From: harelb@math.cornell.edu (misc.activism.progressive co-moderator)
Subject: Background to IRAQ-GATE(4)NSC INFLUENCE OVER EXPORT LICENSING FOR IRAQ
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: daemon@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: misc.activism.progressive on UseNet ; ACTIV-L@UMCVMB
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 20:24:54 GMT


         NSC INFLUENCE OVER EXPORT LICENSING FOR IRAQ 

         
        One of the responsibilities of the NSC is to ensure that 
the national security decision directives issued by the 
President are properly carried out. Take for example the case of 
Iraq. Both Presidents Bush and Reagan were determined to improve 
relations with Iraq, and both considered the best way to achieve 
that goal was to expand trade with Iraq. Since trade was the 
foundation on which improved relations were to be achieved, 
increased importance was placed on the export licensing process. 
        The export licensing process controls the export of U.S. 
goods and technical data in order to achieve certain national 
security and foreign policy goals. For example. in order to 
protect our national security, the export licensing process is 
used to limit the export of sophisticated United States computer 
technology to the Soviet Union that could be used to improve 
weapons systems. In the case of export licensing, the National 
Security Act of 1947 and subsequent legislation, provide the 
President, through the National Security Council [NSC], with 
ample authority to establish policies on export controls. 
        To get a feel for the NSC's role in achieving the 
President's objective regarding Iraq, we can look to the 
comments of Paul Freedenberg. He was the chief export licensing 
official at the Commerce Department during the latter half of 
the Reagan years and the beginning of the Bush administration. 
        Mr. Freedenberg recently testified that Iraqi use of poison 
gas against the Kurds, as well as the Iranians, did not suppress 
the zeal of the NSC to approve technology transfers to Iraq. In 
testimony before Congress he stated: 
         
        In the summer of 1988, a number of licenses were pending 
with regard to technology transfer to Iraq. I asked for official 
guidance with regard to what the licensing policy would be 
towards Iraq since by that time there was credible evidence of 
the use of poison gas by the Iraqis against their own people and 
also against the Iranians. I suggested that the imposition of 
foreign policy controls be considered as a way of justifying the 
denial of export licenses to Iraq. I was told by the National 
Security Council that the licensing policy with regard to Iraq 
was that of normal trade and that under normal circumstances and 
that I should clear the licenses that were pending. I passed 
that information on to my licensing officers and the few dozen 
licenses that were pending at that time were approved and 
licenses were issued for exports to Iraq. 
         
        This provides clear insight into the power of the NSC 
and points to the influence it can have over the export 
licensing process. Yet another example is provided by Dr. 
Stephen D. Bryen, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Trade Security Policy and Director of Trade Technology Security 
Administration [DTSA]. DTSA helps review export licenses to 
determine if exports should be denied because of their potential 
military applications. 
        While testifying before the Banking Committee, Dr. Bryen 
stated: 
         
        Generally speaking, the Defense Department s strongest 
objections for Iraq concerned the potential use of exported 
goods for Iraq's nuclear program, for missile testing and 
construction, and for chemical and biological weapons 
development. In most cases when we raised these issues we ran 
into strong opposition from the State and Commerce Departments. 
In July 1987, at the urging of the State Department, the 
National Security Council directed DTSA to be more forthcoming 
with respect to Iraq. The NSC singled out a number of cases DTSA 
held up, and urged us to revisit them. We decided, in all but 
two or three cases identified by NSC to stick by our guns and 
not give in because we had evidence the technology was going 
into strategic military programs. 
         
        While Mr. Scowcroft was not the NSC Director at the time 
of the above incidents, you can get a feel for the enormous 
lnfluence the NSC can exercise over individual export licensing 
decisions. 
        The NSC provides crucial input into the President's foreign 
policy and national security decisions. These decisions often 
affect trade between the United States and foreign nations, 
which in turn affects a corporation's ability to sell its goods 
overseas. As the Iraq example illustrates, the NSC can exercise 
considerable sway over export licensing decisions the directly 
determine whether or not a corporation's export license is 
approved. This is one of the prime reason Mr. Scowcroft's stock 
ownership presents the potential for a conflict of interest. 
        Mr. Scowcroft's past affiliation with Kissinger Associates 
also raises the question as to whether or not Mr. Scowcroft can 
truly provide independent advice to the President in matters of 
national security or foreign policy when those policies can run 
against the interest of corporations that he owns stock in or 
that are affiliated with Kissinger Associates. 

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