From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Date: 12 Nov 92 15:47:09 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.37.721583229
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za

FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.

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   SUMMARY:   A argument  that _neither_  determinism nor  indeterminism can
sustain the pheomenon of human action is offered.  The argument is  indebted
to Chisholm and Anscombe, and considers two different concepts of causality.

                                ---oOo---

   There has  been a  lot of  hot air  (some of  it mine) on `free will' and
determinism, in  the course  of which  letting off  it has been periodically
pointed out that indeterminism, or randomness, has nothing to do with  `free
will' either, and indeed that nobody could possibly be held responsible  for
an `act' which was the result of a random cause.

  These arguments have  usually been offered as a  _reductio_ad_absurdum_ of
either incompatibilism,  or of  voluntarism in  general.   The arguments all
have a hidden assumption:  That the  class of ways things can be is  exhaus-
tively divisible into  deterministic and indeterministic  (with randomness).
In some cases the world is held  to be a bit of both, eg  with deterministic
macro phenomena and indeterministic micro, but no other alternative is  con-
sidered.  This is made worse by the unecessary habit of assuming that `every
event has a  cause' (which we  can call the  `Principle of Universal  Causa-
tion')is equivalent to determinism, which is not the case.

   Determinism holds  that the  way the  future will  be is already decided,
while the  Principle of  Universal Causation  holds that  the way the future
will be will be caused by things  which exist and happen before it.   I will
get back to this in a moment, but want to look briefly at `free will.'

    Voluntarism  (the  thesis  that  we  `have'  free  will, or are free. or
whatever) holds that  we _choose_ our  actions, that we  cause them to  take
place, _AND_ that we are capable of acting other than we do in at least some
cases.  It is in these cases that we are responsible.

    It  is  clear  the  `possibility  for  being otherwise' condition is in-
compatible with determinism.  It is equally clear that tha condition that we
be the authors of our own actions, that our actions follow from our desires,
and choices, is incompatible  with indeterminism.  Therefore  _unless_ there
is     some     other    option    besides     determinism  /  indeterminism
_voluntarism_is_impossible_.

    Here is one other option:   Immanent causation.  (The term is  medieval,
  and the opposite term is  `transeunt' causation.)  An event  is immanently
  caused where it  is caused by  a thing, rather  than another event.   This
  means that the event  is caused, but could  not have been predicted.   The
  `thing' which does the causing we  could call the `agent' and the  causing
  could be a way of its exercising its power.

  I would be reluctant call this `free will', which I think is a  ridiculous
term, but feel that morality, responsibility in general, and the  phenomenon
of agency are far  better satisfied by a  view such as this,  than by either
determinism or indeterminism.  It  allows many things which are  problematic
under determinism  to happen,  for example  for us  to act  contrary to  our
desires, and has no problems of its own which are not problems for causality
in general.

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| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
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Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc