From: bhv@areaplg2.corp.mot.com (Bronis Vidugiris)
Subject: Re: Fighting Words?
Organization: Motorola, CCR&D, CORP, Schaumburg, IL
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 23:41:49 GMT

In article <88Gk02NE24pu01@JUTS.ccc.amdahl.com> tjc50@juts.ccc.amdahl.com (Terry Carroll) writes:
)In article <gsm1RB1w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM>, rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM 
)(Richard Carlson) writes:
)> Were the "fighting words" the ones which were addressed to
)> specific individuals, like that policeman?  Does "one-on-one" mean
)> face-to-face _and_ specifically addressed?
)
)You might want to read the case directly: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 
)568 (1942).
) 
)> If he called the members of the city government fascists (or dumb
)> motherf*ckers, or crackpots, or effete snobs, or closet queens, or
)> uppity [racial slur]s, or whatever), can these words constitute
)> fighting words for someone who is not h/erself a member of the
)> city government or related to a member of the city government?
)
)Can't tell how the 1942 would have ruled on that one; they didn't get the 
)question. 
) 
)> What were the actual "fighting words" Chaplinsky was charged with
)> uttering?
)
)Again, I've posted it as best I can recall:
)
) + Chaplinsky called a policeman a "damned fascist", and said that the city
) + government was composed of all fascists and racketeers.  This is from
) + memory, so these may not be exact quotes, but that's the gist of it.
)
)Terry Carroll - tjc50@juts.ccc.amdahl.com - 408/992-2152
)The opinions presented above are not necessarily those of a sound mind.

Here's some relevant stuff from the UWM post case:
(Cited as: 1991 WL 206819 (E.D.Wis.))

  *7 (a) The Fighting Words Doctrine
 The Supreme Court in Chapinsky set out the fighting words doctrine.  The
Chapinsky Court stated:
  There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting' ' words--those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
 Chaplinsky at 571-72 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
 Thus, the Chaplinsly Court set out a two-part definition for fighting words:
(1) words which by their very utterance inflict injury and (2) words which by
their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  The two
parts of the fighting words definition correspond to different concerns
regarding reactions to offensive expressions.  See Rutzick, "Offensive Language
and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection," 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 1, 6
(1974).  The first half relates to the prevention of psychological injury,
primarily in the form of emotional upset and injury to the ' 'sensibilities' '
[FN3] of addressees.  The second half addresses the prevention of physical
retaliation likely to cause a breach of the peace.
 While the Chaplinsky Court set forth a two-part definition for fighting words,
it applied only the second half.  The Court did this because the statute in
question had been construed to regulate only language which tends to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.  The statute involved in Chaplinsky, Chapter
378, s 2;  of the Public Laws of New Hampshire, provided:
  No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
and hearing with the intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him
from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
 See Chaplinsky at 569.  The New Hampshire.  Supreme Court construed Chapter
378 s 2 such that "no words [are] 'forbidden except such as have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed.' "  See id. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 68 N.H. 200, 38
A. 731;  State v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 294, 47 A. 267).  The Chaplinsky court
held that the limited scope of Chapter 378 s 2, as construed by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, did not-contravene the constitutional right of free
expression.  See id.
 Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has narrowed and clarified the scope of
the fighting words doctrine in at least three ways.  First, the Court has
limited the fighting words definition so that it now only includes its second
half. [FN4]  Second, the Court has stated that in order for words to meet the
second half of the definition they must "naturally tend to provoke violent
resentment."  Finally, the Court has held that fighting words must be "directed
at the person of the hearer."