HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 12 Sep 92 03:34:33 GMT
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department

In article <1992Sep11.231731.7954@galois.mit.edu> tycchow@riesz.mit.edu  
(Timothy Y. Chow) writes:
> Consider a computer program, written in C.  What kind of entity is it?  Is
> it an electronic entity?  Well, perhaps---but what about printouts of the
> computer program?  We tend to say that those are also computer programs.  So
> maybe a computer program is a sequence of ASCII characters.  Well, what
> about a French version of the same program? 
> 
> The analogy with "mind" should be clear.  Even if all minds that we know of
> occur in human beings, this doesn't automatically guarantee that "mind" is a
> biological entity 
> 
> All this suggests that "mind" is one of those ill-defined philosophical
> concepts that Barry Merriman so despises, and not a biological concept.


Yes, that is true. Then my reaction is: maybe it doesn't matter if
we define precisely what 'mind' is. 'mind' is a term humans made up 
to label a human property, and attempts to generalize, abstract
or make it more precise may simply not be important. 

(Such things
are possible, but may have no significance, as they are just arbitrary
modifications of the meaning, and don't really hold any new insight.)


Similarly, 'computer
program' labels a broad class, and it may simply not be important
to have a precise critieria as you ask for above. One can always 
make an exacting specification, but it may just be arbitrary.

This sort of issue used to plague AI and more recently AL (Artificial
Life)---i.e. formulate a definition of the thing in question.  I think
now folks realize a definition is not so important, because no 
great definition pops out as us above all others---suggesting there
is really no precise phenomena to be defined. Its one of those:
we'll know it when we see it things. And one just has to accept such things.

As for minds, when we develop think machines, I imagine we'll just 
call them electronic minds, call ours biological minds, and 
not worry about the precise relation between them.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: BR.SJE@forsythe.stanford.edu (Steve Eastman)
Subject: reply to BR.SJE@RLG
Organization: Stanford University, California, USA
Distribution: net
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 18:37:09 GMT

I am a complete amateur at this.  I want to get a feel for the people who
post here.  I'm trying to understand, for my self, what the fundamental
basis for the validity of science is.  To do so I would like to say a few
things, and get your response.

1) Everything exists only in the present.  That which we have called the
future is now-present predictions of varying degrees of security or
certainty.  That which we call the past is now-present historical references
in varying degrees of closeness of memory like short term memory, long term
memory, and recorded history.  Since it takes about 2 milliseconds for
messages to get from the fingertip to the brain, maybe all of presents is
like history of one kind or another?

2) Every thing exists.  That of which we can conceive exists as a
conception.  Therefore, Santa clause exists.  There seems to be, at first,
two sub-domains of existence: references, and referents.  That to which a
reference refers always exists.  Therefore, you cannot make statements about
existence in the negative, e.g., "there is no such thing as Santa Claus,
really."  What you have to say is something like, "The essence of Santa
Claus, in this discussion, exists as a story, a tale, a reference and a
referent, or an imagination."  Also, false statements exist.  "Nothing"
exists as the name of a set of extant things.

3) "Natural" language is not a very good tool for discussing existence.
This is the philosophers major stumbling block.  Could the reason for this
be the hidden negatives or reference/referent distinctions in natural
language?

4) Is Phenomenology the process of explicating the hidden prejudice against
existence that lurks in the language with which we make our selves present
to ourselves?  (or some thing like that?)


  Steve Eastman
  Systems Programmer
  Research Libraries Group, Inc./Stanford University

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jackson@soldev.tti.com (Dick Jackson)
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Organization: Transaction Technology Inc.
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 00:14:39 GMT

In article <1992Sep4.192427.19464@tamsun.tamu.edu> e343mh@tamuts.tamu.edu (Michael Hand) writes:
=>In article <1992Sep4.040504.3673@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
=>  >Why can't philosophers understand this simple proposition:
=>  >
=>  >YOU CAN'T PROVE ANYTHING ABOUT THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE THROUGH PURE
=>  >CONTEMPLATION.
=>
=>Oh, everyone *understands* it: the issue is whether it's true.
=>And your screaming it doesn't *make* it true!

Good point. Truth, shmooth. Having fun with ideas is the main thing. If
we had an infallible way of determining the truth it would all be so
boring.

Dick Jackson
From: atristan@ucru1.ucr.edu (Andrew Tristan)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Hidden Variables
Date: 11 Sep 92 23:18:47 GMT
Organization: University of California, Riverside

In article <1992Sep5.191520.7172@ariel.ec.usf.edu> mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. (Gregory McColm) writes:
>
[stuff deleted]
>Some of the Vienna Circle people (eg, Frege and Mach) and 
             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^             ^^^^^
Frege in the Vienna Circle?!?!?!?

[more stuff deleted]
>
>-----Greg McColm

-- 
Andrew Tristan             | He who fights with monsters should look
atristan@ucru1.ucr.edu     | to it that he himself does not become
atristan@ucrvms            | a monster.  - FN
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: evanh@sco.COM (Evan Hunt)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Stan's Chosen Ones
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 23:25:31 GMT


Don't blame me, I voted for chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers).
>Give me an idea of how the facts about consciousness are entailed
>by the physical facts about a system.  Your attempt above consists
>in pointing that such a system will act as if it's conscious -- but
>acting as if one is conscious is clearly logically compatible with
>the absence of consciousness.

One cannot measure consciousness in a system (or in a person) save by
evaluation of the system's (or person's) behavior.  Your replica seems
just as conscious as you; can you suggest any further test I might
subject it to that would prove it nonsentient?

It can indeed be logically argued that "being conscious" and "acting
conscious" are separate, but unless "being conscious" is independently
measureable, the assertion can never be proven.

-- 
"This coffee is my blood, this breakfast burrito is my flesh.  And
 it cost me 89 cents, so get your goddamned own." - Jeff Lester, "Saint 11"
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 92 22:03:33 GMT

Flame me if you wish, but for once it seems that Snodgrass is on the mark.
How do we know that in principle we can build a working, physical machine
that can replicate itself?  Mathematical models such as Life are largely
irrelevant because they ignore critical details such as collecting raw
materials, energy, etc.  The only good argument is to claim that we know
enough about how living organisms replicate to be able to build, in
principle, an analogous self-replicating machine.  But there is still so
much that is not understood about how cells replicate that a cautious
thinker might well be justified in waiting until we actually have a working
self-replicating machine before claiming that one can be built.

Cracking the "genetic code" is a far cry from understanding the entire
mechanism of self-replication.  The physical and chemical environment of a
cell is just as important as the DNA.  Even the genetic code is not as
simple as idealizations such as Life might lead one to believe.  It is not
only the primary structure (the list of amino acids) that matters in the
construction of a protein---secondary and tertiary structures (the physical
shape of the protein as it forms) also play a critical role.  This is just
the tip of the iceberg of the complexities that face a would-be engineer of
a self-replicator.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Dualism
Date: 15 Sep 92 00:45:30 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

Dave Chalmers appears to hold that consciousness is distinct from the
physical properties of human beings and that it doesn't cause anything
physical to happen.  In particular, it has no consequences for
psychological phenomena that can be fully explicated behaviorally, such
as belief.

This view (if he holds it) is puzzling, since it seems to imply that our
belief and our assertions that we are conscious are not causally linked
to the fact that we are conscious.  What am I missing?
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: evanh@sco.COM (Evan Hunt)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Stan's Chosen Ones
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 22:59:49 GMT


Don't blame me, I voted for chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers).
>(1) It's logically possible that there could be a physical replica
>of me without any conscious states.
>
>(2) Therefore the existence of conscious states is a further fact,
>over and above the physical facts (i.e. it is contingent relative
>to the physical facts).
>
>(3) Therefore dualism is true.
>
>If there's anything wrong with this argument, it has to be at premise
>(1).  I confess that this premise seems obviously true to me, but
>some people would deny it.

I would, at least, deny that it's *obviously* true.  Consider:  If dualism
is false, then mind cannot be separated from matter; therefore, an object
which lacks consciousness, no matter how much it looks like you, cannot
be a complete replica of you.  If consciousness is a dynamic, ongoing
chemical reaction in your brain, an event rather than a substance, then
that reaction is a part of your physical structure.  A replica would have
to include it, and so the replica would therefore possess consciousness
as well.

Your first premise should be changed to:  "*If dualism is true,* then it
is possible that there could be a physical replica of me without any
conscious states."

-- 
"This coffee is my blood, this breakfast burrito is my flesh.  And
 it cost me 89 cents, so get your goddamned own." - Jeff Lester, "Saint 11"
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 1992 21:51:42 GMT

In article <1992Sep13.201005.23853@galois.mit.edu> tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow) writes:
>                                                      But most of us have
>some intuition (even if some of us squelch it as incorrect) that the giant
>lookup table is not conscious.  By introducing the lookup table I hoped to
>awaken this intuition to show how one might argue that consciousness is a
>further fact beyond the facts that are accessible to us by means of tests.

Some of us have the intuition that the lookup table could not pass the
Turing test.  What does this do to your argument?

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 92 02:04:46 GMT

In article <1992Sep6.235947.22184@cltr.uq.OZ.AU> gar@cltr.uq.oz.au (Greg  
Restall) writes:
> 
> Firstly, I don't think many have read Bob Meyer's paper
> in the right light.  As far as I can see, it contains
> some interesting results that show that under certain 
> conditions, Zorn's lemma grants us the existence of a 
> First Cause. 

Zorn's lemma is more or less an axiom of set theory. It seems 
a bit pointless to take an axiom of set theory, and
simply say this axiom applies to causality, and so there
is a first cause. Why not just postulate a first cause, 
and dispense with the philosophical prestidigitation?


> 
> Secondly, it seems odd that Barry Merriman doesn't 
> understand that in making claims such as the capitalised
> one given above (to the effect that you can't prove
> anything about the physical universe through pure 
> contemplation) he is going perilously close to *doing*
> philosophy.  At least, that is what he would be doing
> if he went so far as to attempt to justify his claim.

Very true. The trick is, I don't go of the metaphysical 
deep end trying to irrefutably justify my claim. I just 
say: look at the historical evidence. How many cases do
we have where pure contemplation (without experimental input)
have told us interesting things about physics. None. 
Thus, I conclude that ~1000 years of attempts have not
produced any successes, and that is the extent to which 
my claim is justified. Pretty compelling to me---at least
I'm not gonna spend my time on it, when another route
with a great success record (science) is available.

Their is no purely logical basis to my claim. Its based 
on empirical evidence. It could have turned out that pure contemplation
worked really well for doing physics, but it just didn't.

As for the 'definition' of 'pure contemplation'---its not necessary
to have a precise one. You all gather roughly what I mean, don't you?
All that matters is if in most cases you can tell, so
as to avoid trying to use this dysfunctional methodology, and
thereby not waste your time.





--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
From: jackson@soldev.tti.com (Dick Jackson)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Transaction Technology Inc.
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 19:41:00 GMT

In article <_cwnz1m.kmc@netcom.com> kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty) writes:
>In article <1992Sep11.224807.13323@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
>>Dualism is simply another form of mysticism. Its the same old
>>premise: we don't understand something, therefore there must 
>>be a paranormal phenomena at work. 
>
>What mysticism? I don't know what you're railing at.  There's
>absolutely nothing paranormal going on at all.  The two
>incontrovertible facts at issue here are as plain and mundane as the
>nose on your face: there are physical phenomena such as objects, and
>there are mental phenomena such as sensations.  And a mystery: how are
>they so different?

Is this a generally agreed statement of the dualist position?  One rarely
or never sees the dualist case actually laid out clear in a positive way.
Instead, it is usually presented as objections to the reductionist
viewpoint (i.e. everything is atoms and fields, conciousness is no more
than software running on wetware).

How many types of dualists are there? At least two I think. Lets call one
"religeous" -- here there is a non-material soul and this is mystically
provided by God. I would consider this viewpoint as being outside the
realm of philosophy as it is understood here.

Let's call the other version "scientific" dualism.  I would very much like
to see this laid out with as much clarity as the reductionist position has
been; I claim that if this were attempted, it would be open to a much more
severe attack than has beeen mounted on the reductionist position.
Anyone care to try?

Dick Jackson
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 11 Sep 92 14:42:07 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Sep11.013212.4413@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:

>Here's a tip: the resolution to the 'mind body problem' is going to come
>from biology, not philosophy. Even at this early stage in brain
>biology we can start to get some solid ideas about what the 'mind' is.
>I suggest you get last months Scientific American, which was devoted
>to the brain. It'll straighten you out a lot more than such philosophical
>BS.

I think this is false, unless the biologists are also doing some
philosophy.  

Moreover, the usualy result of treating mind as biological is to
discard all the subjective aspects rather than explain them.
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 07:04:02 GMT

In article <1992Sep10.052230.6083@galileo.cc.rochester.edu> wgns@troi.cc.
rochester.edu (C. Wiggins) writes:

   >Possible Reply:

   >Any "ability" to conceive of such things is merely apparent.  A dualist
   >might argue that these aren't genuine cases of conceivability -- only
   >apparent ones.  If one REALLY, fully understands what one is trying to
   >conceive of in those cases, one will find she just can't do it.

  This kind of reply makes the whole thing vacuous.
From: king@qut.edu.au
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
Date: 10 Sep 92 16:46:21 EST
Organization: Queensland University of Technology

In article <1992Sep9.004953.7423@cltr.uq.OZ.AU>, 
gar@cltr.uq.oz.au (Greg Restall) writes:> 
> 
> But rather, that the existence of a first cause
> *follows from* a number of other interesting 
> claims.  (Which may be true, or may be false).

or both :-)

just helping you to maintain your levity level, Greg.
From: Alan_Schianni@mindlink.bc.ca (Alan Schianni)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: nano-replicator assumptions
Date: 12 Sep 92 19:12:12 GMT
Organization: MIND LINK! - British Columbia, Canada

I don't agree that for X to create a complex machine Y, X necessarily and
sufficiently must be more complex than Y.  My basis is that in possible worlds
a simple organism such as a seed need not be more complex than its production.
But what is necessary and sufficient it seems in all closely related
possible-words is that X must have the capability (however simple or complex)
to produce Y.
And, in this argument Y can be anything from a microcosm to a complex unity.
No matter how complex a living organism is, without the "Capability" to produce
Y, he Can Not produce Y.
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 13 Sep 92 00:25:15 GMT
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.

In article <1992Sep13.000522.17474@galois.mit.edu> I wrote:
>A complete catalogue of physical facts about vision might still leave us
>wondering whether or not other people's visual experiences are the "same"
>as ours.  Similarly, even if no human being can devise a test that will
>distinguish between Dave Chalmers and the if-then monster, and even if we
>have a complete listing of the if-then monster, we might still be unsure
>about whether the if-then monster is conscious, even though it assures us
>that it is.

I should add that if we accept that the question, "Are others' visual
experiences the same as mine?" is meaningful WITHOUT having to define
"visual experience" in terms of physical facts, then this suggests
that, as Dave Chalmers puts it, the experience of redness is a FURTHER
FACT beyond the physical facts.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 92 01:32:12 GMT

In article <29sn2qc@lynx.unm.edu> amiga@phobos.unm.edu (carlos a.f  senaenterr)  
writes:
> 	This is the best argument for dualism that I have come across:
> 
> 1) What I can imagine is possible.
> 2) I can imagine being disembodied.
> 3) Therefore, I could be disembodied.
> Note: The form of this argument is Modus Ponens, a valid syllogism.
> 

2' I can imagine that dualism is impossible in our universe
3' Therefore, dualism is impossible impossible in our universe.


But seriously: the above argument is so ridiculous, I can't imagine 
that anyone takes it seriously. Where did you ever get the idea that
what you can imagine is possible? There is certainly no empirical 
evidence for this statement (even tho this notion seems to run 
through many philosophical arguments...)

As for twisting the meaning of 'possible' so as to make this argument 
true---fine. But then you are no longer talking about the physical reality
we live in. You are essentially saying there is a definition of 
'possible' that makes the above true. Unfortunately, then you argument 
concludes that disembodiment is 'possible' in this fictitious sense.
Fine, but who cares.

Here's a tip: the resolution to the 'mind body problem' is going to come
from biology, not philosophy. Even at this early stage in brain
biology we can start to get some solid ideas about what the 'mind' is.
I suggest you get last months Scientific American, which was devoted
to the brain. It'll straighten you out a lot more than such philosophical
BS.

Its pretty reasonable to assume the 'mind' is a biological entity, 
not a philosophical one. 

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: None.  This saves me from writing a disclaimer.
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 92 22:01:39 GMT

In article <1992Sep14.144957.28355@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>No.  The main problem lies in the impossibility of constructing a table
>sufficiently comprehensive.
[various practical difficulties deleted]

Are these practical difficulties really relevant?  My point is that the
essence of a certain limited form of the Turing test is captured by a
lookup table (whether it can be implemented in our physical universe or
not), and that many (not necessarily including myself) have an intuition
that such a simple structure cannot be conscious.  If you have no such
intuition, then forget the example.

Evan Hunt has also objected to my lookup table, but his objections I think
are met by my clarification of the data structure, with perhaps a few slight
additional modifications to take account of time elapsed between exchanges.
Problems such as simulating interrupting one another, or pausing between
sentences, can be eliminated by imagining that the Turing test is
administered by passing notes between the examiner and the subjects, who are
assumed to be located in different rooms.

I should perhaps add a disclaimer that I'm not either a physicalist or a
dualist, so please don't think that I'm taking sides on this issue---I just
wanted to clarify a few things because I find the arguments interesting.
-- 
Tim Chow     tycchow@math.mit.edu
Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs
30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and weigh
only 1 1/2 tons.                               ---Popular Mechanics, March 1949