From: coe@bartok.att.com (Chris Eastlund (Supv - Tom Houghton))
Subject: Re: Bush's Accomplishments
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Liberty Corners, NJ
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 22:32:47 GMT
	<nate.555@psygate.psych.indiana.edu>
	<1992Sep14.182441.15949@den.mmc.com> <z1ynkyb.howard@netcom.com>
	<1992Sep14.232111.9187@rchland.ibm.com>

In article <1992Sep14.232111.9187@rchland.ibm.com> jdahl@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Jared Dahl) writes:

>	  " ... the obscenely high number of 
>	  friendly fire deaths that occured in our ranks.  Our military is the
>	  most skilled and well-equipped in the world, and the leaders can't 
>	  even find a way to keep them from bombing each other?"

Let me first apologize to Jared for addressing only one item in his
posting.  I do not intend to address his main thrust against President
Bush, only the use of the friendly-fire statistic to buttress his arguments.

---------------

Not all numbers that can be calculated have any meaning.  
In particular, the number
"allied-casualties-by-friendly-fire/total-allied-casualties"
is not only meaningless but pernicious.  

NOTICE: Before you flame on, please note that the following does not attempt
to defend nor to decry the use of force in the Gulf.  It attempts to correct
a illogical-incorrect statement in order that the continuing public debate
have a basis in reality and logic.  Appeals to emotion have a proper place
in public debate.  Appeals based on falsehood or false logic do not.

Definitions used sporadically in the following text:
	TC - Total Casualty count
	FFC - Friendly fire Casualty count
	QC - Iraqi fire Casualty count

CLAIM: The casualty number that is of primary importance is the total casualty
counts (TC).  If TC is reduced, then the other numbers can be ignored when
declaring an overall success.

It is harder to notify the parents that their child has died due to
friendly-fire than to enemy-fire.  However, I would rather tell one
family that a child has died from friendly-fire, than tell two families
that two children have died from Iraqi-fire.

In either FFC or QC cases, the soldier has died for the same cause.  It is
wrong to declare either death as unnecessary, as the only way to eliminate
FFC is to not shoot a gun or drop a bomb; perfection not being available in
this life. 

If the FFC were "out-of-statistical-control" in Deming-speak, if it were
to be much higher that previous experience would suggest, then you might have
a case for labeling these as "unnecessary" deaths.  Later I make a case
that this number is lower that previous experience would suggest.

The armed forces do attempt to reduce the TC absolutely by reducing FFC and QC
individually, and will also make the hard choice to trade 1 friendly-fire
death for 2 or more Iraqi-fire deaths in order to reduc the TC.

CLAIM: The FFC/TC figure is meaningless as a measure of overall success.

Proof by contradiction: Assume that FFC/TC means something about overall
	success.

Lets look at what FFC/TC might mean in various situations.

Suppose the final counts for Desert Storm were TC=1, FFC=1, QC=0.  In this
case the FFC/TC rate is 100%.  A really obscene value according to the
previous poster.

Now suppose the final counts for Desert Storm were TC=1, FFC=0, QC=1. 
In this case the FFC/TC rate is 0%.  (With heavy sarcasm) This is perfection
and the previous situation wasn't?

So, for a total casualty figure of 1, which would/should be considered
nearer to perfection than most of us ever get in our own jobs, the FFC/TC
ratio gives values at either ends of the scale for the same TC.  Thus it
says nothing about the overall success. 

CLAIM: The FFC/TC value says something about the friendly-fire efficiency.

The problem here is that you are comparing apples to oranges.  While both
values count casualties, the relation is meaningless.  This number is not
something that is necessarily to be minimized, as shown in the previous
paragraph.

This number is a confused calculation.  It is clear to see why if you
look at the FFC/QC calculation, which is to all intents and purposes
the same as FFC/TC.  (As long as FFC is much less than QC, there is no
difference in the meaning of the values FFC/QC and FFC/TC.)

The FFC counts casualties related to our actions.  
The QC counts counts related to the Iraqi actions. 
The FFC counts unintentional casualties.
The QC counts intentional casualties.

How many times I shoot myself in the foot, is not immediately related
to how many times the other person shoots me.  It depends on his skill,
how many shooters are on the other side, and other factors totally
unrelated to my shooting myself in the foot.  I don't even need 
to have an other person shooting at me, I can shoot myself in the foot
during training.

If I am worried about the number of times I shoot myself in the foot,
I want to find numbers that will provide some consistent view of my
skill in not shooting my foot in all situations.  The FFC/TC or FFC/QC
value varies too much depending on the situation to be of use.

Now, let me suggest better numbers to use to discuss the FFC issue.

Lets assume a few things:
  casualties are related to the number of times guns are fired and bombs
     are dropped.  The more munitions expended, the more casualties.

  Deaths due to friendly fire are related to the number of bombs we drop
    and guns we fire.

  Deaths due to enemy fire are related to the number of bombs they drop
    and guns they fire.

  Bullets aimed at the enemy are much more likely to hit the enemy than friends

  If you want to get technical, lets call these monotonic relationships.

Assuming rough parity in skill between the armies, or as close as the of the
US and Soviet armies (for which conflict the US Army strategy and tactics
were designed) we find that if doubling the number of times we fire halves
the number of times they fire, a rate of Iraqi-dead/Our-dead due to our
fire of only 4/1 will reduce our total casualty count. 

For example, assume parity.  They kill 200 of ours, we kill 200 of theirs.
Both sides have 50 friendly-fire casualties.  The totals are 250 lost on
each side.  We double our firing, which halves theirs firing.  We lose
100 to friendly fire, but now only 100 to Iraqi fire; they lose 400 to us,
25 to friendly fire.  The totals are 200 lost for us, 425 for them.
Since the Iraqi-dead/Our-dead ratio due to our guns/bombs is much higher
than 4/1, the advantage to the use of over-whelming firepower is that
much greater.  

The ratios that are meaningful are:
A:	FFC/munitions-expended: How good are we at handling dangerous stuff. 
	This is an excellent number since it can be tracked during live-fire
	exercise and compared to actual combat.  This can find problems
	in training as well as in basic procedures.

B:	Iraqi-dead-by-our-guns/munitions-expended: The use of smart-weapons
	makes it obvious that our military is already quite concerned with
	this number.  Note that increasing this value will reduce the
	total munitions expended in any given battle, thus reducing the
	total FFC.

C:	Friendly-dead-at-our-hands/all-dead-at-our-hands:  If you must
	measure life-to-life, this is the number to use.  It is not
	a good "quality" measure as there is no direct way to reduce this.
	It can be reduced by improving either the A: or B: measures,
	which are easier to convert to into action.  It is not a good
	measure as it does not say whether or not the total friendly-dead-
	at-our-hands has changed, only the ratio.  Also you may wish to
	win the war with a low total death on both sides.  This ratio
	is insensitive to totals.

CLAIM: The FFC shows success.

We had something like 400,000 involved in this battle, and the other
side a number in the same order of magnitude.  I can't remember any
of the numbers for bombs
dropped, rockets launched, or guns fired, but they were large in
comparison to previous battles.   And I didn't hear of any high-level
carpet-bombing that hit our troops like at Monte Casino, or artillery
barrages called for at point blank range as happened in Viet Nam as well
as earlier wars.  I believe that a FFC/tons-of-munitions ratio would
be lower than in earlier wars.  Does anyone out there have real numbers
for this?

I don't have friendly-fire numbers from earlier wars, but using numbers of
250K Iraqi casualties, 100 allied FFC, you get a 1/2500 ratio for Desert
Storm.  If you were to match this ration in Vietnam, assuming a
1M Vietnamese loss, this would match to 400 FFC in Vietnam.  I don't have
the FFC figure for Vietnam but believe that it is far higher than 400.

CLAIM: The TC shows success.

That so few died (on our side) in such a large armored land battle is
a success beyond the dreams of previous generals.  Even such triumphs as
Agincourt had more dead even with smaller armies.  There are all sorts of
ways to quibble about how much of a military success was Desert Storm:
the enemy was incompetent,  the political goal was misguided, 
the ending was botched.  However, this was one of the war scenarios
the US military practiced, and they got it right.  (Flame note:
Again, I didn't say they should or should not have been sent;
only that by the numbers discussed here, they did a good job.)

Summary:

The use of TC/FFC turns two successes into a failure.  While this figure was
grabbed by one party for political discussion, I am not upset or worried
that such shenanigans happen.

What really bothers me is that technically trained people use such statistics
without thought, that liberals repeat this number this without embarrassment,
that conservatives have not discovered and discussed the
irrelevancy/illegitimacy of the number. 

The use of this FFC/TC ratio is "pernicious" because it degrades the public
discourse, by implying things to be obviously true that are not proven, by
implying meaning where there is none.
Rather than a brick to build on, it is stone for throwing through windows.

I suggest the book "Innumeracy" by John Paulos for a better discussion of the
problems of widespread mathematical ignorance.  
 
Chris Eastlund
--
Chris O Eastlund
bartok!coe or coe@bartok.att.com
LC 4N-E03 (908)580-4385