From: black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236))
Subject: Re: Martin's challenge (was Re: animals in research)
Organization: Clinical Products Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 21:54:43 GMT

In article  <1992Dec19.023956.13036@pixel.kodak.com> young@clpd.kodak.com writes:
> In <1992Dec18.220220.12376@clpd.kodak.com>, Bob Black writes:
> >
> >In article <1992Dec12.185729.23128@pixel.kodak.com> young@serum.kodak.com writes:
> >
> >>Bob Black previously wrote:
> 
> [...]
> 
> >>>But these examples fail due to our lack of sufficient information and
> >>>based on assumptions about foreknowledge (that is, we're assuming that
> >>>the deaths were not anticipated or expected by those who died).  
> >> 
> >> 	And that's the whole point: the two examples offered do not refute
> >> 	Martin's challenge.  The reasons for this failure are irrelevant to
> >> 	the point.
> >
> >Actually the reasons do seem relevant.  If the examples have been
> >disproved, then further inquiry would be discouraged.  If the examples
> >have been dismissed due to insufficient information, then further
> >exploration may be merited.  However with the clarifications at the
> >bottom ("SUM of the actions of ALL members..."), Martin's challenge is
> >increasingly starting to look tautologically useless.  His claim now
> >appears to take a form like: If John Doe sacrifices himself, then he
> >won't survive. 
> 
> 	You said it yourself: without foreknowledge of motives, the examples
> 	cannot be shown to refute Martin's challenge.  There WAS no further
> 	exploration, therefore speculation regarding the results of further
> 	exploration is just that: speculation...and speculation does not
> 	refute the challenge.  The fact remains that the two examples, as
> 	presented, were inadequate to refute Martin's statement.  ...

Okay.  Of course, in these two very specific instances, no further
investigation is possible.  The examples fail because the time to
acquire the information is irrevocably past - not because they've been
disproven.  This distinction is important because in one case further
investigation may be justified in future instances of identical or
similar incidents, while in the other case (i.e. the disproven case),
further investigation of future incidents would be discouraged in favor
of other more potentially fruitful pursuits.

> 	As for the utility of his statement, it is, in fact, a statement
> 	of a very simple principle...though not the one you've supplied
> 	in your example.  A better reading would be: sacrifice is maladaptive
> 	and, if carried to extremes, will result in extinction, which is
> 	why it's not seen in existing species.  [I'm paraphrasing Martin,
> 	here, and will welcome any corrections he might offer.]

The key here is the clause "if carried to extremes."  If not carried to
extremes, then it's not obvious that sacrifice is maladaptive.  In fact,
it might prove to be highly adaptive if it serves to slacken exploding
population of the sacrificing species.  

Is abortion maladaptive?

> 
> [...]
> 
> >What's relevant is that there are many examples of dogs
> >appearing to show favoritism toward other taxonomic classes at the
> >expense of their own.  How many such examples are needed to cast doubt
> >on the allegation that dogs are speciesist? Or is it the claim that we
> >can never draw a conclusion in this matter by reviewing the actions of
> >individuals?
> 
> 	You assume that the viewpoint of the dog is irrelevant.  In point
> 	of fact, the viewpoint of the dog is the ONLY relevant consideration.
> 	If the actions of a dog are seen BY THE DOG to further the species,
> 	then there is clearly speciesism because the dog is acting to
> 	benefit his species.  Whether or not it actually IS his species
> 	which is benefitted, is totally without significance.  It's the
> 	motivation, not the action itself, which is the determining factor.

Oh, we're discussing speciesist *motivation* not speciesist *behavior*.
Thanks for clearing that up.

> 
> 	Once again, I must urge caution regarding the use of the domestic dog
> 	as an example, since it has been evolutionarily "corrupted" by human
> 	design.

I will exercise caution then - regarding the application of this concept
to domestic dogs.  But then shouldn't we also do likewise for all other
domestic animals: domestic cats, domestic cattle, domestic fowl, even
domestic humans themselves?

> 
> [...]
> 
> >You're still overlooking the significance of the meaning of the term
> >"species." If a dog thinks a non-dog is actually a dog, that doesn't
> >magically shift the non-dog into a different taxonomic class.  The dog's
> >"point of view" is irrelevant. 
> >
> >When dogs use criteria other than the specific taxonomic classification
> >of species, then they're not acting as speciesists.
> 
> 	See above.  In addition, it's becoming clear that you've corrupted
> 	Martin's original meaning.  He wasn't trying to explore the ability
> 	of a domesticated animal to identify others of its kind, he was
> 	addressing the point that members of a species tend to act in ways
> 	that preserve their species, regardless of the consequences to other
> 	species.  ...

But without this ability to identify others of a kind, then speciesist
motivation becomes irrelevant, because it can't be translated into
results.

>	[Again, if this is a misreading of Martin's intent, I will
> 	welcome his correction.]  In the case of the dog, a mistake in
> 	taxonomy from a "Man-made" creature bred to make just such a mistake
> 	is hardly a rebuttal of the principle.

You're right in saying it's not a rebuttal of the principle, but it does
reduce the applicability and destroy the universality of the principle. 

> 
> [...]
> 
> >How prevalent do these apparently contradictory individual examples have
> >to be in order cast reasonable doubt on the speciesist hypothesis?
> 
> 	I'm not at all certain that a "Man-made" animal would ever really
> 	provide definitive evidence.

Including the class of "Man-made" animals known as humans?

[...]

> 
> >The second claim is now looking more ambiguous.  Is Martin referring to
> >a straight sum of individual behaviors or to a synergistic sum which
> >could never be determined by examining individual behaviors?  Is he
> >simply saying: Those who don't kill themselves stay alive longer?
> 
> 	I hesitate to speak for Martin, and encourage his correction, but I
> 	don't see anything which would defeat proper epidemiology in his
> 	statement.  However, he is not [as I see it] saying something as
> 	totally inane as what you've proposed.  He is saying that a species
> 	cannot survive if it places other species survival ahead of its own.

If it does so ALL the time, then of course not.  If it does so
sometimes, then maybe or maybe not.  
--- 
Robert Black
black@serum.kodak.com - The ONLY email address that MIGHT work.  
These views are not necessarily the views of my employers. 
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals