From: ss@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Scott Stuart)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism
Subject: Re: Blind Watchmaker...
Date: 27 Jul 92 12:10:49 GMT
Reply-To: ss@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Scott Stuart)
Organization: Laboratory for the Foundations of Computer Science, Edinburgh U


>Scott says that causality works with things in this world and therefor
>we should assume that there is a cause.  He goes on to say that since
>god is supernatural then the same expectations should not be made about
>her.
>Why do you assume that causality does not apply to god?  


I don't assume that causality does not apply to god, because I do not
believe in god.  I was stating that there is no reason to assume that
causality does apply to god, rather than stating that it absolutey
does not apply.

>Scott you seem to imply two points in the creationist arguement.
>First, the universe is wonderful and therefor must be the product
>of theistic causality.  Second, theistic causality is not subject to
>the same criteria ... by definition.   
>
>This seems to me  to be quirky because the existence of the natural is
>dependent on the existence of the supernatural but you are asking us to
>accept the existence of the supernatural based on the qualities of the
>natural.  If one accepts the initial premise that there is supernatural
>god then of course the leap to the acceptence of creation is easy.
>
>Let me put it another way.  The reason you give that we can assume
>natural causality is our experience with nature but the reason we can
>believe in god is because of the wonders of natural causality.

I have never seen any proof that causality must hold for all things 
regardless of their properties or origin.  I do however, accept, because
of experience, that things in this world tend to have causes.  Furthermore,
the act of explaining something is inherently looking for its cause.  Since
I find it appealing to explain things, I am willing to accept that things
should have causes.  I think that you have associated my arguments with
those of creationists, and have therefore anticipated their arguments as
part of mine.  I do not think that we can assume, without cause, god
simply because of the wonders of nature.  In fact, just the opposite, I
think that the wonders of nature can be explained without invoking any
supernatural entities.  However, my disbelief in supernatural dieties and
phenomena does not give me the right to use flawed logic and poor arguments
against them.

>>Because of our experience with things in this world, we have come to 
>>expect things to have a cause, and therefore assume that causality must
>>hold for the origins of life.  
>
>In this first sentence you describe the general expectation of
>causality in nature.  But this expectation is not from things of a
>supernatural origin...  If we can easily expect supernatural causes
>for natural things then why not for supernatural things?  
>
>Why cannot natures qaultities stand on their own... if
>the supernatural's quailities

[ This was unfinished in the article I recieved, I didn't edit it]

Nature's qualities can stand on their own.  But, if I want to argue with
people who disagree and believe in supernatural creation I must accept
their viewpoint that god is seperate from physical reality, and argue
from that base.  In accepting that viewpoint, I give up any right to apply
what I have learned from experience about physical reality to the
supernatural.  Thus, I can not argue that god does not exist because he
would then need a cause, because I can not assume that things seperate
from physical reality need causes in the same way as nature.

>
>Scott:
>>However, a god is not within our realm of experience (at least not in
>>the same way as physical objects if you believe the people who say they
>>communicate with a god via prayer),
>
>Hmmm yes of course prayer as physical cause for a supernatural effect.

I only mentioned prayer as an afterthought to ward off any potential 
flames from people saying 'I have experience with god, he talks to me
everytime I pray.'


>
>Scott:
>>there is therefore no reason to assume that the causality which we
>>observe for physical objects should apply to a supernatural god.
>I have  couple 
>
>  -  'There is no reason to assume X about god.' Since god can do
>	 anything she wants to do isn't it true that by definition we
>	 cannot assume anything about god?
>
>  -  'the causality which we observe for physical objects' Do you mean
>     to limit the type of causality ... you say "the" causality are you
>     implying that there are others?


I did not intend to imply that there are other types of causality; perhaps
that phrase was poorly worded.  I do not assume anything about god, 
because I do not believe that god exists.  I pointed out that causality
does not have to apply to god, to say that one shouldn't use that as an
argument against god's existence, because it is fairly easy for someone
to shoot holes in it.  It really just brings up the point that there
are no sound arguments against god, because god is not defined well
enough to apply logic to.  By explaining nature, we may be able
to show that there is no need to believe in god, but we do not show that
god does not exist.  If you want to provide an argument to someone that
the god in which she believes does not exist, you must use her beliefs
about that god as a basis for your argument.  I doubt that you will find 
many people who believe that their brand of god needs a cause.  

Also, when someone criticises an argument which is intended to refute the 
existence of god, please do not assume that that person is implicitly
condoning all other arguments which are intended to support god.

scott