HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: herman@nosc.mil (John W. Herman)
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Organization: Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, CA
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 01:23:24 GMT

heathh@cco.caltech.edu (Heath Ian Hunnicutt) writes:

>	From what I understand, that's not totally true.  While the _specs_
>might be the same, IBM also submitted a rationale for the DES method.  This
>rationale document remains classified, and some wonder if it contains
>information that severely weakens DES.

This keeps coming up.  My guess, and it's only a guess, is that this 
document addresses the selection criteria for the key size.  Any
information regarding the S-box design would be deep black,  and
only those directly involved would even know of its existance.
The selection of the key size would involve assesment of future
computer development and might include some information derived
from intelligence services and is most likely what is in this
document.

Regarding the strength of DES, my guess is that given the restrictions
on key size and algorithm complexity, a stronger system could not be
implemented.  NSA would not have wanted to get caught putting out a
crypto system that would be possible broken in public.  It might
give their opponents hope that they might break the military systems.
Bureaucrats resist public embarressment to the maximum extent possible
up to and including release of classified information.
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal,35-016,8621267,)
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Originator: uri@aixproj.watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 20:11:51 GMT
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: IBM T.J. Watson Research Center

From article <1992Dec11.075845.27376@cybernet.cse.fau.edu>, by spc@pineal.math.fau.edu (Sean 'Captain Napalm' Conner):
>   -spc (And on a related note:  Is there any information as to the ORIGINAL
> 	specification for DES that IBM summited to the NSA that is
> 	available?  Just asking ... )

Sorry to disappoint you - those "original" specs aren't different
from what you can get now from ANSI (:-).
-- 
Regards,
Uri.		uri@watson.ibm.com
------------
<Disclaimer>
Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:230 sci.crypt:5780
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 10:23:41 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1fc2

> Just curious, Amanda--does that mean you also think you have the right 
> to keep and bear your own nukes? 

<raised eyebrow> well, comparing cryptosystems to "nukes" seems a bit far-
fetched, but I do indeed support the right of private citizens to keep and 
bear any type of military hardware.  In simple terms, my answer to your 
question is "The right?  Yes.  The necessary HAZMAT facilities and licenses?  
No."

I'm really *quite* a strong supporter of the second amendment (and the rest 
of the Bill of Rights), and interpret it in quite strong terms (as did, in 
fact, the people who wrote it--read Jefferson's writings).

However, this is getting a little far afield for sci.crypt :)...



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation


Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:219 sci.crypt:5766
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 22:58:11 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1fc1

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
> Thus current arguments about it's not 
> being valid seem to me to be the petulant wailing of children 
> who have been refused free toys.

Well, of course.  This is Usenet.  It's a time-honored tradition.



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation


Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:139 alt.security:5044 sci.crypt:5610 talk.politics.misc:63901 talk.politics.guns:25105
From: heathh@cco.caltech.edu (Heath Ian Hunnicutt)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Date: 11 Dec 1992 23:20:43 GMT
Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
NNTP-Posting-Host: punisher.caltech.edu

uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal,35-016,8621267,) writes:

>From article by spc@pineal.math.fau.edu (Sean 'Captain Napalm' Conner):
>>   -spc (And on a related note:  Is there any information as to the ORIGINAL
>> 	specification for DES that IBM summited to the NSA that is
>> 	available?  Just asking ... )

>Sorry to disappoint you - those "original" specs aren't different
>from what you can get now from ANSI (:-).

	From what I understand, that's not totally true.  While the _specs_
might be the same, IBM also submitted a rationale for the DES method.  This
rationale document remains classified, and some wonder if it contains
information that severely weakens DES.  Some specific things that are
supposedly covered include the design of th S-boxes, i.e: why this
permutation and not some other?  For an interesting discussion of
research into the S-boxes, try "Cryptology for Mathematicians and Computer
Scientists."  I don't have it handy, or I'd give an author and ISBN.
The book is quite good, and gives Pascal source for DES and RSA
implementations.

See ya,
Heath

-- 
--
From the Home for Amnesiac Computer Scientists....
  heathh@cco.caltech.edu

Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 17:33:48 GMT

In article <1gb7obINN3tp@gap.caltech.edu> heathh@cco.caltech.edu (Heath Ian Hunnicutt) writes:
>uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal,35-016,8621267,) writes:
>For an interesting discussion of
>research into the S-boxes, try "Cryptology for Mathematicians and Computer
>Scientists."  I don't have it handy, or I'd give an author and ISBN.
>The book is quite good, and gives Pascal source for DES and RSA
>implementations.
>

The book is called:  _Mathematical_Cryptology_for_Computer_Scientists_and_
Mathematicians_, by Wayne Patterson.  It was published in 1987 by Rowman &
Littlefield.  I disagree that it is "quite good."  The book is riddled with
errors (most of them seemm to be typos, but some are honest-to-goodness
errors), the notation changes from one chapter to the other, and whole areas
of cryptology are left out.

The book is out of print, and I beieve the publisher is out of business.  The
last time I spoke with the author (a couple of years ago) he was thinking of
cleaning up the book and having a second edition published elsewhere.  As far
as I know, nothing has ever come of that.

The source code all works, though.

Bruce

Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: hunter@work.nlm.nih.gov (Larry Hunter)
Subject: Re: Status of DES, or "Is the DES Standard PD?"
Organization: National Library of Medicine
	<1992Dec11.201151.145881@watson.ibm.com>
Date: 11 Dec 92 17:51:57



spc@pineal.math.fau.edu (Sean 'Captain Napalm' Conner) asks:

  (And on a related note: Is there any information as to the ORIGINAL
  specification for DES that IBM summited to the NSA that is 	available?
  Just asking ... )

To which  uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumental) answers

  Sorry to disappoint you - those "original" specs aren't different from what
  you can get now from ANSI (:-).

Which is not entirely true.  There was a significant controversy over the key
size that would be used.  James Bamford's "Puzzle Palace" (a classic text, but
one that could use an update) has a fairly detailed description of the
wrangling.  I believe the original IBM proposal was for 128 bit keys, but the
final standard ended up with 56 bit keys (that's just off the top of my head;
my copy of Bamford is at home).

				Larry
--
Lawrence Hunter, PhD.
National Library of Medicine
Bldg. 38A, MS-54
Bethesda. MD 20894 USA
tel: +1 (301) 496-9300
fax: +1 (301) 496-0673 
internet: hunter@nlm.nih.gov
encryption: PGP 2.0 public key via "finger hunter@work.nlm.nih.gov"
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning)
Subject: Government Officials Punished?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 18:45:25 GMT

The real punishment is that many are bankrupted by the legal costs.  However,
in the case of Ollie North and other such politically-prominant crazies,
these costs are picked up by legal defense funds, probably tax-deductable
contributions.

This is the only positive aspect of rising legal costs that I can think of.

Lew
-- 
Lew Glendenning		rlglende@netcom.com
"Perspective is worth 80 IQ points."	Nils Bohr (or somebody like that).
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: /usr/local/lib/news/organization
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 16:40:40 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Amanda Walker posts a message too delicious to let pass without underlining.
>She says that if the USG considers crypto to be munitions, then she's
>entitled to it under the militia clause of the Constitution.
>
>Just curious, Amanda--does that mean you also think you have the right
>to keep and bear your own nukes?

I don't know if she does, but I do. However, thats another story, and
not appropriate for this newsgroup.

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
"They can have my RSA key when they pry it from my cold dead fingers."
Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:221 sci.crypt:5768
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 23:43:24 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1fc1

moore@cs.utah.edu (Tim Moore) writes:
> By the way, is this stuff really a law or is 
> it regulations draw up by bureaucrats in the executive branch? 

It is the set of regulations, enforced by the Department of State, that 
regulate international arms traffic.  The DoS was given the authority to 
promulgate such regulations by Congress.

> My point is that some of terms, as quoted by PKP, are ambiguous and 
> imply that a whole range of activities are forbidden by ITAR.

A whole range of activities are indeed forbidden by ITAR.

> I interpret the PKP letter by itself to claim that almost any 
> international activity related to cryptography is forbidden.

This is correct.  There are particular exceptions (such as the use of crypto 
technology for authentication but not encipherment), but in general you need 
the same kinds of licenses to import & export cryptographic technology as you 
do other kinds of weapons, such as bombers, tanks, or missiles.

> I'm having a hard time swallowing it. 

Chuckle.  Sigh.  I gather you've never had the pleasure of doing business 
with the government in areas that have military or intelligence implications.

> Exporting classified information isn't a just a violation of ITAR; it's 
> espionage.

Correct.  RSA and DES aren't classified, so this doesn't apply.  However, 
many things that aren't classified are nonetheless considered a matter of 
national security--remember the VAX export fiascos of a decade or so ago?

> Maybe you could reveal how exporting this information 
> doesn't violate ITAR since the passages quoted by PKP would seem to 
> forbid it. 

As I remember, ITAR explicitly does not apply to technical data which has 
been published in publically available media (books, magazines, etc.).

> if I can't implement the IDEA cipher based on a description in a 
> European conference proceedings, I'm worried.  Can you tell me, David, 
> from your reading of the law, that I can do that without violating 
> import/export regulations? 

You can implement it to your heart's content--you just can't then transport 
it out of the country without an arms license.



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation


Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:279 alt.security:5137 sci.crypt:5853 talk.politics.misc:64770
Organization: Penn State University
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 09:57:46 EST
From: <JDG111@psuvm.psu.edu>
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc
Subject: Re: PGP 2.1 site list
 <Bz9FBr.Awn@minerva1.bull.it>

Concerning the difficulties of CRC errors in PGP21.ZIP files - I too had the
same problem when FTPing from numerous sites.  PKZIP 1.10 would always give
CRC errors, and the files were corrupted when they were unzipped.  It
appears that version 1.93 Alpha of PKZIP was used to ZIP up PGP 2.1.  WHen I
used 1.93 to unzip it, it worked fine.  PKZIP 1.10 will *NOT* work with the
PGP 2.1 release ZIP files however.

--Douglas Good,  Penn State University
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: hallam@zeus02.desy.de (Phill Hallam-Baker)
Subject: Re: PGP v. 2.1 Released
Reply-To: Hallam@zeus02.desy.de
Organization: Deutsches Elektronen Synchrotron, Experiment ZEUS bei HERA
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 04:07:23 GMT

In article <1992Dec14.205945.20132@mtu.edu>, cescript@mtu.edu (Charles Scripter)
writes:
|>In article <1992Dec14.163420.26160@news.eng.convex.com>, gardner@convex.com
|>(Steve Gardner) writes:
|>
|>> 	If we fail to trim back the national security state in the wake of
|>> 	the demise of the USSR we will undoubtedly have to fight them 
|>> 	for our constitutional rights in the near future. Idle hands are
|>> 	the devils workshop folks.  Isn't that pretty obvious?
|>
|>"Near future"?  I think we're already to the point of fighting for our
|>Constitutional Rights.  We have the War on Drugs violating most of the
|>Bill of Rights, and the FBI insisting that fiber optic cables have tees
|>in them so they can eavesdrop for "lawful warrant, or other purposes"
|>(I can't think of any "other purposes" that would be "lawful", since
|>a warrant is required for any legal eavesdropping and wiretaps).  As I
|>recall, they also want to prohibit the use of encryption in electronic
|>communications (e-mail, and/or phone), since it would inhibit their
|>ability to eavesdrop.
|>
|>Yes, it's pretty obvious...

You really seem to have a problem with your government there. Over here we have
a rather different arrangement, the government spends its time stopping everyone
finding out what it is doing rather than trying to find out what other people
are doing.

Very difficult for MI5 to make those sort of demands, after all they don't
actually exist.


--

Phill Hallam-Baker
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
From: pete@extro.ucc.su.OZ.AU (Peter Alexander Merel)
Subject: Re: PGP v. 2.1 Released
Organization: Sydney University Computing Service, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 23:09:41 GMT

mathew <mathew@mantis.co.uk> writes:
>strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>> Leaving aside the inflammatory language in "mathew"'s post (I still
>> can't figure out if that's his last name or what),
>It's my name.

And you're entitled to it. It is strange how David Sternlight sees 
inflammatory language in everyone's postings but his own.

>> Second, since he writes from the U.K., it's like counseling someone
>> else to take the law into their own hands with no personal
>> responsibility-- a kind of let's you and him fight.

>Since I believe the UK has laws prohibiting the sending of encrypted messages
>over telephone lines, every time I use PGP I am risking arrest.

PGP legality is a relevant issue to anyone wishing to secure the
privacy of their communications with Americans. And anyone with friends
or loved ones living in the US has a personal stake in what happens
there. Come to think of it, given that no one can forsee their future
movements or attachments, even folk without immediate US concerns are
fully entitled to comment. 

The net is a country to which many feel greater allegiance than they
feel to the country they pay taxes to. PGP and its cousins are tools
with which the net may defend its borders and maintain its integrity.
Folk like PKP who attempt to patent something as fundamental as the
very concept of public key encryption are impediments to the development
of the net and to free exchange of information. Given that PKP have done
nothing in exchange for this disservice, folk in this group have every right 
to regard them and their supporters with suspicion. Such suspicion is not
"paranoia", as David Sternlight enjoys calling it. It is common sense.

-- 
Internet: pete@extro.su.oz.au             UUCP: {uunet,mcvax}!munnari!extro!pete
                       I am a big pond in a small fish.
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,comp.sys.next.sysadmin
From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Re: PGP v2.1 and NeXT
Organization: University of Missouri
Date: 12 Dec 92 08:55:42 GMT

In <WARLORD.92Dec12021232@deathtongue.mit.edu> warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins) writes:
]First of all, the NeXT is neither Mach nor BSD!  It is a BSD-ish UNIX
]signal server on top of Mach.  This means that if you are writing a
]kernel driver you need to write it for mach, but if you are writing a
]user-level application you should write if for BSD.  As far as PGP is
]concerned, its better to define BSD that not, since applications see a
]BSD interface.
]Yes, there is a problem in system.c:  it forgets to include "usuals.h"
]and you have to change the #ifdef around memset, memcmp, and memcpy to
]be:	#if defined(BSD) && !defined(NEXT)
]That is the ONLY changes that you should need to get PGP 2.1 to build
]on the NeXT platform.  You SHOULD NOT change the makefile.unx as
]suggested.

Interestingly enough, I ONLY changed the makefile and it compiled fine
on a next.  I haven't exhaustively run it, but it passed all the tests
suggested in setup.doc.
What gives?

Rich
Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:187 alt.security:5081 sci.crypt:5702 talk.politics.misc:64368 talk.politics.guns:25249
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: PGP v. 2.1 Released
Date: 15 Dec 92 18:30:32 GMT
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)


Leaving aside the inflammatory language in "mathew"'s post (I still
can't figure out if that's his last name or what), his message
suggests that violation of the law by using PGP in the U.S. is a
form of civil disobedience analogous to the Black freedom struggle.

First, the analogy is odious; the two issues are not morally
comparable and anyone who cannot see this is in need of advice.

Second, since he writes from the U.K., it's like counseling someone
else to take the law into their own hands with no personal
responsibility-- a kind of let's you and him fight.
Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:277 sci.crypt:5851
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 09:28:14 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1fc3

In article <BzG8CM.1rH@exnet.co.uk>, s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands) writes:
> You'd know this better than me but doesn't the amendment that grants the 
> right to bear arms say something about a local militis being seen as a 
> necessity "so the right to bear arms shall not be infringed"?  Would you 
> use your crypto-susyem to support your local militia. 

Yes, indeed.  I'm sure you can find people on talk.politics.guns who can 
describe the second amendment and its implications in detail, but briefly 
put, the term "militia" in the second amendment does not refer to the 
military, but to armed individuals--what is now generally called a 
"paramilitary organization".

Remember that at the time, the U.S. had just finished fighting a war of 
rebellion, and the people who wrote the Bill of Rights were intent on making 
sure that the people of the newly-formed USA would be able to counter any 
excesses that their new government might accumulate, including by armed 
rebellion if necessary.  This is why control of weapons is placed into the 
hands of private citizens--it keeps the government from going overboard.
Using crytposystems at a local level to ensure that citizens' lives and 
rights are protected is quite parallel to using firearms to do so.

Now, this right has admittedly been eroded to a great degree in this country, 
as have many of the rest of the Bill of Rights, but the theory is to 
specifically limit the power that the government has over individuals.



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation


Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 1992 04:35:11 GMT

In article <1992Dec19.204449.18376@colnet.cmhnet.org> res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes:
>If a sympathetic congressman
>could be convinced to place the source code into the Congressional Record,
>would this not constitute publishing the work, and therefore divorce it
>from any ITAR jurisdiction?

Why do we need to get a member of Congress to do this? Last I heard,
we had a free press in this country. Except for some who have signed
away their civil rights in exchange for "sensitive" government jobs,
no American needs prior government approval to publish anything he/she
wants.

Cryptographic source code listings ("software") have appeared in many
widely published and internationally distributed books and magazines
over the past 15-20 years with nary a peep from the government. I've
been keeping a bibliography of these as I find them. I have something
like 7 or 8 entries for "DES source code" on my list now.  (I don't
count mere descriptions of the DES algorithm, as they're extremely
widespread. And as we all know, only Americans are capable of turning
them into C code anyway.)

As John Barlow has said, the best way to defend a right is to exercise
it. Often. I'm glad to see Bruce Schneier coming out with his book of
crypto code, and I'm happy to contribute my own public domain DES code
to his effort.

Phil

Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns