Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: MINDWALK - An exercise in Passionate Thought
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 1993 20:53:00 +0000


>|> Randall, How can you assert that a model is reality?
>|> 
>|> There are not elementary particles. There IS a model which accords 
>|> well with observation of some obscure and arcane aspects of atomic 
>|> physics that features concepts that are given the name 'elementary 
>|> particles'. But their existence is not of the same order as you or I 
>|> or the world we live in.

[...]

>It seems to me that you make one true and one false statement above.  It 
>is of course true that models are not reality, being at best but 
>imperfect descriptions of what is (or may be) there.  The falsehood 
>is that in talking about people, or "the world we live in" you're
>not using models; "person" or "human being" is just as much a 
>construct as "elementary particle" or "electron".  

One: At last some intelligent comments.

Two: I did not (carefully) say that persons are real and particles 
are not. I said that their existence was _not of the same order_. I 
agree that 'person' and 'human being' are constructs, but I disagree 
that the concepts are equally 'real'. More on that later...

>There are differences between these concepts, to be sure.  You can't see 
>individual electrons with your unaided senses, and they behave rather
>differently than macroscopic objects, but so what?  They're both 
>attempts to describe what really is, they both simplify that reality 
>so we can grasp it, and they are both subject to modification as we 
>learn more.  

Yes. Very well put. 

However.

One: Is there any item in our worldview models that we can 
justifiably call more real than any other? I mean is 'love' as a 
concept describing reality equally as real as 'Thatcherism' and 
'Quark'. You see where I am heading? 

Two: I disagree on principle with the statement that 'They're both 
attempts to describe what really is' . I think that you will find if 
you examine the matter that concepts in general survive and become 
accepted as 'fact' on utilitarian, not idealistic grounds. That is 
'the earth goes round the sun' is regarded as a fact because it leads 
to simpler math, not because it is necessary a realistic description. 
I think that I read a good line on that recently - can't remember 
where - that evolution favors succesful models, not 'true' ones.

For a first class treatment of that theme try 'Understanding the 
present' by Bryan Appleyard - which makes the point that science is 
actually what WORKS, not what is 'real' or 'true' - and indeed, there 
are alternative possibilities. 

Three: I really like 'they both simplify that reality so we can grasp 
it, and they are both subject to modification as we learn more'. That 
is exactly the point of a good conceptual model - the reduction of 
experience to a simple structure that gives good utilitarian 
predictability. That is why chaos theory is so amusing: It is a model 
that describes, but cannot predict with any degree of accuracy!  

> Anyway, it's time to see how my program (whose purpose, 
> incidentally, is reconstructing tracks of particles, some elementary 
> and some not so elementary) is coming along.  

Sounds like fun. 

PS Tom Price: you wanted to get recommendations on a book that would 
maybe live up to its promise. Try that Appleyard book. It is _very_ 
interesting to consider that what we call 'real' is a system of 
thought that has evolved out of all sorts of conceptual models, 
BECAUSE IT WAS USEFUL, not because it was the only explanation, or in 
any way discernable as 'real.

Leo



Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta