HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.0 help please
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 16:01:05 GMT

In article <1geiggINN7tv@agate.berkeley.edu> bing@zinc.cchem.berkeley.edu (Bing Ho) writes:

   I realize that I can use somebody's public key and encrypt a message
   to him, but what if I am say the president of a corporation and
   wish to encrypt a sensitive memo to all managers.  Would I have to
   encrypt the file however times I have managers, each to his or her
   own key, or could I create a "list" of recipients?

PGP 2.0 does not have this functionality (It was one of the first
things I noticed back in September).  In fact, PGP 2.1, which I highly
recommend you pick up, doesn't have it either.  HOWEVER, PGP 2.2
*WILL* have it.  I don't know when 2.2 will be released, however I'm
sure that it will be in that release.  

So, to answer your question, given PGP 2.0 or 2.1, you have the
encrypt the file once for each recipient, instead of creating a single
cryptofile that you can send to everyone.  I hope this answers your
question.

   I'm sorry if this is in the documentation, but I wasn't really able
   to elucidate it.

No, You didn't miss anything.

   Thanks for any help.

No problem!

-derek
--
         Derek Atkins -- MIT '93 -- Electrical Engineering
--warlord@MIT.EDU | ..!mit-eddie!mit-athena!warlord | s20069@mitvma.bitnet
      Chairman, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: moore@cs.utah.edu (Tim Moore)
Subject: Re: PGP as a World Standard
In-reply-to: strnlght@netcom.com's message of Thu, 17 Dec 1992 21:53:23 GMT
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept
	<1992Dec17.161719.18422@shearson.com>
	<1992Dec17.215323.1154@netcom.com>
Date: 17 Dec 92 19:57:59

In article <1992Dec17.215323.1154@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

    PGP 1.0 was a violation of the RSA patents. Consider it having a label
   called "fruits of a violation". That label isn't removed simply
   because it passes over some wires to Europe.  Note carefully: a copy
   of PGP 1.0 brought to Europe from the U.S. is NOT ethically equivalent
   to a PGP 1.0 programmed from scratch in Europe.

But it wasn't tainted fruit in Europe because RSA isn't patented
there. Devices that infringe on patents may be confiscated in a civil
action, but if there is no patent, there is no violation. The fact
that PGP is a "fruit of a violation" in the U.S. should cause
Europeans amusement, not guilt. 

I read "Spycatcher" when it came out. I didn't feel any ethical
pressure not to, even though it is banned in the UK. If I read a
blasphemous poem by a Brit I wouldn't feel like a conspirator even
though the author committed a crime in his own country.

   I would agree completely that a programmed-from-scratch implementation
   of RSA in a country where they don't have patent protection is
   perfectly legal and ethical. I would not agree that a copy tranported
   from the U.S., where it is not legitimate, somehow is washed clean in
   the blood of the lamb (have I got the metaphor right?) as it arrives
   at the other end of the phone line.

One should ignore the silly laws of other countries. It is hard enough
to slavishly follow those of one's own.

--
Tim Moore                    moore@cs.utah.edu {bellcore,hplabs}!utah-cs!moore
"Wind in my hair - Shifting and drifting - Mechanical music - Adrenaline surge"
	- Rush
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central
	<0#=rh9n@dixie.com> <1992Dec16.173333.12868@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 19:59:56 GMT

DS> == David Sternlight <strnlght@netcom.com>

 DS> Moreover, others have had over 15 years to try to overthrow [the RSA
 DS> patent] and have not succeeded.

Since US patents, as I recall, expire in 17 years after the date of issue,
without means of renewal, is this a sign that the patent status of RSA will
soon become merely a historical curiosity?

(I'm genuinely unfamiliar with the exact patent issues involved,
particularly the dates...)
--
Christopher K. Davis      | ``Usenet seems to run much like the Kif (or,
<ckd@eff.org>   EFF #14   |   for the TV generation, Klingon) high command.
System Administrator, EFF |   Whoever takes action and can be heard wins.''
+1 617 864 0665  [CKD1]   |   --Peter da Silva <peter@ferranti.com>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: kocherp@leland.Stanford.EDU (Paul Carl Kocher)
Subject: GWBASIC encryption broken (code included)
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 22:50:55 GMT

I don't remember who first posted about the GWBASIC encryption about
a week ago, so I'm posting this for all who are interested.

It turns out that the GWBASIC encryption algorithm is basically what
I thought it was -- just a couple ADD/SUB/XORs using (as I had guessed
from the 143-byte periodicity) an 11-byte key and a 13-byte key.

The code was written quickly -- it's finals week and I have an exam
tomorrow ;-) and worked on my test file but has not been checked
for bugs.  Let me know if you find any problems with it.

-- Paul

________Paul C. Kocher, Box 13554, Stanford, CA 94309, 415/497-6589_________
kocherp@leland.stanford.edu (preferred), root@kocher.stanford.edu.  Contract
programming work sought (PC assembly, security, etc) -- write/call for info.


BASCRACK.C---------------------------------------------------------------

#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv) {

     unsigned char key1[13]={       
        0xA9,0x84,0x8D,0xCD,0x75,0x83,0x43,0x63,0x24,0x83,0x19,0xF7,0x9A};
     unsigned char key2[11]={ 
        0x1E,0x1D,0xC4,0x77,0x26,0x97,0xE0,0x74,0x59,0x88,0x7C};
     int nextbyte, index;
     unsigned char c;
     FILE *infile, *outfile;

     if (argc != 3) {
        printf("Utility to decrypt GWBASIC/BASICA files saved with \",p\"\n\n"
               "Copyright 1992 by Paul C. Kocher.  All rights reserved.\n\n"
               "Usage: BASCRACK encrypted.bas outfile.bas\n");
        exit(1);
     }

     if ((infile=fopen(argv[1],"rb"))==NULL ||
        (outfile=fopen(argv[2],"wb"))==NULL) {
        printf("Error opening file.\n");
        exit(1);
     }

     if (fgetc(infile) == 0xFE) {
        fputc(0xFF, outfile);
     } else {
        printf("Not an encrypted BASIC file\n");
        exit(1);
     } 

     index = 0;
     nextbyte=fgetc(infile);
     while (c=nextbyte, (nextbyte=fgetc(infile)) != EOF) {
        c -= 11 - (index % 11);
        c ^= key1[ index % 13 ];
        c ^= key2[ index % 11 ];
        c += 13 - (index % 13);
        fputc(c, outfile);
        index = (index+1) % (13*11);
     }
     fputc(c, outfile); /* Don't decrypt the EOF character */
     return 0;
}
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: Alex.Strasheim@launchpad.unc.edu (Alex Strasheim)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: University of North Carolina Extended Bulletin Board Service
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 21:52:59 GMT

In article <1992Dec15.200406.14952@macc.wisc.edu> stevens@vms.macc.wisc.edu (PAul STevens - MACC - 2-9618) writes:

>  My feeling is that PKP does not have a valid patent.  If it turns out
>  that they do, then more power to them.

I'm beginning to become a little frustrated with this discussion.  Patent
law is a highly technical field, and unless you're a lawyer who works with
patent law on a regular basis, I think it would be foolish for anyone to
give much creedence to your -- or my -- opinion on the validity of the RSA
patent.  Would you pay much attention to a lawyer's pronouncement that a
crypto system is secure?
--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  laUNChpad.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: norstar@tnl.com (Daniel Ray)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: The Northern Lights
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 11:26:10 GMT

> ...
>    Consequently, I for one am not afraid to stand up and be counted as
>a supporter of the fine work of the PGP development team, and especially
>of Phil Zimmermann, who got the ball rolling with version 1.0.  The
>program currently has far more users and admirers than any other
>public-key encryption system, and for good reason.  It is an elegant
>piece of work, made more elegant with each revision.  Nor am I afraid to
>put myself on record as a principled opponent of the RSA patent (and of
>algorithm/software patents generally), and as an opponent of the
>regulation by the government of cryptographic import/export/use in any
>form.  If my doing so creates any legal exposure for me, then that is a
>risk I am prepared to take for the sake of the proverbial `eternal
>vigilance.'  If it actually ends up costing me or other like-minded
>American citizens, then, in my view, this country's Constitution will
>have suffered yet another humiliating debasement.
>
>    Hugh Miller

I agree with Hugh Miller. Indeed, what a bunch of wimps some of you are!
Don't you see...if they divide us they've got us? PGP is strongest in big
numbers!

And even if the number is down to one, the principle is the same! The price
of freedom is sometimes very dear, but, as an American, I am willing to
attempt to preserve the rapidly diminishing set of individual protections
we still have left. PGP is one of the most important tools to assist in
this that has come along in a long time. C'mon people! Show your *heart*...

dan ray
-- 
norstar
The Northern Lights, Troy NY                                 |      
tnl dialins: +1 518 237-2163 @ 1200-2400 bps 8N1 $free     ` | /    
-------------------------------------------------------  --- * ---  
UUCP: uunet!uupsi3!tnl!norstar                             / | .    
Internet: norstar@tnl.com                                    |      
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: se_schn@pavo.concordia.ca (SCHNAAR, SHELDON E.)
Subject: Re: drug dealers on the high seas (was Risks of Using PGP 2.0)
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Summary: Not made legal != criminal!
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: Concordia University
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 16:27:00 GMT

In article <303@ininx.UUCP>, jkreznar@ininx.UUCP (John E. Kreznar) writes...
>In article <10DEC199213473080@pavo.concordia.ca>, se_schn@pavo.concordia.ca (Ranfry) writes:
> 
>> 	Actually, it IS a crime to transport drugs anywhere in the world.  There
>> is NOT country that has made it legal.  
> 
>Are you suggesting that you think that if something has not been made
>legal, it is therefore a crime?
> 
>With an attitude like that loose in the world, it's no wonder that
>earthside individual freedom is on its last legs.
> 
>-- 
>        Relations among people to be by mutual consent, or not at all.
Arrggghhh, stop twisting other's words to suit yourself.  I did NOT 
state what you attribute to me, that conclusion is ALL yours.  The 
reason I specified that NO country had made drug use legal is because
the person I was responding to stated that some countries HAD made
drug use legal.  Those were TWO separate points.

>         ---John E. Kreznar, jkreznar@ininx.com, uunet!ininx!jkreznar
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rjw@shell.portal.com (Robert John Willis)
Subject: The Security of CRCs
Keywords: CRC
Organization: Portal Communications Company
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 03:40:41 GMT

I recently read something in DR Dobbs about the possibility of altering
a file but keeping the same CRC.  I've tried putting together some
test code, but it doesn't seem to work.  Has anyone done this before

Please reply here or rjw@disco.rgm.com
thanks
 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy
From: carter@cmptrc.lonestar.org (Carter Bennett)
Subject: Re: drug dealers on the high seas (was Risks of Using PGP 2.0)
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 06:09:16 GMT
Organization: CompuTrac Inc., Richardson TX

n article <1992Dec13.203420.18016@pegasus.com> tleylan@pegasus.com (Tom Leylan) writes:
>se_schn@pavo.concordia.ca (Ranfry) writes:
>>
>> 	Name one country where cocaine is legal.
>
>Well the U.S. comes to mind.  You need a license but there are people with
>them mostly researchers.  Just because you need a license doesn't define
>something as illegal.

Yes.  When I was working as a volunteer in the hospital ER, cocaine 1-1/2 %
solution was stocked in the narcotics cabinet.  Under serious lock and key,
mind you.  I did see it used once in the re-breaking of a patient's nose that
had healed incorrectly.

Cheerio!

Carter R. Bennett, Jr. - Scientist | "Oh my God!  I _AM_ a nerd!!!"
carter@scilab.lonestar.org - home  | - C. Bennett, Sept 25, 1992, after
carter@cmptrc.lonestar.org - work  | realizing he had been talking about
KI5SR          | market availability of "preconfigured" Toll-House cookies.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: Multi-way encryption/FAQ/archives?
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 02:02:11 GMT

In article <1992Dec10.184723.6236@octel.com> shaun@octel.com (Attack of the Dayglo Howler Monkeys) writes:

   Is there some way the public-key idea can be extended to handle a centralized
   distribution point?  That is, A sends a message to a redistribution point
   R, which forwards the message on to B, C, and D.  A performs encryption, and
   B, C, and D all decrypt the message and get authentication that it was
   from A as well.  R does nothing but redistribute, and contains no keys or
   encryption software.

   A would be responsible for collecting the public keys of B, C, and D.

Yes.  This is really simple, assuming A knows that B, C, and D are
going to be the only recipients.  All B has to do is encrypt the
message in some secret-key system (DES, IDEA, etc.), and then use
Public-Key encryption to encrypt the secret key in the Public Key of
*each* recipient on the list, and include that in the message, and
then send this whole thing to the mail-exploder, which will send the
message to everyone else.

If A, however, DOESN'T know the keys of B, C, or D, or if E gets added
to the list and A doesn't know this, the above method will fail.

-derek

--
         Derek Atkins -- MIT '93 -- Electrical Engineering
--warlord@MIT.EDU | ..!mit-eddie!mit-athena!warlord | s20069@mitvma.bitnet
      Chairman, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt)
Subject: Re: LUC Public-key Encryption
Organization: Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 04:47:23 GMT

In article <1992Dec11.171631.26834@linus.mitre.org> bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman) writes:
>He should not be able to patent this, since what he has done was all
>known before.

Presumably this would be covered by the Merkle/Hellman patent.  But
would the fact that this is, I gather, isomorphic to RSA cause it to
be covered by the R/S/A patent as well?  Math patents raise tricky
questions.  If a reasonable argument could be made both that it is
"obvious to one versed..." and that it is not directly covered by the
R/S/A claims (I don't think you can control derivatives of your
patent's claims), it could be useful.

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail	  (for research use only, of course)
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
From: bei@dogface.austin.tx.us (Bob Izenberg)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: alt.privacy
Date: 20 Dec 92 18:08:14 GMT
Followup-To: poster
Distribution: na
Organization: The Fortress of Ultimate Dorkiness


	I'd like to read the applicable U.S. regulations on export of crypto-
graphic software.  Have they been put up for ftp anywhere?  If not, pointers
to which government agency to call would be good.
	Please reply by email.  I'll summarize by return mail to any "me too"
messages that I get.
Thanks!

Bob
-- 
 == Family values?  Sure, I've got them.  $200 and my family mows your lawn. ==
 ==============================================================================
           HOME: bei@dogface.austin.tx.us  WORK: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1992 00:30:19 GMT


Arthur Rubin discusses the possibility of PKP going after end users.
It's worth noting that in such a case, they can ask for legal fees
as well, and if they win, the result could be very damaging to some
who think their only exposure is PKP's loss measured as the
Mailsafe or ripem licensing fee.

Others think that the legal costs of going after someone are high
and thus not worth it for PKP. It should be noted that PKP has
in-house as well as retainer counsel, and that the costs might
be quite low.

Note that the above two paragraphs aren't self-contradictory--
they can start after someone at a very low cost, and after
they discover the party involved has resources, can run
up quite a good legal bill with outside counsel.

Note that I'm not suggesting PKP would, or would not do this; simply
addressing the assertions of little risk to violate PKP's patents in
the U.S.

Finally, a correspondent has called my attention to the amusing point
that many attorneys, including the Columbia professor posting here,
say, in effect, "I think you have a good case. There's little risk. Go
ahead. That advice is free. If it turns out to be wrong and you want
my help, you'll have to pay me."

David

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: RSA Question (was Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality)
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<r09LrAXKBh107h@nadir.uucp> <1992Dec18.001213.8000@newton.ccs.tuns.ca>
Date: 17 Dec 92 22:10:30

    As far as I know the most efficient way to solve this is to try different
    values for a until you get a positive integer for b.

Nah.  Modulo N, all integers are positive.  -2 is the same as 350,
mod 352. 

See any algorithms book under "Extended Euclidean Algorithm" for
more description.  Just think of it as the ordinary Euclidean
GCD algorithm, except you keep track of how much of each number
you throw away (sorry if that makes no sense).
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 20:00:46 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1b21

pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes:
> Recent research seems 
> to indicate that (1) the key is 56 bits because there's only 56 bits 
> worth of security in the algorithm anyway, and (2) the NSA S-boxes are 
> chosen to be more secure.  If they genuinely don't have the scoop on 
> DES, why should they promote it while suppressing RSA? 

This seems fairly simple to me.  With the ability to build fast custom 
hardware (certainly within the NSA's capabilities :)), a brute-force search 
of the keyspace of DES is *much* more computationally tractable than it is 
for RSA.  That is to say, DES does not represent a strategic barrier to an 
entity with the resources of a government (or these days, of a medium-sized 
corporation).  RSA evidently does, at least at current levels of knowledge.

DES was never billed as anything more than a cipher system that was good 
enough for most applications.  I think it still serves as such, and at this 
point I, at least, am confident that it's exactly what it's advertised to be.  
I am also confident that the NSA and many of their international counterparts 
can routinely read DES-encoded traffic.

Generally speaking, I find that this does not matter to me.  But make no 
mistake, I do feel that legal restraints against the use of strong 
cryptosystems by private citizens should be opposed, for much the same 
reasons that I support the right to keep and bear firearms and other weapons.

It's not the times when I don't need them that concern me--it's the 
occasional times when I do.  The most likely example for me personally is 
likely to be guarding against corporate espionage; in my particular field, 
assuming adversaries do not have a lot of knowledge and computer power is not 
a particularly safe assumption.



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation
From: mlf3@ns1.cc.lehigh.edu (Matt Fante)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: factorization of c69 that was posted to sci.crypt
Date: 11 Dec 92 21:40:37 GMT
Organization: Lehigh University

Somebody posted that they wanted to factor
c69=132686104398972053177608575506090561429353935989033525802891469459697
to sci.crypt.

Prime Factorization of c69 follows:

 c69 = p23*p21*p26

where,

 p23 = 61676882198695257501367
 p21 = 178230287214063289511
 p26 = 12070396178249893039969681


                                Cheers,
                                Matt Fante

_________________________________________________________________________
                             Matthew Fante
           RIPEM and PGP Public Keys Available Upon Request
_________________________________________________________________________

-- 
________________________________________________________________
                         Matt Fante
________________________________________________________________

       PGP 2.0 and RIPEM Public Keys Available Upon Request

                 IEEE, AMS, ASL, NRA, PA CCW
From: robert.heuman@rose.com (robert heuman)
Subject: RSA Data Security Not
Organization: Rose Media Inc, Toronto, Ontario.
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 07:26:46 GMT
X-Gated-By: Usenet <==> RoseMail Gateway (v1.70)


Date Entered: 12-18-92 02:15
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

S(> I guess companies think there's a big enough market without it. Given
S(> the notorious lack of ethics in some countries, leading to massive
S(> software piracy (Italy and Taiwan come immediately to mind), they
S(> probably aren't losing much anyway.

Unfortunately, David, this penalizes multi-nationals, who then lose 
the ability to communicate the resulting files to their off-shore 
locations, and need to use TWO versions of the same product to cover 
both domestic or international locations.  They tend to NOT BUY such 
restricted software, so market IS lost.  I know that I will NOT buy 
crippled software, and that is exactly what software that cannot be 
used by my employer WORLDWIDE in ONE version is, in MHO.

Bob Heuman <robert.heuman@rose.com>
---
   RoseReader 1.70 P001886: This Canadian has an Opinion...His Own!
   RM 2.00 : RoseNet<=>Usenet Gateway : Rose Media 416-733-2285
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: scs@iti.org (Steve Simmons)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Industrial Technology Institute
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 13:48:20 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>Just a small factual correction for Steve Simmons. My understanding
>is that some PKP patents expire in 1997 and others in about 2000.
>When I said people had had 15 years to challenge the patents, I was
>being approximate, since I don't know how long it was known they
>were applying for patents before they did.

Gee, thanks for correcting me when you were the one who gave out
the incorrect "fact".
-- 
	"You can't get here from here."