From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 21:58:11 GMT

In article <7693@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <Bw1s8p.Mtp@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>>In article <7668@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>>In article <1992Sep17.154637.9156@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>>>Not so.  When two things are actually the same it can still be
>>>logically possible for them to be different.  Not always, though.
>>>You have to figure out which case you're in.  But you don't always
>>>have to know two things are actually different to know that it's
>>>logically possible for them to be different.
>
>I agree with what you say below.  "Things that are the same" is
>somewhat imprecise talk that seems to have gotten me into trouble.
>It's probably not worth trying to explain further.
>
>>Not quite.  On the standard line, two things that are identical
>>are necessarily identical: how could something be other than
>>itself?  Take a look at Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_, for
>>instance.  However, what can be the case is that two *descriptions*
>>that pick out the same thing in the real world pick out two
>>different things in other possible worlds.
>
>Ok, I knew this, and have read and remembered _Naming and Necessity_.
>Randall Holmes has told me he's a professional logician and knows
>all about this (and the other relevant issues).  But I must say it
>sure looked to me like he was misunderstanding you and applying the
>wrong notion of possibility.  Moreover, even now his argument against
>your argument looks wrong to me.
>
>So I would appreciate it if one, or both, of you could come up
>with a version of his argument that even I could understand.
>
>-- jd

I'll interject here that what I claim is that _Chalmers_ is using the
wrong notion of possibility.  I admit that his possible world with
zombies in it is a possible world (essentially because it can be
imagined, which is Chalmers's argument for its possibility, as far as
I can see), but I deny that the notion of "qualia" in that possible
world correlates with the notion of "qualia" in our own world.
Chalmers can only construct a possible world in which our "qualia"
correlate with his "non-physical qualia" (absent in the case of the
zombie) and our "relevant physical states" correspond to the relevant
physical states of the zombie when he has _already established_ that
the referents of these two notions (the qualia and the physical
states) are actually different in the actual world.  Imaginable worlds
can be possible worlds considered by themselves, but the identity
criteria relative to the actual world may not work correctly, as in
the case of Chalmers's argument.

If his argument were valid, it would provide a general proof of the
existence of any occult qualities you care to name: I can imagine an
apparently living being without "vitality", so "vitality" must be
distinguishable from the microphysical organization now mistakenly
identified with "life".






-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu