HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Date: 10 Nov 92 06:49:14 GMT
Article-I.D.: usenet.BxHMy3.tu
Organization: Indiana University

In article <burt.721365558@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>>In article <BxBBnw.CEK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (l
>incoln carr) writes:

>>>I would argue that you don't know that as surely as you think you do.
>>>Certainty is a very nebulous thing.  You perceive the phenomena, not
>>>noumena, that you associate with the word "cat" and, because of
>>>certain a priori assumptions that human beings make, you assume that
>>>it must have existed prior to your perception of it and your
>>>assignment of the word "cat" to it.
>
>If I can trust my memories, I knew that cats existed long before I knew
>words for them, or for that matter, long before I knew many words at all.
>But this diverges from the point I was trying to make which is that 
>metaphysics and identity are prior to logic.  Logic is a tool for cutting
>the world up into catagories.  We then assign these catagories names and
>hope that they match up with some accuracy to the actual world.  But
>things have an identity before we have done any logical classification
>or analysis.  To see that logic does not give immediate access to identity
>we only need to consider that it is static.  The law of contradiction
>says that A is not B, so in particular, A cannot change into B because
>that would violate contradiction.  But in the world A's do change into
>B's all the time.  Some adolescents become adult, seeds grow, and so on.
>
>The question of metaphysics is: what _is_ identity, and how can we think
>about it?  But the menu is not the meal, it only indicates what the meal
>might be.
>bv

After reading this statement, I don't think that we really disagree at
all.  The whole point that I was trying to make about the cat is that
the set of phenomena that we perceive to be a cat may or may not
correspond to a single noumenon, what I think your calling an
"identity."  There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence
between the items on the menu and the items of food, to use your
metaphor.  In fact, we don't have any way of finding out a whole hell
of a lot about the food and we're better off talking about the menu.



-- 
Lincoln R. Carr, Computer Scientist-Philosopher    lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
"Treat all rational autonomous moral agents, whether in the form of yourself
or another, never as means solely, but always as ends in themselves."
                  Immanuel Kant, from "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals"
From: Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: It is AI when...
Date: 10 Nov 92 04:50:54 GMT
Article-I.D.: stafford.Stafford-101192104649
Followup-To: comp.ai.philosophy
Distribution: world
Organization: MSUS

Another foolish attempt -

Complete AI is when a machine produces useful, unsolicited
solutions to unanticipated problems and we cannot discern 
it's methods.
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 10 Nov 92 10:22:46 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <3197@ucl-cs.uucp> G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) writes:
>Chris Malcolm writes:

> > ... consciousness is not a brain phenomenon. It's a property of a
> > mind-engaged-in-a-world. You'll no more find consciousness in a brain
> > than in an eyeball, although both have useful contributions to make.

>So the big C does not exist? And what of Mind: what's that?

Some confusion here. At least I'ld better make it clear that a) I
believe in consciousness as a qualitatively special mental mode of
humans, probably not extending even in its most primitive forms
much beyond the higher vertebrates; and b) I can't imagine how my
posting quoted above could be interpreted as implying that I didn't.

In fact, while my remark quoted above referred to consciousness, I
think it generally true of most mental terms, such as "understand",
"intend", "believe", etc., including cases, such as beetles -- if we
presume for the sake of argument that beetles are not conscious, but
can still know things and have purposes.

Perhaps Gordon espouses a specific model of consciousness, such as the
inner-eye model, and supposes that this is the only possible model of
consciousness which can support the everyday use of the term?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: 12 Nov 92 04:45:20 GMT
Article-I.D.: mp.1992Nov12.044520.20154
Organization: Northern Illinois University

In article <1992Nov11.225713.139123@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>
>I never said that an AI *would* retain all memories.  There is still a
>tradeoff to be made -- but the cost of retaining extra memories is likely to
>be lower.  Perhaps enough lower that no memories need be discarded.
>
>One advantage, of course, is that such an AI would be able to remain
>grounded over an extended period time without direct contact with the
>environment it is grounded in (to the extent that that environment does not
>change).

It is not at all clear that this is an advantage.  One of the criticisms
of former president Reagan was that he was too thoroughly grounded in
the 1950s (the criticism was worded differently, of course).  Memory
has a cost quite apart from the hardware cost and the cost of organization.
Excessive memory results in reduced adaptability.  It is my suspicion
that mortality of verterbrates evolved as one way of reducing this cost.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 21:04:37 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov12.044520.20154@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>It is not at all clear that this is an advantage.  One of the criticisms
>of former president Reagan was that he was too thoroughly grounded in
>the 1950s (the criticism was worded differently, of course).

It was worded differently because it had a different meaning.  A better
translation is that he was insufficiently grounded in the 1990s.

>Memory
>has a cost quite apart from the hardware cost and the cost of organization.
>Excessive memory results in reduced adaptability.

There is no such simple relationship.  Humans have much better memories than
amoebas, and also much better adaptability.

Excessive preoccupation with particular memories results in reduced
adaptability.  But if you can not think of something for 30 years, and then
have it available when you want it, that is clearly an advantage over not
having it when you want it.
From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 9 Nov 92 16:52:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: oracorp.1992Nov9.165212.470
Organization: ORA Corporation

A little bit of background to this silly little thread. I claimed that
there was a sentence G such that, assuming David Chalmers beliefs are
deductively closed (that means that he believes any statement that is
a consequence of his other beliefs), then the following equivalences
hold:

     G is true
     <-> David Chalmers' beliefs are consistent
     <-> David Chalmers never comes to believe G


In article <aV0TTB3w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz>,
system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:

>> If it turns out that the reason David Chalmers doesn't believe G is
>> because he thinks G is a meaningless, self-referential sentence, fine.
>> That's just one way to not believe something, and any way is good enough
>> for G to be true.
>> 
>But surely now we are back to a paradox? Unless you are trying to 
>separate "believing" from "co-incidentally agreeing with". If David 
>Chalmers doesn't believe it because it is self-referential, than David 
>Chalmers is agreeing with it (ie he doesn't believe the sentence). 
>Surely if he agree with it, he believes it? But then he isn't agreeing 
>with it?

Notice that G is true if and only if David Chalmers *never* comes to
believe G. The fact that David Chalmers doesn't believe G now does not
imply that he will never come to believe G. Therefore, he cannot
conclude that G is true from the fact that he doesn't *currently*
believe G. There is no paradox.

However, a second implication is that if David Chalmers actually
believes that he is consistent, then either he is mistaken (his
beliefs are inconsistent), or his beliefs are not deductively closed.

Proof:

Under the assumption that David Chalmers' beliefs are deductively
closed, G is true if and only if David Chalmers is consistent.
Therefore, if David Chalmers believes that he is consistent, then he
must believe G. (It is a consequence of his belief that he is
consistent.) But G is true if and only if David Chalmers does not
believe G. So G must be false. But G is true if and only if David
Chalmers is consistent, so if G is false, then David Chalmers is
inconsistent. Therefore, if David Chalmers' beliefs are deductively
closed, and he believes that he is consistent, then he is not
consistent.

So if David Chalmers believes that he is consistent, then either he is
mistaken, or his beliefs are not deductively closed. I think the
latter, because he believes that he is consistent, and he doesn't
believe G (although G is a consequence of his belief that he is
consistent).

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 92 01:20:45 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

hondl@nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu (Kurt Hondl) writes:

> Suppose there was a world that was inhabited by only human beings (in all
> their variety) and various types of dogs.  If a cat were suddenly introduced 
> to this world, would the humans ...
> 
> a) Recognizing the very distinct differences between the "cat" and themselves
>    and simply refer to the "cat" as a dog?

I think I would call it a mutant dog.

Hate your sig BTW. Nothing personal.

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
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Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Consciousness in animals
From: Stafford@Vax2.Winona.MSUS.EDU (John Stafford)
Date: 13 Nov 92 11:37:09 -0600
Followup-To: comp.ai.philosophy
Distribution: world
Organization: MSUS

In article <1992Nov11.043222.2004@cc.uow.edu.au>,
plumpton@wampyr.cc.uow.edu.au (David Plumpton) wrote:
> 
> 
> On the assumption that animals experience consciousness (which I believe),
> where abouts in the level of animal development would people think that
> it starts? i.e. where is the very first 'spark' of self-awareness?
> 
> If we list organisms of decreasing mental complexity from humans to virii as:
> Humans, monkeys, dogs, mice, bees, flies, ameobas, virii,
> where would you first say "Stop, no self-awareness there" ?
> 
> My personal guess would go between bees and flies, i.e. nothing for a fly,
> but the barest degree of consciousness for a bee.

It may be erroneous to assume that because we can reduce the behavior of
an animal to predictable mechanisms that that is all there is to observe
and 'all there is' to the animal.  Consciousness may still exist for
that animal.  We may simply not have the capability of sensing it.
From: colby@oahu.cs.ucla.edu (Kenneth Colby)
Subject: Loebner Turing test for Human like conversation
Keywords: Loebner, turing, natural language
Organization: UCLA, Computer Science Department
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 92 00:57:22 GMT


In the summer issue of AI Magazine, there is an article on the Loebner
Prize competition for most human-like computer conversationalist, wriiten by
Robert Epstein, director Cambridge Center for Behaviorial Studies.

The competition involves Turing-like tests in using ordinary natural language
in a specific domain.  Daniel C. Dennett is chairman of the prize committee.
The next competition will be held 12/15/92.

Does anyone have any comments, criticisms, or suggestions about the article
or the competition.

Is a human-like computer conversationalist conscious?

See comp.ai for original article and follow-ups.

Ken Colby - Malibu Artifactual Intelligence Works

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: plummer@cs.swarthmore.edu (David Barker-Plummer)
Subject: Re: The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging
Organization: Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 12:39:26 GMT

In article <BxHv6w.KJu@ns1.nodak.edu> vender@plains.NoDak.edu (Does it matter?) writes:

> The only explainations of Godel's Theorom have been what amounts to
> a system attempting to prove itself true.  Although this does
> mean that most logic systems (I don't know enough to say ALL)
> cannot safely be self-referent.  Because human beings can solve
> the halting problem, and can bypass Godel's theorem conditionally,
> and an AI would be replicating a large portion of a human's capacities,
> can we not assume that an AI would be partially irrational?

On what basis do you assert that human being can solve the halting
problem?

-- Dave
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 92 10:33:57 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:

> In article <kH5FTB5w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz>,
> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:
> 
> >> `Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words
> >> that will never be believed by David Chalmers.' produces a string of words
> >> that will never be believed by David Chalmers.'
> 
> Well, what difference does it make whether it is self-referential? It
> is clear what G says, and it is clear that it is inconsistent for
> David Chalmers to believe G, and it is clear that if David Chalmers
> *doesn't* believe G, then what G says is true. Putting it all
> together, if David Chalmers is consistent, then G is true, but not
> believed by David Chalmers.
> 
> If it turns out that the reason David Chalmers doesn't believe G is
> because he thinks G is a meaningless, self-referential sentence, fine.
> That's just one way to not believe something, and any way is good enough
> for G to be true.
> 
But surely now we are back to a paradox? Unless you are trying to 
separate "believing" from "co-incidentally agreeing with". If David 
Chalmers doesn't believe it because it is self-referential, than David 
Chalmers is agreeing with it (ie he doesn't believe the sentence). 
Surely if he agree with it, he believes it? But then he isn't agreeing 
with it?

Perhaps we should ask David? ;-)

-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
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From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A linguistical reformulation of the problem of consciousness
Date: 10 Nov 92 17:39:56 GMT
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science

In article <iordonez.721351866@academ01> iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx (Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso) writes:
>Everything in the Universe is in third person (that, it, there, etc).
>Everything but a very little part, that is in the first person, I. What
>makes the difference? What makes a part of the universe become a first
>person? Explain it in terms of third persons alone.
>
>In other words, Why am I?

An interesting way of phrasing the question. I would object to the "very
little part" part, though. Thus far, the worlds of the subjective and the
objective have proved stubbornly incommensurable: my existential reality
cannot be measured by mass or volume. I would substitute "the most interesting
part" for "a very little part".

mt
From: lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Date: 12 Nov 92 04:36:23 GMT
Article-I.D.: usenet.BxL64n.J2B
Organization: Indiana University

In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:
>
>What is consciousness ?  How do we know of it ?  I know of it because "I"
>exist.  Consciousness is, in fact, this "I".  How do I know "I" exist ?
>Descartes proved it.  Cogito ergo sum.  I think, therefore I am.  This has
>been central to all western cultures now for a long period.
>
>I hold it to be false.  I maintain that is is possible - indeed probable -
>that there is NO clear distinction between what is "I" and what is not "I".
>

It doesn't matter at all to the proposition cogito ergo sum that
there is no distinction between what is "I" and what is not "I."  The
fact that one thinks, i.e., apperceives oneself, implies that
SOMETHING must be doing the thinking, whether that SOMETHING is a
single metaphysical entity or not.  Cogito ergo sum holds even if the
thinker is actually a collection of disparate elements and even if the
thinker is somehow deceived about everything else.  The peculiar
nature of the concept of existence still implies that to think one
must exist.  It is equivalent to the following:

1. That which thinks must exist.
2. I think.
3. Therefore, I exist.

As an aside, one can make a case that Descartes himself seemed to have
a notion of "I exist because I think" in mind, but this isn't nearly
as defensible as the above interpretation.

-- 
Lincoln R. Carr, Computer Scientist-Philosopher    lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
"Treat all rational autonomous moral agents, whether in the form of yourself
or another, never as means solely, but always as ends in themselves."
                  Immanuel Kant, from "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals"
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: lbkruij@cs.vu.nl (Kruijswijk LB)
Subject: Re: The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging
Organization: Fac. Wiskunde & Informatica, VU, Amsterdam
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 21:32:21 GMT

In article <BxHv6w.KJu@ns1.nodak.edu> vender@plains.NoDak.edu (Does it matter?) writes:
>  Because human beings can solve the halting problem, etc.
The last theorem of Fermat is a halting problem. Can you solve it?

Lucas B. Kruijswijk					lbkruij@cs.vu.nl
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:57:13 GMT
Organization: Security APL, Inc.

In article <1992Nov10.161749.20605@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <1992Nov10.020502.116627@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>In article <1992Oct30.183122.7795@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>>             Our brains make a tradeoff between retention and brain size
>>based in part on things like mobility.  AI's need not be subject to this
>>constraint.
>
>Before you can call it a tradeoff, you must explain why it would be
>beneficial to clutter the brain with huge volumes of worthless trivia.

I never said that an AI *would* retain all memories.  There is still a
tradeoff to be made -- but the cost of retaining extra memories is likely to
be lower.  Perhaps enough lower that no memories need be discarded.

One advantage, of course, is that such an AI would be able to remain
grounded over an extended period time without direct contact with the
environment it is grounded in (to the extent that that environment does not
change).

>>*Was* evolution capable of producing a brain which could faithfully remember
>>every experience presented to it?  Maybe it's still working on it.
>
>Why should evolution even be interested in such a memory?  How would it
>be beneficial to turn yourself into a lifetime receptacle for junk mail
>and advertising jingles?  If such perfect retention is useful, why was
>the waste paper basket invented?

Because physical storage also has its costs, hence its tradeoffs.

>>                                                                    Note
>>that some people have better memories than others, and that having a better
>>memory is in general an advantage.
>
>Just out of interest, I wonder what evidence exists that some people
>have better memories than others?  Certainly some people have better
>memories for history, others have better memories for language, others
>have better memories for hollywood trivia, etc.  But I wonder if it
>doesn't come close to balancing out if you could measure the total
>combination.

I doubt it very much.  Some people have what are called photographic
memories; they may not remember literally everything, but it certainly seems
to be much more than most people remember.

I don't see how you could test this; how do you that there isn't some whole
category of memory you aren't taking into account?  How do you compare
memory for scents with memory for words with memory for pictures?
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
From: system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 92 01:31:26 NZST
Organization: The Code Works Limited, PO Box 10 155, Auckland, New Zealand

chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

> In article <aV0TTB3w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.n
> 
> >But surely now we are back to a paradox? Unless you are trying to 
> >separate "believing" from "co-incidentally agreeing with". If David 
> >Chalmers doesn't believe it because it is self-referential, than David 
> >Chalmers is agreeing with it (ie he doesn't believe the sentence). 
> >Surely if he agree with it, he believes it? But then he isn't agreeing 
> >with it?
> >
[amusing aside deleted]
> 
> However, even I can tell that it's not valid to infer that I agree with
> G from the fact that I don't believe G.  (You can infer that G is true,
> but that's a different matter.)

But AGAIN, aren't YOU now separating "believing" from "co-incidentally 
agreeing with". Otherwise, aren't you suggesting "that it's not valid 
to infer that I agree with [Wayne McDougall doesn't like ice-cream"] 
from the fact that I don't [like ice cream]" when Wayne McDougall says 
that he doesn't like ice cream and doesn't agree with the sentence 
"Wayne McDougall doesn't like ice cream". (You can infer that [Wayne 
McDougall doesn't like icecream] is true, so WHY is that a different 
matter).

If you don't believe G, and G says that you don't believe G, then why 
can you say it's not valid to infer that you agree with G.

?


-- 
  Wayne McDougall, BCNU
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