From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 15:58:54 GMT

I'm going to take Peter seriously for a couple more rounds.  I would
appreciate comments from the crowd as to whether or not my efforts
are futile.

Peter Nelson writes:
>>Note well that the definition of a concept is contextual.  If we
>>were scientists interested in sorting our samples of DNA, we might
>>well use a more technical definition of human.  Note too, the
>>interesting feature of Rand's definition that the _definition_ does
>>not (necessarily) serve as the criterion for inclusion.  A definition,
>>in Rand's epistemology, serves to identify the fundamental (contextually
>>fundamental, recall) attributes of the existents.
>
>  How do you decide what constitutesa "fundamental" attribute?

This is a reasonable question, but not (as Nelson appears to think)
an unanswerable one.  The fundamentality of attributes for definitional
purposes is determined by context.  The relevant context includes
such things as the general state of our knowledge, the purpose for
which the definition is being made, etc. etc.  Perhaps a couple of examples
will illustrate.

A child may define human as 'living thing which talks'.  This
is certainly an attribute of human beings.  And, within the context 
of the knowledge of a child, this definition states the most obvious
and important distinction between humans and other things.  A human
is differentiated from inanimate objects by the fact that a human is
alive.  A human is differentiated from other living things by the fact
that humans can talk.  This definition is concise and useful, and
(to a child) appears to explain lots about humans.

Later, as an adult, we realize that 'talking' isn't really what is
fundamental.  People are able to build cars.  People are able to
write mathematical formulae.  People are able to talk.  But talking
doesn't really explain these other things.  Sure, talking helps
people to learn and to exchange ideas about these other things.  So
talking is important.  But there is something else more important.

That more important thing is that people are able to use concepts
and to draw abstract conclusions.  This faculty helps to explain
(and is causally efficacious) lots of other stuff about humans,
including: talking, building cars, doing math.

>>What does 'reason' mean?
>>
>>"Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
>>provided by man's senses." (Rand, VOS, "The Objectivist Ethics, p. 20).
>>Rand's full description of our rational faculty can be found in
>>_Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_.
>
>  In other words you are not prepared to define "reason".

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
provided by man's senses.

That is a definition.  I'm not sure what your complaint is.

>  The question still stands, unanswerd my Mr. Wales or Mr. Starr:
>  What is meant by "rational" (or "reason")?  How do you know when you
>  have it?  How do you know how much you have?

The meaning of a concept is the units to which it refers.  Here are
some particular instances of human reasoning: Peter Nelson uses a computer
to compose e-mail letters.  He strings together words which are abstractions
from reality.  He works with premises and conclusions.  This is human
reason.  This is a particular instance of 'the faculty that identifies
and integrates the material provided by man's senses'.  One may test
whether or not Peter has reason by looking at one's computer screen.
Are those sentences?  Yes.  Do they express propositions?  Yes.
How did they get here?  Peter wrote them and sent them over a computer
network.  

Peter has the faculty of reason.

>  What does this mean, "does the most to explain".  I could say what 
>  "does the most to explain all the other attributes of human beings"
>  is our genome.  It is one very clearly, measurable objective fact
>  that defines "human".  And while it no doubt explains much in our
>  intellectual skills, it also explains thousands of other biochemical
>  aspects of "human".   

This is certainly very true, and is a wonderful illustration of Rand's
use of contextualism in definitions.  In the context of discussing
scientific matters about humans, this is a fine definition.  The
particular structure of our DNA is fundamental, if we are making a
biological distinction between different species.

But if we are engaged in a more everyday conversation about human
beings, then the definition based on genomes is not very enlightening.
Many people do not know much about genetics.  I, for one, couldn't
begin to describe the human genome.  And even the greatest genetic
scientist living today does not fully understand how our genetic 
material relates to our intellectual capacities.  We are sure that
there is some connection, but we don't quite know what yet.

So if we want to talk about theoretical politics, or ethics, then
the definition of human as 'the animal with such-and-such a genome'
is not likely to be very helpful.  In that context, it is more
helpful to note that humans are able to think.  Because it is that
fact which is most fundamental in explaining how humans differ
from other things, and which is most fundamental in explaining
the activities that humans can do.

>>faculty.  That is, humans are what they are.  Every human being is
>>what that human being is.
>
>  This is circular to the point of being tautological.  It is the same as
>  saying "I am observing all members of this set to determine the
>  features they have in common, in order to define set membership."

What we do is observe reality.  We note similarities and differences.
We group things based on these similarities and differences.  We do
not _start_ with a grouping and then group things.  That would indeed,
as you say, be circular.  It is difficult to imagine how one could
do such a thing.  

My point, in the previous paragraph, is that the process of concept
formation does not require us to 'assume away' any of the particular
features of particular things.  We form our concept by omitting
measurements along the relevant dimensions (the commensurate
characteristics, the Conceptual Common Denominator).  The individual
things are still whatever they are; we are not free to define the
world out of existence!

>  You can't note ANYTHING about "rationality" because you haven't
>  defined it!   As I've pointed out in posting after posting.
>  Tell us where to buy a rationo-meter.

See above for the definition.  Luckily for you, you don't need to
buy a rationo-meter.  You are equipped with one.  One does not need
any special equipment to note that humans have a conceptual consciousness.
Do this: read this letter and think about where it came from.  Does
it indicate familiarity with your previous writings?  Does it appear
to include arguments which were processed in a form distinctly different
from that which other species can do?

I don't see the difficulty.  One need not have a 'meter' in order to
measure.

>>Rand's statements about reason in humans are not tautological.  This
>>is very important.  Rand's theory of concepts (and in particular, her
>>theory of definition) is able to avoid the trap of 'nontestability'
>
>  Saying so doesn't make it so.   "Testability" means that the terms
>  are defined clearly enough so we can unambigously compare what our
>  theory says to the real world.  We can take measurements and compare
>  them to what our model says.  

You are correct when you say that 'saying so doesn't make it so'.  
But I have done far more than 'say so'.  I have presented clear
and concise arguments.  I have _proven_ my case.  (Interesting
side note for discriminating readers: _proving_ something to be
so doesn't MAKE it so.  Do you see why?  Well-formed propositions
simply _are_ true or false, and a valid proof one way or the other
is an _identification_ of that truth or falsity.)

Given your criterion for 'testability' (which I hesitate to grant,
since it is itself so poorly and vaguely described!), it is easy to
see how to test the proposition 'man is a rational animal'.  First,
look at the definitions of the terms that I have given.  Then, look
at reality.  It is entirely unambiguous to compare the statements
of the theory to the real world.  You can take measurements (do you
see what units the measurements are to be made in?) and compare
them to the model.

>  I can cite the tests used to verify the theoretical proposition
>  that, for instance, light can be bent by gravity.  Perhaps Mr. Wales
>  would be so kind as to cite an instance of "testing" any of Rand's
>  theories.

Well, the demonstration that I have given (up above) that you
have the rational faculty is an instance of a test.  I observed
reality and compared it to my theory.  I conclusively demonstrated
the proposition 'Peter Nelson is a rational animal.'  Would you
care to dispute that claim?

>  No, this isn't true.  Rand says that if I initiate an act of 
>  force against someone else, depriving them of their life or of
>  their ability to live "as man" I have done something _wrong_.  
>  But concepts of "right" and "wrong" are ethical concepts.  The
>  means of life (oxygen, food, even "reason", if we accepted Rand's
>  "definition") are not.   That's the leap I'm talking about.

How about we leave off on this one, until we settle the dispute about
epistemology.  Suffice to say: Rand crosses the is/ought gap by
sticking strictly to hypothetical imperatives.  You could look it up.

--Jimbo


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