HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: novak@vitruvius.ar.utexas.edu (Marcos Novak)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: ANNOUNCING: New Graduate Program in Architecture+Art+Technology
Date: 10 Oct 92 03:46:26 GMT
Organization: School of Architecture, University of Texas at Austin
X-UserAgent: Nuntius v1.1b3


From: mikep@hpmwtd.sr.hp.com (Mike Powell)
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 01:59:19 GMT
Subject: Re: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Organization: HP Santa Rosa Site (SRSD MWTD)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech

	
	This is a silly question IMHO.... of course it is possible
	to make a "machine" that can replicate itself....

	Of course it could not make itself infinitely....
	and of course it would need an 'environment' with
	resources.

	The argument that the LIFE simulation is an invalid example
	because it requires a processor is incorrect.  The processor
	is simply the enviroment.

	We know that factories build the goods for other factories.
	We know how to build automated factories (NeXT boards are said to
	never be touched by human hands).

	How "identical" must it be?  If it must be absolutely identical to
	the placement of every atom.... well of course that is not
	possible.  While no two 'things' can be said to be identical
	in the absolute sense, things can be said to be 'replicas' of
	other things.

	-Mike-

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 06:48:25 GMT

In article <7668@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Sep17.154637.9156@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>It's important not to forget that David Chalmers is talking about logical
>possibility and not physical possibility.  Something might be logically
>possible even if physically possible.  Of course, not everyone will
>accept that logical possibility is an interesting notion.

That's sort of right, but I'm not happy with "physical possibility".
In general I'm happier calling the other major possibility class
"empirical possibility", or "nomic possibility" -- i.e. possibility
subject to the laws of nature.  Calling it "physical possibility"
buys into the assumption that the only laws of nature are physical
laws.  (The zombie is almost certainly nomically (empirically)
impossible, but it's obviously physically possible if it's logically
possible -- it's physically identical to me, so it can't violate
any laws of physics!)

In considering the relevance of the possibility of zombies for the
truth of physicalism, logical possibility rather than nomic
possibility is obviously the relevant notion.  I'm sure Mr. Holmes
is aware of this.

>Not so.  When two things are actually the same it can still be
>logically possible for them to be different.  Not always, though.
>You have to figure out which case you're in.  But you don't always
>have to know two things are actually different to know that it's
>logically possible for them to be different.

Not quite.  On the standard line, two things that are identical
are necessarily identical: how could something be other than
itself?  Take a look at Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_, for
instance.  However, what can be the case is that two *descriptions*
that pick out the same thing in the real world pick out two
different things in other possible worlds.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 00:37:31 GMT

In article <7670@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Sep18.172123.14367@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

>>Either you are talking about a different net, or your interpretation of
>>people's statements is very different from mine.  I see relatively few
>>people who claim that TT is all we should count as evidence, or who
>>claim that functional organization does not matter. 
>
>Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization 
>(or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
>anti-Searle side says they agree? 

This is silly.  You've said this a number of times now, and it's
just wrong.  As far as I can tell, most of the most sophisticated
defenders of the "strong AI" positions on the net don't put any
special weight on the Turing Test or behavior; rather, it's the
organization of internal causation that counts.  Certainly I have
disavowed the Turing Test a number of times, as has Drew McDermott.
The only sophisticated defender of strong AI who I've seen defend
the behaviorist position is Daryl McCullough, but at least he does
it in a sophisticated way.  Certainly there are some people who
have a knee-jerk TT response, but you don't need to pay attention
to everybody out there.

Opponents of strong AI tend for some reason to assume that the
Turing Test is at the logical foundation of the strong AI
position, and fixate upon it.  This is simply not the case.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 13 Oct 92 19:40:47 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <Bw1s8p.Mtp@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7668@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Sep17.154637.9156@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>>Not so.  When two things are actually the same it can still be
>>logically possible for them to be different.  Not always, though.
>>You have to figure out which case you're in.  But you don't always
>>have to know two things are actually different to know that it's
>>logically possible for them to be different.

I agree with what you say below.  "Things that are the same" is
somewhat imprecise talk that seems to have gotten me into trouble.
It's probably not worth trying to explain further.

>Not quite.  On the standard line, two things that are identical
>are necessarily identical: how could something be other than
>itself?  Take a look at Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_, for
>instance.  However, what can be the case is that two *descriptions*
>that pick out the same thing in the real world pick out two
>different things in other possible worlds.

Ok, I knew this, and have read and remembered _Naming and Necessity_.
Randall Holmes has told me he's a professional logician and knows
all about this (and the other relevant issues).  But I must say it
sure looked to me like he was misunderstanding you and applying the
wrong notion of possibility.  Moreover, even now his argument against
your argument looks wrong to me.

So I would appreciate it if one, or both, of you could come up
with a version of his argument that even I could understand.

-- jd
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 14 Oct 92 19:37:40 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Sep29.152225.1174@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>Plausibility arguments are really all that one has to go on in
>>theorizing about consciousness.  Solipsism, to take another
>>position, is consistent with the evidence, but doesn't seem at all
>>likely.
>
>I'm not sure what you mean by "likely" here. I think that the argument
>against solipsism is more based on esthetics or practicality than on
>likelihood (since there is no a priori probability distribution on
>possible worlds). Either we argue: For the world to be like that seems
>arbitrary (which is an esthetic judgement, as far as I can tell), or
>we argue: Assuming I act on the hypothesis that solipsism is right,
>and it turns out to be wrong, then the consequences are much worse
>than the other way around (which is a practical argument). I don't
>see where likelihood comes in.

I'm not sure it helps here, but it seems to me that people often
say "likely" as a sort of rough indication of how many other beliefs
would have to change.  So something unlikely would require that
many things be false that we think are true.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Idealism (was Dualism)
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 19:27:15 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <7667@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Sep16.225422.128824@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>
>>I see plenty of room here for solipsism, but none for idealism.  If I don't
>>accept that my sensations are the result of the physical world, I don't see
>>how to get anywhere.
>
>Maybe there's no matter, only ideas, `a la Berkeley.

But *whose* ideas?  If they are just your ideas, you're back at solispism.
If you want to assert that *other* people also have ideas, you have to
justify your belief in the existence of other people.  And the only evidence
we have for that belief is from our sensory impressions -- impressions we
must interpret as being of the world *before* we can interpret some of them
as being from "other" people.
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 21:47:17 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <0Z2PsB2w165w@netlink.cts.com> snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass) writes:
>frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>> I see no reason to believe that "purpose" is such a fundamental concept.  I
>> see it as an emergent concept in complex systems.
>
>      Do you see it as an emergent phenomena in yourself? Do you 
>observe that you won a tennis match, and then say: "That must have
>been my purpose"? Do you get a college degree, then look back and
>say "Gee, now I understand why I took all those classes"?

"Emergent" here is not intended in such a crude chronological sense.
Rather, the claim is that certain complex systems have purposes, although no
part of those systems has a purpose.

In fact, to tie in with another thread, I think "purpose" is inextricably
tied in with "consciousness", "qualia", "belief", and "intelligence" -- that
a system cannot really have any one of these without having all of them.

>      Even though living systems fall mostly outside the purview of
>exact sciences, these are the systems we would most dearly like to
>understand well. A systems approach which assumes purposeful behavior
>will yeild a better analysis, more cogent and useful, when dealing 
>with living systems, IMO.

Lamarck built an evolutionary theory on that premise.  It failed.
From: exukjb@exu.ericsson.se (ken bell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: universe of information....
Date: 13 Oct 92 21:48:28 GMT
Organization: Ericsson Network Systems, Inc.
X-Disclaimer: This article was posted by a user at Ericsson.
              The opinions expressed are strictly those of the
              user and not necessarily those of Ericsson.

In article <1992Oct11.184011.6848@wixer.cactus.org> sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan) writes:
>From: sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan)
>Subject: universe of information....
>Date: 11 Oct 92 18:40:11 GMT


>How much information is there in the universe? what are the phicical
>relationshipa between quantum, energy and info?

>any thoughts?

>Tim.

This sounds more like a science, than a philosophy, question to me. How 
about this one (hopefully related somewhat to yours): 

Would a complete description of the world have to include a specification 
of everything that is *not* the case, as well as of everything that *is* the 
case? Is this tantamount to asking if there are negative facts?
//////////////////////////////////////
/* Kenny  *   Welcome to Mind Wars! */
//////////////////////////////////////
From: philkime@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Philip Kime)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Zeleney's address
Date: 12 Oct 92 13:53:09 GMT
Reply-To: philkime@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Philip Kime)
Organization: Dept of AI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

Could someone please mail me Mikhail Zeleny's e-mail address as he seems to
have
changed it since last time I tried ....


					Phil.
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 21:58:54 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <7711@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>Anyway, I don't think our intuitions in these areas are very
>reliable.  For instance, it it really intuitive that a number
>of neurons could be killed without much, if any, noticeable
>effect?  Suppose someone's neurons stopped working, one by one.
>What happens?  Does their consciousness fade, blink out, or
>what?  

Curiously, this is a question we can essay a pretty good guess at.  The
answer would seem to be that it disappears in strange and wonderful ways;
and the actual point of disappearance is not easy to mark.

I recommend the book, "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" (sorry, the
author's name escapes me).  This deals with real life examples of the
results of brain damage.  The amazing thing is that people can lose whole
chunks of their mental life, and not even know that they are missing
anything.
From: snodgras@cyber.net (John E. Snodgrass)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 11 Oct 92 03:29:30 GMT
Organization: The Cyberspace Station

In article <1992Oct5.190709.17067@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>This requires explanation.  I think that _everything_ has "qualia", in
>Cahlmers's sense of having a "bare experiential feel".  Consciousness,
>for me, has something to do with "knowing oneself" to some extent.  I
>would recognize any system which maintains an internal model of its
>own activity and can provide answers to queries about same as
>(minimally) conscious.  Note that consciousness does not necessarily
>go with being terribly bright.
>

      I would agree with you that possession of an internal model of itself
is a good criterion for consciousness, since at least in living beings this
is associated with attempts to survive. The content of the model is directed
toward insuring the survival of that which is modeled, i.e. the self.
Moreover, I would suggest that qualia (as a concept) might be defined as
primitive terms in this survival-model. "Bare experiential feel" as much
as one dislikes the vagueness of this term, probably refers to assessments
of the survival-probability -- as per the content of the self-model -- in
the situation which is being experienced.

      Your suggestion that computer programs model themselves, in this or
any other way, however, strikes me as farfetched. To create a coherent
model of any type, I would suggest it is necessary to have a purpose which
that model serves. This provides a means for prioritizing and organizing
the data in the model. Thus without even criticizing the obvious point
that all computer programs have a 'bottom level' which is simply a set
of conditionals relating input to output, no computer program could have
a purpose with respect to _itself_, which would (by my definition) exclude
any possibility of consciousness.

>-- 
>The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
>above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
>opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
>or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu



      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net]
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 18:29:50 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <Bw2xzL.GIA@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Oct13.191235.17667@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>For the umpteenth time, the possibility of non-physical qualia plays
>*no* (repeat: *no*) role in the argument.  As I stated a long long
>time ago, arguments from the possibility of non-physical qualia
>prove nothing, for the sorts of reasons you mention.  The argument
>I've made is from the possibility (even the coherent imaginability,
>if you like) of a zombie world -- the physics without the qualia,
>not vice versa.  If this world is even a coherent notion, then I'm done
>done, as it shows that the physics doesn't exhaust the way the world
>is -- after making the physics, God still had more work to do.

You *haven't* clearly stated this before -- at least not clearly enough for
me to understand it.  (The *original* example dealt with disembodied
consciousness.)

For what it's worth, I think the zombie world *is* an incoherent notion.
The qualia are part of the physical system by virtue of that system's
functional organization; the same functional organization will *necessarily*
produce qualia.

I submit as evidence that agreed point that the functional organization will
produce claims of qualia.  It is an irrelevancy that there are other
functional organizations which will produce claims of qualia without
actually having them.

(main() {int i; for (i=0;i<100;++i) printf("I have qualia.\n");})  :-)
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 13 Oct 92 00:07:51 GMT
	<1992Sep18.172123.14367@mp.cs.niu.edu> <7670@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

   > Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization  
   > (or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
   > anti-Searle side says they agree?

The distinction is between "It thinks" and "It thinks like a human".
I can't imagine anything passing the Turing Test that I wouldn't give
credit for thinking, regardless of its functional organization.  On
the other hand, I wouldn't say "It thinks like a human" unless it had
the same functional organization as a human, even if it were
behaviorally indistinguishable.

	-- Bill
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: "Consciousness Explained"
Date: 7 Oct 92 16:39:45 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <burt.718400899@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>wadley@mullauna.cs.mu.OZ.AU (Gregory Robert Wadley) writes:

>>I'm reading "Consciousness Explained" by Dan Dennett.

>  I can tell you my reaction ...
>exercise of his ego .... sell me a bill
>of goods ... rather patronizing attitude ... offensive ...
>arguments ... not convincing .... agree with ...
>Zelaney that the book was intellectually dishonest.

Despite promising us a detailed review, and being asked detailed
questions by a number of posters, Zeleny in the end refused to make
any detailed criticisms, contenting himself with his usual well-turned
sneers. Care to give some examples of why you found the book
unconvincing and dishonest, or did you just want to share your
feelings with us?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
From: snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 23:00:38 PDT
Organization: NetLink Online Communications, San Diego CA

bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:

> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
> 
>    > Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization  
>    > (or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
>    > anti-Searle side says they agree?
> 
> The distinction is between "It thinks" and "It thinks like a human".
> I can't imagine anything passing the Turing Test that I wouldn't give
> credit for thinking, regardless of its functional organization.  On
> the other hand, I wouldn't say "It thinks like a human" unless it had
> the same functional organization as a human, even if it were
> behaviorally indistinguishable.
> 
> 	-- Bill


      Which brings up the question of why one would want to attempt
the categorization of a machine as either conscious or not conscious.
Obviously a machine is what it is. The only question with regard to
it is _what is it good for_. What's laughable about this whole debate
(the A.I. debate) is that any attempt to make a machine conscious in
the usual sense would have to include giving it "a will of its own".
Nothing but the apparent possession of an ego will ever convince anyone
that a machine is "conscious". The possession of an ego, which is to
say a unified and self-serving perspective, would (no matter how it
was implemented) inevitably -- to the extent that it existed in fact --
make the computer _less useful_.

     This seems entirely self-evident to me. Being a long-time programmer
myself, and being an extreme advocate of the development of computers
for the augmentation of _human_ intellectual powers, I find the idea
of scientists sitting around trying to get a computer NOT TO DO WHAT
THEY WANT pretty funny! I like to imagine a competition between two
societies: one where they try to build intelligent computers, and the
other where they try to build intelligent people using computers. Ha-ha.

     Really the strong AI position arises out of the religious impulse.
They want to discover the principle which will allow them to duck
the responsibility for everything from then on: "Hey, the computer 
told me to do it!"

      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net]

--                    
INTERNET:  snodgras@netlink.cts.com (John Snodgrass)
UUCP:   ...!ryptyde!netlink!snodgras
NetLink Online Communications * Public Access in San Diego, CA (619) 453-1115