From: malenovi@plains.NoDak.edu (Malenovic Nikola V.)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.yugoslavia
Subject: Bosnian Thunder - Accident above Herzegovina ( VREME NDA 8 Sep 1992 )
Date: 9 Sep 92 00:35:59 GMT
Article-I.D.: plains.20225
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computing Network


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     "Vreme" News Digest No. 50                           September 7, 1992
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    Bosnian Thunder - Accident above Herzegovina
    --------------------------------------------


                                 DANGEROUS SKY


           The  crash of  an Italian  G 222  transport plane raises
           usual  questions,  as   investigators  are  expected  to
           clarify  some uncertainties.  Later events  may lead  to
                            interesting conclusions

    Thursday, September 3, 1992, was a perfectly clear summer day, ideal for
    flying.  An  Italian  G   222  turbo-propelled,  twin-engined,  nine-ton
    transport aircraft  took off at  noon from the  Adriatic city of  Split,
    with  a five-ton  shipment of  blankets intended  for Sarajevo, and with
    four  crew (Italians)  and four  passengers (French  citizens) on board.
    Since  this was  a flight  over a  dangerous territory, without standard
    navigation procedures, the role of Forward Air Control (FAC) was assumed
    by an AWACS (Airborne Warning System)  plane on its routine patrol above
    Adriatics.

    Although  the corridor  used by  the  G  222 from  split to  Sarajevo is
    unknown at  the time of writing  this text, it seems  to be the shortest
    cut, via  the Duvansko Polje  mountain valley and  the uplands north  of
    Konjic.

    The AWACS  was monitoring the  transport plane on  its radar and  was in
    radio contact  with it according  to usual procedures  for such flights.
    But,  as VREME  has learned,  during this  flight something difficult to
    explain did happen. The AWACS reported  to its base in Napoli (according
    to our source) that it had lost radar contact with the Italian plane for
    some  twenty minutes.  When the  contact was  recovered, the  G 222  had
    already  been near  the tragic  end of  its flight,  somewhere north  of
    Konjic. Shortly later,  at 1. 24 p.m. local time  (11. 24 GMT), the AWCS
    reported another loss of contact with the Italian plane; it was at 1. 26
    p.m.  that the  last contact  between  Sarajevo  airport and  G 222  was
    recorded.  Afterwards  (the  last  contact  was  only at an eight-minute
    distance from Sarajevo), alarm was sounded. The Italian crew, in none of
    their reporting, had mentioned any threat of fire from the ground.

    The earliest reliable  information that the plane had  crashed came from
    the  American reconnaissance  and rescue  CH 47  helicopters from the US
    Carrier Iwo Jima  in the Adriatic. Four CH 47s  (escorted by F 18 Hornet
    fighter-bombers from the US Aircraft  Carrier Sara toga) had sighted the
    location of crash and photographed the  plane debris. When they tried to
    land, they came  under small arms fire from the  ground, while the AWACS
    warned  the of  possible missile  attack. According  to some reports, an
    infra-red homing  missile was fired  on the helicopters  which ejected a
    parachuted  magnesium  light  and  performed  a  dodging  maneuver;  the
    missile, attracted to the high-temperature light, allegedly exploded.

    The first to arrive at the site  of the crash were French members of the
    UNPROFOR in  an armored vehicle  (VAB), directed there  by data received
    from the American helicopters. They noted that no one survived the crash
    and this was an  indication that the plane was in one  piece when it hit
    the ground.

    This is how the transport plane with humanitarian aid was destroyed - an
    event  that  has  been  feared  by   all  participants  in  the  war  in
    Bosnia-Herzegovina since it began. EC  envoy Lord Owen reacted promptly,
    around noon  on Friday, threatening that  the UN - in  case it is proved
    that  the plane  was downed  - would  respond firmly  and strongly. What
    would this response mean is clear, knowing the vocabulary applied in the
    two  infamous  resolutions  by   the  UN  Security  Council.  Additional
    arguments  for  threats  were  given  undoubtedly  aggressive attacks on
    American helicopters,  which are unarmed rescue  and transport aircraft,
    not combat planes. Had some of the  helicopters been shot in the air, or
    had  crew  members  been  attacked  on  the  ground,  during  the  first
    investigation on  the site of  the accident, the  escort fighter-bombers
    would have evidently fiercely retaliated. This could have easily sparked
    off changes in the history of the Balkans.

    Political  exploitation of  the disaster   began right  away; in  an old
    habit,  no  one  waited  for   the  findings  of  an  investigation  and
    speculations came  immediately as to how  the plane as to  how the plane
    was shot down and who shot it down.

    Tales arrived from Zagreb about the different planes that allegedly take
    advantage of  humanitarian transporters in  "radar image shadow"  behind
    which they sneak  through, carrying munitions to the  Serbian side. Such
    tales  do not  hold: the  Serbian side  does not  have any problems with
    communications and  it circulates freely in  territories it controls; it
    does not need any aircraft. Accusations  that came from the Serbian side
    said  that  the  arms  were  being  sent  to  the  legal  government  of
    Bosnia-Herzegovina, that  the UN is  "biased" and that  humanitarian aid
    planes are somehow involved in the whole thing. In his letter to British
    Prime  Minister  John  Major,  Dr.  Radovan  Karadzic (leader of Bosnian
    Serbs) immediately threatened  with the use of force  to prevent alleged
    shipments of arms to the Moslem side.

    All  the three  sides immediately  announced their  stands. Dr. Karadzic
    asserted that the  plane "was downed" by Moslems;  the Serb Army Command
    asserted  it was  not downed  by its  forces; the  Command of  the Armed
    Forces  of the  Republic of  Bosnia-Herzegovina said  "it did  not"; the
    Croatian side did not care who did  it, and what counted was that it did
    not shoot the plane down. Also interesting at this point is that Italian
    side  said on  Friday afternoon  that it  "possessed evidence"  that the
    plane was downed  "in an action of the missile-attack  kind", but it did
    not  go  into  details.  Other  foreign  factors  (UNPROFOR,  Americans)
    refrained from evaluations until after any final conclusions. An Italian
    team of investigators arrived on the  spot of the crash, both the flight
    recorder and the cabin voice recorder are believed to be recovered soon,
    while  parts  of  the  plane  would  be  tested  for  trace of explosive
    particles.  The AWACS  that monitored  the G  222 flight  must have also
    recorded the fired missile and stored the relevant data in its memory as
    will show  up. But, such  a routine investigation  is naturally needless
    for those who make premature yet politically useful speculations.

    The most interesting  blank in the entire case accounts  for a period of
    20 minutes during the  AWACS, as they say, had not had  the G 222 on its
    radar.  The first  reasonable question  to be  posed is:  had the  plane
    perhaps made  the landing during this  time? But this is  quite unlikely
    because, in the first place, the cargo specification says the five tones
    of blankets were  on board. The G 222's capacity  amounts to nine tones,
    but blankets  are light and take  a rather large volume.  It is unlikely
    that the plane  had landed to pick up some  additional cargo, for it was
    already filled up.  Anyhow, an on-site investigation will  show what the
    cargo contained, just blankets or  something else too. Then again, along
    the Split  - Sarajevo road  there is hardly  a spot where  a plane could
    land, although  a G 222 is  capable of using difficult  and short strips
    for taking off  and landing. To this end, an  analysis of flight records
    would present unambiguous proof.

    It is more  likely to be presumed that the  AWACS radar installation had
    been  out of  order during  the 20-minute  interval. Basically, an AWACS
    radar  scans a  plane irrespective  of its  altitudes. Low-flying planes
    cannot "hide behind hills" because AWACS fly at ten or more kilometers.

    One more presumption  may be made, the G 222  should have been about the
    thousandth  plane  to  land  in  Sarajevo  since the humanitarian relief
    airlift was opened. hence, in purely statistical terms, its accident may
    have been due  either to some mechanical trouble or  human error. G 222s
    are up-to-date and  highly safe planes, equipped with  all the necessary
    navigation installations.
                                                                 Milos Vasic


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     "Vreme" News Digest No. 50                           September 7, 1992
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