Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Sun, 6 Sep 1992 02:28:00 GMT
From:         Hortideas Publishing <0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Sciences & Ideologies II

From Greg Williams (920905)

I said the following to Bill Powers in a post of mine dated 920904:

>>All right, then, I THINK we arrive at the following more complete
>>formulation of your definition: "Controlling another person" means altering
>>variables associated with that person so as to maintain certain of your
>>perceptions as you desire. Another person's output variables (actions) can
>>be so controlled (I have been calling this "manipulation") if you have
>>appropriate knowledge (or adequate prediction) of the person's control
>>structure, without the threat of or direct use of overwhelming physical
>>force by you. Another person's control structure (reference signals) cannot
>>be so controlled regardless of the threat (or perceived threat) of or direct
>>use of overwhelming physical force by you. Nor can another person's
>>CONTROLLED (by him/her) perceptions be so controlled without the threat (or
>>perceived threat) of or direct use of overwhelming physical force by you.

>>Question: Do you have any problems with the above paragraph? I need to know
>>whether it is OK before proceeding further. Thanks!

In reply, Bill said (920905.0930):

>Your paragraph seems fine to me. No error.

>My only proviso is that we agree on this:

>You say:

>>Another person's output variables (actions) can be so controlled (I
>>have been calling this "manipulation") if you have appropriate
>>knowledge (or adequate prediction) of the person's control structure,
>>without the threat of or direct use of overwhelming physical force by
>>you.

>This is true, but I maintain that if such appropriate knowledge
>actually existed, the malfunction of which I speak would have been
>cured, and the desire to control other people would all but vanish. It
>is not likely that anyone now classed as a "manipulator" has anything
>approaching the kind of knowledge of even one other person to
>accomplish what you describe. The kinds of non-coercive manipulation
>we see around us now could easily be avoided by anyone with a modicum
>of self-understanding, if avoiding them were necessary to maintain
>one's inner integrity.

Thanks again for replying on this, Bill. I still think it is important that we
be able define our terms, and that, of course, requires your cooperation. I'll
attempt to deal with your caveat later; right now, I want to call attention to
a different sentence in the paragraph which "seems fine" to you: "Another
person's control structure (reference signals) cannot be so controlled
regardless of the threat (or perceived threat) of or direct use of
overwhelming physical force by you." (Slightly) unpacking this with the aid of
the first sentence in the paragraph, we get the following: "Another person's
control structure (reference signals) cannot be altered by you so as to
maintain certain of your perceptions as you desire, regardless of the threat
(or perceived threat) of or direct use of overwhelming physical force by you."
So far, I suppose, so good -- just substituting in what you define
"controlling another person" to be. I dispute this contention.

I dispute it in two ways: (1) with regard to what might be termed "short-
term" control of another's control structure; (2) with regard to "long-term"
control.

(1) Consider again my yelling-"fire"-in-a-crowded-theater scenario which I set
forth earlier this week. I yell "Fire!" and you (being prudent -- that is, in
order to satisfy a reference signal in you having to do with not getting
burned) move toward the exit. I am controlling for my perception of seeing you
move toward the reference signal, so if you didn't move thusly, I would alter
my actions so as to (I hope) see you move thusly. The situation as construed
would appear to fit my definition of "manipulation" -- I am controlling your
actions, as per the first sentence in the paragraph above which you OKed. But
I claim that I am also altering your control structure: undeniably, it is
operating differently than it would have had I not yelled "Fire!" We can mince
words about whether your reference signals per se have been altered, but it is
clear that the operations of your control structure are different than they
would have been otherwise. I must quickly dispel the notion that, because I
cannot control to perceive your control structure (operating in ANY way -- I
simply don't have perceptual access to your control structure "innards"),
then I am not controlling your control structure. The definition of
"controlling another person," above, which you agreed to, says only that my
control of certain variables associated with you involves control of certain
of my perceptions, and is neutral regarding the connection between your
variables I am controlling and my perceptions I am controlling in order to
control you. The connection might be very indirect. The point is that I have
altered which of your lower-level reference signals you are (let us say)
"needing" to use, given your high-level reference signal which (as we have
discussed before) can be said to be continuously operating throughout (with no
disturbance prior to my yelling "Fire!").

Perhaps you will object that "alter" in the definition of "controlling another
person" means "being the sole agent involved in causing a change in the
variable." But you didn't object in the "manipulation" scenario, where actions
are being controlled. Assuming good control, an action is determined
conjointly by the (relevant) current reference signal and the (relevant)
current disturbance. So alter must mean "being a contributory agent involved
in causing a change in the variable." That is, to alter a variable associated
with another person is to be necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for a
change in the variable.

Perhaps you will object that my (assumed successful) manipulation in some
sense REALLY didn't alter your control structure, only the way it was
operating. That your reference signals weren't altered, only which were
disturbed. OK, then if we take "which reference signals are disturbed" as a
variable associated with you, I was controlling that variable, wasn't I? If
so, we have another kind of variable associated with another person which can
be controlled by another: which reference signals are disturbed, and hence, I
shall say, "active."

However, all of the above having been said, I really am not very interested in
convincing you of the possibility of "short-term" control of another's control
structure. I've gone through the motions mainly to set the stage for a
discussion of the possibility of "long-term" control. A "dry run," as it were.

(2) I admit freely that the "short-term"/"long-term" nomenclature isn't
optimal. I mean to suggest a distinction between the controller's altering the
potential controlee's control structure without/with reorganization of the
latter's control structure being involved. "Long-term" alterations
unquestionably involve changes in the controlee's reference signals, since
such changes are the result of reorganization. And in "long-term" control of
another's control structure, the controller acts to control certain of his/her
perceptions which will be controlled if the controlee's control structure
reorganizes so as to "solve a problem" posed by the controller and which the
controllee wants to solve (shorthand for saying his/her higher-level
reference signal(s) require solution of the problem to be achieved). As it
happens, the controllee cannot solve the problem posed (that he/she wants to
solve) using his/her existing control structure. Assuming that the controllee
does not decide to give up wanting to solve the problem, then his/her control
structure reorganizes in an attempt to solve the problem. Reorganization will
cease (and a new control structure -- with different reference signals -- will
result) when (and if) the problem is solved. If the problem is indeed solved
thusly, then the controller (who controls for his/her own perception that the
controlee solves the problem) can be said to have altered the controllee's
reference levels. The control could involve direct force or threat, or not.

So, such control is possible. Its likelihood is another matter; its success
requires that the controlee not give up wanting to solve the "insoluble
without reorganization" problem and that he/she reorganize until a solution is
found. Of course, the solution might be impossible altogether, regardless of
how much reorganizing occurs (remember Liddell's "experimentally neurotic"
animals who were given impossible discrimination tasks?), but since the
controller wants to see the controllee actually solve the problem, presumably
the controller wouldn't pose an impossible problem except by mistake.

Again, you might object that the new (reorganized) controlee's control
structure is not determined solely by the controller. That is manifestly true.
But will you object that the new structure is determined solely by the
controlee? As I understand your theory of reorganization, a series of random
(pseudo- or not, and perhaps biased in certain ways -- that possibility
doesn't matter to my argument) alterations in the control structure occur, and
each is tested to see whether it solves the problem (or "conflict") which gave
rise to the reorganization process in the first place. When the problem is
solved ("well enough," in some reasonable sense), reorganization stops with
the control structure which was capable of solving the problem. So the new
control structure depends on both the random "walk" in control-structure
space, which I take to be "immediately" the result of the controlee's control-
structure (and possibly "lawless" to some extent, as you suggested not long
ago, as an ultimate refuge of non-traditional-free-will autonomy) and,
conjointly, the problem set by the controller. Had a different problem been
set (and had the controlee reorganized successfully to solve it), then the
resulting control structure would have been different. In short, the
controller's control is necessary, but not sufficient, for the particular
changes in the controlee's control structure following reorganization. That
is, the controller can alter the controlee's control structure (reference
signals), contra the sentence I've been analyzing.

Finally (for now, since I want to get back to writing this month's HortIdeas),
if you object that what you really meant by not being able to control another
person's reference signals is that you can't alter them reliably in a precise
way which you have pre-specified, I agree. But you can control them as per the
definition above of "controlling another person."

We are still distant from sciences and ideologies -- and Skinner. I beg
patience while I attend to other affairs. I promise to return. A hint of the
future: I take education and indoctrination and friendship and organized
cooperation and so forth and so on to rely on control of others' control
structures (sometimes with threats and use of physical force, but often not).

And to nip one potential problem in the bud, I do NOT think PCT supports
notions of trans-organismic control. Control is always the matching of a
particular organism's perceptions with that organism's reference signals.
Colloquially, I say, for example, "I control the path of the joystick." That
is shorthand for "I control my perception of the path of the (perceived by
me) joystick."

Again, to be continued,

Greg
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