From: mcochran@nyx.cs.du.edu (Mark A. Cochran)
Subject: Re: Spoken Like a True ProLifer
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Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 18:21:21 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.011818.5380@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:
>From article <1993Jan6.184709.10601@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>,
>by mcochran@nyx.cs.du.edu (Mark A. Cochran):
>> In article <1993Jan6.174658.753@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:
>>>From article <1993Jan6.055047.14767@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>,
>>>by mcochran@nyx.cs.du.edu (Mark A. Cochran):
>>>> In article <1993Jan5.211703.20856@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>>>> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:
>
>>>> [Lots of deletions, since I'm not goin to comment on it all.]
>
>>>>>Our 7-week-old son Joseph is quite a noisemaker
>>>>>but seems largely incapable of "meaningful communication".  
>
>>>> You have not yet learned how to tell if he is using a "feed me" cry,
>>>> or a "change me" cry, or a "hold me" cry, or a "damn, that hurt" cry?
>>>> Take a vacation and play with the kid. I consider that meaningful
>>>> communication. :)
>
>>>"Take a vacation."  Is that doctor's orders, Mark? :-)  My intent was
>>>to ask 1) whether Joseph's crude "communication" skills could be nothing
>>>more than responses to certain situations (i.e., not deliberate attempts
>>>to communicate) and 2) whether Joseph's ability to "communicate" was
>>>significantly different from that of certain fetuses.
>
>> I think a medical prescription for a vacation is a fine idea... Now if
>> we can just convince employers that it is... :)
>
>> 1) Are *our* communications nothing more then responses to situations?
>> Yes, ours are (hopefully) more sophisticated. It doesn't make a 7 week
>> old babies efforts less meaningful. 
>
>> 2) I've never seen a fetus that could communicate at even the level of
>> a 7 week old baby.
>
>I'm just not sure.  I would think that when discussing personhood
>we would want to be more sure.  What if the difference between a
>fetus and a neonate is more quantitative than qualitative?
>
Can you provide an example of what you would call a quantitative
rather then qualitative difference?

>[deleted, but good]
>
>> What I do object to is people (no, I'm not accusing you) who try to
>> legislate this. I don't see it as fit for legislation.
>
>I agree, although perhaps for different reasons than most.
>
>> Basically, I think the issue is adequately dealt with by medical
>> ethics and professional standards.
>
>I think you'd agree that complete laissez faire in terms of medical
>ethics is not necessarily the best way to operate.
>
No, complete reliance upon medical ethics is not perfect, and I don't
advocate it.
What I do rely on is the combination of medical ethics (which is
backed by some pretty stringent disiplinary measures when violated -
such as losing the license to practice) and the ability of the
individual considering abortion to make their own rational choices.
Instead of trying to legislate the issue, we would be better searved
by funding some efforts towards real solutions. I.E. some real
education for kids about sex and contraception, the realities of
children raising children, nad the optionis available if/when unwanted
pregnancies occur.
EEB says it well. Abortions should be legal, safe, early and rare.

>[deletions]
>
>> Yes, personhood is temporary and conditional. It always has been. We
>> don't consider a corpse a person. Nor, if I understand you correctly,
>> can an individual in a persistant vegitative state, with no realistic
>> chance of ever awakening, be considered a person.
>
>The point is that in the cases in which the vegetative state is
>temporary, certain people's criteria for personhood would still
>not be met, and it is (IMO) both absurd and dangerous to consider
>that their personhood could come and go like a disease.
>
>BTW, I would argue that the comatose person you describe could
>very reasonably be considered a person, albeit one who should
>be allowed to die.  I don't mean in any way to trivialize the
>complexity and difficulty of these situations.  But I cannot
>accept the consequences of flimsy, come-and-go personhood.
>
The analogy with a comatose adult is very thin in any case. Decisions
concerning life support measures are not made based on personhood,
they are made based on the chances of individual ever recovering. And
beyond mere recovery is what *level* of recovery is possible. If the
individual has aq 50% chance of awakening, but a 90% chance of (sorry,
this is more hospital humor...) waking up simply to be planted in the
vegitable garden, it is often considered more merciful to simply let
them die. Similarly, the abortion decision is based on more then just
personhood. 

>> I do think it is fitting to allow a non-person (former person,
>> whatever term you want to use) to die.
>
>So do I.  My wife's family and I have been down that road.  We
>wouldn't have called my father-in-law a "non-person" but we
>knew his death was imminent and the decision to refuse life
>support in no way diminished his significance or his personhood.
>
There is a practice called "advanced directives" which is making
progress towards removing some of the stress of these decisions.
People entering the hospital are given a form which they must fill
out, which outlines the options available to them, should they become
incapacitated. They can stipulate what level of supportthey consider
resonable. Many choose to restrict efforts at life support to
artificial nutrition only, and refuse any mechanical ventilation or
ressussitative efforts. When a family *knows* that mom/dad/whoever
doesn't want these thigns done to them, it makes the decisions much
easier.
The sad thing is that sometimes the patients wishes are disregarded by
the family. When this happens, we usually end up using the measures
the patient has refused. The rational is "The patient isn't real
likely to sue, but the family is". This may change. One of the ICU
staff told me about a patient they had that refused to be placed on a
ventilator. When his heart stopped, his family insisted that all
possible measures be attempted to ressucitate him. He was revived
but suffered major damage to his kidneys (they're shut down completly)
his brain (he's basically lost everything from the shoulders down) and
his self-worth. He's sueing his family for forcing the ressucitation.

>[Hilarious cat humor deleted. I couldn't think of anything else.]
>
And it was going so well, to... ;)

--
                  Mark Cochran          merlin@eddie.ee.vt.edu
These are the views of my employer, your employer, your government, the
Church of your choice, and the Ghost of Elvis. So there.
Member, T.S.A.K.C.
Newsgroups: talk.abortion