From: harelb@MATH.CORNELL.EDU (Harel Barzilai)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,talk.politics.misc,soc.culture.latin-america
Subject: Nicaragua MYTHS (2): The Final Days of Somoza
Date: 16 Aug 92 06:35:01 GMT
Organization: misc.activism.progressive on UseNet ; ACTIV-L@UMCVMB

In which the Carter adminiatration tried to preserve the Somoza
dictarship to the end, until is was clear Somoza had to be quietly
removed to promote the "survivability" of Somoza's brutal "National
Guard" -- Washington's preferance to succeed Somoza.

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    At the time, the National Guard was carrying out murderous
    attacks against civilians, leaving tens of thousands killed.
    Pezzullo recommended that the bloodbath be continued: "I believe
    it ill-advised," he cabled Washington on July 6, to go to Somoza
    and ask for a bombing halt."
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[See bottom for source and availability of rest of article]

_3. The Case for the Doves_

In the new phase of the debate, the right attributes the defeat
of the Sandinistas to the contras, while the left claims that the
contras impeded their effort to overthrow the Sandinistas by
other means.  But the doves have failed to present their case as
strongly as they might.  Let us therefore give them a little
assistance, meanwhile recalling some crucial facts that are
destined for oblivion because they are far too inconvenient to
preserve.

We begin with Lawrence Pezzullo, the leading representative of
the left in the _Times_ survey of opinion.  Pezzullo was
appointed Ambassador in early 1979, at a time when Carter's
support for the Somoza tyranny was becoming problematic.  Of
course no one contemplated any modification in the basic system
of power, surely no significant role for the Sandinistas (FSLN).
As explained by Carter dove Robert Pastor, Director of Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs on the National Security Council,
there was complete agreement that Somoza's National Guard must be
kept intact, and it was not until June 29, shortly before the
end, that any participant in an NSC meeting "suggested the
central U.S. objective was something other than preventing a
Sandinista victory." By then it was finally realized that means
must be sought "to moderate the FSLN," who could not be
marginalized or excluded, as hoped. {note: Pastor, _Condemned to
Repetition_ (Princeton, 1987), 107, 157.}

As in U.S. political democracy generally, the Carter
Administration had its left-right spectrum.  On the right,
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proclaimed that "we
have to demonstrate that we are still the decisive force in
determining the political outcomes in Central America," warning
of apocalyptic outcomes if the U.S. did not intervene.  On the
left, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs Viron Vaky pursued a more
nuanced approach.  Pezzullo's task was to implement the policy of
the left, that is, to bar the FSLN from power through the
"preservation of existing instititutions, especially the National
Guard" (Vaky, June 15, 1979).  This plan was proposed to the OAS,
but rejected by the Latin American governments, all ultra-left
extremists, by U.S. standards.  Pezzullo was then compelled to
inform Somoza that his usefulness was at an end.  On June 30, he
noted in a cable to Washington that "with careful orchestration
we have a better than even chance of preserving enough of the
[National Guard] to maintain order and hold the FSLN in check
after Somoza resigns," even though this plan would "smack
somewhat of Somocismo sin Somoza," he added a few days later.
For the "successor government," the Carter Administration
approached Archbishop Obando y Bravo (in contrast, our religious
sensibilities are deeply offended by political engagement of
priests who envision a church that serves the poor) and the
right-wing businessman Adolfo Calero (later civilian director of
the main contra force); and for head of the National Guard, it
considered Colonel Enrique Bermudez, later contra commander.
{note: _Ibid._, 161; Peter Kornbluh, _Nicaragua_ (Center for
Policy Studies, Washington, 1987), 15f.  For general discussion,
see Holly Sklar, _Washington's War on Nicaragua_ (South End,
1988).}

At the time, the National Guard was carrying out murderous
attacks against civilians, leaving tens of thousands killed.
Pezzullo recommended that the bloodbath be continued: "I believe
it ill-advised," he cabled Washington on July 6, to go to Somoza
and ask for a bombing halt." On July 13, Pezzullo informed
Washington that the "survivability" of the Guard was doubtful
unless Somoza left, as he did, four days later, fleeing to Miami
with what remained of the national treasury.  On July 19, the
game was over -- that phase, at least. {note: Kornbluh, _op.
cit._}

As the FSLN entered Managua on July 19, the Carter Administration
"began setting the stage for a counterrevolution," Peter Kornbluh
observes, mounting a clandestine operation to evacuate Guard
commanders on U.S. planes disguised with Red Cross markings.
This is a war crime punishable under the Geneva conventions, the
London _Economist_ observed years later, when the same device was
used to supply contras within Nicaragua (pictures of CIA supply
planes disguised with Red Cross markings appeared without comment
in _Newsweek_, while the vigorous denunciation of this violation
of international law by the Red Cross passed without notice in
the newspaper of record).  Within six months after the overthrow
of Somoza, the Carter Administration had initiated the CIA
destabilization campaign, inherited and expanded by the
Reaganites.  The Carter doves did not give direct support to the
National Guard forces that they helped reconstitute, preferring
to use the neo-Nazi Argentine generals "as a proxy for the United
States" (Rand Corporation terrorism expert Brian Jenkins).  The
U.S. took over directly with the Reagan presidency. {note:
_Ibid._, 19; see _Culture of Terrorism_, 86; Bob Woodward, _Veil_
(Simon & Schuster, 1987), 113; Jenkins, _New Modes of Conflict_
(Rand Corporation, June 1983).}

Pezzullo's next task was to "moderate the FSLN." The Carter doves
proposed economic aid as "the main source of U.S. influence"
(Pastor).  The U.S. business community supported this plan,
particularly U.S. banks, which, as noted in the London _Financial
Times_, were pressuring Carter to provide funds to Nicaragua so
that their loans to Somoza would be repaid (courtesy of the U.S.
taxpayer, as in the Savings & Loan scam of the Reagan years).
The banks were particularly concerned that if Nicaragua, reduced
to utter ruin and bankruptcy by the U.S.-backed Somoza regime,
were to default on the Somoza debt, it would serve as a "bad
example" for other U.S. clients.  It was also recognized that aid
directed to anti-Sandinista elements in the ruling coalition was
the last remaining device to block the FSLN and its programs.
{note: Pastor, _op. cit._, 157, 208-9; Susanne Jonas, in Stanford
Central America Action Network, _Revolution in Central America_
(Westview, 1983), 90f.} After Nicaragua reached a settlement with
the banks, $75 million in aid was offered, about 60% for the
private business sector, with $5 million a grant for private
organizations and $70 million a loan (partly credits to buy U.S.
goods, another taxpayer subsidy to corporations).  One of the
conditions was that no funds be used for projects with Cuban
personnel, a way of ensuring that nothing would go to schools,
the literacy campaign, health programs, or other reform measures
for which Nicaragua was likely to turn to those with experience
in such projects and willingness to serve.  Nicaragua had no
choice but to agree, since, as the _Wall Street Journal_ noted,
without this "signal of U.S. confidence in the stability of the
country" there would be no bank loans, which were desperately
needed.  Nicaragua's request for U.S. military aid and training
was rejected, and efforts to obtain such aid from the West were
blocked by U.S.  pressure, compelling reliance on East bloc aid
as the external threat mounted. {note: _Ibid._; Theodore Schwab
and Harold Sims, in Thomas Walker, ed., _Nicaragua: the First
Five Years_ (Westview, 1988), 461.}

As these events pass through the U.S. doctrinal system, they
undergo a subtle alchemy and emerge in a different form: The
Sandinistas "enjoyed American encouragement at first; having
helped get rid of Somoza, the Carter administration also gave
them $75 million in aid.  But when the Sandinistas brought in
Cuban and East German military advisers to help build their Army
into the region's largest fighting force, conflict with
Washington was sure to follow..." (_Newsweek_). {note: Charles
Lane, _Newsweek_, March 12, 1990.}

Nicaragua also attempted to maintain its trade links with the
U.S. and the West, and succeeded in doing so through the
mid-1980s despite U.S. efforts.  But Washington naturally
preferred that they rely on the East bloc, to ensure maximal
inefficiency and to justify the attack on these "Soviet clients."
The U.S. also blocked aid from international development
organizations, and, after failing to displace the FSLN, sought to
destroy private business in Nicaragua to increase domestic
discontent and undermine the mixed economy (a major and predicted
effect of the Reagan embargo, and the reason why it was bitterly
opposed by the Nicaraguan opposition that the U.S. claimed to
support). {note: Walker, _Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino_
(Westview, 1986), 67f.; Michael Conroy, in Walker, ed., _op.
cit._; _La Prensa_ (Managua), April 20, 1988, and Stephen Kinzer,
"Anti-Sandinistas Say U.S. Should End Embargo," _NYT_, Jan. 12,
1989.}

[...]

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	       ===================================
	       T h e   D e c l i n e   o f   t h e

		 D e m o c r a t i c   I d e a l
	       ===================================
		By Noam Chomsky, Z magazine, 3/90

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