From: hiraga@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Yuzuru Hiraga)
Subject: Re: The Northern Islands
Organization: Stanford University CSLI
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 10:28:42 GMT

In reply to Mr. Mike Fester:

I admit that part of the confusion is due to my not quoting the
entire sequence along the line of argument.  And I regret that
I do not have the original articles so that I can reconstruct
the sequence.  The reason that I trimmed the quotes is that I personally
find it annoying to read the same lines over and over, especially
when working on a slow modem (and trimming lines is also recommended
as netiquette), and also that I tend to remember my writings to the
extent they are recollectable from fragments.
I also feel that I was not clear enough in making my
point, besides counting my lack of proficiency in English.
I'll try to be better.
Bearing that in mind, I stand by my points.


In article <1992Oct1.183030.6146@island.COM> fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:
>In article <1992Sep30.130135.23447@Csli.Stanford.EDU> hiraga@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Yuzuru Hiraga) writes:
>
>>[line order changed: >> are my words]
>>In article <1992Sep28.151151.2117@island.COM> fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:
>>>>I thought we were talking about Yeltsin's political attitude.
>
>>>Actually, we were talking about Japan's relations with her neighbors.
>
>>No we "were"n't.  This thread started by my reply to your praising
>>Yeltsin's maneuvers using words like "I really admire ..." seen
>>three or four times [sorry, I can't recall the exact words:
>>I don't have the posts anymore].  This should have been a distinct topic
>
>No problem: here it is for the 4th or 5th time. I really admire the way 
>Yeltsin has handled the situation. Each time he has been denied aid by the
>Japanese, he has been able to make money on the islands, and this has cost
>Japan even MORE money to keep other parties from using those islands.
>
>Clearer now?

This was clear enough from the beginning.  And that is exactly what I oppose.
The negative factor of such manipulation is considerable, and in the
long run, will not pay off by the (marginal) gain obtained.
It surely would evoke hostile feelings and disbelief on the Japanese side,
which would impede development of Russo-Japanese relationships and
negotiations (that is, provided that Yeltsin is willing to arrive at
any fruitful agreement with Japan).  If Yeltsin is playing a bluff game
to make Japan concede, he is playing it at a high risk.  The direct
consequence is that it has delayed advance of ordinary negotiations.
The tactics has (so far) not shown much effect.  And the game certainly
can't go on for ever.  Dealing with an obscure paper company shows that
Yeltsin is running out of cards.  If the recession proceeds any further,
Japan might not retain sufficient reserve to be given as aid.
The time Yeltsin is losing might be the most precious resource he is wasting.
The worst part of it is that it's only giving away his desperateness.

Apart from all that, I myself can't find anything to be admired in it --
clever, maybe, effective, perhaps, but nothing respectable as an act
of a decent leader.  It is no different from what one would expect
from a speculator.

>>(Ah! I should have changed the Subject: line), which for some unknown
>>reason you have inflated into the whole issue of northern islands
>>and now "Japan's relations with her neighbors."
>
>Actually, the specific comment to which you responded was my "Japan seems to 
>be able to make trouble with her neighbors all by herself". I have NOT inflated
>the issue.

This in turn, as I recall, was in response to my saying along the above lines,
something like "Russia is raising tension with Japan as well as her
relationship with her neighbors."
In that sense, it was about the Russian behavior, and whether it is true
or not, favorable or not has nothing to do with whether Japan is having
or making troubles of her own.

>I state directly that I do not believe that this will drive any
>sort of wedge between Japan and her neighbors. I state directly that Japan
>can do this all by herself, islands notwithstanding.

Sorry, I've difficulty in comprehending these two sentences.  All I could
imagine is that the "this" in the first sentence designates Yeltsin's
behavior, and "her neighbors" specifically indicates South Korea.
Is that correct?  If so, that is quite different from what I recall
from your original post.  As for the second sentence, "this" seems to
designate "drive a wedge", but then again, what has it got to do with
Russia making trouble with Japan?

>>>>Surely, Mike, you're dodging the issue...
>>>??Hardly. Unless you mean that in your opinion, Japan has some sort of
>>>moral claim to the islands, in which case I have made it quite clear that they
>>>have none.
>
>>No you didn't.
>>As a matter of fact, you failed.
>>And I suggest you refrain from "moral" issues because the sad truth is
>>that it's not the decisive factor in territorial issues (need I bring up
>>Hawaii, or native American rights?  and what moral claim does Russia
>>have anyway?)
>
>If it's NOT a moral issue, then what is it?

Legitimacy, of course.

>And Russia has a REAL claim to it; they are there on the islands.

No doubt about that.

>They don't need a moral claim.

That is not the same as saying that they have a moral claim.
If one claims that Japan has no moral claim on the islands, the first
thing to do is to check whether Russia has any.  If they do, that's it,
decisive victory on that.  If they don't, then it's even, and no point
gained on either side.  [And note here that I am not talking of whether Japan
has any moral claim or not.]
Only after that can we go on comparing the contribution of various
factors, like reality of posession or legitimacy.  Which, of course,
usually leads to a whole bunch of controversy.

>What claim do
>the Japanese have to it? That it once belonged to them and doesn't now?

Said above.
Of course "doesn't [belong] now" has nothing to do with it, nor does
"once belonged to them" by itself.
The point here is the existence of a spontaneous mutual agreement,
as well as international approval.  Of course, "spontaneous" here
is the keyword -- treaties made under strongly unequal conditions are
not to be considered along the same line, though in that case, anything in
favor of the weaker country should be acknowledged as providing a bottom
line.  The 1855/1875 treaties fulfill this, while Japanese annexation
of Korea in 1910 does not.
Skipping the WWII issue for the moment, the 1956 treaty acknowledged
that at least 2 islands (Habomais and Shikotan) belong to Japan,
while not stating Soviet sovereignity of Etorofu and Kunashiri.
This indicates that there was a considerable understanding on the
USSR part that Japan has a right on its claim, which strongly enhances
the Japanese position.
Needless to say, Yeltsin has declared that Russia will respect all
the treaties and relations held by the former USSR and keep continuity
in diplomatic relationships.
Yeltsin himself has once stated that the territorial issues
were a mistake committed by Stalin, which indicates that
at least personally, he thinks Japan has a righteous claim.
And as said above, Yeltsin's way of irresponsible manipulating
works rather negatively, giving away that he is not seriously considering
of holding the islands.
These points make the Japanese claim far more stronger than some
theoretical or illusory legitimacy claim.

>Now, if Japan were to take a public stance like "We think Poland
>should give back land to Germany, Russia should give back land to Finland and
>Poland, Israel should give back land to Jordan, Syria, etc" I might believe
>the Japanese position was due to some deep moral conviction that "war should
>not be used as a means of gaining land".

It's rather surprising that this was brought up.
I have tried to avoid referring to the cases of other nations because
the situation of individual cases have intricacies that makes direct
comparison difficult and faulty (gathering them under the common label of
"war-lost territories" certainly won't do), so they would make only
a restricted and weak case either for or against the particular issue at hand
(especially if we respect the individuality of an independent country),
so consequently, taking a favorable stance to other individual cases
has little relevance (in either way) to a particular claim.

The Japanese declaration that war should not be used as a means of
gaining land [I don't remember the exact words] should be understood as
a commitment on the Japanese side to not cause or enter a war,
based on a deep reproach and remorse on what she had commited in the past
(which, by the way, you do not seem to believe in.  Another note:
this is taught in all Japanese schools).
This does mean that Japan prefers all conflicts to be settled peacefully,
but should a war break out, how its outcome is to judged would vary
case by case, eg. whether one side solely took an unjustifiable offensive.

As for your examples, Poland to Germany (east of Oder-Neisse, Danzig/Gdansk,
etc.) is inappropriate because the situation is far more complex --
that it is difficult to establish legitimacy in the above sense,
the border was already settled between former East Germany and Poland,
current Germany has adapted its legacy and has finally decided not
to make territorial claims to Poland.  This should be honored as a
decision by an independent state (for whatever reason she may have),
and it is none of Japan's business to resurrect the claim.  As for
Russia to Poland, I don't know in detail what claims Poland is or
would be making, nor Japan's position toward it -- though I can imagine
that the situation is complex, involving Russia (Kaliningrad -- whose
Russian legitimacy is questionable) as well as Ukraine and Belarus.
As for Russia to Finland, Japan has always been sympathetic towards
Finland, which surfaced in a pathological way when Nakasone spoke of
"Finlandization" as a situation to be avoided.  Finland itself, again
for her own reasons, is (currently) not making claims against Russia,
which, again, should be honored.  As for Palestina, Japan is supporting
UN resolution 645 (?number?), which does mean saying that "Israel should
give the land back."  This is the reason that Japan-Israeli relations
are not improving, in spite of the fact that there are virtually no
other obstacles between them [Jewish-Japanese relationships has long
been intimate, and Japan had served as a haven against anti-semitism
in Europe.]  Perhaps this is closest to the Russo-Japanese situation,
although of course we should be aware of the differences between them.

And since this has been brought up, observe that resolution of territorial
issues by negotiation is not unprecedented.  This is true with Sinai between
Egypt and Israel (which lead to a steady, if not friendly relationship
between them).  It is also true with Okinawa and Ogasawara between Japan
and the United States.  Do these serve as models?  Perhaps not.
I think that direct comparison with individual cases is in general void,
unless we are quite sure what we are comparing, or using it as only
a counterargument against such impoverished argument.

>As it is, they seem to merely 
>believe that JAPAN should not lose any territory.

No, not "'any' territory".
And of course, they don't merely believe only that.

>>Taking another example:
>
>>>>>Investment almost anywhere is risky.
>
>>>>Why this overgeneralization?
>>>>Investment to RUSSIA is considered as relatively risky,
>>>>be it with or without OED, compared with other locations on equal grounds.
>
>>>Investment almost anywhere is risky, as indicated by the US and Japanese 
>>>banking difficulties, though they were investing heavily in their own
>>>economies.
>
>>Again, you are slipping away.
>>Can this in any sense be regarded as a response to my lines?
>>If you don't agree, DENY AND REFUTE IT.
>>If you concede or don't feel like replying, JUST KEEP IT OUT.
>>But please don't try covering up or twisting things.  PLEASE!
>
>Listen, I stated that investment anywhere is risky. You say it's over-
>generalization.

Preceding that, your initial statement was that Japanese corporations
are frustrated by Miyazawa's attitude.  To that, I responded that
investment in Russia is considered risky, implying that a good part of
Japanese business is not that eager in investing in Russia (there has
been some projects that failed to substantiate in the past, eg.
Chumeni (sp?) oil fields).  This in turn suggests that the pressure
from them against the Japanese government may not be that strong.
The whimsical attitude of Yeltsin may further distract their interest
(eg. one may not be sure when a project might be called off without
notice), so it would work against increasing such pressure.

>You then state that investment in Russia is risky, compared to other nations.

Yes exactly.

>I point out that Japan and the US banks lose money in (by your
>terms) safer nations. It is a DIRECT response to your lines.

No.  Here, you have further changed the meaning of "risk".
Before that, risk at least meant "risk as projected beforehand".
In the above, it means "risk [or rather, failure] as it turns out to be".
These are obviously not the same.  If a project with lower anticipated
risk is to fail (as a consequence), then it is natural to assume that
projects with higher anticipated risks would be more likely to fail
(of course, all this might turn out to be wrong, this is talking only
of possibilities).

>Here it is again; Investment anywhere is risky.

That is a tautology, and as any tautology is, conveys no information.

>>>And giving them[=islands] back would not make any money for them[=Russians]
>
>>Why not?
>
>The Japanese have said "We will not consider aid until the island issue is
>resolved"

No, that is not true.

>They have made no promises of aid, even IF they get the islands back.

Neither is this.  What makes you think that way?

>They have made NO commitment to help put the former Soviet Union.

Excuse me?  I suppose you made a typo here.

>They have tried to get other nations to push their claim to Russia.

Yes.  And what's wrong with that?
The July summit acknowledged the territorial issue as a problem to be solved.
This was less than what Japan desired, but is certainly in favor of Japan,
and not Russia.
At the same time, Japan was also among those that agreed that providing
support to Russia is a vital issue.
# A further note: as mentioned by Michiaki Masuda, US seems to have
# been in support of Japanese claim much earlier, i.e. at least by 1961.

>How has the Japanese position been anything other than
>"YOU give us the islands and we'll THINK about maybe helping you"?

It is true that Russo-Japanese negotiation is pending,
and that territorial issues is the major obstacle.
When two countries with different concerns and different priorities clash,
the negotiation would fail.  But this does not mean that the above kind
of statements were made, nor that is the reason of failure, although
it is conceivable that Russia might have come up with such blame to
accuse Japan.
Japan has approved the Yeltsin government, and has never made any
opposition against supporting Russia.  That the above statements
are false is further testified simply by facts.
Japan has been and is providing considerable (if not huge) aid
to Russia in various forms.  A joint project was signed after the
cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Russia, and local trades are
steadily growing.  Russia did complain that Japan is not providing
sufficient aid (which I personally find rather obnoxious, but that's
a different matter), but that in reverse means that Russia herself
admits that she is already receiving aid.
So your statements are in reality simply void.

Returning to the main point.
If, in the course of negotiation, Russia gave up the islands
with nothing in compensation for it, that would be crazy diplomatics.
Likewise, if Japan poured all the money that Russia demands without
any pledge nor mortgage, that is in diplomatic sense not generosity,
but stupidity (although, of course, humanitarian aids are an exception).
Russia cannot get away with getting the money alone, nor can Japan
get away with getting the islands alone.  All of these are by now
necessarily linked.  If we encounter a stalemate, the only breakthrough
is to seek compromise.  Japan's policy regarding the islands has been
consistent throughout 40 years (which, by the way, you seem to deny in
your other post), and is actually yielding in many ways regarding the
surrounding conditions (like the terms of return, holding a moratorium
period, direct compensation for island properties, etc.).  On the other
hand, USSR/Russian policy has been swaying through that time, at one
time granting at least part of Japanese claims, while at another time
totally refusing even taking it up as an agenda.  Right now, Russia's
attitude is stiffening and retreating.  But at the same time, a number
of Yeltsin's aides are speaking out of practical steps towards resolution.
It is true that Russia has more options in advancing the negotiation.
What Japan has in control may be only the amount of money to give out,
while Russia can merely give the promise to proceed negotiation with
the islands issue, which is sure to bring significant advance on the
joint issue of Japanese aid [I have said this before].  Contrary to
what you say, Japan has shown all willingness to provide aid.
Not making any such offer, and worse still, Yeltsin's maneuver mentioned
at the beginning, is a mere expression of refusal to advance any
reasonable negotiation.

But again, this can also be considered as a sign of desperateness.
I expect that within a few months, perhaps within this year,
there will be significant advance in the islands issue (and thus
accordingly with the aid issue as well).  At that time, Yeltsin's
maneuvers will turn out to be a mere flop.

>>>If they Japanese want them[=islands] back, they are going to have
>>>to be a lot more clever and a lot more flexible. That is, actually, rather 
>>>simple.
>
>>Now, THIS is interesting!  What in the world can be so simple,
>>while Japan is not clever enough to recognize it?
>>Provided, that is, that Russia could expect no money for the islands,
>>and also Japan having no "moral claim" for them?
>
>??? I really don't see what is confusing you. I have stated directly that if 
>they want the islands back, they are going to have to pay for them.

Well, I don't like the idea of "paying" for the islands.
As said above, this is a joint issue, proceeding in parallel.

>If they
>take a stance that there will be no discussions UNTIL the island issue is
>resolved (in their favor), Russia will go on getting money for the fishing
>rights, mineral rights, etc, or whatever she wishes. This will cost Japan
>money anyway, as they have to pay off the S Korean companies to give up the
>negotiated rights, or whatever rights were granted.

>And I have never said
>that "Russia could expect no money for the islands".

You have put that as an isolated issue, and that Russia cannot
expect money by (merely) giving the islands back.

>I have stated, directly,
>several times that they DO expect money, LOTS of it, for the islands. Rather
>the opposite, actually.

Then what we differ is only the order, condition (and perhaps the reason)
of "payment".

>Mike

-Yuzuru Hiraga
Xref: sparky soc.culture.japan:8396 sci.lang.japan:4261