From: jgd@dixie.com (John De Armond)
Subject: Re: Nuclear Power and Climate Change
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 93 09:44:53 GMT
Organization: Dixie Communications Public Access.  The Mouth of the South.

wcarroll@encore.com (William Carroll) writes:

>Thank you, John, for the excellent explantion.

Yer welcome :-)

>>The siren system is NOT a part of the plant other than there is a trip
>>button on the control panel.

>This is definitely NOT the impression given by news reports.

Media lie or mislead?  nah.. :-)

To expand on this a bit, the emergency siren system is designed to 
make sure every person inside the 10 mile radius evacuation zone can
be warned of emergencies.  sirens are not mandated; Midland opted
for supplying a radio to every resident inside the area, but they 
are the most common.  At almost every plant I've been involved with,
the sirens are triggered by radio, the rest were by dedicated phone
lines.  Each siren site contains a motor driven siren of from 10 to
50 horsepower, a radio receiver and controlling electronics.  each
siren is individually addressable plus there is an "all call" code
for simultaneously triggering them all.  (Interesting aside.
At TMI we had a real problem with a prankster.  They forgot to design
in a time stamp into the control protocol which enabled the prankster
to record the audio tones broadcast for the "all call" and then
drive around while playing them back through a low power transmitter.
He'd trigger 2 or 3 sirens at once.  They time out after 10 minutes
but it kinda degraded the public confidence  in the system.)

The central control and transmitter is located at the off-site 
Emergency Operations Center for the simple reason that it might be necessary
to sound an alarm after the plant has become uninhabitable after an
accident.  There is a circuit - two redundant ones, actually - from
the EOC to the control room so the operators can trigger the sirens
AND so they can do routine testing which involves firing them off 
once a week, typically at noon on Saturday.  At TMI, for example,
they just installed a couple of industrial grade pushbuttons in a box
and bolted it to the shift supervisor's desk.  This desk is located
inside the horseshoe control board area but not on the board.

>>>So why should I believe Turkey Point is that much better designed than
>>>Homestead AFB?

>>Because we tell you it is.

>But you admittedly have no more experience or knowledge of USAF specs than
>I have of either. I'm sure the AF felt just as good about the integrity of
>their hangars as you do about the integrity of a nuke plant. Frankly, I
>don't think anyone has the necessary experience weathering hurricanes to
>fell confident in their assumptions about what will happen in one.

My comment was semi tongue in cheek.  I actually do have a decent bit
of knowledge by virtue of seeing pretty detailed pictures of the 
wrecked buildings on TV.  I can compare what I see to what I know
about regarding nuclear plants.  I've a real problem with any metal/sheet
metal building being called "hurricane proof".  I wonder if the USAF
really does call 'em hurricane proof or is this more "media enhancement"
of the facts.

Making a NP survive just about any natural disaster short of a volcano
is pretty easy.  Determine what the worst weather has been, double 
that and then pour enough concrete to withstand it.  Make sure
all outside openings are either above the high water mark or equipped 
with water-tight doors and away you go.   There is little practical limit 
to what can be withstood using this method.  Hey, you ought to see
what constitutes earthquake-proofing the place.  :-)

John
-- 
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