From: mfulsmb@uts.mcc.ac.uk (Martin Barry)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.catholic
Subject: Re: submission to teaching, conscience, ... sigh.
Date: 12 Jan 93 14:56:43 GMT
Organization: Manchester Computing Centre, Manchester, England, M13 9PL.

In article <1993Jan11.212443.16321@news.nd.edu> jocallag@artin.helios.nd.edu (john ocallaghan) writes:
>Are we to take it that when Newman speaks of conscience on 
>p.137 (of my edition) he is not referring to what you mean, but that two pages
>later, without warning, he all of a sudden is?  In the former, he does not
>support your view, while in the latter he does?

I'm not suggesting that Newman is wrong, or that we can disregard him, or
that I don't think my view is the same as his. What I meant was that Newman
explicitly addresses the case where the pope is purportedly commanding
something which is wrong: that much is clear from a literal reading of the
text. Nor am I suggesting that any other principle than that enunciated by
Newman applies in the other sort of case (viz., where something is
proscribed which one holds not to be sinful); taking Newman strictly
literally, as it were in a fundamentalist way, (I use the term, I assure
you, not to give offense but as an objective description) is plainly
inappropriate, for the reason that Steve's post makes clear: in cases of
this latter type it is not the case that conscience will prompt one to _act_
(Steve pointed out that one generally could not lay claim to a prompting of
conscience to have sex at a particular time); and that is what one would
require if Newman (mutatis mutandis) is taken strictly literally. I don't
think, however, that the line Butler proposes is at all contrary to the
spirit of Newman's thinking; Newman himself is silent on the matter, however,
and that is why I said that the quote under discussion does not resolve the
matter unequivocally.

>I'm not sure why you say what "is plainly the view of Butler" is that "one
>maay in good conscience not hold oneself bound by the papal teaching."  From
>the quote you provided, which is the only information you have provided, he
>doesn't seem to refer to conscience at all, unless I missed the word in the
>quote.

You missed it. "[Fr John McHugh] makes no attempt to claim that _Humanae
Vitae_'s teaching has infallible status and he is emphatic that a Catholic
who conscientiously and after due reflection and consideration of the
authoritative teaching, concludes that he is not bound by this teaching is
still a perfectly loyal Catholic, and, it is implied, can follow his
conscience. So far as I know, Fr McHugh's position has never been refuted.
It is all the more impressive as coming from one who had no personal
difficulty in accepting the papal teaching on birth control as true, and
indeed saw difficulties in adopting any other position." [Butler, Theology
of Vatican II, pp 208-9].

>Certainly these are different situations.  But to use of phrase of Newman's
>used constantly in the "Grammar of assent", what is the antecedent 
>probability that either Newman or the Church confines the question of
>"religiosum obsequium" to the first class and not the second?  Is the
>sort of "religiosum obsequium" owed to the second less in the second
>than in the first?

I wonder whether the reason for our disagreement hinges on different
understandings of the word _obsequium_. If I remember correctly, Steve (or
you?) prefers a reading such as "submission", but the difficulty with this
is that _Lumen Gentium_ implies precisely that there are varying degrees of
_obsequium_, while submission can either be given or not given. So I am sure
that other readings such as "respect" or "deference" are more accurate.
However, I certainly don't wish to imply that conscience has an easier time
of it in the second type of situation: my point was that the test has to be
different from that proposed by Newman for type one (act/refuse to act if
your conscience before God tells you you must); perhaps "act/refuse to act
if your conscience before God tells you with certainty that it is not wrong
to do so". I think that is as rigorous a criterion as Newman's; but it is
phrased differently from his.

>Do you really believe it probable, that Newman would make the strong statement
>on the "onus probandi" of conscience and confine it to commands in which the
>pope thinks he is not commanding a sin, while the one commanded thinks he is,
>and not hold such an "onus probandi" for commands to refrain from what the
>pope takes to be a sin, while the one who is commanded does not take it to
>be a sin?

I hope I've explained myself better now. No, I don't think the _onus
probandi_ is less grave; Newman's 'legislation' needs to be amended to take
explicit account of a different set of circumstances from the one he
addresses.

Martin Barry.
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.catholic