From: bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za (MR KR COMAN)
Subject: Re: The German V-2 Rocket
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 14:51:17 GMT


From bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za (MR KR COMAN)

In article <BuBLLC.GB3@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> rlwst8+@pitt.edu (Robert L Williamson) writes:
>From: rlwst8+@pitt.edu (Robert L Williamson)
>Subject: Re: The German V-2 Rocket
>Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 16:53:35 GMT
>
>From rlwst8+@pitt.edu (Robert L Williamson)
>
>
>I have read a lot of articles about the V-2 rocket.  Wow!  I can't believe 
>those Germans could acquire space age technology.  I read articles about the
>mass destruction it did to London.  Why didn't the Germans just concentrate 
>all of their production efforts to building the V-2 and attacking London as
>opposed to even getting involved with a situation like the Battle of Britain.
>
>
>				Rob  
>
1.
Mass destruction?  No, the payload on the V2 was relatively small.  Its 
effect was thus relatively localised.  More important was the shock effect 
of something arriving on target that you couldn't see, hear or intercept -- 
given the contemporary technology.  I guess that the V2 was pretty much on 
a par with the recent Scud missile carrying a *conventional explosive* 
warhead: rather nasty when they land but more psychologically shocking 
than a strategic war-winner.  Overall the V1 "buzzbombs" probably did more '
collateral damage' to Britain versus the V2, but they were a known entity 
and could at least be countered in flight.
2.The Nazi's didn't concentrate on the V2 for a host of reasons that are not 
unique to themselves or their situation: inter-departmental political in-
fighting, major technical problems assoc with radical new technology (it's 
one thing to handcraft a dozen test prototypes, quite another to develop and 
implement the design and process technology to enter full-scale 
production),  scarcity of raw materials and skilled labour, serious 
uncertainties as to just how effective the V2 was (do you 'bet the farm' on 
something totally off the wall that might just not repay the time and outlay 
of resources?),  competing weapons programmes (e.g. V1, Me262, etc),limited 
range (V2's had to be launched from Flanders/Netherlands and could just 
reach London -- not the rest of Britain, so what's the net result?), by end 
1944 such advanced launching sites had been overrun by Allied groundforces 
so the whole emphasis shifted to using the V2 from sites closer into Germany 
as tactical (as opposed to their strategic purpose) weapons against (e.g.) 
Antwerp -- a supply port for the Allies in NW Europe.  	

The book: "The Mare's Nest" by David Irving, 1956 gives a good review of 
these issues as well as the basic design process of the V2, BTW.

	From a British point of view, the lasting effect of the V2 and 
German rocket technology was to direct post-war thinking strongly towards 
the offensive and defensive use of missiles in lieu of manned a/c.  At the 
time of the V1 & V2's, Duncan Sands (a relation of Churchill) was given the 
job of co-ordinating the Allied effort of counter these weapons.  Sands 
became a devout believer in the above doctrine.  When Defense Minister in 
the late 1950's, he issued a policy document that focused primary effort 
towards missiles.  In 1958 therefore, a huge chunk of the RAF's fighter 
capability was axed together with a number of leading-edge a/c programmes (
the EE Lightning fighter just escaped getting canned).   The net effect of 
this was that (in the view of many) British air defenses were woefully 
inadequate thu the 1960's, resting primarily on a handful of Lightning 
squadrons until supplemented by US-sourced Phantoms in 1969.  The pity is 
that Britain had to end up buying from the US 'cos the last of its advanced 
a/c programmes (the TSR-2) had been chopped in 1965 -- the last victim of 
the dead-end philosophy that "the guided missile has made the manned 
aircraft obsolete".   To that extent, I guess, the V2 was a success. 

Cheers,
Keith Coman

Newsgroups: sci.military