HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 07:27:31 GMT

In article <1992Sep28.202810.110716@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:

>Step back a moment, and imagine that you are a computer which has been
>programmed/learned to be conscious.  (Assume that the structure of the
>program is enough like the way the brain works that it is *really*
>conscious, not just "faking" it -- I think "faking" it is impossible in the
>real world, but I could be wrong.  N.B. This note is not directed at those
>who believe real AI to be impossible; but based on his postings, I doubt
>that Mr. Chalmers falls into this category.)  You ask, "what are my qualia"?
>They are the interactions of your self (a portion of a computer program
>running on a computer) with the outside world.  "But why do I feel them?"
>Because you are this system, and feeling is part of what you do.  What other
>kind of explanation is even conceivable for such questions?

To say my qualia *are* the interaction of the program with the world
is to beg the question.  Certainly that may be where they come from.
"Feeling is part of what I do".  Well, what I *do* consists of
certain computations, and reactions, and the like -- it's not even
obvious why all this computation should be accompanied by a "feeling"
at all.  A lot of people think that it wouldn't be; I think that it
would, but that's a contingent hypothesis.  The people that deny
that a computer would feel are at least making a logically possible
hypothesis.

What other sort of explanation?  Well, if it's to be a physicalist
explanation, it must be an explanation of why the presence of qualia
is entailed by the computational organization of the system.  Consider
by analogy an explanation of learning -- we'd explain how, by virtue
of the computational organization, the system's behaviour adapts to
its environment in response to stimuli and the like, and we'd then
say, that's all it *means* to be "learning".  If you can give such
an explanation for consciousness, good luck (but beware of simply
*redefining* consciousness to be an ability to react in a certain
way).

If one gives up on physicalism, all sorts of explanations are possible.
In particular, one can simply admit the existence of qualia as a brute
fact, much as the physicists admits the existence of matter as a brute
fact, and then try to systematize the relation between qualia and the
physical.  I note that this is the strategy taken by so biologically
grounded a figure as Gerald Edelman in his latest book.  He admits
that one can't derive the existence of qualia from any physical theory;
one simply has to "assume" them, and then one can go about theorizing
about them.  He doesn't call his position "dualism", but that seems
to be merely a matter of terminology.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 92 09:43:33 GMT

In article <1992Oct1.220055.20934@kurango.cit.gu.edu.au>, tjdavis@kurango.cit.gu.edu.au (Tim Davis) writes:
|> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
|> 
|> >In article <1992Sep30.010007.21214@leland.Stanford.EDU> ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards) writes:
|> 
|> >>Second, it
|> >>seems advantageous to be conscious of pain (i.e. be able to think about it)
|> >>so that one can figure out why one is in pain. That way one can avoid similar
|> >>situations in the future, or one can choose to ignore the pain if the
|> >>situation requires. 
|> 
|> >There are chess programs which manage to figure out why they are in
|> >check, can learen how to avoid it in future, put up with it if
|> >neceessary for some greater purpose, etc., all without needing to be
|> >conscious of being in check. 
|> >-- 
|> 
|> I am somewhat confused by the second comment.  If in fact the chess
|> programs have no need to be conscious of being in check then what is
|> 'it' that they are trying 'to figure out why they are in', what is 'it'
|> they will 'put up with if necessary for some greater purpose'?  The
|> game must be conscious of 'something' in order to develop these other
|> tendencies.

Yes, good point. What is the test for consciousness? Consciousness
is "awareness" of self and environment. What working definition
of awareness can we use? Is it just that the entity in question must have a
particular state associated with all stimuli it recieves? How complete
must this awareness be? If I am only "aware" of a single cell in my body
am I conscious? If something is aware of its environment but not of itself
is it conscious? How about if it is aware of itself but not of its envirnment?

Does consciousness require that one part of a brain/state-machine be
independent and aware of another part? If this is the case then I would think
that this awareness would have to be "non-deterministic" otherwise we could just
consider the 2 pieces as one. That is, the state of the monitor must be at
times be independent of the monitored part but at other times dependent on it.

So many questions, so few answers...

On a slightly different subject, if one were to continuously wear stereo LCD
goggles that switched say red and blue would one eventually experience blue as
red?

Larry Edwards
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: The Cosmological Bad Dream
From: snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Date: Fri, 02 Oct 92 23:51:37 PDT
Organization: NetLink Online Communications, San Diego CA

miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:

> I'm a linguist, and though you might think linguistics has little
> relevance to the issue you raised, I think it does.  The problem in
> the public's perception of cosmology is that the public takes
> what scientists say about the universe as a set of *assertions*
> while the speech act that cosmologists are actually performing is
> that of *assumption* or *working assumption.*  The difference is
> important.
> 

      The new physics is long past questions of working assumptions,
when generations of scientists have come and gone utilizing those same
assumptions. Certain principles become so ingrained they are taken
as true, and if you argue that they are just assumptions you will
provoke some heated debate -- even amoungst philosophers -- as Kuhn
and others have shown. There is a strong desire to see science as a
window on absolute truth at any given time, with the modest admission
that the window might not be perfectly transparent. This is 
understandable amoungst lab techs, but unfortunately is prevalent
on all levels. As many people are beginning to realize, there is
alot to be gained from a study of the sociology of science, not to
mention the linguistics.


> -- 
> ********************************** +.............................+
> *- Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>* :All opinions expressed herein:
> *There is no privileged position.* :are my own and are not to be :
> *	-God, Derrida, others    * : attributed to my employer   :
> ********************************** +.............................+


      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net (mail)]

--                    
INTERNET:  snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
UUCP:   ...!ryptyde!netlink!snodgras
NetLink Online Communications * Public Access in San Diego, CA (619) 453-1115
From: ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards)
Subject: Re: STRUCTURE OF TIME (at numerous requests)
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 92 22:46:10 GMT

In article <1992Sep28.091054.1@tnclus.tele.nokia.fi>, hporopudas@tnclus.tele.nokia.fi writes:
|> 
|>      In the end of this conversation I would like to remind to all readers
|>    that I have tried to be only as accurate clerk in this matter as possible.
|>      And because this inhuman and hostile environment of science to amateurs
|>    I have some doubts that will Hanna-Maria ever become scientist when
|>    she grows up. This kind of hostile and unhuman environment could injure
|>    her seriously.
|> 
|> 
|>           Hannu.
|> 
|>      "I think that atheistic scientists are fully reponsible for ordinary
|>    peoples sufferings in all over the world, when they have instructed them
|>    to reject God's good doctirine given in The Holy Bible. This doctrine
|>    teaches ordinary people to respect good. Now this kind of respection
|>    does not exist and good peoples who respect good are considered to be mads.
|>    You all "wise scientists" should know that this means only one thing,
|>    namely that all kind of evil will be in full power in all around the world."

Well, first of all, as someone else also pointed out, far more mental and
physical pain has been inflicted upon "ordinary" people in the name of the
holy bible than ever was done in the name of science.

Second, scientists (atheistic or otherwise) do not teach people to
reject the good doctrine in the holy bible ... they teach people to reject
the "bad" doctrine in the holy bible. That is, things like adam&eve and the
age of the earth etc. Scientists do not in general teach people to reject
teachings like thou shalt not kill etc. And frankly, the atheists that I
know are some of the most considerate, kindest, humblest, thoughtful people
I have ever met. They just happen to base there moral values on an empathy
for their fellow human beings rather than on what some religion tells them
they must believe.


Larry Edwards
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jackson@soldev.tti.com (Dick Jackson)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Transaction Technology Inc.
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 20:02:38 GMT

David Chalmers writes:
>An evolutionary story will be able to tell you why a
>particular brain structure evolved, but about the further
>("philosophical") question, it has nothing to say.  This alone of
>course doesn't refute physicalism -- it simply means that the
>physicalist has more work to do (i.e., give an account of how this
>sort of brain structure and function could entail the existence of
>qualia).

I would like to hear your opinion on how qualia, etc. came into being. I,
and others here I think) find it satisfying to hold that our mental states
have evolved to enhance our fitness in an exactly parallel way to our
obviously physical parts. In other words, my introspection, my
model of your mental states, my feeling of embarassment when you point
out my error of logic, all make me function in a superior way to a being
physically similar to myself, but having, perhaps, just a sort of
"robotic" approach to survival, food gathering, etc. Further, my kind of
consciousness is the best possible for my kind of species (it it were not,
better fitted rival models would have chased it out of the competition
hundreds of generations ago).

If you can't go along with this position, then how would you speculate
that human consciousness did arise? Unless you take the extreme view
that every collection of atoms has some level of consciousness,
presumably it must spring forth at some level of system complexity. Do
we allow that slugs are conscious? Rats? Dogs? Apes?

The evolutionary view has answers for these questions -- it seems to me
that any other position is the weaker unless it can provide answers of at
least similar plausibilty.

Obviously we cannot (yet?) explain how the physical leads to the mental,
but I claim that is analogous to asking someone who is using a computer
with a multi-tasking real-time system with multiple I/O channels to
explain the cause of a particular glitch in terms of the quantum mechanics
of its silicon transistors.  It is, in a practical sense, impossible --
despite the fact that at each level of the machine's construction we do
have a complete physical/logical understanding of the processes involved.
I find it quite plausible to suppose that computers in a few years time
will be effectively non-deterministic as far as the user is concerned.
To find out why it did certain things, we will have to ask it!  Running a
diagnostic will then be very much like asking "How are you FEELING
today?".

Dick Jackson
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 00:51:56 GMT

In article <Bv9AIx.HBz@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Sep25.145109.20168@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

RH:
>>Show me a point of difference between my conscious experiences and the
>>cor[r]elated physical events in my brain.

DC:
>Just about anything -- e.g. the blueness of my blue-experiences.

It would be useful to me if you could expand on this a bit.  For
certainly the experience of 475 nanometer electromagnetic radiation
has to feel like something to us (since we "feel" everything we
experience), and we happen to label this something blueness.  Are you
seeking an explanation of why blue light isn't experienced as,
say, pain?  For that I think we would have to turn to the evolutionary
development of the brain.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tjdavis@kurango.cit.gu.edu.au (Tim Davis)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 92 22:00:55 GMT

cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <1992Sep30.010007.21214@leland.Stanford.EDU> ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards) writes:

>>Second, it
>>seems advantageous to be conscious of pain (i.e. be able to think about it)
>>so that one can figure out why one is in pain. That way one can avoid similar
>>situations in the future, or one can choose to ignore the pain if the
>>situation requires. 

>There are chess programs which manage to figure out why they are in
>check, can learen how to avoid it in future, put up with it if
>neceessary for some greater purpose, etc., all without needing to be
>conscious of being in check. 
>-- 

I am somewhat confused by the second comment.  If in fact the chess
programs have no need to be conscious of being in check then what is
'it' that they are trying 'to figure out why they are in', what is 'it'
they will 'put up with if necessary for some greater purpose'?  The
game must be conscious of 'something' in order to develop these other
tendencies.


-- 

=============================================================
Timothy J Davis                 Email:  tjdavis@cit.gu.edu.au
Lecturer
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Fri, 02 Oct 1992 20:27:07 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Oct1.132338.13735@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>I also don't believe that mental states are determined by physical
>states. I believe that the relationship between a mental state and the
>corresponding physical state to be something like the relationship
>between an algorithm and a corresponding implementation, or the
>relationship between a theory and its models.

Two very different analogies.  I *can* in principle determine the algorithm
from the implementation (although there may be cases where I am not smart
enough to do so).  But it is not in general possible to determine the theory
from the model.[1]

I think the first is the better analogy, and that mental states can be
determined from the physical states.


[1] It *may* be possible in principle to determine the theory from *all* the
models, but you have to define "theory" just right to make this true.  At
which point it becomes a tautology.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 00:21:20 GMT

In article <Bv9BKL.IIs@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>Well, this seems to be the net.physicalist.position.of.choice.  Qualia
>just *are* physical events; don't ask why.  Unfortunately, it's
>entirely unsatisfactory.  For this position to be any good, you have to
>provide some reason why God couldn't have created a world with isomorphic
>physical events, but no qualia.

Thought is a physical event with physical effects, some of them externally
visible.  The physical events represented by qualia could not be subjects
of thought if there were no qualia.

>                                            Either way, the call for
>an entailment relation (or alternatively, the call for an explanation
>of why qualia exist at all) is being evaded entirely.

Surely qualia exist (i.e. evolved) so as to allow the physical sensory
input to become a component of thought.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: ledwards@leland.Stanford.EDU (Laurence James Edwards)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 92 01:00:07 GMT

Interesting discussion, I didn't catch the start so I apologize if I
repeat what others have said.

In article <1992Sep29.130441.29896@sophia.smith.edu>, orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
|> In article <Bv9vGp.Ax3@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
|> 
|> >Precisely what needs to be explained is why that [blue] radiation "feels"
|> >like anything at all -- i.e. why that all physical processing is
|> >accompanied by an experiential feel [...] 
|> >There is also the secondary question
|> >of why it feels like *that* rather than like *this* -- it seems
|> >perfectly coherent that our blue experiences and red experiences
|> >could be systematically inverted, for instance. [...]
|> >Evolution is irrelevant to the question of why *this* physical
|> >s[t]ructure gives rise to *this* experiential feel.
|> 
|> We seem to be getting to the crux of the dispute here, not only
|> between you and other netters, but between e.g. Dennett & Block (say).
|> So let's pursue this further.
|> 
|> You want an explanation of two facts:
|> 
|> 	1. Why we feel at all.
|> 	2. Why it feels like this rather than like that.
|> 
|> Despite your rejection of evolution, I believe it can give a type
|> of answer to both.  We feel because it is evolutionarily advantageous
|> to experience pain, to have our pulse quicken at sharp sounds, etc.
|> And perhaps it is neurologically most efficient for these survival
|> advantages to be implemented via experiential feel, rather than
|> zombie reactions.

Well I don't know about neurological efficiency, but it seems that
evolutionarily speaking it might be advantageous to have a non-zombie
reaction to pain stimuli. First of all, pain stimuli are often associated with
situations where you need to flee or fight, in both cases the body needs
to be in a fairly high metabolic state; elevated heart rate etc. Second, it
seems advantageous to be conscious of pain (i.e. be able to think about it)
so that one can figure out why one is in pain. That way one can avoid similar
situations in the future, or one can choose to ignore the pain if the
situation requires. 

|> 	Why this rather than that may again answer to what is
|> most advantageous and most efficient:  there is some sense to
|> experiencing blue as darker than red, since it *is* darker;
|> so inverting blue and red might weaken other cues of the experiential
|> feel, other uses.  So perhaps inverted spectra are perfectly possible,
|> but just not a wise use of neurological resources.

This reminds me of the experiment where some guy wore image inverting goggles
for an extended period of time. After a week or two the world seemed right
side up with the goggles on and upside down with them off. His sense of up and
down eventually returned to normal after he stopped wearing the goggles.

Larry Edwards
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 20:16:32 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Sep29.155432.17618@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>In article <1992Sep28.203519.133337@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>Do you think how it feels has no behavioral consequences?  Would you behave
>>as you do if your blue experiences and your pain experiences were
>>systematically inverted?
>
>My answer to this is "Yes" if you replace "pain" with "red" above; I
>think the answer is still "Yes" to the question as you have posed it,
>but the exchange you propose, unlike the "blue" for "red" exchange, is
>impossible to imagine.  Don't confuse the bare experience of "pain"
>(of various kinds) with the automatic reactions to pain.

Why not?  Convince me that there is a difference.  I can't imagine feeling
pain without the accompanying desire/need to do something about it.  It
seems to me to be the essence of what feeling pain means.

It is easier to imagine the red/blue interchange, because red and blue are
rather similar feelings, and ones don't have nearly as strong behavioral
implications. But I think there are differences in behavior caused by the
differences in the feelings in this case, too.  They're subtle; but pretty
much everyone agrees that red is a "hot" or "active" color, while blue is a
"cool" or "passive" color.  I don't think this is a purely conditioned
response -- babies seem to react the same way.

(BTW, I am *not* assuming that all people have the same feelings in response
to the same stimuli.  Brain structures are similar, but not identical; one
would expect similar but non-identical feelings.  And that is exactly what
happens, as far as we can tell.)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 92 07:11:00 GMT
Organization: Self

In article <Bv9A9w.H13@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

DC:
>>>(2) Our reports of our conscious states, by and large, accurately
>>>reflect those states.

KM:
>>You realize of course, that your theory which uses a functional
>>explanation of why we *think* we have qualia regardless of whether we
>>actually *do*, violates your 2nd principle of plausibility.

DC:
>Not so.  Nothing in my position implies that our reports of
>consciousness don't accurately reflect the contents of our consciousness.

Then I'm still misunderstanding your position.  If the functional
organization of our brains gives rise to an "explanation" of why we
report having qualia, but whether we actually do or not is a
contingent further fact which might not be the case in some alternate
universe, then the fact that we actually do have qualia is logically
independent of what we are bound to say.  In other words, our reports
of consciousness might not accurately reflect the contents of our
consciousness (even though I think in this case they do).  Perhaps I
have a faulty notion of what "logical independence" means.
Or perhaps logical independence is irrelevant to principle (2), and
you're simply stating what you believe to be an empirical fact.

>It's just that the relation between these two isn't as simple as
>billiard-ball causation.

I don't know what you mean by billard-ball causation, but apparently
it's not important anyway.  So far we've been discussing logical
entailment (you say there isn't any) and the nomological character of
supervenience (you say that's what we have).  So let's talk some more
on just what is the relation between these two.

>See my postings on the coherence of the
>explanatory bases of both consciousness and claims about consciousness;
>this notion of "coherence" is motivated precisely by principle (2)
>above.

(Details requested by email.)

-- 
Kevin McCarty (kmc@netcom.com)