HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Reply-To: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Organization: Digital Equipment Corp. - Telstar
Distribution: usa
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 18:43:36 GMT

In article <By0v26.7BE@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>I'm going to take Peter seriously for a couple more rounds.  I would
>appreciate comments from the crowd as to whether or not my efforts
>are futile.
>

[stuff deleted]

>>
>>  In other words you are not prepared to define "reason".
>
>Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
>provided by man's senses.
>
>That is a definition.  I'm not sure what your complaint is.
>

I'm not sure it's a definition. It sounds like you're taking an
unnamed black box, giving a name to it, and calling it a definition.

>So if we want to talk about theoretical politics, or ethics, then
>the definition of human as 'the animal with such-and-such a genome'
>is not likely to be very helpful.  In that context, it is more
>helpful to note that humans are able to think.  

It apparently isn't more helpful to Peter.

>Because it is that
>fact which is most fundamental in explaining how humans differ
>from other things, and which is most fundamental in explaining
>the activities that humans can do.
>

I think Peter is rejecting the notion that it's 'fundamental'.

>>  You can't note ANYTHING about "rationality" because you haven't
>>  defined it!   As I've pointed out in posting after posting.
>>  Tell us where to buy a rationo-meter.
>
>See above for the definition.  Luckily for you, you don't need to
>buy a rationo-meter.  You are equipped with one.  One does not need
>any special equipment to note that humans have a conceptual consciousness.
>Do this: read this letter and think about where it came from.  Does
>it indicate familiarity with your previous writings?  Does it appear
>to include arguments which were processed in a form distinctly different
>from that which other species can do?
>

What it 'appears to do' may not be very important.

>Given your criterion for 'testability' (which I hesitate to grant,
>since it is itself so poorly and vaguely described!), 

I don't think it's all that vague. Peter says "e=mc2", someone else says
"no it's not". An experiment is conducted: matter is converted to energy.
A known quantity of matter is converted to a measured quantity of
electromagnetic energy. The relationship between the two will show
who's right.

>
>--Jimbo
>
>

Don Pajerek

Standard disclaimers apply.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 16:11:12 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <By2I3L.Lx4@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>In article <By13o0.M0y@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>In article <By05Mt.AsF@undergrad.math.waterloo.edu> svanegmo@cantor.math.uwaterloo.ca (Stephen Van Egmond) writes:
>>>Ayn Rand's view of rationality is evidently diametrically opposed to
>>>emotionally-based approaches to philosophy.
>
>>>However, in this context I think that "rational" refers to the method
>>>one uses to derive one's morality.  One begins with a set of axioms that define
>>>basic realities about life (a person's right to their own existence, etc.),
>
>>  From there there **IS** no "etc" since if that's what you assume
>>  then the conclusion that removing your life or your means to 
>>  sustain it is a violation of your rights is trivial!   "A person's
>>  right to their own existence" as an axiom would be a bit like 
>>  taking "e=mc^2" as an axiom.
>
>
>>>This is hardly a formal definition, it's a working one. Accepted?
>
>>  Of course not.  It's a set of axioms that assumes it's conclusions.
>
>You should BOTH go and rad what Rand had to say rather than discuss this
>in ignorance.  She did not claim that her ethics were axiomatic (far from
>it).  Peter is right that rights are far from axiomatic, but Rand never
>said any such thing.

 I didn't say she did;  I was criticizing the poster, Van Egmond.


---peter

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: sconley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Stephen M Conley)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 13:24:48 GMT

In article <Bxy4A4.DLJ@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Y
oder) writes:

>
>1. One should act according to one's self-interest.
>2. Nutrition is necessary for the maintenance of your life.
>3. Human blood is a nutritious substance.
>4. Therefore:  You should [d]rink the blood of the next person you meet.

Hey, yeah!  I really liked those Anne Rice books, so why not?  SLURRRP!

>What is the error here?  It is the same error as underlies your implication
>that initiating force against drug companies is morally acceptable.

Oh, there's an error there?  Ooops.  ;-)

Steve
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 14:34:46 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov20.093014.28745@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>In article <Bxx5nq.8AI@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}  I don't see that ethical systems have any such track record --
>}  that is I don't see any evidence that an ethical system can 
>}  predict in advance the outcome of some choice -- at least not
>}  in a way which distinguishes it from competing ethical systems.
>
>See the recently published book "Who Prospers?" by Lawrence Harrison.  In it
>he goes into explaining the economic success of societies because of their
>cultural values.  Specifically, he details how cultures which share values
>that I'd argue are Objectivist prosper over others.

  There ARE no Objectivist societies.


>}  Except that in the case of weather I presume that the precision with
>}  with our models match reality continues to improve, i.e., our ability
>}  to predict the weather 24 hours from now is probably better now than
>}  it was in 1967, and that was probably better than in 1942.   I don't
>}  see any evidence of this in ethical philosophy  -- i.e., people
>}  seem to be debating the same issues they were 2500 years ago.
>
>I used to think this, too, until a friend of mine who's a physicist informed
>me that this Newtonianism had been superceded by chaos theory.  No, Peter,
>we'll never be able to predict the weather. 

  "Never be able to predict the weather?  Are you saying that the preditions
  of the National Weather Service for tomorrow bear no more than a random chance
  relationship to the actual weather tomorrow?    


> Once again, you don't know what you're talking about.

  No, you just can't read.  What I said is that our ability to predict the
  weather 24 hours from now is better now than it was in 1967, and that
  was better than in 1942.   And this is verifiably true.

  All chaos theory says on the subject is that tiny perturbations
  percolate up and don't disappear in the noise.   The result is that 
  long term forecasting is much more difficult than anyone imagined
  a few decades ago.              


---peter




Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,soc.history,alt.activism,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject: Re: [ACLU] Guardian of Liberty: American Civil Liberties Union
Organization: Syracuse University, CIS Dept.
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 14:25:30 EST

In article <1992Nov18.180705.7050@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:

>>>Actually, I would: My opinion of the "advice and consent" is that
>>>the Senate should accept anyone technically qualified and able to
>>>do the job (e.g. exactly what it means when in the case of appointed
>>>executive officials like the Secretary of Interior. In these cases,
>>>the Senate doesn't subject appointees to political litmus tests.)
>
>>You don't seem to be giving any force to the word "advice".
>  
>"Advice" by it's very nature, is non-binding. I don't think "advice"
>implies "a veto in cases of disagreement."

Perhaps not, but "consent" certainly does.  The "advice" part suggests
that the President should consult with Congress *before* nominating
someone.  The "consent" parts means that the Senate *does* have the
right to "veto in cases of disagreement."


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 13:00:31 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <BxvtEt.ICG@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:

>can.  The Rand quote that was posted here was from an essay on ethics,
>in which Rand was making precisely this point: unlike other animals,
>humans can choose a code of values.

 So what?   Physics is true regardless of whether we can philosophize
 about it.  If I push an Indian mystic who thinks he can levitate off
 a cliff he will accelerate according to laws or falling bodies and
 aerodynamics regardless of whether he believes in these things.
 If there is an absolute ethics then it would exist regardless of
 whether we can "conceptualize" it or philosophize about it.


>Suffice to say: Nelson seems to think that Rand would reject the
>scientific method of theory formulation and test and so on.  This
>is patently false.

  If it's "patently" false, as opposed to merely false, you ought
  to be able to show us a concrete instance of a "objectivist
  experiment".   



>Rand's theory of concepts contains, inter alia, an implicit philosophy
>of science.  This philosophy of science in no way contradicts the
>fundamentals of how science is actually done.  Indeed, by avoiding
>rationalistic and empiricist fallacies, Rand's theory explains how
>science is valid, and how we can have contextual certainty.

  How does Rand feel about the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle?

  

>I'll not post anything further about this for a little while, until
>Peter and I have some private e-mail conversations about this.

  
  As I pointed out by email.  "Rationality" may be a "concept" which
  Rand applies to human beings, but so is "charge" or "mass" that
  physicists apply to an electron or proton.   But this does not
  prevent "charge" or "mass" from being defined clearly enough to 
  detect or measure.                                


---peter





Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:31:38 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov18.194243.14650@kadsma.kodak.com> pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek) writes:
>In article <1992Nov18.172026.8001@ncar.ucar.edu> gary@colossus.cgd.ucar.edu (Gary Strand) writes:

>Peter is apparently is insisting that all problems lie within the domain
>of science.

  Good God, Don, whatever gave you *this* idea?!  

  I am saying that the scientific method and its fellow travelers 
  logical empiricism and logical positivism, have the only proven track
  records at getting at any sorts of universal truths.   It in no way
  follows from this that there ARE universal truths for everything.
  
  To have a universal truth about, say, whether the Mona Lisa is "good"
  art you would need to start with a definition of "good" art.  But any
  such definition would most likely be a matter of opinion, and no one 
  is bound to accept someone else's definition.   Definition questions 
  cannot be answered by science because definitions are social convention.

  Science can describe with ever greater precision the stages of human
  ontogeny.  No doubt at some point it will be able to precisely account
  for every minute biochemical process that occurs from zygote, on.  
  But this would still leave the ontological issue unresolved because
  it is up to society to agree on the definition of "human".
        

---peter



Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,soc.history,alt.activism,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 09:30:14 GMT

In article <Bxx5nq.8AI@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}  I don't see that ethical systems have any such track record --
}  that is I don't see any evidence that an ethical system can 
}  predict in advance the outcome of some choice -- at least not
}  in a way which distinguishes it from competing ethical systems.

See the recently published book "Who Prospers?" by Lawrence Harrison.  In it
he goes into explaining the economic success of societies because of their
cultural values.  Specifically, he details how cultures which share values
that I'd argue are Objectivist prosper over others.

}  Except that in the case of weather I presume that the precision with
}  with our models match reality continues to improve, i.e., our ability
}  to predict the weather 24 hours from now is probably better now than
}  it was in 1967, and that was probably better than in 1942.   I don't
}  see any evidence of this in ethical philosophy  -- i.e., people
}  seem to be debating the same issues they were 2500 years ago.

I used to think this, too, until a friend of mine who's a physicist informed
me that this Newtonianism had been superceded by chaos theory.  No, Peter,
we'll never be able to predict the weather.  Once again, you don't know what
you're talking about.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Peter Nelson's Ignorance of the History of Ideas
Summary: Yet Again!
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 06:17:43 GMT

One of the claims Peter Nelson seems fond of reiterating is that he's ignorant
of there being any track record of any ethical system measurably outperforming
any other.  We may safely assume this to be true if we construe it literally,
and not as the rhetorical denial that it's possible for any ethical system to
do this.  He really is ignorant of the fact that much has been done to show
how ethical systems outperform each other.

It's interesting to put this into the context of the history of ideas.  One
of his other claims is that he's a positivist.  Positivism stems from Saint-
Simon and his student, Auguste Comte, who lived in the early part of the
19th century.  This in itself refutes one of his claims, that positivism is
the methodology of science from the Enlightenment forward.  Saint-Simon
and Comte didn't even have much of a grasp of science.

The early positivists were socialists.  Thus, they wanted to defeat the
arguments against socialism that were made by economists.  They didn't
bother learning economics to do this; instead, they invented another whole
field of study with which to argue against the economic indictments of
their impossible dream: sociology.

This is not to say that all sociologists were socialists, or anything else.
The relevance of this to Peter Nelson's abject ignorance is that it's one
of the intellectual giants of sociology, Max Weber, who did seminal research
on the comparative Protestant and Catholic ethics about a century ago.  He
found, among other things, that Protestants tended to be wealthier than
Catholics under similar conditions.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 15:30:32 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

>Jeremy Caplan wrote:
>| > Peter, the differences between humans and animals is that humans MUST use
>| > their mind to survive.

  ALL animals that have minds must use them to survive.  How long
  do you think a monkey or a dog would last if you were able to
  take away it's mind?   Animals may not post to Usenet (another
  indication that they're not as stupid as we think they are) but
  learning, concept formation, etc, are vital to the survival
  of many species.

  Anyway, so what?  Why is the difference between humans and animals
  even relevant.  You need oxygen to survivem and unlike "rationality"
  oxygen is well defined and its role in survival is beyond dispute.
  Prove that taking away a human's oxygen has any transcendent ethical
  significance.


---peter

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:12:26 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <Bxq72L.HLE@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:

>Let's stick, for now, to epistemology.  I was under the impression
>that you LIKED her ethical arguments and simply disagreed with her
>epistemology.  

  I don't know where you got that idea -- I think her ethical
  arguments (or any arguments that presume an absolute ethics) 
  are unsupportable.


>Could you expand on what you mean when you say that her central terms
>(in epistemology) are 'not defined either operationally or in terms
>of anything which can be measured mechanically'?

  What could be clearer?  She uses terms (e.g., "reason") that I 
  cannot test for.  I have no way of knowing to what extent it
  exists or plays a role in any action or choice any particular
  human makes, or whether one human has it or uses it more than
  another.   In other words she uses terms like these without
  defining them adequately for rigorous discussion.   

  Saying "humans are rational" is like saying "music is pretty".
  I may perceive some music to be pretty, but it isn't necessarily
  the same music as you perceive to be pretty, nor can I measure
  it to say "this music is prettier than that music" or identify
  what the features of the music are that make it pretty.


---peter


Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: Quake Public Access
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 13:14:05 GMT

In article <By13o0.M0y@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>In article <By05Mt.AsF@undergrad.math.waterloo.edu> svanegmo@cantor.math.uwaterloo.ca (Stephen Van Egmond) writes:
>>Ayn Rand's view of rationality is evidently diametrically opposed to
>>emotionally-based approaches to philosophy.

>>However, in this context I think that "rational" refers to the method
>>one uses to derive one's morality.  One begins with a set of axioms that define
>>basic realities about life (a person's right to their own existence, etc.),

>  From there there **IS** no "etc" since if that's what you assume
>  then the conclusion that removing your life or your means to 
>  sustain it is a violation of your rights is trivial!   "A person's
>  right to their own existence" as an axiom would be a bit like 
>  taking "e=mc^2" as an axiom.


>>This is hardly a formal definition, it's a working one. Accepted?

>  Of course not.  It's a set of axioms that assumes it's conclusions.

You should BOTH go and rad what Rand had to say rather than discuss this
in ignorance.  She did not claim that her ethics were axiomatic (far from
it).  Peter is right that rights are far from axiomatic, but Rand never
said any such thing.


--Brian 
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,soc.history,alt.activism,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis)
Subject: Re: Nelson and Me
Organization: Precipitating Pendulums Postal Party Poopers
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 92 18:06:12 GMT

In article <1992Nov22.030215.1429@netcom.com> steveth@netcom.com (Steve Thomas) writes:

   [ .. a bunch of stuff in praise of Jimbo and Tim Starr ... ]

>You've done an excellent job of explaining, and I think the 'audience'--if
>there is one, might have understood.  It's important to note that it is 
>very important they _you_ understand, and that arguing here on Usenet is
>a form of intellectual mind sharpening...

I didn't see the smiley, but this *is* a joke, right ?

-- paul

-- 
hybrid rather than pure; compromising rather than clean; distorted
rather than straightforward; ambiguous rather than articulated;
both-and rather than either-or; the difficult unity of inclusion
rather than the easy unity of exclusion.
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:4945 talk.philosophy.misc:2498 rec.arts.books:20214
From: oliver@dougfir.CS.Berkeley.EDU (Oliver Sharp)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 17 Nov 1992 00:29:34 GMT
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
NNTP-Posting-Host: dougfir.cs.berkeley.edu

In article <forb0004.66.721719521@student.tc.umn.edu> forb0004@student.tc.umn.edu (Eric Forbis) writes:
> Most Marxists are feminists,

Ah, but is this in fact true?  It depends, of course, on what you mean by
"feminist".  Marxism (in its purest form) insists that inequalities in
treatment of workers is caused by an absence of true communism ... i.e. it
has a purely economic basis.  This caused a great deal of trouble to the
Soviets, who paid lip service to Marx, because there were clear gender
based inequities in Soviet society.  These were caused by a variety of
factors, the most important of which was cultural expectations.  In a
society without access to childcare facilities, labor-saving devices,
or good medical service, there is of necessity a large amount of time
devoted to domestic duties.  Make the assumption paramount that these
duties devolve entirely on women, include the fact that women were
strongly encouraged to marry and bear (many) children, and top it off with
poor access to contraception, and you have inevitable inequalities that 
economic restructuring will not fix.

It is certainly true that Marxism seeks to gainfully employ all workers,
including women, and in this sense it could be termed "feminist".  However,
if by "feminism" you mean (as I do) having the goal of raising the lot of 
women, by addressing the aspects of society that hold them down or 
discriminate against them, then I quarrel with your characterization.
A purely Marxist analysis is incapable of accounting for many of the
characteristics of a complex society.  Of course, you might respond that
modern "Marxists" are not so simplisitic.  Based on the people I've met
who call themselves Marxist, I'm not convinced ...

- Oliver

Newsgroups: talk.religion.misc