From: black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236))
Subject: Re: Rights. Was: Re: Children, Children
Organization: Eastman Kodak
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 18:36:34 GMT

In article <1992Apr3.211107.14878@NCoast.ORG> cmort@ncoast.org (Christopher Morton) writes:
>As quoted from <1992Apr1.173639.6919@clpd.kodak.com> by black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236)):
>
>> 
>> As quoted from <1992Mar25.202203.1221@clpd.kodak.com> by black@che.serum.kodak.com (Robert Black (x37236)):
>> (3 of 4)
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm>  Human motivation apart
>> cm> from rudimentary self-preservation IS arbitrary.  Of course since you can 
>> cm> intellectualize that urge and override it, even THAT is arbitrary.  I presume
>> cm> you've heard of suicide....
>> 
>> Human motivation is NOT arbitrary.  You even disproved arbitrariness by
>> naming the self-preservation urge.  But you didn't follow it far enough.
>> Human motivation is almost always (maybe it IS always) directed toward
>> increasing comfort and decreasing discomfort.  Substitute pleasure and
>> pain if you want for comfort and discomfort.  Suicide is just a result
>> of the determination that to go on living is too uncomfortable.  Another
>> way to view all this, of course, is that characteristics like consciousness,
>> awareness and sentience are right down there, at the core of all our 
>> motivations. ...including those motivations that drive us to assert rights.
>
>Human motivation is arbitrary.  There is NO OBJECTIVE reason to choose to live
>anymore than there's an OBJECTIVE reason to choose to die.  It's an expression
>of free will.  If you can override self-preservation.  Things are arbitrary.

If human motivation is arbitrary, then why don't we see more random behavior?
Why aren't humans attracted to painful experiences as much as they are to 
pleasurable ones?

>> > Christopher Morton:
>> cm>Remember, as far as I'm concerned, their "suffering" provides them with no
>> cm>"rights" at all.  I'm not going to argue from the position that it does.
>> 
>> But it's the suffering and the capability to have sensations that make us
>> want to develop our ideas of interests and rights in the first place.  OUR
>> SENTIENCE IS AT THE CORE OF OUR MORAL THINKING.
>
>No it doesn't.  It's your ability to INTELLECTUALIZE your sensations and the
>means to moderate them.  The sensations by themselves are just pure sensory
>data.  Once again, do amoeba formulate and assert their rights?  They react to
>stimulus.

As far as I know an amoeba does not formulate and assert rights.  So what?
Can it feel pain?  Can it suffer?  Does it have a central nervous system?
Read my earlier comments about your obfuscatory metamorphosis of my terms
like sentience into your terms like sensation and stimuli.

>> > Christopher Morton:
>> cm>  Once
>> cm>again, though, have you EVER known a REAL duck to state its interests?
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Yes.  Not in words, but by its actions.
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> REALLY?  WHAT were the interests and how did you KNOW what they were?  What you
>> cm> are obviously doing is to impute YOUR motivations to the duck.
>> 
>> Partly by imputation, of course.  That's what I do with people also.  I'll
>> bet you do too.  I can't get inside a duck's head or another person's head.
>> I'll never know for certain what's there in either the duck or the person.
>> But I can draw conclusions based on behavioral observations and
>> physiological knowledge.  So when I see a duck move toward food or away
>> from a threatening gesture, I think it's safe to conclude something about
>> the motivation involved.  I would apply the same logic to humans.  Do you 
>> disagree?
>
>Then of course you've discredited your own assertion.  You have NO factual
>proof for your assertion.  It is what Stephen Jay Gould refers to so aptly as
>special pleading.  You're argument seems to be that it's so because it HAS to
>be.  No it DOESN'T.

My argument is based on empirical observations and reason.

>  At least not in the absence of proof.  You CAN'T get into
>the duck's head.  You CAN get into the person's.  He'll INVITE you in.  He'll
>send you letters, voicemail and computer messages.  He'll tell you what he
>thinks and WHY.  The duck will NOT.  It CANNOT.

Again you're putting way to much faith in words.  Words are just a component of
behavior, one way of communicating.  They can be deceptive, intentionally or
unintentionally.  They can be wrong.  If a knife-wielding man charges at you
screaming, "I will not hurt you," which do you believe:  the actions or the
words.  Is he inviting you into his head by his words?  Or by his nonverbal
behavior?  There's a reason for the old adage, "Actions speak louder than
words."

>> > Christopher Morton said:
>> cm>The only formulation you've ever heard is the product of HUMAN thought.
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> This assigns humans more responsibility; it doesn't necessarily block others
>> rb> from having rights.
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> Of course it does, at least insofar as the others don't have the same INNATE
>> cm> capacity AS A CLASS.
>> 
>> They have the same innate capacity as a class for sentience and this is at 
>> at the root; it's also what makes these significant and relevant.
>
>So what?  I don't care.  I assign no particular importance to the ability to
>sense stimuli, at least not in comparison to the ability to INTELLECTUALIZE
>those stimuli.

Again you have switched from my "sentience" to your "sense stimuli."  See my
previous comments.

>> > Christopher Morton:
>> cm>No they don't.  Humans have the right to humane treatment because they are
>> cm>HUMAN.
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Why is your statement true and this statement false?:  "Dogs have the right 
>> rb> to humane treatment because they are canine".
>>  
>> > Christopher Morton:
>> cm>Because humans can formulate and restate their rights.  Can dogs?
>>  
>> Robert Black:
>> rb> Why is the ability to formulate rights and restate rights the criterion?
>> 
>> Christopher Morton:
>> cm> Rights are a function of the ability of the affected parties AS A CLASS to
>> cm> understand and formulate them.  
>> 
>> That didn't answer the question.  Rights, in the sense you have generally
>> used the term, are formalized interests which are derived from basic
>> sentience-driven motivations.  The ability to verbalize these interests
>> helps humans to claim their rights but IT NO WAY RULES OUT RIGHTS FOR
>> OTHER QUALIFYING SUBJECTS.
>
>Yes it does.  They can neither recognize, formulate, nor state ANYBODY'S rights
>there's or anybody elses.  You can try to special plead the case that they do, 
>but it's untenable on its face.

But the question was:  Why is the ability to recognize, formulate, and state
your rights a criterion for determining who has rights?  You don't need to 
repeat that you believe it to be so.  I understand that you do.  Is it just your
subjective opinion?  Or do you have some non-tautological objective grounds?


RB (black@serum.kodak.com)
These views are not necessarily the views of my employers.

Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals