From: zursch@whizkid.corp.sgi.com (Jeff Zurschmeide)
Newsgroups: soc.history
Subject: Re: Battle of Shiloh
Date: 6 Apr 92 18:09:30 GMT
Distribution: usa
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc., Mountain View, CA

pdunn@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Patrick L Dunn) writes:
>
>I would go with Antietam and Perryville as the turning point of the war.

But while it's true that Lee went back to Virginia after Antietam, I
still can't see how it qualifies as a turning point given the successes
at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville that led to the second invasion.
You have a really good point about Perryville, though. I'll have to 
cogitate on that one some, though it seems to me on the face of it that
it took a long time to bear fruit, as opposed to Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

>However, when the south was stopped at these two battles (I will not say
>defeated, because technically speaking both battles were tactical draws) they
>were forced to go on the defensive.  Had these battles been confederate
>successes, it is very possible that Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri would have
>joined the confederacy;

This is true. I think, though, that they were forced back on the defensive
because they didn'thave the resources to maintain the offensive. 

>also, Lincoln might be faced with the prospect of
>having Cincinatti occupied and Lee's army beseiging Washington (or something to
>that effect). 

Maryland was pretty tightly held. Lincoln kept large numbers of troops
there who rarely did anything. I don't think Maryland could have successfully
seceded. And even if Kentucky and Missouri went, that's different from 
occupying Cincinnati. Both those states provided plenty of men and goods
to the South as it was. You could even argue that aside from the weight
of perception, it was better forthe South to not *have* to defend them 
as they had to defend Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, et al. They got all the
men and goods they were likely to get in any case and none of the burden. 

>No doubt, several things could have happened, including foreign
>recognition for the confederacy and serious evaporation of settlement for the
>continuation of the war in the north (which would have shown itself in the
>off-year elections of 1862).  Lincoln may have even sued for peace if the
>effect of these things was strong enough).  However, with these northern
>successes, Lincoln was able to issue the Preliminary Emancipation
>Proclaimation, which severely hindered the south's chances of getting foreign
>intervention, and severely unsettled the southern domestic situation (although
>it was a moderately to severely unpopular decision in the north).

Rather than call them successes, I'd call them (as you do) a "lack of 
defeat" - which was good enough for Lincoln. Or at least it was the best
he had had to date. 

>I agree totally.  Blame a large part of the south's military defeat on 
>Jefferson Davis and his disregard for the western confederacy.  He often sent 
>his worst generals there as sort of a "Siberia" for offending him, while giving
>the Virginia theatre the best of everything available.  However, something had 
>to be thin; the Confederacy simply didn't have the resources to defend every 
>spot at one time.

The last sentence above is pure truth.  But A.S. Johnston was by no means
the worst. Up to his death, he was the best they had! Nor, imo, was Joe
Johnston a bad general. Certainly not compared to Fremont, Buell or even
Rosecrans. Later on, yes, I think Davis was protecting his hiney, just as
Lincoln about threw a fit every time the Rebs got into the Shenandoah Valley.
Davis worried, though, about losing Texas. They got a lot of horses, food,
and men from Texas, and don't think Davis didn't know it. 

Regards,

JZ
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