From: jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re:  Opinion on Japan being "forced" to attack the U.S.
Summary: There might have been a chance of victory
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:26:51 GMT
Followup-To: sci.military
Organization: Statistics, Pure & Applied Mathematics, University of Adelaide


From Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>


In article <BxB8ot.L8K@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.) writes:

>From HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)

>Joseph Askew writes:
>> I am afraid this line of argument does do much for me. If the US was going
>> be much stronger as time went on and the Japanese had no way of making the
>> US talk peace then it would have been insanity to think the US might decide
>> to talk. What would the US have to gain by doing so? Nothing! So why did the
>> Japanese alledgedly think they might? Was there ever one US military commander
>> who advocated a surrender in 1942? I have never heard of one and if there was
>> one was he sacked the next day? Japan was not capable of threatening the West
>> Coast, she barely managed Hawaii and as has been said could not land there if
>> she wanted to. Exactly why would the Japanese have any reason to expect a
>> peace settlement? Again is there much evidence of the Japanese high command
>> actually thinking the US might surrender? I haven't seen any although there
>> might be some.

>  Frankly, I have found some your points somewhat puzzling.  You have maintain-
>ed that Japan had no desire for war with the US, that FDR wouldn't have minded
>one in the least, that the Japanese knew full well what they were getting into,
>etc., etc.

Actually I didn't say they knew full well what they were getting into - I
don't think they knew about Hiroshima or the firebombing of Tokyo. Both of
these events might have given them second thoughts.

>  I think we all might agree that Japan felt war (with America) was required
>in order to maintain its conquests in China and elsewhere.  But at this point
>things break down.  If Japan felt the war was a long shot at best, why attack?
>Especially if they knew they had no real hope of a US surrender?  It has not
>been demonstrated to me (by you) that they even felt they might "get lucky".
>Such apparent irrationality would seem to fly in the face of these supposedly
>(as you, Mr. Askew, have presented them) sober military leaders ALL (or nearly
>all) being well aware of the almost-certain doom they faced.

>  Why not simply give up what you felt you were bound to lose anyway, and save
>a lot of Japanese lives, the Navy, chances at remaining a Great Power, etc.?
>I suspect there were other ways to avoid the humiliation -- like my East Indies
>idea, below.

If the Japanese gave up in 1941 there was no chance of them remaining a Great
Power. From China they could strike and obtain the resources they needed (but
no keep them of course) from Korea or worse they could not. To have backed
down would have meant the US could strangle their economy and bring them to
the point of starvation at will. I have seen nothing to indicate the US would
not do so if electorally popular( :-) Spot the low blow, sorry about this but
I couldn't resist it) besides an assumption about the friendly nature of any
other country is a poor basis for a foreign policy over the long term. The
greatest reason was probably that the people in charge were raised in the 'no
surrender' Samurai tradition and that trying and failing was better than not
trying at all etc etc. Besides maybe they might have won! (not that they could
but it is always nice to look on the bright side)

>  While I suspect that Japan would have preferred to be allowed to muck about
>in China unmolested by Western powers, they WERE finally called on the carpet
>about it by the US (hypocritical act or not), and enforced by the embargo.  And
>given the choice between giving up their mini-Empire and war, they chose war.

Fine, I am glad to see you are in agreement with me! I guess you accept my
main point which is that the US put Japan in a spot where War was the only
acceptable option then. What you have said immediately implies that Japan
was not the group of crazed Fascists who struck at a peacable US going about
its daily business without a care in the world! The US was in there getting
its hands dirty and should not be suprised when other people get annoyed about
their meddling.

>  I wonder if the US would have intervened if Japan had struck the East Indies
>first (and only) instead of Pearl and the Phillipines.  Anybody got any ideas?
>Maybe.  But I wonder if the support he wanted from the people would have been
>there.  I dunno.  Seems like a REALLY big gamble on FDR's part to get into
>the war on Germany.  You know, get Japan to commit suicide by attacking first,
>then hope Germany declares war...

The answer is clearly yes. Roosevelt clearly stated to the Japanese that any
further moves South from Vietnam would be considered an attack on the US and
in the event of such an attack the territory of Thailand would be considered
as an attack on the territory of the US. Besides from the Philippines B-17s
could mess up Japans trade and shipping to and from Indonesia. An awfully
big gamble to expect the US to stay out (especially when they are so powerful,
Japan has no advantage of suprise and no chance of hitting the Pacific Fleet)


Joseph Askew


-- 
Joseph Askew, Gauche and Proud  At dawn with staff in hand I climbed the crags,
jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu  At dusk I made my camp amoung the mountains.
Disclaimer? Sue, see if I care  Only a few peaks rise as high as this house,
One China One Korea One Eire32  Facing the crags, it overlooks winding streams.
Newsgroups: sci.military