From: kytan@mantra.fia.dmg.ml.com (Kok-Yong Tan)
Subject: Re: Malaysia to choose F16 or Mig29
Organization: Organised?  Here?  Hahahahahahahaha.....
	<1992Sep21.021620.2408@nuscc.nus.sg>
	<KYTAN.92Sep22093026@mantra.fia.dmg.ml.com>
	<1992Sep26.041734.6022@en.ecn.purdue.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 15:49:25 GMT

In article <1992Sep26.041734.6022@en.ecn.purdue.edu> tenka@en.ecn.purdue.edu (Andy Tenka) writes:

>In article <KYTAN.92Sep22093026@mantra.fia.dmg.ml.com> kytan@mantra.fia.dmg.ml.com (Kok-Yong Tan) writes:
>>In article <1992Sep21.021620.2408@nuscc.nus.sg> engp1186@nuscc.nus.sg (Won-Soon Lau) writes:
>>
>>>Andy Tenka (tenka@en.ecn.purdue.edu) wrote:
>>>: 
>>>: What if both Malaysia and Indonesia stop supplying water to Singapore, hold a
>>>: naval blockade against her for 3 months, and then send in their commandos with
>>>: fresh water supply.  Would they still need a ratio of 2 to 1 to conquer
>>>: Singapore?
>>
>>>You need more now.
>>
>>Well, it has been the standard military belief that for decisive victories,
>>attacking armies need a 3:1 ratio of attacker to defender.  I think this has
>>been the case for some time and not just currently.
>>
>> 
>See, this is the kind of answer I like.  I wish we had more people like
>Kok-Yong in the net, who stick to the issue in discussions.

Uh...thank you.

>Anyway, I still have one question unanswered.  I know that complete
>air superiority of the allied forces brought an easy victory against
>the elite Iraqi Republican Guards.  But then, I think that air superiority
>alone doesn't bring victory.  A good utilization of this advantage is also
>very important.  In the Gulf War, for example, the allied forces used their
>air superiority to starve the Republican Guards by cutting their supply line
>for months, and then the allied ground troops moved in.  I still remember
>watching on TV how the Iraqi troops begged for food from the allied forces.

True enough. However, the Iraqi "behind-the-scenes" powerplays which gave the
Republican Guards the best of equipment and food and left the regular Iraqi
sorely depleted was a factor too.  If I'm not wrong the ones who begged for
food where the non-Republican Guards.  Saddam was very quick to save his elite
troops and left his regular troops as cannon fodder.

>My question is, how would Singapore use her air superiority against Malaysia?
>And also, if Malaysia try to starve the whole Singapore populations by cutting
>off water supply, how would Singapore sustain herself in war?  This is assuming 
>that Singapore could not occupy Johor, considering that it would take a 3:1
>ratio of attacker to defender.  And also, logistic will be a big problem in
>such an invasion, as someone else already mentioned (forgot who it was, but
>he was saying that both Indonesia and Malaysia don't have the capability
>in invading Singapore because of logistic.  I assumed the same holds for
>Singapore against Malaysia.  Of course, this goes against Lau(?) who says that
>Singapore could take Johor in a surprise attack, but I disgress).

Okay, I'll try to stick strictly to the topic from a military, non-patriotic
point of view.  In most cases logistics is only a problem if the lines of
supply are extremely extended and difficult to protect.  In most cases,
detection of an enemy supply convoy with sufficient friendly forces (i.e. air
forces, ground forces, whatever) able to reach it is usually sufficient to doom
that convoy.  With Malaysian and Indonesian bases so close, it all depends on
their detection capability.  Of course, they will have to filter out civilian
traffic from military traffic.  Admittedly, while it is heinous to have
civilians being attacked, from a defenders point of view, it's a propaganda
coup and also causes the attacker to waste precious ammunition.

I think Singapore plans for a...um...water supply problem by
hoping to rely on the reservoir system as a stopgap (though not long term)
measure.  For the long term, Singapore has then got two options:

	1.	Rely on diplomacy to smooth things over.

	2.	Rely on world opinion (considering the water pipeline was built
	with World Bank money) if diplomacy fails.

	3.	Carry out offensive operations in the name of survival if the
	above two options fail.

I have a feeling that the above listing is also the preferred order of action,
with the third option being a distant third.

Both Indonesian and Malaysian logistical problems are solvable with the
Indonesian problem a wee bit more difficult than the Malaysian one due to the
fact that it's very difficult to hide a supply/escort vessel amongst all that
flat water.  Also, everything would then be concentrated on ships--A rather
large target to hit and when it goes boom, all it carries goes boom (or gurgle)
with it.  Malaysia has it easier with her jungle cover.  If the roads to and
from Johor were bombed to unuseability and constantly watched, it makes life
more difficult for a Malaysian resupply operation but not impossible.  Worse
comes to the worst, Malaysia could use humans with pack animals or bicycles to
carry supplies to front line troops, spreading them out over the jungle so that
airborne attacks would only destroy a small portion of the supply convoy. 

The Singapore side only has its efficient road network (after all, Singapore is
essentially "botak" or denuded of natural cover.)  This makes for quick
movement of materiel to the front but terrible in terms of cover.  This leads
us the air superiority question.  To destroy a Singaporean convoy on the way to
the front, the enemy has to use either air power or artillery.  The former is
supposedly more accurate (depending on the quality of the pilots--I'm NOT
saying anything about whose pilots are better:  it's just an objective point on
my part.)  If Singapore can use its air force to achieve air superiority and
suppress enemy aircraft and artillery, then the enemy can only watch
impotently.  An artillery piece in the 155mm class has an approximate range of
25 miles, so that rules out Indonesia doing it. 

As for the possibility of a Singaporean success in a surprise attack on Johor,
it depends on how alert Malaysian troops are.  What Singapore could take in an
attack could not possibly be held for long.  Malaysian troops could retreat
into the jungle and then regroup with reinforcements coming from up north.
Singaporeans, as you've seen, tend to be paranoid and the constant military
exercises for reservists, even to the point of burning some weekends/weekday
nights doesn't alleviate this feeling.  Singapore tends to keep constant watch
on its airspace and I wouldn't be surprised if side-looking radar is being used
to keep track of movements of ground-based armaments.  Singapore also has a
rather rapid call-up system already in place.  Whether Malaysia has one is
unknown but its off-duty troops probably are not concentrated, say, in the
Johor area.  Whatever happens, Malaysia has time and land area to retreat,
regroup and then carefully plan a response.

--
===============================================================================
Kok-Yong Tan, 			  	| My words are my own: 
Fixed Income Analytics Group, 	  	| My bosses know naught.
Merrill Lynch,			  	| Wherever they're sown,
World Financial Center, North Tower, 	| Just I should be sought.
New York, NY 10281-1315.	  	|		- K. Y. Tan, 5 Feb 1992
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