From: ald@clipper.ingr.com (Al Date)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Transcendent values  (was: human rights...)
Date: 15 Sep 92 19:03:49 GMT
Organization: Intergraph Advanced Processor Division - Palo Alto, CA


Excuse me for butting in on this conversation but I just have
to get in a few licks on Kalb.

In article <1992Sep13.184355.109@panix.com> jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
>
>
> It is that recognition, together with
>acceptance of rationality (neither of which can be reduced to desire,
>purpose or inclination), that makes it possible for the interests of
>other people to motivate us without regard to what our own d., p. & i.
>happen to be.

It has nothing to do with the acceptance of rationality.  Love of
your children is not inherently rational.  It has rational components,
but there is much more to it, much of which we cannot easily
quantify.


>>> ... Claims that a moral principle or an argument should be 
>>> accepted by everyone regardless of subjective inclinations . . .
>>
>>I assert that people "can give no sensible explanation" of such claims
>>from their many attempts to do so and their universal failure.  May I
>>suggest that, in this regard, a single counter-example would work
>>wonders.
>
>I'm not sure of what you're looking for.  "A parent should not use his
>own children always and purely as a means to advance his own interests"
>is an example of a moral principle that should be accepted by everyone
>regardless of subjective inclinations.  

C'mon Jim.  You are assuming that we all agree that the child 
has some value of his or her own,
and that society will be better off without abused children running
around.  This is a cultural assumption which can NOT be stated
as a universal moral principle.  Certainly I agree with the principle,
but that is not the same as saying that it "exists" like the
Golden Gate Bridge.  It exists in our minds because of some of the
values which we share.  I am sure that some culture exists or
existed which differed on the matter.


>As to arguments, you yourself
>advance arguments with the apparent intention that people whose
>subjective inclinations favor the contrary view should recognize them
>as valid.

Incorrect.  The argument is that "validity of moral values" is dependent
on certain cultural assumptions. 


>I also don't know what you mean by "universal failure".  I suppose that
>if you have demanding standards for success attempts to explain why
>anything whatever should be accepted as true have universally failed. 
>Nonetheless, you, I and everyone else go on affirming things as true
>because we can't get by without doing so.

Affirming things to be "absolutely true" which are only "relatively
true" is to move even farther away from reality.  Of course, 
it is only because of certain scientific
cultural assumptions that we might agree
that there is value in modeling reality accurately.  (8-)


>>You might begin by explaining what it means to say that "a moral
>>principle ... *should* be accepted by everyone," in the absence of some
>>implicit understanding of what is the *purpose* of this "should". 
>
>Your point seems to be that the only evaluative judgments that make
>sense are judgments that evaluate fitness for some actual purpose.  My
>answer, of course, is that we can't think about life sensibly and in
>fact none of us do think about life without evaluating purposes as good
>or bad categorically.  

That is utter nonsense.  Any good or bad categorization has to be based
on outcomes, (whether expected or actual), or else it is just 
moral mysticism.

For example, we can't think sensibly about the
>relation between parents and children without judging a father who uses
>his son purely and solely as the means to satisfy whatever inclinations
>he finds he has to be a bad father. 

Oh, this is such a jumble!  When we think of some parents as "bad" or
"good," we are inherently judging the long term effects on the children,
the "outcome" of the bad parenting.  If parents could be "bad" in
a void, with no bad outcomes, we wouldnt give a damn.


> In making that judgment we don't
>need to refer to the actual desires, inclinations or purposes of anyone
>involved.  So the categorical "should" is something that I think we all
>understand, at least implicitly.

Yes, we do, but apparently you dont!  "Should" is what we think works
best.  You shouldnt abuse children because it leaves them crippled
or damaged psychologically, which has negative consequences
for them and for society.  

Let's take an historical example of an absolute "should."

*You shouldnt eat pork!  Why? (because it sometimes causes lockjaw).*  
Oh wait, we now know that it is the trichina 
that causes lockjaw, which is killed by cooking pork to 180 degrees--
so now it is OK to eat pork....get it?  "Absolute" moral truth is
based on what we think works.


>In understanding the physical world, I believe it is possible to go
>beyond first-person present-tense sense experience (the analog of
>actual desires, purposes and inclinations).  

Oh, but Jim, there is such a vast and inherent
difference between the external physical world
and the world of internal value judgments that to attempt to apply the rules
of one to the other is almost unimaginable (except for Ayn
Rand I guess).

It is one thing to drive across the Golden Gate Bridge.
It is quite another to say that is good, bad or indifferent.


--Al Date
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory