From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 06:33:15 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

>turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:

>In article <1992Sep11.010546.5396@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>> ...  You're trying to decide how to raise your son [ . . . ] It seems to me
>> that you should not make your decision based simply on whatever your
>> own desires, purposes and inclinations happen to be, and still less on
>> those of third parties. ...
>
>Why not?  "It seems to me" is pretty weak explanation, especially
>when this is almost universally how parents base their decisions. 

You should not make your decision on such a basis because your son is a
human being who is in your power and for whom you are making decisions.
In such a case it is wrong to base decisions purely on your own
interests (which I take to include desires, purposes and inclinations)
or the interests of other parties rather than on the interests of your
son.  That might be appropriate in the case of a chicken but not in the
case of a human being.  (I am sure you will let me know if you
disagree.)  But to make a decision in your son's interests, you need a
conception of those interests that goes beyond your son's actual
desires, purposes and inclinations, if only because those are too
undeveloped and uninformed to serve as a guide to action.  Thus, it is
sometimes useful to view our actions as guided by principles that
transcend actual d., p. & i (which I think was the point at issue).

Contrary to your impression, parents who think about the matter rarely
view themselves as basing the decisions they make on their children's
behalf simply on whatever their own d., p. & i. happen to be.  A piece
of evidence in this regard is that parents usually say they love their
children, want what's best for them and are willing to make at least
some sacrifices for them.

>> ... You can't sensibly make the decision based on speculations as
>> to your son's future (and presumably mature) d., p., & i. ...
>
>Nonsense.  A parent can do this *because* the parent has
>influence over the child's future values.

I was discussing what values can and should guide the parent's choices
and my point was that those values can be neither the child's present
actual d., p. & i. (because they are too unformed) nor the child's
future d., p. & i. (because they will be what they will be in part as a
result of the choice to be made).

>But as many children come to learn, parents who *proclaim* a
>transcendant good are actually dressing up their *own* desires,
>purposes, and inclinations, and can give no sensible explanation that
>what they proclaim as a transcendent good is really that.

You seem to mean "all parents" rather than "some parents".  Claims that
a moral principle or an argument should be accepted by everyone
regardless of subjective inclinations may, of course, be nothing more
than a mask for the will to power.  I see no reason to believe that all
such claims are of that nature, though.  It appears that you would have
the readers of this newsgroup believe that claims that arguments are
valid in that manner are sometimes made in good faith but feel
differently about moral principles.  Why?

>The child's question "*Why* is that good?" can only be answered
>"because."  The child (most likely a young adult by now) learns that
>the parent reifies the parent's values, and tries to hide this magic
>stunt with a bunch of rhetorical smoke and mirrors.

Many such questions can be answered, although possibly not in a way the
child can understand fully.  For example, you can tell a child that
honesty is good because if he is honest then people will trust him,
that lying to someone shows he doesn't really care about that person,
that if people lie to each other they won't be able to cooperate and
live happily together, and so on.  How much that kind of explanation
means to a child is limited by the child's experience and rationality,
and the child necessarily has to take a lot on faith.  If the parent
has a sound moral system the child is likely to absorb most of it and
to find that his own experience bears out the soundness of the system,
so he's not likely to become the kind of scoffer you forsee.

Part of your point may be based on the observation that there is
eventually an end to justification.  One can say to someone that lying
is bad because it destroys the possibility of communion with others and
communion with others is good because man is a social animal and
realizes his nature through such communion, or that people who
systematically cut themselves off from others tend as a matter of fact
to be unhappy.  If he responds that he doesn't care about realizing his
nature or about unhappiness, then there may not be much more to be
said.  Similar remarks apply to justifying things other than moral
principles, though.

>Sometimes the child adopts this deception as their own, and other times
>the child rebels.  Because I dislike deception, I think such rebellion
>is justified.

I find your use of the word "justified" puzzling.  Do you mean nothing
more than that it fits in with your personal desires, purposes and
inclinations for children to rebel against parents who view moral
judgements as objective?  If so, it's an extremely odd useage, and I
wish you'd use language in a way that's more consistent with the way
other people use it.  You would communicate your meaning better if you
did.

>It may take more guts as a parent to say "you have to behave this way
>because I and other adults want children to behave this way," but it is
>often the truth, and as the child matures, this honesty will give the
>youth a more accurate understanding of social relations.

Shouldn't you say "always" rather than "often"?  Also, when you say
"you have to behave this way" it appears that what you mean is "you
will do what I tell you because I am physically stronger than you". 
I'm not sure what other reason you can give the child for respecting
the claim to authority implicit in your "you have".  Whatever may be
true in other situations, this certainly seems a case in which
rebellion would be justified.
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)