HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Restrictions on Public Use of Crypto
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 20:11:00 GMT


Dorothy Denning asks us to consider the following question:

>Do we really want a society where electronic communications cannot
>ever be broken when there is good reason to believe some major threat
>against society is being planned?

I suppose that she asks it sincerely, as though it were relevant.  

Of course it is not.  For better or worse, we already live in such a 
world.  There is absolutely nothing in the proposals of the government
or Dr. Denning that will change that. 

The question is do those of good will surrender the right to private
communications in the name of a futile attempt to prevent those of ill
will from having them?  Even if it would work, I would answer no.  Given 
that it will not work, it is so silly that one wonders why it is raised
at all.  Is it any wonder that one is made suspicious of the intentions
of those that would make such proposals?  Even if the FBI were free from
their record of abuse, I would still be suspicious of their motives.

I suspect that Dr. Denning is misled by the goodwill of the people with
whom she works.  While I respect the integrity of the individual members 
of the FBI and NSA with whom I work, my experience tells me that it is 
not sufficient to protect me from the inertia and momentum of the 
institutions.  The direction of these is at least oblique to the 
intention of my friends that make them up.

I stand with Perry Metzger.  They can have my RSA key when they remove
it from my gold tooth (where I plan to put it as soon as the technology
permits.  In the meantime, they will play hell finding it (them)).

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
203 966 4769, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
From: masticol@cadenza.rutgers.edu (Steve Masticola)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Anagram generator
Keywords: huge berserk rebel warthog
Date: 12 Nov 92 00:44:45 GMT
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.

Has anyone out there run into, or put together, an anagram generator?
If so, I'd appreciate a line. Thanks!

- Steve (masticol@cs.rutgers.edu).
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns,alt.society.civil-liberty,alt.politics.usa.misc
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Followup-To: alt.society.civil-liberty,alt.politics.usa.misc
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 12:15:12 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.223405.12090@rchland.ibm.com>, lwloen@rchland (Larry Loen) writes:
>We have about doubled the prison population in this country in the
>last ten or so years.  Built a lot of prisons.  Spent billions.
>Emptied the mental hospitals to find money to do it (indirectly,
>but that's about what happened).

[ and it doesn't help any ]

That's probably at least partly because over 50 % (I don't remember -
70? 80?) of the people in prison are political prisoners.  Operation
Just Because, operation Prohibition, operation More Iron to the
Streets, operation War on Constitution, operation Use Terrorist
Tactics Against Evil Vitamin, Hemp and Mindfood Salesmen - whatever
they call the one where armed thugs kick down people's doors, steal
their property and kill them, then say "Sorry, wrong address".

Followups directed outside sci.crypt et al.

//Jyrki
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4753 comp.org.eff.talk:7014 alt.privacy:2249 talk.politics.guns:24106
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 14 Nov 1992 00:58:41 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: physics.ubc.ca

donb@igor.tamri.com (Don Baldwin) writes:

>In article <1duqtuINNor2@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
>writes:
>>Certainly when they framed the constution, they did not mean "free
>>speach" as "You can keep any secret you want to keep". It means that I
>>can in public say things and not be brought to court for saying them.

>Why not?  I can send any secret that I want through the physical mails.

Because of legislation, not because of the consititution, ( or perhaps
under the "unreasonable search" clause, but then unreasonable does not
mean never)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: slangley@constant.demon.co.uk (Simon Langley)
Subject: Re: Finally! We're getting somewhere.
Organization: Home
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 02:03:08 GMT

Bohdan Tashchuk (zeke@fasttech.com) wrote:
: 
: I'm sure a bunch of people will jump on this one. I'm posting rather than
: mailing, since the info should be of interest to everyone outside the U.S.A.
: 
: The written U.S. Constitution is the essence of what makes the U.S.A. a far
: safer democracy than the U.K., and by far the freest country in the world.
Mr Qualtrough may not know that we also have a right against self-incrimination
in England and so there really is not that much difference between the two
countries in this respect.

However, our constitution is, as you imply, not written, and for this reason,
the final say on our laws belongs to the elected representatives of the
people rather than a group of unelected Supreme Court judges.  Our system
has served us well for 350 years, how is the US system "safer"?

-- 
   Simon Langley                   (preferred)   slangley@constant.demon.co.uk
   Hampstead, London
   pgp 2.0 public key available                  slangley@cix.compulink.co.uk
From: ujacampbe@memstvx1.memst.edu (James Campbell)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 13 Nov 92 11:18:04 -0600
Organization: Memphis State University

In article <1992Nov13.094243.10343@cactus.org>, ritter@cactus.org
    (Terry Ritter) writes:

>  OK, you don't like the child molesting example.
>  So propose your own worst case.
>  The point here is to "stand in the other guy's shoes" and use the
>  arguments he could use to influence policy.  The issue is not this
>  particular case, but rather how to confront and defeat such an
>  argument when and if proposed.  Is an equally serious public interest
>  served by having cryptography be absolutely unregulated?  Can you
>  make that case to an ordinary individual or legislator?  If not, we
>  risk getting a law we don't want.

>  Terry Ritter  ritter@cactus.org

    How about this for a worst case scenario:  An organization created
for the good of the people, finding itself with very few controls on
its power and the legality of its activities, proceeds to expand its
original mission to include interception and analysis of practically
_all_ electronic communications within the borders of its own country.
Having something very close to the mythical "unlimited computational
and monetary resources," it renders practically all encryption used by
ordinary citizens useless, and invades privacy at will for whatever
purposes it finds expedient.  Given knowledge of such an organization,
perhaps a group of "inanely contrite Cayugas" or some "cagey acolytes
in a tin urn," why should I avoid the use of good encryption in order
to lessen their computational overhead?
    Here's a way I might express it to a non-cryppie:  Suppose there's
a law enforcement organization that has no jurisdiction in your state,
and yet, for "patriotic reasons," finds it highly useful to break into
your home and your neighbors' homes while you're out, photocopy all
your personal papers, and get out without leaving a trace.  They have
a wonderful skeleton-key device that works on all locks in general use.
    K-mart later runs a sale on cylinder-keyed deadbolt locks, which 
are a bit too hard for the skeleton-key to efficiently break.  Should
we now outlaw locks for civilian use on the pretense that they can hide
illegal activity, so the law enforcement organization can continue its
own illegal activity unimpeded?
    This is not to be construed as an indictment of the organization
which I anagramatically referred to, since everyone knows that they
aren't doing domestic surveillance anymore. ;-)  But, just in case...


+----------------------------+--------------------------------+
|      James A Campbell      |  ujacampbe@memstvx1.memst.edu  |
|  Math Sciences Department  |  PGP 2.0 Public Key Available  |
|  Memphis State University  |  (Not that I use it, myself!)  |
+----------------------------+--------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 92 15:42:31 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: world
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <1992Nov10.090133.1707@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> 
denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes: 
        ....
> Whatever regulation, if any, might be considered, it would seem that
> it would have to be aimed mostly at crypto products, not use.

        Good. Regulation of cryptographic products would probably suit
        everybody. The government would appear to be "doing something"
        and people who wanted secure communications could have it by
        using non-product cryptography. Of course, the government
        might make roll-your-own cryptography illegal. This would
        justify truly outrageous measures to enforce the law ("Gimme
        that notebook kid. - What are all these numbers, eh?.. eh?).
        Whoever gets this one through should be nominated for the
        Harry J. Anslinger Award.

        How about the distinction of being the first person to go to
        jail for selling secret encoder rings to school kids?

        It's hard to roll up a diskette to hide it in the shower rod,
        but I guess we'd work something out... :-)

        Cheers,
                Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Consulting Systems Analyst  |  The PC: Colt '45
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  of the information
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |   frontier
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: watt-alan@net.yale.edu (Alan Watt)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Originator: swatt@mickey.CS.Yale.Edu
Organization: Yale University, Computing & Information Systems
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 13:48:22 GMT


In article <1992Nov5.214347.27535@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
|> 
|> Karl Denninger asserts that registration is a prelude to confiscation.
|> 
|> In most of the world cars have been registered for many years, yet no
|> democratic government has used that as a way to confiscate cars
|> (except for those used in law violations).
|> 
|> -- 
|> David Sternlight
|> (pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)

True.  But no government where cars are registered has (yet) promoted
a policy to restrict or ban private automobile ownership.  When one
does, you can bet the registration lists will be used to aid enforcement.

Further, *every* government I know that registers cars taxes them.
Any guess what the registration information is used for?

Should the governement decide at some future time they wish to
ban, restrict, or tax use of public key encryption technology,
you can safely bet every dollar in your name that existing
registration lists will be forwarded directly to the office
responsible for enforcing the ban, restrictions, or taxes.
-- 
  Alan S. Watt
  Yale University			Computing and Information Systems
  Box 2112 Yale Station			(203) 432-6602
  New Haven, CT  06520-2112		Watt-Alan@Yale.Edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: pseudo one time pad...
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 02:12:58 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <1992Nov11.193848.10946@rchland.ibm.com>, lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen) writes:
> I don't know exactly who has done what,
> but I am sure something like that is out there.  I recall, also, the 
> ANSI standard shows one possible way of doing something along this line.

Yup, it's output feedback mode.  You generate the pseudo-random key
as follows:

	C[0] = DES(K, IV)
	C[n+1] = DES(K, C[n])

where K is the 56-bit DES key and IV is a 64-bit initial vector.

The different modes of DES have different properties.  I suggest
reading Davies and Price's ``Security for Computer Networks'' for
an excellent discussion of the topic.
From: alain@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca (W.A.Simon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: talk.politics.misc (was: Freedoms in the USA)
Date: 08 Nov 92 11:33:33 EST

In <4071@bcstec.ca.boeing.com>
kuryakin@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Rick Pavek)
is going off the charter of this group:

> I am struck by the government's gradual process of eroding our 
> freedoms.
> [ ... ]

  I posted my reply in talk.politics.misc: <14086@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca>


--
 Alain
 [ ... usual disclaimer... ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Distribution: na
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:54:52 GMT


 In <1992Nov12.074058.5695@vort.cuc.ab.ca> mike@vort.cuc.ab.ca
 (Mike Nemeth) writes:


>I have noticed this fascination, nay obsession, that the just-say-no-to-
>crypto side has with child pornography. The FBI and suppporters of various
>crypto-restricting bills use every opportunity to tell the public that
>this menace is growing beyond all leaps and bounds, and without the most

 OK, choose your own worst case.  The point here is to be able to
 confront the worst arguments the other side can muster, and so
 legitimately influence legislation.  Blustering won't do it.


>I say that your argument is specious, and attempts to paint ordinary
>citizens who wish to keep their communications private as potential
>child molesters. I also say that the district attorney that would put
>forth such an argument in front of a jury would be cautioned, if not

 If you wish to wait until *after* some of us are arrested and put
 lots lawyer's kids through school to hope for the courts to throw
 out a law restricting cryptography, be my guest.  Frankly, I think
 it more appropriate to understand what a reasonable position would
 be, and push that, in opposition to more radical proposals for
 extensive regulation or simply shouting "Just say NO."


>What i have just described has already
>happened in your country, just replace the word "crypto" with the word
>"drugs". Did the "war on drugs" work? Again i say, hardly. What supporters
>of the "war on crypto" propose will be even worse, an abrogation of your
>civil rights to the point of extinction. You'll be as "safe" from childporn
>as the WOD made you "safe" from drugs.

 Again, blustering won't do it.  What we need are cogent arguments
 which recognize any legitimate concerns society may have about
 the unregulated widespread use of this new technology.

 It appears to me that society may indeed have some legitimate
 concerns which are rooted in common law and The Constitution.
 If we can successfully argue that individual freedoms are more
 important, perhaps we can avoid regulation.  But first we must
 understand those concerns, see how real they are, and how the
 usual voter and legislator are likely to view the situation.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4751 alt.privacy:2247 comp.org.eff.talk:7012
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
Date: 13 Nov 92 19:46:12 GMT
Distribution: inet
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1992Nov12.172726.1727@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
> [...]   There is also a price
>to be paid for LE losing the ability to wiretap that I don't think is
>well understood.


Before the invention of electrical communication, people ensured their
privacy of conversation by looking for people within earshot.

Now, however, people have the illusion of privacy. [Imagine someone
whispering into a cellular phone.]

That privacy is returning to reality, gradually.

This means that law enforcement (LE) and crooks alike have had a brief
period (150 yers?) of easy access to what was intended to be private
conversations -- such that the tapper had little likelihood of being
discovered.

When this brief period finally comes to an end, LE will have to go back to
doing what it did before.

What was that -- or was it so long ago that people have forgotten?

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: New Administration and Crypto Regulation
Organization: Yale CS Mail/News Gateway
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 23:43:00 GMT


>I predict that unless a key registration law is "sneaked in" there's
>going to be a bitter public battle over this issue during the current
>Clinton administration. Hone your arguments and your
>intervention/lobbying/testimony techniques now, whatever side of this
>you're on.

You had better be vigilant, diligent, and skilled.  My sources tell me
that the bureaucracy is determined to win this one.  They believe that
the issue is bigger than any administration, but they expect both the
Clinton administration and the new congress to be sympathetic.

Notice that Dr. Denning has far the easier case to argue.  All she has
to do is keeping pointing out that she is on the side of "LE."
Nevermind that that is irrelevant.  Nevermind that her proposals will
not help LE.  She is on the right side, the side of the angels.  Her
arguments are both politically correct and on the side of the death
penalty.  How can she loose?  Who cares?  A bunch of gun nuts and other
libertarian flakes?  Who can even understand?  Nevermind that there is
no problem, DDD has a solution.  The solution is both politically and
technically correct.  It favors BOTH law enforcement and
national security.  It is favored by the DoJ, the DoD, the NSA and the
FBI.  What else does any congressman have to know?

Perhaps I underestimate the American people; even my sixteen year old
Goddaughter saw the mischief in this proposal without anyone pointing it
out to her.  But one relies upon an uninstructed congress at one's peril.

When we succeeded in getting the language taken out of Senate 266, we
thought that we had seen the last of it.  It has since shown up in at
least three bills.  It will continue to be proposed over and over; it
will not die.  The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
203 966 4769, WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4654 comp.org.eff.talk:6958 alt.privacy:2207 talk.politics.guns:24024
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Attack Methods
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: 11 Nov 92 20:13:33

   So what are some of the methods used to attack an encrypted text, when the
   encryption method is unknown?

One method used in WW2 was to send divers to recover encoding equipment,
codebooks, etc. from sunken enemy ships (perhaps sometimes ships
that were attacked specifically for the purpose of getting the
crypto stuff).  Another method is to capture the sender or receiver
of the messages and demand the encryption keys etc. at gunpoint.

There are also cryptanalytic methods, but I mention the WW2 story to
underscore the fact that sci.crypt readers responding to "challenges"
are fortunately NOT likely to use ALL of the methods that a real world
codebreaker would use.  Any purely cryptanalytic challenge to
sci.crypt, in order to be fair, must provide as much info as an enemy
spy agency would be able to obtain by hook or by crook---this includes
a complete description of the algorithm, plus some known plaintext of
the same nature as the challenge messages.

Basically, you do whatever you can.  For both cryptanalytic and "war
stories" answers to your question, see "The Codebreakers" by David
Kahn.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: andy@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (Andy Freeman)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Followup-To: talk.politics.guns
Organization: Computer Science Department,  Stanford University.
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 23:48:53 GMT

In article <1992Nov12.070004.1556@netcom.com> gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
>amirza@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Anmar Caves) writes:
>It might be that the U.S. is already too screwed up with weird
>judeo-Xian guilt/hate for a ban on handguns to result in anything but
>pandemonium. See? I'm a reasonable guy. I'm willing to fall back
>to the position: "In any *reasonable* society, this would work..."
>Like, perhaps, the majority of other western societies.

Try again.  By that definition of "reasonable", there are no
reasonable society because the proposed measures haven't
provided those benefits....

>>History has also proven
>>that the first steps in oppressing a populace is to disarm them.
>
>Oh, that's alarmist talk. There are plenty of other countries
>with a ban on handguns of which one wouldn't say the population
>is being oppressed. There are plenty of countries of which you
>*would* say it. But you certainly can't claim any causal
>relation.

That's not the relevant measure.  The hypothesis is tested by
the existence of an oppressed country where the populace was
NOT disarmed.

The question isn't whether gun-banning necessarily leads to
oppression, but whether oppression can happen absent gun-banning.

>>...and it would not achieve the desired effect. Even then so,
>>about 5% of adults will carry a gun no matter if it's legal or not.
>
>Remember, we're talking about kids finding Daddy's gun, here.

Talk about it all you want, but it still isn't a significant problem.

>5% sounds to me like a lot less than the present percentage,

Which demonstrates that Gontier doesn't know much about the
present percentage.  Moreover, it demonstrates that he doesn't
understand how many criminals there are.  If 5% of the population
carries, at least 80% of the people carrying aren't criminals.

Carry restrictions don't stop criminals.  Since no social benefit
comes from prohibiting carry by "the rest of us"....

>the terms to which I'm so valiantly trying to limit the discussion,
>that's a Good Thing.

Why should we limit our discussions to Gontier's delusions and exclude
reality?

-andy
--
UUCP:    {arpa gateways, sun, decwrl, uunet, rutgers}!cs.stanford.edu!andy
ARPA:    andy@cs.stanford.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns