X-Organization: Marshall University
X-Envelope-to: POLITICS@UCF1VM.BITNET
X-VMS-To: _IN%"POLITICS@UCF1VM.BITNET"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.politics
Date:         Thu, 28 Jan 1993 14:36:00 -0400
From:         "Michael J. McCarthy" <YEA003@MARSHALL.MU.WVNET.EDU>
Subject:      Re: Homosexuals in the Military

Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1993 12:43:43 -0500
From: Jason Briggs Cormier <CORJB@RHODES.BITNET>
>
>Dave:
>
>I don't know and therefore am seriously asking, but how "off-guard"
>were we at the onset of WWI and II?
>
        I can't speak for WWII directly, but we were quite off-guard for the
First World War.  Might I humbly (or not so humbly) recommend, Michael
McCarthy, "'Lafayette, We Are Here!:  The War College Division and the
Formation of US Military Strategy for the AEF in World War I, 1917," MA Thesis,
Marshall University, 1992.  You can get it through interlibrary loan, or if you
have the disk quota available, I can send you the chapters one by one in ASCII.

        Essentially, the US had not adequately addressed the possibility of
involvement in the war in Europe, partially because the military planners in
the War College Division of the War Department General Staff were content to
concern themselves with fanciful scenarios (such as the German High Seas Fleet
carrying an invasion force of 500,000 through the British blockade, across the
Atlantic and "surprising" the American coastal defenses) and President Wilson
acted to stifle any consideration of US intervention.  Indeed, it was not until
more than A MONTH after Wilson requested the declaration of war that the US
decided to send an immediate expeditionary force to Europe.

[WEAK ATTEMPT TO TIE THIS POST TO THE TOPIC OF POLITICS FOLLOWS:]

        One cautionary note:  be careful of concluding from our 1914-1917
experience that military strength per se is inherently wise.  The US did launch
a preparedness campaign following the sinking of the _Lusitania_ in 1915, and
part of this buildup included the strengthening of the navy, with millions of
dollars spent with the goal to develop a navy strong in capital ships such as
battleships.  When the US finally did get involved, this naval program had to
be refitted because it quickly became obvious that capital ships were
absolutely useless against the German submarines.  The US had to make do with
wooden submarine chasers until it could start to build destroyers, and the war
was over before most of these destroyers would even set sail (they would,
however, see some use in the late 1930s as part of Roosevelt's deal with Great
Britain).

        The moral, then, is that military strength is important, but that
military strength MUST be relevent to the threats that a nation might face.
What exactly that means in our modern post-Cold War context, I'm not sure.

[ABANDONMENT OF ATTEMPT TO TIE THIS POST TO POLITICS FOLLOWS:]

>Furthermore, I know some who could make a very good case for us
>not having gotten into either of those.  That being the case, it
>really wouldn't matter even if we were caught off guard.
>

        Most of the histories which argue against US involvement in the First
World War, such as Walter Millis's _Road to War:  America, 1914-1917_, were
written in the 1930s.  The climate of intense isolationism fostered by the
perceived failure of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations
prompted the view that Great Britain had duped America into declaring war
against Germany.  In addition, the context of the Great Depression contributed
to the idea that powerful financial interests in the US had pushed America into
war to protect their investments, such as loans to the Allies.  These
interpretations have since been discredited.  After Fritz Fischer's study on
German war aims, most recent historians have recognized the threat posed by
German militarism.  With the editing and publication of _The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson_, one finds little evidence in Wilson's own correspondence to
corroborate the thesis that business interests exercised much influence.  In
addition, the collateral backing the loans to the Allies exceeded the value of
the loans themselves (although, admittedly, I do not know what form that
collateral took, and therefore how safe it was).

-------------
Mike McCarthy                   "Lafayette, we are here!"
Marshall Univ. History Dept.            -Col. C.E. Stanton, 4 July 1917, Paris
Huntington, WV 25755, USA       "We've paid off that old fart Lafayette.  What
YEA003@Marshall.WVNET.EDU       frog son-of-a-bitch do we owe now?"
YEA003@MARSHALL                         -U.S. Infantryman after Battle of
                                         Soissons, 28 May 1918
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU