HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: pseudo one time pad...
Date: 18 Nov 92 13:26:58 GMT
Article-I.D.: qiclab.1992Nov18.132658.23404
Reply-To: Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
Organization: SCN Research/Qic Laboratories of Tigard, Oregon.

lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen) writes:

>The problem is, of course, random number generators designed to satisfy
>statistical randomness may well not satisfy at all the need for being
>unpredictable in a cryptographic situation; most are very poor at this, in
>fact, not having been designed with the problem in mind.  Most novices do
>not understand the distinction between "randomness" as in passing Chi Square
>and "unpredictable" as in frustrating analysis.  So, they grab any old
>random number generator out of Knuth or something and usually grab wrong.

Well, one possibility is to point out that *by definition* there is *no*
pattern to to digit stream that constitutes an irrational number, but
the digit stream is *totally* predictable! So *statistically* the 
digits from an irrational (like pi or sqrt(2)) are random. But crypto
folks would find them pretty useless. 


As a trivial example, I could send a message using PI as the key. But
if you have any info about the message (say knowing that many messages
from me start out in a certain way) you can try *assuming* that plaintext.
Then when you see that the key comes out 314159 for the first part of the
message, you may go "gee, that looks like Pi.." So you try plugging in
the next few digits. If reasonable plaintext results, I'd be willing to
bet you'd be looking for a table with Pi to a few hundred digits *fast*.

I've *seen* a key get compromised this way (In a friendly environment).
Someone saw that the plaintext messages between certain users allways
had the same heading. So it was a reasonable assumption for the "enemy"
to see what happened if he plugged in the heading and solved for the key.

He never *did* figure out our key change schedule, but since this was only
a battle of wits, we were only using a 20 digit key. So he could solve
fotr the header and have a chunk of the message. Then he'd try to fill
in the blanks per normal practice when you have a partial key. 

Now I know why lazy code clerks and standard message forms are so 
beloved of folks like the NSA!
-- 
Leonard Erickson		      leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com
CIS: [70465,203]			 70465.203@compuserve.com
FIDO:   1:105/51	 Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
(The CIS & Fido addresses are preferred)
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: My encryption program.  Comments?
Date: 21 Nov 1992 15:37:37 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com

In article <1992Nov21.010043.4210@nwnexus.WA.COM>, 
ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini) writes:

[stuff deleted...]

|> I don't see thay your "zipper" does anything but help protect the
|> first byte:
|>      outchar[2] = inchar[2] ^ key_stream[2] ^ outchar[1]
|> where outchar[1] is sitting right there in front of the cryptanalyst.

I get it.  I modified it so that zipper is no longer xor'd into the
output.  Now, (zipper modulo 113) is effectively added to the index
into the key_stream (skipping somewhere between 0 and 112 bytes of
key_stream).  Thus, I preserved my feedback, but in a way that is not
easily reversible.

Thanks, Ken.

BTW, I also added an initialization vector (based on keystroke delays, 
and some other factors), so that encrypting the same file twice with 
the same pass-phrase will produce totally different key streams.  The
initialization vector xor'd with a PRN (based on the text of the pass-
phrase) as the first byte of the ciphertext.

If you encrypt the same file twice with the same pass-phrase, you can
observe the following:

  ciphertext1[1] == init_vector1 ^ PRN
  ciphertext2[1] == init_vector2 ^ PRN

  thus,

  ciphertext1[1] ^ ciphertext2[1] == init_vector1 ^ init_vector2

Is there a way to deduce either initialization vector?

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: huntting@advtech.uswest.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: Key registration proposal in CACM
Organization: U S WEST Advanced Technologies
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 00:00:08 GMT


Brad Knowles, Defense Information Systems Agency <BLKNOWLE@JDSSC.DCA.MIL> writes in Communications of the ACM:

>Have a central Key Distribution Facility (KDF) that is run under the auspices
>of the IEEE, ANSI, FBI, NIST, another government agency, or some neutral third
>party -- one that gives a reasonable guarantee (one which I will not attempt to
>define here) that the keys will be kept safely from prying eyes, even those
>that belong to the government.  Specify that the RSA encryption algorithm (or
>some other public-key encryption algorithm) will be used to safely encrypt
>messages, and that all keys for this implementation will be issued by this KDF.
>Furthermore, if law enforcement agencies can present a legitimate wiretap order
>to this KDF, then issue them the private key(s) for the person(s) or
>organizations that is/are going to be wiretapped.

This person is either naive, daft, blind or all three.  The government
is not our freind.  It doesn't protect the inocent and it doesn't
punish the well to do.  Trusting the government with your privacy is
alot like trusting a kleptomaniac to house sit for you.


brad
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cuffell@spot.Colorado.EDU (CUFFELL TIMOTHY MICH)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 09:28:07 GMT

In article <4022@randvax.rand.org> edhall@rand.org (Ed Hall) writes:
>
>Let's say that a suspected child-molestor gets arrested.  As is all too
                  ^^^^^^^^^
>often the case, there isn't enough admissible evidence to convict him.
>However, since he was encrypting his diary, illegal crytographic programs
>were found on his computer.  So the prosecutor is able to get him put
>away for a while even though he won't decrypt the diary.  Anti-cryptography
>laws will join tax laws and other such legal weapons used to lock up
>evil-doers who are otherwise too slippery to catch.

Suspected is a key word.  This assumes that he may be innocent.
>
>Let me make one thing clear:  I personally believe that there should be
>no restriction of cryptography.  But in many people's minds this means
>that I'd "let the {terrorist,child-molestor,...} go free!"  It's an
>emotional argument, but an exceedingly potent one.
>
>How do you folks propose to overcome it?  Mistrust of government might
>sound like a good counter on its own, but when "government" is called
>"law enforcement", and the alternative is presented as blowing up
>airliners or destroying the lives of children, what do you say?  What
>evil is there in denying John Q. Public his cryptography compared to
>these things?
>
In this country, the accused is presumed innocent.  If there is not enough
admissable evidence, then either we cannot assume his guilt, or, in the case
of inadmissable evidence, a shortcoming in the law or a particular odius
example of the price we pay to prevent a police state.  One might argue
that an encrypted diary could prove his guilt.  This is true, in much the
same way a illegal search or a coerced confession proves guilt.  The guilty
going free on occasion is the price we pay for our freedoms.  The claim that
the innocent have nothing to hide takes us one step from them.

Here is a practical example.  You are accused of being a child molester.
There exists on your computer an unidentifyable file, consisting of random
data.  You now have to turn this data into a diary, or face criminal
charges.  You're in trouble if that is the output to the new pseudorandom
generator, or an adaptively compressed file, or just about anything.  Even
if it is your diary, what happens if just one bit is altered?  A good
encryption system would produce garbage.  You'd hate to go to jail because
some incompotent (or dishonest) evidence handler didn't park the heads on
your hard drive.  Practically speaking, there is no way for the accused to
prove there inocence (there's a switch), and therefore nothing to prevent the
guilty from masquarading as the innocent.  Even if you grant the government 
the right to invade privacy, there is no practical way to assert thing right
without sending a lot of innocent people to jail.
  
 


>		-Ed Hall
>		edhall@rand.org


-- 

-Tim Cuffel
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
From: jamie@cs.sfu.ca (Jamie Andrews)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Organization: CSS, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 17:45:49 GMT

In article <722206613@pike.cs.duke.edu> srt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Stephen R. Tate) writes:
>Huh?  I can think of very, very few algorithms (programs) that can not
>be counted on to halt.  The only simply stated one has the halting problem:
>given a program, decide whether or not it will ever halt.

     What about: any interpreter for a non-trivial programming
language?  This includes "sh", "csh", "perl", Emacs, and any
Lisp, Prolog, Smalltalk, or Basic interpreter...

> To re-iterate:  programs that cannot
>be counted on to halt are very, very, very rare.  Most people will never
>see one.

     Well, I work with them every day, and I would bet that you
do too.  I even write such programs sometimes, which is more
rare but certainly not uncommon.

--Jamie.
  jamie@cs.sfu.ca
"The Tao's net encompasses the whole universe."  - tao te ching
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
From: leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Date: 16 Nov 92 15:21:32 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Rutgers University Department of Computer Science

In article <PHR.92Nov15203840@napa.telebit.com>, phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
writes:
> ... It is true that if P=NP then all cryptography everywhere (not just RSA)
> is dead...

Actually, this is false.  If P=NP, then PUBLIC KEY cryptography is dead; but
private key cryptography can, in principle, be much stronger.  It can, in
fact, be arbitrarily strong.

The problem for public-key cryptography is that, given a ciphertext and the
public key, I can guess private keys and check that I've got the right one in
polynomial time by simply encrypting my proposed plaintext with the public
key.  If I get the ciphertext back, I've got the key.

For private-key cyptography, I can guess all I like, but there's no way I
can test the correctness of my guess with certainty.  Sure, as a PRACTICAL
matter, I may have some known plaintext, or i can just recognize that I
got English text back.  But we're not talking about "in practice" here.

Note that for a one-time pad, the system is unconditionally secure, even
given the ability to compute non-computable functions.

							-- Jerry
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5001 alt.privacy:2344 comp.org.eff.talk:7131
From: markd@uniwa.uwa.edu.au (Mark Diamond)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 19 Nov 1992 16:24:30 +0800
Organization: The University of Western Australia
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: uniwa.uwa.edu.au

If anyone has suggested the following, I apologise ... if (and I say IF)
one is going to register private keys in some way, then what of making
it a shared secret in accordance with some of the methods outlined by
people like David Chaum. 

Although it would make for a strange (and possibly unfortunate) overlap
between the courts and the LE agencies, one could share the secret
amongst a certain N authorities, where at least K <= N were needed to
reveal the secret, and at least one of the K had to be a court with
jurisdiction to issue an appropriate warrant.

I don't much like the idea myself, but I just raise the possibility.


M A R K  R  D I A M O N D | The University of Western Australia | All these
markd@uniwa.uwa.edu.au    | WACCRM                              | opinions are
                          | 328 Stirling Highway                | my own.
VOICE: +61 9 3847644      | CLAREMONT  WA  6010                 | Perhaps some
FAX:   +61 9 3852938      | AUSTRALIA                           | of them ought
                          |                                     | to be yours.
From: bvickers@valentine.ics.uci.edu (Brett J. Vickers)
Subject: Re: Key registration proposal in CACM
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Reply-To: bvickers@ics.uci.edu (Brett J. Vickers)
Organization: Univ. of Calif., Irvine, Info. & Computer Sci. Dept.
Date: 20 Nov 92 19:27:21 GMT

huntting@advtech.uswest.com (Brad Huntting) writes:
>The government is not our freind.  It doesn't protect the inocent and
>it doesn't punish the well to do.  Trusting the government with your
>privacy is alot like trusting a kleptomaniac to house sit for you.

Even if one had forgotten every instance in which the government has
stepped on individual privacy in the past, one would have to look only
so far back as the election-time State Department passport scandal to
be reminded that the government can rarely be entrusted with issues of
personal privacy.  If that's not plain-as-day evidence that proposals
to regulate cryptography are just plain stupid, I don't know what is.

--
Brett J. Vickers
bvickers@ics.uci.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,misc.legal
From: whg@inel.gov (Bill Gray)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 92 14:49:24 GMT

In article <1992Nov13.190219.24894@dg-rtp.dg.com>, meyers@leonardo.rtp.dg.com (Bill Meyers) writes:
|> In article <lg5gu8INN1m9@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> williamt@athena.Eng.sun.com (Dances with Drums) writes:
|> [ ... ]
|> >	As for registering keys...why do law enforcement officials think
|> >they have a right to know what I am saying to another person.  It seems
|> >like this is an infringement on *freedom* of expression -- if my expression
|> >to another person *must* be subject to monitoring, is it really free?
|> 
|> 
|> Well, I've had a closer look --
|> 
|>         AMENDMENT I
|>         Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
|>         of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
|>         or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;  [etc.]
|>                          ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^
|> -- and it's perfectly clear that what they _meant_ was your freedom
|> to make a speech, e.g., when trying to get elected to public office.
|> There's nothing in there about other modes of communication, and
|> _certainly_ nothing about keeping secrets from the Government!

I suggest that the first ammendment will stand up no better than the fourth
and fifth.  The gov't will simply invoke civil forfeiture against those who
use cryptographic methods to conceal what it wants to see.  There is nothing
illegal about having a lot of cash on your person,  but that hasn't stopped
various LE agencies from seizing same.  Just so,  using encryption could be
seen as justification for forfeiture.

			"Verdict first,  trial later."
					-- The Red Queen

Followups to alt.privacy;  I don't read sci.crypt (it's beyond my feeble
math)
========== long legal disclaimer follows, press n to skip ===========

Neither the United States Government or the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory or any of their employees, makes any warranty, whatsoever,
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility regarding any
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privately owned rights.  No specific reference constitutes or implies
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States
Government or the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  The views and
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the
United States Government or the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: weaver@kuttner.sfc.sony.com (Eric Weaver)
Subject: Re: why isn't there a sci.crypt.politics?
Organization: SONY Advanced Video Technology Center San Jose, CA USA
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 20:47:10 GMT


I third it.  CFV...
-- 
Eric Weaver  Sony AVTC  677 River Oaks Pkwy, MS 35  SJ CA 95134  408 944-4904
& Chief Engineer, KFJC 89.7 Foothill College, Los Altos Hills CA 94022
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: New ENcryption - a Challenge
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 02:33:04 GMT

Erik,

Ex cathedra you say.  Canon we say and canon for a long time.  You just
don't want to hear that.  I sincerely suggest that you exit stage left
with your macho nonesense until you have successfully protected your
algorithm with a patent filing and are willing to make it known.  Then
and only then will people who care about, know about and think about
crypto be interested in your challenge.  The point is so simple I don't
see why you fail to see it.  The ciphertext may well resist attack
without knowing the algorithm but be trivially broken knowing it and
no system with that property is considered secure by anyone in or
peripheral to the field.  Please come back when you are protected and
are willing to follow the rules by disclosing the algorithm.  Until
then, enough already!

Later,

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

"There are some strings.  They're just not attached."
                                                    Victoria Roberts


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
Date: 20 Nov 92 18:32:59 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov19.193420.14972@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>This has probably been covered in this long many threaded discussion
>but assume for a moment that a suspected perpetrator is communicating
>using strong cryptography on a public carrier, phone line for the
>example.


Why are all examples in this HUGE thread of the form (some criminal
uses strong cryptography)?  We should have at least as many examples
of how some criminal breaks the weak or non-existent cryptography of
us honest folks.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New ENcryption - a Challenge
Date: 23 Nov 92 19:37:26 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <24267@alice.att.com> reeds@alice.att.com (Jim Reeds) writes:
>Indeed, to an outsider, a challenge problem of form "here is cipher text,
>please supply plain text and description of crypto algorithm" is eminently
>reasonable.  Is this not what Friedman & company did when faced with
>their first Purple traffic?


That's almost the story.  They had plaintext and matching ciphertext.
They also knew the technology available.  They assumed rotor machines
but soon ruled that out -- stumbled on stepping switches by happy
accident.

Those incidents make good stories.

Friedman and company were employed, full time, to do this.  They spent
several years at it.  They succeeded.

If they had failed, that would not mean that the system was secure.
It would only mean that they had failed, so far.


If they had had a captured machine with operations manual (and maybe some
old key sheets) and still couldn't break any new traffic, *that* would
have meant that the system was secure.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: New Encryption - a Challenge
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov 17 1992
Date: 18 Nov 92  21:39:06

Writes kocherp@leland.stanford.edu (Paul C. Kocher):
 
 > It sounds to me like this "encryption" system just involves 
 > XORing random numbers onto the plaintext, which would explain 
 > why the program is very short, cannot use keys, and produces 
 > different cryptotext when run multiple times (different random 
 > number seeds stored at the beginning of the cryptotext).
 
 The name seems familiar... the PKZIP password cracker? 
 How... ah, interesting that you should make so many assumptions 
 regarding an encryption method that you haven't even seen.  
 
 Well, if it's that simple, it should be real easy to crack! Wanna 
 try?  (Actually, NuCrypt uses embedded, 2048-bit continuously- 
 shifting keys.  Not sure what that means, but you might know :-)   
 Feel like taking a pot shot at it?  Nah, you're probably too busy 
 doing something else this time of year, right?  Mating season 
 perhaps..?  
 

--- Maximus 2.00
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: klaus@hal.nta.no (Klaus Gaarder FNI)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Organization: Norwegian Telecom Research
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 10:07:12 GMT

In article <722206613@pike.cs.duke.edu>, srt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Stephen R. Tate) writes:
|> I tried to send the following by E-mail, but the IBM gateway wouldn't
|> accept it....
|> 
|> 
|> To re-iterate:  programs that cannot
|> be counted on to halt are very, very, very rare.  Most people will never
|> see one.
|> 
|> 
|> -- 
|> Steve Tate srt@cs.duke.edu | The reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem,
|> Dept. of Computer Science  | above all other sciences, is that its laws are
|> Duke University     | absolutely certain and indisputable, while those of all
|> Durham, NC  27706   | other sciences are to some extent debatable. (Einstein)

Unless Mr Tate has a fairly restriced view of 'programs' I must say:

"Surely you're joking Mr Tate?"...

I DO hope my Unix instance never halts...so 
in fact most computer users see a program never halting EVERY SINGLE DAY,
namely their favourite OS!!
MOST sensible production programs are designed to NEVER EVER HALT unless
explicitely told to do so (e.g. Unix 'halt'). By the way, the number of halting
programs is probably vastly outnumbered by the number of non-halting programs.
Or....??

-- 
    __o   
  _`\<,_  
 (*)/ (*) Claudio Caputti
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++^++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Free will - the result of chaotic amplification of quantum events in the brain.
  (c) Bill Taylor, <wft@math.canterbury.ac.nz>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: reeds@alice.att.com (Jim Reeds)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New ENcryption - a Challenge
Summary: we are acting like little kids
Date: 22 Nov 92 06:47:37 GMT
Article-I.D.: alice.24267
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill NJ



Oh, can we stop nagging about this thing?  To an outsider, the collective
body of sci.crypt regulars must seem like a smug self-satisfied cabal of
mystagogues.  I know we are not, but to an impartial outside observer we
must seem that way.  All this "go to the library, read the FAQ, come back
when you have become a good boy" stuff is pretty shabby.

Indeed, to an outsider, a challenge problem of form "here is cipher text,
please supply plain text and description of crypto algorithm" is eminently
reasonable.  Is this not what Friedman & company did when faced with
their first Purple traffic?  Is this not what every cryptanalysis student
does, who does the problem sets in the course?

How about some effort at compromise?  Such as:  can the users' manual
for the new encryption algorithm be published?  Would they be willing to
set up a black-box server, to automatically remotely encrypt or decrypt 
messages of our choice?  (Suppose someone offered you just black-box access
to a 1950's US or Russian system.  Would you disdain to try it out, because
it violates some precept of Kerckhoffs you read about in a book?)

Is no one willing to attempt to solve a puzzle because it is posed in
politically incorrect terms?