HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok)
Subject: Re: Objectivism vs Libertarianism vs Anarchism
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 00:09:56 GMT

In article <C0CFHn.315@tss.com> burke@tss.com (Jim Burke) writes:
>The thing that many Objectivists have trouble with is the fact that our
>government does in fact act as the servant of our population.  It does this
>according to the miriad wants and desires of many elements of our society,
>and a balance is reached in the process.  When things get too far out of
>balance to where the majority no longer feel their needs are being met by
>the government, they can and do choose another one. 

a fair and moral government allows for certain inalienable rights
to which even the minority is entitled. a republic is not simply
majority rule. the simplistic "the majority can change things as it
wishes" is not the basis for an ideal society. for example, the "majority"
could rise tomorrow and decide that all the members of some minority
group should be exterminated. would that be right?

and the "balance" you refer to is an illusion. power is not balanced.
and look at the "choices" americans were offered in the last election.

>The Objectivist view tends to be embraced by those who would prosper under
>"_full_ capitalism".  In other words, those with greater natural in-born
>intelligence and ability, as well as access to capital, know that they would
>prosper to a greater extent than those who are less intelligent or capable, or
>who were not born with access to capital.  People in the latter category
>demand protection of the government from the people in the former category.
>The government tries (and often fails) to create a balance between all these
>opposing interests.  Not everyone wants all the controls removed - Objectivists
>do.  Objectivists want a government that will suit an environment in which
>they personally will prosper, whether or not it is at the expense of others.

this is a ludicrous distortion of the concept of the right to freedom and
to the right of benefit from the production of one's own body, which is
a subset of the right to freedom.
if you are willing to disregard these basic rights then admit so, 
else justify your position.

how exactly do you define "expense of others"?

>This is human nature, and I don't blame them for it, I simply point out that
>there are others who want other things from the government and they also
>get a vote.  Objectivists have not fundamental right to define what the
>government should be - everyone has a vote.

this is ridiculous. we are talking about moral right, not legality.
in ancient rome it was "legal" to skewer Christians. does that mean
there was nothing wrong with it? come on.

i would also point out to you that 50% is not required to gain power
in this country, as the election of our new "president" demonstrates.

--
charles
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: bil@okcforum.osrhe.uoknor.edu (Bill Conner)
Subject: Re: Modern Logic -- question (was Obj. Philosophy)
Organization: Okcforum Unix Users Group
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 02:14:19 GMT

   This whole discussion reminds of the pedantic hair-splitting of the
18th century philosophers. Unfortunately, your premises and
conclusions are equally out of date. Can you cite an instance where
the outcome of this debate can have any affect on the world at large?

Bill
From: Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: On the subject of Kant..
Date: 10 Jan 93 19:09:37 GMT
Organization: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU

pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:

[about whether 'tis nobler to believe in an objective reality]

>Lets just say that regardless of whether an objective reality exists,
>assuming the existance of such a reality in one's cognitive model of
>the world seems necessary in order to survive.

Now this is an interesting point.  I doubt that it is *necessary*,
but it could well be an aid in guiding one's actions.  [There is
an important difference between belief and making an assumption
to make life easier, of course; this is the difference between
religion and science.]  An analogy might be to include the infinity
point in the complex plane; it makes integrals easier.  And if
people want to argue it on that basis, and don't insist on some
magical direct perception of objective reality, I have no quarrel.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk      Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Some ideas are frost giants: pouring cold water on them helps them to grow.
From: gthomas@unixg.ubc.ca (Guy R Thomas)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: A=A
Date: 8 Jan 93 02:34:53 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
NNTP-Posting-Host: unixg.ubc.ca

In  pandit@ssd.intel.com (Milind Pandit) writes:

>In article gthomas@unixg.ubc.ca (Guy R Thomas) writes:

>>This little axiom being A=A.  Well yes, Euclidean Geometry does procede
>>from a set of axioms that has as one of its members A=A.
>>However Euclidean Geometry has nothing to say about the physical world
>>much less about ethics or morals.

>If we believed that Euclidean (and any other type of) Geometry has
>nothing to say about the physical world, we would not be where we are
>today.  Much of our understanding of the world, and much of the
>technological progress that has been made, is based on the assumption
>that Euclidean and other types of geometry do say something about
>the physical world.

Yikes.  Much of the progres that has been made in Euclidean Geometry
is due to the fact that our Objective world appears Euclidean.  An 
abstract system in which none of the components have any objective reality 
can not have objective effects. The objective act of creating such systems
does.

>Similarly, conclusions based on Objectivist axioms can help us
>understand reality and help us progress morally and ethically.

>-- 
>Milind S. Pandit			| pandit@ssd.intel.com
>Operating Systems Engineer		|
>Intel Supercomputer Systems Division	| Standard Disclaimers Apply
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA (Michael Lewchuk)
Subject: Re: Rational Debate, Axioms, and Arguments
Organization: University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 19:46:14 GMT

ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes) writes:
>There seems to be a problem here distinguishing between the logical
>notions of IDENTITY and PREDICATION, the problem presumably due to the
>fact that the English word "is" is used to express both.

Yes, I believe I mentioned this in another forward-reply.

>>Consciousness is the usage of identity -- to determine what is a leaf, what
>>is not, what is hot, what is cold, etc.
>This is merely to fail to respect the distinction drawn in (1),
>And again, it sheds no light whatsoever on the nature of consciousness.
>I would prefer a definition that distinguishes between a conscious
>being and a smoke detector.

a) My objective was to claify, not prove.

b) Personally I can't find a definition than distinguishes between you and
   a smoke detector, other than smoke detectors shouldn't be able to post
   messages. :)
   Seriously, yes, "consciousness is identification" should be read as "is"
   being "has the property of" rather than "is identical to".  Personally
   I would say that logical thought in and of itself is mostly "identification"
   in the broad sense of using (A=A), however as to what consciousness is,
   other than experience, well, that's another matter.

>>If you assume consciousness does not use identity you might
>>reconsider the next time you try solving a math problem or finding a
>>matching pair of socks.

>Are you suggesting that matching socks are identical with each other???

<Laugh>. :)

No, I'm suggesting that (this perceptual blue = that perceptual blue = blue)
is used in many things: essentially "matching" or "correlating" them by
similar and dissimilar characteristics.  That is, without "identity", the
notion of "same"ness disappears.  It is my opinion that we use "same"ness
in many things such as finding a matching pair of socks.

					Michael Lewchuk
					lewchuk@cs.UAlberta.CA
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Rand's Personality vs Objectivism
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 19:08:45 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.181820.7736@fcom.cc.utah.edu> leon@cs.weber.edu
 (Leon D. Atkinson) writes:

   >You might as well come right out and say, "Well, it looks
   >good on paper, but it just doesn't work in reality."  Nothing makes me more
   >disgusted.

  Zealots of all kinds are easily disgusted. However, it is not
necessary to cause you any discomfort here. It suffices to note that
people have in fact in the past been convinced of the unassailable
truth of various doctrines regarding men and society, but have found,
on attempting to put these doctrines into effect, that things don't
turn out the way the doctrines postulate. Now naturally the true
believers in some particular doctrine say that their doctrine is an
exception, that there is no "gap between theory and practice" or anything
similarly disgusting. We expect it of them.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: leon@cs.weber.edu (Leon D. Atkinson)
Subject: Re: Letting Someone Drown
Organization: University of Utah Computer Center
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 18:19:03 GMT

Maybe a more interesting question is:  if one of us saw _Mark_ drowning,
would we save him? :)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: pandit@ssd.intel.com (Milind Pandit)
Subject: Re: Objectivism vs Libertarianism vs Anarchism
Organization: Supercomputer Systems Division (SSD), Intel
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 17:08:37 GMT

In article <103530@netnews.upenn.edu> julio@upenn5.hep.upenn.edu (Julio Gonzalez) writes:
> cl836@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Geoff Stark) writes:
>>
>>
>>Objectivism is a philosophical concept that states reasoning is
>>man's only way of perceiving reality and reality is independent
>>of man's feelings, fancies, wishes or whims.  
> 
>   Is this a denial of artistic reality ?  For instance is the
>   concept of beauty unreal ?

Not according to Rand.  I'm pretty sure she married an artist, and I
know the characters in "The Fountainhead" are often concerned with
what is beautiful and what is not.  I think Rand believes that beauty
is in the eye of the beholder, and that, like emotions, it is
something to be enjoyed, but not the basis for drawing rational
conclusions.  Rational concepts of what is good or evil will probably
determine what you find beautiful or ugly.  Subjective concepts of
what is beautiful or ugly should not determine what you find good or
evil.

>>  No-one has the right to force
>>his desires on anyone else, physical or ideological.  A
>>government, absolutely necessary under objectivism, cannot
>>interfere with anyone's goals (as long as those goals do not
>>collide with anyone else's individual rights).  The government
>>acts only as a law enforcement agency...  
>
>   How can law be enforced without this being considered 
>   an imposition of society's desire ?

Objectivism does not say every person's every whim and desire should
be indulged.  Just because a law limits what a person can do, does not
make it contrary to Objectivism.  A law that prevents you from
spontaneously killing another person without provocation would conform
with Objectivist ideals.  A law that prevents you from doing something
when you are not physically interfering with anybody else's property,
e.g. reading a book, would be contrary to Objectivism.

-- 
Milind S. Pandit			| pandit@ssd.intel.com
Operating Systems Engineer		|
Intel Supercomputer Systems Division	| Standard Disclaimers Apply
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 17:55:40 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.153415.3877@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com 
(Robert Baruch) writes:

  >The first was "A is A", or "existence exists", or the law of identity, which
  >states essentially that before you can talk about something, you must know
  >what you are talking about.  Those who wish to dispute the validity of
  >the law of identity should first realize that to question the law is to

  There isn't a great deal to dispute, since your various formulations of the
supposed principle are on the face of it either vacuous, highly ambiguous, or
grammatically dubious. Why not give us a derivation of some interesting
Objectivist conclusion from the supposed principle?

   >I must also accept that my senses are part of reality, and that they have
   >limitations.  I must accept my senses, and my senses tell me that existence
   >exists.  Red is red.  

  As a first reflection on the very traditional problem of the
validity of sensory input, your comments are woefully inadequate. For
one thing, you don't even touch on what is traditionally a central
problem, namely that people's senses also tell them a lot of things
that we believe are false.
From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Atlas Drowning in the Fountainhead
Date: 12 Jan 93 00:19:01 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

In article <C0pMv6.4Ey@SSD.intel.com> pandit@ssd.intel.com (Milind Pandit) writes:
>Despite your naming your fictional
>character Howard Roark, Ayn Rand never portrayed her Howard Roark in
>this manner.  It has been pointed out that Francisco acted in a manner
>opposite to *your* Howard Roark.  Furthermore, Ayn Rand would be the
>first to say that a person's *mood* should not keep him from doing
>what is right, and that a question concerning life and death is
>certainly important enough to be characterized as one of "awesome
>values clashing in the heavens".

First of all, I'm just having a little fun calling my guy
"Roark", I never meant to slander the Great Fictional Man
Himself (do I need a disclaimer here?)

In any case, if you accept - as you seem to - that the "right"
thing for My_Roark to do is throw the guy the life preserver,
I'd be interested in how you reconcile this with Randism.
As far as I can tell, and at least one contributor to this
discussion has confirmed this, My_Roark is under no obligation
to save the drowner's life, if he is disinclined to do so.
If you can give me a reading of "objectivism" according to
which he really *should* save the guy, even if he doesn't
particularly feel like it, it would change my opinion greatly.

---------------------------------------------------

By the way, I have now read most of Galt's speech in "Atlas",
and am amazed at how little validity there is to this supposed
"proof" of Randism from the premise that A=A. Without
passing judgement on the ethical assertions he makes, it is
more than fair to say that there is not the slightest semblance
of rigorous derivation of the conclusions from this premise.
And I don't mean a formal derivation, either, I mean a
good old-fashioned, plain English, clearly reasoned argument.
The speech is almost 100% pure rhetoric, in which one thundering
dictum succeeds another with no attempt at all at showing genuine
logical dependencies. 

I mean, come on, by robbing somebody at gunpoint, I am supposedly
denying the existence of objective reality??? This is nonsense,
From: sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: End of Iceland's Anarchy
Date: 9 Jan 93 22:59:00 GMT
Organization: University at Buffalo
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41

In article <1993Jan9.204851.5731@eecs.nwu.edu>, ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland) writes...
>In article <1993Jan8.194849.27554@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson
>..com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>>Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
>>>pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
>>>The first problem anarchism always runs into is that of social
>>>stability
>>>
>>>I haven't seen this done, though that doesn't mean it can't be.
>>
>>Iceland, 900AD to 1252AD. Three hundred fifty two years seems stable
>>enough for me.
> 
>Someone mentioned how anarchy in Iceland came to end.  I don't
>remember, but it had something to do with conquest or domination by
>Norway.  Does the way anarchy ended in Iceland indicate anything about
>the vulnerability of anarchies to societies which are NOT anarchies?

	Excellent question.  I don't think that a complete answer
is at hand.  It is known that extended attempts at the military
conquest of such societies were either successful or had altered
the incentives on the system and produced military governments
in defense.  Invasion does tend to be a nasty business for any society.
A plus for anarchy is that such societies are difficult to take over.
A minus might be the difficulty such societies have in forming and
then disbanding militaries.


Mark Sulkowski
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: leon@cs.weber.edu (Leon D. Atkinson)
Subject: Re: Rand's Personality vs Objectivism
Organization: University of Utah Computer Center
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 18:18:20 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.150435.26717@sctc.com>, smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith) writes:
|> Someone brought up the issue of Rand's personality and her failure to
|> live up to her own ideals. Someone posted a response saying such
|> arguments weren't appropriate, and in any case, were wrong. It seems
|> to me that living examples of the effects of a philosophy on one's
|> life should be relevant to discussions of the philosophy. That's the
|> reason I recommend Branden's 'Judgement Day' to any reader of Rand's works.

If something is right, it's right.  If you agree with Rand's arguments, then
that is all you should need.  The fact that an individual failed to execercise
logical behavior does not bear upon the validity of Objectivism.  Granted,
Rand did some things that seemed illogical and even self-destructive, but we
are judging the concepts, not the creator.  If you consider the actions of
Objectivists when judging the validity of the philosophy, then I'd presume you
are a pragmatisist.  You might as well come right out and say, "Well, it looks
good on paper, but it just doesn't work in reality."  Nothing makes me more
disgusted.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 22:24:42 GMT

In article <1993Jan5.212546.12567@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com 
(Robert Baruch) writes:

   >Santa Claus exists if I am not mistaken.  This sentence is certainly
   >true and hence, I am not mistaken and therefore Santa Claus exists.

  This is a formulation of a standard paradox, one that is particularly
of interest in connection with Loeb's theorem. But why do you invite me
to discourse on it? Do you have some kind of interesting Objectivist
derivation from the "law of identity" touching on this paradox?

  In the remainder of your message you expand on your philosophy of
perception, and now comment on sensory deception as well, by
emphasizing the infeasibility of constantly doubting our senses.
However, you will find that there is wide agreement in philosophy on
the infeasibility of constantly doubting our senses. In particular,
philosophers as diverse as Berkeley, Leibniz, Hume, and Wittgenstein
agree on this. Why, one wonders, are they not then Objectivists, at
least as far as their philosophy of perception is concerned?
From: Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Objectivism and "good" emotionalism?
Date: 12 Jan 93 18:27:36 GMT
Organization: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU

dcosley@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Daniel R Cosley) writes:

> ... Costs of not risking yourself to save your wife include a
>lack of integrity and moral courage, loss of your wife, etc.
...
>Because part of rational self-interest includes the knowledge that in order to
>have one's own rights respected, one must respect the rights of others.

Uh, no.  Part of rational self-interest includes the knowledge that
one shouldn't get caught not respecting the rights of others.  And
rational self-interest could easily lead one to jettison the notions
of integrity and moral courage as useless luxuries, foisted upon
one by society.  If you're going to go the rational self-interest
root, have the integrity :-) to take it to the limit, and not get
muddled with wishy-washy emotions.

Integrity: Be true to yourself and yourself alone.
Moral courage: Do only that which is in your rational self-interest.

All else is second-hand. :-)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk      Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Some ideas are frost giants: pouring cold water on them helps them to grow.
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 15:53:57 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.152006.14458@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com 
(Robert Baruch) writes:

   >Yes, I know that's what the _second_ "I am not mistaken" means, 
   >but within (1) you have hidden the _first_ "I am not mistaken".
   >The second sentence is
   >clearly designed to trip up the non-analytic reader into thinking that the
   >second "I am not mistaken" is the same as the first "I am not mistaken".

  No, you miss the point of the argument. In your version you may indeed
stipulate that "I am not mistaken" refers to different things in its
different occurrences. In the paradoxical argument it is essential that it does
not. It is precisely to make this clear that the standard formulation is

  (1)   If (1) is true, then Santa Claus exists

or

    If the sentence I am now uttering is true, then Santa Claus exists.
From: gthomas@unixg.ubc.ca (Guy R Thomas)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: A=A
Date: 8 Jan 93 02:22:20 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
NNTP-Posting-Host: unixg.ubc.ca

merritt@macro.bu.edu (Sean Merritt) 
writes:

In reply to gthomas@unixg.ubc.ca (Guy R Thomas) ( me ) :

Who questions just how much does Euclidean Geometry weigh in terms of 
objective measures:

>  (Stimpson J. Katz) writes:

>   >        If you complain that little can be drawn from this axiom, then I 
>   >submit you would be demonstrating further ignorance. Euclidean Geometry 
>   >proceeds from amazingly few axioms.

>#   This little axiom being A=A.  Well yes, Euclidean Geometry does procede
>#   from a set of axioms that has as one of its members A=A.


>The statement below is false. Abstract constructs in a Euclidean Geometric 
>Space do not have significance in the real world. My knowledge of
>such concepts and my ability to apply them in the real world allow
>me to do quite a bit of engineering. Thereby I have altered the state
>of nature.


Yes, your knowlege of those concepts might enable you to form other concepts.
However the objects of Eucldean Geometry have no Objective existence and
hence can not have any relation to the Objective world.


>The fact that mathematical and physical law restrict the number of
>possiblities for human action and create moral dilemmas that humans
>must solve means that they most certainly do have something to say. 

Mathematical and phisical "law" reflect our perceptions of Objective reality
not visa versa.


Guy
gthomas@native-ed.bc.ca


>Sean J. Merritt		  | "Every revolt is a cry of innocence 
>Dept of Physics Boston University|  and an appeal to the essence of being."
>merritt@macro.bu.edu             | Albert Camus, The Rebel