From: ifaz706@utxvms.cc.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: Solutions to the problem? (was Re: Sgt
Organization: University of Texas @ Austin
Date: 31 Dec 92 15:23:14 CST

In article <1hu053INN8rg@manuel.anu.edu.au>, bdm@cs.anu.edu.au (Brendan McKay) writes:
> In article 1@utxvms.cc.utexas.edu, ifaz706@utxvms.cc.utexas.edu () writes:
> 
>>	I found the following a couple of weeks ago in the Documents
>>	on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (you are probably aware
>>	of them). 
> 
>>	The first, from Aug, 1940 contains a draft declaration by
>>	the Arab Committee (headed by the Mufti), which states
>>	that "Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab 
>>	countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements in
>>	Palestine and the other Arab countries [!!! - NT] in a 
>>	manner that conforms to the national and ethnic interests
>>	of the Arabs, and to the solution of the Jewish question
>>	in the countries of GErmany and Italy" (Series D, Vol. 10,
>>	Doc.403).
> 
>>	The second, from Sept, 1940 describes a later version of 
>>	the proposal. Among other things it calls for recognition 
>>	of the Axis Powers in the "right of the Arab countries to 
>>	solve the Jewish question in the national and racial 
>>	interest on the German-Italian model" (Series D, Vol. 11, 
>>	Doc. 35).
> 
>>	That these do not include genocidal wishes is hard for me
>>	to accept.
> 
> If these were dated 1943 it would be hard to argue, but they are
> dated 1940.  Almost nobody considered the "German-Italian model"
> to include genocide in 1940.  (In the case of Italy, it never did.)

	I concur. "Genocidal" in this context is too strong
	a word.

> You must also remember that the Mufti was not then (or ever) a 
> confidant of the Nazi inner circle.  What can be seen in these
> documents is a straightforward case of ass-licking.  


	I quite disagree. A model of extreme repression and creeping
	annihilation was already in effect in the early '40s. You 
	didn't have to be a confidant of the Nazi inner circle to
	realize that, and the prospects of the long-term effects
	of this model, I think, were quite appealing to the Mufti.
	Of course, if that can help winning the Nazis' heart - why
	not?


The Mufti
> was (a) convinced that the Axis would win the war, and (b) totally
> disenchanted with the British.  Since he foresaw that the Germans
> were going to replace the British as the colonial masters of the
> Middle East, he sought to use active collaboration as a way of
> winning German support for his ambitions (which naturally 
> included a Palestine under his own control).  In his 
> communications with the Nazis, his deliberate aping of their
> rhetoric is really obvious.  
> 
> Incidentally, nearly everything in the preceding paragraph can
> be also said about Lehi, who continued trying unsuccessfully to
> strike a deal with the Nazis until at least the end of 1941.
> (However, I do not consider these two examples to be equally 
> reprehensible, as I have said here many times.)


	I'd be interested to compare the Lehi proposals to
	the Nazis with the Mufti's. Did the Lehi also suggested
	to solve the Arab question according to some racial or 
	national model?

> 
> This is not terribly relevant, but recently I found a US
> intelligence report of 1944 which said the Lehi was being
> funded by Italian Intelligence in 1940 to the tune of about 
> $2000 per month.  I don't know how solid their information was.
> 
>>> As for the 1948 time period, Husseini's part in it has been rather
>>> overblown.  The fact is, most of the Arabs of Palestine ignored
>>> his call to arms (except in the direct defence of their own
>>> villages).  Most of the "irregular" Arab forces in Palestine
>>> during the 1947-8 war were volunteers from other countries.
>>> I will also mention the large number of local peace agreements
>>> signed between neighbouring Arab and Jewish villages.
> 
>>	That he was ignored by some (large or small) parts of
>>	the Arabs of PAlestine does not reduce a bit from what 
>>	his "draconian ideas".
> 
> That's true, but it is relevant to how widely you might want 
> to spread the blame.


	I'm not in the business of spreading the blame, although
	it appears that the Mufti's popularity among the
	Palestinians was untouched following his WWII adventures,
	and even immediately after the defeat in '48. What 
	charm do people find in leaders who lead them from setback
	to defeat to catastrophe?  (Just a rhetoric question.)


> 
> Brendan.


Noam
Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast