HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: is this bad?
Organization: University of Engineering, College of Engineering
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 01:18:04 GMT


I got a number of replies to my query, thanks everyone.. however

----
From cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com Tue Nov 10 20:50 HST 1992
Subject: Re:  is this bad?

You haven't described it well enough.

For example, where does the  DES iteration get its key?


I'd suggest you write a simple program to give your algorithm and
post it that way.
That's a lot clearer -- less likely to be ambiguous.
----

when few replies mentioned I should just use the CBC mode of DES
it became apparent to myself that I hadn't stated my goals well
enought either...


goal:  an encryption scheme that gives me the strength of DES
along with the ability to send single characters one at a time.
Also it would be nice if the scheme lended itself well to
sending 7-bit characters in only 7 bits.

my scheme:
both ends agree upon a private key K 
one side sends the other side an initial 8 bytes of random data
to be used as the initial 'previous plaintext'.

to send bytes of the plaintext the sender encrypts
the previous 8 bytes with key K and uses the resulting 8 bytes 
1 at a time to xor with the plaintext. After these 8 bytes
of 'pad' are used up, 8 more bytes are generated from the
previous plaintext.

example:
previous bytes where 'hello th'
which encrypt as  ('hello th')K = 'abcdefgh'
now to send the next arriving byte 'e' i send  'a' xor 'e'
when I get the next byte 'r' I send  'r' xor 'b' and so on.
after sending the next 8 bytes 'ere how ' I encrypt them
('ere how ')K = 'blahblah'  and use those as pad.

at the other end,  the last 8 bytes of plaintext it had received
is also 'hello th'.  The receiver also computes ('hello th')K
and gets the same pad.  It uses the pad to xor the incomming
stream to recover the new plaintext 'ere how '.  It can
then compute ('ere how ')K and use those to decode the next
8 bytes.


This scheme allows one to send signle characters 1 at a time
instead of waiting for 8.  If this is being used in real
time I can send 'e' right away without waiting for
'ere how ' to be available to me.  If DES is used in its
normal mode of operation I would be required to either
wait for 8 bytes of plaintext to be available or to time
out every once in a while,  pad what I do have to fill
out 8 bytes, and send the data.  The first is unacceptable
for real time traffic and the second adds extra characters
to the stream degrading performance and adding complexity.
The extra characters are sent usually at times when nothing
else is going to be sent (if stream isnt sharing space on
a multiplexed link) so that isnt so much a problem.


 
I hope this is a little bit more clear than last time.
From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov  5 1992
Date: 09 Nov 92  23:08:48

Writes lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen):
 
 > Please send your friend to the library first.  Also, please see 
 > my recent posting "temporary, independent FAQ" for sci.crypt.
 >
 
 I already sent him to the library. He says he couldn't find anything
 related to his program there. 
 
 >
 > It is much, much easier to propose a system than to analyze it 
 > properly.  You will probably find little enthusiasm here and that 
 > may be a mystery to you until you read the FAQ file.
 
 I don't want to get myself involved in the technical aspects of 
 cryptology (-graphy?). I was simply in the process of trying to 
 judge something that had been presented to me, and I wanted to 
 find out whether any of the people who often write authoritative 
 articles here about encryption, etc., are really able to actually 
 crack a certain encryption product or whether they're just good 
 at writing theoretical posts, that's all.
 
 I realize that it must be a lot easier to just post theoretical 
 considerations on such matters than to do any _actual_ decryption, 
 but I thought that the experts here were knowledgeable in a 
 real, practical sense, and capable of putting their obvious 
 knowledge to actual use, that's all.  Perhaps I was mistaken.
 
 The most peculiar thing about your rejection, and that of the other
 person who replied, is that both of you are rejecting the challenge
 _without having ever seen the product you are rejecting!_.  This 
 worries me immensely.  Makes me wonder if you may not simply be 
 avoiding the challenge under some pretenses.  Am I mistaken?
 
 In my experience in the technical world, I've found that prouncing 
 some idea to be unworthy _ex cathedra_ gathers applause only among 
 the NIH (Not-Invented-Here) crowd.  The rest of the world sees only 
 their arbitrary pronouncement, and doesn't give much credit to the
 rejecter(s). 
 
 But if all these experts are unwilling to even _try_... hmmmm.
 

--- Maximus 2.00
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: sjo@cci632.cci.com (Steve Owens)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: [Computer Consoles, Inc., Rochester, NY
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 14:12:03 GMT

	Dave,

	I'm not flaming you.  Unfortunately, I got back to this discussion
in mid-stream.

In article <PA146008.500.721592942@utkvm1.utk.edu> PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu (David Veal) writes:
>In article <1992Nov12.071135.2216@netcom.com> gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
>
>>sjo@cci632.cci.com (Steve Owens) writes:
>>>Please state an example
>>>of something that is legal to do, that you do not do, and still feel
>>>your right to participate in such activity should be banned.
>>
>>Smoking tobacco. Drinking alcohol. 
>
>       I suppose this would come under the "parental" theory of government 
>like the drug laws.

	I guess the idea of "to each his own" is lost on some people.
As long as the people that participate in these activities do not effect
you or society, what difference does it make whether or not they
participate in a that activity?

	I guess the idea of self reliance is lost on some people, too.  
I already have a parent.  I don't need another.

>>>It would keep the law-abiding
>>>citizen from participating in a very satisfying form of recreation.
>>
>>True. But what's recreational satisfaction compared to the blood
>>of innocents?
>
>       Nice emotional appeal.

	First, I'd like to know if Mr. Gontier thinks the "blood of
innocents" includes crack dealers or gang members who are blown away
because they trespass on someone else's turf.

	More to the point, if people were oblidged to intercede on
behalf of the victim of a crime, instead of fearing legal retribution
and not getting involved, the "blood of innocents" may not have to be
spilled, but, again, the idea seems to be lost on some people.

(NOTE: I'm not condoning vigilantism, but I think far too many people
 "turn the other cheek" when they see a crime being committed.)

>>>"Patching the system" simply adds kludge on top of
>>>kludge until you have a system that is so huge noone can understand it
>>>and noone can support it.  If that's the case, it's time for a new system.
>>
>>Ah, now we've gotten to crux of the problem, haven't we?
>>
>>Programmers refer to an old, creaky, patched up system as "mature",
>>at least when they're trying to hire new blood. "Mature" is the way
>>I'd describe our system. Hell, it's just about the oldest government
>>on the planet.

	You can call it "mature" if you want.  Most of the programmers
I know worth their weight typically call them "junk".  I've had to
work with some of these "mature" systems myself, and tend to agree with
their impressions.  Rewriting large sections of the system is typically
the only way to get them to function efficiently.

	Wait a minute, are we talking about computers or governments?

:-)

>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>David Veal               University of Tennessee Div. of Cont. Education
>                         Information Services Group
>PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu  (Mail to VEAL@utkvm1.utk.edu will bounce.)


Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4379 misc.int-property:1396
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,misc.int-property
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 6 Nov 92 00:13:50 GMT
Followup-To: misc.int-property
 <1992Nov3.090942.1626@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> <a_rubin.720982294@dn66> <1992Nov5.221542.191@netcom.com>
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Nov5.221542.191@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>Arthur L. Rubin states that Ron Rivest can ask for keys as a licensing
>requirement for his patented systems.

>I think not. This would be found to be an unreasonable licensing
>requirement, I'm sure, by the courts. Since Rivest has no physical
>control over the use of his patents (since the techniques have been
>published world-wide), he cannot enforce such a provision if it's
>found unreasonable.

>To see just how unreasonable, just imagine the manufacturer of a
>patented safe requiring users to register their combinations.

I didn't say the patent was reasonable; I just said that would be a legal
licensing restriction.

This sub-thread doesn't belong on sci.crypt, see followup line for
suggested newsgroup.
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4477 comp.org.eff.talk:6868 alt.conspiracy:12023
From: pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon on Registered Keys
Date: 8 Nov 92 21:13:29 GMT
Organization: Totally Unorganized

In article <BxCsyp.1Ez@world.std.com> Costanza@world.std.com (Peter Costanza) writes:
>...under the law the NSA is forbidden to do domestic surveillance....
>
>silly.  to security organizations the "law" is just another cover.  It's
>amusing to watch these guys who hate the government, won't pay taxes,
>reject all ideas of social responsibility orchestrated through government,
>defend the good intentions of the garrison state security apparatus.  they're
>usually also gun nuts.  

I believe you are flat wrong here.  Most 'gun nuts' I know pretty much
oppose anything that expands government power.  They tend to hold things
like privacy, etc in especially high regard.  They especially are against
laws, etc making things like government survelliance easier (any other
position would be shooting oneself in the foot, as it were).  About all
they supported was a strong national defense due to the cold war, and
that has changed now, and most gunowners position on the state of
military readiness has also changed to better adapt to the current
situation.

In particular, one who "hates" the government is unlikely to support
moves that give that hated entity MORE power...

I got an idea!!  Why don't you ASK 'gun nuts' what their positions are
instead of taking the word of the media, or HCI, etc as gospel?  It
is just possible that they have an ax to grind, and find it advantagous
to their agenda to make gun owners look as bad as possible...

I suspect you have bought into a stereotype that was dreamed up by the
organizations like HCI, NCBH, etc.  I find that just about every
characterization of a gunowner by these folk to have little relation to
reality.

Just the observations of yet another 'gun nut' ...

-- 
pat@rwing.uucp                                  (Pat Myrto),  Seattle, WA
                      If all else fails, try:
         ...!uunet!{pilchuck, polari}!rwing!pat
WISDOM:    "Travelling unarmed is like boating without a life jacket"
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 11 Nov 92 16:32:15 GMT
Article-I.D.: news.1992Nov11.163215.29116
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
>Although the discussion of key registration has been interesting,
>it does seem a bit like shooting fish in a barrel.
	Wrong.  Hiding computer data from the law enforcement types is more 
	like shooting fish in a barrel.  In fact its kind of like dynamiting
	fish in a barrel.

>    The police bust an alleged child molester, and take possession
>    of his PC.  They believe that the hard drive contains a full
>    database of young kids who have been *or may be* assaulted.
>    That database is enciphered.
>
> Now, your mission, should you decide to accept it, is to defend
> cryptography to ordinary voters, congress people and newspaper
> reporters.  You also need to explain to a relative of one of those
> kids, someone who doesn't own or work with a computer, why the
> government should "allow" private cryptography which could hide
> this sort of information.
	I don't have to defend cryptography to anyone.  The point
	isn't that they won't outlaw cryptography but that it won't
	do any good for what they think they are trying to do.

	What makes you think that the police would even find his
	database?  How are the police going to distinguish the encrypted
	database from random binary shit on this guys disks? 
	Do you think the cops try to decrypt all files called *.EXE?
	What about files full of floating point numbers?  
	What if they guy modifies his DOS image so that there are
	files that don't even appear?  Are they going to look at his
	file allocation table to look for anomalies?  Would they
	know one if they saw it?  Suppose his modified DOS image knows
	that certain parts of the free block table are really not
	free and correspond to his encrypted database.  How are the
	cops going to distinguish these blocks from random binary
	stuff left around in free blocks on his disk?  Suppose he
	has hundreds of floppies?  Are they going to analyze them all
	for very subtle discrepancies?  

	The problem here is that people are assuming that the law
	enforcement types know something about computers.  NOTHING
	could be further from the truth.  My 10 year old daughter
	knows more about computers than the D.A.  


						smg
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4446 comp.org.eff.talk:6843 alt.privacy:2137 talk.politics.guns:23727
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 7 Nov 92 14:56:06 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <DLB.92Nov4100421@fanny.wash.inmet.com>, dlb@fanny.wash.inmet.com (David Barton) writes:
> 	<1992Nov3.090942.1626@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
>    The average cost of a wiretap in 1991 was $45K.  Most of this goes
>    to labor.  Those of you who think that law enforcers are likely to
>    start tapping everyone with or without a warrant need to do a
>    reality check on cost and government budgets.  Assuming there are
>    about 100 million lines, the total cost to listen in on them all
>    would be $4.5 trillion!
> 
> I am sorry, but this line of argument is absurd.  If the government
> were to attempt wide-scale wiretaps, it would not be so stupid as to
> tap each individual lines.  Most phone communications includes at

The main cost, I believe, is the labor of listening, not the labor of
installing the intercept.  They put 2 people on simultaneously for 3
shifts a day and 7 days a week.  Although my back of the envelope
calculation fails to account for the savings that would come from 
scaling, the real costs for large scale surveillance would nonetheless 
have to be staggering.  It would be like going back to the use of
human beings for the telephone switches!

But perhaps the more important point is that they could not do it 
because it is illegal under Title 18 to tap without an order.  I 
really don't see how some gov't agency could embark on massive 
surveillance without someone finding out and throwing the books at 
them.

Another point about intercepts that seems to be misunderstood has to 
do with minimization.  If the gov't is listening, they have to turn it 
off if the conversation turns to something unrelated to the court 
order.  They can periodically check, but even with a court order they 
are not allowed to listen to everything. 

It's a very tedious, tiring job and law enforcers groan when they find 
out they have to do a tap.  The myth of folks eager to wiretap 
everyone is nothing like the reality.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mbmg@mbunix.mitre.org (Michnikov)
Subject: public domain DES code
Organization: The MITRE Corp., Bedford, Ma.
Distribution: usa
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 20:57:58 GMT

Where can I get it from ?
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4385 alt.politics.usa.constitution:921
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.politics.usa.constitution
Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy (was Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?)
Date: 6 Nov 92 02:34:17 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Oct30.165406.5853@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>But it depends on interpretation. Regulating channels is not the
>same as regulating speech.
	Perhaps but free speech DOES apply to the electronic media.

>A strict constructionist would say that one can say what one likes into 
>the air via one's unaided voice. But as soon as technical means 
>intervene (such as the use of a megaphone in a public park, or the 
>use of e-mail) the government has the right to regulate those means. 
	Strict constructionism is a strategem used by those so called 
	"conservatives" who want to let technology obsolete the constitution.
	They don't really believe in the principle of free speech and they 
	are eagerly awaiting the day when everyone communicates through 
	media other than word of mouth and then they can so encumber 
	speech (vis-a-vis the norm) that they effectively control it.
	The important thing about speech is the communication involved
	not the medium through which it is accomplished.  Those who would
	deny this are actually hostile to true freedom and are afraid of
	the new and alien ideas that freedom brings.
	

>One is still free to talk,and thus the protection isn't violated.
	Right.  And if you fall for this your freedom as well as mine is
	in danger.


>By the way, even strict construction has limits, as in the Supreme
>Court decision that the right to free speech does not extend to
>falsely crying "Fire!" in a crowded theater.
	*Even* strict construction has limits?  Surely you mean
	*especially* strict construction. ;-)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: kdm1@Ra.MsState.Edu (Kenneth D. Mitchell)
Subject: Get your security ideas in print!!
Summary: looking for input for a book
Keywords: encrypt,security
Organization: Mississippi State University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 10:15:52 GMT

 
 
If you have any wonderful ideas that have not been discussed
before about data security, communications security, and computer
security let me know.
 
I am helping to research a book on computer security and data encryption.
Anyone that provides a new insightful idea or technique can
get their name and email address listed in the credits.
Just because you mail does not mean you get your name in the credits,
you have to give me something good.
 
I already know about multiple encryptions of DES, so dont tell me about
that.
 
I dont want to know about this wonderful thing called 'public-key'
I know about that too.
 
What I DO want is something new and innovative, like how your neighbor
converted his tv and shortwave to monitor the computer screens at the bank.
Or how you pass secret keys using carrier pidgeons.
Or how you implement the Canary Trap in your mail.
Or how you keep the FBI from learning from your computer after they have
confiscated it.
Or how you converted your bedroom to a TEMPEST/VanEck proof area.
Or how you tapped your schools fiberoptic network.
 
Tell me what you think about Nortons Diskreet, Wipeinfo
Tell me about such and such program that claims to be DES but is
   really Caesar.
Tell me if there is a vendor that sells one-time pad systems.
Tell me how to beat ethernet encryption software
Tell me if you have some way of sending data besides modem, microwave,
internet, compuserve, radio network, ethernet, fiberoptic, telepathy
   or tell me something new in these fields.
 
It must be something that I can suggest to others,
something that is tested and explain why you think it is secure or insecure,
something I can tell others to watch out for or not to use,
 
 
Tell me something I probabally dont know.
 
I will not respond by telling you 'that is a stupid idea, everyone knows
that', this is supposed to be a learning service.
 
I cannot gurauntee that I will respond to everyones mail but I will try.
All help is appreciated.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wright@lims01.lerc.nasa.gov (Ted Wright)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 5 Nov 92 19:00:51 GMT
Organization: NASA Lewis Research Center

In article <8qNqTB4w165w@entropy.mcds.com> morpheus@entropy.mcds.com (morpheus) writes:
>From: morpheus@entropy.mcds.com (morpheus)
>Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
>Date: Wed, 04 Nov 92 18:43:30 EST
>ron@zooid.guild.org (Secret Mud) writes:
>
>> I believe in being able to protect my data, until I am presented with a court
>> order to allow it to be searched.
>
>I believe in being able to protect my data. (note period) ...
>
>Hypothetically say I have all my data encrypted with 'mega-DES ]I[' - how will
>an "ummm... I can't remember the key, sorry" hold up in court (assuming said
>court had the papers they need, etc).  Would that be perjury?  Can they
>subpeona a mental construct?  What could they legally do?  (legally as in per
>constitution, etc.  Not the FBI's version..)
>
>
>                        --  morpheus@entropy.mcds.com --
>                   Who do you trust when everyone's a crook?
>                                      -qr

Well, "I don't recall" worked well enough for Ronald Reagan.

Ted Wright (wright@lims01.lerc.nasa.gov)
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Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: nadja@jetsun.weitek.COM (Nadja Adolf)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: WEITEK Corporation, Sunnyvale CA
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 92 01:39:09 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.114903.5599@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>cleanup, just one instance of the tragedy of the commons 

Tim, please define what the 'tragedy of the commons' was. Not the misuse of
the term by certain economic schools, but the actual origin of the term.

Oh, I see you've looked it up.

Embarrassed yet?


-- 
The Earth Pig Bourne....

nadja@node.com (prefered email address)
nadja@weitek.com