Organization: Penn State University
Date: Wednesday, 15 Apr 1992 08:25:26 EDT
From: John A. Johnson <J5J@psuvm.psu.edu>
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Bartley's nonjustificationist view of rationality (Was: Better answer
 <graham.702437350@dumas> <1992Apr8.020638.7782@xanadu.com>

In article <1992Apr8.020638.7782@xanadu.com>, hibbert@xanadu.com (Chris Hibbert)
suggests that some Bartley material be added to the FAQ file, and queries
into the distinction between belief and assumption:
>
>But maybe that's what you meant.  If you mean something like
>"revisable opinion" when you say "assumption," and "equally worthy of
>being considered" when you say "equally possible", I guess you're
>saying the same thing as I am.  Do we agree on everything but
>terminology?

I had originally replied:

>Yes, yes, I think we (you, Graham, and myself) do all agree.  It has
>been about 20 years since I have read Bartley, but I remember his
>position as being remarkably similar to Graham's and mine.
>
>I've been meaning to reply to this post for several days now, but
>have been wasting my time quibbling with WEEMBA.  Let me see if I
>can ignore him for a while to concentrate on this Bartley thing,
>which is indeed relevant to the concerns of atheists.
>
>My intention is to dig up my notes on Bartley and reply with a
>more detailed response.

I was discussing beliefs and assumptions via e-mail with
Allison Mitchell when the rationality business came up again,
giving me an opportunity to present Bartley's views.  Below is
a copy of that correspondence.  Perhaps it will generate discussion
on possible meanings of "rationality" and why some of us atheists
consider ourselves to be more rational than theists.

[Allison]
>From your (and Graham's) earlier responses to Jarek, and the discussion we are
>having, I assume (without being completely rational, of course) both of you
>put
>some stock in being "reasonable" and "rational."  Please correct me if I'm
>wrong.  Since we're busy defining things, I have a few questions:
>        1) How are you and Graham defining "rational"?

Well, I can only speak for myself (although Graham usually agrees with
me on these things).  My definition of *rational* or *reasonable*
follows Bartley's position in his *Retreat to Committment* (A. A. Knopf,
1962).  This position locates rationality in criticism rather than in
justification.  The problem with traditional justificationist definitions
of rationality is outlined by Bartley as follows [pp. 90-92]

"No matter what belief is advanced, someone can always challenge it
with:  'How do you know?' and 'Give me a reason.'  Unless this procedure
is to go on forever, it must be halted at a 'standard,' 'criterion,'
'ultimate presupposition,' 'end,' or 'goal' whose authority is simply
accepted.  If all men do not cease their questioning at the same point,
however, 'ultimate relativism' results.  For there is no Archimedes'
lever with which to decide among competing sets of ultimate standards.
Even if everyone did happen to stop at the same place, there would be no
way to determine whether this universal subjective standard led to
objectively true statements about the world.  Obviously, a man cannot,
without arguing in a circle, justify the rationality of his standard of
rationality by appealing to that standard.  Yet, if he holds certain
beliefs--for example, the standard itself--to be immune from the demand
for rational justification and from the question of 'How do you know?'
he can be said to hold them irrationally or dogmatically.  And, so it is
claimed, argument among men about the radically different beliefs they
hold in this way is pointless.  For rational argument consists in mutual
criticism, with each man supporting all his beliefs with good reasons.
The limits of rational argument withing any particular way of life,
then, seem to be defined by reference to that object of belief in
respect to which commitment is made or imposed, in respect to which
argument is called to a halt."

The justificationist approach (that one is rational by supporting one's
claims with reasons) is left open to a devastating *tu quoque*
argument based on the following three premises:

1.  For certain logical reasons (discussed in the above quotation),
    rationality is limited such that everyone must make a dogmatic,
    irrational commitment.
2.  Therefore, one has a right to make whatever commitment one
    pleases: the scientist to science, mystics to mystical
    revelation, etc. [this is the heart of Jarek's argument--he
    believes whatever he likes to believe]
3.  Therefore, no one may criticize anyone else's commitment, nor
    can anyone be criticized for making that commitment.

(I lifted the above summary of the *tu quoque* argument from the
 writings of one of my former teachers, Walt Weimer--*Notes on
 the Methodology of Scientific Research [Erlbaum, 1979].)

Bartley describes the view of rationality as critical as follows (pp.
151-152)"Second, a comprehensively critical rationalist, like other men,
holds countless unexamined presuppositions and assumptions, many of
which may be false.  His rationality consists in his willingness to
submit these to critical consideration when he discovers them or when
they are pointed out to him. When one belief is subjected to criticism,
many others have to be taken for granted--including those with which the
criticism is being carried out.  THe latter are used as the basis of
criticism, but because they are unproblematical at present:  we possess
no criticisms of them.. For the time being thse are, in that sense
alone, beyond criticism.  And one belief that is nearly always taken for
granted when one or another belief is being criticized is the belief in
criticism itself.  But the fact that most of a man's beliefs are beyond
criticism at any one time does not mean that any of them has to be
beyond criticism all the time:  this is not so logically, and probably
not even practically.  Nor does it mean that the belief in criticism
itself may not come up for critical review from time to time."

In this context I can respond to your other questions:

>        2) Is rational thought actually possible if assumptions and beliefs
>are
>           irrational or nonrational?

Indeed, if one defines rationality in terms of being open to criticism
rather than having an unassailable justification for your position.

>        3) If rational thought IS actually possible, what do you base it on if
>           not assumptions and/or beliefs?

All thoughts (except absolute or ultimate presuppositions) presuppose
assumptions.  Nonetheless, it is openness to criticism, not the
the presence or absence of assumptions that defines rationality.

[Johnson]
>But I do agree that assumptions are "handier" because they can be
>discarded more easily when one is confronted with contradictory
>evidence.  One might cling longer to beliefs due to the emotional
>attachment.  That is why I suggest that holding assumptions is more
>rational than holding beliefs:  one is more open to additional
>information and less blinded by feelings.

[Allison]
>I agree with you wholeheartedly on this.  For example, I firmly believe that I
>do in fact exist.  I am quite emotionally tied to this belief.
>Allison

>Oh, btw, I'm forwarding what I responded to to Graham so that he can keep up
>with the discussion.  Unfortunately, I'm not a VAX whiz, so I don't know how
>to
>reply with an extract and send it to an additional person at the same time.
>Could you forward my replies to Graham as well, so that he could read them?
>Thanks!

Not only am I forwarding this to Graham; I am also posting a copy of
this to alt.atheism, as I had promised a piece on Bartley.
-----------------------------------
John A. Johnson (J5J@psuvm.psu.edu)
Department of Psychology Penn State DuBois Campus 15801
Penn State is not responsible for my behavior.
"Cynicism is the first religion.  It is the means by which to discover
 all else, since cynicism implies skepticism.  Skepticism results in
 examination, and examination leads to understanding."  from
 _The Spirit of Shaolin_ by David Carradine