From: rmk@frog.CRDS.COM (Rick Kelly)
Newsgroups: comp.os.os2.advocacy
Subject: Re: MS's misconduct!
Date: 9 Oct 92 08:12:54 GMT
Organization: Charles River Data Systems

In article <1992Oct5.215925.6501@hellgate.utah.edu> brian%jaguar.cs.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Brian Sturgill) writes:
>In article <1992Oct5.230835.22607@ms.uky.edu> sam@ms.uky.edu (Mike Mills) writes:
>>thg@cam-orl.co.uk (Tim Glauert) writes:
>>
>>>In article <1992Oct4.180905.27222@ms.uky.edu>, sam@ms.uky.edu (Mike Mills) writes:
>>>|> IMHO, preemptive multitasking is a requirement.
>>
>>>OK, I agree.
>>
>>>|>  Also, any OS should be multiuser.
>>
>>>OK, I agree again, for a PC/Workstation OS.
>>
>>>|>  This is a shortcoming in both NT and OS/2.
>>
>>>Sorry, you lost me at this point. NT is fully multi-user. What are you trying
>>>to say?
>>
>>>|> With machines
>>>|> becoming more and more powerful, there is an increasing need for multiuser
>>>|> operating systems, in order to take better advantage of the underlying
>>>|> machine.
>>
>>>I agree. That is one reason I prefer NT to OS/2 2.0.
>>
>>
>>Ok, perhaps I'm mistaken here.  From what I've read, NT offers symmetric
>>multiprocessing and some other things, but is NOT multiuser.
>>
>>If NT is truly multiuser, then I must say that is one thing in its favor.
>>
>>Someone care to give the definititve answer on this?
>
>Well if you'll take my word as "definitive", I'll give it.
>
>NT has "multi-user" capabilities that exceed Unix.  I'll compare it against
>Unix.
>
>In most Unix a process has a user id and with each user id has an associate
>set of group id's.  This set defines what files a user can access,
>what devices (protected as if they were files) the user can access,
>and if the user id is 0 then special system administrative privileges
>are granted.
>A few Unixes also allow access control lists (ACLs)
>which typically allow a list of users id's that are specifically
>forbidden or allowed to access a file.
>
>NT goes beyond this.  Each thread has a security context consisting of
>the logon session's identity, the user's logon (for file ownership
>purposes), and a set of capabilities.  Most system objects (e.g. files,
>processes, threads, synchronization objects) have ACL's that control
>who can manipulate them.  Security on file systems only work under
>NTFS.  (FAT and HPFS are not built for security.) There's the expect
>set of API calls that allow the manipulation of the ACL's and that
>allow authorization.  Plus there is a call that allows a server to
>impersonate a client.
>
>(Take this next part with a grain of salt... my monitor died, so
>I'm without NT for a few days... someone else out there want to
>verify this is possible?  I looked briefly at it before, but have
>not actually done it.)
>The user management system allows the creation of "groups" that
>represent sets of capabilities.  Thus rather than having just
>root/normal user granularty, NT can have "users" with partial system
>admin priviledges...  thus allowing appropriate accounts for operators,
>etc.  The user in a simple, secure environment (e.g. me at home) can
>simply grant their normal user account all capabilities.  Thus you get
>the best of both worlds appropriate granularity at complex sites;
>simplicty at simple sites.



You ought to go look at SCO UNIX, SCO ODT, Solaris 2.0, and SVR4.

It's in there.
Newsgroups: comp.os.os2.advocacy