From: jbc4m@holmes.acc.Virginia.EDU (John B. Carr)
Subject: Kennedy and withdrawal
Reply-To: jbc4m@holmes.acc.Virginia.EDU (John B. Carr)
Organization: University of Virginia
Distribution: all
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 22:13:43 GMT

	Neil Sheehan and George Herring are both rather skeptical of
Kennedy's intention to withdraw as reported long after the fact by
members of his staff.  The following passages are from George
Herring's America's Longest War, the United States and Vietnam, 1950 -
1975.

pp. 94-95

The Joint Chiefs had initiated long-range planning on troop levels in
1962 to ensure a balance between the Vietnam commitment and America's
other global requirements, and in 1963 had produced a plan calling for
a phased withdrawal of American advisers to begin later in the year
and to end in 1965.  The plan seems to have reflected the Pentagon's
persisting optimism about progress in containing the insurgency.  Some
members of Kennedy's staff have since argued, however, that the
President's approval of it indicates his determination to avoid an
open-ended commitment.

pp. 101-102

(Sept. 1963)
In return for the removal of American troops and the resumption of
north-south trade, Hanoi agreed to a neutralized South Vietnam in
which Diem would be permitted to preside over a coalition government.
Diem was at least tempted by such a deal, for reasons of survival if
not for others.  French President Charles de Gaulle was actively
promoting a settlement along similar lines.
[...]
	Hindsight makes it clear that such an approach had much to
commend it, but the administration gave it no consideration.  Kennedy
was increasingly frustrated by a situation which was rapidly becoming
unmanageable, but he was not yet ready to abandon a policy that had
been set for more than a decade. [...] Perhaps they [Kennedy and his
advisors] were captives of their own rhetoric and could not seriously
consider a settlement which required an American withdrawal.

p. 107

His [Kennedy's] defenders, many of whom would become outspoken
opponents of the war, would later argue that at the time of his death
he was planning to extricate the United States from what had become a
quagmire.  What Kennedy might have done can never be known, however,
and his administration must be judged on what it actually did during
its brief tenure.  Kennedy and most of his advisors accepted, without
critical analysis, the assumption that a non-Communist Vietnam was
vital to America's global interests, and their rhetoric in fact
strengthened the hold of that assumption.  That the President himself
never devoted his full attention to Vietnam, as his defenders claim,
seems clear.  He reacted to crises and improvised responses on a
day-to-day basis, seldom examining the implications of his actions.
Nevertheless, his cautious, middle course significantly enlarged the
American role and commitment in Vietnam, and with the coup [against
Diem], the United States assumed direct responsibility for the South
Vietnamese government.  Although apparently troubled by growing
doubts, Kennedy refused, even after the problems with Diem had reached
the crisis point, to face the hard questions.  Perhaps in concealing
from the nation the dangers of the growing American involvement, he
deluded himself.  Whatever his fears or his ultimate intentions, he
bequeathed to his succesor a problem eminently more dangerous than the
one he had inherited from Eisenhower.

--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 John Carr                           UNIX Support Specialist
 jbc4m@virginia.edu                  Academic Computing, Gilmer Hall
 804/982-4710                        University of Virginia
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Newsgroups: alt.war.vietnam