From: gambit@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu ()
Subject: Re: An Ethical Metaquestion, or a meta-Ethical Question.
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 04:35:51 GMT
Keywords: Ethics,Decidability

In article <C0y97M.6G0@ccu.umanitoba.ca> feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>In article <C0wGrH.81r@world.std.com> rjk@world.std.com (robert j kolker) writes:
>>We know that in the relm of formal systems and computation theory, there
>>are recursively undecidable (formal) statements and recursively unsoluble
>>problems.
>>
>>Question: Is there a similar situation in the domain of Ethical theory
>>(objectivist or otherwise). Are there Ethical problems that do not admit
>>of a solution.  Since Ethics is not generally self-referential it may not
>>be as easy to answer this question as it is in the relm of formal logic
>
>I don't know of any genuine paradoxes in ethics; and, of course, many
>meta-ethicists (none of them Objectivists) deny that there are ANY
>normative truths in ethics; but two sorts of puzzle come to mind:
>
>1) dilemmas; one rule dictates, say, truthfulness, while the other
>dictates kindness, and it is physically impossible to obey the two
>simultaneously
>
>2) quasi-practical-paradoxes: suppose (for the sake of discussion; to
>humour me) that utilitarianism is true; and suppose further (as might
>well be true) that promulgating that doctrine (or adopting it
>conciously) might result in sub-optimal outcomes ...

I would say that there are no insoluble problems in ethics; there may be
situations in which there are several alternatives from which one may
choose, but, in accordance with a rational hierarchy of values, one choice
will doubtless be the best.  If it comes to the point where there are
two (or more) choices which are equally good, and you must choose one of
them, then there can be no blame for not choosing the other one.  (Because
ethics must be contextual, I'm omitting any specific examples.)

The two "puzzles" offered above do not apply to Objectivism.  The first
mentions "rules"; Objectivism states that ethics is NOT a set of rules, but
is derived from rational value-judgements within a certain context.  The
second is only a puzzle is one assumes utilitarianism is true.  I think
it's a nice reductio ad absurdum for utilitarianism. :)

By the way, there was another follow-up to this article by Mikhail Zeleny
(which I did not follow-up from due to its length and the fact that it
would take me forever to edit using vi).  He offered several paradoxes:

The Protagoras Paradox:  I'd say the fault lies in Protagoras' agreement
to the terms of his instruction; he asked for that one.  The problem is
not with Protagoras, but with his student, who is basically attempting to
renege on his agreement.  The fault, therefore, lies with his student.

Newcomb's Paradox (the one about the two boxes and the Predictor):  First off,
this isn't an ethical problem.  Second, it presupposes the existence of
a "Predictor" who is omniscient.  But A is A, a thing is what it is, has a
specific, delimited identity, and therefore the Predictor cannot exist.
And thus passes away the paradox.  (So you should take both boxes! :) )

The "God Paradox":  This one presupposes both the existence of a God and that
the maxim "God helps those who help themselves" is true.  It should be
obvious by the outcome of Zeleny's discussion that neither assumption is
true.

As an aside, I am thinking of a taped lecture by Dr. Leonard Peikoff which
I once heard, in which someone asked him "What is the Objectivist stand
on symbolic logic?"  (I am doing this from memory, but I'm pretty sure I
got it right.)  Peikoff replied:  "The same as the Objectivist stand on
numerology. . .all I can say is that if you want to play a particularly
foolish game, then do so at home, and don't tell anybody about it.  And
especially don't go around teaching it as philosophy."


------------------------------------------------

Benjamin W. Lagow
Grad Res Asst, Dept. of Materials Science and Engineering
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism