HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: wb8foz@skybridge.SCL.CWRU.Edu (David Lesher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Naval Enigma & secrets....
Date: 12 Oct 1992 03:21:49 GMT
Organization: NRK Clinic for habitual NetNews abusers - Beltway Annex
Reply-To: wb8foz@skybridge.scl.cwru.edu (David Lesher)
NNTP-Posting-Host: skybridge.scl.cwru.edu

Others said
# And as far as some codes that wer *never* broken, don't be too
# sure, as we don't have an FOIA over here (UK).  My father knew one of the 
# Bletchley park people and only found out 3 years ago that he was involved!

See Kahn's book on the naval Enigma effort.

It also has a good story re: keeping secrets. Seems the King toured
Bletchley Park and recognized a friend of his daughter.  He greeted her
and asked what her job was. She replied along the lines of "I'm not
permitted to tell you..."



--
A host is a host from coast to coast..wb8foz@skybridge.scl.cwru.edu
& no one will talk to a host that's close..........................
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: keeshu@paramount.nikhefk.nikhef.nl (Kees Huyser)
Subject: Re: Letter Frequency
Organization: the National Institute for Nuclear Physics and High Energy Physics; the Netherlands
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 10:48:58 GMT

-----------------------<snip>--------------------
#include <stdio.h>

int freq[256] = { 0 };

main()
{	int c;

	while((c = getchar()) != EOF)
	{	freq[c]++;
	}
	for(c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++)
	{	printf("%d\t%c\n", freq[c], c);
	}
}
-----------------------<snip>--------------------

try this,
--kees
-- 
* Kees Huyser   	(System Adminstrator and resident Macintosh Guru )  *
* internet: keeshu@paramount.nikhefk.nikhef.nl		 AppleLink: HOL0397 *
* The National Institute for Nuclear Physics and High-Energy Physics, CSG/K *
* P.O.Box 4395,  1009 AJ Amsterdam,  The Netherlands,    phone:+31205922132 *
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Huttunen)
Subject: Re: DES Encryption/ Encrypting more than once.
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 18:38:20 GMT

In article <wa6JsB7w165w@works.uucp> ferret@works.uucp (Dave Ferret) writes:

! Just a sidenote to 'Hackers' words...

!   There are also encryption algorithms that when used to encrypt the 
! plaintext over and over and over, will yield the un-encrypted text. (Ie: 
! Its a circular encryption -- Sorry, I don't know the correct term here)

Any encryption scheme that has a fixed block length *must* do this. Think
of a series of encryptions:
	x_1 -> x_2 -> x_3 -> ... -> x_k -> ... -> x_n -> ...
If 'n' is greater than the possible number of messages that can be encoded
in the fixed length block, there must be some blocks in the chain that
are the same (pigeonhole principle). Let x_k and x_n be the same blocks.
Then by encrypting x_k (n-k)-times yields x_k.

(n-k) might be quite large, though. ;-)

ps. I'm not sure, but it would seem that this applies to every
    block x_n.....?
--
...............................................................................
Ari Huttunen   			       Any similarity to other alien life forms
				          is purely coincidental.
					      <Alien 3 misquote>
From: locatech@tron.gun.de (Joerg Loehn)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: re: PGP... Availaible
Organization: TRON Public Mailbox, Neurath, Germany
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 07:32:00 +0100

BX017%CLEVELAND.FREENET.EDU@USENET.ZER schreibt in einer Message vom 04.10.92 17:05 Uhr:

> Hello
> 
> Where i Can see  a PGP... Program for Amiga computer...?
> 
> 
> Please... answer me... 
> 
> bye
>                               
>                                               Michel Aubin

Hi Michel...

I've got an Atari STE and had the same question,  but now I  have 
PGP 2.0 as source. If you have a C-Compiler and you are familliar 
with the C-Language you could compile it on your Amiga.

If you don't find anyone in your reach who can get you a copy  of 
the  sources of PGP,  please email me and I will send it to  you. 
PGP is packed with ZIP,  but you need a quite new version of  it. 
If you like I can pack it with LHarc (lh1 or lh5), ARJ or ZOO.
LHarc is fully compatible to the Amiga-version (I've tested often 
enough with soundmodule-files).

By  the way.  Is anyone out there who can help me?  I've got  the 
Problem than I'm NOT familliar with the C-Language and so I'm not 
able to compile PGP.


so long...
           Joerg (LOCATECH@tron.gun.de)
           Location: Germany

## net_sh v1.4 (sb)
ERROR 0815: Programmer not found !   Press <ESC>
From: James_Zuchelli@qm.claris.com (James Zuchelli)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: What is Crypto 93 and where?
Date: 8 Oct 92 21:52:34 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Claris Corp

What is Crypto 93/  I assume a convention of crypto people?  where is it held.
Also, is there a Crypto FAQ available?  How about addresses for crypto 
associations, clubs, etc.

James Zuchelli
------------------
The above is my personal opinion and does not represent that of Claris Corp.
or my employer.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 13 Oct 92 16:18:43 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Oct12.184051.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:

>The attack against the *cryptosystem*, as opposed to the attack against QM,
>goes like this:  The eavesdropper clones the photons and SAVES them - he
>makes no attempt to measure their polarization states yet.  Later, when Alice
>has revealed to Bob (and the eavesdropper) which "regime" (circular or linear)
>each photon polarization is to be measured in, the eavesdropper can safely go
>back and measure just that state.  QM guarantees that he gets the same answers
>Bob did, when Bob measured those same photons in Alice's "regime".  (On the
>ones where Bob chose the wrong "regime", both the eavesdropper and Bob get
>random answers.)  When Bob now tells Alice which photons he read in the
>"right" regime, the eavesdropper learns which of his measurements to keep,
>too.

Even if you can clone photons with the same polarization (not obvious to
me, but not theoretically impossible), this will change the photon count
statistics Bob will get, which may be detectable.


--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
Keywords: Quantum mechanics, cryptography, silliness, photons
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 13:31:49 GMT

In article <1992Oct13.061724.25758@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
>leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:
>: 
>: The attack against the *cryptosystem*, as opposed to the attack against QM,
>: goes like this:  The eavesdropper clones the photons and SAVES them - he
>
>How does he do this?  I know of no way to "save" a photon.  Somehow mirrors
>would be involved and I think interaction with a mirror would alter the
>polarization state.

Why not put the photon in orbit around a black hole, and, when you're
ready to measure it, move your equipment in place to intercept it?  :-)

		--Ken Pizzini
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: New Cryptography Book
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 21:53:19 GMT

A number of people have asked me the same questions about the book, so I
figured that one answer will suffice for everyone.

1)  Hopefully, the book will be published by next August, in time for Crypto
93.

2)  There will be a source code disk that goes along with the book.  No, it
will not be sold with the book.  (Keep in mind that the author has little
say in any of these decisions--it's the publisher's call.)  I will, myself,
sell it seperately.  I don't know for how much; enough to cover expenses.
Unfortunately, I cannot send it to addresses outside the country.  I won't be
able to put the code on an ftp site for the same reason.  (I don't like this
solution either, but it wasn't my choice.)

3)  Right now the plan is for the book to come out in both a hardcover and
a paperback edition.  Who knows what will happen when the time comes.

Otherwise, I am still looking for pieces of code to include.

Bruce

****************************************************************************
* Bruce Schneier
* Counterpane Systems         For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1
* schneier@chinet.chi.il.us
****************************************************************************
From: mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. "Buddy can you spare a clue?" Ranum)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: query: how to synch crypto streams
Date: 16 Oct 92 18:55:31 GMT
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Washington ULTRIX Resource Center

craig@jido.b30.ingr.com writes:

>How timely you should ask this, I'm just about to go off and read up
>on key exchange protocols, so I'll be interested in what other answers
>come up.

	I got lots of nice answers, most pointing me towards reading about
Diffie Hellman key exchange, which appears to be unusable in the USA.

mjr.
From: norstar@tnl.com (Daniel Ray)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Need 80386.s module for PGP2.0 that works with Microsoft C 5.0 XENIX
Keywords: pgp, assembly language, asm, 80386.s, 80386.S, Microsoft C, XENIX
Date: 11 Oct 92 08:09:57 GMT
Organization: The Northern Lights, Troy NY


Hi. I was able to compile PGP under XENIX here, but ONLY using the 8086.asm
module. The 80386.S module was written for gcc which I don't have, and Micro-
soft C 5.0 just sat there doing nothing, chugging away at it.

So I had to 'make x286' for PGP instead of using the 32 bit stuff and the 80386
assembly module. So PGP is very slow.

Does anyone have a working version of the file 80386.[Ss] in the source
distribution that works on non-gcc cc?? I would grately appreciate any help.

If you can help, send to: norstar@tnl.com

-- norstar
The Northern Lights, Troy NY                                 |      
tnl dialins: 518 237-2163 @ 300-2400 bps 8N1 $free         ` | /    
------------------------------------------------------   --- * ---  
UUCP: uunet!uupsi3!tnl!norstar                             / | .    
Internet: norstar@tnl.com                                    |      

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: asrael@bob.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (Stefan Schoef)
Subject: I need barcode specifications
Keywords: barcode
Organization: Rechnerbetrieb Informatik  /  RWTH Aachen
Date: 15 Oct 92 11:38:47 GMT

Hello!
The subject says it all: I need the specs for bar codes, the different
systems in use, the coding scheme etc.
If someone knows where I can find it, please answer me by email.

Stefan


   =========================================================================
   !  Stefan Schoef   !  Tel.: +49 - 241 - 60 39 80                        !
   !  Amyastr.32      !____________________________________________________!
   !  5100 Aachen     !----------------------------------------------------!  
   !  Germany         !  E-Mail: asrael@i1.Informatik.RWTH-Aachen.DE       !
   =========================================================================
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSA outside the US
Date: 12 Oct 92 16:00:56 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <1992Oct9.233126.10429@uoft02.utoledo.edu> jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu (jason 'Think!' steiner) writes:
>   1. RSA is pretty much a standard in Europe.
>   2. it is illegal to export RSA stuff from the US.

> this is just silly.

Isn't it.......

>am i reading this right? if it's true why is export of encryption
>schemes so much of a problem? apparently they're already out there.


The argument (only slightly rephrased by me from what I read) given by
Bobby Inman (ex-head of the NSA) was that:

1.	it's important to thwart crypto development in the private sector
as much as possible;

2.	all we have control over is the US and in particular US exports --
so that's what we're trying to control;

3.	the US is #1 in crypto research [they're working to make that not
true, of course, assuming it ever was] and #1 in computer manufacturing
[that's slipping, too -- never was true in crypto hardware, I believe
(excepting military contracts)];

4.	good crypto is like an atom bomb -- could make a major power of an
otherwise minor power -- needs to be suppressed -- mustn't be in the hands
of private citizens.


In other words (mine), the technology is out there but the US economy, if
it were allowed to produce good crypto in volume (eg., spurred on by
international markets), would flood the world with good crypto -- making it
likely that a lazy lawbreaker would be able to use good crypto and
therefore defeat eavesdropping.  The FBI is using roughly the same argument
for internal controls and demands for plaintext-tapping ports.


Nobody has argued against the idea that big time drug dealers can afford
good crypto equipment (eg., scrambler phones from Switzerland) -- but what
about the little folks -- high school students trying to buy a pound of pot
to sell to their friends?  Those are the real targets of this
administration -- along with people carrying large amounts of cash, of
course.  For all we know, the big time drug dealers are campaign
contributors....  :-(


What I want to know is how the candidates stand on this issue.  It's got a
small enough interest group that the debates will probably skip over it.
I'd expect Bush to keep up being DCI with all private citizens as the
potential enemy (who me?  paranoid?).  I'd worry a little about Perot --
given his habit of hiring private investigators.  I haven't heard from
Clinton anything to allow me to predict.

Does anyone else have a feel for this?
From: James_Zuchelli@qm.claris.com (James Zuchelli)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Bitz & Bobz
Date: 13 Oct 92 20:38:58 GMT
Organization: Claris Corp

(deleted)
> 
> >For a REALLY secure computer, just low-level format the HD after use.
> 
> Try telling that to GCHQ/NSA!  Governement regs involve repeated writes
> of 0s then 1s (three times) followed by a single-byte written and verified.
> This is because some people (including Dr.Solomon!) have equipment that can
> rescue data from re-formatted discs! 

(deleted)

I have heard that people in a certain government lab have reformatted a hard
disk three times (or written 1's and 0's over it three times) and still been
able to recover data.  So the official word at that facility is that if you
want to take a computer with a hard disk in it from a Secret area to a non-
Secret area, you have physically destroy the hard disk.

I personally have reformatted the ahrd disk on my Mac II, written 1's and 0's 
over the entire disk and then used a disk rescue program to recover recognia-
ble fragments of files.

In my opinion, once its written to disk it is there forever in one form or
another (and don't forget tape recorders, under some circumstances if you
erase an audio tape, you can recover fragments or even entire tracks of the
erased tape.  One Technician inLos Angeles was able to recover information
from an erassed vcr tape.)

James Zuchelli
---------------------
The above is my personal opinion and not that of Claris Corp. or my employer.
From: jac54@cas.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Using genetic engineering for exhaustive DES key search
Date: 15 Oct 92 19:33:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: cas.1992Oct15.193308.9209
Distribution: na
Organization: Chemical Abstracts Service, Columbus, Ohio

In article <17786@autodesk.COM> drake@Autodesk.COM (Dan Drake) writes:
>wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes:
>+
>+    lou@Cadence.COM (Louis K. Scheffer) writes:
>+    +The basic approach would be to build a bacteria that acts as a DES key search
>+    +machine.  Each bacteria generates keys at random, decrypts the encrypted block
>+    +with the key, and compares the result with the plaintext.  If there is a match,
>+
>+ A real computer virus, eh?  The difficult part is to gen up an enzyme
>+ that generates _random_ numbers, represented as e.g. random proteins.
>+ (OK, I'm not sure getting a bacterium to do DES is really that
>+ straightforward either, but ....)  Enzymes like to always do the same thing.
>+ The obvious approach is to use mutations to create the randomness,
>+ but the mutagen would also presumably affect the compare-the-results genes.
>+ So you've now got a very large number of very small monkeys typing away,
>+ and another crowd of monkeys randomly yelling "This stuff is Shakespeare!" :-)

	Indeed, error rates in biological systems are of the order
	of 10^-9 - 10^-12 per generation.  Mutagenesis ups the error rate
	and kills the beast more often than not (except when you have silent
	substitutions).  So, at 10^8 bugs/mL, needing 10^9 mutants at
	a mutation frequency of 10^-9, you need 10^8 mL, or 10^5 L to
	get all your variants.  You can get about 1 mL of this on a
	Petri dish to screen for your mutant so you need 10^8 Petri
	dishes with a vol. of 50 mL or, 500,000 litres of Petri dishes.
	With practice, you can innoculate 5 plates/min so the whole thing
	would take 2.10^7 min or about 100 manyears. Piece of cake, now
	to screen them.
>
>It's surprising that no one has mentioned the immune system here.
>Generating a zillion variant cells which make a zillion variant
>antibodies, apparently at random, is just what makes it possible to
>respond to antigens that haven't been invented yet.  And we've mostly
>solved the compare-the-results problems, though people suffering from an
>auto-immune disease may take exception.  None this proves that you could
>attack decryption this way, but it's a sort of existence proof.

	Mechanistically, it's a little more limited than zillions
	(trillions is a possibility).


	Alec Chambers
From: rrb@corona.CSS.GOV (Robert Blandford)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Block-chaining with Public Key
Keywords: Public-Key Block-Chaining
Date: 13 Oct 92 20:30:10 GMT
Article-I.D.: seismo.51322

Is there any software/hardware  available which will encrypt data using
block-chaining with public key cryptography?  How slow is it compared
to DES when using RSA or the NIST algorithm?  I am not talking about
key management but about encrypting entire documents and using the
last block as a signature instead of first computing a message digest.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3820 alt.security:4580
From: bart@cs.kuleuven.ac.be (Bart De Decker)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Looking for some authentication papers
Date: 15 Oct 92 19:18:14 GMT
Organization: Dept. Computerwetenschappen K.U.Leuven


I'm looking for a copy of the following papers:

- Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi, and Roger Needham, "A Logic of Authentication",
  Proc. R.Soc.Lond.A 426(1989), pp. 233-271
- M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham, "Authentication: A Practical Study in Belief
  and Action", Proc. of the 2nd Conf. on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge,
  M. Vardi, ed., 1987, pp. 325-342

Are they archived somewhere, where I could ftp them?
If not, could somebody send me a paper copy? (Reply first by e-mail before doing so; I just need
one copy, not a few hundred ;-))

Thanks a lot,

-- Bart -- bart@cs.kuleuven.ac.be
-- 
Bart De Decker                 | Katholieke Universiteit Leuven  
bart@cs.kuleuven.ac.be         | Department of Computer Science 
FHGAA27@BLEKUL11               | Celestijnenlaan 200 A 
Tel: +(32) 16 20 10 15 x3633   | B-3001 Leuven (Heverlee), Belgium
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: FAQ, anyone?
Date: 9 Oct 92 15:56:04 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

There's a team of people working on a lengthy and ambitious FAQ
for sci.crypt.  I think you'll be pleased by the result when it's
released.  The size of the project makes it difficult to predict
when it will be complete, though.
The volunteers who are working on the FAQ (I am not amoung them)
deserve your thanks.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: m_reymond@zeus.dev.macsch.com (Mike Reymond)
Subject: VCR Plus Codes
Reply-To: m_reymond@macsch.com
Organization: MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 92 22:48:52 GMT


I just got a VCR Plus device (@Fry's in LA for $28.88) and think it's the greatest thing since sliced bread.  No, I am not VCR illiterate. It's just that I have an old VCR which does not have on-screen programming. 

I am new to this newsgroup and I have been trying to figure out how the VCR Plus codes are derived? 

My inquiry is purely academic. I don't intend to invent my own device.
I've tried to determine if there is a consistent pattern, but have found none.
I suspect there is some sort of encryption. I have also noticed that prime time 
shows on channels 2-13 have codes with the fewest digits.

I was told by a helpful netter in rec.puzzles that this newsgroup has been down this line of inquiry before.

If this query has already been answerd in a FAQ, let me know where I can get it or e-mail it to me.
If this is the wrong group for this I apologize and point me in the right direction.

Thanx
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: vermeulen@rulwinw.LeidenUniv.nl (Hans Vermeulen)
Subject: PGP 2.0
Organization: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Leiden
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:01:32 GMT


Hello,

Where can I get a copy of PGP 2.0?
Please reply by e-mail.

Hans Vermeulen.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Huttunen)
Subject: Re: Prime generation, a possible weakness in PGP?
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
	<1992Oct9.160150.13377@eoc.com>
Distribution: alt
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 19:11:37 GMT

In article <1992Oct9.160150.13377@eoc.com> ahaley@eo17 (Andrew Haley) writes:

! Large pseudoprimes (of any base) are very rare indeed. 

Are pseudoprimes to base X, where X is large more rare than
pseudoprimes to base Y, where Y is small.

! wrong.)  In any case, it is likely that a composite p or q would cause
! messages to not decrypt correctly, a fact that you'd soon notice.

Perhaps, but I wouldn't bet on it, unless I got some proof.

! It might be worth using the Miller-Rabin test, in which no analogues
! of Carmichael numbers exist, as a backup.  This would be easy to add
! to the search procedure, but I don't think that it's really necessary.

I have some code that does exactly that (uses the Miller test). The 
reason I became worried was that Kenneth Rosen incorrectly states
in his book that "If n is composite the probability that n passes
all k tests is less than (1/4)^k." This is incorrect as was pointed out.
--
...............................................................................
Ari Huttunen   			       Any similarity to other alien life forms
				          is purely coincidental.
					      <Alien 3 misquote>
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3815 alt.security:4579
From: ian@pharaoh.cyborg.bt.co.uk (Speed Freak)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Re: Letter Frequency
Date: 15 Oct 92 15:32:21 GMT
Organization: large

holland@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Rich Holland) writes:

>I'm in dire need of a letter frequency chart for the English language.  I
>remember as a kid reading books on basic cryptanalysis and seeing these
>charts of the most frequently used letter (like "E" is most often used,
>then "S" or "R" or something, etc).  I don't remember the order, but now
>I need it.  Anyone got a copy of a table of something like this online?

>If not, got a source where I can go look it up quick?

Try 'The Gold Bug' by Poe.

Ian.
-- 
Ian Crocker 					ian@cyborg.bt.co.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt