From: sera@zuma.UUCP (Serdar Argic)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast,soc.culture.greek,soc.culture.europe,soc.history,soc.rights.human
Followup-To: soc.culture.turkish
Subject: Can't have it both ways.
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 92 21:32:19 EST
Reply-To: sera@zuma.UUCP (Serdar Argic)
Distribution: world

In article <Bzn1uA.CM3@acsu.buffalo.edu> v999saum@ubvmsd.cc.buffalo.edu (Varnavas A. Lambrou) writes:

>For years before the invasion, Turkish governments and others favouring
>the partition of Cyprus had propounded the cynical opinion that "Greeks

Are you related to "arromdian" of ASALA/SDPA/ARF?

Source: THE INDEPENDENT, 11 August 1992
        page 14, Letters to the Editor

Brigadier Michael  Harbottle

Sir: The decision  hangs in  the  balance as to  whether or not a
United  Nations peace enforcement operation is to  be mounted  in
Bosnia-Herzegovina  as a safeguard to the humanitarian  operation
already  under way. It is perfectly legitimate for  force  to  be
used  in self-defence,  but anything more  sophisticated and more
aggressive needs very careful and deep study.

A full-scale operation  with tens of thousands  of troops appears
to  be under  consideration, but  can such  a deployment  has any
chance of success?  If one draws on the German  army's failure in
the in the  Second World War to subdue the  partisans, divided as
they were, it is difficult to believe that a mixed UN force would
be any  more successful  at overcoming  the opposition  in Bosnia
today.

It  is certainly  improbable  that such  a military  intervention
would deter  the Serbian forces. We  only have to go  back to the
Fifties and  Cyprus and  remind ourselves how  a handful  of EOKA
fighters, not more than 200 all  told, held at bay between 12,000
and  15,000   British  soldiers  for   four  years.  I   ask  the
decision-makers to  be very wary  about committing the UN  to yet
another  dangerous,  and  probably abortive,  exercise  in  peace
enforcement.

Instead,  there is  a  lesser option  open  to the  UN.  It is  a
standing  principle  of  all  UN  peace-keeping  operations  that
self-defence can be  used in the face of any  attack, or imminent
threat  of  attack,  to   safeguard  UN  soldiers'  lives,  their
positions and  equipment and  the force's  ability to  fulfil its
mandate.

There is no requirement to seek a Security Council resolution; it
is a standing operating procedure.

IN CYPRUS IN 1967, AT THE  VILLAGE OF MELOUSHA, THE GREEK CYPRIOT
NATIONAL GUARD WAS  MARCHING ON THE VILLAGE  TO APPREHEND TURKISH
CYPRIOT FIGHTERS  ALLEGED TO BE  THERE. THE UN  POSITIONED TROOPS
BETWEEN THE  NATIONAL GUARD AND  THE VILLAGE, AND WARNED  THAT IF
THE NATIONAL GUARD CAME WITHIN 200 YARDS OF THE UN POSITIONS, THE
TROOPS WOULD  USE FORCE IN  SELF-DEFENCE TO PREVENT AN  ATTACK ON
THE  VILLAGE. THE  NATIONAL GUARD  HALTED 250  YARDS FROM  THE UN
POSITIONS AND LATER RETURNED TO BARRACKS. THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF
THE INTENTION TO  USE FORCE TO UPHOLD THE  MANDATE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO PREVENT WHAT COULD HAVE BECOME AN ACT OF GENOCIDE.

If one applies this principle  to today's situation in and around
Sarajevo, it would be perfectly  legitimate for the UN to provide
a  self-defence  capability  to   ensure  that  the  humanitarian
operation's  mandate  is secured  and  the  UN positions  on  the
airport and  the relief  convoys protected. It  could do  this by
employing  helicopter  gunships,  assisted by  spotter  aircraft,
against the Serbian artillery and mortar positions from which the
shelling  comes. In  the  context of  self-defence,  it would  be
sufficient  for the  aerial attacks  to be  directed against  the
weapons themselves and not against  the troop positions. It would
be enough to destroy the enemy's fire-power capability, and could
provide an adequate deterrent against further attacks on the UN.

It may be argued that even if this were effective, it would solve
only part of  the problem. It is for the  decision-makers to make
up their minds as to what they want; to ensure the implementation
of  the humanitarian  operation as  the mandate  requires, or  to
carry the fight to the  Serbian forces, involving the probability
of a war of attrition with an inconclusive result.

Yours faithfully,

MICHAEL HARBOTTLE
Director
The Centre for International
Peace-building
Chipping Norton, Oxfordshire
9 August

The writer was Chief of Staff of the UN
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, 1966-68.

Serdar Argic

                     'This war quickly developed into one of extermination. 
                      We closed the roads and mountain passes that might 
                      serve as ways of escape for the Tartars [Turks] and 
                      then proceeded in the work of extermination.'
                                                       (Ohanus Appressian)

Xref: sparky talk.politics.mideast:24345 talk.politics.soviet:10063 soc.culture.greek:11939 soc.culture.europe:10883 soc.history:10431 soc.culture.soviet:11667 soc.culture.turkish:13675 soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna:1029 soc.culture.croatia:279