From: c251005@cs.UAlberta.CA (c251 TA)
Subject: Re: DETERMINISM 2: Another `refutation.'
Organization: University of Alberta
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 20:14:29 GMT

In article <1d9t7nINN24k@agate.berkeley.edu> lizi@soda.berkeley.edu (Cosma Shalizi) writes:
>>DETERMINISM 2: `Refutation' number two.
>	A hopeful title...
>
>>    Atomic-type  things,  for  example  Neutrons,  have things called `half
>>  lives' which are periods of time  over which half of any given  collecion
>>  of the type of thing in  question will `decay', or change into  something
>>  else.
>	Okay so far.
>>    The QM description of things involves treating every Neutron  (sticking
>>  with our current example) as identical.  Indeed it involves treating them
>>  as `the same' to the extent, in effect, of regarding there as being  only
>>  _one_ (busy as a one legged man at an ass kickin' contest) Neutron in ex-

I disagree, indiscernability does not imply identity, review the "bundle"
view of existence whereby an object only exists in terms of its outward
characteristics, ie: a red ball is a red ball because it looks red, is kinda
small, round, has a certain elasticity, etc.  Since we can still identify
two neutrons by their canonical coordinates, there is no convincing evidence
(to me at least) that these are the same particles.

>>  istence.    To  repeat:  we  have  no  theoretical  reason  to regard two
>>  `different' Neutrons as different.  _BUT_ of any two, over the  half-life
>>  period, only _ONE_ will decay.
>	Well, not exactly. The half-life is the period during which it is
>damn likely that half will decay, but it appears to be statistical - there's
>nothing in the math which prevents no member of any arbitrarily large group
>of neutrons from decaying over any time period.

Or both for that matter

>>    From situations between which we have no reason to distinguish, we  get
>>  clearly _different_ outcomes.   Hence the  falsity of determinism,  which
>>  holds that the way the past was/present is necessitates a unique (and al-
>>  ready specifed/specifiable) future.
> 	Indeed, _if QM is correct_. A hidden-variables theorist would
>tell you that there was, in fact, some difference between the two neutrons,
>hidden away in the clockwork that made them tick. At this point I begin
>to approach my level of incompetence: I'm not sure if the hidden
>variable theories propose any way to examine the inner mechanisms. Whether

In fact they did and in a very famous experiment posed by John Bell it was
proved decisively that Einstein's hidden variable hypothesis is incorrect.
Ie:  There is no possible way for us to predict the outcome of any (quantum)
experiment with certainty, determinism as such is dead.  However, there may
be some interpretations of QM which allow a 'kind' of determinism that of
course WE can't measure, but as Popper would say, if you can't test a theory,
it's just mysticism (sorry Popper).

>or not they do, if such theories are correct, then the quantum argument
>against determinism fails. (Personally, I think that on the quantum
>level the world is not deterministic, but a) I haven't studied this too
>deeply and b) I'm just an undergrad. Caveat lector.)
>
>>  Any thoughts?