From: CDELL@VAX1.UMKC.EDU ("VALENTINE M. SMITH")
Newsgroups: talk.politics.soviet
Subject: Comments on Document ae2bkhun.doc of the LC Archives
Date: 13 Aug 92 17:37:37 GMT
Reply-To: "talk.politics.soviet via ListServ" <TPS-L@indycms.iupui.edu>

The "argumemt" about the cross-posting of these documents is almost
moot, in my estimation, as this one and one more are all that is
left. I'm sorry that posting this series has been of so much
aggravation to certain individuals, but it has been crossposted to
both get to Library of Congress monitoring about such comments -
because those monitors are only looking at RUSSIA and TPS-L, and NOT
Val-L or SovHist - and because people from all four lists have
requested more of them. As two people pointed out this morning,
delete them if you don't want to read them, and also there are the
documents in seq1.loc.gov to retrieve without my comments for those
wanting to use them for "teaching." After I finish this series,
(which I WILL do) then I can relapse back into the silence on RUSSIA
that some expect me to manifest.


>Copy To Comrade Molotov
>Top Secret For members of the Politburo
>Please make no copies for any reason. Each
>member of the Politburo (incl. Comrade Kalinin)
>should comment directly on the document.
>Lenin.

This document is written two months before Lenin's first stroke, and
a couple of weeks prior to Stalin's selection as General Secreatary
of the CPSU at the 11th Party Congress.

>In regard to the occurrence at Shuia, which is already slated for
>discussion by the Polituro, it is necessary right now to make a firm
>decision about a general plan of action in the present course.
>Because I doubt that I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting
>on March 20th in person, I will set down my thoughts in writing.

I cannot find a specific reference to the "occurrence at Shuia." Any
clues as to what this about?

>The event at Shuia should be connected with the announcement that the
>Russian News Agency [ROST] recently sent to the newspapers but that
>was not for publication, namely, the announcement that the Black
>Hundreds in Petrograd [Piter] were preparing to defy the decree on
>the removal of property of value from the churches.  If this fact is
>compared with what the papers report about the attitude of the clergy
>to the decree on the removal of church property in addition to what
>we know about the illegal proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, then it
>becomes perfectly clear that the Black Hundreds clergy, headed by its
>leader, with full deliberation is carrying out a plan at this very
>moment to destroy us decisively.

Patriarch Tikhon "protested" the seizure of church property, probably
in the proclomation Lenin refers to, for which he was jailed about
two months after this document was written, and stayed jailed until
he "recanted" the following year. He died in 1925. (From  _The World
Almanac of the Soviet From 1905 to the Present (1990), 229-30).

>It is obvious that the most influential group of the Black Hundreds
>clergy conceived this plan in secret meetings and that it was
>accepted with sufficient resolution.  The events in Shuia is only one
>manifestation and actualization of this general plan.

Probably the only way that the clergy could have met in the year
after the civil war was over.

>I think that here our opponent is making a huge strategic error by
>attempting to draw us into a decisive struggle now when it is
>especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous to him.  For us,
>on the other hand, precisely at the present moment we are presented
>with an exceptionally favorable, even unique, opportunity when we can
>in 99 out of 100 chances utterly defeat our enemy with complete
>success and guarantee for ourselves the position we require for
>decades.  Now and only now, when people are being eaten in
>famine-stricken areas, and hundreds, if not thousands, of corpses lie
>on the roads, we can (and therefore must) pursue the removal of
>church property with the most frenzied and ruthless energy and not
>hesitate to put down the least opposition.  Now and only now, the
>vast majority of peasants will either be on our side, or at least
>will not be in a position to support to any decisive degree this
>handful of Black Hundreds clergy and reactionary urban petty
>bourgeoisie, who are willing and able to attempt to oppose this
>Soviet decree with a policy of force.

He was right about the clergy's "strategic error" in resisting,
though a "policy of force" was probably more a policy of "passive
resistance" rather than overtly attacking the Bolsheviks.

>We must pursue the removal of church property by any means necessary
>in order to secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million
>gold rubles (do not forget the immense wealth of some monasteries and
>lauras).  Without this fund any government work in general, any
>economic build-up in particular, and any upholding of soviet
>principles in Genoa especially is completely unthinkable.  In order
>to get our hands on this fund of several hundred million gold rubles
>(and perhaps even several hundred billion), we must do whatever is
>necessary.  But to do this successfully is possible only now.  All
>considerations indicate that later on we will fail to do this, for no
>other time, besides that of desperate famine, will give us such a
>mood among the general mass of peasants that would ensure us the
>sympathy of this group, or, at least, would ensure us the
>neutralization of this group in the sense that victory in the
>struggle for the removal of church property unquestionably and
>completely will be on our side.

He surmised correctly, apparently, and this program was carried out.

>One clever writer on statecraft correctly said that if it is
>necessary for the realization of a well-known political goal to
>perform a series of brutal actions then it is necessary to do them in
>the most energetic manner and in the shortest time, because masses of
>people will not tolerate the protracted use of brutality. This
>observation in particular is further strengthened because harsh
>measures against a reactionary clergy will be politically
>impractical, possibly even extremely dangerous as a result of the
>international situation in which we in Russia, in all probability,
>will find ourselves, or may find ourselves, after Genoa.  Now victory
>over the reactionary clergy is assured us completely.  In addition,
>it will be more difficult for the major part of our foreign
>adversaries among the Russian emigres abroad, i.e., the
>Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Milyukovites [Left Wing Cadet
>Party], to fight against us if we, precisely at this time, precisely
>in connection with the famine, suppress the reactionary clergy with
>utmost haste and ruthlessness.

Is he referring to Machiavelli here?

>Therefore, I come to the indisputable conclusion that we must
>precisely now smash the Black Hundreds clergy most decisively and
>ruthlessly and put down all resistance with such brutality that they
>will not forget it for several decades.

Lenin definitely had no mercy for opponents.

>The campaign itself for carrying out this plan I envision in the
>following manner:

>Only Comrade Kalinin should appear officially in regard to any
>measures taken--never and under no circumstance must Comrade Trotsky
>write anything for the press or in any other way appear before the
>public.

Was this because Trotsky had a Jewish background, wherein Kalinin had
been Orthodox?

>The telegram already issued in the name of the Politburo about the
>temporary suspension of removals must not be rescinded.  It is useful
>for us because it gives our adversary the impression that we are
>vacillating, that he has succeeded in confusing us (our adversary, of
>course, will quickly find out about this secret telegram precisely
>because it is secret).

>Send to Shuia one of the most energetic, clear-headed, and capable
>members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsIK] or
>some other representative of the central government (one is better
>than several), giving him verbal instructions through one of the
>members of the Politburo.  The instructions must come down to this,
>that in Shuia he must arrest more if possible but not less than
>several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local petty
>bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct or
>indirect participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of
>the VTsIK on the removal of property of value from churches.
>Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to Moscow
>and personally deliver a report to the full session of the Politburo
>or to two specially authorized members of the Politburo.  On the
>basis of this report, the Politburo will give a detailed directive to
>the judicial authorities, also verbal, that the trial of the
>insurrectionists from Shuia, for opposing aid to the starving, should
>be carried out in utmost haste and should end not other than with the
>shooting of the very largest number of the most influential and
>dangerous of the Black Hundreds in Shuia, and, if possible, not only
>in this city but even in Moscow and several other ecclesiastical
>centers.

One wonders who was sent, and how many ended up being shot to satisfy
this memo, and its sender.

>I think that it is advisable for us not to touch Patriarch Tikhon
>himself, even though he undoubtedly headed this whole revolt of
>slave-holders.  Concerning him, the State Political Administration
>[GPU] must be given a secret directive that precisely at this time
>all communications of this personage must be monitored and their
>contents disclosed in all possible accuracy and detail.  Require
>Dzerzhinsky and Unshlikht personally to report to the Politburo about
>this weekly.

This policy changed, as noted above.

>At the party congress arrange a secret meeting of all or almost all
>delegates to discuss this matter jointly with the chief workers of
>the GPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice [NKIu], and the
>Revolutionary Tribunal.  At this meeting pass a secret resolution of
>the congress that the removal of property of value, especially from
>the very richest lauras, monasteries, and churches, must be carried
>out with ruthless resolution, leaving nothing in doubt, and in the
>very shortest time.  The greater the number of representatives of the
>reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie that we succeed in
>shooting on this occasion, the better because this "audience" must
>precisely now be taught a lesson in such a way that they will not
>dare to think about any resistance whatsoever for several decades.

This was written two days into that party congress, and no doubt such
a resolution was passed, though I have no history of the congress(es)
at hand to verify that.

>To attend to the quickest and most successful carrying out of these
>measures, there at the congress, i.e., at the secret meeting, appoint
>a special commission, the participation of Comrade Trotsky and
>Comrade Kalinin being required, without giving any publicity to this
>commission, with the purpose that the subordination to it of all
>operations would be provided for and carried out not in the name of
>the commission but as an all-soviet and all-party order.  Appoint
>those who are especially responsible from among the best workers to
>carry out these measures in the wealthiest lauras, monasteries, and
>churches.

Why wre Kalinin and Trotsky's "participation" in this process
"required?"

>                                                 Lenin.

>March 19, 1922.

>I request that Comrade Molotov attempt to circulate this letter to
>the members of the Politburo by evening today (not making copies) and
>ask them to return it to the secretary immediately after reading it,
>with a succinct note regarding whether each member of the Politburo
>agrees in principle or if the letter arouses any differences of
>opinion.
>                                                 Lenin.

Did the all of the notes asked for in this afternote get written? Did
they survive besides the one included?

>A note in the hand of Comrade Molotov:

>"Agreed.  However, I propose to extend the campaign not to all
>gubernias and cities, but to those where indeed there are
>considerable possessions of value, accordingly concentrating the
>forces and attention of the party.

>March 19.  Molotov."

Sounds as though Molotov was trying to be a realistic brake, in terms
of resources available, not in terms of sympathy with the clergy,
this written only a month after the Cheka was replaced by the GPU.

>        True copy: [illegible]

>        The original has been transferred to the Lenin Institute.

This was the opening gun of a campaign that apparently succeeded
almost completely. VMS