HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,sci.physics
Subject: Re: Meaning of life
Date: 1 Apr 92 17:08:30 GMT
Organization: Intel Corp, Chandler, AZ

In article <1992Mar31.160529.27507@hellgate.utah.edu> tolman%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Kenneth Tolman) writes:
>In article <10046@inews.intel.com> bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes:
>>That's too complicated to be correct.
>
>Hmmm.  The actual idea is very simple and short.  

Trust me.  If it's more than one line; it's far too long.

>>It's more of a political statement than a definition of meaning.
>
>I agree, it is a pretty weak definition of meaning.

Here we touch upon what can be described as "first-year semantics".

Questions like "if a tree falls in the forest and there's
nobody around, does it make a sound?" hinge on the meanings
of the word, "sound", and not on physics (answer: certainly
audio frequency acoustical waves are created; but certainly
no auditory phenomenon occurs).

Here, we run into the larger problem, the meaning of
"meaning," in the context, "the meaning of life."  Good
luck.  I happen to think that, as in the case of the
tree in the forest, the meaning of the word is moot and
the answer comes in a form that circumvents it.

>>This is sort of ironic, since it shows that you really don't know...
>
>Don't know what?

The answer.

>I don't claim to know anything, I am just presenting
>an idea which has implications.  No one knows anything for certainty.

Precisely the reason I never give the answer.  I'm still
looking for the first counterexample.  Perhaps I'll pass
it on after I've passed on.  Certainly if anyone desires
to dig through my papers they'll find it (they better look
close; it's small; no essay; just the statement).

				--Blair
				  "Okay, play the game as though
				   you think I'm playing a game.
				   Denigrate me and my name for
				   want of the actual answer.
				   It will not be forthcoming,
				   nor will I engage in argument
				   over my veracity.  I shall smile
				   and nod.  Little more."
From: ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Reference (was: A rock implements every FSA)
Date: 8 Apr 92 22:21:28 GMT
Organization: Peridot Konsult i Mellansverige AB, Oerebro, Sweden

In article <1992Apr6.114955.10762@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>N.B.  I haven't answered your article about semantics simply because there
>seems to be nothing to say,

Ah, at last I have confirmation that you have seen that article at all.
It is kind-of hard for the sender to see the difference between non-receipt
and received-but-discarded with our current e-mail and news systems.

Also, by not answering at all, I can't know whether you don't answer
because you agree or because you disagree or because you're not interested,
and it deprives me of any opportunity to straighten out misunderstandings
(or to learn more, if things would turn out that lucky).

> beyond reiterating that your quasi-Russellian
>view admits the possibility of referring to phenomenal data only.

If it does admit any kind of reference at all, I think I may have disproved
the assertion of your's that I originally reacted to.

However, if you mean that the previous iteration of this was your statement
that "logically proper names can only denote such entitities as we are
directly acquainted with, i.e. sense-data, universals, and our selves." then
it is not much of an answer since my previous article already attempted to
address that objection. You can't refute an answer by reiterating your
original statement, as if nothing happened. There are more constructive
ways to do that, for instance pointing out what you disagree with in the
answer.

My argument was basically that it would be possible to refer to the things
that cause, or could cause, your phenomenal experience by using a description
of those things based on the phenomenal data that they case, or could cause.
(That's a "causal connection"!) Furthermore, I claim support for this view
in your own explanation of the insufficiency of purely denotative and purely
connotative signs, since you have there already admitted most of these
mechanisms as possible, except that you just didn't connect them to each
other in order to solve the problem as a whole. Thus my position is that
you can not deny my conclusion without either dropping some of your own
original argumentation, or show a logical flaw in my reasoning. (That's
what makes it interesting.)

-- 
Kristoffer Eriksson, Peridot Konsult AB, Hagagatan 6, S-703 40 Oerebro, Sweden
Phone: +46 19-13 03 60  !  e-mail: ske@pkmab.se
Fax:   +46 19-11 51 03  !  or ...!{uunet,mcsun}!mail.swip.net!kullmar!pkmab!ske
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2065 comp.ai.philosophy:4127
From: ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Date: 4 Apr 92 02:37:16 GMT
Organization: Peridot Konsult i Mellansverige AB, Oerebro, Sweden

In article <1992Apr1.103814.10555@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@widder.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>In article <6728@pkmab.se> ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:
 >>Pardon me for asking, but what is "haecceitism"?
 >
 >As I defined it in a previous article, haecceitism (in the sense of Kaplan)
 >is the doctrine that holds that the question of transworld identity of a...

Why is it called "haecceitism"? The word has a somewhat unusual appearance.

-- 
Kristoffer Eriksson, Peridot Konsult AB, Hagagatan 6, S-703 40 Oerebro, Sweden
Phone: +46 19-13 03 60  !  e-mail: ske@pkmab.se
Fax:   +46 19-11 51 03  !  or ...!{uunet,mcsun}!mail.swip.net!kullmar!pkmab!ske
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: trivedi@rabi.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Date: 9 Apr 92 09:08:44 GMT
Organization: Enrico Fermi Institute, University of Chicago.

In article <1992Apr8.220429.29772@Princeton.EDU> fchen@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Franklin M. Chen) writes:

>To philosophers of mathematics out there:

sorry, I am only a physicist like you ..

>Being trained in physics, I am well aware of the usefulness of
>mathematics as a tool, but lately I have been wondering about various
>"foundational" issues in mathematics.  Can someone explain to me why
>mathematics needs any kind of foundation at all, or give me references
...

The term "foundation" is extremely misleading in this context; 
someting like "superstructure" would be far better although it
admittedly doesn't sound so nice.

Usually foundations outlast the structures they support;
few structures can outlast their foundations.

In mathematics, traditional arithmetic, algebra, geometry etc. are much
more stable than any "foundations" anyone has provided for them. Make no
mistake, it is those "foundations" that are going to come and go and 
change with time: 

THESE ARE CLEVERLY WORDED SUPER-PATTERNS, NOT FOUNDATIONS.

Try "Introduction To Metamathematics" by S. Kleene; and "Philosophy of
Mathematics" by Benacerraf and Putnam. They will lead you to more
literature should you be so inclined.


>I am particularly puzzled by the notion of sets.  I am not sure what a
>set is supposed to be.  In particular, I sets that are "uncountable" are
>mind-boggling to me.  

One possibility is that you are reacting to a sense of unfamiliarity.
Square-roots were mind-boggling to the Greeks, fractions are mind-boggling
to most young children (and adult Americans), and people have mind-boggled
the hell out of each other over things like imaginary numbers,
non-Euclidean geometries, or Goedel's theorems. But sometimes, once you
have understood something new, if you have, then it is just a matter of
getting used to it: there may well be nothing more there!

BTW, are you less puzzled by the notion of mass, or energy, or entropy,
or that of electric charge (I don't know what kind of physics you do)?


> Are sets and the notion of different
> infinities needed for doing physics, or can one do without them?

Sets: While not really needed, they are helpful in organizing your
understanding of mathematical tools.

Infinities: Aren't we often trying to avoid them?  :-)


>Please reply by e-mail, as I do not read this newsgroup.

Will send you a copy.

--Anil
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2105 comp.ai.philosophy:4276
From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ahah, Plato from behind (Re: "revisiting"+false d
Date: 13 Apr 92 18:34:34 GMT
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.

In article <kujcb8INNi70@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> 
silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber) writes:

>In article <1992Apr13.011832.11030@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>You completely misunderstand the argument.  Try reading it again, using a
>>dictionary next time.  Good luck.

ES:
> Dismissive != discursive

You are very observant for a C programmer.

ES:
> I think MZ adopts Plato's habit of taking things always from behind
> instead of head on.  

See the "Laws" VIII, 836b--d, which will dispel your misinterpretation
of Plato.

ES:
> Personally, I don't think I misunderstand his "argument", 

That's entirely your prerogative.

ES:
>							    and he 
> fails to demonstrate otherwise,

I don't have to.

ES:
>				  so as , I think Victor Hugo, once 
> said in minimalist rejoinder: " ! "

As replied Kurt Vonnegut, "*".


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139           (617) 661-8151            :
: email zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu or zeleny@HUMA1.BITNET            :
:                                                                    :
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Date: 10 Apr 92 15:33:05 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <1992Apr10.024357.15902@midway.uchicago.edu> trivedi@rabi.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi) writes:
>In article <15127@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>>The term "foundational" in this sense does not refer to relatively
>>permanency but to relative primacy.  In other words, mathematics in
>>general is built upon a foundational theory, 
>
>Where did you get that? You should know that mathematics was built,
>not upon these "foundations", but long before anyone thought of them.

You are talking about temporal order, while DG is talking about
a logical order.  He is not claiming that the foundations came
first historically.

Mathematicians started working on foundations because they wanted
to be able to justify their mathematical practices.  Where their
theories consistent, for instance.  All sorts of interesting results
followed; hence the continuing interest in foundations today, although
a lot of the work in now called mathematical logic.
From: epfaith@twinkies.berkeley.edu (Edward Paul Faith)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Date: 14 Apr 92 01:26:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: agate.sdcbgINN9el
Organization: U.C. Berkeley Math. Department.
NNTP-Posting-Host: twinkies.berkeley.edu


  Ah, there is just no getting out of this.  (If I am just saying
stupid things, please tell me and I will consider more carefully what
I say.)  I will focus on one question.  This will be short.

In article <1992Apr13.174152.2194@mp.cs.niu.edu>rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu 
(Neil Rickert) writes:
]In article <sbahlINN219@agate.berkeley.edu> epfaith@twinkies.berkeley.edu 
](Edward Paul Faith) writes:
]>In article <1992Apr12.051222.25154@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu 
]>(Neil Rickert) writes:
]>...
]>] Russell's paradox pointed out some mistakes which did require deep
]>]reflection on the nature of mathematics.
]>
]>  Is this paradox the result of mistakes, or of inconsistent axioms,
]>which is another thing entirely?
]
]  I guess that is all a matter of definition.  But the point is this --
]if you define the field of mathematics in such a way that the only
]type of error possible amounts to the use of inconsistent axioms, you
]should not find it at all surprising if every mistake turns out to be
]due to inconsistent axioms.

  What causes a result to be an error?  I can think of two reasons a
result can be an error.  
  
  First, the rules were not followed, or perhaps what amounts to the
same thing, eventually it is agreed that the rules were not followed.
For example, in Go, a player might make a wrong move, which was for
some reason not initially noticed by either him or his opponent.
Mathematical results are generally considered valid if one can arrive
at them by following the rules.  This is why we have proofs.  That, at
any rate, is one way of looking at the matter of proofs.

  Another way a result can be an error, is if it says a false thing
about the world, or about some object about which there is an
intrinsic fact-of-the-matter.  This latter idea strikes me as false,
even though on the surface of things it seems as if the English
sentences in a proof refer to some object which exists independently
of what we might believe about it.  Up until now, I have ascribed this
latter interpretation to you, perhaps wrongly.  When you stress the
"intrinsic meaning" what pops into my mind is the notion that math is
about mathematical objects which exist in a sort of platonic idos.

So I have only two clear ideas of ways to make an error.  The second I
reject, and the first seems highly ambiguous, because it depends on
what people agree on at any given time.

Does this line show up?
From: fchen@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Franklin M. Chen)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Sets in mathematics
Date: 8 Apr 92 22:04:29 GMT
Organization: Princeton University
Originator: news@ernie.Princeton.EDU

To philosophers of mathematics out there:

Being trained in physics, I am well aware of the usefulness of
mathematics as a tool, but lately I have been wondering about various
"foundational" issues in mathematics.  Can someone explain to me why
mathematics needs any kind of foundation at all, or give me references
to consult on this matter?  I was never very worried about fiddling
around with dx's and dy's nonrigorously, for example, and the news that
the talk of Dirac delta "functions" could be eliminated by distribution
theory didn't matter much to me either.  As I see it, mathematics is a
way from getting from one result to another.

I am particularly puzzled by the notion of sets.  I am not sure what a
set is supposed to be.  In particular, I sets that are "uncountable" are
mind-boggling to me.  Cantor's diagonal argument shows that given a rule
for forming a real number, and given a number of such rules, one can
construct a rule for forming a different real number.  This is supposed
to show that the "set" of real numbers is "uncountable."  What is added
by this manner of talking?  Are sets and the notion of different
infinities needed for doing physics, or can one do without them?

Please reply by e-mail, as I do not read this newsgroup.

	Franklin Chen
From: trivedi@rabi.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi)
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Organization: Enrico Fermi Institute, University of Chicago.
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 02:43:57 GMT

In article <15127@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>In article  <1992Apr9.090844.12520@midway.uchicago.edu> Anil Trivedi writes:
>]

AT:
>]In mathematics, traditional arithmetic, algebra, geometry etc. are much
>]more stable than any "foundations" anyone has provided for them. Make no
>]mistake, it is those "foundations" that are going to come and go and 
>]change with time: 
>]
>]THESE ARE CLEVERLY WORDED SUPER-PATTERNS, NOT FOUNDATIONS.

DG:
>The term "foundational" in this sense does not refer to relatively
>permanency but to relative primacy.  In other words, mathematics in
>general is built upon a foundational theory, 

Where did you get that? You should know that mathematics was built,
not upon these "foundations", but long before anyone thought of them.

>The obvious implication is that such
>studies are superfluous and have no fundamental importance.  But there
>are some serious questions...

You have a chip on your shoulder or what? :-) 
Such studies are neither superfluous nor unimportant, but they
do not constitute "foundations" upon which mathematics is built.

>You may
>not be personally interested in these questions, satisfied to just
>"use what works", but that is what makes you a physicist 

Actually, for an outsider, I am very interested; that's how I developed
these opinions. It is most mathematicians who don't give a hoot about
your "foundations".  :-)


>In thermodynamics ...

I know. I know. I never liked that subject! 

>A more difficult and fundamental questions is: Is mathematical
>reasoning purely logical, or do we somehow just "know" things about
>mathematical objects so that we can make leaps of intuition? 
 
A reliable answer to such questions will come from actually understanding
how the brain works; I don't know how far we are from that kind of knowledge, 
I wish I did.


> ...only through
>foundational studies will we ever (possibly) have any proof that
>mathematics actually works.

What can I say? It is good to have convictions. Goog luck; and I
do mean that sincerely. 
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2111 sci.logic:881
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Date: 10 Apr 92 17:11:25 GMT
Organization: Northern Illinois University

In article <1992Apr10.113550.462@midway.uchicago.edu> trivedi@curie.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi) writes:
>In article <1992Apr10.043120.26071@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>[comments about foundations deleted]

>Every circus seems to have room for a few clowns who pretend that the whole 
>thing exists thanks to them and moves according to their gestures. In
>mathematics, it's the "foundation" crowd who have volunteered for that role.

  Well, I am not part of the "foundation crowd".  If anything, I am by
inclination toward the opposite direction.  I tend to be critical of what
I view to be an over emphasis on formalization by most mathematicians.

  The fact that you would assume I am part of the "foundation crowd" shows
how far you are from grasping how mathematicians view their field.

>I am not talking about some historical mathematics that might have once
>existed but about today's living mathematics. Take arithmetic. 
>WHEN TALKING ABOUT ITS BUILDING, I DO NOT SEE JUST HOW THE TENSE IS DAVID'S 
>OR YOURS OR MINE TO CHOOSE: 
>arithmetic IS NOT being built today; it WAS ALREADY there before all this
>foundation hard-sell came along. That fixes the tense for honest people. 

  Well in that case language has nothing to do with verbs or nouns, since
language was certainly around long before people started dissecting sentences.
Matter has nothing to do with atoms, since matter was around long before
physicists started looking for its constituents.  Biology has nothing to
do with DNA, since biology was around long before anything was known
about DNA.

  Why do you allow linguistics, physics, and biology to have a theoretical
foundation, yet deny that right to mathematics?

 Your real problem is that, as a constant user of mathematics, you are
so busy looking at the trees that you cannot see the forest.

-- 
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2095 comp.ai.philosophy:4256
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech

Hi Everybody,

       I'm looking for a listing of Universities in USA and/or Europe
that offer MS/Ph.D. programs in Cognitive Science. 

I am holding a Master's Degree in Electrical Engineering and I am 
currently working as an EE at Hewlett Packard. I am considering a 
switch of fields and I am interested in programs, that combine Philosophy, 
Self Organizing Systems, Cognitive Science and Computer Science. 

If you have information about schools, programs and quality of programs
please let me know.

Thanks,

Reinhard Seidel  (reinhard@hpscdc.scd.hp.com)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
From: trivedi@curie.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi)
Subject: Re: Sets in mathematics
Organization: Enrico Fermi Institute, University of Chicago.
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 11:35:50 GMT

In article <1992Apr10.043120.26071@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

>In article <1992Apr10.024357.15902@midway.uchicago.edu> trivedi@rabi.uchicago.edu (Anil Trivedi) writes:
>>In article <15127@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>>>In article  <1992Apr9.090844.12520@midway.uchicago.edu> Anil Trivedi writes:

AT:
>>>]In mathematics, traditional arithmetic, algebra, geometry etc. are much
>>>]more stable than any "foundations" anyone has provided for them. Make no
>>>]mistake, it is those "foundations" that are going to come and go and 
>>>]change with time...
DG:
>>>The term "foundational" in this sense does not refer to relatively
>>>permanency but to relative primacy.  In other words, mathematics in
>>>general is built upon a foundational theory,
AT:
>>Where did you get that? You should know that mathematics was built,
>>not upon these "foundations", but long before anyone thought of them.
NR:
>  Did you read what David wrote?  He did not say "mathematics was built
>upon these foundations."  He used the present tense, not the past.  You
>are talking about the historical development of mathematics, while he
>is talking about mathematics as it is currently viewed.
....
>currently viewed, mathematics is built upon ZF or similar foundations,



Every circus seems to have room for a few clowns who pretend that the whole 
thing exists thanks to them and moves according to their gestures. In
mathematics, it's the "foundation" crowd who have volunteered for that role.

I am not talking about some historical mathematics that might have once
existed but about today's living mathematics. Take arithmetic. 
WHEN TALKING ABOUT ITS BUILDING, I DO NOT SEE JUST HOW THE TENSE IS DAVID'S 
OR YOURS OR MINE TO CHOOSE: 
arithmetic IS NOT being built today; it WAS ALREADY there before all this
foundation hard-sell came along. That fixes the tense for honest people. 
You cannot appropriate other people's work and then claim to have built what 
they gave you. It is Principia that owes its existence to arithmetic,
not the other way round.



DG:
>>>You may not be personally interested in these questions,... but that is 
>>>what makes you a physicist 
AT:
>>...it is most mathematicians who don't give a hoot about "foundations".  :-)
NR:
> Most mathematicians do indeed care about foundations. That does not mean
> they spend a lot of time worrying about them...

Some caring. :-)

Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:2101 comp.ai.philosophy:4273