From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Date: 12 Nov 92 09:21:24 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov12.042127.17368
Distribution: world
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov11.213254.426@news.wesleyan.edu> 
RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:

>In <BxKAF7.JLw@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> 
>jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu writes:

JW: 
>> My question to Ruth is as follows:  What is 'feminist logic'?  
>> In what way is it different from ordinary 'human logic'?  What are
>> the attributes of 'feminist logic' that allow us to differentiate
>> it from other logic?  Is there a distinction 'feminine/masculine'
>> along the lines of 'modal/deontic'?

RG:
>First of all let me say that I am reporting what I have published re. feminist
>logic, which is not the primary work in the field.  I guess I'd suggest Andrea
>Nye's new (1992) book on feminism & logic (I forget the title) as more recent
>and probably more representative.  Or Genevieve Lloyd, THE MAN OF REASON: 'MALE
>AND 'FEMALE' IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1985 or so).
>
>Anyway, in a paper titled "Teaching Feminist Logic" I suggested that
>phenomenological redescription (see below for explanation) is a form of the use
>of human reason.  I suggested that it is what Thomas Kuhn was trying to explain
>when he stumbled around trying to explain "paradigm shifts" and/or why they
>were, in the end, rational.  I also suggested that it is a form of reasoning
>first described by Marx & later appropriated by feminist activists, known as
>"consciousness raising."
>
>Basically, I argued, phenomenological redescription is the activity of
>redescribing a state-of-the-world in a way which accounts for more of the
>phenomena.  Examples: Kuhn's "paradigm shifts", the transformation of the
>hapless Winston's perceptions in the scifi novel "1984" (i.e., brainwashing),
>Marxist class-consciousness raising, feminist gender-consciousness raising.

This is perhaps the most telling point of Dr Ruth's account, -- in
adducing as her representative examples of "phenomenological
redescription" a pop tract on the historiography of science, a work of
political fiction, and two articles of political dogma, she implicitly
declares her refusal to adhere to the scientific conception of knowledge
in even the most radical form.

RG:
>I suggested that this was *NOT* unique to women or feminists in any essential
>way, but that it did tend to act as a sort of "affirmative action" w.r.t.
>reasoning, because those who were able best to REdescribe the phenomena tended
>to be those who were least well served by current descriptions of it, i.e., the
>epistemically disenfranchised, politically disenfranchised, etc.  I suggested
>that while this IS some use of human reason, it certainly is not deductive or
>inductive reasoning, but some yet other kind.  I proposed that it needs to be
>studied, that research needs to be done on learning about the parallels to
>validity, soundness (etc.) in phenomenological redescription, and that CLEARLY
>it is subject to both validity isomorphism and fallacy isomorphism, and that
>rather than ignoring or pooh-poohing it, it needs to be researched.

Observe that the fortuitous attribution of the alleged skills of
"phenomenological redescription" to those who are least well served by
current descriptions of the "state-of-the-world" very neatly begs the
question of the means whereby the comparative merits of such descriptions
are to be established.  For phenomenology being by definition in the eye
of the beholder, the sole possible criterion of epistemic entitlement that
can fit the above scheme is the pragmatic one, of utility to pre-defined
special interest groups vying for "recognition" in the eyes of the polis.

Now, who are these groups?  We are told without any argument that they are
"epistemically disenfranchised, politically disenfranchised, etc."  It is
not hard to explain why this must be so.  In Dr Ruth's revisionist project
aiming at the fragmentation of the all-encompassing conception of Man as a
rational animal, it is important to stake her claim for meaningful
difference from the universalist ideal, without thereby exposing herself
as an irrational blatherer.  Thus she must make a positive identification
of herself with those who are currently excluded from, or marginalized by,
the prevalent norm of rational discourse.  Naturally, these hapless
individuals are those branded as know-nothings, blockheads, ignoramuses,
or, to resort to the beautiful language of our times, the language among
whose fruits we happily count such choice expressions as `handi-capable',
`knowledge-base nonpossessor', `acceptional child', and many other gems of
the same nature, -- the "epistemically disenfranchised".  In other words,
Dr Ruth proposes to empower *all* those lacking any credibility in their
claims to knowledge.  In line with the correct victimological fashion,
their lack is to be attributed not to any fault or shortcoming of their
own, but to the horrid unfairness of the egghead epistemic elite, which
steadfastly refuses to grant recognition to those whose explanatory
paradigms differ from their own ossified practice.  Thus among the
epistemically disenfranchised we are bound to find such fascinating
epistemic groups as the Flat Earthers, the Theosophists, the Creation
Scientists, the General Semanticists, the Objectivists, the Holocaust
revisionists, the Transcendental Meditators, the Trickle-Down economists,
and the Cold Fusioneers, as well as assorted faith healers, perpetuum
mobilists, and alternative number theorists of the world, whose
revolutionary proofs of Fermat's Last Theorem defiantly decorate the
bulletin boards of Math departments from Fairbanks to Cape Town.

So much for the claims of reason.  As to the putative reasons why
"phenomenological redescription" cannot be subsumed under deductive or
inductive reasoning, we are given no explanation.  In line with Dr Ruth's
implicit pragmatism, it is most peculiar that abduction is not mentioned
among the alternative possibilities; on the other hand, the selfsame
philosophical prejudice clearly rules out the possibility of explaining
the alleged occurrences of the phenomenon as the run-of-the-mill
ontological revisions of the sort that accompanied the development of
bacteriology and epidemiology in shifting the focus of pathology from
construing and classifying diseases as characterized by collections of
symptoms, to the study of the microorganisms identified as their
determining causes.  For this sort of explanation, with its implicit
reliance on a presumption of reality of the scientist's ontology, commits
him to the classical goal of an impartial search for truth, and _ipso
facto_ excludes the primality of the pragmatic consideration of accounting
for more of the observed phenomena in a way that maximizes the
satisfaction of those served by his descriptions thereof.

Given her pragmatist approach, it is not at all clear what Dr Ruth might
envision as "the parallels to validity, soundness (etc.)" in the process
of phenomenological redescription.  Even less clear is her claim that the
process so described "is subject to both validity isomorphism and fallacy
isomorphism", both inasmuch as the gratuitous deployment of the
pseudorigorous borrowings of the structuralist math terminology results in
utter obfuscation of her thesis, and insofar as any attribution of formal
validity criteria would require a far more rigorous reformulation of her
vague eristic claims.  Naturally, the greatest difficulty implicit in the
enterprise of so doing, consists in the need to navigate between the
Scylla of utter unoriginality, and the Charybdis of blithering nonsense.
Given Dr Ruth's telling endorsement of Andrea Nye, I predict that her
enterprise is destined to meet with the latter end.

RG:
>Now you might ask:  what makes this FEMINIST philosophy?
>
>Answer:  The fact that the motivating philosophical question arose out of a
>feminist research concern:  namely, "Why is it that (anecdotally, any way)
>fewer women than men are attracted to careers in math and science?  Why is it
>that at puberty, scores on standardized tests (SAT, GRE, etc) begin to diverge
>with women's scores dropping behind men's scores on shat is supposedly a
>measure of math *aptitude*?  Why do so many women and men report (anecdotally,
>any way) that women's reasoning and men's reasoning seem different? [even Kant
>& Aristotle & many of the GreatPhilosophersOfRationality made this observation]
>What would happen if, instead of asserting that this is incorrect, we tried
>accounting for the phenomena in some other way?  The result suggested was that
>perhaps politically and epistemically disenfranchised people engage more often
>in a form of reasoning that is not yet *recognized* as reasoning, thus making
>it look as though they "just don't reason as much" or "as well" or "in the same
>ways."  This was my proposal.

To answer the question, doing so would automatically undermine their human
dignity, by ensconcing their cognitive faculties in a mold that separates
them from the universal claims of human reason.  On the face of it, any
claim that there may exist a "disenfranchised" form of reasoning "that is
not yet *recognized* as reasoning" is patently ridiculous, as the common
definition of reasoning applies to any progression from premisses to
conclusion.  If undestood charitably, the claim depends on a further
qualification of reasoning as valid, pleasing, persuasive, useful, or what
have you.  All but the former alternative fall outside of the provenance
of logic, as it is normally understood, and so are irrelevant to the
question as originally formulated; on the other hand, the attribution of
validity to the putative pattern of reasoning in question seems
unwarranted by Dr Ruth's description thereof.  The end result is that the
alleged faculty of "phenomenological redescription", as distinguished from
the conventionally recognized patterns of valid and plausible reasoning,
sounds much like Andrea Nye's specious opposition of the womanly mastery
of nurturing, receptive reading and the sterile, oppressive male skill of
logical analysis.  This is most certainly *not* an approach designed to
empower the "epistemically and politically disenfranchised"; instead, it
calls for a deliberate codification and valorization of their intellectual
situation in a manner that postulates its essential nature as worthy of
emulation, and suggests an intrinsic connection between their marginal
status and the fundamental properties of their minds.

>--------------------------
>(note: nothing here has anything to do with what women philosophers have
>already said, or with what gender the author or discoverer of axioms might be,
>etc.  it is not historiography; it is philosophy)

Thank you very little for this small concession to universality, Dr Ruth.
As for your modest claim to philosophical status, it stands unwarranted
and unjustified by your narrative.  Instead of any evidence of your own
epistemic entitlement, all I can see is the eternal battle cry of the
rapacious tenure-seeker: "it needs to be researched"!  The implication
being, it needs to be researched by someone uniquely qualified for the
task, yea, by the brave pioneer who laid the groundwork of the future
edifice with a meta-phenomenological redescription of her own.  Now, how
could the NEH dare to look askance at such selfless devotion to the
scholarly ideal?  Well, never mind their comfortable predispositions, for
I can, have, and will continue to do so.

>------------------------
>Ruth Ginzberg <rginzberg@eagle.wesleyan.edu>
>Philosophy Department;Wesleyan University;USA

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Desperate, lonely, cut off from the human community which in many cases
has ceased to exist, under the sentence of violent death, wracked by
desires for intimacy that they do not know how to fulfill, at the same time
tormented by the presence of women, men turn to logic."  -- Andrea Nye