From: morgan@sitka.triumf.ca (Morgan Burke)
Subject: bug in FAQ file (summary)
Organization: TRIUMF, Vancouver BC
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 20:22:22 GMT

dgraham@bmers30.bnr.ca (Douglas Graham) writes:
>Oh, probably.  Which might explain why I'm bored as hell with this thread.

Not bored enough to work up a sweat debating some very fine points.  ;-)

>Perhaps you could start afresh by explaining exactly what *you* think
>is wrong with Pascal's Wager.

Better than that, I will summarize what I believe has been resolved in
this debate up to this point.

Pascal's Wager is summarised in the FAQ as follows:
  1. One does not know whether God exists.
  2. Not believing in God is bad for one's eternal soul if God does exist.
  3. Believing in God is of no consequence if God does not exist.
  4. Therefore it is in one's interest to believe in God.

The FAQ claims that statements 2 & 3 violate information entropy, since
they are derived from a lack of knowledge about God (ie. from statement 1).
In fact neither statement is derived from a lack of knowledge about God.

Statement 2 is derived from Christian lore and tradition, about which
much is known.  There is no information entropy violation, if one accepts
that scriptures provide an accurate description of God, should He exist.
Given that the only widely accepted definition of God is that provided by
His description in the Bible, Statement 2 stands on very solid ground.

Objections that God may not match His biblical description are similar to
claims that Sherlock Holmes may have been an idiot.  The only source of
knowledge about literary characters (fictional or not) is the literature
they appear in, not arbitrary re-definitions provided by ornery debaters.

Objections regarding the injection of Christian interpretations of God
are irrelevant.  Pascal's cultural bias, the use of capital-G God, and
the mention of "eternal soul" in the argument obviously imply a
Judeo-Christian context to this debate.

Statement 3 is derived from the simple fact that nothingness can have no
effect on existence.  However, the statement makes the assumption that
the alternatives are either a Christian God or a godless universe.  This
assumption was likely made by Pascal, and is loosely implied by statement
1, but is otherwise a ridiculous example of Christian chauvinism.  The
possibility of rival gods is implicitly rejected.

However, if we consider the possibility that God is a false god, and that
a rival God may exist, then statement 3 is unfounded.  This possibility
is covered elsewhere in the FAQ, and is not contested.  This is a different
objection to statement 3 than the contention that it violates information
entropy due to being derived from statement 1.

It was also demonstrated through numerous examples that Pascal's logic
was valid:  it is logically acceptable to make decisions based on
lack of knowledge about the state of existence of something, provided
that you have adequate knowledge of the *consequences* of either state.
Pascal thought he had adequate knowledge of these consequences, but a
more critical look from outside the Christian worldview shows that some
of his assumptions were faulty.

As an aside, his logic is only viable if the probabilities assigned to
both states are significant.  Otherwise, the work involved in dealing with
unlikely scenarios is overwhelming.  Pascal's wager assumes a significant
probability for the existence of God, and is therefore somewhat circular.

As such, I continue to believe that Pascal's logic was valid, but unsound
due to faulty assumptions.  It does not violate information theory in the
manner described by the FAQ.

-- Morgan Burke (morgan@reg.triumf.ca)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism