HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rmr@acsu.buffalo.edu (Richard M. Romanowski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Logic and stuff
Date: 19 Nov 92 01:58:18 GMT
Article-I.D.: acsu.BxxxH7.Hz1
Organization: UB

corruble@lpia6.ibp.fr (CORRUBLE Vincent) writes:

>I think the way people perceive/understand the experiment is the reason
>why they
>think that 2 is more likely than 1
>They hear
>|> >1) Linda is a bank teller.
>|> >2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement."
>but they perceive
>|> >1) Linda is a bank teller and she is NOT active in the feminist movement.
>|> >2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement."
>since this dichotomic question is much more common than a attribute with
>a "don't know"
>value.

	It sounds as though this is more descriptive of the particular
phenomenon, and my theory is just a general factor which enters in, but
doesn'y drive the whole thing.  The dichotomy is probably the specific
cause of the observed phenomenon, whereas the "important info selection"
factor I dreamed up applies, but only in the background....

	Good call, Dr. Corruble...
Luck
Rick
From: iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Ivan A Derzhanski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 23 Nov 92 15:17:44 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

In article <9BA=#Z+@engin.umich.edu> jxm@engin.umich.edu (John Murray) writes:
<Also, count the letters in the following 
<to obtain the first eleven digits of e 
<
<"To express e, remember to memorize a sentence to simplify this"
<
<Neat, cos it kinda self-referential! 

Neat, yes, but not neater than the repetition of "1828" after the
second digit (2.7 1828 1828 4).  It almost makes the mnemonic superfluous.

-- 
 `Haud yer wheesht!  Come oot o the man an gie him peace.' (The Glasgow Gospel)
Ivan A Derzhanski   (iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk;  iad@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu)
* Centre for Cognitive Science,  2 Buccleuch Place,  Edinburgh EH8 9LW,  UK
* Cowan House, Pollock Halls, 18 Holyrood Park Road, Edinburgh EH16 5BD, UK
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:627 sci.philosophy.tech:4101 sci.lang:8029
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on symbolic representation
Date: 15 Nov 92 17:22:12 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Nov13.100925.2924@news.Hawaii.Edu> lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:

>Paraphrases are expressions that mean the
>same thing, so there must be a thing that they mean, and once we've
>found it, we'll know why they are paraphrases.

Reification rides again! Why must there be such a thing? Why could not
paraphrases be identifiable simply by a certain kind of transformation
capable of turning one into another?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Subject: Re: Position of Mach bands
Keywords: same
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 23:54:25 GMT

There's a recent special IEEE issue on wavelets and wavelet transforms.
And I don't need to point out the material you directed me towards. Of
course, there's always Karl Pribram.

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com

Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:684 sci.philosophy.tech:4176 sci.lang:8097 sci.philosophy.meta:2633
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Date: 19 Nov 92 06:08:22 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov19.010823.17595
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov18.170839.29220@psych.toronto.edu>
christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>In article <1992Nov18.042158.17562@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Nov17.214321.18500@psych.toronto.edu>
>>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>>>>Indeed.  Logical reasoning tells me that if I walk out in front of a bus,
>>>>I'll get run over.  Does he mean that in the Far East this doesn't hold?

CG:
>>>LOGIC tells you this?!?!? Astounding! I'd love to see that logic. I've
>>>always thought this was contingent; true, but contingent. The things
>>>you learn on the net...

MZ:
>>Some people are vitalists; some are physicalists; a few gentle souls
>>are semanticalists.  Michael is a logicist, -- theirs is an ancient
>>and venerable breed, and I fail to see any egregious fault with the
>>views they espouse.  Read more Spinoza, Chris.

CG:
>The issue to which I was alluding was not whether natural language could
>ultimately be reduced to *some* logic. In fact I hope it can because, under
>at least one interpretation ofthe problem, the question amounts to whether
>there can be a theory of language at all. The problem is that the question
>of whether one gets run over if one steps in from of a bus, cannot be
>answered a priori, and therefore is not a logical truth (at least it can't
>be derived out of any of our present logics). Tally-ho!

Hmm... I dissent.  The fact that one gets run over if one steps in
front of a bus is arguably an analytic consequence of our concepts of
*bus-hood* and *stepping in front of*.  Consequently, it is knowable
_a priori_.

>-- 
>Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
>Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
>University of Toronto
>Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: lad@ausom.oz.au (Lyn Dawson)
Subject: Meaning (not Theory of)
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:07:17 GMT
Organization: AUSOM - The Apple Users Society of Melbourne

Something I've just come across may be of interest, if not scientific:

"The Map is Not the Territory"

"The meaning of your communication is the response you get - if you
don't like the response - vary your communication"

regards
-- 
Lyn Dawson		InterNet	lad%ausom.oz.@sol.cc.deakin.oz.au
East Brighton
Victoria
Australia		"Subvert the dominant paradigm"
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:746 sci.philosophy.tech:4230 sci.lang:8163
From: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 23 Nov 92 11:13:46 GMT
	<1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<RJC.92Nov19162241@daiches.cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
	<1992Nov20.111124.17630@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: Human Communication Research Center
In-reply-to: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu's message of 20 Nov 92 16:11:21 GMT

In article <1992Nov20.111124.17630@husc3.harvard.edu>, Michael Zeleny (mz) writes:

mz> I see no reason to suppose that the salient contextual features are
mz> unique and irreproducible, in the sense you seem to suggest.

One of them is the person hearing/reading the phrase. You can't rewind
people to an earlier state and giving them two phrases at once is
pointless unless you are one of the more sadistic variety of
psycho-linguist :-).

There, I suspect, is the core of the difference between you and, so
far as I can see, everyone else on this thread. You seem to want to
divorce `language' from its human context. If you do that hard enough,
then indeed you _do_ get a formal language, however you also end up
with something which is of no interest to anyone except formal
language theorists, since you have no way of showing that any facts
you might determine about your formalised language have any relevance
to real language as she is spoke. You're just repeating all of the
mistakes of the people who tried to deduce rules for English from an
idealised Latin grammar, you haven't shown that you have a meaningful
inverse transformation.

--
rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk				_O_
						 |<
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: dmorton@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Daniel Morton)
Subject: Re: reasons why AI not able to model mind?
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 00:19:19 GMT


You might want to look into the January 1990 issue of Scientific
American. Has an article by John Searle ( the arch-enemy of AI
researchers) and another interesting article by Paul and Patricia
Churchland which tries to prove that classical AI is not likely to give
us consious machines. If you want to search for articles on this topic keep
in mind the names Searle and Dreyfus. If an argument is about the likely
hood of AI, they are usually mentioned in some way.


 
-- 
"Awright, let's forget the bullshit and get on with the so-called art"
                      --  Charles Bukowski  --  
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:655 sci.philosophy.tech:4144 sci.lang:8073 sci.philosophy.meta:2609
From: miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: <None>
Date: 17 Nov 92 18:13:54 CST
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services

In article <BxvDqn.8n1@ccu.umanitoba.ca>, feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>>
>>Let us remember that human rights are based on a *committment* to 
>>logic. 
>>
>> [Lots ommitted]
>>
>>Furthermore, remember that a committment to logic is a *western* ideal
>>that is not going to be applicable in many areas of the world.
> 
> Something this silly has got to be bad for ya.

Hear, hear...
-- 
-Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>
 OPINIONS ARE MY OWN           


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: peeters@tasman.cc.utas.edu.au (bert peeters)
Subject: Re: Theory of Meaning 
Organization: University of Tasmania, Australia.
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 23:02:01 GMT

swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:

>(4) Bert Peeters, as a semanticist, takes me to task for giving
>    Stephen Stich instead of Stephen Schiffer as the author of
>    "Remnants of Meaning" and accuses me of thereby refering to
>    a non-existent entity. I knew what I meant, he knew what I
>    meant and furthermore we both know why I made the slip. But as a
>    theoretician he makes a lot of assumptions about how proper
>    names work and calculates that I can't actually have meant
>    what I did mean. Of course he doesn't actually believe the
>    results of his own calculations... This is why we don't need
>    semantics (;-)).

I must have had a couple of bad days towards the end of last week,
because I seem to have antagonised a number of people on various BB's.
Such was not my intention. In the case of Philip Swann's challenge
to semanticists to tell him why theories of meaning should exist, I
was annoyed by what I perceived as a derogatory tone, and promptly
put the same kind of tone (consciously or not, I'm not sure) in my
next few postings. I thought - and still do - it is not enough to
refer to the literature to back up one's position ("because X and Y
say so, it must be true" - what sort of an argument is that?). The
case was made worse by Swann's slip (Stich for Schiffer). I only
found out who he had in mind by checking the library holdings under
"title" rather than "author". How many people will have looked for
Schiffer's book, not finding it because the author's name had been
misquoted? This is not just about him and me, it is about all of
us who read sci.cognitive and are interested in meaning. And why he
made the slip? Honestly, I do NOT know. I do not know either whether
I really "calculated that he couldn't actually have meant what he
did mean", so all that follows from there (including "this is why
we don't need semantics" and including the smiley) is shaky. We do
need theories of meaning, to avoid misunderstandings like this one.
Taken up too much bandwith already, and I don't want to antagonise
anyone any further. My apologies to everyone who thinks I'm a bore.
Perhaps that's true.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Bert Peeters                         Tel: +61 02 202344
Department of Modern Languages               002 202344
University of Tasmania at Hobart        Fax: 002 207813
GPO Box 252C                            Bert.Peeters@modlang.utas.edu.au
Hobart TAS 7001
Australia
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym)
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:24:16 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.131357.12605@news.Hawaii.Edu> lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:
>
>I think logic is wonderful.  Not all logic is semantic -- logic may be
>done syntactically.  Having shown that two sentences imply each other
>in some logical syntax, what is gained except confusion by proceeding
>to associate some esoteric meaning-thing with them both?
>
A theory of language...? Sorry, just a thought. I guess notions such as
language are passe out in the Pacific.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov17.134024.1624@sol.cs.wmich.edu> <BxvDqn.8n1@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
	<1992Nov17.175227.20588@athena.cs.uga.edu>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 19:15:21 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.175227.20588@athena.cs.uga.edu> mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.
edu (Michael Covington) writes:

   >Indeed.  Logical reasoning tells me that if I walk out in front of a bus,
   >I'll get run over.

  How?
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Meaning (not Theory of)
Date: 21 Nov 92 18:38:56 GMT

lad@ausom.oz.au (Lyn Dawson) writes:

>Something I've just come across may be of interest, if not scientific:

>"The Map is Not the Territory"

From Count Korzipsky (spelled wrong, I'm sure), General Semantics.
There are lots of fun variations on this:
"The menu is not the meal"
"The picture in the ad is not the product."
etc.

>"The meaning of your communication is the response you get - if you
>don't like the response - vary your communication"

This sounds like some of Werner Erhard's bullsh*t.  It has only a
limited validity, and raises questions of "meaning for who"?  But it
can also be used to beat people over the head, telling them that
the reason they're leading such miserable, rotten, lousy lives is
that they are miserable, rotten, and lousy, and they should "take
responsibility for their own lives because they create their own
world."

>regards
>--
>Lyn Dawson         InterNet  lad%ausom.oz.@sol.cc.deakin.oz.au
>East Brighton
>Victoria
>Australia          "Subvert the dominant paradigm"

Should we make subverting the dominant paradigm the dominant paradigm?
regards
burt voorhees
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:682 sci.philosophy.tech:4173 sci.lang:8096 sci.philosophy.meta:2629
From: rmr@acsu.buffalo.edu (Richard M. Romanowski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Date: 19 Nov 92 01:50:47 GMT
Organization: UB

christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>>>LOGIC tells you this?!?!? Astounding! I'd love to see that logic. I've
>>>always thought this was contingent; true, but contingent. The things
>>>you learn on the net...

	Well, if we could rigorously define all the things that we
consider logical, Bertrand Russell would have nothing on us.

>>
>>Some people are vitalists; some are physicalists; a few gentle souls
>>are semanticalists.  Michael is a logicist, -- theirs is an ancient
>>and venerable breed, and I fail to see any egregious fault with the
>>views they espouse.  Read more Spinoza, Chris.
>>
>The issue to which I was alluding was not whether natural language could
>ultimately be reduced to *some* logic. In fact I hope it can because, under
>at least one interpretation ofthe problem, the question amounts to whether
>there can be a theory of language at all.

	I think that LOGIC will be reduced to a natural language. 

	But what do I know?
Luck
Rick
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: wombat@cs.montana.edu (Izurieta)
Subject: hierarchies
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, MSU, Bozeman Mt 59717
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:00:28 GMT


	I have been reading a few papers in segmentation of environments
into regions.  Apparently, this is done by humans to create cognitive
maps of some areas.  These regions in turn, form part of a hierarchy.

	Here is my question,  What are the advantages of using a hierarchy
to subdivide an environment?  Are there any computational advantages?

				Clem

				(wombat@cs.montana.edu)

Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:698 sci.philosophy.tech:4185 sci.lang:8107
From: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 19 Nov 92 16:22:41 GMT
	<1992Nov16.120727.17500@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1992Nov17.092016.28202@news.unige.ch>
	<1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: Human Communication Research Center
In-reply-to: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu's message of 18 Nov 92 03:15:41 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>, Michael Zeleny (mz) writes:

mz> Even granting your alleged ability [to find contexts to separate
mz> synonyms], it is obvious that it does nothing to exclude the
mz> context-dependent theories of meaning.  

The problem here is that the phenomenon becomes purely theoretical.
You _can't_ put two phrases or whatever into the same contex for the
same reason you can't put two physical objects into the same 4-space
location, not enough room.

mz> The best NL examples are furnished by good translations.

Give me one example. Even phrases in languages I know nothing of are
not interchangable unless they are phonetically _very_ similar, which
is a bit of a degenerate case for synonymy. If I understand, even
vaguely, one of the languages, then all kinds of contextual effects
are going to ruin any equivalence you wish to set up.

mz> Following Montague, I believe that deicticaly disambiguated natural
mz> languages *are* formal languages.

This is either empty or patently false, either way it doesn't reflect
the Montague as I have seen. I think you need a different verb in that
opaquely embedded phrase :-).

--
rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk				_O_
						 |<
From: iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Ivan A Derzhanski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 23 Nov 92 15:23:18 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

In article <11451@hogg.ed.ac.uk> guy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Guy Barry) writes:
<kate@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Kate Jeffery) writes:
<>when the moon is a C it's crescendo and when it's a D it's diminuendo
<>but it's the other way round. (In the Southern Hemisphere anyhow...)
<
<Oh God -- those "wrong way round" ones are more trouble than they're worth.

True -- unless you have a submnemonic to help you remember whether the
chief mnemonic is "wrong".

<  The way I heard it was:
<
<	When the moon is Coming it is really departing
<	When the moon is Departing it is really coming

The Bulgarian moon mnemonic on the other hand is a "straight" one:
when the moon is like a "C", it _slabee_ `becomes slender, loses weight',
and when it is like a "D", it _debelee_ `becomes fat, gains weight'.
(Some familiarity with the Cyrillic alphabet is needed for the first part.)

-- 
 `Haud yer wheesht!  Come oot o the man an gie him peace.' (The Glasgow Gospel)
Ivan A Derzhanski   (iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk;  iad@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu)
* Centre for Cognitive Science,  2 Buccleuch Place,  Edinburgh EH8 9LW,  UK
* Cowan House, Pollock Halls, 18 Holyrood Park Road, Edinburgh EH16 5BD, UK
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym)
Organization: University of Hawaii
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 13:13:57 GMT

Michael Zeleny (zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu) wrote:
: In article <1992Nov16.125741.22619@news.Hawaii.Edu> 
: GL:
: >I didn't see Chris's followup, so I'm taking this opportunity to
: >agree with him.  I was just kidding.  "Mean the same thing" is
: >just a manner of speaking, perhaps reflecting some folk theory
: >which, however, we're under no obligation to accept.
: 
: Who's that "we", kemosabe?

Rational discussants.

: If you don't feel that being bound by logic is a *moral* obligation, ...

I think logic is wonderful.  Not all logic is semantic -- logic may be
done syntactically.  Having shown that two sentences imply each other
in some logical syntax, what is gained except confusion by proceeding
to associate some esoteric meaning-thing with them both?

Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:747 sci.philosophy.tech:4231 sci.lang:8164
From: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 23 Nov 92 11:32:28 GMT
	<1992Nov16.120727.17500@husc3.harvard.edu> <erwin.722217539@trwacs>
	<MxG=!XC@engin.umich.edu>
Organization: Human Communication Research Center
In-reply-to: rcj@engin.umich.edu's message of 20 Nov 92 20:36:32 GMT

In article <MxG=!XC@engin.umich.edu>, R o d Johnson (rodj) writes:

 In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs> erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:
he> [That meaning parallels brain state]

rodj> "Are considered" by who?  Says who?  Suppose I were to say "two
rodj> statements are considered equivalent if they hold in exactly the same
rodj> possible worlds."  Why is my claim any less definitional than yours?

Well, I don't know about more definitional, but it is certainly more
immediatly meaningful. 

Given some quite widely shared assumptions about the world, the
brain-state definition has a well defined interpretation and, although
we may not be able to decide it because of technological limitations
or more inherent limitations such as QM, it does seem clear what a
decision procedure for it might be.

On the other hand, when you start throwing around terms like `possible
world' and `hold' then you are dragging in a _huge_ raft of auxiliary
machinery and new assumptions. Then, even if we all agreed just what
we meant by holding in a possible world, there is no reason to think
that the equivalence so defined relates to anything interesting in the
real world.

[Well, that should get me lynched by any passing semanticists]

--
rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk			_O_
					 |<
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:628 sci.psychology:4403 comp.ai:4288