From: jsp@uts.amdahl.com (James Preston)
Newsgroups: alt.supermodels,soc.men,soc.women
Subject: Re: Elle MacPherson causes rape?
Date: 12 Nov 92 22:07:12 GMT
Reply-To: jsp@pls.amdahl.com
Organization: Amdahl Corporation, Sunnyvale CA

auer@cs.swarthmore.edu (David S. Auer) writes:

}Should one express oneself in a manner that is offensive to another?
}Legally, this should be allowed; yet, if one knows that one's expression
}will wantonly offend those who do not wish to be offended, is not appropriate
}to move one's expression elsewhere?

Why is it that seemingly everyone sees this question of offense from
only one direction?  If the above is valid, then the following should
also be valid:  Should one be offended by an expression that was not
meant to offend?  If one knows that the expression one takes offense
to is, in fact, devoid of offense, then is it not appropriate to move
one's offense elsewhere?

}Freedom is only a good thing when it does not interfere with another's
}freedom.  I consider freedom from offense nearly as important as freedom of
}expression.

"Nearly as"?  Does that mean that you do, in fact, consider freedom of
expression to be more important than freedom from offense?  So then,
given that in a situation where I want to display a calendar and you
want to not be offended by said calendar, it surely must be clear that
we cannot both have our freedoms.  One of us MUST give it up.  So then
how do you decide which freedom is more important?  You seem to have
answered that yourself:  Freedom from offense is only "nearly as" important
as freedom of expression, so even though it may be really, really close,
freedom of expression wins, and I get to display my calendar.

}What you seem to be advocating is a bargain: I will not get offended if you
}will not get offended.  What if the other person does not wish to engage in
}your bargain?  Is this just?  Permissable certainly, but hardly equitable.

But you are simply wanting a different bargain:  You will not engage in
forms of expression that offend me if I do not engage in forms of expression
that offend you.  Now what if I do not wish to engage in your bargain?  Is
*that* just?  I fail to see why your bargain should be any more equitable
than the other bargain.

}What if other's do not wish to be indifferent to their desires?  You may
}feel fine and dandy in suppression city, but why enforce that numbness upon
}others who are content with their preferences and wants?  You have decided
}on the price for yourself and wish to extract it from other's.  Do not be
}surprised when others resist payment.

Funny, this reads to me like an argument in favor of freedom of expression.
Those who wish to display calendars do not wish to be indifferent to their
desires to do so.  "Supression city" sounds to me like a state of affairs
in which no one is allowed freedom of expression for fear of giving
offense.  You seem willing to pay the price of supression of expression
in order to gain your freedom from offense, but do not be surprised that
others resist the cost of that.

}Show some consideration towards the feelings of others.  You will be amazed
}at how liberating the experience can be.  I do not fear offending others,
}for I know that when I do it is not out of pettiness or indifference.

Show some consideration towards the feelings of others.  You will be amazed
at how liberating the experience can be.  I do not fear offending others,
for I know that when I do it is out of their desire to be offended, not
out of any desire of mine to offend.

--James Preston