HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: mossip@nubis.rutgers.edu (Paul Mossip)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: obnoxious sounds (was Re: rsh)
Date: 17 Apr 92 17:22:59 GMT
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.

spencer@burst.Princeton.EDU (S. Spencer Sun) writes:

>In article <1992Apr16.013856.23454@informix.com> proberts@informix.com (Paul Roberts) writes:
>>Me too! Please let me know what you find out. I think putting speakers
>>into computers was about the worst thing ever done. Certain people who
>>shall remain nameless now spend most of their day sending noises of one
>>sort or another to each other's workstations.

>Well, I developed a pretty ugly hack to lock off /dev/audio involving
>named pipes... I don't use it though, because we don't really have
>problems with sounds here... just an occasional one or two that isn't
>very serious and it doesn't get to a really annoying level so it's not
>worth using it.  There's always the danger that you'll forget to unlock
>it and/or something else will go wrong and then /dev/audio will be
>inaccessible until you realize what you did (if you realize it)...

>In short, the solution I came up with is a kludge and you probably
>wouldn't want to run it.  But it can be done.
>----------
>Spencer Sun - Princeton Univ. Class of '94 - Dept. of Computer Science
>Clockwork Orange (Princeton Ultimate) (when I bother to show up for practice)
>Please be considerate, and don't talk during the show!  (SSSSSSHHH!)
>Thank you for coming to Loews!  Sit back and relax -- enjoy the show!

hacks are always possible.. when a login is done on the "console" the device
 /dev/console is changed by chown $USER /dev/console.  
in /etc/ttytab you configure the programs that you want init to run to handle
all of your terminals (console, RS-232 ports ) you could hack a 'getty C' to
have it chown /dev/audio as well as /dev/console. (and then get your sysadm to 
use it)  If you are running an xdm (we do here) then there are two scripts 
'GiveConsole' and 'TakeConsole' which do a chown $USER /dev/console
and it would be trivial to add /dev/audio.

Another simple fix would be to have the sysadmin to just chmod og-w /dev/audio
and then none of you would be able to use it. (a bit draconian)

Any solution will require that the sysadmin does something since the device 
/dev/audio is owned by root and you won't have the perm's to change it.

-Paul Mossip
Rutgers University CAIP Center
internet: mossip@vizlab.rutgers.edu
UUCP: {backbone}!rutgers!vizlab!mossip
-- 
-Paul Mossip
Research Assistant: Rutgers University (CAIP Center)
Internet: mossip@psi.rutgers.edu
UUCP:     {..backbone..}!rutgers!psi!mossip
From: birmingh@fnalc.fnal.gov
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: Source for Crypt() ???
Date: 6 Apr 92 21:39:15 GMT
Organization: Fermi National Accelerator Lab

In article <1916@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

> What you have made is a kind of pseudo-random number generator.  I

	And it's a foot-in-the-mouth award for P.J. Birmingham, who called
    this one totally wrong! My apologies to John Davis; Carl Ellison is
    right.

--    
 Phillip J. Birmingham   birmingh@fnal.fnal.gov  
 I don't speak for Fermilab, although my mouth is probably big enough...
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: tihor@acf3.NYU.EDU (Stephen Tihor)
Subject: Re: Smartcard authentification
Organization: New York University
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 07:18:00 GMT

The algorithm myst not just use the PIN to "unlock" the standard password
stream it must be an integral part of the equations.
Xref: sparky alt.security:2755 sci.crypt:1865 alt.society.futures:143
From: synergy@Metaphor.COM (Michael Synergy)
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt,alt.society.futures
Subject: Need a resource
Keywords: technology, security, IT
Date: 13 Apr 92 23:38:12 GMT
Reply-To: synergy@Metaphor.COM (Michael Synergy)
Followup-To: synergy@metaphor.com
Organization: m4


I'm currently writing a paper on the impact of computers on security, risks, loss,
etc.  To do this, I need a good overall list of current and future technologies to
analyze for their risk/threat value.  I just need broad headings, such as 'disk
drives:  floppy, CD-ROM, optical, ...'

I imagine such a list is fairly lengthy, so let me know how I can get a copy in a
machine readable format.

Thanks one and all for your help, or at least reading this message.

Michael Synergy
synergy@metaphor.com
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: cearley_k@wizard.colorado.edu
Subject: Smartcard authentification
Organization: UMS
Date: 7 APR 92 11:07:45 MST

What is the possibility that tokens based on pseudo-random number generation
can be broken by discovery of the random number algorithm (assuming there are
a limitted set of reliable algorithms). It appears, e.g. with SmartCard and
others, that these are syncronized by starting with a common seed for the
authenticator and the card, and then stepping through a 24-bit numerical
state space in the same sequence. If I captured the random-number and knew
that the interval before the next number was 60 seconds, I would know the
password for this user from now on. The 'local' pin numbers to activate
the cards, etc. would be of no value. 

What is the potential here that one could crack an entire authentification
base that relied on these physical tokens to protect against eavesdropping?
(Or if this information was leaked...say from a competing technology...)

	Curious
	
	-Kent Cearley
	-University of Colorado, Boulder
From: sysrb@cs.few.eur.nl (Reino de Boer)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: rsh
Date: 16 Apr 92 11:25:36 GMT
Reply-To: sysrb@cs.few.eur.nl
Organization: Erasmus University Rotterdam

In <CKD.92Apr15154631@loiosh.eff.org> 
	ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) writes:

> who> 	People are able to rsh commands to other peoples consoles and I
> who> was wondering how permissions could be set to prevent this. It can
> who> get anoying when people rsh the screen melt to my console. We run
> who> SunOS 4.1 and use SUN 4/110 machines. Also, someone got hold of
> who> xlock.c and has modified it as a nasty trojan horse by using rsh
> who> to lock people's screens. The modifications were simple, but with
> who> a little effort could be made far more evil. So, for your safety
> who> and mine, please prevent rsh to other people's sessions.

>Check out fbtab(5) and Xsecurity(1).

Excerpt from my fbtab:

# Uncomment the following entries to enable window system security
/dev/console	0600	/dev/kbd:/dev/mouse
/dev/console	0600	/dev/fb:/dev/bwone0:/dev/bwtwo0
/dev/console	0600	/dev/cgone0:/dev/cgtwo0:/dev/cgthree0:/dev/cgfour0
/dev/console	0600	/dev/cgsix0:/dev/cgeight0:/dev/cgnine0
#/dev/console	0600	/dev/gpone0a:/dev/gpone0b:/dev/gpone0c:/dev/gpone0d
/dev/console	0600	/dev/audio:/dev/audioctl

Hope this helps -- Reino
-- 
Reino R. A. de Boer  
CS Dept, Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam
email: sysrb@cs.few.eur.nl
NIS has given `world readable' a somewhat broader meaning (Casper H.S. Dik)
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: mirage1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Robert Ames)
Subject: Re: Source for Crypt() ???
Followup-To: alt.security
Keywords: crypt
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Distribution: na
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 05:33:09 GMT


davis@amy.tch.harvard.edu (John E. Davis) writes:

>Here is a data encryption program that I wrote.  I suspect it can be cracked
>pretty easily but I do not know this for sure.  It is short and fast.  To use
...
>I am also posting this because I would like to know the dangers of this
>simplistic algorithm.

The entire password is contained in the first 8 bytes of ciphertext.  To see
this, try encrypting a file consisting of binary zeroes, and then a file of
binary ones, etc.  If an English word was used as a password, a dictionary
attack on the first 8 bytes of ciphertext should yield the key.

Here is some simple code to produce GNUPLOT input from ciphertext.  The
Gnuplot instruction:   plot 'cipher.dat' with points    will produce a
scatter plot which gives some indication of randomness.  Perhaps your
image graphics lab could work up something more sophisticated.  Notice
that for your crypt the apparent randomness depends on the key (e.g. key
'00000000' produces non-random output).

-Bob

/* scatter.c   produces gnuplot input data */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void usage(char *);

int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int c1, c2;
    FILE *in;

    if (argc != 2) usage(argv[0]);
    in = fopen(argv[1], "rb");
    if (!in) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't open %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); }
    while (1)
    {
        c1 = fgetc(in);
        if (feof(in)) break;
        c2 = fgetc(in);
        if (feof(in)) break;
        printf("%d %d\n", c1, c2);
    }
    fclose(in);
    return 0;
}

void
usage(char *fn)
{
    fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s ciphertext\n", fn);
    exit(1);
}

-- 
Robert Ames mirage1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca  P.O. Box 724, Station 'A', Toronto

Newsgroups: alt.security
From: sgardner@rucs2.sunlab.cs.runet.edu (Steve Gardner)
Subject: AVALON NARC ANNOUNCEMENT
Organization: Radford University
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 92 12:00:37 GMT

===========================================================================
CA-66:66                      CERT Advisory
                               June 6, 666
                         Avalon Nark Vulnerability
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has
received information concerning a vulnerability with the NARK software
in versions of Avalon up to 666. The vulnerability does not exist in the
improved "DEAD" version of Avalon.

Hackers are aware of this problem, and a fix is available as apar number
"fix666".  This patch is available for all Avalon releases from HELL to
666.

The fix is in the 666 update and DEAD release of Avalon. Hackers may
call NARK Support (+61-3-435-1654) and ask that they be Narked on.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     All versions except the DEAD version of Avalon will Nark.

II.  Impact

     The Avalon is known to act erratically, narking as it executes.
     Also known to hide as a "god" whilst actively narking.

III. Solution

     - The Avalon software should be shot on site. 
 
     - It is best to shoot first and ask questions later. This will
       result in a better % chance of eliminating the correct Avalon,
       the first time.

     - The Avalon should be approached with extreme caution. Whilst
       approaching, the approachee should wear special NarkProof
       clothing to ensure against "nark" infection.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT/CC would like to thank the hackers of the internet, for
bringing this security vulnerability to our attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your local hacker has been narked on, contact CERT/CC or
your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).

Internet E-mail: cert@cert.sei.cmu.edu
Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
           CERT/CC personnel answer 7:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
           on call for emergencies during other hours.

Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

Past advisories, information about FIRST representatives, and other
information related to computer security are available for anonymous ftp
from cert.sei.cmu.edu (192.88.209.5).
-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is my signature.  There are many like it but this one is mine.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xref: sparky alt.security:2773 comp.unix.admin:2821
From: crimmins@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Mark Crimmins)
Subject: Re: National Security Agency of USA
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 1992 01:39:41 GMT

In <1992Apr10.195202.15995@newshost.lanl.gov> richards@beta.lanl.gov (William C. Richards) writes:

>In article <a_rubin.702001091@dn66> a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:
>>In <1992Mar20.92546.23945@ms.uky.edu> morgan@ms.uky.edu (Wes Morgan) writes:
>>
>>>>From: kowan%ai.mit.edu@UMCVMB.missouri.edu (Rich Cowan)
>>>>Subject: National Security Agency
>>
>>>>Other factors an applicant should contemplate:
>>>>	A thorough background examination which may include
>>>>questioning your friends, enemies, former lovers and professors.
>>

Yep, and many questions about love life and substance use, which can
very easily turn you from "the highest scoring person we've ever seen"
on their tests, to someone on whom they will pass.  This, even if you
would be regarded as a near-dweeb at most colleges.  Also beware of
the lie detector tests not only at application, but also every 6
months.  You have to be fingerprinted even to apply.  My info comes
from my own experience, which, granted, was in 1984 (would that I
could type numbers in capitals).  I decided to become a philosopher
instead :>.

Mark
Newsgroups: alt.security
Organization: large
Date: 10 Apr 1992 14:05:58 EDT
Expires: 1 Apr 93 12:34
Subject: MISC.security -- where'd it go?
From: hobbit@babyoil.ftp.com (*Hobbit*)

[my news-poster keeps generating these blank messages, dammit...]

I am the ex-moderator of misc.security, or security@rutgers as some of you may
have known it.  After leaving Rutgers and starting here at FTP I had negative
free time available to run the list, so it quietly died.  I didn't even have
time to seek out a new moderator.  Someone had already created alt.security
[and more recently alt.locksmithing, which is really more appropriate as
regards my original purpose way back when].  Alt.security seemed to be taking
the load, albeit at a lower s/n ratio, so I felt no burning necessity to put
misc.security back on its feet.  After a year and a half, I still don't.

Last night I winged a rmgroup at the news system to toast misc.security.  If
I can convince a certain cadre of PINHEADS that I meant it, this group should
vanish.  However, the old archives of this list are still sitting in the
anonymous FTP repository at pyrite.rutgers.edu, and since disk space doesn't
seem at a premium there, they should remain for a while.

So if the relative newcomers to alt.security want to catch up on what was
happening before alt.security started, I urge them to check these archives
out.  If someone is archiving alt.security they may want to slurp these down
to a mirror directory or something.

There's no FAQ there, since in days of yore the concept of a FAQ wasn't the
trendy thing.  Some of the info there may help flesh out the one AEM's
working on, though.

The most amusing thing is that I'm *still* getting "add-me" requests mailed to
security-request@aim.rutgers.edu, which was a vax 785 we unloaded in '89 or so!

_H*
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: Source for Crypt() ???
Date: 6 Apr 92 16:11:01 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <DAVIS.92Apr4144850@shasta.bu.edu> davis@amy.tch.harvard.edu (John E. Davis) writes:
>Here is a data encryption program that I wrote.  I suspect it can be cracked
>pretty easily but I do not know this for sure.  It is short and fast.  To use
>it, do:
>
>     crypt keyname filein > fileout
>
>The key should be 8 chars or less.  To decrypt the file, repeat the process.

The key is too small for this to be secure.  Any known (or guessed)
plaintext of 8 characters or more will break at least the rest of the
message.  (I haven't looked to see if your algorithm can be worked
backward).



What you have made is a kind of pseudo-random number generator.  I
suggest you take that generator's output all by itself, and analyze it
as a string of allegedly random numbers.  If there are any obvious
patterns of that stream of bytes, then it's an even weaker PRNG.

Look for example at every 8th key byte when the key is 8 characters
long.  See if that stream is a valid PRN stream.
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis)
Subject: Re: fbtab and XDM(was Re: X server security (was Re: rsh))
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central
	<CKD.92Apr15191334@loiosh.eff.org>
	<1992Apr16.130433.11227@sparky.imd.sterling.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 1992 16:09:59 GMT

 DWB> == David Boyd <dwb@IMD.Sterling.COM> 

 DWB> 	Good point.  As a follow up question,  has anyone looked to
 DWB> see if the R5 XDM utilizes this? I did a grep for fbtab in my R4P18
 DWB> version and did not find it.  Has anyone hacked in support for this
 DWB> into XDM?  The fbtab file will do little good if the login program
 DWB> you are using does not use it.  If there is interest I will look at
 DWB> making the mods to the R4 xdm.

X11R5P9 xdm doesn't appear to (based on a real quick test I just did).
Of course, the real answer is to modify the startup script to parse (and
use) /etc/fbtab as well as chowning /dev/console.  (The default
configuration sets the startup script to /usr/lib/X11/xdm/GiveConsole.)

It's probably also a good idea to have the reset script (by default,
/usr/lib/X11/xdm/TakeConsole) parse /etc/fbtab so it can chown the files
back to root.wheel... ;-)

I would be interested in a pair of scripts to do this.  perl would
probably be a good choice; I might even do them myself, if I can find
the time.
--
Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org> |    ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS DEPARTMENT
System Manager & Postmaster     |  "There's always something going out of
Electronic Frontier Foundation  |      business in Central Square."
+1 617 864 0665  NIC: [CKD1]    |   -Rita Marie Rouvalis <rita@eff.org>
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: ehrlich@cs.psu.edu (Dan Ehrlich)
Subject: Re: alt.security Frequently Asked Questions (Release 1.0)
Organization: Computer Science Department, Penn State University
Distribution: na
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 1992 15:26:09 GMT

In article <29e5dcd2@babyoil.ftp.com> hobbit@babyoil.ftp.com (*Hobbit*) writes:

[nothing]

Can you please repost the FAQ?  There was nothing in the article as recieved
at my site.
--
Dan Ehrlich - Sr. Systems Programmer - Penn State Computer Science
<ehrlich@cs.psu.edu>/Voice: +1 814 863 1142/FAX: +1 814 865 3176
Newsgroups: alt.security,comp.sys.dec
From: sfreed@fornax.unm.edu.cirt.test (Steve Freed)
Subject: Re: Kerberos (was Re: rsh)
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 92 06:16:35 GMT
Organization: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque NM
Reply-To: sfreed@ariel.unm.edu

In article <1992Apr16.034552.1199@news.iastate.edu>, john@iastate.edu (John Hascall) writes:
> security.  Until vendors come up with a way to secure the "rom
> monitor" this will continue to be the case.  DEC gets the "we almost
> have it now" award for having a password you can set to restrict access
> to "rom monitor" commands -- except they provide no way to secure the
> case -- a quick thumbscrew, pull the battery leads, and, voila, no more
> password -- if you're lucky that is, if you're not they steal the disk :-(

Actually, an easier way ...you don't have to take it apart. All you have
to do is hit the power switch. When you turn it back on it will try to auto-
boot back to multi-user mode. Since the file system is "dirty" it will
have to fsck all the partitions. We have had an ~80% success rate that 
one of the partitions is corrupt enough that it will fall back
into single user mode with a message of "please fsck by hand".

-- 

Steve.                    sfreed@ariel.unm.edu

Newsgroups: alt.horror
From: kemnitz@netcom.com (Greg Kemnitz)
Subject: Re: Lovecraft/Barker
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 92 21:00:51 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 

In article <1992Apr10.185203.25447@noose.ecn.purdue.edu> brackney@author.ecn.purdue.edu (Larry J Brackney) writes:

>   I like Lovecraft's work a lot, but as far as I am concerned, I
>enjoy reading works inspired by his writing more than the stuff
>he penned himself.  Case in point, the Arkham volume: Tales of the
>Cthulhu Mythos by Lovecraft and Divers hands.  Although the names of
>individual contributors in that volume do not come to mind, stories
>like "The Space Eaters" and "Sticks" are incredible.  They really
>retain the "look and feel" of Lovecraft's work, but are executed
>in a much more accessible style.  Opinions?

I would have to disagree.  Yes, some of these stories are really good, 
but only a few of them really made it for me as truly "Lovecraftian."
They were interesting tributes, certainly.  I just glanced at my volume.
Yes, "The Space Eaters" is really a terrific story, written by Frank
Belknap Long, appearing in Weird Tales in 1928.  Sticks is also a good
story.  But I really like oriinal Lovecraft best of all: I find it to, 
in general, be the most chilling of all (The Shadow Out of Time, for
example.)  

BTW, I read somewhere (maybe here) that there was an additional volume
out titled *New* tales of the Cthulhu Mythos.  Could someone please
post Arkham House's mailing address one more ime?  Please?

I really do love to read new Mythos stories, though, even if I like
H.P.'s best, an am always looking for ones that I haven't read.  I've
read some of the "collaborations" with Derleth,and "The Lurker at the
Threshold" seems to be about the best--and not nearly as good as most of
the stories in "Tales...."




		Jon Rhein
		jon@postgres.berkeley.edu
		from an evil friend's account



>   By the way, if you haven't had a chance to read the Tales of the
>Cthulhu Mythos compilation, I really recommend it.  It is a very
>nice tribute to Lovecraft by a number of excellent authors who
>were inspired by him.  The artwork is also excellent.
>
>   - larry
>
>--
>/  Larry J. Brackney      | E-Mail: brackney@mn.ecn.purdue.edu              \ 
>|-------------------------| S-Mail: 3116 Hilltop Dr.  W. Lafayette IN  47906 |
>|  Mechanical Engineering | Phone : (317)-463-1602 (Home)                    |
>\  Purdue University      |         (317)-494-6552 (Office)                 /


Newsgroups: alt.horror
From: c9107143@cc.newcastle.edu.au (SNACK ON DANGER DINE ON DEATH)
Subject: Friday The 13th Number?????????????????????
Organization: University of Newcastle, AUSTRALIA
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 1992 01:04:34 GMT


What number was Friday The 13th Jason Takes Manhatten???
 is this the last one before the new one that is suppossedly coming
 out????
thanks
please
e-mail me
Later
Kurgen
From: joker@ac.dal.ca
Newsgroups: alt.horror
Subject: alt.horror
Date: 9 Apr 92 16:14:00 -0300
Organization: Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada