From: ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: New Carrier Plan
Organization: Gannett Technologies Group
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 21:38:55 GMT


From ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)

In article <BvnELL.IBy@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>My problem is this.  There seems needless duplication of forces.  It
>would be better if those same planes that helped the carriers fight
>their way to the beach could support the Marines on the beach.
>Further, it seems that there is *no way* the Marines are going ashore
>until the navy has the surrounding sea firmly in control.  This
>implies that those naval planes are free to support the Marines.
>Finally, once a beach head is secured, the Air Force should be able to
>fly in land-based fighters to continue to support the Marines.

Look at the island campaigns in the Pacific to see the flaws in this
approach.

>Therefore I argue that at no point due the Marines need their own air
>force.  Your argument seems to be that the Air Force/Naval Air fails
>to provide the support that they should.  This seems to me to *not*
>call for a whole Marine air force to make up the deficiancy, but
>instead that the Air Force / Naval Air should be fixed.

Our concept of dividing forces into air, land, and sea has become
obsolete. These aren't natural separate roles, and trying to force
them to be that way has led to serious problems such as the coordination
problems faced on Grenada and in Panama. When a ground force has to make
a credit card call back to the States to get air support, the system is
badly broken. 

The air force has recently changed it's structure to be more mission
oriented, but that doesn't go far enough. The marine model of integrated
air, sea, and land forces is a *total* mission structure. CAS is a natural
fit with a ground assualt force and should be part of that force rather
than an asset begged from another command whose main orientation is
air superiority and strategic bombing. A mission commander needs all his 
forces directly under one command with one central focus. 

The natural division of forces would be into a Strategic Strike force 
consisting of strategic bombers, missiles, missile firing submarines,
and theater based air superiority assets; a Sealane Control force consisting 
of land based air, carrier based air, surface combatants, and submarine 
attack forces; an Invasion Force structure built along the lines of a beefed 
up Marine Expeditionary force; and an Air/Land Battle Force consisting of 
Army and Army Air Force elements. 

>I argue that the Marine Air Force should be cut simply because
>something needs to be cut (for bugetary and political reasons) and
>that the Marine Air Force performs a function that can be carried by
>the other forces.
>
>Like I said, what would *you* cut????

This is a false and dangerous philosophy of military structuring. The
decision needs to be made as to what missions the US military must
be capable of carrying out, and then the forces necessary to carry
out those missions must be structured. Once that's done, you add up
the bill and pay it, or change the mission structure. Half a loaf
is *not* better than none in combat. Either you have the assets to
carry out the mission, or you abandon the mission. Any other course
leads to defeat and needless waste of lives.

Gary


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