From: carl@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU (Carl J Lydick)
Subject: Re: The Evil Man Is (Was: Re: Pigs
Reply-To: carl@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU
Organization: HST Wide Field/Planetary Camera
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 1992 13:15:23 GMT

In article <1466601323@igc.org>, alanm@igc.org (Alan McGowen) writes:
>
>
>/* Written  1:51 pm  Apr 11, 1992 by carl@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU in cdp:sci.environmen */
>In article <40911811@hpindda.cup.hp.com>, alanm@hpindda.cup.hp.com (Alan McGowen) writes:
>>>The fact that we can imagine doing better proves that our destructiveness
>>>*is* evil, and not merely toxicity.
>>
>>Let's see.  This means that if I can't swim, but can imagine knowing how to
>>swim, and see someone drowning, then the fact that I don't save him makes me
>>evil, right?  Alan, some of your rantings would seem less like rantings if
>>you'd acknowledge the fact that WE DON'T KNOW HOW to accomplish many of your
>>stated objections.  In particular, if you'd change your apparent attitude of
>>"OK, I've pointed out that a problem exists; all the rest is `just
>>implementation,' and if nobody does the implementation for me, or worse, they
>>point out difficulties in potential implementations, that means everyone else
>>is an ecocidal goon," you might have a chance of making a few converts.
>>
>>>That we can envision ecocentrism is enough to make anthropocentrism wrong,
>>>just as the fact that it was possible to envision a world without slavery made
>>>slavery wrong.
>>                                           
>>I'm afraid that argument is fundamentally flawed.  I can imagine a world in
>>which NOBODY has enough to eat.  Does that make a world in which at least some
>>people are well-fed wrong?  You continue to assert, without proof, that
>>`ecocentrism' is somehow superior to `anthropocentrism.'
>
>Apparantly Carl's position is that if the economy of a country 
>depends upon slavery and it would be too inconvenient to change 
>it then slavery is not evil, and similarly if the economy depends 
>upon trashing ecosystems and driving species extinct, and it 
>would be too difficult to change it, that is not evil either.

Let's see.  Alan uses the adjectives "inconvenient" with regard to slavery and
"difficult" with regard to extinctions.  "Inconvenient" implies a pretty low
level of difficulty.  To abolish slavery, the freemen of some societies would
have had to make do with a somewhat lower standard of living, if all the
freemen in the society decided willingly to abolish slavery.  The level of
difficulty of implementing Alan's proposed solutions to the problem of the rate
of extinctions is considerably higher than this.  As has been pointed out in
this newsgroup, lowering human population at the rate Alan suggests is very
likely to result, at some point in the process, of having a relatively small
number of people of working age supporting a large number of elderly people. 
It's quite possible (and perhaps even likely) that the relative population
levels for these age groups will result in the premature deaths of quite a few
people.

Now, a somewhat lower standard of living isn't evil.  In the matter of slavery,
we're talking about a choice between evil and mere inconvenience.

On the other hand, causing the premature death of someone IS considered by most
people to be evil, and is called murder.  Causing the premature deaths of LOTS
of people is also generally considered evil and is called mass murder.

Now, if I were the sort to use the sleazy rhetorical devices in which Alan
delights, I'd stop here and conclude that since Alan advocates the rate of
population decline that he does, Alan doesn't think that mass murder is evil.

However, not being the ecodidal goon he makes me out to be, I'll present the
rest of the argument as well, to wit:  It's also likely that continued human
population growth will eventually result in the premature deaths of lots of
people.  Let's consider two extreme cases:
	1)  We immediately begin breeding as rapidly as we can;  This is
	    certain to cause massive numbers of premature deaths in the near
	    future.
	2)  We reduce our population to what Alan considers a reasonable level
	    overnight.  This, too is certain to cause massive numbers of
	    premature deaths in the near future.
In fact, case 1) will cause more deaths than case 2).  Somewhere between these
two extremes, there is likely to be an optimal strategy which will minimize the
number of premature deaths.  If we place a value on other species for the sake
of the other species, this will, in all likelihood, push the optimal strategy
in the direction of faster population reduction.  If we try to go too far in
that direction, however, we risk societal disturbances that could destroy
enough of our infrastructure that the attempt at a controlled reduction in
population fails, instead resulting in civil disturbances severe enough to
damage our current infrastructure to the point that we end up reverting to
primitive slash-and-burn agricultural practices and subsistence farming, along
with all the incentives such a society has to breed at a rather high rate.  One
possible result of such an outcome is an extinction rate much greater than what
we're seeing now, since we wouldn't start out with the regulatory mechanisms
that societies that used such practices in the past took many years to develop
to regulate their populations.

>This is just what one would expect of a utilitarian econo-
>centrist, but it is moral imbecility all the same. The evil of 
>slavery or of trashing ecosystems is not mitigated by the fact 
>that it is convenient or profitable to have slaves or wreak 
>havoc.

It's also moral imbecility to claim that it's immoral to exploit things that
lack any capacity for moral sense themselves.  The immorality of slavery was
denied in the past (in this country) by denying the fact that the slaves were
human beings.  When it became accepted that they were, in fact, human,
potentially moral beings, the immorality of slavery became obvious.  As I've
said before, when someone can demonstrate that a tree is capable of actively
engaging in a moral relationship, I'll gladly convert to ecocentrism.

>Fortunately Carl's argument did not prevail wrt slavery in the 
>American past (abolition will ruin the economy!), and it is to be 
>hoped that the moral growth of the American people in the near 
>future will be able to reject the same argument about, say, 
>preserving old-growth or the Arctic wilderness (preservation will 
>ruin the economy!) There are more important moral concerns than 
>simple profitability in either the case of slavery or 
>preservation. 

It the case of slavery, I agree.  In the case of preservation, I disagree,
at least if you're talking about truly long-term profitability.  When you can
show me a tree that has taken deliberate steps that reduced its own personal
welfare in order to improve the welfare of another organism, then I'll
recognize your analogy between slavery and preservation as having some
validity.

>>Purely as a rhetorical mechanism, I propose yet another paradigm: 
>>`ossocentrism.'  ROCKS have an inherent right to exist.  Since life is the
>>
>
>I suspect that an ecocentric culture would in fact have respect 
>for at least certain kinds of rocks, and I doubt that it would 
>distinguish itself by making any more Mt. Rushmores. However, I 
>have no intension of arguing for that sort of respect in 
>sci.environment. It isn't central to my purpose, and would be 
>wasted on the sort of people who in the 19th century couldn't 
>comprehend that slavery was wrong, and today cannot comprehend 
>that anthopogenic extinction is wrong, i.e. it would be wasted 
>upon anthropocentrists. 

Since it's not central to your purpose, I conclude that you agree that rocks
don't have a moral right to exist.  What is it about life other than homo
sapiens which gives it a moral right to exist when rocks don't enjoy the same
right?

>In Carl's view something is wrong only if it diminishes one's own 
>wealth (or fitness). The evolution of sociality proceeds by 
>finding ways to generate cooperative and altruistic arrangements 
>despite this undeniable pressure for individual fitness 
>maximization.  The existence of sociality in the world -- and 
>especially of the culture-based sociality of humans -- is a 
>testimony to the possibility of further evolution in this 
>direction.

Again, Alan:  The "culture-based sociality of humans" is based on the premise
that all those involved are capable of contributing to the sociality as well as
enjoying the benefits thereof.

>Ecocentrism is the direction in which humans are 
>evolving anyway, despite the small setback of the last 10,000 
>years.

Interesting.  Alan claims that we're evolving in the direction of ecocentrism,
despite this small setback.  Of course, this "small setback" happens to
encompass all of history.  Care to provide some instances of our evolution in
this direction, Alan?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carl J Lydick | INTERnet: CARL@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU | NSI/HEPnet: SOL1::CARL

Disclaimer:  Hey, I understand VAXes and VMS.  That's what I get paid for.  My
understanding of astronomy is purely at the amateur level (or below).  So
unless what I'm saying is directly related to VAX/VMS, don't hold me or my
organization responsible for it.  If it IS related to VAX/VMS, you can try to
hold me responsible for it, but my organization had nothing to do with it.