HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: wwe@aifb.uni-karlsruhe.de (Wolfgang Weitz)
Subject: pgp2.0 - signing text files
Organization: AIFB, University of Karlsruhe (Baden / Germany)
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 16:20:51 GMT

Hi,

I'd like to use pgp2.0 to sign UseNet messages and mail so that

 (1). *everybody* can read my postings/mails (even without pgp) and 
 (2). those who do have it can also check the signature.

My problem is that ``pgp -s text'' adds the signature in 'binary' form so that
I can't send the resulting ``text.pgp'' as ordinary mail (although the original
text is unchanged, satisfying (1) ). On the other hand: If I use ``pgp -sa text''
the resulting ``text.asc'' is pure ASCII (satisfying (2)), but the receiver
needs pgp to convert the base64 representation (of signature _and_ text)
into the original text again.

So:  Is there any pgp option which allows me to sign a text file with the signature
in base64 representation and the message body unchanged? I know that I can generate 
a signature in a separate file using ``pgp -bsa text'' and then include the resulting 
signature ``text.asc'' in my mail, but this way the receiver must separate signature
and message body into two files to have pgp check it. Is there a ``standard''
way to have pgp do this directly?

Thanks in advance, Wolfgang <wwe@aifb.uni-karlsruhe.de>

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiq1LzAAAAECALg0T4Mmg/9DAKZD12wZQ7ic14sQp2fBq5W8VDNeBiTe3npY
SdxoG+rfxngIBdJFaU8BWce6DxG8WIEA+UDqNGEABRO0I1dvbGZnYW5nIFdlaXR6
IDx3ZWl0ekBicm9vemxlLnV1Y3A+
=C0RV
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: lpc@dickens.com (Luis P Caamano)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 18:12:46 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: Dickens Data Systems, Inc.

In article <PHR.92Sep30185509@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin) writes:
>would be pretty incriminating).  As a modern day alternative, I've
>often thought the No Such Agency could do the following:
>
>   - write encryption/decryption code that runs in an embedded
>     micro of the kind found in calculators.
>
>   - go to favorite defense contractor that also makes calculators
>     (e.g. TI), and say "we want you to make a new model of simple,
>     consumer calculator, priced so lots of people will buy them
>     (here's some $$$ to make it profitable), and by the way, when
>     the user types this undocumented 20-keystroke sequence, it should
>     run this code that we'll supply (from previous step).
>
>   - The calculator goes on the market and becomes popular, so
>     the spy can carry one without drawing suspicion.  The special
>     key sequence is made long enough and weird enough that no one
>     will ever enter it by accident.  Of course, hitting clear
>     in this mode reverts it to a normal calculator, in case 
>     someone walks in on the spy (see Follett's "Eye of the Needle").

Why not just go buy an HP-48 and replace the chip with your own chip
that has everything you want.  C'mon you need to watch more 007
movies ...

-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Luis P. Caamano                    |         lpc@dickens.com
Dickens Data Systems, Inc.         |         uunet!dickens.com!lpc
Atlanta, GA                        |         (404) 475-8860
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If I think I know it all, I'll stop learning. -myself
The more I learn, the more I know I know nothing. -somebody else
From: gregb@cup.portal.com (Greg - Byrd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Proposed noise-based encryption method
Date: Thu,  1 Oct 92 17:05:46 PDT
Organization: The Portal System (TM)

What you have described is the classic "one time pad".  With advances
in mass storage techniques this is becoming progressively more attractive.
I recall a description in some novel (I think Clancy's "Patriot Games") of
a secure military manpack radio into which one inserts a card containing
a one-time pad.  Without a matching pad all you hear is white noise.
In the book a Bad Guy throws away the disk with the pad, leaving the
Good Guys in the jungles of Columbia listening to white noise...

Greg Byrd ---> Bell    (803) 686-4575
               Snail   Island Technical Group  /  3 Cardinal Ct. #619
                       Hilton Head Island      /  SC  29926
               Email   gregb@cup.portal.com
----- Uh, I didn't say that.  My boss said it!  Yeah.  Yeah. That's it. -----
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy
From: homer@theory.TC.Cornell.EDU (Homer Smith)
Subject: Re: Encryption and Privacy
Organization: Me
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 14:40:08 GMT


     The world is full of small little people with nothing important
to say.
 
     Their feeling is that the only people who have something to say,
who are not being quiet, are up to no good.

     It is perfectly fine with them then if the Government, which
they elect into power, passes laws outlawing privacy, in the
name of catching the bad guys, because if the government listened 
in on THEM, they would hear only silence.

     Those who have nothing to communicate have no need of privacy.
 
     Privacy is basically a directed channel of communication.
 
     It's saying something to A and not to B.
 
     To the silent majority, and I do mean silent, the crime
is not the directing of a communication, it is the presence of
any communication of importance at all.

     To them, they consider that if you are directing a communiction
it's only because you are trying to hide that there IS a communication.

     If you have nothing to communicate and in fact resent those
who do, you will have no need for direct channels to anyone,
and will take efforts to destroy the channels built by others 
to communicate amongst themselves.

     The reason why governments are elected into power such as ours,
is because of the nature of the people that who them into power:
people who have nothing to say, no one to say it to, and
no reason to have it said.
 
     The first thing that such governments do is outlaw privacy,
because what they are really outlawing is communication.
 
     Such people would be perfectly happy if the world
and everyone in it were perfectly silent all the time.
 
     Once privacy is outlawed only outlaws will have privacy.
 
     And they will be our elected officials, you can bet
your sweet life on it.
 
     Silence may be golden, but privacy is precious.  

     Unfortunately, those who have nothing to say, rarely have
ears to hear either.

     Homer






Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: shulick@yankton.ucs.indiana.edu (Sam Hulick)
Subject: Sorry for confusion: DES vs. UNIX
Originator: shulick@yankton
Reply-To: shulick@yankton.ucs.indiana.edu
Organization: Vallen Software
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 21:11:54 GMT


Sorry.  I asked people to email me DES encryption source code.  To those who
did: thanks.  But I found out too late that DES encryption is NOT what UNIX
uses.  UNIX machines just UNIX encryption.  Now, could someone e-mail me the
source for THAT?  Thanks in advance.

-- 
Sam Hulick          | "The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to
shulick@indiana.edu | hate them, but to be indifferent to them: that's the
(NeXTmail welcome)  | essence of inhumanity."  --George Bernard Shaw
From: Christopher_C_Lapp@cup.portal.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 92 17:12:38 PDT
Organization: The Portal System (TM)
Distribution: usa

How about a cryptosystem that used the teachings of various
religious figures in the Bible as its key?As a spy, I would write
a passionate letter detailing my sins and moral turpitude to my spy partner, 
and he/she would assign a "long beep" to the aspects of my sins that were
in accordance with the bible, and  a "short beep" to those that weren't.  T
output would be a Morse-code of biblical proportions! By using the bible as t
key, we could have uncrackable, undetectable, and public key encryption.
Any comments?
Chris Lapp
From: clancy@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Kim Clancy)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RESULTS: challenge login devices
Date: 6 Oct 92 18:38:09 GMT
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology




I use Enigma Logics Multisycn card.  NIST sent it to me since I dial into
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karger@osf.org (Paul A. Karger)
Subject: Re: public key interception and translation, etc.
Organization: Open Software Foundation
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 14:23:48 GMT

In article <6880@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
|> All this talk about total isolation and how the enemy can translate your
|> public keys given that all communication is trapped is a fine parlor game,
|> perhaps, but hardly relevant.
|> 
|> The criteria for trusted systems pay quite a lot of attention (perhaps more
|> than is deserved) to detecting and preventing covert channels.  It's a
|> *very* hard problem -- and that assumes that you have total ownership of
|> the computer system and all you're trying to prevent is communication from
|> within the one system -- and you're allowed to announce that you've forbidden
|> access -- and the user isn't allowed to complain.
|> 
|> To achieve complete spoofing of the kind being discussed here, it's not a
|> computer system for which covert channels are being prevented but a social
|> system and the enemy has to achieve it without letting anyone know that the
|> censor/intruder is active -- in a society in which free speech is a guaranteed
|> right, no less.
|> 
|> How about taking this discussion to alt.tv.mission.impossible?


While in many cases, it is possible to detect the fact that
all communications are being trapped, that is not the case if
the computer in question is being used in a dedicated applications
environment with non-computer-literate users or worse still in an
isolated location with no on-site operators, but only a security guard 
at the door.

For example, a commercial system at an oil-drilling site or a defense radar
system at an isolated radar site could easily be vulnerable to complete 
trapping and spoofing of communications.  Even a bank in downtown Manhattan
could be vulnerable, if no one in the branch was familiar with the signs
that spoofing is happening!  The common attitude is that if the computer
says so, then it must be right.  

This is a people problem, not a mathematical
problem, but encryption must be used in the real world, not in an ivory
tower.  That is why keys need to get changed and procedures are very critical.
The British would likely not have broken Enigma during WWII, if the Germans
had used the system in its theoretically best ways.  Most of the breaks
came from bad procedures and lazy crypto operators.
From: lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org (Mr. Lyn R. Kennedy)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP20 - Hacked???
Date: 2 Oct 92 13:39:48 GMT
Organization: Radio Amateur k5qwb

34AEJ7D@CMUVM.BITNET writes:

> So far any version of PGP20 I have run across, by whatever transmission
> or encoding method, has contained mostly corrupted files. The only
> files not failing the CRC checks were PGP.EXE and the first of the
> documentation files.
> 
> I'm suspicious - this looks like Someone is circulating a rather
> crudely hacked version of the program. Or am I being overly paranoid?
> 
> W. K. Gorman

Yep, you're paranoid. :-)

You need pkzip 1.10


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 
73,            internet     | lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org
Lyn Kennedy    packet radio | K5QWB @ N5LDD.#NTX.TX.US.NA
               pony express | P.O. Box 5133, Ovilla, TX, USA 75154

-------------- "We have met the enemy and he is us."  Pogo --------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: SHA C code (was: Re: SHS/SHA document)
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 02:10:01 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <1992Sep23.164458.2234@vixvax.mgi.com> cepek@vixvax.mgi.com writes:

>Question 2:  Is anyone interested in a C implementation?  I wouldn't
>mind making it available to save others some work -- given a suitable
>answer to Question 1.

I posted an implementation here a few weeks ago - the reason I posted the
SHS/SHA document was that there were so many requests for it in response to the
code that I thought I may as well let everyone at it...

>Question 1:  So... *are* there export restrictions?  If so, is it ok
>to post a C implementation here?  (We don't do anon ftp here)

Export restrictions?  From New Zealand? :-)  Certainly noone complained about
my code being posted...

Peter.
--
    pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz || peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz || peter@nacjack.gen.nz
			      (In order of preference)
From: gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt)
Subject: Re: More on cracking DES algorithm
Organization: Gordon Burditt
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 1992 06:34:27 GMT

>Let's say someone retreives the DES source code, which is easy enough.  Why
>WOULDN'T they be able to take every single mathematical operation, reverse each
>one, and then have a "decrypt()"?  I know it's not that simple, but how has DES
>made it so even a good mathematician can't just reverse all the operations?

Suppose		A = B XOR C
now reverse it, given A = 1, find B and C.  Not so easy, huh?  It
gets worse with AND and OR.

Suppose the function you wish to reverse takes a 56-bit DES key, encrypts
the constant plaintext 0x0000000000000000, and generates 64 bits of
ciphertext.  It *IS* possible to reverse this.  You end up with
56 boolean equations, one for each bit of the key, and maybe you want
one for indicating whether it's a possible output or not.  

Unfortunately, each of the 56 equations involves 64 input variables
(the ciphertext bits), and there are about 2**55 terms in each equation 
(corresponding to each possible ciphertext output where the key bit in 
question is a 1 and the other key bits vary).  I say "about" because
"collisions" where two different keys map the same plaintext to
the same ciphertext would cause redundant terms in the equation,
which could be removed.  Due to the way DES "mixes up the bits", 
these equations won't reduce much.  

This analysis is almost as messy as just pre-computing a "dictionary"
of what all 2**56 keys generate, and looking up the result you want
to crack to find the corresponding key.

					Gordon L. Burditt
					sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon
From: craig@jido.b11.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Subject: Re: PGP20 - Hacked???
Reply-To: craig@jido.b11.ingr.com
Organization: Intergraph Corporation, Huntsville, Alabama
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1992 21:00:18 GMT

In article <92275.10211134AEJ7D@CMUVM.BITNET> 34AEJ7D@CMUVM.BITNET writes:
   So far any version of PGP20 I have run across, by whatever transmission
   or encoding method, has contained mostly corrupted files. The only
   files not failing the CRC checks were PGP.EXE and the first of the
   documentation files.

   I'm suspicious - this looks like Someone is circulating a rather
   crudely hacked version of the program. Or am I being overly paranoid?

   W. K. Gorman

No, you are being just-about-right paranoid, but I'll bet if you get
PKUNZIP release 1.10 instead of whatever you've used to date, you'll
find it works better. I had the above problem with PKUNZIP 1.01.

-- Craig Presson
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: capsalad@uful07.phys.ufl.edu (Dave Schulman)
Subject: Irrational numbers as "strong" RNGs?
Organization: University of Florida, Gainesville
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 92 08:23:52 GMT

     Here's something that's been troubling me for a while: Bearing in
mind that 1) commercially available software (Mathematica, Maple,
etc.) are capable of computing & displaying hundreds of digits of,
say, pi in next to no time (thousands of digits if you let the program
run overnight), and that 2) the digits of pi (well, the first billion
or so anyway) so far appear to be "normal"; that is, they appear with
roughly equal frequency... 

     Is it possible to use some irrational number as the basis for a
strong random number generator?  For example, suppose that I was to
use the decimal part of 17 * (pi * e ^ 5), specifying in advance or
perhaps as part of a public key sequence which decimal digit would be
used as the starting point.  If I were to use the aforementioned idea
with the proviso that the "key" would begin at the 175th digit, this
would appear to be usable as a random-number generation scheme
considerably more "random" than any deterministic function that could
be implemented in software.

     Of course, I could further muddle things by factoring in more
obscure yet easy-to-remember numbers, such as, oh, the inverse
fine-structure constant, Feigenbaum's number, the wavelengths of the
Fraunhofer lines....

     If this is a really stupid idea, please tell me so that I can
quit wasting brain and silicon power on it.  If not, feel free to use
it if you haven't thought of it already.

     Some of you probably have.  You know who you are...

=============================================================================
Dave Schulman                                   capsalad@uful07.phys.ufl.edu
                                                Late of the
                                                University of Florida's
                                                Department of Physics
                                                I'm still one
=============================================================================


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Organization: Little to None
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 20:21:53 GMT

>May I ask an ignorant newbie question please?  It was my understanding that
>the two primes used in most of these public key systems weren't real primes
>at all, but were usually pseudo-primes that had been picked at random and
>tested with statistical methods to give a high *probability* of being prime.
>
>If that is the case, factoring a 500-bit product into two 250-bit primes may
>well reduce to factoring it into 2 125-bit primes and a 250-bit prime, which
>might well be *much* easier.
>
>Am i mistaken?

You are correct in that the "pseudo-primes" used in such systems have not
been proven to be true primes by an exhaustive, theroretically 100% accurate,
analysis.  Any known algorithm that would accomplish this would require so
much computer time as to make it infeasible to run.  The pseudo-primes have,
however, passed stochastic tests which, when applied iteratively, can
guarantee primality to some chosen level of confidence.  Obviously, the
more iterations run, the higher the level of confidence, and it is not
difficult to achieve very high levels of confidence.

You are further correct that, in those rare cases that a composite number gets
past these probabalistic tests, the keys chosen are weaker than the norm, and
most likely significantly weaker.  I have heard it stated, though, that for
the length of primes we are talking about, the probabalistic approach is
provably superior to an exhaustive search.  This is because the exhaustive
approach takes so much more real time that, when you factor in the reliability
of today's best hardware platforms (the chance that the hardware, after going
through all the motions, would not have made a glitch so as to cause an
incorrect result), it is actually easy to achieve a higher confidence with
probabalistic methods.

No one is going to certify completely that your public key will not turn
out to be easily breakable, but statistics is on your side.
-- 
Rob Stampfli  rob@colnet.cmhnet.org      The neat thing about standards:
614-864-9377  HAM RADIO: kd8wk@n8jyv.oh  There are so many to choose from.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: kurt@eskimo.celestial.com (Kurt Cockrum)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 corrupt ??
Summary: As an aid in corruption detection, signatures should be well known.
Organization: >>> Eskimo North (206)-FOR-EVER <<<
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 16:12:00 GMT

In article <1992Sep22.005843.4590@Princeton.EDU> mgflax@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Marshall G. Flax) writes:
>In article <cis.717119132@kraken> cis@kraken.itc.gu.edu.au (Tony O'Hagan) writes:
>>I have ftp'd pgp20.zip from 2 different sites (binary mode) and
>>downloaded them to my humble PC to discover that PKUNZIP considers
>>that SOME of the files are corrupt.  I'm currently using PKUNZIP v1.02 .
[...list of files & hosts deleted...]

It would be nice if the signatures for these were well known.
For example, each part of a distribution could have associated with it
a hunk of data consisting of signatures from the various checksumming
programs, say md4, md5, snefru, brik, etc.

This could also apply to the files contained within a distribution,
where a self-check could be administered at unpacking time.

Gene Kim and Gene Spafford at Purdue are currently betatesting a tool
called tripwire that accumulates
a database of signatures (including *all* the unix file system attributes).
This wouldn't be spoofproof, but when 2 parties disagree about the signature
of a file, or of a collection of files (which can be signatures or lists of
same), they can investigate further.  Publishing signatures of software
releases and distributions makes a lot of sense IMO!
-- 
kurt@grogatch.celestial.com (Kurt Cockrum)
 Nostalgic conservatives will soon be referring to the Bush Era as
 "those Halcion days of yesteryear".
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Ottawa
Distribution: usa
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 92 21:05:10 GMT

In article <1992Oct1.042050.1180@unlv.edu> flagg@blind-lemon.cs.unlv.edu (Scott Cunningham) writes:
>In article <66926@cup.portal.com> Christopher_C_Lapp@cup.portal.com  
>writes:
> "How about a cryptosystem that used the teachings of various
> "religious figures in the Bible as its key?
> "he/she would assign a "long beep" to sins in the bible, and a
> "short beep" to those that weren't. By using the bible as the key, we
> "could have uncrackable, undetectable, and public key encryption.
> "Any comments?
> "Chris Lapp
>
>Why not use another more obscure text and do the same thing.  For example  
>use a different pulp romance novel each time and associate your sins with  
>those which actually occured in the book used.  This is by no means  
>uncrackable, just real obscure.  It breaks down when you have to tell your  
>partner what book to use, if someone were to find out they would have your  
>code down cold in minutes.  The way around this is to use an encryption  
>like RSA where each person has his/her own key thus no key to have to  
>transmit, no key to intercept.

The problem with using some more obscure text is that the men wearing
dark suits are more likely to get suspicious if they notice that there's
several hundred people carrying around the same Harlequin romance.  With
the Bible, if the spy is a traveller, he wouldn't even have to carry one,
since most hotels have one in the bedside drawer (and for standardization
purposes, it might be wise to go with the "Gideon" standard of the NASB
Bible, which is the one in the hotels).

Another possibility would be for the spies to choose something based on
the #1 bestseller of the week (or maybe #2).  Nobody is surprised at the 
airport if they see someone carrying the latest Clancy book onto the 
plane...  it wouldn't be a bestseller if there weren't lots of people
that bought the book!  (Flames about the ways ``bestsellers'' are chosen
by the media will be cheerfully ignored ;-)

-- 
Christopher Browne
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca
University of Ottawa
Master of System Science Program