Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Truth and Denotation (was re: Philosophical Influence)
From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 18 Aug 92 13:02:19 EDT
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Aug18.035040.13732@a.cs.okstate.edu>
onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>From article <1992Aug17.071316.14809@husc3.harvard.edu>, by
>zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):

>>In article <1992Aug17.024216.1123@a.cs.okstate.edu>
>>onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>>>From article <1992Aug16.043209.14785@husc3.harvard.edu>, by
>>>zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny):

[some bullshit elided]

MZ: 
>>However, if you have any ideas, I'll be happy to discuss them.

COO:
>We'll see if you actually discuss them.

I'll take this as a promise of ideas to come.  

COO:
>>>>>Second, it comes as no surprise that you find the
>>>>>second task of philosophy as that which concerns meaning--this point
>>>>>and your first task go hand in hand.  It turns out, Mikhail, that the
>>>>>two tasks you have set forth, as divided in two, can not
>>>>>be seperated.  Confused?  Always look to the function of the sign,
>>>>>the function of the sign is to structure.  Since it was the structure
>>>>>you were looking for, and since the sign is to structure, your first
>>>>>task should have stated "find meaning."  And finding meaning, Mikhail,
>>>>>is the purpose of philosophy--See...Heidegger isn't so bad, now is he?

MZ:
>>>>You seem to be confusing the function of the sign with its structure.  The
>>>>function of the sign is to denote; otherwise, I assure you, we wouldn't be
>>>>having this conversation.

COO:
>>>And what does denotation do Mikhail?  Structure..  Denotation and structuring
>>>go hand in hand unless you would like to 
>>>explain why they do not--I would be much appreciative. Mmm. Now you
>>>are back to square one.  

MZ:
>>Unfortunately for you, the burden of proof lies on the party making a
>>positive claim.  Denotation doesn't have to do anything, except be denoted.
>>If you think otherwise, try telling me why.

COO:
>Denote 'denotation' and you will have formed a structure.  Thus,
>denotating structures.  OH, and I am so dissapointed.  Yes, the
>key verb there is 'formed.'  (BTW, I hardly felt burdened)

Once you distinguish the relation from its terms, this will no longer
appear reasonable.  Denotation is a relation that holds between a sign and
the object it represents; the term `denotation' is also used metonymically
to stand for the object so represented.  A sign is a term in the denoting
relation; as such it is indeed a member of a structure.  However, its
function is not to structure, in any meaningful sense of that expression,
but to represent, that is to act as proxy of the object denoted by it.  Any
structure of the object is logically, and hence ontologically prior to the
representational structure of the sign-object relation.  Only the latter is
formed in the act of naming; if your point is limited to that, I fail to
see its relevance.

COO:
>>>>>Your next question is probably "so what's wrong?"  The answer is:
>>>>>nothing, so long as you don't pressupose reality in the finding of meaning
>>>>>and here I say "reality" not "being" because being is always presupposed..

MZ:
>>>>I don't presuppose much of anything these days, -- doctor's orders.
>>>>Instead, I deduce things, as far as I can, and no further.  Reality of
>>>>meaning is one of them; being, though decidedly not a big deal, is another.
>>>>Have I mentioned Parmenides yet?

COO:
>>>First, Being can not be deduced--it is always presupposed. 

MZ:
>>I take the _cogito_ over the overwhelming authority of your claim.

COO:
>And this is your mistake--although philosophically understandable.

Unless you succeed in convincing me in your own words that the _cogito_ is
a philosophical mistake, I'll remain lost to the light of your wisdom.
Incidentally, "reality in the finding of meaning" is deducible by other
means, on which see below.

COO:
>>>							     Second,
>>>meaning can be deduced, as it has been, but it is not limited to a simple
>>>deduction.   Ontically, meaning is deductable.  

MZ:
>>I fail to understand this claim.

COO:
>Which claim?  If the latter, you either understand it or you don't.
>As to the former, meaning should have been with scare-quotes 'meaning'
>to denote that I was refering to the concept.  However, this brings me
>to a critical point that I think hasn't been brought up.  
>The problem that I find with the representational crap is that it
>limits the "horizon" of the word.  Words are always in use.  Whenever
>the word comes under analysis it is even further in use.  However, 
>its use now is one which fits a particular philosophical agenda.  
>There is the issue of history and world that seems to be ignored
>in representational theories. 

I take it that you are unfamiliar with the work of Popper, who regards the
Third World as evolved, rather than immutable.  Once again, I have
absolutely no interest in giving an exposition of his views, as the burden
of so doing clearly belongs to the party pronouncing *all* representational
theories to be "crap".

COO:
>			       When, for example, we analyze the
>meaning of a word in philosophy, or philology, we attempt to pin
>it down to a particular "historical" period, within a particular
>contextual arrangement under which the word is employed.  The problem
>that I find with this is simply that we provide no analysis of the
>analysis--we act as though the present action of analysis has no
>impact on the word's meaning.  Because of this, I refer to representational
>theories as "crap."

Looks like you don't know Tarski, either.  Does the distinction between an
object language and a metalanguage ring a bell?  Aside from that, of course
metalinguistic analysis will trickle down into the object language, -- it's
all part of the normal semantic evolution.  The mere fact of distinguishing
between _genesis_ and _on_ doesn't entitle you to infer that the
historicity of the former has no bearing on the essential nature of the
latter.

COO:
>>>						Third, you fail to
>>>address the reality issue--the pressupposition of reality was made in
>>>your first task stated as "find the structure of reality."  The problem
>>>which Plato had, which Heidegger brings up again, is that we are
>>>not clear what "Being" is nor do we have any idea of what reality is either.

MZ: 
>>Speak for yourself, kemosabe.  My intuitions differ.

COO:
>You reserve the right, of course, to make the above appear as shallow
>as possible.  However, I fear that you do not comprehend the 
>severe philosophical ramifications.

I am afraid that you have done your part in making the above appear as
shallow as possible.  If you feel that there exist severe philosophical
ramifications, which are deducible from premisses acceptable to both of us,
without _petitio principii_, then please show them to me; otherwise I'll
continue to choose my familiar ideas over your pompous revisionist
pronouncements.  Note that your `wh'-questions just don't make the grade.

COO:
>>>						    Now, to avoid a confusing
>>>equivocation of Being and Reality, we must seperate the two so that
>>>they will not be confused.  On this point, reality is a world in which
>>>we search(appropriate as I was reminded by Professor Dreyfus once).
>>>Now, the realitivistic flag may be tripped in your mind--but you must 
>>>realize that we are not certain what you mean by truth, nor are we
>>>certain what you mean by reality. 
>>> A propos the relativistic elements, Heidegger reduces the looming
>>>philsophical problem down to a simple determinite which is pre-analytical:
>>>it claims "there is."  It claims that "truth" is that which denotes the
>>>world as such.  Since the world is "in each case mine."  And since we
>>>all are, the truth is a universal--not too terribly relativistic now
>>>is it. 

MZ:
>>Charles, this is getting quite hopeless.  We are really speaking different
>>languages, and I have absolutely no interest in humoring you by mocking
>>your idiom.

COO:
>Nor do I of yours.

At last we agree on something.

MZ:
>>		  I find that some of your basic claims are due either to
>>ignorance, or more charitably, to unwarranted revisionism; the latter is
>>what I originally tagged your master with, so you may share the honors if
>>you so wish.  As for me, I prefer to converse with post-Eleatic, if not
>>post-Socratic philosophers.  Your discourse, as it is presented, is a great
>>illustration of the reason why Heidegger is not taken seriously by the vast
>>majority of Anglo-American philosophers: you habitually indulge in
>>grandiloquent, utterly unsubstantiated claims, which attempt to turn the
>>clock back 2,500 years, without the least regard for the intervening
>>history of progress in the subject.

COO:
> Of course this is purely a statement of ignorance on your part.
>Heidegger was utterly concerned with the intervening history of the
>subject.  Whether or not we want to refer to the history as "progress"
>is, of course, the crux of the debate.  Further, I find no substantiation
>in any of your rebuttals either--all I can find are vague
>references to a history of philosophy and a smug assumption that
>I have not bothered to read any of it; so, I ignore that point.  

My references are anything but vague: on being (note the lowercase `b') see
the Eleatics; on the deduction of the same, see Descartes (or read on).  If
you claim passing familiarity with the history of philosophy, you are not
entitled to anything more explicit than that.  (If you disclaim such
familiarity, I have no interest in continuing this conversation.)  And if
you wish to challenge the progressive status of Parmenides or the _cogito_,
then offer some arguments to the contrary.  You see, you are the one doing
rebuttals here; I am standind on the classical grounds, and so far have
seen no reason to budge.

MZ:
>>				  Unfortunately for you, you lack both
>>Heidegger's sophistication and his classical erudition; fortunately, you
>>are well on the way to matching him in bad faith, as I have demonstrated
>>elsewhere.  

COO:
>Try, "Unfortunately for you, you lack both the time and the bandwith
>to reproduce the amount of material necessary to show any sort of
>sophistication or erudition."  Which is, of course, what I assume
>about you.  Further, you have demonstrated nothing--ranted plenty,
>but demonstrated nothing.

Charles, once again, just so that you can understand it -- the burden of
proof lies on you, for you are the one telling me that my theory is crap.
Now, if you truly lack both the time and the bandwith to reproduce the
amount of material necessary to show any sort of sophistication or
erudition, you have absolutely no business continuing this discussion; by
contrast, as the defending party, I need only expend enough energy to
expose your claims as unsubstsantiated by argument.  This much I have done.

MZ:
>>	Unless you can show me that you are capable of presenting a
>>brief, cogent agrument, -- not an assertion, not a quotation or paraphrase,
>>but an argument, -- this discussion is now officially over.

COO:
>Oh no!  And perhaps if I could get the same from you, we might get
>somewhere.  So, lets begin at the beginning.  What is 'truth' Mikhail?
>I want a concrete answer, no paraphrases, no references to the history
>of philosophy which I obviously heretofore have not read, no quotations,
>but an argument--what is 'truth'?  Now, if you fail to provide an answer
>I will simply accept that you can not and resume my studies in an
>area more capable.

My pleasure: `truth' is an English word signifying the quality of being
true, conformity with fact, agreement with reality, and so on.  By
contrast, truth is an abstract object inferred to be the denotation of all
true sentences.  Note that this constitutes a concrete and comprehensive
answer to your question, bereft of any external references.  However, for
the sake of completeness, I'll add that the argument on which the said
inference is based may be found in Church's _Introduction to Mathematical
Logic_, his 1943 review of Carnap's _Introduction to Semantics_, or
G\"odel's 1944 article "Russell's Mathematical Logic".  For the benefit of
those familiar with elementary logic, and the TeX notation for the same, a
technical version of this argument will be reproduced on request.  So there
you are, procurator.

>BCnya,
> Charles O. Onstott, III

So where were all your ideas?

>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Charles O. Onstott, III  Account at Oklahoma State University for summer.
>Graduate Student in Religious Studies           onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu
>University of Chicago
>
>"anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the one-self, and brings
>it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported
>by conerful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, is an impassioned
>freedom towards death--a freedom which has been released from the 
>Illusions of the "one", and which is factical, certain of itself, 
>and anxious."            Martin Heidegger  _Being and Time_
>------------------------------------------------------------------------

I prefer the part cited by Carnap.

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta