From: beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver)
Subject: Re: Choice for men: movin
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 18:29:30 GMT

In article <1992Oct10.020711.15293@zooid.guild.org> Will Steeves <goid@zooid.guild.org> writes:
>beaver@castor.cs.psu.edu (Don Beaver) writes...
>DB> The "excessively restrictive" portion of Pennsylvania's law was struck down:
>DB> the husband "notification" requirement that was, in essence, "permission."
>
>Are you sure of this, Don?  Since you are from Pa., would it be possible for
>you to take a jaunt to the office of your nearest legislator, and pick up a
>copy of the original law, especially the notification provision.
>
>My understanding was that it was notification-only - *not* permission or even
>"permission in disguise".  Could you please clarify this for me?

Ugh.  I just moved here last year (which means I also get the "blame"
for the 1982 law) and never thought I'd be in a center of action...  :-)

   "Section 3209 of the Act contains the spousal notification
   provision.  It requires that, before a physician may perform
   an abortion on a married woman, the woman must sign a
   statement indicating that she has notified her husband of
   her planned abortion.  A woman is not required to notify
   her husband if (1) her husband is not the father, (2) her
   husband, after diligent effort, cannot be located, (3) the
   pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual assault that has
   been reported to the authorities, or (4) the woman has
   reason to believe that notifying her husband is likely to
   result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by him or
   by another individual.  In addition, a woman is exempted
   from the notification requirement in the case of a medical
   emergency.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3209 (1990)."
          [Planned Parenthood v. Casey; Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas]

What I meant by, `in essence, "permission,"' was that the Supreme Court's
opinion seems to be that this was essentially permission.  The dissent
wrote the following:

   "But this case involves a much
   les intrusive requirement of spousal notification, not
   consent.  Such a law requiring only notice to the husband
   -does not give any third party the legal right to make the
   [woman's] decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining
   an abortion should she choose to have one performed.- 
   Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra, at 496 (Kennedy, J., concur-
   ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see H. L.
   v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 411, n. 17.  Danforth thus does
   not control our analysis.  Petitioners contend that it should,
   however; they argue that the real effect of such a notice
   requirement is to give the power to husbands to veto a
   woman's abortion choice."
          [Planned Parenthood v. Casey; Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas]

(Danforth was a Missouri case over a law requiring spousal consent.)

The majority concluded:

   "Section 3209's husband notification provision constitutes an
   undue burden and is therefore invalid.  A significant number of
   women will likely be prevented from obtaining an abortion just as
   surely as if Pennsylvania had outlawed the procedure entirely."
          [Planned Parenthood v. Casey; Syllabus]

Without becoming a lawyer and without spending hours reading
these texts, I don't have a direct argument that the majority 
opinion was that the law was "essentially permission."  But 
the dissent claimed it was not; the majority concluded "undue burden;" 
and here I leave it to the reader to make his/her own judgement.

Don
-- 
beaver@cs.psu.edu                       Opinions from the PC-challenged
Xref: sparky alt.feminism:2511 soc.men:17670