From: 15942@brahms.udel.edu (Stephen Barr)
Subject: Barr and Barry: discussion back 'on track'? (sorry)
Organization: University of Delaware
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 18:24:42 GMT

      Martin has a point about the context in which
Newman discussed these issues in his Letter to the Duke
of Norfolk. Nevertheless, I think I am being true to Newman 
and Vatican II. 
      Both Newman in that Letter and the Vatican in certain
statements made since Vatican II, emphasize that conscience 
is not a teacher of doctrine. Conscience does not deal in
general or abstract propositions, but rather is a faculty
that in concrete circumstances adjudges a particular act
to be evil and therefore shunned or good and therefore to
BE done. It may apply general principles, but not a source of 
them. Newman explicitly says this a page or two before the
passage I quoted. The Vatican said the same in April (the 26th ?)
of 1968 in a document pertaining to the celebrated Washington case.
      Newman therefore does not seem to envision *at all* as 
a theoretical possibility *conscience* instructing one that a
*doctrine* is wrong. He says that infallibility and conscience cannot
collide, as conscience deals with concrete judgements, and              
infallibility with general propositions. Of course, he is not
completely logical here: infallibility could teach a general
proposition which could imply in a specific case something
that does conflict with conscience. He may be a little illogical,
but he is certainly clear that he does not regard conscience
as operating on the level of *doctrine*. 
      Moreover, Vatican II does not say much about a right
to dissent. I still maintain that submission is what is meant
by obsequium. In various places in Canon Law which are almost
quotations from Lumen Gentium, and Lumen Gentium itself,
the words submission, obedience, etc are used (at least in the
English translations I have seen). Vatican II certainly *is*
talking about doctrine here. 
      I have not seen in Vatican II documents or Newman a
basis for the idea that one may act contrary to authoritative
moral teaching of the bishops/pope except where conscience 
compels it. The conscience exception is implicit (at least)
in both Newman and Vatican II. Any indication of another
kind of exception which would justify disobedience to
authentic and authoritative moral teaching I have not seen.
      I think there is a basis for not assenting to the
doctrine of Humanae Vitae. I see that in certain hard cases,
which are probably not common, a real clash between conscience
and Humanae Vitae's teaching is possible. (For example, if
one is in danger of dying from another pregnancy and one is
not in a position to refuse one's husbands advances. Other
examples I can also imagine.) I also understand that few
Catholics understand how weighty are the arguments for
submitting to Humanae Vitae, how can they given what they have
been taught. What I do not see is that in the vast majority
of cases there is a justification for disregarding Humanae Vitae
and using contraceptives. I reject the view that because the
arguments in Humanae Vitae seem unconvincing to one, one is
free to use contraceptives. I believe that is simply wrong.
         Steve.
:wq
vi NEWmancon


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