HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 05:00:27 GMT

In article <1992Oct9.040228.2117@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
>In article <1992Oct8.230422.5045@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com> max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb) writes:
>>In article <1992Oct6.204155.13168@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:

>>>Those who insist on defending its existence should come
>>>up with plausible arguments as to what makes them believe that the sequence
>>>of rule-implementations could be conscious, when clearly no individual
>>>rule-implementation can be.
>
>>It isn't clear to me.
>
>Wow, this business sure leads to some surprising assertions! Are you saying
>that a flip-flop changing state or a neuron firing are conscious?

Yes, indeed, there are some surprising assertions.  For example you are
apparently asserting that every individual rule-implementation is
equivalent to a flip-flop changing state.

>>You have advanced Searle's argument as an argument in favor
>>of substance dualism (it is not, and Searle says so). 
>
>I have advanced it for what it is, an argument against the equivalence
>of consciousness and algorithmic processing.

Wow!  Another surprising assertion.  I don't know of anyone who believes
that consciousness and algorithmic processing are equivalent.  Equivalence
would imply that any algorithmic computation whatsoever, even the addition
to two numbers, produces consciousness.  It would also imply that any
conscious creature is algorithmic.  Do you normally debate by attacking
a completely preposterous interpretation of the opposing position?

>            I still think that consciousness cannot arise from manipulation
>of symbols, because the symbols have no meaning without a consciousness
>attributing meaning.

But that is not a valid argument.  If the algorithmic program creates
consciousness, then that consciousness might use symbols to which it
attributes meaning.  You are apparently making the fallacious assumption
that the symbols used by this consciousness must of necessity also be
symbols known to the algorithm which creates the consciousness.  There
is no valid reason to make such an assumption.

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 8 Oct 92 21:23:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: casper.BvtnEt.5Dz
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town

In <1992Oct6.171057.26199@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:


>While it may be true that there could be a program that behaved as
>though intelligent yet was not, ELIZA is not an example. Behaving as
>if intelligent means making responses that are appropriate for an
>intelligent being in all possible circumstances (for all possible
>input/output histories, at least). The trickery involved in ELIZA is
>that it behaves acceptably for a shrewdly guessed set of inputs, a set
>that is likely to be the first things said to "her". If you try to go
>beyond this very small set and say unexpected things, ELIZA's
>responses quickly degenerate into nonsense. Taking a look at ELIZA's
>code shows you the limitations of "her" abilities to respond
>intelligently.

>The assumption behind behaviorist AI is not that "If you can fool
>someone into thinking a program is intelligent, then it is
>intelligent", but "If the program behaves like an intelligent person
>in all possible circumstances, then it is intelligent". While there
>may be philosophical arguments against this position, people's
>gullibility when interacting with ELIZA is no argument.

Arguments on both sides of the AI debate certainly are concerned with the
gullibility of ELIZA's victims. For one: gullibility (which comes in degrees) 
is limited in a similar way that ELIZA's ability to anticipate our inputs
is. Perhaps the problem is not that ELIZA is not sophisticated enough to cover
a sufficiently broad scope of human-generated inputs intelligently, but that 
humans are not suitably advanced to tease the limits of human genius. When 
confronted by an (admittedly hypothetical) interogator of suitable sophistication our own psychotherapists may reduce to little more than ELIZAs with larger
vocabularies, better guesses, and advanced conceptual schemes ... if they 
don't already.


Neil Horne
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ard@cs.bham.ac.uk (Antoni Diller)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: unpublished chapters of "The Turing Option"
Date: 16 Oct 92 12:23:28 GMT
Organization: School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

In article <1992Sep25.203827.17312@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>I have archived two unpublished chapters of "The Turing Option" by
>Harry Harrison and Marvin Minsky, published by Warner Books, August
>1992.  Use  
>  ftp wuarchive.wustl.edu  (and then login with name "anonymous")
>  cd doc/minsky
>  get option.chapters
>
>These chapters have a lot of far-out ideas about how to build a
>humanlike machine.
>
>A co-author does not have complete control.  These FTP chapters are
>part of the text I wrote that did not make it into the published book.
>Both Harry and the editor at Warner thought they would slow down the
>story too much.  At the time I disagreed, but now I think they were
>right...

After reading this I went out and bought a copy of this book; I think
using science fiction to promulgate ideas from computer science and AI
is a great one.  One of my interests is formal methods and I was wondering
if anyone wants to collaborate on a novel incorporating the ideas
of formal methods.  I've even got an idea for a plot.  We start off
with a new super-hero called Formal Methods Man (real name: Zed B. Tool)
whose superhuman powers include the ability to solve the halting problem,
being able to square the circle and to decide undecidable questions.
In the book he saves the world from the Spaghetti Monster.  He does this
by first infecting the Spaghetti Monster with the JSD virus which interfers
with its flow of control; then he proves to the Spaghetti Monster
that it is inconsistent and in its weakened state the monster cannot
argue back and disappears in a puff of smoke...  Meanwhile, Miranda---Formal
Methods Man girlfriend---has an identity crisis, becomes referentially
opaque and starts talking with a lisp....

Anyone want to collaborate?


Antoni Diller
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Death of Consistancy
Date: 12 Oct 92 18:16:00 GMT


QM and Logic: no go? Maybe...  but there again QM and General Relativity
maybe be united, perhaps through superstring theory.  Therefore, since
GR is logical theory, non-probabilistic, there is hope for AI yet!


Gordon Joly      Phone  +44 71 387 7050 ext 3703      FAX  +44 71 387 1397
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk        UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ginsberg & Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Date: 15 Oct 92 00:13:04 GMT
Reply-To: swf@tdat.teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: NCR Teradata Database Business Unit

In an article sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com <Mark Riggle> writes:
| I believe that Godel's theorem is NOT the linchpin in Penrose's
| argument.  It is important, but he merely uses Godel's theorem
| to show the limitations of the computablity of currently
| realizable computers. His linchpin conjecture is that
| consciousness is based on the collapse of the quantum
| probability distribution.

The problem with this is that it makes the center of his argument pure
speculation.  His quantum stuff is almost entirely his own ideas, it
is not in any way standard.  Nor is his application of it to neurology
in any way derived from the results of neurobiology.

Thus, it is little more than a 'what if'.

|  Penrose
| turns this around and conjectures that the collapse is
| responsible for providing the 'ultra-computation' required for
| consciousness and the collapse is caused by quantum gravity
| effects. 

The problem is he must first demonstrate the *need* for such 'ultra-
computation'.  Only then can he proceed to provide a mechanism for it.
A mechanism that does not meet any need is purely extraneous.  It can
be dropped without loss.
-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Date: 15 Oct 92 00:19:46 GMT
Reply-To: swf@tdat.teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: NCR Teradata Database Business Unit

In article <11609@risky.Convergent.COM> paul@colosus.convergent.com writes:
|The only way in which it can be shown that the execution of an algorithm
|of some particular sort cannot _fly_like_a_bird_ is to show that some
|critical portion of the process used by _birds_in_flight_ is not representable
|as some algorithm.
|
|I expect to have my PC flying around my living room any day now, as soon as I
|come up with the right algorithm. ;^)
|
This has been gone over before.  That argument is only equivalent to mine
*if* thought is primarily a physical, rather than a cybernetic, process.

Since this is cerainly not obvious - it requires demonstration.

At the current state of technology it is more *useful* to continue to do
research on the tentative assumption that thining is primarily cybernetic.
If, in the future, evidence to the contrary shows up, we will have lost
little.  If the assumtion is true, then we will have made major progress
towards AI.
-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
Organization: TECHNION - Israel Institute of Technology.
Date: Friday, 16 Oct 1992 11:43:47 IST
From: Uri Zakai <RPR1ZAK@TECHNION.BITNET>
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: masters degree

hello
im thinking of coming to the us, for my masters degree.
can anyone recommend a university with an especially good philosophy
dept. ?
please specify the field for which that dept. is best known for .
thanku
uri zakai
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1992 05:12:59 GMT

minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:

>On second thought, I think I better postulate two Boojums.  Otherwise
>what would we say if Searle declares that thinking cannot occur
>_solely_ by virtue of a single Boojum?

Better to have three Boojums, just to be on the safe side.  And some green
slime.  And some flashing lights on the side, which spell out in Morse "I am
not a computer, I am a free man".  For ever and ever.  Amen.

Tim
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: stgprao@st.unocal.COM (Richard Ottolini)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Organization: Unocal Corporation
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1992 15:23:06 GMT

>In article <1992Oct12.191445.18565@pasteur.Berkeley.EDU> c60c-2gh@web-4f.berkeley.edu (Erik Strickland (Og)) writes:
>>
>>	Of all of the people attending this discussion, I am perhaps the most
>>fortunate, inasmuch as I'm a student at UC Berkeley who has studied under 
>>Searle for a year and a half. 
>
>>	According to Searle, the mind is a secretion of the brain, which "just
>>happens" as a result of electrochemical reactions in the brain. At no point is
>>there any real "information processing" going on in the brain, as "information"
>>is a meaningless concept without an observer, and (excepting a homunculus) there
>>is no observer in the brain. The brain in this way is not a computer or
>>information processing device, but is just a lump of conveniently arranged 
>>molecules, much like a heart or liver. 
>>	The original question was this: If I could in some way simulate all of the
>>electrochemical processes/entities in the brain, such that for all time, the state
>>of my model was in 1-1 correspondence with the modeled brain, would the simulated
>>brain have a simulated mind? 

I can buy Searle's argument that the mind probably doesn't manipulate
information (sensation, memories) in a symbolic fashion as most computers
currently do.  I can't accept the argument there is some magical component
in meat-brains that embodies thought/consciousness/intelligence that
precludes the construction of an artificial intelligence out of computing
technology.  "Specialness" of natural systems has not held up for artificial
life, artificial flight etc.  Sometimes the artificial replacement imitates
natures closely and sometimes it is quite different.  It is not clear which
way artificial intelligence will turn out.
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Word Mechanics (was: parts of "Brain and Mind")
Date: 13 Oct 1992 23:50:09 GMT
Organization: SunSoft Inc., Los Angeles, Ca.
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>>I suppose one could call it an OR at some level, but I don't
>>usually think of it that way.  I model the understanding going
>>on in the infant's mind as not yet having the necessary
>>appreciation of forms of discomfort to be able to distinguish
>>between them.
>
> [The OR idea] seems necessary, in some form, because the various
> noxious-condition detectors are probably not vague 'emergents' at
> all, but definite devices, e,.g., the thirst, heat, cold, and
> hunger detectors in the hypothalamus...

I think we're in agreement here; I think the difference is a
matter of viewpoint.  From our point of view there are several
inputs (thirst, cold, hunger) all ORed together (into discomfort).
From another point of view (anywhere beyond the OR gate) there is
one input (discomfort), that has several possible meanings that
can be learned to be distinguished upon closer examination.

I find the latter point of view interesting because I think it's
closer to the point of view of many of the agents or entities
developing in the infant's mind.  Taking the point of view of
those developing entities might shed better light on the process
of their development.  At first all those entities recognize is
"discomfort", so their models and decisions are at that level of
granularity.  Later they learn to recognize finer distinctions as
the models become more complex.

I guess I believe that the two viewpoints facilitate different
sorts of insights into models of the developing infant mind.

Dave
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books,sci.cognitive
From: kamorgan@athena.mit.edu (Keith Morgan)
Subject: Re: Good books on the Rationalists?
Followup-To: rec.arts.books
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 1992 17:34:30 GMT

	Bill Turkel writes:

>Does anybody have any recommendations for books about The Rationalists?
>I am particularly interested in a treatment of modern positions which
>have been influenced by the Rationalist program.  Books on or by particular
>Rationalist thinkers are also OK.


Well, I haven't read this yet but it sounds like what you want (snappy
title too):

Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West by John
Ralston Saul. Saul took a thrashing in the NYT Book Review on August
30 and has a a long letter refuting both the review and the reviewer
in the September 27th issue of the Review. BTW, Saul also writes
novels, anyone ever sampled him?

Three recent recommendations on Descartes' role in all this:

Susan Bordo. _The Flight to Objectivity: essays on Cartesianism and
Culture_.  SUNY Press, 1987.

Dalia Judovitz. _Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: the
Origins of Modernity_. Cambridge Univ Press, 1988.

Hiram Caton. _The Origin of Subjectivity: an Essay on Descartes_. Yale
Univ Press, 1973.

Keith





--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Morgan		 	|In literature, as in love, we are 
kamorgan@athena.mit.edu  	|astonished at what is chosen by others.
		         	|	        Andre Maurois
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1992 02:36:33 GMT

In article <26864@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <1992Oct12.220803.15594@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
 ( rest deleted -- back to Chris Malcolm)

>Searle quite clearly has said that he thinks it is obvious that a
>digital computer could think, just that it couldn't do so solely by
>virtue of running a program.
>
>Here's the relevant quote from the reply by Searle to critics in the
>original 1980 BBS airing of the arguments.
>
>"`Could a machine think?'
>"... yes. We are precisely such machines.
>"`... could a ... man-made machine think?'
>[Searle answers yes, obviously, just by duplicating all the biological
>machinery.]
>"`Ok, but could a digital computer think?'
>
>"If by "digital computer" we mean anything at all which has a level of
>description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of
>a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we
>are the instantiation of any number of computer programs and we can
>think.
>
>"`But could something think, understand, etc, _solely_ by virtue of
>being a computer with the right sort of program? Could instantiating a
>program, the right program of course, by itself be a sufficient
>condition of understanding?'
>
>"This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually confused
>with one or more of the earlier questions, and the answer to it is "no".
>
>[My quotation comes from p300 of Haugeland's "Mind Design".]
>
>So clearly Searle has thought this way -- i.e., as he _explicitly_ says
>above, that a digital computer could think -- for at least a dozen
>years, and a _dozen_years_ago_ was complaining in print of exactly the
>sort of misunderstanding of his views which has characterised most of
>the discussions of the Searle in this newsgroup since its inception.

I'm still having trouble.  This seems to say that a computer could
think, with the right program, but not _solely_ by virtue of being a
computer with the right sort of program? So there must be another
secret ingredient, e.g., the virtue of sentience or, let's say, a
soul.  I see no reason to consider this more seriously than any other
religious or vitalistic bit of dogma.  Do you disagree?  Why can't I
insist that a Boojum is necessary as well.

On second thought, I think I better postulate two Boojums.  Otherwise
what would we say if Searle declares that thinking cannot occur
_solely_ by virtue of a single Boojum?

Help. please.

.
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Word Mechanics (was: parts of "Brain and Mind")
Date: 13 Oct 92 03:05:50 GMT
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Cc: minsky

In article <1bcpsfINNh06@smaug.West.Sun.COM> dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield) writes:
>minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>>The infant may not have much of an "object
>>concept" yet, and might first form a functional-representation for
>>"whatever-helps-stop-being-wet-or-hungry-or-cold,etc."  And it is
>>conceivable that there could be a hardware "OR" for several such
>>discomfort-detectors, and that they have better-than-chance
>>connections to some vocal actions.  Virtually all other mammals do!
>
>I suppose one could call it an OR at some level, but I don't
>usually think of it that way.  I model the understanding going
>on in the infant's mind as not yet having the necessary
>appreciation of forms of discomfort to be able to distinguish
>between them.  It's like having a thesaurus with not very many
>entries, so concepts are only expressable at a course-grained
>level.  One could say I "OR" many different colors into "red",
>but what's really going on is that I don't have a decision
>process or criterion to distinguish among them -- my process
>has no "OR" involved, but I only pay attention to the high bits.

Maybe a misunderstanding.  Perhaps I should not have used the term
"discomfort", but I don't t se your objection to the OR idea.  It
seems necessary, in some form, because the variou noxious-condition
detectors are probably not vague 'emergents' at all, but definite
devices, e,.g., the thirst, heat, cold, and hunger detectors in the
hypothalamus.  These all, I presume, have their outputs funnelled --
innately -- over to the alarm-cry machinery.  I agree, to be sure,
that the distinctions between them are not yet distinguished by "the
infant's mind" -- whatever you might possibly mean by such a phrase in
this context.  Yes, at later stages, the infant can say other things
-- and so you're right about the need for further discriminations
vis-a-vis other parts of the brain.  But your statement suggested a
different idea, that the detectors themselves are not initially
separate -- and I find that too hard to believe.  In other words, the
OR is necessary at the start; later the  system must develop other,
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 22:16:09 GMT

In article <1992Oct12.191445.18565@pasteur.Berkeley.EDU> c60c-2gh@web-4f.berkeley.edu (Erik Strickland (Og)) writes:
>
>	Of all of the people attending this discussion, I am perhaps the most
>fortunate, inasmuch as I'm a student at UC Berkeley who has studied under 
>Searle for a year and a half. 

>	According to Searle, the mind is a secretion of the brain, which "just
>happens" as a result of electrochemical reactions in the brain. At no point is
>there any real "information processing" going on in the brain, as "information"
>is a meaningless concept without an observer, and (excepting a homunculus) there
>is no observer in the brain. The brain in this way is not a computer or
>information processing device, but is just a lump of conveniently arranged 
>molecules, much like a heart or liver. 
>	The original question was this: If I could in some way simulate all of the
>electrochemical processes/entities in the brain, such that for all time, the state
>of my model was in 1-1 correspondence with the modeled brain, would the simulated
>brain have a simulated mind? 
>	Searle's position is very much consistent with all of our brain-damaging
>experience, and is difficult to counter. It is the actual goo inside your brainpan
>that does the work, much as it is the acids/catalysts inside your stomach which
>actually digest your food. In both cases, simulation of the physical processes
>does nothing more than prove a clever exercise in computer science; in neither case do you get the 'secretion' of the simulated entity, the mind or the digestion.
>	Searle says that, should our dogma be incorrect and silicon be able to
>secrete mind-stuff in the way that brains do, then great, wow, neat. But you
>can't get there through information processing, you can't get there through 
>computer science; you can't make a mind out of an arbitrary substance.
>
>	I've found that, in general, people on this newsgroup are very vague
>and miss the point quite often. I hope I've done neither. 

Ha. Ha.  I guess I've missed the same point with respect to
transubstantiation in Catholic theology, and I guess Pasteur missed
the same point with respect to 'living things' and organic chemistry.
No, you're not being vague, merely insisting that certain substances
cause minds.  No more arbitrary than insisting that saying certain
prayers induce states of grace, etc.  In other words, does Searle
suggest any reason why the mind-stuff is secreted by the hydrocarbons
-- rather than the, I think, more plausible (and more widely believed)