HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: herman@nosc.mil (John W. Herman)
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz Trunked Radio System Signals)
Organization: Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, CA
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1992 22:48:16 GMT

smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:

>In article <1992Dec30.121120.736@uoft02.utoledo.edu>, cscon0151@uoft02.utoledo.edu writes:
>> I've heard the designers of DES made the code too difficult.  The NSA, which
>> apparently has to approve the encryption format,  thought that code was too
>> difficult, and purposely flawed the encryption standard.  That's what the
>> people in sci.crypt told me (I think it was them).  Anyways, the sci.crypt
>> newsgroup has some good info about DES and DVP,  at least they did a couple
>> months ago.

>Yup, sci.crypt is the right newsgroup for this question, and I've redirected
>followups to that group.  But since the question keeps coming up...
*** Lots of good stuff I agree with deleted. ***

DES is certainly good eough for any application that does not interest
a government.  If a government is interested in decrypting any information
you have, you should consult a professional.  I have no idea how you might
get in touch with one.

One other point, any examination of the open literature regarding
protection of sensitive information reveals that the easiest way to get
access to that information is by corrupting someone with access.  In
commercial endeavors, this is frequently very easy since only money and
honor are involved.  Other popular methods are illegal entry and bugging
of various types.  None of these techniques require any cryptographic
capability.  (When was the last time you checked your mechanical pencil
to see if it was bugged.)

The crypto system is frequently the strongest link in a weak protection
scheme.  Lots of idiots and a few good cryptologists have looked at DES
and no one has come up with any easy way to crack it.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6110 misc.legal:21680
From: rick@ee.uwm.edu (Rick Miller)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,misc.legal
Subject: Re: PGP use Ethical and Legal Questions
Date: 23 Dec 1992 11:15:01 GMT
Organization: Just me.
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.2.33
Summary: No Complaint == Customer Satisfaction

jap@cbnews.cb.att.com (james.a.parker) writes:
[...]
>In addition, PKP has apparently not attempted to defend its patent against
>PGP (although they know of its existence); this gives some merit to the theory 
>that PKP *knows* it has no legal standing.
>
>The answer at this point, then, is it is unknown.  Unless and until the matter
>is adjudicated in a court of law, the legal status is not known.

I'm not a leec^H^H^H^Hlawyer, but I know that there is substantial precident
in cases where some one *should* have *said* something, but didn't...

A painter is contracted to paint a room in Acme's corporate offices.  He paints
it all right, but yellow with pink polka-dots!  Never mind that he was told to
paint it blue... some company drudge had walked through and *seen* it, and yet
there had been no complaint.  Because "the company" was 'aware' of the change,
and didn't react by objecting, the change was upheld as "approved".

This same thing confronts *anyone* who contracts labor of just about any sort.
What about RSA/PKP?  They've undoubtedly known of PGP 2.1, yet have not taken
any action (that I know of) to defend their patent... this signifies approval
by default in my eyes.  The only objection they seem to have (according to the
RSAREF license) is that PGP doesn't use the software libraries written by RSA.

I mean, since RSAREF's license puts the RSA _algorithm_ "in the clear" for
personal, private, and educational uses (just what PGP2.1 is for, de facto...),
then the only thing RSA is left quibbling about is that PGP is using different
source-code to do the same thing!  Hey, if that were illegal then there could
only be one flavor of UNIX[tm]!! or of *anything*!!!

Essentially, RSA's RSAREF license says, "Because this is our proprietary
algorithm, we're going to dictate that you only implement it with our source-
code."   The RSAREF license forbids any changes (other than those needed to
port it, in C only, to other architectures).  This means that you're not even
allowed to *improve* it!  I'm sure that someone could find a way to run their
algorithm more efficiently, quicker, etc. ... but that's not allowed.

Rick Miller   <rick@ee.uwm.edu> | <rick@discus.mil.wi.us>   Ricxjo Muelisto
Occupation:  Husband, Father, WEPCo. WAN Mgr., Discus Sys0p, and  Linux fan
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: vince@ghost.dsi.unimi.it (David Vincenzetti)
Subject: Re: sci.crypt.science
Organization: Computer Science Dep. - Milan University
Date: Fri, 25 Dec 1992 17:21:17 GMT

In <Bzru3E.1I4@chinet.chi.il.us> schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes:

>Anyone besides me sick of all the political discussions?  How about splitting
>this into sci.crypt.science and sci.crypt.politics?  Or booting all of the
>political talk to alt.security--and having someone moderate this newsgroup to
>ensure compliance?  My kill file is bulging.
>
>Bruce

What a good idea! I'm tired of all this political trash, furthermore
I'm outside the US and I don't like listening all the time to the risks
of using a patented algorithm, to the risks of looking at a patented
algorithm, to the incredible risks of even messing with a patented algoritmh
when living in the US. ``Cryptography == Weapon == Illegal'' for some
people, but I cannot stand this  absurdity any more.

Regards,
David

PS:
	The correct equation would be:
	
	``Cryptography == Privacy == Lack of control by government''
		==>
	``Crypto must be declared illegal to discourage its diffusion''

	Let's not make things more complicated.
-- 
David Vincenzetti, system administrator
Department of Computer Science,         Email: vince@ghost.dsi.unimi.it
via Comelico 41, 20135 Milan, ITALY     Phone: ++39 2 55006 39{1,2}
$PUBLIC KEY available by finger(1)$     Fax  : ++39 2 55006 373
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 21 Dec 92 19:31:37 GMT
 <a_rubin.724442396@dn66> <1992Dec18.230642.9747@netcom.com>
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Dec18.230642.9747@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:


>Arthur Rubin says:
>" R should then have been prosecuted for
>writing his Scientific American article, as Scientific American is sent
>world-wide."

>In this he fails to distinguish between ideas and algorithms (permitted
>via footnote in ITAR) and programs and software code (specifically
>prohibited).

But there was "code" in the SciAm article.  The algorithm description was
written in an actual translatable computer language.
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: PKP patents (legal question)
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 12:53:47 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <168C761F.UC445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu>, UC445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John M. Kelsey) writes:
>    Does PKP hold patents to *all* forms of public-key cryptology, including
> those methods still undiscovered?  Or do they simply hold the patent to
> all public key methods currently known?  Or neither?

There are claims in some of their patents that appear to claim all forms
of public key cryptography and public key distribution systems (i.e.,
Diffie-Hellman).  It isn't clear to me that those claims would withstand
attack.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:6107 alt.security.pgp:394
From: pcl@ox.ac.uk (Paul C Leyland)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: PGP as a World Standard
Date: 23 Dec 92 10:14:51 GMT
	<bontchev.725034641@fbihh> <1992Dec22.193145.15016@netcom.com>
Organization: Oxford University Computing Services, 13 Banbury Rd Oxford OX2
	6NN
In-reply-to: strnlght@netcom.com's message of 22 Dec 92 19:31:45 GMT

In article <1992Dec22.193145.15016@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

   I hate to prolong this thread, but on a new point Vesselin raised, if
   the patent or munitions act violation were possession and use of PGP
   in the U.S., the restitution is to get rid of it. Posting a key is not
   itself a violation but indicative of one, and thus a PGP-signed
   cancellation won't cure the violation. It would just worsen it, since
   one would have to use PGP to create the revocation certificate.

I always fear to get involved in an argument between two parties, said
argument being conducted in public, but here goes anyway.

As I understand it, David has unwittingly used a product he obtained
in a manner which he now believes to be unethical and, quite
naturally, does not wish to re-use that tainted product to negate some
of the consequences of the first action.

On the other hand, Vesselin has suggested that the product must be
used if he (David) is to make restitution in some sense.

Here's what I suggest:

David does *not* use PGP to issue a revocation certificate.  He
broadcasts, on this newsgroup, his secret key, pass-phrase, anything
he wishes, *without* using PGP.  He uses uuencode, for example, as an
asciifier.  Vesselin likewise posts David's public key and anyone who
is interested checks it against their own copy.  Once both are
published, anyone can check that they are indeed a public-private
pair.  Anyone in possession of both can then issue a revocation
certificate.

I'll volunteer, if need be, as I don't believe possession and use of
pgp *in my environment* is illegal or unethical.  I'd prefer others to
do it (Vesselin?), as I've only just started to use pgp and I'm not
fully confident that I know exactly what I'm doing.

Does this suggestion satisfy the honour of both parties?  Is it
practical?

Paul
--
Paul Leyland <pcl@oxford.ac.uk>          | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Service      |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is come, the song is over.
Tel: +44-865-273200  Fax: +44-865-273275 | Thought I'd something more to say.
Finger pcl@black.ox.ac.uk for PGP key    |
From: berson@crvax.sri.com (Thomas A. Berson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: sci.crypt.research
Date: Sun, 27 Dec 92 21:22:46 PST
Distribution: world
Organization: Anagram Laboratories

Count me in for sci.crypt.research. This other stuff is getting
old real fast.
--T
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 06:00:47 GMT

In article <1992Dec22.003359.1777@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>First of all the language of the act I posted makes clear that
>software, algorithms, flow charts are all controlled matter in the
>cryptographic area.

I wonder if the name "Joseph A Meyer" rings a bell to Mr. Sternlight.

Meyer was the NSA employee who in 1977 wrote an (unauthorized,
according to the official story of the incident) letter to the IEEE
warning that the scheduled presentation of the original RSA papers
would violate the ITARs.  To quote from the account in "The Puzzle
Palace" by James Bamford:

"He had a point. The ITAR did cover any 'unclassified information that
can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production,
manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development,
operation, maintenance, or reconstruction' of the listed materials, as
well as 'any technology which advances the state-of-the-art or
establishes a new art in an area of significant military applicability
in the United States'. And export did include transferring the
information both by writing and by either oral or visual means,
including briefings and symposia in which foreign nationals are
present.

"But followed literally, the vague, overly broad regulations would
seem to require that anyone planning to write or speak out publicly on
any technology touching the Munitions List must first get approval
from the State Department -- a chilling prospect clearly at odds with
the First Amendment and one as yet untested by the Supreme Court".
(end of excerpt)

Those familiar with the story know that in the resulting furor, the
NSA disavowed Meyer's actions. And no action was ever taken against
the inventors of RSA, despite the fact that their "disclosure"
arguably enhanced foreign cryptographic capabilities far more than
anything released since then, including software packages like PGP.

After all, PGP is merely an implementation of an algorithm that is now
well known all over the world, thanks to R, S and A having stood up to
Mr. Meyer (or the NSA, depending on who you believe) for the First
Amendment. I do not mean to disparage all the work that went into PGP,
but any competent and motivated C programmer could have produced
something comparable. Indeed, there are other independent RSA
implementations from outside the US, such as the "CRYPTOS" package
from Moscow.

Face it, the NSA knows that they can't hold back the rising tide of
cryptography forever.  They know that their ban on exporting widely
available public domain encryption software wouldn't have a chance in
court, and that it will probably be eliminated by the Clinton
administration anyway (if recent news reports are accurate). But that
doesn't keep them from doing their utmost (short of going to court, of
course) to delay the inevitable.  And people like Mr. Sternlight help
make things just a little easier for them.

Phil
From: matt@amsaa-cleo.brl.mil (Matt Rosenblatt)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP v. 2.1 Released
Date: 22 Dec 92 16:37:20 GMT
Organization: U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, APG MD

In article <1992Dec18.224331.7046@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com 
(David Sternlight) writes:

>and if my grandma had baytzim she'd have been my grandpa. 

Foreign languages, here on sci.crypt?

>Surely there's no compulsion on a patent holder to license what they
>consider to be a violation, after the fact. Both PGP 1.x and 2.x were
>presented as faits accompli.   [David Sternlight]

Aghh!  Please: "faits accomplis."  Watch those foreign languages!
                              ^

					-- Matt Rosenblatt
					(matt@amsaa-cleo.brl.mil)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)
Subject: Re: PGP technical question (Not a flame)
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 10:52:43 GMT

In article <168C413C13.UC445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu> UC445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John M. Kelsey) writes:
>   Why did PGP change from bassomatic to IDEA?  Where can I find references
>to IDEA?  (It's Swiss?)
I assume they changed to it, because it's _not_ DES :-) , has a 128-bit
key, and is 'a little bit' faster than e.g. DES.

It is swiss.

PGP says:
The IPES/IDEA block cipher was developed at ETH in Zurich by James L.
Massey and Xuejia Lai, and published in 1990.  
Early published papers on
the algorithm called it IPES (Improved Proposed Encryption Standard),
but they later changed the name to IDEA (International Data
Encryption Algorithm).

Idea Sources say:
The IDEA(tm) block cipher is covered by a patent held by ETH and a
Swiss company called Ascom-Tech AG.  The Swiss patent number is
PCT/CH91/00117.  International patents are pending. IDEA(tm) is a
trademark of Ascom-Tech AG.  There is no license fee required for
noncommercial use.  Commercial users may obtain licensing details
from Dieter Profos, Ascom Tech AG, Solothurn Lab, Postfach 151, 4502
Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel +41 65 242885, Fax +41 65 235761.

For further information on the IDEA cipher, see these papers:
1) Xuejia Lai, "Detailed Description and a Software Implementation of 
   the IPES Cipher", Institute for Signal and Information
   Processing, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich, Switzerland, 1991
2) Xuejia Lai, James L. Massey, Sean Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and 
   Differential Cryptanalysis", Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'91

I hope this helps you, if You __really__ need 1) as paper-mail, send
me a mail.

Friendly greetings,
	/Gec
-- 
Instruments register only through things they're designed to register.
Space still contains infinite unknowns.

Germano Caronni    caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: sci.crypt.research
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 04:41:43 GMT

In article <23998@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca> alain@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca (Alain Simon) writes:
>In <1992Dec27.043202.29306@ncar.ucar.edu>
>prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Philip Zimmermann)
>endorses:
>
>> Starting sci.crypt.research sounds good to me.
>> [ ... ]
>
>	I would much rather create a talk group dedicated to political
>	aspects, philosophical issues, and subversive proposals
>	than move an existing group with a strong mandate and a very
>	clearly identifiable hierarchy (sci).
>	
>	NO 	to sci.crypt.research
>	YES	to talk.crypt
>	YES	to keeping sci.crypt as is
>	NO	to moderating either
>
>
>
>--
> Alain - Canadian Patent #1310575
> [ ... usual disclaimer... ]

Second the motion.

David

-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PGP as a World Standard
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 19:31:45 GMT


I hate to prolong this thread, but on a new point Vesselin raised, if
the patent or munitions act violation were possession and use of PGP
in the U.S., the restitution is to get rid of it. Posting a key is not
itself a violation but indicative of one, and thus a PGP-signed
cancellation won't cure the violation. It would just worsen it, since
one would have to use PGP to create the revocation certificate.

David


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PGP - Legal?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 03:04:25 GMT

In article <1993Jan4.004107.25668@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:

>
>Espionage? For obtaining unclassified information that is very widely
>and readily available to anyone in the US?

We were talking about what's possible. Phil should read the munitions
act some day. There are some things, for example, which can readily
be seen from "unclassified territory" that are a violation of the
law to photograph. They are enumerated by general category in the 
Act.

Phil seems to think that calling attention to the facts makes one
a right-wing Republican. He is way off base.

David



-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: gerben@rna.indiv.nluug.nl
Subject: Simple PGP question
Organization: G.R.O.S.S.
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 21:09:10 GMT

If I try to "sign" a message with -s, the original text is encrypted. I want to  
have a sort of "digital signature" appended after the text. I could use pgp -bs for  
that, but is that the way to go? And what if I want to use a unix pipe?

Thanks,

-- 
Gerben Wierda                 Tel. (+31) 35 833539
  "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."
  From the Talmud(?), rephrased in Lewis Carroll, "Alice in Wonderland".

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: positron@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jonathan Haas)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: University of Michigan EECS Dept., Ann Arbor
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1993 16:50:50 GMT

In article <2229.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us> jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel)  writes:
>
>    Since laws will probably be drafted concerning the use of cryptology
>    how would you want such a law  to read if you had the opportunity to
>    shape it.
>                                                                          

Well, if the government passes a registration law, and demands that I hand
them my private key, I will politely tell it to kiss my ass. Our
government has already way, way overstepped its bounds (considering
that it was created to protect the rights of its citizens; nothing
more) and I will not voluntarily help it to go farther. If such a law
is passed (which I doubt will happen, but you never know) I predict
large-scale disobedience with it, which is proper.

This raises an interesting question. If the government tosses me in
jail for refusing to relinquish my private key as required by law,
it will likely get access to my UNIX account and all the files contained
thereon. My private key is protected by a password, and PGP demands
it each time I attempt to use it. Just how secure is PGP's encryption
of secret keys?

-- 
__/\__  Jonathan S. Haas         | Jake liked his women the way he liked
\    /  University of Michigan   | his kiwi fruit: sweet yet tart, firm-
/_  _\  positron@eecs.umich.edu  | fleshed yet yielding to the touch, and
  \/                             | covered with short brown fuzzy hair.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality: AntiAmericanism
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 20:04:35 GMT


There have been a few anti-American distortions of my post that I need
to correct, in which people, in response to my comments about crypto
saving lives in WWII have said, "What about the Japanese dead?"  Some
have even attempted privately to accuse me of racism, but when
challenged have failed to support such nonsense.

Leaving aside that the Purple decrypts allowed the U.S. forces to
defend against Japanese ATTACKS, as in the Pacific Naval battles (so
the Japanese dead belong on the head of the Japanese, not the U.S,.
military), I also cited Enigma, which saved many British and other
non-U.S. lives.

It seems that some like to bash the U.S. (including some Americans)
at every opportunity, but please, it's really off the subject
of whether crypto has saved lives in wartime. The evidence seems
incontrovertible to me. 

And let's recall that the question of whether it has is really about
whether the government thinks it has. And let's recall that the
question of whether the government thinks it has is offered as an
explanation for why the government takes crypto more seriously than
the dimensions of a model airplane (which is what started this entire
subthread).

So getting back to the origin of this entire mini-tempest side
discussion, all the arguments above were sophistries attempting to
refute the obvious--that the government takes crypto more seriously
than the dimensions of model airplanes, which was my original point in
response to a question.

David
Newsgroups: sci.crypt