From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Nicaraguan Elections: FINAL REPORT (9/9)
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: PACH
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 08:15:34 GMT

/** reg.nicaragua: 124.9 **/
** Written 10:24 am  Sep  5, 1992 by nyonline in cdp:reg.nicaragua **
IMA Final Elections Report
ni:instmediacarnet.nicanew10:25 pm  Mar 18, 1990

INSTITUTE FOR MEDIA ANALYSIS
FINAL REPORT
US INTERVENTION IN THE NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS OF 1990   

Copyright, 1990. Institute for Media Analysis. 
New York and Managua.

  The results of the February 25 elections in Nicaragua
represent a stunning victory for proponents of `Low
Intensity Conflict'. The loss of this battle, however,
does not spell the end of the war for control of the
destiny of the Nicaraguan and Central American people,
and it is incumbent on US opponents of US interventionism
to emerge from post-election depression and prepare
themselves  for action during the dangerous phases of
subversion and continued LIC which face the people of
the region.   
  This report will be divided in two parts. First we
will provide a post-mortem on our own coverage and
analysis of the election, which took the form of 18
telecommunications-based field note reports and a series
of five publications produced in Managua during the
campaign. Next, we will try to outline some of the
factors contributing to the FSLN loss, and finally,
provide some signposts for interpreting events down the
road in Nicaragua.

HOW THE INTERVENTION NETWORK STRATEGY DID `FAIL'

  The Institute for Media Analysis pre-election final
report, "The Failure of the U.S. Intervention in the
Nicaraguan Elections," was published in Managua, in both
Spanish and English, on February 23. Two days later the
U.S.-supported coalition, the United Nicaraguan
Opposition (UNO), defeated the incumbent Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN or Sandinistas)
by a 14 point margin.
  
  The title gives the impression that the Report
predicated the defeat of UNO and a Sandinista victory. 
Certainly, the authors--David MacMichael and Edgard
Chamorro, were not alone in their personal belief that
the FSLN would win.  IMA would be less than candid if it
did not admit that readers of the report might well draw
that conclusion.

  However, in fact, the report did not go that far.  It
concentrated on four election issues--the contras,
public opinion polls, the use of international observers,
and U.S. financing--and how the U.S., Nicaraguan and
international press reflected the attempt, as IMA
postulated, of the Bush administration to use these
issues to advance its policy objetives in Nicaragua. 
The main U.S. policy objective was not actually to
produce an UNO victory but, through manipulation of U.S.
and world public opinion, to deligitimate in advance a
Sandinista government resulting from the elections.

  The report concluded that on these four issues,
overall, the U.S. failed in its attempt to create a
public opinion concensus that the Sandinistas had been
forced by U.S. policy and pressures to accept elections
which they were certain to lose unless they resorted to
massive  fraud. 

  The contras were presented as struggling for the goal
of democracy through through free elections with the
support of most Nicaraguans.  Keeping the "freedom
fighters" in place and supplied was presented as a
necessary guarantee against Sandinistas fraud or
cancellation of the elections.  Indeed, IMA saw
cancellation of the elections as a secondary, or even
primary, objetive of the Bush administration in order to
justify a continued policy of aggression against an
"illegitimate" Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
  
  Public opinion polls, controlled or influenced by the
U.S., were to be used to convince international public
opinion that the Sandinistas were unpopular and that UNO
had majority support.  International observers (United
Nations, Organization of American States and others)
were, in IMA's analysis projected ambiguously. 
Initially, the use of international observers was
welcomed by the administration, not to guarantee free
elections but to report inevitable Sandinista violations. 


  Later, there was an attempt to depreciate the UN and
OAS observation effort when it appeared it might, in
fact, legitimate the process.  Finally, IMA examined the
issue of open U.S. financial support for UNO through
public funds supplied by the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED).  This intervention was defended by the
administration as necessary to overcome or reduce the
unfair advantages possessed by the Sandinistas which,
likewise, made fair elections that would legitimate a
Sandinista continuation in power impossible.  The common
theme, the ill-concealed, if not open, objective of the
Bush administration, was to discredit in advance any
Sandinista electoral victory in order to justify a
continued policy of hostility.  Only secondarily, in
IMA'sview, were US efforts to influence the media
intended to produce an electoral result in Nicaragua. 
IMA's analysis concluded that, over the range of issues
examined, the Bush administration had failed to
invalidate the electoral process in the media.

  This delegitimization was necessary  for the U.S. to
keep alive the option of pursuing an aggressive, hostile
policy against any re-elected Sandinista government. 
Indeed, reporting from the US, as reflected in media in
Nicaragua in the days immediately preceding the election,
confirmed the correctness of the IMA conclusion.  The
Bush administration, in declarations by Secretary of
State James Baker, echoed in the editorial column of the
New York Times and the other U.S. official media,
accepted that the electoral process was essentially
legitimate and that the Sandinistas were likely to win
honestly and fairly, albeit with maximum use of the
advantages of incumbency.  U.S. policy thereafter, these
sources declared, would be based not on the electoral
legitimacy of a Sandinista government but on the conduct
of that government, especially in its foreign policy. 
Since such statements certainly gave no comfort to UNO,
it can be deduced that the Bush administration was just
as surprised by the UNO victory as were the vast majority
of analysts, journalists and pollsters covering the
Nicaraguan elections.
  
  To repeat, in this sense the Bush administration media
manipulation effort failed.  The question, is whether
and if so, how, these efforts influenced voter behavior
in  Nicaragua.  IMA does, in the following section
speculate on this and concluded, on the issues examined,
that the administration effort produced effects which
hurt the FSLN electorally.

  IMA's conclusion that association with the contra hurt
UNO, and especially in the areas into which the contras
had reinfiltrated to carry out armed propaganda for UNO
during the campaign, is contradicted by election results
in which UNO's victory margin was greatest in the main
areas of contra operations, Regions V and VI.  IMA's
analysis was influenced by its own field research which
relied heavily on our own sources and on interviews.

  Its conclusions were identical with those of the
Hemisphere Initiatives public opinion poll done by
Greenberg-Lake Associates, which was conducted at
approximately the same time.  This poll, relying on
direct interviews with a supposedly representative
population in areas where the contras were most active 
even found that the FSLN enjoyed its greatest support in
those regions. This, of course, was not reflected in
voter behavior. 
  On the matter of U.S. funding, IMA's analysis of the
Nicaraguan media allowed it to conclude that UNO, by
accepting the foreign funds, had offended presumed
nationalistic and anti-yanqui sentiment in a majority of
the population.  Additionally, the analysis suggested
that squabbling over the division of the spoils had
caused dissension in the UNO leadership while arousing
discontent and suspicions of corruption among the rank
and file.  In this, IMA agreed with the academic
assessment of Professor George Vickers of the City
University of New York  Graduate school that, "The
funding process has produced a series of negative
results."  Again, the presumed negative effects were not
visible after the votes were counted.

  With regard to public opinion polls, IMA concluded,
basically, that both sides, but especially UNO, had lost
credibility by publicizing questionable poll results
that showed them in the most favorable light.  However,
IMA did find that the polls that showed the FSLN leading
were, by judgment of the published opinions of polling
professionals, more accurately representing public
opinion than those that showed an UNO lead.  The
Washington Post-ABC/TV poll, reported in Managua on the
eve of the elections, reinforced that opinion, giving
the FSLN an approximate 12 point margin.
  
  How then, do we account for a 14 point UNO victory, an
approximate 25 point swing?   Much of the explanation
for such voter behavior rests in an analysis of the
historical development of the population's attitudes
towards sharing information. In many cases, we can
reasonably assume, people felt some reluctance to reveal
an opposition sentiment to a stranger that might, in
some way, be capable of doing harm to them. Given that
official repression towards dissidence was one of the
hallmarks of the Somoza dictatorship (without even
beginning the discussion of Spanish treatment of the
indigenous populaton) , the behaviors etched in the
popular conciousness are quite understandable. Given
that the UNO pollsters started their interviews with the
opening line of "Hi, we're from UNO, could we ask you a
few questions?" the greater receptivity to revealing true
voting intentions lead to more accurate predictions.
Progressive social science methodologists, take note.

  To recapitulate, IMA emphasizes the paradox that  the
Bush administration effort to influence public opinion
against the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan elections
failed, in the end its favored candidate won in an
electoral process it had tried to discredit.  Probably,
this success, coming on the heels of the Panama
invastion---also considered a success--will serve to
justify in the future the combination of military and
political interventions carried out in the name of
democracy that are emerging as a hallmark of the Bush
administration.

THE ELECTION RESULTS: AN INTERPRETATION

  The day after the elections, IMA scanned the streets
of Managua trying to gauge the emotions of the people
who had just decided not to re-elect the revolutionary
heroes of a decade earlier. The mood in Managua was one
of enormous grief, often compared here with the feeling
at a wake following an unexpected death. Not a few people
when asked how they voted answered "I voted for UNO, but
I wish that I hadn't, I never expected that UNO would
win. I just wanted to send the FSLN a message that I was
not in agreement with the way things are." or simply,
"What have we done?"
  There was no big joyous UNO victory celebration, no
sign that the people were happy with the outcome, only
remorse and fear.
  Clearly, a substantial percentage of the people who
voted for the UNO were, in fact, either voting against
the FSLN, or were voting to punish the FSLN in what they
considered to be a `symbolic' protest vote. Just as
clearly, a large percentage of voters voted for the
promise of change, perhaps the only coherant message
that came out of the UNO campaign. 
  At this point, several weeks after the election and in
spite of the relatively smooth nature of the trsansition
talks, the banking system is collapsing as the population
makes a run on the banks, a symptom, perhaps, of a lack
of confidence in the future administration. 

1. How Economic the Economic Subversion of Nicaragua
Helped Produce this Electoral Coup.

   As was intended from the beginning by the Intervention
Network architects,  the progressive and accumulative
effects of eight years of war and economic aggression
created immense difficulties to the average Nicaraguan
family. Not surprisingly, the persons affected most
directly by these circumstances were gradually convinced
of the need to change governments as a means of bettering
personal economic conditions. Cursory analysis of the
election results reveals much more support for FSLN
candidates in areas in which the agrarian reform
succeeded in allotting land to the peasantry than in
those areas relatively unaffected by agrarian reform.
But even in some of those areas, the constant and
increasingly uncushioned deterioration of the standard
of living among the poorest sectors could not be
overcome.

  The economic situation worsened considerably in the
past two years following the implementation of a series
of reforms aimed at monetary stabilization. Policies had
to be followed which would never have been implemented
in circumstances others than those brought about by the
long economic and military war waged against Nicaragua.

  The curtailing of many subsidies along with government
cutbacks in all areas except defense reduced the ability
of the Sandinistas to convince the population that the
`social wage' package of government provided benefits
compensated for the decline in income which plagued
workers and peasants throughout the 1980's. 

  The Sandinistas and their admirers alike (the IMA team
being no exception), nonetheless, tended to downplay the
political impact of such measures, publically at least,
and stoically reconciled themselves to the imposition of
a package referred to internally as `surgery without
anesthesia.' The implicit assumption was that the
Nicaraguan people could be asked to continue indefinitely
lives of austerity, hardship and war. A notable exception
to this unofficial policy of uncritical thinking was
provided by the ENVIO team in several issues over the
past two years, particularly the issue entitled `Package
without People.'

   Symptoms of suffering at the popular level grew more
obvious once the hyperinflation control package was
introduced in 1987.  It produced a severe economic
depression and mild success in lowering inflation in
1989 to only 3000% from the world record levels of 1988.

  A few numbers illustrate just how bad things got  and
partially explain why the FSLN lost, at least
temporarily, a large part of its popular base of support.

  Nicaraguans' real per capita income dropped 60% in the
decade, making the country's citizens the poorest in
Central America. For the decade between 1977 and 1986,
agricultural output fell by an average of 1.6% per year
while the population grew by 3.2% yearly. That is,
Nicaraguan farm output declined by 16% even as the
population grew by nearly one-third. At the same time,
exogenous factors forced a major decline in the overall
terms of trade. Over the past 12 years, the prices
Nicaragua received for the products it exports fell by
11% at the same time that it had to pay 59% more for its
imports. 

  Hyperinflation itself was largely a result of the
deepening fiscal crisis of the state. The massive
deficits accumulated in the earlier years of the
revolution, in which public spending reached an
astounding 60% of the GNP in 1984, are attributable to
both the war costs, and to unrealistic projections made
by the new government in terms of its ability to actually
provide the ambitious (and costly) solutions to the
structural social and economic problems it inherited. 

  As the economy careened out of control in the past
several years, the government desperately tried to regain
some degree of power over the situation through
monetarist measures mentioned above. 

  The private sector, which had long since abandoned
serious investment refused to fully join in government
efforts to reactivate the economy, even under an
obviously market oriented matrix which was ushered in
with policies even the IMF would consider too costly
from a social stability standpoint. Total investment
over the ten years fell by 75% and many of the larger
state investments, made in the early revolutionary years
when large amounts of foreign assistance flowed in, were
poorly chosen.

  Many of the initial gains in health, nutrition and
mortality indices were being lost as government services
and programs were cut. Meanwhile foreign aid declined as
the Western European countries embraced both neo-
liberalism and Eastern Europe or succumbed to US
pressures aimed at isolating Nicaragua. The break-up of
the COMECON support network and the inability of the
USSR to provide more aid completed a very bleak panorama
for the future.

2. THE WAR AND THE DRAFT

  Another factor which worked against the Sandinista
chances was the growing weariness provoked by a war which
seemed unendable if the Sandinistas stayed in power.  As
is frequently true in protracted warfare, as the end drew
closer it became harder to convince young men that it
was necessary for them to risk their lives on a  cause
the government itself declared as `won'. The same popular
yearning for `normalcy' that was associated with the
economy was present with the war. In rural areas families
have been seperated for years, with combatants fighting
on both sides in many cases. It is estimated that over
one-third of the families in the country have suffered
the death or maiming of a direct family member over the
course of this eight year war.
  
  Nonetheless, the war never completely ended. In fact,
it was one of the principal instruments used by  the
Intervention Network to both try to  mobilize anti-
Sandinista support and to delegitimate  the elections
internationally by making it appear as if it was the
Sandinistas who were responsable for the war. Several
dozen casualties and kidnappings per week were reported
throughout the campaign. A big offensive launched in
September and October with some 3000 contra troops
succeeded in forcing the FSLN into suspending the
unilateral cease-fire. The fallout from this action,
combined with Sandinista reluctance to halt the draft,
had a far more negative effect than was considered by
FSLN campaign coordinators. 

  At the massive campaign rally held in Managua just
before the election, there were many rumors among those
present to the effect that Daniel Ortega was going to
announce the end of the draft. When the measures
announced fell far short of that, there was a noticable
measure of disappointment. While it would be hard to say
how many votes were lost by this decision, it was
undoubtedly one more factor contributing to the defeat.


3. A QUESTIONABLE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY:
      Did the FSLN lose touch with its base?
  
  The worsening economy both contributed to the ability
of the contras to continue to recruit in the most
depressed sectors of the rural countryside and became a
major issue in the campaign. Surprising to many was the
fact that UNO did not highlight the economy more in its
campaign, and instead tended to focus on supposed
sandinista repression, corruption, the legitimacy of the
elections themselves and the war. One explanation is
that, in essence, many of those issues were economic in
that they did focus peoples' discontent on a party which
seemed to ask more sacrifice from the popular sectors
than from its own party members. UNO succeeded in
cultivating the growing sense that party members were
receiving too many perks (cars, housing, government food
packages, and dollar bonuses at Christmas) to which
ordinary poor people had little or no access. 

  Many of the priveleges and income enhancements were
institutionalized at about the same time that the
austerity measures began to produce negative results
within Nicaragua's poorer social sectors. Highly visible
symbols, like the ever-expanding `diplo' dollar store
conglomerate, extravagent rock and teenage crooner
concerts, and highly sexist beauty contests, maddened
those most directly affected by the economic downturn as
well as those concerned with fundamental social change. 

  The election revealed that there was an important
`punishment' component to the voting last month. People
who had long supported the FSLN, in large part in
admiration for the huge personal sacrifices made by many
Sandinistas in the struggle against the dictatorship,
now felt angry at a party that had embarked upon a policy
course of increasing economic differentiation and seemed
to be distancing itself from the hardships experienced
in the everyday lives of the poor. 

  One criticism which was heard in conversations with
Sandinista supporters was the tone and content of the
campaign itself. The choice of the `Daniel is my gallo
(rooster)' theme was considered sexist and coarse by
many women. The rock concert style at the urban rallies
seemed garish and aimed at middle class voters far more
than towards the poor who constitute the overwhelming
majority of voters in Nicaragua. TV commercials depicting
scantily clad FSLN disco queens may have attracted some
urban youth vote but were probably not well received
among the more conservative rural population. 

  The highly `upbeat' tone of the campaign (e.g. the
campaign slogan of "We won, lets move forward")
contrasted considerably with the grinding deterioration
in everyday life experienced at popular levels. The
economic war mounted by the Intervention Network indeed
affected the ability of the people to believe that the
US would ever allow the Nicaraguan economy to prosper
under the Sandinistas. Carefully timed statements several
weeks before the election intimated that the Sandinistas
would have to jump through unspecified further hoops in
order for the embargo to be lifted and for other economic
aggressions to be halted. 

  The campaign to equate UNO with the national guard
under Somoza seemed inconsonant with the fact that
Violeta de Chamorro, whose husband was murdered by
Somoza's thugs in 1978, was the UNO candidate. In fact,
the hugely exaggerated claims and accusations that
earmarked all of the print media efforts,  were
profoundly disturbing to many and created an air of
anxiety doubt as to the ability of the nation to hold
elections at all.


4. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
  
EXPECTATIONS AND AID

  One irony of the electoral process is that the
Sandinistas lost power just as it seemed that some of
the very difficult measures that had been undertaken
over the past several years were ready to bear fruit.
Privately, several economists associated with the UNO
have indicated to IMA that the dirty work involved in
economic restructuring had already been done.
Furthermore, the US was making tentative plans to lighten
the economic pressure on Nicaragua and the IMF had sent
a team here to start putting together a package designed
for the `special case' of Nicaragua. A package with
several oil-producing nations had been approved for
large amounts of development aid, pending an FSLN
victory, and the streamlined state sector and bureaucracy
had overcome some of the problems plaguing the government
in the past. 

  Equally ironic is that the business climate in
Nicaragua has not necessarily improved with the UNO
victory. Discussions with the private sector were well
underway concerning reactivation of the economy and the
private sector role in the recovery process. Such talks
were a tacit admission that there existed sufficient
stability for coherant economic planning and investment
to take place. Now, however, the uncertainties associated
with the governability of a UNO-led Nicaragua may
actually slow private investor activity. At the same
time, some of the impressive subsidies received by the
revolutionary government will be cut back or eliminated
altogether. For example, the oil subsidy, equivalent to
60% of the total value of Nicaraguan exports last year,
may be among the first to go. The Cuban subsidies and
bi-lateral development aid package have been mostly
eliminated.

  While many hope that very large aid packages are
forthcoming  from the US and Japan, there is little in
the way of support for this expectation in the recent
experience of other `transition' societies such as the
Philipines. At best, most observers feel that after an
initial period (one or two years) of large, but still
insufficient amounts of assistance, Nicaragua will lose
priority status and receive little or only moderate
amounts of US aid. This would leave Nicaragua with
almost no hope for real recovery from the destruction of
the past ten years. The most probable scenario under UNO
stewardship is one of slow growth little different, in
global terms, than the scenario which would be unfolding
had the Sandinistas won. The straight-jacket which bound
the FSLN into a model far different than they would have
liked is now pressuring the UNO planners who are
obviously sobered by the implications, both economic and
political, of having to assume responsability over a
crippled, structurally deformed economy

CLASS and COUNTER-INSURGENCY

  Another worry of UNO planners must be how to deal with
a support base which voted for the `change' ticket in
the expectation that `change' meant something better for
them in the short and medium terms. The IMF strategies
being designed for Nicaragua will provide dubious
benefits to the poor majority of UNO voters. The
elimination or curtailing of subsidies for basic food
and other marketbasket items, the `privatization' of
transportation and the elimination of jobs in the biggest
single employment sector-the government- will hardly be
popular moves. While inflation will probably be reduced
(though to what degree remains unclear), there are few
guarantees that large investment projects, capable of
absorbing the new unemployed and boosting demand, are
forthcoming. 

  In the medium term and in accordance with standard IMF
policy, UNO will doubtlessly try to introduce legislation
`freeing' cooperative land and enabling peasants to use
their land as collateral for credit. This, in turn, will
probably lead to a re-concentration of landholding on
the prime agricultural and cattle-raining lands. Credit
will be denied to people on more marginal holdings due
to the risky nature of such ventures.

  Labor unions may find that their legal maneuvoring
room to utilize mechanisms such as strikes will be
restricted. On the other hand, the Nicaraguan working
and peasant classs are the most politicized and organized
in the hemisphere, with two generations of militant
history. Over the past decade there developed a growing
sense that the destiny of Nicaragua was in the hands of
these sectors. For years, this disciplined amalgamation
accepted sacrifices unimaginable in virtually any other
country in the world. While a sizable part of these
sectors voted for the UNO, there is every reason to
expect that considerable resistance to right-wing reforms
will erupt among the very people that voted for the
opposition. On the other hand, in a period in which the
FSLN is cooperating to help in the transition and
reconstruction phases, the ability of the party to
contain its membership will be severely tested.

THE INTERVENTION NETWORK: WHAT NEXT?

  Independently of whether or not the workers and
peasants revolt, either now or later, one of the first
areas to which the Intervention Network will try to gain
access is the police and armed forces. In most poor
countries government austerity measures have meant
social unrest and even riots. In a UNO-lead Nicaragua
such unrest is virtually guaranteed. Without a faithful
police force capable and willing to control worker
demonstrations and social protest, such measures could
be unworkable in the Nicaragua context. This is an
unacceptable result from the IMF and US viewpoint.

  Already the Bush Administration  has sent out a series
of trial balloons to the effect that the Sandinista
Popular Army `must' disarm in order for aid to the
contras to be halted, even though the UNO itself has
made numerous statements to the effect that it does not
agree with this position. Undoubtedly cognizant of the
very tenuous governability of the country  should the
Nicaraguan military not cooperate in the transition
process, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the Cardinal
for Central America, Miguel Obando y Bravo, are scheduled
to go to Honduras this week to demand the disarmament of
the contras. Once the contras are disarmed, arguements
that the size of the army can be reduced substantially
are possible. Violeta even speaks of the de-
militarization of Central America and a Costa Rica style
force. 

  Former Contra Director Alfredo Cesar (who has been on
CIA payroll in the past according to many reports) talks
of dramatically reducing the size of the Interior
Ministry and the State Security apparatus. Some rumors
around Managua place him as a likely Minister of either
Interior or Defense. Should this be the case, the CIA
will have little trouble gaining access to the `re-
structuring' efforts. Within a few months AID monies for
the `professionalization' and `de-politicization' of the
armed forces and the police will be flowing in at an
extraordinary rate. 

  Once again, however, the enormous strides made by the
FSLN over the past ten years at building political
conciousness within both base level as well as
hierarchical structures serves to mitigate the coming
efforts to force the Nicaraguan security forces to adopt
the Central American status quo. US efforts to `reform'
the Nicaraguan military will find great resistance and
will be carefully monitored from with the security
apparatus itself.

  Many of the structural and historical conditions which
brought about the revolution still exist, albeit in
reduced and altered forms. In fact, after a decade in
which the US based Intervention Network has tried to
destroy the revolution, the means the new government
choses to use to resolve those same conditions will
themselves prove to be major factors in deciding the
future of Nicaragua. 
  The principal victory of the first ten year period of
the Nicaraguan revolution may well be the development of
a popular sense that the government exists for the
people. Though paradoxically the growth of that level of
conciousness may well have contributed to the FSLN
defeat, it may also be the best guarantee that Nicaragua
can never fully be forced to return to the position of
subservience and domination assumed by its Central
American neighbors. 

  Opponents of US policy in the region need to be aware
of the essential role they must play in Nicaragua and
the rest of Central America in opposing US involvement
in the internal affairs of these countries. All military
and para-military aid as well as USAID police training
programs have to be fought, human rights abuses must be
exposed and the many activities that have been developed
over these difficult years which have contributed to
peace and anti-intervention efforts must be continued. 
Most importantly, Nicaragua and the region should stay 
in the public eye. Efforts on the part of the CIA and
the Intervention Network, motivated by a brutal ideology
and designed to destroy the FSLN and popular forces in 
Nicaragua have to be monitored, exposed and opposed by
the civilized people of the world.

  At the same time it is important, however, to heed 
leaders such as President Ortega who has supported, up
to this point, all of the efforts of the incoming
administration aimed at garnering reconstruction aid for
this country. In fact, the amounts being mentioned will
barely begin to scratch the surface of the requirements
for undoing the destruction wreaked on  this nation's
economy, and her people over the past years by the US
government. 

  In the best case scenario, Nicaragua, and maybe the
region as a whole, can enter a new period in which the
structural problems encountered in these marginalized
countries can be dealt with in a more peaceful  and
negotiated manner. The experience of international
monitoring of the Niaraguan elections by both the OAS
and UN teams can and should serve as a means of resolving
the situations in El Salvador and Guatemala. The model
democratic procedures followed here likewise could serve
in other situations to resolve conflict and empower the
populace of the region. This, in turn, could help focus
attention at last on the viabilty of regional and
international solutions to the pressing economic and
social problems facing the vast majority of the world
population as we swerve into the twenty-first century

ENDS FILE

Networked by New York On-Line
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