HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Keywords: pi mnemonics
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 17:02:43 GMT

In article <1992Nov8.042647.28846@athena.cs.uga.edu> jford@aisun1.ai.uga.edu (Jamie Ford [MSAI]) writes:
>Here's another mnemonic for pi (you must supply your own 3):
>
>I need a drink, alcoholic of course, after our class covering theoretic
>1  4   1   5       9      2    6       5    3    5      8        9
>
>
>quantum mechanics.
>   7       9
>
Well, how about, "BOY, I need a drink..."
                   3 . 1  4   1   5  ...

Just a thought...

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: snit@nevada.edu (S. Nev. Institute of Tech.)
Subject: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia
Originator: snit@helios.nevada.edu
Organization: Southern Nevada Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 07:37:28 GMT

[Sent this before, but the top paragraph was cut off... ]
I'm in a _philosophy_of_cognitive_science_ class that has been
discussing "qualia" and other internal sensations.  I'm planning on
writing a paper that asserts that artificial intelligence should not
define qualia (or other constructs) on any terms other than
functional.  

If one believes that qualia can be defined in functional terms only,
this is pretty obvious.

If one believes that functionality doesn't fully define qualia, then I
believe that a model that fulfills the functions (even though it lacks
"true" qualia) would do what cognitive AI is designed to do (IMHO - to
predict, explain, describe, and manipulate human thought and
behavior).

Does anyone have a good arguement that qualia can not be defined soley
on a functional basis?  If so, is this qualia outside a formal system?
Outside the realm of AI?  Any refutation of these arguements?


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: jxm@engin.umich.edu (John Murray)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 92 23:51:52 EST
Organization: University of Michigan Engineering, Ann Arbor
 

                   ........blue violet grey white 
"Bad Boys Raped Our Young Girls But Violet Gave Willingly"
  
Also, count the letters in the following 
to obtain the first eleven digits of e 

"To express e, remember to memorize a sentence to simplify this"

Neat, cos it kinda self-referential! 
I'm sure there are plenty of similar
ones for the digits of Pi.
 
John Murray
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: "ronald davis" <ronald.davis@canrem.com>
Subject: j t fraser
Reply-To: "ronald davis" <ronald.davis@canrem.com>
Organization: Canada Remote Systems
Distribution: sci
Date: 10 Nov 92 23:58:50 EST

Could anyone tell me where I might find J. T. Fraser, the author and
editor of many interdisciplinary studies of time, an the founder of the
International Society for the Study of TIme?

I would appreciate a reply to rdavis@epas.utoronto.ca

Many thanks,

Ron Davis
--
Canada Remote Systems  - Toronto, Ontario
World's Largest PCBOARD System - 416-629-7000/629-7044
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: the symbol-grounding problem
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 01:31:02 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.220857.8355@ils.nwu.edu> pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler) writes:
>
>But I suggest starting
>with Yorick Wilks' article, which explains why he prefers "procedural"
>semantics to "denotative" semantics, and why he believes Barwise and
>Johnson-Laird have both come up short.

Interesting. J-L is an advocate of procedural semantics. Look, too, at
Jerry Fodor's "Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother" in _Representations_.

Where can one find the Wilks article?


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
From: ted@dgbt.doc.ca (Ted Grusec)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 9 Nov 92 03:11:12 GMT
Organization: The Communications Research Centre

One trivially simple one I remember from a very long time ago was how
to remember which, rods or cones, were responsible for night vision
(light and dark) versus day (color) vision.  "Rods work at night",
referring to the then colloquial term for "penis" as a "rod".  Whether
that's still colloquial I don't know.

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ted Grusec - Communications Research Centre, Ottawa, Ont., Canada
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:560 sci.philosophy.tech:3965 sci.lang:7923
From: gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Theories of meaning without formal logic
Date: 9 Nov 92 00:59:57 GMT
Reply-To: gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations


Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that do not
postulate that some kind of truth functional logic is at the
foundation of meaning?

Is psychologism (mid-1800s: Fries, Beneke, J.S. Mill) worth perusing?
All I know of this school so far is from _The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy_ (Macmillan, 1967): ". . . The only instrument
philosophical inquiry has at its disposal is self-observation (or
introspection) and . . .  there is no way to establish any truth other
than by reducing it to the subjective elements of self-observation."

Are there any overviews of psychologism from a modern (cognitive)
perspective?

Is phenomenology worth perusing in this context??

Jake.

PS - I support the creation of sci.philosophy.lang!

-- 
"What's so interdisciplinary about studying lower levels of thought process?"
				  <-- Jacob Galley / gal2@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: Sophomore, Math/Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Date: Fri,  6 Nov 1992 13:18:52 -0500 
From: Franklin Chang <fc0v+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
	<BILL.92Nov5165753@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>

Isn't there a mnemonic for the colors of bands on resistors?

black brown red orange yellow green ? ? ?

Could someone refresh my memory?
Frank

fc0v@andrew.cmu.edu.
---------------------------
DEEP THOUGHTS...

If you go parachuting, and your parachute doesn't open, and your friends

are all watching you fall, I think a funny gag would be to pretend you were

swimming.

---------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: brianlev@uiuc.edu (Brian A. Levine)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 21:06:05 GMT

In article <flamer.720978731@mithril> flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey
@mithril) writes:
>[Maybe this is too low-tech for this group, but here goes...]
>
>I was thinking about the cute mnemonic tricks that I was taught in
>school over the years, and was wondering if others would share
>their own experiences.  What I am talking about is short ways of
>remembering otherwise complicated sequences for those of us who
>are not eidetic.
>
>
>    4.  And another sentence for remembering the sequence of the
>	planets: Mercury-Venus-Earth-etc.
>
>Any others to add to the list?
>
There is the famous one for remembering the spectral classes of stars: O B A F
G K M R N S W

O Be a Fine Girl Kiss Me Right Now Stupid, Wow!

In fact this mnemonic has changed over the years as astronomers have added
further spectral classes. 

--
Punya Mishra
punya@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 21:51:21 GMT

In article <KRULWICH.92Nov5150451@zowie.ils.nwu.edu> krulwich@zowie.ils.nwu.edu (Bruce Krulwich) writes:
>
>
>The provinces of Canada are "bazmo" -- British Columbia, Alberta, Zaskatuwan
>(sp), Manitoba, and Ontario.                                      ^^^^^^^^^^
>                                                                  !?!?!?!?!?!
> 
Try "Saskatchewan".
It's generally advisable to use only mnemonics that work.

By the way, don't forget Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, and Newfoundland.

Silly Americans.... (mutter, mutter, clunk) :-)

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Subject: Re: the symbol-grounding problem
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 15:54:06 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.013102.9830@psych.toronto.edu>, christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
> In article <1992Nov10.220857.8355@ils.nwu.edu> pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler) writes:
> >
> >But I suggest starting
> >with Yorick Wilks' article, which explains why he prefers "procedural"
> >semantics to "denotative" semantics, and why he believes Barwise and
> >Johnson-Laird have both come up short.
> 
> Interesting. J-L is an advocate of procedural semantics. Look, too, at
> Jerry Fodor's "Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother" in _Representations_.
> 
> Where can one find the Wilks article?

In the book I mentioned earlier in my article, _Meaning and
Mental Representations_.

The table of contents is:

Jon Barwise, On the Circumstantial Relation between Meaning and Content.

Umberto Eco, On Truth. A Fiction.

Gilles Fauconnier, Quantification, Roles and Domains

Ray Jackendoff, Conceptual Semantics.

Philip N. Johnson-Laird, How is Meaning Mentally Represented?

George Lakoff, Cognitive Semantics

Wendy Lehnert, The Analysis of Nominal Compounds.

Roger Schank and Alex Kass, Knowledge REpresentation in People and Machines.

Bas van Fraassen, Identity in Intensional Logic: Subjective Semantics.

Yorick Wilks, Reference and Its Role in Computational Models of Mental
		Representations.


'Pretty good cross-section, huh?

The editors are Eco, Santambrogio, and Violi.  The publisher is Indiana U.

	-dp-
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: rjones@dip.eecs.umich.edu (Randolph M. Jones)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: University of Michigan EECS Dept., Ann Arbor
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:59:29 GMT

In article <flamer.720978731@mithril> flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:
>    4.  And another sentence for remembering the sequence of the
>	planets: Mercury-Venus-Earth-etc.

Mother Very Easily Made A Jam Sandwich Using No Peanuts, Mayonaisse, or Glue

Mercury Venus Earth Mars Asteroids Jupiter Saturn Uranus Neptune Pluto Mickey
Goofy
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:574 sci.philosophy.tech:4009 sci.lang:7951
From: miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on symbolic representation
Date: 10 Nov 92 08:58:55 CST
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <1992Nov9.202812.11520@midway.uchicago.edu>, gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley) writes:

[earlier bibliographic references]
 

> Now I think my original question was not specific enough. What bothers
> me about the theories of meaning that I have seen is that they do not
> adequately account for how meaningful symbols are linked to WHAT THEY
> MEAN. 

[...]

> Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that manage
> to link symbolic / categorical representation to any form of
> nonsymbolic / noncategorical representation? What kinds of nonsymbolic
> representation are there?

[...]

It sounds as if you are interested in what we often call lexical
meaning.  And you are interested in non-truth-conditional approaches.

There are two things you probably should look into; one
is prototype theory; anything by Eleanor Rosch, and for a recent
summary, John R. Taylor, _Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in
Linguistic Theory_.

The other is natural kinds; Hilary Putnam, several of the papers in
_Mind, Language, and Reality_; and Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity"
in D. Davidson & G. Harman, eds., _Semantics of Natural Language_, and
for a recent summary, Georgia Green, _Pragmatics and Natural Language
Understanding_ (L. Erlbaum, 1989), Ch. 3, section 3 (she proposes that
*all* terms are natural kind terms).
-- 
-Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> {Sometimes you have to look reality straight
 OPINIONS ARE MY OWN            {in the eye, and deny it. - G. Keillor
From: gstecker@sdcc13.ucsd.edu (Chris Stecker)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Chaotic brain behaviour and its influence on duplicating a person
Date: 12 Nov 92 09:02:44 GMT
Article-I.D.: sdcc12.40921
Followup-To: sci.cognitive
Organization: University of California, San Diego

In article <RICHARD.92Nov9172845@cantor.harlqn.co.uk> richard@harlqn.co.uk (Richard Brooksby) writes:

>Anyway, if the brain were to make use of chaotic behaviour, or at
>least be influenced by chaotic functions, then it is unlikely that
>duplicating a person completely (setting aside quantum physics for the
>moment, *ahem*) would duplicate their behaviour.  Their chaotic nature
>would cause them to diverge unpredictably.

I don't think that the divergence would be very noticable--i.e. you would
probably still recognize that particular individual's behavior in the 
construct.  Realize that if the chaotic effects of a system (brain) are
cumulative, then even if they are very small, they can influence the final
state of the system by a very large degree.  Therefore, any cognitive event
that I experience has the potential to, and in fact, must, affect my behavior,
if the chaotic model of the brain is correct.  Regardless of the difference
between my two/three/four...n possible behavior patterns for a particular
day, I will be exhibiting normal behavior, considering my personality, at
the end of the day.  This outcome is almost certain, no matter which of the
patterns I take (so long as no drastic events take place, such as my death),
or which of the patterns you expected me to.  Thus, if it were possible to 
duplicate a person enitrely, their behaviors would almost certainly be 
extremely different, but both would be recognizable as the same individual,
and, in fact, neither's behavior could be said to be more representative
of the individual than the other.

Chris Stecker						gstecker@ucsd.edu
From: cs348b26@ibmb4.cs.uiuc.edu (Eric Welton)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 5 Nov 92 22:26:58 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.Bx9L0y.7B2
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Here's another one from chemistry - the diatomic gases
H-7 cause they form a 7 except for hydrogen, or
HONiFiClBrI (pronouncde Honey-Fickle-Bri) since
the gases are Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Oxygen, Fluorene,
Chlorine, Bromine, and Iodine - I hope I got those right.

	-eric welton
From: guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Guy Barry)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 8 Nov 92 10:38:49 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:

>    1.  The man "Roy G. Biv" allows you to remember the colors of
>	the spectrum: Red-Orange-Yellow-Green-Blue-Indigo-Violet.

Or "Richard of York gained battles in vain".

>    2.  In Chemistry, part of the Periodic Table was represented
>	by "Al Sipsclar" (Al-Si-P-S-Cl-Ar) and his girlfriend 
>	"Phoebe Bicnofne" (Fe-Be-B-C-N-O-F-Ne).

The second one must be wrong, since iron (Fe) doesn't belong in that
sequence.  My father used to pronounce the first eighteen elements as
"H-helibeb-cnof, nenamgal sipsclar".

>    4.  And another sentence for remembering the sequence of the
>	planets: Mercury-Venus-Earth-etc.

The one I know is "Men very easily make jugs serve useful nocturnal
purposes".

-- 
Guy Barry | Computer Laboratory     | Centre for Cognitive Science
          | University of Cambridge | University of Edinburgh
          | Guy.Barry@cl.cam.ac.uk  | guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk
          | +44 (0)223 334757       | +44 (0)31 650 4413
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: rist@socs.uts.edu.au (Robert Rist)
Subject: research position in Sydney
Keywords: cognitive modelling programming planning
Organization: Computing Sciences, Uni of Technology, Sydney.
Date: 11 Nov 92 01:45:16 GMT

                      SCHOOL OF COMPUTING SCIENCES
                    UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY


                           RESEARCH ASSISTANT
                             Ref No M107/14

Applications are invited for the position of Research Assistant, Grade
1.

The project on which the research assistant will work is part of a
long-term study into the knowledge, strategies, and techniques used by
people to design and code computer programs. The specific job is to
develop, under instruction, an executable model of human program
design.

The applicant must have a degree in computer science or cognitive
science, experience in Lisp or CLOS programming, a working knowledge of
artificial intelligence, and good communication skills. A strong
background in planning, cognitive modelling, or formal methods of
programming, would be an advantage.

The appointment will initially be made for one year. Applicants are
encouraged to obtain a position criteria by telephoning the Recruitment
Office on (02) 330-1087. Further enquiries can be directed to Dr. R.
Rist on (02) 330-1849.

SALARY RANGE: Research Assistant Grade 1 ($25,300 - $28,200).

APPLICATIONS: Written applications should quote the above reference
number, and include details of qualifications and experince, plus the
name, address, telephone, fax number and electronic mail address (if
possible) of three referees. Applications should be sent to the address
below by the closing date of 30 November, 1992.

                      THE RECRUITMENT COORDINATOR
                    UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY
                     PO BOX 123 BROADWAY NSW 2007

              EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND A SMOKE-FREE
              UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT ARE UNIVERSITY POLICIES
From: krulwich@zowie.ils.nwu.edu (Bruce Krulwich)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 5 Nov 92 21:04:51 GMT
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences, Evanston, IL


flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:

> I was thinking about the cute mnemonic tricks that I was taught in
> school over the years, and was wondering if others would share
> their own experiences.

The provinces of Canada are "bazmo" -- British Columbia, Alberta, Zaskatuwan
(sp), Manitoba, and Ontario.
From: guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Guy Barry)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 10 Nov 92 08:55:07 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

jxm@engin.umich.edu (John Murray) writes:

>I'm sure there are plenty of similar
>ones for the digits of Pi.

"How I want a drink, alcoholic of course, after the heavy chapters
involving quantum mechanics."

-- 
Guy Barry | Computer Laboratory     | Centre for Cognitive Science
          | University of Cambridge | University of Edinburgh
          | Guy.Barry@cl.cam.ac.uk  | guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk
          | +44 (0)223 334757       | +44 (0)31 650 4413
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:41:32 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.073728.17827@nevada.edu> snit@nevada.edu (S. Nev. Institute of Tech.) writes:
>
>Does anyone have a good arguement that qualia can not be defined soley
>on a functional basis?  If so, is this qualia outside a formal system?
>Outside the realm of AI?  Any refutation of these arguements?
>
Read Frank Jackson's "Epiphenomenal qualia". In fact, you'll probably want to
look at all the papers on consciousness and qualia reprinted in Lycan's
_Mind and Cognition_ (1990, Blackwell).

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
From: guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Guy Barry)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 11 Nov 92 18:47:06 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

kate@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Kate Jeffery) writes:

>My favourites are:
>Polythene and positive both begin with PO and it's WRONG!!! (Polythene
>charges negatively)

>and, along the same lines,

>when the moon is a C it's crescendo and when it's a D it's diminuendo
>but it's the other way round. (In the Southern Hemisphere anyhow...)

Oh God -- those "wrong way round" ones are more trouble than they're
worth.  The way I heard it was:

	When the moon is Coming it is really departing
	When the moon is Departing it is really coming

The other one I know is to distinguish between brass and bronze:
"bronze" contains a Z, so it's the one without any zinc in it...

-- 
Guy Barry | Computer Laboratory     | Centre for Cognitive Science
          | University of Cambridge | University of Edinburgh
          | Guy.Barry@cl.cam.ac.uk  | guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk
          | +44 (0)223 334757       | +44 (0)31 650 4413
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril)
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Organization: Intel Corporation
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 15:49:54 GMT

ted@dgbt.doc.ca (Ted Grusec) writes:

>In article <KRULWICH.92Nov5150451@zowie.ils.nwu.edu> krulwich@zowie.ils.nwu.edu (Bruce Krulwich) writes:
>>
>>flamer@mithril.intel.com (Jim Trethewey @mithril) writes:
>>
>>> I was thinking about the cute mnemonic tricks that I was taught in
>>> school over the years, and was wondering if others would share
>>> their own experiences.
>>
>>The provinces of Canada are "bazmo" -- British Columbia, Alberta, Zaskatuwan
>>(sp), Manitoba, and Ontario.

>That makes 5 provinces.  Canada has 10, plus additional "territories"
>striving for provincehood. The 5 not appearing on your list are Quebec,
>Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island.
>-- 
>-----------------------------------------------------------------
>Ted Grusec - Communications Research Centre, Ottawa, Ont., Canada

The two territories being Yukon and Northwest, yes?
Anyone watching the 125th anniversary commemorative quarters (12 total, 
one per month) come out, would get educated.  But then, it seems we don't
get quite as much Canadian coinage down here as we used to when the exchange
rate was closer (I know only because I am also a coin collector).

So do the Canadians have a mnemonic for all 12?  I have never heard a
mnemonic for the 50 states.  In fact, I bet the average US citizen could
not name all 50 states if their life depended on it!  And I don't think
I could confidently list all the US territories (PR, VI, GU, ...).
--
--Jim Trethewey, $WORK = flamer@mithril.intel.com, $HOME = flamer@alfirin
 5200 NE Elam Young Parkway HF3-73, Hillsboro OR 97124-6497 (503)696-5444
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:575 sci.philosophy.tech:4012 sci.lang:7954
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on symbolic representation
Date: 10 Nov 92 15:45:21 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Nov10.125621.7952@news.unige.ch> swann@divsun.unige.ch 
(SWANN Philip) writes:

>Wittgenstein's later writings demonstrate pretty convincingly that
>the very idea of a "theory of meaning" is absurd. This doesn't stop
>people from continuing to try to square the circle... 

Bullshit.  See Bede Rundle's _Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy
of Language_ (Blackwell, 1990) for a critical evaluation of Wittgenstein's
later writings which shows the incoherence of his account of language.
Rundle comes out in favour of some type of theory of meaning, although
he rejects most of the candidates that have been offered.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive