From: young@serum.kodak.com
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@serum.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 92 23:13:30 GMT

In <BvH1uL.83@wpg.com>, <BvH79M.wK@wpg.com>, and <BvH7qp.xu@wpg.com>,
  Russell Lawrence writes:

[...]

>Please explain why sentience and sapience would be arbitrary 
>considerations when we're making decisions that affect non-human
>animals, but not-arbitrary when we're making decisions that 
>affect human animals.  

	I thought I'd explained this over the last few postings, but there
	is apparently some confusion which remains.  Perhaps I can illustrate
	with an example: would you offer dialysis to a kidney-dead cow?

[...]

>ry> You asked about a brain-dead HUMAN; the discussion was (and should
>ry> still be) about assignment of status to non-human species.  Your
>ry> question was (and is) irrelevant.  
>
>No, it's not irrelevant, Rich.  I don't accept your notion that
>structural dissimilarities between human animals and non-human 
>animals will justify your callous disregard for the thoughts
>and feelings of non-human animals.

	There are at least two things wrong with your statement:

	   1. I have never limited my discussion to animals.

	   2. You are making an assertion of "callous disregard" with
		absolutely no supporting evidence...but then, no one is
		surprised at that.

[...]

>You stated previously that it was ok to kill brain-dead humans 
>because their "major sensory processing center has ceased to 
>function".  You later amended your position by stating that it's
>ok to kill such entities because they're not "functional 
>organisms".

	You have evidence to support the assertion that I said it was OK
	to kill any human?  It should be obvious, but "irrelevant to the
	discussion" is hardly equivalent to "OK to kill", no matter HOW 
	often you wish to insist that it is.

	Now, you tried this tactic before, with quotes and all, and Craig
	Boeker (who wasn't even involved in the discussion) pointed out
	that your deductions were less than exemplary, based on the quotes
	you provided.  One would have thought that this would discourage
	you from repeating such silliness.  Please refrain from such
	things in the future and save us all some bandwidth.

>You still haven't explained why it is or isn't ok to 
>kill a kidney-dead human.  Both Craig Boeker and I are awaiting 
>your answer.
>
>Is it ok to kill a kidney-dead human?   If no one else cares about your
>answer, they're free to hit the 'n' key.

	Would you offer dialysis to a kidney-dead cow?  The question,
	Russell, isn't about how we treat each other, but upon what 
	criteria do we base our treatment of other species.  The discussion
	is based on the following comment:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From <altar.713493440@sfu.ca>:

>>Insects are not of the same status as birds, repitiles (sic), and mammals...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	Let us stick to the question at hand, shall we: should humans base
	ethical judgements of the "worth" of non-human species on arbitrary
	criteria such as sentience and sapience?

	Perhaps we can discuss physically injured humans some other time.

>[re: false gods of structural similarity]
>
>ry> You've pointed to what you consider to be a similarity and then
>ry> told me I'm wrong when I say it's a "false god".  If it's not a
>ry> "false god," then it must be a "true god," eh?  ...
>
>Binary logic strikes again.  If you were to deny the absurd 
>notion that your family worships dead butterflies, would it be 
>reasonable for the rest of us to conclude that your family 
>worships live butterflies?  
>
>I've stated repeatedly that I would respect the sentience and 
>sapience of any entity...  regardless of its structural 
>foundations.  You, on the other hand, have evidently adopted the 
>notion that sentience and sapience are irrelevant considerations 
>when an entity doesn't have an anthropic shape and form.  Why
>do you persist in claiming that I share your notions?

	Oh, Russell, Russell, Russell......you can't seriously be believing
	that drivel, can you?  Your grasp of logic here is pathetic...of
	course the fact that you've deleted the portion of my post which
	explains it shows just how far you read before committing yourself
	to an erroneous reply.  Let me help by re-posting the appropriate
	passage fragment which you replaced with three dots:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Or is there some third, as-yet-unmentioned state for this question?  Seems
to me that similarity of structure is either relevant or not when judging
the worth of other species.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	This is, indeed, a binary question, as I see it.  I'd be willing
	to entertain any other states besides relevant and irrelevant if
	you'd like, however.

>In article <BvGKrH.I9H@wpg.com> russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence) writes:
>rl> The existence or non-existence of universal absolutes has no bearing
>rl> on the discussion.   It's a cop-out, Rich.
>
>From article <1992Oct1.222738.23594@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
>ry> Oh?  From what?  If there is no absolute from which your ethics
>ry> spring, then I am free to develop my own.
>
>You're free to develop your own ideas, but their truth or falsity
>won't be alterred by the existence or non-existence of "cosmic"
>absolutes.

	Let me get this straight, I can set my own values and ethics, but
	if they don't match yours, they're wrong.  Is that about it?  OK,
	let's accept your amusing premise for a moment.  Where, outside of
	your own mind, is the reference that states that you are correct
	and I am not?

	P.S. If this sounds a lot like question number 3., you shouldn't
		be terribly surprised...it IS question number 3.

[...]

>ry> The cop-out here is your continued failure to supply any answers to
>ry> the very questions I've been asking regarding the source of your
>ry> ethics.  I'll ask them again, just in case you've [conveniently]
>ry> forgotten again: ...
>ry>
>ry> 1. Define "meaning" as you've used it in this discussion...
>
>Sure Rich.  Here's my definition (once again) for anyone who
>didn't see it when I posted it in response to your previous queries:

	[...Russell's copy replaced with commented copy below...]

	Here's my critique showing why your "definition" [note quotes] was,
	well, how shall we say it..."inadequate".  Enough of your original
	comments remain so that accusations of "creative editing" should not
	rear their ugly heads.  For any intrepid readers which yet remain,
	I _do_ apologize for this, but Russell seems to require it.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From <1992Sep17.185555.19963@pixel.kodak.com>:

>rl> These terms are defined in the dictionary, Rich.  "Sentience" 
>rl> designates sensory abilities, namely the ability of an entity to 
>rl> gather information about its own being as well as its 
>rl> environment.  "Sapience" designates the cognitive abilities that 
>rl> permit an entity to process and analyze information.  The word,
>rl> "meaningful", is a catch-all term that designates significance 
>rl> or purpose.

	The question is what constitutes "meaning," yet you supply us with
	definitions of "sentience" and "sapience" and state categorically
	that lack of these qualities demonstrates insignificance and lack
	of purpose.  I do hope that this is omniscience and not simply
	ill-considered hubris.  It most certainly is NOT a description of
	that which constitutes "meaning."

>rl> Let's review the ethical importance of "meaningful" existence. 

	And what does "ethical importance" have to do with the definition
	of "meaning," as you've used it in your arguments?  You're telling
	us your idea of what DERIVES from "meaning," not of what absolute
	components "meaning" might CONSIST.

>rl> Without the qualities of sentience and sapience, existence would 
>rl> be perceptually and cognitively meaningless to a ball-bearing, 
>rl> and hence it would be impossible to deprive it in any way.  

	Once again, you've told us nothing about what "meaning" IS; you've
	only told us that we can't deprive a non-living entity of it. (A claim
	which would seem to be at odds with those you've hypothesized 
	[before]...remember the sentient/sapient, but non-living, entity?  
	And no, I'm not claiming that ball bearings are sentient and/or 
	sapient.)

>rl> We could do it no harm if we whack it with hammers, or melt it down, 
>rl> or deal with it as we choose.

	Of course we could "do it harm": if we flatten it with a hammer, it
	no longer functions as originally conceived, but we digress.

>rl> On the otherhand, existence is 
>rl> meaningful to a healthy chimpanzee, who possesses the ability to 
>rl> perceive his own being as well as the world around him.  Hence, 
>rl> we ought to think about the impact that our actions may have on 
>rl> him or her.

	Note that the definition of "meaning" is yet sufficiently nebulous
	so that we don't know whether a chimp's life has it or not...we are
	simply told that a chimp's life is full of it ["meaningful"].  Let
	us ask, since the definition of "meaning" is nebulous, how we may
	determine whether a paramecium's life has "meaning."

	So much for your "definition."  May we proceed now?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	And might we expect a REAL answer to the question instead of these
	fuzzy forays into a forest of flatulent falsehoods?

>ry> 2. Who, or what, gave you the authority to assign status to non-human
>ry>     species?
>
>Sure Rich.   Here's my response.
>
>From Message-ID: <BuuEID.6I7@wpg.com>:
>=====================================================================
>I don't assign "status", Rich.  [...remainder of statement deleted...]
>=====================================================================

	You're really gonna make me do this, aren't you?  [sigh...]
	OK, here's what I have to say about your assertion that you
	don't assign status.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From <1992Sep25.010922.5239@pixel.kodak.com>:

We can classify non-human species as much as we wish, but as soon
as we begin to make moral and ethical judgements based on the
presence or absence of certain characteristics, we have assigned
status, as in "relative rank in a hierarchy of prestige."  As
soon as you tell me, "It's WRONG to kill cattle for food, but it's
no big deal if you digest a few paramecia when you eat the cow,"
you've assigned status.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

	Since you HAVE told me that it's wrong to kill cattle but not carrots,
	you HAVE assigned status.  Therefore....

	Your assertion that you DON'T assign status is in error and begs
	the question.  Your response was (ahem......pause......) inadequate.

>ry> 3. By what absolute, significant-to-all-species criteria do you attach
>ry>    ethical importance to the death of some species and not others?
>
>What species did you have in mind, Rich?

	Oh good grief, Russell, you call this an answer?!  __Pick__ a few
	representative species for crying out loud and ANSWER THE QUESTION.

>ry> 4. Why, if your criteria are not absolute, am I 'wrong' to develop my
>ry>     ethics [in this area] using some other criteria?
>
>As I said, you're free to develop your own ideas.  Whether they'll
>make sense or not is another matter altogether.

	OK, so how about if I use the criterion of "alive", instead of the
	presence of sentience and sapience which, after all, don't exist
	on our planet without life?  Does that make sense?


-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals