From: baruch@nynexst.com (Robert Baruch)
Subject: Re: Premises of "objectivism?"
Reply-To: baruch@nynexst.com
Organization: NYNEX Science & Technology, Inc
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 19:16:53 GMT

In article 93Jan6212321@bugs.sics.se, torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
> In article <1993Jan6.190550.3206@nynexst.com> baruch@nynexst.com 
> (Robert Baruch) writes:
> 
>    >Ayn Rand meant the "A is A" formulation to mean that before you can talk
>    >about something (and extract truths from it), you must know exactly what
>    >it is you are talking about.  If you look at the formulation above, you
>    >will find that if you apply Ayn Rand's "A is A" to the two "I am not
>    >mistaken" phrases, you will find that they mean different things, and
>    >so the formulation is invalid.
> 
>   Really? Perhaps you could expand on this, preferably applied to a standard
> formulation of the paradox, involving the sentence
> 
> (1)   If the sentence (1) is true, then Santa Claus exists.

Very well.  Since you didn't quote the "paradox", let me quote it here for
the benefit of others:

"Santa Claus exists, if I am not mistaken.  Since that sentence is true, I am
not mistaken, and hence Santa Claus exists."

You are equating (1) = "Santa Claus exists, if I am not mistaken".  

If you analyze the meaning of that sentence, it really is saying,
"If I am not mistaken that Santa Claus exists, then Santa Claus exists."

The analysis of the second sentence is,

"Since sentence (1) is true, I am not mistaken that sentence (1) is true, and
hence Santa Clause exists."

Which is, of course, a false conclusion.

Application of the rule "Before you talk about something, you must know exactly
what it is you are talking about", or "A is A", forces you to analyze the exact
meaning of each phrase in the argument.  This analysis underlines the flaw.

If you want to see it formalized, here it is:

1. if not not A, then A.  (A = Santa Claus exists,
      "not not A" = I am *not* *mistaken* that A is true)
  (or, in symbols, A -> A  [A implies A])

2. (A->A) is true, hence not not (A->A) is true, and hence A is true.

[The "not not (A->A)" is the "if I am *not* *mistaken* that sentence (1) (A->A)
  is true"].

> 
>    >Unfortunately, I cannot answer this, since I am not familiar with the works
>    >of these other philosophers.  However, if they agreed on the infeasability
>    >of doubting our senses, I wonder what their views were on doubting the 
>    >senses for *anything* (not constantly, just for some things).
> 
>   What they agree on is the infeasibility of *constantly* doubting our
> senses, that is, of never accepting anything on the basis of sensory
> input. But of course they are much concerned with sensory errors and
> illusions. Berkely is famous for rejecting the existence of "matter"
> outside mind, and this of course automatically makes him a bad guy
> from the Randian point of view. But Berkeley is not at all opposed to
> our accepting the evidence of our senses, but on the contrary claims
> to stick strictly to the evidence, avoiding unwarranted metaphysical
> speculation.  The point of my mentioning him and the other
> philosophers is that the standard Objectivist considerations you put
> forward don't really confront or take into account these other lines
> of argument in the philosophy of perception.

If Berkeley claims to stick strictly to the evidence, then he must admit
that his sight of matter is true.  Are you saying that when he closes his
eyes, he sees nothing, and hence nothing really is visible at that time?
I really don't think the human mind really works that way.  

Consider:  The psychologist Piaget performed an experiment, where a baby was
shown several times a shiny object hidden under a plate (or something).  Each
time, the baby was allowed to lift the plate and see the object.  Then, when
the baby wasn't looking, (and I think this was also done in plain sight of
the baby later on), the object was hidden elsewhere.  The baby was extremely
puzzled when it couldn't find the object under the plate anymore.

As we grow up, we begin to reason and learn.  We realize that if the object is
no longer under the plate, it must be elsewhere, and we begin to search for it.
(If, that is, if you're into shiny objects :) ).  To give up and say that my
senses tell me the object isn't present anymore, therefore it doesn't exist
seems to me to be anti-reason.

--Rob

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism