From: kumara@well.sf.ca.us (Robert Kovsky)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Still reconciling science and mysticism
Date: 24 Jan 93 16:05:07 GMT
Organization: Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link


	On January 20, I posted a long article titled "Science and
Mysticism: a reconciliation."  Mr. Onstott, Mr. Farris and Mr. Holmes posted
comments and questions.

	Let me respond by addressing some of the major issues in a less
formal discussion.

	First, let me say that words are an imperfect medium, that I do not
believe their use can be perfected, and that the amount of space and labor I
devote to defining a term depends on how critical it is to my purposes.
Some words in quotation marks are disputable, but I do not believe that the
dispute is worthwhile (at least at this point).

	I begin with the venerable division of "all there is" into two
parts:  (1) <experience>, which "exists" in my "mind" and which is, as far
as I can tell, immaterial; and (2) <the world>, which I believe "exists"
outside of me and which is, at least in important parts, material.  For
purposes of this article, I accept the division uncritically.


	Experience has "structure and dynamics".  That is, it makes sense to
speak of experience as dividing, at least in part, into "experiences" and to
say that "some experiences undergo change."  Likewise, I believe that the
world has "structure and dynamics."

	Please allow me the use of the word "logic" to mean "structure and
dynamics" and whatever belongs in addition.  This is, of course, neither a
technical nor an accurate use of the word "logic," but, in fact, "structure
and dynamics" is not much better and, moreover, there is no word or term
that is really satisfactory.  I use "logic" here because it was used by
Prof. Pagels in a phrase I quoted.

	Hence, we are talking about "the logic of experience" and "the logic
of the world."  Or, as Prof. Pagels said, "the logic of the mind" and "the
logic of nature."

	Now, I believe that there is <some> relationship between "the logic
of experience" and "the logic of the world."  First, experience can be used
to orient oneself in the world and to manipulate it, with at least some
success.  Second, the "evolution" of experience was "designed" to further
such orientation and manipulation and the "evolution" of such a relationship
is an efficient way to carry out this "design."

	But what is that relationship?  I presume that the nature of the
relationship is <factual>, and some possibilities present themselves, which
we can consider as <hypotheses>.

	One hypothesis is that "the logic of experience" and "the logic of
the world" have a simple relationship in which "experiences" represent
"things in the world", "changes in experience" represent "changes in the
world", and so forth.  As Prof. Pagels said, the two "logics" are in "accord
with each other."  This is the hypothesis of Kant and is a foundational
hypothesis of science.  Call it the "accordance" hypothesis.

	I assert that the accordance hypothesis is <factually> wrong.  I
have some arguments in support of this assertion.

	The first argument is that "the logic of experience" has some
serious and pervasive errors.  One example of error is that we
systematically confuse "an experience" with "the thing in the world" the
experience purportedly represents:  we <project> the experience and call it
the thing.  Paranoia involves extreme examples of this error.

	Another example of error is that "the logic of experience" is built
on "states."  A state persists unchanged, even if only instantaneously.
There appear to be, however, very few states in "the world" and these few
are deliberated constructed in science laboratories so that the experiments
"accord" with "the logic of experience."  (Experiments in science
laboratories have other special features, including isolation, a "clean
slate," and "full constraints".  A discussion of the effects of these
peculiar features is beyond the scope of this posting.)

	Other arguments that support my assertion that the accordance
hypothesis is factually wrong actually support a competing hypothesis, which
I will call the "approximation hypothesis."  The approximation hypothesis
says that, although "the logic of experience" and the "the logic of the
world" are fundamentally different, "the logic of experience" is highly
plastic and capable of an enormous repertoire of modifications.  Very often,
it is possible "to construct and modify" a body of experience so that the
body is a functionally adequate approximation of a portion of the world.

	Such "construction and modification" (which I will call "fiddling
around") is an unending labor, because the world, in a way that seems
perverse to us who are operating within "the logic of experience",
continually presents us with new cases where the approximation is not
functionally adequate.

	One argument I use to support the approximation hypothesis and to
attack the accordance hypothesis is based on the existence of three major
theories of physics, i.e. Newtonian, relativistic and quantum mechanical.
These three theories yield indistinguishable results when dealing with a
broad range of problems, such as those involving ideal billiard balls.  But
the three theories are fundamentally in conflict with one another in their
premises.

	Newtonian physics presupposes absolute space and time.  Material
bodies exist without any effect on space and time.  The speed of light has
no unique and special status.  None of these presuppositions exists in
relativistic physics.  Quantum mechanics presupposes that beneath observable
reality is a peculiar something else, call it a "probability amplitude."

	The yielding of indistinguishable results requires either a process
of taking a mathematical limit of relativistic equations (all speeds tending
toward 0 in comparison with that of light) or an averaging process involving
quantum mechanics (the Ehrenfest theorem).  This is an example of "fiddling
around".

	Moreover, quantum mechanics is in conflict with relativity.  An
important conflict is "the EPR effect", discussed in "Quantum Philosophy,"
Scientific American, July, 1992.

	I argue that if "the logic of experience" were in accordance with
"the logic of the world," there should be <one> theory that states that
accordance.  The existence of three theories (difficult to accord with one
another) supports, rather, the hypothesis that each is a different
approximation.

	Next, I assert that "fiddling around" requires an exercise of
freedom.  There is difficulty in arguing this because (as I shall assert
below) freedom is, so to speak, <beyond> the direct reach of "the logic of
experience" and must be approached indirectly.  But it is an important
argument because I am saying that our lives are filled with "fiddling
around" and hence with freedom.  More, that this freedom is of great
importance to us, however difficult it is to discuss verbally.  (The
question of "free will," i.e. of "voluntary movements" seems to me to be of
much lesser importance.)   This argument requires a detailed analysis of how
"fiddling around" occurs in the context of particular problems, beyond the
scope of this post.

	In brief, "fiddling around" requires an exercise of freedom because
freedom is involved in the recognition and incorporation into experience of
novel and happenstance features of the world.  (Maybe I'll deal with this in
a later post, but your appetite for this one is probably waning.)

	The approximation hypothesis allows for the existence of matters in
the world that are not susceptible to being brought within the
"constructions and modifications" of experience.  I assert that freedom is
such a matter.  One argument in support of this assertion is that when we
seek to understand the world, we use primarily two sets of conceptual tools:
 (1) mechanism; and (2) a set of tools involving "stochastics," "random
processes" and "probability."  Neither of these sets is really suitable to
grasp the essence of freedom.   Because "fiddling around" is open to novel
and happenstance features of the world, it cannot be mechanical.  (Compare
to computers, which, in their mechanical way, are incapable of "fiddling"
with novelty and happenstance.)  Because "fiddling around" is purposeful, it
cannot be random.

	I mean by "mysticism" the assertion that there exist real "things",
in the world, with real and important roles in our lives, that are beyond
the reach of experience.  Or, at least, the kind of experience that is
constructed by "fiddling around."  I assert that freedom is such a "thing."
( A stronger form of "mysticism" would assert that these "things" are
reachable by a kind of experience different from "fiddling around," but I do
not address that stronger form here.)

	Hence, by adopting the "approximation hypothesis" in place of the
"accordance hypothesis," I believe that it is possible to reconcile science
and mysticism.

	In <The Learned Ignorance>, the fifteenth century mathematician and
mystic, Nicholas of Cusa, argued:  "The relationship of our intellect to the
truth is like that of a polygon to a circle; the resemblance to the circle
grows with the multiplication of angles of the polygon, but ... no
multiplication, even if it were infinite, of its angles will make the
polygon equal the circle.  It is clear, therefore, that all we know of the
truth is that the absolute truth, such as it is, is beyond our reach."

	Thanks to those who responded to my original post.  I am a
relatively isolated amateur and it is very gratifying for me to have an
opportunity to communicate with you on these topics.:p
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.philosophy.tech