From: sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: Pro-choicers must condone infanticide
Date: 31 Dec 92 01:32:26 GMT
Organization: University of Arizona UNIX Users Group

From article <1992Dec30.164138.10210@hemlock.cray.com>,
by mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson):

> In article <1992Dec30.005916.25736@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
> sfm@manduca.neurobio.arizona.edu (Stephen Matheson) writes:

>>From article <1992Dec29.160413.11977@hemlock.cray.com>,
>>by mon@cray.com (Muriel Nelson):

[deletia]

>>> Since the very definition of 'fetus' hinges
>>> on a state of pregnancy for a woman, which is a profoundly
>>> altering physical condition, I maintain that it's a morally
>>> significant component of the fetus' existance.
>>
>>I just can't go with you on this one.  Please help me understand.
>>What is it about being a fetus that renders one less morally
>>significant than when one becomes a neonate?
>>
>>Is it:	1) Dependence upon the mother for sustenance?
>>		2) Anatomical connection to the mother via the placenta?
>>		3) Occupation of (and expansion of) one of the mother's
>>			pelvic cavities?
>>		4) Alteration of the mother's metabolism?
>>		5) Danger to the mother resulting from impending parturition?
>>		6) Some combination of all or none of the above?

> It's all of the above, and then some.  I don't think a
> fetus generally interacts with others in a way that
> would make it a member of society.

I didn't know that the requirements for membership were so rigid, but
perhaps that's because I haven't given much thought to how one obtains
membership.  Nor am I convinced that such membership is a prerequisite
for the acquisition of rights.

> I _have_ seen instances where the fetus was an important focus for
> family and caregivers, but I think there's a moral
> difference in an entity that actually lives among us.

If the entity slips into a coma, does this moral difference persist?
Let's assume that the coma is reversible.  In this situation, I
typically think of people in a predicament such as that depicted in
the film _Awakenings_.

If the entity is postpartum, but retains complete dependence upon others,
and is incapable of normal interactions with others, is "it" a member of
society?

> Can you interact with a fetus without treating in some
> way with a pregnant woman?  Suppose you want to express
> kindness and love towards a fetus.  Any way to leave
> the woman out of that?

I just can't see why this reduces the moral significance of the fetus.  I
can certainly see why this complicates it.

[deletions]

>>> Does this mean that you would not favor legislation
>>> restricting abortion?  Because I maintain that it's
>>> impossible to give legal rights to a fetus without
>>> compromising the rights of women.

>>I am largely undecided on the issue of legislation.  For now, I
>>oppose it because I believe it diverts attention and effort almost
>>completely away from the simple pro-life goal of discouraging
>>abortion.  In other words, I'd like to see elective abortion go away
>>by becoming unnecessary and undesireable.

> I think there's a lot that can be done here, from ensuring
> the availability of prenatal care and adequate food for
> pregnant women, to reinstating the Title X funding that
> allowed low-income, uninsured women to obtain tubal ligations.
> (Removed about twelve years ago with the advent of the Reagan 
> administration.)

And that's just a start.

I think this is the obvious common ground shared by people
who are not pro-abortion (I'm using this term precisely).  IMHO, one gets
to this rarely-visited arena by recognizing that the problem of unwanted
pregnancy is central, with or without abortion.

>>As for the consequences of granting rights to fetuses, I suppose
>>you're right.  Certain "rights" would be compromised.  This sort
>>of thing happens a lot, doesn't it?  I mean, don't my rights have
>>to be continuously balanced against the rights of others?  We'd have to
>>agree on some sort of hierarchy of rights between the fetus and mother.
>>But we do that every day, don't we?

> Not in exactly the same way.  The pivotal issue is that
> legislation in this area would affect bodily autonomy rights
> that are generally not compromised by others in our society.

You have stated that you do not believe that fetuses are persons.
If they are, does the statement above still apply?  In other words,
do bodily autonomy rights supersede other rights such as the right
to life (when those rights are in apparent conflict)?  Is it true that 
bodily autonomy rights are "generally not compromised by others in
our society"?  It seems to me that they are routinely *limited* in
situations where they appear to infringe on the rights of others or
certain state interests ([gulp] -- I'm no legal expert, but I'm
thinking of laws dealing with prostitution, drug use, sale of one's
body parts).


It seems to me that we have 3 questions here:
	1. Is the fetus morally distinct from the neonate?  If so,
	   why?  If not, why not?
	2. Are fetuses persons?  Are neonates persons?  Why or why not?
	3. If a fetus is a person, is her/his right to life
	   rendered irrelevant by the mother's right to bodily autonomy?
	   Is abortion really the legal equivalent of refusing to
	   give desperately-needed plasma to your kid?

Further, it seems to me that all these questions are interesting and
important, and that reasonable people may differ in their opinions without
any of them being guilty of misogyny, hatred, fascism, crimes against the
Motherland, advocacy of infanticide, or even stupidity.

So on we go...
--

Steve Matheson   Program in Neuroscience   University of Arizona
sfm@neurobio.arizona.edu
Xref: sparky talk.abortion:52843 alt.abortion.inequity:6167