From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Date: 11 Apr 92 02:19:00 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Apr10.221902.10943
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.

In article <6751@pkmab.se> 
ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:

>In article <1992Apr6.114955.10762@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: 

>>In article <6741@pkmab.se> 
>>ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:

>>>In article <1992Apr1.081958.10553@husc3.harvard.edu>
>>>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:  

MZ:
>>>>I note that any description of Chalmers' wacky notion of implementation is
>>>>conspicuously absent from the above.

KE:
>>>As if it was less wacky to hold the view that a rock counts as an
>>>implementation of each and every FSA...

MZ:
>>Consider the notion of "reductio ad absurdum".

KE:
>As far as I can see, the only thing that it reduces to absurdity is Putnam's
>own notion of "implementation", which several people (including me, and your
>primary target) have criticized over and over again. So what's the point?

No one else has offered a more adequate notion of implementation.  Would
you care to try?

KE:
>(To summarize my own version of the criticism that I gave in another article:
>Putnam's mapping of abstract FSA states onto a different (and random) physical
>state for each input results in only an incomplete mapping of the FSA's
>transition function onto the rock's physical transition function. It leaves
>holes in the mapping of the transition function. Therefore, it is logically
>false to claim that the rock is accurately described by the abstract FSA,
>which I would presume should be a minimum requirement for any reasonable
>notion of "implementation". - Your counterattack that there are problems in
>reasoning about possible worlds seems totally beside the point; Putnam's
>notion of "impementation" is no less flawed because of that. Did I mention
>any possible worlds? I might even abstain from mentioning physical laws,
>you know, but that might bring up some other bulky issues.)

Your failure to mention an adequate constraint on your own definition
doesn't constitute an argument against its existence.  Material conditions
are simply insufficient for the characterization of an FSA; if they were,
then Putnam's example would have been sufficient to characterize an
automaton that, as a matter of contingent fact, doesn't get into any other
state specified in its table.  Chalmers knows that, but you don't.  Again,
if you care to adduce a semantical theory that explains strong conditionals
without any reference to possible worlds, I would like to hear about it.

KE:
>>>Whatever the correct notion of implementation may be, I think it should
>>>be one that excludes arbitrary rocks, otherwise it simply is useless, and
>>>definitely does not capture the thing we use this notion for.

MZ:
>>Agreed, but this doesn't exclude the possibility that the correct notion of
>>implementation, like the related notion of interpretation, or the
>>fundamental notion of reference, is simply unavailable to a run-of-the-mill
>>functionalist.

KE:
>But in what way does Putnam's argument help in demonstrating that point,
>especially if the functionalist in question does not swallow Putnam's
>notion of "implementation"?

For the umpteenth time, feel free to implement your own notion.

MZ:
>> Chalmers may yet escape this quagmire,

KE:
>You haven't even shown him to be IN any quagmire. You have still not
>really explained why he should be concerned about your possible worlds
>objection. You just keep repeating it with no additional material.

I am being charitable in assuming that he understood it in the first place,
and that you may yet come to understand it in the future.


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