From: news@cc.swarthmore.edu (USENET News System)
Subject: YUGOWAR: WHY IS GOING ON?
Originator: vuksan@ginger
Organization: Swarthmore College
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 01:31:53 GMT

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The following text has been written by:
Ivo Skoric, 103 St Marks pl, New York, NY 10009, USA
telephone:(212) 995-5601 e-mail: iskoric@igc.apc.org
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@2 YUGOWAR: WHY IS GOING ON?
 
NASTY POLITICS
Nation-states of former Yugoslavia do not have democratic tradition
whatsoever. Historically, political transitions in Serbia, and the
rest, were made through and by violence.
 
In forty years of totalitarian regime, civil society was never
successfully developed. There was never (except for the very short
period in a chaos of late '80-ties) a space for free expression of
opinions that were different of governmental.
 
That regime suddenly collapsed globally leaving people in a vacuum.
The bonding factor of society vanished. When regime that tries to
control every aspect of people's lives collapse - it is a disaster.
Imagine catholic church collapsed in 10th or 11th century.
 
Individuals who held the political power, in the time of that
collapse, decided to keep that power at any cost. That became
obvious after Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia in 1988
shifting fundamentals of party ideology from "class unity" towards
"ethnic unity".
 
NO ECONOMY
There are parts of former Yugoslavia that were never industrialized
before the end of the WW II: Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro. Those
and other parts were forcedly industrialized after the WW II.
Forced urbanization and industrialization in '50-ties destroyed
agriculture and rural areas. Most rural areas in former Yugoslavia
today have negative population growth. The factories built were
mostly "old industries": coal, iron, steel, etc. So, when the old
industries were hit by a global extinction in '80-ties, Yugoslav
economy collapsed like British or Poland's.
 
Yugoslavia failed to develop new industries. Yugoslavia failed to
make its products competitive in the world market. As a result -
productivity felt, and GNP plunged. In the middle of '80-ties
Yugoslavia consequently became unable to service its 20 billion $
debt without introducing draconian measures on its own population.
Late Yugoslav governments tried to balance between cuts in military
spending (that consumed 80% of country's budget), lowering the real
incomes, rescheduling debt payments and increasing unemployment.
Finally, they failed. IMF and other world creditors refused to be
more lenient on debt (the same is today happening to Russia),
standard kept falling (today is around year 1950.), unemployment
kept rising (today it is 10-70% depending on state and age group),
and Yugoslav Army stubbornly refused to go along with cuts. So,
government just printed more money in order to keep abundant brass
happy. That made yearly inflation rate in Yugoslavia soared to over
2000%.
 
People who grew up in Yugoslavia in eighties remember that as years
of quiet despair. There were no signs that the old regime would be
able ever to recover the country's economy. There were no signs
either that anybody would ever be able to topple the old regime.
Hopelessness was the word.
 
It was expected that nineties would be years of much louder
despair.
 
TOO MUCH CULTURE, TOO MUCH HISTORY
Yugoslav nationalities lived for about 500 years in a state of
permanent ongoing warfare. Horror stories were told from grandpa
to grandson generation after generation. Taking too serious marxist
account of "armed people", Tito developed a country defense so that
everybody got acquainted with all aspects of modern warfare since
the grammar school. Deep economic crisis and no legally available
reliefs made crime a desirable and honorable act. If a small
business is forced to pay a 110% in taxes, the owner would
certainly cheat. So, the lawmakers intentionally developed laws
that nobody could obey. The intention was to collect bribes. The
result was a society that treats crime not only as acceptable but
also as desirable behavior. Violence was just a next step...
 
Croatian and Serbian national symbols, that were long suppressed,
but never openly discussed in communist Yugoslavia, historically
create a great deal of fear in the opposite ethnic group. Increased
use of those symbols in the war in Croatia helped convince ordinary
people on both sides that "the time has come."
 
Then, there is cannon-food. Unemployment was about 3 times higher
among youth. No signs of recovery, no space for rationalization,
no future feeling overwhelmed younger generations, made them ready
to take whatever risk. Late eighties saw increase in both domestic
and neighborhood violence and in juvenile delinquency and drug
abuse. Eighties were also years of Bad Blue Boys, Torcida, Armada,
Grobari (graveyardsmen), Delije and other soccer hooligan gangs.
Croat and Serb hooligans were not less formidable than their
English or Scottish counterparts. They were just waiting that
somebody hangs a gun over their shoulders.
 
They did not have to wait very long.
 
(Grown-ups tend to believe that youth defies order. Actually, young
people desperately want to install some order and some system in
their lifes, and if society fails to supply tools (jobs, housing,
education, social services, sports, entertainment...), youth will
instinctivelly form their own subterranean culture. Such culture
will be both more strict and more violent as society as a whole
progresses to a bigger chaos. Youth will try to form a phalanx
against the approaching chaos - I believe this is the clue to all
this neo-nazi stuff in eastern Europe. If society fails to cut the
extremes of the new culture and, at the same time, if society fails
to accomodate the mainstream of the new culture to the mainstream
of the old culture, it usually ends with trouble).
 
 
THE GRIDLOCK
Since Tito died Yugoslavia had no president. Instead country was
ruled by an eight-headed presidency. Each republic and province had
the voting member. Each voting member had a veto right. So, all
decisions had to be made by consensus. After Milosevic came to
power in Serbia, Serbian delegate made demands for even more
entitlement from Slovenia and Croatia in order to feed ever
greater Yugoslav Army. Slovenia and Croatia grew less and less
willing to comply. That lead to a political gridlock. As I remember
Yugoslav presidency wasn't able to reach the simplest decision
since 2-3 years before the war started.
 
Ante Markovic, the federal prime minister, wanted Yugoslavia in
E.C. with the convertible currency. E.C. demanded, among other
things, democratization of Yugoslav society. Political structures
in Slovenia and Croatia were willing to go along - in Serbia they
labeled that E.C.'s demand as interfering with country's internal
affairs. Finally, Croatia and Slovenia decided to consider
secession if they would be unable to reach a compromise with Serbia
on the issue.
 
Impatience with Milosevic's arrogance of a bully and an
overstatement of E.C. commitment made Slovenia and Croatia to rush
with the independence declarations.
 
(Watching the Congress of People's Deputies in Russia I instantly
remembered Yugoslavia in late eighties: endless sessions of central
committee, deputies shouting on, threatening, physically silencing
each other, the whole delegations demonstratively leaving the
congress, etc. I am just very curious if Russia will end the same
way Yugoslavia did...)
 
THE LACK OF COMMITMENT
Yugoslavia lost its geo-strategic importance with the end of the
cold war. So, usual anti-communist rhetoric didn't work with the
U.S. and other western countries. Also, Yugoslavia was a poor
uninteresting place without any major reserves of any strategically
important resource (e.g. oil, coal, iron, copper, gold, uranium,
etc.). Then, there were mixed interests of world economic and
political superpowers in Yugoslavia: Germany with ties to Slovenia
and Croatia and the U.S. with ties to Serbia and the Yugoslav
military-industrial complex.
 
More important, however, is a general lack of commitment to just
peace in this world. People all over the planet are living too
damned comfortable with bad things happening all over the planet
to "other" people. And, for peace you need at least two. For war
- one is enough. Yugoslav Army and Milosevic were willing to reach
their political objectives by force if necessary, and ONLY if world
community did something in the beginning of that crusade (1988 or
1989) would this war today be avoided.
 
Yugoslav Army should have been disarmed and demobilized a long time
ago (or more precisely: at latest immediately after the war in
Slovenia).
 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IS HARDLY FEASIBLE
Even for a world's strongest army it is difficult to win just by
using conventional weapons. Last forty years world prepared itself
for a nuclear warfare. Even poor countries like Yugoslavia built
its military bases inside the mountains able to resist a direct
nuclear blast. To complicate that the terrain in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Macedonia is mountainous - Alpine (with a lot of snow in winter).
Dense forests in summer all but protect Serbian troops from aerial
surveillance. Factions in Bosnia not only fight a guerilla warfare,
but wear the same or very similar uniforms, look alike and use the
same weapons, what would make impossible to tell friend of enemy.
Also, there are confusing and discouraging fights between Croat and
Bosnian forces, and between regular Croat and Croat paramilitary
forces who are supposed to be allied.
 
Even if logistics would be solved - the only party really
interested in foreign military intervention are Bosnians. Yugoslav
Army and Serbs are obviously against, because they would be the
principal target. Unfortunately, Croatian government seems to be
very vague on the issue. It seems that it can live comfortably with
30,000 Croat paramilitaries, that would otherwise threaten the
government, roaming Bosnia. Like Mongolia between Russia and China,
Bosnia is engulfed within Croatia and Serbia. So, in order to do
the job, any foreign military force would have to have support of
Croatia to place the troops there (as Americans did with Saudi
Arabia during the Gulf War).
 
"Yugoslavia" needs much longer preparation for an intervention than
"Somalia." Essentially, the case is same: foreign troops have to
liberate starving, suffering civilians from merciless hands of
armed gangs ruling the country. The difference is that armed gangs
in former Yugoslavia are more numerous, better equipped, better
trained and less hungry. Tugs in Somalia are probably less
dangerous, if not worse equipped than tugs in South Central Los
Angeles.
Also important: while Somalian disaster was created by superpowers
direct conflict over Somalia during cold war, so the U.S. bears
some resposnsibility to clear the mess, Yugoslavia long time
enjoyed the position to tease east and west like an undecided
bride. Now as a sick, old and ugly crow, Yugoslavia is of interest
to nobody.

Newsgroups: soc.culture.yugoslavia,soc.culture.croatia,alt.society.revolution,alt.politics.europe.misc,soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna