From: harrsen@parts.eng.ohio-state.edu (John Harrsen)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.iranian
Subject: Summer of Discontent
Date: 4 Sep 92 21:55:42 GMT
Article-I.D.: ee.1992Sep4.215542.18433
Organization: The Ohio State University

The following is an editorial which appeared in the July
issue of the Iran Liberation (News-letter of People's
Mojahedin). It deals with the recent uprisings in Iran and
their root causes. 

Asghar

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Anti-government protests throughout the country have
confronted the ruling mullahs with their most serious crisis
in recent years. Since the last days of May, when residents
of Mashad staged a massive demonstration, attacking all
government institutions in their path, Khomeini's heirs have
suffered a recurring nightmare of clashes, confrontations,
and mass protests.       

The official newspapers again feature headlines on
executions of dissidents and activists of the Resistance and
Mojahedin. Khamenei describes the protestors as "weeds"
which must be "eliminated," while Rafsanjani demands harsher
measures by suppressive forces and encourages the Islamic
Revolutionary Courts to "keep up the good work" issuing
death sentences for the arrested.       

In cities, Revolutionary Guards units known as Komiteh have
been separated from the police, with which they had merged,
and again independently organized. The regime has also
announced the formation of anti-riot brigades made up of
Pasdaron (Guards). Mass hangings and arrests as well as
various other tactics to intimidate the public ensure that
on the third anniversary of Khomeini's death, the regime he
left behind, albeit on its last legs, continues in
Rafsanjani's words, "to be governed by the Imam's spirit".        

The Mashad upheaval in May was the sixth major
anti-government demonstration nationwide since mid-April.
Unrest and clashes have continued through June in the
densely populated, impoverished sections of south Tehran.
Various other cities and regions, including Kurdistan and
Baluchistan, also saw frequent clashes between discontented
residents and Resistance supporters, and the mullahs'
repressive agent.        

The spread and persistence of these incidents, despite the
government crackdown, have set off alarm bells in Tehran.
The protests point clearly to nationwide organization and
direction, referred to by Rafsanjani as "organizational
contacts" between "our enemies within and our organized
enemies without."      

Rafsanjani was alluding to the Iranian Resistance's
strategy, made public last year, for the overthrow of the
mullahs' regime, i.e., to combine the anti-government
demonstrations and protests within Iran with the
concentrated military force of the National Liberation Army
of Iran. To this end, more than 600 demonstrations, strikes,
and protest acts were staged last year under the guidance of
the Resistance and Mojahedin forces.        

The continuing popular protest also demonstrate that the
intimidative edge of the clampdown is losing its keenness.
The wave of passivity among the Pasdaron, escalating trend
in Guards' resignations last year, and dismissals of "many
heads of law enforcement organs" for their failure to
suppress the Mashad demonstration depict the chaotic
internal state of the mullahs' regime.       

It is not inaccurate to assess the anti-government
demonstrations and unrest in Iran as rooted in the economic
crisis. Fifteen million unemployed in a country of 60
million, 50% inflation, and a daily income of less than a
dollar for 80% of the population undoubtedly fuel popular
unrest. Adding more fuel to the flames, social crises such
as government corruption, one million drug addicts, millions
of refugees and people without homes, and an assortment of
privations have brought the society to an explosive state.         

In and of themselves, however, the economic and social
problems cannot explain how and why popular demonstrations
which erupt over specific incidents are transformed within a
few hours into anti-government confrontations with enraged
protestors chanting "death to Rafsanjani and Khamenei" and
"hail to Rajavi and the Mojahedin!" The regime's leaders
correctly attribute the "political origins" of these clashes
to the Resistance and the Mojahedin.       

Popular indignation towards the ruling regime is at a peak,
and the presence of a nationwide, deeply rooted, and well
known Resistance, embodied by the Mojahedin and the National
Liberation Army, leads to the rapid politicizing of any
protest. The protestors' demand for the mullahs' overthrow
reflects the pivotal demand since 1981 of the Iranian
Resistance in its unrelenting confrontation with the
Khomeini regime. 

The mullahs believe, therefore, that the most effective and
"fundamental" approach to the current crisis is to strike at
the Resistance. Terrorist plots against the life of
Resistance Leader Massoud Rajavi and the April air raid on
one of the NLA's bases convey how seriously Tehran's rulers
view the threat from the Resistance. Official U.S. sources
have confirmed that the regime intends to launch another air
strike against the NLA, and Posdaron forces on the western
frontier have been put on full alert.

In Iran, the public chants for the mullahs' overthrow
endorse the course of action and solution put forth by the
Mojahedin. From the other side, the wave of executions and
brutal repression ordered by Rafsanjani - and condemned by
such bodies as the European Parliament and Amnesty
International - leave no illusions 8bout the moderation of
the mullahs' president. Rafsanjani has personally laid to
rest the naive perceptions of the April Majlis elections as
consolidating a new "trend toward moderation."        

"The radicals " in the delicate balance of power inherited
from Khomeini had served Rafsanjani well as scapegoats who
could be blamed for the failure of his economic policies ,
the persistence of executions and torture, and the terrorist
operations abroad. Compelled to sweep his rivals aside in
the April elections, Rafsanjani has left only himself to
blame for the regime's failures and crimes.

In the last days of his reign, the Shah told the Iranian
nation in a television address, "I have heard the sound of
your revolution. " The acknowledgment was too little, too
late; even the formidable military apparatus which had made
Iran the region's foremost military power could not save the
Shah. Thirteen years later, Rafsanjani is hearing the
message from Shiraz, Arak, Mashad, south Tehran , and
Tabriz. Fate is knocking at the door of Khomeini's hapless
successor. 
Newsgroups: soc.culture.iranian