From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Assasination
Date: 23 Aug 92 23:46:58 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <dliebman.18kg@terapin.com> 
dliebman@terapin.com (David Liebman) writes:

>In article <1992Aug21.114541.14978@husc3.harvard.edu>,
>zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <170pm0INNsbr@early-bird.think.com> 
>>karlr@think.com (Karl Rotstan) writes:

>>>In article <1992Aug19.181238.14909@husc3.harvard.edu>
>>>zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>>(stuff deleted)

KR:
>>>I think there are a few issues to be addressed.  First, what is the purpose
>>>of assassinating the individual?  If it is to "obtain justice", then I
>>>would be highly dubious of the action, for it allows the accused no chance
>>>to defend himself in court.  Also, when we start talking of justice, we
>>>need to be very careful of definitions.  Even within the universe of
>>>parliamentary democracies there are many variegated interpretations of
>>>justice, due process, and individual rights.

MZ:
>>To simplify this discussion, let us agree that the purpose is protection of
>>innocent lives, and that justice, due process, or individual rights aren't
>>forthcoming on the occasion.

DL:
>that's no longer an issue of morality -- rather one of calculation.
>if we are certain that our hypothetical target will be the cause of
>multiple death, we would be left with an obvious scale of quantity --

I don't see how you arrive at this conclusion.  Why is the "scale of
quantity" relevant to our discussion?  Also, why is all calculation
assumed inimical to moral reasoning, even if the latter is construed
deontologically, as I am suggesting?  Surely rational deliberation is a
form of calculation.

KR:
>>>Also, there is a danger that the assassination will backfire, as happened
>>>to the young Polish jew who assassinated the German Vice-Consul (I think
>>>that was the rank) in Paris in 1938.  This led directly to Kristallnacht,
>>>which, I suggest, is not exactly what the assassin wanted.

MZ:
>>Perhaps not, but was his action right or wrong, regardless of its
>>consequences? furthermore, might it have been right if, instead of
>>unwittingly killing an old school liberal democrat, he had killed Hitler
>>himself?

DL:
>irrespective of consequences?  surely you must mean _some_ consequences?
>for instance, one consequence of assassinating X is that X is now dead.
>another is that X will now not be able to kill Y and Z.
>to say that this is the only significant consequence seems rather
>artificial.  the boundary you propose here seems to lie along an
>axis of certainty: we predict that multiple lives will be lost if
>we do not kill X -- and you think that we might calculate our
>justification based only on this initial prediction.  this would
>force our concept of morality to depend on the notion of
>'reasonable certainty' or somesuch: adding yet one more vagary
>to the matter.

Not at all.  Killing is part of any act of assasination simply because it
is one of the faktors which make the act what it is.  There's no need to
appeal to any distinction based on certainty.  I take this to be the
distinguishing trait of the deontological approach, as opposed to
teleological systems of morality, most notably utilitarianism.

>regards,
>dave

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc