From: uphrrmk@Msu.oscs.montana.edu
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Reply-To: uphrrmk@Msu.oscs.montana.edu
Organization: Montana State University
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 01:09:20 GMT

In article <1992Nov17.230828.17309@mp.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <spurrett.44.721940415@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
>>
>>SUMMARY: There's been a lot of activity following my original posting, at
>>least by the standards of my earlier efforts.  In this posting I attempt to
>>clarify some confusions and respond to a few criticisms, and also offer an
>>analysis of the debate intended to characterise the fundamental issues.
>>
>>PART I: Clarifications
>>
>>(1) In article <1992Nov12.224326.6870@guinness.idbsu.edu>,
>>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>>
>>> I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
>>> chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
>>> incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
>>> correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
>>> that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
>>> sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
>>> [.....]
  Interesting.>>
>>I disagree fundamentally.  Certainly there are many senses of possibility, but
>>the sense relevant to `free will' is not what is sometimes called `epistemic'
>>possibility, as suggested by Holmes.
>
>But surely Randall's "free will" is all that you can ask for.  After
>all you cannot know that which you cannot know.  There is no way of
>determining if there is any other type of free will.
   True.  It's hard to tell what's there if you don't know what's there.>
>>                                      This is, perhaps, well illustrated by
>>looking at the way we deal with attributions of responsibility.  If I believe
>>of a person who stole my watch that that person _thought_ s/he could have
>>chosen not to take the watch, but was in fact mistaken then I cannot con-
>>sistently hold him/her responsible.
>
>This argument is surely irrelevant.  Randall was not talking about belief
>but about knowledge.  In other words, the situation is that as far as
>the thief knew, he had the free will not to steal your watch, and as
>far as you know he had that same free will.  Thus, based on everything
>you know, you should hold him responsible.  But if in some interpretation
>of how the universe works it happens that the thief was not free, then
>in that same interpretation you yourself are not free to decide not to
>hold him responsible either.  To put it in other terms, your ability to
>choose whether to hold him responsible is itself the evidence you need
>to conclude that he was responsible.
      Ah, But how do you get back the watch?>
             Hello. This net looks thought provoking and interesting.
Pleased to meet you all. I was wondering if anyone had anything to recommend in
the way of Chinese philosohy?  I've gotten hooked on Taoism, and have so far
read "The Tao te Ching", "The Tao of Pooh" " The Bhaghavad Gita", a fair bit of
Mark Twain when he was being very caustic, and a LOT of Medieval history,
Celtic,Russian and Chinese Mythology.  I would enjoy it very much if anyone
would give me some suggestions of anything I might not have read and might
enjoy.
                           Merci, and may the Gods of Fattening Treats
                           reward you with Insulin Shock Brownies...
                           (write for recipe and mouth-watering description)

                           La Mort.
P.S.  Is it possible that there's a TAO of Dessert?  If there isn't, there
should be.  Stands to reason there would be; after all, there's a Tao of 
Sex out there...(Wish I could find a copy, saw it in a bookstore and fell in
love. Didn't have enough $ to get it, though.)

                           

Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2554 sci.philosophy.tech:4207