From: Paul.Hemeren@fil.lu.se
Newsgroups: alt.atheism
Subject: Re: Bartley's nonjustificationist view of rationality (Was: Better answer
Date: 17 Apr 92 16:12:08 GMT
Organization: Cognitive Science, Lund University

In article <92106.082526J5J@psuvm.psu.edu> J5J@psuvm.psu.edu (John A. Johnson)
writes:
>In article <1992Apr8.020638.7782@xanadu.com>, hibbert@xanadu.com (Chris
Hibbert)
>suggests that some Bartley material be added to the FAQ file, and queries
In article <92106.082526J5J@psuvm.psu.edu> J5J@psuvm.psu.edu (John A. Johnson)
writes:
>In article <1992Apr8.020638.7782@xanadu.com>, hibbert@xanadu.com (Chris
Hibbert)
>suggests that some Bartley material be added to the FAQ file, and queries
>into the distinction between belief and assumption:
>>
>>But maybe that's what you meant.  If you mean something like
>>"revisable opinion" when you say "assumption," and "equally worthy of
>>being considered" when you say "equally possible", I guess you're
>>saying the same thing as I am.  Do we agree on everything but
>>terminology?
>
>I had originally replied:
>
>>Yes, yes, I think we (you, Graham, and myself) do all agree.  It has
>>been about 20 years since I have read Bartley, but I remember his
>>position as being remarkably similar to Graham's and mine.
>>
>>I've been meaning to reply to this post for several days now, but
>>have been wasting my time quibbling with WEEMBA.  Let me see if I
>>can ignore him for a while to concentrate on this Bartley thing,
>>which is indeed relevant to the concerns of atheists.
>>
>>My intention is to dig up my notes on Bartley and reply with a
>>more detailed response.
>
>I was discussing beliefs and assumptions via e-mail with
>Allison Mitchell when the rationality business came up again,
>giving me an opportunity to present Bartley's views.  Below is
>a copy of that correspondence.  Perhaps it will generate discussion
>on possible meanings of "rationality" and why some of us atheists
>consider ourselves to be more rational than theists.
>
>[Allison]
>>From your (and Graham's) earlier responses to Jarek, and the discussion we
are
>>having, I assume (without being completely rational, of course) both of you
>>put
>>some stock in being "reasonable" and "rational."  Please correct me if I'm
>>wrong.  Since we're busy defining things, I have a few questions:
>>        1) How are you and Graham defining "rational"?
>
>Well, I can only speak for myself (although Graham usually agrees with
>me on these things).  My definition of *rational* or *reasonable*
>follows Bartley's position in his *Retreat to Committment* (A. A. Knopf,
>1962).  This position locates rationality in criticism rather than in
>justification.  The problem with traditional justificationist definitions
>of rationality is outlined by Bartley as follows [pp. 90-92]
>
>"No matter what belief is advanced, someone can always challenge it
>with:  'How do you know?' and 'Give me a reason.'  Unless this procedure
>is to go on forever, it must be halted at a 'standard,' 'criterion,'
>'ultimate presupposition,' 'end,' or 'goal' whose authority is simply
>accepted.  If all men do not cease their questioning at the same point,
>however, 'ultimate relativism' results.  For there is no Archimedes'
>lever with which to decide among competing sets of ultimate standards.
>Even if everyone did happen to stop at the same place, there would be no
>way to determine whether this universal subjective standard led to
>objectively true statements about the world.  Obviously, a man cannot,
>without arguing in a circle, justify the rationality of his standard of
>rationality by appealing to that standard.  Yet, if he holds certain
>beliefs--for example, the standard itself--to be immune from the demand
>for rational justification and from the question of 'How do you know?'
>he can be said to hold them irrationally or dogmatically.  And, so it is
>claimed, argument among men about the radically different beliefs they
>hold in this way is pointless.  For rational argument consists in mutual
>criticism, with each man supporting all his beliefs with good reasons.
>The limits of rational argument withing any particular way of life,
>then, seem to be defined by reference to that object of belief in
>respect to which commitment is made or imposed, in respect to which
>argument is called to a halt."

While I agree that there may be limits to rational argument, i.e.
the limits expressed by Bartley in the last sentence of the quote,
the notion that rationality lies in criticism rather than justification
is somewhat problematic, at least as presented here. How can criticism
be rational without appeal to some standard of justification? It is
interesting, if not revealing, that Bartley, in his critique of
justificationism, not only criticizes justificationism but then goes
on to justifiy his criticism. It seems to me that there has to be some
accepted standard of what constitutes rational criticism. And that such
standards require some measure of justification for, at least the
relevance of criticism.

>The justificationist approach (that one is rational by supporting one's
>claims with reasons) is left open to a devastating *tu quoque*
>argument based on the following three premises:

Again, it seems to me that the justificationist approach that you
claim this argument is attacking is the same one proposed by Bartley
when he states above, "For rational argument consists in mutual
criticism, with each man supporting all his beliefs with good
reasons."

>1.  For certain logical reasons (discussed in the above quotation),
>    rationality is limited such that everyone must make a dogmatic,
>    irrational commitment.
>2.  Therefore, one has a right to make whatever commitment one
>    pleases: the scientist to science, mystics to mystical
>    revelation, etc. [this is the heart of Jarek's argument--he
>    believes whatever he likes to believe]
>3.  Therefore, no one may criticize anyone else's commitment, nor
>    can anyone be criticized for making that commitment.
>
>(I lifted the above summary of the *tu quoque* argument from the
> writings of one of my former teachers, Walt Weimer--*Notes on
> the Methodology of Scientific Research [Erlbaum, 1979].)

Tu quoque (Latin: "you're another") is a form of the ad hominem
argument. In what relevant way is the above argument tu quoque?
Furthermore, it seems that the terms "dogmatic" and "irrational"
imply some standard of rationality. In order for the argument
to be "devastating," some light needs to shed on the issue of
how a "dogmatic irrational commitment" can be dogmatic and
irrational without appealing to a standard of rationality and
hence justification.

>Bartley describes the view of rationality as critical as follows (pp.
>151-152)"Second, a comprehensively critical rationalist, like other men,
>holds countless unexamined presuppositions and assumptions, many of
>which may be false.  His rationality consists in his willingness to
>submit these to critical consideration when he discovers them or when
>they are pointed out to him. When one belief is subjected to criticism,
>many others have to be taken for granted--including those with which the
>criticism is being carried out.  THe latter are used as the basis of
>criticism, but because they are unproblematical at present:  we possess
>no criticisms of them.. For the time being thse are, in that sense
>alone, beyond criticism.  And one belief that is nearly always taken for
>granted when one or another belief is being criticized is the belief in
>criticism itself.  But the fact that most of a man's beliefs are beyond
>criticism at any one time does not mean that any of them has to be
>beyond criticism all the time:  this is not so logically, and probably
>not even practically.  Nor does it mean that the belief in criticism
>itself may not come up for critical review from time to time."

Once again, you can't have criticism without justification. The
criticism needs to be justified in at least two ways: (1) One needs
to show, with goods reasons, why the criticism applies to a given
belief (relevance) and (2) One needs to argue or demonstrate the force
of the criticism if a given belief is to be abandoned.

>In this context I can respond to your other questions:
>
>>        2) Is rational thought actually possible if assumptions and beliefs
>>are
>>           irrational or nonrational?
>
>Indeed, if one defines rationality in terms of being open to criticism
>rather than having an unassailable justification for your position.

To the extent that rationality is being open to criticism, it is also
being open to justification. If rationality is simply being open to
criticism, then it is rational to be equally open to dogmatic criticism
as well as what I would call rational criticism. When we accept
criticism, it is usually on the basis of the relevance and (logical)
force of the criticism not just because it is criticism.

>>        3) If rational thought IS actually possible, what do you base it on
if
>>           not assumptions and/or beliefs?
>
>All thoughts (except absolute or ultimate presuppositions) presuppose
>assumptions.  Nonetheless, it is openness to criticism, not the
>the presence or absence of assumptions that defines rationality.

See previous statement.

>[Johnson]
>>But I do agree that assumptions are "handier" because they can be
>>discarded more easily when one is confronted with contradictory
>>evidence.  One might cling longer to beliefs due to the emotional
>>attachment.  That is why I suggest that holding assumptions is more
>>rational than holding beliefs:  one is more open to additional
>>information and less blinded by feelings.

Perhaps I missed this in an earlier post, but why do you believe that
beliefs have emotional attachment and assumptions do not? Isn't there any
value in having emotions? Not giving up a belief becasue of emotional
attachment may have advantages. See for example Patricia Greenspan's
EMOTIONS AND REASONS (1988, Routledge).

Secondly, if there is no "well-foundedness" of assumptions and they are
therefore nonrational, how can it be more rational (how can it be rational
at all) to hold assumptions than beliefs. By "belief" I am referring to the
sense used in folk-psychology a la Jerry Fodor and others where our beliefs
lead us to quite rational behavior.

>[Allison]
>>I agree with you wholeheartedly on this.  For example, I firmly believe that
I
>>do in fact exist.  I am quite emotionally tied to this belief.
>>Allison
>
>>Oh, btw, I'm forwarding what I responded to to Graham so that he can keep up
>>with the discussion.  Unfortunately, I'm not a VAX whiz, so I don't know how
>>to
>>reply with an extract and send it to an additional person at the same time.
>>Could you forward my replies to Graham as well, so that he could read them?
>>Thanks!
>
>Not only am I forwarding this to Graham; I am also posting a copy of
>this to alt.atheism, as I had promised a piece on Bartley.
>-----------------------------------
>John A. Johnson (J5J@psuvm.psu.edu)
>Department of Psychology Penn State DuBois Campus 15801
>Penn State is not responsible for my behavior.
>"Cynicism is the first religion.  It is the means by which to discover
> all else, since cynicism implies skepticism.  Skepticism results in
> examination, and examination leads to understanding."  from
> _The Spirit of Shaolin_ by David Carradine

Paul Hemeren