HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Competition  (was: Jobs)
Date: 7 Sep 1992 11:25:07 -0500
Organization: U Texas Dept of Computer Sciences, Austin TX
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu
Summary: The original does not lie outside *economic* competition.

-*----
In article <1992Sep7.042857.9173@panix.com> gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
> ...  Competition makes everything boring.  The original, which
> is what is interesting, is outside of competition precisely 
> because there's nothing like it.

The above comment *might* apply to a sports match (though, no 
doubt, Michael Jordan fans would object), but it misses the
point of economic competition.  There, "something totally 
different" can take the place of, or even, just show the
lack of need for, a myriad of minor variations of what was
previously used.  

Russell
From: exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 14 Sep 92 22:16:24 GMT
Organization: Ericsson Network Systems, Inc.

In article <1992Sep12.175922.4033@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
>Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
>Date: 12 Sep 92 17:59:22 GMT

>exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:

>>Perhaps a distinction between rational and irrational desires is needed
>>here. Very often we are justified in directing someone's behavior
>>because we are in a position to know what is really in their long-term
>>interest.
>> 
>>Natural rights need not then be conceived as transcendent, but rather
>>as rooted in people's deepest, long-term, interests as human beings. 

>It appears to me that on this view the content of natural rights (which
>depends on people's rational interests) might be viewed as determined
>by the characteristics that people are found through experience to have
>and to that extent would not be transcendent.  However, I'm not sure
>that the status of natural rights as natural rights can be derived
>through determining what people's rational interests are.  For example,
>even if behavioral and social scientists all agree that honesty is the
>best policy in the sense that people who are honest are most likely to
>have enduring feelings of satisfaction and happiness, one could still
>ask whether a father is justified in training his son to be honest when
>some aspects of the training are opposed to the son's current
>dispositions, purposes and inclinations.

>In addition, I take it that on this view the actual dispositions,
>purposes, inclinations and so on that people have over time would be
>taken as evidence for a theory of what their rational interests are.  I
>believe it is a truism that theories regarding non-observable entities
>like "rational interests" are under-determined by the evidence for
>them.  So it appears that the key to your suggested system of natural
>rights -- rational interests -- will in fact transcend all actual
>experience.
>-- 
>    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)

Yes, very probably.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 14:05:35 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA



 exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:
> If life is justifiable at all, then it must be possible 
> to justify the means to necessary to sustain life.  And if
> life cannot be sustained without leaving persons the
> unrestrained freedom to pursue those means to sustain 
> themselves under the objective conditions of existence, 
> then it is this necessity which justifies us in saying that
> people have a right, a human or natural right, to things
> like life and property, etc. ...


    More Randian gobbledygook.  What does "if life is
    justifiable" even mean?   What does it mean for 
    life to be "justifiable"?   

    I'm alive.  I like being alive.  I would prefer to 
    remain being alive.  But this, by itself does not
    give me some kind of "right" to remain alive.  Nor
    is there some natural "reciprocity rule" in nature 
    that requires that I grant to others what I prefer 
    for myself, even though some sophomoric Usenet
    posters may try to invoke such a rule from time 
    to time.

    Moreover, it can be amply demonstrated that freedom
    is not necessary to remain alive.   And let's not hear
    and romantic nonsense about "man qua man" unless you
    are prepared to offer objectiv, operational definitions
    of terms like "reason" or "rational".


---peter
From: ald@clipper.ingr.com (Al Date)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Human Rights...
Date: 5 Sep 92 01:13:47 GMT
Organization: Intergraph Advanced Processor Division - Palo Alto, CA

In article <lacbfaINN2h6@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM> tmhoff@oogoody.Corp.Sun.COM writes:
>>If you really dont like fascism, you need to realize that by empowering
>>the govt (whether for "good" causes of the right or of the left) you are
>>contributing to the growth of a potentially fascist state.  
>
>It's amusing to hear someone argue against fascism yet confer all coercive
>power to the state. If the state is not to be trusted in the comparitively
>trivial realm of taxation how can you possibly trust the state with the
>sole ownership of the use of force? 

If the power of the state is restricted to the protection of individual
rights, then taxation is trivial.  In short, I do NOT trust the
state with the sole ownership of the use of force, but there is
no alternative, except every woman for herself (which might work,
but it would seem to require a higher level of human evolution).

>This is an honest question. Your
>schizophrenia on this issue befuddles me. All the other powers of the state 
>seem trivial comapred to the ones you have given it as its birthright.
>

The only powers I have given to the state are those which are needed
to try to ensure justice and peace.  I am at a loss as to what you are
talking about, but I have an open ear.  


>>"Soak the rich!" springs forth from the same part of the human psyche as
>>"Kill the Jews!"
>
>Which springs forth from the same part of the human psysche that asserts
>a minimal government enforcing only a few negative rights is the only
>just and true government. Is there no continuum? 

I am a true fan of continua, but here again, I dont know what part of 
the human psyche you are referring to.

My point was that Soak the Rich and Kill the Jews are 
both cries of envy and hatred with overtones of righteousness, but 
which are devoid of the moral notion of tolerance.  The idea
of minimal govt enforcing negative rights is the *essence* of
the morality of tolerance, which is the opposite of fascism,
on a long continuum, of course.


--Al Date
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 12 Sep 92 17:59:22 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell) writes:

>Perhaps a distinction between rational and irrational desires is needed
>here. Very often we are justified in directing someone's behavior
>because we are in a position to know what is really in their long-term
>interest.
> 
>Natural rights need not then be conceived as transcendent, but rather
>as rooted in people's deepest, long-term, interests as human beings. 

It appears to me that on this view the content of natural rights (which
depends on people's rational interests) might be viewed as determined
by the characteristics that people are found through experience to have
and to that extent would not be transcendent.  However, I'm not sure
that the status of natural rights as natural rights can be derived
through determining what people's rational interests are.  For example,
even if behavioral and social scientists all agree that honesty is the
best policy in the sense that people who are honest are most likely to
have enduring feelings of satisfaction and happiness, one could still
ask whether a father is justified in training his son to be honest when
some aspects of the training are opposed to the son's current
dispositions, purposes and inclinations.

In addition, I take it that on this view the actual dispositions,
purposes, inclinations and so on that people have over time would be
taken as evidence for a theory of what their rational interests are.  I
believe it is a truism that theories regarding non-observable entities
like "rational interests" are under-determined by the evidence for
them.  So it appears that the key to your suggested system of natural
rights -- rational interests -- will in fact transcend all actual
experience.
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 11 Sep 1992 10:26:01 -0500
Organization: U Texas Dept of Computer Sciences, Austin TX
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu
Summary: Jim Kalb's example is far from convincing.

-*----
In article <1992Sep11.010546.5396@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
> ...  You're trying to decide how to raise your son.  Your son's own
> desires, purposes and inclinations ("I'd like to eat chocolate more
> often", or what have you) may be relevant, but more as data to take
> into account than as something to negotiate about.  It seems to me
> that you should not make your decision based simply on whatever your
> own desires, purposes and inclinations happen to be, and still less on
> those of third parties. ...

Why not?  "It seems to me" is pretty weak explanation, especially
when this is almost universally how parents base their decisions. 

> ... You can't sensibly make the decision based on speculations as
> to your son's future (and presumably mature) d., p., & i. ...

Nonsense.  A parent can do this *because* the parent has
influence over the child's future values.  Many parents I know
try to both (1) instill certain values in their children, and (2)
instill habits and practices that the child, looking back with
the instilled values, will appreciate. 

> So the only thing left (or so it seems to me) is to base your 
> decision on the good of the child, conceived as in principle
> independent of anyone's actual d., p. & i.

I presume this means the *transcendent* good of the child.  To
actually do this, it is not enough to assume that a transcendent
good exists, but also that one knows of what it consists.  But as
many children come to learn, parents who *proclaim* a
transcendant good are actually dressing up their *own* desires,
purposes, and inclinations, and can give no sensible explanation
that what they proclaim as a transcendent good is really that.
The child's question "*Why* is that good?" can only be answered
"because."  The child (most likely a young adult by now) learns
that the parent reifies the parent's values, and tries to hide
this magic stunt with a bunch of rhetorical smoke and mirrors.  
Sometimes the child adopts this deception as their own, and other
times the child rebels.  Because I dislike deception, I think such
rebellion is justified.

No, thank you.  My father was honest in raising me, and I will
try to be honest with my children.  It may take more guts as a
parent to say "you have to behave this way because I and other
adults want children to behave this way," but it is often the
truth, and as the child matures, this honesty will give the youth
a more accurate understanding of social relations.  Whether you
want new adults to better understand society is, of course, yet
another personal value. 

Russell
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 15 Sep 92 00:43:06 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:

>Soon, I will tire . . .

I already have.  It seems unlikely to me that continuing my discussion
with Russell (very few people realize that we're on a first-name basis)
will lead to much illumination for anyone.

I mentioned that the same issues are currently being discussed in
sci.philosophy.meta, and anyone interested should look to see what's
going on there.
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 12 Sep 92 17:58:02 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi) writes:

[I had written:]

>|> So the only thing left (or so it seems to me) is to base your decision
>|> [how to raise a child] on the good of the child, conceived as in principle
>|> independent of
>|> anyone's actual [desires, purposes and inclinations].

>How does "the good of the child" makes itself known to you.  Since this
>knowledge is presumably arising within you, how do you distinguish
>between it and your own "desire?"

Same way I distinguish between my perceptions and knowledge of the
physical world.  You start with perceptions, preconceived notions,
things that people have told you, things that seem obviously true and
so on, and then pick through them, criticize them, systematize them and
reflect on them in the light of experience, and arrive at views that
you believe come closer to the truth of whatever it is you're concerned
with, whether that thing is ethics or cosmology.

If you're interested, Randall Holmes and others have just posted
extended discussions of this very topic in sci.philosophy.meta in the
thread on _The Story of O_.
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: brownfield!jbrow (Jim Brownfield)
Subject: Re: A question
Reply-To: <jbrow@glv.com>
Organization: Encompass
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 22:12:56 GMT

In article <1992Sep12.031256.16231@panix.com> gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch)  
writes:
> In my opinion, no president has the slightest idea of how to
> "run" the economy.  I could tell them the secret, but I can't
> even convince the regular denizens of talk.politics.theory of
> the rightness of my views -- even though they should be
> obvious to anybody.

I agree.  One reason for this is that nobody seems to understand what the   
economy is.  Presidential candidates from both the major parties talk about how   
their programs will "expand" the economy, but the economy is an aggregate of  
the  *wants* of all the people involved.  Unless everyone *wants* to do what a  
Bush,  Quayle, Clinton, or Gore wants them to do, these politicians cannot  
"run" an  economy, and people really don't make very good sheep.

[stuff deleted]
> -- 
>  )*(    Gordon Fitch    )

Jim Brownfield
#include <standard/disclaimer.h>
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 10 Sep 1992 11:51:06 -0500
Organization: U Texas Dept of Computer Sciences, Austin TX
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu
Summary: Nope, not needed at all.

-*----
In article <1992Sep9.232943.8908@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
> ... It seems to me impossible to think about human conduct
> sensibly without assuming that there is objective [transcendent]
> right and wrong.  Try to discuss politics, for example, or think
> about how to treat your wife or bring up your children, without
> the assumption that it really is better -- regardless of what
> one's own purposes or inclinations may be -- to do some things
> rather than others. ...

I do this all the time, without the need for any assumption such
as the one that Jim Kalb proposes.  I find that politics and
morality are most usefully thought about IN TERMS OF people's
desires, purposes, and inclinations, rather than under the
assumption of some Good that transcends these, which seems to me
to cloud the issues rather than help.  

Perhaps Jim Kalb would be good enough to give an example where
this assumption is helpful.

> ... But if that's so, how can we reject the assumption that
> some things really are better than others ...

I presume Kalb means "transcendentally are better."  Something
can be better in terms that are not transcendent, but this is
still very real.  (Indeed, the term "objective" is also
misleading.  For example, a car that gets 40 mpg is -- ceterus
paribus -- objectively better than one that gets 20 mpg.  The
difference can be measured quite well.  That we think this 
"better" is, of course, a consequence of the human desire to do
more with less effort and expense.  But there is no reason to
assume a *transcendent* good here.)

In any case, that someone cannot imagine or think about things
otherwise is a frequent excuse for that person's faith.  Such
excuse must be considered in the light of the ease with which
others think about and experience life without such faith.

Russell
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: thogek@seismo.gps.caltech.edu (Thomas Kiefer)
Subject: A question
Summary: you tell me
Organization: not today
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:24:21 GMT

I have a question for ya.  (Hope this is the appropriate group for it.)

A friend recently mentioned this to me, and I thought it was interesting,
but don't know enough about government/politics and its history to decide
if it might make sense or not.

Anyway, first of all, you need to agree (at least for the sake of argument)
that present economic conditions (i.e. recession) are at least in part due
to ineffective and/or negligent actions on the part of political leaders,
especially the Presidency, in past years.  (If ya can't do that, jump to
the next article...)

Now, my friend's thought was, can we (to some extent) blame this whole
thing on Nixon and Watergate?

I can hear it now.  "Where the HELL did THAT come from?!"  Well, the idea
goes something like:

 Nixon was President.  He pulled his Watergate stunts, which caught up
 with him, and led him to resign before he was impeached.

 Ford ended up taking over as P, but (possibly due to not being as well
 known nationally (?), or his unpopular full-pardoning of Nixon to spare
 him any possible criminal trials), couldn't hang on to it into the next
 term.

 Jimmy Carter then came in, possibly more from the get-away-from-Nixon-
 Ford-and-those-Republicans vote than anything else, and, although he is
 clearly an intelligent man, he apparently didn't function very well in
 his government/political environment, and Things got screwed up (beserk
 inflation, etc.).

 Fleeing Carter's administration, the voting public pulled another we-need-
 change vote and replaced him with Reagan.  ("Yeah, he's an actor, but at
 least he's had SOME political experience.")  Reagan's acting experience
 may have helped as well, giving him his better TV appearance.  He (or at
 least something while he was in office) seemed to fix up much of the
 economy, so he got two terms, and passed his legacy on to Bush in '88.
 But his "fix" on the economy now looks pretty unstable, as trickle-down
 economics is not so healthful in the long run, and we're still flopping
 around in recession...

Anyway, this is all vastly simplified.  (Duh.)  But,... does my friend
have a point?  Did Tricky Dick inadvertantly open up a path of electing
Presidents primarily just to get that last guy out of there (usually not
the best way to pick a Pres)?  Would this probably have happened anyway,
with or without Watergate?  Even ignoring the economy, has this affected
the path of Presidents we've followed?  Etc?

Just asking.

-- 
===================================================================
===========================Thomas Kiefer===========================
====thogek@seismo.gps.caltech.edu===or===thogek@cco.caltech.edu====
===================================================================
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: b645zaw@utarlg.uta.edu (Stephen Tice)
Subject: Re: Is Ross Perot sandbagging?
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: The University of Texas at Arlington
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 19:59:00 GMT

In article <715743196snx@dale.CAM.ORG>, 
dale@dale.CAM.ORG (Dale Wharton) writes...

>Friday, 4 Sep, Terry Gross interviewed Gore Vidal, the writer, on
>National Public Radio.  Vidal grew up in the home of his grandpa,
>a senator from OK.  He predicts Ross Perot will reenter the race
>once Bush and Clinton have shredded each other with negative campaigns.

Perhaps a better question is to what end? If Ross want's to get the
points he made in _United We Stand_ out to the American people, and
that really is his core motive -- then he could get a great deal of
air time by renentering. Let's go to the other extreme though, and
assume for a moment that somehow Perot wins. What could his next 
step possibly be knowing that congress would be hell bent on forcing
his resignation, and perhaps a new election. 

My proposition is that it's clear Congress would be out to destroy
him, so that the partisans can take the reigns again. So if Ross
comes back -- would he really intend to win?

>dale@dale.cam.org          M O N T R E A L          Te souviens-tu?

 /                                                                  \
(  Stephen D. Tice     |     Human science is based on the writings  )
 >                  -- S --  of 300 generations, the view from one  < 
(  Arlington Texas     |     small planet and a very short lifetime. )
 \                                                                  /          

As long as we're speculating, I'm curious what the likely result would
be if one of the candidates' Spouse were to die (for whatever reason).
Who would it affect the most? I submit Bill Clinton would come out 
best, Bush would be crippled, Same for Gore, and Quayle who knows?

More curious a question -- If a sitting president resigns, do we have
to put up with his VEEP, or is there a way to force a general election,
through recall?
From: dale@dale.CAM.ORG (Dale Wharton)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Jobs
Date: 6 Sep 92 02:24:56 GMT
Organization: private

In article <1992Sep4.052830.12554@midway.uchicago.edu>
wag5@midway.uchicago.edu (J Wagner) writes:

>         When you got your degree, assuming you got your degree, and assuming
> that degree was intended to prepare you for the job you are now in,
> would you say that that degree has fulfilled or been necessary in your
> ability to function properly, i.e., to do your work?

The answer to this question is no.  I read recently that people now entering
the workforce for the first time will change occupations eight times before
they're through.  How can you prepare for change to that extent?

It seems a bachelor's degree today is impossible to justify on a cost/benefit
basis IF the cost is yours.  In my case Sam paid the shot (GI Bill).  So
it's another story.  For 40 years I was a more dedicated and able consumer
(as well as escalating taxpayer) than I would have been without that degree
and the status and expectations it conferred.
--
dale@dale.cam.org             M O N T R E A L             Te souviens-tu?