Organization: University of Illinois at Chicago
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 11:15:39 CST
From: <U15231@uicvm.uic.edu>
Newsgroups: soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna
Subject: Owen: We've Reached The Crunch

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 02:24:22 EST
Subject: Newsweek: Owen



WE'VE REACHED THE CRUNCH

By DANIEL PEDERSEN
c.1993 Newsweek
(Distributed by New York Times Special Features)
   David Owen became Britain's foreign secretary when he was only
39. Now Lord Owen, 54, he returned to diplomacy four months ago as
the European Community's negotiator for peace in Bosnia.
   Last week the talks approached a climax. Owen and Cyrus Vance,
the U.N. envoy, unveiled a plan to divide Bosnia into 10
semi-autonomous provinces.
   The Bosnian Serbs balked at anything less than full sovereignty,
and Western military intervention grew more likely.
   But another round of talks was due Sunday and Monday in Geneva.
At his office there, Lord Owen spoke late last week with Newsweek's
Daniel Pedersen. Excerpts:

   PEDERSEN: Are the Bosnian Serbs prepared to make reliable
concessions?
   OWEN: I don't think we know yet. But I doubt the day of
reckoning can be postponed much longer. We have now reached the
crunch, and the nub of the issue is out on the table  the Bosnian
Serbs' wish for a state within a state.

   Will Serbian President Milosevic really pressure the Bosnian
Serbs to deal?
   It's very difficult to know with President Milosevic. He says,
``I will talk to (Bosnian Serb leader) Karadzic.'' You are left to
draw your own conclusions. But we explained to him that there was
no way that Serbs, under this proposed constitution, would be
living under a Muslim-dominated state. The safeguards are very
strong.

   Before you took this job, you argued for military intervention.
Lately, you have argued for diplomacy. What changed?
   My view has not changed. At the right moment, the use of air
power is a perfectly legitimate addition to your diplomatic armory.
In the summer, when I argued for intervention, we had no large U.N.
forces there and people could by and large feed themselves.
   In the winter you really are in a serious crisis if the convoys
are seriously disrupted. That isn't to say I would rule out a
military option.
   But I'd ask myself, ``What are you doing it for?'' Have no
doubt: once there's intervention, it isn't going to be business as
usual. The United Nations will be associated in Serb eyes with the
Muslims.

   Would enforcement of the no-fly zone send the right message?
   It may be a quick way of sending a message. But in substance, it
doesn't alter the balance of power on the ground or bring a
settlement closer.
   If there is no agreement, I think the world has to ask whether
any other package is fairer than the one Vance and I have proposed.
I think the answer is no.
   The next question is, can you enforce this settlement
(militarily)? I think the answer is yes. And it wouldn't take
ground troops to do it.

   Would you arm the Bosnian Muslims?
   Arming them is part of walking away from a solution. That's
letting them fight it out. If you arm the Muslims, you've armed the
Croats because the arms come through there.
   And then you've put intolerable pressures on the Russians (and
other) traditional suppliers of the Serbs. There are masses of
sophisticated weaponry lying around in the former Soviet Union,
only too ready to be sold.

   So you're talking about using massive air power to enforce a
settlement?
   Yes. With three warring factions on the ground, it makes no
sense to add ground troops. ... (But enforcing the settlement)
would be a much more substantive decision than enforcing the no-fly
zone.
   Though you would be risking the humanitarian effort, you would
be putting it at risk for a defined end. You can't do this if you
haven't got a settlement on offer. There is on the table a serious,
well-worked-out, solid document.

   A novice could look at your provincial map and see some pretty
odd shapes there. Isn't map-drawing a doomed exercise?
   I don't think it is, or I wouldn't have done it. Neither Serbs
nor Croats are prepared to live under a powerful centralized
government. They see that as Muslim domination. So to keep Bosnia
as a single state, it has to be decentralized.

   You wrote an essay last summer that talked about history
repeating itself. Critics say your map appeases Serbian aggression.
   The total Bosnian Serb military pullback (proposed in the peace
plan) is nearly 24 percent. That is very substantial. In Bihac, the
area with maximum ``ethnic cleansing,'' there's a 62 percent
pullback. The Muslims would say it should go further.
   But you have to take account of what is negotiable. The Serbians
have not lost this war. I challenge you to find a case in history
where there has been this degree of rollback by negotiation, prior
to defeat.

   If there's a settlement, how much military expertise will it
take to implement it? How many U.N. forces, and for how long?
   It's very hard to believe you could get elections in under a
year. The United Nations would have to be there, quite heavily
engaged, for at least that long.

   What principles of international law are at stake here,
justifying intervention?
   There aren't very firm principles, which is why this is so
complex. There are elements of an external aggression, and of a
civil war. I would never say stop talking. I'm a negotiator. But I
think the Security Council has to consider whether there are
methods of enforcing a settlement.
   Because here is a country where grotesque abuses are taking
place, war crimes are taking place, people are starving, and there
is a need for peace.
-0-
 NYT-01-11-93 0409EST

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