HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: tomh@cybernet.cse.fau.edu (Tom Holroyd)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Date: 16 Dec 92 05:12:07 GMT
Organization: Cybernet BBS, Boca Raton, Florida

mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. (Gregory McColm) writes:

> Being lazy, I skipped over the logic parts of Penrose's book.  
> Two logicians I know claim that the logic part is a mess, and 
> some of the scientific reviews are very negative.  While I 
> can't comment on the physics (I suspect that he knows what he 
> is doing there, but I am completely non-expert), I can say that 
> his discussion on ethology (animal psychology) is uninformed 
> and decades out of date.

Flame on.

Actually, his physics isn't that great either.  He pretty much
ignores non-equilibrium physics (he sticks to equilibrium thermo-
dynamics for much of the book, and in one place even calculates
the probability of the universe based on classical entropy as
one part in 10**(10**123).  (p.344)  This is a totally absurd number).

Most phenomena that are mysterious to "classical" (i.e. newtonian)
physics are well understood in terms of the pattern and structure
forming properties of systems that are far from equilibrium, which
includes among other things, us.  When energy flows *through* a
system, it can self-organize;  this is in contrast with the closed
systems of classical physics.  The universe may or may not be closed,
but locally, it is certainly not closed, and most of the physics in
Penrose's book doesn't apply.

And about his quantum physics, read Petrosky and Prigogine "Laws and
Events: The dynamical basis of self-organization" Can. J. Phys. 68 p670
(1990) which discusses the collapse of the wave function as a result
of high-order correlations - basically achieves what Penrose tries to
get but without having to postulate a new, non-local force of quantum
gravity to explain anything.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary (parting shot)
Summary: where to draw boundaries part of a larger linguistic "confusion"
Date: 14 Dec 92 05:42:09 GMT

: From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
: Message-ID: <1992Dec10.005710.15070@spss.com>
: Anyway, maybe we'd better leave it at that for awhile.  I've enjoyed the
: discussion a lot, both the agreements and disagreements, but I suspect
: we're beginning to repeat ourselves.... 

True, agreed.  But I'll put in one parting shot, that I think reflects
much of the points we differed on.  It occured to me in the thing
about gloves not being "definable" or "explainable" without reference
to human hands.

: But that's not a definition of a glove, much less an explanation.  Is a
: hot-air balloon with a few dimples in it a glove? You could refine your
: description, adding constraints about size, proportions, etc., but the
: point is that nobody learns the meaning of the word or thinks about it
: in their heads that way-- a glove is something worn on a human hand. 
: (If you weren't being serious, there, I just ran the point needlessly
: into the ground.)

Hmmmm.  Well, I was medium serious.  Let me start this way.  Is a rubber
party baloon with five protrusions from it a glove?   In answering,
consider those funny looking balloons one often sees at parties at
hospitals and other medical establishments. 

The point is, "this object is a glove" is really, fundamentally, at the
base of it all, not really talking about the object.  It's just a
misleading linguistic convention.  It's "really" talking about the
intent of some users of the object.  Maybe even the expectations of the
manufacturer of the object.  But again, not actually about the object 
at all. 

Is it a vodka bottle or an incindiary device?  A prophylactic or
a party balloon?  Is it a motor fuel or an "accelerant"?  An independent
sensor-effector cluster or part of a robot's body?

ALL of these examples, it seems to me, are not talking about the
objects involved at all.  Merely about how we are looking at them
at any given time.

( Back to the glove for a moment.  The situation of the title
  person in _The_Man_Who_Mistook_His_Wife_for_a_Hat_ had interesting
  points here.  Clearly, it wasn't the *bandwidth* that ultimately
  grounded him.  Consider the incident of the rose.  Clearly it wasn't
  other symbols that grounded him.  Consider the verbal hints about
  the glove.  Interesting scenario, indeed. )
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avl0@cine88.cineca.it
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: brains in a vat
Date: 17 Dec 92 09:53:24 +0100
Organization: CINECA, Italian Interuniversity comp. centre

<< I'm  sorry, this could be a dated material, but my host was down >>

In article <e9wHVB2w165w@codewks.nacjack.gen.nz>
system@codewks.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:
>Don't read the next example! You'll hate yourself.
>I warned you...
>angels == mechanism => no free-will => no responsibility && must comply with
>setup of meachnism => serving G-d

I totally agree with you, substitute angels with humans and your reasoning
will work again. BUT ...
First: this introduces a new item: the goal is no more its own material
survival; this help us in avoiding the materialistically unavoidable egoism
in every action.
Second: an a-temporal dimension is admitted. This makes plausible a reality
where sequentially-temporal awarness, which can perceive only causality and
mechanisms, can be overcome.
So, Math Sciences can rightly investigate material reality having nothing to
do with fundamental Hope, Happyness, Goal and Truth which can be
defined, all together, as God.
Apply Science to humans and you'll find only mechanism, but it is not a
complete understanding of what is a man.
Leave opened this door and the question about Happyness and Truth can be posed.
This is the only interesting question, survival can be a part of the answer
but it is very very secondary and can not be reached!
"Friends, is'nt it true, talking about Truth we forget women too?" [Socrates]
"What does the soul desire more than Truth?" [S.Augustin]
Which is the answer? Let me use Platon.
"I feel, oh Socrates, and perhaps you too, that a sure Truth about these things
in the present life can not be reached in any way, or perhaps with huge
difficulties. But I think it is a vileness do not study every aspect of
things said about that, and stop researches before having examined every way.
Beacuse there are only two solutions: you can know how things are, or, if you
can not, stick to the best and surest of human reasons and with it, as a boat,
try to traverse the sea.
Unless we can, with a better confort and less danger, make the voyage by a
solider means, namely with the help of the revealed words of a god."
-- 
"To be or not to be,  /// Marco Voli    [voli@cineca.it]     | ph.+39-51-598411
 that is the         /// Supercomputing Group                | FAX+39-51-594872
 problem"           /// CINECA  Interuniversitary Computing Centre
 Billy the kidder  /// via Magnanelli 6/3 - 40033 Casalecchio (BO) ITALY
-- 
"To be or not to be,  /// Marco Voli    [voli@cineca.it]     | ph.+39-51-598411
 that is the         /// Supercomputing Group                | FAX+39-51-594872
 problem"           /// CINECA  Interuniversitary Computing Centre
 Billy the kidder  /// via Magnanelli 6/3 - 40033 Casalecchio (BO) ITALY
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 04:10:12 GMT


In article <BILL.92Dec18123201@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu> ,
bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:

>ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes: 
 
>>>This question of what a system is isn't merely my own 
>>>hobbyhorse; it underlies the famous Systems Reply as well.  
>> 
>> Not famous enough.  References? 
 
>The "Systems Reply" is one of the standard responses to the Chinese 
>Room argument; Searle discusses it in "Minds, Brains, and Programs". 

Oh, THAT "Systems Reply".  Searle discusses it briefly in the Scientific
American article, but I don't see how that relates to the entity
environment boundary.  I guess I'm going to have read Searle to keep up
with this group :-(

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 15 Dec 92 00:02:33 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <Bz0L30.9E0@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>In article <1992Dec3.174922.7063@spss.com>,
[KE:]
>>>I don't readily see the basis for drawing the boundary along the contours
>>>of minimum information exchange.

[MR:]
>>Well, what other basis is there?  I think we would like to avoid making
>>the boundary a mere matter of the observer's arbitrary choice.

[KE:]
>I would like to propose an elaboration of the concept entity/environment
>boundary.  Instead of thinking of it as a mathematical/conceptual surface,
>let's flesh it out and call it the entity/environment interface.

[discussion deleted]

>What do you think?

You haven't written anything I disagree with, but I don't see that you've
answered the question: where do you draw the entity/environment boundary
and on what basis?
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 15 Dec 92 22:55:16 GMT
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem


In article <Bz9xGB.69n@spss.com> ,
markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:

>You haven't written anything I disagree with, but I don't see that you've 
>answered the question: where do you draw the entity/environment boundary 
>and on what basis?   

Well, I was getting to that.  Had to pause for a bit to make sure we're in
sync. (and because I was getting a little off track).

I can see the basis of drawing the boundary along the minimum information
contour if we bring in the idea of a physical interface that is neither
entity nor environment.

In a world of distended AI systems and a large range of possible
environments, the interface would work something like this.  You could have
an S/E cluster especially designed for a given environment, which would
plug into your AI system via the standard interface.   Your AI system could
use the interface to plug into different kinds of S/E clusters in different
kinds of environments.  

If the S/E clusters have some intelligence, and are designed to minimize
the bandwidth of the connection to the entity, and if we draw the entity
line at this low bandwidth connection, then it seems the S/E cluster can't
properly be called entity or environment, and must then be part of the
interface.

In this sense, I agree with your minimum information boundary.

However, if we define the entity as that which acts on the environment,
then we would have to include the S/E cluster as part of the entity.  If
your AI is designed to influence the next election, the S/E cluster would
include media transmission points, and the broadcasting of large quantities
of "information".   In this example, information itself is the main
effector, and the entity environment boundary could be along the contours
of maximum information "exchange".

--
Ken Easlon
ken@holonet.net
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: causal powers
Date: 16 Dec 92 04:32:25 GMT
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem



In article <Bz9yG8.4FJ@iat.holonet.net> I wrote:

>I don't agree with Searle (as quoted) that the emulating computer need be
>"built of material with the same 'causal powers, as the brain."

Since then I went back and read Searle's article in the Jan 1990 issue of
Scientific American.  I hope these quotes aren't illegal.

     "...any alternative system, whether made of silicon, beer cans or
     whatever, would have to have the relevant causal capacities equivalent
     to those of brains."

Can't say as I disagree with that.

     " Any artifact that produced mental phenomena, any artificial brain,
     would have to be able to duplicate the specific causal powers of
     brains, and it could not do that just by running a formal program."

Depends on what he means by "formal".

     " That argument (Chinese room argument) rests on the distinction
     between the formal symbol manipulation that is done by the computer
     and the mental contents biologically produced by the brain, a
     distinction I have abbreviated--I hope not misleadingly--as the
     distinction between syntax and semantics."

OK, I think the man is only objecting to the limitations of trying to
duplicate consciousness with abstract symbols.  I'll go along with that.

I gather that Searle has doubts about our being able to emulate biological
semantics on a digital computer, but he'll come around.

--
Ken Easlon
ken@holonet.net
Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:7094 sci.logic:2456
From: djb85@thor.albany.edu (Donald J. Byrd)
Subject: Re: The Complexity Required for intelligence
Organization: State University of New York at Albany
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 22:57:24 GMT


Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: jbaez@riesz.mit.edu (John C. Baez)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Organization: MIT Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 07:04:19 GMT

In article <1992Dec9.193523.9560@ariel.ec.usf.edu> mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. (Gregory McColm) writes:

>Being lazy, I skipped over the logic parts of Penrose's book.  
>Two logicians I know claim that the logic part is a mess, and 
>some of the scientific reviews are very negative.  While I 
>can't comment on the physics (I suspect that he knows what he 
>is doing there,

Don't count on it.  He seamlessly blends exposition of standard theories
with wild-eyed speculations without alerting the reader of the
difference.  He claims, for example, that quantum gravity is important
in the functioning of the brain.  He also gives a very misleading
account of Everett's relative state formalism (known by
sensation-seekers as the "many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics," although this metaphor is bound to confuse anyone who can't
follow Everett's rigorous math).  

>but I am completely non-expert), I can say that 
>his discussion on ethology (animal psychology) is uninformed 
>and decades out of date.

I'm afraid this is one of those books where everyone
says that what the author writes on THEIR specialty is a mess, but that
hopefully the rest is okay.


Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: vellino@bnr.ca (Andre Vellino)
Subject: testing 
Organization: Bell-Northern Research
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 19:39:01 GMT

hello world
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding, intelligent thermos, searle
From: system@codewks.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 07:39:29 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

comptec90012@camins.camosun.bc.ca (Greg W Burnham) writes:

> In article <a11JVB7w165w@codewks.nacjack.gen.nz>, system@codewks.nacjack.gen.
> > comptec90012@camins.camosun.bc.ca (Greg W Burnham) writes:
> > 
> > [ List of what a themos can ONLY do for you DELETED]
> > 
> > But remember that I can trivialise you in exactly the same way. It would
> > just take longer.
> 
> Nothing about Greg or any other sentient being is trivial.  That is the very
> essance of sentience.

So are you saying that there is a smooth continuum between Greg [a sentient
being] and a thermos [generally regarded as non-sentient], that depends 
solely on complexity?

> 
> > Greg does nothing for 12 hours when it is dark, unless bladder = full, or h
> > has received a piece of paper with "party" on it. When alarm goes off, or
> > person makes loud noise, sits up, and yawns, and puts on clothes....
> 
> Greg can do thousands of thing during the 12 hours when it is dark.

Indeed, but in theory at least I could enumerate them just as you can
enumerate what a thermos can do. There are just more of them.

> These choices are not always influenced by others.  

Well maybe. Or perhaps I believe in a fairly rigid deterministic view of
life, genetics, environment, society, the universe. Perhaps his choices are
TOTALL influenced by others, but at a level of complexity that we cannot
observe [but could in theory be enumerated]. Whether a thermos keeps a hot
drink hot, or a cold drink cold, depends on the behaviour of others.

> Greg can make his
> own decisions.

So as well as being more complex, you suggest Greg has [for want of a better
word right now] "free will"? In addition to complexity?

> He does not need to sleep when it is dark.

No, but he often does. Perhaps a thermos does not need to keep cold drinks
cold. It can make its own decisions. It just chooses to do so, being very
very dependable.

Consider an Asmovian positronic robot, constrained by the three laws of
robotics. Some of the ones in, say "The Rest of the Robots" may well be
accepted as sentient, yet would ALWAYS be compelled to say, attempt to save
a human life. Do you believe you can have sentience without free will?



-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Date: 18 Dec 92 19:32:01 GMT
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

   > >This question of what a system is isn't merely my own
   > >hobbyhorse; it underlies the famous Systems Reply as well. 
   >
   > Not famous enough.  References?

The "Systems Reply" is one of the standard responses to the Chinese
Room argument; Searle discusses it in "Minds, Brains, and Programs".

	-- Bill
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: avrom@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Avrom Faderman)
Subject: Re: The Ealson Test
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 23:31:26 GMT


In article <Bz0Hvr.8Mn@iat.holonet.net> ken@holonet.net (Ken Ealson) wirtes: 

| I have arrived at last at the ultimate final true formulation of the 
| Ealson test.
|
| FOR A STATEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED TRUE, IT MUST SEEM PLAUSIBLE TO EALSON!

Hmmm...  I think I agree with the basic idea behind your test, but there is 
one revision I would like to make.

FOR A STATEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED TRUE, IT MUST SEEM PLAUSIBLE TO FADERMAN!

:-}


-- 
Avrom I. Faderman                  |  "...a sufferer is not one who hands
avrom@csli.stanford.edu            |    you his suffering, that you may 
Stanford University                |    touch it, weigh it, bite it like a
CSLI and Dept. of Philosophy       |    coin..."  -Stanislaw Lem
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: causal powers
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 03:38:52 GMT


In article <724658704@sheol.UUCP>,
throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

>...the difference between simulation and emulation...
>... is one of effect-domain. 
 
I'm not sure I agree with this entirely.  The effect domain of a good
computer simulation (in the sense normally used) could be altered simply by
changing or extending the I/O peripherals.  If a numeric output of a
manufacturing simulation were routed to numerically controlled machine
tools, the simulation becomes an emulation. (OK, not such a good example,
but you get the idea.)

>Of course, my point of view still leaves fuzzy areas, such as 
>whether SHRDLU-like entities simulate or emulate. 

If we stick to something like the traditional definition of simulate (to
imitate by taking on an appearance) and emulate (to strive to equal or
exceed),  I think SHRDLU could be said to emulate a robot's computational
ability, while simulating sensory sources and motor effects.

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |


Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 1992 01:30:55 GMT

In article <1992Dec9.193523.9560@ariel.ec.usf.edu> mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. (Gregory McColm) writes:
>Strictly speaking, given a recursively enumerable (r.e.) set of 
>sentences (ie, a (possibly infinite) set of sentences that can 
>be listed one after another by a computer) that is consistent, 
>there exists a sentence that can be neither proven nor disproven 
>from that r.e. set.

There are other conditions that must be met other than merely being
RE.  I wouldn't point this out, except that a lot of people seem to
think that Godel's theorem applies to an arbitrary theory, and that's
simply not so.

>The assumption that the set of sentences is 
>r.e. is necessary:

This is not actually true (I used to think it was too).  Here's a
counterexample.

Choose a set S which is not RE.  For each integer n, fix a term kn
whose interpretation is n (do this in the usual way, i.e. let kn be n
applications of the symbol for the successor function to the constant
for 0).  Let L be the language of first-order Peano Arithmetic extended
by a new unary predicate symbol "SS".  Form a first order theory T on
the language L by taking first-order Peano Arithmetic and, for each
integer n, adding the axiom "SS(kn)" if n is in S, and "not(SS(kn))" if
n is not in S.  This clearly gives a theory whose axioms are not RE.

Next, extend any of the usual Godel codings (and assorted
representations of syntactic functions like substitution) to the
language L in the natural way.  You then extend the definition of "x is
a theorem" in the obvious way (in the part of the definition where you
need the formula which stands for "x is an axiom", just take the "x is
an axiom of PA" formula and add "\/ P(x)" on the end, where P(x) is a
formula which means

	((x is a code for a formula "SS(kn)") AND SS(kn)) OR
        ((x is a code for a formula "not(SS(kn))") AND not(SS(kn)))

(If you think this is more self-reference than you can actually get,
think about it some more).

The above gives you a theory (plus attendant other stuff) which
satisfies the result quoted by Daryl McCullough in his posting of
December 8 (I think that's the right date).  Thus, there will be a
Godel sentence for T.

> the (complete) set of all true sentences on 
>the integers is an example of a non-r.e. set of sentences that 
>will prove or disprove every sentence (written in the language 
>of the integers).

This demonstrates that you can't just drop the requirement that the
axioms are RE.  It doesn't demonstrate that that condition is
necessary.
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy