From: dliebman@terapin.com (David Liebman)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Morally good necessary possible sometimes possible reproductiveness
Date: 21 Dec 92 00:17:55 PST
Organization: BBS

JMF:                                                          
>>       This is a very, very weird argument, but I will give you points for
>>arguing it well. However, in the real world, why is possibility more
>>inclusive? In both cases, there just ain't going to be any "sex," so why
>>should it matter to anyone not merely treading in their own intellectual
>>waters?
 
MZ:                                                            
>In fact, "the real world" gets very, very weird, if only the actual
>events are considered as making the basis for its description.  For
>instance, lacking access to the facts of the subject matter, there
>would be nothing in the actual world to allow you to favor in any way
>a consistent truth-teller over a consistent liar.  This is not just an
>epistemological issue, wherein only the evidence would be lacking, but
>a metaphysical one, wherein the lack of evidence would entail the lack
>of facts of the matter.
 
lacking the facts of the matter, it would of course be of no concern to 
us whether you are an honest man or a liar; any consequence attributable
to your utterances would serve to simultaneously reveal both facts and
forthrightness.
 
MZ:
>In other words, counterfactual reasoning can tell you more about the
>intrinsic nature of things, as opposed to the way they happen to be.
 
the intrinsic nature of things, in turn, can only tell you about
the potential ways they could happen to be.
                                                                               
JMF:                                                                           
>>>>     By the way, what if they can't switch to the ol' bump and grind? For
>>>>instance, I have quite a few friends here at college who are going out with
>>>>female virgins. The women do not wish to lose their virginity at this
point,
 
MZ:                                                            
>>>Skippy, if you need me to tell you what's wrong with this picture, you
>>>have no chance of getting it straight anyway.
 
JMF:                                                       
>>       I'm pretty sure that what you mean by "what's wrong with this picture"
>>is not the fact that these women won't have sex. But what is your definition
>>of the realm of possibility? The chances of a barren woman suddenly becoming
>>fertile during sex is about equal to the odds of a gay man suddenly growing 
>>a womb and being able to bear children with semen entering through his mouth.
>>True, in some possible world, this woman could be feritle - but in some
>>possible world, we could also impregnate aardvarks. Does this make
>>bestiality okay with you? 
 
MZ:                                                             
>That's just the thing, Skippy, -- the chances are *not* the same, in
>light of what we know about the nature of sexuality.
 
in light of what most of us know about the nature of sexuality, the
chances -- that is, the statistical probablilities -- are (in some
identifiable cases) precisely the same: nil.  if your comprehension of
biology leads you to believe otherwise, do clue us in.
 
MZ:
>I will admit
>that this modal theory is a weird thing, -- it has taken me several
>years to accept it as meaningful, and in my own work, I still like to
>investigate even more arcane alternatives.  But it does what it is
>supposed to do, i.e. illuminate its subject matter.
 
it is interesting that this luminous perspicacity has caused the
devotion of such immense effort to arguing that sex between
two men is not essentially different than sex between a man and an
infertile woman, which, i suspect, few of you would maintain given
a somewhat different venue.
 
given that i am not familiar with this modal theory save for mikhail's
brief expositions, i will refrain from disputing its veracity.  i will
also, reluctantly, refrain from further discussing its utter uselessness.
one question, though: why, specifically under the auspices of modal theory,
is the practice of celibacy (which has as much chance of being producing
babies as the practice of homosexuality) not equally immoral?
 
note, however, that the premise that procreation is the only morally
relevant aspect of sexuality is equally essential to mikhail's position.
this reference to the survival of the species, i take it, is the requisite
anchor in materiality.  given this, the continued spawning of humanity
is only a morally relevant concern if it is _materially_ affected
by the act in question, which in this case is evidently not so.
pending dismissal of that proposition, i'd like to take this opportunity
to wag my finger at everyone who couldn't recall that _happiness_
(that's the classical term, i believe) may also be, as the saying goes,
a morally relevant concern.  once again i think i'll just say it and wait
for someone to dare a refutation.
 
finally, i wanted to make sure that everyone noticed that mikhail, in
his corrections to someone's review of his argument, indicated that
his position is that homosexual recreation is not morally _praiseworthy_.
in other words, it is assumed that the appreciation and applause of
the moral order ought to be relevant to the conduct of our sexual
activities.  kinky, no?
 
 
regards,
dave
 
 
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc