Date: 17 Nov 92 23:50:16
Distribution: world
From: Eberhard von Kitzing - MPImF - Heidelberg - FRG <mpimfhd!vkitzing@unido.informatik.uni-dortmund.de>
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Organization: <none>
Reply-To: vkitzing@germany.eu.net
Subject: Re: Chance, Necessity or free Will

Matthew W Cushman <mc7l+@andrew.cmu.edu> (MC) posted his ideas about 
free will,  whereas David Spurrett (DS,  spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za) 
presented two types of refutations of modeling the world 
deterministically.  I think these are very fundamental questions.  
Before I try to outline some answers I would like to widen the scope 
of this question to that which I expect to be one of the underlying 
questions in this context.  

My personal interest in such type of questions stems from general 
questions like: "What is the fundamental motor driving our Universe?" 
Does is result from a rigid set of laws similar to those given by 
Newton?  In such a deterministic world the Laplace's Demon would be 
able to know past and future only from the knowledge of the presence!  
Or is it the result of pure blind chance?  Or is there something more
than this?

What type of driving forces should be considered as fundamental for
our universe? `Abdu'l-Baha, the son of the prophet founder of the
Baha'i-Faith stated in a Letter written in 1922 to the famous Swiss
physician August Forel concerning our question:
   "Now, formation is of three kinds and of three kinds only: 
   accidental, necessary and voluntary."
   (`Abdu'l-Baha cited in J.P. Vader "For the Good of Mankind -
    August Forel and the Baha'i-Faith", Oxford 1984)

Thus,  in principle one can consider only three types of driving 
forces or fundamental causes: by chance,  deterministically or by some 
free will.  Does anyone know a fourth independent alternative 
(combinations of the three given above are no independent 
alternative)?  

Now we have to be somewhat more definite with this causes.  Let us
start with the deterministic one which seems to me the most simple.
One definition may be that the future is determined by the past.
Additionally I would add that only such systems are considered to be
deterministic which may at least in principle be represented by a
formal theory.  For instance Newton's mechanics would be deterministic
according to this definition.  David Spurrett argued in his second
refutation against determinism that our world cannot by like this:
DS>   Atomic-type  things,  for  example  Neutrons,  have things called `half
DS> lives' which are periods of time  over which half of any given  collecion
DS> of the type of thing in  question will `decay', or change into  something
DS> else.
DS>
DS>   The QM description of things involves treating every Neutron  (sticking
DS> with our current example) as identical.  Indeed it involves treating them
DS> as `the same' to the extent, in effect, of regarding there as being  only
DS> _one_ (busy as a one legged man at an ass kickin' contest) Neutron in ex-
DS> istence.    To  repeat:  we  have  no  theoretical  reason  to regard two
DS> `different' Neutrons as different.  _BUT_ of any two, over the  half-life
DS> period, only _ONE_ will decay.
DS>
DS>   From situations between which we have no reason to distinguish, we  get
DS> clearly _different_ outcomes.   Hence the  falsity of determinism,  which
DS> holds that the way the past was/present is necessitates a unique (and al-
DS> ready specifed/specifiable) future.

Also thermodynamics would fall into this category of determinism.  Now 
what is with quantum mechanics.  The time evolution of the probability 
vector is deterministic,  i.e.  it is determined by completely by the 
past.  Only in single experiments the probabilistic attribute of this 
theory plays a role.  

Refutation of the world as a FORMAL SYSTEM:
There is a theorem of Goedel that formal systems cannot completely 
describe themselves (see Hofstaedter,  "Escher,  Goedel,  Bach").  This 
means that definitely no physical theory considered by man can 
describe the whole cosmos,  because this theory to be complete would 
have to explain its own appearance in the minds of human beings.  The 
same argument would hold for any other intelligent species in our 
universe.  Consequently no formal system will ever be able to give a 
complete description of our universe.  

Although formal theories cannot explain everything their excellent 
value for describing certain aspects of our world is not belittled by 
this theorem.  


Refutation of PURE CHANCE:
Now let us consider "chance" as a fundamental cause.  In this context,  
I do not mean stochastic events as found in quantum mechanics.  These 
have been dealt with under formal theories.  Here I mean absolutely 
unpredictable events without any statistics.  It would not allow to 
make any type of scientific theory about it,  because in this case this 
theory again would be a formal system.  Although it is difficult for 
me to consider this possibility,  it has to be included for 
completeness of this discussion.  But, why should any universe created by 
pure chance allow something like science?  


Now we have to face the question of Free Will. David Spurrett's first
refutation of determinism was largely statement in favour of free
will:
DS>   The argument  starts from  a factual  observation.   Our legal  systems
DS> (this is not  a modern Western  point, it seems  universal) acknowledge a
DS> distinction between  `do-ers' and  `do-ees' in  a fundamental  and strong
DS> way.  For example when one  person pushes another over a cliff  we direct
DS> our criticism/ revenge/ abuse/ rehabilitation/ whatever at the person who
DS> `did' the pushing.  Some archaic legal systems had different economies of
DS> `do-ers' and, for example, tried crows for crop damage.  NO LEGAL  SYSTEM
DS> HAS EVER `TRIED' A LAW OF NATURE, OR A MECHANICAL DEVICE.  Certainly any-
DS> one wanting  to haul  the gravitational  attraction which  exists between
DS> bodies possessing mass  before the bench  would look stupendously  silly,
DS> despite the fact that that  attraction would have been an  essential part
DS> of the total cause of the death of a person pushed off a building.
DS>
DS>   An  analysis  of  the  workings  of  the proceedings shows that what is
DS> presupposed of a `doer', what  defines him/her is that there  is believed
DS> to be someting like a `possibility for having done otherwise.'  (ie  Free
DS> Will)   Indeed if  it is  possible to  prove that  the person who did the
DS> pushing could not have done otherwise (they were hypnotised, compelled by
DS> another person etc) then that counts as a defence.  The defence works  by
DS> showing that with respect to that act they were not free; that they were,
DS> in that respect, like the attractive force.
DS> 
DS>   If we allow only the assumption that the world be in some way which al-
DS> lows our  legal procedures  to be  grounded in  truth (which we certainly
DS> seem to assume when using them)  then the _way_ in which they  work seems
DS> to  constitute  an  argument  against  determinism.    This  is   becuase
DS> determinism holds, in  effect, that there  are no `do-ers',  that nothing
DS> has the possibility of being other than it is.

One other more empirical way concerning the question of free will 
would be to study the influence of the concept "free will" on the 
behaviour of human beings.  Do people believing in free will behave 
different from those not believing in it?  This would not prove the 
existence of free will but it would clarify its role in society and 
would shed some light on the question,  why such a concept may have 
evolved during history.  

Any system of moral values does definitely refer to free will.
Otherwise it makes no sense to set up such rules.  From instance
Baha'u'llah, the prophet founder of the Baha'i-Faith, wrote:
  "And now, concerning thy question regarding the creation of man.
   Know thou that all men have been created in the nature made by
   God, the Guardian, the Self-Subsisting. Unto each one hath been
   prescribed a pre-ordained measure, as decreed in God's mighty
   and guarded Tablets. All that which ye potentially posses can,
   however, be manifested only as a result of your own volitions."
	      Baha'u'llah "Gleanings", page 149.

------------------------------------------------------------

Eberhard von Kitzing
Max-Planck-Institut fuer Medizische Forschung
Jahnstr. 29, D6900 Heidelberg, FRG

FAX : +49-6221-486 459  (work)
Tel.: +49-6221-486 467  (work)
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email: vkitzing%mpimfhd.uucp@Germany.EU.net  or  vkitzing@mpimfhd.uucp

P.S.: Because I don't have regular access to NetNews I would
      highly appreciate to obtain personal copies from follow-ups.
      Eberhard
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc