Newsgroups: bit.listserv.politics
Date:         Tue, 7 Apr 1992 10:04:00 EDT
From:         rf35 <Richard_A_FYFE@UMAIL.UMD.EDU>
Subject:      RE: Genetic defects
Comments: To: Forum for the Discussion of Politics <POLITICS@ucf1vm.cc.ucf.edu>

Greetings:

        I have argued that if a person wishes to engage in an
activity which will result in an individual suffering what we
recognize as genetic defects, then there is no moral argument
that can be raised against them so long as 1) the defects are
not so severe that the person created would have been better
off not existing (that is, so long as the life of the person
created can be expected to be positive overall) and 2) that
the person created does not pose an excessive risk or burden
on others who have not consented to such an burden.

        I have assumed that all obligations are obligations to
somebody.  If there is an obligation to refrain from an activity
which produces a individual with a genetic makeup without going
beyond the limitations given above, then to whom is this obli-
gation owed?

        My main argument is that creatures of different genetic
makeup are, essentially, different sorts of creatures.  I can
see no rational for claiming that a creature of a particular
genetic makeup, that is not a risk to others and has any chance
at all of having a reasonable life for themselves, ought not to
exist.  Imagine, for example that we come across a humanoid life
form in the universe which is like us in all respects except that
among their population Downs Syndrome is the norm.  We form
treaties with them, some of them migrate to Earth, and some of
us migrate to their planet.  It seems hypocritical that while we
are at the same time welcoming them we are at the same time
supporting laws and institutions which aim at preventing their
like from existing.  We would in effect be saying that the mem-
bers of this race have a moral reasons not to reproduce.  And,
if they have no such obligations to reproduce, then it seems
there is no moral reason why a human should refrain from pro-
ducing an individual exactly like them.  A human being with a
"genetic defect" is merely another form of life, and no argument
(other than the two conditions already made) can be given for
saying that this form of life ought not to exist.

        Note: In saying that no argument can be given that this
form of life ought not to exist I do not imply that it ought to
exist.  In ethics, there are three categories of action, not two.
The three categories are "prohibited", "permitted", and "required."
To argue that there are no arguments for prohibiting or restricting
an activity does not imply that the activity is therefore re-
quired or obligatory.

        When we select one form of life over another, when we
engage in genetic manipulation of this type, all we are doing
is satisfying our desire for the type of creatures we want to
exist in the universe.  I have nothing against this; our desires
are important and it is certainly within the realm of moral
permissibility that we may change the universe into something
we are more comfortable with.  All I am asking is that we be
honest with ourselves and admit that when we decide against
allowing a particular type of creature to exist that we are
doing this to satisfy our tastes and preferences.  We are not
responding to a higher moral calling, and we are not increasing
the overall level of intrinsic good in the universe.

                                Richard A. Fyfe
                                rf35@umail.umd.edu
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