From: sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: Spoken Like a True ProLifer
Date: 7 Jan 93 01:18:18 GMT
Organization: University of Arizona UNIX Users Group

From article <1993Jan6.184709.10601@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>,
by mcochran@nyx.cs.du.edu (Mark A. Cochran):
> In article <1993Jan6.174658.753@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:
>>From article <1993Jan6.055047.14767@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>,
>>by mcochran@nyx.cs.du.edu (Mark A. Cochran):
>>> In article <1993Jan5.211703.20856@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>>> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:

>>> [Lots of deletions, since I'm not goin to comment on it all.]

>>>>Our 7-week-old son Joseph is quite a noisemaker
>>>>but seems largely incapable of "meaningful communication".  

>>> You have not yet learned how to tell if he is using a "feed me" cry,
>>> or a "change me" cry, or a "hold me" cry, or a "damn, that hurt" cry?
>>> Take a vacation and play with the kid. I consider that meaningful
>>> communication. :)

>>"Take a vacation."  Is that doctor's orders, Mark? :-)  My intent was
>>to ask 1) whether Joseph's crude "communication" skills could be nothing
>>more than responses to certain situations (i.e., not deliberate attempts
>>to communicate) and 2) whether Joseph's ability to "communicate" was
>>significantly different from that of certain fetuses.

> I think a medical prescription for a vacation is a fine idea... Now if
> we can just convince employers that it is... :)

> 1) Are *our* communications nothing more then responses to situations?
> Yes, ours are (hopefully) more sophisticated. It doesn't make a 7 week
> old babies efforts less meaningful. 

> 2) I've never seen a fetus that could communicate at even the level of
> a 7 week old baby.

I'm just not sure.  I would think that when discussing personhood
we would want to be more sure.  What if the difference between a
fetus and a neonate is more quantitative than qualitative?

[deleted, but good]

> What I do object to is people (no, I'm not accusing you) who try to
> legislate this. I don't see it as fit for legislation.

I agree, although perhaps for different reasons than most.

> Basically, I think the issue is adequately dealt with by medical
> ethics and professional standards.

I think you'd agree that complete laissez faire in terms of medical
ethics is not necessarily the best way to operate.

[deletions]

> Yes, personhood is temporary and conditional. It always has been. We
> don't consider a corpse a person. Nor, if I understand you correctly,
> can an individual in a persistant vegitative state, with no realistic
> chance of ever awakening, be considered a person.

The point is that in the cases in which the vegetative state is
temporary, certain people's criteria for personhood would still
not be met, and it is (IMO) both absurd and dangerous to consider
that their personhood could come and go like a disease.

BTW, I would argue that the comatose person you describe could
very reasonably be considered a person, albeit one who should
be allowed to die.  I don't mean in any way to trivialize the
complexity and difficulty of these situations.  But I cannot
accept the consequences of flimsy, come-and-go personhood.


> I do think it is fitting to allow a non-person (former person,
> whatever term you want to use) to die.

So do I.  My wife's family and I have been down that road.  We
wouldn't have called my father-in-law a "non-person" but we
knew his death was imminent and the decision to refuse life
support in no way diminished his significance or his personhood.

[Hilarious cat humor deleted. I couldn't think of anything else.]

--

Steve Matheson   Program in Neuroscience   University of Arizona
sfm@neurobio.arizona.edu