HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Time symetric causality.
Date: 5 Nov 92 10:58:15 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.25.720961095
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Oct26.201649.11871@wixer.cactus.org> sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan) writes:
>From: sparky@wixer.cactus.org (Timothy Sheridan)
>Subject: Time symetric causality.
>Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 20:16:49 GMT
>
>Can the future explaine a q fluctuation.  ie 'if it has to turn out a given
>way then that is the pre initial condidion'
>
>The EPR experiment seems to say that something somewhere else can effect an
>event. So why cant the future be involved.? 
>Perhaps the 'Dice' are behind us.
>
>Tim.
>
EPR was supposed to show that QM was incomplete.  It purported to do this by 
showing that as it stood QM involved non-locality.  It was this, rather than 
the indeterminism itself, which was the object of the paper.  [By the way 
EPR is not an `experiment' in the normal sense.]  Not all kinds of non-
locality are problematic, but with some it is possible to rig things so that 
effects precede causes (which is sort of what you seem to be talking 
about).  This may not sound like such a problem, but one can derive the 
consequence that it is possible to get the effect of a _decision_ to take 
place before the decision.  Such an example shows why some versions of non-
locality are so strenuously resisted: they involve destroying the 
intelligibility of the world.

You need to be far more clear about what you mean by the future being
`involved.'  (Certainly the way I _want_ parts of the future to be (ie the
`final cause') is crucial in explaining/predicting my motivated actions.)
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:3977 talk.philosophy.misc:2354
From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
Subject: Re: Law of Causality
Organization: USC  Department of Computer Science
Date:  4 Nov 92 19:51:57 GMT

I've added talk.religion.misc partly in response to Erik's closing comments.

In <1992Oct28.210817.1177@spectrum.xerox.com> eradm@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Erik Radmall) writes:

>In article <nyikos.720043946@milo.math.scarolina.edu>, nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:
>|> In <1992Oct22.200110.21065@spectrum.xerox.com> eradm@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Erik Radmall) writes:
>|> 
>|> >In article <BwJ7nw.90F@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>|> >|> >The Law of Causality has been known a priori and regared as necessarily
>|> >|> >true by philosophers for centuries.
>|> >|> >
>|> >|> >Much philosophy has depended on it.
>|> >|> >
>|> >|> >Quantum Mechanics denies the Law of Causality.
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> Let's be careful here.  It is more accurate to say that some
>|> >|> (philosophically indefensible!) interpretations of QM deny the
>|> >|> Law of Causality.
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> --Jimbo
>|> 
>|> >Perhaps it is the _definition_ of causality that is problematic here. What _kind_
>|> >of causality would certain QM interpretations negate? By the way, chaos theory
>|> >is bound by causality! The only thing chaos theory says about causality is that
>|> >everything is subject to the sensitivity of initial conditions. The "butterfly
>|> >effect" within chaos is about causality to the max!
>|> 
>|> That makes no difference.  My point was that quantum-magnitude
>|> perturbations *might* lead, whether by stricly causal methods or otherwise,
>|> to grossly observable changes.  The perturbations themselves, on the
>|> other hand, could at least in theory take the form of "choosing" between
>|> two or more *possible* outcomes of the same physical state of affairs.
>|> The upshot is that a non-physical soul (assuming, for the sake of argument,
>|> that such things exist) could act on a body without this action being
>|> detectable *even in theory*, yet make a big difference on how that body
>|> goes through life.

>Huh? Let me get this straight. This was a thread about QM and causality, and now this 
>notion of "soul" starts to creep in. Whoa! If you want to discuss this topic,
>please create a new thread like "Soul, does it exist?"

Sorry, you are misreading my message.  Perhaps I could start a thread
titled, "Soul, is its existence and action in the world compatible with
the scientific data?"  But that would not fit into the table of contents,
and I would prefer to also add "at least in principle" after "compatible." 

, so people can waste HUGE
>amounts of bandwidth spewing their own pet theories. And please X-post to
>sci.skeptic, alt.atheism, and a host of other worthy recipients of this underdiscussed
>topic.

I have no intention of starting the kind of thread you are suggesting.
If you would like to start one, do it yourself.  I give you permission
to use this post to get started.

>Yours in flames,

They're pointed the wrong way.

>Erik.

Peter Nyikos
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 00:00:22 GMT

In article <7882@skye.ed.ac.uk>,
jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>>I will agree that *given* an abstraction function, and *given* a
>>decomposition of a system into parts, then it may be possible to say,
>>objectively, whether the system with that decomposition and that
>>abstraction function has a certain functional organization.  However,
>>the choice of abstraction function and decomposition are not
>>objective, and can be done in more than one way.
>
>The choice can be done in more than one way, but so what?

So the most you can say is "X has functional organization Y, if you
use abstraction function A". You cannot say "X has functional
organization Y", without giving the abstraction function.

My original complaint was with the idea of distinguishing "programs
with consciousness" from "programs without consciousness" by their
functional organization---programs with certain functional
organizations are conscious, and programs with different functional
organizations are not. This idea doesn't get us anywhere unless we
know which abstraction function A to use.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.religion.misc
From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
Subject: Re: QM and Free Will
Organization: USC  Department of Computer Science
Date:  4 Nov 92 22:07:36 GMT

In <1992Oct29.180335.3011@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>In article <1992Oct29.032255.24455@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:
>>In article <1992Oct28.135035.7336@ulrik.uio.no> solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
>>>It has been claimed that the indeterminist interpretations
>>>of QM secure free will.
>>
>>Therefore it is tempting for scientists to claim that free will is
>>not real. Our feeling of free will is just for comfort.
>>However, this leads to the problem that then no one is responsible for
>>their own actions. Responsibility then becomes just a legal fiction for
>>covenience of organizing society.
>>
>>That is somehow wrong as I know that I can always stop myself doing
>>something wrong, if I choose to. I know that I can change any decision
>>at the last minute. It seems that responsibilty is a real ethic.
>>To deny that would make us ethically bankrupt.
>>

>We are responsible for our actions because we cause them.  Causality
>is essential to the notion of responsibility.  There may be a feeling
>that because those causes have further causes, our responsibility is
>somehow alleviated, but there is no reason to believe this unless some
>other moral agent (the person holding a  gun to our head at the time?)
>can be identified as causing the act in a way extrinsic to our own
>will.

Change it around: *you* are holding a gun to the head of a dictator
and ordering him to call off a massacre.  If he agrees, he "did the
responsible thing," but was "not responsible for his responsible 
behavior."

The point of this little exercise is that there is more than one
meaning of the word "responsible" floating around here, and we ignore
the distinctions at our peril.

>  But if we do something voluntarily, and our will has not been
>meddled with (this covers cases where other moral agents have
>deliberately supplied us with false information, as well as cases
>where we have been coerced) then we are responsible. 

"Voluntarily" is also a loose word.  A true determinist has to redefine
it in the following way: we *appeared* to have done what we did 
voluntarily, though it was not really voluntary because there is really
no such thing.  But since we have this useful little word to play around
with, let's attach it to these illusory instances where we really 
thought we acted voluntarily.

Peter Nyikos

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 1: Compatibilism sucks!
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 18:39:59 GMT

In article <spurrett.22.720960371@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1992 13:03:12 GMT
>FREE WILL 1: Compatibilism sucks.

>  Compatibilism (the thesis  that free will  and determinism are  com-
>patible, ie. that  both can be  simultaneously true) is  crud.  If  we
>define determinism as:
>    
>    `The theory that the state of a system at some time and the  rela-
>  tions governing the  time development of  the system determine,  un-
>  ambiguously, the state of  the system at any  later time.  (In  time
>  reversal invariant theories,  the state of  the system at  some time
>  and the relations governing time  development give the state of  the
>  system at _any_ time.)'

This definition presupposes that "the state of a system at some time"
has meaning.  According to relativity, the notion of simultaneity is
dependent upon the observer.  Keep in mind that the "system" of concern
is the complete universe.  Given the meaninglessness of "at some time"
this definition is, at best, a convenient simplification, but it has no
real substance.

>  And further is we define voluntarism (the thesis that we have  `free
>will') as:
>    
>    `The theory that a person is free with respect to same act if they
>  both can perform it and refrain from performing it.'

In most cases, a person cannot "both" perform and refrain from performing,
since one often excludes the other.  Perhaps you should be using the
word "either".  But, in any case, the statement depends on the uncertain
semantics of "can".

>  The question, therefore, is _which_ of  the two is true.

This insistence on either/or, this belief in the existence of some
absolute truth, is at the heart of your problem.  There is no reason,
other than religious belief, to suppose that the real world works this
way.  Rather than asking for the absolute truth, you should be asking
about which is a useful interpretation of the available evidence.
Compatiblism maintains that determinism and free will are both useful
and compatible interpretations.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.religion.misc
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Subject: Re: QM and Free Will
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 00:11:36 GMT

In article <nyikos.720916492@milo.math.scarolina.edu> nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:
>  But
>occasionally we come across axioms that seem *almost* self-evident,
>and we also have a strong intuition for the *consistency* of various
>axioms ["large cardinal axioms"].   
>
>Now, where do these intuitions come from, if we are *only* the
>concatenation of atoms blindly following physical laws?

Uh, from interactions of those atoms?  Seriously, what is it about
INTUITION in particular that seems to you to conflict with the idea of
atoms blindly following physical laws?  It could be that having such
intuitions (or at least, some characteristics which lead to having
them) has some survival advantage.
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta,sci.classics
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Plato's Views on Women
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:21:09 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Keywords: Plato, politics, women, feminism


In article <40376@unix.SRI.COM>, maslak@unix.SRI.COM (Valerie Maslak) writes:

|> Speaking of Plato, I was at Georgetown University when Bill Clinton
|> was there, and I had the interesting experience there of having an
|> instructor, a Christian Brother, exclude me, as the only woman in
|> the philosophy class, from two lectures that discussed Plato.
|> Presumably because he was uncomfortable discussing Plato in front of
|> me.  I could have complained to the dean, but this was pre-feminist-
|> consciousness, so I didn't complain, I just let this be part of what
|> convinced me to quit school. 
|> 

You mean that you *allowed* yourself to be shut out, and this is
somehow the fault of someone or something *else*?  You *could*
have done something (and almost certainly it would have been
effective), but you *chose* not to?  We've all done things like
this that we regret in retrospect.  But most of us (even women
in my experience) are reluctant to blame society or culture for
such an error.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:3957 talk.philosophy.misc:2336
From: lizi@soda.berkeley.edu (Cosma Shalizi)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.physics,sci.skeptic
Subject: Re: Measurement & Precision
Date: 6 Nov 92 02:11:27 GMT
Organization: Campsu Crusade for Cthulhu (Berkeley Tentacle)
NNTP-Posting-Host: soda.berkeley.edu

In article <1992Nov2.043143.24298@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:
>Imagine you are a stone age philosopher. All you have are your big chunky
>stone tools to work with to engineer with for everyday life.
>You produce a persuasive argument that it is impossible to ever produce
>tools, machines and measurements that are accurate to within micrometers
>(or fractions of a camel's hair).
>It is obvious to you that your coarse implements can't measure to any greater
>accuracy than they are already and so engineering to greater precision
>is philosophically impossible, by simple inductive reasoning.
>Where is the flaw in his argument?
   1. Induction is not valid. This has been known for some time. There are
      many inductive arguments which are rational - the fact that all observed
      crows have been black _is_ reason to believe that all crows are black -
      but not valid, the way, "All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man,
      therefore Socrates is mortal" is valid.
   2. This is not a philosophical argument but an engineering one. "With our
      current technology, it is impossible to make things finer than a 
      camel's hair, and we can think of no ways of improving things to get
      around this limitation." This is a very sound argument. With stone age
      techniques and science, there is no way to make tools or measurements
      of the desired accuracy.
>I'm wondering to what extent we are tricking ourselves with words
>(like the stone age man example did) today when we grapple with such
>philosophical mysteries as quantum mechanics, mind-body problem,
>determinism v. free will etc.
   I have yet to see arguments - serious, competent arguments - advanced on
those problems that depended on the state of our engineering. Certainly this
is not the problem with quantum mechanics. In brief: No - not like your
stone age philosopher was.
P.S. See Ch. 4 of _The Plato Cult_ in re pseudo-questions, Derek.

	Cosma Rohilla Shalizi
	In Real Life: lizi@ocf or lizi@soda .berkeley.edu
	larval physicist
-- 
"What's the use of being an American citizen if I can't swear when I
damn well want to?" - My mother, while waiting in line in Heathrow
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.physics,sci.skeptic
From: whit@carson.u.washington.edu (John Whitmore)
Subject: Re: Measurement & Precision
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 20:56:22 GMT

In article <1dck8fINNgie@agate.berkeley.edu> lizi@soda.berkeley.edu (Cosma Shalizi) writes:
>In article <1992Nov2.043143.24298@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:
>>Imagine you are a stone age philosopher. All you have are your big chunky
>>stone tools to work with to engineer with for everyday life.

>>It is obvious to you that your coarse implements can't measure to any greater
>>accuracy than they are already and so engineering to greater precision
>>is philosophically impossible, by simple inductive reasoning.

>   1. Induction is not valid. This has been known for some time. There are
>      many inductive arguments which are rational - the fact that all observed
>      crows have been black _is_ reason to believe that all crows are black -
>      but not valid, the way, "All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man,
>      therefore Socrates is mortal" is valid.

	Induction IS valid, it is the basis of all science.  It just
isn't LOGICALLY valid (i.e. an inductive argument is not a logical
proof).  Just to further complicate matters, a 'proof by induction'
is the name of an argument which is not inductive, and which is
logically valid.

>   2. This is not a philosophical argument but an engineering one.

	Yep.
	For instance, a lathe (consisting of two fixed centers)
can spin its workpiece about a line which is as perfect as the
flexing of the support of the centers allows: there is NOTHING
to limit the circularity of work on the lathe that relates in
any way to the 'accuracy' of the centers.

	To take a second example, one can run two wheels on 
parallel axes and make a centerless grinding rig; such machinery
produces (routinely) hardened steel rods with .0001" accuracy,
from grinding wheels which are considerably coarser than the
accuracy to be attained (again, it is the rigidity of the
centers that matters most).

	The caveman's measuring tools include flakes of stone
with sharp edges (obsidian knives are VERY nice tools in 
many respects), with which accurate marking onto a scale
is possible; the limit of caveman measurement accuracy is just
about the limit of his visual ability to see differences,
and I'm sure he could achieve hundredth-of-an-inch 
comparisons.

	Lastly, it is possible to scale down a machine by
pantograph-like methods: a large accurate screw can be used
thus to make a small, even-more-accurate screw... and
thus one can bootstrap from crude mechanisms to more accurate
ones.  Getting back to the larger scale is just a matter of 
stacking the small, accurate devices atop each other, like
Johansson blocks.

	John Whitmore

Newsgroups: talk.philospohy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.physics,sci.skeptic
From: grante@aquarius.rosemount.com (Grant Edwards)
Subject: Re: Measurement & Precision
Reply-To: grante@aquarius.rosemount.com (Grant Edwards)
Organization: Rosemount, Inc.
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 18:00:42 GMT

dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:

: Imagine you are a stone age philosopher. All you have are your big
: chunky stone tools to work with to engineer with for everyday life.

First, Philosopher's should abstain from making engineering decisions
without any experience or education upon which to base such decisions.

: You produce a persuasive argument that it is impossible to ever
: produce tools, machines and measurements that are accurate to within
: micrometers (or fractions of a camel's hair).

And while you are producing persuasive arguments to the contrary,
other people are out actually doing it.

: It is obvious to you that your coarse implements can't measure to
: any greater accuracy than they are already and so engineering to
: greater precision is philosophically impossible, by simple inductive
: reasoning.

It may be obvious to you, but it's pure bullshit.

It's possible to measure and reproduce items accurate to within 100
microns using very primitive techniques.  Place two cubes against each
other and run you finger back and forth across the joint.  It's
possible to judge to within 20 or 30 microns which is larger.

If it's still too big, you get out the water and rouge and grind away
at it for another hour or two.  Talk to somebody who's ground their
own mirrors for a telescope -- a remarkably primitive but effective
process.

It's possible to determine if the corners of a large building are
level with nothing more than trenches in the ground and a few barrels
of water.

It's possible to layout an exact square with nothing more than a piece
of string.

People are patient and clever, Derek.  With a few thousand year's
worth of hard work they can accomplish quite a bit.

You have made the same mistake as do the "aliens built the pyramids"
crowd.  You have seriously underestimated the persistence and
resourcefulness of H. sapiens.

--
Grant Edwards                                 |Yow!  I just forgot my whole
Rosemount Inc.                                |philosophy of life!!!
                                              |
grante@aquarius.rosemount.com                 |
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta,sci.classics
From: rooney@cheshire.oxy.edu (Michael Sean Rooney)
Subject: Re: Plato's Views on Women
Summary: Gary, be more respectful of other fields
Keywords: politics, women, feminism
Organization: Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA 90041 USA.
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 01:01:02 GMT

In article <BxIKsp.Gt3@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>
>As another teaser, have you ever wondered why the "feminist philosophers"
>all seem to have a certain political perspective -- as though this
>somehow is a part of the essential nature of feminism or feminist
>philosophy?  If you want to get a job as a "feminist philosopher" you
>not only have to teach "feminist issues", but you have to teach them
>in a certain *way*, from a certain point of view.  Any feminist
>philosophers out there who are Ayn Rand followers?  Any feminist
>philosophers who would, under any objective criterion, be considered
>"right" of center rather than "left"?
>

	Two comments.

	Gary, you're really only highlighting your willingness
to argue issues you have little substantive knowledge of here.  The
political differences between, say, Irigaray, Okin, Fraser, and Daly
(to take four prominent feminist philosophers of diverse schools)
are probably much wider than those separating, e.g., Rorty and
Putnam.  

	Secondly, you seem to be implicitly claiming that a true
philosophy worthy of the name should be politically neutral, equally
acceptable to both followers of Rand and Marx.  This foolishness
merely betrays the ethically irresponsible legacy of Wittgenstein's
disconnection of transcendental philosophy from the world. [1]  
That feminism seeks some connections between thought and practice
is no vice.

[1] Not to give Ludwig too much credit: these ideas are inherited
from his hidden inspiration, Schopenhauer.

Cordially, 

Michael S. Rooney
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech