HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 24 Jul 92 17:48:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <Brw9B8.10z@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
> 
>In article <BrvAMK.2C3@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
>|> In article <BruMFG.MMC@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
>|> >In article <BruHGx.B2F@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
>|> >|> In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
>|> >|> >In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> [stuff deleted...]
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> >I'm not sure what the multi-valued reality stuff is, nor what other
>|> >|> >contexts you have in mind where this assumption fails.  I have a vague
>|> >|> >feeling that what is lurking behind these questions is old phenomena/
>|> >|> >noumena or observation-statement/theoretical-statement distinction
>|> >|> >together with the usual non-uniqueness problem in saving the phenomena.
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> >Anything else?
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> [stuff deleted...]
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> A label for everything....how nice and comfortable...
>|> > 
>|> >"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
>|> >shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
>|> >*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
>|> >particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
>|> [stuff deleted..]
>|> 
>|> Labels are also used to devalue something, so that it fits better 
>|> into the realm of the common place and the "anything else."
>|> 
>|> - Peggy -
> 
>Could you expand on this?  For example, could you show how my question
>to Leo either devalues or attempts to devalue anything?  In particular,
>could you indicate how establishing something as based on (to pick
>a single example) the phenomena/noumena distinction devalues it?  In
>the process, could you please give an account of the labels *you* are
>using?  For instance, what do you mean by "value", and how is this
>affected by the question I asked?  And what is meant by "the realm of
>the common place" and "the 'anything else'"?
> 

No, will not expand on this.  Too much work.

I expect you *know* what I meant.  Now you wish to discuss it (to 
death) on your own terms, so you can "win" a philosophical battle 
of some sort.

Not worth the energy to do battle over this.

- Peggy -
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 24 Jul 92 23:31:01 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <BruG43.D9x@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1107@kepler1.rentec.com>, andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt) writes:
>There are many (non-isomorphic) mappings that may be used successfully.
>It does not follow from this that *any* mapping is "correct".  The
>anti-realist does not believe that *anything* goes, but rather that
>there is no particular mapping with a special claim to preferred status.
>The world is really out there -- under one or another description.
>There are a number of "right" descriptions you may pick.  But there are
>*wrong* descriptions as well.  Choose one that is wrong enough and you
>are dead meat.  In this sense, indeed, "Right thinking or bust."

I agree with the anti-realist that the real world is out there "somewhere",
and that we do not seem to have a uniquely appropriate description for it.

But given my idea that most people function on the basis of unexamined
beliefs most of the time, you should expect that I think it matters little
to your lifespan if you pick a _wrong_ description. It may not even affect
your functioning, especially if you pick a world picture on the basis that it
agrees with your unexamined beliefs...

What's at stake here is not the necessity of philosophy, but the added value
of philosophy. And when you look at the lives of modern philosophers, I
don't see a convincing pattern of well being emerging. 


Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
From: oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 24 Jul 92 01:27:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <BruMFG.MMC@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
> 
>In article <BruHGx.B2F@acsu.buffalo.edu>, oispeggy@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Peggy Brown) writes:
>|> In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com>, sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes...
>|> > 
>|> >In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
>|> >|> 
>|> > 
>|> 
>|> [stuff deleted...]
>|> 
>|> >I'm not sure what the multi-valued reality stuff is, nor what other
>|> >contexts you have in mind where this assumption fails.  I have a vague
>|> >feeling that what is lurking behind these questions is old phenomena/
>|> >noumena or observation-statement/theoretical-statement distinction
>|> >together with the usual non-uniqueness problem in saving the phenomena.
>|> 
>|> >Anything else?
>|> 
>|> [stuff deleted...]
>|> 
>|> A label for everything....how nice and comfortable...
> 
>"Labels" are quite useful in communication when their meaning is
>shared among the communicants.  Rather than using the "labels" I
>*could* have described at great length the concepts to which these
>particular labels apply, thus eliminating the labels from my question.
[stuff deleted..]

Labels are also used to devalue something, so that it fits better 
into the realm of the common place and the "anything else."

- Peggy -
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1992 13:03:53 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <memo.540399@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:

|> Well right and wrong imply value judgement. So our anti realist has
|> assumed

Someday I would like someone to give a reasonably precise account of
what a "value judgement" is and how it can be distinguished from other
sorts of judgements (apparently devoid of value or not based on value?).
Then I would like it to be shown why such imputations of "value
judgements" are always offered with the implication (or outright
claim) that it is somehow "bad" or "unreasonable" to make such
judgements.  (Isn't such a claim a value judgement itself?  But I
digress.)  I'm not suggesting that we get into this hairball in
this thread, but every once in a while someone will respond to something
with "That's a value judgement," as though this is some kind of
conversation stopper, counter argument, or counterexample.

|> 
|>                (i) A separate reality
|>                (ii) selection criteria for his worldview
|> 
|> before he gets on with the task of having such.  Are these necessary
|> preconditions?
|> 
|> 
|> 

Not to answer these questions directly (as though I *could* provide
especially lucid answers), but instead ...

Stumbling about the UNC bookstore this weekend I came across a
relatively recent book of Van Fraassen's entitled _Laws_and_Symmetry_
which appears to be a rather complete treatment of most of the
topics raised in this thread (from his anti-realist perspective).
The publication date was 1989.  The book deals with the fundamental
questions raised by Leo in (i) and (ii) and goes into great detail
in terms of specific examples drawn form the sciences and views of
other philosophers of science.  I haven't read it yet, but since
Bas's intuitions and mine always seemed to be pretty much in synch
I expect I will agree with most of it.  Regardless of such agreement
or disagreement, however, I think it likely that those interested
in the topics we have been fooling with would benefit from looking
at it.

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 12:47:28 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <memo.546540@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
|> denmckinnon@halls1.cc.monash.edu.au (NEIL MCKINNON) writes..

|> 
|> >Their semantics for truth seemed quite similar to me. For Putnam, a
|> >sentence is true only if it is part of an Ideal theory (i.e one that
|> >maximally satisfies observable evidence and maximally satisfies our
|> >constraints on theory acceptance, like simplicity).
|> 
|> Ok. You answered. truth is the simplest explanation that fits the
|> bill?

Not "simplest", but "best" -- whatever this turns out to be.  It
includes such things as saving the phenomena, simplicity, coherence
with other accepted theories, generality, etc.

Please note that this is not an essential feature of an anti-realist
position (as I at least hinted at in a previous posting).  Van
Fraassen, for example, feels very strongly (and offers lengthy
argument) that "inference to the best explanation" is invalid.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Settimbrini
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 13:15:54 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Jul28.201743.24599@cis.umassd.edu>, pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:

|> passes for phil. in universities know this. Harvard thinks phil. is the
|> elucidation of the arbitrary and conventional usages of language. Rand says that
|> is a rationalization for using words to manipulate people. the alternative, of
|> course, is the conceptual grasp of reality. Stephen Grossman
|> 

Sorry, I can't resist ... But this reminds me so much of part of an answer
to an essay question I got when assisting in a course in modern philosohy
eons ago:  "From mere experience it is difficult to deduce conceptual concepts."

Perhaps so.  At least this pithy attack on empiricism (at least that's what
I *think* it is) has stayed with me for many years.

(It isn't quite as good as one I got in a course in ancient philosophy:
"Anaximander was an ogre and Gnomen was his sister," -- which I think would
have come as a double shock to Anaximander.)
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 92 16:59:04 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon

>>There are many (non-isomorphic) mappings that may be used successfully.
>>It does not follow from this that *any* mapping is "correct".  The
>>anti-realist does not believe that *anything* goes, but rather that
>>there is no particular mapping with a special claim to preferred status.
>>The world is really out there -- under one or another description.
>>There are a number of "right" descriptions you may pick.  

The term "anti-realism" is new to me, but it looks as if it is a wheel
which I recently re-invented. Consequently I would be intensely happy
if anyone were to point me to some literature on "anti-realism." Books
are preferred to journal articles, but either will do.

Many thanks,

Tom

******************************************************************************
 Tom Price  |  Obscure Dropout  |  tp0x@cs.cmu.edu  |  Simplicity, simplicity
******************************************************************************
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Subject: Settimbrini
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 22:27:58 GMT

Mike Morris, etc. were discussing Mann's Settimbrini from his "Magic
Mountain."
	"Ominous Parallels" by Leonard Peikoff, a clearly written phil.
of history using, as examples. pre-Nazi Ger. & contemp. US, has excell-
ent description of Mann's book. S was not an advocate of reason but of
rationalization or floating abstraction. Windbag, college bull session.
mood of book is "sly flirtation w/death." S kisses woman's X-rays. He 
loves her because she bangs doors in good style (expresses existential-
ist foolishness). This is not rational. Consider context of Kantian nih-  
ilism: hatred of values and reason. Aristotelian reason is NOT Cartes-
ian rationalism. Aristotle starts in real. Descartes starts in consc-
iousness. Radical diff. 
	Kant prepared Ger. culture for Nazism. Intellectuals, artists
applied nihilism to current events. Make movie: "Beer Hall Putz, Adolph's
Early Days." Same intellectuals, artists still popular or influential.
Marcuse taught in Ger. in 30s and Bezerkeley in 60s. Modern culture is
Christianity minus earlier classical Greek influence. No theology, just
blind faith. Weber-science has no solutions to Ger. chaos. Heisenberg-
uncertainty. Godel-contradictions. Not getting hysterical at Nazi rally
a faux pas. Note: Hitler's 1st guard's, SA, were exclusively homosexual 
drug addicts. Why??? Please no comments from multicultural fanatics.
Example is just example. Center does not hold? Drugs, bizarre sex, astrol-
ogy, religious cults, & Nazism. Enlightenment created US, individual
rights, self-confidence. Kant opposed values AS SUCH. NO values, only
duty. Sacrifice as end, not means. Suffering is sign of morality for 
Kant, followers. Death camps. Now frivilous "intellectuals" discuss
misery and consider themselves superior to rational people who success-fully deal with reality. The lost poet sits at his barstool and stinks. 
Get it together. None of this wishy-washy deconstuctionist gump. Nosiree.
Kant was so foolish he had a bubconscious. Stephen Grossman.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Date: 22 Jul 92 16:42:10 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <Brqpqw.IEG@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <memo.533140@cix.compulink.co.uk>, shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith) writes:
>|> e.g. In order to 'do Science' a necessary precondition is the
>|> assumption of some separate and observable reality.
>
>This is also a precondition for simply continuing to live. 

Uh what? You mean that people must accept the cogito in order to
live? This is skating close to the program of the anthropic principle.

It's a bit like challenging the person who denies a separate reality
to shoot himself. If he's convinced that he believes in the Newtonian
physics he's filled his 'dream reality' with, maybe he better not!

What I take your meaning to be is more along the lines that you have
to act _as if_ there is a separate reality. It would seem clear that
a truly unobservable reality has no point of contact with the choices
one lives by, 

>who fail to make it end up with severely shortened lifespans.  There
>is in fact a strong force of natural selection on those who adopt
>the wrong (okay, *a* wrong) epistemology.

Sounds like you're implying that one set of words must be used to map
to this separate reality - or else what? For an anti-realist, you put
a big load on language, "Right thinking or bust" (?)

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
From: durham@mpr.ca (Paul Durham)
Subject: Re: The Anthropology of Coca-Cola
Organization: MPR Teltech Ltd., Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 92 01:27:31 GMT

In article <1992Jul27.142228.19058@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> rwd4f@poe.acc.Virginia.EDU (Rob Dobson) writes:
>So did anyone see the Coke ad last night with the Japanese boy drinking
>his first coke?

No, but I found their Brazilian ad rather interesting. Basically it dealt with
a schoolboy having sexual fantasies about his teacher !

Also, everyone in the ad was white and well off, which hardly represents a
cross-section of the Brazilian population.


Paul


-- 
Paul Durham                    |      durham@mprgate.mpr.ca
MPR Teltech Ltd                | durham%mprgate.mpr.ca@ubc-cs.uucp
8999 Nelson Way                | ...uunet!ubc-cs!mprgate.mpr.ca!durham
Burnaby, B.C., Canada. V5A 4B5 |      phone: (604) 293-6035    
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
From: rsb2@ellis.uchicago.edu (ronan surtida bernas)
Subject: Cognitive anthropology and social/moral issues
Reply-To: rsb2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1992 06:37:17 GMT

I take a cognitive anthropological approach to moral reasoning and discourse
concerning such social issues as abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia and
so on.  Would anybody lead me to studies that investigate cultural models of
such issues?  I would prefer to receive replies at my e-mail address since
I am usually unable to check the newsnet.  Thanks so much.
From: trimper@edsi.plexus.COM (Greg Trimper)
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
Subject: Re: The Anthropology of Coca-Cola
Date: 30 Jul 92 01:28:17 GMT
Article-I.D.: edsi.1992Jul30.012817.21273
Organization: Enterprise Data Systems Incorporated, Appleton WI

haynes@cats.ucsc.edu (Jim Haynes) writes:

>Now my cousin's anthropologist wife tells me that the soft drink "Big Red"
>is popular only in San Antonio, TX (and from tasting it I can't imagine
>why it's popular there either).  And then there's Moxie, which the
>Bostonians crave.

Big Red is popular in Dallas, as well.  It is put out by a subdivison
of Dr Pepper bottling.

Sure wish I could get some here in Wisconsin, where the favorite drink
is beer, any kind.

Greg Trimper   trimper@edsi.plexus.com
From: asb@media.mit.edu (Amy Bruckman)
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
Subject: ethnography of ham radio
Date: 24 Jul 92 23:26:34 GMT
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory


Does anyone know of any good ethnographic writings
about ham radio?  (I'll post a summary of
references on this and on my letter-writing
question.)

Thanks!

-- Amy
From: wade@Turing.ORG (Wade B. Komisar)
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
Subject: Re: Ethnographies of software developers
Date: 30 Jul 92 19:25:39 GMT
Organization: The Turing Project, Charlottesville Virginia.


 Although not an anthropological work, Tracy Kidder's _The Soul of A New 
Machine_ is an ethnographic work describing the development of the MV-
series of minicomputers made by Data General.  Kidder is a journalist, and
describes the culture of a high-tech environment very well.

-- 
                    Wade B. Komisar (wbk3a@Virginia.EDU)           
  
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
From: SJOSEPHS@130.187.183.14 (STEVEN JOSEPHSON)
Subject: Re: correlation symbols use <--> language in early man?
Organization: Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp.
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 22:36:31 GMT
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.11

In <ARILD.92Jul16131923@milan.philosophie.uni-stuttgart.de> arild@milan.philosophie.uni-stuttgart.de writes:

> I'm posting this for someone else (an amateur archaeologist). (Any
> inaccuracies in my recasting of his query is my fault!)
> 
>         "The earliest archaelogical findings of symbol use (figurines) date
>         back 35,000 years ago, and correlates with the arrival of the Cro
>         Magnon man. Neanderhals (who disappeared around 30,000 years ago)
>         are believed not to have used symbols. Cro Magnon also had a
>         developed frontal lobe, whereas Neanderthals had underdeveloped
>         frontal lobe. I believe that the use of symbols correlate with the
>         development of the frontal lobe, and I conjecture that language
>         developed in man at the same time. I.e., the use of language, a
>         symbol system, and the use of visual symbols in art, had the same
>         neurological source."
>             "Is there any research along these lines? Can anyone provide
>         any pointers to literature and journal articles addressing this (or
>         related issues)?"

It is *very* difficult to do good research along these lines, mainly because we
have very little experience with pre-linguistic brain structure and because the
archaeological record is not useful for addressing this question in a
meaningful way.  The best attempt I know of offhand is work done by a fellow
named Marshack, who is convinced that some bone pieces from Magdelanian France
show evidence of notational modifications.  There has been a piece or two in 
Scientific American in the last 15 years, and likely other places as well.
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
From: rwd4f@poe.acc.Virginia.EDU (Rob Dobson)
Subject: Re: The Anthropology of Coca-Cola
Organization: University of Virginia
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1992 13:15:18 GMT

In article <1992Jul30.012731.27997@mprgate.mpr.ca> durham@mpr.ca (Paul Durham) writes:
>In article <1992Jul27.142228.19058@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> rwd4f@poe.acc.Virginia.EDU (Rob Dobson) writes:
>>So did anyone see the Coke ad last night with the Japanese boy drinking
>>his first coke?
>
>No, but I found their Brazilian ad rather interesting. Basically it dealt with
>a schoolboy having sexual fantasies about his teacher !
>
>Also, everyone in the ad was white and well off, which hardly represents a
>cross-section of the Brazilian population.
>
>
The one last night was particularly bad. No, it didnt have the strange 
overtones of the brazilian one. This one had a bunch of japanese studio
musicians, making a coke commercial. They couldnt get the 'groove' going
until they all took a break, and drank a coke. With the sugar/caffeine
water coarsing thru their veins, they grooved incredibly. Of course, the 
cross-cultural lead in to this was Natalie Cole, explaining how when she
gets down in the studio, a coke really helps her out.....

I guess we all really ARE alike, arent we....

-r


Newsgroups: sci.anthropology
From: rwd4f@poe.acc.Virginia.EDU (Rob Dobson)
Subject: Re: The Anthropology of Coca-Cola
Organization: University of Virginia
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 13:34:50 GMT

In article <glenda.712296755@hoel> glenda@st.nepean.uws.edu.au (Glenda Robinson) writes:
>haynes@cats.ucsc.edu (Jim Haynes) writes:

>
>>Gee, a friend of mine who spent some time in Japan said that the Japanese
>>don't like American soft drinks - "they taste like medicine".  The natives
>>drink Calpis, which is fermented milk with lots of sugar.
>
>
>      (Cow Piss) is what it really tastes like. I was on a tour there in
>1980, and one of our fellow travellers won a bottle on the Pachenko machines.
>About 15 to 20 people tasted it, from all age groups (13 to 70) and NOT ONE
>of us liked it.
>Must be an aquired taste.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

BINGO!!! YOU WIN!!!! You have stumbled on the point of my original post.
Coca-cola, in this absurd ad campaign, has tried to portray love of 
carbonated water, sugar, and carmel color as a universal, a trait that
links all humans cross-culturally. When, of course, it is an acquired taste,
and one that is nutritionally 100% worthless. But of course, coke will keep
trying, and soon people all over the world will acquire this taste, become
addicited to the sugar and caffeine, and coke laughs all the way to the bank
(which will not be in any of these other countries that love coke, im sure).

American capitalism scores again. I mean, in Russia, food is scarce but we
still have McDonalds charging more than an hour's wage for the average russian
for a big mac and coca-cola....

-rob