From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Moral propagationism
Organization: TECHbooks --- Public Access UNIX --- (503) 220-0636
Date: Sun, 27 Sep 1992 09:13:23 GMT

In article <Bv3Jr2.LFx@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>But here's the rub.  If it *is* descriptive, and it *is* correct, then
>it does not *need* to be prescriptive since it imposes *limits* on the
>prescriptions one might make.

So do the laws of physics.  Our epigenetics is in most ways more
flexible than physics, especially considering the cultural capabilties 
we have or can develop.  The current limit is probably our lack of
understanding of our epigenetics.  

In neither case do we use the scientific theories as the logical basis 
for determining how we should act; in some cases these theories should 
inform those decisions.  Not in all cases; sometimes burdening ourselves 
with learning instead of taking quick action reduces the propagation of 
the morality, and is therefore immoral.

>|> [various epigenetic ills, and how birth control has
>||  short-circuited the most important part of genetic propagation]

>Perhaps, but what follows from this?  That we must somehow "engineer"
>ourselves out of our human nature?  I think this could be done only by
>rather draconian methods involving gene alteration in the breeding pool
>(an approach that certainly a libertarian must reject).

Not necesarily, if it was done voluntarily.  We could get into a 
philosophical discussion of whether it's "voluntary" for the descendents, 
and I could conjure up the reasoning that allows parents to make and
raise children in the first place... but I'm not really up for that one
yet. :-)  Also I'm a political Libertarian, not doctrinaire libertarian;
my ethics is moral propagationism.

However, let's talk about today's capabilities.  Is birth control
moral?  It's used to prevent genetic propagation, and has been
demonstrated quite effective in reducing fertility, so a genetic
propagationist would consider most of its uses, if not its very
tempting presence, immoral.  Those basing morality on an epigenetic 
"moral intuition" might consider it moral, if it enhanced the joys 
or lessened the worries of sex.  A moral propagationist would look 
at the propagation of the morality.  On the one hand, he might note 
that fertility means a new mind accessible to that morality.
On the other hand, he might note that it's easier to teach or
evangelize other people's children in the doctrine than raise
one's own.  That's the anti-natal morality.  Both strategies are
found in religions and practical moral philosophies, and knowing the
natal strategy allows one to predict some other aspects of a
morality.  For example, pro-natal moralities isolate their 
children from exposure to other moralities, eg through private 
schools.  Anti-natal moralities promote those institutions that
allow them to propagate to other's children, for example public
schools.  Both strategies can be moral, though the anti-natal strategy
has obvious if perhaps distant ultimate limits. It is likely
that an anti-natal morality propagates best in a pro-natal
society, and vice-versa, reaching an equilibrium, so this is
a case where the relativity is quite apparent.

>But the other
>alternative is that, as a consequence of our genetic makeup and our
>changing environment, we may perish as a species.  What a surprise!
>This happens to every species. 

It happens to all species, but it need not happen to a
morality if it can construct a successor species or artifact to
match or improve on the human mind.  In the meantime, extinction of 
the human species is immoral, because it would exterminate the morality
that instructs such a thing.

>|> Proof by induction:
>|> Base case: A moral system that cannot survive will not exist, and
>|> 	therefore will not provide moral guidance, therefore cannot
>|> 	be moral in any meaningful definition of the word
>
>This seems to argue along the lines that when presented with a choice
>of acting morally and dying or acting immorally and living, one ought
>to forego moral action in the short term in order to sustain the ability
>to act morally at a later time.  

A morality typically exists in many individuals, not one, giving
a situation analogous to kin selection in genes.  When martyrdom 
serves as a role model, it can enhance the propagation of the morality, 
as likely occured with Christianity.

(That analogy is made explicitly by some moralities; note how religious 
"kin" are often referred to as "brother" or "sister").

>|> Step: A moral system that propagates more widely than another has
>|> 	(all other things being equal) a greater chance for ongoing
>|> 	survival.  It provides moral guidance to more people, and 
>|> 	ultimately more success for the memes that are symbiotic 
>|> 	with it (the society in general).
>
>Let's get down to brass tacks.  I think that as a criterion of adequacy
>most people would feel that any moral system based on slavery must be
>rejected.

Many living in the South up until the late 1800's would have disagreed
with you.  There's nothing universally intuitive here, nor is moral
intuitionism a valid way to derive morality.  Whether slavery is moral
or not ultimately depends, like all other questions of morality, on
how well such a morality would be propagated.

Note that, as with genetic propagationism, moral propagationism
leads to a form of relativism; what is immoral in our society might
or might not be immoral in another.  A specific moral judgement must
be made in the context of the society in which it would propagate.

>The slaves should act submissively as slaves since this will contribute
>to the system's ability to propagate itself.

My miswording of the proof's conclusion bites me again.  It doesn't
matter if the system as a whole is propagated; what matters is if
the moral system propagates itself.  It's difficult to analyze the
situation in the slave society itself, because we don't live there;
ultimately the anti-slavery morality prevailed.  In today's society, 
one would be hard-pressed to come up with a pro-slave morality that 
could propagate very far.  There's nothing _a priori_ or universally 
across time immoral about slavery, and that probably applies to most 
of the other things our current moralities consider evil.

>|> Moral propagationism brings moral systems back to the level of culture, 
>|> the meme, instead of being stuck back in the animal-world of genetic 
>|> determinism.  It also provides a concrete measure of morality of past
>|> moral systems, of Islam vs. Christianity vs. Bhuddism vs. the various
>|> moral philosophers, which can than be used as a guide for determining that
>|> which would be most moral in the future.
>
>Maybe I'm just being thick.  How does it do this?

We can study past moralities; for example humanities studies the 
spread of Christianity in Europe.  If we can determine
why that happened, it can teach us morality -- for example, what
was the reason for the sixth commandment, thou shalt not commit
adultery?  How often was it taught, how often practiced, and what
effect did that have on the society and in turn on the propagation
of the morality itself?  What effect would such teaching have
in today's society?  Population theology.  Not saying this is 
easy to do, but it ultimately might teach us quite a bit.  

>|> If it is argued that epigenetic behavioral tendencies imply a universal
>|> morality, I disagree -- they resemble original sin more closely
>|> than they resemble original morality.
>
>Lost me there.  And the fact (if it is one) that there are limits does not
>imply a universal morality.

There exists a school of moral philosophy -- is it Hume? -- that
teaches that we can determine morality by logically deducing the
consequences of our universal moral intuitions.  For example, we
can all decide that slavery is immoral, beauty is moral, etc. and
derive a moral system from those _a priori_ "truths".  I reject
that, because such shared emotions will, in a culturally diverse
society, be based on epigenetics.  The most widely propagated moralities, 
eg most Christian and Islamic sects, would consider sociobiology's
description of epigenetics as a mapping of human sin, not of human 
divinity.   (leaving aside the question of whether they consider
sociobiology itself valid, and just looking at its conclusions
about human nature).

>They may not make things impossible in the *individual* case, but they do
>make things impossible in the statistical (population) case I think.

Hmm.  I would buy "quite improbable" in yesterday's and today's society
for some things, but not "ultimately impossible".  To take a perhaps
silly example, "it's immoral to cross the ocean by ship" would have
been unworkable in most societies up until very recently, but it is
workable today, since one would normally fly on a plane anywyay.
Neither flying nor cross-ocean swimming is built into our genes, so
both would be unworkable if we relied just on epigenetics as our
guide.

>...it is quite odd to describe this as going "far beyond
>Wilson".

_Selfish Gene_ came out in 1976 and pretty thoroughly covered 
sociobiology/ethology/behavioral ecology/<insert favorite Latin 
verbiage here> up to that time.  Wilson focused on his own studies 
with insects in _Sociobiology_, and on general philosophy in _On 
Human Nature_.  Neither gives good coverage of the field; I strongly 
suggest at least skimming through _Selfish Gene_ and Symon's 
_Evolution of Human Sexuality_ to see what you've missed.  



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