HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Numbers and sets
Date: 28 Dec 92 19:12:53 GMT
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.

In article <1992Dec28.155555.21505@guinness.idbsu.edu>, holmes@opal.idbsu.edu 
(Randall Holmes) writes:
>In article <Bzsrvt.167@umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>    Is there a relationship between sets and Plato's Forms?

Plato's Forms were ideal exemplars of
>mundane objects; sets do not have this character (the set of all
>natural numbers is not a perfect natural number).  

    Perhaps I should have asked about Kantian, subjective forms. I am starting 
"Plato, Kant and Aristotle in Math" by Glenn Marcus (2nd Renaissance Books,
1991, audio) and should have some wisdom on math soon.
    Marcus says scientists (excepting computer scientists w/info theory) use
only pre-20th century math and quotes a leading mathematician on the 
impracticality of math. Comments?
================================================================================
	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
                                                              AYN RAND
================================================================================
Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASS.EDU>
================================================================================
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 31 Dec 92 14:42:02 EST
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Dec31.171138.18363@guinness.idbsu.edu>
holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>In article <1hteqjINN85h@tamsun.tamu.edu> 
>cmenzel@kbssun1.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel) writes:

>>holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

RH:
>>>First-order logic does not commit one to abstract objects at all.

CM:
>>Seems hasty, Randall.  Don't you think the semantics for first-order
>>logic (or better perhaps, a first-order language) commits you to
>>(among other things) the semantic entities that interpret the
>>constants and predicates of the language?  If so, then you're at least
>>committed to sets or classes or, for friends of the forms, properties
>>and relations as the meanings of predicates.

RH:
>First-order logic doesn't commit one to the semantics for first-order
>logic, either.  The semantics for first-order logic certainly does
>involve some set theory.

Good.  And what does the semantics for set theory involve?

RH:
>Personally, I am committed to set theory, and so to semantics for
>_some_ interpretations of first-order logic (all consistent theories
>have countable models, after all).

Nonsense.  ZFC^2 is consistent, and has no countable models.

RH:
>				    But the intended interpretation of
>Cantorian set theory _cannot_ have semantics in the sense indicated.
>Its domain of discourse is _not_ a set, and most of its predicates are
>_not_ sets or relations (all are "too large").  This is not specific
>to Cantorian set theory; the same holds for the set theories derived
>from NF.  If one tries to get around this by using proper classes,
>super-classes, and so forth, one still has the same problem at a
>higher level (the theory of the classes, super-classes, and so forth).

That's precisely my point: the true semantics of ZFC presupposes a
proper class theory, which likewise presupposes a proper super-class
theory, and so forth.  May I assume that you have conceded my point?

>>--Chris Menzel
>>  Philosophy Department
>>  Texas A&M University

>-- 
>The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
>above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
>opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
>or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."

Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4632 sci.logic:2487
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Date: 29 Dec 92 16:48:42 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1hpqgkINNmi6@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> 
PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:

>>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
>>PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:

J:
>>>But, I don't understand how using unreified predicates instead of
>>>objects helps avoid set theoretic paradoxes. Grelling's paradox
>>>uses only a predicate, and (unless I'm very confused) does not
>>>require reification.

MZ:
>>You are very confused.  If Grelling's paradox is regarded as purely
>>syntactical, then it is unproblematic on a Quinian view that requires
>>stratification (as spurious as such a requirement might be); if, on
>>the other hand, it is regarded as semantical, then the contradiction
>>depends on the assumption that the predicate "...is heterological"
>>expresses a _bona fide_ property.

J:
>Well, if I was confused before, I am more confused now.

You have my sympathies.

J:
>First of all, if a view (Quinean or otherwise) requires stratification
>to deal with a purely syntactical predicate, then the issue of
>reification is not the salient one. Stratification is a strategy
>for eliminating the paradoxes whether the predicates are reified or not.

Correct.  Stratification is a purely syntactical trick.  Rage away,
Randall.

J:
>Second, I have no idea whether "is heterological" expresses a bona
>fide property. I care only that whether it is a meaningful predicate.
>(What would it express if not a bona fide property? A trope?)

A predicate is meaningful, if and only if it expresses a property.

J:
>My point was that the Grelling paradox doesn't depend on any
>quantification over properties, nor on a semantics that
>assigns objects to predicates. It's solution is (must be)
>independent of the question of reification.

Well, that depends.  I suggested two interpretations of Grelling's
paradox.  A purely syntactical one is blocked by stratification; on
the other hand, the semantical one does not get off the ground, until
and unless one comes up with a semantics that assigns a predicate
object to the adjective `heterological'.  So there you are.

>Jamie

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4646 sci.logic:2499
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Date: 29 Dec 92 01:30:15 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1hntpkINNnp8@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> 
PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:

>But, I don't understand how using unreified predicates instead of
>objects helps avoid set theoretic paradoxes. Grelling's paradox
>uses only a predicate, and (unless I'm very confused) does not
>require reification.

You are very confused.  If Grelling's paradox is regarded as purely
syntactical, then it is unproblematic on a Quinian view that requires
stratification (as spurious as such a requirement might be); if, on
the other hand, it is regarded as semantical, then the contradiction
depends on the assumption that the predicate "...is heterological"
expresses a _bona fide_ property.

>Jamie

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
From: nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: That which hurts
Date: 25 Dec 92 19:51:21 GMT
Article-I.D.: casper.Bztz5L.DMM
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town

Somewhere along the "Truth" thread, Jamie writes:


" Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
  list of 100-word sentences of English.

  It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
  ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
  one of us, no one ever will. "

That something's amiss becomes clear when you consider that in the event of your
sentence being an imperative (the requirement of alphabetic order may yield
something like "Abandon aardvarks!" at the top of your list) or a question
the sentence is neither true nor false. 

In fact, it is widely held that propositions, as opposed to sentences, are the
bearers of truth value. The process of interpretaion involves nothing less
than establishing a correspondence between sentences and statements (which
also have no truth value) and if possible (and this is not possible in the 
cases mentioned above) between statements and propositions. 
Consider also what truth value you would care to assign to ambiguous sentences. 


(I don't know how helpful this is, I've missed much of the thread.)

Neil Horne
Cape Town
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4663 sci.logic:2516
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Quantifying over the white flag
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 11:58:47 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

>From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)

(About 150 lines of reproduced text deleted.)

>Give it up:  universal quantification is _not_ paradoxical.

I hereby surrender.

Jamie
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4660 sci.logic:2514
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 17:11:38 GMT

In article <1hteqjINN85h@tamsun.tamu.edu> cmenzel@kbssun1.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel) writes:
>holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>: First-order logic does not commit one to abstract objects at all.
>
>Seems hasty, Randall.  Don't you think the semantics for first-order
>logic (or better perhaps, a first-order language) commits you to
>(among other things) the semantic entities that interpret the
>constants and predicates of the language?  If so, then you're at least
>committed to sets or classes or, for friends of the forms, properties
>and relations as the meanings of predicates.
>
>--Chris Menzel
>  Philosophy Department
>  Texas A&M University

First-order logic doesn't commit one to the semantics for first-order
logic, either.  The semantics for first-order logic certainly does
involve some set theory.

Personally, I am committed to set theory, and so to semantics for
_some_ interpretations of first-order logic (all consistent theories
have countable models, after all).  But the intended interpretation of
Cantorian set theory _cannot_ have semantics in the sense indicated.
Its domain of discourse is _not_ a set, and most of its predicates are
_not_ sets or relations (all are "too large").  This is not specific
to Cantorian set theory; the same holds for the set theories derived
from NF.  If one tries to get around this by using proper classes,
super-classes, and so forth, one still has the same problem at a
higher level (the theory of the classes, super-classes, and so forth).
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Numbers and sets
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 15:55:55 GMT

In article <Bzsrvt.167@umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>    Is there a relationship between sets and Plato's Forms?

Some people think so; that is why the popular term for mathematical
realists is "platonists".  Plato's Forms were ideal exemplars of
mundane objects; sets do not have this character (the set of all
natural numbers is not a perfect natural number).  There is a
relationship between sets and form with a small f (to avoid calling
the objects of mathematics "abstract", which I think is
epistemologically misleading, I call them formal objects), but they
are not Forms in Plato's sense.  Moreover, the use of mathematical
objects is quite different from that of Plato's Forms.


>================================================================================
>	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
>you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
>tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
>                                                              AYN RAND
>================================================================================
>Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASS.EDU>
>================================================================================


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4679 sci.logic:2531
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Expression
Date: 3 Jan 93 20:52:35 GMT
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

1) That every case of (A&B) is also a case of (A) does not establish
that there is no distinction betwen (A&B) and (A);

2) I think Austin and Searle have it right, in this context: it is the
speech _acts_ we should attend to, and not (at least, not exclusively
to) the sentence forms we use to impliment our actions.  So, we
distinguish describing and prescribing, though the sentence "your fly
is open" can be used to do both, and though declarative sentences with
truth values can be used to prescribe.  "Expressivism", I take it, is
meant to suggest that one function of language is to express, say,
attitudes.  IF -- and in fact it's a big "if" -- "Homicide is always
immoral" functions chiefly to express an attitude towards homicide,
nothing in entailed as to whether "immoral" denotes a property in the
Platonic heavens, the Aristotelian world of properties as multiply
exemplified, or in the conceit of tropes.

As to what true sentences denote, why, of course, as our father Frege
taught us, they denote the true.
-- 
Michael Feld                  | E-mail: <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy           | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba        | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Semantics of Set Theory
Date: 25 Dec 92 17:09:46 GMT
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.

Can anyone help me distinguish the "argument" of Randall and Holmes from the
ravings of mental patients? It seems much ado about nothing, a way for the
intellectually challenged to pass the day until nurse brings another sedative.

Alternatively, Peikoff, in _Objectivism_, says, "i have presented the ideas of
objectivism, their validation, and their interrelationaships. i have arranged
the idesa hierarchically; each chapter, and within the chapters each section, 
builds on earlier material....I offer not a heap of concretes, polemics, quotes,
and random elaborations, but a progression of essentials....I have ommitted
every nonessentiual that might cause the reader to lose sight of ayn Rand's
system as a whole....Like any proper work of general philosophy, this book is
written not for academics, but for human beings (including any academics who
qualify)....Modernist intellectuals are comparable to a psychopath who murders
for kicks. They seek the thrill of the new; and the new, to them, is the
negative. The new is obliteration, oblitration of the essential in every field;
they have no interest in anything to take its place. Thus the uniqueness of the
century behind us: philososophy gleefully rid of system-building...."

With full regard for the ad hominem fallacy I note Kasanin's _Language and
Thought in Schizophrenia_, in which the  author wonders about the small amount
of reasoning in culture after a brilliant description of symbol associations 
among the insane. Of course, I don't mean to suggest that Zeleny and Randall are
insane (and it would be churlish to suggest otherwise) but the similarity
between their...whatever and Kasanin's hilarious descriptions is...well,
disturbing. Are there any thoughts or even ejaculations on this somber topic?
quotes, and random 


and Thought in Schizophrenia_, wondered about the small amount of reasoning in
culture in general. Here are some causes.
================================================================================
	"In that world, you'll be able to rise in the morning with the spirit
you had known in your childhood: that spirit of eagerness, adventure and cer-
tainty which comes from dealing with a rational universe."
                                                              AYN RAND
================================================================================
Stephen Grossman <PMSC13SG@UMASS.EDU>
================================================================================
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Truth again
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 11:25:45 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

>Posted on 20 Dec 1992 at 18:54:07 by oleary@staff.tc.umn.edu

J:
>>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>>
>>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>>one of us, no one ever will.

Response from O'Leary:

>Not only do you not define truth with respect to sentences of English, your
>example is circular.  The sentence is or isn't syntactically correct and may
>or may not have semantic content.  By saying that the sentence is on a list
>of English sentences, you imply that it is syntactically correct.  The
>semantic content of the sentence, however, still depends on it being
>interpreted.

Of COURSE I didn't define truth with respect to sentences of English.
Would you like me to do so? What sorts of criteria must I meet? If
O'Leary insists, I will do my best to define truth for English, but
I'm not promising anything.

The rest of the objection is very close to jibberish.
By saying that the sentence is on a list of English sentences I
OBVIOUSLY imply that it is syntactically correct. Does O'Leary
deny that the syntactically correct sentences of English are
enumerable? They are obviously enumerable by an alphabetic list.
Does he deny that there are ANY 100-word sentences of English?
Or that the set of 100-word sentences of English is enumerated
by alphabetization? Or that the list has a first entry?

The semantic content of a sentence depends on its being interpreted
in one sense. This is precisely the point I have been making.
If we regard English sentences as intepreted, then they have a truth
value. Whether they have truth value is independent of whether anyone
has ever actually interpreted them, or whether anyone ever will
interpret them. THAT was the point Randall was making. He worried
that he could not give an example of a sentence that no one has
ever interpreted or ever will. So I gave an example, not by
constructing it but by describing a definite English sentence.


The complaint that my example is "circular" is ridiculous. No circularity
has been pointed to.

Jamie
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4676 sci.logic:2529
From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: No Reification Here
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 17:07:01 EST
Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: brownvm.brown.edu
News-Software: BNN via BNN_POST v1.0 beta

Randall,

>I do not agree with Zeleny that quantification involves ontological
>commitment to the domain over which one is quantifying as a completed
>totality.  It merely involves commitment to each of the objects in the
>domain.  I'll admit that I am committed to an ontology including all
>of the quantification ranges, since there is only one, the universe,
>which is in fact an object!  But this involves taking unfair advantage
>of my NF advocacy; even from a ZFC standpoint, it can be observed that
>quantification ranges are not necessarily objects; they can be
>non-reified predicates, and they can be "referred to" using
>syntactical means.

I hope I don't have to ask for the longer reply!

But, I don't understand how using unreified predicates instead of
objects helps avoid set theoretic paradoxes. Grelling's paradox
uses only a predicate, and (unless I'm very confused) does not
require reification.

You said earlier that the REAL trick is denying Separation.
That seemed promising. Can I follow up a bit?

I can talk about everything all at once. But everything all at
once is not a completed totality. Check.

I can restrict my quantifiers, too. I suppose that denying Separation
means that there are some ways I cannot restrict them. For example,
I CAN say something like, "Everything blue is also square." May
I also say, meaningfully, "Every quantifier that has another
quantifier in its range commits its employer to abstract objects"?

(I am not at all interested, right now, in whether I can say that
TRULY, only MEANINGFULLY.)

Can I meaningfully say, "Some quantifiers have themselves in their range."?

I won't insult you by leading you down such an obvious path. You can
see better than I can where this is going.

Where do you get off? (Is the problem inherent in speaking of a "range"?
I will be surprised if it is.)

Jamie
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:4658 sci.logic:2510
From: cmenzel@kbssun1.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
Subject: Re: No Reification Here
Date: 31 Dec 1992 00:28:03 GMT
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station, TX
NNTP-Posting-Host: kbssun1.tamu.edu
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
: First-order logic does not commit one to abstract objects at all.

Seems hasty, Randall.  Don't you think the semantics for first-order
logic (or better perhaps, a first-order language) commits you to
(among other things) the semantic entities that interpret the
constants and predicates of the language?  If so, then you're at least
committed to sets or classes or, for friends of the forms, properties
and relations as the meanings of predicates.

--Chris Menzel
  Philosophy Department
  Texas A&M University
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech