HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: gawne@stsci.edu
Subject: Effectiveness of Reserves (was Re: Swiss military preparedness?)
Organization: Space Telescope Science Institute
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 17:13:58 GMT


From gawne@stsci.edu

In article <Bzo8zo.CKC@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
 "Donald R. Newcomb" <dnewcomb@whale.st.usm.edu> writes:

> What M. Baechler describes is probably the rule among militia defense
> forces rather than the exception. As a noncom. in what can be described
> as a semi-organized militia (the MS State Guard) I can assure you that
> it is true here. From what I have seen watching Swedish conscripts
> learning the basics of taking bearings on the pier in Kalmar, it must
> be true there to. When troops train at home their "gardens" call to
> them louder than their sergeants. The only exception is found when a
> danger is perceived to be clear and present (e.g. the Natives just burned
> the next village upstream; the Soviets are massed in Bohemia and could
> sweep down through the Emmenthal to flank NATO forces in France).

Well folks, the US Marine Corps Reserve is another exception.  I've served
with three different SMCR units and all of them had well motivated and
disciplined members.  I have furthermore had occassion to deal with members
of the SMCR from units all over the country and I've never seen any
problems that didn't have equal or worse counterparts in active duty units.

> The Soviets (and Americans when we conscripted) made a special point
> to remove conscripts from their home territory for training so that they
> could hear their sergeants calling.

So?  What do conscripts have to do with volunteers?  I guess if you are
going to require every citizen to be in the militia you have an argument
here.

> The great advantage of the militia concept comes in its economics. All
> other things being equal, a battalion of the Swiss militia could probably
> be trained and equipped for the cost of keeping a couple platoons of the
> USMC for a year.  They would, however, be totally useless to anyone with
> dreams of imperial glory or "vital interests" to defend abroad.

I'm not so sure about this.  Marines are pretty cheap.  Figuring a couple
of platoons to be 60 men with an average rank of LCpl (E-3), your largest
expense is going to be the ~$1 million for pay and allowances.  And a lot
of their pay can be written off as "training" costs.  What does it cost to
train and equip (in annual costs) a battalion of Swiss infantry?  Still,
your point is valid in that militia cost far less than regular forces.

But to expand just a bit, I served 9 years of active duty in the USMC from
'72 till '81.  Since '81 I've been in the Marine Corps Reserve.  I've had
plenty of opportunity to see things from both points of view, and as far
as I'm concerned the reserve Marine lacks nothing when compared to his 
active duty counterpart.

-Bill Gawne,  Space Telescope Science Institute
 GySgt USMCR

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Peter Cash <cash@convex.com>
Subject: Re: Napoleon's Guard (Re: Prussian Military)
Keywords: books history prussia
Organization: The Instrumentality
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 21:25:41 GMT


From Peter Cash <cash@convex.com>

On a (possibly) related note, I've run across mention of German cavalry
used in WW I called the "Uhlans". Can anyone tell me what kind of units
these were, and anything about their history? The name strikes me as
peculiar--it has no meaning in German.
-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Stephen Camp <hobbes@spacemanspiff.den.mmc.com>
Subject: Re: Bradley AA version (was Re: helos vs tanks)
Organization: Denver, Colorado
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 21:19:13 GMT


From Stephen Camp <hobbes@spacemanspiff.den.mmc.com>

In article <Bzo8oq.C5G@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Michael Gallagher <gallaghe@oasys.dt.navy.mil> writes:
>

>    Problem with 30mm weapon use is there is no AP round in service
>- the A-10 and Apache AH-64 helicoter use a dual purpose 30mm round
>that is slow and probably won't defeat the future threat land combat
>vehicle the Bradley will come up against.  That is why the Army wants
>45/50mm rounds and EM/ETC cannons.
>
>    The reason the 30mm round is effective now is because it is a top
>attack weapon, and also being shot from the A-10, it has a little additional
>initial velocity from the aircraft launching speed (a few hundred f/s
>helps when KE = 1/2*m*v*v). Also, as you remember from Desert Storm,
>when the AH-64 attacked land combat vehicles, it used its Hellfire missiles,
>not the 30mm.
>
>

Three points:

1)  Doesn't the Air Force fire a 30mm round with a *depleted uranium* core
	/penetrator out of the A-10's GAU-8A cannon?  Sounds pretty AP to me.

2)  I believe a 30mm round from an A-10 starts with a muzzle velocity 
	upwards of 3000 fps or higher.  An A-10 pilot once told me they can't
	get the plane much past 300 kts.  A +500 fps velocity delta probably
	helps, but I think the extra speed  is *far* from critical.

3)  During Desert Storm, two A-10 pilots set a record for some 20+ tanks
	destroyed in *one* sortie.  If memory serves, they knocked all 
	20+ tanks out using *only* cannon.  (Now, if i were some helo 
	jock and *had* hellfires as well as 30mm... I'm no dummy, I'd 
	shoot the missiles first even if I had 30mm AP.)  I don't think
	the A-10 pilots had any mavericks with them at the time.  I think
	they were RTB (return to base) at the time.  Anybody remember
	the whole story on this one?



-- 

Steve Camp
(303)971-4379
hobbes@spacemanspiff.den.mmc.com

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Aryk Nusbacher <nusbache@epas.utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: Prussian Military
Organization: University of Toronto - Office of the Provost
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 17:24:46 GMT


From Aryk Nusbacher <nusbache@epas.utoronto.ca>

In article <BzH50K.AsH@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> jheath@fieldofdreams.npirs.purdue.edu (Jim Heath) writes:

>The "600" of Charge of the Light Brigade fame were Hussars (if I'm not
>mistaken).  I believe the coat was designed that way to leave the
>sword hand free.

The Light Brigade at Balaclava included the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's).

A hussar's hat is a shako, not a busby.

And the Hussar wore two coats:  a dolmen, which was a heavily frogged
coat which was worn closed, and a pelisse, which was a fur-lined coat
worn as a cape -- always open, though it was fully frogged.  The
pelisse was worn to look cool and to provide some protection to the
off-shoulder, where it hung.

Aryk Nusbacher


Newsgroups: sci.military
From: phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au (Stephen Harker)
Subject: Re: Alaska Class Cruisers
Organization: Physics Department
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 17:36:39 GMT


From phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au (Stephen Harker)

In article <Bzq2p3.4Iy@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, "david.r.wells" <drw@cbnewsg.cb.att.com> writes:
> 
> From "david.r.wells" <drw@cbnewsg.cb.att.com>
> 
> In article <Bz9Etz.6D4@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Don Mcgregor <drm@mozart.esl.com> writes:
>>
>>It certainly would have been interesting to see how the _Alaska_   
>>changed the dynamics of the night battles.  My guess is it would have  
>>been torpedoed, since that was the killing weapon after dark, and its  
>>guns wouldn't have come into full effect.  But _Alaska_ vs. _Hiei_ at  
>>2,000 yards, now that would be interesting. Or the effect it would  
>>have on some of the Japanese heavy cruisers during a night gun  
>>battle. Or _Alaska_ replacing one of the US BBs in the other night  
>>action with the Japanese BB and cruisers.
>>
>     They might well have been torpedoed, especially if they were employed
> as cruisers, as I suggested. Alas, the Alaskas would not have fared too
> well against the Long Lance. Dulin & Garzke report that their anti-torpedo
> protection was poor. (and their diagrams back this up) But keep in mind,
> that the Alaskas DID have radar, which would have improved their performance
> at night, perhaps even beyond the performance of the Long Lance.  
>     As for Alaska vs Hiei, I'd still put my money on the Alaska, for the
> same reasons as I mentioned in the Alaska vs. Renown debate. Even after
> reconstruction, the Hiei was still basically a glorified Lion, (read
> "very little armor", exact stats unavailable) and probably had especially
> poor deck armor. Also, I doubt if the Hiei's guns could elevate more than
> 30 degrees. Add to this mix the Alaska's radar, and the Alaska would be
> the clear winner at long range. At 2000 yards, it might be a different story,
> but I doubt the battle would last that long. (Of course, the Kirishima DID
> get lucky with the South Dakota, so anything's possible!)

	Peter Hodges in "The Big Gun" (full details given earlier) says
that the all the Japanese 14" class ships including the Kongo class were
modified progressively from the original 25 degree maximum elevation to 33
degrees, and finally to 43 degrees.  One class of ships did not have higher
elevation on X and Y turrets, but this was not the Kongo class.  In general
the Japanese made extensive modernisation of their earlier ships, this did
include some improved armour but I don't have the details to hand.

	The figures that are given by Peter Hodges for range show that the
Japanese 14" ships at 43 degrees would outrange all US main armament, bar
the Iowa class 16" guns.  They would also outrange all British main
armament (unless you want to include the 18" gun on coastal defence monitor
which is stretching things a bit).  However penetration is another matter,
again I don't have details for this to hand.

-- 
Stephen Harker			phs172m@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au
Monash University		Baloney baffles brains: Eric Frank Russell

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Ryan Montieth Gill <labrg@emory.edu>
Subject: Re: WW2 BARRAGE
Organization: Emory University, Atlanta, GA
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 15:31:31 GMT


From Ryan Montieth Gill <labrg@emory.edu>



	effectiveness and number of kills are different...No covoy
	escorted by a Blimp was ever attaced by U boats...  The
	presence of an obstacle will in many cases preclude one's
	attempts to risk the obstacle...I would think that a german
	pilot who was aware of BB's would steer clear of them to
	prevent being fouled in the cables.. only the foolhardy and the
	brave beyond this point...

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: po-tai@hprisc-23.cae.wisc.edu (Po-Tai Cheng)
Subject: NIKE-HERCULES Missile System 
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 15:57:58 GMT


From po-tai@hprisc-23.cae.wisc.edu (Po-Tai Cheng)



Hi everybody..... I am from Taiwan. Before I came here, I serve in the

Army Missile Command of Taiwan as a maintenance seargent. I am interested about

the history of the NIKE-HERCULES Guided Missile System. Is there anyone can

tell me where to get this kind of information? Thanks.......


Newsgroups: sci.military
From: emory!ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: Swiss military preparedness??
Organization: Destructive Testing Systems
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 17:28:22 GMT


From emory!ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)

In article <Bzs8Jq.KxF@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> durin!huntsville.sparta.com!valle@uunet.UU.NET (Tony Valle) writes:
>
>I think the driving issue of an armed militia versus a true modern
>army is one of logistics. Putting aside the better training and 
>equipment available to a modern army (which makes them more efficient),
>and the considerable advantage in firepower (which makes them more
>destructive), the real problem with maintaining a guerilla war
>against a motivated occupying army is in supply.

Actually, guerilla war experience shows you have this backwards. It's
the conventional invader who has the supply problem. The guerilla draws
his supplies from the local economy and from captured enemy stocks. The
guerilla avoids enemy main force units and concentrates on hitting the
long and vulnerable enemy logistic supply lines. 

>As Dan Sorenson pointed out -- the invading army would control the
>roads. And by extension, they also control the ports, the airports,
>and the manufacturing facilities. And while it is true that going out
>in small groups into the surrounding countryside might prove unhealthy
>for the invaders, direct frontal assault on military encampments would
>be suicidal for the militia. WIthout the ability to dislodge an 
>occupation force from key production areas, it's only a matter of
>time before shortages in ammunition, fuel, parts, and food render the 
>militia militarily ineffective.

The guerilla controls the countryside, including the roads, at all
times except when the enemy is actually moving down the road in
strength. The guerilla mines the roads, sets up ambushes of supply
columns, and generally makes movement of supplies a dangerous and
expensive operation for the enemy. The guerilla *never* engages
in direct frontal assualts, that's suicidal. The guerilla engages
in a prolonged war of attrition that wears the enemy forces down
through denial of supplies, denial of safe areas for R&R, sabotage,
ambushes of small units, and hit and run attacks on critical strong 
points.

The guerilla doesn't need fuel, because he has no heavy vehicles to
slow him down. Nor does he need parts that aren't available on the
local economy. His ammo requirements are modest and most frequently
come from captured enemy stocks. And he is fed by the people. The 
guerilla is like the sea, he flows gracefully away from strong forces, 
but comes back again and again eroding away the enemy's strength in 
tiny nibbles and bites.

Gary
-- 
Gary Coffman KE4ZV          |    You make it,     | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems |    we break it.     | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way             |    Guaranteed!      | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary      
Lawrenceville, GA 30244     |                     | emory!ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu


Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Brian Douglass <anasaz!briand@anasazi.com>
Subject: Re: Secret Weapons Flops Flops
Organization: Anasazi Inc Phx Az USA
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 21:25:57 GMT


From Brian Douglass <anasaz!briand@anasazi.com>

In article <BzM9zn.MKK@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> dave pierson <pierson@empror.enet.dec.com> writes:
>
>From dave pierson <pierson@empror.enet.dec.com>
>
>Back again, sniping at Secret Weapons Video.  Down to their usual form.  Subject
>this week was "flops, weapons that failed....)
>Lotsa misinformation about the Paris Gun of WWI (at minimum, their were two, not
>one and NONE of the film footage appeared to  be of the actual gun.  That last
>I would not mention, if that were all.  "Failed due to breech wear", nope,
>failed due to counterbattery fire forcing moves, and loss of front line two
>attacks.

What I remember reading about this gun, is that Krupp determined what the
barrel wear would be per shot, and cast shells of ever increasing size to
match the increased bore size due to use.  Because of the tremendous 
breech pressures, and powder composition, the barrel wear was extensive.

As to counterbattery, while allied searches searched extensively for the
weapons, they never could find them.  And eventually their own wear put
them out of action.

As to footage, apparently the Germans did an excellant job at destroying
the guns, diagrams and any and all photos, save one or two.  That someone
had found motion footage of the gun in action would have been a gold mine.


Newsgroups: sci.military
From: gustin@evs2.uia.ac.be (Emmanuel Gustin)
Subject: Re: Gladiators in WWII RAF service
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 21:22:19 GMT


From gustin@evs2.uia.ac.be (Emmanuel Gustin)

mike@aloysius.equinox.gen.nz (Mike Campbell) writes:
:
: From Mike Campbell <mike@aloysius.equinox.gen.nz>
:
: > From MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>
:
:    <quite a lot deleted>
:
: > Certainly no Glad squadrons feature in
: > the RAF's Order of Battle after May 1940.
:
:
: I seem to remember that there was a single squadron still equipped
: with the type in 10 (?) Group (SW of England) during the "Battle of
: Britain", August - September 1940.  The final delivery was only in
: April 1940 (!!!!).
:
: Any one know any other details?

No247 squadron formed at Roborough, Plymouth in august 1940. Its primary
duty was the defence of Devonport dockyards. 15 serials are listed for
these a/c. The squadron re-equipped
with Hurricanes at the end of 1940. Gladiators kept flying in the UK until
january 1945 in the Meteorological flights. My source does not give
information on any fighting done. Maybe there was none.

It is also mentioned that Gladiators operating from Scotland encountered
German aircraft in October 1939.

Some also took part in the Battle of France. 607 and 615 squadron went the
France in November 1939. The 607 sq. claimed 70 German aircraft -- like
most wartime figures, I would divide this by 3.

Emmanuel Gustin
gustin@uia.ac.be

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Rick Pavek <kuryakin@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
Subject: References wanted: Biafra, Congo, Sudan
Organization: Boeing Computer Services
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 17:13:56 GMT


From Rick Pavek <kuryakin@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>

I'd like to find references for the African bush wars, not necessarily
limited to the above.  Orders of battle, accounts, maps, historical
info, area studies, and books/articles would all be welcomed.

Primary focus is on mercenary troops but would like info on Rolf
Steiner and his actions as well.

Purpose of this exercise is to examine how feasible a series of
conflict simulations would be to produce and to build a basic library
for researching the same.

Xerox acceptable, originals preferred.

Also would like to find any insignia/patches/flags or photos from these
conflicts.

Thanks, Rick

--------Gut here
-- 
Rick Pavek                       | Never ask a droid to outdo its program.
kuryakin@bcstec.ca.boeing.com    |           
Seattle, WA                      |   It wastes your time
                                 |          and annoys the droid.  

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: eric remy <edremy@leland.stanford.edu>
Subject: Re: Helos vs. tanks
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 16:01:12 GMT


From eric remy <edremy@leland.stanford.edu>

In article <BzH4uM.AGF@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> wwo@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (Thomas Schoene) writes:
>
>From wwo@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (Thomas Schoene)
>
>I just remembered something else.  The Army is apparently upgrading its tank
>ammunition.  The new HEAT round will have a proximity fuze to improve its
>capability vs. helos.  Apparently HEAT is the preferred round for such things.
>Sabot will aledgedly pass through some helos without killing them.  (This
>probably refers to passing hits on types with a cargo/passenger section)

Geez, have they changed this again?  When I went through Knox, we were
told to use sabot on choppers due to the much higher velocity of sabot.
(Choppers can be pretty speedy...)  All of the computer trainers
(U/MCOFT) penalized you for using sabot instead of HEAT, but we were
told to ignore this.  

Sabot could pass through the target, much like it will for lightly
armored vehicles like BRDMs.  ("Fire, Fire HEAT" is the correct
command to engage stuff like this when you have a sabot round in the
tube.)  Still, I'd rather hit the target ineffectively: the chopper
driver probably will be a little rattled when something going a mile a
second passes a few feet from him...


As a side note, I wouldn't count on the AA machine gun on my tank
(M60A3) to defend me against anything in the air.  If I can't hit it
with the main gun I'll just go and hide: it's way too hard to crank
the thing around to hit a fast moving object.

>
>-- 
>Tom Schoene
>wwo@cornella.cit.cornell.edu  -or- wwo@vax5.cit.cornell.edu
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
>Back off man.  I'm a political scientist!


-- 
Eric R.      edremy@d31ha0.Stanford.EDU       Department of Chemistry
                        -1/2\nabla^2\psi_{T-72}

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>
Subject: Re: WW2 BARRAGE
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 17:17:22 GMT


From MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>

In article <BzM9u7.MDr@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> "patterson,george r" <patter@dasher.cc.bellcore.com> writes:
>From: "patterson,george r" <patter@dasher.cc.bellcore.com>
>Subject: Re: WW2 BARRAGE
>Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 16:01:19 GMT
>
>From "patterson,george r" <patter@dasher.cc.bellcore.com>
>
>In article <BzH56M.B81@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> fengxi@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca (Fengxi Zhou) writes:
>>
>>Do these balloons, nets, cables do any damage to modern low level strike
>>aircraft, like f-15e and tornado? or better yet, f-117 and b-2? given the
>>speed of those birds, i would guess the impact be quite serious, although
>>the idea looks positively low-tech. might even hang a few claymore to enhance
>>the effect. what do you think?
>
>What do you *think* the effect is going to be of hitting a 1" piece of
>steel at hundreds of miles per hour? Low-tech doesn't mean ineffective.
>The claymore idea is interesting, but the cables normally used are quite
>heavy as it is. It probably wouldn't be worth it to make a balloon big
>enough to hold up mines as well.

	I'm not sure that BB's had cables of that diameter as a matter of 
course -- a fairly light quarter inch steel wire would do the job PROVIDED
the plan of getting an a/c to hit it was merely the start of the fun.

	The reading that I've picked up on this in the last week or so
suggests that the UK concept early in the war was designed around the idea 
that once a bomber hit a cable, an explosive charge would sever the cable 
from both the balloon and the ground, immediately thereafter a drogue 
parachute would deploy causing (let's say) severe handling problems for the
unfortunate pilot.   

	Keep in mind too that the Germans fitted "cable cutting" devices to
certain of their a/c (the He111 comes to mind); a heavy guage cable would
require a quite powerful winding engine to operate its cable drum; and that
all BB's needed to be periodically brought down for repair and regassing.  
This suggests that although really heavy cables make sense in special point-
defense situations (e.g. vital factories), for the most part a flexible, 
opportunistic deployment was perhaps more common.   Again, must stress that
German and US equipment/tactics were probably quite different -- having
1" cables capable of stopping a B17 in its tracks for a dense BB coverage 
of (say) the Polesti oilfields makes perfect sense.
Cheers,
Keith Coman
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"If we pay dogfood salespeople more than we   :  Dept of Management
 do teachers, we should not be surprised if   :  Rhodes University
 our dogs eat like kids, and our kids end     :  Grahamstown, 6140
 up reading like dogs."                       :  Rep of South Africa
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





Newsgroups: sci.military
From: eriks@lin.foa.se (Erik Svensson FOA2)
Subject: Re: Helos vs. tanks
Organization: FOA, Linkoping, Sweden
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 16:01:17 GMT


From eriks@lin.foa.se (Erik Svensson FOA2)

>From wwo@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (Thomas Schoene)

>As others have commented, Phalanx is rather too large for this.  Some Israeli
>company actaully proposed Phalanx as a land-based air defense system and it
>would have required its own truck as a prime mover.

I saw a mock-up of that in Paris last year. A phalanx /Barak combo for point 
defence of high-value targets. It was huge. I do wonder if they ever got one 
sold.
--
Erik Svensson			Research Officer
Guided Weapons Division		National Defense Research Establishment (FOA)
Stockholm			Sweden

net.address: 	eriks@fenix.lin.foa.se

"Another casualty of applied meta-physics!" -- Hobbes

Newsgroups: sci.military