From: young@serum.kodak.com
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@serum.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Products Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 92 22:07:41 GMT

In <Bsv4GK.Cw0@wpg.com>, russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence) writes:
>
>Ted Altar writes:
>twa> A rather condescending attitude, indeed.  Now, if you have an
>twa> rational ethical position that is less "anthropocentric" then
>twa> please articulate it for us all.  A positive critique is more
>twa>interesting than a negative one.
>
>From article <1992Aug11.221728.11736@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com [Rich Young (x37176)]:
>ry> Indeed.  But since you have already implied that the ethical position
>ry> presented which calls the original statement "parochial"  is not
>ry> "an (sic) rational ethical position", it would do little good to
>ry> expand on it here.  Suffice it to say that, IMHO, life is life whether
>ry> it is vertebrate or not, and assigning some self-described "status"
>ry> to the various forms in which life is found is hubris of the most
>ry> egotistical variety.  As just another passenger on planet Earth, what,
>ry> beyond immodest ego, gives one the right to make such assignments?
>ry> [rhetorical question]
>
>I agree with you that "life" is "life".  Isn't it also true that 
>pain is pain, emotions are emotions, and intentions are 
>intentions?

	Absolutely, and a rose is a rose is a rose (thank you, Gertrude Stein,
	by way of The Bard).  The point is that we humans have no inherent
	right to decide arbitrarily that Bambi's life is "worth more" or of
	a "higher status" than that of an alga.  Or to put it on a more
	homespun basis: that the life of a cow is somehow more valuable
	than that of an ear of corn.  Let us recall the original premise.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From <altar.713493440@sfu.ca>:

>>Insects are not of the same status as birds, repitiles (sic), and mammals,
>>nor are the latter equivalent in all respects to human beings.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

>Is it merely the presence of self-replicating proteins, aka life, 
>that endows an entity with the ability to perceive existence in a 
>meaningful, good or bad, way?  Or, is it the higher-level 
>capacity of sentience and sapience that provides the essential 
>groundwork for "good" and "bad" experiences?  

	While your definition of life may be a bit simplistic, its absolute
	accuracy probably doesn't matter here, as long as we can agree that
	there is a fundamental difference between a living thing and a
	computer...I want to squelch any such planned forays in their
	infancy, since they serve only to distract and have no relevance
	to the original point.

	Now, as far as sentience and sapience are concerned, it is true that
	"life" which includes these capabilities is certainly more highly
	organized, but it would be an unwarranted assumption to assume that
	a certain level of organization automatically carries with it some
	pre-determined niche of status or importance on any absolute scale.
	Who are we to say that insects are not of the same status as birds,
	etc.?  They are surely not as complex, but this is no better a
	criterion for "an (sic) rational ethical position" than many other,
	equally reasonable, criteria...all of which are arbitrary human
	assignments which have little basis except in our own desperate
	attempts to classify and pigeonhole our environment into comfortably
	familiar categories.

>To the extent that reptiles, birds, and mammals possess such 
>capacities, it's not the consequence of a human assignment by any
>means.  Rather, it's the consequence of their evolutionary heritage,
>which we just happen to share in common.

	It is true that the mere possession of such faculties is not the
	result of human action, but the assignment of value based on these
	attributes most assuredly is.  How far down the evolutionary scale
	do you have to go before a creature's death no longer makes you
	feel guilty?  An ape, a monkey, a tamarin or lemur, a skunk, a rabbit,
	a mouse, a lizard, a tortoise, a cockroach, an ant, a worm, a daphnia,
	Aspergillus flavus, Escherichia coli, or simpler still?  Where do you
	draw the line, and on what absolute basis?  Or is the line simply a
	function of where you, and you alone, are comfortable?  And on what
	absolute moral imperative might you insist that your line become
	my line?

	Why should the fact that humans share some specific attribute, such as
	sapience, with some other non-human life form be important?  Isn't the
	fact that the non-human life form is alive sufficient?  Why is my
	ethical standard of "life has worth" less valid than your standard
	(admittedly greatly simplified here, but no more than mine) of
	"SENTIENT life has worth"?

>twa> ... to refer to the
>twa> appeal for the self-evidence of a morally relevant quality, at least
>twa> self-evident to most reasonable and fair-minded folk.  Most individuals,
>twa> given our current state of social development and civilization, do 
>twa> hold that pain and suffering are inherent evils (i.e., morally relevant 
>twa> qualities), at least with respect to people.
>
>ry> An unwarranted assumption.  There are societies which believe that
>ry> pain and suffering are a rite of passage, and therefore "good".  
>
>Do the members of such societies view pain as an intrinsic good?  
>Or, would it not be more accurate to say that such people view 
>pain as a unpleasant experience which courageous men and women 
>must learn to overcome from time to time in order to prepare 
>themselves for dealing honestly with life's hardships?  

	They view it as ethically responsible and morally valid.  The fact
	that it is also unpleasant is irrelevant.  It is distinctly unpleasant
	for me to give blood when attended by a less than accomplished
	phlebotomist, but it is, nevertheless, ethically responsible and
	morally valid; it is a "good" thing to do.  Pain, or lack of it,
	does not necessarily determine "goodness" or "badness", or more
	accurately, moral and ethical validity, in any absolute sense.

[...]

>I suppose we could test your exceptional theory that the 
>aforementioned people view pain as "good" by arranging for you to 
>gratuitously jab a few of them with red hot pokers while the rest 
>of us closely monitor their cries, their facial gestures, and 
>their subsequent acts of retaliation or gratitude.  

	(Sigh....)  Of course, by enclosing the word "good" in quotes, I
	had hoped that the fact that it was being used as shorthand for
	"morally and ethically valid within the context" would be patent.

>Incidently, I suspect that such rites of passage among people like
>the Kikuyu have been gradually fading away in direct correspondence
>with the increasing popularity of air-conditioning facilities in 
>Nairobi.

	And so, probably, have other (non-painful) aspects of their culture
	been changed after exposure to Western society.  So what?  The loss
	of this tradition is no more relevant than the loss of any other.

[...]

>Is the "badness" of pain a function of your abstract notions of
>"moral relevance", or is it a function of neural structures that 
>are not uniquely human?  

	Pain is not inherently "bad".  Your mother may have been in great
	pain when you were born, was that a "bad" thing?  [I mean no flame
	here, only what might be a particularly moving example.]

	As for the physical "process" of pain, it is certainly reasonable
	to assume that similarity of physical structure produces a certain
	similarity of perception, but it is ONLY an assumption, and does
	not, in and of itself, exclude the possibility that dissimilar
	mechanisms may produce related, if clearly not congruent, responses
	which grow less similar, **but no less intense**, as the mechanism
	also becomes less similar.  Hold an ant over a burning match...does
	it feel "pain" as we do?  Who knows, but it is clearly desperate to
	remove itself from the source of such intense heat.

>twa> The anthropocenticism
>twa> here is the refusal to recognized that non-human animals also have
>twa> a shared capacity for pain and suffering.
>
>ry> On the contrary, the "anthropocenticism" (sic) here is the
>ry> implication that non-human life forms must necessarily perceive
>ry> and react in human ways to be "worthy", and that similarity of
>ry> physical structure to that of humans confers some special "status".
>
>Most AR advocates that I know would readily respect the rights of 
>a sentient/sapient organism from Outer Space, regardless of 
>his/her/its structural similarity to humans.  Of course, this 
>assumes that we could recognize the sentient/sapient capabilities 
>of such an organism, given its dissimilarities in terms of 
>anatomy and behavior.

	Admirable sentiments, indeed.  Now we need the same respect for
	those living things for whom the existence of sapience is less
	clear...there are myriad examples on our own home planet.

>In the case of mammals and birds, such dissimilarities don't exist.  

	Irrelevant.  Similarity of structure is a false god, born of
	anthropocentrism, not of thought, analysis, and knowledge.  You
	said it yourself: the simple fact that we cannot recognize certain
	capabilities in an organism does not mean that those capabilities
	are not there.

-Rich Young (my opinions, not Kodak's)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals