From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Proceso 533: Editorial
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 21:10:17 GMT

/** reg.elsalvador: 135.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 533: Editorial **
** Written 12:15 pm  Oct 15, 1992 by cidai@huracan.cr in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: cidai@huracan.cr (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 533: Editorial

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador
 
PROCESO 533
October 7, 1992
 
EDITORIAL:
Visitors' week
 
     Last week, El Salvador hosted the visits of several prominent
individuals interested in the peace process, whose deadline is
approaching despite accumulated delays and non-compliance. The
visitors were supposed to help the process end on October 31, as
scheduled; but at week's end, everyone but the government has
agreed to renegotiate the postponement of the deadline.
     The first to reach San Salvador was the president of Honduras,
Rafael Callejas, on a mission of good will, Central American
brotherhood, neoliberalism and promises of great cooperation
between the two nations. During his visit, there was a conspicuous
absence of the people affected by the World Court ruling, whose
future lies in the hands of the Binational Commission. Neither of
the two presidents placed any priority on this delicate and
distressing problem. The ARENA government has thereby lost a good
opportunity to repair somewhat the damage done in failing to
properly defend Salvadoran interests in The Hague. Callejas' visit
offered Cristiani an opportunity to procure a public commitment
that the neighboring nation would respect and defend the right to
self-determination for the people affected by the ruling.
     Next, U.N. Secretary Adjunct Marrack Goulding was here for
five days, seeking a way to resolve the problem of land transfers,
a precondition for FMLN demobilization. Neither U.N. land and
financing experts nor Goulding could get the two sides to reach an
agreement. Goulding left the country with the comment that the
issue was very complicated from both political and technical
standpoints. Meanwhile, Cristiani boldly asserted that the peace
process is suffering delays because the FMLN failed to present a
clear land inventory on time, because the State lacks resources,
and, particularly, because the FMLN has refused to accept the
government's proposal, as if the rebels were obligated to accept
meekly everything that comes from the president. The FMLN, for its
part, held up the demobilization of its third contingent. In this
state of impasse, everyone is now waiting for a new proposal from
the United Nations.
     The president's proposal for transferring lands is
unacceptable, because it presupposes extending even further the
unproductive minifundio model, and because it seeks to dismantle
communitarian forms of productive organization set up in former
conflict zones. Furthermore, although it is true that the State
lacks the resources to purchase all the lands listed in the
inventory, it is also true that the Land Bank has been raising the
price of land arbitrarily; instead of seeking a creative and bold
solution to the land problem, the Bank has been hindering the
process. In other words, the government agency in charge of land
transfers is instead doing everything possible to prevent them.
     Although we do not wish to downplay the importance of the land
transfers, neither the U.N. nor the FMLN should fall into the
temptation of overlooking the other unfulfilled parts of the peace
accords. It is true that the peace process has become bogged down
around one of the most ancient and change-resistant aspects of the
Salvadoran social structure -land ownership- but it would be
unacceptably simplistic to link land and demobilization so
exclusively. In the same vein, it would be too formalistic to
reduce the entire peace process, at the eleventh hour, to an issue
of land transfers for demobilization. It would be a colossal error
to fall into this trap, because the chances of democratizing El
Salvador would be wiped out by the stroke of a pen.
     After Goulding came a few top U.S. officials who usually visit
El Salvador when that nation's interests are at risk. The head of
the U.S. Southern Command and the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs came to support President Cristiani in the
difficult administrative decisions he must now take to fulfill the
Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations about purging the Armed Forces.
Apparently, Washington not only placed some of the names on the
list, but also promised to support the government to ensure it can
effectively overcome resistance by the military.
     Nevertheless, Cristiani explained to the head of SouthCom that
he would like to handle the Commission's list with flexibility.
Later he added that the issue had been taken up with the U.N.
Secretary General, and apparently an agreement had been reached.
However, the president has yet to explain to the nation what he
means by flexibility. Does he mean extending the 60-day deadline
for discharging the officers named by the Commission, or does he
mean not discharging all the officers named immediately? In any
case, neither the president nor the Secretary General have the
mandate to reach such an agreement without consulting with the
other signatory to the peace accords.
     Aronson began his visit with the unilateral demand that the
FMLN continue demobilizing, ignoring completely the land issue and
other incomplete aspects of the accords. He even threatened the
FMLN with the censure of the international community, especially of
the United States. At the end of his visit, now apparently with a
better understanding of the situation, he stated that extending the
demobilization deadline depended upon the two sides and on the U.N.
     The last visitor of the week was Pedro Nikken, an independent
expert called in to supervise compliance with the human rights
aspects of the accords. A fundamental part of his mandate is to
verify if the two sides, and concretely the ARENA government, have
complied with U.N. recommendations on the issue. Nikken will
undoubtedly put President Cristiani in a bind, since his government
has treated all those recommendations and suggestions with cold
indifference.
     It has been a busy week, but with few results. The process has
become hung up on land ownership, one of the most decisive
structures ensuring the social injustice which has prevailed in El
Salvador. It was also what started the war. The two sides are
waiting for a new U.N. proposal to resolve the impasse, but it will
be difficult to find one capable of satisfying both sides.
Meanwhile, among those who wish to take maximum advantage of the
opportunity provided by the peace accords to modernize El Salvador,
there is already consensus to extend the October 31 deadline.
 

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