From: beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion,alt.abortion.inequity
Subject: Re: Observations
Date: 3 Sep 92 13:39:21 GMT
Distribution: usa

In article <1992Sep02.222713.42392@watson.ibm.com> margoli@watson.ibm.com writes:
>In  <BtyFFK.512@cs.psu.edu>  beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver) writes:
>> In article <1992Sep01.231720.34638@watson.ibm.com> margoli@watson.ibm.com writes
>> >In  <Btx4G6.E2y@cs.psu.edu>  beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver) writes:
>> >> In article <1992Sep01.191402.16457@watson.ibm.com> margoli@watson.ibm.com wri
>> >>
>> >> >And it's not enforcing beliefs, any more than the killing of cattle
>> >> >being legal enforcing beliefs on those believe cattle to be holy.
>> >> >They are still free to believe any way they like; what they are not free
>> >> >to do is act on those beliefs in such a way as to violate the rights
>> >> >of other people.
>> >>
>> >> Interesting.  So human fetuses are roughly equivalent to cattle.
>> >
>> >Perhaps you should have someone explain the concept of an analogy to you.
>>
>> Let's see, I guess old Noah Webster died a few years back, but
>> maybe his successors could explain the concept of "analogy" to
>> this poor person lacking a proper education:
>>
>>  1: inference that if two or more things agree with one another in some
>>  respects they will prob. agree in others

>analogy (n)
>DEFINITIONS:
>1   inference that if two or more things
>    agree with one another in some respects
>    they will prob. agree in others
>2   resemblance in some particulars between
>    things otherwise unlike : SIMILARITY
>3   correspondence between the members of
>    pairs or sets of linguistic forms that
>    serves as a basis for the creation of
>    another form
>4   correspondence in function between
>    anatomical parts of different structure
>    and origin
>(c) G. & C. Merriam

>Note "otherwise unlike" in definition 2; you probably saw this in your
>dictionary as well.

Yes, now what?  You were kind enough to suggest that my understanding
of "analogy" was off, yet somehow both our dictionaries stated that 
to infer a similarity between cattle and fetuses from +your+ statements 
falls directly within definition (1) of "analogy."


>> Your position seems to be:
>>
>>    legal(kill(cattle))  does_not_imply  enforce(belief(unsanctity(cattle)))
>>    legal(kill(fetus))   does_not_imply  enforce(belief(unsanctity(fetus)))
>
>Not exactly; since I don't think that anti-abortionists believe the fetus
>is holy (although some act that way), "unsanctity" isn't quite right.

Your point is taken, but I hope that you don't later declare that 
pro-lifers are bible-thumpers who believe in the sanctity of life.
If you would accept that the sanctity of cattle implies it is
immoral to kill them, a better version is:

  legal(kill(cattle))  does_not_imply  enforce(belief(immoral(kill(cattle))))
  legal(kill(fetus))   does_not_imply  enforce(belief(immoral(kill(fetus))))

>> Well, these agree in "legal," "kill," "does_not_imply," "enforce,"
>> "belief," "unsanctity," and they seem only to differ in "cattle" vs. "fetus."
>> And my guess is that, being an observant person, you claim (implicitly?):
>>
>>    legal(kill(cattle))
>>    legal(kill(fetus))
>>
>>
>> Thus, you seem to claim that both "cattle" and "fetus" lie within the domain
>> for X in the following statements:
>>
>> 1.   legal(kill(X))       does_not_imply  enforce(belief(unsanctity(X)))
>> 2.   legal(kill(X))
>> 3.   not(enforce(belief(unsanctity(X))))
>>
>> in which case it is not unreasonable to infer that "cattle" and "fetus"
>> probably agree in other respects.
>
>You were doing pretty well up until the last sentence.  How about
>preceding the numbered statements with "For all X, ".

Thanks for your opinion.  I'm sorry to have been so nonstandard
as to assume that implicit universal quantifiers (ranging over 
a restricted "domain for X", see above) couldn't be inferred.


>> This is not to say that they +necessarily+ agree, nor that you
>> +implied+ they agree.  But to +infer+ that they probably agree
>> is precisely one of the primary effects (and purposes) of analogy.
>
>Given your numbered statements, whoever I was addressing asserted
>that legal(...) *did* imply enforce(...).  I was using the same
>relationships but with a different X that did not carry the same
>emotional involvement to them, but which does for others.

Are you now saying your purpose was not so much to provide an analogy 
as to show a direct logical contradiction of their position?  You claim 
they say  (for all X) F(X), and you sought to demonstrate an X 
for which F(X) is not true.  More precisely, it seems you sought 
to demonstrate an X that they would have to conclude was a violation 
of F(X) based on different "emotional involvement."


>I think a simpler formula might be:
>   legal(X)    does_not_imply   enforce(belief(f(X)))
>
>with the various substitutions for X and f being:
>   kill fetus, moral
>   kill cattle, sanctity
>   transfer blood, moral

You omitted the paragraph of mine addressing this.  The more variables
you have, the less weight there is to give to the conclusion that
other aspects are similar.  Thus your conclusion that I would infer
a similarity between blood and fetuses is wrong.  In the posting we
originally addressed, only one variable is needed:

  legal(kill(cattle))  does_not_imply  enforce(belief(immoral(kill(cattle))))
  legal(kill(fetus))   does_not_imply  enforce(belief(immoral(kill(fetus))))

Again, "analogy" (v1) is not contradicted by an inference that cattle
are roughly equivalent to fetuses.  

Don
-- 
beaver@cs.psu.edu                       Opinions from the PC-challenged