HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: dlb@fanny.wash.inmet.com (David Barton)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 8 Nov 92 22:34:54 GMT
	<DLB.92Nov4100421@fanny.wash.inmet.com>
	<1992Nov7.145606.1684@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
Organization: Intermetrics Inc., Washington Division, USA

In article <1992Nov7.145606.1684@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:

   The main cost, I believe, is the labor of listening, not the labor
   of installing the intercept.  They put 2 people on simultaneously
   for 3 shifts a day and 7 days a week.  Although my back of the
   envelope calculation fails to account for the savings that would
   come from scaling, the real costs for large scale surveillance
   would nonetheless have to be staggering.  It would be like going
   back to the use of human beings for the telephone switches!

The operative term here is, "keyword searches".  There is a reason the
NSA sponsers research in natural language recognition.

   But perhaps the more important point is that they could not do it
   because it is illegal under Title 18 to tap without an order.  I
   really don't see how some gov't agency could embark on massive
   surveillance without someone finding out and throwing the books at
   them.

I envy your faith in the government.  I do not share it.  The
government does a great many things that are illegal.  Some of these
are found out about in retrospect, and made public.  We can only
speculate about how many are not.

   Another point about intercepts that seems to be misunderstood has
   to do with minimization.  If the gov't is listening, they have to
   turn it off if the conversation turns to something unrelated to the
   court order.  They can periodically check, but even with a court
   order they are not allowed to listen to everything.

And if evidence uncovered in a tap that is not covered by the warrent,
it is inadmissible.  This does not mean that they stop listening.

   It's a very tedious, tiring job and law enforcers groan when they
   Ifind
   out they have to do a tap.  The myth of folks eager to wiretap
   everyone is nothing like the reality.

If everyone played by the rules, there would be a lot fewer objections
to government power in general.

I note that you did not address my comments concerning whether the
registration scheme would even help the government in those cases it
is trying to build.

					Dave Barton
					dlb@hudson.wash.inmet.com
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4652 comp.org.eff.talk:6957 alt.privacy:2205 talk.politics.guns:24021
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registering "Assault Keys"
From: jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu (jason 'Think!' steiner)
Date: 12 Nov 92 04:07:32 EST
Followup-To: talk.politics.guns
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4

gurgle@netcom.com (Pete Gontier) writes:
> sjo@cci632.cci.com (Steve Owens) writes:
> 
> Remember, we're talking about kids finding Daddy's gun and shooting 
> each other with it out of ignorance. That's *all* I'm talking about.

that's it? then your band-aid is closer to an iron lung. it's a 
drastic measure, costs a bunch, restricts the freedom of the people 
it's supposed to help & doesn't do anything to heal the original cut.

if you're worried "about kids finding daddy's gun and shooting each
other with it out of ignorance" then why not remove the -truely-
dangerous factor, ignorance? that would solve the problem without
any detrimental side effects. i, for one, plan to purchase a handgun
precisely so i can teach my children how to handle and respect
firearms.

jason

follups to talk.politics.guns

--
  "More life, more love, more freedom, more choice!" - MORTAL, Painkiller
`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,`,` jsteiner@anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu ,`,`,`
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: 12 Nov 92 17:42:46 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1060.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us> jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) writes:
>    However, recently (yesterday) I had  the opportunity to speak with a
>    law enforcement official who had quite a different view.
>
>    He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
>    from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molester who encrypted
>    his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molester will
>    more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence.



That's unfortunate, if true.  They'll have to get busy guessing what the
suspect might have used as a private key for IDEA-encrypted keys.  The same
would apply to raw DES or IDEA.  It doesn't have to be PGP.

However, that has nothing to do with you as a BB source for PGP.  I hope
you gave the official a copy.  With that, your job is done.

PGP shares no guilt in child molestation.  If the suspect had committed
something to memory and that was the only thing which could convict him,
then he goes free, according to our Bill of Rights.  If he goes free,
then he is not a child molester (according to the law).

Encryption gives me (or even a molester) the ability to record information
as securely as if it were in memory -- because the key is in memory.  If
the owner forgets it, for example, then whatever was encrypted is lost to
the owner.

And, to repeat, PGP is not an issue here.  This applies to *any* secret-key
encryption algorithm -- publicly available or personally invented.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: New Encryption Method - a Challenge!
Date: 10 Nov 92 22:44:19 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <n0e07t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
> The most peculiar thing about your rejection, and that of the other
> person who replied, is that both of you are rejecting the challenge
> _without having ever seen the product you are rejecting!_.  This 
> worries me immensely.  Makes me wonder if you may not simply be 
> avoiding the challenge under some pretenses.  Am I mistaken?


The taunts are unworthy of this newsgroup.


What is being rejected is:

1.	any attempt to get readers of this group into a "here's the
	ciphertext, try to break it" game

2.	any alleged cryptosystem which has no key (and is therefore
	useless)


If you (and I doubt there's any friend) want to have the system reviewed,
publish it.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.folklore.urban,alt.politics.usa.constitution
From: fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
Subject: Re: U.S. Constitution
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 04:21:46 GMT

In article <1992Nov5.121745.21162@ulysses.att.com> smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:
>Yes, and I think it's going to make for an interesting Supreme Court case.
>I seem to recall an earlier court ruling that ratifications be ``substantially
>contemporaneous'', which sure doesn't apply here.  And a lawsuit has been
>filed under that amendment, charging that a recent Congressional pay
>raise violates it.

Actually, the Court ruling required that all future amendment have a
time limit on them. It did not apply that standard to past amendments.

                                            Frank Crary       
                                            CU Boulder

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4416 comp.org.eff.talk:6821 alt.privacy:2123 talk.politics.guns:23660
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Date: 6 Nov 92 20:22:04 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
Distribution: inet
NNTP-Posting-Host: icat.larc.nasa.gov

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>Those who would oppose registration because it would make it easier to
>enforce laws should direct their attention to the laws, not the
>registration. Otherwise they are advocating making law violation
>easier.  The proper place to oppose "improper" laws is in the
>law-making process, and subsequently in the courts, not in the
>"registration" arena, unless registration itself is, say,
>unconstitutional. If it is, then the grounds for opposition are
>constitutional, not that it's "been shown" (I say it hasn't) that
>registration is usually a prelude to confiscation.

I think the main problem many people have with registration schemes has
nothing to do with enforcing *current* laws.  It has to do with setting
the stage for making future (undesirable) laws possible.  It is easier to
fight bad legislation by not giving congresscritters the inkling that
something is even possible, than it is by letting them know they can increase
their power and then trying to prevent them from doing it.

By the way, a MAJOR HUGE difference between automobiles and guns/crypt
is that driving a car on the highways of a state is a privilege, whereas
bearing arms in defense of self/family/country and communicating with
others privately are RIGHTS guarranteed (not granted) by our constitution.

The state has an interest in registering automobiles, so that it can
exercise the authority granted it by its citizens regarding vehicular
rules and regulations.  But the state has NO legitimite interest in
registering firearms or crypto keys, since its citizens have NOT granted
it the authority to interfere with exercising these rights.  The legislature
does not have the authority to pass laws which infringe on these rights,
and if our courts were performing their duty all that crap would get
thrown out.  But since things don't always work as intended, some of us
tend to get more PROactive than REactive.

This is why the mention of firearms/crypto key registration makes people
hopping mad - we know what the long term impact of letting such laws get
passed will be.  The government will assume powers not given it by the
people.

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
From: boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: 8 Nov 92 01:10:13 GMT
Organization: UB

In article <1992Nov7.142220.1683@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> 
denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
> I'd like to suggest another possibility, which for want of a
> better name I'll call the "copper balloon".  It's quite clear that key 
> registration goes over like a "lead balloon".  My question is: is this 
> any better?  worse?
[Lengthy description deleted]

Your copper balloon won't float any better than your lead one would.

THIS IS UNENFORCABLE!  It's a neat idea but it won't matter a HILL OF
BEANS! 

If I were J. Random Mafioso, I would:

1. Get laptop PCs, modems, and an DES cypher program.  (John Gotti
   himself could write one in LISP given the books and enough time --
   he's not stupid.  Or he could hire someone.)

2. Exchange keys when I meet the guy I want to talk to.  I have
   to meet him to see if I trust him anyway.  (This is when I show him
   the big nasty bruisers who'll make him into salami if he crosses me).

3. Use REGULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE to transmit undecryptable messages.
   I can run around to payphones, use accoustic couplers, whenever I
   want!  Are you going to bust me for having a laptop and a modem?

> Assuming that the 3rd party devices were reliably constructed, this 
> would at least superficially provide more protection since no keys 
> would be kept unless a court order were issued.

I have $5000 -- enough to buy the equipment so I don't need to.  I
don't wanna participate in your silly protocol because I don't want
you to be able to tap me.

Are you going to make it a crime for me to use my modem?

-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: tedwards@eng.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards)
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Organization: Project GLUE, University of Maryland, College Park
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 00:33:06 GMT

In article <1dre8mINNhfk@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

>This is the place for concrete examples which will convince even the person
>who doesn't share my belief and who *never will share that belief*.

"P.C." needs for crytography...

* protection of communication between homosexuals who wish to
  remain in the closet, especially those in the armed forces
* abortion supporters and doctors who perform abortions in the
  Mid-West to avoid persecution from mobs of fundies
* communication between Wiccans in the broom closet
* the need for secure communication between radical political
  groups, or environmental groups who wish to avoid eavesdropping
  by large, polluting organizations

* communication networks in this country are becoming to large to
  provide any amount of physical security, especially with 
  microwave and satellite links.  Anyone could be listening in
  anywhere (not just the government, they're way down on my list
  of people I'd worry about)     

I'm suprised your average "bleeding-heart" liberal would ever
think cryptography is not neccessary.  Of course, they might
have some weird connection in their minds about guns and 
crypto. (Or that "crypto" stuff is just part of the mean
old military industrial complex).

Well, let me go on record as saying I personally will uphold
my rights to be secure in my papers, no matter if it is the
left or the right or the center that tries to take it away.

-Thomas

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: msells@napier.uwaterloo.ca (Marty Sells)
Subject: Public Key Cryptography Source Code Wanted
Summary: RSA or whatever
Originator: msells@napier.uwaterloo.ca
Keywords: wanted, public key, RSA
Organization: University of Waterloo
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 05:41:23 GMT

Could someone point me towards some source code for a public key crypt
system. Is RSA releasable in source form? (I saw postings about the
pattent dates etc. so I wondered).
 
I checked archie, simtel, garbo. E-mail for a reply is fine.

Marty.
msells@napier.uwaterloo.ca
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Authentication protocols in GSM
From: makamn@cstp.umkc.edu
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 20:44:26 GMT
Organization: UM - Kansas City, Computer Science

Hi:

I would like to get more information on the PROTOCOLS and SYSTEM 
ARCHITECTURE used for the AUTHENTICATION procedure in present day
CELLULAR systems and GSM .

My EMAIL address is:MAKAMN@CSTP.UMKC.EDU
From: alain@elevia.uniforum.qc.ca (W.A.Simon)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Simple hardware RNG
Date: 11 Nov 92 08:01:11 EST

In <1992Nov1.225224.23220@qualcomm.com>
karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
proposes:

> [ ... ] 
> One of the exhibits was a "chaotic pendulum" consisting of several
> [ ... ]
> outcomes over time. Just the ticket for a good hardware random number
> generator.
> [ ... ]

	Practically, a software model, maybe...
	But it could be found out.

	But what's wrong with this: /dev/faircoin

	A process spits out an uninterrompted
	sequence of alternating 0s and 1s, to a
	bit bucket.  It is the "fair coin"...
	010101010101010101010101010101...

	Everytime a process needs a random bit, it
	reads the character device.  The device
	driver just taps the "fair coin" on the
	shoulder, which the "fair coin" takes as a
	request for a contribution.  It interrupts
	its blissful occupation, turns its shlong
	away from the bucket, aims it at the master
	end of the device and squirts the next drop
	of randomness: a "0" or a "1".  It then
	blissfully resumes where it was interrupted.



--
 Alain
 [ ... usual disclaimer... ]
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: time-release keys
Date: 10 Nov 92 14:43:20 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com


For things like sealed archives (things kept secret for 30 years, for
example) we depend on some human to obey the rules -- release the sealed
material on time and not allow anyone to look at it early.

If we were to have a radio relay station on the moon with ability to
decrypt via its own RSA key (for example), we could send it a message and
have the decrypted message come back precisely delayed from the time of
transmission.  No one could read it on its way out, so the delay meets the
requirements I'd like to satisfy for sealed archives -- only the delay is a
little short.

We could encrypt millions of times over, using different keys, but the
computation time preparing the secret might take longer than the
transmission (or at least a sizeable fraction of it).


Does anyone out there have an idea of how to achieve this time-release of
info (probably of an encryption key rather than of a body of text) with the
independence of human good behavior but a decent time interval?

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy,talk.politics.guns
From: watt-alan@net.yale.edu (Alan Watt)
Subject: Re: Registered Keys - why the need?
Originator: swatt@mickey.CS.Yale.Edu
Organization: Yale University, Computing & Information Systems
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 15:09:22 GMT


In article <1992Nov7.133526.1682@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>, denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
	<...>
|> My understanding is that the phone companies keep an audit of all taps.
|> 
|> Section 2519 of Title 18 contains fairly elaborate reporting 
|> requirements for law enforcement.  The reports go into the annual
|> "Wiretap Report" which lists the judge, prosecutor, offense specified,
|> cost, duration, number of intercepts, persons intercepted, 
|> incriminating intercepts, arrests, trials, motions to suppress, and
|> convictions for each tap.

Look in the report and see if it lists CT State Police monitoring of
all calls in/out of their facilites for several years up to 1991, when
it was finally disclosed.  All calls from detainees to their attorneys
were recorded, as were all calls from attorneys at State Police facilites
to anywhere.  The State Police claimed they "never reviewed" the recordings.
Just recently, the CT Attorney General announced that no charges would be
filed in the case.

Now admittedly, these recordings were made on the PABX equipment at
State Police premises, not the facilities of SNET or another public
service provider.  But given the changes in telecommunications, what
unit of governemnt *doesn't* operate its own phone network these days?
CT has a private T3 network linking all state offices;  am I safe in
assumeing that any phone call I make or receive in any state office
facility is free of monitoring devices?  Recent experience here suggests
(1) you cannot trust the authorities; (2) if caught they will not be
punished (thus reinforcing item 1).
-- 
  Alan S. Watt
  Yale University			Computing and Information Systems
  Box 2112 Yale Station			(203) 432-6602
  New Haven, CT  06520-2112		Watt-Alan@Yale.Edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
From: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Date: 11 Nov 92 11:01:00 GMT
Reply-To: jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (Jim Wenzel) 
Distribution: world
Organization: The GrapeVine BBS *** N. Little Rock, AR *** (501) 753-8121



    I  have been  reading this   newsgroup for  several weeks  with keen
    interest. And  for one am in  favor of the privacy  that it permits.
    However, recently (yesterday) I had  the opportunity to speak with a
    law enforcement official who had quite a different view.

    He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
    from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molestor who encrypted
    his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molestor will
    more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence. This  has caused me
    some  concern   because  we  have  agreed   (volunteered)  to  be  a
    distribution site  for PGP (logon as  PGP USER pw: PGP).  Yet, I for
    one would hate to think that there is anyway we could help such scum
    in receiveing PGP or similar encryption technology.

    At  this point  I am  curious as  to what  others think.  Both about
    distribution  and about  it's use   by the  underworld. I  have read
    'Dennings' report  and though I  disagree with it  on several points
    this particular  case does raise some  real-life issues pertinent to
    the discussion. If a  law was to be passed (and you  can bet that if
    cases like  this one in particular  continue one will be)  how would
    you like it to read?

*  Jim Wenzel,  SysOp,  The GrapeVine BBS,  (501) 753-8121  5.6 gigs  *
*  RIME, Use-Net, ForthNet, SmartNet, MetroLink, Intelec , RecoverNet *
*  ThrobNet and MediaNet message echos.  Large IBM, Amiga, Adult and  *
*  Programming file areas. PGP 2.0 public key available upon request  *

---
 * SM 1.06 A0059 * Gentlemen:  Start your debuggers...
Organization: Middle East Technical University - Computer Center
Date: Thursday, 5 Nov 1992 10:46:26 TUR
From: <C51885@TRMETU.BITNET>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject:    Information needed about Zero Knowledge Techniques

Hello,
  I want to get detailed information about Zero knowledge Techniques.
I will be very pleased, if you send me informations, documents, sources
etc. about it..
             Thanks Ismail Tore.

E-mail:        C51885 at trmetu.bitnet
Home Address : Yeni Ankara Sok. No: 13/5
               06340 CEBECI/ANKARA