HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bwebster@pages.com (Bruce F. Webster)
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Reply-To: bwebster@pages.com
Organization: Banzai Research Institute
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 15:44:41 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.090133.1707@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>  
denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
> 
> I am also not content to let society drift in the direction of completely 
> unregulated crypto without attempting to understand the consequences
> of that from the view of LE as well as the view of protecting privacy
> and proprietary interests.
> 

1) My observation over the past eleven years (which is when I first became  
aware of issues of cryptography) is that if we, as a society and a government,  
are "drifting" towards anything, it's towards regulated (and eviscerated)  
crypto-technology. The only real counterforce to that trend has been the  
efforts of various individuals and small groups to advance and distribute the  
technology, often in the face of subtle and overt pressure not to do so.

2) Understanding the consequences is a simple though-experiment: imagine a  
postal service where neither the gov't nor anyone else had the right nor the  
power to read letters (though they might intercept it and delay or prevent its  
delivery). Might criminals avail themselves of such a system? Yes. Is that a  
serious enough problem to justify shutting down such a system or compromising  
its privacy? No, IMHO. ..bruce..

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bruce F. Webster             |  We hackers linger by our leading edge
CTO, Pages Software Inc      |  Forgetting what is pending in the cache
bwebster@pages.com           |  Till practice hurtles past us, and we crash.
#import <pages/disclaimer.h> |            -- Jeff Duntemann
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal,35-016,8621267,)
Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy
Originator: uri@aixproj.watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 19:36:29 GMT
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM T.J. Watson Research Center

From article <1992Nov12.202606.22666@cactus.org>, by ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter):
>  If government agents *have* a warrant, would an attempt to prevent
>  their entry into a house be considered "legal"?  Is secretly-held
>  information really different from other "effects" mentioned in the
>  Fourth Amendment?

1. No, it's not legal to prevent the entry of LE with a warrant.....

2. Yes, there is a difference between the "things" and "information".
   For example, I can't prevent LE from seizing my diary and looking
   through it (or my PC :-).  But if it happens so, that my diary is
   encrypted or written in an obscure little-known language, I don't
   have to provide th LE with my keys,  or disclose the language, or
   the plaintext.

   It just happened so, that until very recent times, most governments
   could break most of private citizens' encryption.  Therefore it was
   not a concern for the gov't. Today anybody can get/write/buy a good
   encryption with almost 100% security - so some fools got scared and
   started devising counter-measures (as if indeed it were possible to
   drink a sea :-)... So again, you can under court order seize my PC,
   but I'm not obligated to tell you what's in it. If you can get that
   information out without my cooperation - lucky SOB you are. If not,
   too darn bad (:-).

   Actually, in real world, gov't proved it's inability to deal with
   real enemy ciphers (for example, see the case of Mr. Abel...  His
   asistant used a nice fully-mnemonic encryption system (i.e. no PC
   and other incriminating equipment, just a pencil and a nice clean
   sheet of paper). FBI wasn't able to break it... It all was during 
   50-ies; Mr. Kahn thought, that it was practically unbreakable - I 
   second his opinion :-). 
-- 
Regards,
Uri.		uri@watson.ibm.com
------------
<Disclaimer>
From: emil@lamisun2.epfl.ch (Emil Laurentiu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PKZIP contest
Date: 9 Nov 92 03:30:32 GMT
Organization: Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne

The paragraph bellow is extracted from the PGP2.0 documentation:


     There is a company called AccessData (87 East 600 South, Orem, Utah
     84058, phone 1-800-658-5199) that sells a package for $185 that
     cracks the built-in encryption schemes used by WordPerfect, Lotus
     1-2-3, MS Excel, Symphony, Quattro Pro, Paradox, and MS Word 2.0.  It
     doesn't simply guess passwords-- it does real cryptanalysis.  Some
     people buy it when they forget their password for their own files. 
     Law enforcement agencies buy it too, so they can read files they
     seize.  I talked to Eric Thompson, the author, and he said his
     program only takes a split second to crack them, but he put in some
     delay loops to slow it down so it doesn't look so easy to the
     customer.  He also told me that the password encryption feature of
     PKZIP files can be easily broken, and that his law enforcement
     customers already have that service regularly provided to them from
     another vendor.


In these conditions I think the contest launched by PKWARE is of no interest. 
      

-- 
---------------------------------------------------------
Waiting for the war to begin...                      Emil
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4740 alt.privacy:2244
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Disclosing a new encryption method (the other side)
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: 11 Nov 92 19:57:00

For a crypto system to be competetive nowadays, it must withstand the
same kinds of attacks that existing systems have proven their ability
to withstand.  This means all the methods that cryptography users,
including industrial, military, and criminal [ :-) ] organizations are
able to muster---including not just cryptanalysis, but commando raids
on traffic endpoints, plus the use of bribery, seduction, and torture
to get the algorithms and other info out of people.  You have to
assume that both the algorithm and an unlimited amount of encrypted
traffic with known plaintext and known keys are available to the
enemy.  They WILL get this info.  You can then change the keys,
but once they know the algorithm you can never make them stop knowing it.
Your system (with the new keys) must continue to withstand cryptanalysis.
The existing ones do---if yours doesn't, you don't have a worthwhile method.

THAT is why you have to publish your algorithm (or post permission the
sci.crypt commando squads to break into your home) if you want anyone
to take you seriously when you say it is secure.  

For relevant war stories, see "The Codebreakers" by David Kahn.
From: jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu (jason 'Think!' steiner)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 10 Nov 92 16:31:16 GMT
Article-I.D.: uoft02.1992Nov10.113117.11080
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

TSOS@uni-duesseldorf.de (Detlef Lannert) writes:
> >>The major difference between guns and cars are that licensing and 
> >>registration have not been suggested as a way to reduce the 
> >>numbers of cars in private hands.  This has been said a number of 
> >>times for guns. [...]
> 
> I'm afraid that the comparison of cryptographic key registration to 
> the registration of cars and guns can be misleading.

in some aspects, yes.

> Possessing (and using) a car or a gun is a privilege and can 
> infringe on other people's rights. 

this isn't entirely true. at least in the US, possession of arms is
a -right-.

> Free communication, however, is IMHO not a dangerous device at all, 
> and therefore I don't see why it should be controlled by the 
> authorities.

there's the rub. while communication isn't dangerous to you or me,
it's a great threat to authoritarian governments.

> Please don't engage in (albeit interesting) discussions about the
> registration of guns, cars, planes, or what-have-you, thereby 
> creating false analogies and opening up new wealths of arguments 
> for the pro key registration lobby.

..which are just as fallacious as the ones they've been using
for registration of "guns, cars, planes, or what-have-you".

jason

--
  "More life, more love, more freedom, more choice!" - MORTAL, Painkiller
`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,` jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu ,`,`,`
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
From: rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp)
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
Organization: Metaflow Technologies Inc.
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:15:04 GMT

In article <n0e07t@ofa123.fidonet.org>, Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
|>  The most peculiar thing about your rejection, and that of the other
|>  person who replied, is that both of you are rejecting the challenge
|>  _without having ever seen the product you are rejecting!_.  This 
|>  worries me immensely.  Makes me wonder if you may not simply be 
|>  avoiding the challenge under some pretenses.  Am I mistaken?
|>  
|>  In my experience in the technical world, I've found that prouncing 
|>  some idea to be unworthy _ex cathedra_ gathers applause only among 
|>  the NIH (Not-Invented-Here) crowd.  The rest of the world sees only 
|>  their arbitrary pronouncement, and doesn't give much credit to the
|>  rejecter(s). 
|>  
|>  But if all these experts are unwilling to even _try_... hmmmm.

I think you are discounting time value here.  The cryptologists who
hang out here are probably not terribly interested in carrying out even
a known plaintext attack on something encrypted with an unknown
algorithm -- they just don't have the time to waste.  They would much
rather look at and analyze the algorithm in order to assess its
characteristics (security, speed, patent infringement, etc.).

To assert a NIH attitude is absurd, given that there is no _here_
here.  The problem is that neophytes show up with "unbreakable" code
challenges in sci.crypt on a regular basis (about every other month, or
so).  Nobody has the time to reverse engineer an algorithm starting
from square one -- it is a long, tedious process, the first time
'round, unless the code is ridiculously trivial.

If your friend is truly interested in having experts assess the
security of this algorithm, s/he must submit the _algorithm_ to the
experts -- not the _output_ of the algorithm.
-- 

...Russ Schnapp
BIX: rschnapp           Email: uunet!metaflow!rschnapp or rschnapp@metaflow.com
Metaflow Technologies   Voice: 619/452-6608x230;  FAX: 619/452-0401
La Jolla, California    Unless otw specified, I`m speaking only for myself!
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 13 Nov 92 01:25:45 GMT
Article-I.D.: news.1992Nov13.012545.29228
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Nov12.230445.25742@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
> Computer cryptography makes it possible for those who accumulate
> information to avoid the due-process search which is expected
> when people accumulate things.
	Good memory that is sufficiently selective during a trial
	makes it possible for those who accumulate information to 
	avoid the due-process search which is expected when people
	accumulate things.

	Do you see what is wrong with this sentence?  Think about it.
	Then . . . repeat after me: Information is not a thing.  
	Information is not a thing.  

> The difference is that what was once rare and easily breached by
> the authorities is now on its way to becoming common and
> impenetrable.  Cryptography really is different from a wall safe.
	It will still be impenetrable for law enforcement in the
	case of criminals.  Unless you make the "crime" of an illegal
	encryption device (ie. a computer with th appropriate software) 
	comparable to the most heavily punished felonies recognized by 
	the law criminals commiting those felonies will use it and they will 
	consider the risk quite acceptable.  The only people who will be denied
	the right to some privacy from big brother will be decent
	law abiding citizens.  I don't understand why you can't see
	this.  Is it really that hard a concept?!?


						smg
From: birmingh@fnala.fnal.gov
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptography, please
Date: 6 Nov 92 22:44:25 GMT
Organization: Fermi National Accelerator Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: fnala.fnal.gov

In article <Bx6IM7.DDK@chinet.chi.il.us>, schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes:
> This newsgroup is supposed to be about cryptography.  Would everyone please
> take the political discussion to alt.privacy or somewhere else mour suitable.
> 
> Thank you,
> Bruce

         Actually, I think it's relevant to this group. Let it stay (but
    can we stop mutating the subject lines, so folks like Bruce can wield
    killfiles more effectively?)

-- 
 Phillip J. Birmingham   birmingh@fnal.fnal.gov  
 I don't speak for Fermilab, although my mouth is probably big enough...
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4676 comp.org.eff.talk:6971 alt.privacy:2216 talk.politics.guns:24047
From: shaffer@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Michael A. Shaffer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 12 Nov 92 18:51:19 GMT
Organization: Argonne National Laboratory

>We have about doubled the prison population in this country in the
>last ten or so years.  Built a lot of prisons.  Spent billions.
>Emptied the mental hospitals to find money to do it (indirectly,
>but that's about what happened).

Well we have put a lot of non-violent offenders in prison. But we
are releasing many violent offenders all the time. Some 90% of
those convicted of violent crimes are repeat offenders. Now they must
have been released if they were on the outside to commit those
crimes. We are NOT keeping the violent offenders locked up. Studies
have shown that the chances of doing significant time for a violent
crime are VERY low.

>
>I sure don't feel any safer.  Seems to me that all we did with
>stiffer sentences and more prisons was increase the supply of
>criminals with darn little effect on violent crime.  Has it been
>cut by half?  By even 10%?  Do you feel any safer?  I sure don't.
>
>As for our wonderful handgun culture, I think it very interesting
                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

What a wonderfully PC term. Did you come up with that one yourself?

>that I am more likely to be blown away by a 13 year old in 
>Minneapolis than I am to be blown up by the IRA in London and

You have a source fir this I presume. Also consider that you are even
MORE likely to be blown away in DC where handguns are banned.

>probably even in Belfast.  True, no one can keep the IRA disarmed,
>but trying does seem to help a little. . .

Completely irrelevnt.

>
>-- 
>   Larry W. Loen        |  My Opinions are decidedly my own, so please
>                        |  do not attribute them to my employer

				mike
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:38:06 GMT
Article-I.D.: transfer.1drgduINNigc
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov11.155632.29487@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>  [(legal) discovery] makes
>public key systems particularly vulnerable, since once they have your
>private key [...] they can read everything.

	[...] 

>Perhaps a smart judge would permit you to furnish plaintext instead of the
>key, though likely not, since you couldn't "prove" that was the real plaintext
>without revealing the private key. Maybe there's a way to authenticate the
>plaintext via signatures, without having to reveal your private key--dunno.


This isn't hard.  All the judge has to do is encrypt your message with the
public key and compare encrypted bits, if you've used straight public-key.
If you've used PK to encrypt a DES key, then all you have to surrender
is the DES key and the judge can do the body decryption.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: hruby@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 9 Nov 92 08:28:52 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <a_rubin.721077147@dn66>, a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:
> In <PA146008.482.721071372@utkvm1.utk.edu> PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu (David Veal) writes:
> 
>>       The major difference between guns and cars are that licensing and 
>>registration have not been suggested as a way to reduce the numbers of cars 
>>in private hands.  This has been said a number of times for guns.
> 
> Are you sure?  Wasn't one of the EPA and California AQMD/ARB proposals a
> buyback of old cars?
> --

In fact, I just heard on NPR this morning that Virginia is planing on 
buying all cars in the state older than 1981 models so as to comply 
with the Clean Air Act.  $700 each.  

I wonder where they'll get the list of who owns those cars ...
:-)
From: n9020351@henson.cc.wwu.edu (James Douglas Del-Vecchio)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Where can I get some good intro books on crypto?
Date: 7 Nov 92 09:01:23 GMT
Article-I.D.: henson.1992Nov7.090123.6549
Organization: Western Washington University


Where can I get some good intro books on crypto?

Jim Del Vecchio
From: matwesx@gsusgi2.gsu.edu (William E. Sadler)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: One time pads
Date: 12 Nov 92 18:03:53 GMT
Organization: Georgia State University

A question:

Are one time pads secure?  I am thinking of the system that the military uses
for infantry troops.  Essentially, a book of one time pads are published, and
used for a specific amount of time.  Presumably, there is not enough traffic
to get ahold of the individual messages before the pad changes.

Any comments?  I don't have the background to make a judgement, and would 
like some input.  I have been told (by mil commo officer) that it is 100% if
the pads are not compromised.

Thanks!

-- 
/**************************************************************************/
/* William E. Sadler          |       Internet: matwesx@gsusgi2.gsu.edu   */
/* 717 Stephenson Ridge       |               : acmwes@gsusgi2.gsu.edu    */
/* Stone Mountain, GA  30087  |               : 71005.1241@compuserve.com */
/* (404) 413-1957             |            CI$: 71005,1241                */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Who beat their swords into plowshares, will plow for those who didn't  */
/**************************************************************************/
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4608 comp.org.eff.talk:6938 alt.privacy:2191 talk.politics.guns:23982
From: ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 11 Nov 92 15:44:42 GMT

From: amirza@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Anmar Caves)
>In article <1992Nov10.044148.22135@netcom.com> gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
>>
>>>Or could it be that a ban
>>>on guns looks to be the quick fix, even though I have yet to see any
>>>evidence of its efficacy in reducing either homicide or other crimes of
>>>violence, or overall accidental deaths.
>>
>>Quick, I dunno. Sure wouldn't hurt. Let's give it a try.
>
>Wrong, it would hurt.  History has proven this time and time again.
>New York, Wash. DC, Chicago, all places that have banned guns and have
>the highest crime rates in the country, with the crime rates rising
>dramatically after the citizenry was unarmed.  History has also proven
>that the first steps in oppressing a populace is to disarm them.
> ...

Could we keep the pure gun talk to talk.politics.guns?  It sure doesn't fit
sci.crypt or comp.org.eff.talk, or even alt.privacy.

Thanks, Ron Sharp.
From: sysevm@nsrvan.vanc.wa.us
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Restrictions on Public Use of Crypto
Date: 9 Nov 92 18:49:44 GMT
Article-I.D.: nsrvan.1992Nov9.104944.45
Organization: National Systems & Research, Vancouver WA

In article <921108201101.251385@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>, WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL writes:
> 
> Dorothy Denning asks us to consider the following question:
> 
>>Do we really want a society where electronic communications cannot
>>ever be broken when there is good reason to believe some major threat
>>against society is being planned?
> 
> I suppose that she asks it sincerely, as though it were relevant.  
> 
> Of course it is not.  For better or worse, we already live in such a 
> world.  There is absolutely nothing in the proposals of the government
> or Dr. Denning that will change that. 
> 
> The question is do those of good will surrender the right to private
> communications in the name of a futile attempt to prevent those of ill
> will from having them?  Even if it would work, I would answer no.  Given 
> that it will not work, it is so silly that one wonders why it is raised
> at all.  Is it any wonder that one is made suspicious of the intentions
> of those that would make such proposals?  Even if the FBI were free from
> their record of abuse, I would still be suspicious of their motives.
> 
> I suspect that Dr. Denning is misled by the goodwill of the people with
> whom she works.  While I respect the integrity of the individual members 
> of the FBI and NSA with whom I work, my experience tells me that it is 
> not sufficient to protect me from the inertia and momentum of the 
> institutions.  The direction of these is at least oblique to the 
> intention of my friends that make them up.
> 
> I stand with Perry Metzger.  They can have my RSA key when they remove
> it from my gold tooth (where I plan to put it as soon as the technology
> permits.  In the meantime, they will play hell finding it (them)).
> 
> William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
> 49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
> 203 966 4769, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL


	Thanks William, This is just what I wanted to say.

	Let me add that at this period of human history we have the lowest
ability to keep our personal actions and communications from the 'governments'
than anytime ever. For DaVinchi just writing backwards was enough. A simple
cypher worked for the Ceasars, Face to face through a messenger was good for
Kings, Barons and merchants in the past. But now through technology (think of
Enigma) our ability to keep to ourselves has eroded to only face to face in
with great care. RSA is needed.

regards, Ethan
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4627 alt.privacy:2195 comp.org.eff.talk:6945
From: wlw2328@ultb.isc.rit.edu (W.L. Lance)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 11 Nov 92 23:14:10 GMT
Organization: Rochester Institute of Technology
Originator: wlw2328@ultb

Excuse my ingnorance, but I have neglected to read sci.crypt, and
alt.privacy for a few weeks and seem to have missed the core of the
key registration issue. Can someone please send or post a brief synopsis
for me? 

At what state is thos "proposal" if it is one.


Thanks,
Lance

-- 
*******************************************************************************
Lance Ware==wlw2286@ultb.isc.rit.edu           	         Mac and IBM Reseller
    Finger me for my PGP Public Key, I prefer receiving encrypted e-mail!
                     Continually computing fractals . . .
Newsgroups: sci.crypt