From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: "Presumed Guilty, How & Why the W.C. Framed Lee Harvey Oswald" [9/11]
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Summary: A factual account based on the Commission's public & private documents
Originator: daemon@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Keywords: continued endemic denial of our true history consigns us to oblivion
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1992 13:48:22 GMT


                              *  *  *  *  *  *  *




      8


      The Alibi:  Oswald's Actions after the Shots




      The first person to see Oswald after the assassination was Dallas
      Patrolman Marrion Baker, who had been riding a motorcycle behind
      the last camera car in the motorcade.  As he reached a position
      some 60 to 80 feet past the turn from Main Street onto Houston,
      Baker heard the first shot (3H246).  Immediately after the last
      shot, he "revved up that motorcycle" and drove it to a point near a
      signal light on the northwest corner of Elm and Houston (3H247).
      From here Baker ran 45 feet to the main entrance of the Book
      Depository, pushing through people and quickly scanning the area.
      At the main entrance, Baker's shouts for the stairs were
      spontaneously answered by building manager Roy Truly as both men
      continued across the first floor to the northwest corner, where
      Truly hollered up twice for an elevator.  When an elevator failed
      to descend, Truly led Baker up the adjacent steps to the second
      floor.  From the second floor, Truly continued up the steps to the
      third;  Baker, however, did not.  The Report describes the
      situation:

            On the second floor landing there is a small open area
         with a door at the east end.  This door leads into a small
         vestibule, and another door leads from the vestibule into
         the second-floor lunchroom.  The lunchroom door is usually
         open, but the first door is kept shut by a closing mechanism
         on the door.  This vestibule door is solid except for a
         small glass window in the upper part of the door.  As Baker
         reached the second floor, he was about 20 feet from the
         vestibule door.  He intended to continue around to his left
         toward the stairway going up but through the window in the
         door he caught a fleeting glimpse of a man walking in the
         vestibule toward the lunchroom. (R151)

      Baker ran into the vestibule with his pistol drawn and stopped the
      man, who turned out to be Lee Harvey Oswald.  Truly, realizing that
      Baker was no longer following him, came down to the second floor
      and identified Oswald as one of his employees.  The two men then
      continued up the stairs toward the Depository roof.
         "In an effort to determine whether Oswald could have descended
      to the lunchroom from the sixth floor by the time Baker and Truly
      arrived," the Commission staged a timed reconstruction of events.
      The Commission knew that this encounter in the lunchroom such a
      short time after the shots could have provided Oswald with an
      alibi, thus exculpating him from involvement in the shooting.  The
      reconstruction could not establish whether Oswald was at the
      sixth-floor window;  it could, however, tell whether he was {not}.
      In the interest of determining the truth, it was vital that this
      reenactment be faithfully conducted, simulating the proper actions
      to the most accurate degree possible.
         From beginning to end, the execution of the reconstruction was
      in disregard of the known actions of the participants, stretching-
      -if not by intent, certainly in effect--the time consumed for Baker
      to have arrived on the second floor and shrinking the time for the
      "assassin's" descent.[1]
         To begin with, the reconstruction of Baker's movements started
      at the wrong time.  Baker testified that he revved up his
      motorcycle immediately after the {last} shot (3H247).  However,
      Baker's time was clocked from a simulated {first} shot (3H252).  To
      compare the time of the assassin's descent with that of Baker's
      ascent, the reconstruction obviously had to start after the last
      shot.  Since the time span of the shots was, according to the
      Report, from 4.8 to over 7 seconds, the times obtained for Baker's
      movements are between {4.8 and 7 seconds in excess}.
         Although Baker testified that he was flanking the last "press"
      car in the motorcade (3H245), the record indicates that he was, in
      fact, flanking the last {camera} car--the last of the convertibles
      carrying the various photographers, closer to the front of the
      procession than the vehicles carrying other press representatives.
      Baker said he was some 60 to 80 feet along Houston Street north of
      Main when he heard the first shot (3H246).  Those in the last
      camera car were also in this general location at the time of the
      first shot (Jackson:  2H158;  Couch:  6H156;  Dillard:  6H163-64;
      Underwood:  6H169;).  During the reconstruction, Baker drove his
      motorcycle from his location at the time of the {first} shot a
      distance of 180 to 200 feet to the point in front of the Depository
      at which he dismounted (3H247).  However, since Baker had revved up
      his cycle immediately after the {last} shot on November 22, the
      distance he traveled in the reenactment was entirely too long.
      Since the motorcade advanced about 116 feet during the time span of
      the shots, the distance Baker should have driven in the
      reconstruction was no greater than 84 feet (200 - 116 = 84).  This
      would have placed Baker near the intersection of Elm and Houston at
      the time he revved up his cycle, not 180 feet from it as was
      reconstructed.  Likewise, the men in the last camera car recalled
      being in proximity to the intersection at the time of the last shot
      (Underwood:  6H169;  Couch:  6H158;  Jackson:  2H159).
         With 116 feet extra to travel in a corresponding added time of
      4.8 to 7 seconds, Baker was able to reach the front entrance of the
      Depository in only 15 seconds during the reconstruction (7H593).
      Had the reenactment properly started at the time of the last shot,
      it follows that Baker could have reached the main entrance in 8 to
      10 seconds.  Did Baker actually consume so little time in getting
      to the Depository on November 22?
         The Commission made no effort to answer this question, leaving
      an incomplete and unreliable record.  Billy Lovelady, Bill Shelley,
      Joe Molina, and several other employees were standing on the steps
      of the Depository's main entrance during the assassination.
      Lovelady and Shelley testified that another employee, Gloria
      Calvery, ran up to them and stated that the President had been
      shot;  the three of them began to run west toward the parking lot,
      at which time they saw Truly and a police officer run into the
      Depository (6H329-31, 339).  This story is contradicted by Molina,
      who contended that Truly (he did not notice Baker) ran into the
      main entrance before Gloria Calvery arrived (6H372).  Mrs. Calvery
      was not called to testify, and the one statement by her to the FBI
      does not address this issue.  From her position just east of the
      Stemmons Freeway sign on the north side of Elm (22H638), it does
      not seem likely that she could have made the 150-foot run to the
      main entrance in only 15 seconds.  Yet, adding to this confusion is
      an affidavit that Shelly executed for the Dallas Police on November
      22, 1963.  Here he stated that {he} ran down to the "park" on Elm
      Street and met Gloria Calvery {there} (24H226).  Obviously, the
      issue cannot be resolved through these witnesses.
         While Molina felt that Truly ran into the Depository some 20 to
      30 seconds after the shots (6H372), Lovelady and Shelley estimated
      that as much as three minutes had elapsed (6H329, 339).  When
      Counsel Joe Ball cautioned Lovelady that "three minutes is a long
      time," Lovelady partially retracted because he did not have a watch
      then and could not be exact (6H339).  Supporting Molina's estimate,
      Roy Truly told the Secret Service in December 1963 that Baker made
      his way to the front entrance "almost immediately" (CD87, Secret
      Service Control No. 491);  almost a year later Truly said on a CBS
      News Special that Baker's arrival "was just a matter of seconds
      after the third shot."[2]
         I was able to resolve the issue concerning Baker's arrival at
      the Depository through evidence strangely absent from the
      Commission's record.  Malcolm Couch, riding in the last camera car
      (Camera Car 3), took some very important motion-picture footage
      immediately after the shots.  Couch, whose car was almost at the
      intersection of Elm and Houston when the last shot sounded,
      immediately picked up his camera, made the proper adjustments, and
      began filming (6H158).  Others in Camera Car 3 related how their
      car came to a stop or hesitated in the middle of the turn into Elm
      to let some of the photographers out (2H162;  6H165, 169).  Couch's
      film begins slightly before the stop, just as the car was making
      the turn (6H158).  From Couch's testimony and the scenes depicted
      in his film, in addition to the testimony of others in the same
      car, it can be determined that Couch began filming no more than 10
      seconds after the last shot.[3]
         The first portion of the Couch film depicts the crowds
      dispersing along the island at the northwest corner of Elm and
      Houston.  The camera pans in a westerly direction as the grassy
      knoll and Elm Street come into view.  In these beginning sequences,
      a motorcycle is visible, parked next to the north curb of Elm, very
      slightly west of a traffic light at the head of the island.  Baker
      testified that he parked his cycle 10 feet {east} of this signal
      light (3H247-48).  The position of the motorcycle in the Couch film
      is not in great conflict with the position at which Baker recalled
      having dismounted;  it is doubtful that Baker paid much attention
      to the exact position of his motorcycle in those confused moments.
      It would appear that this cycle, identical with the others driven
      in the motorcade, {must} have been Baker's, for it is not visible
      in any photographs taken {during} the shots, including footage of
      that area by David Weigman,[4] and no other motorcycle officer
      arrived at that location in so short a time after the shots.  No
      policeman appears on or around the cycle depicted in the Couch
      film.
         Thus, photographic evidence known to, but never sought by, the
      Commission proves that Officer Baker had parked and dismounted his
      motorcycle {within 10 seconds after the shots}.  Corroborative
      evidence is found in the testimony of Bob Jackson, also riding in
      Camera Car 3.  Jackson told the Commission that after the last
      shot, as his car hesitated through the turn into Elm, he saw a
      policeman run up the Depository steps, toward the front door
      (2H164).  This is entirely consistent with Baker's abandoned
      motorcycle's appearing at this same time in the Couch film.
         During the Baker-Truly reconstructions, Baker reached the second
      floor in one minute and 30 seconds on the first attempt and one
      minute, 15 seconds on the second (3H252).  Since Baker's simulated
      movements up to the time he reached the main entrance consumed 15
      seconds (7H593), the actions subsequent to that must have been
      reenacted in a span of one minute to about 75 seconds.  However,
      since Baker actually reached the main entrance within 10 seconds on
      November 22, the reconstructed time is cut by at least five
      seconds.  Further reductions are in order.
         Officer Baker described the manner in which he simulated his
      movements subsequent to dismounting his motorcycle:

            From the time I got off the motorcycle we walked the
         first time and then we kind of run the second time from the
         motorcycle on into the building. (3H253)

      Baker neither walked nor "kind of" ran to the Depository entrance
      on November 22.  From his own description, he surveyed the scene as
      he was parking his cycle, and then "{ran} straight to" the main
      entrance (3H248-249).  Billy Lovelady also swore that Baker was
      {running} (6H339).  However, Truly provided the most graphic
      description of Baker's apparent "mad dash" to the building:

         I saw a young motorcycle policeman {run} up to the building,
         up the steps to the entrance of our building.  He {ran}
         right by me.  And he was pushing people out of the way.  He
         pushed a number of people out of the way before he got to
         me.  I saw him coming through, I believe.  As he {ran} up
         the stairway--I mean up the steps, I was almost to the
         steps, and I {ran} up and caught up with him.  (3H221;
         emphasis added)

         Thus, walking through this part of the reconstruction was, as
      Harold Weisberg aptly termed it, pure fakery, unnecessarily and
      unfaithfully burdening Baker's time.[5]  The Report, on the other
      hand, assures us that the time on November 22 would actually have
      been {longer}, because "no allowance was made for the special
      conditions which existed on the day of the assassination--possible
      delayed reaction to the shot, jostling with the crowd of people on
      the steps and scanning the area along Elm Street and the Parkway"
      (R152-53).  Had the Commission directed any significant effort to
      obtaining as many contemporaneous pictures as possible--including
      those taken by Couch--it could not have engaged in such excuse-
      making.  Even at that, how could the Commission dare go to all the
      efforts of staging a reconstruction and then admit--to its own
      advantage--that it deliberately failed to simulate actions?  As was
      discussed in chapter 1, this child's play was inexcusable as an
      effort bearing such weight in deciding Oswald's guilt.  The Couch
      film eliminates the possibility that the factors mentioned in the
      Report could have slowed Baker down.  As for "jostling with the
      crowd of people on the steps," the Report neglected to mention
      other disproof of this as a slowing factor.  As Truly testified,

         when the officer and I ran in, we were shouldering people
         aside in front of the building, so we possibly were slowed a
         little bit more coming in than we were when he and I came in
         on March 20 (date of the reconstruction).  {I don't believe
         so.  But it wouldn't be enough to matter there}.  (3H228;
         emphasis added)

         Once in the building during the reconstruction, the two men
      proceded [sic] to the elevators "at a kind of trot . . . it wasn't
      a real fast run, an open run.  It was more of a trot, kind of"
      (3H253).  This, again, was not an accurate simulation of the real
      actions.  While Truly admitted that the reconstruction pace across
      the first floor was "about" the same as that of November 22, he
      described the former as a trot and the latter as "a little more
      than a trot" (3H228).  Baker himself said that once through the
      door, he and Truly "kind of ran, not real fast but, you know, {a
      good trot}" (3H249), not the "kind of trot" he described during the
      reconstruction.  A swinging door at the end of the lobby in the
      main entrance was jammed because the bolt had been stuck.
      Apparently, the pace on November 22 was of sufficient speed for
      Truly to bang right into this door and Baker to subsequently
      collide with Truly in the instant before the door was forced open
      (3H222).  Likewise, Eddie Piper, a first-floor witness, had seen
      the two men {run} into the building, yell up for an elevator, and
      "take off" up the stairs (6H385).
         In walking through part of the reconstruction, which should have
      been conducted running and was begun at least five seconds early,
      Baker and Truly managed to arrive on the second floor in one
      minute, 30 seconds.  In the reconstruction, equally begun too early
      but staged at a pace closer to, though not simulating that of
      November 22, the time narrowed to a minute and 15 seconds.  While
      Baker and Truly felt that the reconstructed times were minimums
      (3H228, 253), it would seem that the opposite was true.
      Subtracting the extra seconds tacked on by including the time span
      of the shots reduces even the maximum time to one minute, 25
      seconds.  The understandably hurried pace of November 22 as
      manifested in all the evidence would indicate that Truly and Baker
      reached the second floor in under 85 seconds, and the Couch film
      introduces the possibility that it may have taken as little as 70
      seconds, since Baker parked and abandoned his motorcycle within ten
      seconds of the last shot.
         The second part of the reconstruction was supposed to have
      simulated the "assassin's" movements from the sixth-floor window
      down to the second-floor lunchroom.  Here the figurative lead
      weights tied to Baker and Truly during the reconstruction of their
      movements are exchanged for figurative roller skates, to shorten
      the time of the "assassin's" descent.
         Secret Service Agent John Howlett stood in for the "assassin."
      He executed an affidavit for the Commission in which he described
      his actions:

         I carried a rifle from the southeast corner of the sixth
         floor northernly along the east aisle to the northern
         corner, then westernly [{sic}] along the north wall past the
         elevators to the northwest corner.  There I placed the rifle
         on the floor.  I then entered the stairwell, walked down the
         stairway to the second floor landing, and then into the
         lunchroom. (7H592)

      This test was done twice.  At a "normal walk" it took one minute
      and 18 seconds;  at a "fast walk," one minute, 14 seconds (3H254).
      This reconstruction also suffered from most serious
      ommissions.[sic]
         The "assassin" could not just have walked away from his window
      as Howlett apparently did.  If the gunman fired the last shot from
      the Carcano as the official theory demands, a minimum time of 2.3
      seconds after the last shot must be added to the reconstructed time
      since the cartridge case from that shot had to be ejected--an
      operation that involves working the rifle bolt.  Furthermore,
      witnesses recalled that the gunman had been in no hurry to leave
      his window (2H159;  3H144).
         There were also physical obstructions that prevented immediate
      evacuation of the area.  Commission Exhibit 734 shows that some
      stacks of boxes nearest to the "assassin's" window did not extend
      far enough toward the east wall of the building to have blocked off
      the window there completely.  However, as Commission Exhibits 723
      and 726 clearly show, other columns of boxes were situated behind
      the first stacks;  these formed a wall that had no openings large
      enough for a man to penetrate without contortion.  Deputy Sheriff
      Luke Mooney discovered three cartridge cases by this window.  He
      had to squeeze "between these two stacks of boxes, I had to turn
      myself sideways to get in there" (3H285).  The gunman would have
      had to squeeze through these stacks of boxes while carrying a 40-
      inch, 8-pound rifle.  Considering these details, we must add at
      least six or seven seconds to the Commission's time to allow for
      the various necessary factors that would slow departure from the
      window.
         To simulate the hiding of the rifle, Howlett "leaned over as if
      he were putting a rifle there [near the stair landing at the
      northwest corner of the sixth floor]" (3H253).  The Commission did
      not do justice to its putative assassin who, as the photographs
      reveal, took meticulous care in concealing his weapon.  The mere
      act of gaining access to the immediate area in which the rifle was
      hidden required time.  This is what Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone
      went through before he discovered the rifle:

            As I got to the west wall, there were a row of windows
         there, and a slight space between some boxes and the wall.
         I squeezed through them. . . .  I caught a glimpse of the
         rifle, stuffed down between two rows of boxes with another
         box or so pulled over the top of it. (3H293)

      Luke Mooney "had to get around to the right angle" before he could
      see the rifle (3H298).  Likewise, Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman
      reported that "it was covered with boxes.  It was very well
      protected as far as the naked eye" (7H107).  Another Deputy
      Sheriff, Roger Craig, recalled that the ends of the rows between
      which the rifle had been pushed were closed off by boxes, so that
      one could not see through them (6H269).
         Photographs of the area in which the rifle was found (e.g., CE
      719), and a bird's-eye view of the hidden rifle itself (e.g., CE
      517), corroborate what these men have described and add other
      information.  CE 719 shows that the rifle was found amid clusters
      of boxes that did not permit easy access.  CE 517, in particular,
      is very revealing.  It shows that the rifle had been pushed upright
      on its side between two rows of boxes that partially overlapped on
      top, thus eliminating the possibility that the rifle had merely
      been dropped down between the stacks.  CE 517 also demonstrates
      that both ends of the rows of boxes were partially sealed off by
      other boxes, indicating a possibility never pursued by the
      Commission--namely, that boxes had to be moved to gain access to
      the weapon.  When interviewed by CBS News, Seymour Weitzman
      inadvertently admitted this fact:

            I'll be very frank with you.  I stumbled over it two
         times, not knowing it was there. . . .  And Mr. Bone [sic]
         was climbing on top, and I was down on my knees looking, and
         {I moved a box, and he moved a carton, and there it was}.
         And he in turn hollered that we had found a rifle.[6]

         Hence, the concealment of the rifle required much maneuvering.
      In addition to squeezing in between boxes, the gunman had to move
      certain cartons filled with books.  The rifle itself had been very
      carefully placed in position.  Doubtless this would have added {at
      least} 15, perhaps 20, seconds to the reconstructed time {even if
      the hiding place had been chosen in advance} (of which there is no
      evidence either way).
         If we take the Commission's minimum time of one minute, 14
      seconds (giving the advantage to the official story) and add the
      additional six or seven seconds needed just to evacuate the
      immediate area of the window, plus the 15 to 20 seconds more for
      hiding the rifle, we find that it would have taken {at least} a
      minute and 35 seconds to a minute and 41 seconds for a sixth-floor
      gunman to have reached the second-floor lunchroom, {had all his
      maneuvers been planned in advance}.  Had Oswald been the assassin,
      he would have arrived in the lunchroom {at least} five to eleven
      seconds {after} Baker reached the second floor, even if Baker took
      the {longest} time obtainable for his ascent--a minute, 30 seconds.
      Had Baker ascended in 70 seconds--as he easily could have--he would
      have arrived at least 25 seconds before Oswald.  Either case
      removes the possibility that Oswald descended from the sixth floor,
      for on November 22 he had unquestionably arrived in the lunchroom
      {before} Baker.
         The circumstances surrounding the lunchroom encounter indicate
      that Oswald entered the lunchroom {not} by the vestibule door from
      without, as he would have had he descended from the sixth floor,
      but through a hallway leading into the vestibule.  The outer
      vestibule door is closed automatically by a closing mechanism on
      the door (7H591).  When Truly arrived on the second floor, he did
      not see Oswald entering the vestibule (R151).  For the Commission's
      case to be valid, Oswald must have entered the vestibule through
      the first door before Truly arrived.  Baker reached the second
      floor immediately after Truly and caught a fleeting glimpse of
      Oswald in the vestibule through a small window in the outer door.
      Although Baker said the vestibule door "might have been, you know,
      closing and almost shut at that time" (3H255), it is dubious that
      he could have distinguished whether the door was fully or "almost"
      closed.
         Baker's and Truly's observations are not at all consistent with
      Oswald's having entered the vestibule through the first door.  Had
      Oswald done this, he could have been inside the lunchroom well
      before the automatic mechanism closed the vestibule door.  Truly's
      testimony that he saw no one entering the vestibule indicates
      either that Oswald was already in the vestibule at this time or was
      approaching it from another source.  However, had Oswald already
      entered the vestibule when Truly arrived on the second floor, it is
      doubtful that he would have remained there long enough for Baker to
      see him seconds later.  Likewise, the fact that neither man saw the
      mechanically closed door in motion is cogent evidence that Oswald
      did not enter the vestibule through that door.
         One of the crucial aspects of Baker's story is his position at
      the time he caught a "fleeting glimpse" of a man in the vestibule.
      Baker marked this position during his testimony as having been
      immediately adjacent to the stairs at the northwest corner of the
      building (3H256;  CE 497).  "I was just stepping out on to the
      second floor when I caught this glimpse of this man through this
      doorway," said Baker.
         It should be noted that the Report never mentions Baker's
      position at the time he saw Oswald in the {vestibule} (R149-51).
      Instead, it prints a floor plan of the second floor and notes
      Baker's position "when he observed Oswald in {lunchroom}" (R150).
      This location, as indicated in the Report, was immediately outside
      the vestibule door (see CE 1118).  The reader of the Report is left
      with the impression that Baker saw Oswald in the vestibule as well
      from this position.  However, Baker testified explicitly that he
      first caught a glimpse of the man in the vestibule from the stairs
      and, upon running to the vestibule door, saw Oswald in the
      lunchroom (3H256).  The Report's failure to point out Baker's
      position is significant.
         Had Oswald descended from the sixth floor, his path through the
      vestibule into the lunchroom would have been confined to the north
      wall of the vestibule.  Yet the line of sight from Baker's position
      at the steps does not include any area near the north wall.  From
      the steps, Baker could have seen only one area in the vestibule--
      the southeast portion.  The only way Oswald could have been in this
      area on his way to the lunchroom is if he entered the vestibule
      through the southernmost door, as the previously cited testimony
      indicates he did.
         Oswald could not have entered the vestibule in this manner had
      he just descended from the sixth floor.  The only way he could have
      gotten to the southern door is from the first floor up through
      either a large office space or an adjacent corridor.  As the Report
      concedes, Oswald told police he had eaten his lunch on the first
      floor and gone up to the second to purchase a coke when he
      encountered an officer (R182).
         Thus, Oswald had an alibi.  Had he been the sixth-floor gunman,
      he would have arrived at the lunchroom {at least} 5 seconds {after}
      Baker did, probably more.  It is extremely doubtful that he could
      have entered the vestibule through the first door without Baker's
      or Truly's having seen the door in motion.  Oswald's position in
      the vestibule when seen by Baker was consistent only with his
      having come up from the first floor as he told the police.
         Oswald {could not} have been the assassin.
         The Commission had great difficulty with facts, for none
      supported the ultimate conclusions.  Instead, it found comfort and
      security in intangibles that usually had no bearing on the actual
      evidence.  Amateur psychology seems to have been one of the
      Commission's favorite sciences, approached with the predisposition
      that Oswald was a murderer.  This was manifested in the Report's
      lengthy chapter, "Lee Harvey Oswald:  Background and Possible
      Motives" (R375-424).
         To lend credibility to its otherwise incredible conclusion that
      Oswald was the assassin, the Commission accused Oswald of yet
      another assassination attempt--a shot fired at right-wing Maj. Gen.
      Edwin Walker on April 10, 1963 (R183-87).  Thus, Oswald officially
      was not a newcomer to the "game" of political assassination.
      Although I am not in accord with the conclusion that Oswald shot at
      Walker, I find it illuminating that the Commission did not follow
      its inclination for psychology in its comparison of Oswald as the
      Walker assailant to Oswald as the Kennedy assailant.
         Having just torn open the head of the President of the United
      States, as the Commission asserts, how did Oswald react when
      stopped by a policeman with a drawn gun?  Roy Truly was first asked
      about Oswald's reaction to the encounter with Baker:

            Mr. Belin:  Did you see any expression on his face?  Or
         weren't you paying attention?
            Mr. Truly:  He didn't seem to be excited or overly afraid
         or anything.  He might have been a little startled, like I
         might have been if someone confronted me.  But I cannot
         recall any change in expression of any kind on his face.
         (3H225)

      Officer Baker was more explicit under similar questioning:

            Rep. Boggs:  When you saw him [Oswald] . . ., was he out
         of breath, did he appear to have been running or what?
            Mr. Baker:  It didn't appear that to me. He appeared
         normal you know.
            Rep. Boggs:  Was he calm and collected?
            Mr. Baker:  Yes, sir.  He never did say a word or
         nothing.  In fact, he didn't change his expression one bit.
            Mr. Belin:  Did he flinch in anyway when you put the gun
         up . . .?
            Mr. Baker:  No, sir. (3H252)

            Sen. Cooper:  He did not show any evidence of any
         emotion?
            Mr. Baker:  No, sir. (3H263)

      This "calm and collected" "assassin" proceeded to buy himself a
      coke and at his normal "very slow pace," was then observed by
      Depository employee Mrs. Robert Reid walking through the office
      space on the second floor on his way down to the first floor
      (3H279).  Presumably he finished his coke on the first floor.
      Documents in the Commission's files (but omitted from the Report,
      which assumes Oswald made an immediate get-away) indicate very
      strongly that, at the main entrance after the shots, Oswald
      directed two newsmen to the Depository phones (CD354).
         According to the evidence credited by the Commission, Oswald was
      not such a cool cucumber after his first assassination attempt.
      Here the source of the Commission's information was Oswald's wife,
      Marina, and his once close "friends," George and Jeanne De
      Mohrenschildt.  The incident in question is described in the Report
      as follows:

            The De Mohrenschildts came to Oswald's apartment on Neely
         Street for the first time on the evening of April 13, 1963
         (three days after the Walker incident), apparently to bring
         an Easter gift for the Oswald child.  Mrs. De Mohrenschildt
         then told her husband, in the presence of the Oswalds, that
         there was a rifle in the closet.  Mrs. De Mohrenschildt
         testified that "George, of course, with his sense of humor-
         -Walker was shot at a few days ago, within that time.  He
         said, `Did you take a pot shot at Walker by any chance?'"
         At that point, Mr. De Mohrenschildt testified, Oswald "sort
         of shriveled, you see, when I asked this question . . . made
         a peculiar face . . . (and) changed the expression on his
         face" and remarked that he did target-shooting.  Marina
         Oswald testified that the De Mohrenschildts came to visit a
         few days after the Walker incident and that when De
         Mohrenschildt made his reference to Oswald's possibly
         shooting at Walker, Oswald's "face changed, . . . he almost
         became speechless."  According to the De Mohrenschildts, Mr.
         De Mohrenschildt's remark was intended as a joke, and he had
         no knowledge of Oswald's involvement in the attack on
         Walker.  Nonetheless, the remark appears to have created an
         uncomfortable silence, and the De Mohrenschildts left "very
         soon afterwards." (R282-83)

      De Mohrenschildt further testified that his "joking" remark "had an
      effect on" Oswald, making him "very, very uncomfortable" (9H249-
      50).  In another section, the Report adds that Oswald "was visibly
      shaken" by the remark (R274).
         The Commission certainly chose a paradoxical assassin.  We are
      asked to believe, according to the Commission, that Oswald was
      guilty of attacking both Walker and Kennedy.  Yet, this man who
      officially became markedly upset when jokingly confronted with his
      attempt to kill Walker did not even flinch when a policeman put a
      gun to his stomach immediately after he murdered the President!
         The Commission begged for the charge of being ludicrous in
      drawing its conclusions relevant to Oswald and the assassination;
      it insulted common sense and intelligence when it asked that those
      conclusions be accepted and believed.



__________

 [1] The first critical analysis of these reconstructions appeared in
     "Whitewash," pp. 36-38.

 [2] "CBS News Extra:  `November 22 and the Warren Report,'" p. 28.

 [3] To my knowledge, the Couch film is not commercially available.  I
     was fortunately able to obtain numerous stills made from
     individual frames of a copy of the Couch film, which was
     originally obtained from the Dallas television station for which
     Couch worked.  Due to the legalities involved, these pictures can
     not be reproduced here.

 [4] I obtained numerous frames from the Weigman film in the same manner
     as described above.  These can not be reproduced either.

 [5] Weisberg, "Whitewash," p. 37.

 [6] "CBS News Inquiry:  `The Warren Report,'" Part I, p. 9.







--
                                              daveus rattus   

                                    yer friendly neighborhood ratman

                                KOYAANISQATSI

    ko.yaa.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
        in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.  
          5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.



Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive