Prioritize the following values:

(1)  Saving the life and conciousness of another human being.
(2)  The few seconds of time that it would take to throw a life 
     preserver.

Objectivism states that you should choose 1 or 2 based upon which
of the choices above holds a higher value.  Another human being's life
regardless of whether I know him or not is a higher value than the
infintessimal time I could save by not throwing a life presever.  Rand
herself said that you should offer aid in an emergency as long as that
aid did not conflict with any higher principle.  A few minutes of time
is not a higher priciple.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Rational Debate, Axioms, and Arguments
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 23:42:57 GMT

In article <C0EL60.6E3@SSD.intel.com> pandit@ssd.intel.com (Milind Pandit)
 writes:

   >Absolutely, but Objectivism is the only philosophy that rests on
   >axioms which we must all accept.  For example, you cannot say, "I am a
   >Socialist because I reject Objectivism's axiom 'existence exists'."
   >If you reject this axiom, you must reject any kind of ordered view of
   >the universe and your place in it.  Objectivism is the only philosophy
   >that rests solely on a few such axioms and draws its conclusions
   >logically from them.

  This, of course, is how it appears to the faithful. However, the
ordinary philosophical outsider takes a rather different view. First,
the idea that philosophy consists of "philosophies" resting on
"axioms" has very little to do with how philosophy is understood
outside Objectivism and similar sects. Second, philosophers are
normally inclined neither to accept nor to reject Objectivist "axioms"
such as "A is A", simply because these much-touted formulas appear to
to be slogans into which the enthusiastic Objectivist inserts
whatever Randian wisdom seems appropriate on a particular occasion.
Third, the supposed logical reasoning from the supposed axioms is
pathetic by any ordinary philosophical standards, both as regards
rigor and content.

  All of this, of course, is no big deal. It merely means that Ayn Rand
was a fifth-rate philosopher, and that her followers emulate her as best
they can. It would be a great favor to the ideals of capitalism, romanticism,
and selfishness (as these ideals are understood by those who find
Rand's novels gripping and persuasive) to quietly drop the Randian
philosophizing. And of course there are those who argue for such ideals
in much more reasonable terms.

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Daniel R Cosley)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 23:01:10 GMT

Perhaps you could give an example of how Objectivism is incomplete.  I don't 
understand in what sense you mean "complete" in regard to a philosophy.  As in,
can it tell us everything about the universe?  Or as in it will always tell you
what is right to do?  Please clarify...
-- 
Dan  ***  dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
*******************************************
Disclaimer: Due to budget constraints, The Ohio State University cannot afford 
to express official university opinions on Usenet.
From: frankp@galena.bellcore.com (Frank Perez)
Subject: Private Roads in an Objectivist Society
Organization: Bellcore, Livingston, NJ
Date:  9 Jan 93 14:06:52 GMT
Summary: Private Roads in an Objectivist Society
Keywords: Private Roads

Dear Objectivists:

I am a strong supporter of laizze-faire capitalism, but I have the following
concern.

It is my understanding that in an Objectivist form of government, ALL roads
would be private.

I could see this implementable for turnpikes, highways, or long-distance roads.
But what about local roads like city streets and streets next to your house,
let's say.

This might sound a little ridiculous, but what if I own a house and the local
road is owned by someone else and that person does not let me use his road.
I now have a house but I cannot enter it because all the local streets 
surrounding the house are owned by this person who will not let me use his 
road. Do you see a possible problem ?

An answer to this question would be most greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Franklin Perez

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism