From: lbn@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (generic fellow)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Regarding faith in reason (was: Re: Ayn Rand)
Date: 5 Nov 92 06:20:26 EST
Distribution: talk
Organization: Cornell University

In article <61729@mimsy.umd.edu>,
mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate) writes: 

> As I mentioned in my response to Mr. Wales, religion presents a problem for
> philosophy in that religion palpably exists.  Moreover, religion, in the
> end, contains within it some claims to authority on philosophical matters.
> Christianity is the easiest case here; the ressurection is claimed to be
> historical, and the religion's espousal of "faith is the evidence of things
> unseen" is in contrast to the typical "verification" theory of truth.  The
> gospels, as authorities, require *some* refutation.

in that last sentance you are speaking from and from within that very
authority.  it is authority which demands refutation of itself
as condition for cessation.  such conditions always ought
to be viewed with distrust.

>                                                      I'm willing to give
> other religions the benefit of the doubt and say, well, moslems, I guess we
> just accept different authorities.  I'm much more critical of atheism
> because it claims an authority that I can get at-- human reasoning.

this strikes me as somewhat opportunistic.  i would be inclined to be
far more wary of an authority i _didn't_ have access to.

> Purely philosophical arguments, except strictly within the context of the
> religion itself, are circular arguments, and are for the most part
> inconsistent while calling inconsistency a flaw. 

and in what manner is Faith not equally self-justifying?  besides,
you needn't believe that pure philosophies are the finest examples of
human reasoning, in spite of their plaintive claims at that.

>                                                   Dismissing the gospels
> with a wave of Occam's Razor, besides being questionable as to whether the
> principle is properly applied in the first place, is fundamentally an act of
> faith in humanity, a faith which, in my experience, isn't justified.

faith and rationality are commesurate in that neither will accept a
refutation that does not first indicate terms of surrender.  that is to
say, both reject discourse that does not admit to the assumptions
which the discourse itself may be concerned with rejecting.  if you
consider your position against Reason to be a reasoned position, you
subvert that position; alternatively, you may choose to justify your
position against Reason by recourse to Faith, at which point Reason
will immediately dismiss your case, which summary action will be the
equivalent of said case.

you are quite correct in pointing out that Reason, under the restrictive
terms it establishes for itself, is fundamentally incapable of
refuting Faith even to the strict satisfaction of Reason itself.
whereas Faith, by its own terms, as you demonstrate, is free to rest
content with its rejection of Reason.  it is this facility which i
distrust.  Reason may indeed be forced to admit its inadequacy --
even its inability to thoroughly justify itself _to_ itself --
with this admission i am reassured that i may resist its consumption
of me.

regards,
dave

                               
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2397 sci.philosophy.tech:4038 sci.philosophy.meta:2497