From: garvin+@cs.cmu.edu (Susan Garvin)
Subject: Re: Supreme Court Upholds Freedom of Speech
Summary: Read the decision, folks
Keywords: DODie lies again
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 04:12:12 GMT

In article <1993Jan25.191239.29856@ncsu.edu> dsh@eceyv.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger) writes:
#The Court rejected both arguments -- that the protesters had discriminated
#against "women in general" and "women who sought abortions".  Scalia
#said that at the bare minimum, the protesters would have had tto focus
#upon women "by reason of their sex" in order for the Klan act to apply.

Reverend Holtsinger is actually close to the truth in this part.
I included the relevant parts of the decision at the bottom of
this post.


#He said that the protesters' purpose was "physical intervention"
#between "abortionists and innocent victims", and their purpose was
#not "directed specifically at women as a class". 

Here, however, Reverend Holtsinger reverted to his old tactic of
misrepresenting what someone said.  Justice Scalia most certainly
did not say "that the protesters' purpose was "physical intervention"
between "abortionists and innocent victims"".  He quoted Jayne
Bray et al as saying that, but DODie evidently couldn't resist
the temptation to make it appear that a Supreme Court justice
had used the phrase "innocent victims" to describe aborted
fetuses.

Susan

'finger dsh@odin.ece.ncsu.edu' for documentation which shows that 
DODie lies about other Supreme Court cases, too



  "To begin with, we reject the apparent conclusion of the
District Court (which respondents make no effort to
defend) that opposition to abortion constitutes discrimina-
tion against the -class- of -women seeking abortion.- 
[...]

  Respondents' contention, however, is that the alleged
class-based discrimination is directed not at -women
seeking abortion- but at women in general.  We find it
unnecessary to decide whether that is a qualifying class
under 1985(3), since the claim that petitioners' opposi-
tion to abortion reflects an animus against women in
general must be rejected.  We do not think that the
-animus- requirement can be met only by maliciously
motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign (though objec-
tively invidious), discrimination against women.  It does
demand, however, at least a purpose that focuses upon
women by reason of their sex-for example (to use an
illustration of assertedly benign discrimination), the
purpose of -saving- women because they are women from
a combative, aggressive profession such as the practice of
law.  The record in this case does not indicate that
petitioners' demonstrations are motivated by a purpose
(malevolent or benign) directed specifically at women as
a class; to the contrary, the District Court found that
petitioners define their -rescues- not with reference to
women, but as physical intervention -`between abortion-
ists and the innocent victims,'- and that -all [petitioners]
share a deep commitment to the goals of stopping the
practice of abortion and reversing its legalization.-  726
F. Supp., at 1488.  Given this record, respondents'
contention that a class-based animus has been established
can be true only if one of two suggested propositions is
true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be
presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent
is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined
solely by effect.  Neither proposition is supportable."
Newsgroups: talk.abortion,talk.politics.misc,alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,talk.religion.misc