From: apakabar@access.digex.com (John A. MacDougall)
Newsgroups: alt.activism
Subject: Labor Rights in Indonesia
Date: 23 Jan 1993 13:31:16 GMT
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Forwarded by hrwatchnyc@igc.apc.org:

News from Asia Watch
January 23, 1993
Vol. 5, No. 2

INDONESIA: CHARGES AND REBUTTALS OVER LABOR RIGHTS PRACTICES

Analysis of Submissions to the U.S. Trade Representative

I. INTRODUCTION


	In June 1992, Asia Watch and the International Labor
	Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), a
	non-governmental organization based in Washington,
	petitioned the United States Trade Representative, Carla
	Hills to review Indonesian labor rights practices. Under
	U.S. law [Section 502(b)(7) of the Trade Act of 1974.],
	the President, at the recommendation of the Trade
	Representative, must end tariff benefits to a U.S. trading
	partner under a program known as the Generalized System of
	Preferences (GSP), if the country in question is not
	"taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker
	rights."  The rights in question include freedom of
	association, the right to organize and bargain
	collectively, ban on forced labor, a minimum age for the
	employment of children and acceptable conditions of work.


	The Office of the Trade Representative agreed to review
	the Indonesian case, and a hearing before the GSP
	Subcommittee of that office was held on October 16 at
	which both Asia Watch and ILRERF testified. On November
	16, the Indonesian government submitted a 170-page
	response to both petitions, drawn up by the law firm White
	and Case, with over 100 attachments. Both petitioners were
	given a chance to respond, and in December, an Indonesian
	delegation led by Dr. Payaman Simanjuntak of the Ministry
	of Manpower met in Washington with the GSP Subcommittee
	and representatives of Asia Watch and ILRERF. President
	Clinton will announce a decision in April 1993. If GSP
	benefits are cut as a result, the annual cost to Indonesia
	of the rise in tariffs on Indonesian exports coming into
the U.S. will be about $400 million.

	This report summarizes the major allegations made by Asia
	Watch in its original petition to the U.S. Trade
	Representative and in subsequent materials submitted, and
	the Indonesian rebuttal. Asia Watch, as an organization
	concerned with the defense of civil and political rights,
	focused on restrictions of freedom of association and
	evidence of forced labor, rather than working conditions,
	including wages and safety, per se. It believes, however,
	that securing the right of workers to organize is a key
	step toward the improvement of working conditions in
Indonesia.

II. SUMMARY OF CHARGES AND REBUTTALS


	The main Asia Watch (AsW) charges and Indonesian
government (GOI) rebuttals can be summarized as follows:

AsW: Indonesia restricts the right to freedom of association by
allowing only one government-controlled trade union, the Serikat
Perburuhan Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI). While other unions are in
theory permitted, requirements to obtain legal recognition are so
onerous as to make recognition impossible. Those attempting to
form independent unions have been harassed.

GOI: SPSI was formed by and for workers without government
interference. It is not the only legally recognized union; the
Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) was recognized in April
1990. A new Ministry of Manpower regulation, now in draft, will
substantially ease requirements for obtaining recognition. Many
other organizations effectively function as unions, even without
recognition, such as the civil servants organization, KORPRI.
There has been no government attempt to hinder the formation of
new unions.

AsW: The right to bargain collectively is restricted by the lack
of independent unions, controls on the right to strike, and
military interference. Management often only agrees to negotiate
if workers make a credible threat to disrupt production by work
stoppages or strikes. SPSI units at the workplace, where they
exist, often side with the company. The presence of soldiers and
police during negotiations between workers and management serves
as form of intimidation and robs the process of any meaning.

GOI: The Ministry of Manpower vigorously promotes collective
bargaining, but such bargaining is consultative, not
confrontational as in the West. SPSI workplace units have been
effective in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Strikes
are permitted; they are only declared illegal when established
procedures are violated. The petitioners fail to understand the
dual political/military role of the Indonesian armed forces and
the role of the army in protecting against internal disturbances.
The threat of communist insurgency through labor disputes is a
serious national security problem, not merely a labor problem.


AsW: The Indonesian government has engaged in forced labor by
luring East Timorese laborers to Java on false pretenses, paying
them substandard wages and forcing them to undergo military
training. Logging companies, with some government involvement,
have effectively created a system of bonded, unpaid labor in the
Asmat area of Irian Jaya.

GOI: Indonesia is bound by the ILO Convention No.29 Concerning
Forced Labor. Allegations about East Timorese workers were based
on inadequate, inaccurate and untrue information. The workers
volunteered for the positions, were paid the minimum wage and were
provided with transportation to return to East Timor if they
chose. The Indonesian military assists with training but that
training is not "military" per se.  The government has no record
of officials in Irian Jaya cooperating with timber companies to
compel Asmat tribespeople to cut down trees.

	The Indonesian government's assertions do not stand up to
scrutiny, as the following analysis will show.

III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION


SPSI and Government Control

	SPSI remains the only legally recognized trade union which
	claims to negotiate with employers on behalf of workers,
	the recognition of the Indonesian Teachers Association
	(PGRI) notwithstanding. In the 1991 Country Reports on
	Human Rights Practices, the State Department noted, "The
	Government and employers have considerable influence over
	SPSI affairs; a retired military lieutenant colonel and
	GOLKAR district chairman with some prior union experience
	is chairman of the largest provincial branch of SPSI,
	primarily due to government backing. The Minister of
	Manpower is a member of the SPSI Consultative Council.
	SPSI officials are pressured to join GOLKAR and GOLKAR
	members dominate the SPSI leadership." [Country Reports on
	Human Rights Practices for 1991, U.S. Department of State,
February 1992, p.870.]

	The Indonesian government states that SPSI has a total
	membership of 1,016,562 workers organized into 10,000
	workplace units (PUK SPSI). This represents less than six
	percent of the workforce. The greatest obstacles to
	forming more units, the government asserts, are "lack of
	worker familiarity with trade union practices, employer
	resistance, employee apathy and employee fear of possible
	employer retaliation."[Statement of the Government of
	Indonesia before the Office of United States Trade
	Representative, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Generalized
	System of Preferences Subcommittee, (hereafter referred to
as Indonesian Statement), November 16, 1992, p.71.]

	But in those units which do exist, SPSI often fails to
	represent worker interests. In May 1992, for example, an
	agreement was reached by the district head of Bekasi
	(outside Jakarta), the district leader of SPSI and the
	local head of the employers association, APINDO, to ban
	all strikes in Bekasi until the session of the People's
	Consultative Assembly (MPR) to elect the President was
	concluded in March 1993. There was no consultation with
	workers about this 10-month ban on strikes, as the number
	of strikes in Bekasi after May amply indicates. The
	Indonesian government, however, maintains that, "Rather
	than harming the workers by agreeing not to strike, the
	SPSI supported the desire of the workers and worked to
	improve their welfare...The majority of the workers, after
	experiencing the disruption of frequent strikes in the
	region, sought this agreement as an alternative means to
	address their demands...The tripartite agreement thus
	represents a carefully considered decision on the part of
	workers to enter an agreement to settle labor disputes
	peacefully through negotiation and thereby avoid
	potentially harmful strikes and lock-outs."[Indonesian
	Statement, p.44 and p.83] There is no indication of how
	this decision of the "majority" was reached or "the desire
of workers" ascertained.

	Another indication of SPSI's links to the government may
	be gleaned from the widely-publicized strike at the PT
	Evershinetex textile factory in Ciluar, Bogor (West Java)
	on May 14. After workers went on strike and security
	forces were called in, the factory issued a statement
	ordering workers back to work the next day, saying
	negotiations would begin if they obeyed. The statement was
	signed by the personnel director of the company, the head
	of local office of the Ministry of Manpower, the
	subdistrict chief, the Bogor police chief, the subdistrict
	military commander -- and the head of the SPSI unit at the
	plant ["Kronologi Kasus Pemanggilan dan Pemecatan Buruh PT
Evershinetex oleh KOREM 061 Bogor."].

	It is true that in many of the strikes called over the
	past year in West Java, workers have demanded that an SPSI
	unit be set up in their plant. But it is also clear that
	the main reason workers without an SPSI unit demand to
	have one is that it is the only way they feel they can get
	their grievances addressed by management. Ad-hoc
	negotiating groups formed by workers in the aftermath of
	wildcat strikes are not taken seriously by management, and
	agreements reached by such groups are often ignored. But
	when SPSI units do exist, workers often demand that it be
dissolved for failing to protect their interests.

	In its original petition, Asia Watch cited the case of the
	PT Star Angkasa metal factory in Surabaya, where in 1991,
	workers had protested mandatory payment of SPSI dues and
	asked for the SPSI unit to be dissolved on the ground that
	it did not defend their interests. The Indonesian
	government called the case material presented "at best
	incomplete and at worst inaccurate." According to the
government's account of the same strike,

On July 16, 1991, the workers went on strike to demand an increase
in wages and to be informed about the terms of their collective
bargaining agreement. In response to the strike, the company
negotiated with representatives of the company SPSI unit and
agreed to institute a pay raise in March 1992 when the new minimum
wage provisions went into effect.

	The following day, the workers went on strike again to
	demand the replacement of the executive board of SPSI in
	the company. The workers were unhappy with the board
	because they believed it did not accurately present the
	union's financial report and did not fight for improvement
	in the workers' welfare. Contrary to the petitioners'
	allegations, the workers did not request that the SPSI be
	dissolved or request any money to be returned. Rather,
	they were unhappy with the executive board...Their demands
	did not include objections to the payment of SPSI dues
	[Indonesian Statement, p.46.].



Requirements for Registration

	The current requirements for legal recognition as a union
	are that the organization in question have representation
	in 20 of Indonesia's 27 provinces [Indonesia forcibly
	annexed East Timor as its 27th province in July 1976; that
	annexation has not been recognized by the United Nations
	and was illegal under international law.], 100 districts
	and at least 1,000 workplaces.

[Regulation PER-05/MEN/87 on Worker Union Registration.] The
Indonesian government maintained that a new draft regulation,
which surfaced for the first time in response to the GSP
petitions, would reduce that requirement to five provinces, with
at least 25 district-level branches, 100 workplace unions and
10,000 members.

	ILRERF examined the draft more closely and discovered that
	a union which registers based on the new regulation would
	have to have a recommendation from an existing federation
	of worker unions -- i.e. from SPSI. Moreover, if workers
	wished to form not just a new union but a new trade union
	federation, they would have at least ten registered unions
	as members, all of which would have had to meet the
	individual and branch-level membership requirements and
	each of which would have to obtain approval of the
	government union to register. [International Labor Rights
	Education and Research Fund, Rebuttal of ILRERF to the
	Statement of the Government of Indonesia,December 3, 1992,
	p.12.] The new draft, then, hardly constitutes an
improvement.

	It should be noted that any effort to ease the
	registration process must be accompanied by respect by the
	government for freedom of assembly. If workers interested
	in forming a new union are not permitted to meet freely to
	discuss their plans, without government obstruction or
	surveillance, reform of the registration process is
	meaningless.



Setiakawan and SBSI

	Two independent unions have emerged in the last two years,
	Setiakawan (Solidarity) and the Worker's Union for a
	Prosperous Indonesia (SBSI). "In recognition of the right
	to organize and associate, the Government did not take any
	action in connection with the establishment" of either
	organization, and both are free to apply for recognition
	as a union, according to the Indonesian government's
	November 16 statement to the GSP Subcommittee.In fact,
	while it is true that neither was outlawed, both
	organizations have faced harassment and surveillance since
	they were founded, Setiakawan in 1990, SBSI in 1992. The
	nature of the harassment virtually precludes either
	organization being able to hold the meetings that might
	result in the recruitment of the necessary number of
members for recognition.

	The Indonesian government now claims, citing a October 7,
	1992 statement from the Setiakawan Management Council,
	that Setiakawan was not attempting to become a union and
	considered itself an educational organization. But this
	may reflect a response to government pressure. In July
	1991, the Secretary General of Setiakawan, was abducted by
	armed men believed to be members of military intelligence,
	and held for three days. The abduction followed a series
	of training meetings for workers that Setiakawan had held
	under the watchful eye of security forces. A year later,
	on July 6, 1992, workers at the PT Astari Niaga plant in
	Tangerang went on strike, demanding a wage increase
	retroactive to April. On July 7, the head of the SPSI unit
	and the company announced a settlement, but the workers
	rejected it, saying there had been no consultation with
	them beforehand and SPSI had never attempted to gather
	them together to explain the agreement. When the workers
	refused to settle, the company called in the police, who
	investigated one of the workers and accused him of being
	manipulated by Setiakawan. ["Pengunjuk Rasa, Tolak Hasil
	Kesepakatan Kenaikan Upah", Kompas, July 8, 1992.]  It is
	not known what happened to the worker.



	The SBSI has fared little better. On October 28, 1992,
	police in Tangerang, West Java, broke up a meeting in
	which nine members of SBSI, headed by their General
	Chairman, Mochtar Pakpahan, were discussing how to open a
	branch office in Tangerang. Greg Talcott, the U.S.
	embassy's labor attache, was present as an observer.  All
	ten men were taken to the Tangerang police station;
	Talcott was released after an hour. The others were
	interrogated overnight and released the following morning.



	On October 29, at about 10 p.m., Mochtar Pakpahan was
	picked up at his home by Sergeant Peter Sihotang of the
	military intelligence agency BAIS and taken to an unknown
	destination on the outskirts of Jakarta where he was
	interrogated for four hours by Colonel Dadang Supriadi in
	the presence of three other BAIS officers before being
taken back to his house at about 4 a.m. on October 30.

	Pakpahan was questioned about what information he provided
	Talcott and what assistance Talcott had given him. He was
	also questioned about why he decided to establish SBSI,
	since the SPSI was already in place; what funds he had
	obtained; and from whom. He was told by Colonel Supriadi
	that SBSI was an illegal organization and that the SBSI
	bulletin that it had produced was subversive in content.
	[Asia Watch provided the details on the SBSI incident to
	the U.S. Trade Representative on December 1, too late to
	be included in the material sent to the Indonesian
government for a response.]

The Indonesian Teachers Association and Other Professional
Organizations

	The Indonesian government claims that the Indonesian
	Teachers Association is a legally registered union with
	completely voluntary membership which functions to
	"protect the rights and welfare of teachers."[Indonesian
	Statement, p.5] The State Department, in its 1991 report,
	noted that PGRI "has not...attempted to bargain over wages
	and working conditions, preferring its traditional role of
	working with the Government to pursue the interests of its
	members. Some PGRI officials are employees of the Ministry
	of Education."

[Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, p.871.] The
Indonesian government refutes that assertion, saying PGRI has
represented teachers in negotiations for increased salaries,
promotions and pension benefits. "Neither PGRI nor the Government
has to negotiate using Western methods in order to comply with the
ILO Convention or retain GSP benefits."[Indonesian Statement,
p.55]

	But not only has PGRI not functioned as a union -- its
	leaders have actually forced teachers into actions which
	are detrimental to their interests. In January 1992, the
	head of the PGRI branch in Yogyakarta, Sawal
	Hardjoprijitno, said that a deduction should be taken from
	teacher salaries to contribute to the success of GOLKAR in
	the 1992 election campaign. He told a reporter that
	teachers were at once members of KORPRI, the civil
	servants association, and GOLKAR, and that they should
	take an active role in seeing their organization
	succeed.["Untuk Dana Pemilu, Wajar, Gaji Guru Dipotong",
Bernas, January 23, 1992, p.1.]

	The Yogyakarta officer's remarks reaffirm a statement in
	the PGRI General Program for 1989-94, attached to the
Indonesian Statement as Exhibit 26:

In keeping with the principle and strategy of the New Order
approaching the 1992 General Elections, PGRI is determined to
continue upholding the struggle of the New Order and working
toward bringing victory to the Functional Group [the ruling party,
GOLKAR] which has the same principle and aspirations and
historical ties."

	ILRERF points out that nowhere in the PGRI Five-Year Plan,
	published in 1989, is there any hint that PGRI itself
desired recognition as a union.

Rather than representing the success of a labor union or worker
organization in leaping over the high wall of eligibility
standards which the Indonesian law requires, [recognition as a
union] illustrates the autocratic power of the government to
create "labor unions" by fiat as well as to prevent them from
being created.[ILREF Rebuttal, p.8.]

	The Indonesian government asserts that a number of other
	state-sponsored professional associations are
	"quasi-unions" and are in the process of increasing their
	memberships to apply for formal recognition as unions.
	These include KORPRI; the Indonesian Journalists
	Association (PWI); the Indonesian Seamen's Union (KPI);
	and the Indonesian Workers' Cooperative Alliance
(INKOPAR).

	It is particularly inappropriate to call KORPRI a trade
	union. In August 1991, almost a year before the national
	parliamentary elections took place, members of KORPRI in
	the Javanese district of Purworejo were complaining that
	they were being forced to pay "tactical dues" at the
	neighborhood, village, subdistrict and district level in
	order to build a campaign chest for GOLKAR. All members of
	KORPRI were also members of GOLKAR, according to the
	district secretary who was also head of the Purworejo
	KORPRI unit.["Dikeluhkan, Pungutan untuk Pemilu", Bernas,
	August 7, 1991. In fact, members of KORPRI are not legally
	obligated to be GOLKAR members; the pressure to join
	GOLKAR, however, can be intense.] Likewise on June 2,
	1992, the head of the KORPRI unit at Gajah Mada University
	in Yogyakarta sent around a letter urging all members to
vote for GOLKAR.

	If Indonesia were a country in which free and fair
	elections took place, the fact that an organization
	claiming to be a union campaigned for a particular
	political party would not be remarkable. In a country
	where elections are manifestly not free or fair, and the
	party in question represents the government, pressure to
	support that party takes on a much different coloring. If
	KORPRI is a "quasi-union", the interests of labor and
	management are difficult to distinguish.



	Not even the Indonesian government takes seriously the
	notion of any non-SPSI organization functioning as a
	union. In a letter dated October 5, 1989 from the
	Indonesian embassy in Washington to Foreign Minister Ali
	Alatas regarding the GSP petition of the AFL-CIO that
	year, the ambassador says, "Our lawyers asked our help in
	several matters on which we need confirmation from the
	government, as we have already conveyed to you by
	telephone. Among these matters is the notion that SPSI is
	not the only labor union in Indonesia but one of 21
	professional associations on the attached list which have
	been permitted to operate. In case SPSI has objections, we
	suggest that, for foreign consumption, the letter to the
	U.S. Trade Representative be approved, without sacrificing
	the government's domestic policy." [Letter from Ambassador
	Abdul Rachman Ramly to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, 5
	October 1989, No.132-DB-1989. The Indonesian text reads:
	"Dalam kaitannya dengan konsep surat kami diatas, pihak
	pengacara kita meminta bantuan kami beberapa hal yang
	perlu mendapat konfirmasi dari Pemerintah RI seperti yang
	telah kami sampaikan kepada Bapak Menteri per telepon
	antara lain bahwa SPSI bukan satu-satunya Serikat Pekerja
	di Indonesia namun masih ada sekitar 21 serikat pekerja
	profesional yang diizinkan di Indonesia sebagaimana daftar
	terlampir. Sekiranya pihak SPSI berkeberatan, kami
	sarankan kiranya untuk konsumpsi luar negeri khusus
	mengenai surat kepada USTR tersebut dapat disetujui, tanpa
	mengorbankan kebijaksanaan pemerintah di dalam negeri."]


	But the government goes further and maintains not only the
	unions but all social organizations as defined by Law
No.8/1985 can function as unions:

The difference between unions and social organizations or other
associations that perform union functions is that only unions
registered with the Ministry of Manpower may negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. In practice, however, this distinction is
without a difference because a social organization can negotiate
agreements concerning working conditions...Further, these
associations function like unions in other ways: all can recruit
workers and all represent workers and negotiate on behalf of
workers concerning working conditions.[Indonesian Statement,
p.36]

	Law No.8/1985, the Social Organizations Law, further
	restricts freedom of association by forcing yet another
	category of organizations to register with the government
	and pledge adherence to the state philosophy, Pancasila.
	The law increases state control over non-governmental
	organizations by Article 13, giving the government the
	power to dissolve any organizations which disturb general
	security and order, receive foreign aid without permission
	from the government and "render assistance to foreign
	parties detrimental to the interests of the Nation and
	State." Further, Article 8 is an indication of the
	government's determination to force non-governmental
	organizations (NGOs) into joining single umbrella
organizations which would then come under its control:

In order to be better able to discharge their function, Social
Organizations having one and the same character [are obliged to]
unite into one fostering and developing body.  [Law No.8/1985,
quoted in Ben Witjes, "The Indonesian Law on Social Organisations:
A Study of the Sociopolitical Context and the Consequences for
Indonesian and Foreign NGOs", Nijmegen (Netherlands), April 1987,
p.50.]

	SPSI is thus the umbrella organization for workers the way
	PGRI is for teachers. Similar organizations exist for
	youth, women, doctors and so on. The government's failure
	to see any real difference between unions and other
	professional and mass membership organizations in
	Indonesia underscores how lacking in independence the
"unions" really are.

IV. RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY AND STRIKE


	The right of workers to organize themselves to bargain
	collectively with their employers about wages, benefits
	and working conditions is the essence of trade union
	activity, and it is a right the Indonesian government
	formally recognizes. According to the Indonesian
	government, workers are to be represented by officers of
	the trade union, and the company by senior officers; if
	they are unable to resolve a dispute on their own, they
	may request the Ministry of Manpower to appoint a
	"conciliator" or submit the dispute to a Tripartite
	Regional Committee, usually referred to by its Indonesian
	acronym of "P4D", consisting of five people each from
	"labor unions, employer groups and representatives from
	government agencies." [Indonesian Statement, p.64. The
	disputing parties can also submit the dispute to binding
	arbitration, according to Indonesian law, but this almost
	never happens.] Given the level of unionization, these
	provisions, even if they guaranteed an impartial process
	which they do not, would affect only a tiny minority of
	workers. Among the existing SPSI units, only half have
	produced collective bargaining agreements, and the extent
	to which union negotiators actually represented worker
demands must be questioned.

	The Indonesian government also notes, however, that there
	is provision in Indonesian law that if a company with at
	least 25 employees has no union, a delegation of workers
	may be appointed to negotiate a "company regulation" with
	the employer about conditions of employment and rules of
	conduct. The Indonesian government maintains that these
	"company regulations" are basically the same as collective
	bargaining agreements. But without genuine freedom of
	association, there are no checks on who represents the
	workers, the extent to which a real bargaining process
	takes place or how well the agreement is implemented. In
	many of the labor disputes that took place in the
	Tangerang and Bekasi areas in 1992, workers were reluctant
	to come forward to negotiate because they feared being
fired after publicity about the dispute died down.

	On October 14, 1992, a strike involving 5,000 workers took
	place at six factories belonging to the Yasinta group of
	textile manufacturers, demanding increases in wages and
	benefits. The workers claimed they had conveyed their
	demands three times to their SPSI unit, but that the unit
	was on the side of the factory. When police and military
	forces were called in, reportedly because the workers were
	blocking traffic, they and the company urged the strikers
	to send representatives to negotiate a settlement. No
	worker would go, because all feared retaliation. The fear
	was based in part on the fact that after 70 workers had
	gone on strike earlier on September 29, four of them had
	been fired. The next day, the workers marched to the
	district parliament to seek its help. A parliamentarian
	persuaded them to send representatives to the local office
	of the Ministry of Manpower to negotiate with the
	company.

["Ribuan Pengunjuk Rasa Mendatangi DPRD," Kompas, October 16,
1992; "5000 Karyawan Unjuk Rasa," Media Indonesia, October 16,
1992.]

	The fear felt by the Yasinta workers is a direct
	consequence of lack of freedom of association; workers are
	all too well aware of the consequences of challenging the
	established order. If the SPSI units are often
	unrepresentative of workers when the boards of these units
	are ostensibly "democratically elected", the worker
	committees chosen to negotiate "company regulations" must
be even less so, as no such claim is made.

Strikes

	Precisely because existing procedures for resolving labor
	disputes do not, for the most part, allow for a real
	expression of worker demands, many workers have resorted
	to strikes and work stoppages to draw attention to their
	grievances, particularly in West Java and the industrial
	area around Jakarta. These are wildcat strikes. While the
	Indonesian government does have a law governing the right
	to strike, it requires that workers attempt to negotiate
	first, by the same procedures which effectively block
	their interests from being heard. A new draft law outlines
	a procedure so cumbersome and detailed that workers would
	have to specify exactly what slogans they would put on
signs they wanted to carry.

	The Indonesian government maintains that the spectacular
	rise in wildcat strikes from 20 in 1989 to over 156 in the
	first 10 months of 1992 (a non-governmental source lists
	294) is due to its own enforcement of minimum wage laws
	and increased awareness by workers of their rights, thus
	implying that frequency of strikes is a sign that the
	labor rights situation is improving. [Indonesian
Statement, p.83.]

	It is hard to see how the strikes could reflect better
	enforcement of minimum wage laws since most of the strikes
	are over failure of companies to pay the minimum wage.
	Increased awareness of rights is probably a factor, but
the main reason is probably desperation.

	In one case, women workers at a Tangerang-based
	electronics factory called PT Automen, owned by South
	Koreans, went on strike in September 1992. They said they
	were forced to work 11 hours sitting down with a one-hour
	break and no overtime. They complained of physical
	side-effects from the work and also of sexual harassment
	on the part of the Korean managers. There was no SPSI unit
	allowed in the factory, because the Korean owner said he
	knew from the Korean experience that if unionization was
	allowed, workers demands would escalate. When the women
	finally went on strike, the Tangerang office of the
	Manpower Ministry said it was not aware of any problem.
	Plants are supposed to be regularly visited by inspectors
	from the Ministry to ensure they meet Ministry
	regulations, but no inspector had visited since the
	factory opened two years before, even though there has
	been a history of problems with South Korean-owned firms.
	After the case was publicized, the local Ministry office
	said it would send an inspector to the plant.["Ribuan
	Karyawati Dipaksa Lembur Bila Terlambat Dihukum,"
	Jayakarta,  September 10, 1992; "Depnaker Akan Teliti
Pemaksaan Lembur", Jayakarta, September 26, 1992. ]

Military Interference in Negotiations and Strikes

	The Indonesian government says, "When strikes occur, the
	workers are usually successful in obtaining their
	demands."[Indonesian Statement, p.2.] It is true that it
	is often only these strikes which force employers to the
	bargaining table, and in many case, the workers come away
	with a promise of increased wages. There have been several
	instances of subsequent strikes because the company in
	question failed to live up to the agreement. More
	worrisome, however, is the fact that the Indonesian
	military often interferes with strikes and oversees the
negotiations.

	The Indonesian government acknowledges military
	involvement but says that the claims of Asia Watch and
	ILRERF as to the extent of that involvement are
	inaccurate. It first notes that the military's presence is
	to "protect public safety and prevent destruction of
	property or civil unrest" and that its involvement is
	justified by Law No.5/1967 on internal security. "One of
	the military's roles with respect to strikes," according
	to the government, "is to determine if there are any
	outside forces at work...One possible inroad for communist
	subversion is through worker unrest. The Government
	especially fears that the communist ideology might be
	attractive to young people who did not live through the
	national distress of the 1960's, and many of those young
	people can best be reached on the job through labor
	disputes."[Indonesian Statement, pp.87-89.]  Asia Watch
	notes that there has been no serious political threat from
	communism since the Indonesian army encouraged a pogrom
	against suspected supporters of the Indonesian Communist
	Party in 1965-67, in which an estimated 500,000 people
were killed and over one million arrested.

	In gathering information to respond to the cases raised by
	Asia Watch and ILRERF, the Ministry of Manpower relied on
	information from companies and documents relating to the
	negotiations. In virtually all cases where Asia Watch
	cited specific arrests or detentions by the military,
	confirmation could only have come from the military. The
	Manpower Ministry, however, was apparently either
	unwilling or unable to interview military sources in
	preparing its response. Indeed, in many of the cases, it
	appears as though neither the company concerned nor the
	Ministry of Manpower had any ability to influence the
nature or extent of military involvement.

Two Accounts of the Same Strike: The Case of PT Gajah Tunggal

	Asia Watch and ILRERF both cited several examples of
	military interference in labor disputes. The Indonesian
	government responded to each of these cases in detail. One
	of these cases was the massive dispute in August 1991 at
	PT Gajah Tunggal, a conglomerate consisting of 14
	factories in Tangerang making everything from tires to
	fanbelts to sports shoes and involving some 14,000
	workers. A comparison of specific points in the Asia Watch
	(AsW) and Government of Indonesia (GOI) versions of the
	Gajah Tunggal strike is instructive. In some cases, the
	Indonesian version provides helpful additional details.
	The most interesting differences, however, are those in
	which both accounts agree on the facts and differ in the
interpretation.

Beginning of Strike

AsW: Workers went on strike after an announcement on July 30, 1991
that the wages of workers employed less than three years would be
adjusted upwards to meet the minimum wage standard, but those
employed for more than three years would not receive raises. The
workers demanded the minimum wage, insurance and paid vacation
leave; they also demanded that the SPSI unit be dissolved, as they
believed it was being used as a tool to control the workers.

GOI: Workers who were already earning above the minimum wage
initiated the strike after new employees who were earning 10
percent below the minimum had their wages adjusted upward. The
long-term employees demanded the same percentage increase. Workers
said they no longer wanted to be represented by the SPSI unit
which represented the entire conglomerate, but asked for a
separate unit to be set up in each of the 14 factories.

Arrival of Military

AsW: On the morning of August 1, after workers on the night shift
in one of the factories had refused to work, truckloads of troops
from the subdistrict military command (KORAMIL) were called in.
The soldiers in combat gear fired plastic bullets into the air and
ordered the workers to choose their representatives then and there
to negotiate with the Gajah Tunggal directors. Workers refused on
the grounds that anyone they chose would be fired. Management
produced a letter that no one would be dismissed, witnessed by the
Ministry of Manpower, SPSI and members of the police.

GOI: By 10:00 a.m., thousands of workers were gathered inside and
outside the fences of the complex. The workers became disruptive
and began to destroy property.

Because of the size and uncontrolled nature of the protest, the
company notified the local office of the Ministry of Manpower, as
required by law, and also notified the local police.

At about 10:15 a.m., members of the Indonesian military (KORAMIL
Battalion 203) arrived at the strike. Contrary to Petitioners'
allegations, these soldiers were not dressed in combat gear but
were equipped with standard riot control gear, including crowd
control sticks and guns loaded with plastic bullets. In order to
stop the destruction of property and control the large crowd, two
or three soldiers fired warning shots into the air.

At this point, the workers began shouting that they wanted to meet
with the management of the company...The head of the local SPSI
asked the workers to choose representatives to negotiate with
management. Fearing that their representatives would be penalized,
the workers demanded that management sign an agreement promising
not to take any action against the representatives. The management
signed the agreement, which was then acknowledged by the
Department of Manpower, SPSI, APINDO (local office of the
employers' association) and an officer from KODIM [district
military command]. [Indonesian Statement, p.92].

Initial Negotiations

AsW: Negotiations began at 3 p.m., with one worker representing
each factory in the complex and with the police, the district
military command and the subdistrict military command in
attendance. The police commander reportedly threatened the workers
that if they continued to strike, they would be charged with
subversion. An agreement was announced at 6 p.m.

GOI: Negotiations began in utter confusion, because instead of 140
worker representatives, about 400 were present.

As Petitioners note, all parties who were present at the strike
also attended the negotiation. This included members of the
police, the district military command and the subdistrict military
command. Contrary to the Petitioners' allegations, however, these
parties were present at the negotiations only to provide
constructive comments and to observe...Petitioners' allegation
that a police commander threatened to charge the workers with
subversion if they continued to strike is completely false...By 9
p.m., the company had agreed to all the workers' demands related
to the company regulations.[Indonesian Statement, p.93]

Arrest of Strike Leader

AsW: The agreement fell short of the original demands and the
strike continued. The worker representatives were called in by the
security forces and government representatives and interrogated
about how they had conveyed the agreement to their colleagues.
They were then sent back to the factories to get the acceptance of
their fellow workers. They returned to work on August 3, but
continued to press their demands in a letter signed by one
Zulkifli Saleh, the man who had become their chief spokesman. On
August 16, Zulkifli was arrested without a warrant by the district
military command (KODIM). Eight other workers were taken to the
KODIM on August 19 and interrogated from 1:30 p.m. until just
after midnight. They saw Zulkifli but were not allowed to speak to
him and were accused of being communists, subversives and
saboteurs.

GOI: About 20 percent of the workers did not start work on August
2, and a second strike began when workers from Plant A, who were
dissatisfied with the agreement began to demonstrate. They then
forced other workers to join in, often using physical force and
threats. By 8 a.m., all the workers had left the factories and
gathered outside. Shortly thereafter, management announced that
the factory was closed and asked the workers to go home. Members
of the  police assisted with the exit of the workers and by 10
a.m. the plant was closed. Management announced that the next day,
the plant would operate as normal and any worker who did not
appear would not be paid. There was no threat of firing.

On August 9, 1991, personnel was informed that Mr. Zulkifli, one
of the worker representatives, had been absent from work for four
days for health reasons. When an employee is seriously ill, the
company usually sends someone to the employee's home to see if the
family needs assistance. When the representative from management
went to Mr. Zulkifli's home, however, he was informed that Mr.
Zulkifli was out attending a meeting.

On August 14, the President Commissioner of the company came to
the complex to meet with one worker representative from each of
the 14 factories. However,...one hundred workers crowded into the
room. Then, Mr. Zulkifli appeared in the crowd and produced a list
of demands. His demands were taken under advisement and work
resumed as usual. After that day, Mr. Zulkifli never returned to
PT Gajah Tunggal...The Government has no information of any arrest
or detention of Mr. Zulkifli.

[Indonesian Statement, pp.94-95.]

Second Strike

AsW: After workers heard about the arrest of Zulkifli, workers at
PT Gajah Tunggal assembled at 1 p.m. and decided to go on strike
immediately, demanding that Zulkifli be freed, that their demands
be met and that the SPSI unit be dissolved. Four truckloads of
combat-ready soldiers from Battalion 203 and other units were
called in and all exits of the complex were sealed off. Soldiers
started beating the strikers who fought back, throwing stones and
destroying one vehicle.

GOI: On August 20, after the lunch break, employees of Plant A
refused to go to work but never informed management of the
reasons. Petitioners' allegation that workers were striking to
demand that Zulkifli be freed is not true.

Management immediately notified the Ministry of Manpower and the
local police...While approximately 60 members of the KORAMIL
Battalion 203 arrived at the complex, they were not called by
management and they did not enter the complex until forced to do
so in response to the violent acts of the protestors.

Petitioners allege that KORAMIL officers beat the strikers. When a
large group of demonstrators gained unauthorized access to the
complex through the portion of the fence that had been destroyed
earlier, management informed military and police of the trespass.
Members of the military began to remove demonstrators, using
retaliatory force in some instances to secure the removal of all
the demonstrators.

Interrogation by Military

AsW: The next day, August 21, more than 5,000 workers marched to
the local parliament building in Tangerang but were prevented from
entering by fully armed troops and riot police. Troops marched
around the Gajah Tunggal complex, firing shots int the air and
beating up some of the workers they accused of insulting the
military and engaging in vandalism. Four workers were detained in
the local police headquarters; by September 4, two of the four had
resigned. Two other worker representatives, Sam'un and Sulawan,
were summoned to the KODIM at 3 p.m. on September 4, where they
were beaten up. They returned to the factory the next day. On
September 7, another worker, Sunardi, was arrested at the factory
and taken to the BAKORSTANAS or internal security agency's
headquarters in Jakarta where he was interrogated about who had
instigated the strike. He was released around midnight and
resigned the next day. Five others were called in by the military
and released; they, too, resigned immediately after their release,
suggesting they were pressured to do so during interrogation.

GOI: Disturbances began again on August 21. In attempt to control
the crowd before violence broke out, police fired into the air.
Thousands of workers marched to the local parliament building
where they were met by the head of the Parliament on the steps and
discussed their demands. Some 85 percent of the workers returned
to work on August 22. The company assured workers of their safety
and almost all returned the following day. Two or three employees
from Plant A decided on their own not to return to work. Over the
next several days, two officers from the local Tangerang police
department (POLSEK) came to the personnel office of PT Gajah
Tunggal requesting permission to question employees suspected of
being directly involved in the destruction of facilities during
the most recent demonstration. These workers were brought to
POLSEK and returned the same day. The police always reported back
to the personnel office after the employees had been returned to
work. No workers were arrested or fired as a result of this
questioning. By the beginning of September 1991, all of the
workers' demands had been successfully negotiated.

Other Cases of Military Involvement

	Asia Watch had also raised a case in Bekasi where the
	chief of police was called in to witness the negotiations
	between workers and management of PT Daimi Azis, a
	ready-to-wear garment factory. Some 900 workers had walked
	off the job in November 1991, demanding they be paid the
minimum wage. According to the Indonesian Government,

Petitioners allege that the police took part in negotiations
between management and workers as a coercive tool to "intimidate
the workers to accept what management offers." This
characterization is inaccurate. While police attended the
negotiations, they served only as witnesses to the negotiations.
In addition, the results of the negotiations themselves
demonstrate that company management granted the workers' demands.
Police intimidation would be both an unnecessary and inappropriate
element in the cooperative tenor of negotiations.[Indonesian
Statement, p.100.]

	It should be noted that the workers were only demanding
	what was rightfully theirs. The government response fails
	to recognize that the very presence of security forces can
	be a veiled threat to the workers and a reminder that
failure to come to terms can have serious consequences.

	Asia Watch had also cited the case of the Medan Canning
	Company where workers, most of them women, went on strike
	in February 1992, demanding higher wages. The strike was
	successful, but on February 16, after the strike was
	settled, five women involved in the strike were detained
	overnight by the district military command, KODIM 0201 as
	a means of punishing them for striking. On February 29,
	four men, including two workers and two labor organizers
	from a local non-governmental organization were arrested
	and held for questioning until March 7, when they were
	released. In response, the Indonesian government merely
	states, "The company did not request this action, and it
	does not have any knowledge of any military
	activity."[Indonesian Statement, p.102.] It is quite
	possible that the company did not request the action, but
	this does not lessen the fundamental violation involved:
	an effort by the military, using a variety of techniques
	including arbitrary detention, to pressure workers into
	refraining from any public expression of grievances or
associating for the purposes of collective bargaining.

	Another case indicates that when security forces detain
	and interrogate workers, they do so not to determine
	criminal liability for actions such as vandalism but to
	ascertain political motivation. On June 8, 1991, after the
	strike at the Evershinetex textile plant in Bogor in May,
	three workers were called in by the regional military
	command, KOREM 061, and interrogated in what they termed a
	threatening manner about their involvement in the strike,
along the following lines:

-- why do you like the New Order [the Suharto government]?

-- why don't you like the Old Order [the Sukarno government]?

-- write out the five principles of Pancasila [the state
ideology].

-- do you believe in Pancasila?

-- which political organizations do you support?

-- which political organizations have been authorized by the
government?

-- what ideology do you favor?

-- what was your purpose in holding a clandestine meeting?

-- who usually calls the clandestine meetings?

...A few minutes later, the head of intelligence for KOREM 061
threw out the following questions:

-- did you hold a clandestine meeting?

-- who told you that such a meeting was being held?

-- who invited you to the meeting?

-- who led the discussion at the meeting?

-- who was present?

-- what were you assigned to do during the strike?

-- who did you know at the clandestine meeting?

-- how many people attended?

-- is it true a factory employee was almost lynched?

-- why did you try to protect that employee and the head of SPSI?

-- who instigated you to go on strike?

After answering these questions, each worker was asked to sign a
sheet of paper, saying:

-- I am ready to resign from Evershinetex.

-- I organized the clandestine meeting and instigated other
workers to strike.

-- I broke the windows of the factory.

-- I wrote anti-Chinese graffiti.  ["Kronologi Kasus Pemanggilan
dan Pemecatan Buruh PT Evershinetex oleh KOREM 061, Bogor," p.3.]


	The three workers, Marsidin, 23; Dedi, 22; and Sarmin, 24,
	were formally dismissed on June 10, 1991. On June 18, a
	group of Evershinetex employees went to the local office
	of the Ministry of Manpower to protest the actions of
	KOREM.  Three days later, three of those employees, Mikun,
	30, who had worked for the factory for 10 years; Ujang,
	30, a five-year employee; and Kasturi, 27, a 12-year
	employee, were summoned to KOREM headquarters on June 22
and forced to sign a letter of resignation.

	On June 26, three more men, Wardoyo, Latif, and Syamsudin
	were summoned, and they went to the KOREM the next day. In
	its original petition to the US Trade Representative, Asia
	Watch quoted sources saying the three were beaten until
	they agreed to resign and sign statements admitting guilt
	in the strikes. The Indonesian government denied the three
	were beaten. In new material obtained by Asia Watch, the
	workers suggest they signed the statement out of fear
	rather than because of physical abuse. Wardoyo was
	interrogated for three hours about what materials had been
	submitted to the Ministry of Manpower; who had led the
	delegation to the Manpower office; why he had become a
	spokesman for the group; and why he had contacted an
	intelligence agent in a rival military unit, KOSTRAD. He
	was then locked in a room. Five hours later, he was taken
	out and asked to sign a statement that he confessed to
	breaking windows, engaging in anti-Chinese activity; and
	holding a clandestine meeting. He was also asked to state
that he had resigned from the factory. [Ibid, p.4.]

	The Indonesian government version is that Wardoyo, Latif
	and Syamsudin tried to return to work but the company
	refused on the grounds that they had been involved in
	vandalism. They were dismissed, according to the
	government, with approval of the Ministry of Manpower. The
	government version made no mention of the role of the
military.

Defense of Workers and Press Coverage of Strikes

	Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are actively
	discouraged from defending workers arrested in labor
	disputes. In late 1992, an NGO called the Jakarta Social
	Institute, which has assisted workers in Tangerang,
	encountered difficulties in getting authorization for its
	staff to defend garment industry workers. The Institute
	was told that there was an agreement involving SPSI
	Tangerang, the local office of the Ministry of Manpower,
	district military and civilian leaders at the district
	level (MUSPIDA) and the Tangerang branch of the national
	employers' association, APINDO that NGOs should be kept
	away from detained workers because they hindered the
	settlement process. [Communication from the Legal Aid
Institute, Jakarta, November 29, 1992.]

	Newspaper and magazine editors were also reportedly urged
	in late 1992 not to "blow up" stories about labor
	disputes, although Indonesian press coverage has generally
been fairly good.

V. FORCED LABOR


East Timorese Workers

	One of the most detailed exchanges between Asia Watch and
	the Indonesian government involved Asia Watch's
	allegations that the Indonesian government in late 1990
	and 1991 had lured hundreds young East Timorese workers to
	Java with promises they would receive vocational training
	and high-paying jobs when in fact they were given menial
	jobs at substandard wages. Many were kept under the
	watchful eye of the Indonesian military and suspected of
	being supporters of the East Timorese resistance when they
	protested about their treatment. The Asia Watch charges,
	published in a May 1992 report entitled "Deception and
	Harassment of East Timorese Workers" were based on
	interviews and several statements signed by the East
	Timorese concerned. The Indonesian government went to
	great lengths to refute the charges, including getting one
	of the signers of the statement published in the Asia
	Watch report, Dominggus Soares, to claim that his name had
	been used without his knowledge. Asia Watch has since
	learned that some of the East Timorese were summoned
	without being told why to the provincial office of the
	Ministry of Manpower in October 1992. They were then asked
	about the accusations that East Timorese were unhappy with
	their work, in the presence of the deputy head of the
	provincial Manpower office, representatives from the
	factories employing the East Timorese, and an attorney
	from White and Case. Under the circumstances, it is
	possible the East Timorese felt they had no choice but to
claim job satisfaction.

The Original Charges

	In its report, Asia Watch noted that in December 1990, a
	daughter of President Suharto, Siti Hardijanti Hastuti,
	better known as Tutut, went to Dili, East Timor, with an
	offer of jobs and vocational training for young East
	Timorese workers. The program was to be run jointly by
	Mrs. Tutut's philanthropy, the Tiara Foundation, and the
	Ministry of Manpower. Hundreds of East Timorese ranging in
	age from 15 to 25 were recruited to take part in what they
	were told would be a three-month skill-training program,
	leading to high-paying jobs on Pulau Batam, an industrial
	development site off the coast of Sumatra. They found
	themselves sent not to Pulau Batam but to enterprises in
	Java and Bali where they worked as unskilled labor, doing
	everything from hauling crates in Semarang, Central Java,
	to cleaning chicken cages at a poultry farm in Bogor, West
	Java. One group of 100 workers who arrived in Surabaya,
	East Java on June 6, 1991 and were then transferred to
	Jakarta, ended up being sent to what was in effect a boot
	camp run by KOPASSUS, the Indonesian special forces. They
	were under constant surveillance, and in at least one
	case, workers were detained and beaten for protesting
	about their working conditions. Many of those who wished
	to return home found themselves stranded. While there was
	no question that the young people had left East Timor
	voluntarily, Asia Watch argued that because they were
	deceived as to the true nature of the jobs and training
	they would be getting and because they did not have the
	money to return, the whole project became tantamount to
forced labor.

The Indonesian Response

	The Indonesian government strongly denied the charges.
	East Timor, it said, with its population growing far
	faster than its economy, has a major unemployment and
	underemployment problem. The local government together
	with the Ministry of Manpower thus developed the East
	Timor Worker Program to improve skills, increase income by
	allowing workers to work in the industrial rather than
	agricultural sector, and reduce the burden on the local
	government to provide employment opportunities. With
respect to the specific charges,

Neither the Government nor the Foundation made any promises with
respect to wages and work location when it agreed to place the
workers... Due to the workers' low skills, the Government found
that it was inappropriate to place the East Timorese on Batam
Island because of the relatively high technology employed there


In 1991, East Timorese workers were placed at the following
locations through the Government's Worker Program:

Location of Assignment                  Number of Workers

Bali                                             60

East Java                                       160

Central Java

	Semarang and vicinity    67

	Solo                                     40

	D.I. Yogyakarta          40


West Java

	Bandung                          23

	Tangerang                                64

	Bekasi                           35

Indocement                               34

DKI Jakarta                             200

South Kalimantan                         39

East Kalimantan                  59

TOTAL:                                          821


[Indonesian Statement, pp.109-110. On pp.112-115, the government
lists some of the companies employing East Timorese, including PT
Gemala Container, North Jakarta; PT Hasi (shoe factory),
Tangerang; PT Kanindotex  (textile), Semarang; PT Suaco (cable
factory), West Jakarta; PT Indah Jaya Textiles, South Jakarta; PT
Indocement (cement plant), Bogor; PT Tunggal Yudi Sawmill Plywood
(logging), in Samarinda, Kalimantan; PT Pamindo Tiga (automobile
part); PT Superior Coach (automobile assembly); PT Bakri Brothers
(steel pipes); PT Gunung Garuda (steel); PT Delta Santa Wood; PT
Kedaung Group; PT Wono Kayo Rojo Koyo (poultry) in Malang, East
Java; PT Kali Jaya Putra (rattan), Surabaya.]

	In 1992, the government notes, 31 more workers were sent
	to Solo and 30 to South Kalimantan, raising the total
	placed to 882. The Tiara Foundation, for its part, placed
	208 East Timorese, with 71 in the textile factory, PT
	Kanindotex in Semarang; 78 in PT Barito Pacific in the
	Moluccas; 24 in PT Kedawung, Jakarta and 17 in the poultry
	farm, Cipendawa in Bogor, West Java. (A communication Asia
	Watch received from eight East Timorese at Kanindotex,
	dated December 7, 1992, notes that in fact, only 38 of the
original group remain.)

The Foundation worked together with the Ministry of Manpower in
the recruitment and selection process, and applicants were chosen
from a list of job hunters compiled by the regional office of the
Ministry of Manpower in East Timor. [Indonesian Statement,
p.111.]

	Asia Watch had called the jobs "menial." The government
called that characterization misleading.

Because workers received the majority of their training on the
job, they all started with simple assignments usually taking
positions in the production unit.[Indonesian Statement, p.111.]


	The government also termed "completely false", the charge
	that the workers were receiving substandard wages, saying
	the wages exceeded the minimum wage applicable in the area
	where they were working. The workers at Kanindotex
	acknowledged in December 1992 that they were now receiving
	above the minimum wage for Semarang. In August 1991, when
	they first made public their complaints, however, their
	wages met the minimum only with the addition of a
	temporary subsidy from the Tiara Foundation and even then,
	room and board, which the workers had thought was promised
	by the company, was deducted. The remainder was inadequate
	to meet basic needs.  Moreover, the workers complained in
	December 1992 that those among them who had been outspoken
	in expressing grievances were receiving Rp.1000 (50 cents)
	a day less than their silent colleagues, a major
	discrepancy when wages are only $1.20 to $1.70 to start
with.

	For its statement to the GSP Subcommittee, the government
	also had 29 workers in the logging company, PT Tunggal
	Yudi Sawmill Plywood, fill out a questionnaire saying how
	much they enjoyed working there. The workers had to give
	their name and employee number and were asked four
	questions: Do you like working for PT Tunggal Yudi Sawmill
	Plywood? How is your relationship with your fellow workers
	or your supervisor? Is it difficult for you to communicate
	with your co-workers or your supervisor? What do you do
	with your wages? No worker far from home at the lowest
	level in the factory is going to say on a form requested
	by the government that he or she is unhappy and has poor
	relations with supervisors -- even if there were not the
	history of human rights abuses by the government against
East Timorese.

	But there is also a history of East Timorese workers being
	forced to make statements about job satisfaction. At the
	PT Kanindotex factory in Semarang, 65 workers signed a
	letter to the then governor of East Timor, Mario
	Carrascalao, that an employee of the Tiara Foundation had
	pressed them into signing a statement the previous May
	that work was going well and there were no major problems.
	"Because the statement was basically forced on us and
	accompanied by threats, that if we refused to sign, none
	of our complaints would be addressed, some of us felt
	forced to sign." [The full letter is published in Asia
	Watch, Deception and Harassment of East Timorese Workers,
4:16, May 19, 1992, p.6-7.]

	The Indonesian government also obtained a statement by
	Dominggus Soares, one of the workers whose signature
	appears on the 1991 letter to Governor Carrascalao,
	disavowing any knowledge of the letter and saying that he
	was happy working for Kanindotex. According to the
	government, "This casts doubt on the veracity and accuracy
of the alleged letter."

	Asia Watch managed to check back with eight of the workers
	at Kanindotex who not only reiterated their original
	charge but said that on August 30, a week after the letter
	was written, "we were forced to denounce our own
	aspirations" in the National Parliament Building in
Jakarta.

	In response to Asia Watch's assertion that one group of
	100 East Timorese were given military training and were
	under surveillance by KOPASSUS, the army special forces,
	the Indonesian government said the charge was based on
	inaccurate information. The workers, according to the
government, were given physical and vocational training.

	The physical training consists of marching, saluting,
	obeying commands, standing at attention, and running
	obstacles courses. The Indonesian military assists with
	this training, which is received not only by workers from
	East Timor but also by workers from all over the country.
	It is thought that this combination of training eases the
	transition from an agricultural environment to a
	industrial one and prepares the trainees for work in an
	industrial environment. Thus, the training that is
	provided to East Timorese youths, although it may contain
	some military elements, is not "military training."
[Indonesian Statement, p.118.]

	As supporting evidence for this remarkable statement, the
	government attached a letter from one Lieutenant Colonel
	Sutrisno, a navy officer in charge of the West Java
	training program. Colonel Sutrisno notes that the military
assistance used in the training centers

comes from the various branches of the Indonesian Armed Forces
including the Marine Corps and Kopassus, a special combat-trained
force which is exceptionally suited to train young job-seekers
from a variety of backgrounds. [Sutrisno letter, Exhibit 98 in
Indonesian Statement.]

	It is KOPASSUS, Asia Watch notes, which has been
	responsible over the years for some of the worst human
	rights abuses in East Timor, including torture,
disappearances and summary executions.

	According to some of the East Timorese in Colonel
	Sutrisno's training center, two youths, Luis Maria Lopes
	and Nuno V. Pereira, discussed their frustrations in a
	meeting with Sutrisno on August 3, 1991 and Sutrisno said
	he would study the problem and meet them again on August
	9. On August 8, however, the two were picked up from their
	Jakarta workplace and taken back to the Training Center
	where they were interrogated by two KOPASSUS officers. The
	following day, 13 other East Timorese then undergoing
	training at the Center were lined up in the area used for
	flag-raising ceremonies and beaten and kicked by three
	soldiers, include one KOPASSUS sergeant and one Marine
	officer. The youths were then interrogated by Colonel
	Sutrisno himself, accused of being political activists and
	threatened with electric shocks if they did not answer
properly.

	The Indonesian government's version is that of the 100
	East Timorese who entered Sutrisno's training program,
	only nine were unhappy with their jobs which consisted of
	loading, unloading and storing rattan. Two of these
	workers were Luis Maria Lopes and Nuno V. Pereira. Colonel
	Sutrisno met with them on August 3 to discuss their
	grievances and told them he would try to find them new
	jobs, "although it would be difficult because they had not
	finished elementary school." He asked them to be patient.
	The next day, Luis and Nuno returned with the other seven
	and met with Sutrisno and the Training Center placement
	officer. The latter asked the East Timorese whether they
	wished to return to East Timor, and they said no. As a
	result, four returned to their jobs, three returned to
	East Timor at government expense "because they caused
	disruption in the workplace," and Nuno and Luis dropped
	out of the program. "Asia Watch's allegations that the
	East Timorese youths...were beaten, kicked and threatened
	with electric shock are completely untrue." [Indonesian
Statement, p.119.]

Irian Jaya

	Asia Watch did not include material on Irian Jaya in its
	June 1992 petition to the Trade Representative. ILRERF
	alleged that some of the indigenous Asmat people were
	forced into labor by Jakarta-based logging companies, a
	charge the government dismissed as founded. Part of the
	difficulty of verifying reports of forced labor in Irian
	Jaya is the lack of access. It is far more difficult to
	get a travel permit into the Asmat area than it is to go
to East Timor.

	Asia Watch has received two reports about Irian Jaya since
	June which need to be investigated. One concerns the PT
	Phoenix company. In July 1992 in Uus, near Agats, a group
	of Asmat workers went to collect wages for several months
	logging and were told that their credit was overextended,
	so they received nothing. Sources said many of the workers
	had effectively become bonded labor, following a
	well-established pattern in Irian Jaya. Companies like PT
	Phoenix reportedly offer a kind of "credit card" to their
	employees to use at company stores, so the workers can
	purchase goods against income from their wages. The goods
	are at the store are usually not available elsewhere and
	the workers have no way of checking, and are often too
	unfamiliar with the process to ask, how their individual
	accounts are kept. They wind up in permanent debt to the
	company store and thus become bonded labor for the
company.

	Another tactic reportedly used by logging companies in the
	Asmat area is to have government inspectors declare logs
	brought in by workers to be below standard because they
	are less than 50 centimeters in diameter. The rejected
	logs are then shipped out anyway as local officials look
	the other way, but the logging companies do not pay the
	workers who felled them. According to one Asia Watch
	source, in February 1992, workers in the villages of Sa,
	Er, Erma and Sona were instructed by the district officer
	working with a company called Artika Optima, a subsidiary
	of the Djajanti Group, to bring in logs no less than 35
	centimeters in diameter. When the government inspector
	rejected the logs as too small, according to this source,
	two months' work of the indigenous clans involved went
uncompensated.

VI. CONCLUSIONS


	Asia Watch maintains that Indonesia is not "taking steps
	to afford internationally-recognized worker rights" as the
	U.S. Trade Act requires. The documentation provided by the
	Indonesian government in rebutting the petitions of Asia
	Watch and ILRERF is voluminous, but selective. While the
	government goes to great lengths to get detailed
	descriptions from different companies about strikes held
	on their premises, it simply denies or professes ignorance
	of beatings, arrests or detentions. The government has
	provided no convincing evidence to suggest that SPSI is an
	independent union or that the Indonesian government is
	willing to allow full freedom of association; on the
	contrary, there is ample evidence to suggest that the
	government has no intention of relaxing its control over
the labor movement.

	The material cited in this paper also indicates that the
	primary agency for exercising control is not SPSI nor the
	Ministry of Manpower but the Indonesian armed forces. As
	in China in 1989 where the demands for autonomous student
	organizations and labor unions, free from Party control,
	became impossible for Chinese authorities to grant without
	calling into question the entire power structure, it is
	virtually impossible for the Indonesian government to
	recognize autonomous labor unions without generating
	demands for autonomy elsewhere. At stake is the role of
	the military in society, the "dual function" which grants
	the armed forces a major role in political life. Real
	progress toward the protection of labor rights will not
	and cannot be made by changes in Ministry of Manpower
	regulations. Full freedom of association will have to
await more far-reaching political change.

				      * * * *

For More Information

Sidney Jones (212) 972-8400

Mike Jendrzejczyk (202) 371-6592

Asia Watch is an independent organization created in 1985 to
monitor and promote internationally recognized human rights in
Asia.  The Chair is Jack Greenberg, the Vice Chairs are Harriet
Rabb and Orville Schell, and the Executive Director is Sidney
Jones.

Asia Watch is a division Human Rights Watch, which also includes
Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and Middle East
Watch.  The Chair of Human Rights Watch is Robert L. Bernstein and
the Vice Chair is Adrian DeWind.  Aryeh Neier is Executive
Director; Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director; Holly Burkhalter,
Washington Director; Susan Osnos, Press Director.