From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 01:28:30 GMT


>In article <tim.720580709@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au I wrote:

>Consciousness is to the study of the brain what phlogiston is to the study of
>combustion.

Only a few souls were brave enough (or silly enough ?) to respond to this
posting, either by email or by followup.  My thanks to them all.  I should now
explain:

1)  a certain field is thought interesting enough to devote attention to (the
brain, combustion);
2)  pretty soon one particular concept is thought worthy of study
(consciousness, phlogiston);
3)  pretty soon after that many people decide that this concept is, indeed,
the central focus to the whole problem;
4)  at some later time it is found this central focus doesn't exist.

What ?

The analogy breaks down, you say, because consciousness DOES exist.  Aha, I
say, they said that about phlogiston too....

What is consciousness ?  How do we know of it ?  I know of it because "I"
exist.  Consciousness is, in fact, this "I".  How do I know "I" exist ?
Descartes proved it.  Cogito ergo sum.  I think, therefore I am.  This has
been central to all western cultures now for a long period.

I hold it to be false.  I maintain that is is possible - indeed probable -
that there is NO clear distinction between what is "I" and what is not "I".

To computers for a minute - what is the difference between one massively
parallel computer, and two massively parallel computers fully connected ?  If
the connections are strong enough, the two computers are indistinguishable
from one (bigger) computer.

The distinction between one human and another is that our communication
between neurons is much, much weaker than between those in a single human.

So, can this be tested ?  If not, it is mere idle philosophising (still
interesting, though....).

Yes, you can make predictions of results that would not otherwise be the case,
and see if those predictions hold.  We need to examine cases where
communications links between two humans are incredibly strong, and cases where
links within one human are very much weakened.  If this thesis is correct, we
should expect to see actions similar to those of a single person, in the first
case, and actions similar to two different people, in the second case.

For the first case, I suggest an examination of siamese twins, or twins who
have never been separated.  Many such cases exist, and I would claim tend to
support this hypothesis.

For the second case, take people with damaged brains, especially those who
have (for one reason or another) so-called 'split brains'.  Behaviour patterns
here seem again to support the hypothesis.

If you think this is hugely counter-intuitive, you're right.  I don't like
admitting any more than you do that there is no clear distinction between me
and everything else.  But if there isn't, then consciousness becomes so
changed as a concept that it's hardly worth using the term any more.  Rather
like phlogiston, in fact.

(.....yes, I understand that to be taken seriously this has to be couched in
terms of theories and axioms, with a sprinkling of lemmas, all garnished with
footnotes and references.  Oh well.....)

-- 
Tim S Roberts
School of Applied Science                 tel:     051-226467
Monash University (Gippsland)             fax:     051-221348
Switchback Road
Churchill                                 email:   tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au
Victoria 3842
Australia