From: robert@geoblue.gcn.uoknor.edu (Robert Lindsay)
Subject: Re: Lee-Longstreet
Organization: Geosciences Computing Network, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 19:07:20 GMT

In article <1992Aug17.180908.6972@leland.Stanford.EDU> whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>In article <1992Aug17.145456.5600@constellation.ecn.uoknor.edu> robert@geoblue.gcn.uoknor.edu (Robert Lindsay) writes:
>>Yeah, Hood and Johnston did not have a very high opinion of each other. 
>>IHMO Hood was the on at fault. You only have to look at the result of the
>>Battles around Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville vs. Kennesaw Mountain
>>to see the answer.
>
>Having only read Hood's side of it, I don't pretend to understand it, but
>Hood's argument is that Johnston's defensive policies were causing mass
>desertions from the army which meant that the army would dissolve in a few
>more months. By taking the offensive he stopped the desertions and at least

Assuming anything about the atlanta campiagn from reading Hood's Advance and
Retreat is a serious error. Hood has big time axes to grind with just about
everybody. His number for losses to desertion were seriously inflated, and
his bitching about his corps commanders at Franklin and Nashville are
inexcusable. The fact was that he ordered a frontal assualt against a entrenched
enemy force of aproximately equal size. There wasn't even a preliminary
bombardment. Roughly half the divisional commanders and many brigade
commanders went down in the assault, including General Clerburne, who
is reported to have said "If we are to die at least we should die like
men" before leading the first assualt. The fact the the union forces did
essentially march past his army in the middle of the night while Hood was
out "playing" may have had something to do with his eagerness to squander
his army against a force that was PLANNING TO WITHDRAWL anyway. Finally
when Hood took over the Army of Tennessee they had aproximately 65,000 troops.
Within 6 weeks he had lost three battles, ~20,000 men, and Atlanta. When
one considers that the Confederates needed not to WIN at this point but
just hold atlanta, Hoods actions are even more stupid.

>had a chance to win a major battle; not a good chance, but then the
>Confederacy had very no good chances left in the winter of 1864 anyway.
>It always seems logical to me; Johnston's policy seems like one designed
>to turn defeat into slightly slower defeat, whereas Hood could conceivably
>have achieved something. Hood claims he would have won Franklin and Nashville
>if he had had better cooperation from his corps commanders, for whatever
>that's worth.
>"The logical outcome of defensive warfare is surrender."

Except that "War is Politics conducted by other means". Sometimes you don't
have to win just avoid losing. Such was the Atlanta campaign. Hood was the
wrong man at the wrong time, one only needs to read Lee's recomendation
about Hood to see that.

>>
>>One Brigade = ~1,500 troops.
>>While Longstreet (in hindsight) certainly should have done this, It is not
>>unreasonable for him not to have. What if there was a breakthrough and that
>>one brigade was not availible because it was wondering around the boonies?
>>Remeber they had not recon on the flanks due to the lack of Cav. And beyond
>>all this I don't think one Brigade in the mist of 85,000 troops is going
>>to be decisive. On the other hand, I certainly could have help take Little
>>Round Top (which might or might not have been significant)
>>
>The Union army was sending massive reinforcements to Cemetary Ridge on the
>second day; a brigade in their rear would have slowed down the process
>considerably, maybe long enough to make the Confederate attack successful.
>That's what I was thinking, anyway. As far as reconnaissance goes, Hood
>sent out his foot scouts and had established that the Union flank was in
>the air; I'm not sure the cavalry could have established much more.
>However, they could probably have established it earlier, making it 
>possible to make a real flank attack instead of the one brigade assault
>Hood proposed.

All of this presupposes that Longstreet is in position earlier. Longstreet
was not. Longstreet had already suggested going around the flank of the union
army, Lee overuled him. Longstreet also had a long history of being slow in
making a attack. On the other hand, when those attacks went in, they were
some of the most devasting of the war, (as Second Mannasas and Chickamuga
showed)
>
>
>-- 
>Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
>
>"We have met the enemy and he is us" - Walt Kelly