From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: El Salvador: Proceso 527: Editorial
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1992 23:33:51 GMT

/** reg.elsalvador: 162.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 527: Editorial **
** Written  9:39 pm  Aug 31, 1992 by cidai@huracan.cr in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: cidai@huracan.cr (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 527: Editorial

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador
 
PROCESO 527
August 26, 1992
 
EDITORIAL:
The peace process weathers its second crisis
 
     The call to order made by U.N. Secretary Adjunct for
Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, asking both sides to
demonstrate in practice that they have the political will to
achieve peace in El Salvador, has had positive results. Goulding
warned them that it was no longer the time for discussions and
debates, but rather for complying with the accords concretely and
swiftly. In effect, the two sides have agreed on key issues
contained in the revised schedule that Goulding left on the
negotiating table before leaving the country.
     The fundamental aspects of re-starting the peace process are
the following: First, the FMLN promised to concentrate all its
forces and deposit the corresponding weapons on the indicated
dates. Once this commitment is fulfilled, the FMLN will leave the
government without any pretext to continue accusing it of non-
compliance, nor can the government continue to delay its own
compliance with the accords.
     The second element is the government's commitment to begin
programs to aid former combatants to rejoin civilian life,
including the so-called emergency packages. So far, the government
has been alleging a lack of financing as a pretext to delay
beginning the programs.
     The third element is the government's commitment to begin
classes at the National Academy for Public Security as soon as
possible, and to adopt all necessary measures to get the National
Civilian Police in the streets in the near future. This area has
been one of unexplained delays on the part of the government.
     Fourth, both sides committed to re-establish public
administration in former conflict zones as soon as possible, and to
define a special security regimen there.
     Fifth, the government committed itself to adopting all
necessary legislative measures to replace the Armed Forces
Territorial Service with a new military and reserve service.
     Finally, the two sides committed to promoting pending
legislation demanded by the accords, to step up efforts to acquire
additional financial resources, to facilitate the incorporation of
private enterprise into the Forum for Economic and Social
Consensus-Building, and to facilitate its operation.
     These commitments constitute a happy ending to the second
crisis in the peace process. Objectively, the above list shows that
the side with more commitments is the side which has complied
least, and the one who will have to work the hardest between now
and September 16, when compliance will be evaluated: the Cristiani
government. Of course, the FMLN also has pending commitments, but
this is the side which has demonstrated greater honesty and
political will. The FMLN has not concealed its failures to comply
and has always provided an acceptable explanation for them.
     This has not been the case with the Cristiani government, who
in the weeks prior to the crisis used propaganda tactics to try to
conceal its lack of commitment, using a discourse aimed at
projecting an image of normality. Even its charges against the FMLN
bore a softer tone. Thus, while the government has refused to meet
its promises, its official representatives, including the
president, projected an image of total commitment to the peace
process. They spoke of peace and democracy with the same serenity,
but without committing the resources necessary for both to become
reality.
     This serenity takes the form of indifference in the area of
human rights, since the government's passivity toward the
increasing spiral of attacks by and victims of the death squads and
common criminals is the same attitude it maintained throughout the
war. It displays the same attitude toward clandestine right-wing
groups which threaten and intimidate, securely shielded by
impunity. If the government were to act according to its
constitutional mandate, we would soon see those responsible for
these crimes in the courts.
     Time is running short, and the political space necessary for
these maneuvers is closing rapidly around the ARENA government.
When President Cristiani speaks before the U.N. General Assembly
next month, he cannot show up empty-handed. The community of
nations will not accept another speech full of ideas and promises.
By then, the Secretary General will have his own report and
recommendations for the Security Council, based on the evaluation
to be made by Goulding in mid-September. Goulding clearly stated
that this is no one-month grace period for the two sides, but
rather a very short time in which they must demonstrate their
willingness to comply and show concrete results.
     The United Nations firmly maintains the original deadline of
October 31. By then the peace process must conclude, but it must
conclude with full compliance of all the accords. This is why
catching up with delayed accords is so urgent and places so much
pressure on both sides.
     Now that the second crisis has been overcome, one is forced to
wonder why the situation was allowed to deteriorate so far as to
drive the peace process into a crisis. Couldn't these dangerous
situations have been avoided with firmer and swifter progress
toward solid and lasting peace?
 

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