HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: scoggin@delmarva.com (John K Scoggin Jr)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: anonymous ftp
Date: 28 Jan 1993 16:13:12 GMT
Organization: Delmarva Power & Light Company
Distribution: world
Reply-To: scoggin@delmarva.com
NNTP-Posting-Host: mercury.delmarva.com

In article 8346@dove.nist.gov, wack@ariel.ncsl.nist.gov (John Wack) writes:
> In article <1993Jan28.025728.2959@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> jpw@sansfoy.lib.Virginia.EDU (John Price-Wilkin) writes:
> >Can someone point me to documentation (an FAQ?) on setting
> >up a secure anonymous ftp service that logs transactions.
> >
> >John Price-Wilkin
> >jpw@Virginia.EDU
> 
> John,
> 
> Since your initials are the same as mine, I had to reply: cert.org has
> a good faq on securing anonymous ftp, and wuarchive.wustl.edu offers a
> hacked ftpd that includes access control, logging, and some other
> goodies.  Undoubtedly there are others, but those are the ones I'm
> familiar with and know to be worthwhile.
> 
> -JP Wack


Look on ftp.uu.net in directory networking/archival/ftp for the wuarchive
ftpd code and the uunet patches.  Follow the directions carefully and you'll
have a very nice logging facility for anonymous ftp.

	- John
---
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+    
|  John K. Scoggin, Jr.			Email: scoggin@delmarva.com   |
|  Supervisor, Network Operations       Phone: (302) 451-5200         |
|  Delmarva Power & Light Company       Fax:   (302) 451-5321         |
|  500 N. Wakefield Drive               NOC:   (800) 388-7076         |
|  Newark, DE 19714-6066		                              |
|  The opinions expressed are not those of Delmarva Power, simply the |
|  product of an over-active imagination...                           |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
From: probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: 22 Jan 1993 07:45:12 -0600
Organization: Kansas State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: matt.ksu.ksu.edu

senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:

>so, get the source for something like ls (it's on ftp.uu.net).  then
>modify it so that it attaches a binary file which does x (x can be
>innocuous [print a smilie on the console] or destructive [halt]) to a
>system command (mkdir) which is installed suid.  then, go talk to the
>sysadmin and tell them that there is something wrong with your
>directory.  when they cd to it and do an 'ls' (your version), bango --
>virus.  this 'x' thing that the binary file does can also include
>copying itself to other programs.

>so, if root executes your ls, then x is attached to some program in the
>system.  have your x only do it to programs which are suid.  then it's
>all over the place; memory protection and file access controls fail
>here.

>this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>out there do?

No, this assumes root has . at the FRONT of his/her path. This of course is
extremely stupid and I believe covered in the FAQ.

A scenerio like this assumes that the sysadmin is a pretty trusting person
and probably already has large security holes in the system.

James
From: strick@osc.versant.com (tear this card in half to release your free sample)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses.  Are there any??
Date: 23 Jan 93 04:42:55 GMT
Article-I.D.: osc.5949
Organization: the techwood toaster pastry users group

There's always the virus that Dennis Richtie
put in the original UNIX, and is in yours today.  

						strick
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Virus Spreading Experiments (was Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??)
Keywords: virus, experiment, existence
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date: 25 Jan 93 16:19:27 GMT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

bediger@teal.csn.org (Bruce Ediger) writes:

> >What actually keeps viruses from spreading on such platforms is the
> >different level of software sharing between the users.

> Are there papers/books/other references that purport to demonstrate this?
> I would be interested in reading such, if they exist.  Have any other 
> virus-spreading experiments been publlished, other than Fred Cohen's 1984
> work, and Tom Duff's "Computer Systems" article?  The Duff article was more-or

If you have read Cohen's works, there it is demonstrated well enough
that the only way to make viruses impossible for a Turing machine is
to do either one of the following: limit sharing, limit transitivity,
or limit functionality. Cohen also describes it in a more "readable"
manner in his "Short Course on Computer Viruses".

Regards,
Vesselin

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-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: guay@fraser.sfu.ca (Tim Guay)
Subject: Firewall
Summary: router as firewall
Keywords: Router, firewall
Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 17:38:44 GMT

Hi;
Does a router make a good firewall? Is there anything I should know about
using a router as a firewall?

Thanks
	Tim Guay,
	Tech Coordinator CMNS SFU
	guay@sfu.ca
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: mo@mg.stu.rpi.edu (Monish Gopinath)
Subject: Read if you work for the MIS dept.
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 07:05:52 GMT

I am trying to get some information on the issue of security in a MIS  
department for a paper I'm writing.

	(1) Is security an issue?
	(2) Why or why not?
	(3) How is it addressed in the dept.?
	(4) How is it implemented?

If you can give me any other information related to security I would  
appreciate it.
P.S. Could you include the size of your MIS dept. and (if you don't mind)  
the name of the organization you work for. Thank you.

REPLY DIRECTLY TO mo@mg.stu.rpi.edu
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
From: oleg@gd.cs.csufresno.edu
Date: 23 Jan 93 20:27:29 PST
Organization: Computer Science Departement of California State University in Fresno

In article <1jrgcdINNgm9@cronkite.cisco.com> ohansen@europe.cisco.com (Ove Hansen) writes:
>In article <9302314.5488@mulga.cs.mu.OZ.AU> carl@montebello.ecom.unimelb.EDU.AU (Carl Brewer) writes:
>|>In article <1jotp8INNiu@matt.ksu.ksu.edu> probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:
>|>>senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:
>|>>
>|>>>this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>|>>>out there do?
>|>>
>|>>A scenerio like this assumes that the sysadmin is a pretty trusting person
>|>>and probably already has large security holes in the system.
>|>
>|>a scenario like this assumes that the sysadmin should not be a sysadmin.
>
>Now, Remember that the majority of sysadmins are part-timers who have better
>things to do in their company than tighten up the security holes that the
>vendors leave in the systems they sell. In most small companies I have seen
>where there are just a few Unix, VMS, OS/2, DOS, Mac or-whatever-boxes the
>least computer-illiterate person is usually the person who is expected to
>spend a couple of hours a day looking after the systems. It's unfair saying
>that this sysadmin shouldn't be a sysadmin just because the vendors can't
>be bothered making the systems more secure. Tell me the following: when I
>install my shining new Sun desktop server option, is there a '.' in root's
>path? Is there any access control on exported file systems? Is there a '+'
>in /etc/hosts.equiv? The default security in a new installation should be
>high, it then would be up to the sysadmin to open up his system to suit his
>needs, instead of running the risk of having the system full of holes because
>he hasn't known of them. If the system then was full of large security holes
>I would agree with your statement, now you're shooting the pianist because
>the piano-vendor sold the bar-owner a crap piano.
>

Actually, I think  the system  should come as it comes. If  a computer  was to
come with high security, the same  computer-iliterate  sysadmin  would  hardly
ever bother to open it.  Niether would  (s)he  ever  figure out  how to export
directories  to clients. Or how to allow  users  to  rsh  from one  client  to
another  without a password. Or why ping won't  run after cd /usr/etc (about .
in $PATH). 

Of course, closed, "secure" system is easier to manage. But most computers are
bought for users,  not  for managers  :) And I  bet  that there are many sites
where users would  rather have insecure but functional system. After  all,  if
you only have local area  network and just several users \n is probably a good
root password.

Having said that I agree that it would be nice if manufacturies gave us some
hints about how to make system more secure if needed (or perhaps even shell
scripts to do the convertion). 

Oleg
Organization: Sophomore, Math/Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1993 18:40:49 -0500 
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@CMU.EDU>
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??

Excerpts from netnews.comp.security.misc: 21-Jan-93 Re: Unix Viruses.
Are there.. by Len Senetza@sigma.uleth. 
> so, if root executes your ls, then x is attached to some program in the
> system.  have your x only do it to programs which are suid.  then it's
> all over the place; memory protection and file access controls fail
> here.
>  
> this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
> out there do?

Well, of course.  Memory protection and file access controls can't
possibly protect everyone all the time when human stupidity is applied
in all its glory.
--
David Sward   x4405 (1-412-268-4405)   sward+@cmu.edu or dsa3+@andrew.cmu.edu

Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: odwyer@sse.ie (Frank ODwyer)
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Organization: SSE Ltd, Dublin. Ireland
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL4
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 13:46:32 GMT

probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:
: senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:
: >this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
: >out there do?
: 
: No, this assumes root has . at the FRONT of his/her path.

Nope. At the end will do.

$ cd /tmp
$ sl -l

: James

-- 
Frank O'Dwyer
odwyer@sse.ie
From: probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: 25 Jan 93 04:17:39 GMT
Article-I.D.: matt.1k13r3INNmlo
Organization: Kansas State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: matt.ksu.ksu.edu

odwyer@sse.ie (Frank ODwyer) writes:

>probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:
>: senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:
>: >this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>: >out there do?
>: 
>: No, this assumes root has . at the FRONT of his/her path.

>Nope. At the end will do.

>$ cd /tmp
>$ sl -l

>: James

>-- 
>Frank O'Dwyer
>odwyer@sse.ie

That is true, except it probably wouldn't get me for 2 reasons.

1) I don't have . in any path on any system I use.
2) sl is aliased to ls :-) (I mistype a lot)

James
From: smacphai@cs.strath.ac.uk (Stephen N MacPhail CS90)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Password Generators.
Date: 25 Jan 93 18:48:40 GMT
Organization: Comp. Sci. Dept., Strathclyde Univ., Glasgow, Scotland.
Originator: smacphai@lister-07.cs.strath.ac.uk


	Has anyone out there ever used password generators? How good are they?
Is it a good idea to use them and where can I get one?

			Ta very much.
 
-- 
Stephen Neil MacPhail,
Final Year Research,
University Of Strathclyde.
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.unix.admin,comp.databases.sybase
From: rjs@muug.mb.ca (Robert J. Stanish)
Subject: sybase passwords
Summary: synchronizing unix and sybase passwords
Keywords: sybase,security,password
Organization: Manitoba Unix User Group, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 17:17:52 GMT

Does anyone know of a method to synchronize passwords between unix and
Sybase in a C2 security environment?

Please respond by e-mail, and I'll summarize.

Thanx in advance.


Bob Stanish                                                   PH:204-946-7242
rjs@mona.muug.mb.ca           Snail-Mail:P.O. Box 6000, WPG,MB,CANADA R3C 3A5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tight-ass disclaimer:  All opinions are those of the author and do not represen
                       those of any official organization.
-- 
Bob Stanish                                                   PH:204-946-7242
rjs@mona.muug.mb.ca           Snail-Mail:P.O. Box 6000, WPG,MB,CANADA R3C 3A5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tight-ass disclaimer:  All opinions are those of the author and do not represen
From: ohansen@europe.cisco.com (Ove Hansen)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: 25 Jan 1993 18:36:49 GMT
Organization: Cisco Systems Europe
NNTP-Posting-Host: europe.cisco.com

probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:

> 2) sl is aliased to ls :-) (I mistype a lot)

I too cot fed pu with mistypig - get that bloody desk calculator every
time I try to cd anywhere... anyway, a few executables named 'xs' (next to
'cd') etc. strategically scattered around my file systems would without
-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ove Hansen, Cisco Systems Europe                  | Mail: ohansen@cisco.com  
16, avenue du Quebec,   Z.A. de Courtaboeuf       | Tel:  +33 1 60 92 20 56
91961 Les Ulis cedex, France                      | Fax:  +33 1 69 28 83 26
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: erc@unislc.uucp (Ed Carp)
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Organization: Unisys Corporation SLC
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1993 20:43:55 GMT

oleg@gd.cs.csufresno.edu wrote:

: Of course, closed, "secure" system is easier to manage. But most computers are
: bought for users,  not  for managers  :) And I  bet  that there are many sites
: where users would  rather have insecure but functional system. After  all,  if
: you only have local area  network and just several users \n is probably a good
: root password.

I'll tell my cat you said that.  She likes to play on the keyboard, and has
done wierd things more than once.

I keep telling her I'm going to teach her C so *she* can go work and *I* can
stay home and sleep... ;)
-- 
Ed Carp			erc@apple.com, erc@saturn.upl.com	801/538-0177

"It is your resistance to 'what is' that causes your suffering."   -- Buddha
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith)
Subject: Re: quantitaive risk analysis
Keywords: risk analysis
Organization: SCTC
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 19:40:04 GMT

I haven't seen anything on cost/benefit and computer security risk
analysis, but there are several US DOD Orange Book derived approaches
that specify strength of security (actually, Orange Book rating) to
security risk (actually, range of data sensitivity handled).  It's
documented in the Yellow Book: CSC-STD-003-85, Guidance for Applying
the TCSEC in Specific Environments.

I remember hearing a couple of papers presenting alternative rating
approaches at the 1991 NCSC, and they should be in the Proceedings.
From: jpw@cbis.ece.drexel.edu (Joseph Wetstein)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Encryption
Date: 21 Jan 93 19:39:33 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: Drexel University, College of Engineering, Philadelphia, PA


I would very much like some public domain encryption software, if it is 
available. Source code would be great. DES, public-key, whatever.

Thanks
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: taylort@happy.rtp.dg.com (Tad Taylor - SQE Security Poobah)
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 15:19:13 GMT
Organization: Data General Corporation, Research Triangle Park, NC

In article <senetza.727648754@honte> senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:

	[Deleted description of user trying to get root to run his
	 personal version of the "ls" command.]

>
>this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>out there do?

It also assumes that root has . in its path before /usr/bin (or
wherever else the real "ls" is kept) and that root would actually cd
to the directory.  root should NEVER (IMHO) put . on its path before
system controlled directories.  It's pretty questionable to put . on
there at all.

Tad Taylor

/* Tad Taylor                          |      919-248-6374                   */
/* Data General Corporation            |      taylort@dg-rtp.dg.com          */
/* 62 T.W. Alexander Dr.               |      FAX: 919-248-5942              */
/* Research Triangle Park, NC 27709    |(ceo) tad_taylor@dgc.ceo.rtp.dg.com  */
From: tcahoon@msen.com (Tim Cahoon)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: 26 Jan 1993 03:56:38 GMT
Organization: Msen, Inc. -- Ann Arbor, Michigan
NNTP-Posting-Host: garnet.msen.com
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]

James Michael Chacon (probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu) wrote:
: odwyer@sse.ie (Frank ODwyer) writes:

: >probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:
: >: senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:
: >: >this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
: >: >out there do?
: >: 
: >: No, this assumes root has . at the FRONT of his/her path.

: >Nope. At the end will do.

: >$ cd /tmp
: >$ sl -l

: >: James

: >-- 
: >Frank O'Dwyer
: >odwyer@sse.ie

: That is true, except it probably wouldn't get me for 2 reasons.

: 1) I don't have . in any path on any system I use.
: 2) sl is aliased to ls :-) (I mistype a lot)

: James
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: bigmac@erg.sri.com (Bryan McDonald)
Subject: Re: Firewall
Keywords: Router, firewall
Organization: CHAOS - SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, USA
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 21:58:07 GMT

In article <guay.728156324@sfu.ca> guay@fraser.sfu.ca (Tim Guay) writes:
>Hi;
>Does a router make a good firewall? Is there anything I should know about
>using a router as a firewall?
>
>Thanks
>	Tim Guay,
>	Tech Coordinator CMNS SFU
>	guay@sfu.ca

There is a mailing list dedicated to firewalls, someone there should
be able to answer your question.  Send email to majordome@greatcircle.com
with the body text of help, and majordomo (another listserv object)
will tell you how to join the list.  They have a FAQ and lots of
knowledgable people.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan McDonald                   |   Computer, Hardware, And Operations Support
bigmac@erg.sri.com               |                     CHAOS
Postmaster-Systems Administrator |            ITAD - SRI International
---------------------------BayLISA Newsletter Editor----------------------------
-------USENIX/SAGE (Systems Administrators Guild) Publications Coordinator------
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: lwv26@cas.org (Larry W. Virden)
Subject: Steps to verify cleanliness of code on Unix boxes
Reply-To: lvirden@cas.org (Larry W. Virden)
Organization: Nedriv Software and Shoe Shiners, Uninc.
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 13:54:23 GMT


Anyone have some steps to take to look at a program to see if it accidentally
or intentionally takes actions which could be considered dangerous?  For
instance, on many micros, there are programs which will scan for certain
operations and warn the user of a possible danger.

I think that such a tool that could be run on a set of code would
be very useful.  What types of things do you look for when you are
examining a new piece of code?  For instance, the following might
be some things to particular examine - none are necessary 'evil' but
are conditions which have the possibility for accidents or abuse.

1.	Does it require root or other specialized privleges?
2.	Does it attempt to send email to off site addresses?
3.	Does it attempt to perform chmod's or chown's on files that it
	does not create?
4.	Does it attempt to delete files that it does not create?
-- 
Larry W. Virden                 UUCP: osu-cis!chemabs!lvirden
Same Mbox: BITNET: lvirden@cas  INET: lvirden@cas.org
Personal: 674 Falls Place,   Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-1614
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: tihor@acf3.NYU.EDU (Stephen Tihor)
Subject: Re: Dial-in modem security measures
Organization: New York University
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 17:01:00 GMT

While it is possible to have a secure dial back using onely one line it does
require that theline be properly set up.  But so do the two line solutions,
they just require a different set up withthe hone company.
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
From: senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza)
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Organization: University of Lethbridge
Date: 21 Jan 93 20:39:14 GMT

In <17988@umd5.umd.edu> matthews@oberon.umd.edu (Mike Matthews) writes:
>A virus spreads itself around by latching in to valid programs.  I've always
>believed that Unix's memory protection and file access controls would
>prohibit a true virus; nobody's been able to convince me otherwise yet.

so, get the source for something like ls (it's on ftp.uu.net).  then
modify it so that it attaches a binary file which does x (x can be
innocuous [print a smilie on the console] or destructive [halt]) to a
system command (mkdir) which is installed suid.  then, go talk to the
sysadmin and tell them that there is something wrong with your
directory.  when they cd to it and do an 'ls' (your version), bango --
virus.  this 'x' thing that the binary file does can also include
copying itself to other programs.

so, if root executes your ls, then x is attached to some program in the
system.  have your x only do it to programs which are suid.  then it's
all over the place; memory protection and file access controls fail
here.

this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
out there do?

>------
>Mike Matthews, matthews@oberon.umd.edu (NeXTmail accepted)
>------
>I was gratified to be able to answer promptly, and I did.  I said I
>didn't know.
>		-- Mark Twain



--
  +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |  Leonard Senetza            |  E-Mail: senetza@sigma.uleth.ca         |
  |  Academic Consultant        |   Phone: 403-329-5162                   |
  |  University of Lethbridge   |     FAX: 403-382-7108                   |
  |  Lethbridge, Alberta        |-----------------------------------------|
  |  Canada, eh?                |  Disclaimer: Why should I tell _them_?  |
  |  T1K 3M4                    |    What they don't know, can't fire me. |
  +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
From: lsnyder@fig.ucsb.edu (Lowell R. Snyder,,,COMS,Undergraduate)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Subject: Re: Unix Viruses. Are there any??
Date: 24 Jan 93 19:22:49 GMT
Organization: University of California, Santa Barbara

In article <senetza.727648754@honte> senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes
>so, if root executes your ls, then x is attached to some program in the
>system.  have your x only do it to programs which are suid.  then it's
>all over the place; memory protection and file access controls fail
>here.
>
>this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>out there do?

Been there, done that. *Most* Unix sysadms have . as the last place to look
for a file, with the system programmers (the ones that need it) using
least privilege! This works around that problem.

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Newsgroups: comp.security.misc