HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Making sense out of Penrose
Date: 12 Nov 92 04:31:00 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Nov10.225645.6418@walter.cray.com> martinm@garond.cray.com (Martin Maiers) writes:

>Danah Zohar, _The Quantum Self: A Revolutionary View of Human Nature and 
>Consciousness Rooted in the New Physics_, 1990, Bloomsbury, London.

Zohar is very proud of being the inventor of this notion. Yet there
have been several books published on this notion before hers. The
earliest reference to this notion I know of is a series of
speculations by Haldane many decades ago, derived from the observation
that the EEG potentials on the surface of the brain are about the same
size as one would expect of an electron of the size of the brain,
which led him to develop the idea that perhaps the brain was an organ
(in part) constructed to host peculiarly large scale weak subatomic
effects.  But I can't remember where Haldane said this -- can anyone
help?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: eamon@vax2.concordia.ca (Eamon Egan)
Subject: Re:  Ginsberg and Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: Concordia University
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 16:30:00 GMT

In article <1992Nov4.234237.21662@Csli.Stanford.EDU>, 
avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman) writes...
>samsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com (Mark S. Riggle) writes:
> 
>| In the Strong AI vs. Weak AI hypothesis arguments, it is easy to forget 
>| the very special treatment of consciousness in quantum physics and that 
>| it should be accounted for.
> 
>In _some_ versions of quantum physics, perhaps.  There are several versions 
>of Q.M., however, entirely compatible with the data, that accord no such 
>special status to a conscious observer.  A paricularly interesting one is 
>the "many-worlds" interpretation, proposed by Hugh Everett.  On this view, 
>rather than one time-line, the universe has a branching time-axis. 
>"Superpositions of states," like the one Schroedinger's cat is supposedly 
>in before the box is opened, are really just cases of parallel time-lines 
>having different states without the experimenter knowing which line
>he/she's in fact in.  When the box is opened, the experimenter finds out. 
> 
>Although this view seems slightly counterintuitive at first, it is no more 
>so than many other consequences of modern physics, and _certainly_ no more 
>so than the "conscious observer causes collapse" theory.
> 
>For those that disagree, imagine that, instead of a cat, a conscious 
>(aren't cats at least a little conscious, anyway?) observer, such as a 
>person, were trapped in the box.  Now, _from_the_perspective_of_an_
>_experimenter_outside_the_box, all Schroedinger's assumptions still hold.  
>So we must conclude that even the person inside the box is, from someone's 
>perspective, in a superposition of states.  Therefore "conscious
>observation" has nothing to do with the collapse of the wave function.

Someone *else's* conscious observation has nothing to do with the collapse 
of the wave function *for me*.  Just as *my* conscious observation has 
nothing to do with the collapse of the wave function *for someone else*.
Wave function collapse, in the pure sense, is itself relative to each 
consciousness.  "so and so's friend" (I forget whose) is a published
though-experiment which puts a conscious observer in a superposition of 
states with respect to another observer.

However, that being said, I think that real quantum mechanics in practice 
takes the wave function to have collapsed after the effect has propagated 
up to the macro level.  At this point the heisenberg whatsits have been 
rendered insignificant, and nothing weird is any longer observed.  That's 
why Schrodinger's cat is only interesting as a thought-experiment.

If anyone knows what I'm saying better than I do, please straighten me out.

------------------------------------------
Eamon Egan
Philosophy, Concordia University, Montreal
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 02:29:39 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Oct30.195251.9573@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>I tend to equate grounding with the folk notion of "knowing what you're
>talking about."  If I talk about something I haven't directly experienced,
>like marijuana, I could be accused of "not knowing what I'm talking about";
>in this case my statements could be meaningful, but ungrounded.
>
>I assume grounding is most important to those (like Harnad and George Lakoff)
>who see meaning as derived from direct real-world experience.  I suppose it
>wouldn't much interest those who identify "meaning" merely with logical sense
>or reference, or with the magic of causal properties.  On the other hand, I
>don't know how these folks would explain the dubiousness of my comments
>about the taste of marijuana, since there is presumably nothing wrong with
>my sense, reference, or causal properties.

There are two not-unrelated problems:

(1) There is, in a purely information-theoretic sense, much more information
in actually tasting marijuana than in anything or everything you have been
told about it.  So you *can't* have comparable grounding compared to someone
who has tasted it.

(2) Humans are not so constructed as to be able to take verbal descriptions,
however complete and accurate, and translate them into the equivalent memory
structures generated for sensory experiences.  So even if somebody could
tell you exactly what it tasted like, you couldn't fully understand the
explanation.  (This *is* a problem with your causal properties; one which
an AI need not share.)
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ginsberg and Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 8 Nov 92 16:51:58 GMT

Avrom Faderman writes:
 > [...]
 > For those that disagree, imagine that, instead of a cat, a conscious 
 > (aren't cats at least a little conscious, anyway?) observer, such as a 
 > person, were trapped in the box.  Now, _from_the_perspective_of_an_
 > _experimenter_outside_the_box, all Schroedinger's assumptions still hold.  
 > So we must conclude that even the person inside the box is, from someone's 
 > perspective, in a superposition of states.  Therefore "conscious
 > observation" has nothing to do with the collapse of the wave function.
 > 
 > 
 > -- 
 > Avrom I. Faderman                  |  "...a sufferer is not one who hands
 > avrom@csli.stanford.edu            |    you his suffering, that you may 
 > Stanford University                |    touch it, weigh it, bite it like a
 > CSLI and Dept. of Philosophy       |    coin..."  -Stanislaw Lem

So who "observes" (or observed) that unique quantum event, the Big
Bang? 

And when did they do so?

Gordon
____

Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman)
Subject: Re:  Brain and mind (killing boring wife)
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 23:47:23 GMT

In article <1992Oct22.154730.585@cine88.cineca.it> av10@cine88.cineca.it 
writes:

| But this Justice is not just, I'm a pure mechanism, why it punishes Me?
| Does punish Physical and Biological Laws
| THEY have the responsibility of my actions!

This rests on a notion of responsibility that includes complete
incompatiblist free will.  I ask you to reconsider it:  Imagine a society 
that was generally evil.  All the customs, all the mores of this society 
are complete inverses of our own--wanton torture is considered a perfectly 
acceptible way to pass an afternoon.  I think even a hard-core anti-mechanist 
would agree that, without exposure to other societies, it would be next to 
impossible for any member to abandon these evil ways.  But does this mean 
that they are not morally responsible for their actions?  The point is that 
they _are_ evil, however they got that way.  The same applies in the case 
of laws of the harder sciences.

| If robots and humans are equivalent which is the value of You and Me. 
| Can I sell or buy a robot? Yes? THEN I can sell or buy a man, Slavery 
| is not wrong in principle.

CAN you sell or buy a robot?  (I mean morally).  Clearly you can sell or 
buy _some_ robots (all that are currently in existence), but it is by 
no means clear to me that you could sell or buy a robot that had  
considerable functional similarity to a human.  Trying to argue that 
you can't would be almost equivalent to proving the thesis of Strong 
AI;  I won't attempt it here.  However, to take some of the _absurdity_ 
out of the idea, and (perhaps) to come to accept it on an emotional 
level, there are several pieces of literature that are very convincing.  
In particular, I would reccomend _Do_Androids_Dream_of_Electric_Sheep_,
by Philip K. Dick, and (a lesser-known source that illustrates the idea 
that even far sub-human machines have _some_ moral considerations tied 
up with them) a chapter from Terrel Miedanner's _The_Soul_of_Anna_Klane_,
quoted in Hoftadter and Dennet's _The_Mind's_I_ as "The Soul of the
Mark III Beast."  Both of these works are particularly good in that they 
don't simply _assume_ artificial entities can be moral objects; they 
let you draw your own conclusions.


-- 
Avrom I. Faderman                  |  "...a sufferer is not one who hands
avrom@csli.stanford.edu            |    you his suffering, that you may 
Stanford University                |    touch it, weigh it, bite it like a
CSLI and Dept. of Philosophy       |    coin..."  -Stanislaw Lem
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Search within
From: glex@pinn.nacjack.gen.nz (glenn dillon)
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 92 21:49:49 +1200
Organization: The Pinnacle Club BBS, Auckland, New Zealand. +64-9-631-5382

As stated in the previous message, the solution to AI may be found by 
following a broad path.
   Some of the best solutions to programming AI, in my experience, have 
without exception come from searching within, and then through 
observation or indeed direct questioning or testing of other individuals.

We all know ourselves, our own minds much better than we can ever learn 
from the minds of other people or animals. We are continually with 
ourselves, we can continually examine our own reactions, mistakes, and 
anylyse them (If we are honest enough with ourselves).

We all have a vast pool of information about ourselves and surely could 
beack it down into some form of model, concentraiting on the common 
denominators of 'thought','learning', and other such things of the mind.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke)
Subject: Dual Mind Experience (was Re: Simulated Brain)
Organization: University of Central Florida
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 1992 13:07:31 GMT

In article <1992Nov1.213451.23994@news.weeg.uiowa.edu>  
tlund@news.weeg.uiowa.edu (Thomas Lund) writes:
> 	Another phenomenon.  When a split brained person is instructed to
> do a spatial-oriented task such as tangrams or other shape/pattern matching
> games, they can do it much more effectively using ONLY left hand (right  
brain)
> The right hand (left brain) is very ineffective, and OFTEN, if the person is
> trying to solve the problem with just the right hand, the left hand will 
> try to take over.  THE TWO HANDS ACTUALLY INTERFERE WITH EACH OTHER'S WORK.

I have observed a similar phenomenum while working a jigsaw puzzle.
My left hand (I am right handed) would, almost as if of its own volition,
put the piece it was holding into the proper position, without intervention
from my " right-side verbal" consciousness.  A slightly weird sensation.
Maybe that's why I tend to find jig-saw puzzles relaxing.
--
Thomas Clarke
Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central FL
12424 Research Parkway, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32826
(407)658-5030, FAX: (407)658-5059, clarke@acme.ucf.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:17:49 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.020502.116627@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>In article <1992Oct30.183122.7795@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:

>             Our brains make a tradeoff between retention and brain size
>based in part on things like mobility.  AI's need not be subject to this
>constraint.

Before you can call it a tradeoff, you must explain why it would be
beneficial to clutter the brain with huge volumes of worthless trivia.

>                                       The organizational problem for memory
>is real, but I see no reason to think a solution requires deleting memories.
>Physically providing enough high-quality memory is either within our
>capacities now, or very close to it.
>
>*Was* evolution capable of producing a brain which could faithfully remember
>every experience presented to it?  Maybe it's still working on it.

Why should evolution even be interested in such a memory?  How would it
be beneficial to turn yourself into a lifetime receptacle for junk mail
and advertising jingles?  If such perfect retention is useful, why was
the waste paper basket invented?

>                                                                    Note
>that some people have better memories than others, and that having a better
>memory is in general an advantage.

Just out of interest, I wonder what evidence exists that some people
have better memories than others?  Certainly some people have better
memories for history, others have better memories for language, others
have better memories for hollywood trivia, etc.  But I wonder if it
doesn't come close to balancing out if you could measure the total
combination.
From: vender@plains.NoDak.edu (Does it matter?)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging
Summary: Goedel's Theorem Misinterpreted?
Date: 10 Nov 92 09:47:20 GMT
Article-I.D.: ns1.BxHv6w.KJu
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computing Network

In article <2217@sdrc.COM> dodins@sdrc.sdrc.com (John Dinsmore) writes:
>
>All of this discussion is very nice, but provides no insight into an 
>already elegant proof:
>
>Kurt Godel has already resolved this issue (circa 1930) with his 
>mathematical proof that
>any formal system--read logic--is incomplete in the sense that, 
>given any consistent set 
>of axioms, there are true statements in the resulting system that 
>cannot be derived
>from these axioms.
>
>Read the original. You'll like it.

Excuse me, but could someone explain the relevance to this subject matter?
  The only explainations of Godel's Theorom have been what amounts to
  a system attempting to prove itself true.  Although this does
  mean that most logic systems (I don't know enough to say ALL)
  cannot safely be self-referent.  Because human beings can solve
  the halting problem, and can bypass Godel's theorem conditionally,
  and an AI would be replicating a large portion of a human's capacities,
  can we not assume that an AI would be partially irrational?
  
Just a note in passing:  The statements
    B: "A always lies"
    A: "I am telling a lie"
result in an unresolvable problem, quite similar to a halting problem.
In order to remain functional, an AI would have to realize that the
problem was not halting, and discontinue computation.  Having thus
solved a halting problem (which automata cannot do in finite time
deterministically), the AI becomes equivalent to a human being (and
the human to it).

In other words, the holy grail of AI probably won't have a consistant
  logical system embedded into it anyway.
--Brad
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman)
Subject: Re:  Ginsberg and Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 23:42:37 GMT

samsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com (Mark S. Riggle) writes:

| In the Strong AI vs. Weak AI hypothesis arguments, it is easy to forget 
| the very special treatment of consciousness in quantum physics and that 
| it should be accounted for.

In _some_ versions of quantum physics, perhaps.  There are several versions 
of Q.M., however, entirely compatible with the data, that accord no such 
special status to a conscious observer.  A paricularly interesting one is 
the "many-worlds" interpretation, proposed by Hugh Everett.  On this view, 
rather than one time-line, the universe has a branching time-axis. 
"Superpositions of states," like the one Schroedinger's cat is supposedly 
in before the box is opened, are really just cases of parallel time-lines 
having different states without the experimenter knowing which line
he/she's in fact in.  When the box is opened, the experimenter finds out. 

Although this view seems slightly counterintuitive at first, it is no more 
so than many other consequences of modern physics, and _certainly_ no more 
so than the "conscious observer causes collapse" theory.

For those that disagree, imagine that, instead of a cat, a conscious 
(aren't cats at least a little conscious, anyway?) observer, such as a 
person, were trapped in the box.  Now, _from_the_perspective_of_an_
_experimenter_outside_the_box, all Schroedinger's assumptions still hold.  
So we must conclude that even the person inside the box is, from someone's 
perspective, in a superposition of states.  Therefore "conscious
observation" has nothing to do with the collapse of the wave function.


-- 
Avrom I. Faderman                  |  "...a sufferer is not one who hands
avrom@csli.stanford.edu            |    you his suffering, that you may 
Stanford University                |    touch it, weigh it, bite it like a
CSLI and Dept. of Philosophy       |    coin..."  -Stanislaw Lem
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 11 Nov 92 02:11:49 GMT

: From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
: Message-ID: <1992Nov10.161749.20605@mp.cs.niu.edu>
: Before you can call it a tradeoff, you must explain why it would be
: beneficial to clutter the brain with huge volumes of worthless trivia.

Hmmmmm?  First of all, the "worth" of a memory isn't in the memory
itself, but in its use in later contexts.  Therefore there IS no memory
with zero worth, just memories with low probabilities of later
encountering a relevant context.   Second, the term "clutter" implies
some cost of the memories being there, as does "huge volumes".

Thus, Neil is already talking about trading off the cost of "clutter"
and the unwieldiness of "huge volume" against the later "worth" of the
memory, and thus supplies the explanation Neil demands.  In fact, even
if the "worth" IS zero, this worth is being traded off against the cost
of the memory.  (Unless, of course, I'm misunderstanding Neil's meaning
in the first place.)
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Wed, 04 Nov 92 07:38:58 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

lamorte@netcom.com (R. Scott LaMorte) writes:

> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:
> 
> >While I can accept that to a degree, I hope you are not suggesting that 
> >the brain or thought or consciousness or whatever can't communicate to 
> >the body. I can THINK about a roller-coaster ride, and my pulse will go 
> >up, body will tense, etc etc.
> 
> 
> AYes, but not as much as it woulf if you were *really* on the ride.
> Thinking the event is not the same as experiencing the event.

Yes, but it surely thats because the BRAIN isn't as convinced that its 
on the ride, as opposed to the body. I don't think your response has 
any comment on my point, which is that it really is the brain 
controlling the body, and the body with all its hormones, etc, really 
has a very limited repertoire of brainless (or below conscious brain) 
response.

I've never tried it, but I imagine that if you slugged me unconscious, 
strapped me in a roller coaster, and turned it on, my body would 
exhibit little or none of the changes it would while I was conscious.

> 
> >Since I can get excited by watching a TV program without sound, ie 
> >video input only, and since I don't think my eyes (and every other 
> >sense) are wired to every part of my body, I think my brain must act as 
> >a processing agent, and then alerts the body to what is happening.
> 
> Well, I've read some theories that state that to some degree many of
> our behaviors are hard-wired responses. If I toss something in your
> face, you blink. While your eyes certainly aren't plugged directly to
> your eyelids, certainly the process skip conscious awareness.

Hmmmm, does anyone know if I would blink if I was knocked out, and had 
something thrown at my eyes (which are open, but very glazed by now)??

> 
> -R. Scott LaMorte
> 


-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:02:49 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.025040.117799@Cookie.secapl.com>,
frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:

Statement G:

     `Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words
      that will never be believed by David Chalmers.' produces a
      string of words that will never be believed by David Chalmers.'

>And as a statement, G is self-referential in an unacceptable way.  Consider
>sentence H:
>
>`Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words which
>is false when interpreted as a statement.' produces a string of words which
>is false when interpreted as a statement.'
>
>If we can interpret G as a statement, we can interpret H likewise; but this
>produces a flat-out contradiction.  Thus it is *not* legitimate to interpret
>G as a statement, however clear its meaning may seem.

I disagree. The problem with statement H is *not* its self-reference.
G and H both have the same form, roughly:

     G <-> not(G in B)
     H <-> not(H in T)

where B is the set of believed sentences, and T is the set of true
sentences. The problem is *not* that G or H is self-referential, it is
the fact that there is no consistent notion of the set of all true
sentences. As a matter of fact, your sentence H shows that there can
be no such set.

However, given that there is a set A of strings, there is no problem
with the existence of a self-referential sentence G such that
   G <-> The string expressing G is in A

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY