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Date:         Sun, 22 Nov 1992 23:05:09 PST
From:         Penni Sibun <sibun@PARC.XEROX.COM>
Subject:      Re: privileged points of view; language experiments
              22 Nov 1992 19:51:53 -0800
              <92Nov22.195427pst.13015@alpha.xerox.com>

(penni sibun 921122.2300)

   [From Bill Powers (921122.2000)]

   Hank Folson (921122) --

   Your post is to the point. We have to consider what people use language
   for, not just try to explain language by examining words.

lots of us, both ``interactionists'' and more traditional
psychologists, have been doing this for a long time.

   It would be interesting to devise some experiments to see why people use
   language as they do. I'm thinking of some task that requires two (or
   more) people to cooperate, but that requires them to convey information
   to each other. One way to test ideas about the elements of language
   would be to start with the most primitive operations that you think all
   languages contain, such as naming. Of course other primitive

herb clark and gradstuds at stanford have a whole suite of such
experiments.  i'm not sure what they would consider primitive
operations, if any, but i don't think naming w/b one.  *referring*
probably is (though of course referring needn't be verbal).  for a
fascinating read on this topic, i recommend clark and wilkes-gibbs,
``the collaborative construction of referring expressions'' (full ref.
on request).  referring is a dynamic and often volatile thing, whereas
naming implies a mapping between stuff and symbols and has static
connotations.  i wouldn't be surprised if an adequate model of
referring obviated any distinct model of naming.

   Suppose that the people are allowed to send symbols back and forth by
   picking them out of a list. The symbols are arbitrary, not familiar
   words, and can be defined only through common experiences with the task
   and with each other.

why should we suppose this sort of artificial task will be revealing
of anything particular to language?

   Some interesting problems come to mind. Attaching a symbol to an object
   might seem easy, but with no rules, how do you get across that you are
   attaching the symbol to the object and not to the actions by which
   you're calling attention to the object? How would yuou get it across

there's literally tons of research on symbol manipulation.  it's even
been studied extensively in other species, inclding the usual
suspects--chimps (see david premack, _intelligence in ape and man_)
and dolphins (no handy refs., sorry).  for that matter, one could
cogently argue that skinner's pigeons can attach symbols to objects;
we don't want to say this means that pigeons have human-like language,
do we?

   I think the deaf community would have a lot to teach about what happens
   when a group of people is brought together without any initial means of
   communicating.

i find this notion incoherent.  w/ possible exceptions of severely
damaged individuals (eg, those w/ autism, those severely abused in
childhood), any group of individuals you bring together are going to
have myriads of ways of communicating.

communication is a terribly important part of what human beings (and
all organisms!) do.  language may or may not involve symbol
manipulation.  but language is fundamentally communcation.  wouldn't
it be a good idea to start studying a language at its foundations?

cheers.

                                --penni
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