From: hermi@function.mps.ohio-state.edu (Lotfi Hermi)
Newsgroups: soc.religion.islam
Subject: The Islamic Project: Thoughts by Dr. Hasan Turabi
Date: 15 Dec 1992 03:06:47 GMT
Organization: Department of Mathematics, The Ohio State University
Reply-To: hermi@function.mps.ohio-state.edu (Lotfi Hermi)
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Originator: gwydion@wookumz.gnu.ai.mit.edu

		M I D D L E   E A S T   P O L I C Y

		 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 3, 1992, pp 49-61


    I S L A M, D E M O C R A C Y, T H E  S T A T E  A N D  T H E  W E S T
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     =	Summary of a lecture and round-table discussion with Hasan  =
     =	Turabi, prepared by Louis J. Cantori and Arthur Lowrie	    =
     ================================================================

Dr. Turabi is the leader of the  Sudanese National Islamic Front and the 
Popular Arab and Islamic Congress. Dr. Cantori is Professor of Political 
Science at the University  of  Maryland, Baltimore County; Mr. Lowrie is 
Adjunct Professor at the University of South Florida.'

Dr. Turabi  was  in the United States for a private visit in May, 1992. 
On May 10, he was  the guest  of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise 
(WISE) and the Middle East Committee of the University of South Florida 
in Tampa. In addition to the editors of this article, the following in-
vited group of Islam specialists, USF faculty and WISE were his  inter-
locutors: Peter Bechtold; Richard Bulliet, Columbia University; Richard
Cottam, University of Pittsburgh; John Esposito, College  of  the  Holy 
Cross; Hanna Freij,  University of Pittsburgh;  Richard  Hermann,  Ohio 
State  University;  Robert Kramer, St. Norbert College; Carolyn Lobban, 
Rhode  Island  College;  Karl Magyar, Air University;  Mohammad Muslih, 
Long Island University;  Abdel  Aziz Mustafa, University of Pittsburgh; 
Emile Sahliyeh,  University  of Texas; Mark Tessler, University of Wis-
consin-Milwaukee; John Voll, University of New Hampshire; Ramadan Abdu-
llah, WlSE-Tampa; Basheer Nafi, WlSE-London; Khalil Shikaki,  WISE-USF; 
Abdelwahab Hechiche, USF; Jamil Jreisat. USF; Mohsen Milani, USF;  Mark 
Orr, USF.

The following is a summary of a one-hour presentation by Hasan Turabi 
followed by approximately four hours of questions and discussion. Dr. 
Turabi's remarks have been summarized in order to present the essentials 
of his position on the contemporary Islamic movement as well as other matters.
The summary also follows his own line of argument. The editors have taken 
more license with the question-and-answer period. Instead of presenting the 
actual flow of that discussion or repeating the question, the question is 
presented as a topic, e.g., "Islam and the Palestinian Question,'' about 
which Dr. Turabi then comments. Even here, however, his commentary is 
presented as delivered, including in some cases the digressions onto related 
topics. The full text of the proceedings of  the round table will be published
in English and Arabic by the World and Islam Studies Entreprise (WISE), P.O.
BOX 16648 ,Tampa , Florida, 33687

Dr. Turabi has become one of the leading theorists of the contemporary Islamic
revival. In addition, he has played a leadership role in the Sudanese Muslim 
Brethren while pursuing an active political career and numerous intellectual 
activities. Born in Kassala, Eastern Sudan, in 1932 to a family with a long 
tradition of Islamic learning and the practice of Sufism, he is a graduate 
of the Faculty of Law of Khartoum University, has a Master's Degree in Law 
from the University of London and a Ph.D. in Law from the Sorbonne in Paris. 
He subsequently served as dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khar-
toum, a member of parliament and secretary general of the Islamic Charter 
Front (1964). After a leftist coup in 1969, he was imprisoned for seven years. 
>From 1979 to 1982 he was attorney general under Jafar Numeiri and remained as 
a presidential adviser on legal and foreign affairs until March 1985, when he 
was imprisoned again until the fall of the Nimieri regime. In 1988 the National
Islamic Front led by Dr. Turabi joined the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, where 
he served as attorney general, minister of justice and minister of foreign 
affairs. No longer in government, Dr. Turabi remains the leader of the Na-
tional Islamic Front and the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress. He supports 
the present Bashir government in the Sudan and remains an important presiden-
tial adviser. He is the author of numerous works on contemporary Islam, inclu-
ding the following: As-Salah (The Prayer), Al-lman (The Belief), Tajdid Usul 
Al-Fiqh (Renewal of Source Methodology in Jurisprudence), Risalat Al-Mara 
(The Mission of the Woman), Al-Masala Ad-Destouriya (The Constitutional Issue),
Al-Muslim Bayn Al-Wijdan wa As-Sultan (The Muslim between Conscience and 
Authority). In addition, there is a recently completed study of Turabi by 
Abdel Wahab El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in the Sudan 
(London: Grey Seal Books, 1990).

SUMMARY OF TURABI'S REMARKS
 
The ideal of Islam, ". . . is not just that God is one, absolutely one, but 
also existence is one; also life is one. All life is just one program of 
worship. Whether it is economics, politics, sex, private, public or 
whatever. And society is also one. So unitarianism is a fundamental principle 
that explains almost every aspect of doctrinal or practical Islam." Within 
forty years after the death of the Prophet, however, politics and Islam came 
to be separated. This is analogous to the experience of Christianity. 
The jurists of Islam took it upon themselves to argue on their own and separa-
te from the people that the Sharia or religious law was above government and 
administration. They thus distanced themselves from politics. This was also 
the case of Sufism, which sought to organize the unity of the community of 
believers or the Umma away from politics. The real secularization of 
Islamic society however occurred under the aegis of Western imperialism, which 
disestablished Islam, destroyed public institutions and replaced the Sharia 
with French or British positive law.
 
The first reaction of Islam to this was a reaction [Mahdism] without an 
intellectual dimension and which ultimately succumbed. The more mature 
response has come in the form of the modern Islamic revival. Some thought 
that it would reinterpret Islam in terms of the contemporary world but it 
has been a renaissance rather than a reformation. The first phase of this 
revival attempted to use regular sources of Islam in order to criticize and 
reformulate their condition [salafyya]. Islam was seen as a state and a 
religion. In this phase traditional Islamists [ulama] stayed out of 
politics and, while the populist movement of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt 
[Hasan al-Banna], Syria and Iraq were engaged in politics, they were severely 
repressed. Repression drove the latter under ground. These early Islamists 
also learned from the experience to distance themselves from government. 
Subsequently other Islamic movements have developed with a more central 
political involvement. In the Sudan this began as an elitist model like 
typical Islamic movements but then developed a popular dimension. In fact, 
however, all modern societies appear to have developed in a populist fashion, 
and in the Islamic world the newer movements of Khomeini and Algeria reflect 
this. These latter movements are without elitism or obsession with quality. 
They represent quantity and the people. This populism has attracted atten-
tion to the politics of the Islamic movement to the detriment of efforts at 
understanding it spiritually and in terms of its efforts at reforming society.

I try to plead with everybody that it [the Islamic movement] wasn't a political
movement exclusively. We are a religious movement for the education of the 
individual, and that we have much more substantial achievements in the field 
of reforming society and changing individuals and the moral education, and 
these achievements are probably more exceptional than our politics.

The impact of Islam in politics has naturally been looked at negatively by 
many because it represents social change and the alteration of the status quo. 
The movement itself must initially engage in negative criticism of the present 
situation in order to prepare the way for its positive alternative. This 
alternative at the early stage will be very general because people have not 
yet conceived an understanding of fundamental ideas. They do not want to know 
details, for example, about Islamic banking but rather they object to religion 
being associated with politics. This is why a slogan like Islam huwa al-hal 
(Islam Is the Solution) is very important. The development of a program 
is not an ivory tower exercise but an interactive process in public life. 
Furthermore, these programs have had to be developed in the absence of freedom,
and this has added to the difficulty.
 
The Islamic movement has occurred in a context of the intellectual bankruptcy 
of slogans like Arab socialism. These slogans did assist in gaining national 
independence but they were empty of concrete detail of application. In the case
of the Sudan, for example, a British administrator was replaced by a Sudanese 
administrator. The Islamic movement is also criticized for not being democra-
tic. Within the movement there has been a question of the meaning of the term 
dimuqratiyya (democracy) as a foreign word in application to Islamic soci-
eties. The Western association of secularism and cutthroat competition for 
power with the term is objectionable but also objectionable is the prominence 
of politics in the term. In Islam, politics is considered amoral, not immoral. 
The critics of the Islamic movement want to label it as anti-democratic when 
in fact it is essentially a grass-roots and populist phenomenon and highly 
democratic. 

It is true that Hasan al-Banna and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represented 
a sheikh and followers within which shura or consultation was not binding. In 
our movement in the Sudan, on the other hand, what began as an elitist movement
has now been joined to a regional elective process. The leader is elected and 
he is held accountable. There is no sheikh or dynasty in the movement. In fact,
"Islam shuns absolute government, absolute authority, dynastic authority and 
individual authority."
 
The Islamic movement is viewed as revolutionary, but this is a natural conse-
quence of being repressed and expression welling up from below. In fact, what 
has happened is that the repression has ostracized Islam from democracy and 
compelled it to become revolutionary. "People have come to believe that it 
seems democracy would never breed Islam, and if it threatens to do so, it will 
be aborted by someone, from outside or inside.'' In any case, Islam today seems
to be inevitable. Nationalism used to be an alternative to Islam but ". . . 
today if you want to assert indigenous values, originality and independence 
against the West then Islam is the only doctrine that has become the national 
doctrine." Furthermore, in the past there has been the possibility that the 
traditionalist ulama would be antagonistic to the Islamists. The former have 
been used previously by the government against the Islamists. But after the 
recent Gulf War this has changed. This is especially the case in Morocco and 
Saudi Arabia and other states where the mullahs, the ulama and the Salafi 
[reformist] establishment have called their regimes irreligious. These are 
dynastic and not religious. Iran has now lslamized revolution and created an 
alternative to nationalist and socialist revolutions. This applies to elections
as well.
 
Some thought that liberal political parties would compete in Algeria but 
instead Algeria proves that if you want to avoid Islam you have to avoid the 
ballot box. The army as an institution, for example in Turkey, presses for 
secularization but as the army in the Sudan shows, the army itself can be-
come Islamized. Sudan under Numeiri started out being secular under the aegis 
of the army but he ended up appealing for Islamic support. In the Sudan, all 
the groupings which compete politically are in fact religious, e.g. the Ansar 
and the Khatmiyyah, and as a result the Sharia bill passed unanimously in the 
Parliament.
 
If Islamic government is inevitable, what are its underlying principles? 
The basic point is that it is limited. Islam exists in society as a matter of 
norms and law. It is an integrated and a total way of life. Therefore govern-
ment must be limited because Islamic government would be omnipotent. Government
has no business interfering in one's religion or religious practices. This 
limitation resembles that of liberalism and the Marxist vision of a vanishing 
state. Government has always been dynastic and limited in the sense that educa-
tion, health and social services have been delivered by trusts and non-govern-
mental organizations. In the case of the Sudan, government may have to play an 
important role to establish rules but then it should withdraw. Does Turabi have
a role in government? No, because society is the primary institution in Islam, 
not the state. He supports the present government but will not join it. The 
jurists and the sharia limit government. The positive law of colonialism freed 
government as did the limited elite-based democracy which resembled that of 
revolutionary France and Britain.
 
Society determines the Quranic edict to do what is good and forbid what is im-
proper. Democracy is based on shura or consultation and ijmaa or consensus. 
This is simplified by the fact that the sharia is so all encompassing that 
there is less need for legislation. The Quran emphasizes people and not govern-
ment and hence the emphasis upon consensus. They wish to be united and not 
divided. Even in the West, rigidly separate political parties do not exist at 
the present time. Hence the absence of differences between, for example, 
the American Republican and Democratic parties. In the Sudan there has not 
been a viable multiparty system. The major parties represent the House of 
Khatmiyya or Mahdi, i.e. dynasties. Furthermore, the Sudan is not a 
nation but a complex composite of ethnic groups and organizations. Nimeiri 
experimented with a single party that didn't work, and now Sudan has an expe-
rimental system that approximates Islam. It is not known if it will work but 
it is being implemented in stages from the local to the national within a 
federalist framework. The Parliament is expected to be governed by a practice 
of dialogue and consensus. Some think that it was based on the practice of the 
National Islamic Front in being a series of elections from the local to the 
national level. The process will take time in order to free the people before 
entrusting them from automatically supporting their sheikhdom and their reli-
gious order. Everyone would participate including females, who are to partici-
pate in all activities: "They are in the movement and in the leadership as well
and in the political process." Minorities in the south of Sudan are to have 
autonomy, immunities and freedom as in the model state of the Prophet, as did
the Jews at the time of Muhammad.
 
The international dimension of the Islamic movement is conditioned by the uni-
versality of the umma (community of believers) and the artificial irrelevancy 
of Sudan's borders. Therefore the revolution is easily exported. This is espe-
cially true in the relations of the Sudan to Black African neighboring states. 
Relations with non-Muslim states are predicated upon peaceful relations gover-
ned by the sharia (religious law) and especially illustrated in the case of 
trade relations. Muslims, however, are insistent upon a fair international 
order. Just as their challenge to the status quo domestically is viewed nega-
tively, such is also the case in international relations. "Islam will challenge
those who enjoy an advantage under the present world order, in economic 
relations between north and south, in the U.N. structure, in the monopoly of 
information, technology or armaments" because it seeks justice. It is not 
because Islam is hostile to Christianity or bellicosely anti-Western. The 
international order should be one of pluralism and diversity .

STATE, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
 
Dr. Turabi was asked whether he was idealizing the closeness of din wa dawla 
(religion and state) at the time of the Prophet or idealizing Islamic history 
since the Prophet, which is said to be characterized by a greater separation 
of the two. The response was that limited government does not preclude reli-
gion. However, Islamic government after the death of the Prophet was too 
separated from religion. Islam is, after all, based on a unitarian principle, 
". . . otherwise you would have a distance developing between law and morality,
between politics, so to speak, as a pursuit and the ultimate ends of religion. 
You would ultimately tend to develop into a secularized model of the West, and 
that was what I criticized." The jurists not only stood outside of government 
but they themselves were also separate from society. This left government 
without moral guidance. The Islamic movement does not necessarily argue for 
the constitutional presence of jurists. What it seeks, for example in the 
practice of Islamic banking, is the active participation of jurists as bankers 
who will informally monitor banking practices as to whether or not they are
in accordance with Islamic law, forbidden, desirable or not recommended. Simi-
larly, laws passed in Parliament could be reviewed by consulting jurists as to 
their Islamic content. "Jurists have to enlighten people but they have to be 
in the midst of people and in the midst of the process itself, inside Parlia-
ment and not away from it."
 
Regarding the desirability of safeguarding society from the intrusion of gover-
nment, the Sudan is itself in a transition phase. Therefore, the government is 
presently intruding as a matter of expressing its leadership. So for example, 
the government is facilitating marriages by providing people with a dowry, 
furniture and clothes. But government must prepare to withdraw from this 
leadership role. This is why the economy is being privatized. This is not 
inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but in fact is inspired by 
Islam. As a result, the complete withdrawal of subsidies and the floating of 
the pound have occurred.  Protest followed efforts at doing this earlier but 
now the measures are accepted because they are justified by the theory of 
Islamic economics. According to Islam, property in theory belongs to God and 
not government. Individuals manage this property and wealth as God's trustees.

This economic privatization and movement away from government control has 
also been pursued politically by the decentralization and federalizing of 
political power. Power is now distributed on a regional basis with strong 
local powers. Even education is increasingly private rather than public.
 
Thus in reference to the question of the relation of civil society to the 
state, in general society should be left alone but if a societal function 
fails, government should step in. "Once society picks up the function, then 
it should withdraw once more to its limit of security and organizing those 
aspects of society which must be legally organized. "
 
What is important is that the sharia operates to control government and guide 
it. In general, people are more interested in the religious law, not laws as 
they pertain to constitutional arrangements, e.g. parliament, executive, etc.
Islamic law also has the advantage of being familiar. Thus, religious law 
decisions are highly publicized and widely discussed by the public because 
its principles are familiar to all.

With all this attention to society and privatization there is a danger in fact 
of neglecting the state. In the Sudan as opposed to Egypt, there is little
awareness of "stateness." When the Islamic state finally takes form, there is 
little doubt it will be smaller than the average state. lt will be more true 
to the liberal tradition than present-day governments in Western Europe. Islam 
requires an independent point of view. In fact, one is a better Muslim with a 
dissenting point of view than a conforming one.
 
As far as national unity is concerned, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, Is-
lamic government is limited government, but on the other hand, in the Sudan for
example, there is no common consensus or sense of unity. Therefore, in the 
short run unity must be stressed even while there is a respect for diversity.
A particular problem is that the Sudan possesses a Westernized elite and a 
traditional mass, each of which subjectively feels it has nothing in common 
with the other. A single party is not desirable to achieve this unity, but 
somehow unity must be achieved in order to permit the desired diversity.
 
So far the discussion has ranged from the ideals of the Islamic state to the 
particular features and problems of the developing Sudanese model. Islam is 
eternal but it has to be related to time and place. As France and Britain are 
in the West and share much in common so too are they quite different. 
"It is in the interest of humanity that people should be allowed the freedom 
to develop different models." What is happening in the Islamic world today is 
a movement from greater particularism towards something which is more common.
 
Specifically in the case of Sudan, you can't achieve consensus through authori-
ty because this would not be consensus but standardization. It gives the 
appearance but not the reality of peace. The army could be a centralizing 
institution as a professional force which tends to be secularized, but it 
could also be Islamized. Perhaps a way of achieving this would be to have a 
small standing army and a large popular defense force drawn trom society and 
therefore Islamized.
 
In summary, it is important on the subject of the contemporary Islamic movement
to appreciate that we are in a period of change. Change creates anxieties and 
uneasiness. With time, however, "The Islamists themselves will feel easy, will 
relax; we are not going to advocate a very strict orthodox Islam."

I think many judgments passed with respect to the Islamic revival are only 
relevant because people are seeing something on the move. And there will come a
time [when] we'll also overcome this moving from being negative to being 
constructive and positive. From being general to being specific and down to 
earth. From being very idealist, almost visionary, to being more pragmatic and 
so forth. From being very assertive in the way we advocate our views 
to being reasonable and moderate. These are very natural symptoms of a period 
of social change.

ISLAM, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WORLD
 
The Islamic movement is a growing force throughout the Middle East, and the 
Sudanese model enjoys great popularity among the Arab masses for its Islamic
stands on foreign-policy issues. The Gulf War was a blessing in disguise 
because it turned the Islamist movements into mass movements and radicalized 
Islam in Saudi Arabia. The Islamic masses have taken control and many govern-
ments and movements are being undermined. They must go popular or perish. 
There is a "course of history" that makes the establishment of Islamic states 
"almost inevitable." As more states go Islamic, pressure on the Sudan and Iran 
will be reduced and many in the West will realize that Islam cannot be stopped,
and they will cease interfering.
 
The West is urged to rely directly on Islamists for information about the 
Islamic revival, not on Arab leaders who feel threatened and spread disinforma-
tion. It is true that the Islamic movements are a threat to governments and the
present world order because they seek to express Islamic values and correct the
inequities of the status quo. But they are not a belligerent, subversive 
threat. It should be carried out through peaceful dialogue, not revolution, 
because revolution is always accompanied by excess and violence. With regard 
to the stated U.S. government position which opposes "radical interpretations" 
of Islam which are then "exported" to other countries, Dr. Turabi asked if the
State Department wanted to become a "school of interpretation within Islam" and
whether "export" includes inviting students to come and study and then sending 
them forth as carriers of the message? In the unlikely event that the United 
States were to seize on a pretext to smash the Sudanese model, it would require
a very costly re-colonization. The Sudan is a vast country and it would provoke
a great jihad (religiously based resistance). The Americans are unlikely to 
undertake such an enterprise unless the Sudan were to turn terrorist and target
Americans.
 
The Arabs should relate more positively to their neighbors, Kurds, Africans, 
Persians and others. The Arabs are important leaders in the Muslim world and 
they need the solidarity of all Muslims to support Arab causes. Therefore, the 
Sudan works for reconciliation between Iraq and Iran, between Iraq and Syria, 
and others. The Sudan has also turned east to Pakistan, Malaysia, lndonesia and
China, and to a lesser extent Iran. The reports about Sudan's relationship with
Iran are not true. There is not a single Iranian military technician in the 
Sudan, and Sudan buys no Iranian arms. The only purchases were dual-use Merce-
des vehicles for which no Iranian technicians are needed. No protocols have 
been signed. There are exchanges taking place about how to Islamize public 
institutions, but Sudan does not have much to learn from Iran. The Sudanese are
Arabic speaking and "there are thousands of Sudanese who know Islam better than
the more learned ulama in Iran. There are no Iranians in the Sudan other than 
those in the embassy. The Egyptians and the Saudis are alarmed, but in fact the
relationship with Iran doesn't amount to a great deal."
 
There is "absolutely no basis in fact" to charges of Sudan's involvement with 
terrorism or terrorists. There are no camps for training Palestinians, Tuni-
sians or others. There are about 200 Palestinian refugees from the Gulf, mostly
professionals who have no travel documents. There are 100-150 Tunisians, mainly
students.
 
Questions on the impact of the Gulf War and other topics elicited assessments 
of individual Arab regimes and their relationship to the Islamist movement.
 
At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was considered hostile
to the Islamist movement and his appeal for a jihad was disregarded. The 
Islamist movements denounced Saddam's occupation, but this was rapidly eclipsed
by the "massive mobilization" of the West and the presence of foreign troops on
the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia. Muslims around the world then saw Saddam re-
jecting "being assimilated, dominated, or integrated into the West." Muslims 
viewed restoration of Kuwait as a pretext for the ulterior motives behind the 
war which were (a) "Israeli expansion designs" and Iraq's threat to them and 
(b) control of Gulf oil. Today Islamists have some influence with Saddam and
he has responded to their initiatives not to ban religious parties per se and 
to provide lists of political prisoners. The Islamist movement is very small 
among the Kurds so it is unlikely Islamists can play a mediator role.
 
Kuwait was not held in high esteem by Muslims because of its wealth, the abuse 
of that wealth, and the conduct of the rulers.
 
King Fahd did not believe Saddam Hussein was going to invade Saudi Arabia. 
When asked if he had invited the Americans in, "Fahd had replied: 'Well, I did 
not but they would have come anyway and it would have been very bad if I did 
not invite them.' He would probably have lost his throne, but he might lose it 
anyway because of that invitation." An Arab solution was possible but Saudi 
Arabia rejected it because they were advised not to allow Saddam to get out of 
the trap he had fallen into. The impact on the Saudi masses has been greater 
than elsewhere because Saudi Arabians had no experience with colonization. 
ARAMCO was different because it was completely isolated from the people. Sud-
denly they found thousands of Gls walking about in Riyadh and it was a shock to
them, especially American females with guns. As a result the conflict between 
the Islamists and the small liberal establishment and the monarchy has become 
very open and wide-spread through mosques, leaflets, fax machines, books and 
sermons on tapes. The Bedouins of Saudi Arabia are by nature a very free people
and once they know something is wrong with government, it will be difficult to 
contain them. King Fahd is "in quite a mess and he doesn't know what to do." 
"If he sought my advice I don't know how he can save himself. I know it's very 
dangerous to concede because it will only encourage the opposition to ask for 
more and more. I know it is very dangerous to try to obstruct the process 
because then he would invite a revolution." A change of regime may not take 
place soon, but the process will take its course sooner or later.
 
In Algeria, the delay of the process will give the Islamic leaders time to
focus more on the issues, solidify their front, consolidate their base and 
elaborate their program. They will come back very soon after having matured 
in jail. The movement is especially powerful because of French colonization 
which sought to deprive Muslims of their land, language and religion. It is a
deeply religious movement and not just a protest against injustice or economic 
deprivation. The people could have opted for liberal democracy as elsewhere in 
the world, but they opted for Islam. People in the West, perhaps because they 
have become less religious, cannot seem to understand that people can be moved 
by religion. The current regime that seeks to frustrate the movement represents
nothing. The army is probably secular only at the top. It is a conscript army 
and if the strain is too much it will definitely crack because the younger 
officers are already Islamic.
 
The Tunisian government is "very precarious." It is just a ''security appara-
tus" and a security apparatus cannot determine the future of a country. It can 
hold power for a certain time but once change begins the whole edifice can col-
lapse very rapidly as in the Soviet Union.
 
Egypt is a very stable, regimented state so the Islamic movement will develop 
slower. Yet the Egyptian government fears the Sudanese model because Islam 
could prove its undoing. There is much alienation between the state and Islam. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is a dormant force, but there is a current of extre-
mists. At present the extremists are divided and unfocused, and the Egyptian 
government keeps them that way with its "very efficient instruments of suppre-
ssion." President Mubarak considers Islam a personal threat and is obsessed 
with it. Therefore there is unlikely to be a coopting or gradual Islamization. 
After he goes perhaps the Egyptians may feel it would be wiser to allow Islam 
to express itself.
 
The Sudan is leaning more to Africa than to the Arab world because relations 
with Saudi Arabia and Egypt are a bit cold and because the Sudan has an open 
frontier and very cordial people-to-people relationships with Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and relations have improved dramatically with Uganda, Kenya and central
Africa.

ISLAM AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
 
Questions regarding the Islamist position on Palestine elicited mainly genera-
lities. Islamists feel an intense association with the Palestinians, but in the
short term there is little that they can do. If all Islamic movements ultima-
tely become Islamic states, the balance would change. Meanwhile, the whole 
context of the Palestinian problem is changing by becoming more Islamic both 
within and without. Jerusalem belongs to all the Muslims and they resent 
that the Arabs exclude them.
 
Regarding a possible solution, Islamists have not had to elaborate a specific 
position so they have stuck to the principle that the displacement of the 
Palestinians was illegitimate. The Arab states have grown weaker and more 
divided and are now prepared to take anything they can get. But not enough 
history has passed to legitimize the act of displacement. The Sudan, as an 
Islamic state, has said no to the Madrid talks, but otherwise kept silent. 
Nevertheless, "all things are possible if only the whole issue was not approa-
ched as a de facto exercise of forcible displacement." Collective rights were 
granted to the Jews in Medina, the Islamic model state managed by the Prophet 
himself. He gave the three Jewish communities complete local autonomy, cul-
tural rights, collective rights, and even some jurisdiction over their society.
However, "if you force people they will fight over the slightest concession. 
That's the 

ISLAM AND WOMEN
 
The liberation of women cannot be done by decree. Government can give women 
the right to vote, but women could still socially be denied that right. You 
have to work from below through social organizations. The Islamic movement in 
the Sudan did not want women's liberation to come about by Westernized liberal 
elites. It took the lead by effectively invoking religion against custom and 
convention. The Islamic party advocated women's right to vote in 1964. Today 
women participate in all aspects of the party: in Parliament, as ministers, as 
judges. Education is coed except at the secondary level. Women came to the 
Islamic movement because they had been deprived and the movement gave them 
recognition and a place in society. Women have played a more important role 
in the party than men recently and more women than men voted for the Islamic 
party. They perform most of the social charitable work and are now even in the 
military. Women have not achieved parity in all spheres, such as commerce, but 
then neither have they in the West. It is not true that women judges have been 
purged. Women continue to work in all phases of the law in almost equal numbers
to men. Questions about women's presence anywhere are no longer raised in the 
Sudan.

Segregation of women is definitely not a part of Islam. This is just conven-
tional, historical Islam. It was totally unknown in the model of Islam or the 
text of Islam. It is unjustified. But dress, yes. In the Quran and the sunna 
there is a definite prescription, not for the mode, but how much one should 
cover. People focus only on women's dress, but both men and women are required 
to dress in a particular form. There are also moral aspects of dress, but the 
Prophet did not impose them by law. He advised strongly about them but he did 
not impose them. In society you are always under some form of pressure when it 
comes to dress and women are subject to much more pressure than men. So in an 
Islamic society, society would definitely exercise a measure of censure and 
encouragement for one form of dress over another. But no organization like the 
Saudi amr bil-maarouf wal-nahi an al-munkar has legal authority to stop women 
or harass them. In the Sudan because there are many non-Muslims one can't even 
advise on proper dress. Harassment is definitely objectionable in Islam.
 
In the Sudan the role of women changed with urbanization. People feared for the
sanctity of women and the family and it was better for women to stay at home, 
especially at night. Past injustices toward women such as being unable to 
inherit land, arranged marriages, etc. are changing.  

There is a new personal-status law which borrows from all sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence and deals with divorce, marriage, parenthood and inheritance. It 
borders on being liberal, but it doesn't outlaw polygamy. The Quran is cate-
goric on polygamy, but the world is going in the direction of polygamy anyway 
de facto, if not de jure. English law now recognizes cohabitation as a legal 
relationship.

ISLAM AND ARAB NATIONALISM
 
While Arab nationalism has had its accomplishments, it now can be said to be in
need of a dialogue with Islamism. Perhaps it is losing its importance because 
it has accomplished everything it was destined to. "And partly they [Arab 
nationalists] lost their significance because they have failed and people have 
despaired of their ever achieving their goals." In other words, Arab nationa-
lism has run its historical course. Islam, on the other hand, does not trans-
cend completely one's allegiances to neighborhood, family and nation as long as
". . . you don't become introverted and you don't become chauvinistically 
nationalist."  As long as one is open to the umma or community of believers 
then one can possess other loyalties. ''So Islam itself does have a certain 
scope for synthesis in this respect and Islamists and nationalists, Arab na-
tionalists, are now not only engaged in very friendly dialogue, but are working
together in many areas." In this respect, then, Saddam Hussein's Arab natio-
nalism and Libya's Nasserism along with Syria can have "very good" relations 
to Islam. "This new synthesis will probably bring about more unity."

SUDAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Questions on human-rights abuses evoked explanations of the crises the Sudan 
has experienced. The economic crisis is being met but the security crisis cau-
sed by the civil war continues. American treatment of the American-Japanese 
during World War II, British detentions during the Gulf War, the fact that 
India's constitution permits preventive detention, and the more numerous poli-
tical prisoners in countries neighboring the Sudan were all cited as examples 
of how governments act in crises. 

Reports of torture in the Sudan are said to have resulted primarily from those
periods of one to five days of detention following arrest when the police had 
resorted to third-degree methods. This behavior is typical of police around the
world. In addition, the Sudanese are very sensitive to their dignity and they 
would call harsh words, a strong light, or an interview in the middle of the 
night, "torture." Most reports date from the early days rather than recently 
"perhaps because the regime now feels secure." In any case, once in jail one is
safe. The law restricts detention to three months without trial. The number of 
political detainees is not more than 20-30 at any one time. "The regime intends
to retain the preventive detention system until the political system is fully 
established."
 
The removal of squatters from shanty-towns in the Three-Town area to outside of
Omdurman was done by the Khartoum municipality and has been blown out of all 
proportion. There were people from all parts of the Sudan who had come to the 
urban center. They had no sanitation facilities, no water supply and the rainy 
season was coming. They were moved to the outskirts of Omdurman and were given 
a "much better deal. Water supply, sanitation, or at least pits, and medical 
services, school and so forth." "The ambassadors, having little work to do, 
diplomatic life is such a boring life, enjoyed talking up this issue. They were
told if you can help out, good, bring money and we'll build houses. If you 
can't, this is the best we can do. We can't leave them in the center of town, 
40,000 crowded in one square feddan without adequate sanitation. There are 
millions of Sudanese who are worse off than these people. "

MINORITIES AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
 
The religious freedom of non-Muslims as well as Muslims who may have different 
views from the majority is going to be guaranteed in the Sudan. This may not be
absolutely the case at present because of the economic emergency and the civil
war. Islam has no problem in dealing with Muslims who may hold views different 
from the prevailing majority. It is these differences that have brought about 
the various madhhabs (schools of law). The people's freedom to exercise ijtihad
(individual interpretation) should not be inhibited. If someone deliberately 
and professedly says that he's a non-Muslim, the traditional view in the time 
of the Prophet was that he was left alone unless he actually changed sides and 
joined the enemy during a war. Later on Muslims came to adopt the view that 
apostasy is punishable by death. In fact it was only on one or two famous occa-
sions that it was practiced. In the Sudan it was dealt with not just as intel-
lectual apostasy, but it would have to comprise sedition and insurrection. In 
the code it reads just like treason. There is now an attempt to bring all the 
society together--the Salafis, the sufis, the Ansar, the Khatmiyya, the commu-
nists, the trade unionists, the small sects, religious sects, the professions, 
the artisans-- and have a debate to develop freely within one united Sudan. 
This is perhaps not the final model, but the final model will have more of the 
same. The Sudan does not consider that it has achieved the Islamic model it is 
working toward, but it has drawn the model.

Regarding non-Muslims, Islam has a status of ahl al-dhimmah or people of the 
trust, those with whom you have a covenant of trust. They are a minority and 
are weak, so you have to be fair to them. The South will be offered maximum 
decentralization. Non-Muslims are entitled not only to freedom of belief and 
freedom of culture, but their private life should be immune to intervention by 
govermment or society. So family law is part of religion and is personalized 
in the Sudan. Civil law is universal, a contract law is a contract law all over
the country. But criminal law has been decentralized. "We don't want to delve 
into people's private beliefs. So the equation was regionalizing the law; no
single national code." Because the South is predominantly non-Muslim, it is 
absolved from Islamic punishment in particular. "In the South there is not 
going to be punishment for alcohol, nor capital punishment for theft and so 
on."
 
With regard to the legacy of slavery in the South, the Sudan did not know sla-
very on any mass scale until Mohammed Ali and his European friends came and 
commercialized a limited practice. In Sudanese society ethnic minorities tend 
to disappear, and if the British had not created a divide between North and 
South the problem would not have been posed so acutely after independence. 
Under the British, Arabic became the Northern language. The South was excluded 
and English was made the language of instruction and administration. "The South
under the Addis Ababa agreement opted for Arabic and now every Southerner in 
the deep forest speaks Arabic. Language is no longer a very important bone of 
contention."
 
The elites of the South were all graduates of missionary schools, which increa-
sed the divide with the North. So the discrepancies between North and South 
were economic, linguistic, religious and ethnic. The civil war which led to 
millions of Southerners coming to the North was a blessing in disguise because 
it enabled Southerners to see they were the same complexion as Northerners and 
"they easily mingled and associated freely with Northerners and there was no 
tension at all." This did more to remove the distrust than any political 
dialogue although it has not been removed completely. If peace comes, the 
government plans to build roads between the North and South to enable people to
mix, and "then you will not have ethnicity and land in one area and another 
ethnicity and land in another area."
 
There is no problem of political integration, the Southerners have their fair 
representation based on population. As a result of the fall of the Ethiopian 
Mengistu government, which had strongly interfered in the South, "the South is 
not holding together. It is the Upper Nile Shiluk and Nuer against the Dinka of
Bor. The Dinka of Bahr Al-Ghazal perhaps don't see eye-to-eye with John Garang 
[leader of the southern forces] anymore. The Equatorians have always wanted a 
separate entity." The Sudanese government is going to the peace talks with a 
substantive offer for the first time. If the war is settled, economic devel-
opment will ensure that the country is integrated because there is no color bar
and no ethnic bar in the Sudan. The Northerners are not Arab. They speak Ara-
bic, but they are East African people if anything. The Nubians didn't even 
speak Arabic. Western Sudan is part of West Africa. It is mostly Nigerians, 
Chadians, and Gabonese. John Garang probably tells Africans the Southerners are
Negro Africans being persecuted by Arabs; he tells Europeans they are Chris-
tians persecuted by Muslims, and he tells Marxists they are the oppressed class
persecuted by the bourgeoisie. "But in fact the Sudanese are Arab in culture. 
Some are probably Arab in descent as well, but all are colored people unlike 
the Arabs. There is no Arab-African divide anywhere in the Sudan." What the 
British did has long been obliterated. "Southerners living in the North are now
2-3 million and they have been living there for years. The word Southerner 
doesn't mean a thing to them. Soon there will be just Muslims and Chris-
tians and then the only issue will be how Christians would fare in a Muslim 
society. But ethnicity, no."
 
What is needed is a common universal status for minorities. If you allow Mus-
lims Fridays off, you should allow Christians to have their days off. Religious
schools should be recognized as in the Sudan, but they are not in England. The 
dress of minorities should be recognized, but there was an uproar in France 
about two girls covering up their heads. "If the world is becoming one, why not
one status for minorities everywhere?