HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Hidden Variables
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 92 07:34:29 GMT

In article <snodgras.714776381@crash> snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)  
writes:
> (Barry Merriman) writes:
> 
> >Perhaps the modern definition of a philosopher of science is one
> >who cannot actually make any contribution to science, but still likes
> >to talk about it.
> 
> 
> the development of human
> knowledge is not a routine matter of adding two and two, or making a simple
> sequence of measurements. For every technique of observation there is an
> underlying model, and for every model a set of assumptions. Who choses those
> assumptions?

The same can be said about sitting down in a chair. A complex model
of the physical world underlies the sitters behavior---that there is
indeed a chair where there `appears' to be one, and that it will
continue to be a chair when you sit in it. Better not sit
down----better mull all this over first, sort it all out, put it
on firm theoretical ground,...!

>  Who questions those assumptions? You?

And who will question the nature of the chair? You, I assume.

>       Think about that for a few months, then come back and give us your
> next thought. We need a little comic relief around here.

Yes, but you still haven't answered my question: name one
significant contribution that a philosopher _of_ science
has made _to_ science. My feeble mind can't think of any.

My basic argument goes to your point above: 
who questions the assumptions? 

The philosophers do question assumptions, but they have a 
nack for questioning the ones that are not important, and a nack 
for answering their own questions in useless ways. The scientist
has a nack for targeting just the critical assumptions and 
resolving the question in ways that advance scientific understanding.

For a good lesson in this, look at the history of investigations
of time. As the old saying goes, investigations of the nature
of time have been alternately philosophical, theological, and useful.

The philosophers should be totally embarrassed---and
learn a lesson---from the way Einstein blew out their useless
theorizing with a physical theory of time.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1992 09:09:04 GMT

In article <1992Sep4.040504.3673@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu 
(Barry Merriman) writes:

   >All in all, an excellent example of my complaint: philosophers 
   >who try (and fail) to apply the techniques of science and mathematics to
   >establish 'deep' philosophical truths.

  But isn't your own article an excellent illustration of the deep
truth that many scientists 1) are extremely serious-minded people
and have a tin ear for nuances in language, and 2) have an aversion to
empirical investigations?

 >Do they ever send phil papers to real scientists to referee?

  This would make as much sense as sending scientific papers to
real philosophers to referee.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: QUICKIE TARSKI QUESTION
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 04 Sep 92 15:37:32 GMT

Can somone out there tell me what year Tarski died? E-mail please.
Thanks.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 05:02:21 GMT

In article <1992Aug28.013928.4918@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu
 (Barry Merriman) writes:

   >However, in retospect its clear these folks greatest contributions
   >were as mathematicians and physicists. Their philosophical efforts 
   >were of little import, although it does give early philosophy a
   >bit of a boost to be able to claim these great scientists as philosophers.

  My only objection to this remark is that it is completely vacuous. What
is the point of discussing "philosophy" in terms that presuppose or
draw on no knowledge whatever of anything having to do with philosophy?


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1992 04:58:02 GMT

In article <1992Aug28.014351.4993@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu
 (Barry Merriman) writes:

   >The fact that Einstein let his philosphical biases prejudice him
   >against QM is an excellent example of the perils of the philosophical
   >way of knowing things.

   The theory of relativity was the outcome of "philosophical prejudices".
Or do you think that the convictions on which he proceeded in the case of
relativity were somehow more "scientific" just because he succeeded in that
case?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Subject: Re: Hidden Variables
Date: 25 Aug 92 20:59:41 GMT

In <1992Aug24.085622.28313@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:

>In article <snodgras.714198449@crash> snodgras@crash.cts.com (John Snodgrass)  
>writes:
>>       I frequently encounter philosophically (or historically) naive
>> scientists, who seem to overlook the most obvious 
>> philosophical contradictions
>>       John Snodgrass
>>       --------------
>>       snodgras@crash.cts.com

>Hmm, thats interesting.  I have a rather different experience.
>I _never_ encounter philosophers that have made any useful contribution
>to our understanding of the physical universe. Are there any?

>Perhaps the modern definition of a philosopher of science is one
>who cannot actually make any contribution to science, but still likes
>to talk about it.


      Yeah, right. Science is what you do, and philosophy is what everyone
else does. Just one little problem. Most of what you do, which starts with
how you view the phenomena you work with, is based on a philosophical point
of view. Contrary to the idealistic portrayal of science you may have
been exposed to in your narrow technical training, the development of human
knowledge is not a routine matter of adding two and two, or making a simple
sequence of measurements. For every technique of observation there is an
underlying model, and for every model a set of assumptions. Who choses those
assumptions?  Who questions those assumptions? You?

      Think about that for a few months, then come back and give us your
next thought. We need a little comic relief around here.



>--
>Barry Merriman
>UCLA Dept. of Math
>UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
>barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


      John E. Snodgrass
      -----------------
      snodgras@crash.cts.com
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<Btn8r8.8LK@unx.sas.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 14:04:43 GMT

In article <Btn8r8.8LK@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
 writes:

   
   >There is another (more recent) approach in which the philosophy of science
   >reduces to the sociology and history of science (generally this is
   >in reaction to the posititivists).  The degree of parasitism increases
   >with this sterile approach, and Barry would be (is?) quite right
   >to be distressed by it.

  What is sterile about the history of science? And why is it any more
"parasitic" than other historical studies?
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 17:35:59 GMT

In article <1992Aug26.112309.18272@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
>Yes, more or less. I have nothing against the "philosophies" that arise
>from the development and use of theories, a la Bohr, Einstein, etc. 
>Those philosophies are more for practical application (i.e. giving
>you a powerful way to think about the new methods) than they are
>philosophy in the academic tradition (trying to understand the 
>True Nature of things).

If I am not mistaken, Bohr and Einstein (and Einstein in particular) viewed
themselves as trying to understand the True Nature of things.  Einstein's
obejctions to quantum theory were motivated primarily by deep-seated
feelings about what reality is like, and not because of experiments that
didn't fit or serious inconveniences of the theory.

>But still, why should I not be irritated with academic philosophers?
>I view them as intellectual parasites.

You're entitled to these views.  But most readers of this newsgroups will
not be impressed by mere polemic.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
From: arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Sets and Objectivity (Re: Science vs Philosophy of)
Date: 28 Aug 92 20:26:43 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept, QMW, University of London

In <1992Aug27.173243.4672@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

>To me, your "naive and obvious" question "which reasonings are valid,
>and which not, when applied to the (one) Universe..." is not naive or
>obvious at all.  In fact, what you've done is to encapsulate most of
>epistemology! [...]
>I don't know how close I came to addressing your actual question.
>Marko Amnell

Not very close; but it's not your fault. My message was garbled, in
more than one way. (I didn't even manage to get my own telephone number
right. :-( ) I was probably conflating several different foundational
problems.

The point I meant to make was that whatever appearance of objectivity
there is in set theory results from there being a gentlemen's agreement
to treat the theory of sets in much the same way as Hilbert treated the 
Euclidean theory of points, lines, and planes (or tables, chairs, and
beer mugs); which politely ignores the fact that any definition of a
class of structured sets obviously depends upon having a concept of
"set". About the naive concept of set there is no agreement: not even
on what axiom system to use (e.g. ZFC is found irksome for formalizing
category theory), let alone on what sets really are. So metaphysical
argument is unavoidable (unless silence on a disputed point counts as
profound metaphysical wisdom :-) ).

It doesn't follow from this that set theory cannot help to clarify
metaphysical problems (so long as some help is allowed to go in the
other direction).

Incidentally, has Patrick Suppes worked out anything along these
lines? (I've been unable to track down his "A Set-Theoretical 
Philosophy of Science" - an exact reference would be appreciated, if
anyone can provide it.)
--
Angus H. Rodgers  (PhD student), | arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk  
Dept. of Computer Science, Queen | [ +44 | 0 ] 71 975 5241   
Mary & Westfield College,  Mile  | This space has not been left blank,
End Rd., London E1 4NS, England  | intentionally or otherwise.
From: miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 26 Aug 92 06:07:38 CDT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <1992Aug26.002202.14701@math.ucla.edu>, barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:

> I mean, get some perspective: science has exploded, expanded its 
> understanding millions of fold over the past 300 rears. Philosophy
> is still struggling with same old ill-posed questions, and philosophy
> of science is simply riding on the coattails of the scientists, 
> ruminating on their accomplishments with their inneffective digestive system.
> 
> If all philosophers of science retired tomorrow, no one would notice.
> If all scientists did, quite the opposite.

The *enterprise* of science would continue for as long as society is
willing to fund it; but it would be am amputated limb.  Do you really
feel that insights such as Heisenberg's are valueless?

I've often felt that scientists who talk this way have unknowingly 
expropriated the concerns of the philosophers and simply think of them
as part of science.  If that's all it is, there's no real issue here.
-- 
********************************** +.............................+
*- Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>* :All opinions expressed herein:
*There is no privileged position.* :are my own and are not to be :
*	-God, Derrida, others    * : attributed to my employer   :
********************************** +.............................+
From: exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 27 Aug 92 15:31:51 GMT
Organization: Ericsson Network Systems, Inc.

In article <1992Aug27.080951.1870@sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
>Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
>Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 08:09:51 GMT

>In article <1992Aug26.112309.18272@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu 
>(Barry Merriman) writes:

>   >Yes, more or less. I have nothing against the "philosophies" that arise
>   >from the development and use of theories, a la Bohr, Einstein, etc.

>  Actually the relation between philosophy and physical theory is not
>that straightforward.

>   >Those philosophies are more for practical application (i.e. giving
>   >you a powerful way to think about the new methods) than they are
>   >philosophy in the academic tradition (trying to understand the 
>   >True Nature of things).

>  The philosophy of science is concerned with, among other things,
>1) understanding what science is, and 2) understanding what, if
>anything, science tells us about the world. Naturally, if you have
>no interest in these questions, there is no reason for you to
>pay attention to philosophy. Very many scientists want just to do
>science and not reflect on these things, which is fine. However,
>instead of explaining that this is their attitude they often say
>very silly things about what science is and what it tells us
>about the world.

>   >But still, why should I not be irritated with academic philosophers?
>   >I view them as intellectual parasites.

>  There are lots of intellectual parasites around. Some of them are
>philosophers, and very many more are scientists.


>  

Intellectual parasites indeed!  Science was born from womb of philosophy!
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kenny Bell                          *        Welcome to Mind Wars
Ericsson Network Systems, Inc       *        Abstract Arts BBS 386-7907
P.O. Box 833875                     *        Severity with oneself is heroism.
Richardson, TX 75083-3875           *        --A.G.Sertillanges (France, 1943)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Date: 28 Aug 92 01:43:51 GMT
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department

In article <1992Aug27.173559.12442@galois.mit.edu> tycchow@riesz.mit.edu  
(Timothy Y. Chow) writes:
> 
> If I am not mistaken, Bohr and Einstein (and Einstein in particular) viewed
> themselves as trying to understand the True Nature of things.  Einstein's
> obejctions to quantum theory were motivated primarily by deep-seated
> feelings about what reality is like

Absolutely---and was not this divergence the point at which his
productive scientific career ended? As someone once said, if Einstein
had retired and gone fishing in 1925, it would have made no difference
to theoretical physics. He was crippled by his inability to accept QM
(even tho he was one of its originators!).

The fact that Einstein let his philosphical biases prejudice him
against QM is an excellent example of the perils of the philosophical
way of knowing things.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jgn@vixen.uucp (22122-niederberger)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: Bellcore, Livingston, NJ
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 92 18:54:00 GMT

In article <BtnLxM.MM@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1992Aug27.142730.28989@porthos.cc.bellcore.com>, jgn@vixen.uucp (22122-niederberger) writes:
>
>|> If education is a product offered to consumers, then we should judge
>|> it by how happy the customers are.  Universities that teach
>|> "creationism" and such nonsense are only to be judged by the
>|> marketplace.
>|> 
>|> I for one would be happy to keep a few philosophers around if only to
>|> counterbalance this consumerist rubbish.
>
>Which is the rubbish part?  That people should get to choose what
>they pay for?  Or that creationism is crap?  And how do you keep
>a few philosophers around if you don't pay them?  And which few?

Equating education with a marketable commodity is rubbish.  No doubt
people already have a choice in what they pay for, and sometimes even
in what they get.  Oft-times what they want is a club-card (i.e.,
degree) that qualifies them for the job market--and there are plenty
of institutions that will service their needs.  As far as education
goes, though, I wouldn't want the meaning of the word degraded by a
identification with what most universities sell.

BTW, I would pay the philosophers and the few I would keep would
simply be *the best*.  

But this is straying from the newgroup charter...

Peace,

Joe N.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: e343mh@tamuts.tamu.edu (Michael Hand)
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1992 19:14:57 GMT

In article <Bu22I4.AyF@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
  >Come on guys, I know for a fact of two areas in which this *does*
  >happen.  One is (gasp!) the philosophy of physics (quantum mech.
  >in particular) where I know of philosophers who publish in
  >physics journals (and I'm sure some physicists publish in philosophy
  >journals).  The other is the philosophy of biology where perhaps
  >even more of this happens.

Another is the journal *Linguistics and Philosophy*, which (I think)
sends each submission to a linguist referee and a philosopher referee.
More generally, a lot of "technical" philosophy of language and
"theoretical" linguistics is indistinguishable.
B-o} Michael
_______________________________________________________________________
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Hand                     phone (409)845-5660, fax (409)845-0458
Dept of Philosophy, Texas A&M Univ, College Station TX 77843-4237 U.S.A.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 92 04:26:29 GMT

In article <7390@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

> Part of the reason is that there's often something in the original
> that was distorted in earlier attempts to extract the concepts themselves.  

If the concept is so particular that its defined as what is present
in the priginal work, I doubt there is any concept there at all. Simply
vagues ideas that only had meaning within the authors own way of thinking of  
it.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1992 12:47:00 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Aug30.042348.19289@math.ucla.edu>, barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
|> In article <1992Aug28.162115.22963@galois.mit.edu> tycchow@riesz.mit.edu  
|> (Timothy Y. Chow) writes:
|> 
|> >  How do you divorce the
|> > concept of "Being-in-the-world" from Heidegger, or "Absolute Spirit" from
|> > Hegel?  Such divorcing is not as easy as you seem to make it out to be.
|> > 
|> 
|> We quite succesfully divorced calculus from Newton and 
|> Electrodynamics from Maxwell. If the notions you cite cannot be divorced
|> from their authors, that says to me that the phrases don't really
|> mean anything, and that philosophers are more interested in
|> the individuals than in the ideas.

Well, guys, I think he's got this right.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Science vs Philosophy of
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 17:56:22 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <1992Aug27.143116.16970@dcs.qmw.ac.uk>, arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
|> In <1992Aug26.095740.17255@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
|> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> 
|> >it's not at
|> >all clear that philosophical problems are amenable to scientific
|> >solutions.  Having said that, one of the reasons I'm using set theory in
|> >metaphysics is to try to bring some objectivity into the field.

Objectivity, no.  Precision, yes.

|> Wouldn't it be more useful to bring some metaphysics into set theory?

Geez!  The problem is how to get metaphysics *out* of set theory!

Nino Cochiarella once explained to me that he read Spinoza and
Leibniz in order to stimulate conceptions of theorems in set theory
(particularly at the transfinite level, of course).  It seemed to
work for him.  He is (or was) an outrageous Platonist -- what might
be termed the anti-Ockham.  "Maximize the number of entities" was
his guiding rule.  (I haven't spoken to him or read anything by him
in years.  This may have changed.)
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech