From: Jeffrey D Koperski <jkopersk@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Newsgroups: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Existence of gods (Atheism FAQ point 7)
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 21:57:05 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: The Ohio State University

>The problem with your example is that scientists don't believe in things
>that are undetectable. We bar interactions from things outside the light
>cone, but there are things out there that have light cones from events
>in the past intersect our world line at the present. Those things we
>believe in. Anything from distances so vast that they wouldn't intersect
>our lightcone now (assuming you follow certain theories of cosmology)
>we don't believe in until we have reason to suspect their existance.
>
Well, I believe this is simply false.  It would certainly be odd if everything
that exists happens to fall within our light cone or sends a signal that cuts
through it.  I admire your staunch empiricism and what might be called irrealis
m about objects outside our light cone, I just don't think it's widely held.  P
enrose and Hawking don't sound like irrealists on this point.

>The thing is, if God affects the universe, there has to be a physical
>side to God. If he has the capacity for revelation, during that revelation
>He is physically observable and detectable.

Of course this is true.  However, the FAQ reply seems to demand that God be
dectectable now or when a scientist desires to detect him.  Since God is a free
agent and under no obligation to cooperate with science, he need not be
detectable at any other time than special revelation.  If the FAQ criterion was
simply detectable-at-some-point-in-time, then God meets that criterion.

>>Second, numbers, sets, and a host of universals are undetectable when
>>uninstantiated, but many philosophers and most mathematicians believe in the
>>existence of (at least) some mathematical entities (see, for example, Roger
>>Penrose, _The Emporer's New Mind_).
>
>Some, but not all. 

But all I really need to make the point is "some."

>
>And it depends a lot on how you define existance. God
>is supposed to be able to affect the physical universe directly. The number
>3 doesn't have that feature. There is a difference between numbers and
>electrons. It is the physical existance of God that we are interested in
>here. If you state that God is not composed of matter then we move the
>question over to what is God composed of, since God has to be composed of

I'm not sure what would count as a definition of 'existence'.  It seems to be
the paradigm case for a primitive notion.  Buffalo exist, this table exists,
electrons exist, and God exists.  I would capture all such claims with one
existential quantifier with no equivocation [(Ex)(Bx), etc.].
God's interaction with the physical universe is a difficult question in the 
philosophy of religion and theology.  Notice, however, that I need not solve 
this problem here.  My point is merely that the detection criterion in the FAQ 
rules out entities beside God that philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians 
ascribe existence to.  Since this is the case, the criterion is too strong.

Thank you for your reply.  I do not take it to be in any way mean spirited and 
that is much appreciated.

Jeff Koperski
Dept. of Philosophy
Ohio State