From: chuck@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Chuck D'Ambra)
Subject: Re: Are sentience and sapience arbitrary ethical criteria?
Reply-To: chuck@sage.cgd.ucar.edu
Organization: The Big Cracker
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 22:01:36 GMT

In article <1992Oct14.210515.15087@pixel.kodak.com>, young@serum.kodak.com writes:

cd: The identification or selection of ethical standards by humans is not
cd: random, simply because non-humans are incapable of doing so.  If ethics
cd: are exclusively the province of humans, why is an anthropocentric view
cd: inappropriate?

ry:	I find it mildy amusing that the very group which has argued that
ry:	humans and sapient/sentient animals are equal, now finds it convenient
ry:	to argue that man is perhaps a bit MORE than equal.  We're either
ry:	just another animal or we're not...it can't be had both ways.

What group would that be?  If you're referring to PETA or animal rights
groups in general, I'm not a member of any of them and for that matter
have yet to be convinced that we should recognize rights for non-human
animals.  Few such advocates (and definitely not I) actually claim that all
animals are equal.  These organizations contend that they have *some* of the
same rights as humans.  I'm not aware of any that believe human ethical
standards should apply to other animals.  With that in mind, how about
answering the question?

cd: We are not attempting to determine if the earth is the
cd: center of the universe, but rather what are the boundaries of appropriate
cd: human conduct....

ry:	...through the use of criteria we can't even define properly, and
ry:	certainly cannot measure objectively.  The application of the 
ry:	criteria is "capricious."

I don't agree.  We have suitable definitions for the subject criteria and can
conduct experiments to objectively measure things like cognitive ability.

cd: Indeed, the existence of absolute ethical standards is a fundamental
cd: question, one which I hope this group will explore more completely.  But
cd: why would it matter whether non-humans recognize principles if they are
cd: incapable of doing so?

ry:	It should matter to humans whether the principles being espoused
ry:	are universally and objectively applicable.  Ironically, your
ry:	implications recall an argument often used by AR advocates: blacks
ry:	weren't considered human by slaveholders.  They were considered
ry:	incapable of grasping certain principles.  Did it not "matter"?
ry:	"Well", you say, "they WERE human, and the slaveholders were clearly
ry:	wrong in their assessment."

ry:	Are we so sure of our assessments here?  Or are we slaveholders?

Those who consider sentience and sapience relevant criteria for ethical
considerations would be obliged to reconsider their positions/behavior should
we obtain compelling evidence that carrots, amoebae, etc. possess such
abilities.

Interestingly, your questions are highly relevant to those who would treat
non-human animals as nothing more than property or food.

cd: Let me give an example.  Many persons, including some contributors to this
cd: group, believe in absolute ethical standards set forth by a supernatural
cd: being.  Would we learn anything about the validity of this idea by
cd: considering the opinions (or absence thereof) of amoebas?

ry:	If amoebae could express opinions, we might!  :*)

ry:	Look, no one is going to argue that an amoeba is capable of
ry:	considering the implications of the existence of a supernatural
ry:	being.  In this discussion we are addressing something far, far
ry:	more basic: pain, and the ability to sense and react to it.

Perhaps I have misunderstood your position.  It seemed to be that any
particular standard for ethical conduct is arbitrary unless it is *accepted*
by all species.  I still have trouble with the way you've stated it here:

1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the amoeba reacts to some
conditions in its environment.  It does not support the conclusion that
it feels pain.

2) If the point is that an ethical criterion must address something that
is present in all organisms, it denies our ability to draw boundaries by
simple definition.

ry:	A better question, though, might be this: "Are sentience and 
ry:	sapience, although recognized as ethical criteria, nevertheless
ry:	arbitrary in their application to non-human species."

Why would they be non-arbitrary in application to humans and arbitrary
in application to other animals?  If they are valid criteria (I believe
they are), we are obliged to give similar ethical consideration wherever
they are present.

cd: If this assertion were valid, perhaps we would have a first criterion that
cd: applies to all species:  organisms of all species are self-interested
cd: (where "interest" carries the same connotations as the dictionary definition
cd: of caring).

ry:	Are you saying here that your criterion says, "...all species care
ry:	(in the dictionary sense) what happens to them?"  Clearly not, since
ry:	the dictionary sense of "care" implies cognition, but we've been
ry:	here before, haven't we?  As I said in my last posting, "care," in
ry:	the dictionary sense, is simply part of the implementation of "react"
ry:	that comes along with complexity of structure.  To that, let me
ry:	add the phrase, "...where pain and suffering are concerned."

It is not my criterion.  It seemed to follow from the arguments you
presented, at least as I interpreted them.

ry:	We may use the word "care" with reference to amoebae, but we must
ry:	understand that there is no attempt to attach cognition to this
ry:	looser interpretation; it is merely shorthand for "the urge to
ry:	ameliorate or end the presence of noxious stimuli."

So we agree after all the amoeba has no cognitive ability, i.e. it is
not sapient.  If sapience is a valid criteria for ethical distinctions,
we have a basis for treating it differently than some other organisms.  If
not, we are left to either find another basis or accept the unreasonable
notion that none exists.

cd: Is survival of one's species an absolute ethic?

ry:	It certainly is close to an absolute, and it derives from survival 
ry:	of self.  Unless we can show moral relevance in other species,
ry:	however, I would be hesitant to call it an "ethic," except, perhaps,
ry:	for humans.  [ ... ]

I agree.

cd: Even if human society's ethical standards concerning cannabilism stem from
cd: nothing more than the predominant opinion, that is a sufficient basis to
cd: consider them non-arbitrary.  If we look closely we may find that they are
cd: part of human nature.

ry:	Isn't that what I said?  I think it entirely probable that human
ry:	attitudes toward cannibalism spring from atavistic instincts to
ry:	preserve the species, as do taboos against inbreeding.  On the 
ry:	other hand, saying that ethics surrounding this practice aren't 
ry:	arbitrary is rather ingenuous, since we are drawing from a pool 
ry:	of homogeneous creatures with identical physical structure.  It 
ry:	doesn't take much imagination to conclude that the physical and 
ry:	cognitive processes of one human are pretty much like those of 
ry:	another.

ry:	It's when we go beyond species boundaries and draw similar
ry:	conclusions without the justification of knowledge that our 
ry:	criteria become arbitrarily applied.

Which begs the question of how much knowledge is required.  Do we insist
on the unobtainable goal of complete knowledge and use it as justification
for ignoring the issue or, given that we are far from ignorant on the matter
either, base our decisions on the available evidence?  In neither case will
we have an assurance that our actions are correct, but with the latter case
we are at least assured that we have made our best effort.

Many of the discussions occurring in this group boil down to "where to draw
the line?".  Rational criteria can be established.  If one has difficulty
accepting sentience and sapience, what alternatives are more reasonable?

--------------------
Chuck D'Ambra
chuck@sage.cgd.ucar.edu
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals