From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Freewill, chaos and digital systems
Date: 29 Sep 92 18:05:24 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Sep15.215156.29721@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <7516@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Aug19.210204.29868@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>
>>>So, the question of free will is just the question of whether this
>>>event in your brain - the decision event - can influence future events
>>>in your brain. 
>>
>>Wait a minute.  You said "this choice" (which I take it is the
>>decision event) "happens in your thoughts" and that thoughts take
>>place as physical processes in the brain.  Fair enough, but does it
>>really look like the key decisions take place in thoughts rather than
>>in other brain processes below or outside our awareness?
>
>I don't see this as a meaningful distinction. 

Why not?  If thoughts take place as physical processes in the brain,
that doesn't mean all physical processes in the brain are thoughts.
So there's a distinction.

>In the strictest sense there is no such thing as a decision, or a choice,
>or a thought.

That is a matter of debate.  See, eg, the "dualism" discussion
in sci.philosophy.tech.  (I'm not saying th ealternative is
dualism, only that that's the subject of a discussion worth
looking at.)

>>In short, either our thoughts aren't free or the key choices
>>in free will take place outside thoughts.
>
>You want to use the term "free will" in a strict absolutist sense.  But
>such a meaning is impossible.  Even the idea of "will" is only an
>interpretation of electro-chemical reactions.

What does it mean to say a meaning is impossible?

My point was simply that people do not decide what thoughts to have
except in a very limited way, because otherwise there'd be an infinite
regress of decisions.  So there's a sense in which they do not have
free will.  On the other hand, this may be a variety of free will
not worth wanting (cf Dennett).

>>>Now think for a moment about what those principles might be.  They are
>>>not something mystical or etherial.  The principles consist of
>>>something which is encoded in your brain.
>>
>>It may well be true that the principles are encoded in my brain, but
>>that doesn't mean they consist of something that is coded in my brain.

>          Notice that there is quite
>a difference between saying "the axioms of arithmetic are encoded in my
>brain" and "the axioms of arithmetic are recorded in my brain". 

Well, what is the "something" that is encoded?  How does the
encoding make it not mystical or etherial?

>>>  This physical substance
>>>which represents your principles is part of the universe, and is part
>>>of what determines your action.  So, yes, you decision on how to vote
>>>was indeed predetermined.  But it was not a sham; your reasoning was
>>>not a charade.  The physical conditions which predetermined your vote
>>>was that physical substance in your brain which represents your
>>>principles.  Your reasoning was completely correct.  It was your
>>>principles, or their physical embodiment, which determined your vote.
>>
>>This is a very prejudicial way of looking at it.  What if the
>>reasoning was wrong?  What if B didn't violate the principles and
>>the voter was just mistaken?
>
>People make such mistakes all the time.  I'm not sure what is your
>point, or why the possibility of a mistake makes it prejudicial.

You pick a case where the reasoning is "completely correct"
in order to reinforce the claim that it was not a sham or a
charade.  If you pick a case where the reasoning is completely
bogus, this particular support collapses.

>>                 What if the voter is mistaken about what his
>>principles imply and cannot be made to realize his mistake no
>>matter how carefully it is explained?  (Think of the net.)
>
>This happens all the time.  What of it?  The voter can use his free will
>to make the wrong decision if he wishes.

The point is still that you pick a case that "looks free", and
where the right thing happens.  ("Your reasoning was completely
correct.")

Why did you pick that kind of case to make your point if it
made no difference?

>>So what says the reasoning wasn't a charade?  It could involve
>>mistakes without the voter being able to realize they were mistakes.
>>The voter had to vote against B even if all the reasons were
>>completely bogus.  The voter had no choice and was just riding
>>along on a deterministic wave.
>
>Absolute notions of free will vs. predestination are inventions, and
>have no reality.  In a sense, YOU, yourself, have no reality.  There
>are various fundamental particles and forces, and YOU are an interpretation
>of the configuration of some of those particles and forces. 

Why not use a sense in which I don't have no reality?

Sure there's a sense in which "absolute" notions of free will
(where did the "absolute" come from?) have no reality.  There's
also a sense (indeed, the same one will do) in which, say, the
various rights in thge Bill of Rights have no reality.  So?

>My argument
>was meant to show that free will is a reasonable interpretation (those
>things which, according to your thoughts, influenced your action, really
>did influence your action)

So we conclude what?  That there's sometimes free will, when
what someone thinks influences their actions happens to match
what did influence their actions?

-- jd