From: jocallag@artin.helios.nd.edu (john ocallaghan)
Subject: Re: submission to teaching, conscience, ... sigh.
Organization: OUC, University of Notre Dame
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 21:24:43 GMT

In article <6434@mccuts.uts.mcc.ac.uk> mfulsmb@uts.mcc.ac.uk (Martin Barry) writes:
>> I will quote Newman
>>     "And, further, obedience to the Pope is what is called
>>     'in possession;' that is, the onus probandi of establishing
>>     a case against him lies, as in all cases of exception,
>>     on the side of the conscience. Unless a man be able to
>>     say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that he must
>>     not, and dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is
>>     bound to obey it, and would commit a great sin in 
>>     disobeying it."
>
>Newman appears to be addressing a different type of situation from that of
>_Humanae Vitae_, namely one in which a pope might be enjoining the faithful
>to commit some sinful act or sinful act of omission; he is not speaking of
>another potential category of dissent from the Magisterium, namely that in
>which the pope were to condemn an act as sinful which one's conscience held
>not to be sinful. We've been here before: Steve advocates voluntary
>abstention in humility. I have a great deal of respect for this point of
>view and the associated practice, but I do not find it compelling. It seems
>to me (and is plainly the view Butler takes) that one may in good conscience
>not hold oneself bound by the papal teaching. In any event, I submit that
>Newman's view (which I would not disagree with) is not strictly germane to
>the circumstances of _Humane Vitae_.

Oh now Martin, be fair.  If I recall correctly, you introduced Newman into the
discussion way back when as support for your view on conscience, concluding
the discussion with the famous quote "certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I
shall drink,-- to the Pope, if you please,-- still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards."  But this quote occurs a mere two pages after the quote
Steve provides.  Are we to take it that when Newman speaks of conscience on 
p.137 (of my edition) he is not referring to what you mean, but that two pages
later, without warning, he all of a sudden is?  In the former, he does not
support your view, while in the latter he does?

I'm not sure why you say what "is plainly the view of Butler" is that "one
maay in good conscience not hold oneself bound by the papal teaching."  From
the quote you provided, which is the only information you have provided, he
doesn't seem to refer to conscience at all, unless I missed the word in the
quote.  He refers to the difference between a statements made by the pope
which have an infallible character as proceeding from that charism which the
pope can exercise, and those which don't.  How do you go from that to "one
may in good conscience not hold oneself bound by the papal teaching?"  As Newman
shows, one can hold oneself in good conscience not bound by the papal teaching,
but not because it is not infallibility taught.  The question is whether one must hold by faith a non-infallible teaching of the pope.  The answer to that is
easy, no.  It is another question whether the consciences of faithful Christiansare bound in obedience to a non-infallible teaching of the pope.  The answer to
that, as Steve has pointed out very well, is sometimes yes and sometimes no.
So why do you claim that Bishop Butler is making a statement about the latter
based upon his explicit words, as quoted by you, that bear only on the former?

But as to your claim about what Newman is talking about...
You seem to indicate that there are at least two kinds of papal commands:
1) Those in which the pope commands an act of commission, or omission, in
which the one commanded thinks what is commanded is a sin.  This is what
Newman, according to you is talking about.  And perhaps his writing bears
this reading.  Here he seems to take it, given his referenceces following 
the quote, that the faithful have a duty in conscience to obey, unless they
are convinced "as in the Presence of God," that such obedience would be sinful.
Humanae Vitae, dealing with the pope teaching that artificial contraception 
is wrong and commanding that it not be done, is not such a situation, for 
purportedly the one commanded, if there is to be a conflict of conscience
does not think artificial contraception is a sin.

2) So we have the other class, with which Newman, according to you, is not 
concerned, but Humanae Vitae is.  In this instance, the pope teaches that
a certain action is wrong, namely artificial contraception, and commands
Catholics to avoid it. "Similarly excluded is every ation that, either
in anticipation of the conjugal act or in its accomplishment or in the 
development of its natural consequences, would have as an end or a means,
to render procreation impossible."
The one commanded does not agree that it is sinful, and therefore is free
to act against the papal command.

Certainly these are different situations.  But to use of phrase of Newman's
used constantly in the "Grammar of assent", what is the antecedent 
probability that either Newman or the Church confines the question of
"religiosum obsequium" to the first class and not the second?  Is the
sort of "religiosum obsequium" owed to the second less in the second
than in the first?  After all, consider tax evasion.  From what I have
heard, the new catechism is going to teach explicitly that tax evasion is
a sin, and not to be done. (For those who needed the new catechism to tell
them this, I feel sorry.)  What category does such a teaching fall into?
What category does the teaching on abortion fall into?  What category does
the teaching on usury fall into?  What category does the teaching on
adultery fall into?  What category does the teaching on theft fall into?
Now it may be difficult to find explicit instances of either the pope or
the bishops teaching in an document that some of these are wrong, and to
be avoided, e.g. adultery.  At this point no one needs to be so taught,
though you might get some argument on that.  In any case where do such
teachings fall, for perhaps one day the teaching authority of the Church may
find it necessary to condemn adultery explicitly?  They seem pretty clearly
to fall into category 2).  Now antecedently, given that such teachings about
the nature of sin, and what particular sins exist, will usually if not always
(for logical reasons), it seems probable, for both Newman and the Church,
fall into the category 2),
isn't it more likely 
that they would hold that one has as much, if not more duty of "religiosum
obsequium" in cases of 2) than in case of 1).  Now by antecedently I mean
before we even go in search of documents of either Newman's or the church's.
Do you really believe it probable, that Newman would make the strong statement
on the "onus probandi" of conscience and confine it to commands in which the
pope thinks he is not commanding a sin, while the one commanded thinks he is,
and not hold such an "onus probandi" for commands to refrain from what the
pope takes to be a sin, while the one who is commanded does not take it to
be a sin?

Peace,
John O'Callaghan


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