From: chrisl@stpaul.gov (Chris A Lyman)
Subject: Back and Forth on Sentience (Was Re: What pisses me off ... )
Organization: City of Saint Paul Public Works
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 16:50:15 GMT

nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:
> mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson) writes:
>> nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:

>>> A sentient fetus is a "person" in the phenomenological sense of the word.

>> This statement is not correct.

> It is correct, you simply refuse to seriously entertain the possibility
> that there is such a thing as a sentient fetus.

Your response is not correct.  In your first statement (in this article),
you claimed personhood for the fetus on the basis of sentience.  In fact,
you assumed sentience.  But in the very next statement, you implied that
demonstrations of sentience are not important.

Are you trying to pull a Clinton on us?

>> It has yet to be demonstrated that a fetus is capable of sentience.

> So?  It has yet to be demonstrated that your whole life has not been
> a dream and that we are not all just figments of your imagination.

Later in your article, you used the phrase "pseudo-philosophy."  What's
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander in this instance, Peter.

And if life is indeed a dream, why should it become a nightmare for
women with unwanted pregnancies?

>> Even if a fetus could be shown to possess sentience, in a
>> phenomenological sense, the 'experience' of the fetus would 
>> hardly be comparable to the experience of born persons.  A fetus 
>> does not experience 'being-in-the-world'.  There is also a clear
>> distinction between the phenomenological self-awareness of one's 
>> own personhood and the recognition of the personhood of 'others'.

> None of this makes an iota of difference to me.  And by the way,
> Gilbert Ryle, author of _The Concept of Mind_, would have claimed
> that your last sentence is gibberish.  Not that I agree with him, I just
> want to point out that you are making a doctrinaire statement ["This
> statement is not correct" was another one.] about something whose
> meaning is less than clear to everyone.

I think that Muriel is trying to find a distinction between sentience,
which even house plants possess, and sapience, which is more uniquely
human.  Is putting words in the mouth of Gilbert Ryle the best you can
do here?

>> A fetus does not attain 'otherness' until birth, except for those 
>> who regard the personhood of the woman as completely transparent.

> Pseudo-philosophy.  A 24-week premature child attains otherness
> before a 34-week fetus?  Tell me another one.

See, Peter, it has to do with _environment_.  The evironment for a 24-week
premie is much different than that of an *in utero* 34-week fetus, don't you
agree?  It's the _interaction_ with our environment that's the trump card in
forming our concepts of ourselves and of 'otherness,' don't you think, Peter?

>> It is possible that the woman carrying the fetus may regard it
>> as 'other', though in doing so she would probably experience a
>> profound sense of alienation from her own body.

> Staple pro-abortion propaganda, dressed up in philosophical language.

Staples are sometimes used to close incisions after C-section deliveries,
but I haven't seen that used in any pro-choice or pro-abortion arguments.
You dismissed Muriel's point without even addressing it.  Is that the best
you can do?

Many women feel alienated from their bodies because of experiences with
sexual abuse they had as children.  As a member of your school's Campus
Sexual Assault Task Force, you should be sensitive to that fact.

>> The transition from connectedness to 'otherness' is, in fact, not complete
>> psychologically at parturition for some women.  Hence, the lifelong distress
>> that affects many women who give up their babies for adoption.

> Can't shake the feeling that her child, now grown up, is still a 
> part of her body?  No matter how you dress it up, it's the same
> stinking pro-abortion propaganda.

That's not what Muriel said, Peter, and you look stupid adding insult to
your unfounded dismissal of her point.

>> It has been argued that it is possible for others to interact
>> experientially with a fetus while it is still in utero.  I
>> would point out, however, that such exchanges  _always_
>> involve some interaction with the physical person of the 
>> pregnant woman.

> So what?  The same is true of a breastfeeding baby.

Not necessarily.  Babies quickly develop a protocol of sorts for interacting
with others.  I have yet to see any demonstration that interaction with a
fetus *in utero* is anything but a one-way street.

>> From the perspective of all outsiders, the 'otherness' of a fetus is
>> completely derivational from the experience of treating in some way with
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> the body of the pregnant woman.

>> This statement is not correct.  If I step into a darkened room
>> while a sonogram of a baby is being shown, what sense is there
>> in what you say?

This response is completely non-sequitor, unless you consider viewing
a sonogram as a form of interaction with the pregnant woman and her fetus.

>> It is also extremely difficult to assess  the quality of such 'experiences'
>> for the fetus, since the memory of 'post-fetuses' so rarely includes such
>> things.

> Ditto the first few months of birth.  Are you ready to support
> legislation allowing infanticide for this reason?

Ye gods and little fishes, Peter, what does infanticide have to do with
abortion?

-- 
Chris Lyman  /  email: chrisl@pwcs.stpaul.gov  / standard disclaimers
 "One of the HORRIBLE things of trying to defend a FREE REPUBLIC is
 that I get to support your RIGHT to say STOOPID THINGS." -- drieux
Newsgroups: talk.abortion