From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Organization: WP Group
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 01:39:34 GMT


Russell Lawrence
rl> I don't understand why you think that the 
rl> importance of sentience and sapience in our ethical decision- 
rl> making ought to be measured with reference to "collective lives".  

From article <1992Oct10.204358.6800@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
ry> Because only in this way can we show that these criteria are
ry> NOT universal, but are basically anthropocentric, and therefore
ry> arbitrary.

I don't understand why a man like yourself who publicly claims to 
have intelligence that's vastly superior to the common man can be 
so willing to believe that he can demonstrate the truth or 
falsity of an idea by appealing to an authority.  What's worse, 
many of your appeals are particularly ludicrous because they've 
involved abstract entities: like the opinions of "cosmoses" 
and "collective lives" and such.  Were you under the impression 
that fallacious appeals would be more convincing if they involved 
such grand designs?  

You've stated that the criteria of sentience and sapience are not 
universally accepted by all entities, and hence, "arbitrary".  
Would you mind naming a few ideas that meet such a standard of 
acceptance?  [Hint: an intellectual standard that can never be met 
isn't a very useful standard.] 

rl> If my vet were to operate on one of the dogs that lives with me, 
rl> without using anesthesia, the dog would most assuredly consider 
rl> the experience to be unpleasant...  regardless of the impact or
rl> non-impact that such an incident might have on the "collection" 
rl> of all dogs.  

ry> So what?  Does the fact that your dog feels pain make its death
ry> any more important to a giraff than the death of the bacteria
ry> which lived in the dog's gut?  

This is refreshing.  I see that you're scaling down your cosmic 
proportions to something that's more modest and far more 
concrete.  Be that as it may, it truly frivolous to test the 
goodness or badness of the pain that's experienced by my dog by 
asking whether the pain has any impact on a nameless giraffe.  

The fact that my thoughts take place inside my head doesn't mean 
that the ideas are arbitrary, nor does it mean that they can be 
dismissed as "anthropocentric".  If I study the empirical facts 
and conclude that a dog is feeling pain in response to a particular 
event, my statements about the dog's suffering are hardly 
"arbitrary", regardless of whether or not you and the giraffe
agree with them.   After all, neither you nor the giraffe are
omniscient.

Nor would it be reasonable to dismiss my ideas as 
"anthropocentric" simply because they take place inside my head.  
The fact of the matter is that the pain of the dog is rooted in 
the dog, not me, and this pain would continue to exist or 
not-exist...  regardless of whether you and I and the nameless 
giraffe pay any heed.

ry> The fact that your dog suffered
ry> doesn't bother the giraff a bit.  Nor will the giraff be upset
ry> if YOU suffer and die, in spite of the fact that you revered its
ry> [the giraff's] sentience and sapience.

What's your point?

I know a lot of humans who wouldn't care if Rich Young were to 
suffer and die.  Would this lead us to believe that any concerns 
I might have about your suffering are arbitrary, simply because 
they're not universally shared by all humans, all giraffes, all 
mammals, all animals, all cosmoses, all "collective lives", all 
wizards of Oz, all ball-bearings, etc, etc?  Of course not.  The 
fact of the matter is that such dismissals would be "id-iotic" in 
the classical sense of the word [from the greek word 'id'].  In 
effect, you're pointing to your lack of concern to prove the
claim that your lack of concern is an acceptable course of action.  

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ
Newsgroups: talk.politics.animals