From: fester@island.COM (Mike Fester)
Subject: Re: The Northern Islands
Organization: /usr/local/rn/organization
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 15:22:46 GMT

In article <1992Oct6.102842.1073@Csli.Stanford.EDU> hiraga@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Yuzuru Hiraga) writes:

>>No problem: here it is for the 4th or 5th time. I really admire the way 
>>Yeltsin has handled the situation. Each time he has been denied aid by the
>>Japanese, he has been able to make money on the islands, and this has cost
>>Japan even MORE money to keep other parties from using those islands.
>>
>>Clearer now?
>
>This was clear enough from the beginning.  And that is exactly what I oppose.
>The negative factor of such manipulation is considerable, and in the
>long run, will not pay off by the (marginal) gain obtained.

"Mariginal gain"? He needs cash, not empty promises of consideration.

>It surely would evoke hostile feelings and disbelief on the Japanese side,
>which would impede development of Russo-Japanese relationships and
>negotiations (that is, provided that Yeltsin is willing to arrive at
>any fruitful agreement with Japan).  If Yeltsin is playing a bluff game
>to make Japan concede, he is playing it at a high risk.  The direct
>consequence is that it has delayed advance of ordinary negotiations.
>The tactics has (so far) not shown much effect.  And the game certainly
>can't go on for ever.  Dealing with an obscure paper company shows that
>Yeltsin is running out of cards.  If the recession proceeds any further,
>Japan might not retain sufficient reserve to be given as aid.

And it might be born in mind that Japan has NEVER promised anything, even IF
they get the islands back. And so far as "good will" is concerned, it is 
JAPAN who needs that more than Russia. Japan is finding herself being prodded
out of European markets, mistrusted in Asia, and losing some credibility
here in the US. Germany, Britain, France, and the US have all made veiled and
blunt statements about Japan not doing her part to promote reform in Russia.
In that sense, Japan risks more than Russia.

>The time Yeltsin is losing might be the most precious resource he is wasting.
>The worst part of it is that it's only giving away his desperateness.

He IS desparate! He has told anyone who would listen (and apparantly several
who aren't) that the situation in Russia is DESPARATE. As in IMMEDIATE. As in
future good will won't give them what they need NOW>

>Apart from all that, I myself can't find anything to be admired in it --
>clever, maybe, effective, perhaps, but nothing respectable as an act
>of a decent leader.  It is no different from what one would expect
>from a speculator.

Right, clever and effective. Now, what has the Japanese side done to match that.

>>Actually, the specific comment to which you responded was my "Japan seems to 
>>be able to make trouble with her neighbors all by herself". I have NOT inflated
>>the issue.
>
>This in turn, as I recall, was in response to my saying along the above lines,
>something like "Russia is raising tension with Japan as well as her
>relationship with her neighbors."
>In that sense, it was about the Russian behavior, and whether it is true
>or not, favorable or not has nothing to do with whether Japan is having
>or making troubles of her own.

No, you responded to my observation that Korea bought fishing rights in that
area, and Japan payed off the Koreans to forgo those rights. You wondered what
I found admirable about "Russia driving a wedge between Japan and her 
neighbors". My resonse is as above.

>>I state directly that I do not believe that this will drive any
>>sort of wedge between Japan and her neighbors. I state directly that Japan
>>can do this all by herself, islands notwithstanding.
>
>Sorry, I've difficulty in comprehending these two sentences.  All I could
>imagine is that the "this" in the first sentence designates Yeltsin's
>behavior, and "her neighbors" specifically indicates South Korea.
>Is that correct?  If so, that is quite different from what I recall
>from your original post.  As for the second sentence, "this" seems to
>designate "drive a wedge", but then again, what has it got to do with
>Russia making trouble with Japan?

You may go back and read the original if the above explanation still does not
jibe with what you remember.

>Legitimacy, of course.

Then what IS a legitimate claim? That they were once Japan's? They are not
Japan's now, they are Russia's. Is Japan's claim no longer legitimate?

>>And Russia has a REAL claim to it; they are there on the islands.
>
>No doubt about that.
>
>>They don't need a moral claim.
>
>That is not the same as saying that they have a moral claim.
>If one claims that Japan has no moral claim on the islands, the first
>thing to do is to check whether Russia has any.  If they do, that's it,
>decisive victory on that.  If they don't, then it's even, and no point
>gained on either side.  [And note here that I am not talking of whether Japan
>has any moral claim or not.]
>Only after that can we go on comparing the contribution of various
>factors, like reality of posession or legitimacy.  Which, of course,
>usually leads to a whole bunch of controversy.

Agreed, sort of. But in fact, Russia has a real claim, being there now.

>>What claim do
>>the Japanese have to it? That it once belonged to them and doesn't now?
>
>Said above.
>Of course "doesn't [belong] now" has nothing to do with it, nor does
>"once belonged to them" by itself.
>The point here is the existence of a spontaneous mutual agreement,
>as well as international approval.  Of course, "spontaneous" here
>is the keyword -- treaties made under strongly unequal conditions are
>not to be considered along the same line, though in that case, anything in
>favor of the weaker country should be acknowledged as providing a bottom
>line.  The 1855/1875 treaties fulfill this, while Japanese annexation
>of Korea in 1910 does not.
>Skipping the WWII issue for the moment, the 1956 treaty acknowledged
>that at least 2 islands (Habomais and Shikotan) belong to Japan,
>while not stating Soviet sovereignity of Etorofu and Kunashiri.
>This indicates that there was a considerable understanding on the
>USSR part that Japan has a right on its claim, which strongly enhances
>the Japanese position.

There was also a tacit understanding that Japan was going to be less of a 
contributor to the military balance of the region; which is why the USSR 
pulled their proferred treaty (never ratified) after the US-Japan defense
agreement.

>Needless to say, Yeltsin has declared that Russia will respect all
>the treaties and relations held by the former USSR and keep continuity
>in diplomatic relationships.

As the treaty was never ratified, this doesn't mean much.

>Yeltsin himself has once stated that the territorial issues
>were a mistake committed by Stalin, which indicates that
>at least personally, he thinks Japan has a righteous claim.
>And as said above, Yeltsin's way of irresponsible manipulating
>works rather negatively, giving away that he is not seriously considering
>of holding the islands.
>These points make the Japanese claim far more stronger than some
>theoretical or illusory legitimacy claim.

He IS considering holding the islands. In fact, he IS holding them.

>>Now, if Japan were to take a public stance like "We think Poland
>>should give back land to Germany, Russia should give back land to Finland and
>>Poland, Israel should give back land to Jordan, Syria, etc" I might believe
>>the Japanese position was due to some deep moral conviction that "war should
>>not be used as a means of gaining land".
>
>It's rather surprising that this was brought up.
>I have tried to avoid referring to the cases of other nations because
>the situation of individual cases have intricacies that makes direct
>comparison difficult and faulty (gathering them under the common label of
>"war-lost territories" certainly won't do), so they would make only
>a restricted and weak case either for or against the particular issue at hand
>(especially if we respect the individuality of an independent country),
>so consequently, taking a favorable stance to other individual cases
>has little relevance (in either way) to a particular claim.

Why is it that 'other nations' claims have intricacies, etc? Japan's very 
public pronouncements on the subject generally include statements like "war
should not be used as a means of changing boundaries". In fact, Japan has used
wars to acquire territory, and to attempt to acquire even more. That being the
case, Japan can only be read to mean "war should not be used as a means of
changing boundaries to OUR disadvantage".

>The Japanese declaration that war should not be used as a means of
>gaining land [I don't remember the exact words] should be understood as
>a commitment on the Japanese side to not cause or enter a war,
>based on a deep reproach and remorse on what she had commited in the past
>(which, by the way, you do not seem to believe in.  Another note:
>this is taught in all Japanese schools).

You'll have to pardon my skepiticism here; your comments about Japan's deep 
remorse do not seem to jibe with the rest of Asia's perception of Japan, with
Japanese pronouncements on the comfort women, with the controversy over the
text books, etc. Your statement about Japan's commitment not to cause or 
enter a war seems to ignore the new law allowing Japanese troops to go overseas
and to carry firearms. Japan's deep commitment seems to be to perceived
expediency; not in and of itself a bad thing, but certainly not as pure an
intention as indicated above.

>This does mean that Japan prefers all conflicts to be settled peacefully,
>but should a war break out, how its outcome is to judged would vary
>case by case, eg. whether one side solely took an unjustifiable offensive.
>
>As for your examples, Poland to Germany (east of Oder-Neisse, Danzig/Gdansk,
>etc.) is inappropriate because the situation is far more complex --
>that it is difficult to establish legitimacy in the above sense,

Poland didn't even EXIST for far longer than Japan annexed Hokkaido. The ter-
ritorial agreements are the result of a) Germany appearing to be penitant about
its past and b) recognition of the way the world is now, rather than the
way they want it to be.

>And since this has been brought up, observe that resolution of territorial
>issues by negotiation is not unprecedented.  This is true with Sinai between
>Egypt and Israel (which lead to a steady, if not friendly relationship
>between them).  It is also true with Okinawa and Ogasawara between Japan
>and the United States.  Do these serve as models?  Perhaps not.
>I think that direct comparison with individual cases is in general void,
>unless we are quite sure what we are comparing, or using it as only
>a counterargument against such impoverished argument.

>>As it is, they seem to merely 
>>believe that JAPAN should not lose any territory.
>
>No, not "'any' territory".
>And of course, they don't merely believe only that.

Actually, it certainly appears that they mean precisely that.

>>>Again, you are slipping away.
>>>Can this in any sense be regarded as a response to my lines?
>>>If you don't agree, DENY AND REFUTE IT.
>>>If you concede or don't feel like replying, JUST KEEP IT OUT.
>>>But please don't try covering up or twisting things.  PLEASE!
>>
>>Listen, I stated that investment anywhere is risky. You say it's over-
>>generalization.
>
>Preceding that, your initial statement was that Japanese corporations
>are frustrated by Miyazawa's attitude.  To that, I responded that
>investment in Russia is considered risky, implying that a good part of
>Japanese business is not that eager in investing in Russia (there has
>been some projects that failed to substantiate in the past, eg.
>Chumeni (sp?) oil fields).  This in turn suggests that the pressure
>from them against the Japanese government may not be that strong.
>The whimsical attitude of Yeltsin may further distract their interest
>(eg. one may not be sure when a project might be called off without
>notice), so it would work against increasing such pressure.

"Whimsical attitude of Yeltsin"? The man is sitting on a potential economic
disaster, Japan has not made ONE move to help his nation, and you call
Yeltsin "whimsical". It seems that Japan is being "whimsical", not to mention
selfish and short-sighted.

>>You then state that investment in Russia is risky, compared to other nations.
>
>Yes exactly.
>
>>I point out that Japan and the US banks lose money in (by your
>>terms) safer nations. It is a DIRECT response to your lines.
>
>No.  Here, you have further changed the meaning of "risk".
>Before that, risk at least meant "risk as projected beforehand".
>In the above, it means "risk [or rather, failure] as it turns out to be".
>These are obviously not the same.  If a project with lower anticipated
>risk is to fail (as a consequence), then it is natural to assume that
>projects with higher anticipated risks would be more likely to fail
>(of course, all this might turn out to be wrong, this is talking only
>of possibilities).

NO, I did NOT change the meaning of anything. I said, and I meant, that 
investment ANYWHERE is risky. ALL investment is for a PROJECTED return, period.

>>Here it is again; Investment anywhere is risky.
>
>That is a tautology, and as any tautology is, conveys no information.
>
>>>>And giving them[=islands] back would not make any money for them[=Russians]
>>
>>>Why not?
>>
>>The Japanese have said "We will not consider aid until the island issue is
>>resolved"
>
>No, that is not true.

Yes it IS true. It has been repeated MANY times past and recently. It is 
absolutely, incontrovertably, TRUE.

>>They have made no promises of aid, even IF they get the islands back.
>
>Neither is this.  What makes you think that way?

Gosh, public pronouncements by Miyazawa of the last few months as reported by
NHK. Pronouncements of the former Kaifu cabinet of the last few years.

>>They have made NO commitment to help put the former Soviet Union.
>
>Excuse me?  I suppose you made a typo here.

No, I have not.

>>They have tried to get other nations to push their claim to Russia.
>
>Yes.  And what's wrong with that?
>The July summit acknowledged the territorial issue as a problem to be solved.
>This was less than what Japan desired, but is certainly in favor of Japan,
>and not Russia.

How does that favor Japan? All it says is that the other nations recognize there
is an issue on which the 2 disagree.

>At the same time, Japan was also among those that agreed that providing
>support to Russia is a vital issue.
># A further note: as mentioned by Michiaki Masuda, US seems to have
># been in support of Japanese claim much earlier, i.e. at least by 1961.

As mentioned in my rebuttal; we tended to support a lot of things to the 
disfavor of the USSR during the Cold War; hardly keystones of any policy,
though.

>>How has the Japanese position been anything other than
>>"YOU give us the islands and we'll THINK about maybe helping you"?
>
>It is true that Russo-Japanese negotiation is pending,
>and that territorial issues is the major obstacle.

Uh, then how do you arrive at your statements above where you claim that my
statement; 

>>The Japanese have said "We will not consider aid until the island issue is
>>resolved"
is not true as evidenced by your rebuttal...
>No, that is not true.

>When two countries with different concerns and different priorities clash,
>the negotiation would fail.  But this does not mean that the above kind
>of statements were made, nor that is the reason of failure, although
>it is conceivable that Russia might have come up with such blame to
>accuse Japan.

The above statements WERE made, RECENTLY, as reported by NHK.

>Japan has approved the Yeltsin government, and has never made any
>opposition against supporting Russia.  That the above statements
>are false is further testified simply by facts.
>Japan has been and is providing considerable (if not huge) aid
>to Russia in various forms.  A joint project was signed after the
>cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Russia, and local trades are
>steadily growing.  Russia did complain that Japan is not providing
>sufficient aid (which I personally find rather obnoxious, but that's
>a different matter), but that in reverse means that Russia herself
>admits that she is already receiving aid.
>So your statements are in reality simply void.

??? How much OED money is going in there? And you just stated above:

">It is true that Russo-Japanese negotiation is pending,
>and that territorial issues is the major obstacle.
"
>Returning to the main point.
>If, in the course of negotiation, Russia gave up the islands
>with nothing in compensation for it, that would be crazy diplomatics.
>Likewise, if Japan poured all the money that Russia demands without
>any pledge nor mortgage, that is in diplomatic sense not generosity,
>but stupidity (although, of course, humanitarian aids are an exception).

Then what is your problem here? I stated at the beginning of this thread and
since then, that Yeltsin's whole point is to get money (which Russia desparately
needs) for the islands (which Japan desparately wants). You spent to whole
first part of this post claiming that behaving in this fashion was not to 
Yeltsin's benefit, now you claim that for him to do otherwise is "crazy
diplomatics (sic)". 

It is obvious that you are not reading what I wrote, or what YOU write, if you
do not see that you're a) agreeing with my initial posts and b) contradicitng
yourself in this post.

>But again, this can also be considered as a sign of desperateness.
>I expect that within a few months, perhaps within this year,
>there will be significant advance in the islands issue (and thus
>accordingly with the aid issue as well).  At that time, Yeltsin's
>maneuvers will turn out to be a mere flop.

Again, Yeltsin has made no prtense about being anything BUT desparate.

>>>Now, THIS is interesting!  What in the world can be so simple,
>>>while Japan is not clever enough to recognize it?
>>>Provided, that is, that Russia could expect no money for the islands,
>>>and also Japan having no "moral claim" for them?
>>
>>??? I really don't see what is confusing you. I have stated directly that if 
>>they want the islands back, they are going to have to pay for them.
>
>Well, I don't like the idea of "paying" for the islands.
>As said above, this is a joint issue, proceeding in parallel.

???  How is a purchase carried out except in parallel? Are the islands available
my mail-order?

>>If they
>>take a stance that there will be no discussions UNTIL the island issue is
>>resolved (in their favor), Russia will go on getting money for the fishing
>>rights, mineral rights, etc, or whatever she wishes. This will cost Japan
>>money anyway, as they have to pay off the S Korean companies to give up the
>>negotiated rights, or whatever rights were granted.
>
>>And I have never said
>>that "Russia could expect no money for the islands".
>
>You have put that as an isolated issue, and that Russia cannot
>expect money by (merely) giving the islands back.

??? You really are misreading what I wrote.

>>I have stated, directly,
>>several times that they DO expect money, LOTS of it, for the islands. Rather
>>the opposite, actually.
>
>Then what we differ is only the order, condition (and perhaps the reason)
>of "payment".

Then WHY all this bandwidth?


Mike
-- 
Disclaimer - I'm only doing what the little voices tell me to do.