HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Labels.
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1992 17:49:00 +0000

sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes..

|> >I'm not sure what the multi-valued reality stuff is, nor what other
|> >contexts you have in mind where this assumption fails.  I have a vague
|> >feeling that what is lurking behind these questions is old phenomena/
|> >noumena or observation-statement/theoretical-statement distinction
|> >together with the usual non-uniqueness problem in saving the phenomena.
|> 
|> >Anything else?
|> 

>"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
>shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
>*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
>particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
>But since I felt that Leo has at least passing familiarity with
>these labels, efficiency of communication is served by using them.

Well Gary: All this has been taking place whilst I was in bed with
the flu. I log in - and you're all taking my name in vain!

No - I didn't entirely understand those labels. I thank you for your
belief that I can come up to speed on philosophical jargon: There are
still a lot of areas where I have NO idea what the jargon means.
Thats why I try to write in a non jargon style. If I am covering old
ground I am happy to be directed to the relevant texts: However I
don't have the time to do another degree in philosophy:-(

I suppose I am wo#rking towards:-

        (i) What if anything, has absloute existence, and what do we
        mean by such a statement?

        (ii) If the answer is nothing, what governs our assumptions
        of existence, and why?

        (iii) Is it possible to live comfortably in a series of
        contingent assumption - A sort of 'God exists - it must be
        Sunday' sort of way, where (irrespective of whether there is
        or isn't a separate reality) we chhose to act as if different
        sets of assumptions were in place on different occasions.

Thats not too clera: I blame the 'flu. Sorry
From: khan@davidsys.com
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Naqshbandiyya Sufi Master
Date: 29 Jul 92 14:33:23 PST
Organization: DAVID Systems Inc, Sunnyvale CA





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Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Subject: Settimbrini
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1992 20:17:43 GMT

Re: M. Zeleny, Jul 24
    I've noticed that when subjectivists are confronted by a serious argu-
ment they tend to abandon their pretense of being interested in philosophy
for metaphors, ad hominems, etc. I made a serious point about artistic in-
fluence in pre-Nazi Germany and was greeted with conceptual disintegration.  
the irony is that opposition to reason was culturally influential in pre-
Nazi Ger. when faced with cultural/econ/pol chaos Ger. responded with ir-
rationality and by blaming reason. This cultural trend exists in the US
and we are going to pay a terrible price someday. Abandoning reason for
nazism and abandoning reason for environmentalist fantasies is the same
foolishness and will have the same destructive result. 
    Contemp. phil. is the problem. It is a concern with literally mind- 
less trivia unrelated to human life. rand may be right or wrong about this or
that but any poage of her writings shows a serious concern with the human need
to have a perspective on his daily actions as a guide to those actions. 
    Analysis, pragmatism, and neo-existentialism have disintegrated serious   
thought into word games and technical trivia. People who have studied what
passes for phil. in universities know this. Harvard thinks phil. is the
elucidation of the arbitrary and conventional usages of language. Rand says that
is a rationalization for using words to manipulate people. the alternative, of
course, is the conceptual grasp of reality. Stephen Grossman

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 15:45:16 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <BruHGx.B2F@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
|> In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
|> > 
|> >In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
|> >|> 
|> > 
|> 
|> [stuff deleted...]
|> 
|> >I'm not sure what the multi-valued reality stuff is, nor what other
|> >contexts you have in mind where this assumption fails.  I have a vague
|> >feeling that what is lurking behind these questions is old phenomena/
|> >noumena or observation-statement/theoretical-statement distinction
|> >together with the usual non-uniqueness problem in saving the phenomena.
|> 
|> >Anything else?
|> 
|> [stuff deleted...]
|> 
|> A label for everything....how nice and comfortable...

"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
But since I felt that Leo has at least passing familiarity with
these labels, efficiency of communication is served by using them.
Since the labels have rather standard meanings in the history of
philosophy and are the sort of things one comes across very early
in studying much metaphysics or philosophy of science, it seemed
reasonable that most others interested in this discussion would
have requisite familiarity with them as well.  Perhaps the
reference to the non-uniqueness problem is a bit beyond this, but
I have given previous reference (for example, to Van Fraassen,
where this is described).  Anyone unfamiliar with it is of course
free to ask (as I asked about Leo's reference to "multi-valued
reality").  To constantly need to redefine and review common
fundamental vocabulary and concepts is an impediment to discussion.
Leo has shown himself to be conversant with these concepts and
quite capable of familiarizing himself with others in a fairly
rapid fashion.

Beyond this, the section of my posting you quote is in fact
a *question* to Leo.  I do not, therefore, think it is meaningful
to describe this as "comfortable".
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Settimbrini
Date: 29 Jul 92 17:33:37 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

In article <1992Jul28.201743.24599@cis.umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>I made a serious point about artistic in-
>fluence in pre-Nazi Germany and was greeted with conceptual disintegration.  

Well, that was only polite of us to greet both of you - he was sitting on your
shoulder, after all!

>the irony is that opposition to reason was culturally influential in pre-
>Nazi Ger. when faced with cultural/econ/pol chaos Ger. responded with ir-
>rationality and by blaming reason.

I think you have the cause/effect reversed. Familiar with Oswald Spengler's
_Decline of the West_? Or even (I'll mention it again since you keep bringing
up Nazism and philosophy) Allan Bloom's _Closing of the American Mind_?
Philosophy leads the world around by the nose, not the other way around.

>    Contemp. phil. is the problem. It is a concern with literally mind- 
>less trivia 

Give me artfully mindless trivia any day.

>unrelated to human life. rand may be right or wrong about this or
>that but any page of her writings shows a serious concern with the human need
>to have a perspective on his daily actions as a guide to those actions. 

So if all this boils down to is wholism, and you, Stephen, preach the gospel
of wholism, why not change tack? People seem to have a Rand problem -- so,
given that, what _other_ thinkers can help us out? Who else can you recommend
to teach us a more wholistic perspective? Thoreau? Bucky Fuller? F. H. 
Bradley? Martin Buber? Anybody? Surely you've read more than just Ayn Rand.

Tom

******************************************************************************
 Tom Price  |  Obscure Dropout  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************
From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Christopher P Menzel         )
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1992 18:08:35 GMT

In article <BrwK0J.Jvx@acsu.buffalo.edu> oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
>In article <Brw9B8.10z@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
>>|> >"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
>>|> >shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
>>|> >*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
>>|> >particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
>>|> [stuff deleted..]
>>|> 
>>|> Labels are also used to devalue something, so that it fits better 
>>|> into the realm of the common place and the "anything else."
>>|> 
>>|> - Peggy -
>> 
>>Could you expand on this?  For example, could you show how my question
>>to Leo either devalues or attempts to devalue anything?  In particular,
>>could you indicate how establishing something as based on (to pick
>>a single example) the phenomena/noumena distinction devalues it?  In
>>the process, could you please give an account of the labels *you* are
>>using?  For instance, what do you mean by "value", and how is this
>>affected by the question I asked?  And what is meant by "the realm of
>>the common place" and "the 'anything else'"?
>> 
>
>No, will not expand on this.  Too much work.
>
>I expect you *know* what I meant.  Now you wish to discuss it (to 
>death) on your own terms, so you can "win" a philosophical battle 
>of some sort.

>Not worth the energy to do battle over this.

I for one have *no* idea what you meant, and the impression I'm left
with is only that, failing any clear answer to a clear and reasonable
question, you cast vague and unwarranted aspersions.

Chris Menzel





Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 13:28:50 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1107@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:
|> In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

|> >who fail to make it end up with severely shortened lifespans.  There
|> >is in fact a strong force of natural selection on those who adopt
|> >the wrong (okay, *a* wrong) epistemology.
|> 
|> Sounds like you're implying that one set of words must be used to map
|> to this separate reality - or else what? For an anti-realist, you put
|> a big load on language, "Right thinking or bust" (?)

There are many (non-isomorphic) mappings that may be used successfully.
It does not follow from this that *any* mapping is "correct".  The
anti-realist does not believe that *anything* goes, but rather that
there is no particular mapping with a special claim to preferred status.
The world is really out there -- under one or another description.
There are a number of "right" descriptions you may pick.  But there are
*wrong* descriptions as well.  Choose one that is wrong enough and you
are dead meat.  In this sense, indeed, "Right thinking or bust."
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Settimbrini
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1992 13:30:06 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Jul29.233303.4490@guinness.idbsu.edu>, holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

|> To jostle your preconceptions a little: I have read the works of Ayn
|> Rand, and they had a very powerful effect on improving my moral
|> character when I was a teenager.  Even when I was a teenager, I could
|> tell that she was not competent as a technical philosopher; I also
|> knew enough about the views of enough philosophers to know that her
|> characterizations of their opinions were caricatures.  I _agree_ with
|> you that our society is in danger of disintegration through a failure
|> to firmly support the supremacy of reason and the specific reasoned
|> principles on which this country (and others) were founded.  But I
|> suggest that independent, reasoned investigation of these subjects
|> (and of the history of philosophy) would be better than the course you
|> seem to be taking.

My views and impressions (and to some degree, experiences) are virtually
identical to Randall's here.  I would add the following.

In my experience with followers of Rand it has always seemed to me that,
first, they are struck with the "correctness" of her political views and
her practical views of ethics and morality.  (Frequently this is simply
because those views correspond to the follower's own pre-systematic
and pre-analytic intuitions.)  They then perform an inference (tacit
in most cases, I believe) something like:  "Since these views are correct,
and since Rand offers X as a foundation and justification for those
views, then X is correct (and by extension, anything inconsistent with
X is *not* correct)."  Here simply take X to be the fundamental "principles"
of Rand's which I will not enumerate or review here (A is A? Man is man?
Therefore, ???  Sorry, I digress.)

But this inference is simply a case of affirming the consequent (and would
in itself, I presume, be condemned by Rand in her usual manner).  If X
justifies Y, and I believe Y, then I believe X.  This is not, please note,
inference to the best explanation (or justification).  It is, again in
my experience with these followers, simply inference to the first justification
they have come across.  Those who are willing to critically analyze this
justification, and to consider alternative ones, typically end up rejecting
Rand as simplistic if not ultimately incoherent.



-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 24 Jul 92 19:49:34 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <BrwK0J.Jvx@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:

|> 
|> No, will not expand on this.  Too much work.
|> 
|> I expect you *know* what I meant.  Now you wish to discuss it (to 
|> death) on your own terms, so you can "win" a philosophical battle 
|> of some sort.
|> 
|> Not worth the energy to do battle over this.

No guts, no glory.  I'll happily discuss it on your terms.  I just
need to know what they mean.  If you don't want to finish a battle,
don't start one.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 28 Jul 92 14:28:26 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <Bs1t0L.n2p@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1119@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:
>
>|> What's at stake here is not the necessity of philosophy, but the added value
>|> of philosophy. And when you look at the lives of modern philosophers, I
>|> don't see a convincing pattern of well being emerging. 
>
>Surely you don't mean to suggest that this is peculiar to *modern* philosophers!

Yeah but presumably they have had the chance to learn from their predecessor's
"mistakes". I think that people who innovate in philosophy are a bit like
people who innovate in religion - they're often pessimists who believe that the
present understanding has no hope of success. Sometimes they're totally
pessimistic like Marcuse or Nietzsche - they declare the larger questions
insoluble, or arrive at horrifying solutions (Nietzsche's eternal recurrence).

Now an example or two doesn't prove anything, but I find any idea that the
practice of philosophy has a beneficial effect on one's life as unfounded,
but in the older traditions this was one of the explicit aims of philosophy.
Needless to say there is a value judgement here, and presumably any philosophy
which abhors value judgements must fail to justify its practice, and it must
even leave this failure unexplained. Is there any reason to expect that such
a philosophy may leave us no happier than before?

BTW when I say modern I mean the Enlightenment onwards.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Message for William Tucker
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 20:51:40 +0000

They say you are no longer at mitre.org.
If you read this please E-mail me a valid address

Thank you

Leo
From: jhaukioj@sara.cc.utu.fi
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Sorry...
Date: 29 Jul 92 12:56:58 GMT
Organization: University of Turku, Finland

Sorry for the three extra ones - I was getting error messages and thought I
wasn't getting through.
-- 
		    	Jussi Haukioja
			JHAUKIOJ@SARA.UTU.FI
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 92 18:46:38 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

In article <BrvAMK.2C3@acsu.buffalo.edu> oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:

>>|> A label for everything....how nice and comfortable...
>> 
>>"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
>>shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
>>*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
>>particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
>[stuff deleted..]
>
>Labels are also used to devalue something, so that it fits better 
>into the realm of the common place and the "anything else."


Peggy, if you disdain or distrust terminology-intensive discussion,
what are you doing reading this newsgroup?

Tom

******************************************************************************
 Tom Price  |  Obscure Dropout  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 31 Jul 92 16:40:11 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

> |> Gary Merrill writes:-
> 
> We do not have ideal theories.  The crucial question is not "What
> is an ideal theory?" but "What is a good theory?" and "What makes
> one theory better than another?"  The bottom line is not "What is
> true?" but "What is it most reasonable to believe?"
 
Not "What is it most reasonable to believe?", but "Is it useful?", because
we do not _believe_ in theories...because we do not treat our theories
as we treat _the scriptures_...we may believe in a scripture, but what is
the use of saying "We believe in our theories or such and such a theory !" ?
I think you are confusing the theories with scriptures ...
 
See what happens then;
Jussi Haukioja says:-
 
JH>Not *any* consistent set of beliefs. The body of beliefs must also be
             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
JH>consistent with observations. Maybe this is what you meant, but then it 
                   ^^^^^^^^^^^
JH>would be more reasonable to talk of judgements instead of beliefs.
                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^           ^^^^^^^
it would be even more reasonable if we didn't confuse "theories" with
"scriptures" n the first place, and utter nonsense like:
 
"I believe in such and such a theory (QM if you believe:-)), 
it is the truth itself, and it's consistency with observational 
evidence implies the truth of my outstanding belief :-> 
I would look rediculous if I didn't have a belief in (QM) after such solid,
consistent observable evidence, there would be something wrong with my
judgement (:->if I had any left), wouldn't it My Dear Adaimantus ? 
It would also be unsensible :-> bla..bla..bla..
bla..
bla..bla..bla..bla..
bla..bla.."
 
(see how I've jumbled belief/believe/theory/truth/consistency/observational/
evidence/judgement/observable-evidence/unsensible and it is really bad
if I still managed to pass my message to you :-> Unless you think that 
I am wasting my time :->)
 
JH>I think they do. On any sensible anti-realist conception of truth, a true 
                                                               ^^^^^    ^^^^
JH>judgement needs to be consistent with observable evidence. This seems to 
   ^^^^^^^^^             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
JH>to me ensure that e.g. the belief that I am now sitting by a computer 
                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                               
JH>is true,
   ^^^^^^^
 
is that a belief "now sitting by a computer"? Do you waste your belief
for such a trivia :->?
 
JH>because I don't see how any theory(in a loose sense)could be observationally
                               ^^^^^^                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
JH>adequate unless it implied the truth of this belief.
                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
here we end up in the abyss of confusions with our concepts like:
  observation/consistent/evidence/judgement/truth/true/theory/belief..
 
JH>Jussi Haukioja 
JH>JHAUKIOJ@SARA.UTU.FI
 
> Gary H. Merrill  
****