From: mschiffer@engin.umich.edu (Michael S. Schiffer, LHN)
Subject: Re: warfare
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 92 11:48:41 EDT
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations

In article <1992Oct3.205615.12966@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:

>Of course you are right -- outsiders will always try to attack you in
>an effort to steal what you have if it looks like they have a chance
>of succeeding. The question is, can we come up with ways to provide a
>defense that is effective against such threats even within a
>voluntarist structure. The answer is, by my reckoning, that cross
>agreements between security companies provide a large fraction of the
>answer. Remember that, from a contract point of view, you don't care
>if its a small street gang or an organized military operation
>attacking your home -- you signed a contract with a company to provide
>you with security, and you expect them to fulfill their oblgations.
>The difference is just one of scale. Through creative mutual
>reinsurance agreements, it should be possible for security agencies to
>create a structure that is capable of responding effectively to mass
>threats that would overwhelm a single agency. My expectation is that
>because of the constraints of the market that security agencies would
>come up with techniques that would make them, if anything, more
>effective per dollar spent than government based defense systems.

	But what's to prevent the security agencies themselves from
becoming a threat?  After all, provision of defense in exchange for
wealth isn't a definition only of anarchy-- it also characterizes
feudalism.  Why shouldn't a security agency exercise power over its
clients, or raid those who aren't?  Because other agencies are
protecting them?  One might as well claim that no knight would oppress
a serf because he could just switch allegiances-- he could, but only
if the other knight thinks it worth the risks of fighting the first
one.  Similarly, raids would look profitable whenever the victim's
agency was weak (say because of a recent conflict) or if said agency
could be bribed to look the other way or join in.  The name of "state"
might be abolished, but there would still be people able to use force
to get what they want, and to acquire still more power (conscripting
soldiers, forcing less powerful agencies into alliance, looting
enemies, etc.)-- again, parallelling the development of medieval
kingdoms and empires.

>By the way, Vernor Vinge's short story "The Ungoverned" in his
>collection "True Names and Other Dangers" deals directly with this
>whole question of mass defense by voluntarist organizations in the
>face of an espansionist statist threat.

	And, I point out, wins the victory with a rabbit from a hat.
I won't spoil the story by revealing the exact method, but it's hardly
something which could be depended on in an anarchy-- or (as the story
notes) tolerated by neighbors in any case.  How many people would lose
property or life without their consent, and without _any_ ability to
influence the decision (even one as diffuse as plebiscite) if that
form of defense were used?

Mike
--
Michael S. Schiffer
mss2@midway.uchicago.edu
mschiffer@aal.itd.umich.edu
mss2@amber.uchicago.edu