From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Expression
Date: 31 Dec 92 20:15:15 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1hv9efINNgh8@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> 
PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:

>>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)

J:
>>>In regular old realist semantics, the semantic value of a predicate
>>>is a property. The predicate contributes that property to propositions
>>>expressed by sentences in which the predicate occurs.

MZ:
>>Not so fast.  In "regular old realist semantics", the semantic value
>>of a predicate is a propositional form, involving at least one
>>property.  Remember the Russellian quest for the true logical form of
>>language!

J:
>Is that "at least one property" the property which the predicate
>expresses?

Make it `a property which the predicate expresses'.

J:
>>>  "To call something rational is to express one's acceptance of norms
>>>  that permit it." .... Normative talk is part of nature, but it does
>>>  not describe nature. In particular, a person who calls something
>>>  rational or irrational is not describing his state of mind; he is
>>>  expressing it. To call something rational is not to attribute
>>>  some particular property to that thing--not even the property of
>>>  being permitted by accepted norms. The analysis is not directly
>>>  of what it is for something to *be* rational, but of what it is
>>>  for someone to *judge* that something is rational. We explain
>>>  the term by saying what state of mind it expresses. In this sense
>>>  the analysis is *expressivistic*, and in too big a mouthful, I shall
>>>  call it the *norm-expressivistic analysis*.
>>>                              [Wise Choices, Apt Feelings pp.7-8]
>>>     [The quotation marks appear in the original.]
>>>
>>>I hope this is clear enough for present purposes. According to
>>>Gibbard, there is no property of being rational. But "is rational"
>>>is meaningful in that it expresses a special kind of endorsement.

MZ:
>>Well, I find the distinction between describing and expressing
>>*itself* to be bereft of cognitive value.  Does this mean that Gibbard
>>is doing expressivist philosophy?  Or does it mean that I simply don't
>>care for his brand of vacuous verbigeration?  You be the judge.

J:
>I don't know what it means. I decline to judge.

A wise choice.  Or is it an apt feeling?

J:
>I am disappointed that you see no distinction between describing
>and expressing, though. Let me try another example.
>
>If I say, "All Jews should be exterminated," I am expressing
>a hatred for Jews. But I am not describing it. If my statement
>is false, it does not follow that I have described my hatred
>incorrectly.

Context, please.  If you say "All Jews should be exterminated," you
are expressing your hatred for Jews, and _eo ipso_, expressing your
state of mind.  Indeed, you are not describing either your hatred, or
your state of mind; however you are describing nature, -- that is,
your nature, -- to the extent that your expression is properly and
naturally a consequence of your personal constitution and makeup.

As to the questions of truth and falsehood, they depend on the
semantical analysis.  If your statement is analyzed as synonymous with
"I believe that in the best of all possible worlds, all Jews will have
been exterminated", then it is true iff you are sincerely asserting
it; on the other hand, what you are saying is synonymous with "In the
best of all possible worlds, all Jews will have been exterminated",
which may or may not be true, independently of your state of mind, iff
the Jews constitute a pernicious parasite, feeding off the innocent
Aryan mankind.

J:
>>>Similar ideas can be found in de Finetti.

MZ:
>>That's too bad.  I had more respect for him.

J:
>So you have a choice: either abandon your respect for de Finetti,
>or examine your rejection of the cognitive value of expressivism.
>
>(You might also choose to doubt my report, but I will if
>pressed provide a quotation.)

You are getting too aggressive for your own good.  Expressivism, as
exposed above, sounds like a crock of shit; furthermore, I am resigned
to the fact that mathematicians make for bad philosophers.

MZ:
>>>>The speaker's degree of belief surely is a property of the speaker.

J:
>>>It is. But, according to de Finetti, someone who says "The eternal
>>>damnation of the heretics has probability .5" does not express
>>>a proposition about his state of mind, about his degree of belief.
>>>He rather expresses his degree of belief.

MZ:
>>This does not sound like communication to me.

J:
>It does to me.

See above.

J:
>>>If I utter "Ow! you son of a bitch" when Tom Nagel steps on my
>>>gouty toe, I have not expressed the proposition that I am in pain,
>>>but I have expressed my pain.

MZ:
>>I refer you to Frege's article on thoughts.  Your pain is inherently
>>inexpressible, though propositions about it can be readily expressed.

J:
>By "I have expressed my pain," I meant that it can be inferred
>from my having said it that I am in pain. A smile is an expression
>of happiness. The rolling of eyes is an expression of exasperation.
>But neither of these facial expressions expresses a proposition.
>Neither describes anything.

Why not?  The expression of a proposition may be described as a
natural phenomenon, correlated with an expressive intention.  In
either case, a proposition may or may not be expressed, according as
you do or do not intend to express it.

MZ:
>>_Au fond_, it is a difference in semantic theory, that generates our
>>disagreement.  Consequently, to the extent that we remain exemplars of
>>our own semantic views, our difference is bound to stay unresolved.

J:
>Quite.

So be it.

>Jamie

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4633 sci.logic:2488