HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: sb4x@uvacs.cs.Virginia.EDU (Shumeet  Baluja)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: RE: Simulated Annealing
Keywords: Simulated Annealing
Date: 6 Apr 92 22:38:00 GMT
Article-I.D.: murdoch.1992Apr6.223800.23013
Reply-To: sb4x@virginia.edu
Organization: University of Virginia Computer Science Department


Here are three good references for Simulated Annealing:


 Kirkpatrick, S. , Gelatt, C., Vecchi, M. "Optimization by Simulated 
  Annealing.", SCIENCE, Vol. 220, No. 4598, May 1983, pp 671-680  1983

 
 Golden, B. , Skiscim, C., "Using Simulated Annealing to Solve Routing
  and Location Problems."  NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS QUARTERLY. Vol 33
  pp. 261-279, 1986


 Nahar, S, Sahini, S. Shargowitz, E. "Experiments with SA",
  22ND DESIGN AUTOMATION CONFERENCE. PAper 44.6, pp. 748-752  1985



hope this helps. 



Shumeet Baluja
sb4x@virginia.edu
From: joungwoo@mensa.usc.edu (John Kim)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Allen Ginsberg's email address
Date: 15 Apr 1992 09:50:43 -0700
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
NNTP-Posting-Host: mensa.usc.edu
Summary: Please let me know Ginsberg's email address
Keywords: Allen Ginsberg, email address


Could somebody let me know the email address of Allen Ginsberg? I believe he
is at AT&T Bell Labs in Holmdel, New Jersey, if this helps any.

Please let me know by email.

Thank you in advance.

John
-- 
Joung-woo John Kim				joungwoo@mensa.usc.edu
Computer Science Dept.
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0781

Newsgroups: comp.ai
From: larry@cchtor.cch.com (Larry Chin)
Subject: PD program called CLIPS
Reply-To: larry@cch.com
Organization: CCH Canadian Ltd.
Distribution: na
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 10:01:20 GMT


Hello all,

I am looking for an ai tool called CLIPS, does anyone know where I can find
this ? I checked the uunet archives and it does not seem to reside there.

If anyone had any idea where this might be please e-mail me, I do not as a rule
read this newsgroup.

Thanks,



Larry Chin {larry@cch.com}			CCH Canadian Ltd.
System Administrator				6 Garamond Court
Research and Development			Don Mills, Ontario.
(416) 441-4001 ext. 349				M3C 1Z5

These are my opinions, MINE YOU HEAR, MINE !!!

-- 
Thanks,



Newsgroups: comp.ai
From: pja@news.cis.ohio-state.edu (Peter J Angeline)
Subject: Gentic Algorithms with Competing Species
Reply-To: pja@cis.ohio-state.edu
Organization: The Ohio State University Department of Computer and Information Science
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 06:56:42 GMT


Does anyone have some good references for genetic algorithms (or anything for
that matter) where species are competing against one another?  In other
words say you have N species setup such that an individual from one species
competes with a subset of each of the others as the fitness function.  The
object is to make all the species competent against each other.

I am aware of Thomas Ray's work with Tierran but that doesn't quite get at what
I'm after.  Thanks in advance for the pointers.

-pete angeline

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter J. Angeline            ! Laboratory for AI Research (LAIR)
Graduate Research Assistant  ! THE Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210
ARPA: pja@cis.ohio-state.edu ! "Nature is more ingenious than we are."
From: rao@parikalpik.eas.asu.edu (Subbarao Kambhampati)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: perf of lisp on Suns for acad. AI applns.--experiences with SparcII, IPX and ELC wanted
Date: 13 Apr 92 01:51:40 GMT
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, Arizona State University, Tempe


We are trying to purchase some new sun workstations for use in our AI
lab and are trying to decide between sparcII's, sun-ipx's and sun-elc's.
The tradeoffs ofcourse is that Sparc II is 1.5 times costlier than
IPX and twice as costly as ELC. At the same time, it makes no sense to
buy a cheaper workstations if it is going to involve very high
performance penalties for lisp.


I wanted to get people's feedback on their experiences with running
lisp (and non-trivial but also non-humongous "ai" programs) on Suns.
If any of you (particularly academia types) have any experience
(positive or negative) in using lisp on sun-ipx or sun-elc, I would
appreciate very much hearing your feedback.

 Please e-mail to rao@asuvax.asu.edu (or reply to this article). If
there is sufficient interest I will summarize on the net.

thanks
Rao
[Apr 12, 1992]
Xref: sparky comp.ai:1979 comp.ai.philosophy:4277 comp.ai.edu:255 comp.cog-eng:197
From: saint@mitchell.hac.com (Kathy Saint)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Wanted - case-based expert system
Date: 13 Apr 92 15:06:54 GMT
Reply-To: saint@mitchell.hac.com (Kathy Saint)
Organization: Hughes Aircraft Company


As the subject says, we're looking for a case-base expert system (i.e., not
rule-based).  Any pointers would be greatly appreciated.  

Thanks in advance,
Kathy.

==============================================================================
Kathy Saint             ||  "She's a witch!! She's a witch!!."
"I'm not dead yet."     ||  "How can you tell she's a witch?"
                        ||  "She looks like one!!"
saint@mitchell.hac.com  ||      - "Monthy Python & the Holy Grail"
From: bokkie@uctvax.uct.ac.za
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Eliza-Like Programs
Date: 15 Apr 92 10:37:34 +0200
Organization: University of Cape Town

In article <1992Apr6.045225.7045@cbnewsh.cb.att.com>, 
young@cbnewsh.cb.att.com (young.u.huh) writes:
> Are there any Eliza-like programs that were written more recently?
> Young Huh
> yhuh@ihlpe.att.com

I have one in interpreted BASIC, and one in compiled PASCAL.
a few years back.  Contact me directly if you want a copy.

Also, note that many AI textbooks include ELIZA code or
examples.  For instance:
Sterling,L. and Shapiro,E.  _The Art of Prolog_ MIT Press.

Frank Bokhorst
Dept of Psychology
University of Cape Town
South Africa  
e-mail: bokkie@uctvax.uct.ac.za
-------------------------------
They were obtained from public-domain distribution systems
From: mcovingt@athena.cs.uga.edu (Michael A. Covington)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Dictionary of Spellings
Date: 16 Apr 92 18:25:43 GMT
Organization: University of Georgia, Athens

In article <1992Apr16.130046.11164@husc3.harvard.edu> sweeney@husc3.harvard.edu writes:
>We need a dictionary of spellings to test some linguistic learning 
>algorithms. In particular, we are seeking an ASCII file of several 
>thousand unique words, with or without affixes. 

Such a file is included with (almost) every copy of UNIX, under the
name /usr/dict/words.



-- 
==========================================================================
Michael A. Covington, Ph.D. |  mcovingt@uga.cc.uga.edu  |  ham radio N4TMI
Artificial Intelligence Programs | U of Georgia | Athens, GA 30602  U.S.A.
==========================================================================
Newsgroups: comp.ai,la.seminars
From: campbell@aero.org (Andrew Campbell)
Subject: This Wednesday 4/15/92, TACART: Lewis on Intelligent Objects
Organization: The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA
Distribution: la
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 1992 20:58:50 GMT

Los Angeles (LA) Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Technical Activity Committee on Artificial Intelligence (TACART)

             TACART

TOPIC:       Software Development with Intelligent Objects
SPEAKER:     Dr. Steven M. Lewis, The Aerospace Corp.
DATE:        Wednesday, 15 April 1992
TIME:        The talk will begin at 7:30
ABSTRACT:    The Cognits class library is a C++ class library which
             exploits inheritance and polymorphism to generate
             objects capable of behaving like the Minsky-type
             frames often used in AI. Standard objects are
             arranged as a tree with a number of builtin classes
             of connections between objects. Knowledge in the
             system is represented by fields in the objects and
             by the connections. A connection of special interest
             is Subscription, which requests the subscribed object
             to notify the subscriber of any changes. View, which
             is a subclass of Subscription, defines the relationship
             between an object and a widget on the screen. Cognits
             incorporates a Model-View-Controller paradigm for
             visualizing objects. Objects also have methods for
             browsing the class hierarchy. Cognits has been used for
             the development of satellite scheduling programs for the
             Air Force, and has proved especially useful in tracking
             requirements and constraints. Dr. Lewis will also discuss
             the pros and cons of using C++ rather than conventional
             AI languages for solving AI problems.
BIOGRAPHY:   Steven Lewis has a BS in math from Caltech and a PhD in
             Biophysics from the University of Washington. He has been 
             a member of the technical staff at The Aerospace Corp since 
             1988. Before that, he was Professor of Biomedical Engineering 
             at USC. He is also the head of engineering for Rhinosoft Inc,
             a small company producing Rhinomanometers.
PLACE:       The Conference Room, in the Basement of the Santa Monica
             Public Library, located at the corner of 6th St. and
             Santa Monica, in Santa Monica (4th/5th St. Exit from I-10).
DINNER:      No dinner is planned. No social activities are planned.
CONTACT:     L. Andrew Campbell (310) 336-8642 (days)
-- 
 zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
|L. Andrew Campbell     internet: campbell@aerospace.aero.org   |
|M1-102 PO Box 92957    organization: The Aerospace Corp.       |
|Los Angeles CA 90009   telephone: (310) 336-8642               |
Xref: sparky comp.ai:1926 comp.ai.neural-nets:1826
From: venkat@vidcom.csc.ti.com (Venkat Venkateswar)
Subject: Public domain Truth Maintenace Systems (TMSs and ATMSs)?
Organization: Texas Instruments
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 1992 15:04:34 GMT

Are there any public domain Truth Maintenance Systems (TMSs)? I am 
specifically interested in Assumption-based Truth Maintenance Systems
(ATMSs). Please send me e-mail and I will summarize the responses.

Thanks,

Venkat
From: devlin@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Keith Devlin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Can machines display intelligence
Date: 14 Apr 92 20:25:43 GMT
Organization: Stanford University CSLI

In article <92105.11231232HOCVO@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU> 32HOCVO@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU writes:
>I am looking for some opinions and insight on Artificial Intelligence.
>Will machines be able to learn, reason, and understand from experiences?
>What do you think?
>Laurie A. Kayden

Given a fairly straightforward, functional definition of your terms, the
answer surely is that machines already do all of these things. Beyond
that, and you are into questions of what you mean by "understand", "learn",
etc. If you have not yey done so, read the Dreyfus and Dreyfus book "Mind
over Machines". You don't have to agree with everything they day, but it
is a stimulating book.
From: throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: sensory-deprived rocks
Date: 6 Apr 92 12:02:23 GMT

> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
> Date: 1 Apr 92 14:29:01 GMT
> [...] the technical
> point is that a rock is functionally equivalent to a human being with
> nonfunctional sense organs and muscles.

I see this was posted on April 1 (GMT), but nevertheless...

I don't see that a rock is functionally equivalent to a human with
nonfunctional sense organs and muscles.  It is only behaviorally
equivalent.  The dissection of the rock (into internal states) would
yield different results from the dissection of the human (into internal
states).

Of course, this begs the question of whether functionalism is distinct
in principle from behaviorism at all; that's another story.

But look at it this way.  Isn't functionalism just behaviorism with a
different choice of interface/boundary?  If so, it would seem on the
surface (ha!) that the two *ought* to be distinct, in so far as the
interface across the chosen boundary is distinct.

Wayne Throop       ...!mcnc!aurgate!throop
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: What counts as the "Right" functional organization?
Date: 15 Apr 92 23:10:22 GMT
Organization: Northern Illinois University

In article <1992Apr15.192007.22672@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992Apr14.181138.8475@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>                                       But once you pin it to terms such
>>as 'belief' or 'understanding' or 'semantics' you run into the problem of
>>these terms not being sufficiently well defined, and the discussion will
>>quickly degenerate into arguments about issues that are not really central.
>
>"Not being sufficiently well defined" for what?  If you don't know what
>the terms really mean, then how can you possibly claim to have a theory
>of how they are produced?  How would you know when you are successful?

 I suspect the way I use the term "understanding" in a very similar to the way
you use it, and the meaning I associate with "understanding" is quite similar
to the meaning you have.  If I were asked to define "understanding" I would
have to refuse on the grounds that I don't know what it is.  If I recall
correctly, whenever you are asked, you too refuse to give a definition,
although your explanation may be more like 'since we all agree on the
meaning, it is pointless to define it'.  Regardless of the reason given,
the fact remains that discussions on this newsgroup have not provided
any clear and generally accepted definition of "understanding";  therefore
the term is not sufficiently well defined.

 Let me put it in other terms.  If you claim that "semantics" is well defined,
I would have to interpret that as an concession that the CR argument is bunk.
For, as far as I am concerned, it ain't well defined if you don't know how
to implement it.  I think this is R. Hamming's idea of understanding - you
don't truly understand something unless you can program a computer to do it.

-- 
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 1992 23:17:21 GMT

In article <1992Apr7.211232.6930@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>>
>What you "like to think" has little bearing on the question. Surely
>whether SHRDLU, thermostats, and rocks have minds is an empirical
>question.

  A precise, complete and unambiguous definition of "mind" please.  You
obviously have such a definition, since you declare the question to
be "empirical".

-- 
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940
From: silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: O-I ( other intelligence )
Date: 17 Apr 92 17:03:29 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Mt. View, Ca.
NNTP-Posting-Host: orfeo


 Does anyone have information as to what is known about
 the 'numerical awareness' of insects ?  As much simpler
 systems, it would be interesting to compare the 
 insect's numerical awareness to ours. 
 Insects and other arthropods are famous for their rigourous geometrical
 instincts ( beehives, spider webs, etc) , yet their geometrical
 instincts are not unequivocal evidence of numerical AWARENESS.  If
 insects do have some kind of operational numerical awareness,
 this might have implications for characterizing certain aspects
 of insect "other-intelligence".
From: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Robert Rosen & Physical form of Church's Thesis
Date: 10 Apr 92 16:52:24 GMT
Reply-To: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Organization: Center for Neural Systems, Memory, and Aging

In article <TogZiB1w164w@cybernet.cse.fau.edu> 
tomh.bbs@cybernet.cse.fau.edu writes:
>Robert Rosen has a new book out, called "Life Itself" which
>addresses many of the issues that have been discussed here.

>Rosen claims that the physical form of Church's Thesis is false.
 
>Issues this raises are:

>2) Is a turbulent flow an effective form of computation?  That is,
>   does a turbulent flow comprise an algorithm for computing something?

  The important question is, does a turbulent flow comprise an
algorithm for computing something *useful*?  If it can be
shown that any system gains any advantage, or accomplishes
a goal, by using a turbulent flow in a way that cannot be
reproduced by a Turing machine, then this would show that
Church's Thesis is false.  Otherwise not.

	-- Bill
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: petersow@saifr00.cfsat.honeywell.com (Wayne Peterson)
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Organization: Honeywell Air Transport Systems Division
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 92 14:47:21 GMT

Micheal Gemar writes:

"I agree that behaviour serves as "evidence".  I use behaviour all the time
to determine whether or not posters on the net are intelligent :-)."

Does this make them imposters?

-Wayne

Just asking?
From: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Subject: Re: Functional Equivalence (Was: A rock implements every FSA)
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 1992 11:48:58 GMT

In article <1992Apr9.214829.3723@oracorp.com> 
	daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:

 >Your definition amounts
 >to letting people see the intermediate steps of the calculation
 >instead of just the final results.

Yes, exactly.  I was searching for a definition that would accord with
my intuitive notion of "functional equivalence."   I am not satisfied
with the results.

 >To me, functional equivalence is a constraint that is imposed over and
 >above behavioral equivalence, and is not simply a matter of drawing
 >the interface at a different place.  For whatever your choice of
 >interface is, there is a corresponding notion of behavioral and
 >functional equivalence. 

I agree: the meaning of these two types of equivalence is dependent on
where you draw the interface.  And that choice seems to be arbitrary.
Which leads me to wonder how firm are the basic tenets of functionalism.
Presumably when a functionalist says that

	appropriate functional organization ==> mind, consciousness, etc.

they are drawing the interface line to separate what counts as
functional organization.  But if that line is arbitrary, it is hard to see
how it can delineate mind.
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
Date: 10 Apr 92 11:41:31 GMT
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

On a computer as a formal system:
They may be in an abstract sense, but we do know of non-linear analog
processes that affect their functioning. For instance, if you do a disk
access, it slows the rotation of the disk due to the power draw. In
time-critical processing, this can result in chaotic response times. I
know of at least one system where this results in wide differences in
functional behavior. (The algorithm used in the system is highly sensitive
to the order in which inputs are presented to it.)

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 6 Apr 92 19:31:25 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>I have been mildly surprised by the reaction to my "challenge"
>regarding the Chinese Room.  It turns out that no one is willing
>actually to defend the argument.  Everyone actually wants to talk
>about something else:
>
>  In article <6419@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

I'll respond briefly since I'm mentioned explicitly.  
Many of the attacks on the Chinese Room argument, and Searle
generally, are based on misunderstandings of what Searle has said.
I think there's something to be said for trying to straighten
out these misunderstandings, and I have been willing to try to
"defend" the argument in that sense.  (I've also been willing
to argue a number of other points ...)

However, I can't continue to spend as much time with this newsgroup
as I did recently, and this particular issue (which I take to be,
roughly, coming up with the argument Searle should have made) is not
one of the issues I find most interesting.

Still, for what it's worth, I did say what I thought the CR argument
was a while back, and even said why I thought Searle hadn't proved his
case.  I could always post the article again...

>I am still willing to pursue this if anyone else is, but I think the
>suggestion that we move the discussions of understanding and semantics
>out of the Room is a good one.

I find Dennet's idea that the Chinese Room is an "intuition pump"
(rather than an argument) attractive.

-- jd
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: HAL's address (was Re: SHRDLU's mind)
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1992 01:28:32 GMT

In article <1992Apr15.191554.22489@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>Hmm... does anyone know HAL9000's email address?
>
HAL9000@orion.jupiter.com

Problem is that it doesn't go into effect for anoth 9 years.
(THAT RIGHT FOLKS!!! NINE YEARS!!!!)

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Date: 6 Apr 92 18:10:33 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Apr4.175511.24556@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Apr4.015204.10671@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>
>>Again, the degree of necessity is the last, if not the least of your
>>problems (for, if functionalism is true, biological necessity is the same
>>as physical necessity); the first one has to do with giving an appropriate
>>semantics for your conditionals.  That your conflicting requirements simply
>>won't allow you to do: you can either stipulate trans-world identity
>>conditions for mind-brains, or for their properties, but not for both.
>>Choose the former, and you lose the conditionals; choose the latter, and
>>you lose personal identity.
>
>As I've made clear on a number of occasions, I subscribe to Parfit's
>treatment of personal identity, so that there need not be determinate
>facts about personal identity across worlds.

I'm not sure what the import of that is supposed to be.  Do you want
your other arguments to depend on Parfit's conclusions being right?
From: derek@lynx.cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: ai in the media
Date: 7 Apr 92 20:02:49 GMT
Article-I.D.: spool.1992Apr7.200249.27300
Organization: U of Wisconsin CS Dept

In <60528@aurs01.UUCP> throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

>Now I'm even MORE aghast, since I've seen last night's episode
>of "The Machine that Changed the World", in which it was stated
>(with a straight face, no less) that Turing had established that
>anything a human could do, a computer could do.

Yes; they also said that he was "light-years ahead of his
time" so what do you expect?  Nice performance by Jacobi, tho.

derek
sure, it can do *that*, but can it SNEEZE?