From: jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Larry Jewell)
Newsgroups: soc.veterans,alt.war.vietnam
Subject: 'NamVet Newsletter, Vol.4, no.12 (3/7)
Date: 4 Oct 92 16:58:38 GMT
Followup-To: soc.veterans
Organization: Purdue University








     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 29
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

                         Christmas Tree Hijacked!
                    U.S. Veteran News & Report 11/19/90
                           Input by: Terry Hayes
                        VETLink #1 - Pittsfield, MA
                              (413) 443-6313
     
     WALDEN,  CO -- Fifty  to  sixty Vietnam Veterans,  POW/MIA  family 
     members and activists ambushed a freight train in Walden, Colorado 
     today.   The  train was carrying the official Christmas tree bound 
     for the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C.
       Dr. Bruce Adams, whose brother, MSgt. Steven H. Adams,  has been 
     missing  in  North Vietnam since 18 October 1966,  led  the  group 
     which included long-time POW/MIA advocate Lew Ross, from Nevada.
     
       The  action,  called  "Project  Desert  Wreath"  supported  U.S. 
     servicemen  and  women  serving  in  the  Persian  Gulf,   and  in 
     particular,  the  eight  now  reported MIA from  Operation  Desert 
     Shield.  The group also called attention to live POW/MIAs from the 
     wars in Southeast Asia and Korea as well as World War II.
       After   stopping  the  train,   Adams  mounted  ladders  on  the 
     locomotive  and held a press conference during which he dubbed the 
     train the "Freedom Train" and the tree the "People's Tree."
       The  group  then  decorated the tree and its car with  a  wreath 
     containing  the names of the eight MIAs from the Persian Gulf  and 
     several  wreaths  decorated with POW/MIA bracelets from all  fifty 
     U.S. states.
     
       "Project  Desert Wreath"  marks the first time a POW/MIA message 
     has adorned an official tree of the U.S. Capitol Building.
       Dr.  Adams  asks  for public support and media attention to  the 
     tree,  which  leaves Walden en route to Washington,  D.C.  through 
     Nebraska  in  the  next  few days.   He  requests  that  concerned 
     Americans make sure the tree reaches Washington still carrying the 
     POW/MIA message.
     
     For information, contact Dr.  Adams at:  (307)  742-7260  or (307) 
     721-2900.
     
     Groups supporting the event included:
     Vietnam Veterans of Wyoming National Committee for American War 
     Veterans National Alliance of Families
     
     (Special  note  must be taken that when the train stopped and  the 
     engineer  appeared,  he  was a Vietnam veteran and was  wearing  a 
     POW/MIA hat!)
     
     [Note from Joe:  The reported MIA/POWs in Operation Desert Shield, 
     after  much  discussion in VIETNAM_VETS,  appear to be those  that 
     were  KIA-BNR (Killed in Action -  Body Not Recovered).   THANX to 
     all of you who responded so  quickly when the question was asked!]
     








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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990



     =================================================================
       F r o m   A z t e c   S h o r e   t o   A r c t i c   Z o n e
     =================================================================

       U.S. Coast Guard in South East Asia/Vietnam Conflict;  Part 1
                    By: John (Jack) Hawkins, USCG (Ret)
                        VETLink #1 - Pittsfield, MA
                              (413) 443-6313
     
                   -------------------------------------
                      From Aztec Shore to Arctic Zone
                          To Europe and Far East
                      Our Flag is carried by Our Ships
                          In Time of War and Peace
     
                                            Verse from "SEMPER PARATUS"
                                          The Coast Guard Marching Song
                   -------------------------------------
     
       The  United States Coast Guard is the smallest of this  nation's 
     five armed services,  and during the Vietnam War,  Coast Guardsmen 
     continued to serve with distinction, as their fathers did in Korea 
     and World War II and their grandfathers in World War I.
       Operating  from  82 foot coastal patrol boats,  destroyer  sized 
     large  cutters,  C-123 &  C-130 aircraft,  180 foot buoy  tenders, 
     ammunition laden vessels, isolated Loran stations,  or as exchange 
     pilots  with  the 37th ARRS or on staff with the  merchant  marine 
     details in Saigon, "COASTIES"  performed military duties every bit 
     as heroic as their brother and sister Army,  Navy,  Marine and Air 
     Force brother and sister Vietnam veterans.
       This  article is the first part of a multi-part history of Coast 
     Guard operations in SOUTH EAST Asia and the Vietnam Conflict. Many 
     books,  videos,  movies,  and such have discussed Vietnam from all 
     angles,  except  from the view of the Coast Guardsman in SouthEast 
     Asia.
       Originally written in 1975 as part of the Coast Guard Historical 
     Nomograph  program,  I have transcribed it verbatim.   The author, 
     Eugene  Tulich,  then a Coast Guard Lieutenant,  served two  tours 
     afloat on coastal barrier patrols off the coast of South Vietnam.
       So,  we'll  start  with  "A Story of  Twenty-six",  the  82-foot 
     coastal patrol boats.
     
                   -------------------------------------
                      And never have we struck it yet
                        In spite of foeman's might
                      Who cheered us on and cheered again
                        for showing how to fight.
                                                       "SEMPER PARATUS"
                   -------------------------------------
     
     INTRODUCTION
       Early  in  the war in Vietnam it was obvious that the Viet  Cong 
     and  North  Vietnamese forces were obtaining their supplies  in  a 
     myriad  of  ways.   The forces allied with the Republic  of  South 
     Vietnam  had no effective means of stopping the enemy infiltration 
     of men, arms and supplies 
       During  February of 1965,  an Army pilot flying over Vung Ro Bay 
     near  Qui Nhon noticed an "island"  moving slowly from one side of 
     the  bay  to another.   Upon closer observation the  "island"  was 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     discovered  to be a carefully camouflaged ship.   Air strikes were 
     called  in and the vessel sunk.   Intelligence sources  determined 
     the  ship  was of North Vietnamese origin and engaged in  rearming 
     enemy forces.
       It   became  imperative  to  establish  a  tight  security   and 
     surveillance system.   This would be no easy chore with over 1,200 
     miles  of coastline to patrol and over 60,000 junks and sampans to 
     control.   To provide this coverage the Coastal Surveillance Force 
     was  established  in March of 1965.   This Task Force  provided  a 
     single  command to integrate sea-,  air-  and land-based units and 
     coordinate  U.  S.  Navy,  Coast Guard and South Vietnamese  naval 
     units.   This unique organization was called Market Time after the 
     native sampans and junks utilizing coastal waterways for fishing.
       Naval   units   of  the  Market  Time   operation   successfully 
     interdicted  enemy vessels carrying supplies and  personnel.   The 
     success  of  the operation forced the enemy to rely on the Ho  Chi 
     Minh trail to transport supplies.   As most of the trawler "kills" 
     were in southern Vietnam near the Ca Mau peninsula,  the enemy had 
     to carry supplies over an extraordinarily long distance.
     
     A TALE OF TWENTY SIX
       It   was  shortly  after  the  February  trawler  incident  that 
     Commander  Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV)  gave serious thought 
     to  maintaining surveillance and patrols in the inland and coastal 
     waters  of  the Republic of Vietnam.   It was not long before  the 
     need  for  Coast  Guard units was recognized and on  the  16th  of 
     April, 1965 the Secretary of the Navy requested information on the 
     availability of Coast Guard units from the Secretary of Treasury.
       Three days later on 19 April,  the Commandant of the Coast Guard 
     advised  that  82  foot and 40 foot patrol boats  were  available. 
     Coast  Guard  Representatives  were  sent to  Commander  in  Chief 
     Pacific  Fleet  (CINCPACFLT)   and  again only three  days  passed 
     before the decision was reached that the Coast Guard would provide 
     seventeen 82 foot patrol boats.  In support of the seventeen,  the 
     Navy  promised  to support two Repair Ships (ARL's).   A few  days 
     later  on  the  29th  of April,  the Secretaries  of  Defense  and 
     Treasury  sent a joint memorandum to the President advising him of 
     the proposed deployment.   The following day it was announced that 
     Coast Guard Squadron One was being formed.
       Shortly thereafter on the 6th of May the Coast Guard promulgated 
     an  operation  order for the deployment of the seventeen and  only 
     twelve  days  later the 17 patrol boats were being loaded as  deck 
     cargo on merchant vessels in New York, Norfolk,  New Orleans,  San 
     Pedro, San Francisco, and Seattle.
       Nine days following the loading of the patrol boats, Coast Guard 
     Squadron  One was commissioned at Coast Guard Base  Alameda.   The 
     ceremony took place at 1000 hours, 27 May 1965.
       Particular note should be made of the willingness of the Navy to 
     call  up  its  primary back-up force and the preparedness  of  the 
     Coast  Guard to swiftly shift from a peacetime mission to a combat 
     mission.
       Initially,  total  Coast  Guard personnel assigned to the  newly 
     formed Squadron One numbered 47 officers and 198 enlisted.   These 
     Coast   Guardsmen   underwent  survival  training   at   Coronado, 
     California  and were instructed by the Coast Guard on such  topics 
     as  the  care and feeding of the 81 mm mortar and the .50  caliber 
     machine gun, and other subjects which included NBC warfare, Damage 
     Control,  Navigation  and  Piloting,  Organization,  Rules of  the 
     Nautical   Road,   Boarding   Procedures  and   Tactics,   Lookout 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     Procedures,  Recognition,  Combat  Indoctrination,  Radiotelephone 
     Procedures, Water Survival,  Hand to Hand Combat,  and the Code of 
     Conduct.  Upon completion of the required training,  the personnel 
     joined their patrol boats at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.
       On  the  12th of June 1965, Coast Guard Squadron One came  under 
     the  Authority of the Navy when it changed operational control  to 
     Commander  in Chief,  Pacific Fleet.   While under the operational 
     control  of  CINCPACFLT, the men and patrol boats of Squadron  One 
     were  given  shakedown and refresher training at Subic  Bay  Naval 
     Base.  While the cutters were preparing for the voyage to Vietnam, 
     Squadron  One established an liaison office at the Headquarters of 
     Chief,  Naval  Advisory  Group in Saigon to help smooth the  rough 
     waters that were bound to work up.  Finally on 15 July,  the boats 
     of  Coast Guard Division Twelve departed Subic Bay for Da Nang and 
     five  days later the patrol boats of Division Eleven sailed for An 
     Thoi  in the Gulf of Thailand.   Upon arrival at their  respective 
     bases  they  CHOPPED to Commander Task Force 71.   They were  only 
     under  CTF 71 a few days as Commander Task Force 115 (Market Time) 
     was  established  on  30 July  1965.   Five  Coastal  Surveillance 
     Centers  were  set up under CTF 115 and located at  Da  Nang,  Qui 
     Nhon, Nha Trang,  Vung Tau,  and An Thoi.  These CSC's coordinated 
     the  patrols  of the RONONE cutters and directed most  significant 
     operations.
       The cutters lost no time getting on patrol and going about their 
     duties.   As  there was a great profusion of junks,  sampans,  and 
     varied  other craft, a priority system of boarding was instituted. 
     The  priority  scheme was:   first,  vessels transiting the  area; 
     second,  junks  fishing or operating in restricted  areas;  third, 
     fishing boats anchored and not working nets;  and fourth,  fishing 
     boats  working  nets.   These patrol duties were  accomplished  by 
     being  on  underway two-thirds of the time in Division 11;  and  3 
     days  on patrol followed 1 day inport with a 5 day respite after 6 
     patrols  in  Division  12.   When the cutters were  underway  they 
     reported   to  the  minesweeper  or  destroyer  escort  that   was 
     maintaining the outer barrier patrol.
       The  outer  barrier  ships  assisted the WPB's  with  radar  and 
     navigational  information.   In turn,  the WPB's provided  similar 
     service  to  Vietnamese  Naval Junk Force units  that  were  close 
     inshore.   Though  the water was too shallow for the cutters to be 
     in  close  with the VNN junks,  they were able to provide  gunfire 
     support if necessary.
       A  few  matters  required quick rectification.   The  CGC  POINT 
     ORIENT  on  its  first night time patrol near  the  17th  parallel 
     received  mortar  and  machine  gun fire.   White  cutters  are  a 
     beautiful  sight on a moonlit or flare-lit night,  that is  unless 
     you are on the cutter.  On the 21st of September,  CTF 115 ordered 
     the patrol boats painted grey.  An old adage of military life also 
     crept in - the 10% that did not get the word.   CGC POINT YOUNG on 
     one  of  its  early patrols received fire  from  friendly  forces.  
     Luckily no one was hurt and immediate steps were taken to preclude 
     further  incidents,  though we will note a little later there  was 
     still that 10% of the 10%.
       It was felt that after one month of aggressive patrols there was 
     only about a 10% chance of a junk slipping through the barrier and 
     no chance of a steel hull.   Division Eleven in its first month of 
     operations  boarded more than 1,100 junks and  sampans,  inspected 
     over 4,000 Vietnamese craft, and used more that 4,800 man hours to 
     carry  out the assigned mission "Stop Sea Infiltration of  Weapons 
     and Supplies to the Viet Cong".   The heavy patrol schedule of the 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     cutters  was complemented by the shore staff working an average of 
     84 hours a week.
       The  effectiveness  of the patrols hurt the VC and  the  barrier 
     patrol  became  both a physical and psychological warfare  battle. 
     The  VC  told the fishermen that the WPB's were driving them  from 
     their  best  fishing grounds just so U.S.  fishing boats could  be 
     brought  in.   This may have appeared to be true to the Vietnamese 
     fishermen  since  frequently  the  best fishing  grounds  were  in 
     restricted  waters and the WPB's did chase them out.   To  counter 
     this  Coast  Guard,  Navy,  and South Vietnamese set up a  counter 
     PSYOPS  program  which  included handouts of  literature  and  SVN 
     flags.  Medical treatment was given as needed and medevacs to U.S. 
     hospital facilities were common.  
       Of  course,  an  American cannot participate in  PSYOPS  without 
     dispensing profuse quantities of candy and cigarettes.
       Action  was always just around the bend or the island and on  19 
     September  1965  the POINT GLOVER and the POINT MARONE  had  some. 
     POINT  GLOVER  was nearly rammed by a 20 foot junk  carrying  five 
     men,  one  of  whom was subsequently captured along  with  several 
     small  arms,  ammunition,  papers and clothing.   The cutter POINT 
     MARONE  was  attempting  to inspect a 40 foot junk when  the  junk 
     evaded  and opened fire with small arms and grenades.   The cutter 
     responded  with machine gunfire killing 8 Viet Cong.   One VC  was 
     captured  along  with small arms,  ammunition,  grenades,  a  lead 
     sealed box, clothing, money,  and caulking compound.   Besides the 
     normal  duties  of  preventing the infiltration of enemy  men  and 
     supplies,  the  WPB's  were  frequently  called  upon  to  provide 
     emergency support for U.S.  Special Forces camps.   This emergency 
     support  consisted of the transportation of  personnel,  medevacs, 
     and firing urgent Naval Gunfire Support missions.
       Even though the performance of the cutters was nothing less than 
     outstanding,  there remained a large gap in the force which had to 
     be filled.   Division Twelve in Da Nang covered the East Coast and 
     Division  Eleven provided coverage on the West Coast,  but no  one 
     really  protected  the vital Southeast Coast.   So on the 29th  of 
     October, 1965, the Coast Guard, at the request of the Secretary of 
     the  Navy,  ordered  nine additional Coast Guard 82  patrol  boats 
     detached  from  normal duties for deployment to RONONE  under  CTF 
     115.   The  WPB's of Division Thirteen were embarked on 1 December 
     1965 and the division established on the 12th.  The cutters sailed 
     from Subic enroute Vung Tau on 15 February 1966.   As Squadron One 
     grew  so  did  the  duties of its  staff.   On  5  November  1965, 
     Commander  Coast  Guard Squadron One was assigned additional  duty 
     with  COMUSMACV  Joint Staff attached to NAVADVGRP  in  connection 
     with   IV   Coastal   Zone  advisor   task.    On   15   December, 
     COMCOGARDRONONE  was  upgraded to a captain (O-6)  billet and  the 
     position  tasked  with  additional duty as advisor  to  CHNAVADGRP 
     SAIGON for Coast Guard related matters.
       The  cutter POINT WHITE had not been in-country a month when she 
     started  conducting patrols on a VC controlled area of the Soi Rap 
     River.   The POINT WHITE used a ruse of steaming out of the patrol 
     area  and covertly returning to the VC area.   Soon she spotted  a 
     junk crossing the river and attempted to stop it.  The junk opened 
     fire  with small arms,  including automatic weapons.   POINT WHITE 
     returned  the fire and rammed the junk throwing the occupants into 
     the water.  The cutter's Commanding Officer rescued a survivor who 
     turned  out  to  be a key VC leader of the Rung Sat  Secret  Zone. 
     During this month of March, 3 WPB's of Division Thirteen accounted 
     for 27 VC killed in action, 7 captured in action, and considerable 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     contraband confiscated.
       Activity  continued  throughout  April,  1966 with  Coast  Guard 
     Cutter POINT COMFORT being fired upon by a Cambodian patrol in the 
     Gulf  of  Thailand;  the POINT PARTRIDGE capturing a hard core  VC 
     Colonel of Engineers;  and Coast Guard and Navy personnel fighting 
     a  conflagration  that  destroyed  seventy housing  units  in  the 
     village of An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island.
       May  started  out  with  the POINT PARTRIDGE  capturing  a  junk 
     containing  CHICOM weapons and the POINT GRACE capturing a  sampan 
     taking  3 prisoners,  rifles and ammunition.   On the 19th of  the 
     month  a significant naval engagement was fought.   The POINT GREY 
     was  on  patrol near the Ca Mau peninsula when she sighted  a  120 
     foot   trawler  heading  on  various  courses  and  speeds.    Her 
     suspicions  were  aroused and POINT GREY commenced  shadowing  the 
     trawler.   After observing what appeared to be signal fires on the 
     beach she hailed the vessel,  but received response.   The trawler 
     ran aground and POINT GREY personnel attempted to board it.   They 
     were  prevented from doing so by heavy automatic weapons fire from 
     the  beach  which resulted in three wounded on board  POINT  GREY. 
     POINT  CYPRESS  and  U.S.  Navy units came  to  assist.   After  a 
     determination was made that the trawler could not be salvaged,  it 
     was destroyed.   U.S.   Navy salvage teams recovered a substantial 
     amount  of  war material.   This incident was the  largest  single 
     known  infiltration  attempt  since the Vung Ro  Bay  incident  of 
     February, 1965.
     
       May  was also the first birthday of RONONE and during that first 
     year  of operations the cutters of Squadron One steamed more  than 
     half  million  miles;  were underway over seventy percent  of  the 
     time;  detected  150,000 junks;  inspected 30,000  junks;  boarded 
     35,000 junks; accounted for 75 VC KIA/WIA/CIA;  arrested hundreds; 
     destroyed sixteen s and one steel hull; captured enemy weapons and 
     supplies  in  excess  of  100  tons;  conducted  thirty-five  NGFS 
     missions;  participated  in special operations in support of  U.S. 
     and  South  Vietnamese  forces;  and conducted  an  active  PSYWAR 
     campaign.
       The  month of June proved to be as exciting as May.   The  POINT 
     LEAGUE  was  on  patrol and detected a 98 foot  trawler  in  South 
     Vietnamese  waters.   The POINT LEAGUE challenged the trawler  and 
     was  fired  upon.   The cutter returned fire and ran  the  trawler 
     aground.   The cutters POINT SLOCUM and POINT HUDSON joined in the 
     fray  along with aircraft.   A small explosion was observed on the 
     trawler  and  she was subsequently  boarded and  captured.   After 
     refloating,  the  trawler was towed to Vung Tau where many tons of 
     war material was removed.   Two Coastguardsmen were wounded during 
     the battle.
       Little happened during July,  1966 and August started off slowly 
     with  routine  operations.   The POINT ARDEN rescued an  LCU  from 
     straying over the 17th parallel,  a not uncommon occurrence due to 
     the configuration of the coastline.  On 11 August 1966,  the POINT 
     WELCOME  was  on  patrol  near  the  DMZ  when  suddenly  she  was 
     illuminated  and then attacked by friendly  aircraft.   Sustaining 
     several  hits  in  the bridge area,  she was also  ablaze  with  a 
     gasoline   fire.    She  attempted  to  repel  the  attack   while 
     extinguishing  the fire.   Still under attack she ran aground  and 
     was abandoned, but not before all donned life jackets.  When other 
     Coast  Guard units arrived on scene the Commanding Officer of  the 
     POINT WELCOME was dead along with one of his crew.   The executive 
     officer,  two  other crewmen,  the Vietnamese liaison,  and a Life 
     
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     Magazine  reporter were wounded.   The POINT WELCOME was refloated 
     and towed to port for repairs.
       September  was  a time for rescues with the Coast  Guard  saving 
     four  of six crewmen from a downed helicopter.   The POINT  LEAGUE 
     responded  to  a  distress on the S/S  DRAGONLADY.   POINT  LEAGUE 
     dewatered  a  flooded  compartment,  replaced  the  injured  Chief 
     Engineer  with a first class engineman and gave general comfort to 
     the  seasick  officers and the inexperienced  crew.   October  was 
     quiet and November was highlighted by the POINT COMFORT dispersing 
     enemy  forces  attacking  U.S.  Special  Forces  personnel.  POINT 
     COMFORT  provided  NGFS,   suppressed  enemy  fire  and  evacuated 
     refugees.
       The days went routinely until 14 March 1967 when the POINT ELLIS 
     and  USN units detected an enemy steel hull trawler and forced  it 
     to  beach.   The  enemy,  forced  to destroy a precious  cargo  of 
     mortars, small arms,  uniforms and other contraband,  was deprived 
     of a large quantity of much needed war material.
       The  waters  around  Vietnam were relatively  uncharted  and  so 
     survey vessels were dispatched to conduct hydrographic operations. 
     During  these operations in May,  1967 a survey boat from the  USS 
     MAURY  was hit by enemy fire and was sinking.   The POINT  KENNEDY 
     went  alongside the survey boat to give damage control  assistance 
     and   simultaneously   suppressed  enemy  fire  while   skillfully 
     extracting  both  craft from this precarious position.   The  same 
     month  the  Vietnamese liaison and a crewman from the POINT  ELLIS 
     went  into  the water to recover a sailor lost overboard from  the 
     USS PRINCETON.
       On  15  July 1967,  the POINT ORIENT led an attack on  an  enemy 
     trawler.   The  trawler,  after  being taken under fire  by  POINT 
     ORIENT   and  a  PCF  grounded  near  a  river.    The   trawler's 
     superstructure was heavily damaged and she was ablaze from stem to 
     stern.   Though  on fire she did not explode though several  minor 
     explosions  did  take  place.   The contents of the  trawler  were 
     salvaged  by  USN and ROK units.   In addition to trawler  killing 
     Coast  Guard  patrol  boats  acted as blockade  units  to  prevent 
     exfiltration,   provided   NGFS   and  conducted  Harassment   and 
     Interdiction missions.
       The Coast Guard patrol boats were built for offshore rescue work 
     in  adverse weather conditions while their Navy  counterpart,  the 
     PCF, was not.   So well suited to their missions,  they frequently 
     remained  on station while larger naval units departed.   This did 
     not  go  unnoticed at CTF 115.   So in  September,  1967,  it  was 
     decided  that seasonal shifts of WPB's were to take place with the 
     WPB's following the monsoons and the PCF's following the sunshine. 
     Though  this  policy may not have been popular with an  occasional 
     Coastguardsman,  they  still  maintained the patrol  schedule  and 
     fulfilled all their duties.
       The 29th of February,  1968 brought the largest naval engagement 
     of  the  Vietnam war.   Four trawlers attempted to  penetrate  the 
     barrier.   Of  these,  three were destroyed and the fourth beat  a 
     retreat  to the north.   The first attempted to run the barrier in 
     the  area  near  Da Nang.   The Coast  Guard  Cutter  ANDROSCOGGIN 
     challenged  her  and shortly after commenced fire which the  enemy 
     infiltrator returned.  POINT WELCOME closed in illuminating;  with 
     the  POINT GREY and a PCF using machine guns.   The trawler  fired 
     back at the patrol boats, but she beached herself.   POINT WELCOME 
     fired 81 mm and others fired machine guns which silenced the enemy 
     fire.   Shortly  after  0230  on the 1st  of  March,  the  trawler 
     destroyed itself.
     
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       Another  trawler was destroyed off the Ca Mau peninsula.   After 
     numerous  hits by gunfire from the CGC WINOA,  POINT GRACE,  POINT 
     MARONE,  POINT  HUDSON,  and  USN PCF's she burst into  flame  and 
     subsequently  exploded.   She  disappeared from the radar  screens 
     about the same time as the previous one.
       About  the  same time that the second trawler was  sounding  her 
     death knell a third sounded hers.  Caught and beached northeast of 
     Nha  Trang,  she  attempted to return fire of the Coast Guard  and 
     Navy units, but was destroyed after several direct hits from 81 mm 
     mortars.
       A  fourth trawler was spotted by the Cutter MINNETONKA on  outer 
     barrier  patrol before the trawler crossed into Vietnamese waters. 
     The trawler turned and left the area.
       Near the DMZ was a base at Cua Viet where a LST ramp was located 
     for  unloading  supplies and ammunition.   The POINT ARDEN was  at 
     that  location  on  10  March when  a  fire  started.   The  chief 
     boatswain's  mate  from  the POINT ARDEN  extinguished  the  fire, 
     secured  a 5"  rubber hose pumping gasoline and is given  probable 
     credit for saving the main ammunition dump.   He received shrapnel 
     wounds from a minor explosion that took place.
       Between the Cua Viet LST ramp and the next major phase of RONONE 
     history  was  the  conducting routine operations such  as  patrol, 
     NGFS, H & I, SAR, arresting draft dodgers and so forth.  The POINT 
     ORIENT captured six NVA officers in an infiltration attempt.
       A  high  level  decision  was made  and  in  January  1969,  two 
     Vietnamese  Navy  lieutenants reported aboard WPB's as  the  first 
     phase  in  a transition to Vietnamese control of WPB's.   A  month 
     later  17  VNN ensigns and 2 more lieutenants reported as part  of 
     the turnover.
       With  out a doubt language and communications did arise but they 
     were  quickly  overcome.    Vietnamese  enlisted  men  phased  in, 
     replacing  U.S.   counterparts and after several fully operational 
     patrols  were  ready for turnover.   On 16 May 1969,  the  cutters 
     POINT  GARNET and POINT LEAGUE were transferred to the  Vietnamese 
     Navy  in  appropriate ceremonies at Saigon and named LE PHUOC  DUC 
     and LE VAN NGA respectively.
       While  transition  was taking place the other cutters  continued 
     their  normal  duties.   In two boat trips through the  surf,  the 
     POINT  BANKS  extracted nine friendlies trapped by  the  VC.   The 
     damage  control  parties of the POINT CYPRESS and the POINT  WHITE 
     saved  a  PCF from sinking.   The POINT WHITE refloated two  PCF's 
     that went aground at Ha Tien.  While at Ha Tien,  crewmen from the 
     cutter  repaired an evaporator previously thought unrepairable and 
     gave  the forces in Ha Tien their first consistent water supply in 
     more than a year.
       Regardless   of  whatever  other  activities  the  cutters  were 
     involved  in the primary mission was turnover.   Included in  this 
     turnover process was the training of Vietnamese repair forces.  By 
     August  the  VNN  WPB repair crew was able to remove  and  install 
     overhauled  engines in the WPB's unaided except for some  American 
     muscle.  Problems  were  inherent  in the  turnover  as  personnel 
     reporting not of the proper pay grade, of insufficient number, and 
     late  reporting.   But  it  must be remembered that  the  VNN  was 
     suffering  growing  pains emerging from primarily a  coastal  junk 
     force to a modern navy in just a few years.
       Boats  were constantly being turned over and while a substantial 
     portion  of the crew was Vietnamese several significant operations 
     took  place.   In early 1970 the cutters POINT JEFFERSON and POINT 
     PARTRIDGE conducted maximum boarding,  search and PSYOPS missions. 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 37
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     Three hundred fifteen junks were boarded or inspected, 2 detainees 
     taken, 2,000 people reached, 3,000 bars of soap and 5,000 leaflets 
     distributed along with numerous food items,  and medical treatment 
     given to twelve Vietnamese.   A few days later the POINT JEFFERSON 
     helped retake an outpost overrun by the VC by giving close support 
     to  friendly forces.   During May 1970 the cutters POINT BANKS and 
     POINT GREY landed a group,  detained 16 suspected VC,  captured 22 
     VC/NVA,  and killed nine VC.   Ten enemy watercraft,  15 offensive 
     structures   and  13  other  structures  were  destroyed  in   the 
     operation.
       On 15 August 1970,  the last two cutters of the twenty-six,  the 
     Cutters  POINT  MARONE and POINT CYPRESS were transferred  to  the 
     Vietnamese.   The  same day RONONE and Coast Guard Division Twelve 
     were  disestablished.   A new post of Senior Coast Guard  Officer, 
     Vietnam  was established as a sub-unit of Commander,  Coast  Guard 
     SouthEast Asia Section.
     
         [Stay tuned for other parts of the USCG in SEA - Vietnam]
     








































     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 38


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       A T T A C K   o n   t h e   U . S . S .   L i b e r t y ! ! !
     =================================================================

          The Liberty - What does the government DO with the truth?
                      Input by: Joe Meadors
                     SeaBat BBS - Corpus Christi, TX
                              (512) 387-6638
     
       The  following  is an exact duplicate of a document prepared  on
     September  21,  1967,  by  the Legal Adviser of the Department  of 
     State  for  Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under  Secretary  for 
     Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow.
       The Legal Advisor, Mr. Carl F. Salans, was asked to analyze and
     compare the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report and the Israeli
     Defense Forces report of the USS Liberty incident.
       This document was classified TOP SECRET until January 24, 1983,
     when it was declassified and released in response to a $15,000
     lawsuit filed in Minneapolis Federal District Court after the
     State Department refused to release it under the administrative
     provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
     
                                  DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                                   The Legal Advisor
                                                   September 21, 1967
     
     
     TO:         U - The Under Secretary
     THROUGH:    S/S
     FROM:       L - Carl F. Salans
     SUBJECT:    "The LIBERTY" - Discrepancies Between Israeli Inquiry
                 and U.S. Navy Inquiry - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
        As you requested, we have compared the decision of the
     Israeli Judge, dated July 21, 1967, with the findings of the U.S.
     Navy Court of Inquiry, and the Clifford Report, concerning the
     LIBERTY incident.
     
        The following discrepancies are noteworthy:
     
     I.   SPEED AND DIRECTION OF THE LIBERTY
          - The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boat Division 
            Commander reported and reconfirmed the target's (LIBERTY's) 
            speed  at  28  to  30 knots and that  it  had  changed  its 
            navigational direction shortly after 1341 hours.
          - The U.S. Navy inquiry established that the LIBERTY had been 
            on  a  steady course at 5 knots from 1132 hours  until  the 
            attack.
     
     II.  AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE
          - The Israeli report indicates that a ship was reported in
            the  area  by  reconnaissance  aircraft at  0600  and  that 
            another report was received of a contact between an Israeli 
            aircraft and a surface vessel about 0900.
          - The Navy Court findings of fact,  plus testimony of various 
            members of the crew indicates reconnaissance overflights of 
            the LIBERTY at 0515, 0850, 1030, 1056,  1126,  1145,  1220, 
            and 1245.
     
     III. IDENTIFICATION BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

          - The  Israeli  report  indicates that the  fighter  aircraft 
            carried  out  a run over the ship in an effort to  identify 
            it.
          - The  Navy  Inquiry  reports  no  such  identification  run. 
            Commander  McGonagle  testified that he observed  one  air-
            reconnaissance  flight approximately five to six miles from 
            the  ship at an altitude of 7,000 feet.   He did not see it 
            approach  the  ship.   Within a couple of minutes,  a  loud 
            explosion  was  heard  from  the port  side  of  the  ship, 
            apparently  resulting from a rocket,  launched by a  second 
            aircraft.
     
     IV.  IDENTIFICATION BY TORPEDO BOATS
          - The   Israeli  report  indicates  that  the  torpedo  boats 
            approached the LIBERTY in order to establish visual contact 
            and to identify it, and that in addition,  the Commander of 
            the  torpedo  boats  signalled the LIBERTY  requesting  its 
            identification.  The LIBERTY reportedly answered, "Identify 
            yourself first," and opened fire on the torpedo boats.
          - Commander  McGonagle's  testimony indicated that  the  only 
            signals  from the torpedo boats were those made during  the 
            high-speed  approach from a distance of approximately 2,000 
            yards  and that it was not possible for the LIBERTY to read 
            the signals because of the intermittent blocking of view by 
            smoke  and flames.  No reply signal was sent.   Immediately 
            after  the  liberty was struck by a  torpedo,  the  torpedo 
            boats  stopped at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards 
            and  one  signalled  by flashing light in English  "Do  you 
            require assistance?"  Commander McGonagle testified that he 
            had  no  means  to communicate with the boat by  light  but 
            hoisted  "CODE  LIMA INDIA."   ("I am not  under  command," 
            i.e., not able to control movements of ship.)
     
     V.   FLAG AND IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS
          - The  Israeli  report  indicates that the  fighter  aircraft 
            which  reportedly made an initial pass over the LIBERTY was 
            looking  for  a  flag but found  none;  likewise  no  other 
            identification mark was observed.  ".  .  .  Throughout the 
            contact  no American or any other flag appeared on the ship 
            .  .  .."  (Elsewhere the report had indicated that at 1055 
            the  ship had been identified as the LIBERTY "whose marking 
            was GTR-5.")
          - The  Navy inquiry confirms by testimony of five members  of 
            the  crew  that  they had personally  observed  the  Ensign 
            flying  during  the  entire morning and up  until  the  air 
            attack.   The  Ensign was subsequently shot away during the 
            air attack.  Before the torpedo attack, a second Ensign was 
            hoisted.   The  Navy report also found that "hull  markings 
            were clear and freshly painted."
          - The  Clifford report noted that "the LIBERTY's U.S.  Navy's 
            distinguishing  letters and number were painted clearly  on 
            her bow.  The LIBERTY's name was clearly painted in English 
            on  her stern.   The ship's configuration and her  standard 
            markings   were   clearly  sufficient  for   reconnaissance 
            aircraft and waterborne vessels to identify her correctly . 
            .  .."  The report noted that at all times prior to the air 
            attack the LIBERTY was flying her normal size American flag 
            (5 ft.  by 8 ft.)  at the masthead.   Five minutes prior to 
            the attack by the torpedo boats,  the LIBERTY put up a flag 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 40
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

            measuring  7 ft.  by 13 ft.  to replace the flag which  had 
            been shot down in the air attack.
     
     VI.  IDENTIFICATION OF SHIP AS "EL-KASIR"
          - The  Israeli  report  indicates  that  shortly  before  the 
            torpedo attack the torpedo boat Division Commander reported 
            the  certain  identification of the vessel as  an  Egyptian 
            transport  ship named "  El Kasir."   Identification of the 
            target  was  made  both by the Division Commander  and  the 
            commander  of  another  torpedo boat.   The  Israeli  Judge 
            indicated in his decision that "on examining photographs of 
            the  two  ships,  I  am satisfied that  a  likeness  exists 
            between  them,  and  that  an error  of  identification  is 
            possible,  especially  having  regard  to  the  fact,  that 
            identification  was  made  while the ship  was  clouded  in 
            smoke."
          - The Clifford report noted "That the LIBERTY could have been 
            mistaken   for  the  Egyptian  supply  ship  El  Quseir  is 
            unbelievable.  El Quseir has one-fourth the displacement of 
            the  LIBERTY,  roughly  one-half  the  beam,  is  180  feet 
            shorter, and is very differently configured.  The LIBERTY's 
            unusual  antenna  array and hull markings should have  been 
            visible to low-flying aircraft and torpedo boats.   .  .  . 
            Trained  Israeli  naval  personnel should  have  been  able 
            easily  to  see  and identify the larger  markings  on  the 
            LIBERTY.
     
     ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI REPORT
     I.   SPEED OF "LIBERTY" AND "EL KASIR" AS IDENTIFICATION FACTORS
          - The  Israeli  report states that the initial speed  of  the 
            target reported by the torpedo boat commander at 1341 hours 
            as  30 knots was verified within minutes and confirmed as a 
            speed of 28 knots.   The report notes that it was the speed 
            of  the target which led to the final conclusion that there 
            was  no reason for surmising that the target could possibly 
            be the LIBERTY.
          - The  reported speed would have ruled out the "El Kasir"  as 
            the  target,  as well as the LIBERTY since the top speed of 
            the "Kasir,"  published in JANES FIGHTING SHIPS,  is in the 
            range of 14 knots.  The LIBERTY's top speed is 18 knots.
     
     II.  FAILURE TO RELATE LIBERTY TO BOMBARDMENT CAPABILITY
          - The  Israeli  report emphasizes that the attack  originated 
            with  reports that the El Arish area was being shelled from 
            the  sea.   The  implication of such reports was  obviously 
            that  a  ship capable of such shelling was present  in  the 
            immediate  offshore  area,  i.e.,  within gun range of  the 
            shore.
          - It would be clear to any trained observer that the armament 
            aboard  the LIBERTY was incapable of shore bombardment.  It 
            appears  nevertheless  that neither the  aircraft,  torpedo 
            boats,   nor   the  command  headquarters  to  which   they 
            presumably  reported  evaluated the ship's  capability  for 
            shore bombardment.
     
     III. TIME SEQUENCE OF ATTACKS
          - The  Israeli report indicates that it had been agreed  that 
            as  soon as the torpedo boats located the target,  aircraft 
            would  be  dispatched.   At  1341 hours  the  torpedo  boat 
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 41
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

            located the target.  "A few minutes later," the dispatch of 
            aircraft  was requested.   The first air attack occurred at 
            approximately 1400 hours.
          - Assuming  "a  few minutes later"  would mean four  or  five 
            minutes,  the request for aircraft must have occurred about 
            1345.  One  may infer from the fact that within a period of 
            approximately  15  minutes,  the request  was  transmitted, 
            received, a command decision made, aircraft dispatched, and 
            the attack launched,  that no significant time was expended 
            in  an effort to identify the ship from the air before  the 
            attack was launched.
     
     IV.  ATTACK BY TORPEDO BOAT AFTER "DO NOT ATTACK" ORDER
          - The Israeli report confirms that during the final attack by 
            aircraft  the marking "CPR-5"  was noted on the hull and an 
            order  was transmitted to the torpedo boat division not  to 
            attack.  The order was recorded in the log book of the flag 
            boat  at  approximately  1420  hours.   The  torpedo  boats 
            nevertheless  began their attack run at approximately 1428.  
            The  Division Commander later "claimed that no such message 
            ever reached him."  The Deputy Commander testified that "he 
            received  the  message  and passed it on  to  the  Division 
            Commander."
     =================================================================

               "Truth" Held Hostage by Government Employment
                          By: James M. Ennes, Jr.
                          Input by: Joe Meadors
                     SeaBat BBS - Corpus Christi, TX
                              (512) 387-6638
     
     James M. Ennes, Jr.
     Woodinville, Washington 98072
     
     February 8, 1988
     
     Captain R. F. Testa, USN
     Deputy Chief of Legislative Affairs
     Department of the Navy
     Office of Legislative Affairs
     Washington, D.C. 20350
     
     Dear Captain Testa:
     
     Admiral  Robert  Garrick has kindly shared with me your letter  of 
     13 November which responds to some questions Admiral Garrick asked 
     about  the Israeli attack upon the USS Liberty in 1967.   I should 
     like  to comment briefly upon certain government errors which  you 
     have repeated to Admiral Garrick in your letter.
     
     First,  you  tell  Admiral Garrick that the Navy Court of  Inquiry 
     conducted  a  "thorough investigation"  into  the  attack,  taking 
     testimony  from  numerous witnesses including officers and men  of 
     the  Liberty,  weighing contradictory evidence and evaluating  the 
     record as a whole.
     
     While  I  realize that our government has been claiming  "thorough 
     investigation"  since  1967,  I should like you to understand that 
     your  statement  in  this regard is  mistaken.   I  was  Liberty's 
     officer  of  the  deck when the attack started and I  was  on  the 
     bridge  almost  continually  for seven hours preceding  the  first 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     strafing run, when I was wounded.   I held the deck or the conn or 
     both during most of that period.   I was relieved of the conn only 
     seconds before the firing started.   No one else was on the bridge 
     continually during that extended period of reconnaissance,  count-
     down  to  the attack and start of the attack.   Thus I was by  any 
     measure  a  key witness to the event.   Yet the court declined  to 
     interview me personally and declined to accept a sworn statement I 
     submitted while the court was in session.  Similarly,  none of the 
     ship's  deck  logs or quartermaster's notebook logs were  accepted 
     into  evidence by the Court or entered into the official record as 
     is usual in cases of this sort.  Like other vital records,  ship's 
     weather  logs  were available but ignored,  even though  wind  and 
     weather  conditions  were important to the court's  deliberations.  
     Other  key  officers  were likewise forbidden to  testify  on  the 
     record.   For instance,  the ship's second-in-command who relieved 
     our  mortally wounded executive officer was forbidden to  testify.  
     Officers and key people who did testify were allowed only to cover 
     a  narrow  range of answers which had been  meticulously  reviewed 
     beforehand.
     
     This  must  be  the  only inquiry ever held by  the  Navy  into  a 
     disaster  at sea in which the Navy failed to interview either  the 
     Officer of the Deck for the critical period,  or the ship's second 
     in command,  and failed to take into evidence any of the key deck, 
     bridge  and  weather  logs.   Can  anyone seriously  call  this  a 
     thorough inquiry?
     
     I could go on at length.  The point is,  that Court of Inquiry was 
     by no means "a thorough investigation."  Its conduct, in fact,  in 
     several  instances  was in gross violation of the requirements  of 
     the Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
     
     The  record,  in fact,  is such a travesty that the Judge Advocate 
     for  CINCUSNAVEUR  refused  to prepare an endorsement for  it  and 
     objected  strenuously and personally to the Judge Advocate General 
     of  the Navy when that task was handled by others.   That officer, 
     one  of the few to display any courage in this case,  later became 
     Judge  Advocate General of the Navy and retired as a Rear Admiral. 
     The flawed report, however,  sailed on and was ultimately approved 
     for political reasons despite the many fatal defects.
     
     The  main  point I wish to make,  however,  regards your reply  to 
     Admiral  Garrick's  question  which asked why Sixth  Fleet  rescue 
     aircraft  were  recalled  while  we were still  under  attack  and 
     calling for help.   According to your letter,  those aircraft were 
     recalled "following the receipt. . .of a message. .  .stating that 
     Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats had erroneously attacked a U.S. 
     ship and that rescue operations were underway."  That, sir, is not 
     true.
     
     Captain  Testa,  the  attack on our ship started at  2:00PM  local 
     time.   At  2:09PM local time Captain Joseph Tully of the  carrier 
     USS  Saratoga  informed  us  by radio that  rescue  aircraft  were 
     enroute.   Those aircraft,  however,  were recalled on orders from 
     Washington  while we were still fighting,  dying,  and crying  for 
     help.   Numerous  responsible people are available to verify  this 
     fact,  including Captain Tully,  his now-retired navigator Admiral 
     Max Morris,  and others.   The recall mentioned in your letter was 
     the recall of the second flight of aircraft.   Those were launched 
     
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     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     at least two hours later,  long after we were torpedoed and 34 men 
     were dead or mortally wounded.   Those men could be alive today if 
     Captain  Joe  Tully had been allowed to do his job.   That is  the 
     flight  that  cost the lives of my shipmates!   Forget the  flight 
     that  originated after the shooting was over.   Won't you tell  us 
     why  Captain Tully's first flight,  the rescue flight,  the flight 
     that could have saved 34 lives was recalled?
     
     You  tell  Admiral Garrick that Israel conducted its  own  inquiry 
     which  reported that the attack was an error--sadly suggestive  of 
     the fox investigating the case of the missing chickens!   You fail 
     to  mention  that the State Department subsequently examined  that 
     Israeli  excuse  and  found it to be  untrue,  yet  for  political 
     reasons classified that finding Top Secret until forced to release 
     the  report  years  later under the Freedom  of  Information  act.  
     Isn't  it ironic that our government still cites in its  arguments 
     the  discredited Israeli excuse,  but ignores its own study  which 
     shows that the Israeli report is untrue?
     
     The Navy explains discrepancies in the conduct and findings of the 
     Court  of Inquiry by telling us that the court record is bound  to 
     contain  conflicting evidence,  including some evidence which  may 
     not  support  its findings.  Conclusions,  the Navy  asserts,  are 
     necessarily  based upon an evaluation of all the  evidence.   This 
     assertion  is  evasive  and misleading.   Our  complaint  is  that 
     evidence  was ignored and conclusions were published based upon no 
     evidence whatsoever!   Worse,  our complaint is that several vital 
     conclusions run counter to and are totally contradicted by and not 
     supported  in  any  way by any of the evidence.   This  is  not  a 
     question of how the evidence was evaluated.  Our complaint is that 
     findings  were  made  without regard for  the  evidence,  and  any 
     careful reading of that transcript will show that this is so.
     
     For  but one small example,  the court concluded as a "Finding  of 
     Fact" that the flag may not have been seen by the attacking forces 
     because it hung limp from the mast on a windless day.  Yet,  there 
     is  not one scrap of evidence to support such a  conclusion.   The 
     ship's Weather Log records 14 knots of relative wind,  and several 
     witnesses  report seeing the flag fly clearly displayed in a  good 
     breeze before and throughout the attack.  Not a single witness and 
     not one scrap of evidence suggests that the flag ever hung limp at 
     the mast even for a moment.   Yet the court,  for reasons unclear, 
     chose to disregard all existing evidence and testimony and instead 
     engaged  in  unwarranted speculation and published an  unjustified 
     conclusion  which says that the pilots may not have seen the  flag 
     because it might have been a windless day.  Such nonsense.   This, 
     sir, was by no means a thorough investigation.
     
     My  shipmates and I possess evidence to support every statement in 
     this letter. We are eager to testify as well.   Numerous patriotic 
     Americans  of  the era agree with our position and have  said  so, 
     including Admiral Thomas Moorer (who ordered the report you cite), 
     Dean Rusk, Richard Helms and his deputy from CIA, General Marshall 
     Carter  and  his Deputy from NSA,  Paul Warnke who served at  that 
     time  as  principal  advisor on National Security Affairs  to  the 
     Secretary of Defense,  and many others now out of government.  The 
     sad  truth is that hardly anyone finds the courage to speak up  on 
     this subject until they are safely out of government.
     
     
     NAM VET Newsletter                                        Page 44
     Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990

     Isn't  there someone still in the Navy with the courage to examine 
     this subject honestly while they are still in government with some 
     chance  of influencing what our government says on this  important 
     subject.   Must  we  hear  the truth only from  former  government 
     officials and retired naval officers?   Surely,  somewhere,  there 
     must  be at least one active duty senior officer with the  courage 
     to  examine  the  facts in this case and then to work  within  the 
     system  to help us correct the grave injustices of the past twenty 
     years.
     
     Won't  you take time to look into this case a bit deeper.   If you 
     will do that, I am certain you will find that the subject deserves 
     a  more thoughtful answer than the one you gave Admiral Garrick on 
     November 13.
     
                                            Sincerely,
          Volume  4, Number 12                           December 14, 1990



     =================================================================
                              I n - T o u c h
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                         In-Touch.  What is it ???
     
                       Input by: Ray "Frenchy" Moreau
                      NAM VETs IN-TOUCH Section Editor
                     Herndon Byte eXchange - Herndon, VA
                               (703) 471-8010
     =================================================================
     
     |+++++++++++++++++++++++++ IN TOUCH ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++|
     |  There are some 43 million people in the United States whose  |
     |  lives were directly and irrevocably touched by the Vietnam   |
     |  War.                                                         |
     |                                                               |
     |  Almost four million people served in Vietnam -- the longest, |
     |  and perhaps most difficult, war in our history.  More than a |
     |  quarter of a million were seriously wounded. 58,175 are dead |
     |  or missing.                                                  |
     |                                                               |
     |  Each of those who returned recognizes the true cost of war.  |
     |  But so too do the families and friends, wives and lovers of  |
-- 
#L.W. Jewell Moderator at the Veterans Information Site (veteran@cc.purdue.edu)#
#& WWII-L Listowner: "Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange,#
#sudden and wholly unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all   #
#phases of life." "Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41  #