From:  ()
Subject: LINCOLN'S GENERALS
Followup-To: alt.war.civil.usa
Organization: Trinity College, Hartford, CT.
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 16:11:36 GMT

I consider the original question to skew the real circumstances. The Army
of the Potomac suffered a lack of quality leadership in the opening years
of the war, plain and simple. It wasn't so much formulated doctrine as a
result of hesitancy, uncertainty in themselves. Second Manassas (Bull
Run)... a stinging Union defeat due to Pope's panick. He simply choked.
Generals must be cool under fire, at all costs, before anything else.

You can't diagnose Meade's decision to not pursue a crippled Lee on 3 July
1863, pushing him back against a swollen Potomac, as a result of his desire
to win battles, and not the war.

Firstly, Meade doesn't deserve that much credit for the Union's victory at
Gettysburg. Buford and his troops and Reynolds's troops (not Reynolds, who
didn't survive long enough on that battlefield on 1 July to make a
meaningful contribution) deserve much of the credit for recognizing the
value of the high ground and holding it until the rest of the Army of the
Potomac could converge on the town that night and the next day. Also,
Chamberlain held the entire Union left against wave after wave of
Confederate infantry charges the next afternoon. These were formative
aspects of the battle.

Secondly, Lee's judgement was clouded by former successes and the prospects
of winning a decisive victory and marching in to Washington to hand Lincoln
a note from Jefferson Davis offering terms for and armistice. 2 July's
fighting, especially Devil's Den and Little Round Top, were pretty costly
clashes for Lee. But he could have accepted Longstreet's recommendations
and withdrawn, positioning himself between Meade and Washington and forcing
battle on ground of his choosing. Read Sahaara's THE KILLER ANGELS. I've
read many personal letters and testaments about the battle and Sahaara's
novel is based on historical evidence and is essentially narrative with a
novelists' imaginative characterizations. But its' really very close to the
truth. Lee was foolish and the third day's assault on the ridge was a
disaster of the first order of magnitude. I am willing to entertain the
notion that, having heeded Longstreet's advice and withdrawn the night of
2-3 July, Lee could have battled Meade another time and beaten him badly.
The Confederacy's war leadership in the early years of the war is something
that all Americans can take pride in... they were truly superb.

Meade knew that the Union (I refuse to say it was because of Meade) won an
important victory at Gettysburg and was content with that. As Lincoln said,
he held the enemy in the palm of his hand but refused to close it. He could
most
likely have punished Lee severely and forced a surrender had he pursued.
But he didn't have it in him. Remember the telegram he sent Lincoln on 4
July... "I have driven from our soil every last vestige of the invader."
Lincoln liked Grant because Grant understood that you had to destroy armies
to win wars, not simply defeat them in battle and drive them back. He was
willing to risk enormous casualites to achieve strategic, not merely
tactical, success. The Union had many great officers at the regimental and
divisional level, but its great commanders emerged only in the last two
years of the war.
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa