HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
Subject: Re: Coffe cups in the cockpit (Re: A320 yarns)
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 1992 06:19:25 GMT

In article <5822.2a7043b2@hayes.com> bcoleman@hayes.com (Bill Coleman) writes:

>Ah, but the implication here is that the pilot is doing the "right" thing,
>so it is OK for him to override the computer inputs. Consider what would
>happen in the same situation when the computer is doing the "right" thing
>and attempting to cover up for a pilot's mistake.

Grrrrrrrrrrrr... < Belker growl >

THE FAA SAYETH:

FAR 91.3  RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND

(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is
the final AUTHORITY as to, the operation of that aircraft.

Revoke that, then we talk.


>This type of "ghost-like" behavior could actually perpetuate a sequence 
>of mistakes from the pilot, and may be exactly what the designers were
>trying to avoid.

Moving throttles have worked very well up through now; I can't think of
a single accident that may have been caused by their use.  With the A320,
I can think of *two* that might have been prevented with such a gross
*mechanical* cue.

You do have a point, though--fighting throttles, in a mandatory protection
mode (in this case, alpha floor) is not good.  Thus, alpha floor should be 
eliminated.  Not the pilot.






---
Robert Dorsett
rdd@cactus.org
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett)
Subject: Re: Personal Flight Simulators
Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1992 09:37:22 GMT

In article <l7f03rINNpou@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM> jdr@starflight.Corp.Sun.COM writes:
>Have any of you tried the FS-100 personal flight simulator from MDM Systems
>Inc of Charlotte, NC, yet? If so I would like to get your opinions of how
>well it serves for instrument training and proficiency. Also your opinions
>of the relative merits of other personal flight simulators and accessories
>therefor, such as the Flightmaster simulator control yoke and pedals from
>Flightmaster of Dallas, TX.

For the FlightMaster, see:

%A Frank C. Brasington
%T Control System for PC-Based Instrument Flight Training
%B PC-based instrument flight simulation--a first collection of papers,
presented at the winter annual meeting of the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Atlanta, Georgia, December 1-6, 1991
%P 39-45
%C New York
%E A. Robert Sadlowe
%I American Society of Mechanical Engineers
%D 1991
%O April 17, 1992

It's not a very good paper.  Mainly nuts & bolts-type stuff.  The product
also doesn't look very impressive.  It's nice to see "alternative" inter-
faces being developed, though.

Others in the collection are much better.  Lots of discussion of work at the 
University of Champaign-Illinois, some discussion of "certification" 
requirements, some BS from Azuresoft about Elite, etc.

Overall, I'm left with the impression that if we're going to be talking
"self-use" simulators, which can't be "accredited" for flight training,
"mimicky" simulators should be abandoned as non-productive (force is half 
of the game, and nobody's trying that), and that, perhaps, a custom *chair*, 
and a versatile, RS-232 interface, with an effective built-in sidestick and 
pedals, might be the best approach.  I'd spend a thousand bucks for something 
like that, if I had the dough, even without software.





---
Robert Dorsett
rdd@cactus.org
...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd
From: k9jma@cbnewsc.cb.att.com (edwin.m.schaefer)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Re: What's the "truth" about obviously-inapplicable AD's???
Date: 28 Jul 92 16:49:49 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: AT&T

In article <1992Jul28.031200.21166@xymox.palo-alto.ca.us> philf@xymox.palo-alto.ca.us (Phil Fernandez) writes:
.......stuff deleted
>Now, I don't believe for a second that all of these responses are
>equally "correct" and valid from the FAA's point-of-view.  
>
>DOES ANYONE HAVE ANYTHING AUTHORITATIVE TO SAY ABOUT THIS ISSUE?  By
>"authoritative", I mean backed up by a specific reg, or citation from
>an FAA publication, or direct contact with the FAA, or something?

The FAA doesn't have a single point of view. Enforcement actions are
begun by the local FAA person. Each will have its own interpretation of
"the rules" and does pretty much what it pleases. The most important
consideration is your "attitude" toward FAA Authority. If you are
properly abashed, admit guilt, and ask forgiveness they may not pursue
certificate action against you. However, if you quote them chapter and
verse of the rules or rely on published material in that way the FAA
will become very hostile. Therefore an "authoratative" statement not
only doesn't exist it wouldn't help you if you had one.
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: rls@uihepa.hep.uiuc.edu (Ray Swartz (Oh, that guy again))
Subject: Manufacturer being sued _for_no_reason_
Reply-To: rls@uihepa.hep.uiuc.edu
Organization: Vis-Orb Tragnetics Recorporation
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1992 16:14:21 GMT

	I just got this off of the wire.  Disgusting, as usual.

Ray Swartz


	CHICAGO (UPI) -- The estate of blues guitarist Stevie Ray Vaughan,
killed with four others when a helicopter crashed into a fog-shrouded
ski hill in southern Wisconsin, sued the pilot, the helcopter company
and the makers of the helicopter Wednesday.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
[...]
	The Cook County suit accuses the helicopter company -- Omniflight
Helicopters Inc. and the pilot of negligence -- and the makers of the
helicopter -- Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., General Motors Corp. and
Allied-Signal Inc. -- of making a defective craft.
[...]
	Vaughan had just completed a concert with Eric Clapton, Robert Cray,
Buddy Guy and older brother, Jimmie Vaughn, at Alpine Valley in southern
Wisconsin and boarded a helicopter early in the morning on Aug. 27,
1990, to go back to Midway Airport on Chicago's Southwest Side.
	The helicopter crashed slammed into a fog-shrouded ski hill near the
					      ^^^^^^^^^^^^
concert site and the wreckage was found nearly five hours later.
Vaughan; Clapton's agent, bodyguard and tour manager, and pilot Jeffrey
Brown were all killed.
	The other helicopters made it safely back to Midway.
	``The pilot should have never taken off,'' said attorney Thomas
Demetrio, who brought the suit on behalf of Vaughan's brother, Jimmie,
and their mother, Martha. ``All things point to pilot error but
			    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
nevertheless we have brought suit against the manufacturers.''
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
[...]
From: brianh@ism.isc.com (Brian Horn)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Re: Dogs in Planes
Date: 31 Jul 1992 18:31:54 GMT
Organization: SunSoft Inc., Los Angeles, Ca.
NNTP-Posting-Host: bigboy

In article <1992Jul31.161123.656@scubed.com> schneide@scubed.com (Steve Schneider) writes:
>discussion very closely.  I don't know if anyone else mentioned it,  but
>the late great stunt pilot Art Scholl used to fly at airshows with his
>dog named Aileron.  It was a small black dog, although I don't recall the

BTW, Aileron is still hopping about at Rialto and still enjoys airplanes.
(or at least last August? he was)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: prager@mdd.comm.mot.com (David Prager)
Subject: Re: 707 Barrel Roll
Followup-To:  all those other articles
Organization: Cowboy Rhodesian Ridgebacks
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1992 18:55:35 GMT

A lot of sources have been named or quoted to verify what happened that
August day. One source that has not been mentioned here is an article
in the Seattle Times by Emmett Watson. Watson interviewed Johnson for
an issue of the Times' Pacific Magazine in in August of 1986 or 1987, during
that years Seafair week.

I remember reading Johnson claiming that the sequence of events was
roll-"chandelle"-2nd pass-2nd roll. 

I'll try and dig out the article.


===============================================================
David Prager					(W)206-487-5837
Motorola					(H)206-485-4397
Mobile Data Division
19807 Northcreek Parkway		
Bothell, WA 98011			prager@mdd.comm.mot.com
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: earlb@ssd.intel.com (Earl Brabandt)
Subject: Re: Controlled airspace
Organization: Supercomputer Systems Division, Intel Corp.
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1992 16:18:28 GMT

In article <jcmorris.712505563@mwunix> jcmorris@mwunix.mitre.org (Joe Morris) writes:
>brecher@pyramid.unr.edu (Steve Brecher) writes:
>
>
>I seem to recall Pete Campbell saying that he had found one airport 
>in North Dakota or Montana which had an ATA but no CZ.  Can anyone on
>the net offer a specific example of an ATA which is *not* enclosed 
>within controlled airspace?

In the May 1, 1992 NPRM (Docket No. 26852; Notice No. 92-5) dealing 
with airspace reclassification (airspace alphabet soup -- AAS), the 
FAA listed the areas at airports that have an airport traffic area but 
do not have an associated control zone, as of April 30, 1991:

FAA Region: Western-Pacific
	Tucson, Ryan Field, Arizona
	Mojave Airport, California
	Whiteman, California

Earl Brabandt, CFII, MEI
From: heuring@riker.cs.colorado.edu (Vincent Heuring)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Need Help Convincing University to Let Us Fly
Date: 25 Jul 92 15:37:05 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder


A couple years ago a colleague and I convinced the university
to let us fly to conferences in the club plane, and be reimbursed
for direct costs. We had to provide them with certificate of insurance,
etc.  Now all of a sudden they have had a case of amnesia, and have
withdrawn permission. They really didn't give us any reason except
that it was an "unreasonable risk."

Do any of you netters have any *successful* experiences to share
that might help us get back our flying privileges? I'm interested
in any lines of argument that we might present.

-- 
---
 Vincent Heuring   Dep't of Electrical & Computer Engineering
 University of Colorado at Boulder      Boulder CO 80309-0425
 heuring@cs.Colorado.EDU   o) 303-492-8751    h) 303-449-8868
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: brent@telebit.com (Brent Chapman)
Subject: Re: United flight's cargo door?
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1992 20:05:10 GMT

joero@microsoft.com (Joe Robison) writes:

>In article <jcmorris.711658927@mwunix> jcmorris@mwunix.mitre.org wrote:

>> The door was recovered from the floor of the Pacific at a depth of
>> approximately 14,200 feet.  (That's roughly 440 atmospheres of pressure!)

>Talk about your needles and haystacks...how in the world did they find it?

The Navy probably used finding it as an exercise in the use of their sub-based
magnetic anomoly detection gear (usually used for hunting out other subs),
then used recovering it as an exercise for their deep-rescue capabilities.


-Brent
--
Brent Chapman                                   Great Circle Associates
Brent@GreatCircle.COM                           1057 West Dana Street
+1 415 962 0841                                 Mountain View, CA  94041
From: cap@selway.umt.edu (Charles A. Smith)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Solution found for dead battery, we think
Keywords: First time filling problem
Date: 30 Jul 92 21:15:43 GMT
Organization: University of Montana

I post this because it may save some of you the same hassle that I've
been through for the last two days --

First, thanks to all of you who sent me tips on troubleshooting.  I used
the advice to determine absolutely_for_sure that there are no shorts in
my electrical system.

So why did the battery fail?  Well, the first time, it was apparently just an
old battery that finally gave up the ghost.  However, my new battery failed
because it was not filled properly.  It seems that when a battery is first
filled, it can appear to be full, but in fact it is not.  Kind of like
the fuel tanks on Cessna 210's.  The proper procedure
is to fill it, wait, fill it again, wait, and fill it again.  My new
battery was only "filled" once, and subsequently was installed in the 
airplane with insufficient fluid to maintain a charge.  I'm told the
problem has been corrected.  We'll see.

Cap



-- 
========================================================================
Cap Smith                 Assistant Prof. of MIS           PP-ASEL
cap@selway.umt.edu        University of Montana            Skylane 71654
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis)
Subject: Re: "remain clear of the ARSA..."
Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc
Date: 22 Jul 92 18:23:42 GMT

In <7480324@hpnmdla.sr.hp.com> glenb@hpnmdla.sr.hp.com (Glen Baker) writes:

>In rec.aviation, greg@octopus.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) [me] writes:

>>  Indy Departure:  "57E, Indy departure.  Remain clear of the ARSA.  What
>                      can I do for you?"

> OK, I realize that this gets discussed from time to time, but can 
> they *really* do this to you? By saying "57E, Indy departure" they've
> established radio contact and my (perhaps faulty) understanding is
> that they *can not* refuse permission to enter the ARSA.

We hash over this from time to time and the answer is, YES, they can
do this to you.  You are required to conform to ATC instructions at
all times unless you are declaring an emergency.  "Remain clear of the
ARSA" is an ATC instruction.

The MINIMUM requirement for entering an ARSA is simply two-way radio contact
(let's ignore the mode-C stuff, etc. for now).  So, once you've made contact
with ATC, you may enter the ARSA *unless* ATC issues an instruction which
specifically prohibits you from entering the ARSA.  Simple, no?  :-)

greg
--
Gregory Reed Travis				D  P  S  I
Data Parallel Systems Incorporated   greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!)
Bloomington, IN			     greg@indiana.edu (For the others)
From: hale@hpfcso.FC.HP.COM (Bill Hale)
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 1992 16:35:10 GMT
Subject: Re: Good pictures, was:  prevalence of engine failures
Organization: Hewlett-Packard, Fort Collins, CO, USA
Newsgroups: rec.aviation


Statistics from American Bonanza Society training clinics since 1982:

	AT the clinics: ~10K hours flown, 3 engine failures = 1/3000 hr
		
		Specifics: 1)  Exhaust pipe blew a gut, causing turbo loss
			       < 1000 hours since new, AD later issued on part
			       Pilots misdiagnosed (at 200' going into an
			       overcast) and flooded engine
			   
			   2)  250 hours since new IO550 threw a rod on runup
			       Shiny new A-36.  Right thru the case!

			   3)  Old, fairly rotten E225 had cylinder failure
			       on downwind

		Only #1 resulted in a crash


	Of the 150 or so different sudents I've personally had in the
	 program...
		
		2 have had the dreaded night forced landings in their
		careers.  (Average TT probably ~>2000TT)

		One of these was a prop tip departing--probably the 
		scariest tale I've heard--and the other was a busted
		crankshaft over Long Island at nite.

		Both survived the ensuing forced landings but the airplanes
		didn't.

	I used to think the Lycomings were more reliable, but I'm not
	so sure, especially if you include the class of engines that 
	this statistic represents and not just IO-320s, etc.

	Based on all this, my judgement in where to go & when has become
	more conservative of late.



+Regards, Bill Hale;  hale@hpfclm.FC.HP.COM   [hplabs|hpfcla]!hpfclm!hale
+Thru ether-K0QA; In ether-BE33 N33HP CFIAIME A&P; Twisted pair 1-303-229-3037
+Snail: c/o HP UTD MS73 3404 E Harmony, Ft Collins, CO 80525 Incoming:40 44.2N
+105 33.1W; Pictures 303-299-6441
From: cep@taligent.com (Christophe Pettus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Re: Cleared to enter the TCA... Helpfull hint.
Date: 28 Jul 92 18:02:51 GMT
Organization: Taligent, a little subsidiary of two really big companies.

In article <1992Jul25.063654.9189@chinet.chi.il.us> harlow@chinet.chi.il.us (Steven A Harlow) writes:
>I find it helpfull when flying near an ARSA (or TCA)
>to lower the altimeter setting (or just turn off the transponer)
>and repeat to myself, "I am under the ARSA.  I am under
>the ARSA."

This is a joke, right?  Please say it's a joke.
--
-- Christophe

"Be calm.  Look cute."
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: kaye@uniwa.uwa.edu.au (Kaye Stott)
Subject: I must have done SOMETHING right
Organization: University of Western Australia
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1992 10:13:26 GMT


Just a normal day at the gliding field. I did a great check flight in the
morning, and decided not to waste it - go and do a solo - I'm still on
daily checks.

Jumped into the Puchacz, and we took off on aerotow. Just clear of the
end of the runway, heading towards the town, the tow plane started to wave.
My reactions were slow; disbelieving. Does he REALLY want me to get off???
I was too slow - the pilot disconnected, and there was the rope, slicing back
through the air. OK - get the nose down, look at the options. River to the
left, houses directly ahead, and a very strong headwind. Estimated altitude
250-300'. The field I've always though of as being my safe landing is to my
right, so even as the rope is still swinging back at me I'm turning right.

No - too many powerlines and fences, and I'm too new at this to put it down
accurately into that mess. If I turn and try to land on the strip I've just
taken off from the tail wind will kill me. I decide that the strong tail
wind is my ally - it will get me back to the cross strip. Decision made;
the turn continues and I head back. Quick glance at the altitude; 200'
indicated, but I'm not losing much height, and there's the strip. 

I'm cutting across at an angle - have to do more than 90 degrees to line up,
and height is critical; I can see the whites of the sheep's eyes as they
scatter below me. The turn onto final is sloppy - I'm too afraid of the
ground to do a crisp, sharp turn. Instinctively the hand pulls back on the
stick, trying to avoid the ground, but my training is too good, and I correct
and keep my speed up. Divebrakes out, low across the main strip, try to
flare, but the cross-wind roll off the trees gets me, and I'm slammed
down into the ground at 60kt. BOUNCE! up, but its stable. Keep the brakes
steady, and fly the thing! Back toward the ground, control the attitude,
divebrakes fully extended after I touch, and I just do a small bounce, then
settle to a 'normal' landing.

It was all too quick to be scared. I climbed out, shut the canopy, and had
a quick bet with myself as to how would be first on the scene. Right again -
the CFI!

I learned a lot from this, but I don't recommend it as a way to test your
ability to handle wave-off or rope breaks! Not reacting quickly to the
wave-off was inexcusable, but my mind just didn't WANT it to be true. I also
didn't drop the rope. In fact, I spend the entire time worrying about the 
damn thing. That suggests we need changes to our training, since I should
have done it automatically. My speed control was good, and the training
held me in good stead there. Also, my taking the stong tail wind into
consideration was correct, and I did allow for crosswind on my landing.
I couldn't do much about the roll off the trees - just be ready for it and
try to fly.

Overall, I'm not unhappy about my handling of the situation once I was
faced with having to put the glider down under stress. Both the plane and I
survived unscathed, and it won't put me off flying!

Kaye
From: Charles.K.Scott@dartmouth.edu (Charles K. Scott)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Re: INFO WANTED on STREAK SHADOW Kitplane
Date: 28 Jul 92 11:46:53 GMT
Organization: Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH

In article <24JUL199222003260@mm.ovro.caltech.edu>
mjd@mm.ovro.caltech.edu (MARK DEAZLEY) writes:

> I'm looking for any feedback that anybody in the US, UK or
>  elsewhere can provide.

This kitplane has a very wide flight envelope, possibly the widest of
any airplane in it's weight catagory.  With a weight that approaches
that of an ultralight, it can top end at 140 mph and stall at 30,
that's impressive.

Corky Scott
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
From: joero@microsoft.com (Joe Robison)
Subject: Re: GLIDER: POST task? (was Re: Re: SOARING: 15m Nats in Minden)
Date: 22 Jul 92 06:40:26 GMT
Organization: Microsoft Corp.

In article <122140195@hpfcso.FC.HP.COM> rjc@hpfcso.FC.HP.COM wrote:
> > 	I know *very* little about competition flying and the tasks.  What is a
> > POST task and what was the mistake in this instance?  And if it doesn't take
> > too much time/space, how about a description of the tasks and how they fit into
> > organizing a competition?
> 
> Aland can give more details about POST procedures, but I'll give it a
> shot.
> 
> POST -- Pilot Option Speed Task
> 
> In a normal, non-POST task, the Competition Director decides on a task
> for the day based on the weather forecast, and everyone attempts to
> fly that task as fast as possible -- only speed counts (unless a pilot
> can't complete the task; then only distance counts toward his score).
> In a POST, each pilot chooses his own task, based on a set of
> allowed turnpoints.  This requires the pilot to choose his task "on the
> fly" as weather conditions develop through the day.  Both distance and
> speed count in the score.

There are variations.  The two most common (I believe) are "Scratch 
distance" and "Time only." In the former, the Competition Director (CD) 
calls a minimum "scratch distance" -- say 150 miles.  In Sports Class, 
where everything from Nibus III's to 1-26's can be flying against each 
other, the pilot multiplies the scratch distance by his/her ship's handicap
(1.7 for a Nimbus say, or 0.7 for a 1-26 (these numbers are completely
made up for example purposes only)). The resulting number is the distance
that pilot must fly.  Hence the Nimbi are going to be covering a lot
more ground than the lesser ships.  The highest speed wins (there are
adjustments if you land short of your distance). This task has a fairly
high mental load on the pilot if the day develops differently than you
expected and you have to pick new turnpoints on the fly. If the thermals
are wide apart and/or the winds are high, the lower performance ships
can't make their distances no matter what their handicap is.

In "Time only" the pilots are given a minimum time they must be out on
course -- say 3.5 hours.  The pilots bag as much distance as they can
in the time they are out.  They can stay out longer, but since the
scoring is based on speed and distance flown, you only want to stay
out if the day is stronger at the end of the time than it was at the 
begining (since presumably that will allow you to raise your average 
speed).  There is a penalty for landing early.  This variation has a 
lower mental workload, since you don't have to plan your turnpoints in 
advance or recalculate distances if you go for different turnpoints
while you're on course -- you just fly where the lift looks good,
and bag turnpoints as you go.  The Sports Class Nationals in Ephrata
used this variation exclusively this year.
From: srg@quick.com (Spencer Garrett)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation
Subject: Re: prevalence of engine failures
Date: 29 Jul 92 06:03:49 GMT
Organization: Quicksilver Engineering, Seattle USA

> >I cannot recall seeing a single documented account of a commercial jet
> >aircraft in which two engines failed.
> 
> I believe it was Southern Airways that lost both engines in a DC-9 flying through a thunderstorm. They put it down on a highway with some survivors.

Yep.  It happened in the late 70's near Atlanta, Georgia.  The DC-9
encountered *heavy* hail and lost half of its windshield in addition
to both engines.  What really struck me as odd was that from the ATC
transcripts it seemed like the controller never really reacted to
the emergency.  He steered them out of the arriving traffic corridor,
but apparently thought he had a while to find them someplace else
to go.  I was living there at the time and felt that they could have
easily made Dobbins AFB had they been steered in that direction.
As it was, they landed on a two-lane highway.  About 1/3 of the
passengers survived, but 8 or 10 people on the ground were killed.