From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 18 Nov 92 08:01:14 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.50.722073674
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc18.superbowl.und.ac.za


SUMMARY:  A  more detailed version  of the `difference  between determinism
and the principle of universal causation' is offered.

(1) A Historical Note:

I will not  go into any  details, but it  is worth pointing  out that there
have been many  different concepts of  causality over the  ages, often with
more than type of cause being regarded as essential for anything to happen.
Aristotle,  for  example,  spoke  of  `Material',  `Final', `Efficient' and
`Formal' causes.  It is a feature of modern philosophy (following Descartes
and especially Hume)  that most talk  of causes centres  on `efficient,' or
mechanical, causes.  This is not an essential move, and creates many  prob-
lems.  It should also be pointed out that determinism arose in the  context
of a rejection of talking of causes _at_all_, and was intended to be purely
descriptive.

(2) Determinism and Causation:

    "Determinism ... must  be  carefully distinguished from  what we might
     call  the Principle of Universal  Causation, that is, from the thesis
     that every event (or fact, change, or state of affairs) has a cause."
                                          [Inwagen `Essay on Free Will'.]

In the  work quoted  above Peter  van Inwagen  points out  that to _deduce_
determinism from the Principle  of Universal Causation would  require three
additional premisses:

 "(1) if an event (or fact, change, state of affairs or what have you)
    has a cause then its cause is always itself an event (or what have
    you) and never a substance or continuant such as a man;
  (2) If an event (or what have you) _A_ was the cause of an event _B_,
    then it follows, given that _A_ happened and given the laws of nature,
    that _B_ "causally necessitated"
    to happen;
  (3) Every chain of causes that has no earliest member is such that, for
    every time _t_, some event in the chain happens earlier than _t_." 
                                                            [Inwagen]

These  premisses  are  far  from  self  evident,  and  we  cannot arrive at
determinism starting from  the Principle of  Universal Causation unless  we
use all three.  Each adds  a specific element to the determinist  brew, and
involves a significantly stonger claim than the simple asertion that  every
event has a cause.   If we look  at each of the  three in turn this  can be
clarified:

(1) If the  Principle of Universal  causation is true,  but premiss one  is
false,  then  the  doctrine  of  immanent  causation (sometimes also called
`agent'  causation)  is  true.    If  some_thing_  is itself the cause of a
change, rather than the cause being an earlier state of affairs, then  this
change is causal,  but not deterministic.   The change  is caused, but  the
cause is not.  [See R Chisholm's essay `Freedom and the Self']

(2) If the  Principle of Universal  causation is true,  and premiss (1)  is
true, but premiss two is false,  then even though every event is  caused by
.MDNM/
In this case the past does not  determine a _unique_ future.  This was  the
position urged  by G.E.M  Anscombe in  her inagural  lecture "Causality and
Determination."  The primary thrust of the lecture is an argument  intended
to show the non-equivalence of the  concept of causation, and that of  nec-
cessitation which underlies determinism.

(3) If the  Principle of Universal  causation is true,  and premiss (1)  is
true, and premiss (2) is true, but premiss three is false, then every event
may be caused  by an earlier  event which necessitates  it, but determinism
might still be false, for relatively clear reasons.

                              ---oOo---

I hope this helps.
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
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Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc