HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bill@wsuaix.csc.wsu.edu (William E. Johns;S23015)
Newsgroups: sci.materials
Subject: Re: 2 plastics questions
Date: 7 Sep 92 16:15:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: serval.1992Sep7.161512.28057
Organization: Washington State University

In article <a750288.19@pan.mc.ti.com> a750288@pan.mc.ti.com (John E. Brennan) writes:
>In article <1992Aug31.204952.29444@serval.net.wsu.edu> bill@wsuaix.csc.wsu.edu (William E. Johns;S23015) writes:
>>In article <a750288.16@pan.mc.ti.com> a750288@pan.mc.ti.com (John E. Brennan) writes:
>>>I'm hoping somebody can give me some help with these questions.
>>>
>>>1.  What adhesives can bond high density polyethylene to rigid PVC or 
>>>    HDPE to itself?  The bonds would be used in outdoor applications.
>
>>I would guess that your best luck would be in bonding HDPE to PVC or itself
>>would be with HDPE itself.  Use it as a hot melt.
>
>
>THANKS A BUNCH FOR THIS!!  We've made up a few samples using a hot melt and
>they're doing great.

Good.
>
>>>2.  What plastics would be resistant to soaking in hot transmission fluid?
>
>>I just gotto believe there are lots and lots.  How hot?  Nylons, delrin,
>>PTFE, what's the application?
>>>
>
>The application is a casing for an electrical part inside a transmission.
>Temperature would be 250 F or above.

Hmmmm.  This could be interesting.  I suspect that any number of polymers are
stable to that environment, but if you are gonna try and seal something
inside of a container, then your seal will be suspect.  Tranny oil just
isn't all that expenseive.  Get yourself some chunks of various polymers, 
machine them out to a smallish edge and treat with hot tranny fluid for a bit.
By knowing the dimensions and weights before you start, you can determine
which materials has the least uptake and is the most dimensionally stable.
Take the toughest one and make your container using a really good o-ring.

Ride Free,

Bill
________________________________________________________________
bill@wsuaix.csc.wsu.edu if you feel compelled to send email
johnsw@wsuvm1.csc.wsu.edu if you seriously expect an answer
AMA #500924   DoD #00314   WMTC #0002   SR= 2.125
Yamabeemer fjgs1200pdr100 740GLE  KotV KotRR KotD #0001  :-)
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/

If you walk, just walk.
If you sit, just sit.
If you ride, just ride.

Above all, don't wobble.
                             Zen saying (slightly modified)
Newsgroups: sci.materials
From: kim@aho.no (Kim B Larsen)
Subject: Info on Aerosols/new insulation materials?
Keywords: Aerosols LBL
Organization: The Oslo School of Architecture
Date: Sat, 5 Sep 1992 12:57:26 GMT

I am working on my diploma project which is the design of an Antarctic
scientific research station to be situated on the Brunt Ice Shelf
in the Weddel Sea.

To my knowledge Lawrence Berkeley Livermore laboratories, CA has come up 
with a new insulation material - Aerosol - which is made up of mostly air.
I am requesting information on this new material and also lightweight construction materials that would be appliable to building in extreme environments.

If responding directly to me, please use the following email-address:

kimbl@ulrik.uio.no

- Kim Baumann Larsen - The Oslo School of Architecture, Norway

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com (Bill Sommerfeld)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 18:21:21 GMT
	<1992Sep4.205842.12303@qualcomm.com>
	<1992Sep10.034159.1617@qiclab.scn.rain.com>
Organization: Hewlett Packard
Followup-To: alt.security

In article <1992Sep10.034159.1617@qiclab.scn.rain.com> leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson) writes:

   I know of no *decent* lock that behaves this way. 

Well, it depends on how you define "decent"...

Just about any mechanical key-based lock has a problem along these
lines (due to the limits of manufacturing tolerances) which turns an
O(x**y) problem into an O(x*y); it's just a matter of what equipment
is necessary to exploit it.

This is getting a bit far afield for sci.crypt; note the followup-to
here.

					- Bill
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Probabilistic encryption
Organization: The Ohio State University Department of Computer and Information Science
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 1992 22:49:00 GMT

> Is it under the same restrictions RSA is? If the algorithm is freely
> usable, and it's provably as secure as RSA, I'm amazed that someone
> hasn't implemented and distributed it widely.

The entire notion of public-key cryptography is subject to patents
held by Public Key Partners, a sister company of RSA Data Security.
The patent laws grant them a monopoly on all use of the technology
until the patents expire in 1997 and 2000.  No one has challenged the
patents or is likely to, as far as I know.

A partial list of related technology that's been seen on the Internet is:

  rpem, by Mark Riordan.  Based on Rabin encryption (square roots modulo pq).
      Mark stopped distributing it after RSADSI lawyers sent him a warning 
      that he was violating their patents.

PGP, by Phil Zimmermann, prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu.  RSA-based, originally
      for PC with ports to Unix.  Not approved by RSADSI; OK to distribute
      internationally but probably illegal to use in the USA or export from
      the USA.

  ripem, by Mark Riordan.  RSA-based, Unix.  Uses RSAREF and is distributed
      free with the blessing of RSADSI (subject to the RSAREF license
      agreement with RSADSI, which each user must electronically agree to).
      Legal in USA for personal use; legal outside USA for any use; illegal 
      transport from within USA to outside USA.  To get it, send mail to
      mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu.

  PEM, by a consortium of companies including RSADSI.  RSA-based, Unix + ?.
      A proposed standard for privacy-enhanced mail on the Internet, a couple
      of years behind schedule.  Will probably appear within the next year or
      two.  Most of the complexity deals with the public key certification
      hierarchy, which none of the earlier public-domain systems deal with at
      all.

I am hoping to see some more discussion of innovative uses of public
key technology; privacy-enhanced mail is just the tip of the iceberg.
We must think about what we want, so we know what to ask for!


[ Marc Ringuette | Cranberry Melon University, Cucumber Science Department  ]
[ mnr@cs.cmu.edu | 412-268-3728 |      ".surivorter erutangis a ma I"       ]
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: MD5 for MSDOS
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 92 17:11:25 EDT
Distribution: world
Organization: Thibault & Friends

        Has anyone compiled the MD5 source into an MSDOS binary?

        I've been trying it out with Zortech C++ small model but the
        results I get aren't the same as the test case. Detailed
        examination of the source hasn't given me any clues.

        Any suggestions, or a pointer to a source for the successfully
        compiled binary would be deeply appreciated.

           ,Marc

--

 Marc Thibault        |                              |  Any Warming,
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  Oxford Mills, Ontario       |  Global or otherwise,
 CIS:71441,2226       |     Canada                   |   appreciated.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: IDEA cipher (was: PGP 2.0 Announcement)
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 08:56:27 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <1398@eouk9.eoe.co.uk> ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes:

>Yes, IDEA has a 128 bit key.  It's rather beautiful algorithm,
>involving multiplications mod 65537 (which is prime, so the
>multiplications are invertible because every number (except zero) has
>an inverse mod a prime), additions mod 65536, and XORs.  These
>operations are combined in a network which thoroughly scrambles the
>data.  There are no table lookups or bit permutations at all.
>
>BAD NEWS: It's PATENTED.  Not just in the USA but in Europe as well.
>If enforced, this patent will probably prevent the widespread adoption
>of this algorithm.  A great shame.

However the patent owners, Ascom-Tech AG, are being very reasonable about
the patent (totally unlike PKP).  They let us use it in PGP without having
to pay any license fees since PGP is free, and are very approachable about
it's use in other programs.  Still, I ended up not using it in my PGP-compatible
archiver since I have a religious thing about patents - however, IDEA is a very
good cipher and the way the patent is being administered is one of the more
enlightened I've seen.

Peter.
From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Is DES broken ?
Date: 7 Sep 92 09:50:55 GMT
Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3

sghahn@sol.kaist.ac.kr (Hahn Sang Geun) writes:
: 
: I heard from a colleague in electronics department that
: 16 round DES was broken at the 1992 CRYPTO meeting.
: 
: He told me a progress in differential cryptalanalysis
: made it possible.
: 
: Is that correct ?
: If so, how practical is that ?
:
: S. HAHN
: Mathematics Department
: KAIST
: South Korea

There was a recent exchange in this group on this subject.  This
attack reduces the number of encryptions to break DES to about 2**47.
Note that this is a chosen plaintext attack, which means that the
attacker has to provide some 10**15 bytes of data to be encrypted.
Note that the attacker can't do any of this himself; his enemy, who is
being attacked, must do the encryption and return the data to his
attacker.

This means that for all practical purposes DES is still secure against
differential attack.

However, a massively parallel machine could be used in a known
plaintext attack, which would require some 2**55 encryptions to find
the key.  As the attacker could use millions of DES processors in
parallel, this would be much more practical than the differential
attack.

Andrew.

Ref: "Differential Cryptanalysis of the full DES," Biham and Shamir,
Weizmann Institute Technical Report, Rehovot, Israel.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3125 alt.privacy:1812 comp.org.eff.talk:5709
From: Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Juhani Huttunen)
Subject: Re: ATM fraud
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 23:37:37 GMT

In article <1992Sep8.164652.1780@osf.org> karger@osf.org (Paul A. Karger) writes:

! This points up the need for one of the B2 and up security measures from
! the orange book - namely trusted path.  There must be a way for the user
! to authenticate to the system, but there must also be a way for the system
! to authenticate itself to the user, so that user knows that this is the
! real bank ATM or terminal or workstation or whatever...

It just shows that the current idea of an 'ATM card' is no good. We need
intelligent tokens and pretty damn fast. By 'intelligent token' I mean
a card that can be challenged by the computer of the bank. I've seen this
talked about in many books, so it's nothing new. What I would like to know
is that how soon such devices will be available? Will the patents on
public encryption prevent such devices for another 10 years?
--
...............................................................................
Ari Huttunen   			       Any similarity to other alien life forms
				          is purely coincidental.
					      <Alien 3 misquote>
From: mcs@wet.UUCP (Gil Nardo)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems?
Date: 5 Sep 92 20:14:53 GMT
Organization: Wetware Diversions, San Francisco


  I'm trying to find out more about Elliptic curve cryptosystems.
  Has anybody published anything comprehensible on these systems?
  The only reference I have is 
      "A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography"
  by Neal Koblitz (Springer-Verlag).

-->Pre-Thanx for useful net wisdom
-- 
Gil Nardo                  | mcs@wet.com
Migrant Computing Services | (415)664-1032
1032 Irving Street, #435   |-----------------
San Francisco, 94122       | Supernova = *!
From: jorgense@plains.NoDak.edu (Lee A. Jorgensen)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Locks (was Re: "Sneakers" ...)
Date: 16 Sep 92 03:47:39 GMT
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computing Network

In article <1992Sep11.142742.29624@meaddata.com> sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams) writes:
)leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson) writes:
): 
): most cheap "number wheel" bike locks *do* work that way. Put tension
): on the lock, then spin the cylinders. One will bind as it hits the 
): correct number. Then you spin the remaining ones. One of *them* will
): bind. Etc. It takes about a minute to open. :-)
): 
): I know of no *decent* lock that behaves this way. But there are a lot
): of junk locks out there!
)
)A good lock has a cog that the (??) 'lever' has to drop into before
)testing whether that 'tumbler' is in the right position.
)
)These should be secure without much tolerance (at least to me... :-)).
)
)The easy ones allow movement with pressure on the tumblers.

There is a way to even pick Master Paddlelocks.  If you know what to 'feel'
for in the lock mechanism.  I have picked a few, but after about 10-15 minutes.
Also, I have gotten 2 of the 3 numbers with the person right there verifing
the technique.

BUT, I out-grew this fascination and don't condone it anymore.

-Lee.

-- 
Lee Jorgensen             Internet: jorgense@plains.NoDak.edu
-------------------------------------------------------------
   Sorry, but the rest of this .signature is out of order.
               Sorry for the inconvenience.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: Lehman Brothers
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:03:18 GMT

ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
>
> In <716015512.F00005@utopia.hacktic.nl> Nonsenso@utopia.hacktic.nl
> (Nonsenso) writes:
>
>>There could have been a problem with pgp 1.0 when keys could not be
>>certified. That way it'd be easy for anyone to forge a key on your user-ID
>>and sit in the middle of communications. PGP 2.0 features this
>>key-certification and is thus a lot stronger regarding to key-security
>>than the 1.0 version.
>
> Really?  So how do we "certify" a key without already having a
> previously-certified key from the other end?
>
> How does the first guy certify his key to others so they can certify
> their keys to him?

You and your friend Alice get together and sign each others keys in
person. Later, Bob sends you a key of his, signed by Alice. Since you
know Alice's key to be valid, you suspect that Bob's is. This way, a
small number of people you trust can validate a large number of other
people who you can't meet in person.

I'd just read the manual. Most questions are answered.

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
		  Just say "NO!" to death and taxes.
			 Extropian and Proud.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3153 comp.security.misc:1201
From: gs26@prism.gatech.EDU (Glenn R. Stone)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: 8 Sep 92 19:03:10 GMT
Reply-To: glenn.stone@eas.gatech.edu
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: The Group W Bench

In <715637499@romeo.cs.duke.edu> trt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Tom Truscott) writes:

>>>Anyways, one-time pads are really effective in short
>>>messages and are reasonably secure on larger documents.

>Arguably this is backwards. As suggested in "Codebreakers",
>if I suspect that a "yes" or "no" decision is forthcoming, and I 
>intercept a 3 character long message, I can make a reasonable
>guess as to the message's contents.

nope, 'cause even the book I have on crypto written for 10-year-olds
says to pad your messages out to groups of five....

sotha ttraf fican alysis isnot asbig athre atasi tcoul dbexx

>More generally, "traffic analysis" is still a threat.  So some systems
>send continuously, just sending nulls or-ed with the pad
>(== the pad itself) when there is no real traffic.

This is doubly true, however.  Everybody who's been around knows that when
there are pizza delivery trucks headed for Foggy Bottom, Something Big is
going down.... a very simple "traffic analysis".  

Anything remotely resembling good code won't reveal the actual number of
characters in the message exactly; really good stuff, a la above, sends
synchronously and uses framing characters or some such...  on the other
hand, if you stumble onto something sending async, you can always tell
when something's going on when the message traffic goes way up... ;)

-- Glenn R. Stone (glenn.stone@eas.gatech.edu)
Nazi conservative Quayle NSA coverup watergate CIA breakin nuclear gun drugs
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 02:06:38 GMT

ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes:

>unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
>: Uh, read your first line. You have the source- change the Sboxes to your
>: heart's content. 

>NO!  Don't change the S-boxes or the ordering of the S-boxes because
>it greatly weakens DES.

Agreed. But he was the one who was worried that the present S boxes were
weak, so he can change them ( probably making them much much weaker, but
then paranoia has its costs).
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 21:13:51 GMT


 In <716015512.F00005@utopia.hacktic.nl> Nonsenso@utopia.hacktic.nl
 (Nonsenso) writes:

>There could have been a problem with pgp 1.0 when keys could not be
>certified. That way it'd be easy for anyone to forge a key on your user-ID
>and sit in the middle of communications. PGP 2.0 features this
>key-certification and is thus a lot stronger regarding to key-security
>than the 1.0 version.

 Really?  So how do we "certify" a key without already having a
 previously-certified key from the other end?

 How does the first guy certify his key to others so they can certify
 their keys to him?

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org


Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3145 alt.security:4291
From: jim@cs.strath.ac.uk (Jim Reid)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Date: 8 Sep 92 12:26:01 GMT
	<18h94qINNlkq@early-bird.think.com> <Bu990J.JDn@newcastle.ac.uk>
Organization: Computer Science Dept., Strathclyde Univ., Glasgow, Scotland.
In-reply-to: Graham.Shaw@newcastle.ac.uk's message of 8 Sep 92 10:26:42 GMT

In article <Bu990J.JDn@newcastle.ac.uk> Graham.Shaw@newcastle.ac.uk (G.D.Shaw) writes:

   In article <18h94qINNlkq@early-bird.think.com> barmar@think.com (Barry Margolin) writes:
   >When we really have compilers capable of executing free-form English, the
   >government may adjust their notion of the distinction between software and
   >human-oriented description.  Since the description of DES *is* in a public
   >domain document (a US FIPS), it's clearly not considered to be a software
   >implementation that is subject to export restrictions.

   True for DES (and indeed most ciphers), but what about intrinsically much
   simpler systems like RSA?  With suitable maths software, the distinction
   between a 'human-orientated description' and a 'computer program' becomes
   a very fine one.

Indeed. I suppose that Tanenbaum's book "Computer Networks" must now
also be classed as munitions since the first edition included Pascal
source code for a DES implementation.

		Jim
From: keith.willis@almac.co.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: cia story (was : gchq
Date: 10 Sep 92 12:30:53 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: ALMAC BBS Ltd



[iwm@doc.ic.ac.uk (Ian W Moor) said]

IW>   GCHQ can be located by observing the unexplained deviation in the
IW>   microwave trunk route...

        GCHQ can be located by driving into Cheltenham and looking
        for a large low-rise complex, surrounded by lots of razor
        wire, filled with large, skyward-pointing dishes.


---
 ~ PQ 2.15 194 ~ 
----- PGP v1.0 --- public key ------ keith.willis@almac.co.uk

section 1 of uuencode 5.15 of file keith.pub    by R.E.M.

begin 644 keith.pub
MF;``0A8U*BI7:6QL:7,L($ME:71H("`@("!K96ET:"YW:6QL:7-`86QM86,N
M8V\N=6O>`^5^EYDE<?D,&>2!MNH>T+*/9_\.1-=WDSF_;.]<THIK/X]5R[T"
MY41S!CX_EE1=E;&V8PN<9*5?9],UV,J/(7S=`C-3S+>*+7`1T[8-8Q*@_@"I
LIR(5-E1Z*\@=1W42HU<X*^WG'GXL8#R0C@;=](&@IQ>0#2,4G@F9FS<%`!$%
`
end
sum -r/size 40780/274 section (from "begin" to "end")
sum -r/size 57997/179 entire input file
--
ALMAC BBS Ltd. 0324-665371
Dos based USENET access,  call for details!
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: User authentication
Date: Sun, 06 Sep 92 15:41:47 EDT
Distribution: na
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <104729351DN5.61R@tanda.isis.org> 
(Marc Thibault) writes: 

>         Not at all -- many banks provide anonomous accounts. The only

        Based on the mail I received re this posting, it would appear
        that the USA stands alone in requiring "true identity" for an
        ordinary bank account.

        Just to verify, I went to a Canadian bank branch I've never
        used before and opened a savings account with $200 in cash. I
        was not asked for ID.

            ,Marc
---
 Marc Thibault        |                              |  Any Warming,
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  Oxford Mills, Ontario       |  Global or otherwise,
 CIS:71441,2226       |     Canada                   |   appreciated.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ffhoust@eos.ncsu.edu (FORREST FRANCI HOUSTON)
Subject: general inquiry
Organization: North Carolina State University
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 19:02:25 GMT

Over the summer I finally got around to reading Codebreakers and
I found it really interesting.  I was wondering what other books 
on the same subject are out there.  I am mainly looking for 
introductory to intermediate level books, preferably with an
emphasis on the use of computers in this field. 

Please e-mail me as I do not always find time to read this group.
Thanks in advance.

Forrest
ffhoust@eos.ncsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: styri@hal.nta.no (Haakon Styri)
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Reply-To: styri@nta.no
Organization: Norwegian Telecom Research
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 92 11:11:50 GMT

In article <1992Sep7.051916.16197@qualcomm.com>, karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
|> 
|> Obviously only Americans are capable of taking an algorithm
|> description and turning it into working code. The next thing you know,
|> the US government will be revoking the passports of anyone suspected
|> of being able to program...

This of course not an old idea. Look up any decent history book and read all
about the industrial revolution and English emigration law. :-)  If anyone
believe this worked they should also believe that the Merrimack Manufacturing
Company was an illusion.

On the other hand, the people who laugh at the export restrictions probably
haven't done any real integration testing of a really large software construct.
At least there's a fair chance that the foe fouls up...

---
Haakon Styri			***   Std. disclaimer applies	***
Norwegian Telecom Research
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dave@jato.jpl.nasa.gov (Dave Hayes)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Reply-To: dave@jato.jpl.nasa.gov
Organization: Jet Propulsion Lab - Pasadena, CA
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 20:08:45 GMT

krazykid@csa.bu.edu (Ernest Kim) writes:
>PS:  Don't watch this movie with four or more computer science
>students together.  It sorta ruins the movie for you and the people
>around you.  

Ain't that the truth? C'mon folks...the plot was much more interesting
than the techno-accuracy, wasn't it? I thought the movie was very well
done.

And as to the suction cup modem...hey maybe these guys got it for free
out of a trash bin and started using it? 



-- 
Dave Hayes - Network & Communications Engineering - JPL / NASA - Pasadena CA
dave@elxr.jpl.nasa.gov       dave@jato.jpl.nasa.gov         ...usc!elroy!dxh

    If it works...use it. If it doesn't, find out why and use THAT.