From: shoham@ll.mit.edu (Daniel Shoham)
Subject: Re: Harpoons ??
Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 02:15:00 GMT

In article <1jqjneINN8fq@bigboote.WPI.EDU> megazone@coal.WPI.EDU (MegaZone) writes:
>In article <1993Jan16.001747.8894@ll.mit.edu> shoham@ll.mit.edu (Daniel Shoham) writes:
>>This possibility is based on the operational doctorine of tank warfare. Tanks
>>are quite voulnerable to anything that comes close to them (they can lose thei
>>chain REAL easy). Therefore, when in hostile terrain, tanks always travel
>>surrounded by dismounted infantry. The tank provide the heavy firepower to
>
>Don't generalize. It depends on the environment. Against Syria the Israeli 
>tanks operated with NO infantry support and won overwhelmingly. But the next 
>time out they got cocky and suffered losses since the Syrians modified their
>tactics. In Desert Storm is was common for M-1A1s to outrun the infantry, or

I didn't want to start an extensive debate of Tank warfare history in this
newsgroup, but I can't help join one that is started.

/Begin boring debate on tank warfare/

In 1967, Israel stormed the Golan Height from Syria with almost no armor!
After Syrian armor and artillary was destroyed by overwhelming Israeli air
superiority, Syrian infantry have fled the area. Heli-borne paratroopers backed
by infantry secured the Golan for Israel. Armor freed up from the Jordanian
front (after Arab resistance west of the Jordan river collapsed) was in fact
sent Northward to the Golan front. However, it was stuck in a maddening 11
hour traffic jam (really!), and arrived on the scene after it was all over.
Undoubtedly, had it arrived in time, it would have been used with infantry
support.
In 1973, Israel got cocky in the sense that the government could not believe
that the Arabs would dare attack - despite intelligence reports to that fact -
and refused to mobilize. During the initial Syrian offensive,  (2pm, oct 6,
1973 - midnight oct 7, 1973 - local time), Israeli DEFENDERS
were massively outnumbered, and partially over-ran. Syrian tanks used plenty
of dismounted infantry in their thrusts (the 5th, 7th, and 9th Syrian
divisions are all infantry divisions, and accompanied the 1st and 3rd armored
division. Independent Republican Guard forces carried their own infantry and
armor with them). The Israeli counter-offensive ( - 11am, oct 10, 1973) had
a very substaintial infantry support to the armor. Syrian infantry could not
keep up with the rapidly outmanuevered Syrian tanks, and a massive tank-kill
had taken place. When it was over, Syria lost 1150 tanks (and 100+ Iraqi and
50+ Jordanian expeditionary forces), to total Israeli loss of about 100 
(not counting tanks that were later repaired as lost).

A very similar turn of events took place on the Israeli-Egyptian front in both
wars!

>for the infantry to stay in the M2/M3s since the Iraqi's lacked weapons 
>powerful enough to stop an M-1A1. This allowed for dashing tactics which took
>advantage of the M-1s speed and mobility to outflank enemy units. Sure, an
>M-1 would be vulnerable to a satchel charge, but if it is traveling at 40+mph
>how are you going to place it? And Chobham will shrug off tank cannon rounds,
>let alone RPGs and AT rockets. Tactics change dependng on the situation and
>the equipment involved. You don't use the same tactics in the desert as in the
>city, nor with M-48s as with M-1s. 

Not accurate.

In Desert Storm, dismounted infantry was used whenever hostiles were in the
area! True, when Tanks were cruising cross country in open desert WITH NO
HOSTILES AROUND (i.e. the big encirclment drive), the infantry stayed in their
armored personnel carriers (APC's), but this was not when fighting took place.

/End boring debate on tank warfare/

>
>Hoth was pretty much a desert as far as tactics are concerned. The AT-ATs were
>IFV's. They chose bad tactics, not preparing for the speeders. They should have
>had anit-aircraft vehicles. (Something the Army is short on too...) Other than
>that the tactics were fine.

You keep missing the point! infantry dismounts not because the terrain is
more/less restricted, but because there are hostiles in the area with short
range weapons.

Yes, Hoth is open space, but there were a lot of rebels on foot there (well,
not a lot, but many more than walkers :). The rebels built trenches, used
short range weapons (harpoons, Lightsaber, Grenades, etc. They could also
have build snow-traps, or melt enough snow to make for a small water barrier).

Dismounted infantry would have taken pot-shots at any such rebels, and not
allowed them to get anywhere near the walkers.

>And the AT-STs were kicking ass in the jungle. Mobility didn't seem to be a
>problem for them. They just got outsmarted.

I don't consider trading AT-ST's for Ewok as kicking %^&, even when you kill
a dozen Ewoks for every AT-ST you lose. (Just as I don't consider trading a
tank for a dozen infantry a winning proposition).

Face it, the AT-ST were not designed for jungle warfare, and lost to a most
lo-tech opponent.


Dan Shoham               shoham@ll.mit.edu
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