From: young@clpd.kodak.com (Rich Young)
Subject: Re: Human motivation and true altruism
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@clpd.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 22:14:17 GMT

In <C0H370.9vo@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:
>
>======================================================================
>ry> Please name one human activity that CANNOT be explained by one of 
>ry> these:
>ry>
>ry> 1. the desire to increase pleasurable ("good") feelings in the 
>ry> one performing the activity, or,
>ry> 
>ry> 2. the desire to decrease or avoid unpleasurable ("bad") feelings
>ry> in the one performing the activity.
>======================================================================
>
>You say the thread is about "motivations".  I say the thread is
>about your prior statement, to wit:
>
>  "Please name one human activity that CANNOT be explained 
>   by [good feelings and bad feelings]".

	Then perhaps you should read the "Subject:" line in the header.  You
	know, the one which says "Human motivation..."

	In addition, you might consult the two postulates which clearly
	refer to "...the desire to..."

	   desire, n., longing, craving.

	   motive, n., something (as a need or desire) that causes a person
			to act.                ^^^^^^

	   motivate, v.t., to provide with a motive.
                                             ^^^^^^

	Are you still unclear regarding the subject of this thread?

[...]

>ry> Now, let's get to the definition of "activity":
>ry> 
>ry> activity, n., 1: the quality or state of being active; 2: a
>ry>                vigorous or energetic action; liveliness.
>ry> 
>ry> active, adj., 1: characterized by action rather than by con-
>ry>                templation or speculation; 2: productive of
>ry>                action or movement.
>ry> 
>ry> Any questions?
>
>Yes, I have a question.  Why did you leave out some of the other 
>definitions?
>
>2: energetic action; liveliness; alertness
>3: a normal function of the body or mind

	Your number 2 is certainly included in what I gave, so you've added
	nothing new there.  That leaves us with number 3, which, in my
	dictionary, is given with the example, "as in digestion."  This third
	definition is clearly a reference to autonomic activity which proceeds 
	simply because we are "alive," and for which the concept of "motiva-
	tion" is inapplicable.  Since the subject of the thread is "Human
	motivation..." it should be clear that this type of thing is beyond
	the scope of the discussion.  To the extent that "motivation" can
	even be considered in an autonomic function, it could be argued
	that it is in the best interest of the organ systems involved to
	continue to function.

	In truth, however, what we have here is a clear attempt to engage 
	in the logical fallacy of equivocation.  The word "activity" is 
	commonly used in two ways: 

		"He needs some kind of activity to keep him awake."

				and

		"Say, Frank, was there any neural activity in that
		patient when you examined him?"

	It is clear that my usage was in the first sense, but Russell wants
	us to believe that the second sense is equivalent.  Not just 
	"applicable," mind you: "equivalent."  He can't succeed without
	re-defining the parameters of the discussion, so he attempts this
	equivocation to shift the focus.

>rl> I think we've demonstrated that it's foolish to "explain" all activities,
>rl> including a particular pattern of thinking, by your theory.   [Like it
>rl> or not, thinking is a form of human activity, Rich.]
>
>rl>As I've pointed out repeated, I don't see how you can explain
>rl>"bad feelings" without appealing to altruistic thinking.
>
>rl>You're entitled to use words as you see fit, but an amendment of 
>rl>your original statement to exclude mental activities from the
>rl>debate wouldn't be wise.  After all, feelings are a mental activity, 
>rl>too, are they not?  
>
>rl>Moreover, the concept of altruism, at its very core, hinges on 
>rl>mental perception and cognition.  Were you hoping that you could 
>rl>make "altruism" disappear by insisting that we can admit "feelings"
>rl>into the discussion, but not other forms of mental activity?

	Suffice it to say that my intent was to discuss the motivation
	behind activities which are voluntary (thus requiring motivation), 
	not peristalsis or other processes which occur simply as a function 
	of being alive.

	"Thinking," as another bodily process, is involuntary.  You cannot
	exist as a fully functional human and not "think."  The simple
	existence of the process does not require motivation.  To the extent
	that your thoughts are directed, the motivation behind such direction
	is selfish, however.  That is, it either gives you pleasure or it 
	allows you to avoid or reduce unpleasurable feelings.  If we use your
	rape taboo example: we've agreed that the beginning of such a taboo is
	the realization that rape can be unpleasant for the victim.  Now, the 
	"realization" may well have sprung, unbidden, into a receptive mind, 
	but the decision to continue to cogitate over the implications of 
	this realization were a conscious choice and required a motivation.  
	What might such a motivation be, Russell?  Why would a man choose to
	continue to mull over the implications of rape?  What would motivate 
	him to examine the act and its consequences?  It is the examination
	and conclusions which result in a taboo, not simply the observation
	that rape is unpleasant.

	Observation and motivation are not equivalent.  I will make the 
	observation that rape seems to figure prominently in many of Russell's
	discussions; one can only wonder about the motivation behind his 
	apparent obsession, however.

>rl> If the mindfulness of the bear or the live chicken egg isn't a 
>rl> factor, why would the man feel remorse in one case but not in the 
>rl> other?
> 
>ry> How should I know!?  Ask HIM.  HE'S the one getting his jollies
>ry> by killing them.  The mere fact that he's getting his jollies is
>ry> all the proof I need.  It doesn't matter how he feels AFTER the 
>ry> fact; it's how he felt BEFORE the fact that I'm discussing.  It's
>ry> what made him do it in the first place that interests me here.
>>>
>rl> You've assumed that he's "getting his jollies", just as you assumed
>rl> that he was "feeling remorse".  It's quite apparent that you can't
>rl> explain the feelings of remorse without relying on the very assumptions
>rl> that you've been trying to prove.
> 
>ry> OK, let's be rash and assume that you're right for just a brief
>ry> moment, and that I'm "relying on the assumptions I'm trying to
>ry> prove."  Why'd he do it, Russell?  Why'd he kill all them chickens,
>ry> if not for his own benefit?
>
>I'm sure that he did kill the mindless chicken eggs for his own 
>benefit.

	"...for his own benefit."  Thank you.  That's my point.

>The unanswered question, however, is this: 
>
>   Why would the man refrain from killing the mindful bear, but 
>   not refrain from killing the eggs?
>
>Your explanation, I believe, is that the man feels remorse in the
>one case but not the other.

	No, it's not.  It's that, beyond the simple fact that his motives
	for either choice are selfish, I can only speculate regarding the
	exact direction of his thoughts.  In other words, there is a wide
	variety of reasons for his actions, but all of his reasons will be 
	selfish in the final analysis.

>Unfortunately, this explanation takes remorse for granted, as I've 
>pointed out many times.

	OK, I'll agree that remorse isn't necessary for everyone to refrain
	from killing bears...I used the term because YOU had expressed some
	reluctance to kill grizzly bears.  To wit:

	   "On the other hand, I wouldn't kill a grizzly simply to satisfy 
	   a childish quest for funfilled sports.  Why?  Because I can 
	   appreciate the fact that grizzlies aren't mindless automata..."

	I assumed from this that you WOULD feel remorse for killing a
	grizzly...apparently I was in error.  I freely admit that there may 
	be other reasons to pass up the chance to kill a bear.  Whether
	or not there's remorse isn't the point; the unpleasurable feeling
	to be avoided might well be disgust instead of remorse.  On the other 
	hand, there might be pleasure in letting it live...either way, the 
	motivation is, in the final analysis, selfish.

>rl> Why would a man conclude that it's ok to bang the keyboard of
>rl> a computer but not ok to bang the face of a dog?   Answer: 
>rl> because he realizes that computers, unlike dogs and rape 
>rl> victims, don't feel pain.
>
>rl> [...] .....why would the man feel discomfort if he were unconcerned
>rl> about the dog's predicament?
>
>ry> If he were truly unconcerned, he wouldn't feel any discomfort
>ry> of course, but that's not what you said.  Your [straw] man
>ry> concluded "...that it's ok to bang the keyboard of a computer
>ry> but not ok to bang the face of a dog."  Clearly he's made a value
>ry> judgement through some mental process which is based on his
>ry> perception of doggie discomfort.  If he were unconcerned, then
>ry> "OK" or not "OK" wouldn't even enter into it.  The action would
>ry> be ethically irrelevant.
>
>Are you admitting that the man wouldn't feel any discomfort if
>he were unconcerned about the dog's predicament?

	What did I just get through saying?

>Please tell us why you think that such concerns can be explained by the man's
>alleged selfishness?

	I'd be happy to...if that's what I really thought.  Since it isn't,
	however, I see no need to comply with your request.  Unless, of
	course, you can point out precisely where I've stated that concerns
	are due to selfishness.  In fact, what I have said is that the 
	motivations behind human activity are selfish.

[...]

>rl> I don't enjoy watching rapes, Rich.  And the reason I don't enjoy
>rl> watching rapes is that I realize that rape is very unpleasant for
>rl> the victims.   If I were convinced that the victims enjoy being
>rl> raped, then I suppose I would consider rape to be a fun activity.
>
>rl> You'll notice that my "good" and "bad" feelings depend on observations
>rl> of "good" and "bad", and not the other way around.
>
>ry> I don't care WHAT your "good" and "bad" feelings depend on, Russell,
>ry> the mere fact that you HAVE them is all that's required to support
>ry> my thesis.
>
>Again, your "thesis" is a circular argument that depends on the very
>premise that you're hoping to prove.

	And again, you make this statement based on faulty conclusions; see
	below.

>In the case at hand, it seems clear that my feelings depend on
>altruistic thinking, rather than vice-versa.  Therefore, it would
>be silly to argue that my opposition to rape can be explained
>by my "selfish" feelings.  After all, without altruistic thinking
>my opposition would be non-existent.

	In the first place, a mental position of "opposition to rape" is
	not an activity and is, therefore, outside the scope of this
	discussion.  The thinking that went into the formulation of the
	position might be called an activity, since it was voluntary, and
	as a voluntary activity, it required motivation.

	So why did you bother to think about it at all, Russell?

>ry> Give me one example of a human action that can't be explained either
>ry> by the desire to increase pleasurable feelings in the one performing
>ry> the action, or the desire to decrease or avoid unpleasurable feelings
>ry> in the one performing the action.  Forget everything except this
>ry> request, if you like, but DO answer (not simply "address") it.
>
>rl> The formulation of prohibitions against rape, Rich, but you knew that 
>rl> already.
>
>ry> Your example is refuted.  If rape were something about which all
>ry> members of a society were unconcerned, there would be no taboo, but
>ry> concern = mental discomfort which results in a taboo because some
>ry> big mucky-muck had the horsepower to say, "I don't like it, so you'd
>ry> better not do it," and make it stick.
>
>You're going in circles, Rich.  Why did the "big mucky-muck" choose to 
>exercise his power in such a way?

	How about this: because it made him uncomfortable to think that rapes
	might occur in the future?

	Or how about this: the exercise of authority gave him pleasure, and
	the unpopularity of rape gave him an excuse to exercise it?

>ry> Your example is not only refuted, it's pathetic.
>
>My friend made similar claims after I pointed out the flaws in his
>argument that all "badness" is caused by Satan.

	On the other hand, your friend probably didn't pretend, as you do,
	that concern causes no mental discomfort.


-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals