HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 09:45:17 GMT

In article <1992Nov7.145606.1684@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
}But perhaps the more important point is that they could not do it 
}because it is illegal under Title 18 to tap without an order.  I 
}really don't see how some gov't agency could embark on massive 
}surveillance without someone finding out and throwing the books at 
}them.

As if the US government obeys its own laws!  They apply them to us, not to
themselves.  Shall we do a search through US history to find illegal taps?

}Another point about intercepts that seems to be misunderstood has to 
}do with minimization.  If the gov't is listening, they have to turn it 
}off if the conversation turns to something unrelated to the court 
}order.  They can periodically check, but even with a court order they 
}are not allowed to listen to everything. 

That's only if they want to gather admissible evidence for a trial.  If you
think that's all that the government does in tapping, you're naive.


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
From: boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption System - Challenge!
Date: 11 Nov 92 00:54:49 GMT
Organization: UB

In article <4146@bcstec.ca.boeing.com> tld5032@bcstec.ca.boeing.com 
(Terry Davis) writes:
> As always we discount what we don't understand or happen to like.  

No, we're discounting what doesn't make sense.  The guy wants
everybody to evaluate his nifty system without supplying the program
for analysis.  This doesn't wash.  He's assuming we can't figure out
how the program works.  You're not allowed to make that assumption.

> I see nothing in the article that indicates his system is not
> keyed.  System generated and embedded secondary keys provide
> exactly the appearance described.

I see nothing in the article that indicates his system IS keyed.
There is nothing in the article to indicate how the system actually
works, and until the guy explains his algorithm he is selling snake
oil.

> Myself, I'm particularly fond of keyed systems that refuse to 
> generate to the same encryption pattern each time!

I don't believe you.  Explain how this makes a system harder to break.
The decryption process has to work on any message, so it has to
somehow discern something invariant in the message that leads to the
original plaintext.  The cryptographer is free to do the same.

> On final note, perhaps we FLAME new thoughts and ideas far to soon!
> A more little tolerance might just encourage more exchange of new
> concepts which is what I thought this group was all about!

Ok, explain to me what new concepts I'm rejecting here.


-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4371 comp.org.eff.talk:6793 alt.privacy:2103
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Date: 5 Nov 92 19:50:57 GMT
Organization: Bush and Noriega - a CRACK Team!

In article <8qNqTB4w165w@entropy.mcds.com> morpheus@entropy.mcds.com (morpheus) writes:
   Hypothetically say I have all my data encrypted with 'mega-DES ]I[' - how will
   an "ummm... I can't remember the key, sorry" hold up in court (assuming said
   court had the papers they need, etc).  Would that be perjury?

The proper phrase is
	"I refuse to answer on the grounds that it may incriminate me"
Unfortunately, if you're accused of "crimes against the state",
like failing to register your keys, that argument is tougher to use.
--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
#Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Trickle-Down Economics: Giving money to government bureaucrats 
#	and hoping some will trickle down to the people who need help.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@qualcom.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Finally! We're getting somewhere.
Reply-To: karn@chicago.qualcomm.com
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 22:14:53 GMT

In article <BxFF18.1oA@constant.demon.co.uk>, slangley@constant.demon.co.uk (Simon Langley) writes:
|> However, our constitution is, as you imply, not written, and for this reason,
|> the final say on our laws belongs to the elected representatives of the
|> people rather than a group of unelected Supreme Court judges.  Our system
|> has served us well for 350 years, how is the US system "safer"?

This isn't a bug, it's a feature.

Democracy is easy. It's really not *that* hard to find out what
the majority wants and then to implement it. A mob is probably the
purest form of democracy there is.

But the real measure of a civilization lies in its ability to protect
the rights of unpopular minorities against the passing, emotional
outbursts of the majority. Placing the final say in the hands of nine
unelected (but hardly unscrutinized) judges who serve for life is
essential if you are serious about individual rights.

As former Justice Brennan used to say, "The majority already have the
other two branches of government. We're here for the minority."

Read the Federalist Papers, particularly the ones by Alexander Hamilton
on the need for judges to "serve during good behavior" (i.e., for life)
for a far more eloquent explanation of this principle.

Phil


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 04:51:22 GMT

pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
: 
: If "standard" means analog, well, analog phone scramblers are almost
: all easily broken, and are pretty poor in general. Why use one when
: digital techniques that are virtually unbreakable are available?

How is this done in the case of randomly hopping variable split band
spectrum inverters?  Current technology allows hopping between any of
32 frequency split points at a 60 hz hopping rate.  From 16.67 ms
fragments how on earth does one gather any information as to its
content or split point?  According to Micheal Washvill a voice and
data security specialist with a "federal agency":

	VSB scrambling can be broken but not in real time. The only
	practical attack is through trial and error.  The scrambled
	speech must first be recorded, then divided into finite time
	segments according to the hop rate.  Each segment is processed
	through a variety of split points until clear speech results."

He claims a 60 to one decode time.  Gimme a break!  Who decides when
clear speech results?  Automatic speech recognition is nowhere near
capable of this which leaves a human to determine what is clear
speech.  Think of the combinatorics here to decide on a second!  Does
it actually seem reasonable that this could be done in finite human
time or is this guy blowing self serving smoke to discourage its use?

Or are there more sophisticated methods?  I have some experience in
signal processing and in speech recognition and certainly can't think
of one.  I've seen the statement that it is easy but I'd sure like to
see that backed up with an algorithm.

Bob

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

        "One can learn to be alone, even enjoy it, but let intimacy
         break that solitude, even briefly, and one must start all
         over again."

                                                     Elia Kazan


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: andy@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (Andy Freeman)
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
Organization: Computer Science Department,  Stanford University.
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 23:05:30 GMT

In article <1dp5mpINNfat@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca> unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
>Many of the guns used in crimes are stolen- stolen from all those law
>abiding citizens who never use them. And if there are more available to
>steal they are easier to steal.

If anyone really thought that gun theft was a serious issue, they'd
enforce the relevant laws.  They'd encourage reporting.  However, the
reality is different.  Gun theft is a "free" crime - people who commit
it aren't punished.  Moreover, people who report it ARE punished.

A few weeks ago, there was a big story about a UPS-theft ring.  A
worker at a UPS facility was stealing gun shipments.  The US attorney
involved got on the tube screaming about how gun manufacturers didn't
report this sort of crime and how once they found out about it, they
solved it right away.  He used this to argue for a proposed new law.

Reality was a bit different.  The gun manufacturers reported the first
shipment stolen.  They reported every subsequent stolen shipment.
They were ignored.  They started investigating themselves and despite
not having useful investigative authority, narrowed things down so it
was a simple matter to find the thief.  All the time they kept
reporting both the thefts and what they'd found out.  Finally, the US
attorney decides to get involved and grab all the glory.

Any day you folks want to take gun theft seriously, you can do so.
Until you do, don't whine at me about it.

>> If you feel that they are just too dangerous for people to own, consider the
>>  numbers - there are about 200 million handguns in the US, and about 12000 
>>  firearms homicides per year, and 1400 accidental firarms deaths.  That makes
>>  firearms safer than automobiles.  
>> 
> Uh, hardly. divide the number of deaths by the number of times they
>are used, not by the number.

Sure.  There are billions of shots taken each year.  50% of US
households have guns.

Guns are still safer.

-andy
--
UUCP:    {arpa gateways, sun, decwrl, uunet, rutgers}!cs.stanford.edu!andy
ARPA:    andy@cs.stanford.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: slangley@constant.demon.co.uk (Simon Langley)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: Home
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Distribution: inet
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 02:01:47 GMT

Steven Miale (spm2d@uvacs.cs.Virginia.EDU) wrote:
: 
: Most people tend to assume that "militia" == "military"; this is
: incorrect. Similar roots don't necessary imply similar meanings;
: compare "pedestrian" and "pediatrist".
: 
Err, these two words do not have the same root.  Pedestrian is from the Latin
pes, meaning foot; pediatrist is from the Greek pais (pi alpha iota sigma) 
which means child.  Militia and military _are_ cognate.

-- 
   Simon Langley                   (preferred)   slangley@constant.demon.co.uk
   Hampstead, London
   pgp 2.0 public key available                  slangley@cix.compulink.co.uk
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Lead Balloons
From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
Date: 5 Nov 92 16:47:26 GMT
Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.

In <1992Nov4.125819.1637@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:

>The $45K per wiretap average came from the "Wiretap Report" for 1991.
>It lists all wiretaps for the year -- well, at least the court-ordered
>ones :-) 

Probably dividing the total cost of all wiretaps divided by the number of
court-ordered wiretaps.  :-)
--
Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal)
My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer.
My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 22:11:04 GMT


The discussion of multiple content messages is somewhat silly. The
government, if it were to register keys, would be pretty stupid not
to ask for the keys in advance. It's impossible to develop a
multiple content message until you know what the "real" message
is intended to be.

-- 
David Sternlight
(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)
From: alain@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca (W.A.Simon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: A One-Time Way to Thwart Key Registration...
Date: 05 Nov 92 08:29:16 EST

In <pcw.720808942@access.digex.com>
pcw@access.digex.com (Peter Wayner)
sneaks one on the Feds:

> [ ... ] 
> Actually, my favorite solution to this criminal problem is to use
> a one-time pad. Then it is possible to come up with two keys. One
> that decrypts the conversation into a benign one and one that decrypts
> it into the real message.
> [ ... ] 
> So the criminals send key #1 to their cohorts and register
> key # 2 with the Federal Key Exchange Registry. When
> the cops bug the line all they hear about is the stories
> about their trip to Hershey PA. 
> [ ... ]

	the Braid allows any number of messages to be hidden within
	the ciphertext.  A convenient choice of key will allow to
	decode any one of them while leaving all others encrypted.

	Of course, this presupposes that one accepts the Braid as
	a valid method of encryption...			-{smiley}-


--
 Alain
 [ ... usual disclaimer... ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 17:20:26 GMT

In article <BxHn0t.MCL@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca> lcmyu@crypto2.uwaterloo.ca (Luis Ola Toshio Chi-Ming) writes:
>Can someone tell me how these digitally encrypted phones provide
>reasonable security in light of the following problem.  Phones lines
>can tolerate raw data rates of 9.6 kbps whereas voice requires 
>64 kbps.  Let's say the CELP compression reduces the voice
>requirement down to 9.6 kbps (voice becomes noticibly choppy thereafter).

Actually, a common data rate for CELP is 8 kbps. This is the rate used
in the TDMA digital cellular system, and it is also the peak rate of
the vocoder in our CDMA system. Our vocoder also supports three lower
speeds (1000, 2000 and 4000 bps) with the rate changing dynamically
with voice activity. This would let you multiplex other things (e.g.,
data) with vocoder data, using pauses in speech to full effect.  In
overload situations the vocoder can be told to run at a lower average
rate with a slight degradation in quality.

Error correction is not really an issue. We have a few bits in each
frame devoted to a CRC on the most important bits, but voice is so
redundant that you can withstand a fairly high frame error rate
(several percent) before the quality degrades unacceptably. Voice is
very redundant.

>this would imply blocks of duration 6 seconds.  An uncorrected channal bit
>error would result in white noise for 6 seconds.

I don't know where you get this figure. Our vocoder operates on 20
millisecond frames. Lose a frame and you lose audio for 20
milliseconds. All processing is done on a frame-by-frame basis, and if
you wanted to add cryptography it too could be done separately on each
frame.

Phil
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4441 comp.org.eff.talk:6840 alt.privacy:2135 talk.politics.guns:23721
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 7 Nov 92 13:35:26 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

In article <1992Nov4.202104.3851@chpc.org>, rboudrie@chpc.org (Rob Boudrie) writes:
> The dept of justice proposed wiretap backdoor would require that the
> government be able to monitor telecommunications from a remote location.
> 
> Does anyone know if the proposal would require that they be able to 
> selectively tap into any lines they want (policing themselves doing sop
> only under court order), or if the telephone companies would be allowed
> to enable the remote tap only for specific numbers once presented with
> a court order?  Also, if tapping is done from the remote location, is
> the local telephone company permitted to retain an audit trail of the 
> tap (not the contents; just what number the government remote monitoring
> facility tapped and when)?  Such an audit trail would help provide a 

Law enforcers would not be able to activate a tap.  To quote from the
Digital Telephony proposal: "The legislation does not establish any
independent 'dial-up' authority by which criminal law enforcement 
agencies could effectuate interceptions without the affirmative 
assistance of the providers or operators.  The providers and operators
will continue to make the necessary interconnections or issue the 
necessary switch program instructions to effectuate an interception."

My understanding is that the phone companies keep an audit of all taps.

Section 2519 of Title 18 contains fairly elaborate reporting 
requirements for law enforcement.  The reports go into the annual
"Wiretap Report" which lists the judge, prosecutor, offense specified,
cost, duration, number of intercepts, persons intercepted, 
incriminating intercepts, arrests, trials, motions to suppress, and
convictions for each tap.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu
From: alain@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca (W.A.Simon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 10 Nov 92 21:46:23 GMT

In <199211101157.AA24155@alchemy.cs.ruu.nl>
Piet van Oostrum <piet@cs.ruu.nl>
wonders about my hints:

> > If you are interested, I suggest you consider [trumpet triumphal]
> > The Braid [drum roll] yes, my own baby! Look it up for details on
> > how it is done (just add low bias).  
> Can you give some info on this?

Given:
    a random bit stream,
    a bit stream of data to be hidden,
    a bit stream of digitized material.

Recipe:

    Say we have a digitized sound with a 16 bit sampling range.
    We read the digitized material one word at a time (16 bit chunks).

    We read the random bit stream 4 bits at a time, in order to generate
    decimal values between 0 and 15.  This number is the order of the bit
    we will borrow within the digitizing word.  Had we had 32 bit sampling
    we would have picked our random bits 5 at a time... etc...

    As we output the bits of the digitizing word to destination, we ignore
    the true value of the selected bit and replace it with the actual value
    of our next bit of sensitive data.

    If we have a lot of digitized material and relatively little sensitive
    data, we could pull an extra number from the random bit stream such
    as 0 (we don't substitute any bit in this word) or 1 (we do).  The
    variations and the gradations are infinite.

    If we want to change the obvious white noise into a less obtrusive
    tape hiss, we generate the decimal number two or more times and pick
    the lowest value of the two or three as the borrowed bit pointer.
    The least significant bits will be diddled more often than others.
    
    Et voila...  a hissy sound track wich contains seditious material,
    which is best kept secret, like the Constitution maybe...



--
 Alain
 [ ... usual disclaimer... ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 09:26:30 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.172823.1015@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
}
}At least two readers (in my reading so far) have complained about my
}comments about registering cars not being a prelude to confiscation.
}Note carefully that in my original statement I said 'except when
}associated with a law violation' or words to that effect.

But that isn't true, either.  No legislation need be violated, no charges
filed.  All that has to happen is "probable cause" be found by a judge, then
they can (and often do) take everything.  Registration of cars can be used
to make this easier.  And I haven't covered indirect taxation as practiced
by the IRS.

Those who would oppose registration because it would make it easier to
}enforce laws should direct their attention to the laws, not the
}registration. Otherwise they are advocating making law violation
}easier.  The proper place to oppose "improper" laws is in the
}law-making process, and subsequently in the courts, not in the
}"registration" arena, unless registration itself is, say,
}unconstitutional. If it is, then the grounds for opposition are
}constitutional, not that it's "been shown" (I say it hasn't) that
}registration is usually a prelude to confiscation.

That's easy.  Where in the Constitution are the powers delegated to the
Federal government to register cars, guns, crypto gear, computers, etc.?
Nowhere.  Thus, it's an unconstitutional as well as tyrannical power grab for
this to be done.


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: andy@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (Andy Freeman)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Organization: Computer Science Department,  Stanford University.
Distribution: inet
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 21:06:12 GMT

In article <1992Nov7.080407.25806@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>Michael T. Palmer argues that owning guns is a right guaranteed by the
>Constitution which the State has no right to intervene in.
>
>He is mistaken, and the argument itself is a tired piece of NRA propaganda.
>A careful reading of the Constitution, as well as the interpretation of
>many Constitutional scholars and the courts is that the relevant provision
>is a Militia clause, not an individual gun clause.

It has a Militia clause.  More specifically, it has a "well regulated
militia" clause.  A well regulated militia is an armed people - it
isn't an organization controlled by govt.  See Fletcher's Political
Works, pub'd in 1749.

The importance of the militia clause is that it is to subordinate govt
military power to that of the armed people.

You can't have an armed people without an individual right to keep and
bear arms.

-andy
--
UUCP:    {arpa gateways, sun, decwrl, uunet, rutgers}!cs.stanford.edu!andy
ARPA:    andy@cs.stanford.edu
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4472 comp.org.eff.talk:6864 alt.privacy:2150 talk.politics.guns:23761
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:26:15 GMT


 In <1992Nov11.152949.23374@rchland.ibm.com> lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com
 (Larry Loen) writes:

>I think if we consider the matter, legal scenarios involving
>cryptography will fit the wall safe model rather well and we can
>send people to jail, or torture them for their keys, or whatever the
>social decision turns out to be without considering cryptography as
>anything different in the decision.

 OK.  So we have one vote for including wall safes in the bill to
 require users of cryptography to reveal information after due
 process.  The District Attorney will take you out to lunch if
 *that* gets passed.

 Are we really unable to convince an ordinary legislator that this
 would be a bad law?

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4476 comp.org.eff.talk:6866 alt.privacy:2153 talk.politics.guns:23762