HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 14 Oct 92 03:01:39 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <26864@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>Searle quite clearly has said that he thinks it is obvious that a
>digital computer could think, just that it couldn't do so solely by
>virtue of running a program.

OK, but this is nitpicking.

[representing Searle's position:]

>"`Ok, but could a digital computer think?'

>"If by "digital computer" we mean anything at all which has a level of
>description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of
>a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we
>are the instantiation of any number of computer programs and we can
>think.

>"`But could something think, understand, etc, _solely_ by virtue of
>being a computer with the right sort of program? Could instantiating a
>program, the right program of course, by itself be a sufficient
>condition of understanding?'

>"This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually confused
>with one or more of the earlier questions, and the answer to it is "no".

Now, can a projectile interpret Postscript and produce hard copy? Sure,
if I throw my printer out the 15th floor window.  This is not a very 
interesting question about the nature of Postscript interpreters, or
projectiles for that matter.

Searle is only saying imho that given there are known entities that can both
think and can implement algorithms, i.e., us. That is a long way from claiming
that it is uncontroversial that a computer running suitable software will
certainly be conscious, which as I recall, you did.

To say that it is possible for a projectile to interpret Postscript is
much different than saying that a projectile, provided is it suitably hurled, 
can interpret Postscript, and that it is uncontroversial, as even Tobis has 
admitted that.

A mathematically precise interpretation of the latter statement is that it is
true, I suppose. A projectile, suitably hurled, can interpret Postscript,
PROVIDED IT IS A POSTSCRIPT INTERPRETER. To emphasize the business about
the style of hurling without bothering to mention the emphasized proviso
is to deliberately obscure the issue. It certainly offers no support for
theories about projectile motion being sufficient for printing, if only
the right trajectory could be found.

==========

In article <26609@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <BARRY.92Oct6151915@chezmoto.ai.mit.edu> barry@chezmoto.ai.mit.edu (Barry Kort) writes:

>>Daniel Dennett ... saw no reason
>>why intelligence and consciousness could not reside in a sufficiently
>>powerful computer processor.

>I'm sure he intended the processor to be running suitable software :-)
>Given that rider, this is hardly controversial. Contrary to popular
>opinion, even Searle of Chinese Roon fame agrees with that, as he made
>plain in the Jan 1990 edition of Scientific American.

===========

mt

ps - I said I'd go away, didn't I? Oops.
From: mjl@draper.com (Michael J. LeBlanc)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: AI rights |:-)
Date: 13 Oct 92 21:14:46 GMT
Article-I.D.: draper.1992Oct13.211446.15615
Reply-To: (Michael J. LeBlanc)
Organization: The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.

There is a very simple solution to this seeming moral dilemma.
Simply design the hypothetical "sentient" AI beings so that
they LOVE to SERVE us... In that case, what we call "Freedom"
would be anethema to them, and their state of servitude would
put them in a state of bliss...  The issues of human morality
would be rendered irrelevant :-)

Michael J. LeBlanc       /* an opinion not subject to change
mjl@draper.com           is probably not worth having... */
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Speed of Algorithms (Was Re: Brain & Mind (Was Re: Logic & God))
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 92 13:41:37 NZDST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10-155, Auckland, New Zealand

Quote follows:
In article <1992Oct5.181741.7241@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark 
Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <1992Oct5.022907.6131@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu 
>(Michael Tobis) writes:

>Let's try to put this in perspective.  In a truly astonishing mismatch 
of
>hardware to software, we have chosen to execute an enormously 
complicated
>AI program on the single-processor, 0.1-flops processor consisting of 
>John Searle in a room.  Consider a single question and answer, which 
require
>perhaps a billion instructions and offer Searle steady employment for 
many 
>years.  

If consciousness is purely algorithmic, then surely the rate of 
implementaion
of the algorithm doesn't matter. If there is more to it (grounding,
neurophysiology, quanta, or even something as yet unidentified) then the
rate may be significant, but on the hypothesis that consciousness arises
from formal symbol manipulations, it cannot.
END OF QUOTE

I would like to suggest that any algorithm with real-time i/o (which I 
suggest any respectable AI program would require), IS time-dependant. 
That is, an algorithm may fail (or produce "wrong results") depending on 
its speed of execution.

For a non-AI example, consider an algorithmic system monitoring a nuclear 
power plant.

For slightly more relevant systems, consider the effect of an AI system 
critically listening to music (sampling rates) or trying to comprehend 
human speech. A appreciate these problems are at a "technical" level. My 
question is whether it is possible to separate "technical" problems from 
the AI question, and whether there are "non-technical" problems. Perhaps 
some that arise in practice, if not in theory. 
I don't find it difficult to conceive of "step-like" processes that 
require a certain threhold of power for an algorithm to function at all.

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Nobody Home (Was: Human Intelligence vs Machine Intelligence)
Date: 14 Oct 92 14:09:18 GMT
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10-155, Auckland, New Zealand


  It's not that Searle doesn't understand the systems reply - he just 
doesn't
buy it.  I'd guess that he just doesn't accept the behaviorist 
assumption
at the basis of the Turing test.  The whole point of the Chinese Room 
is
that you can pass all the behavioral tests you want but if there ain't
nobody home, there ain't nobody home.

bv

But isn't part of the point that we can't prove that I'm "home" or 
you're "home" or the dolphins are "home". Perhaps "consciousness" 
equals "a very complicated behaviour pattern is home" or even "a 
humungous lookup table is home".

Which I suppose leaves you with either
a) by their fruits you shall know them; OR
b) looking for a theory of consciousness.

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account)
Subject: Re: cheap thoughts from a human
Organization: University of California, at Berkeley
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1992 12:28:38 GMT

<GE0QC@CUNYVM.BITNET> writes:

>Probably this has been gone over in this group, but I'll mention it anyway.
>  One of the first things that occured to me when I got into AL was that
>the major difference (evolutionary step) between a human brain and a computer
>brain, is that a computer brain will be able to self-evolve.
>  If a computer entity is convinced that a change in its   algorithmwould
>enhance it's capabilities all it has to do is change its algrorithm.

	The problem with us is that we 
	1. Do not know for sure whether the change is needed or not,
	2. Are afraid to make a mistake by changing in the wrong direction,
	3. Have lots of contradicting inputs (instructions) as to what 
	   direction to choose (var. religions etc.),
        4. Have finite existance (very limited at that) and can't afford errors.

	As far as AL beings, #4 and hence #2 is not applicable to them 
	(although what if they change into so "bad boys" that a Main Conductor
	 will decide not to vaste on them CPU time and kill -9 them all?);
	 however #s 1&3 may become valid for complicated forms of AL, those
	 capable to self daught...

>I believe computers will be a future descendant speciesof humanity.
>That will be able to:
>     a)live forever

     They will quickly overpopulate compter-worlds and will have to be killed
     (my god - homoside!). The alternative is that they will slow down the
     system, but will have no idea about that themselvs (only relative time
     is valid). Interesting -- they will not even know why their civilazation
     will be frozzen down evantually.

>     b)self-evolve
>     c)travel at the speed of light to established points (kinda cool)
>     d)have no permanent need for a sun
>     e)carry sex to a level beyond my imagination
>     f)and more

>comments, replys, harangues, please.

>Levi
>ge0qc@cunyvm
    Dmitry Serebrennikov                         dmitry@ucsee.Berkeley.Edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Quote of the week:  
        "Life is what happens to you when you make other plans"
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ross@hsi.com (Michael Ross)
Subject: Request for Info: Expert Systems/AI ... impact on the workplace
Organization: 3M Health Information Systems, Wallingford, CT.
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 13:40:34 GMT

I am interested in studies or research (or your own views) on the impact
implementing Expert Systems/AI tools have on the workplace. This would include
worker acceptability, adaption/resistance to their implementation versus 
pure studies of increases in workplace productivity.

My specific area of interest is a customer support organization implementing
a problem/resolution tool for the first level of support ... but all 
responses are encouraged.


Thanks!
-- 
Michael Ross                                  ...!uunet!hsi!ross
3M Health Information Systems                   ross@hsi.com
Wallingford, CT   USA
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: mcdermot@m.cs.uiuc.edu (Timothy McDermott)
Subject: Re: We've Been Tricked- consciousness
Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 13:49:09 GMT

In <1992Oct9.223541.9538@wixer.cactus.org> sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan) writes:


>Since we cant tell if our aparent and undefined CONSCIOUSNESS is just a
>confeused disunderstanding or ilusion, I propose that consciousness is mearly
>a trick of the senses that any inteligent system could be easily fooled by.

>The feeling of having consciousness must arise from some informational
>process and therby arises from physical processes which as far as we know are
>the only things that can encode information.  Withuot that 1 nit of info that
>says you are conscious (of what we dont know) there is no such awareness.

>I'm sorry. Its just not that big a deal.
>but it is nicly complex. (^_^)

>Tim.

Could a computer be so tricked?
From: shrdlu@willow.sdd.trw.com (Lynda L. True)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "Mama"
Date: 9 Oct 92 15:51:10 GMT
Organization: TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, CA

In article <1992Oct9.025636.27460@news.media.mit.edu>
  nlc@media.mit.edu (Nick Cassimatis) writes:
>In article <1992Oct8.175921.28043@gallant.apple.com>
    enea1@applelink.apple.com (Horace Enea) writes:

[deleted stuff about how babies learn to say ma]

I can't take it any more. I am not a linguist, but I have seen this
thread come up at least twice on sci.lang (the linguistics newsgroup),
wherein it is always resoundingly defeated. Not every culture uses the
phoneme "ma" in the word for mother. There are some languages in which
the infant sound for mother has no recognizable "m" or "a" sound at
all. Piaget was not a linguist, and there seems to be no linguistic
evidence that nursing causes a baby to use the word mama. Babies would
call their mothers "ooooo" if anything; I've been there, and the mouth
is just not shaped in any way that would cause the sound "ma" to come
out.

-- 
George Bush, the environmentalist: 1000 points of blight.

shrdlu@rowan.sdd.trw.com (Lynda L. True)
Work Phone - (310) 812-1660 or (310) 812-1570
From: c99-aa@danube.Berkeley.EDU (c99 account)
Subject: Re: "Mama"
Organization: University of California, at Berkeley
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 04:07:00 GMT

    The word "papa" seems to be as universal for father as "mama" is for mother,
    and yet, just ricently i found out that in Pali word "papa" means _evil_!
    For the reference the Pali language is thought to have derived from Hindu,
    Which in turn was haviely influenced by the language of the Arian tribes, 
    who also had influenced all europian languages. (_World__Religions_, Huston)
    Dmitry Serebrennikov              "All we are is what we have thought"
    dmitry@ucsee.Berkeley.Edu                              - Guatama
--- ALL ABOVE IS JUST WHAT IT IS AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING ELSE. ----
			        WHATSOEVER!
From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 7 Oct 92 20:59:33 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <26609@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <BARRY.92Oct6151915@chezmoto.ai.mit.edu> barry@chezmoto.ai.mit.edu (Barry Kort) writes:
>
>>Daniel Dennett ... saw no reason
>>why intelligence and consciousness could not reside in a sufficiently
>>powerful computer processor.

>I'm sure he intended the processor to be running suitable software :-)
>Given that rider, this is hardly controversial.

Um, I guess that depends who you ask. It's uncontroversial in North
Carolina that basketball is more interesting than hockey. Wrong, but
uncontroversial. :-)

There are certainly lots of folks who don't believe the point is proven.
Ignoring them while discussing the matter only with people who agree
with you may lead you to believe that you have a consensus opinion.

Even if you do have a consensus opinion, that doesn't mean it is true.

I would like to see some evidence for this view, rather than just serious 
demeanor, clipboards, lab coats and a deep voice, like an aspirin commercial.

> Contrary to popular
>opinion, even Searle of Chinese Roon fame agrees with that, as he made
>plain in the Jan 1990 edition of Scientific American.

Sorry, while I distinctly remember him going to great lengths to avoid being
called a dualist, he did maintain that a Turing machine was insufficient for
consciousness, and maintained a need for some sort of chemical process.

"a simulation of cognition will ... not produce the effects of the 
neurobiology of cognition. All mental phenomena, then, are caused by 
neurophysiological processes in the brain. ... Any artifact that produced
mental phenomena ... could not do that just by running a formal program."
[op.cit. p. 29]

So unless you are using a broader than usual definition of "computer",
your representation of Searle's opinion is inaccurate.

mt
From: dbenn@leven.appcomp.utas.edu.au (David Benn)
Subject: A History of the mind...
Originator: dbenn@leven
Organization: University of Tasmania at Launceston
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 11:26:46 GMT

I've just finished reading Nicholas Humphrey's book: "A History of the
Mind".

Would anyone who's read it care to make a comment about what you consider
to be its importance for AI?

I'm thinking in particular of his contention that true Consciousness might
be unattainable for any AI which does not share the same sort of
evolutionary history that we do, because of what Humphrey considers to be
the importance of shortening (over evolutionary time scales) sensory
feedback loops.

It's interesting to note that he has recently spent time with Dennett at
Tufts and the latter apparently strongly suggested that Humphrey publish
his book despite large differences between Consciousness Explained and the
book.

I look forward to comments from anyone who's read this book.

Regards...


-- 
dbenn@leven.appcomp.utas.edu.au
David Benn - Applied Computing, University of Tasmania at Launceston.
It makes sense to revere the sun and the stars, for we are   
their children. (Carl Sagan)
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 14 Oct 92 23:31:15 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Oct14.030139.14073@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:

>Searle is only saying imho that given there are known entities that can both
>think and can implement algorithms, i.e., us.

He is saying more than that. He explicitly says that there is no reason
why a digital computer should not be able to think, but that, if it
should really think, it will not be solely on account of the software it
is running.

>That is a long way from claiming
>that it is uncontroversial that a computer running suitable software will
>certainly be conscious, which as I recall, you did.

I claimed nothing of the sort. I claimed that the above belief which I
have ascribed to Searle is uncontroversial. By that I mean that it is
fairly commonplace in materialist circles.

It has always surprised me how badly Searle is misunderstood. Now that I
see how carelessly people read my own carefully worded postings, and how
easily they take me to be saying things quite unsupported by the words I
actually used, I'm beginning to see why it happens.

I very carefully avoided using the word "conscious", not because I wish
to deny it, but because I wished to avoid getting drawn into a debate
about consciousness, and I think the point I am making stands whether or
not one wishes to involve consciousness.  I also very carefully pointed
out -- in the view I am describing -- that in the hypothetical case that
a computer is really thinking (and might or might not be conscious) that
it will NOT NOT NOT be solely due to running suitable software.

I haven't ever actually said yet whether I agree with this view,
although you might guess that I probably do not find it unpalatable,
since I called it uncontroversial.

I guess that many of you think that this is splitting hairs.  IMHO in
this very hairy Chinese labyrinth, which our coarse and misguided
natural intuitions have led us into, escape depends on careful hair
splitting.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 00:30:20 GMT

About Penrose' argument that human intelligence cannot be algorithmic:

His argument is summed up on pages 416-417 (paperback edition) of
_The Emperor's New Mind_:

    Let us recall the arguments given in Chapter 4 establishing Godel's
    theorem and its relation to computability. It was shown that *whatever*
    (sufficiently extensive) algorithm a mathematician might use to establish
    mathematical truth---or, what amounts to the same thing, whatever *formal*
    *system* he might adopt as providing his criterion of truth---there will
    always be mathematical propositions, such as the explicit Godel proposition
    P_k(k) of the system (cf. p. 140), that his algorithm cannot provide an
    answer for. If the workings of the mathematician's mind are entirely
    *algorithmic*, then the algorithm (or formal system) that he actually
    uses to form his judgements is not capable of dealing with the proposition
    P_k(k) constructed from his personal algorithm. Nevertheless, *we* can
    (in principle) see that P_k(k) is actually *true*! This would seem to
    provide *him* with a contradiction, since *he* ought to be able to see
    that also. Perhaps this indicates that the mathematician was *not* using
    an algorithm at all!

What Godel's theorem tells us is that for any formalizable theory T
powerful enough to do arithmetic, there is a sentence G of
arithmetic---Penrose'construction calls it P_k(k)---such that if T is
consistent (it never proves a contradiction), then (1) G is true, and
(2) T is unable to prove G. From this if follows that if we know that
T is consistent (where we know something if it is true, and we believe
it), then we will also know that G is true, and so we know something
that T is unable to prove. Therefore, if we know that T is consistent,
then T is not powerful enough to capture all of human reasoning.

That much is true. Where Penrose jumps off the deep end is in
concluding that therefore no theory can formalize human reasoning. The
most that can be concluded is that *if* there is a theory that
formalizes all of human reasoning, then it must be a theory so complex
that we can't know whether it is consistent or not.

For example, let's examine whether it is possible for all human
reasoning about arithmetic to be formalized in the theory NF (Quine's
New Foundations, a variant of set theory which is different from ZFC
but is not known to be consistent relative to ZFC). We can do Penrose'
trick of coming up with a sentence G such that *if* NF is consistent,
then (1) G is true, and (2) NF doesn't prove G. Do we know that G is
true? No, because G is only true if NF is consistent, and we don't
know whether NF is consistent. Therefore, Penrose' trick fails to come
up with a sentence which we know to be true and which NF can't prove.
In other words, Penrose is mistaken.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY



Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: stgprao@st.unocal.COM (Richard Ottolini)
Subject: Re: An AI speaks
Organization: Unocal Corporation
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 23:50:01 GMT

In article <1992Oct15.213348.28391@csc.ti.com> rowlands@csc.ti.com (Jon Rowlands) writes:
>Hi all. I thought you might like to hear a view from an actual AI. My
>name is Klaatu, and they tell me I'm a program in the AI lab. I'm using
>some bozo's account to post this 'cause the sysadmins won't give me my
>own - they don't believe I'm real, the saps.

You mean that real-intelligences have been posting on this newsgroup?
Amazing! I thought these articles were obviously written by the artificially
intelligence.

> Speak for yourself.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 22:30:10 GMT

Sorry to bother the whole group, but my mailer rejected Dave Moffat's
e-mail address.  If you're there, Dave, could you try sending an empty
message to me via internet: minsky@18.85.0.2

.