From: pesetsk@athena.mit.edu (David M Pesetsky)
Subject: Prototypes [was Re: typology of Esperanto]
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 00:27:55 GMT

In article <1992Aug24.202419.9164@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <1992Aug23.190212.107@leland.Stanford.EDU> alderson@elaine46.Stanford.EDU (Rich Alderson) writes:
>>>>I'm not sure what you mean by prototype theory.
>>>
>>>As found in Lakoff's _Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things._
>>
>>I have to admit that I haven't read it.  I'd have appreciated a quick summary
>>rather than a reference, but I'll check this out now that I have some time.
>
>Usually I get in trouble for *not* providing a reference.  Oh well.
>
>Briefly, Lakoff argues that the traditional view of categories as sets of
                 ^^^^^^ [or asserts?]
>things which have some property in common, and in which membership is 
>strictly binary, is wrong.  Instead, there are good examples (prototypes)
>and bad examples of member of a category-- e.g. robins but not ostriches
>are good examples of "birds".  Categories may have strict boundaries (e.g.
>"bird") or not (e.g. "tall man").  Categories may be extended in various
>ways, notably by metonymy, so that members may end up without any 
>properties in common.  Categories are not "natural kinds" but products of
>human cognition, and the links which establish a word's membership in a
>category may depend on human culture.
>
>(For details, arguments, and evidence, you'll have to read the book.)
>[...]
>
>It should be noted that, according to prototype theory, we normally reason
>about categories based on the best members, not the worst.  We are more
>likely (right or wrong) to think that what's true of robins is true of 
>chickens than vice versa.[...]
>
>>To take a classic example, do you consider English to be a Germanic language,
>>or a Romance language, or even a Hellenic one? [...]

I have looked at Lakoff's recent book, though not with great care, and I
have heard Lakoff give a long (three-hour) talk on the book.  One
question that is never addressed, at least not by him, is why we should
think that our sense that some avians are "better examples" of birds and
others worse is a fact about the nature of categories instead of a fact
about our ability to decide what belongs in what category.  Lakoff
dismisses the question out of hand when it is put to him, or at least
dismissed it when it was put to him at the lecture I attended.  But he
is not afraid to construct a large chain of speculations as to the
nature of language (so-called "Cognitive Linguistics"), mind, cognition,
politics etc. on the basis of the idea that categories are prototypes.
Maybe a closer acquaintance with the work of Eleanor Rosch, his main
source, would convince me, but people I've discussed the matter with who
do know this work tell me that the argument is not there either.

I don't really care whether Esperanto is Indo-European or not, but I do
care about the side-issue you raise.  I tend to get nervous when
Lakoff's recent work gets cited as if there were results there.
Certainly there are marvellously interesting observations, for example
about the ubiquity and systematicity of metaphor, but the larger edifice
with prototypes and all looks very dubious to me.  One reason is
Lakoff's conclusion that traditional linguistics is barking up the wrong
tree, since it is based on categories.  I've always felt sure that I was
barking up the right tree, myself, and see no reason to pick another
tree to bark up. [Sure, we use metaphors!]

I know this wasn't your topic, but it's one that interests me more.  Any
"Cognitive" linguists read this?  

-David Pesetsky
Newsgroups: sci.lang