From: sera@zuma.UUCP (Serdar Argic)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast,soc.culture.greek,soc.culture.turkish
Followup-To: soc.culture.turkish
Subject: Re: The "Akritas Plan" is to be found in "Stavrinides", pp. 135-143.
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 20:13:07 EST
Reply-To: sera@zuma.UUCP (Serdar Argic)
Distribution: world

In article <C15Apq.2xu@news.cso.uiuc.edu> msg7038@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Michalis  Syrimis) writes:

>>You sound like "Morning the porn-peddler" of ASALA/SDPA/ARF. A copy of 
>>the "Akritas Plan" is to be found in "Stavrinides", pp. 135-143.

>You are completely out of your mind Serdar.  

"Paliks". Amazing creatures. Well, I am "open-minded" about "out of mind
palik".

>I should ask the nn. policy
>makers to require a minimum IQ level to let people post in the network.

Then there would not be a newsgroup called "soc.culture.greek". By the 
way, I point at their brain cells with utter disdain.

>"Stavrinides" is publishing company in Cyprus.  But that's the first time
>I've heard of that book of theirs ....:).

We need more "paliks". We are running out of them.

Source: Pierre Oberling, "The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot
        Exodus to Northern Cyprus", Social Science Monographs, Boulder,
        1982, ISBN 88033-000-7, pp. 81-84.

>Being a scientis you should have learned by now what's the accepted way of
>sighting a source.  However, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and 
>give you an example.
>e.g.
>Day, R.A. (1983). How to Write a Scientific Paper, 2nd Edition, ISI Press,
>Philadelphia, PA.

I told him he hasn't the sense G*d gave a stump.

>So give us an author, year, publishing author, and address.

Always.

Source: Pierre Oberling, "The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot
        Exodus to Northern Cyprus", Social Science Monographs, Boulder,
        1982, ISBN 88033-000-7, pp. 81-84.

Source: Zaim M. Nedjatigil, "Cyprus: Constitutional Proposals and
        Developments," (Nicosia, 1977), pp. 74-81. 


                              AKRITAS PLAN


	TOP SECRET                                          HEADQUARTERS


	     Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown
	the course which our national problem will take in near future.
	As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be 
	concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological
	limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in 
	national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of
	developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to
	time, and measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and
	timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political
	conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through 
	various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion
	are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know,
	however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and 
	that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also,
	it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is a 
	first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and 
	unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional
	application of the right of self-determination.
	     As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt
	upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective.
     	This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external
	(international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and
	handling of our cause within and outside the country are different.

	A. METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE
	     In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem
	had been presented to the world public opinion and to diplomatic 
	circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of
	self-determination. But the question of Turkish minority had been
	introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes
	had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it 
	was impossible for the two communities to live together under a 
	united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes
 	of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, 
	which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and
	agreements between the contending parties. 
	(a)  Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression 
	     in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not 
	     been solved and that it has to be reviewed.

	(b)  The creation of the following impressions has been accepted
	     as the primary objective:
	     (i)  that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory
		  and just
	     (ii) that the agreement which has been reached is not the 
		  result of the free will of the contending parties.
	     (iii)that the demand for the revision for the agreements is not
		  because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonor 
	          their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival
		  of them. 
	     (iv) that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
	     (v)  that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the
		  strong elements on which foreigners must rely.

	(c)  Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives,
             satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic 
	     missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements
	     are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a
	     result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations,
	     and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been an
	     important trump in our hands that the solution  brought by the 
	     Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting
	     wisely in this respect, our leadership avoided holding a
	     referandum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved
	     the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. 
	     Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the adminis-
	     tration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the 
	     Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.

        (d)  Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives
	     we must materialize the second stage on an international level.
	     Our objective in this second stage is to show:
   	     (i)  that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but 
	          only to remove unreasonable and unjust provisions of the 
	          administrative mechanism;
	     (ii) that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away
	          because tomorrow may be too late;
	     (iii)Omitted
	     (iv) that this question of revision is a domestic issue for 
	          Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of
	          intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
	     (v)  that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and 
	          safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
                   
        (e)  Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international 
	     opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against
	     oppresion of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to 
	     convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with 
	     Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances
	     we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public
	     opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-
	     determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right
	     of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must first
	     get rid of the Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Gurantee, the 
	     Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions in the 
	     Constitution which will inhibit the free and unbridled expression
	     of the will of people and which they carry dangers of external
	     intervention. For this reason, our first target has been the 
	     Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited
	     as not being recognized by the Greek Cypriots.
 
             When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force  
        will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a
        plebiscite.

	     It will be understood from the above explanations that it is 
	necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order
	to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and 
	developments failed to materialize, our future actions would
	be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would
	be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions
	to be taken are as follows:
        (a)  The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and
	     the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of 
	     Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the 
	     necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is
	     generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable
	     (passage omitted) whereas an external intervention to prevent
	     the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified
	     and inapplicable.
        (b)  Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of 
	     intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
        (c)  Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance
	     which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination
	     are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express
	     and apply its will. 
	(d)  It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force)
	     and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately
	     any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then
	     be completely independent.
       
             It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (a) to (d)  
	to be carried out in the order indicated. 

	     It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance 
	of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal
	or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is 
	completed. For instance, it is accepted that the above four stages
	constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that
	it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (a) if stage (d)
	is revealed, because it would then be rediculous for us to seek the 
	amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments
	are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements.
	
	     The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the
	procedure to be followed in the international field.

	B. THE INTERNAL ASPECT
             Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according
	to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in
	the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national
	cause.
	1-   The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the 
	possibility of a forceful intervention. This danger, which could be 
	met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the 
	political damage that it could do rather than the material losses
	that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage (c),
	then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not 
	entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both 
	internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many similar
	incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention,
	even if legally excusable, has the attacker been removed by either
	the United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions
	to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack
	on Suez Canal by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of
	the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the
	Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep
	the port of Eliat in the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious
	dangers in the case of Cyprus.
	      If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make
	under stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention
	will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every 
	support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take
	place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers, that
	is, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e. at the stage
	of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international 
	support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us
	seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely 
	careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose. 
	      The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention
	by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed:
	(Omitted)
 	2-    It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must
	be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple 
	Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:
	      (a) The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c)
	      (b) Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre
	of Turks.
	      The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn up for
	the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of 
	intercommunal strife. We do not intend to engage, without provocation,
	in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section omitted)
	the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely
	stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the 
	impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention
	is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions 
	for amending the Constitution will not be secret; we would always appear
	to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take any 
	provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be
	met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces,
	according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.
	3-    (Omitted)
	4-    It is, however, naive to believe that it is impossible for us to 
	proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as a first
	step towards our more general Plan as described above, without expecting
	the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason, 
	the existence and the strengthening of our Organization is imperative
	because: (a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our
	counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic
	created among the Greeks, in towns particular. We will then be in  
	danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while
	if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then
	they will probably be brought to their senses  and restrict their 
	activities to insignificant, isolated incidents. (b) In case of a 
	planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not
	it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible
	time, since, if we manage to become masters of the situation within
	a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or
	justifiable. (c) The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish
	effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further 
	Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply
	these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they
	will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without
	serious consequences for their Community. (d) In case of the clashes
	becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through 
	actions (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS,
	because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic
	activity.
	5-    In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of 
	enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or
	cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary
	elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at least
	four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and 
	intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for
	everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally  
	essential for our success and survival. This, however, does not prevent
	the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false
	patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them
	with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that
	the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment
	of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out 
	Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the  
	prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must
	not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street
	politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable
	justification. In any case owing to the fact that, for well-known
	reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne fruit long
	before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with
	self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel
	with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity
	and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by
	properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the 
	public. 
	     Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the 
	reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and 
	opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful,
	negative and antiprogressive elements who attack our leadership like
	mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and  
	practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our  
	activities we need a strong and stable government, up to the last
	minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are good for
	nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite actions
	or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. A
	typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no 
	better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse
	to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be 
	isolated and kept at a distance.
	     We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives ONLY
	VERBALLY. Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the 
	Organization to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly
	equipped to enlighten others. NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY SORT IS 
	ALLOWED. LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE IS
	EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON. There can be no action that would inflict
	a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of 
	the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.
	     Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our  
	activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be
	most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible
	persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will
	refer to this Plan only generally under their personal responsibility
	and under the personal responsibilty of the Chief of sub-headquarters
	concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be done only
	after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who will
	control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or 
	statement MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER
	PUBLICATION. 
	     The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten
	our members and the public VERBALLY. Every effort must be made to show
	ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing, or 
	any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited.
	Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue
	to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit
	without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.
	     

	NOTE: The present document should be destroyed by burning under the 
	personal responsibilities of the Chief of the sub-headquarters  and in
	the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being 
	received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any
	part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have it in
	their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief
	of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out
	of the office of sub-headquarters.

					The Chief
					 AKRITAS

Serdar Argic

                           'We closed the roads and mountain passes that 
                            might serve as ways of escape for the Turks 
                            and then proceeded in the work of extermination.'
                                                       (Ohanus Appressian)
                           'In Soviet Armenia today there no longer exists 
                            a single Turkish soul.'    (Sahak Melkonian)


Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast