HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu (Chad Barret Wemyss)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: F-14 as a strike bomber
Keywords: BombCat
Date: 3 Nov 92 15:35:27 GMT
Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute


From Chad Barret Wemyss <chadwemy@wpi.wpi.edu>

In article <Bwu9F8.AvG@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> FWR100@PSUVM.PSU.EDU writes:

>I read in a FLIGHT recently that the question of putting "Bombcats" on
>carriers arose from the Gulf war.  Once the Iraqi AF had been essentially
>swept under the carpet, the F-14's were useless - there was no call for air
>superiority missions any more, and they had no Air-to-ground function.  The
>same article said that iron bombs would be slung in the 4 positions between
>the engines (this would still leave 2 Phoenix-capable hardpoints under the
>wings), and the a/c would use modified sights to conduct shallow-angle dive
>bonbin attacks.
>
>
>Mike Campbell, Christchurch, New Zealand 

Let me just start by saying that I believe that is impossible to combine the 
air-superiority and ground-attack roles on a single airframe in a single 
sortie, as some people seem to be suggesting with the BombCat.

First of all, there is always a call for air superiority missions, even just 
as insurance.  

Second, the F-14 was designed as an interceptor.  Therefore it has a very 
limited suite of air-to-ground avionics, and also that it has less hard-points 
for carrying weapons than a purpose-designed attack aircraft.  The first 
problem is being remedied in the BombCat by installing an attack avionics 
package in the Tomcats.  However, the second is a little more difficult to 
solve.

The standard load for a Tomcat is 4 missiles (either the 1000-lb. Phoenix, the 
500-lb. Sparrow, or the 350-lb. AMRAAM) on pallets under the fuselage, and 
either 2 more Phoenix, or 2 Sparrow/AMRAAM's and 2 Sidewinders, for a total 
of either 6 or eight AAM's.  They also normally carry two auxillary fuel tanks 
under the intakes.  

My point is that the Bombcat is either going to have an extremely limited 
ground attack load if the under-fuselage hardpoints are the only ones used, and
if the wing pylons are used, then the only self-defensive weapons that it will 
be able to carry are 2 Sidewinders on the pylons

In addition, the Bombcat will be unable to use sophisticated ground-attack 
ordinance such as LGB's (due to a lack of a laser designator or locator), or 
Anti-Radar Missiles such as the HARM.

The final problem will be re-training all the F-14 fighter pilots to fly like
bomber pilots.  This training is not the norm for Tomcat pilots, and as a 
matter of fact is probably completely foreign to most of them.

In my opinion, the A-6F is a better choice as a long-range attack aircraft.  
First, it was designed with the role in mind, albeit nearly 35 years ago.  
Second, it can carry 30,000 lbs of ordinance, where the BombCat cant carry 
20,000.  Finally, for anyone who thinks that the A-6 doesn't have the air-to-
air capability to survive in a hostile environment, the new F model has the 
capability not only for Sidewinders, but for radar-guided AMRAAM's.

Chad Wemyss
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Daniel F Boyd <boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu>
Subject: New Bombers (was Reorganizing the DoD (was New Carrier Plan))
Summary: wing spar is in the way
Organization: UB
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 19:08:01 GMT


From Daniel F Boyd <boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu>

In article <Bx97op.2DM@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> 
ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib) writes: 
> What about using an existing commercial or military transport
> airframe as a basis for a new bomber?  What about something based on
> the 767, or a 747 variant for instance?

The wing spar is in the way.  There is no place to put the bomb bay
because both these aircraft are low-winged, with the wing going
underneath the fuselage.  This puts the wing spar right where you want
to put the bomb bay.

Also, 747s and 767s are designed to carry the weight of people
distributed throughout the cabin, and they're not designed for the
stresses you would get when you let go of the bombs -- the plane loses
a lot of weight in a hurry, and 7X7s don't do that.

> Would this cost less?

Probably not enough less to make it worth it.  If the Air Force needs
a carpet-bombing plane then they'll ask for one -- and it will
probably have efficient turbofan engines and so on that Boeing learned
how to build/use when making the 767, a more efficient wing, all sorts
of things.  But it won't be the same plane, because the basic airframe
of a bomber and a transport have different needs.

Also, remember that, for the foreseeable future at least, the B-52 and
the B-1 fill the Air Force's needs.  Conventional area bombing can be
done with the B-52s until they wear out; then the B-1 can take over
the whole mission.  A B-1 can carry a larger conventional bombload
than a B-52, and they can go faster, so you could probably fly two or
three missions in a day with B-1s versus one mission for the B-52s.

Conventional area bombing is of questionable military value at best;
even in WWII when the Allies were pounding Germany day and night,
German war production increased every month right up to the end of the
war.  The B-52s from Guam trucking huge bombloads over North Viet Nam
didn't help us win Vietnam.  True, they demoralized the Iraqi army,
but Iraq doesn't count because they were poorly organized in the first
place.  (Suppose we had to fight well-trained committed Syrians
instead of poorly-trained 'I'd-rather-be-in-Philadelphia' Iraqis?)

It's better to send F-111s over with LGBs to take out every power
plant and TV station in the country than it is to send a flight of
B-52s over with MK84s to flatten five square miles of random
territory.

We could always buy some Bears -- but given the known shoddy state of
Soviet military production, would YOU want to fly in one?

-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)
Newsgroups: sci.military,soc.history
Subject: 50 Years Ago: Monday, 26 October, 1942
Date: 4 Nov 92 17:18:15 GMT
Followup-To: soc.history
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department


From military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)

Monday, 26 October, 1942

A major naval battle develops in the Guadalcanal vicinity.  Aircraft from 
the Japanese carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, and Junyuo attack the US 
carriers Enterprise and Hornet.  The Hornet is hit by four bombs and three
torpedoes, and is abandoned and later is sunk.  The Enterprise takes two bomb
hits, and other American ships including the battleship South Dakota suffer
damage as well.  The Japanese aircraft take heavy losses; over 100 Japanese
planes have been lost in the last few days.

The American counterstrike damages the carriers Zuiho and Shokaku, along
with the destroyer Chikuma.  

The Allied attack at El Alamein continues to achieve little progress, and
Montgomery halts most of his attacks to regroup.  Rommel sends his panzer
divisions to counterattack.

Army Group A captures Nalchik in the Caucasus.

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bill Thacker			            military@att.att.com
Send submissions for "50 Years Ago" to military-request@att.att.com

"Thus we will relieve the pressure of our enemies on China and Russia,
those two superb fighting allies." - Wendell Willkie, urging the creation
of a second front in Europe and an offensive in Burma
From: flak@eagle.eng.corp.mccaw.com (Dan Flak)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: CAS: Commo w/FM, UHF
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:20:04 GMT
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department


From Dan Flak <flak@eagle.eng.corp.mccaw.com>

>From Richard Pierson <fist@iscp.bellcore.com>

> In the event of a CAS with fast movers the FAC is supposed
> to take control or the ALO (yea right, you're really going to
> get that AF jock up front and dirty with HIS UHF radio- maybe if
> the brigade toc runs out of coffee and donuts :-)).

I'm not going to sit here and let this one go by... I was a FAC.

The first time I ran into an Army General, I was 15 feet in the
air spread out on a tree limb with binoculars and PRC-66 hanging
off my neck working an airstrike.

I spent a *lot* of time camping out with the 82nd Airborne and
have much more time in a MK-107 than an O-2. Of course, I was a
lieutenant at the time, and probably didn't know any better.
-- 
 Our plan was to put the Starlifter on the deck at 350 knots and di-di-mao out
                                   the delta.
       Dan Flak - McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., 5400 Carillon Point
    Kirkland, Wa 98033-7397, 206-828-8006, (usenet: flak@eng.corp.mccaw.com)
From: woody@udcf.gla.ac.uk (Ian Woodrow)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: What happens to Czechoslovak Air Force after the split ?
Date: 11 Nov 92 17:23:28 GMT
Organization: Glasgow University Computing Service


From Ian Woodrow <woody@udcf.gla.ac.uk>

WHAT will happen to the current Czech and Slovak Air Force when the country
divides in January ?   Will the inventories be split among the 2 new republics
and if so how will it be done ?  In particular what will happen to the MiG29s.
These is only one squadron of them at the moment based at Zatec to the West-
North-West of Prague (about 80km).  

I am also posting this to soc.culture.czecho-slovak in case any subscribers in
Czechoslovakia can find out what is happening.  Oh, and if anyone in Czecho-
slovakia feel like calling the Czech & Slovak Public Relations office in Praha
the phone numbers are 342696 & 322746.
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: brian@coombs.anu.edu.au (Brian)
Subject: Re: WW2 Penetration Tables
Organization: Australian National University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:05:28 GMT


From brian@coombs.anu.edu.au (Brian)

"Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil> writes:


>From     "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>


>WRT the German Panzerschrek and Puppchen, I thought the latter's ammunition
>was just the former's projectile with an attached propelling charge to
>increase the range. We have one of each in our museum here and they look 
>very similar except for the back end. The massive difference in penetration
>(100mm vs 209mm) is not possible to account for with the minor differences
>in the projectile design.

	There is according to my references, a 1 oz difference in the weight of
the two projectiles (the Puppchen being the heavier) warheads.  However the
clincher must be the comment by Chamberlain and Gander that, "it [the Puppchen]
fired a DIFFERENT [emphasis mine] rocket grenade from the RP series, namely
the RPGr4312 which had a percussion igniter."  The RPGr4322 and the RPGr4992
both used electric ignition.  In addition, the US manual on the German Military
Forces, TM-E 30-451, makes the comment, about the Puppchen's round that it
was, "an 88-mm hollow-charge rocket similar to that used with the Racketpanzer-
busche, BUT [emphasis added] with a flush cap in the center[sic] of a rimmed
base fitting over the end of the stabilizing[sic] fins. The rimmed base serves
as a cartridge case and remains in the breech after the projectile has fired."

>As to Panzerfaust's actual penetration being less than some sources state,
>it's likely that as the war progressed the Germans used more wax in the RDX
>in an effort to "stretch" it, and at the % RDX levels used in the Panzerfaust
>very small changes in wax content can have large effects on explosive
>effects. Sloppier tolerances in the charge liner would also reduce performance.

	Indeed.  You should also take into account that the fuses used in the
Panzerfaust were also notorious for both failure and possible inability to
ignite the charge properly.  But what else could be expected with the Riech
coming down around their ears in 1944-45?



--
Brian Ross_____Brian@Coombs.anu.edu.au________________________________________
	"Three discoveries are essential to the contented and civilised life -
sex, wine, and bookshops, by no means necessarily in that order."
_________________________________Tony Baker, Adelaide Review, October 1992____
From: dmturne@ptsfa.pacbell.com (Dave Turner)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Pearl Harbor & U.S. plans to attack Japan.
Date: 3 Nov 92 15:35:22 GMT
Organization: Pacific * Bell, San Ramon, CA


From Dave Turner <dmturne@ptsfa.pacbell.com>

In article <Bx1G6t.I41@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> kasprj@isaac.its.rpi.edu (Jim Kasprzak) writes:
> Hector Bywater's book _The Great Pacific War_, written in the late 30's,
>was partially intended as a protest against this plan, by demonstrating a
>much more effective strategy for fighting Japan in the Pacific, namely the
>island-hopping method which was actually used. Bywater also outlined what 
>would be a good Japanese strategy for fighting such a war, including a 
>surprise attack on US bases such as the Philippines and Guam. Strategists
>on both sides read the book, and many historians believe that it was at 
>least partially responsible for the strategies that were used on both sides
>when the Pacific War became a reality.
> 
> The book was recently reprinted by St. Martin's Press, and got a good 
>amount of attention last year in connection with the 50th anniversary 
>of Pearl Harbor. It shouldn't be too hard to find a copy at a good library
>or bookstore.

I was wondering when someone would mention Bywater's book.

Ask for:

	The Great Pacific War
	Hector C. Bywater
	1991
	ISBN 0-312-06364-4

-- 
Dave Turner	(510) 823-2001	{att,bellcore,sun,ames,decwrl}!pacbell!dmturne
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: anthony@cs.uq.oz.au (Anthony Lee)
Subject: Re: Collins Class?
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 19:14:53 GMT


From anthony@cs.uq.oz.au (Anthony Lee)


In <Bx7C2y.DtH@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> bull@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au writes:


:present to order Collins class subs (the Collins class was designed
:as a submission for the Australian navy, to replace our Oberons).

Do you know what will happen to our Oberons ?  
Doesn't the RN still operated theirs ?

:and Sub-Harpoon missiles. There has been speculation of adding
:Tomahawk cruise missiles, either torpedo tube launched, or in a
:vertical launcher located in the sail. Projected underwater

Wouldn't it take a major redesign to the sail in order to be
able to launch Tomahawks ?

:speed is 25+ knots, with a maximum diving depth of approx 400

That's really fast for a diesel-electric sub.  Is this a short
duration high speed burst or can it be sustained.  Even the
RN Upholder class can't do >20 knots.
--
Anthony Lee (Time Lord Doctor) (These are my opinions !)
email: anthony@cs.uq.oz.au	voice:+(61)-7-3651204 FAX:+(61)-7-3651999
SNAIL: Department Computer Science, The University of Queensland, 
       St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia
From: slkdh@cc.usu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Desert Storm special operations
Date: 4 Nov 92 17:32:06 GMT
Organization: Utah State University


From slkdh@cc.usu.edu

	Nesweek, June 17, 1991 contains an article entitled "Secret Warriors."
It has several interesting stories of Spec Ops in the Desert Storm war plus yet
another picture of those famous SEAL Fast Attack Vehicles.
Enjoy.

Thom Goodsell

"Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean someone isn't out to get you!"
Newsgroups: sci.military
From: 92vanatter@gw.wmich.edu
Subject: Change of M17A2 mask to M40 mask?
Organization: Western Michigan University
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 17:29:27 GMT


From 92vanatter@gw.wmich.edu


I would like to discuss why the military is changing from the M17A2 
chemical and biological mask to the new M40 mask?

The new M40 seems like a step back, with the filter attached from the 
side of the mask.  I feel the M17A2 was more ergonomically designed 
with the filters integrated within the mask.  Thus your mask would not
catch on as many things, more freedom of movement.

Anyone that has info, or would like to respond, please e-mail me or 
post on the net.

Dion VanAtter
92vanatter@gw.wmich.edu



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)
Subject: Re: refurbishing ICBMs as launchers
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:38:52 GMT


From ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)

In article <BworEM.FE9@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:

>There are two problems with doing this for something like the Minuteman
>force.  One is that those really aren't very large rockets by launcher
>standards.  Even the Titan II -- much larger than the Minuteman -- is on
>the small side of medium launchers now.

True, but satellites are getting pretty small, too. Pegasus was 
designed to launch fairly small satellites. 

As I see it these days you need ultra-heavy launchers for the mongo 
payloads like Hubble and small, cheap launchers for the microsatellites
that are starting to appear.




-- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iskandar Taib                          | The only thing worse than Peach ala
Internet: NTAIB@SILVER.UCS.INDIANA.EDU |    Frog is Frog ala Peach
Bitnet:   NTAIB@IUBACS                 !

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: livesey@solntze.wpd.sgi.com (Jon Livesey)
Subject: Re: Jutland
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.  Mountain View, CA
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 19:08:16 GMT


From livesey@solntze.wpd.sgi.com (Jon Livesey)


In article <Bx97JB.27F@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, seb@tadtec.co.uk writes:
> 
> The initial assesment of Jutland was that it had been a British defeat
> (although this was played down in any official comments at the time, of
> course) but subsequent events and analysis suggested a fairer verdict was a
> marginal British victory.  Consider the following:

Actually, that's not quite right.   There was an initial *claim*
from Germany that it had been a British defeat, but this claim
was in no sense an objective assessment: it was a propaganda
claim intended to direct attention away from the German flight
from the battlefield.

In any case, was immediately and widely ridiculed by people
who pointed out, correctly, as you also did, that the Royal
Navy was ready to fight again, and the German Navy was
not.    Also, when you say "marginal British victory", you
may be understating the case.

jon.



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: chadwemy@wpi.WPI.EDU (Chad Barret Wemyss)
Subject: Re: CAS: Commo w/FM, UHF
Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:15:32 GMT


From chadwemy@wpi.WPI.EDU (Chad Barret Wemyss)

In article <BxGrH4.6L2@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us> writes:
>
> I, for one, don't like parts of your idea abuot using AWACS for 
>CAS control. The very *last* thing you want is CAS that does not 
>have some dirrect link to the troops they are supporting who has a 
>visual on *both* the ground troops and the CAS. This is *exactly* 
>what happened when the A-10s attacked the British troops in DS and 
>killed several. 

I agree completely, and have an alternative possibility.  

The E-8A Joint STARS aircraft carries a Sideways-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR),
capable of spotting any enemy mechanized forces on the ground for many dozens 
of miles.  The prototypes were used in the Gulf war in the scud hunt, and were 
a major aid in making the process more efficient.  Also, they include many of 
the same Command, Control and Communications (C3) facilities as the AWACS, the 
idea being to vector strike aircraft against ground targets in much the same 
way that an E-3 Sentry vectors interceptors against enemy aircraft.  

My proposal is to use the E-8 as a part of the CAS system.  It could remain on 
station for several hours, doing what it normally does, looking for enemy armor
concentrations, supply lines, fuel dumps, etc.  With the addition of a few key 
commo systems, it could also be an airborne controller for CAS operations, 
using aircraft that are in the air on rotations.  When there were no calls for 
CAS, these attack aircraft could attack targets of opportunity that the Joint 
STARS aircraft picks up with it's SLAR.  

However, when an airborne or ground-based FAC called in for air support, the 
E-8 controllers could decide which aircraft could best respond to the 
situation, based on proximity and remaining ordinance, and send them to answer 
the FAC's request.  

While admittedly this introduces another step in the communications chain, I 
believe that it would make the process much more efficient from an aircraft 
standpoint because the attack aircraft can be used against targets of 
opportunity when they are not providing CAS.  While this option exists now, it
would be made much easier if these targets were already pinpointed by the Joint
STARS

Chad Wemyss

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: "J.D. Baldwin" <baldwin@csservera.usna.navy.mil>
Subject: Re: Jutland
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 19:36:06 GMT


From "J.D. Baldwin" <baldwin@csservera.usna.navy.mil>

I wrote a well-received paper for my Naval War College "Strategy and
Policy" course arguing that Jellicoe was a hero for failing to press the
attack against the German fleet.  That's right, a hero.  And I still
believe it--at least as applied to his strategic calculus rather than
his talents as an operational commander (which were quite good, but
don't put him in the pantheon of great naval commanders).

Corbett, in "The Great War" (interesting mainly  because it was  written
about WW I in the years prior to WW II), sums up British popular opinion
when  he  says that Jellicoe  could  have  used more  of "the  spirit of
Nelson" at Jutland and that his failure to press the attack cost Britain
a  glorious  victory  which  could have boosted  morale and  the general
fortunes  of  the  British  armed forces  at  a critical  time.  Corbett
admits, however,  that Jellicoe, at  the  time  he broke off the attack,
could  still have lost the  battle and if he had suffered severe losses,
would probably have lost the war single-handedly.

I argued (and still argue) that it takes just as much (or even more)
courage to take the conservative tack when one's service's ideal of
strategy and courage is someone like Nelson, who took great risks in
order to achieve great victories.  Jellicoe had to know that he would be
seen as letting down the tradition of Nelson by backing off in the face
of an unknown submarine and mine threat.  He backed off anyway, because
he knew that a badly damaged British fleet would mean the near-immediate
end of the war on less than favorable terms for Britain, whereas even a
glorious victory wouldn't mean a lot in concrete terms, because the
German fleet was pretty much neutralized in the face of the continued
supremacy of the British fleet anyway.

It was a simple "game theory" calculation in a case where such a
calculation was definitely called for.  In this case, prudence *was* the
better part of valor, and we ought to recognize Jellicoe's wisdom in
following his instinct in this regard.
--
 From the catapult of:              |+| "If anyone disagrees with anything I
   _,_  J. D. Baldwin, Comp Sci Dept|+| say, I am quite prepared not only to
 _|70|___:::)=}-  U.S. Naval Academy|+| retract it, but also to deny under
 \      /   baldwin@usna.navy.mil   |+| oath that I ever said it." --T. Lehrer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Newsgroups: sci.military