HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Date: 6 Jan 93 10:26:32 GMT
Article-I.D.: transarc.MfGo1sj0Bwwb0LWj9r
Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA

Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis) writes:
>  Another "likelihood theory":
> 
>       What first world government permits the use of DES for the protection 
>       of classified material? Does the US government? I believe not.

I would bet that this is because they want classified material to be 
safe for a hundred years or so.  They recognize that DES (while it may
be relatively safe for the near future) will be highly vulnerable to
brute-force attack within 50 years, and they have a lot of secrets
they'd rather no one found out about.   It doesn't have to be because
there are hidden flaws in DES.

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Here's a challenge
Date: 11 Jan 93 14:58:29 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: icat.larc.nasa.gov

jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) writes:

>In article <1993Jan11.021259.10637jp@tygra.Michigan.COM> jp@tygra.Michigan.COM (John Palmer) writes:
>>I want to check out some components of an encryption system that I'm
>>using and would like to see if anyone can crack this encrypted file.
>>Only hint is that its text of some kind. I've uuencoded it. 
>>
>>[encrypted text deleted]

>[decrypted text deleted]
>Hope this answers your question about the security of that particular
>component. :)

Hmmm, well, I guess that takes care of my previous post about this.  It
must have simple enough to not take much effort.

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
RIPEM Public Key now available  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM
Organization: the best minds of a generation, destroyed by madness
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 06:50:44 GMT

In article <36.2B51F28B@purplet.demon.co.uk> Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis) writes:
    -=> Quoting David Sternlight to All <=-
    DS> We next come to the point of whether the act is a violation of the
    DS> national laws in the country where the downloader is. From what
    DS> responses I've seen so far to that inquiry, it probably is in France,
    DS> Germany, maybe Italy, Canada, and the U.K., not the Netherlands, and

    As of 1st January 1993, there are no longer export/import restrictions
    between member states of the EC. Therefore, the movement of PGP NL/UK,
    NL/IT, NL/GE, NL/FR (or any of the 16^2 combinations possible) is no 
    longer any concern of national member states. National regulations 
    regarding the use of PGP or other strong cryptology may still exist. 

I'd be surprised if the import and export of munitions aren't still restricted,
even though regular commercial goods can now be traded more freely.
Governments tend to treat such things specially :-)
Obviously, check your local laws to see whether crypto software is a munition.
--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
# Bill Stewart 1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
Bush's pardon of his co-conspirators shows that he is, in the end, still a wimp.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle)
Subject: Re: Complete ITAR Available
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 07:08:47 GMT

Re PGP: this is a patent issue, not a copyright issue.  Different legal basis.
Re ITAR: Well, have the rules changed, or not?  This is important.
From: rick@ee.uwm.edu (Rick Miller)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Another well-intentioned novice's question
Date: 4 Jan 1993 11:23:22 GMT
Organization: Just me.
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.2.33

rteasdal@polyslo.csc.calpoly.edu (Rusty) writes:
>
>	A few months ago, in the letters section of the 
>_Communications of the ACM_, there was published a letter which
>commented that, in the opinion of the author, cryptographic	
>efficiency would be greatly enhanced by compressing a message
>before encrypting it, the better to remove repetitive patterns
>from the plaintext.
>
>	I don't see, though, that standard (i.e. LZW) compression
>algorithms actually do remove any of the redundancy from the text;
>they merely encode and substitute for lengthy repetitive patterns
>with smaller ones. Mathematically, the whole of the message is
>still there, is it not?
>

I'm no "crypto wizard", but what I know of cryptology and compression will
probably suffice.  (Correct me if I'm wrong!)...

In general, compressing your data before encrypting it will do *two* things
to increase security.  First, it makes the resulting message SMALLER.
Second, it makes the cleartext more RANDOM.  Both of these modifications
will make your communications more difficult to "crack".

SMALLER:  Less ciphertext means less hard data for the cracker to work with.
	Much of cryptanalysis is *statistical*, and the accuracy of statistical
	data increases with the amount of data to be analyzed.  Less data means
	more *guessing* for the cryptanalyst.

RANDOM:  Patterns in the plaintext can sometimes "show through" some algorithms
	into the ciphertext...  The more random the plaintext, the less chance
	there is of this happening.

	NOTE...  It is *STRONGLY* advised that the compression method used
		*NOT* add a standardized 'header' to its compressed output
		(like PKZIP does), as this will make the cryptanalysts' job
		*much* easier.

Rick Miller   <rick@ee.uwm.edu> | <rick@discus.mil.wi.us>   Ricxjo Muelisto
Occupation:  Husband, Father, WEPCo. WAN Mgr., Discus Sys0p, and  Linux fan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen)
Subject: Re: Any way to *CREATE* Vcr+ (VCR PLUS) codes??? (please read)
Date: Mon, 04 Jan 1993 22:35:20 GMT
Reply-To: lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM Rochester
Keywords: VCR+ patent

In article <1iaa91INNhgr@agate.berkeley.edu>, shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) writes:
|> In article <C0CED1.60H@metaflow.com> rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp) writes:
|> >Is it really necessary to reverse-engineer the VCR+ algorithm?  I thought
|> >that VCR+ is patented.  If you can obtain the patent number, then the patent
|> >can be retrieved.  The patent _must_ disclose the method used.
|> 
|> The patent doesn't include enough information to decode the VCR+ code.
|> It explains how to make/decode _a_ VCR code, but not _the_ VCR+ code.  That
|> is, there are a bunch of specific details you need that aren't included.  (As
|> an analogy, the RSA patent won't help you decode a particular RSA-encoded
|> message.)
|> 
|> Ken Shirriff				shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU

Has anyone thought to call their local TV station or a local newspaper that
publishes VCR+ codes?

I would imagine the manufacturer doesn't care a fig if the algorithm is
published.  They would only care to license the production of the _hardware_
in actual VCRs.  It would be in their interest, I would think, to _give away_
the encoding algorithm to TV stations and any producer of TV listings, such
as a newspaper.  Perhaps later on, they will try & get revenue out of the
guides, but at first they surely gave it away and still may be doing so. . .

I could be wrong, but for those who care, a phone call or two ought to
do it if my guess is correct.

-- 
   Larry W. Loen        |  My Opinions are decidedly my own, so please
                        |  do not attribute them to my employer
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp)
Subject: Re: Any way to *CREATE* Vcr+ (VCR PLUS) codes??? (please read)
Keywords: VCR+ patent
Organization: Metaflow Technologies Inc.
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 18:36:36 GMT

In article <1992Dec31.031552.17197@netcom.com>, pdh@netcom.com (Phil Howard ) writes:
|> I would consider cracking VCR+ an interesting and challenging exercise.
|> I've noted some patterns in the codes in TV Guide and thought I would
|> give it a try sometime.  I've collected a few issues, including one week
|> from several areas so I can get a lot of channel diversity.  Some day I
|> may even get around to it.

Is it really necessary to reverse-engineer the VCR+ algorithm?  I thought
that VCR+ is patented.  If you can obtain the patent number, then the patent
can be retrieved.  The patent _must_ disclose the method used.

Of course, you can't legally _use_ the patented technology without licensing
it, but it's perfectly legal to understand the technology.  That's the whole
point of the patent system -- to make information public.  

I guess the question is whether the patent number is public information...
-- 

...Russ Schnapp
BIX: rschnapp           Email: netcom!metaflow!rschnapp or rschnapp@metaflow.com
Metaflow Technologies   Voice: 619/452-6608x230;  FAX: 619/452-0401
La Jolla, California    Unless otw specified, I`m speaking only for myself!
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
Subject: Re: WordPerfect and US cr
Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 01:29:00 +0000

 -=> Quoting David Sternlight to All <=-

 DS> ....The (US) government has behaved in such a way that at present
 DS> we know that such licenses will not be issued for certain specific
 DS> techniques, such as DES and RSA.

 Not so. Export from the US of crypto products containing DES and RSA 
 implementations is permitted to some countries, to approved end-users
 (not necessarily Governmental end-users).

.. Facts are stubborn little bastards, be careful with them.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.11

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date:  6 Jan 93 16:50:31 GMT

markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson) writes:

> The following just came in on rsaref-users mailing list.

> >RSAREF is now available via anonymous FTP to 'rsa.com'. Along with

Sorry, the information is not true. I just tried and the directory
/rsaref contains only the README file and a subdirectory called
'dist'. This directory is not readable for the anonymous user. I knew
what to look for, but got the message that the file is not a plain
file or something like that. Seems that it is still USA-only product.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6644 alt.security.pgp:485
From: mathew <mathew@mantis.co.uk>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 14:51:54 GMT
Organization: Mantis Consultants, Cambridge. UK.
X-Newsreader: rusnews v0.98

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>In article <1993Jan8.173701.8858@ncar.ucar.edu> prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Philip
> Zimmermann) writes:
>>In conclusion, I'd like to point out that normally, when an academic
>>paper is published that claims a cryptosystem is weak, it generally
>>includes some real data to back up its claims.  Such data is
>>conspicuously absent here.
> 
> This attitude is a hiding behind "academic" practice in an area where
> Sidelnikov has raised the most serious doubts about a number of
> aspects of PGP as presently implemented. For him to be both an
> Academician (the highest rank in Soviet Science, given to very few,
> and after massive and extended demonstrations of competence) and a
> Laboratory Manager means we ought to take his words with at least as
> much seriousness (but without the associated "special pleading" doubts
> some might have) as similar words from the head of the cryptanalysis
> division (or whatever it is called) of the NSA.

It looked to me like Philip has done so, and is therefore interested in
seeing some actual data provided by Sidelnikov.

> Let me be perfectly clear here. Sidelnikov's standing in the
> cryptology field in the Soviet scientific community is of the most
> senior level, and that's not a statement about science politics.

It is, however, painfully close to argumentum ad verecundiam.


mathew
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6604 alt.society.civil-liberty:7338
From: jkreznar@ininx.UUCP (John E. Kreznar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Summary: Being ``collegial'' is a two-way street.
Date: 10 Jan 93 09:09:16 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Independence Industries, Los Angeles

In article <1993Jan7.230612.12564@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

> Many years ago (in 1970-72) I worked for the U.S. Secretary of Commerce...

> Let's pursue this discussion in a collegial, not an adversarial way.

How can a victim of nationalism be collegial with one who so self-
righteously endorses his nation's arbitrary interference into the
peaceful activities of unaffiliated third parties, such as non-
nationals who would trade in encryption software?  I'm afraid that
your time inside the beltway has blinded you to the fact that your
``democratically elected Congress'' institutes a tyranny of the
majority which is inconsistent with personal freedom and civility
and even with the ostensible principles of your government.

See my letter in Communications of the ACM, 1992 April, for
amplification on these points.

 |  Voting in government elections, or petitioning government, or willfully  |
 |  accepting government ``benefits'' when it's feasibly avoidable (thereby  |
 |  generating demand for taxation), accelerate the supplanting of personal  |
 |  choice by collective dictate,  making these most serious crimes against  |
 |  humanity.  ---John E. Kreznar, jkreznar@ininx.com, uunet!ininx!jkreznar  |

-- 
        Relations among people to be by mutual consent, or not at all.
         ---John E. Kreznar, jkreznar@ininx.com, uunet!ininx!jkreznar
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: How fast is DES?
Date: 11 Jan 93 15:25:58 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Germano Caronni (caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch) wrote:
: In article <1494@eouk9.eoe.co.uk> ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes:
: >
: >The only thing I have seen which might be faster is Khufu.  Certainly
: >IDEA (as used in PGP) isn't any faster, and if you use enough rounds
: 
: Have you tried it ? (pgp -c is not a very fair test, as there are
: some tmpfiles which let me think that pgp tries compression&encryption:-) )

I tried IDEA when it was still called PES [*] (Proposed Encryption
Standard.)  This was long before PGP became available.  My
implementation was entirely in carefully optimized 386 assembler, as
was my DES implementation, so I think that the comparision is fair.

That IDEA should not be a great deal faster than DES isn't very
surprising.  IDEA has four modular multiplications in its inner loop,
(each one of which involves multiplication, test, and shift) and a few
additions and XORs.  DES requires four mask/lookup/XOR/shift
operations in its inner loop, but has 16 rounds, compared to IDEA's 8.
The speed advantage of IDEA depends on the speed ratio of 32 bit table
lookup/ XOR to 16 bit multiply.

Interestingly enough, if you were to use a machine (such as a DSP)
with a flash multiplier things would be very different.  I would
expect IDEA to be much faster than DES on such a machine, always
assuming that the other IDEA operations could be efficiently coded.

Andrew.

[*] In fact, PES is slightly different from IDEA, but runs at almost
identical speed.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Subject: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Organization: Wimsey Information Services
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 05:21:08 GMT

The following just came in on rsaref-users mailing list.

>Received: from RSA.COM by van-bc.wimsey.com with smtp
>	(Smail3.1.28.1 #12) id m0n9PzZ-0000KgC; Tue, 5 Jan 93 17:55 PST
>Received: by RSA.COM 
>	id AA18302; Tue, 5 Jan 93 17:15:58 PST
>Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 17:15:58 PST
>Message-Id: <9301060115.AA18302@RSA.COM>
>To: rsaref-users@RSA.COM
>From: burt@RSA.COM
>Subject: RSAREF now available via anonymous FTP
>Sender: rsaref-users-request@RSA.COM
>Status: ORS
>
>Dear RSAREF user --
>
>RSAREF is now available via anonymous FTP to 'rsa.com'. Along with
>RSAREF you can get RIPEM, Mark Riordan's RSAREF-based privacy-enhanced
>mail application, and an Emacs command interface to RIPEM. See the
>file 'README' in the FTP directory 'rsaref' for more information.
>
>-- Burt Kaliski
>RSA Laboratories
>
-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
From: mccurley@cs.sandia.gov (Kevin S. McCurley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: How fast is DES?
Date: 11 Jan 93 19:37:51 GMT
Article-I.D.: cs.1993Jan11.193751.12762
Organization: Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

In article <1993Jan11.005724.5271@psych.psy.uq.oz.au> eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au (Eric Young) writes:
>BTW a DEC Alpha 500 APX I played with does 830kbytes/s in cbc mode.
>From what I remember seeing in this newsgroup, DES hardware often does
>~20mbit/sec.  The top end Alpha, with assembler should be >= 8mbit/sec.
>
>Hardware giving only a 2.5 speedup?
>I get the feeling it should be possible to produce much faster DES
>chips.... :-)

At Crypto '92 there was a presentation from Hans Eberle of DEC Systems
Research Center about a GaAs gate array that would operate at 250 Mhz,
or 1 Gbit/sec.  It supports ECB and CBC modes.  As I remember it had a
nice cooling tower ...

Kevin McCurley
Sandia National Laboratories
From: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Privacy -- encrypt/decrypt devices on Wireless phones
Date: 5 Jan 1993 23:35:48 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)
Reply-To: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
NNTP-Posting-Host: hela.ins.cwru.edu


In a previous article, ericb@hplsla.hp.com (Eric Backus) says:

>> Patrick W. P. Dirks writes:
>> 
>> As other posters have pointed out, monitoring cordless phone links is *NOT*
>> illegal in the US.  I believe monitoring cellular phone calls is not
>> against the law, either, except that you cannot disclose the contents of
>> anything you monitor or use it for your own gain.  Congress recently passed
>> a bill that prohibits the sale of scanners that can receive (or be "easily
>> modified to receive") the 800 MHz cellular band.  That doesn't make
>> listening illegal, however, and doesn't remove existing scanners from the
>> market.
>
>You are correct that it is legal to monitor cordless phones in the US.
>You may not disclose what you hear or use it for gain, which is true
>of most things that you can legally monitor in the US.

	True.  But According to a previous posting, it was pointed out,
that monitoring an unscrambled cordless phone conversation and possibly using
that conversation against the party could be held up in Court.  But, monitoring
a scrambled and decoding the conversation is a Felony and not likely to be
addmitted in Court.  I thought, therein, lies the difference! Yes, privacy
is important, but more so, protection in case of... was another problem.
So, it is right, the wired line is best preferred in conversations of
outmost privacy, but now as I understand it, a Cordless phone with a scrambling
feature of one's voice provides some, small, but significant advantages over
non-scrambled voice communication. Is is worth the extra $20?  I think so.
-- 

Dan Frezza
Internet: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu
From: sspy@west.darkside.com (mshannon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: My book
Date: 9 Jan 93 09:55:08 GMT
Organization: The Dark Side of the Moon +1 408 245 SPAM

Someone asked about the book I am writing. Title is Digital Privacy, a 
self defense manual written for people who know how to turn a computer on 
if someone shows them where the power switch is. 
In addition to cryptography, it covers anti-theft products and measures 
one can use, van Eck transient radiation interception, and computer 
hacking. It will be printed in the next few weeks.
Someone suggested that I have "sold out to RSADS" because I have 
recommended MailSafe as the most user friendly program available for non 
programmers and engineers to use to secure their files. 
Not true. Like I said, this book is for the "average" user.
I have concluded that using RSA keys longer than 200 digits and triple 
encrypting the DES (360 bit keyspace?) are totally unnecessary for the 
average person and small business owner. I believe that MailSafe provides 
more than enough security.
Finally, thank you to all who have provided useful information. I am very 
grateful.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mkagalen@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu (michael kagalenko)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Organization: Northeastern University, Boston, MA. 02115, USA
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 01:40:41 GMT

I, as original poster, would like to explain, that the article in question 
was originally published in on of the Russian newsgroups by someone from
Riga, and not from MSU. I ask him permission & reposted the article.
I'll try to contact MSU itself.


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: hal@gateway.mitre.org (Hal Feinstein)
Subject: FAQ/good resource
Organization: Mitre Corporation, McLean, VA
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 21:09:57 GMT


A good introductory book on cryptograhy is NIST special publication 800-2
called Public-Key Cryptograhy" by James Nechvatal  April 1991

Contents:
Cryptosystems and crypanalysis
Key Management
Digital Signatures and Has Functions
Examples of public key systems and hash functions
Implementations of public key cryptography
Sample proposal for a Lan Implementation 

Appendix
Mathematical and Computational Aspects
Algorithmw and architectures
The classicla theory of computation
theory of probablistic computing
breaking knapsacks
Birthday attacks
Modular arithmetic and Galois Fields
Euclid's Algorithm
Chinese Remainder theorem
Primative Roots and discrete logs
Primality tests
Mathematics of RSA
Quadratic residuosity modulo a compositite
introduction to zero knowledge proofs
alternatives to diffie/hellman model


The text is 162 pages long and is not an in-depth examination of these
topics but a good introduction. Just right for the frequenctly asked
beginner questions.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner