HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: lynch@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov (Nicki Lynch)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
Subject: What information is out there?
Date: 8 Jan 93 20:38:47 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology

I am part of a team preparing information for presentation at the
National Computer Security Conference in September 1993 in
Baltimore, MD.  We are interested in the resources available to
computer security practitioners.  This includes the various forums,
groups, or sites distributing computer security information.  For
example, here at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, we have a computer security bulletin board which
provides computer security information and resources, as well as a
place for discussion.  As an adjunct, we have an anonymous FTP site
which offers our information in electronic downloadable form.  

We are familiar with RISK Forum, VIRUS-L, DOCKMASTER, and the
various newsgroups on Usenet (Alt.security and Comp.security.misc
among them) which have computer security discussions.  We're
interested in finding other resources; those resources might
include newsletters, forums, bulletin boards, information services,
clearinghouses, journals, electronic sites having computer security
information available on-line, and resources of computer security
training materials.  In short, what is available out there for the
computer security practitioner.

While primarily focused on services available to government
computer security practitioners, we are also interested in
resources and information of use to the rest of the community.  We
are especially interested in services on Internet and other nets
(such as Fido or Compuserv) or universities that offer computer
security information.  

The objective of our presentation is to let people know what is out
there, where it is "on the nets" and how to access it.

Any information would be welcome, along with suggestions about the
scope of the presentation. Please make the information on the
resources as specific as possible.  Thank you in advance.

Nickilyn Lynch
Computer Scientist, NIST
lynch@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov
(301) 975-4267
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: nur@mars.dgrc.doc.ca (Nur Serinken)
Subject: Re: Motorola 'Secure-Clea
Reply-To: nur@mars.dgrc.doc.ca
Organization: Communication Research Centre
Distribution: na
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 13:33:47 GMT

In article 7026@netcom.com, rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:

What about the modern analog devices that use split band inversion where
one of 32 programmable split points in the voice band may be selected
and changed at 60 Hz or faster at "random?"  Two separate inversions
are performed, one for the lower sideband and one for the upper
sideband around the split point.  This seems *much* harder.  This topic
has come up before but perhaps we have new readers.  Does anyone have
any actual knowledge of or experience at trying to decode such a
signal?  With such short segments it seems to me that only brute force
"try the possibilities" could work and the combinatorics are rather
formidable with 32^60 or 2E90 possibilities in each second's worth of
speech. 

Combine this with spread spectrum or Pulson modulation and, well....

What's Pulson modulation?  It is a method where the signal is impressed
on a carrier that is a sequence of pseudo randomly spaced 1.5 ns pulses
by dithering the pulse position about its expected position.  In theory
this can only be demodulated by a receiver that knows the pseudo random
spacing of the carrier pulse train.  A transceiver has been
demonstrated by Pulson Communications using a pulse train centered at
1.9 GHz with a 100% pseudo random modulation of the pulses about the
center period (before dithering.)  Now that I think about it, a PRN
that can spit out a new number every 500 ps sounds rather difficult.
Not to mention the method for controling the pulse position that
rapidly.  Well, they say they have done it anyway.

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

End of article from Bob Cain.


If the 32 folding frequencies are identified by analyzing spectograph of the
encrypted signal, the inversion operation will be trivial. At the 32 folding
frequencies there will be a deep null and some folding sine wave leaking. If
the folding operation is performed at 16 msec intervals when one folding location
in time is identified next folding operation will be 16 msec later. ( 16 msec is
assumed if the folding performed at 60 times per second ). If the system uses
same 32 folding frequencies a parallel bank of detector filters can detect
the folding points and invert them.

---


Nur  Serinken       | Communications Research Centre -DRL
		    | PO Box 11490 Stn "H"
                    | Ottawa, ON K2H 8S2
Voice-(613) 998-2289| Canada
Fax  -(613) 990-7987| 
INTERNET: nur@mars.dgrc.doc.ca

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.1 source posted to alt.sources
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 17:37:31 GMT

vanzwol@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Ted Van Zwol) writes:
>In article <1993Jan7.115335.1216@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:
>>I have posted the PGP 2.1 sources to alt.sources - see the posting itself for
>>more details (I assume everyone knows what PGP 2.1 is :-).
>
>This intrigues me.  I'm not accusing you (Peter) of anything, but consider:
>
>How do we know the PGP sources on alt.sources (or even that on any FTP site
>for that matter) are "safe".  What kind of precautions or checks exist to
>prevent bogus code from cropping up.  Why couldn't some intelligence agency
>get their hands on the code and weaken the encryption algorithm just enough
>for them and then distribute the modified source to the rest of the world.

Well, if you have an earlier version of PGP that you trust, someone
can digtially sign the new version and you can trust it if the
signature corresponds to someone you trust.

Admittedly this does not solve the bootstrap problem, but then again
nothing does. How do you know that ANYONE is trustworthy? How do you
know your wife isn't poisoning you, for example?

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Anti-spoofing protocol?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 09:00:57 GMT


The problem of detecting a spoof in between two ends of a
Diffie-Hellman exchange is unsolved, as far as I know, using any known
protocol.  Is that changed if the crypto boxes at each end can have an
embedded unique electronic ID that cannot be retrieved from the box
(hypothetically at least?)

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

    'The meek shall inherit the earth--the rest of us will move on..'
                                                    Sameer Parekh


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
From: mab@wdl39.wdl.loral.com (Mark A Biggar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Date: 12 Jan 93 00:16:28 GMT
Organization: Loral Western Development Labs

In article <1993Jan11.070508.12914@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
>And you have to consider the competition, such as a stealth airplane
>designed specifically for reconnaissance. Airplanes can get a lot
>closer to the subject than satellites, and they let you easily change
>the instruments to suit the mission. They can also loiter in one spot
>for a long time.
>Now if you could keep the existence of such a plane secret, perhaps by
>retiring your known spy airplanes with great fanfare and issuing a
>cover story about how they've been completely replaced by satellites,
>then you might actually be able to use it repeatedly before your
>adversary even begins to suspect you have it. Of course, you might
>have to make up another cover story to explain all those sonic booms
>heard on a regular basis here in Southern California...

Such a replacement for the SR-71 exists.  I believe that the name of the 
new plane is "Aurora" and that there has been at least one article speculating
about it in Air&Space.

--
Mark Biggar
mab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com
From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PKZIP cracking contest -- post-mortem?
Summary: What was the password?
Date: 7 Jan 93 16:51:55 GMT
Organization: Banzai Institute

Now that the 31 Dec 92 deadline for the PKware contest ("crack this
zip-encrypted file") has passed, I'd like to know what the password really
was.  I did some initial hacks based on looking at passwords that passed
the CRC test in the header, then looked for things that they had in
common, hypothesizing that if they <did> have something in common, that
would give a clue as to what the password looked like.

So I threw lots of passwords at it, and came up with some interesting
commonalities.  For example, I fed it all five-letter passwords drawn
from printable characters (my Sparcstation was busy while I was in Japan
for a couple of weeks!), and came up with these most common 4-letter
substrings from the 5-letter passwords that passed the CRC.  There were
74,472 passwords that worked, including (for example):

	4Hut@
	7dhdA
	5$.~W
	+}h]y
	((w~~

To give you a flavor of the more usual kind of things, here are all of the
substrings that were common to exactly 4 of the semi-successful passwords:

        &\"r (\'j .x\` >\`\ H\`B O\"\ \",\ \"2\ \"4\ \"P\ \"XK \"b\ \'#{
        \'T1 \'\\ \'f\ \`.\ \`3, \`4M \`5\ \`92 \`X\ \`g\ b\`\ d\'\ g\"\
        oi\' zu\' }f\'

Notice that there are many backslashes and quotes of one kind or another.

Now here's everything above 4 occurrences of common substrings in
CRC-passing passwords:

   5 )\'k
   5 C\"Q
   5 _\`\
   7 \`Y\
  14 \'\`
  20 \"\`
  22 \'\"
  22 \`\"
  24 \"\'
  27 \`\`
  30 \"\"
  31 \`\'
  33 \'\'

There's a dramatic peak of things with backslash and one or the other kind
of quotes.  This is kind of interesting, because these are characters hard
to pass through the shell to a program (like pkzip).

I didn't have time to follow up on this and try to extend it to 7-letter
passwords composed of these characters and a few others, but I'm quite
curious now to find out if the <real> password had a preponderance of this
stuff (backslashes and quotes), or whether my whole search strategy was
out to lunch.  Could somebody from PKware comment?
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Monday, 16 Afteryule S.R. 1993, 16:52
From: lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org (Mr. Lyn R. Kennedy)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 09:34:46 CST
Organization: Radio Amateur k5qwb

karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:

> In article <1993Jan10.122415.20405@bernina.ethz.ch> caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz
> >Isn't there a possibility to place some mirrors up there, align their 
> >positions by measuring distances between them with laser or whatsoever,
> >and then computationally combine the so won pictures ?
> 
> I thought about this some time ago, because it would be the only way
> to overcome the fundamental limits on what you can do from orbital
> altitude with something that can fit inside the payload fairing of a
> launcher like the Titan (commonly used to launch spy payloads out of
> Vandenburg).

It seems it would be more feasable to take several pictures by the same 
satellite at slightly different locations and combine them 
electronically. I'm not sure I understand the limits of this but I've 
been led to beleive that it works. A similar method is being used with 
radio-telescopes, recording the information simultaneously at several 
sites and then combining the data to get better resolution.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 
73,            internet     | lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org
Lyn Kennedy    packet radio | K5QWB @ N5LDD.#NTX.TX.US.NA
               pony express | P.O. Box 5133, Ovilla, TX, USA 75154

-------------- "We have met the enemy and he is us."  Pogo --------------
From: rick@ee.uwm.edu (Rick Miller)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Keys&Encrypts Transmitted Together
Date: 10 Jan 1993 13:41:21 GMT
Organization: Just me.
Distribution: usa
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.2.33
Summary: Security through Obscurity

In article <73247@cup.portal.com> Christopher_C_Lapp@cup.portal.com writes:
>I wonder if anyone has thought of including the key of a 
>message with the message, in such a way that the key of the 
>message was on the surface indistinguishable from the 
>message.  [...]

What you've got then, is "Security through Obscurity".  In reality, the
"key" of such a (poor) crypto system is *not* the one transmitted with the
message.  Rather, the key is simply knowing *how* to decript the message.

Generally, this method is shunned by those who know cryptography because it
offers poor security on a broad scale.  What I mean by this is that if any
large organization were to use it, there would be lots of opportunity for
someone "outside" to find out how it's done.  It would be just as risky as
having everyone in a large company use the very same password to access
company records...   Eventually, it'll "leak".

It's fine if you're just encrypting your own files and you never tell anyone
else about it, but it loses its appeal when you try to do anything else.
It's just too easy to give away a method.

Here's the test:  Can you give the source-code to the cracker, and still be
assured that the cracker won't be able to get in?  If not, then your *program*
is really your "key", and you've got security through obscurity.

So in effect, any such system should only be used where you'd use pig-Latin.

Rick Miller   <rick@ee.uwm.edu> | <rick@discus.mil.wi.us>   Ricxjo Muelisto
Occupation:  Husband, Father, WEPCo. WAN Mgr., Discus Sys0p, and  Linux fan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 18:38:54 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.074735.14802@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
>In article <1993Jan5.030228.10817@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>>My impression is that the key modern breakthroughs are in public
>>key crypto systems, including RSA, and that those were invented
>>mostly by Americans (not sure if Shamir is Israeli or American).
>
>Shamir is an Israeli, living in Israel.
Thanks for the confirmation. That is one-third of RSA and thus does
not change my surprise that Amanda would suggest America is not
still dominant in this field.
>
>>My impression is that the non-U.S. developments are essentially
>>derivative, elaboration, etc.
>
>Since Shamir is the 'S' in 'RSA', and since you clearly believe that
>RSA is not derivative (otherwise it wouldn't qualify for the patent
>you defend so strenuously), then there is obviously at least one
>non-American who has made at least one significant contribution to
>modern cryptography. Another significant Shamir contribution is
>differential cryptanalysis, which is rapidly becoming a fundamental
>tool in the design of new secret key ciphers.
This is making too much heavy weather of my inquiry, for what purpose
I do not understand. The statement which I questioned wasn't that no
non-Americans had contributed; it was that the assumption of American
dominance was no longer warranted. I find this puzzling given the
work I'm familiar with, and what has seeped under the door about the
NSA's budget and quality of their personnel.

Phil follows this by a discussion of others' ability to copy software or
develop software from algorithms. That point is not at issue here.

David

-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: castor@grizzle.Stanford.EDU (Castor Fu)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Organization: DSO, Stanford University
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 17:46:06 GMT

Whatever "academician" means, it probably doesn't mean "member of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences."  I just went to our library, and looked through
the list of members of the Soviet Academy, and there was no V.M. Sidelnikov.
This was a pretty recent list, (1991).

Unless you choose to believe that there is a "secret list" this casts
some doubt on the rest of the article.

--
Castor Fu, (foo@leland.stanford.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ceblair@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Charles Blair)
Subject: Re: Telephonic Poker?
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 19:24:57 GMT

   RSA's intended system appeared in a paper in the book THE MATHEMATICAL
GARDNER (papers in honor of Martin Gardner).  Subsequently flaws were found
by Lipton and probably others.  One problem is that, even if you can't
recover N from f(N), you may be able to get partial information which could
be useful (I think the specific problem for RSA was whether N was a square).
For more details, see CODES and CRYPTOGRAPHY by Welsh, a book by Salomaa
whose title I can't remember, and probably other places.

   I think playing poker raises problems that go beyond the issues involved
in flipping a coin over the phone, specifically figuring out how to make
sure two people don't get the same card.

   A crude approach for coin flipping:  I announce N = product of two big 
primes.  You try to guess whether the middle digit of the smaller factor
is even or odd.  (this was off the top of my head--- no guarantee it doesn't
have a flaw)

   A system for poker based on Probabilistic Encryption (rather complex,
not straightforward use of PE) was published in FOCS or STOC by Goldwasser
and Micali around 1982.

   A year or so ago, I saw a paper ``How to play any mental game.''  Didn't
read it, but it seemed to involve interactive verification protocols.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Legal Stuff!
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 4 Jan 93 18:13:24 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Dec25.060924.14629@netcom.com> tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney) writes:

>In article <a_rubin.725045922@dn66> a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:
>>> (I said)
>>>If you import a box made using
>>>a patented process, that box can become an infringing device.
>>
>>Wrong again.  Using PGP to read or send email appears to violate the
>>patent.  Using something made by a patented process (as opposed to the
>>object itself being patented) is not illegal.

>You might not like the law the way it is, but you are just plain WRONG.

>35 USC 271 (g)
>"Whoever without authority imports into the United States or
>sells or uses within the United States a product which is made by a
>process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if
>the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of
>such process patent.  In an action for infringement of a process patent,
>no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the non-
>commercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate
>remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importa-
>tion or other use or sale of that product.  A product which is made by
>a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to
>be so made after --
>  (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
>  (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product."

OK, I may be wrong (how is "imported" defined _this_ time), but it's
irrelevant to importing of PGP, or, in fact, PGP messages.  A PGP-encrypted
message probably is argueably "made by a process patented in the United
States", but PGP source/object code is not.  PGP code is not "an
implementation of a patented process".

In regard PGP messages, even if "imported ... product" applies to
information, the "importer" of E-mail is probably the first US site
receiving it, rather than the addressee.  The "importer" of encrypted news
would be all of the first US sites receiving it????

Also, this code section seems to make individual infringement for PGP
messages impossible to remedy, as the importer MUST be the one gone after.

--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.ripem
From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)
Subject: Re: How fast is DES?
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 14:42:07 GMT

In article <1494@eouk9.eoe.co.uk> ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes:
>: swapping and table lookup operations during multiple iterations I am
>DES can be converted to shift/ mask/ lookup/ XOR in the inner loops.
>No bit permutations are needed.
look at ufc-crypt. It does this quite well...
>:   Is it possible for a software solution to reach an encryption rate
>: of about 100kB/sec (read 100 * 1024 Byte not 100 * 1024 Bit per second)
>: on a typical PC (say, Intel 386DX 33MHz)?
>
>The only thing I have seen which might be faster is Khufu.  Certainly
>IDEA (as used in PGP) isn't any faster, and if you use enough rounds

Have you tried it ? (pgp -c is not a very fair test, as there are
some tmpfiles which let me think that pgp tries compression&encryption:-) )
On a sun 3/60 IDEA encrypts 1MB of data in 13.43 seconds.
(78060 bytes per second) Perhaps you can compare this with you machine.
As far as I know the sun 3/60 runs rather slow ;-))
Or do a 'cc -DTEST idea.c -o idea' and then run 'idea' separately...
Friendly greetings,
                gec




-- 
Instruments register only through things they're designed to register.
Space still contains infinite unknowns.

Germano Caronni    caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 07:47:35 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.030228.10817@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>My impression is that the key modern breakthroughs are in public
>key crypto systems, including RSA, and that those were invented
>mostly by Americans (not sure if Shamir is Israeli or American).

Shamir is an Israeli, living in Israel.

>My impression is that the non-U.S. developments are essentially
>derivative, elaboration, etc.

Since Shamir is the 'S' in 'RSA', and since you clearly believe that
RSA is not derivative (otherwise it wouldn't qualify for the patent
you defend so strenuously), then there is obviously at least one
non-American who has made at least one significant contribution to
modern cryptography. Another significant Shamir contribution is
differential cryptanalysis, which is rapidly becoming a fundamental
tool in the design of new secret key ciphers.

However, the present state of affairs is claimed to be that the open
discussion and publication of cryptographic algorithms is not export
controlled -- only actual implementations are. Therefore you're
missing the mark by talking about whether non-Americans make
significant contributions to the theory of cryptography. Even if only
Americans made them they'd still be available worldwide.

You ought instead to ask the question whether there are any
non-Americans capable of turning an algorithm description into working
code.  Evidently the US State Department doesn't think so and nor do
you, since you defend this interpretation so strongly.

Phil
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.ripem