From: miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: The Cosmological Bad Dream
Date: 3 Oct 92 10:57:50 CDT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <qk42RB1w165w@netlink.cts.com>, snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:
> miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
> 
>> I'm a linguist, and though you might think linguistics has little
>> relevance to the issue you raised, I think it does.  The problem in
>> the public's perception of cosmology is that the public takes
>> what scientists say about the universe as a set of *assertions*
>> while the speech act that cosmologists are actually performing is
>> that of *assumption* or *working assumption.*  The difference is
>> important.

>       The new physics is long past questions of working assumptions,
> when generations of scientists have come and gone utilizing those same
> assumptions. Certain principles become so ingrained they are taken
> as true, and if you argue that they are just assumptions you will
> provoke some heated debate -- even amongst philosophers -- as Kuhn
> and others have shown. There is a strong desire to see science as a
> window on absolute truth at any given time, with the modest admission
> that the window might not be perfectly transparent. This is 
> understandable amongst lab techs, but unfortunately is prevalent
> on all levels. As many people are beginning to realize, there is
> a lot to be gained from a study of the sociology of science, not to
> mention the linguistics.

     I wonder if I might go into this a little further and ask some
questions.
     Actually, Speech Act theory *is* philosophy, since it's from
Austin.  His basic insight was that not everything is an assertion. 
The theory initiated by him and developed by Searle and others
posits felicity conditions for various speech acts: complaining,
insulting, questioning, etc. and of course including asserting. 
The way you support the claim that a given set of felicity
conditions are correct for a given speech act is by seeing what
happens when they are violated: what happens is that the speaker is
judged by the speech community to be irrational (or bizarre, or
ignorant of how the language is used, or whatever).
     One of the conditions for a felicitous *assertion* is that the
speaker have evidence for its truth at the time of utterance. 
Since a testable, non-obvious and therefore non-trivial scientific
hypothesis is supported or falsified or revised for years after it
is stated, it seems to me that a scientific hypothesis cannot be an
assertion.  This works out empirically: if the hearer of an
assertion later discovers a single counter-example, (s)he concludes
that the assertion was false.  A single counter-example rarely
falsifies a scientific hypothesis, but rather leads to its
revision; you keep a good theory (a fortiori if it's the only
theory you have) in the face of many apparent counter-examples.
     If some present-day scientists are as you suggest treating
hypotheses and working assumptions as assertions, then they must be
using language in a special way.  What is very puzzling is why the
expected bizarreness-reaction of hearers is not much in evidence. 
Thousands of people watch TV programs which seem to perform such
assertions as "The following is what occurred during the first
three minutes of the existence of the universe" and don't bat an
eye.  This must be part of the sociological factor you mentioned.
-- 
********************************** +.............................+
*- Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>* :All opinions expressed herein:
*There is no privileged position.* :are my own and are not to be :
*	-God, Derrida, others    * : attributed to my employer   :
********************************** +.............................+

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