From: cshi@cs.ulowell.edu (Chunde Shi)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.china,soc.culture.taiwan,talk.politics.china
Subject: U.S. military is "moving forward"--from high sea to coastal area.
Date: 5 Oct 92 22:31:29 GMT
Organization: University of Massachusetts at Lowell Computer Science

Repost without permission:

>From "Navy News Service" <NAVNEWS@nctamslant.navy.mil>

Here is the complete text of the new Navy/Marine Corps strategy
statement, "...From the Sea," as announced in article NNS104 of
the 30 Sep 92 issue of the Navy News Service (NavNews 046/92). 

                         ...FROM THE SEA
 
        PREPARING THE NAVAL SERVICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
                         September 1992
 
              A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE
 
     ...From the Sea is a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper.  It
defines a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps.  The
Navy Policy Book and the Marine Corps' Master Plan describe
internal policy issues and serve to complement the task of
articulating the shape and size of our service for the next
century.
 
                          SEAN O'KEEFE
                      Secretary of the Navy
 
FRANK B. KELSO II                  C. E. MUNDY, JR.
Admiral, U. S. Navy                General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Naval Operations          Commandant of the Marine Corps
 
                          INTRODUCTION
 
     The world has changed dramatically in the last two years,
and America's national security policy has also changed.  As a
result, the priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps have shifted,
leading to this broad assessment of the future direction of our
maritime forces.  
 
     The fundamental shift in national security policy was first
articulated by the President at the Aspen Institute on August 2,
1990.  The new policy is reflected in the President's National
Security Strategy and the "Base Force" concept developed by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.  
 
     This National Security Strategy has profound implications
for the Navy and Marine Corps.  Our strategy has shifted from a
focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and
opportunities.  While the prospect of global war has receded, we
are entering a period of enormous uncertainty in regions critical
to our national interests.  Our forces can help to shape the
future in ways favorable to our interests by underpinning our
alliances, precluding threats, and helping to preserve the
strategic position we won with the end of the Cold War.   
 
     Our naval forces will be full participants in the principal
elements of this strategy--strategic deterrence and defense,
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.  
 
     With a far greater emphasis on joint and combined
operations, our Navy and Marine Corps will provide unique
capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our future
security challenges.  American Naval Forces provide powerful yet
unobtrusive presence; strategic deterrence; control of the seas;
extended and continuous on-scene crisis response; project precise
power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale
warfighting scenarios emerge.  These maritime capabilities are
particularly well tailored for the forward presence and crisis
response missions articulated in the President's National
Security Strategy.   
 
     Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate
future operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to
concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex
operating environment of the "littoral" or coastlines of the
earth.  With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of
the world claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure freedom
of commercial maritime passage.  As a result, our national
maritime policies can afford to de-emphasize efforts in some
naval warfare areas.  But the challenge is much more complex than
simply reducing our present naval forces.  We must structure a
fundamentally different naval force to respond to strategic
demands, and that new force must be sufficiently flexible and
powerful to satisfy enduring national security requirements.  
 
     The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team, both
active and reserve, is to provide the nation: 
 
     Naval Expeditionary Forces - Shaped for Joint Operations
     Operating Forward From the Sea - Tailored for National Needs
 
     This strategic direction, derived from the National Security
Strategy, represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean
warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the
sea.  The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and
can provide the initial, "enabling" capability for joint
operations in conflict--as well as continued participation in any
sustained effort.  We will be part of a "sea-air-land" team
trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they
execute national policy.   
 
     In addition to our new direction, the Navy has a continuing
obligation to maintain a robust strategic deterrent by sending
nuclear ballistic submarines to sea.  As long as the United
States maintains a policy of nuclear deterrence, our highly
survivable nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines will
remain critical to national security.  We also need to turn our
attention and explore potential naval contributions to other
forms of conventional strategic defense.  In particular, we are
carefully examining the naval capabilities which could contribute
to theater missile defenses.   
 
     Beyond the shift in emphasis for the naval forces, there are
some traditional naval missions for which we must redouble our
efforts to improve our capability.  Of particular importance,
sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy.  Our nation must
remain capable of delivering heavy equipment and resupplying
major ground and air combat power forward in crisis.  Sealift is
the key to force sustainment for joint operations and we are
committed to a strong national sealift capability.
 
                   DEFINING THE NEW DIRECTION
 
Naval Expeditionary Forces
 
     The restructured Naval Force must expand on and capitalize
upon its traditional expeditionary roles.  "Expeditionary"
implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that
are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly. 
Specifically, Naval Expeditionary Forces are:  
 
     >  Swift to respond, on short notice, to crises in distant
lands.  Naval Forces, deployed overseas, are poised to respond to
national tasking.  Recent examples include the initial rapid
response to meet the requirements for Desert Shield and provide
assistance to storm battered Bangladesh and the war torn Kurds
following Desert Storm.   
 
     >  Structured to build power from the sea when required by
national demands.  The Navy and Marine Corps "sea-air-land" team
is capable of a full range of action--from port visits and
humanitarian relief to major offensive operations.  Even as
Desert Shield intensified, tailored Naval Forces responded to
evacuation requirements in both Liberia and Somalia.  
 
     >  Able to sustain support for long-term operations.  Ships
at sea in remote areas of the world have a healthy
self-sufficiency.  Naval Forces can remain on station for
extended periods.  Amphibious forces remained off Liberia for
seven months.  The USS Eisenhower task force remained in the
Indian Ocean at sea for five months during the Iranian Hostage
Crisis.   
 
     >  Unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight
approval from foreign governments in order to enter the scene of
action.  The international respect for freedom of the seas
guarantees legal access up to territorial waters of all coastal
countries of the world.  This affords Naval Forces the unique
capability to provide peaceful presence in ambiguous situations
before a crisis erupts.   
 
     In sum, Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive
forward presence which may be intensified or withdrawn as
required on short notice.
 
Shaped for Joint Operations
 
     The Navy and Marine Corps are full partners in joint
operations.  The battlefield of the future will demand that
everyone on the field be teammates.  Such teamwork "enables"
joint combat operations.  Some examples of how Naval Forces will
implement this concept include:  
 
     o  As a highly sustainable force on scene, a Naval Force
commander can command the joint task force while the operation is
primarily maritime; and shift that command ashore if the campaign
shifts landward at the discretion of the Unified Commander.   
 
     o  Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps
can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal
air base to allow the entry of heavy Army or Air Force forces. 
The success of modern U.S. military strategy depends on forces
organized, trained, and equipped for this division of combat
labor.   
 
     o  Sealift will provide the maritime bridge to ensure heavy
joint forces can arrive and fight effectively in major crisis.
 
Operating Forward, From the Sea
 
     As the U.S. withdraws from overseas bases, Naval Forces will
become even more relevant in meeting American forward presence
requirements.   
 
     The Navy and Marine Corps operate forward to project a
positive American image, build foundations for viable coalitions,
enhance diplomatic contacts, reassure friends, and demonstrate
U.S. power and resolve.  Naval Forces will be prepared to fight
promptly and effectively, but they will serve in an equally
valuable way by engaging day-to-day as peacekeepers in the
defense of American interests.  Naval Forces are unique in
offering this form of international cooperation.   
 
     Operating forward, Naval Forces demonstrate United States
commitment overseas and promote American interests.  A scheduled,
coalition-building multinational exercise involving U.S. Navy and
Marine forces provides visible assurance to friends--and a
warning to potential enemies.  Humanitarian assistance and
nation-building efforts have similar effects.  
 
     Naval Forces also contain crises through forward operations
and rapid responses with flexible and sustainable sea-based
forces.  The seeds of conflict will continue to sprout in places
where American interests are perceived as vulnerable.  The art of
managing crises in these areas is delicate and requires the
ability to orchestrate the appropriate response and to send
precisely tailored diplomatic, economic, and military signals to
influence the actions of adversaries.
 
     Naval Forces provide a wide range of crisis response
options, most of which have the distinct advantage of being
easily reversible.  If diplomatic activities resolve the crisis,
Naval Forces can withdraw without action or build-up ashore.
 
     If diplomacy fails, Naval Forces operating forward, as part
of a joint U.S. military team, can project United States combat
power as required.   

     Operating forward means operating in the littoral or "near
land" areas of the world.  As a general concept, we can define
the littoral as comprising two segments of the battlespace:
 
     >  Seaward: The area from the open ocean to the shore which
must be controlled to support operations ashore.
 
     >  Landward: The area inland from shore that can be
supported and defended directly from the sea.
 
     The littoral region is frequently characterized by confined
and congested water and air space occupied by friends,
adversaries, and neutrals--making identification profoundly
difficult.  This environment poses varying technical and tactical
challenges to Naval Forces.  It is an area where our adversaries
can concentrate and layer their defenses.  In an era when arms
proliferation means some third world countries possess
sophisticated weaponry, there is a wide range of potential
challenges.
 
     For example, an adversary's submarines operating in shallow
waters pose a particular challenge to Naval Forces.  Similarly,
coastal missile batteries can be positioned to "hide" from radar
coverage.  Some littoral threats--specifically mines,
sea-skimming cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic
missiles--tax the capabilities of our current systems and force
structure.  Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed.  It
does not derive directly from command of the high seas.  It is an
objective which requires our focused skills and resources.
 
Tailored for National Needs
 
     As Naval Forces shift from a Cold War, open ocean, blue
water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary
focus, Naval organizations will change.  Responding to crises in
the future will require great flexibility and new ways to employ
our forces.  As an example, the Naval Services will make
available to Unified Commanders a notional Expeditionary Force
Package from among the following: 
 
     >  Aircraft carrier and air wing
     >  Submarines
     >  Amphibious ships with embarked Marines
     >  Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
     >  Surface combatants
     >  Mine Warfare Forces  
     >  Navy Special Warfare Forces 
 
     Under the aegis of the Unified Commander, these forces would
be available for tasking in the full range of joint operations
with the other services, thus providing a cohesive joint team
capable of rapid and decisive action--from peacetime presence and
exercises to joint strike in major crisis.  
 
     The Expeditionary Force Package can operate with other
elements of joint or combined task forces, including: 
 
     --  Air Force composite wing 
     --  Army infantry, airborne, or air mobile forces 
     --  Special Operations forces 
     --  Surveillance, refueling, air defense assets 
     --  Coast Guard assets 
     --  Reserve Forces in contributory support 
     --  Allied forces and assets 
 
     Naval Forces can be continuously tailored to developing
events.  The answer to every situation may not be a carrier
battle group.  It may be an amphibious readiness group and a
surface action group with Tomahawk missiles.  It may be a group
of minesweepers, with several guided missile frigates for
defense.  Or it may be the overwhelming power of a carrier battle
group and an amphibious ready group with embarked Marines,
operating with Air Force and Army forces.  The key is
continuously tailoring our forces to anticipate and support
national needs.   
 
     Forces can be "shared" across theater boundaries to
demonstrate capabilities, signal commitment to local leaders and
promote opportunities for regular exercises and exchanges with
air, sea, and ground forces of our allies and coalition partners. 
Rapid movement of these forces across Unified Command boundaries
will occur to forestall or respond to crises.
 
                    OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
 
     All services are enhancing and streamlining their
capabilities to maximize efficiency, particularly in joint and
combined operations.  The Naval Service will focus on
complementing the capabilities of the other Services, examine
ways to minimize duplicative capabilities, and thereby
efficiently meet the challenges of the new security environment. 
The shift in focus to littoral operations requires a
corresponding shift of emphasis toward accelerating the adaption
of existing forces to counter littoral threats.
 
     In addition to our traditional operational capabilities of
forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and
sealift, four key operational capabilities are required to
successfully execute the new direction of the Navy and Marine
Corps:
 
     Command, Control, and Surveillance
     Battlespace Dominance
     Power Projection
     Force Sustainment
 
Command, Control, and Surveillance
 
     The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure command
and control capabilities to promote efficient joint and combined
operations as part of an overarching command, control, and
communications architecture that can adapt from sea to shore.  We
will also exploit the unique contributions which Naval Forces
bring to littoral operations.   
 
     Our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize
exploitation of space and electronic warfare systems to provide
commanders with immediate information, while denying and/or
managing the data available to our enemies.  Integrated
information and netted sensors will allow us to use surveillance
data from all sources--national and combined--and to target and
strike from a variety of land, sea, and air platforms.   
 
     The Naval Force Commander will have the capability to
command a joint task force and function as, or host, a Joint
Force Commander.  Command and control system capabilities enable
domination of the battlespace and power projection, and are
central to the precise application of power.   
 
     Particular emphasis will be placed on the ability to collect
intelligence through covert surveillance early in crisis.  Naval
intelligence efforts will be directed to a regional focus.
 
Battlespace Dominance
 
     The battlespace is the sea, air, and land environment where
we will conduct our operations.  The dominated battlespace
expands and contracts and has limits.  Dominating the battlespace
presupposes effective command and control capabilities and serves
as the logical prerequisite for the projection of power ashore. 
Battlespace dominance means that we can maintain access from the
sea to permit the effective entry of equipment and resupply. 
This dominance implies that Naval Forces can bring to bear
decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air.  We
must use the full range of U.S., coalition and space-based assets
to achieve dominance in space as well.  
 
     Naval Forces must also have the capability to deny access to
a regional adversary, interdict the adversary's movement of
supplies by sea, and control the local sea and air.  For the
Naval Service, then, dominating the battlespace means ensuring
effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from
sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of potential
missions.  This is the essence of naval adaptability and
flexibility which are the keys to contingency response. 
Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare.
 
Power Projection
 
     Naval Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of
littoral areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high
intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of
their choosing under any weather conditions, day or night.  Power
projection requires mobility, flexibility, and technology to mass
strength against weakness.  The Navy and Marine Corps Team
supports the decisive sea-air-land battle by providing the
sea-based support to enable the application of the complete range
of U.S. combat power.   
 
     Power projection from the sea means bombs, missiles, shells,
bullets, and bayonets.  When Marines go ashore, naval aviation
aboard aircraft carriers and--if required--land based
expeditionary aircraft will provide them sustained, high-volume
tactical air support ashore to extend the landward reach of our
littoral operations.  Rugged naval aircraft are well suited for
expeditionary airfield operations.  These capabilities--the
ability to generate high intensity power projection from the
decks of our carriers and expeditionary airfields--are critical. 
They must continue to be sufficiently available and ready to
contribute to joint warfare and decisive victory.   
 
     Our carrier and cruise missile firepower can also operate
independently to provide quick, retaliatory strike capability
short of putting forces ashore.  Remaining ready indefinitely to
strike, this potential force from the sea is a critical tool for
diplomacy and influence.  The mere arrival of naval strike forces
into an area of heightened U.S. interest sends a clear signal.   
 
     Joint operations between Naval and Air Force strike
assets--including carrier-based aircraft, land-based naval
expeditionary aircraft, land-based Air Force aircraft from both
local and distant bases, and Tomahawk missiles from surface
forces and attack submarines--have become standard.
 
     Finally, forces projected ashore can maneuver and build up
power rapidly deep in the objective area to disorient, divert,
and disrupt the enemy.
 
Force Sustainment
 
     America's influence depends on its ability to sustain
military operations around the globe.  The military options
available can be extended indefinitely because sea-based forces
can remain on station as long as required.  Naval Forces
encompass the full range of logistics support that is the
critical element of any military operation.  It requires a
comprehensive and responsive logistics support system, including
air and sealift, replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities,
and advanced logistic support hubs.  It requires open sea lanes
of communication so that passage of shipping is not impeded by an
adversary.   
 
     In peace, naval logistics forces support the day-to-day
forward operations of Naval Forces.  During crisis, warfighting
materiel afloat in maritime prepositioning ships enables the
near-immediate projection of credible military power.  Finally,
during war, strategic sealift ships will deliver heavy equipment
and resupply heavy ground and air combat forces.  Forward
logistics, prepositioning, and strategic sealift, coupled with
strategic airlift, are the keys to force sustainment.
 
                           CONCLUSION
 
     The Navy and Marine Corps Team is changing in response to
the challenges of a new security environment.  The shift in
strategic landscape means that Naval Forces will concentrate on
littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea.  Maneuver from the
sea, the tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land,
provides a potent warfighting tool to the Joint Task Force
Commander--a tool that is literally the key to success in many
likely contingency scenarios.
 
     The new direction of the Naval Service signals changes in
doctrine, education, service integration, training, acquisition,
infrastructure, operations, risk reduction, and other areas. 
Amplifying documents and policy statements will follow on these
subjects.   
 
     Naval Forces must be both capable and affordable, supported
by relevant concepts, doctrine, and training.  These changes will
refine and implement the operational capabilities of
expeditionary warfare so that Naval Forces can help provide the
Nation's leaders with a full range of options to preserve
regional balances, lay the foundations for coalition operations,
provide assistance to Americans in danger, respond to crises of
every type, and project decisive power ashore in conflict.
 
                         IMPLEMENTATION
 
Naval Doctrine Command
 
     We are establishing a Naval Doctrine Command.  Integration
on the battlefield starts with integration of doctrine and
training.  The regional and littoral warfighting environment
requires new doctrinal thinking to get the most out of
integrating the Navy/Marine Corps and the joint sea-air-land
team.  The new Naval Doctrine Command, alternately commanded by a
Navy Rear Admiral and a Marine Corps Major General, will provide
for smooth integration of Naval Forces into joint operations at
any level, close the gap between the air-land battle and
amphibious warfare, and translate "operational maneuver from the
sea" into naval doctrine.  Above all, it will build doctrine for
expeditionary warfare.
 
Examining Our Current Force
 
     We will examine functions and capabilities, seeking to
eliminate areas of redundancy and enhancing areas considered
deficient in light of this shift in strategy.  Navy and Marine
Corps equipment design, tactical training, logistics support, and
task force structure will be optimized for taking and holding
objectives on or near the enemy's coastline.  We specialize in
maneuver warfare from over the horizon, using the ocean to
project force at soft points in the enemy's defense.  Our job
during a regional conflict is to control the ocean adjacent to
the littoral battlefield, the ground from the shore to our
objectives, and the skies above both.  We rely on Navy and Marine
Corps strike assets to neutralize enemy threats that may engage
us from outside of established defense perimeters.  Our goal is
to focus our procurement strategy on systems that best support
the unique capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.
 
Immediate Tasks
 
     Fiscal realities and a newly defined regional, littoral
naval focus require new thinking, significant changes, and a
commitment to undertake challenging tasks.  The Navy and Marine
Corps will: 
 
     >  Restructure to accommodate the strategy outlined in this
document.  
 
     >  Link air, land, and naval warfare to ensure truly joint
warfare.  
 
     >  Develop naval doctrine consistent with the new direction
and focus--including an examination of functions and
capabilities.  
 
     >  Organize, train, and implement new Naval force packages
for expeditionary operations.  Train commanders and man their
staffs for joint operations.  
 
     >  Configure, train, and man numbered fleet and Marine 
expeditionary staffs to be able to command a joint task force and
function as, or host, a Joint Force Air Component Commander.  
 
     >  Enhance communications, command, and control on naval
flag ships to the degree necessary to host the commander of a
joint task force.  
 
     >  Establish Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command as
a Vice Admiral billet; provide additional permanent staff billets
and communications command and control capabilities necessary to
execute his responsibilities.  
  
     >  Provide the Marines with the medium-lift they require.
 
     >  Increase emphasis on generation of high intensity power
projection, support of force ashore, and weapons necessary to
fulfill the mission.
  
     >  Expand the integration of Navy and Marine Corps 
fixed-wing air capabilities.  
 
     >  Fully integrate attack submarines, maritime patrol 
aircraft, and mine warfare assets into the expeditionary task
forces.  
 
     >  Resolve sealift deficiencies.  
 
     >  Continue to reorient naval intelligence resources from
the former Soviet Navy to regional, littoral threats.  
 
     >  Structure the Naval Reserve for immediate crisis 
response and peacetime contributory support.  
 
     >  Procure equipment systems to support this strategy and
remain ahead of the global technological revolution in military 
systems.
Xref: sparky soc.culture.china:26759 soc.culture.taiwan:14105