From: cowan@ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu (P.L. Cowan)
Newsgroups: alt.war.civil.usa
Subject: Re: LINCOLN'S GENERALS
Followup-To: alt.war.civil.usa
Date: 8 Jan 93 22:20:47 -0800
Organization: SSRL, Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lab
NNTP-Posting-Host: ssrl01.slac.stanford.edu

In article <1993Jan8.161136.18699@starbase.trincoll.edu>,  () writes:
> You can't diagnose Meade's decision to not pursue a crippled Lee on 3 July
> 1863, pushing him back against a swollen Potomac, as a result of his desire
> to win battles, and not the war.

Good! Back to Gettysburg.

I don't think it is correct to say that Meade decided "not to pursue".
He did in fact pursue. However, Meade had left his train in
Westminster, MD during his rapid concentration upon Gettysburg. Lee on
the other hand had his wagons with him (perhaps to his regret). Lee
was therefore in a better position to move quickly. Also, with Stuart
back with the Army, Lee was able to cover the South Mountain passes
effectively (as usual) with cavalry.  Meade had sent most of his
cavalry off (I don't know why, but perhaps it was to locate the then
absent Stuart before he could pull and unpleasant surprise). Meade
finally did confront Lee north of the Potomac, but Lee was already
dug in too well to risk an all out attack (Burnside style).

> Firstly, Meade doesn't deserve that much credit for the Union's victory at
> Gettysburg. Buford and his troops and Reynolds's troops (not Reynolds, who
> didn't survive long enough on that battlefield on 1 July to make a
> meaningful contribution) deserve much of the credit for recognizing the
> value of the high ground and holding it until the rest of the Army of the
> Potomac could converge on the town that night and the next day. 

Well a lot of people (Howard, Hancock, Slocum) have claimed credit for
recognizing the value of "the high ground". Some people give Buford the
credit (including Saraah) and maybe that's right. Since Buford didn't
survive the year, he cannot be accused of glorifying his role in his 
old age. Still, if Buford thought that Cemetery Hill was such a great
defensive location, why did he deploy his own men all the way out on
McPherson Ridge?

It is certainly true that Meade cannot be given credit directly for
selecting the defensive position, since he wasn't there yet. Still one
should remember that Meade was the only commander of the AotP who was
never embarrassed by Bobby Lee. (IMHO a draw against R.E.L. should be
considered an outstanding achievement).

> Also,
> Chamberlain held the entire Union left against wave after wave of
> Confederate infantry charges the next afternoon. These were formative
> aspects of the battle.

Again, one has to read between the lines here. Chamberlain and Oates
both became governors of their states, so they had a pretty free hand
to play up their mutual confrontation on the Union left. I don't
intend to minimize the importance of LRT, but Oates had only two
regiments coming down from Round Top, and Vincent's Brigade (although
newly arrived) was still pretty  well situated. True Chamberlain's
20th Maine took heavy casualties, but had Oats overran the Maine men,
the 83rd PA was next in line beside them and had scarsely been
engaged and Haslett's battery on top of the hill was giving the Rebs 
perhaps as bad a pounding as the 20th Maine did. Also the Confederate
threat to LRT coming through Devil's Den was perhaps more serious than
Oats's charge down Round Top.
 
> 2 July's
> fighting, especially Devil's Den and Little Round Top, were pretty costly
> clashes for Lee. But he could have accepted Longstreet's recommendations
> and withdrawn, positioning himself between Meade and Washington and forcing
> battle on ground of his choosing. Read Sahaara's THE KILLER ANGELS. 

Also read Coddington, Pfanz etc. The roads south between Emittsburg
Pike and South Mountain were not very promising for a rapid flanking
movement by the entire AoNVa. Longstreet's version of events might be
closer to the truth than his adversarial erstwhile CSA comrades, but
it is still no less likely to be self serving.

> I've
> read many personal letters and testaments about the battle and Sahaara's
> novel is based on historical evidence and is essentially narrative with a
> novelists' imaginative characterizations. But its' really very close to the
> truth. 

For a novel, Saraah's book is notably loyal to the historical consensus.

> Lee was foolish and the third day's assault on the ridge was a
> disaster of the first order of magnitude. 

Obviously, but not significantly more so than his attack on Malvern
Hill or Grant's attack at Cold Harbor.

> Meade knew that the Union (I refuse to say it was because of Meade) won an
> important victory at Gettysburg and was content with that. 

I would have to say I would have been content with it also for my
first week on the job. But then, I'll never have a statue of myself
surrounded by naked women on Pennsylvania Avenue.

On a more serious note, remember that not only was Meade new to his
job, but Reynolds (1st Corps) was dead, Hancock and Sickles (2nd and
3rd) were wounded, Sykes (5th Corps) had just replaced Meade, and
Howard's 11th Corps had again come under suspicion. That left Segwick
(6th) and Slocum (12th) as the only Corps commanders with more than a
week's experience (besides Howard). This is not to mention division
and brigade commanders etc.

Also, Meade's Army had just fought in the biggest battle ever in the
Western Hemisphere and although "victorious", had sustained something
like 30% casualties. For comparison remember that in defeat at
Waterloo, Napoleon's veterans had sustained only 20% and in the famed
charge (and slaughter) of the Light Brigade on the Crimea, the LB had
suffered only a slightly higher percentage (and that was just a
cavalry brigade).

> As Lincoln said,
> he held the enemy in the palm of his hand but refused to close it. He could
> most
> likely have punished Lee severely and forced a surrender had he pursued.

Lincoln was not necessarily correct. Remember Sickles (who perhaps knew his
own @$$ was in jeopardy) left the field with the battle in progress and 
went to Washington (as any true politician would) to give Lincoln his
version of events ASAP. (Can you say, "spin doctor"?) Sickles led the
criticism of Meade as being too conservative to cover his own damned 
foolish move at the Peach Orchard.

> Lincoln liked Grant because Grant understood that you had to destroy armies
> to win wars, not simply defeat them in battle and drive them back. He was
> willing to risk enormous casualties to achieve strategic, not merely
> tactical, success. The Union had many great officers at the regimental and
> divisional level, but its great commanders emerged only in the last two
> years of the war.

It is always the commanders who are in command at the end of a war (on the 
victorious side) who are the "great" ones.

-- 
Paul Cowan     
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