From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Mikhail on the theory that sex is icky
Date: 11 Dec 92 21:56:15 GMT
 <1992Dec10.203818.18379@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Dec11.183617.20888@sun0.urz.uni-heidelberg.de>
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Dec11.183617.20888@sun0.urz.uni-heidelberg.de>
gsmith@lauren.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de (Gene W. Smith) writes:

>In article <1992Dec10.203818.18379@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>Note that so far you have failed to substantiate your charge of
>>mindlessness, lacking proof of which, your similes remain bereft of
>>moral force.  

GWS:
>You want me to substantiate my charge of mindlessness?  OK, Little
>Boy, what follows is my summary of your argument, as annotated and
>approved by you, translated into the language of modal logic, which
>you claim to be the way you are defining those essences.

Mr Smith, I am 34 years old, stand 6' in my slippers, weigh 188lbs, and
bench press 310lbs.  However, if it pleases you to address me as "Little
Boy", I have no objections, provided that you reciprocate by accepting
the honorary apellation of "Hysterical Rimadonna".

>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

GWS:
>$We start with the argument that the morally relevant *function* of sex
>$is reproductive (some discussion of biology would be nice here, this
>$isn't as clear or obvious as people might think it is).  Therefore,
>$the essence of sex is reproductive.  Also, the only good sex is that
>$which involves its essence.  Therefore, sex must be done in such a way
>$that the essential or substantial nature of sex is respected.  That
>$means we can tamper with accidents, like condoms or sterility.  But we
>$can't tamper with substance.

MZ:
>>Thank you for summarizing for me.

GWS:
>This now becomes:
>
>We start with the argument that the morally relevant function of sex
>is reproductive. 

Correct.

GWS:
>		  This means that the essence of sex is reproductive,
>that is, it is necessarily the case that sex is reproductive, i.e.
>sex is reproductive in all possible worlds.

Not so fast.  This means that the *moral* essence of sex is reproductive
that is, it is necessarily the case that all morally praiseworthy sex is
reproductive, i.e. sex is reproductive in all deontically desirable
possible worlds.

GWS:
>					     The only good sex is that
>which involves its essence.  Therefore, the only good sex is that
>which is reproductive. 

That is, *morally* good.

GWS:
>		        However, it is OK to have sex in such a way
>that sex is not reproductive, just so long as it still remains the
>case that sex is necessarily reproductive. 
	   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

	   the couple in question is *possibly* reproductive.

GWS:
>					     However, it is bad to have
>sex which is necessarily not reproductive, i.e. not reproductive in
>any possible world, because the sex is reproductive in all

							desirable

GWS:
>							    possible
>worlds, and also the only good sex is that which is reproductive in
>all possible worlds.
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 the actual world.

I have you exactly where I wanted you, Mr Smith.  It is painfully
obvious that your knowledge of modal logic is far inferior to my grasp
of category theory.  As a remedial manual, I recommend the book _Modal
Logic_ by Brian F. Chellas, with particular emphasis on Chapter 6,
"Deontic logic".

GWS:
>This complete gibberish is now followed by:

GWS:
>$Men and women are different in essence, so homosexual sex essentially
>$rather than accidentally is not reproductive.  Therefore, it is
>$perfectly all right for MZ to boink his girlfriend while wearing a
>$condom, at least if he has checked her DNA to see that she is really
>$XX and not one of those women who are XY but just didn't respond to
>$testosterone in the womb.  But homosexuality is bad, and you should
>$faint with horror at the mere thought of it.  

GWS:
>This becomes:
>
>Men and women differ in all

			morally relevant

GWS:
>			     possible worlds, since it is necessarily
>the case that a man has an XY genotype and a woman has an XX genotype.

Analytically true, and hence correct.

GWS:
>Since having the same genotype entails not being reproductive in any
>possible world, it is morally bad for two people with the same
>genotype to have sex, since their sex is not reproductive in all
							      ^^^
								 any
GWS:
>possible worlds, whereas in fact

			morally praiseworthy

GWS:
>				  sex *is* reproductive in all possible
>worlds. 						   ^^^^^^^^^^^^
 ^^^^^^
 the actual world, whilst morally permissible sex is possibly
reproductive between the same partners, i.e. reproductive in some
possible world.

GWS:
>It is all right to for one person to have sex with another so long as
>they have been to a doctor and made sure that they have opposite
>genotypes.  This is true even if the woman is sterile or the man
>infertile, because in some possible world the woman would not be
>sterile or the man would not be infertile.

Keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, the phenotype
corresponds to the genotype.

GWS:
>					    However, in no possible
>world could someone who is somatically a woman but with an XY genotype
>have an XX genotype, and so in fact she is actually a man, and
>heterosexual sex with her is really homosexual, whereas lesbian sex
>with her is heterosexual and in fact entirely free from blame.

Correct.  I told you that hard cases make for bad rules.  Rules must be
based on the paradigmatic cases, as per the above discussion.

GWS:
>Moreover, it is always fine to have sex using birth control devices,
>because in some possible world you might not be using birth control
>devices.  This situation, where a certain form of sex is reproductive
>in some possible world, but not in this one, is morally good, 

						neutral, or permissible,

GWS:
>							       because
>it does not contradict the fact that

				morally permissible

GWS:
>				      sex is reproductive in all
							     ^^^
							     some

GWS:
>possible worlds, whereas if the sex is not reproductive in any
>possible world it would contradict the fact that 

					morally permissible
GWS:
>						  sex is
						      ^^
						   ought to be

GWS:
>							 reproductive
>in all 
    ^^^
    some

GWS:
>	possible worlds, and therefore be bad.
>
>Because homosexual sex is not reproductive in all possible worlds,
>whereas sex in fact is reproductive in all

				      morally desirable

GWS:
>					   possible worlds,
>homosexual sex is a grave moral transgression, nearly as
>bad as murder, and abusing 
		    ^^^^^^^
		explaining the depravity of their ways to

GWS:
>			    homosexuals is therefore a highly
>moral act.

I would call this "negative dialectics", the art of elenctically
eliciting the truth from an obstreperous, obstinate nitwit, -- but,
alas, the term is already taken.  How about "pedagogical battery", o
nitwit of my heart?

GWS:
>>>						Clear?

MZ:
>>Ever so.

Ditto.

>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

MZ:
>>I need modal logic only to legitimize the appeal to a certain
>>ontology, which you repeatedly denounced as an incoherent mediaeval
>>relic.

GWS:
>You need more than that.  I think you need psychiatric help if you
>think you have made a coherent argument via modal logic, Little Boy.

I leave the making of arguments to you, Hysterical Rimadonna.
Henceforth, feel free to address your own summary, with my corrections.

MZ:
>>In fact, many -- perhaps most -- metaphysicians of modality
>>are committed to the position that having his peculiar genotype is a
>>necessary property of any living individual.

GWS:
>Oh?  I could poke tons of holes in this complete BS, but why bother...

Indeed, why bother to expose your abject ignorance one extra time?  I
refer you to _The Metaphysics of Modality_, by Graeme Forbes, Chapter 6:
"The Necessity of Origin".  Also see Kit Fine's "Model Theory for Modal
Logic", _The Journal of Philosophical Logic_, 1978, 1981, and, of
course, Saul Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_, Harvard, 1980: pp. 110ff.

GWS:
>>> If X is an essential
>>>property of being female implies that it is necessarily the case that
>>>if a person is female, then they have property X, then that definition
>>>has consequences.  For instance, if having an XX genotype is an
>>>essential property of being female, it follows that it is necessarily
>>>the case that any woman will have an XX genotype.  

MZ:
>>Correct.  Nor have I ever denied my commitment to this conclusion.

GWS:
>Proof that you are a complete idiot if any more is needed.

Not an argument.

>-- 
>     Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/IWR/Ruprecht-Karls University 
>               gsmith@kalliope.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de

This is fun!  Are you as clueless when you argue about mathematics?  Oh
yes, you are, -- there is this tiny matter of your idiotic claim of the
ontological priority of the cardinal nymbers, in a structure built on
the backbone of the ordinals.  Sayonara, nitwit!

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:3022 rec.arts.books:22711 alt.politics.homosexuality:8139