Newsgroups: soc.history,soc.culture.indian,soc.culture.china,soc.culture.pakistan,soc.culture.sri-lanka,soc.culture.iranian
Subject: Re: Indhist Prelude 2: The problem of the destitute East
From: A.Raman@massey.ac.nz (Anand V Raman)
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 92 07:11:49 GMT
Organization: Massey University Computer Centre
Keywords: Consciousness, AI
X-Regarding: Strong AI == Immanent Consciousness ? 

In article <JMC.92Sep27112326@SAIL.Stanford.EDU> jmc@cs.Stanford.EDU 
<John McCarthy> writes:

>If understanding is to be advanced, muddled phrases like "immanence
>of consciousness" have to be abandoned and replaced by asking precisely
>what mental qualities can usefully be ascribed to natural or artificial
>systems under what circumstances.  A quality is usefully ascribed if
>it helps understand the behavior of the system.

As to whether Occam's razor can apply to AI theories or not, there was
an interesting, but very long thread in comp.ai.philosophy  earlier on
this year.  So I'll give this paragraph a pass for the time being.

>The muddle is the phrase "immanence of consciousness" which has no
>clear meaning.  The thermostat example is mine from my paper
>_Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines_.  The point of the paper is
>that one ascribes mental qualities one by one to specific as may be
>justified to account for behavior.  No present day machines have
>anything as complex as consciousness, not because it is impossible in
>principle, but because we haven't figured out how to do it yet.

   Immanence of consciousness, as I used it to refer to strong AI, means
exactly  that.  This is a purely  physicalist view of consciousness that
also    results  from  Reductionistic  Materialism.      It attributes a
consciousness  to any and  every  physical event.  I  also  subscribe to
Strong AI, but perhaps  more rigorously than  you, as you have indicated
your  reluctance to attribute consciousness to  your  thermostat. (As an
aside, I thought the use of a thermostat as an example in your paper was
a brilliant idea)

   Personally, I think this is about as rational  as one  can  ever get.
The argument for this  is simple.  As far as  I  am concerned, the human
brain is a purely  physical system.   Either  all physical  systems,  no
matter how simple, are conscious  or none are.   The latter possibility,
as Sankara and Descartes have  already demonstrated, is clearly  absurd.
One  cannot coherently  doubt  the existence of  his own Mind.  The only
remaining alternative,  if   we   shouldn't succumb to a    theology  or
metaphysics which endows humans with a soul of some kind, is to say that
even inanimate  things exhibit conscious  behaviour, albiet in different
forms and in varying degrees.  Frankly, I find it extremly difficult not
to see intentionality in your thermostat.

   I agree that  the  position is   unfalsifiable and hence  practically
useless.  However, it  is useful at least for  the purpose  of  refuting
it's  negation, which to  Strong AI  opponents  seems to  be a necessary
truth.  That makes it significant enough to warrant mention.

   I'm  sure you are  aware that Searle's  position on the issue, not to
mention Penrose's, is one that tends to  see humans as special entities.
In  my opinion,  that  is a  scientifically unsubstantiated metaphysical
view.  I am inclined to find more wisdom in  someone like Hofstadter who
calls an  anthill a singular  living organism, and Schrodinger who finds
it astonishing that we are gullible enough to attribute consciousness to
a certain  level of material organization -  our  bodies, but neither to
our  internal  organs  or cells,   nor    to a  society.     To Penrose,
Consciousness is something special and we should be grateful to have it.
To me, however, consciousness is the most common thing  there is - human
behavior is special, perhaps,  as it is a  product of a complex physical
system, but not consciousness.

   Maybe  you  had connected "Immanence   of  Consciousness" with   some
school  of hindu philosophy which  you dislike, and hence  felt impelled
to  object?   In  that  case,   I  must  apologize for  not  making that
dissociation clearer as  when I wrote it  I  wasn't consciously aware of
that connotation.

Cheers.

- & (anand v raman)

PS: John, should we move this to comp.ai.philosophy?
    I think we are saying the same thing in different words.  Maybe
    we should check out our views via email before going public?
    If you will be initiating the redirection to a different forum,
    could you please mail me the subject line you plan to use.
    -- Thanks.
Newsgroups: soc.history,soc.culture.indian