HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: nuke@wam.umd.edu (root)
Subject: Re: ABORTION: WHEN Does Human Life BEGIN?
Organization: University of Maryland, College Park
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 05:56:42 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.164831.2395@cnsvax.uwec.edu> mcelwre@cnsvax.uwec.edu writes:
>          
>
>                     ABORTION: WHEN DOES HUMAN LIFE BEGIN?
>          Robert E. McElwaine

Wrong forum... go amuse a tree, intimately.


Take care..

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:27:33 GMT

In article <spurrett.49.722073557@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:

>  Looking directly at the issue of `what difference' it would make for
>an act to be  caused by an agent,  and to be random,  the most obvious
>point is that the  two would not be  the same in the  consciousness of
>the agent.

You might indeed be aware whether an event is random rather than a result
of free will.  But it may not be possible to be aware of whether an
event has some external cause rather than being a result of free will.

>            (Just  as  deliberately kicking  my dog is different  from
>kicking it when  somebody taps my  knee with a  little rubber hammer.)
>If I _am_ the  cause then I would  probably know it.   Unconscious mo-

But in the question of an external cause, rather than free will, you
must consider that the external cause which resulted in your kicking
the dog would also have resulted in your believing that it was deliberate
act for which you were personally responsible.
Organization: University of Illinois at Chicago
Date: Monday, 23 Nov 1992 18:07:29 CST
From: <U53846@uicvm.uic.edu>
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Abortion

Hi, would some body please help me for my paper please......
Here is my topic:  Suppose you find out that you are pregnant and there is a 50
-50 chance that due to a genetic defect, your child may be psychologically
disposed to become a sociopath, do you choose to have an abortion?
Males please be little more creative :)  I really need some help on it.  Thanks
and I'm really appreciate any ideas.........

                                                 John
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2493 sci.philosophy.tech:4114
From: 21monteraste@cua.edu
Subject: <None>
Organization: The Catholic University of America
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 22:50:23 GMT

Help!
Is there anyone out there from Wyoming?
Does anyone know someone from Wyoming?
Please help!!!

Benito :|
From: siphon@momad.uucp (Stimpson J. Katz)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Objectivism and Religion (a psuedo-response to Nyikos)
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 08:24:59 EST
Organization: Modem Madness BBS    1+516-295-9435

     Why is it that everytime an Objectivist makes a point it is
consistently misunderstood by the greatest number (and don't even
suggest that it is our fault).

     You are correct that Objectivists define the universe as all that
exists. You are further correct to re-state the question as whether
one part of the universe created the rest of it. Yet what you forget
is the claim that this one part of the universe that did the creating
must have further attributes to qualify as God, else the singularity
of the big bang theory is god, and religion (concepts such as soul,
prayer, afterlife, etc..) become really untenable.

     I am sorry that the Objectivist you found yourself talking to was
such a second-hander. What he was trying (I think) to convey was that
advocates of religion want you to think that God is somehow separate
from the universe. The problem is similiar with regard to "supernatural".
Natural means all that is. Religionists invent terms like god and
supernatural to try to convince people that existence is more than that
which it is, that is, to deny identity.

     But all this is secondary to the problem of definition. 
Understanding
must logically precede belief. This means that before the claims of
religion can even be considered they must be understood. I for one
do not understand such terms as "god", "supernatural", "soul", "spirit"
and a few others. Until such time I am incapable of believing the claims 
of religion, even if I wished to.

Siphon@Momad.UUCP
Stimpson J. Katz

     I swear, by my life and my love of it, never to live for the
sake of another man, nor to ask another man to live for mine.

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Subject: Re: Being and Time
Reply-To: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Organization: University of Oslo, Norway
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:56:01 GMT

In article <BxsDJB.5nM@news.cso.uiuc.edu>, bzb47596@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu
(Baba Z Buehler) writes:
|> solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
|> 
|> 
|> >	What is the connection between Being and Time?
|> 
|> >Whoever manages an answer that satisfies, has won my respect.
|> 
|> 
|> Didn't someone or another say that being was continuity through
|> time?  But maybe that would only satisfy existance<==>time and
|> not being<==>time.  But it would seem that in order to be one must
|> be continuous through time and be able to percieve it.
|> -- 
|> Phaedrus - Master of the Tao of Pooh

Possible. What was meant by "continuity through time"?
Is it the continuity of "something", and is this "something"
again either a perception or an - existant?

As for the latter sentence, might not ones own existence be the
measure stick of "existence"?

[You have won what my respect is the continuance of ... :-)]

Solan
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 15 Nov 92 21:40:06 GMT
Organization: Indiana University

Ian writes:
>Let's say you have iron-clad proof that it's somehow "irrational" or
>"immoral" for me to sacrifice my life to save that of my child.  Would
>you suggest that I stand aside and let my child die even though it is
>against my nature to do so?  You could of course say that the ultimate
>benefit to me is negative if I stand aside but am miserable for the
>rest of my life because I went against my nature.  This just amounts to
>defining "altruistic" in such a way that such "superficially
>altruistic" actions are in fact selfish.  I'd be perfectly happy with
>this response.  I just want to know if this is your response or not.

No one could ever create some kind of 'iron-clad' proof that it is
somehow "irrational" or "immoral" for someone to sacrifice their life
in an attempt to save those values which make life worth living.
Many 'superficially altruistic' actions ARE in fact selfish.

Many confusions about ethical egoism arise out of a too simplistic view
about what is, in fact, in a person's rational self-interest.  Rand's
view of human nature is precisely in line with your intuition here:
eudaimonia (flourishing, the good life) requires full recognition
of the entire context of our life.  That includes the irreplacable
value of our own loved ones.

The moral purpose of our lives is to achieve our own happiness.  But
such happiness can not be achieved in any old willy-nilly irresponsible
manner.  Achieving values sometimes requires taking risks... even very
serious risks with our own lives.  I would risk my life to save the
life of my wife, or the life of a few close friends... because they are
so valuable to me that the risk is worth it.

Naive views of human nature lead to silly ideas about altruism being
moral.

--Jimbo
From: bzb47596@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Baba Z Buehler)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Being and Time
Date: 16 Nov 92 01:59:35 GMT
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana

solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:


>	What is the connection between Being and Time?

>Whoever manages an answer that satisfies, has won my respect.


Didn't someone or another say that being was continuity through
time?  But maybe that would only satisfy existance<==>time and
not being<==>time.  But it would seem that in order to be one must
be continuous through time and be able to percieve it.
-- 
Phaedrus - Master of the Tao of Pooh             internet: phaedrus@uiuc.edu 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
     "The intelligent man finds almost everything ridiculous,
      the sensible man hardly anything."   --Goethe
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: muttiah@thistle.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah)
Subject: Re: Proving Life after Death? (was Re: Ayn Rand on Religion [Was: Reply to Wingate])
Keywords: Rand Religion Wingate
Organization: Purdue University Engineering Computer Network
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 04:23:04 GMT

In article <1992Nov22.133927@aifh.ed.ac.uk> edwardc@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Edward Carter) writes:
>In article <1992Nov21.192703.16527@noose.ecn.purdue.edu>,
>muttiah@thistle.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah) writes:
># <<<<lots of stuff deleted -- thanks!  Quite embarassing really :-)>>>>
># 
># ***************** Entering reality, ********************
># 

>"Consciousness as a complete unit" seems to imply that it's a physical
>object. This, in turn is something that you deny when you claim that
>it's "the collective workings of the neurons...". It can't be both
>a complete [ie enduring, physical] unit and the output of a working
>machine [ie dependent upon the machine keeping working for it to
>exist].

It is a carry over from that observation that things get transformed into 
something.  Just think of your personality.  Surely, you think of your 
self as being one person don't you ? It may be dependent upon the machine, 
but still it is you as one complete person.

>This `it's got to go somewhere' argument can only be reconciled with the
>idea of consciousness as the result of the brain's workings if the
>physical brain somehow makes the transition to the astral plane, surely?

It does, believe me, I've personally seen it happen. King kong and
many others are floating around in this astral plane :-).  My point is
that, fine the brain decays into fertilizer.  But now what happened to
that personality ( which I'm equating with consciousness for stupidity's
sake) ?.  Something must have happened to it.
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2517 sci.philosophy.tech:4157
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Good Book -- Rand's or God's
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 01:13:57 GMT

I would like very much to e-mail to Stimpson Katz.  Unfortunately,
my efforts thus far have met with failure.  This machine appears
to not comprehend his address.

Stimpson, could you be so kind as to send private e-mail to:
jwales@iubvm.ucs.indiana.edu?  That machine seems better able to
comprehend addresses.

As to Wingate's latest musings, I will not respond today.  Suffice to
say that I disagree with him on perhaps every single point he makes
but one: the insufficiency of his reasoning prowess.

--Jimbo

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: lip@s1.gov (Loren I. Petrich)
Subject: Proving Life after Death? (was Re: Ayn Rand on Religion [Was: Reply to Wingate])
Keywords: Rand Religion Wingate
Organization: LLNL
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 08:11:57 GMT

In article <nyikos.722047409@milo.math.scarolina.edu> nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:
>I have added talk.religion.misc
>
>In <9V1uTB1w165w@momad.UUCP> siphon@momad.UUCP (Stimpson J. Katz) writes:
>
: I wrote:
>
: >As far as Rand's critique of religion, it boils down to the essential point
: >that religion makes no testable claims and therefore says nothing about
: >reality.

>Every person tests the claims of Christianity when (s)he dies.  That we 
>do not know the outcome of the test for the people who preceded us, is 
>a perhaps temporary bit of ignorance.  Of course, if Ayn Rand is right,
>and there is no afterlife, then the claims of Christianity are indeed
>untestable in a certain sense (no one will ever know that the answer is No
>if it really is No) but to say that Christianity makes no testable claims is to
>do a really striking bit of question-begging.

	And we test the claims of a whole lot of other religions,
also.

	What if Islam turns out to be the One True Religion, and one
won't get to screw all those Houris just because one didn't believe in
Mohammed?

	And furthermore, there are hordes of apologists who claim that
Christianity can be tested _before_ one's death.

: One need not prove a negative, Mr. Wingate.

>This I call The Forensic Fallacy.

	[Argument that the burden of proof is on the side of the less
accepted alternative(s)]

	So?

	I believe that my consciousness will end at death because it
seems too closely tied to my body. So if my body goes, it will go too.

	But if I wake up in some other realm, then I will have to
accept the fact that I did, and I will attempt to find out how this
remarkable event happened.

	In other words,

	I'll believe in it when I see it. But not before.


	There are further difficulties with this standard of evidence.
What about popular beliefs that are easily shown to be wrong? Like the
supposed coexistence of early people and dinosaurs (wrong by 65
million years)?

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: pol253b@monu1.cc.monash.edu.au (Ms D Alexander)
Subject: references on "defining the moral community"
Organization: Monash University, Australia.
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 11:54:58 GMT

I was wondering if anyone could help with references (articles/books or 
anything at all) which discuss the problems of defining the moral
community - or any relevantly connected material.

Thanks in anticipation.

Oh, and please reply via email to pol253b@monu1.cc.monash.edu.au

Dey.
Dey
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:02:48 GMT

In article <spurrett.55.722363012@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>In article <1992Nov16.171137.5862@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>>It is not contradictory to suppose that the universe is in principle
>>deterministic but that one cannot oneself predict one's own behaviour.
>>There are questions of complexity of computation, for instance; it may
>>not be possible to compute the future state any faster than it
>>actually comes to pass.  _You_ cannot predict your behaviour; someone
>>in a privileged position relative to you might be able to do so.
>
>I agree totally.  Being determined and being predictable are two very
>different (although not unrelated) things.  The class of predictable
>events is, however, a subset of the class of deterministically neces-
>sitated events, while the class of events for which an agent can be
>meaningfully held responsible is _not_.

And this I simply deny.  An intelligent being can be held responsible
for the consequences of any of its actions if it could have reasonably
foreseen those consequences.  Where is the relevance of determinism?

Determinism as applied to us does not mean that some outside force
makes us do things; it means that it is our nature to act in certain
ways.  Only the application of an outside force relieves us of
responsibility for our actions.

>
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
>| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
>| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
>| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 23:08:28 GMT

In article <spurrett.44.721940415@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>
>SUMMARY: There's been a lot of activity following my original posting, at
>least by the standards of my earlier efforts.  In this posting I attempt to
>clarify some confusions and respond to a few criticisms, and also offer an
>analysis of the debate intended to characterise the fundamental issues.
>
>PART I: Clarifications
>
>(1) In article <1992Nov12.224326.6870@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>
>> I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
>> chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
>> incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
>> correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
>> that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
>> sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
>> [.....]
>
>I disagree fundamentally.  Certainly there are many senses of possibility, but
>the sense relevant to `free will' is not what is sometimes called `epistemic'
>possibility, as suggested by Holmes.

But surely Randall's "free will" is all that you can ask for.  After
all you cannot know that which you cannot know.  There is no way of
determining if there is any other type of free will.

>                                      This is, perhaps, well illustrated by
>looking at the way we deal with attributions of responsibility.  If I believe
>of a person who stole my watch that that person _thought_ s/he could have
>chosen not to take the watch, but was in fact mistaken then I cannot con-
>sistently hold him/her responsible.

This argument is surely irrelevant.  Randall was not talking about belief
but about knowledge.  In other words, the situation is that as far as
the thief knew, he had the free will not to steal your watch, and as
far as you know he had that same free will.  Thus, based on everything
you know, you should hold him responsible.  But if in some interpretation
of how the universe works it happens that the thief was not free, then
in that same interpretation you yourself are not free to decide not to
hold him responsible either.  To put it in other terms, your ability to
choose whether to hold him responsible is itself the evidence you need
to conclude that he was responsible.
From: ddrumm@amiganet.chi.il.us (Daniel Drumm)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Ayn Rand
Date: 18 Nov 92 07:58:22 GMT
Organization: Amiga Network Information Systems


        I am looking for any information regarding clubs, organizations
or any other information including newsletters concerning the work
and life of Ayn Rand. If you have any information about clubs, rare
books and any other collector's items, please leave me email. 


Daniel Drumm      _#      **MMp     g#00   `N##0"    _agN#0P0N#           _#L
                 g##       jN##    j##F     J##    _dN0"      "          g##L
Chicago        _#]##      _0 ##L  jN##F     ###   g#0"                 _03##L
Bulls         gE_j##      #  0## jF ##F    j##F  j##     ______       gE_j##L
3-Peat!     _0"""N##     d"  J##L0  ##F    0##   0##     "9##F"     _0"""5##L
          _gF    ]##    jF    ##0   ##F    ##F   `##k     d##     _gF    j##L
        _g#_    _j##L__g#__   ]N  _j##L_ _d##L_   `#Nh___g#N'   _g#_    _j##L_
       `""""    """""'""""'    "  """""" """"""      """""""   `""""    """"""
Usenet: ddrumm@amiganet.chi.il.us                         Fido: 1:115/300
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Being and Time (longish)
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 14:31:27 GMT
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov13.163800.25095@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>
>In <spurrett.38.721583424@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>
>>    What it is to `be' is to have a distribution over a region of space and  a
>>    period of time.  Being is Temporal, and Spatial.
>
>This seems to be a statement that the objects of physics are the only
>things there are.  Is that your intention?
 
Sort of.  I don't see a need for a distinction between physics and 
philosophy, insofar as the object of both is to establish the truth about 
the world.  (ie. I think positivism can eat crud and die)  This does not 
mean that I like everything which goes under the name of `physics' or, for 
that matter, `philosophy'.  To `be' however is to exist, which should mean 
that anything which `is' is a legitimate object of `physical' enquiry.  I 
don't know where morality and aesthetics fit in here though.  That a thing `
is' beautiful does not necessarily mean that beauty `is', and that it `is' 
good to _do_ some thing, does not necessarily mean that good `is' in the 
sense that a stone `is'.  It _might_ mean that in both cases, but I have no 
argument either way.

>Jim Kalb

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
From: oopcv@Msu.oscs.montana.edu
Subject: The Lighter Side
Reply-To: oopcv@Msu.oscs.montana.edu
Organization: Montana State University
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1992 15:44:44 GMT

This is a really stupid question, but it's nagging at me all the same.  Can
someone fill in the philosopher's names?

	To do is to be.
		--
	To be is to do.
		--
	Do be do be do.
		--Sinatra

Thank you.  I now return you to your regularly scheduled debates.  :)

Cheryl
Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2479 sci.philosophy.tech:4100