From: covici@ccs.covici.com (John Covici)
Reply-To: covici@ccs.covici.com
Newsgroups: alt.activism
Subject: Unauthorized Biography of George Bush: part 25
Date: 1 Oct 92 20:58:23 GMT
Organization: Covici Computer Systems

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{XVII: Iran-Contra} 

{What pleases the prince
has the force of law.} 
   --Roman law  {``As long
as the police carries out the will of
the leadership, it is acting
legally.''} 
   --Gestapo officer Werner
Best@s1  
We cannot provide here a complete
overview of the Iran-Contra affair. We
shall attempt, rather, to give an
account of George Bush's decisive,
central role in those events, which
occurred during his vice-presidency and
spilled over into his presidency. 
   The principal elements of scandal
in Iran-Contra may be reduced to the
following points: 
   1) the secret arming of the
Khomeini regime in Iran by the U.S.
government, during an official
U.S.-decreed arms embargo against Iran,
while the U.S. publicly denounced the
recipients of its secret deliveries as
terrorists and kidnappers; 
   2) the secret arming of its
``Contras'' for war against the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, while
such aid was explicitly prohibited
under U.S. law; 
   3) the use of communist and
terrorist enemies--often {armed
directly by the Anglo-Americans}--to
justify a police state and covert,
oligarchical rule at home; 
   4) paying for and protecting the
gun-running projects with
drug-smuggling, embezzlement, theft by
diversion from authorized U.S.
programs, and the ``silencing'' of both
opponents and knowledgeable
participants in the schemes; and 
   5) the continual, routine perjury
and deception of the public by
government officials pretending to have
no knowledge of these activities.

   Bush's Central Role

   When the scandal broke, in late
1986 and early 1987, George Bush
maintained that he knew nothing about
these illegal activities.
   Since that time, many
once-classified documents have come to
light, which suggest that Bush
organized and supervised many, if
not most,
of the criminal aspects of the
Iran-Contra adventures. 
   The most significant events
relevant to George Bush's role are
presented here in the format of a
chronology. 
   Over the time period covered, the
reader will observe the emergence of
new structures in the U.S. government: 
   @sb^The ``Special Situation
Group,'' together with its subordinate
``Standing Crisis Pre-Planning Group''
(May 14, 1982). 
   @sb^The ``Crisis Management
Center'' (February 1983). 
   @sb^The ``Terrorist Incident
Working Group'' (April 3, 1984). 
   @sb^The ``Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism'' (or simply Terrorism Task
Force) (July 1985). 
   @sb^The ``Operations Sub-Group''
(January 20, 1986). 
   All of these structures revolved
around the secret command role of the
then-vice president, George Bush. 
   The propaganda given out to
justify these changes in government has
stressed the need for secrecy to carry
out necessary {covert acts} against
enemies of the nation (or of its
leaders). Certainly, a military command
will act secretly in war, and will
protect secrets of its vulnerable
capabilities. 
   But the Bush apparatus, within and
behind the government, was formed to
carry out {covert policies}: to make
war when the constitutional government
had decided not to make war; to support
enemies of the nation (terrorists and
drug-runners) who are the friends or
agents of the secret government. 
   In the period of the chronology,
there are a number of meetings of
public officials. By looking at the
scant information that has come to
light on these meetings, we may reach
some conclusions about who advocated
certain policy choices; but we have not
then learned much about the actual
origin of the policies that were being
carried out. This is the rule of an
oligarchy whose members are unknown to
the public, an oligarchy which is bound
by no known laws. 
   {March 25, 1981:} 
   Vice President George Bush was
named the leader of the United States
``crisis management'' staff, ``as a
part of the National Security Council
system.'' 
   {March 30, 1981:} 
   President Reagan was shot in an
attempted assassination.
   {May 14, 1982:} 
   Bush's position as chief of all
covert action and {de facto} head of
U.S. intelligence--in a sense, the
acting President--was formalized in a
secret memorandum. 
   The memo explained that ``National
Security Decision Directive 3, Crisis
Management, establishes the Special
Situation Group (SSG), chaired by the
Vice President. The SSG is charged ...
with formulating plans in anticipation
of crises.'' 
   The memo in question also
announced the birth of another
organization, the Standing Crisis
Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), which was to
work as an intelligence-gathering
agency for Bush and his SSG. This new
subordinate group, consisting of
representatives of Vice President Bush,
National Security Council (NSC) staff
members, the CIA, the military, and the
State Department, was to ``meet
periodically in the White House
Situation Room....'' They were to
identify areas of potential crisis and
``[p]resent ... plans and policy
options to the SSG'' under Chairman
Bush. And they were to provide to Bush
and his assistants, ``as crises
develop, alternative plans,''
``action/options'' and ``coordinated
implementation plans'' to resolve the
``crises.'' 
   Finally, the subordinate group was
to give to Chairman Bush and his
assistants ``recommended security,
cover, and media plans that will
enhance the likelihood of successful
execution.'' It was announced that the
CPPG would meet for the first time on
May 20, 1982, and that agencies were to
``provide the name of their CPPG
representative to Oliver North, NSC
staff....'' 
   The memo was signed {``for the
President''} by Reagan's national
security adviser, William P. Clark. It
was declassified during the
congressional Iran-Contra hearings.@s2 

   Gregg, Rodriguez, and North

   {August 1982:} 
   Vice President Bush hired Donald
P. Gregg as his principal adviser on
national security affairs. Gregg now
officially retired from the Central
Intelligence Agency. 
   Donald Gregg brought along into
the vice president's office his old
relationship with mid-level CIA
assassinations manager {Felix I.
Rodriguez}. Gregg had been
Rodriguez's boss in Vietnam. 
   Donald Gregg worked under Bush in
Washington from 1976--when Bush was CIA
director--through the later 1970s, when
the Bush clique was at war with
President Carter and his CIA director,
Stansfield Turner. Gregg was detailed
to work at the National Security
Council between 1979 and 1982. From
1976 right up through that NSC
assignment, CIA officer Gregg saw CIA
agent Rodriguez regularly. Both men
were intensely loyal to Bush.@s3 
   Their continuing collaboration was
crucial to Vice President Bush's
organization of covert action.
Rodriguez was now to operate out of the
vice president's office. 
   {December 21, 1982:} 
   The first ``Boland Amendment''
became law: ``None of the funds
provided in this Act [the Defense
Appropriations Bill] may be used by the
Central Intelligence Agency or the
Department of Defense to furnish
military equipment, military training
or advice, or other support for
military activities, to any group or
individual ... for the purpose of
overthrowing the government of
Nicaragua.'' 
   ``Boland I,'' as it was called,
remained in effect until Oct. 3, 1984,
when it was superseded by a stronger
prohibition known as ``Boland II.''@s4 
   {February 1983:} 
   Fawn Hall joined Oliver North as
his assistant. Ms. Hall reported that
she worked with North on the
development of a secret ``Crisis
Management Center.'' 
   Lt. Colonel North, an employee of
the National Security Council, is seen
here managing a new structure within
the Bush-directed SSG/CPPG arrangements
of 1981-82.@s5  
   {March 3, 1983:} 
   In the spring of 1983, the
National Security Council established
an office of ``Public Diplomacy'' to
propagandize in favor of and run cover
for the Iran-Contra operations, and to
coordinate published attacks on
opponents of the program. 
   Former CIA Director of Propaganda
Walter Raymond was put in charge of the
effort. The unit was to work with
domestic and international news media,
as well as private foundations. The
Bush family-affiliated Smith Richardson
Foundation was part of a National
Security Council ``private donors
steering committee'' charged with
coordinating this propaganda effort. 
   A March 3, 1983 memorandum from
Walter Raymond to then-NSC Director
William Clark, provided details of the
program: ``As you will remember you and I
briefly mentioned to the President when
we briefed him on the N[ational]
S[ecurity] D[ecision] D[irective] on
public diplomacy that we would like to
get together with some potential donors
at a later date.... 
   ``To accomplish these objectives
Charlie [United States Information
Agency Director Charles Z. Wick] has
had two lengthy meetings with a group
of people representing the private
sector. This group had included
principally program directors rather
than funders. The group was largely
pulled together by Frank Barnett, Dan
McMichael (Dick [Richard Mellon]
Scaife's man), Mike Joyce (Olin
Foundation), Les Lenkowsky (Smith
Richardson Foundation) plus Leonard
Sussman and Leo Cherne of Freedom
House. A number of others including Roy
Godson have also participated.''@s6 
   Elsewhere, Raymond described
Cherne and Godson as the coordinators
of this group. Frank Barnett was the
director of the Bush family's National
Strategy Information Center, for which
Godson was the Washington, D.C.
director. Barnett had been the project
director of the Smith Richardson
Foundation prior to being assigned to
that post. 
   The Smith Richardson Foundation
has sunk millions of dollars into the
Iran-Contra projects. Some Smith
Richardson grantees, receiving money
since the establishment of the National
Security Council's ``private steering
committee'' include the following: 
   @sb^{Dennis King}, to
write the book {Lyndon LaRouche and the
New American Fascism}, used as the
basis for arguments against LaRouche
and his associates by federal and state
prosecutors around the country.
   @sb^{Freedom House.} This
was formed by Leo Cherne, business
partner of CIA Director William Casey.
Cherne oversaw Walter Raymond's
``private donors committee.'' 
   @sb^{National Strategy
Information Center}, founded in
1962 by Casey, Cherne, and the Bush
family. 
   Thus, when an item appeared in a
daily newspaper, supporting the
Contras, or attacking their
opponents--calling them ``extremists,''
etc.--it is likely to have been planted
by the U.S. government, by the George
Bush-NSC ``private donors''
apparatus. 
   {March 17, 1983:} 
   Professional assassinations
manager Felix I. Rodriguez met with
Bush aide Donald P. Gregg, officially
and secretly, at the White House. Gregg
then recommended to National Security
Council adviser Robert ``Bud''
McFarlane a plan for El Salvador-based
military attacks on a target area of
Central American nations including
Nicaragua. 
   Gregg's March 17, 1983 memo to
McFarlane said: ``The attached plan,
written in March of last year, grew out
of two experiences: 
   ``--Anti-Vietcong operations run
under my direction in III Corps Vietnam
from 1970-1972. These operations [see
below], based on ... a small elite
force ... produced very favorable
results. 
   ``--Rudy Enders, who is now in
charge of what is left of the
para-military capability of the CIA,
went to El Salvador in 1981 to do a
survey and develop plans for effective
anti-guerrilla operations. He came back
and endorsed the attached plan. (I
should add that Enders and Felix
Rodriguez, who wrote the attached plan,
both worked for me in Vietnam and
carried out the actual operations
outlined above.) 
   ``This plan encountered opposition
and skepticism from the U.S.
military.... 
   ``I believe the plan can work
based on my experience in
Vietnam....''@s7 
   Three years later, Bush agent
Rodriguez would be publicly exposed as
the supervisor of the covert Central
American network illegally supplying
arms to the Contras.
     Rodriguez's uncle had been Cuba's
public works minister under Fulgencio
Batista, and his family fled Castro's
1959 revolution. Felix Rodriguez joined
the CIA, and was posted to the CIA's
notorious Miami Station in the early
1960s. The Ted Shackley-E. Howard Hunt
organization there, assisted by Meyer
Lansky and Santos Trafficante's
mafiosi, trained Rodriguez and other
Cubans in the arts of murder and
sabotage.
   Felix Rodriguez recounted his
early adventures in gun-running under
false pretexts in a ghost-written book,
{Shadow Warrior}: ``[J]ust around the time
President Kennedy was assassinated, I
left for Central America. 
   ``I spent almost two years in
Nicaragua, running the communications
network for [our enterprise].... [O]ur
arms cache was in Costa Rica. The
funding for the project came from the
CIA, but the money's origin was hidden
through the use of a cover
corporation.... The U.S. government had
the deniability it wanted; we got the
money we needed.... 
   ``In fact, what we did in Nicaragua
twenty-five years ago has some pretty
close parallels to the Contra operation
today.''@s8
 
   Rodriguez followed his CIA boss
Ted Shackley to Southeast Asia in 1970.
Shackley and Donald Gregg put Rodriguez
into the huge assassination and dope
business which Shackley and his
colleagues ran during the Indochina
war; this bunch became the heart of the
``Enterprise'' that went into action 15
to 20 years later in Iran-Contra. 
   Shackley funded opium-growing Meo
tribesmen for murder, and used the dope
proceeds in turn to fund his hit
squads. He formed the Military
Assistance Group-Special Operations
Group (MAG-SOG) political murder unit;
Gen. John K. Singlaub was a commander
of MAG-SOG; Oliver North and Richard
Secord were officers of the unit. By
1971, the Shackley group had killed
about 100,000 civilians in Southeast
Asia as part of the CIA's Operation
Phoenix. 
   After Vietnam, Felix Rodriguez
went back to Latin American CIA
operations, while other parts of the
Shackley organization went on to
drug-selling and gun-running in the
Middle East. 
   By 1983, both the Mideast Shackley
group and the self-styled ``Shadow
Warrior,'' Felix Rodriguez, were
attached to the shadow
commander-in-chief, George Bush.     
   {May 25, 1983:} 
   Secretary of State George Shultz
wrote a memorandum for President
Reagan, trying to stop George Bush from
running Central American operations for
the U.S. government. Shultz included a
draft National Security Decision
Directive for the President to sign,
and an organizational chart (``Proposed
Structure'') showing Shultz's proposal
for the line of authority--from the
President and his NSC, through
Secretary of State Shultz and his
assistant secretary, down to an
interagency group. 
   The last line of the Shultz memo
says bluntly what role is reserved for
the Bush-supervised CPPG: ``The Crisis
Pre-Planning Group is relieved of its
assignments in this area.'' 
   Back came a memorandum on White
House letterhead but bearing no
signature, saying no to Shultz: ``The
institutional arrangements established
in NSDD-2 are, I believe, appropriate
to fulfill [our national security
requirements in Central America]....''
With the put-down is a chart headlined
{``NSDD-2 Structure for Central
America.''} At the top is the
President; just below is a complex of
Bush's SSG and CPPG as managers of the
NSC; then below that is the secretary
of state, and below him various
agencies and interagency groups.@s9 
   {July 12, 1983:} 
   Kenneth De Graffenreid, new
manager of the Intelligence Directorate
of the National Security Council, sent
a secret memo to George Bush's aide,
Admiral Daniel Murphy: 
   ``... Bud McFarlane has asked that
I meet with you today, if possible, to
review procedures for obtaining the
Vice President's comments and
concurrence on all N[ational]
S[ecurity] C[ouncil] P[lanning] G[roup]
covert action and MONs.''@s1@s0 

   The Bush Regency in Action
 
   {October 20, 1983:} 
   The U.S. invasion of the Caribbean
island-nation of Grenada was decided
upon in a secret meeting under the
leadership of George Bush. National
Security Council operative Constantine
Menges, a stalwart participant in these
events, described the action for
posterity: ``My job that afternoon was
to write the background memorandum that
would be used by the vice president,
who in his role as `crisis manager'
would chair this first NSC meeting on
the [Grenada] issue.... 
   ``Shortly before 6:00 p.m., the
participants began to arrive: Vice
President Bush, [Secretary of Defense
Caspar] Weinberger, [Attorney General
Edwin] Meese, J[oint] C[hiefs of]
S[taff] Chairman General Vessey, acting
CIA Director McMahon, [State Dept.
officer Lawrence] Eagleburger, ...
North and myself.
   ``President Reagan was travelling,
as were [CIA Director] Bill Casey and
Jeane Kirkpatrick.... 
   ``Vice President Bush sat in the
President's chair.'' 
   Menges continued: ``The
objective, right from the beginning,
was to plan a rescue [of American
students detained on Grenada] that
would guarantee quick success, but with
a minimum of casualties.... 
   ``Secrecy was imperative.... As
part of this plan, there would be no
change in the schedule of the top man.
President Reagan ... would travel to
Augusta, Georgia, for a golf weekend.
Secretary of State Shultz would go
too....'' 
   Work now proceeded on detailed
action plans, under the guidance of the
vice president's Special Situation
Group. 
   ``Late Friday afternoon [Oct. 21]
... the CPPG ... [met] in room 208....
Now the tone of our discussions had
shifted from whether we would act to
how this could be accomplished.... 
   ``[The] most secure means [were
to] be used to order U.S. ships to
change course ... toward Grenada.
Nevertheless, ABC news had learned
about this and was broadcasting it.'' 
   Thus, the course of action decided
upon without the President was
``leaked'' to the news media, and
became a {fait-accompli.}
Menges's memo continues: ``It pleased
me to see that now our government was
working as a team.... That evening
Ollie North and I worked together ...
writing the background and decision
memoranda. Early in the evening [NSC
officer Admiral John] Poindexter
reviewed our first draft and made a few
minor revisions. Then the Grenada
memoranda were sent to the President,
Shultz and McFarlane at the golf course
in Georgia.... 
   ``Shortly before 9:00 a.m. [Oct.
22], members of the foreign policy
cabinet [sic!] began arriving at the
White House--all out of sight of
reporters. The participants included
Weinberger, Vessey, and Fred Ikle@aa from
Defense; Eagleburger and Motley from
State; McMahon and an operations
officer from CIA; and Poindexter, North
and myself from NSC. Vice President
Bush chaired the Washington group. 
   ``All participants were escorted to
room 208, which many had never seen
before. The vice president sat at one
end of the long table and Poindexter at
the other, with speaker phones
positioned so that everyone could hear
President Reagan, Shultz, and
McFarlane. 
   ``The detailed hour-by-hour plan was
circulated to everyone at the meeting.
There was also a short discussion of
the War Powers Resolution, which
requires the President to get approval
of Congress if he intends to deploy
U.S. troops in combat for more than
sixty days. There was little question
that U.S. combat forces would be out
before that time.... 
   ``The President had participated and
asked questions over the speaker phone;
he made his decision. The U.S. would
answer the call from our Caribbean
neighbors. We would assure the safety
of our citizens.''@s1@s1 
   Clearly, there was no perceived
need to follow the U.S. Constitution
and leave the question of whether to
make war up to the Congress. After all,
President Reagan had concurred, from
the golf course, with Acting President
Bush's decision in the matter.           
   {November 3, 1983:} 
   Bush aide Donald Gregg met with
Felix Rodriguez to discuss ``the
general situation in Central
America.''@s1@s2 
   {December 1983:} 
   Oliver North accompanied Vice
President Bush to El Salvador as his
assistant. Bush met with Salvadoran
army commanders. North helped Bush
prepare a speech, in which he publicly
called upon them to end their support
for the use of ``death squads.''@s1@s3 
         
   Attack from Jupiter
 
   {January 1 through March
1984:} 
   The {Wall Street Journal} of March
6, 1985 gave a de-romanticized version
of certain aquatic adventures in
Central America: ``Armed speedboats and a
helicopter launched from a Central
Intelligence Agency `mother ship'
attacked Nicaragua's Pacific port,
Puerto Sandino on a moonless New Year's
night in 1984. 
   ``A week later the speedboats
returned to mine the oil terminal. Over
the next three months, they laid more
than 30 mines in Puerto Sandino and
also in the harbors at Corinto and El
Bluff. In air and sea raids on coastal
positions, Americans flew--and fired
from--an armed helicopter that
accompanied the U.S.-financed Latino
force, while a CIA plane provided
sophisticated reconaissance guidance
for the nighttime attacks. 
   ``The operation, outlined in a
classified CIA document, marked the
peak of U.S. involvement in the
four-year guerrilla war in Nicaragua.
More than any single event, it
solidified congressional opposition to
the covert war, and in the year since
then, no new money has been approved
beyond the last CIA checks drawn early
[in the] summer [of 1984].... 
   ``CIA paramilitary officers were
upset by the ineffectiveness of the
Contras.... As the insurgency force
grew ... during 1983 ... the CIA began
to use the guerrilla army as a cover
for its own small ``Latino'' force.... 
   [The] most celebrated attack,
by armed speedboats, came Oct. 11, 1983,
against oil facilities at Corinto.
Three days later, an underwater
pipeline at Puerto Sandino was
sabotaged by Latino [sic] frogmen. The
message wasn't lost on Exxon Corp.'s
Esso unit [formerly Standard Oil of New
Jersey], and the international giant
informed the Sandinista government that
it would no longer provide tankers for
transporting oil to Nicaragua. 
   ``The CIA's success in scaring off a
major shipper fit well into its mining
strategy.... 
   ``The mother ship used in the mining
operation is described by sources as a
private chartered vessel with a
configuration similar to an oil-field
service and towing ship with a long,
flat stern section where helicopters
could land....'' 
   The reader may have already
surmised that Vice President Bush (with
his background in ``oilfield service''
and his control of a ``top-level
committee of the National Security
Council'') sat in his Washington office
and planned these brilliant schemes.
But such a guess is probably
incorrect--it is off by about 800
miles. 
   On Jupiter Island, Florida, where
the Bush family has had a seasonal
residence for the past several decades,
is the headquarters of Continental
Shelf Associates, Inc. (CSA).@s1@s4 
   This company describes itself as
``an environmental consulting firm
specializing in applied marine science
and technology ... founded in 1970....
The main office ... is located in
Jupiter, Florida, approximately 75
miles north of Miami.''
   The founder and chief executive of
CSA is Robert ``Stretch'' Stevens. A
former lieutenant commander in naval
special operations, Stevens has been a
close associate of CIA officer
{Theodore Shackley}, and of
Bush agent {Felix Rodriguez}
since the early 1960s, when Stevens
served as a boat captain in the
invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs,
and through the Vietnam War. 
   During the period 1982-85, CSA was
contracted by the U.S. intelligence
community, including the CIA, to carry
out coastal and on-the-ground
reconnaissance and logistical support
work in the eastern Mediterranean in
support of the U.S. Marine deployment
into Lebanon; and coastal mapping and
reconnaissance of the Caribbean island
of Grenada prior to the October 1983
U.S. military action. 
   Beginning in approximately the
autumn of 1983, CSA was employed to
design and execute a program for the
mining of several Nicaraguan harbors.
After the U.S. Senate restricted such
activities to non-U.S. personnel only,
CSA trained ``Latin American
nationals'' at a facility located on El
Bravo Island off the eastern coast of
Nicaragua. 
   Acta Non Verba (Deeds Not Words)
is a ``subsidiary'' of CSA,
incorporated in 1986 and located at the
identical Jupiter address. 
   {Rudy Enders}, the head of
the CIA's paramilitary section--and
deployed by George Bush aide Donald
Gregg--is a minority owner of Acta Non
Verba (ANV). 
   ANV's own tough-talking
promotional literature says that it
concentrates on ``counter-terrorist
activities in the maritime
environment.'' 
   A very high-level retired CIA
officer, whose private interview was
used in preparation for this book,
described this ``Fish Farm'' in the
following more realistic terms:
``Assassination operations and training
company controlled by Ted Shackley,
under the cover of a private
corporation with a regular board of
directors, stockholders, etc., located
in Florida. They covertly bring in
Haitian and Southeast Asian boat people
as recruits, as well as Koreans,
Cubans, and Americans. They hire out
assassinations and intelligence
services to governments, corporations,
and individuals, and also use them for
covering or implementing `Fish Farm'
projects/activities.'' 
   The upshot of the attack from
Jupiter--the mining of Nicaragua's
harbors--was that the Congress got
angry enough to pass the ``Boland II''
amendment, re-tightening the laws
against this public-private warfare. 
   {April 3, 1984:} 
   Another subcommittee of the Bush
terrorism apparatus was formed, as
President Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 138. The
new ``Terrorist Incident Working
Group (TIWG)'' reported to Bush's Special
Situation Group. The TIWG geared up
government agencies to support militant
counterterrorism assaults, on the
Israeli model.@s1@s5 

   ``How Can Anyone Object?''
 
   {June 25, 1984:} 
   The National Security Planning
Group, including Reagan, Bush, and other
top officials, met secretly in the
White House situation room at 2:00 p.m.
They discussed whether to risk seeking
``third-country aid'' to the Contras,
to get around the congressional ban
enacted Dec. 21, 1982. 
   George Bush spoke in favor,
according to minutes of the meeting. 
   Bush said, ``How can anyone object
to the U.S. encouraging third parties
to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas
under the [intelligence] finding. The
only problem that might come up is if
the United States were to promise to
give these third parties something in
return so that {some people might
interpret} this as some kind of an
exchange'' [emphasis added]. 
   Warning that this would be
illegal, Secretary of State Shultz
said: ``I would like to get money for
the Contras also, but another lawyer
[then-Treasury Secretary] Jim Baker
said if we go out and try to get money
from third countries, it is an
impeachable offense.'' 
   CIA Director Casey reminded Shultz
that ``Jim Baker changed his mind [and
now supported the circumvention]....'' 
   NSC adviser Robert McFarlane
cautioned, ``I propose that there be no
authority for anyone to seek third
party support for the anti-Sandinistas
until we have the information we need,
and I certainly hope none of this
discussion will be made public in any
way.'' 
   President Ronald Reagan then
closed the meeting with a warning
against anyone leaking the fact they
were considering how to circumvent the
law: ``If such a story gets out, we'll
all be hanging by our thumbs in front
of the White House until we find out
who did it.'' In March of the following
year, Bush personally arranged the
transfer of funds to the Contras by the
Honduran government, assuring them they
would receive compensating U.S. aid. 
   The minutes of this meeting,
originally marked {``secret,''}
were released five years later, at
Oliver North's trial in the spring of
1989.@s1@s6 
   {October 3, 1984:} 
   Congress enacted a new version of
the earlier attempt to outlaw the U.S.
secret war in Central America. This
``Boland II'' amendment was designed to
prevent any conceivable form of deceit
by the covert action apparatus.
   This law was effective from
October 3, 1984, to December 5, 1985,
when it was superceded by various
aid-limitation laws which, taken
together, were referred to as ``Boland
III.''@s1@s7 
   {November 1, 1984:} 
   Felix Rodriguez's partner, Gerard
Latchinian, was arrested by the FBI.
Latchinian was then tried and convicted
of smuggling $10.3 million in cocaine
into the United States. The dope was to
finance the murder and overthrow of the
President of Honduras, Roberto Suazo
Cordova. Latchinian was sentenced to a
30-year prison term. 
   On Nov. 10, 1983, a year before
the arrest, Felix Rodriguez had filed
the annual registration with Florida's
secretary of state on behalf of
Latchinian and Rodriguez's joint
enterprise, ``Giro Aviation
Corp.''@s1@s8 
   {December 21, 1984:} 
   Felix Rodriguez met in the office
of the vice president with Bush adviser
Donald Gregg. Immediately after this
meeting, Rodriguez met with Oliver
North, supposedly for the first time in
his life. But Bush's adviser
strenuously denied to investigators
that he ``introduced'' his CIA employee
to North.@s1@s9 
   {January 18, 1985:} 
   Felix Rodriguez met with Ramon
Milian Rodriguez, accountant and money
launderer, who had moved $1.5 billion
for the Medelli@aan cocaine cartel.
Milian testified before a Senate
investigation of the Contras'
drug-smuggling, that more than a year
earlier he had granted Felix's request
and given $10 million from the cocaine
cartel to Felix for the Contras. 
   Milian Rodriguez was interviewed
in his prison cell in Butner, North
Carolina, by investigative journalist
Martha Honey. He said Felix Rodriguez
had offered that ``in exchange for
money for the Contra cause he would use
his influence in high places to get the
[Cocaine] cartel U.S. `good will'....
Frankly, one of the selling points was
that he could talk directly to Bush.
The issue of good will wasn't something
that was going to go through 27
bureaucratic hands. It was something
that was directly between him and
Bush.'' 
   Ramon Milian Rodriguez was a
Republican contributor, who had partied
by invitation at the 1981 Reagan-Bush
inauguration ceremonies. He had been
arrested aboard a Panama-bound private
jet by federal agents in May 1983,
while carrying over $5 million in cash.
According to Felix Rodriguez, Milian
was seeking a way out of the narcotics
charges when he met with Felix on
January 18, 1985. 
   This meeting remained secret until
two years later, when Felix Rodriguez
had become notorious in the Iran-Contra
scandal. The {Miami Herald} broke the
story on June 30, 1987. Felix Rodriguez
at first denied ever meeting with Ramon
Milian Rodriguez. But then a new story
was worked out with various agencies.
Felix ``remembered'' the Jan. 18, 1985
meeting, claimed he had ``said
nothing'' during it, and ``remembered''
that he had filed documents with the
FBI and CIA telling them about the
meeting just afterwards.@s2@s0 
   {January 22, 1985}: 
   George Bush met with Felix
Rodriguez in the Executive Office
Building.
   Felix's ghost writer doesn't tell
us what was said, only that ``Mr. Bush
was easy to talk to, and he was
interested in my stories.''@s2@s1 
   {Late January, 1985:} 
   George Bush's office officially
organized contacts through the State
Department for Felix Rodriguez to
operate in Central America from a base
in El Salvador, in a false ``private''
capacity. 
   The U.S. ambassador to El
Salvador, Thomas Pickering, then cabled
to Gen. Paul F. Gorman, commander of
the U.S. Army Southern Command:
``Rodriguez has high-level contacts at
the White House, DOS [State Department] and
DOD [Defense Department], some of whom
are strongly supporting his use in El
Salvador. 
   ``It would be in our best
interests that Mr. Rodriguez confer
with you personally prior to coming to
El Salvador. I have some obvious
concerns about this arrangement....'' 
   Felix Rodriguez flew to Panama to
speak to General Gorman. They discussed
his covert aid to the Contras ``since
the early eighties.''@s2@s2 
   Rodriguez, by George Bush's story
the private, volunteer helper of the
Contras, flew from Panama to El
Salvador on General Gorman's personal
C-12 airplane. General Gorman also sent
a confidential cable to Ambassador
Pickering and Col. James Steele, U.S.
military liaison man with the Contra
resupply operation in El Salvador: 
``I have just met here with Felix
Rodriguez, [deleted, probably ``CIA'']
pensioner from Miami. Born in Cuba, a
veteran of guerrilla operations
[several lines deleted].... 
   ``He is operating as a private
citizen, but his acquaintanceship with
the V[ice] P[resident] is real enough,
going back to the latter's days as
D[irector of] C[entral] I[ntelligence]. 
   ``Rodriguez' primary commitment to
the region is in [deleted] where he
wants to assist the FDN [Contras
military forces].''@s2@s3 
   {February 7, 1985:} 
   The Crisis Pre-Planning Group
(CPPG), subordinate to Chairman Bush of
the Special Situation Group (SSG), met
to discuss means to circumvent the
Boland amendment's ban on aid to the
Contras. They agreed on a
``presidential letter'' to be sent to
President Suazo of Honduras, ``to
provide several enticements to Honduras
in exchange for its continued support
of the Nicaraguan Resistance. These
enticements included expedited delivery
of military supplies ordered by
Honduras, a phased release of withheld
economic assistance (ESF) funds, and
other support.'' 
   The preceding was the admission of
the United States government in the
1989 Oliver North trial--number 51 in a
series of ``stipulations'' that was
given to the court to avoid having to
release classified documents.   
   {February 12, 1985:} 
   The government admissions in the
North trial continued: 
   ``52: ... North proposed that
McFarlane send a memo [to top officials
on] the recommendation of the CPPG [the
Bush-supervised body, often chaired by
Bush adviser Don Gregg].... The memo
stated that this part of the message
[to the Honduran President] should not
be contained in a written document but
should be delivered verbally by a
discreet emissary.'' This was to be
George Bush himself.
   Honduras would be given increased
aid, to be diverted to the Contras, so
as to deceive Congress and the American
population.@s2@s4   
   {February 15, 1985:} 
   After Rodriguez had arrived in El
Salvador and had begun setting up the
central resupply depot for the
Contras, Ambassador Thomas Pickering
sent an ``Eyes Only'' cable to the
State Department on his conversation
with Rodriguez. Pickering's cable bore
the postscript, ``Please brief Don
Gregg in the V.P.'s office for
me.''@s2@s5 
   {February 19, 1985:} 
   Felix Rodriguez met with Bush's
staff in the vice-presidential offices
in the Executive Office Building,
briefing them on the progress of his
mission. 
   Over the next two years, Rodriguez
met frequently with Bush staff members
in Washington and in Central America,
often jointly with CIA and other
officials, and conferred with Bush's
staff by telephone countless
times.@s2@s6 
   {March 15-16, 1985:}
   George Bush and Felix Rodriguez
were in Central America on their common
project. 
   On Friday, Rodriguez supervised
delivery in Honduras of military
supplies for the FDN Contras whose main
base was there in Honduras. 
   On Saturday, George Bush met with
Honduran President Roberto Suazo
Cordova. Bush told Suazo that the
Reagan-Bush administration was
expediting delivery of more than $110
million in economic and military aid to
Suazo's government. This was the {quid
pro quo}: a bribe for Suazo's support
for the U.S. mercenary force, and a
transfer through Honduras of the Contra
military supplies, which had been
directly prohibited by the Congress. 
                                         
   Notes for Chapter XIX
 

   1.
 William L. Shirer, {The Rise
and Fall of the Third Reich: A History
of Nazi Germany} (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1960), p. 271.
 
   2.
 Memo, May 14, 1982, two pp.
bearing the nos. 29464 and 29465.

   3.
 Testimony of Donald P. Gregg,
pp. 72-73 in Stenographic Transcript of
Hearings Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Nomination Hearing for Donald Phinney
Gregg to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Korea. Washington, D.C., May 12,
1989.

   4.
 {Report of the Congressional
Committees Investigating the Iran
Contra Affair}, published jointly by
the U.S. House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran, and the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, Nov. 17, 1987,
Washington, D.C., pp. 395-97.
 
   5.
 {CovertAction,} No. 33, Winter
1990, p. 12.

   6.
 Memoranda and meetings of March
1983, in the ``National Security
Archive'' Iran-Contra Collection on
microfiche at the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Reading Room.
 
   7.
 Don Gregg Memorandum for Bud
McFarlane, March 17, 1983, stamped
SECRET, since declassified. Document
no. 77 in the Iran-Contra Collection.

   8.
 Felix Rodriguez and John
Weisman, {Shadow Warrior} (New
York: Simon and Schuseter), 1989 p. 119.
 
   9.
 Shultz Memorandum, May 25, 1983
and White House reply, both stamped
SECRET/SENSITIVE. Documents beginning
no. 00107 in the Iran-Contra
Collection.
 
   10.
 De Graffenreid Memorandum for
Admiral Murphy, July 12, 1983, since
declassified, bearing the no. 43673.
Document no. 00137 in the Iran-Contra
Collection.
 
   11.
 Constantine C. Menges, {Inside
the National Security Council} (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp.
70-78.
 
   12.
 Chronology supplied by the
Office of the Vice President, cited in
{The Progressive}, May 18, 1987,
London, England, p. 20.
 
   13.
 Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} p. 221.

   14.
 This section is based on 1)
literature supplied by CSA, Inc. and
its subsidiary ANV, and 2) an
exhaustive examination of CSA/ANV in
Jupiter and other locations.

   15.
 Scott Armstrong, Executive
Editor for The National Security
Archive, {The Chronology: The
Documented Day-by-Day Account of the
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and
the Contras} (New York: Warner Books,
1987), p. 55.
 
   Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale
Scott and Jane Hunter, {The Iran-Contra
Connection: Secret Teams and Covert
Operations in the Reagan Era} (Boston:
South End Press, 1987), pp. 219-20.
 
   16.
 National Security Planning
Group Meeting Minutes, June 25, 1984,
pp. 1 and 14.

   17.
 This is an excerpt from
Section 8066 of Public Law 98-473, the
Continuing Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1985.

   18.
 Armstrong, {op. cit.,} Nov. 1,
1984 entry, p. 70, citing {Miami
Herald} 11/2/84 and 11/3/84, {Wall
Street Journal} 11/2/84, {Washington
Post} 8/15/85, {New York Times}
12/23/87.
 
   Armstrong, {op. cit.,} Nov. 10,
1983 entry, p. 42, citing corporate
records of the Florida secretary of
state 7/14/86, {Miami Herald} 11/2/84,
{New York Times} 11/3/84.
 
   19.
 Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} pp. 220-21.

   20.
 Report of the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate,
December 1988, pp. 61-62.
 
   21.
 Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} pp. 221-22.
 
   22.
 {Ibid.,} pp. 224-25.
 
   23.
 General Gorman ``Eyes Only''
cable to Pickering and Steele, Feb. 14,
1985. Partially declassified and
released on July 30, 1987 by the
National Security Council, bearing no.
D 23179. Document no. 00833 in the
Iran-Contra Collection.
 
   24.
 U.S. government stipulations
in the trial of Oliver North,
reproduced in {EIR Special Report:}
``Irangate...,'' pp. 20, 22.
 
   25.
 Gregg Hearings, p. 99.
 
   26.
 Rodriguez and Weisman, {op.
cit.,} p. 227.
                


----
         John Covici
          covici@ccs.covici.com