Newsgroups: soc.women,talk.politics.theory,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta,sci.classics
Subject: The "validity" of feminist philosophy (Was Re: Plato's Views on Women)
From: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu (Andrew McRae,   ,,)
Date: 8 Nov 92 18:30:51 EST
Reply-To: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu
Originator: mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu

In article <BxE9EL.IuK@quake.sylmar.ca.us>, brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
> In article <1992Nov6.163605.17172@husc3.harvard.edu> mcrae@husc8.harvard.edu writes:
>> [...]
>>"Does he have any arguments for his views?", we wonder again.
> 
> I thought I was pretty clear.  All of these examples are, like sex, attributes
> of people which are not philosophically significant.  Did you not understand 
> my point?  Or are you just being obnoxious? 

You appeared to be making two claims in the first part of your post:
firstly, that the question of whether "feminist philosophy" is a "valid
area of thought" hinges on whether sex is an "attribute of people which is
philosophically significant", and secondly that sex is not such an
attribute. But the only things you said in support of these claims were:

> If you think that feminist philosophy is a valid area of though, do 
> you also think that there ought to be such a thing as "black philosophy",
> "bald philosophy", "poor philosophy", "male philosophy", or "blue-eyed
> people who live in Hollywood philosophy"?  I don't.

which seems to be nothing but a statement of your views. If I understand
what you mean by "a valid area of thought", then I think that feminist
philosophy is a "valid area of thought", but I don't think that "there
ought to be such a thing" as "blue-eyed people who live in Hollywood
philosophy". (I expect that, by and large, people interested in feminist
philosophy, such as the person you were replying to, would agree with me.)
All I can tell from what you wrote is that you disagree with me, not _why_
you disagree with me -- you've given me no reason to question my beliefs,
and that's what an argument would do. 

>>Consider two views of "feminist philosophy". (I do not wish to insist that
>>these exhaust the alternatives, nor that they are independent, nor that
>>either is true.)
> If you don't consider them to be true, then why do you argue for them?  What
> DO you think is true?  Anyway, on to your objections...

What I was trying to do (and you're right, I should have said this) was to
provide some kind of working characterization of "feminist philosophy" --
something which, I submit, any attack on the "validity" of the field will
have to do. I don't want to insist that the characterizations I gave are
totally accurate descriptions of everything that goes on in the field,
because I don't claim to be able to give such a description. I do claim
that they are initially plausible, and that you've given no good argument
that either fails to describe a "valid area of study". I think it's up to
you to either explain what's wrong with them as characterizations of
feminist philosophy, or show why the kind of enquiries they describe
aren't "valid areas of study".

>>(1) It is a field of philosophy distinguished from other fields by its
>>subject matter -- it investigates issues of particular interest to women
>>and of relevance to women's position in the societies they live in.
> 
> Which women?  Am I being hopelessly radical to maintain that women posess
> free will?  Are there not women who don't share these concerns?

Of course there are women who are not interested in such issues. Maybe
they even form a majority of women, I don't know. So I'll grant that the
phrase "of particular interest to women" is not precise enough. (But I'll
stick by the other bit.)

> Such subject matter might justify some treatment in anthropology or sociology,
> but not philosophy.  Do you really think that there is anything that could
> rightly be called "feminine metaphysics"?  "Feminine epistemology"?
> "Feminine ethics"?  "Feminine politics"?  If so, perhaps you can explain
> how this relates to the views of Maggie Thatcher and Barbara Boxer.

Well, there are a lot of people working in feminist epistemology and
feminist ethics, so I think the onus is on you (at the beginning) to offer
some reason for thinking that what they're doing isn't worthwhile. (This
is no different from what I'd require for any other field -- I am
completely unqualified to judge what goes on in most of the laboratories
at any university or research institute, for instance, but I take the fact
that people spend time doing such work in such a setting to be good prima
facie evidence that what's going on is a "valid field of study", and I'd
require anyone who disagreed to make some kind of a case for their view
before I took them seriously.) And "Do you really think..."-type
rhetorical questions won't provide such a reason, because anyone who
_does_ think there are such things will just answer "Yes". 

>>(2) It radically differs from traditional philosophy in method and
>>approach; among other things, it mounts a challenge to presuppositions
>>that underlie traditional philosophy and that are responsible for much of
>>the oppression that women suffer in the societies they live in.
> 
> Well, it claims to do this anyway.  I don't think that the fact that the
> philosophers of history were men had anything substantial to do with their
> philosophies.

I say yet again: unless you give reasons for this belief, you are simply
begging the question.

>                I have heard a number of ridiculous claims that somehow
> being male has impaired these thinkers (or that being female would have 
> improved their thinking), but I have never really heard one worthy of
> addressing here.  Would you like to put one of them forward?

What has the question of whether being male makes you a worse philosopher
(however that's supposed to be measured) got to do with the question of
whether feminist philosophy is a "valid field of study" (which is what
we're on about here)? If these "ridiculous claims" are false, does that
make feminist philosophy "invalid"? If so, please explain exactly why. If
not, then the issue is irrelevant to what we've been arguing about.

>                                              Feminists claim that all of
> the fundamental philosophical ideas are tarnished by their being 
> "male-dominated" (etc.). 

I'm beginning to think you've read even less about feminist philosophy
than I have. There have been many lively debates, in print, between people
working in the field of feminist philosophy, over the truth of claims such
as this -- it is _simply_false_ to claim that people working in feminist
philosophy all take this kind of claim for granted.

The claim you made in your post was that "feminist philosophy" was "not a
valid area of study". All I claim is that you've not given any sort of
adequate argument for this. I'd suggest that a good way to go from here
might be to offer some characterization of what it is you mean by feminist
philosophy -- I'd agree, for instance, that if it's to be any kind of
philosophy as such, feminist philosophy shouldn't simply _assume_ that

>                                                             all of
> the fundamental philosophical ideas are tarnished by their being 
> "male-dominated" (etc.). 

but if this is going to be part of what you mean by feminist philosophy,
then it's just inadequate as a description of what goes on under the name
"feminist philosophy" in the real world. I'd also like to know what it is
you means by a "valid area of study". By and large, I think that the
things that go on in (for instance) universities usually count as "valid
areas of study", and therefore I think that the mere fact that many people
study and practise feminist philosophy in universities (and other places)
creates a strong prima facie case that feminist philosophy is a valid area
of study. Of course it's only a prima facie case. But I think that a
clearer picture of what makes an area of study "valid" might help sort out
just how strong the case is. 

BTW, should we stop sending this thread to so many newsgroups? (I'm
reading it in sci.philosophy.*).

Andrew.

-- 
Andrew McRae                       Internet: mcrae@husc.harvard.edu
                                     BITnet: mcrae@HUSC
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