From: slkg9733@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steven L. Kellmeyer)
Subject: Re: Right To Not Support
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 1992 23:21:34 GMT

kevin@rotag.mi.org (Kevin Darcy) writes:

>In article <BssHxM.2rB@news.cso.uiuc.edu> slkg9733@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steven L. Kellmeyer) writes:
>>kevin@cfctech.cfc.com (Kevin Darcy) writes:
>>
>>>In article <BsDw1x.5A5@news.cso.uiuc.edu> slkg9733@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steven L. Kellmeyer) writes:
>>>>vixie@pa.dec.com (Paul A Vixie) writes:
>>>>
>>>>>slkg9733@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steven L. Kellmeyer) writes:
>>>>
>>>>True, but we are assuming the delivery was not coerced.  The man has
>>>>delivered raw materials in the same way a truck might deliver steel
>>>>to an automobile plant.  Surely, assuming the raw material was of good
>>>>quality, the steel company cannot be held liable for the upkeep of
>>>>the automobile (or whatever other use the company may decide to make
>>>>of that raw material).
>>
>>>An automobile does not have a right to support, however. Your analogy sucks.
>>
>>Non sequitor.

>That's "non sequitur". If you're going to play with Latin, try to at least
>get the spellings right.

My, we are a little pissy, um, prissy today, aren't we?

>>The raw material analogy still holds, since the "right to support"
>>can only be compelled from the individual(s) responsible for the creation
>>of the child.  

>Wrong. The right to support is premised on causal PARTICIPATION in the
>creation of a child. Not just the creator, but everyone significantly 
>contributing to the creation, can potentially be held liable. This includes 
>the father.

"everyone significantly contributing to the creation" eh?  Then why doesn't
the OB/GYN pay any child support?  Especially in one of those multiple
embryos via fertility drugs that require selective abortion if any of
them, mother included, is going to live?  No child until birth, after all,
so anything the doctor does before then may be construed to "significantly
contribute to the creation".  Notice that I'm giving you the benefit of 
the doubt and not mentioning that you made this up out of whole cloth.

>>The child's right to support is not in question, nor does 
>>the analogy bring it into question.  

>The analogy is fatally flawed because you are trying to interpret child 
>support as a tort action for the consequences of a child's "manufacture"
>when in actual fact it's a statutory obligation relating to the whole process
>leading up to the child's "manufacture", i.e. extending all the way back to
>the act of sexual intercourse.

Oh, PLEASE!!!  The fact that it is currently a statutory obligation doesn't
enter into it.  We are discussing whether or not it SHOULD be a statutory
obligation, based on the relevant law currently surrounding procreation,
and I have pointed out that the legal basis for abortion, and the Tennessee
court case on a man's right to choose not to be fa father calls this whole
obligation into question.

Furthermore, if such "obligation" relates "to the whole process leading up
to the child's 'manufacture'" and extends "all the way back to the act of
sexual intercourse", then why doesn't the woman incur any obligation by
the act of intercourse which created the man's obligation?  If the man
has an obligation towards a child-not-yet-in-being simply because he had
sex, then the woman also has an obligation towards a child-not-yet-in-being
simply because SHE had sex.  If this obligation creates financial compulsion
on the man, despite the fact that he is legally denied all voice in the 
matter, one would think the woman would have an equal obligation to assure
existence of the child and carry to term.  To be equal, she would necessarily
be denied all legal recourse to abortion, i.e. all legal voice in the matter
as well.  This is obviously not the case. 

>>It questions just who has the "duty"
>>that the "right" implies.  The duty obviously does not derive from someone
>>who clearly supplies nothing more than raw material.  

>This is not "obvious", Kellmeyer, as I've been telling you for over a year.
>This has nothing to do with warranty or commercial law. There is no legal
>distinction between "raw" and "refined" genetic materials. There is no
>legally-recognized "manufacturing" process. You're totally out in left field

You are wrong.  The process by which a child is created is clearly divided
in the law into three stages, called trimesters.  There is clearly no legal
entity in the first stage, there clearly is enough value put into the raw
material in the second stage to warrent government interest, and there is
enough value put into the raw material in the third stage to permit 
government regulation.  If the subject were anything other than a child, we
would clearly BE talking about a manufacturing process involving human
raw material instead of clay or steel.  The fact that the SC didn't happen
to use the word "manufacturing" does not detract from the utilitarian
manufacturing regulation attitude supplied in RvW.

>here. The only thing the law cares about in terms of causality is whether the 
>father significantly contributed to the creation of the child. Obviously he 
>did. Stop trying to rewrite a well-established legal rationale.

The law no longer cares about that.  Tennessee proved that "significant
contribution" is not sufficient to compel the man to anything, assuming
the woman does not control the fetus.  Artificial insemination by donor
has already seriously weakened the "well-established legal rationale" you
are on about, as does some forms of surrogate parenting.  The only thing
that appears to matter at the present time is whether or not the woman
controls the child being manufactured.  If she does, she can choose to
impose financial burdens on an unwilling male.  If she does not, she can
not.

>>>>>> [re: Tennessee frozen embryo case]
>>>>
>>>>Furthermore, he *did* rule that the man had a right "to choose not to be
>>>>a father".  This implies a) he is not currently a father (the frozen 
>>>>embryos are not children, nor do they create any paternal duties in the
>>>>man)  and b) the "father" status would inevitably result (along with
>>>>possible child support obligations - that I don't really know) if 
>>>>re-implantation were to be allowed.
>>
>>>Analogy #2 sucks also, since there is the added complication of divorce to
>>>be considered. As I understand it, when the "parents" divorced, she retained
>>>ownership of the frozen embryos, but the Tennessee court ruled that he still
>>>retained some form of ownership control over the DISPOSITION of that 
>>>property. There were "strings attached", as it were. So while it might make
>>>good propaganda to cite the "can't force a man to become a father" part of
>>>the ruling, that was not necessarily the main principle relied on to decide
>>>the case, and therefore the case might not be particularly relevant to the 
>>>paternity child-support controversy.
>>
>>I made no analogy in the second part, so I'm not sure what you are referring
>>to.  

>You are trying to draw an analogy between the frozen embryo case and the state
>of the law wrt paternity, are you not?

No.  I am pointing out the logic that necessarily underlay the court's 
decision.  Why you think the court's logic somehow resembled an "anology"
is interesting, but perhaps you could take that up with your psychiatrist.

>>However, if the man retained some sort of "control" even AFTER a
>>divorce, one would assume that this same control would hold within a marriage.

>Yes, but the delineation between his rights and her rights to that property 
>would be a lot fuzzier in that case, and unlikely to ever show up in a court
>case.

If you have a point, I do not know what it is.

>>Again, you are attacking a line of reasoning that is not germane to the 
>>central premise.  

>Hand-waving. Please prove that the case was decided on anything other than
>post-divorce property-disposition rights, and you might have a chance of
>making the analogy to paternity stick. Otherwise, I'm liable to just dismiss
>the quotes about "right to choose not to be a father" as little more than
>irrelevant dicta.

Well, unless you think children are property, I think the court's statement
that "a man has a right to choose not to be a father" is pretty clear.
Careful what part of a court's ruling you consider "irrelevant dicta".
Not a few judges would disagree.

>>Those "strings" you speak of only appeared when the 
>>embryos were not being held by the woman.  

>No. Those "strings" were only CONTESTED after the divorce went through. They
>may very well have pre-existed the divorce decree.

If they did, he could have sued her for carrying to term and making him a
father against his wishes.  Tell me, Kevin, you love to speak of 
"well-established legal criteria", how far do you think such a case would
have gone?    Now quit wasting my time.  You argue with me only because 
you don't like my politics.  My reasoning supports your position, and that
makes you feal queasy as hell, because you suspect I have ulterior motives.

I do.  I want to show exactly how sleazy the current law, and the current
thrust of the law, in re procreative matters, is.  And how sleazy it soon
will be.  You like sleaze too well to like the light.

>								- Kevin

Steve Kellmeyer
From: mikep@hpmwtd.sr.hp.com (Mike Powell)
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 01:05:06 GMT
Subject: Re: HATE (was "Hating Men...")
Organization: HP Santa Rosa Site (NMD MTA MWTD)