HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 13 Nov 92 16:59:50 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Nov13.075603.8557@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:



> I believe most readers will recall that I have clearly stated,
> several times, ***FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION***, two approaches:


>    1. Require users to register their keys in advance; presumably,
>       creating or transmitting enciphered information which could
>       not be accessed by a registered key would itself be a crime.

>       This could be surprisingly tricky to prove.

>       This implies a key-registration bureaucracy, and also
>       supports wiretapping for content without warning the
>       target.

>       It inconveniences 99% of the users, simply to allow access
>       to the other 1%, who would not use registered keys anyway.

>       Misused, it would also allow "fishing expeditions."


>    2. As an alternative, I have proposed that each user be
>       responsible for providing keys, after the fact, in response
>       to a legal warrant.  Failure to do so would be a crime.

_I_ think this would violate the Fifth Amendment.  Also, it might be
physically impossible, as the key generator would probably be in equipment
seized, as well as the encrypted files.

>       This would be easy to prove, although there would always be
>       some percentage of honest mistakes which juries would have
>       to address.

>       This would eliminate the key-registration bureaucracy, but
>       *would* require users to archive their keys without fail.
>       This would inconvenience all users to some extent, and
>       would make the use of cryptography a serious issue.

>       It would prevent wiretapping for content (but not traffic
>       analysis), but would warn an entire conspiracy the instant
>       a single individual was approached.

>       "Fishing expeditions" would rapidly become apparent.

In addition, as I noted in another message, there is no duty to actively
cooperate with a warrent; only to provide the information.  (I can't
remember what case it was, but a defendant in a government civil case once
provided about 10,000,000 pages of documents to the government, saying
"what you asked for is in there somewhere, but we don't know how to find
it."  I'm not sure what happened on appeal.)
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:26:06 GMT



 In <1992Nov12.063300.12408@seanews.akita.com>
 billmcc@seanews.akita.com (Bill McCormick) writes:


>The "safe" analogy seems to be the best model.  Requiring registration
>of crypto-keys is *exactly* the same as requiring registration of safe
>keys and combinations.
>
>Why is it that it's immediately obvious that being required to give
>the government copies of your safe or house keys is incredibly intrusive but
>that requiring registration of crypto keys doesn't evoke the same
>response.

 Suppose the issue is *not* (necessarily) giving the government keys
 in advance, but rather "providing access *after* due process":  The
 Constitution specifically provides that people are secure only from
 *unreasonable* search and seizure, and this certainly implies that
 *reasonable* search and seizure is accepted and constitutional.

 If government agents *have* a warrant, would an attempt to prevent
 their entry into a house be considered "legal"?  Is secretly-held
 information really different from other "effects" mentioned in the
 Fourth Amendment?

>Something to think about.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tom@ulysses.att.com (Tom Smith)
Subject: ATM security question
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 18:45:46 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill

On another newsgroup, there is a lot of discussion about Automatic
Teller Machines and the Personal Identification Number (PIN) associated
with an account/card.  There is controversy about whether or not
an encrypted version of the PIN is encoded onto the magnetic stripe
on the card.

Facts, anyone?

Thanks,
Tom Smith.
tom@ulysses.att.com				"Hold these pies."
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4745 comp.org.eff.talk:7011
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 13 Nov 92 19:32:15 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov12.202330.22580@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
>
> Inevitably there must be limits to all rights.  What are the limits
> on the individual's right to secrecy?
>


What are the limits on an individual's right to keep a thought inside
his own head?

I would assume that there are no limits to that right.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: seth@mivax.mc.duke.edu (SETH)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon on Registered Keys
Date: 9 Nov 92 16:37:00 GMT
Article-I.D.: mivax.9NOV199211371909
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Duke University Medical Center
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <1992Nov8.040757.26340@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU>, burke@Turing.ORG (John R. Burke) writes...> 

>I take offense to your article. I love my country, I pay may taxes, and yes
>I am a gun owner.. not all gun owners are rednecks or anarchists.

I've known a lot of anarchists and none of them owned guns.
Anarchy is not chaos.  Viking Iceland had very reasonable form of anarchy.
Look it up if you need to.

>But I do defend your right to make stupid statements.

Me too.


******************************************************************************

None of these opinions come from the idiot! G. Woof Woodbury.

*****************************************************************************
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 03:23:26 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Nov2.084229.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:

>But there's another
>situation where the case is different:  Encrypted record keeping.
>Imagine that Richard Nixon, [. . .]
>Or imagine that Ollie North's famous deleted mail messages had been encrypted.
>Or, to take a recent example, that Caspar Weinberger [. . .]
	This is really cute.  You want more sweeping powers for the 
	government so it can protect us from the likes of Nixon and Ollie
	North.  Shoot, they WERE the government!!  Any time you give the
	feds more power they will use it to help the Nixons and Ollie Norths
	of this world to step on folks like me and you.  Go ahead, give up
	your freedom to our mommy the government.  I'll cast my lot with
	the Tom Paines and Ben Franklins of this world.

>Oh, and if you think "well, it'll be better for me to refuse anyway - it'll
>just be a couple of days in jail" - think again.  A judge can hold you in jail
>essentially indefinitely.  (There was a celebrated case of a woman who refused
>to reveal the whereabouts of her child, claiming her ex-husband was abusing
>her.  She was in jail for several YEARS, and was only freed as the result of a
>new law that, for the first time, placed a limit on such jailings.  This law
>was passed in direct response to this case; I don't know how broadly it is
>drafted, but even when it applies, it still could leave you as a guest of the
>government for quite some time.)
	You sound like you approve!  No one wants to go to jail but I hope
	that when push comes to shove our generation will contain some
	people like the people who wrote the U.S. constitution.  Freedom
	often requires sacrifice.  It was that way in Tom Paine's day and
	it will probably always be that way.


							smg
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 15:56:32 GMT


Terry Ritter raises the question of the forced discovery of keys AFTER the
legal system has become engaged. I believe the laws related to discovery
are quite broad. In a civil suit, for example, either party has the right
to subpoena any papers of the other they think reasonably relevant. The
only protection is a suppression order by the judge, on grounds of trade
secrets, etc. Such an order does not prevent either party from seeing
the papers, but simply seals them so they cannot be used nor disclosed
to third parties, except for purposes of the lawsuit.

It would seem to me that one could force the disclosure of keys quite
easily, given that background. Anyone could, for example, sue someone
for damages based on some cause, and then use discovery to get
whatever they want. Of course it's after-the-fact, but it makes
public key systems particularly vulnerable, since once they have your
private key (if you don't change it often, or if you done have classes
of private keys for different activities), they can read everything.
Since the whole value of a public key system is to have a single key
set so people can send encrypted traffic to you, anyone "up to no
good" would probably more likely use a private key system, with many
different keys.

Perhaps a smart judge would permit you to furnish plaintext instead of the
key, though likely not, since you couldn't "prove" that was the real plaintext
without revealing the private key. Maybe there's a way to authenticate the
plaintext via signatures, without having to reveal your private key--dunno.

I've always thought the protections in the discovery rules to be very weak.
Once an adversary party knows confidential (sealed) information, unless
it's something clean-cut, such as a unique invention that cannot be duplicated
except via your method, the cat is out of the bag and it's very hard to prove
disclosure or improper use of sealed information.

-- 
David Sternlight
(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:25:17 GMT


 In <ARI.HUTTUNEN.92Nov11145925@cardhu.cs.hut.fi> Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi
 (Ari Huttunen) writes:


>How do you know he indeed is the molester if all you have is
>an enciphered *something* and lot's of suspicion? What if the
>enciphered *something* is a pile of old love letters? In this
>case you would sentence an innocent man to prison for molesting.

 I assume that the police would have some reason to so believe.
 These kind of cases are always difficult; the question: "Did he
 touch you--down there?" can mean different things to adults and
 children.  Then the adults can become irrational, and then that
 will influence the kids.

 But choose your own worst case.  We are discussing arguments which
 could be used to lead to laws limiting the use of cryptography.


>I always thought a man is innocent until proven guilty...

 The issue under discussion is the possibility that a future
 society could regard hiding information, after due process,
 as a crime in itself.

 ---
 Terry Ritter  ritter@cactus.org

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
X-Quoted: 44%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 15:01:47 -0500

Thus said ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter):
> In <1992Nov12.213519.9323@news.cs.indiana.edu>
> Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu> writes:
>>However, personal information which is not obtainable
>>without my cooperation (such as facts I have memorized) cannot be
>>obtained without my consent for use against me.
>
> Nonsense.  Clearly you are not required to yield your memories.
> However, *anything* (you) write or "have" *can* be "obtained
> without (your) consent for use against (you)," provided only that
> a specific warrant does issue for probable cause.

The key word in my text is "cooperation"; perhaps I should have said
"assistance".  If I write something down, and you get a warrant to
search and find it, it can be used against me.  I have seen no proposal
to change this.  However, I am not required to help you find what is
written down, nor to help you understand the meaning of what is written
down.  Really, I don't think we're disagreeing on this...

[ stuff re the Constitution deleted ]

> Since I have access only to the document itself, I can only form
> an opinion by reading it, and I believe my position is entirely
> consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

I must have misunderstood your position then.  I thought you were saying
that I could be compelled to reveal the (memorized) key to any encrypted
files which are found in a warranted search.  What exactly *is* your
position?
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted
Thinking of the kind that GPS and other AI models that attempt to reason
from first principles hardly occurs at all. [sic]
		- Riesbeck & Schank
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4429 comp.org.eff.talk:6832 alt.privacy:2130 talk.politics.guns:23715
From: n9020351@henson.cc.wwu.edu (James Douglas Del-Vecchio)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 7 Nov 92 08:39:28 GMT
Article-I.D.: henson.1992Nov7.083928.5583
Organization: Western Washington University

ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud) writes:

>If you want to deal with lying under oath to a court, go ahead.  And would you
>also refuse a court order to search your house?  If not, then why not?  The

	Um, because police will shoot you if you try to stop them?

>only difference between searching a house and a disk drive would seem to be
>that it's a lot easier to defend a disk drive against legal search.

	Another difference is that saying "I don't remember" on the
stand won't result in immediate bodily harm.

> - Ron Sharp.

Jim "I don't remember" Del Vecchio
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 15:04:23 GMT

In article <1992Nov7.045122.15675@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>: 
>: If "standard" means analog, well, analog phone scramblers are almost
>: all easily broken, and are pretty poor in general. Why use one when
>: digital techniques that are virtually unbreakable are available?
>
>How is this done in the case of randomly hopping variable split band
>spectrum inverters?  Current technology allows hopping between any of
>32 frequency split points at a 60 hz hopping rate.  From 16.67 ms
>fragments how on earth does one gather any information as to its
>content or split point?

Well, first the disclaimer: Metzger did say "almost all" and "in general".

>                         According to Micheal Washvill a voice and
>data security specialist with a "federal agency":
>
>	VSB scrambling can be broken but not in real time. The only
>	practical attack is through trial and error.  The scrambled
>	speech must first be recorded, then divided into finite time
>	segments according to the hop rate.  Each segment is processed
>	through a variety of split points until clear speech results."
>
>He claims a 60 to one decode time.  Gimme a break!  Who decides when
>clear speech results?  Automatic speech recognition is nowhere near
>capable of this which leaves a human to determine what is clear
>speech.  Think of the combinatorics here to decide on a second!  Does
>it actually seem reasonable that this could be done in finite human
>time or is this guy blowing self serving smoke to discourage its use?
>
>Or are there more sophisticated methods?  I have some experience in
>signal processing and in speech recognition and certainly can't think
>of one.  I've seen the statement that it is easy but I'd sure like to
>see that backed up with an algorithm.

If indeed "the only practical attack is through trial and error", then
I agree that this is a pretty secure method.  But what is the random
number generator chosing the splits?  If this is not cryptographically
strong then there is a nice weakness to exploit.  And keep in mind that
to crypto folk a scheme is usually considered insecure if there is a
way to break the code (or protocol, or whatever) that is cheaper than
brute-force trial-and-error; "finite human time" isn't usually the metric
used.

		--Ken Pizzini
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4495 comp.org.eff.talk:6877 alt.privacy:2159 talk.politics.guns:23787
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 9 Nov 92 15:20:04 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: icat.larc.nasa.gov

watt-alan@net.yale.edu (Alan Watt) writes:

>it was finally disclosed.  All calls from detainees to their attorneys
>were recorded, as were all calls from attorneys at State Police facilites
>to anywhere.  The State Police claimed they "never reviewed" the recordings.
>Just recently, the CT Attorney General announced that no charges would be
>filed in the case.

>Now admittedly, these recordings were made on the PABX equipment at
>State Police premises, not the facilities of SNET or another public
>service provider.  But given the changes in telecommunications, what
>unit of governemnt *doesn't* operate its own phone network these days?

You betcha.  At Langley Research Center, all phone traffic is *subject*
to monitoring, ostensibly to ensure that work-related conversations are
taking place.  We use a ROLM phone CBX.  Apparently there has been abuse
of long-distance calling cabailities for personal conversations (even
personal business, such as pyramid insurance schemes and the like).  I
have absolutely no idea if I was ever listened in on, but at least NASA
can rightfully say that they own the equipment and put it there so I can
perform the duties they pay me for.  PLUS, we were told up front about
the possibility of monitoring.

This is much different than giving the impression of a secure line for
conducting attorney-client conversations and then recording it all (even
if they SAY they never listened to it).

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 08:34:26 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.034529.11323@news.eng.convex.com> gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) writes:
}In article <1992Nov3.090942.1626@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
}>I apologize for the insult.  What led me to say what I said was that 
}>many people had said things that I interpreted as disrespectful of
}>all law enforcement.
}	When law enforcement starts behaving in a respectable manner
}	they will enjoy the *earned* respect of the populace.  
}	When they stop such abominations as civil forfeiture and 
}	other abuses in the name of the war on some drugs they can hope
}	for respect.  In the mean time they deserve nothing but contempt
}	from a proud and free people.  You may think like a serf if you
}	wish but don't be surprised when others don't follow suit.

Whoa, there!  I'm with you on the evils of civil asset forfeiture and other
abuses, but you're engaging in collectivist thinking if you claim that law
enforcement deserves no respect whatsoever.  This is unreasonable.  Just
because there are some bad apples - okay, many - doesn't mean they're all bad.


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4828 comp.sys.next.misc:22011
From: nweaver@soda.berkeley.edu (Nicholas C. Weaver (The Weeniehead))
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.sys.next.misc
Subject: Re: UNIX Mail with PubKey Encryption
Date: 15 Nov 1992 18:24:07 GMT
Organization: U.C. Berkeley, CS Undergraduate Association
NNTP-Posting-Host: soda.berkeley.edu

In article <947SBPN7@cc.swarthmore.edu> eoliver@ralph.cs.haverford.edu (Erik Oliver) writes:
>Thwap!  Erik hits himself over the head for not being aware of For Your
>Eyes Only on the NeXT.  On the other hand, Public Key encryption is only
>useful if the other person can certify the file and unless the receiving
>machine is another NeXT that just won't be the case.
>
>-Erik

	Of course, the real way to do solid encription is the following.
First, make up some gizmo to generate a random binary string, (White noise,
maby.  Hmm, I wonder how random blowing into the mike is?)  You CAN"T use
the random number function, it must be TREULY random.  THen, make a single
copy and give it to your friend through a secure channel.  You then use the
Voyench (sp) algorythem for one time encription.  Very useful, completely
uncrackable.  See Scientific American Oct 92 for a sidebar on the subject.
Possibly make a service to take a key and file and encrypt, and another to
decrypt.  Voila, now you can REALLY give the NSA fits.
-- 
                             Nicholas C. Weaver
			  nweaver@soda.berkeley.edu
It is a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, .signifying nothing.
                   Tis better to dream with eyes wide open.
From: bsy+@CS.CMU.EDU (Bennet Yee)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Polynomial Deduction
Date: 9 Nov 92 22:14:13 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.BxGz3w.Jy6.2
Reply-To: bsy+@cs.cmu.edu
Organization: Cranberry Melon, School of Cucumber Science

In article <69133@cup.portal.com>, lordSnooty@cup.portal.com (Andrew - Palfreyman) writes:
>On reading a couple of texts on error-correcting codes, the
>following question occurred to me:
>
>What is an efficient method for deducing the checksum generating
>polynomial, given many examples of a block code with an appended checksum?

Let file_n considered as q_n(x), with checksum the residual r_n(x),
where for all n: q_n(x) mod p(x) = r_n(x), p the checksum generating
polynomial used.

Then for all n: p divides q_n - r_n.  So p divides GCD_{i=1}^{n} q_i - r_i.
 In particular, with high probability p = GCD_{i=1}^{n} q_i - r_i
(assuming random q's).

This shows that Karp-Rabin fingerprints can not be used to check
integrity when the privacy of the fingerprints (as well as the
irreducible[s] used) can not be guaranteed.

-bsy

-- 
Bennet S. Yee		Phone: +1 412 268-7571		Email: bsy+@cs.cmu.edu
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890