HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Dreams (Was: grounding and the entity/environment boundary)
Organization: SPSS Inc.
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 17:59:16 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.221842.18550@spss.com> I write:
>I'd be more comfortable with this if we knew exactly what dreams *are*.
>For instance, one theory is that they are the brain's attempt to make sense
>of random neural activity.  If that were true-- if the brain when deprived 
>of sensory input starts making up its own-- it doesn't support the idea 
>that world-grounded systems do so well when removed from the world.
>(But of course there are other theories of dreams.)

[Harry Erwin asked me to post this reply, since his newsserver is broken.]

-------------------------

Speculations on the purpose of dreams:

Evidence: dreams are not usually remembered
          sleep deprivation causes insanity

Other Data:
          The mammalian brain uses a chaotic attractor as the starting
          point for pattern recognition and novelty creation processes.
          This is apparently due to the very small amount of energy
          needed for controlling that type of system and for that type
          of system to converge to a terminal state. Initializing a
          chaotic process for that purpose is equivalent to finding
          a delicate balance point. It can be disturbed easily.

Conjecture:
          Dreaming is an adaptation associated with the use of chaotic
          attractors in the mammalian brain. It recalibrates/restabilizes
          the dynamics of the brain to ensure that the initial state of
          the chaotic attractor can be easily found. It erases stable
          states that are activated by random noise to help ensure that
          pattern recognition responds to real patterns, not "ghosts."
          It also ensures that novelty creation responds to the "real
          world" rather than being influenced by delusions.

Cheers,
   Harry Erwin

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 21:24:03 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov11.140249.22979@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>In article <1992Nov10.025040.117799@Cookie.secapl.com>,
>frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>
>Statement G:
>
>     `Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words
>      that will never be believed by David Chalmers.' produces a
>      string of words that will never be believed by David Chalmers.'

By the way, this statement as is can easily be falsified by David Chalmers.
All he has to do is believe *once* -- thereafter he, and everybody else, can
consistently recognize it as false.

>>And as a statement, G is self-referential in an unacceptable way.  Consider
>>sentence H:
>>
>>`Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words which
>>is false when interpreted as a statement.' produces a string of words which
>>is false when interpreted as a statement.'
>>
>>If we can interpret G as a statement, we can interpret H likewise; but this
>>produces a flat-out contradiction.  Thus it is *not* legitimate to interpret
>>G as a statement, however clear its meaning may seem.
>
>I disagree. The problem with statement H is *not* its self-reference.
>G and H both have the same form, roughly:
>
>     G <-> not(G in B)
>     H <-> not(H in T)
>
>where B is the set of believed sentences, and T is the set of true
>sentences. The problem is *not* that G or H is self-referential, it is
>the fact that there is no consistent notion of the set of all true
>sentences. As a matter of fact, your sentence H shows that there can
>be no such set.

Wait a minute!  Where did these sets come from?  I didn't commit myself to
the existence of any particular sets.

Even so, you have done nothing to argue that there *is* a set of believed
sentences -- you have just failed to derive a contradiction from the
assumption that there is.

Note the contrast with provability for a formal system.  G"odel's sentence
can be shown to be equivalent to provability in the formal system.  By
contrast, you are blandly asserting the right to do so with the word
"believe".

I still believe that sentences like G are invalid.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 03:03:02 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov3.051001.21374@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>In article <gm4FTB4w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz>,
>system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:
>>> Now, as John Baez said, the induction aspect working backward from
>>> Friday to Sunday is irrelevant. The heart of the paradox can be found
>>> in a simplified version where the judge says to the prisoner: "You
>>> will be executed today, but you will not be able to figure out that
>>> you will be executed today."
>>
>>Excuse me, but it seems inappropriate to transform the judge's sentence 
>>into a self-contradictory statement.
>
>The statement "You will be executed today, but you will not be able to
>figure out that you will be executed today" is *not*
>self-contradictory. Suppose the prisoner thinks the judge might be
>lying, then he can't figure out anything from what the judge says.
>Therefore the judge's second statement "...you will not be able to
>figure out that you will be executed today" will turn out to be true.
>If in addition, the judge *does* hang the prisoner, then the first
>statement "You will be executed today" will turn out to be true. If
>everything the judge says turns out to be true, then it can't be
>self-contradictory.

There are two forms of the unexpected hanging problem: one where the judge
says "... you will be surprised ...", and the other where he says "... you
will not be able to prove ...".  Both really work the same in the stripped-
down version as when multiple days are involved.

In the proof-theoretic version, the judge's statements (together with the
fact that he makes them to the prisoner) *are* contradictory.  There is
potentially a problem with levels, since formal systems in general can't
deal with statements about what they are able to prove.  But in any context
where they can be accepted, they are contradictory; hence you can prove
anything from them; so in particular the second statement is false (since
you can prove anything from a contradiction, you *can* prove that it will
occur on whatever day it actually does occur).

The other version presents a psychological problem.  The prisoner *can* make
the second statement false here, simply by expecting the hanging every day.
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 11 Nov 92 23:07:20 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:

>For the first case, I suggest an examination of siamese twins, or twins who
>have never been separated.  Many such cases exist, and I would claim tend to
>support this hypothesis.

True. Some twins who have spent their lives together behave like one
person, claim to think as one, and prefer to be treated as one person.

>For the second case, take people with damaged brains, especially those who
>have (for one reason or another) so-called 'split brains'.  Behaviour patterns
>here seem again to support the hypothesis.

True. In some circumstances two different consciousnesses, with
different perceptions, and different purposes, can be discerned.

>If you think this is hugely counter-intuitive, you're right.  I don't like
>admitting any more than you do that there is no clear distinction between me
>and everything else.  But if there isn't, then consciousness becomes so
>changed as a concept that it's hardly worth using the term any more.  Rather
>like phlogiston, in fact.

You seem to argue that the changes in the concept of consciousness
necessary to encompass these phenomena are so unpalatable that you
prefer to heave the bathwater, baby and all, out of the window. I'm
very sorry to hear this. Have you consulted a philosophical therapist
about this problem? :-) I suggest a reading of Dennett's
"Consciousness Explained", which spends a lot of time on this problem,
most fruitfully, IMHO.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
From: avl0@cine88.cineca.it
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: It is AI when...
Date: 11 Nov 92 09:14:25 +0100
Followup-To: comp.ai.philosophy
Distribution: world
Organization: CINECA, Italian Interuniversity comp. centre

In article <Stafford-101192104649@stafford.winona.msus.edu>, Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford) writes:
> Another foolish attempt -
> 
> Complete AI is when a machine produces useful, unsolicited
> solutions to unanticipated problems and we cannot discern 
> it's methods.

Consider this attempt too:

Complete AI is when a machine produces the same behaviour and the
same functionality of a human being and uses them to reach the same 
Fundamental Goal.
This definition can be a superset of your.

N.B. I believe that the main step in this way is the definition
of the Fundamental Goal. Does anybody have any idea about that?

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: coonstot@quads.uchicago.edu (charles orville onstott)
Subject: Martin Heidegger: Understanding and Meaning--a reading group
Summary: Reading group proposition 
Keywords: Heidegger, meaning, understanding, interpretation, sign
Reply-To: coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu
Organization: University of Chicago Computing Organizations
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 22:32:50 GMT

I am planning on doing a detailed re-reading of Division 1 Section V
of Martin Heidegger's _Being and Time_.	 This chapter deals with
the concept of "Being-In."  I am most concerned, however, with the
concepts of _meaning_, _understanding_, _interpretation_, and _sign_.
Therefore, I plan to do a reading to recover these concepts and
their associated ramifications.	 I am not closed to the possibility
that this could turn out to be a criticism.

  If anyone is interested in this sort of a study, I propose an
email reading group which I will proctor.    The readings will
be designed so that most of Section V will be covered by the end of
November.  Thus, the reading will be  a little demanding.  However,
we will not be reading all of Section V, only those that are relevent
to the purpose stated above.

  Whether or not you have read Heidegger, if you would be interested
in learning Heidegger's criticism of hermeneutics and reference theory
as presented in _Being and Time_, this reading would be very useful
to you.	 This could give you an introduction to a great thinker on these
matters--and one that presents several challenges to our current
understanding of these given concepts.	The application of his
criticism ranges anywhere from Artificial Intelligence, the Human
Sciences, to Hermenuetics.

The format:  Readings will be conducted on a weekly basis with
a posting of commentary on the reading at the end of the week by
all members.  These will be forwarded to all members of the group.
Commentary on the responses should be made at will and will be
forwarded to all those involved.  At the end of November, a commentary
on the group's movement of thought on Heidegger will be made by myself
and will be open to response through December.	It may take us
1 week into December to finish the relevent sections before the
final phenomenological study of the group's thought.

If you are interested, please send me email and I will send
out the first reading set.  You will need to have your own
copy of _Being and Time_(any library should have at least 1 copy)
I will be using the english translation of this text; however,
if you know German and have a copy of _Sein und Zeit_ your
input would be valuable.

Thank You,

Charles O. Onstott, III
University of Chicago Divinity School
coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu


-- 
Charles O. Onstott, III                         (coonstot@midway.uchicago.edu)
Graduate Student in Religion and the Human Sciences
The University of Chicago Divinity School
           "For [the study of] history, too, has its fashions."  (Anouilh)
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Categories
Date: 9 Nov 92 19:18:04 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

In article <1992Nov7.213838.15600@constellation.ecn.uoknor.edu> hondl@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu 
(Kurt Hondl) writes:
>In article <BxBBnw.CEK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu 
(lincoln carr) writes:
>>In article <burt.720913842@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca 
(Burt Voorhees) writes:
>>>Logic is the tool that we use in order to be precise about our thinking 
>>>about identity, but it did not create identity.  Cats existed, for example, 
>>>before there was ever a word for cat.
>>
>>I would argue that you don't know that as surely as you think you do.
>>Certainty is a very nebulous thing.  You perceive the phenomena, not
>>noumena, that you associate with the word "cat" and, because of
>>certain a priori assumptions that human beings make, you assume that
>>it must have existed prior to your perception of it and your
>>assignment of the word "cat" to it.
>
>Suppose there was a world that was inhabited by only human beings (in all
>their variety) and various types of dogs.  If a cat were suddenly introduced 
>to this world, would the humans ...
>
>a) Recognizing the very distinct differences between the "cat" and themselves
>   and simply refer to the "cat" as a dog?
>or
>b) recognize the distinct differences between the various types
>   of dogs and this new "cat" and be compelled to name the new
>   intruder as a "cat"?

Is it relevant what humans really do in comparable situations?  Describing
the unaccustomed fauna and flora of the New World, for instance, the Europeans 
used both methods: in some cases existing words were extended to new 
referents, similar to their Old World models ("robin", "corn", "monkey");
in other cases new words were used ("tomato", "coyote", "woodchuck").  
Different European languages sometimes take opposite tacks with the same item: 
e.g. where English borrowed an Indian name for the tomato, Italian extended
an existing term: pomodoro = 'golden apple'.  Indeed, within English we have
both corn (extension) and maize (borrowing).

The question of why people have the categories they do is the main focus
of George Lakoff's _Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things_.  Lakoff points out,
among other things, that nature is not neatly organized into "natural
kinds": there is no neat, clean natural category of "cats" which can be
defined independently of human cognition and culture.  (The biological concept
of "species" differs in its essentials from the philosophical notion of
a category.)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 92 11:55:04 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb) writes:

> 
> Close one eye. Now open it and close the other.
> See the parallax shift? Think you would miss that happening over and over?
> I don't think so. The point is that awareness has been split, and what
> is on one side of the divide is prevented from crossing over. Period.
> 
Not that I wish to imply that I agree or disagree with anyone, but I 
would like to say that the above argument, IMO, is false.

If the mind pearl leaping across, isn't carrying the memories, or 
histories of perception from one side to the other with its jump, AND 
if the two sides of the brain aren't communicating, then I don't see 
that the mind pearl would be aware of any parallax change. Change means 
being able to compare before and after.

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
  This .sig unintentionally left blank.

Hello! I'm a .SIG Virus. Copy me and spread the fun.
From: rseymour@reed.edu (Robert Seymour)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Keywords: consciousness, mind, brain
Date: 11 Nov 92 09:17:32 GMT
Article-I.D.: reed.1992Nov11.091732.7442
Reply-To: rseymour@reed.edu
Organization: Reed College, Portland, OR

In article <3197@ucl-cs.uucp> G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) writes:
> Chris Malcolm writes:
>  > In article <tim.720580709@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)  
writes:
>  > 
>  > >Consciousness is to the study of the brain what phlogiston is to the  
study of
>  > >combustion.
>  > 
>  > Because consciousness is not a brain phenomenon. It's a property of a
>  > mind-engaged-in-a-world. You'll no more find consciousness in a brain
>  > than in an eyeball, although both have useful contributions to make.
>  > -- 
>  > Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>  > Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>  > 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
> 
> So the big C does not exist? And what of Mind: what's that?
> 
> Gordon.
> ____
> 
> Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
> Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
> Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT

	Consciousness directly implies something to be conscious of. However,  
if we consider the whole brain, the implication is that it may be self aware  
(i.e. the brain is a physical thing, and it may be conscious of it's own  
existence). With a *mind* however, this is less clear. Does a *mind*  
necessarily imply a physical manifestation? I don't think so, so it would not  
equate consiousness. 
	However, were now dancing around several problems of metaphysics in  
that it suggests there may be a something such as a mind which exists, but has  
no manifestation. To say its a property of a "mind-engaged-in-a-world" implies  
that a mind may also not be engaged in a world (else consciousness is intrinsic  
in above argument). 
	While existence without manifestation less a problem for concepts  
(still the one vs. the many paradox [i.e. is there a Platonic heaven], but a  
stronger argument since they are not directly observable [unless we get into  
tropes...]), but these concepts are abstractions from reality, whereas the mind  
without manifestation is not. However, this is not the province of AI, so I'll  
leave the conclusions on the *mind* vs. the *brain* to the reader.

--
Robert Seymour				rseymour@reed.edu
Departments of Physics and Philosophy
Artificial Life Project			Reed College
Reed Solar Energy Project (SolTrain)	Portland, OR
From: max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 6 Nov 92 00:17:31 GMT
Organization: Cypress Semiconductor Northwest, Beaverton Oregon

In article <749@ckgp.UUCP> thomas@ckgp.UUCP (Mike Thomas) writes:
>
>Hi,
>
>In Article 7679 Thomas Lund writes:
>> An excellent suggestion for a discussion topic.  Granted, there is
>> no way of knowing what has happened to the "mind"; whether it has turned into
>> a hurricane or two is unobservable.  However, there are some behaviors that
>> split brained patients exhibit that need to be considered by AI theorists.
>
>... But the point I wanted to
>make was this. The patient admitts to being able to control both hands.

All sorts of brain damage can be invisible to
the subject; in fact, stimilate a motor region in a patient, causing
the arm to raise, and she will make up some supposed reason for initiating
the motion. And, in fact, these patients don't _report_ their minds as
being split - it takes subtle experiments to detect it.

>The problem was that one mind/hemishpere desided to do something, then the
>focus/"I" would jump to the other side not knowing what it wanted to do but
>responds to the domain/environment/stimuli of the book... hence turning the
>page the incorrect number of times... the the "I"/Focus jumps back and the
>mind gets frustrated because the other hemishpere did not respond correctly.

You want to believe in the "I"/Focus, so you imagine it 'jumping'. I don't
see that you have presented one good reason for believing in it.  You
have here admitted that the mind is split by the operation (with caveats).
So thoughts, intents, apparently are not carried by your jumping boojum.
Your boojum doesn't contain or imply a unified field of experience - so
it appears useful neither to scientists (making no predictions) nor to
dualists (in no way encapsulating awareness in a mind pearl).

>The important part is this, that you need both the mind and the focus/"I" to
>get the mind to control the body/brain, and that when useing language or
>symbols that will need to be used, the focus/"I" does not take the symbols
>with it, the symbols are created in the mind that handles symbols (left
>hemishpere, right hand) but the function hand in this exmple (the left hand,
>right hemishpere) does not have the numbers to control the count of pages to 
>turn. Remember that the act of jumping is not noticable since your perception
>is the same in the two domains/minds (looking out at a book). 

Close one eye. Now open it and close the other.
See the parallax shift? Think you would miss that happening over and over?
I don't think so. The point is that awareness has been split, and what
is on one side of the divide is prevented from crossing over. Period.

>  Thank you, 
>  Michael Thomas 
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Organization: UTCS Public Access
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 17:46:34 GMT

In article <1992Nov9.221842.18550@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <720937346@sheol.UUCP> throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:
>.................
>>Consider an
>>analog of a pre-grounded computer conversing on a teletype.  Say, a
>>person in a SDT, except with the ability to twitch one finger to send
>>morse code and feel morse-encoded vibrations applied to some point on
>>the skin.  I see no fundamental reason why that person cannot remain
>>sane, and further, remain grounded in the use of the morse signals.
>>That is, I'd claim that this person is plausibly both statically and
>>dynamically grounded, though clearly this form of dynamic grounding
>>will NOT ground new experiences AS WELL (as richly) as the statically
>>grounded material.
>
>And I see no guarantee that the guy *will* remain sane-- or grounded-- 
>in circumstances so far removed from those evolution has fitted him for.
>But I don't see any way to resolve this by argument alone; somebody's
>just got to try it.
>
There is some evidence which may shed a certain amount of light on this
problem. There were (are ?) some unlucky souls put into nearly-SDT 
conditions - prisoners kept in dark cells, perhaps chained to a wall, for
years. My understanding is that going insane is a very common affliction
in these circumstances.
..............

Andrzej Pindor

-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca