HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West (Richmond and Washingtom`n
Date: 14 Dec 1992 13:57:25 GMT
Organization: Department of Physics, Kansas State University, Manhattan KS, USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: bohr.phys.ksu.edu

In article <Bz948z.Ixv@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
 (gary charbonneau) writes:
>In article <tecump.724277205@sulu> tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello) writes:
>
>>Do you think that England would even challenge the Federal govt?  i am 
>>still a little hazy on my opinion of the subject due to lack of study
>>of that.  But the United States soon had the strongest fleet in the 
>>world.  
>
>A valid question.  Can somebody verify the "stongest fleet in the world"
>assertion?  However, even if it is not technically true, the sudden
>introduction of ironclad technology would surely have changed the
>equation in American waters.  I am thinking here primarily of the po-
>tential American threat to Canada.  The early ironclads were, I imagine,
>both rather shortlegged (because of limitations on their fuel supply)
>and unseaworthy.  This means that an American ironclad fleet operating
>from, say, New England, would have had considerable advantages over 
>a British ironclad fleet operating from the UK.

While the original "Monitor" was not ocean-going, other early ironclads
such as the "New Ironsides" were.
And by the end of the war, the U.S. had many ocean-going ironclads (mostly
monitors).  The British navy had one ironclad for sure: the "Warrior"
(which has been restored and is on display at Southampton, UK).  But the
U.S. had the largest number of the the most up-to-date ironclads of any
navy by 1865.

--
Justin M. Sanders    
Dept. of Physics     "I could not fail to disagree with you less."
Kansas State Univ.                           -- Gabriel Weinreich
From: tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West (Richmond and Washingtom`n
Date: 13 Dec 92 20:06:45 GMT

what if the confederacy had not changed its capital to Virginia, but 
leave it in the cotton states?  Then purhaps the situation would be
a little different - what with the "capital" being the most important
thing to many folks.  the jobs of the northern armies would be reversed.

but that is a i"what if" but so are a lot of things.
what if Washington was taken?  Hmm.  did it really matter a whole lot
that the seat of the Federal govt was taken. to be honest, it was not
to strategically located anyway.  even if England and France had recog
the CSA, do you really think Lincoln wouldve given up?  the loss of the
capital, a mere city, is while important, negligiable with respect
to the cause in which they were engaged, more precisely, the preservation
of the Union.

Do you think that England would even challenge the Federal govt?  i am 
still a little hazy on my opinion of the subject due to lack of study
of that.  But the United States soon had the strongest fleet in the 
world.  

Now, if the Confederate capital fell, the strained bonds between the
"independent and sovereign states" would be stretched far.  Davis had
enough trouble keeping the states in line with the capital secure.
Lincolns states were dedicated to a cause of preserving the Union, as
opposed to every state for itself attitude many of the southern states
had.  (of course, we cannot neglect the states rights' expoused by
northerners.).

hmmmmm.


d
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: re: European Intervention (was Re: exit)
Date: 17 Dec 92 14:38:15 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <tecump.724621503@sulu>, tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu 
(Dominic J. Dal bello) writes:
> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
> 
>>  It's quite possible that a British, French, and Russian peacekeeping force
>>arrives to try to end the fighting. The Russians were proposing this very
>>seriously, I'm not sure how the British and French felt about it. It's also
>>not clear what this force does if it arrives, but I think the probability
>>is that end ends up on the Confederate side de facto, which would about do
>>it for the Union.
> 
> Do you really think the European nations would intervene under any 
> circumstances unless they were absolutely sure they could win.  

From what I've read of the British Army's view of the ACW, they thought 
exactly that. The Battle of 1st Manassas (Bull Run) did damage to the 
reputation of the American soldier that lasted much longer than it 
should have. 

>...the largest
> army ever assembled in the modern western world would be on the march, now
> , not only fighting for the Union, but for its survival as well.

That's pretty much how I see it too, in 1864, but the CSA was the 
2nd biggest, and in 1862 was much better led than the Union Army.
Earlier, say at the time of the Mason-Slidell incident, I think 
Lincoln would not even have attempted to contest European intervention.

- Paul - 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan     Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV   "I've been to one World's Fair, a picnic and a rodeo, but
                that's the stupidest thing I ever heard..."_Dr.Strangelove_
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: wrbanek@fnala.fnal.gov (John D. Wrbanek)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: European Intervention (was "exit")
Date: 17 Dec 92 19:56:28 -0600
Organization: Fermilab, Batavia, IL
NNTP-Posting-Host: fnala.fnal.gov

In message <1992Dec17.191347.836@cronkite.ocis.temple.edu>,
agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu (Andrew Wing) wrote:
[lots of stuff deleted]
>	The Trent affair was probably the closest that England came to
>intervention.  It was best that England stayed out, she had little to gain
>by intervening and much to lose.

I remember a story I read about Queen Victoria and her husband (Prince Albert?)
when this Trent affair hit England.  Parliment was moving to vote on declaring
war on the US, and it was looking like it would pass.  The Prince wrote an
impassioned letter urging them to stay out of the civil war, which the Queen
signed.  Well, Parliment ended up voting against going to war, and the Prince
died three days later.

I don't remember the source, so I was wondering if anyone can comment on the
accuracy of the story.

Thanks.

john d. wrbanek

  wrbanek@fnal.fnal.gov           wrbanek@fnald.fnal.gov
  wrbanek@fnal.bitnet             wrbanek@warner.fnal.gov

  Fermi Nat'l Accelerator Lab.          *  Your tax dollars at work!  *       
  RD/OD/Ops                       "Fermilab is operated by University Reaserch 
  P.O.Box 500 MS 355              Association, Inc., under contract with the   
  Batavia, IL 60510               U.S. Department of Energy." - FNAL management

My opinions aren't those of FNAL, URA, DOE, or anyone except myself (thank God).
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 92 08:14:48 GMT

In article <Bz4BDK.1M9@constellation.ecn.uoknor.edu> robert@geoblue.gcn.uoknor.edu (Robert Lindsay) writes:

>Why was Atlanta more protectable? Sherman didn't seem to have as much trouble
>with it as grant did in virginia with Richmond.

As you point out below, Grant was up against R.E. Lee, not J.B. Hood. :)
However, the answer to your question is distance. Richmond by all rights
should have fallen in 1862 to McClellan. The Union could sail to within 50
miles of Richmond. They had to march 300 miles to reach Atlanta (assuming
they start from the South Carolina coast, which they control. From Kentucky
it's even farther.)
>
>Where else could they have put it that would have been safer?

As argued above, Atlanta. Another better site would've been the original one,
Montgomery Alabama.
>
>I think Sheridan 'proved' that after a good chunk of the AofNVa was
>pretty well plowed under. I don't think he would have had such a fun time
>in 62 or 63.

I think he would have. Jackson was outnumbered something like four or five
to one at the start of the Valley campaign of 1862. A good commander with
control of all the troops in the region (which was the Union's real failing,
the divided command) could have chased him out, and burned the Valley if
he had been so inclined.

>Why is DC less important than Richmond?
>It does not look good if you are trying to supress a rebellion and the 
>rebels take your capital. That's why all the troops were there in the
>first place.

I agree here. If DC falls, the rebellion has succeeded, whereas the
rebellion can survive the loss of Richmond (though with greatly reduced
odds).

>Actually Grant has taken a lot of those troops with him during the
>wilderness campaign, It wasn't quite as lopsided as all that, But I do
>agree it was probably a hopeless task to take DC.

Oh, but Early could have made one heckuva raid: burn the White House and
Congress, take as many Senators prisoner as he could, etc. etc. (And Early
was mean enough to do it, too.) By this point in the war I don't think it
would affect the outcome, though, and he could never have held DC for more
than 48 hours.
>
>He never 'whipped' Joe Johnston, he proved he couid GET to Atlanta, but we
>will never really know whether he could have taken it from him instead of
>the opium-addicted Hood.

As above.. :)

-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau)
Subject: Re: Capture of Washington: "Conventional Wisdom"
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 13:48:32 GMT

In article <1992Dec16.134924.21028@panix.com> spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) writes:
>charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau) writes:
>
>>"One elderly veteran of the 25th New York Cavalry thought as late as
>>1915: 'If Gen. Early had the proper pluck, he could have gotten into
>>Washington....our skirmish line was thrown out n a single file over a
>>large front.'  Lieutenant Frank Wilkeson, assigned to Battery A, 4th
>...
>>down the rifle pits on either side.  'The line once broken, the work
>>done, and the city would be in their possession,' declared Lieutenant
>>Edgar S. Dudley, 2d U.S. Artillery...."
>
>A couple of artillery lieutenants from a garrison force? I'm quite
>sure they were qualified observers... of their platoon front. I
>repeat: Neither Early nor anyone else was ever going to take
>Washington.
>
>dhs   spencer@panix.com

Well, since he DIDN'T, there's no way to settle the point definitively,
is there?  However, let me suggest a little thought experiment.  Early
arrives in front of Washington.  The garrison consists of .... Abraham
Lincoln, armed with a saber.  Who do you bet on, Old Jube with 12,000
men, or Old Abe with his saber?  The point I was trying to make in
my original post is that your statement that no one "was ever going
to take Washington" assumes that the fortifications were adequately
manned.  "No one was ever going to take Richmond" either under the
same assumption, but, when the time came, Grant's troops went up,
over, and through Lee's fortifications like a knife through butter,
because the Confederates were spread way too thin.

So the real question is whether the Washington defenses were adequately
manned at the time that Early first arrived there, and whether it was
whooly unnecessary for Grant to send a corps back there to hold the
city.  You are saying that Grant was mistaken?


Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Grant in the East (was Jackson at the Seven Days)
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 92 04:14:20 GMT

Paul Cowan wrote:
>I don't think it is realistic to claim that Grant was compelled to
>stay in the East against his better judgement in order to coordinate
>Meade and Burnside.  The more significant task was coordinating the
>AotP (Meade) and the Army of the James (Butler), not becouse of
>seniority issues, but because they were acting separately to converge
>on a common goal. From what little I know about military strategy, I
>am led to understand this is one of the most difficult things to
>accomplish in the face of an enemy.

It's even harder when you consider that in 1865 there was no radio, only
telegraph which had to go through Washington. Also, there was no land
communication between Butler and Meade, everything had to go by ship and
then down to Meade. Did Butler even have telegraph communication with
Washington in the absence of a land link, or could they do an undersea
line? If not, then all traffic between Meade and Butler would've been by
dispatch, and that's going to make it extremely difficult to coordinate.
  On the other hand, sending Grant to Meade didn't help this at all... I
think this too is due to the fact that Meade wasn't empowered to give
Butler orders, and Butler was very senior to Meade.


-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: European Intervention (was "exit")
Date: 17 Dec 92 19:59:49 GMT

cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>The
>enlistment rate on behalf of the Union was much lower than the CSA,
>but had the war been seen as one for/against England, monarchy, etc,
>would these ratios have changed?

what do you mean by enlistment rate.  Do you refer to the % of population
enlisted, or the number of men coming in?

The south in any case had to get a higher percentage of men in the field,
in order to field enough men.  Patriotic spirit in the South mustve been
darn high at the beginning of the war, as well as in the north.  However,
these facts must be remembered"
	1. the "rebels" were fighting for their homes.  the Yankees had
		to come down south.
	2. the Confederate draft started BEFORE union conscription, and
		was much less formal, especially in the latter years
		when men were shanghai`d as the army marched north (
		(See Sam Watkins' "Co. H").  The confederacy had just
		as hard a time, if not worse, in filling its ranks.

just some more thoughts.  sorry

dom
From: tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Arlington Cemetery (was Re: Thomas)
Date: 21 Dec 92 03:38:57 GMT

robert@geoblue.gcn.uoknor.edu (Robert Lindsay) writes:

>In article <tecump.724200145@sulu> tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello) writes:
>>
>>
>>
>>it was in DC proper.  (Arlington is in DC proper).  Is not the military

>Ah No. Arlington in in Virginia. As in the state of Virginia. As in
>the other side of the potomac from DC.

>>"asylum" where belle boyd was kept for awhile?  (or where the Licoln
>> "conspirators
>>were hung, or where Jeff Davis was held after the war?)
>>
>>Arlington was not the only cemetary in/about washington.  it was founded
>>as the other cemetaries were becoming too crowded. 


ah. sorry.  I know that.  Gotta check my posts better.

I meant to write Arlington is NOT in DC, which would be obvious
to see, i believe, from the full previous sentence.

Actually, when DC was created, it was supposed to contain a portion 
on "the other side of the potomac from DC"  


dom
 
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Washington
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 22:26:42 GMT

FWIW, the opinion of Secretary Gideon Wells on Early's raid was that "an
attack on Washington could not be resisted, and he predicted that such an
attack would be made very soon." The source document is The_Diary_of_
Gideon_Wells, Vol II, and the quotation is from Catton, A_Stillness_at_
Appomattox.
  You can believe what you want to of Wells, but his opinion should carry
somewhat more weight that that of "a garrison artillery lieutenant".
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: jsanders@phys.ksu.edu (Justin M. Sanders)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Arlington Cemetery (was Re: Thomas)
Date: 21 Dec 1992 05:06:28 GMT
Organization: Department of Physics, Kansas State University, Manhattan KS, USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: bohr.phys.ksu.edu

In article <1992Dec16.105802.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>
>To get back to the original point (my ggg-uncle's grave in the "Military 
>Asylum, Washington, DC") a reply from my post on soc.roots indicated that
>Lee's Arlingtion estate did not become a cemetery until 1863 (roughly a year
>after my ggg-uncle's death during the Peninsula Campaign). I haven't confirmed
>this, but I'll have to do some more research to locate the "Military Asylum".
>I now suspect it was a hospital. My post on soc.roots drew some good
>recomendations for references, which I will summarize and post if there is
>interest here.

Sometimes the simplest method yields the solution:

The U.S. Military Asylum is clearly marked in the maps of Washington
provided in the Atlas to Accompany the Official Records.  It can, for
example, be seen on Plate 6 and on Plate 89 Pt. 1 (very nice map).  
It is north of the city proper in these maps, but still in the district.  
Comparing the old maps with modern ones, the present-day
U.S. Soldiers' and Airmen's Home occupies what appears to be the same
location, on modern N. Capital St.
--
Justin M. Sanders    
Dept. of Physics     "I could not fail to disagree with you less."
Kansas State Univ.                           -- Gabriel Weinreich
From: turrell@violet.berkeley.edu (David Turrell)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: southern reasons
Date: 14 Dec 1992 07:46:48 GMT
Organization: Cobol Pacific University
Distribution: usa
NNTP-Posting-Host: violet.berkeley.edu

In article <1992Dec5.001001.22695@leland.Stanford.EDU>
whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:

>In article <1992Dec3.035854.22660@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
>wgatherg@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (William Gathergood) writes:
>
>>My 16 yr old daughter is writing a paper on the Civil War and is frustrated by
>>Northern "propaganda" about all aspects of the war.
>[...]
>>   1. What were the major reasons for the South to decide it was necessary to 
>>      fight a war for independence against the North?
>
>   The most important difference between North and South was that, as an
>agricultural nation exporting food and cotton to Europe, the South favored
>free trade while the North favored protective tariffs to protect Northern
>industrial products from superior English competition. [...]

The South wasn't unanimous on the issue of protective tariffs. Hemp
(Kentucky, Virginia) and Sugar (Louisiana) farmers enjoyed protective
tariffs. South Carolina at the time of the nullification crisis
(metion of which was deleted from the quoted material above) farmed
Cotton and Rice.

The North benefited directly from Southern exports and was not
unanimous on the tariff question either. New York pocketed fully 40
cents (from interest, commissions, freight charges, insurance) of
every dollar paid for cotton in the (early?) 1850's. One bitter
complaint of southerners was the monopoly northern shipping enjoyed in
the export trade. One of the anticipated consequences of southern
political independence would have been competition for the export
business from European shippers, which were excluded by law.

I don't know what constitutes northern propaganda as mentioned above.
I could easily believe that some high school textbooks treat the topic
of causation with bland one-dimensionality, but southern arguments
permeate the serious literature, and even Ken Burns' progressive
documentary presents an impressive southern spokesman, Shelby Foote.

A convenient one-volume book of readings is "The Causes of The Civil
War", Kenneth M. Stampp (ed.), Prentice Hall, which has many of the
most important writings of civil war period southerners and
northerners, as well as modern historians, with good introductory
notes that don't try to draw final conclusions.

-David
From: tecump@sulu.ucsb.edu (Dominic J. Dal bello)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Winning the war in the West
Date: 13 Dec 92 20:02:39 GMT

cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink) writes:

>In article <1992Dec10.131438.2793@panix.com> spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) writes:
>>The AofP
>>took no initiative at all (other than the "mud march") for a year
>>after Chancellorsville.

>Sorry to pick nits from such an excellent exposition, but the mud march
>was led by Burnside and came before Chancellorsville, which strengthens
>your point.
>--Chuck


>-- 
>D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
>cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
>uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . .


ahh.  but what about the ill-fated Mine Run Campaign in the fall of
1863.  if you do not call that "initiative", albeit short-lived, then
what do you call it?

perhaps we must consider the fundamental purpose of the Army of the Potomac
before we simply put the Eastern campaigns down.  While i am a firm
believer in the western theory, the eastern boys had a time job to do
themselves.

dom

Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa