From: dsholtsi@csl36h.csl.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger)
Subject: Re: Just Plain LIES!! (was Re: The facts about Roe, Doe, and Colautti)
Reply-To: dsholtsi@csl36h.csl.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger)
Organization: North Carolina State University
Distribution: na
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 00:34:30 GMT

In article <1992Aug17.131337.3354@newstand.syr.edu> 
greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield) writes:

> With absolutely no shame for *completely* misrepresenting quotes, Doug 
> Holtsinger writes:

Please calm down Mr. Greenfield.  Take a deep breath and relax. 
Slinging insults and false accusations will not win an argument.
I'm willing to discuss this issue on a calm, rational level. 
You don't seem willing to do the same.  That's unfortunate, 
because I thought we could learn a lot from each other. 

You have repeated an argument that I've already addressed
in my last response.  Please don't ignore my response again.

You've also ignored quotes from three of my sources.  Two of them
were from prestigious law review journals.  I've put them at the
end of this article. 
 
>> Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton must be read together: 

> As I have said *several* times before, *I* have never said that the two 
> cases should not be read together.  What I said is that you cannot 
> assume that the discussion of "health" in the Doe opinion applies to the 
> "life and health" provision in Roe, regarding third-trimester abortions.

Mr. Greenfield, look closely at the quote which follows.  It is a 
clear unequivocal statement that Roe and Doe must be read together.
There are no exceptions listed. 

   ----

  "In Doe v. Bolton, 410 US 179, 35 L Ed 2d 201, 93 S Ct 739,
   procedural requirements contained in one of the modern
   abortion statutes are considered.  That opinion and this
   one, of course, are to be read together[67]."

   Roe v. Wade, 35 L Ed 2d at 184 (1973)

  ----

> Every objective indication supports this contention.

You've provided one source which supports your contention,
but it's from an author who has held conflicting views on
Roe and Doe.  In another source, he rejects your argument
and supports mine.

> That Roe and Doe are to be read together is not in question.  I have 
> stated that every time you repeat the lie that I have said otherwise.

You are claiming that Roe and Doe should not be read together on
the definition of the term "health".  I've given you six independent
sources, along with a quote from the Roe decision, which say you're 
wrong. 

> And *you* still refuse to reconcile the *obvious* contradiction between 
> your "reading" of Doe and Roe together, and the explicit statements of 
> Roe, Doe and Colautti.

There is no contradiction between Roe, Doe, and Colautti.  Those decisions
are all consistent with each other.
 
> And it is *your* argument that suggests that Doe should be read to mean 
> that the entire three-stage framework or Roe is meaningless.

None of the opinion given in Doe conflicts with Roe.  That is your
argument, not mine.  

>>  "The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
>>   woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. [...]  
>>   Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care."
>>
>>   Roe v. Wade, 35 L Ed 2d at 177 (1973)

> Did you really believe that this pathetic lie would pass unscathed?

Are you claiming that this quote from Roe v. Wade is a "pathetic lie"? 

> Why didn't you also cite the paragraph that *immediately* follows in the 
> Roe opinion?

Because it doesn't support your argument.

>"On the basis of elements such as these, appellants and some *amici* 
> argue that a woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to 
> terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for 
> whatever reasons she alone chooses.  With this we do not agree."
>
> This alone destroys your entire argument.  

That is essentially the same argument that you presented last time,
which I've already addressed.

I'll just repeat what I said last time, along with some quotes
that support my argument, which you ignored in your last response:

This indicates that a woman's right to an abortion is largely
dependent on the availability of a physician who is willing
to perform the abortion, which would be the same situation with 
abortion on demand.  [The Court] rejects the claim that Roe 
is abortion on demand because a woman cannot demand an abortion 
from a physician who is unwilling to perform the abortion.
Note that this observation is consistent with two of my sources 
(Mark Tushnet, and The Alan Guttmacher Institute). 
 
And here are the two sources which support my argument:

   ---

  "The final stage of pregnancy under Roe v. Wade occurs after the
   fetus becomes viable[4]. After viability, the state could regulate
   or prohibit abortions unless they were ``necessary, in appropriate
   medical judgement'', to preserve the life or health of the woman.
   This standard must be read, however, in light of the Court's
   decision the same day in Doe v. Bolton, that clinical judgement
   ``may be exercised in light of all factors -- physical, emotional,
   psychological, familial, and the woman's age -- relevant to the
   well-being of the patient[5]. Thus, the Court nominally allowed
   the state to prohibit post-viability abortions except in apparently
   limited cases, but it actually defined the limitation in a way
   that bars the state from prohibiting such abortions if physicians
   are willing to perform them."

   Mark Tushnet, "The Supreme Court on Abortion: A Survey",
   Abortion, Medicine, and the Law, Third Edition, 1986, 
   pp. 162

   ---

   "Summary and Analysis of State Laws Relating to Abortion",
   Barbara Kaiser, Harriet F. Pilpel, and Eve W. Paul,
   in Family Planning, Contraception, Voluntary Sterilization
   and Abortion: An Analysis of Laws and Policies in the United
   States, Each State and Jurisdiction.

   A Report of the Office for Family Planning
   Health Services Administration
   U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
   1978

   Prepared by the Alan Guttmacher Institute


  "The landmark events in establishing the basic law governing abortion
   in the United States were the January 1973 decisions of the United 
   States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade[1] and Doe v. Bolton[2]. [...]

   The Roe and Doe decisions have these results:  [...]

   (3) After the fetus is viable, a State may regulate in its interest,
   even to the extent of prohibiting abortion unless to save the life
   or health (including the mental health) of the woman. [...]

   Roe and Doe held the right to abortion to be a fundamental right,
   but the decisions also involved the medical profession in the
   decision-making process. A corollary is that a woman's decision
   to exercise her rights is in part dependent on the availability
   of health institutions and professionals willing to perform 
   abortions."

   ---


> But just in case anyone is 
> interested in the remainder of the paragraph:
>
> "Appellants' arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in 
> regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to 
> support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, is 
> unpersuasive.  The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also 
> acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right 
> is appropriate.  As noted above, a state may properly assert important 
> interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and 
> in protecting potential life.  At some point in pregnancy, these 
> respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain 
> regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision.  The 
> privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.  In 
> fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some *amici* that 
> one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a 
> close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the 
> Court's decisions.  The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited 
> right of this kind in the past. [citations omitted]"

This is the same argument from last time.  This is the second time 
you've ignored my response.  See above for the response.


> In short, this shows that
>
>  1) Mr. Holtsinger's entire argument is without merit,

No, it shows that you've repeated an argument that I've already 
addressed, and you've ignored my response.  That's very dishonest
of you.

>  2) Mr. Holtsinger is shamefully deceitful in citing
>     quotes out of context--he just plain lies.

Mr. Greenfield is repeating arguments that I've already addressed,
and he refuses to respond to them.  He's trying to make me upset 
by slinging false allegations, but it won't work.

>>  "I agree that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
>>   the abortion statutes of Georgia and Texas impermissibly limit
>>   the performance of abortions necessary to protect the health of
>>   pregnant women, using the term health in its broadest medical
>>   context."
>>
>>   Roe v. Wade, 35 L Ed 2d at 185 (1973) 

> Actually, this is from a single concurring opinion by Justice Burger 
> which applies to both Roe and Doe.  

Yes, and notice that he applies the term "health", in its broadest
medical context, to both the Roe and Doe decisions. 

> And once again, you have 
> (conveniently) neglected to include an important statement (the 
> concluding statement, in this case!) which contradicts your position:

And once again, you have repeated an argument that I've already
addressed.   Third time.  See above for the response.

> "Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution 
> requires abortion on demand."

Same argument.  See above for the response.  

> How many lies can you include in a single post?

I haven't posted any lies.  I am very disappointed that you continue to
ignore my argument, and the sources which support it.

>>  "The vicissitudes of life produce pregnancies which may be unwanted,
>>   or which may impair ``health'' in the broad Vuitch sense of the
>>   term, of which may imperil the life of the mother, or which in 
>>   the full setting of the case may create such suffering, dislocations,
>>   misery, or tragedy as to make an early abortion the only civilized
>>   step to take.  These hardships may be properly embraced in the
>>   ``health'' factor of the mother as appraised by a person of
>>   insight.  Or they may be part of a broader medical judgement
>>   based upon what is ``appropriate'' in a given case, though
>>   perhaps not ``necessary'' in a strict sense."
>>
>>   Roe v. Wade, 35 L Ed 2d at 190 (1973)

> Perhaps one more?  I cannot find this quote *anywhere* in the Roe 
> opinions (based upon the reprints of the majority opinion by Blackmun, 
> the concurring opinion of Stewart and the dissenting opinion of 
> Rehnquist in the US Civil Rights Commission report.

It's from the opinion of Justice Douglas.

> Earlier, you cited from Roe:
>
> "In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in 
> one of the modern abortion statutes are considered.  That opinion and
> this one, of course, are to be read together."
>
> What you failed to include, once again, was the *very next* paragraph:
>
> "This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the 
> respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical 
> and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the 
> profound problems of the present day.  The decision leaves the State 
> free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of 
> pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to 
> recognize state interests."

Fourth time that you've repeated this argument.  See above for the
response. 

> You just can't keep those fibs from coming out of your keyboard, can 
> you?

You just can't keep ignoring my response, can you? 

> Here's another quote from Roe that demonstrates the distinction between 
> the Court's treatment of the three distinct phases of pregnancy:
>
> "Measured against these standards, Art. 1106 of the Texas Penal Code, in 
> restricting legal abortions to those 'procured or attempted by medical 
> advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,' sweeps too 
> broadly.  The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed 
> early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single 
> reason, 'saving' the mother's life, the legal justification for the 
> procedure.  The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional 
> attack made upon it here."

This doesn't support your argument. 

>> The following six authors support my argument that Roe and Doe
>> give a broad interpretation to the term "health":

> And I'm sure that all have are as credible as *you*!

My first source was from a professor of law at Georgetown University.
You ignored that source. 

My second source was from a prestigious law review journal. You ignored
that too.

My fifth source was from a prestigious law review journal.  You
ignored that source.

You responded to three sources, and ignored three others, giving 
you a batting average of .500.  Not very good, Mr. Greenfield.

>>  "In Roe and in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), the
>>   Supreme Court has held that the term `health'' includes both the
>>   physical and mental condition of the mother."
>>
>>   26 Vanderbilt Law Review at 829 (1973), Mark B, Anderson et al,
>>   "Abortion after Roe and Doe: A Proposed Statute" 

> This does not even support your position!

Of course it supports my position.

> There is no question that a serious threat to the mother's *mental* 
> health is covered by the "life or health" provision in Roe regarding the 
> third trimester.  The Court has never confused this with the expansive 
> treatment of "health" with regard to the first-trimester.

You've offered a single source which supports your interpretation,
but the author has given conflicting views on Roe and Doe.  In one
source, he supports my argument, and not yours. 

> Only *you* and your so-called scholarly sources have been confused on 
> this point.

Are these the "so-called scholarly sources" that you're referring to
Mr. Greenfield?

  Yale Law Journal
  Vanderbilt Law Review
  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
 
> I pointed this out in my last post, but you ignore it, as usual.

Repeating your argument over and over won't make it any more true.

>>   "Summary and Analysis of State Laws Relating to Abortion",
>>   Barbara Kaiser, Harriet F. Pilpel, and Eve W. Paul,
>>   in Family Planning, Contraception, Voluntary Sterilization
>>   and Abortion: An Analysis of Laws and Policies in the United
>>   States, Each State and Jurisdiction.
>>
>>   A Report of the Office for Family Planning
>>   Health Services Administration
>>   U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
>>   1978
>>
>>   Prepared by the Alan Guttmacher Institute
>>
>>
>>  "The landmark events in establishing the basic law governing abortion
>>   in the United States were the January 1973 decisions of the United 
>>   States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade[1] and Doe v. Bolton[2]. [...]
>>
>>   The Roe and Doe decisions have these results:  [...]
>>
>>   (3) After the fetus is viable, a State may regulate in its interest,
>>   even to the extent of prohibiting abortion unless to save the life
>>   or health (including the mental health) of the woman. [...]
>>
>>   Roe and Doe held the right to abortion to be a fundamental right,
>>   but the decisions also involved the medical profession in the
>>   decision-making process. A corollary is that a woman's decision
>>   to exercise her rights is in part dependent on the availability
>>   of health institutions and professionals willing to perform 
>>   abortions."

> This says only that health professionals cannot be *forced* to perform 
> an abortion that they do not feel is indicated.  It is incumbent upon 
> the woman to find a physician who is willing to perform the abortion.

Thank you for summarizing my position so nicely.  Yes, a physician
cannot be forced to perform an abortion under Roe.  They cannot be 
forced to perform an abortion even if there were no abortion laws at all.

>>   _A Lawyer Looks at Abortion_, Lynn D. Wardle and Mary Anne Q. Wood,
>>   Brigham Young University Press, 1982, pp. 137--138.

> I checked--this reference should be to pps. 133-134.

Yes, you're correct, sorry. 

>>  "The Supreme Court has defined health in some contexts to include ``all
>                                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>   factors--physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
>>   age--relevant to the well-being of the patient[50]''. If the post-
>                                                          ^^
>>   viability abortion is performed because it is ``necessary'' to avoid
>>   the burdens that pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood would place
>>   on a woman's emotional and psychological health, could not her doctor
>>   assume that it would be better if a method were chosen and every step
>>   taken during the abortion itself to insure that the fetus did not
>>   survive[51]?

> Does not this argument, coupled with the fact that the Court *has* 
> upheld the right of a State to require protections for the viable fetus 
> (just not those in the statute of Colautti--see Planned Parenthood of 
> Kansas City v. Ashcroft) suggest that post-viable abortion are *not* one 
> of the contexts to which the broad definition of health cited above?!

I don't know, can you provide a source which supports this claim? 

>> This last quote is from a professor of law named Lynn D. Wardle,
>> who appears to be the same person that you quote in one of your
>> sources.  It appears that this particular author has held conflicting  
>> opinions on Roe v. Wade, since the opinion above does not match
>> the opinion which you quote.

> This is rather interesting.  I note that there are actually two authors 
> of the aforementioned source, and that the following quote from the 
> source (which was published a year after the source I used):
>
> "A state desiring to protect its interest in the potential life of a 
> viable fetus should accept the Supreme Court's invitation to prohibit 
> any post-viability abortion unless it is necessary to preserve the life 
> or health of the pregnant woman.  Nearly half of the states presently 
> conform to the standard.
>
> "In many states, the exception to the prohibition of post-viability 
> abortions is allowed only to prevent death or 'permanent impairment,' 
> 'imminent peril,' 'severe and long-lasting,' or other variously 
> described threats to the woman's health.  The judicial sustainability of 
> such descriptions is questionable, as they appear to require something 
> more than the necessary preservation of health.  But given the fact that 
> a broad reading of the 'health' exception would subvert the state's 
> constitutional right to prohibit post-viability abortion, such efforts 
> are commendable and should be upheld."
>
> is very telling.  First of all, the quote demonstrates the fact that, 
> the practice of post-viability abortion laws simply does not support 
> your argument.  

You neglected to include the two sentences which follow that passage:

  "Nevertheless, in Margaret S. v. Edwards, a federal district
   court struck down a Louisiana statute which prohibited post-
   viability abortion except when the abortion was necessary to
   prevent ``permanent impairment to'' the woman's health.  The
   court found the ``permanent impairment'' standard to be 
   inconsistent with Roe v. Wade which presumably protected
   temporary as well as permanent incapacity." 

> Furthermore, it demonstrates that the authors are 
> stating their own conjecture in this source.

Yes, but only with regards to this particular point.

> Most importantly, there is a dramatic contrast between the objective 
> tone (or at least, not blatantly-biased tone) of the first source, which 
> I cited, and the blatant pro-life bias in the above statements.

But they're from the same author!

> This latter source smacks of someone who has gotten "religion" and has 
> abandoned scholarly research for political partisanism.

The book is written by an author that you've relied upon to support
your claims about Roe and Doe.  
 
>> You have provided a single source
>> from this author which supports your argument, and none of your
>> other sources support your argument.  I think you need to resolve
>> the conflicting opinions given by this particular author before
>> your argument can be given any credence at all.  

> See above.  

Eh?  Above, you say that you've relied upon an author who, in your words,
has "gotten religion and has abandoned scholarly research for political
partisanism".

> Perhaps you could argue that we should be very careful in 
> evaluating the author's earlier work.

Of course.  And the latter work also.

> However, even those portions of the argument presented in my earlier 
> post that are based upon the author's earlier work are clear, reasoned, 
> and have not been attacked in *substance* by anything you have said.

Perhaps, but his argument is inconsistent with his later work.

> That position is supported by the *explicit* statements of the Court in 
> the cases of Roe, Doe and Colautti.

No, it is not.

> That position is also supported by absence of any mention of your 
> extreme and absurd position in three major constitutional law texts (S. 
> Goldman, Braveman and Banks, and Rossum and Tarr), as well as one source 
> devoted to abortion (Drucker).

The absence of any mention of the definition of "health" in Roe and
Doe is not proof of your claims.

>>  "Roe provides that the State, because of its legitimate interest
>>   in potential life, may regulate and even forbid abortions after
>>   a fetus becomes viable, ``except when it is necessary to
>>   preserve the life or health of the mother.'' Roe, 410 U.S.
>>   at 164, 93 S.Ct. at 732.  The first sentence of ... [a section
>>   of the Louisiana abortion statute] while appearing to follow
>>   the guidelines set forth in Roe, uses the phrase ``to prevent
>>   permanent impairment to her health.'' This is not the same
>>   standard articulated in Roe, preservation of maternal
>>   health. [...] The Court finds that the requirement of
>>   permanent impairment impermissibly restricts the meaning
>>   of Roe."
>>
>>   Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. at 196 (1980)

> A "permanent impairment" and a *serious* threat to health are not 
> synonymous phrases.  There are many *serious* conditions that may heal 
> in time.  This quote does *not* support your contention that there is 
> only a single 'health' standard defined by Roe to apply to abortion in 
> all phases of pregnancy.

Perhaps so, but I've provided six other sources which do support my
argument. 

> So, it turns out that four of your "six sources" do not support your 
> position!

Since you've completely ignored three of them, I don't see how you can 
make this statement.  All six sources support my argument. 

>
>>> [... Doe v. Bolton ...]
>>> In its opinion, the SC 
>>> ruled that the use of the term "health," within the *Georgia 
>>> statute*, could be interpreted broadly enough to comply with 
>>> the first trimester rights recognized in Roe.  

>> That is not correct.  The original Georgia statute gave the 
>> following exception for abortion:
>>
>>  "(1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of
>>   the pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure
>>   her health;"
>>
>>   Doe v. Bolton, 410 US at 202 (1973)
>>
>> That restriction cannot be read broadly enough to comply with
>> the "first trimester rights" in Roe, which is abortion on demand.

> Since the *original* statute did not come before the Supreme Court, this 
> is totally irrelevant.  This provision of the statute had already been 
> struck and removed by a lower court, and was not considered by the 
> Court.

Yes, that's true, but you said "within the Georgia statute"...
which I interpreted as the original Georgia statute.  

>>> [...]
>>> Doe v. Bolton, specifically, did *not* discuss, suggest or 
>>> intend that the interpretation of the term "health" in the 
>>> context of the Georgia statute was to be used as the 
>>> interpretation of "health" with respect to the exceptions 
>>> required by Roe for post-viability abortion prohibitions.

>> Roe and Doe must be read together, so your statement is
>> not correct. 
>>
>>  "That opinion [Doe v. Bolton] and this one, of course, 
>>   are to be read together."
>>
>>   Roe v. Wade, 35 L Ed 2d at 184 (1973)

> More quotes out of context (plain lies!).  See the statements that 
> immediately followed this, cited earlier in this post.

Those quotes aren't taken out of context. 

> You don't seem to understand what it means to read two things together.  
> I suppose that if the Court had stated in Doe that "The woman wanting 
> the abortion has blonde hair" you would assert that this must be read 
> with Roe to mean that *Jane Roe* had blonde hair!

No, the color of the woman's hair is irrelevant. 

>> Also, I've given you 6 independent sources which agree with
>> one another, and they conflict with your single source. 

> This is simply not true--

Yes, it's true.

> though I doubt it is important, since I have no 
> doubt that you could easily find 100 sources to support your position--I 
> just doubt that they would be very credible.  (I'll have to see to 
> believe.)

I'm sorry you don't believe my sources.  You have ignored three
of them, and two sources are from prestigious law review journals.

>> In summary, you have one source which supports your claims,
>> but the author gives conflicting claims in another source. 

> This is not true either.  

Yes, it's true.

> But even if we assume that all of my direct 
> sources can not be relied upon, and must be independently verified, you 
> have presented *nothing* to dispute the substance of the argument I 
> present, or the many citations from Supreme Court opinions which are 
> *not* taken out of context (unlike yours) and which EXPLICITLY REJECT 
> YOUR CLAIMS!

I'm not a lawyer, so I don't feel compelled to address your argument
directly, other than to cite sources from professionals who disagree
with your opinion. 

I've already addressed the citations from the Supreme Court decisions.

>> I've given you 6 independent sources which support my argument.
>> The only support for your argument comes from an author who has
>> written conflicting opinions on Roe and Doe.  This same author
>> has written an opinion which supports my argument.  You need
>> to resolve this conflict before your argument can be given 
>> any support whatsoever.  

> Once again, you have not.

Yes, I have.

> Additionally, the fact that the author of an argument appears to have, 
> later, changed her opinions does *not* suggest that you may toss aside 
> that argument without *any* substantive response.

Yes, it does suggest that I may toss aside your argument.  It suggests
that the author could have been wrong, and changed his mind, or perhaps
he's just confused.  You need to resolve that discrepancy in his work.
You have failed to do that.

> The argument stands on its own--it does not miraculously disappear if 
> the author stops supporting it.

Well, then it would become just your opinion.  What are your qualifications?

> In sum, your last post proves that you cannot be trusted to honestly 
> represent facts, and as such, you have no credibility.

I'm sorry, but you've ignored three of my sources. The only source
for your claims is from an author who's held conflicting opinions
on Roe and Doe. 

> You shamefully lie to support your arguments.

These false allegations won't get me upset.  Try another tack,
like presenting some credible sources for your opinion.

Oh, and here are the two sources that you ignored (besides
the article by Mark Tushnet, which I've re-posted above):

   ---
   82 Yale Law Journal at 921 (1973), John Hart Ely, "The Wages of
   Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade" 
 
   [...] At the point at which the fetus becomes viable[17] the
   interest in protecting it becomes compelling[18], and therefore
   from that point on the state can prohibit abortions except--and
   this limitation is also apparently a constitutional command,
   though it receives no justification in the opinion--when they
   are necessary to protect maternal life or health[19].

      [19] 93 S. Ct. at 732 [...] This holding--that even after
      viability the mother's life or health (which presumably is to
      be defined very broadly indeed, so as to include what many
      might regard as the mother's convenience, see 93 S. Ct. at
      755 (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v. Vuitch,
      402 U.S. 62 (1971), must, as a matter of constitutional law,
      take precedence over what the Court seems prepared to grant
      at this point has become the fetus's life, see p. 924 infra--
      seems to me at least as controversial as its holding respecting
      the period prior to viability."

   ---

   B.B. Sendor, "Medical Responsibility for Fetal Survival under Roe and Doe",
   10 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 444,465 (1975)

  "Even during viability, when the state may proscribe certain abortions
   because of a ``compelling'' interest in potential life, it may not
   do so when abortion ``is necessary, in appropriate medical judgement,
   for the preservation of the life or health of the mother[18].''
   In Doe, the Court stated that the term ``health'' should be given
   a broad reading:

      [T]he medical judgement may be exercised in light of all factors--
       physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
       age--relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these
       factors may relate to health. This allows the attending 
       physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgement.
       And it is room that operates for the benefit, not the
       disadvantage, of the pregnant woman[19].

   In short, Roe and Doe give the woman (1) a privacy interest that
   outweighs any rights which may be asserted on behalf of the fetus
   up to the point of viability, and (2) a broadly defined health
   interest which prevails over any interest asserted on behalf of
   the fetus throughout the term of pregnancy.

   ---


>J. S. Greenfield


Doug Holtsinger

Newsgroups: talk.abortion