From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Semantics (was Probably (was More importantly, ...
    <1992Apr1.002426.23295@sunb10.cs.uiuc.edu> <9329@wrgate.wr.tek.com>      
    <1992Apr2.135016.13575@unx.sas.com>      
    <waterman.702266736@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu> 
    <1992Apr3.140112.14817@unx.sas.com> 
    <waterman.702413275@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu>
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 1992 14:18:02 GMT
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
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In article <waterman.702413275@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu>, waterman@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu (T.S. Waterman) writes:
|> 
|> Wait a minute here -- these are statements _made by_ some speaker,
|> who for the moment we'll assume is "telling the truth," whatever that
                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

But this is to beg the question (at least to a certain extent)!
Of course *if* the speaker is telling the truth, then the "content"
(in some informal sense for now) of the two statements certainly
is very close to the same.  But your original claim concerned *meaning*.
And truth conditions form a significant part of meaning.  So when
you start off by assuming that the issue of truth (and hence truth
conditions?) won't be considered, you grant yourself too much.

|> means (more later).  To address your points:
|> 1) If you had a book that you didn't know about, you wouldn't be talking
|> 	about it, and you wouldn't have meade either statement.
|> 2) If you didn't have the capacity at the time to form a thought
|> 	about your book, again you wouldn't make either statement.
|> So, neither of your concerns really addresses the truth or falsity
|> of the statement, because the statement wouldn't exist in your scenarios.
|> 
|> My original point was that utterances in discourse in some way
|> indicate _ony_ the beliefs of the speaker (assuming for the moment


I suspected this would be the response!  Of course semantics of
utterances (considered indexed to the one doing the uttering) are
different from "stand-alone" statements.  Nonetheless, I'm afraid
you are still incorrect.

Even if I utter both

	1) My book is blue.

	2) I think my book is blue.

the truth *conditions* for these are quite distinct (though related).
Even if both are true, they *mean* very different things.  

You might argue that 1) implies 2), but certainly 2) does not
imply 1).  Notice, however, that in *uttering* one of these I don't
need to utter the other.  You might argue that by *uttering* 1)
I thereby make 2) *true* (though I have not uttered it).  Clearly,
by *uttering* 2) I do not make 1) *true*.  (Of course, an omniscient
God might make 1) true by uttering 2), but what would he need with
a blue book anyway?)  So their semantics, even (or especially)
relativized to a speaker, are quite different.  They do not at all
"mean" the same thing.  "I think" *may* be used in common speech
merely for emphasis, but it may also be used to make a distinction
between reporting a fact (or, if you like, what the speaker takes
to be a fact) and reporting a belief -- a kind of distinction
we make all the time.

I'll grant you that *if* a speaker is *not lying* then his utterances
indicate his *beliefs*, but on reflection, doesn't this seem pretty
trivial?  Doesn't

	If X is not lying, then X's statements indicate
	X's beliefs.

mean no more than

	If X believes what he is saying, then X's statements
	indicate X's beliefs.

???  I don't feel uncomfortable in acknowledging that!  However,
you can't get from there to the position that 1) and 2) mean
the same thing.

Again, you are correct that all and any statement *can* be construed
as an expression of the epistemic state of the speaker, but to you
go on to say something that indicates that this is virtually all
there is to any statement made by a speaker -- the report of an
epistemic state.  Centuries of philosophy have shown rather conclusively
that this is not a satisfactory position to take concerning language.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm