HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: A=A: My Beef with the Bull
Date: 7 Jan 93 18:03:37 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Originator: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu

Thus spake srogers@teenwolf.mcc.com.mcc (Steve Rogers)
 
>Philosophy is not math.  It has more in common with a science like physics.
>Phisosophy requires real world information, not experiments like physics,
>but information about the nature of reality and human beings.  Your request
>is much more like asking a physicist to 'prove' the electron in a 40 line
>posting than a proof about the square root of 2.  You can get an idea of
>why Objectivism holds certain ideas in 40 lines, but Objectivism is not a
>set of proofs.  Your position seems to be "any idea that cannot be explaned
>completely to me in a posting is obviously false".  I don't think that is
>very reasonable.
 
My position is not that "any idea that cannot be explained completely to
me in a posting is obviously false", nor have I given you any reason to
make this silly charge. I would not, in fact, expect to be able to get a
very good grasp of any philosophical system or school from a net
posting, "objectivism" notwithstanding.
 
What makes my (facetious) requests for short proofs of "objectivism"
appropriate is the frequency with which we are told that "objectivism"
is unique among all schools of philosophical thought in the
self-evidence of its premises and the purity of its logical reasoning.
In effect, we are told that "objectivism" *IS* a set of proofs; just
re-read some of the recent postings to this group if you dispute this.
If such were the case - which it of course is not - then "objectivists"
should indeed be able to present their proofs in a reasonably concise
form. The patent absurdity of my request merely reflects the absurdity
of the Randites' claims.
 
Which is not, however, to say that "objectivism" is false, or
incoherent, or badly reasoned, though it in fact is all of these things.
It is merely to say that Randites claim for their views a ridiculously
exalted status that they are quite obviously incapable of defending.
From: madhavn@madhavn.mentorg.com (Madhav Nerurkar)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Date: Wed, 06 Jan 1993 02:11:35 GMT
Organization: mentor
Keywords: 
Followup-To: 

In article <1993Jan5.230110.2869@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Daniel R Cosley) writes:
|> Perhaps you could give an example of how Objectivism is incomplete.  I don't 
|> understand in what sense you mean "complete" in regard to a philosophy.  As in,
|> can it tell us everything about the universe?  Or as in it will always tell you
|> what is right to do?  Please clarify...
|> -- 
|> Dan  ***  dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
|> *******************************************
|> Disclaimer: Due to budget constraints, The Ohio State University cannot afford 
|> to express official university opinions on Usenet.

I mean in the sense that it will help determine truth or falsity of statements
(so that I can decide what is "right" or "wrong").

The reason I said it must be incomplete is because of my interpretation of 
Godel's theorem that it means existence of statements that are true but can
not be proved to be so.

A subsequent post by Torkel Franzen says that the notion of "proof" in Godel's
theorem is quite different than the sense in which it is normally used (including
the one I was using). I am not a mathematician and am quite willing to accept
that statement as it made sense to me.

Thus I stand corrected on the Godel/incompleteness issue, though I reserve the
right to read more of The Proof and give this another shot later.


Madhav Nerurkar                     Disclaimer: These are my opinions.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Subject: Re: On the subject of Kant..
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 17:46:28 GMT

gus3@ellis.uchicago.edu (Christian Gustafson) writes:

>Besides Kant's distinction between a phenomenal and a noumenal world, you
>can't forget to mention the other basix of Kant's moral philosophy, that
>self-interest and personal desires must be wholly absent from one's intention,
>from one's Will, for an action to be moral.  Kant wants us to act according
>to imperatives, to follow a _duty_ independent from our interests or personal
>desires.  From Kant's perspective in evaluating an action, everything is
>tied to the original intent, to 'good Will', and NOT to the actual outcome 
>of action.  Blah!

One could replace "Will" above with "bloated ego and vanity" and it would
still make sense.  Will is not the only self-trait inherent in people.  There
is also vanity, egotism, and other self-delusionary practices which usually
associate themselves with "will" by claiming that they are "you".

While I don't claim that an action must be ego-less to be "moral", it however
must be ego-less to be rational.  Introducing ego into the evaluation of
reality makes it subjective and non-rational because you tend to reach the
conclusions you want to reach irrespective of "reality".  Think of it this
way: all actions are judgments.  A judge who is biased (accepts bribes, etc.)
does not make fair judgments.  Likewise a person who is biased cannot accept
the facts in a rational manner.

The actual outcome of action is irrelevant, since we do not know the future.
How can you say "Well, I don't know what's gonna happen, but because I think
that this is likely then it must be the correct evaluation of the future"?
One must deal with all possible realities, which is dealing with probability
and alternative realities.  Even if reality is "deterministic", from our
point of view many things are *very* probabilistic and should be treated
accordingly.

>:::::======  Christian Gustafson    
>:::::======  gus3@midway.uchicago.edu
>===========  The last living Spencerian.

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA
From: pgk@pacersoft.com (Paul Kamp)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Thoughts on the group
Date: 6 Jan 93 19:49:41 GMT
Followup-To: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Organization: Pacer Software, Inc.

In article <1993Jan6.181000.2522@fcom.cc.utah.edu>, leon@cs.weber.edu (Leon
D. Atkinson) wrote:
> 
> 	I'm really excited about this group and hope to contribute
> often, but I refused to cater to a Kantian mob who's only real
> purpose is to shut us down.

Kantian mob?  I do not think those that may disagree to be a Kantian mob. 
In fact, Kant was a lover of truth and tried to define how we can know
things using logic.  Isn't that what is so dear?  Verifiable truth and
arguments that are not emotional but rational?  How can we know or acquire
knowledge.  It appears that you are prepared to discount Kant as readily as
others are ready to discount objectivism.

Paul Kamp
Pacer Software, Inc.
Internet: pgk@pacersoft.com
AppleLink: PACER
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: bil@okcforum.osrhe.uoknor.edu (Bill Conner)
Subject: Re: Libertarianism and Religion?
Organization: Okcforum Unix Users Group
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 05:16:06 GMT

Mark,

   Libertarianism is most certainly based on religion, as are all
other isms. In this case the religion is:
"I-Can-Do-Whatever-I-Want-Because-I-Am-Human-And-Man-Is-The-Crown-Of-Creation"
Your particular branch of this religion insists on its atheism
because it rejects all authority. Your religion is little more than
solipsism.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: Free Markets are ecomomic anarchy
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 01:19:06 GMT

johnhall@microsoft.com (John Hall) writes:
>In article seth@mivax.mc.duke.edu (Judge Not) writes:
>| The laissez-faire-free-market* is economic anarchy.  
>
>Free markets don't work in anarchies.  There are rules in
>laissez faire -- a code of laws inforcing contracts and
>a police/judicial system to monitor such.

Anarchy in no way implies a lack of rules -- it merely implies that
there is no monopoly producer or enforcer of those rules. In
particular, free markets as we know them today not only work well in
anarchies, but were in fact developed in them. As has been noted, the
Law Merchant (Lex Mercatoria?) was developed in medieval merchant
courts that were non-governmental entities with no police powers --
somehow, however, they developed virtually all of what we consider to
be the commercial law, and indeed the UCC in force around the U.S.
today is largely a codification of the common law developed by those
courts. Those courts had no "code of laws", just the customary (or
common) law that they had developed, and they had no police system --
their only capacity to enforce contracts was that those who failed to
obey the decisions of merchant courts were ostracised by the merchant
community. 

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: gsmith@polyhymnia.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de (Gene W. Smith)
Subject: Re: On the subject of Kant..
Organization: IWR, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 18:34:32 GMT

In article <1993Jan07.025827.22542@news.mentorg.com>
madhavn@madhavn.mentorg.com (Madhav Nerurkar) writes:

>I have bought a copy of Coppleston's "History of Philosophy" and plan
>to read about Kant and perhaps get references to any works of his that
>are suitable for layman reading. Whether Kant deserves Rand's
>criticism or not I don't yet know. My own experience of people who
>claim consciousness to be supreme has been that they wanted me to
>accept THEIR consciousness as supreme.

This is silly.  If you want to find out about Kant you need to read
Kant.  I suggest the 'Critique of Pure Reason' at least.

-- 
     Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/IWR/Ruprecht-Karls University 
               gsmith@kalliope.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: mech@mdis1.wdl (Miguel Echavarria)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Organization: Loral Western Development Labs
	<1993Jan05.223006.29473@news.mentorg.com> <106228@bu.edu>
	<lewchuk.726347503@therien>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 14:58:09 GMT

In article <lewchuk.726347503@therien> lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael
Lewchuk) writes:

< Replying to an assetion that Goedel's theorem, of which I know nothing
about, only applies to formal systems >

   Not entirely correct.  The proof was much stronger than this. It was that no
   formal system of *logic* could be both consistent and complete.  Mathematics
   can be shown to be a subset of logic.  Thus, mathematics in and of itself
   cannot be both consistent and complete.

< example deleted >

   I believe what this means is that rationality is a more poweful system
   than logic since logic cannot prove all possibly true statements but
   rationality can account for them in some fashion.

-------

I presume Goedel arrived at his result using logic. I consider it a testament
to the worth of logic that it can in some manner reveal its own limitations. I
wonder if 'rationality' leads to similar results. You seem to imply that it is
the be all and end all of human ( or perhaps sentient ) thought. I have a hard
time understanding what I take to be 'rationality', but I assume it is some
super-set of logic. Is there a book or primer ( like the ones on fallacious
arguments ) that might provide a basis for what is considered 'rationality.'

This may be off the subject, but before we deify rationality or reason or
whatever, it might help to outline what we think these concepts mean.

--
Miguel Echavarria
mech@wdl1.wdl.loral.com
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: srogers@teenwolf.mcc.com.mcc (Steve Rogers)
Subject: Re: A Warning to the Uninformed
Reply-To: srogers@teenwolf.mcc.com.mcc
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 13:40:50 GMT

brandyn@Apple.COM (Brandyn) says:

>    My point, as I stated, was simply that one shouldn't call something
> Objectivism that isn't.  You can debate philosophy without reguard to
> particular individuals, because philosphy is the study of the reality which
> is common to all.  You can argue whether Objectivism is right or wrong, because
> you can compare it to reality.  But you can't argue what is and is not
> Objectivism without going back to those who defined Objectivism -- Objectivism
> is a proper noun, and it defines a system that is someone's particular
> formulation. 

Yep.

---
| Steven Rogers  MCC/ESL  3500 West Balcones Drive
| Austin, Texas 78759-6509  (512) 338-3691 srogers@mcc.com

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: A Warning to the Uninformed
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 23:01:04 GMT

greg@cpsc.ucalgary.ca (Greg James) writes:
>Is there any guarantee that the resulting billing bureaucracy for an
>Objectivist socity will not be larger than a government one? If we assume that
>current government spending approximates the magnitude of demand, then there
>will (hopefully) be private concerns to provide ex-government sevices to all
>that want and are willing and capable to pay for them.
>
>However, the result would be a billing nightmare. Public roads, for
>example.  "You travelled on road segments a,c,d,e,g,... on your way
>to work and we expect payment." Bike trails? Toll booths every 10
>metres?

There is a reason that the market won't make things that inconvenient
-- transaction costs. Whenever you have to pay a toll of a nickel
every ten feet, consider that the road company has to pay someone to
collect the nickels. If the market gets as fragmenented as you suggest on
the roads, I suspect that electronic automatic chargeback systems and
other mechanisms would arise to prevent things from becoming
inconvenient. Repeating, remember that every time a beaurocrat throws a
stumbling block in your way, it costs the company money as well as
you. The market provides incentives to minimize this.

Now, there isn't any such incentive at all for government -- they have
no competitors and do not care about costs. So we would expect to see,
in the real world, that things run by government would tend to be
bureaucratic and unpleasant, and things run by private companies would
tend to try to make your life more convenient through time -- and
indeed, this is exactly what we observe, with government forms
multiplying every year, and airlines advertising how quick their
checkin service is.

>I don't think parks would be a problem. however. With no government
>zoning regulations, it would all become built up. After all, who
>would pay for a chunk of land, then fence it in, call it a park, and
>charge admission?

There are private parks right now, actually, and they tend to be much
nicer than public ones. Compare, for instance, Grammercy Park in New
York City versus any of the parks that are of similar size. Of course,
it is also possible to produce private parks that are open to the
public -- people might have an incentive to beautify their
neighborhood to increase the property value even if people can "free
ride" on the park.

>Basically, everything you did that involved anything that didn't belong to you
>would be billed directly to you. I can imagine my mailbox (including the mail
>delivery bill) at the end of the month.

You already pay a mail bill. What do you think postage stamps are!

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: robscjr@athena.mit.edu (Robert S Cruikshank)
Subject: Re: Health Care Rights?
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 05:58:46 GMT

Bill, if you feel that I'm not doing any thinking and am blindly following
Objectivist views, you either didn't read my post or didn't believe it.

Also, about the ideas of dead people:

A student writer once commented to E.B.White that it seemed pointless to
study old authors, since we know so much more than they did.
"Yes," White replied, "they are what we know."

I grew up in an intellectual vacuum.  The single dominant emotion of my
childhood existence was starvation for knowledge and information. I created 
and invented and discovered because I had to, because I had almost no other
source of ever learning anything.  If you, who are lucky enough to know of
the existence of the writings and work of other minds greater than yours and
mine, choose to dismiss and ignore them, then that is your choice, sir.  It
will never be mine.


--
Robert S. Cruikshank         Cartographer of the Infosphere
robscjr@athena.mit.edu    Disclaimer:  So sue me.  Claimer:  Yes, I said this.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok)
Subject: Re: Rand's Personality vs Objectivism
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 00:04:22 GMT

In article <1993Jan11.183735.4477@sctc.com> smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith) writes:
>bil@okcforum.osrhe.uoknor.edu (Bill Conner) writes:
>
>>   To attack Ms. Rand for her inability live up to her ideals is a
>>variation of the argumentum ad hominum, a favorite tactic of those who
>>have nothing worthwhile to contribute.    ...  The ad
>>hominum fallicy will be hard to give up, let's see who's really
>>interested in truth and fairness ...
>
>Before we arbitrarily reject "ad hominum" agruments let us remember
>what such an argument is. The classical argument goes like this:
>
>  Joe has flaws; therefore Joe's work has flaws.
>
>Such arguments are clearly nonsense when Joe's work concerns music or
>electron spin or biology or celestial mechanics. But that's not what
>we're discussing here. In this case the flaws are directly related to
>the work being examined. In short:
>
>  Ayn Rand's personal behavior was flawed, and
>  Ayn Rand claimed her behavior reflected proper Objectivist ideals.
>
>Now, I think we are doing a serious job of Faking Reality if we
>pretend this is irrelevant to a discussion of Objectivism. How can we
>discuss Truth in this context when we dismiss genuine, tangible
>examples of the topic under discussion?

i think the point some O/objectivists are making is that her flawed
behavior and her claim that her behavior reflected proper O ideals
do not necessarily mean O is flawed. there are two possibilities:

A. Rand was right that her behaviour reflected objectivist ideals
   and since her behavior was flawed, objectivism is flawed;

or

B. Rand was *wrong* that her behavior reflected objectivist ideals
   and so the flaws in her behavior are irrelevant.

there are other counter-arguments too, but the above is one point
i thought beared explanation. it is simply possible that Rand was wrong
not in her philosophy, but rather in her evaluation of how well
she applied it to her own life.

--
charles
From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Kant=Kant
Date: 8 Jan 93 22:26:37 GMT
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada

baruch@nynexst.com (Robert Baruch) writes:
>> Kant's goal was to propose a theory of what might be called
>> "intersubjective knowledge": a theory of how there can be such a thing
>> as objective, individual-independent truth in spite of the fact that
>> language, perception, and thought are inevitably constrained by the
>> modes in which the human mind operates.

>This is amusing to me.  If the human body developed inside of reality, then
>it must have evolved a method to interpret reality, otherwise it would not
>be able to remain in reality for very long (aka "survive").  The causality
>is, reality shaped humans.  For Kant to question that many humans can sense
>the same thing from an object, even when the object goes unsensed by anyone
>sometimes, seems to me to be a denial that humans adapted to reality.  >--Rob

Well, as far as I know, plants survive quite well without interpreting
reality.  If we ate soil and suntanned for our daily food and were watered
by rain, we'd probably not have perceived as much as we do now.  The point
is that life develops senses in accordance with its survival needs.  It does
not perceive reality in its totality, just that subset of reality it needs
to conduct basic survival operations.

It seems to me that there is the denial that senses convey the "true" picture,
but the assumption that they function by perceiving a subset of the properties
of reality in some particular way.  That is, I can see "blue", but I cannot
"see" a blue ball.  In some sense, I believe this makes the claim that
omniscience is required in order to perceive reality: the best that a finite
creature can accomplish is to try to act as best as possible within the scope
of its senses (and thus to create other "artificial sesnses" as it proves
that reality exists beyond present perception).  However, the claim is also
that one cannot perceive reality beyond one's limited mindset (in some sense,
imagination).  Thus, you cannot perceive beyond what you can imagine.  Sort
of like, who was it, the Incans not perceiving ships (or something like that?)
because they had never had that concept of real large ships.  Thus they
basically were oblivious to them.

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 18:53:25 GMT

leon@cs.weber.edu (Leon D. Atkinson) writes:
>|> "A is A" is not provable or disprovable.

>This is true.  Reality is not a theory, nor even an axiom.  It is a fact.

No, it is an assumption.  Reality could be based on both subjective and
objetive realities, or any happy median between the two.  Why does reality
"have" to be totally objective or totally subjective?  The fact that I
can only interpret perceptions according to my reality does not mean that
there is no objective reality, and the fact that we seem to agree on what
reality is does not mean that we at least partially base our actions on
things which are not and cannot be objective: dreams, hopes, desires, love,
and even on a universe which at least could be partially subjective.

>Facts are neither proven or disproven, they simply are.  "I think, therefore
>I am" is a foolish statement.  And furthermore, existence exists independent
>of human perception which means that existence objective, not subjective.

"I think therefore I am" was once the cornerstone of philosophy, and still
is to some extent.   To say "A is A" we need to do something about subjective
reality.  Either:
a) deny it exists (foolish)
b) say it is irrelevant (silly, since it is the antithesis of "A is A")
c) prove it is all perception of an "objective" reality and no valid
   subjective reality exists without a basis in objective reality.
The last would likely require either proof that existence is just little
atoms floating around, according to physical laws, or that subjective reality
can be somehow dealt with objectively.  If the universe can react to subjective
reality (thereby dealing with different people in different ways based on
their perception), this theorem is shot.

Possible example:

Suppose we have something like Star Trek, Next Generation's scenario where
they go into an area of "space" which essentitially creates subjective
reality.  This area is essentially a real illusion, and "reality" no longer
exists here -- the entire area reacts to each person as a unique reality.

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA