From: KARLIN@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (P.L. Cowan)
Subject: Lee-Longstreet (was Confederate Unit Thanks Blacks)
Organization: BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 20:39:10 GMT
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.23

In <1992Aug11.150433.28540@athena.mit.edu> coronell@athena.mit.edu writes:

: 	This article appeared in the Boston Globe this morning (8/11). 
: 
: *********************************************************************
: 
: Wilmington, NC - The Sons of Confederate Veterans have voted to thank 
: African-Americans who fought for the Southern cause and to renounce 
: the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups. The 13,000 
: member group said yesterday that 1,100 delegates at its 97th annual 
: convention also voted here during the weekend to absolve Lt. Gen. 
: James Longstreet of any blame for the Confederate defeat at the Battle 
: of Gettysburg in July 1863. (Reuters).
: 
: *********************************************************************
: 
: 	Any SCV members out there? To what extent did Blacks willingly 
: support the Southern cause? Concerning Longstreet's role in the defeat 
: at Gettysburg, I fail to see how he could have been blamed in the first 
: place for the Confederate defeat. My understanding has been that this 
: was due to Lee's miscalculations.
: 
: 					Dan Coronell
: 					coronell@athena.mit.edu

A brief (and probably subjective) review of the Lee-Longstreet controversy 
of "who lost Gettysburg" follows:

After the war Lee said little about the military aspects of the late war. Most 
of the finger pointing between Lee's lieutenants began after his death in 1869.
Had Lee  been alive to hear the attacks, there is reason to believe he would
have defended "Old Pete". In fact, it was at Lee's funeral service in Lexington
that Jubal Early gave a speech which began the controversy by absolving Lee of
responsibility for his (most famous) defeat at Gettysburg and placing the blame
on Longstreet. 

(One must remember that of all the Confederate military leaders, Longstreet was
the most vocal in trying to mend the wounds of the re-united country. In fact, 
Longstreet became a Republican and eventually served as Postmaster General.)

Early's case against Longstreet at Gettysburg is along the following lines:

1) On July 2, Longstreet's men collapsed Sickle's position, and nearly turned
the Union left flank at Little Round Top. Yet the attack did not begin until
sometime between 1 and 4 PM. Had Longstreet not been so slow, this attack would
have been decisive and "turned the tide" in favor of the Confederacy.

2) On July 3, Longstreet was in overall command of the attack we know as
"Pickett's Charge" (contemporary accounts, more appropriately, refer to this as 
"Longstreet's Second Assault"). The failure of that "glorious" charge was due to
Longstreet's failure to send additional troops to support it.

In response to the above assertions, my understanding is as follows:

1). Longstreet's First Corps was at the tail end of the Confederate march to
Pennsylvania from Fredericksburg, Va. Some units marched as much as 28 miles on
July 1 before arriving at camp at Marsh Creek in the wee hours of July 2. In
addition, the First Corps was delayed on July 1 behind the supply wagons of A.P.
Hill's  Second Corps on the road over the mountain from Cashtown. (It is
doubtful that Lee would have brought these wagons to Gettysburg if he had
expected a major battle).

It is true that Longstreet argued with Lee to delay the attack on the 2nd. 
Half of the First Corps (Hood's and Pickett's divisions) was still on the road
from Cashtown, and Longstreet wanted to wait for their arrival. In the end,
Lee and Longstreet compromised, and the First Corps began moving into position
when most of Hood's division arrived. (For this reason Pickett's division was
"fresh" the next day). The last of Hood's troops to arrive were Law's Brigade,
which were the very same troops that nearly took Little Round Top.

The march from Marsh Creek into position was a farce. The staff officer that
Lee sent to guide Longstreet's newly arrived men did a U-turn when he realized
that he was leading the men on a road in full view of the Union Signal Corps on
Little Round Top. The U-turn led to a squabble between McLaws and Kershaw about
whose troops should lead the march, and added hours to the deployment. (It did
confuse the Union Signal Corps as to Lee's intentions).

Ironically, the delay of Longstreet's attack provided Sickle enough time to
move his men (the Union Third Corps) from Cemetery Ridge to a more precarious
position at the Peach Orchard. One can argue that Longstreet's success on 
July 2, was mainly due to Sickle's blunder. In retrospect, the attack on July 2
was probably optimally timed from the Confederate point of view, even though
this was entirely fortuitous.

2.) There is no dispute that Longstreet was doubtful of the chances of success 
of an attack on the Union center on July 3. It is a mater of pure speculation
whether sending additional troops would have meant a Confederate victory (as
Early and others claimed), or an even more disastrous Confederate defeat. (The
only troops available to support Pickett's and Pettigrew's men where those who
had seen heavy fighting the previous two days.) Pickett left no doubt, even
after Lee's death, that he felt it was Lee's mistake to have even attempted the
charge. Lee, himself, apologized personally to the defeated troops as they
returned to the lines.

Ironically, Early was not above criticism for actions (or inaction) at 
Gettysburg, himself. On July 1, Lee urged Ewell (the Third Corps commander and
Early's superior general) to occupy Culp's Hill which would have made the Union
position on Cemetery Hill untenable. Early argued Ewell out of trying this,
partially due to (erroneous) scouting reports that the Union Army was already
dug-in. Early's division had had a relatively short march from Carlisle, and had
only seen limited fighting that day against the Union Eleventh Corps (which
collapsed quickly, as they had done a month before at Chancellorsville). 

Longstreet's attack on July 2 was to be coordinated with Ewell's attack on
Culp's Hill (which by now was heavily defended). While Longstreet's attack came
late in the day, Early's attack started even later despite the fact that he
was camped (since the previous afternoon) a few city blocks from his point of
attack. In fact, Early's delay permitted Meade to shift elements of the Union 
12th Corps from Culp's Hill to support his left flank against Longstreet.

IMHO Early's errors were at least as severe as Longstreet's, but if there was
one of Lee's lieutenants who was most responsible for the Confederate defeat at
Gettysburg, I would say it was J.E.B. Stuart. Lee's lack of information led him
to stumble unprepared into a major battle, and it was Stuart's (and the
cavalry's) primary responsibility to supply such information. As I pointed out,
Lee surely would have left most of his supply wagons in Cashtown if he had
anticipated a large Union force within striking distance of Gettysburg. Also,
Stuart's men (had they not been joy-riding through Maryland) could have
supplied reliable reports on July 1 about the situation on Culp's Hill. However
after the War, Stuart was a dead Confederate hero and not even Jubal Early
could criticize him.

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P. L. Cowan	Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV 	(I'm posting this from a friend's account)
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan	Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV 	(I'm posting this from a friend's account)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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