From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: What is Love? _The Story of O_
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 18:07:40 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.


In article <lrvn5xk.anson@netcom.com>, anson@netcom.com (Anson Kennedy) writes:

|> Yes, I am aware of these sorts of criteria.  This implies that there
|> is a group of criteria which would define a "higher" moral standard
|> by which other standards are to be judged.  So acceptable standards
|> compose a set which share certain common traits.

This is not implied by my description of the function of such criteria.
I described a *methodology* which is required in order to evaluate and
compare moral standards.  Choosing such criteria in no way implies a
"higher" moral standard -- or any moral standard at all, unless you
extend the concept of moral standard to cover virtually anything.  I
think it virtuallly certain tha acceptable moral standards do in fact
share common traits, but this is a matter for investigation and not
an axiom with which we start.

|> The faulty ones are those which lay outside that set.  But can there
|> be another, equally valid, set of criteria which would define a set
|> in which the faulty standards are now acceptable?

There is room for argument concerning both the specific criteria and
the nature of these criteria.  There is also room, once you have progressed
far enough and have a complete or partial moral system to reconsider the
original criteria.  However, this is not to say that the criteria are
arbitrary or should be modified or replaced without good reason.  Also,
keep in mind that (certainly at the level of abstraction that my
description has had thus far) it is still possible for there to be
different (perhaps even incompatible in certain ways) moral standards
that are all members of the "acceptable" set.  (Astute readers will note
the similarity of this approach to the development of moral standards
with the issues concerning theory development, acceptance, and rejection
in general.)

Can there be a separate but incompatible set of *criteria*?  Of course
there can, but then we can argue about the acceptability of this set
of criteria.  I think that unless you work very hard at avoiding it,
it is possible for any group of individuals to arrive at a mutually
acceptable set of criteria.  People who cannot participate in such
an agreement are called "sociopaths".  Then you can decide whether
such people are "evil" or "sick" or "dysfunctional" or whatever.
(I prefer "evil", but I won't defend that right now.)

|> Interesting that you should use the term "appropriate domain."  This
|> seems to me to be the central point:  Judging the moral standards
|> expressed in _The_Story_of_O_ presupposes that it is in the appropriate
|> domain.  But what if its domain is so different from the one being used
|> to judge it that any comparison is invalid?

I don't understand what your point or question is here.  (I may be
at a disadvantage in not having read the story, but I don't think
I'll run out and get a copy.)

|> Or is the issue so black and white that you can have only two sets:
|> acceptable standards and false ones?

Isn't that what "standard" *means*?  You can argue about which standard
to have, but if you allow *anything* as a standard, then you have none.

Anyhow, what I did in my prior posting to say what "faulty moral standard"
*means*.  I did not attempt to suggest any specific criteria, or to claim
that one or another standard is acceptable or not.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
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