From: dpe@inel.gov (Don Palmrose)
Subject: Re: Marines, are they needed?
Organization: INEL EG&G Idaho
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1992 12:58:18 GMT


From dpe@inel.gov (Don Palmrose)

In article <1992Jul28.130722.25304@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.) writes:
> 
> 
> From HADCRJAM@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)
> 
> In <1992Jul26.175840.27199@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> jmc@sail.stanford.edu writes:
> 
> > 3. My impression is that naval air power was not of much use against
> > land targets in Libya or in the Gulf.  It seems that too much of it is
> > optimized for air-to-air combat in defense of the carriers themselves.
> > The Aegis cruisers would be useful against an enemy with substantial
> > air power, but we don't have any at the moment.
> 
>   For the first point here, it would seem this is a good argument for
> changing the the aircraft complement, not ditching the carrier fleets.  (Could 
> you imagine A-10's flying off carrier decks?  Never happen, but I do drool at
> the thought...8^)) The carrier is still the only reasonable and fairly certain 
> way of projecting air power into a coastal area (land bases may not be 
> available).
> 

Also, the Navy had more than a third of all aircraft sorties against Iraq.
Navy aircraft were extremely effective against Libya.  One reason why people
think they were not is because the Naval Aviators do not want fancy camera
equipement taking up room and space that can be fitted with electronic jammers
and such.  Thus, the Air Force had much better video of their planes in action
that caught the public eye.

>   As to the second point, it is rarely a good idea to cut down on the defenses
> for such a valuable vessel.  It doesn't take all that many planes to launch
> a frightening number of a/s missiles.
> 
> > I was told that in the Gulf, the Navy was inhibited by the prospect
> > of mines and that they could not co-ordinate air strikes with the
> > Air Force because of lack of high speed digital communication.  (The
> > daily 700 page air tasking document had to be delivered on floppy
> > disks.)
> 
>   I also understand it had to do with the differing philosophies between the
> two branches.  The air force preferred very structured, semi-rigid plans,
> while the navy was more inclined to maximize flexibility.  This difference
> no doubt stems from the different expected operating environments for each.
> 

The Air Tasking Order for Desert Storm weighed 6 POUNDS!  Due to the common
problem of each branch having different ways of communicating, the ATO had to
be picked up in Riyadh, delivered to the carriers, and transferred to the
surface ships. IMO, not a way to run an air campaign (put this in the things
to correct column of the Desert Storm Report).  Just think how any corrections
were done!

> semper fi,
> 
> Jammer Jim Miller 
> Texas A&M University '89 and '91
> 

Don Palmrose
"I'd rather not serve on a ship designed to sink...."




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