From: young@clpd.kodak.com (Rich Young)
Subject: Re: Human motivation and true altruism
Originator: young@plasma
Reply-To: young@clpd.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Diagnostics Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 04:44:33 GMT

In <C0EJ65.Gsy@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:
>
>From article <1993Jan5.055124.5824@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@clpd.kodak.com 
(Rich Young):
>> In <C0CyLL.6pD@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:

[...]

>> What on Earth is an "altruistic conclusion?"  And why are you
>> talking about conclusions when the thread is about motivations?

[...]

>This thread began when you set forth one of your unsubstantiated, 
>"prove-me-wrong" type theories:
>
>Message-ID <1992Nov6.162026.7683@pixel.kodak.com>
>======================================================================
>ry> Please name one human activity that CANNOT be explained by one of 
>ry> these:
>ry>
>ry> 1. the desire to increase pleasurable ("good") feelings in the 
>ry> one performing the activity, or,
>ry> 
>ry> 2. the desire to decrease or avoid unpleasurable ("bad") feelings
>ry> in the one performing the activity.
>======================================================================
>
>I think we've demonstrated that it's foolish to "explain" all activities,
>including a particular pattern of thinking, by your theory.   [Like it
>or not, thinking is a form of human activity, Rich.]

        Two things here, Russell:

           1. How does this provide the definition of an "altruistic
                 conclusion?"

           2. How does this explain your referral to "conclusions" when
                 the thread is clearly about "motivations?"

        Now, let's get to the definition of "activity":

           activity, n., 1: the quality or state of being active; 2: a
                          vigorous or energetic action; liveliness.

           active, adj., 1: characterized by action rather than by con-
                          templation or speculation; 2: productive of
                          action or movement.

        Any questions?

>>>If the mindfulness of the bear or the live chicken egg isn't a 
>>>factor, why would the man feel remorse in one case but not in the 
>>>other?
>> 
>> How should I know!?  Ask HIM.  HE'S the one getting his jollies
>> by killing them.  The mere fact that he's getting his jollies is
>> all the proof I need.  It doesn't matter how he feels AFTER the 
>> fact; it's how he felt BEFORE the fact that I'm discussing.  It's
>> what made him do it in the first place that interests me here.
>
>You've assumed that he's "getting his jollies", just as you assumed
>that he was "feeling remorse".  It's quite apparent that you can't
>explain the feelings of remorse without relying on the very assumptions
>that you've been trying to prove.

        OK, let's be rash and assume that you're right for just a brief
        moment, and that I'm "relying on the assumptions I'm trying to
        prove."  Why'd he do it, Russell?  Why'd he kill all them chickens,
        if not for his own benefit?

>>>Why would a man conclude that it's ok to bang the keyboard of
>>>a computer but not ok to bang the face of a dog?   Answer: 
>>>because he realizes that computers, unlike dogs and rape 
>>>victims, don't feel pain.
>> 
>> Yes, and.......?  C'mon, Russell, you can do it.......
>> 
>> [Don't show this to Russell, Gentle Reader, or he'll never under-
>> stand the ideas involved: the man feels some mental discomfort upon
>> seeing the dog's pain, and so formulates a proscription, or taboo,
>> against banging the face of dogs so that he won't have to observe
>> such an act in the future...and undergo more mental distress.  His
>> motives in formulating the taboo are ultimately selfish.]
>
>Again, why would the man feel discomfort if he were unconcerned
>about the dog's predicament?

        If he were truly unconcerned, he wouldn't feel any discomfort
        of course, but that's not what you said.  Your [straw] man
        concluded "...that it's ok to bang the keyboard of a computer
        but not ok to bang the face of a dog."  Clearly he's made a value
        judgement through some mental process which is based on his
        perception of doggie discomfort.  If he were unconcerned, then
        "OK" or not "OK" wouldn't even enter into it.  The action would
        be ethically irrelevant.

>>>> Indeed.  As I've shown above, it'd be silly to assume that 
>>>> conclusions have any relevance to this discussion at all.  It's
>>>> motivations we're discussing.
>>>
>>>Yet, you'd have us believe that altruistic ideas are somehow bound
>>>and determined by motivation.
>> 
>> No, that's what you'd have us BELIEVE I said, Russell.  I've
>> ACTUALLY said no such thing.
>
>Thinking is an activity, Rich.  Reread your original statement.  [...]

        See definitions, above, Russell, then YOU go re-read my original
        statement.

[...]

>I don't enjoy watching rapes, Rich.  And the reason I don't enjoy
>watching rapes is that I realize that rape is very unpleasant for
>the victims.   If I were convinced that the victims enjoy being
>raped, then I suppose I would consider rape to be a fun activity.
>
>You'll notice that my "good" and "bad" feelings depend on observations
>of "good" and "bad", and not the other way around.

        I don't care WHAT your "good" and "bad" feelings depend on, Russell,
        the mere fact that you HAVE them is all that's required to support
        my thesis.

[...]

>> Why have you broken with prior tradition and concluded that
>> killing cattle for lunch is an abomination?
>
>Here are some of the reasons why I consider the killing of cattle to
>be a poor choice:

        [...yeah, yeah, we know all about John Robbins...]

>My decisions re: cattle consumption are "driven", as it were, by 
>reasoning based on the observed facts and not by my desire to avoid
>"bad feelings" or seek out "good feelings".

        Uh-huh.  Sure, your "decisions" [he really means "conclusions"]
        regarding the consumption of cattle are based on reasons you
        consider to be logical, but how does the thought of engaging in
        an activity such as eating meat make you FEEL?

[...]

>>>The taboo creator in your example would be immune to such
>>>pressures.  You yourself have mentioned that such a man would have
>>>had the power to force his views on others (in your hypothetical
>>>example.)  I'm still waiting for you to explain how his decision
>>>to implement a taboo was bound to his own selfish "feelings".
>> 
>> When you answer the question above, you'll have the answer to
>> this one.
>
>I've answered your question.  Now please answer mine.

        You've "addressed" it, but you haven't answered it yet.  How does
        the thought of eating meat make you FEEL, Russell?

[...]

>As I pointed out previously, one of my neighbors claims that all 
>bad events in the world are caused by Satan.  The fact that you'd 
>have difficulty convincing him otherwise doesn't indicate that 
>he's right.  It merely indicates that he's very adept at fooling 
>himself.  

        Which is probably why you get along with him.

>> Give me one example of a human action that can't be explained either
>> by the desire to increase pleasurable feelings in the one performing
>> the action, or the desire to decrease or avoid unpleasurable feelings
>> in the one performing the action.  Forget everything except this
>> request, if you like, but DO answer (not simply "address") it.
>
>The formulation of prohibitions against rape, Rich, but you knew that 
>already.

        Your example is refuted.  If rape were something about which all
        members of a society were unconcerned, there would be no taboo, but
        concern = mental discomfort which results in a taboo because some
        big mucky-muck had the horsepower to say, "I don't like it, so you'd
        better not do it," and make it stick.

        Your example is not only refuted, it's pathetic.


-Rich Young (These are not Kodak's opinions.)