HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: thornley@mega.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Organization: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, CSci dept.
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 21:05:49 GMT

In article <KETIL.92Oct11024703@bark.ii.uib.no> ketil@ii.uib.no writes:
>In article <1992Sep28.165259.17464@linus.mitre.org> bwise@hemlock.mitre.org (Barry Wise) writes:
>   Pearl Harbor (guess which side blundered)
>
>Well, I suppose you mean the Japanese? After all they took on an enemy
>they had little chance of defeating.  But: the Americans lost a large
>part of their fleet, and many lives were lost.  I dunno, they should
>have been warned (yes, rumors has it, they were. And that the fleet
>were left siting ducks on purpose.  Which makes the whole thing
>political again...
>
Pearl Harbor received two separate warnings of imminent hostilities, one for
the army and one for the navy, ten days before the attack.  The Navy chose
to rely on the Army, and the Army prepared for nothing but sabotage.
These decisions were made by the ranking officers, Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, and therefore IMHO count as military blunders.

DHT


Newsgroups: alt.war
From: buckley@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (BUCKLEY  CHARLES RAY)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 04:49:13 GMT

In article <6028@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at> mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner) writes:
>From article <1992Oct14.181238.5994@news2.cis.umn.edu>, by thornley@giga.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley):
>> Yup.  Bombing the fuel tanks would have been real serious for us.  Part of
>> the Japanese problems were command (Nagumo, who commanded the actual attack,
>> really didn't believe in it)
>
>It's true that Nagumo was a battleship-type admiral, but AFAIK he was
>not instrumental in planning the targets for the air attacks.  His job
>was taking the carriers there and bringing them back.  The reason why
>the Japanese did not mount a third attack (which the pilots wanted)
>was that Nagumo was deathly afraid that the US would be expecting them
>and come looking for his carriers.  After the first two waves had
>attacked successfully, he just wanted to get out of strike range fast.
>Kind of ironic that he still commanded four of the carriers at Midway
>when the US carriers really were waiting.
>-- 
Not to ironic as Midway was only six months after Pearl Harbor. In any case, 
the game plan for the Japanese was to draw out the US carriers. Which it did.

Nagumo was also worried about the air defences at Pearl Harbor. Most of his
aircraft losses were in the second wave and by the time the third wave would 
have been on target, the US would have manned all of its AA guns. Japan had
lost 29 aircraft to enemy fire and had another 74 damaged to the extent that
they would not be able to participate in any more action. This acounted for 
about 1 in 3 of the aircraft involved.
 The carrier force could not afford the
loss of many more aircraft especiialy if it did not know where the carries were.
They would have been meat to any of the carriers operating in the area if they
had lost another 100 planes. It would have been Midway six months early.

Charles Buckley    BB-48 USS West Virginia you can't keep a good ship down.


Newsgroups: alt.war
From: mfraioli@grebyn.com (Marc Fraioli)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military luck-outs of all time
Keywords: As a foil to the greatest blunders thread, how bout the times someone should have caught their lunch and didn't. My favorite:
Organization: Grebyn Timesharing
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 22:11:41 GMT

>Michael Reese - Univ. of Chicago |___      Phone : 312-791-8075 fax : 567-7455
>  Center for Radiation Therapy   | |_) _   Get in good physical condition before
>                                   | \|_)  submitting to bondage. You should be
>    "Birthplace of Softball"          |_)  fit to be tied. - Robert Byrne


 How about all the folks on the winning side of the "Greatest Blunders"
thread? ;-)
-- 
Marc Fraioli
mfraioli@grebyn.com	        	(So I'm a minimalist...)
From: wiener@duke.cs.duke.edu (Edward Wiener)
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Greatest Military Lost Opportunity of All Time?
Date: 16 Oct 92 21:29:09 GMT
Organization: Duke University Computer Science Dept.; Durham, N.C.


>What is the Greatest Military Lost Opportunity of All Time?

>With perfect hindsight (-: it seems that, had military force been used
>in certain place and time, the present-day world would be totally
>different. What are these places and times?
>Of course, we must assume that the proposed military action would have
>been succesful.

>Finnish government should be high on the list for not carrying out the
>plan by General Mannerheim of destroying the Bolshevik Russian
>government in 1919...



      Whom are you trying to impress with these bold claims?
      Even to insinuate that the Finnish Army was capable
      of overthrowing the Bolshevik Government, at a time
      when far more powerful groups were proving themselves
      incapable of this feat -- Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich,
      the British, Canadian, French, and Czech interventionists --
      implies that you are completely out of touch with
      military history.  Your General Mannerheim -- who allied
      his country with Hitler in WWII -- is a classic case
      of a legend in his own mind.


-- Eduard Wiener
From: mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner)
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Date: 16 Oct 92 11:06:08 GMT
Organization: DB and ES Subdivision, TU Vienna

From article <1992Oct15.213335.15476@rayssd.ssd.ray.com>, by m1b@rayssd.ssd.ray.com (Barone):
> In article <6028@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at> mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at
> (Markus Stumptner) writes:
>> The reason why
>> the Japanese did not mount a third attack (which the pilots wanted)
>> was that Nagumo was deathly afraid

> 	I think that a case could be made that Pearl Harbor was too
> successful to the Japanese.

I would say this is true for Nagumo, who decided he had done enough to
sail home, but not for the pilots.  The warships were intended as the
primary targets.  The Japanese bombed and strafed a lot of other
installations, airfields, barracks, but were not really interested in
supply stuff as long they had weapons (aircraft or ships) to destroy,
a mindset which they held throughout the war.  As it happened, the
flyers started thinking about the other installations once the
battleship targets had been effectively attacked.  

> including the storage tanks and drydock facilities.  Also, if the
> results weren't up to what the Japanese hoped for after two attacks
> (such as US battleships making it to open sea) but they still had the
> resources to continue to press the attack, they probably would have.
 
But if they had gone after the battleships out in the open sea, they'd
probably left the tank and repair yards alone as well.

> 	Take a look at Dunkirk, as well.  The speed of the invasion
> of France exceeded what the Germans expected, and Hitler got cold feet
> in front of Dunkirk.

That was a political move, not a military decision, and is thus a
completely different kind of bird.  Now if Guderian had stopped the
tanks on his own so they would not be exposed to British naval guns,
or Nagumo had forbidden to bomb the shipyards so the Japanese could
use them after the war, the analogy would hold :-)
-- 
Markus Stumptner                                mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at
University of Technology Vienna                 vexpert!mst@relay.eu.net
Paniglg. 16, A-1040 Vienna, Austria             ...mcsun!vexpert!mst
Newsgroups: alt.war
From: kk@cpsc.ucalgary.ca (Ken Kittlitz)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Organization: University of Calgary
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1992 20:27:29 GMT

In article <yeuesB1w165w@netlink.cts.com> galan@netlink.cts.com (Greg Gross) writes:

  > Custer's biggest problem was that he couldn't see past his own ego. And 
  > it got a lot of good men killed.
  > G.

Custer certainly had ego-problems, but his arrogance extended beyond his
own abilities to those of his regiment -- he believed the 7th Cavalry
could defeat any Indians they might encounter.

In other respects, though, some of Custer's decisions weren't as ludicrous
as they might appear.  His decision to attack the village without proper
reconaissance was based largely on the belief that his column had been
spotted (it actually hadn't been) and that the Sioux would break camp
and disperse.  In fact, all other senior officers in the campaign (Terry,
Gibbon and Crook) also thought that the biggest problem would be getting
the "hostiles" to fight --- the Sioux warriors did not like the way the white
man fought (cowardly rifle-range killing instead of close-range individual
combats) and were understandably unwilling to risk the lives of their
families if they could help it.  However, the Indians were quite prepared
to make a stand.  On June 17th, over a week before the Little Big Horn
battle, Crazy Horse and about one thousand warriors attacked Crook's
column of about the same number of men, mostly to prevent them from
getting any closer to the village.  Crook was eating breakfast. After
about eight hours of fighting, the soldiers pulled back to their supply
camp, where they spent the rest of the summer hunting and fishing (!).
Crook was effectively out of the campaign, and also knew that the
Indians were both numerous and willing to fight.  It apparently never
occurred to him that Terry, Gibbon or Custer might find this
information useful.

						Ken
Newsgroups: alt.war
From: thornley@giga.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Organization: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, CSci dept.
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 18:12:38 GMT

In article <14OCT199209505662@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.edu> holthaus@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.edu (James Holthaus at University of Iowa) writes:
>In article <Bw3sJt.K1w@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>, mpinnock@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (M B Pinnock) writes...
>>Pearl Harbour would have been a masterstroke had the US carriers been
>>in at the time. Also no major fuel or ammunition was destroyed. The Japanes
>
>[Didn't the U.S. have large fuel tanks, the primary storage for the Pacific
> Fleet, that the Japanese didn't bomb?]

Yup.  Bombing the fuel tanks would have been real serious for us.  Part of
the Japanese problems were command (Nagumo, who commanded the actual attack,
really didn't believe in it), some were planning (the plans were simply to
hit ships and planes, not logistics), and I suspect that some problems
existed because there really were no good answers.  The Japanese could have
done more damage to the war effort.  Actually, bombing the tanks would have
been especially good, in that it would have seriously restricted U.S.
activity, and done nasties to morale.

DHT
From: mcgrew@dropout.rutgers.edu (Charles Mcgrew)
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Date: 14 Oct 92 01:58:55 GMT
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.


	thornley@mega.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley) writes:
	Pearl Harbor received two separate warnings of imminent
	hostilities, one for the army and one for the navy, ten days
	before the attack.  The Navy chose to rely on the Army, and
	the Army prepared for nothing but sabotage.  These decisions
	were made by the ranking officers, Admiral Kimmel and General
	Short, and therefore IMHO count as military blunders.

Well, IMHO nobody in the US hierarchy believed that Pearl would be
attacked.  The Philippines, yes, but Pearl Harbor is a very long way
from Japan (if the USN expected an attack on Pearl, wouldn't Naval
Operations have had the battleships put to sea?), and everyone
expected Japanese moves generally southward.

   What was sent to Pearl was a "war warning", which is very far from
being "you are about to be bombed" (if you recall, the "japanese
attack" message from Intelligence did not arrive before the japanese
attack.)  Given all that, Short believed that his main threat was
covert, not overt; given the information he had at hand, I'd probably
think like he did, though act not in the same way.  (I'd disperse my
aircraft, not concentrate them; but Short's decision was not as stupid
as people have tried to make it sound.)

   In any case, it is generally agreed that Kimmel and Short's heads
were presented to the populace to dispose of the issue of blame for
Pearl Harbor, rather than for real negligence.  (The two of them
conducted a spirited defense of themselves to the investigating
congressional committee, and scored a number of good points in doing
so.)  

   MacArthur was also caught with his planes on the ground; even more
flat-footed than Short was - MacArthur had several *hours* of pointed
warning, since he knew about the attack on Pearl before the sun was
even up in the Philippines - but got 'off' without a blemish, because
he was more "necessary" to the war effort at the time.  The blame does
not necessarily fall where it belongs, especially when it comes to the
deaths of American boys...  (that's been true all through our history,
by the way.)

Charles
Newsgroups: alt.war
From: jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Larry Jewell)
Subject: Re: What if there had been no Pearl Harbor?
Keywords: WWII, Pearl Harbor
Organization: Purdue University
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 11:50:46 GMT

In article <1992Oct8.235812.21287@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca> parasite@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Leslie Mills) writes:
>> (introduction deleted...)
>>So, here are the questions: Would the Japanese have had any chance of
>>getting the US to agree to negotiations if
>>(a) the Japanese diplomats had not fumbled the translation of the
>>declaration of war, i.e., the attack would have happened, say, an hour
>>or even a few minutes after the declaration;
>The American public would still have felt "stabbed in the back".  From
>what I heard, the declaration of war was worded in such a roundabout
>manner the Americans would have felt lied to regardless of the timing.


NB, the declaration on war from Japan was not written until AFTER the 
attack.   Check Toland.  Cite follows this PM.

Larry J


-- 
#L.W. Jewell Moderator at the Veterans Information Site (veteran@cc.purdue.edu)#
#& WWII-L Listowner: "Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange,#
#sudden and wholly unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all   #
#phases of life." "Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41  #
From: mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner)
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Date: 14 Oct 92 20:59:30 GMT
Organization: DB and ES Subdivision, TU Vienna

From article <1992Oct14.181238.5994@news2.cis.umn.edu>, by thornley@giga.cs.umn.edu (David H. Thornley):
> Yup.  Bombing the fuel tanks would have been real serious for us.  Part of
> the Japanese problems were command (Nagumo, who commanded the actual attack,
> really didn't believe in it)

It's true that Nagumo was a battleship-type admiral, but AFAIK he was
not instrumental in planning the targets for the air attacks.  His job
was taking the carriers there and bringing them back.  The reason why
the Japanese did not mount a third attack (which the pilots wanted)
was that Nagumo was deathly afraid that the US would be expecting them
and come looking for his carriers.  After the first two waves had
attacked successfully, he just wanted to get out of strike range fast.
Kind of ironic that he still commanded four of the carriers at Midway
when the US carriers really were waiting.
-- 
Markus Stumptner                                mst@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at
University of Technology Vienna                 vexpert!mst@relay.eu.net
Paniglg. 16, A-1040 Vienna, Austria             ...mcsun!vexpert!mst
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
From: galan@netlink.cts.com (Greg Gross)
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 01:19:15 PDT
Organization: NetLink Online Communications, San Diego CA

frank@rover.uchicago.edu (Frank - Hardware Hacker - Borger) writes:

> In article <1992Oct14.181238.5994@news2.cis.umn.edu>, thornley@giga.cs.umn.ed
> >In article <14OCT199209505662@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.edu> holthaus@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.
> >>In article <Bw3sJt.K1w@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>, mpinnock@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (
> >>>Pearl Harbour would have been a masterstroke had the US carriers been
> >>>in at the time. Also no major fuel or ammunition was destroyed. The Japane
> 
> 	Interesting that no one ever learns from these mistakes. The Argentin-
> 	eans never tried to attack the unarmed supply and support ships of
> 	the British fleet. I heard the commander of the British forces say
> 	that had they lost their supply ships, and been without ammo, fuel,
> 	etc. they would have had to withdraw.
> 
> 	Rommel made the same point in WWII, stating something like, "If I
> 	can deprive the enemy soldier of food, ammunition, and fuel, I don't
> 	have to defeat him."
> 
>    Frank R. Borger - Physicist    __       Internet:  Frank@rover.uchicago.ed
> Michael Reese - Univ. of Chicago |___      Phone : 312-791-8075 fax : 567-745
>   Center for Radiation Therapy   | |_) _   
>                                    | \|_)  Did you ever have the measels, and
>     "Birthplace of Softball"          |_)  if so, how many? - Artemus Ward


I seem to remember the Argentines sinking at least one merchantman during 
Falklands-Malvinas. Atlantic Conveyor or something similar.
 
What I don't remember was the Argentines running any coordinated strikes 
against the British fleet...part of the force to tie up the covering 
Harriers and escort ships, the rest to go after the transports. What I 
saw instead were almost suicidally courageous but piecemeal attacks on 
the British warships.
G.

--
Gregory Alan Gross      Welcome to life, where no good deed goes unpunished.
San Diego Union-Tribune         (619) 293-1270 (voice)
P.O. Box 191                    (619) 293-2333 (fax)
San Diego, CA 92112-4106        galan@netlink.cts.com (Internet)
Newsgroups: alt.war
From: jaume@ldgo.columbia.edu (steven jaume)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Lost Opportunity of All Time?
Summary: US Civil War - Antietam
Organization: Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 20:46:37 GMT

In article <1992Oct16.122400.25307@cs.joensuu.fi>, hvaisane@cs.joensuu.fi (H. Vaisanen) writes:
> What is the Greatest Military Lost Opportunity of All Time?
> 
> With perfect hindsight (-: it seems that, had military force been used
> in certain place and time, the present-day world would be totally
> different. What are these places and times?
> Of course, we must assume that the proposed military action would have
> been succesful.
> 
How about the failure of McClellan (sp?) to destroy the Army of Northern
Virginia at Antietam in 1862?  It's not everyday that an army commander
gets a copy of his enemies plans delivered to him.  Although McClellan
managed to bring Robert E. Lee to battle in a situation where the Army of
the Potomac enjoyed a 2X or better numerical superiority and had R.E. Lee
with his back to the Potomac River, he only managed a draw, and Lee escaped.

One might argue that a desicive victory for the North at Antietam may not
have changed the course of the US Civil War very much, but remember that
even the marginal victory McClellan won was enough for Abraham Lincoln to
feel secure enough to issue the Emancipation Proclamation (which did change
the nature of the Civil War).

Anyone else has a different view on this?

Steve Jaume	jaume@lamont.ldgo.columbia.edu


Newsgroups: alt.war
From: c34657b@saha.hut.fi (Tuomas Viljanen)
Subject: Re: London Bookstore recommendations wanted
Organization: The Nibelungenlied Incorporated
Distribution: alt
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 12:04:52 GMT

In article <EMERY.92Oct6204150@Dr_No.mitre.org> emery@Dr_No.mitre.org (David Emery) writes:
>I'm looking for recommendations for good used military history
>bookstores in London (England).  I know about the History Bookshop.
>Does anyone have any other recommendations?

Try Motorbooks (near Leicester Square underground station). Excellent place.
Another suggestion could be the souvernir shop of the RAF Museum at Hendon
and Imperial War Museum. Hope this helped. BTW, _where_ is the History
Bookshop ?




  ++ Tuomas Viljanen                     ++ For a battle like Crecy, you do  ++
  ++ Lahderanta 20 A 19                  ++ not need a military genius like  ++
  ++ SF-02720 Espoo 72 FINLAND           ++ Edward III. All you need is an   ++
  ++ 358-0-592175 or c34657b@saha.hut.fi ++ idiot like the Duke of Alencon.  ++
Newsgroups: alt.war
From: buckley@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (BUCKLEY  CHARLES RAY)
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 04:28:33 GMT

In article <14OCT199209505662@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.edu> holthaus@vaxa.weeg.uiowa.edu (James Holthaus at University of Iowa) writes:
>In article <Bw3sJt.K1w@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>, mpinnock@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (M B Pinnock) writes...
>>Pearl Harbour would have been a masterstroke had the US carriers been
>>in at the time. Also no major fuel or ammunition was destroyed. The Japanes
>
>I recall reading somewhere (in some unidentifible place) that the Japanese left
>many large tanks of fuel untouched.  The article asserted that the Japanese
>considered the US to have boundless supplies, so they didn't even bother hitting
>the fuel at Pearl.  The article went on to say that those tanks were the primary
>storage for the Pacific Fleet's fuel.  If those tanks had been hit, more fuel
>would have had to have been shipped from the West Coast.  Can anyone support
>this or cut it to shreds?

No, you nailed it. The Japanese had incredible luck until the batlles started
but blew it once it began. Pearl Harbor was a flat out stretegic failure and
a great tactical success. The Japanese needed to destroy the fuel storage
facilities (conveniently located above ground). They also needed to destroy
the dry dock facilities, submarine pens, and block the channel. The loss of the
fuel pens alone would have given the Japanese an incredible advantage as the
US carrier forces would have needed to go to California to refuel as there were
insufficient tankers in the Pacific to transport the fuel to Hawii - even if the
yards were rebuilt in a reasonable amount of time - a highly unlikely scenario.

Charles Buckley     BB-48  USS West Virginia - you can't keep a good ship down

Newsgroups: alt.war
From: cashman@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Geoff Cashman)
Subject: Re: Seawolf program (was Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time)
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 16:07:08 GMT

Both responses so far apparently hinge on the idea that U.S. policy
regarding the navy must be directed towards power projection on land.

Agreed.

Both responses indicated that there are very few serious naval threats
of appreciable size remaining in the world today for the U.S. Navy. 

*somewhat* agreed. 

1 - It can not be ignored that when a fleet enters an area with the 
    intent of hostile action that it is entering a hostile area.
2 - It can not be ignored that an increasing number of countries around
    the world are seeing the utility of submarines as a part of their
    navies.  Look into Jane's if you don't believe me :-)

Those two facts alone would make me want to have Seawolfs around
rather than Centurions.  

It is a known fact that the best ASW platform is another submarine.
I would not want to enter a hostile environment with billion+ dollar
carriers having my subsurface elements not being up to the task of
defenses of those surface units. 

			- Geoff Cashman


Newsgroups: alt.war