HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 19:18:40 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Nov13.091553.51@nsrvan.vanc.wa.us> sysevm@nsrvan.vanc.wa.us writes:
>Some kind of an intelectual game not the deeply insightfull
>modde of thought that is required for this issue. (see my next followup for
>more details)
	You seem to confuse rational thought with intellectual games.
	You also seem to confuse emotion with insight.  

>No, it does not mean that. It means to look at the real arguments. It
>means that you would have a differient viewpoint if you were looking at this 
>as a father instead of as an intellectual game.
	But I AM a father.  I am also a citizen.  You could use your
	irrational, emotional arguments to justify any atrocity you wanted.
	All you have to say is: "I'm a father, certain kinds of individuals
	are dangerous to my children, therefore this constitution shit
	is for the birds.  We can't affort it.  The price in the blood
	of the innocents is too high."

	Sadly, all too many people are dangerously susceptible 
	to totally specious arguments based on emotion.  That's why
	mobs and witch hunts and mass hysterias happen.  Until people 
	can discipline themselves to avoid hysteria we are likely to be 
	troubled by dictators and despots.  The most effective of
	which know how to manipulate people who can't control their 
	emotions long enough to have a rational thought.


						smg

	


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: polish@cs.columbia.edu (Nathaniel Polish)
Subject: Re: Encrypted phones, keys, taps, ...
Organization: Columbia University Department of Computer Science
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1992 18:08:19 GMT


It was suggested that a human listener would be required to determine when
the scrambled speech was "cleared" because recognision technology is not
up to it.  This is just plain false.  The spectral characteristics of clear
versus scrambled speech are easily distinguished.  Scrambled speech is useful
when the opponent does not have much time available to unscramble -- as is
the case in battlefield communications.  The value of the information declines
so fast that unscrambling is often not worth the trouble.

Nathaniel Polish
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 15:32:27 GMT
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories

In article <1992Nov12.003306.17491@src.umd.edu>, tedwards@eng.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards) writes:
> "P.C." needs for crytography...
> 
> * protection of communication between homosexuals who wish to
>   remain in the closet, especially those in the armed forces

Well, come January 20 I think that that ``especially'' will change...

Be that as it may, we have our own examples very close to home (or to
$HOME).  A number of newsgroups feature ``anonymous contact services'',
with the attendant worries about the security of those services.  Indeed,
the code for one of them was just posted to a source newsgroup.

PGP can do a lot better -- the contact service just becomes a key
registry, and encrypted email can even be posted to some group like
alt.personals.gerbils.pgp.  Anonymous posting then becomes as simple
as an open NNTP port.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: drake@Autodesk.COM (Dan Drake)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 13 Nov 92 21:59:42 GMT
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Autodesk Inc., Sausalito CA, USA

tedwards@eng.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards) writes:
> I'm suprised your average "bleeding-heart" liberal would ever
> think cryptography is not neccessary.  Of course, they might
> have some weird connection in their minds about guns and 
> crypto. ...

Aw, come on.  I'm a bleeding-heart liberal myself, and I wouldn't jump
to the conclusion that there's some connection between guns and crypto
just because 20%(*) of recent communication in sci.crypt has been about
guns.

Still, _somebody_ seems to think there's a connection.


(*)invented figure

--
Dan Drake                 In software, the *complete* design *is* the software!
drake@Autodesk.com        --Hugh Lamaster
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: RSA marketing weakness or lack of demand?
Keywords: RsA, PKP, marketing
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 21:25:31 GMT


Pat Farrell says:
"Until integrated software is widely available, and the legal
usage issues resolved, RSA will remain at best a niche
product. It is possible that this will not be resolved before
the PKP patents expire."

That's 1997. I'm curious. Do people think a Democratic administration
and Congress would support or oppose key registration? What's the
historical track record on similar issues?

If the Democrats obtain a second term, absent new laws, unrestricted
use of public key systems without PKP's legal interference will
be possible at that time. Who knows, by then personal computers may
even be fast enough to permit full RSA use, rather than RSA key encryption
of DES/IDEA messages. In any case, the issue would need to be confronted
by both intelligence and law enforcement.

I predict that unless a key registration law is "sneaked in" there's
going to be a bitter public battle over this issue during the current
Clinton administration. Hone your arguments and your
intervention/lobbying/testimony techniques now, whatever side of this
you're on.

-- 
David Sternlight
(pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ashley@citr.uq.oz.au (Ashley Beitz)
Subject: Distributed Systems Technology Research Position
Summary: Research Scientist Position for investigating encryption
Keywords: security distributed systems cryptology
Organization: Prentice Centre, University of Queensland
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 06:04:57 GMT



                       Cooperative Research Centre for 

                        Distributed Systems Technology

                              Brisbane, Australia


                 trading as DSTC Pty Ltd, A.C.N. 052 372 577


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               RESEARCH SCIENTIST
----------------------------------------------------------------------------


The Cooperative Research Centre for Distributed Systems Technology has 
been established under an Australian Government programme with initial 
Government and industry funding of $A54 million over 7 years.  It will 
develop technologies that will form infrastructure for global 
distributed information systems and services.  


The Position:

The person employed in this position will be investigating the 
application of encryption for distributed and open systems.  You will be 
responsible for investigating the possible usage of encryption in 
distributed and open systems, determining the required algorithms, and 
designing appropriate protocols for the secure and efficient usage of 
these algorithms.  The research will be conducted as part of a team in 
the Management, Security and Performance Unit of the CRC for Distributed 
Systems Technology's site at the Queensland University of Technology.
Applicants should have a PhD with a strong background in cryptology, 
extensive programming experience and an interest in applying information 
security techniques to distributed systems.  Development or industrial 
experience is advantageous.


Terms:

The appointment will be for a initial period of 3 years, commencing in 
early 1993.  Salary: $A40,000 - $A50,000 per annum.  For further 
information, contact Assoc. Prof. Ed Dawson, Ph: +61(7)864.1937, Fax: 
+61(7)221.2384, Internet: e.dawson@qut.edu.au.

Written applications should include names, addresses and fax numbers for 
2 referees and should be addressed to Rob Cook, CEO, DSTC Pty Ltd, The 
University of Queensland, Queensland, 4072, Australia,
Fax: +61(7)365 4399.  Applications close on 4th December, 1992.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Ashley Beitz		  | CiTR			|ashley@citr.uq.oz.au
                          | University of Queensland	|voice: +61 7 365 4309
			  | St Lucia, Queensland 4072	|fax:   +61 7 365 4399
			  | Australia			|
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne)
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Ottawa
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 92 21:30:07 GMT

In article <7986@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:
>In article <lfjmkiINNa74@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber) writes:
>>    Require: (for-all p)( (c=E(p)) is a text which appears to be
>>                                   a plaintext)
>
>
>The problem here is that both c and p must carry information and be
>believable both in style and as a real communication.  ("The pen of my aunt
>is on the table" doesn't pass as a real communication even though it parses
>correctly.)

The only "obvious" way around this is to use "steganography", where
through some (seemingly minor) changes in a cover message, you communicate
the "real" message.  Maybe through extra spaces here and there; maybe in
some sort of line break pattern; probably generically through some use
of "punctuation" in a message.

It makes data compression all the more important - if you can compress
the REAL message to 1/3 the size, there's only 1/3 as much "steganoizing"
to do, which is REALLY important, because this sort of scheme would
require a LOT of cover text.

And to avoid spoofing?  Might want to send an MD5 checksum via some other
channel...
-- 
Christopher Browne                |     PGP 2.0 key available
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca           |===================================
University of Ottawa              |  The Personal Computer:  Colt 45
Master of System Science Program  |  of the Information Frontier
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: andrew1@garfield.cs.mun.ca (Andrew Furlong)
Subject: Canadian Law
Keywords: Canada, law, cryptography, encryption
Organization: CS Dept., Memorial University of Newfoundland
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 14:25:45 GMT


   I'm new to this group, so I apologize in advance if anyone's asked
   this question before:


   What is the current state of Canadian Law involving cryptosystems
   and encryption of messages?  I know this is a broad question; I don't
   want the full legal text, just a general description of where things
   stand.  Please e-mail responses (if there is enough followup interest,
   I'll post what I get).

   Thanks in advance,

       Andrew



-- 
Andrew Furlong             |
                           |    There's no justice.
andrew1@garfield.cs.mun.ca |    Just us.
(709) 722-2121             |                     - T. Pratchett
From: zeke@fasttech.com (Bohdan Tashchuk)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Finally! We're getting somewhere.
Date: 5 Nov 92 10:27:44 GMT
Article-I.D.: fasttech.1992Nov5.102744.28493
Organization: Fast Technology

In <1992Nov4.191531.17572@spider.co.uk> paulq@spider.co.uk (Paul Qualtrough) writes:

>What?!?!  Has the land of truth, justice and cotton fields done away with
>the standard swearing-in phrase of "...the truth, the _whole_ truth, and
>nothing but the truth" which, if agreed to, implies that you must testify
>"against yourself" if some part of the truth is incriminating?

>I'm not saying the idea is good or bad, but without a real knowlege of your
>constitution, I doubt that there's going to be a strong case for challenging
>such a law if passed from a constitutional standpoint.

I'm sure a bunch of people will jump on this one. I'm posting rather than
mailing, since the info should be of interest to everyone outside the U.S.A.

The written U.S. Constitution is the essence of what makes the U.S.A. a far
safer democracy than the U.K., and by far the freest country in the world.
It is a truly magnificent document. A lot of the "countries-of-the-month" that
keep springing up have adopted various ideas from it. But as the discussion
in sci.crypt shows, it's not enough to merely have words on paper. People must
understand the words and stand ready to protect their liberties.

The applicable section is the "5th Amendment", which was part of the first
ten amendments, the "Bill of Rights", ratified about two years after the
Constitution itself. The Bill of Rights was written specifically to convince 
skeptical people that the government couldn't become a tyranny.

It's a historical accident, but I think the fact that the Bill of Rights
was adopted separately from the Constitution itself is a great thing. The
Bill of Rights doesn't give the government any powers. All it does is
*prohibit* the government from doing many things.

The U.S. Constitution is "the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding."

Here is the 5th amendment:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time
of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

-----

I don't want to sound too maudlin about it, but many, many people have fought
and died to defend the ideals represented by the Bill of Rights.
From: lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org (Mr. Lyn R. Kennedy)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Lead Balloons
Date: 5 Nov 92 15:05:21 GMT
Organization: Radio Amateur k5qwb

denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:

> As someone has said, "A society that cannot enforce its laws invites
> disrespect for those laws."  But regulating crypto may not be a good
> solution either unless we can come up with an acceptable means.

This is an important point: Do you want to live in a society which has 
laws that people will obey because they are for the common good or do 
you want to live in a society where the government is able to force you 
to obey it's laws no matter how bad they are?

We in the U.S. suffer from too many secret police agencies now. You 
would be appalled to know what some of them are doing. Crime, organized 
or not, thrives in an environment where the ordinary citizens don't
trust the police.

Crypograpy is currently used both to keep your secrets from the 
government and your government secret from you. It shouldn't be that 
way. See .sig



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 
73,            internet     | lrk@k5qwb.lonestar.org
Lyn Kennedy    packet radio | K5QWB @ N5LDD.#NTX.TX.US.NA
               pony express | P.O. Box 5133, Ovilla, TX, USA 75154

-------------- "We have met the enemy and he is us."  Pogo --------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:53:30 GMT


 In <1992Nov12.012409.26925@news.cs.indiana.edu> Marc VanHeyningen
 <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu> writes:


>"The right to free speech includes the right to speak in a fashion not
>easily understood by others."

 Certainly we can agree that "speaking" via wires or on public
 "airwaves" is not, ultimately, free.  Given that resources are
 consumed, there will be regulations for use.

 But does society have the right, *after* due process, to see behind
 any secrecy veil a private citizen may erect?  While a citizen may
 not be compelled to testify against himself, his or her "houses,
 papers, and effects" are only protected from *unreasonable* "search
 and seizure" (that is, without a warrant issued for probable cause).

 Since society *did* have an existing right to penetrate secrecy
 (*after* due process) under The Constitution, we would have to
 argue that there is no social need for such access under new
 security technology.  Can anyone believe that no cases will exist
 under which society will require such access?  Thus, is punishment
 for failure to allow access (*after* due process) somehow not
 a legitimate law?

 I think it would be easier to argue for legislation setting higher
 standards for warrants than it would be to argue that all personal
 information is ultimately private under all circumstances.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org

From: lyons@hplredHPL.HP.COM (Nic Lyons)
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 1992 18:03:19 GMT
Subject: Re: FAQ?
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, CA
Newsgroups: sci.crypt

Could someone mail me a FAQ, too?  Thanks!

--

	Nic Lyons	Hewlett-Packard Labs Distributed Computing Department
			1501 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA  94304
			lyons@hpl.hp.com or nic@hplnpl.hpl.hp.com
			Telephone [415] 857-7510
From: garfield@utopia.hacktic.nl (garfield)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Registering keys
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 92 00:14:22 GMT
Organization: U.T.O.P.I.A.

Why all the fuss about registering keys?? If they want them.. give them 
what they want.. If everyone registeres 10 or 15 keys and each key is 10K 
in size.... Then they have a slight problem of storage...

garfield@utopia.hacktic.nl

 ---
garfield@utopia.hacktic.nl (garfield)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: piet@cs.ruu.nl (Piet van Oostrum)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 09:58:11 GMT
Reply-To: piet@cs.ruu.nl (Piet van Oostrum)
Organization: Dept of Computer Science, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

>>>>> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) (TR) writes:

TR>     The police bust an alleged child molester, and take possession
TR>     of his PC.  They believe that the hard drive contains a full
TR>     database of young kids who have been *or may be* assaulted.
TR>     That database is enciphered.

Yeah and would you think he would just encipher it with a registered key?

Or think of the following scenario: Het isn't so stupid to put the database
in his computer, but he has it on paper in a vault with a combination lock.
What is the difference? (by the way, the vault destroys its contents when
it is forcefully opened).
-- 
Piet van Oostrum <piet@cs.ruu.nl>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bbs-hrick@jwt.UUCP (Rick Harrison)
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Reply-To: bbs-hrick@jwt.UUCP
Organization: The Matrix
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 07:26:59 GMT

jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel)  writes:

>     However, recently (yesterday) I had  the opportunity to speak with a
>     law enforcement official who had quite a different view.
>     He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
>     from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molestor who encrypted
>     his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molestor will
>     more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence. This  has caused me
 
Not everyone who is accused is guilty.  If the police couldn't
find sufficient evidence elsewhere -- the testimony of victims,
child pornography in the suspect's house, etc -- why would they
or you expect there to be evidence in his computer?  If you
robbed a bank, molested a child, or committed some other crime,
would you rush home, boot your computer and type in a detailed
description of what you had just done?!?!  Please, examine the
underlying assumptions which you are harboring.
 
===
Rick Harrison
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4471 comp.org.eff.talk:6863 alt.privacy:2149 talk.politics.guns:23760
From: roana@cs.utwente.nl (Room 101)
Subject: secure communication via third party
Keywords: diffie-hellman
Organization: University of Twente, Dept. of Computer Science
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 11:23:04 GMT

Consider two parties X and Y who have never met and never exchanged
information. They wish to establish a confidential and authenticated
channel. Since they can't communicate directly, they need to send their
messages to Z, who (supposedly) routes them to the recipient.

X and Y can use Diffie-Hellman to establish a secret key using public
messages that Z can read. However, Z might intelligently change these
messages to create a transparent channel between X and Y. Z will be able
to read and change all messages sent over this supposedly secure channel.

Is it possible for X and Y to detect if Z has created a transparent
channel between them, for example by using the fact that both have
calculated different secret keys. I know authentication is possible
if all communication between the parties is conversational, since X
can send Y a hashed value of its next block and the key, wait for Ys reply 
and send the real block. Z cannot fake this, since it doesn't know the
original block of data. However, this type of check is impractical
for everyday use on network layers.

Any suggestions are welcome.
 
Ronald
roana@cs.utwente.nl
From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: 12 Nov 92 23:04:45 GMT
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx


 In <1992Nov12.160033.26502@rchland.ibm.com>
 lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen) writes:

>I think there is no need for a new law
>at all.  I am not a legal expert, but I think that only information
>in one's own brain is exempt from involuntary surrender.  Else, why
>have search warrants in the first place?

 It is one thing to be forced to surrender ciphertext, and quite
 another to be forced, under criminal penalty, to surrender the
 associated plaintext.  The point of this would be the ability to
 convict someone who will not and *can* not afford to reveal the
 plaintext because of greater penalty.

 Many people (not so many here, of course) believe there *is* a
 need for a new law.  Abstractly, I would prefer that everybody be
 free to do everything; I find myself in the unfortunate position
 that these desires are limited by reality.  In practice, it seems
 to be necessary to have some limits and controls to allow society
 to stumble along.

 I have never had the experience of being searched under a warrant;
 I expect that I would take it as an invasion of my privacy.  But
 the reality is that such an "invasion" is *our heritage* under
 common law.  Moreover, I am not aware that due-process search is
 an active civil rights or personal freedom issue.  Can we really
 expect to avoid this accepted part of our heritage simply because
 we have a new technology that makes that possible?  I expect that
 if we wish to eliminate the use of warrants we will have to
 confront that issue directly in a political forum.

 Computer cryptography makes it possible for those who accumulate
 information to avoid the due-process search which is expected
 when people accumulate things.


>But, whatever the state of the law actually is, I don't see any
>reason that cryptography requires any _special_ treatment.  It just
>isn't really different than a wall safe.

 The difference is that what was once rare and easily breached by
 the authorities is now on its way to becoming common and
 impenetrable.  Cryptography really is different from a wall safe.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org
Organization: Middle East Technical University - Computer Center
Date: Thursday, 5 Nov 1992 10:51:32 TUR
From: <C51885@TRMETU.BITNET>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject:    DES source Code is needed

Hello,
Could you send me the DES source code (as a C Code) to me, or could
you tell me, where can I find it .(May be FTP address and directory and file
names)
Thanks Ismail Tore.
E-mail address : C51885 at trmetu.bitnet
Newsgroups: sci.crypt