From: thughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (Toby . Hughes)
Subject: CAS (was: The A-10)
Organization: University of Texas at San Antonio
Distribution: all
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 14:59:39 GMT

In article <1gs1nlINN2rb@crcnis1.unl.edu> jskean@unlinfo.unl.edu (jonathan skean) writes:
>
>Back when we were still involved in the Viet-Nam conflict, my Marine
>grunt friends claimed that when they needed REALLY close air support,
>they preferred to put their lives in the hands of another Marine.
>If no USMC pilots were available then the other variety of Naval Aviator
>was acceptable, but there was a lot less confidence in calling for help
>from the Air Force. I'd love for Mr. Hughes or anyone else directly
>involved to comment on this attitude.  For one thing, did the Air
>Force support Marine operations very often anyway?  All I can testify
>to personally is that a lot of alcohol was involved at the time these
>tales were told and it would not have been wise to dispute the
>veracity of the story-tellers to their faces.
> //    JSKEAN@UNL.EDU . . . USN, but never again!  \\
> \\    2nd place, SE Asian War Games, 1960-1975    //


This was a common form of interservice badmouth, but was based at least
partially on the realities of what was going on.  All three services
provided some measure of close air support, but the majority of it was
done by the Air Force for the simple reason than the Air Force provided
the largest avaiable resource for the job. Seven US airbases in-country
had fighter units assigned.  With the one-year-on-the-job limitations
on pilots, the Air Force had to reach a little deeper into the manpower
pool to fill all the cockpits, and there were some over there who maybe
should not have been.  In my RTU (stateside training), we even had a
40 year old ex C-141 pilot that someone in personnel decided should be
an F-4 driver.  Needless to say, someone with no tactical experience
can't always get as good as he should be as fast as he needs to, and
we had some guys who you wouldn't want to be dropping ordnance near the
friendlies.  The Marines and Navy had some, too, I would guess in about
the same proportion, but because of our larger presence, we had more.
Most of the good FACs had a way around the problem.  If the fight was
really tight, and I'm talking about putting ordnance within 50 meters of
friendlies, the FAC would mark a target some distance away for the first
pass, and make his decision whether or not to bring the fighters in close
on how well they did on that one.
I don't want to give the wrong impression here. Most of the jocks, regard-
less of which service, were pretty damned good at what they did. Mistakes
were made, just as they were made by any other combatants, and some folks
paid a high price for the close proximity of friend and foe.  But when
Close Air Support in Southeast Asia is finally weighed in the balance, it
will not be found wanting.
And as for your Marine and his choice, hell, we'd ALL like to have a
choice.  But if he really was ass-down in the gumbo, and the ALO told him
that all he had to help was a couple of grungy old USAF F-4s with wall-
to-wall napalm (that word again!) I don't think he would complain too
loudly.
I would LOVE to post a couple of letters I have from some kids in D Company,
3rd of the 8th, at Dak To in November of 1967.  There is no question
about how THEY felt about USAF CAS.  But since personal experience seems
to be branded as 'ego' on this group, you'll just have to take my word
for it.

William F. "Toby" Hughes
Career Military, USAF (retired)
List Curmudgeon

Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military