From: gds@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (Riel Smit)
Subject: The dash that went wrong
Reply-To: gds@cs.uct.ac.za
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 11:13:34 GMT

The following appeared in "The Argus" of Sept 12, 1992.  The reporter
is Ken Vernon.

                    The dash that went wrong

ANC leader Mr Ronnie Kasrils -- the red pimpernel -- is a man of
action, a man who takes risks, and a man who has stared death in the
face many times... and lived to laugh about it.
  This week in Bisho the man of action was once again where he loved
to be - at the cutting edge of the struggle, leading by example and
loving every minute of it.  But things went tragically wrong and 28
people died.
  Was Mr Kasrils to blame?  Was the dash away from the main march on
Bisho and throuhg the stadium that seamingly triggered the killings a
case of Kasrils derring-do gone wrong?  Was the march itself an
unnecessary provocation?
  In a hardhitting interview, the man of action denied that he, or
his organisation, was in any way responsible for the Bisho tradegy.
  "The men who killed those 28 people are the men who pulled the
triggers and the men who ordered them to do so -- they are the ones
who are responsible for the massacre at Bisho."
  Even when asked if he did not cynically lead a group of men to
their deaths to create the martyrs necessary to remove a political
opponent, Mr Kasrils does not lose his composure.
  "If we really wanted to do that, to have people killed, would some
of the top leaders of the ANC have been at the forefront of the
march?
  "No, we may have miscalculated.  We really believed that a major
element within the Ciskeian army sympathised with us and would waver
and either run or join us.
  "We never believed they would open fire on a mass of people with
the eyes of the world -- the Press, the international observers, the
Peace Commission -- present."
  Mr Kasrils admitted that the group which followed him on his dash
through the stadium and towards Bisho was a hand-picked group who all
had been briefed on what to do, and that it was planned that at least
half of the marchers were then to have joined them in the occupation
of Bisho.
  "Everyone knew what we were to do.  Everyone knew there was a risk.
There is no such thing as a risk-free strategy in this kind of
situation. But, we assessed the risks and believed that getting rid
Gqozo was worth that risk."
  He said that the final decision to dash through the stadioum was
taken only minutes before, although the possibility of the action had
been discussed and agreed to by the march leaders much earlier.
 "I reconnoitered the stadium and realised the potential that the gap
in the fence represented.  The plan was that we would rush away from
the soldiers opposite the gap to avoid any head-on confrontation. But
we only got about 30m before they opened fire.
  "To say that I was responsible for the dash for Bisho is wrong.  It
was a joint decision and was approved by the leaders of the march
before and by the ANC leadership when the march was planned.  Even
the decision to go ahead through the stadium, taken in a rush as we
approached the wire barricade, was taken jointly."
  "In spite of the deaths, Mr Kasrils was adamant the march was both
necessary and the right thing to do.  "We have been in a life-and-death
struggle for decades and in order to get where we are, sacrifice has
been needed.  If we had not been prepared to sacrifice we wouldn't
have got where we are -- on the eve of liberation.
  "The march was necessary because the people of Ciskei were crying to
us that they were being beaten and killed by Gqozo.  We had to
respond.  But, the march is just one aspect of the pressure still
necessary to force real change.
  "We need to make people motivated and mobilised to force change. 
Perhaps Gqozo would have fallen without the march, but I doubt it. 
Now, he cannot survive.  Pretoria can't afford to keep him in power."
  Mr Kasrils denied that the mass action campaign in the Ciskei, as
well as other campaigns planned against Bophuthatswana, contradicted
the ANC's previous commitment to negotiations with people the
organisation regard as having no legitimacy.
  "We have never said that, because we are talking, we set aside our
right to exert pressure through mass action.  During the Vietnam war
for instance, the US continued to fight while talked.  During
industrial action, a unioun may continue to strike while talking with
management.  Mass action falls into the same category."
  He also denied that Ciskei and Bophuthatswana were singled out for
mass action because they disagreed with the ANC, not because they
were undemocratic military dictatorships.
  "They have been targeted because they are refusing to allow people
to take part in normal political democracy,"  he said.
  Why then, I suggested, is not the Transkei -- also ruled by a
military dictator, but one who happens to be well-disposed toward the
ANC -- also the target of mass action?
  His reply was that in the Transkei and Venda -- another ANC-aligned
homeland - people were free to join political parties like the ANC and
to have peaceful protests.
  "Despots don't like giving up power, so how do you get them to give
up their power?  Protests and demonstrations are accepted now.  We
have been civilising the authorities slowly in this and it has become
accepted. Bisho was an off-point in that process."
-- 
Riel Smit,  Computer Science                              gds@cs.uct.ac.za
University of Cape Town                      gds%cs.uct.ac.za@rain.psg.com
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