From: shoham@ll.mit.edu (Daniel Shoham)
Subject: Deportees
Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 92 06:57:58 GMT


The "deportation crisis" is somewhat of a red herring, and a rather interesting
study of post-Likud/post-cold-war Arab-Israeli politic.

 I would (greatly) oversimplify by summerizing in one line the views of the 4
non-religious political blocks in Israel:
"Right-of-Likud" - All Arabs want us all dead, strong determined action needed.
Likud            - Most Arabs want us all dead, do whatever works for now.
Labor            - Many Arabs will compromise, do whatever works for now.
"Left-of-Labor"  - Most Arabs will compromise, territorial deal NOW.

The similarity between Likud and Labor explain why they often worked together
(conterary to popular opinion of the two's incompatibility). The left-of-labor
coalition members (MERETZ), would like to have a PLO state in (some?, much?,
all? of) the territories captured in 1967 as a compromise they consider will
be acceptable to Palestinians. They realize that much of the Israeli public is
not overly enthused with the idea but consider it something they can GRADUALLY
sell if the PLO and the Arab states can deliver (peace). From MERETZ point of
view, we (MERETZ) will deliver the Israeli "radicals" and the PLO will deliver
the Palestinian ones - allowing a compromise of the "center". While Likud &
right, consider the difference between "moderates" (PLO) and radicals (Hamas)
to be only of means (the PLO is willing to kill us in stages, HAMAS insists on
doing it all at once), Labor & left consider it a genuine difference (the PLO
will leave us alone if we make a territorial deal, HAMAS will not).

In the Palestinian street HAMAS and the PLO have been batteling for control
for several years now. The PLO was still dominant, but HAMAS was gaining. In
Gaza, HAMAS and the PLO were compeatative while the PLO still had the edge in
the West Bank. 
Events of the week leading to the explusion (HAMAS killing of Israeli soldiers,
topped off by the kidnap-murder), tipped the balance strongly in favor of HAMAS
in it's battle for support. Volunteers were joining HAMAS in droves. This
presented the Labor-MERETZ government with a dual problem: security - if
killing Israelis is so popular, more are sure to come; and peace process - if
the PLO lose control to HAMAS, no compromise - territorial or otherwise would
be possible. The situation was presented in great urgency - the only apparent
approach was to physically break the HAMAS organizational capacity. By
arresting 1600 HAMAS activists (a significant number, perhaps the entire known
organizational aparatus) the ability of HAMAS to plan activities and accept
volunteers would be greatly hampered. In that respect, the operation worked
well - no farther killing of soldiers or (as threatened) civilians took place.
As far as Labor was concerened, the election promise to keep security was kept.
As for saving the position of the PLO to keep the peace talks going - things
didn't turn out as planned. MERETZ called on the PLO to join forces with Israel
(specifically with "peace-loving" Israelis like themselves) to root out the
"anti-peace" HAMAS. After dithering for 36 hours (perhaps considering the
MERETZ offer - which was earnest, if naive), the PLO disapointed MERETZ by
pointedly siding with HAMAS.
While Likud + Right are not surprised - they always considered the PLO as more
the brothers of HAMAS than a reasonable partner for compromise - the PLO may
have wanted to accept the MERETZ offer but was affraid this would be commiting
organizational suicide.

Note that I have yet to say a word about the expulsions, just the arrests. I
find little distinction, actually. While various interpertation of "morality"
and "international law" are quick to find a distinction, operationally both
actions serve very similar purposes in a very similar manner. They remove from
"the street" individual deemed important for the HAMAS organization capability
while serving to (perhaps) deter anti-Israeli activities (not all people are
zealots who are un-deter-able, some people have families and can't afford to
"get involved"). Since speed was of the essence in that operation, there is no
way "proper legal channels" could have been consulted (there are Israeli laws
allowing for such emergency-mass-arrests, for the legality-inclined).
The expulsion were judged to satisfy the Israeli public that Labor is no less
"tough on terrorists" than Likud was. An international "outcry" was anticipated
- but one no different than the "routine" outcry Israel gets on a regular
basis whenever anything half-significant happens (the arrest of 1600 HAMASist
would surely generate the routine outcry).

What Labor-MERETZ did not anticipate was the Syrian reaction (there is no such
thing as a Lebanese reaction). When the IDF (figurativly speaking) opened their
operation manuel to the chapter called "expulsions" it said something like:
" Procedure on expulsions: 1. Place expelees on buses. 2. Drive to the Lebanon
security zone. 3. With proper cover proceed to the no-man-land. 4. Disembark
expelees. 5. Provide each expelee with $50 cash and a trenchcoat. 6. Go home.
After being photographed by the foreign media, the expelee would take a taxi
to Beirut to meet representatives of his organization."
Since the Syrians must be interested in the peace talk (as it is the only
realistic way for them to regain any territory), Labor-MERETZ did not even
consider the posibility of Lebanon not allowing the expelees in (they never
gave Likud any troubles - surely they don't preffer Likud to us?).

Assad (of Syria), however, had a different idea. As a minority ruler, he has
very little interest in a formal peace treaty and an introspective focus for
his government and population (that is not to say that he fails to see the
disadvantages of active war - he just like to keep the fire at a low level,
like it is now). Assad values the continuing state of affairs more than the
Golan (which is why he won't even pay the lip service of promissing peace in
return for anything - Golan or otherwise). Terminating the peace talk with
Israel as the apparent "guilty" party is just ideal for Assad.
By escalating the deportation crisis from a "routine outcry" to a "major
outcry", Assad forced the PLO's hand. It had to side with HAMAS and against
MERETZ. As Labor could not - without a major loss of face, and future votes -
back down (and MERETZ, having also voted for the deportation, likewise), a
crisis big enough to kill the peace talks was created. Assad has demonstrated
his mastery of Mid-east politics once again.

Labor is not entirely displeased with the outcome. Even "major outcries" blow
over (there is no shortage of other world crisis to occupy the Western press).
Israeli voters will remember (be reminded of) their resolve against terrorists.
Even if the presently formatted peace talk do not survive, any Arab party that
will not return to the negotiation table after the affair blows over was, in
all likelihood, not interested in a compromise anyhow (how could any Arab
party ever hope to get a better deal from a future Likud-led, or even Labor-
Likud coalition, or from war?).
Well, MERETZ, finally realizing what happened under their watch are quite
unhappy. Have they been in the opposition, they would now be in the streets
demonstrating against the government actions. However, having voted for it,
they are locked into a course they regret they ever started. To try and salvage
the situation, they decided to offer the PLO direct talks (a move they 
originally intended to make much, much later - after the Israeli public was
sold on several intermediate steps). I suspect the PLO would not have, as 
MERETZ clearly hoped, said "Oh, direct talks. Great, thats what we have been
waiting for. Let's get down to business right away. And, oh, don't worry about
those HAMAS fellas - we never really meant it when we said they are our
brothers. No one would remember them when Arafat visits Yad-Vashem before
giving a speech in the Kneset?". Well, we will never know, Rabin riding high
in Israeli public opinion was not about to trash his approval ratings to
satisfy the MERETZ agenda (using American political lingo here, I'm affraid).

Ok, what's next:
- Look for a symbolic acceptance of a few deportees back on all sort of excuses
  (wrong ID, paperwork mistake, yes they are HAMAS members we are taking back,
   but not the one we "intended" to deport, etc)
   Anything up to, say, 50 returnees is symbolic. Above that, Rabin is cracking

- PLO, Jordan, and "moderate" Arabs publicly announce that they can not live
  with such small meaningless gestures, but they do nonetheless.

- The camp becoming semi-permenent (for the 2-year expulsion period). Some sort
  of arrangement to allow UN supplies to reach the camp is worked out (but not
  necessarily publicized).

- To prevent a ceremonious return 2 years from now, Israel would allow - in
  small lots - groups to return before that period ends. Perhaps a half within
  a year, perhaps all within 18 month.
   
- The whole issue blows over by new-year.

- Despite Assads best efforts, the peace talks resume after Clinton takes
  office, and Syria can't afford to (totally) boycut them. (But they can afford
  to drag things forever, Rabin won't mind - as long as he can win the next
  election).

- The story won't even make the news-roundup of 1993 that magazines and other
  news media love to do around this time of the (next) year (I think 1993 will
  have enough "world" news to fill volumes without this diversion).


What could go wrong: (not likely, but not out of the question)
- Suppose, Iraq, in its new policy to test the limits of the box it is in,
 launches, over the next few days, a Scud that the UN says it no longer has, in
 the general direction of Israel, saying some bombastic statement linking the
 launch to the expulsions. 
 Will U.S. forces based in Saudi Arabia act? (making the two appear to be 
 defending Israel and it's expulsionist policies) Will Israel overfly Jordanian
 airspace and find something dear to Saddam's heart to bomb that still stands?
 (can't believe there are too many such targets). Hard to see Israel willing to
 go into a tit-for-tat scud/bombing exchange with Iraq.

- Some (but more than a handfull) deportees die. In particular, if at the
  hand of Israeli/South Lebanese forces (say, during an attempt to march back).
  The ability of Arab nations and the PLO to forget the whole affair after a
  short time and return to the table may be destroyed. Assad would love to see
  that happen, but it is not so easy to motivate manipulated individual all the
  way to walk into their death. Conterary to popular misconception, zealots -
  even Muslim ones - do not cheerfully walk into their death (there are some
  exceptions to this rule, but not as much as the propoganda of their
  organizations proclaims).

- A spectacular (and "successfull") terrorist action against Israel by HAMAS.
  It need not kill many people (like the kidnap-murder that "only" killed one),
  just be "spectacular". Rabin may feel compeled to save his "tough-on-terror"
  reputation by a farther mass-action (and perhaps finds himself playing the
  expulsion-for-killing game with HAMAS, like Likud's airstrikes-for-anything
  game with the PLO).


Dan Shoham               shoham@ll.mit.edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The view presented are not necessarily those of my employer, etc.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lincoln Laboratory
244 Wood Street
Lexington Massachusetts, 02173-9108
Office B-373
617-981-3515
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: soc.culture.jewish