From: charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau)
Subject: Re: European Intervention (was "exit")
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 15:35:48 GMT

In article <1992Dec18.131943.29739@panix.com> spencer@panix.com (David Spencer) writes:
>whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
>
>>One point which hasn't been raised yet in this discussion is the fact that
>>England's textile industry was suffering badly due to the inability to get
>>cotton from the South.
>
>Yes. *But* the textile workers were rabidly anti-slavery. The
>Manchester wool and cotton workers organized a number of massive
>pro-Union demonstrations. Our ambassador wrote several letters of
>appreciation and (if I recall correctly) addressed one of the
>demonstrations. This has always amazed and touched me.
>
>Intervention in favor of the rebels would have been very unpopular
>among the liberals (comprising most of the commercial and
>entrepreneurial classes) and the working-men. After we apologized for
>the Trent affair, there was never much chance that England would aid
>the rebels.  And France was too wound up trying to exploit our
>troubles in other ways, and in worrying about Germany.
>
>My reading of the English sources is that military intervention was
>never a serious possibility. The Brits might have engaged in a little
>battleship diplomacy over the Trent affair, but they'd never have
>mobilized. The real issue in Britain was whether to give financial
>support to the rebels and to permit them to raise money and construct
>vessels in England.
>
>Remember that Britain abolished slavery and the slave trade -- over
>the objections of powerful political and economic interests -- long
>before. The British Navy had been active in suppressing the slave
>trade.
>
>dhs    spencer@panix.com

There is some useful information relevant to this discussion in Regis
A. Courtemanche's book, No Need of Glory: The British Navy in American
Waters, 1860-1864.  As you point out, the Trent affair was the point
at which Anglo-American tensions peaked.  At that time, Sir Alexander
Milne, commander of the North American and West Indian Station, had
at his disposal 42 ships and 14,088 men.  By 1864, this would shrink
to 31 ships and 7,317 men.  Clearly, these figures do not indicate the
true magnitude of the effort that Britain would have been able to
undertake had war actually broken out.  According to Courtemanche,
at the time of the Trent incident, Milne "planned to crush the U.S.
fleet, and then establish a blockade from Cape Henry, Virginia, to
Maine.... Milne would enter the Chesapeake, try to cut off all supplies
to Washington, and 'if possible to get at the capital'".

"By 1864," notes Courtemanche, "the United States had reached parity
with the navies of Britain and France.  At that time the United
States had 671 ships, including 71 ironclads, and 51,000 men; France
had 376 ships, with 18 ironclads and 51,998 men; while Britain had
417 ships, with 30 ironclads and 68,811 men."

While this is not a diplomatic history, Courtemanche does make a
couple of useful points.  One is that, by 1863, British interest
had returned to European affairs because of the Polish crisis
and the Schleswig-Holstein situation.  He also says, "The truth
was that Britain, despite the distress of her textile workers, was
making so much money by selling goods to both sides, that there was
little popular sentiment for intervention."

- Gary Charbonneau
  charbonn@silver.indiana.edu

Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa