From: young@serum.kodak.com
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@serum.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 92 21:39:21 GMT

In <BvEr3s.7y@wpg.com>, <BvF2Js.55E@wpg.com>, and  <BvF3q1.5AK@wpg.com>,
  Russell Lawrence writes:

>From article <1992Sep30.131834.21101@brtph560.bnr.ca>, by cboeker@batph78.bnr.ca (Craig Boeker):

    [...scenarios regarding brain-dead and kidney-dead people deleted...]

>cb> Basically, I think the decision on this type of thing should occur in the
>cb> following manner:
>cb> 
>cb> 1) the individual.  Either through concious decision (sound mind and body,
>cb>    etc.) or living will.
>cb> 
>cb> 2) the family of the individual.
>cb> 
>cb> 3) if no family exists then the state must have some policy regarding
>cb>    how long to provided life support.
>
>All three of these decision-making routines depend on sapience, 
>but Rich has argued repeatedly that sentience and sapience are 
>"arbitrary" criteria...

	...for assigning status to non-human species.  Please finish the
	statement, Russell.  Mr. Boeker is talking about something completely
	different.  He came late to the discussion and has missed some of
	the salient points...not his fault, and no offense taken or meant,
	but true nonetheless.

	Please do not try to use this as yet another distraction, Russell.

>I suspect that Rich had the right idea when he wrote the following:
>
>======================================================================
>The phrase "brain-DEAD" [emphasis added] sums it up quite nicely:
>he's not really "alive".  His major sensory processing center has
>ceased to function.   
>======================================================================
>
>However, he back-tracked when he realized that he had inadvertently
>acknowledged the importance of sentience (sensory ability) and 
>sapience (cognitive ability).

	Context, Russell, context.  There's no back-tracking here.  You
	asked about a brain-dead HUMAN; the discussion was (and should
	still be) about assignment of status to non-human species.  Your
	question was (and is) irrelevant.  If you doubt this, please look
	at the original sentence of Ted Wayn Altar upon which the discussion
	is based:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From <altar.713493440@sfu.ca>:

>>Insects are not of the same status as birds, repitiles (sic), and mammals...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	As I've said several times now, the issue wasn't INTRA-species,
	but rather INTER-species.  From that INTER-species standpoint,
	the following makes perfect sense:
>ry> ======================================================================
>ry> ...a brain-dead, or kidney deficient, or liver-failed, etc., human is
>ry> effectively dead.  It is a non-functional organism.
>ry> ======================================================================
>
>Is it ok to kill a kidney-dead human?  Please clarify your position.

	Who cares re the subject of this discussion?  Even if I do as you
	ask and "clarify" (which should be unnecessary, since I've already
	given the answer), what additional insight would it provide regarding
	the human assignment of status to NON-HUMAN species?

[...]

>Does the term "equivocation" mean anything to you?

	Oh, wow, Russell, ANOTHER new word!  Yesterday it was "reductionism."

>Let's look at the whole statement, without your creative editing:

	Yes, let's.  BTW, no malice was intended in my editing; I simply
	didn't feel that the extra text added to the point...especially
	since the statement regarding my advocacy of drug testing is in
	error, a point we covered when you first posted this paragraph:

>=================================================================
>If you really believe that similarity of structure and function 
>is a false god, as you say, why do you advocate drug testing on 
>mammals?  If you're going to tell us that it's reasonable to test 
>the effectiveness of analgesics on rats...  given the similarity 
>between rat brains and human brains, it won't make much sense for 
>you to turn around and pretend that rats cannot suffer and that 
>the similarity between humans and rats is a "false god".  
>=================================================================
>
>Careful readers will notice that I was taking issue with the 
>inherent hypocrisy in your position, not declaring some sort of 
>reverence for structural similarity.  In truth, I consider your 
>allegation that structural similarity is my "false god" to be 
>irrational.  That's *not* to say that structural similarity is my 
>"true" god.  

	"Inherent hypocrisy?"  Tactic #208 again: argument by assertion.

	Careful readers will note that you've already accepted that the
	similarity exists ["...given the similarity..."], and that it does
	not, therefore, "make much sense for [me] to...pretend that rats
	cannot suffer and that similarity between humans and rats is a
	'false god'."

	You've pointed to what you consider to be a similarity and then
	told me I'm wrong when I say it's a "false god".  If it's not a
	"false god," then it must be a "true god," eh?  Or is there some
	third, as-yet-unmentioned state for this question?  Seems to me
	that similarity of structure is either relevant or not when judging
	the worth of other species.

	Let me summarize once again: you've accepted that there is a
	similarity and then stated clearly that it's erroneous to consider
	the similarity a "false god," isn't that about it?

	As I said, it sure looks to ME like you place a great deal of
	importance on similarity of structure.  This is no surprise, since
	most AR arguments in this forum eventually boil down to this issue.
	Even the redoubtable Ted Altar used this argument in his rejection
	of the concept of "plant pain".  The fallacy, of course, is that,
	while similarity of structure would certainly argue FOR (but not
	prove) similarity of sensation, dissimilarity of structure does not
	argue equally well AGAINST the presence of equally significant, if
	not congruent, sensations.

>As I stated previously, I'd be opposed to the torture of a rat 
>for the simple reason that rats apparently feel pain, not because 
>their brains are similar to the brains of humans.  It's
>true that structural similarities may enter the discussion when 
>someone like yourself argues that rats don't feel pain, ...

	Show me where I've argued specifically that rats don't feel pain.

	It's becoming very clear why you can't seem to get my point: you
	don't know what I've written.  There IS another possibility, but
	I'll give you the benefit of the doubt.

	Please answer the following questions:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. Define "meaning" as you've used it in this discussion.

2. Who, or what, gave you the authority to assign status to non-human
    species?

3. By what absolute, significant-to-all-species criteria do you attach
    ethical importance to the death of some species and not others?

4. Why, if your criteria are not absolute, am I 'wrong' to develop my
    ethics [in this area] using some other criteria?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	Thank you in advance.


-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals