HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
Date: 21 Jan 1993 19:48:33 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com

cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes:

|> If that $56 figure is faintly accurate, then I expect that the NSA
|> must have some rather high-speed hardware, probably specialized to
|> DES, that costs quite a bit less than anyone expected.  I would have
|> expected a somewhat higher bill.
|> 
|> I can give some basic "blanks" to fill in:
|> 
|> a) Number of messages processed: _____________
|> 
|> b) Mean Size of messages processed:   _____________  (may be important)
|> 
|> A * B = "total ciphertext"
|> 
|> c) Cost of electricity and staffing, per hour, for the NSA "DES
|> Breaker" computer:                  ____________
|> 
|> d) Average time to decrypt 1K of message on the "DES Breaker":
|> ______________
|> 
|> Actually, one can probably get that $56 just out of figures b), c) and
|> d).
|> 
|> $56 = (b) * (c) / (d)
|> 
|> I'm ignoring capital costs, in this analysis, but I'd suspect that so
|> does the NSA.  Governments don't tend to consider "capital costs" to
|> be REAL costs, for a variety of reasons.
|> 
|> And if anyone wishes to publicise the values b), c) and d), that's
|> THEIR choice.  Those three numbers are probably considered QUITE
|> secret.

You need single-chip search engines (custom-built IC, not standard 
DES chips) with a gate delay of 3 nanoseconds to get a 1-microsecond
search time.  You make a machine with 100 racks of 10,000 IC's/rack.

in 1976, given economies of scale, each IC would cost ~$10 
($10M/machine).  Allow a factor of two, for other hardware and you
pay $20M/machine.  Amortize costs over 5 years, and you pay $10K/day.

10**6 keys     10**5 sec     10**6 IC     10**17 keys
----------  X  ---------  X  --------  =  -----------
  sec/IC          day           1             day

10**17 searches ~= 2**56 searches = 1 exhaustive search.

1 exhaustive search/day at $10K/day = $10K/exhaustive search.

These are 1976 figures.  Even if we are optimistic by an order
of magnitude, the cost of computation falls in 5 years by a factor 
of 10; in 15 years (by now) by 1,000.  This results in a cost of
~$10/exhaustive search.

(The preceding is condensed from a talk given by Prof. Martin E. 
Hellman of Stanford University at the RSA Data Security Conference,
1/17/93)

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:7080 alt.radio.scanner:3881
From: walsh@optilink.COM (Mark Walsh)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.radio.scanner
Subject: Re: AT&T news release
Date: 18 Jan 93 22:20:40 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: Optilink Corporation, Petaluma, CA

In article <1993Jan14.021852.22341@news.eng.convex.com> gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) 
writes:

>       Since it takes a TV signal about a microsecond to travel 3m

From article <15500.2b58dbb0@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu>, by vancleef@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu:

> EM radiation propogates at 1/299792458  sec per meter or
> 33.3 ns per meter. In one microsecond the wave travels about 30m.

Reminds me of a programming class in college.  Our teacher
held up a foot long piece of wire and said, "Does anybody
know what this is?"  I blurted out "It's solid copper,
26 gauge, with an insulation breakdown of 300 volts."
She tried not to laugh and said, "No!  *This* is a
nanosecond!"
-- 
Mark Walsh (walsh@optilink) -- UUCP: uunet!optilink!walsh
AOL: BigCookie -- Amateur Radio: KM6XU@WX3K -- USCF: L10861
"What, me worry?" - William M. Gaines, 1922-1992
From: gtoal@pizzabox.demon.co.uk (Graham Toal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Spycatcher
Date: 24 Jan 93 17:53:18 GMT
Organization: Cuddlehogs Anonymous

In article <JIM.93Jan24171124@hunter.cs.strath.ac.uk> jim@cs.strath.ac.uk (Jim Reid) writes:
:eventually went on sale in the UK. It was then discredited when Wright
:claimed to have made up some of its allegations - like the plot
:against then Prime Minister Harold Wilson - so that the book would get
:a lot of publicity and generate extra sales.

I thought I'd followed this saga quite closely, but I never heard anything
like this.  When did this happen?  Where did you hear it?

G
From: waldo@lucifer.stanford.edu ()
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Technical Terms ...
Date: 22 Jan 1993 19:08:24 GMT
Organization: CMR XRAY LAB
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: lucifer.stanford.edu


Greetings and Felicitations:

I recently came across some terms that I don't understand very well
and I was wondering if somebody out there in net land could take a
moment to enlighten me.

What does the term "superencipherment" mean ?

What exactly is a "generatrix" ?

If this stuff is in the FAQ list, let me know and I will try to
hunt it up somewhere.  Many thanks.

waldo@lucifer.stanford.edu
From: BUSCHMAN@NDSUVM1.BITNET
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Wanted source code for gi buster
Date: 28 Jan 93 01:22:08 GMT
Organization: North Dakota Higher Education Computer Network

Wanted The source code for GI Buster.


If anyone has any info on the VCii.  I would love the specs for the TI 7010 chi
p.  I believe that this is what they use in the descrambler.  Any info would be
 appreciated!  Thanks Much!

                           Greg   Buschman@vm1.nodak.edu
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Getting random numbers from timing events?
Date: 21 Jan 1993 20:16:07 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com

In article <1jk77nINNeh3@darkstar.UCSC.EDU> speth@cats.ucsc.edu (James Gustave) writes:
>
>  I need a source for truly random numbers for an encryption program I'm
>working on.  I was thinking of using PGP's approach and time keyboard input
>with a fast timer, then use the low-order 8-bits as a random number.  I'm
>working on a Mac, so I'd like to use key and mouse events.  How can I tell
>if the numbers I'm getting are good enough to be considered cryptographically
>random?


One way is to do the same sequence of operations over and over again,
trying to be as repeatable as possible, timing it each time.  Then take the
several series of numbers and reduce them statistically to a set of basis
functions.  You should learn from this how many bits of each timed event
are noise and how many are part of the timed sequence itself.  The noise
ones are the only ones you want to use.

It might be, by the way, that there is a regular source of real noise.  You
might therefore take a number of sequences of different actions but the
same length and try to reduce them.  Any common basis found might be noise
from your computer or OS.

Of course, you have to look at the results and interpret them before getting
the answer to your question.  I hope you publish the results here, when you
do get the answer.



-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jac54@cas.org ()
Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's
Organization: Chemical Abstracts Service, Columbus, Ohio
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 11:34:45 GMT

In article <unruh.727986636@unixg.ubc.ca> unruh@unixg.ubc.ca (Bill Unruh) writes:
>In <1993Jan25.115302.27951@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:
>
>>      Polaris tests (late 50's-early 60's).  How many stories of
>>      U.S. astronauts being lost in flight can you remember.  I can
>>      remember one, and that had to do with faulty plumbing.
>
>In flight none before the Shuttle. On Launchpad ( not during a launch but
>during a dry run) three, in an Apollo capsule fire. (Grissom,,, and the two
>others I can't remember).


	...White and Chafee.  The cause of the fire was electrical and
	was the result of haste and poor design of the original Apollo
	capsule.  It had nothing to do with badly written code.

	Alec Chambers
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math
From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Subject: Re: RSA cracked? I don't think so..., HUGE primes?
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Distribution: na
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 07:05:21 GMT

gilgalad@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Ralph Seguin) writes:
: A friend of mine posessing a masters in mathematics said that he had heard
: and saw a flyer in his local math dept that RSA had been cracked.  I told

Could this flyer be obtained?

: him that I thought that this was a load of bunk.  We got into a heated
: discussion and he claimed that methods of factoring large composites had
: been developed that were several orders of magnitude faster than older
: methods.  I told him that this was irrelevant, since you  could generated
: arbitrarily large composites to form your key.  Even going 12 orders of
: magnitude faster (1 trillion times faster), it could still take easily
: several billion years to factor some of the smaller sized keys.  The
: question that I have is: am I completely wrong here (ie, have I stuck
: my foot and a good portion of my leg in my mouth ;) ?  Personally, I feel

If in fact there was a fundamental breakthrough in factoring it could make
the size of the composite irrelevant but I am sure we would know about
that.

: that the NSA posted that flyer to get people to refrain from using something
: they are unable to crack ;>

Not even the NSA is that stupid (I hope :-)

: 
: My second question is:  what is the best means available for generating
: truly huge primes (200+ digits)?  Fermat and Mercene (sp?) numbers
: are NOT secure.

Generating big random numbers and then testing them probabilistically for
primality.  Sounds crude but it works.  The density of primes up in the 
range desired is higher than intuition would lead one to believe.  I think
that 100 attempts is larger than what is encountered on the average (and
I'll be corrected if not :-)  The probibalistic test can be iterated
for an arbitrarilarily high theoretical probability that one is prime.
Well, I know that one is prime, you understand what I mean. :-)

I am less sure of this but I think that if the probabilistic test for
primality actually yields a composite then the product of this with a
real prime is about as hard to factor as a two prime composite.  The
probability of getting two such composites is exceedingly small.

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

    'The meek shall inherit the earth--the rest of us will move on..'
                                                    Sameer Parekh


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,sci.math
From: bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman)
Subject: Re: Oh yeah?  Factor this...
Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA
Distribution: na
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 00:56:08 GMT

In article <1993Jan21.205045.13877@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
:In article <1993Jan21.011510.24294@linus.mitre.org> bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman) writes:
:>27392450308603031423410234291674686281194364367580914627947367941608692026226993634332118404582438634929548737283992369758487974306317730580753883429460344956410077034761330476016739454649828385541500213920807
:>:
:>:Can you factor this number [in your lifetime]?  If so, you may be
:> 
:>What is the source for this number? Is it a random integer? Is it
:>an RSA number, constructed as the product of nearly equal primes?
:>If the latter it is out of current computational range.
:
:(Correcting a previous post)
:Couldn't you take the approximate square root of the number, truncate the
:result, and then start searching up and down from there if the number is the
:product of two nearly equal primes?
 
The above number is 209 digits. Its square root is 105 digits. Let's
say it is the product of primes, the first 10 digits of which are the
same. Thus, they are nearly equal. That only leaves about 10^95 numbers
to search by the proposal you make.

The method you suggest is known as Fermat's method. It is still
only O(sqrt(N)).

--
Bob Silverman
These are my opinions and not MITRE's.
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
From: bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: References for number field sieve (was Re: Oh yeah?  Factor this...)
Date: 22 Jan 93 21:16:30 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA

In article <PC123.93Jan22192804@bootes.cus.cam.ac.uk> pc123@cus.cam.ac.uk (Pete Chown) writes:
:In article <1993Jan22.013643.10520@linus.mitre.org> bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman) writes:
:
:   The Number Field Sieve [on some reasonable unproved assumptions] takes
:   exp( (c + o(1))  (log N)^1/3  (log log N)^2/3)
:   with c ~ 1.91
:
:Does anyone have a reference for any articles or books on the number
:field sieve?  I would quite like to see how they have done it.
					     ^^^^           ^^

The antecedent of the pronoun "they" is unclear to me. To whom do
you refer? And what is "it"? Derived the asymptotic run time? Or
are you asking how the algorithm works?
 
I gave a reference in the bibliography I just posted. The paper 
assumes quite a lot of background in algebraic number theory and
knowledge of the quadratic sieve [they do not explain sieving
procedures]. It also assumes you know a lot of general techniques
in computational number theory, e.g. the Cantor-Zassenhaus method
for factoring polynomials modulo primes, etc. etc. It is a really
excellent paper, but novices will have a rough time with it.
--
Bob Silverman
These are my opinions and not MITRE's.
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: m_reymond@zeus.dev.macsch.com (Mike Reymond)
Subject: SWK's Paper "Decoding a VCR Controller Code"
Keywords: VCR+
Reply-To: m_reymond@macsch.com
Organization: MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 15:49:51 GMT



In SWK's paper:  

        Shirriff K,  Welch C, Kinsman A,  "Decoding a VCR 
        Controller Code,"  Cryptologia, 16 (#3,  July 1992),  227-234.  

They had cracked the code for program lengths up to 300 minutes which
corresponds to table entries up through 479.  As shown below, I've
discovered that for 6 digit codes the table entries  extend past 479
and, as one might expect, correspond to a duration of 330 minutes
beginning with 11:30 PM down thru 8:00 AM.  Do the times earlier
than 8:00 AM encode to 7 digits?  Or is the tenth bit (t subscript 9)
of the mapped top, which is not discussed in the paper, used for the
earlier times?

If the current date in the VCR+ device is 1-1-93, the:

table index   Code        Date    Channel    Start    Length
    480      100081     1   1  93   3        2330       330
    481      100560     1  12  93   40       2300       330
    482      101471     1   4  93   42       2230       330
    483      101710     1   1  93   2        2200       330
    484      101907     1   4  93   1        2130       330
    485      102928     1  12  93   38       2100       330
    486      102973     1  27  93   38       2030       330
    487      103404     1  26  93   18       2000       330
    488      105100     1   4  93   26       1930       330
    489      106839     1   4  93   28       1900       330
    490      106884     1  19  93   28       1830       330
    491      107513     1  19  93   27       1800       330
    492      107780     1   6  93   17       1730       330
    493      108419     1   6  93   19       1700       330
    494      108868     1  13  93   46       1630       330
    495      109597     1  13  93   45       1600       330
    496      109895     1  18  93   16       1530       330
    497      110350     1  27  93   12       1500       330
    498      100539     1  26  93   47       1430       330
    499      101480     1  28  93   40       1400       330
    500      101839     1   4  93   13       1330       330
    501      102386     1  12  93   10       1300       330
    502      102597     1  13  93   20       1230       330
    503      103020     1  20  93   42       1200       330
    504      103470     1  18  93   8        1130       330
    505      103539     1  26  93   31       1100       330
    506      103706     1  13  93   23       1030       330
    507      104815     1   6  93   45       1000       330
    508      105294     1  12  93   22       930        330
    509      105599     1  21  93   45       900        330
    510      106020     1  20  93   28       830        330
    511      106123     1  19  93   27       800        330

Mike Reymond

e-mail: m_reymond@macsch.com
phone:  (213) 259-4926
From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Second cousin to a spoof proof
Date: 25 Jan 93 21:02:29 GMT
Organization: IR
X-Mail-Warning: Do not reply by mail---silverton not configured yet.

In article <C13L7D.1M7@dcs.ed.ac.uk> pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes:
> At the moment, I can't think how to define the problem precisely enough
> to prove that spoofing is impossible.

Assume there is an automorphism of the universe which switches Bob and
Charlie. Then no matter what Alice does, she can't tell the difference
between Bob and Charlie. More precisely, Alice cannot define the
function which is 1 for Bob and 0 for Charlie, because this function
is not invariant under the automorphism.

In practice, for this automorphism to exist, Bob and Charlie have to
start with all the same information, receive all the same information,
and be in a position to send all the same information.

---Dan
From: boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: cipher-text character frequency anaysis program
Date: 29 Jan 1993 02:24:06 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: affirmed.csl.sri.com

This program counts the occurences of each character in
a file, and reports those characters that occured a
certain number more (or less) times than average.

Is this a useful tool in cipher-text analysis?


-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.


------------------- clip clip ------------------------------------
begin 660 freq.c.Z
M'YV0(]*X&<.F#IDR('C,H4,FS1L7:'PH4& D"9,B(%2TR?/%S!LX9=R@,).&
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MA$>0(FF>3+FR3(J6/GW**4.GCAPW3H<616'G31HR*<+*$4C'#(J%!^7(02EB
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MC$ 4,<^,01G:3DNV($*/T?DR9D85I77RU%KF3)J%960"Q:A"H)D>*$#+$0W"
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M#3;8-T<=;?0  VEVG('2@G?0@<96<Z"!$AH%HB$BB28J^,8=;*31QHDIQM@&
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MB_3ZRVO#*#QL\*\OT*#PRLLN*K#/$*=8\PL)5WQMMD9E?*NG*,-;)\@[HS&R
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M1$?"L5:$;OEG!EV2YA8&FB"X@:$8/;Z!U!MCC.'576.@^H(8>?"X90GOLD&&
M"X@IEAJ[. ):YJ!.7BHEHGMGM2T*CVKI:=L@\,%'4M47![3=$J<%<NBCMX6"
MZ725((,+,N ! O P"/_^',6CE 9*U:-$?81[6M_WP<FY#P]$L)_[^. Z*O/)
M]+IW/<>U(2W:XQ[_LN0]9]GH*N/ZF (28 ;1L:5TYCG=?=3'/O?!3WY'0$(0
;@K"$$-3/*/B;8!>ZDP#)4,8R-J/6N#2C0\T 
 
end
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: bs@gauss.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman)
Subject: Re: Is N a prime power?
Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 00:57:30 GMT

In article <1k3qqpINNt0@gaia.ucs.orst.edu> pmontgom@math.orst.edu (Peter Montgomery) writes:
:In article <1993Jan25.150556.24096@linus.mitre.org> bs@fatima.mitre.org 
 
stuff deleted....

: >:verify that a very large (hundreds of digits) number has at least two
: >:distinct prime factors (i.e., that the number is not a prime power).
: >:Tompa gives no hint how to do this and I haven't been able to find anyone
: >:else who knows.  I'd very much appreciate it if someone could explain
: 
: >Direct search. An upper bound on the number of exponentiations is
: >log_2(N). Each one takes O(log^3 N), so direct search takes only
: >O(log^4 N) operations. 
:
:	I suggest testing whether GCD(N, b^(N-1) - 1) > 1,
:where b is selected randomly and GCD(N, b) = 1.  
:If N = p^k, then p-1 divides p^k - 1 = N-1, 
:so p divides both N and b^(N-1) - 1.  This takes time O(log^3 N).
:
Indeed. This is a variant of Cantor-Zassenhaus. [for polynomial roots
mod p]. 
--
Bob Silverman
These are my opinions and not MITRE's.
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.ripem
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Illegal to import PGP into U.S.!
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1993 03:05:58 GMT


Here is the law which covers imports as well as exports of crypto materials
to and from the U.S.:
123.2 Imports.

No defense article may be imported into the United States unless (a)
it was previously exported temporarily under a license issued by the
Office of Munitions Control; or (b) it constitutes a temporary
import/intransit shipment licensed under Section 123.3; or (c) its
import is authorized by the Department of the Treasury (see 27 CFR
parts 47, 178, and 179).

Further, Part 127 - Violations and Penalties - states in 127.1 (a):

(a) It is unlawful
    (1) to export or to attempt to export from the United States
        any defense article or technical data or to furnish any
        defense service for which a license or written approval
        is required by this subchapter without first obtaining 
        the required license or written approval from the Office
        of Munitions Control;
    (2) to import or attempt to import any defense article whenever
        a license is required by this subchapter without first
        obtaining the required license or written approval from
        the Office of Munitions Control;


125.2 Exports of unclassified technical data.

Paragraph (c) reads:

(c) Disclosures. Unless otherwise expressly exempted in this
subchapter, a license is required for the oral, visual, or documentary
disclosure of technical data to foreign nationals in connection with
visits by U.S. persons to foreign countries, visits by foreign persons
to the United States, or otherwise.  A license is required regardless
of the manner in which the technical data is transmitted (e.g., in
person, by telephone, correspondence, electronic means, telex, etc.).

-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: pjb@csfb1.fir.fbc.com (Paul J. Bell)
Subject: Spycatcher 
Reply-To: uunet!csfb1!pjb
Organization: First Boston Corporation
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 16:29:42 GMT

Sorry, I can't stand it anymore. Will someone please tell me/us some details
re: Spycatcher. Author or Publisher and where it was/is available and where
it is/was banned ?

cheers,
	paul
Newsgroups: sci.crypt