From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 7/7
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:58 GMT

------------------------------------------------------
The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
     Z Magazine, September 1992
and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
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Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 7 of 7, 11.5KB) (217 lines)
========================
 
8. Kennedy and the Political Norm
---------------------------------
 
A methodological point is perhaps worth mention.  Suppose that we
were to concoct a theory about historical events at random, while
permitting ourselves to assume arbitrary forms of deceit and
falsification.  Then in the vast documentary record, we are sure
to find hints, scattered indications of possible fact, and other
debris that could be made to conform to the theory, while
counter-evidence is nullified.  By that method, one can "prove"
virtually anything.  For example, we can prove that JFK never
intended to withdraw any troops, citing the elusiveness of NSAM
263 and his unwillingness to commit himself to the withdrawal
recommendation by his war managers.  The task is only facilitated
by a search for nuances and variations of phrasing in the
mountains of documents, usually committee jobs put together
hastily with many compromises.
 
This is not the way to learn about the world.  In particular, the
widespread belief that JFK was a secret dove has to be explained
on some grounds other than his position on Vietnam.
 
Are there other grounds?  Another suggestion is that JFK was
going to end the Cold War, harming the military-industrial
complex.  To assess the thesis, we may turn again to the speech
he was to give in Dallas on the day of the assassination, with
its proud boast about his vast increases in Polaris submarines,
Minuteman missiles, strategic bombers on 15 minute alert, nuclear
weapons in strategic alert forces, readiness of conventional
forces, procurement, naval construction and modernization,
tactical aircraft, and special forces.  Recall further that all
of this had been achieved on the pretext of a fabricated missile
gap and other fantasies about how Eisenhower was "frittering
away" our wealth in "indulgences, luxuries, and frivolities"
while the country faced "the possibility of annihilation or
humiliation" (senior Kennedy economic adviser Walter Heller).  At
Dallas, JFK intended to call for more of the same, because "we
dare not weary of the task" of confronting "the ambitions of
international communism," his "monolithic and ruthless
conspiracy." Reagan could hardly claim more.
 
Perhaps the Dallas speech can be explained by the "delude the
right" gambit.  More imagination would be required to deal with
some facts that JFK did not intend to share with his audience:
namely, his knowledge that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had
undertaken huge cuts in active Soviet military forces, verified
by US intelligence, including elimination of half the tactical
air force (with two-thirds reduction in light-bomber units) and
removal of about 1500 aircraft from the Navy, half of them
scrapped and the rest turned over to air defense; that Khrushchev
had withdrawn more than 15,000 troops from East Germany, calling
on the US to undertake similar reductions of the military budget
and in military forces in Europe and generally; and that in 1963
Khrushchev had proposed further reciprocal cuts -- options
privately discussed by Kennedy with high Soviet officials, but
dismissed by the President as he expanded his intervention in
Vietnam.
 
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 is regularly
invoked in this connection.  On its import, we may turn to
McGeorge Bundy, hardly one given to downplay the achievements of
the Kennedy Administration, or its peaceful intent.  The LTBT
"was indeed limited," he writes, and did not impede the
technological advance in nuclear weaponry, which is what was
important to US strategic planners.  Bundy concludes that "what
produced the treaty was steadily growing worldwide concern over
the radioactive fallout from testing," along with Kennedy's
ability to show "moderation" after facing down Khrushchev at the
missile crisis.  The same show of strength enabled JFK to deliver
a "peace speech" in 1963, Bundy observes.
 
It also set off the next phase of the arms race, as the USSR
tried to compensate for the weakness that had been exposed by
JFK's military build-up and uncompromising public posture, which
helped bring the world all too close to nuclear war.
 
Another common belief is that JFK was so incensed over the
failure of the CIA at the Bay of Pigs that he vowed to smash it
to bits, sowing the seeds for right-wing hatreds.  Again, there
are problems.  As historians of the Agency have pointed out, it
was Lyndon Johnson who treated the CIA "with contempt," while
JFK's distress over the Bay of Pigs "in no way undermined his
firm faith in the principle of covert operations, and in the
CIA's mission to carry them out." JFK promised to "redouble his
efforts" and to "improve" covert operations.  He fired the CIA's
harshest critic (Chester Bowles) and appointed as Director the
respected John McCone, who "revitalized the intelligence
process." The CIA was "reestablished...in White House favor" and
became a "significant voice in policy making" under Kennedy,
particularly in 1963, "as covert actions multiplied in Cuba,
Laos, Vietnam and Africa" (including new instructions in June
1963 to increase covert operations against Castro).  Under JFK,
the CIA Director became "a principal participant in the
administration, on a par with the Secretary of State or of
Defense" (Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, John Ranelagh).  The enthusiasm
of the Kennedy brothers for counterinsurgency and covert
operations is, of course, notorious.
 
Roger Hilsman, JFK's Director of State Department Intelligence,
writes of the effort to make intelligence operations more
"effective and appropriate," overcoming the incompetence of
recent operations.  The intent is well illustrated by his
discussion of CIA Director Allen Dulles's defense of the
successful overthrow of the governments of Iran and Guatemala.
"Dulles is fundamentally right," Hilsman states.  If the
Communists remain "antagonistic" and use subversion, then we have
a right "to protect and defend ourselves" -- by overthrowing a
conservative parliamentary regime or a reformist democratic
capitalist government and imposing a murderous terror state.
 
Furthermore, as Robert Spears points out, those most incensed by
JFK's CIA shake-up were not right-wing jingoists, but the "Bold
Easterners," a group very much like the "action intellectuals" of
the New Frontier.  The "decline in the reputation and standing of
the CIA" paralleled the "decline in the abundance and power of
the Ivy Leaguers." LBJ reduced their role in the decision-making
process, and Nixon "consciously sought to exclude the CIA from
power" because of his contempt for the "Ivy League liberals" who
dominated the Agency.  The Nixon years were "the nadir for the
CIA."
 
Johnson and Nixon, then, should have been the targets for CIA
resentment.  There seems to be little promise here.
 
Others have argued that Kennedy's threat was to the business
elite and the wealthy, a position hard to square with fiscal
policies that overwhelmingly benefited higher income groups,
including the 1962 investment credit ("a bribe to capital
formation," in Paul Samuelson's phrase) and the Revenue Act of
1964 proposed by Kennedy just before his assassination, which
"provided for regressive personal and corporate income tax cuts,"
Richard Duboff and Edward Herman observe.
 
Some have brought forth Latin America as the sign of Kennedy's
break with the establishment.  Cuba poses a problem for that
thesis, notably Kennedy's terrorist war after the Bay of Pigs,
which broke entirely new grounds in international terrorism and
was a significant factor in the missile crisis.  After that
Kennedy initiated a new sabotage and terror program, though "with
the assassination,...the heart went out of the offensive,"
Michael McClintock observes, and the operations were terminated
by LBJ in April 1964.
 
One of the most significant Kennedy legacies was his 1962
decision to shift the mission of the Latin American military from
"hemispheric defense" to "internal security," while providing the
means and training to ensure that the task would be properly
performed.  As described by Charles Maechling, who led
counterinsurgency and internal defense planning from 1961 to
1966, that historic decision led to a change from toleration "of
the rapacity and cruelty of the Latin American military" to
"direct complicity" in "the methods of Heinrich Himmler's
extermination squads." The aftermath is well known.
 
These improved modes of repression were an aspect of Kennedy's
other major Latin American initiative, the Alliance for Progress,
which required effective population control because of the dire
impact of its development programs on much of the population;
related projects helped subvert democracy and bring on brutally
repressive regimes in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, British Guiana, Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere.  The
export-promotion policies of the Alliance brought about
"economic miracles" in the technical sense: nice macroeconomic
statistics, great profits for US agribusiness, petrochemicals and
other investors and a life of luxury for local elites, and
increasing misery for the general population.  Unemployed
increased from 18 to 25 million and agricultural production per
person declined during the "decade of development." The "economic
miracle" turned into the massive crisis of the 70's, setting the
stage for vastly increased US-backed terror and forecasts of new
"economic miracles" as the old policies are reinstated.
 
Six military coups overthrew popular regimes during the Kennedy
years, ten more later; in some cases, Kennedy policies
contributed materially to the outcome, while in Guatemala, he
backed the murderous junta when it blocked an election in fear
that former President Arevalo, who had brought capitalist
democracy to Guatemala, might participate.  In 1962-63, Kennedy's
CIA initiated its (successful) program to subvert the 1964
election in Chile, because, as the NSC determined, "We are not
prepared to risk a Socialist or FRAP [Allende] victory, for fear
of nationalization of U.S. investments" and "probable Communist
influence."
 
There is no serious question that "Through its recognition
policy, internal security initiatives, and military and economic
aid programs, the [Kennedy] Administration demonstrably bolstered
regimes and groups that were undemocratic, conservative, and
frequently repressive.  The short-term security that
anti-Communist elites could provide was purchased at the expense
of long-term political and social democracy" (historian Stephen
Rabe).
 
Without proceeding any further, it is not easy to make a case
that JFK represented some departure from the norm of business
rule.
 
The withdrawal-without-victory thesis can serve as a case study,
which illustrates patterns of much greater generality.  It
serves, I think, as a warning against temptations that popular
movements will do well to avoid, if they are to challenge the
dangerous drift of events and policy on the basis of a serious
understanding of the world.  History and life are too complex to
be captured in any simple formula.  But however unpleasant and
difficult it may be, there is no escape from the need to confront
the reality of institutions and the policies and actions that
they largely shape.



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