From: ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Date: 11 Apr 92 14:45:36 GMT
Organization: Peridot Konsult i Mellansverige AB, Oerebro, Sweden

In article <1992Apr7.223711.18902@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <6742@pkmab.se> ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:
>>In article <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>>>Michael Gemar (in e-mail) suggested that the CR was not, after all,
>>>the issue, but syntax vs. semantics was.  Christopher Green made the
>>>same point, in a posting I seem to have misplaced.  
>>
>>Oh, so they know the final word on what the issue is, indeed?
>
>Come, come, let's all be friendly here.

Sorry.

> As I have tried to demonstrate repeatedly (but evidently to no avail) in
>this forum, the Chinese Room is merely a *demonstration* of the formal
>*claim* that syntax doesn't yield semantics.

And you are right in that. But don't forget that many of the arguments that
you find in this newsgroup may nevertheless be directed particularily at the
Chinese Room, and not at something wider, and should be met accordingly.

And also, even though the Chinese Room is only part of Searle's total
argument, I don't see that Searle himself provides much of any other
support for the claim that he derives from it (at least in the Scientific
American article), so it seems to be an important part of his total
argument, as put forth by himself. So it is not very surprising that
people concentrate on the Chinese Roomwhen they discuss Searle. Maybe
there are other arguments that can substitute for it, that others can give,
but we will depart a bit from Searle by doing so.

>>I might be willing to participate in a debate of the suggested kind that
>>takes on a broader scope of this general issue. For instance, the above
>>mentioned people could argue for the position that "computers couldn't
>>possibly possess minds", using all arguments they find relevant, not
>>limited to the Chinese Room argument, while I would take on the position
>>"you're wrong, there is no proof that computers can't have minds".
>
>I have no real anti-AI agenda, appearances to the contrary.  I am not
>interested in simply marshalling all the arguments I can find against
>the claim that computers could possess minds.  I *am* interested in 
>discussing *issues*.

To make the discussion productive, we need a clearly stated position and
counter-position, such that we can know when one or the other position is
being affected by the arguments. It is also good to know explicitely when
someone changes to argue a slightly modified position or abandons a
particular supporting argument. It is also probably best to have the
positions "belong" to certain persons, so not everyone starts editing
each others positions without first convincing the others.

>>I would not be willing to argue the position that "I can prove that
>>computers can have minds", though, which is perhaps the position which
>>the above mentioned people believe the rest of us are arguing from. Is
>>there anyone at all here who would be brave/foolish enough to take on that
>>position?

>Again, I am not interested in "us vs. them" debates.  I am perfectly
>willing to be open-minded - heck, I've even changed my view about the
>sufficiency of Searle's response to the Systems Reply.

Yes, that's a very interesting development. Christopher Green seems to
be much more determined about his position. But we still have to agree
on some explicit starting positions to get the discussion going, and
have a reasonable number of people that can work out the best arguments
on each side amongst them, at least that was Drew's original idea.

> But if your demonstrations can't hold up to reasoned argument, then
>they're not very good demonstrations.

Just in order to be able to agree on what is reasoned argument and
irrelevant complications, the positions that are being argued for need
to be clearly defined and carefully chosen.

>> An empirically verified explanation of how the human brains
>>work (which we don't have either) would convert some people, I think, but
>>not even that is water-tight. 
>
>How do you empirically verify how the brain generates meaning?

That's my point. You can't really.

It might be possible to arrive at an empirical description of all the work
the brain does, and it might be possible to show all kinds of correlation
between this work and the subjective experiences the brain's owners are
having, but having all this, it is still a question of faith whether you
surrender to all that and assume that that work has to be the explanation,
or choose to believe that there has to be some other explanation. I wanted
to say, though, that I *have* seen some indications that some could be
satisfied by such a case.

> The whole debate is whether behaviour (i.e., Turing Test) is sufficient
>to indicate a mind.  In this case, it seems to me empirical considerations
>don't enter into it.  It is a matter of analysis.

Since it is also a problem of choosing what definitions and basic views
you like the best, it is also a matter of taste.

For instance, if you have the basic view of the world that everything can
be reduced and explained, then you may be persuaded by an empirical
description in choosing your further definitions. One very taste-dependent
issue would be how powerful capabilities you ascribe to the human mind,
I think.

Aside from that, I sense trouble already. First you said the issue was
syntax vs. semantics. Here you say the debate is about behaviour as an
indicator of mind. Perhaps they are close in your mind, but I think the
clarity of the debate is best served by choosing one precisely formulated
question and sticking to that.

>> I think the problem to a great extent
>>involves how we choose to define meaning and mind and other terms (i.e.,
>>what attributes of these concept we take for granted, and base our further
>>arguments on), and there simply is no way to "prove" a definition. Some
>>definitions can be shown not to lead to the expected consequences, though.
>
>I agree completely with all of the above, and I think this is the *only*
>way to proceed on this issue.

Uhm, I didn't state any way of how to proceed in that quote. Perhaps you
mean that the way is to discuss definitions and consequences?

>>I also think that the failure even to agree on the _issue_ for this proposed
>>more formal debate, provides the definite demonstration that people have been
>>attributing the wrong positions to each other,
>
>This may very well be the case, although the validity of one's argument
>has no relation to what side one is on.

No, but what side one is on does affect the final purpose of the argument
and the type of proof needed, and if you interpret an argument as coming
from another side than what was meant (and they often don't say what
side they come from explicitely), your reaction to the argument will be
wrong.

If you read an argument, intended to show conclusion A, as an argument for
the related but slightly different conclusion B, it may seem nothing but
silly, even if originally had a point, and very often the discussion will
take off in a new direction leaving the original point unresolved.

Therefore, we all have to be very careful if we want to keep the discussion
straight.

>I'd be willing to drop the Chinese Room in favor of a wider debate.  I can't,
>however, speak for my "co-religionists".

So, what do we hear from the "co-religionists"?

-- 
Kristoffer Eriksson, Peridot Konsult AB, Hagagatan 6, S-703 40 Oerebro, Sweden
Phone: +46 19-13 03 60  !  e-mail: ske@pkmab.se
Fax:   +46 19-11 51 03  !  or ...!{uunet,mcsun}!mail.swip.net!kullmar!pkmab!ske
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy