Newsgroups: bit.listserv.seasia-l
Date:         Tue, 21 Jul 1992 04:50:44 PDT
From:         "Indonesia Publications/Task Force" <apakabar@IGC.APC.ORG>
Subject:      CAMB: UN Sec-Gen Report
X-To:         seasia-l@msu.edu

/* Written 10:23 am  Jul 21, 1992 by peg:unic in cdp:unic.news */
/* ---------- "SG ON CAMBODIA" ---------- */
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							     Distr.
							     GENERAL

							     S/24286
							     14
							     July
							     1992

							     ORIGINAL:
							     ENGLISH


	     SECOND SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
	       UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA


1.   In my special report dated 12 June 1992 (S/24090), I noted
that, in accordance with the Paris Agreements, the Force Commander
of the military component of the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had determined that the second phase
of the cease-fire should begin on 13 June.  In order to comply
with the Agreements, the four Cambodian parties were obliged to
take a number of steps, including the regroupment and cantonment
of their armed forces.

2.   I also noted in my report, however, that it was becoming
increasingly clear that one party, the Party of Democratic
Kampuchea (PDK), was not taking the steps necessary to enable it
to honour the assurances that it had given.  That party has still
failed to comply with the Agreements and has refused to canton any
of its forces.

3.   As of 10 July, the number of troops cantoned by each of the
four Cambodian parties was as follows:

     Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF)                   9
     003 National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI)
     3 187 Khmer People's National Liberation Armed
       Forces (KPNLAF)                                        1
     322 National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)
     0

	  Total                                              13
	  512


4.   Furthermore, PDK has failed to take a number of other
measures incumbent upon it for the proper implementation of the
Paris Agreements.  These involve failure to grant free and
unrestricted access to UNTAC and to mark minefields in the zones
they control, and to refrain from further violations of the
cease-fire.

5.   In explanation of its position, PDK has introduced its own
interpretations of the provisions of the Paris Agreements relating
to the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign
forces and to the

92-31015  3269f (E)   150792
/... role and powers of the Supreme National Council.  PDK asserts
that these provisions have not been implemented, and that until
they are it is not in a position to proceed with the
implementation of the other provisions.

6.   At the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Cambodia, held at Tokyo on 22 June 1992, an
informal "proposal for discussion" was drawn up by representatives
of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the
co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference and other participants in the
Conference, including my Special Representative.  This proposal,
which is reproduced in the annex to the present report, sets out a
number of measures designed to meet some of the concerns expressed
by PDK and thus to facilitate its participation in the full
implementation of the Paris Agreements without further delay.

7.   At an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme National Council
convened at Tokyo on the same day, the four Cambodian parties were
asked to respond to the proposal for discussion.  Three of them
accepted it.  PDK did not reject the proposal, but promised to
consider it and to make known its views at a later stage.

8.   On 2 July 1992, in the absence of His Royal Highness Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, a working session of the Supreme National
Council was held at UNTAC headquarters at Phnom Penh.  The Tokyo
proposal was discussed and again three of the Cambodian parties
expressed agreement with it.  However, PDK expressed no opinion on
the proposal; instead, it introduced its own proposals regarding
the role and powers of the Supreme National Council and the
administrative structures in the zone under the control of the
Cambodian People's Party.

9.   On 8 July 1992, a further meeting of the Supreme National
Council was held under the Chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk, at
which my Special Representative again pressed the Party of
Democratic Kampuchea, represented at the meeting by Mr. Khieu
Samphan, the President of the party, for a clear and positive
response to the Tokyo proposal.  Mr. Khieu Samphan did not respond
to that request, but repeated his own proposals.  Moreover, in a
letter addressed to me on 9 July, he again took the same
position.

10.  In addition to the meetings of the Supreme National Council,
my Special Representative has met three times with Mr. Samphan in
the last two weeks in an endeavour to secure the agreement of PDK
to the Tokyo proposal and to persuade it to take the necessary
steps to comply with the Paris Agreements.

11.  UNTAC has also taken a number of steps designed to meet the
concerns of PDK.  In particular, UNTAC has strengthened its
verification mechanisms, such as border checkpoints and mobile
military investigation teams in order to follow up, as required,
on any evidence that might be presented to it regarding the
presence of foreign forces or the provision of outside military
assistance.  It is hoped that, with the assistance and cooperation
of the neighbouring countries, UNTAC will soon be able to complete
the establishment of border checkpoints so that it may fully
implement the provisions of annex 2, articles VI and VII of the
Agreements.  In addition, UNTAC is giving top priority to the
recruitment and deployment of its civil administration staff as
rapidly as possible, in order to exercise its mandate under the
Agreements of direct control over existing administrative
structures in the areas of foreign affairs, national defence,
finance, public security and information, as well as its
supervision in other areas.

12.  UNTAC has also actively sought agreement with PDK on the
establishment of a mechanism for keeping the four Cambodian
parties informed and involved with regard to UNTAC exercise of
direct control over the five areas named above.  Consideration is
being given, inter alia, to establishing working groups under
UNTAC chairmanship or other appropriate consultative mechanisms.

13.  At these meetings, Mr. Khieu Samphan has elaborated his
party's position vis-a-vis the relationship between the Supreme
National Council and UNTAC and the question of UNTAC exercise of
authority in Cambodia, and has called for the dissolution of the
main institutions and structures established by the Cambodian
People's Party in the zone under its control.  However, it is
clearly understood in the Paris Agreements that UNTAC control
should be exercised through the "existing administrative
structures" of each of the four Cambodian parties.  As my Special
Representative has explained to Mr. Samphan, the Phnom Penh
authorities form part of these "existing administrative
structures" and cannot be abolished or dismantled.

14.  Phase II commenced on 13 June 1992.  In accordance with the
Paris Agreements, UNTAC was to have endeavoured to complete the
regroupment and cantonment process within four weeks, i.e., by 11
July.  In fact, as a result of the refusal of one party to take
part in that process, and because of the need to ensure that this
process is undertaken in such a way as to maintain the military
balance between the four parties, barely 5 per cent of the
estimated 200,000 soldiers had been cantoned by that date.

15.  Since my last special report to the Security Council, UNTAC
military deployment has been proceeding and is now almost
complete, with some 14,300 troops in the country and the remainder
en route.  Other aspects of the UNTAC operation are also moving
forward to the greatest possible extent under the circumstances.
A total of 50,000 refugees and displaced persons have been
repatriated; 1,780 UNTAC civilian police monitors have been
deployed throughout the country to supervise the fair and
impartial enforcement of law and order; more than 100 cases of
human rights investigations have been successfully carried out in
the last few weeks in the zones under control of the Cambodian
People's Party, and investigations will soon begin as necessary in
the zones of the United Nations Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and KPNLF; extensive
discussions have taken place over the electoral law submitted to
the Supreme National Council on 1 April; and the Ministerial
Conference at Tokyo resulted in pledges of $880 million,
substantially in excess of the sum I called for in my appeal.  In
all of these spheres, however, UNTAC has been denied access to
operate in the zones controlled by PDK.

16.  As far as civil administration is concerned, my Special
Representative announced on 26 June comprehensive plans to
introduce, throughout the territory of Cambodia, United Nations
control of the existing administrative structures of each of the
four parties.  While three of the parties have, pursuant to the
request of my Special Representative, submitted lists of their
laws for review by UNTAC, PDK has failed to do so.  Work is now
proceeding on the review of the laws of the three parties in
compliance.

17.  In the five areas over which UNTAC is mandated to assume
direct control, efforts to recruit and deploy staff with the
necessary qualifications and experience have been accelerated.
Control over the administrative structures of the Cambodian
People's Party dealing with foreign affairs and national defence
was established on 1 July 1992.  In finance, control will be
progressively introduced between 1 July and 1 September; in public
security, the staff concerned will be fully deployed by 15 July,
following which the service will be completely operational; and in
information, UNTAC established a Media Working Group composed of
representatives of the four parties on
10 June 1992, and the Director of the Information Division has now
visited the broadcasting facilities of three of the parties.

18.  In my special report of 12 June, I stated that the successful
implementation of phase II of the cease-fire depended on the
cooperation of all parties and would not be sustainable for more
than a brief period without such cooperation.  I also noted that
the implementation of the Paris Agreements had reached a critical
stage.  I found it necessary to draw this to the attention of the
Security Council so that the Council could consider what action it
might appropriately take to ensure that UNTAC received the
cooperation it needed, and in particular that the timetable for
implementation was adhered to.

19.  Since then, phase II of the cease-fire has begun on time, and
three of the parties have shown themselves willing to participate
in the regroupment and cantonment process, but PDK has not.  That
party has also failed to respond to repeated requests from my
Special Representative to comply with the 12 points he listed on
26 May 1992 to ensure implementation of the Paris Accords, or to
accept the proposal for discussion drawn up by participants in the
Ministerial Conference at Tokyo.  As a result, the ability of
UNTAC to adhere to the timetable set by the Security Council has
been seriously compromised.  In these circumstances, there are two
possible courses of action:  the first is to suspend the operation
until all parties can be persuaded to fulfil their obligations
under the Paris Agreements.  The second is to pursue the process
and thus demonstrate that, despite the lack of cooperation of one
party, the international community remains determined to assist
the Cambodian people in their quest for peace and stability.  I am
convinced that the latter approach is the most appropriate.

20.  Accordingly, I have asked my Special Representative to press
forward with the regroupment and cantonment process wherever
possible.  UNTAC will do this cautiously and selectively, while
taking great care to maintain security in the countryside and
ensuring that the parties cooperating with UNTAC do not suffer a
military disadvantage vis-a-vis the party that is not.  It will
concentrate, for instance, on areas where there is no military
confrontation.  Some cantoned troops may also be permitted to keep
their weapons until the situation is clarified.  However, UNTAC
efforts to continue with the regroupment and cantonment process
with the cooperation of only three of the parties cannot go on
indefinitely.  Indeed, I am convinced that any further delay in
the full implementation by all parties of this essential aspect of
the Paris Agreements is likely to affect the ability of UNTAC to
organize and conduct the elections on schedule and that it could
ultimately jeopardize the whole peace process.

21.  I therefore believe that every effort should continue to be
made to persuade PDK to join phase II and to cooperate with UNTAC
and the other three parties.  To this end, I wrote on 7 July to
Mr. Samphan.  I assured him that my Special Representative would
pursue his efforts to take into account, on the basis of the Tokyo
Proposal, the legitimate concerns expressed by PDK, as well as
those of the other three parties.  I have also taken advantage of
my visits to certain capitals, including most recently Paris and
London, to share with leaders my concern about the implementation
of the Paris Agreements and to enlist their support.

22.  In  conclusion, the main questions that need to be addressed
at this juncture are, in my view, the following:  (a) what steps
might be taken to persuade PDK to comply with its obligations
under the Paris Agreements; (b) what action should be taken to
underscore the determination of the international community to
implement the Agreements, in accordance with the timetable set
forth in my implementation plan (S/23613); and (c) how to obtain
the full and active support of the signatories of the Paris
Agreements for UNTAC efforts to carry out the various aspects of
the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

				     Annex

			    Proposal for discussion


1.   The principles embodied in the Paris Agreements, to which all
signatories, including the Cambodian parties, have committed
themselves, represent the only viable means of restoring peace and
prosperity to all the people of Cambodia.

2.   The first requirement at this juncture is a full and timely
implementation of the Paris Agreements and, in particular, that
the Cambodian parties carry out immediately the obligations
relating to phase II of the cease-fire, as set out by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia on 26 May
1992.

3.   What follows requires as of this day a binding undertaking by
all Cambodian Parties to assure full and effective cooperation
with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
and immediate access to and freedom of movement throughout their
respective areas for all military and civilian personnel of
UNTAC.

4.   After careful consideration of the views of His Royal
Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk and high representatives of the
four Cambodian parties, the following measures, within the letter
and spirit of the Paris Agreements and preserving their integrity,
may assist the full implementation of the comprehensive settlement
without further delay.

5.   The Supreme National Council will assume a more active role
in developing advice to the Special Representative in implementing
the Agreements, including the implementation of phase II.  It will
cooperate more closely with the various parts of UNTAC
implementation efforts.  Meetings of the Supreme National Council
will be held frequently.  Other consultative mechanisms can also
be considered.

6.   Each of the Cambodian parties shall cooperate actively with
UNTAC in the fulfilment of UNTAC responsibilities under the
Agreements for the investigation, verification and reporting of
allegations of the presence of foreign forces in Cambodia, and of
allegations of cease-fire violations and formally confirming the
cessation of outside military assistance not permitted under the
Agreements.  To this end, the Supreme National Council will give
advice to UNTAC on further verification activities.  Observers
from each of the Cambodian parties shall also be attached to the
Mobile Investigation Teams set up by UNTAC.  It is a fundamental
principle that each of the Mobile Verification Teams, including
observers from each of the Cambodian parties, shall have free and
unrestricted access to all areas controlled by each Cambodian
Party.

7.   In order to ensure a neutral political environment, UNTAC
must accelerate the recruitment and deployment of its civil
administration personnel into all existing administrations.
Special attention shall be given to the five key areas identified
in the Agreements.  Likewise, all of the Parties accept without
further delay the deployment of those personnel, including members
of the UNTAC police component.  UNTAC, in consultation with the
Supreme National Council, will ensure that its control of each of
the five key areas will be applied with equal vigour to the
administrations of the four Parties.

8.   The Supreme National Council will discuss all high-level
visits of foreign dignitaries to Cambodia.  Reception of high
foreign guests should be conducted in the name of the Supreme
National Council with close cooperation from the existing
administrations.

9.   All foreign trade and investment agreements by all Cambodian
Parties shall be reported to the Supreme National Council
secretariat and subject to UNTAC oversight in consultation with
the Supreme National Council.

10.  After consultation with the Supreme National Council
regarding procedures and qualifications, UNTAC, through its civil
administration control, will supervise the issuance of visas to
all foreigners seeking to enter any part of Cambodian territory.
The Supreme National Council shall consider the issue of a uniform
stamp, in the name of the Supreme National Council, to validate on
request passports, travel documents and identity cards of
Cambodians.

11.  It is a fundamental principle that multilateral assistance
and budget support activities coordinated through UNTAC during the
rehabilitation period shall be designated to the Supreme National
Council and shall be disbursed, when UNTAC can supervise the
delivery of assistance or expenditure of money.  In any United
Nations documents referring to assistance or budget support for
"Cambodia" or for "the Cambodian authorities", it is clearly
understood that these terms refer to the whole territory of
Cambodia or to the administrations of all Cambodian parties.  It
is also clearly understood that budgetary support to pay or
subsidize the salaries of teachers, administrators, officials,
health workers, etc., in "Cambodia" is applicable according to
need to the territory or administration controlled by each
Cambodian Party.

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