From: russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence)
Subject: Animal Intelligence.  Was: Computer pseudo-intelligence? 
Organization: WP Group
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 04:23:57 GMT


From article <swood.718575230@vela>, by swood@vela.acs.oakland.edu (Scott Wood - EVENSONG):
sw> Let's just say someone decides to develop a computer model to behave
sw> just like an organism under various test conditions as many of these
sw> AR-heads would like to have us do as a viable option to animal research.
sw> ...
sw> If you add pain stimulus to a model, then would it be cruel to cause
sw> pain on the computer?  Is the computer somehow different than the
sw> animal if all the observed behavior (whether simulated or actually acted
sw> out by some robotic peripherial) is the same?

I'd willingly respect sentience and sapience whenever and wherever 
it exists...  regardless of the structural foundations that make it 
possible.  However, I don't think it'd be a easy matter to replicate 
pain in machinery.  Pain, as well as other kinds of sentience that 
we observe in mammals and birds, is far more complex than you seem 
to realize.   While your "simulation" may mimic some reactions to
pain, it would be a mistake to confuse the simulation for the real 
thing.

sw> I personally see how right now, with my meager program skills, I would
sw> be able to create a program that would simulate the day-to-day functions
sw> of a simple creature like a lobster INCLUDING PAIN STIMULI.  So is it then
sw> unethical for me to simulate pain on that computer.

Please explain how you're going to "simulate" pain on a computer.

sw> The above is a thinker for the rest of you to chew on and spit out as you
sw> may.  My point is, that I do not see most animals as nothing more than
sw> a complex ball of nerves that behaves in various ways on stimuli.  And
sw> through memory, occasionally learns from it.
sw> However, I see the development of man as a being far more advanced than
sw> any other creature on this planet.  The fact that he attempts to bring
sw> order out of his world puts him aloft from the rest of the species, but
sw> does not seperate his connection from them.

You seem to think that human animals are separated from other animals
by a wide, wide gulf.  I don't think Darwin would agree with you.

Here are some extracts from an essay by Donald Griffin entitled,
"Animal Thinking", published in the November, 1991 issue of 
_Scientific American_.

====================================================================
Abstract: To what extent animals are capable of conscious thought 
    is a ripe subject for behavioral science.  Communication among 
    animals indicates that they are more capable of cognition than 
    previously believed.  Though simpler than human thought, animal 
    thought exists.  

A cognitive revolution has rekindled scientific interest in human 
and animal thinking.  Psychologists and ethologists have begun to 
recognize that internal cognitive processes such as learning and 
memory, problem solving, concept formation, expectation, intention 
and decision making have important effects on animal behavior.  
This, together with computer simulation of many types of human 
thinking, has replaced the behaviorism that used to recognize only 
observable behavior as worthy of scientific consideration.  One 
major facet of behaviorism has, however, remained strongly 
entrenched: an implicit assumption that all animal cognition is 
unconscious.  

It is difficult to believe that all animals pass their entire lives 
as unconscious "sleepwalkers." We know very little about what 
differences there may be between conscious and unconscious 
processing of information, and still less what neural processes 
lead to decisions about which of various possible actions will 
achieve desirable results or avoid unpleasant consequences.  Yet as 
far as we know, the central nervous systems of animals operate 
onthe same basic principles as human brains, and no uniquely human 
neuronal or synaptic mechanisms have been discovered.  Much of the 
experimental analysis of brain function has therefore been based on 
studies of animals.  

This residue of behaviorism is customarily justified by the claim 
that although animals may have conscious mental experiences, these 
are hopelessly inaccessible to scientific analysis, and thus 
hypotheses about them cannot be objectively tested.  The same 
skeptical philosophical arguments have been applied to human 
consciousness.  Yet we manage to understand the thoughts and 
emotions of our companions with reasonable accuracy, even though we 
cannot prove precisely what they are thinking or feeling.  The 
crucial difference is generally held to lie in the unique human 
ability to report mental experiences, largely through our use of 
language.  How, then, can we ever discover what animals might be 
thinking?  

Cognitive scientists who study animal behavior have recently begun 
to analyze evidence that animals sometimes experience simle 
conscious thoughts about matters of crucial importance to them.  Of 
course, there is an enormous difference in complexity between human 
and animal thinking.  Animal thoughts may well be limited to simple 
perceptual consciousness, thinking about the concrete world--food, 
predators and social companions--without any introspective thinking 
about the thoughts themselves.  Thinking about the likely results 
of alternative actions is much safer than trying them out in the 
real world, where mistakes are often fatal.  

The versatility with which animals cope with the challenges they 
face often suggests that they are indeed thinking about what they 
are doing.  Chimpanzees, for example, prepare sticks suitable for 
probing into termite nests, often being obliged to do so at some 
distance from the place where the probes will be used to obtain 
food.  An occasional green-backed heron fishes with bait.  The heron 
breaks a small twig into even smaller pieces, carries one to the 
water's edge, drops it in, watches it intently and seizes small 
fish attracted to the floating bait.  But behaviorists still argue 
that no matter how skillful or ingenious its behavior may be, there 
is no way of telling whether the animal is conscious of what it is 
doing.  

A more promising approach to the problem of identifying conscious 
mental experiences arises from the versatility and scope of animal 
communication.  Although customarily viewed as incidental 
by-products of physiological states--roughly analogous to groans of 
pain--some animal signals are now known to convey semantic 
information about significant objects and events.  These may be 
statements about immediately present situations, for instance, the 
alarm calls of vervet monkeys that inform their companions what 
kind of predator is threatening and thus what escape behavior is 
called for.  In other cases, animal signals identify things that 
are not part of the immediate surroundings but must be remembered 
or anticipated.  For instance, the waggle dances of honeybees 
convey the direction, distance and desirability of food sources, 
water or cavities suitable for a new colony--all of which are 
removed in time and space from the situation where the 
communication takes place.  

Animal communication often involves reciprocal exchanges, as one 
animal responds to the signals of another, which then alters its 
own signals in a simple dialogue.  Such communication sometimes 
leads to important group decisions, like the honeybees' choice of 
which cavity is mot appropriate for establishing a new colony.  

When animals make strenuous and mutually adjusted efforts to 
communicate with others,.  they may well be reporting simple 
conscious thoughts as well as emotional feelings.  Of course, we 
cannot rigorously prove this in any specific case, any more than we 
can be absolutely certain what other people think or feel.  But a 
comparable level of useful and generally accurate inference seems 
reasonable.  An African Grey parrot has been trained to use 
imitations of English words to ask for things it wants to play 
with, to answer questions about color or shape, to say whether two 
objects are the same or different, and, if they differ, whether in 
shape or color.  This parrot, and the several chimpanzees who have 
learned to communicate by means of keyboards or by gestures derived 
from American Sign Language, expresses simple statements and 
requests.  Although such communication is extremely limited compared 
with the tremendous scope of human language, it is quite sufficient 
to convey uncomplicated thoughts.  

The communicative signals that animals exchange provide objective 
data for scientific analysis.  For instance, experimental playbacks 
of recorded calls and observation of other animals' responses help 
clarify just what information is conveyed.  Thus, the critical 
interpretation of animal communication constitutes a useful window 
on animal minds.  Communicating animals may be able to tell us 
directly and explicitly about some of their thoughts and feelings, 
once we are prepared to listen.  

DONALD R. GRIFFIN is best known for his discovery (jointly with 
Robert Galambos) that bats use echolocation.  He has investigated 
animal behavior for many years while at Cornell, Harvard and 
Rockefeller universities.  Since retiring from Rockefeller, he 
continues his work at Harvard's Concord Field Station.  
====================================================================

-- 
Russell Lawrence, WP Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000
russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ