From: ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Meaning and Sentence (Was: Premises of "objectivism?")
Date: 25 Jan 1993 00:53:49 GMT
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
NNTP-Posting-Host: unixg.ubc.ca

In article <1993Jan21.200916.26386@ulrik.uio.no> 
solan@smaug.uio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) wrote:
|The sentence is not meaningless because it is paradoxical, but because
|it is not constructive, i.e. built from elements already possessing
|meaning. Paradoxical sentences just happen to be non-constructive, and
|therefore meaningless. It is because they are meaningless that they
|can appear to be paradoxical.

My problem here in the lack of a sufficient explanation of
"constructivity". I made a guess, based on your explanations, as to
what kind of "construction" you might have in mind. It was not, of
course, the only possible guess, but it is strongly implied by the
context of your remarks about Torkel Franzen's example sentences.
Perhaps my mistake was to proceed further without waiting for an
explanation of the use of the term.

In article <1jng38INNh0v@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>, I wrote:
| Consider, for example,
| 
|  (*) If X and Y are true sentences, then (X and Y) is a true sentence.

In article <1993Jan22.102812.16649@ulrik.uio.no> 
solan@smaug.uio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
|I am not speaking of building new sentences from old sentences, and
|just that. I am speaking of the elements, i.e. the concepts and
|symbols, that they must have meaning _before_ the sentence can be
|said to have meaning.

This still strikes me as vague. In the above example (*), is it
necessary for each referent sentence (X and Y) to have meaning, for
all true sentences X and Y, *before* (in whatever sense of "before"
you have in mind) we can treat (*) as meaningful? If so, then it would
seem to follow that (*) never can have meaning, which is surely
absurd. That additional elements might also have to have meaning in
order for the sentence to have meaning does not help matters if you
are already assuming requirements which imply (*) is meaningless.

If we do not assume the requirement that the sentences of which a
sentence refers to the truth or falsity must have meaning first, then
your explanation of why the paradoxical sentences are not meaningful
is rather incomplete. What ingredient of those sentences fails to have
meaning?

I wrote:
|If reference to the truth of a sentence makes that other sentence
|being referred to part of the "construction" of the sentence, then it
|is hard to see how we can affirm a claim like (*); it can only be
|"constructed" after all true sentences have been constructed. So a

I am making here my guess as to what you may mean by "construction",
as well as the notion of "priority" in construction. Note also the
initial "If"-- the discussion which followed was conditional.

Svein Olav G. Nyberg:
|This is not Objectivist concept theory.

Of course. I am trying to unravel your notion of "construction", not
present someone else's theory of concepts.

| Using O concept theory,
|which does NOT state that a concept are all its referents, the
|dilemma is solvable. The dilemma has risen here because you want
|a concept to equal all its referents, _and_just_that_. I am here
|assuming at least SOME familiarity with Objectivist concept theory,
|as this after all is a newsgroup devoted to the discussion of
|Objectivism.

No, I do not "want" a concept to equal all of its referents. More to
the point, I don't assume or believe it either, let alone that a
concept is _nothing_more_than_ its referents.

I realize that this issue is treated as though it were a key point in
Rand's discussion of concepts, but this does not mean that a rejection
of it plays a significant role in anyone else's thinking. Part of Ayn
Rand's policy for handling other systems of thought was to categorize
errors according to the fundamental mistaken premise. Unluckily you
have misidentified my premise in this case.

I wrote:
| simple-minded implementation of the idea, that the problem with
| paradoxical sentences lies in the impossibility of building them up
| from the sentences to which they refer, cuts much too deeply into our
| ability to discuss truth and logic in general. Your claim
| 
|    "Paradoxical sentences just happen to be non-constructive, and
|    therefore meaningless."
| 
| is an example of the kind of assertion which can easily fall into the
| "not constructive" category in such a scheme.

If you had something less simple-minded in mind, then certainly feel
free to describe it.

Svein Olav G. Nyberg:
|My sentence referred to is a recognition of an abstract fact, and
|when you claim it falls for "self-reference", you are making the
|same mistake as when someone claims that the concept "concept" falls
|because of "self-reference".

I do not claim that it fails due to "self-reference". My claim is that
it fails a certain criterion, and it shows that this criterion cannot
be a necessary criterion for meaningfulness. Meaningful sentences do
not form *this* kind of order of construction, and you haven't
exhibited how the paradoxical sentences fail any other kind.

|I won't throw books at you, but the one book that IS fundamental to
|understanding Objectivism is Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist
|Epistemology", and I think you ought to read that before commenting
|on what you BELIEVE are the problems with Objectivism.

My copy of ItOE is in storage in the U.S., the U.B.C. library doesn't
have a copy, and the nearest bookstore didn't have any of Ayn Rand's
books at all. What I remember of ItOE does not make your explanation
of the paradoxes any clearer.

My criticism here is not directed at objectivism so much as at the way
it is being presented. As I recall, someone claimed that the problems
which mathematicians have had with paradoxes would have been avoided
had we been applying objectivist philosophical principles, the law of
identity in particular. Now, is it not fair to say that this claim has
yet to be substantiated?

>|> The point is that the paradoxes pose a non-trivial obstacle for a
>|> person who wants to produce a comprehensive account of language and
>|> meaning. I know of no easy solution, and doubt one is known. I think
>|> we've established now at least that a simple application of the law of
>|> identity does not suffice.
>
>"Construction" can hardly be called "a simple application of the LoI".

Indeed, a simple or straightforward application of neither the law of
identity nor the concept of "construction" suffice to clear away the
obstacle.

Keith Ramsay            "Being a computer means not having 
ramsay@math.ubc.ca       to say you're sorry."
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism