From: salas@ra.nrl.navy.mil (Miguel Salas)
Subject: Re: Somalia News Update, No 42
Organization: Naval Research Lab, Washington, DC
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 17:32:45 GMT

This is the kind of posting I personally like to see in a newsgroup.

Bernhard, Thanks for the detail info. It was written objectively.

In article <antbh.724020268@strix> antbh@strix.udac.uu.se (Bernhard Helander) writes:
>
>
>In this issue:
>US TROOPS AND THEN WHAT...?
>GLIMPSES FROM THE ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE
>____________________________________________________________________ 
>
>               S O M A L I A  N E W S  U P D A T E  
>
>____________________________________________________________________ 
>No 42                December 10, 1992.               ISSN 1103-1999  
>____________________________________________________________________ 
>Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and 
>fax. Questions can be directed to antbh@strix.udac.uu.se or to fax 
>number +46-18-151160. All material is free to quote as long as the 
>source is stated. 
>____________________________________________________________________ 
>
>   Note to fax-subscribers: Unfortunately the delivery time for
>   the facsimile edition has increased. As this issue "goes into 
>   press" the previous two issues have not yet been sent out by
>   the fax gateway that handles the distribution.It is said to be due
>   to an over-heated use of SUNET's fax gateway. I would like to
>   encourage all fax-subcribers to explore their possibilities of 
>   receiving instead the e-mail edition
>                                    B. H. 
>
>
>
>US TROOPS AND THEN WHAT...?
>
>   (SNU, Uppsala, Dec 10) The deployment of the first 1 800 US troops 
>went exceptionally well. So far they have met little or no resistance 
>and they have had some success in collecting guns from the 
>population. 
>   Mogadishu is reported to be exceptionally calm. The sporadic 
>gunfire that most people had grewn so accustomed to during the past 
>two years, is hardly heard anymore. From a military point of view the 
>operation "Restore Hope" has been extremely simple. It is tempting to 
>say "embarrassingly simple" when keeping in mind that so many people, 
>so long have appealed to the UN for a massive international military 
>solution. With the advantage of hindsight we no know that it took 
>only 1 800 troops to restore some sort of order in Mogadishu, and 
>that not a single round needed to be fired. Today, there have been
>some shooting as a truck tried to get through a road block without
>being searched. French soldiers opened fire and there are reports 
>of some casualties.
>   Nevertheless, the dangers of "Restore Hope" do no not lie 
>in establishing control over the port and and airports in the Mogadishu 
>area. Resistance may be expected as the US troops advance towards the 
>interior. However, although the size of the forces of the various 
>factions and their armament that the forces will encounter may look 
>impressive on paper, few seem to claim that this will really 
>constitute a serious problem for the Marines. 
>   The real problems are political. There is an immanent danger that 
>the foreign intervention will create an opportunity for the factional 
>leaders to present themselves and to become established as the 
>legitimate leaders of the Somali people - without giving the Somali 
>people much say in the matter! Already Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah 
>Aydiid have been "summoned to the American embassy", according to a 
>telegram. Any kind of solution worked out for the future of Somalia 
>must undobtedly to some extent come to involve these and other 
>factional leaders. However, a genuine peace process cannot by-pass 
>the traditional leadership such as clan elders, intellectuals, 
>religious leaders, influential persons of both sexes, not to mention 
>all the Somalis in exile.
>   In the worst possible scenario, some of the factional leaders will 
>reach a quick agreement with the Americans. They will be allowed to 
>set the agenda for peace talks and sign fancy documents. Large scale 
>disarmanent will be carried out but the core of the factional armies 
>will withdraw to Ethiopia. Once things have settled - it is 
>reasonable to expect that within six to eight weeks - the Americans 
>can start to pull out. With the foreign troops out, some new peace 
>conferences will be held but disagreements will emerge. Sporadic 
>fighting will begin among groups that are by then based in Ethiopia 
>and soon that unrest will spread into the south of Somalia again. 
>   The consolidation of the power of the factional leaders will be 
>accomponanied by the massive input of Western development aid 
>assistance. This will provide these leaders with new resources to 
>distribute among their followers and it will effectively block all 
>attempts towards democratic development. Somalia will to some extent 
>see a revival of the economy of late 80's during which foreign 
>developement assistance accounted for 57% of the GNP. The difference 
>will be that Somalia will have not one dictator as in the days of 
>Siyad Barre, but several "regional dictators" subsiding off 
>development corruption and basing their power on their control of 
>foreign funds.
>   Already some signs of this process are visible. US administration 
>officials are reported to have said that the warlords no more are to 
>be described by that term, "regional leaders" is the euphemism they 
>have come up with. Another sign is the coclusion of the recently 
>concluded Addis Ababa conference that the targets for input of aid 
>should be "determined at the local level in accordance with the 
>prevailing leadership structure in each area". (See next article)
>
>
>GLIMPSES FROM THE ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE
>Copyright Inter Press Service 1992, all rights reserved.  
>
>    (New york, Dec 8 (IPS) -- As U.S. Marines prepare to land in 
>Mogadishu to begin 'Operation Restore Hope', the United Nations is 
>trying to encourage Somalis to search for a long-term political 
>solution to the crisis in their country.
>   A U.N. spokesperson confirmed monday that Ismat Kittani, 
>Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's special representative in 
>Somalia, was "in touch with all factions on a regular basis".
>   This meant that the two rival warlords in the East African nation, 
>Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi, who did not attend a coordination meeting 
>on Somalia in Addis Ababa, were being kept informed of U.N. efforts 
>to forge a political understanding between Somali leaders.
>   Jan Eliasson, U.N. under-secretary-general for humanitarian 
>affairs who addressed the meeting Dec. 5 (see SNU 40, Dec 4), said it 
>was important for the conference "to lay the foundation for a future 
>for Somalia beyond emergency relief".
>   The conference was attended by 400 participants from donor 
>countries, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and U.N. 
>relief bodies. A quarter of the participants were community, 
>political and ngo leaders from Somalia.
>   Two areas thought to be crucial for reconstruction was health and 
>agriculture. Several Somali doctors and specialists working in 
>refugee camps in neighbouring countries were being asked to return to 
>Mogadishu to help start the medical services there.
>   The conference focussed on measures to intensify the United 
>Nations' 100-day programme of accelerated relief and recovery 
>assistance to Somalia. Launched two months ago, the programme was 
>disrupted when rival warlords broke ceasefire agreements and attacked 
>U.N. food shipments.
>   Eliasson admitted that the 100-day programme was so far only a 
>"partial success". but even in its limited operation, the programme 
>"may directly and indirectly have saved the lives of perhaps as many 
>as one million people".
>   An important conclusion of the conference was that the new targets 
>of the 100-day programme would be "determined at the local level in 
>accordance with the prevailing leadership structure in each area". 
>   There has been considerable criticism from human rights activists 
>that the way relief supplies were delivered by some Western agencies 
>actually contributed to the general lawlessness in Somalia. This was 
>because some relief agencies ignored local community leaders and made 
>separate deals with armed groups or "technicals" as they are known in 
>Somalia.
>   Among the conclusions of the conference were those relating to the 
>role and activities of what it called the "humanitarian protection 
>forces" or the U.S. troops under the U.N.-authorised intervention.
>   Without specifying the circumstances, the conference said the 
>humanitarian protections forces "should remain until such time as 
>their mission has been accomplished".
>   And hinting at a broader role for the  U.S.-led forces, the 
>participants "strongly recommended" that while they were there, the 
>troops should become involved in "the rehabilitation of the physical 
>infrastructure" of the country.
>   Although the conference did not refer specifically to disarming 
>the irregular forces, it said the "reduction of arms, particularly of 
>the 'technicals' and other heavy weaponry, was fundamental" in 
>restoring law and order.
>   So far, the precise task of the U.S.-led force has been defined by 
>the U.N. security council resolution and the top leadership of the 
>U.S. defence department as one which will ensure "a secure 
>environment" for the delivery of relief supplies to the starving 
>Somalis.
>   If the two biggest warlords cooperate with the U.S-led force, as 
>they have already indicated they will, a "secure environment" for the 
>delivery of relief supplies may well be created for the asking. But 
>the conference participants in Addis Ababa expect the "humanitarian 
>protection forces" to do more than just that. They want the armed 
>gangs disarmed and demobilised, and the humanitarian protection force 
>to help in the reconstruction of Somali society. 
>_________________________________________________________________ 
>Posted by Bernhard Helander in Uppsala, Sweden.