From: jmmatthe@apgea.army.mil (Jeffrey M. Matthews <jmmatthe>)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: FW-190 (was Re: Bf 109)
Date: 22 Dec 92 22:15:35 GMT
Organization: CRDEC APG

In article <1992Dec21.210248.4149@dartvax.dartmouth.edu> Charles.K.Scott@dartmouth.edu (Charles K. Scott) writes:
>In article <1992Dec18.174255.28802@apgea.army.mil>
>jmmatthe@apgea.army.mil (Jeffrey M. Matthews <jmmatthe>) writes:
>
>> In an interesting footnote  to history, the Eighth Air Force was so
>> impressed with the 190's all-around performance that in early '44 they
>> traded an entire squadron of P-51B's for some black market FW's.  The
>> Mustangs were, in turn, snapped up by the Luftwaffe, who were amazed by
>> the projected production rates.  The scene was thus set for a classic
>> meeting of the giants.
>
>This is pretty interesting, if true.  Where did you hear about it?  I
>know of only one Focke-Wulf that ended up in British hands and this was
>in 1942, it was practically worn out with extensive testing.  And you
>say there was a whole squadron of 190's used by the Americans?  And
>that they actually escorted a flight of B-17's?  And not only that but
>the Germans were able to put an entire squadron of Mustangs together
>and not only that but attack a flight of B-17's?  Are you sure this
>didn't come from a work of fiction?  I swear I've not heard of this in
>20 years of reading military aviation history. I mean think of the
>logistics, the need for armament, mechanics to keep them running
>changing the radios, training in type and this scene would have to be
>repeated for the Germans.  Did I miss some smiley's somewhere?
>
>Corky Scott

All right, I lied.  Either that, or you missed the paragraph which said
"...if it didn't happen that way, it should have."  (Stolen, BTW, from
*The Cowboys*).

What I was hinting at is that it's fallacious to compare aircraft with
different missions, even if they are, on the surface, comparable.  The
FW didn't need nearly the range the allied fighters did, as there was
nothing to escort far from home.  The allies didn't need the firepower
that many of the German interceptors did, as they weren't dealing with
the same problem.  Remember, if you're using weapons with similar range,
the interceptor has to pull its guns off target long before the guy in
the turret stops firing.  That, plus a big, non-evading target, prompts
cannons in interceptors, machine guns in escort fighters.

To be effective, a fighter has to be, in addition to a damn good machine
(which the Ta 152 was), available in sufficient quantity.  The P-51 was
popular not only for its performance, but because it was more producible
than, for example, the Jug.  Inelegant, but typical of the American ap-
proach to strategy at the time.  After all, if you can win by applying
5 to 1 odds with an indifferent machine, just think what you can do with
5 to 1 and a comparable one.

Your comments about supportability point up another little irony.  The
military system has come under much derision for its inefficiency. But
never, nowhere, has any entity been able to specify and acquire such a
range of equipment and scatter it over the globe, along with all of the
personnel to operate it and maintain it, route supplies where they are
needed, going from dead-in-the-water to avalanche in four years, quite 
like the WWII Allies, and in particular the U.S. of A.

Well, it was fun writing the piece; judging from some of the books I've
read on WWII aircraft, I may not have seen the last of it.    :-)

J. Matthews
Standard Disclaimers and Implied Smileys Apply.
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military