From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Philosophy and Myth
Date: 7 Apr 92 23:14:31 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Apr3.203251.20339@osf.org> fjc@osf.org (Frank Casper) writes:
>In article <1992Apr3.161924.13687@news.eng.convex.com>, cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
...
>	By the way, could you explain a bit more about this statement of
>yours?

>>As for metaphysics, the problem with it is--as Wittgenstein pointed out
>>long ago (and as I only lately realized)--that it seeks to cast questions
>>into a scientific form, though they are not the right type of questions for
>>this.

You're quite right to ask for an explanation of this, though I'm not
certain that I'm up to it. 

Some metaphysical questions seem to have a form that looks very much like
the form of an empirical--or scientific--question. For example, "What is
the nature of consciousness?" is one that used to exercise me a great
deal. I thought that consciousness was some sort of "process"--something
that "goes on", so I wanted to find an explanation of just what kind of
process this is. Wittgenstein address this very point in section 308 of 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS:

	 How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and
	states and about behaviourism arise? --The first step is the one
	that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and
	leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more
	about them--we think. But that is just what commits us to a
	particular way of looking at the matter.  For we have a definite
	concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The
	decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was
	the very one that we thought quite innocent.) --And now the analogy
	which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we
	have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored
	medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And
	naturally we don't want to deny them.

When we set up a philosophical question like this ("What characterizes the
process of thinking? How does the mind interact with the body?") we believe
that we are posing it in neutral terms, but we are not. We have an analogy
in mind, and the analogy invites us to explore the question just as though
we were answering a question, say, of physics or biology.

When we ask the question like this, it seems as though getting an answer
were a matter of doing a hazy kind of physics, or a diaphanous
neurophysiology. The temptation is to think that just as we have theories
in physics, we need a theory of consciousness; just as we have mechanisms
in neurophysiology, we need a mechanism that illuminates the mind-body
interaction.

Though such questions have the form of questions that can be answered
empirically (by an experiment), they can't really be answered like this. To
attempt to answer them empirically--for example, by taking photographs (as
some have claimed to take photographs of the "auras" that surround persons)
leads one deeper in mystical confusion. The most valuable thing one can do
in connection with such questions is to examine why one wants to ask them.

For example, what is one asking who asks, "What is consciousness?". What is
the basis of this question? What do we mean by "consciousness"? _Does_ this
word have a meaning when it's used like this? 



-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:559 alt.mythology:1069