From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Truth and Denotation (was re: Philosophical Influence)
Organization: Oklahoma State University
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 92 00:59:12 GMT

From article <1992Aug18.130222.14853@husc3.harvard.edu>, by zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):
> In article <1992Aug18.035040.13732@a.cs.okstate.edu>
> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
> 
> 
> COO:
>>>>>>Second, it comes as no surprise that you find the
>>>>>>second task of philosophy as that which concerns meaning--this point
>>>>>>and your first task go hand in hand.  It turns out, Mikhail, that the
>>>>>>two tasks you have set forth, as divided in two, can not
>>>>>>be seperated.  Confused?  Always look to the function of the sign,
>>>>>>the function of the sign is to structure.  Since it was the structure
>>>>>>you were looking for, and since the sign is to structure, your first
>>>>>>task should have stated "find meaning."  And finding meaning, Mikhail,
>>>>>>is the purpose of philosophy--See...Heidegger isn't so bad, now is he?
> 
> MZ:
>>>>>You seem to be confusing the function of the sign with its structure.  The
>>>>>function of the sign is to denote; otherwise, I assure you, we wouldn't be
>>>>>having this conversation.
> 
> COO:
>>>>And what does denotation do Mikhail?  Structure..  Denotation and structuring
>>>>go hand in hand unless you would like to 
>>>>explain why they do not--I would be much appreciative. Mmm. Now you
>>>>are back to square one.  
> 
> MZ:
>>>Unfortunately for you, the burden of proof lies on the party making a
>>>positive claim.  Denotation doesn't have to do anything, except be denoted.
>>>If you think otherwise, try telling me why.
> 
> COO:
>>Denote 'denotation' and you will have formed a structure.  Thus,
>>denotating structures.  OH, and I am so dissapointed.  Yes, the
>>key verb there is 'formed.'  (BTW, I hardly felt burdened)

MZ:> 
> Once you distinguish the relation from its terms, this will no longer
> appear reasonable.  Denotation is a relation that holds between a sign and
> the object it represents; the term `denotation' is also used metonymically
> to stand for the object so represented. 

First, on your definition of denotation, quite clear I might add, we 
already see the first pressuposition:  that of the difference between 
the sign and its object.  Before one denotes, one already has in mind
that there is a distinction.   This, of course, is not the area of
the problem in and of itself--rather it provides access to the area
of the problem.  In essense, you are claiming that the (sorry if I
borrow Heidegger's jargon, but it works) in-order-to of a denotation IS
to represent that which it IS NOT.  I don't know how Platonic you want
to get on this issue, however I don't sense a strong Platonism in this
statement.  As such, I will not address the Platonic problem.   I 
assume, therefore, that the sign does not equal the object ontologically;
under Platonism this is not clearly the case(as it is a matter of debate).
Thus, we can arrive at a few conclusions.  First, the in-order-to
of denotation assumes an ontological difference between the sign
and the object.  This is a structure.  Second, following the first, that
the structure was already implied pre-applicationally to the function
of denotation.  Third, following second, that structure was presupposed.
Finally, I still maintatin there is no difference to be made out
of your "two tasks" of philosophy given  In consequence they should be 
conflated to "find meaning."

MZ:

> A sign is a term in the denoting
> relation; as such it is indeed a member of a structure.  However, its
> function is not to structure, in any meaningful sense of that expression,

   You are correct to point out that its 'function' is not to structure,
as the structure is already implied.

> but to represent, that is to act as proxy of the object denoted by it.  Any
> structure of the object is logically, and hence ontologically prior to the
> representational structure of the sign-object relation.  Only the latter is
> formed in the act of naming; if your point is limited to that, I fail to
> see its relevance.

  Here I disagree again.  The structure of the sign is
ontologically prior to the object, and hence the sign-object relation.
If this were not the case, application of the sign to some essence
or accidental would in every case be an impossibility.


> 
> COO:
>>>>>>Your next question is probably "so what's wrong?"  The answer is:
>>>>>>nothing, so long as you don't pressupose reality in the finding of meaning
>>>>>>and here I say "reality" not "being" because being is always presupposed..
> 
> MZ:
>>>>>I don't presuppose much of anything these days, -- doctor's orders.
>>>>>Instead, I deduce things, as far as I can, and no further.  Reality of
>>>>>meaning is one of them; being, though decidedly not a big deal, is another.
>>>>>Have I mentioned Parmenides yet?
> 
> COO:
>>>>First, Being can not be deduced--it is always presupposed. 
> 
> MZ:
>>>I take the _cogito_ over the overwhelming authority of your claim.
> 
> COO:
>>And this is your mistake--although philosophically understandable.
> 
> Unless you succeed in convincing me in your own words that the _cogito_ is
> a philosophical mistake, I'll remain lost to the light of your wisdom.
> Incidentally, "reality in the finding of meaning" is deducible by other
> means, on which see below.

The _cogito_ is not a philosophical mistake as such.   The idea that
it is somehow ontologically prior to Being is.

> COO:
>>>>							     Second,
>>>>meaning can be deduced, as it has been, but it is not limited to a simple
>>>>deduction.   Ontically, meaning is deductable.  
> 
> MZ:
>>>I fail to understand this claim.
> 
> COO:
>>Which claim?  If the latter, you either understand it or you don't.
>>As to the former, meaning should have been with scare-quotes 'meaning'
>>to denote that I was refering to the concept.  However, this brings me
>>to a critical point that I think hasn't been brought up.  
>>The problem that I find with the representational crap is that it
>>limits the "horizon" of the word.  Words are always in use.  Whenever
>>the word comes under analysis it is even further in use.  However, 
>>its use now is one which fits a particular philosophical agenda.  
>>There is the issue of history and world that seems to be ignored
>>in representational theories. 
> 
> I take it that you are unfamiliar with the work of Popper, who regards the
> Third World as evolved, rather than immutable.  Once again, I have
> absolutely no interest in giving an exposition of his views, as the burden
> of so doing clearly belongs to the party pronouncing *all* representational
> theories to be "crap".

No exposition is necessary; I happen to be quite familiar with Popper.
The problem with Popper lies in the first two worlds.  The third world
as evolved is the critical mistake.  Perhaps if he had gone in reverse
his ideas might make more sense.


> 
> COO:
>>			       When, for example, we analyze the
>>meaning of a word in philosophy, or philology, we attempt to pin
>>it down to a particular "historical" period, within a particular
>>contextual arrangement under which the word is employed.  The problem
>>that I find with this is simply that we provide no analysis of the
>>analysis--we act as though the present action of analysis has no
>>impact on the word's meaning.  Because of this, I refer to representational
>>theories as "crap."
> 
> Looks like you don't know Tarski, either.

In fact, I have not read any Tarski--perhaps I should take a look.  Do
you have a title you would recommend?


>  Does the distinction between an
> object language and a metalanguage ring a bell?  Aside from that, of course
> metalinguistic analysis will trickle down into the object language, -- it's
> all part of the normal semantic evolution.  The mere fact of distinguishing
> between _genesis_ and _on_ doesn't entitle you to infer that the
> historicity of the former has no bearing on the essential nature of the
> latter.

  In fact, I haven't claimed this at all--if anything, I am concerned
as to the sort of effect that the historicity of the _on_ has on the
_genesis_ of the word under analysis.  This has, in fact, been my
entire point.  The representational stance tends to maintain that
historicity doesn't exist whenever it comes to interpret a word--it
is this very point that leads me to find it as 'crap.'  It acts as
if the word simply denotes that which it has been led to denote throughout
its use in history--its implications on the present and the future are
never considered..  If a word historizes, then this is a mistake.
I concur with Heidegger that 'history' as such has a remarkably 
priveledged connotation of the 'past.'

MZ:
> If you feel that there exist severe philosophical
> ramifications, which are deducible from premisses acceptable to both of us,
> without _petitio principii_, then please show them to me; otherwise I'll
> continue to choose my familiar ideas over your pompous revisionist
> pronouncements.  Note that your `wh'-questions just don't make the grade.

If words have a history, or if historicity of a word can even be a question
as I think it can, then how do we expect that our words will have
anything to say about "reality."  Being, on the other hand, already
exists prior to the word, the object, and the application of the 
one to the other.  'Reality,' as such, really denotes the current
interpretation of the world.   As such, 'reality' is relative.  However,
Being is not. 

> 
> My pleasure: `truth' is an English word signifying the quality of being
> true, conformity with fact, agreement with reality, and so on. 

  But if it is 'fact' and 'reality' that come under question, we
see your defensiveness.  So tell me, what is fact and what is reality?
That which is true?  And haven't we just formed a circle?

> So where were all your ideas?

Well, you replied to them...  And, it seems we may have actually
moved forward this time....  I have to infer that you at least found
them to be ideas as you had already claimed the discussion was over
unless I presented some...

> 
> cordially,
> mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
> "Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."

So, is it when you tie people up, or is it when you type in your
arguments?

> 

And how many days from now is it now Mikhail?  are you leaving for
good or are you planning on comming back?

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
 
Sorry guys, no quote from C. G. Jung for now...
------------------------------------------------------------------------



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