HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 01:33:16 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.132612.8892@news.unige.ch> swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:
>In article <1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>, zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>> 
>> Following Montague, I believe that deicticaly disambiguated natural
>> languages *are* formal languages.
>
>I begin to understand. 

No I don't think you do.

> Zeleny believes that there is no useful difference
>between an entity and its name or description. He thinks that a picture
>of an elephant *is* an elephant, that a formal description of a sentence
>*is* a sentence ... and so on. 

I *hope* formal description of a sentence is (at least) a sentence. Otherwise,
it's not much of a description. I assume you *meant* to claim (by parity with
you elephant example) that the formal description of a sentence was *the very
sentence* that it was intended to be a description of.  Naturally, he can't
have meant these things (and, naturally, you know it). We'll assume your caustic
words were meant as a reductio. Surely it's not beyond the realm of possibility
that some formal description of language will capture those generalizations
that we attribute to ordinary languages.  Put another way, it is possible that
one day we'll have a *theory* of language. Now what's so astounding about that?

>This makes him the World's last surviving logical positivist.
>
Now, now, name calling won't get us anywhere. Besides, Hempel is still
alive and he was once a logical positivst.  And Charles Osgood was calling
himself a logical positivist as a defense against Jerry Fodor as late as the
1960s.  In any case, one need not be a logical positivist just to believe
that theories aregood things.  Even formal theories that don't rely too
heavily on pretheoretic intuitions that we all nod our heads a unreflectively.



-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: afzal@divsun.unige.ch (Afzal Ballim)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Keywords: genitalia synonyms
Reply-To: afzal@divsun.unige.ch
Organization: University of Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 12:18:04 GMT

In article <1992Nov20.111117.24278@news.unige.ch>, swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:
|> In article <1992Nov20.103115.23839@news.unige.ch>, afzal@divsun.unige.ch (Afzal Ballim) writes:
|> > ``The degree of synonymy (or near synonymy) in the vocabulary for genitalia
|> > and copulation has no parallel elsewhere in the English lexicon -- except in
|> 
|> This is fascinating, but I think it actually supports my position. There
|> may be 1,000 words for 'penis' in the OED (really???): but in a given
|> speech community at a given time, I would bet that there around five.
|> Perhaps we could have a poll of the net (no, just joking!). Of course,
|> just having approximately the same reference is not enough for synonymy -
|> and I would again claim that in most cases the *usage* of the words will
|> differ. Also, these words often have an expletive function that one could
|> argue lacks semantic content completely....
|> 
|> Philip Swann
|>  
|> 

I agree. It does support your position in that it seems that true synonymic
use of terms is rare, and in any case is contextual! I.e., supposedly synonymic
terms are not universally substitutable.

-- 
Afzal Ballim	             |BITNET,EARN,MHS,X.400: afzal@divsun.unige.ch
 ISSCO, University of Geneva |UUCP: mcsun!divsun.unige.ch!afzal
 54 route des Acacias	     |JANET: afzal%divsun.unige.ch@uk.ac.ean-relay
 CH-1227 GENEVA,Switzerland  |CSNET,ARPA: afzal%divsun.unige.ch@relay.cs.net
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:680 sci.philosophy.tech:4171 sci.lang:8094 sci.philosophy.meta:2628
From: mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.edu (Michael Covington)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Date: 18 Nov 92 22:57:54 GMT
Article-I.D.: athena.1992Nov18.225754.19944
Organization: AI Programs, University of Georgia, Athens

In article <TORKEL.92Nov18205249@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1992Nov18.164042.2001@athena.cs.uga.edu> mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.
>edu (Michael Covington) writes:
>
>  >Of course it's contingent and is arrived at BY LOGICAL REASONING FROM 
>  >PREMISES.
>
>  But surely anything can be arrived at by logical reasoning from premisses,
>for example that I will not be harmed if I run out in front of a truck. Just
>what was the point of your original posting?

Someone had asserted that "logic" was a peculiarity of Western culture.

I was trying to show the absurdity of this notion by taking a practical
example: in a situation where "Western" logic tells me that if I step out
in front of a bus I'll be killed, would he claim that in the Far East the
same situation is not as dangerous because "Western" logic does not apply?
-- 
:-  Michael A. Covington     internet mcovingt@uga.cc.uga.edu 
:-  Artificial Intelligence Programs       phone 706 542-0358
:-  The University of Georgia                fax 706 542-0349
:-  Athens, Georgia 30602-7415 U.S.A.     amateur radio N4TMI
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning
Organization: University of Hawaii
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 21:14:50 GMT

Michael Zeleny (zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu) wrote:
: 
: GL:
: >...  Having shown that two sentences imply each other
: >in some logical syntax, what is gained except confusion by proceeding
: >to associate some esoteric meaning-thing with them both?
: 
: Invariance under selection of specific syntax. Explanation of
: syntactical rules.  That, and bivalence.  In short, truth. ...

Justifying a semantic account of paraphrase by appeal to some need
felt need to give an account of truth is circular.  "Explanation of
syntactical rules" sounds nice, except that no syntactical rule of any
natural language has ever been explained semantically, and there is no
reason to think one ever will.

(I'm reading this in sci.lang, but I'm beginning to suspect you do
not intend what you are saying to have any relevance to natural
language.  If not, think about editing your newgroups line.)

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: afzal@divsun.unige.ch (Afzal Ballim)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Keywords: genitalia synonyms
Reply-To: afzal@divsun.unige.ch
Organization: University of Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 10:31:15 GMT

According to [1, pp. 161]:

``The degree of synonymy (or near synonymy) in the vocabulary for genitalia
and copulation has no parallel elsewhere in the English lexicon -- except in
the terms for `whore.' There are reportedly more than 1,200 terms for `vagina'
and more than 1,000 for `penis' (with or without testicles), 800 for
copulation, and 2,000 for whore...'

The article goes on to explore instances of synonymy and non-synonymy between
terms, e.g. ``twat'' and ``cunt'' are synonymous in

(1) Your twat needs a wash.
(2) Your cunt needs a wash.

In fact, ``twat'' and ``prick'' can even be synonymous in certain cases:

(3) You twat!
(4) You prick!

However, in such cases the ``euphemisms'' are not synonymous with the
terms of which they are normally considered euphemisms.

(5*) You vagina!
(6*) You penis!

This is a fascinating article which finishes by presenting a schema (or
algorithm) for determining the intended denotation of `vagina', `twat',
`cunt', and `prick'. It just goes to show that synonymous terms can 
exist in language, although it says something about the circumstances
in which this can occur.

[1] Allen, Keith (1990) ``Some English terms of insult invoking sex
organs: evidence of a pragmatic driver for semantics'' In S. Tsohatzidis
(ed.), ``Meanings and Prototypes, Studies in linguistic categorization,''
pp. 159--194.


-- 
Afzal Ballim	             |BITNET,EARN,MHS,X.400: afzal@divsun.unige.ch
 ISSCO, University of Geneva |UUCP: mcsun!divsun.unige.ch!afzal
 54 route des Acacias	     |JANET: afzal%divsun.unige.ch@uk.ac.ean-relay
 CH-1227 GENEVA,Switzerland  |CSNET,ARPA: afzal%divsun.unige.ch@relay.cs.net
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Subject: Re: Meaning (not Theory of)
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 21:24:35 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.200717.11887@ausom.oz.au>, lad@ausom.oz.au (Lyn Dawson) writes:
> Something I've just come across may be of interest, if not scientific:
> 
> "The Map is Not the Territory"
> 
> "The meaning of your communication is the response you get - if you
> don't like the response - vary your communication"

The Count (Korzybski) strikes again.

I guess it was insightful in its time.  (No flame, Lyn).  Is this all that
remains of general systems theory?  This aphorism is all I ever hear about
it anymore.

	-dp-

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: dlb@fanny.wash.inmet.com (David Barton)
Subject: Re: Meaning (not Theory of)
Organization: Intermetrics Inc., Washington Division, USA
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:02:29 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.200717.11887@ausom.oz.au> lad@ausom.oz.au (Lyn
Dawson) writes:

   Something I've just come across may be of interest, if not
   scientific:

   "The Map is Not the Territory"

   "The meaning of your communication is the response you get - if you
   don't like the response - vary your communication"

Both assumptions of NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming --- NOT Natural
Language Processing).

If you want to start a discussion about this field, I humbly suggest
that sci.psychology is a better place to try.  They have a regularly
erupting flame war on NLP there.

Some of the material in "The Structure of Magic" by Bandler and
Grinder might be grist for the mill of sci.cognitive; however, it is
at a "lay public" kind of level.  Some of Dr. Grinder's publications
might be better.

					Dave Barton
					dlb@hudson.wash.inmet.com
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:695 sci.philosophy.tech:4182 sci.lang:8104 sci.philosophy.meta:2646
From: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Date: 19 Nov 92 20:01:39 GMT
Reply-To: pcollac@pyrnova.mis.pyramid.com (Paul Collacchi)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Pyramid Technologies, Mt. View, California.

In article <TORKEL.92Nov17201521@bast.sics.se>, torkel@sics.se (Torkel
Franzen) writes:
|> In article <1992Nov17.175227.20588@athena.cs.uga.edu>
mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.
|> edu (Michael Covington) writes:
|> 
|>    >Indeed.  Logical reasoning tells me that if I walk out in front
of a bus,
|>    >I'll get run over.
|> 
|>   How?

Exactly.  Logic is a set of rules of inference, not an epistemological
device. There is a difference between 'intelligence' which is often
spontaneous and sometimes seemingly 'illogical' and logic.

The vast majority of investigation now is empirical and not purely
deductive for the simple reason that pure deductive reasoning isn't
worth shit without
being seasoned by reality.  Remember when Aristotle reasoned that
circles were perfect, that heavier objects fell faster, and the Earth
was the center of the universe.  (I may have my facts wrong about
Aristotle, but you get the point, don't you?)

Do you have any idea how embarassing it is for all of us to have waited
for nearly two centuries before someone was clever enough to actually
drop something and watch it fall?

Logic is best when taken out regularly and thrashed thoroughly with the
ugly stick.  By creating Reality that way it did, Life shows itself to
have a terrific sense of humor, which I appreciate very much.


Paul Collacchi
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: snit@nevada.edu (S. Nev. Institute of Tech.)
Subject: reasons why AI not able to model mind?
Originator: snit@redrock.nevada.edu
Organization: Southern Nevada Institute of Technology
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 22:16:41 GMT

Anyone know of good articles that would argue that AI can not
accurately model human thought, innerness, qualia, etc
thanks.

snit
             \/              
            ()()          
            /()\          
          _|    |_        
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:741 sci.philosophy.tech:4227 sci.lang:8160
From: frank@i1.msi.umn.edu (Loren Frank)
Subject: Logic and stuff
Organization: University of Minnesota
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 03:54:16 GMT

I have been reading the last few postings on logic and meaning, and it seems
to me that there are two uses of the word logic that are being used 
interchangibly. One one hand there is formal logic, where sentences are 
mapped to precise symbolic formula. There are a set of inference rules and,
depending on the system, a few axioms, from which all well formed formuli
can be derived. The odd thing is that this sort of logic alows the derivation
of all sorts of formuli that are, in my opinion, at least, nonintuitive.
One example would be that if we know that it is not the case that a 
proposition P implies a proposition Q, it is possible to derive P 
(ie. P is true) and not-Q (Q is false). An English translation of that would
amount to something like "It is not the case that if it is raining then 
the moon is made of green cheese," which implies that "it is raining" and
"it is not the case that the moon is made of green cheese," neither of
which follow intuitively from the original statement. Essentially, logic of 
this sort fails to capture a number of intuitive notions like causality.
	On the other hand there is also the less formal logic of "if I
step in front of a speeding bus, I will get hurt." (I think someone said
something like that recently) This makes sense, and seems logical, but it 
cannot be demonstrated formally without the addition of a number of 
premises having to do with the implications of stepping in front of,
speeding, and so on. We do not think of that sort of everyday statement
as logical in the formal sense, if for no other reason than we do not tend
to think of things in the language of P and Q's and strict implication and so
on. 
	On a slightly related topic, when people are given the following
scenario :Linda has been very active in social concerns for most
of her life. During college she was involved in a number of organizations
whose aim was to bolster the rights of the underrepresented. 
People are then asked "which of the following is more likely:
1) Linda is a bank teller.
2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement."
People almost always choose 2) even though the likelyhood of a conjunction
is always less than the likelyhood of one of the conjuncts.

I am not quite sure what that means, but it is true...


Loren Frank
frankl@carleton.edu



Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Meaning (not Theory of)
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 19:52:06 GMT

In article <DLB.92Nov19100229@fanny.wash.inmet.com> dlb@fanny.wash.inmet.com (David Barton) writes:
>
>Both assumptions of NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming --- NOT Natural
>Language Processing).
>
>If you want to start a discussion about this field, I humbly suggest
>that sci.psychology is a better place to try.  They have a regularly
>erupting flame war on NLP there.
>
Please do not discuss NLP here. It is precisely because such discussions
began taking ove sci.psychology that sci.cognitive was formed. As safe
rule is "If it has ANY clinical possibilities whatsoever, it doesn't 
belong on sci.cognitive."


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:696 sci.philosophy.tech:4183 sci.lang:8105
From: ph@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Pat Healey)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 19 Nov 92 13:25:08 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

>In article <1992Nov17.092016.28202@news.unige.ch>
>swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:
>	     Finally, while genuine synonymes *might* exist as
>transient phenomena in human language, surely one would quickly
>be driven out by the other for simple reasons of efficiency (would
>you want to keep two identical copies of the same procedure in
>a program?).

Interestingly, Jim Hurford has suggested (via a game-theoretic model)
that this tactic of `driving out' synonymy is an evolutionarily
stable strategy that may have become genetically fixed during Hominid
evolution. 

One pragmatic aspect of natural language where synonymy is apparently
promiscuous (sic) is taboo words. How many words can you think of
which all `mean' genitalia ?? :-)

Pat.


-- 
Pat Healey				    | University of Edinburgh  
Phone: +44 (0)31 650 4436		    | Centre for Cognitive Science 
ARPA: ph%cogsci.ed.ac.uk@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk | 2 Buccleuch Place
JANET: ph@uk.ac.ed.cogsci   	            | Edinburgh EH8 9LW, Scotland
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:672 sci.philosophy.tech:4163 sci.lang:8086 sci.philosophy.meta:2622
From: mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.edu (Michael Covington)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Date: 18 Nov 92 16:40:42 GMT
Article-I.D.: athena.1992Nov18.164042.2001
Organization: AI Programs, University of Georgia, Athens

In article <1992Nov17.214321.18500@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Nov17.175227.20588@athena.cs.uga.edu> mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.edu (Michael Covington) writes:
>>
>>Indeed.  Logical reasoning tells me that if I walk out in front of a bus,
>>I'll get run over.  Does he mean that in the Far East this doesn't hold?
>
>LOGIC tells you this?!?!? Astounding! I'd love to see that logic. I've
>always thought this was contingent; true, but contingent. The things
>you learn on the net...

Of course it's contingent and is arrived at BY LOGICAL REASONING FROM PREMISES.
I never said it was analytic.


-- 
:-  Michael A. Covington     internet mcovingt@uga.cc.uga.edu 
:-  Artificial Intelligence Programs       phone 706 542-0358
:-  The University of Georgia                fax 706 542-0349
:-  Athens, Georgia 30602-7415 U.S.A.     amateur radio N4TMI
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym)
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 16:56:47 GMT

>
>Let us remember that human rights are based on a *committment* to 
>logic. 
>
> [Lots ommitted]
>
>Furthermore, remember that a committment to logic is a *western* ideal
>that is not going to be applicable in many areas of the world.

Something this silly has got to be bad for ya.
-- 
Michael Feld                  | E-mail: <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy           | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba        | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:654 sci.philosophy.tech:4143 sci.lang:8072 sci.philosophy.meta:2608
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning
Date: 17 Nov 92 22:21:24 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov17.172125.17543
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov17.131357.12605@news.Hawaii.Edu> 
lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:

>Michael Zeleny (zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu) wrote:

>>lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:

GL:
>>>I didn't see Chris's followup, so I'm taking this opportunity to
>>>agree with him.  I was just kidding.  "Mean the same thing" is
>>>just a manner of speaking, perhaps reflecting some folk theory
>>>which, however, we're under no obligation to accept.

MZ:
>>Who's that "we", kemosabe?

GL:
>Rational discussants.

What mandate entitles you to represent them in this categorical manner?

MZ:
>>If you don't feel that being bound by logic is a *moral* obligation, ...

GL:
>I think logic is wonderful.  Not all logic is semantic -- logic may be
>done syntactically.  Having shown that two sentences imply each other
>in some logical syntax, what is gained except confusion by proceeding
>to associate some esoteric meaning-thing with them both?

Invariance under selection of specific syntax. Explanation of
syntactical rules.  That, and bivalence.  In short, truth.  I shall
assume that you have read Tarski, so I will omit the motivational
details.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Commitment to logic; was ...
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 01:24:45 GMT

In article <Bxxx4o.Hqq@acsu.buffalo.edu> rmr@acsu.buffalo.edu (Richard M. Romanowski) writes:
>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>>The issue to which I was alluding was not whether natural language could
>>ultimately be reduced to *some* logic. In fact I hope it can because, under
>>at least one interpretation ofthe problem, the question amounts to whether
>>there can be a theory of language at all.
>
>	I think that LOGIC will be reduced to a natural language. 
>
>	But what do I know?

I'm not sure. What do you know? Why would one *want* to "reduce" logic
to natural language. One is patently rigorous, the other is not. We 
usually want a rigorous explication of that which is perplexing. Is
your comment a joke, a exercise in obscurantism, an omnidirectional
blast at science, or an actual contribution? Please tell us.
 
-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta