From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Ethical Relativism. Was: Hunters: Legitimate concern?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1992 09:07:24 GMT


Russell Lawrence asks John Van Etten:
rl> Has it occurred to you that an action might be ethical or unethical
rl> regardless of the power of the person performing the action?

Dan Sorenson:
ds> Yes, it has.  I've discovered that there is no absolute morality
ds> or ethical code. 

rl> How would a man searching for a particular set of facts be able 
rl> to discover that the facts do not exist?  By searching every nook and 
rl> cranny of the universe, perhaps, and then reporting that the 
rl> objects in question were nowhere to be found?   Do you have a degree
rl> in ethics, by any chance?  

From article <viking.712212922@vincent1.iastate.edu>, by viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson):
ds> Nope, I don't.  Not that it makes any difference, of course.  
ds> Facts and ethics are hardly good things to compare.  How can you 
ds> test an ethical belief?  I'll give you a hint -- it's a belief, 
ds> not a fact.  

We can test ethical ideas in the same manner that we can test
any idea: by analyzing their factual and rational basis.

ds> It's quite similar to saying, "God is good." and then demanding 
ds> proof one way or the other.  It doesn't work, and never will, 
ds> because there is no underlying "fact" to base arguments on.  
ds> Thus, our disagreements.  

No, it's not like saying, "God is good".  Such a statement is,
to the best of my knowledge, not supported by any empirical
data.  

Suppose someone were to say, "It's a good thing when we poke 
total strangers in the eye with a ice pick".  Do you think you 
could come up with a body of factual evidence to evaluate the 
alleged goodness or badness of such an act?  If so, then the
goodness or badness of icepick-eye-poking is *not* simply a
matter of belief, but has a factual/rational basis.

I realize that some ethical problems are difficult to solve,
just as many scientific problems are difficult to solve, simply
because our knowledge and intellect are limited.  However,
this doesn't mean that goodness is simply a matter of belief,
nor does it mean that "goodness" is a totally arbitrary term. 

ds> Like the vast majority of criminals who cry their
ds> innocence after being convicted, the person being "picked on" is the
ds> first to cry morality, while effectively this action must be moral for
ds> it to be commonplace.  

rl> It seems to me that the justice or injustice of a courtroom trial 
rl> would depend on the effectiveness of the court in digging away at 
rl> the truth.  You, on the other hand, seem to be saying that the 
rl> goodness of a particular judicial action can be measured solely 
rl> by public opinion.  

ds> It can, and it does.  Helmet laws, semi-auto military look-alike 
ds> weapon bans, exclusionary rule violations, extentions of the RICO 
ds> statutes, and a host of other frauds have been upheld by the 
ds> courts on no factual basis.  I'll leave it to you to find the 
ds> facts on these issues, but if you want pointers e-mail shall be 
ds> fine.  

As I said, public opinion polls are a poor way of evaluating
the truth or falsity of ideas, apart from those ideas describing
public opinion-in-itself. 

> ...
ds> Think of it this way, Russ: you belive hunting
ds> to be unethical, but you're in the minority.  It's no wonder you wish
ds> to base your argument on ethical grounds.  Those of us with the guns
ds> simply disagree with your ethical view, and it remains for you to
ds> change our minds if you want hunting to be unethical.  For the moment,
ds> hunting is ethical and quite enjoyable.

rl> So you say, but I consider your opinions to be highly suspect.  
rl> Perhaps you can redeem your credibility by explaining why you 
rl> consider slavery to be ethical simply because some men consider it
rl> such.

ds> I note you skipped a bit: I do consider slavery ethical for a
ds> society that believes it to be ethical, but I do not personally hold
ds> it to be an ethical thing in my own society.  

Is your position a purely arbitrary one...  like flipping a coin?  
Or, have you analyzed the factual and rational arguments for and 
against slavery and determined that slavery is not a good thing?  

ds> You can ignore the qualifiers if you want, Russ, but they are 
ds> very important in this case.  I'm certain that some Romans 
ds> thought slavery was wrong (besides the slaves, I mean).  Now that 
ds> their view is the one that society has adopted in no way means 
ds> the previously-held view was unethical...

An ethical idea, like any idea, may be true or false.  Yet, for
some strange reason, you seem to be unwilling to consider that
many ethical ideas can, indeed, be false.   How strange!

If a medieval scholar were to declare that the earth is flat,
would you consider such a statement to be a truthful representation
of reality... or, would you be inclined to present evidence
refuting the medieval scholar's position?

If the same scholar were to tell you that witch burning is good, 
because it drives out demons weighing roughly half an ounce apiece, 
would you accept his statement at face value...  or, would you 
point out that there's little evidence to support his belief and 
quite a bit of evidence to show that witchburning is both painful 
for the victim and socially disruptive?  

ds> Ethics change, just as societies change, over time, and I cannot 
ds> hold a person responsible for criminal acts that weren't criminal 
ds> when they were done.  

And rightly so.  We can't blame individuals for acting on the
basis of the best information that they might have available.
On the other hand, this doesn't mean that witch-burning is a
good thing, simply because some people subscribed to the notion.

ds> If your view wins out in another hundred years, then animal 
ds> hunting will be immoral.  Such is life on this planet.  Until 
ds> that time, my actions are not immoral to me, or to the society I 
ds> live in, and I have no ethical qualms about hunting.  As for 
ds> redeeming my credibility, don't assume I give a whit what people 
ds> on here think of my credibility.  Killfiles can take care of any 
ds> annoyance they might have of me, and my posting record should 
ds> show myself to be remarkably consistent in claiming nothing 
ds> absolute exists when it comes to morality.  

Is the world flat or round?  

rl> Would rape or slavery truly be ethical if a sufficient number of 
rl> persons in power declared such activities to be acceptable?

ds> Yes.  Read your history.

rl> I can point to any number of dead authors who believed that 
rl> slavery is ethical, just as I can point to several past
rl> authorities who believed rape to be ethical.  Is a mere belief 
rl> the same as truth?

ds> Yes.  For proof, see organized religion.  Belief is much
ds> more persuasive than "truth," because "truth" doesn't require fact,
ds> only belief.  If you mean, "Is a mere belief the same as fact?" then
ds> I have to answer "No," with the caveat that facts are often over-ridden
ds> by beliefs.  See "propaganda" in your dictionary for details.

You're contradicting yourself.  First you say that belief is the
same as truth, and then you say that belief is more persuasive
than truth.   You've obviously recognized that there's a difference
between the two terms, and yet you seem to be clinging to the notion
that believing some particular notion necessarily makes the notion
true.  

[It occurs to me that one source of the confusion here may be the
mistaken notion that a belief that isn't true must necessarily 
be a lie.  If I say that witch burning isn't really good, I'm not
saying that the medieval advocates of witch burners were all liars.
Rather, I'm pointing out that factual and rational analysis
negates their claims.]

rl>   If Himmler believed that killing jews 
rl> was ethically good, would this belief transform suffering into
rl> pleasure?

ds> It certainly would for Himmler, since his suffering at the
ds> hands of the Evil Jewish Masses would be turned into pleasure at
ds> watching Them get hauled off.  For the Jews, I doubt it.  For the
ds> record, Russ, who cares, and why doesn't it matter if the person
ds> who cares isn't Himmler or his fellows?

It matters quite a bit to individuals who might be persecuted by
an ignorant fool who believes what he wants to believe.

rl> Would the victims not suffer just the same?

ds> That depends on the slave-owner and the society of the time.

rl> This makes no sense whatsoever.  Why would the suffering of any
rl> given person be dependent on the mind-set of someone else?

ds> You missed it, Russ.  The "victims" are slaves, right?  There is 
ds> evidence to suggest that slaves in Egypt led a better life than 
ds> those who were "free" of their own nations, and some societies 
ds> came up with rather severe rules of slave ownership.  Not every 
ds> society beats their slaves, nor are all slaves the same type of 
ds> property.  In scandanavia, slaves could inherit property when 
ds> their master died.  I don't think slavery in and of itself 
ds> involves suffering, simply because the slave-owner could, at his 
ds> whim, cease any of the abhorrent practices of slavery we commonly 
ds> think of.  As an example, let's assume I am a slave of my father.  
ds> That he treats me like a son and not a slave is the relevant 
ds> thing, not that somewhere there is a title of ownership saying I 
ds> am a slave.  Slavery is more than just ownership, it's treatment, 
ds> when one starts talking of "suffering." Name one thing a slave 
ds> cannot be, and my response will be, "The slave owner can allow it 
ds> at his whim, and hence it does not have to be." If you answer 
ds> "Freedom," I must partially agree, but I do note that as a debtor 
ds> I'm at least an indentured servant, and that my debtors allow me 
ds> some freedom is all I can expect.  

You seem to be saying here that slavery would be ok in a particular
instance if the slave were treated as a king.  Perhaps you're right,
but in such an instance, your appraisal of the slave's treatment involves
a set of alleged facts that could be tested in various ways. 
To the extent that you cite factual matters, you're contradicting your
prior notion that goodness or badness is simply a matter of opinion.

rl> Did Scott suffer?  Or would you say that the badness of his 
rl> bondage simply disappeared in the sea of prevailing opinion that 
rl> property rights are a good thing?  

ds> I don't know, did he suffer?  You had better ask Scott.

If he did suffer, would you still consider his enslavement to be 
a "good" thing, simply because of prevailing opinion about the
rightness of slave ownership?

rl> Or would their suffering not matter?

ds> It certainly didn't matter to the supreme court, nor I suspect
ds> to the rest of the country with the exception of the slaves.  Hence,
ds> his suffering was not relevant to the case.

On the other hand, do you not agree that his suffering would make
a difference in our factual investigation of the goodness or badness
of his bondage?  

ds> Now you're catching on!  If it doesn't matter to those who are in 
ds> control of the slaves, it doesn't matter.  Period. You're a 
ds> slave?  Too bad, but those are the breaks.  I'm certain every 
ds> traitor executed thinks it's immoral to do so, but I don't 
ds> particularly care what traitors think.  Get the idea now, Russ?  

rl> Are you an advocate for ignorance, or, are you an advocate for 
rl> truth?  I realize that the suffering of slaves may not have 
rl> mattered in the least to some slaveowners, but you seem to be 
rl> going a step further in claiming that there existed no additional 
rl> data worthy of consideration.  (yikes)

ds> Was there?  The Supreme Court didn't think so, and I can
ds> think of no other body more inclined to uphold the law.

1) Are you assuming that supreme court justices are omniscient?
2) Are you assuming that laws, by definition, are good indicators
   of truth?  

> [much deleted]

ds> If you enjoy being beaten, should I consider your liking of this 
ds> action when I dislike it?  No, I'll go with what I think is best 
ds> to do.  

rl> You're free to control your body in any manner of your choosing, as
rl> long as it doesn't infringe on the rights of other thinking/feeling
rl> individuals.

ds> So which of us is "right," Russ?  Am I infringing on your rights 
ds> because I refuse to do what you enjoy and I abhorr, or visa 
ds> versa?  I'd really like to see your answer to this one, since I 
ds> see it as a Catch-22 that illustrates how each side may consider 
ds> itself to be "right." ...

In using the term "rights of other individuals", I was referring
to personal rights... not property rights.  

Justice Taney ruled against Dred Scott because he considered
Scott's suit to be an assault on the property rights of Scott's 
legal owner.  This sort of notion, as I point out from time to 
time, is fundamentally medieval in its immediate origins, and 
depends on the assumption that minds are less important than 
property, feudal bonds, etc.  It's precisely this kind of 
thinking that introduces the Catch-22 trap that you've 
identified.  Was Dred Scott violating the rights of his owner?  Or 
was the owner violating the rights of Dred Scott?  

This sort of topsy-turvy confusion goes away when we stop and 
consider that property is clearly subservient to personal agency.  
In a world of mindless entities where intentions are 
non-existent, property would be non-existent.  On the other hand, 
it's entirely possible for intelligent entities to exist without 
making property claims on persons and things in their environment.  

> ...
rl> You're not a lonely god in a lonely universe.   You're entitled to
rl> treat your own body as you see fit, but you're not entitled to
rl> claim the minds and bodies of other individuals.

ds> No man is an island, right?  I read that many, many years ago.  
ds> I'll claim the minds and bodies of other individuals when I see 
ds> fit to do so, Russ -- I do it to eat right now, and we all do it 
ds> to exist.  

Is this true?

ds> I may not be an island, but I'm a damned big island compared to a 
ds> rabbit, and I see no reason to sacrifice myself for a smaller 
ds> island.  If we can get along in good harmony, so be it.  If we 
ds> can't, Darwin seems to have an answer to the problem.  

What is that answer?

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ