From: yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken)
Newsgroups: sci.econ
Subject: Re: Libertarians, slaves and company towns
Date: 14 Apr 92 16:09:48 GMT
Organization: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

In article <1992Apr14.013829.27016@clipper.ingr.com> ald@clipper.ingr.com (Al Date) writes:
>>In the real world, it makes little difference to a debt-bonded sharecropper
>>that he has a theoretical right to hire F. Lee Bailey and sue his employer.
>>In practice, he has *no* legal redress, and if your theory tells you
>>otherwise, it is an indication of the poverty of your theory.
>>
>
>He has much more legal recourse than an actual slave.
>To deny that is an indication of some serious blinders in your 
>world view.

I'm sorry, but a theoretical difference with no practical implications does
not seem to be a difference worth much. In practice, economic power
translates into political power, no matter what your theory says.


>>In practice, a vast inequality of wealth between the employer
>>andthe employees seems to be inextricable from a vast inequality of
>>political/judicial power. 
>
>This is only true to the extent that political actions are allowed to
>mix with economic actions, which libertarians seek to avoid to the greatest
>extent possible.  Where there is the need to compete on a legal footing,
>100,000 workers can pool their resources in unions or in boycotts or
>in class action lawsuits and take on any corporation.

Do corporations have a legal right to lock-out workers who have a current
contract? Do workers have a legal right to engage in secondary boycotts?
What's the difference between a picket line and harrasment? Should a local
or federal government agency consider the labor situation at a 
corporation when making purchasing decisions? Can workers sue for damages
if they believe that work conditions are hazardous? If so, can the courts
demand access to private workplaces? Can employers require female workers
get stererlized? Male workers? ....
All of these are political questions, not amenable to pure market decisions.
Who makes these decisions? How can you prevent economic power from being
used to influence these decisions?

>For example, a mutli-national energy concern can
>>easily afford to shift production while fending off lawsuits from coal
>>miners in one mine. The miners, of course, are aware of this, and are thus
>>convinced to accept infringements of their human rights in exchange for
>>wages.
>>
>You can pose any hypothetical situation.  The bottom line is that the
>best hope for the workers is greater competition for their labor.

That's not a hypothetical situation. And, why must the workers have only
a choice of employers? Why can't workers have access to investment capital
without the permission of a rich man or a corporate board.


>>>Practically speaking, the only way that someone
>>>can face a clear choice between starvation and bondage is if the 
>>>agent offering the "choice" has a monopoly on all jobs offered everywhere
>>>and a monopoly on the entire food supply, something which has only
>>>existed under centrally planned economies.
>>
>>False. In conditions of artificially induced scarcity, such as were endemic
>>during the pre-welfare-state industrial revolution, jobs were not easy to
>>come by, and many workers had absolutely no reserve wealth. Thus, a job loss
>>meant no food today, eviction, and quite possibly death. 
>
>I would say that this was much more true in pre-industrial society.  Savings
>and reserve wealth and a large middle class are a feature of industrial
>society, and in direct proportion to the length of time that society has
>had a chance to operate.

Actually, in direct proportion to the influence of unions and social
democratic parties. The rise of the US middle class coincided with the
rise of the AFL-CIO, the establishment of NLRB, and massive public
investment in  tranportation, housing, education, and social security
programs.

>>>local monopoly on both items, as in the much-ballyhooed
>>>example of the company town, it cannot be considered 
>>>involuntary servitude (ie legal ownership of humans) in the strict sense,
>>>as long as people can walk, run, or ride away from the town, which many
>>>of them did.  The Land of Opportunity may not have been uniformly so,
>>>but it sure beat monolithic tyranny.
>>
>>So, feudal serfs who could move to cities to escape their feudal bonds were,
>>in your estimation, not victims of involuntary servitude? 
>>
>I didnt say they werent victims, but they certainly were no longer slaves,
>as long as there was no legal recourse against them.

The distinction eludes me. American slaves who made it to Canada were
also beyond legal recourse of their "owners".  If you have to run away to 
get your freedom, you are not free. No?

-- 


yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu