From: david@bourbon.ee.tulane.edu (David Kaufmann)
Subject: Re: Child abuse ordered by G-d
Nntp-Posting-Host-[nntpd-12488]: bourbon
Organization: Department of Electrical Engineering, Tulane Univ.
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 13:40:15 GMT


In article <1993Jan25.154032.25642@gboro.rowan.edu> kilroy@gboro.rowan.edu (Dr Nancy's Sweetie) writes:
>
>We have been discussing the OT Law.  I wrote that, by the standards I have
>available, the OT law is unreasonably harsh.
>
>David Kaufmann has been taking the opposite position, at least when he can
>refrain from insulting me.  However, he misunderstood and failed to address
>the main point of my last post.  I will attempt to restate it.
>
First, let's clear up a point: my intent is not to insult, except when
that seems to be the response desired by the statements made. So, I am
more than willing to return to polite discourse and apologize for any
insults, if you'll do the same.

>
>Dr Kaufmann argued that I cannot reasonably judge OT laws by any but OT
>standards; there is an entire philosophy which drives the legal system, and
>what should be considered is how well the various punishments fit within
>that legal system.
>
We can drop the titles, please. I find the Mr., Ms, Dr, clergy bit
rather pretentious. The above is correct, but misses the point in
connection with a discussion of absolute vs. relative morality
(discussed below). But I will reiterate this point: if the punishment
fits within the legal system and the philosophy of that system, which
produced the law, is morally sound, then the punishment is not
improper or harsh. That does not mean that the punishment should be
applied outside that system. A different example: US law and British
law differ on the right to own a gun. One law is not necessarily
immoral, not even in comparison with the other system. 

>Judaism, for example, assumes that the Torah is divinely authored; one of
>the basic commandments of Judaism is to honor one's parents.  Parents are
>considered representatives of the Creator.
>
>A rebellious son, who denies his reponsibility to his parents and declares
>his rejection of the source of life has, by this standard, forfeited his
>right to life.
>
>Therefore, by the philosophical framework in which the OT Law is meant to
>operate, killing a rebellious son is perfectly consistent.  I have never
>denied this.
>
But what you miss is the requirements for applying the penalty (as
pointed out several times, this is explicit in the Talmud), which is
also critical for a judgment, even outside the framework.

>
>However, Dr Kaufmann said nothing whatsoever about my counterexample about the
>Spanish Expulsion of the Jews.
>
>The Spanish monarchs had declared being a practicing Jew "the greatest, most
>perilous, and most contagious of crimes."  Spain was a Catholic country, and
>someone who rejected the Catholic religion had forfeited his right to live
>in a Catholic country.
>
>Using the philosophical framework that Ferdinand and Isabella lived in, the
>expulsion of the Jews was completely justified and perfectly consistent.
>
The comparison doesn't work for two reasons (other than those already
pointed out by other posters): 1) you are comparing a political act
with a legal one; 2) you are comparing the unmitigated condemnation
of an entire class of people with the trial of an individual.

This in fact is the issue of "affirmative action": is a group entitled
to special privileges or subject to special mistreatment because of
its nature as a group? This is the Ferdinand and Isabella question.

The rebellious son question is individualistic: has this person
violated the law and what penalty should apply.

If you are asking about the morality of the law itself, then that must
be seen as part of the legal system. If you are asking about the
morality of a particular action, then that action must be judged first
by the system's morality, and then by whatever terms of objective
morality can be agreed upon. (In neither case is a gut reaction or
superficial reading sufficient.) THus, a more proper comparison would
be: How legal was the expulsion? And only then, since rebellious son x
was executed, using such-and-such testimony and evidence, are the two
judgments legally valid? And only then, are both, either or neither
morally correct.

In short, judging an action also requires considering the system that
produced it. Judging the system requires defining the terms of
judgment/morality. The question is not thus, was the expulsion moral
on its terms the way the rebellious son is moral on its terms, but
first, what axioms do we use to judge a system, how then do we judge
the system that produced the expulsion, how do we judge the system
that produced the rebellious son law, is the judgment itself correct,
and is there any comparison between the two systems.

All this goes far beyond an unsubstantiated, negative assertion that
"by the standards I have
>available, the OT law is unreasonably harsh."
>
>It seems to me that if I cannot fairly criticise Jewish law by standards
>except those used by the people of the time, that I also cannot fairly
>criticise Spanish law except by the standards of THOSE people.  The standards
>of legality and morality that I follow are external to the OT society, true;
>but they are also external to the standards of Ferdinand and Isabella.
>
Again, this missed a point. I am not arguing for criticising Jewish
law by the standards of the time, since the standards of Jewish law
are not subject to particular socio-economic conditions. Further,
before an evaluation can be made of either "OT society"  (to say
nothing of Judaism, which goes beyond this) or Ferdinand and Isabella,
first the standards of legality and morality being used must be
defined and analysed and then compared with the ones being judged. It
may be that your standards are wanting; it may be that none are but
that there has been a misapplication in one or more cases.

If you are going to challenge the assumptions of the rebellious son
(or Fredinand and ISabella) you must first state the basis of that
challenge and see if it is appropriate.

>
>In your last answer, you said nothing about the Spanish actions of 1492.
>Perhaps I did not make it clear, but your evaluation of those actions is
>what I was interested in.
>
>So then: how do you see the Expulsion of the Jews?  Do you use standards
>external to the 15th-Century Spanish monarchy?  If so, who are you to use
>your standards on others?  Why should anybody care what you think?
>
To make it clear: The expulsion of the Jews from Spain was an act of
political and religious anti-Semitism, of questionable legality. It is
an example of class-action prejudice and irrelevant to an examination
of case law.

I use the same standard to judge the morality of the Spanish expulsion
as I do to judge the morality of the rebellious son or Roe v. Wade:
the standard of absolute morality outlined (note the word) in the
Torah and explicated by Jewish scholars and legal experts. An act
which promotes or fulfills one's obligation to G-d (and these
obligations are detailed in the sources above) is moral; one that does
not is immoral. (Obviously, individual acts may subject to some
discussion, but the basis of that discussion is clear.)

The standards are not mine. My feelings about the rebellious son are
irrelevant and I don't mention them. And one should not care about my
thinking, but should consider if the reasoning is sound, regardless of
its source.

Now, if you want to move the discussion to the question of determining
absolute morality, fine, but that's another issue altogether.

In conclusion, I would have had no problem had you said the law of the
rebellious son seems harsh. But you said it represented one of a
number of excessive punishments for trivial offenses. That is an
unsubtantiated opinion that has not been supported by evidence or
logic. So far, you've simply said, I judge, and when challenged
responded, well, then you can't judge either.

Now, if you don't deny the legitimacy of the rebellious son law within
context (and defining context is another topic), but condemn it, then
you are condemning the system. For this, you need some evidence and
logic, and you haven't provided any beyond an emotional I don't like
it. That's hardly logical or moral.

Anyway, I hope this clarifies the questions and issues somewhat. (And
none of the above is intended to insult, only to point out the logical
consequences, flaws, etc.)


David Kaufmann
INTERNET:	david@bourbon.ee.tulane.edu
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