HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Intellectual Property
Date: 8 Jan 93 22:21:31 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Originator: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu

>I have never understood why people don't voluntarily give up their claim of
>being Objectivists when they wish to deviate from that philosopy which is by
>definition exclusive. Just call it something else and say it has nothing to do
>with Objectivism ...
 
(Again, a striking parallel with Christian Science, which holds that the
writings of Mary Baker Eddy are never to be questioned or even
interpreted, but merely read or recited.)
 
Look, philosophical systems are not software: you don't "own" them just
because you were the first to present an idea. If there is something to
this "objectivism", then it is the prerogative of anyone who so chooses
to attempt to refine and improve it. Particularly if it is the kind of
Pure Light of Reason that so many seem to feel it is! You can't "define"
a philosophy into exclusiveness, any more that you can define a branch
of mathematics into exclusiveness and say, "if you find any alleged
faults in these proofs, and present them in corrected form, you aren't
finding anything 'wrong' with my proofs, you're just substituting your
own". Besides, even if you could get away with it (academically
speaking), what kind of intellectual integrity is that - to insist that
your system is *by definition* not subject to criticism???
 
>The other day on TV, I saw a Muslim woman that was raped by a Serbian militant
>and who gave birth to a daughter who she did not even want to see...
>I really sorry for the child. I want to reconcile this feeling with rest of my
>rational thought in which Objectivistic ideas figure prominently.
 
That fact that feelings of compassion for an innocent, unwanted child,
doomed to a miserable fate, are seen as posing a dilemma for your
"objectivism" is a sad statement on the nature of this so-called
"philosophy". What would the orthodox say, that you're being a "slave",
a "second-hander", an "incompetent", a member of the "Kantian mob"?
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: madhavn@madhavn.mentorg.com (Madhav Nerurkar)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Date: Tue, 05 Jan 1993 22:30:06 GMT
Organization: mentor
Keywords: 
Followup-To: 

In article <106150@bu.edu>, ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:
|> In article <1993Jan04.214429.11578@news.mentorg.com> madhavn@madhavn.mentorg.com (Madhav Nerurkar) writes:
|> >I agree that the post you are responding to is not accurate. I disagree that
|> >Godel's theorem is not relevant to Objectivism. Ayn Rand intended to provide
|> >a sound and complete theory of reality. According to Godel's theorem it can
|> >never be complete if it is formal and consistent as it was intended to be.
|> >Is atheism claimed to be so, too ? 
|> 
|> First of all, what on Earth is a "sound and complete theory of reality"???
|> Second of all, whatever "Objectivism" may be, it is most certainly NOT
|> a formal theory in the technical sense, and Godel's theory applies only
|> to formal theories. I have a feeling that if people were a little more
|> familiar with how the proof works, there would be less of this mystical
|> conjecturing on the basis of it. Third of all, atheism is not a "theory"


You can't possibly be confused about soundness or completeness. By theory of
reality I mean that just as arithmetic deals with numbers, Objectivism deals
with the entire physical reality around us.

Why are we hung up on technicalities in informal internet debates like this ?
My understanding of Godel's theorem is based on passages in "Godel, Escher,
Bach", admittedly not very rigorous. The essence that I got out of it is the 
existence of statements that are true but can not be proved to be true. Isn't
that result generally accepted ? Why should I care how the proof works or
what class of formal theories was used to demonstrate it ( As Torkel Franzen
would want me to) ? 

Which of the following you object to ?

  - There are statements that are true but can not be proved to be true.
  - Objectivism was intended to be sound and complete.
  - A theory that is intended to be sound and complete has something to do
    with a theorem that states there are some true statements that can never
    be proved.


If the technical details of the proof make a difference, please explain how.


Madhav Nerurkar

Disclaimer: These are my opinions.
From: sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Rand's Personality vs Objectivism
Date: 5 Jan 93 20:18:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <1993Jan5.181820.7736@fcom.cc.utah.edu>, leon@cs.weber.edu (Leon D. Atkinson) writes...
>If something is right, it's right.  If you agree with Rand's arguments, then
>that is all you should need.  The fact that an individual failed to execercise
>logical behavior does not bear upon the validity of Objectivism.  Granted,
>Rand did some things that seemed illogical and even self-destructive, but we
>are judging the concepts, not the creator.  If you consider the actions of
>Objectivists when judging the validity of the philosophy, then I'd presume you
>are a pragmatisist.  You might as well come right out and say, "Well, it looks
>good on paper, but it just doesn't work in reality."  Nothing makes me more
>disgusted.


	What else can we base the usefulness of a morality on other than
the effect it has on the people who practice it?  Isn't that the acid test?

	Think about it.  Are you honestly saying that we should IGNORE
REALITY here?  That we should shut our eyes, or -blank-out- when witnessing
evidence of the effects of a philosophy on real people?

	That's not pragmatism at all.  It's verification.

	The best defense that Objectivists may have is that Ayn Rand was
simply not "good enough" at practicing her philosophy.  The best criticism
that other people may have is that she was "good enough" at it and unexpected
quirks of human psychology did her in.

	FACE REALITY!

Mark Sulkowski
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok)
Subject: Re: Failure of Objectivism(8)
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 00:13:22 GMT

In article <C0ECx2.202@acsu.buffalo.edu> sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski) writes:
>In article <1993Jan5.023915.8322@netcom.com>, mward@netcom.com (Michael Ward) writes...
>>On a personal note: Ayn Rand was a consummate coward.  She tolerated
>>no opposition to her own ideas.  She dismissed all but her most rigid
>>True Believers.  She betrayed her chief collaborator after years of
>>intense work together.  She refused to give credit to her
>>contributors.  Ultimately, she failed herself, trading self interest
>>for self indulgence as she evolved into a cantankerous and vindictive
>>old woman.
>> 
>>This, of course, says nothing about the philosophy itself.  Still, 
>>somehow I just want a better role model for my kids.
>
>	Excellent point.  I wonder if Objectivism naturally leads towards
>this kind of behavior (perhaps due to unexpected quirks in human nature)
>or if this effect was a personal quirk of Ayn Rand.
>
>	If Objectivism does fail to properly take human psychology into
>account in producing this effect, this may be the strongest criticism
>of all.

this of course discounts the possibility that Rand succumbed to her
apparent inconsistency due to her being forced to live her life in
a world she considered repulsive.

also, there have been many cases of creators whose genius has been
acclaimed despite their evident failures and even madness. to discount
objectivism due to Rand's behavior is ridiculous. remember that in A.S.,
some of the major characters' actions appeared inconsistent with the
values it was eventually revealed they had.

--
charles
From: merritt@macro.bu.edu (Sean Merritt)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Date: 6 Jan 93 18:19:32 GMT
	<1993Jan04.214429.11578@news.mentorg.com> <106150@bu.edu>
	<1993Jan05.223006.29473@news.mentorg.com>
	<TORKEL.93Jan6002412@bast.sics.se>
Organization: Boston University Physics Department
In-reply-to: torkel@sics.se's message of 5 Jan 93 23:24:12 GMT

In article <TORKEL.93Jan6002412@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:


   In article <1993Jan05.223006.29473@news.mentorg.com> madhavn@madhavn.mentorg.
   com (Madhav Nerurkar) writes:

     >Why should I care how the proof works or
     >what class of formal theories was used to demonstrate it ( As Torkel Franzen
     >would want me to) ? 

#     On the contrary, I have emphasized that there is no reason at all why
#   Objectivists should concern themselves with Godel's theorem. On the
#   other hand, if you make nonsensical invocations of Godel's theorem,
#   it is in order to point out that they are nonsensical. So let me repeat
#   a simple basic point: Godel's theorem applies to formal systems. "Objectivism"
#   is not a formal system.


Conjecture: We are three people with only two parachurtes and 30 seconds
to decide who will use these as our plane is going to crash.

1) Only two of us can have a parachute and thus enhance our chances for 
survival.

Here is a direct application a mathematical fact influencing the objective
reality. I've got math and the natural numbers in the door.

If we don't appeal to logic:

2) Someone must act altruistically.

3) We die fighting for the 2 chutes.

If logic is used:

4) We appeal to proablitly and chance, draw straws.

Again I have math "in the house" as it were.

and now I evoke math/probabiltiy again.

1b) parachutes with lower probabilty of sucees for two persons.

5) We attempt to use one chute for two people.

Math again for the person using the chute alone is 
"safer"(higher probabilty of survival if the skill levels are the same).

A Turing machine could solve this problem by denying someone
a chute, it could not without specific input choose 5) that
is a human's are capaple of this. If I provide the TM with 
the data that chutes can be used by one or two people it
will again fall in line with human decisions. 

Can you offer a counter Objective analysis that does not use
math or logic at some level? Do so then. But if you do
than you have brought the consequences of Godel's Theorem
into play. For the specific conjecture above a TM may
or may not halt. Humans will reach a decision no matter what. 

"People will believe the improbable may occur but never the impossible
 can occur."

-sjm
--
Sean J. Merritt		         | "Every revolt is a cry of innocence    
Dept of Physics Boston University|  and an appeal to the essence of being."
merritt@macro.bu.edu             | Albert Camus, The Rebel
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: baruch@nynexst.com (Robert Baruch)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Reply-To: baruch@nynexst.com
Organization: NYNEX Science & Technology, Inc
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 14:09:08 GMT

In article 1ioa1lINNla@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca, ramsay@math.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay) writes:
> In article <1993Jan8.171632.17379@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com writes:
> >In article 93Jan8165357@lludd.sics.se, torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
> [...]
> >>   (1)   If (1) is true, then Santa Claus exists
> >> 
> >> or
> >> 
> >>     If the sentence I am now uttering is true, then Santa Claus exists.
> >> 
> >
> >
> >The first argument apparently asserts that (1) is true, then goes on to say
> >that if (1) is true, Santa Claus exists.  To determine whether this argument
> >is valid, you need to apply "A=A" to (1), determining the meaning of (1).
> 
> The argument is as follows. Assume (1) is true. Then since (1) is
> true, then by (1) Santa Claus exists. Thus if we assume (1) is true,
> we may conclude that Santa Claus exists; ergo if (1) is true then
> Santa Claus exists.

Unfortunately, everyone continues to misquote the argument.  Here it is
once again:

"Santa Claus exists, if I am not mistaken.  The previous sentence is true, hence
I am not mistaken, and therefore Santa Claus exists."

You don't have to assume (1) (="Santa Claus exists if I am not mistaken") because
it is true.  (1) means, "if Santa Claus exists, then Santa Claus exists."
Your mistake is claiming that BECAUSE (1) is true, all of it's parts are true.
If I were a millionaire, I would have at least one million dollars.  Does it
therefore follow that I am a millionaire?  Be serious.

By ignoring the internal structure (read meaning) of (1), you are committing
a logical fallacy, and ignoring the law of identity.  (1) is (1).  (1) is a 
specific thing.  Before you use (1), you must know what (1) is -- what it
means.  Precisely.

--Rob

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: sbs9276@ritvax.isc.rit.edu
Subject: Re: Failure of Objectivism(8)
Reply-To: sbs9276@ritvax.isc.rit.edu
Organization: Rochester Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 14:42:08 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.023915.8322@netcom.com>, mward@netcom.com
(Michael Ward) writes:

>On a personal note: Ayn Rand was a consummate coward.  She tolerated
>no opposition to her own ideas.  She dismissed all but her most rigid
>True Believers.  She betrayed her chief collaborator after years of
>intense work together.  She refused to give credit to her
>contributors.  Ultimately, she failed herself, trading self interest
>for self indulgence as she evolved into a cantankerous and vindictive
>old woman
>This, of course, says nothing about the philosophy itself.  Still,
>somehow I just want a better role model for my kids.

      Me too-- I don't disagree that Ayn Rand was not a good role
model in her life. In fact she was quite an evil b;)ch. HOWEVER,
you are right in saying that her personal life has NOTHING to do
with her philosophy. And I think the philosophy she is
responsible for forming is absolutely incredible-- now can you
maybe elaborate on how her personal life is a "fault of
objectivism". Mozart was a womanizer. Does that negate his
musical genius? C'mon-- find fault with the philosophy if you
really can. I have seen no demonstration of a disagreement by you
with any logical validity-- and I think there are some places to
attack objectivism.


                                        Stephen Schott
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: End of Iceland's Anarchy
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 1993 02:01:23 GMT

ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland) writes:
>In article <1993Jan8.194849.27554@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson
>.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>>Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
>>>pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>>>The first problem anarchism always runs into is that of social
>>>stability
>>>
>>>I haven't seen this done, though that doesn't mean it can't be.
>>
>>Iceland, 900AD to 1252AD. Three hundred fifty two years seems stable
>>enough for me.
>
>Someone mentioned how anarchy in Iceland came to end.  I don't
>remember, but it had something to do with conquest or domination by
>Norway.  Does the way anarchy ended in Iceland indicate anything about
>the vulnerability of anarchies to societies which are NOT anarchies?

Yes, but it says the same thing about the vulnerability of any
country. Norway was far larger and more powerful than Iceland, with
far more resources and inhabitants. Just as China could march in and
take over Hong Kong, even though Hong Kong is run by a government, so
a very large and powerful opponent could take over an anarchy. This
does not mean, however, that anarchy is fatally flawed -- merely that
the world is not a perfect place and that there is not an answer to
every problem.
--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pandit@ssd.intel.com (Milind Pandit)
Subject: Re: Health Care Rights?
Organization: Supercomputer Systems Division (SSD), Intel
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 17:25:43 GMT

In article <Jan02.215244.18857@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> sa114984@longs.LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Steven Arnold) writes:
>In article <1993Jan2.202500.10898@genie.slhs.udel.edu>, rich@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Rich Schwartzman) writes:
>|> 	Not so.  Rand wrote that voluntary donations to/support of charity
>|> out of benevolence was proper.  What Rand objected to was the altruistic
>|> notion of an obligation being involved.
>
>	I believe there IS a very real MORAL obligation involved, an obligation,
>however, not to be enforced by government.  Do I and Rand have a difference of
>opinion?

I believe you do have a difference of opinion.  Rand believed there is
no moral obligation to take responsibility for another person.
Furthermore, it is evil to forcibly take responsibility for another
person: "Since I think A is wealthy and B is poor, I will take some of
A's possessions and give them to B.  If A refuses, I will have him
arrested and thrown in jail, and the same goes for B."  However, if
two people agree on a transaction that is completely one-sided, they
have the right to execute it.

In a philosophy class, we once had a discussion of whether people did
things for selfish reasons.  Our conclusion was that it is not
possible to say that every person person performs every action for
selfish reasons.  However, it is *possible* for a person to perform
every action for selfish reasons, and Rand says that it is good to do
so.

-- 
Milind S. Pandit			| pandit@ssd.intel.com
Operating Systems Engineer		|
Intel Supercomputer Systems Division	| Standard Disclaimers Apply
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: baruch@nynexst.com (Robert Baruch)
Subject: Re: Foundations of Objectivism
Reply-To: baruch@nynexst.com
Organization: NYNEX Science & Technology, Inc
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 15:24:51 GMT

In article Ez1@darkside.osrhe.uoknor.edu, bil@okcforum.osrhe.uoknor.edu (Bill Conner) writes:
> 
>    At last someone who understands and will admit to the limits of
> human intelligence - stick around pal, you are indeed rare. My only
> reservation is the appeal to Quantum Physics, which is still to vague
> and obscure to contribute much to this or any other discussion (Frijof
> Capra notwithstanding).
> 
> Bill
> 

Do you have an "article include" feature in your followup editor?  It would
help if you explained who this "someone" is...

--Rob


Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: baruch@nynexst.com (Robert Baruch)
Subject: Re: Kant=Kant
Reply-To: baruch@nynexst.com
Organization: NYNEX Science & Technology, Inc
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 15:07:40 GMT

In article 106418@bu.edu, ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:
  
> Kant denies that material objects considered as "things in themselves"
> possess such attributes as spatiality, temporality, and certain logical
> properties. He holds that such attributes are structural components of
> perception, such that while we can have no external knowledge that does
> not presume a spatio-temporal-logical framework, we are not justified in
> claiming that these attributes are metaphysically "real".
>  
> If this sounds problematic, it is.
>  
> However, it is in no sense equivalent to the claim that "if we imagined
> that an apple were an orange, it would become so". Nor does it in any
> way deny the Sacred Axiom that "A=A", which, in fact, is a pure logical
> truth for Kant.
>  
> Kant's goal was to propose a theory of what might be called
> "intersubjective knowledge": a theory of how there can be such a thing
> as objective, individual-independent truth in spite of the fact that
> language, perception, and thought are inevitably constrained by the
> modes in which the human mind operates.

This is amusing to me.  If the human body developed inside of reality, then
it must have evolved a method to interpret reality, otherwise it would not
be able to remain in reality for very long (aka "survive").  The causality
is, reality shaped humans.  For Kant to question that many humans can sense
the same thing from an object, even when the object goes unsensed by anyone
sometimes, seems to me to be a denial that humans adapted to reality.

--Rob


Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 22:45:28 GMT

In article <1993Jan12.204125.5666@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com 
(Robert Baruch) writes:

   >I guess the argument is how to determine the meaning:

  No, the non-trivial argument is the argument that Santa Claus exists that
was set out in the article.

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: jwtlai@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca (Jim W "GrimJim" Lai)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: University of Waterloo
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 04:53:57 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.153415.3877@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com writes on
the problem of identifying redness:
>To question whether the red I perceive is "true" red (i.e., perhaps
>my senses are deceived, or my senses do not pick up the full concept of "red")
>is to question the validity of my sensory input.  Then you must question your
>perception that I have senses.

It is possible that one is color-blind to the difference between red and green.
What then?

>I could deny that my senses tell me the "true" story.  I could hypothesize that
>right now I am not writing this, but cursing my boss to his face.  If I were
>to question my sensory input, and wonder exactly what it is that I am 
>really sensing, I would be paralyzed.  I must accept the evidence of my senses.
>I must also accept that my senses are part of reality, and that they have
>limitations.  I must accept my senses, and my senses tell me that existence
>exists.  Red is red.  

People who are color-blind to the differences between red and green are not
paralyzed.  But their senses tell them that red is green, even other others
tell them not.  What then?

>----On the "tenets of faith" of Objectivism:
>
>I defy you to deny the law of identity.  This is not faith, but reason.  To
>deny the law of identity is to deny myself, and to consider myself as
>self-defeating.  In that case, I may as well spare myself the agony of not
>knowing whether my senses are true (or whether my agony is true!) and kill
>myself.

Anyone who has no doubts about whether their senses are true will always be
fooled by perceptual illusions.  It is a fact that senses are not "true", in
that they do not perfectly reflect reality, or else there would be no such
thing as a perceptual illusion.  The logical conclusion is to accept this fact,
but I fail to see how this would cause "paralysis".  We can, after all, build
machines operating on "fuzzy logic" (or heuristics, for that matter) which do
not require relatively precise information in order to operate.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok)
Subject: Re: Letting Someone Drown
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 00:13:18 GMT

In article <106742@bu.edu> ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:
>>Personally, I would consider myself lucky if I was drowning and Mr. Roark was
>>around rather than, say, a person who considers world as unreal.
> 
>Oh come *ON*, now... many non-"objectivists" do you really know who go
>around claiming "the world is unreal?" Talk about straw men!

well, how many objectivists would not throw the life preserver?
by your own admission, none. that was the point being made.

you began throwing the straw around here.
ridiculous situations lead to ridiculous results.

>A typical
>"objectivist" false dichotomy.

so far i have seen a lot of bluster, but no demonstration from you
of anything dichotomous.

>Personally, I wouldn't care a helluva lot about their philosophical
>convictions, as long as they threw me the life preserver.

so what? everyone would feel that way. irrelevant.

--
charles