HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: Sat, 05 Sep 92 20:03:10 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 

karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:

>In article <6395@vtserf.cc.vt.edu>, ranck@vtserf.cc.vt.edu (Wm. L. Ranck) writes:
>|>    I saw a preview of "Sneakers" when I was at the movies about a week ago.
>|> In a couple of scenes they showed groups of letters on a screen rapidly
>|> changing (sort of like a slot machine) and resolving into words.  Now this
>|> bothered me.  The space characters were already in place!  In other words
>|> it was obvious from the cyphertext what the length of each word was.
>|> Pretty poor encryption scheme that.

>It sounds like that scene was written by the same guy who did the
>climax of "War Games". Remember how the computer (Joshua?) cracked the
>missile launch code ONE CHARACTER AT A TIME?

      The idea probably came from one of the early Bond movies, where
Bond uses a suitcase-sized (this is a '60s movie) safe-opening machine
which worked that way.  

					John Nagle
From: Mike Rosing <mrosing@igc.apc.org>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Date: 10 Sep 92 16:44 PDT
Subject: 64 bit DES differentially secure
Nf-ID: #N:cdp:1465900006:000:1840
Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!mrosing    Sep 10 16:44:00 1992


Howdy,
	I have successfully incorporated Dawson and Tavares Expanded
design [1] and Adams S-boxes [2] to build a 64 bit key DES which uses
the 16 sub-keys to pick out 16 blocks of 16 4x4 S-boxes.  I can't
believe it works!  This seems so complex I'm not sure I can describe
it.

	I typed in the 57 S-boxes that Carlisle sent me.  I used the
Dawson tables to expand my working version of DES into a 64 bit key.
For each subkey, I use the first 7 bits to determine where to "split"
the remaining 57.  I then alternatly scan up and down from this point
(assuming the hamming weight was > 16) and use the index for each bit
that is set as an index into Adams S-boxes.  The row of 16 bytes (one
4x4 S-box) is copied into next slot in the master S-table until 16
rows have been filled.

	For each round, I use the (round index * 128) as the
starting point in the master S-table for each F module's 8
Substitution blocks. The round index is reversed between encrypting
and decrypting and it actually works both forwards and backwards
(encrypting and decrypting).  

	I also put in a set of random numbers to build an 8x4 S-box
from the 57 4x4 list in case the Hamming weight of a key was less than
16.

	Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial requests for
information.  I've had a blast getting this to work.

[1]  "An Expanded set of design criteria for substitution boxes and
their use in strengthening DES-like cryptosystems", Dawson, M.H.;
Tavares, S.E.; IEEE Pacific Rim Conf. on Communications, Computers
and Signal Processing, Victoria BC May 1991, p191

[2]  private communication from Carlisle Adams

Patience, persistence, truth,         reality:       mgr@anhep2.hep.anl.gov
Dr. mike                                 UUCP:    uunet!pyramid!cdp!mrosing
IMI, P.O. BOX 2242, Darien IL 60559    bitnet:              mrosing@igc.org
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: smart-card fragility
Date: 10 Sep 92 16:23:41 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <11671@ember.UUCP> pacolley@ember.UUCP (Paul Colley) writes:
> the smart cards we were using had a
>lot of reliability problems (chip popping out of card, not working
>after you sat on your wallet, not surviving exposure to water,
>etc.).  Customers already get very upset when their mag-stripe
>cards stop working, and replacing them with something that is much
>more fragile doesn't seem like a good idea.


Amen.

My normal ATM card developes a split after a month or two which just
keeps growing.

As far as I can tell, this comes from my sitting on it in my wallet.

Since we can make truly flexible magnets, I would assume we could make
truly flexible ATM cards -- so that they wouldn't split.


The real question:  can we plate chip logic onto a flexible substrate
and have the layers just as flexible?
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3138 alt.security:4284
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Date: 8 Sep 92 02:02:48 GMT
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada

who@gandalf.UMCS.Maine.EDU (William H. Owen) writes:


>	There is a nice version of DES in pascal included in "Computer Networks"
>by Andrew S. Tanenbaum. Anyone have a version of DES with a 128 bit key size? Or
>alternative choices for S-boxes? Or just maybe the NSA doesn't want you to crypt
>something that the gov't can't uncrypt.
Uh, read your first line. You have the source- change the Sboxes to your
heart's content. Double, triple, qudruple encrypt with different keys,
and different permutations. If NSA had really wanted to make sure you
couldn't use anything but their weak(???) DES, they would never have
agreed to release the details of DES for you to change them.
From: boche@vnet.ibm.com (Ulrich K. Boche)
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 92 00:59:36 CET
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSA's faq hosed up?
Organization: IBM Germany, Ehningen
News-Software: UReply 3.0

This is a shortened log og my attempts at getting the RSA FAQ:

15:57:33 > ftp rsa.com netdata
15:57:34 > user anonymous
15:57:34 >> OPEN RSA.COM
...
15:57:35 <<< 230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
15:57:35 > cd /pub/faq
15:57:35 <<< 250 CWD command successful.
15:57:35 > ascii
15:57:36 <<< 200 Type set to A.
15:57:36 > get faq.ps.z
15:57:36 >>>> Representation forced to IMAGE.
15:57:36 >> GET faq.ps.z FAQ.PSZ.D ( REPLACE
15:57:37 >>> PORT 128,112,129,123,25,13
15:57:37 <<< 200 PORT command successful.
15:57:37 >>> RETR faq.ps.z
15:57:37 <<< 550 faq.ps.z: No such file or directory.

15:57:37 > get faq-k.ps.z
15:57:37 >> GET faq-k.ps.z FAQ-K.PSZ.D ( REPLACE
15:57:38 >>> PORT 128,112,129,123,25,14
15:57:38 <<< 200 PORT command successful.
15:57:38 >>> RETR faq-k.ps.z
15:57:38 <<< 550 faq-k.ps.z: No such file or directory.

15:57:38 > quit
15:57:38 >> CLOSE
15:57:38 >>> QUIT
15:57:38 <<< 221 Goodbye.

What is my problem?

Ulrich Boche, IBM Germany FSC Large Systems
Disclaimer: This posting represents my own views, not those of IBM
From: jmount+@CS.CMU.EDU (John Mount)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: 7 Sep 92 14:44:15 GMT
Organization: Carnegie Mellon University

In article <1992Sep4.205842.12303@qualcomm.com>, karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
|> It sounds like that scene was written by the same guy who did the
|> climax of "War Games". Remember how the computer (Joshua?) cracked the
|> missile launch code ONE CHARACTER AT A TIME?
|> 
|> I wish I could find a bank with a vault whose combination lock worked
|> that way.

But there have been such "bank vaults".  The name escapes me, but
there was an operating system that checked passwords with a loop like:

for(i=0;i<strlen(actual_password);++i)
   if(candidate_password[i]!=actual_password[i])
      return(ACCESS_DENIED);
/* grant access */

Where candidate_password was a pointer supplied by user code.

You could crack the system by guessing the password one character at a
time.

(method: suppose you known the first k characters, k can be zero, of
the password.  To learn the (k+1)st character set candidate_password
to point to k+1 characters before the end of a page of memory.  Have a
process running that page faults a lot, to keep the memory system
busy.  Copy the k known characters to candidate_password and copy in a
guess for the (k+1)st character.  Ask the system to check this
password several times, and time each call.  If the (k+1)st character
is correct the system will occasionally page fault in looking for the
(k+2)nd character if the (k+1)st character is wrong it will never look
at the (k+2)nd character and will page fault less.  So you can tell if
your guess is right by observing the timing of the password call.)

-- 
--- It is kind of strange being in CS theory, given computers really do exist.
John Mount: jmount+@cs.cmu.edu               (412)268-6247
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 
5000 Forbes Ave., Pittsburgh PA 15213-3891
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Organization: Mead Data Central, Dayton OH
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 14:27:42 GMT

leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson) writes:
: karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
...
: >that way.
: 
: most cheap "number wheel" bike locks *do* work that way. Put tension
: on the lock, then spin the cylinders. One will bind as it hits the 
: correct number. Then you spin the remaining ones. One of *them* will
: bind. Etc. It takes about a minute to open. :-)
: 
: I know of no *decent* lock that behaves this way. But there are a lot
: of junk locks out there!

A good lock has a cog that the (??) 'lever' has to drop into before
testing whether that 'tumbler' is in the right position.

These should be secure without much tolerance (at least to me... :-)).

The easy ones allow movement with pressure on the tumblers.

sdw
--
Stephen D. Williams    SDW Systems (513) 496-5223 Pager (513) 439-5428 VMail
Object Oriented R&D    Internet: sdw@world.std.com CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
Source Distribution    By Horse: 10028 Village Tree Ct., Miamisburg, OH 45342
GNU Support            ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,local.crypto
From: fin@unet.umn.edu (Craig A. Finseth)
Subject: Re: ATM fraud
Organization: University of Minnesota, Networking Services.
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 22:01:56 GMT

In article <1992Sep15.185901.15924@relay.nswc.navy.mil>, wcollin@relay.nswc.navy.mil (Dave Collins - E41) writes:

|> As you can see below, I work for a place that has a lot of security measures
|> in use. One of these is a keypad for entering PIN like identification numbers.
|> You press a start button which randomly enumerates the keypad with a different
|>  sequence each time, thereby eliminating the over-the shoulder eavesdropper.
|> You also have to be pretty much dirrectly in front of the keypad to view the
|> numbers.

So, how do blind people use this keypad?

The challenge is not to create such a device at all, but to create one
that is (1) secure, (2) cost-effective, and (3) can be used by people
with disabilities (because of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the
latter is now _legally required_, not just a "nice extra").

Disabilities include but are not limited to:

- blindness (braille or fixed-entry format required)
- sight-imparied (braille not ok, requires high-contrast, large characters,
	wide range of sight angles, etc.)
- may be in a wheelchair
- etc.

Oh, yes, you also can't just have a closed booth that people go into.
That would create a security hazard (both for the money and the people
inside).

Craig

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: lairdb@crash.cts.com (Laird P. Broadfield)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: 16 Sep 92 00:30:41 GMT

In <KRAZYKID.92Sep15081612@csa.bu.edu> krazykid@csa.bu.edu (Ernest Kim) writes:

>In a more realistic movie, they wouldn't be using modems where you put
>the telephone mouth piece on a suction cup to make a connection with a
>computer.  How about using a logic probe to connect the black box to
>the computer??  These aren't meant to be flames, just realism
>comments.  I really liked the movie because it was funny and kept me
>entertained, not for it's representation of technology.  

Well, now wait a minute.  Let us turn on our "willing suspension of
disbelief"-icators and review these scenes.  1) It was certainly my
impression that the acoustic coupler was being used for the voice-
stress analyzer hookup, a reasonable hack.   2) Who says that was
a logic probe?  It looked more like a scope probe, or possibly a
*signal injector* probe.  Again, not *entirely* unreasonable.  It's
not like they named the computer WOPR again.

(Yes, admittedly, there were some pretty obvious foulups, particularly
in proceedure, but none of them were movie-busters, and the above two
were far from heinous.)

-- 
Laird P. Broadfield     lairdb@crash.cts.com    ...{ucsd, nosc}!crash!lairdb
Hi!  I'm a shareware signature!  Send $5 if you use me, send $10 for manual!
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: grady@public.BTR.COM ( )
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Secure password generation
Date: 13 Sep 92 01:35:59 GMT
Organization: BTR Public Access UNIX, MtnView CA. Contact: Customer Service cs@BTR.COM

For pronounceable passwords,                                                    
you might consider using a combination
of the MD5 (message digest) algorithm
coupled to one or more of my Moby Lexical
databases:
 
The Pronunciator database will give
you a comprehensive set of individual,
double, and longer phonemes tuples that
are, by definition, pronounceable (using
IPA and 150,000 real words and phrases
in English and adopted into English.)

The Part-of-Speech database would even
permit you to construct grammatically
correct "sentences" for passphrase
generation; the Moby Words database has 560,000
entries in English; good enough for a subsequent
comprehensive scan for stereotyped passwords
or phrases.

The MD5 Algorithm would then collapse the
password or phrase into a well-distributed
bit space that a salt cold be coalesced into
or a  key extracted from.

Although not an endorsement,
Eugene Spafford is in fact using Moby Words
in a similar Internet project;  the NSA
is a licensee of the Part-of-Speech database.

These databases are available world-wide,
with special consideration for educational
and research organizations.

For more information on these data sets, please
e-mail a postal address to:  grady@btr.com
phone (408) 373-1491, or write:

Illumind
571 Belden St.
Monterey, CA  93940  USA
         
~
-- 
Grady Ward  grady@btr.com  Moby Lexicons
From: jc@mantis.co.uk (John Cox)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: SHS/SHA source code + random thoughts
Keywords: SHS SHA message digest
Date: 7 Sep 92 08:46:05 GMT
Organization: Mantis Consultants, Cambridge. UK.

mccurley@cs.sandia.gov (Kevin S. McCurley) writes:

> In article <1992Sep4.060230.28313@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> Peter Gutmann (pgut1@cs.au
> >SHA Speed
> >=========
> >
> >  I ran the SHA code against the distributed version of MD5 (which is
> >significantly less optimised than the SHA code).  The results were as follow
> >
> >	      25 MHz PClone     DECstation 2100     DECstation 5000
> >
> >    SHA         31 K/sec           120 K/sec           208 K/sec
> >    MD5         55 K/sec           169 K/sec           278 K/sec
> >
> > [misc comment deleted]
>
> machine                                  bytes/second
> ---------------------------------------------------------
> IBM RS/6000 530H, xlc -O                   1,098,000 
> SGI IRIS (33 MHz Model 4D340), cc -O3      1,038,200
> Sun Sparcstation 2, cc -O4                 1,009,000
> IBM RS/6000 530, xlc -O -Q                   832,600
> SGI IRIS (25 MHz Model 4D240), cc -O3        806,000
> DECstation 5000, cc -O4                      598,000
> Sun Sparcstation 1+, cc -O3                  507,000
> Sun Sparcstation 1, cc -O4                   498,000
> DECstation 3100, gcc -O2                     495,000
> NeXTstation cc -O                            347,000
> Gateway 2000 (50MHz 80486Dx2), gcc -O2       244,710
> Sequent Symmetry (Intel 386), cc -O4          87,128
> Zenith 386 (16MHz), gcc -O2                   81,761
> Gateway 2000, Turbo C 2.0                     57,569
> Zenith 386, Turbo C 2.0.                      17,700
> 
> The only direct comparision I see to Peter's figures are for the
> Decstation 5000, where my results are about a factor of 2.8 faster.
> This comparison may not be fair, since I don't know how Peter could
> find a better compiler for his, or maybe he is reading stuff from a
> file.
> 
> [more comment deleted]
> 
> Kevin McCurley
> Sandia National Laboratories

As a note about speed on PCs without going to the level of using
assembler - in fact without changing a byte of the distribution source
of MD5, MS C7 will produce the following result:

Ti'ko 486/50, MS C7.0, cl /Oazxb2 /Gr /G2     555,555 Kb/sec

Which compares favourably with the result of the gateway 2000 above.


John Cox, jc@mantis.co.uk, jc@cix.compulink.co.uk
Mantis Consultants, Unit 56, St. John's Innovation Centre, Cambridge. CB4 4WS.
From: nelson@reed.edu (Nelson Minar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Probabilistic encryption
Date: 6 Sep 92 21:08:51 GMT
Article-I.D.: reed.1992Sep6.210851.11931
Organization: Reed College, Portland, OR

In article <9209060713.AA27357@news.cis.ohio-state.edu>
Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes:
>[encryption algorithm that seems as useful and secure as RSA]
>Still, the practicality of the algorithm and the excellent cryptographic
>guarantees makes it a very attractive method.  Does anyone know if it's
>gotten much attention?

Is it under the same restrictions RSA is? If the algorithm is freely
usable, and it's provably as secure as RSA, I'm amazed that someone
hasn't implemented and distributed it widely.

Is there a catch?
-- 
                __
nelson@reed.edu \/           Fortune presents gifts not according to the book
From: leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Date: 10 Sep 92 03:41:59 GMT
Article-I.D.: qiclab.1992Sep10.034159.1617
Reply-To: 70465.203@compuserve.com
Organization: SCN Research/Qic Laboratories of Tigard, Oregon.

karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:

>It sounds like that scene was written by the same guy who did the
>climax of "War Games". Remember how the computer (Joshua?) cracked the
>missile launch code ONE CHARACTER AT A TIME?

>I wish I could find a bank with a vault whose combination lock worked
>that way.

most cheap "number wheel" bike locks *do* work that way. Put tension
on the lock, then spin the cylinders. One will bind as it hits the 
correct number. Then you spin the remaining ones. One of *them* will
bind. Etc. It takes about a minute to open. :-)

I know of no *decent* lock that behaves this way. But there are a lot
of junk locks out there!
-- 
Leonard Erickson		      leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com
CIS: [70465,203]			 70465.203@compuserve.com
FIDO:   1:105/51	 Leonard.Erickson@f51.n105.z1.fidonet.org
(The CIS & Fido addresses are preferred)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: mju@mudos.ann-arbor.mi.us (Marc Unangst)
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 1992 20:56:30 GMT
Organization: The Programmer's Pit Stop, Ann Arbor MI

In article <Bu5597.3x4@sneaky.lonestar.org> gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt) writes:
>I believe this is called a conspiracy.  It's probably illegal REGARDLESS OF
>WHAT THE TEXT CONTAINED, even if it's a complete but PG-rated description 

Not in the U.S.  Conspiracy is when you meet with someone else and
agree to commit a crime.  In some cases, you also have to take steps
towards actually carrying out what you conspired to do.  But I can get
together with a friend and conspire to meet him at McDonald's for
lunch, because meeting at McDonald's for lunch isn't a crime.

-- 
Marc Unangst                | Real men don't use Windows.  Real men use X. 
mju@mudos.ann-arbor.mi.us   | Only a real man would use a GUI where the
                            | shift keys after "Alt" are "Super" and "Hyper."
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security
From: gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt)
Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
Organization: Gordon Burditt
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 1992 05:14:54 GMT

>   Supposing I have a complete description of DES in text form, and I split it

It is my understanding that a description of DES in text form is not
restricted, as long as it is not a software implementation of DES.  Byte 
Magazine already published one quite a few years back.  (I forget whether 
there was a full software implementation included or not.  There probably 
was, in something like 6800 assembly language.)  And it's my understanding 
that the Feds would think nothing of responding to a request for the 
appropriate FIPS or whatever standard, with the return address of KGB 
headquarters in Moscow, by sending the document.  This was back when
the Soviet Union existed and was considered an "Evil Empire".

>into 8 parts, with file N containing every 8th character modulo N.

>   If 100 people each decide to post one of these files (they make a random
>choice without knowing about the other 99 people even being there), and posts
>it to a place that can be publically accessed outside the US, then have any
>restrictions on DES been violated?  If so, who violated them?  How?

I believe this is called a conspiracy.  It's probably illegal REGARDLESS OF
WHAT THE TEXT CONTAINED, even if it's a complete but PG-rated description 
of Clinton's first post-marital sex, the Constitution of the United States, 
or the text of one of Bush's speeches.  I think you're legally much safer
posting the plaintext.

						Gordon L. Burditt
						sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon
From: Nonsenso@utopia.hacktic.nl  (Nonsenso)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 1992 02:56:54 -0200

-> What the PGP docs should say is that you don't need to keep your
-> public key _confidential_.
 
It DOES say so. The manually explicitely states that you should share your 
public key with as many people/systems as possible. What you _should_ keep 
confidential is your private key.
There could have been a problem with pgp 1.0 when keys could not be 
certified. That way it'd be easy for anyone to forge a key on your user-ID 
and sit in the middle of communications. PGP 2.0 features this 
key-certification and is thus a lot stronger regarding to key-security 
than the 1.0 version.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: SHS/SHA source code + random thoughts
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 06:32:01 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <1992Sep12.033925.2526@cs.sandia.gov> short blonde females convinced
    mccurley@cs.sandia.gov (Kevin S. McCurley) to write:

>In article <1992Sep11.090308.26993@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:

>>Then in article <1992Sep4.060230.28313@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> tall men in dark
>>    coats forced Kevin S. McCurley <mccurley@cs.sandia.gov> to write:

>followed by some highly relevant technical information.  I assume that
>Peter was trying to be funny here, but for the record, no one forces
>me to say anything regarding this, nor has anyone tried to put words
>in my mouth regarding any other cryptographic issues.

My news/mail reader inserts random humorous reply lines in place of the usual
"In article 123, xyz writes:" type lines.  Unfortunately in this case the
line used was rather inappropriate, and was in no means meant to cast any
aspersions in the posting (or the poster:-) in question.

Tall men in dark coats are currently giving the mail reader software a talking
to.

Peter.
--
    pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz || peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz || peter@nacjack.gen.nz
		       (In order of preference)
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3143 alt.security:4289