From: josip@src.umd.edu (Josip Loncaric)
Subject: Re: Irony continues in our history
Followup-To: soc.culture.yugoslavia
Organization: Systems Research Center, Maryversity of Uniland, College Park
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 16:22:24 GMT

In article <1992Aug17.110938.29340@cco.caltech.edu> simic@pollux.ccsf.caltech.edu (Petar Simic) writes:
> 	Josip Loncaric writes:
>
>In article <1992Aug14.160640.24664@cco.caltech.edu> simic@pollux.ccsf.caltech.edu (Petar Simic) writes:
>>
>>       Josip Loncaric writes:
>>>>
>>True, Serbs were DRIVEN into resistance by Ustashe terror, but Croats 
>>joined resistance OUT OF PRINCIPLE.  ...
>><<
>>
>>       This is very naive, isn't it? Or is it a joke? 
>
>There is nothing funny about my statement.  Nor is it naive: unlike
>Serbs, Croats had joined the resistance primarily because they wanted
>freedom from occupation and fascism. Serbs did not have luxury of such
>a choice: Ustashe terror simply forced them into resistance.
>
>	Josip
><<<
>	I challenge this statement on the two grounds:
>
>	* First, it was only Serbs who remained loyal (out of principle, I
> guess?) and fought within Yugoslav army the invasion of Germans. 

You are talking about a different period: before occupation took place.
The Serbs who "remained loyal" were also inept: they failed to defend
even Serbia, let alone Slovenia and Croatia.  And the reason was not a
lack of loyalty, but the corrupt structure of the Yugoslav royal army,
and the ferocity of the Axis attack.

> *Croatian
> contingent* of this army refused to fight, as it is recorded in the books
> dealing with this period. This was a heavy blow to defense of Yugoslavia,
> since Germans got a free passage through half of Yugoslavia and could
> concentrate all their powers on attacking Belgrade and the rest of Serbia,
> inflicting thousands Serbian causalties. Here is the relevant quote (Edmond
> Paris, "Genocide In Satellite Croatia", 1962):
> 
>	"...On April 6, German army attacked Yugoslavia from several directions,
> while the German air force bombed Belgrade and other Serbian cities
> mercilessly.
>	Many members of the minority groups sided with the enemy. The army's
> Croatian contingent refused to fight..."

I ask again: Why did this army fail to defend Serbia?  Could this have
anything to do with the reasons I've stated above?  Or did the Serbs
refuse to fight, too?

Furthermore: The Yugoslav royal army was commanded by Serbian officers:
161 generals were Serbs or Montenegrins, 2 Slovenes and 2 Croats.  Serbian
control of the army was such that military careers were virtually closed
to non-Serbians.  This kind of command structure, plus corruption, plus
bad planning, plus military inferiority led to the rapid defeat.  Excuses
about Croats do not explain the rapid defeat and surrender of other units.
Furthermore, the phrase "many members of minority groups sided with
the enemy" is misleading because many did not.

I should remind you that the pre-war Yugoslav military doctrine was based
on the defense of Serbia: Slovenia and Croatia were considered expendable.

>	--------------- end of the quote --------------------
>
>
>	These Serbs were not driven by Ustasha terror, but resisted Germans
> out of patriotic duty (principle). On the contrary, the sample of Croatian
> population, represented by the Croatian contingent of Yugoslav army,
> "refused to fight Germans". This says lot about the "principle" staff.

I'm talking about Croatians joining resistance during occupation.
You're talking about a period before occupation and about the collapse
of the Serbian-run royal army, which has nothing to do with the alleged
disloyalty but everything to do with the other reasons I've described.

>	If you add to this the fact that Croatian ustasha army was very
> numerous, some units fighting on the East front, and that the increase in
> strength of partisans in Croatia was often in direct correlation with ustasa
> terror on the local Serbian population (many original German documents
> testify to this - this worried Germans a lot but they had somewhat limited
> authority in Croatia) you will realise that most of the partisans were Serbs,
> those who joined out of principle (patriotic duty, ideology, whatever), as
> well as those who joined out of rebelion against the ustasha terror.

Ustashe had organized an army consisting of Ustashe and of Domobrani.
Domobrani were regular conscripts representing the majority of the NDH
armed forces.  The total armed forces of NDH were about 200,000 soldiers
in 1943-44 period.  This included presend-day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
By comparison, Tito's Partisans had about 150,000 combatants under arms
in Croatia alone (operative units were 60.7% Croat, 24.5% Serb, etc.) in
late 1944.  Given that the Serbs had 14.5% of population in Croatia,
their participation was relatively higher than Croats which can indeed
be explained by Ustashe terror directed against Serbs.  This is precisely
what I have said already.  NOTE: Croats were drafted into the NDH army,
but joined Tito's forces out of principle.
(Source of numbers: "Enciklopedija Jugoslavije")

>	* Second, those Croats who joined the anti-resistance movement might
> indeed have done it out of principle. Unfortunately, Croatian participation
> in the anti-fascistic movement in Yugoslavia was NEGLIGIBLE untill it started
> to become clear that Nazies might loose. I could quote many YU historians
> who were participants in the partisan movement - dr. Dedijer, dr. Bulatovic,
> etc. who write in length about this - and risk that you will discvalify them
> as "former partisan and communists", so I will quote from the book by the
> well known former partisan and the new-born anti-communist author,
> president of todays Croatia, Franjo Tudjman:
> 
> 	"Spreading of the partisan movement in Croatia came depending upon
> the realisation of the broad masses of people that the Independent State
> of Croatia does not mean the solution of the Croatian national question,
> because this state would share the fate of fascism and Hitler's Europian
> order...(pp.443, "Wastelands of Historical Reality", Nakladni Zavod Matice
> Hrvatske, 1989)."

This says nothing about the relative representation of Croats vs. Serbs
in the Partisans, but says that Partisan movement grew particularly rapidly
as broad masses of people realized that NDH is not here to stay.  Armed
resistance, however, was limited by the availability of arms, and those
were in short supply until late 1943, when Italian arms were captured
and the Allies started sending in more support.

Let me quote U.S. Government publication "Yugoslavia: a country study"
on the strength of Partisan movement in ALL of Yugoslavia:

early 1942:   about  80,000
end of 1942:  about 150,000
late 1943:    about 300,000 
spring 1945:  about 800,000

In 1943, the key event was the collapse of Italy and the capture of
the Italian arms by the Partisans, so they came to resemble a regular army:
Also, at this time, the Allied support was shifted to the Partisans.

CONCLUSION: rapid growth of the Partisans occured when they were able to
arm themselves after the collapse of Italy.  Availability of arms was
the main limiting factor, but there were plenty of people supporting
the Partisans even before they could get arms and joined their armed forces.

>	------------------------ end of citation ------------------------
>
>	Given the weight of the evidence, do not think that further discussion
> between us about this question, on this net will be usefull, because, even
> if you have some very original ideas of how to revise part of the history
> of Croatia in the WWII, we dont have on this net forum qualified to accept
> the revisions.
>
>	Petar.
>
>PS. 	I will be absent for a while, and most likely I will not be able to
> 	continue this discussion.

I'm tired of this discussion too.  But you continue distorting the record,
trying to smear Croats as fascists, although you know full well that
Croats had firmly rejected fascism in the strongest possible way:
by risking everything and fighting against overwhelming odds for their
freedom and dignity.  I find your manipulations of history morally 
reprehensible, stimulated by Milosevic's warmongering propaganda.

Josip