HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 15:59:54 GMT

In article <1992Apr8.073244.29543@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>
>
>Here you are mistaken. There are such things as small minds
>and big minds. Would you not agree that small animals have
>small minds, insects have even smaller minds. The problem
>you are having is that you want to be able to limit the
>size of a mind (quantize mind?) this cannot be done without
>introducing a whole bunch of other problems, such as what is
>the smallest mind, etc..
>-- 
 
It seems you haven't been paying close attention. The question is not
whether there are "small" anbd "big" minds. The question is whether
an answers to that question has any bearing whatsoever on the
question of whether something can be said to have a mind at all.
I have argued that it does not. A small mind is just as much a mind
as a big mind is.


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: tolman%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Kenneth Tolman)
Subject: Re: The 'Big Bang' and the origin of 'mathematical  objects'
Date: 14 Apr 92 11:55:39 MDT
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept

In article <1992Apr2.181440.11808@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>	Mathematical objects are not physical--the "Big Bang" is
>irrelevant to their existence or non-existence.  They are also
>eternal (they have no relationship to time) and therefore the question
>of a physical beginning for such objects makes no sense.


Ummmm...  Mathematical objects only exist within your head.  Your computation
and internal "gut" feeling are physical artificacts, embedded in the physicsl
world.  Let us consider any sort of mathematical concept:

  It relies on axioms, which are built up into proofs.

Where did these axioms come from?  Why did you choose them?  Euclid chose
his axioms, and some of them seemed to be incorrect to Riemann, who
developed the basics needed for relativity.  Where the hell are the
axioms coming from?  From your head!  They are physically instantiated.

So what you are arguing is that something "self consistent" exists outside
of space and time.  This is a meaningless conjecture.  The very idea
of contingency and relationship is only something founded within our 
universe.  Asserting that some aspect of humanity is beyond time and space
is merely arrogant nonsense.
From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Dethroning logic
Date: Mon, 06 Apr 1992 17:31:01 GMT
Organization: SPSS Inc.

I've been reading _The Improbable Machine_, by Jeremy Campbell, which was
recommended by someone on this newsgroup.  Campbell is very excited,
in a journalistic way, about new theories of the mind that emphasize its
non-logical nature-- its dependence on real-world knowledge, its ability
to thrive on poor-quality information, its use of worldly expectations
and stereotypes rather than on logical deductions.

In this light one can find hidden affinities between many of the pro- and
anti-AI viewpoints expressed in this newsgroup-- namely, in an overemphasis
on the rational as the hallmark of human intelligence.  Mikhail Zeleny, for
instance, seems to define the irreproducible core of thought as reference,
mathematical thought, and the conception of infinity.  On the other side, 
the reduction of intelligence to what can be tested through a conversation 
by teletype (excluding visual processing, intonation, nonverbal behavior,
interaction with the environment, qualia) reveals, I think, the same
equation of intelligence with rationality.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: SHRDLU's mind
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1992 01:35:17 GMT

In article <1992Apr13.151731.22702@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher D. Green) writes:
>
>> Surely whether SHRDLU, thermostats, and rocks have minds is an
>> empirical question.
>
>Surely not. It is a philosophical question, which is the reason that
>we have this newsgroup. It isn't an empirical question because it
>doesn't have any observable consequences.
>
Surely so. To be empirical, a question must be a matter of fact, not just
of definition. Surely it is a matter of fact whether or not SHRDLU,
thermostats, and rocks have minds, just as it is a matter of whether
they have this, that, or the other chemical composition, number of
arms, and whether they go to church on Sunday.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------
From: clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: ai
Date: 6 Apr 92 14:20:44 GMT
Organization: University of Central Florida

In article <atten.702298596@groucho.phil.ruu.nl> atten@phil.ruu.nl (Mark van  
Atten) writes:
| I want to discuss
|  
| II THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GOEDEL'S THEOREM TO AI
| 
| II.1 This is not repeat not Lucas' argument
| II.2 Penrose's argument
| II.3 Goedel's theorem and ai
| II.4 non-algorithmic processes
| II.5 the infinite mind
| 
My receipt of your post did not contain II.  Was it cut off?  Should I look for  
a future post?

Most anxious to hear how you distinguish Penrose's argument from Lucas'.  To my  
ear they are fundamentally similar.
Organization: Penn State University
Date: Thursday, 9 Apr 1992 12:16:50 EDT
From: <JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu>
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
 <1992Apr8.220700.12092@mp.cs.niu.edu> <92099.200726JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu>
 <1992Apr9.005331.23376@mp.cs.niu.edu>

In article <1992Apr9.005331.23376@mp.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil
Rickert) says:
>
>In article <92099.200726JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu> <JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu> writes:
>>In article <1992Apr8.220700.12092@mp.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil
>>Rickert) says:
>>  [Emmer:]
>>     The purpose is to distinguish between what the computer is actually
>>doing (i.e. what is actually happening inside the computer) and what kinds
>>of things _we_ do with the various states (say, output) of the computer
>>(i.e. how we interpret them).
>   [Rickert:]
> Certainly you may, if you wish, say that what the computer "is actually
>doing" is formal manipulations, and anything else is an interpretation.  But
>then you must surely say that what you are actually doing is chemical
>manipulations, and anything else is an interpretation.  Any use of this
>approach to deny the possibility that computers could ever have semantics
>applies equally to deny the possibility that humans could have semantics.
>
     I never stated that my approach was designed to "deny the possibility
that computers could ever have semantics".  I simply wanted to distinguish
between machine (or biological) level causal interactions and meaning.  The
distinction only denies the possibility of semantics for both humans and
computers if one assumes that, whatever meaning is, it is reducible to
mechanical functions.  I happen to think that its not, and I take my guidance
in this way of thinking from the arguments presented by such figures as
Kant and Husserl, who show that (to put it in a very simplified manner)
subjectivity cannot be reduced to objectivity because the former is the
condition of the possibility of the latter.
     Please note that in my more extended response to your other comments,
I stated that my arguments had "not, of course, show[n] that our brains
'have meaning' in some other way than the computer's state does".  I am
not at this point entirely convinced wither way as to whether a computer
can be created and programmed to instantiate the kind of subjectivity
found in humans.  I do, however, think it is useful to distinguish between
formal systems (or computers) and their interpretations.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 John Emmer               "...reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict
 Philosophy Department     is always simply the agreement of free citizens..."
 Penn. State University                   - Immanuel Kant, CPR, A738/B765
 JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu       Now playing:  Amiga: BC  Genesis: KC  SNES: Smash TV
From: atten@phil.ruu.nl (Mark van Atten)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: goedel and ai - correct version!!
Keywords: ai,goedel
Date: 10 Apr 92 10:47:13 GMT
Organization: Department of Philosophy, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands

centaur@terminus.gatech.edu (Anthony G. Francis) writes:

>atten@phil.ruu.nl (Mark van Atten) writes:
>>There is an ongoing discussion right now on mathematical realism in the ai
>>group. Some people question the relevance of this to ai. In this article,
>>I want to discuss
>>1 The objective existence of mathematical objects
>>2 The significance of this for ai

>>II THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GOEDEL'S THEOREM FOR AI
>>II.2 Penrose's argument
>>Let F be a formal system, and G(F) an undecidable formula in F. (e.g., Con(F))
>>Then Penrose's argument is this:
>>The ***deduction*** of G(F) from F is true and valid, 
>>we can ***see*** that. The important thing is that it is 
>>the deduction is seen to be valid, while it is
>>not formalizable (is that correct English?).
>>Perhaps mathematical intuition cannot see ALL of true math. (Goedel thinks it
>>can, however), but that doesn't matter for this argument: there is at least
>>one math. truth that can not be formalized and hence, is not algorithmic.
>>It must be borne in mind that this is a question of principle. Probably no one
>>will ever be able to compute the 10^10^10^10 digit 
>>of pi, but in ***principle***, it is possible.
>>Again: it is the fact that we see the validity of 
>>Goedel's proof, not the truth
>>of G(f); that is the difference with Lucas.

>The deduction of G(F) is not formalizable from _within_ F, but that
>does not mean that it is not formalizable at all. It is possible to 
>devise a new formal system F', in which it is possible to prove truths 
>_about_ F. From within F', it is possible to derive that G(F) is an 
>undecideable formula within F, and that G(F) is true and valid. That is,
>the validity of the deduction of G(F) from F can be determined in a 
>formalizable way, even though this cannot be determined from within F.

This is not a valid argument. To see why, let's compare it with the proof
that there are infinite many prime numbers. It starts with the assumption
that there is a largest prime number; let's call it n. Then a larger prime
is constructed, thus proving that n cannot be the largest one. However, since
no assumptions were made about n (except its being the alleged largest prime),
the argument obviously succeeds for any proposed candidate; therefore, it is
concluded that there is no largest prime at all.
The analogy is obvious. No one would claim that, since we called the largest
prime n, we've only proven that there is some  prime number for which a larger prime
exists. It's a proof of principle. So is Penrose's argument. He does not claim
that for any given consistent formal system, we can see the truth of its
Goedel sentence; that is not obvious at all, as Hofstadter points out in his
refutation of Lucas. Penrose argues that, given any consistent formal system,
we are able to see the validity of the deduction of its Goedel sentence. In a
way, we are always a step ahead of the next formal system.

Mark.
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Functional Equivalence (Was: A rock implements every FSA)
Keywords: functionalism, behavioralism
Date: 14 Apr 92 06:43:58 GMT
Organization: Indiana University

In article <46079@dime.cs.umass.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:

>	So here's my proposal:
>
>		Two Turing Machines are FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT
>		if they make the same tape moves & writes, in the
>		same order, on every starting input tape.

That's not a bad criterion for TM equivalence -- it abstracts away
from head-states of course, but that's not an unreasonable abstraction.
Of course one gets different notions of equivalence or implementation
depending on how much one abstracts away from.

What's missing is a characterization of when a TM is actually
being implemented by a physical system.  By assuming we already
have tape squares and symbols individuated, much of the work is
already done.

>Note that there is no mention of mapping between states of the two
>machines.  So in a sense, I am defining functional equivalence in
>terms of behavioral equivalence.  But it is fine-grained behavior.
>After all, if we included state transitions as part of the behavior,
>Then behaviorism = functionalism! 

I disagree.  Changes in a TM's tape aren't behaviour, they're
internal function.  It's a mistake to think of a TM as a tape-head
that makes it's inputs and outputs onto the tape: if you did this,
then the "mechanism" itself would only be an FSA.  The tape just
allows for arbotrarily complex internal states.

(Of course, there is the question of how one then allows for
input and output to and from a TM.  The usual solution is to set
aside a certain finite portions of the tape for input and output,
or else to allow separate tapes.)

>	Consider the consequences of this definition for the two machines
>TM1 = 5-color-map-checker, and TM2 = single-state rejector, discussed
>by David Chalmers and Daryl McCullough recently.  TM2 will take a plane
>graph on its input tape, ignore it, write "no" (or 0) and halt.
>TM1 will take the graph, determine if its chromatic number is 5, and if
>not, write "no" and halt.  It should be clear that if TM1 is really
>a program that checks for chromatic # = 5, for graphs of arbitrary
>size (this is important!), then it must use the tape to write intermediate
>results.  And therefore, TM1 != TM2 under my definition of equivalence.

But this evades the question of whether an implementation of TM1
might actually implement TM2 under some mapping (and the question
of whether any old rock might).  Given a physical system, there
won't be a single canonical decomposition into tape squares and
symbols.  I think Putnam's wrong, but he can't be beaten as
easily as this.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Organization: Indiana University
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 92 07:07:55 GMT

In article <1992Apr12.120115.1221@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:

>As to David Chalmers' comment about "strong conditionals" the only
>thing I can think of is that he must be demanding that two
>functionally equivalent systems must have the same behavior even when
>started in unreachable states. For example, if you start the 5 color
>map program in the state that corresponds to having found a map that
>requires 5 colors, then it will behave differently than the do-nothing
>one-state machine. Even though it is impossible to reach such a state,
>you could artificially put the 5-color map program into a "success"
>state, by, for instance, setting the success boolean to "true". (Is
>that what you mean, Dave?)

That's part of it.  The other, perhaps more important, part is that
the right state-transitions have to be produced by counterfactual
inputs.  Most implementations of the single-state machine won't
satisfy these input-dependent conditionals (implementations
of the single-state machine needn't even be sensitive to different
inputs).

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
From: clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: lookup tables again
Date: 7 Apr 92 12:30:23 GMT
Organization: University of Central Florida

In article <1992Apr4.173208.16061@math.okstate.edu> gindrup@math.okstate.edu  
(Eric `'d'kidd' G..) writes:
| In article <1992Apr03.170149.39582@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark  
Rosenfelder) writes:
| >Why do I say that?  Oh, the famous two-slit experiment.  There's no way
| >to tell where on the screen the electron will end up.  All you get is
| >probabilities.  
| 
| Well, if one performs the two-slit experiment in such a way that only one
| electron is emitted at a time, it STILL won't end up in one place.  "The"
| electron is smeared out over the screen and all your left with is a 
| distributed electron.  I.e. The electron is observed all over the card where
| its interference amplitudes are real and positive.  Film which is exposed
| in this manner does not get made up of a single point, but instead is made
| up of the expected interference banding - from one electron interfering
| with itself.
 
I believe this need clarification.  In the two slit experiment you do observe a  
single flash of light on a fluorescent screen, or a single grain of silver  
halide in the emulsion is primed to convert to silver in development.  The  
probabilities of seeing the flash or developing an exposed grain do follow the  
interference bands, so that the interference pattern is built up one flash at a  
time.  

That is what is strange.  Particle-like dectection (single flashes) are  
governed by wave-like mechanics.  If the electron were indeed smeered all over  
the screen then all would be pure wave mechanics and there would be no mystery.   
On the other hand pure particle mechanics won't due either since the  
interference bands disappear when the particle passes through only one slit.  

Put the two mechanical views together using the magic of Heisenberg's infinite  
matrix algebra/Schrodinger's equation/von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation  
and you get quantum mechanics.  The problem which no one has solved yet is to  
provide an intuitively satisfying interpretation of the mathematics.  Once  
conclusion from all the recent bruhaha about Bell's inequality is that  
particles do not exist independent of the observer.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay)
Subject: Re: The 'Big Bang' and the origin of 'mathematical  objects'
Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1992 00:55:09 GMT

tolman%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Kenneth Tolman) writes:
|Ummmm...  Mathematical objects only exist within your head.  

Perhaps you could explain what you mean a bit more.

For example, when one defines "prime", one says it is a positive
integer p such that there do not exist integers m and n, 1<m,n<p, such
that mn=p. Isn't this a clear definition? Surely it is not enough that
no such m and n exist "in my head". There must actually not be such m
and n, whether "in my head" yet or not.

Consider the RSA cryptosystem, which uses prime numbers. If instead of
using primes in RSA, we just used numbers for which factors didn't
exist "in anyone's head", it wouldn't work. In the process of looking
for primes, it is entirely possible to find numbers which are
allegedly shown not to be prime, although they have no currently known
factor (no factor exists "in anyone's head"). How do you explain why
such a system works?

|Your computation
|and internal "gut" feeling are physical artificacts, embedded in the physicsl
|world. 

This is no less true for thoughts about any other subject, if it is
true at all.

|Let us consider any sort of mathematical concept:
|
|  It relies on axioms, which are built up into proofs.

I don't agree that all mathematical concepts "rely on" axioms. What
sort of "reliance" is involved?

|Where did these axioms come from?  Why did you choose them?  Euclid chose
|his axioms, and some of them seemed to be incorrect to Riemann, who
|developed the basics needed for relativity.  

The mathematical concepts pre-dated the axioms of Euclid's textbooks,
for example. The axioms were introduced to systematize what had gone
before.

The situation is clearer if we consider the natural numbers 1,2,3,....
The concept of natural number was around for a long time before the
axiomatic method, and yet we are using essentially the same concept
today as was available in ancient times (just better understood). We
have all learned about the natural numbers, and most of us learned to
deduce facts about them, without having any axioms. I don't see any
other manner in which the concept of "natural number" is "dependent on
axioms", either.

I doubt whether Riemann can really be said to have thought the
parallel axiom was "incorrect". Doing non-Euclidean geometry does not
mean that one thinks Euclidean geometry is "incorrect"

|Where the hell are the
|axioms coming from?  From your head!  They are physically instantiated.

Mathematics "comes from" many sources. All beliefs, in some sense,
"come from one's head".

|Asserting that some aspect of humanity is beyond time and space
|is merely arrogant nonsense.

Who's asserted that (here)?
-- 
Keith Ramsay            Even if a proof from given axioms can, in
ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca     principle, be found mechanically, is it not
                        often found in ways not all that different
                        from finding a new axiom? -Georg Kreisel
From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Chinese Room (or Number Five's Alive)
Date: 6 Apr 92 18:19:03 GMT
Organization: Edinburgh University

In article <1992Mar31.182905.25732@cs.ucf.edu> clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke) writes:

>I am inclined to agree with Searle, but think that he goes too far in limiting  
>things to organic goop.

He doesn't. It is a common misconception that he does.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205
Organization: Penn State University
Date: Wednesday, 8 Apr 1992 16:56:57 EDT
From: <JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu>
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
 <1992Apr4.061244.767@mp.cs.niu.edu> <92098.170625JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu>
 <1992Apr8.010858.5398@news.media.mit.edu>

In article <1992Apr8.010858.5398@news.media.mit.edu>, minsky@media.mit.edu
(Marvin Minsky) says:
>
>In article <92098.170625JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu> <JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu> writes:
>>>
>>    Are you suggesting that ...  computations are _not_ syntactic?  In what
>>manner would they not be?  From what I understand, whatever the computer does
>>_is_ "formal" and "precise", although we may interpret its output as
>>_meaning_ something imprecise.
>
>Nonsense. What the computer does is what it does, just like a brain.

   What does this mean?  That a computer does whatever it does (which tells
us nothing) or that a computer does whatever a brain does (which is a central
issue here, not something that can be simply assumed or stated without
support)?

>It is _you_ who may interpret what it is doing as formal or precise.

   Does this mean that you reject the isomorphism that many philosophers
find between computers and formal systems?  And if so, on what grounds?
(Directing me to an article would be an acceptable response here, although
some stated reasons would be easier to discuss on the net.)



-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  John Emmer             "...reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict
  Philosophy Department   is always simply the agreement of free citizens..."
  Penn. State University                 - Immanuel Kant, CPR, A738/B765
  JPE1@psuvm.psu.edu     Now playing:  Amiga: BC  Genesis: KC  SNES: Smash TV