HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Causality and exceptions
Date: 8 Sep 92 19:23:04 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <1992Sep4.161504.19714@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>In article <1992Sep4.124028.1383@bernina.ethz.ch> stettbac@isibee5 (Juerg Stettbacher) writes:
>>Does anyone know about a thing, an event or anything else that 
>>exists, happens or simply is with no cause.

>What about the universe (the totality of _everything_ that exists)?

Nope. The universe _may_ be without cause, but to assert that it in fact
_is_ without cause requires a bit more work. One interesting point is that
you will probably need to restrict "cause" and "effect" to be linearly
ordered in time in order to make it stick - else the interpretation, suggested
by quantum theory, that the observer "causes" the events is in play.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Causality and exceptions
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 00:22:35 +0000

stettbac@isibee5 (Juerg Stettbacher)

>Hello world

A C programmer by my troth!

>Does anyone know about a thing, an event or anything else that
>exists, happens or simply is with no cause. In other words: Can you
>tell me about an effect without cause?

        (i) Language. Cause and effect are two names given to
        different aspects of a descriptive model. You cannot have one
        without the other. They are aspects OF THE SAME THING.

        (ii) Reality. Cause and effect is only one of many ways of
        looking at it. You could just as easily say "Everything is.
        Nothing causes it" and not confuse yourself any more than
        you are already :-)


Thus in linguistic terms the answer is NO, In real terms, it depends
on exactly how you define cause and effect, and since they can't
really be precisely defined except by language, see (i). Give up. Do
something more interesting. Watch paint dry.

:-)
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger and Nazism -- one more time
Date: 10 Sep 92 00:14:19 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <Bu9EB0.GsL@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>recent journal articles this weekend I stumbled across the
>following in the latest volume of _Philosophia_ :
>
>	What Price Deconstruction?  Derrida on Heidegger
>	and the Question of Nazism:  A Critical Study
>
>	_Philosophia_, Vol. 21, 183-199
>
>I though others might be interested in it.  Unfortunately,
>I seem to have neglected to jot down the name of the author.

In a similar vein, a novel has recently been published based on Paul de Man
which poses the possibility that his disconnection of author's intent from
text is a clever way of disowning things he wrote for the Nazis in Vichy
France. I can't remember the author's name, since all I know is the review
of it on the BBC World Service (Meridian/Books show).

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Request for intro's to philosophy
Date: 14 Sep 92 22:09:50 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

Correction!!  _From Frege to Goedel_ is, of course, not only a collection
of _20th_ century logic papers.  The range of years is from Frege's
Begriffsschrift (1879) to Goedel's 1931 papers.  Sorry about that,
historians...whew!


-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: Request for critiques of Objectivism, and for intro's to philosophy
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 1992 16:30:20 GMT

Andy Fingerhut writes:

>I would be interested to know if anyone reading this has studied
>Objectivism as well as a sizable amount of other philosophy, and what
>their views are on Objectivism.  

I have studied Objectivism as well as a sizable amount of other philosophy.
My view on Objectivism is that it is stunningly clever, brilliantly argued,
and revolutionary.  My view, as you will see from the other replies your
query is sure to generate, is in the minority.

I think that your letter hit upon one of the main reasons why Rand
has been so popular with non-Philosophers but has been treated with
utter disdain by academic Philosophers.  For Rand, philosophy is not
a cute little game.  Philosophy is the foundation of any effective
approach to living a good life.  For academic philosophers, philosophy
is far too often a plaything disconnected from reality, with little or
no implications for real-world living.

>If anyone knows of critical articles
>or books (other than Nathaniel and Barbara Branden's books), I would
>also be interested in knowing about them.  I'll be glad to summarize
>and post any information I get.

I am sending you (in private e-mail, since I'm not sure that this list
will be interested in the whole thing) an in-progress bibliography of
works in philosophical and other academic journals about Rand.  But my
strongest suggestion is that you get _Objectivism: the Philosophy of
Ayn Rand_, by Leonard Peikoff (Dutton, 1991).  His book is a concise
summary of Rand's thought.  Unfortunately, his book tends to gloss over
some of the 'hard parts' in a way that the 'philosophically mature' may
find unsatisfying.  Consider it a good introduction.

If you wish to address some specific question about Rand's ideas to people
who are extremely qualified to answer, I suggest that you subscribe to
my mailing list, "Moderated Discussion of Objectivist Philosophy."  
The easiest way to subscribe is to drop me a line.  The members of my
list include philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, economists,
artists, etc.

--Jimbo

jwales@iubvm.ucs.indiana.edu



Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:1882 sci.philosophy.tech:3205
From: snodgras@cyber.net (John E. Snodgrass)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology
Date: 13 Sep 92 07:44:54 GMT
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: The Cyberspace Station

In article <Bu9E1I.GAD@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:

>In article <1992Sep7.082543.25359@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au>, John Wilkins <john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au> writes:

>|> The basic lesson from evolutionary theory is that there are no hard
>|> distinctions between such activities as science and other structured
>|> traditions. Hull takes this literally (and so he should).

>Quite a lesson to draw from a theory that is about (and successful in)
>a particular biological domain.  Suddenly, because we have a good theory
>accounting for change in biological populations over time, we ipso
>facto have a successful theory concerning science, theory change,
>and knowledge?  I remain somewhat skeptical about this extension.

      So do I, but for a different reason. The whole notion of ideas
evolving is actually no different from the notion of physical evolution.
Behavior is the result of ideas, and since all biological systems are
at bottom behaving systems, we can view evolution as a result of
altered behavior. After all, if a cell produces a new protein, or undergoes
some other mutation which ultimately affects the survival of the organism
and is passed on, this doesn't mean the cell has something _new_ in it,
so much as that it _behaves_ differently. The material of transference
(genetic) is itself only _information_, which is to say coded behavior.
Such coded behavior could be called stored "ideas". So the same
can obviously be applied to information in human society. Hence it is not
a _new_ theory, but the old theory revisited on another level.

      The same complaint applies to "memes" as somehow autonomously
evolving. Someone else has already pointed out that such 'entities' are
dependent on lending greater survival value to the 'host', as their only
means of propagation. But the notion that "memes" propagate at all,
even in a metaphorical sense, is highly dubious (i.e. a bad analogy). The
behavior of one organism may affect another organism
in some way that seems to involve copying, but copying is in fact
not taking place in the data communications sense. Each organism must
observe events, and restructure its own behavior. Thus the movement of
the meme is illusory, manufactured by the observer.

>--
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]

      John E. Snodgrass [snodgras@cyber.net]
From: epfaith@sunkist.berkeley.edu (Edward Paul Faith)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Causality and exceptions
Date: 6 Sep 1992 21:30:12 GMT
Organization: U.C. Berkeley Math. Department.
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: sunkist.berkeley.edu

In article <gate.w76NqB1w165w@lakes.trenton.sc.us> kalki@lakes.trenton.sc.us (kalki) writes:
>JS>Hello world
>
>JS>Does anyone know about a thing, an event or anything else that
>JS>exists, happens or simply is with no cause.
>JS>In other words: Can you tell me about an effect without cause?
>
>
> How is "a thing without cause" the same as "an effect without cause?"
> We have never heard of "thing" and "effect" being synonomous terms.
> There is God, Who is without cause, but we do not know of an effect
> without cause.
>---
> * OLX 2.1 TD * Kalki's Infoline, 803-643-3172, Aiken, SC, USA
>                       

It is asked if there are any events without causes.  Arthur Schopenhauer
argued that this would be inconceivable (The Fourfold Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason--first root)

But what about singularities in spacetime?  Black holes seem to simply
be the end of anything that falls in them, at least in the classical,
Einsteinian maodel.  A rock falls into a black hole, and it simply
vanishes when it reaches the singularity.  Poof, not even a cloud of
smoke.  In this case, there is an event without an effect.

Turn this around and you have an event without a cause, as for example
the Big Bang.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: amiga@phobos.unm.edu (carlos a.f  senaenterr)
Subject: Re: Keywords: 
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 92 01:58:08 GMT
Organization: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque
From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 31 Aug 92 21:10:47 GMT

>(ken bell) writes:

> I think it is very dangerous to equate love with feelings, of however a
> a noble kind. For feelings are evanescent, while love (I'm in one of those
> moods) is usually thought to be something stable and a stablizing influence
> on humankind.

>That's interesting. If Love isn't a feeling which informs
>one's existence, actions and response, what is it? How
>could Love not be a feeling?

>Dano

  In this entire discussion I haven't seen any real consideration of the
distinction between love and feelings.  I would like to suggest that love,
as love, is not a feeling at all, but a recognition.   That all the various
feelings that we associate with love are just our particular individual ego
responses to a recognition.  I'm using a definition of love that I originally
got from Oscar Ichazo: "Love is the recognition of the same consciousness
in another as in oneself."  There are a couple of corollaries to this: 1)
so long as a person is caught up in their own individual ego processes
they cannot fully recognize consciousness in another, and cannot fully
love (think of the lust crazed teenager who looses interest after 
satisfaction of desire); 2) to develop ones capacity to love it is necessary
to clarify one's consciousness beyond the ego controlled state we spend
most of our time in.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 12:45:14 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <c3tn5y+.anson@netcom.com>, anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:
|> 
|> This begs the question.
|> 
|> Let me rephrase:  What, then, is a "faulty moral standard?"
|> 
|> And:  In what way is _The_Story_of_O_ representative of one?
|> 
|> Your reply seems more a defense of Randall Holmes than a substantive
|> reply to my question.  I did not attack Mr. Holmes.  I asked what 
|> should be a simple question.
|> 
|> Or is asking for clarification an attack?
|> -- 
|> 

Sorry.  I thought this phrase so common that I took your question
as an implied criticism.  If you are indeed asking in what sense
a moral standard can be faulty (or outrightly false, as Randall
suggests in a more recent posting), then there are some fairly
lengthy and detailed answers to be had.  It is probably better for
you to scan the abundant literature on this subject than to be
subjected to some half-baked lecture from me in this medium.

However, some quick suggestions that may serve as no more than
hints:  If you set out to either develop a moral standard from
scratch or to decide among a set of competing moral standards
it is wise (if not necessary) to first establish some pre-systematic
criteria of adequacy -- either conditions which any acceptable
moral standard must satisfy or "defeaters" which would require the
rejection of any moral standard that implied them.  I will not
attempt to be more specific than this since I think it would only
stimulate arguments over the particular examples I might give.

A moral standard failing any of these criteria is faulty -- in
precisely the same way that (for example) an inconsistent mathematical
theory is faulty (consistency being one of the criteria of
adequacy) or a scientific theory that fails to predict phenomena
in the appropriate domain is faulty.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: windsphire@wizard.colorado.edu
Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: 9 Sep 92 10:04:43 MST

Gary, here's a non-systematic, non-exhaustive list, but should be a useful
nexus...

		-Windsphire

> |> mechanism. Besides, I've seen memetic arguments that easily draw
> |> correspondences to mechanisms of inheritence, mutation, randomness and
> |> parts of parts. Look at this thread for example.
> 
> Okay, I'll bite.  Trot 'em out in detail.

	Evolution, cognition, and realism :  studies in
                 evolutionary epistemology /  edited by Nicholas Rescher.
                 Lanham :  University Press of America,  c1990.
                 CPS publications in philosophy of science
                 "These essays originated from an interdisciplinary
                  conference on "Evolutionary Epistemology" held in
                  Pittsburgh in December of 1988, under the sponsorship of
                  the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Philosophy of
                  Science."--Pref.

	Theories of the evolution of knowing :  proceedings of the
                 fourth T.C. Schneirla Conference /  edited by Gary
                 Greenberg, Ethel Tobach.
                 Hillsdale, N.J. :  L. Erlbaum,  1990.
                 Proceedings of the fourth T.C. Schneirla Conference held at
                 Wichita State University in November 1987.
                 Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

	A useful inheritance :  evolutionary aspects of the theory
                 of knowledge /  Nicholas Rescher.
                 Savage, Md. :  Rowman & Littlefield,  c1990.
                 Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory ;   v. 1

	Information, knowledge, evolution :  proceedings of the
                 Forty-Fourth FID Congress held in Helsinki, Finland, 28
                 August-1 September, 1988 /  edited by Sinikka Koskiala and
                 Ritva Launo.
                 Amsterdam ;  New York :  North-Holland ;  New York, N.Y.,
                 U.S.A. :  Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada,
                 Elsevier Science Pub. Co.,  1989.

 	Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology
                 of knowledge /  edited by Gerard Radnitzky and W. W.
                 Bartley, III ; with contributions by Sir Karl Popper ...
                 [et al.].
                 La Salle, Ill. :  Open Court,  1987.
          
	Evolution--revolution;  patterns of development in nature,
                 society, man, and knowledge.  Edited by Rubin Gotesky and
                 Ervin Laszlo.
                 New York,  Gordon and Breach  [1971]

 	Models of Growth and the Evolution of Scientific Knowledge.
           	In: Explorations in knowledge.
               	1991 v 8 n 1


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Heidegger and Nazism -- one more time
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 12:20:59 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


It is not my intention to stir the embers of the recently
extinguished dispute on this subject, but as I was scanning
recent journal articles this weekend I stumbled across the
following in the latest volume of _Philosophia_ :

	What Price Deconstruction?  Derrida on Heidegger
	and the Question of Nazism:  A Critical Study

	_Philosophia_, Vol. 21, 183-199

I though others might be interested in it.  Unfortunately,
I seem to have neglected to jot down the name of the author.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:19:26 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <7291@charon.cwi.nl> jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) writes:
>In <1992Sep11.040353.15399@news.eng.convex.com>, cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>>In article <d!vnhpk.anson@netcom.com> anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:
>>>So in what way is _The_Story_of_O_ extreme?

>>If you're at all familiar with this story, and are still asking this
>>question, then there's no point in answering you. This truly is a case of
>>"if you have to ask, then don't bother". 

>>Dialogue implies a certain degree of mutual understanding; if this
>>understanding is not present, then dialogue is impossible.

>The events in the story take place with the consent of all involved.
>If you do not understand the meaning of consent, then indeed, dialogue
>with you is likely to be impossible.  I can only suggest you read
>alt.sex.bondage for a few months, and then reread O.

What does consent have to do with it? Some people are self-destructive, and
consent in--or even initiate--all sorts of activities that damage them.
Does that make it right for me to assist them in their own destruction? To
take pleasure in doing the evil to them that they themselves may desire? Of
course not. 

> I can only suggest you read
>alt.sex.bondage for a few months, and then reread O.

You have an odd notion of moral education.
-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: Robert.Vienneau@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau)
Subject: Grossman Satire (was Re: Causality and exceptions)
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.meta
Organization: Extended Bulletin Board Service
Date: Sat, 5 Sep 1992 00:36:41 GMT

In a previous post some time ago, Stephen Grossman had relations
existing, just like anything else. So ...

Existience exists, and things exist. They all exist and the set of all
things exist. Sets exist, and so do their members. Some sets have
members that are sets themselves, and some sets don't. Both kinds of
sets exist. They exist equally. All sets exist. The set of all sets
that can be defined in 100 words or less is a set. It exists, and it is
defined in less than 100 words. It is a member of itself. The set of
all sets that are members of themselves exists. So does the set of all
sets that are not members of themselves. Limits only exist in epi, not
obj.

Logic exists, and so does illogic. Shit exists, and Mr. Grossman's mind
exists and so does the shit that is Grossman's mind.

                                         Robert Vienneau
                                         rob@kaman.com

P.S. For those tempted to try this, this is not nearly as much fun or as
good as I thought it might be. Of course, I'm unwilling to abandon
spelling and grammar, as well as logic.

--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  bbs.oit.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: windsphire@wizard.colorado.edu
Subject: Re: Causality and exceptions 
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: 9 Sep 92 09:48:48 MST


> Does anyone know about a thing, an event or anything else that
> exists, happens or simply is with no cause.
> In other words: Can you tell me about an effect without cause?

How about...

What causes/caused consciousness? (Is this like saying 'what temperature
is a molecule'?). Vague theories about evolutionary epiphenomenon 
automatically discounted as wishful thinking.

		-Windsphire

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta