From: nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 12 Nov 92 15:22:17 GMT
Organization: Hewlett-Packard Corporation, Chelmsford, MA

In article <BxKnAC.8Bq@quake.sylmar.ca.us> brian@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>In article <BxGCxI.tx@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:

>>>of academic philosophers?  Whether it's rigorous by your definition or not,
>>>does that mean it's false?  Or do you even believe in falsehood?
>
>>  Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are:  testability, 
>>  falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
>>  Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
>>  false.  
>
>Depending on how you define these, you are right.  Objectivism DOES fail
>when analyzed from a logical positivist point of view.  If it didn't
>it would just be a special application of LPism.  On what basis do you
>conclude that these criteria are correct?

   On the basis of pragmatism -- systems of knowledge based on these
   seem to "work" the best and have the best track record of achieving
   closure and progress (e.g., compare the track record of science trying
   to answer the questions under its domain and improve the precision
   of its models with those of religion trying to deal with the issues
   under its domain.  Religion is still wrestling with the same issues
   they have been for thousands of years with no mechanism for resolving
   differences of opinion.  Science gets past its disputes and moves
   onward) .   But I'm well aware that this leads to the regression:
   "On what basis do I choose "what works" as my criteria, <etc>?" 
   That's why I have repeatedly asked others who use different criteria
   what THEY think are good epistemological criteria, and why.


>a precondition of that denial.  What do you think the status of such 
>statements is?  False?

   I would call it axiomatic.



> You want to test out Rand's ethics?  >Look at people you have known. 
> Who lives better lives?  Thieves?  Slaves? >Murderers?  Liars?  Dictators?
> Or honest free independent men?

   I can certainly think of plenty of thieves, dictators, liars, etc, 
   who live far better than I or anyone I personally know.   And 
   therein lies the problem:   If objectivism had the weight of
   something like a law of physics there would be NO exceptions.
   Moreover, the fact that people, whether thieves, dictators,
   and liars, or honest free independent men, do as they do, is
   easily explained via any number of philosophies.   The fact
   that most societies adopt the ethical systems they do and attempt
   to enforce them is perfectly consistent with pragmatism, for
   instance.



>  When you look at social systems, which promote the lives of the
>  citizens?  Fascism? Monarchy?  Socialism?  Military dictatorship?
>  or Capitalist Republics?

    But all you're doing is building the argument for pragmatism, and
    Rand hated pragmatism.  


>Ah, but is the existence of objective external reality falsifiable?

   No, it's axiomatic.   It's also not at issue here since none of
   us, as far as I know, fails to accept the existence of objective
   external reality as axiomatic.    One problem with Randians is that
   they choose as axioms things which are highly debatable.   



>Again I have to ask whether you are aware of the objectivist argument
>in favor of it's ethics?  Are you making the claim that there are no
>ethical positions any better or worse than any others?  Say, that the
>ethical ideas of Charlie Manson are no better or worse than yours?

  Again, this begs the question we're discussing here which is "on
  what basis can we say that one set of ethical ideas is better or
  worse than another?"    I certainly *prefer* my ideas to Manson's
  but this is subjectivism.   I can argue that a society based on
  Mansonic principles would not work as well as one based on my
  ideas, but even if that's true it's just pragmatism.

  So in absolute terms no I do NOT claim that my ethics are better
  than Manson's.   However, as I've pointed out before, the lack
  of objective ethics is a double-edged blade:  Just as I would
  argue that the Jews and others had no absolute right to not be
  subject to force and fraud by the NAZIs, likewise I would argue
  that the NAZIs had no right to not be subject to force and fraud
  by us.   Ethics-as-social-convention, where that convention is
  sometimes enforced by force, is a simple, consistent model which
  easily accounts for all of this without resorting to metaphysics.


---peter
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:4794 talk.philosophy.misc:2339 sci.logic:1962