From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Mostly about the War in the East (was: winning the war in the west)
Date: 11 Dec 92 14:00:25 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1992Dec11.142521.29467@panix.com>, spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) writes:
> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
> 
>>One more point to add: Davis and Lee were not simply defending
>>Richmond. They genuinely attempted to take the War north.
> 
> Which I regard as proof positive they were poor strategists and poor
> students of history. 

----- (again I am attempting to save bandwidth by deleting liberally) ------

I am less sure this was a priori a bad idea. I do agree that by 1863
Washington was secure (despite my little fiction about Jackson at 
Gettysburg), but I said "take the War north" not necessarily "storm 
Washington".

Your other post (in response to Gary Charbonneau) states rather
unambiguously that the CSA could NEVER have taken Washington, but it
seems to me it was little more that self restraint on Lee's part not
to march in and take it with a brigade of Virginia Militia  within the
few days after Fort Sumter. Whether or not there were real
opportunities after the two Battles of Manassas, or during the
Antietam Campaign, are questions that are much clearer than hindsight.
What I am trying to lead up to is that Davis, Lee, Bragg and most of
the CSA leaders believed that the people of Maryland and Kentucky
would rally to the support of an invading Southern army. Beyond the
rioting and bridge burning that occured around Baltimore after Fort
Sunter, Lincoln was holding a good fraction of the Maryland State 
legislature (including one or more of the Key family) without Habeus 
Corpus in Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor.

The point I want to make is that Baltimore was every bit as much of an
occupied city as was New Orleans (they even had Ben Butler in charge
for a while) and Baltimore was the logistical key (no pun intended) to
the defense of Washington. I don't think Lee believed he could 
capture either Baltimore or Washington using military strength during
the Antietam Campaign, but he did hope to strike a match.

However, it was one of Lee's biggest errors that he expected to
"liberate" *western* Maryland (just as Bragg and Breckinridge
miscalculated in Ky.) Had he had a way to cross the Potomac
southeast of Washington the story might have been different (but then
he would have been in a worse mess than McClellan on the Peninsula). 

> About four score and seven years before the Civil
> War, a brilliant strategist named Washington demonstrated how to win a
> war of revolution against an overwhelmingly stronger foe.

This is intriguing. Could you make this point more explicit? 

My reading of the War for Independence and the Civil War has given me
the impression that Lee was strongly influenced my Washington's
military precedent, but more successful at it. Only, Lee lacked the
French Navy.

Lee of course was literally George Washington's heir, and he took 
this role very seriously. As a general, Washington's characteristics
were to take long-odds chances when it looked like he was beaten. 
Trenton/Princeton is the best example. To me, Washington's actions
there always struck a close resonance with Lee on the Peninsula and at
Chancellorsville. I can envision the image passing through Lee's mind
at the time. I would even go so far as to speculate that emulating
Washington may have been what transformed "Granny" Lee into "Marse'
Robert".

RE: the AotP

>>[DS2]  This was clearly not an army that was being driven to fight. Other
>>[DS2]  than the occasional acid sarcasm, Lincoln never pressed his Eastern
>>[DS2]  commanders.
> 
>>I have to disagree about Lincoln. My picture is that he pushed as hard
>>as he could. Perhaps too much so in some cases.
> 
> Nope. I stand by my assertion. Read through the 1861-63 volumes of
> Lincoln's collected papers, read Nicolay & Hay and skim through the
> relevant Official Records. There's nothing there to suggest that the
> high command was driving the commanders of the AofP. If they were,
> you'd see a lot more than the occasional barb at Mac. 

Well, I'll look at it again. My reading suggests that Lincoln took a
more active role in military planning than any other American
president (excluding Davis). 

> If you need an
> example of how to drive senior commanders, compare Grant's despatches
> and orders starting with the Vicksburg campaign. Lincoln -- and
> certainly Scott and Halleck -- knew how to give orders like that. but
> they didn't.
> 
As for Grant, another of his talents was his ability to use the
English language in a clear and simple manner. Scott was the
antithesis, and I honestly don't think Halleck was emotionally capable
of issuing a direct order (other than "You are under arrest").

This reminds me of a story. I think it was Burnside that kept on his
staff a colonel who was reputed to be the dumbest officer in the army.
Burnside would test the clarity of his written orders by having this 
colonel read it. If *he* understood it correctly, Burnside knew there
was no danger of misinterpretation. When Grant took charge, this
colonel was transferred, since he wasn't needed.

> One of the last chapters of Grant's memoirs is devoted to thumbnail
> sketches of his views on his subordinates. It's a fine display of
> judgment. 
> 
I read Sherman's memoirs last summer, and intended to follow it with
Grant's, but I've picked up so many suggestions for reading material
from this group that it got pushed down the list. 

A friend of mine recommended a book that was a best seller a few years
ago, that discussed the careers of four famous generals and what made
them so effective. The four included Wellington and Grant (possibly
Eisenhower). Anyway I've forgotten the title and author, and nothing
has jumped out at me in the book stores. Any help would be
appreciated.

>>Also, one can infer from Foote that Sherman was a helpless
>>basket case until he met Grant (but I think Foote is overly hard on
>>'Cump in this respect).
> 
> Sherman get so hysterical in his memoirs about the Kentucky incident,
> that one has to conclude that he *did* go around the bend. Grant
> tactfully avoids the subject.
> 
> I've previously quoted Senator Sherman ('Cump's brother) on 'Cump:
> 
>     "Cump is a magnificent machine, with every screw one-half
>     turn loose."
> 
> dhs   spencer@panix.com

That's a good quote to remember. Independent of the Kentucky incident,
Foote portrays Sherman a nervous, excitable, unstable (rather
a lot like me when you think about it). My image (not necessarily
valid) is of a much more grim persona. After all he was a man who in
addition to being one of the most notorious soldiers of History, was
also a banker, a lawyer, a university president and a railroad man. 
What a diabolical combination! 8^)

-- Paul

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
P. L. Cowan     Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to 
COWAN@ANL.GOV   "I've been to one World's Fair, a picnic and a rodeo, but
                that's the stupidest thing I ever heard..."_Dr.Strangelove_
---------------------------------------------------------------------------