From: Zhahai.Stewart@f93.n104.z1.fidonet.org (Zhahai Stewart)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 92 16:43:22 PDT
Organization: FidoNet node 1:104/93 - Adelante, Boulder CO

 RB> The dept of justice proposed wiretap backdoor would require that the
 RB> government be able to monitor telecommunications from a remote location.

 RB> Does anyone know if the proposal would require that they be able to 
 RB> selectively tap into any lines they want (policing themselves doing sop
 RB> only under court order), or if the telephone companies would be allowed
 RB> to enable the remote tap only for specific numbers once presented with
 RB> a court order?  Also, if tapping is done from the remote location, is
 RB> the local telephone company permitted to retain an audit trail of the 
 RB> tap (not the contents; just what number the government remote monitoring
 RB> facility tapped and when)?  Such an audit trail would help provide a 
 RB> disincentive to "extra" goveernment taps, especially if the phone
 RB> company would be required to provide this audit trail to you unless
 RB> the government could produce a copy of the court order within 48 hours of
 RB> your requesting the tap audit trail on your phone.

 Excellent questions.  The first attempt by the FBI is over, but they will
 continue to bring this up until it is resolved.  So part of your question,
 or suggestion, will be most relevant to future proposals.  I cannot speak
 on that detail regarding the more recent FBI proposal (if it was even
 addressed in that level of detail), but we can talk about the overall
 context in which future proposals will be submitted.

 The given rationale behind the "remote tapping" proposal was to lessen 
 the chances of discovery (serious crooks might have plants in the telco);
 probably also to save costs, but that does not concern us in this msg.
 Given that purpose, I would expect that FBI remote tapping proposals
 in the future will have a tendency to favor absolutely minimal oversight
 by (possibly compromised) telco workers, whether security officer or
 technician.  That is, the only way to keep down the chances of a leak
 about a given number being remotely tapped, is to keep down the number
 of people who will or could find out about it.  While it is probably not
 the intent of the current FBI proponents (tho how can we tell?), this
 would have the auxilliary effect of making an illegal tap less detectable,
 less likely to be revealed.  That is, reducing the chance of a crook 
 finding out about a legal wiretap, means that the courts are also less 
 likely to find out about an illegal wiretap.  And the FBI (or local
 police, who might do more abuse of such a system than the FBI in many
 cases) would know this.  I maintain that such a system would have a
 strong tendency to encourage abuses, gradually worsening every year.

 Checks and feedbacks, such as you propose, would be the *minimum*
 institutionalized restraints which must accompany any future proposal.
 The FBI is unlikely to push for such audit trails on themselves.  It
 will take outside pressure to incorporate such safeguards into such a
 system if it every passes (*perhaps* it should never pass in any form,
 but that may be unrealistic).  I'm glad that you are starting to think
 about just what safeguards would be neccessary and sufficient.  I hope
 you will be passing your thoughts along to legislative and civil rights
 folks next year when some proposal re-surfaces.  (I would also like to
 see it here!).
     ~z~


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