HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Mamatology
Date: 11 Oct 92 17:10:52 GMT
Article-I.D.: casper.Bvyvq4.Bvv
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town

In <c99-aa.718545726@danube.Berkeley.EDU> c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account) writes:

>dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield) writes:

>>The origin of the word "mama" (and its close relatives in other languages)
>>appears to contradict that statement.  "Ma" is one of the easiest syllables
>>to utter, and is one of the first spoken by infants.  The first entity that
>>an infant wants to refer to is his mother. 
>   Why not that it's wet or hungry?  Besides there is any number of acounts
>   of infants' first words being something else (papa or other). There is 
>   lot's of jokes in the families about that, I am sure.
>   Also, sound "MA" seems to be very close to the sound "A" which perheps the
>   most natural sounding for human (concider "R", "Woo", "F" instead...)

I agree. Anyway, there's no more reason to assume that the infant intends to    refer to anything when it says "mama", then there is to believe that it wants tocommunicate any vital bit of info when it emits any one of a variety of high 
pithched whines in what we call gibberish. A more plausible explanation is that
it stumbles upon the sound by chance (which, as you point out, is quite easy) 
utters it, and upon noticing the attention in which it's bathed, repeats the
act propitiously.

Neil Horne
From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 11 Oct 92 19:17:59 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <1992Oct11.154359.2872@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>In article <BvvGDF.861@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>In article <1992Oct9.040228.2117@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>>...........
>>>of birth and death. My claim is not that consciousness is independent of
>>>brain function. It is only that brain function is insufficient to produce
>>                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>consciousness by virtue of any known or plausible objectively verifiable
>>>physical phenomenon. i

>>This is a very strong and totally unsupported statement. 

>It may seem strong to you; to me it seems like a reluctance to make a
>strong statement. As such, there is nothing unsupported about it.

>I did not say that they were known to be insufficient, I said that there
>was no plausible hypothesis how they might be sufficient.

Whoops. Maybe that is not exactly what I said, but it is what I should have
said. Apologies. Actually Mr. Pindor's point is well taken.

I should have quit while I was ahead. These interesting discussions have
given me much to think about, and I should stick to my resolution to
shut up until 1) I am caught up on what I am actually supposed to be doing and
2) I have refined my position to take into account the more meaningful 
criticisms I have encountered here.

However, I stand by the following exchange.

>> Our ignorance
>>does not make them insufficient. It is more plausible to assume our ignorance
>>of how known physical laws combine in such a complex system (there is plenty
>>of evidence of similiar situations in other fields, even less complex) then 
>>invent mysterious, ethereal phenomena for which there is NO evidence.

>As long as you admit that this is an assumption, you are talking science.
>Once you announce that the assumption is verified, you are just appplying
>experience from unrelated areas. That is, you are applying faith in the
>completeness in physical science. There is not the smallest indication
>that the rules of physical science can span the phenomena of consciousness:
>opinions about consciousness are genuinely orthogonal to physical and 
>mathematical science, and that is (in part) why a nonentity can play chess.

>There already is a mysterious ethereal phenomenon: I am it, and I hope
>and suppose you are it too. We proceed from opposite assumptions about
>whether this phenomenon can be reduced to physical science. Neither
>assumption is any stronger or more unsupported than the other, as long
>as we are honest enough to state that our expectations are just that, and
>not results.

mt
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 13:08:04 GMT

In article <26774@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>Searle's point is that _if_ a computer were to manifest mental
>phenomena ... then these mental phenomena would not have been 
>caused _just_ by the running of a computer program.

I think this is a mischaracterization of Searle's emphasis.
For your phrasing implies that Searle believes that it is quite 
possible that programmed computers have minds; but that
if it so happens that this is the case, it would be because of
the causal powers of the silicon, not by virtue of running
the program.
	But Searle rather emphatically denies that an appropriately
programmed computer will be a mind:  "Any artifact that produced
mental phenomena ... could not do [so] just by running a formal
program."  His statement that "it might be possible to produce
a thinking machine ... out of silicon chips," is more like saying
an artificial silicon brain might be possible, but if so, it wouldn't
be a computer in today's sense of the term.  I don't see that
Searle ever countenances the possibility that *computers* might
manifest mental phenomena, the antecedent of your characterization
of his position.
	Perhaps his new book expands on these issues.  I haven't
read it yet.
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: AI rights :-)
Date: 7 Oct 92 16:03:59 GMT


 > Forgive me if this subject has already been discussed to death here...
 > 
 > One major problem I foresee with the arrival of "true AI" is that
 > they may end up being slaves. Many people still believe that the
 > universe was created only 10,000 years ago, I think many religious
 > people will refuse to accept AI's as being equally sentient, and
 > instead decide that they are souless and thus ok to keep as slaves.
 > 
 > Has anyone thought about trying to head off this disaster by insuring
 > the rights of all sentient beings before "true AI" comes to pass?
 > -- 
 > ------          Join the Pythagorean Reform Church!               .
 > \    /        Repent of your evil irrational numbers             . .
 >  \  /   and bean eating ways. Accept 10 into your heart!        . . .
 >   \/   Call the Pythagorean Reform Church BBS at 508-793-9568  . . . .
 >     

I eat fish only beause they are lower than animals. I do not eat pig
(and of course I do not dolphins and horsemeat).

Is there a suggestion that I could eat some lower forms or AI
hardware?

Gordon,
____

Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account)
Subject: Re: cheap thoughts from a human
Organization: University of California, at Berkeley
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1992 13:17:18 GMT


<GE0QC@CUNYVM.BITNET> writes:

>Probably this has been gone over in this group, but I'll mention it anyway.
>  One of the first things that occured to me when I got into AL was that
>the major difference (evolutionary step) between a human brain and a computer
>brain, is that a computer brain will be able to self-evolve.
>  If a computer entity is convinced that a change in its   algorithmwould
>enhance it's capabilities all it has to do is change its algrorithm.

	The problem with us is that we 
	1. Do not know for sure whether the change is needed or not,
	2. Are afraid to make a mistake by changing in the wrong direction,
	3. Have lots of contradicting inputs (instructions) as to what 
	   direction to choose (var. religions etc.),
        4. Have finite existance (very limited at that) and can't afford errors.

	As far as AL beings, #4 and hence #2 is not applicable to them 
	(although what if they change into so "bad boys" that a Main Conductor
	 will decide not to vaste on them CPU time and kill -9 them all?);
	 however #s 1&3 may become valid for complicated forms of AL, those
	 capable to self daught...

>I believe computers will be a future descendant speciesof humanity.
>That will be able to:
>     a)live forever

     They will quickly overpopulate compter-worlds and will have to be killed
     (my god - homoside!). The alternative is that they will slow down the
     system, but will have no idea about that themselvs (only relative time
     is valid). Interesting -- they will not even know why their civilazation
     will be frozzen down evantually.

>     b)self-evolve
>     c)travel at the speed of light to established points (kinda cool)
>     d)have no permanent need for a sun
>     e)carry sex to a level beyond my imagination
>     f)and more

>comments, replys, harangues, please.

>Levi
>ge0qc@cunyvm
    Dmitry Serebrennikov                         dmitry@ucsee.Berkeley.Edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ALL ABOVE IS JUST WHAT IT IS AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING ELSE.
			        WHATSOEVER!
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 12 Oct 92 17:09:30 GMT
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory

In article <26609@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>Contrary to popular
>opinion, even Searle of Chinese Roon fame agrees with that, as he made
>plain in the Jan 1990 edition of Scientific American.

That a mere machine could think?  I don't remember any such statement
by Searle.

.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: lifw
Date: 8 Oct 1992 01:09:27 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

stemp@halcyon.com (Kevin Stemp) writes:
>does life begin at the instant the sperm penetrates the egg, or when the
>two pronucleoi fuse, when meiosis stops, after the egg implants, in the
>3rd week, or after the child is born, or hell, maybe after 1 year????

Life began millions of years ago.  This is just a continuation.  Your
body and mind are just gametes' way of producing more gametes.  Don't
take yourself too seriously.

-- 
          Magic is the art of assuming a role strongly enough
          that the Universe falls into the complementary role.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Organization: University of California, at Berkeley
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1992 12:10:33 GMT

mhf4421@usl.edu (Flynn Matthew H) writes:

>De Saussare goes into this to some depth.  He was a Linguist, and had
>definitely seen the OED.  I'm not denying philology here--I know that many
>words spring out of other words and seem to have logical reasons for what they
>mean.  Language is a code, and it necessarily has some structure,  but there is
>no real substantial connection between that code and what it represents other 
>than our generally accepted associations. 

    A good question would be whether what the language represents even exists...


    Dmitry Serebrennikov                         dmitry@ucsee.Berkeley.Edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Quote of the week:  
        "Life is what happens to you when you make other plans"
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 8 Oct 92 18:00:36 GMT
Article-I.D.: smaug.1b1t04INNht6
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>Symbols are not symbols until a
>consciousness attaches a meaning to them.

I'm not convinced of this.  I think there are symbols that have
meanings below a conscious level.  I think good writers and
filmmakers and advertisers understand and exploit that.  To a cat
the sound of a can opener symbolizes food; to a dog, rolling over
and exposing the neck symbolizes submission.

One could argue that these are "lower-forms" of consciousness.  In
that case:

>How can consciousness arise from symbols when symbols cannot exist
>without consciousness?

By bootstrap from lower forms of consciousness; the same way chickens
arise from eggs when eggs cannot exist without chickens.

>It is my belief that a Turing Test passing
>algorithm is likely in the near future, but that is only because we
>are capable of being sytematically tricked, not because we have a handle
>on the nature of consciousness.

What evidence is there that human consciousness is not just a
systematic trick?

What test for consciousness would you propose instead of TT?

>This is much
>different than proposing that passing the Turing Test is sufficient
>evidence of consciousness to assign rights to AI realizations or AI
>algorithms. (Those who disagree: which would it be, btw?)

Wouldn't it make sense to treat two instantiations of the same
algorithm the same way we do twins?

Dave
-- 
          Magic is the art of assuming a role strongly enough
          that the Universe falls into the complementary role.
From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 11 Oct 92 15:43:59 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <BvvGDF.861@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>In article <1992Oct9.040228.2117@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>...........
>>of birth and death. My claim is not that consciousness is independent of
>>brain function. It is only that brain function is insufficient to produce
>                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>consciousness by virtue of any known or plausible objectively verifiable
>>physical phenomenon. Similarly, your examples of the fascinating qualia
>>that result from various brain injuries miss the point. Clearly the brain
>>has something to do with it. My point is that we are still utterly
>>mystified as to what that might be.

>This is a very strong and totally unsupported statement. 

It may seem strong to you; to me it seems like a reluctance to make a
strong statement. As such, there is nothing unsupported about it.

>Yes, we have no
>idea how known physical phenomena may give rise to consciousness, but there
>is a long way from there to stating that they are insufficient.

I did not say that they were known to be insufficient, I said that there
was no plausible hypothesis how they might be sufficient.

> Our ignorance
>does not make them insufficient. It is more plausible to assume our ignorance
>of how known physical laws combine in such a complex system (there is plenty
>of evidence of similiar situations in other fields, even less complex) then 
>invent mysterious, ethereal phenomena for which there is NO evidence.

As long as you admit that this is an assumption, you are talking science.
Once you announce that the assumption is verified, you are just appplying
experience from unrelated areas. That is, you are applying faith in the
completeness in physical science. There is not the smallest indication
that the rules of physical science can span the phenomena of consciousness:
opinions about consciousness are genuinely orthogonal to physical and 
mathematical science, and that is (in part) why a nonentity can play chess.

There already is a mysterious ethereal phenomenon: I am it, and I hope
and suppose you are it too. We proceed from opposite assumptions about
whether this phenomenon can be reduced to physical science. Neither
assumption is any stronger or more unsupported than the other, as long
as we are honest enough to state that our expectations are just that, and
not results.

mt
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Word Mechanics (was: parts of "Brain and Mind")
Date: 8 Oct 1992 15:37:44 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account) writes:
>>The origin of the word "mama" (and its close relatives in other languages)
>>appears to contradict that statement.  "Ma" is one of the easiest syllables
>>to utter, and is one of the first spoken by infants.  The first entity that
>>an infant wants to refer to is his mother. 
>   Why not that it's wet or hungry?

I don't know.  Maybe the infant's brain finds it easier to assign
a symbol to a distinct concrete object outside itself rather than
a feeling-state such as wetness or hunger, so that happens first?
(This use of a symbol to denote an object is a different skill than
the expression of discomfort (hungry or wet) by crying.)

If you're interested in the origin of the word "mama", look at
the entry for it in the Oxford English Dictionary, which gives
word origin and history.

>   Also, sound "MA" seems to be very close to the sound "A" which perheps the
>   most natural sounding for human (concider "R", "Woo", "F" instead...)

Yes, part of what I said was that "Ma" was one of the easiest
syllables to pronounce.  "Ahh" is the easiest vowel: you just
drop your mouth open.  The other vowels require learning to
shape the mouth.  For consonants, "m" just requires starting
the vocal chords while the mouth is closed, and then just
dropping it open.  Other consonants require an aspiration or
a puff of air as you open your mouth, which is more complex,
or teeth to hiss, or a placement of the tongue on the palate,
or something else more complex than "m".
 
Dave
-- 
          Magic is the art of assuming a role strongly enough
          that the Universe falls into the complementary role.
From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 7 Oct 92 23:13:24 GMT
Reply-To: swf@tdat.teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: NCR Teradata Database Business Unit

In article <1aqirgINN5u9@smaug.West.Sun.COM> dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield) writes:
|mhf4421@usl.edu (Flynn Matthew H) writes:
|The origin of the word "mama" (and its close relatives in other languages)
|appears to contradict that statement.  "Ma" is one of the easiest syllables
|to utter, and is one of the first spoken by infants.  The first entity that
|an infant wants to refer to is his mother.  The association of that word to
|that concept was not arbitrary.  Reference the OED for more detail.
|
This is, at most, a trivial, isolated exception.  Even the unquestioned
existance of a number of 'sounds-like' words ("woof", "boom", "moo") in
most languages does not constitute a significant contradiction to the
basic statement:

Words are, by and large, arbitrary, and even where not wholly arbitrary,
they are still partially so.  Even mimic words are filtered through a given
language's internal patterns and restrictions, and the exact form they take
is invariably highly conventualized.
-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 14 Oct 92 22:16:25 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <1992Oct14.180354.8129@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <1992Oct14.152444.21325@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu 
>(Michael Tobis) writes:

>>	"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
>>		That alone should encourage the crew.
>>	Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
>>		What I tell you three times is true."

>If anyone has been attempting arguments by assertion here, Michael, it's
>you. 

I assert very little beyond that consciousness is not behavior, a point
that many others here acknowledge. I think that this is so apparent that
I can hardly imagine how to defend it. Other than that, I state my hunches
and point out that there is no less evidence for my hunches than for
Searle's or Dennett's or Minsky's or whoever's.

>I don't recall your providing a single argument in favor of your
>dualistic idea of mind.  (Distaste for materialism is not an argument.)

I have no arguments that pass the muster of the accepted rules of science,
but neither does anyone else. Distaste for dualism isn't an argument either.

>At the same time none of your interlocutors, so far as I can see, is guilty
>of the notions you attribute to them, such as the idea that the nature of
>consciousness is already explicated, 

Again, especially since the scientific method rejects subjective evidence, 
applying the scientific method to subjective phenomena is not guaranteed to 
work.  Most of you folks seem to think that the scientific method invariably 
succeeds, and that, while it may elude us at present, a scientific explanation
of consciousness must in principle exist. I claim that this assertion is as 
unsupported as its contrary.

So, whether or not (as Dennett seems to claim) consciousness is explained,
most of the people here seem convinced that such an explanation is possible
in principle. I think this belief has no foundation beyond intuition, and
I acknowledge that my belief to the contrary has no foundation beyond 
intuition. At least my belief is falsifiable: come up with an explanation
that isn't just handwaving and I will concede the point.

>or that consciousness can emerge from 
>a system without being designed in.  

Well, it is often claimed that an algorithm which responds coherently  to
Chinese has a conscious experience of Chinese. This looks like a counter-
example to me.

>Your positions are not made 
>more attractive by misrepresenting those of your opponents.

I cannot keep all of you folks straight just yet. If I respond to something
A has said in a posting by B, I apologize if it is taken as an attribution
to B. I think this has happened a few times, and I need to watch for it.

But I'm not trying to make a political argument, so I don't care about the
attractiveness of my ideas, just their validity.

mt