From: was@cbnewsm.cb.att.com (wasif.sattar)
Subject: Re: Independence vs Autonomy ( was Re: The word "liberation")
Organization: AT&T
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1992 19:31:59 GMT
Summary: Why did the Bangobondhu let himself be arrested?

In article <1992Oct5.202032.28328@bcrka451.bnr.ca>, hassan@bnr.ca (Abu Hassan) writes:
 
> A related question I asked a lot of Awami Leaguers (and others) is why 
> Mujib decided to stay at his residence on March 25 (and get arrested by
> Pak army) instead of going into hiding like other leaders of AL ! Nobody
> has a satisfactory answer to this. Even Mujib never told anything 
> about this later on. But to me it was a very important turning point 
> decision for our nation. 
> 
> My explanation to this act is that Mujib had no idea of the severity of
> action (to be) taken my Pak army. And probably he did not have liberation
> war in mind !! He probably thought that this would be like the other previous
> movements (52, 69 etc.) and (as usual) he should not give up but go to 
> jail to show his protest and commitment to the demands. The point I am 
> trying to make is that, if Mujib was sure about the beginning of liberation
> war, he should have joined the war instead of going to jail. Two things
> could have been achieved by doing this. He could lead the war (and avoid 
> factional conflicts among the freedom fighters). More importantly, Mujib
> could have a much better perception of post-independence Bangladesh and 
> how to administer the country.
> 
> If I remember Anthony Mascarenhaus's book correctly, Mujib did not have 
> the slighest idea of what was going on in Bangladesh after 16th of December.
> He was planning to take everything easy for sometime instead of going back
> to Dhaka right away.
> 
> Abu S.Mahmudul Hassan

If you read Siddiq Salek's book "Witness to Surrender" he quotes several
insider sources having claimed that on several occasions the Bangobondhu
pleaded with the East Pakistan administration (Governor, DCMLA,GOC, etc.)
to either proceed with the transfer of power to the elected representatives
or to arrest him. At that time there existed a central administration
run by Gen. Yahya Khan with close advisors like Gen. Peerzada, etc. and a
local administartion run first by Vice Admiral Ahsan (followed by Gen.
Sahibzada Yaqub). [Side issue: Adm.Ahsan was replaced with Gen. Yaqub because
in the eyes of the central govt. (read Gen. Yahya Khan) he was not "hard-
lined" enough. Then Gen. Yaqub was unceremoniously replaced with Gen. Tikka
Khan once again because Yaqub was not considered to be tough enough for 
the post of DCMLA/Governor of East Pakistan].

The provincial and central administrations were usually not in sync with
each other with each one running at a different pace. Had the early warnings
and recommendations of Adm. Ahsan and Gen. Yaqub been heeded to, Pakistan
would have still had its Eastern wing and the Bangobondhu if not in power
now would have been in retirement as one of Pakistan's senior politicians.

The East Pakistan administration recommended to Yahya that if he were to 
postpone the date from March 1st he should also announce a firm date for
starting the proceedings of the National Assembly session with the maiden
session in Dhaka. Yahya wanted to postpone the date indefinitely without
announcing an alternate date. Mujib told Gen Yaqub that any date within
March 1971 would be acceptable to him and all elements of his party. Yaqub
relayed this to Yahya and Yahya confirmed that he understood the contents
of Yaqub's message. Gen Yaqub also requested Yahya to come to Dhaka and
see the inflamed situation for himself which Yahya refused to do. He then
asked Gen. Peerzada to convince Yahya to come to Dhaka. Yahya not only 
did not come to Dhaka but also did not address the nation personally while
conveying the news of such profound importance as the indefinite postponement
of the NA session. An announcer read out the govt. proclamation. 

Meanwhile in Dhaka Gen. Yaqub had built up a working relationship with
Mujib. They would frequently confer either directly or via intermediaries.
It seems like Mujib trusted Gen. Yaqub and Gen. Yaqub believed that Mujib's
threats of a struggle for independence were only to appease the hard-liners
in the AL and that Mujib was willing to settle for a largely autonomous
East Pakistan within the framework of Pakistan. At each stage in the
transactions between Yaqub and Yahya, Mujib supposedly pleaded to Yaqub to
either help arrange a peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives
or to arrest him to save him from the wrath of the AL hard-liners. Mujib
was willing to negotiate and agreed to give the Yahya-Bhutto clique time
until the end of March to straighten out their affairs and come to Dhaka
to start off the NA session. The hard-liners felt that by the beginning of
March enough time had already been given to Bhutto to come forward to join
the NA. The East Pakistan administration was watching Mujib carefully to
see if he made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). According 
to Siddiq Salek, Mujib's famous speech on March 7, 1971 (Ebarer shongram
muktir shongram, Ebarer shongram shadinotar shongram!) did not count as the
much feared UDI by Pakistan's judgement. Yahya suddenly decided to come to
Dhaka to see Mujib. He sent a message stating that he was not only willing
to satisfy all six of his famous 6-Points but was sure he could do better. 

We all know how Yahya's meeting with Mujib proceeded. Mujib, until March
25, believed that a negotiated settlement could be reached. Yahya used the
time bought by his so-called discussions with Mujib to amass troops and
materiel  in East Pakistan for the upcoming genocide. I found Siddiq
Salek's book quite digestable except for his claim that there was no blue-
print for a genocide. It may be true that during the first two weeks of
March there were no such plans but once Yahya started his talks with Mujib
and he also started to ship personnel and equipment to East Pakistan he 
definitely had cast his plan in concrete.

In his book Salek does not go into much detail about the mass killing of
Bengalis. Secondly he paints the genocide as not much more than collateral
damage. He wrote in detail about the maltreatment and killing of non-
indigenous East Pakistanis by the Bengalis or by AL goondas but strangely
was rather sketchy about the massacres of Bengalis which were several orders
of magnitude worse than any genocide ever commited by man.

I am sorry to have digressed from the topic under discussion. Among various
explanations I have heard regarding why Mujib let himself be arrested the
one that struck me most is that he wanted to give himself up as the 
sacrificial lamb in order that his people (the Bengali nation) be spared
from reprisals. Although Mujib had never in his wildest dreams imagined
the magnitude of the cruelty that would be inflicted on us he still feared
that based on previous instances of brutality, the Pakistanis were capable
of a good amount of cruelty. If the Pakistani army were not able to find
him in his house when they went to arrest him, they would have probably
razed the entire city of Dhaka in anger. 

The Bangobondhu mentioned in his interview with David Frost in early 1972
that his house had been surrounded by soldiers early enough on March 25 to
make sure that he couldn't flee arrest. I think he could have easily fled
if he was really serious about it. Until the moment the crack-down actually
started, Mujib was in total command of the situation around the country.
During the non-cooperation movement everything ticked according to his
wishes - even the Chief Secretary Shafiul Azam and the Justices of the
High Court took their orders from him!

Shubhechhante,
Wasif