From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Quine
Date: 17 Aug 92 19:31:40 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Aug17.153142.14818
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <BsvGp0.L6M@unx.sas.com> 
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

>In article <MARTINC.92Aug11215203@grover.cs.unc.edu>,
>martinc@grover.cs.unc.edu (Charles R. Martin) writes:

CRM:
>>> I dunno, MZ... the overwhelming importance of Goedel-Roesser and via
>>> them Turing on philosophy I think would be hard to overestimate.  (I
>>> agree with you about Heidegger et al -- I suspect that by 2092 they'll
>>> be about as well known as the Thomists and neo-Platonists, but no longer
>>> an active influence.) 

GM:
>In general I agree.  However, I think Michael's view of Quine's contributions
>is less than accurate.  (I will not debate the issue regarding students.)
>It is, oddly enough, a view that I might well have agreed to until
>recently when my participation in this group caused me to look back
>over a number of papers and then further into Quine's autobiography
>and contributions.  Even if you restrict attention to the purely
>technical contributions (in set theory, concatenation theory, etc.)
>these are impressive.  (I agree that it may be argued that the
>contributions may not be as truly "foundational" as those of Tarski
>et al., although I think a lot of the set theory stuff compares
>favorably to contributions of Zermelo or von Neumann.)  Add to this
>the contributions in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of
>language (which cannot be painted with the broad brush of "negative")
>which one does not find in Tarski, Goedel, et al. and you begin
>to see a philosopher much along the lines of Russell (minus any
>moral philosophy which, in Russell's case, is probably best left
>unanalyzed).  Then there is the general area of metaphysics --
>in which we must include not only the "negative" (but major)
>contributions of such works as "Two Dogmas", "On What There Is",
>complaints about modal logic, etc., but also the positive contributions
>(sometimes with Goodman) in the area of nominalism.

I feel compelled to disclaim any intention to belittle Quine's contribution
to philosophy.  However I disagree with your estimation of his importance,
for the same reason I consider Locke to be a far more important philosopher
than Berkeley or Hume, even though they are both better writers and clearer
thinkers.  Likewise, Quine's impact on the history of logic, exemplified by
what has come to be known as "the first-order thesis", whose assumption is
essential to even such ontological works as "On What There Is", has been
negative in a well-defined sense, i.e. unhelpful for, and critical of, any
new developments in modal, intensional, and higher-order logic.  I note in
passing that the idea of positive contributions to nominalism (I say this
as a fan of _The Structure of Appearance_) appears to me as an oxymoron.
You would do well to reflect on the theoretical reasons why nominalism
cannot furnish a foundation for mathematics, or of the methodological
ramifications of Quine's dictum to "round off smoothly" the ontology of set
theory on any prospects of development therein, clearly dependent on the
study of large cardinals.  Likewise, you might consider the incalculable
damage inflicted on the subject of intensional logic by Quine's
oft-repeated claim that identity conditions for the same are obscure, -- in
spite of several such criteria having been articulated by Church.  Indeed,
Quine's doctrine of opacity is wholly bereft of theoretical content,
amounting to little else than gainsaying of the Fregean approach to oblique
contexts.  Perhaps by keeping these considerations in mind you would come
to a better understanding of why I consider his contribution to be far
inferior to those of Zermelo, Von Neumann, and Church.  Finally, Quine's
failing to formulate a moral prilosophy is a clear consequence, and a
condemnation, of his quasi-nominalist views; as you know, rationalist
realism doesn't suffer from such failings.

GM:
>In short, one tends to forget how much (and in how many areas) Quine
>has done, and how much this has stood the test of time (however briefly
>measured that may be at this point).  In addition, unlike such
>philosophers/logicians/mathematicians as Tarski and even Carnap, and
>unlike such philosophers/non-logicians/non-mathematicians as
>Heidegger, Sartre, et al., Quine's influence spans many diverse
>"schools" of philosophy.  Again, there are many reasonable criteria
>one might choose to determine "influence" or "importance".  While
>I have usually favored the intuitions and approach of Tarski and 
>Carnap over Quine, I think it must be conceded that the influence
>of Quine has, and will continue to be, substantial.

Agreed.

GM:
>(I detest this talk of "influence", by the way.  It is usually
>done completely in the absence of any clearly stated criteria,
>and it is never clear to me what the point is of attempting to
>establish that A had more "influence" than B.  Having participated
>in it even to the degree that I have above, I feel somehow "unclean".
>I'm done with it.)

I have addressed the failings of this attitude in my response to Mark
Peterson.

>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."