From: itsmine@med.unc.edu (Greg Popken)
Subject: Re: re:rights?
Organization: UNC-CH School of Medicine
Distribution: na
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 18:28:13 GMT

In article <C0ELtn.HnD@wpg.com> russ@wpg.com (Russell Lawrence) writes:
>From article <1993Jan5.172233.635@samba.oit.unc.edu>, by itsmine@med.unc.edu (Greg Popken):
>>>I truly don't understand why you think an individual must be capable 
>>>of making moral distinctions in order to be deserving of just treatment.
>>>Are your ideas based on some sort of arguments that you'd be willing
>>>to share with people who are skeptical of your position?
>> 
>> Share?  Of course. For you Russell, the world.
>> 
>> I believe that in order to have rights beings (not individuals) must be
>> capable of fully understanding those right, and the concequences of thier
>> actions.
>
>Greg, I've understood for quite some time that this is your belief.  I'm
>asking you to explain its factual and rational basis.

Russell, rights carry with them certain responsibilities.  Animals are
incapable of accepting these responsibilities.  Furthermore animals are
incapable of making a distiction between morally correct and incorrect
behavior.  Therefore the are incapable of possesing rights.

 > >>>I don't know what sort of cases you have in mind when you post 
>>>articles about animals that don't deserve rights, but I often think of 
>>>animals that are caught in steel traps, or animals that have just been 
>>>shot, or animals that have just had their beaks removed, or monkeys
>>>that have had their nerves severed, etc, etc.  
>> 
>> [I love the way you slip in the Silver Springs thing.]
>> In all these cases animals don't have rights.  Rights are not something
>> that you base on situational ethics, as you seem to believe.
>
>I don't believe that "rights" are based on situational ethics.  To give
>you an example, if we were faced with the alternative of killing an
>innocent man in order to save a million other innocent men and women,
>I would probably argue that it would be ethically acceptable to kill
>the single man.  This doesn't mean that the man's "rights" simply 
>disappear in such an instance, nor does it mean that the "badness" of
>such a killing simply fades away in the midst of the greater good.  
>
So your opinion of "good" and "bad" is based on some convention or
previous value you place on the alternative offered.

>Perhaps you agree with Thomas Jefferson that men are endowed by their
>"creator" with rights, whereas I'm inclined to define the concept 
>of rights in more secular terms: It's my contention that the 
>concept of a "right" is instituted...  not by some mysterious 
>"creators", but by a society's willingness to respect the 
>thoughts and feelings of thinking/feeling individuals.   
>
I agree rights are man created ideas.  Why sould they be univeraslly
applied to all animals.

>> That doesn't mean that the treatment of animals in any manner is ethical.
>> It does mean that we have a responsibility to be humane to animals, not
>> that they have *the right* to be treated humanely.
>
>Unfortunately, I still don't understand how you define the term "rights".
>

Would it make any difference?  

[...]
>
>Be that as it may, it's not my intent to malign the character of 
>men in lab coats.  If you'd care to exercise some restraint in 
>your choice of words, I'll be happy to do likewise.  

Restrains my middle name.
>
>>>   Now please explain why you think
>>>the concept of "rights" ought to be limited to moral agents, and not
>>>applied to moral patients.
>> 
>
>>>> rl>  Is it truly fair to base our 
>>>> rl>treatment of other individuals, not on their abilities, but on 
>>>> rl>their membership in a class? 
>>>>>
>>>> Reread the first statement in this threat.  Does it mention membership in
>>>> a class?  Or does it mention *ABILITY* to make moral distinctions?
>>>
>>>I did reread your statement and it certainly sounded like your concept
>>>of justice was tied to class affiliation.
>> 
>> Oh, so now its *tied* to class affiliation.  Are you admitting that it is
>> not *based* on it?
>
>You tell me.  Again let's assume for the moment that you have a 
>godlike ability to judge intelligence, and that you were facing 
>two individuals, each possessing mental abilities that are more 
>or less comparable to the other in spite of the fact that one 
>individual happens to be an intelligent chimp whereas the other 
>individual happens to be a retarded human.  In deciding which 
>individual has "rights", would you base your judgment on class
>affiliation?

Again, I state that rights should be based on the ability to make moral
decisions.
Humans have this ability other animals do not.  There are exceptions to
every defination.  A dogs is defined by webster's as a four legged
carnivore.  If the is a dog with only three legs is it no longer a dog?
In addition, do you feel it is appropriate to issue rights on an idividual
basis?

 >>>  Let's suppose that there 
>>>exist two individuals: an extremely bright chimpanzee who understands
>>>some of the concepts of social fair play, however rudimentary, and an
>>>extremely retarded human who has the moral-decision making capacity 
>>>of a turnip.  Does the chimp deserve more rights than the retarded
>>>human?  Or would you say that the human deserves more rights simply
>>>because of his genetic class?
>> 
>> Are you suggesting that chimpanzees are capable of understanding the moral
>> implication of thier actions?  If so, can they be held responsible (on
>> an ethical bases) for the consequences of those actions?
>
>Are we using the concept of "moral" thinking in the same sense?

Russell, I'm tired of you turning these discussion into a matter of
semantics.  You know damn well what I'm talking about.
 >
>I would say that ethical decision-making involves the task of 
>making choices between actions that have good outcomes versus 
>actions that have bad outcomes.    While an intelligent chimp may 
>lack the intellect and training to make the same range of "moral"
>choices that professional philosophers might be capable of making,
>they're clearly capable of making simple ethical choices.  For example,
>a chimp who's used to human companionship might know that it's
>"not good" to bite off fingers.  

Outcomes have very little to do with it.  The bases for the decision does.
 Not whether it is good or bad for the monkey to bite the finger off. 
But, why it is good or bad.
The monkey does not do it because he will be punished or experience a loss
in some way.  The human does't do it because he understands the it is
ethically wrong.

 > >To the extent that the chimp is capable of making a wider
range >of moral choices than a retarded human, would he not deserve more
>"rights" than the human?

You have not shown that the chimp is capable of making any moral decisions
much less a wider range.


BTW, here is the ref. I promised you yesterday. (that's the day before
today, not the month before last.

Herman Goring: " A Broadcast Over The German Radio Network Describing The
Fight Against Vivisection and Measures Taken To Prohibit It., Aug 28,
1933," in The Political Testament of Herman Goring, translated by H.W.
Blood-Ryan (London: John Long, 1939), pp70-75.

I have checked to see if Tulane has it but their library is not on line. 
I have reqested an interlbrary loan and am expecting a copy in a week or
two.  I'll be happy as a nursing babe at a falsie factory to post excerpts

Love me
Greg Popken
 
 > >--  >Russell Lawrence, WP
Group, New Orleans (504) 443-5000 >russ@wpg.com   uunet!wpg!russ


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