HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 10 Nov 92 19:41:12 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In <TORKEL.92Nov10193200@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In brief: not only are the terms used in your definition - "rational persons
>familiar with the subject matter" - exceedingly vague and
>indeterminate, but the idea that there is some set of sentences which
>any such group of persons would single out as "descriptive" has no
>basis in fact.

Well, there's no way to get around the vagueness of natural language,
and this would include deciding when one in asserting something
substantive.

>Next you stipulate that the sentences in S are those descriptive
>sentences that we - presumably these rational and informed people -
>could in principle "verify":

This is one way of defining truth.

>Are you saying that these hypothetical persons could
>verify the truth of e.g. all true mathematical sentences or sentences of
>physical theory occurring in Russell's writings? Again, are you saying that
>there is a method of "verifying" the truth of any "true" sentences concerning
>human existence occurring in Russell's writings?

Well, not "verifying", necessarily, but there would be a lot of
sentences about whose truth or falsehood there was general agreement.

>I submit that many people will reject as simple-minded in the extreme
>any proposed task of dividing these sentences into those that do and
>those that do not "assert something about the world", as well as the task
>of deciding which of these sentences are "true". Each of the sentences may
>be questioned in many ways, elucidated or analyzed in many ways, argued
>for or against in many ways, accepted or rejected on different grounds
>and interpretations. If we accept one of these sentences as true or
>reject it as false, what we mean by this can be understood only in the
>context of our interpretations and explanations.

Sure.  Again, the vagueness of natural language.

>I submit further that even if a bunch of people accept your two tasks
>as meaningful, there is no reason whatever to believe that they will arrive
>at any consensus, or that their decisions will agree with those of a
>different group, or that they will arrive at the same decisions the next time
>you ask them.

But there is a consensus about the truth of lots of sentences in everyday
life.  I'll admit that the sketch isn't too great, but then I just made
it up to give you an idea of what I had in mind.  I think much of your
criticism might be avoided if one concentrated on formal systems, instead.
That would probably be the only way of making the picture work, as in
the Tractatus.  If we stay with natural language, there's no way to
eliminate the vagueness.  And like you said, if we stick to formal
language, the connection to reality is severed.


-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: koc5@ellis.uchicago.edu (michael shalom kochin)
Subject:  Women Objectivist Philosophers (was Re: Plato's Views on Women)
Keywords: objectivism, Rand
Reply-To: koc5@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 04:07:15 GMT

In article <BxK3DF.AHy@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1992Nov11.074321.421@news.wesleyan.edu>, RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:
>|> In <BxIKsp.Gt3@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com writes:
>|> > philosophy?  If you want to get a job as a "feminist philosopher" you
>|> > not only have to teach "feminist issues", but you have to teach them
>|> > in a certain *way*, from a certain point of view.  Any feminist
>|> > philosophers out there who are Ayn Rand followers?  Any feminist
>|> 
>|> Oh, puh-leaze, Gary!  Do you know *ANYONE* who has gone on the job market as an
>|> Ayn Rand specialist & gotten a job of *any* description in an academic
>|> philosophy department?
>
>Well, no.  But I would *expect* this since she is such a "visible"
>writer, well-known, and a *woman*.  If we are to pay special attention
>to the philosophy of women, shouldn't a consideration of Rand have
>a more central place?  Especially since she represents a perspective
>quite distinct from most (if not all) "feminist philosophers"?
>... 
>I do (did) , by the
>way, know a woman who got a master's degree in philosophy while
>"specializing" in Rand.  Oddly enough, she went on to law school
>rather than academia.
>
>I also know at least three women who quite clearly had trouble getting
>positions for which they were eminently qualified because it was
>felt that their political views were not amenable to what was
>desired for the courses they would teach in "women's studies".
>I won't mention the names for obvious reasons.  If you choose to
>take this as evidence of prevarication, do so.

I know of a woman who
was kicked out of the grad program in philosophy at Harvard
despite having decent grades who was an Objectivist.

At the time, the other Grad students were quite upset by her expulsion,
especially as the reasons seemed insufficient.  I don't recall whether the
political aspect was seen as the _real_ motive for her expulsion, nor, of
course, do I know the real reason for it either.

yrs.
Kochin


-- 
All of my postings are approved by Hanna Gray and represent the official
opinion of the University of Chicago...
             Mike Kochin, Dept. of Political Science
Hi!  I'm a .sig virius!  Join in the fun and copy me into yours!
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 5 Nov 92 20:39:45 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Nov5201244@echnaton.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <1992Nov5.165309.7636@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI
> (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >A bit of elaboration.  The reason why a realist might want to
>   >believe that there is a set of all truths is simple.  He believes
>   >that there is such a thing as the Whole Truth about the world.
>
>  Associating this particular piece of babbling with "realism" is
>quite arbitrary.

I think we already covered all this two months ago.  I don't see
why realism about scientific theories (which is what I have in
mind here) can't include a belief that science approaches some
sort of ultimate truth about reality.  But call it Amnellian
babble-realism (ABR) if you like.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 11 Nov 92 09:15:01 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

Well, clearly, the scheme I suggested in this thread appears to fail
in its present form.  This is not so surprising; as Kripke said, most
philosophical theories end up being false.  But, this doens't mean
we should stop developing them--the method of failure invariably
teaches us something.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 10 Nov 92 21:07:58 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Nov10213804@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>In article <1992Nov10.194112.9270@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>   >Well, not "verifying", necessarily, but there would be a lot of
>   >sentences about whose truth or falsehood there was general agreement.
>
>  What is this reflection supposed to contribute to the explanation of
>"the set of true sentence occurring in Russell's writings"?

But, you're the one who picked this example from natural language, to
which my lame argument was a response.  If one is formulating some
kind of ultra-Platonistic metaphysical theory, one can do as Ludwig did
and just stick stubbornly to formal logic.  See Randall's recent comments
in this thread for where this leads.

>   >I think much of your
>   >criticism might be avoided if one concentrated on formal systems, instead.
>
>  What does this have to do with the set of true sentences occurring in
>Russell's writings?

See above.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 6 Nov 92 06:57:06 GMT

amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

>What I wish to ask you all is your general opinion about the
>_metaphysical_ status of the Law of Excluded Middle.  Reading
>Hintikka's article, I was struck by the dissimilarity of the
>role of this principle in the problem of Truth, when compared
>with its role in the metaphysical problem of Reality or
>Existence.

>In _The Logical Basis of Metaphysics_ Michael Dummett attempts to
>show that if one accepts _tertium non datur_ then the realist
>approach to physial objects and the existence of mathematical
>objects is supported. (This is an over-simplification, but bear
>with me, I have a point)  This suggested to me that if the Law
>of Excluded Middle supported Realism, then it would also be
>on the side of the existence of a set of all truths.

>But Hintikka shows that this is manifestly false. 

You might also enjoy reading Heidegger's The Metaphysical Foundation
of Logic.

The law of excluded middle is one of the three "laws of thought" that
give the basic axioms of Aristotelean logic.  Other two, of course,
being the law of identity and the law of contradiction.  Taken together
these three laws provide the basis for definition of equivalence
classes of things.  In other words, we need them to assign generic
names.  Thus, if we accept these laws, and in particular excluded
middle, as having metaphysical validity then we are assuming that
the objects which we identify through application of these laws
are really existant.
The catch with this is that the identity established via these laws
is static.  Nothing can change (as Parmenides showed) since change
violates the law of contradiction.  And excluded middle, unless we
view change as an instantaneous jump.  Thus we cannot take these laws
as describing reality.  Rather, they are descriptive of the way that
our mind parcels up sensation and assigns names.
Some of the attempts at a quantum logic do away with excluded middle,
as do the intuitionist (and constructivist) mathematicians.  (This is
why they do not accept proof by contradiction.)
A book that might interest you is: Horn, R.E. (ed.) Trialectics: Toward
a Pratical logic of Unity.  Can be ordered from Lexington Institute,
80 Marrett Road, Lexington, MA 02173, USA
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 5 Nov 92 20:51:17 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <TORKEL.92Nov5201116@echnaton.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
(Torkel Franzen) writes:

>What is "Excluded Middle" supposed to mean here?

Both Hintikka and Grue are able to define what they call a "truth
predicate" in their systems by allowing sentences to have more
than two truth-values.  Grue explicitly adds a third truth-value
called "indefinite" and in Hintikka's IF system some sentences
are said to have "no truth-value".

By the Law of Excluded Middle I mean any philosophical principle that
says that sentences of some language (formal system, natural language)
can only have the truth values "true" or "false".  I am interested in
the consequences that these logicians see in either asserting or
denying this principle.

There is the further question of under what conditions a sentence
has a truth value in a logic.  In natural deduction set theories
like Gilmore's, some sentences fail to have a truth value because
they're not allowed by the rules of deduction.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<TORKEL.92Nov9140517@isis.sics.se>
	<1992Nov9.201300.16428@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 20:51:54 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.201300.16428@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >The status of propositions is problematical in that it is not at all
   >clear in what sense a statement _expresses_ a proposition.  This is
   >in addition, of course, to all the usual problems with abstract objects.

  But, as I said before, I am not objecting to associating abstract
objects with sentences. I am quite prepared to accept the description
"the proposition expressed by the statement ....".

   >Would you be happier with "the totality of all possible sentences
   >(in all possible (or actual?) languages)" then?

  There is a considerable difference between "all possible languages"
and "all actual languages". After all, "Znorklozk frazk, znorkbul
frazk" is a sentence in any number of possible languages, but what
does it mean to say that it expresses a true proposition? And sticking
to actual languages, how do you propose to explain what "expresses a
true proposition" means applied to English sentences, in a way that
makes this locution any clearer than those sentences themselves? After
all, to speak of "the totality of true English sentences" is not to
make any obvious sense, unless one is able to provide an explication (based
on whatever considerations) of every possible English sentence.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 18:47:03 GMT


I don't think that "Reality is the Truth about the world".  Reality is
the world itself; Truth is what can be said about the world.  Of
course, what can be said about the world is part of the world, and
when we start considering what can be said about that aspect of the
world, we get into trouble.  Thus Tarski's paradox, etc.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov5.205117.12672@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov5225053@lludd.sics.se>
	<1992Nov6.001206.17116@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 05:13:50 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.001206.17116@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >But, of every possible state of affairs,
   >is it the case that it obtains or does not?  This is the question of
   >the status of the Law of Excluded Middle.

  This again is a piece of Dummett-style mystification. Let me be blunt:
there is no "law of excluded middle" in this sense. There is only a very
natural tendency to use tautologies in expressing metaphysical convictions.
Saying "every possible state of affairs obtains or does not" is at best
only a way of suggesting what one is getting at, and it's a poor way of
doing this.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 20:56:44 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov10.101409.10695@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>In <1992Nov09.200615.128772@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com 
>(Frank Adams) writes:

Marko Amnell (I think):
>>>Can you not even _imagine_ what it would be like for
>>>there to be a collection of all true propositions about the world?
>>>Suppose eg. that there is an omniscient being, would it not know all
>>>true propositions?  Apparently so, and this means that you are saying
>>>that the very notion of omniscience is confused.  I disagree.  I think
>>>I can conceive what an omniscient being would be like.  Just imagine
>>>a succesion of larger and larger computers, with the limit as the
>>>series approaches an infinitely large memory.  What is confused about
>>>this idea?
>
>>But, unless you place the computer *outside* the world, the world
>>itself keeps getting larger and larger as the computer does.  So the
>>computer never gets to omniscience.
>
>>It is not at all clear that it is sensible to talk about something
>>existing outside the world.
>
>It's not clear, but neither is it inconceivable.

If the world is everything that exists (a reasonable if not very informative
definition), then existing outside the world *is* inconceivable.

>  God might know all
>truths, including all truths about himself; if this were possible,
>it would eliminate the difficulty you cite.

No absolute proof is available, but there are all sorts of reasons to think
that this is impossible.  Informally, in my objection to your computer
model.  Formally, in such things as Tarski's theorem on the undefinability
of truth in formal systems.

>Alternatively, one could settle for near-omniscience.

Near-omniscience is as different from omniscience as near-pregnancy is from
pregnancy.

>  I was only
>trying to show that one could try to imagine what a collection of
>all truths would be like in the real world.  There is no need to
>cling to the computer metaphor--it was only an illustration.

But if all the metaphors fail in the same way, one has to wonder if the
problem isn't in the underlying concept.
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 6 Nov 92 10:30:13 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <Bx9JuL.CJq@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com 
(Gary Merrill) writes:

>In article <1992Nov5.205117.12672@klaava.Helsinki.FI>, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>|> In article <TORKEL.92Nov5201116@echnaton.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
>|> (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>|> 
>|> >What is "Excluded Middle" supposed to mean here?
>|> 
>|> Both Hintikka and Grue are able to define what they call a "truth
>|> predicate" in their systems by allowing sentences to have more
>|> than two truth-values.  Grue explicitly adds a third truth-value
>|> called "indefinite" and in Hintikka's IF system some sentences
>|> are said to have "no truth-value".
>
>This type of approach is pretty old now.  I recall a book edited by
>(I think) Robert Martin entitled something like "The Liar Paradox"
>that was published in about 1971 or so.  (I believe that it was
>a collection of papers presented at some symposium on the liar.)
>A couple of papers in there took a many-valued approach to the
>liar paradox.  You should, of course, be aware (as you may be)
>that the pardox can be reconstructed in many multi-valued
>systems.

Yes, this is true, and Hintikka explicitly deals with the "Strengthened
Liar" and tries to show that his IF system avoids it too.  Frankly, I
have my doubts about whether he pulls it off or not.  In Grim's new
book it is shown that a Liar-type Paradox can be built in any logic
having any features, including an infinite number of truth values.
But, right now I see arguments and counter-arguments on both sides.
I have no idea who is right and who is confused.

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 23:46:21 GMT

In article <BxGpuq.3EC@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>In article <1992Nov9.123508.17250@husc3.harvard.edu>, zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>|> 
>|> MZ:
>|> >>Am I hearing the term `proposition' from a self-professed extensionalist?
>|> 
>|> RH:
>|> >"Proposition" means "sentence".
>|> 
>|> Certainly not to me, nor, I suspect, to the vast majority of
>|> philosophers.  If you mean "sentence", then write `sentence'.
>
>I agree with your sentiments, but I'm not at all sure that your
>claim about the vast majority of philosophers.  Since at least
>the medievals, philosophers have used 'proposition' (or 'propositio'?)
>when they meant 'sentence'.  In the past when I have insisted on
>the same distinction of usage I have been accused of pedantry --
>something of which I am *never* guilty.
>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

I'm very much aware of the distinction; the reason why I feel free to
use "proposition" to mean "sentence" is that I do not recognize any
"propositions" in any sense intermediate between and independent of
truth values and sentences as existing.  Thus, the word is available
(and _has_ been used in this sense, as Gary points out).  When Marko
claimed that the set of all propositions was an inconsistent totality,
I indicated why I thought not using sentences in a suitable language
as "propositions" in NFU.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov5.203945.12450@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov5224750@lludd.sics.se>
	<1992Nov5.235132.16787@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 04:50:54 GMT

In article <1992Nov5.235132.16787@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >If one considers realism to be the thesis that there
   >is an objective, mind-independent reality, then it seems natural to
   >me that this metaphysical goal is in some sense the totality of
   >all true propositions about the world.

  Well, to me it seems natural to couple the thesis that there is an objective
mind-independent reality with a rejection of the idea of a "totality of
true propositions about the world" as confused and unjustifiable. Eating a
banana, I have no doubt about its mind-independent reality. The assertion
that there is a "totality of true propositions" about the banana, on the
other hand, is not so much doubtful as senseless.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 23:02:16 GMT

Following Quine, I would say to Marko that there are no "facts" or
"states of affairs"; there are objects in reality and there are
sentences.  Now the terms "fact" and "state of affairs" may be used to
refer to these, I suppose; a "fact" might be a true sentence (or class
of true sentences equivalent in some way) (while a "proposition"
would be a sentence or class of sentences without the commitment to
truth).  A "state of affairs" might be a chunk of 4-space (if it is a
state of affairs in the physical world).

			










-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu