From: pralmo01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu
Subject: Re: Causality
Organization: University of Louisville
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 1992 18:55:08 GMT

In article <h#g+qWB@engin.umich.edu>, ingles@finch.engin.umich.edu (Ray Ingles) writes:
> 
> In article <1992Mar31.004618.1@ulkyvx.louisville.edu>, pralmo01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu writes:
>> In article <qQd+kk+@engin.umich.edu>, ingles@chem.engin.umich.edu (Ray Ingles) writes:
> 
> [deletions, look out]
> 
>> >> QM does not constitute an argument against causality.
>> >> 
>> >> (I couldn't agree more.)
>> > 
>> >  I'm sure, but from what we've seen you are in fact confusing
>> > the "classical" sense fo causality referred to above with QM
>> > causality, where for example, as in virtual particles, something
>> > can (and does) come from nothing. True, it's for a short time,
>> > but it is not such that it has no effect. For example, it is
>> > postulated that black holes will radiate due to just this fact.
>> > (The so-called "Hawking Effect.")
>> 
>> Well, now I'm going to reverse myself and say that  causality is violated
>> at the quantum level.  Margenau and I did not properly take into account 
>> the collapse of the wave-packet, which means that a smooth differential
>> equation cannot be used to describe the universe.
>> 
>> Now, I still don't say:  'something comes from nothing' since in fact
>> we cannot know all of reality, only the physical part, and only that
>> part through a filter of observations.
> 
>  Oh, so now by your definition we can't understand everything, because
> we can't understand everything? Show me that this non-physical part
> of the universe exists. Until then, I can't really accept your argument.
> 

That non-physical reality exists is a theorem in the 
argument, not the assumption.  The assumption is that the universe has a 
cause.

>> >> Now, over and above physical causality as described aboe, let us
>> >> define something called metaphysical causality (MC).  
>> >> 
>> >> MC has been introduced into philosophical discussions on the grounds that
>> >> existing things do not appear to hold themselves in being.
>> > 
>> >  On what is this statement based? What would something that *did*
>> > "hold itself in being" be like, if not a material object?
>> > 
>> Well, it certainly wouldn't be a material object which is always 
>> disintigrating and transforming and falling apart.
> 
>  WHAT? And here I thought that you were arguing that material objects
> could "poof out" and disappear at any moment if it weren't for some
> "Metaphysical cause" "holding them into being."
>  Now it seems you're doing a convoluted version of the 'argument from
> design,' that the universe is to orderly to have arisen by chance. 
[deletions]
> 

That's not what I'm saying.  What I originally said was, existing things do
not appear to hold themselves into being.  Now you can deny this 
and say that existing things do hold themselves into being, or that they
just are, and the universe has no cause.  Not only do I not see how material
things hold themselves into being, I don't see how a purely material
universe can regulate itself as current physics observes.

> 
> [deletion]
>
Me: 
>> The point is that physics constructs a chain of 'maps' which are
>> interrelated, but which always leave certain questions untouched, 
>> such as:  WHY are the laws of physics thus?  Now there are lots
>> of RELATIONAL ANSWERS to that kind of question (well because
>> space is isotropic!, etc.) but all such answers can themselves
>> be questioned.
> 
>  Some might consider such "fundamental why" questions as meaningless...
> or at least unanswerable given the current data, which for all
> practical purposes is the same thing.
> 
OK, but I say that answer (meaningless) is very unintuitive (at least to me!)


>> Can you give me an example of a physical body which is unaffected by the
>> rest of the universe? 
> 
>  No. What relevance, if any, does it have to the subject at hand?

Individual things do not appear to regulate themselves, they are controlled
by interactions which always take into account more than the object itself.
> 
>> > 
>> >> It is interesting to observe that if the 'law mechanism' of the 
>> >> universe were a machine it would have to compute an infinite amount
>> >> of time to calculate what happens in any small part of the universe
>> >> for any small length of time.  Thus, the decision making procedure of
>> >> the universe is not like anything known within the universe.  (This
>> >> prompted Feynman to conjecture that the laws of physics are really 
>> >> simple, such as rules governing cellular automata.)
>> > 
>> >  Indeed, and why is this "not like anything known within the universe?"
>> > I can work with cellular automota on the very computer I'm using to
>> > post this.
>> > 
>> 
>> Well, if you want to say that that conundrum will be solved since
>> there is a possible solution, go ahead.
> 
>  No, I suggest that *your* argument that the "conundrum" is unsolvable
> is wrong, since there is at least one possible solution. Whether it's
> "the" "correct" answer is irrelevant, we can't decide yet based on
> the current data.

I never insisted that the universe will never be discovered to have some
machine-like regulating features.  I only commented that according to 
standard physics this doesn't appear to be so.  It isn't a crucial step
in the argument; I brought it in as a side issue.  'It is interesting to
observe...  
> 
>>  But currently the best
>> models all have lots of quantities which nature computes on a
>> seemingly instantaneous basis, using the continuum of real 
>> numbers,
> 
>  See "The Emperor's New Mind" for an argument that imaginary numbers
> in fact make for a better model of the universe. But anyway...
> 

Good God, am I going to have to read every popular physics book ever
written? :-)  By the way, all physicists should know that complex numbers
are the basis for QM (wave-packets have phase and amplitude).  Nevertheless,
it is a continuum of numbers.



>> and solving things to very high precision.
> 
>  True, but not infinite. According to QM, measures of position
> become meaningless when you get small enough. I.e. if nature is
> a computer, it can be thought of a "truncating" below a certain
> precision.

Uh, run that by me again?  QM does not 'truncate'.  Probability 
distributions are assumed to hold to infinite accuracy, same for any
other expectation value which can be calculated with a supposedly
correct theory.


> 
>>  There is
>> no really solid reason to believe, in my opinion, that Feynman's
>> conjecture is on the right track.
> 
>  No, nor any reason to doubt it, nor any reason to think that we
> are being held together by a God who's frantically doing math in
> It's head to make the laws work out right.
> 
Plenty of reason to doubt, and in fact the theories favored by 
expt right now do not invoke cellular automata.
                                                      
Joe Deasy



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