HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: UNIX Mail with PubKey Encryption
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date: 19 Nov 92 17:11:13 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

> Vesselin Bontchev is incorrect about RSAREF running only on PCs. In the
> ripem versions under beta test, which use RSAREF, there is a Mac and
> a Unix version as well as a PC version.

> He is also mistaken about the interface. ripem, which uses rsaref, has
> the same kind of command line interface that PGP does.

Indeed, I confused RSAREF with the MailSafe program. My descriptions
are true for MailSafe, not for RSAREF. Sorry for the misunderstanding,
but it is not difficult to make such a mistake, having in mind that I
have never seen any of those packages... :-)

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.0 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A new encryption problem?
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 92 21:34:43 EST
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Distribution: world
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <1060.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us> 
(Jim Wenzel) writes: 
           ....
> 
>     He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
>     from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molestor who encrypted
>     his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molestor will
>     more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence. This  has caused me
>     some  concern   because  we  have  agreed   (volunteered)  to  be  a

        Yah. Right. Quite a coincidence that this happens within days
        of an identical hypothetical case being posted in this group.
        It's probably safe to assume that Jim actually believes this
        brown mushy stuff, but...

        (1) The guy's not a molester if they have no evidence (isn't
            that what US law says?) It's hard to believe that a file
            submitted as hearsay (see-say?) evidence would convict
            anyone in the absence of something more substantial.

        (2) Why do the police need to get a copy of PGP? If the patsy
            used PGP, then he'd have to have a copy of it not far from
            the encrypted data. Could they really introduce decrypted
            evidence without proving that the patsy had access to the
            encryption software? Could it be that they intend to get a
            little creative?

        (3) Could it be that somebody in Cal. read Terry's post and
            thought of a neat way to put a chill on PGP distribution?

        (4) Is it possible that the call actually came from one of
            Jim's users who's more anal-retentive than most about what
            Jim makes available on his system?

        (5) Could it be that Jim's found a poignant way to reintroduce
            a topic we all thought had been beaten to death?

            Cheers,

                Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Consulting Systems Analyst  |  The PC: Colt '45
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  of the information
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |   frontier
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

                
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: ken@halcyon.com (Ken Pizzini)
Subject: Re: New Encryption - a Challenge
Organization: The 23:00 News and Mail Service
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 09:57:25 GMT

In article <n0ef0t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
>Writes zeke@fasttech.com (Bohdan Tashchuk):
> > At least they told you what your friend needs to do for them 
> > to be interested.
> 
> Some asked to see the algorithm in order to tell us how it works.
> Some trick.  We already know how it works.  No, I'm afraid that's 
> not _quite_ what I'm after... :-)  Thank you very much...

No, not to tell you how it works, but to tell you how it _breaks_.

		--Ken Pizzini
From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Triple DES
Date: 20 Nov 1992 04:50:53 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: physics.ubc.ca

leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:
>....  (Actually, "meet in the middle"
>attacks show that double encryption, done this way, cannot be MUCH stronger
>than single encryption - though it may be SOMEWHAT stronger.)

>							-- Jerry
Since the total number of possible encrypting functions of 64 bits is
something like (2^64)!, and there are only 2^56 DES encryption
functions and multiple DES is half the set of all encryptions, I would
expect (naively) that double encryption would essentially be as strong
as a key with 2*56=112 bits, unless DES is almost a group ( ie most
double encryptions yield the same encryption as some single DES). Why is
this argument wrong, or is DES almost a group in the above sense?
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Public Key Patents
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
	<PHR.92Nov17033415@napa.telebit.com>
	<PCL.92Nov18102622@black.oxford.ac.uk>
Date: 18 Nov 92 04:01:04

    Oh, I don't know about that.  The European public got rather a lot,
    and don't even have to pay royalties.  Come to that, PKP don't even
    have a monopoly.  A limited monopoly, limited to within the US, yes.

    "The public" != "The population of the US".

Excellent point.  I meant "the public" to mean the abstract public
who in the justification of patents temporarily give up their right
to use the invention freely, in exchange for getting to see the
details of the invention.  For RSA, this just means people in the US.
From: palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Date: 20 Nov 92 16:29:51 GMT
Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA  USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: icat.larc.nasa.gov

castor@drizzle.Stanford.EDU (Castor Fu) writes:

>With all the talk about "suspected" child molesters, etc. I thought I
>would bring up one point. How do people feel about restricting cryptographic
>privileges of people once they have been convicted of a particular
>set of crimes?

>It seems to me that  once a person has violated certain rules, e.g.
>child molestation, insider trading, etc.  one might restrict their
>access to tools which are particularly useful towards those ends,
>e.g. guns, crypto etc.

Hmmm, an interesting point.  But how do you restrict access to tools that
they can construct themselves?  Sure, it is illegal for a convicted felon
to own (or fabricate) a firearm, but the only reason they don't all do it
is because it takes expensive milling machines and considerable talent.
But how do you prevent someone from coding up an RSA program?  Prevent them
from purchasing a computer?  A compiler?  Restrict their access to books
which have the algorithm?  I think the pervasiveness of the information
and tools necessary to create encryption programs will make your suggestion
impossible to implement.

Remember, if they're already convicted criminals, they probably won't
pay too much attention to such laws anyway, so you'd have to find some
way to physically prevent them from getting what they want.  Literally
impossible.  The corner drug/gun dealer will now carry floppy disks
with PGP 2.0 on it for those that can't get it legally (and can't program
it themselves).

-- 
Michael T. Palmer, M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681
Voice: 804-864-2044,   FAX: 804-864-7793,   Email: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov
PGP 2.0 Public Key now available -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.politics.usa.misc,alt.society.civil-liberty,talk.politics.misc
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Cryptography by private citizens (was Re: Demons and Ogres)
Followup-To: alt.politics.usa.misc,alt.society.civil-liberty,talk.politics.misc
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:21:31 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.103439.19143@cactus.org>, ritter@cactus (Terry Ritter) writes:
> I see no reason to think that corporations would not be granted
> easy-to-get licenses if they use particular types of equipment.
>
> In fact, a March 1987 article in Data Communications magazine
> described NSA's Commercial Comsec Endorsement Program (CEEP) and
> Project Overtake encryption equipment in two classes:  Types I
> and II.  Type I would be available only to government agencies and
> contractors, but a Type II "module" would be a replacement for DES
> equipment, and would be built into a computer or communications
> device and sold by a vendor.

> Business use and personal use are two different things.  I think
> it quite likely that the government would like to license the
> first, and minimize the second.  Consequently, arguments based on
> American business competitiveness may be totally irrelevant to the
> continued use of strong cryptography by individuals.

Is this really what U.S. citizens want?

If it is, you've gone very far from the ideas and principles of the
Constitution.  Doesn't China currently have a somewhat similar policy
towards it's citizens, ie. supporting capitalism/business but not
individual or political freedom?

If it is not, it makes me wonder where is the problem, ie. what causes
such a great gap between what citizens want and what the government
wants.

Somehow this development doesn't seem isolated.  Take for instance
psychoactive substances - it's illegal to use stuff like amphetamines
as a private citizen, but in the army, when you're part of the
governemnt organization, it's OK.

Followups directed out of sci.crypt.

//Jyrki
From: grayt@Software.Mitel.COM (Tom Gray)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: 19 Nov 92 18:20:51 GMT
Organization: Mitel. Kanata (Ontario). Canada.

In article <1992Nov17.082637.1780@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu> denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes:
>In article <BxKLDM.Mss@sneaky.lonestar.org>, gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt) writes:
>>>1.  Caller activates call.  All 3 parties generate a random x and
>>>exchange their values y = a^x mod p for some a and p.  All 3 parties
>>>generate the key k in the style of DH but with 3 exponents instead
>>>of 2.
>> 
>> You're proposing enough telephone-company equipment to be involved in
>> EVERY telephone call in progress at once.  This is VERY expensive.  If 
>
>I'm not so sure.  Switches are involved in every call right now.  
>Also, the majority of calls are unlikely to be encrypted and key 
>negotiation only takes  place at the beginning of a call.  But this
>is a good point.
>

I'm afraid that this proposal reflects a naive view of the future of the
communications network. How would such a proposal work with a virtual
private network. How would it work over a private line with compressed
traffic.

Switches may be involved in every call but even today they are not involved
in the setting up of every call. 

I could go on and on about this but I refer the reader to the manyarticles
on the coming broadband network. In such networks bandwidth is reserved and
protocols are negotiated end to end. The telco could not hope to be able
to decipher the control message passing thrugh the bradband pipes.

This is the concern that many have with the FDI digital telephony proposal.
It will force the telecom industry to abandon promising future developments
and in the case of this proposal standard industry technology which is
curreltly widely deployed.
-- 
i.sinature
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math,comp.theory
From: sethb@fid.morgan.com (Seth Breidbart)
Subject: Re: Cryptography and P=NP
Organization: my opinions only
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 17:27:19 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.193900.20199@rchland.ibm.com>
lwloen@vnet.ibm.com writes:
>In article <BxvEF3.Kqw.2@cs.cmu.edu> Jiri Sgall writes:
>
>>(partial quote of James Annan):
>
>>|> And remember, proving P=NP doesn't necessarily mean finding such an algorithm,
>>|> merely proving it exists.
>>|> 
>
>>Once you have the proof, you can easily run a kind of universal algorithm,
>>which will be guaranteed to be polynomial
>
>OK, I don't know beans about P and NP.  So, an elementary question:
>
>Do all programs of class P halt?  Your "universal algorithm" seems perilously
>close to the "halting" problem and I have never been able to eliminate it
>from far simpler cases than P or NP.  Or, is the halting issue kind of a
>separate point/issue (ie, the solution is "P" when it works)?

Each program in P runs in polynomial time, so it must halt.

Number all the polynomial-time machines (by adding a clock to each
Turing Machine); do this in such a way that machine k runs in time < n^k.
The "universal algorithm" consists of running machine i until it halts,
and checking to see if an answer is found.  If machine k solves the
problem, then this algorithm runs in time k n^k.  If P != NP, then
this universal machine might not halt.  (More likely, it will always
halt, but not within any polynomial time bound.)

Seth		sethb@fid.morgan.com
From: xepo@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Scott R Violet)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Encryption with a Fast Wavelt Transform (FWT)
Date: 22 Nov 1992 20:37:48 GMT
Organization: Computing Services Division, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
Distribution: usa
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.7.4
Originator: xepo@csd4.csd.uwm.edu


HI,
	For a project I am working on I will need to be doing some
sort of fast encryption skeem (sp?), and was wondering if anyone would
have some pointers on how I might use a FWT to accomplish this?  Is
there a nice way to do it based on some sort of key idea, or am I
approaching it from a completly wrong place.
Thanks,
-- 

		-Scott Violet (xepo@csd4.csd.uwm.edu)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jkapson@ad-29.Naitc.Com (John Kapson)
Subject: Re: PGP and real criminals
Followup-To: talk.politics.guns
Organization: AC Nielsen Co., Bannockburn IL
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 18:49:44 GMT

In article <palmer.722276991@news.larc.nasa.gov> palmer@icat.larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) writes:
[snip]
>Hmmm, an interesting point.  But how do you restrict access to tools that
>they can construct themselves?  Sure, it is illegal for a convicted felon
>to own (or fabricate) a firearm, but the only reason they don't all do it
>is because it takes expensive milling machines and considerable talent.

Actually, as evidenced in Afghanistan, it only takes hand tools and very
little talent.  Felons find it easier to buy them on the black market.
But this is more appropriate for t.p.g., so followups are directed there....

+-----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
|      John Kapson      |                                               |
| NRA               ILA |  "Fear a goverment that fears your guns."     |
| jkapson@nis.naitc.com |                                               |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQCNAisCo2UAAAED/i9nZNA3RtKL1a3SPShkRYQqkl1tQX2ky8ghJp3ljKkfQlN9
UyyWZaurtJhb9holVjk1w8gVF5UflMolf08qOdvPUz60oH+sDUPG0+WiClBDTDus
QgFnP4t2BB1mpLxzhi4E++0+3zH231ItA+0l9Cp5fr70rOX69EXJO1UF3PhDAAUR
tCNKb2huIEthcHNvbiA8amthcHNvbkBuaXMubmFpdGMuY29tPg==
=TNIh
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: mvm@caesun6.epg.harris.com (Matt Mahoney)
Subject: Encryption with MD5
Reply-To: mvm@epg.harris.com (Matt Mahoney)
Organization: Engineering Productivity Group, Harris Corp., Melbourne, FL
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:05:15 GMT

In an earlier article, I asked if encryption by XOR with a pseudo-random
sequence R generated with a secure one-way hash function like MD5:

  R[i+1] = MD5(R[i] XOR password)
  ciphertext = plaintext XOR R

was secure.  The reponse I got was that it was secure, although not
immune to forgery if part of the plaintext was known.  Also, appending
the password to R[i] instead of XOR might be prefereable.

I later discovered a weakness.  If two files encrypted with the same
password are XORed together, then the result is the XOR of the plaintext,
which can be easily broken.

One solution would be to use a salt which would be different for
each file, e.g.

  salt = MD5(time-of-day + filename + process id + ...)
  R[i+1] = MD5(R[i] + password + salt)
  ciphertext = salt + (plaintext XOR R)

where + means concatenation.  Does this weaken the encryption?

--------------------------------        _\/_
Matt Mahoney, mvm@epg.harris.com       |(TV)|  Drug of the Nation
#include <disclaimer.h>                |____|

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 18:36:18 GMT

Rob Stampfli (res@colnet.cmhnet.org) wrote:
.....
: Suppose the "annonymous informant", or the "expert" who doesn't know as much
: as he thinks he knows, gives the authorities an encrypted message using a key
: you have never seen before, but which, he alleges, originates from you.
: Suppose the tap of your ISDN line misses a few bytes at the start of your
: message.  Under these conditions there is little you can do, even if you
: desire to be cooperative.  However, your failure to produce the desired
: result would place you in considerable legal jeopardy under what is being
: proposed here.

Even better, when confronted with the intercepted ciphertext and
commanded to product the plaintext, Alice says "OK, but where's the
rest of it?"

Her interrogators say "Huh?" She then explains that she split her
message up into pieces and they must've missed some of them. Sorry,
but there's nothing she can do about it.

Can the authorities demand she reconstruct, from memory, the original
message? Probably not, from my reading of the Constitution, from
precedents about the 5th Amendment, and from the many messages on this
topic.

This just illustrates another impracticality of key registration,
especially when crypto methods are mixed in with compression, packet
systems, dynamic generation of keys, etc.

I suspect the inevitable consequence of a key registration system
would be severe restrictions on networks (all would be run by
authorities), demands that messages be checksummed and signed be
government authorities, and even that plaintext be archived and
produced late under court order.



--Tim May
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version.
From: hal@cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Copper Balloon
Date: 18 Nov 1992 06:25:34 GMT
Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
NNTP-Posting-Host: alumni.caltech.edu

Could someone explain how three people (e.g. two plus the phone company)
generate a session key "in the style of DH"?  I don't see how Diffie-
Hellman generalizes naturally to three participants.  Thanks.

Hal
From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Beale Cipher FAQ?
Date: 20 Nov 92 03:00:16 GMT
Organization: Banzai Institute

In article <1eg7a1INNjmg@gap.caltech.edu> palmer@cco.caltech.edu (David M. Palmer) writes:
>What is the status of the Beale ciphers and attempts to crack it?
>Have NSA people dropped a few Cray-years on it with the Library of
>Congress as the source of potential keys? 

Here's the article I wrote for the sci.crypt FAQ that was forming a year
ago.  A summary of my Cryptologia paper (referenced below) can be found
in Dorothy Denning's "Cryptography and Data Security".  Naturally I think
that's the most important Beale reference. :-)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FAQ: What are the Beale Ciphers, and are they a hoax?

The story in a pamphlet by J. B. Ward (1885) goes: Thomas Jefferson
Beale and a party of adventurers accumulated a huge mass of treasure and
buried it in Bedford County, Virginia, leaving three ciphers with an
innkeeper; the ciphers describe the location, contents, and intended
beneficiaries of the treasure.  Ward gives a decryption of the second
cipher (contents) called B2; it was encrypted as a book cipher using the
initial letters of the Declaration of Independence (DOI) as key.  B1 and
B3 are unsolved; many documents have been tried as the key to B1.

Afficionados can join a group that attempts to solve B1 by various means
with an eye toward splitting the treasure:

	The Beale Cypher Association
	P.O. Box 236
	Warrington, PA 18976

You can get the ciphers from the rec.puzzles FAQL by including the line
	send index
in a message to netlib@peregrine.com and following the directions.

Some believe the story is a hoax.  Kruh (Cryptologia 12,4 Oct 88) gives
a long list of problems with the story.  Gillogly (Cryptologia 4,2 Apr 80)
decrypted B1 with the DOI and found some unexpected strings, including
ABFDEFGHIIJKLMMNOHPP.  Hammer (president of the Beale Cypher Association)
agrees that this string couldn't appear by chance, but feels there must be
an explanation; Gwyn (sci.crypt expert) is unimpressed with this string.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	U.S. National Debt: $4,139,581,836,252
	Your Share: $16,183