HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: segr@nessie.mcc.ac.uk (Simon Read)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSA Hardware
Date: 6 Nov 92 22:47:23 GMT
Organization: UMIST

This is fast becoming a(n) FAQ!

Still here goes:

There are lots of implementations of the basic step of most Public Key
Algorithms (namely Modular Exponentiation) in hardware. There are a
copule by Cylink (Stateside), there is one (now defunct) by GEC-Marconi
Secure Systems here in the UK, there are a couple by Belgian and Dutch
companies, and there are several that have been designed by research
labs (including UMIST, partly by ME!).

Other public key ciphers include:

El Gamal, Diffie-Hellman, Fiat-Shamir.

For more details, mail me.

---------
Simon.Read@umist.ac.uk
From: wierda@ltb.ltb.bso.nl (Gerben Wierda)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Encryption law in The Netherlands, France and the EC.
Date: 5 Nov 92 09:26:47 GMT
Organization: BSO/LT, Baarn, The Netherlands

Well, I checked it out. Here are the results:

The Netherlands has no law banning or regulating encryption. The justice
department is thinking about it but it is in its very early phase of
lawmaking. (Some people asked me if there is regulation regarding privacy:
there is).

They also tell me that in the EC there is some movement on this issue. But no
laws yet.

The Law in France that was mentioned earlier has been published but it is not
an acting law yet. They first have to regulate its implementation, something
that is not trivial. So it is still free to use encryption in France.

The person I spoke with was very interesting in info on the discussion that
was going on. Pointer to articles are very welcome.
-- 
wierda@ltb.bso.nl (Gerben Wierda)     ||    #include <std/disclaimer.h>. Support
NeXTmail: gerben@rna.indiv.nluug.nl   ||    the League for Programming Freedom!
    "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."
    (From the Talmud(?), rephrased in) Lewis Carroll, "Alice in Wonderland".
From: phudl@csv.warwick.ac.uk (Mr S J Liddicott)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Why Encryption will Remain Legal
Date: 9 Nov 92 10:01:22 GMT
Organization: Computing Services, University of Warwick, UK
NNTP-Posting-Host: lily.csv.warwick.ac.uk

In article <1992Nov4.235802.919@qiclab.scn.rain.com> 70465.203@compuserve.com writes:
>mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. "Will do TCP/IP for clues" Ranum) writes:
>>>4)  The nature of encrypted data renders proof of criminal activity difficult.
>>>    How do you prove in court that a chunk of data is a message rather than
>>>    random noise [...]

>For that matter, if I was the defendant, and I'd been using some sort of
...
>*that*, they can just as easily get the original plaintext to use as
>evidence.

Or even, make up the plain text, calculate it's key and put it in you
appartment, and 'FIND' it.

-- 
*----------*-------------------------------------------------------------*
| Sam   Jam|"Never underestimate the importance of a cheap laugh"-       |
| Liddicott| phudl@csv.warwick.ac.uk  | I WAS IN IDAHO | Plucky Duck TTA |
*---------------It's a thing that makes me go hmmm...--------------------*
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: A Copper Balloon
Date: 7 Nov 92 14:22:20 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

I'd like to suggest another possibility, which for want of a
better name I'll call the "copper balloon".  It's quite clear that key 
registration goes over like a "lead balloon".  My question is: is this 
any better?  worse?  I would also like to suggest that we keep this
thread focused on this proposal and not on the merits/demerits of
wiretapping in general.

The basic idea is very simple.  Use a 3-way Diffie-Hellman public-key
exchange protocol to set up a session key for use with say DES 
encryption.  The third party would be the service provider (actually
equipment owned by the service provider), which would make the key
available to law enforcement if a court order has been received and
an intercept activated.   Here's a concrete scenario for telephone
security devices:

1.  Caller activates call.  All 3 parties generate a random x and
exchange their values y = a^x mod p for some a and p.  All 3 parties
generate the key k in the style of DH but with 3 exponents instead
of 2.

2.  If a tap has not been activated, the 3rd party would be a bit
bucket.  The key would not be saved or distributed elsewhere.  Indeed 
the third party might even play a slightly different game and issue
a random y without even having generated an x.  

3.  If a tap has been activated, the key would be delivered to the 
government monitoring facilty along with the communications stream.

The idea for this came from several places.  First, encryption can 
be used without the need for users or devices to have permanent
secret keys.  For example, at least some telephone security devices 
have no keys wired into them.  The session keys are negotiated at 
the time of the call.  Diffie-Hellman does not require any concept
of a permanent key.  Doug Jones posted a message earlier mentioning
a scenario that would not use permanent keys.

Second, the trick is basically the same as used by Silvio Micali in
fair cryptography, though he had 5 parties.

Third, someone (Carl Ellison?) suggested that it might be better to
just record session keys rather than permanent keys.  Since the 
session keys are what is ultimately needed, this sounds good to me.

Obviously this would not work with PGP or any form of RSA encryption
which uses permanent keys.  So if such a strategy were used, it would
constrain what protocols & methods could be used.

Like key registration, I expect it would be much harder to enforce on 
computer nets that run software than telephone systems where you could 
require that hardware products meet the basic requirements.

Assuming that the 3rd party devices were reliably constructed, this 
would at least superficially provide more protection since no keys 
would be kept unless a court order were issued.

OK, fire away.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registering keys
Date: 12 Nov 92 21:01:11 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <Nmq4TB1w165w@utopia.hacktic.nl> garfield@utopia.hacktic.nl (garfield) writes:

>Why all the fuss about registering keys?? If they want them.. give them 
>what they want.. If everyone registeres 10 or 15 keys and each key is 10K 
>in size.... Then they have a slight problem of storage...

No, no, no...you just don't have the right attitude.

What you do is register 2^32 keys (you have a key-generating function
with a 32 bit seed).
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4690 comp.org.eff.talk:6978 alt.privacy:2226 talk.politics.guns:24057
From: williamt@athena.Eng.Sun.COM (Dances with Drums)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 12 Nov 92 20:51:20 GMT
Reply-To: williamt@athena.Eng.sun.com (Dances with Drums)
Organization: Sun Microsystems Inc., Mountain View, CA
NNTP-Posting-Host: athena

In article <1992Nov11.214859.26168@adobe.com> pngai@adobe.com (Phil Ngai) writes:
>Even if it were possible to make all 200 million or so guns in private
>hands disappear and prevent new ones from being made or imported
>(compare to success of US War on Drugs), is this what we want? Is a
>woman free from rape simply because criminals now have only knives,
>clubs and their two strong arms to use?
---
	More to the point -- are citizens free from being beaten at gunpoint
by officers of the law acting outside the law?  The Rodney King case
is one example of officers acting outside the law (all white juries
not withstanding).  Another case was just recently when students at
UCSC were maced, kicked and beaten while holding a sit-in.  Some of
the students pleaded just to be left alone as the cops were beating them.
The cops thought this was the best way to get the students to disperse.
The cops involved said they would use violent tactics again if the students
refused to cooperate.  When I found this out, I was incredulous.  These
were law *enforcement* officers?  Whose laws are they enforcing?

	As for registering keys...why do law enforcement officials think
they have a right to know what I am saying to another person.  It seems
like this is an infringement on *freedom* of expression -- if my expression
to another person *must* be subject to monitoring, is it really free?


-wat-
--
 --- "If women really earned fifty-nine cents to the dollar for the same
 work as men, what business could compete effectively by hiring men at
 any level?"    -- Dr. Warren Farrell
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.conspiracy
From: Costanza@world.std.com (Peter Costanza)
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon on Registered Keys
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 16:11:11 GMT

...under the law the NSA is forbidden to do domestic surveillance....

silly.  to security organizations the "law" is just another cover.  It's
amusing to watch these guys who hate the government, won't pay taxes,
reject all ideas of social responsibility orchestrated through government,
defend the good intentions of the garrison state security apparatus.  they're
usually also gun nuts.
From: gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 12 Nov 92 11:14:45 GMT
Article-I.D.: ke4zv.1992Nov12.111445.3478
Reply-To: gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman)
Distribution: inet
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group

In article <17888@autodesk.COM> drake@Autodesk.COM (Dan Drake) writes:
>spm2d@uvacs.cs.Virginia.EDU (Steven Miale) writes:
>> ...
>> Second, the amendment never says that it is only the *militia* who
>> has a right to keep and bear arms. It says that in order in *insure*
>> a well-regulated militia, the right to keep and bear arms shall not
>> be infringed. 
>
>Query: Can anyone tell me what the word ``well-regulated'' means when
>used in the 2nd Amendment?

It's an archaic firearms term meaning "adjusted to strike to point of
aim." A double barrel shotgun is said to be well regulated when both
barrels fire to the same point of aim. When applied to the militia,
it means that the militia is practiced in the effective use of weapons.

Gary
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: butzerd@columbia.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer)
Subject: pseudo one time pad...
Organization: The Ohio State University Dept of Electrical Engineering
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:36:42 GMT

In the FAQ (Thanks to Larry Loen for this... it is informative...), the
following is stated about pseudo one time pads:

  There are a variety of cipher systems which generate "pseudo
  one time pad" streams of cipher key, but all have the same
  theoretical vulnerability; any algorithmic process introduces
  relationships between some old key bit(s) and the new key bit
  and so permits cryptanalysis.  "Random number generators" are
  frequently dreamed up by newcomers as a "pseudo one time pad",
  but they are notoriously vulnerable to analysis, all
               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  independent of whether the pseudo-random stream satisfies
  randomness tests or not.

My question is, why?  Now before I get roasted & told to "read the
literature..." and "your an idiot...", I have read the literature.  I've
also spent a considerable amount of time working with/analysing pseudo
random number generators (PRNGs).  It seems to me that, if your source is
sufficiently random (ie. NOT some type of feedback shift register or linear
recurrence equation, but something random in a cryptographic as well as a
statistical sense), and you follow the one time rule (ie. only use any key
ONCE - never encrypt 2 files with the same key), this should be pretty
secure.  For example, would the following be "vulnerable to analysis"?

1) DES a file of ASCII 0's (of the same length as the plain text) with
some key - this gives you a pseudo-random bit stream.

2) XOR this with the plain text ---> cipher text.

This is pseudo one time pad that I don't think would be "easy" to break.
Now, how about substituting some other type of PRNG for DES?  If its
non-predictive (can't determine numbers in the stream from other numbers)
and statistically random, whouldn't it work?  Is the real problem coming up
with a "good" enough PRNG?

Thanks for the help...

Dane Butzer

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 HappY HappY JOY JOY !!!  |  Long disclaimer does not follow.  Press n to skip
          - Ren & Stimpy  |  anyways...          butzerd@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wierda@ltb.ltb.bso.nl (Gerben Wierda)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Can someone send me the first denning post (trial balloon)
Date: 9 Nov 92 12:52:17 GMT
Organization: BSO/LT, Baarn, The Netherlands

Please mail me if you like to (do not send it right now, since that might
flood the mailbox.... ;-)

Thanks in advance,


-- 
wierda@ltb.bso.nl (Gerben Wierda)     ||    #include <std/disclaimer.h>. Support
NeXTmail: gerben@rna.indiv.nluug.nl   ||    the League for Programming Freedom!
    "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."
    (From the Talmud(?), rephrased in) Lewis Carroll, "Alice in Wonderland".
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKZIP contest
Date: 9 Nov 92 14:42:22 GMT
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg

emil@lamisun2.epfl.ch (Emil Laurentiu) writes:

>      seize.  I talked to Eric Thompson, the author, and he said his
>      program only takes a split second to crack them, but he put in some
>      delay loops to slow it down so it doesn't look so easy to the
>      customer.  He also told me that the password encryption feature of
>      PKZIP files can be easily broken, and that his law enforcement
>      customers already have that service regularly provided to them from
>      another vendor.


> In these conditions I think the contest launched by PKWARE is of no interest. 

I had the claim that you are quoting verified. The company mentioned
in the PGP documentation CANNOT crack ALL PKZIP archives. You are
still safe, if you are using a long (>8 chars) and weird
(upper case + lower case + digits + punctuation characters) password.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.0 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ctdonath@dodo.syr.EDU (Carl T. Donath)
Subject: Re: WordPerfect encryption
In-reply-to: spear@ucsu.Colorado.EDU's message of Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:42:23 GMT
Organization: Syracuse University
Distribution: usa
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 92 13:30:49 EST

Somewhere out on the net is WPCRYPT, a program that generates the password(s)
for an encrypted WordPerfect file. 
--
  _____/ ctdonath@rodan.acs.syr.edu   Carl T Donath \_____
 / The second amendment is the only right that guarantees \
 \        the preservation of all other rights.           /
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns,alt.usage.english
From: gtoal@ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: The IBM PC User Group, UK.
Distribution: inet
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 08:50:45 GMT
Followup-To: alt.usage.english

In article <BxFEz0.1nG@constant.demon.co.uk> slangley@constant.demon.co.uk (Simon Langley) writes:
:Steven Miale (spm2d@uvacs.cs.Virginia.EDU) wrote:
:: 
:: Most people tend to assume that "militia" == "military"; this is
:: incorrect. Similar roots don't necessary imply similar meanings;
:: compare "pedestrian" and "pediatrist".
:: 
:Err, these two words do not have the same root.  Pedestrian is from the Latin
:pes, meaning foot; pediatrist is from the Greek pais (pi alpha iota sigma) 
:which means child.  Militia and military _are_ cognate.
:

I don't think there *is* a 'pediatrist'.  The child-doctor is a
p(a)ediatrician; the foot-doctor is a *pod*iatrist, which comes
from the Greek 'pod'...

G
[followups redirected to alt.usage.english]
-- 
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4687 comp.org.eff.talk:6976 alt.privacy:2223 talk.politics.guns:24056
From: cdt@sw.stratus.com (C. D. Tavares)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 12 Nov 92 21:38:17 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Inc.
NNTP-Posting-Host: rocket.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov12.070004.1556@netcom.com>, gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
> amirza@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Anmar Caves) writes:

> >...it would hurt.  History has proven this time and time again.
> >New York, Wash. DC, Chicago, all places that have banned guns and have
> >the highest crime rates in the country, with the crime rates rising
> >dramatically after the citizenry was unarmed.

> It might be that the U.S. is already too screwed up with weird
> judeo-Xian guilt/hate for a ban on handguns to result in anything but
> pandemonium. See? I'm a reasonable guy. I'm willing to fall back
> to the position: "In any *reasonable* society, this would work..."
> Like, perhaps, the majority of other western societies.

Hey, Mexico is a great example.  Jamaica is another one.  Lots of
Judeo-Christian guilt in Jamaica.  But at least the guns are banned.
Totally.
-- 

cdt@pdp.sw.stratus.com      --If you believe that I speak for my company,
OR cdt@vos.stratus.com        write today for my special Investors' Packet...
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.conspiracy
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: RSA marketing weakness or lack of demand?
Followup-To: alt.conspiracy
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 23:01:09 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.195347.24435@ulysses.att.com>, smb@ulysses (Steven Bellovin) writes:
>That story appears to be false.  See ``Kahn on Codes'', p. 200.
>Briefly, an ``eccentric'' NSA employee wrote to the IEEE warning them
>that a conference session on cryptology was in violation of the law.
>For a time, MIT suspended distribution of (I think) the RSA paper.  The
>Senate Intelligence Committee later investigated, and determined that
>this employee was acting on his own, not in his official capacity or
>with the approval of his superiors.  Kahn appears to believe that,
>incidentally.

Of course this adds little information - fear, uncertainty and doubt
are good tools to use.  Besides, a long-used technique is to just
"imply" that some acts (like this) are expected from the employee but
if the employee gets in trouble because of this that's his own problem
and the organization denies all responsibility.  Anything needn't even
be said.

>U.S. patent law permits applications to filed up to one year after
>publication.  There is nothing underhanded about that; it's simply
>different than in the rest of the world.  And it applies to everyone --
>I know someone who's applying for a patent under just those circumstances,
>and it has nothing whatsoever to do with security or cryptography.

Yes.  And if someone thinks the RSA patent would have gotten through
without a patent secrecy order if the patent had been applied before
publication, I have a nice second-hand bridge to sell, in very good
condition.

Followups directed to alt.conspiracy, as many readers think this is a
group for cryptography, not politics of governments or freedom.

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Finally!  We're getting somewhere.
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 19:18:51 GMT


Another interesting entry from Black's Law Dictionary:

"Fruit of poisonous tree doctrine. Evidence which is spawned by or
directly derived from an illegal search or illegal interrogation is
generally inadmissable against the defendant because of its original
taint, though knowledge of facts gained independently of the original
and tainted search is admissable. Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.  This doctrine is to the effect that an unlawful
search taints not only evidence obtained at the search, but facts
discovered by process initiated by the unlawful search. This doctrine
is generally applied to cases involving searches in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution right against unlawful searches
and seizures, but it can be applied to searches in violation of a
statutory right. Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840, 865."

In other words, if the government holds a gun to your head until you
reveal your crypto key, then any information they decrypt with this
key is inadmissable in court. But if they crack your key on their own,
then they can use it.

Phil
From: tld5032@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terry Davis)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption System - Challenge!
Summary: Thoughts on the response
Date: 9 Nov 92 16:41:35 GMT
Organization: Boeing Computer Services


boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd) writes in response:
> Your acquaintance doesn't know ANYTHING about cryptography.
> He is ignorant of the Fundamental Assumption Of Cryptography:
>         "The security of a system lies only in the keys."
> Given your description, NuCrypt doesn't even use a KEY.
> Send the guy to the library.

As always we discount what we don't understand or happen to like.  
I see nothing in the article that indicates his system is not
keyed.  System generated and embedded secondary keys provide
exactly the appearance described.

Myself, I'm particularly fond of keyed systems that refuse to 
generate to the same encryption pattern each time!  Personally,
suspect that his friend may well get to keep his money!

On final note, perhaps we FLAME new thoughts and ideas far to soon!
A more little tolerance might just encourage more exchange of new
concepts which is what I thought this group was all about!


Take care

 | Terry L. Davis | Boeing Computer Services, Bellevue, WA         |
 |  206-957-5325  | BOEING EMAIL: tld5032@commanche.ca.boeing.com. |
 | INTERNET EMAIL: tld5032@atc.boeing.com.                         |
  -------------- Monday November 09,1992 08:23 AM PST ------------- 
 == As always, should the above be construed as representing BOEING, ==
 ==   the COMPANY will dis-avow any knowledge of me or my actions.   ==
From: pcl@oxford.ac.uk (Paul Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: (continuation on new encryption method)
Date: 12 Nov 92 13:21:13 GMT
Organization: Oxford University Computing Service, 13 Banbury Rd, Oxford, OX2
	6NN
In-reply-to: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org's message of 6 Nov 92 23:25:34 GMT

In article <n0dc9t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:

   Sorry about the break, but the message editor here does not seem
   to allow more than 100 lines per message...

   Anyway, to complete my post, here's the most interesting part:

   ================continues from previous message=========

    Apart from the intellectual challenge, the author of NuCrypt says 
    he's offering a fine evening in New York City to anyone capable of 
    decrypting the secret words.  Should you win, you'll have to get to 
    NYC yourself to collect but, once there, there should be no expenses 
    for you well into the wee hours... sounds like an easy big dinner
    to me...


Doesn't sound so great to me.  Let's see \pounds 500 for a free meal?

8-)

Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt