From: ttran@cv3000.Prime.COM (T. Tran)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.vietnamese
Subject: DIALOGUE/Reply NgV Anh2
Date: 22 Dec 92 07:57:56 GMT
Organization: Saigon.COM Public Access BBS; Data Line: (408)730-1092

I'll reprint Ng Anh's posting as is, with my *updated* response preceded 
by the markers "*>>": 

>From v-nguyen@retina.cis.ohio-state.edu (Viet-Anh V Nguyen)'s
"<1992Dec9.221159.1042@cis.ohio-state.edu>:

>From: ttran@cv3000.prime.com (T. Tran)

** It had been a tradition in our history-- and a splendid tradition it
** was, one that the Communists, because of the intoxication of victory
** over such a powerful enemy, failed to heed -- that after defeating 
** the Chinese invaders, to send a "ddi co^'ng" delegation to make peace
** with our giant neighbor.


Yes, how "splendid" a tradition it was - a symbolic kowtow that every Vietnam-
ese should be proud of! I'm afraid that it's you, not the Communists, who are
intoxicated with their "victory over such a powerful enemy." Why? I'll quote 
Neil Sheehan in his recent book "After the War Was Over", p. 46:


     "...To create and maintain peace in centuries past, Vietnamese emperors
      performed a symbolic kowtow by sending tribute in gold and silver and
      acknowledging a fictitious suzerainty by the grand emperor in Peking.
      Twentieth-century Vietnam resorts to different gestures of deference;
      the process and objective remain the same. When I was in the North,
      secret high-level contacts were under way to try to satisfy Chinese
      pride by working out a modus vivendi over Cambodian - Vietnamese accept-
      ance of a UN-sponsored settlement of the war there. Although the Viet-
      namese Communist Party had no intention of permitting a democracy move-
      ment on the Western model, the slaughter of the students in Tiananmen
      Square in 1989 by Deng and the Chinese old guard was widely regarded
      among senior officials as stupid and repugnant. The feelings were not
      expressed in public. Vietnam, I was told, could not afford to cause
      China further offense."

*>>   Perhaps because of the brevity of my reference, I was not able
*>>   to make clear what I meant. Let me give it a second try.
*>>   The "trieu cong" after victory is BY NO MEANS a "symbolic" kowtow,
*>>   Neil Sheehan notwithstanding. It's simply a way to re-establish
*>>   peace and normal relationship between a small country like VN and
*>>   a giant neighbor, who had just been ignominiously defeated on the
*>>   battlefields.
*>>
*>>   The head of the delegation, "su+' tha^`n", would be chosen on the
*>>   basis of deep classical learning, quick wit, and ability to fashion
*>>   extemporaneous poems to respond to literary challenges from
*>>   the Chinese court. The intention was to show that VN possessed
*>>   a culture deep enough to stand up to the best of the Chinese, and
*>>   hence put to rest any further expansionist ambition. 
*
*>>   By "splendid" I referred to the depth of our forefathers' wisdom.
*>>   Having won a difficult, protracted war, they did not exult in it,
*>>   nor did they waste time congratulating themselves on how great they
*>>   were, but IMMEDIATELY set on the task of reconciliation, removing
*>>   emnity, to establish normal relationship with the enemy, "Nghi~ ve^`
*>>   ke^' la^u dai` cua? nha` nu+o+'c."
*>>
*>>   For it was not their objective to win war, but to ensure that there
*>>   would be no more war they'd have to win, "Ta('t muo^n ddo+`i 
*>>   chie^'n tranh". It was not they who were looking for a fight, but
*>>   they'd never back down if foreigners brought the fight to their
*>>   land. But once the fight was over, they quickly focused the country's
*>>   energy on the rebuilding of peace and internal development. The 
*>>   following "phu'", a form of traditional VNese poetry, captured  that
*>>   spirit:
*>>
*>>		De^'n nhu+ tha^`n vo~ kho^ng gie^'t,
*>>             DDu+'c lo+'n hie^'u sinh.
*>>             Nghi~ ve^` ke^' la^u da`i cu?a nha` nu+o+'c,
*>>             Tha ke^? ha`ng va.n si~ binh.
*>>             Su+?a ho`a hie^'u hai nu+o+'c.
*>>             Ta('t muo^n ddo+`i chie^'n tranh.
*>>             Chi? ca^n ve.n dda^'t, co^'t sao an ninh.
*>>                                       (Phu' "Nu'i Chi' Linh")
*>>
*>>   And that wisdom was not a matter of accident: it had deep root in
*>>   the culture of VN -- an encompassing appreciation of human nature,
*>>   and an understanding of the transitoriness of everything in this 
*>>   world, even of great military victory.

*>>   Nguyen Trai, a national hero in the 15th century, used both force
*>>   and power of persuasion to fight the Minh occupation:
*>>   "Ne^'u nhu+ muo^'n ke'o qua^n ve^` nu+o+'c thi` ca^`u ddu+o+`ng
*>>    su+?a xong, thuye^`n ghe sa('m ddu?, thu?y lu.c hai ddu+o+ng, tu`y
*>>    theo y' muo^'n, ddu+a qua^n ra co~i, ye^n o^?n muo^n pha^`n. Ta
*>>    thi` giu+ pha^.n be^` to^i, kho^ng thie^'u chu+'c co^'ng."
*>>                                           (Nguyen Trai Toa`n Ta^.p)
*>>   Certainly, it's not the voice for any kowtow ! It's a polite way
*>>   to say that, "if you guys accept defeat, "cuo^'n go'i ve^` nu+o+'c,"
*>>   I certainly let you withdraw in peace, bodies unharmed, so you can
*>>   still live to see your wife and children." The cost of a few gifts for
*>>   "trie^`u co^'ng" was a pittance compared to the riches the invaders
*>>   could amass lording over the local population. Not to mention the
*>>   fate of an entire nation living as slaves to the foreign rulers. 
*>>
*>>   The terror of the Chinese troops after defeat:
*>>
*>>           Li'nh gi`a tu+`ng tra?i mu`i chinh chie^'n,
*>>           Nghe no'i Nam chinh u? ma(.t ma`y.
*>>
*>>   And the anxiety in the heart of the Chinese "su+' tha^`n" to
*>>   VN after an invasion totally crushed:
*>>
*>>           Bo'ng loe` gu+o+m sa('t lo`ng the^m dda('ng
*>>           Tie^'ng ro^.n tro^'ng ddo^`ng to'c ddo^'m hoa. 
*>>
*>>   I doubt very much Neil Sheehan understood these kinds of subtlety
*>>   in the VNese language enough to have a feel for the ways of the 
*>>   VNese. 

*>>   As for the intoxication, it was a much bigger problem than merely
*>>   not to comment on the Tiananmen Square incident. Actually, by the
*>>   time of this incident, the intoxication had worn off considerably.
*>>   When China broke away from the "monolithic" socialist block, 
*>>   condemning the Soviet Union as a new form of imperialism, VN was 
*>>   put into a position of taking side, which eventually led to China's
*>>   attemp to "teach VN a lesson". Listening to the rhetorics from VN
*>>   re: the US and later China right after 1975, didn't you feel that
*>>   VN was "overplaying" its hand just a tad ? But let's not get too 
*>>   far afield from our discussion. It is a topic for another day.  

** The story I understood about these two islands is this, although I
** haven't been able to locate any historical document to verify its
** authenticity:
** a/ In the early years, fearing that the U.S would occupy these islands
**    and hence took them away from VNese sovereignty forever, the
**    NVNese did not OBJECT when China printed a map claiming these
**    islands as their own.
** b/ HCM and his government never agreed to sign away Truong Sa and 
**    Hoang Sa to China, or any part of the Northern border.


The document you'd like to get hold of is Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs's "Vietnam's Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes"
which builds a good historical case for Vietnam's sovereignty over the disputed
islands by citing Ly Qui Don's "Phu Bien Tap Luc" and other old documents. 

For Pham Van Dong's denial of his wrongdoing, see, for example, Far Easter
Economic Review, March 16, 1979, p. 11. Basically, Dong said the reason he
did what he did was because it was "wartime".

Anyway, according to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs's "China's Indisput-
able Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands" (Beijing Review, Feb. 18,
1980), Hanoi has "settled" this matter with the Chinese in the past. They
basically claimed:


      - In June 1956, two years after Ho Chi Minh's government was
        re-established in Hanoi, North Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister
        Ung Van Khien said to Li Zhimin, Charge d'Affaires of the Chinese
        Embassy in North Vietnam, that "according to Vietnamese data, the
        Xisha and Nansha islands are historically part of Chinese territory."

      - On September 4, 1958, the Chinese Government proclaimed the breadth
        of its territorial sea to be twelve nautical miles which applied to
        to all territories of the PRC, "including ... the Dongsha Islands,
        the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands..." 
        Ten days later, Pham Van Dong stated in his note to Zhou Enlai that
        "the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and
        supports the declaration of the Government of the People's Republic
        of China on China's territorial sea made on September 4, 1958."


If these claims can be substantiated (perhaps the second one can, since other-
wise PVD wouldn't have had to explain anything), then the current regime may 
have put itself in a rather difficult position to deal with the Chinese over
the disputed islands. 

*>>  I want to thank you for providing these historical information.


**   If it's the VNese in VN that we want to help, then let's LISTEN to
**   them.  


No objection here.

Vietanh Nguyen
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