HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: RSA claims 33 and 37 of U.S. patent 4,405,829
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 19:21:21 GMT

The patent contains as claim 33:

	In a communication system an encoding means for transforming a
	transmit message word signal M to a ciphertext word signal C
	where M corresponds to a number representative of a message and

		0 <= M <= n-1

	where n is a composite number and where C corresponds to a number
	representative of an enciphered form of said message and corresponds
	to

		C = a[e]*M^e + a[e-1]*M^(e-1) + ... a[0](mod n)

	where e and a[e], a[e-1], ... a[0] are numbers.

Claim 37 is nearly identical except that cryptographic use is specifically
claimed.

Thus it appears that any cryptographic method using a polynomial modulo
a composite infringes.  I am seeking opinions, particularly from any
legal experts that may read this as to whether this claim which essentially
claims the use of a single mathematical formula is defensable?

Further I would like to know if anyone is aware of any prior art (filing
was Dec. 14, 1977) using a polynomial as simple as C = M^2(mod n) even that 
would invalidate this claim.

Thanks,

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

                ____________________________________________
               \                                           /
                \ Flames to /dev/null    Advice by email! /
                 \                                       /
                  \ PGP public key available on request /
                   \                                   /
                    -----------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern))
Subject: Re: What public key is REALLY good for
Organization: University of Kaiserslautern, Germany
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 12:17:08 GMT

ygoland@edison.seas.ucla.edu (The Jester) writes:

>[Lots of stuff with which I basically agree]

However, you also write,

>The most important aspect of key verification is the trust factor,
>person A trusts Person B who trusts &  verifys person C's key. Thus person A
>is supposed to accept C's key with B's validation. This chain can be
>extended infinitely.

It *can*, but only if you (A) allow introducers (B) to introduce
introducers (C).  PGP has a parameter in its config.txt file that
allows you to tell PGP how deep the certification process may become
(it's called CERT_DEPTH I think, and its default is set to 4).

Furthermore, there is a difference between the *validity* of a key and
the *trust* you put in its owner.  You may believe that a certain key
is from Billy, but wouldn't trust Billy to sign any other keys
competently.  On the other hand (this is far-fetched), you might trust
somebody's ability at key management but might believe that his key
has been exposed or otherwise cracked.

Have fun.

-- 
Stephan <neuhaus@informatik.uni-kl.de>
sig closed for inventory.  Please leave your pickaxe outside.
PGP 2.0 public key available on request.
From: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Using genetic engineering for exhaustive DES key search
Date: 6 Oct 92 10:11:03
Organization: /accounts/hughes/.organization
Distribution: na
NNTP-Posting-Host: soda.berkeley.edu
In-reply-to: lou@Cadence.COM's message of 1 Oct 92 05:59:12 GMT


Re: engineering a bacterium to search for DES keys.

Basically the same idea (with a different implementation) is found in
a recent CACM article about a technique called the Chinese Lottery.

The implementation there is to manufacture a device which randomly
tries DES keys on a stored plaintext/ciphertext pair and then
manufacture these into television sets, achieving parallelism on the
order of millions.  When the internal chip finds a match, it tells you
you've won the lottery!  Call 1-800-GET-CASH with the following number
[...] to collect your $1000 prize.


Eric
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Public Key program
From: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Date: 30 Sep 92 18:50:00 GMT
Reply-To: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Distribution: world
Organization: The GrapeVine BBS *** N. Little Rock, AR *** (501) 753-8121


  I am trying to get a copy  of the public key program that is currently
  be discussed. We  do not have FTP capablities  here.. Someone posted a
  mail-server where it  could be requested from.. but,  I never received
  it from there.  Is there somewhere where I can  direct dial to receive
  it?

*****************************************************************
*  Jim Wenzel,    SysOp,    The GrapeVine BBS,   (501) 753-8121 *
*  RIME,  Use-Net,  ForthNet,  SmartNet,  MetroLink,  Intelec , *
*  RecoverNet, ThrobNet and MediaNet message echos.  Large IBM, *
*  Amiga, Adult and  Programming file areas.  4.2 gigs on-line. *
*****************************************************************
---
 * SM 1.06 A0059 * friends come and go, enemies accumulate.
                                                                                      
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1992 07:54:56 GMT


 In <BvE5yD.14L@exnet.co.uk> s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands) writes:

>Terry seems to me to be saying,"It's a good system but
>there are weaknesses.  What are you going to use it for?"

 Not quite, actually.  I was *trying* to say: "It's a good system,
 and should have almost *no* weaknesses, PROVIDED that it is *used
 correctly*.  I was attempting to describe incorrect usage, and
 show *why* that usage really was incorrect.

 I guess I would like to see public-key documentation put more
 emphasis on user responsibilities.  It seems unlikely that *any*
 system can deliver true secrecy *by itself*; each user is
 necessarily responsible for operating the system in ways which
 will secure the secrecy that the system can deliver.

 Individuals in the US (and probably most of the "free world") have
 very little experience with information security.  One of clippings
 in my files is a column from Insight for Dec. 10, 1990 (p. 28),
 during the buildup in the Saudi desert.  It seems that Iraqi
 radiomen picked up names of US servicemen, and then got Marine
 patrols "to bite on a phony message."  Obviously, proper military
 equipment, training, and execution could have prevented this (and
 probably quickly did).  But normal people in our society simply
 do not expect such attacks, and don't operate in ways to minimize
 those possibilities.  Until people understand the possible problems,
 they are vulnerable, *even if* they have a good cryptosystem.

 (Indeed, I would argue that the lack of understanding of information
 security by the general populace--some of whom must inevitably get
 into critical situations--constitutes a national security problem
 much larger than any use of cryptography by criminals.)


>In the PGP Phil Z compares encrypted e-mail to the envelope we use
>for letters.  Well, you can steam letters open; put medicinal alcohol
>on them and make them transparent; poke in a split stick, wind the
>letter round it, remove the letter read it and put it back.  Should
>we give up using envelopes?

 We should absolutely give up sending *serious* secrets in
 envelopes :-).

 But I guess you mean that the cryptosystem can be less than secure
 if we only use it for small secrets.  I never know how to respond
 to this:  We have to set up a secure link *before* we use it.  Can
 we know the extent of the secrecy we will need in the future?  Can
 we afford to squander secrecy up front simply because we are lazy
 and would prefer not to validate public keys?  I wouldn't think so,
 but I'm certainly willing to listen.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: lewis@aera8700.mitre.org (Keith Lewis)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.0 and USENET
Organization: The MITRE Corporation
    <1992Sep23.182529.21715@cactus.org> <Bv9BDL.2sr@sneaky.lonestar.org>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 13:13:09 GMT

In article <Bv9BDL.2sr@sneaky.lonestar.org>, gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt) writes:
>> It seems to me that there are only two really different schemes
>> on the list:  Telephone Verification, and all the rest.  What the
>
>Telephone verification doesn't work too well for *SOMEONE YOU MET
>ON USENET*.  

It can if you use a little common sense.  Carry on a conversation with the
person.  If you met on alt.beer, talk about beer until you're convinced it's
the same person.  This does not eliminate spoofing completely -- the
CIA/whatever could assign a beer expert to the fake phone number; but it
makes it a lot more difficult.

Keith Lewis             klewis@mitre.org          "Mr. Cheap"
I don't dance to music; music dances to me.  Email me for my PGP key.
The above may not (yet) represent the opinions of my employer.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3531 alt.security:4496 alt.security.pgp:53
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Date: 29 Sep 92 00:06:13 GMT
Organization: IR

In article <1992Sep27.202153.11858@colnet.cmhnet.org> res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes:
> You are correct in that the "pseudo-primes" used in such systems have not
> been proven to be true primes by an exhaustive, theroretically 100% accurate,
> analysis.  Any known algorithm that would accomplish this would require so
> much computer time as to make it infeasible to run.

No.

For theoretical purposes, there exists an algorithm which tests p for
primality in time log^5 p. If the algorithm says ``it's prime'' for a
non-prime, then the generalized Riemann hypothesis is false.

Actually that algorithm isn't too slow in practice, but for practical
purposes what you really want to use is Morain's ECPP. ECPP gives you
a _proof_ that your number is prime, no assumptions necessary. Theory
doesn't guarantee that ECPP is polynomial-time, but that doesn't stop
it from being very, very fast.

---Dan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning)
Subject: Re: Pseudo-one-time pads
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 1992 22:17:33 GMT

There are two issues here: 1) The academic consideration of RNGs with
"truely" random distributions and 2) The consideration of being able to
predict the random number series.

All of the academic consideration of RNGs I have seen focus on 1). 2) is
necessary for using them in an encryption system. I have made my RNGs
pretty unpredictable by running 32 different Additive Congruential Method
RNGs, and only selecting one bit of each for each 32-bit number. I do so
by randomly (another RNG) selecting the particular bit from each. Of course,
this is computationally extremely expensive.

I believe that the OTP using itis pretty safe. However, safety can be improved
by compressing the oriignal file and then distributing it randomly through
a random number file.

The compression removes redundancy in the signal. The distributing it randomly
through a random number file hides the signal in noise, similar to spread
spectrum transmission.

However, none of this works if the opposition can predict the random number
series.

-- 
Lew Glendenning		rlglende@netcom.com
"Perspective is worth 80 IQ points."	Nils Bohr (or somebody like that).
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: erc@unislc.uucp (Ed Carp)
Subject: Re: Proposed noise-based encryption method
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Organization: Unisys Corporation SLC
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 21:08:53 GMT

Greg - Byrd (gregb@cup.portal.com) wrote:

: What you have described is the classic "one time pad".  With advances
: in mass storage techniques this is becoming progressively more attractive.
: I recall a description in some novel (I think Clancy's "Patriot Games") of
: a secure military manpack radio into which one inserts a card containing
: a one-time pad.  Without a matching pad all you hear is white noise.
: In the book a Bad Guy throws away the disk with the pad, leaving the
: Good Guys in the jungles of Columbia listening to white noise...

Uh, I think you're referring to "Clear and Present Danger", another of Tom's
*excellent* novels.  If you have the time, his latest, "The Sum of All Feaers"
is IMHO his best so far.

-- just another Tom Clancy fan!
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG     erc@apple.com                801/538-0177
"This is the final task I will ever give you, and it  goes  on  forever.   Act
happy, feel happy, be happy, without a reason in the world. Then you can love,
and do what you will."           -- Dan Millman, "Way Of The Peaceful Warrior"
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Distribution: usa
Date: 2 Oct 92 17:03:09

In article <1992Oct1.191326.2121@fasttech.uucp> zeke@fasttech.uucp (Bohdan Tashchuk) writes:

   >   - The calculator goes on the market and becomes popular, so
   >     the spy can carry one without drawing suspicion.  The special
   >     key sequence is made long enough and weird enough that no one
   >     will ever enter it by accident.

   This is a neat idea. If the calculator breaks, the spy goes to the
   nearest office supply store and buys another. I haven't read about
   anything like this in the literature. It wasn't possible much more
   than 20 years ago, since computers (calculators) weren't consumer
   items.

He doesn't have to wait for it to break.  He enters the enemy country
without carrying the calculator through customs, and buys one after
he gets there.  If he thinks he might get searched soon, he throws
the calculator away and buys another one when he has some traffic
to encrypt.

   How do you know TI or HP or Casio haven't already done it?  :-)

How do *you* know that I don't know if they've done it?  :-)

   Thanks for contributing some new material to this group, rather
   than rehashing the current discussions about what precautions
   rabidly paranoid people should take to prevent Big Brother from
   spoofing ALL their communication with everyone on every possible
   subject in real time.

But spies might have to worry about Big B. reprogramming the calculators
in the local office supply store... :-)
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3567 alt.security:4513 alt.security.pgp:64
From: gtoal@ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Date: 30 Sep 92 02:02:11 GMT
Organization: The IBM PC User Group, UK.

In article <1992Sep29.124453.19221@linus.mitre.org> lewis@aera8700.mitre.org (Keith Lewis) writes:
>     Encryption Algorithm).  So far, IDEA has resisted attack much better
>     than other ciphers such as FEAL, REDOC-II, LOKI, Snefru and Khafre. 

The implication of the above is that someone has beaten the snefru hashing/
signature function.  Is this the case?  Who collected the prize - there
was a K$ on it wasn't there?

G
-- 
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3489 alt.security:4468 alt.security.pgp:28
From: gtoal@ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Date: 26 Sep 92 22:27:04 GMT
Organization: The IBM PC User Group, UK.

In article <Bv6Izu.Aoq@newcastle.ac.uk> Graham.Shaw@newcastle.ac.uk (G.D.Shaw) writes:
>Factor this, and the resulting primes can be trivially combined together
>to yield the private key.  Once you know the private key, you can decrypt
>the message in the normal way.

May I ask an ignorant newbie question please?  It was my understanding that
the two primes used in most of these public key systems weren't real primes
at all, but were usually pseudo-primes that had been picked at random and
tested with statistical methods to give a high *probability* of being prime.

If that is the case, factoring a 500-bit product into two 250-bit primes may
well reduce to factoring it into 2 125-bit primes and a 250-bit prime, which
might well be *much* easier.

Am i mistaken?

Graham
PS I assume there's no point in buying a list of second-hand known prime
numbers because *anyone* could acquire the same list which would of
course be much smaller than the space of pseudo-primes.
-- 
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 30 Sep 92 12:42:12 GMT
Organization: ExNet Systems Ltd Public Access News, London, UK

In article <920929152106_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM> 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM (Hal) writes:
>I think people are coming down too hard on Terry Ritter, who
>is just trying to alert people to problems with using public
>keys without validation.  He is getting all these sarcastic
>comments just because people don't like to hear the things he
>is saying.

I'll agree with that. Terry seems to me to be saying,"It's a good system but
there are weaknesses.  What are you going to use it for?"

In the PGP Phil Z compares encrypted e-mail to the envelope we use for letters.
Well, you can steam letters open; put medicinal alcohol on them and make them
transparent; poke in a split stick, wind the letter round it, remove the letter
read it and put it back.  Should we give up using envelopes?

(I hope I didn't tell you something you didn't already know there)

Richard
[NULL signature]
From: gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Public Key for the Rest Of Us
Date: 26 Sep 92 23:27:02 GMT
Organization: Gordon Burditt

>Sorry. Patent for this one is pending. I have written a program that simulates
>the friction of two sticks together and a temperature result. This prgram is
>used to drive one stick turning inside a small hole of another one (so there
>is hardware involved) to the point there is a fire. I am expecting royalties
>from every use of fire in a couple of months.

Sir:  You are hereby notified that a Patent Secrecy Order has been
placed on your invention of fire.  You are not to discuss this 
invention with anyone.  Any further use of fire by you or anyone
else will result in prosecution.  Conviction may result in the
testing of a new invention, "burning at the stake", but you may
not discuss that, either.

It is further ordered that sticks and stones are now export-controlled
munitions.  You may export them, to certain countries only, provided
you have obtained an export license for each individual stick and stone.

	Gordon "I'm the Government and You're Not, So There" Burditt
	Department of Nuisance Regulations
	Untied States Patent Office


					Gordon L. Burditt
					sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQCNAiq3d7sAAAEEAMt1BATZFylyyFebt7i61Znl3UG6czff9X+IwIAiSnF9DNgZ
Vpag1Ez13Ey2xqP/CWT33YYg8AhUYL6FPPj56kHh0c2ZynVnCVx3US9OiFJ9uHxw
7JRiDWkBuXLx2UKDxkvuN9KWqk5Yw5MqWbhGRtWqB8vI4Os9UHayoOeLg4idAAUR
tC5Hb3Jkb24gTC4gQnVyZGl0dCA8Z29yZG9uQHNuZWFreS5sb25lc3Rhci5vcmc+
=oEJL
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 corrupt ??
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date: 29 Sep 92 09:16:40 GMT

billmcc@seanews.akita.com (Bill McCormick) writes:

> Here are the MD5 hash values for the PGP 2.0 distribution.

>     pgp20.zip:     BD 66 4E 83 A1 BC 56 AA 50 32 D6 21 6D 76 3A 01
>     pgp20src.zip:  0A 5D C0 E1 2C D4 3E 13 74 BB 70 A1 24 BA 98 02

Nah, no good. If somebody modifies the archive comments, this will
change the zip archive as a whole, and therefore its message digest.
What we need is a MD on each file in the archive, a list of the files,
and an MD of that list. And all this - issued by some of the
developpers of PGP.

The best solution would be, if Phil Zimmerman signs the above MDs with
his PGP 2.0 private key and re-publishes his PGP 2.0 public key,
signed with his PGP 1.0 private key.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.0 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: billmcc@seanews.akita.com (Bill McCormick)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 corrupt ??
Organization: SEANEWS - Seattle Public Access News & Mail
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 1992 02:29:04 GMT

In article <1992Sep26.161200.2243@eskimo.celestial.com> kurt@eskimo.celestial.com (Kurt Cockrum) writes:
>It would be nice if the signatures for these were well known.
>For example, each part of a distribution could have associated with it
>a hunk of data consisting of signatures from the various checksumming
>programs, say md4, md5, snefru, brik, etc.

Here are the MD5 hash values for the PGP 2.0 distribution.

    pgp20.zip:     BD 66 4E 83 A1 BC 56 AA 50 32 D6 21 6D 76 3A 01
    pgp20src.zip:  0A 5D C0 E1 2C D4 3E 13 74 BB 70 A1 24 BA 98 02

These were created by the simple-minded program which follows.

BEGIN ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE =====
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#include "md5.h"

void
findhash( FILE *fp )
{
	MD5_CTX		ctx;
	char		buffer[ BUFSIZ ];
	size_t		count;
	int		i;

	MD5Init( &ctx );
	while ( (count=fread(buffer,1,sizeof(buffer),fp)) > 0 )
		MD5Update( &ctx, buffer, count );
	MD5Final( &ctx );

	for ( i=0; i<sizeof(ctx.digest); i++ )
	{
		printf( "%02x%c",
		        (unsigned int) ctx.digest[i],
			i == (sizeof(ctx.digest)-1) ? '\n' : ' ' );
	}
}




int
main( int argc, char **argv )
{
	int	i;

	if ( argc <= 1 )
	{
		fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s filename\n", argv[0] );
		exit( 1 );
	}

	for ( i=1; i<argc; i++ )
	{
		FILE	*fp;

		fp = fopen( argv[i], "rb" );
		if ( fp == NULL )
		{
			perror( argv[i] );
			exit( 1 );
		}
		printf( "%s:\t", argv[i] );
		findhash( fp );
		fclose( fp );
	}
	return 0;
}
END ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE ===== CUT HERE =====

-- 
SEANEWS  []  Seattle News + Mail  []  Public Access  []  +1 206 937 9529
E-mail for PGP key.                   sum -r billmcc.pub gives "33931 1"
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: public key interception and translation, etc.
Date: 30 Sep 92 15:21:45 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

All this talk about total isolation and how the enemy can translate your
public keys given that all communication is trapped is a fine parlor game,
perhaps, but hardly relevant.

The criteria for trusted systems pay quite a lot of attention (perhaps more
than is deserved) to detecting and preventing covert channels.  It's a
*very* hard problem -- and that assumes that you have total ownership of
the computer system and all you're trying to prevent is communication from
within the one system -- and you're allowed to announce that you've forbidden
access -- and the user isn't allowed to complain.

To achieve complete spoofing of the kind being discussed here, it's not a
computer system for which covert channels are being prevented but a social
system and the enemy has to achieve it without letting anyone know that the
censor/intruder is active -- in a society in which free speech is a guaranteed
right, no less.

How about taking this discussion to alt.tv.mission.impossible?
Newsgroups: sci.crypt