HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: robert.heuman@rose.com (robert heuman)
Subject: Legal Stuff!
Organization: Rose Media Inc, Toronto, Ontario.
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 08:19:15 GMT
X-Gated-By: Usenet <==> RoseMail Gateway (v1.70)


Date Entered: 12-21-92 03:11
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) wrote:

S(> ripem was coded in the U.S. and uses DES. DES cannot be exported
S(> outside a few specific countries without a license which will not be
S(> granted by the U.S. authorities. Thus ripem is not legally available
S(> there. Since ripem's use of RSA's patented technology is licensed by
S(> RSA, it does not violate their patents in the U.S.

The irony of this is that DES is available world-wide anyway.  There 
is little difficult programming it, and therefore software 
implementations have been done, both inside and outside the US.  In 
addition, since DES in software is unacceptable for secure cyptology 
use, DES chips have been built.  One source was the USSR (now Russia). 
Other sources include Germany, Holland, etc. Hardware DES devices can 
be purchased from many countries as well, including Twaiwan, Canada, 
England, etc.  Therefore the effect of the COCOM and US rules is to 
deny the US chip maker a worldwide market, and instead give it to 
other nations.  DES is in use WORLDWIDE for financial transactions 
such as funds transfer, to protect the messages, and this use is even 
sanctioned by the US, so licenses are readily granted in this case, 
to almost anyone exporting to a Bank, anywhere in the world (or so I 
understand - anyone wanting to comment, feel free to jump in...). 
Therefore the point of the export restrictions on DES seems to have 
been lost along the way.

David, do not use DES as an example for RIPEM... unless you feel that 
the latter will end up as the former, around the world and widely 
available and used, export controls notwithstanding.

Bob
 
---
   RoseReader 1.70 P001886: This Canadian has an Opinion...His Own!
   RM 2.00 : RoseNet<=>Usenet Gateway : Rose Media 416-733-2285
From: dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin) 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Legal Stuff!
Date: 24 Dec 92 21:58:00 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: Advanced Computer Concepts BBS, New Rochelle, NY 914-654-1981
Reply-To: dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin) 

DS> .Instead, the way to handle it is to challenge the patent. As I understand
  > .it, the way you do that is by infringing, putting the patent holder
  > .on formal notice you are so doing, and then if he wishes, adjudicate
  > .the matter in court.

It would seem that, according to you, there are ample cases of
infringement, and these have been brought to the attention of PKP.  Has
PKP indicated in any way that they intend to bring action against a
user or possessor of PGP?

        D/
---
 . QMPro 1.0 41-3345 . Bring back A-N airways!!    Dick.Zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com
                                                              
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6059 alt.security.pgp:367
From: conners@cse.fau.edu (Sean Conner)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: 22 Dec 92 19:14:36 GMT
Organization: Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL, USA

In article <1992Dec17.002347.19216@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>In any case, the goverment may choose not to prosecute model makers
>but that's no assurance they won't prosecute crypto issues,
>particularly given their concern about those issues and the much
>greater damage secure cryptography can do to intelligence collection,
>compared to the damage from airplane models.

  I don't doubt that a secure cryptography system will damage intelligence 
collection (at least here in the US), but who is the Goverment exactly serving
by restricting the import/export/use of cryptography systems?  The citizens of
the US, or itself?

  It seems to me that the US Goverment wants to have its cake (having a secure
cryptography system for its use) and eat it too (by having everyone else use
a weaker system (including its citizens) so that it can gather "Intelligence"
to protect itself (or is it to protect the citizens? 8-)
>
>David

  -spc (for the list makers at the [FBI | NSA | CIA], my name is spelled
	S-E-A-N C-O-N ... )
From: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Motorola 'Secure-Clear' Cordless Telephones
Date: 2 Jan 1993 02:31:05 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)
Reply-To: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
NNTP-Posting-Host: hela.ins.cwru.edu


>     Yes, technically, it is a felony for you to use a speech-
>inversion descrambler to monitor these Motorola 'Secure Clear'
>cordless. Or for that matter, the new Radio Shack DUoPHONE ET-499,
>cordless phone which also depends on speech-inversion for privacy
>protection.  The public utility of the ECPA has been argued about

     Excellent point here.  The very simple point is that having some
basic scrambling of the signal is better than not at all!  The person
person having a scanner wwhose intentions is to eavdrop could face possible
consequences according to the law.  This reason alone makes having some
simple, basic private feature of scrambling well worth the few extra
bucks!  However, the question of how good the security one gets, surely
is not the best unless one wants to pay big bucks.
	I bought a Motorola Model 100, the first model of the series, that
offers the privacy feature spoken above.  I am very pleased with the phone,
since it is half the size of my older AT&T 5300, but has 10 channels to
scan instead of the three.  But also, it does have a 3 volume level control
for amplication of received signals which is a big plus for me, since I am
hard of hearing and wear hearing aids --- also, it is hearing-aid compatible,
which some cordless phones are not.
>     Despite the ECPA, it is unconscionable to me that Motorola --
>who surely knows better-- would produce the slick brochure &
>specifically market the 'Secure Clear' line as being invulnerable
>to eavesdropping.   Their wording unequivocally gives the
>impression that the 'Secure Clear' conversations are secure, not
>only from other cordless phone & baby monitors, which have several
>common frequencies, but also against communications hobbyists with
>scanner radios.
> 
	Another good point.  However, I had asked AT&T if they plan to
come out this year with a cordless phone having some kind of privacy feature,
they said no.  I don't think Motorola was trying to fool me; I knew what
this was and was very basic scrambling of the signal.  But again, having it,
for at least the reason listed above, makes it worth it.

>manuals.  The Tropez 900 actually seems to generate a very weak 
>analog harmonic in the 440MHz spectrum, but you'll still be a
>lot better off than poor old Lee Trevino.
>
>
	What specfic information does the Tropez 900 have? How does it
compare in price to the Motorola or Radio Shack Model?  Are we talking about
$150-$200 for a basic model or $400-600?

>
>-- 
> Tim Tyler      Internet: tim@ais.org  MCI Mail: 442-5735 
>P.O. Box 443    C$erve: 72571,1005  DDN: Tyler@Dockmaster.ncsc.mil
>Ypsilanti MI    Packet: KA8VIR @KA8UNZ.#SEMI.MI.USA.NA
>48197
>

-- 

Dan Frezza
Internet: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle)
Subject: Re: Enigma, ULTRA
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 20:16:39 GMT

ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes:
>Does anyone know of any technical description in the open literature
>of the work done at Bletchley Park during WW2?  There doesn't seem to
>be much information in Kahn's _Codebreakers_, but as that was
>published in 1967 I'm not very surprised.

      Read "Turing - The Enigma" for a biography of Turing and a general
discussion of life and work at Bletchley Park.  "Ultra Goes to War"
and "The Ultra Secret" discuss the military implications.  If you can
find it, "Modern Machine Cryptography" describes exactly how the work
at Bletchley Park was done, with photos of the gear and BASIC programs
so you can simulate a bombe.  I've heard that a bombe has been shown
at the Smithsonian (it may be in storage at the moment; they have far
more stuff than museum space).

      There's a movie deal in this somewhere.

					John Nagle

ps:   No, I'm not going to look up the authors and publishers for people.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Legal Stuff!
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 22 Dec 92 17:36:58 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Dec22.015459.21651@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>In article <a_rubin.724977120@dn66> a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:

>>(2>) We've gone through this.  I haven't tracked the exception to the
>>exception to the exceptions in the regulations, but it is unclear whether
>>"public domain" (meaning essentially, published) crypto software is covered
>>by ITAR.

>" It would be useless to continue this given that you seem to be
>making this up as you go along. I've quoted the law that says PKP is
>covered, and if you claim an exception to an exception you have to
>produce it. Since you seem not to know what it says, and the specific
>definition of "public domain" in the exception is critical to the
>discussion I'm at a loss to how to continue. The obligation is on me
>to produce the law backing my assertions and I've done so. The ball
>is now in your court.

You have not produced the law....you have produced the regulations. 
Legally, the obligation would be on me to produce the law, to show that the
regulations are not consistent with the law, but I don't feel any moral
obligation to do so.  I may get around to it.
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)
Subject: Re: Stupid question time.
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
Date: Sun, 27 Dec 1992 23:24:24 GMT

In article <1992Dec22.222639.26141@cbfsb.cb.att.com> osan@cbnewsb.cb.att.com (Mr. X) writes:
>Would multiple encryptions add to the level of security of, say, a PK system
>like RSA or a knapsack scheme?  What I mean is to encrypt the clear text and

I will talk only about knapsack, as I am currently having literature around
which covers that facette :-)
It seems that, although first rated computationally infaisible (before
Shamir did show a way to break specifc single-iterated knapsacks), Ernie
Brickwell broke a knapsack-system of 40 iterations and hundred weights
in the cargo-vector. (Taking about 1 hour of cray-1 CPU) 
E.F. Brickwell  "Breaking iterated knapsacks" Procedings of Crypto '84
(vol 12, pp. 342-358)
I do not know how much knapsack could be 'strengthened' by using independant
keys for each iteration, but I assume knapsack is _broken_.

>then encrypt the encrypted text, probably with a different key.  If encryption

With different keys. Using the same key more than once could cause trouble.
(I guess the resulting operation would not be weaker than an only-once
encryption, but does not actually need to be stronger!)
Somebody with more theoretical knowledge, please tell us why this is so ;-)

But I _guess!_ that using different keys, and the encryption mechanism NOT
being a group (wasn't there some posting about multiple DES - encryptions
which talked about the possible problems which did not rise in DES?) you
actually create a wider keyspace.

>offer the equivalent of encryption with very large keys (say, >10000 digits).

At which computational costs ? I guess the method is good and slow .-)

Don't take me for an expert, I am only doing this for fun, and speculating
here.
Friendly greetings & a happy new year,

	/gec



p.s. there are no stupid questions. only stupid answers :-)

-- 
Instruments register only through things they're designed to register.
Space still contains infinite unknowns.

Germano Caronni    caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch
From: bill@power.network.com (Bill O'Hanlon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: 21 Dec 92 17:33:26 GMT
Reply-To: bill@power.network.com
Organization: Network Systems Corporation

In article 13537@netcom.com, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Jyrki (apt name) posts another anti-U.S. screed in which he says that
>I must have been referring to violence done by the U.S. government



I fail to understand how someone who constantly harps on ethics could possibly
have written the above message and expect anyone to pay attention to him.  Rude
name calling is never ethical.  And ethical behavior has consistency as a firm
basis.

Continue to post, by all means, Mr. Sternlight.  If we can't have a reasonable 
discussion on cryptography, then perhaps we can settle for watching you discredit
yourself.
---
Bill O'Hanlon               Network Systems Corporation
bill@network.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tim@ais.org (Tim Tyler)
Subject: Re: VTECH's encrypting wireless phone
Organization: UMCC
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 08:36:21 GMT

In article <1hoqavINN162@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>
>I looked at Motorola's encrypting wireless phone at the store -- heard
>what "encrypted" voice sounds like -- and could recognize the voice,
>so it's not nearly secure enough.  I haven't seen, but have a brochure
>for, VTECH's encrypting wireless phone -- with digital transmission
>between handset and base.  So I called them up and asked what they use
>for encryption.  They refused to tell me....wouldn't even tell me the number
>of bits of key for the algorithm.
>
   This Spring, I was able to have a discussion with a senior executive of 
VTECH, I asked him about the codecs & encryption.  It was a situation where
I had a 'need to know,' & if I recall correctly, he indicated that while the
Tropez was (vo)CODED over to digital, it was NOT encrypted!  This
contradicts information which comes with the Tropez 900s, but such things
don't surprise me any more, after the blatant lies Motorola made about their
speech-inverted 'Secure-Clear' line.
 
  Perhaps the VTECH marketing staff made the typical assumption that 'coded'
is synonomous with 'encrypted' or 'enciphered.'

   I can't see VTECH or any ofthe other developers of 900MHz codec'ed
cordless phones spending too much time on cryptographic protection for these
phones.  For the moment, it would be a lot simpler to intercept the Tropez
conversation via physical tapping, & physical tapping would also defeat any
crypto on the cordless phone RF circuit.   Only the idiots at Motorola's
Consumer Products Division have warranted that their cordless phone is
actually 'secure.'  That's pretty pathetic, since they use analog
voice-inversion when there are a variety of digital codec'ed,
direct-sequence spread-spectrum cordless phones out on the market!


>Does anyone out there know details of VTECH's encryption?  At the
>price they're asking ($350), they can afford to do at least 1 round of
>DES-CBC, but I'm sure they don't.  If they did, they would have told
>me.
>
>-- 
>-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
>-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
>-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
>-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488


-- 
 Tim Tyler      Internet: tim@ais.org  MCI Mail: 442-5735 
P.O. Box 443    C$erve: 72571,1005  DDN: Tyler@Dockmaster.ncsc.mil
Ypsilanti MI    Packet: KA8VIR @KA8UNZ.#SEMI.MI.USA.NA
48197
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: LUC vs. RSA
Date: 2 Jan 93 21:43:30 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: scss3.cl.msu.edu
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Sean Casey (csc@pilot.njin.net) wrote:
: Could someone please post a few details of LUC instead of bickering
: over where it's exportable/importable or not.

Here is a repost of my original posting on LUC.
Note that rpub.cl.msu.edu now has an archive of past sci.crypt
postings.

Subject: LUC Public-key Encryption
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Summary: New public-key algorithm from New Zealand
Keywords: 

The January 1993 issue of Dr. Dobb's Journal has an article by
Peter Smith on a new public-key encryption algorithm called LUC.
This algorithm, based on "Lucas sequences", resembles RSA in
that it involves modular arithmetic based on N, the product of two 
large primes, and a second number, e.

A Lucas sequence, V[i](P,Q), is defined as follows.  P is the message
to encrypt.  Q is an integer that is always set to 1 for our purposes.

   V[0] = 2
   V[1] = P
   V[n+1] = P*V[n] - Q*V[n-1]

The ciphertext P' = V[e](P,1) mod N.  
The plaintext  P  = V[d](P',1) mod N.

The public key component is [N, e].  The secret component is d,
which is computed based on e and the prime factorization of N.

The author, who is also the inventor of the LUC algorithm,
claims that it is at least as fast as RSA and is more secure
because it is more resistant to adaptive chosen-message forgery.

Not surprisingly, the author is attempting to patent the system
and is looking for people to license it to.  A provisional patent
has been obtained.  It is not clear whether this patent applies
to New Zealand or to the United States, or both.

The author's American partner can be contacted as:

   Horace R. Moore
   101 E. Bonita
   Sierra Madre, CA   91024

For more information, see the article.

Mark R.
From: todd@palomar.tivoli.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: MD5 as an encryption engine?
Date: 30 Dec 92 03:48:21 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: Tivoli Systems, Inc.


Once again I've seen a reference to the fact that protocols relying on
MACs (message authentication codes) are preferable to those using
private key encryption mechanisms like DES.  The claim is that
libraries containing APIs to MAC mechanisms, like MD5, are exportable
because they don't fall under the munition regulations.

Isn't it a simple matter to use an algorithm like MD5 to produce a
very strong cipher?  Although there are lots of possibilities,
something like the following should work well

        Y[0] = MD5(K^R)
        Y[n] = X[n] ^ MD5(K^Y[n-1])

where X[1..n] are the blocks of plaintext and Y[0..n] are the
resulting ciphertext blocks, ^ is exclusive or, and R is just some
random value.  MD5 can be replaced by other strong hashing functions
or one-way functions.  It has been conjectured that MD5 is strong,
i.e. that for a given value V, finding a K such that V = MD5(K) 
takes on the order of 2**128 operations.

If the conjecture about MD5 is true then the resulting encryption
should be stronger than DES; furthermore, MD5 is much faster than DES.

So why is MD5 exportable and why couldn't it be used as a replacement
for DES?  (Of course there is the obvious reason that there hasn't
been as much time to study it.)








--

Todd
-- 
Todd Smith                                     TIVOLI Systems, Inc.
todd@tivoli.com                                6034 West Courtyard Dr.
                                               Suite 210
(512) 794-9070 [794-0623 fax]                  Austin, TX   78730
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: weaver@kuttner.sfc.sony.com (Eric Weaver)
Subject: Re: Legal Stuff!
Organization: SONY Advanced Video Technology Center San Jose, CA USA
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 23:29:52 GMT


In article <1992Dec22.215815.3172@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
|> Since I don't like to argue for argument's sake

;-}

|> 2. For RIPEM's cryptographic components (DES and RSAREF) to somehow
|> be rewritten de novo outside the U.S. to be consistent with national
|> crypto and patent laws, thus permitting communications between the
|> U.S. version of RIPEM and any other.
|> [...]
|> I suspect 2. is unlikely without some illegal export from the U.S.

Oh really?!

Think about it!  DES is available Out There.  RSA is available Out There.
The PEM documents are available Out There.  All one has to do is send
a few RIPEM encrypted messages Out There for someone to figure out the
necessary glue for a RIPEM clone.  It's NOT that hard to reverse engineer.

Whoever does will have made a legal means of private mail exchange with 
subjects of the USGovernment, which could be worth the effort to someone
who needs same.
-- 
Eric Weaver  Sony AVTC  677 River Oaks Pkwy, MS 35  SJ CA 95134  408 944-4904
& Chief Engineer, KFJC 89.7 Foothill College, Los Altos Hills CA 94022
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 20:11:57 GMT


Steven Brewer's analogy between crypto and medical knowledge is
incomplete.  It's true that how to heal people in general is not on
the munitions list (but see below), but some aspects of how to make
them sick (i.e.  chemical and biological weapons) is.

So are some healing technologies, particularly some specialized
antidotes to the above.

Thus those aspects of medical knowledge having significant comparative
military advantage ARE on the munitions list, just as is crypto.

I'm not defending, just reporting. No flames about how bad CBW is,
please.

David

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: jap@cbnews.cb.att.com (james.a.parker)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: AT&T
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 15:55:28 GMT

In article <1992Dec21.075152.13537@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Jyrki (apt name) posts another anti-U.S. screed in which he says that
>I must have been referring to violence done by the U.S. government
>when I talk about lives lost or saved by cryptography during the war.
>[...]
>This is not the first time Jyrki has ignored the facts in order to flog
>his anti-American views, and it will doubtless not be the last.

Mr. Sternlight:

Jyrki may not be an American native or citizen, but he has a grasp of U.S.
law and history that probably would put him in the 95th percentile of
U.S. citizens.  He is not at all anti-American, just anti-American government
-- a position which is both sensible and admirable.

You have just lost what little credibility you may have had with me.

                                     James Parker
                                     jap@cb1focus.att.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt