From: shoham@ll.mit.edu (Daniel Shoham)
Newsgroups: alt.war
Subject: Re: Greatest Military Blunders of All Time
Date: 14 Oct 92 03:23:30 GMT
Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory

In article <KETIL.92Oct11024703@bark.ii.uib.no> ketil@ii.uib.no writes:
>In article <1992Sep28.165259.17464@linus.mitre.org> bwise@hemlock.mitre.org (Barry Wise) writes:
>
>   The Arabs attacking Israel(anyone of numerous times)
>
>Yep.  Never underestimate an opponenet. :-)

Yep. Yep. Yep.
This one of the *VERY* few military blunders of all time! As others have
pointed out, most military disasters are really POLITICAL blunders. Attacks
on clearly stronger opponents (Pearl Harbor, Hitler, Saddam, etc.) in the hope
of politically demoralizing the opposition, lack of political support for a
war (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.) against a weaker opponent.
There are also many tactical (local) blunders, but I don't count those.

As for Arab attacks on Israel, the Six days war in particular - but even the
Yom Kippur war, they are clear military blunders. (Politically, the picture is
less clear, Israel have mostly benefited from the SDW, the Arabs from the YKW).

In all wars, the Arabs enjoyed a massive superiority in numbers, economic
power, weapons, strategic depth, high-grounds, and international backing
(counting the backing that counts: $+weapons, not moral support). All of the
above were less so, but still the case in the YKW.
In each case, a war of mobility, systematic outmanuevering, and rapid
demoralization turned initial defeats into routs.

The SDW wins the title of the greatest military blunder. Before the war, no
pure military evaluation could lead to any conclusions other than a total Arab
victory (although some analysts, taking other factors into account dared to
speculate that Israel might hold its own if the Arabs will fail to get their
act together). Just prior to the War, Israel's PM (Eshkol) made a very somber
radio broadcast to his nation saying that he has no illusions about the (grim)
military situation (It is well known that this broadcast served to encourge
the Arabs toward the war. It was later charged that Eshkol was "setting the
Arabs up"). The PLO (a young organization, at the time totaly under Egyptian
control) London spokesman stated that after the war (Israeli) survivors should
be allowed to "return" to "their countries of origin" but added that he doubted
there would be any survivors. (Yes, the PLO does predate Israeli occupation
of the West bank + Gaza in the SDW).
As for the military balance, Egypt alone was stronger than Israel (several 
times over) while Jordan and Syria were (each) matched to Israel (but had
significant advantages is terrain). Israel was less than 10 miles wide at the
most densly populated area, with the government buildings (in Jerusalem)
within sniper range of the border. On the Syrian front, The Syrians were well
entrenched in the 3000m high Golan height (above the Sea of Galile at 200m
BELOW sea level).

After the UN force left the Sinai (at Egypt's demand) and Egypt occupied it,
and after Jordan and Syria (and also Iraq, but they were too far to be more
than a diversion) joined Egypt in a joint-command alliance, it appeared to
Israel that war was inevitable. Israel thus decided to forgo the dubious
public relation advantage of being attacked for the certain military advantage
of a first strike. In a risky move, the entire Israeli air force was sent to
attack the Arab air forces on the ground in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq 
(air power is the only manner in which Iraq COULD have been a factor in the
war). Only 4 planes were left to defend Israeli airspace. Total surprise was
reached, and thank to the aid of detailed intelligence the attack was very
successfull. Over 400 planes were destroyed on the ground. With no air cover,
Egyptian supply lines and armored columns were hopelessly exposed in the Sinai.
What followed was a decimation of Egyptian ground forces by air power with
Israeli ground forces doing little more than mopping up and taking (lots of)
EPWs. With the Bridges over the Suez Canal blown up, even if the Egyptian
forces were not too disrupted to attempt a withdrawal it was no longer
possible. The entire Egyptian force in the Sinai was destroyed.
Compared to the Egyptians, the much smaller Jordanian force did well. The 
British-trained and British-equiped legions held some strong points (mostly
in Jerusalem) quite well. However, with Israeli forces freed up from the 
Egyptian front and with total air superiority, this front was also decided.
The Jordan river hindered Jordanian efforts to withdraw after the war was lost
(like the Suez did for the Egyptians). Most (but not all) Jordanian forces in
the West Bank and Jerusalem were destroyed.
Even without air cover, and with Jordan and Egypt out of the war, Syria should
have been able to defend itself (being entrenched on top of 3000m mountains
is not a minor advantage) against the entire Israeli force (which was now
directed against Syria alone). That did not happen. Syrian forces were so
demoralized after the defeat of the other forces that they fled with very
little fighting. Syrian forces survived the war (they fled in time and were
not vigorously pursued).

Dan Shoham
shoham@ll.mit.edu