From: buckley@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (BUCKLEY  CHARLES RAY)
Subject: Re: Convoys (was Re: Bush's position on Bosnia)
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 07:50:56 GMT

In article <Bt3vDA.IoH@rice.edu> billb@owlnet.rice.edu (William Stenson Blackwell) writes:
>In article <1992Aug16.110826.10293@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>, buckley@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (BUCKLEY  CHARLES RAY) writes:
>
>|> I am aware of Afghanistan. Overall the support for convoy was failry low.
>|> What I am advocating is a much larger support structure per convoy. Is
>|> much harder to attack a convoy protected by a battalion or division than one
>|> protected by a company. I prefer A-10's for ground support as the record of
>|> shoulder SAM's was not good against them in Kuwait. Also spotters could be placed on the ridge lines on both sides of the road. B-52's could also be utilized
>|> in an Arclight scenario.
>|> 
>I don't know, basically what you're arguing for is useful in a situation
>that's socio-politically more fo a hybrid of WWII and 'Nam.  It's a partisan
>war in one neighborhood, but it's also (adopting your plan) a set-piece
>conflict.  I think with the convoys, you'd be more into the partisan
>conflict realm.  Correct me when I err, but wouldn't a B-52 have too
>long of a turn around time to make it much more than a sanitizer preceding
>a convoy?  Again, I think this would tip-off the enemy.  It sure did in 'Nam.
>(Both ours and the French)  The 'Cong were the ones who found that mortar
>trick in defeating U.S. emplacements (the Afghans just re-worked it to use
>against convoys).  If you're into the stuff, read Frederick Pohl's Mercernary
>(I think it's called Falkenberg's Legion now -- I could have the author wrong).
>
The way I pictures the B-52 working was that after a unit was engaged a B-52
on sentry over the Med. would come over the enemy unit and drop a load of HE.
The idea I have is a deployment in depth along both sides of the Road to the
depth of several miles. A group infiltrating from the outside would have to
go through numerous levels of depth (ala Korea). Other units would operate
with the convoy with a number of units posted in each village along the way.
Other units would be posted every few miles along the road. Response times
to an attack would be very short and the attacking units would have very little
time to severely damage the convoy. I am talking about a deployment and 
intervention on the order of a division for every ten miles of road. This would
equate to about 10-12 divisions. The force would be composed of the US's light
infantry divisions (7th, 10th, 25th) among others. Special forces like you
envision would be tasked to operate outside the valley. France would sure as
hell better send more than their 1,100 man offer. (I have read every on of
the Falkenberg series as well as all of Pournelle's other books - including
his collaborations). The idea behind what I plan is that it will make it
much more difficult to strike at the convoy. The downside is that there will
be a lot more potshots taken at the troops defending the convoys.

>|> I am talking *very* large scale involvement. The concept of half-way involvement
>|> usually equates to more dead in the long run. I agree that it is not desired.
>|> I personnally do not want us to get dragged into this quagmire. I also do not
>|> want to see men killed because they lacked adequate resources to do the job
>|> right. I am not so sure about airstrikes in this theater. I would use them
>|> to impede movement of the enemy during an engagement, but I think the only
>|> effective way to make sure of the result is by sending in infantry.
>
>This is where I basically have a problem with this.  I still believe that this 
>is a partisan conflict (i.e. for those scratching their heads: Partisan
>Warfare is a term used in former-Soviet strategic doctrine to describe the
>9-5 guerrilla.  A person works, then gets off for a few ( ;-) ) hours of
>warfare before going to bed.  Essentially, it is one where the entire populace
>is suspect of being the enemy.  I know, generally they are full-time 
>guerrillas, but I used an acceptable analogy...).  I think our special warfare
>troops would be ideal in this (as per another post), but regular infantry
>just isn't cut out for it.  They lack the training, psychological screening,
>and general will to do such work.  I think Viet Nam proved this.  
>
Viet Nam is an iffy allusion here. The US spread itself very thin within
the country side itself. I remember a statistc were some guy claimed that
there were at most 50,000 combat troops operating in the field at any given
time. The rest were general support. This gave a lot of room for the VC to
manuever. If you exemine the current state of training, you will find that
low intensity warfare is one of the more common types of training now
being used for the units I mentioned. A pass system and a registration of
everyone who lives in the region are quite possible. With the availibility
of laptop computers and modems, a checkpoint could quickly evaluate a
persons pass. A date would be given for the surrender of all arms in the
towns locted along the road. An attack would result in a house to house
search any firearm found would be confiscated and the residents arrested
(not effective except as a deterent for some people -  any moron would
store the gun elsewhere). A general martial law would be installed.
Since this is the UN, some form of liberty must be maintained so, Residents
wishing to travel after hours could call for UN approval. A pass would be 
delivered to the resident. The pass would be in the form of a credit card
type material with a magnetic strip encoding the information about the pass.
Anyone caught without a pass or with a counrtfeit pass would be arrested.

>On another front, it seems that Bush has his sights set more on SH, so 2 large
>scale foreign commitments aren't going to happen.  On a related note, is any-
>one else as disgusted as I that not only are we the world's policeman (I don't
>really mind this to an extent that we can afford it.), but that we solicit
>payment for it?  The biggest "Gulf War Firsts" was that ti was the first time
>in our nation's history where we prostituted ourselves to others.  I find it
>reprehensible that we've become a nation of mercernaries.  Perhaps that's
>the reason the Japanese keep us around, we're so good at fighting everyone.
>
I don't like us being the world's policeman but I sure as hell want someone
else to foot the bill. We're going to pay our price in blood.

>-- 

Charles Buckley


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