From: TEX5HAD@CMS1.LEEDS.AC.UK (Haluk DEMIRBAG)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.turkish
Subject: TURKEY AND IRAQ: TOWARDS NORMALISATION?
Date: 2 Oct 1992 01:09:31 -0500
Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway
Reply-To: Turkish Cultural Program List <TRKNWS-L%USCVM.BitNet@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU>
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu

TURKEY AND IRAQ: TOWARDS NORMALISATION?

By Robert Olson

Less than  two years after  the invasion of Kuwait,  recent press
reports indicate that  Turkey would like to begin  the process of
normalising relations with Iraq. This  is despite the fact Turkey
was  one  of  the  most enthusiastic  of  those  countries  which
supported  the  war  against  Iraq and  the  toppling  of  Saddam
Hussein.

The reason  for the turn-around  is clear.  The Gulf war  and its
consequences  have brought  about a  substantial increase  in the
activities  of the  Kurdish nationalist  movement in  Turkey. The
Kurdish  problem, both  within and  beyond Turkey's  borders, has
become the  primary domestic  and foreign  policy concern  of the
Turkish government.

Its participation in the  coalition against Saddam brought Turkey
numerous   advantages.   It   strengthened  further   its   close
relationship with  the USA;  it allowed it  to forge  closer ties
with  Europe; the  US and  Europe have  supported its  diplomatic
thrust into the Turkic-speaking republics  of the former USSR, if
only as  an indication  of their  desire to  circumscribe Iranian
influence  in that  area;  it was  earmarked  to receive  several
billion  dollars in  aid from  Europe, the  US and  the Gulf;  it
received reportedly as  much as 8bn dollars  in military hardware
and investment; it was  granted substantial tariff concessions by
the US, especially for textile exports.

But Turkey's  objectives as far  as the Kurds are  concerned have
not been achieved  by its participation in  the coalition against
Saddam. It  hoped that  the war would  culminate in  Saddam's and
perhabs even the Ba'th's fall from power. This, Turkey might have
hoped, would  have allowed  it to influence,  if not  direct, the
Kurdish nationalists  in Iraq  along lines  which suited  its own
domestic and foreign policy. In  practical terms Turkey wanted to
compel both Barzani's KDP and  Talabani's PUK to side with Ankara
against the Kurdistan Workers' party, the PKK.

This, in fact, was a precondition  as far as Turkey was concerned
for  the  Iraqi Kurds  to  continue  to  receive fuel,  food  and
medicine from Turkey, with supplies in desperate need during 1991
and  early  1992. Ankara  also  wanted  Barzani and  Talabani  to
completely sever their ties  with other Kurdish nationalit groups
inside  Turkey. Having  had little  direct involvement  with, and
indeed very deep suspicions of, the  PKK, neither the KDP nor the
PUK had any  great difficulty in complying with  most of Ankara's
demands.

At war with the PKK

But  the truth  is  that  this had  little  impact  on the  PKK's
capabilities,  given both  its  support in  southeast Turkey  and
outside  help, certainly  from  Syria, possibly  from Tehran  and
Baghdad as  well. This  became clear  when Turkey  mobilised some
100,000 troops,  gendarmes and  police in response  to widespread
nationalist demonstrations  in Kurdish  areas during  this year's
Nawruz  (New  Year)  celebrations  in  March,  its  largest  ever
military deployment against the Kurds.

For much  of this year, the  Turks have continued to  deploy such
forces,  in conjunction  with state-controlled  Kurdish militias,
both to wage  a bloody conflict with the PKK  in a massive effort
to crush it militarily and, if  possible, to root out and destroy
all  publicly organised  nationalist activity.  This has  brought
condemnation  from international  human rights  organisations and
from  some European  governments, especially  Germany, which  has
greatly  angered Turkey.  By  contrast,  the military  operations
against the Kurds have not raised a murmur in official US circles
and the national media.

In view  of this situation, Turkey  has now come to  realise that
the  effort  and  expense  of   trying  to  destroy  the  Kurdish
nationalists at home  and at the same time control  those in Iraq
is beyond its financial, diplomatic and political resources, even
if it  possesed the requisite military  power. Ankara's continued
attempts to crush  the Kurds militarily are likely  to worsen its
relations with Europe, which, in  turn, might lead to a reduction
of support  for Turkey's policies  in Central Asia and  the Black
Sea region.  Turkey's dual preoccupation with  the destruction of
the Kurdish nationalist  movement in Turkey and  control over the
Kurds  in Iraq  simply detract  from  its ability  to pursue  and
implement foreign policy in other vital areas.

In view  of the above,  Turkey's desire to  "normalise" relations
with  Baghdad  is  hardly  surprising.  And  while  there  is  no
guarantee  that Iraq  itself wishes  to normalise  relations with
Turkey, it wants  to at least improve  them. The re-establishment
of  the  security arrangements  against  the  Kurds that  existed
before the Gulf crisis would be a sensible starting point. If the
process is  done in phases and  with prudence, Europe and  the US
might well have to acquiesce in such a policy.

Robert Olson teaches history at the University of Kentucky.

MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, 7 August 1992
            _
|-| /-\ |_ |_| |< {"Turkey's fight against  PKK  terrorism constitutes
                    her legitimate right of self-defence" US Assistant
                    Secretary of State Thomas Niles}
Xref: sparky soc.culture.turkish:10383 talk.politics.mideast:20692 soc.culture.greek:9419 soc.culture.europe:8739 soc.rights.human:3753