From: young@serum.kodak.com
Subject: Re: Are sentience and sapience arbitrary ethical criteria?
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@serum.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 21:05:15 GMT

In <1992Oct13.222225.20316@ncar.ucar.edu>, Chuck D'Ambra writes:

[...]

>The identification or selection of ethical standards by humans is not
>random, simply because non-humans are incapable of doing so.  If ethics
>are exclusively the province of humans, why is an anthropocentric view
>inappropriate?

	I find it mildy amusing that the very group which has argued that
	humans and sapient/sentient animals are equal, now finds it convenient
	to argue that man is perhaps a bit MORE than equal.  We're either
	just another animal or we're not...it can't be had both ways.

>We are not attempting to determine if the earth is the
>center of the universe, but rather what are the boundaries of appropriate
>human conduct....

	...through the use of criteria we can't even define properly, and
	certainly cannot measure objectively.  The application of the 
	criteria is "capricious."

>ry:	Are there or are there not absolute ethical standards?  This goes
>ry:	to the heart of the question: if there are not, then the standards
>ry:	AR advocates attempt to foist upon us are based on personal opinion
>ry:	and carry no more weight than the opinion of any other group.  It
>ry:	is precisely my point that the concept of a significant-to-all-
>ry:	species criterion is not considered by other species: no principle
>ry:	can truly be considered "universal" or "absolute" unless it is
>ry:	recognized by ALL species.  [Note that "recognize" is used loosely
>ry:	here...much as "care" is, below.]
>
>Indeed, the existence of absolute ethical standards is a fundamental
>question, one which I hope this group will explore more completely.  But
>why would it matter whether non-humans recognize principles if they are
>incapable of doing so?

	It should matter to humans whether the principles being espoused
	are universally and objectively applicable.  Ironically, your
	implications recall an argument often used by AR advocates: blacks
	weren't considered human by slaveholders.  They were considered
	incapable of grasping certain principles.  Did it not "matter"?
	"Well", you say, "they WERE human, and the slaveholders were clearly
	wrong in their assessment."

	Are we so sure of our assessments here?  Or are we slaveholders?

>Let me give an example.  Many persons, including some contributors to this
>group, believe in absolute ethical standards set forth by a supernatural
>being.  Would we learn anything about the validity of this idea by
>considering the opinions (or absence thereof) of amoebas?

	If amoebae could express opinions, we might!  :*)

	Look, no one is going to argue that an amoeba is capable of
	considering the implications of the existence of a supernatural
	being.  In this discussion we are addressing something far, far
	more basic: pain, and the ability to sense and react to it.

>cd: My point was that, unlike the other distinctions, the presence or 
>cd: absence of sentience and sapience determine whether or not an organism 
>cd: is capable of suffering and caring what happens to itself.  Are you 
>cd: really disagreeing with that point?
>
>ry:	Yes, I really am disagreeing; the amoeba example below should be
>ry:	an adequate illustration.
>
>Then there are two issues here.  Are sentience and sapience required for
>an organism to be capable of suffering and for caring what happens to itself?
>Do these capabilities have ethical significance?

	Two good questions.  Before we can address the first, we must
	carefully define "suffering" and "care," as in "caring what happens
	to itself."

	The second question can be answered out of hand: clearly, sentience
	and sapience have ethical significance to some sub-set of humans.

	A better question, though, might be this: "Are sentience and 
	sapience, although recognized as ethical criteria, nevertheless
	arbitrary in their application to non-human species."

[...]

>ry:	Clearly we need a list of characteristics by which we can recognize
>ry:	whether sentience and sapience are present.  Will you now provide
>ry:	us with such a list so that we may begin this classification?  How
>ry:	do you know that a cow has it, and an amoeba doesn't, for instance?
>
>The scientific method provides a reasonable means of establishing which
>organisms possess these characteristics.  I've yet to see any practitioners
>of this method support your assertion that amoebas may be among them.

	What are these scientific methods?  How can we measure the species?

	Sure, no scientist worthy of the title would claim that an amoeba
	feels pain in the classic human sense, but few would argue that
	an amoeba can sense its environment and react appropriately to
	preserve its life...within its physical limitations, of course.

>If this assertion were valid, perhaps we would have a first criterion that
>applies to all species:  organisms of all species are self-interested
>(where "interest" carries the same connotations as the dictionary definition
>of caring).

	Are you saying here that your criterion says, "...all species care
	(in the dictionary sense) what happens to them?"  Clearly not, since
	the dictionary sense of "care" implies cognition, but we've been
	here before, haven't we?  As I said in my last posting, "care," in
	the dictionary sense, is simply part of the implementation of "react"
	that comes along with complexity of structure.  To that, let me
	add the phrase, "...where pain and suffering are concerned."

	We may use the word "care" with reference to amoebae, but we must
	understand that there is no attempt to attach cognition to this
	looser interpretation; it is merely shorthand for "the urge to
	ameliorate or end the presence of noxious stimuli."

>cd: The amoeba has evolved with a moderately complex set of physio-chemical
>cd: reactions that allow it to react in the manner it does.  While the 
>cd: cognitive abilities of other organisms also have physio-chemical 
>cd: underpinnings, they're hardly the same thing.  React != care.
>
>ry:	You're so convinced that they're "not the same thing?"  Clearly,
>ry:	the physio-chemical reactions of a cow are significantly more
>ry:	complex than those of an amoeba, so they are not congruent in
>ry:	the details, but is not the purpose identical?  Did not these 
>ry:	physio-chemical reactions evolve to accomplish precisely the same 
>ry:	function for each organism? 
>
>A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy is an amoeba?

	Where pain and suffering, or the amoebic analog, are concerned, yes.

>No, the purposes are not identical.  The cognitive abilities of a cow
>serve additional purposes, e.g. to learn from experience, to nurture
>its offspring and to be self-aware.  The distinctions may not always be
>obvious, but I don't think there as blurred as you maintain.

	We've already (I hope) stipulated that a cow is more complex, but
	aversion to life-threatening stimuli is pretty basic stuff.  The
	ability, indeed the desire, to nurture offspring and the capability 
	of self-awareness are simply manifestations of the cow's evolutionary
	complexity, not an indication that the cow is somehow more "worthy"
	of life than the amoeba.  Reactions to stimuli perceived as life-
	threatening are not all that different, however: both organisms
	will try to escape using necessary means within their individual
	physical limitations.

	The distinctions may not be as obvious as you think on this most
	basic of levels.

[...]

>Is survival of one's species an absolute ethic?

	It certainly is close to an absolute, and it derives from survival 
	of self.  Unless we can show moral relevance in other species,
	however, I would be hesitant to call it an "ethic," except, perhaps,
	for humans.  It is more like the result of evolutionary pressure:
	nematodes don't survive unless they do things which promote their
	survival.  There are uncontrollable external influences as well,
	of course, which may mediate against their survival anyway, but it
	is certain that nematodes won't continue to exist unless they
	engage in reproductive activity, for instance.  This is a basic
	activity from which even humans are not exempt, as is the urge to
	escape from stimuli perceived as life-threatening, which humans
	experience as "pain."

>Even if human society's ethical standards concerning cannabilism stem from
>nothing more than the predominant opinion, that is a sufficient basis to
>consider them non-arbitrary.  If we look closely we may find that they are
>part of human nature.

	Isn't that what I said?  I think it entirely probable that human
	attitudes toward cannibalism spring from atavistic instincts to
	preserve the species, as do taboos against inbreeding.  On the 
	other hand, saying that ethics surrounding this practice aren't 
	arbitrary is rather ingenuous, since we are drawing from a pool 
	of homogeneous creatures with identical physical structure.  It 
	doesn't take much imagination to conclude that the physical and 
	cognitive processes of one human are pretty much like those of 
	another.

	It's when we go beyond species boundaries and draw similar
	conclusions without the justification of knowledge that our 
	criteria become arbitrarily applied.



-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals