From: dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz)
Subject: Re: Criteria for Sustainability
Organization: Computer Science Department University of Rochester
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 23:01:32 GMT


In article <1466601789@igc.apc.org> alanm@igc.apc.org (Alan McGowen) writes:


>	14) Seeks to understand "human nature" and "human society" within 
>	the larger context provided by evolutionary biology, so that we do
>	not again make the mistake of supposing that humans are beings apart 
>	from nature who can be expected to flourish in any artificial world 
>	of engineers' whims - or of moral philosophers' intuitions. 


McGowen's a hopeless case, but perhaps some other readers
would like to read this excerpt, to be exposed to some actual
philosophical inputs:

From Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Environmental Ethics and Global
Imperatives":

  Althought stirring appeals for recognition of the inherent value
  and inalienable rights of all beings have been made, much
  of the apparent persuasiveness of the expanded-rights claim
  will not hold up under rational scrutiny.  For one thing,
  the position often relies on calls to end "human chauvinism"
  and thus aligns itself with every group that has wished to end
  some "-ism," whether racism, sexism, or speciesism.  But merely
  to call for an end to human chauvinism is to beg precisely the
  question at issue.  Why should human chauvinism, or better,
  sentient chauvinism, be ended?  What must be proved is that there
  is a nonanthropocentric reason for ending it.  From a moral point
  of view, it is unclear why one should respect a thing -- for
  example, a rock or a river -- if it experiences no pain, elation,
  or suffering?  Why, apart from anthropocentric considerations,
  should poison oak have rights?  Why, other than for anthropocentric
  reasons, should one not dump toxic wastes in places where they
  will pollute groundwater?

  Of course, there are sound anthropocentric reasons why persons
  should not destroy rare plants or despoil landscapes.  I, too,
  believe that one should revere all things.  My reason for this
  belief, however, is not that rocks or rivers have rights but that
  needless destruction bespeaks human callousness, myopia, and
  perhaps greed, all of which are wrong on anthropocentric grounds.
  The point of view of the expanded-rights theorists appears
  to be that there is some other, inherent, nonanthropocentric
  reason for not picking flowers or destroying rocks.  But such a
  notion of inherent value is puzzling.  What would it mean to
  say that everything has rights.  How then, would any action
  be possible that did not "harm" something?  If everything has
  equal status and there were no sentient or human chauvinism,
  then would there be a realistic way to adjudicate controversies
  over rights? ...

  Yet another problem with the expanded-rights position, insofar
  as it calls for recognition of the alleged rights of nonsentient
  beings, is that it fails to take into account that all values are
  necessarily values for us; there is no such thing as a value in
  and of itself, without a valuer.  [PFD: I would go further and say
  there is no such thing as a value without a social context in
  which we hold that value.]  If nonsentient beings cannot have values,
  what would it mean to assert their value?  How can one visit good
  or evil on something that has no thoughts or feelings, even in a
  potential sense, as does a human zygote or comatose person? ...
  The problem is their position provides no conceptual or nontheological
  rationale for extending the range of human relevance, short of question-
  begging appeals to inherent value.

  Other difficulties with the expanded-rights position have to do
  with conceptual problems of individuation, interspecies comparisons
  of utility, and justice among nonhumans. ... [these difficulties
  suggest] that, [expanded rights ... are] unlikely to be defensible
  as a rationally justified ethical obligation.

  ... The ecosystemic versions of environmental ethics fall victim to
  the same sorts of problems as the expanded-rights position.  According
  to proponents of holistic environmental ethics, recent industrial
  history is a biotic hemorrhage, to be remedied by judging all human
  action in terms of their effects on all ecosystems of the planet.
  According to this view, whatever promotes ecosystemic well-being
  is said to be good and right, whatever jeopardizes is to be bad and
  wrong.  A basic problem arises, however: why consider a whole that is
  not a conscious, sentient being?  What reasons are there, apart from
  human well-being, for ascribing moral worth to some ecosystemic whole?

  In response to such questions, a proponent of ecosystemic ethics
  is likely to respond that the earth has a beauty, a balance of
  nature, that is inherent in it.  But the problem with such a
  response is that these are values that the earth and its ecosystems
  have only as objects of consideration by conscious, sentient human
  beings.  It is not clear that the earth has these alleged properties
  apart from some viewer or valuer.  Hence, it is not clear that there
  is some nonanthropocentric basis for affirming an ecosystemic ethics.
  Moreover, even if there were inherent value in ecosystems, apart
  from human or divine ascription, it is not clear what this might be.
  ...  The difference cannot be merely that what happens naturally
  is good and that what happens through human interference is bad, for
  this would be to sanction a purely stipulative definition of ecological
  and moral goodness and badness.

  Perhaps the main difficulty besetting ecosystemic ethics is that it
  somehow derives an ethical `ought' from a scientific or ecological
  `is'.  In other words, some natural characteristics of ecosystems
  are taken as normative, as things that should be preserved.  It is
  widely held by moral philosophers, however, that one cannot legitimately
  deduce some moral duty from an existing state of affairs. ...
  Thus the inference of ecosystemic ethicists from `is' to `ought'
  must be mediated by value judgements -- for example, preserving
  diversity is good.  But to the extent that the tenets of
  ecosystemic ethics rest upon value judgements, then to that same
  extent they are open to question.  One such question is why a
  different, but equally plausible, value judgement should not be
  made. ...

  The problem of specifying criteria for a balance of nature is as much
  a central difficulty for ecosystems ethicists as it was for
  medievalists to specify criteria for what was "natural," and
  hend allowed, under natural-law ethics.  [ examples of
  controversies about homosexuality and contraception being
  deemed "unnatural" ]  It is difficult to see how proponents
  of ecosystemic ethics could avoid similar difficulties...


Kristin goes on and argues that an anthropocentric ethics, with real
consideration of inter-generational equity, would be sufficient
justification for avoiding damage to ecosystems.

	Paul F. Dietz
	dietz@cs.rochester.edu
Newsgroups: sci.environment