From: 15942@brahms.udel.edu (Stephen Barr)
Subject: Re: The Real Presence
Organization: University of Delaware
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 20:20:36 GMT

    Dear Martin, 
               Let me make a couple of further points.
    I think Rahner is wrong that the concepts of 
     substance, form, property, and accident have
    become incoherent because of modern physics. I 
    am of the opinion that Lonergan has constructed a
    metaphysics and epistemology that are in accord 
    with the world-view of modern science wherein these
    terms have well-defined meanings. He is a neo-Thomist.
    Was. I incline strongly toward his system, so I
    suppose I am a Thomist, at least till I see something 
    that is better.
              I share some uneasiness with the use of
    the substance/accident distinction to explain the
    Church's doctrine. I believe the substance/accident
    distinction is a valid one, at least in the Lonerganian
    framework. I am not sure it is the relevant distinction
    in the case of the Church's Eucharistic faith.
              I would say that the "form" of something
    is what is intended by an inquiry into the intelligible
    structure of that thing. That form is described in terms
    of properties. In my view, whatever there is to the 
    intelligible structure of bread, the form of bread, is
    accessible to the investigation of the physical sciences.
    Whatever can be grasped about the nature of bread is
       discoverable in the data which can be derived from
    physical observations. When you have completely understood
    the data about bread you have completely understood the
    bread. (I am being a little sloppy here, I know). And
    what persists after consecration includes the results of
    any possible physical observation or experiment. So 
    in terms of these concepts as I would use them (following,
    I *think* Lonergan) it is not clear that only accidents
    rather than the "form" including all the "properties"
    of bread.  So I am not clear how to do justice to the 
    Church's faith using these distinctions as valid as they
    may be in themselves.

        A semantic point. I think the Church intends (now
    anyway) the term 'transubstantiation' to mean only
    "that change which occurs when bread is consecrated",
    without implying any precise metaphysical account
    of that change in terms of technical Aristotelian
    catagories. There is *some* content to the Church's
    faith as defined at Trent. You and I would (probably)
    agree that it *does* include the following: (a) at
    consecration a change occurs in the Eucharistic elements
    that is objective; (b) it is true to say "this is Christ's
    body" after but not before consecration; (c) it is true
    to say "this is bread" before but not after consecration; 
    (d) what appears to the senses (aided or not) does not
    change.  You and I would agree that what was defined at
    Trent does *not* include the tenets of Aristotelian
    metaphysics. 
       So there is some kind of a change, and we need language
    for it. In my view Trent meant to provide certain terms
    that are acceptable. In the same way, in the Trinity there
    are three of something and one of something. We need words
    for "what there are three of" and "what there is one of".
    The Councils used 'person' and 'nature'. If we were
    doing it for the first time today different terms might
    have been used. It is also true that 'person' and 'nature'
    are terms that nowadays are used in technical senses in
    various philosophical systems. Moreover, the mystery of
    the Trinity can be understood in different ways using
    new concepts. But should the terms used to express the
    mystery in a formula change every time a new theology of
    the Trinity appears? We need not keep changing the
    terms 'nature' and 'person' every time a more refined
    understanding of what is meant by those terms comes along.
       Similarly, we need some term for "what changes at the
    consecration", "what does not change", and "the change".
    "Transubstantiation" is the traditional term for the
    change that occurs. We can still use that term without
    necessarily intending all of Aristotelian metaphysics!
    I believe the Church authorities wish this word continue
    in use, as the words nature and person continue, for
    convenience and stability of terminology. The word Real
    Presence (words, that is) contain less than the whole Catholic 
    DOctrine.  
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU