From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 2/7
Followup-To: alt.activism.d
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: ?
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:14 GMT

------------------------------------------------------
The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
     Z Magazine, September 1992
and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
------------------------------------------------------
 
Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 2 of 7, 9.5KB)
========================
 
2. JFK and Withdrawal: the Early Plans
--------------------------------------
 
The optimistic mid-1962 assessment led Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, the primary war manager for Kennedy and Johnson,
to initiate planning for the withdrawal of US forces from
Vietnam, leaving to the client regime the dirty work of cleaning
up the remnants.  Kennedy and McNamara recognized that domestic
support for the war was thin, and that problems might arise if it
were to persist too long.  Similarly, in November 1967, General
Westmoreland announced that with victory imminent, US troops
could begin to withdraw in 1969 (as happened, though under
circumstances that he did not anticipate); that recommendation
does not show that he was a secret dove.  Advocacy of withdrawal
after assurance of victory was not a controversial stand.
 
In contrast, withdrawal _without victory_ would have been
highly controversial.  That position received scant support until
well after the Tet offensive of January 1968, when corporate and
political elites determined that the operation should be
liquidated, in large part because of the social costs of protest.
 
The question to be considered, then, is whether JFK, despite his
1961-2 escalation and his militant public stand, planned to
withdraw _without_ victory, a plan aborted by the
assassination, which cleared the way for Lyndon Johnson and his
fellow-warmongers to bring on a major war.  If so, one may
inquire further into whether this was a factor in the
assassination.
 
The withdrawal decisions were reported at once in the press with
fair accuracy, and the basic facts about the internal
deliberations lying behind them became known 20 years ago when
the _Pentagon Papers_ appeared.  In July 1962, the analyst
writes, "At the behest of the President, the Secretary of Defense
undertook to reexamine the situation [in Vietnam] and address
himself to its future -- with a view to assuring that it be
brought to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time."
McNamara declared himself impressed with the "tremendous
progress" that had been made, and called for "phasing out major
U.S. advisory and logistic support activities." General Paul
Harkins (commander of the US military mission) estimated that the
VC should be "eliminated as a significant force" about a year
after the Vietnamese forces then being trained and equipped
"became fully operational." McNamara, however, insisted upon "a
conservative view": planning should be based on the assumption
that "it would take three years instead of one, that is, by the
latter part of 1965." He also "observed that it might be
difficult to retain public support for U.S. operations in Vietnam
indefinitely," a constant concern.  Therefore, it was necessary
"to phase out U.S. military involvement." The Joint Chiefs
ordered preparation of a plan to implement these decisions.  The
operative assumption was that "The insurgency will be under
control" by the end of 1965.
 
On January 25, 1963, General Harkins' plan was presented to the
Joint Chiefs, stating that "the phase-out of the US special
military assistance is envisioned as generally occurring during
the period July 1965-June 1966," earlier where feasible.  A few
days later, the Chiefs were reassured that this was the right
course by a report by a JCS investigative team headed by Army
Chief of Staff Earle Wheeler that included leading military
hawks.  Its report was generally upbeat and optimistic.  The
anticipated success of current plans to intensify military
operations would allow a "concurrent phase-out of United States
support personnel, leaving a Military Assistance Advisory Group
of about 1,600 personnel" by 1965.  All of this was considered
feasible and appropriate by the top military command.
 
Wheeler then reported directly to the President, informing him
"that things were going well in Vietnam militarily, but that `Ho
Chi Minh was fighting the war for peanuts and if we ever expected
to win that affair out there, we had to make him bleed a little
bit'." The President "was quite interested in this," General
Wheeler recalled in oral history (July 1964).  His dovish
advisers were also impressed.  In April 1963, Hilsman proposed to
"continue the covert, or at least deniable, operations along the
general lines we have been following for some months" against
North Vietnam with the objective of "keeping the threat of
eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind." But "significant
action against North Vietnam" is unwise on tactical grounds: it
should be delayed until "we have demonstrated success in our
counter-insurgency program." Such "premature action" might also
"so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of
domestic opinion that the pressures for neutralization will
become formidable"; as always, the dread threat of diplomacy must
be deflected.  With judicious planning, Hilsman said, "I believe
we can win in Viet-Nam."
 
Hilsman was not quite as optimistic as the military command.  A
few days before the President heard Wheeler's upbeat report, he
received a memorandum from Hilsman and Forrestal (Jan. 25) that
was more qualified.  They condemned the press for undue pessimism
and underplaying US success, and agreed that "The war in South
Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago," praising
ARVN's "increased aggressiveness" resulting from the US military
escalation, and reporting that GVN control now extended to over
half the rural population (the VC controlling 8%), a considerable
gain through late 1962.  But "the negative side of the ledger is
still awesome." The VC had increased their regular forces,
recruiting locally and supplied locally, and are "extremely
effective." "Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet
Cong could continue the war effort at the present level, or
perhaps increase it, even if the infiltration routes were
completely closed." "Our overall judgment, in sum, is that we are
probably winning, but certainly more slowly than we had hoped."
They made a variety of technical recommendations to implement the
counterinsurgency program more efficiently, with more direct US
involvement; and to improve the efficiency of the US mission to
accelerate the "Progress toward winning the war."
 
We thus learn that in early 1963, in an atmosphere of
considerable to great optimism, the military initiatives for
withdrawal went hand-in-hand with plans for escalation of the war
within South Vietnam and possibly intensified actions against
North Vietnam.  We learn further that such "intelligence and
sabotage forays" into North Vietnam were already underway --
since mid-1962 according to McGeorge Bundy.  On December 11,
1963, as the new Administration took over, Michael Forrestal
(another leading Kennedy dove) confirmed that "For some time the
Central Intelligence Agency has been engaged in joint clandestine
operations with ARVN against North Vietnam." Journalist William
Pfaff reports that in the summer of 1962, at a Special Forces
encampment north of Saigon he observed a CIA "patrol loading up
in an unmarked C-46 with a Chinese pilot in civilian clothes,"
taking off for a mission in North Vietnam ("possibly into China
itself"), with some "Asians, some Americans or Europeans."
 
The connection between withdrawal and escalation is readily
understandable: successful military actions would enable the GVN
to take over the task from the Americans, who could then withdraw
with victory secured, satisfying the common intent of the extreme
hawks, war manager McNamara, and JFK.
 
In the following months, the withdrawal plans were carried
forward under the same optimistic assumptions, with the agreement
of the military, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General
Maxwell Taylor, JFK's most trusted military adviser.  The
"fundamental objective" remained unchanged, Michael Forrestal
advised the President on August 27: the US must "give
wholehearted support to the prosecution of the war against the
Viet Cong terrorists," and "continue assistance to any government
in South Vietnam which shows itself capable of sustaining this
effort."
 
The reference to "any government" relates to increasing
Administration concerns over the Diem regime.  One factor was
that its repression was evoking internal resistance, which was
interfering with the war effort.  Another was that Diem and his
brother Nhu were pressing their demands for US withdrawal with
increasing urgency, sometimes in public, including a front-page
interview in the _Washington Post_ in May in which Nhu called
for withdrawal of half the American military.  Administration
planners feared that GVN pressures for withdrawal of US forces
would become difficult to resist, a danger enhanced by
exploratory GVN efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement with the
North.  The skimpy political base for Kennedy's war would then
erode, and the US would be compelled to withdraw without victory.
That option being unacceptable, the Saigon regime had to get on
board, or be dismissed.
 



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