From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: re:rights?
Organization: WP Group
Distribution: na
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 23:12:58 GMT

From article <1993Jan5.172233.635@samba.oit.unc.edu>, by itsmine@med.unc.edu (Greg Popken):
>>I truly don't understand why you think an individual must be capable 
>>of making moral distinctions in order to be deserving of just treatment.
>>Are your ideas based on some sort of arguments that you'd be willing
>>to share with people who are skeptical of your position?
> 
> Share?  Of course. For you Russell, the world.
> 
> I believe that in order to have rights beings (not individuals) must be
> capable of fully understanding those right, and the concequences of thier
> actions.

Greg, I've understood for quite some time that this is your belief.  I'm
asking you to explain its factual and rational basis.

>>I don't know what sort of cases you have in mind when you post 
>>articles about animals that don't deserve rights, but I often think of 
>>animals that are caught in steel traps, or animals that have just been 
>>shot, or animals that have just had their beaks removed, or monkeys
>>that have had their nerves severed, etc, etc.  
> 
> [I love the way you slip in the Silver Springs thing.]
> In all these cases animals don't have rights.  Rights are not something
> that you base on situational ethics, as you seem to believe.

I don't believe that "rights" are based on situational ethics.  To give
you an example, if we were faced with the alternative of killing an
innocent man in order to save a million other innocent men and women,
I would probably argue that it would be ethically acceptable to kill
the single man.  This doesn't mean that the man's "rights" simply 
disappear in such an instance, nor does it mean that the "badness" of
such a killing simply fades away in the midst of the greater good.  

Perhaps you agree with Thomas Jefferson that men are endowed by their
"creator" with rights, whereas I'm inclined to define the concept 
of rights in more secular terms: It's my contention that the 
concept of a "right" is instituted...  not by some mysterious 
"creators", but by a society's willingness to respect the 
thoughts and feelings of thinking/feeling individuals.   

> That doesn't mean that the treatment of animals in any manner is ethical.
> It does mean that we have a responsibility to be humane to animals, not
> that they have *the right* to be treated humanely.

Unfortunately, I still don't understand how you define the term "rights".

>>Would you also have us believe that an animal cannot be victimized or 
>>misused in any way if it lacks the capacity to make moral distinctions?  
>>If not, why would you quibble over terms like "victim" and "misuse"?
> 
> No, please see above.
> I quibble over these statements because they we used in a context refering
> to my research. They carry with them negative connotations and suggest
> inhumane treatment, which does not accuately describe the situation.

Would it be inaccurate to say that the single man that we might kill,
in the scenario above, is a "victim"?   Probably so.   From the standpoint
of the "victims", there may not be much difference between men in lab
coats conducting pain-avoidance experiments and a group of oversized 
boys with cattle prods.  Surely the victims' pain isn't ameliorated 
by the fact that the guys in lab coats are seeking knowledge rather
than sadistic thrills.

Be that as it may, it's not my intent to malign the character of 
men in lab coats.  If you'd care to exercise some restraint in 
your choice of words, I'll be happy to do likewise.  

>>   Now please explain why you think
>>the concept of "rights" ought to be limited to moral agents, and not
>>applied to moral patients.
> 
> Moral agents and moral patients are concocted definations of designed for
> a system of "right giving" with which I do not agree.  To answer this
> question as stated would lend credence to this system.  If you wish to
> know why I don't feel animals should have rights please reread the above.

I did reread your prior statements and they haven't explained why you
think the way you do.   Are you expecting us to simply accept your beliefs
at face value, without any scrutiny whatsoever?

>>> rl>  Is it truly fair to base our 
>>> rl>treatment of other individuals, not on their abilities, but on 
>>> rl>their membership in a class? 
>>>>
>>> Reread the first statement in this threat.  Does it mention membership in
>>> a class?  Or does it mention *ABILITY* to make moral distinctions?
>>
>>I did reread your statement and it certainly sounded like your concept
>>of justice was tied to class affiliation.
> 
> Oh, so now its *tied* to class affiliation.  Are you admitting that it is
> not *based* on it?

You tell me.  Again let's assume for the moment that you have a 
godlike ability to judge intelligence, and that you were facing 
two individuals, each possessing mental abilities that are more 
or less comparable to the other in spite of the fact that one 
individual happens to be an intelligent chimp whereas the other 
individual happens to be a retarded human.  In deciding which 
individual has "rights", would you base your judgment on class
affiliation?

> 
>>  Let's suppose that there 
>>exist two individuals: an extremely bright chimpanzee who understands
>>some of the concepts of social fair play, however rudimentary, and an
>>extremely retarded human who has the moral-decision making capacity 
>>of a turnip.  Does the chimp deserve more rights than the retarded
>>human?  Or would you say that the human deserves more rights simply
>>because of his genetic class?
> 
> Are you suggesting that chimpanzees are capable of understanding the moral
> implication of thier actions?  If so, can they be held responsible (on
> an ethical bases) for the consequences of those actions?

Are we using the concept of "moral" thinking in the same sense?

I would say that ethical decision-making involves the task of 
making choices between actions that have good outcomes versus 
actions that have bad outcomes.    While an intelligent chimp may 
lack the intellect and training to make the same range of "moral"
choices that professional philosophers might be capable of making,
they're clearly capable of making simple ethical choices.  For example,
a chimp who's used to human companionship might know that it's
"not good" to bite off fingers.  

To the extent that the chimp is capable of making a wider range
of moral choices than a retarded human, would he not deserve more
"rights" than the human?

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals