From: lvc@cbnews.cb.att.com (Larry Cipriani)
Subject: Why Gun Waiting Periods Threaten Public Safety (part 3 of 4)
Organization: Ideology Busters, Inc.
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1992 19:33:30 GMT


     The national waiting period violates, at the very least, the spirit of
the Tenth Amendment.[170]



                            VIII. ALTERNATIVES


     Synopsis: There a number of alternatives that -- while clearly
     superior to the waiting period -- do not represent good policy
     choices in themselves. The Instant Telephone Check and the 7 day
     waiting period/background check both use the same (often
     inaccurate) database; the Instant Check has the obvious advantage
     of being speedy, and not interfering with expeditious acquisition
     of a self-defense gun. Firearms Owners Identification Cards take a
     long time to obtain initially, and serve as a basis for gun-owner
     registration and overly broad fingerprinting of the general
     population. Turning drivers licenses into "smart cards" also
     requires citizens to submit fingerprints to the government in order
     to exercise their Constitutional rights. The most effective way to
     deal with criminals possessing guns is to better enforce laws
     regarding criminal gun acquisition and to target the black market
     trade that supplies the gigantic majority of criminal guns.
     Researchers from the National Institute of Justice have suggested
     several possibilities to directly attack the black market; none of
     the NU proposals interferes with Constitutional rights.

     Henny Youngman was once asked how he liked his wife. "Compared to what?"
he replied. There are a number of alternative controls on retail gun sales
that, compared to a waiting period, are quite attractive.

     If the only issue to be decided is what kinds of restrictive controls on
retail gun sales are best, all of the alternatives detailed below compare
favorably to the waiting period. They are just as effective at stopping legal
purchases by ineligible buyers as a waiting period would be. Because the
alternatives do not give the abusive administrators an easy opportunity
maliciously to block every retail transaction, these alternatives are much
less likely to result in wholesale denials of the right to bear arms, and
hence less likely to threaten public safety. At the same time, they consume
police resources at a rate equal to or significantly less than the rate at
which a waiting period would consume police resources. Hence, the
alternatives are clearly superior to a waiting period from all perspectives.

     On the other hand, if the question is not how to further restrict retail
gun sales, but instead if any such restrictions would be worthwhile, none of
the alternative controls appear satisfactory. Like a waiting period, the
alternative controls on legitimate sales can be evaded, and will likely do
virtually nothing to disarm criminals. And while the alternative controls are
not as dangerous to civil liberties as is a waiting period, the alternatives
still pose some danger.

     The most effective way to promote public safety and preserve civil
liberties is to crack down on the black market that supplies criminal guns.
A number of approaches for attacking the black market are suggested below.




                            A. "INSTANT" CHECKS


     One alternative to waiting periods is an "instant telephone check." The
first state to enact such a check was Virginia; and Florida and Delaware have
recently followed suit. When a Virginia gun dealer sells any handgun or
certain long guns to a Virginia resident, the dealer calls a toll-free number
at state police headquarters, to verify that the purchaser has no legal
disqualification. If everything proceeds properly, the sale can be
consummated with no more delay than a credit card check might entail.

     Support of an instant check is widespread. Criminologists and legal
scholars such as Gary Kleck, Don Kates, and Robert Cottrol who are generally
skeptical of gun prohibition support the instant check system. Even big-city
police chiefs who generally agree with Handgun Control, Inc., split from that
group in preferring the instant check over a national firearms identification
card.[171] The National Rifle Association also supported the instant
telephone check in Virginia.

     In terms of sorting out ineligible buyers, the instant check is just as
effective as a 7-day waiting period, according to the Department of Justice
Task Force, and for that reason is supported by Attorney General.[172]
Unfortunately, in terms of preventing incorrect denials of the right to bear
arms, the instant check is just as bad as the waiting period. Because the
data quality for instant checks is, according to the Task Force, equivalent
to that for a one or three week background cheek, only 84%-88% of applicants
will be initially allowed to purchase if there were a national instant check.
The unlucky remainder must go through a secondary verification process (such
as submitting fingerprints at state police headquarters) that would take
several weeks.[173]

     Of course a criminal can evade an "instant" check just as easily as he
can evade any other check. All he needs is a fake driver's license with
another name. Since false social security and alien registration cards may
sometimes be bought for as little as $35,[174] and since those cards are
usually sufficient to obtain a driver's license, the instant check is likely
to be just as porous as longer checks. The instant check, therefore, like the
waiting period, could be evaded by anyone with false identification.[175]

     For the purchasers who are rejected initially, fingerprint checks might
be required to verify their identity. It is estimated that, if the instant
check were national and comprehensive, the FBI would need 395 new clerical
employees and 8,000 more square feet of office space to process the
fingerprint work.[176] Given the limited efficacy of any police permission
system, it might be considered whether 395 additional FBI employees might be
better employed at projects focused on criminals, rather than on law-abiding
citizens.

     An instant check will cost between $7.07 and $9.39 per purchase.[177]
For a person buying a high-quality target pistol, the cost is hardly
noticeable. For a poor person buying a $40 used revolver for self-defense,
the cost is considerable. The cost could be justified, if it yielded
important benefits.

     Significantly, the instant check is subject to the same problem of
creating a gun and gun-owner registration system as is a waiting period. As
the Task Force observes, "Any system that requires a criminal history record
check prior to purchase of a firearm creates the potential for the automated
tracking of individuals who seek to purchase firearms."[178] If a transaction
number must be placed on the dealer gun sale form (to prove he made the
check), and if the state retains its own record of transaction numbers, the
record-keeping could easily be perverted into gun registration.

     At the least, any instant check system should include protections to
absolutely bar gun-owner record retention, and should specify that if
computer or other failure prevents the police from approving the sale, the
sale should be delayed no more than 24 hours.

     The instant check is clearly preferable to a waiting period. The instant
check uses the same criminal/mental data base as would a waiting period, and
would therefore be equally effective in denying ineligible buyers. Bemuse the
large majority of sales would be approved on the spot, abusive administrators
would have much less of an opportunity to interfere with the right to bear
arms. It is true that an instant check eliminates the "cooling off" feature
of a waiting period; but as discussed above, the number of crimes that could
be prevented by "cooling off" is very, very small. The loss to public safety
from the elimination of the "cooling off" period is more than offset by
allowing persons who need a gun for immediate self-defense to get one,
and by substantially reducing the numbers of arbitrary denials of firearms
purchases.



                  B. FIREARMS OWNERS IDENTIFICATION CARDS

     One suggested alternative to waiting periods for each firearm purchase
is the creation of a Firearm Owners Identification Card (FOID). A person
applies once for FOID card and submits her fingerprints to the authorities;
after a four to six week review process, the person is granted a card which
allows her to make unlimited purchases, with no further approval, as long as
the card remains valid. (The card might expire after one year, or three
years, or be valid for life.) Massachusetts and Illinois are among the states
currently using a FOID system. Faced with the choice between the instant
telephone check and the FOID card, Handgun Control, Inc. prefers the FOID
card.[179]

     The Task Force suggests that each FOID card would cost $30.
Approximately 1,700 new FBI employees would be required to process the
necessary fingerprint checks of FBI files. According to the Task Force, the
FOID card, taking up to six weeks to process, would be substantially more
accurate than an instant check or a short waiting period.

     As with the instant check or the waiting period, the list of FOID owners
would be a de facto registration list of gun owners. The more serious civil
liberties problem, however, involves massive fingerprinting.

     The National Association of Police Organizations favors the collection
of fingerprints of gun owners as the first step towards a comprehensive
fingerprint system: "Hence the development of such an integrated national
fingerprint system should be considered not merely for its benefits in
connection with felon identification concerning firearms purchases but also
in connection with improving law enforcement in general."[180]

     The American Civil Liberties Union states "limited criminal history
record checks, with fingerprint cards, are justified in certain licensing and
employment situations. However, we oppose routine fingerprinting of all
individuals who seek to buy firearms as an intrusion into privacy that cannot
be justified by the minuscule benefit that may be achieved...."[181] Of
course the ACLU's principle should also apply not only to proposed national
fingerprint proposals, but also to the current practice in states such
as New York and Illinois which routinely fingerprint the large fraction
of the population which exercises its right to bear arms.

     The same arguments that lead one to reject a national or identity card
apply to federal gun licensing through a FOID. A national licensing system
would require the collection of dossiers on half the households in the United
States (or a quarter, for handgun-only record-keeping).

     Implementing national gun licensing would make introduction of a
national identity card more likely. Assuming that a large proportion of
American families would become accustomed to the government collecting
extensive data about them, they would probably not oppose making everyone
else go through the same procedures for a national identity card.

     Although the problem of illegal immigration is immense, Congress has
repeatedly rejected calls for a national ID card. The same reasons that
impelled Congress to reject that national ID card should impel Congress (and
the states) to reject large steps towards such a card.



                              C. SMART CARDS


     Another suggestion for screening of firearms purchasers has been the
development of "smart" cards. As the Task Force explains, "every adult would
carry an identification card issued by the state of residence, such as a
driver's license, that would have electronically imprinted identifying
information."[182] An instant fingerprint check in gun stores will within a
few years be technologically feasible.[183]

     The Smart Card seems to pose no serious problems from a pure Second
Amendment viewpoint. There would be no false denials, since the cardholder
would not be confused with other people with similar names and birth dates.
There would be hardly any delays in purchases, since almost everyone would
have a smart card.[184] There would be less risk of creating a gun
registration system, although some states would be tempted to include gun
registration data directly on the smart card.

     Nevertheless, civil libertarians (including those with no interest in
the gun issue) should oppose the smart card for the same reason that they
oppose a firearms owners identification card (FOID). Both smart and FOID
cards are a huge step towards a national identity card. Smart/FOID cards
would of course be introduced with the assurance that they would only be used
for limited purposes. But the Social Security Number, it was promised, would
only be used for Social Security; today, the SSN is in effect a mandatory
universal identification number, demanded by all levels of government and by
businesses.

     The National Rifle Association rejects the idea that persons who fill
out the federal gun purchase form (form 4473) should be required to affix a
fingerprint: "Exercise of a constitutional right cannot be conditioned on
making fingerprints available to the police."[185]    Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that Constitution forbids states to collect fingerprints of
people merely because they exercise their Constitutional rights.[186] But the
smart card requires a citizen to offer his fingerprint for government
approval before exercising his right to bear arms.

     The instant driver's license fingerprint scan offers few anti-crime
advantages over the instant telephone check. Both can be evaded with false
identification. (In the case of the fingerprint scan, the criminal just makes
sure to have someone else's print placed on his fake driver's license.)[187]
The instant fingerprint scan proposal would result in every state having a
fingerprint of all of its adult citizens. It is questionable whether states
currently ought to be fingerprinting citizens who obtain drivers' licenses.
It is repugnant to federalism to force states to erode the privacy of their
citizens by forcing the states to collect fingerprints.

     Like the FOID card, the smart card looks handsome when compared to the
waiting period, since it is more effective in denying ineligible buyers, and
is less suspectable to repeated abuse by anti-gun administrators. But
standing on its own, the smart card fails important civil liberties tests.


           D. ANTI-CRIME ALTERNATIVES THAT DO NOT INFRINGE CIVIL
                       LIBERTIES                   

     If the goal is really to keep felons from obtaining guns (rather than
imposing gun control on honest citizens for its own sake), then the focus on
retail sales in entirely misplaced. Hardly any felons buy crime guns in
stores; almost all of the guns come from the underground market. A system
aimed at disarming criminals should aim primarily at the black market.

     The National Institute of Justice authors, Wright and Rossi, suggest
"stiff penalties for firearms transfers to felons whenever these were
detected and, in the same framework, stiff penalties for the crime of gun
theft."[188] Enhanced penalties for transfers to felons were added to federal
law in 1986, and should be added to state laws as well. To assist
prosecutions of gun theft, states should follow Virginia's lead, and make
sale of a stolen firearm a special, serious offense.[189] In many states, the
theft and sale of $75 gun amounts to only petty larceny. Selling a "hot" $75
pistol should be a more serious offense than selling a "hot" $75
toaster-oven.

     Other ways to keep criminals away from guns include closer monitoring of
parolees and probationers, and more intensive crackdowns on fencing
operations for stolen firearms. State or federal strike forces aimed directly
at gun-runners might be introduced or augmented. To deal with the rare cases
of criminals with non-false identification buying guns at retail, police
departments could distribute wanted posters and/or gun felon lists to
gun stores.[190]

     Funding for any of the above programs should come from the same general
revenues that support all law enforcement, or from a special assessment on
convicted gun felons.[191] Persons exercising their Constitutional right to
bear arms should not be forced to pay a special tax to support enforcement
efforts against gun criminals, any more than camera owners or magazine
readers should be taxed to pay for enforcement of child pornography laws.



                              IX. CONCLUSION


     One night a man was walking down the street, and saw his friend crawling
on the sidewalk, near a lamppost. The friend explained that he was looking
for his wallet. The man got down on his knees, and helped the friend look.
After about 15 minutes, the man said "I don't think your wallet is anyplace
near this lamppost."

     "Of course it isn't," the friend replied. 'It fell out of my pocket over
there, in that dark alley."

     "Then why are you *looking all the way over here, by the lamppost?" the
man asked.

     "Because the light is so much better over here."

     Where should police officers look for armed criminals? In the dark
alleys and black markets where criminals sell guns? Or behind a desk, where
the light is better, so they can examine paperwork filled out by law-abiding
citizens?

     Especially when a legislature is considering laws that impact
fundamental rights, it is improper to pass legislation simply because "it
might help a little" or "it won't do much harm." Proponents of a new law have
the burden of proving that their new law will accomplish a significant
positive good. The burden is all the higher when proposed legislation affects
a significant number of people, and waiting periods regulate the 50% of
American households that choose to possess firearms. Proponents of a waiting
period have failed to carry their burden of persuasion.

     The criminological evidence is solidly against the waiting period. Most
police do not favor the waiting period, and even if they did, their opinions
do not over-ride Constitutional commands. While the Constitutional question
is not at all well-settled, analysis of core Constitutional principles
suggests that a waiting period cannot pass muster under the bar on prior
restraints or the requirement of "least restrictive means."

     Of all the proposals for increased restrictions on retail firearms
sales, the waiting period scores last in terms of disarming criminals, and
first in terms of threatening the exercise of the right to bear arms.
Alternative restrictions share many of the waiting period's defects. At the
federal level, all of the proposals violate the spirit of the Tenth Amendment
guaranteeing state autonomy. All of the proposals facilitate gun
registration. All of the proposals force a citizen wishing to exercise her
right to bear arms to receive, at least once, permission from the government.
The waiting period gives abusive administrators a chance to interfere with
every firearms transaction, while the alternatives allow interference with
some transactions. In terms of fighting crime, all of the proposals are
essentially trivial. They will force police officers to carry out a
surveillance of ordinary citizens that will almost never result in the arrest
of a criminal.

     The strongest evidence against a waiting period comes from the
copywriters of Handgun Control, Inc., the lead proponent of the bill. They
have chosen to build their case on a misrepresentation -- the empirically
false claim that a waiting period would have stopped John Hinckley. If
Handgun Control, Inc's most compelling argument is false, why should
legislators or other citizens believe HCI's other assertions? Why should the
public accept controls like waiting periods which are designed as
intermediate steps towards prohibition? Why should Americans accept
alternatives like instant telephone checks or smart cards which -- although
better in every respect than waiting periods -- fail to eliminate the civil
liberties problem created by forcing people to risk being put on a government
list because they exercise their rights.

     The premise of the waiting period -- and of most suggested alternatives
-- is that citizens can be required to ask police permission before
exercising their rights. But the Constitution does not create a privilege to
possess "sporting" guns. The Constitution recognizes a fundamental human
right to keep and bear arms.[192] And that is why waiting periods, besides
being ineffective, are illegal and immoral.


1. Sarah Brady said Pascoe's bill is "everything on my wish list that I've
been wishing for a federal level." Gary Massaro, "Brady's Appeal for
Gun-Control,"  _Rocky Mountain News_, Jan. 26, 1990.

2. Senate Bill 90-93, Colorado Senate, 57th General Assembly, Second Regular
Session (1990).

3. Mrs. Brady quoted in Sam Meddis, "Petitioners Taking Aim at Gun Laws," 
_USA Today_, July 20, 1988.

4. Mrs. Sarah Brady, Testimony before House of Representative Judiciary
Committee, Oct. 28, 1985, quoted in _Congressional   Record_, Feb. 5, 1987,
p. S.792.

5. James Brady, Fund-raising letter for Handgun Control, Inc., "Wednesday
morning" (summer 1990), p. 1: "John Hinckley - a man with a history of mental
problems - purchased an easily concealed handgun." Most recipients of the
fund-raising letter are not aware, as Mr. Brady surely must be, that no
background check could have discovered Hinckley's entirely private record of
consultation with mental therapists.   The fund-raising letter, which
includes substantial portions of Mr. Brady's standard testimony before
Congressional committees, is hereinafter cited as James Brady Fund-raising
letter.

6. Hinckley transcript, pp. 1489-1559; Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Bail. He also forfeited the guns he had been attempting to carry onto the
plane.

7. Texas driver's license #9457099, issued to John W. Hinckley, Jr., 1612
Avenue Y, Lubbock, Texas. Hinckley trial pp. 1751-52.

8. Sarah Brady, "How to Deter Future Hinckleys,"  _New York Times_, Nov. 8,
1985. Also: Barbara Lautman, HCI Communications Director, "Only the Criminals
Are Hurt By Waiting,"  _USA Today_, May 26, 1987, p. 12A; Handgun Control,
Inc., "Briefing Paper on the Brady Amendment" (1988): "Had a waiting period
been in effect and a background check undertaken, it could have been
determined that Hinckley committed a felony by lying about his address on the
federal forms and he could have been stopped."  Ohio Senator Metzenbaum (the
lead Senate sponsor of the waiting period) claims that Hinckley submitted "a
defective driver's license." Sen. Metzenbaum,  _Congressional Record_, Feb.
4, 1987, p. S792.

9. Advertisement, "A $29 handgun shattered my family's life."  _The New
Republic_, July 18, 1988, inside front cover. Also, same advertisement,  _New
York Times_, August 1, 1988, p. 1.   Rep. Edward Feighan (House sponsor of
waiting period), "Feighan Introduces Bill to Deter Criminals and Save Lives,"
Press Release, February 4, 1987: "One check would have told a Texas dealer
that John Hinckley was using a false address and could have prevented him
from purchasing a handgun."

10. Mrs. Sarah Brady, Congressional testimony, quoted in "Flagship Bill
Introduced,"  _Washington Report_  (Handgun Control, Inc. newsletter), Spring
1987, pp. 1-2.

11. "Brady Backs a Wait on Handgun Sales,"  _USA Today_, June 17, 1987, p.
2A.

12. Advertisement, "A $29 handgun shattered my family's life."  _The New
Republic_, July 18, 1988, inside front cover. Also, same advertisement,  New
York Times, August 1, 1988, p. 1.

13. Southwestern Bell,  _Lubbock-Slaton Telephone Directory_ (November, l979)
(listing "John W.Hinckley ... 409 University Av.").

14. 18 United States Code SS 522(a)(6).

15. ATF Rul. 80-21, reprinted in Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,  _(Your Guide to) Federal   Firearms
Regulation_, 1988-89, ATF P 5300,4 (6-88), p. 73.

16. Rep. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wisc.), "Fact Versus Fiction on the
Brady Amendment," August 11, 1988 (part of "Dear Colleague" letter titled
"NRA Shoots Self in Foot"), p. 2.

17. Shots from a .38 caliber are almost twice as likely to kill as .22
calibre attacks. Franklin Zimring, _The Medium is the Message: Firearms
Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault_, 1 Journal of Legal Studies
97 (Jan. 1972).  
     The campaign Mrs. Brady and HCI wage against "Saturday Night Specials"
(cheap handguns like the RG .22) is particularly odd in light of the fact
that Hinckley owned guns more powerful than a "Saturday Night Special," and
had a ban on "Saturday Night Specials" been in effect, Hinckley would not
have been able to buy the cheap handguns in Texas, and probably would have
used the higher-quality (and deadlier) handguns.


18. Advertisement, "A $29 handgun shattered my family's life." _The New
Republic_ July l8 1988, inside front cover. Same advertisement, _New York
Times_, August 1, 1988, p. 1. See also James Brady Fund-raising letter, p. 1:
"That shot - from a $29 Saturday Night Special - changed my life..." Also,
Sarah Brady: "Nine years
ago, I got thrown into the issue when John Hinckley bought a $29 handgun in
Dallas," in Peter Nye, -National Gun-Control Position," _The National Voter_
(League of Women Voters), October/November 1990, p. 5.

19. "Gun Used to Shoot Reagan called a $47 'Saturday Night Special',"
_Baltimore Sun_, March 31, 1981 (reporting testimony of federal agents based
on their examination of the purchase record for the transaction involving
Hinckley). See also, Pete Earley, "The Gun: A Saturday Night Special From
Miami," _Washington Post_, March 31, 1981: "[W]hen model RG14 finally reaches
the public, its price tag is about $47.50 - one of the cheapest pistols
available." (article about model of gun used by Hinckley).

20. Mrs. Brady also offers diverse stories about her own involvement in the
anti-gun crusade. In a November 1985 _New York Times_ op-ed, she explained
her involvement as directly triggered by NRA's attempt to repeal federal gun
control through the McClure-Volkmer bill:  
     Last July, the Senate passed the McClure-Volkmer bill, which would make
     it even easier for the kind  of tragedy that struck down my husband to
     happen again. This bill would severely undermine federal  gun laws by
     allowing anyone to buy a handgun across state lines, by limiting
     Government inspections  of gun dealers' records and by repealing certain
     handgun record-keeping requirements. I decided I had  to do more than
     think about the problem. 
Sarah Brady, "How to Deter Future Hinckleys," _New York Times_, Nov. 8, 1985
(>emphasis added<).  
     As a New York Times reporter described it:  
     >Mrs. Brady first enlisted in the fight for gun control in  the  summer
     of 1985< when it appeared that the  Senate was about to adopt a measure
     backed by the NRA that was designed to weaken the 1968 Gun  Control
     Act.  
          "It just enraged me," she recalled of the effort to alter the
          comprehensive law... 
Barbara Bamarekian, "Fighting the Fight on Gun Control," _New York Times_,
Feb. 10, 1987, p. B 10.  
     But another newspaper states that Mrs. Brady has actually been an
anti-gun activist since 1973, not since 1985, as she twice claimed in the
_New York Times_. According to a _USA Today_ profile, "Sarah Brady has spent
nearly a third of her life arguing for tougher gun laws ... Brady, daughter
of an FBI agent, >began her fight for stronger gun laws in 1973<, when she
tried to ban Saturday Night Specials..." "Brady Backs a Wait on Handgun
Sales," _USA Today_, June 17, 1987, p. 2A (>emphasis added<).

     In light of Mrs. Brady's deceptions about matters large and small, her
attack on the NRA, "I think they tend to prevaricate quite often" seems a
case of the pot calling the kettle black. ABC News/Time Forum, January 24,
1990, show #ABC-11, transcript.
     It is also ironic that she congratulates herself: "I have tried very
hard not to make it an emotional issue because I think that is what the gun
lobby has done." _New York Times_, Feb. 10, 1987. A reader of Handgun
Control's late 1990 fund-raising letter might find the rhetoric somewhat
emotional:
     _[Y]ou_ are at risk. _You_ are in danger of also becoming a victim of
     the senseless handgun violence ... _[S]top_ our insane national handgun 
     war ... Frankly, what makes me livid is that the NRA opposes the Brady 
     Bill because they claim it's an inconvenience ... For their convenience, 
     I experience pain - sometimes so intense I cry ... I need help getting 
     out of bed, help taking a shower, help getting dressed and, damn it, 
     even help going to the bathroom ... _The_NRA_lobbyists_can_go_to_
     _hell!_ ... [T]he NRA lobbyists scream FOUL! ... But the mighty NRA
     roars NO! And the cowards in Congress cringe! ... I desperately need
     your help.  James Brady Fund-raising letter (emphasis in original).

21. For example, Hank Johnson, Executive Editor, "Making a Case for Gun
Control,"  _Athens Daily News_ (Georgia), September 16, 1990 ("Had such a
waiting period been in effect when John Hinckley walked into a Dallas pawn
shop ... he could have been stopped.")

22. Sarah Brady, Vice Chair, Handgun Control, Inc., Statement (press
release), February 4, 1987, p. 1.
Presumably she meant to say "1980."

23. Handgun Control, Inc., "Briefing Paper on the Brady Amendment" (1988);
Rep. Feighan (sponsor of waiting period), remarks, _Congressional Record_,
September 15, 1988, p. H7636.

24. The National Sheriffs Association, which currently supports the waiting
period, certainly qualifies as a major law enforcement organization, since it
is the largest group of sheriffs in the United States. Interestingly, Handgun
Control, Inc. claimed in 1988 to have the support of "every major law
enforcement organization,"
even though in 1988 the NSA had voted not to support a waiting period.
Apparently when the NSA later changed its mind and supported Handgun Control,
the NSA then qualified as a "major police _organization."
     Both NACOP and AFP are for-profit organizations, and are associated with
retired police chief Gerald Arenberg, who is also associated with other
for-profit organizations. Handgun Control, Inc., sometimes _.announces this
fact as if it somehow delegitimizes the NACOP and AFP - although the more
than 100,000 law enforcement officers who have joined these organizations
apparently do not agree. Perhaps no major law enforcement organization has
been more tainted by financial impropriety than has the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, a strong supporter of the waiting period;
the questionable financial practices of IACP's former leadership should
certainly not disqualify it as a voice for its members. A fortiori, the
for-profit status of _NACOP and _AFP, untainted by any hint of scandal,
should not disqualify these groups as police voices.

25. The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, Fraternal Order of
Police, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Major Cities Chief Administrators, National
Association of Police Organizations, National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs Association, National Troopers
Coalition, Police Executive Research Forum, Police Foundation (a think-tank),
and Police Management Association. _Congressional Record_, Sept. 15, 1988, p.
H 7639; Handgun Control, Inc., "Briefing Paper on the Brady Bill," p. 2.

26. "What PERF Members Think About Police Education, Assault Weapons, Toy
Guns, Etc."  _Subject to Debate_ (PERF newsletter) March/April 1989, p. 1. It
cannot be said that PERF has done an outstanding job of informing its members
of the technicalities of the firearms debate. Ninety-four percent of PERF
members favored a ban on nondetectable weapons, apparently unaware of
testimony from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and from the
Federal Aviation Administration that there was no such thing as an
undetectable weapon currently in existence or technologically feasible in the
foreseeable future.

27. National Association of Chiefs of Police, "American Law Officers Survey
for 1989." The NACOP survey was sent to 16,259 command officers, and 16%
responded. The 16% represented departments which employ 172,355 officers.  
     Both the NACOP and the PERF surveys were conducted by mail, and response
was voluntary. Because the surveys were not conducted by random sampling, it
is not possible to assign a confidence interval to either survey.
Accordingly, it is statistically possible that either or both of the surveys
is not a correct measure of its population's opinion.  
     On the other hand, it seems very possible that both PERF and NACOP were
accurate measures. The responses to other questions in the surveys revealed
results that would be expected of the sample populations. The big-city chiefs
(PERF), favored: educational requirements for entry-level police (77%); an
"assault weapon" ban (76%); funds for drug research (85%); and collection of
data on hate crimes (78%).  Likewise, the NACOP survey found results that are
consistent with the expected conservative orientation of national police
commanders as a whole: belief that the death penalty deters crime (93.8%);
opposition to drug legalization (94.4%); belief that "the courts are too soft
on criminals in general" (95.6%), and belief that their department was
undermanned (87.3%).  
     In any case, it is doubtful that Handgun Control, Inc. would criticize
the NACOP survey, since NACOP's survey methodology is the same as PERF'S, and
Handgun Control cites the PERF survey in its own informational literature.
Handgun Control, Inc., "Waiting Periods Work."-


28. National Association of Chiefs of Police, "American Law Officers Survey
for the Year 1990." The NACOP survey was sent to approximately 16,000 command
officers, and 10% responded. See the previous endnote for caveats regarding
the response rate.

29. Handgun Control, Inc. claims that the NRA has lost police allies because
it has "gone off the deep end" by opposing reasonable gun controls.
Interestingly, when HCI tried its "deep end" advertisement in Police
magazine, the magazine received mail "unrivaled by any subject in the last
two years," most of the writers saying they didn't like the contents of the
ad one bit." Police's editor composed an editorial condemning Handgun Control
Inc., defending the NRA, and warning that "HCI is trying to erode the Second
Amendment." F. McKeen Thompson, "Readers Respond to HCI . . . And We Agree,"
_Police_ (The Law Officer's Magazine), vol. 11, no. 12 (December 1987), p. 4.
     In any case, the NRA is not the only group to lose friends over its
extreme stands. On most issues, the Fraternal Order of Police is a staunch
ally of Handgun Control. (The FOP leadership switched sides on the gun debate
in anger over the NRA's stand on armor-piercing bullets.) But when Handgun
Control helped push the New Jersey legislature to enact a bizarre and
overbroad "assault weapon" ban (it even applied to BB guns), the local
chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police strongly opposed the law.
Apparently, the FOP did not agree with HCI that BB guns should be confiscated
as assault weapons. Dewey R. Stokes, "Major Issues Face FOP," _National FOP
Journal_, Summer 1990, p. 4 (describing FOP stand in New Jersey, and national
FOP support for New Jersey's opposition).

30. Regarding the criminal procedure amendments to the Constitution, only a
small percent of cases are not prosecuted or are reduced to lesser charges
because of the rules against illegally seized physical evidence and coerced
confessions. Peter F. Nardulli, "The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Empirical Assessment," 1983 _American Bar Foundation Research Journal_
(1983): 585-6 10; Thomas Y. Davies, "A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still
Need to Learn) about the 'Costs' of the Exclusionary Rule: The NLJ Study and
Other Studies of 'Lost' Arrests," 1983 _American Bar Foundation Research
Journal_ (1983): 611-90; "Legal Safeguards Don't Hamper Crime-Fighting,"
_National Law Journal_, December 12, 1988, p.5: Six-tenths of one percent to
2.35% of cases are dismissed because of bad searches; in a survey of
prosecutors, 87% said that 5% or less of their cases were dismissed because
of Miranda problems.

31. See for example the remarks of Rep. Mel Levine (D-Calif.), _Congressional
Record_, April 10, 1986, p. H1746 (allowing interstate transportation of
handguns for sporting purposes will cause 'mayhem ... on our streets..and
further handicap law enforcement efforts to control handgun crime."); remarks
of Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich), ibid. ("[T]he police in my district are
concerned that the _Volkmer substitute would add considerably more peril to
their job than already exists.")

32. "91% of Americans Favor Brady Amendment," _Subject to Debate_, Nov./Dec.
1988, p. 10.

33. _Subject to Debate._

34. Polling data from Herbert McClosky & Alida Brill, _Dimensions of
Tolerance: What Americans Believe About Civil Liberties._ (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1988).

35. "It established some rights of the individual as unalienable and which
consequently, no majority has a right to deprive them of." Albert Gallatin,
Congressman and Cabinet officer of the early American Republic, quoted in
Richard E. Gardiner, "To Preserve Liberty: A Look at the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms," 10 _Northern Kentucky Law Review_ 63, 79n. (1982).

36. McCloskey and Brill.

37. Wright, Rossi, and Daly, pp. 223-35.

38. Sarah Brady, Fund-raising letter for Handgun Control, Inc., "Wednesday,-
(no date, 1988).

39. Matthew DeZee, "Gun Control Legislation: Impact and Ideology," _Law &
Policy Quarterly_ 5 (July l983): 363-79. Although DeZee stated that he
supported stricter gun laws, he did not offer any proposals.

40. "Homicides, Robberies and State "Cooling-Off' Schemes," in ed. Donald B.
Kates, _Why Handgun Bans Can't Work_ (Bellevue, Wash: Second Amendment
Foundation, 1982), pp. 101-12.

41. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal and State Firearms Control Laws," in
_Firearms and Violence: Issues of Public Policy_ (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger, 1984): 225-58 (the study also found no perceptible impact on crime
or gun acquisition from the federal Gun Control Act of 1968).

42. Report on the Federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, S. Rep. no 3476,
97th Cong., 2d sess. (1982), pp. 51-52..

43. Philip. J. Cook & James Blose, "State Programs for Screening Handgun
Buyers,"  _Annals of the American Academy of Political Science_ 455 (May
1981), pp. 88-90. Although skeptical about screening systems as a panacea,
Cook and Blose still favor screening since it might increase the marginal
price or time needed to obtain a gun for inexperienced criminals (such as
teenagers), and might keep weakly-motivated criminals from obtaining guns at
all. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
     Although Cook and Blose do not offer evidence, their intuition about
possible benefits is not implausible. But since waiting periods and other
screening systems do not show any statistical effect, it must be that the
number of criminals actually affected is fairly small. Parts IV and V below
discuss how the potential benefits of a waiting period compare to the
potential harms.
     One study I have cited in earlier works (Cato Institute and Senate
Testimony, both 1988) for the inefficacy of gun control is Douglas Murray,
(1975). My citation to Murray was an error. As Wright, Rossi, and Daly point
out, Murray's statistical model has a design flaw which minimizes any
possible relationship between gun laws and gun crime.

44. Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton, Letter to House Judiciary
Chairman Peter Rodino, March 19, 1986.

45. James Wright, Peter Rossi, and Kathleen Daly, _Under the Gun: Weapons,
Crime and Violence in America_ (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine, 1983).

46. James Wright and Peter Rossi, _Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey
of Felons and Their Firearms_ (New York: Aldine, 1986). Three-fifths of the
prisoners studied said that a criminal would not attack a potential victim
who was known to be armed. Two-fifths of them had decided not to commit a
crime because they thought the victim might have a gun. Criminals in states
with higher civilian gun ownership rates worried the most about armed
victims.

47. _The Armed Criminal in America_, p. 46 (report to National Institute of
Justice; later republished as Armed and Considered Dangerous).
     One of the authors, Professor James Wright nevertheless sees little
disadvantage in a waiting period. He calls it "a reasonable precaution" and
argues "Few legitimate purposes to which a firearm might be put are thwarted
if the user has to wait a few days, or even a few weeks, between filing the
application and actually acquiring the weapon." James D. Wright, firearms
chapter in ed. Joseph F. Sheley, _Criminology_ (Wadsworth Pub., 1991), p.
442. Professor Wright's view seems to be that while the waiting period, like
any screening system, might yield only small benefits, it is worthwhile
because it exacts virtually no costs. The counter- argument that the waiting
period's small benefits are outweighed by the damage it does to public safety
is discussed below. Professor Wright's assumption that a waiting period
"leaves the legitimate user pretty much alone" is true in theory but not in
fact; as detailed below, a waiting period can be and often is
administratively abused and made into a prohibition.

48. Wright & Rossi, pp. 181-87.

49. Ibid, p. 188, n. 3.

50. There is of course some value in keeping a criminal from obtaining a
second gun or a better gun, but the process would be unlikely to stop a
criminal from perpetrating a given armed crime.

51. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Assistant Director of Criminal
Enforcement, Memorandum to Director, July 10, 1975 (Greenville survey; of
20,047 names submitted to FBI for record checks, 68 had felony convictions;
of those, 41 had not been represented by counsel at their conviction or who
committed crimes in the distant past; twenty-seven buyers were prosecuted)
(of the 1.3% of buyers selected for prosecution, .9% had non-violent felony
convictions, and .4% had violent convictions). Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Assistant Director for Criminal Enforcement, memorandum to
Director, May 8, 1975 (of 374 records checked, 39 were purchasers with felony
records who were not appropriate for prosecution because of age or
non-violent nature of felony; six purchasers were prosecuted).

52. Douglas A. Blackmon, "Gun Sale Limits Don't Cut Crime, Experts Say,"
_Atlanta Journal & Constitution_, May 29, 1990, p. A-9. The numbers for
previous years were: for 1981, 1365; for 1982, 1009; for 1983, 1148; for
1984, 1349; for 1985, 1413; for 1986, 1515. Anita Lagunas, Supervisor,
Firearms Control Unit, California Attorney General, Letter to Richard
Gardiner, National Rifle Association, March 23, 1987.

53. California Board of Criminal Statistics, in Blackmon.

54. William Davis, "Gun Law Backfires," _Los Angeles Daily News_, Mar. 4,
1991 (letter to the editor from law enforcement officer and licensed federal
firearms dealer whose application was put on hold).
     There are also reports that all "assault weapon" registrants have been
placed in police computer lists of persons who pose a special hazard.
California's practice of enforcing its laws with special severity against
persons who are especially law-abiding makes the registrants seem naive, and
seems to vindicate the intuitive distrust of gun registration felt by most
gun-owners.

55. Handgun Control, Inc., "Briefing Paper."

56. "Gun Control: It Threatens the Right People," _Tallahassee Democrat_,
February 1, 1985 (In six month period since waiting period went into effect,
37 of 1,425 applicants were denied; of the 37, 14 were denied for outstanding
arrest records for traffic offenses and other misdemeanors).


57. Handgun Control, Inc., "The Case for a Waiting Period."

58. In response to a letter from the NRA requesting information about the
Columbus waiting period, the police department analyzed its records and found
that in the period January 1, 1985 through July 22, 1985, thirty of the 1,419
handgun purchase applications had been refused. Due to man-hour limitations,
the department was not able to provide data for other periods. G.J. McCain,
Major, Bureau of Support Services, Columbus Police Department, letter to
Richard Gardiner, National Rifle Association, September 12, 1985. Of the 32
denials, seven were because of outstanding warrants, four were due to
marijuana cases, three for other drug cases, thirteen were for felony
convictions other than marijuana, and five were due to age.

59. Bureau of Justice Statistics, _Identifying Persons, Other than Felons,
Ineligible to Purchase Firearm: A Feasibility Study_ (May 1990) (report
performed under contract by Enforth Corporation, Cambridge, Massachusetts),
p. 25.

60. Pete Shields, _Guns Don't Die-People Do_ (New York: Arbor House, 1981),
p. 83.

61. Task Force, p. 86.

62. David Bordua, "Operation and Effects of Firearms Owners Identification
and Waiting Period Legislation in Illinois," (University of Illinois:
unpublished paper, 1985).

63. Sgt. R.G. Pepersack, Sr., Maryland State Police, Commander, Firearms
License Section, written testimony and oral questioning before United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution,
regarding S. 466, "Handgun Violence Prevention Act," June 16, 1987 (In 1986,
there were 20,704 applications, 1,102 initial disapprovals, 370 approvals
granted upon appeal, and 14 currently active cases involving an applicant who
had a conviction of a crime of violence, of which 5 or 6 had been selected
for prosecution for attempting an illegal purchase.)

64. Pepersack, p. 2 (of 471 appellants in 1986, 370 [78%] were ultimately
approved).

     Because so many initial denials are overturned, it is misleading for
Handgun Control, Inc. to characterize the entire total of initial denials as
"people who were trying to purchase handguns illegally." "The Case for a
Waiting Period."

65. "The Case for a Waiting Period." Also, "Flagship Bill Introduced,"
_Washington Report_ (Handgun Control, Inc. newsletter), Spring 1987, p. 1.

66. From 1966 (when current controls were enacted) until June 1988, there
were 1,153,400 applications for either a permit to purchase a handgun or a
firearms identification card. Of those applications, 29,850 (2.5%) were
denied. According to reporter Eugene Kiley, of the _Bergen Record_, the state
police conducted a random survey of 507 applicants in 1985. Applying the
percentages from the 1985 survey to the data as a whole leads to the
following breakdowns for the denials:

Reason                             Percent        Number
Criminal Record                    29%             8,366
Falsifying Application             35%            10,097
Public Health, Safety & Welfare    20%             5,770
Mental or Alcoholic                 7%             2,020
Insufficient Reason to issue        6%             1,731


In other words, the total denials for actual danger (8,366    criminal
record, plus 2,020 mental or alcoholic = 10,386) uncomfortably close to the
number of denials for patently arbitrary reasons (5,770 public health, plus
1,731 insufficient reason = 7,501). If the denials based on falsifying
application (10,097) are also considered arbitrary (since the category does
not include falsifications relating to criminal, mental, or alcoholic
ineligibility), the number of arbitrary denials significantly exceeds the
number of legitimate denials.


67. Ibid.

68. Statement of Robert F. Mackinnon, on behalf of the Coalition of New
Jersey Sportsmen, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, on Legislation
to Modify the 1968 Gun Control Act, part 2, serial no. 131, 99th Congress,
1st and 2d sess., Feb. 27, 1986 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1987), p. 1418.  
     For example of the New Jersey law in operation, see W. Peter Haas,
Chairman, Public Safety Committee, Borough of Mountain Lakes, letter to
Police Chief Joseph Spinozzi, July 29, 1968 ("it is my opinion that you as
Chief of Police of our Borough deny any applications for any type for weapons
permits. You may accept the application and fully process that application to
the point of approval or disapproval, then disapprove and notify the
applicant of your decision and their recourse through the County Court ---
Article 4 Section 2A: 151-33 (d) ... authorizes the disapproval of any person
where the issuance would not be in the public interest or welfare. It is my
belief that it is not in the public interest to issue permits...")

69. Each application takes about four hours to process. Colonel Clinton
Pagano, testimony before the New Jersey Assembly Law and Public Safety
Committee, hearing on A. 594, February 1988. If one assumes that each man
hour costs the state of New Jersey ten dollars, the licensing system has cost
New Jersey $46,136,000. (The figure is in 1988 dollars, and based on the
figure of 1,153,400 total applications in 1966-88, cited in the previous
endnote.) There have been 10,386 denials based on criminal, mental,
or alcohol records (see previous endnote), and dividing the number into the
total dollar cost yields the cost per denial of $4,442.13.

70. The dealer must report the sale to local police within 6 hours. The
police have 48 hours to veto the sale, but in practice dealers generally wait
72 hours, to be sure to avoid liability for a sale in an ineligible person.
Weekends and holidays do not count for purposes of the 48 hour computation. 

     Police believe that the law requires all private transfers to be routed
through retail dealers, so that police can perform the check, but the
requirement, if it exists, is widely ignored.  
     All information regarding Pennsylvania comes from the author's August
28, 1990 telephone conversation with Ms. Sharon H. Crawford, head of the
state police firearms unit, in Harrisburg.

71. A good number of "hits" are based on felony convictions from many years
before, or on a conviction of aggravated assault, which some people
(negligently) do not realize is a disqualifying felony.

72. Task Force, p. 87.

73. Blackmon.

74. Task Force, p. 89.

75. In Virginia, 8 of 673 ineligibles (1.2%) were arrested. Handgun  Control,
Inc., "The Case for a Waiting Period" (1990). See also the Maryland date
discussed above.

76. James Brady Fund-raising letter, p. 3: "Seven days to help police thwart
a purchase by a drug dealer."

77. As Sterling Johnson, New York City's former special narcotics prosecutor
acknowledged, "You either have to protect yourself with a gun or get out of
the (drug) business." Anthony M. DeStefano, "City Teens: Armed and
Dangerous," _New York Newsday_, Sept. 24, 1990, p. 30.

78. Blackmon.

79. "Killer Fraternized with Men in Army Fatigues," The Globe and Mail_,
December 9, 1989; "Killer's Letter Blames Feminists," The Globe and Mail,
December 9, 1989.
     To be precise, Canada does not have a formal waiting period. In 1978,
Canada implemented a national law which required police permission for every
handgun purchase, and a one-time License (good for five years) for long gun
purchases. The license application requirement served, in effect, as a
waiting period for most first-time gun purchasers.

80. Blackmon.

81. James Brady Fund-raising letter.

82. Elisabeth Scarff, Decision Dynamics Corporation, _Evaluation of the
Canadian Gun Control Legislation_ (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing
Centre, 1983) (prepared for the Solicitor General of Canada), pp. 5, 29.

83. A study of Toronto indicated that the gun laws decreased firearms suicide
by men, but "the difference was
apparently offset by an increase in suicide by leaping." Charles L. Rich,
James G. Young, Richard C. Fowler, John Wagner, Nancy A. Black, "Guns and
Suicide: Possible Effects of Some Specific Legislation," _American Journal of
Psychiatry_, 147 (no. 3, March 1990), p. 342.

84. World Health Organization, _World Health Statistics_, 1984 (Geneva:
W.H.O., 1984), pp. 183, 189; United States Bureau of the Census, _Statistical
Abstract of the United States_, 1989 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1989), p. 820.

85. "Legislature: Pass Handgun Law," Denver Post, January 24, 1975.

86. David Hardy, "Legal Restrictions on Firearms Ownership as an Answer to
Violent Crime: What Was the Question?" _Hamline Law Review_ 6 (July 1983):
404. It might be wondered if lives would be saved if homicidally enraged
husbands "cooled off" while driving around at night look for open firearms
dealers willing to sell to drunken and agitated customers, rather than
staying home and finding alternative weapons.

87. In a Detroit study, 75% of wives who shot and killed their husbands were
legally defending themselves or their children against illegal attacks. The
figure for Miami was 60%, and for Houston, 85.7%. "[W]hen women kill, their
victims are ... most typically men who have assaulted them." Martin Daly and
Margo Wilson, _Homicide_ (New York: Aldine, 1988), pp. 15, 200, 278.
     Saunders, "When Battered Women Use Violence: Husband Abuse or
Self-Defense," _Violence and Victims_ 1 (1986), p. 49; Barnard et al, "Till
Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder," _Bulletin of the American
Academy of Psych. and the Law_ 10 (1982): 271; Donald T. Lunde, _Murder and
Madness_ (San Francisco: San Francisco Book Co., 1976), p. 10 (in 85 % of
decedent-precipitated interspousal homicides, the wife kills an abusing
husband); E. Benedek, "Women and Homicide," in ed. Bruce Danto, _The Human
Side of Homicide (New York: Columbia, 1982).
     It is sometimes suggested that the abused woman is to blame for not
leaving the relationship. Many women do leave, only to be followed and killed
by their former mate.
     See generally Lenore E. Walker, _Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women
Kill and How Society Responds_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1989); Cynthia K.
Gillespie, _Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law_
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989).

88. Gary Kleck, _Guns and Violence_ (Hawthome, New York: Aldine, 1991,
forthcoming) chapter 8. The study of 1982 data Kleck reviewed is Ted
Mannelli, "Handgun Control," Report to the Executive Office of the Governor,
State of Florida (Tallahassee: University of Florida, 1982) (unpublished).

89. "Excerpts from Dinkins's Address: Mobilizing to Fight Crime," _New York
Times_, October 3, 1990, p. B2.

90. Eric Stenson, "Laws Limiting Access to Guns Putting Dent in NRA's Clout,"
Asbury Park Press, Aug. 5, 1990.

91. 54 Fed. Reg. 43532,

92. Task Force, p. 24.

93. For example, the Lakewood, Colorado, police chief defended the Pascoe
21-day comprehensive wait: "If we can save one life, it's worth it." Also,
Richard Boyd, President of Fraternal Order of Police, quoted in "Two Sides
Spiritedly Debate Bill on Gun-purchase Waiting Period," _The Capital Times_
(Madison, Wisc.), June 18, 1987; Rep. Edward Feighan (House sponsor of
waiting period), "Feighan Introduces Bill of Deter Criminals and Save Lives,"
Press Release, February 4, 1987 ("If this bill can save even one life, which
I know it can, Congress should act on it now."); Fraternal Order of Police:
"If the seven-day waiting period will save just one life - the life of a law
enforcement officer or a citizen - then [Congress's] work will be successful.
- quoted in Handgun Control, Inc., "Waiting Periods Work."
     If the criteria for legislation is whether it will save a single life,
legislatures would also want to consider a ban on new private swimming pools
and on cigarette lighters, as well as a reduction of the speed limit to 15
m.p.h. There is of course no Constitutional right to swim or light fires or
drive at a particular speed; and pools, cigarette lighters, and cars are not
usually considered useful for self-defense. Cars kill many more people than
guns. Cigarette lighters cause more fatal accidents for children than do
guns. (In 1984, the number of accidental deaths from all types of guns for
children under the age of 5 was 34, while that same year 90 children aged 0-4
were killed by cigarette lighters. Centers for Disease Control, "Mortality
and Morbidity Weekly Report," March 11, 1988, p. 145; _Consumer's Research_,
May 1988, p. 34.)

-- 
Larry Cipriani, att!cbvox1!lvc or lvc@cbvox1.att.com
Newsgroups: alt.politics.clinton,talk.politics.guns