From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Systems Reply I (repost perhaps)
Keywords: AI Searle Dickhead Barf
Date: 8 Apr 92 19:59:12 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Mar29.083336.6608@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:

>All right, I will play by your rules! I do not see any problems
>with computers lining up "Cats" with cats, just as they can
>line up a subdirectory with the name of the subdirectory!

Look at Putnam's _Reason, Truth, and History_ for his cats
and cherries argument.

>My thoughts are an intricate part & parcel of my
>behaviour, just because it is not externally visible
>does not mean that it is not behaviour! 

We have very different idea of what "behavior" means.
Moreover your definition does not seem to be the one in
general use.

>I think that
>you missunderstood my point, just because we cannot
>explain how its done in humans - does that mean that
>it cannot be duplicated by a physical system?

No, but if we have good reasons to conclude that it can't
be duplicated by a computer, we still have these good reasons
even if we can't say how it's done in humans.

Unless you are willing to accept this point, there is no
point in continuing to discuss these matters with me,
because I am never going to agree that showing how it's
done in humans is necessary.

>Now I am not saying that understanding has already
>been duplicated by machines, I am arguing that there
>is no reason that it cannot be!

Several people have offered reasons why it cannot be.
They may be wrong, but they're not wrong just because
they haven't said how humans do it.  Address their
arguments rather than demanding they they do things
that are unnecessary!

>>Quite simply, the arguments are _not_: machines are not people,
>>therefore they do not understand.
>>
>I beg to differ, as evidenced by all those arguments about
>intentionality, and agency on the net recently, which very
>conveniently disqulifies certain things from having these
>properties by mere hand waving!

Quote the arguments you have in mind, because I haven't
any that fit your description.  

>>Here's a similar case.  Suppose there's an argument that a particular
>>kind of airship is too heavy (or wrongly shaped) to fly.  This is
>>_not_ an argument that it is not a bird and hence it can't fly.
>
>In this case you have made specific observations as to
>why flying is impossible, your observations may be
>right or wrong, but they are provable! No such turkey
>in your argument about intelligence & understanding!

That is just false.  Eg, Searle has an argument that computers
lack required causal powers (compare to "an argument that it's
wrongly shaped").  

>>>What if I showed you that people are machines?
>>
>>Depends on just what you showed.  But look at Searle's remarks
>>on "meat machines" first.  Indeed, I recommend (again) the first
>>Reith Lecture, reprinted as chapter 1 of his _Minds, Machines,
>>and Programs_ (or some similar title).
>>
>Nothing that Searle says proves that people are anything
>other than machines! Granted, machines with extraordinary
>capabilities, but still machines!

This shows that I was right to recommend the Reith Lectures, though
it's actually the 2nd one in which he discusses meat machines.

You seem to think Searle is trying to show people are not machines
That is wrong.  Searle is not trying to prove people are not machines.
He says they _are_ machines.  He also says machines can have minds.

-- jd
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy