HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 1992 00:23:06 GMT

In article <1992Apr6.182533.109@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Apr6.023638.518@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>>Kristoffer Eriksson:
>>>Surely, no-one has suggested that SHRDLU is advanced enough to have a mind?
>>
>>Christopher Green:
>>>Under strong AI, one would be committed to such a view. Surely, if McCarthy
>>>believes is thermostat has beliefs, he believes that SHRDLU does. Same
>>>goes for any other thorough-going functionalists. Right Dave...?
>>>
>>
>>  I think I'm a backer of strong AI, but I don't believe that
>>mind is an all-or-nothing concept.  Minds come in varying degrees
>>of sophistication.  
>
>Varying degrees of sophistication have no bearing on the question of
>presence or absense.  A small mind is still a mind, just as a small ball
>is still a ball.

And a small giant is still a giant, etc.  Is a small large X still an
X?  Yes, I suppose, if all X's are Y's (for all X and Y), which
appears to be the thesis here.
From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 7 Apr 92 17:39:55 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Apr7.133956.10799
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.

In article <1992Apr7.153156.10030@cs.yale.edu> 
mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>That's true.  Let me try to state the point noninsultingly: I have a
>lot of respect for Searle, when he sticks to his home turf of the
>"logic of introspection" (a phrase I just made up).  But it's obvious
>that he has never taken a course on operating systems, and that his
>style of rebutting arguments against computationalists would be quite
>different if he had.

Let me try to state the counterpoint noninsultingly: I have some respect
for you, when you stick to your home turf of the non-monotonic logic (as
little as I respect the subject itself).  But it's obvious that you have
never taken a course on the philosophy of mind, and that your style of
rebutting Searle's dismissal of the System's Reply arguments would be quite
different if you had.

Incidentally, if you sincerely believe that any information about operating
systems might change the outcome of this stalemate, I urge you to try it
out on me.  Even though I've never bothered to take any courses in the
computer "science", I doubt that you would be able to convincingly extend
your condescending characterization of Searle to my own case.

> -- Drew


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139           (617) 661-8151            :
: email zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu or zeleny@HUMA1.BITNET            :
:                                                                    :
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: The Chinese Room (or Number Five's Alive)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 92 06:45:26 GMT

In article <1992Apr5.210553.11966@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>Under strong AI, one would be committed to such a view. Surely, if McCarthy
>believes is thermostat has beliefs, he believes that SHRDLU does. Same
>goes for any other thorough-going functionalists. Right Dave...?

No, not necessarily.  A functionalist need only hold that beliefs result
from the *right* functional organization, not from any old functional
organization.  The question of what organization suffices will get
different answers from different functionalists.

Personally I think that a thermostat certainly has representational
content, but it's stretching things somewhat to say that this is the
content of a belief, as "belief" might be held to require further
structure, e.g. interactions with other beliefs.  On the other hand,
it's not a million miles wrong.  A similar story holds for SHRDLU:
it has more complex contents; whether one holds that it has "beliefs"
depends on just what one requires of the term.

One way to think of it is to divide a propositional attitude like
belief, desire, hope, fear into (a) a propositional content, and
(b) an attitude to that content.  SHRDLU certainly has the content,
but the question of the attitude is somewhat murky, requiring a lot
of conceptual analysis.  I'd be happy to say that SHRDLU has the
more general attitude of "acceptance" (see Stalnaker's _Inquiry_),
and leave the more specific question of "belief" up in the air.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
Organization: University of Waterloo
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 13:56:13 GMT

markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
> Whoa there-- I don't think you can drag the linguists onto your bandwagon.
> Linguists and philosophers don't seem to use "semantics" in the same way.
> When linguists talk about "semantics", or a certain MIT linguist talks about
> "the semantic component of a grammar", they have in mind something about as
> formal, symbolic, and computable as the thing they call "syntax."

I think we can safely include computational linguists as disputants in
the syntax and semantics logomachy.  Some `Schankians' have claimed
that syntax is basically a `surface' effect of semantics, while others
of a different ilk have attached intrinsic semantic meaning to
syntactic structure.  Personally, I doubt there is any pure separation
to be had in reality.

> Searle seems to use "syntactic" to mean "formal", or "manipulating...
> symbols [with] precisely stated rules."  "Semantics" he seems to equate
> with reference.  Perhaps these are standard usages in philosophy, but they
> would not allow one to make sense of most discussions of syntax and
> semantics in linguistics.
> 
> Would it be a fair restatement of Searle's axiom, to say that "Formal symbol
> manipulation cannot of itself comprise or yield reference"?

In his conclusions of "Can computers think?" in _Minds, Brains, and
Science_, Searle states:

	2.  _Syntax is not sufficient for semantics_.
	    That proposition is a conceptual truth.  It just
	    articulates our distinction between the notion of
	    what has content.

	...

	4.  _Minds have mental contents; specifically, they have
	    semantic contents_.
	    And that, I take it, is just an obvious fact about how
	    our minds work.

Nowhere does Searle actually define what he means by syntax and
semantics other than negatively.  He seems to go through the
properties he ascribes to computer programs (aka formal systems) and
simply asserts that they are `obviously' not properties of
intelligence.  In effect, his defintions of are negatively constructed
and somewhat post hoc.  In conclusion 4, he does equate `semantic'
with `mental', but that doesn't help much.  I would agree, from other
sources, that Searle does *seem* to mean reference however. 

Having studied Searle's views on speech acts, I have a high regard for
Searle's powers of reasoning and observation, but I have also learned
to become wary of what he simply claims is `our' intuition or leaves
as an exercise to the reader.

				Cam
--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Proof, n.  Evidence having a shade more of
cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu  |  plausibility than of unlikelyhood.  The
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  testimony of two credible witnesses as
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |	opposed to that of one."    Ambrose Bierce
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Robert Rosen & Physical form of Church's Thesis
Date: 13 Apr 92 17:44:11 GMT
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

There's an extraneous "no" in the argument. It appears I may be able to
argue that Church's Thesis fails for chaotic flows.


-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 21:01:02 GMT

In article <1992Apr8.182009.23909@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:

>  As far as I can see, "syntax" is an aspect of "form", and "semantics"
>is an aspect of "function".  So, "Syntax does not imply semantics" is
>a special case of "Form does not imply function."  I agree with
>this completely, at least in principle.  (Practically speaking,
>form often says a great deal about function.)  I even agree
>with Searle's claim that instantiating a set of syntactic rules
>is not sufficient for semantics.  Semantics implies some sort of
>connection with the real world, and syntactic rules alone cannot
>force such a connection to exist.
>
>  I disagree, though, that these arguments pose any kind of problem
>for AI.  It is clear to me that the Chinese Room, and computer
>programs in general, *do* have semantics.  The semantics are not
>conferred by the formal structure alone; they are conferred by
>the way the program is instantiated and interacts with the world.

See Searle's response to the Robot Reply in "Minds, Brains, and Programs".
The bottom line there is that interacting doesn't help.

- michael

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 8 Apr 92 07:04:52 GMT
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

In article <511@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>
>
>I believe I do understand syntax and semantics, linguistics is one of
>my 'hobbies', and I have studied it extensively.
>
>And I have yet to see an argument supporting 'no semantics from syntax'
>that does not equally apply to the human brain.  No one has yet provided
>a compelling, observatianally verified, model of how the *brain* could
>generate semantics in any other way.
>
>Yes there have been some clever models that seem to show this *may* be
>possible, but none of them have any observatianal evidence to support
>them, or even to show that they are actually possible.
>-- 
I am not aware of even one such model (that supports that
semantics is strictly human) Please summarize for me.
>---------------
>uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)


-- 
*****************************************************************
*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
*****************************************************************
From: silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: "revolutsiya ili smert"
Date: 17 Apr 92 17:52:42 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Mt. View, Ca.
NNTP-Posting-Host: orfeo


 Le mauvais vitrol-eur, en essayant d'ecraser un homme dans la rue
 se dit des betises en formes de discours.  Il n'est
 ni instituteur, ni enseignant, ni professeur, mais plutot
 juge im-penitent/impertinent qui frequente les bars problematiques
 de quartiers perimes.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 1992 22:20:46 GMT

In article <511@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:

>I may not have a *detailed* model of how semantics emerges on top of
>an essentially 'syntactic' functionality, but I do have an outline model.

If you do, I (and presumably others) would be interested in seeing it.

>I do not believe that any amount of pure reason (without observational
>evidence) will ever show such a thing to be impossible, or possible.

Care to defend this view?  

>It will only be through research on living minds and on computational
>modelling that a detailed model can possibly be derived, or be shown
>to be impossible.

What *empirical* evidence would count?  Remember that we are arguing over
whether having the appropriate behaviour is sufficient evidence for
having a mind.  I may be wrong, but I see *no* way in which this is
amenable to empirical investigation.  

>And I have yet to see an argument supporting 'no semantics from syntax'
>that does not equally apply to the human brain.  No one has yet provided
>a compelling, observatianally verified, model of how the *brain* could
>generate semantics in any other way.
>

The difference between the brain and computers is that we *know* the 
brain produces meaning.  We *don't* know that computers do.  Even if we
don't know *how* the brain does it, we *can* rule out ways in which it
doesn't, e.g., angels dancing on pinheads.  The claim being made is that
we have independent reasons for ruling out functionalism as well, namely,
that syntax is insufficient of itself to yield semantics.  The truth of this
claim is independent of whether we *do* know how the brain does what it does. 


- michael

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 1992 20:33:27 GMT

In article <1992Apr6.023638.518@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>Kristoffer Eriksson:
>>Surely, no-one has suggested that SHRDLU is advanced enough to have a mind?
>
>Christopher Green:
>>Under strong AI, one would be committed to such a view. Surely, if McCarthy
>>believes is thermostat has beliefs, he believes that SHRDLU does. Same
>>goes for any other thorough-going functionalists. Right Dave...?
>>
>
>  I think I'm a backer of strong AI, but I don't believe that
>mind is an all-or-nothing concept.  Minds come in varying degrees
>of sophistication.  The essential ingredients are a picture of
>the world, the ability to use it to accomplish goals, and some
>ability to communicate.  SHRDLU has all of these things (though
>its picture is actually of an "imagined" world), so I see no
>reason not to grant it a mind, albeit a primitive one.

OK, so what are the moral consequences of this belief?  

- michael
From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Systems Reply I
Date: 11 Apr 92 00:18:59 GMT
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine

In article <6590@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
|In article <1992Mar28.141316.16968@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
|>
|>I can only reiterate what I have said before.  If you wish to show that
|>computers lack something that humans possess, it seems to me that you
|>need to show (a) that computers lack it, and (b) that humans possess
|>it. If you only prove (a) then you have not proved your point.
|
|Not to your satisfaction, perhaps.  I see no reason to _prove_ that
|humans have understanding in the sense required for the Chinese Room,
|for instance.

That is *not* what Daryl is asking for; he, and I, are asking for evidence
(not even proof, just evidence) that humans understand in a way that
Searle's CR does not.

We are really all agreed that humans understand things, what is dividing
us is how to determine if something else does.

So Searle has shown that the CR lacks something he chooses to call
'understanding', why should I believe that humans have this particular
brand of 'understanding' and not some other?  Why should Searle's definition
(or lack of it) be nay better than mine? or Darryl's?

|What interests me in this is whether or not computers can understand,
|and not in whether or not I can convince a determined skeptic that
|humans can understand.  Other people may have different interests,
|of course.

That is also my interest (in this group).  But what is understanding?
What is it that we humans have that we are looking for in computers?
Until we know that we cannot answer the question.

|Now, if an argument against computer understanding also applied
|to humans, I would regard that as reason to conclude the argument
|was wrong.  But I'm certainly not going to conclude the argument
|is wrong just because no one has yet shown it doesn't apply to humans.
|Why should I?

But what if I show reason to believe it might, or could, apply to humans?

Does this not at least weaken the force of the argument?
-- 
---------------
uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: The Chinese Room (or Number Five's Alive)
Date: Wed, 08 Apr 1992 21:21:38 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <1992Apr7.203725.1344@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu 
(Michael Gemar) writes (quoting me):
>>[...] Strong AI claims that minds can be created by
>>implementing an appropriate program.  It does not claim that minds are
>>created by implementing *any* program.  (Maybe some people think that,
>>but it is not a consequence of Strong AI.)
>
>What counts as an "appropriate" program? And does this mean you are willing to
>jettison the Turing Test, since it makes no stipulation as to the 
>type of program implemented?

"Strong AI" is Searle's term, and I was just trying to make sure it's used
correctly.  Searle makes it clear that strong-AI-ers don't consider all
programs to have minds.

But to answer your question, yes, I'm willing to throw out the Turing Test.
Or, rather, it's okay as a first approximation-- failing to pass it would
normally rule out intelligence-- but it ignores both external behavior
(e.g. nonverbal activity) and internal phenomena (e.g. qualia) that I think
are part of sentience.  

It could be argued that the test allows indirect probing of these areas--
you could ask questions to see if the putative intelligence can learn,
can feel, can make plans, knows about the world, can model virtual worlds,
remembers things, can adapt to different situations, etc.-- but there's
something underhanded about not allowing us to examine such things directly,
by examining the machine's internal functioning.  

It's also, frankly, out of date.  Surely most AI researchers now believe
that real-world knowledge, not natural-language processing, is the key to 
further progress.
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Systems Reply I
Date: 8 Apr 92 20:08:36 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Mar28.141316.16968@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>>It's always open to you to try to show that some argument against
>>computer understanding would also apply to humans. What's wrong, I
>>think, is to try to get out of this by demanding that other people
>>prove the opposite.
>
>I can only reiterate what I have said before.  If you wish to show that
>computers lack something that humans possess, it seems to me that you
>need to show (a) that computers lack it, and (b) that humans possess
>it. If you only prove (a) then you have not proved your point.

Not to your satisfaction, perhaps.  I see no reason to _prove_ that
humans have understanding in the sense required for the Chinese Room,
for instance.  I see no more need to prove this than to prove that
my coffee cup is not the most intelligent being in the universe.

What interests me in this is whether or not computers can understand,
and not in whether or not I can convince a determined skeptic that
humans can understand.  Other people may have different interests,
of course.

Now, if an argument against computer understanding also applied
to humans, I would regard that as reason to conclude the argument
was wrong.  But I'm certainly not going to conclude the argument
is wrong just because no one has yet shown it doesn't apply to humans.
Why should I?

-- jd
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 17:35:00 GMT

In article <1992Apr7.222046.16470@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
......
>
>>It will only be through research on living minds and on computational
>>modelling that a detailed model can possibly be derived, or be shown
>>to be impossible.
>
>What *empirical* evidence would count?  Remember that we are arguing over
>whether having the appropriate behaviour is sufficient evidence for
>having a mind.  I may be wrong, but I see *no* way in which this is
>amenable to empirical investigation.  
>
Is a statement that a given entity (a human, a robot, an alien, a rock, etc)
has a mind or not amenable to empirical investigation? I presume you agree that
it is. 'Appropriate behaviour' (whatever it might be) is empirical evidence of 
some sort, do you agree? Then it is a simple matter to see if conclusions
drawn from this evidence coincide with whatever evidence you suggest to use
for deciding whether an entity has a mind.  
The problem is that you DO NOT HAVE any method of deciding whether an entity
has a mind, apart from 'appropriate behaviour', and you do not like this one.
To escape from this dilemma, you propose to resort to pure speculations, which
can be done with covered eyes and plugged ears. 
Please tell me, if you are faced with an entity, is it having a mind an
objective fact or a matter of personal taste? If the latter, there is no point
of discussing it. If the former, then there should be empirical evidence to 
base the decision on. Or do you have other suggestions?

>>And I have yet to see an argument supporting 'no semantics from syntax'
>>that does not equally apply to the human brain.  No one has yet provided
>>a compelling, observatianally verified, model of how the *brain* could
>>generate semantics in any other way.
>>
>
>The difference between the brain and computers is that we *know* the 
>brain produces meaning.  We *don't* know that computers do.  Even if we

Is this (brain producing meaning) an objective empirical fact, or subjective
'knowledge' arrived at by introspection? If the second, you cannot know
whether computers produce it or not, because your introspection does not extend
to computers. If the first, then please specify criteria used to arrive at
this conclusion. Then we will be able to see if this does or does not apply 
to computers.

>don't know *how* the brain does it, we *can* rule out ways in which it
>doesn't, e.g., angels dancing on pinheads.  The claim being made is that
>we have independent reasons for ruling out functionalism as well, namely,
>that syntax is insufficient of itself to yield semantics.  The truth of this
>claim is independent of whether we *do* know how the brain does what it does. 
>
>
>- michael
>


-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy