HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: erover@panix.com (Elizabeth Rover)
Newsgroups: alt.war,soc.women,alt.war.vietnam
Subject: Re: Revenge of The Women In Combat thing....
Date: 6 Jan 93 21:26:12 GMT
Organization: Panix Public Access Internet & Unix, NYC

In article <1993Jan5.225135.324@wetware.com> drieux@wetware.com (drieux, just drieux) writes:
>phantasm@iastate.edu () writes:
>] icsjm@asuacad.bitnet writes:
>] 
>] > definately the term "equal" needs defining......let's look at it from a
>] > military point of view.....yes, a woman can fly a jet as good as a man....
>] 
>] Better...
>] 
>] > yes a woman can sail a ship as good as a man....but NO a woman could
>] > participate in the jungles of some south eastern country.  Maybe as a
>] > nurse or medic, but not in the jungle working in teams....especially
>] > the work I did in Viet Nam......a womans survival rate would probably
>] > be about 2 or 3 seconds.
>] 
>] There are women today who could... There were women who could have done your
>] work in Nam better than you did... And with proper training, there are no
>] reasons why women would be poorer soldiers than men...
>
>
A recent study (ie: within the past year) of the Donner Party's failed
attempt to get from the east coast of the U.S. out to the west coast showed
that women tend to be better survivors than men. Discover Magazine wrote
this whole thing up, and I don't remember which issue it was, or the facts
of the expidition, but what it came down to was that they encountered a
horrible winter, and the men generally died before the women. Somehow,
someone, somewhere, disproved the old theory, that the men were chivalrous
and let the women eat the food, and took better care of the women than of
the men. The truth of the matter, in this case at least, is that, even
without training, the women had better endurance than the men. So, to say
that "a woman's survival rate would probably be about 2 or 3 seconds" is
not only unfounded, but unsubstantiatable. 

If anyone knows of the Discover article, could they email me which issue it
was in, I'd love to get a copy of it. Thanks.

--Liz


-- 
Liz Rover           "Le coeur a des raisons que la raison ne connait pas"
erover@panix.com    "The heart has reasons that the reason does not know"
Newsgroups: alt.war,soc.women,alt.war.vietnam
From: cathy@octel.com (Cathy Kearns)
Subject: Re: Revenge of The Women In Combat thing....
Organization: Octel Communications Inc., Milpitas Ca.
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 20:09:31 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.021039.6855@msc.cornell.edu> hillyard@msc.cornell.edu writes:
>But I am somewhat skeptical of common claim 
>that women have better endurance.  Looking at track and field (something with
>nice, objective performance ratings), the difference between men's and women's
>world class times are the same 10% from the 100m dash to the marathon.  Maybe 
>a marathon isn't long enough?  About a month ago I watched some Iron Man 
>Triathlon (x miles swimming, 112 biking and then a full marathon), the top men
>finished in 8 hours, the top women 10% later.  So when is this greater 
>endurance supposed to take effect?   

As I remember, there was a few years where women won the Ididiron (sp?). 
(Isn't that a rather long and strenuous dog sled race across an artic 
region of Canada.)  I also believe women have won and place in 100 mile
races, such as the Western States.  I believe the sport is call Ultra-marathons.
Does anyone out there know anything about these?

								Cathy
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Battle of Monocacy
Date: 11 Jan 93 10:17:59 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <C0p8rL.LG5@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, charbonn@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (gary charbonneau) writes:
> In article <1is1n1INNdpc@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu> am339@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Michael J. Logsdon) writes:
>>
>>I am searching for information on the battle of Monocacy, near
>>Frederick MD, July 9, 1864.  I am specifically looking for
>>first hand accounts, especially confederate, on the battle, 
>>or Early's Washington campaign.
>>
>>Kevin Casey   am339@cleveland.freenet.edu
> 
> The most recent issue of Civil War Times Illustrated has an article on the
> battle.
> 
> - Gary Charbonneau
> 

As it happens, I am writing this from within 15 miles of Monocacy Battlefield.
In addition to the article in CWTI, there is also an article on the battle
in the current issue of The_Blue_and_the_Grey.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 19:41:05 GMT

So far, the discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign has left out a
description of events following May 2nd. On May 3rd, Hooker hid his army
behind trenches and ordered Sedgewick's corps at Fredricksburg to march
to his rescue. On May 4th, Lee detached three divisions from his army to
cope with Sedgewick, leaving only about 20,000 effectives at Chancellorsville
to face Hooker's 60,000-odd. Yet Hooker did nothing, letting Sedgewick's
corps fight by itself. On May 5th, Sedgewick escaped to the north bank of
the Rappahannock, without Hooker's help, and Hooker continued to wait in
his trenches while Lee's detached divisions rejoined the main body. On
May 6th, Hooker withdrew across the river, despite the fact that Lee was
planning to attack him in his trenches. With the Union army in trenches,
outnumbering the attackers nearly 2 to 1, this attack would have been a
complete disaster, but Hooker didn't stick around to receive it. Slocum's
XII Corps wrecked Ewell's Second Corps under very similar circumstances
on Culp's Hill at Gettysburg, not to mention Pickett's attack, of which
much has recently been posted.
  I think the criticism of Hooker at Chancellorsville rests at least as
much on the events of these four days as on the events of May 2nd and the
destruction of XI Corps. XI Corps was one of seven corps at Hooker's
disposal and the loss of it by no means meant the loss of the battle,
especially when traded for the loss of Stonewall Jackson (and, temporarily,
AP Hill as well) on the Rebel side. But Hooker managed to throw away the
battle over the next four days.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: the "peter principle"
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 21:06:39 GMT

In article <1993Jan12.183849.1698@cronkite.ocis.temple.edu> agwing@picasso.ocis.temple.edu (Andrew Wing) writes:

>	And how about Hood in the CSA?  He was the spearhead of the Texans
>during the seven days, breaking the Union left.  He was a competent corps
>commander under Joe Johnston, but when he got command of the AoT, well we
>all know what happened at Spring Hill/Franklin/Nashville...
>
I always thought that Hood got kind of a bum rap on that. He could list on
more finger than he had left the number of times Lee had attacked a Union
Army that outnumbered him and succeeded. Plus, he missed out on Pickett's
charge at Gettysburg, didn't witness what should have been the best warning
against aggressive behavior.
Also, he was in a position of "damned if you do and damned if you don't."
His army was collapsing, he was short of provisions, and Sherman was slowly
pushing him back. If he took the offensive, he'd probably lose but he might
reverse the trend of the war. If he stayed on the defensive, he'd have been
slowly strangled just as Lee's army was in Virginia. So why not attack?
The usual answer to that is that the fall of Atlanta ruined hopes that
Lincoln would be defeated for re-election, but 1) I question that Hood could
have really know that: in fact, we don't know if Lincoln would have
been defeated had Hood stayed quiet and 2) this is no grounds for criticizing
the Nashville campaign as Atlanta had already fallen. 
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 16:23:35 GMT

In article <C0p5Lv.G2z@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> tbarnes@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (thomas wrentmore barnes) writes:
>He also was nearly killed by a cannonball that smashed into a
>pillar that he was leaning against. I think that this last bit of info
>was especially important. Hooker was shaky and indeciscive for the rest
>of the battle. IMHO he might well have had a head injury that 19th c.
>medicine wasn't advanced enough to detect, like a concussion. 

In fact, the force of the blast left him looking so obviously out of it that
many of the soldiers who saw him reported him as having been drunk on the
day of the battle.  I think the most egregious error that can appropriately 
be laid at his feet after the shell struck is his refusal to relinquish
command.  On the other hand, I don't recall that anyone even suggested
that he should do so.  Does anyone out there know the military etiquette 
for an underling to relieve an officer under these circumstances?
--Chuck
-- 
D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . ."
From: morphy@cco.caltech.edu (Jones Maxime Murphy)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: White Resistance in the North
Date: 10 Jan 1993 14:30:20 GMT
Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
NNTP-Posting-Host: alumni.caltech.edu

I've just finished reading Iver Bernstein's "The New York City Draft Riots".
It documents a major and brutal episode of White support for the Confederacy
in New York City. Many black men were murdered and sexually mutilated, as were
white women known to have slept with black men. Five regiments of Federal
troops had to be ordered back from the Southern front to bring NYC back
into the Union. I'm curious about similar episodes in the North, which 
naturally would have been suppressed by the propaganda machine most white
Americans call "history".
Jones
-- 
Jones M Murphy Jr                                
Assistant Vice President, New Products
AIG Financial Products					 (800) 248-SWAP
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: PAPAI@kcgl1.eng.ohio-state.edu (Jonathan Papai)
Subject: hooker
Organization: The Ohio State University
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 03:49:14 GMT


	In another group, discussion turned to whether Genl.
Hooker had anything to do with the popularization of the term for
prostitute, with some evidence the term pre-existed acw, but may
not have been widely used.  I know I've read about this
authoritatively somewhere, but can't put a finger on it.  Any pointers?

Thanks millions
J.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 17:20:11 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.161136.18699@starbase.trincoll.edu> () writes:
>I consider the original question to skew the real circumstances. The Army
>of the Potomac suffered a lack of quality leadership in the opening years
>of the war, plain and simple. It wasn't so much formulated doctrine as a
>result of hesitancy, uncertainty in themselves. Second Manassas (Bull
>Run)... a stinging Union defeat due to Pope's panick. He simply choked.
>Generals must be cool under fire, at all costs, before anything else.

I don't know if panic is the right word... Pope's bombast, Pope's blundering,
Pope's arrogance, Pope's refusal to listen to facts... the list goes on.
>
>You can't diagnose Meade's decision to not pursue a crippled Lee on 3 July
>1863, pushing him back against a swollen Potomac, as a result of his desire
>to win battles, and not the war.

You can diagnose his failure to attack July 13th near Williamsport Maryland
as such. He had a crippled Army of Northern Virginia trapped against an
unfordable Potomac river and (apparently at the advice of his corps
commanders) failed to attack. You can also suggest that he shouldn't have
taken 10 days to get that close to the Rebel army again (Lincoln suggested
this in a letter to Meade which he never sent) and you can also suggest that
the failure to follow up against the repulse of Pickett was a mistake (Gen.
Hancock was trying to organize such an attack when he was wounded) although
I wouldn't necessarily endorse that. But Hancock's opinion shouldn't be
dismissed too lightly: he was there.

>Firstly, Meade doesn't deserve that much credit for the Union's victory at
>Gettysburg. Buford and his troops and Reynolds's troops (not Reynolds, who
>didn't survive long enough on that battlefield on 1 July to make a
>meaningful contribution) deserve much of the credit for recognizing the
>value of the high ground and holding it until the rest of the Army of the
>Potomac could converge on the town that night and the next day. Also,
>Chamberlain held the entire Union left against wave after wave of
>Confederate infantry charges the next afternoon. These were formative
>aspects of the battle.

I think this overcredits Chamberlain slightly as Chamberlain only commanded
one regiment... We might also give credit to G.K. Warren who was responsible
for sending V Corps to the left, and to Cols Vincent and Weed whose brigades
did most of the fighting on Little Round Top. (Chamberlain's regiment was in
Vincent's brigade. Vincent's brigade was in Barnes' 1st Division and Weed's
was in Ayres' 2nd Division, both V Corps.) Also we should credit Hancock
with holding the center together on both the second and third days, plus
for advising Meade to fight at Gettysburg in the first place.
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Hooker revisionism
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 23:38:19 GMT

In article <1993Jan11.151134.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>I would say that Hooker was a pretty effective subordinate commander in the
>AotP too.

On the battlefield he was, but his campground angling for promotion and his
tendency to bad-mouth his superiors had a bad effect on morale which offset
his battlefield worth. Once he'd had his taste of high command, he became
a much more valuable subordinate officer since he wasn't bitching all the time.
Or so I'm told: I too suffer from a lack of information about Hooker's post-
Chancellorsville career. Was he in fact a good loyal subordinate to Sherman? 
I'm mostly just going on the fact that I haven't heard that he was not...
-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt)
Subject: Re: Text of The Gettysburg Address
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 07:51:57 GMT

There are five texts of the Gettysburg address floating around, all of them
quite similar but not exactly alike. I believe that two are previous drafts
of the speech, one is Lincoln's text, and two are eyewitness records of what
was said (no reason to believe that Lincoln followed his written text word
for word). I didn't check the two posted versions to see if they matched 
or not....
FYI.

-- 
Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu
I can no longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist
conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids!
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: cjt1@ellis.uchicago.edu (Charles Ten Brink)
Subject: Re: Lincoln's Generals: A Thought
Reply-To: cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 18:19:02 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.082704.1@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu> cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan) writes:
>Let me just address the case of McClellan. I have noticed that Mac always
>refered to his mission as "saving the Nation" rather than "destroying the 
>Rebel army" or even "taking Richmond". I believe he was trying to supress
>the rebellion as bloodlessly as possible, with some hopes that things would
>simply go back to the way they were. In retrospect, I believe his intentions
>were impossible to realize, and this is why his record looks so poor.
>
And I think his poor record is the reason that his successors were so intent
on battlefield victories.  After seeing McClellan fail so consistently, and
be so obviously out of favor with the administration, they probably saw their
role as a more narrow, "soldierly" one than McC tried to assume.
--Chuck
-- 
D'Angelo Law Library         "The dogmas of the quiet past are
cjt1@midway.uchicago.edu      inadequate to the stormy present. . .
uclcjt1@uchimvs1              We must disenthrall ourselves. . ."
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: hooker
Date: 9 Jan 93 23:40:59 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan9.195808.16252@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:
> irrelevant question: Why wasn't III Corps at Antietam?) 
> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

The 3rd Corps was assigned to garrison duty in Washington. I'm not sure why,
but Kearny's death may have been a factor. The Corps commander, Heintzleman,
remained in charge of the Washington garrison, even after his corps was 
returned to the AotP.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
From: glhewitt@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Gary Livingston Hewitt)
Subject: Hookers
Originator: news@nimaster
Organization: Princeton University
Distribution: na
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 17:42:26 GMT


According to OED on this system...

 4 A prostitute.  slang (chiefly U.S.).
  1845 in N.E. Eliason _Tarheel_Talk_ (1956) 277
If he comes by way of Norfolk he will find any
number of pretty Hookers in the Brick row not
far from French's hotel.

Note the date, 1845.

Gary
-- 
  ++====+========+==========+=======+===++
  ||    |    Gary| L. Hewitt|       |   ||  HELP!  I've been imprisoned
  || glh|ewitt@ph|oenix.prin|ceton.e|du ||  by my .signature!  HELP!
  ++====+========+==========+=======+===++
From: tonyz@hpwrce.mayfield.hp.com (Tony Zugates)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 23:46:54 GMT
Subject: Re: Grant's Memoirs
Organization: the HP Mtn.View Resp. Cntr.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa

Jonathan writes:
"Grant's book ends with the end of the war.  Does anyone have info
if he planned to write about subsequent events and died too soon,
or was stopping at that moment the original plan.

-J."

      I have also read in another book "Mask of Command" that Grant 
      was pretty much a failure in everything else he did in life
      including before and after the war (including the Presidency)
      and that shortly before he died from throat cancer he wrote
      "the memoirs" to generate income which he was lacking severely
      at the time....  I think he knew the end was near and indeed
      died soon after finishing his memoirs... 

      Eloquently written, eh?  No one writes in this fashion 
      anymore. It was a joy to read.
From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: Lincoln's Generals: A Thought
Date: 7 Jan 93 17:19:29 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <16B4F4F04.M18709@mwvm.mitre.org> Andrew R. Lacher 
(M18709@mwvm.mitre.org) writes:

>It seems as though Lincoln was trying to win the war, while his generals were
>trying to win battles (or in some cases trying not to lose battles).  Any
>thoughts?
>Andrew R. Lacher      | Center for Advanced Aviation System Development

In article <1993Jan7.210312.12503@leland.Stanford.EDU>, whale@leland.Stanford.EDU (Stephen Schmidt) writes:

> Hm. Let's consider those 
[McClellan's] 
>successors one by one:
> 
> 1) Burnside. Doesn't seem to have been able to be intent on anything for
> very long. The opening of the Fredricksburg campaign suggests he was 
> interested in taking Richmond, but the battle itself suggests little except
> that Burnside was a horrible general.

'Nuff said.

> 2) Hooker. Hooker was so intent on taking Richmond that he overlooked the
> need to win battles.  ;)

I'd say that Hooker's problem was that he was so volitile in is apparent 
intentions. He started out like gang busters to avoid Lee's Army in 
Fredericksburg and move on Richmond. Then he halted, as if to try to 
destroy Lee's army by permitting the latter to attack (ala Burnside) 
the AotP in an apparently strong defensive position. Finally, with a
potential victory still within grasp, Hooker's main concern seemed to 
be avoiding the distruction of his own army. This contrast with Grant 
who never lost sight of his objective.

> 3) Meade. I think this statement is probably most accurate as a description
> of Meade than the other two. The failure to pursue after Gettysburg is a
> pretty clear case of an over-focus on winning battles. I think the Mine Run
> campaign (about which I know little) also would support this notion of Meade.

Meade also was pretty consistant in striving for two goals: a) protect 
Washington and b) not be destroyed by Bobby Lee. This may not seem very 
ambititious, but he satisfied these limited goals (especially b) more 
successfully than his predecessors, and under Grant, his army did play 
the ace of trump in the war by taking Petersburg and therefore Richmond 
(and therefore Lee's army).

> 4) Grant. I don't think this statement is really meant to apply to Grant as
> he came from the Western theater.

Sherman said of Grant, "he has a simple faith in success." I suppose the 
same could be said of Lincoln.

And I suppose we should include Pope somewhere, but Steve's comments on 
Burnside will suffice to cover both.

> -- 
> Steve Schmidt			<><		   whale@leland.stanford.edu

-- 
Paul Cowan     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Please send replies, comments etc. (no flames thank you) to COWAN@ANL.GOV   
"If anyone disagrees with anything I say, I am quite prepared not only to
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