From: CMSgt Mike Bergman <bergman@afnews.pa.af.mil>
Subject: DoD News 08/05/92 ... any interest?
Organization: Hq Air Force News Agency/SCC
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 20:29:48 GMT


From CMSgt Mike Bergman <bergman@afnews.pa.af.mil>




From CMSgt Mike Bergman <bergman@afnews.pa.af.mil>

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                                                        (703)697-5131 (Into) 
                                                      (703)697-3189 (copies) 
IMMEDIATE RELEASE              August 5, 1992   (703)697-5737 (Public/industry)


                            GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENTS 

      Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced today that the President has
nominated Major General Howell M. Estes III, United States Air Force, for
appointment to the grade of lieutenant general with assignment as Deputy
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United
States Forces Korea;  Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of
Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force,
Pacific Air Forces. Major General Estes is currently assigned as Director of
Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States
AIr Force.  

    Major General Estes was born December 16,1941, in San Antonio, Texas.  


      Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced today that the President has
nominated Lieutenant General Ronald R. Fogleman, United States Air Force, for
appointment to the grade of general and assignment as Commander in Chief,
United States Transportation Command and Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott
Air Force Base, Illinois.  General Fogleman is currently serving as Commander,
Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; Deputy Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; and
Commander, Republic of Korea/United States Air Component, Combined Forces
Command, Osan Air Base, Korea.  He will replace General Hansford T. Johnson who
is pending announcement.  

      Lieutenant General Fogleman was born January 27,1942, in Lewistown,
Pennsylvania.  

                                          -END- 





IMMEDIATE RELEASE              AUGUST 4, 1992       (703) 697-5131 - INFO

                             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                                CONTRACT AWARDS

                                     NAVY

      National Steel and Shipbuilding Company is being awarded a cost- plus-
award-fee contract for the Phased Maintenance Program of USS GRINDLEY (CG-21),
USS ENGLAND (CG-22), USS STERETT (CG-31) and USS STANDLEY (CG-32).  The actual
award amount for FY 92 is $195,907.  Options under the contract, if exercised,
will extend he value to $63,939,471 and extend performance through FY 96.  This
award was competitively procured with four proposals solicited and three bids
received.  The Naval Sea Systems Command is the contracting activity
(N00024-92-C-8501).  

       Southwest Marine, Inc., is being awarded a cost-plus-award-fee contract
for the Phased Maintenance Program of USS LEAHY (CG-16), USS HALSEY (CG-23),
USS JOUETT (CG-29), USS HORNE (CG-30) and USS FOX (CG-33).  The actual contract
award amount for FY 92 is $99,438.  Options under the contract, if exercised,
will extend the value to $98,351,754 and extend performance through FY 96.
This award was competitively procured.  Four proposals were solicited and three
proposals were received.  The Naval Sea Systems Command is the contracting
activity (N00024-92-C-8502).  

       Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Bethpage, New York, is being awarded a
$6,369,000 modification to a letter contract to manufacture operational test
program sets/test program sets for the AN/AYQ-15 stores management system for
the F-14D aircraft.  Work will be performed in Bethpage, New York, and is
expected to be completed by December 1995.  Contract funds will not expire at
the end of the fiscal year.  This contract was not competitively procured.  The
Naval Air Systems Command is the contracting activity (N00019-91-C-0241).  

      Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, Norfolk, Virginia is being
awarded a $46,977,785 cost-plus-award fee contract for the Phased Maintenance
Program for AOR class ships homeported in Norfolk, Virginia.  Work will be
performed in Norfolk, Virginia and is expected to be completed by December
1997.  $8,660 of the contract funds will expire at the end of the fiscal year.
This contract was competitively procured with nineteen proposals solicited and
four bids received.  The Naval Sea Systems Command is the contracting activity
(N00024-92-C-8503). 

                                   AIR FORCE 

     Atlantic Research Corporation/Hercules, Incorporated, Gainesville,
Virginia, is being awarded a $6,095,548 face value increase to a cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract for enhancement of the Variable Flow Ducted Rocket Engine to
increase both booster and gas generator total impulse and maintain full
compliance with Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) requirements.
The work will be performed at McGregor, Texas (8l%) and Gainesville, Virginia
(l9%).  Contract is expected to be completed February 1996.  Contract funds
will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Aeronautical
Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting
activity (F33615-87-C-27OO, POO039).  

      Dyncorp Aerospace Operations, Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a
$17,829,594 requirements contract for aircraft maintenance services for AT-38
and F-4E aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.  The work will be
performed at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.  Contract is expected to be
completed September 1993.  Contract funds will not expire at the end of the
current fiscal year.  Fifty bids were solicited and five proposals were
received.  The solicitation was issued in January 1992 and negotiations were
completed in May 1992.  The 49th Contracting Squadron, Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico, is the contracting activity (F29651-92-D0008).  

CORRECTION:  

      The announcement that McDonnell Douglas Corporation, McDonnell Services,
Incorporated, St. Louis, Missouri, was awarded on July 27, 1993 a $7,295,675
face value increase to a firm-fixed-price contract for temporary housing for
residents of the Al-Gaim compound in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in support of the
Royal Saudi Air Force Peace Sun Construction Program was in error.  This
contract has not been let.

                                      END


DoD News Briefing
Tuesday, August 4, 1992 - Noon
Mr. Pete Williams, ASD/PA


Mr. Williams:  Good afternoon.

     We have a Memorandum for Correspondents for you on the fact that there
will be several ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Marine
landing on Guadalcanal this week -- both in Washington and on the Island of
Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.  The events in the Pacific will include
gatherings of veterans and commemorative battlefield ceremonies.  The
Memorandum for Correspondents will run down for you the list of who's taking
part.  It also notes and gives you the details on the formal Washington
commemorative ceremonies that will take place this week, including one Friday,
August 7th, at the Marine Corps War Memorial, more popularly known as the Iwo
Jima Memorial.  Secretary Cheney will participate in that.  The two page
Memorandum for Correspondents gives you all the details on the events planned
for that.

     That is my only announcement.  I'm happy to take your questions.

     Q:  Can we have an update on the V-22 crash -- the investigation and
preliminary results?
     A:  We don't do preliminary results in investigations.  We'll wait until
the investigation is completed. 

     They have brought up from the Potomac almost all of the V-22 wreckage.
They were not able to get little parts, but the Marine Corps estimates that
they've gotten 90 percent of the V-22 aircraft.  The wreckage has been taken by
barge to the Naval Air Warfare Center at Patuxent River, Maryland.  There are
no recovery or salvage craft on scene any more out on the Potomac where the
crash happened.  The Navy Aircraft Mishap Board and the Court of Inquiry
continue their investigation.

     Just to go back on a previous question that I think we got last Thursday
about the videotape of the accident, whose is it and how can you get it.  It is
a tape owned by Boeing.  The tape was not a requirement of any contract between
the Navy and Boeing, and Boeing undertook the taping with its own funding and
equipment.  Neither the Department of Defense nor the Navy have possession of
the tape, however, Boeing has agreed to make the tape available for the
purposes of the investigation.  They've cooperated to that extent.  But if you
want to get a copy of the videotape, you're going to have to ask Boeing.

     Q:  Did they get the data box or the flight recorder or any of that stuff?
     A:  There is no such thing on the V-22 as a "black box" like there is on a
commercial aircraft.   However, because this was a test aircraft, there were a
number of test instruments on board the V-22 at the time of the crash.  In fact
some of the crew members were there for the purpose of operating that test
equipment, to examine the flight characteristics of the V-22.  There were
various data recorders.  They've recovered some of those recorders.  I can't
tell you the exact status of what the data is, given that it was underwater for
quite awhile.

     Q:  Is that going to be completed before the House/Senate Conference?
     A:  There is no way to predict when the investigation is going to be
completed.  They'll take as long as they need to to do their jobs.

     Q:  This videotape, did the Pentagon undertake a formal, legal memorandum
or study to determine whether or not Boeing did own that videotape?
     A:  Lawyers looked into it.  I don't know how many memos they wrote.  I
suppose they write memos every time they do anything.  But yes, the lawyers did
consider it.

     Q:  On the nuclear test ban vote by the Senate last night, the Department
is still saying, of course, that Cheney will recommend to veto it if that
passes.  Is the Department or the Administration opposed to any kind of
moratorium saying as in nine months by the Senate and by the House?  Or is it
strictly against a ban, a complete ban?  Is it against the moratorium as in the
moratorium by Russia and...
     A:  Yes, we're against both.  We're against both a moratorium or a
complete ban.  Secretary Cheney sent a letter last night to Members -- we can
make a copy available for you -- in which he said that if a moratorium is
passed he would recommend the President veto the bill.  My understanding on
where this stands legislatively, the Water and Power Appropriations Bill has
been passed by both the House and the Senate.  This nuclear test moratorium is
on the Senate version of the bill, so they go to conference now.  But there is
also the possibility that opponents of nuclear testing will try to put similar
language on the Defense Authorization Bill when that comes up for a vote.  So
they may try again with it.  But that's the current legislation, that's where
it stands right now.

     The Hatfield Amendment, which is what prevailed, is opposed by the
Department of Defense for several reasons.  First of all, it imposes a
comprehensive test moratorium after September 30, 1996.  The Secretary's letter
to Congress last night said that all Administration studies and reviews have
concluded that as long as we will retain a nuclear deterrent, regardless of its
size, we will need to test for safety and reliability and we'll retain a
nuclear deterrent past September 30, 1996.

     Secondly, the amendment assumes that we will solve all safety problems by
September 30, 1996, with a finite number of tests.  The Secretary said
yesterday that was an irresponsible supposition.  That it assumes that we will
never have a safety or reliability problem after September 30, 1996, but no one
can ensure that.  And indeed, he said in his letter, history has shown the odds
are very much against that supposition.

     Thirdly, he said the amendment requires that Congress review the
President's certification on the need for testing.  He said that creates yet
another roadblock.  In effect, he said, given the reporting and certification
requirements and the possibility of further congressional blockage, the
amendment is a de facto moratorium.

     Finally, he said a nine month moratorium in testing means that the staff
at the Nevada Test Site will be paid for essentially doing nothing.  That, he
said, is a waste of taxpayers' funds and could lead to a loss of expertise.

     He noted in a handwritten note at the bottom of that letter, "If a
moratorium is passed, I will recommend the President veto the bill."

     I have some further words here, of a broader Administration view.  That
first of all, the amendments would prevent the United States from conducting
underground nuclear tests that are necessary to maintain a safe and reliable
nuclear deterrent.  Secondly, it would be an inefficient use of scarce fiscal
resources, and includes the possibility of congressional disapproval of the
entire test program, or even of individual tests, seriously interfering with
the President's powers of commander in chief.  For those reasons, the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of Energy and the National Security Adviser would
recommend a veto of this legislation.

     I would note two other points.  The President has adopted a sound nuclear
testing policy responding to the changed international security environment to
reduce threat, the need to reduce defense spending, and the need to maintain a
safe and reliable but much smaller nuclear deterrent, and the President's
policy limits the number, yield, and purpose of U.S. nuclear tests while
allowing for the minimum necessary to meet his national security
responsibilities.

     Q:  Do you have any opinion on the French testing because they're talking
now about lifting their moratorium?  Their's are not underground.  There's are
in the Pacific.
     A:  The French will have to speak for their own policy.  We believe, for
our own reasons of safety and reliability, that we have to pursue nuclear
testing.

     Q:  Does the U.S. Government have any independent confirmation of the
existence of these death camps?
     A:  I saw the State Department's briefing on that subject yesterday.
Richard was asked about it.  He said he'd seen press reports, and that he would
look into it.  I have not seen anything on it.

     Q:  What he said is they had their own reports which are the same as the
press reports.
     A:  All right.

     Q:  Today, an Assistant Secretary is up on the Hill saying we have
reports, but we don't have confirmation.  The only way we can get confirmation
is if the Serbs allow the International Red Cross to visit the death camps,
presumably a written invitation to a mass execution or something.  But the U.S.
Government obviously has other means of confirming things, national technical
means.
     A:  Right.

     Q:  You've got an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic which has F-14's with
camera pods and the whole bit.
     A:  Sure.

     Q:  Are you aware of any efforts by this building to get independent
                                           confirmation?

     A:  Let me take the question.  I don't know the answer.  The question is,
are we aware of any efforts to get independent confirmation of the reports of
death camps.

     Q:  The second part of that is, if you get any, and the stories come with
people being held in vast open pits, and presumably stuff you can see from the
air, in the past you have released photographs taken by planes or satellites.
If you get confirmation from planes, we would like to see those pictures.
     A:  Very good.

     Q:  In a similar vein, there was a small item in a weekly saying that the
Russians had been quietly shipping fuel and military hardware and spare parts
to the Serbians.  Do you know anything about that?
     A:  I don't know anything about that, but I'll take that question, too.
Do we have anything on reports that the Russians have been shipping military
fuel, hardware and spare parts to the Serbs.

     Q:  In light of these reports of atrocities and death camps and cattle
cars and that kind of stuff, children, babies being killed.  Is the U.S.
military reconsidering its hands-off policy?
     A:  Not that I'm aware of.  Number one, our current policy, as you well
know, Wolf, I think you questioned the Secretary about this over the weekend
yourself.  His answer really hasn't changed since you talked to him on
Saturday.  Our posture right now is to assist the United Nations in responding
to the needs of the people of the former Yugoslavia.  Right now the only thing
the UN has asked us to do is to provide humanitarian relief flights into
Sarajevo, and I can, in a moment, give you a rundown on that.  But I'm unaware
of any further requests from the UN.  I don't believe we've had any further
requests from the UN for support beyond that.

     Q:  Would you take that question on whether you've had any further...
     A:  Let me just state it more positively.  There have been no further
requests from the United Nations for support beyond that.

     Q:  What about from other agencies of the U.S. Government like the White
House or the State Department -- has the Pentagon been asked to prepare for any
further military contingencies?
     A:  We would never discuss that, that's the standard answer.

     Q:  Would there be any consideration of broadening the humanitarian effort
beyond the flights into Sarajevo, perhaps helping provide assistance for some
of these children to leave so they don't have to be shot at in buses?
     A:  Again, our current posture in Yugoslavia is to respond to requests
from the United Nations.  All the United Nations has asked us to do so far is
relief flights into Sarajevo.  As you know, the Secretary has said on several
occasions that we are prepared to go further, and he's mentioned the fact that
we're prepared to provide air support for other provision of humanitarian
relief supplies.  It's our supposition that if that request were to come, it
would require further action from the UN, and the UN hasn't taken that step.

     Q:  The UN does have the ability and the machines on the ground to escort
these kids in these buses from point A to point B, but because they feel that
it's going to violate this neutrality position by having these personnel
carriers, that that's why they're holding back.  Do you think Secretary Cheney
is going to have any type of consultation with the UN in light of this seeming
to be kind of quandary that's going on up in New York right now?  Is he going
to possibly have a meeting?
     A:  First of all, if there were contact between the U.S. Government and
the UN it would be through the State Department.  That's the agency of the U.S.
Government that conducts those discussions.  Secondly, State has a permanent
representative to the UN in New York, an ambassador to the UN, and he's in
constant contact with the UN.  So if there were any such requests, that would
be the place they would come.

     Let me do the humanitarian relief into Sarajevo and give you the current
picture there.

     There were two U.S. Air Force C-130's that were scheduled to fly four
separate sorties into Sarajevo today.  They were to go directly from Rhein Main
Air Base to Sarajevo, then from Sarajevo to Zagreb and back to Sarajevo.  Each
plane was to do that.  However, only one sortie was completed early this
morning.  It delivered 13.4 tons of food supplies, but the second mission was
turned back on the way to Sarajevo because of shelling at the airport.  So the
aircraft was diverted back to Rhein Main, and there will be no more U.S.
flights today.

     Since the last briefing on Thursday, through the end of today, including
this one flight, the Air Force has flown 18 missions into Sarajevo and
delivered about 60 tons of cargo.  Those shipments on Friday, Monday, and
today, were either MRE's or bulk food.  The cumulative totals since this
operation began July 3rd, are 78 missions delivering more than 950 tons of
relief supplies and equipment, and all the same aircraft units are still there
flying these missions.

     Q:  I believe President Bush said there would be nothing that would
prevent the U.S. from continuing in its effort to provide the relief.  Here
you're saying that one out of four didn't make it.  And that he wasn't ruling
out air strikes in order to rid the area of some of this mortar fire so that
the flights could continue.
     A:  That's right, but...

     Q:  What's the line?  Where is President Bush drawing the line here?
     A:  Remember what the President has said, there is an antecedent to the
President's statement.  That's the one I just said a moment ago.  We are
willing -- the President has said it, Secretary Cheney has said it, Secretary
Baker said it, our ambassador at the UN has said it, and he said it in his
testimony last week before Congress -- we're willing to provide the further air
support, but it's always been predicated or a further action by the UN.

     I'm told, by the way, that the Sarajevo Airport is closed today for the
rest of the day.

     Q:  Can you give us the latest information about the Marine deployments in
Kuwait?
     A:  Yes, I can.  Let me give you a rundown on the exercises in Kuwait.

     There are, as you know, three that are the subject right now.  Two Marine
Amphibious exercises, and one exercise which we announced late on Friday, of an
Army exercise to go over and join up with pre-positioned Army equipment.

     There are two Marine exercises, and I'll give you the names of these
exercises not because I particularly think they're great names but because
everybody seems to want to talk about them and it keeps them separate.  The
first one is called Eager Mace 92-3.  It's an amphibious field training
exercise.  It began yesterday with the advanced force operations, and that's a
small number of forces going ashore in Kuwait to survey the landing area and
prepare for actual amphibious assault.  And by the way, this landing area is 15
miles north of Kuwait City.  

     Then earlier this morning the amphibious assault phase began with troops
and equipment moving ashore by helicopter and the two types of amphibious
landing craft, both what are called the LCACs (Landing Craft, Air Cushion) and
the LCUs (Landing Craft, Utility).  Now if only one knew what those stood for!
The LCACs are those sort of hydrofoil things.  I'm not sure what the
abbreviation stands for, but I'll get it for you.  The LCUs are the more
conventional type motorboats like you see in all the pictures from World War II
where they land up on the shore and the front gate comes open, to use two
nautical terms.

     The exercise is scheduled to conclude on the 19th of August.  It includes
elements of Amphibious Squadron One, and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
The ships involved include the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa, the
amphibious transport dock ship USS Ogden, the dock landing ship USS Fort
Fisher, and the tank landing ship USS Schenectedy.  The Marine Corps units
include Battalion Landing Team 14, and Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, and
that's a total of 1900 people who will be involved in that amphibious exercise.

     The second Marine exercise is called Native Fury 92-3.  That's the
Maritime Pre-Positioned Force exercise.  That also began yesterday when the
advanced team flew in for the survey of the equipment staging areas and
offloading points.  This exercise will happen about 25 miles south of Kuwait
City.

     This exercise includes elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit Service
Support Group 11, Naval Beach Group 1, and a detachment of the 3rd Marine
Aircraft Wing.  About 900 U.S. service personnel will take part in that
exercise.  Both the exercises I just talked about are under the command of Rear
Admiral Raynar A. K. Taylor, who is Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, U.S.
Central Command.

     The third exercise which we announced Friday is called, for reasons that
elude me, Intrinsic Action.  This is the field training exercise involving the
U.S. Army forces.  That also began this week with the arrival in Kuwait of
about 350 advanced personnel.  Most of these folks are from Fort Hood, some of
them are Fort Campbell.  The remainder of the forces will arrive in Kuwait over
the next three weeks.  The task force will deploy without its equipment and
will use the pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait which tests the procedures for
contingency operations in the area.  That includes two mechanized infantry
companies and two armor companies, along with air combat and combat service
support units from the 1st Cavalry Division and 13th Corps Support Command at
Fort Hood, Texas, and a special forces element from the 5th Special Forces
Group in Fort Campbell, Kentucky.  About 2400 Army soldiers will be involved.

     The exercise, Intrinsic Action, director is Major General Robert S. Fix of
the U.S. Army, who is the Deputy Commanding General of 3rd U.S. Army, and U.S.
Army Forces Central Command.

     Q:  I've lost count.  I'd just like to know how many service personnel are
going to be in this, and what is the length of time?
     A:  Going back over the numbers again.  Eager Mace 92-3, that's the
amphibious landing exercise, is 1900 total U.S. personnel.  Native Fury 92-3,
the maritime pre-positioned force exercise, is 900.  Exercise Intrinsic Action
is 2400.

     Q:  350 advanced?
     A:  350 advanced are there now, but that's included in the 2400.

     Intrinsic Action will run also for about a month, roughly speaking.

     Q:  Can you tell us about the aircraft carriers, where are they located
right now?  What is happening out there?  I've lost count of where they're
going and...
     A:  Where do you mean?

     Q:  What is the location, how many naval vessels are there out there
right? 
     A:  In the Gulf?

     Q:  Yes.  And in the Mediterranean as well.
     A:  In the Mediterranean there are 21 ships.  That includes the aircraft
carrier Saratoga about which I'll have more to say in a moment; four cruisers;
two destroyers; three frigates; six auxiliary ships; and five amphibious ships
with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked.  That's the total, 21 ships
in the Med.  Let me break it down for you.

     These numbers that I am going to give you are subsets of the 21.  They add
up to 21, but you don't add them to the 21.  Six ships in the Adriatic.  Four
of them are the carrier Saratoga, a cruiser, a destroyer, and a supply ship.
Those four ships are conducting flight operations in the central Adriatic.
There are two ships that have been there for quite some time, the Iwo Jima,
that's an amphibious assault ship; and the Aegis class cruiser Gates.  They
continue to provide communications and radar tracking capabilities in support
of Operation Provide Promise which is the flights of humanitarian supplies into
Sarajevo.

     Q:  Those two are in addition to the four you just named?
     A:  No.  Six ships in the Adriatic.  Four are the carrier Saratoga, a
cruiser, a destroyer, and a supply ship.  Plus the other two, Iwo Jima and
Gates.

     The USS Jack Williams, which was the ship taking part rotating in and out
of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, the NATO Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean, is in the Ionian Sea.

     The other 14 ships -- if you add this all up it comes back to 21 -- the
other 14 ships are the two cruisers, the destroyer, four amphibious ships, two
frigates, and five supply ships.  They're all operating in the western Med and
off the coast of Greece.

     In the Middle East area, in the Red Sea, four ships.  That's a cruiser, a
destroyer, and two frigates.  Then in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and
Northern Arabian Sea, 18 ships.  That includes the USS Independence, the
aircraft carrier which is in the Persian Gulf; and the command ship USS
LaSalle; two destroyers; two frigates; two cruisers; four amphibious ships; and
four auxiliary ships; and the amphibious ships are the ones taking part in
Exercise Eager Mace.

     Q:  Can you tell me if there is any Arab allied support aside from the
Kuwaitis?  Specifically the Saudis or the Egyptians, that are taking part in
this exercise in Kuwait?
     A:  No, the Kuwaiti exercise is a joint U.S./Kuwaiti exercise, so by
definition it's just the U.S. and Kuwait.

     Q:  A congressional committee released documents on the Hill today saying
that the Pentagon and JCS had recommended or were recommending as short a time
as three months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that increased military
exchanges between the United States and Iraq, including officer exchanges,
should be initiated.  Have you any comment on that?
     A:  Sure.  First of all, there was no Pentagon proposal.  This was a
proposal working down in the Joint Staff, at the staff level, but it was never
pursued.  No such aid was ever given to Iraq. 

     I don't think the documents were released today, I think this is part of a
series of documents that the Administration has made available to Congress in
its investigation of aid to Iraq.

     Q:  What was the reasoning behind such a proposal?  What would the
interest be in having those kinds of exchanges?
     A:  I think the reasoning was that it was in the U.S. interest to try to
pursue military-to-military exchanges with Iraq to try to get the government of
Iraq to take a more, try to work up a good relationship or improve
relationships with an important nation in the Middle East and try to steer that
nation's military in the right direction.

     Q:  Were such plans underway with Iran and other countries in the area?
     Q:  And Syria?
     A:  I don't know the answer to that question.  The Joint Staff plans for a
lot of things, but clearly, this was something that was never done.  Let me
walk you through the background of this.

     In June of 1989, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq expressed the belief that it was
time to test the sincerity of statements that the Iraqi government was making
at the time that Iraq wanted a broader dialogue with the U.S. Government.  The
embassy said that the U.S. could not hope to change the nature of the regime,
and recognized that Iraq was a police state, but nevertheless, the embassy said
more exchanges, low level exchanges, might give the United States the
opportunity to educate and influence Iraqi leaders, and the embassy proposed a
series of low level contacts, including medical and aircraft accident
investigation training, textbooks, and other forms of limited, non-lethal
cooperation.  That was in June of '89.

     In October of '89, a national security directive noted the strategic
importance of the region and said the U.S. should propose incentives for Iraq
to moderate its behavior.  It said the U.S. should consider training courses
and medical exchanges as a way of developing more access to the Iraqi defense
establishment.  That's October of '89.

     That same document also urged caution in dealing with Iraq because of our
concerns over the issues of chemical and biological weapons, the Iraqi nuclear
program, and human rights violations.

     In pursuit of that October '89 national security directive, the U.S.
Central Command Staff suggested considering some limited non-lethal options to
be decided on a case-by-case basis, such as providing Army field manuals and
English textbooks, training programs on aviation safety, officer exchange
programs, aerial reconnaissance training and so on.  

     Q:  When was that?
     A:  I don't have the date here.  I believe that was late in '89, but let
me check the date on that.  I think that was November of '89, but let me check
that.

     In January of 1990 then, the Central Command Staff was told by the Joint
Staff that there was no approval for their suggestion of that sort of low level
aid to Iraq, so the original proposal by the embassy in Baghdad was not
pursued, and neither were other suggestions that were made by the Joint Staff.
So no proposal for any kind of military-to-military contact was ever made to
the Iraqi government.

     State would have to tell you, it's not clear to me from going back to the
June '89 one whether that was the ambassador or the charge'.  It's the embassy,
but I don't know which it was.  State could tell you that.

     Q:  But in October of '89, you say a national security directive.  That
didn't come from the JCS Staff, did it?  
     A:  No.

     Q:  Where did that come from?
     A:  Those come from the White House.

     Q:  And that urged these closer relations, which are parallel to the ones
the JCS Staff were talking about, right?
     A:  It didn't parallel them, it preceded them.  But it came after,
remember the sequence.  June of '89, a cable from the embassy suggesting low
level, military-to-military contact.  Then in October '89, national security
directive saying the U.S. should consider training courses and medical
exchanges as a way of developing more access to the Iraqi defense
establishment.  Then in pursuit of that, Central Command Staff suggesting
considering some limited non-lethal options to be decided on a case-by-case
basis, such as Army field manuals, English textbooks and so forth.  Then in
January of 1990 the Joint Staff going back to the Central Command Staff and
saying there is no approval for those low level kinds of support.

     Q:  What I mean is, you made it sound earlier as if the proposal at the
Joint Staff level kind of came out of the blue, and it didn't.  It was a direct
result of the...
     A:  I disagree with that.  I started at the beginning and walked you
through the sequence of events.

     Q:  Who signs off on the Joint Staff decisions, if there was no approval?
Who decided there was no approval?
     A:  Who decided there was no approval?  There was no approval.  The
suggestion was never approved.  There was no inter-agency agreement on it.

     Q:  So you're saying at a higher level.
     A:  No, it's a working level agreement.  It's a working level decision.
Agencies of the federal government don't just coordinate at the top, they
coordinate at all different levels.  So there was just never any agreement on
the recommendation.

     Q:  Between the Joint Staff working with low level echelons of the State
Department...
     A:  I don't know exactly how the contact happened, but there was never
any...

     Q:  You're treating this as though it's a very low level decision.
     A:  It is.

     Q:  Someone has to make a decision somewhere along the line and to say yes
or no.
A:  It never reached the point of Secretary Cheney or General Powell, for
example, in the Defense Department.  It never reached, the suggestion from the
Central Command Staff for these limited, non-lethal options, that suggestion
never reached the "Chiefs," the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  It was discussed at the
staff level.  It gets confusing here, because the Joint Staff has a staff.
That's what it is.  But it never reached the Chiefs.  It was never considered
by Secretary Cheney or General Powell. 

     Q:  Where did the national security directive come from?  
     A:  From the White House.

     Q:  Did that not suggest officer exchanges, training?
     A:  Let me read this one more time.

     In October of 1989 a national security directive noted the strategic
importance of the region and said the U.S. should propose incentives for Iraq
to moderate the behavior.  It said the U.S. should consider training courses
and medical exchanges as a way of developing more access to the Iraqi defense
establishment.

     Q:  Are you saying that's not directly military suggestions, military
training courses or...
     A:  No, that is a suggestion for low level, non-lethal,
military-to-military contacts.

     Q:  So you're saying the national security directive says give us some
proposals.  The proposals came back and they were rejected on the staff level,
basically?
     A:  It said the U.S. should consider and look at them on a case-by-case
basis, but there was never any inter-agency agreement on those recommendations.
Nothing ever went forward to the government of Iraq.

     Q:  It seems like it comes down to two months, from November '89 to
January 1990 where there seems to be some ambiguity.  You have these staffers
walking around here in this building having certain policies, and then in 1990
they had a review and said let's scrap this limited non-lethal option.  Is that
what happened?  Or basically they never really had, there were two schools of
thought in this building?  I'm just trying to say from a layman's perspective,
where did we turn the corner on Iraq?
     A:  Let me try to go through this one more time.

     First of all, welcome to the U.S. Government.  This is the way business
gets done all the time around here.  I don't think anyone should be shocked
that people suggest things but not everything gets followed up on.  I don't
know what Washington would be like if every idea in town was actually executed.

     Remember the sequence here.  June of '89 the embassy says the Iraqis have
been suggesting some low level military-to-military contacts.  This might be a
way for us to get a little more leverage over them, or try to build closer
relations and guide them. 

     Then in October of '89 there's a national security directive saying Iraq
is important in the region, the U.S. should propose incentives for Iraq to
moderate its behavior.  Then it specifically says consider training courses,
this is military training courses, and medical exchanges.

     In pursuit of that, Central Command Staff, these aren't people in this
building, but in this specific case it's down at McDill Air Force Base which is
the head of Central Command.  They come up with some suggestions.  Limited
non-lethal options, case-by-case basis, Army field manuals, all that sort of
thing.  Then in January of '90, the Joint Staff goes back and tells the Central
Command Staff, thank you for your suggestions, but there's no inter-agency
agreement on exactly how to proceed, so nothing was ever done.

     Q:  On the military exercise in the Middle East, do you have any clear
concept of enemy and its possible behavior in executing your military exercise?
     A:  No, this is not that kind of an exercise.  This tests the ability to
do certain specific missions.  In the specific case of Kuwait, Secretary Cheney
and the Kuwaiti Defense Minister signed on September 19th a ten year defense
cooperation agreement.  Under that agreement we said we would undertake several
kinds of things.  Joint training, joint exercises, pre-positioned equipment,
combined training exercises, that kind of thing.  What's going on right now are
exercises under that agreement that we signed last September.  Part of the
reason for that agreement is to demonstrate continued U.S. support for the
security of our allies in the region and the stability of the Persian Gulf.
That's the real purpose of the exercise.  They also give us the ability to test
the ability of U.S. forces to respond to contingencies in that part of the
world.  But it's not the kind of exercise where you have an enemy scenario and
that kind of thing.

     Q:  So you mean you have no direct relation to the Iraqi movement these
days?
     A:  That's right.

     Q:  On the memo that's been discussed...
     A:  Which one?

     Q:  The CENTCOM memo, the CENTCOM recommendations to the Joint Staff.
     A:  And that was, by the way, November 29, 1989.

     Q:  The November 29, '89 memo from CENTCOM to the Joint Staff, was that
approved by General Schwarzkopf, who was then the Commander of CENTCOM?
     A:  I have no way to know that.  You can't tell.

     Q:  Can you check that?
     A:  I can check it.  I don't know what I'm going to find out.  Anybody in
the military that's on a staff can sign out a cable at certain levels.  Majors,
commanders, it happens every day.  We can ask the Central Command whether
General Schwarzkopf signed it.

     Q:  Can you ask if General Schwarzkopf approved that recommendation?
     A:  Yes we can.

     Q:  Going back to the exercises, you've indicated there's no perceived
target or enemy in this exercise.  For some reason, Saddam Hussein sees it a
little differently, accusing the United States of moving in to safeguard the
world's oil supplies in that part of the world.
     A:  He needs to pay more attention to current events.  We signed this
agreement with Kuwait in September of 1991, and said at the time that we would
undertake a series of exercises.  We began those exercises early this year, or
maybe late last year.  I think the first exercise with Kuwait was in December
of 1991, shortly after we signed that agreement.  So the names of the exercise
themselves reveal the fact that they are the third in a series.  It's Eager
Mace 92-3.  The third Eager Mace exercise in '92.  There may have been one in
'91.  And the third Native Fury exercise in '92.  92-3.  

     Q:  Native Fury is the first.
     A:  Well, this is 92-3.  There may have been two others.

     Q:  I thought you stated this was the first...
     A:  Well, who can tell?  (Laughter)  Let me go back and try to find that
out.  The point is, this is not the first U.S. exercise with Kuwait.  We've
been doing these things for months now.

     Now clearly, and we've said this very openly.  In the Army pre-position
exercise, that was originally planned for September.  We started the planning
on that one early this year in like about February I think, is when I saw the
first cables going back and forth on this exercise.  That exercise earlier this
year was planned for September.  After all the business at the Agriculture
Ministry in Baghdad, the decision was made to move that exercise up almost a
month, several weeks, so that it would start in August instead of September.
Then the situation at the Agriculture Ministry was dealt with, and rather than
shift it back to September again, the decision was made to just go ahead and
keep it in August.

     Q:  That's why I came here today.  You said we're not saber rattling and
all this other stuff, but when you move the FTX up to now as opposed to
September and all Capitol Hill reacts and says we need to show Saddam that we
mean business and demonstrate all this stuff isn't that, in effect, saber
rattling?  And also putting U.S. forces in a very vulnerable position, being
that you don't have the same coverage that you had two years ago and inflaming
this mess.
     A:  Remember, number one, that the exercises that are going, there are
three exercises going on in Kuwait.  The Marine exercises involve more troops
than the Army exercise will involve.  That exercise was planned anyway.  That
is one of several in a series of exercises that have been going on since last
September.  We moved the Army exercise up a few weeks when it looked like the
situation in the Agriculture Ministry was not going to be resolved, as an
expression of our support for stability in the region and the security of our
allies.  We've always said that.  That is one of the reasons we have these
cooperative agreements with those nations in the region, is to have a
demonstrable evidence of support for our allies in the region.

     Q:  How far will American ground troops get to the Iraqi border, or
American aircraft fly toward the Iraqi border?
     A:  I think I just gave you part of the answer, Mark.  Eager Mace, they'll
go 15 miles north of Kuwait City.  I don't know think there's a lot of aircraft
involved in either of those two exercises.  The Army exercise is primarily a
ground exercise.

     Q:  I'm curious because this is such a sensitive issue after the Gulf War.
Is this costing Kuwait anything?
     A:  The Kuwaiti Secretary said over the weekend the Kuwaitis would pay for
part of the expense of this.  I just don't have the breakdown.  It's part of
our agreement.

     Q:  What about Iraqi flights over Shiite positions in southern Iraq?
     A:  I've not seen any new evidence that Iraq has conducted, let me put it
this way, they've continued to fly their fixed wing aircraft, but I haven't
seen any new evidence that Iraq has used combat aircraft to bomb Shia positions
in the south since the incident that I briefed you earlier on in late July,
July 23rd.

     Q:  Are the helicopter attacks continuing?
     A:  Not that I know of, Charlie.

     Q:  In the rundown of ships, you said there were four in the Red Sea.  I
believe there was a story in the Early Bird yesterday out of Jordan quoting the
Iranians as saying that the U.S. Navy was getting much more aggressive in its
intercept operation there.
     A:  Quoting who?

     Q:  I think it was Jordanian officials.
     A:  I'll have to check into that.  I've not heard anything about that.

     Q:  The question is, have the ships in the Red Sea gotten some new
guidance or orders or whatever?
     A:  Not that I know of, but I'll be happy to look into it.

     Q:  The Iraqis have sent a letter to the UN saying that on July 27th a
U.S. aircraft patrolling over northern Iraq dropped an incendiary bomb near
Sulamania.
     A:  I'll check into that.  I seriously doubt it, but I'll certainly check
into it.

     Q:  Can you find out if it matches up with anything like a flare or
whatever?
     A:  My understanding on this business of flares was, first of all, you'll
recall the Iraqis accused the coalition of intentionally dropping flares to
start fires in agricultural areas in northern Iraq.  That is absolutely not
true.  We sent a letter to the UN to indicate that that was not true.  We said,
however, it is possible that in normal operations some of the aircraft may drop
flares from altitudes that are so low that the flare doesn't completely have a
chance to go out before it hits the ground.  So I think we changed the
procedure under which our aircraft use those flares.  But we have never
intentionally dropped any incendiary device -- flare or anything else -- over
northern Iraq to start a fire.  But I will look into the specific question you
asked.

     Q:  As recently as July 27th pilots are still feeling compared to pop
flares, if this is what this is.  Does that mean that Iraqi anti-aircraft is
still locking on?
     A:  There's still anti-aircraft radars in northern Iraq.  They've moved
some of them around.

     Q:  Wasn't there, it was several months ago now, they moved SA somethings
up there that we were protesting.  Did they move those back?
     A:  Well, I'll not get into specific numbers about systems, but they did
have surface to air missiles in northern Iraq.  They have moved them around.
There's no real pattern to their movements, but there's still surface to air
missiles in northern Iraq.

     Q:  If this turns out to be a pilot popping a flare, was he doing it
because an Iraqi anti-aircraft radar...
     A:  Understood.  I've got the question, we'll take it.

     Q:  There was a story on the wire this morning about  a GI being killed in
Korea.  What do you know about that?  Do you know if it's political or
something personal or...
     A:  No, I don't know anything about that.  I'll have to look into that.

     Q:  Can you confirm that there was an Air Force plane carrying medical
equipment to Armenia that was blocked by a refusal of the Turks to grant it air
space rights?
     A:  Let me give you what I have on that.

     A couple of quick things while Colonel Burpee finds that for me.  

     First of all Raynor Taylor is R-A-Y-N-O-R.  Raynor A. K. Taylor.

     LCAC stands for Landing Craft Air Cushion.  LCU stands for Landing Craft
Utility.

     The first Eager Mace was November of '91.  The first Native Fury is now.
Calling it 92-3 is a typo.

     Now, getting back to the supplies to Armenia.  The government of Turkey
did grant overflight permission for the U.S. military aircraft delivering
medical supplies to Armenia.  That permission was given on July 29th, which is
the same day we asked for it.  At the same time we were told by the Turkish
government that it wanted to inspect the flight.  In keeping with the February
appeal from the CSCE for an arms embargo on parties to the Nigorno Carabac
conflict.  Turkey has asked planes that overfly its territory to Armenia, all
of them, to land for inspection.  Other nations have complied.

     Following consultation between the Departments of State and Defense, U.S.
officials decided it would be preferable for operational expediency to use
another route, so that the airplane did not have to fly across Turkish air
space.  That plane left the United States on schedule to Rhein Main Air Force
Base.  Supplies were off-loaded pending the approval of a new flight plan and
the granting of appropriate diplomatic clearances, and we anticipate that the
flight will continue to Yaravan on or around August 7th.

     Q:  There's been a report from this building, quoting sources in this
building, saying that U.S. aircraft have spotted and pinpointed Escobar in
Colombia, and that there's a hunt going on for him in the central Colombian
jungles.  Have you anything on that?
     A:  We've said before that we're assisting the government of Colombia.  No
U.S. personnel will accompany Colombian law enforcement officials in
apprehending Escobar, but nonetheless, we have devoted a small number of U.S.
military personnel and their efforts to support the Colombians in their efforts
to locate Escobar.  But that's as far as we've gone.

     Q:  Is it true that he has been pinpointed by U.S....
     A:  We're not going to get into operational details.

     Q:  The House committee looking into the so-called October surprise
apparently has contacted the Pentagon several times with requests for
information.  Can you offer any details as far as how many requests they've
made, what they've asked for, and what if anything you've given them?
     A:  We've given them everything they've asked for.  They've given us a
long list of material.  Congressman Gedjenson has written us a letter. Indeed,
the story about what you asked me earlier, Jeff Smith's story in the Washington
Post, comes from some of the documents that were given to Congressman Gedjenson
in pursuit of his request for information.  I don't know the number, Chuck.
I'll see if I can get it for you.  But they've given us several letters asking
for information.  Not only the Department of Defense, but other agencies of the
federal government, and we've given them everything they've asked for.

     Q:  Gedjenson's not on the October surprise.
     A:  There's something different?

     Q:  Yes.  The freeing of the hostages.
     A:  Let me check into that.  I don't know the answer on that one.

     Q:  The Navy supplied some 3,000 names to the Secretary of Defense's
office that need to go up to the Hill for promotion, to the Senate committee,
but the Secretary of Defense's office has not forwarded them up.  The Navy says
they have been all cleared, they were not at Tailhook.  Why haven't they been
forwarded up to the Hill?  Is the Department of Defense Inspector General
stopping that flow?
     A:  I haven't heard, Mark, but I'll look into it.

     Press:  Thank you.
:END


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