From: barnhart@gagme.chi.il.us (Aaron Barnhart)
Subject: IPS: SOMALIA: U.N. BLUE BERETS ARE NOT E
Originator: barnhart@gagme
Organization: Gagme Public Access UNIX, Chicago, Illinois.
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 14:17:56 GMT

Area: Africa, east
Reference: Agriculture; Europe, western
Title: SOMALIA: U.N. BLUE BERETS ARE NOT ENOUGH


harare, aug 18 (ips/obinna anyadike) -- western governments have
belatedly woken up to the horror iAn somalia where 1.5 million
people are now starving to death and 4.5 million out of a
population of seven million are at imminent risk in the world's
worst humanitarian disaster.

the u.s. has pledged to airlift 145,000 tonnes of food
relief beginning on aug. 24 and to transport a contingent of 500
pakistani blue berets to protect it. the italian government
announced it has earmarked an extra 35 million dollars in aid
and is pressing its european community partners to do more.

an estimated 40,000 tonnes of food is needed daily, not
just to the relatively accessible towns but to the villages in
the countryside where those without the remaining strength to
leave, quietly die.

death from starvation is not quick. it is an agonisingly slow
process. the pledged relief is not enough, and the airlifting
of aid is a last resort and terribly inefficient. the
international reaction to the plight of somalia is yet another
example of too little, far too late.

when this correspondent visited somalia in february,
mogadishu was already an apocalyptic vision of destruction and
despair after three months of bloody factional fighting between
interim president ali mahdi and united somali congress (usc)
chair gen. farah aideed.

ordinary people could not understand why the u.n. had not
intervened to stop the conflict. the indiscriminate shelling
from both sides across the lines in the city had killed or
wounded 40,000, mostly civilians, and displaced 500,000. aid
agencies were already warning that in the countryside famine had
arrived.

since then, the reaction of u.n. agencies and the donor
community has been dismal. the world food programme had
delivered only 20,000 tonnes of food between may-july. u.n.
special representative, mohamed sahnoun admited earlier this
month that ''now we are paying the price'' for not intervening
in november.

behind the chaos in somalia is the shadow of military
dictator siad barre, overthrown in 1991. during his 21-year
regime, barre manipulated clan loyalties in a country which
maybe ethnically homogeneous, but is riven by deep-seated
loyalties to clans, sub-clans, down to the basic 100-strong male
social unit of the 'diya', all shot through with personal and
traditional fueds.

behind barre's oppressive regime stood first the soviets,
looking for anchorage at the gulf of aden port of berbera,
followed on their departing heels in 1977 by the u.s., and as a
constant the italians, the former colonial power. (more/ips)


somalia: u.n. (2)

berbera stands testimony to that foreign involvement. italian
manufactured armoured cars lie burnt out along the road in
barre's forces last stand in the north, a soviet sam missile
assembly plant decays, while the 4.5 km long airport runway,
built by the americans as an emergency landing strip for the
space shuttle, accomodates the occasional propeller-driven aid
agency plane.

there is also a deep hatred for the gulf states that financed
barre up until the last, taking over from the u.s. where
congressional criticism led in 1988 to the cancellation of
military and ultimately economic aid.

with opposition mounting throughout the 1980s, barre began to
run-out of client clans. he turned to brutal suppression led by
his own marahan dominated military. the north was decimated, the
largest town hargeysa systematically reduced to rubble in an
attempt to stamp out the isaq clan-based somali national
movement (snm).

in the late 1980s, in a loose alliance with the snm, the
hawiye-led (the largest clan in somalia) usc under aideed took
up armed opposition in the central region where barre responded
with the same scorched-earth tactics. in the south, the somali
patriotic movement (spm) of the darod also rebelled.

the final assault on mogadishu, a hawiye city, was launched
by the usc in december. after bitter fighting, barre fled ahead
of his marahan who faced violent retribution.

but within three-days victory had turned sour. ali mahdi,
local businessman and member of the usc declared himself interim
president without consulting the factions in the movement. he
was supported by an urban-based political elite, known as the
''manifesto group''.

the division was between those that did the fighting and
those that inherited the spoils. as tension increased, mahdi
turned for support to his sub-clan the abgal around mogadishu,
and aideed recruited from among his habar gadir of the central
region, many having found refuge in the capital during barre's
counter-insurgency. the north declared its seccession in may.

despite international mediation efforts, where aideed accused
italy and egypt of backing mahdi and mahdi blamed aideed for
not giving his administration a chance, fighting was inevitable.

it has now taken on its own momentum. in a starving country,
food is the key, and the battle is over its control. although
the ceasefire is holding, marauding gangs in mogadishu and
the countryside where to own a gun is a passport for survival,
operate ou of control. as somalis point out, 500 blue berets
will not be enough to impose order. (end/ips/oa/ro/92)



-- 
Aaron (Barnhart@gagme.chi.il.us) -- posting from Evanston, Illinois
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african