From: Indonesia Publications/Task Force <apakabar@igc.org>
Newsgroups: soc.culture.portuguese
Date: 28 Jul 92 17:33 PDT
Subject: East Timor Newsbriefs July 28
Nf-ID: #N:cdp:1591800211:000:31051
Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!apakabar    Jul 28 17:33:00 1992


From: Indonesia Publications/Task Force <apakabar>
Subject: East Timor Newsbriefs July 28



Forwarded from greenleft.news conference:
Topic 41Green Left issue 64, July 29Response 31 of 35
peg:greenleft
Green Left Weekly 7:42 pm  Jul 28, 1992

Urge linking of human rights, Indonesian aid

By Max Lane

Governments of 18 industrialised countries, including Australia,
have agreed to provide Indonesia with further loans totalling
US$4.8 billion. The biggest lenders are the World Bank and Japan,
followed by the other big Western powers.

Representatives of the 18 met on July 17 in Paris met to conduct
their annual vetting of the Indonesian economy. The group is now
known as the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) and is chaired
by the World Bank.

Previously the lending governments met as the Inter-Governmental
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), chaired by the Netherlands. However,
Indonesia has refused to collaborate further with the IGGI while
the Netherlands chaired the group because of the Netherlands'
attempt to link aid and human rights.

The Netherlands suspended aid to Indonesia in the wake of the
Dili Massacre on November 12.

To balance its budget, the Suharto government depends on huge
inputs of foreign aid, mostly in the form of loans. Despite being
a major exporter of oil and the world's biggest exporter of
liquid natural gas as well as a major exporter of tropical
timber, the government has now run up a debt of over US$100
billion.

According to Indonesian government figures, approximately 50% of
all government expenditure on development comes from foreign aid.
``Revenue'' from loans is included on the income side of
Indonesia's national budget, which means that it is nearly always
``balanced''.

The US ambassador in Jakarta made very strongly critical
statements of the Suharto regime prior to the CGI meeting. He was
not, however, critical of the level of political repression or
poverty but the extent of corruption and red tape that bedevils
foreign investors. US investment has been dropping off over
recent years.

Some of the European countries, led by Portugal, did express some
concern over human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor.
But the CGI as a whole seemed to believe that such issues should
not be linked to aid.

Human Rights organisations, including New York-based Asia Watch,
TAPOL (the British Campaign for Human Rights in Indonesia),
several of the Netherlands-based Indonesian pro-democracy groups
and Aksi (Indonesia Solidarity Action) in Australia, have urged
governments to make such a link. Asia Watch sent a memo to the
CGI arguing for the linking of democratisation and development
assistance.

Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans has made it clear
several times that the Australian government will not link human
rights and aid. When the US House of Representatives blocked US$2
million of military aid to Indonesia, Evans condemned the
Congress as being too punitive.

Australia provided $106 million in 1990-91 and an estimated $113
million in 1991-92 in economic assistance, mostly to projects
involving Australian companies. Australia also conducts a
development cooperation program with the Indonesian military,
including joint exercises, training and other exchanges.

Aksi groups in Sydney and Canberra have decided to launch a
petition campaign demanding the Australian government link
economic assistance to improvements in Indonesia.

In particular, Aksi is calling for the Australian government to
raise: the release of all political prisoners; the repeal of laws
restricting political and social organisations, especially the
law enforcing a single ideology and banning new parties; the end
of restrictions on trade unions; the end of violent repression of
people calling for self-determination in West Papua, Aceh and
East Timor; and the start of peace talks with the East Timorese.


Forwarded from GreenNet reg.easttimor conference:
Topic 352Indonesia Condemned Before UN Comm
fbpreg.easttimor11:44 pm  Jul 27, 1992

Draft   Draft   Draft

Indonesian Occupation of East Timor Condemned before UN Committee
by John M. Miller, PO Box 150753, Brooklyn, NY 11215

for Portuguese American Journal

John M. Miller is Director of the Foreign Bases Project and a
member of the East Timor Action Network.

     In a day of testimony before the United Nations' special
committee on decolonization, speakers repeatedly condemned
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.  The committee heard moving
testimony from eyewitnesses to the November 12 Santa Cruz
massacre in which up to 200 Timorese died.  Groups testifying
included Timor support groups from Australia, Europe and North
America and Timorese political parties. All actively called on
the UN to take the initiative in ending human rights violations
and promoting self-determination for the Portuguese colony.
     The hearing began dramatically on July 27 as Jose Ramos
Horta, Special Representative of the National Council of Maubere
Resistance (CNRM), told the committee that instead of reading his
own testimony he would read a message to the committee from
Xanana Gusmao, the head of CNRM and the commander of FALINTIL,
the Timorese guerrilla army. The message had arrived only a few
days before from East Timor.
       Xanana's message evoked many of the themes that would
characterize the testimony that followed. The changing
international situation, "a historical whirlwind," was setting
the stage for achieving the United Nations' objective of
eradicating colonialism by the year 2000. The November 12
massacre had "jolted the international conscience" and revealed
the brutal nature of Indonesian rule.
    "Totalitarian regimes are now on the path toward full respect
for fundamental freedoms," he said. Sanctions against Iraq and
Libya "suggest that the universal concept of justice should
breach national boundaries." Resolutions on Yugoslavia show "that
the universal principles of self determination should prevail...
in all latitudes and in all circumstances." Namibia's achievement
of independence demonstrated that even long-standing problems
could be resolved.
     Concretely, Xanana urged that relevant UN resolutions, both
those specific to East Timor and those more generally applicable,
be fully obeyed. He stressed that the future status of East Timor
be decided by the East Timorese people in an internationally
recognized act of self- determination. Xanana called for a
dialogue "without pre-conditions" between all parties to the
conflict: Portugal, Indonesia and the East Timorese. The exact
form of Timorese participation in the talks could be worked out,
but Bishop Belo and the local Catholic Church would be involved.
He said that strong roles for the UN and Portugal, as the
administrating power, were essential to the success of the peace
process.
     Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, soon after it had
declared independence. Its larger neighbor annexed the
half-island the next year.  The UN continues to recognize
Portugal as the administering power, and three members of
parliament from Portugal spoke before the committee. Since 1979,
Portugal has informed the Secretary-General that is unable to
fulfill its obligations as administrating power because of the
Indonesian occupation.
     Indonesia, in a letter to the chair of the committee,
objected to the entire hearing. The letter said that "the process
of decolonization in East Timor has been carried out in
conformity" with UN principles. This view was strongly rejected
by many at the hearing. Vicente da Silva Guterres of the Uniao
Democratica Timorense (UDT) said that the request for integration
with Indonesia by four Timorese parties "did not have any
legitimacy!" The members of the UDT that signed the request did
so without any authority from the party and were formally
expelled. Guterres like most of the those testifying reiterated
the CNRM call for Indonesian military withdrawal, the active
involvement of the UN and its agency in the territory and an
eventual vote of the Timorese people on their political status.
  Indonesia's massive human rights violations were highlighted
during the hearing.  Asia Watch and Amnesty International
outlined their findings of escalating human rights violations. In
recent years, Indonesia has sought to repress younger Timorese
who have taken up the cause of independence. All who testified
noted the light sentences given to a handful of soldiers involved
in the Santa Cruz massacre, while those who gave the orders to
qshoot are free. Meanwhile, pro-independence demonstrators,
including survivors of the massacre, have received sentences as
long as life in prison.
     Alan Nairn and Amy Goodman, two American journalists who
witnessed the November 12 massacre, told their stories to the
committee. Nairn called Indonesia's actions that day "a cold
blooded execution." Far from being an exceptional event, the
massacre's significance comes from the fact that journalists
witnessed the event and videotape of it was shown around the
world.
     Li-Lien Gibbons -- whose step-brother Kamal Bamadhaj was
allowed to bleed to death after being shot November 21st -- told
the committee. "I am not here because Kamal is any more or less
important than any other victim. But I can speak before this
committee without putting other members of my family at risk.
East Timorese can not." Bamdhaj was Malaysian with New Zealand
citizenship.
     Indonesian government investigations of the massacre were
widely condemned. Statements by Indonesian generals typify the
military's attitude toward Timorese rights. In early July,
Major-General Mantiri, recently installed as commander of the
region that includes Timor, said "We don't regret anything. What
happened was quite proper....They were opposing us,
demonstrating....To me that is identical with rebellion, so
that's why we took firm action."
     Those testifying repeatedly urged the UN to release the
report of S. Amos Wako, who as special representative of the
Secretary-General, visited Timor in February of this year to
investigate the events surrounding the massacre. Up to now, Wako
has only reported privately to the Secretary-General.
     Spokespeople for East Timor support groups from Britain,
Canada, the U.S. and Australia strongly condemned their own
governments' support for Indonesia. However, Charles Scheiner of
the East Timor Action Network/US told the committee of the House
of Representatives' recent decision to cut military training aid
and the resolution by the US Conference of Mayors urging Congress
and the President to "assist in the resolution of the conflict,
providing for the self- determination of East Timor." Scheiner
reminded the committee that "the views conveyed by the Bush
administration do not always accurately reflect what is happening
in this country."
     After speaking before the committee, Guido Orlando de
Freitas Rodrigues, a member of the Portuguese parliament from the
ruling Social Democratic Party, told the Portuguese-American
Journal that now that Portugal no longer held the presidency of
the European Community it would take "more powerful action in
order to force negotiations" with Indonesia on the future of East
Timor. He cited the vote blocking EC negotiations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations on a new cooperation
agreement as evidence of Portugal's new resolve on the issue.
     Rodrigues said his government was awaiting Indonesia's
response to its proposal to begin negotiations without
preconditions before determining its next steps. However, Ramos
Horta, speaking to activists after the hearing, said that
Portugal had not done enough to prepare to block possible
Indonesian initiatives on East Timor at either September's
meeting in Jakarta of the movement of non-aligned nations or this
fall's session of the UN General Assembly.      East Timor was
first placed on the decolonization committee's agenda in 1960.
The committee itself has little power, but the information it
gathers is used by the Secretary-General and other UN bodies.


Forwarded from GreenNet reg.easttimor conference:
Topic 353FEER: Timor issue won't go away
gn:tapolreg.easttimor 8:39 am  Jul 28, 1992

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review
Date: 30 July 1992
Byline: Shada Islam in Brussels, Adam Schwarz and Suhaimi
Aznam in Jakarta
Abridged

STUMBLING BLOCK; INDONESIA-EC AGREEMENT DITCHED BY TIMOR ISSUE

Portugal has blocked EC plans for an ambitious new cooperation
agreement with Asean because of what Portuguese Foreign
Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro denounced on July 20 as
Indonesia's "unacceptable violation  of human rights in East
Timor".

Portugal's decision to hold up the long-awaited EC-Asean pact
has embarrassed both the EC Commission - which has spearheaded
the drive to upgrade the Community's relations with Asean -
and the British government which has promised to start paying
more attention to Asean and the South Asian countries during
its six month stint as EC president.

The EC already has a trade cooperation agreement with Asean
but the commission wants a new agreement covering a wider
range of topics. European Commissioner Abel Matutes has argued
that the EC must draw up a  new enhanced cooperation agreement
with Asean in order to boost the Community's political and
economic presence in the region.

The new agreement, he insisted, would encourage increased
European investments in South East Asia, allow the EC to push
for better protection of intellectual property rights in the
region and increase EC influence over how Asean runs its
environment policy.

Commissioner Matutes - who was to accompany British Foreign
Secretary Douglas Hurd to Asean's dialogue with its main
trading partners following the Asean ministerial conference in
Manila - quickly criticised Portugal's action in blocking the
agreement as regrettable. The commissioner, who favours a more
subtle approach to human-rights issues, pointed out that by
refusing to sign up to the new accord, Portugal was in fact
undermining the EC's political clout in the region.

Portugal's decision to block the start of negotiations on the
EC-Asean agreement followed Lisbon's unsuccessful attempt to
have Indonesia's human rights record formally raised by the EC
at the meeting of a new international aid consortium for
Indonesia which met in Paris on 16-17 July, which pledged
US$4.94bn in development aid to Indonesia.

With this fresh funding, the new aid consortium indicated that
it was not tying aid to human rights. The outcome of the aid
consortium meeting showed a clear gap between Portugal's
stance on the East Timor issue and that of other Western
countries but comments by Portuguese officials suggest that
Lisbon is in no mood to be conciliatory. Foreign Minister
Pinheiro told the Review that he would "never accept" any
plans for a reinforced cooperation unless Jakarta "showed
clearly" that it would start respecting human rights.

Portugal wants Indonesia to agree to direct UN-sponsored talks
on the future of East Timor. Pinheiro said again in Brussels
that the people of the territory should be allowed to decide
their own future and that representatives from East Timor
should be included in any negotiations.

Indonesia says it wants to restart stalled talks with Portugal
under UN auspices but accuses Portugal of shifting its ground
on the issue of Timorese participation in the talks. "The
Portuguese agreed to discussions with no pre-conditions and
then turned round and said they wanted Timorese
representatives at the talks," said Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, an
official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Officials in Jakarta are hoping the dialogue process will get
a nudge in September when a European Parliament delegation -
including three Portuguese delegates - is due to visit
Jakarta. But there is little optimism in Jakarta about an
early end to the Timor problem. "I think it will take at least
another 2-3 years before East Timor will drop out of the
spotlight again," said one Asian ambassador in Jakarta.

Privately, senior Indonesian officials worry that persistent
criticism of Indonesia's handling of East Timor may not only
damage relations with the EC. A more serious worry is that the
issue could mar the upcoming summit on the Non-Aligned
Movement, which Jakarta will host in September. The East Timor
case is also likely to surface at the UN General Assembly
session in September.

In response, Indonesia will soon take a more aggressive line
in defending its East Timor policies, officials say. "There
will be a change from passive posture to a more forceful,
sophisticated approach," says parliamentarian Marzuki
Darusman. The Foreign Minister has retained US public-
relations firms Smith NcCabe and Burson Marsteller to produce
an English-language brochure explaining its East Timor policy.

Despite these efforts, criticism from abroad seems unlikely to
ease in the foreseeable future. Since early May, four Timorese
have been convicted on subversion charges for organising anti-
integration activities, receiving sentences from nine years to
life. By contrast sentences of 18 months or less were given to
10 soldiers court-martialled for their involvement in the 12
November killings in Dili, the East Timor capital.


    Reuter, Kuala Lumpur, July 28 - British Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd said on Tuesday the European Community (EC) and ASEAN states should
make better use of their existing economic agreement following
Portugal's veto of a new pact.
    "What we can do now is to make better use of the existing economic
agreement (signed in 1980)," he told reporters on arrival in Kuala
Lumpur for a two-day visit.
    Hurd, whose country chairs the Community, described the new pact as
"a perfectly good agreement."
    He added: "The possibility of signing the agreement has been blocked
for the time being. There was no consensus...no unanimity by EC members.
It's a pity, we'll have to wait."
    ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, groups Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
    Portugal said it would not approve the new agreement unless
Indonesia changed its policy towards East Timor. Indonesian soldiers
massacred scores of protesters last November in the former Portuguese
colony, which Jakarta annexed in 1976.
    Diplomats said the delay in signing the agreement could put pressure
on Indonesia to improve its human rights record but added that the move
would not be initiated by ASEAN.
    "ASEAN will view that situation as a bilateral problem between
Portugal and Indonesia and not one concerning ASEAN members," said a
Malaysian diplomat who attended last week's ASEAN foreign ministers'
meeting in Manila.
    Hurd will meet Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Finance Minister
Anwar Ibrahim and Defence Minister Najib Razak.
    He said his visit would strengthen the "good friendship" between the
two countries. In the past Malaysia had launched a "Buy British Last"
campaign in protest at Britain's decision to raise tuition fees for
foreign students.
    "Trade between us had doubled, thanks to Malaysia's economic growth.
Our links will grow stronger," Hurd said.



Forwarded from GreenNet reg.easttimor conference:
Topic 351TAPOL statement to Decol'n Comm.
gn:tapolreg.easttimor 9:43 pm  Jul 28, 1992

TAPOL  statement to UN Committee of 24

The following the the full text of the statement submitted to
the UN Decolonisation Committee (Committee of 24) in New York
on Monday, 27 July 1992 by Liem Soei Liong, on behalf of
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign:

                 ---------------------------

Mr. Chairman and honourable members,

On behalf of TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, I
thank you for the opportunity to petition your Committee about
East Timor. Our organisation has followed events in East Timor
since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. I would like to make an
assessment of recent developments in East Timor, in particular
since the Santa Cruz Massacre of 12 November.

The international outcry and its impact on the Jakarta Government

The massacre in Santa Cruz was not an 'incident', as the
Indonesian authorities claim, but part of a history of mass
killings in East Timor. It was the presence of foreign
journalists and a British cameraman when Indonesian soldiers
opened fire on a defenceless crowd that made all the
difference. The Suharto government, which has one of the worst
human rights records, faced an unprecedented wave of protests.

Also unprecedented was President Suharto's decision to set up
two commissions: a National Inquiry Commission and a Military
Inquiry Commission. The commissions were created for two
reasons, to resist strong demands for an independent inquiry
by convincing world opinion that the matter was being taken
seriously; and to use the tragedy to 'clean out the stable' by
adjusting policies, punishing and replacing military
personnel, and so on. It is well known that Suharto's policies
in East Timor had been encountering opposition at army
headquarters for some time. Suharto's efforts at damage
limitation resulted in several governments welcoming the
measures as "credible", "evenhanded" and "encouraging".

Nothing could be further from the truth. The preliminary
report of the National Inquiry Commission (KPN) served to deny
access to an international inquiry into the killings. Members
of the Commission which was led by a retired general hardly
spoke with the victims. A deep-rooted fear among the Timorese
would have made it impossible even for a genuinely Indonesian
commission to get at the truth. The KPN ignored graphic
evidence in the film, Cold Blood and statements by foreign
eyewitnesses, Allan Nairn, Amy Goodman, Max Stahl and Russell
Anderson.

Jakarta's 'evenhandedness' meant that both peaceful Timorese
demonstrators and Indonesian military were tried. Timorese
students demonstrating in Jakarta a week after the massacre
were sentenced to up to 10 years; Timorese tried in Dili for
participating in the 12 November memorial procession got from
6 years to life. In contrast, responsible military commanders
were 'punished' by being sent to the US for further studies
while low-ranking soldiers who admitted to shooting at the
innocent crowd received sentences averaging less than one
year.

Mr. Chairman and honourable members,

In this post Cold War period, the role of the UN has been
greatly  enhanced. We therefore welcomed the initiative of
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to send Dr. Amos Wako
as his special representative to Indonesia and East Timor in
February and to talk to people on the spot. We look forward to
publication of Dr Wako's report in the belief that it will
contribute to a proper understanding of the real situation in
East Timor.

Regarding the Wako visit we must draw your attention to grave
restrictions. Although official visits to East Timor are
routinely stage-managed, the Wako visit was unique. The newly
appointed commander of East Timor, Brig.General Theo Syafei
treated the visit as a test case. No effort was spared to
control the entire region. Several layers of military patrols
were stationed round Dr. Wako's hotel to prevent anyone
approaching him. The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH)
reports:

"... repressive measures were taken. The local apparatus
arrested and detained about 120 youngsters who had previously
been held in connection with the 12 November 1991 event. The
arrested youngsters were 'invited' by their respective village
head and the local army NCO to attend compulsory courses. The
invitation told them to bring enough clothes for several days.
In fact, they were taken to the KODIM (Military Subdistrict
Command) and told to sign statements that they would make no
attempt to meet Amos Wako. According to a witness who met
them, the 120 youngsters were then taken to the barracks of
Infantry Battalion 744 in Taibessi, Dili and split into 3
groups of 40. Nobody was allowed to meet them. Then, on 15
February, they were taken for several days to Same sub-
district, about 100kms from Dili".

Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei boasts of being a hardliner and blames
his predecessor, General Warouw, for being too soft on the
Timorese. This same Theo Syafei has warned the Timorese that
if a demonstration like the one on 12 November were to happen
during his commandership, there would probably be even more
casualties.

The other newly installed commander is Major-General Mantiri,
responsible for the Nusa Tenggara region which includes East
Timor, has also shown the true face of the Indonesian army. In
a recent interview he said of the Santa Cruz massacre:

"....We don't regret anything. What happened was quite proper.
As military this is so. They were opposing us, demonstrating,
even yelling things against the government. To me that is
identical with rebellion, so that's why we took firm action".

Last week the Indonesian army revised its casualty figure for
the Santa Cruz massacre. The official number of dead is now
said to be 19 (the figure first given by General Try Sutrisno
but later dismissed as 'too low' by the KPN); 31 of the 115
'missing' persons have now allegedly been found 'alive and
well', leaving a total of 66 persons 'unaccounted for'. Who do
the Indonesians think they can fool with such concoctions? Why
has the army still failed to produce the name of a single
victim? Why have no bereaved families been able to bury their
loved ones? And, as if to mock the grieving Timorese,
Brig.Gen. Syafei said on 20 July that he hopes all the 66 are
dead.

Mr. Chairman,

TAPOL has made statements to this committee on many occasions
primarily to inform this august body about the military
situation in East Timor. We want to continue this tradition.

Ever since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, East Timor has
been run like a military operation. A special military
structure was designed with a direct line of command to
military headquarters in Jakarta. In June this year, Brig.
General Theo Syafei announced that changes would be likely to
occur in East Timor in September when combat troops would be
withdrawn and the special military structure Kolakops would be
dissolved. Let us take a closer look at the so-called
demilitarisation of East Timor.

Firstly, the withdrawal of combat troops. Anybody familiar
with the 16-year history of East Timor's occupation knows that
the major, traditional battles between ABRI (the Indonesian
armed forces) and Falintil (the armed wing of the East
Timorese resistance) took place from 1975 to 1978.  ABRI,
superior in weaponry and the number of men under arms,
gradually took control of large parts of the country. Falintil
adjusted its strategy and diversified into small guerrilla
units, while ABRI's role became increasingly territorial, to
control the majority of the population in the cities and
resettlement camps. The entire eighties was taken up by a huge
territorial effort by the army to pacify the East Timorese.
Commander Theo Syafei has said in recent interviews that the
main security threat is not the small, roaming guerilla units
but the expanding anti-colonial movement among young East
Timorese. The withdrawal of combat troops only highlights this
strategy but it does not mean that armed resistance has ceased
to be a threat. Only this month, Brig. General Syafei admitted
that between 7 and 10 clashes occur every month.

The withdrawal of some combat units from East Timor should
also be assessed against the background of increased guerrilla
activities in Aceh and West Papua, the two other trouble-spots
for Jakarta. General Edi Sudradjat, the army chief-of-staff,
has warned that insurrections in these three areas are an
obstacle to economic development:

"That's why all kinds of separatist movements led by any group
of extremists that want to divide the unity of the Indonesian
Republic must be wiped out"

In recent months, territorial operations have been reinforced
by a huge increase in the number territorial troops in the
area. In trouble spots such as the villages around Dili, as
many as five platoons have been stationed in each village. As
with combat troops, territorial troops from all parts of
Indonesia are usually stationed for between 6 months and 2
years.

Should Falintil step up guerilla activities, army head-
quarters can always dispatch KOSTRAD rapid deployment forces
which have two combat-ready battalions in Java. The new terri-
torial strategy is explained in a paper, "Perspectives for
territorial operations in the development of human resources
in East Timor" by the Kolakops commander, Theo Syafei.

Implicitly, the paper admits that they have lost the hearts
and minds of the youth and see the short- and medium-term task
as being to create a sense of security - in other words,
protecting the population from pro-independence elements.
Another task is to create cadres, in other words, to make
Indonesians out of the East Timorese, and to establish desa
binaan (guided villages), in other words, villages with a
heavy presence of territorial soldiers, controlling and
indoctrinating the villagers. General Syafei said that he
would take four approaches: persuasive, educational, preven-
tive and repressive:

"To implement persuasive and educational methods, a certain
supportive condition is needed to help villagers develop their
village wholeheartedly and with full concentration. Therefore,
preventive measures will be taken, including setting up
security posts, patrols and compulsory nightwatches. These
measures are intended not to frighten the population but
protect them and allow justice to prevail. These measures will
also be taken against foreign visitors who use the hospitality
of the East Timorese to spread issues and vilify East Timor

The dissolution of KOLAKOPS is a cosmetic measure. Even
without a formal structure, East Timor will continue to be a
special military project for the army. Strong emphasis on the
territorial structure will minimise the use of special command
units; in emergencies Brig.General Theo Syafei will be able to
rely on special combat units from Java.

Mr. Chairman and honourable members,

Much has changed in the world today, good things as well as
bad things. So it is with East Timor. The tragic events in
Santa Cruz had a positive result by bringing East Timor onto
the international agenda. Far more people realise that a
political solution for East Timor is crucial. As East Timorese
say, wherever they are - in East Timor, in Indonesia or in
exile in Australia and Portugal - peace negotiations are long
overdue. It is for the international community, the United
Nations, to take the initiative and bring the parties
concerned to the negotiating table. The Timorese resistance is
prepared to talk with the Indonesians without preconditions,
in the international spirit of today, an offer the Indonesians
cannot reject. We are convinced that this Committee will take
the important step of advising the Secretary General to
accelerate this peace process.

Thank you.