From: forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Date: 5 Jan 93 03:19:57 GMT
Article-I.D.: shelley.1iauotINNkab
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
NNTP-Posting-Host: stein.u.washington.edu

In article <1993Jan1.223614.26337@netcom.com> doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt) writes:
>In article <1992Dec22.211814.5623@u.washington.edu> forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:
>>I hope there is no question in anyone's mind but that there exists
>>HLTs that will pass the Turing Test. [...]
>>Interogator:  What time is it in Seattle?
>>HLT:          Oh, about noon.  Why?
>
>The current time, info about weather, and other such state information
>(call them sensory inputs) *necessarily* will be inputs to any mechanism
>that hopes to pass the Turing Test.

I'm not sure such sensory input is *necessary* but it sure makes me feel more
comfy.  It certainly would be nice if input and output were causally linked 
and there was a relationship between input, output, space, and time.  You 
may be implying this by "hopes to pass".

>Nor is it an issue (mathematically) if the input sentences are allowed to be
>of infinite length, nor if the world is continuous, therefore requiring input
>state of infinite precision and therefore infinite length...One just makes
>the lookup table of infinite length as well, and define a one to one mapping
>between the set of inputs and the set of outputs. Mathematically this is
>nearly as trivial as a finite map (lookup table).

If I understand this correctly, it is not a matter of whether or not the world
is deterministic but rather if a deterministic entity existing within the world
and given the correct sensory inputs can be said to be intelligent.

>Whether the construction of such tables (finite or infinite) is computable
>even in principle amounts to the question of whether strong AI is possible,
>so there's no point in getting into that here.

Darn, I thought that was one of the major points of this line. 

That is,

Give the "in principle" computablity of the construction of an HLT would one
call such a constructed HLT intelligent?  If not then Strong AI fails.

Today (not yesterday and maybe not tomorrow), I believe behavior isn't 
sufficient to determine intelligence.  I base this believe on my image of 
an HLT which serendipitouslly passes the Turing Test even though its output 
is not causally connected to the input.  It seems to me that there is a 
minimal HLT for a given space/time which happens to produce the correct 
behavior at the correct time even though it is not causally related to the 
world at that space/time (space and time needn't be part of the table provided
the entity producing the behavior produces it in a way synchronous with the
passage of space/time.)  I feel much better about those HLTs whose outputs 
are contingent based upon sensory input but since most of those contingencies 
will not be expressed they cannot be determined behaviorally.  I think Searle 
has won the argument and lost it (the CR thought experiment does nothing for
me, where as contemplating why it does something for some does do something
for me.)

I happen to accept the intelligence of the physically instantated HLT but only
because I imagine the entity instantating it to be related to the world in
the correct way (input causally linked from the world and output causally 
effective in the world.)

I don't think one could actually instantate an HLT which could pass the
Turing Test but one might be able to show that some parts of a TT passing
HLT could be replaced by algorithms which can be physically instantated.
I'm not sure such a move would get one very far.

>	Doug
>-- 
>Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
>Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

--gary forbis@u.washington.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy