From: jmowen@mona.Gwinnett.COM (John M. Owen)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Is NASA doing what Feynman deplored again? -- Was: NASA Town Meeting
Date: 13 Nov 92 04:53:34 GMT
Article-I.D.: mona.ZFV6TB1w165w
Organization: Flat On My Back in Bed With Mona, Duluth, GA, USA

cecil@physics.unc.edu (Gerald Cecil) writes:

> In article 20255@access.usask.ca, choy@skorpio.usask.ca 
> >I was reading Feynman's account of his work investigating 
> >the Challenger and he was complaining about how NASA is so 
> >backward. Now the shuttles are flying again, what is 
> >NASA's situation?
> 
> Based on the 1st NASA Town Meeting in Rayleigh on Monday 
> that I attended, some in NASA are still denying reality.  
> The lone astronaut chairing the pane took issue with the 
> question I posed to Goldin regarding shuttle reliability.
> [...]
> [...] the astronaut stridently stated that (I paraphrase): 
> ``I want to clear up some misconceptions regarding the 
> Shuttle. The Shuttle is the most reliabl space vehicle 
> that's every flown.  We have a reliablity of .987, etc 
> etc etc.[..."]
> OK, so use his number, raised to the 45th power 
> (i.e. approx # of shuttle flight until SSF is assembled) 
> to get a 45% probability of losing an orbiter.  Feynman
> must be spinning in his grave. [...] 

The key summary of Feynman's report, IMHO,
was along the lines of:
 "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence
  over public relations, for Nature can not be fooled."
The decision-making process where P.R. goals and the desire 
to get along with management goals took precedence
over real-world limits is insidious. NASA needed to make 
sure it was eradicated (at least w/r/t go/no go decisions). 
After the SSME hydrogen leak episodes, I felt like NASA 
management had demonstrated the lesson as learned. 

But now I wonder if we see signs of a shift towards
the old insidious attitudes. Urgh. in AW&ST Oct 26 '92, 
pg. 15, _NewsBreaks_, _Columbia Begins Mission 52_ : 
 "the mission management team granted last-minute rule 
  waivers to permit the launch in wind conditions which 
  exceeded the normal limits and under conditions likely 
  to impose excess structural loads."
 "The weather waiver was granted despite reservations
  expressed by Jeff Bantle, mission flight director,
  who said he considered the weather ''no go," but that
  he would ''execute the launch.''
(pardon me if Mr. Spencer has already covered this) 
The article goes on to say that the weather waiver was
granted (regarding crosswinds on the KSC runway in event of
RTLS abort, I assume):
 "...after the [management?] team determined the average
  wind velocity value was less than the maximum permitted."
The loads prompting the load waiver were not reached 
during launch, but the gust limit (15 kt) was exceeded
(during the period an RTLS might have occurred, I assume).

I wonder who asked for the waivers? I suspect everything
was still within some tolerance which exceeds the normal
limits. On the other hand, is the flight director being
quoted in context? In any case, average wind velocity  
seems to be a slightly half-baked basis for a decision. 

Is there a followup to this story, esp. regarding Mr. 
Bantle's comments, and the relevance of the particular 
safety limits? Certainly the AW&ST article makes me 
feel a bit uneasy. It's not enough to make me believe 
the attitudes that led to the Challenger accident are
affecting shuttle operations again. 

-- jmowen@mona.Gwinnett.COM (John M. Owen) 
-- My .sig is bigger than yours - but I keep it offline.