HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: darrell@cse.ucsc.edu (Darrell Long)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Bug in RIPEM?
Date: 11 Jan 1993 00:39:07 GMT
Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz (CE/CIS Boards)
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: cypress.ucsc.edu

I'm getting "Can't allocate memory" if I use X to paste in the text of a
message, but it works just fine from a file.

sequoia [154]% ripem -d
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: DES-CBC,DA04DC500141C287
Originator-Name: dlong@moria
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MIGcMAoGBFUIAQECAgQAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7jegKLZX28cAhEB5e8MqfdNMykGIa
 IwyEt5/uL6EVQKe3IEAc4IlpraWefEeIYdgfoGRdbLwIHwuHcSMQoeMfkghKoG6E
 4k54nxf5FsVJPH/cgwzSHpV8azjKucnU8eTgxUUAQaH7/CarER/3isM3AmT8bxui
 r+iyUU8GBDb1KQIDAQAB
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 nUYVqO0RfnCmQ5ooC6pTI57GxUbDOISFJsnZ76IkeQmTj/s1sZqfg6iQTlNQT5Gp
 MGVzb+9HZ0yBCM9bjNvq7eC27wsDXxntiOr5TaBNtdqG1WdZgsD1eGk4GCMwuMNy
 B/JTfXqzM6HZBJGTUv38SZwYiL4DCWDjdyIlgUvlCuGQu+ohmzrhmA==
Recipient-Name: darrell@sequoia
Key-Info: RSA,
 j1fC2A5P3oFwzV1B3lEpifjGF0OJ8YRDdBIBGeJO/Lp9uvT0yPuhim9FzvrikGj+
 e8Aal2EJrYyBbCHPBxcvHm6L9mow+nzkJKtqcIOMkKI14ZjGvzg9cyblJ6s+9qyZ
 GLNeHK6ON7q2YvKXRWb04WB89SiMeRTKCPj6YmKrhmk=

jZ8QBDmU3b3pSYxV64MUqBmP2fvlbqB3Pw3B5OVkaZWLfiKV+gC89dC4QkYY1yF5
Am0nJ9hcN8JUGg6JmnQmZX3MHSSAuGV5PXdkYRBtIew=
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Enter password to private key: 
Can't allocate memory.
sequoia [155]% cat > /tmp/bar
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: DES-CBC,DA04DC500141C287
Originator-Name: dlong@moria
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MIGcMAoGBFUIAQECAgQAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7jegKLZX28cAhEB5e8MqfdNMykGIa
 IwyEt5/uL6EVQKe3IEAc4IlpraWefEeIYdgfoGRdbLwIHwuHcSMQoeMfkghKoG6E
 4k54nxf5FsVJPH/cgwzSHpV8azjKucnU8eTgxUUAQaH7/CarER/3isM3AmT8bxui
 r+iyUU8GBDb1KQIDAQAB
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 nUYVqO0RfnCmQ5ooC6pTI57GxUbDOISFJsnZ76IkeQmTj/s1sZqfg6iQTlNQT5Gp
 MGVzb+9HZ0yBCM9bjNvq7eC27wsDXxntiOr5TaBNtdqG1WdZgsD1eGk4GCMwuMNy
 B/JTfXqzM6HZBJGTUv38SZwYiL4DCWDjdyIlgUvlCuGQu+ohmzrhmA==
Recipient-Name: darrell@sequoia
Key-Info: RSA,
 j1fC2A5P3oFwzV1B3lEpifjGF0OJ8YRDdBIBGeJO/Lp9uvT0yPuhim9FzvrikGj+
 e8Aal2EJrYyBbCHPBxcvHm6L9mow+nzkJKtqcIOMkKI14ZjGvzg9cyblJ6s+9qyZ
 GLNeHK6ON7q2YvKXRWb04WB89SiMeRTKCPj6YmKrhmk=

jZ8QBDmU3b3pSYxV64MUqBmP2fvlbqB3Pw3B5OVkaZWLfiKV+gC89dC4QkYY1yF5
Am0nJ9hcN8JUGg6JmnQmZX3MHSSAuGV5PXdkYRBtIew=
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
sequoia [156]% ripem -d < /tmp/bar
Enter password to private key: 
I don't get the bomb puzzle.  Does the executioner always open box
3?


Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 08:07:22 GMT

In article <1993Jan07.202702.20110@convex.com> hamrick@convex.com (Ed Hamrick) writes:
> ...
>If you agree that this printed book is exportable, then few would
>disagree that a magnetic tape containing this source code is exportable.
>If you agree that the source code on tape is exportable, then few
>would disagree that the compiled version of this source code is exportable.
>
>Note all of the language in the regulations regarding pre-publication
>review.  When you read the regulations, they clearly indicate that once
>information is publicly available (can be obtained in a library/bookstore),
>then the cat is out of the bag and the information is exportable.  I
>believe that the Commerce Department, State Department, and NSA are
>completely uninterested in preventing the export of anything that's
>available to anybody at B. Dalton's bookstore.
>
>Anonymous ftp is fully equivalent to B. Dalton's bookstore or a
>public library.
>
>Note that this discussion has nothing to do with the exportability
>of integrated hardware/software crypto solutions.  My premise is
>primarily that the book containing the DES source code is freely
>exportable because it is publicly available information.

Sorry, but I agree that the book is exportable, but the mag tape
would not be -- should be, but the Feds do NOT agree.  

I told this before, but...  A friend of my was publishing a public
domain Forth language system (books with full source code and disks).
He was told (perhaps six or eight years ago) that he could NOT ship
the disks to someone in the USSR wanting to buy them.  He could ship
the books.  This was despite:  The books and disks were available at
a variety of bookstores (Stacey's in Palo Alto for one) and was
public domain. 

This real-world experience completely contradicts your position
that it has something to do with being publicly available.  No,
it has to do with an antiquated view from the Feds that books are
ok, but once the code becomes machine readable it becomes a physical
item very different from a book -- and therefore controllable.

It seems to also be a question of: If you ask, they'll tell you NO,
so don't ask.  -- or --  Do it and wait to see if anyone throws you
in jail.  The problem is that if an officer of any corporation did
either of those, the directors and shareholders would likely go after
that officer for having done something VERY wrong.


-- 
Glenn Tenney
voice: (415) 574-3420      fax: (415) 574-0546
tenney@netcom.com          Ham radio: AA6ER
From: everettm@Cayman.COM (Mark Everett)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: What algorithm?
Date: 6 Jan 93 16:42:40 GMT
Distribution: alt.security.ripem
Organization: Cayman Systems Inc., Cambridge, MA


I realize that PGP uses the RSA algorithm, which is patented and therefore
illegal in the U.S.  What is RIPEM and what algorithm does it use so as not
to infringe on RSA's patent?  I was reading about using Lucas functions rather
than exponentiation in Dr. Dobbs Journal (DJJ), which is ostensibly more secure
than RSA, so I assume there are some reasonable variants to avoid legal problems.
Which does RIPEM use?

--
.................................................................................
Mark J. Everett	    : Cayman Systems Inc, 26 Landsdowne St, Cambridge, MA 02139
everettm@cayman.com : Phone 617-494-1999, Fax 617-494-5167, AppleLink CAYMAN.TECH
From: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: Another bug in RIPEM?
Date: 11 Jan 1993 03:32:36 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)
Reply-To: bz223@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Danny Guy Frezza)
NNTP-Posting-Host: hela.ins.cwru.edu


In a previous article, darrell@cse.ucsc.edu (Darrell Long) says:

>If I set the RIPEM_KEY_TO_PRIVATE_KEY environment variable, I can encrypt but
>not decrypt.  For example,
>
>sequoia [1]% printenv
>HOME=/home/darrell
>LOGNAME=darrell
>USER=darrell
>...
>RIPEM_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE=/home/darrell/lib/keys/public
>RIPEM_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE=/home/darrell/lib/keys/private
>RIPEM_KEY_TO_PRIVATE_KEY=XYZZY
>sequoia [2]% ripem -e -m encrypted -r darrell@sequoia | ripem -d
>Hello world!

	Just curious.  Did you type a <control> Z after "Hello world"?

I tried this on my 386, msdos version, and had no problem.
I also tried it from a file, no problem also.
Hmm..

>Private key could not be decrypted with this password.
>
>But if I don't set it, and type the password each time, everything works fine:
>
>sequoia [1]% ripem -e -m encrypted -r darrell@sequoia | ripem -d
>Hello world!
>Enter password to private key: 
>Enter password to private key: 
>Hello world!
>
>

-- 

Dan Frezza
Internet: bz223@Cleveland.Freenet.Edu
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: Key generation
Date: 8 Jan 93 22:03:43 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: scss3.cl.msu.edu
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Matthew Merkelson (memco@cns.nyu.edu) wrote:
: Approximately how much time should be taken up in random string typing
: during key generation? I compiled ripem on a Sun and spent over 7
: minutes typing randomly without ever being asked for a password. I finally gave up
: and tried using the -R efs option. Did I do something wrong?

Key generation takes less than a minute on a Sun (depending on the
model).  Don't forget to enter a carriage return at the end
of the random string.  RIPEM doesn't start computing until
you type the CR.

Mark R.
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: Licensing Question on RIPEM/PGP
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 19:47:59 GMT

This response is based on the legal situation as I understand it. Others
may respond based on their personal advocacies or on how they think
things SHOULD BE.

In article <15948@hq.hq.af.mil> rick@hq.af.mil writes:
>I have been following some of the threads here and I am trying to discern
>what the licensing differences are between RIPEM and PGP.
>
>As I understand it PGP is not being licensed by PKP although if you
>are a federal employee you can still use the software because
>uncle Sam funded development. This is in the US, and these restrictions
>aren't necessarily true overseas. Has any of this changed?

This is not quite correct. PGP2.x was written in Europe, and thus
requires an ITAR license to import. None has been granted. This
is quite separate from patent issues.
>
>I have been following the RIPEM stuff for a couple of days
>and it seems it is being licensed in the US. Is this true? 
>If so why are  licenses being issued for RIPEM and not PGP?
>Assuming the above hasn't changed.

The ITAR license mentioned above is given by the U.S. government
and relates to the Munitions laws. The license you mention for
RIPEM is a license to use PKP's patents with respect to RIPEM,
and is given by RSA Inc. which makes available a set of routines,
RSAREF, which use the patented technology. That is a private
license under the Patent laws and has nothing to do with the
Government license under Munitions laws. Thus far, RSA/PKP
have refused to give a patent license for PGP. Although
the U.S. Government does not require a patent license to use
the RSA techniques used in PGP, PGP also uses IDEA, a Swiss
crypto system. To import IDEA requires the Government
license (nothing to do with RSA Inc., PKP, or RIPEM/RSAREF).

I've had e-mail from other Government employees, who use RIPEM
and say it's more than their job's worth to get involved with PGP.
>
>If someone could explain this I would be thankful. 
>
>-- 
>Rick Weldon     I-NET Inc. (Pentagon, 7TH Com Group)
>E-mail: rick@hq.af.mil


-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu (Marc VanHeyningen)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: What algorithm?
Date: 6 Jan 93 18:13:49 GMT
Distribution: alt.security.ripem
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
X-Quoted: 54%

Thus said everettm@Cayman.COM (Mark Everett):
>I realize that PGP uses the RSA algorithm, which is patented and therefore
>illegal in the U.S.  What is RIPEM and what algorithm does it use so as not
>to infringe on RSA's patent?  I was reading about using Lucas functions rather
>than exponentiation in Dr. Dobbs Journal (DJJ), which is ostensibly more secure
>than RSA, so I assume there are some reasonable variants to avoid legal problems.
>Which does RIPEM use?

RSA.  However, it uses an implementation of RSA which is licensed for
noncommercial use by RSADSI and thus is unquestionably legal to use in
the U.S. and Canada.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted

Immediate access, limited costs, high-tech medicine.
For health care, choose only two of the above.
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: memco@cns.nyu.edu (Matthew Merkelson)
Subject: Key generation
Reply-To: memco@cns.nyu.edu
Organization: New York University
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 21:53:26 GMT

Approximately how much time should be taken up in random string typing
during key generation? I compiled ripem on a Sun and spent over 7
minutes typing randomly without ever being asked for a password. I finally gave up
and tried using the -R efs option. Did I do something wrong?

---
memco@wotan.cns.nyu.edu

Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 16:04:44 GMT


Ed Hamrick posts a long re-quote from the export rules in response to
a message from Tenney. It would be helpful if he quoted only the
specific language applicable to refute Tenney's contention, since
we have moved past the general assertion to specifics that will
either confirm or refute the contention that if DES is published
in a book, the software is exportable.

Now to the details:

The contention was as above.
Tenney reported on a case of prohibition of export of software.
Hamrick counter-argues that source code is o.k., by quotation.

It may be (I'm not an attorney) that the regulations define
source code as something machine-readable, and not printed
in a document. If so it would mean Tenney's exception example
was valid, despite Hamrick's contentions, and that you could
export what we might CALL source code, printed in a book,
but could not export a listing that could be read into a
machine directly and compiled. 

Note that the law was perhaps written without consideration of OCR
devices, which WOULD confuse the issue even further. Dunno what a
judge would make of a case where a book was exported and the person at
the other end used a scanner to read the source code. My guess is that
it would probably be o.k. but that the government would still insist
that machine-readable source code was still a violation. Then the
lawyers would get into the charming discussion called "But isn't an
OCR a machine? If it's o.k.  how is it different from more
conventional machine-readable source code? The only thing I can figure
out is to agree with those who say the whole thing is a muddle.

Hamrick also quotes part of the regulations which permit export
of software if it is sold here for just the cost of publication.
It may be that Tenney's friend had a product for which he
was charging more than that, thus not covered by the relevant
paragraphs.

My own conclusion is that this particular area is likely to
need redefinition to make the rules unambiguous. It would
seem from the extensive Q&A that the government is really trying
to make things understandable, but simply hasn't done a good
job yet of clarifying some ambiguities. Knowing the bureaucratic
mind, until some egregious case comes up, they will probably
leave us in limbo.

BUT the rules may have to be redefined to clarify cases such
as those we're discussing. When that happens, another opportunity
will arise for those who wish to restrict civil liberties in the
name of national security to drive a coach-and-four through
the regulations. This baby needs to be watched very closely
by the EFF, CPSR, ACLU, or any other group that feels a strong
responsibility for intervention early in the law-making process.

-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 22:24:22 GMT


Ed Hamrick raises the new question of whether a book available at
B. Dalton's, which contains the DES code, is exportable.

From memory, I think at the time of the Pentagon Papers case, and again
when some "little" magazine published plans for building your own
A-bomb, the courts ruled that prior restraint was not permitted, but
that the government was free to act after publication.

If my memory is accurate, wouldn't that permit prosecution (if the
government for some reason wanted to do so) of anyone who exported
the book?

If Ed wants to pursue this, an interesting and amusing experiment
would be to call the book's publisher and ask if they will fulfill
prepaid mail orders for that book from outside COCOM countries--say
Iraq or Cuba or the PRC.

David
-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail

Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: hamrick@convex.com (Ed Hamrick)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: CONVEX Computer Corporation, Richardson, Tx., USA
Date: Thu, 07 Jan 1993 20:27:02 GMT
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan7.083740.6128@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
>In article <1993Jan07.075317.15435@convex.com> hamrick@convex.com (Ed Hamrick) writes:
>>The attached information clearly states that publicly available software
>>is freely exportable.  There aren't ANY weasel words about types of software.
>
>Unfortunately, the information attached applies specifically to the
>Commerce Department's "Core List" controls, *not* to the State
>Department's ITARs (International Traffic in Arms Regulations). In
>theory, the Core List controls "dual use" technologies (stuff with
>both military and civilian uses, general purpose computer hardware
>being the classic example) while the ITARs are supposed to regulate
>only munitions (i.e., pure weapons, a Stinger missile being the
>classic example.)

To simplify the discussion, and to remove any licensing issues that crop
up when discussing RSA, consider whether DES software is exportable.
To simplify even further, consider the question of whether a printed
book available at B. Daltons book store which contains a printed copy of
source code that implements DES encryption is exportable.  I maintain
that this book can be exported under the license I mentioned.  I
further maintain that this book and it's contents are uninteresting to
the State Department and NSA once it has been made available to the
public.  This institutional disinterest is codified in the description of
the type of information that is freely exportable.

The reasons for this institutional disinterest seem obvious, but
maybe I'm missing something subtle.

If you agree that this printed book is exportable, then few would
disagree that a magnetic tape containing this source code is exportable.
If you agree that the source code on tape is exportable, then few
would disagree that the compiled version of this source code is exportable.

Note all of the language in the regulations regarding pre-publication
review.  When you read the regulations, they clearly indicate that once
information is publicly available (can be obtained in a library/bookstore),
then the cat is out of the bag and the information is exportable.  I
believe that the Commerce Department, State Department, and NSA are
completely uninterested in preventing the export of anything that's
available to anybody at B. Dalton's bookstore.

Anonymous ftp is fully equivalent to B. Dalton's bookstore or a
public library.

Note that this discussion has nothing to do with the exportability
of integrated hardware/software crypto solutions.  My premise is
primarily that the book containing the DES source code is freely
exportable because it is publicly available information.

Regards,
Ed Hamrick
Xref: sparky alt.security.ripem:55 sci.crypt:6508
From: mjr@TIS.COM (Marcus J Ranum)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Date: 8 Jan 93 00:50:42 GMT
Reply-To: mjr@TIS.COM
Followup-To: alt.security.ripem
Organization: Trusted Information Systems, Inc.

hamrick@convex.com (Ed Hamrick) writes:
>Obviously the Russians, along with every other
>country that isn't allowed to import cryptographic equipment, have fully
>functional DES and RSA source code.

	Tell me it ain't so! The poor Russians don't have *ANY* chip
fab plants? Not even a teeny little one?

	Right.

mjr.
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 06:59:38 GMT

In article <1993Jan7.230612.12564@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>beyond the reach of the law, unless we search everybody as they
>leave the country--a remedy I'd recoil from.

Why do you "recoil" from this? It's obviously the only technique that
could possibly make a ban like this meaningful. The search, of course,
would have to include every international phone trunk as well as every
parcel, letter and suitcase. Remember, you only need *one* master to
make an unlimited number of copies.

>In passing, a word to those who may not fully understand the U.S.
>system. The export laws aren't the result of some anti-democratic
>Administration, but the result of laws passed by a democratically
>elected Congress, after extensive public hearings and testimony.

That's the theory. In practice, the line of accountability of the
bureaucrats making the decisions is awfully long and thin.  NSA calls
the shots on crypto export decisions. Their obsession with secrecy is
legion, and they need not explain the reasons behind a decision to
anyone. The phrase "national security" is the most you'll get. Let's
face it -- that's the de-facto "root password" to the protections of
the Constitution.

Nor is there any provision for direct judicial appeal from an
unfavorable NSA decision. The only way to get one is to deliberately
violate the ruling, get hauled into court as a criminal defendant, and
hope you can persuade the judge to overturn the rule. Not many people
want to take that risk, which is why NSA has been able to exploit the
FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) factor so successfully even when the
rule in question is totally bogus and they've never actually
prosecuted anyone. They milk the 'chilling effect' for all it's worth.

This may nominally be a democracy, but doesn't this type of secret
policymaking remind you just a little of the former USSR?  Remember
that the standard excuse for denying Soviet citizens the right to
emigrate was that they carry "state secrets" from their service in the
military. Pretty soon I expect Mr. Sternlight to argue that anyone who
knows how to write a cipher should need an exit visa to leave the US.

Phil
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: Another bug in RIPEM?
Date: 11 Jan 1993 03:40:57 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: scss3.cl.msu.edu
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Darrell Long (darrell@cse.ucsc.edu) wrote:
: If I set the RIPEM_KEY_TO_PRIVATE_KEY environment variable, I can encrypt but
: not decrypt.  

This bug was fixed (by Louis A. Mamakos) in RIPEM 1.0.1.
I just tried it on my system and it works now.

Mark
Xref: sparky alt.security.ripem:78 sci.crypt:6582
From: jyanowit@mtholyoke.edu (Jason Yanowitz)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Date: 9 Jan 1993 14:48:26 -0500
Organization: Mount Holyoke College
NNTP-Posting-Host: slab.mtholyoke.edu

Well, now I can join the long list of people who've posted on sci.crypt on
topics which, only in a very removed sense, apply to the mathematics of
cryptography (the ethics, yes, but this is talk.ethics.crypt).  My apologies
to those that care, but then, you probably aren't reading this thread.

Ciao,
Jason
jyanowit@orixa.mtholyoke.edu



-- 

jason
(thhis account forwards to jyanowitz@hamp.hampshire.edu)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt