From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 20:23:03 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.222047.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>In article <1993Jan8.161136.18699@starbase.trincoll.edu>,  () writes:
>> [stuff deleted]
>I don't think it is correct to say that Meade decided "not to pursue".
>He did in fact pursue. However, Meade had left his train in
>Westminster, MD during his rapid concentration upon Gettysburg. Lee on
>the other hand had his wagons with him (perhaps to his regret). Lee
>was therefore in a better position to move quickly.

I think I disagree with this. Wagons are a butt-slow thing to have drag
around with you, especially when you are going over mountains. Since Meade
is moving south, he's marching back towards his wagons yet isn't slowed
down by them. (At least I think so: I can't find Westminster on my Maryland
map.) I think Meade can move very rapidly down to his wagons, gaining some
distance on Lee, and from then on can move as fast as Lee, keeping his head
start. (At least in theory, he can. In practice the Union usually marched
a lot slower than the Confederates, for strange reasons.)

>Also, with Stuart
>back with the Army, Lee was able to cover the South Mountain passes
>effectively (as usual) with cavalry.  Meade had sent most of his
>cavalry off (I don't know why, but perhaps it was to locate the then
>absent Stuart before he could pull and unpleasant surprise).

The cavalry of both armies was on the field of Gettyburg on July 3rd so I
don't think that this is the reason. Perhaps Stuart's men marched off
somewhere and Meade's cavalry tried to follow and failed? Or maybe Meade
didn't really understand the use of cavalry? More distinguished infantry
commanders (JA Early to name one) didn't.

>Still, if Buford thought that Cemetery Hill was such a great
>defensive location, why did he deploy his own men all the way out on
>McPherson Ridge?

Probably to cover the town and road junction. If he is on Cemetary Hill
the road junctions, which are still important when both armies are
scattered and it isn't clear where the battle will be fought, are all
in Confederate hands. I don't have any evidence for this thought but it
seems like a reasonable one.

>> read many personal letters and testaments about the battle and Sahaara's
>> novel is based on historical evidence and is essentially narrative with a
>> novelists' imaginative characterizations. But its' really very close to the
>> truth. 
>
>For a novel, Saraah's book is notably loyal to the historical consensus.

We probably ought to distinguish between "the truth" and "the historical
consensus" on this since the historical consensus on Gettysburg did a 180
degree turn in the 1950's, at least in regard to the Confederate side. Who
knows whether a cache of undiscovered letters will come to light and our
perceptions may shift again? Still, I agree that Shaara's book is accurate
to the best existing information.
BTW, I'm looking at my copy right now and "Shaara" is the correct spelling.

>> Lee was foolish and the third day's assault on the ridge was a
>> disaster of the first order of magnitude. 
>
>Obviously, but not significantly more so than his attack on Malvern
>Hill or Grant's attack at Cold Harbor.

Hm. Nor was it more foolish than digging in at Antietam, or dividing the
army in two at Chancellorsville... I don't think the word "foolish" should
be applied to Lee's actions when so many seemingly foolish things that he
did worked out so splendidly. I have to agree that it was a disaster ex post,
but Lee had gambled and won before.

>On a more serious note, remember that not only was Meade new to his
>job, but Reynolds (1st Corps) was dead, Hancock and Sickles (2nd and
>3rd) were wounded, Sykes (5th Corps) had just replaced Meade, and
>Howard's 11th Corps had again come under suspicion. That left Segwick
>(6th) and Slocum (12th) as the only Corps commanders with more than a
>week's experience (besides Howard). This is not to mention division
>and brigade commanders etc.

Some of the replacement commanders were fairly good generals. Newton commanding
I Corps comes to mind. I don't know who took over II Corps when Hancock was
wounded. His senior division commander is apparently either Caldwell or
Gibbon, but the senior division commander of I Corps (Doubleday) didn't get
that command. I think the loss of Sickles has to be counted as a gain for
the Union.
Also, the two corps that had the fewest losses at Gettysburg, 6th and 12th,
which would have borne the brunt of the fighting in any subsequent battles,
are the same two that have veteran commanders.

>Also, Meade's Army had just fought in the biggest battle ever in the
>Western Hemisphere and although "victorious", had sustained something
>like 30% casualties. For comparison remember that in defeat at
>Waterloo, Napoleon's veterans had sustained only 20% and in the famed
>charge (and slaughter) of the Light Brigade on the Crimea, the LB had
>suffered only a slightly higher percentage (and that was just a
>cavalry brigade).

True, but he wasn't fighting against the Light Brigade. All three divisions
of Longstreet's Corps had over 50% casulties. While Meade was in bad shape, his
opponent was in even worse condition. Meade's relative advantage over Lee was
greater on July 4th than on July 1st.

>> tactical, success. The Union had many great officers at the regimental and
>> divisional level, but its great commanders emerged only in the last two
>> years of the war.
>
Actually, I would disagree with the idea that the Union had many great officers
at either the regimental or division level, even by 1864. Read an account of
the movement from Cold Harbor to Petersburg, or for that matter any other part
of the 1864 campaign, and see how many times a good strategy of Grant's or
Hancock's was foiled because some division commander screwed up. We could
also mention Ledlie at the Battle of the Crater.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!