From: casper@vxcrna.cern.ch (CASPER,DAVI./PPE)
Subject: Re: The Fog of War and McClellan (and Yamamoto and Patton)
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    
Organization: European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1992 23:31:00 GMT

In article <1992Apr9.173335.4706@nsisrv.gsfc.nasa.gov>, timothy@vansant.gsfc.nasa.gov (Timothy Van Sant) writes...
>In article <_8rjxgk@lynx.unm.edu> randym@triton.unm.edu writes:
>> In article <8APR199217314326@vxcrna.cern.ch> casper@vxcrna.cern.ch  
>(CASPER,DAVI./PPE) writes:

[Concerning a Union attack on the Confederate left on Nicodemus Hill, at
Antietam]

>>>I wonder 1) if this Union attack can be dealt with somehow and 2) if it was
>>>ever considered in the historical battle.

[We can criticize....]
>> McClellan for not ending the war in one afternoon, but could we have really
>> done any better? Probably not.

>One might suppose that his conduct of the actual one-day battle was  
>passable.  (IMHO, his coordination of the Union attacks was bad even by  
>ACW standards!)  But his conduct of the campaign as a whole was terrible.   
>Given that he stumbled upon a copy of the Confederate plans for taking  
>Harper's Ferry, revealing that Lee had divided his force, he could have  
>been much more aggressive in seeking out portions of the AoNV to defeat in  
>detail.  He also wasted an entire day before the actual battle during  
>which the bulk of Jackson's men were still at Harper's Ferry.

There is another very interesting critique, which I can't remember the source
of (it might have been the "In Their Quiet Fields" designer's notes), which
points out that at the end of September 17, McClellan refused to commit the
remaining corps of the Union Army, which had formed the core of the Army of
the Potomac which he had built the previous year.  The critic suggests that
McClellan refused to endanger "his" army to save the other corps formerly
part of Pope's Army of Virginia, which he considered inferior.

Equally damning as McClellan's campaign leading up to Antietam was his failure
to continue the attack on the 17th, or resume it on the 18th, or to pursue Lee
during the dangerous withdrawal back across the Potomac.  Indeed, I think the
AoP camped on the Antietam battlefield for over a month after the battle,
without making a single advance, and this led directly to Little Mac's
dismissal.

To return to the original question, whether the Union attack on Nicodemus
Hill can be countered, it seems like the only alternatives for Lee are either
to reinforce the left flank (i.e., extend the line), or to counter-attack the
flank of the I Corps as it passes in front of Jackson to attack the hill.
I think both have a lot of dangers.  The first has the problem that some other
segment of the already thin line will be weakened, while the second is
vulnerable to an attack by the 12th Corps, assuming it is released.  The
CSA starting position is not so bad in Jackson's sector (on top of a low hill,
I recall), so attacking might largely forfeit this advantage. So I guess if
I were Lee, I would try to cover the left by juggling units, just as he did in
the real battle.  Perhaps if Lee reacts fast enough, he can get infantry on the
hill before it is overrun, and create another Bloody Lane-style massacre.

In closing, I will agree that the Union player has too much intel at the start
of the game.  One way to address this would be to allow hidden Confederate
set-up.  After all, Lee was free to deploy his army any way he wished.  Perhaps
a more interesting way to remedy the problem is to allow the CSA player
to increase the strengths of all his regiments (or even add new ones which were
left in various other places in the actual campaign), but at a VP cost.  That
way, the true uncertainty of the Union command could be recreated, but at
perhaps some cost in terms of the historical OOB.  Such a scheme might also
allow the CSA to weaken his units for a bonus, or also allow the Union to
adjust his strength by adding or removing corps.  Naturally, the VP scale would
have to be carefully calibrated. 

Another battle which I have thought this mechanic might really improve is the
battle of Midway.  In that case, the US usually knows the Japanese
dispositions, strengths and objectives at the start, while the Japanese player
knows he is walking into an ambush.  One could allow both sides to choose their
strength levels, objectives, and intelligence using a VP scale.  Hence an
overcautious Japanese player might putz around too long while the US player,
lacking the Yorktown and without advance warning of the attack races to get
into position.  Or an overly confident Japanese player might run headlong into
the waiting arms of a 3 (or even 4) CV trap (the historical result).  Or,
finally, the US player could commit all his resources against a mere diversion,
upon which he would have to inflict a totally crushing defeat, or else lose the
game because he has drained resources from other key sectors for little gain. 
The initial scenario could be determined either randomly or by choice of the
players, or a combination (allowing the players control over the decisions
within the scope of their real-life counterparts, while letting chance determine
the factors that were not...in either case, VP would be added or subtracted to
maintain balance).  Naturally, the starting conditions would not be known at the
start.

_IF_ the VP could be adjusted properly, this technique could improve a lot of
games where the players normally have too much knowledge.  The only application
of this method I can remember is in "Wacht Am Rhein" (Battle of the Bulge),
where the Germans could choose four levels of strength ranging from a "Spoiling
Attack", or an even bigger "go for broke" effort than historically (more troops
stripped from the Eastern Front).  The required level of victory was different
in each case, but I do not recall that the Americans also had the freedom to
adjust their forces.  In fact, faced with a mere "spoiling attack" the Americans
could have chosen to continue Patton's offensive against the Saar, and the
decision to divert his Army had to made early in the battle before the full
scale of the German offensive became apparent.  So even in this case, there is
room for allowing the players a greater variety of choices.

Up Front is another game which has this element.  In DYO scenarios, reinforcing
units cost less points, if they enter later in the game.  In terms of
recreating the "fog of war", Up Front really is in a class by itself.


Dave Casper
CERN - Geneva
casper@vxcrna.cern.ch

Newsgroups: rec.games.board