From: black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236))
Subject: Re: Rights. Was: Re: Children, Children
Organization: Eastman Kodak
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 17:52:56 GMT

In article <1992Apr3.211756.14986@NCoast.ORG> cmort@ncoast.org (Christopher Morton) writes:
>As quoted from <1992Apr1.173807.6978@clpd.kodak.com> by black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236)):
>
>> 
>> 
>> As quoted from <1992Mar25.202203.1221@clpd.kodak.com> by black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236)):
>> (4 of 4)
>> 
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Here's why sentience is a more convincing criterion to me (with apologies
>> rb> to Robert Wright):
>> rb> 
>> rb> Imagine a planet of organisms that look and act exactly like humans.  
>> rb> But suppose they are actually automatons, made of silicon chips - or even made
>> rb> of flesh and blood.  Assume they have powerful brains, complex language, high 
>> rb> culture, all sorts of capabilities associated with advanced organisms.
>> rb> They can even formulate and discuss rights.  But they can't feel pain, 
>> rb> pleasure, or anything else.  Is there anything immoral about slapping one of 
>> rb> them in the face?  How about killing one of them?
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> They have transcended the boundary between man and animal, organic or not.    
>> cm> When you can demonstrate that a duck has these qualities you'll have a case.
>> cm> You're still trying to sneak the "ability to suffer" criterion on.  I STILL
>> cm> don't buy it.
>> 
>> No attempt has been made to "sneak" it in.  It is at the root of all our
>> motivations, interests and rights.
>
>No it's not.  It's at the root of your argument.  It invalidates the argument.
>Mere irritability confers NO rights.  If it did, then a garden slug would have
>MORE rights than a human being who had lost the ability to sense and react to
>stimuli.  Is that what you think?  If for some reason all sensation was lost
>to you, would you lose your rights?

You keep dropping my words like sentience, consciousness, and awareness and
introducing your terms like sensation, stimulus, and irritability.  In doing 
so, you corrupt what I'm saying and then argue against your own misstatements
of my claims.  It won't work.

Is the state where you lose all sensation called death?  Does a dead person
have rights?

>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Now subtract all these variable and add sentience.  In other words, 
>> rb> replace the robots with chimps, dogs, cats etc.  Is there anything immoral
>> rb> about gratuitously hurting or killing them?
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> Please, do you think you'll get by with this be repetition?  I would have more
>> cm> concern for the "androids" than I would for any cat.  And by the way, I can't
>> cm> believe that you'd figure I'd let the undefined "gratuitous" slip by.  What 
>> cm> DOES it mean?  Does it have a FIXED meaning, or does it change to suit you?
>> 
>> The term "gratuitous" was used to eliminate self-defense or accidental
>> cruelty from the example.
>
>How about using it for food?  Some cultures do.  I don't consider that
>gratuitous.

It depends on the circumstances.  In any event, can we at least agree that
UNNECESSARILY hurting animals (i.e. not killing as swiftly and painlessly
as possible) even for food is WRONG?

>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm>>We grant humane treatment (but not the right to it) to animals, simply
>> cm>>because we feel like it and are culturally disposed to do so.
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Are these REALLY the only reasons?  Why do "we feel like it"?  Why are we
>> rb> "culturally disposed to do so" for dogs but not for rocks?  Doesn't it have 
>> rb> something to do with the fact that we all know that animals have a 
>> rb> consciousness, can suffer, can feel pain etc.?
>>  
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm>That may be the reason WHY we feel like it, but that doesn't contradict my
>> cm>statement.  At some or any point, we can change our minds.
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> I don't see why you balk at calling these grants rights.  i.e. these
>> rb> grants of humane treatment to animals.  After all, in your definition
>> rb> rights are just whatever a group of humans agree on at any given time.
>> rb> We, they, whoever is deciding the rights can change them.  It's not
>> rb> difficult to change them.
>
>Becuase RIGHTS derive from those who HOLD them.  Priviliges accrue FROM the
>GRANTOR *TO* the GRANTEE.

If you're kidnapped by an Arab terrorist and held against your will, do you 
lose your innate rights?  An answer to the effect that you would kill your
captors is a dodge.  Do you have any rights in this situation?

>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> Because RIGHTS derive from the PEOPLE who HOLD them.  Priviliges are granted
>> cm> TOO somebody else.        
>> 
>> It's more accurate to say that rights derive from some characteristic of
>> those who hold them.  You introduced the idea of innate rights and then
>> dropped it to revert to the narrower legal rights.  But the legal rights are
>> variable and limited because laws change, political systems differ, etc.  When
>> you attempt to develop a theory of rights from the innate nature of a living
>> creature and probe to the roots of motivation, you will find that you always 
>> end up back at sentience or something comparable or a generalization of it.
>
>That characteristic is INTELLIGENCE sufficient to RECOGNIZE them.  Humans can
>INNATELY HAVE rights.  What those rights ARE is a function of HUMAN 
>interaction.

First, the equivocal use of the term "rights" in those two sentences should
lead you to define different terms or at least to prepend a modifier
whenever you mention rights.  Secondly, isn't it really possible to have
innate rights and not be aware of it?

RB (black@serum.kodak.com)
These views are not necessarily the views of my employers.


Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals