Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Fri, 16 Oct 1992 13:45:00 GMT
From:         Hortideas Publishing <0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Models and Data

From Greg Williams (921016)

>Bill Powers (921015.0700)

GW>>"Override" means that the error relative to an acquired reference
GW>>signal, necessary for reorganization to start, is less than the
GW>>errors relative to inherited reference signals, necessary for
GW>>reorganization to start in the absence of the acquired reference
GW>>signal.

>Still can't figure out what you mean. It would help if you described
>the specific situation you have in mind instead of the generalization
>you got from it. A diagram would help even more.

It is simply YOUR reorganization model, except that the criteria for starting
reorganization due to errors in (some? all?) innate critical variables are
subject to alteration by reorganization triggered by sufficient error in
acquired (within a single lifetime) reference levels -- which can be thought
of as acquired critical variables. Consider simplified people with only one
innate critical variable. The people walk around on a flat plain with edges;
falling over an edge means death. Near the edge, the plain slopes downhill
increasingly sharply. The innate critical variable is feet being angled (as
they would be on a slope), so if a person is too close to an edge, it begins
to reorganize. But now suppose the People of the Plain develop a people-
sacrifice religion. The sacrificees-to-be are raised from birth to "believe"
that, when the chosen (by the priests) time comes, their walking over the edge
will win them the ultimate religious reward: eternal life. Their control
structure reorganizes over their period of training so that an acquired
critical variable having to do with what it takes to win eternal life
"overrides" the innate critical variable having to do with angled feet (the
criterion for critical error in foot angle for triggering reorganization gets
larger), and, at the officious time, they walk right down the slope and over
the edge, without any "random"-appearing movement (reorganization is not
triggered by the angled-feet critical error, because the criterion for
starting reorganization is not met -- well, until after the point of no
return!). There they go, perhaps singing "holy" phrases.

>RE: new information as rubber-banding.

>The actions are different at the level of moving your fingers, but the
>same at the level of phoning someone. The plan "Call Joe" remains the
>same, and the perception matches it, at the higher level. What has to
>change is the way the error at that level is translated into a
>specific sequence of digits to dial to correct the error.

In rubber banding: The actions are different at the level of moving your [the
subject's] fingers, but the same at the level of holding the knot over the
dot. The perception "do as the experiment requested" remains the same, and the
perception matches it, at the higher level. What has to change is the way the
error at that level is translated into a specific sequence of positions of the
[subject's] end of the rubber band.

>By asking for Joe's phone number, I obtain a new number in my memory.

Yes, unless you just write it down for future reference.

>This does not make it a reference signal yet. This new number must be selected
>when I want to achieve "Call Joe." This means that the higher system must,
>given the same error signal as before, select a new reference-sequence at the
>lower level. This requires reorganization.

Fine by me. But if you didn't have the old number memorized, and don't try to
memorize the new one (you don't call Joe very often -- so seldom that you
didn't even know he moved), this is just a kind of rubber-banding. That was
all I was originally claiming. With memorization or re-memorization, I accept
that there could be reorganization -- at least, some sort of learning; I
wonder what critical variable might have reached its criterion error level,
and it doesn't seem very "random" -- and so it would fall under type 3 in my
summary of control of one's perceptions depending on another's actions.

>This involves reorganization, but perhaps not carried out in the way I
>visualize for "E. coli" learning. This sort of phenomenon might be a
>clue about a more systematic way of reorganizing.

I think you're headed in the right direction now, and not simply
stochastically.

>I'm not sure what the loop gain of E. coli would be if E. coli's
>random actions had to control another E. coli's swimming behavior by
>disturbing the other's time rate of change of concentration in order
>to control the first E. coli's sensed time rate of concentration.
>The thought of a teacher randomly trying different teaching methods as a way
>of helping a student randomly reorganize toward a specific behavior does not
>impress me as fraught with possibilities.

I don't think E. coli is equipped to do this sort of thing. If you do, please
present a model for how. The fallacy I see in your trying to analogize between
E. coli and people is that the person who attempts to control his/her
perceptions which depend on others' actions does NOT act randomly. That is NOT
the way (successful) teachers teach. Ask Gary whether he teaches by "randomly
trying different teaching methods"! Granted that Gary cannot predict in
advance that student X will have a difficulty of kind y; still, Gary knows
that when a student does (apparently, to Gary) have difficulty of kind y, then
he will do z (because it has often worked before in such cases -- it might not
work now, in which case he will try doing i; if i doesn't work, he'll just
recommend that the student drop the course -- you can't teach some people
statistics!).

>Your proposal calls at least for some experimental or working-model support.

I agree. But a working model of a teaching situation isn't possible at this
time. PCT models are still quite primitive: arm movements and distance-seeking
from obstacles. We're far, far, far from modeling the complex concepts
involved in teaching. And I'm building a house. Nevertheless, I still can
point to the abundant evidence that, in the real world, successful control of
one's perceptions depending on others' actions is ubiquitous. People ARE
"taught" to "swim." Can you FALSIFY my hypothesis that social interactions
involving intention (that is, are non-"accidental") ALWAYS involve at least
one of the four types of control in my summary? Or can you only suggest other
possible hypotheses which (given current state-of-the-art) cannot be clearly
regarded as more likely to be correct than my hypothesis? I think we're
arguing in a vacuum -- a vacuum of data, not of models. If you can't falsify
my hypothesis, you should look at "natural experiments" (the "wild") as well
as design experiments to see which hypothesis best fits the data. (An aside:
If ANYONE comes up with examples not fitting my types, I'd be happy to see the
list expand.)

>What we need is an experiment with Rick's model in which a
>human teacher tries to "facilitate" E. coli's progress up the
>gradient. Put your model where your mouth is.

Before even attempting any models, you need to take the data on human social
interactions seriously. A model of E. coli is NOT a model of a human. How
about looking, instead, at how a human teacher "facilitates" a human student's
"progress up the gradient" of learning some subject? I suspect that you'll
object because of the complexities with respect to the current stage of PCT
models, which are at the beginning stages currently. But it is better to look
for the money near the dark spot where you dropped it than to look for it
under a lamppost down the street. If a human teacher cannot "facilitate" E.
coli's progress up a gradient, that tells me that the analogy between E.
coli's klinotaxis and a human student's learning is a poor one. Human students
CAN learn to swim -- and can often learn faster with a teacher's
"facilitation." E. coli CANNOT learn to progress up a chemical gradient
faster, regardless of "facilitation."

>This is illustrates a problem with arguing at high levels of
>abstraction: general statements end up saying much less than they seem
>to say.

So, let's get back to the data: data about human social interactions.

>In effect, you're saying "I can't teach them the actions that will result in
>swimming, but by George I'll know swimming when I see it."

I am saying that PCT says that the teacher can at least tell the student when
his actions DON'T look like swimming actions, and suggest new, more
appropriate (to learning how to swim, as judged by the teacher) lower-level
reference signals for the student, rather than sitting around waiting for a
purported random-walk process to achieve the student's desired goal
("swimming"). This is what Skinner called "shaping." (Skinner didn't care WHY
it works!)

One way a human CAN "facilitate" E. coli's moving more quickly up a chemical
gradient (I don't have to run the experiment, it obviously works, at least in
a statistical sense of speeding progress up a gradient on average, over many
trials): whenever E. coli starts to go in a direction with a component DOWN
the gradient, almost immediately block progress, so the bacterium will just
sit there, instead of going any farther down the gradient, before it tumbles.
The problem with claiming any analogy between this and human teaching is that
E. coli's gradient-climbing is never improved in the absence of the "barrier-
facilitation," whereas the human student comes to be able to swim in the
absence of the teacher.

>You're trying to weasel out of the difficulties in exactly the way
>Skinner did. A response is that class of actions that has a particular
>consequence. All Skinner did was formalize (vaguely) the same habit
>that all behavioral scientists follow: naming behaviors by their
>controlled consequences, so as not to have to explain how the organism
>could select behaviors that, combined with disturbances, end up
>producing the same consequences again and again.

I agree with you that how organisms produce invariable ends via variable means
should be be explained. PCT models are the basis for my summary of the ways in
which control of perceptions depending on others' actions can succeed. I am
attempting to explain WHY Skinner's experiments succeeded in certain ways, and
WHY they have limits to success. He didn't know why. But it is only fair to
add that, for his purposes of "prediction and control" (AS HE SAW THEM -- I
think he was fooling himself), he didn't think he needed to know why.

>This, too, is merely explaining the outcome by describing the outcome.
>If both parties do end up controlling successfully, then the actions
>each takes to counteract the disturbances from the other (or from any
>source) cause no important errors in either of them. If that's not
>true, there will be conflict. It's not necessary for either control
>system to refer to this abstract constraint as they learn to interact
>with each other. Each system will either meet with no resistance, or
>have its actions resisted. If its actions are seriously resisted, and
>there's no alternative already known, the organism will begin to
>reorganize. If its actions aren't resisted, the organism will simply
>control. It doesn't have to know that it's using the actions of the
>other as part of its control loop. That doesn't require any planning;
>it simply happens, if it happens. If it doesn't happen, that's OK,
>too: control occurs either way. The main thing is to control your
>perceptions; the actions by which you accomplish that will come to be
>whatever is required.

In all of this, some of the four types of control in my summary are happening.
If the would-be controller has poor models of what the other wants, types 1,
2, and 3 won't succeed, and only type 4 is left -- conflict. If you don't care
about understanding why some social interactions go (virtually) straight to 4,
while others don't, that's OK. I know that others (especially those who would
prefer to avoid type 4, if possible) DO care. Some individuals on the net have
told me that they care.

>Let's get back to science.

Let's get back to data on human social interactions. When PCT models are up to
dealing with that data, I'll be happy to aid with the modeling -- maybe I'll
be done with house-building by then! Perhaps Tom Bourbon can provide some
optimistic news on making PCT models for human social interactions. I hope so!

>Bill Powers (921015.1800)

>A thought: I just realized that dogs can do the same thing with each
>other. But I presume that they don't know control theory and can't
>assess other dogs' goals. Can't a person accomplish control that
>brings another into the loop without having to know that the other
>person is also controlling something?

That depends on what you mean by knowing another is controlling something.
Most people don't know PCT (and no dogs do, presumably, and probably not even
Bill's cat!), but (barring "coincidence"), successful control of perceptions
which depend on another's actions (except for type 4 control) does indeed
require having a model of (some of) what the other wants. Apparently, most
PCT-ignorant people and at least some PCT-ignorant dogs (cats, too!) have such
models, to a degree -- and it appears that dogs and cats have such models not
only of other dogs/cats, but of humans and prey animals, too. Our dog
"Friendly" has come to make the model (I speculate) that Pat wants to go on a
walk in the woods after watching a video movie (this occurs about once a
week); Friendly is always there at the door with her tail wagging and her
"please" look when the movie ends; she is not at the door, etc., otherwise. If
this is anthropomorphizing, so be it. I don't follow Dr. Skinner's rules,
because I think psychology can get farther along (even if we err to a degree
toward over-anthropomorphizing in the short-term) by not following those rules
and making tentative models of organisms' innards, which models must then be
corrected in the light of experimental evidence. I hasten to add that it seems
to me that E. coli has no "modeling others" capability -- I don't
anthropomorphize THAT much! Many invertebrates -- much ignored by PCTers, to
their great loss, I believe -- appear to have quite refined modeling
capabilities, largely, I suppose, unmodifiable in a single lifetime.

I suppose Ed Ford could provide examples showing that explicit understanding
of PCT (of which some people, but not other animals, are capable) can
sometimes improve the ability to successfully control perceptions which depend
on others' actions -- and even to do so without needing to resort to violence
or threats of violence.

Best,

Greg

P.S. I'll mail the corrected figures on Monday. Sorry about my fumble on the
function keys. Glad to hear the paper is finally ready to go, otherwise.
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