HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
Guys,
I've built Lucid Emacs 19.3, and the following functions (suggested recently
by someone on the list) seem to hang lemacs. A new screen is opened, but
then lemacs goes to sleep and never comes back. Any idea? Thanks in advance.
BTW, sometimes even 'C-x 5' (x-new-screen) hangs lemacs.

My configuration is:
  SparcStation 1+ w/SunOS 4.1.3
  gcc 2.2.2
  MIT X11R5, patch 17

---------------------------------------
(defun x-find-file (filename)
  "Does find file in new X Window"
  (interactive "Ffind file new screen: ")
  (select-screen (x-create-screen nil))
  (switch-to-buffer (find-file-noselect filename)))

(defun y-find-file (filename)
  "Does find file in new X Window"
  (interactive)
  (select-screen (x-create-screen nil))
  (switch-to-buffer (find-file-noselect filename)))

(defun find-dot-emacs ()
  (interactive)
  (y-find-file "~/.emacs")
  )

;; add new item to existing menu
(add-menu-item '("File")  "Find File New Screen"  'x-find-file t)
;; add a new menu
(add-menu-item '("--Dot Files--") ".emacs"        'find-dot-emacs t)

---------------------------------------

-- 
/* ----------------------------------------------------------- */
/*  Amir J. Katz             |   amir@matis.ingr.COM           */
/*  System Specialist        |   Voice:  +972 52-584684        */
/*  SEE Technologies Ltd.    |   Fax:    +972 52-543917        */
/* ............ Solaris 2.0 - The Final Frontier ? ........... */
x-gateway: rodan.UU.NET from help-lucid-emacs to alt.lucid-emacs.help; Tue, 15 Sep 1992 17:21:26 EDT
Subject: Re: Available Minibuffer Partial Completion Packages?
Reply-To: daveg@synaptics.com
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 13:52:15 -0700
From: daveg@thymus.synaptics.com (Dave Gillespie)
Newsgroups: alt.lucid-emacs.help
Eric Eide writes:
> I generally use Dave Gillespie's "partial minibuffer completion" package for
> GNU Emacs, but my copy (version 1.05 beta) doesn't work within Lucid GNU Emacs.
> Has anybody adapted any of the partial completion packages to Lucid?

I have been really busy lately but I am finally finding the time to
port my Emacs packages to Lucid GNU Emacs.  My enhanced info.el,
with the same highlighting support as in Lucid's info.el plus all my
new features, will be ready in a few days.  I'll do the completer
sometime soon, although it's not quite as high a priority.

The big project is porting Calc.  Unfortunately there are still several
Emacs features that Calc uses heavily but that Lucid GNU Emacs doesn't
support, such as horizontally-split windows and horizontal scrolling.
At the moment I've just disabled all these features, but I'd like to
try to rethink them for the multi-screen context.  (For example, Keypad
Mode really ought to run on its own screen, so you can leave it up there
all the time.)  I'll keep you all posted---it probably won't be long
before there is a beta version ready to test.

								-- Dave
x-gateway: rodan.UU.NET from help-lucid-emacs to alt.lucid-emacs.help; Mon, 14 Sep 1992 23:05:04 EDT
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 20:03:28 PDT
X-Windows: The defacto substandard.
From: jwz@lucid.com (Jamie Zawinski)
Subject: Re: blink-paren function
	<47510@shamash.cdc.com>
	<47573@shamash.cdc.com>
Newsgroups: alt.lucid-emacs.help
In message <47573@shamash.cdc.com> Bruce Dunlop wrote:
>
> Wouldn't it be possible to modify the behavior of blink-paren, depending
> on whether you just typed in a right paren. or not?

The point of blink-paren is to not be tied to insertion.  Blinking the
matching paren just after you've typed one is easy.  Blinking it when
the cursor happens to be on it is a Hack.

> After moving the cursor, it would be more intuitive and consistent to
> see the blink match the hi-lited character.

You think this because you think of the cursor as being ON a character.
You have not truly discovered The Way.  

	-- Jamie
Newsgroups: alt.lucid-emacs.help
From: hoelzle@Xenon.Stanford.EDU (Urs Hoelzle)
Subject: paste in minibuffer (19.3)
Organization: CS Department, Stanford University, California, USA
Distribution: alt
Date: 10 Sep 92 17:34:08 GMT

The new "mousable completions" feature is cool, but it seems to have
broken the cut&paste behavior for the minibuffer.  In 19.3, the middle
mouse button no longer works as "paste" in the minibuffer.  Pasting
with the mouse is very useful: for example, when doing a query
replace, I can select the search string in the text buffer and paste
it in the minibuffer.  Is there any way to change this back to the
19.2 behavior?

-Urs
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: fitz@wang.com (Tom Fitzgerald)
Subject: Re: Firewalls
Organization: Wang Labs, Lowell MA, USA
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 92 02:10:41 GMT

intell@rock.concert.net (James Henderson - INTELLENET Inc.) writes:

> Firewalls continue to be of considerable interest to me.  I have read of
> several firewalls, including commercial offerings, which require that
> the user log onto the gateway and then communicate outwardly from there.
> This seems to me to be a security risk in itself.  If the user can log
> onto the gateway, then that user has the potential to break into that
> system and from there wreak havoc with a supposedly secure net.

One of the points of the firewall is that it doesn't allow access to anyone
you don't want to have on the LAN.  You can define different levels of
service depending on the source of a request: SMTP allowed from everywhere,
NNTP by everyone inside and a specific list of neighbors, rlogin only from
the inside.

Also, the firewall gives you a central monitoring point.  Every breakin
attempt must include penetrating the firewall, so watching that one system
closely will tell you if there are any breakins to anywhere on the net.

> Another problem I see with this is that you force the user to either
> have a separate password for the gateway, which may be forgotten and 
> an undesirable complication, or the user must use their internal password.
> If this gets sniffed out or cracked, then the net is wide open.

Who's in a position to sniff the password?  If users can only login from
the inside, the password is only exposed on the inner LAN anyway.  The best
defense against cracking is shadow passwords.

You can't really force passwords on the gateway to be different from private
passwords, without some serious ugliness (storing the crypted passwords for
private systems on the gateway itself or some such).  This doesn't sound
worthwhile at all.

> Couls we get a discussion goig on the strengths and weaknesses of
> different firewall strategies?

The firewall you're describing (a system that must be logged into, to allow
access into or out of a secure LAN) is only one kind.  Another kind is a
router that only allows specific kinds of traffic to flow in each direction.
Both have their advantages; and in fact they work pretty well in series.

Firewalls aren't perfect by any means, but they give you one more layer
of defense.

-- 
Tom Fitzgerald   Wang Labs       fitz@wang.com   "I went to the universe today;
1-508-967-5278   Lowell MA, USA                   It was closed...."
Xref: sparky alt.security:4356 sci.crypt:3211
From: hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu (Hugh Miller)
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 12 Sep 92 19:16:43 GMT
Organization: Loyola University Chicago

In <1992Sep12.032506.5521@colnet.cmhnet.org> res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes:

>Another reason may be that they are using MD5 in 2.0.  Does anyone know
>if pgp2.0 is compatible with pgp1.0?

    Not key-compatible, i.e., you can't use your old keys & keyrings
with the new version, and there is no conversion utility.  You've got to
redo your keyrings from the ground up.
    This was intentional.  The idea is that with the new keyring
management features, you will more or less automatically build a good
level of security in the right way -- the FIRST time.
    
    -=- Hugh

-- 
Hugh Miller         | Dept. of Philosophy | Loyola University of Chicago
Voice: 312-508-2727 |  FAX: 312-508-2292  |    hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu
In this world of sin and sorrow, there is always something to be thankful      
 for; as for me, I rejoice that I am not a Republican. -- H. L. Mencken
Xref: sparky alt.security:4368 sci.crypt:3233
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (PeterClaus          Gutmann        )
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 15 Sep 92 04:01:58 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <1992Sep13.125302.16476@sol.ctr.columbia.edu> space aliens made
    seth@startide.ctr.columbia.edu (Seth Robertson) write:

>There appears to be a minor bug in PGP which can cause PGP to
>reference element -1 in an array.  When I compiled it with gcc -O on
>my Sun, it caused PGP to go into an infinite loop, though of course
>anything could happen.
>
>[patch for config.c, ~line 310]

Gack!  I recognize that code (turns bright red).  I actually ripped it out of
another program I've been working on and it seems to have lost something in
the translation.  The original line of code (before it got stuck into PGP) reads
(sound of dusty archives being searched):

    while( bufCount && \
	   ( theCh = buffer[ bufCount - 1 ] ) == ' ' || theCh == '\t' )
	   bufCount--;

Apologies to anyone who's been inconvenienced by this problem....

Peter.
--
    pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz || peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz || peter@nacjack.gen.nz
			    (In order of preference)
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: steve@donald.tamu.edu (Steve Rikli)
Subject: Re: COPS bug? in dev.chk - here's a fix
Organization: College of Architecture, Texas A&M University
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 00:30:03 GMT

In article <1992Sep10.143408.517@dragon.acadiau.ca> rob@dragon.acadiau.ca (Rob Hutten) writes:
>
>Hi.  We're running COPS 1.04 (shell version) under SunOS 4.1.2
>and recently the following error was being issued:
>
>    Warning!  NFS file system  exported with no restrictions!
>
>The COPS routine that checks prints this message is
>/usr/local/secure/cops_104/dev.chk.  The problem occurs whenever the
>/etc/exports file contains a comment, namely a line beginning with a #.
>The program ignores these lines with a
>
>	$SED -e 's/^#.*$//' $exports
>
>command, which replaces all lines beginning with # with a blank line.
>This blank line was still being passed through awk, causing the null first
>parameter to be printed in the warning message.
>
>The problem can be fixed by replacing this line:
>
>   $SED -e 's/^#.*$//' $exports | $AWK '!/access=/ {
>                print "Warning!  NFS file system " $1 " exported with no restric
>   tions!"}'
>
>with this:
>
>   grep -v '^#' $exports | awk '!/access=/ {
>                print "Warning!  NFS file system " $1 " exported with no restric
>   tions!"}'

I spoke with the author of Cops, Dan Farmer, via email about this last
April, and the bug fix he sent me was:

	$SED -e '/^#.*$/d' $exports | $AWK '!/access=/ {

He said this is what will be used in the next version.  Speaking of which,
hmmmm??  ;-)  Anyhow, I've put this fix in, and it does the Right Thing.

There was some question whether all unices actually treat '#' as comments,
but he didn't think it was a problem.

cheers,
sr.
--
|| Steve Rikli 	           |||  Visualization Lab               ||
|| steve@archone.tamu.edu  |||  Texas A&M University            ||
|| (409) 845-3465          |||  College Station, TX  77843-3137 ||
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
From: wcs@cbnewsh.cb.att.com (Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 erebus.att.com!wcs)
Subject: Re: Certifying PGP (was: Re: PGP *2.0* available)
Organization: Your typical phone company involved in your typical daydream
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 05:53:57 GMT

In article <ARI.HUTTUNEN.92Sep12002801@supergirl.hut.fi> Ari.Huttunen@hut.fi (Ari Juhani Huttunen) writes:
] Would it not be possible for Branko Lankester to publish his public
] key in the BYTE Magazine (for example)? I don't know what a 1/4 page ad[...]

You don't really need to do that - broadcasting to the net can be adequate,
provided the ostensible author of the broadcast has the opportunity to
repudiate fake broadcasts, and to receive enough separate transmissions
of the broadcast that it's unlikely they've all been spoofed on their
way back to him.  Spread it around by ftp...
-- 

				Pray for peace;      Bill
#Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Any technology distinguishable from magic is not sufficiently advanced ...
From: davidsen@ariel.crd.GE.COM (william E Davidsen)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: Firewalls
Date: 9 Sep 92 13:08:23 GMT
Reply-To: davidsen@crd.ge.com (bill davidsen)
Organization: GE Corporate R&D Center, Schenectady NY

In article <1992Sep7.150150.29998@rock.concert.net>, intell@rock.concert.net (James Henderson - INTELLENET Inc.) writes:
| 
| Firewalls continue to be of considerable interest to me.  I have read of
| several firewalls, including commercial offerings, which require that
| the user log onto the gateway and then communicate outwardly from there.

  That's the way we do it. The firewall does not forward packets of any
type, nor does it NFS mount anything, nor does it support X. Guest users
are logged in using a chroot package I devised which needs both a
regular login password which we select (known good) and a 2nd level
password which the user must change every N days (typically 185).

  The users can telnet of ftp out, pull stuff into their accounts, and
then ftp it to a local machine. Guest users do not have uucp
connectivity, and unless the permissions have been changed they can't
get into the guest home directories via ftp in, they must log in and ftp
out.

-- 
bill davidsen, GE Corp. R&D Center; Box 8; Schenectady NY 12345
    I admit that when I was in school I wrote COBOL. But I didn't compile.
From: mgriffin@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Mark Griffin)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Why does pwunconv take so long
Date: 9 Sep 92 16:54:19 GMT
Organization: Kansas State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: matt.ksu.ksu.edu

We are thinking about using Shadow password, so I have been kind of playing
with it lately.  Doing the pwconv command seems to work fine, but the pwunconv
seems to take forever.  Why is this?  Is there any way to speed it up.  We
have about 2000 users on our system (3B2 1000, SysVR3.2.3).

-- 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .  .
Mark Griffin, Sys Admin, Fort Hays State University      |It is always better to
Internet:mgriffin@matt.ksu.ksu.edu Bitnet:mgriffin@ksuvm |do, than be done to.
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .  .
Newsgroups: alt.security
From: rob@dragon.acadiau.ca (Rob Hutten)
Subject: COPS bug? in dev.chk - here's a fix
Organization: Acadia University
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 14:34:08 GMT


Hi.  We're running COPS 1.04 (shell version) under SunOS 4.1.2
and recently the following error was being issued:

    Warning!  NFS file system  exported with no restrictions!

Normally this error would list an explicit filesystem, such as

    Warning!  NFS file system /usr exported with no restrictions!


The COPS routine that checks prints this message is
/usr/local/secure/cops_104/dev.chk.  The problem occurs whenever the
/etc/exports file contains a comment, namely a line beginning with a #.
The program ignores these lines with a

	$SED -e 's/^#.*$//' $exports

command, which replaces all lines beginning with # with a blank line.
This blank line was still being passed through awk, causing the null first
parameter to be printed in the warning message.

The problem can be fixed by replacing this line:

   $SED -e 's/^#.*$//' $exports | $AWK '!/access=/ {
                print "Warning!  NFS file system " $1 " exported with no restric
   tions!"}'

with this:

   grep -v '^#' $exports | awk '!/access=/ {
                print "Warning!  NFS file system " $1 " exported with no restric
   tions!"}'

My grep command removes comment lines instead of just blanking them out.

Has anyone else been having this problem?  Has this already been
solved?  Excuse me if this is old news, but I just started work
this week and had not previously been monitoring alt.security.


-Rob
-- 
Rob Hutten, Unix guy  
Acadia University Computer Centre, Wolfville, NS.
rob@dragon.acadiau.ca OR rob.hutten@acadiau.ca
Standard disclaimers apply.
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
From: hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu (Hugh Miller)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: Loyola University Chicago
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 04:23:59 GMT

<Greg Byrd's interesting points elided>...

    Probably best to move this discussion to misc.legal.computing or
comp.patents (or both), since sci.crypt isn't set up for such.  Meet you
there.

    -=- Hugh

-- 
Hugh Miller         | Dept. of Philosophy | Loyola University of Chicago
Voice: 312-508-2727 |  FAX: 312-508-2292  |    hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu
In this world of sin and sorrow, there is always something to be thankful      
 for; as for me, I rejoice that I am not a Republican. -- H. L. Mencken
Xref: sparky alt.security:4313 sci.crypt:3164
From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 9 Sep 92 02:57:54 GMT
Organization: University of Missouri

In <1992Sep8.204519.23739@news.cs.indiana.edu> "Marc VanHeyningen" <mvanheyn@silky.cs.indiana.edu> writes:
>(Oh, and there's just one "But does it..." offhand:  does it allow for
>authentication without encrypting or encoding the plaintext [i.e. doing
>the MIC-CLEAR encryption type]?)

It allows you to generate signatures separate from the plaintext file.
That sounds adequate for your purposes.

Rich
From: intell@rock.concert.net (James Henderson - INTELLENET Inc.)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Firewalls
Date: 7 Sep 92 15:01:50 GMT
Organization: CONCERT-CONNECT -- Public Access UNIX


Firewalls continue to be of considerable interest to me.  I have read of
several firewalls, including commercial offerings, which require that
the user log onto the gateway and then communicate outwardly from there.
This seems to me to be a security risk in itself.  If the user can log
onto the gateway, then that user has the potential to break into that
system and from there wreak havoc with a supposedly secure net.
Another problem I see with this is that you force the user to either
have a separate password for the gateway, which may be forgotten and 
an undesirable complication, or the user must use their internal password.
If this gets sniffed out or cracked, then the net is wide open.

Couls we get a discussion goig on the strengths and weaknesses of
different firewall strategies?

Thanks,

Jim Henderson
From: wetmore@cs.ucdavis.edu (Brad,4480-A Chemistry Annex,2149,7540674,Levitt)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: COPS bug? in dev.chk - here's a fix
Date: 10 Sep 92 19:29:15 GMT
Reply-To: wetmore@cs.ucdavis.edu
Organization: Computer Science, University of California at Davis.

In article 517@dragon.acadiau.ca, rob@dragon.acadiau.ca (Rob Hutten) writes:
>
>Hi.  We're running COPS 1.04 (shell version) under SunOS 4.1.2
>and recently the following error was being issued:
>
>    Warning!  NFS file system  exported with no restrictions!
>
>Normally this error would list an explicit filesystem, such as
>
>    Warning!  NFS file system /usr exported with no restrictions!

Yes, we had the same problem just a couple days ago.  Dan Farmer sent
us a bug fix, but until I receive word from him, I don't feel right
about posting his fix.  I'll write to him now...

BTW our site had some blank lines in the /etc/exports file,
and that caused his sed script to give the erroneous info.

Brad

---
   /
O /                         Steal here.
 X ----------------------------------------------------------------
O \     Brad Wetmore:                 wetmore@toadflax.cs.ucdavis.edu
   \    Help!!!  I've been robbed.  Someone stole my .sig, and sold 
	it back at the UCD used .sigstore.
From: styri@hal.nta.no (Haakon Styri)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: Firewalls
Date: 7 Sep 92 16:10:26 GMT
Reply-To: styri@nta.no
Organization: Norwegian Telecom Research

In article <1992Sep7.150150.29998@rock.concert.net>, James Henderson writes:
>
> This seems to me to be a security risk in itself.  If the user can log
> onto the gateway, then that user has the potential to break into that
> system and from there wreak havoc with a supposedly secure net.

You may set your system up so it's quite restricted. Define the firewall
so it'll only accept remote logins from the inside. (May of course be too
much security and too little functionality.) Define the secure machines/net
so they/it will refuse any logins from the firewall. 

> Another problem I see with this is that you force the user to either
> have a separate password for the gateway, which may be forgotten and 
> an undesirable complication, or the user must use their internal password.
> If this gets sniffed out or cracked, then the net is wide open.

Well, the firewall shouldn't always be a throughway. A firewall that's only
a gateway with an extra lock (maybe) is more like a gateway than a firewall.
If i doesn't stop the fire it's a poor firewall.
From: inf_as@debet.nhh.no
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Security evaluation
Date: 9 Sep 92 09:32:22 MET
Organization: Norwegian School of Economics

What is the status concerning evaluation of computer security within an
organization?
Is it a question of detailed analysis of the specific security measures
implemented?
Or, is it possible to apply some surrogate measures? - if so, what kind
of measures?

Thanks in advance.
Audun Sunde
INF_AS@DEBET.NHH.NO
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
From: wittlin@sci.kun.nl (Aleksander Wittlin)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:10:40 GMT

In <1992Sep9.181117.11610@sci.kun.nl> wittlin@sci.kun.nl (Aleksander Wittlin) writes:

>Hello,
> PGP 2.0 as it is now,  won't run on SUN3 systems.
>Make is trying to use sparc.s rsalib assembler primitives
>and  crashes (all Suns are supposed to be sparcs!).  
>Is there a simple fix of that problem? 

>A. Wittlin

Indeed it is! Thanks to Stephan <neuhaus@informatik.uni-kl.de> for the following patch to
Makefile:

*** Makefile.sun3	Fri Sep 11 13:12:16 1992
--- Makefile	Tue Sep  8 00:07:06 1992
***************
*** 97,113 ****
  
  sunspc:
  	$(MAKE) all CC="ccspc -B/1.8.6/sun4 -ansi -w -I/usr/include" \
! 	CFLAGS="-O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST  -DPORTABLE -DMPORTABLE"
  
  # Sun with gcc
  sungcc:
! 	$(MAKE) all CC=gcc LD=gcc \
! 	CFLAGS="-O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST  -DPORTABLE -DMPORTABLE"
  
  # Sun with standard cc: compile with unproto
  suncc: unproto/cpp
! 	$(MAKE) all CC=cc LD=cc \
! 	CFLAGS="-Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST  -DPORTABLE -DMPORTABLE"
  
  sysv:
  	$(MAKE) all CPP=/usr/lib/cpp \
--- 97,114 ----
  
  sunspc:
  	$(MAKE) all CC="ccspc -B/1.8.6/sun4 -ansi -w -I/usr/include" \
! 	CFLAGS="-O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DUNIT32 -DMERRITT" \
! 	OBJS_EXT=sparc.o
  
  # Sun with gcc
  sungcc:
! 	$(MAKE) all CC=gcc LD=gcc OBJS_EXT=sparc.o \
! 	CFLAGS="-O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DUNIT32 -DMERRITT" \
  
  # Sun with standard cc: compile with unproto
  suncc: unproto/cpp
! 	$(MAKE) all CC=cc LD=cc OBJS_EXT=sparc.o \
! 	CFLAGS="-Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DUNIT32 -DMERRITT"
  
  sysv:
  	$(MAKE) all CPP=/usr/lib/cpp \

-----------------
A. Wittlin
Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
From: wittlin@sci.kun.nl (Aleksander Wittlin)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 1992 18:11:17 GMT

Hello,
 PGP 2.0 as it is now,  won't run on SUN3 systems.
Make is trying to use sparc.s rsalib assembler primitives
and  crashes (all Suns are supposed to be sparcs!).  
Is there a simple fix of that problem? 

A. Wittlin
Xref: sparky alt.security:4329 sci.crypt:3178