From: bb063@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Christopher J. Crobaugh)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re-Post of Dr Suter Article
Date: 22 Dec 1992 12:56:34 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (USA)
NNTP-Posting-Host: slc4.ins.cwru.edu


Here's Dr. Suter's article again, in ASCII format, with the
footnotes at the end. I also have this in WP 5.1, with the
footnotes embedded.

 GUN PROHIBITION IN THE MEDICAL LITERATURE - TELLING THE TRUTH?


by Edgar A. Suter, MD
Family Practice
5201 Norris Canyon Road, Suite 140
San Ramon, CA 94583 USA

Abstract

The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs has promulgated a policy that
opposes private ownership of "assault weapons." The policy is based
upon a report citing a single study that stands alone in its
conclusion. The report fails to address considerable research that
undermines the rationale of the prohibitionist policy. Many
misperceptions are perpetuated in that report. The constitutional
impediments to gun prohibition have been casually dispatched by the
Council without sound support. This article presents evidence
previously overlooked by the medical literature.

Acknowledgments

The author is indebted for their review and helpful suggestions to:

Paul H. Blackman, PhD, Research Coordinator, National Rifle
Association, Institute for Legislative Action, Washington, DC

James Boen, PhD, Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of
Biostatistics, University of Minnesota, School of Public Health,
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Robert Cottrol, JD, PhD, Associate Professor, Rutgers School of
Law, Camden, New Jersey

Col. Martin Fackler, MD, Retired Chief, Wound Ballistics
Laboratory, Letterman Army Hospital, Presidio, San Francisco,
California

Don B. Kates, Jr., LLB, Former Constitutional Law Professor, St.
Louis University School of Law, Civil Rights Attorney, Novato,
California

Gary Kleck, PhD, Professor of Criminology, Florida State
University, Tallahassee, Florida

The author is, however, solely responsible for the content of this
paper. Any errors exist despite, not because of, the kind help of
these or other reviewers.

Introduction

JAMA recently published a report submitted by the AMA Council on
Scientific Affairs in support of banning "assault weapons." [1] A
review of the authorities and references cited by the Council fails
to identify the three most comprehensive compilations of "assault
weapons in crime" data. [2, 3, 4] Also missing are the two most
comprehensive reviews of the "guns and violence" literature,
including the National Institute of Justice study. [5, 6] The
Council has not addressed and, therefore, not dispatched the
confounding data of these and many other readily available studies
and sources. The sole datum offered in support of the policy is
from a newspaper study so flawed that the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) disavowed the study's finding. [7]
Though the Council acknowledges an individual right to firearms
ownership, it has dismissed the constitutional impediments to
"assault weapon" bans without analysis or authority.

Comparison of the Council's few and selected sources with the many
other available authorities makes it difficult to conclude that the
Council conducted either a thorough or unbiased investigation.

Political background

Since more than 200 million firearms are distributed amongst
approximately half of US households, it is difficult to credibly
characterize firearms ownership as unusual or deviant and it is
generally accepted that promoting prohibition of private ownership
of all guns is "political suicide." For these reasons, it is
reported, the attempted tactic of gun prohibitionists has been to
conquer small pieces of the electorate at a time, serially
stigmatizing and then banning certain types of weapons, hoping
eventually to obtain their goal of total gun prohibition. [8]

In support of this, one can observe that "the criminals' weapon of
choice," the "bad guns" we must loathe, change more frequently than
one can explain a change in criminals' weapon selection.
"Undetectable plastic guns", "Saturday Night Specials", machine
guns, "cop killer bullets", and, now, "assault weapons" have all
been described as posing an imminent, if not actual, danger.
Despite the claims, no figures supporting the assertions are
offered or, if figures are offered, analysis shows the figures are
more-or-less-artfully crafted.

Despite more than a century of effort, [9] gun prohibitionists have
unsuccessfully promoted national and state efforts to ban handguns.
Notwithstanding polls alleging support for handgun bans, in 1982
voters in California rebuffed draconian handgun restrictions by
nearly a 2-to-1 margin. A similar referendum failed in
Massachusetts. By the 1970's and 80's liberal and feminist thinkers
[10] and scholars [11] began to break ranks over the orthodoxy of
gun prohibition. By 1988, even liberal politicians, such as Rep.
Barney Frank, [12] had found the politics of gun prohibition to be
a liability. The California Attorney General's 1988 study had
determined "[assault weapons] constitute[d] absolutely no
conceivable threat", so that office would not support their
regulation. [13]
Then, a drifter with a long criminal and psychiatric history,
including multiple weapon felonies, was allowed to purchase several
firearms, despite a waiting period and the background check by the
California Department of Justice. In violation of federal law
barring mental defectives from gun ownership, he obtained an
AKM-56S rifle in Oregon and transported it to California. On
January 17, 1989 Patrick Purdy turned his weapons on children in a
Stockton, California schoolyard, killing 5 of 35 he wounded. [14]
It has gone virtually unnoticed that, even when used against
children, almost all of those wounded (86%) survived.

No matter that even the Law Enforcement Adviser of Handgun Control
Inc. (HCI), Mr. Philip C. McGuire, "agree[d] with the NRA" that
"assault weapons" were not a problem; [15] no matter that a porous
criminal justice system repeatedly put a dangerous and mentally
defective Patrick Purdy on the street, or that the California
Department of Justice allowed weapons in his hands  his guns took
the blame. One must grudgingly concede to the NRA that even
stringent gun control failed to keep guns out of the hands of a
known criminal and mental defective.

Perplexingly the California Department of Justice withheld and
continues to withhold its reports showing "assault weapons" have
been no more than an anecdotal crime problem. Handgun Control Inc.,
absent supportive data, began its political campaign. The media has
also put its "spin" on the issue:

"It could be argued that the perception that these firearms are
frequently used by criminals is attributable to media reports that
selectively highlight incidents in which they have been used. One
news commentator testified that reports on the use of such firearms
stemmed from a conscious decision on the part of his broadcast
station to influence the public." [16]

Typical for media coverage of gun control issues, [17] all pretense
of objectivity in the press went out the window, [18] finding us
where we are today. As Mercy and Houck have called us to science in
the pages of JAMA, [[19] let us examine the data available and the
problems of data acquisition.

The importance of defining "Assault weapons"

Obtaining a consistent definition of "assault weapon" would be key
to amassing and collating meaningful data pertinent to legislative
and public policy considerations. By 1988, however, the California
Attorney General's Office had already concluded such a definition
was technically impossible. [20] Data acquisition and analysis have
also been hampered by prejudice and disinformation.

Consider the prejudice in the remarks of Dr. Jerome Kassirer,
Editor-in-Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine:

"Data on [assault weapon] risks are not needed because they have no
redeeming social value." [21] [emphasis original]

One of the Council's sources, Mr. Sugarmann, seems disposed to
intentionally obfuscate the issues and deceive the public:

"The semiautomatic weapons' menacing looks, coupled with the
public's confusion over fully automatic machine guns versus
semiautomatic assault weapons - anything that looks like a machine
gun is assumed to be a machine gun - can only increase that chance
of public support for restrictions on these weapons." [22]

as does the California Attorney General's Office memorandum:

"Information on assault weapons would not be sought from forensic
laboratories as it was unlikely to support the theses on which the
[assault weapon ban] would be based." [23]

No functional or meaningful features or combinations of features
uniquely distinguish the politically incorrect "assault weapons"
from their "sporting" counterparts. Because there is no consistent
definition, comparison of data from different jurisdictions is
impeded.

The definition of "assault rifle"

As Mr. Sugarmann's strategy admits, though cosmetically similar,
"assault weapons" are not the same as "assault rifles." "Assault
rifles" are defined by widely accepted criteria. "Assault rifles"
are capable of machine-gun-like "automatic" fire. They are designed
to wound rather than kill. They fire intermediate power cartridges,
more powerful than most pistols, but considerably less deadly than
hunting rifles which, by definition, are designed to kill. [24, 25]
In any other context, "assault rifle" is a misnomer.

"Assault rifle" wound ballistics

That "Assault rifles" are designed to wound rather than kill is
important. Attempting to address popular misconceptions regarding
their purported deadliness, Col. Martin L. Fackler, MD, the
recently retired Director of the United States Army Wound
Ballistics Research Laboratory, wrote:

"Military bullets are designed to limit tissue disruption - to
wound rather than kill. The Full-metal-jacketed bullet is actually
more effective for most warfare; it removes the one hit and those
needed to care for him newspaper descriptions comparing their
effects with a grenade exploding in the abdomen must cause the
thinking individual to ask: how is it possible that 29 children
and one teacher out of 35 hit in the Stockton schoolyard survived?
If producers of assault rifles had advertised their effects as
depicted by the media, they would be liable to prosecution under
truth-in-advertising laws." [26]

It would seem therefore that we should question the reliability of
anecdotal assertions such as:

"Of the [South African] patients who were hit with one projectile
[from an AK-47] in any portion of their torso, there were no
survivors whatsoever. Of the patients who were hit with even a
single AK-47 projectile in any extremity, 95% had to have that
extremity amputated." [27]

Streptococcal bacteremia and Clostridial gangrene are the common
complications of any penetrating wound inadequately treated with
antibiotics, necessitating amputation from the iatrogenic
complication, rather than from the injury itself. [28, 29] Though
described in the lay press, the author's search of the
peer-reviewed literature failed to corroborate injuries such as
those described by Trunkey. The literature review finds instead
that "assault weapon" wounds more closely approximate handgun
injuries than rifle injuries:

"[M]any AK-47 shots will pass through the body causing no greater
damage than that produced by non-expanding handgun bullets. The
limited tissue disruption produced by this weapon in the Stockton
schoolyard is consistent with well documented data from Vietnam as
well as with controlled research studies from wound ballistic
laboratories." [30]

Congressional testimony agrees:

"It is my opinion as a court-qualified 'firearms expert' thatsix-
(or seven-) shot hunting shotguns are more lethal at ranges under
50 yards than either the semi or full-automatic versions of the
AK-47" [31]

The Council perpetuates myths about "high velocity" bullets and
"assault weapon" wound ballistics that have been definitively
dispelled in the pages of JAMA [32] and elsewhere. [33, 34, 35, 36]
The Council expresses its horror at the devastation caused by the
single shock wave of a "high velocity" bullet, failing to note that
the average Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy utilizes about
2,000 shock wave pulses, each of which is three times that of the
"high velocity" bullet, without any evidence whatsoever of soft
tissue damage. [37] The vogue of undue concern over "cavitation" in
all but non-elastic tissues has justifiably passed, though without
the Council's notice. When the Council cites a newsweekly interview
(of a surgeon who thinks inelastic watermelons are appropriate
human tissue simulants) [38] and elsewhere [39] for theories of
wound ballistics repudiated in peer-reviewed literature, one must
wonder whether the Council wisely or carefully selected the best
scholarship available. If "watermelon wound ballistics" were valid,
deceleration injury from a one foot fall would similarly crack
human tissue.

The public may actually be endangered more by banning less deadly
weapons, handguns and "assault weapons." If handguns were
unavailable, criminals have indicated they would substitute more
deadly weapons (e.g. shotguns and rifles, which can be easily made
concealable by using a hacksaw to make them "sawed off"), rather
than less deadly weapons (e.g. knives and clubs). [40] It is a
reasonable, though untested, hypothesis that the likeliest
substitute for handgun-configuration "assault weapons" would be
equally deadly revolvers and that the likeliest substitute for
rifle-configuration "assault weapons" would be more deadly shotguns
and rifles, resulting in a net increase in morbidity and mortality.

The lack of definition of "Assault weapon"

Even gun prohibitionists cannot agree on a definition of "assault
weapons." [41] "Assault weapons" are semi-automatic and not capable
of full-automatic machine gun fire (they fire a single bullet with
a squeeze of the trigger rather than a "spray"). As the California
Attorney General's Office has noted, they are not definable by any
unique technical criteria. [42] This is one reason that legislative
attempts have failed to clearly distinguish these "politically
incorrect" guns from functionally identical "sporting guns"
chambered in more deadly calibers. The conundrum, acknowledged by
the Council, is one factor in the legal appeals to overturn the
arbitrary selection of weapons in the California "Assault Weapon"
Ban. [43]

"Assault weapons" encompass an amorphous group of guns functionally
identical to other common hunting and target rifles. [44] They
inconsistently share cosmetic similarities with military weapons.
The Council has not explained how cosmetic features make guns more
deadly than functionally identical weapons. Is a gun more deadly by
virtue of a plastic stock, a pistol grip, a durable finish, a flash
suppressor, tritium night sights, or a bayonet lug? Have we a spate
of drug dealers using unrusty weapons in night bayonet charges?

Even the capability of accepting "high capacity" magazines is an
unreliable distinction since every one of the common hunting and
target rifles cited above are capable of accepting factory or
after-market "high capacity" magazines.

Contrary to the Council's insinuation, they are not routinely or
factory equipped with "silencers" (properly, "suppressors").
Federal law (and law in 38 of the 50 states) [45] does allow
private citizens to optionally equip their firearms with
suppressors under the restrictions of the National Firearms Act of
1934, [46] but the Council did not offer data to support that such
legal options are either widespread or a problem.

Professor Kleck of the Florida State University School of
Criminology examined the contradictions:

"The difficulties with this political compromise [of eliminating
only some semi-automatic weapons] are obvious. If semi-automatic
fire and the ability to accept large magazines are not important in
crime, there is little reason to regulate ["assault weapons"]. On
the other hand, if these are important attributes, then it makes
little crime control sense (though ample political sense) to
systematically exclude from restriction the most widely owned
models that have these attributes, since this severely limits the
impact of regulation." [47]

Skullduggery and duplicity in the public debate

The first "Assault weapon" ban as a model

A review of the first "assault weapon" ban shows the conceptual and
technical impossibilities involved. The political skullduggery is
also impressive. In 1988 in contemplation of restrictive
legislation, Mr. S.C. Helsley, Acting Assistant Director of the
Investigation and Enforcement Branch of the California Department
of Justice, was asked by his Director "whether a definition could
be formulated which would allow legislative control of 'assault
rifles' without infringing on sporting weapons." His three page
memorandum of October 31, 1988 summarized the 17 supporting
technical documents, including data confirming the nearly
non-existent use of "assault weapons" in crime, and concluded, "I
do not think the necessary precision is possible." [48]

"In early January 1989, the Attorney General and his Executive
Staff were briefed on the difference (or lack thereof) between
assault and non-assault weapons. At the conclusion of that
briefing, the Attorney General, to the obvious displeasure of some
of his key advisers, said that he would not support assault weapon
legislation unless hard data could be developed.

"With the Purdy Stockton schoolyard shooting in January 1989, the
Attorney General immediately [without 'hard data'] announced his
support for the Roberti/Roos initiatives." [49]

In another memorandum, Mr. Helsley documented, "In the past 20
years, [Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement] specials agents have never
been fired at by a suspect with one of the weapons listed in 12276
PC [California's 'assault weapon' ban]." [50]

Described by California Assemblyman Tom McClintock as "the ultimate
triumph of symbolism over substance," the ban was enacted. The
weapons named by manufacturer and model number in the California
Roberti-Roos "Assault Weapon" Ban of 1989 [51] were chosen on
appearance, not by any forensic criteria or supportive crime data.
[52] In the words of Mr. Helsley of the California Attorney
General's Office three years after the ban's enactment,
"Most if not all of the principal players in crafting the
legislation had absolutely no knowledge of firearms Most of the
weapons on the listconstitute absolutely no conceivable
threatPublication of a manual for public or law enforcement use
will require that we reach some yet unreached conclusion about
which weapons are covered." [53] [emphasis original]

Because of this approach, because technical advice was assiduously
avoided, [54, 55] the law banned guns that didn't exist, [56] named
gun manufacturers that do not exist, [57] failed to ban Patrick
Purdy's gun, [58] and redundantly banned certain machine guns. [59]
By legislative fiat in the original law, the Encom CM-55 became an
"assault weapon" - that weapon is a manual, single-shot shotgun
that has the menacing feature of a pistol grip.

Most damning, however, is the suppression of two statewide studies
done by the California Attorney General's Office. Both the 1987
Helsley report [60] and the 1991 Johnson report [61] have shown
"assault weapons" were not and are not a crime problem. Poised for
a later-to-fail gubernatorial campaign and ignoring the very report
he commissioned, former Attorney General Van de Kamp grandstanded
in support of the proposed ban of "assault weapons." California
State Senate President Pro-tempore David Roberti's Office has
described how they "managed" the media throughout the legislative
process. [62] For political gain, deception was perpetrated upon
the Californians whose taxes paid for the suppressed studies. The
ban continues to cost taxpayers at least $4.5 million per year in
administrative and enforcement costs. [63]

The law has been pronounced unenforceable by the current California
Attorney General, Dan Lungren. [64] Why then does his office
"stonewall" requests for the reports? His office received the draft
report of the Johnson study on September 26, 1991, yet, the
following December, in a response to a request for the report by
State Senator Robert Presley, [65] Mr. Patrick Kenady, Assistant
Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, stated "such a document
does not exist. What you refer to was a preliminary draft document
not retained in the ordinary course of business." [66] Subsequently
the "not retained" document has been leaked and become readily
available from channels outside the Attorney General's Office. [67]
The raw data of the Johnson report and caveats on its reliability
are now available from the Attorney General's Office. [68]

None of the vagueness, insupportability, errors, skullduggery,
deception, and the resultant expensive and frightening legal
pitfalls that the ban holds for law-abiding gun owners seems to
trouble at least one spokesperson, Mr. Louis Tolley of Handgun
Control Inc., the well-funded gun prohibitionist lobby:

"We believe that if any gun dealer, manufacturer, or gun owners
wants [sic] to test the law in court, they should be given every
opportunity. Arrest them. Put the burden on them to prove the law
is too vague." [69]

This author fails to understand how the public good will be served,
crime will be decreased, or lives spared by jailing or vindictively
depleting honest citizens' financial resources at trial when they
are simply confused by or are unsupportive of bad law that even
their Attorney General's Office cannot understand.

Pointedly, the massive and public civil disobedience of the
California "assault weapon" ban [70] is strong evidence that
otherwise law-abiding citizens are unwilling to even register their
banned guns. New York City recently confiscated "assault weapons"
registered in 1989. Chicago has also enacted a confiscatory ban.
[71] Seeing confiscation follow registration cannot be reassuring
to gun owners weighing the risk and benefit of registering guns of
any kind.

Old news and false claims

The newly-fearsome semi-automatic weapons are of a design type
prevalent since semi-automatic weapons were developed over a
century ago [72] and true assault rifles have been with us for 50
years, since the Wehrmacht's 1942 introduction of the
Maschinerkarabiner 42(H) and the slightly later introduction of the
Sturmgewehr 44. [73] "Assault rifle" is actually a translation of
the German "sturmgewehr." The Soviets followed with the
introduction of the Avtomat Kalashnikova of 1947, the AK-47.

The Council perpetuates the erroneous claim that these weapons are
"easily converted to full automatic fire", though current law
requires that all guns undergo an extensive evaluation by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to prove that they cannot
be easily converted to fully automatic fire. [74] A hint of the
infrequency with which conversions are attempted can be gleaned
from the observation that about 6 of the 4,000 guns seized annually
in Los Angeles have evidence of attempted, though rarely
successful, conversion. [75]

The Council writes "assault weapons are meant to be spray fired
from the hip", citing Handgun Control Inc. as authority. Though the
Council cites Assault Rifle Fact Sheet 1: Definitions and
Background of the Institute for Research on Small Arms in
International Security for explanation of gun nomenclature, the
Council fails to cite pertinent portions of the Fact Sheet's
definition of Assault Rifle:

"designed to produce roughly aimed bursts of full automatic fire."
[emphasis added]

or its discussion of Rate of Fire:

"In actual practice the number of shots that can be delivered from
any self-loading weapon is limited by shooter skill, especially the
need to reload The shooter's probability of hitting a target with
a self-loading rifle when pulling the trigger as rapidly as
possible is about 1 hit in 5 shots fired." [76] [emphasis added]

A portion of the testimony of Dr. Edward C. Ezell, Curator of the
National Firearms Collection, Armed Forces History Division,
Smithsonian Institution, before the US Senate Committee on the
Judiciary is cited by the Council, but the Council missed the
preponderance of his testimony nullifying the Councils imagery.
[77] They also ignored his similarly invalidating open-letter to
Congressman John Dingell. [78]

The Council writes "a reliable estimate of how many of [the 200
million firearms owned by American citizens] are assault weapons is
not available", citing another well-funded gun prohibitionist group
as authority. Though the Council cites Assault Rifle Fact Sheet 1:
Definitions and Background of the Institute for Research on Small
Arms in International Security for explanation of gun nomenclature,
the Council fails to note either Fact Sheet #2's [79] or Dr.
Ezell's educated guess [80] of 3.34million military-style
semi-automatic rifles or roughly 3% of America's civilian rifles.

Best evidence

Since the Council acknowledges these resources, but not their full
content, one can only speculate why the Council prefers to cite the
partisan imagery of the well-funded gun prohibition lobby, Handgun
Control Inc., rather than non-partisan scholars of the Library of
Congress and Smithsonian Institution.

In an attempt to support that "assault weapons" are the "weapon of
choice for drug gangs," the Council cites dubious sources and
concludes "Clearly the injuries from assault weapons are taxing
hospital emergency departments in large urban areas." The bases for
these assertions? Newspaper articles where, for example, a 5%
increase in multiple gun shot cases over 10 years is assumed, but
not demonstrated to be due to "assault weapons," [81] a two day
survey of one emergency room in Los Angeles County is embellished
by anecdotal stories from four surgeons, [82] other articles that,
without any evidence at all, assume, but do not demonstrate the
wounds they treat are due to "assault weapons," [83] and a
"background paper" [84] from the same California Attorney General's
Office that suppressed, even denies the existence of, the other two
contradictory statewide studies described above. Reading the
Council's sources fails to detect any peer-reviewed references for
factual matters. Can anyone conclude that the council conducted a
scientific or unbiased investigation?

Is the Council so short of supporting facts that it must resort to
hyperbole and partisan imagery? Let us look at the data.

The unrepresentative nature of gun trace requests

The only evidence offered by the Council that "assault weapons" are
a problem of the proportion suggested by the lay media are the Cox
Newspaper articles, [85] a series by two reporters who based their
conclusion that 11% of crime guns were "Assault weapons" on gun
trace requests of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
While the Council acknowledges, "The sample of firearms for which
traces are requested is not likely to be representative of all
firearms used in crime", they uncritically accept the Cox article
as best evidence in the face of considerable documentation that the
Cox figures exaggerate the "assault weapon" problem by a factor of
three to 110, depending on locale studied and the definition of
"assault weapon" used.

Gun traces are not representative of the criminal prevalence of gun
use any more than perusing the index of a research journal
necessarily reflects the prevalence of disease. Journal indices and
gun traces largely reflect a level of interest in the topic or the
gun. No study corroborates the prevalence suggested by the Cox or
other gun trace figures.

In an unprecedented move, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms challenged the methods and conclusions of the Cox study.
[86] As early as 1976 one well-known gun control advocate
acknowledged the limitations of gun trace data. [87] In its Report
For Congress on "assault weapons," the Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress has elucidated the weaknesses
that make the BATF gun trace system inappropriate for statistical
purposes:

"The [B]ATF tracing system is an operational system designed to
help law enforcement agencies identify the ownership path of
individual firearms. It was not designed to collect statistics

"Two significant limitations should be considered when tracing data
are used for statistical purposes:

--   First, the firearms selected for tracing do not constitute a
random sample and cannot be considered representative of the larger
universe of all firearms used by criminals, or of any subset of
that universe. As a result, data from the tracing system may not be
appropriate for drawing inferences such as which makes or models of
firearms are used for illicit purposes;

--   Second, standardized procedures do not exist to ensure that
officers use consistent definitions or terms in the reports of
circumstances that lead to each trace request. Some trace requests
do not even identify the circumstances that resulted in the
request." [88]

"No crime need be involved [to initiate a gun trace]." [89] Efforts
to return stolen guns to rightful owners, guns "found at the
residence of a suspect though the firearm itself is not associated
with a criminal act" (including tax evasion investigations), and
certain non-violent crimes are included amongst gun traces. [90]
Even the assertion that a gun trace is related to organized crime
"does not necessarily provide information on an actual violation."
[91]

It is axiomatic that the uncaptured guns of unsolved gun crimes
cannot be represented amongst either seized weapons or traced
weapons  simply because the weapon is not in police hands to be
tabulated or traced  another factor explaining the
unrepresentative nature of gun traces.

The small sampling and unrepresentative nature of gun traces are
clear. Of the 17,000 guns seized by the New York City Police
Department in 1990, only 1000 were selected for tracing. [92] As
another example among many, consider Los Angeles, a hotbed of drug
gangs and violent crime, a city in which the Council's media
sources would have us believe "assault weapon" crime is rampant. In
1989 "assault weapons" represented approximately 3% of Los Angeles
criminal gun use, but 19% of gun trace requests. [93] Boston, too,
has highlighted "assault weapons" for special trace attention. [94]

The data

There are limitations on other sources of data. As noted in the
California Attorney General's Office caveats, the inconsistency of
attempts to define "assault weapon" in the few jurisdictions that,
to date, have even made the effort, makes data comparison
difficult. Compilations of statistical firearms forensics data are
additionally hampered by incomplete responses of varying fractions
of polled agencies. Gun traces are, however, hardly the best
evidence. The best and the preponderance of data currently
available indicate that "assault weapons", even in the hotbeds of
violent crime, account for generally 1% to 3% of crime guns [95]
which approximately equals their representation amongst all guns in
the USA. [96] This is shown in essentially all studies and reports
 first consider the local jurisdictions:

Jurisdiction Year & Findings

Akron [97] in 1989 - 2.0% of seized guns

Baltimore City [98] in 1990 - 1.5% of seized and surrendered guns

Baltimore County, MD [99] in 1990 - 0.3% of seized guns

Bexar County (San Antonio), TX [100] in 1987 through 1992 - 0.2% of
homicides

     -    in 1987 through 1992 - 0.0% of suicides
     -    in 1985 through 1992 - 0.1% of seized guns

California [101] in 1987 - 2.3% of seized rifles*

California [102] in 1990 - 0.9% of seized guns

Chicago [103] in 1988 - 1.0% of seized guns

Chicago suburbs [104] in 1980 through 1989 - 1.6% of seized guns

Denver [105] in 1991 - 0.8% of seized guns

Florida State [106] in 1989 - 3.6% of seized guns*(also documented
declining use of "assault weapons" since 1981)

     -    Miami in 1989 - 1.4% of homicides

     -    Miami in 1989 - 3.3% of seized guns*

Massachusetts [107] in 1984 through 1989 - 0.9% of homicides (study
excluded Boston)

Massachusetts [108] in 1988 - 1.9% of homicides

Massachusetts [109] in 1985 through 1991 - 0.7% of all shootings
(including suicides)

Minneapolis [110] in 1987 through 1989 - 0.3% of seized guns

Los Angeles [111] in 1989 - 3.0% of seized guns*

New Jersey [112] in 1988 - 0.0% of homicides

New Jersey [113] in 1989 - 0.0% of homicides

New York City [114] in 1989 - 0.5% of seized guns

San Diego [115] in 1988 through 1990 - 0.3% of seized guns

San Francisco [116] in 1988 - 2.2% of seized guns

Washington, DC [117] in 1988 - 0.0% of seized guns

Washington, DC [118] in 1991 - 3.0% of seized guns

* "assault weapon" broadly defined

Since none of the violence- and drug-ridden urban centers display
a disproportionate representation of "assault weapons" amongst
crime guns, does the Council expect us to believe "spray fire"
weapons are hosing down rural America?

Consider national data overlooked by the Council. The 1990 FBI
Uniform Crime Reports show 4% of all homicides in the United States
involve rifles of any type. [119] Even in the far-fetched,
hypothetical scenario that every single rifle homicide was
committed with an "assault weapon," the total could not exceed that
4%. Consult the data for types of weapons used in any reported
violent crime; the conclusion is inescapably the same.

In a 1990 answer to the National Rifle Association's request for
statistics on the use of "assault weapons", the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) "noted that 12 0f 810 (less than 1.5%) deaths
of law enforcement officers 'during the past decade' involved
['assault weapons'] and also discussed the dearth of information on
the criminal use of these firearms" [120] Weapons used against
police officers are not necessarily representative of guns
generally used in crime; facing a trained and armed opponent makes
a greater "stand off" distance desirable for the assailant. Rifles
may, therefore, be more prevalent in such circumstance, so the
"less than 1.5% potentially over-represents "assault weapons"
amongst crime guns in general.

Having cited the prohibitionists' estimate from the Cox study, it
strikes balance to briefly note the NRA's estimate of a 0.08%
prevalence of "assault weapons" amongst crime guns. [121]

In researching this paper, a request for data on the use of
"assault weapons" in crime was made of the research staff of
Handgun Control Inc. Helpfully HCI provided copies of the Cox study
(with appended analysis of "assault weapons" traced to crime) and
copies of newspaper articles on "assault weapon" incidents, but, at
the time of submission of this manuscript, no other data or
studies. Having noted the flaws inherent to gun trace data, the
author has not cited gun trace data from local jurisdictions. The
author has also not cited data on "assault weapons", claims of
"increased use," "significant numbers", or other vague claims when
appropriate comparative or substantiating data is absent.

The Council has not even acknowledged the confounding evidence,
much less made an attempt to dispatch it. The Council's report
flounders with its sole datum, the Cox Newspaper article. While
there are important caveats in consideration of any current data
and the definitive analysis of "assault weapons" in crime has yet
to be accomplished, it is certainly difficult to place credence in
any claim that "assault weapons" are the "criminals' weapon of
choice."

Of what "legitimate" use are these "Assault weapons"?

Though it is rather surprising in a democracy to be asked
justification of the ownership of any lawful item, convincing
answers are obtained.

Certain features, such as ergonomic design, durability, and
high-capacity magazines, are noted amongst (though not unique to)
"assault weapons" and other functionally similar weapons. Those
features provoke the ire of prohibitionists, but are features that
make such weapons particularly suited to popular action target
competitions, hunting, home defense, defense against multiple gang
assailants, and community defense and self-protection in times of
riot or natural disaster.

Collecting, sport, and target competition

Despite their military origins, true "assault rifles" do appeal to
the collector and the target shooter. An estimated 177,000 machine
guns (a legal classification that includes true "assault rifles")
are lawfully and rightfully owned by private citizens under the
restrictions of the National Firearms Act of 1934. [122] They are
legal under state statutes in 46 of the 50 states. [123] They are
collected and used virtually without incident in both formal
competition sponsored by the National Firearms Association and
informal target shooting. Even the Director of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms had difficulty recalling their
criminal misuse. [124]

"Assault weapons" are increasingly used in national and
international target competitions sponsored by the International
Practical Shooting Confederation, the US Practical Shooting
Association, the US Government's National Board for the Promotion
of Rifle Practice, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship (DCM),
countless local gun clubs, and the National Rifle Association (the
official National Governing Board for the shooting sports in
America, as such, a member of the US Olympic Committee). Those
active in these competitions number over 35,000 (the number of
shooters rated and ranked for purposes of DCM competitions alone)
[125] - a number higher than reported criminal misusers - and these
competitors consider their activity "legitimate sporting use."

In an aside the Council insinuates "surplus Garands have been sold
at a special price by the US Army to National Rifle Association
members", but fails to tell the whole truth - the rifles are
available at that special price to any target competitor
participating in the DCM matches and that the sales have returned
over $1 million to the US Treasury. Tax dollar for tax dollar, the
DCM matches are the most cost-effective recruiting tool for the US
Armed Forces. [126] The National Rifle Association (NRA) promotes
gun safety and sport shooting. The National Rifle Association
Institute for Legislative Action is the lobbying organization for
the nearly three million dues-paying NRA members. The NRA deserves
innuendo for representing its members no more than does the AMA.

Hunting

The plastic materials and protective metal finishes used in
military weapons of the last three decades have proven to be
particularly durable. [127] Though initially proven on the
battlefield (as sometimes occurs with advances in trauma care), use
of these materials is now common amongst hunting rifles,
semi-automatic and otherwise, as apropos the rough terrain and/or
inclement weather associated with hunting.

Representative Gary Ackerman missed the mark when he asked whether
hunters needed "a Mac 10 machine gun with 30 round banana clips of
armor piercing bullets to bag a quail". [128] Ranchers protecting
their herds and flocks from packs of running, marauding predators
and farmers protecting their crops from destructive varmints do
need light and durable weapons with high magazine capacity and
rapid-fire capability.

Self protection and community defense

The use of these weapons by citizens in community defense can be
demonstrated in several instances. [129, 130, 131, 132] The
higher-than-usual death toll and property damage made memorable the
gripping video footage of uninsured, law-abiding Los Angeles shop
owners using guns, including semi-automatic weapons, to protect
themselves, their families, and their property. They turned back
waves of murderous looters with determined display and, when
necessary, use of their protective weaponry. [133] Reflect that
riots in American cities resulting in death and damage are a
regular phenomenon. No major American city can claim freedom from
the problem. Does the Council have an antipathy to self-defense or
community protection?

As nearly a dozen national studies show, including a study by the
National Institute of Justice [134] and two studies commissioned by
gun-prohibitionist organizations, [135,136] guns do protect us;
they are used defensively by law-abiding citizens about 606,000 to
960,000 times per year exceeding all estimates of criminal misuse.
Using a gun to resist a crime or assault is safer than not
resisting at all or resisting with means other than firearms. Guns
not only repel crime, guns deter crime as is shown by numerous
surveys of criminals. [137]

Particularly where the powerful images of children are concerned,
any recitation of the data undercutting the exaggerated extent of
the gun problem is met with, "if it saves only one life" The most
loving person, however, must admit that a life lost because a gun
was absent is at least as valuable as a life lost because a gun was
present. We generally would value the life of the innocent over the
aggressor. Remember that "dead" is not necessarily or even usually
"innocent." Given the preponderance of defensive gun use, we must
see pseudo-data and images that pluck at our heartstrings for what
they are, certainly not a basis for public policy.

The myths of police protection
It has been argued than guns are not needed by citizens because
they are protected by the police and the military, including the
National Guard. [138] Despite increasing law enforcement manpower
and expenditures and in view of the increased crime rate, the
effectiveness of that protection can be rightfully questioned. It
can be correctly observed that a significant, if not majority, of
police activity involves "mopping up" after the crime has already
occurred.

Research suggesting that police apprehension offers less deterrent
to criminals than the threat of encountering an armed victim has
been reviewed. [139]

Additionally, it is alarming to recall that armed citizens had to
protect themselves from the police and US National Guard soldiers
participating in the looting in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo;
[140, 141] and the withdrawal of police protection from riot-torn
areas of Los Angeles; and the two day delay in putting armed and
supplied National Guard soldiers on those same streets of Los
Angeles. [142]

Bursting the legal myth

Case law [143] and government statutes [144] are clear that the
police only have a responsibility to provide some general level of
protection to the community at large, that they are under no
obligation whatsoever to protect any individual, even if in
immediate danger, [145] unless the police have promised special
protection to informants or witnesses. [146] An oral promise to
respond to an emergency call for assistance does not make the
police liable to provide protection. [147]

"What makes the city's position particularly difficult to
understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law, Linda
[the victim] did not carry any weapon for self defense. Thus, by a
rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the
City of New York, which now denies all responsibility to her."
[148]

The harsh reality

Communities can afford neither the liability nor the level of
police expenditures necessary to guarantee the personal safety of
all the individuals who may be (or think they may be) in need of
protection. The level of police powers necessary to attempt such
levels of protection would necessitate more of a police state than
would be currently tolerable in our society.

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."  Benjamin
Franklin [149]

Throughout American history we have innumerable examples of
criminal activity, terrorism, civil disorder, and natural disaster,
where the police and military forces have been unable or unwilling
to protect citizens, often for racist reasons. [150] The
relationships amongst gun control, racism, [151, 152, 153, 154] and
political power [155, 156] have been explored.

The logical conclusion?

Citizens have the natural right [157] and the common sense duty to
protect themselves, their families, their communities, and their
property. Particularly for the weak, the infirm, the aged, or the
individual outnumbered by organized gangs or disorganized rioters,
guns are the equalizing tools of self-protection - utopian
lamentations notwithstanding. Honest citizens and their families
should not be disarmed by fantasies of paradise in a "gunless"
utopian society so they may be martyred by sociopaths, crazies, and
criminals.

For those who "know" there is no individual Right to Keep and Bear
Arms

Dr. Kassirer has skeptically noted, "Some believe that possession
[of arms] is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." [158] A review of
extant scholarship is convincing that such "belief" in an
individual right to bear military style arms is consistent with
historical evidence and case law. Among those who support an
individual right to keep and bear arms are the US Senate
Subcommittee on the Constitution [159] and the US Supreme Court.
[160]

The numerous papers and statements of the authors, signatories, and
commentators of the Bill of Rights show unequivocally that
"militia" was, in their view, the armed citizen. They clearly
abhorred a "select militia," namely the National Guard, as a threat
to freedom as fearful as a "standing army." [161] Their intent for
the Second Amendment was stated most succinctly by Patrick Henry 
"The great object is that every man be armed." [162]

The current United States Code states "The militia of the United
States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age
and under 45 years of age." [163] The following section of the
United States Code defines what James Madison and the other
Founding Fathers considered a "select militia" or what we recognize
as the National Guard. According to Congress, [164] in order to
allow sending the National Guard overseas, it has been established
under the Congressional authority to "raise and support armies"
[165], not under its authority "to provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining the militia." [166] All Americans were reminded of
this in the 1989 US Supreme Court decision Perpich v. Department of
Defense [167] which prevented governors from withholding their
National Guard units from exercises outside the United States.
The US v. Miller decision [168] is often cited and misunderstood.
Not only is it historically unassailable that "militia", to the
authors of the Bill of Rights, was the armed citizen, but the US
Supreme Court's holding in US v. Miller states explicitly that the
"militia" comprises "all males physically able of acting in concert
for the common defense." That same case acknowledged the individual
citizen's right to own military weapons  "part of the ordinary
military equipment" or which "could contribute to the common
defense." Miller was freed at the federal district level, on Second
Amendment grounds, from charges of possession of a "sawed-off"
shotgun for which he had not paid the tax required under the
National Firearms Act of 1934. The federal attorney pursued an
appeal. Miller died before the appeal reached the Supreme Court
leaving his position unargued. Though ample evidence from the
trench warfare of "The Great War" was available, no evidence that
a "sawed-off" shotgun was a "militia" weapon had been introduced.
The Court held that, absent formal evidence submitted on Miller's
behalf, it could not take "judicial notice" of whether or not a
sawed-off shotgun was a protected weapon. Because Miller's position
was unargued, his indictment was upheld  leaving gun
prohibitionists confused about the Court's holdings.

In Cases v. US, building upon US v. Miller, the Supreme Court found
it could regulate, but not"prohibit the possession or use of any
weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia." [169]

In US v. Verdugo-Urquidez, [170] a Fourth Amendment case holding
that the warrant requirement is inapplicable to the search of a
home in a foreign country, the Court noted that "the people" who
have the right to free speech, to peaceably assemble, and to be
secure in their papers and effects are one and the same "the
people" who have the right to keep and bear arms. The Court
explicitly held that the authors of the Bill of Rights did not
somehow confuse "the people" with "the state." The Court also noted
that "people" have rights and that the "state" has powers. The
powers of the state regarding the militia were clearly delimited in
the body of the US Constitution which preceded the Bill of Rights.
The power of the states to raise their own militias and the power
of the federal government to raise an army are not exclusive of the
inherent, individual right of the people to keep and bear arms. The
Bill of Rights was felt a necessary addition by Federalists and
anti-Federalists alike to protect the many inherent rights of the
people. [171] It is groundless to assert that the Second Amendment
protects powers delegated to the government.

Justice Brennan, expanding upon the opinion, reminded us that the
rights are inherent, not granted or rescinded by fickle government
whimsy:

"[rights are not] given to the people from the government [T]he
Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' rights.
Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government
from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be preexisting."
[172]

All these holdings undercut the "prohibitionist theory" of the
Second Amendment. At the US Supreme Court level, the
"prohibitionist theory" rests largely on the refusal of the Court
to hear certain gun cases (denial of certiorari petitions), rather
than on the Court's explicit holdings in the admittedly few extant
holdings. [173] Those few holdings have not used the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to explicitly "incorporate" the Second
Amendment protections against the states. There is, however,
increasing legal scholarship supporting such incorporation. [174,
175] Only in Second Amendment matters do we see certain "liberals"
take unique and hypocritical refuge in a "states' rights" posture.
The pace of Second Amendment litigation parallels legislative
infringements and jurisdictional conflicts, so the Supreme Court is
unlikely to indefinitely evade the incorporation issue.

The linguistic analysis of the Second Amendment is unambiguous.
[176] While the introductory phrase "A well-regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free state," is partially
explanatory, there is nothing equivocal, qualified, or limiting in
the substantive guarantee of the declarative phrase "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." There are
no qualifiers as in the right to be secure against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." [177]

Despite efforts by the well-funded gun prohibitionist lobby to
denigrate this individual right as the "insurrectionist theory",
[178] their "prohibitionist theory" of the Second Amendment is the
theory that flounders. So, if gun prohibitionists do not find the
protective or recreational uses of firearms persuasive reasons for
sane, law abiding, adult citizens to own the firearms of their
choice, and in view of the constitutional impediments to gun
prohibition, their only legal option to accomplish their goal is to
first convince Americans that they have no lawful or natural right
to selfprotection from felons or tyrants and then to amend the US
Constitution.

Public policy by emotion, carelessness, or deception

The Council has had the opportunity to make its case on "assault
weapons." Any objective review of the available data decimates the
purported factual underpinnings of the Council's position. If,
after a review of the best evidence available, the Council or other
readers continue to espouse a prohibitionist policy, so be it. If
those sentiments are based on fears of what people "might" do with
this or that weapon, so be it. If those sentiments are based on a
general antipathy towards guns, so be it. Let us not, however,
imagine that the prohibitionist view is supported by anything else.
The emperor has no clothes. Neither hoplophobic anxieties;
prohibitionist agitprop; aberrant, selected, and sculpted
"factoids"; nor political skullduggery and deception are proper
bases for public policy.

Other areas of gun prohibitionist interest have been equally biased
and devoid of substance. Many firearms owners are physicians who
are familiar with the indictments [179, 180] of the highly
politicized Center for Disease Control (CDC) policies regarding gun
prohibition and their funding of related research. Reviewing the
charges might make one question whether or not the CDC is simply a
"factory of fallacy" and whether or not taxpayers should properly
pay for polemics masquerading as research.

The near virtual exclusion of data and analysis that confounds the
prohibitionist position makes it appear that medical journals
operate on the principle that "freedom of the press belongs to
those who own one." [181] Some dream of a day when we will see:

--   standardization of gun data collection to enhance public
policy considerations,

--   no taxpayer funding of rhetoric,

--   more incisive analysis and critical, but unbiased, review of
articles and policies before publication,

--   less polemics and fewer contrived "factoids" from researchers,
editors, officers, and committees enamored of their a priori
conclusions, and

--   discontinuance of editorial policies that stifle and
marginalize objective research and dissenting opinions.

The personal [182, 183] and monetary [184, 185] costs of guns
compared with medical "misadventure" leaves room to wonder whether
doctors are more deadly and costly than guns. Drs. Organ and Fry
remind us that 25,000 trauma deaths per year [about twice the
number of annual gun homicides and approximately equaling total
annual gun deaths] are the result of an inadequate trauma system.
[186] These sobering perspectives should not be lost on the
Council, the House of Delegates, the officers of the AMA, the CDC,
or its stable of researchers while they toe the politically correct
line on gun prohibition.

The compromise essential to effective gun control

That the cooperation of law-abiding gun owners is necessary to the
success of any regulatory scheme is routinely overlooked by gun
control and prohibition advocates. The portion of 200 million
firearms in the hands of Americans who recognize an inherent right
to those arms will not evaporate with the stroke of a pen.
Intolerable police state tactics will be necessary to obtain even
their marginal compliance  too high a price for too little
benefit.

The author supports education in safe, responsible firearms
ownership by mentally competent and law-abiding adults. There
should be certain punishment for violent crime regardless of
instrumentality. Victimless possession of objects  guns 
responsibly stored and safely used should neither be banned nor
restricted. The author sees no justification for gun bans of any
kind. He, like Thomas Jefferson, finds support in a favorite
passage penned in 1764 by Cesare Beccaria:

"False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real
advantages for one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would
take fire from men because it burns, and water because one may
drown in it; that has no remedy for evils, except destruction. The
laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such a nature.
They disarm those only who are neither inclined nor determined to
commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those who have the courage
to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the most important of
the code, will respect the less important and arbitrary ones, which
can be violated with ease and impunity, and which, if strictly
obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty  so dear to men, so
dear to the enlightened legislator  and subject innocent persons
to all the vexations that the guilty alone ought to suffer? Such
laws make things worse for the assaulted and better for the
assailants; they serve rather to encourage than to prevent
homicides, for an unarmed man may be attacked with greater
confidence than an armed man. They ought to be designated as laws
not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by the tumultuous
impression of a few isolated facts, and not by thoughtful
consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a universal
decree." [187]

Criminal and psychiatric background checks can be accomplished
without leaving residual records of ownership that can later be
used to aid confiscation. The benefits of instantaneous background
checks must be weighed against the risks of privacy loss inherent
to easily-accessed, centralized data on mental health records.

License to carry weapons, openly or concealed, should be available
to sane, law-abiding adults who demonstrate safety, skill, and
knowledge of the law related to self-protection. Such license
should not entail additional encumbrance nor be subject to
arbitrary police discretion or subjective interpretation of "need"
or "good cause."

Inexpensive weapons should be available to the poor, particularly
since they are most at risk for victimization.

Ironically it is two gun control  but not prohibition  advocates,
Profs. Kates and Kleck, who have most illuminated these public
policy matters. Each has made thorough evaluation of the broad
expanse of research available (including their own research) and
derived rational and objectively supportable suggestions for
revising controls  extending certain effectual controls and
rejecting the ineffectual, the unattainable, or the merely symbolic
 with an eye towards realistic, attainable goals. They emphasize
that gun control is not a panacea, only incremental improvements
are attainable. [188, 189] The underlying causes of violence  all
violence, not just gun violence  must be addressed.

In view of the one-sided nature of numerous, ineffectual
concessions eroding gun rights to date, the author must emphasize
that gun owners should concede no further ground until ineffectual
and even marginally effectual controls and bans  in other words,
all controls but those described above  are lifted. Too often the
prohibitionist view of "compromise" is "gun owners have five
apples, we are morally entitled and, therefore, demand them all."

So long as the strident prohibitionists frame the debate, their
bigotry, symbolism, [190] deception, and intransigence will prevent
effectual solutions. Their presumption of moral superiority is
undeserved and an impediment to rational, effectual, and
cost-effective solutions. Utopia is not one of our choices.

Though not a promising expenditure of effort, the author
acknowledges one utopian fantasy; governments should not possess
instruments of coercion and violence denied to their citizens. That
governments should be denied the same weapons of mass destruction
denied their citizens is already a matter of some public accord.

What else? Promising directions

Good evidence exists that violence in entertainment contributes
significantly towards violence in our society. [191, 192] That
unwelcome contribution should be minimized. Voluntary restraint by
an entertainment industry cognizant of its ill effects on children
is desirable. Parents may exercise control over their children's
viewing habits. The misdirection of anger and frustration amongst
the poor and rich alike can be mitigated by training. [193]

We should reassess national drug policies that make the drug trade
so attractively profitable that people will kill to reap those
profits. We should cease relegating the education and moral
instruction of our children to the state.

We should discourage the view that life is or could be risk-free 
or that liberty does not have a price worth paying. We should
retire the rhetoric of egalitarian, passive entitlement and revive
the values of individual responsibility. We are not tossed
completely helplessly on a sea of circumstance.

Certainly we must love and cherish our children, raising them with
an appreciation of individual responsibility, liberty, learning,
and the sanctity of life  the libertarian views that may guide
this nation toward better days.

Footnotes

1 American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs.
Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard in the United States. in
JAMA 1992; 267: 3070.

2 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991.

3 Florida Assault Weapons Commission. Assault Weapons/Crime Survey
in Florida For Years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989. Tallahassee, FL: May
18, 1990.

4 Johnson TD. Report on a Survey of the Use of "Assault Weapons" in
California in 1990. Office of the Attorney General, California
Department of Justice. September 26, 1991.

5 Wright JD. and Rossi PH. Weapons, Crime, and Violence in America:
Executive Summary. Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, National
Institute of Justice. 1981.

6 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991.

7 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Press Release. undated.

8 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. Chap. 2.

9 Kates DB. "Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United
States." in Kates, DB, Editor. Restricting Handguns: The Liberal
Skeptics Speak Out. North River Press. 1979.

10   Silver CR. "Self-Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the
Independence of Women in a Violent, Sexist Society," Salter J and
Kates DB. "The Necessity of Access to Firearms by Dissenters and
Minorities Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to Protect,"
among others in Kates, DB, Editor. Restricting Handguns: The
Liberal Skeptics Speak Out. North River Press. 1979.

11   Levinson S. "The Embarrassing Second Amendment." Yale Law
Journal. 1989; 99: 637-59.

12   Dionne EJ. "A Liberal's Liberal Tells Just What Went Wrong."
New York Times. December 22, 1988.

13   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 1.

14   Kempsky N, Chief Deputy Attorney General. A Report to Attorney
General John K. Van de Kamp on Patrick Edward Purdy and the
Cleveland School Killings. Office of the Attorney General,
California Department of Justice. October 1989.

15   Mohr C. "House Panel Issue: Can Gun Ban Work." New York Times.
April 7, 1989. P. A-15.

16   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). p. 38.

17   Kleck G. "The Mass Media and Information Management: News
Media Bias in Covering Gun Control Issues." paper presented to the
annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology. San
Francisco, CA. November 20-23, 1991.

18   Hammond, G, Time magazine. form letter to persons complaining
about Time's firearms coverage. August 1, 1989. in Morgan E and
Kopel D. The Assault Weapons Panic: "Political Correctness" Takes
Aim at the Constitution. Independence Issue Paper No. 12-91.
Golden, CO: Independence Institute. October 10, 1991.

19   Mercy JA and Houck VN. "Firearms Injuries: A Call for
Science." JAMA. 1986; 255: 3143-4.

20   Helsley SC, Acting Assistant Director, Investigation and
Enforcement Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to
GW Clemons, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, California
Department of Justice. October 31, 1988.

21   Kassirer JP. Correspondence. N Engl J. Med 1992; 326:1159-60.

22   Sugarmann, J. "Assault Weapons and Accessories." memo to the
"New Right Watch". 1988. n Morgan, Eric and Kopel, David. The
Assault Weapons Panic: "Political Correctness" Takes Aim at the
Constitution. Independence Issue Paper No. 12-91. Golden, CO:
Independence Institute. October 10, 1991. p. 24.

23   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 2.

24   Defense Intelligence Agency. Small Arms Identification and
Operation Guide - Eurasian Communist Countries. Washington, DC: US
Govt. Printing Office. 1988. p. 105.

25   Ezell EC. Small Arms of the World. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole
Books. 1983. p. 515.

26   Fackler ML. Letter to the Editor. Wall Street Journal. April
10, 1989. p. A-13.

27   Trunkey D. Affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction, Oregon State Shooting Association, et al.
v. Multnomah County, et al.. September 4, 1990.

28   Fackler ML, Breteau JPL, Courbil LJ, Taxit R, Glas J, and
Fievet JP. "Open Wound Drainage versus Wound Excision in Treating
the Modern Assault Rifle Wound." Surgery. 1989; 105: 576-84.

29   Fackler ML and Kneubuehl BP. "Applied Wound Ballistics." J
Trauma. 1990; 6(2) Supplement: 32-7.

30   Fackler ML, Malinowski JA, Hoxie SW, and Jason A. "Wounding
Effects of the AK-47 Rifle Used by Patrick Purdy in the Stockton,
California, Schoolyard Shooting of January 17, 1989." Am J Forensic
Medicine and Path. 1990; 11(3): 185-90.

31   Knox N. testimony before the US Congress. Hearings on HR1154
Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and
Means. 101st Congress, 1st Session. April 10, 1989. Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office. p. 304-6.

32   Fackler ML. "Wound Ballistics: A Review of Common
Misconceptions." JAMA. 1988; 259: 2730-6.

33   Lindsey D. "The Idolatry of Velocity, or Lies, Damn Lies, and
Ballistics." J Trauma. 1980; 20; 10689.

34   Fackler ML. "Ballistic Injury." Annals of Emergency Medicine.
1986; 15; 1451-5.

35   Fackler ML. "Wound Ballistics." in Trunkey DD and Lewis FR,
editors. Current Therapy of Trauma, vol 2. Philadelphia: BC Decker
Inc. 1986. pp. 94-101.

36   Fackler ML, Breteau JPL, Courbil LJ, Taxit R, Glas J, and
Fievet JP. "Open Wound Drainage versus Wound Excision in Treating
the Modern Assault Rifle Wound." Surgery. 1989; 105: 576-84.

37   Fackler ML. "Wound Ballistics: A Review of Common
Misconceptions." JAMA. 1988; 259: 2730-6.

38   Pinkney DS. "ERs Seeing More 'War Wounds' Caused by Assault
Weapons." American Medical News. April 14, 1989; 3: 42-5.

39   Feuchtwanger MM. "High Velocity Missile Injuries: A Review."
J R Soc Med. 1982; 75: 966-9.
40   Wright JD. and Rossi PH. Armed and Considered Dangerous: A
Survey of Felons and Their Firearms. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
1986. p. 220 and Table 11.3 at p. 221.

41   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. pp. 2-4.

42   Helsley SC, Acting Assistant Director, Investigation and
Enforcement Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to
GW Clemons, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, California
Department of Justice. October 31, 1988.

43   e.g. Fresno Rifle Club v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415.;
Abascal, Kasler, McCord, Danto, Mauser, Magaddino, Snow, Bowman,
Henderson, Ford, Suter, Erler, Mixson, Howard, Krot, Colt's
Manufacturing Co., Threat Management Institute v. Lundgren[sic]

44   e.g., among many, Remington 740, Remington 7400 Sporter,
Heckler and Koch 770, Heckler and Koch SRT-9, Ruger Mini-14 Ranch
Rifle, Browning Automatic Rifle, Valmet Hunter, Galil Hadar,
Springfield Armory M1A, Springfield Armory SAR-4800, Armscorp T-48

45   Shea D. Machine Gun Dealers Bible. Hot Springs, AR: Lane
Publishing. 1991. p. 199.

46   USC XXVI 5801-5872.

47   Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. p. 72.

48   Helsley SC, Acting Assistant Director, Investigation and
Enforcement Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to
GW Clemons, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, California
Department of Justice. October 31, 1988.

49   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 1.

50   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to GW Clemons,
Director, Division of Law Enforcement, California Department of
Justice. February 13, 1991.

51   California Penal Code 12275-12290

52   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 2.

53   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 4.

54   Helsley SC, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement
Branch, California Department of Justice. memorandum to Patrick
Kenady, Assistant Attorney General, California Department of
Justice. February 14, 1991. p. 2.

55   Johnson TD. Report on a Survey of the Use of "Assault Weapons"
in California in 1990. Office of the Attorney General, California
Department of Justice. September 26, 1991.

56   Gilbert Equipment Company Striker 12, Calico M-900 pistol,
Heckler & Koch H-93

57   Baretta, Steyer

58   Made in China AKM-56S

59   the Avtomat Kalashnikova , Steyr AUG (Armee Universal Gewehr),
Cetme G-3

60   Helsley SC, Acting Assistant Director, Investigation and
Enforcement Branch, California Department of Justice. Memorandum to
Allen Sumner, Senior Assistant Attorney General Re: AB1509 (Agnos).
June 2, 1987.

61   Johnson TD. Report on a Survey of the Use of "Assault Weapons"
in California in 1990. Office of the Attorney General, California
Department of Justice. September 26, 1991.

62   Forsyth R, Media Director for Senate President Pro-tempore
David Roberti, California State Senate. "Assault Weapons in
California: A Case Study in Issue Management and the Media." Senate
of the State of California. presented at National Conference of
State Legislators. Chicago, IL. December 10-12, 1989.

63   Bock AW. "Statistical overkill on banned rifles." The Orange
County Register. June 28, 1992. p. 3.

64   Los Angeles Times. "Assault Weapons Ban Called Unenforceable."
June 25, 1991. at A-3, A-22.

65   Presley R, California State Senator. Letter to Gregory Cowart,
Director of Law Enforcement, California Department of Justice.
November 6, 1991.

66   Kenady P, Asst. Attorney General for Legislative Affairs,
California Department of Justice. Letter to the Honorable Robert
Presley, California State Senator. December 20, 1991. p. 1.

67   Bock AW. "Statistical overkill on banned rifles." The Orange
County Register. June 28, 1992. p. 3.

68   Lungren DE, Attorney General, State of California and Kenady
PM, Assistant Attorney General for Legislation, State of
California. letter to Edgar A, Suter, MD. August 3, 1992.

69   Tolley L, spokesman, Handgun Control Inc. memorandum to Donna
Brownsey, assistant to California State Senator David Roberti.
"California Assault Weapon Lists." July 17, 1991. p. 1. in Morgan
E and Kopel D. The Assault Weapons Panic: "Political Correctness"
Takes Aim at the Constitution. Independence Issue Paper No. 12-91.
Golden, CO: Independence Institute. October 10, 1991. p. 49
footnote 12.

70   Lucas G. "State Semiautomatic Gun Registrations Called
Surprisingly Low." SF Chronicle. March 10, 1992. p. A15.

71   Schneider J. "Chicago Semi-Auto Ban Effective Aug. 14." The
New Gun Week. July 24, 1992. p. 1.

72   Datig FA. The Luger Pistol. 1962. Borden Publishing Company.
pp. 37-38. regarding the development of the Borchardt
semi-automatic pistol.

73   Hogg IV and Weeks J. Military Small Arms of the 20th Century
- 5th Edition. Northfield, IL: DBI Books.  1985. pp. 170-1.

74   U.S.C. XXVI Chap. 53. 5801 et seq.

75   Trahin J, Detective, Firearms/Ballistics Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department. testimony before the US Senate.  Hearings on
S386 and S747 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
Committee on the Judiciary. 101st Congress, 1st Session. May 5,
1989. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. p. 379.

76   Assault Rifle Fact Sheet 1: Definitions and Background.
Washington, DC: Institute for Research on Small Arms in
International Security; March 24, 1989.

77   Ezell EC, curator of the National Firearms Collection at the
Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History.
testimony before the US Congress. Hearings on HR1154 Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means.
101st Congress, 1st Session. April 10, 1989. Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office.

78   Ezell EC. open letter to The Honorable John Dingell. March 27,
1989.
79   Assault Rifle Fact Sheet 2 Quantities of Semi-automatic
"Assault Rifles' Owned in the United States. Washington, DC:
Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security;
March 24, 1989.

80   Ezell EC, curator of the National Firearms Collection at the
Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History.
testimony before the US Congress. Hearings on HR1154 Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means.
101st Congress, 1st Session. April 10, 1989. Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office.

81   Goldfarb B. "Hospitals Endure a Drug War Assault." USA Today.
March 19, 1990. P. D-1.

82   Pinkney DS. "ERs Seeing More 'War Wounds' Caused by Assault
Weapons." American Medical News. April 14, 1989; 3: 42-5.

83   McCarthy C. "Medical Price of Violence; Guns and Drugs are
Stretching Emergency Rooms to the Limit." Washington Post. February
21, 1989.  p. Z-14.

84   Assault Weapons: Background Paper. Sacramento, CA: California
Attorney General's Office; February 1989.

85   Cox Newspapers. Firepower: Assault Weapons in America.
Washington, DC: Cox Enterprises, 1989.

86   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Press Release.
undated.

87   Zimring FE. "Street Crime and New Guns: Some Implications for
Firearms Control." Journal of Criminal Justice. 1976; 4: 95-107.

88   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B. pp.
65-76.

89   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B at p. 66.

90   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B at p. 70.

91   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B at p. 71.

92   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B at p. 67.

93   Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. p. 75.

94   Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992). Appendix B at p. 69.

95   Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. Chap. 2.

96   Assault Rifle Fact Sheet 2 Quantities of Semi-automatic
"Assault Rifles' Owned in the United States. Washington, DC:
Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security;
March 24, 1989.

97   Hearings on HR1154 Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means. 101st Congress, 1st Session.
April 10, 1989. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. p.
114-5.

98   Baltimore Police Department. Firearms Submissions. 1990.

99   Hearings on HR1154 Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means. 101st Congress, 1st Session.
April 10, 1989. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. p.
77.

100 DiMaio V, Chief Medical Examiner, Bexar County, TX. letter to
George Lundberg, MD. June 11, 1992.

101 Helsley SC, Acting Assistant Director, Investigation and
Enforcement Branch, California Department of Justice. Memorandum to
Allen Sumner, Senior Assistant Attorney General Re: AB1509 (Agnos).
June 2, 1987.

102 Johnson TD. Report on a Survey of the Use of "Assault Weapons"
in California in 1990. Office of the Attorney General, California
Department of Justice. September 26, 1991.

103 Simkins JE. "Control Criminals, Not Guns." Wall Street Journal.
March 25, 1991.

104 Mericle JG. "Weapons seized during drug warrant executions and
arrests." unpublished report derived from files of Metropolitan
Area Narcotics Squad, Will and Grundy Counties, IL. 1989. in Kleck
G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York: Aldine de
Gruyter. 1991. Chap. 2.

105 Reply Brief of State of Colorado, Robertson, et al. plaintiffs,
State of Colorado, plaintiff-intervenor v. City and Country of
Denver. # 90CV603 (Colorado District Court). p. 13-15.

106 Florida Assault Weapons Commission. Assault Weapons/Crime
Survey in Florida For Years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989. Tallahassee,
FL: May 18, 1990.

107 Boston Globe. March 26, 1989. p. 12. in Kleck G. Point Blank:
Guns and Violence in America.  New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 1991.

108 Arnold M, Massachusetts State Police, Firearms Identification
Section. Massachusetts State Police Ballistics Records. March 14,
1990.

109 Arnold M, Massachusetts State Police, Firearms Identification
Section. Massachusetts State Police Ballistics Records. April 11,
1991

110 Reins W, Sgt. memorandum to Minneapolis Police Chief J. Laux.
April 3, 1989.

111 Trahin J, Detective, Firearms/Ballistics Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department. testimony before the US Senate.  Hearings on
S386 and S747 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
Committee on the Judiciary. 101st Congress, 1st Session. May 5,
1989. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. p. 379.

112 Newark Star Register. "Florio Urges Ban on Assault Rifles,
Stresses His Support for Abortion." July 18, 1989. p. 15.

113 Constance J, Deputy Chief, Trenton, NJ Police Department.
testimony before the Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee. March 7, 1991. p. 3.

114 Moran, Lieutenant, New York City Police Ballistics Unit. in
White Plains Reporter-Dispatch. March 27, 1989.

115 San Diego Union. "Smaller Guns are 'Big Shots' with the Hoods."
(reporting a study by the city's firearms examiner). August 29,
1991.

116 Hearings on HR1154 Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means. 101st Congress, 1st Session.
April 10, 1989. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. p.
68.

117 Wilson GR, Chief, Firearms Section, Metropolitan Police
Department. Wall Street Journal. April 7, 1989. p. A-12, col. 3.
and New York Times. Apr. 3, 1989. p. A14.

118 Wilson GR, Chief, Firearms Section, Metropolitan Police
Department. January 21, 1992. in Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress 
'Assault Weapons': Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and
Issues." Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library
of Congress; May 13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992).
Table 5. p. 18.

119 FBI. "Uniform Crime Reports Crime in the United States 1990."
1991. Washington DC: Us Government Printing Office. p. 12.

120 Bea K. "CRS Report for Congress  'Assault Weapons':
Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues." Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress; May
13, 1992 (Technical Revisions, June 4, 1992).  p. 23.

121 Blackman PH. "Senators Use False Numbers to Cover Up Gun Ban
Votes." The American Rifleman. November 1990. pp. 49-50.

122 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. NFA Weapons Inventory:
Data through 12/31/90. Computer run of 1/14/91.

123 Shea D. Machine Gun Dealers Bible. Hot Springs, AR: Lane
Publishing. 1991. p. 199.

124 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. Chap. 4.

125 Competitions Division, National Rifle Association. personal
communication. July 21, 1992.

126 Baker JJ, "DCM Notes." The American Rifleman. June 1990. p. 72.

127 Harris CE. "Bluing and Beyond." The American Rifleman. December
1982. p. 24.

128 135 Congressional Record 1868. February 28, 1989.

129 Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1988, Section II. p. 3. reporting on
a housing project using Kalashnikov-style rifles and other
semi-automatic weapons to drive back an attack by the "Bloods" gang

130 Washington Times, November 25, 1988, Section C. p. 6. reporting
on a block club defending its community from the "Bloods" gang

131 135 Congressional Record S1869-70 (daily ed. February 28,
1989). in Morgan, Eric and Kopel, David. The Assault Weapons Panic:
"Political Correctness" Takes Aim at the Constitution. Independence
Issue Paper No. 12-91. Golden, CO: Independence Institute. October
10, 1991. p. 16.  citing several instances of citizens defending
their communities using "assault weapons" in cases of domestic
disorder following natural disasters such as blizzards, floods, and
hurricanes.

132 Cable News Network. Video footage of Korean shop owners during
the April 1992 Los Angeles riots. April 31, 1992.

133 Foster SE. "Guns and Property." The Free Market. Ludwig von
Mises Institute. July 1992; 10: 1 & 7.

134 Wright J D., Rossi PH and Daly K. Under the Gun: Weapons,
Crime, and Violence in America. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 1983.

135 Cambridge Reports, Inc. An analysis of public attitudes towards
handgun control. a survey for the Center for the Study and
Prevention of Handgun Violence (an organization sharing directors
with Handgun Control, Inc.).

136 survey for National Alliance Against Violence by Peter Hart &
Assoc. in Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New
York: Aldine de Gruyter. 1991.

137 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. Chapter 4.

138 Henigan DA. "Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment."
Valparaiso University Law Review. Fall 1991; 26: 107-129.

139 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
Aldine de Gruyter. 1991. pp. 130-8.

140 Hernandez M. "US Orders In Troops to Quell Island Violence."
Los Angeles Times. September 21, 1989. p. 1.

141 Hyman S. "Hurricane Looting Rains Its Lessons Left and Right."
Los Angeles Times. October 1, 1989. Opinion Section. p. 5.

142 Foster SE. "Guns and Property." The Free Market. Ludwig von
Mises Institute. July 1992; 10: 1 & 7.

143 South v. Maryland, 59 US (HOW) 396, 15 L.Ed., 433 (1856);
Bowers v. DeVito, US Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 686F.2d.
616 (1882).

144 for example, California Government Code  845. "Failure to
provide police protection 

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure
to establish a police department or otherwise provide police
protection service or, if police protection service is provided,
for failure to provide sufficient police protection service."
145 Hartzler v. City of San Jose, App., 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975).

146 Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A2d. 1306 (D.C. App. 1983).

147 Warren v. District of Columbia, D.C. App., 444 A.2d. 1 (1981).

148 Riss v. City of New York, 293 N.Y. 2d. 897 (1968).

149 Franklin B. Historical Review of Pennsylvania. 1759.

150 Cottrol RJ and Diamond RT. "The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration." The Georgetown Law Journal.
December 1991: 80; 309-61.

151 Tonso WR. "Gun Control: White Man's Law." Reason. December
1985. pp. 22-25.

152 Tahmassebi S. "Gun Control and Racism." George Mason University
Civil Rights Law Journal. Summer 1991; 2: 67-99.

153 Cottrol RJ and Diamond RT. "The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration." The Georgetown Law Journal.
December 1991: 80; 309-61.

154 Kates DB. "Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the
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155 Kessler RG. "Gun Control and Political Power." Law & Policy
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156 Kates DB. "Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the
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157 Kates D. "The Second Amendment and the Ideology of
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158 Kassirer JP. "Firearms and the Killing Threshold." N. Engl J
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159 US Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution. The Right to Keep
and Bear Arms: Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary. United States Congress. 97th.
Congress. 2nd. Session. February 1982.

160 US v. Cruickshank, 95 US. 542 (1874), held that the individual
right to possess arms existed independent of the Second Amendment
and US v. Miller, 307 US. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206 (1939)
is discussed in the body of this article.

161 Halbrook SP. "The Right of the People or the Power of the
State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment."
Valparaiso University Law Review. Fall 1991; 26: 131-207

162 Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of
Virginiataken in shorthand by David Robertson of Petersburg, 275
(2nd ed., Richmond) 1805.

163 USC X 311(a)

164 House Report No. 141, 73rd. Congress, 1st. Session. 1933. pp.
2-5.

165 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (12).

166 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (16).

167 Perpich v. Department of Defense. 110 S.Ct. 2418 (1990).

168 Miller v. US. 307 US 174 (1938).

169 Cases v. US, 131 F.2d. 916 (1st Cir. 1942) at 922.

170 US v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 US 259 (1990).

171 US Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution. The Right to Keep
and Bear Arms: Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary. United States Congress. 97th.
Congress. 2nd. Session. February 1982.

172 US Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution. The Right to Keep
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173 Henigan DA. "Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment."
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174 Amar AR. "The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment." The
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175 Halbrook S. "Freedmen, Firearms, and the Fourteenth Amendment"
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176 Halbrook SP. "What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis
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177 US Constitution. The Bill of Rights. Article IV.

178 Henigan DA. "Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment."
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179 Blackman PH. 1990. "Criminology's Astrology: The Center for
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180 Blackman PH. 1991. open letter to the Director of the Office of
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181 Liebling AJ. American Film. 3:67. July 1978.

182 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
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183 Harvard Medical Practice Study. "Harvard Medical Practice
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184 Wenzel RP. "The Mortality of Hospital Acquired Bloodstream
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185 Martin MJ, Hunt TK, Hulley SB. "The Cost of Hospitalization for
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186 Organ CH and Fry WR. "Surgery." JAMA. 1992; 268: 413-4.

187 Beccaria C. On Crimes and Punishments. 1764. (translated 1963
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188 Kates DB. Guns, Murders, and the Constitution: A Realistic
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189 Kleck G. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America.  New York:
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190 Kates DB. "Bigotry, Symbolism and Ideology in the Battle over
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191 Centerwall BS. "Television and Violence: The Scale of the
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192 Centerwall BS. "Exposure to Television as a Risk Factor for
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193 Spivak H, Prothrow-Stith D, and Hausman AJ. "Dying Is No
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-- 
bb063@Cleveland.Freenet.Edu  Chris Crobaugh - (216) 327-6655 (V)
"Those who would sacrifice essential liberties for a little 
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." B. Franklin
Xref: sparky talk.politics.guns:25585 talk.politics.drugs:8042 sci.psychology:4855