From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 14:38:14 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <schiller.726487694@hpas5>, schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:

|> My position as a scientist is that facts, i.e. the  results of observation,
|> are the basis of theories. There are no "well-known" flaws of this position. 
...

|> The discussion would become more interesting if somebody of the opposing camp
|> would  give a precise example of which "theory" is necessary to observe
|> something ! (Eddington surely was not able to do so ...)

There really is abundant literature in this area stretching back
at least 50 years.  If the flaws in the positions are not known to
you, this is simply a comment on the breadth of your study of
methodological areas.  The positivists (many of whom were physicists
themselves, and with whom I share *great* sympathies) attempted to
base their epistemology on the fundamental concept of an "observation
statement" and the sharp distinction between observation terms
and theoretical terms.  This (so far as I, and I think anyone else
can see) is precisely the position you are taking in insisting that
"facts" ("results of observations") are independent of theory.  The
flaws to this are, I repeat, well-known.  There remain very interesting
issues in the area of observation, what it is, what it's relation to
theory is, etc.  This is an area which interested me particularly when I
was an academic, and in fact my last substantial research project
as such was an NSF grant in just this area.  I do have sympathy with
your view, but as phrased it simply will not do.

The fact that you put the question by requesting an example of how
a theory is necessary to observe something indicates a lack of
understanding and sensitivity to the real issues.  I don't need a
theory to observe *something*.  But to say (in a coherent manner
and with a clear intersubjective sense) that *what* I have observed
is an *electron* requires substantial theoretical superstructure.

A couple of years ago one of my sons built a Wilson cloud chamber
(for a science fair) and did several of the usual experiments.
We all stood around and observed the alpha particles.  No, wait.
I didn't actually see the *alpha particle*.  I saw a trail of vapor
in the chamber. No, wait some more.  How do I know that it was
*vapor* I saw?  What I saw was a white line against the black
background of the chamber.

Demonstrate this experiment to someone with no knowledge of *theory*
and you won't (can't!) get them to say

	I see a vapor trail.
	I see an alpha particle.

Now *you* can say

	What they see is a vapor trail.
	What they see is an alpha particle.

but you say this (and *justify* these assertions) based on the *theory*
that you know.  You can *say* that each of the following is a fact:

	There is a white line of something in the chamber.
	There is a vapor trail in the chamber.
	There is the track of an alpha particle in the chamber.

But there is an important *difference* among these "facts".  If you
don't recognize that difference and how it plays a role in theory
development, theory confirmation, theory acceptance and rejection;
and if you simply lump all of these "facts" together and insist that
they are all independent of theory; then you may call yourself a
scientist, but you won't be a very good one.

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
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