HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Subject: Heidegger and Nazism
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 19:39:54 GMT


>  However, I see no justification, on the other hand, to your second
>claim when compared to the first.   I think that you will have to 
>select which you feel is more adequate.  If you select the first, 
>I am all ears as to how you can arrive at Nazism from his text--even
>Derrida, whose methods may be questionable, failed to convience me of 
>anything on this regard.  If you select the latter, you have to
>be careful when thinking of God in this way.  There is always the
>issue of time which puts forth a significant stumbling block to those
>who would like to reduce _Sein und Zeit_ to a simple theological 
>treatise.  However, to maintain both propositions simulatneously seems
>undeniably absurd.
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
>Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
>University of Chicago
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>


Before I try to meet this legitimate challenge (that is, risk making
(more of) a public spectacle of myself), let me just check on one
crucial point:

I take it that we all agree that Heidegger was a Nazi for a
significant portion of his Professorial career?  So the challenge is
to show either the compatibility of _Sein & Zeit_ with Nazism, or that
the text is itself nazi-istic?  Failing that initial understanding,
I've no inclination to play.
-- 
Michael Feld                         | E-mail:  <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy                  | FAX:     (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba               | Voice:   (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Does evil imply error?
Date: 18 Aug 92 05:13:25 GMT
	<BILL.92Aug16190021@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>
	<1992Aug17.045220.14806@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

   Bill Skaggs:
   > You are saying that a person who does evil should be assumed to not
   > know what is good?

   Mikhail Zeleny:
   > No, Bill, I am not that much of a Platonist.

Then I fail to understand your rationale for ignoring Heidegger's
moral philosophy.

  MZ:
  > However, I sometimes wonder about the assumption you mention.  Do
  > you think it may be justified? 

In my opinion Dostoevsky refutes it comprehensively and eloquently.

Regards,
	-- Bill
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug19.172735.6787@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Aug19.194436.4924@sics.se>
	<1992Aug20.075850.20324@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 09:46:17 GMT

In article <1992Aug20.075850.20324@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >Thinking more about your question, I also think that the existence of a
   >set of all truths is related to the Popperian idea of verisimilitude
   >(what Niiniluoto calls 'truthlikeness') -- of how close a scientific
   >theory is to the Whole Truth about the world as a Peircean ideal end of
   >inquiry.

  Popper's notion of verisimilitude, surely, had nothing at all to do
with any notion of "the Whole Truth about the world", but concerned
the problem of distinguishing, from the point of view of truth and
falsity, between two theories that both have false consequences as
well as true consequences.

  >Someone who believes in the objectivity of science (notice I
  >didn't say 'realist' this time) could claim that if there is no set of
  >all truths then problems emerge about the aims of scintific inquiry.

  No doubt somebody could claim this. Are you also saying that such a
claim makes good sense?
From: rob@KAMAN.COM (Rob Vienneau)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Wittgensteins Logic Contributions
Date: 21 Aug 92 19:31:53 GMT

Recently, there has been a debate about Wittgenstein's contributions
to logic and its philosophy. Are not the following important
contributions from the Tractatus?

Invention of truth tables.

Definition of a tautology as a compound proposition that is true under
all possible assignments of truth values to the atomic propositions
of which it is composed.

Sheffer defined a relation from which "NOT", "AND", "OR", and
"IF"-"THEN" can be defined. Was the importance of this generally
realized before the Tractatus?

For an interesting presentation of an interpretation of W's later
philosophy using a mathematical example, see Saul Kripke's
_Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language_.

                                       Robert Vienneau
                                       rob@kaman.com
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: davidc@panix.com (David B. Chorlian)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence 
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 00:41:16 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix, NYC

In <1992Aug14.124501.14732@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>I find the question of the nature of meaning to be the second most
>important classical philosophical question, the first being that of the
>structure of reality.  The contributions of Frege, Russell, Cantor, Tarski,
>Church, et al. to one or both of them, as the case may be, could hardly be
>overestimated. 

You overestimate them.  The contributions of Husserl, Heidegger, and
Wittgenstein to understanding the structure of the everday reality
in which we live our lives is far more significant. (And not because
they offer a coherent set of answers.)  Both Husserl and Wittgenstein
were interested in logic and mathematics at the beginning of their
philosophical careers, making significant contributions to the
philosophy of logic and mathematics, and each turned from the model
of formal logic as a controlling discipline to studies which rooted
themselves in what they thought was the everyday experience of
humankind.  In doing this they approached their work with the same
degree of rigor as they had brought to their studies of formal
logic.  Their results show that the world cannot be understood as
the objective correlate of a system of formal logic, as a set of
objects with properties, but as constituted by a range of human
activities and practices which show a complicated and subtle
"grammar".

>cordially,
>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>eleven more days and counting...
>"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."

David B. Chorlian
Neurodyamics Lab
SUNY/HSCB
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Christopher P Menzel         )
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 19:41:22 GMT

In article <1992Aug18.135945.7450@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>MA:
>>>>>What about  the true propositions that are left out of USC(T)?  I
>>>>>suggest that we interpret these as _noumenal truths_ -- ineffable
>>>>>but  true propositions,  such as  facts about God.   The question
>>>>>of whether there actually is  an alethic totality  made up of all
>>>>>true _propositions_ is, of course, left unanswered.
>>
>MZ:
>>Chris Menzel has adequately addressed this claim in the concluding remarks
>>of his article on this thread.
>
>He has presented one more argument in ZF -- this hardly settles the
>issue.  As to his comments about omniscience I find them absurd.  

Sputter!...Such impudence!  Hey, I have TENURE!

>If God knows all truths then surely (if the word 'all' is to have any 
>                             ^^^^^^
>proper meaning) there must also _be_ a set of all truths.

Rhetoric alert!!!  So the idea is that `all' has its "proper meaning"
only if the things quantified over constitute a set, and indeed that
it is absurd to suggest otherwise?  Care to provide an argument for
that--beyond an emphatic "surely" (bang the table, stamp the floor)?

>MZ:
>  Why worry about this any more than you
>>worry about the existence of an alethic totality of all sets (in ZF, that
>>is)? 
>
>I do worry -- about both.  The existence of a set of all true
>propositions is linked to many important philosophical problems.
>The articulation of a successful Platonist philosophy of mathematics
>is probably not possible with just a set of all true statements since
>if Fermat's Last Theorem, eg., is true the proof of this could be
>inexpressible.

And how, exactly, the does the existence of a set of all truths help
us here (if that's what you're suggesting; if not, what ARE you
suggesting)? 

--Chris Menzel
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Heidegger, Hitler, Racism and logic.
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 16:44:00 +0000


... I just picked up on a thread by Michael Zeleny, in which he
castigates Heideggers anti-semitic and Nazi symapthies.


This probably isn't the place to raise the issues, but I have always
been struck by how _logical_ bothe Nazis and Marxists are: I had an
extraordinary conversation with a Nazi ex-patriot in South Africa,
who used to run a local Christian chat show on the radio (you may
choose not to believe all this - I had trouble myself). Anyway he was
trying to convince me of the logical necessity of apartheid. His
arguments were lucid and coherent. Eventually I traced them back to
the key difference in our outlooks...

"Right" he said " you have to admit that the slant-eyes - the
coolies, and the blacks - they're different - right?"

"No" I said " I don't admit that".

"Well" he said "then there's no point in talking to you is there?"

What frightened me was how compellingly he was able to build on that
one, seemingly innocent assumption, to demonstrate that the
difference should be preserved - by legislation - and that any
inter-racial conflict was a natural result of that difference, and
that he and I, as standing irrevocably on one side of that
difference, were bound to defend our own side.

I have had similar conversations with Marxists.

Logic, by itself, can be a most dangerous tool. I hope that this
story will go some way to explaining why I personally have stressed
my own interest in elucidating the assumptions on which any
philosophies are based, and also explaining some of the personal
distaste I have for those who worship pure logic, without regard to
the primary assumptions on which they based their arguments.

If - as Michael has suggested - Heidegger was a raving Nazi, I would
not personally allow this to detract from his performance in terms of
logic: Many Nazis have displayed an unswerving dedication to logic in
their implementations of 'final solutions' [Extremely final in many
cases] and 'medical research'.  I _understand_ the
Nazi/Racist/Elistist perspective: I don't _like_ it, and I feel that
it is based on false premises, but I _understand_ it.

I feel bound to say here therefore, that because Nazism is
distateful, surely should not prevent us from accepting Heidegger as
a philosopher. As a human maybe, but not as a philosopher .....

Leo
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Objectivism/Existence
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 09:34:16 GMT

In article <1992Aug17.203645.26278@cis.umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU 
(Stephen Grossman) writes:

  >Now, my critics know why it was childishly easy to debate the
  >creatures who inhabit university "philosophy" departments.

  I don't doubt this. Were not the debates in fact a rout, with your
opponents beating a hasty retreat as soon as they saw you in the
corridor? That's the normal reaction in cases of this kind.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug13.143151.11881@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Aug13.155837.12893@sics.se>
	<1992Aug13.185324.18254@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 20:21:26 GMT

In article <1992Aug13.185324.18254@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >The whole of his corpus.  So I don't care what anyone says, Ramsey's
   >still a big man in my book ...well over 17 stone they said...

  Yes, but Ramsey himself (polemicizing against awe before the vastness of
the universe) claimed not to be impressed by his own size.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 11:53:02 +0000

denmckinnon@halls1.cc.monash.edu.au (NEIL MCKINNON) writes..

[...]


>It follows that truth is relativized to each individual, his/her
>observations, and the ideal theory applicable to him/her at any given
>time. There is something else which is interesting to note. Putnam's
>criteria for the status Ideal Theory were that the theory in question
>satisfies maximally all operational constraints (i.e. observational
>evidence) and theoretical constraints *we* put on theory acceptance.
>Now it occurs to me that the ideal theory (and therefore much of what
>is true) applicable to an individual is partially dependent upon the
>theoretical constraints that person chooses to impose on theory
>acceptance. Not everyone will follow Putnam's line (i.e. the ideal
>theory must be maximally simple, conservative etc.). Some will want
>to impose a constraint like "must not conflict with a literal
>interpretation of the Bible." Other things are a mystery to me, like
>what theoretical constraints would be laid down for the ideal theory
>of 4 year old Christopher?

I think you have hit the nail on the head there: What you have
described as 'operational constraint' is what I have called
'underlying assumptions and beliefs' and what you and Putnam seem to
call an 'Ideal Theory' is what I call a worldview.

>What bothers me about this picture now is that it does not seem to
>explain, for example, the convergence of beliefs within a society,
>and how we use our language successfully as a communal device to
>attain goals. Putnam feels the need to retain realism (though he is
>an anti-realist at base) as an model to explain these things, but I
>don't see how they can in fact be explained if without assuming that
>there might be a language-independent, objective Universe.

I am beginning to see why Gary recommended Putnam to me...:-)

Surely the point is that the anti-realist position isn't that there
isn't a reality, but that it is permanently inaccessible to the Ideal
Theory. The Theory is - a theory.

>Neil.

 Leo
From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Hitler, Racism and logic.
Date: 17 Aug 92 08:29:13 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Aug17.042914.14805
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Aug17.030234.1300@a.cs.okstate.edu>
onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>[...]

Charles, I find your statements pertaining to Heidegger's Nazi involvement
to be wholly contrary to the facts of the matter, as described in numerous
monographs on the subject, and summarized by me earlier on this thread.  It
appears that you are intent on pursuing this ignoble course of
falsification of historical record in full cognizance of the evidence I
adduced elsewhere; accordingly I have nothing more to add to this topic
beyond making a final statement of my utter disgust with your deliberate
untruths.  You are most welcome to have the last word.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence  
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 16 Aug 92 22:59:42 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

  
> >zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):  
  
[a cart-full of palavra deleted]  
   
> I find the question of the nature of meaning to be the second most  
> important classical philosophical question, the first being that of the  
> structure of reality.  The contributions of Frege, Russell, Cantor, Tarski, 
> Church, et al. to one or both of them, as the case may be, could hardly be  
> overestimated.   
  
however, "meaning" and "reality" are just another couple of words among  
thousands of words of our language...they have no magical nature to be  
hooked on...but those people were looking for magical solutions to the  
problems which are deeply rooted in language and which can be solved by   
hard work and patience of a fish-line un-tangler...:->  
  
If you really want to discover the order of importance (if there is  
such an order) of our words, perhaps you may start from "will" which   
would lead you to the most intimate corners of our language...and I bet  
you would love that trip...it is not because the question of the nature   
of "will" to be the most important, but just because it is a knot head...  
  
[another cart-full of palavra deleted]  
  
> cordially,  
> mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu  
> eleven more days and counting...  
> "Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."  
  
le Chevalier des Mots.
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Does evil imply error?
Date: 17 Aug 92 02:00:21 GMT
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

   > Now, clearly an ethics is never deducible from logic alone; nor
   > is Heidegger's doctrine in any way limited to the same.  In this
   > sense, it is indeed important to note the moral failings of its
   > creator, for these failings throw light on what may be
   > interpreted either as a fundamental gap between theory and
   > praxis, very likely due to an essential feature of the former, or
   > as prima facie evidence of its internal inconsistency, which
   > brings us back into the provenance of logic, or, finally, as a
   > sign of a fatal defect in its basic assumptions.  In no case does
   > the philosopher escape unscathed by the ramifications of his
   > personal scrofulousness. 

You are saying that a person who does evil should be assumed to not
know what is good?

	-- Bill
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 20 Aug 92 14:28:55 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <1992Aug19.094252.7977@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>In article <1992Aug19.080257.4921@sics.se> 
>torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>
>>   >On a realist reading of mathematical truth, a proposition such as
>>   >Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false.  What I suggest is 
>>   >that even if a proof one way or the other is never found, it still
>>   >exists (this is what I called a 'noumenal truth' in my note).
>>
>TF:
>>  What exists?
>
>The proof of FLT (in the _nous_ of God, see below).
>

OK. Does a solution to the Halting problem for Turing machines "exist"?
Does a bijection from the reals to the integers exist? I would guess you
want to say no.

So if the statement "The Fermat Conjecture is decidable" is either true or
false, why can't it be false? In which case a proof will never be found,
and I would prefer to say that a proof didn't exist.

I don't think you can arbitrarily assert that the FC is decidable, which
is what you appear to be doing. If you can prove it is, I can send you
an application form for a Fields medal.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Objectivism, Aug.4
Date: 13 Aug 92 00:29:40 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

In article <1992Aug12.204436.8690@cis.umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>	This is important, that even very briefly, Smith has corrupted 
> metaphys-ics w/epistemology. Forget about "point" or "talk" as they are 
> mere epistemology. Metaphysics or existence just exists.

I just made a long reply to this. Honestly, I have no idea what pmsc13sg was
getting at, but I remembered a story I'd written in which a character 
is accused of this very corruption, so I posted the relevant parts. This
was probably a bad move. My hope was that pmsc13sg would think I'm making some
very esoteric point, and attack it, and then I could bluff a few more times
until I understood one thing that he's said. Then I could make oblique fun of 
it and exit the thread. (No malice, of course, we've all done something like
this at one time or another ... remember an argument you're familiar with that
contains the key words and keep spitting it out until you're clued in ...)

But that's a procedure more suited to one of the talk.* groups, like 
talk.philosophy.misc. So, briefly, Leo or pmsc13sg, what's up with this
Epistemology and Metaphysics thing? I feel like I want to contribute but
I'm all lost and stuff. Thanks.


> You are epistemologically privileged to know our wisdom. Our 1985
> essay, "Existence 2," is available thru net.

Again, please send it to the address below.


Tom

******************************************************************************> Tom Price  |  Obscure Dropout  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************
From: mw@ki.fht-mannheim.de (Marc Wachowitz)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 21 Aug 92 09:00:51 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Fachhochschule fuer Technik Mannheim
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

skataria@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca wrote:
: WHAT IS LOVE? 
: Can somebody give me a convincing answer?

You :-)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marc Wachowitz, mw@gandalf.ki.fht-mannheim.de, 75742@novell1.rz.fht-mannheim.de
  *  wonder everyday    *    nothing in particular    *    all is special  *