From: hallam@zeus02.desy.de (Phill Hallam-Baker)
Subject: Re: buying peerage
Reply-To: Hallam@zeus02.desy.de
Organization: Deutsches Elektronen Synchrotron, Experiment ZEUS bei HERA
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1992 22:27:16 GMT

In article <1992Sep9.164257.2338@maths.nott.ac.uk>, anw@maths.nott.ac.uk (Dr A.
N. Walker) writes:

|>In article <1992Sep8.225728.316@dscomsf.desy.de>
|>Hallam@zeus02.desy.de writes:
|>[about the HoL delaying tactic]
|>>This applies only to bills, orders in council can in general be recinded by
|>a
|>>motion in either house. since the main method of legislation by the Thatcher
|>>government was enabling bill followed by orders in council [...]
|>
|>	In other words, the Thatcher government *chose* to govern in a way
|>that *could* be vetoed by their buddies upstairs.  Big deal.  Presumably,
|>an incoming Labour (or other) government could choose to govern in the
|>old-fashioned way and avoid the veto, or could produce an Act restricting
|>the application of the veto to orders.

You don't see anything wrong in a system where socialist governments have to
play by one set of rules and the Tories can make up their own?


|>>		       This effectively means a complete veto over all business
|>>in the last year of a parliament.
|>
|>	In such a case, the veto is likely to be a major issue in the
|>election campaign.  A government which tries to push through deeply
|>unpopular business in haste just before an election is being just as
|>silly as an opposition that uses its [assumed] majority in the HoL to
|>block popular business.  In other words, it's not likely to happen in
|>the real world short of a major constitutional crisis that indeed has
|>to be resolved by an election.

Again the Lords can create problems for a Labour government and create
constitutional crises, you still can't see what is wrong in having an inbuilt
slant to the whole system?


|>>When parliamentary time is the major factor determining the passage of many
|>>bills a veto can in fact prevent a clause from getting to the statute book
|>
|>	But this doesn't happen either.  The time has mostly already been
|>spent in getting the bill through the HoC in the first place.  When the HoL
|>uses its "veto", one of three things happens:  (a) the bill really was a bit
|>silly, and it is quietly dropped;  (b) the bill was basically OK but the HoL
|>has found some serious problem, and it gets batted to and fro [usually
|>quite quickly] until it is acceptable to both Houses;  (c) the HoC decides
|>to push the bill through regardless, in which case they wait the statutary
|>year and then bung it through unchanged in a few minutes flat.  In no case
|>is there a serious waste of parliamentary time.  There are many reasons
|>why legislation that runs into difficulties can get bogged down for lack
|>of time;  the HoL "veto" isn't one of them.

You forget the difficulties of the Labour government running on a majority of
four. In this situation the HoL could have proved a major problem. What happened
of course is they were told that if they gave a peep then instead of
nationalisation bills being passed it would be a new parliament act.


|>>The House of Lords does an important job - badly. There is no place for
|>>superanuated buffoons whose reason for being entitled to vote rests on their
|>>brown nosing or on the brown nosing of their ancestors.
|>
|>	I agree that the HoL consists of rotten people doing a rotten job;
|>until you consider the possible alternatives.  If not the brown noses, then
|>who?  If elected representatives, then you must face the probability that
|>they will often be of different complexion from the government.  Whether
|>or not they have "real" power, you then have a recipe for constitutional
|>crisis, with both sides screaming about mandates, and fixes -- as we see
|>occasionally in France and in the USA when the President is at loggerheads
|>with the Senate [or whatever]. 

So what? Might actualy see some open government for a change. In such a
situation there is deadlock until the parties accept that they must shift from
their party lines and agree on some middle course. This is a perfectly sensible
form of government. You do not *have* to have an elective dictatorship where the
MPs are merely lobby fodder for the executive.


|> The advantage of having people who know
|>that they have no real right to be there is that in a crisis they have to
|>back down and keep a low profile.  This means that when they do stand up,
|>they're probably pretty serious about it.

Last time the Lords made a big stand it was to introduce Clause 23, remember
that? the homophobic bigotry clause. Tacked into another bill and then
railroaded through the commons. Unelected people can turn out to be bigots just
as easily as farsighted "impartial" participants.

--

Phill Hallam-Baker
Newsgroups: soc.culture.british,rec.arts.tv.uk,rec.arts.drwho,alt.tv.prisoner