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/* ---------- "SG ON BOSNIA & hERZEGOVINIA" ---------- */
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							    Distr.
							    GENERAL

							    S/24333
							    21
							    July
							    1992

							    ORIGINAL:
							    ENGLISH


	       REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION
			   IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA


				 INTRODUCTION

1.   In a statement made by its President on 17 July 1992
(S/24307), the Security Council welcomed the agreement signed
earlier that day in London by the parties to the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the parties, inter alia, asked the
Security Council to make arrangements for international
supervision of all their heavy weapons (see S/24305, annex).  The
President's statement recorded the Security Council's decision in
principle to respond positively to this request and called upon
the parties to declare immediately to the Force Commander of the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the locations and
quantities of the heavy weapons to be placed under international
supervision.  The Council further requested the Secretary-General
to report by
20 July on the implementation and resource implications of this
decision.

2.   The Force Commander of UNPROFOR immediately instructed his
Sector Commander in Sarajevo to enter into contact with the
representatives of the three parties with a view to identifying
the locations and quantities of heavy weapons to be supervised.
However, no relevant information was made available by any of the
parties, two of whom had, by noon New York time on 21 July 1992,
made no response at all to the Force Commander's request.  In
these circumstances, the Force Commander submitted to me on 19
July 1992 a proposed Concept of Operations for UNPROFOR to
supervise the parties' heavy weapons, on the basis of such
information as was available to him from public sources.
Estimates of the resources required by this Concept of Operations
have been prepared by the Force Commander on the basis of
experience acquired by UNPROFOR in the course of its deployment in
the region.  The Force Commander's Concept of Operations is
annexed to the present report.  Its financial implications are
outlined in an addendum which will be circulated separately.


92-32048  3305i (E)   210792
/...
	      I.  PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.   The Concept of Operations proposed by General Nambiar
envisages the deployment of United Nations military observers
(UNMOs) throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, other
than Sarajevo, where separate arrangements are already in effect.
The UNMOs would supervise, through liaison, monitoring and
patrolling, the heavy weapons of all parties to the conflict in
that Republic.  Some 1,100 UNMOs would be required and they would
be based in 62 "equipment-collection points" (ECPs) which would be
grouped into seven "patrol areas".  Teams of six UNMOs at each ECP
would conduct the necessary patrols on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

4.   The UNMOs would, to the extent possible, have to be
self-sufficient in respect of their accommodation and subsistence.
They would require vehicles (three per patrol team in the initial
phase), communications equipment, office equipment and working
space, and technical and administrative support.  A large number
of interpreters, and smaller numbers of civil affairs and
information personnel would also be necessary, as would adequate
arrangements for medical care and the evacuation of casualties.

5.   The Force Commander's concept also envisages that the UNMOs
would have an important role in helping the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian agencies to identify requirements for humanitarian
relief.  This is based on the assumption that implementation of
the London Agreement would open up access to many areas where
there are pressing humanitarian needs and that UNPROFOR would
inevitably be expected to help UNHCR and other agencies respond to
these needs.

6.   The success of such an operation would be impossible without
the cooperation of the parties, who would be required to declare
all the heavy weapons in their possession and to cooperate with
UNPROFOR in concentrating these at locations where they could be
monitored.  It would also be necessary for the parties to
demonstrate a genuine commitment to a sustained and lasting
cease-fire and to maintain that commitment largely without
international help for several weeks, for reasons explained in
paragraph 12 below.

			       II.  OBSERVATIONS

7.   After carefully considering the London Agreement and the
circumstances in which it was concluded, as well as the advice of
the Force Commander, I have come to the conclusion that the
conditions do not exist for me to recommend that the Security
Council accept the request of the three parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that the United Nations supervise the heavy weapons
which, in the second paragraph of the London Agreement, they have
agreed to declare and place under international supervision.  This
is for a variety of reasons, some of them relating to principle
and some to practical considerations.

8.   In the first place, the request contained in the London
Agreement raises the question of the relationship between the
United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of
international peace and security.  In "An Agenda for Peace"
(S/24111), I have stated my view that their potential should be
utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking and peace-keeping.  Chapter VIII of the Charter of the
United Nations describes the role which such arrangements and
agencies can play and lays down guidelines for their relationship
with the United Nations and specifically with the Security
Council.  That Chapter underlines the primary responsibility of
the Security Council in such matters, providing, for instance,
that in certain circumstances it can "utilize" regional
organizations or agencies.  There is no provision for the reverse
to occur.  In other instances when the United Nations and a
regional organization have both been involved in an international
peace and security situation, care has been taken to ensure that
the primacy of the world Organization has not been compromised.

9.   Secondly, the United Nations did not participate in the
negotiation of the London Agreement.  Only on the eve of its
signature were my staff informed of the request it was likely to
contain and given the opportunity to draw attention to the
practical constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to carry out this
task.  It is most unusual for the United Nations to be asked to
help implement a politico-military agreement in whose negotiation
it has played no part.  The London Agreement is thus very
different from the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia
which was negotiated by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy,
assisted by experienced staff from the Secretariat.  As a matter
of principle, I believe that such staff should be involved in the
negotiation of any agreement which is likely to give rise to a
peace-keeping role for the United Nations.

10.  My concern on these two points is heightened by the lack of
clarity concerning the respective roles of the United Nations and
the European Community in implementation of the London Agreement.
In its first paragraph, the parties have undertaken to explore
measures for strengthening the cease-fire in the longer term.  It
is not clear whether the European Community would help them to do
this (they would certainly not be able to do it without third
party help), as part of the follow-up to an agreement mediated by
the Community, or whether this role would be performed by the
United Nations, which in the second paragraph is asked by the
parties to perform a function that would be the main determinant
of whether the cease-fire could be strengthened.  In order to
clarify this and other points, I have asked Lord Carrington to
make available to me the records of the London negotiations.

11.  Thirdly, it is well established that certain conditions have
to exist before a successful peace-keeping operation can be
established.  These include the consent and cooperation of the
parties and a practicable mandate.  Neither exists in the present
case.  The cease-fire which was supposed to begin on
19 July 1992 has not come into effect in Sarajevo or, to judge
from media reports, elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  On the
contrary, fighting has intensified to the extent that relief
operations through Sarajevo airport had to be suspended on 20 July
and again today.  None of the parties has declared to UNPROFOR the
quantity and locations of its heavy weapons, information without
which the Force Commander cannot begin to plan the additional
deployment which would be needed in order to supervise them.

12.  Fourthly, the additional function which UNPROFOR is asked to
assume is simply beyond the present operational and logistical
capability of the United Nations.  UNPROFOR is already stretched
to the breaking-point, with severe shortages of civilian personnel
and of almost all categories of equipment.  The Force Commander
has told me that he would have neither personnel nor vehicles
which he could spare for this new function.  Nor do other United
Nations peace-keeping operations have spare resources that could
be redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In spite of repeated
requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has not
been authorized to establish a reserve stock of basic
peace-keeping equipment which would enable me to respond quickly
to new requirements of this kind.  Only a handful of Member States
have committed themselves to keep military personnel on stand-by
for service in United Nations peace-keeping operations and many of
them have already exhausted their reserves of such personnel, as a
result of unprecedented demand during the current year.  I am
advised that in these circumstances it would take at least three
months to deploy all the personnel and equipment required to
implement the Force Commander's concept.  There is reason to doubt
whether the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina would respect the
cease-fire for so long a period without their heavy weapons being
supervised.

13.  Fifthly, there is a question of priorities.  The United
Nations is already massively engaged in the former Yugoslavia.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is leading the
international effort to deal with the largest humanitarian crisis
which has afflicted Europe since the Second World War, with 2.25
million refugees and displaced persons and another 850,000 persons
estimated to be trapped in their homes by the fighting.  An
international conference on this problem is being convened by her
on 29 July.  UNHCR alone has already provided more than 25,000
tonnes of relief supplies and estimates its total requirements
till 31 March 1993 at $141.9 million, of which only $52.1 million
has been received so far.  On the peace-keeping side, some 13,600
troops are deployed in Croatia, the third largest force ever
fielded by the Organization.  Their mandate is constantly
expanding as experience on the ground brings to light further
complexities in implementing the United Nations peace-keeping
plan.  In Sarajevo another major operation has been mounted, at
great risk to the security of the personnel involved, to reopen
the airport for humanitarian relief flights.  My concern is that
if the Security Council continues to concentrate its attention and
resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at
the expense of the Organization's ability to help resolve equally
cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, e.g. in Somalia.

14.  In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in conveying to
the Security Council my view that the conditions do not exist for
it to accept the request addressed to it by the parties in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, I am not decrying the European Community's
achievement in negotiating the London Agreement.  Nor am I
suggesting any reduction in the existing activities of the United
Nations in the former Yugoslavia.  On the contrary, I shall
shortly recommend to the Council a further enlargement of
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in the United Nations Protected
Areas.  Nor, of course, am I questioning the Security Council's
right to decide what the response of the United Nations to the
London Agreement should be.

				     Annex

			     Concept of operations


				 INTRODUCTION

1.   The aim of the present annex is to outline the reinforcement
to UNPROFOR required for the extension of its mandate to include
the monitoring of a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
London Agreement) (S/24305, annex).

2.   It is assumed throughout that:

     (a)  All parties continue to support the Agreement and that
there is no widespread breakdown of the cease-fire before an
UNPROFOR deployment;

     (b)  All sides will agree to concentrate heavy weapons at
points agreed with UNPROFOR.  Given the large quantity of heavy
weapons involved, it will be impossible to monitor them in their
current positions;

     (c)  Sarajevo is not included in the operation.  The nature
of the task and deployments in the city mean that it will be a
separate operation under the command of UNPROFOR headquarters;

     (d)  If the cease-fire holds, the infrastructure of Bosnia
and Herzegovina will be steadily restored;

     (e)  Implementation of the London Agreement will open access
to many areas in urgent need of humanitarian relief and UNPROFOR
will inevitably be expected to support the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian agencies.

				A.  The mission

3.   The mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (less
Sarajevo) is to supervise the parties' heavy weapons as provided
for in the London Agreement.

			       B.  Requirements

4.   The mission requires:

     (a)  Establishing equipment collection points (ECPs) for
     heavy weapons;

     (b)  Monitoring ECPs;

     (c)  Monitoring actual and potential trouble spots;

     (d)  Establishing a United Nations military observer (UNMO)
     presence in
Bosnia and Herzegovina within the time-frame of the London
Agreement;

     (e)  The use of the good offices of the United Nations to
maintain the cease-fire;

     (f)  Assisting UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to
identify requirements for humanitarian relief.

		      I.  FACTORS AFFECTING THE OPERATION

				A.  The parties

5.   Time.  The warring parties have agreed to only a 14-day
cease-fire.

     Deduction:  Initial deployment of UNPROFOR must take place as
soon as possible, but not later than 2 August 1992 when the
initial 14-day agreement expires.

6.   Geography.  The main areas of conflict (excluding Sarajevo
Sector) are the Bihac region, Tuzla region, the Sava River from
Derventa to Brcko, Foca to Gorazde, south-eastern Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including Dubrovnik to Herceg Novi, central Bosnia
and Herzegovina from Jajce to Zenica and the Mostar area.  (See
map, appendix A.)  There are reports of "ethnic cleansing"
throughout the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Note that
although in Croatia, Dubrovnik is closely linked to neighbouring
areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

     Deduction:  The cease-fire monitoring tasks can be achieved
in geographically limited areas, but humanitarian tasks will be
required throughout the Republic.

7.   Command and control.  Experience shows that the parties do
not have full control of their forces.  To influence the
situation, pressure must be applied to all levels throughout the
Republic.

     Deductions:

     (a)  There will have to be constant liaison on all sides and
     at all
levels, for example on the Serb side with the Government of the
so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its army
headquarters, its corps headquarters and local military commanders
and civil leaders;

     (b)  This is the key part of the operation and must take
place as quickly as possible from the top downwards;

     (c)  Breakdowns in the cease-fire must be anticipated and it
may be impossible for UNPROFOR to influence the situation;

     (d)  To maintain contact with the more "independent" groups,
a coordinated television/radio campaign, involving all sides,
explaining the roles and mandate of UNPROFOR must be initiated.

			      B.  Infrastructure

8.   Movement.  Although the infrastructure of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was previously well established, there has been
significant damage to it and road movement will be difficult in
many areas, e.g. most of the bridges across the Neretva River have
been destroyed.  Many other routes are blocked by landslides or
cratering.  The extent of minefields is not known but probably
extensive.  Many areas can be reached only by unimproved tracks
but these will be impassable because of the threat from mines.

     Deductions:

     (a)  Operations may be limited by obstacles, liaison must be
     established
with the factions to re-establish links using their own
equipment;

     (b)  Helicopters will be needed for casualty evacuation and
quite possibly for routine movement;

     (c)  United Nations combat engineer support will be needed
for minefield clearance in areas where local support is not
available;

     (d)  The inaccessibility of some areas because of the mine
threat means that alternative surveillance means are needed,
perhaps using air photography (with the agreement of all
parties).

9.   Communications.  Civilian communications are non-existent or
unreliable.

     Deduction:  The operation will require independent
communications covering the area of operations and linking the
area to the remainder of
UNPROFOR.

10.  Supplies.  There are probably shortages of
petrol/oil/lubricants (POL), food, potable water and electricity
in the areas of conflict.  Should the cease-fire hold, it is
assumed that much of the normal civilian infrastructure will be
restored; UNMOs will in due course be able to live off the local
resources.

     Deductions:

     (a)  Some UNPROFOR logistic support will be required,
     especially in the
early stages of deployment;

     (b)  Generators with necessary fuel and equipment will be
needed throughout the area.

11.  Accommodation.  May be available, but it is possible that it
will be occupied by refugees or destroyed.  There may not be any
accommodation at ECPs.

     Deduction:  It is considered that the availability of
accommodation will be at its worst at the ECPs.  It will be
necessary to rapidly concentrate into as few ECPs as possible to
minimize this requirement.  Such points will have to be selected
with the accommodation requirements in mind.  However,
temporary/permanent accommodation may be required at some sites.

12.  Medical.  Local medical support is inadequate.

     Deduction:  UNPROFOR medical support must be used to give
first aid, to stabilize casualties and to evacuate them, quite
possibly by helicopter.

				  C.  Climate

13.  There are great extremes of heat and cold in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The task is unlikely to be completed before the
start of winter in October.

     Deduction:  Cold weather equipment, including quite possibly
snow ploughs, will be needed to complete the task in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  A reconnaissance must be conducted to identify the
requirement well before the start of winter.

		    II.  TASKS AND TYPE OF TROOPS REQUIRED

			       A.  Patrol tasks

14.  Tasks required to implement the mission are:

     (a)  To command the operation;

     (b)  To liaise with all sides at the appropriate level as
     soon as
possible;

     (c)  To liaise with all United Nations agencies;

     (d)  To monitor lines of confrontation;

     (e)  To establish and monitor the concentration of heavy
     weapons at ECPs
and to patrol extensively to ensure adherence to the agreement;

     (f)  To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and
identify and report on areas that require humanitarian
assistance.

Manning requirements.  UNMOs are best able to achieve these tasks.
Infantry battalions do not have the necessary skills.  (A large
number of such units would be needed to achieve the mission.)
Limitations on off-road movement means that air reconnaissance may
be required.

			    B.  Support operations

15.  Support operations required by the mission are:

     (a)  Route clearance;

     (b)  Helicopters;

     (c)  Logistics:  see appendix B;

     (d)  Medical support, based on existing assets with some
     reinforcement.
For details see appendix B;

     (e)  A quantity of equipment is needed to achieve the
mission.  For details see appendix B;

     (f)  A public relations campaign is required, using civil or
military personnel from outside UNPROFOR;

     (g)  Communications equipment will be required which can be
operated by UNMOs.

			  III.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

16.  A force of UNMOs will deploy into Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Command will be exercised from a forward UNMO headquarters in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (HQ UNMO BH) which will report to UNPROFOR
headquarters through the Chief Military Observer.  Patrol areas
will be established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These
patrol areas will be based on the current areas of conflict and
will contain a varying number of patrol teams.  Proposed patrol
areas are indicated in appendix C.  A diagram of the UNMO Bosnia
and Herzegovina organization is contained in appendix D.  UNMOs
will be responsible for the following tasks in order of priority:

     (a)  To establish liaison with all parties at a high level at
the earliest opportunity;

     (b)  To establish low-level, local liaison;

     (c)  To control the concentration of heavy weapons;

     (d)  To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;

     (e)  To identify, in conjunction with relevant agencies,
     requirements for
humanitarian relief.

				 IV.  THE PLAN

			      A.  General outline

17.  Deployment of the UNMOs into Bosnia and Herzegovina will be
in a two-phase operation.  It will be impossible to start Phase
One without reinforcement of UNPROFOR.  The minimum requirement is
the manpower and materiel associated with the patrol areas
headquarters and the HQ UNMO BH.

     (a)  Phase One.  Liaison and reconnaissance; establish a
headquarters (HQ UNMO BH), establish initial links and
headquarters in patrol areas, identify principles for the
concentration of heavy weapons, initiate the public relations
campaign, receive and train reinforcements.  All activities should
be concurrent;

     (b)  Phase Two.  Deployment of patrols; control the
concentration of heavy weapons and conduct patrols throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

			    B.  Manning requirement

18.  Approximately 1,100 UMMOs with support elements.  Details are
contained in appendix E.

				  C.  Timing

19.  Phase One tasks should be started before 2 August 1992.  This
cannot be achieved using existing assets.

		       D.  Administration and logistics

20.  Details are contained in appendix B.

				  Appendices


A.   Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

B.   Logistic support

C.   Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

D.   Operational command structure

E.   UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

				  Appendix A

		   Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina


				  Appendix B

			       Logistic support


				HQ UNMO Zagreb

1.   The current role of this headquarters will expand.
Currently, it has operational command of Bihac and Dubrovnik, and
administrative command of UNMOs deployed in Sectors East, West,
North, South and Sarajevo.

2.   The Bosnia and Herzegovina expanded mandate for UNPROFOR
demands that it assume operational command of HQ UNMO BH, and
seven patrol areas, within each of which patrol teams equipped
with three vehicles will operate.  The headquarters will be
responsible for the reception and training of all new UNMOs at
Zagreb.  Additional tasks and related manpower required in HQ UNMO
Zagreb are identified below.

     Training

3.   Assuming a deployment of 1,100 UNMOs, a training team will be
required.  Initial location of all training to be at Pleso,
Zagreb.  Should the new UNPROFOR headquarters location be more
suitable, this will be adopted.  The concept of training will be
as designed for the induction of the 120 UNMOs for Sarajevo for
the Pink Zones - a two-day package for most with additional
medical training for some (see paras. 6-12 below).

4.   The training task demands 10 experienced UNMO instructors.
After the initial deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs,
this can be reduced to five, the latter figure being sufficient to
train the expected turnover of established UNMOs in the mission
area.

     Administration

5.   The requirement will be for an additional seven individuals
to fulfil the administrative tasks.  They can be military or
civilian.  They will be required during and beyond the deployment
of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs to support the new
establishment of mission UNMOs.

				Medical support

6.   Refresher training for all UNMOs in first aid to be included
in the above programme.

7.   Additional training for one UNMO in each vehicle (one in
three), sufficient to sustain life for six hours, to be provided.
This to supplement unknown medical support within Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

8.   Provision of one enhanced first aid pack per vehicle.

9.   All above from existing British Medical Battalion resources.

10.  Resources necessary to establish adequate medical presence at
HQ UNMO BH are:

     1 Senior Medical Liaison Officer (SMEDLO)
     1 Nurse 3 Medics
     2 Drivers 2 Signallers

     1 (4 x 4) Jeep
     2 Ambulances

11.  Resources necessary to establish medical presence at each
patrol area:

     1 Driver
     2 Medics
     1 Ambulance

12.  Total requirement based on one HQ UNMO BH and seven patrol
areas is:

				 Interpreters

13.  The HQ UNMO BH will require three interpreters, and each
patrol and ECP two each.  A total of 200 interpreters will be
necessary.  Provision for their accommodation and subsistence will
be necessary.

			    Vehicles/communications

14.  Telecommunications connections required for voice and fax at
each patrol area and the HQ UNMO BH.

     1 Car (light) - Senior Military Observer 3 (4 x 4) Jeeps per
     patrol team
     2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per patrol area headquarters (one with winch)
     2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per equipment-collection point
     1 Computer
     1 Printer
     1 Fax
     1 Generator
     1 Base station of both VHF/HF
     1 Handie-Talkie per vehicle (5 spares at patrol headquarters)
     plus
	 veh charger assembly
     1 INMARSAT

15.  HQ UNMO BH will need to be equipped as per above plus the
following:

     2 Photocopiers 3 (4 x 4) Jeeps for UNMO headquarters
     (stand-by patrol)

16.  Total requirement for the above items based on 7 patrol
areas,
1 HQ UNMO BH, 62 ECPs, 24 patrol teams and an additional 17
patrols for Dubrovnik peninsular:

     8 Cars (light) 354 (4 x 4) Jeeps (8 with winch)
     8 Computers 8 Printers 8 Fax machines 8 Generators 8 Base
     stations of both VHF/HF
   407 Handie-Talkies (1 per veh; 5 spare at Patrol HQ)
     8 INMARSAT
     2 Photocopiers

17.  Each vehicle to be equipped to the following scale:

     (a)  Documentation

	  (i)  Vehicle trip tickets (appropriately completed and
	  authorized);

	 (ii)  Insurance card;

	(iii)  Vehicle document holder;

	 (iv)  Maintenance card.

     (b)  Equipment

	  (i)  1 VHF and HF vehicle-mounted set and antennae;

	 (ii)  United Nations flag and pole and light;

	(iii)  Fire extinguisher;

	 (iv)  2 Jerry cans (full) of appropriate fuel;

	  (v)  Battery jump leads;

	 (vi)  Jack/brace and vehicle tool kit;

	(vii)  Tow rope;

       (viii)  Coolant in water bottle (full);

	 (ix)  Set of snow chains;

	  (x)  First aid kit;

	 (xi)  Warning triangle;

	(xii)  Spare oil in suitable container;

       (xiii)  Internal map light;

	(xiv)  Cooker/lantern (same fuel);

	 (xv)  Tents, 3-man;

	(xvi)  Rations/water;

       (xvii)  Shovels/axes;

      (xviii)  Fragmentation blankets for each team member.

18.  Should weather conditions deteriorate during winter, and ECP
and patrol teams be dispersed and isolated, there should be a
requirement for over-snow vehicles.  Two such vehicles would be
necessary at each patrol area.

19.  There will be a requirement for fuel at HQ UNMO BH in the
initial stages, until local resources are identified.  This could
be a fuel pod vehicle with integral pump unit of up to
4,000-litres capacity.

20.  Air support.  There could be a requirement for air support
for the following:

     (a)  As per paragraph 19 above should over-snow vehicles not
     be available;

     (b)  MEDEVAC;

     (c)  Routine (limited) resupply in difficult areas;

     (d)  Establishing communications (repeater sites);

     (e)  Command and control;

     (f)  Air reconnaissance.

				  Appendix C

		Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina


		     (                                  )



     Note:  The Dubrovnik area is included in the Bosnia and
     Herzegovina task.
				  Appendix D


				  Appendix E

	      UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina



     Notes:

1.   The total number shown on the chart does not include the
additional enhancement of 35 UNMOs required in Sector Sarajevo.
This has been determined an operational necessity by Commander
Sector Sarajevo.  Therefore, the total UNMO requirement would be
1,097.

2.   The chart has been designed on a building block format based
on the following formula:

     (a)  Each site will have six UNMOs on it at any time
     because:

     (i)  The threat to security of UNMO lives dictates that a
     patrol team
	  consist of a minimum of two vehicles with at least two
	  crew in each;

    (ii)  There is a need for concurrent foot patrolling while
    manning
	  vehicle-mounted communication equipment.  Foot patrols
	  will not be able to communicate over long ranges and
	  hits can only be achieved from the vehicle;

     (b)  ECPs must be monitored 24 hours a day.  Teams must be
rotated in shifts of no more than 12 hours.  Therefore there is a
requirement for a second six-man team per site.  Note that living
conditions of the ECPs are likely to be very poor and UNMOs will
have to return to a base location regularly;

     (c)  Each patrol team consists of a minimum of three vehicles
with three UNMOs in each vehicle.  As the operational situation
improves and the details of the task and the terrain become
clearer, patrols will be able to consist of single vehicles with
two UNMOs;

     (d)  The above table includes 50 UNMOs for deployment to
Dubrovnik area to monitor the proposed demilitarization.

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