HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: leemike@eecg.toronto.edu (Michael Lee)
Subject: Re: Liar paradox
Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto
Date: 17 Dec 92 00:10:06 GMT

In article <GUTTMAN.92Dec16164336@circe.mitre.org> guttman@circe.mitre.org (Joshua D. Guttman) writes:
>In article <1476@eouk13.eoe.co.uk> pwestlak@eoe.co.uk (Peter Westlake) writes:
>
>   Please forgive me if this is a naive question (or even completely stupid :-)
>
>   The way I have heard the original Cretan liar paradox expressed is that
>   Epiminedes, a Cretan, said "All Cretans are liars". The reasoning goes that
>   as Epiminedes is known to be from Crete, he therefore claims to be a liar, 
>   and therefore claims not to be, which is a paradox.  But it seems to me
>   (in my ignorance) that this statement permits a consistent interpretation,
>   namely that SOME Cretans are liars, and that Epiminedes is one of them.
>   By supposing the existence of other Cretans, we avoid a paradox.
>
>   So a) I have the original statement wrong
>   or b) it never was a paradox really
>   or c) I have missed something obvious and everything I say is false.
>   Break it to me gently, especially if I have misspelled "Epi.*".
>
>
>I think you misspelled Epimenides, but you're right about it's not being
>paradoxical, as stated.  I think that his statement was enough to make people
>realize, though, that something very similar was going to be really paradoxical
>("This very sentence is false").
>
>Kripke, who's always entertaining, says that the statement is quoted by St.
>Paul in one of the Epistles, who writes that Epimenides, even one of their own,
>states that all Cretans are liars.  St Paul adds, "This testimony is true."
>Paul seems to have missed the logical subtlety here.
>
>	Joshua Guttman 

There is a collection of essays by Quine called `Paradoxes and Other
Essays' which deals with the above paradox (nonparadox), with a quote
by St. Paul followed by a blurb by Quine.  The first essay deals with
antimonies in clear expository manner.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: vinch@iastate.edu (The Doomsday)
Subject: Need help on UFO!!!
Summary: I need notion from non alien believers
Keywords: aliens
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 06:22:58 GMT


  I was to write an argumentative paper dealing with aliens.
  The problem is I have to be on the contra side of aliens.
  It means I am against the existence of the extraterrestrial life.
  
  There must somebody on this newsgroup who can help me. The paper
  must be written by Monday morning.
  I am desperate, please help.....
  
  Please reply directly to my e-mail address: vinch@iastate.edu

   Thank's!! (a whole bunch)...

                                
                               
                              I logged in; therefore I am...
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.religion.misc
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Truth again
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 04:50:44 GMT

In article <1992Dec16.062548.11476@u.washington.edu> joechip@hardy.u.washington.edu (Erich Vandenloos) writes:

>I've been following this thread for a bit and noticed Tarski popping up
>a couple of times. I've been reading Etchemendy's "The Concept of Logical
>Consequence," which is basically a sustained attack on Tarski's ideas
>about truth and consequence (isn't that in New Mexico?). It's interesting,
>although a little too Realist for my taste, but I was wondering if anyone
>else has read it or is reading it, and is interested in discussing it. I
>hope to hear from you hypothetical "consequence-enthusiasts" out there!

I liked this book for a number of reasons, not least for its unblinking
insistence that logical truth is just conceptual truth and vice versa.
The book doesn't really attack the received Tarskian view, though.  It's
more that it attacks what Tarski actually said, which turns out to be
somewhat different.  So somehow two wrongs turn out to be something of a
right, and the received view (logical truth/consequence = truth/consequence
in all models) isn't in too much danger.  The real work in the definition
is done by the unanalyzed modal and semantic notions ("all models" and
"true in a model" respectively), though, so no-one can claim that this
provides much of a "reduction".

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 15:36:18 GMT

In article <1992Dec17.005633.20095@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:
>In article <1992Dec16.163051.324@lincoln.ac.nz> flockoff@lincoln.ac.nz writes:
>>Hi, I just thought I'd put in my 2c worth on this topic.
>>Firstly I am a hard and fast determanist, with the inherent belief that
>>free-will is an illusion.  I have however no problem equating this belief
>>with the atribution of praise or blame on peoples actions. Reasoning follows :
>>
>>I think the crucial question is - Why do we wish to apportion blame or
>>praise?  The answer is surely (hopefully :-), because by praising or blaming
>>we hope to make people behave in the future the way we want them to.
>>So if someone, through no free-choice of their own blows someones head off,
>>then it is perfectly reasonable to punish them severly because this will
>>hopefully lead to premisses something like these entering into their brain
>>machine
>>
>>If I'm bad -> I'll get punished
>>If I'm punished -> I'll be unhappy.
>
>But this presupposes that we have the freewill to choose that we rather not
>be unhappy.

No, it presumes that we act intelligently; i.e., in response to what
goes on around us.  This is not precluded by strict determinism.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: joechip@hardy.u.washington.edu (Erich Vandenloos)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Truth again
Date: 20 Dec 92 08:56:03 GMT
Article-I.D.: u.1992Dec20.085603.13125
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle

The thing I've had trouble with in Etchemendy is his insistence on
varying the meaning of the quantifiers. It seems like his points (def-
initely the point about cross-term restrictions, but seemingly other
ones as well) depend on the problems caused by varying quantifiers, but
I fail to see any motivation outside of his argument for ever varying
them. It seems like you'd run into plenty of trouble if you started
varying 'or' and 'not' too, but somehow it doesn't seem important. Maybe
you know something I don't? I could easily just be missing his point,
and if you could fill me in, I'd be thrilled.

Erich Vandenloos
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu ()
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Truth again
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 15:29:11 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

>Posted on 14 Dec 1992 at 13:41:47 by jimmy donal wales

>>>Hope you're not the Jamie that Aerosmith sing[?] about.
>
>Jamie:
>>I wouldn't know. Presumably, I am, relative to SOME interpretation....
>
>This is precisely what I find so bizarre about your position.

I don't see why it's bizarre. It seems obviously true, to me.

>What is a proposition, as distinct from a sentence?  I've always
>(well, not always, only for the past few years since I heard about
>such things!) thought of propositions as equivalence classes for
>sentences.  But I'm not sure how this fits into your interpretational
>scheme.

It's ok to think of propositions as equivalence classes of sentences.
Well, by and large it is (not for sentences that contain indexicals).
But then you'd BETTER be taking INTERPRETED sentences, otherwise
the conception of propositions makes no sense.

Propositions are what sentences express. I can say what a French person
says even though I don't speak French. That "what" is a proposition.
I can also believe a proposition, etc.
Propositions are contents of sentences.

>Do propositions need interpretation?  Or is interpretation the scheme
>that transforms a sentence into a proposition?

The latter.
An interpretation of a sentence tells you what proposition it expresses.
(Roughly--it might tell you something slightly different, e.g. if the
sentence contains an indexical.)

>Did you say that mental states need interpretation?  It seems more
>plausible to say that (at least some!) mental states (or processes)
>ARE interpretation.

Mental states have contents. So do sentences. What content a sentence
has is a matter of its interpretation. What content a mental state
has is a matter of its interpretation.

Suppose you believe that mental states are brain states (or at least
that a token of a mental state is a token of a brain state, to allow
someone like Donald Davidson to agree). A brain state is not a proposition.
But it may have a propositional content.

>I'm not above reading a book, if you want to suggest one.  After all,
>Christmas vacation IS coming up and Randall hasn't come through with
>his promised suggested reading on QM.  (Nudge, nudge.)

Yike.
I can't think of a good one on the relevant topic.
Sorry.

>I wish Mikhail Zeleny would attack me.

I look forward to it.

Jamie
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Subject: Re: Truth
Reply-To: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Organization: University of Oslo, Norway
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 18:24:57 GMT

In article <1gahkjINNd44@cat.cis.Brown.EDU>, PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu
() writes:
|> Oh, sure, just because Randall is a more respected member of the
|> newsgroup, answer him and not me. Even though *I* said it first.
|> I'm crushed.
|> 
|> Anyway. I think what Randall showed is not that a sentence in itself
|> is true, you're right. IF "a sentence in itself" is understood to
|> mean an UNINTERPRETED sentence. But what does seem correct is that
|> a sentence can be thought of as interpreted in a context in which
|> there is no one to interpret it. THAT is what Randall showed.

No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
cases rather arbitrary, though.)

What is a sentence?

If you mean by sentence an expressed and understood statement,
even though not checked for truth-value or other content, you
are right above, and I apologize.

If you mean something else, like just the sound floating in the
air, or the semblance of letters on a piece of paper, youre
wrong. Randall has shown nothing of the kind you then imply.

But I might just INTERPRET your sentences wrong, of course. I did
assume we were speaking English, and that ... what am I doing?
Youre gonna interpret this - right? Who knows if you do not
interpret according to a code only you know, and read what I have
written above as - SHOOT ME!  Ouch - what have I started?!

|> And then it DOES follow that sentences can be thought of as true or
|> false independently of interpreters.
|> But not, obviously, independently of interpretations.

Well, as indicated above, interpretation can be diverse.
Should we not then go for _intended_ interpretation, at
least in some fashion.

But what becomes truth then, is not the sentence at all,
but the interpreted _meaning_.

|> >You place the truth in sentences, not in beliefs of persons.
|> >I really find that nonsensical. If I just "interpreted" the
|> >lamp before me in the right fashion, it would too, according
|> >to paralell arguments, be "true" or "false" about another
|> >thing entirely.
|> 
|> Right. More strictly, relative to an interpretation of the lamp,
|> it COULD be true or false. Whether there were an interpreter there
|> to do the interpreting or not.

But then, as said above, it wouldnt be the lamp that was true
or false, would it. Not even the lamp _qua_interpreted_ either.
The truth would be ...

|> Jamie

Hope youre not the Jamie that Aerosmith sing[?] about.


Saa kan vi se om du kan si om denne norske setningen er sann:
"En daare kan spoerre mer enn ti vise kan svare."

Om verden staar til paaske,
                         Solan
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: oleary@staff.tc.umn.edu ()
Subject: Re: Truth again
Organization: University of Minnesota
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 1992 23:54:07 GMT

In article <1gius4INNo68@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu,
(Jamie) writes, among other things:

>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>
>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>one of us, no one ever will.

Not only do you not define truth with respect to sentences of English, your
example is circular.  The sentence is or isn't syntactically correct and may
or may not have semantic content.  By saying that the sentence is on a list
of English sentences, you imply that it is syntactically correct.  The
semantic content of the sentence, however, still depends on it being
interpreted.

+------------------->  Signature Block : Version 3.C  <---------------------+
|                                                                           |
|    "Nothing astonishes men so much as common-sense and plain dealing."    |
|                                            --- Ralph Waldo Emerson        |
|                                                                           |
+---------------->   Copyright (c) 1992 by Doc O'Leary   <------------------+
From: joechip@hardy.u.washington.edu (Erich Vandenloos)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Truth again
Date: 16 Dec 92 06:25:48 GMT
Article-I.D.: u.1992Dec16.062548.11476
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle

I've been following this thread for a bit and noticed Tarski popping up
a couple of times. I've been reading Etchemendy's "The Concept of Logical
Consequence," which is basically a sustained attack on Tarski's ideas
about truth and consequence (isn't that in New Mexico?). It's interesting,
although a little too Realist for my taste, but I was wondering if anyone
else has read it or is reading it, and is interested in discussing it. I
hope to hear from you hypothetical "consequence-enthusiasts" out there!


Erich Vandenloos
From: dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Electrical and Electronic Eng., University of Adelaide
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 00:56:33 GMT

In article <1992Dec16.163051.324@lincoln.ac.nz> flockoff@lincoln.ac.nz writes:
>Hi, I just thought I'd put in my 2c worth on this topic.
>Firstly I am a hard and fast determanist, with the inherent belief that
>free-will is an illusion.  I have however no problem equating this belief
>with the atribution of praise or blame on peoples actions. Reasoning follows :
>
>I think the crucial question is - Why do we wish to apportion blame or
>praise?  The answer is surely (hopefully :-), because by praising or blaming
>we hope to make people behave in the future the way we want them to.
>So if someone, through no free-choice of their own blows someones head off,
>then it is perfectly reasonable to punish them severly because this will
>hopefully lead to premisses something like these entering into their brain
>machine
>
>If I'm bad -> I'll get punished
>If I'm punished -> I'll be unhappy.

But this presupposes that we have the freewill to choose that we rather not
be unhappy.
From: flockoff@lincoln.ac.nz
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 16 Dec 92 16:30:50 +1300

Hi, I just thought I'd put in my 2c worth on this topic.
Firstly I am a hard and fast determanist, with the inherent belief that
free-will is an illusion.  I have however no problem equating this belief
with the atribution of praise or blame on peoples actions. Reasoning follows :

I think the crucial question is - Why do we wish to apportion blame or
praise?  The answer is surely (hopefully :-), because by praising or blaming
we hope to make people behave in the future the way we want them to.
So if someone, through no free-choice of their own blows someones head off,
then it is perfectly reasonable to punish them severly because this will 
hopefully lead to premisses something like these entering into their brain
machine

If I'm bad -> I'll get punished
If I'm punished -> I'll be unhappy.
Axiom - try to make (happy)=T - (Initialized at boot up:-)
so by MTTs they won't be bad, which is surely the only point of praise and
blame.

This is probably really stupid but I thought I'd find out what was wrong
with it anyway.

Bye

------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Grooby - Lincoln University - NZ
Probably bet not to email me at above address as I probably
won't get it. Thanx.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: Truth again
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 18:41:47 GMT

Svein:
>>Hope you're not the Jamie that Aerosmith sing[?] about.

Jamie:
>I wouldn't know. Presumably, I am, relative to SOME interpretation....

This is precisely what I find so bizarre about your position. 
I don't want to argue about it, really, since I don't know much about
this whole area.  But I would like some more information.

What is a proposition, as distinct from a sentence?  I've always
(well, not always, only for the past few years since I heard about
such things!) thought of propositions as equivalence classes for
sentences.  But I'm not sure how this fits into your interpretational
scheme.

Do propositions need interpretation?  Or is interpretation the scheme
that transforms a sentence into a proposition?

Did you say that mental states need interpretation?  It seems more
plausible to say that (at least some!) mental states (or processes)
ARE interpretation.

Anyhow, anything you can say to shed light here would be appreciated.

I'm not above reading a book, if you want to suggest one.  After all,
Christmas vacation IS coming up and Randall hasn't come through with
his promised suggested reading on QM.  (Nudge, nudge.)

I wish Mikhail Zeleny would attack me.

--Jimbo

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Truth again
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 16:38:46 GMT

In article <1gius4INNo68@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>>Posted on 14 Dec 1992 at 15:14:53 by Randall Holmes
>
>>>>No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
>>>>non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
>>>>cases rather arbitrary, though.)
>>>
>>>Huh?
>>>I have no idea why you think he showed that.
>>
>>Neither do I.
>
>Oh, good.
>
>> I'm on Jamie's side of this argument; truth (of
>>sentences in a certain language) is not defined in terms of observers
>>or interpreters.  Take my argument and apply it, further, to the truth
>>or falsehood of a sentence which has never in fact been uttered by
>>anyone (it would be self-defeating for me to give a counterexample,
>>but counting arguments show that there are such).
>
>Of course, we can DESCRIBE a sentence which has never been uttered, and
>it STILL will never have been uttered. So you CAN give a counterexample.
>
>I'll take a shot!
>
>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>
>(A small prize to whoever can utter it first.)
>
>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>one of us, no one ever will.
>
>> I don't agree with
>>Jamie on "types and tokens" (sentences are not equivalence classes of
>>tokens), precisely because the canons which determine truth or
>>falsehood of a sentence could in fact be applied to the so far
>>unuttered sentence which has no "tokens" at all; I think of sentences
>>as abstract objects of the same order as numbers.
>
>I'm not sure what the disagreement is supposed to be. I think I agree
>with the above.
>I allowed that Jimbo could think of *propositions* as equivalence
>classes of sentences, for most purposes. I was then thinking of
>sentences as abstract objects. I usually think of types as
>abstract objects.

Then we don't disagree; I'm willing to talk about concrete instances
of sentences being "tokens" of abstract sentences (used as "types") as
long as it is understood that sentences which have no tokens are
distinct from one another ("types" are not mere equivalence classes).


>
>Jamie


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Truth again
Date: 14 Dec 92 20:14:53 GMT
Organization: Boise State University

In article <1gib6mINN76i@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
>
>|> Anyway. I think what Randall showed is not that a sentence in itself
>|> is true, you're right. IF "a sentence in itself" is understood to
>|> mean an UNINTERPRETED sentence. But what does seem correct is that
>|> a sentence can be thought of as interpreted in a context in which
>|> there is no one to interpret it. THAT is what Randall showed.
>
>>No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
>>non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
>>cases rather arbitrary, though.)
>
>Huh?
>I have no idea why you think he showed that.

Neither do I.  I'm on Jamie's side of this argument; truth (of
sentences in a certain language) is not defined in terms of observers
or interpreters.  Take my argument and apply it, further, to the truth
or falsehood of a sentence which has never in fact been uttered by
anyone (it would be self-defeating for me to give a counterexample,
but counting arguments show that there are such).  I don't agree with
Jamie on "types and tokens" (sentences are not equivalence classes of
tokens), precisely because the canons which determine truth or
falsehood of a sentence could in fact be applied to the so far
unuttered sentence which has no "tokens" at all; I think of sentences
as abstract objects of the same order as numbers.  By the way, there
is nothing arbitrary about the assignment of truth value to the kind
of sentence in my example; it is simply that we are not in a position
to find out what the correct assignment is.

[...]

>
>Jamie





-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech