HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 00:09:17 GMT

In article <9301081644.AA19208@TIS.COM> mjr@TIS.COM writes:
>	Those pictures were from a KH-11. KH-11's are presumably
>quite obsolete. We're talking a matter of years since those pictures
>were published. If you extrapolate a little bit, based on the kinds
>of advances in commercial electronic imaging that we've been seeing,
>it's quite possible that far, far higher resolution pictures are
>possible.

You forget about the diffraction limit.  What I found so interesting
about those pictures was that their resolution (30cm) was just about
exactly what I'd expect for an objective mirror just small enough to
fit in the payload shroud of a Titan 3C, operating at visible light
wavelengths from minimum orbital altitude.  I.e., the KH-11 is already
operating damn close to the theoretical limits. It's simply not
possible to do better without getting closer and/or using a larger
mirror. The laws of physics are the same for classified projects as
they are for the rest of us.

The only way to get closer is to use an airplane, since you just can't
orbit satellites at arbitrarily low altitudes. And if they start
flying larger objective mirrors, it'll be obvious from the enlarged
payload shrouds.  The only other way is to build deployable mirrors
capable of accuracies of fractions of a wavelength.  Given the severe
thermal cycling in space, I think this is infeasible.

For these and other reasons, I don't believe for a second that the
Pentagon voluntarily retired the SR-71 in favor of satellites. I'm
willing to bet that they had a new generation airplane already well in
hand when they did that.

Phil
From: shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Any way to *CREATE* Vcr+ (VCR PLUS) codes??? (please read)
Date: 4 Jan 1993 23:43:19 GMT
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
NNTP-Posting-Host: hijack.berkeley.edu
Keywords: VCR+ patent

In article <1993Jan04.223520.29065@rchland.ibm.com> lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com writes:
>I would imagine the manufacturer doesn't care a fig if the algorithm is
>published.

They do.

>It would be in their interest, I would think, to _give away_
>the encoding algorithm to TV stations and any producer of TV listings, such
>as a newspaper.

They don't give it away; they don't even reveal the algorithm.  They sell
the code numbers to the newspapers.

Ken Shirriff				shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1993 10:13:04 GMT

In article <1993Jan10.060013.4644@csi.uottawa.ca> cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes:
>It doesn't surprise me AT ALL that the NSA would have "lotsa
>supercomputers."  That kind of goes with the territory.  It also
>doesn't surprise me that they can consider breaking DES.  With the
>kind of computing horsepower they've got, brute force can't be THAT
>hard.

As the old joke goes, a Cray can execute any infinite loop in under 6
seconds. :-)

Crays aren't quite as fast as you think. And they're probably not
especially cost-effective for direct, brute-force searches of the DES
keyspace, unless of course somebody has discovered some significant
shortcut.  An array of special purpose processors would be much faster
and far more cost-effective.

NSA undoubtedly uses its Crays mainly for signal processing.  Remember
that before the cryptanalysts can get their ciphertext bits, you have
to extract them somehow from the terabits of raw broadband digital
tape recordings made by the intercept sites.  For example, if
frequency hopped spread spectrum is used, one way to attack it is to
demodulate every channel in the entire hopping range, an obviously
CPU-intensive job.  With their fast floating point and pipelined
vector processing capabilities, Crays are ideally suited for this kind
of number crunching.

Phil
From: eduard@htsa.aha.nl (Eduard Beijnes)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: GWBASIC encryption broken (code included)
Date: 5 Jan 93 12:58:42 GMT
Organization: Algemene Hogeschool Amsterdam, Polytechnic Institute

Some time ago I use GWBASIC then used QB 4.0

Some of the programs were protected (save"x",p)
But to unprotect them I used a trick.
I had two files:

protect.bas and unpro.bas

protect.bas was the original program
and unpro was a file with two bytes (unpro.bas is at home
I am writing this at school )

loaded gwbasic
load"protect
load"unpro
list
10 ..
20 ....
30 ....
etc.

Isn't this easier ???
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 01:52:35 GMT


In response to Castor Fu, who has gone to some trouble to id
Sidelnikov, as I've said in my e-mail to him (dunno if I've posted
this or not), I received e-mail from a Russian at one of the most
reputable U.S. Universities whose bona fides seem genuine, who says he
knows Sidelnikov, has met him in Moscow, and he is who he says he is.

Whether the Sidelnikov message is a spoof or not isn't known, but the
history of its posting (first to an internal Russian network, then
forwarded by a Latvian to us) seems to suggest Sidelnikov's bona fides
had ample opportunity to be questioned in Russia and Latvia, and
apparently were not.

Unless you think the Latvian poster made it all up.

Well, there's no point in arguing about it--the warning is there and
may be ignored, accepted, or used as a tip to attempt independent
verification of the claims.

David
-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)
Subject: Description of IDEA-Algorithm (list of contents 0/3)
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 12:48:44 GMT

In the following 3 postings I make available (as requested by high
number of people) the description of Xuejia Lai's (and J.L. Masseys)
IDEA-Algorithm (also known as IPES). This corresponds to a chapter
of Mr. Lai's doctorate thesis and is also known as a paper:
  1) Xuejia Lai, "Detailed Description and a Software Implementation of 
     the IPES Cipher", Institute for Signal and Information
     Processing, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich, Switzerland, 1991

The description contains a detailed explanation of en- & deciphering,
the key schedule, the IDEA cipher seen as a set of group-operations,
and states some provable security features of the idea cipher. At the
end an implementation is given.

Please remark that I post this postscript-file with permission of
Xuejia Lai, and that there is a Swiss Patent on it, (I do not know
if there are others) which allows non-commercial use of IDEA.
Please remark also that, although I am posting this in my own respon-
sability, I did not(have part/was allied to/knew about) the creation
of this algorithm until I saw it in a publicly available software.
(Thanks to Mr. Zimmermann here!)

As I asked Mr. Lai about the article of 'Dr. Sidelnikov V.M.' he told
me that he had read it, but found no facts in it, that would enforce
or just back up Dr. Sidelnikov's statements about IDEA. He seemed not
very concerned, found it amazing, that the whole article gave some exact
numbers, but no explanation how they were achieved. But I am sure, Mr.
Lai will speak for himself sooner or later...\

Friendly greetings,
	Germano Caronni


-- 
Instruments register only through things they're designed to register.
Space still contains infinite unknowns.

Germano Caronni    caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: butzerd@blanc.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer)
Subject: Re: Encryption plus compression (Was: Another well-intentioned novice's quest)
Organization: The Ohio State University Dept of Electrical Engineering
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 21:51:40 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.195004.5453@den.mmc.com> jhull@vulcan-gw.den.mmc.com writes:
>I thought that compression prior to encryption added "more than might
>otherwise be expected" strength to a system because it made differential 
>cryptanalytic attacks difficult or impossible.
>
>Am I missing something here?
>
>--- --- --- --- ---

Sorry if this has been brought up, but don't many compression programs put
some type of table at the start of the compressed file (defining what
characters map to what uncompressed sequences, for example)?  If this is
the case, doesn't this give your opponent some extra info., just like
partially know plain text?  This would more than compensate for the extra
2^4 or whatever factor introduced in the attacker's work function.  Seems
like you'd have to be careful to avoid this (although I don't know how you
would).

Just my $0.02 worth...
Dane Butzer
butzerd@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli)
Subject: Re: Telephonic Poker?
Organization: Little to None
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 03:43:43 GMT

In article <1993Jan3.185628.2976@zip.eecs.umich.edu> positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas) writes:
>I was reading a paper that explained the RSA algorithm
>in layman's terms, and among other things it said, "An
>interesting side benefit of this algorithm is that it
>makes it possible for two people who do not trust each
>other to play poker by telephone." I've thought about
>it, and I can't for the life of me figure out HOW. The
>paper did not elaborate. Can someone explain to me the
>algorithm with which two mutually distrusting players can
>play poker by phone (or, more simply, have a fair coin
>toss)?

OK.  How about this scenerio:  Alice sends Bob a message in which
she describes the situation that the coin toss is going to resolve in
enough detail so as to make it unique, and appends the DES encrypted
output of the privately selected phrase "HEADS" or "TAILS", encrypted
by a random key that she, for the moment, keeps private.  She signs
this entire message.

Bob then takes this message, appends to it his choice "I CHOOSE HEADS"
or "I CHOOSE TAILS", signs the entire thing and sends it back to Alice.

Alice then reveals the random DES key in a signed message to Bob.

If Bob's choice matches Alice's, he wins.  Otherwise, she wins.  Once
Alice receives the reply from Bob, the deed is done.  Both can use the
signed message from the other, plus the DES key, as proof of the
outcome.  If Alice does not or cannot produce the DES key that decrypts
her original choice of "HEADS" or "TAILS", she is adjudicated the de
facto loser.  If Bob never receives the initial message from Alice, or
Alice never receives his reply, well, then the deal was never properly
consummated to begin with.
-- 
Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Date: Mon,  4 Jan 1993 19:19:12 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1b31

karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
> The ITAR writers clearly never envisioned that software would be 
> freely given away. The assumption was that software, especially source 
> code, would be proprietary.

This is painfully obvious when you read the regulations.  They also evidently 
assumed that the USA has "natural" superiority in the areas of cryptography 
and computer technology.  Now, while that superiority may still be present in 
some respects, it is by now obvious that it is by no means "natural", and is 
at this time *impeded* by export restrictions, not enhanced by them, since it 
restrains U.S. industry from competing effectively in the global marketplace.

One can only hope that the new administration, with its emphasis on 
revitalizing the economy, will take a second look at some of this, and at 
least move software-only cryptosystems into the domain of the Commerce Dept. 
instead of the State Dept.

This is the first issue that has me seriously considering writing the White 
House as well as my congresscritters.  Sigh.  I wish that I could find a 
congresscritter who had enough of a clue to push for hearings on the issue, 
but no luck yet.  Anyone have any suggestions?



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner
From: bonk@elm.cis.ohio-state.edu (gregory j bonk)
Subject: AT&T news release
Organization: The Ohio State University Dept. of Computer and Info. Science
Distribution: usa
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 15:51:03 GMT

I was sent this from a broadcast to AT&T employees.
 Thought you might be interested.....
   
         *** AT&T today announced a high-power, all-digital cordless phone 
         with four times the range of today's conventional cordless 
         telephones.  The AT&T Extended Range Cordless Telephone 9530 
         operates in the 900-MHz frequency, providing virtually 
         interference-free conversations with consistent sound quality up 
         to one mile from the base.  The AT&T 9530 uses full digital 
         transmission to encode speech onto a radio signal, much like music 
         is encoded onto a CD, and to provide clearer sound over a longer 
         range than cordless phones operating in the 46/49-MHz frequency.  
         AT&T's spread-spectrum, frequency-hopping architecture, which is 
         patent-pending, actually avoids interference by "hopping" the 
         radio signal among 50 of the available 173 channels during a 
         conversation.  If any of the channels experience interference, the 
         9530 automatically swaps it for a new, clearer channel.  Because 
         it operates over a different frequency, the AT&T 9530 is 
         unaffected by forms of interference common to 46/49-MHz cordless 
         phones, such as garage door openers, baby monitors and radio 
         intercoms.  It also performs well in environments typically 
         difficult for conventional cordless, such as high-rise apartment 
         and multilevel buildings.  The random selection of 50 of 173 
         channels, along with digital speech encoding, makes it nearly 
         impossible to eavesdrop on conversations.  The AT&T 9530 was 
         designed and developed by AT&T Bell Laboratories, employing 
         advanced integrated circuit technology developed jointly with AT&T 
         Microelectronics.  The AT&T Extended Range Cordless Telephone 9530 
         will be available in late spring at AT&T Phone Centers nationwide 
         for $449.99.  For more information, call 800-222-3111.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ted@nmsu.edu (Ted Dunning)
Subject: Re: Motorola 'Secure-Clea
Organization: Computing Research Lab
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 03:47:10 GMT


In article <1993Jan6.083201.7026@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:


   Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis) writes:
   :  -=> Quoting Ted Dunning to All <=-
   : 
   :  TD> ......... simple speech inversion really shouldn't be called a
   :  TD> security device.
   : 
   : 
   : 
   :  Exactly so. I couldn't have put it better.
   : 

   What about the modern analog devices that use split band inversion where
   one of 32 programmable split points in the voice band may be selected
   and changed at 60 Hz or faster at "random?"  Two separate inversions
   are performed, one for the lower sideband and one for the upper
   sideband around the split point.  This seems *much* harder.

seems much harder, but unless noise is injected, the ww2 experiments
showed that it wasn't hard to piece the spectra back together.  in
fact, trained listeners could mostly understand even these agile
systems.


   Now that I think about it, a PRN
   that can spit out a new number every 500 ps sounds rather
   difficult.

as long as you don't have to get the number off chip, it isn't so
terribly hard.  a pulson modulator only has to have one bit per cycle.

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6522 alt.security.ripem:63
From: pcl@ox.ac.uk (Paul C Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: What's troubling Dave Sternlight now....
Date: 8 Jan 93 09:57:31 GMT
	<1993Jan8.013550.19195@shearson.com>
	<1993Jan8.060103.4032@qualcomm.com>
Organization: Oxford University Computing Services, 13 Banbury Rd Oxford OX2
	6NN
In-reply-to: karn@servo.qualcomm.com's message of 8 Jan 93 06:01:03 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.060103.4032@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:


   Example: several years ago, somebody with access to KH-11 spy photos
   sent some pictures of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction to
   Jane's Defense Weekly. The photos were secret, and this guy ended up
   going to jail. But Aviation Week then picked up and ran the same
   photos, and so did William Burrows' book "Deep Black". And you didn't
   hear a peep about this because the photos were already public.

For what it's worth, one of these photos made the back page of _The Times_
(of London).  It was printed quite large -- about 7" by 4" -- and showed
lots of detail.  I remember being somewhat surprised that pictures of
that quality were being published in a national newspaper.

Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
Finger pcl@black.ox.ac.uk for PGP key    |
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Anti-spoofing protocol?
Date: 4 Jan 1993 23:30:56 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1993Jan4.215027.17258@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>This all assumes that you have a secure means of getting your public key
>to the other or an authenticated one.  Both seem equivalent in the end
>to swapping a secret key to me.  This makes me question the fundamentals
>of PK actually.

PK doesn't allow absolute determination of identity.  There is no such thing.

What PK does (eg., via RSA) is put me in a private room which can not be
eavesdropped with some one person.  That one person is free to carry a wire
and to lie about his name, age, even gender.  That person is free to just
mouth words supplied by someone else.  That person is free to be a spoofer.
Of course, this dishonest person is free to do all these things in the
flesh.  He doesn't need PK to do any of this.

However, if that person is honest, then I'm having a private conversation.
Through that conversation, I can get to know this person.

What a shared secret can do (iff the person is honest) is establish a
relationship between two events -- in this case, the opening of a private
channel and the passing of a shared secret -- so that, if the person is
honest, I'm assured that I'm speaking to the same person I spoke to in the
earlier incident.

The same can be done with PK -- under one RSA key, I contact someone, build
a friendship and give him a secret to hold for future identification.

Under a new RSA key, I encounter someone who claims to be my old friend.
Within a private channel established to this possibly new person, I ask for
evidence of the shared secret -- and when I get it, I know that these
channels are probably to the same person.

		------------------------------

An anti-spoofing protocol may be impossible to invent.

It would have to tell the difference between:

Case I:

	Alice calls Bob, sets up a secure channel by exchanging public keys
	over the line.  Unknown to Alice, Eve is spoofing this.

	Alice <-> Eve <-> Bob

Case II:

	Alice calls Bob, sets up a secure channel.  Unknown to Alice, Bob
	has his assistant Carl handle all his channels to women with names
	A-M, so Bob reencrypts in Carl's key...

	Alice <-> Bob <-> Carl

The first is spoofing by an eavesdropper.  The second isn't.

The block diagrams are the same.

Can any protocol detect the difference, assuming that Alice and Bob have no
shared secret (no knowledge of each other beforehand)?

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: How fast is DES?
Date: 8 Jan 93 09:43:38 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Holger Muenx (muenx@heike.informatik.uni-dortmund.de) wrote:
: 
: Guten Tag!
: 
:   Due to the complexity of the DES algorithm involving various bit
: swapping and table lookup operations during multiple iterations I am
: wondering how fast the DES is in praxis.

DES can be converted to shift/ mask/ lookup/ XOR in the inner loops.
No bit permutations are needed.

:   Is it possible for a software solution to reach an encryption rate
: of about 100kB/sec (read 100 * 1024 Byte not 100 * 1024 Bit per second)
: on a typical PC (say, Intel 386DX 33MHz)?

Using SDCRYPT, which is (still, AFAIK) the fastest DES implementation
available on a PC results in:

	486/33     229223 bytes/sec
	386/40     175497 bytes/sec

I haven't got a 386/33, but extrapolating these figures suggests that
your performance requirements would comfortably be exceeded on such a
machine.

:   If not: are there any other secure encryption/decryption algorithms
: which are running faster?

The only thing I have seen which might be faster is Khufu.  Certainly
IDEA (as used in PGP) isn't any faster, and if you use enough rounds
in FEAL to make it resistant to differential cryptanalysis that isn't
much faster either.  There are others, such as REDOC-II, but I don't
think that they would have much of a speed advantage when implemented
in software.

Another possibility is using a hash function such as MD4 as a stream
cipher generator.  One advantage of using stream ciphers is that the
stream can be generated offline, so that when you want to transmit a
message it can be done instantly.  The total processing time to
encrypt will not be any less, but the stream can be generated while
the processor would otherwise be idle, effectively reducing the
encryption overhead to zero.

Andrew.
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Phil's Dream (How-To?)
Date: Sat, 09 Jan 93 19:33:48 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: na
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <1993Jan5.174656.29816@fuug.fi> 
an4729@anon.penet.fi writes: 

> Can I help?

        Yes. Start publishing your key and use encryption in email
        with other netniks.

        Cheers,
                Marc
---
 Marc Thibault        |  Automation Architect        |  All we are saying
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  is give global
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |  warming a chance.
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

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AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
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