From: mtanner@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Michael C. Tanner)
Subject: Re: ASRS CALLBACK # 163 (
Organization: George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA
Date: 11 Jan 93 13:06:22

In article <942.180.uupcb@ssr.com> dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin)  writes:

   MCT> .problem.  How hard would it have been for the controller to
      > .mention contact approaches?

   The controller isn't allowed to solicit a contact approach.  I missed
   the beginning of the discussions, but did the pilot declare an
   emergency?  If not, why not?  Lots of things change when an emergency is
   declared.

This is precisely the point.  As one poster noted, the rules should not be
intended to keep the pilot ignorant, but it seems the FAA and others interpret
them that way.  Forget what controllers are and are not allowed to do, what
*should* they be allowed to do?  What is wrong with them informing the pilot
what the options are?

      > .The FAA creates a regulatory environment so complex that the
      > .average pilot cannot realistically understand all of it, and an
      > .enforcement environment so vindictive that people would rather
      > .cover their asses than act to reduce dangerous situations. Then
      > .NASA (and NTSB, too) proclaims the fault to be the pilot's, who
      > .should have known better.  Why can't they look at the real
      > .problems? (rhetorical question)

   What, in your opinion, are the "real" problems?  The regulatory
   environment is indeed complex, but little of it comes into play
   during the average flight operations.

We are not talking about average operations.  The controller had every reason
to know the pilot was in trouble.  The pilot may have flown only 2 or 3
approaches in IMC in the past year, and this time had the near emergency of
icing.  A person's mind tends to narrow under these circumstances, the
distinction between "visual approach" and "contact approach" makes little real
difference at any time, and might easily be forgotten under pressure.

The real problem here is needlessly complex rules and the inability of ATC to
provide reasonable assistance.  Because of the FAA's rule enforcement the
controller has to decide between doing something that may save lives, knowing
it could result in disciplary action, or doing nothing and hoping things work
out.  I don't think controllers should be put in that situation.

      > .I agree that pilots should be active information seekers during
      > .weather briefings, but we should be able to have confidence that
      > .we'll get the obviously relevant information without having
      > .to pull teeth for it.  Again, there are problems here that
      > .it is unreasonable to blame completely on pilots,
      > .but they are being overlooked.

   Do you have concrete suggestions?  Saying that the briefers should
   supply the information that the pilot needs is like saying that you
   believe in apple pie and motherhood.  How about specifics as to what's
   wrong, and how to improve it.  Bear in mind that FSS' are going away, in
   favor of a few AFSS, and that the emphasis is shifting to a pilot
   doing a self-briefing with DUAT.

In this case NASA has said it's the pilots' fault for not receiving
required/useful info.  NTSB probably has done the same thing for accidents.
If they are saying accidents are caused by pilots being too stupid to ask for
X, Y, or Z, then let's set things up so pilots get X, Y, and Z automatically.
In fact, maybe it isn't X, Y, and Z that pilots need at all, but an
understanding of what they mean for the flight, i.e., analysis.  Maybe the
current FSS, AFSS, and DUAT is not the proper vehicle, so expand the horizons
a little.

I don't have answers.  I'm suggesting that the analyses we are getting are too
narrowminded, and calling for a broader discussion.  They always seem to come
back to better pilot training or additional regulations forcing pilots to do
something else.  How about changes to the system?

-- mike

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