From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 00:15:25 GMT

In article <spurrett.90.724001190@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>
>SUMMARY:  In  response to stony  silence in the  fact of requests  for
>clarification on  a number  of points,  and allegations  to the effect
>that may characterisations of his  position  is inaccuarate

And your inaccuracy continues, with your false accusation of "stony
silence."  You may not have liked my response, and you may even consider
it unsatisfactory.  But it was far from a "stony silence."

>                                                            I  attempt
>to point out  to Neil Rickert  what it was  that he said  that made me
>think of positivism/empiricism when reading his postings.  This  takes
>a little time, but I have cut as much out as I could.

My editing will be more severe than yours.  Frankly this discussion is
becoming quite tiresome.  When you started your series of postings, I
took it as an attempt to start an honest debate on free will.  But
instead of discussing the issues you are mounting a campaign to discredit
me by attaching inappropriate labels (such as positivist) to my comments.

>Before going  anywhere I  would like  to note  a few  key points of my
>definition of positivism.

[Several partial definitions given, which I will not repeat.]

I don't know why you bothered wasting bandwidth on these definitions of
positivism.  You are the one who called for a definition, so having
found suitable definitions you could have just read them quietly to
yourself.

However, having seen your definitions, I can only state that on the
basis of those definitions I clearly am not a positivist, nor have I
presented positivist arguments.

[Spurrett now quotes several of my comments on free will.  Since there
is a basic similarity to them, I will respond to only one for brevity.]

>3)  In  article  <1992Nov17.230828.17309@mp.cs.niu.edu>   rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu
>(Neil Rickert) writes:
>
>>  But surely Randall's "free will" is all that you can ask for.  After
>>  all you cannot know that which you cannot know.  There is no way of
>>  determining if there is any other type of free will.

I do not know how you are misconstruing these statements as to imply
they are positivistic.  However, let me rephrase that statement as:

    the hypothesis - that there could be some other kind of free will
    distinct from that described by Randall -- is not falsifiable.

>In response to a request for explanation of the above (in a later posting):
>....
>>  And I am trying to point out that there is no scientific test that
>>  can settle the question.

And that statement of mine seems quite unsurprising for a hypothesis I
consider not to be falsifiable.  There is nothing positivistic about
it.  Had I said "there is no scientific test which can settle any
question" you might be able to label me as a positivist.  But your use
of the label in reference to a single question is quite bizarre.  Are
you trying to suggest that every question is automatically amenable to
science and that this supposed amenability must never be questioned?

>4) In a Posting on another thread I used an argument where, following from  the
>logical incompatibility of two  theses, I claimed that  at most one of  the two
>could be true:
>
>In  article  <1992Nov5.183959.29975@mp.cs.niu.edu>  rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil
>Rickert) writes:
>
>>  This insistence on either/or, this belief in the existence of some
>>  absolute truth, is at the heart of your problem.  There is no reason,
>>  other than religious belief, to suppose that the real world works this
>>  way.

Thank you for quoting me quite out of context :-( .

I will restore the context.  You had given a definition of determinism
and a definition of free will.  You then attempted to argue that
compatabilist theories are wrong.  In my response I took issue with
your definitions.  Then, on your argument about compatabilism:

     >  The question, therefore, is _which_ of  the two is true.

[Note that your statement, to which I was responding, does not look like
a claim that "at most one of the two could be true."  Instead it looks
more like a claim that _exactly_ one of the two is true.]

     This insistence on either/or, this belief in the existence of some
     absolute truth, is at the heart of your problem.  There is no reason,
     other than religious belief, to suppose that the real world works this
     way.  Rather than asking for the absolute truth, you should be asking
     about which is a useful interpretation of the available evidence.
     Compatiblism maintains that determinism and free will are both useful
     and compatible interpretations.

Let me put this in perspective with an analogy.  Instead of discussing
"determinism" and "free will", let's imagine we are discussing the
Ptolemaic model of the solar system (the earth is fixed and the sun
revolves around it), and the Copernican model (the sun is fixed and the
earth revolves around the sun and rotates on its axis).

Now if we describe the cycles and epicycles in sufficient mathematical
detail, the predictions made by the Ptolemaic model are identical to
the predictions made by the Copernican model.  No scientific experiment
can distinguish between them.  However when used to describe the motion
of the planets, the Copernical model is much simpler, and therefore far
more useful.  But when we are describing the changes in shadows on
earth, the Ptolemaic model is simpler and more useful, and in
consequence we still use it with terms such as sunrise, sunset, and
with references to the sun moving from east to west.

Suppose then, in reference to these two models, we were to ask:

  The question, therefore, is _which_ of  the two is true.

I am claiming that this question has no content.  All you can ask is
which of the two is more useful for the purpose at hand.  The apparent
mutual inconsistency of the two models does not alter the fact that they
are quite compatible in the sense that they make the same predictions.

>5) Curious (naiveley  thinking myself to  be at least  a little informed  about
>theology and the superficial outlines  of comparative religion and the  like) I
>attempted to establish what was meant by this:

[Details of Spurrett's request for an explanation deleted for brevity.]

>There was no answer, ...

I did indeed answer.  Perhaps you neglected to read my response.  I
shall not burden this newsgroup with a repetition, but I will attempt
to email a copy to Spurrett.

[Lengthy attempt to discredit me deleted for brevity.]

>                 In  particular my  repeated insistence  that the free
>will question  is as  much scientific  as philosophical  in nature has
>been even more repeatedly  ignored and ...

This is completely false.  You know full well that it has not been
ignored.  Indeed, I have challenged your view and used many lines of
argument to support my challenge.

>    I ....   pointed out as succinctly as I could to Rickert that:
>
>         >  Your argument lacks a definition of science.

Here is the situation.  You claim it is a question of science.  I have
dared to challenge that view, and evidently my challenge has offended
you.  The proper way to demonstrate that it is a question of science is
for you to describe the experiments which would potentially settle the
issue.  If there are no possible experiments, it is not science.  It is
your turn.  Put up or shut up.  But instead of describing your proposed
experiments, you demand that I define religion; you demand that I define
positivism; you demand that I define science.  These irrelevant demands
are nothing but obfuscations apparently designed to conceal the fact
that you have no experiments in mind.

Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc