From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
Subject: Re: Pro-Choice Criteria for Personhood
Organization: USC  Department of Computer Science
Date: 15 Oct 92 20:28:49 GMT


I didn't see a distribution line up above, so I typed one in.  Hope 
that does the trick.

In <YAMAUCHI.92Oct11154251@sartre.ces.cwru.edu> yamauchi@ces.cwru.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes:

>I'm curious about the criteria that other people who are pro-choice
>would use to determine whether an organism is a person.  I'm
>pro-choice, but it seems to me that abortion rights activists are
>often unclear about this in their public statements.

I'm really curious about this myself.  Most pro-choicers avoid coming
out and spelling out their criteria.

>I'm not interested in debating with pro-lifers who believe that
>personhood begins at conception.  They generally believe this for one
>or both of the following reasons:

>1) They believe that a soul enters the body at conception.
>2) They believe that personhood is defined by having a unique genetic
>code.

>It seems pointless to argue over these.  (1) is a religious statement
>which one can either believe or not (I don't).  (2) is a semantic
>definition which one can either choose to adopt or not (I choose not
>to).

I tend to agree.  My viewpoint is much like yours.

>On the other hand, there are a number of criteria that are consistent
>with various types of pro-choice positions.

>The most common, viability, seems to me to be the weakest, since it is
>a function of the external technological level of the fetus'
>surrounding society.  Using this criteria, an American n-month old
>fetus might be a person when an African fetus of the same age would
>not be.

Also, it is illogical.  It means that offspring able to survive 
outside the womb have the "right" to remain inside, while those
unable to survive outside the womb may be expelled with impunity.

>To me, the most compelling criteria would be one based on
>self-awareness. 

Compelling if it is there.  But in general, I would leave off the
prefix "self".  Awareness of any kind is my criterion.

> Unfortunately, this is rather difficult to measure
>directly.  As far as I'm concerned, the _minimal_ criteria would
>include both brain activity and responsiveness to external stimuli.

This is present before the end of the 7th week.
  
>I realize that this would include some deep coma victims among the dead,
>but it's perhaps not unreasonable to consider deep comas a form of
>(sometimes) reversible brain death.

If it is reversible, it is not death, barring miracles.

>At the other end, I would consider the ability to build a complex
>model of oneself and one's environment to be sufficient, though
>perhaps not necessary, conditions for self-awareness.  However, testing
 ^^^^^^^
>this is difficult until the subject in question develops the ability
>to use language effectively.

Why "perhaps"??  Are children under the age of two in some sort of
gray area?  Judging from the rest of the post, I would guess that
you think in this way.  I suggest, though, that some of your ideas
are incorrect.  There is lots of evidence for prenatal conditioning.
See Verny and Kelly's book, _The Secret Life of the Unborn Child_.

And one can recollect things from very early on.  Verny and Kelly
give some apparent cases where children remember being born.  My
own youngest brother was such an apparent case.  And I have a 
distinct recollection of something I did when I was six months old.

Peter Nyikos


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