HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 8 Nov 92 16:45:42 GMT

Chris Malcolm writes:
 > In article <tim.720580709@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
 > 
 > >Consciousness is to the study of the brain what phlogiston is to the study of
 > >combustion.
 > 
 > Because consciousness is not a brain phenomenon. It's a property of a
 > mind-engaged-in-a-world. You'll no more find consciousness in a brain
 > than in an eyeball, although both have useful contributions to make.
 > -- 
 > Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
 > Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
 > 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205

So the big C does not exist? And what of Mind: what's that?

Gordon.
____

Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.tech,talk.philosophy.misc
From: shan@ee.ic.ac.uk (Shan Parfilt)
Subject: Re: RFD: sci.philosophy.language
Keywords: RFD, philosophy of language, sci.philosophy.language
Organization: Elec. Eng. Dept., Imperial College London
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 92 16:33:38 GMT

>>The following is an OFFICIAL request for discussion to create a
>>newsgroup called sci.philosophy.language.  (At least in my mind) It
>>supersedes a previous post I made requesting the creation of
>>talk.philosophy.language.  It has been pointed out to me that a
>>designation of sci might be more appropriate.
>
>I'd like to see such a group also, but would also be interested in
>including discussions on psychological and computational aspects of
>language.  I realize that this all may be too much to have in one
>group.  Perhaps there could be a group such as: comp.ai.language or
>sci.cog.language etc.
>
>Either way, it would be nice to see some more psychology and AI in the
>philosophy of language.
>
I too would be interested in such a group, and am also particularly 
interested in 'psychological and computational aspects of language'.

S. Parfitt
From: zlsiida@fs1.mcc.ac.uk (dave budd)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Loebner Turing test for Human like conversation
Date: 12 Nov 92 16:24:56 GMT
Organization: Manchester Computing Centre

In article <1992Nov9.011846.9873@cs.ucf.edu> hrm@engr.ucf.edu (Harley Myler) writes:

>Loebner Turing test for Human like conversation

>The entries in this competition consist of Eliza-like programs


Having read the transcripts which were posted here, I wouldn't have passed 
any of them (not even the humans :-).  I agree with another posting that all 
programs should deal with one domain for fairness.  I was surprised at just 
how much like Eliza the programs were, considering how long people have had 
to improve on the original.  Looking forward to next year's efforts.



        Practice random kindness and senseless acts of beauty

  Dave Budd, MCC, Oxford Rd, Manchester, England   (44|0)61-275-6033  
  D.Budd@mcc.ac.uk                                          fax 6040
From: hondl@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu (Kurt Hondl)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Summary: Do cats pre-exist in human consciousness?
Date: 7 Nov 92 21:38:38 GMT
Article-I.D.: constell.1992Nov7.213838.15600
Organization: National Severe Storms Laboratory
Originator: usenet@kittyhawk.ecn.uoknor.edu

In article <BxBBnw.CEK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr) writes:

>In article <burt.720913842@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>>
>>It is logical only in that it is an identity, and the question of identity
>>is at the core of the metaphysical foundations of logic.  It's a mistake
>>to put logic as prior to identity.  Logic is the tool that we use in order
>>to be precise about our thinking about identity, but it did not create
>>identity.  Cat's existed, for example, before there was ever a word for
>>cat.
>>
>
>I would argue that you don't know that as surely as you think you do.
>Certainty is a very nebulous thing.  You perceive the phenomena, not
>noumena, that you associate with the word "cat" and, because of
>certain a priori assumptions that human beings make, you assume that
>it must have existed prior to your perception of it and your
>assignment of the word "cat" to it.
>

Suppose there was a world that was inhabited by only human beings (in all
their variety) and various types of dogs.  If a cat were suddenly introduced 
to this world, would the humans ...

a) Recognizing the very distinct differences between the "cat" and themselves
   and simply refer to the "cat" as a dog?

or
 
b) recognize the distinct differences between the various types
   of dogs and this new "cat" and be compelled to name the new
   intruder as a "cat"?


========================================================================|
 Kurt D. Hondl - Meteorologist	      | *     *   ****    ****   *      |
 National Severe Storms Laboratory    | **    *  *    *  *    *  *      |
 Forecast Applications Research Group | * *   *  *       *       *      |
 1313 Halley Circle,  Room 240	      | *  *  *   ****    ****   *      |
 Norman, OK  73069		      | *   * *       *       *  *      |
 (405)366-0433     (405)366-0472 FAX  | *    **  *    *  *    *  *      |
 hondl@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu        | *     *   ****    ****   ****** |
========================================================================|
 "Of all the things I've lost, I miss my mind the most!"  Unknown       |
========================================================================|
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 8 Nov 92 16:42:49 GMT

Bill Skaggs writes:
 > tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
 > 
 >    > Consciousness is to the study of the brain what phlogiston is to
 >    > the study of combustion.
 > 
 > How about:  Consciousness is to the study of the brain what *flame* is
 > to the study of combustion?
 > 
 > 	-- Bill


How about: Consciousness is to the study of the consciousness what
consciousness is to the study of consciousness?

But I recurse...
____

Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman)
Subject: Testing
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 23:33:57 GMT

Forgive me for testing.  Pnews hasn't been working here for a while.


-- 
Avrom I. Faderman                  |  "...a sufferer is not one who hands
avrom@csli.stanford.edu            |    you his suffering, that you may 
Stanford University                |    touch it, weigh it, bite it like a
CSLI and Dept. of Philosophy       |    coin..."  -Stanislaw Lem
From: max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 11 Nov 92 16:55:14 GMT
Article-I.D.: hilbert.1992Nov11.165514.21373
Organization: Cypress Semiconductor Northwest, Beaverton Oregon

In article <Hy3XTB5w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:
>max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb) writes:
>
>> 
>> Close one eye. Now open it and close the other.
>> See the parallax shift? Think you would miss that happening over and over?
>> I don't think so. The point is that awareness has been split, and what
>> is on one side of the divide is prevented from crossing over. Period.
>> 
>Not that I wish to imply that I agree or disagree with anyone, but I 
>would like to say that the above argument, IMO, is false.
>If the mind pearl leaping across, isn't carrying the memories, or 
>histories of perception from one side to the other with its jump, AND 
>if the two sides of the brain aren't communicating, then I don't see 
>that the mind pearl would be aware of any parallax change. Change means 
>being able to compare before and after.

If you reread the original article with more care, you will discover
that the original poster claimed that the 'mindpearl' didn't notice
any change, _because_ both eyes were looking at the book, and supposedly
recieving the same data. This is only relevant if the mind pearl _can_
carry information.

My point stands. Further, in your version (which I understand you not
to be arguing) the `mindpearl` is just another homunculus emptied
of functionality to protect it from falsification.

>
>-- 
>  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
>  This .sig unintentionally left blank.
>
>Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 12 Nov 92 02:55:36 GMT

>In the above interpretation of the metaphor, I was using only noumena
>and phenomena, or what you're calling objects and percepts.  Perhaps
>the original poster of the metaphor had your third category, words, in
>mind, but I don't really see why such a third category would be
>necessary.  It would seem that words would be phenomena.  By
>"phenomena" I mean absolutely all perceptions, including "internal"
>perception, or apperception.

I'm not so sure about that.  I think the words are necessary
as a third catagory, unless we want to claim that there is
an inate natural language.  The perceptions are all internal,
even though we attribute most of them to external sources.
But we use words to lable the perceptions, and manipulate
them linguistically.
There is something very Kantian about all of this:

nomena-->sensation-->apprehansion-->perception-->empirical thought
         sense data   sensations     objects       naming and
                     in space/time  (sensed things)    thinking about (words)

Our usual problem is to work backward from the words to some sense of
the nomena, if we want to go that far, it doesn't usually seem to be
a matter of survival if we develop an intuition of nomena or not as
long as we can on occasion deal with sensations located with respect
to us in space and time (e.g., getting out of the way of that thing
which, after the fact, I'll recognize as a truck.)
bv
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 11 Nov 92 04:21:45 GMT
Article-I.D.: aupair.burt.721455705

>In article <burt.721365558@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.
ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>>>In article <BxBBnw.CEK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
(l
>>incoln carr) writes:
>all.  The whole point that I was trying to make about the cat is that
>the set of phenomena that we perceive to be a cat may or may not
>correspond to a single noumenon, what I think your calling an
>"identity."  There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence
>between the items on the menu and the items of food, to use your
>metaphor.  In fact, we don't have any way of finding out a whole hell
>of a lot about the food and we're better off talking about the menu.

Yea, usually we're happy to get any kind of correspondence
at all.  And, while we're talking we are talking
about the menu, but I'd like to explore the comment that
we don't have any way of "finding out a whole hell of
a lot about the food..."  I'm not sure that I agree with
that but it takes us onto pretty slippery ground.

It seems to me that we can talk around things, using
language as a pointer as it were, and allowing
the build up of a tacit knowledge of the food...,
but then we get into the questions of how our
states of consciousness influence our understanding,
and the definition of states which allow (if possible)
unbiased understanding.  I'll vote for suspension of
judgement as the desirable state in this regard...
bv
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 16:19:37 GMT

In article <aV0TTB3w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:

>But surely now we are back to a paradox? Unless you are trying to 
>separate "believing" from "co-incidentally agreeing with". If David 
>Chalmers doesn't believe it because it is self-referential, than David 
>Chalmers is agreeing with it (ie he doesn't believe the sentence). 
>Surely if he agree with it, he believes it? But then he isn't agreeing 
>with it?
>
>Perhaps we should ask David? ;-)

Surely I'm the *last* person you should ask.  You people seem to at
least have a clue about what's going on with G.  Me, I'm just very
confused about it. :-)

However, even I can tell that it's not valid to infer that I agree with
G from the fact that I don't believe G.  (You can infer that G is true,
but that's a different matter.)

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
From: hrm@engr.ucf.edu (Harley Myler)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Loebner Turing test for Human like conversation
Date: 9 Nov 92 01:18:46 GMT
Organization: Univ. of Central Florida
X-Xxdate: Sun, 8 Nov 92 01:20:55 GMT
X-Useragent: Nuntius v1.1.1d12

Loebner Turing test for Human like conversation

The entries in this competition consist of Eliza-like programs
that are quite interesting and (artificially!) perceptive. Well
worth serious interest by anyone involved in AI, particularly
NL researchers.

BTW, was this thread response composed by a human? Don't
believe everything you read in a signature block.

______________________________________________________
Harley R. Myler                         A little learning is a dang'rous
thing,
Dept. of Elec. & Comp. Engr.       Drink deep or taste not the Pierian
spring:
University of Central Florida    There shallow draughts intoxicate the
brain
Orlando, Florida 32816-0450    And drinking largely sobers us again.
407.823.5098                                --Alexander Pope
From: lamorte@netcom.com (R. Scott LaMorte)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 5 Nov 92 18:10:01 GMT
Article-I.D.: netcom.1992Nov5.181001.15077
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest)

>> 
>> AYes, but not as much as it woulf if you were *really* on the ride.
>> Thinking the event is not the same as experiencing the event.

>Yes, but it surely thats because the BRAIN isn't as convinced that its 
>on the ride, as opposed to the body. I don't think your response has 
>any comment on my point, which is that it really is the brain 
>controlling the body, and the body with all its hormones, etc, really 
>has a very limited repertoire of brainless (or below conscious brain) 
>response.

>I've never tried it, but I imagine that if you slugged me unconscious, 
>strapped me in a roller coaster, and turned it on, my body would 
>exhibit little or none of the changes it would while I was conscious.

>> 
>> Well, I've read some theories that state that to some degree many of
>> our behaviors are hard-wired responses. If I toss something in your
>> face, you blink. While your eyes certainly aren't plugged directly to
>> your eyelids, certainly the process skip conscious awareness.

>Hmmmm, does anyone know if I would blink if I was knocked out, and had 
>something thrown at my eyes (which are open, but very glazed by now)??

Point taken! Was I was trying to say, though, is that not all
responses require conscious control. I think our definitions of
consciousness are off here (oh no!).

I think if hit you on the side of the head with, say, a large lead
pipe, and then propped you up and tapped your knee with a little hammer,
it would probably kick.

That wasn't my main point though. My main point was that many reaction
occur before our counscious mind has awareness of the stimulus. *I*
don't have to take the time to think about blinking when you throw
something at me, that response is hard-wired *in the brain.* "I" only
become aware of it after the fact.

Hmm. Just reminded me of a quote. "How do I know what I am going to
say until I hear myself say it?" (paraphrased). Perhaps awareness as I
describe it is just a recording device, and all reactions are
automatic? (just a thought...)
.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:46:01 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

(I am posting this by request.  Please send replies to the address below,
not to me.)

Date: Tue, 10 Nov 92 09:22:01 EST
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
To: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary

(Would you post this response for me? My newsserver is ill.)

Desimone has shown that individual neurons retain an impressively large
number of memories. The evidence seems to support massive amounts of
switching in the dendritic arbor, which is later stabilized by growth of
new synapses and deletion of old.

Harry Erwin

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke)
Subject: Re: It is AI when...
Organization: University of Central Florida
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:22:05 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.204536.16987@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu  
(Christopher Green) writes:
> In article <Stafford-101192104649@stafford.winona.msus.edu>  
Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford) writes:
> >Another foolish attempt -
> >
> >Complete AI is when a machine produces useful, unsolicited
> >solutions to unanticipated problems and we cannot discern 
> >it's methods.
> 
> So, if after such a machine has produced as useful, unsolicited solution
> to an unanticipated problem, we tear it apart and figure how what it's
> method must have been, the formerly intelligent behavior becomes 
>  unintelligent (because we can now discern its method)? 
 
If you can discern how it works it's not truly intelligent behavior.
You'll know its truly intelligent when you can't figure out how it
works.

You'll get papers like:
"Hypothesis as to the functioning of modules VI and VII of the IBM genetic
neural intelligence."

"Correlation of storage node acitivity with external stimuli in the DEC
evolutionary AI Mark 8."

--
Thomas Clarke
Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central FL
12424 Research Parkway, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32826
(407)658-5030, FAX: (407)658-5059, clarke@acme.ucf.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:52:11 GMT

In article <BxHv6w.KJu@ns1.nodak.edu> vender@plains.NoDak.edu (Does it matter?) writes:
>In article <2217@sdrc.COM> dodins@sdrc.sdrc.com (John Dinsmore) writes:
>>
>>All of this discussion is very nice, but provides no insight into an 
>>already elegant proof:
>>
>>Kurt Godel has already resolved this issue (circa 1930) with his 
>>mathematical proof that
>>any formal system--read logic--is incomplete in the sense that, 
>>given any consistent set 
>>of axioms, there are true statements in the resulting system that 
>>cannot be derived
>>from these axioms.
>>
>>Read the original. You'll like it.
>
>Excuse me, but could someone explain the relevance to this subject matter?
>  The only explainations of Godel's Theorom have been what amounts to
>  a system attempting to prove itself true.  Although this does
>  mean that most logic systems (I don't know enough to say ALL)
>  cannot safely be self-referent.  Because human beings can solve
>  the halting problem,

We cannot!

 and can bypass Godel's theorem conditionally,

We can't do this either, in any sense in which an AI could not do it.

>  and an AI would be replicating a large portion of a human's capacities,
>  can we not assume that an AI would be partially irrational?
>  
>Just a note in passing:  The statements
>    B: "A always lies"
>    A: "I am telling a lie"
>result in an unresolvable problem, quite similar to a halting
problem.

It is certainly not an unresolvable problem:

	a.  I think you haven't said quite what you want to say -- the
	relevance of B's statement is unclear.  (What A says is
	paradoxical).

	b.  Such sentences cannot be constructed in formal languages.

>In order to remain functional, an AI would have to realize that the
>problem was not halting, and discontinue computation.  Having thus
>solved a halting problem (which automata cannot do in finite time
>deterministically), the AI becomes equivalent to a human being (and
>the human to it).

Write on the blackboard 1000000 times:  "Human beings cannot solve the
halting problem".  Ask a programmer.

>
>In other words, the holy grail of AI probably won't have a consistant
>  logical system embedded into it anyway.
>--Brad

It very well might.




-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: plumpton@wampyr.cc.uow.edu.au (David Plumpton)
Subject: Consciousness in animals
Organization: University Of Wollongong
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 92 04:32:22 GMT


On the assumption that animals experience consciousness (which I believe),
where abouts in the level of animal development would people think that
it starts? i.e. where is the very first 'spark' of self-awareness?

If we list organisms of decreasing mental complexity from humans to virii as:
Humans, monkeys, dogs, mice, bees, flies, ameobas, virii,
where would you first say "Stop, no self-awareness there" ?

My personal guess would go between bees and flies, i.e. nothing for a fly,
but the barest degree of consciousness for a bee.

From observing the behaviour of chimps I have no doubt at all that they
are conscious. It's pretty much the same for dogs. A mouse seems like a
scaled down dog. A bee looks to me to have small amounts of planning and
navigating, but a fly seems "hard-wired" and aimless.

Any comments or wildly differing arguments?
-- 
/------------------------------\ /-------------------------------\
I       David Plumpton          I     There is a holy trinity:    |
I plumpton@wampyr.cc.uow.edu.au I N Tesla, R Feynman and C Sagan  |
\------------------------------/ \-------------------------------/
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: Re: Consciousness in animals
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 01:55:06 GMT

plumpton@wampyr.cc.uow.edu.au (David Plumpton) writes:


>On the assumption that animals experience consciousness (which I believe),
>where abouts in the level of animal development would people think that
>it starts? i.e. where is the very first 'spark' of self-awareness?

>If we list organisms of decreasing mental complexity from humans to virii as:
>Humans, monkeys, dogs, mice, bees, flies, ameobas, virii,
>where would you first say "Stop, no self-awareness there" ?

>My personal guess would go between bees and flies, i.e. nothing for a fly,
>but the barest degree of consciousness for a bee.

>From observing the behaviour of chimps I have no doubt at all that they
>are conscious. It's pretty much the same for dogs. A mouse seems like a
>scaled down dog. A bee looks to me to have small amounts of planning and
>navigating, but a fly seems "hard-wired" and aimless.

Oh dear.  Yet again we have the idea that something "has" consciousness, or it
does not. I really can't agree with this approach.

I can look at a lot of human actions (my own included) and conclude they're "
hard-wired and aimless" too....


-- 
Tim S Roberts
School of Applied Science                 tel:     051-226467
Monash University (Gippsland)             fax:     051-221348
Switchback Road
Churchill                                 email:   tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au
Victoria 3842
Australia