HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Organization: Wimsey Information Services
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 17:46:03 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.043621.28202@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Mark Henderson, writing from Canada, advises a Bulgarian National
>writing from Germany on how to get the RSAREF and RIPEM files
>without reading or agreeing to the license agreement.

After personal communication with David I think I'll say just the following:

I offer no apology.

What I posted was publically available information which can be obtained
anonymous ftp from any site on the internet.

In fact, I wasn't even the first person to post it.
(Message-ID: <1ig1k1INNhe0@flash.pax.tpa.com.au> in alt.security.pgp
and <1993Jan6.112659.16343@bernina.ethz.ch> in sci.crypt)

The cat's out of the bag folks. If you want U.S. only distribution, you'll
need to implement some sort of access controls on the ftp server.

Enough said.

Mark
-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands)
Subject: Re: RIPEM and RSAREF available by anonymous ftp !!!
Organization: ExNet Systems Ltd Public Access News, London, UK
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 13:35:45 GMT


In the the dear dead days beyond recall (say, a month ago) I remember
somebody saying,"If you make it available on a bulletin board then
you've exported it".  It could have been David Sternlight - it's his
style.  (Unambiguously moral or arrogantly dogmatic - you choose).

If s/he's right then hasn't RSA violated the relevant regs. ?

Richard

[R A Hollands s0rah@exnet.co.uk]
From: dws@ssec.wisc.edu (DaviD W. Sanderson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: VCR+ Source repost wanted
Date: 11 Jan 93 23:46:05 GMT
Organization: UW-Madison Space Science and Engineering Center

In article <93011.154938JDG111@psuvm.psu.edu> <JDG111@psuvm.psu.edu> writes:
>I missed the original posting of the VCR+ source,but would really like to
>have it.

Look in an alt.sources archive site.  Here's one location:

usc.edu:/archive/usenet/sources/alt.sources/volume93/Jan/930101.01.Z

DaviD W. Sanderson (dws@ssec.wisc.edu)

	"The Noah Webster of smileys is David Sanderson"
		- The Wall Street Journal, 15 Sep 1992
From: kaufman@Xenon.Stanford.EDU (Marc T. Kaufman)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Date: 12 Jan 93 01:24:25 GMT
Reply-To: kaufman@CS.Stanford.EDU
Organization: CS Department, Stanford University, California, USA

mab@wdl39.wdl.loral.com (Mark A Biggar) writes:

>In article <1993Jan11.070508.12914@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
->Now if you could keep the existence of such a plane secret, perhaps by
->retiring your known spy airplanes with great fanfare and issuing a
->cover story about how they've been completely replaced by satellites,
->then you might actually be able to use it repeatedly before your
->adversary even begins to suspect you have it. Of course, you might
->have to make up another cover story to explain all those sonic booms
->heard on a regular basis here in Southern California...

>Such a replacement for the SR-71 exists.  I believe that the name of the 
>new plane is "Aurora" and that there has been at least one article speculating
>about it in Air&Space.

No, you have to say:
Such a replacement for the SR-71 does NOT exist.  IF is existed it's name
would probably be Aurora, it would probably use a pulse ramjet engine that
would leave telltale diamond contrails, and it would make a lot of noise
with sonic booms.  But those are just funny clouds and earthquakes.  Pay no
attention to the man behind the curtain.  After all, the SR-71 didn't exist,
either [until Lyndon Johnson renamed the YF-12].

-- 
Marc Kaufman (kaufman@CS.Stanford.EDU)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: LUC vs. RSA
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 4 Jan 93 18:43:53 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Dec30.151754.10932@rose.com> robert.heuman@rose.com (robert heuman) writes:


>Date Entered: 12-30-92 10:07
>amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes, in 
>Message-ID: <9212291723.AA25966@chaos.intercon.com>

>re something developed in Aussie land:

>A> Where it was developed is not relevant to ITAR.  If it performs encipherment, 
>A> it's covered--doesn't matter if it's foreign, domestic, PD or commercial.  
>A> This is the principle manner in which ITAR presents a trade barrier to U.S. 
>A> vendors who are trying to compete in international markets.
>A> 
>A> The Department of Commerce likes exports.  The Department of State doesn't.
>A> That's the U.S. regulatory system for you.

>I believe (I could be wrong) Australia is part of COCOM, which means 
>that crypto software and hardware are covered, and cannot be exported 
>or imported without permission from the government.  The ITARs are US 
>only, but the COCOM regs are not, and still cover the product.

But, do COCOM regs define encryption software as munitions?  (They
certainly won't include US laws or regulations by reference; there must be
a specific definition.)  Of course, the regs are probably secret....
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 18:27:00 +0000

 -=> Quoting Jim Mccoy to All <=-

 JM> In all the various conspiracy
 JM> theories and other guesses regarding DES and the NSA, it should be
 JM> noted that DES was at one time used for secure encryptin of files for
 JM> some branches of the government (the "standard" in DES... :) and was
 JM> decertified for this role as scheduled.  Few ciphers will last forever.
 JM> In time even the 1024 bit public keys people consider secure now will
 JM> be crackable for $56.   
 JM> jim

 I'm sure your right, Jim, even if one Hebrew crypt stood up for 
 over two thousand years. But electronic computers have only been around 
 for the last fifty. Almost takes the fun out of things, doesn't it?
 
 Owen




___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.11
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: KH-11 pictures -
Date: 12 Jan 93 04:07:00 GMT
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc

In article <Ngy8wB2w164w@k5qwb.lonestar.org> lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org (Mr. Lyn R. Kennedy) writes:
>It seems it would be more feasable to take several pictures by the same 
>satellite at slightly different locations and combine them 
>electronically. I'm not sure I understand the limits of this but I've 
>been led to beleive that it works. A similar method is being used with 
>radio-telescopes, recording the information simultaneously at several 
>sites and then combining the data to get better resolution.

This is called VLBI (Very Long Baseline Interferometry). You make
*simultaneous* high speed recordings of a single source at widely
spaced sites.  The recordings must preserve the amplitude *and phase*
of the incident EM radiation, and they must be very precisely
timestamped (to allow accurate alignment when the signals are
combined). Although this is practical (although tricky) at radio
frequencies, I *seriously* doubt the technology is in hand to do it at
optical frequencies on a satellite. I don't think there are any A/D
converters yet that can sample at the Nyquist rate for green light,
for example.

Phil
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: beezer@cc.utah.edu (BEEZER)
Subject: Re: [QUESTION]:  PUBLIC-KEYS (ETC) FOR PUBLIC BBS NETWORK
Summary: You're better off to do it yourself.
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.4-b1  
Organization: Salt Lick, UT
Date: 12 Jan 1993 12:47 MST  


I understand clearly the advantage/need to encrypt before uploading,
but 1) most users to this network won't d/l the s/w and spend so
much time encrypting (currently incompatible with all off-line mail
readers)...

2) The BBS/network will likely be more vulnerable to shut-down by
feds than the post office is...  ie. sending local/abroad drug
trafficing via public access bbs/network would be an easy and
expected abuse.  In this case, the sysop sets himself up for
owning and transmitting illegal material - although he doesn't
know that, he should...  shouldn't he?

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mccoy@ils.nwu.edu (Jim Mccoy)
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1993 05:08:11 GMT

In article <1993Jan9.163011.23230@csi.uottawa.ca> cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes:
> [regarding the ability of the NSA to break DES encoded messages...]
>
>
>If that $56 figure is faintly accurate, then I expect that the NSA
>must have some rather high-speed hardware, probably specialized to
>DES, that costs quite a bit less than anyone expected.  I would have
>expected a somewhat higher bill.

Well, to the best of my knowledge the NSA has one of the largest
collections of supercomputers (Y-MPs, etc.) in the world.  This is thier
job after all, to crack codes.  In all the various conspiracy theories and
other guesses regarding DES and the NSA, it should be noted that DES was at
one time used for secure encryptin of files for some branches of the
government (the "standard" in DES... :) and was decertified for this role
as scheduled.  Few ciphers will last forever.  In time even the 1024 bit
public keys people consider secure now will be crackable for $56.  

jim




-- 
Jim McCoy          |  PGP 2.0 Key md5 hash:
j-mccoy@nwu.edu    |  61323c49024cb089337c78a05aafe8c6
mccoy@ils.nwu.edu  |  finger mccoy@ils.nwu.edu for public key

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6356 alt.security.pgp:452
From: juha@elixir.e.kth.se (Juha Sarlin)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: PGP 2.1 doesn't use first byte of IDEA random key?
Date: 4 Jan 93 16:46:57 GMT
Organization: School of EE, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

The function strong_pseudorandom() uses a key and a seed from the
randseed.bin file to generate pseudo-random numbers.  For some reason
the first byte of the key is not initialized or modified, although I
think that it is used in key generation.  Perhaps the author hoped to
get random data in the buffers because they are on the stack?  On my
system the first byte seems to always be zero.

Here is a patch to handle the first byte in same way as all the
others:

*** 1.1	1992/12/27 15:37:03
--- crypto.c	1993/01/04 15:24:41
***************
*** 327,329 ****
  		randaccum(8*(sizeof(key)+sizeof(seed)));
! 		for (i=1; i<sizeof(key); i++)
  			key[i] ^= randombyte();
--- 327,329 ----
  		randaccum(8*(sizeof(key)+sizeof(seed)));
! 		for (i=0; i<sizeof(key); i++)
  			key[i] ^= randombyte();
***************
*** 360,362 ****
  	/* now cover up evidence of what user got */
! 	for (i=1; i<sizeof(key); i++)
  		key[i] ^= idearand() ^ randombyte();
--- 360,362 ----
  	/* now cover up evidence of what user got */
! 	for (i=0; i<sizeof(key); i++)
  		key[i] ^= idearand() ^ randombyte();
***************
*** 396,399 ****
  	count=0;
! 	while (++count <= IDEAKEYSIZE)
! 		key[count] = randombyte();
  
--- 396,399 ----
  	count=0;
! 	while (count < IDEAKEYSIZE)
! 		key[count++] = randombyte();
  
--
Juha Sarlin   juha@elixir.e.kth.se or juha@tds.kth.se
From: tsudik@pollux.usc.edu (Gene Tsudik)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: KryptoKnight Network Security Service -- reports available
Date: 5 Jan 1993 07:23:53 -0800
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: pollux.usc.edu

Folks,

I'd like to announce the availability (ftpability?) of some papers/reports 
having to do with KryptoKnight Authentication & Key Distribution Service.
KryptoKnight is, essentially, a general-purpose network security package
developed at IBM Research.

The ftp site is jerico.usc.edu. The directory is pub/gene/kk. 

1) This paper describes the derivation of a secure two-party 
authentication protocol. (To appear in JSAC Special Issue on 
Secure Communications.)

2PP.ps      - postscript
2PP.ps.Z    - compressed postscript
2PP.ascii   - ASCII version
2PP.ascii.Z - compressed ASCII 

2) This paper describes the design of a family of three-party authentication
and key distribution protocols underlying KryptoKnight. (In submission to
ACM/IEEE ToN.)

3PP.ps      - postscript 
3PP.ps.Z    - compressed postscript 
3PP.ascii   - plain ASCII
3PP.ascii.Z - compressed ASCII


3) KryptoKnight overview paper (presented at ESORICS'92 in Toulouse.)
KK.ps       - postscript
KK.ps.Z     - same compressed


Cheers,
Gene                                                     


-- 
----------------------
Gene Tsudik, Member FDIC
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6572 alt.security:5288 alt.security.pgp:475
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: PGP 2.1 source posted to alt.sources
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 00:07:22 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland

In <1993Jan8.155007.16181@csi.uottawa.ca> cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes:

>In article <C0IFAw.3vy@bcstec.ca.boeing.com> vanzwol@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Ted Van Zwol) writes:
>>This intrigues me.  I'm not accusing you (Peter) of anything, but consider:
>>
>>How do we know the PGP sources on alt.sources (or even that on any FTP site
>>for that matter) are "safe".  What kind of precautions or checks exist to
>>prevent bogus code from cropping up.  Why couldn't some intelligence agency
>>get their hands on the code and weaken the encryption algorithm just enough
>>for them and then distribute the modified source to the rest of the world.
>>
>>I haven't looked at the source or the comments myself, so I don't know if
>>this is already addressed.  But, it concerns me.  Who's to say the copies of
>>PGP available are trustworthy?  I'm terribly confused...

>The best idea would probably be to have an MD5 signature of (say) the actual
>text of each post appended to the end.  Said signatures could then be
>published either in:
>a) sci.crypt
>b) Some moderated newsgroup?
>c) The C Users Group magazine?

>or somewhere such.

I thought of clear-signing the post with PGP, but then decided against it
since it would have involved shipping the entire thing home to sign (I won't
use PGP on a multiuser system) and back again, and would have almost
certainly screwed up the automatic unsharing process.  Unfortunately until
there's some organised way of authenticating postings (eg PEM or the
equivalent functionality in PGP) there isn't any easy way to authenticate
the posting.

(On the other hand I doubt very much whether the NZ govt could be bothered
messing around with usenet postings, and if there were discrepancies
caused by mainpulation on non-NZ sites it would probably be discovered
pretty quickly when differing versions of the code were found floating
around).

Peter.
--
 pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz||p_gutmann@cs.aukuni.ac.nz||gutmann_p@kosmos.wcc.govt.nz
peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz||peter@nacjack.gen.nz||peter@phlarnschlorpht.nacjack.gen.nz
              (In order of preference - one of 'ems bound to work)
           -- Whoever dies with the most email addresses ... wins --
 

From: Zandor@f729.n153.z1.ship.wimsey.bc.ca (Zandor)
Sender: UUCP@ship.wimsey.bc.ca
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: DUOFONE E499
Date: Tue, 05 Jan 1993 21:22:42 -0800

Is there any Millatry based Cordless phones like the DUOFONE E499.  Is it a
HAM Radio based PHONE that has virtually untracible or fixed signal.  I am
curious if there are phones or Hand radios available at a inexpensive price
for example $300 up or are they allot cheaper now.

Just more Curious then anything does it work with voice and data support and
could I patch a Satillite signal to it.  I might know some people who are
intrested.

Thanks

Zandor

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Any way to *CREATE* Vcr+ (VCR PLUS) codes??? (please read)
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<29287@oasys.dt.navy.mil>
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 02:19:48 GMT

    You don't have to collect published codes, you can just sit down with the
    VCR Plus+ device and start punching in numbers.  But there are 9,999,999
    7 digit codes (and each one requires 9 button presses to test), so it can
    take a long time to get enough numbers.

What does pushing buttons on the device tell you?  Doesn't pushing
a number like 1952037 cause the device to send some infrared pulses
at a particular time which is difficult to predict from the number
alone?  Or does the device somehow display what is going to send and
when it is going to send them?

Note: I don't own a VCR+, or a VCR, or even a TV set so I'm asking
from curiosity only (I think it's an interesting problem).  But
this should explain why I'm not familiar with using the device.
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Bit Commitment
Date: 9 Jan 1993 05:02:31 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <C0IEo4.3pB@chinet.chi.il.us> schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes:
>Bit commitment is an easy protocol.  Alice commits to a bit (or a series
>of bits) in such a way that Bob does not know what the bits are until Alice
>tells him, and Alice cannot change her bits once she has commited to them.
>
>What I am looking for is a real-world example of where this protocol would
>be useful (besides magic tricks).


I've used this in the past when sending out puzzles to friends along with
my answer, encrypted.  When they have submitted their solutions, I release
the key revealing my solution.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.ripem
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date: 11 Jan 93 23:01:23 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

> I notice that one RIPEM public key in the public server file has its
> first 34 characters identical to my ripem public key. Perhaps this is
> related. It seems an unlikely coincidence, given that the two keys
> were generated by different individuals, apparently on different
> computers, and very likely at different clock times.

David Sternlight again broadcasts to the whole world his inability to
read. The answer to his question is in the documentation of RIPEM.
(Even that particular might be named "README", but I am not certain
about that...)

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
From: mab@wdl39.wdl.loral.com (Mark A Biggar)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Telephonic Poker?
Date: 4 Jan 93 22:34:58 GMT
Organization: Loral Western Development Labs

In article <1993Jan3.185628.2976@zip.eecs.umich.edu> positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas) writes:
>I was reading a paper that explained the RSA algorithm
>in layman's terms, and among other things it said, "An
>interesting side benefit of this algorithm is that it
>makes it possible for two people who do not trust each
>other to play poker by telephone." I've thought about
>it, and I can't for the life of me figure out HOW. The
>paper did not elaborate. Can someone explain to me the
>algorithm with which two mutually distrusting players can
>play poker by phone (or, more simply, have a fair coin
>toss)?

Method for fair coin toss over the phone (or a computer network):

1. both parties agree upon a Pseudo-random number algorithm and
	a method for computing a coin toss from the output of the PRNG.
2. party A selects a seed for the PRNG, excrypts it using ANY excryption
	function, and sends the encrypted seed to party B.
3. B then selects an interger N and sends it to A.
4. A iterates the PRNG N times and uses the result to determine the coin flip
	using the pre-agreeded upon method.
5. A now sends the result of the coin flip and the encryption key to B.
6. B can now decrypt the seed and verify that A did iterate the PRNG
	N times and correctly determined the result of the coin toss.

This can easily be extended to generating die rolls, card draws etc.
Also a sequence of random values can be fairly produced by having B 
specify a monotonic increasing sequence of integers {N1, N2, N3, N4,...}.
A then uses the ith integer in the sequence to produce the ith random value 
with B being able to verify the fairness of the sequence after the fact.  
Note that B can generate the integer sequence incrementaly so that values
are only generated as needed, like for a game (Poker for example!)

Note: that RSA is not needed for this algorithm and any encryption algorithm 
that is strong enough to be unbreakable during the time it takes to generate 
the random values is good enough (even an encryption algorithm that both 
parties know how to break is good enough, if the time to break it is larger 
than the time needed to produce the random sequence.)

P.S. Does this question come up often enough to be in the FAQ?  If so, please
feel free to use the above write up for that purpose.

--
Mark Biggar
mab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6558 alt.security.pgp:472
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: mwarren@oracle.com (Mark Warren)
Subject: RE: PGP cyptanalysis (was Re: discussion desired)
Organization: Oracle Corporation, Belmont, CA
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 21:20:51 GMT
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by an unauthenticated user
              at Oracle Corporation.  The opinions expressed are those
              of the user and not necessarily those of Oracle.


Does anyone know of a similar analysis of RIPEM and/or RSAREF?

Thanks,

Mark


In article <1993Jan7.002820.3579@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu> mkagalen@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu (michael kagalenko) writes:

     About using the electronic signature for protection of
     commercial information:

     The analysis of PGP ver.2.0 program.


      ---------------------------------------------------------------------



	THE MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY named after m.V. Lomonosov
      ______________________________________________________________


	   THE MATHEMATICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY PROBLEMS LABORATORY



--
Mark Warren                                                  warren@oracle.com           
(415) 506-4639 Voice or 506-7292 Fax                       RIPEM key on server
The X-Face header is my picture! Get `faces' from cs.indiana.edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt