From: grady@public.BTR.COM ( )
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: FBI telephony bill
Date: 2 Oct 92 16:14:05 GMT
Organization: BTR Public Access UNIX, MtnView CA. Contact: Customer Service cs@BTR.COM

Stephen Hebditch (steveh@orbital.demon.co.uk) writes, in 
part:

"In what sort of circumstances would an ordinary individual 
really need such [packet radio] technology?"

----------------------

The "ordinary" person would not.  That is one basis for the 
FBI's allegation of the efficacy of their new digital 
intercept bill.  But their reasoning is precipitous and 
faulty.

Using radio waves rather than fixed wires or telephone lines, 
packet radio is useful whenever a person needs a digital 
network with extreme geographical and topological 
flexibility.  One aspect of this flexibility is the 
possibility of increased privacy to that network user.

For example, the classic "spy scenario" data drop is 
virtually obsolete: Agent X drops off microdots of 
information under tree stump; Agent Y takes microdots and 
drops off new supply of one-time encryption pads in return.

Unbeknownst to Agents X and Y, Agent X, who has been under 
surveillance since Agent Z has compromised him or her, leads 
the officials to the drop that permits them to finally catch 
the master Agent Y.

This obsolete technic can be effectively replaced with the 
following higher-tech scenario: Agent X gets on the cross-
town bus to go to the library.  S/he is carrying nothing but 
a half-full brown paper lunch sack.  About the same time, 
miles away, Agent Y is grocery shopping.  In the corner of 
the cart is a half-full brown paper lunch sack.  Agent X 
decides to doze off.  Agent Y scans his or her coupons to see 
if they can be used at the store today.

Sometime later Agent X gets off the bus and goes into the 
library.  Meanwhile, Agent Y pays for the groceries and takes 
them home to put them away.

During this time, completely anonymously, Agent X has 
supplied Agent Y with several full color photos of the 
industrial plant with key blueprints, the complete corporate 
customer database, even several minutes of video recording 
from a bug that s/he had planted in the company boardroom.  
In return, Agent Y has given X new instructions, and the name
and number of the new "expense account."

Agent X, who has been compromised by Agent Z, has his or
her belongings searched, even scrutinized, by the FBI.  They
find packet radio equipment, perfectly legal to own without a
permit, and nothing at all incriminating on any of her computer
systems.

Reluctantly, they return her equipment.  After threats of media
exposure and legal action, they apologize for their intrusion.

---

All of this is possible today with off-the-shelf consumer 
electronic equipment and fifteen minutes of training. The 
components needed in each paper bag consist of: a hand-held 
amateur transceiver, model W2 manufactured by Icom America, 
Inc.  2380 - 116th Ave. N.E., Bellevue, WA  98004; a 
HandiPacket terminal node packet modem sold by PacComm, Inc. 
4413 N. Hesperides St., Tampa, FL  33614 and a palmtop 
computer, model 95LX manufactured by Hewlett-Packard, Inc., 
3000 Hanover St., Palo Alto, CA  94304.  (Each of these 
components could be replaced with any of several other 
vendor's products.)  This equipment is completely self-
contained, uses internal battery power, and weighs less
than three pounds.

---

Or, perhaps, this scenario is happening even as you read this 
article:  Alice, Bob, Carl, and Dick are CEOs of a high-tech 
industry that is under extreme SEC scrutiny under Antitrust 
laws.  Because of recent indictments and investigations of 
fraud and theft of trade secrets, each suspect that their 
phones are tapped and their mail covers scrutinized.  Alice, 
the most ruthless of the lot, has reason to believe that she 
is also under surveillance.

Every Saturday, Alice goes to the movie matinee.  She like to 
sit in the back row.  Other than the popcorn she invariably 
purchases, she carries a small handbag.  Bob like to cross-
country bicycle and always carries a small backpack.  Carl 
always goes to the library to take notes on his new book on 
Sun-Tzu marketing.  Dick likes to go off to the boonies to do 
a little plinking with his Glock.

After a pleasant afternoon, each heads home.  The next day, 
the retail prices on their new digital signal processing 
wafers go up by almost exactly the same 22% percent.  They 
will meet their quarterly pre-tax profit forecasts after all 
-- each CEO is immensely pleased.

---

In all of the above cases, all participants are using RSA 
public keys that they have posted via radio or Internet.
This precludes the FBI, or even the  NSA, from discovering
the content of subsequent communications, even if detected
and recorded.
Radio direction finding, although a possibility, is precluded 
by the mobility of the participants, the narrow line-of-sight 
beam width of the UHF radio frequencies used, and the 
unexpected time and non-standard radio channels employed.  
Unencrypted data is only kept on volatile "ram disks" that 
disappear when power fails; the participant's hard disk never 
contain any incriminating evidence, except, perhaps, for the 
large files of random data ostensibly used for statistical 
pseudo random number generation.

---

Finally, consider this scenario.  Zelda is changing 
employers.  She would like to get the source of the new 3-D 
multi-media imaging code, but does not have a "need to know" 
and thus cannot get access to the password on the server that 
would permit her to peruse the code.

Working late one night, she adds a small adapter to the DIN 
cable that drops into the software team leaders cubicle.  The 
adapter looks like a small DB-25 gender changer: 2" x 2" by 
1/2".

Several weeks later, well settled into her new job, she 
always takes the time every night to
examine the contents of the software that is dumped into her 
computer at home each day.  She has collected almost the 
entire source of her previous employer by this time.

Zelda built the "adapter" from a $50 Baycom modem and a $40 
wide-band FM bug transmitter that is powered by the +5 volts 
of the serial cable.  These components are available from the 
back of any electronics magazine.

---


The important aspect of all these above scenarios is that 
they all effectively evade the new proposed FBI digital 
telephony bill.  In fact, the new telephony bill makes is 
easier to abscond with corporate secrets because the Bill 
_guarantees_ a vulnerable spot in each PBX and computer 
network or BBS.  This vulnerability is supposedly only 
exploitable by the FBI -- in truth, it can be exploited by 
anyone with sufficient, and moderate, technical skill.

I guess the point of all the above is that the new proposed 
digital provider bill is already obsolete by current, not to 
mention future, technology.  By even _proposing_ such a bill, 
the FBI admits that it needs a "cheat" to keep up with 
current technology -- but such an explicit admission 
virtually assures a hacker, spy, corporate thief, cracker, 
samizdat publisher, or persons simply interested in privacy, 
that the FBI has the policy of looking for the quick-and-
dirty work-around rather than truly mastering the available 
technologies and carrying out their lawful duty without 
technical or economic degradation to equally lawful users.

Perhaps, like the hilariously ineffective "outlawing" interception
of cellular radio  conversations, this FBI digital provider requirements
bill  may give a false sense of security to the legislators and the 
agency itself, all the while more thoroughly compromising the privacy
of  "ordinary" people and simultaneously making our products less
competitive  abroad.

Meanwhile, ironically, the Bill _assures_ the cracker and 
hacker of moderate capacity a continued bonanza of high-tech 
data anonymously acquired through undefeatable conspiracies, 
that can be undetectably exploited, and unbreakably 
concealed.


For more information, contact:

Grady Ward                grady@btr.com
packet radio address: KD6ETH@K6LY.#NOCAL.CA.USA.NA



-- 
Grady Ward  grady@btr.com  Moby Lexicons