HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: vincent@reg.triumf.ca (pete)
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: dept. of theophysics and cosmogyny
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 1992 11:58:00 GMT

In article <1992Aug20.221402.12691@news.eng.convex.com>, 
cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes...
>In article <1992Aug20.213124.27227@reed.edu> bcushman@lust.reed.edu 
(Ben Cushman) writes:
>>In article <403@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca> skataria@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca  
>>(skataria) writes:
> 
>>> WHAT IS LOVE? 
>>> Can somebody give me a convincing answer?
> 
>What kind of love? As any classical scholar knows, the ancients had several
>different words that are today regrettably subsumed under the same English
>word. For example, "eros" was quite different from "caritas"--only in
>modern times does one use the same word for teenagers who are smitten by
>one another and for Mother Theresa's regard for humanity: we call both
>"love". No wonder we're confused, and puzzle about the meaning of "love".
> 
>"Romantic" love, incidentally, is a modern invention. It wasn't around
>before...oh, the 1200s. (C.S. Lewis wrote a scholarly work about this; I'll
>track down the reference if anyone is interested.)
> 
>>Here is a first attepmt at a reading list--
>....
> 
>I'd like to add: I Corinthians 13, by the apostle Paul.
> 
A couple of minor interesting notes about this text: first, as
an example of earlier divisions in the meanings now bundled in
the word `love', different (older?) versions of the bible use the word
`charity', rather than `love', in this text. With that reading,
I find the impact of the text considerably reduced. Probably
because `love' carries the passionate emotion of its other
aspects into its use in a spiritual context.

Secondly, I encountered a book I believe was called The Essene
Gospels, many years ago, which as I recall reputed to date
from ~170 AD ( in Macedonia?). It contained the identical
text to I Corinthians, but framed as a speech made by Jesus,
folded into a story which mainly featured Jesus as some
kind of practitioner of herbal folk medicine.

===========================================================================
I am become as sounding brass...                          Pete Vincent


Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<MARTINC.92Aug11215203@grover.cs.unc.edu>
	<1992Aug12.121000.14661@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1992Aug13.082047.23332@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 11:22:11 GMT

In article <1992Aug13.082047.23332@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >I don't know
   >about influence, but to me the greatest philosopher of the century was
   >Frank Ramsey.

  Ramsey was a remarkable person to be sure, but your evaluation of his
philosophical work is highly eccentric. Could you explain your attitude
further?

   >This is a test to see if I can post more successfully than my previous
   >embarrassing attempt.

  Your article here arrived with a senseless "Followup-To: %r" line.

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Having to believe
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 18:16:56 GMT

In article <denmckinnon.4.713853978@halls1.cc.monash.edu.au> denmckinnon@halls1.cc.monash.edu.au (NEIL MCKINNON) writes:
[...]
>What bothers me about this picture now is that it does not seem to explain, 
>for example, the convergence of beliefs within a society, and how we use our 
>language successfully as a communal device to attain goals.  Putnam feels 
>the need to retain realism (though he is an anti-realist at base) as an 
>model to explain these things, but I don't see how they can in fact be 
>explained if without assuming that there might be a language-independent, 
>objective Universe.

Eureka!  I have it!  There is a language-independent, objective
universe!  But didn't I start by thinking something like that back
when I was a little kid?  Why did I let anyone talk me out of it in
the first place?

>
>Neil.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 1992 15:02:23 GMT
Organization: The Instrumentality
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <21AUG199204583702@reg.triumf.ca> vincent@reg.triumf.ca (pete) writes:
>In article <1992Aug20.221402.12691@news.eng.convex.com>, 
>cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes...
...
>>I'd like to add: I Corinthians 13, by the apostle Paul.

>A couple of minor interesting notes about this text: first, as
>an example of earlier divisions in the meanings now bundled in
>the word `love', different (older?) versions of the bible use the word
>`charity', rather than `love', in this text. With that reading,
>I find the impact of the text considerably reduced. Probably
>because `love' carries the passionate emotion of its other
>aspects into its use in a spiritual context.

Quite right--the King James Version uses "charity". I think the impact is
"reduced" primarily because our word "charity" has become debased from the
original meaning of the word.  "Charity" now merely means to give to the
poor--the more powerful connotations have been altogether drained from this
word.
-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Huh?!?
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 11:52:53 +0000

torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes...

>In article <1992Aug12.185711.9520@gecko.uucp> josh@Tekelec.gecko.uucp
>(Josh Barinstein) writes:

>   >Say what???

>  I take it you haven't learned Kocabas-speak yet. It will come to you.
>Just relax, and let your eyes look in opposite directions.


You sly old fox: And we thought you were just a stuffy old stuck up
philosopher, and now you let on that you are really a closet
Transcendental meditator and mystic to boot....


Well!



Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Christopher P Menzel         )
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 04:27:23 GMT

In article <1992Aug18.214302.1721@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>MA:
>>>If God knows all truths then surely (if the word 'all' is to have any 
>>>                             ^^^^^^
>>>proper meaning) there must also _be_ a set of all truths.
>>
>CM:
>>Rhetoric alert!!!  So the idea is that `all' has its "proper meaning"
>>only if the things quantified over constitute a set, and indeed that
>>it is absurd to suggest otherwise?  Care to provide an argument for
>>that--beyond an emphatic "surely" (bang the table, stamp the floor)?
>
>Grim's argument (whose general form you seem to accept) against
>universal quantification over all true propositions (which I believe is
>your suggestion) appears on pp.119-20 of his book.  May I suggest that
>you and your tenure look it up so that we can discuss it.

Well, I wouldn't dream of speaking for my tenure, but for myself,
here's a sneak preview of my reply, a full version of which will
follow after I track the book down and review the argument as you
wisely counsel: I am inclined to accept the argument as it applies to
the existence of a set of all truths (though I don't think it's
*quite* as airtight as I let on earlier), but I find it thoroughly
unconvincing when revised so as to cast aspersions upon the the
coherence of quantification over all truths.  Arguments to follow...

>>>MZ:
>>>  Why worry about this any more than you
>>>>worry about the existence of an alethic totality of all sets (in ZF, that
>>>>is)? 
>>>
>MA:
>>>I do worry -- about both.  The existence of a set of all true
>>>propositions is linked to many important philosophical problems.
>>>The articulation of a successful Platonist philosophy of mathematics
>>>is probably not possible with just a set of all true statements since
>>>if Fermat's Last Theorem, eg., is true the proof of this could be
>>>inexpressible.
>>
>CM:
>>And how, exactly, the does the existence of a set of all truths help
>>us here (if that's what you're suggesting; if not, what ARE you
>>suggesting)? 
>
>On a realist reading of mathematical truth, a proposition such as
>Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false.  What I suggest is 
>that even if a proof one way or the other is never found, it still
>exists (this is what I called a 'noumenal truth' in my note).

Well, SURELY no self-respecting realist would deny that an undecidable
proposition is nonetheless either true or false (indeed, in the case
of FLT, true (if undecidable)); but I fear you have not answered the
question...

--Chris Menzel
From: ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson)
Subject: Re: Wittgensteins Logic Contributions
Organization: GRAMMA
	<1992Aug22.102046.4759@sics.se> <1992Aug22.160048.11994@sics.se>
	<1992Aug22.163832.13136@sics.se>
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 18:40:07 GMT

>>>>> In article <1992Aug22.163832.13136@sics.se>, torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

torkel>In article <1992Aug22.160048.11994@sics.se>ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson) 
torkel> writes:

   >Doesn't W comment on this matter in the "W lectures on
   >the foundations of mathematics" (ed. Diamond)? I don't have the
   >book here but I recall that W says that Frege invented the truth tables but
   >that he used them for actually defining the logical constants. 

torkel> You're right that Wittgenstein mentions this, 
        but what he says (or rather,
torkel> what he is reported as having said) is something different. I quote:


torkel>     Incidentally, this kind of schema [i.e. truth tables] is not
torkel>     my invention; Frege used it. The only part of it which is my
torkel>     invention - not that it matters in the least - was to use this as
torkel>     a symbol for the proposition, not as an explanation of it
torkel>     (like Frege).

Thank you for giving the correct passage. Enough space has
probably already been given to this item but since it was
brought up I can as well mention that this is discussed in
"Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932, ed. Lee" where we
find:  (page 50)

___________________________________________________________________________    

Frege explained such truth functions ('not', 'or', 'and' e t c)
by propositions containing the words true and false; and this
explanation is itself a notation which can be substituted for
them. (Every explanation can be substituted for what it
explains.) It is not a statement of a relation between e.g. 
'not p' and 'p is false' but a definition.


    p  |                |
  -------------         |
    T  |   F            \    =    not p
  -------------         /
    F  |   T            |
                        |
                        

But not "If 'p is T' is F, and 'P is F' is T, then not p". It is
a definition not an expression of an external relation.

----------------------------------------------------------------
(Due to lack of symbols the above passage is somewhat edited.)


I believed that even in the 1935 lectures the truth function
(e.g. 'not') is what is being defined (according to W) by the
truth table. Then regarding the logical constants, 'not' for
example, as a truth functions permits the formulation I
incorrectly attributed to W: 
"the logical constants can be defined by truth tables".
Exactly what is meant by "proposition" in the quote
you give above is unclear to me. Perhaps W regarded the truth
table as a replacement for the proposition "not p" the
connection being that "p" is used in the truth table. 
What really is defined is, I beleive, the 'not' as 'p' is ranging over
all propositions. 

best regards Anders
--


        Dawn points, and another day
      Prepares for heat and silence.

      
      (T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: "Is truth good?" or "Is good truth?"
From: Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz (Hakki Kocabas)
Date: 15 Aug 92 02:21:35 GMT
Organization: Kappa Crucis Unix BBS, Auckland, New Zealand

Scientific philosophy ?!
Scientific philosophy !?
who's that, I'm gonna bust that body!
who's thaaaaat....I'm really gonna bust that body!

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence 
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 19:15:33 GMT

In article <1992Aug18.004116.24086@panix.com> davidc@panix.com (David B. Chorlian) writes:
>In <1992Aug14.124501.14732@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>
>>I find the question of the nature of meaning to be the second most
>>important classical philosophical question, the first being that of the
>>structure of reality.  The contributions of Frege, Russell, Cantor, Tarski,
>>Church, et al. to one or both of them, as the case may be, could hardly be
>>overestimated. 
>
>You overestimate them.  The contributions of Husserl, Heidegger, and
>Wittgenstein to understanding the structure of the everday reality
>in which we live our lives is far more significant. (And not because
>they offer a coherent set of answers.)  Both Husserl and Wittgenstein
>were interested in logic and mathematics at the beginning of their
>philosophical careers, making significant contributions to the
>philosophy of logic and mathematics,

Wittgenstein, at least, made no significant contribution to
mathematical logic.  He did "popularize" it in the Tractatus.  About
Husserl, I can only report that I am not aware of any contributions of
Husserl at all.  You should be aware that I am a professional
mathematical logician.

 and each turned from the model
>of formal logic as a controlling discipline to studies which rooted
>themselves in what they thought was the everyday experience of
>humankind.  In doing this they approached their work with the same
>degree of rigor as they had brought to their studies of formal
>logic.  Their results show that the world cannot be understood as
>the objective correlate of a system of formal logic, as a set of
>objects with properties, but as constituted by a range of human
>activities and practices which show a complicated and subtle
>"grammar".

All that this kind of argument shows is that the world is not a
_simple_ set of objects and properties.  First, there is the matter of
confusion of use and mention; analysis of the way we experience the
world is not analysis of the world itself (or only of a small part of
it).  Second, "grammar" is a matter of objects standing in relation to
one another.  Final remark: the world is not "constituted" by _any_
human activity.

>
>>cordially,
>>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>>eleven more days and counting...
>>"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."
>
>David B. Chorlian
>Neurodyamics Lab
>SUNY/HSCB


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Heidegger and Nazism
Organization: Oklahoma State University
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 92 19:13:33 GMT

From article <1992Aug19.193954.18697@ccu.umanitoba.ca>, by feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld):
> 
>>  However, I see no justification, on the other hand, to your second
>>claim when compared to the first.   I think that you will have to 
>>select which you feel is more adequate.  If you select the first, 
>>I am all ears as to how you can arrive at Nazism from his text--even
>>Derrida, whose methods may be questionable, failed to convience me of 
>>anything on this regard.  If you select the latter, you have to
>>be careful when thinking of God in this way.  There is always the
>>issue of time which puts forth a significant stumbling block to those
>>who would like to reduce _Sein und Zeit_ to a simple theological 
>>treatise.  However, to maintain both propositions simulatneously seems
>>undeniably absurd.
>>
> 
> Before I try to meet this legitimate challenge (that is, risk making
> (more of) a public spectacle of myself), let me just check on one
> crucial point:
> 
> I take it that we all agree that Heidegger was a Nazi for a
> significant portion of his Professorial career?  So the challenge is
> to show either the compatibility of _Sein & Zeit_ with Nazism, or that
> the text is itself nazi-istic?  Failing that initial understanding,
> I've no inclination to play.

  I would be intereted in either claim.  First, how you find a text
that purposely avoids ethics as one that could support something
like Nazism which requires an ethics.  And second, how you would
support the text as Nazistic.  As to whether Heidegger was a Nazi
for a significant protion of his Professorial career is a matter of
some debate(as Mikhail and I have shown), however in light of the challenge
I propose, it really makes no difference.

> -- 
> Michael Feld                         | E-mail:  <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
> Dept. of Philosophy                  | FAX:     (204) 261-0021
> University of Manitoba               | Voice:   (204) 474-9136
> Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada	                     

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
University of Chicago
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 18 Aug 92 21:43:02 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Aug18.194122.14877@tamsun.tamu.edu> 
cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Christopher P Menzel         ) writes:

>In article <1992Aug18.135945.7450@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>>MA:
>>>>>>What about  the true propositions that are left out of USC(T)?  I
>>>>>>suggest that we interpret these as _noumenal truths_ -- ineffable
>>>>>>but  true propositions,  such as  facts about God.   The question
>>>>>>of whether there actually is  an alethic totality  made up of all
>>>>>>true _propositions_ is, of course, left unanswered.
>>>
>>MZ:
>>>Chris Menzel has adequately addressed this claim in the concluding remarks
>>>of his article on this thread.
>>
MA:
>>He has presented one more argument in ZF -- this hardly settles the
>>issue.  As to his comments about omniscience I find them absurd.  
>
CM:
>Sputter!...Such impudence!  Hey, I have TENURE!

Wow!...gee!...Can I see it when mom's not looking?

MA:
>>If God knows all truths then surely (if the word 'all' is to have any 
>>                             ^^^^^^
>>proper meaning) there must also _be_ a set of all truths.
>
CM:
>Rhetoric alert!!!  So the idea is that `all' has its "proper meaning"
>only if the things quantified over constitute a set, and indeed that
>it is absurd to suggest otherwise?  Care to provide an argument for
>that--beyond an emphatic "surely" (bang the table, stamp the floor)?

Grim's argument (whose general form you seem to accept) against
universal quantification over all true propositions (which I believe is
your suggestion) appears on pp.119-20 of his book.  May I suggest that
you and your tenure look it up so that we can discuss it.

>>MZ:
>>  Why worry about this any more than you
>>>worry about the existence of an alethic totality of all sets (in ZF, that
>>>is)? 
>>
MA:
>>I do worry -- about both.  The existence of a set of all true
>>propositions is linked to many important philosophical problems.
>>The articulation of a successful Platonist philosophy of mathematics
>>is probably not possible with just a set of all true statements since
>>if Fermat's Last Theorem, eg., is true the proof of this could be
>>inexpressible.
>
CM:
>And how, exactly, the does the existence of a set of all truths help
>us here (if that's what you're suggesting; if not, what ARE you
>suggesting)? 

On a realist reading of mathematical truth, a proposition such as
Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false.  What I suggest is 
that even if a proof one way or the other is never found, it still
exists (this is what I called a 'noumenal truth' in my note).

Marko Amnell
From: rob@KAMAN.COM (Rob Vienneau)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: The Cogito is mistaken
Date: 21 Aug 92 19:44:14 GMT

Why Descartes' cogito argument is mistaken:

Consider the proposition "I think" or "Thinking is occuring."

Either it is in a language or it is just some vague feeling. If the
latter, one cannot draw any logical implications from its truth, and
Descartes' project fails.

If the former, a natural question arises. How do words mean? Thus, a
theory of meaning is needed prior to Descartes' axiom.

Now suppose one accepts that for a word or sentence to have meaning, a
distinction must exist between what I feel that word means at any
given time and what that word does mean. There's a difference between
thinking one is following a rule and following a rule.

From this, it would seem that the use of a language is a social
process. Thus, to state "I think" presumes the existence of other
minds and a whole social world. But Descartes whole purpose was to
show what is self evident when everything is doubted (because, after
all, a demon may just be giving us illusions). Thus, Descartes is
mistaken in taking the cogito as an axiom.

Putnam, in _Reason, Truth, and History_, has a refutation of the
possibile existence of Descartes' demon. His argument also takes the
theory of meaning as central.
                                     Robert Vienneau
                                     rob@kaman.com
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:1550 sci.logic:1272
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Aug19.150044.28450@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Aug19.162800.25005@sics.se>
	<1992Aug19.172735.6787@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 19:44:36 GMT

In article <1992Aug19.172735.6787@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

  >Call it what you like.  I only care about the ideas not the label.

  I don't call it anything; it was you who prefaced your comments with
the statement that "on a realist reading of mathematical truth, a
proposition such as Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false",
which suggested that those remarks had something to do with
mathematical realism as ordinarily understood.

   >If there is no set of all truths and we think of the universe as the
   >physical manifestation of a set-theoretical possible world (ie. a set of
   >true propositions such that no proposition may be added to it without
   >precipitating a contradiction) then there is no universe as a totality;
   >the universe is, as Grim says, somehow incomplete or open.  Metaphysical
   >realism seems to include the thesis that the universe is complete and
   >whole -- in the sense of ,say, the opening lines of the _Tractatus_ 
   >"The world is all that is the case."

  I have no idea what you mean by "thinking of the universe as the
physical manifestation of a maximal consistent set of true
propositions", nor what "a universe as a totality" is supposed to
convey. It appears that "metaphysical realism" in your terminology is
a very obscure doctrine. I take it you are not saying that the
existence of a "set of all truths" is presupposed e.g.in mathematical
realism?

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta