From: yarvin@cs.yale.edu (Norman Yarvin)
Newsgroups: alt.current-events.somalia
Subject: Re: U.S. Is Not Going to War in Somalia for any Good Reasons
Date: 14 Dec 1992 02:01:11 -0500
Organization: Yale Computer Science Department
NNTP-Posting-Host: cathy.na.cs.yale.edu

egl1@cunixf.cc.columbia.edu (Elizabeth G. Levy) writes:
>In article <1ggi67INNhog@CATHY.NA.CS.YALE.EDU> yarvin@cs.yale.edu (Norman Yarvin) writes:
>>"Peacekeeping" missions are of extremely marginal utility.  Mostly they
>>amount to having UN soldiers sit around in the demilitarized zone.  On the
>>rare occasions when one party decides to break the peace, the UN soldiers
>>run for cover.
>
>On the other hand, you have situations where the nation-state has
>completely broken down, like in the Sudan and Somalia.  There are no
>real factions with motivated and disciplined forces.

There are factions in Somalia.  What do you think those "warlords" are?
There are about seven groups, each of which has several thousand armed men,
with personal weapons and in some cases armored personnel carriers and
artillery.  I would imagine none of these forces has thorough discipline, but
still there are leaders who are clearly in control.

>  Shows of
>strength may clear the streets in this case.  This is why I'm arguing
>for a somewhat more muscular UN: 100 Pakistani troops won't put the
>fear of god into potential adversaries, though helicopter gunships
>may.

We already know that even helicopter gunships will not work for intimidation;
some Somalians shot at one of ours.  Of course now that those particular
Somalians were obliterated, the rest may be more respectful.  But in general
it is risky to try to intimidate without having any real capability to back
it up.

>  I'm
>arguing for giving the UN the means to implement more imaginative
>solutions than simply having soldiers stand there to be fired upon.
>Bosnia, for instance, would perhaps call for using air power against
>the Serbs, arming the Bosnians so their negotiating position won't be
>so disadvantageous (The Serbs won't stop fighting unless they can gain
>nothing further by continuing hostilities.  An armed adversary would
>certainly bring them to the table somewhat more quickly.), etc.  I
>certainly would not advocate putting ground troops into the region,
>since that would most certainly be "of extremely marginal utility."
>The UN, of course, cannot do this, in part from the lack of means and
>political will.

In other words, you would have the UN try to achieve enough of a balance of
power so that the war stops.  This would work, in the sense that they could
achieve a balance of power in the short term.  But it would be a major
operation without a fixed ending point.  Our military has shied away from
such things ever since Vietnam, and for good reason.  The US simply does not
have the political will to sustain a long war.  Our opponents know this,
too; it was proven in Vietnam, where the military stalemate which was
reached was not acceptable to us.  The Serbians would know that if they
called our bluff by keeping the war going, eventually we would pull out.

(It might seem that arming the Bosnians would not be a major operation.  But
if we were to supply weapons we would also have to supply a constant stream
of ammunition and spare parts.  If we stopped the flow they would be in the
position of the Nationalist Chinese army or the South Vietnamese army.  We
would also have to make sure we were not giving them weapons that would
enable them to be the aggressor; this would take some very dangerous
intelligence work, for we certainly could not trust their own figures.)

--
Norman Yarvin						yarvin@cs.yale.edu
 "Power corrupts.  Absolute power is kind of neat."
		-- John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy 1981-1987