From: smezias@rnd.GBA.NYU.EDU (Stephen J. Mezias)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: Misogyny
Date: 16 Nov 92 16:10:51 GMT
Organization: NYU Stern School of Business

In article <1992Nov15.190847.22192@rotag.mi.org> kevin@rotag.mi.org
(Kevin Darcy) writes to me (>>>>) & (>>):

>>>>I find the anti-choice position to have a
>>>>discriminatory effect and I feel comfortable interpreting that
>>>>discriminatory effect as evidence of misogyny.  
>>>
>>>More men than women died when the Titanic sunk. I guess icebergs are 
>>>misandrous, huh?
>>>
>>>Be careful in attributing motives, based purely on EFFECTS, Stephen.
>>
>>First, I am sure that certain corrections would disprove your
>>contention.  If we controlled for the effects of (1) actual gender
>>distribution on the ship and (2) policies that allocate positions on
>>lifeboats on the basis of status, we could disprove your claim by
>>testing against a random sample of events {Ship hitting iceberg}.  
>
>Similarly, can you identify any "policies" in the pro-life movement
>which specify discrimination against gender WITHOUT being inextricably
>linked to the biological fact that currently only women gestate? I
>doubt very much that you can.

Why does an inextricable link disqualify misogyny, which requires the
same inextricable link?  You seem to be saying that one can only prove
misogyny by looking at policies that do not have an inextricable link
with gender.  Sounds like Catch-22.

>>Second, the question is not about comparisons of objective cause and
>>effect, it is about how we actually define cause and effect.  If one
>>applies a contract law model, then proving intent is not necessary.
>>The very fact that you failed to meet the contract *in effect* is
>>enought to establish guilt.
>
>Actually, you're not even correct on those grounds.  Intent is
>necessary for there to be a "meeting of the minds". People who have
>made contracts while drunk, for instance, have had their contractual
>obligations voided.  Similarly, for fraud & coercion. The absence or
>presence of intent to enter into an obligation is critical.

(1) I was making a statement about the determination that a contract
has not been fulfilled when contract law is applied.  I made no
statement about how its applicability is determined either to existing
contentions of contract or the case of abortion policies.  I only note
in passing that the use of the word contract to describe relations
among groups in society has a pedigree as long as any other
terminology you might care to use.  However, I was suggesting the
model of proof by effect, which I believe does apply here, and giving
an example of its application; I did not intend to argue that contract
law, the application example I used, was necessarily applicable in
this case.
 
(2) Thus, my argument was about how the standards of proof we choose
constructs the social reality within which policies are enacted.  My
argument is quite simple; while you may not agree, I think the
assertion that it is not correct in some objective sense is hardly as
cut and dry as you suggest: (a) At the individual level,
discrimination can *only* be understood in terms of motives such as
misogyny, racism, homophobia, etc.  I notice that you ignored my
question to you about other possible explanations.  (b) Discriminatory
effect is sufficient as proof of disrimination, i.e., failure to
support equitable policies.

In disagreeing by pursuing the legalese line you seem to be favoring
here, I suggest that you read the criticisms of HLA Hart and theories
of law as an objective reality by Stanley Fish throughout his book
Doing What Comes Naturally (1989: Duke University Press).

>Having said that, I don't think the contract model is particularly useful
>here, unless you're trying to say that pro-lifers "contract" to deny
>women abortions (???)

Why is the contract model not useful as an example of an area where we
use proof by effect in our legal system?  

>>My statement quite clearly gave my position: I am comfortable in
>>associating the intent to discriminate against women with support for
>>forced pregnancy.  If you have some other interpretation that you wish
>>me to consider as I follow your advice to be more careful in making
>>such assertions, please share it with us.
>
>They value fetal human life higher than born human life. If there is any
>discrimination present, it's by developmental stage FIRST, and gender SECOND.
>I'd be more likely to just chalk it up to simple insensitivity to women's 
>wants and needs, than to active misogyny or desire to gender-discriminate.
>Insensitivity is far more prevalent in the human condition than hatred.

Apparently, we disagree; I take the insensitivity as prima facie
evidence of misogyny.  While I understand that someone who lynched
women for taking jobs would be more misogynistic than someone who was
merely insensitive to the needs of women, I don't think that
disqualifies both categories of behavior from meriting the label of
misogyny.  Similarly, I would characterize those in the pro-forced
pregnancy camp who want to deny exceptions for rape, incest, and the
mother's life as more misogynistic than those would permit such
exceptions.  Where would you draw the line?  Does someone have to
physically harm a woman before their behavior could be termed
misogynistic?

SJM 
Newsgroups: talk.abortion