From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
Subject: Re: Life at conception...
Organization: USC  Department of Computer Science
Date: 15 Aug 92 12:37:23 GMT

In <1992Aug14.235603.29173@midway.uchicago.edu> eeb1@ellis.uchicago.edu (e elizabeth bartley) writes:

>In article <1992Aug9.194933.2088@brandonu.ca> mcbeanb@brandonu.ca writes:
>>In article <1992Aug9.030413.7285@midway.uchicago.edu>,
>>eeb1@ellis.uchicago.edu (e elizabeth bartley) writes:
>>> In article <1992Aug8.131443.2079@brandonu.ca> mcbeanb@brandonu.ca writes:
>>>>In article <23302@oasys.dt.navy.mil>,
>>>>bense@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Ron Bense) writes:
> 
>>>>> (Note: there are stages in my definition, and this is not a black and
>>>>> white subject, but to save bandwidth, I've not gone on for 100s of lines
>>>>> describing the variations and differences. Suffice it to say that I
>>>>> believe a z/e/f before 6 months is not deserving of *any* rights or
>>>>> respect, except if it is intended to be brought to term.)

>>>>How can you pick such a definite cut-off point?

>>> I don't know for sure about Ron, but my cut-off point is almost
>>> exactly the same time: 23-24 weeks.  This is because that's when
>>> myelination in the brain starts, and I don't see how there could be
>>> enough of a brain for there to be "anybody home" before myelination of
>>> the brain.

What's myelination got to do with "anybody home"?? Would you say there is
"nobody home" in advanced cases of multiple sclerosis?  Annette
Funicello [see latest issue of _People_ magazine] might not appreciate
your point of view.

>>>  My position isn't *quite* the same as Ron's, because in
>>> theory I think potential people have some rights....  But the rights
>>> of a purely potential person are so trivial that it amounts to almost
>>> the same thing before myelination.

To be precise: before there is "anybody home".  "before myelination" is
begging the question.

>>It almost sounds as though you treat the brain like a Christian would
>>the soul.

There is a lot of truth to the analogy.  I'll be talking about this a
lot in my September posts (maybe some August ones too).  But the 
Christian perspective is theological and metaphysical.  Mine is 
phenomenological (a fancy word for "pertaining to conscious experience") 
and so is Ms. Bartley's, judging from her words. So
too, it would seem, is that of Supreme Court Justice Stevens, who
comes from a very different prespective than Justice Blackmun.  His
votes don't show it, but his stated opinions do.

>Well, I am a Christian, but I don't think that has much to do with
>this discussion; since God won't tell me when the soul enters the
>body, I've figured out my position from information unrelated to
>religion....

>>Why should you pick a point like that?  This means you

>Practically, I can't figure out a good way to implement a sliding
>scale system.  It doesn't matter much anyway.  Granted, *in theory* I
>believe that potential people have rights, and the stronger they get
>to personhood and the more likely they are to reach it the more
>important those rights are.

The likelihood of a 2-month fetus to reach it is not much less than
that of any other Homo Sapiens in utero.  

	BTW, what meaning of personhood are we talking about here? 
the legal one [Blackmun used the term "potential life"--not even 
"potential person, mind you!--for the THIRD trimester fetus!] 
or the experiential, in other words, phenomenological one?  It makes a 
gigantic difference.

	[Then there is a whole raft of other meanings of "human person"
conjured up by people who seem to like the idea of experimenting
on babies after birth.]

>  However, *in practice* I think the right
>of a woman to control her own body outranks the right of any purely
>potential (no matter how strong the potential) person to live.

Whose body is being controlled in an abortion?  

Peter Nyikos