From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Subject: Re: Human Rights...
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 23:31:25 GMT
Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix & Internet, NYC

ald@clipper.ingr.com (Al Date) writes:

>In article <1992Sep6.021415.10802@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>
>>One advantage to holding that moral principles are absolute is that it
>     ~~~~~~~~
>>makes it possible for people who disagree about which moral principles
>>are the correct ones to believe that they are talking about the same
>>things (correct moral principles), even though they disagree about
>>them, and that discussion may lead to agreement.  

>Yeh, like between Randall Terry and a woman who consciously chooses to
>have an abortion? I see no hope of that discussion leading to agreement.
>Ever try to discuss ethics with the Ayatollah?

I would rather discuss ethics with the Ayatollah than with someone who
says "I do it because it's what I feel like doing and it fits in with
the things I like".  In the latter case I might be able to point out
ways in which what I'd like the guy to do also fits in with what he
likes.  On the other hand, I also might be able to convince the
Ayatollah that what I want him to do is required by the Koran.  So to
that extent, one argument would be as likely to succeed as the other. 
But in the case of the Ayatollah, I would also be able to appeal to the
principle that there are objective standards of right and wrong that
bind both of us and that are no more dependent on what he thinks or
wants than on what I think or want, and take it from there.  So with the
Ayatollah I'd have two shots at convincing him, compared with only one
for the relativist.

Of course, the Ayatollah might personally be a rather dogmatic fellow,
and the relativist might be personally more accomodating.  But the
reverse might be true as well -- there are many psychopaths who are in
the habit of doing whatever they think works for them but are personally
rather unpleasant, and many highly conscientious people who think that
"good" definitely means something different from "what suits the
purposes that I and the people I get along with share", but don't think
of the absolute as their private property.  I don't believe that either
the Nazis (if you don't object to my using the all-purpose example) or
the communists were big in transcendent standards of morality or
anything else.  The Nazis emphasized will rather than knowledge -- one
gathers from their concept of "Jewish science" that they even rejected
objectivity in the case of knowledge of the physical world -- and the
communists thought "morality" could be reduced to class interests, by
which I suppose they meant whatever the members of a class thought would
work out practically.

>[Y]our statement here that there is subjective utilitarian  value to be
>gained by claiming to be the holder of absolute moral truth effectively
>undermines any claim to absolute moral truth.

Unfair!  You claimed (I believe) that there is subjective utilitarian
value to rejecting the notion of absolute moral truth, and I was
contesting that claim on your own ground.  I thought I was being a nice
guy.  Possibly I should simply have said that your claim was irrelevant.
In any case, I don't see why claiming a viewpoint is useful implies that
it is false.

>Everyone will never agree on everything of a moral nature.  But at least
>"what works best" has a greater chance of empirical verification than
>some a priori principle.   I mean, you can SEE IT. And, who wants to
>adhere to a priori principles which result in all kinds of unacceptable
>results in the real world?  

One could believe that moral principles are as absolute as the speed of
light and also believe that we discover what they are in the same way we
discover what the speed of light is -- by reason and experience.

>To me the essence of morality is tolerance of others.  Not because it is
>an absolute truth, but because it works.

Would you abandon tolerance if you became convinced that it didn't serve
your purposes?  In that event it wouldn't work for you.

>Tolerance says that you can believe whatever the hell you want, as long
>as you dont impose it on me.  This allows people to interact in positive
>ways (including economic), without ever having to confront their
>inevitable disagreements on absolute moral truth.

It's not clear to me what the connection is between tolerance as so
defined and belief that there are moral absolutes.  Someone who rejected
moral absolutes (de Sade, for example) might like to use people for his
own purposes against their will.  On the other hand, someone who
believed that human freedom and dignity are absolutes might decline to
impose anything on anybody.
-- 
    Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
Xref: sparky ba.politics:5134 ca.politics:7556