From: viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson)
Subject: Re: Ethical Relativism. 
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1992 02:45:24 GMT

In <Bs6q4J.H3A@wpg.com> russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence) writes:

[ here I sit, cold beer in hand, wondering if anybody else is reading
this stuff and thinking it's worthwhile.  Let me know, eh?]

>From article <viking.712460245@vincent1.iastate.edu>, by viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson):
>ds> There is a big difference between physical pain and what we might
>ds> call suffering.  I believe I am suffering if I am within earshot of rap
>ds> music, but it causes no physical pain.  In addition, a bee sting causes
>ds> a fair amount of pain, but I wouldn't say I was suffering because of it.
>ds> What is hardwired into the body has little bearing on suffering, and
>ds> pain cannot be measured like an electric field to provide evaluation in
>ds> supporting the belief that some benefits might be worth some pain.

>You're quibbling, Dan.  

	Yes, I am.  However, this quibble is important if we are to have
any means of measuring pain and suffering in the belief that the level of
such is somehow relevant.  In addition, if our morality is to be decided
on the inflicting of pain and/or suffering, then we had best decide how to
measure each.  I don't think we can, hence no accurracy in the claims.

>rl> Not in this forum, but I'll be happy to engage in such a 
>rl> discussion after you and I manage to agree that "goodness" isn't 
>rl> always a product of mere belief, like Sunday School 
>rl> etiquette-rules or the cut of an italian suit, and that an idea isn't 
>rl> necessarily a truthful representation of reality just because 
>rl> it's sincerely believed.  

>ds> This should be rather fun to listen to, but unfortunately I do
>ds> not subscribe to the first idea you mention above.  

>Is the distaste that most animals have for pain (aka suffering) merely
>a matter of belief?

	It doesn't at all matter in reference to the claim you made,
but I submit that it is.  I, for one, believe that they don't like pain.
To get back on track, how does the inflicting of some pain affect the
goodness of an action?  My hernia surgery last fall hurt far more and
far longer than the broken leg I received, but I tend to think the
surgeon did good while the brain-dead driver who hit me did bad.  Care
to quibble a bit?  You might take into account that it is commonly held
that fish feel no pain per se when hooked, but I've yet to see anything
that proves or disproves this.  Other sensory perceptions besides pain
can cause an aversion reaction.  In my case, tickling works just as well.

>ds> The second is obvious, but I tend to think that beliefs are what 
>ds> the individual views as reality, flawed or not.  You know, 
>ds> Plato's cave and all that.  The former I disagree with because 
>ds> "goodness" is an abstract concept that cannot be measured, or 
>ds> consistently evaluated.  In such a case, there is no way to judge 
>ds> the goodness of a decision except on belief.  

>Does the world go away when the ostrich sticks his head in the
>sand?

	Are you the ostrich or an observer somewhere else?  In the
case of the ostrich, it does until something he doesn't see interferes
with his situation.

>rl> Once again, you're assuming that the adjective, "truthful", is 
>rl> antonymous with "deceitful".  The fact that an idea is believed 
>rl> doesn't mean that it's an accurate reflection of reality.  

>ds> 	It doesn't have to be an accurate reflection of reality to be
>ds> believed, or to be believed as truth.  You're choosing to ignore that all
>ds> reality is merely what we believe we sense.  If truth is reality, or
>ds> fact, then this is why we believe things to be true, or correct, and
>ds> for all intents and purposes they are reality until a better one is
>ds> proposed.  See, I used only one definition there.

>If a man truly believes that he can flap his wings and fly like a bird,
>thanks to LSD, do you think he's going to land softly?  Or, will he
>make a large stain on the sidewalk?

	He'll make a great stain on the sidewalk, much to the excitement
of reporters, camera crews, and spectators.  Speaking on behalf of the
poor stain, if it wasn't true, why did he jump?

>ds> 	Escape hatch?  The only escape from this argument is the "U"
>ds> button, and I'm not pressing it.  I am a humble sceptic only because I
>ds> know Einstein could be proven wrong, but right now it's the reality and
>ds> law that I live under, and it's correct for me now.  Not that I could
>ds> prove Einstein wrong, you understand...

>Are you really a skeptic?  If I were to say that you would surely
>die if you were to leap from a tall building without the use of any
>mechanical contrivance, would you challenge me?   Or would you be
>inclined to agree?

	I'm really a sceptic, Russ -- the problem is that I make the
same claim that you do.  Being a sceptic doesn't mean I'll always take
the opposite side of any claim made, or not believe any of them until
they are proven in an actual demonstration.  In your case above, I'd be
inclined to agree unless that tall building happened to be the island
of an aircraft carrier and I thought I could get over the side of the
ship and land in the water.

<Dan Sorenson, DoD #1066 |"There'll be angels on Ariels in leather>
<z1dan@exnet.iastate.edu | and chrome, Ridin' down from heaven    >
<viking@iastate.edu      | just to carry me home." -- R. Thompson >
< ISU thinks I need more education, which they provide for a fee. >