From: kauff@neit.cgd.ucar.edu (Brian Kauffman)
Subject: Re: Protecting newborn infants as non-persons
Organization: Boulder CO
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 21:07:41 GMT

>   = dsholtsi@csl36h.csl.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger) writes:
>>  = kauff@neit.cgd.ucar.edu (Brian Kauffman) writes:
>>> = dsholtsi@csl36h.csl.ncsu.edu (Doug Holtsinger) writes:
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>> How many people are saying this?  And how do they define "person"?  
>> Is it the same type of "person" found in the sentence: 
>> "All person's should be treated equally." ?
>
>If we define 'person' as an entity holding constitutional rights,
>as some people have argued, then a 'person' would be an entity
>that would have the equal protection of the laws, and their
>life could not be deprived without due process.  

I think the current *legal* interpretation of "person" is an interesting
subject, but that is not what I'm talking about.

------------------------
>> A newborn infant certainly fits *my* notion of a 'person'.
>
>Then it follows that certain fetuses are persons. 

Maybe yes, maybe no.  A fetus & an infant do have a major distinction,
how important is this distinction to the notion of "personhood" ?

------------------------
>>> If we consider newborn infants as non-persons, then we
>>> are not considering their interests, but we are considering
>>> society's interests in protecting them.  Therefore, when
>>> when society's interests are not served by protecting a
>>> a particular newborn infant, then that infant may be killed. 
>
>> Replace "newborn infants" with "some fetus'" and this could start 
>> to make sense.  With that in mind, one might say:
>> "Therefore, when when society's interests in protecting the life of 
>> a particular 'non-person' are in conflict with the constitutional rights 
>> of a 'real person', then that 'non-person' may be killed."
>
>I think you're assuming that personhood begins at birth, which
>seems arbitrary to me. 

No.  I'm merely assuming that being a "normal, human infant" is sufficient, 
although perhaps not necessary, to establish "personhood".

------------------------
>Personhood is designed to protect individual rights and self-interests,
>even when those self-interests conflict with society's.  The only 
>reason we might protect a non-person is because it serves societal
>interests.  Therefore it makes no sense to protect a non-person
>when societal interests are not served by protecting them.  

Perhaps.  A zygote's "value" may well be more associated with the 
interest of the potential parents (or others in society) than with 
the zygote itself.  But it's not clear that society only protects 
non-person's out of mere self-interest.  What is the motivation for laws 
against animal torture?  I think it is more of a moral empathy toward 
conscious beings rather than self-interest.

So, now it's your turn to make some clear statements: 
(text from a previous post...)
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*Obviously* there will always be some areas of contention wrt to what 
constitutes a "person", but I think it's useful to narrow down the points 
of disagreement.  

To that end, I challenge you to provide concise answers to the following:

Q1: Do you agree that the physical presence of a brain is necessary, 
    although perhaps not sufficient, for "personhood"?  <yes xor no>

Q2: (I'm trying to establish that we agree that "persons" actually exist)
    Do you agree that being a "normal, adult human" is sufficient, although 
    perhaps not necessary, to establish "personhood"?  <yes xor no>  
    
Q3: Do you agree that being a "normal, human infant" is sufficient, although 
    perhaps not necessary, to establish "personhood"?  <yes xor no>

-Brian
Newsgroups: talk.abortion,alt.abortion.inequity,soc.men,alt.child-support,alt.da