From: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com (Richard Wojcik,snake)
Newsgroups: sci.lang
Subject: Re: Cognitive Phonology (was Cognitive Linguistics...)
Date: 28 Sep 92 20:25:40 GMT
Reply-To: rwojcik@atc.boeing.com
Organization: Research & Technology

In article 5572@news.Hawaii.Edu, lee@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:
>I don't see that chaining (feeding) is involved.  Say, for example, that
>bleaching of non-high palatal vowels is unsuppressed in Yawelmani.  The
>consequence ought to be that /e:/ is not a phoneme, independent of
>whether lowering is suppressed and independent of whether lowering
>can feed palatal-bleaching.  At least, that's my understanding.

Logically, I can't see how the Process system can "define" phonemes.  David's
theory has always maintained that beginning language learners--infants--have
essentially adult phonemic systems.  This view contrasts sharply with, say,
Jakobson's, where the phonemic system becomes more elaborate over time.  What
Stampe means (and he can step in to correct me at any time if I'm putting the
wrong spin on it) is that learners suppress processes in order to be able to
pronounce phonemes properly.  /e:/ becomes a phoneme for Yawelmani speakers,
because they can't produce [e:] in those positions when they intend [i:] or
some other vowel.  Consequently, they tailor their Processes to accomodate the
vowel /e:/.  Having mastered this and other pronunciations, they then possess 
a Process system that serves as a "phoneme detector."  The adult can rely on
the Process system as a heuristic for phonemes.  Given some phonetic target in
a foreign language or dialect, the behavior of fortitions tells them whether or
not it is phonemic.  (And chains of Processes are relevant because the "foreign"
target may be more than a single Process removed from any native target.)

>}...  I was talking about Rationalist generative theory,
>}and you want Empiricist generative theory to be king of the mountain.
>
>Not exactly.  I want the good guys and the bad guys both to be able
>to do generative grammar, because the theory itself requires no
>philosophical commitment.

That's a very charitable attitude that you have for the bad guys, but I just
disagree with you about philosophical commitments.  You can get so broad and
general about a theory that it includes everybody's work.  That might make for
more cordial relationships among linguists, but it really doesn't make for
interesting claims about the nature of language.

>Did you not earlier characterize NP as a theory about actual pronunciations
>rather then intuitions about pronunciations?  Does this not imply that
>I may not use intuitions as evidence in NP?  I am saying that there is
>nothing in the theory that should prevent me from using intuitions, and
>I'm not going to let you stop me from doing it.  You don't need to if
>you don't want to.

I've tried to answer this earlier, but it is important.  No.  I deny that 
Natural Phonology is just a theory about actual pronunciations.  Both pro-
nunciations, and intuitions about them, constitute data for the theory.  What
I have been claiming is that the relationship between intuitions, pronunciations,
and theory is fairly clear in the framework of Natural Phonology.  You know how
Processes affect intuitions, and you know how they affect pronunciation.  I can
construct a scenario for how generative grammars affect intuitions, but very
few people seem comfortable with it.  I'd like to be able to deny that Natural
Phonology is compatible with Generative Theory, but I've begun to detect an
overwhelming spirit of ecumenism in the linguistic community.  There is more 
than one path that leads to nirvana.  ;-)

>}:-)  Seriously, though, I've claimed that generative theory started out by
>}defining the data as a pattern of well-formedness judgments.
>
>If you will permit an analogy, this is like concluding that astronomy
>is a theory of photographs, because astronomers get all their data from
>them.  How you can get relevant data is just an accident of circumstances
>and a methodological issue, not a theoretical one.

I don't particularly agree with the analogy, but let's go with it.  This is 
similar to David Pesetsky's criticism.  You are saying that I am confusing
what the theory explains with the data.  I understand that.  But how do 
astronomers know that their photographs have anything to do with astronomy?
Somehow, I think that astronomers would find it easier to justify the use of
photographs than generative linguists would the use of intuitions.

>}...  After all, I've
>}asked for anyone to explain to me just what the relationship is between
>}intuitions and the grammar.  Nobody has tried. ...
>
>That's because there isn't any theoretically defined relationship!  (In
>the case of generative grammar.)

Let's try this.  Pretend that you are an astronomer trying to explain why 
your photographs have a bearing on your work.  Then construct a similar 
explanation for why patterns of grammaticality judgments have a bearing on
linguistic theory.

-----
Disclaimer:  Opinions expressed above are not those of my employer.

    Rick Wojcik   (rwojcik@atc.boeing.com)   Seattle, WA
Newsgroups: sci.lang