From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Request for critiques of Objectivism, and for intro's to philosophy
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 18:01:40 GMT

In article <BuMnpr.L4o@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>First, I would like to thank Randall Holmes for his letter.  He appears
>to be the sort of person one can have a discussion with!  Many opponents
>of Objectivist positions express dismay at 'Randroids', people who appear
>to have simply memorized Rand's philosophy without comprehension of it
>or of possible objections.  I understand their objection; it is sometimes
>valid.
>
>But remember that we see a lot of it from this side, too!  How many
>times do I see people rablidly denouncing Rand with no apparent understanding
>of her philosophy.
>
>But Randall Holmes's approach is the correct one.  He states certain
>things which he disagrees with in Rand's view, and expresses a willingness
>to think about them.  I think that this is the essence of valid
>philosophical debate.
>
>>For instance, her insistence on rejecting
>>physical determinism is ill-advised; she makes the common error that
>>physical determinism is incompatible with moral choice, which it is
>>not.  
>
>Actually, you are mistaken on Rand's view of physical determinism.
>Her view is that metaphysics and physics are different subjects.  In
>the recently published 'dialogues' (at the end of _Introduction to
>Objectivist Epistemology_) Rand is very careful to separate the two.

Rand may have noted this somewhere, but both Rand and Peikoff have
used this argument; I saw it in Peikoff's "Philosophy of Objectivism".

>
>In particular, she certainly does _not_ make the claim that physical
>determinism is incompatible with moral choice and therefore false.
>Such a claim would, as you note, invert the heirarchy of metaphysics,
>epistemology and ethics.

>
>(On to the law of identity)
>>Rand seems to use it to say "Each thing has an
>>essential nature and has to have the properties which follow from that
>>nature". 
>
>This is a slightly inaccurate phrasing, but not horribly so.  For Rand,
>the nature of a thing _is_ the properties of the thing.  
>Whatever a thing is, that is what it is, and not something else.  For
>Rand, essences are epistemological, not metaphysical.
>
>>Proposition:  The Objector is an adherent of the forces of Evil -- he
>>denies the Law of Identity, Man is Man, from which we deduce that
>>George, being a man, must have property X, which belongs to man's
>>essential nature.
>
>Whoa!  This line demonstrates a misunderstanding of Rand's epistemology.
>For example, Rand defines MAN as 'the rational animal'.  But this does
>not mean that each individual man is some kind of combination of rationality
>and animality.  Each person is, metaphysically, whatever that person is.
>The discovery that 'rationality' (in the sense: capability to reason) and
>'animality' are the fundamental characteristics (meaning: explaining the
>most about all of the attributes of the referents of the concept in the
>appropriate context) is epistemological.
>
>Rand's view of concept formation is one of 'measurement omission'.
>The basic idea is that of observing similarities and differences,
>regarding each entity as a member of a group, integrating the group
>into a conceptual whole, and finding essential characteristics which
>serve to best define the concept.

And how does this work for second-order abstractions?  It also doesn't
really work for relations.  

>
>I beleive the above summary of Rand's position to be accurate for the
>most part.  But I have to warn everyone that I wrote it off the top
>of my head.  The best source is, of course, Rand herself.

I will also say that I wrote my posting without access to sources, as
well.  The fictitious "application" of the Law of Identity is intended
to illustrate a rhetorical style; there are a number of logically
trivial (and certainly true) assertions like "A is A" and "Existence
exists" from which Objectivists seem to think that they can deduce
conclusions.  The point is that the real content of these assertions
for Objectivists is NOT contained in the tautologous surface
sentences; it would be a service to those of us who are willing to
talk to Rand's followers if they would "unpack" them.  "Existence
exists", for instance, means "The world as we "naively" perceive it
exists", a perfectly respectable philosophical position with which I
agree.  But this assertion is not expressed by the sentence "Existence
exists" to the rest of us.  The use of the Law of Identity to confirm
that things conform to their essential natures is equally confusing;
the philosophical principle being defended is respectable, but the
rhetoric sounds silly to the rest of us (because A is A is in fact a
tautology with NO content to speak of!)


>
>--Jimbo
>


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.philosophy.tech