HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 15:27:28 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov15.104940.10073@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>In article <BxJx6s.G5A@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>As I've said, I'm a pragmatist.   I look for 
>}  what seems to work.  The epistemology that I've chosen has an excellent
>}  track record ever since the Enlightenment and is the basis of all modern
>}  science.
>
>Pragmatism didn't even exist until the late 19th century.  Logical positivism
>didn't exist until even later.

  The basic methodology existed -- it just didn't get formalized into
  and "ism" until later.

>}  The bottom line is that logical empiricism works better than anything
>}  else.
>
>Not outside the natural sciences, it doesn't, because we can't do controlled
>experiments elsewhere.

  This doesn't mean it doesn't work -- it just means that you are
  unable/unwilling to use its methods.   The bottom line is that it's
  the only approach that works.


>  In the social sciences, for example, all we have to go on are case studies
>  and theories based upon axioms.

  Excatly.  And look how well the social "sciences" work!

  
>What I don't like about it is that it's incoherent, thus unsuccessful in
>fields like economics.

  It's never been *tried* in economics, for exactly the reasons you
  state!   It's too hard to set up the appropriate experiments.  And 
  the results are obvious: economics as a science is a joke!

  So this is the bottom line: forming testable, falsifiable models
  using rigorously defined terms and metrics, and using experiments
  and objective metrics to compare those models to reality, and to 
  refine those models (. . . repeat . . . ) is the only methodology
  that humans have ever devised with a consistent track record for
  getting at the truth or resolving differences of opinion about
  reality.

  It does not follow from this that because people have thus far
  been unable/unwilling to apply these methods to certain areas 
  that this methodology is wrong or flawed, or even inapplicable.
  That would be like saying that because science has not yet found
  a cure for AIDS that witch doctors or sacrifices to various
  deities are a better bet than science for future investigations.


---peter

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,soc.history,alt.activism,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject: Re: [ACLU] Guardian of Liberty: American Civil Liberties Union
Organization: Syracuse University, CIS Dept.
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 19:20:26 EST

In article <1992Nov18.012950.29966@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:

>>...it seems perfectly reasonable that he should be judged
>>by some people to have sufficiently inappropriate ones for the job.
>
>I don't see how holding unpopular opinions should disqualify a
>Supreme Court Justice. Hugh Black, for example, held many unpopular
>views on constitutional interpertation, but he is considered to be
>one of the "great" Justices of this century.
>
>>Would you insist that any person with a Bork's background in
>>constitutional law be eligible for the Court, and that the Senate
>>should pay no attention to their opinions ?
>
>Actually, I would: My opinion of the "advice and consent" is that
>the Senate should accept anyone technically qualified and able to
>do the job (e.g. exactly what it means when in the case of appointed
>executive officials like the Secretary of Interior. In these cases,
>the Senate doesn't subject appointees to political litmus tests.)

I don't think you can describe what happened to Bork as "He failed a
litmus test."  No single issue was the basis of his defeat.

In any case, while I can't say that I'm unhappy about Bork having been kept
off the Court, I must say that I think he got a bit of a raw deal in the
process.

Furthermore, I think that your idea of "advice and consent" is rather
perverted, though it may reflect what the Senate actually does in many
cases.  (But not all, by any stretch--and of course, it is the Senate's
perogative to exercise its right to "advice and consent" as it sees fit.)

But in fact, I don't believe that even *you* believe what you say.  Suppose
a particular appointee were "technically qualified" as was Bork.  (i.e.,
having had a long background in constitutional law and interpretation.)
Now, suppose that individual had concluded that the Constitution really
means that justices on the SC should just make up the rules as they
go along, and totally ignore any intentions of the framers, legislators,
executives, etc.

Would you think that the Senate should confirm *that* individual, solely
because of "technical" qualifications?


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 22:20:29 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <By16Jw.39v@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>>  Why?  The definition of "mass" in physics is not based on
>>  context.  
>
>But of course it is!  I don't really have any idea how you could
>argue such a thing.  Has the definition of the term changed over
>time?  Have scientists looked at reality and decided that what
>fundamentally determines 'mass' is different from what was previously
>thought?

  I assumed we were speaking English.  My statement was in the present
  tense (note: "is", not "was").  The definition on "mass" is the 
  same whether we are discussing big things or little things, near
  things or far things, biology or chemistry  -- it is not context
  dependent.  How people used to think of mass, or any other idea
  in the past is totally irrelevant as is how they might use the 
  term in the future.    

  But you seem to be suggesting that Rand is saying that the definition
  of "human" is context dependent NOW, that is, there could be several
  different definitions in effect simultaneously depending on the 
  application.


>Which is precisely what I said!  I'm glad that we agree on this point.
>The definition of the concept 'human' would be different for the purposes
>of genetic research than for discussion of baseball.  That is to say,
>the definition is contextual.  


>>  Yes.  Since I have no definition of rational I do not claim
>>  that I am rational.  For all I know my perception that I am
>>  even willing myself to write this could be, and according to
>>  at least some metaphysicist may well be, nothing more than
>>  an epiphenomenon.
>
>At the risk of sounding facetious, I think that it is about time that
>I say: I'll take you at your word, Peter.  Until such time as you
>are willing to claim rationality for yourself, I'll just assume you
>have none.

  . . . Which violates your claim that "humans are rational.  

  The bottom line is that you have no defintion of "rational" that
  does not depend on your own subjective judgement.  In this sense 
  your whole logical framework has no more basis than that of 
  religion or art appreciation.

  
>But other observers will see that I'm only joking.  Why?  Because
>they have read my postings and have seen that I have a definition
>of 'rationality' which is sufficiently precise to allow us to 
>determine that you are a rational being.                ^^

  . . . to allow YOU to make this determination.  It is this 
  very subjectivism that is one of the central flaws of Rand's
  ideas.


>Peter _is_ a rational animal, his own protestations to the contrary
>notwithstanding.

  Again, you offer no proof.  


---peter





Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: gary@colossus.cgd.ucar.edu (Gary Strand)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Climate and Global Dynamics Division/NCAR, Boulder, CO
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 18:28:42 GMT

pn> Peter Nelson

pn> Choosing some alternative epistemology merely because it's too hard to
    apply science to problems like these makes about as much sense as doing
    animal sacrifices to cure AIDS because science hasn't succeeded at it.  

  Is it really? Or is it merely recognizing that science does not, and cannot,
  contain all the methods and theories for getting at the answers we seek? 

--
Gary Strand                      Opinions stated herein are mine alone and are
strandwg@ncar.ucar.edu            not representative of NCAR, UCAR, or the NSF
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 14:26:45 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <1992Nov20.092150.28574@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:

>}  A prerequisite for "doing what's best in the long run" is being 
>}  able to predict what long-term effects your actions will have.
>}  I challenge you to prove that you can make such predictions
>}  accurately.
>
>Peter once again commits the error of implying that quantity exhausts the
>options here.  Qualitative prediction is all we can correctly get from
>economic theory.

  OK, show us some "qualitative" predictions for the near term that we
  can use to verify your claim.

  
>When it comes to qualitative predictions, economic theory works.  The Great
>Depression was predicted by Ludwig von Mises, who also used his mastery of
>economic theory to end the inflation in Austria when he lived there.
                                                                

  Any Keynesianism predicted the exconomic expansion in Europe in 
  the postwar period.   So what?  The fact that one person made one
  accurate prediction is meaningless.   Every single day millions
  of investors make preditions about the future course of securities
  markets and the next day many of them turn out to be right.  
  Including ones made by tossing darts at a dart board -- the
  infamous Wall Street Journal "Dart Board Index" which frequently
  beats teams of major securities analysts.
                                          


>Thus I refute Peter Nelson, yet again.
 
  Your "refutation" consists of claiming that verifiable (measurable)
  economic predictions are impossible so you aren't obligated to make
  them -- a bit like a child "passing" a test by refusing to take it.
  Or  witch doctor "refuting" medicine by saying that doctors (witch
  or otherwise) are not expected to improve the patient's condition,
  but instead should be judged by some other means -- handwriting
  legibility, perhaps.

  If you're going to make the claim that the Austrian school produces
  a more rigorous economic theory than anyone else's you should be
  prepared to back it up.  

  The bottom line remains:  you can't "do what's best in the long run"
  without demonstrably being able to predict the long term outcome of
  your choices.  You have given us precisely no reason tho think this 
  is done any better by your pet economic school than any other.                            

                           
---peter


Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:5033 alt.politics.libertarian:1967
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Date: 19 Nov 92 17:04:10 GMT
Back-References: <BxvGCn.J9n@apollo.hp.com>

In <1992Nov17.155659.2275@news.acns.nwu.edu> Jeremy Caplan wrote:
> Peter, the differences between humans and animals is that humans MUST use
> their mind to survive.

Even this is arguable.  Ever heard of feral children?
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>
From: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: the simplicities of freedom
Date: 16 Nov 92 16:10:52 GMT
Reply-To: pajerek@kadsma.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Digital Equipment Corp. - Telstar

In article <37623@uflorida.cis.ufl.edu> jfh@reef.cis.ufl.edu (James F. Hranicky) writes:

[stuff deleted]

>
>1) You are free to accept or reject advertisements.
>

No you're not. Advertising depends on this. You will be affected by
advertising in ways of which you are not consciously aware.


>Jim Hranicky (jfh@reef.cis.ufl.edu)
>

Don Pajerek

Standard disclaimers apply.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 22:35:16 GMT

I'm responding to Peter Nelson in private e-mail, because I think that
his lack of knowledge of that which he critiques is too embarassing to
parade in public.

On the rationality of animals question, it should be pointed out that
there _are_ valid contexts in which we should take into account the
differences between humans and other animals.  In particular, we must
recognize that our powers of conceptualization are vastly more powerful
than those of any other species.  The crude reasoning done by animals
is not sufficient to allow them to philosophize, for example.  Nor to
allow them to choose an ethical theory in the same way that humans
can.  The Rand quote that was posted here was from an essay on ethics,
in which Rand was making precisely this point: unlike other animals,
humans can choose a code of values.

Suffice to say: Nelson seems to think that Rand would reject the
scientific method of theory formulation and test and so on.  This
is patently false.

One cornerstone of Rand's entire philosophical output is her constant
concern that we clarify our concepts, in the sense that we constantly
ask ourselves 'Rand's question': What are the facts of reality that
give rise to this concept?  What are the referents of this concept?

Rand's theory of concepts contains, inter alia, an implicit philosophy
of science.  This philosophy of science in no way contradicts the
fundamentals of how science is actually done.  Indeed, by avoiding
rationalistic and empiricist fallacies, Rand's theory explains how
science is valid, and how we can have contextual certainty.

I'll not post anything further about this for a little while, until
Peter and I have some private e-mail conversations about this.  I
really do think that once I explain Rand's theory to him, he will not
be so blindly hostile.

--Jimbo

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Quake Public Access
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 04:27:45 GMT

In article <1992Nov16.232606.13858@netcom.com> steveth@netcom.com (Steve Thomas) writes:
>In article <BxGCxI.tx@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>  [...]
>>  I believe Randiansim is based on 
>>  some variation of Aristotelianism. 
>>  [...]

>Hark!  It's the muffled sound of somebody talking through their hat!

But that is quite true.  Rand often pointed to Aristotle as providing
the foundations for many of her ideas.  

--Brian

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 10:26:44 GMT

In article <By0p1F.4Fy@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}>"Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
}>provided by man's senses." (Rand, VOS, "The Objectivist Ethics, p. 20).
}>Rand's full description of our rational faculty can be found in
}>_Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_.
}
}  In other words you are not prepared to define "reason".

Jimbo just gave the definition.  It's the sentence that begins with "Reason".
Which words aren't you capable of looking up in a dictionary?

}  Note that "a=a" would be optimized out of existence by any decent
}  compiler because it's logically meaningless.

I love it: the first law of logic logically meaningless!

}  Tell us where to buy a rationo-meter.

The same place you got your triviality meter.


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 17:21:47 GMT

Note that the 'it' which has never been tried (according to Nelson) in
economics is 'positivism'.

And note that I've restricted the newsgroups line to just talk.politics.theory,
since this is moving too far from r.a.b. or t.p.m.

Tim Starr writes:
>Peter Nelson writes:
>}
>}  It's never been *tried* in economics, for exactly the reasons you
>}  state!   It's too hard to set up the appropriate experiments.  And 
>}  the results are obvious: economics as a science is a joke!
>
>Again you reveal your ignorance.  Milton Friedman is probably the most famous
>person to attempt economics with a positivist method.  Many, if not most,
>present economists are positivists.  They use historical case studies in
>place of controlled experiments, assume a determinist rational utility-
>maximizer theory of man ("homo oeconomicus"), make falsifiable and testable
>claims, and are largely responsible for the sad state of economic illiteracy
>we're in.

Tim Starr is right here, about the modus operandi in the field of
economics, for the most part.  A very large part of what economists
do is to derive theories and test them.  In my specialty (financial
economics) we have available a very large quantity of data on stock,
bond, and option market prices... a very large portion of research
hours is spent testing theories using this data.

>You're assuming that it's potentially possibly for there to be controlled
>experiments in the social sciences, which it isn't.  Only then could you
>hold this analogy.  We can do controlled experiments in the attempt to test
>the hypothesis that AIDS is caused by HIV, for example (we've never found a
>cure for ANY virus, by the way).  We don't, but we could.

There _are_ some experiments that can be done in economics.  This is
a (more or less) new and exciting field of economic research.  Take
a look at this month's _Scientific American_ for a brief overview of
*some* of the work being done in this area.

In all fairness, I should point out that a great deal of economic
theorizing is not, strictly speaking, directly testable.  In particular,
there are a great many game theoretic models whose assumptions (for
tractability) abstract away too much of the real world to allow for
a direct tests.  But the intuitive implications of such models can
be posed as testable hypotheses.  Much work is being done in this
area.

My net judgement of this exchange between Tim and Peter?  Tim is
aware of the basic and most popular methodology in economics, while
being perhaps less than fully versed in every detail of the field.
I think that this is an appropriate level of knowledge for an intelligent
person who is interested in economic questions.

Peter's level of knowledge, I leave it to the reader to judge.

--Jimbo


Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 09:12:25 GMT

In article <BxzJ8z.Evo@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
}Well, there is, quite simply, no reason at all to retreat from
}a statement which one has never made.  There IS no 'absolute'
}or 'transcendent' sense... if 'absolute' and 'transcendent' are
}supposed to mean 'without context'... in which anything is moral.
}
}Objectivism does not contain any categorical imperatives.  Rand's
}ethical theory is purely teleological.  See Binswanger's book
}_The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts_ for an excellent
}explanation of this.  Or, just read Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics",
}to see for yourself what she says on the matter.  All ethical statements
}are hypothetical imperatives.  Reality's only command to humans is
}'you must, if...'  You must eat, if you are going to live.  You must
}think, if you are going to prosper.

While I largely agree with Jimbo, I'm not so sure that there are no
categorical imperatives or that Objectivist ethics are purely hypothetical
imperatives.

For instance, none entertain the alternative of living or not from a non-
living position.  Perhaps it would be better to formulate the fundamental
alternative as either continuing to live or dying.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 20:11:37 GMT

Stephen Van Egmond writes:
>>Ayn Rand's view of rationality is evidently diametrically opposed to
>>emotionally-based approaches to philosophy.
>>
>>However, in this context I think that "rational" refers to the method
>>one uses to derive one's morality.  One begins with a set of axioms
>>that define basic realities about life (a person's right to their own 
>>existence, etc.),

Rand does not begin with 'a person's right to their own existence'
as an axiom.  An axiom is that which is implied by any other statement
or proposition.  An axiom is not a postulate or an assumption.

--Jimbo

Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: kwee@oracle.uucp (Karl Wee)
Subject: Re: More on the Enduring Rand
Keywords: Ayn Rand, Objectivism, Moral Principles
Organization: Oracle Corporation, Redwood Shores CA
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 03:57:06 GMT
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by an unauthenticated user
              at Oracle Corporation.  The opinions expressed are those
              of the user and not necessarily those of Oracle.

In article <BxK77A.3EK@world.std.com> rjk@world.std.com (robert j kolker) writes:
>It appears the a moral principle is in one of two forms:
>
>	1. OughtStatement. A statement that requires or forbids something
>	2. World_Statement implies OughtStatement, where World_Statement is
>	   an assertion about the world, possibly quantified and containing
>	   no ought-type modalities.
>
>Question: Is there a moral principle or prescription, the denial of which
>produces a contradiction?

Clearly a moral principles always depends on some unprovable thing.  These
unprovable things are *choices* by people as a whole.  They make these
choices in order to reduce the amount of chaos and unpredictiability of
their lives.

We cannot prove that making these choices will optimize anything in any sense,
but we *can* prove that if these choices are followed through, we'll more or
less know what our lives are like.

Making these choices is the definition of civilization.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory