HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Thu, 27 Aug 1992 13:29:45 EDT
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: SR; Interactionism;Agre's Cooking program

[Martin Taylor 920827 13:30]
(Bill Powers 920827.0800)


>You [MMT say
>>What is the problem with controlled agents themselves controlling
>>others? Let us take the S-R position that some pattern in the
>>environment determines the behaviour of an agent (I assume this is
>what >"control" means in that context).  Then why should the actions
>of that >agent not create a pattern in the environment that determines
>the >behaviour of another (sub)agent?"
>
>>It seems to me analogous to the situation of a high-level ECS
>>controlling its percept by way of (unknown to it, of course) setting
>>references that lower ECSs use in controlling their percepts.
>
>The most important disanalogy is that one organism has no way of
>directly setting reference signals for another.

Yes, but remember that reference signals have no place in an S-R view
of the world.  Rick's original question posited an intrinsic paradox in
the S-R view, that should, in itself, be enough to get S-R people to see
the error of their ways.

>>... whether you buy this analogy or not, I can't see the paradox when
>>the controlled controller is seen strictly from an S-R viewpoint.
>
>The paradox can't be seen from a strict S-R viewpoint. I'm very
>puzzled by these words of yours. I certainly agree that you "do have a
>slight inkling of what PCT is all about." But the impression you're
>creating here is that there is something about the S-R explanation of
>behavior that you still find valuable. Is that true? Or am I once
>again misinterpreting?

"Wud some Guid the giftie gie us,
Tae see oursens as ithers see us."
(Rabbie Burns --more or less)

All I am saying is that when looking for paradox, one should not take two
simultaneous viewpoints.  I do not in any way accept the S-R position.  But
to someone who does not see its intrinsic nonsensicality, there is no problem
with the controlled controller at all.  There's no paradox.  Neither, in
PCT terms is there any control.

So don't worry about whether I support the S-R position.  It is intrinsically
unsupportable, and needs no spurious paradoxes to show its problems.

Martin
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Thu, 3 Sep 1992 12:59:17 EST
From:         Avery Andrews <andaling@FAC.ANU.EDU.AU>
Subject:      make of this what you will (off sci.cog)
X-To:         csg-l@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu

Xref: manuel sci.cognitive:338 comp.ai.philosophy:7142
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Mind Reading
Keywords: chaos, neurobiology
Date: 2 Sep 92 12:47:59 GMT
Followup-To: sci.cognitive
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

I suppose we all use personal experience as an input to our research. I'm
going to describe something here that has influenced my ideas.

I've learned over the years to read minds. This is _not_ ESP, but rather a
four-stage process as follows:

1. Instantiate a personality model,
2. Calibrate it based on observation,
3. Do a process switch into the calibrated model,
4. Observe the model.

The personality model appears to have some relationship to a full
personality--it's often good enough to predict behavior in the short term.
Observation includes defocused inputs. The process switch requires
suppression of the sense of myself, and often requires a displacement of
the point of view to the location of the other individual. Observation is
difficult, since it involves deliberately "being" within the personality
model, rather than in one's own comfortable personality. I find this whole
process exhausting.

The results are often startling, and it is the simple existence of this
sort of ability that leads me to speculate on distributed cognition in
social groups.

A couple of insights have emerged from this:
1. Lou Pecota and Tom Stafford have shown that chaotic processes are very
   cheap to control. Freeman's work seems to indicate that a chaotic
   process is an efficient point to start from if you're doing pattern
   matching. Perhaps human personalities are based on chaotic processes
   (as Paul Raup's work seems to indicate) for efficiency of control.
2. The ease with which we innovate based on existing ideas may well
   reflect a chaotic process responding to small control signals. Since
   this "stream of consciousness" appears to be generated by a process
   akin to the process by which speech is generated, we may find that
   the evolutionary origin of this innovative process to be associated
   with the evolutionary origin of speech.

Cheers,

--
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Fri, 28 Aug 1992 22:44:39 -0500
From:         "Gary A. Cziko" <g-cziko@UIUC.EDU>
Subject:      Marken Computer Demos
X-To:         "Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)" <CSG-L@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu>

[from Gary Cziko 920828.2237]

Rick Marken (920828.1330) to Dennis Delprato (920828)

>I'll try to write a program that will support your lab.
>I think I could do it in Hypercard -- but the animation might
>not run fast enough unless you're running an SE30 or better.
>I could also write it in Basic or Pascal. In either case I
>could send you both the source and object files.  This might
>be the best way to go if you have Turbo pascal or microsoft basic.

Rick, some time ago you mentioned the possibility of "packaging" your
programs into one with a menu interface.  I would find this very useful for
my students.  We do use programs like Find Mind and Mind Reader, but having
it all together would be a lot easier.  Would this fit into Dennis's needs
as well?--Gary
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary A. Cziko                    Telephone: (217) 333-8527
Educational Psychology           FAX: (217) 333-5847
University of Illinois           E-mail: g-cziko@uiuc.edu
1310 S. Sixth Street             Radio: N9MJZ
210 Education Building
Champaign, Illinois 61820-6990
USA
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Mon, 31 Aug 1992 09:25:34 CDT
From:         "McClelland,Kent" <MCCLEL@GRIN1.BITNET>
Subject:      please send mail

SET CSG-L MAIL
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Date:         Wed, 26 Aug 1992 11:16:38 EDT
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: The Bible is Close Too

[Martin Taylor 920826 11:00]
(Rick Marken 920825.2100 canon fire)

> Dynamics, per se, are not
>fundemental to PCT; although the world is dynamic
>(and, hence, so are the actions that are part of the
>process of controlling perceptual consequences of
>that world).

In this quote is the heart of the resistance to using information theory
and the results of psychophysical studies.  Rick is controlling for the
perception that dynamics is irrelevant to the operation of a control system,
whereas I believe that the control system is defined by its dynamic behaviour.
Not everything can be relegated to the result at infinite time, as the
stability equations often trotted out assume.  It matters that the control
system respond fast enough to changing events in the world (disturbances).
It matters (sometimes) whether there are overshoots in the control function.

Why is there a conceptual problem with understanding the importance of the
differing numbers of degrees of freedom in different parts of the hierarchy?
Because they depend on the dynamics, and dynamics is predetermined to be
necessarily unimportant.  A static analysis is simply not good enough.

I don't know why Rick, in particular, is controlling for this reference,
because it contradicts his own presentation (I've forgotten the title of
the paper for the moment) pointing out the congruity between the rates at
which certain actions can be performed and the rates at which the relevant
perceptions can be performed.  If that isn't a consequence of dynamics, what
is?  Why are the so-called "slowing factors" included as a naive method of
ensuring stability in the hierarchy simulations if not for reasons of dynamics?

Dynamics is central to the importance of PCT as a psychological theory.  As
a static theory it only presents a trivial truth that has some amusing
consequences.  You'll never persuade the world of its beauty by repetitive
ranting based on that trivial truth.

>Forgive me, Bill, for I care not what I do.

Your resistance to disturbances leads the outside observer to doubt the
truth of this claim.

Martin
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Wed, 26 Aug 1992 13:57:08 MST
From:         Ed Ford <ATEDF@ASUACAD.BITNET>
Subject:      This and That

from Ed Ford (920826:1400)

Last week I gave my first workshop on the Outcome Based Parenting
program I created which includes a heavy amount of PCT.  The PCT went
extremely well.  The participants saw and accepted the many connections
between PCT and human thinking and actions.  More on that later.  When
I returned, I found my computer had been permanently zapped by
lightening.  One son living at home lost an amplifier and another son
several miles from my home lost a new TV set.  Some blame it on that
crazy weather (notice I didn't say that crazy man) from California.  At
any rate, after making the purchase of a new computer and having
(aren't I lucky) my son-in-law get me back in operation yesterday (my
first back up disc didn't work, but the second did), I found a lot of
mail.

Mark, give me some time and I'll reply to your thoughts on dealing with
the past.

Rick, I'm a Republican....more on your convention comments later.

Bill, my perception of the word belief (noun) is tied directly to what
I have found to be true and/or working through dealing with others,
thinking through a problem, and/or evidence.  That's what I mean by
belief.  Faith (noun) is the belief in something about which you have
no proof or at least insufficient evidence.  When it comes to a
person's religion, it can be a faith or a belief.  Mine happens to be a
belief.

Ed Ford              ATEDF@ASUVM.INRE.ASU.EDU
10209 N. 56th St., Scottsdale, Arizona 85253            Ph.602 991-4860
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Sat, 29 Aug 1992 13:14:31 EDT
From:         Martin Taylor <mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA>
Subject: Re: candidate models of reorganization

[Martin Taylor 920829 13:00]
(Bruce Nevin 920828 13:21:43)

>(Martin Taylor 920820 19:15) --
>
>> I think we have three candidate reorganization systems that are plausible,
>
>Add to this one more, Bill's fallback position and the one I like as
>primary, though it is harder to model.  In this view, reorganization is
>carried out by the constituents (cells) of the control system
>experiencing conflict and chronic error.

So far, it sounds identical to my own position, at least if by "control
system" you mean "ECS".  If you mean "hierarchy" I don't see how a hierarchy
experiences anything, conflict and error included.  An ECS can experience
error, which could be the result of conflict, but it can't experience conflict
directly.

You go on to expand on how reorganization might be achieved in a specific kind
of hardware(mushware) implementation.  I have no objection to that, but the
way it is done would have to be different in other (say intracellular) systems.

I am afraid I have never properly understood your "control system of order n"
concept, so maybe I am quite misreading your intention here.

My notion works entirely within a (any) single control hierarchy, Bill's
requires a separate hierarchy monitoring variables that do not appear in the
percepts of the hierarchy being reorganized, and Jeff's requires a set of
symbiotic control systems that may be hierarchies, but that influence the
one being reorganized only by inducing error into it so that it reorganized
according to my (ad your?) scheme.  Does your "order n" and "order n-1" fit
into one of these three categories, or is it something else again?

Martin

PS.  Personally, I rather like Jeff's version, although Bill thinks that it
can't work.  In time, I hope, we shall see.
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Mon, 31 Aug 1992 17:29:21 CST
From:         Thomas Baines <bainest@SMTPLINK.EID.ANL.GOV>
Subject:      please send mail
X-To:         MCCLEL%GRIN1.BITNET@ANLVM.CTD.ANL.GOV, CSG-L@UIUCVMD.BITNET

          OK Heeeeere's Tommy!
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Fake-Sender: sibun@parc.xerox.com
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Fri, 4 Sep 1992 12:02:02 PDT
From:         Penni Sibun <sibun@PARC.XEROX.COM>
Subject:      Re: AI stuff
              4 Sep 1992 09:58:25 -0700
              <92Sep4.101200pdt.11702@alpha.xerox.com>

(ps 920904.1200)
   [From Bill Powers (920904.1100)]

   Penni Sibun (920902.1400) --

   >   well, i don't suppose solipsism is very useful.

   That's too easy an answer. Control theory is not about solipsism. It
   just recognizes that we don't all experience the same environment, so
   whatever you say about the environment is probably not true for
   everyone else. I don't doubt that there's an environment there. What I
   do doubt is that our perceptual representations of it are isomorphic
   to it.

i didn't say control theory was about solipsism.  you said everyone
``out there'' is imaginary.  i don't think that has explanatory power.
and i certainly don't say that perc. reps are isomorphic to the
env.--shoot me as a cognitivist if i do!  and remember, i'm not trying
to talk about the enviroment.  a message ago, we were agreeing that
instituions were processes, not objects.  you don't hold that
processes are out there in the environment, do you?

   OK, I think that's what I said. The automaton itself could behave in
   unpredicted ways while still being deterministic. I suppose your
   definition would hold even if the automaton is deterministic, but one
   of its computing elements computes a random action when it's
   operating.

automata are just math.  when you say ``4 + 7 = 11'' it doesn't matter
4 what or 7 what or what it looks like when you've got the 11
together.  that's just not part of the mathematical description.

   Automata that are theoretical abstractions aren't very interesting,
   are they? I prefer mine to be "concrete-situated."

no.  but yr original question had to do w/ terminology, and i tried to
explain that terminology.  i do think that, as w/ any other field, to
really understand what the practitioners are talking about, you need
to have some idea of the foundations.  theory of computation is one
such for ai.

   >the natural numbers are the positive integers starting from 1, so a
   >function from natural numbers to world states implies discreet rather
   >than continuous time.

   OK. The problem with discrete time is that it rules out real physical
   phenomena unless it's handled in a way I haven't seen in any AI
   models. Physical phenomena take place continuously, and their

right.  ai models are like this, basically cause the run (or are
supposed to) on digital computers.  i don't think you'll find anyone
that would argue that there's something missing by not being able to
model continuous time.  the issue is more how close and/or useful your
approximation is.

   I've written a persuasive letter to Chapman, by the way. It's worth
   another try.

what did you try to persuade him of?  just curious.

cheers.

				--penni
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Date:         Fri, 28 Aug 1992 12:09:21 EST
From:         Avery Andrews <andaling@FAC.ANU.EDU.AU>
Subject:      arm demo questions
X-To:         csg-l@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu

[Avery Andrews 920828.1209]

As a sort of comprehension check on my understanding of the arm demo
(old version), is there a reason why it was done the way it was
done, rather than the way I would have done it, having position
error-signals set reference-levels for joint-angle velocities (I don't
claim any advantages for my way--it's just what would occur to me
first).  Is there any known relevant empirical evidence?

Also, I'm unclear on why there needs to be a computation for a
kinaesthetic vertical angle (A + B/2, where A is the vertical
shoulder angle and B is the elbow angle).  Why couldn't the
vertical shoulder angle reference level be derived directly from the
visual system?

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Mon, 31 Aug 1992 09:49:58 CDT
From:         "McClelland,Kent" <MCCLEL@GRIN1.BITNET>
Subject:      Misdirected Message

From Kent McClelland

Sorry about an earlier message meant for LISTSERV instead of distribution to
the whole list.  I'm trying to get back in touch after a month of travel and
frantic preparation for a new semester.  Hope everyone is doing well.

Kent
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From: marken@aero.org (Richard Marken)
Subject: Re: agre, facism
Organization: The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 1992 23:43:46 GMT

I'm testing the follow-up feature of the rn command. Hope this
works.

In article <92Aug22.140417pdt.38019@huh.parc.xerox.com> 
sibun@parc.xerox.com writes:

>i really recommend preston's paper.  it starts at exactly the same
>place as yr blind men paper, adn draws a v. diff conclusion.

I send a preprint request to Beth Preston but I am just burning
with curiosity. Did she start off with the simultaneous equations
for a closed loop system and come up with different conclusions
about its apparent "behavior" in relationship to environmental
variables and constraints?  

By the way, I found that I do have a copy of a paper by Agre and
Chapman (it's in the "Designing Autonomous Agents" collection
edited by Pattie Maes, MIT, 1990). I have read it now. I see that 
there are some sentences that seem consistent with PCT. For example,
on p. 21 they say "a plan does not directly determine an agent's
actions" -- which is precisely true from PCT perspective; it
directly determines an agent's PERCEPTIONS (assuming that a plan
is a specification of intended outcomes, which seems to be exactly
what A&C are trying to say).

They do make some, well, strange statements, the meaning of which 
seem to be left to the reader's imagination. For example, I never 
got a clear explanation (I thought) of this gem (also on p. 21):
"We have found, in the case studies that we conducted, that
participating  in the flow of the environment, rather than attempting
to control it, can simplify the machinery required to account for
the organization of activity". If they are not saying something
trivially obvious I would really like to know what it is. As it stands,
it sounds to me like they are saying that the internal organization
of, say, a stick that falls when you stand it on end and release it is
simpler than that of a stick that maintains its vertical orientation
when it is released. Is that it???

Best regards

Rick

     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)



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Posted-Date: Wed, 02 Sep 92 08:27:21 PDT
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Wed, 2 Sep 1992 08:27:21 PDT
From:         marken@AERO.ORG
Subject:      chapman; visual perception

[From Rick Marken (920902.0830)]

Bill Powers (920901.1900) --

>RE: Chapman's book.

>The part on visual perception isn't anywhere
>near as specific as I was lead to believe, ahem.

Sarcasm on--

Which is EXACTLY what I guessed (and mentioned in a post
to Avery). Proving once again that, while I am an asshole,
I am also always right (which is appropriate since I am
striving to be to Powers what Huxley was to Darwin; only
problem is that I'm not quite as smart as Huxley; but there
do seem to be plenty of volunteers for the part of
Wilberforce [like just about every "scientific" psychologist]
and they seem to be willing to be even sillier than the
good Bishop).

Sarcarm off--

Best regards

Bulldog Rick


     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)
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Posted-Date: Fri, 28 Aug 92 13:09:15 PDT
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Fri, 28 Aug 1992 13:09:15 PDT
From:         marken@AERO.ORG
Subject:      PCT in the Classroom

[From Rick Marken (920828.1330)]

Dennis Delprato (920828)

>I supervise laboratory experiences of approx. 380 1-2-year
>students and 60 3-4-yr. psychology majors each year.

Sorry, forgot include your name in the list of PCT teachers.

What kind of Macs do you have? Do you have Hypercard 1.0 or 2.0?
Which one?

I'll try to write a program that will support your lab.
I think I could do it in Hypercard -- but the animation might
not run fast enough unless you're running an SE30 or better.
I could also write it in Basic or Pascal. In either case I
could send you both the source and object files.  This might
be the best way to go if you have Turbo pascal or microsoft basic.

Let me know. I'd really like to do it.

Best regards

Rick

     **************************************************************

Richard S. Marken                   USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation                   Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Tue, 25 Aug 1992 17:43:12 EDT
From:         mmt@BEN.DCIEM.DND.CA
Subject: Re: Modeling vs. WHAT?

[Martin Taylor 920825 17:30]
(Bill Powers to Penni Sibun 920825.1400)

>> why conduct elaborate deductions about yr surrounding when
>>you can look and see?  in particular, why maintain elaborate control
>>structures when you can look and see what needs to be done?  why make
>>highly detailed Plans when you can improvise?  why required instant
>>expertise when you can improve by just keeping on doing it?  why try
>>figuring it out yourself when you can collaborate w/ others who have
>>been there?  why insist on figureing out every situation afresh when
>>you can trust yor accumulated experience?
>
>At one level I agree with all these rhetorical questions, as long as
>you don't apply them to PCT.

I don't understand this answer.  When I read Penni's posting, I wrote her
privately that you yourself could not have described PCT better.  If the
"you" in her posting is an ECS or a group of ECSs, doesn't this descibe
pretty succinctly what is going on in the control hierarchy?  That's how
I interpreted her posting. Either I understand PCT less than I thought I
did, or one of us is grossly misunderstanding Penni.

>>faced w/ an empirical phenomenon to explain, our first explanatory
>>recourse should be to dynamics, not to machinery.
>
>I don't call that an explanatory recourse; it's just describing the
>dynamics of the phenomenon (usually from the standpoint of an unspoken
>theory).

But it is precisely the dynamics of the control hierarchy that describe
the modelled behaviour.  Again, I miss the point of your criticism, since
it seems to me that you and she both have the same intention of simplifying
mechanism to a point at which it can be directly tested through the dynamics.

Penni wrote back to me asking why she kept getting "jumped on" for making
these kinds of comment.  I don't know why.  I would have expected compliments.
There is some kind of a fog here.  Could it be the smoke from our respective
burnouts?

Martin
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