From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Organization: SPSS Inc.
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 18:28:52 GMT

In article <1992Oct14.221625.28631@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu 
(Michael Tobis) writes (quoting me):
>>I don't recall your providing a single argument in favor of your
>>dualistic idea of mind.  (Distaste for materialism is not an argument.)
>
>I have no arguments that pass the muster of the accepted rules of science,
>but neither does anyone else. Distaste for dualism isn't an argument either.

I guess I'm baffled at your combattiveness on behalf of a theory which
you yourself maintain is supported by no arguments.

Actually I think you overstate the helplessness of both materialists and
dualists.  The arguments of both, in the study of mind, rely chiefly on
induction.  The materialist sees that science has explained more and more
things in the world, and expects it will explain more, including mind.  
The dualist observes that no convincing, detailed materialist theory
of mind exists, and assumes that this condition will last forever.

The dualist's case is so far a bit less convincing, since his induction
rests, rather precariously, on a negative claim.  He also has Occam against
him: the materialist doesn't have to worry about souls.  And he has no
program for science: if he wants to do cognitive science he has to borrow
the assumptions of his materialist colleagues.

If we are thinking only of the study of mind, then, it would seem to make
more sense to adopt materialistic rather than dualistic assumptions.
But of course people generally adopt materialism or dualism based on
very different grounds, and simply import their assumptions into this area.

>>At the same time none of your interlocutors, so far as I can see, is guilty
>>of the notions you attribute to them, such as the idea that the nature of
>>consciousness is already explicated, 
>
>Again, especially since the scientific method rejects subjective evidence, 
>applying the scientific method to subjective phenomena is not guaranteed to 
>work.  

Science does not reject subjective evidence when it is considering subjective, 
rather than objective, phenomena.  An example is the association between
REM sleep and dreams, which could not have been made if subjective phenomena,
such as dreams, were out of bounds as evidence.  Modern linguistics depends
heavily on subjective judgments of grammaticality.  Economics relies on
the different, subjective values assigned by consumers to various goods.

>Most of you folks seem to think that the scientific method invariably 
>succeeds, and that, while it may elude us at present, a scientific explanation
>of consciousness must in principle exist. I claim that this assertion is as 
>unsupported as its contrary.

No, not *as* unsupported.  A claim that something doesn't exist anywhere 
rates more skepticism than one that something exists.  But even if you were
right, what of it?  Those who follow the scientific method can test their
beliefs by actively seeking for an explanation of mind.  Those who don't
can sit on their hands and kvetch.  I'd rather be in the first group.

>>or that consciousness can emerge from 
>>a system without being designed in.  
>
>Well, it is often claimed that an algorithm which responds coherently  to
>Chinese has a conscious experience of Chinese. This looks like a counter-
>example to me.

There need be no contradiction here; it can be maintained that only a 
system *designed* to be conscious will be capable of conversing coherently 
in Chinese.

>I cannot keep all of you folks straight just yet. 

Try.  You cannot by any means assume that everybody here shares the same
opinion-- about Searle, about the Turing Test, about dualism, about
grounding, about consciousness.