From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Nicaraguan Elections: THE OBSERVERS Pt.2 (7/9)
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 08:15:24 GMT

/** reg.nicaragua: 124.7 **/
** Written 10:15 am  Sep  5, 1992 by nyonline in cdp:reg.nicaragua **
Inst. for Media Analysis Report
Reports and documents on Nica elections  6:12 pm Feb 21, 1990

IV. THE OBSERVERS Pt.2 

 The Richardson appointment indeed was a shrewd move on the part 
of Perez, and its acceptance by Nicaragua was equally astute. The 
Post article of August 31 cited anonymous, probably U.S., U.N. 
officials as saying Nicaragua "bitterly opposed Richardson's 
appointment for several weeks." This was untrue, since his name 
had only been floated a few days before the appointment. 
Nicaragua's only objection was the purely formal notification to 
the Secretary-General that as a matter of principle it found 
naming a national of an interested country difficult. However, it 
had no problem with the nominee himself, for whom it had the 
greatest respect. This, according to sources close to the 
Nicaraguan government.  

 In any case, Richardson has indeed served to quiet U.S. right 
wing attacks on the U.N. observer group. His prestige allowed him 
to refute U.S. U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering's effort to 
denounce the government conduct of the electoral process. 
Pickering's complaints relied heavily on the strictures circulated 
by Weinstein, who reported seeing armed intimidation of 
registrants, something no other observers reported. Richardson's 
endorsement of the favorable U.N. report of mid-October was widely 
reported in the U.S. press. Carter also endorsed the registration 
process as fair and well-conducted, and this view prevailed 
generally.  

 Inside Nicaragua, the opposition, also finding its hopes of 
unfavorable international observation reports disappointed, began 
to attack the good faith of the observers. Lino Hernandez of the 
"independent" Nicaraguan Permanent Human Rights Commission, 
frequently quoted in the U.S. press, assailed the U.N., the OAS 
and Carter in La Prensa on November 17. All these, according to La 
Prensa did nothing but hang around the Hotel Intercontinental and 
completely overlook, what La Prensa plainly sees and they do not: 
Sandinista mobs, police violence, the breaking of the cease fire, 
State Security oppression of opposition activists, impugning the 
reputation of opposition candidates, etc.  

 Especially galling, was the note sent by the U.N. observer group 
to the Secretary-General particularly praising the work of the 
Supreme Electoral Council. La Prensa complained editorially that 
it was too soon to judge "above all in the context of so many 
doubts as to the impartiality of the President [Mariano Fiallos] 
of the Council."  

 Even though the international organization observers and 
Carter's group did generally report favorably on the process, and 
did so to the outrage of UNO and the disappointment of the Bush 
administration, to a certain extent they do what the U.S. and UNO 
had hoped they would. First, their focus was almost entirely on 
the government (the Sandinistas) and not on the opposition or its 
U.S. backers. Thus, such criticism as was made was necessarily of 
Sandinista flaws. These, then, would be emphasized in treatment in 
the U.S. official press. For example, the New York Times, February 
7, discussing the latest U.N. report, which was overwhelmingly 
favorable on the process, had the sub-headline, "Campaign is 
Called Generally Fair but Intimidation by Sandinistas is Cited." 
The article in full was positive and noted that the picture it 
gave was far more favorable than that promulgated by the U.S. 
government, but the selection of the headline is indicative of 
the way U.S. media have treated the observer reports. OAS reports 
have received the same treatment. Overall positive conclusions 
are scanted in order to highlight, and frequently misinterpret, 
shortcomings that are noticed, almost always dealing with the 
campaign tactics of the Sandinistas and overlooking UNO's.  

 For his part, Carter and his group have scrupulously refrained 
from voicing any criticism of the opposition. At a meeting of 
political parties in December to get mutual agreement on a 
resolution to end violence at political rallies, the UNO 
representatives walked out and did not return. Nor would they sign 
the resolution because it called also for an end to contra 
violence. Carter refused to comment.  

 The Center for Democracy of Allen Weinstein has made no pretense 
of objectivity. Its reports on armed intimidation of registrants 
in October were dismissed as fantasy by other observers and 
attracted little attention. However, on December 10, Weinstein 
brought a group of 10 "bipartisan" NED activists to attend an UNO 
rally in Masatepe. The visitors included two who are listed in the 
Association of Former Intelligence Operatives (AFIO) as ex-CIA 
officers and also Peter Kelly and Scott Patrick of BMS&K. Also 
along was Brent Bozell, founder of the World Freedom Foundation, 
a registered agent in the U.S. for the contras. The group also 
included Bob Beckel, 1984 presidential campaign director for 
Walter Mondale. Mondale, it will be recalled, had repudiated the 
Democratic Party's peace with Nicaragua campaign plank and had 
promised to establish a "quarantine" around the country.  

 A U.N. report issued just two days earlier had stressed that 
actual violence at political rallies was minimal, consisting of 
nothing more than minor rock throwing by juveniles on the fringes 
of crowds when it occurred at all. However, at this rally, which 
had been moved up a week, apparently in order to accommodate the 
visitors, massive violence erupted. Before it was over, one man 
was dead, many injured, and the FSLN campaign house burned down by 
an UNO mob. Subsequent investigation revealed plenty of blame to 
be shared by all parties--FSLN activists, UNO provocateurs and the 
police, who failed to act to prevent violence or restore order. 
However, the evidence revealed that UNO had brought along a 
truckload of streetfighters who were, at a signal, sent into 
action. One of them was arrested and confessed to using a bayonet 
to kill the victim, who turned out to be a Sandinista supporter.  

 Nevertheless, Weinstein and company immediately issued a 
statement filled with false details, blaming the whole affair on 
"Sandinistas" and concluded that "unless the Sandinista 
authorities take immediate and decisive measures to permit non- 
violent and non-intimidating campaigning by the opposition [sic], 
free and fair elections in Nicaragua are improbable, if not 
impossible." In the company of UNO officials, Weinstein flew the 
next day to San Jose, where the Central American presidents were 
meeting and attempted to present his inflammatory statement to 
them. Denied entrance, he flew immediately to Washington where he 
met with Vice-president Quayle and, informally, with President 
Bush.  

 The prompt and thorough Nicaraguan police investigation 
essentially discredited Weinstein. However, he clings to his 
story. At a February 8 discussion at the Carnegie Endowment in 
Washington he admitted that his version had been disputed, but, 
he stated, "As my father used to say, `Was you there, Charlie?' 
What Weinstein failed, apparently, to realize was that the phrase 
his father used was one associated with a comedian of the 1920s 
and 1930s, Jack Pearl, who played the role of the legendary 
German liar, Baron Munchausen. His act consisted of telling 
stories so outrageously untrue that at some point his straight 
man would say, "Oh, come now Baron, that can't be true." To this 
Pearl would challenge, "Well, was you there, Charlie?" 
Weinstein's Masatepe story is a tale by Munchausen.  

 It is some evidence of Weinstein's shabby reputation that after 
a day or two of major media coverage (e.g., New York Times, 
December 12, "Nicaraguan Melee Darkens Peace Talks") the story 
faded away. Paul Reichler admitted to the Institute that 
recommending acceptance of Weinstein had been a mistake.  

 Moreover, while this would be difficult to document, the affair, 
according to Institute staffers, Edgar Chamorro and David 
MacMichael, both formerly with the CIA, had all the appearances of 
a classic CIA staged event. They reported this in El Nuevo Diario, 
December 13. Eventually, Masastepe became an embarrassment for 
UNO. Police investigation showed conclusively that UNO had come 
prepared for a brawl. The UNO campaign leaders in Masatepe 
publicly withdrew from the campaign, admitting their part in 
staging the affair. Finally, it led to an all party conference to 
denounce campaign violence from which UNO walked out, refusing to 
sign the agreement in which all other parties concurred.  

 One more attempt at using the Nicaraguan government's openness 
to observers against it should be noted. Despite notification by 
the Nicaraguan government that it would not accept a U.S. 
congressional delegation as official observers, although it would 
accept individual members of Congress in an unofficial capacity or 
as members of other accredited groups, On November 14, President 
Bush named a 20 member delegation to be headed by Senator Lugar 
and California Democrat Tony Beilenson, chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee. Lugar, as noted, is a board member of the 
Center for Democracy.  

 The Nicaraguan response was swift and direct. On November 30, 
Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockman issued an eloquent 
statement. It proclaimed Nicaragua's electoral process to be "the 
most thoroughly observed and scrutinized ever held by a sovereign 
state, open to all experienced, honest and impartial observers. 
These qualities, he said, gave them the trust of the international 
community. He went on, "The same cannot be said of President Bush, 
nor of any commission appointed by him."  

 Pointing to the fact that the Congress had just voted millions 
for the Chamorro campaign and many more millions for the support 
of the contra, he said: "President Bush and the U.S. Congress 
cannot have it both ways. They cannot attempt to buy the election 
for one candidate and them present themselves to as impartial 
election observers." This powerful and dignified rebuke was not 
widely printed, if at all, in the U.S. Certainly, it did not 
appear in the official press.  

 One final note, also little remarked in the U.S. press, was 
struck on January 16. Senator Lugar appeared at a Center for 
Democracy press conference with Allen Weinstein to complain that 
the denial of visas to the Bush-appointed group might well 
jeopardize any congressional intent, should the FSLN win the 
election, to accept the results or to normalize relations. Lugar's 
speech, and his response to questions, show a clear depreciation 
of the U.N. and OAS observation effort, as well as that of the 
Carter group. His repetition of all the accusations against the 
Sandinistas, not only in the conduct of the elections, but in 
every other aspect of the revolution was evidently prepared for 
him by Weinstein. It was a foretaste of the congressional debate 
on what to do about Nicaragua that can be expected after February 
25, should the FSLN win the elections.  

 Overall, the Institute would conclude that the Nicaraguan 
government's reliance on international observers, especially, the 
U.N. and the OAS, to secure legitimacy for the electoral process 
and to immunize against opposition charges of fraud has generally 
succeeded in its objectives. The acceptance of the Weinstein group 
was an error, but not a fatal one. The rejection of the U.S. 
congressional delegation was courageous but risky. Although the 
U.S. press did not make much of it, depending on the results of 
the voting on February 25, it may play a part in the shaping of 
future U.S. policy. If it does, however, it will be more a 
rationalization for what is decided than a true factor.

ENDS PART 7 -- PART 8 FOLLOWS
** End of text from cdp:reg.nicaragua **

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