From: Mike Fester <island!fester@uunet.uu.net>
Subject: Re:  Opinion on Japan being "forced" to attack the U.S.
Organization: /usr/local/rn/organization
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 17:43:31 GMT


From Mike Fester <island!fester@uunet.uu.net>

In article <BxKB4r.FLp@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au> writes:
>
>>  Frankly, I have found some your points somewhat puzzling.  You have maintain-
>>ed that Japan had no desire for war with the US, that FDR wouldn't have minded
>>one in the least, that the Japanese knew full well what they were getting into,
>>etc., etc.
>
>Actually I didn't say they knew full well what they were getting into - I
>don't think they knew about Hiroshima or the firebombing of Tokyo. Both of
>these events might have given them second thoughts.

If the Japanese did NOT know full well what they were getting into, then how 
does this strengthen your arguement that the Japanese were forced into the 
war even though they knew they would be destroyed by it? If they could not have
envisioned an attack on the home islands, then they certainly were NOT aware
of what the US could do. It would seem, given the reaction to the Doolittle
Raids, that the Japanese really did not have an inkling of the potential of
the US. And given that the Japanese drew up plans for simutaneously fighting
Great Britain, the USSR, and the US, they do not seem to have been at all 
aware of the magintiude of their attempt. And finally, given that all the 
moderates had been killed or removed as 'traitors', who, of a sane, reasonable
nature, was left to stop the rush of Japan into war with the US? Any names
available?

BTW, it is pretty clear that Japan had no idea what it was getting into in
China, given that rather long war. How could they suddenly have become more
intelligent regarding the US?

>>  I think we all might agree that Japan felt war (with America) was required
>>in order to maintain its conquests in China and elsewhere.  But at this point
>>things break down.  If Japan felt the war was a long shot at best, why attack?
>>Especially if they knew they had no real hope of a US surrender?  It has not
>>been demonstrated to me (by you) that they even felt they might "get lucky".
>>Such apparent irrationality would seem to fly in the face of these supposedly
>>(as you, Mr. Askew, have presented them) sober military leaders ALL (or nearly
>>all) being well aware of the almost-certain doom they faced.
>
>>  Why not simply give up what you felt you were bound to lose anyway, and save
>>a lot of Japanese lives, the Navy, chances at remaining a Great Power, etc.?
>>I suspect there were other ways to avoid the humiliation -- like my East Indies
>>idea, below.
>
>If the Japanese gave up in 1941 there was no chance of them remaining a Great
>Power. From China they could strike and obtain the resources they needed (but

They seem to be rather (economically, at least) a great power now, so that 
point is rather trivially dismissed.

>no keep them of course) from Korea or worse they could not. To have backed
>down would have meant the US could strangle their economy and bring them to
>the point of starvation at will. I have seen nothing to indicate the US would

As pointed out, the US fleet was not in a position to do that in 1941. Given
that, how could the US strangle their economy? 

>not do so if electorally popular( :-) Spot the low blow, sorry about this but
>I couldn't resist it) besides an assumption about the friendly nature of any
>other country is a poor basis for a foreign policy over the long term. The

Canada, Great Britain, and a few others seem to have done well by banking on
the friendly intentions of a certain power over the long-term. Similarly, if
40+ years is any indication, Japan, Italy, Germany, etc, have similarly done
quite well by relying on those same friendly intentions. Note that this 40+
year period is more than long enough to have satisfied the conditions of the
time.

>greatest reason was probably that the people in charge were raised in the 'no
>surrender' Samurai tradition and that trying and failing was better than not
>trying at all etc etc. Besides maybe they might have won! (not that they could
>but it is always nice to look on the bright side)

If your "Besides maybe they might have won" is to be taken seriously, surely
this argues in favor of a system in the control of people who had no idea
what they were up against. And the "Samurai tradition" requires absolute 
obedience to one's master; it does not require trying and failing, if the master
does not order it.

>>  While I suspect that Japan would have preferred to be allowed to muck about
>>in China unmolested by Western powers, they WERE finally called on the carpet
>>about it by the US (hypocritical act or not), and enforced by the embargo. And
>>given the choice between giving up their mini-Empire and war, they chose war.
>
>Fine, I am glad to see you are in agreement with me! I guess you accept my
>main point which is that the US put Japan in a spot where War was the only
>acceptable option then. What you have said immediately implies that Japan
>was not the group of crazed Fascists who struck at a peacable US going about
>its daily business without a care in the world! The US was in there getting
>its hands dirty and should not be suprised when other people get annoyed about
>their meddling.

Actually, the Japanese expansion put them in a spot where we would not sell 
them any more oil. Now, how exactly was the US "in there getting its
hands dirty" in the late 1930's? And the expansion to which you refer was done
under the direction of those "crazed Facists". The JAPANESE put themselves into
that spot: the US did not install the Japanese in China, and then tell them
to get out.

>>  I wonder if the US would have intervened if Japan had struck the East Indies
>>first (and only) instead of Pearl and the Phillipines.  Anybody got any ideas?
>>Maybe.  But I wonder if the support he wanted from the people would have been
>>there.  I dunno.  Seems like a REALLY big gamble on FDR's part to get into
>>the war on Germany.  You know, get Japan to commit suicide by attacking first,
>>then hope Germany declares war...
>
>The answer is clearly yes. Roosevelt clearly stated to the Japanese that any

If the answer is clearly yes, then please explain how FDR would get Congres-
sional approval for attacking Japan, when he could not get such approval for 
getting into war with Germany.

>further moves South from Vietnam would be considered an attack on the US and
>in the event of such an attack the territory of Thailand would be considered
>as an attack on the territory of the US. Besides from the Philippines B-17s
>could mess up Japans trade and shipping to and from Indonesia. An awfully
>big gamble to expect the US to stay out (especially when they are so powerful,
>Japan has no advantage of suprise and no chance of hitting the Pacific Fleet)

Given that FDR could not get Congress into the European war, in spite of being
quite vocal about it, it is difficult to see that Roosevelt could have gotten
public support for a war in Asia, had Japan confined its goals to non-US 
targets. And in the BTW category, Thailand was allied with the Japanese in that
war, so it is really difficult to see how a) Japan would be inclined to attack
it and b) if it WAS attacked, why the US would consider that an attack on
the US. 

Plain and simple, you have yet to demonstrate that FDR could have gotten the
needed support from Congress to enter into a Pacific War, had Japan not attacked
US forces first.

Mike
-- 
Disclaimer - I'm only doing what the little voices tell me to do. 

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