From: Gershon Baskin <ipcri@igc.apc.org>
Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast
Date: 08 Nov 92 00:25 PST
Subject: Palestinian Test
Nf-ID: #N:cdp:1483500302:000:9625
Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!ipcri    Nov  8 00:25:00 1992


October 26, 1992 This article was printed in the Jerusalem Post
November 8, 1992. It can be republished anywhere. Please indicate
author's name and title. Comments are also welcome!  The Problem
of Security Arrangements Between Israel and the Palestinians
During the Interim Period
						by: Gershon Baskin
(International Director of the Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information, Jerusalem - IPCRI.)

	The primary purpose of the interim period in an agreement
	between Israel and the Palestinians is to allow for the
	two sides to disengage themselves from decades of conflict
	and to begin to develop trust. From Israel's perspective,
	this period is also supposed to take on the character of a
	test. If the Palestinians are successful in taking control
	of their own affairs, and if as a result of this, the
	levels of violence decrease, then in the second stage of
	negotiations, we can discuss further separation including
	territorial issues.

	During the interim period the Palestinians are supposed to
	take full control of their daily lives. They will control
	their own educational system, their own health care
	system, taxation, housing, welfare, municipal affairs, and
	even a small police force which will deal with matters of
	criminal law and order. It is certainly in Israel's
	interest not to be involved with these internal
	Palestinian affairs. The sooner the Palestinians have full
	control over these matters, the better it will be for both
	the Palestinians and for Israel.

	Israel doesn't care, nor should she care about the
	internal civil affairs of the Palestinians. If the
	Palestinians want to control their daily lives, then the
	sooner the better. This should not even be an issue for
	negotiations. As soon as the Palestinians are ready to
	take full control of these areas of their lives, let them
	tell Israel and let Israel give it to them. The few
	Israeli military personnel involved in these areas today
	within the civil administration can find other avenues of
	employment. After all of this occurs, one major question
	remains open - Is the ability of the Palestinians to run
	their own civil services a relevant test? The answer is
	clearly - no! If they provide good health care or bad
	health care - this is their problem. If the educational
	system produces scientists or drop-outs - this too is
	their problem. The only issue of relevance and the only
	test of importance from Israel's perspective is in the
	realm of internal security. Only when the Palestinians can
	prove that they are capable of controlling their own
	population, that they can prevent hostile acts against
	their own regime and (of course) against Israel; only then
	is it clear that Israel can make full peace with them.

	The issue of internal security is not on the agenda for
	negotiations. Israel's position is that during the entire
	period of the interim agreement, Israel will retain full
	control over all aspects of security. The Palestinians
	will be allowed to have a small (about 1,000 men) police
	force which will deal solely with matters of criminal law
	and order. They will give out traffic tickets and they
	will investigate robberies. They will not be charged with
	riot or crowd control. They will have no responsibility or
	ability to protect the Palestinian self governing
	authority against its enemies from within or from the
	outside. There may be many opposition parties and
	individuals who will try to sabotage the peace process and
	the Palestinian regime from within the Palestinian camp.
	These enemies of peace, according to Israel, will be the
	sole responsibility of Israel. Israeli soldiers, border
	police, and shin bet (General Security Service) agents
	will maintain the same high profile in the future as they
	have today.

	Israel has a problem. There are 110,000 settlers and some
	150 settlements for which Israel must guarantee security.
	If there were no Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza,
	Israel could withdraw the troops, the border police and
	the Shin Bet and say to the Palestinians - "sink or swim".
	Today, Israel cannot do that. Israel sent the settlers
	there and now it has to protect them. What is the problem?
	If Israel has to maintain the same military-security
	presence and profile in the West Bank and Gaza during the
	interim period, then nothing on the ground will change.
	The Palestinians already have a high degree of control
	over the matters of civil life. They control the education
	system and the health care system. There are very few
	areas of civil life today where the Palestinian resident
	of the West Bank needs to have contact with an Israeli
	clerk or officer. However, the Palestinian residents of
	the West Bank and Gaza have daily contact with Israeli
	soldiers, border police and shin bet agents.

	Israel's security grip on the territories and on the lives
	of their residents is overwhelming. Road blocks, curfews,
	permits, identity cards, night searches, and more are all
	part of the daily encounters between Israel's security
	apparatus and the Palestinian residents of the West Bank
	and Gaza. All of these are necessary evils if Israel wants
	to maintain control of the territories and protect Israel
	and Israelis against the wrath of the Palestinians.
	Intelligence gathering is a primary aspect or Israel's
	security presence. This vital tool for protecting Israeli
	interests and lives can only exist if there is a large
	enough military presence to protect the agents and
	individuals who collaborate with those agents.

	Israel is in a Catch-22 situation. Israel wants to
	disengage from the Palestinian population. Israel wants to
	increase its level of security. Israel also wants to test
	the Palestinians' ability to run their own affairs. The
	only test of relevance is one of internal security, but
	Israel can't decrease its security presence because it
	needs to protect the settlers.

	The Palestinians are also in a difficult position. They
	need to show changes on the ground. Autonomy without
	control over security issues is a very half-empty glass.
	Continued Israeli retention of security affairs means that
	very little will, in fact,  change on the ground. However,
	even if the Palestinians took over internal security
	affairs, how would they cope with the divisions within
	their own population which could threaten the existence of
	the Palestinian regime? Would the Palestinian internal
	police force - a Palestinian Shin Bet - interrogate
	political opponents from the Hamas? Would the Palestinian
	authority institute administrative detention? Could a
	Palestinian regime hold political prisoners? Dealing with
	terrorists is easy, they can be proven guilty of crimes,
	but what about political organization working against the
	peace process? Can the Palestinians create an effective
	and obedient chain of command?

	Israeli and Palestinian security experts estimate that the
	Palestinians would need a security police force numbering
	18,000 - 20,000 people. There would have to be an
	effective and well trained intelligence apparatus. There
	will have to be a liaison mechanism between the
	Palestinian force and Israel. The only way that Israel
	could agree to the existence of such a force in the future
	is if Israel retains control over the security of the
	settlers and the settlements and has full cooperation with
	the Palestinian force. There is a possibility that Israeli
	security presence could gradually decline if the
	Palestinian security police force is an effective one.
	This kind of arrangement would only be possible if the
	Palestinians agree that their own security is based on
	Israel's  security. A mutuality of security understandings
	could pave the way for future agreement on this issue.

	What about the test? It is in Israel's interest (as well
	as the Palestinians) to see that aspects of internal
	security are transferred to the Palestinians as soon as
	possible. When the Palestinians themselves have to prevent
	fundamentalists from attacking Israel or Israelis, then we
	will be able to judge to what extent coexistence is
	possible. How do the sides begin?  Two fundamental
	principles must be accepted - (1) the transference of
	security responsibilities to the Palestinians will be
	gradual and (2) the process will begin in a certain
	geographic locations and not throughout the territories.
	The establishment of an internal security police force,
	its training, and the creation of an effective chain of
	command will take between three - five years. Gradually,
	it might be possible to turn over certain limited areas to
	Palestinian security control. If they succeed in one
	locale, another area could be added. One example where
	this can begin relatively easily is in the Gaza Strip.
	This could begin in the cities followed by the camps (or
	vice versa). It could also begin in certain villages in
	the West Bank. The Palestinians could submit a plan for
	implementation to Israel for its approval. Israel would
	make it clear that the true test of the plan's success is
	the test of time and the criteria are reduction in
	violence against Israel and Israelis and effective
	Palestinian control of its own public.

	Palestinian success in controlling the Palestinian
	population and in preventing violence against Israel and
	Israelis would then signal that future agreements on
	broader issues, such as territory are possible. Failure of
	Israel to agree to put the Palestinians to the test means
	that Palestinian autonomy will be an irrelevant exercise
	in a process which will not result in peaceful
	coexistence.