From: anderson@macc.wisc.edu (Jess Anderson)
Subject: Re: Individualism & the Common Weal
Organization: Madison Academic Computing Center, UW-Madison
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 92 16:46:06 GMT


In article <1992Oct27.041904.5915@gordian.com>
mike@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas) writes:

>In article <1992Oct27.000306.19568@macc.wisc.edu>,
>anderson@macc.wisc.edu (Jess Anderson) writes:

>>Glory, we may be making some progress, because I think you
>>may have said what you meant to say in the first place.

>Well, something must be wrong then :-)

Don't worry, we can fix it. :-)

>>See, when you say what you said there, it sounds like what
>>I've been calling frontier justice: every person for
>>themself, I can do anything I want unless you can force me
>>not to, I look out for me, your worries are never going to
>>be my worries, unless you get in my way, that is, etc.  This
>>is not, I maintain, at all an unreasonable reading of what
>>you've been saying heretofore.  Here, for the first time, I
>>think, you take a less extreme stand.

>Honestly, I think you were reading that into me since those
>views don't correspond to any views that I would consider to
>be my own.

I call that progress of a sort.  Throughout all this long
discussion, I keep looking for your principles that connect
people to one another.  It seems clear that to resolve a
large number of social and political problems there must be
a number of basic adjustments in the way individuals relate
to the larger society, including, of course, their
government.

What I think we're talking about has focussed *primarily* on
the individuals; in some regards (least restraint, self-
responsibility, etc.) we are probably not far apart.  But I
think the core of the problem is in adapting our social and
political institutions to work better.  I don't profess to
have answers to most of the questions (nor indeed to know
what all the best questions are), but what I get again and
again from things you say suggests too great a focus on
individuals *to the detriment* of the group.  So I think
that's the crux here.

>The overall characterization is not mine, although some
>aspects I would support.  Certainly *not* "I can do anything 
>I want unless you force me not to." That sounds like true 
>unprincipled anarchy to me (ie the rule of brute force).

Sounds the same to me, which is why I want to get rid of it.

Then you *are* willing to give up some portion of your
sovereignty as an individual so that you and others who are
doing likewise can co-operate?  Is that right?  If it is,
then what we're talking about is which portions and to what
ends, I think.

>My contentions have been along the lines of what a proper
>government should do and not do.  This is not the same
>question as what an individual or individuals in a society
>should strive for.  You agree that there is a difference
>don't you?

I'm sure we can agree that the government does things it
shouldn't and doesn't do things it should.  While I agree
there's a formal difference between the people and their
institutions, it's also true that these things are
indissoluably linked.  If I say: individuals should strive
for themselves only, we agree that's not anough.  I think
that ineluctably means that individuals must also strive for
their institutions, which are in effect extensions of
themselves and others, the common ground.

If we can agree on this much, we can arrive at debating what
the common ground is, as well as debating the principles
that govern our common interests.

>Basically, self-interest which takes into account the long
>term interest of that person.  Rational/enlightened self
>interest (I use the two pretty much interchangeably if that
>is any help) implies that your total whole is considered
>when making value judgements about particular things.

Including the interests of others, or not?  I keep coming
back to this shared part, because I think that's where the
wicket gets sticky.

>Because something is distasteful in the short run does not
>necessarily mean that it is not a worthy long term goal.

Under here, presumably, might be belt-tightening in
less-flush times.  That leaves us with the question of whose
belts and how much tightening, of course.  So you have a
lot, let's say: can we take more belt from you than from
somebody who doesn't have enough to eat (leaving aside for
the moment how they got that way)?

If you say yes to that (I hope you do, but I don't know what
you'll say), then must we depend only on your good will to
offer it up, or is there some way (one that you would agree
to) that we can arrange things so hungry people aren't so
anxious about such basic things as food, shelter, and
security?

You see, what I'm after here is this: what will you allow as
reasonable and fair government programs to offset or remedy
inequities that have heretofore been systemic?

>Not suprisingly, rational self-interest ends up coming to
>many of the same conclusions which other forms of ethics
>come to but minus any nebulous duties to God or Society on
>which most other ethics are hinged on.  The distinction is
>very far-reaching though.

Somewhere along the line, I think, we will have to come to
grips with deities in other forms; since time virtually
immemorial, philosophers have grappled with the idea of
Good.  Most of the time they spell it with fewer o's, but in
the end some such idea has always proved necessary.  It is a
central ethical issue, isn't it?

>>I agree that we know ourselves better than others do.  I
>>agree that (in general) we know what we want.  

>>I do not agree that either of those facts means we
>>automatically know what is best for us, not to mention for
>>others.  It might, but it doesn't necessarily.  Surely
>>you can think of examples.

>Yes, we can all point out situations where someone is making
>tragic (or not so tragic) errors.  People are certainly not
>infallible and I don't mean to imply that they are.

>There are really only two choices in the matter though:
>either you let people make their own choices and decisions
>for better or worse, or somebody makes them for them
>(potentially) against their will.

I don't see it as that clear-cut.  We do not exist in a
vacuum.  We can help each other, and help does not _ipso
facto_ equate to paternalism (indeed in my book it works
better if it's maternal, but that may simply be my bias).

>It is the "against their will" part which is paternalism --
>ie, I know what's better for you, so just obey.

I don't want us to get too abstract here.  Being nurturing
(to put a more inclusive and arguably kinder light on what
you call paternalism) doesn't imply, necessarily, such
absolute subordination of the other person's will.  For
example, we have to work in the case in which the other
person really *does* "know better." Maybe the kid has to get
burned to know what hot really is, but we don't let him or
her learn this by pulling a vat of boiling water off the
stove onto their head.  Friends don't let friends drive
drunk.  Someone is enraged enough to go get their gun; we
really should try to talk them out of using it.

>Since everybody is fallible (even large groups of the same
>people) it makes sense that you must respect the only
>person's judgement who is most effected by the decision, and
>first in line to take heat for a bad decision: that same
>person.

Yes, but.  This is only true where it's true.  There's lots
more to it than that, the examples above, for instance.

>This doesn't mean that you stop being a friend as necessary,
>and shake your head when somebody does something foolish.
>It just means that people have to be responsible for their
>own actions.

There's an important subtext here, I think.  I certainly
agree that people should be responsible for their own
actions.  The thing is, quite a lot of the time, no part of
that really computes.  You're assuming rationality in all
contexts, and there's plenty of evidence that many contexts
(and arguably the more important ones, in our discussion) are
not ultimately rational.  Yet our political and social
ethics must still provide for such cases.  Quite a lot of
the time, people you might see as making a bad mistake are
doing nothing more than responding to their environment as
best they can, "because that's the way it is." Saying they
should be more responsible simply does not address them in
any meaningful way.

>>I agree we should be as responsible as we can be, but to
>>return to my earlier point: life is so complicated that it's
>>unrealistic for each and every citizen to be expert enough
>>to make an informed decision on every point that needs to be
>>decided.

>Certainly this is correct. To do so requires omniscience.

Deity by another name, that is.
 
>I make the distinction, again, that there really needs to be
>two different sorts of concepts in government:

>1) The recognition of individual rights and liberties which
>are *very* difficult to change since they are statements of
>philosophical principle.

>2) The nuts and bolts of actually realizing those
>philosophical principles in practice.

>The constitution (proper) is more of the latter, the BoR and
>DoI are examples of the former.  I think that democratic
>election of the latter is just fine, but throwing up the
>former to the whim of the moment would be disastrous.

I have little problem with any of that.  I would amend the
Declaration to say (paraphrased) "that all people are equal"
(replacing "men" and dropping "created").

On the latter point, I would (don't faint) embrace the
*principle* that that government is best which governs
least, but I would expect that principle *not* to preclude
the government governing *as necessary* to secure equality
for all its citizens, even if that comes at the expense of
*some* of them.  The underlying principle is sovereignty.  Each
individual must be willing to give up *some* for the use and
benefit of others in the society; basically, it's the glue
that bonds a society together.

Our debate is about who gives up what and for what purposes,
but before we can have that debate, we really must agree on
the preceding.  Do we?

>>Now if there's to be a
>>lasting solution to the contest of those arguments, it will
>>have to be by appeal to a mutually agreed-upon concept of
>>rights for all.  This necessarily will involve (I claim)
>>some (maybe considerable) yielding of your principle of
>>noninterference in the perceived needs of individuals.  I
>>don't expect you to like that very much, but I want to hear
>>a workable alternative, in that case.

>Well, I wouldn't count on that.  True human rights are
>rights of potential, not substance.

Food is a right of substance.  And we are talking about
hunger as systemic, not about hunger as incidental or
something a person chose.  Neither the Declaration nor the
Constitution mentions food or hunger, but hunger is a real
problem, and what we are talking about is ultimately
concerned with addressing that problem, I think.

-- 
Jess Anderson <> Madison Academic Computing Center <> University of Wisconsin
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