From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Life vs. Sentience.  Was: Closure on Sport Hunting.
Organization: WP Group
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 08:29:32 GMT


Russell Lawrence writes:
rl> How can a mindless organism be deprived in any way?  If a boulder 
rl> lacks both sentience and sapience, would it care if we smash it 
rl> into gravel?  

In article <mw-y3bc@rpi.edu>, by vanetten@unix.cie.rpi.edu (John S. Van Etten):
jve> Boulders are not alive, Russell.  But you've admitted that plants 
jve> are, which is good, because that's a first step -- you had me 
jve> scared with all this talk that you think they are just chemical 
jve> reactions.  Sentience and sapience are two qualities to which man 
jve> can relate readily, but that does not mean that they are the only 
jve> ones...  

I agree that boulders are not alive.  I don't agree that the 
presence of self-replicating proteins magically endows an entity 
with the capacity of experiencing its own existence.  The skin 
cells of a brain-dead man on life support are just as much alive 
as the cambium cells of plants, yet it seems unlikely to me that 
either the skin cells of the man or the cambium cells of the 
carrot are capable of experiencing existence any more than the 
vibrating atoms in a "dead" granite boulder.  

> ...
jve> What on earth makes you think that you can declare that plants must
jve> have "conscious intentions" in order to be spared your wrath?  As far
jve> as this clouds business goes, if I take two identical clouds (carrying
jve> the same amount of moisture) in two different environments, either
jve> they will both rain (because they are supersaturated), or they will
jve> both not rain.  Now if I take two identical plants and put them in two
jve> different environments, one with soil and one without.  What happens?
jve> The one with soil will grow above the ground (stalks, etc., and may
jve> even have flowers as part of it's reproductive process) and the other
jve> without soil will send out roots like mad to try and find nutrients.
jve> Why do these identical plants react differently to different
jve> environments?  Because they are *alive*.  And I'm not yet convinced
jve> that Russell Lawrence should be able to pull them out and throw them
jve> in the dumpster just because they are "mindless as rocks" to him.

I agree with you that it would be silly to uproot plants, 
or destroy television sets, or burn down houses simply because 
these entities are as mindless as rocks.  On the other hand, it 
would be even sillier to argue that we would be depriving plants, 
tv sets, or houses of their existence by destroying them, given
the fact that such entities are incapable of perceiving existence
in the first place.

Be that as it may, I'd be disinclined to advocate the wanton 
destruction of any mindless entity, not because the mindless 
entity would be "deprived" of its existence, but because such 
acts of destruction might have a meaningful impact (directly or 
indirectly) on thinking/feeling beings.  

> ...
rl> How can an entity have intentions (ie, "wants") if it doesn't have 
rl> any mental faculties?   Please explain. 

jve> I'd say there's a lot a evidence against your assertion.  Perhaps 
jve> you ought to think more critically about it.  

rl> Why don't you post some of the evidence, John?  You've stated 
rl> that whales are "merely food", yet you're now pretending that 
rl> plants are persons (in the philosophical sense) with intentions.  

jve> I don't believe that I think plants are persons.  But they are alive.
jve> Even Russell Lawrence admitted that above. ;-)

You didn't answer my initial question: How can an entity have 
intentions (aka "wants") if it doesn't have autonomous mental 
faculties (aka higher-level signal processing facilities)?  

rl> Do you think your position would be believable among readers who 
rl> aren't searching for a flimsy rationale to justify the killing of 
rl> animals that clearly have both thoughts and emotions?  

jve> You seem to be confused once again, old friend.  Perhaps it's my
jve> fault.  It is not really my position that plants should not be killed
jve> for food or lumber or paper or whatever.  These opinions are those of
jve> my friends who feel that only fruits and milk and other things that
jve> are "given up willingly" should be consumed.  No living thing (plant
jve> or animal or human) should be killed.  "Flimsy rationale."  Oh my, my,
jve> my.  I'm not at all convinced that the rationale of these people isn't
jve> every bit as good as Peter Singer's.  Also, at least their criterion
jve> (life itself) is a little better defined than "sentience according to
jve> Peter Singer and Russell Lawrence."  Whatever that is.

Everyone's entitled to his/her opinion, yet most people will probably 
see an ethical difference between the suffocation of a cat and 
the uprooting of a carrot.  This difference is determined, not by 
"brown eyes" and "cuddly fur" as some hunters and researchers 
have suggested, but by the cat's ability to experience pain and 
emotional trauma during the suffocation process.  (Again, this is
a function of sentience and sapience... not life-per-se).

> ...
rl> In short, if their brainless bodies are as mindless as rocks, I don't
rl> see how their life or death would make much difference to the organisms
rl> themselves.  Without senses and cognitive capabilities, how/why would
rl> a cabbage care whether it's eaten or not?

jve> Russell Lawrence doesn't see it.  Oh my, my, my.  I've convinced.
jve> This must indeed be The Way It Is.  To answer your question, I don't
jve> know.  The key point, however, is that you and Peter Singer don't know
jve> either.  The fact that plants will do things in an effort to survive
jve> and remain alive should at least cast some doubt about the
jve> absoluteness of your assertion.

rl> Not really.  As a person who respects empirical facts, I'm reluctant to 
rl> personify mechanical and chemical reactions.  

jve> > I don't believe personify is the correct term (but you knew that ;-).
jve> > They are alive, and as such I'm not as quick as you to label them as
jve> > mere chemical and mechanical reactions.  Do you feel that people and
jve> > that dog that lives with you that you don't own are just chemical and
jve> > mechanical reactions as well?  Actually, I'm not so sure that a case
jve> > can't be made for both.

It's true that my life, and your life, and the life of the dog 
that lives with me are chemical processes.  Complex chemical 
processes, of course, but chemical processes nonetheless.  

However, it's inaccurate to say that we're _only_ chemical 
processes, since we all share the ability to experience and shape 
our respective existences in countless ways.  It's precisely in 
the realm of this experience that the qualities of "good" and 
"bad" begin to play a role in our lives.

The notion that perceptions of "good" and "bad" can exist outside 
the realm of experience won't be very convincing to anyone who 
knows that such qualities completely disappear when a 
thinking/feeling man is left unthinking and unfeeling, thanks to 
deep anesthesia.  Such qualities simply don't exist in a mindless
void.

rl> ...
rl> You've stated previously that you don't consider human embryos 
rl> and fetuses to be "alive", yet they're surely as alive as cabbage 
rl> plants.  How do you explain your sudden concern about the "wants" 
rl> of cabbages, given your previous statements about embryos and 
rl> fetuses?  Do embryos "want" to stay alive, as much as cabbages
rl> "want" to stay alive?

jve> As you know, when I used the term "not alive" to describe an embryo, I
jve> was using it as "personhood" in the context of the conversation.  It
jve> is not a seperate entity.  An individual plant is.

Plants live in a complex web of interdependent organisms, just as 
my skin cells live in a complex web of interdependent organisms.  
Someone's notion that an atom, or a molecule, or a skin cell, or 
a plant could stand apart as a separate entity would be 
determined by the scope of his view.  Going to the macrocosmic 
extreme, it might be argued that you and I are nothing more than 
different branches of a single, humongous organism that stretches 
back to the beginning of life on earth, since we are connected in 
time and space by a single thread of ever-changing DNA.  It's
only in the realm of autonomous mental experience that we can make
any clear distinction between the notion of "I" and "you".

Again, what counts is neither independence nor the presence 
of self-replicating proteins (ie life), but the quality of 
meaningful experience.  

> ...
rl> How can a mindless entity experience deprivation?  Does a dead man
rl> experience hot or cold or pain or loss of income?  Can a dead man be
rl> deprived in any way?  If not, why not?

jve> Because he's *dead*, Russell.  Let's avoid comparing apples and
jve> oranges, shall we?  Plants are *alive*.

A comatose, brain-dead man on life support is surely alive.  
Could such an individual experience hot or cold or pain or loss 
of income or anything else for that matter?  If not, how could he 
possibly be "deprived" by death in any meaningful way?  

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ