From: 0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM (Hortideas Publishing)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Subject: (no subject given)
Date: 14 Oct 92 11:09:00 GMT
Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU

From Greg Williams (921014)

>Bill Powers (921013.0930)

GW>>I do think, though, that it might be possible for acquired criteria
GW>>to override the built-in ones. I don't think that possibility is a
GW>>problem for either of our viewpoints.

>I agree in general, but I'm not sure what operation you mean by the
>term "override."

"Override" means that the error relative to an acquired reference signal,
necessary for reorganization to start, is less than the errors relative to
inherited reference signals, necessary for reorganization to start in the
absence of the acquired reference signal.

>The control hierarchy is learned specifically as a means of preventing
>critical error from becoming large enough to cause significant
>reorganization. That's automatic; reorganization simply continues
>until the critical error IS prevented from becoming that large. When
>the learned control processes work well enough, critical error does
>not become large enough to cause their organization to be altered.
>That's why they persist.

Sounds good to me.

GW>>If memory, not reorganization, is involved in a particular instance
GW>>of "facilitation" (or, more generally, "purposive influence"), then
GW>>that instance is a kind of "rubber-banding," which might not have,
GW>>for you, what you call "deep theoretical significance," but
GW>>certainly has great practical significance AND scientific
GW>>significance, in my opinion.

>How is it an example of "rubber-banding?" I don't understand.

If the control structure stays the same (no reorganization), then new
information simply disturbs a controlled variable, resulting in "offsetting"
actions to maintain control of that variable. If you are controlling for
phoning someone and I tell you that the phone number was recently changed, you
control by using you fingers to dial the NEW number -- different actions, same
controlled variable.

>If this is the crux of our dispute, then our dispute seems to come
>down to a quantitative question: loop gain.

I think the loop gain can range from very low to very high for a swimming
teacher (as one instance), just as the loop gain can range widely for a
subject controlling (in Rick's famous experiment) for keeping a dot near a
certain point on a computer screen when the dot is subject to a random
alteration in the direction of its movement each time the subject presses a
key. I think the situations are analogous.

>Don't get me wrong; I'm not saying that people can't TRY to control
>others by means like the one you suggest. I'm not even saying that
>they don't convince themselves that they ARE controlling others by
>such means. But whatever control does exist is mostly in the
>imagination. Just consider the looseness and uncertainty in the
>scenario you propose.

"Looseness" and "uncertainty" need to be evaluated by looking at whether this
kind of control works virtually all the time or only part of the time or
never. As I look at the "wild," it works quite efficiently virtually all the
time if the controller has an accurate model of something the other wants.

>The controller's effects are small, statistical, unreliable, and exceedingly
>slow. The loop gain must be close to zero.

Just as in Rick's experiment, the effects needn't be slow, unreliable,
exceedingly slow, OR statistical (well, you might use statistics to
economically describe the TRAJECTORIES in both cases, but the controller's
intended outcome, namely, seeing the cursor or other person's actions he/she
wants to see, does NOT need a statistical description, only a criterion (set
by the controller) for meeting/not meeting the desire, which can be met by a
CLASS of POSSIBLE actions). Aside: now that I think about it, there is no need
for the class of possible actions to be finite; it is a CONCEPTUAL class,
i.e., "the infinite class of all possible trajectories of the dot which remain
within an inch of the dot," or "the infinite class of all possible ways of
coming to stay afloat without external support in deep water."

>Think how easy it would be for the putative controllee to see the point of
>what the controller is doing and simply decide not to cooperate. Always
>assuming, of course, that there is no underlying threat of irresistable force
>that itself would be the actual means of control.

SEZ PCT: THE CONSTRAINT ON SUCCESSFUL CONTROL OF YOUR PERCEPTIONS WHICH DEPEND
ON ANOTHER'S ACTIONS IS THAT YOU DISTURB (OR CAREFULLY DON'T DISTURB) IN SUCH
A WAY THAT THE OTHER'S ONGOING CONTROL (IF THERE IS NO REORGANIZATION) OR NEW
CONTROL (IF THERE IS REORGANIZATION) RESULTS IN WHAT _BOTH_ PARTIES WANT. To
meet this constraint requires interacting with the other enough (maybe just
statistically, at the population level) to make a model of part of the other's
control structure. If the model is poor, the other might "simply decide not to
cooperate" -- but if the model is good, and the putative controllee sees the
point FOR THE CONTROLLEE of what the controller is doing, then the controllee
WILL cooperate, because cooperation will get the controllee what he/she wants.
(Of course, if deception is involved, or if the controllee is unsophisticated,
the controllee might only BELIEVE that he/she will get what he/she wants and
not get what he/she doesn't want. Folks who understand the very real
possibility of this sort of thing "patronize" others by warning them that what
they (currently) want might not turn out to be best for them.)

GW>>IN PRACTICE, I see that this works much of the time: A indeed does
GW>>perform actions B wants to see, and often within a short time.

>If that is what you see, the only explanation I can think of is that
>you have misconstrued what you see. A much simpler explanation is that
>A has perceived what all of B's elaborate preparations are aimed at,
>and has decided to help B out by doing what B wants. I could see that
>as leading quickly and specifically to production of the behavior that
>B wants to see.

You've almost got it. Actually, B wants A to "help out" A, which happens
(perhaps unbeknownst to A) to "help out" B, and might (but need not and
usually doesn't!!!) in fact (via 20-20 hindsight) result in what A wouldn't
consider beneficial for him/her.

>Of course B might take this to indicate success of his or her method of
>control, particularly if it's control of A that B wants.

Yes, and it would be "success" in the sense that B could have made a POOR
model of what A wants, and thus would have failed. But B succeeded, because B
met the constraints for successful control of his/her perceptions which depend
on some of A's actions.

>I don't see how the method that you have outlined could be either quick or
>specific. Perhaps you have left something out of the description.

I hope the above helps. Perhaps the analogy with Rick's experiment will be
most instructive for you.

>Exchange relations are not control of another person. They
>specifically avoid the abitrary influencing of one person's actions to
>satisfy the goals of another. One person does not study another simply
>to get what is wanted out of the other; that is a control relation.

"Arbitrary" is in the eye of the beholder. I claim that attempted control of
ANYTHING is subject to certain constraints (you can't lift a two-ton rock by
hand, and you can't make a person want what they don't want). I've been saying
all along that I want to look at the CONSTRAINTS ON CONTROL of one's
perceptions which depend on others' actions. IN GENERAL, CONTROL CANNOT BE
ARBITRARY. If what you mean by "control of others" is ARBITRARILY MAKING THEM
ACT AS YOU WISH, then you're NOT talking about what I am talking about (except
in number 4 of my summary -- using force/threat of force) -- and even that
kind of control cannot be ABSOLUTELY arbitrary (sticking a gun to my head
won't result in my picking up a two-ton rock for you, sorry, better shoot).

>This is a very different social relationship from one in which people
>memorize each others' characteristics, plot and intrigue, manipulate
>situations and environments, all so they can get what they want even
>if the other person doesn't want to cooperate or doesn't know there is
>manipulation going on.

(Common) exchange interactions as well as the (not so common) nasty stuff you
cite here BOTH involve attempts to control one's perceptions which depend on
others' actions, and so should fit somewhere in my summary schema (the four
kinds of "social" control). And PCT explains why exchange is more common than
the nasty stuff.

>It's difficult to get what you want or need from other people, because
>everyone is defensive about "being controlled."

Some definitely with much higher loop gain than others. But the other's loop
gain regarding "not being controlled" isn't a problem for a controller with a
good model of what the other wants. In types 1-3 of my summary, the controllee
is getting what he/she wants (at the time) for control to be successful.

>They're defensive about that because that's what THEY are trying to do; they
>want to be the controller, not the controlled.

Some definitely with much higher loop gain than others. The success of types
1-3 control requires that the controllee feel "in control," not "being
controlled."

GW>>Today my son Evan was having a problem with his new birthday
GW>>present, a radio- controlled truck. He asked me to help him figure
GW>>out what was wrong with the transmitter. Some experiments guided by
GW>>me showed a weak battery. Next time he'll be able to cure the
GW>>malady himself. No, he didn't hold a gun to MY head, either. We
GW>>BOTH got to where we wanted to be.

>See how easy it is when nobody is trying to figure out how to control
>someone else? He asks, you give. The hardest part for you is waiting
>to give until he asks.

You seem to equate ALL of control of one's perception which depend on
some of another's actions with (mainly) type 4 in my summary and some sub-
types (involving deception and unsophisicated controllees) of type 2. I
believe those types/sub-types are rare relative to the other types/sub-types
in everyday life. Much control is (approximately) symmetric: win-win. I have
yet to be convinced that ANY social interactions involving intention on the
part of at least one of the parties involved do NOT involve one of the four
types of control of one's perceptions which depend on others' actions. Such
interactions include "exchange" as well as "teaching" and "con games."

I believe that an understanding of the constraints we face in attempting
control of types 1 through 3 might help to avoid escalation to type 4.

>I think we also judge people by their intentions. You know, "Why are
>you being so nice to me today?"

We certainly do. (And not always cynically. "His heart is in the right
place.") But believing it important to CHANGE their intentions is a sure path
to violence. Attempting to see them ACT the way you want need not be -- if you
take their intentions into consideration. Sez PCT.

Best (now why did he say that?),

Greg
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