From: sharon@world.std.com (Sharon M Gartenberg)
Subject: The Economist on the proposed Bosnian ``peace plan''
Summary: The respected British weekly argues for an admittedly imperfect plan
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 03:28:49 GMT

Note: I happen to strongly disagree with this piece. I think it is an 
aboslute outrage that civilians continue to be shelled and starved while
``peace talks'' are going on in Geneva. 
 
It is unconscienable that the world community neither permits the 
internationally recognized government of BiH to try to protect itself
and its citizens, nor does the world community take any action to try 
protect the hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians under attack and
siege. The Serbian nationalists, with massively superior firepower, have
no incentive at all to stop what they are doing. I can't see that being
asked to ``please stop'' will work any better now than it has for the 19 
meaningless cease-fires negotiated last year.
 
Moreover, in the unlikely event that this plan is adopted by all three
sides, it is hard to see how it could possibly work.

What about those who have pulled thousands of unarmed men from their
homes and shot them or slit their throats? What about those who committed
widescale rape and torture? Do they simply get to take over some of the  
autonomous regions and not be punished for their crimes?

Nevertheless, I post the following because it puts forth the best case I
have seen among proponents of these ``peace talks,'' and at least explains
the rationale behind them. --Sharon--
 
``A Map for Peace: Why the West Must Push for an Imperfect Plan for Bosnia''
A leader in the January 9, 1993 Economist
 
Staying out, however judicious, was never going to be cost-free. Ever since
the world decided that it was not prepared to use its soldiers to keep the
former Yugoslavs apart, it has been clear that there would be a price to
pay. The belligerents have been paying with their lives and homes. The rest
of the world will pay with its principles.
 
Whether the cost is to be high or low may depend on the fate of the peace
plan proposed by the outside world's representatives, Lord Owen and Cyrus
Vance, in Geneva on January 2nd. If the plan is accepted by Bosnia's Croats,
Muslims and Serbs, and if it lasts long enough to allow peace to become re-
established in Bosnia, the price will have been worth paying. True, the
democratic world's principles will have been damaged, but not intolerably.
 
At the heart of the plan is a map. It carves Bosnia & Hercegovina up into
ten largely autonomous provinces: three mostly Croat, three mostly Serb,
three mostly Muslim and one, round Sarajevo, mixed. The Croats are pleased 
(and alone have said so); they stand to get a chunk of territory in the west
next to Croatia. The Serbs are not pleased; they would not win the
sovereignty they want and would have to give up some land, though they
would still have more than at the start of the fighting. The Muslims, also
displeased, would be the losers; they would be left with less than they
had before the war, though more than they have at present.
 
Area is not the only consideration. The provinces would come in different
shapes and sizes, and one would consist of separate bits. Though freedom
of movement throughout the country would in theory be guaranteed, and
there might even be ``throughways'' policed by United Nations or other
international forces, the inhabitants of enclaves would inevitably feel
insecure. The smallest, most irregular and most isolated provinces are
in the east, where the fighting has been heaviest. The division is
contrived, and looks it; it also looks unstable.
 
Practical matters such as these may doom the arrangement even if all the
parties agree to it. Yet any imaginable solution is bound to suffer from
similar shortcomings. It is no longer possible to think of Bosnia as both
a unitary state and a peaceful one. Any decentralised arrangement is sure 
to be peculiar and unstable. The hope is that, once the three groups stop
fighting, they will be able to rearrange their bits and pieces by
negotiation, possibly even trading land for guarantees. In time, 
instability will decrease.
 
The objections of principle are harder to swallow. The plan gives the Serbs
more land than they had, and recognises that many people will never return
to their former homes. Two principles are thus breached: territory will
be gained by conquest; and populations will have been shifted forcibly. 
Agression will have been rewarded, and ethnic cleansing accepted.
 
Even so, some principles that have recently looked in jeopardy are not 
sacrificed by the plan. No country will be annexed or obliterated from
the map, no state created within a state. Indeed, international frontiers
will not have been changed by force. If they agree to the plan, the Serbs
may say that they have won a Greater Serbia; the Croats may make the same
claim for Croatia. But Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia will not exist
de jure, whereas the old state of Bosnia & Hercegovina will, and will
be something more than a fictional entity.
 
It is far from certain, however, that the plan will be accepted. The
Muslims, who have the greatest cause for complaint, are -- unfortunately 
for them -- least able to block it. In any event, if they are wise, they
will look at the Palestinian example and take what they can get while it
is on offer.
 
The bigger obstacle is the Serbs. For that reason, the West must do 
nothing to let the Serbs think it will relax the pressure on them unless they
say Yes to the plan. On the contrary, if the Serbs reject this proposal,
they must expect the pressure to increase. The manifest drawbacks of
intervention, notably the certainty that some western soldiers would be
killed, have so far kept the West from intervening against the Serbs. But
further Serbian intransigence at the conference table would not only
strain western credibility to the point where the West would have to make
good some of its threats; it would also make western public opinion less 
reluctant to see active intervention. The Serbs have more to gain from the 
peace plan than some of them seem to think.
 

-- 
Sharon Machlis Gartenberg
Framingham, MA  USA
e-mail: sharon@world.std.com