From: pesetsk@athena.mit.edu (David M Pesetsky)
Subject: Re: Prototypes [was Re: typology of Esperanto]
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 12:00:18 GMT

In article <c_bnap+@lynx.unm.edu> lgorbet@carina.unm.edu (Larry P Gorbet ANTHROPOLOGY) writes:
>
>It is not obvious from your post just what kind of ontological status you
>are assuming for "categories".  That is, just what do you believe
>categories are that we are deciding what belongs to?  That's not a
>rhettorical question.  It is not clear, if one is talking psychology or
>neurology, how one makes a principled distinction between "categories" 
>and "the results of the process of categorization".  Isn't a view of
>categories as "classical" sets also about "our ability to decide what
>belongs in what category:  given some set of necessary and sufficient
>conditions for membership or given an exhaustive listing (or some 
>combination thereof), isn't that just a "way to decide what belongs".

Not at all.  Suppose, for example, we have a mental category "Germanic
language" which is defined as "all and only those languages that use
morphmes descended from Proto-Germanic for 90% of the terms on some word
list (e.g. Swadesh)".  Now suppose we have another category "Romance"
with a similar definition. Granted, a stupid definition, but let's
assume it for the sake of the example.

Now suppose we are asked "is English Germanic or is it Romance".  I
might be quite happy to answer "neither".  But if forced, there is an
obvious metric under which it's *closer* to Germanic than to Romance.
So I hesitate for a second, remember that I have to give some answer,
none of the above isn't an answer, besides, that would be unhelpful, so
I say "Germanic".  Even if I'm not being given a forced choice
inventory, there may be an implied forced choice, since it's more useful
to give the closest category than to give no answer at all.  Presto, we
have the results Lakoff discusses, but the fuzziness is now all in the
metric of "closeness" and not at all in the category itself.

There's another way you can get the appearance of prototypicality
without the essence: the answer to a question is "yes" (e.g. is an
ostrich a bird, is the Pope a bachelor), but there is some other
property of ostriches or Popes that comes much closer to defining them,
so that the property being questioned is not exactly salient to the
categorizer.

So there really is a difference.

>
>One can investigate how real people decide membership a tad more easily than
>one can investigate empirically some a priori construct of a philosopher.

A priori?  That seems an a prioristic assertion to me.  But, yes it
would be hard to pry these stories apart.  THat's not an argument that
they are indistinguishable, however.

>
>BTW, at least two of your assertions about what Lakoff claims are just
>factually inaccurate.  First, neither he nor any of his close  associates
>anywhere claims that "categories are prototypes".  At least often based
>on prototypes, yes; but not themselves prototypes.  About like saying that
>in GB, grammars are lexical categories and their projections.  A category
>mistake.  Second, Lakoff does not criticize "traditional linguistics" 
>because it is based on categories (unless by that assertion you mean to
>beg your question about the nature of categories).  Rather the 
>criticism is because they are based on an *erroneous* conception of
>categories.  [that's my claim about what Lakoff says, not about 
>"traditional linguistics"].
>

OK.

-David Pesetsky
Xref: sparky sci.lang:6654 alt.usage.english:6852 soc.culture.usa:6797