From: harelb@MATH.CORNELL.EDU (Harel Barzilai)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.desert-storm
Subject: U.S. Gulf motives (from email)
Date: 18 Aug 92 22:59:08 GMT
Organization: misc.activism.progressive on UseNet ; ACTIV-L@UMCVMB

To: harelb@math.cornell.edu (Harel Barzilai)
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 17:29:25 -0400
From: --
    
X:      If Ministry of Military Industrialization is so important to 
        Saddam's survival, why wasn't it bombed during the war? 
    
    Because they wanted (more accurately: preferred) Saddam in power
HB: (preferred to the possibility of *democracy* in Iraq, ergo the people
    rather than a dictator -- one and only one person to deal with, and
    "influence" -- make decisions in Iraq.
...

    I watched Brent Scowcroft (sp?) being interviewed on Face the Nation
X:  right after the war.  Among other things, he was asked why the US
    let the Republican Guards (along with 700 tanks, mostly T-72)
    escape relatively unscathed, instead of destroying them from the air.
    B.S. responded that it was our goal to destroy the Iraqi's
    OFFENSIVE capabilities.  He repeated this statement two or three
    times.  I do not think that was an attempt to save Saddam's ass,
    but rather a calculated move designed to preserve the Iraqi power 
    structure intact, with or (preferrably) without Saddam.  Imagine

And as Chomsky (and others, in this case) have documented, there are
*reasons* why Washington sought to preserve the "power structure" --
to preserve the "iron fist" and deter Iraqi democracy

     State Department reasoning was outlined with admirable 
    clarity by _New York Times_ chief diplomatic correspondent 
    Thomas Friedman.  If the society suffers sufficient pain, 
    Friedman explained, Iraqi generals may topple Mr. Hussein, "and 
    then Washington would have the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted 
    Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein." The technique of punishing 
    Iraqi civilians may thus succeed in restoring the happy days when 
    Saddam's "iron fist...held Iraq together, much to the 
    satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not
    to speak of the boss in Washington, who had no problem with the
    means employed. {note: _NYT_, July 7, 1991.} 

Regarding "preferably without Saddam," as I said, and as Chomsky
documents, and as the historical record of U.S. preferences
demonstrates, sure, a more loyal dictator than Saddam was and is
prefered to Saddam, but Saddam is preferable to democracy in Iraq, for
the familiar reasons I reiterated. Since there was a risk ["risk"
rather than "hope", in Washington's eyes] of democracy in Iraq, the
U.S. supported Saddam, after the war, as Chomsky extensively documents
and footnotes, in order to reject helping the Iraqi democratic
opposition in any way. Let me be clear: if there was an "democratic
opposition" group that was loyal to U.S. interests, surely Washington
would act differently; this is of course the familiar deep
understanding of "democracy" by Washington: the people in these
countries (as has been accomplished to a lesser degree in the U.S.)
are to be "free" to chose their national policies *so long* as these
do not conflict with Washington's goals. Stalins, the Ayatollah
Khomeni, and Quaddafi no doubt hold this same principle of "democracy"
-- that people should be allowed to decide on policies, so long as
these are the "right" decisions -- dear to their hearts.

An example of *explicit* mention of this is:

    strategic conception.  Robert Pastor comments that "The United
    States did not want to control Nicaragua or the other nations in
    the region, but it also did not want to allow developments to get
    out of control.  It wanted Nicaraguans to act independently,
    _except_ when doing so would affect U.S. interests adversely."
    Nicaraguans, in short, should have complete freedom to do what we
    want them to do, and need not be controlled unless they are out of
    control. {note: Pastor, _op. cit._, 32 (his emphasis).}

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

As for the pro-Saudi policy, U.S. planners are not stupid. The
familiar strategy, as the historical record shows from latin america
to the middle east and elsewhere, has been that when an outrigh marine
landing will no longer do, support for local elites who put down their
own population is maintained through aid so long as the elites are
obidient to Washington's interests; so long as that is the case,
crumbs from the pie (sometime substantial) are given to these
(foreign) elites, as reward, but the overall benefit goes to
Washington. 50 or so footnoted pages of Chomsky would help us see this
better, but let me just note here that we can merely note the ease
with which the U.S. is able to replace third-world elites, formerly on
Washington's/CIA's payroll, when they are not sufficiently obedient.
An analysis of this basic reality leaves little doubt about who are the
primary beneficiaries, and who are the secondary beneficiaris, in
these relationships between Washington and it's third-world
client-states.

    was a valid one.  The answer is no, because the policy had been
    designed to advance the Saudi interests rather then that of the US.
    If that sounds like yet another conspiracy theory, try to come up
    with a single case over the last few years where the Saudi interests 
    were not put ahead of ours.

    The Saudis, as we all know, have a lot of wealth, but not enough
    muscle to protect their wealth.  For years, they thought Saddam
    would serve as their bodyguard, and we were dutifully supplying
    Iraq with loans, loan guarantees, even nuclear technology, and
    closing our eyes on the Saddam's atrocities against the Kurds
    (hey, the Saudis could not care less about the Kurds).  When
    the Saudis conceded a piece of Kuwaiti territory to Iraq, the
    US cheerfully went along.  When Saddam overstepped his boundaries
    and threatened Saudi Arabia, only then the US forcefully
    intervened.  Still, the Saudis were in need of protection,
    so we let the Republican Guard off the hook. When it became
    clear that Saddam was there to stay, the Saudis sent a 3B
    check to another M-E monster, Hafez Al Assad.  It did not take
    us long to get in bed with Assad...
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To: harelb@math.cornell.edu (Harel Barzilai)
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 17:29:25 -0400
From: --
    
        If Ministry of Military Industrialization is so important to 
        Saddam's survival, why wasn't it bombed during the war? 
    
    Because they wanted (more accurately: preferred) Saddam in power
    (preferred to the possibility of *democracy* in Iraq, ergo the people
    rather than a dictator -- one and only one person to deal with, and
    "influence" -- make decisions in Iraq.
...

    I watched Brent Scowcroft (sp?) being interviewed on Face the Nation
    right after the war.  Among other things, he was asked why the US
    let the Republican Guards (along with 700 tanks, mostly T-72)
    escape relatively unscathed, instead of destroying them from the air.
    B.S. responded that it was our goal to destroy the Iraqi's
    OFFENSIVE capabilities.  He repeated this statement two or three
    times.  I do not think that was an attempt to save Saddam's ass,
    but rather a calculated move designed to preserve the Iraqi power 
    structure intact, with or (preferrably) without Saddam.  Imagine
    the Allies stopping at the Nazi Germany borders and hoping that
    Hitler would be removed from power and replaced with a more palatable 
    NSDAP functionaire (Borman? Himmler?)...

    As a result of this cynical move, Iraq remains a considerable,
    though diminished, threat to the US interests in the Persian Gulf,
    which begs a question whether our policy toward the post-war Iraq 
    was a valid one.  The answer is no, because the policy had been
    designed to advance the Saudi interests rather then that of the US.
    If that sounds like yet another conspiracy theory, try to come up
    with a single case over the last few years where the Saudi interests 
    were not put ahead of ours.

    The Saudis, as we all know, have a lot of wealth, but not enough
    muscle to protect their wealth.  For years, they thought Saddam
    would serve as their bodyguard, and we were dutifully supplying
    Iraq with loans, loan guarantees, even nuclear technology, and
    closing our eyes on the Saddam's atrocities against the Kurds
    (hey, the Saudis could not care less about the Kurds).  When
    the Saudis conceded a piece of Kuwaiti territory to Iraq, the
    US cheerfully went along.  When Saddam overstepped his boundaries
    and threatened Saudi Arabia, only then the US forcefully
    intervened.  Still, the Saudis were in need of protection,
    so we let the Republican Guard off the hook. When it became
    clear that Saddam was there to stay, the Saudis sent a 3B
    check to another M-E monster, Hafez Al Assad.  It did not take
    us long to get in bed with Assad...

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Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.individualism,talk.politics.misc