From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 18:42:09 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.101842.6934@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>In article <TORKEL.92Nov6055054@bast.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
>(Torkel Franzen) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Nov5.235132.16787@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>
>>   >If one considers realism to be the thesis that there
>>   >is an objective, mind-independent reality, then it seems natural to
>>   >me that this metaphysical goal is in some sense the totality of
>>   >all true propositions about the world.
>>
>>  Well, to me it seems natural to couple the thesis that there is an objective
>>mind-independent reality with a rejection of the idea of a "totality of
>>true propositions about the world" as confused and unjustifiable. Eating a
>>banana, I have no doubt about its mind-independent reality. The assertion
>>that there is a "totality of true propositions" about the banana, on the
>>other hand, is not so much doubtful as senseless.
>
>OK, this is your view.  I understand it.  Allow me to add another quotation,
>this time from the Hintikka paper I referred to.
>
>  One partial way of seeing the relevance of [a definition of truth in a
>  logic that avoids Tarski's Truth Theorem] is to recall the extremely
>  strong, albeit partly tacit tradition or trend in philosophy (not only
>  in the philosophy of language) that maintains that semantics is ineffable,
>  at least the semantics of our actual working language.  This tradition
>  is represented by no lesser figures than Frege, Wittgenstein, the
>  Vienna Circle of 1930-32, Quine and Church, and similar views frequently
>  rear their ugly heads elsewhere in contemporary philosophical discussions.
>  And if semantics at large is inexpressible, then the key concept of all
>  semantics, the concept of truth, will _a fortiori_ be ineffable,
>  according to this tradition.  Furthermore, we are not dealing here with
>  a sect of analytic philosophers, either.  Martin Kusch has shown that
>  a similar view is one of the key ingredients of Heidegger's philosophy.
>  This entire multiple tradition comes to a screeching halt if truth turns
>  out to be definable after all in a nontrivial way.
>
>Now, I'm not saying I underline everything Hintikka is saying here, nor
>does Jaakko think that what I focus on in metaphysics is "central".
>But, I cite this passage as further evidence of the importance of truth
>definitions for philosophy at large.
>
>-- 
>Marko Amnell
>amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
>Graduate Student in Philosophy

But note that the multi-valued logics do not escape the problem.  The
assignment of truth values remains ineffable; it is only because you
have more than two of them that you become able to get a set of all
truths -- but the set of all truths ceases to be the supremely
interesting object!


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu