From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive
Subject: Philippines: Rumours of peace
Date: 10 Oct 92 03:33:33 GMT
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Organization: PACH
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu

/** reg.philippine: 304.0 **/
** Topic: GL: Rumors of Peace **
** Written  8:47 pm  Oct  7, 1992 by fbp in cdp:reg.philippine **
From: Foreign Bases Project <fbp>
Subject: GL: Rumors of Peace

/* Written  6:22 pm  Oct  6, 1992 by peg:greenleft in cdp:greenleft.news */
/* ---------- "Green Left #74, October 14" ---------- */
Philippines: Rumours of peace

By Peter M. Sales

No leader ever swept into office on a higher wave of popular
support than Corazon Aquino; few ever departed more undone or
unsung. The hero of the heady days of People Power presided over
a stagnant government and an economy going nowhere; her final
hollow victory was surviving the seven coup attempts against her.
After an initial overture to the rebels, she launched a policy of
total war which carried death and destruction to the impoverished
countryside and led to an increase in militarisation throughout
the archipelago.

After the May elections and the advent of the Fidel Ramos
administration, an outbreak of peace was virtually inevitable.
The new president has been a leading advocate of a strategy which
aims to cripple the communist revolution by isolating its leaders
and undercutting its support.

Ramos was totally identified with the ``surrender or die'' policy
of Aquino, so there is no surprise that he now continues it. He
also plans to introduce the death penalty for rebellion.

Congress is pushing Ramos to show more innovative leadership,
House majority leader Ronaldo Zamora claiming that the
presidential proposals ``will have no dramatic impact''. There is
widespread disappointment that Malacanang has offered nothing
more than an elaborate amnesty program.

Ramos dearly wants to end the insurgency so that the armed forces
can be switched to external defence, with more sophisticated
ships, aircraft, missiles and other military hardware. Apart from
damping the mutinous rumblings from the barracks, the Philippines
could thereby gain a higher profile in ASEAN, exert greater
pressure on its neighbours in regard to contentious hot spots
like the Spratly Islands, and become a more effective regional
ally of the United States.

Ramos is fashioning his peace initiative in accord with a
counterinsurgency strategy which he hopes will end the 23-year
insurgency by demoralising his opponents and defeating the armed
rebels. Since his return to Malacanang (as a Marcos relative,
messenger of the US and chief architect of martial law, he was
never far from the presidential palace), Ramos has made a number
of forthright statements about crushing the insurgency.

An early indication of his plans was the retention of General
Lisandro Abadia as armed forces chief of staff. Abadia helped to
formulate the current counterinsurgency strategy known as
``gradual constriction''. After some initial success, this scheme
has largely broken down, but Ramos appears willing to persevere
with it for the moment.

The chances of peace, at least in the short term, are not
promising. There have been a number of government overtures to
the international office of the National Democratic Front in
Utrecht, Holland, but these are stalemated on a choice of a
venue. The Ramos team is anxious to get negotiations under way
somewhere in the Philippines. The NDF wants them held overseas
for safety's sake and in order to acquire belligerent status in
the process. Neither side has suggested a cease-fire.

Ramos has also sought to gain credit by freeing two prominent
political prisoners. In the case of Satur Ocampo, alleged head of
the NDF and its chief negotiator at the failed cease-fire talks
in 1986-87, bail should have been granted some time ago. The
release of Romulo Kintanar is more surprising. Rumoured to be the
commander of the New People's Army, Kintanar was recently
recaptured after a highly publicised escape from Camp Crame.

Ramos he anticipates that his gesture will sow discord within the
underground movement. Ocampo belongs to a faction derisively
known as the ``surrenderists''; Kintanar is described as a
hardliner and represents those cadres who want to shortcut
protracted war by launching city-based insurrection.

Presidential clemency has been very selective. While Ramos has
released dozens of detainees already, he is using some captives
as bargaining chips and hundreds more remain in jail. Aquino
began a policy of bringing criminal charges against political
detainees. Many are serving long sentences in the civil prison
system. Moreover, arrests of activists from legal organisations
have increased dramatically.

Congress has repealed the Anti-Subversion Law, and Ramos
legalised the Communist Party of the Philippines, but it is too
early to know what this will mean in practice. The CPP is
presently trying to organise a grassroots review of policy in
order to become more responsive to members. Studies of earlier
setbacks and defeats have already led to internal debate.

The NPA appears to have modified the dictates of classic Maoism,
and may end its efforts to achieve strategic stalemate with the
armed forces. The rebels will return to what they do best -
guerilla activity in the countryside. If successful, however,
they will be among the first to seize state power from this stage
of insurgency. Such momentous decisions require much debate
within the NDF and its member organisations.

Ramos' peace plans remain tightly linked to counterinsurgency
efforts. They appear to offer little more than a means by which
rebels can surrender. The administration appears unwilling to
discuss the socioeconomic problems which provoked the insurgency
in the first place.

Ramos is even more vague about economic change than his
predecessor. Land reform has become a dead issue, and general
disillusionment is widespread. The powerful elites remain firmly
in control. The new president enjoys the support of the
Manindigan (Take a Stand) group of businessmen, which was set up
after the death of Ninoy Aquino. This clique is nationalist in
sentiment, but very conservative in all other respects.

Nonetheless, progress may eventuate from the current discussions.
Unlike Aquino, who was always being attacked as incompetent and
soft on the communists, Ramos can talk about a settlement without
the risk of such allegations. He is regarded as ruthless,
calculating and a mainstay of counter-revolution since Marcos
days.

Formal talks will begin after tentative agreement on an agenda.
Malacanang has abandoned a long-time insistence on the 1987
Philippine Constitution as the basis of discussions.

Could the sceptics be proved wrong? Some sort of political
settlement might be achieved, yet even this presents grave risks.
One of the most problematic features of any peace initiative is
the fighting which erupts immediately beforehand as each party
jockeys for position. A terrible irony for an impoverished
country wracked by war is that the approach of peace could lead
to renewed fighting.
[Peter Sales is a lecturer in the Department of History and
Politics at Wollongong University.]



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