HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<TORKEL.92Nov9140517@isis.sics.se>
	<1992Nov9.201300.16428@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov9215154@bast.sics.se>
	<1992Nov10.103533.12104@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov10130705@isis.sics.se> 	<
	<1992Nov10.194112.9270@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 20:38:04 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.194112.9270@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >Well, not "verifying", necessarily, but there would be a lot of
   >sentences about whose truth or falsehood there was general agreement.

  What is this reflection supposed to contribute to the explanation of
"the set of true sentence occurring in Russell's writings"?

   >I think much of your
   >criticism might be avoided if one concentrated on formal systems, instead.

  What does this have to do with the set of true sentences occurring in
Russell's writings?
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Date: 9 Nov 92 09:56:24 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In <1992Nov8.120900.5613@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI 
I wrote:

>If one sets up a logic with more than two truth values, and hence
>manages to avoid Tarski's paradox, then a further paradox can be set
>up by considering the function that sends sentences to their truth
>values.  In particular, a paradox is formed by the sentence "the truth
>value of this sentence is not `true'".  So, this sentence is true iff
>it is anything but `true'.  Is it just like Tarski's, then?  Can you 
>elaborate a bit  about this paradox?  I will try to see if Hintikka's
>IF system avoids it or not.

OK.  Hintikka's logic avoids the Strengthened Liar Paradox, and hence
also Randall's modified Tarski Paradox, in the thoroughly uninteresting
way that these sentences cannot be formalized in the system IF.  This
is because the sentence "This sentence is not true" contains contradictory
negation.  In IF contradictory negation can only occur at the beginning
of a sentence, not inside it.  Here's what Hintikka says:

  Why cannot [a Liar-type] sentence be forthcoming with a weak negation
  instead of a strong one in [IF extended to include weak negation]?
  The answer lies in the fact that in the extended IF languages 
  contradictory negation can occur only sentence-initially.  Therefore,
  it cannot be used in constructing a sentence like [ eg. "The truth
  value of this sentence is not `true'"].  The best such a sentence can
  therefore do is to say ... ["This sentence is false"] and not [the
  version with weak negation].  Furthermore, no matter how we manipulate
  sentence-initial contradictory negations, we cannot produce a paradox.

So, it is the expressive limitations of IF which allows Hintikka to avoid
these kinds of paradoxes. (Incidentally, the deduction theorem does fail
in IF, as Merrill suggested).

-- 
Marko Amnell
amnell@klaava.helsinki.fi
Graduate Student in Philosophy
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Date: 5 Nov 92 22:01:32 GMT
Article-I.D.: unx.Bx9JuL.CJq
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com


In article <1992Nov5.205117.12672@klaava.Helsinki.FI>, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> In article <TORKEL.92Nov5201116@echnaton.sics.se> torkel@sics.se 
|> (Torkel Franzen) writes:
|> 
|> >What is "Excluded Middle" supposed to mean here?
|> 
|> Both Hintikka and Grue are able to define what they call a "truth
|> predicate" in their systems by allowing sentences to have more
|> than two truth-values.  Grue explicitly adds a third truth-value
|> called "indefinite" and in Hintikka's IF system some sentences
|> are said to have "no truth-value".

This type of approach is pretty old now.  I recall a book edited by
(I think) Robert Martin entitled something like "The Liar Paradox"
that was published in about 1971 or so.  (I believe that it was
a collection of papers presented at some symposium on the liar.)
A couple of papers in there took a many-valued approach to the
liar paradox.  You should, of course, be aware (as you may be)
that the pardox can be reconstructed in many multi-valued
systems.  In addition, these approaches are not without their
own oddities.  I have the vague recollection (the only kind I
have any more) of analyzing and criticizing approaches of this
sort in my dissertation.  If I can remember this weekend, I'll
wipe the mold off it and see if there is anything useful in it.

-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk (Leo Smith)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Reply-To: shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:45:00 +0000

torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes...

>In article <1992Nov5.203945.12450@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

>   >I think we already covered all this two months ago.  I don't see
>   >why realism about scientific theories (which is what I have in
>   >mind here) can't include a belief that science approaches some
>   >sort of ultimate truth about reality.

>  Realism about scientific theories "can include" all sorts of things,
>for example the belief that the universe is a banana being eaten by
>the Composite Principle of Aloofness. But why associate these ideas
>with realism?

Is this academic put-down game restricted to members of scandinavian
teaching establishments, or can anyone join in?

BTW Torkel, you might some time care to look at one or two logical
schemas that don't rely on binary logic. I am sure you are
intelligent enough to concoct one that is reasonably consistent with
reality and itself.

You know. Not just dividing the world into 'Torkel' and '~Torkel' but
including such categories as 'Almost Torkel' 'Somewhat Torkel' and
'Not exactly Torkel, but nevertheless _not [Not Interesting] for all
that....'

Who knows what dizzying revelations might result from such wild
theorising?




Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: CBURMAN@finabo.abo.fi ()
Subject: Re: Wittgenstein's PI
Organization: The Clam of Reason Ltd.
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1992 01:40:40 GMT
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.23

In <1992Nov13.155716.4511@news.eng.convex.com> cash@convex.com writes:

> In article <Ef0mgdS00iUzM99owN@andrew.cmu.edu> bg13+@andrew.cmu.edu (Benedicta Gray) writes:
> >The pompous-sounding Mr.Zeleny's "joke" aside: A nice reasonable
> >hardback version of the Philosophical Investigations with English facing
> >German text is available from Great Expectations - (708) 864 3881. 
> 
> Is it the one with the green cover? Only the ones with green covers
> levitate when read by candle light. 

Tsk, tsk, tsk... Peter, if you had levitated yourself you'd know that books 
don't levitate. People levitate, books hover.

Oh, I almost forgot: ':-> :-> :->, Man.'


Chris Burman, cburman@abo.fi
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales)
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 15:41:19 GMT

I'll be responding to Ruth in private e-mail.  I question the value
of further public nyah-nyah-nyah on this topic.

--Jimbo
From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Chaos and causelessness
Date: 4 Nov 92 23:35:07 GMT
Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.

In article <1992Nov2.211512.4304@spcvxb.spc.edu> 4chua_l@spcvxb.spc.edu writes:
>Chaos implies causelessness:  true or false
>I am very curious about people's responses to this statement.

As a technical term, no it does not. In general use, no again, otherwise
nobody could cause chaos, and this happens often enough in actual experience.

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Date: 12 Nov 92 17:08:19 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov12.120821.17374
Distribution: world
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov12.074102.430@news.wesleyan.edu> 
RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg) writes:

>In <1992Nov11.150554.17351@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu writes:

MZ:
>> I would answer your question myself, but for my abject inability to
>> come up with a charitable description of the putative subject.  Your

RG:
>Would that be, perhaps, because you haven't actually READ any of the
>literature?  I find that there are an enormous # of people who claim to know a
>priori that the subject of feminist philosophy is worthy only of dismissal,
>without ever having read anything in it, but relying only on the reports of
>those who want to sack it.  This is not proper philosophical method.

You are reaching, Dr Ruth.  I have read the book, and even own a copy.

MZ:
>> local academic bookstore is likely to have a sheaf of remaindered
>> copies of a "feminist logic" tract by Andrea Nye.  Read it, and draw
>> your own conclusions.

RG:
>Have YOU read it?  I haven't.  I'm looking forward to it, but I haven't yet had
>the time.  It only came out last spring, I think.  From the large amount of
>net.discussion of her book, I imagine that either (1) It must be just about on
>the NYT bestseller list, & she must be pulling in enormous royalties; or (2)
><*gasp*> there are an awfully lot of people talking about a book they haven't
>read, who are speaking about it as though they HAD read it.

It's a remarkably unselfconscious piece of drivel.  Enjoy.

RG:
>[Just for the record:  I get equally peeved at those who sneer at Ayn Rand
>without having ever READ any of her work, as I do at those who sneer at Andrea
>Nye (or Andrea Dworkin for that matter) without having read theirs.]

I also read the classic rants of Andrea Dworkin (_Intercourse_), Kate
Millett (_Sexual Politics_), and Luce Irigaray (_Ce sexe..._), as well
as assorted pages from Barbara Johnson, Simone de Beauvoir, and Mary
Daly.  Do I get a medal, or what?

RG:
>Lemme see:  reaching FAR back into the ancient recesses of my brain, back when
>I used to know something about logic, it seems to me that I do not recall the
>proof that the "Philosophical Sneer" can be incorporated into a system of rules
>of inference without introducing the possibility of corrupting either
>consistency or completeness of the system.
>
>However, the "Philosophical Sneer" does seem somehow related to the
>now-discredited "Proof By Intimidation" : a proof method usually identifiable
>by the use of the term "obviously" or "clearly", followed by some statement
>which is neither obvious nor clear, and which often does not follow from the
>premises.

Blah.  No need to sneer: we rationalists know everything _a priori_.

>------------------------
>Ruth Ginzberg <rginzberg@eagle.wesleyan.edu>
>Philosophy Department;Wesleyan University;USA

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: johnme@ecs.comm.mot.com (John Meyer)
Subject: Re: Chaos and causelessness
Organization: pcb_design
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 13:14:01 GMT

In article <1992Nov2.211512.4304@spcvxb.spc.edu> 4chua_l@spcvxb.spc.edu writes:
>Chaos implies causelessness:  true or false
>I am very curious about people's responses to this statement.



TRUE!
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:2536 sci.logic:2004
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic
Subject: Re: Question for Ruth
Date: 12 Nov 92 04:52:24 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov11.235225.17365
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov11.215032.5572@news.eng.convex.com> 
cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:

>In article <1992Nov11.150554.17351@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>...
>>come up with a charitable description of the putative subject.  Your
>>local academic bookstore is likely to have a sheaf of remaindered
>>copies of a "feminist logic" tract by Andrea Nye.  Read it, and draw
>>your own conclusions.

PC:
>Ah yes, Andrea Nye. My claim to fame is that I was a graduate student at
>the University of Oregon philosophy department at the same time that she
>was. In fact, I took the required logic class with her. (That's right--the
>U of O required just _one_ logic class for the Ph.D., and the logic
>disabled (among whom both I and Andrea counted ourselves) had the option
>of taking History of Logic instead of Logic for Real Men.) 

"Desperate, lonely, cut off from the human community which in many cases
has ceased to exist, under the sentence of violent death, wracked by
desires for intimacy that they do not know how to fulfill, at the same
time tormented by the presence of women, men turn to logic."

PC:
>As I recollect, Andrea had some trouble in that class. In retrospect, I
>realize that this was due to oppression by white men (both alive and dead).
>I don't know why _I_ had a hard time understanding logic; unlike Andrea,
>I'm not allowed any excuses. (Actually, I did finally get an A in the
>course--but I had to work like a slave.)

Indeed, the book starts with a touching sob story of the difficulties
involved in the educational experience in question: "But logic, she is
learning, is not a feminine subject."  (Sorry, Peter, your name is not
mentioned.)  I thought it was the funniest thing I had ever read; by
contrast, my girlfriend was rather insulted.  So maybe it is not a
feminine subject, after all...

Warm thanks to Edward G. Nilges, whose glowing recommendation inspired
me to peruse Andrea Nye's masterpiece.

Shall we talk about the other pinnacle of feminist philosophy, Andrea
Dworkin's _Intercourse_?

>-- 
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
>Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 23:47:03 GMT

Consider the following sentence:

	"Appended to its own quotation is not a true sentence of
English" appended to its own quotation is not a true sentence of
English.

Is this a true sentence of English?


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<TORKEL.92Nov9140517@isis.sics.se>
	<1992Nov9.201300.16428@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<TORKEL.92Nov9215154@bast.sics.se>
	<1992Nov10.103533.12104@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 12:07:05 GMT

In article <1992Nov10.103533.12104@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.
Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >What is an abstract object?

  As far as my questions are concerned, it doesn't matter what an
abstract object is. I have no problem with abstract objects in
this context.

   >This is a job for the linguist.  I don't think I have to give an exhaustive
   >characterization of every possible English sentence before I can refer
   >to such a totality in a philosophical theory. 

  You're ignoring the point at issue. Take a set S of English
sentences, say the set of sentences found in the writings of Bertrand
Russell. What subset of S is specified by "the set of true sentences
in S"? If you hold that there is in fact such a well-defined subset,
please say so, in which case further arguments can be brought to bear.
If you do not, please take notice of the fact that nothing is gained
by switching to "the set of true propositions expressed by sentences
in S".

   >Nor, for that matter, is
   >it necessary for me to provide a full account of the nature of propositions
   >before I can make use of them in my theorizing.

  How true. However, nobody has asked you to provide a full account of
the nature of propositions. Rather, I have asked how you propose to make
sense of the locution "the totality of true propositions". So far it
appears that you are content to "theorize" about this supposed totality
in hot-air style.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 1992 18:48:50 GMT

In article <1992Nov7.052154.17197@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1992Nov6.184703.16761@guinness.idbsu.edu> 
>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>>I don't think that "Reality is the Truth about the world".  Reality is
>>the world itself; Truth is what can be said about the world.  Of
>>course, what can be said about the world is part of the world, and
>>when we start considering what can be said about that aspect of the
>>world, we get into trouble.  Thus Tarski's paradox, etc.
>
>Let me see if I am getting this straight.  You, Randall, are
>presumably "part of the world" itself, and _ipso facto_ part of
>Reality.  Consequently, what I can say about you is Truth.
>
>So we have that
>
>	Randall Holmes is a wood duck
>
>is part of Truth, insofar as I can, and indeed do say it right now.

It would be an element of the set of true propositions in your
language, i.e., an element (not a part) of what I am terming
Truth[MZL] (where MZL is your language); but all of this depends on my
being a wood duck, which does not hold.

AHHH!  I see that I did goof here!  Of course, Truth is not merely
what can be said about the world, but what can be said _correctly_
about the world.  Thank you!

>
>Did I get your proposal right, or is there anything more profound to it?
>
>>-- 
>>The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
>>above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
>>opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
>>or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
>
>cordially,
>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<TORKEL.92Nov6061350@bast.sics.se>
	<1992Nov6.102344.7218@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1992 12:04:30 GMT

In article <1992Nov6.102344.7218@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:

   >But, how do you avoid this "mystification", Torkel?  How do you describe
   >what you are really "getting at" without introducing some kind of
   >metalogical machinery?  Dummett's terminology happens to be at hand, so
   >I use it.  Show me a better analytic machinery, and I will adopt it
   >instead.

  What "analytic machinery" are you using now? I don't see any analytic
machinery in statements such as "every possible state of affairs
obtains or does not obtain", but only a tautology used as a rhetorical
device. By this I don't mean that such formulations are to be rejected.
They are often convenient, but they don't really take us anywhere.

  To amplify this, suppose you try to explain to me what you mean by
the statement "every possible state of affairs obtains or does not
obtain". Clearly you are using the tautology here in some special
way.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle (Long)
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<1992Nov6.183933.16613@guinness.idbsu.edu>
	<1992Nov8.123739.6079@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
	<1992Nov9.160434.15359@guinness.idbsu.edu>
	<1992Nov11.220209.22072@cltr.uq.OZ.AU>
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 09:20:37 GMT

In article <1992Nov11.220209.22072@cltr.uq.OZ.AU> gar@cltr.uq.oz.au
 (Greg Restall) writes:

   >Isn't this self-refuting?

   >The use of proper names such as "the Absolute Infinite",
   >"the Truth" and forms such as "it" seem to indicate
   >that a rather direct means of reference is in use.

  This is an old problem which essentially has no solution. In many
religious traditions what is recognized as self-refuting is rather to
try to refer to what cannot be referred to. (As in the Tao Te Ching
and the Diamond Sutra.) However, by the same token, it doesn't really
matter what words we use: "the absolute infinite", "the truth", "the
buddha mind": such terms are all quite arbitrary, and the essential thing is
only to keep this in mind.

  This traditional point of view carries over naturally to the
cumulative hierarchy. The cumulative hierarchy is of course ineffable,
and any attempt to refer to it is doomed to failure! Of course those
who lack the requisite religious faith may well take a dim view of
this notion, but it has a mathematical point as well, since it leads us
to the reflection principle "any mathematically sensible assertion
true of the universe is true of some set". Of course this principle
itself vainly attempts to refer to the universe! But from it we get
mathematically formulated reflection principles.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Plato's Views on Women
From: RGINZBERG@eagle.wesleyan.edu (Ruth Ginzberg)
Date: 10 Nov 92 18:10:58 EDT
 <ISBELL.92Nov9141459@panther.ai.mit.edu> <1992Nov10.160153.3803@kadsma.kodak.com>
Distribution: world
Organization: Philosophy Dept., Wesleyan University
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.20In-Reply-To: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com's message of Tue, 10 Nov 1992 16:01:53 GMTLines: 24

In <1992Nov10.160153.3803@kadsma.kodak.com> pajerek@telstar.kodak.com writes:

> Let's take a philosophical question: is mathematics reducible to logic?
> Is there is 'feminist' perspective on this question? And keep in mind,
> we must separate 'the position taken by most feminists' from 'a position
> that is both distinct and distinctly feminist'.

See my "Teaching Feminist Logic" in the APA (American Philosophical
Association) NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY, Spring, 1989.
 (and, no, I'm not going to retype the whole thing here....)

> Enjoy.

Ditto.

-rg

PS: There is no *SINGLE* "philosophical question" such that if X has no
perspective on it, then X cannot be used as a modifier of the term
'philosophy'.

------------------------
Ruth Ginzberg <rginzberg@eagle.wesleyan.edu>
Philosophy Department;Wesleyan University;USA
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Excluded Middle
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 16:16:02 GMT

My remark about hierarchies of languages evading Tarski's Paradox
should not be taken too seriously.  Tarski's Paradox is worse than
some of the others; the sequence of "truths" in the hierarchy could
not even be definable (in the way in which the iterative hierarchy,
for instance, _can_ be defined).  There could not be a sequence
Truth(a) (truth for language a) that could be described internally, or
we would be able to define Truth as "belonging to Truth(a) for some a"
and recover the paradox.  But there are possible uses for such
hierarchies.


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:2538 sci.logic:2006