HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym)
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:30:10 GMT

In article <71kqssj@lynx.unm.edu> lgorbet@carina.unm.edu (Larry P Gorbet ANTHROPOLOGY) writes:
>In article <1992Nov17.162358.22391@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>I agree with Mikhail that logic is a moral obligation, but I don't
>>think that sentences have "meanings" (the sentences themselves do fine
>>as propositions, and refer to their truth-values).  It is possible to
>>analyze the reference of sentences formally, and no "meanings" prove
>>to be needed (and this is on the level of semantics, not syntax).
>
>So sentences which differ in that the words _radius_, _hypotenuse_,
>_chord_ (etc.) are interchanged are all synonymous, since these terms have
>identical reference in all cases (since each line segment in the
>Euclidean plane is a radius, is a hypotenuse,....).  My point is that
>reduction of meaning to reference gives up most of the reason we have
>a word _meaning_ in the first place.
>

This is nonsense.  Words like "radius", "hypotenuse", and "chord" are
implicit relation terms (radius of what circle?) -- they do not simply
refer to a line, but indicate its relation to some other geometrical
figure as well, so they are not interchangeable.

"The square on the hypotenuse is the sum of the squares on the legs"
is not intertranslatable with "the square on the radius is the sum of
the squares on the legs" (the latter being nonsense) because the first
sentence abbreviates a sentence of the form "For any right triangle T,
the square on the hypotenuse of T is the sum of the squares on the
legs of T".  In the latter form of the sentence, it is clear why
substituting "radius" for "hypotenuse" would be silly (T does not have
a radius).

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: lgorbet@carina.unm.edu (Larry P Gorbet ANTHROPOLOGY)
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym)
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 01:22:32 GMT
Organization: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque

In article <1992Nov17.162358.22391@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>I agree with Mikhail that logic is a moral obligation, but I don't
>think that sentences have "meanings" (the sentences themselves do fine
>as propositions, and refer to their truth-values).  It is possible to
>analyze the reference of sentences formally, and no "meanings" prove
>to be needed (and this is on the level of semantics, not syntax).

So sentences which differ in that the words _radius_, _hypotenuse_,
_chord_ (etc.) are interchanged are all synonymous, since these terms have
identical reference in all cases (since each line segment in the
Euclidean plane is a radius, is a hypotenuse,....).  My point is that
reduction of meaning to reference gives up most of the reason we have
a word _meaning_ in the first place.

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: rcj@engin.umich.edu (R o d Johnson)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 19:33:11 EST
Organization: Lost Tribes of Gazebo

In article <1992Nov21.115346.17656@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>In article <MxG=!XC@engin.umich.edu> 
>rcj@engin.umich.edu (R o d Johnson) writes:

>>In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs> 
>>erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:

>HE:
>>>Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
>>>considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
>>>the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof).

>RJ:
>>"Are considered" by who?  Says who?  Suppose I were to say "two
>>statements are considered equivalent if they hold in exactly the same
>>possible worlds."  Why is my claim any less definitional than yours?
>>(Note: this isn't about which one is *correct*; this isn't an
>>empirical question.)

>Just because the correctness of your definition of synonymy is not
>amenable to confirmation by (narrowly construed) empirical means, does
>not imply that there is no matter of fact about it.  

No no no.  I knew I had expressed that last bit poorly.  I don't mean
that accounts of synonymy (or meaning) are necessarily not empirical.
I meant the question of which definition one uses isn't empirical.  If
I use Harry's definition, I ask one set of questions and (maybe) get
one set of answers; if I use mine I ask another.  I'm not objecting per
se to his definition (though to be honest I find it ridiculous) but to
the implied consensus behind "are considered."

>In particular, one
>failing of the possible-worlds approach consists in its identification
>of proof-theoretically equivalent propositions.  This is unproblematic
>in situations which call for the study of such deductively closed
>domains as doxastic commitment; however even in such cases, full
>generality will be sacrificed to the implicit assumption that the
>underlying Boolean algebra of propositions must be atomic.

I'm not even remotely interested in defending possible-worlds
semantics.  I was simply using it for an example of a competing, and
nonequivalent, definition of "equivalent."  Any other would have done
as well.  However, while we're on the subject, I've never heard the
argument made that PW semantics must have an atomic Boolean algebra
(in fact--be kind, I'm rusty here--aren't all Boolean algebras
atomic?).  Can you amplify?

 
-- 
       Rod Johnson  *  rcj@caen.engin.umich.edu  *  (313) 764-3103
    
                "What I do doesn't happen in a warehouse"
                                          --Jim Dickinson
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:631 sci.philosophy.tech:4104 sci.lang:8031
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 15 Nov 92 22:20:20 GMT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <28179@castle.ed.ac.uk> 
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <1992Nov13.100925.2924@news.Hawaii.Edu> 
>lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:

GL:
>>Paraphrases are expressions that mean the
>>same thing, so there must be a thing that they mean, and once we've
>>found it, we'll know why they are paraphrases.

CM:
>Reification rides again! Why must there be such a thing? Why could not
>paraphrases be identifiable simply by a certain kind of transformation
>capable of turning one into another?

This is a bogus objection, Chris.  Once your theory identifies the said
transformations, it is a short step indeed to characterize restricted
versions thereof, which will be bijections in extension.  Then you will
want to talk about equivalence classes under the induced relation,
thereby committing yourself to abstract propositions and concepts.

In general, reification is unavoidable under any reasonable view of
ontological commitment.  Even that classic would-be example of gratuitous
reification of "sakes" from the use of locutions like "for the sake of
X", or "for its own sake" is perfectly reasonable, nay, unavoidable, in
any systematic discussion of teleological theory of value.

>-- 
>Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
From: dubuf@ltssun7.epfl.ch (Hans Du Buf)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Position of Mach bands
Keywords: same
Date: 16 Nov 92 14:11:04 GMT
Organization: Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne

Hi,
I am looking at responses of Gabor filters to ramp edges, something like this:

_________
                     \
                        \
                           \

Sorry if your font gives something weird, I mean of course an edge defined by a plateau
meeting a ramp.
Quite interesting, but also very complicated analytically. Might give a new explanation of
the Mach band effect. For this I need references to papers about the EXACT POSITION of
incremental and decremental bands, not about increm/decrem thresholds etc.
I found a few papers by Lowry and DePalma, Fiorentini, and also McCollough, but all way
back in the 50- and 60-ties. 
Does someone know whether there exist more recent and perhaps more precise data on
the exact positions of the perceived extrema relative to the edge position? Whether the
extrema are located at the edge or systematically shifted towards the plateau or ramp
side?  And the influence of edge blur (when the ideal ramp edge is blurred by a Gaussian
lowpass filter. This is very important.
Thanks,
Hans


Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning
Organization: The Institute for the Learning Sciences
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 16:40:25 GMT

In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs>, erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:
> Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
> considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
> the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof).

You don't have enough evidence to back up this claim.

	-dp-

Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:704 sci.philosophy.tech:4188 sci.lang:8110
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 19 Nov 92 23:58:59 GMT
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA

Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof). Since cortical activation is an
analog process, distributed over multiple layers, and reflecting nonlinear
dynamics at all scales, from the synaptic switching in the dendritic arbor
on up, defining equivalence becomes somewhat problematical.

Cheers,

-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:665 sci.philosophy.tech:4154 sci.lang:8082 sci.philosophy.meta:2613
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Folk Theories of Meaning (was re: Theories of
Date: 18 Nov 92 09:15:22 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov18.041523.17561
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <71kqssj@lynx.unm.edu> 
lgorbet@carina.unm.edu (Larry P Gorbet ANTHROPOLOGY) writes:

>In article <1992Nov17.162358.22391@guinness.idbsu.edu>
>holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

RH:
>>I agree with Mikhail that logic is a moral obligation, but I don't
>>think that sentences have "meanings" (the sentences themselves do fine
>>as propositions, and refer to their truth-values).  It is possible to
>>analyze the reference of sentences formally, and no "meanings" prove
>>to be needed (and this is on the level of semantics, not syntax).

Truth-functional semantics is still concerned with meanings.

LPG:
>So sentences which differ in that the words _radius_, _hypotenuse_,
>_chord_ (etc.) are interchanged are all synonymous, since these terms have
>identical reference in all cases (since each line segment in the
>Euclidean plane is a radius, is a hypotenuse,....).  My point is that
>reduction of meaning to reference gives up most of the reason we have
>a word _meaning_ in the first place.

Surely expressions like `radius', etc., are best thought of as
predicates (as in `radius of ...'), rather than singular terms.  On
the other hand, there are plenty of singular terms which ought to be
considered as interchangeable _salva veritate_ and therefore _salva
significatione_ by the extensionalist, viz. `the even prime number',
`the positive root of the equation "x^2-4=0"', `the greatest integer
n, for which the diophantine equation "x^n+y^n=z^n" has solutions'
(assuming the truth of FLT), `the number of bullet scars on Mikhail
Zeleny', `Alonzo Church's favorite number', or even `the integer
bound of Dan Quayle's college GPA'.  The possibilities are endless...

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:674 sci.philosophy.tech:4165 sci.lang:8088
From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Date: 18 Nov 92 18:44:04 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Nov18.134406.17573
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Nov18.132612.8892@news.unige.ch> 
swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip) writes:

>In article <1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>,
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>Following Montague, I believe that deicticaly disambiguated natural
>>languages *are* formal languages.

PS:
>I begin to understand. Zeleny believes that there is no useful difference
>between an entity and its name or description. He thinks that a picture
>of an elephant *is* an elephant, that a formal description of a sentence
>*is* a sentence ... and so on. It is natural therefore that he finds
>identities all over the place! Since natural language is identical to
>some formal logic, it is easy to crank out "true" statements about natural
>language. This makes him the World's last surviving logical positivist.

You are not even close.  The point is that a *correct* and
*comprehensive* normative description will _ipso facto_ have full
descriptive adequacy.  No confusion between use and mention needs to
be involved.  Furthermore, it should be obvious to anyone familiar
with the meaning of the terms that the focus of Montague's program is
rationalist, and so directly opposed to that of *any* sort of
empiricism, including, but not limited to, logical positivism.

PS:
>As for the technical points, I don't see that they touch my reasons for
>rejecting synonymy in natural language. 

Of course not.  Mere rational explanation is quite powerless against
capricious reasons.  What's the point of making up your mind, if you
leave it open to the possibility of change?

PS:
>					 From what I remember of philosphy
>at Harvard, I'm surprised that Zeleny forsees an apparently natural
>extension of formal logic to "context-dependent theories of meaning". I'd
>love to see how that would be done... 

Montague's papers have been collected by Richmond Thomason in a volume
called _Formal Philosophy_.  Read it.

PS:
>				       I don't think many people would
>consider natural language translations as synonymes, least of all Quine
>or Putnam. 

Ah, "philosophy at Harvard"... thank you for answering my query about
the state of scholarship at the University of Geneva by offering
evidence to the effect that, in your idiolect, `education' is
synonymous with `training'.

>Philip Swann
>

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
From: swann@divsun.unige.ch (SWANN Philip)
Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
Keywords: genitalia synonyms
Organization: University of Geneva, Switzerland
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 11:11:17 GMT

In article <1992Nov20.103115.23839@news.unige.ch>, afzal@divsun.unige.ch (Afzal Ballim) writes:
> According to [1, pp. 161]:
> 
> ``The degree of synonymy (or near synonymy) in the vocabulary for genitalia
> and copulation has no parallel elsewhere in the English lexicon -- except in
> the terms for `whore.' There are reportedly more than 1,200 terms for `vagina'
> and more than 1,000 for `penis' (with or without testicles), 800 for
> copulation, and 2,000 for whore...'

This is fascinating, but I think it actually supports my position. There
may be 1,000 words for 'penis' in the OED (really???): but in a given
speech community at a given time, I would bet that there around five.
Perhaps we could have a poll of the net (no, just joking!). Of course,
just having approximately the same reference is not enough for synonymy -
and I would again claim that in most cases the *usage* of the words will
differ. Also, these words often have an expletive function that one could
argue lacks semantic content completely....

Philip Swann
 

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
From: trocklin@news.weeg.uiowa.edu (Tom Rocklin)
Subject: Physiology & Psychology (Q)
Followup-To:  sci.psychology
Organization: University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:24:55 GMT

There is an argument that says, roughly, that knowing the details of the
neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of an organism (I'm particularly interested
in humans) will still leave you ignorant  of important details
of the psychology of that organism.

The argument is sometimes made as an analogy with computers:  knowing the
hardware details of any (or all) of the many computers on which Unix can run
will tell you some constraints that Unix must deal with, but won't tell you
much about Unix itself.  Similarly, knowing the details of the brain (and
the rest of the relevant system(s)) will tell you some constraints on the
psychology of an organism, but not much more.

I'd be happy to hear comments on this argument (which I'm neither endorsing
nor rejecting), but more importantly, I'd appreciate pointers to published
versions of the argument (and related arguments).                ^^^^^^^^^

Thanks in advance.
-- 
Tom Rocklin                                  374 Lindquist Center
319/335-5570                               The University of Iowa
319/335-5386 (fax)                            Iowa City, IA 52242

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta
From: dsg@impmh.uucp (Dave Gordon)
Subject: Getting run over (was Re: Commitment to logic; was ...)
Organization: Integrated Micro Products Ltd
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 19:49:21 GMT

In <1992Nov19.010823.17595@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1992Nov18.170839.29220@psych.toronto.edu>
>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>CG:
>>The issue to which I was alluding was not whether natural language could
>>ultimately be reduced to *some* logic. In fact I hope it can because, under
>>at least one interpretation ofthe problem, the question amounts to whether
>>there can be a theory of language at all. The problem is that the question
>>of whether one gets run over if one steps in from of a bus, cannot be
>>answered a priori, and therefore is not a logical truth (at least it can't
>>be derived out of any of our present logics). Tally-ho!
>
>Hmm... I dissent.  The fact that one gets run over if one steps in
>front of a bus is arguably an analytic consequence of our concepts of
>*bus-hood* and *stepping in front of*.  Consequently, it is knowable
>_a priori_.

Nope.  I can step in front of a bus and *not* get
run over (it's a stationary bus :-)
Or does a stationary bus not have "bus-hood"?
Or does the concept of "stepping in front of" exclude stationary vehicles?

Etc, etc, for all other cases of not getting run over ...

So it looks more like:
	IF I step in front of a bus, *and* it is moving sufficiently
	fast, *and* the driver fails to avoid me, *and* I fail to
	jump back (having suddenly perceived the bus), *and* ...
	(insert more conditions as required) ...
	THEN there is a *high probability* that I wil be run over
	(I don't think you can practically specify sufficient
	conditions for this to become a certainty!)

-- 

===============================================================================
Dave | dsg@imp.co.uk | +44 753 516599 | "C^i tio ne estas .subskribo"
===============================================================================
From: iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Ivan A Derzhanski)
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Subject: Re: Silly Mnemonic Tricks
Date: 23 Nov 92 15:41:30 GMT
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK

In article <1992Nov11.143856.6394@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
<>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
<>>
<>>You know, it always amazed me that people needed a mnemonic for the order
<>>of colors in the spectrum.  Their order always seemed pretty intuitive
<>>to me (e.g., what comes between red and yellow? orange of course. Would
<>>anyone think blue?).

Quite.  (And yellow between orange and green also seems intuitive to me.
Would anyone put anything else there?)

<I was sent e-mail by someone who said the mnemonic is needed because
<color are psychologically circular (e.g. red-violet-blue) and Roy G Biv
<reminds you what the endpoints are.

If you have heard of infra_red_ and ultra_violet_ rays, as I'm sure
everybody has, you won't need any sophisticated memorisation aid to
know that the endpoints can't be green and orange.  Or?

-- 
 `Haud yer wheesht!  Come oot o the man an gie him peace.' (The Glasgow Gospel)
Ivan A Derzhanski   (iad@cogsci.ed.ac.uk;  iad@chaos.cs.brandeis.edu)
* Centre for Cognitive Science,  2 Buccleuch Place,  Edinburgh EH8 9LW,  UK
* Cowan House, Pollock Halls, 18 Holyrood Park Road, Edinburgh EH16 5BD, UK
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang,sci.philosophy.meta