From: fdeming@cvbnet@prime.com (Frank Deming {x6088})
Newsgroups: rec.games.chess
Subject: Re: Inflation in ELO's system
Date: 9 Oct 92 15:52:14 GMT
Organization: Computervision, A Prime Computer Company, Bedford, MA, USA

In article <1992Oct8.160151.27862@cis.uab.edu>, sloan@cis.uab.edu (Kenneth Sloan) writes:
|> In article <4051@cvbnetPrime.COM> fdeming@cvbnet@prime.com (Frank Deming {x6088}) writes:
|> >...
|> >The problem with what you have presented is that many of the beginning and
|> >average players leave the game, in greater numbers than the strong players.
|> 
|> But the relevant question is: do these beginning and average players
|> leave the game with a higher or lower rating thant their initial
|> *established* rating?  
|> 
|> Let's take a few examples:
|> 
|> Player 1: plays in 2 tournaments, and never returns
|> 
|> Player2: plays in 5 tournaments, receiving an initial established rating
|> of 1200.  Continues to play for 2 or three more tournaments, raising his
|> rating to 1250 - and then gives up.
|> 
|> Player 3: playes informally for a long time, and gets quite good.
|> Enters USCF play and receives an initial established rating of 1800.
|> Plays for 50 years, acheiving a peak rating of 2350 - after which the
|> ravages of time reduce his skill and his rating drops to 2100.  
|> 
|> As a result of these players entering and leaving the pool:
|> 
|>                         Player 1    Player 2    Player 3
|> rating points created      0          1200       1800
|> rating points removed      0          1250       2100
|> ---------------------    ---          ----       ----
|> net effect                 0           -50       -300
|> 
|> Player 1 never causes the system to mint new rating points, but he
|> doesn't remove any from the pool.  The other two (fairly typical)
|> careers have the net effect of removing rating points from the pool.
|> 
|> Of course, we might also have:
|> 
|> Player 4: enters USCF play after years of study in Bolivia, receiving an
|> initial established rating of 2299.  Discovers Bill Goichberg, and
|> sandbags his rating down to 2100.  Wins $10,000 every year at the World
|> Open, and spends every weekend the rest of the year getting his rating
|> back down to 2100.  Eventually retires to Aruba with his winnings.
|> 
|> Player 5: Player 4's brother.  Smarter than his brother, he sandbags
|> during his Provisional Rating days, and enters with an initial
|> established rating of 986.  Wins a different section in a Goichberg
|> tournament every year - moving up as slowly as he can, and doing lots of
|> sandbagging along the way.  Retires with a rating of 2399 and *buys*
|> Aruba with his winnings - taking along Goichberg as his personal body
|> slave. 
|> 
|> Player 4 contributes 199 rating points to the pool when he leaves, along
|> with a few $$.
|> 
|> Player 5 removes 1413 rating points, and lots more $$.
|> 
|> Of course, every once in a while, you get:
|> 
|> Player 6: plays for 15 years in Bolivia, developing a completely new
|> style and several TN's.  Wins everything in his first 5 tournaments and
|> gets an initial established rating of 2650.  This gets the attention of
|> the local masters, who study his games and unravel his novelties.  They
|> then beat him back down to his natural level of 2150 - at which point he
|> moves to England, hoping to do it again before Inside Chess does a story
|> on him.
|> 
|> Player 6 removes 500 points from the pool - contributing to rating
|> inflation.
|> 
|> The only question left is:  how many of each kind of player are there?
|> What is the *net* gain or loss of rating points?
|> 
|> -- 
|> Kenneth Sloan                   Computer and Information Sciences
|> sloan@cis.uab.edu               University of Alabama at Birmingham
|> (205) 934-2213                  115A Campbell Hall, UAB Station 
|> (205) 934-5473 FAX              Birmingham, AL 35294-1170

I have still a problem with the way you have set up your problem. So, I will
ask a question(given that I have not read Elo's work).

Given that at the lower rating levels there is a high degree of joining the
rating system and then leaving it, do these individuals give an upward push to
the rating system.
1. For the sake of argument, let say that 3 out 4 players that join the
   rating system are in it only for the short term. The short term meaning
   in this case they only ever establish provisional ratings. They are typically
   weak, but not always.
2. In receiving a provisional rating, they gain this rating number, but also
   at the same time they contribute to the rating loss or gain of their opponents.
   For the new provisional player, their rating adjustments are not on a net
   basis, as I understand, but their opponents are.
3. Given that they are weak players, in typical tournaments, what are their 
   effect on the net ratings of their opponents. In many open tournaments, these
   new weak players, do get trounced badly, and leave the game. Do they in the
   games they play, contribute net points to their opponents. Since these players 
   enter and leave with provisional ratings, it would seem that their main 
   contribution would be their net(+/-) effect on the other players. An example
   of this could be:
      before an individual is in the pool, the pool has x points in it(not 
      an average)
      after the individual leaves the pool, he has contibute y(+/-) net points
      to the pool.
      Look at this before and after, it is clear what the provisional player was
      rated while in the pool does not matter.


Next Question on Inflation, given that the K factor is 32 for under(2100?),
24 for under 2400(?) and 16 for above, is this not a recent concession to rating
inflation?

Last Question: What is the name and publisher of Elo's book?


Thank You 
frank deming(a4/Q)