HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bvs@photon.com (Bruce Shetler)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: SPAN
Date: 18 Dec 92 01:18:49 GMT
Organization: Photon Research Associates, Inc.
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]


Apparently there is something called the Space Physics Analysis
Network.  Does anyone out there have knowledge of this net, how to
access it, etc.?  Feel free to reply here or via e-mail.  

Thank you,
Bruce

--

========================================================================
  Bruce Shetler                           
  Photon Research Associates          Living in Southern California...
  San Diego, CA   92121               The ultimate oxymoron?
  bvs@photon.com        
========================================================================
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 00:49:32 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology

In article <SHAFER.92Dec11113554@rigel.dfrf.nasa.gov> shafer@rigel.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) writes:
>Being success oriented is a wonderful idea if you're not depending on
>the developement of cutting-edge technology for your success.  The
>YF-22/YF-23 program was an outstanding example of how very well it
>works to be success oriented.  They were integrating elements that
>were somewhere between off-the-shelf and state-of-the-art into those
>aircraft.
>
>But suppose that they were depending on the timely development of
>several new technologies?  Maybe new engines _and_ new structural
>materials _and_ passive sensors _and_ flight control computers?
>Then every slip in every new technology would slip the program.

The answer to this one, of course, is obvious...  You need two separate
streams of activity:  the X stream, which pushes the edge of technology
and sometimes cuts itself when the edge turns out to be sharp, and
the YF stream, which builds production prototypes using technology whose
sharp edges are already known.  Trying to skip the X stage of the process
is attractive but doesn't work all that well (it's not for lack of trying,
either).

However, I think you can make a good case that projects in both streams
ought to be run on a "success-oriented" basis.  For the YF stream, as
Mary points out, it works extremely well.  And the X stream's job is not
to build things but to learn things, and ultimately you learn by making
mistakes... so best make them as quickly and cheaply as possible.  The
more time and money you spend trying to ensure that an X-stream project
won't fail, the more the project's cost/benefit ratio deteriorates.
(Maybe I'm just cynical, but I suspect we'd know more about hypersonic
flight if we'd flown the X-30 through X-35 as fast-track experimental
hypersonic craft, instead of spending ten years on the ground "preparing"
for an X-30 that will never fly.)  The X stream *will* have failures;
the stream as a whole needs to accommodate this, but the individual
projects should aim to succeed or fail quickly.
-- 
"God willing... we shall return."       | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
       -Gene Cernan, the Moon, Dec 1972 |  henry@zoo.toronto.edu  utzoo!henry
From: Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca (Nick Janow)
Subject: Re: fast-track failures
Organization: MIND LINK! - British Columbia, Canada
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 06:59:58 GMT

gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:

> When fighter development from concept to flying prototype cost less than
> $100,000, normally funded internally by the company, and took less than a
> year, planes were simpler then, that was an acceptable approach. Now with
> development costs running into the billions, and usually taxpayer funded,
> the financial risks of a failed project have become too high to take such a
> cavalier approach.

I wonder if the development of the hardware might still cost something close
to the 1992 equivalent of $100,000...with the additional billions required
for paperwork, politics, and legal nonsense.  :-/

--

Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro,alt.sci.planetary
From: sysmgr@king.eng.umd.edu (Doug Mohney)
Subject: Re: Galileo's Atmospheric Probe Passes Health Checks
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 20:00:23 GMT
Organization: Computer Aided Design Lab, U. of Maryland College Park
Reply-To: sysmgr@king.eng.umd.edu

In article <1992Dec15.170442.1866@elroy.jpl.nasa.gov>, baalke@kelvin.jpl.nasa.gov (Ron Baalke) writes:

>     Its incandescent shock wave will be as bright as the sun and
>reach temperatures up to 28,000 degrees Fahrenheit.  After entry,
>the fore and aft heat shields of the deceleration module will be
>shed by deploying a small pilot parachute and then a large main
>chute, exposing the descent module to Jupiter's hydrogen/helium
>atmosphere.

Will entry be observed by the camera on the orbiter? 

                    I have talked to Ehud, and lived.
  -- >                  SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU                        < --
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: philb@techbook.com (Phil Biehl)
Subject: Apollo 13 book
Organization: TECHbooks of Beaverton Oregon - Public Access Unix
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 21:28:48 GMT

I'm looking for a book I heard about a number of years ago regarding the
Apollo 13 mission and near disaster. I believe it was called "Houston,
We Have a Problem" or something like that. I thought it was by Buzz
Aldrin but a library search found nothing. It's an account of the
engineering behind the Gold Team that brought the astronauts safely
home. Has anyone heard of or have such a book? Where can I get it?
Thanks & happy ho ho.

Phil Biehl
Home Row, Inc.

-- 
philb@techbook.COM  Public Access User --- Not affiliated with TECHbooks
Public Access UNIX and Internet at (503) 220-0636 (1200/2400, N81) 
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer)
Subject: Re: DoD launcher use
Organization: Evil Geniuses for a Better Tomorrow
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 20:40:50 GMT

In article <1992Dec11.171055.24364@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman) writes:

>>The current head of Space Command ran the air war against Iraq and was
>>hampered by lack of access to satellite images. A vehicle with DC's
>>turnaround time is just what he needs.

>This puzzles me somewhat. DC would allow a short notice launch of a LEO
>satellite, but such satellites have very short, and fixed, looks at a
>given combat theatre. If would seem to me that recon aircraft are still
>a better choice for tactical recon. 

for many applications satellite is better. Recon aircraft are too easy
to shoot down (especially when doing Bomb Dammage Assessments). In addition,
every aircraft in the theatre needs services for takeoff, landing, refueling,
jamming, defense suppression, ATC, fighter cover, and others. Every recon
sortie you fly looses you a sortie for CAP, bombing, or whatever. In 
addition, satellite images can be made available sooner and are far fresher
than photos taken from aircraft.

Aircraft DO have a role but rapid satellite deployment will make your air
force a LOT more productive.

>Using DC itself as a recon platform
>seems like serious overkill, 

Not DC itself. DC simply launches the satellite.

>but then the military always likes overkill I suppose. 

Sometimes. But then so would you if it was YOUR ass on the line getting
shot at.

  Allen
-- 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Allen W. Sherzer | "A great man is one who does nothing but leaves        |
|  aws@iti.org     |  nothing undone"                                       |
+----------------------134 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX----------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 22:14:10 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In <1992Dec16.124640.29309@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:

>Where did I say that? If Saturn had pogoed just a little harder,
>the Apollo program would have been dead in the water with no one
>killed, and no one on the Moon either. 

Like it or not, Apollo *worked*.  Can you name a program of
similar size and complexity, using your new, improved, failure-
oriented management system, that did as well.

>Neither the Soviets nor the US had serious contingency plans in 
>place in the race to the Moon. 

Oh?  Diverting an Earth-orbital mission (Apollo 8) into a
circumlunar flight, because of a rumor that the Soviets were 
going do it first, sounds like a contingency plan to me.  Unless
you're rewriting history again.


>Either critical systems worked as planned, or the program 
>failed. One of the Soviet critical systems did fail, ours did
>not. So we "won", but it wasn't a rational way of running a
>developmental program to deliver a reliable, economical launch 
>system. That's why we don't fly Saturns today.

Yes, you're definitely rewriting history, again.
From: roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: "trivial engineering"
Date: 12 Dec 92 02:48:28 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.Bz4LE6.DtI.1
Distribution: sci
Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology formerly National Bureau of Standards
X-Added: Forwarded by Space Digest
Original-Sender: isu@VACATION.VENARI.CS.CMU.EDU


-From: ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright)
-Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
-Date: 11 Dec 92 17:28:26 GMT
-Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA

-By that logic, every jet-engine design is a "radically new technology."
-This "isn't trivial engineering that can be brushed aside by saying
-it's been done before with other engine designs... It *should* work, 
-but they won't know until they try it what problems may develop."  For
-some reason, I don't see airliners falling out of sky because of the
-"radically new" engines that are introduced, quite regularly, every
-few years.

Somebody (I think it was Goldin) commented recently on a jet engine
company's recent design of the new engine. The design process cost
something around a billion dollars - they hope to sell enough to pay off
the design cost in 20 years. And it wasn't a radical new design - it just
gets a few percent improvement in power or efficiency compared to an
existing engine. (I would *hope* that designing a throttleable RL-10
or an RL-200 costs less than a billion dollars, but I can't say for sure.
A large part of the cost has to be for testing.) One advantage for rocket
engine technology is that it's "younger" than jet engine technology -
a relatively inexpensive change could possibly result in a significant
improvement.

->>Saying that doesn't make it so.  The engine is about as "radically
->>new" as a new microprocessor.  

The cost of designing a new microprocessor can also approach a billion
dollars. (Not sure of the exact magnitude - >$100 million appears to be
fairly common.)

-It's amazing that things we did routinely in the 1960's are considered
-challenging today.  I guess we've lost a lot of technology since then,
-right?

If Goldin has his way, I suspect a lot of new things will be tried.
Those "smaller, faster, cheaper" spacecraft could be used to test
advanced propulsion systems, for instance.

John Roberts
roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov
From: BrianT@cup.portal.com (Brian Stuart Thorn)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 92 18:35:51 PST
Organization: The Portal System (TM)
  <1gvl1jINN84@mirror.digex.com>


>Here seems a stupid one?
>
>SVS needed a clear payload bay in order to test full arm extension.???
>
>Now when a satellitte is carried up, it is inside some shrouds and often
>a turntable spinner.  Also bigger payloads are on racks.
>
>Why not towards the last day of flight,  EVA two astronauts and jettision
>the miscellaneous hardware.?  sure it's sapce junk,  but they could
>wrap it all together on some cables and deploy a large mylar drdrogue
>shield so it's radar visible and has high atmospheric drag.  it should come
>down in a few years, if the drag is sufficient.
>
>any guesses?


  No, that's not a very good idea. We don't need more Space Junk floating
  around up there no matter how easy it is to see.
   
  On the other hand, when a TDRS/IUS is sent on it's way, it opens up
  a great big space in the payload bay. Plenty of room for the RMS
  Space Vision System's needs. So, if it needs a clear payload bay for
  tests, fly it on STS-54 (TDRS-F/IUS) or STS-51 (ACTS/TOS). I don't
  understand how this idea escaped the person who replied to my original
  post.
  
  -Brian
  
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: what the little bird told Henry
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 12:46:40 GMT

In article <ewright.724447336@convex.convex.com> ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) writes:
>In <1992Dec13.182843.9876@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>>Success oriented has always been a pejorative phrase in any complex
>>developmental program that isn't tolerant of major program slippages
>>and that doesn't have practically unlimited funding to fix problems
>>as they appear. IE any non-military or commercial program. 
>
>Actually, commercial projects tend to be very success oriented, 
>because (unlike the public sector) failure does not bring in 
>more money and when the money's gone, the project's over.  The
>failure-oriented, "cover your butt" mentality only ensures
>failure, and that doesn't go over big with investors and financial
>people.

Actually operating without contingency planning for failures of
particular developmental parts of your program is what's "failure
oriented" because you're going to get bit in the butt when some
promised system doesn't pan out and your project *depends* on
it working for the project to succeed. That then makes your total
project a *failure* rather than a success. Success orientation
says every planned system is going to work just hunky dory and
we don't need no stinkin' contingency planning. A realistic
approach on the other hand *expects* some things not to work
and has viable alternatives in progress to cover their butt
and make the system work.

>>Any realistic development program *expects* problems along the way 
>>and plans for alternative approaches if one of the developmental 
>>technologies fails to live up to it's promise. Apollo took extraordinary 
>>risks in the Saturn booster program and suffered near catastrophe at 
>>least twice, either of which could easily have been like the Soviet N-1 
>>failures instead of the successes they were.
>
>Oh, I see.  You aren't afraid the project will ultimately fail.
>You're afraid that someone will get killed along the way.  In
>that case, we'd better put an end to all large industrial projects.
>Have you ever heard the saying, "every bridge kills a man?"

Where did I say that? If Saturn had pogoed just a little harder,
the Apollo program would have been dead in the water with no one
killed, and no one on the Moon either. Development is a risky
business. Not to plan for failures, and work arounds to those
failures is extremely risky business. Neither the Soviets nor
the US had serious contingency plans in place in the race to the 
Moon. Either critical systems worked as planned, or the program 
failed. One of the Soviet critical systems did fail, ours did
not. So we "won", but it wasn't a rational way of running a
developmental program to deliver a reliable, economical launch 
system. That's why we don't fly Saturns today.

Gary

Newsgroups: sci.space
From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 17:57:19 GMT

In article <ewright.724021208@convex.convex.com> ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) writes:
>In <1992Dec9.133030.6288@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>>An SSTO has to haul all of it's engine and structure mass to orbit so
>>these have to be lighter than a staged rocket that can discard engines
>>and structure along the way. This is inherent in SSTO design. So a
>>staged rocket can be made to have lower stresses than a SSTO for the
>>same payload.
>
>Except that there is absolutely no relationship between the size
>(thrust) of an engine and the "stress" on it.  Robert Truax has
>designed very large engines for his Sea Dragon (millions of pounds
>thurst) with extremely *low* chamber pressures.  Faulty analogies
>to race cars not withstanding.

Snide remarks not withstanding, chamber pressure isn't the only form
of stress on a vehicle. While I like Truax's Sea Dragon proposal
on several grounds, the low chamber pressures lead to very high
loads on the turbopumps because so much more fuel per unit time
has to flow to achieve the high thrust required with low pressure
engines. Reducing stress in one area can lead to increased stress 
in another area when the objective remains to get a vehicle from 
surface to orbit in a single leap. The high speed pumps, not combustion 
chamber stresses, are the main reliability concern of liquid fuel rockets
anyway.

>>The wings impose a mass penalty,
>>but that's offset by not having to carry landing fuel and it's tankage 
>>for VTOL operation.
>
>No, it's not.  The mass of propellent required for a vertical landing
>is much less than the weight of the wings.  The only way you can possibly
>come out ahead is if you use the wings for lift on both takeoff and landing.

I'm not convinced this is true, especially if most of the "wing" is really
lifting body. Also the fuel is not the only mass penalty of VTOL, bigger
tankage and structure are required as well. Certainly I agree that HTHL
is most efficient since you don't need as much fuel to get to orbit, or
to get landing fuel to orbit when aerodynamic lift can help out. That
means your vehicle can be smaller and have a better mass ratio than the
pure brute force approaches. Certainly a launcher that is never intended
to re-enter the atmosphere is more efficient without wings, but if the
wings can handle the bulk of the return trip as passive systems not
requiring high speed high precision machinery, they deserve serious
consideration. 

Gary
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: absolutely, positively overnight
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 22:07:11 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology

In article <1992Dec11.172437.24552@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman) writes:
>>... The Saudi
>>royal family would surely buy one.  And then there's Air Force One...
>
>Take a look at Air Force One, or Two. A 747 and a 707. The Air Force
>is very conservative in the choice of aircraft on which to fly the
>President. The Saudi royals are even more conservative...  Give DC 20
>years of routine passenger carrying flight experience...

They adopted the 707 much more quickly than that.  The long delay for
the transition to the 747 was because it was a lot more expensive and
the 707s were working well, not because they were nervous about the
747 being new.

I don't seriously expect that a DC-1 would ever become Air Force One,
actually.  Not because it's dangerous, but because it's too *small*,
and because servicing facilities for it won't be nearly as common as
those for 747s for a long time.  But I rather suspect it would be rather
less than twenty years before the president rides in one.  He *is* the
boss, after all...
-- 
"God willing... we shall return."       | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
       -Gene Cernan, the Moon, Dec 1972 |  henry@zoo.toronto.edu  utzoo!henry
From: claudio@nmsb.larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Egalon)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Micro-g in KC-135
Date: 13 Dec 1992 17:57:21 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
Reply-To: claudio@nmsb.larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Egalon)
NNTP-Posting-Host: b1230bmac9.larc.nasa.gov

What causes the microgravity in the KC-135, the centripetal 
acceleration at the top of the parabola, which may cancel the gravity 
acceleration,  or something else???

claudio@nmsb.larc.nasa.gov

Claudio Egalon


Newsgroups: sci.space
From: roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts)
Subject: Re: Safety margin
X-Added: Forwarded by Space Digest
Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology formerly National Bureau of Standards
Original-Sender: isu@VACATION.VENARI.CS.CMU.EDU
Distribution: sci
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 05:11:26 GMT


-From: prb@access.digex.com (Pat)
-Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
-Date: 15 Dec 92 20:25:53 GMT
-Organization: UDSI

-Right now,  all staged rockets are vintage 60's/50's designs.  they have
-absolutely no margin for safety.  neither does the shuttle.  

Those last two statements are not correct.

John Roberts
roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov

Newsgroups: sci.space
From: dsblack@iastate.edu (Vilkata TDK)
Subject: Re: spacecamp
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 19:25:56 GMT

In <1gftavINNaqj@rave.larc.nasa.gov> claudio@nmsb.larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Egalon) writes:

>As far as I know there are two space-camps one in Huntsville (which 
>is the biggeste one) and another in Florida near KSC. I guess that they 
>have another one in Kansas but I am not sure.

You're right about Huntsville (Alabama) and Florida--Huntsville is the 
original (and, as you said, bigger).  The one in Kansas is (I believe) in
Hutchinson, and I know for a fact it isn't "Space Camp brand".  In other words,
it's not related in any way (legally--obviously the subject matter is similar)
to the Huntsville and Florida ones.  On the other hand, I have heard (my cousin
went to it) that it is very good.  Still, if I had the choice, I'd choose
Huntsville (I've already been twice--VERY good program!).


-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    V I L K A T A     T . D . K .         ------dsblack@iastate.edu------    |
|         If you know what my name refers to, email me!  I forgot!            |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: prb@access.digex.com (Pat)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...)
Date: 19 Dec 1992 16:51:58 GMT
Organization: UDSI
NNTP-Posting-Host: access.digex.com

In article <BzDKw5.3no@news.cso.uiuc.edu> jbh55289@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Josh 'K' Hopkins) writes:
>
>HE indulged in creative accounting?  I think the contract for DC-X was $58 
>million, not a "couple hundred million."  The average total cost of a shuttle
>mission is a little over $500 million not a billion+.
>



I believe this is called "szaboing " it:-)