From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 21:14:04 GMT


From article <1992Aug22.175923.25363@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> Let me say it another way: a brain-dead human is a fatally flawed
ry> organism, the carrot is a functional organism removed to a hostile
ry> environment.  Not only is the comparison of the "apples and oranges"
ry> variety relative to situation, but the subjects used for the
ry> comparison are not equally viable before the comparison is made.

A man with total kidney failure is also a "fatally flawed 
organism".  If you think it's ok to allow a brain-dead human to 
die by withdrawing medical treatment without his explicit 
consent, would it also be ok to allow a kidney-dead human to die 
by withdrawing medical treatment without consent?  

BTW, when I posed a similar question previously, you declined to 
answer after saying that the question was "irrelevant".  In doing 
so, you were once again guilty of "assigning status" as I'll 
explain later on.  In any case, I'm challenging both the honesty 
and consistency of your claim that "self-sustaining life" rather 
than sentience and sapience is the property that truly matters in 
making ethical decisions.  As such, it seems to me that your 
presentation would be more convincing if you'd avoid evasive 
answers.  

ry> ... No life form is any more important than any other, no life 
ry> "style" is any less "ethical" than any other, and no creature, 
ry> except Man, is bothered with delusions of omniscient grandeur in 
ry> assuming that similarity of structure and function have any real 
ry> significance at all.  

If no life form is any more important than any other, why do you
think it would be wrong to use retarded humans in medical experiments
but not wrong to use chimps?   Please answer the question without
assigning special status to yourself.

ry> Let me hasten to add that this particular cognitive facility of 
ry> Man gives him no more status or "worth" than the ability of a 
ry> giraffe to eat acacia without injury to its mouth.  Different 
ry> species have different "talents", based on their evolutionary 
ry> niche.  

Of course they have different talents, but to the extent that 
those "talents" reflect different levels of sentience and 
sapience, don't you think they need to be taken into account?  To 
illustrate, let's just suppose that chickens are particularly 
sensitive to pain and that carrots are totally insensitive.  If 
we were to evaluate the ethical consequences of sticking needles 
into chickens and carrots, don't you think we should stop and 
consider their respective sentient abilities?  In doing so, we're
not assigning special status at all, but merely recognizing the
basic facts.

ry> ...
ry> Are you now going to argue that my claim that a carrot is worthy
ry> simply because it is alive is less valid than your requirement
ry> for sentience/sapience, based on similarity of structure?  I remind
ry> you once again that, without the "arbitrary" criterion of "life",
ry> sentience and sapience would not exist in our world.

Rich, I'm not saying that a carrot is worthy or not-worthy.  What 
I'm saying is that a carrot isn't going to give two hoots whether 
it's alive or dead or stuck with pins if, as I suspect, the 
carrot is completely senseless and mindless.  On the other hand, 
the dog that's lying next to me at the moment would suffer 
immensely if you were to tie him down and stick him with pins.  
Do you honestly believe that "sentience" is an arbitrary 
consideration in making an ethical distinction between sticking-dogs
and sticking-carrots?

rl> If it's acceptable for you to "assign" varying degrees of "status"
rl> to humans and carrots in accordance with the condition of their 
rl> sensory processing capabilities, ...

ry> I have decided relevance based on ability to survive unaided; I have
ry> not "assigned status", and as I've said above, "sensory processing
ry> capability" was mentioned only because that's what you decided to
ry> bring up, not because it's important in its own right.

What's the difference between "assigning status" and "deciding 
relevance", Rich?  In declaring that one set of properties is 
relevant or not-relevant, are you not "assigning status"?  After
all, the term "relevance" is meaningless without a status point,
is it not?  

rl> ... why is it wrong for Ted Altar to 
rl> point out that differing degrees of sentience and sapience among 
rl> different organisms might require us to evaluate the consequences 
rl> of our actions toward them accordingly?  

ry> It isn't, necessarily, until he assumes that his determinations 
ry> are the only ones which carry any moral and ethical weight.  He, 
ry> and you, are free to draw arbitrary lines wherever you choose on 
ry> the evolu- tionary ladder, but don't get upset if others 
ry> recognize that the lines you draw are, indeed, arbitrary, and do 
ry> not form a basis for universal agreement.  

Again, sentience and sapience are _not_ arbitrary values, as most
readers will understand when they contemplate the ethical difference
between our withdrawal of medical treatment from a brain-dead man
as opposed to a kidney-dead man.  Or for that matter, the ethical
difference between sticking carrots with pins as opposed to sticking
dogs with pins.

rl> You've criticized Ted for using quite a few pidgeon-holes to 
rl> categorize organisms with varying degrees of sentience and 
rl> sapience, and yet, you yourself have a grotesquely simple set of 
rl> pidgeon-holes: one hole for thinking/feeling humans [brain-dead 
rl> humans and fertilized embryos excluded] and a giant hole for 
rl> every other organism, regardless of its thinking/feeling 
rl> abilities. 

ry> Where do get this stuff?  We __ARE__ in the same hole as "every
ry> other organism".  Brain-dead humans and fertilized embryos aren't
ry> [shall I say it yet AGAIN] biologically self-sustaining, and are,
ry> therefore, irrelevant.

You're assigning "status" once again, by telling us what's 
relevant or not-relevant.  Moreover, you're contradicting some of 
the statements you've made in the past.  If it's true that you 
consider all organisms to be in the same ethical category, why is 
it ok to use non-human animals in involuntary medical experiments 
but not ok to use human animals under the same conditions?  

ry> There __IS__ only one category: life.  Now you may call this
ry> "grotesquely simple", but I, frankly, prefer to call it "elegantly
ry> uncomplicated".  If it's alive, then it's as "worthy" as I am.
ry> Period.  If it's a non self-sustaining adult, it's dead, although
ry> it may not yet appear to be.  Period.  _I_ don't have to worry
ry> about similarity of structure, and complexity of development, and
ry> whether or not it "feels pain" before I can decide whether it's
ry> "worthy" or not.

So you say, Rich, but such claims are logically inconsistent with your 
past postings.

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals