Newsgroups: bit.listserv.csg-l
Date:         Wed, 7 Oct 1992 11:31:00 GMT
From:         Hortideas Publishing <0004972767@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject:      Scratching the surface

From Greg Williams (921007)

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Gary: FAX number for TUTSIM Products: 415-325-4801

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>Bill Powers (921005.1330)

>What I'm being so stubborn and obtuse about (I can see how it looks
>from your end) is really simple: I see learning as a skill of an
>organism. A rock does not learn, no matter how long you try to teach
>it or how you disturb it. The mechanisms of learning -- those that
>decide when it is necessary to learn, those that decide when learning
>has been successful, and those that actually create changes of neural
>connections and synaptic weightings -- belong exclusively to the
>organism. There is nothing the outside world can do to make these
>MECHANISMS work any differently.

This is getting supremely delicate. I agree with you that the mechanisms of
an organism's learning are solely the organism's, but I also contend that
significant particulars of the way those mechanisms work depend on BOTH the
history of the organism's innards (and, by implication, the histories of its
ancestors' innards) AND the history of its interactions with its environment
(ditto for ancestors).

>This is just like saying that the mechanisms of muscle contraction are
>properties of the organism that no outside environment can change: muscles
>contract in response to driving signals because of their biological
>construction, not because of the world in which such contractions take place.

I agree that the mechanisms of neural transmission remain unaffected by an
organism's environment (barring physiological trauma), just as the muscle
contraction chemistry does. But just as muscles can hypertrophy when "driven
by" exercise, so can control structure organization become altered when
"driven by" environmental problem-setting (especially by other controllers).
A particular manifestation of hypertrophy/alteration depends significantly on
BOTH innards AND outards.

>So it is with learning: learning is a function of a biological system with
>the necessary equipment.

It is a function of that AND disturbances due to an independent environment.

>The argument we're having is failing to converge because we're talking
>about two different things. What I'm talking about is the fundamental
>organization of the organism; what you're talking about is how this
>organization interacts with particular external events and processes.
>I'm talking about how a muscle works; you're talking about what that
>muscle will do under various kinds of driving signals.

The reason why I'm talking about the PARTICULARS of learning is because those
are what I believe many investigators and laypersons think are important to
explain and deal with. But my point that, in general, the "fundamental
organization" of an organism in the here-and-now does NOT depend solely on the
innards. I simply don't see how it could, going all the way back to a
consideration of the basic math (the diff. eqs.) in the PCT model.
Disturbances are inputs; inputs affect the PCT (with reorganization or not)
variables' trajectories.

>Because of the built-in capacity to reorganize, and the built-in
>criteria that go with it, this particular piece of equipment has an
>especially important function: it makes the organism (the human one,
>at least) infinitely adaptable to external circumstances. From the
>standpoint of the organism, IT DOES NOT MATTER what particular control
>processes have to be learned. The organism has no built-in preference
>for controlling any specific variable in any particular way -- not,
>that is, among those variables controlled by the learned part of the
>organization. The only unchangeable requirement is that the critical
>variables be maintained near their respective reference levels.

This is a fine argument for the idea that the true "guiding" of reorganization
to particular states which satisfy the INTERNAL criteria (after all, the
end states of reorganizations appear quite NONrandom!) is the work of the
environment. I suspect that there are internal processes at work in the
guiding, too, but that is beside this point.

>The
>world outside the organism has absolutely no influence on that
>requirement; it is absolute. Critical reference levels are the only
>ones in the organism about which we CANNOT say that they are set as
>they are in order to accomplish something else (during one organism's
>lifetime).

Yet I suspect that it is possible to override the inherited c.r.l.'s. "Death
before dishonor," "my country over my life," etc. At least the SETTINGS of
c.r.l.'s or the loop gains for their associated circuits, I think we are
agreed, appear to be modifiable within one's lifetime (and, I would add, in
ways influenced by the environment). I.e., "wanting to be accepted by peers"
comes to outweigh "wanting to survive," and the platoon members start running
up to the enemy machine-gun nest.

>"Mundane learning" works because of critical error. All learning does,
>that involves a change in any functions.

This is quite a remarkable hypothesis, at least to my ears, after hearing for
so long that reorganization is a gut-wrenching experience. It seems to me that
you must be careful not to set yourself up for criticism similar to that
applied to the rampant instinctism early in this century, when there were
dozens of rather specific instincts postulated. Are you implying that there is
an inherited critical variable corresponding to, say, wanting to do things
well, which is in charge when I want to do things well? If so, then I suppose
there is another c.v. corresponding to NOT wanting to do things well in
charge when I don't? THIS SORT OF APPROACH EXPLAINS TOO MUCH. The succinct
question I ask you about your critical variables of various sorts being
involved in all sorts of "mundane" learning is: How would you test this
hypothesis?

>My point is not that organisms have no influences on each others'
>behavior, or even that these influences can't be manipulated to have
>intended effects. It is that these are all surface phenomena, acquired
>through the control actions of a reorganizing system.

I think that these "surface phenomena" are quite important to many folks, and
that a PCT-understanding of them would be welcomed by many. They certainly ARE
"acquired through the control actions of a reorganizing system." And those
control actions depend on the ENTIRE CONTROL SYSTEM INVOLVED, which loops
through BOTH organism and environment.

>I am also not rejecting the idea of interaction. Organisms can ask for
>help (in numerous ways), and get it. They will reject the very same
>"help" if it is given without being requested. Organisms can ask for
>instruction and information, and get it. They will reject the same
>instructions and information if it was not requested -- provided they
>are given any choice in the matter.

So close, and yet so far. We basically agree, but then you go overboard with
the "me against the world" view. If proffered aid is thought useful by a
person, the person won't reject it. Rejecting it or not has nothing to do with
whether the person requested it. Guessing well about what a person would be
pleased to know, but currently doesn't know that they would be pleased, is the
province of good teachers and counselors.

>The demand for learning comes from
>inside the organism, not from outside it.

THIS demand, NOW, comes from inside. How did THIS demand come to be? It arose
from processes BOTH inside AND outside.

>Ah, well. We've run this subject into the ground for now.

To the contrary, I think we've only scratched the surface.

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Bill, a check for $11 for photography goes out today. Now I anxiously await
the rejection slip!

Best,

Greg
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