From: doak@sunbug.ingr.com (Doak Heyser)
Subject: Re: Lee-Longstreet
Reply-To: doak@sunbug.dazixco.ingr.com
Organization: Dazix
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 23:37:42 GMT


In article <1992Aug17.182354.8824@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>  Hm. Two thoughts on this subject. First, I think that most of the "touch of
>  genuis" that Lee and Jackson had was largely based on complete contempt
>  for their opponents. In many of Lee's and Jackson's great battles, they
>  did things that would have enabled a competent opponent to crush them:
>  eg, Seven Days, Antietam, Chancellorsville. I have always thought that
>  their reputations were built less on their own skill and more on the lack
>  of skill of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. On the other hand, you
>  have to credit them with recognizing when they were up against inferior
>  generals and taking advantage of it.

   Well, Lee and Jackson were facing larger, better equipped armies.  If
they hadn't fought aggresively they probably would have lost.  Taking
chances isn't the whole story though - they had to follow up on them by
taking advantage of their opponents mistakes.  Plus, they didn't panic
when others would have.  They seemed to be pretty good at strategy and 
tactics too.  Maybe overconfidence was Lee's weakest point.  8-)
   Besides, I thought Lee did pretty well against Grant in the Forty
Days despite having less than half the men.  Just what is the consensus
on these battles anyway?  I know Grant "won" since he put the siege on
Richmond but is there anything that Lee could have done better in this
series of battles?  (Yes, I'm aware of Lee pulling his guns out of the
Bloody Angle but that seems to be a good decision based on bad
information.)
   I'm curious, has anyone ever wondered what might have happened if
Lee had fought Grant with an equal sized and equipped army?  Maybe it's
good we didn't get to find out.

>  But, when Meade and Grant took over, Lee continued behaving as if he was
>  up against McClellan, and it was Longstreet who was warning that the Union
>  army had better commanders and the old tricks wouldn't work anymore. Hence
>  the loss at Gettysburg.

   I believe not having his cavalry to help him and the loss of Jackson
was more of an influence than Meade being in command though.
Nonetheless, Pickett's charge wasn't a trick - it was brute force and
the Army of the Potomac fought a great battle.  In fact, it possibly
was the best battle they fought during the war.  (Or is that common
knowledge?)


>  Same thing with Jackson's and Longstreet's tries at independent command.
>  Jackson was up against Frement and Sigel, while Longstreet was up against
>  Rosecrans and Parke (and also Burnside, to be fair). If the Union army

   Wasn't Longstreet in command at Chickaumaugua (Bragg had gone into a
funk by then)?  And wasn't he responsible for the breakthrough that had
Rosencran's fleeing for his life?  If this is the command you are
refering too (I don't think so), then I don't see how Longstreet could
have done any better.


>                      ..... I don't know whether I prefer genius or reliable
>  brilliance... it's a tough call.

   I'd settle for having a competently aggressive commander (Grant) and
twice the army my opponent has.  
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