HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: dab@ism.isc.com (David A. Butterfield)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: NLP
Date: 9 Sep 92 01:41:00 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change

exudeb@exu.ericsson.se writes:
>>I have a strong sense of spatial orientation, and a "feel" for the
>>positions and sizes and shapes of the objects I pass, but no picture.
>
>I seems that you are able to
>do the things that others do "visually" without "seeing" anything.

My wife seems to have a strongly developed visual sense.  She seems
to somhow index her memories visually.  When asked to recall a
particular detail about an event, in her mind she "looks at a video"
of the events surrounding the detail, until she "finds" the particular
scene she's "looking for" and then looks at it to "see" the answer.

One thing she seems to be able to do, that I don't seem to be able to
do, is to use these visual memories to "look" again at what she saw
when she was experiencing the event in person, in order to see some
visual detail that she hadn't noticed the first time.  I do not know
how to remember something visual that I didn't notice the first time.

>I would guess
>that you would also have a "feel" for the colors of particular
>buildings, and that you would be able to imagine a building being moved
>to a different location, or being painted a different color.

I can imagine moving a building to another location.  However, I
don't imagine color.  I *might* be able to remember if something
was generally light or dark, but that's iffy.  I know my car is
blue-green, because it's the color my wife picked, and we discussed
it.  However, strange as it may seem, I don't know what color my
house is, since I've never noted what the color was while I was
looking at it.  I think it's a light color, maybe with dark trim.

>For this person, sights, sounds, tastes,
>and smells all had a unique "feel".  The best explanation I know for
>this is that the original experiences have been translated into
>feelings, apparently without loss of information.

I agree that some of those things have a "feel".

It's hard to imagine how one could translate a visual into a
feeling without losing information.  I *do* have a general
feel for some aspects of what I see, for example, I think light
colors feel different than dark ones, but the fine visual
details escape my memory unless I examine them while in person,
and then remember what I learned from that examination.

Dave
-- 
          Magic is the art of assuming a role strongly enough
          that the Universe falls into the complementary role.
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: mdkline@rodan.acs.syr.edu (Mark D. Kline)
Subject: Re: Mood swings
Organization: Syracuse University
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 92 08:51:16 EDT

In article <Bu7x5p.B1@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lisa lynne davidson <lldavids@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> writes:
>Can someone tell me about the character disorder connected w/ mood
>swings, not manic depression itself, but where the moods swing
>faster?  


Rapidly fluctuating moods are seen in several character disorders,
usually one of the "cluster B" group in DSM III-R  (which includes the
histrionic, narcisisstic, borderline, and antisocial personality
disorders).    Sometimes patients having one of these personality 
disorders is described as having an "emotionally unstable character."
These disorders are described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition revised - available in any
library.  One form of atypical depression referred to as "hysteroid
dysphoria" is said to be associated with a crash-like rejection
sensitivity - that is, a very intense sudden depression in response to
any perceived rejection.  Sudden crying or laughing spells ("emotional
incontinence") without precipitant (and without much emotional
sensation) are sometimes seen in pseudobulbar palsy and other
neurological disorders.  

Rapidly fluctuating mood is a nonspecific symptom seen in a variety of
psychiatric conditions.  







--
================================================================= 
mark kline                              mdkline@rodan.acs.syr.edu
suny health science center, syracuse    voice: (315) 422-1050
================ courtesy of syracuse university ================
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ask Computer Systems Inc., Ingres Division, Alameda CA 94501
Distribution: na
Date: 11 Sep 92 18:43:59 GMT

Gary Murphy writes:
> If, as you wrote ...
>
>   The physiology is not the subjective experience.
>   Of course we might expect them to have to do
>   with each other.  But they remain two different
>   things, and two different sorts of things.
>
> Then we should be able to observe the two acting independently
> of each other.

Incorrect.

Counterexample: don't let the smoke out of your chips, it's gotta be
in there for the software to run correctly.  Huh?  Yeah, I let the
smoke out of my chips once, and the software didn't run after that.
You what?  You know, I plugged the board in wrong or something, and
the smoke got out of the chips, you could see it pouring out, and the
software stopped running at the same time.  Uh, how did you know there
was smoke in the chips before?  You know, it got out, and before it
did, the software was fine -- wait, I've got it, the smoke WAS the
software!  Yeah, right, you let it escape, that must have been it.

Yes, it's possible for two different things to be different and for
one to depend on another.  It's also common for analysis of such cases
to veer off, as demonstrated above, when one assumes that if the two
aren't independent then they aren't two.

> what would you require from an experiment to show these
> "two different things" are really the same event seen from
> two different sides?

Speaking as a great fan of experiments, I assure you that meaningful
results of experiments depend sensitively on consistent use of terms.
I can design two experiments, based on the usual category mistakes,
that will come to opposite conclusions (same event, different events)
regardless of the data.  What experiment would you accept that shows
that Holmes can't ask Doyle for more interesting cases?  That shows
that he can?

-- Jon

--
Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: ffujita@s.psych.uiuc.edu (Frank Fujita)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Distribution: na
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:46:31 GMT

zorrilla@cattell.psych.upenn.edu (Eric Zorrilla) writes:
>sensory cells in the area have begun
>secreting Substance P.  Both the patient and the doctors are seeing and
>referring to the same referent, but their vantage points on the physical
>phenomena are different.

I think I have to agree with Jon here.  The secretion of substance P
cannot be 'pain'.  Pain is an experience.  The doctor and patient may
agree that the P stuff correlates 1.0 with 'pain', and even be the
'cause' of pain, but secretion is not pain.

Or, to try to put it a different way, when we say that the tree looks
green to us, we are not referring to a) what color the tree *really* is
(if that question even makes sense) b) what wavelegnth the light is that
is passing through our corena c) what rods or cones are firing in our
retina or d) what neural firings are taking place in our visual cortex.

Maybe this is an emergent phenomena--or maybe the class of mental events
cannot be equated with any class of neural events.  Like the horsepower
of a car cannot be equated with the number of pistons, cylinder size,
carburation system, or any factor made of a linear combination of these
variables.  Thus, while dreaming *depends* on REM (possiby as horsepower
depends on cylinder size) dreaming is not a neural event, but rather a
mental event.

Maybe we should create a new group arts.philosophy.psychology

Just kidding,
Frank Fujita
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ask Computer Systems Inc., Ingres Division, Alameda CA 94501
Distribution: na
Date: 11 Sep 92 07:00:21 GMT

Eric Zorrilla writes:
> From a layperson's definition, the "leg" referent suffices.  An anatomist
> might prefer the latter referent if he or she wanted to characterize the
> leg.  Both terms refer to the same objects, BUT AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
> ANALYSIS.  This is NOT a category mistake.  It is linguistics.

Sounds rather like an appeal to a technical term.
(Of course, there's no mutual exclusion).

How does the analogy apply?

Are you asserting "dream" is a technical term?

-- Jon
--
Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ingres Division, ASK Computer Systems.
Distribution: na
Date: 10 Sep 92 19:18:06 GMT

Eric Zorrilla writes:
>>> by measuring brainwaves and REM activity, we can tell,
>>> _TO_ _GREATER_ _ACCURACY_ than the subject herself exactly
>>> how much dreaming she has been doing.
>> The use of "dreaming" above is simply a category mistake.
>
> Physiology and CNS events may be physical instantiations of the
> phenomena that we experience as dreaming.  Clearly, however,
> this is not 100% provable. I don't think it's a category mistake
> as much as a problem in demonstrability.

"Dreaming" is a term from the discourse of private events.
Its use here mixes it with the discourse of public events,
such as "how much dreaming".

What we refer to when we say "dreaming" is different,
and a different sort of thing, from what we refer to
when we say "brainwaves" or "REM activity".

"The phenomena that we experience as dreaming" misses
the meaning of the word.  "Dreaming" is the experience.
If we discover a physical process that causes the
experience, we need a new word, because the process itself
is not dreaming.

"Pumping" refers to raising water.  "Transpiration" refers
to one way redwoods pump.  Category mistake: "by measuring
transpiration we can tell how much pumping the redwood has
been doing".  Not only false to fact, but fundamentally
meaningless: what we refer to when we say "transpiration"
is different, and a different sort of thing, from
what we refer to when we say "pumping".

-- Jon

Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: ffujita@s.psych.uiuc.edu (Frank Fujita)
Subject: Re: Meyers-Briggs Personality/Temperament Types
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1992 17:58:39 GMT

noring@netcom.com (Jon Noring) writes:
>Overall, how does the psychological community view Meyers-Briggs,
>or is the psychological community divided on its accuracy, approach, and
>applicability?

What do you want to compare it to?  It is the premiere test of Jungian
Personality.  Jungian personality is not held that highly in academic
personality circles.  Academic personality is not held that highly in
other 'hard' psychology divisions.  Psychology is not held that highly
in the 'hard' sciences.  Etc.

So, I will speak from the perspective the the academic personality
psychologist (which I will be in less than a year).  The MBTI is a
conceptually flawed test, being based on type theory.  Type theory says
that people fall into discrete types, being essentially one type or
another type.  Many of the practioners of the MBTI know this and deal
with it as a continous variable test.  Here it is a moderately good test
having reasonable reliability.  It factors well with four of the 'Big 5'
personality factors, and does not deal with psychological health, making
it relatively harmless when improperly applied.

If I had a data set with the MBTI, I'd definitely use it.  If I was
constructing a personalty study from scratch, I'd pick a better
instrument.

Just my $.02

Frank Fujita
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Psychology as Science
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ingres Division, ASK Computer Systems.
Date: 11 Sep 92 01:44:46 GMT

Eric Zorrilla wonders:
> Why does all of academia have to be artificially compartmentalized?

Some fields have large amounts of material to master.
Gotta specialize because no one could learn it all.

In fields like psychology, divisions form almost randomly.
Gotta specialize because no one could un-learn it all.

Either way, territorial aggression soon sets in.

-- Jon

Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: lady@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Lee Lady)
Subject: Re: Fast Anxiety Cure (was Re: Phobias, NLP, etc (was Re: Xanax)
Followup-To: sci.psychology
Summary: Try it out.  
Keywords: NLP   NeuroLinguistic Programming
Organization: University of Hawaii (Mathematics Dept)
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1992 22:17:25 GMT

In article <1992Sep15.053632.26490@pony.Ingres.COM> jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger) writes:
>Lee Lady writes:
>
>> The purported cure described here is undoubtedly a form
>> of quackery designed to bilk people of their money
>
>Cute Lee, cute, but remember that most phrenologists were sincere.
>They really believed it worked.  They meant well.  OK?

OK.  I hope that people will form their judgements on various aspects of
NLP by trying them out, not on the basis of my sincerity or of arguments 
on usenet.  

I must admit that I'm holding my breath right now since Gordon Banks has
agreed to try out the phobia cure.  I have been firmly convinced that
someone with no NLP training can be successful with this just from
reading my instructions, without even seeing a demonstration.  But now I
start thinking about all the things that can go wrong.  Any time a new
technique is taught during an NLP training there are always some people
that have trouble with it.  They raise their hands and an assistant
comes over to help.  With Gordon, there will be no assistants around.  I
do believe, though, that he is capable of making this cure work for his
friend.  

I would really like to hear any feedback on the juggling cure for
anxiety.  If I get a lot of reports that it's not working, I'll let
sci.psychology know about that.  

--
It is a poor sort of skepticism which merely delights in challenging
those claims which conflict with one's own belief system.  
                                                          --Bogus quote 
lady@uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu         lady@uhunix.bitnet
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ingres Division, ASK Computer Systems.
Distribution: na
Date: 12 Sep 92 02:27:22 GMT

Max Webb writes:
> In the Cambridge philosophy department during the seventies it was common
> to dismiss the idea that brain-states and mind-states could be the same
> thing, because the words describing these entities could not be
> substituted one for the other (the original use of the phrase
> 'category error', as far as I know).

The original is with Gilbert Ryle, with reference also to Bishop Berkeley.

The notion isn't that two things couldn't be the same because we
refer to them differently.  Aliases exist and are not at issue here.
The notion is that one sort of thing is different from another
sort of thing, and words referring to instances in each can't
be freely mixed and make sense.  E.g. "my son, this is the spark
of life; water it and watch it grow".

> Try substituting 'molecular kinetic energy' for 'warmth' everywhere
> you see it - ie. "He basked in the warmth of the sunlight".

OK, "he basked in the molecular kinetic energy of her smile".

Clearly, a different sort of thing has crept in here somewhere.

-- Jon

Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Psychology as Science
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ingres Division, ASK Computer Systems.
Date: 12 Sep 92 02:38:42 GMT

David A. Butterfield writes:
> I don't perceive Lee Lady as being resistant to some scientific study of
> NLP; on the contrary, several times I have seen him call for such study
> to be undertaken.  He is an NLP *practitioner*, not a psychologist.

I agree; that too is my perception of Lee.

What I don't hear from Lee, however, is recognition of how very many
treatments have been enthusiastically practiced over the last several
millenia, with just as plausible case studies behind them, and how
very few of them panned out when tested.  "But I saw it work with
my own eyes" was once said about phrenology, too.

But Lee has specified tests he'd like to see performed, and
test outcomes he'd accept as counterevidence.  This is not what
I'd call resistant to scientific study of NLP.

-- Jon

Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com
From: long@next1.acme.ucf.edu (Richard Long)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Mood swings
Date: 8 Sep 92 21:20:08 GMT
Organization: University of Central Florida

In article <Bu7x5p.B1@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lisa lynne davidson  
<lldavids@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> writes:
> Can someone tell me about the character disorder connected w/ mood
> swings, not manic depression itself, but where the moods swing
> faster?  

I just received an excerpt from a book called _I Hate you, Please Don't  
Leave Me_ about Borderline Personality Disorder.   Sudden mood swings are  
one of the diagnostic criteria.   I don't know the author of this  
particular book, but BPD in in the DSM III.
--
Richard Long
Institute for Simulation and Training
University of Central Florida
12424 Research Parkway, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32826
(407)658-5026, FAX: (407)658-5059
long@acme.ucf.edu
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
From: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Subject: Re: Fast Anxiety Cure (was Re: Phobias, NLP, etc (was Re: Xanax)
Keywords: NLP   NeuroLinguistic Programming
Reply-To: jpk@Ingres.COM (Jon Krueger)
Organization: Ask Computer Systems Inc., Ingres Division, Alameda CA 94501
Date: 15 Sep 92 05:36:32 GMT

Lee Lady writes:

> The purported cure described here is undoubtedly a form
> of quackery designed to bilk people of their money

Cute Lee, cute, but remember that most phrenologists were sincere.
They really believed it worked.  They meant well.  OK?

-- Jon
--
Jon Krueger  jpk@ingres.com  
Xref: sparky sci.psychology:3677 sci.misc:1598 talk.politics.misc:44455
From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology,sci.misc,talk.politics.misc
Subject: Re: Note on Smithsonian psych. exhibit
Date: 10 Sep 92 01:56:50 GMT
	<1992Sep6.230250.27560@blaze.cs.jhu.edu> <19950@fritz.filenet.com>
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona

asylvain@felix.filenet.com (The Chipmunk) writes:

   > As silly as it may seem, people DO follow authority, even when
   > authority is obviously silly. 

Think about what would happen if people didn't automatically obey road
signs without understanding why they're there.  Just because you can't
*see* the reason for something doesn't mean there is no reason.

	-- Bill
From: murphyg@Software.Mitel.COM (Gary Murphy)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind
Date: 10 Sep 92 19:10:45 GMT
	<1992Sep9.200732.12737@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com>
	<1992Sep10.054504.9549@pony.Ingres.COM> <88430@netnews.upenn.edu>
Followup-To: sci.psychology
Distribution: na
Organization: Applications Software II, MITEL Corporation, Kanata, Ontario,
	Canada
In-reply-to: zorrilla@cattell.psych.upenn.edu's message of 10 Sep 92 13:05:19 GMT

In article <88430@netnews.upenn.edu> zorrilla@cattell.psych.upenn.edu (Eric Zorrilla) writes:

   In article <1992Sep10.054504.9549@pony.Ingres.COM> jpk@Ingres.COM d(Jon Krueger) writes:
   >What we have measured is not dreaming.
   >Physiology, behavior, and CNS events are not dreaming.
   >The use of "dreaming" above is simply a category mistake.

   Physiology and CNS events may be physical instantiations of the phenomena
   that we experience as dreaming.  Clearly, however, this is not 100% provable.
   I don't think it's a category mistake as much as a problem in 
   demonstrability.

To carry Jon's argument along, we also have no evidence the
electro-chemical activity in the retina and the visual cortex have
anything to do with vision; they are only correlated (in both
directions).  Perhaps Jon could tell us what he would require as a
measurement to conclusively relate the physiology to the subjective
experience?  Would we need to directly manipulate a brain and induce
dreaming? What if we call the experience dreaming only because of the
assumed context of being asleep at the time?  A means to decide would be
a lot more useful to the rest of us than some assertion of a 'catagory
mistake'; as Eric says, the missing argument is demonstrability.

--
Gary Lawrence Murphy - Gary.Murphy@software.mitel.COM - (613) 592-2122 x3709
         The present is received whatever the wrapping paper
From: dab@ism.isc.com (David A. Butterfield)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: NLP
Date: 10 Sep 1992 20:34:39 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change
Keywords: NLP   NeuroLinguistic Programming

echyatt@eos.ncsu.edu (EDWARD CRAIG HYATT) writes:
>2.  If I draw from memory, I often come up with a "schematic" representation
>    of the object I'm drawing.  The drawing is proportional and has all the
>    major components, but non-functional details are missing.

Now this is interesting.  If you've been following my messages the last
few days you've noted that I have very poor visual skills, and I don't
remember things visually.  However, if I have to try to draw something,
I am able to do what you describe above -- drawing a schematic picture.
But I don't draw the picture from an internal picture.  The components
I draw are the ones I found meaningful enough to remember and store
information about.  The information feels like it's stored as objects
with rather abstract attributes, rather than as a picture, or the sound
of me telling myself what I'm seeing.  It's possible that I'm storing
in a kinesthetic mode, but the attributes seem more abstract to me.

For example, if I describe my bedroom, from the point of view of
sitting on my bed, to my right and behind me is the door-object,
with an attached handle-object.  It attaches to the wall at my
right and swings into the room in a particular arc.  But I don't
see a picture of the door or handle, I don't remember the sound
of myself talking about it.  I can remember the feel of opening
and closing the door, and I know what it feels like when it is
open or when it's closed, but that's not what I'm doing when I'm
describing the scene from my imagined position on the bed. I just
"know" what objects with what attributes are positioned in various
locations in space.

Dave
-- 
	  Only resort to the Rules when absolutely necessary.
From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: NLP
Date: 15 Sep 1992 00:55:23 GMT
Organization: x
NNTP-Posting-Host: change
Keywords: NLP   NeuroLinguistic Programming

ohumukin@spectra.com (Kawika Ohumukini) writes:
>Can you enter into a room, eyes closed, without ever being
>in that room before and "feel" where things are?  In other words if
>you were in a room that's organized completely differently, could you 
>find the door without seeing or hearing anything in the room?

No, I must become familiar with a room before I have a feel for it.
In a new room I have little familiarity, and a vague feel.  In a
familiar room I have a stronger feel, and can walk around without
turning on the light (but not well enough to walk around in *total*
darkness).

> How do you know the size of the object?

I experience the size by how far apart I have to spread my hands to
hold it, or how big a job it is to walk around it, or how far back
I have to tilt my head to point my face at the top of it, or how many
objects of a smaller size will fit into it...

> How do you know the shape of it?

I experience the shape by how I would have to move my hands to touch
the perimeter of the object.  I also can experience more complex
shapes by breaking the object down into components, each of which I
represent as a separate object with a size and shape, and remembering
how the components attach together to create the more complex object.

> What are you sensing?

The "feel" of the object, I suppose.
-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.
Newsgroups: sci.psychology