HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 09:44:59 GMT

In article <BxvGCn.J9n@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}  Also if you think "logic" is a basic human trait you should see
}  research by Cosmides (USC, I think).

UCSB.  She's a libertarian I recently had the pleasure of meeting, as well as
her husband.  They work in anthro and psych, as I recall.  How does any of
their work contradict the claim that the unique characteristic of humans is
the capacity for logic?


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 09:21:50 GMT

In article <Bxwxpo.MM1@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}  if you can predict the long-term behavior
}  of social systems you could be the richest man in the world and
}  not have to major in computers in college as rich, or whatever you
}  do.   
}
}  A prerequisite for "doing what's best in the long run" is being 
}  able to predict what long-term effects your actions will have.
}  I challenge you to prove that you can make such predictions
}  accurately.

Peter once again commits the error of implying that quantity exhausts the
options here.  Qualitative prediction is all we can correctly get from
economic theory.  Mixed with historical experience, we can indicate a
probable range of quantitative predictions, but never with the same certainty
as in some of the natural sciences, because none of the factors involved
are constant or, by contrast, variable.

When it comes to qualitative predictions, economic theory works.  The Great
Depression was predicted by Ludwig von Mises, who also used his mastery of
economic theory to end the inflation in Austria when he lived there.

Thus I refute Peter Nelson, yet again.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: asp+@cs.cmu.edu (James Aspnes)
Subject: Rational Man (Rand)
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 22:07:12 GMT

I'm a bit confused by the development of Randian ethics from the claim that
man is rational.  From previous posts here the method seems to run something
like this:

 1. The defining property of humans is rationality.  The argument for this is
    that, unlike other animals, humans need to reason (form concepts?  carry
    out syllogisms?) to survive.

 2. An action is "good" if it promotes life.  In the case of humans, since
    human life depends on rationality, "good" is anything that promotes reason,
    individuality, and various other virtues that are part of man's nature
    as a rational animal.

(and everything else follows from here in a blinding blaze of logic.)

It seems that the same methodology could be used to derive any number of
incompatible systems of ethics.  Consider for example the following argument:

 1. The defining property of humans is the ability to fit in to some society.
    The argument for this is that, unlike other animals, humans need to adapt
    to their social environment to survive.  (Even though solitary humans in
    the wilderness may be able to stay alive, this is an unusual situation
    similar to the "lifeboat situations" that are often raised against Randian
    ethics--- the most common situation a human finds himself in is one where
    he is surrounded by other humans and must to a certain extent adopt their
    ways to survive.)

 2. Something is "good" if it promotes life.  In the case of humans, what is
    good are those things that promote successful adaption of the individual
    to the ways of the group.  So compulsory civics classes, top 40 radio
    stations, and fashion magazines are "good" because they make it easier for
    individuals to find out what the group's folkways are and conform to them.
    On the other hand, most philosophy is evil because it encourages people
    to turn into weird alienated intellectuals that can't talk to normal
    people any more.

One could, of course, imagine similar arguments based on defining humanity
as the animal that wears clothes (making good tailors into saints) or as the
animal that is sexually receptive most of the time (making a virtue of sexual
hedonism), or as the animal that walks erect (making osteoparosis the ultimate
evil that must be avoided.)
/(One/
sj(jjp
So my question is, why do we pick reasoning as the defining human trait?
Certainly as smart rational nerds it's tempting for us to think that that's the
most important part of being human, but how do we justify it to somebody who
isn't a philosopher?
Xref: sparky talk.politics.theory:5116 talk.philosophy.misc:2580 rec.arts.books:20575
From: gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
Subject: Will (was: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?))
Date: 23 Nov 92 23:53:33 GMT
Organization: mydog in exile

nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
|   ...
|   Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
|   How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology?  If the 
|   brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
|   from?  I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
|   where nondetermined events would arise; but free will?   An immortal
|   soul, maybe?   ...

It's easy to account for free will by supposing that
existence wills itself into being.  Will, in this view,
is the primordial fact of the universe.  And this is
consistent with the definition of free will as will
which is not caused by something else.

In this view, human biology, physics, and chemistry
are simply manifestations of some mind or other.  As
would be an immortal soul, if anyone came across one.

Note that the primordial-will theory is consistent
with our immmediate perceptions and experience, while
the "facts" of physics, chemistry, biology, the
determination of events, and so forth, are objects
constructed upon sensation, and, generally, 
language, and are therefore -- I would think --
rather suspect.
-- 

 )*(    Gordon Fitch    )*(    gcf@panix.com    )*(
( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta.,  NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 11:01:34 GMT

In article <By10xx.4AA@newcastle.ac.uk> Chris.Holt@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
}starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}>jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
}>}I'm responding to Peter Nelson in private e-mail, because I think that
}>}his lack of knowledge of that which he critiques is too embarassing to
}>}parade in public.
}
}>On the contrary, since he's hopeless, it's worthwhile to ridicule him so that
}>others won't be as tempted to associate themselves with him in word or deed.
}
}Oh dear.  And here I was enjoying watching him put jimmy donal wales
}on the spot.  I'm not usually tempted to associate myself with
}Peter Nelson, but he's good at seeing problems (e.g. the lack
}of a conservative solution to the medical crisis, and the lack
}of a usable axiomatic basis for objectivism).  So can I be ridiculed
}too? :-)

Not at all.  You've proven to be a respectable opponent.

}>Beasts can't even do the most basic syllogism: if A impies B and B implies
}>C, then A implies C.  Their lives aren't dependent upon reason, as those of
}>men are.
}
}Does this suggest that before the Greeks formalized syllogisms, people's
}lives weren't dependent upon reason?  Certainly not.  Does it
}imply that understanding a formal definition of transitive, reflexive
}relations helps people reason about living their lives?  Not really.
}Can we even be certain that "beasts" cannot apply the given syllogism
}above?  Remember the experiments with teaching chimpanzees language;

I always bear them in mind when discussion this subject.  Even in the
elementary linguistics class I took in college a few years ago we covered
the complete and utter failure of these studies to prove that chimps are
capable of any truly linguistic communication.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: Precipitating Pendulums Postal Party Poopers
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 22:51:22 GMT

In article <By16Jw.39v@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>Peter _is_ a rational animal, his own protestations to the contrary
>notwithstanding.

That you can describe Peter, or anyone else, as rational has little or
no bearing on whether or not he actually is.

I suggest a reading of Dennett's "Brainstorms", particularly the
chapter where he discusses the idea of intentionality as a modelling
technique rather than a mechanism. Your convictions probably won't be
shaken, but at least you'll know that not everyone takes folk
psychology as a serious description of brain function.

There are several people around (Dennett, for one) who would question
whether or not mental states have causal powers at all; if they don't,
your and Rand's endless going on about "rationality" is completely
irrelevant.


-- paul




	



-- 
hybrid rather than pure; compromising rather than clean; distorted
rather than straightforward; ambiguous rather than articulated;
both-and rather than either-or; the difficult unity of inclusion
rather than the easy unity of exclusion.
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 07:50:55 GMT

In article <62264@mimsy.umd.edu> mangoe@cs.umd.edu (Charley Wingate) writes:
}Tim Starr writes:
}
}
}>Yet this is patently false for other sciences such as biology or economics,
}>as we've shown.  They remain verifiable sans quantitative measurement.
}
}I see little evidence of any verification of economics, which, incidentally,
}is eminently quantitative.

It's sort of quantitative.  We can know if the supply of barrels of oil sold
by Opec increases and by how much, but we can't know how much this will lower
the price per barrel.  All we can know is that the price will lower.  This is
the sort of exclusively qualitative prediction I referred to.

The verification is in the track record of investors such as Jim Davidson,
who's won awards (USA Today's, as I recall) of "Best Investor."

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
From: gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Date: 23 Nov 92 23:37:56 GMT
Organization: mydog in exile

gf:
| >                  ...  Suppose the sociobiologists
| >are at least partly right, and we have coding for
| >altruism and also less pleasant forms of communal
| >behavior in our genes:  a politics which does not
| >deal with this coding, which will express itself
| >most likely as very powerful, irrational emotions,
| >like those associated with sex, is doomed to
| >failure -- to disaster.
| >
| >I suspect it is the intuitive apprehension of such
| >emotions which leads people to believe that theories
| >based on rational self-interest are naive or 
| >irrelevant.

jfh@reef.cis.ufl.edu (James F. Hranicky):
| Seems to me that a society based on rational self-interest would take
| any "coding" into account *if* such coding exists. In other words, if
| this is "coded" genetically into people's personalities, then it will be
| in their rational self-interest to help others. Whether it is coded or not
| is beside the point. If it is coded, however, then enforcing it at the
| point of a gun is unnecessary. ...

Not necessarily.  Suppose 95% of the population possess
this coding to such an extent that they are _compelled_ to
act altruistically, but the other 5% are altruism-free.  In
order to protect themselves from serious free-riding and
unlimited and destructive use by the 5%, the altruistic 
majority would have to do something to protect themselves;
and what they would do would probably involve the point of
a gun -- which they could easily justify in the case of
the recalcitrant 5% as being "for their own good." 

The example may seem far-fetched, but I think something 
similar occurs in the establishment of present-day welfare
systems.  That is, the majority, and especially their leaders,
find the poor unaesthetic, as well as possibly rebellious,
criminal, and pathogenic.  They are affected by stirrings of
altruism, as well as fear.  Yet no one agrees on exactly how
much needs to be given to mitigate the situation, and some
intend to ride free.  Hence -- as a matter of defense -- the
majority extract the necessary funds at the point of a gun,
otherwise known as taxation, since they regard the 
alternatives as worse.

One might say this is an example of a society acting 
rationally to handle certain irrationalities -- the 
irrationality, if it is that, of the altruism of its
constituents, the lack of altruism of other of its
constituents (for some altruism seems to be part of 
rational self-interest) and the irrationality of Nature,
so to speak, in creating the poor in the first place.  

Of course, I am using "rational" rather loosely here.
-- 

 )*(    Gordon Fitch    )*(    gcf@panix.com    )*(
( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta.,  NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
From: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Reply-To: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Organization: Digital Equipment Corp. - Telstar
Distribution: usa
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 19:42:43 GMT

In article <1992Nov18.172026.8001@ncar.ucar.edu> gary@colossus.cgd.ucar.edu (Gary Strand) writes:

[stuff deleted]

>  My main point is that perhaps we're approaching this from the wrong angle.
>  The rules for determining whether or not a scientific theory is correct
>  are applicable only to science, and we need some other metrics for judging
>  ethical theories. I certainly wouldn't use the scientific method to judge
>  whether or not the "Mona Lisa" was a good painting, and I don't see that
>  we *necessarily* have to use it to judge theories about ethics. Perhaps
>  you're trying to put a square peg in a round hole.
>
>--
>Gary Strand                      Opinions stated herein are mine alone and are
>strandwg@ncar.ucar.edu            not representative of NCAR, UCAR, or the NSF


It's about time someone said this.

Peter is apparently is insisting that all problems lie within the domain
of science. Well, maybe they don't. Maybe there are other domains. In
these cases, the scientific method is just as inappropriate as would be
the use of 'intuition' to solve certain scientific problems.

If you want to find out how heavy something is, you weigh it; you don't
look at it and think about it. Similarly, in evaluating ethical or other
related propositions, perhaps methods can and should be used which are
quite unlike the scientific method.


Don Pajerek

Standard disclaimers apply.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: UDel, School of Life & Health Sciences
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 09:59:41 GMT

In article <BxvtEt.ICG@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
}I'm responding to Peter Nelson in private e-mail, because I think that
}his lack of knowledge of that which he critiques is too embarassing to
}parade in public.

On the contrary, since he's hopeless, it's worthwhile to ridicule him so that
others won't be as tempted to associate themselves with him in word or deed.

}On the rationality of animals question, it should be pointed out that
}there _are_ valid contexts in which we should take into account the
}differences between humans and other animals.  In particular, we must
}recognize that our powers of conceptualization are vastly more powerful
}than those of any other species.  The crude reasoning done by animals
}is not sufficient to allow them to philosophize, for example.  Nor to
}allow them to choose an ethical theory in the same way that humans
}can.  The Rand quote that was posted here was from an essay on ethics,
}in which Rand was making precisely this point: unlike other animals,
}humans can choose a code of values.

Beasts can't even do the most basic syllogism: if A impies B and B implies
C, then A implies C.  Their lives aren't dependent upon reason, as those of
men are.

}I'll not post anything further about this for a little while, until
}Peter and I have some private e-mail conversations about this.  I
}really do think that once I explain Rand's theory to him, he will not
}be so blindly hostile.

You're making the same mistake I once made: thinking that Peter wants to
learn about Objectivism.  He doesn't.  He's already made up his mind.  He
thinks he knows it all, and he thinks it's wrong.  Moreover, he really and
truly is a positivist.

When I mentioned some of his characteristics to a law professor friend of
mine with a PhD in philosophy (the philosophy of science being he specialty),
she informed me that they're characteristic of positivists.  Hayek's critique
and history of positivism confirms this ("The Counter-Revolution of Science,"
which I recently read to my great benefit).  She's a pragmatist, and she
disagrees with positivism.

Peter is profoundly ignorant.  He's ignorant of this, of course, which
compounds the sin of omission.  He thinks that in order for scientific
theories to be acceptable, they must have predictive power.  Yet evolutionary
theory didn't have this and was still considered scientific.

Thus his claims fail as descriptions of science, and default into normative
claims which he not only can't justify, but doesn't even attempt to.  He's
ignorant of the fact that it is precisely this relativism which justified
the fascists in Mussolini's Italy and the Nazis in Hitler's Germany, and
he doesn't care.


Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu

"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.society.civil-liberty
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject: Re: [ACLU] Guardian of Liberty: American Civil Liberties Union
Organization: Syracuse University, CIS Dept.
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 18:01:27 EST

In article <1992Nov22.042531.248@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:

>>>Your statement of the ACLU's position was incorrect (or, at least, 
>>>misleading) and you claimed there were no relevant Supreme Court
>>>rulings on the subject (which you apparently knew was not the case.)
>
>>I said "definitive", not "relevant". Miller, while relevant, does not
>>address the more recent spate of state gun control laws.
>
>You were discussing the meaning of the Second Amendment in general, not
>it's application to state governments. US v. Miller is quite definitive
>on this subject: The right of private citizens to own militia-usefull
>weapons is protected. If this protection applies to imfringement by
>the federal government only, or also to the states, is unclear from
>modern case law. At least in dicta, Presser v. Illinois says that
>the states can not prohibit the right, although local regulation may
>be acceptable.

I'd say this is a great piece of wishful thinking.  US v. Miller is
anything *but* definitive.

Brown v. Board of Education, Gideon v. Wainwright, Miranda v. Arizona--these
were *definitive* rulings.

But, US v. Miller has been subject to very widely varying interpretation
by legal scholars--including those most important ones (in a practical
sense): judges.  The lower courts have been quite divided over what US
v. Miller means, with virtually all lower federal court rulings adopting an
interpretation different from the "definitive" one that you impute to the
case.

US v. Miller has failed to prevent either federal- or state-level regulation
of arms, and for better than 50 years, the SC has declined to provide any
commentary that clarifies the meaning of the decision.

In fact, *both* sides of the gun control debate cite US v. Miller as
"clearly" supporting their interpretation of the 2nd amendment.


I'd say that US v. Miller is about as far from "definitive" as one can get.



-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
From: ian@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland)
Subject: Re: The Two Faces of Ayn Rand
Organization: EECS Department, Northwestern University
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 22:43:41 GMT

In article <By16rD.3r7@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwales@silver.ucs.indiana
.edu (jimmy donal wales) writes:
>Stephen Van Egmond writes:
>>>However, in this context I think that "rational" refers to the method

>>>one uses to derive one's morality.  One begins with a set of axioms
>>>that define basic realities about life (a person's right to their own
 
>>>existence, etc.),
>
>Rand does not begin with 'a person's right to their own existence'
>as an axiom.  An axiom is that which is implied by any other statement
>or proposition.  An axiom is not a postulate or an assumption.

I think you have the words "axiom" and "tautology" confused, Mr.
Wales.  An axiom is a basic starting assumption or postulate.  A
tautology is that which is implied by anything (or nothing).

Mr. van Egmond, I suggest you read more Objectivism.  Your description
of Rand's starting points is incorrect.
-- 
Ian Sutherland
ian@eecs.nwu.edu

Sans Peur
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
From: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Reply-To: pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (Don Pajerek)
Organization: Digital Equipment Corp. - Telstar
Distribution: usa
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 18:20:35 GMT

In article <Bxz04G.LyL@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>In article <1992Nov19.091133.22814@genie.slhs.udel.edu> starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>>In article <Bxv9Ls.784@apollo.hp.com> nelson_p@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>
>>However, the growth of the Austrian or market-process school is accelerating.
>>It does quite well without your vaunted positivism.
>
>  Define "well".   What does it predict for FY93 GDP, unemployment, 
>  industrial production, etc?
>

Scientific theories need not predict, though many do. What they must do
is explain.


Don Pajerek

Standard disclaimers apply.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian