From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: "Presumed Guilty, How & Why the W.C. Framed Lee Harvey Oswald" [10/11]
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Summary: A factual account based on the Commission's public & private documents
Originator: daemon@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Keywords: continued endemic denial of our true history consigns us to oblivion
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 1992 14:43:24 GMT


                              *  *  *  *  *  *  *




      9


      Oswald's Rifle Capability


      The lunchroom encounter was Oswald's alibi;  it proved that he
      {could not} have been at the sixth-floor window during the shots.
      The Warren Commission falsely pronounced Oswald the assassin.  In
      so doing, it alleged that Oswald had the proficiency with his rifle
      to have fired the assassination shots.  Obviously, in light of the
      evidence that proves Oswald innocent, his rifle capability has no
      legitimate bearing on the question of his involvement in the
      shooting.  In this chapter I will examine the Commission's handling
      of the evidence related to Oswald's rifle capability.  It will be
      demonstrated that the Commission consistently misrepresented the
      record in an effort to make feasible the assertion that Oswald was
      the assassin.[1]
         The first consideration germane to this topic is the nature of
      the shots, assuming theoretically that all originated from the
      sixth-floor window by a gunman using the Mannlicher-Carcano.  For
      such a rifleman, "the shots were at a slow-moving target proceeding
      on a downgrade in virtually a straight line with the alignment of
      the assassin's rifle, at a range of 177 to 266 feet" (R189).
      According to the Commission, three shots were fired, the first and
      last strikes occurring within a span of 4.8 to 5.6 seconds;  one
      shot allegedly missed, although the Commission did not decide
      whether it was the first, second, or third.  While the current
      analysis ignores evidence of more than three shots from more than
      one location, I can make only a limited departure from reality in
      working under the Commission's postulations.  My analysis of the
      wounds proved beyond doubt that the President and the Governor were
      wounded nonfatally by two separate bullets.  This demands, in line
      with the Commission's three-shot-theory, that all shots hit in the
      car.  The Zapruder film reveals that the first two hits occurred
      within a very brief time, probably shorter than the very minimum
      time needed to fire two successive shots with the Carcano, 2.3 to 3
      seconds.  The fatal shot came about four seconds after the one that
      wounded Connally.
         The Report repeatedly characterizes the shots as "very easy" and
      "easy."  However, the experts who made these evaluations for the
      Commission did not consider two essential factors that cannot be
      excluded from any hypothesizing:  1) the President was a living,
      moving target, and 2) the shots had to be fired in a very short
      period of time.  First quoted in the Report is FBI ballistics
      expert Frazier:

            From my own experience in shooting over the years, when
         you shoot at 175 feet or 260 feet, which is less than 100
         yards, with a telescopic sight, you should not have any
         difficulty hitting your target. (R190)

      Frazier testified at the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, where he
      modified his previous Commission testimony.  How would the added
      consideration of a moving target affect his previous assessment?

         it would be a relatively easy shot, slightly complicated,
         however, if the target were moving at the time, it would
         make it a little more difficult.[2]

         The next "expert" quoted is Marine Sgt. James A. Zahm, who was
      involved in marksmanship training in the Marine Corps:

         Using the scope, rapidly working the bolt and using the
         scope to relocate your target quickly and at the same time
         when you locate that target you identify and the crosshairs
         are in close relationship to the point you want to shoot at,
         it just takes a minor move in aiming to bring the crosshairs
         to bear, and then it is a quick squeeze. (R190)

      Zahm never used the C2766 Carcano;  his comments related to four-
      power scopes in general as aids in rapid shooting with a bolt-
      action rifle.  Another expert, Ronald Simmons, was directly
      involved in tests employing the Carcano.  Although this is not
      reflected in the Report, he told the Commission that, contrary to
      Zahm's generalization of a "minor move" necessary to relocate the
      target in the scope, such a great amount of effort was needed to
      work the rifle bolt that the weapon was actually moved {completely}
      off target (3H449).  There is yet another factor qualifying Zahm's
      evaluation.  This was brought out during Frazier's New Orleans
      testimony:

            Mr. Oser:  . . . when you shoot this rifle . . . can you
         tell us whether or not in rebolting the gun you had to move
         your eye away from the scope?
            Mr. Frazier:  Yes, sir, that was necessary.
            Mr. Oser:  Why was that necessary?
            Mr. Frazier:  To prevent the bolt of the rifle from
         striking me in the face as it came to the rear.[3]

         At best, the Report drastically oversimplified the true nature
      of the shots.  It is true that shots fired at ranges under 100
      yards with a four-power scope are generally easy.  However, the
      assassination shots, in accordance with the Commission's lone-
      assassin theory, were fired in rapid succession (indeed the first
      two would have occurred within the minimum time needed to operate
      the bolt) and at a moving target.  The difficulty of such shots
      becomes apparent when it is considered that operation of the bolt
      would have thrown the weapon off target and caused the firer
      temporarily to move his eye from the sight.
         One is prompted to ask what caliber of shooter would be required
      to commit the assassination alone as described above.  Simulative
      tests conducted by the Commission, while deficient, are quite
      illuminating.
         The Commission's test firers were all rated as "Master" by the
      National Rifle Association (NRA);  they were experts whose daily
      routines involved working with and shooting firearms (3H445).  In
      the tests, three targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet
      respectively from a 30-foot-high tower.  Each shooter fired two
      series of three shots, using the C2766 rifle.  The men took 8.25,
      6.75, and 4.60 seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00,
      6.45, and 5.15 for the second (3H446).  In the first series, each
      man hit his first and third targets but missed the second.  Results
      varied on the next series, although in all cases but one, two
      targets were hit.  Thus, in only two cases were the Commission's
      experts able to fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as
      Oswald allegedly did.  {None} scored three hits, as was demanded of
      a lone assassin on November 22.
         These tests would suggest that three hits within such a short
      time span, if not impossible, would certainly have taxed the
      proficiency of the most skilled marksman.[4]  In his testimony
      before the Commission, Ronald Simmons spoke first of the caliber of
      shooter necessary to have fired the assassination shots on the
      basis that only two hits were achieved:

            Mr. Eisenberg:  Do you think a marksman who is less than
         a highly skilled marksman under those conditions would be
         able to shoot within the range of 1.2 mil aiming error [as
         was done by the experts]?
            Mr. Simmons:  Obviously, considerable experience would
         have to be in one's background to do so.  And with this
         weapon, I think also considerable experience with this
         weapon, because of the amount of effort required to work the
         bolt. (3H449)


            Well, in order to achieve three hits, it would not be
         required that a man be an exceptional shot.  A proficient
         man with this weapon, yes.  But I think with the opportunity
         to use the weapon and to get familiar with it, we could
         probably have the results reproduced by more than one firer.
         (3H450)

         Here arises the crucial question:  Was Lee Harvey Oswald a
      "proficient man with this weapon," with "considerable experience"
      in his background?
         While in the Marines between 1956 and 1959, Oswald was twice
      tested for his performance with a rifle.  On a scale of expert-
      sharpshooter-marksman, Oswald scored two points above the minimum
      for sharpshooter on one occasion (December 1956) and only one point
      above the minimum requirement for marksman on another (May 1959)--
      his last recorded score.  Colonel A. G. Folsom evaluated these
      scores for the Commission:

            The Marine Corps consider that any reasonable application
         of the instructions given to Marines should permit them to
         become qualified at least as a marksman.  To become
         qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of the
         opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
         adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified.
         Consequently, a low marksman qualification indicates a
         rather poor "shot" and a sharpshooter qualification
         indicates a fairly good "shot." (19H17-18)

         There exists the possibility that Oswald's scores were either
      inaccurately or unfairly recorded, thus accounting for his
      obviously mediocre to horrendous performances with a rifle.
      However, there is other information independent of the scores to
      indicate that Oswald was in fact {not} a good shot.  In his
      testimony, Colonel Folsom examined the Marine scorebook that Oswald
      himself had maintained, and elaborated on his previous evaluation:

            Mr. Ely:  I just wonder, after having looked through the
         whole scorebook, if we could fairly say that all that it
         proves is that at this stage of his career he was not a
         particularly outstanding shot.
            Col. Folsom:  No, no, he was not.  His scorebook
         indicates . . . that he did well at one or two ranges in
         order to achieve the two points over the minimum score for
         sharpshooter.
            Mr. Ely:  In other words, he had a good day the day he
         fired for qualification?
            Col. Folsom:  I would say so. (8H311)

      Thus, according to Folsom, Oswald's best recorded score was the
      result of having "a good day";  otherwise, Oswald "was not a
      particularly outstanding shot."
         Folsom was not alone in his evaluation of Oswald as other than a
      good shot.  The following is exerpted [sic] from the testimony of
      Nelson Delgado, one of Oswald's closest associates in the Marines:

            Mr. Liebeler:  Did you fire with Oswald?
            Mr. Delgado:  Right;  I was in the same line.  By that I
         mean we were on the same line together, the same time, but
         not firing at the same position . . . and I remember seeing
         his.  It was a pretty big joke, because he got a lot of
         "maggie's drawers," you know, a lot of misses, but he didn't
         give a darn.
            Mr. Liebeler:  Missed the target completely?
            Mr. Delgado:  He just qualified, that's it.  He wasn't as
         enthusiastic as the rest of us. (8H235)

         The Report tried desperately to get around this unanimous body
      of credible evidence.  First Marine Corps Major Eugene Anderson
      (who never had any association with Oswald) is quoted at length
      about how bad weather, poor coaching, and an inferior weapon might
      have accounted for Oswald's terrible performance in his second
      recorded test (R191).  Here the Commission scraped the bottom of
      the barrel, offering this unsubstantiated, hypothetical excuse-
      making as apparent fact.  Weather bureau records, which the
      Commission did not bother to check, show that perfect firing
      conditions existed at the time and place Oswald last fired for
      qualification--better conditions in fact, than those prevailing
      during the assassination.[5]  As for the quality of the weapon
      fired in the test, it is probable that at its worst it would have
      been far superior to the virtual piece of junk Oswald allegedly
      owned and used in the assassination.[6]  Perhaps Anderson guessed
      correctly in suggesting that Oswald may have had a poor instructor;
      yet, from the time of his departure from the Marines in 1959 to the
      time of the assassination in 1963, Oswald had {no} instructor.
         For its final "evaluation," the Report again turned to Anderson
      and Zahm.  Each man is quoted as rating Oswald a good shot,
      somewhat above average, as compared to other Marines, and an
      "excellent" shot as compared to the average male civilian (R192).
      That the Commission could even consider these evaluations is beyond
      comprehension.  Oswald's Marine scores and their official
      evaluation showed that he did not possess even "a reasonable amount
      of adaptability to weapons firing."  If this is better than average
      for our Marines, pity the state of our national "defense"!  The
      testimonies of Folsom and Delgado--people who had {direct}
      association with Oswald in the Marines--are not mentioned in the
      Report.
         Thus, Oswald left the Marines in 1959 as a "rather poor shot."
      If he is to be credited with a feat such as the assassination, it
      must be demonstrated that he engaged in some activity between 1959
      and 1963 that would have greatly developed his rifle capability and
      maintained it until the time of the shooting.  The Report barely
      touched on the vital area of Oswald's rifle practice.  In a brief
      two-paragraph section entitled "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the
      Marines," the Report painted a very sketchy picture, entirely
      inadequate in terms of the nature of the issue (R192-93).  In all,
      Oswald is associated with a weapon eleven or twelve times, ending
      in May 1963.
         Let us examine each of the Commission's assertions from this
      section of the Report:


            1.  During one of his leaves from the Marines, Oswald
         hunted with his brother Robert, using a .22 caliber bolt-
         action rifle belonging either to Robert or Robert's in-laws.

         A footnote to this statement refers to Robert Oswald's testimony
      at 1H327, where essentially the same information is found.


            2.  After he left the Marines and before departing for
         Russia, Oswald, his brother, and a third companion went
         hunting for squirrels and rabbits.  On that occasion Oswald
         again used a bolt-action .22 caliber rifle;  and according
         to Robert, Lee Oswald exhibited an average amount of
         proficiency with that weapon.

         Here again the Report cites Robert Oswald's testimony at 1H325-
      327.  Although Robert did say that Lee showed "an average amount"
      of proficiency (1H326), his other descriptions of the occasion
      would indicate that none of the men showed any proficiency at all
      that day.  This excursion took place in a "briar patch" that "was
      very thick with cottontails."  Among the three men, eight rabbits
      were shot, "because it was the type of brush and thorns that didn't
      grow very high but we were able to see over them, so getting three
      of us out there it wasn't very hard to kill eight of them."  Robert
      further illuminated the proficiency of the shooting when he
      revealed that it once took all three men firing to hit one rabbit.


            3.  While in Russia, Oswald obtained a hunting license
         joined a hunting club and went hunting about six times.

         As mentioned in chapter 1, Liebeler criticized the inclusion of
      this statement in the Report, for Oswald hunted with a shotgun in
      Russia.  Wrote Liebeler, "Under what theory do we include
      activities concerning a {shotgun} under a heading relating to
      {rifle} practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of
      that?"[7]  The sources given for the above-quoted statement are CEs
      1042, 2007, and 1403 (which establish Oswald's membership in the
      club) and 1H96, 327-28, and 2H466.  The latter references to the
      testimony do not support the Report's implication that Oswald's
      Russian hunting trips helped to further his marksmanship abilities.
         In the portion of her testimony cited (1H96), Marina Oswald said
      that Oswald hunted only once during the time she knew him in the
      Soviet Union.  This prompted a brief exchange not complimentary to
      Oswald's performance with his weapon during the hunt:

            Mr. Rankin:  Was that when he went hunting for squirrels?
            Mrs. Oswald:  If he marked it down in his notebook that
         he went hunting for squirrels, he never did.  Generally they
         wanted to kill a squirrel when we went there, or some sort
         of bird, in order to boast about it, but they didn't.

      Robert Oswald testified that Lee hunted "about six times" in Russia
      (1H327-328).  He too revealed the poor nature of Oswald's
      performance:

         We talked about hunting over there, and he said that he had
         only been hunting a half dozen times, and so forth, and that
         he had only used a shotgun, and a couple of times he did
         shoot a duck.

      The third reference to testimony is most revealing.  The source is
      Mrs. Ruth Paine, who related what Marina had told her:

            She quoted a proverb to the effect that you go hunting in
         the Soviet Union and you catch a bottle of Vodka, so I judge
         it was a social occasion more than shooting being the prime
         object. (2H466)

         Information not mentioned or cited in the Report corroborates
      the informal nature of Oswald's hunting in Russia as well as his
      usual poor performance with his weapon.  CD 344 contains the
      transcript of a Secret Service interview with Marina recorded
      Sunday night, November 24, 1963, at the Inn of the Six Flags Motel
      at Arlington, Texas.  This was Marina's first interview conducted
      while she was in protective custody.  When asked about Oswald's
      membership in the hunting club, she made this response through an
      interpreter:

            While he was a member of this hunting club, he never
         attended any meetings.  He simply had a card that showed his
         membership.  She said Lee enjoyed nature and as a member of
         the club he was entitled to free transportation in an
         automobile which enabled him to go out of town.[8]

      Marina added that Lee owned a "hunting gun" in Russia but "he never
      used it."
         Other information came from Yuri I. Nosenko, a Soviet KGB staff
      officer who defected in February 1964 and apparently participated
      in or knew of the KGB investigation of Oswald in Russia.  CD 451
      contains an interview with Nosenko, but it is currently withheld
      from research.  Liebeler, who saw CD 451 during his Commission
      work, composed a staff memorandum on March 9, 1964, repeating some
      of the information obtained from Nosenko.  According to the
      memorandum, "Oswald was an extremely poor shot and it was necessary
      for persons who accompanied him on hunts to provide him with
      game."[9]


            4.  Soon after Oswald returned from the Soviet Union he
         again went hunting with his brother, Robert, and used a
         borrowed .22 caliber bolt-action rifle.

         Robert Oswald is again the source of this information.  The
      hunting trip in question took place at the farm of Robert's in-
      laws.  However, according to Robert, "we did just a very little bit
      [of hunting].  I believe this was on a Sunday afternoon and we
      didn't stay out very long" (1H327).


            5.  After Oswald purchased the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle,
         he told his wife that he practiced with it.  Marina Oswald
         testified that on one occasion she saw him take the rifle,
         concealed in a raincoat, from the house on Neely Street.
         Oswald told her he was going to practice with it.

         Marina Oswald is the source of this above-quoted information.
      The footnote in the Report refers to 1H14-15;  CE 1156, p. 442;  CE
      1404, pp. 446-48.
         Marina's progression of statements relevant to Oswald's rifle
      practice is truly amazing.  The Report quotes her incompletely and
      dishonestly, choosing only those statements which support the
      belief that Oswald practiced with the Carcano.  The following is a
      chronological listing of Marina's relevant words:

            {12/3/63, FBI report of interview with Marina:}  "MARINA
         said she had never seen OSWALD practice with his rifle or
         any other firearm and he had never told her that he was
         going to practice." (22H763)

            {12/4/63, FBI report of interview with Marina:}  "She
         cannot recall ever hearing Oswald state that he was going to
         fire the rifle in practice or that he had fired it in
         practice." (22H785)

            {12/4/63, Secret Service report of interview with
         Marina:}  "The reporting agent interviewed Marina Oswald as
         to whether she knew of any place or of a rifle range where
         her husband could do some practicing with a rifle, and
         whether she ever saw her husband taking the rifle out of the
         house.  She said that she never saw Lee going out or coming
         in to the house with a rifle and that he never mentioned to
         her doing any practice with a rifle." (23H393)

            {12/10/63, Secret Service report of interview with
         Marina:}  "Marina Oswald was asked if she ever saw her
         husband doing any dry practice with the rifle either in
         their apartments or any place else, and she replied in the
         negative." (23H402)

            {12/16/63, FBI report of interview with Marina:}  "She
         cannot recall that [Oswald] ever practiced firing the rifle
         either in New Orleans or in Dallas." (22H778)

            {2/3/64, Marina makes her first appearance before the
         Commission:}

            Mr. Rankin:  Did you learn at any time that he had been
         practicing with the rifle?
            Mrs. Oswald:  I think he went once or twice.  I didn't
         actually see him take the rifle, but I knew he was
         practicing.
            Mr. Rankin:  Could you give us a little help on how you
         knew?
            Mrs. Oswald:  He told me.  And he would mention that in
         passing . . . he would say, "Well, today I will take the
         rifle along for practice." (1H14-15)

            {2/17/64, FBI report of interview with Marina:}  "MARINA
         advised OSWALD had told her after the WALKER incident that
         he had practiced with his rifle in a field near Dallas.  She
         said further that in the beginning of January, 1963, at the
         Neely Street address, he on one occasion was cleaning his
         rifle and he said he had been practicing that day.  [The
         rifle was not mailed until the end of March 1963.]
            "MARINA was asked if she had ever seen OSWALD take the
         rifle from the house and she replied that she had not.  She
         was asked if she had ever known the rifle to have been gone
         from the house at the same time OSWALD was gone from the
         house.  She replied that she could not recall any such
         incident.  She was then asked if it were true then that she
         had never seen OSWALD take the rifle from the house nor knew
         any occasion when he might have had the rifle at a place
         other than at home.  She then admitted that she did know of
         such an occasion.  She said this occasion occurred on an
         evening in March, 1963.  On this evening, she and JUNE
         [their daughter] and OSWALD left the house at about 6:00 PM.
         OSWALD had his rifle wrapped up in a raincoat. . . .  When
         OSWALD returned about 9:00 PM, he told her he had practiced
         with his rifle." (22H197)

            {2/18/64, FBI report of interview with Marina:}  "She
         advised she had been mistaken on February 17, 1964, when she
         said she had recalled OSWALD cleaning his rifle at Neely
         Street, at which time he made the statement he had been
         practicing.  She said she is now able to place the date . .
         . as being shortly before the WALKER incident. . . .  At one
         of the four or five times that she observed OSWALD cleaning
         his rifle at their home on Neely Street . . . he told her he
         had been practicing with the rifle but he did not say when
         he had practiced.  On the other occasions of his cleaning
         the rifle . . . he did not say he had been practicing.
         MARINA deduced that he might have been practicing with the
         rifle." (22H785)

            {6/11/64, Marina again testifies before the Commission:}

            "Lee didn't tell me when he was going out to practice.  I
         only remember one time distinctly that he went out because
         he took the bus.  I don't know if he went to Love Field at
         that time.  I don't--after all this testimony, after all
         this testimony, when I was asked did he clean his gun a lot,
         and I answered yes, I came to the conclusion that he was
         practicing with his gun because he was cleaning it
         afterwards." (5H397)

            Sen. Cooper:  Did he ever tell you that he was practicing
         with a rifle?
            Mrs. Oswald:  Only after I saw him take the gun that one
         time. (5H398)

         Thus Marina, until three months after the assassination, denied
      any knowledge whatsoever of Oswald's rifle practice;  he never told
      her he practiced, and she knew of no practice.  When she first
      appeared before the Commission, her story changed.  She suddenly
      knew of one or two instances when Oswald mentioned he was going to
      practice, although she never saw him take the rifle from the house.
      Subsequent to her testimony, she changed her story again.  After
      telling the FBI she saw Oswald clean the rifle before he even
      ordered it, she "admitted" an incident in which she saw Oswald
      remove the rifle {concealed in a raincoat} to practice {at night}.
      The following day her memory conveniently improved as she retracted
      her statement that she had seen Oswald with the rifle as early as
      January 1963.  She added at this time that although Oswald had
      actually admitted practicing only once, she "deduced" he had
      practiced other times.  This, essentially, was the final version of
      her story.
         {Marina was an entirely incredible witness}.  No honest jury
      could have believed any of her statements;  for everything she
      said, there almost always existed a contradictory statement that
      she had made earlier.  The Commission merely chose her most "juicy"
      descriptions of rifle practice and cited them, ignoring completely
      the other statements.  The official use of Marina's testimony could
      best be described in Aldous Huxley's words, "You pays your money
      and you takes your choice."


            6. According to George De Mohrenschildt, Oswald said he
         went target shooting with that rifle.

         The footnote to this assertion refers to portions of the
      testimonies of George De Mohrenschildt, the Oswalds' "friend" in
      Dallas, and his wife, Jeanne.  The combined stories of the De
      Mohrenschildts are so ridiculous as to make Marina's appear
      reliable and consistent.
         In his testimony, George De Mohrenschildt had been relating the
      incident in which he and his wife paid a late-night visit to the
      Oswalds shortly after the Walker incident (as described in the
      previous chapter).  De Mohrenschildt described how his wife had
      seen a rifle in the closet and offered "facts" unsubstantiated by
      any of the Commission's evidence:

            Mr. De Mohrenschildt:  And Marina said "That crazy idiot
         is target shooting all the time."  So frankly I thought it
         was ridiculous to shoot target shooting in Dallas, you see,
         right in town.  I asked him "Why do you do that?"
            Mr. Jenner:  What did he say?
            Mr. De Mohrenschildt:  He said, "I go out and do target
         shooting.  I like target shooting." (9H249)

         Despite the lack of corroborative evidence, De Mohrenschildt's
      story might have remained plausible had his wife not attempted to
      substantiate it.  In the portion of her testimony cited but {not}
      quoted in the Report, she revealed--to the exasperation of staff
      member Jenner--the details of the incident {ad absurdium:}

            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  I just asked what on earth is he
         doing with a rifle?
            Mr. Jenner:  What did she [Marina] say?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  She said, "Oh, he just loves to
         shoot."  I said, "Where on earth does he shoot?  Where can
         he shoot?"  when they lived in a little house.  "Oh, he goes
         in the park and shoots at leaves and things like that."  But
         it didn't strike me too funny, because I personally love
         skeet shooting.  I never kill anything.  But I adore to
         shoot at a target, target shooting.
            Mr. Jenner:  Skeet?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  I just love it.
            Mr. Jenner:  Didn't you think it was strange to have
         someone say he is going in a public park and shooting
         leaves?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  But he was taking the baby out.
         He goes with her, and that was his amusement.
            Mr. Jenner:  Did she say that?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  Yes;  that was his amusement,
         practicing in the park, shooting leaves.  That wasn't
         strange to me, because any time I go to an amusement park I
         go to the rifles and start shooting.  So I didn't find
         anything strange.
            Mr. Jenner:  But you shot at the rifle range in these
         amusement parks?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  Yes.
            Mr. Jenner: Little  .22?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  I don't know what it was.
            Mr. Jenner:  Didn't you think it was strange that a man
         would be walking around a public park in Dallas with a
         high-powered rifle like this, shooting leaves?
            Mrs. De Mohrenschildt:  I didn't know it was a high-
         powered rifle.  I had no idea.  I don't even know right now.
         (9H316)

         The Commission did not see fit to include in the Report the fact
      that the extent of the De Mohrenschildts' knowledge of Oswald's
      "rifle practice" was that he fired at leaves while walking his baby
      daughter through public parks.  Had this been included, no one
      could have believed the De Mohrenschildts.


            7. Marina Oswald testified that in New Orleans in May of
         1963, she observed Oswald sitting with the rifle on their
         screened porch at night, sighting with the telescopic lens
         and operating the bolt.

         For this the Report cites Marina's testimony at 1H21-22, 53-54,
      and 65 and CE 1814, p. 736.  However, CE 1814 has nothing to do
      with Marina Oswald, or rifle practice (23H471).
         Marina's testimony about the bolt-working sessions on the porch
      of the Oswald's New Orleans home was another spectacle of blatant
      self-contradiction, again none of which was reflected in the
      Report.  In three days, Marina gave three opposing accounts
      represented in the Report as consistent.  On February 3, Marina
      said:

         I know that we had a kind of a porch with a--a screened-in
         porch, and I know that sometimes evenings after dark he
         would sit there with his rifle.  I don't know what he did
         with it.  I came there only by chance once and saw him just
         sitting there with his rifle.  I thought he is merely
         sitting there and resting . . .
            Mr. Rankin:  From what you observed about his having the
         rifle on the back porch, in the dark, could you tell whether
         or not he was trying to practice with the telescopic lens?
            Mrs. Oswald:  Yes. (1H21-22).

      On February 4, Marina offered a version of the porch practice
      different from that put forth in the Report:

            Mr. Rankin:  Did you ever see him working the bolt, the
         action that opens the rifle, where you can put a shell in
         and push it back--during those times [on the porch]?
            Mrs. Oswald:  I did not see it, because it was dark and I
         would be in the room at that time.  But I did hear the noise
         from time to time--not often. (1H54)

      Finally, on February 5, Marina reached the height of her confusion
      and merely retracted the statement attributed to her in the Report:

            Mr. Rankin:  You have told us about his practicing with
         the rifle, the telescopic lens, on the back porch at New
         Orleans, and also his using the bolt action that you heard
         from time to time.  Will you describe that a little more
         fully to us, as best you remember?
            Mrs. Oswald:  I cannot describe that in greater detail.
         I can only say that Lee would sit there with the rifle and
         open and close the bolt and clean it.  No, he didn't clean
         it at that time.  Yes--twice he did clean it.
            Mr. Rankin:  And did he seem to be practicing with the
         telescopic lens, too, and sighting the gun on different
         objects?
            Mrs. Oswald:  I don't know.  The rifle was always with
         this.  I don't know exactly how he practiced, because I was
         in the house, I was busy.  I just knew that he sits there
         with his rifle.  I was not interested in it. (1H65)

         It is important to note that Marina originally denied any such
      New Orleans porch practice to the FBI.  An FBI report of an
      interview with Marina on December 16, 1963, states that "She never
      saw [Oswald] clean [the rifle] nor did he ever hold it in her
      presence [in New Orleans] as best as she can recall" (22H778).
         If Marina's stories of porch practice are true (and here the
      reader may believe whichever version he likes), then Oswald
      practiced sighting with his rifle {in total darkness} on a screened
      porch.  If this call be called "practice," it certainly cannot be
      applied to normal daylight firing.
         The seven assertions as quoted above from the Report constitute
      the known extent of "Oswald's Rifle practice."  Only one had
      substantiation.  The others are either misrepresentations of the
      evidence or are merely unsupported altogether.  Oswald performed
      badly on the hunts in which he participated.  He did not even use a
      rifle in Russia although, to the Commission, intent on associating
      Oswald with a rifle as frequently as possible, a shotgun was the
      same as a rifle.  Marina's assertions that Oswald practiced with
      the Carcano are rendered invalid by her earlier statements that
      Oswald never practiced.  Even if the one incident she finally
      conceded was true, Oswald would have had a total of 64 minutes to
      practice (26H61).  The De Mohrenschildts' description of Oswald's
      target shooting at leaves in the park warrants no serious
      consideration.  As Marina admitted to the Commission, she did not
      know what Oswald did with the rifle when he sat with it on the
      porch of their New Orleans home (if he ever did this at all, as
      Marina originally denied).
         Taking the issue further than did the Commission, we can be
      reasonably certain that Oswald engaged in {no} rifle practice in
      New Orleans during the summer of 1963 or in Dallas up until the
      time of the assassination.
         If Marina was consistent in any of her statements, it was her
      denial that Oswald practiced with the rifle in New Orleans.  While
      she recalled no such incident, she felt that Oswald could not have
      practiced without telling her.

         because as a rule he stayed home when he was not working.
         When he did go out, she did not see him take the rifle.
         (22H778)

      Marina told this to the FBI on December 16, 1963.  She stuck to
      this story before the Commission, saying she knew "for sure" Oswald
      did not practice in New Orleans (1H21).
         More reliable information relating to possible New Orleans
      practice comes from Adrian Alba, a New Orleans garage owner who
      spoke with Oswald about rifles during the summer of 1963.  On
      November 25, 1963, Alba told the FBI that

         he knew of no rifle practice which OSWALD had engaged in
         while in New Orleans, adding that from his conversation with
         OSWALD he did not believe that OSWALD belonged to any of the
         local gun clubs.  He added that it would have been almost
         impossible for OSWALD to practice with a rifle around New
         Orleans unless he belonged to a gun club. (CD7:203)

      Alba repeated this information in his deposition before staff
      member Liebeler.  He explained why Oswald could not have practiced
      in New Orleans unless he belonged to a gun club (which he did not).
      According to Alba, if someone attempted to practice in the only
      possible regions other than the clubs, "they would either run you
      off or arrest you for discharging firearms" (10H224).
         There is no credible evidence in any form to indicate that
      Oswald practiced with his rifle after moving back to Dallas from
      New Orleans in October 1963.  If the rifle was stored in the Paine
      garage as the Commission asserts (though proof of this is lacking),
      then the possibility that Oswald could have taken the rifle for
      practice is virtually nil.  Likewise, Marina was emphatic that
      Oswald never practiced during the time she lived with the Paines.
      For what little reliance, if any, can be put in her testimony, I
      quote her relevant words:

         he couldn't have practiced while we were at the Paine's,
         because Ruth was there.  But whenever she was not at home,
         he tried to spend as much time as he could with me--he would
         watch television in the house. (1H53)

         There is no evidence indicating that the rifle was in Oswald's
      possession during this period.  The woman who cleaned his small
      room on North Beckley never saw it there, although she did not go
      into the drawers of the "little wooden commode or closet" in the
      room (6H440-441).  While several witnesses thought they had seen
      Oswald practicing at a rifle range in Dallas throughout September
      to November 1963, the evidence strongly indicates that the man
      observed neither was nor {could} have been Oswald, as the Report
      admits (R318-30).  Various FBI and Secret Service checks failed to
      turn up any evidence of rifle practice by Oswald in the Dallas area
      (see CEs 2694, 2908, 3049).
         And this was Oswald the marksman--from the time he received his
      first weapons training in the Marines, where he went from a fairly
      good to a rather poor shot, to his few hunting trips with Robert
      Oswald, where he manifested his lack of skill with a rifle, to his
      presumed hunting in the Soviet Union with other than a rifle but
      the same absence of any proficiency, to the time of his assumed
      possession of the rifle, when no credible evidence indicated that
      he ever engaged in practice.
         This obviously was not the caliber of shooter defined by expert
      Simmons as necessary to have pulled off the assassination alone.
      The presumed lone assassin, according to Simmons, had to have
      "considerable experience" in his background, especially
      "considerable experience with" the Carcano, and had to be "a
      proficient man with this weapon."  Oswald was none of these.  The
      only reliable evidence now known demonstrates that he was simply a
      poor shot who never did a thing to improve his capability.
         As we have seen, the Commission consistently misrepresented the
      evidence relevant to Oswald's rifle capability.  In its conclusion
      to this section of the Report, it retained its propensity for
      conjuring up what it wanted without regard to evidence.  It
      concluded this:

            Oswald's Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle
         experience and his established familiarity with this
         particular weapon show that he possessed ample capability to
         commit the assassination. (R195)

         The Commission, in essence, told the public that "rather poor
      shot" Oswald did what shooters in the NRA Master classification,
      the highest rating, could not do.  It must have caused great
      concern among those who spend hours of concentrated practice each
      day trying to maintain proficiency with a rifle to learn that
      Oswald outdid the best and "established familiarity" with his rifle
      by {never} practicing, probably never even playing with his rifle!
         Oswald did not have the capability to fire the assassination
      shots as the official theory proclaims.  That he was a competent
      marksman is a pure myth created by the Commission in flagrant
      disregard of the evidence.



__________

 [1] Analyses of the nature of the shots and related topics have
     appeared in "Whitewash," chap. 4;  Lane, chap. 9;  Epstein,
     chap. 9;  Meagher, chap. 4.

 [2] Frazier 2/21/69 testimony, p. 67.

 [3] Ibid., p. 148.

 [4] See also the excerpts from the Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum as
     discussed in chap. 1.

 [5] U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, "Local Climatological
     Data," for San Diego, California, May 1959, and Los Angeles,
     California, May 1959.

 [6] I have seen this rifle at the National Archives and it does appear
     rather dilapidated.  Fingerprint expert Latona called it "a cheap
     old weapon" (4H29).  Ballistics expert Robert Frazier went into
     more detail on the condition of the rifle:

     Mr. Eisenberg . . . . How much use does this weapon show?

     Mr. Frazier.  The stock is worn, scratched.  The bolt is relatively
     smooth, as if it had been operated several times.  I cannot
     actually say how much use the weapon has had.  The barrel is--was
     not, when we first got it, in excellent condition.  It was, I would
     say in fair condition.  In other words, it showed the effects of
     wear and corrosion. (3H394)

 [7] Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum.

 [8] CD 344 was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg
     and is discussed in "Whitewash II," pp. 15-19.

 [9] This memorandum was shown to Epstein by Liebeler.  References to it
     may be found in "Inquest," p. 146, and the "Saturday Evening Post,"
     April 6, 1968, p. 72.







                              *  *  *  *  *  *  *




      Conclusion




         Throughout twelve hours of interrogation over the weekend of the
      assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald steadfastly denied that he had
      shot the President (R613, 627).  He repeated that denial before
      hundreds of newsmen crowded into the narrow corridors of the police
      headquarters:  "I'm just a patsy," he exclaimed (20H362, 366).
      Even as he lay dying on a stretcher, the police pressed him for a
      final confession.  But Oswald merely shook his head;  he would die
      protesting his innocence (12H185).
         Oswald's plea was ignored amid the clamor of official voices,
      which hastened to assure the public of Oswald's guilt.
         The Dallas Police wasted no time in announcing their verdict.
      Of course, it is preposterous to assume that even the most
      competent police force could have solved one of the century's most
      complex crimes overnight.  Yet this was precisely the claim made by
      the Dallas Police when, on the day after the assassination, they
      told the world that Oswald was beyond doubt the lone assassin.
         Two weeks later the FBI claimed that it too had conclusively
      determined that Oswald was the lone assassin.  This was indeed an
      unwarranted conclusion since, in its "solution" of the crime, the
      FBI failed to account for one of the President's wounds and a shot
      that missed the car.  The FBI seems never to have anticipated that
      concerned citizens would probe its thoroughly flawed report.  It
      made sure that everyone knew the conclusion reached in the report
      by leaking to the press everything it wanted known.  The report
      itself, however, the FBI decided to keep secret.
         The FBI's ploy had one salient effect:  it preempted the Warren
      Commission and left the Commission little choice but to affirm the
      FBI's conclusions.  The alternative was for the Commission to
      conduct a genuinely independent investigation and announce that the
      FBI had erred.  In 1964, given the FBI's reputation as the greatest
      law-enforcement investigative agency in the world and the
      pervasive, although then unspoken fear of J. Edgar Hoover's power,
      this was an unthinkable alternative for the conservative Commission
      members.  The choice was made to rely on the FBI--in effect, to let
      the FBI investigate itself.
         Thus, from the very beginning of its investigation, the
      Commission planned its work under the presumption that Oswald was
      guilty, and the staff consciously endeavored to construct a
      prosecution case against Oswald.  One Commission member actually
      complained to the staff that he wanted to see more arguments in
      support of the theory that Oswald was the assassin.  There could
      have been no more candid admission of how fraudulent the
      "investigation" was than when a staff lawyer secretly wrote, "Our
      intention is not to establish the point with complete accuracy, but
      merely to substantiate the hypothesis which underlies the
      conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin."  In its zeal to
      posthumously frame Oswald--and falsify history--the staff often
      considered ludicrous methods of avoiding the facts--as in the
      suggestion of one staff lawyer that "the best evidence that Oswald
      could fire as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he
      did so."
         The Commission, in presuming Oswald guilty, abdicated its
      responsibility to the nation.  But did the Commission, in spite of
      its prejudices, arrive at the truth?  Does the evidence establish
      that Oswald was the assassin?
         The medical evidence actually disassociates Oswald's rifle from
      the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally.
      The nature of the bullet fragmentation within the President's
      wounds rules out full-jacketed military bullets such as those
      allegedly fired by Oswald.  Bullet 399, discovered at Parkland
      Hospital and traced to Oswald's rifle, could not, in any
      conceivable way, have produced any of the President's wounds.
      Likewise, 399 could not have produced the Governor's wounds without
      having suffered some form of mutilation;  bullets simply do not
      smash through two or three bones and emerge in the condition of
      399, with no apparent distortions and no disruption of their
      microscopic markings.
         The medical evidence leads one to believe that Oswald's rifle
      played no role in the shooting and that all the evidence that seems
      to link Oswald to the shooting was in fact planted.  The only
      evidence that might conclusively show whether bullet 399 and the
      two fragments traced to Oswald's rifle were actually involved in
      the wounding of either victim is the spectrographic and neutron
      activation analyses, and they are withheld from the public.  One
      need not be an expert analyst to deduce that the government would
      hardly suppress this evidence if it corroborated its account of the
      assassination.  The only credible explanation for the suppression
      of this crucial scientific evidence is that it must establish
      conclusively what the medical evidence established to but a
      reasonable degree--that Oswald's rifle played no role in the
      shooting.
         The evidence of the rifle, the cartridge cases, and the bullets
      is significant because it creates the powerful assumption that
      Oswald was the assassin.  The medical evidence, in disassociating
      Oswald's rifle from the crime, makes it apparent that unknown
      persons deliberately planted the recovered ballistic items with the
      intention of leaving evidence that would point to Oswald as the
      murderer.  Such planting of evidence does not necessarily imply an
      enormous conspiracy, as some of the Commission's defenders have
      suggested.  Two accomplices, one at the Book Depository and one at
      Parkland Hospital, are all that would have been required.
      Conditions at both sites were so chaotic at the time that such
      accomplices could easily have escaped detection.
         Once it is established that Oswald's rifle was not involved in
      the shooting, there is not a shred of tangible or credible evidence
      to indicate that Oswald was the assassin.  The evidence proves
      exactly the opposite.
         The circumstantial evidence relating to Oswald himself is almost
      entirely exculpatory.  Every element of it was twisted by the
      Commission to fit the preconceived conclusion of Oswald's guilt.  I
      have documented that, through its staff and its Report, the
      Commission:

          1.  Drew undue suspicion to Oswald's return to Irving on
              November 21, although the evidence indicated that
              Oswald did not know the motorcade route and broke no
              set pattern in making the return;

          2.  Ignored {all} evidence that could have provided an
              innocent excuse for Oswald's visit;

          3.  Wrongly discredited the reliable and consistent
              testimony of the only two witnesses who saw the package
              Oswald carried to work on the morning of the
              assassination;  because their descriptions meant that
              the package could {not} have contained the rifle, the
              Commission claimed to have made this rejection on the
              basis of "scientific evidence," which did not exist;

          4.  Concluded that Oswald made a paper sack to conceal the
              rifle, citing no evidence in support of this notion and
              suppressing evidence that tended to disprove it;

          5.  Concluded that the sack was used to transport the
              rifle, although its evidence proved that the sack never
              contained the rifle;

          6.  Used the testimony of Charles Givens to placed [sic]
              Oswald at the alleged source of the shots {35 minutes
              too early,} even though Givens described an event that
              physically could not have taken place;

          7.  Claimed to know of no Depository employee who saw
              Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30, basing its claim on an
              inquiry in which it (through General Counsel Rankin)
              had the FBI determine whether any employee had seen
              Oswald {only} at 12:30, completely suppressing from the
              Report three distinct pieces of evidence indicating
              Oswald's presence on the first floor during the period
              in question.

          8.  Failed to produce any witness who could identify the
              sixth-floor gunman as Oswald;  both rejected and
              accepted the identification of one man who admitted
              lying to the police, who constantly contradicted
              himself, and who described physically impossible
              events;  and ignored evidence of clothing descriptions
              that might have indicated that Oswald was {not} the
              gunman;

          9.  Reconstructed the movements of Baker and Truly in such
              a way as to lengthen the time of their ascent to the
              second floor;

         10.  Reconstructed the movements of the "assassin" so as to
              greatly reduce the time of his presumed descent;  a
              valid reconstruction would have proved that a sixth-
              floor gunman could {not} have reached the second-floor
              lunch-room before Baker and Truly;

         11.  Misrepresented Baker's position at the time he saw
              Oswald entering the lunchroom, making it seem possible
              that Oswald could have just descended from the third
              floor, although, in fact, the events described by Baker
              and Truly prove that Oswald must have been coming {up}
              from the {first} floor (as Oswald himself told the
              police he did);

         12.  Misrepresented the nature of the assassination shots by
              omitting from its evaluation the time factor and other
              physical obstacles, thus making it seem that the shots
              were easy and that Oswald could have fired them;

         13.  Misrepresented the evidence relevant to Oswald's rifle
              capability and practice, creating the impression that
              he was a good shot with much practice, although the
              evidence indicated exactly the opposite.  The
              conclusion dictated by all this evidence en masse is
              inescapable and overwhelming:  Lee Harvey Oswald never
              fired a shot at President Kennedy;  he was not even at
              the Depository window during the assassination;  and no
              one fired his rifle, the Mannlicher-Carcano, on that
              day.  Beyond any doubt, he is innocent of the monstrous
              crime with which he was charged and of which he was
              presumed guilty.  The official presumption of his guilt
              effectively cut off any quest for truth and led to the
              abandonment of the principles of law and honest
              investigation.  At {all} costs, the government has
              denied (and, to judge from its record, will continue to
              deny) Oswald's innocence and perpetuated the myth of
              his lone guilt.

         With this, a thousand other spiders emerge from the walls.
         It can now be inferred that Oswald was framed;  he was
      deliberately set up as the Kennedy assassin.  His rifle was found
      in the Depository.  We know that it had to have been put there;  we
      also know that it was not Oswald who put it there.  {Someone else
      did.}
         We know that a whole bullet traceable to Oswald's rifle turned
      up at Parkland Hospital;  we also know that this bullet was never
      in the body of either victim.  {Someone had to have planted it at
      the hospital.}  The same applies to the two identifiable fragments
      found in the front seat of the President's limousine.
         We know that someone shot and killed President Kennedy;  we also
      know that Oswald did not do this.  The real presidential murderers
      have escaped punishment through our established judicial channels,
      their crime tacitly sanctioned by those who endeavored to prove
      Oswald guilty.  The after-the-fact framing of Oswald by the federal
      authorities means, in effect, that the federal government has
      conspired to protect those who conspired to kill President Kennedy.
         It is not my responsibility to explain why the Commission did
      what it did, and I would deceive the reader if I made the slightest
      pretense that it was within my capability to provide such an
      explanation.  I have presented the facts;  no explanation of
      motives, be they the highest and the purest or the lowest and the
      most corrupt, will alter those facts or undo what the Commission
      indisputably has done.
         The government has lied about one of the most serious crimes
      that can be committed in a democracy.  Having lied without
      restraint about the death of a president, it can not be believed on
      anything.  It has sacrificed its credibility.
         Remedies are not clearly apparent or easily suggested.
      Certainly, Congress has an obligation to investigate this
      monumental abuse by the executive.  But first and foremost, the
      people must recognize that they have been lied to by their
      government and denied the truth about the murder of their former
      leader.  They must demand the truth, whatever the price, and insist
      that their government work honestly and properly.
         Until then, the history of one of the world's most democratic
      nations must suffer the stigma of a frighteningly immoral and
      undemocratic act by its government.







--
                                              daveus rattus   

                                    yer friendly neighborhood ratman

                                KOYAANISQATSI

    ko.yaa.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
        in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.  
          5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.