From: davea@col.hp.com (Dave Allen)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.misc
Subject: Re: ASRS CALLBACK # 163 (
Date: 13 Jan 1993 01:49:14 GMT
Organization: HP Colorado Springs Division
NNTP-Posting-Host: qadata.col.hp.com

> In article <942.180.uupcb@ssr.com> dick.zeitlin%acc1bbs@ssr.com (Dick Zeitlin)  writes:
>    The controller isn't allowed to solicit a contact approach.

mtanner@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Michael C. Tanner) writes:
> This is precisely the point.  As one poster noted, the rules should not be
> intended to keep the pilot ignorant, but it seems the FAA and others interpret
> them that way.  Forget what controllers are and are not allowed to do, what
> *should* they be allowed to do?  What is wrong with them informing the pilot
> what the options are?

Maybe my posting didn't get out...  Again, here's the other side...
How about a controller suggesting a contact approach and the pilot - without
really knowing what's involved - latches onto it. What a relief! He is now
"cleared" for the contact approach - whatever that is - and flies right into
an obstruction. Pilots do crazy things when they are "cleared" - become
immortal, invincible, and think they've got it made. A similar situation
exists for the Special VFR clearance. Imagine a controller suggesting it
to a pilot who would be over his head, but he has a "clearance", which to
a lot of people means everything is OK, and he goes out and kills himself.

One big killer in IFR work is forgetting who's responsible for what.
Familiarity with procedures is a MUST. Surely your own IFR experience backs
this up.

Before we accuse this controller of attempted murder, consider the little we
know:
1. It's a NASA callback report - ie, the guy lived to tell about it.
2. The pilot was on an IFR flight plan. Filing IFR means you are IFR rated
and current and know one approach from the other, even when stressed -
ESPECIALLY when stressed.

> We are not talking about average operations. The controller had every reason
> to know the pilot was in trouble.

There is no evidence that the pilot reported the ice or that he was in over
his head. 

> The pilot may have flown only 2 or 3 approaches in IMC in the past year

IMC or hood, it's 6 approaches within the previous 6 months. For many, IMC
is easier than a hood. Current also means you know what you're doing and all
the options available to you.

> distinction between "visual approach" and "contact approach" makes little real
> difference at any time, and might easily be forgotten under pressure.

Wow. I see all kinds of difference. Let's start with you describing each one
as you see it.

> The real problem here is needlessly complex rules and the inability of ATC to
> provide reasonable assistance.

They provide incredible assistance when needed/called for and lots of
assistance even when not asked for.

> controller has to decide between doing something that may save lives

As pointed out above, the controller can easily be endangering lives to
suggest contact approaches or special VFR.

> I don't have answers.  I'm suggesting that the analyses we are getting are too
> narrowminded, and calling for a broader discussion.

And I've been trying to get you to broaden out and see the controller's point
of view, and to see what makes the system work.

> How about changes to the system?

Great, but for my vote, not with suggesting contact approaches or special VFR.
The system does change. It changed after the Avianca 707 didn't make it around
for a second approach to JFK. But hey, that wasn't the system's problem. After
headwinds and delays and the number of planes circling JFK, he NEEDED to stop
in Baltimore - would have been a simple approach with plenty of fuel. But no.
He literally chose to gamble, knowing he'd have minutes of fuel if everything
went just right, then flew a really crappy approach, missed, and the vapors
ran out. And all the time he says nothing about being low on fuel.

The system is only as good as its weakest part, which is often the pilot.

For reference, here are relevant pieces of the original article...

>     Number 163                                      December 1992
>GENERAL AVIATION WEATHER INCIDENTS
>In this Part 2 conclusion, Ms. Hicks identifies
>the judgement and training factors that contributed to these weather
>incidents.
>
>IFR FLIGHT PLAN WEATHER INCIDENTS.  Within the IFR flight plan group of
>incidents (76 reports), pilots' *inadequate knowledge of ATC procedures
>and regulations* contributed to more than one third of the incidents.

Maybe that's worth thinking about.

>Many reporters faulted ATC for lack of cooperation in an emergency or
>near emergency situation. ...
>The pilot who, with 1 mile visibility, requested a *visual* approach as
>the ice built up on the airfoils, missed some important distinctions in
>ground school.  The pilot request should have been for a *contact*
>approach, which ATC might have approved.

We still don't know if he declared an emergency or even reported the ice.
Where was he when he had the field in sight for the visual (with one mile
visibility)?

I don't like Hicks' tone (though she's right about the ground school part),
and I don't agree with "the request should have been for a contact approach".
Maybe special VFR would have done him better. But a visual approach was out
of the question. It's up to the pilot to call the shots when things get bad.
Not a controller on the ground with nothing but second-hand information.
There is not enough information in this article to condemn the system or
for this thread to have gone on this long. My experience with ATC has been
that of cooperation and extreme helpfulness, even when not asked for.

dave allen - Fly because you love it.