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Date:         Sat, 29 Aug 1992 16:19:00 +1000
From:         DAVIDB@VAXC.CC.MONASH.EDU.AU
Subject:      IN: Abdurrahman Wahid in Oz
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Notes from a talk by Abdurrahman Wahid at Deakin University in

Melbourne on the evening of 26 August 1992. The title was

"Indonesia - facing the future".



Note: This was typed from hastily scribbled notes, so may

contain some wrongly transcribed or misheard names, figures or

points. Abdurrahman Wahid spoke in English and most of the

language I have used here is his. -- David Bourchier

(davidb@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au)





The 1992 election was a 'political earthquake' for Golkar.

There were three epicentres: East Java, Central Java and

Jakarta. In East and Central Java it registered about 7 1/2 on

the Richter scale while in Jakarta it was about 6! Great

implications. Golkar lost 10 seats in East Java and 8 in

Central Java. Suharto told Anwar Anas, the man responsible for

the Jakarta area on the leadership council (dewan pembina) of

Golkar to ensure that Golkar won 60% of the votes in the

capital. Despite intense efforts, Golkar only managed to win

50% of the vote.



This shows that Golkar has failed to penetrate the layers of

old affiliations. Abdurrahman Wahid (ARW) attributed the swing

in East and Central Java at least partly to the decision of

local Nahdatul Ulama leaders not to urge people to vote for

Golkar. They took a neutral stance and allowed their followers

to vote for whoever they liked. In many parts of Sumatra

however local NU leaders persuaded people to abandon the PPP

and vote for Golkar. PPP lost a lot of seats there. Same story

in Sulawesi.



It is clear that Golkar overall has failed to take root among

the masses. It remains a party of the elite. Likened it to the

old PSI, IPKI and Murba, which never succeeded in attracting

the masses. Military support for Golkar is only half-hearted.

PDI won many of Golkar's votes with populist rhetoric and

policies. The parties which played up the old Sukarnoist

nationalism and islamic populism proved their strength while

the pragmatic, program-oriented Golkar failed to produce

meaningful results.



So will ABRI and the bureaucracy continue to use their time,

money and moral influence on an organisation like this? The

yield is clearly incommensurate with their efforts.  The

political earthquake could be a death sentence for Golkar

unless it finds a way of instilling a sense of belonging among

the masses.



This is closely linked to the question of succession. Suharto

is no longer sure of the support of the MPR - that's why he

has been wooing the Muslims. With the final proof that Golkar

has failed in its efforts it could be restructured or pruned,

and adopt a new kind of leadership. The program oriented, non-

ideological style of leadership will gradually be replaced by

a more activist and ideological style, more populist and

Islamic. If this indeed happens it will be a sign that the New

Order's de-ideologisation will have failed. There will be more

ideology, and a greater role for mass organisations in the

future.



ABRI is locked in a bitter struggle to ensure that the next

president comes from their ranks. That's why the current crop

of appointments to senior military positions are very

important. Many of Benny Murdani's followers have been

relegated to the 'back benches'. This shows that Suharto is

trying to find a new crop of officers who will follow his

policy to try to develop a more ideological style of politics

and a greater role for mass organisations. When Suharto steps

down half way through his next term, or at the end of it, the

struggle will be a bitter one. Several years of crisis. There

is likely to be no decisive leadership. A period of impasse

will be created. [Unclear whether he is referring to the

period before or after Suharto's demise].



Suharto encourages resistance to the efforts by ABRI to

control him in the bargaining process for the presidency. This

has caused Sudharmono to try for another term as Vice

President. Suharto often talks about the need for a good

administrator as Vice President, which is widely understood as

a green light for Sudharmono. So the bitter fight before the

1993 MPR session will be over the question of the Vice

Presidency. Will Sudharmono be able to muster enough

supporters before 1993? The list of Golkar candidates for the

coming MPR will be of the utmost importance. This will

indicate whether Sudharmono has been successful - i.e whether

he gets his own people in as opposed to CSIS people or Benny

Murdani people. Sudharmono will most likely juggle his list to

serve both himself and Suharto's interests. Sudharmono will

ensure that some of Suharto's old cronies are put back into

the MPR - like General Tjokropranolo. These clever

machinations are to be expected from such a shrewd political

operator as Sudharmono.



There is a danger for Suharto though, because ABRI will strike

back more strongly [if he goes ahead with this plan]. Not only

against Sudharmono. It will also weaken the power of the

President himself. Suharto will be reappointed but will be

weaker - when the time comes fro the succession he will be

resisted bitterly by ABRI. An ABRI general told me (ARW)

bluntly that Suharto must step down in a reasonable way

[implied threat]. Suharto will find himself in an intractable

conflict with ABRI if he gives too much support to Sudharmono.



This bitter fight between ABRI and Suharto will weaken the

government as a whole. This in turn will allow a greater

opportunity for initiatives from citizens, NGO's, the press

etc to have an input and to affect changes in the future. The

government will find it harder to resist initiatives from the

outside. Cooperation between NGOs and their foreign supporters

will be able to develop more intensely. So the prospects of

more democratising efforts are improving. But we should not be

hasty. When ABRI feels its interests to be threatened and its

authority challenged it could take a more militant attitude.

political conflict could easily develop into physical

conflict. NGOs and those outside the government will not be

able to withstand this kind of crackdown.



Indonesia has no mediating force - no King like in Thailand.

Also no real competition between ex-generals and generals like

in Thailand. So there is only guarded optimism about the

future of democracy. The nearer the succession gets the more

careful we will have to be.





What about the role of Forum Democracy (FD) and Muslim groups?

FD is many up of members from several action-oriented

organisations, but as a groups we avoid direct action - we

concentrate on reflection, formulating democratic strategies

for the future, political forms for Indonesia for the next

decade. We aim to give a focus and a sharp understanding of

the issues to the people. This is a very difficult task. We

will of course be accused of being cowards [for not taking a

more aggressive stance]. But it will be tragic if a common

understanding can not be reached.



Muslim groups: Should beware of the danger of becoming carried

away with the current goodwill Suharto is showing towards

them. They should use the opportunity to uplift themselves

through education, self awareness, political spirit [?]. They

should use the chance to work for long term advantage, not the

short term benefits to be had. Very important that they do not

let their affinity with Islam get out of control so that it

leads to repression of other groups and intolerance. Many

groups become so spirited that they forget the fundamental

fact that Islamic movements form less than a majority of the

population. Those actively promoting Islam formed only 45% or

so of the Constituent Assembly in the late 1950s. Islamic

strength is still to small to warrant a 'total onslaught'.

Muslims should not become 'heady' with the smell of victory.

Should avoid exclusive issues. They should be able accommodate

all groups, including the non-pri, the non-Malays [esp the

Chinese]. Only in this way can they become strong and

influential. The interests of the entire nation must be kept

at heart.



We want freedom of speech, freedom of association, human

rights, rule of law, the uplifting of women and children,

minorities and economically weak groups. So the situation is

still open ended... The political struggle must not be allowed

to break out into physical violence.





Questions:



On the need for a military government necessary to hold the

country together and the danger of Indonesia disintegrating

like Yugoslavia...



The regions of Indonesia do not divide up ethnically like they

do in Yugoslavia. Can you imagine a Republic of Sumatra -

Achenese Muslims in the North, Christian Bataks, Minangkabaus,

and all the Javanese migrants in Lampung. There are regional

demands in Indonesia but they are for local autonomy, not

separatism. And no, we definitely don't need the military to

enforce national unity. They are counter productive. Like in

Aceh. The problem in Aceh could have been solved by

politicians. The military are only making the problem worse.



About the Chinese dominating the economy and the position of

Muslims...



...Don't blame the Chinese. Yes, certainly there are some

criminal Chinese, especially those close to the President, but

don't lump them all together. Most of them are hard working.

And if we are talking about wealth, we have to ask who is

behind the wealthy Chinese. Officers! Muslim officers! Who is

using who? All the service heads and all the chiefs of staff

are Muslims. The students who go overseas - most are Muslims.

Muslims have to overcome the idea that Muslims are

disadvantaged.



On ICMI...



The majority of ICMI members are sane. They are given a bad

name by activists who have been on the sidelines for too long.

They want to use Islam to break into the mainstream.





On the visit to the President's 'Tapos' ranch of over a

hundred battalion commanders a couple of months ago...



The visit to Tapol..eh, Tapos! -- if all those battalion

commanders visited Tapol, in London, Carmel Budiardjo would

flee! -- was organised by Prabowo, Suharto's son in law, who

knows them all personally. Not really all that important,

except for a public relations exercise. Anyway, [Armed Forces

Chief of Staff] Edi Sudradjat probably did best out of it, as

it was he who gave the order for the Rp150 million from

Yayasan [..?] to be handed out to every battalion -- not

Suharto.

Suharto has managed to keep Edi Sudradjat neutral in his fight

with Benny Murdani, but the president's position is weakening.

By promoting Wismoyo he loses control over Kostrad forces to

somebody he knows less.



On the press...



Kompas will probably be more cautious now as it is down to its

last warning [before being banned]. [Information Minister]

Harmoko wants to be chairman of Golkar and would not hesitate

to close down Kompas [for the political capital this could

bring him in the wake of the Monitor affair]. There is talk

that he wants to start his own ICMI newspaper [to replace it]

which may be called 'Republik'. These days the biting

criticism is not found in Kompas but in Bernas in Yogyakarta

[part of the Kompas stable]. Press is likely to become more

free in the future to do investigative journalism. Perhaps it

will even do like in England with Fergie! But no, if the press

were able to tell those sorts of stories in Indonesia - who is

with who - the whole political system would crumble!
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