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Date:         Thu, 9 Apr 1992 13:03:55 -0400
Reply-To:     "Spiros V. Branis" <phssvb@UNIX.CC.EMORY.EDU>
From:         "Spiros V. Branis" <phssvb@UNIX.CC.EMORY.EDU>
Subject:      SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT ON CYPRUS
Comments: To: hellas@brownvm.brown.edu

Gia osous(es) antexoun na diavasoun diplwmatika keimena, parathetw
tin teleutaia epistoln tou Boutros-Boutros Gali pros to Sumvoulio
Asfaleias gia to Kupriako:

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SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT ON CYPRUS


                                                            Distr.
                                                            GENERAL

                                                            S/23780
                                                            3
                                                            April
                                                            1992

                                                            ORIGINAL:
                                                            ENGLISH


               REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION OF
                            GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS


1.   The present report on my mission of good offices in Cyprus is
being submitted pursuant to the request by the members of the
Security Council that I report by April 1992 whether sufficient
progress has been made to convene the high-level international
meeting and, should conditions not be ripe, to convey to the
Council the set of ideas as they will have evolved by that time
with my assessment of the situation (S/23316).

2.   The report is divided into three parts.  In the first part, I
propose to describe the effort to prepare a set of ideas of an
overall framework agreement; the second part is devoted to the
ideas that have been discussed; and finally in the third part, I
will submit my conclusions and recommendations.

                            A.  The effort to date

3.   The members of the Council will recall that after the 26
February to 2 March 1990 meeting between the leaders of the two
communities in Cyprus and my predecessor did not result in
progress, the Council adopted resolution 649 (1990) of 12 March
1990.  After considering his report (S/21183), the Council made it
clear once again that the solution it foresaw was one based on the
existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities; and
that the objective was a new constitution for the State of Cyprus
that would regulate the relations between the two communities in
Cyprus on a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal basis.  The Council
reiterated that the Secretary-General's mission of good offices
was specifically with the two communities which participated on an
equal footing.  It requested the Secretary-General to pursue his
effort and to assist the two communities by making suggestions to
facilitate the discussions.  Both sides affirmed their full
commitment to resolution 649 (1990).

4.   During the second half of 1990, separate discussions were
initiated between the representatives of the Secretary-General and
the leaders of the two communities to explore ideas that could
bring the two sides within agreement range on each of the
following headings and subheadings of an overall agreement:

92-15571  3339b (E)   060492     /...
     (a)  Overall objectives of the agreement;

     (b)  Guiding principles of the federation;

     (c)  Constitutional aspects of the federation:

     (i)  Powers and functions of the federal Government;

    (ii)  Structure, composition and functioning of the federal
    Government;

   (iii)  Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and
   political,
          economic, social and cultural rights;

     (d)  Security and guarantee;

     (e)  Territorial adjustments;

     (f)  Displaced persons;

     (g)  Economic development and safeguards;

     (h)  Transitional arrangements.

It was recognized that in view of the integrated nature of an
agreement, all the headings had to be spelled out with equal
clarity and needed to be developed in parallel, and agreement
would not be sought until that had been achieved.

5.   By 27 March 1991, it was possible to report to the members of
the Council that the talks, which had been supported by
discussions between one of the representatives of the
Secretary-General and a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey, had been useful both in highlighting the issues
of particular importance to each side and in identifying ways of
bringing the legitimate concerns and interests on a number of
issues within agreement range.

6.   In the course of these discussions the Turkish Cypriot side
had stressed in particular the importance of bi-zonality,
political equality, its effective participation in the federal
Government, and security, which are dealt with under the headings
overall objectives, guiding principles, constitutional aspects of
the federation, and security and guarantee respectively.  The
Greek Cypriot side had emphasized mainly the territorial issue,
the displaced persons, the effective functioning of the federal
Government, and security, which are dealt with under the headings
territorial adjustments, displaced persons, constitutional aspects
of the federal Government, and security and guarantee
respectively.

7.   It was noted that the clarifications that had emerged in the
course of the discussions should make it possible to bring the two
sides within agreement range, in particular on the overall
objectives, the guiding principles and security and guarantee.

8.   On the other hand, it was stressed that there were a number
of issues on which solutions remained to be explored, in
particular, territorial adjustments and displaced persons.  The
main questions arising from these issues are the area that would
come under Greek Cypriot administration and the displaced persons
from one community who may reside in the area to be administered
by the other community.  In March 1991 it was felt that an
agreement should be within reach if it was possible to move
forward on the issues of territorial adjustments and displaced
persons.  It was thought that this could be achieved within a few
months.

9.   On 27 June 1991, the members of the Council were informed
that the discussions that had taken place since March 1991 had not
succeeded in advancing on the outstanding issues.  The idea of a
high-level meeting that President Ozal of Turkey had proposed the
previous month was viewed with favour provided it was thoroughly
prepared to ensure its success.  It was underlined that a
satisfactory solution had to be within reach on all eight headings
of an agreement and it was again stressed that progress was
urgently needed on territorial adjustments and displaced persons.
It was also noted that the position of the two sides remained
apart on the question of the federal executive.  As will be
recalled, the members of the Council concurred with that
assessment and they agreed that a further round of talks be
undertaken in July and August to bring the two sides within
agreement range on all the outstanding issues.

10.  In the course of the talks between July and September at
Nicosia, Ankara and Athens, the representatives of the
Secretary-General continued the process of seeking reactions and
suggestions on the basis of which the ideas were further
elaborated and amended in an effort to reflect in a reasonable and
fair manner the legitimate interests and concerns of both sides.
At the conclusion of the August 1991 talks at Ankara, it was
apparent that, although the two sides remained apart on some
issues and the territorial adjustments remained to be further
defined, the set of ideas that had emerged represented an
important step forward which should provide the basis for working
out an agreement.  However, in the report of 8 October 1991
(S/23121), it was explained that the expectations that a
high-level meeting would take place in September to conclude an
overall framework agreement were not fulfilled.

11.  In resolution 716 (1990), the Security Council noted with
satisfaction the progress made in preparing a set of ideas but
expressed its concern about the difficulties that had been
encountered in completing this work.  It, inter alia, reaffirmed
its previous resolutions and that its position on the solution to
the Cyprus problem was based on one State of Cyprus comprising two
politically equal communities.  In that connection, the Council
endorsed the following definition of political equality (S/21183,
annex I):

     "While political equality does not mean equal numerical
     participation in all federal Government branches and
     administration, it should be reflected inter alia in various
     ways:  in the requirement that the federal constitution of
     the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the
     concurrence of both communities; in the effective
     participation of both communities in all organs and decisions
     of the federal Government; in safeguards to ensure that the
     federal Government will not be empowered to adopt any
     measures against the interests of one community; and in the
     equality and identical powers and functions of the two
     federated states."

12.  The Council requested the leaders of the two communities and
Greece and Turkey to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General
and his representatives and requested the Secretary-General to
report by November 1991 whether sufficient progress had been made
to convene the high-level meeting.  The Council will recall that
because of the parliamentary elections in Turkey and the
subsequent change of Government in Turkey, the talks called for in
resolution 716 (1991) could not be resumed before the end of
1991.

13.  On 9 January 1992, I wrote to the leaders of the two
communities and to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey
underlining the importance I attached to an early settlement to
the Cyprus question and the need to proceed expeditiously to
complete the work requested by the Security Council.  To this end,
I proposed that my representatives resume talks with the leaders
of the two sides in Cyprus and with Greece and Turkey.

14.  On 20 and 21 January 1992, I met with President Vassiliou and
H.E. Mr. Denktas respectively to review the Cyprus question.  I
stressed the importance of maintaining the momentum that had been
achieved in 1991 and reiterated the need to proceed expeditiously
with the work at hand.  Both leaders responded positively to my
proposal that they resume discussions with my representatives in
February.  On 13 and 16 February, I received replies from Prime
Minister Mitsotakis of Greece and Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey
respectively agreeing to the visit of my representatives.  I also
had the opportunity to discuss the Cyprus question with Greek
Foreign Minister Samaras on 24 January and with Turkish Prime
Minister Demirel on 14 February who both assured me of their
Governments' full support.

15.  My representatives undertook a first round of talks in Cyprus
from 5 to 9 February.  They had several meetings with President
Vassiliou, during which they discussed the most recent ideas for
each of the eight headings and accompanying goodwill measures.
Owing to his illness, a similar discussion could not take place
with H.E. Mr. Denktas.  From 18 to 20 February, my representatives
visited Ankara, where they met with Turkish Foreign Minister Cetin
and other senior Turkish officials to review the set of ideas.
From 25 to 27 February, they were in Nicosia where they discussed
the ideas with H.E. Mr. Denktas.  They also briefed the leaders of
the two communities on the views expressed by the other side.
Finally, on 28 and 29 February, my representatives were in Athens,
where they had a similar meeting with Foreign Minister Samaras and
other senior officials.  Unfortunately, these talks did not
succeed in bringing matters forward.  The difficulties that were
described in the report of 8 October 1991 (S/23121) remained
unchanged.

16.  On 26 and 30 March 1992, I again reviewed the situation with
President Vassiliou and H.E. Mr. Denktas respectively.  Both
leaders told me of their desire to continue to work with me and my
representatives.  I recalled that last summer it had appeared that
an agreement was within reach but since then these expectations
had been disappointed.  Not only had there been no progress, but
in some areas there had even been regression.

                             B.  The set of ideas

17.  The set of ideas described below that emerged from the talks
in 1991 provide the elements of a fair solution on a significant
number of elements of the overall agreement.  If similar progress
can be made on the outstanding issues, in particular territorial
adjustments and displaced persons, an overall solution will be
within reach.

18.  The ideas incorporate the agreed understandings that underlie
a solution, namely:

          "Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot
     community and of the Turkish Cypriot community.  Their
     relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of
     two communities in the State of Cyprus.  The mandate given to
     me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of
     good offices is with the two communities.  My mandate is also
     explicit that the participation of the two communities in
     this process is on an equal footing.  The solution that is
     being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and
     must be acceptable to, both communities.  It must also
     respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic
     identity of each community.

          "The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two
     communities, as well as the mandate entrusted to me by the
     Security Council, have set out the framework within which a
     solution must be found.  The two communities and the Security
     Council have committed themselves to a solution that will
     ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
     and non-alignment of Cyprus.  The two communities have, in
     the 1979 high-level agreement, specifically rejected as
     options union in whole or in part with any other country and
     any form of partition or secession.  The two communities have
     stated that they wish to establish a federation that is
     bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and
     bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects." 1/

19.  They also embody the concept of the political equality of the
two communities endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 716
(1991) (see para. 11 above).

20.  The bi-zonality of the federation is reflected in the fact
that each federated state would be administered by one community
which would be guaranteed a clear majority of the population and
of land ownership in its area.  It is also reflected in the fact
that the federal Government would not be permitted to encroach
upon the powers and functions of the federated states, nor could
one federated state encroach on the powers and functions of the
other.

21.  The unity of the country is ensured through the State of
Cyprus' single international personality and sovereignty as well
as its single citizenship, and the preservation of its territorial
integrity.

22.  The powers and functions of the federal Government as
foreseen would ensure the effective participation of the two
communities as well as the effective functioning of the
Government, and would include appropriate deadlock-resolving
machinery.  It envisages a bicameral legislature with the lower
house having a 70 to 30 ratio between Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots and a 50 to 50 ratio in the upper house.  The option of
separate majorities in the lower house for certain major issues
was also discussed.  As part of the federal executive, a council
of ministers was discussed in which the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots would be represented on a 7 to 3 ratio, with one
of three major ministries headed by a Turkish Cypriot.  It is also
envisaged that all powers not vested in the federal Government
would rest with the two federated states.

23.  Provisions were discussed that would safeguard the
fundamental rights of all citizens, including their political,
economic, social and cultural rights.  Accordingly, these rights
would be recognized in the federal constitution and implemented by
the federated states in a manner agreed upon consistent with the
federal constitution.  The freedom of movement would be exercised
as soon as the federal republic was established.  The freedom of
settlement and the right to property would be implemented after
the resettlement arising from the territorial adjustments had been
completed and would be regulated by the federated states in an
agreed manner consistent with the federal constitution.

24.  The security of both communities would be guaranteed through
the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, each of which
would be appropriately supplemented.  It would provide for the
withdrawal, by the establishment of the federal republic, of all
non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the Treaty of Alliance, and
machinery to deal effectively with any concern of either
community.

25   As has been mentioned above, urgent work remains to be done
on territorial adjustments and displaced persons.  The elements on
displaced persons that have been discussed should provide the
essence of a solution.  The question of territorial adjustments
needs to be addressed without delay.  This matter would be
reflected in the overall framework agreement through a map that
would delineate the two federated states so that a substantial
number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons would be able to return
to the area that would come under Greek Cypriot administration.
It would also address effectively the needs of Turkish Cypriots
that would be affected by the territorial adjustments.

26.  Provisions have been discussed for the development of a
balanced economy that would benefit equally both federated states.
A major programme of action would be established to correct the
existing economic imbalance and promote the development of the
federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community.
The question of membership in the European Communities would be
submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate
referendums.

27.  Finally, transitional arrangements to implement the overall
framework agreement and procedures that would be applied during
that period that are sensitive to the concerns of both communities
have been discussed.  A programme of action to promote goodwill
and closer relations between the two communities would be
implemented as soon as the overall framework agreement had been
approved by the two communities in separate referendums.

                      C.  Conclusions and recommendations

28.  The effort to prepare a set of ideas on an overall framework
agreement has now been under way for several years.  As far back
as a year ago, it had been concluded that if the issues of
territorial adjustments and displaced persons could be adequately
clarified, an overall agreement should be within reach.  Following
the discussions at Ankara in August 1991, justifiable expectations
had been raised that an agreement was finally within reach and
that the high-level meeting to conclude the agreement could take
place in September 1991.  As was explained in the report of 8
October 1991 (S/23121), these hopes were disappointed.  Despite
assurances of support from all concerned, the renewed effort in
February 1992 proved equally unhelpful.

29.  Despite repeated efforts, there has been no progress and, as
I have mentioned above, in certain areas there has even been
regression.  This is a matter of serious concern.  The current
effort cannot be expected to continue indefinitely if all
concerned are not willing to make their contribution to a
compromise solution.  It is vital that the parties be willing to
clarify equally all the elements of the agreement and adhere
faithfully to the principles laid down by the Security Council.
As was pointed out a year ago, the usefulness of the parties'
endorsement of Council resolutions has been undermined by the
interpretations they have given them.  It is essential that the
views of the parties be in harmony with the Council's position on
the Cyprus question.

30.  The lack of progress in the Secretary-General's mission of
good offices is compounded by developments related to the United
Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which make it
unlikely that the United Nations will be able for much longer to
maintain a peace-keeping presence in Cyprus, at any rate on the
present scale.

31.  Since 1974, UNFICYP has been remarkably successful in
controlling the buffer zone and preventing a resumption of
hostilities.  Over the years, however, the troop-contributing
Governments have become increasingly uneasy about the lack of
progress towards a just and lasting solution and about the
deteriorating financial situation of the Force.  These factors led
Sweden to withdraw its battalion in 1987.  The Security Council's
attention has been repeatedly drawn to the inadequacy of voluntary
financing and it has been recommended that the cost of the Force
for which the United Nations is responsible should be funded from
assessed contributions.  An exhaustive review of UNFICYP in 1990
came to the conclusion that no further reductions in its strength
could be made without impairing its ability to control the buffer
zone and to prevent minor incidents from escalating.  On the basis
of the review, and with the cooperation of the troop-contributing
Governments, a restructuring of the Force was proposed, which
would have reduced its cost to the United Nations by some 30 per
cent without impairing its operational effectiveness.  A draft
resolution (S/23277) was tabled by which the Security Council
would have decided that in the future the cost of the Force for
which the United Nations is responsible be funded by assessed
contributions but, in informal consultations on 12 December 1991,
it was concluded that the necessary agreement did not exist in the
Council for this change to be made.

32.  In the light of this conclusion, the troop-contributing
Governments' dissatisfaction has increased further.  Two of the
four main contributors have indicated that it is unlikely that
they will be able to maintain their presence for more than another
mandate period and a third has informed me that it was
re-examining its role in the Force.  If any troop-contributing
country withdraws its battalion, I do not believe that it will be
possible to find another Member State ready to bear the cost of
filling the gap under the present financing arrangements.  It thus
seems unlikely that I shall be able to maintain UNFICYP in its
present form beyond the end of the current year.  I am examining
alternative possibilities and will report on them to the Council
during the course of May.

33.  Quite apart from the very unsatisfactory financing
arrangements, the position of troop-contributing Governments
reflect the widely held view, which I share, that at a time of
greatly increased demand for peace-keeping, a critical look has to
be taken at long-lived operations such as UNFICYP and the
peace-making process it supports.  If a Force has for 28 years
maintained conditions in which a peaceful settlement to a dispute
can be negotiated but negotiations have not succeeded, it has to
be asked whether that Force has a priority claim on the scarce
resources that Member States can make available to the
Organization's peace-keeping activities.  This serious situation
makes it all the more urgent that all concerned devote their full
energies to making progress toward an early settlement to the
Cyprus question.

34.  The set of ideas, provided it clarifies adequately the
outstanding issues, in particular territorial adjustments and
displaced persons, would offer a fair basis on which an agreement
can be concluded.  I believe that another determined effort, which
I am prepared to undertake, would be greatly helped if the
Security Council would agree to support actively my effort and to
work directly with me and my representatives and all concerned to
achieve our objective.  If that effort does not succeed,
consideration would have to be given to an alternative course of
action in dealing with the Cyprus question.

                                     Notes

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Gia tin <<antigrafn>> apo to S.C.G.
Spiros
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU