HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com (T.M.Haddock)
Subject: Re: Marine Aircover <was New Carrier Plan>
Organization: Chevron
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 15:23:17 GMT


From hhtra@usho21.hou281.chevron.com (T.M.Haddock)

In article <Bxx23p.MvB@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, erudnick@pica.army.mil (FSAC-SID) writes:
|> A 1000 kg ASM warhead is another matter. Since it sees fairly low
|> stresses during flight, the proportion of HE filler should be roughly
|> comparable to an aircraft bomb. A 2000 lb Mk 84 contains about 1000 lb
|> of HE, so our warhead should contain about 500 kg of HE filler, give 
|> or take. Again, since this is a low stress/shock situation, you can use
|> good filler, some sort of high RDX composition (Comp A series or
|> equivalent). This amount of HE going off next to a ship is going to 
|> cause SERIOUS blast damage. If the missile hits above the belt it's
|> even worse. The BB-vs-BB-critical parts of the ship (engineering, main
|> battery, conning tower) will no doubt survive, but much of the superstructure,
|> missiles, secondary armament, masts, electronics, stacks, etc. may not
|> fare all that well. Phalanx doesn't necessarily improve the situation, 
|> since our system's kill mechanism is (you guessed it) detonation of the
|> missile warhead. The ship will survive such a hit, but will not be fully
|> mission-capable afterwards. All IMHO of course - comments requested.

 It depends at what range the Phalanx engages and hits the missile. 
 Will that much damage be done if it is exploded a few hundred yards
 away?  And Phalanx doesn't have to explode it, just knock it down.
 A few lucky hits in the motor or fins could drive the missile into
 the sea.  I've seen footage on TV of a Phalanx exploding incoming
 target drones, one close (100 yards?) another far (500 yards?).
 Scuds were knock down without their warheads exploding in the air.

|> 
|> 
|> 
|> #a scenario might be for coast defence artillery to fire
|> #DPICM (cluster) and try and scrub the topsides.  while
|> 
|> On the topic of "scrubbing topsides", I was discussing this sort of thing
|> with a gunner's mate on I believe it was USS YORKTOWN. He said that if
|> they (for Lord knows what reason) were engaging a ship with the 5 inch
|> mounts the tactic they would use is to fire prox fuzed rounds targeted 
|> just above the ship to strip her of her fire control sensors, and then
|> engage with delay fuzed HE to inflict substantial damage. Anybody run 
|> into this sort of thing?

 The HARM missile is being given harder shot in its warhead in order
 to inflict more collateral damage to semi-hardened targets such
 as ship superstructures and topside equipment.

 TRAVIS

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>
Subject: Re: The use of unguided rockets in WWII
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 17:40:08 GMT


From MR KR COMAN <bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za>

>Subject: Re: The use of unguided rockets in WWII
>From scw@ollie.seas.ucla.edu
>In article <BxGrsF.75K@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> anthony@cs.uq.oz.au (Anthony Lee) writes:
>>Recently, in one of the threads, there is a mention of the 
>>use of unguided rockets as air-to-surface weapons, in particular
>>to attack tanks.  My question, is how do the pilots aim these
>>weapons, since they are unguided ?
>
>The same way that they aim their cannon, with a gunsight.
>
>Unguided rockets and shells are your basic fire and forget weapon (well once
>the round is on the way you might as well forget it, you can't do much
>about it).
>

By chance I came across a reference to this just yesterday.  The technique 
used by RAF Beaufighters tasked to ground attack missions was as follows:

1.
Keep approach speed at 250 knots and dive angle at 10 degrees. (The writer
emphasised these values).
2.
When about 1500 yards out, fire 20mm cannon towards target.  This does two 
things: creates clear dust/smoke marker near target and encourages the chaps 
on the ground to stop throwing up flak and drop into cover.
3.
When about 700 yards out, fire rockets (all 8 at once or in salvos of 2).
4.
Keeping cannon button (and m.g. button too -- when closer) down from the 
initial 1500 yard range is optional, but a good idea if part two of (2) above
is not notably successful, and good fun anyway.

Described by a South African pilot serving with a RAF Beaufighter sdrn in
Italy, 1944-45.

Looks very much a trial and error, "pencil mark on the windscreen" business!!

Cheers,
Keith Coman

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Condemning a research report on the basis of :  Dept of Management
 invalid and unreliable methodology is the    :  Rhodes University
 cheapest shot in the book."                  :  Grahamstown, 6140
                                              :  Rep of South Africa
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>
Subject: Re: desert storm operations
Organization: Ham Radio Operator, Houston Tex.
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 14:47:19 GMT


From "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>

> From robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
> 
> 
> As it turned out, no amphibious landings were necessary. However, if
> the initial phase of the ground war had been less successful, an
> amphibious assault against heavily defended beaches might have been
> necessary. Such an assault, as any historian (or Marine!) can tell
> you, is expensive in terms of men and gear, and should be avoided when
> possible.
> 
> -Paul Robichaux
>  Sgt., USMCR

 I watched the briefing Gen Schwartzkopf (sp?) gave and got the 
impression that he left out a few details of the plan, on purpose 
:-). The impression I got was that the Marines still afloat were 
never intended to be used for an assault on a defended beach, but 
were the strategic reserve force that could be landed behind any 
sector of our lines that encountered too much trouble. Their heavy 
equipment would only be available to the areas near the coast, but 
their helicopters gave them some capability well inland to support 
the most any of the attacking units to at least some degree. If 
you look at the plan, there is no other real "reserve" force of 
any size, other than the Marines, and certainly nothing with the
flexibility of the Marine force. For the main attack in the west,
there was no "strategic" reserve force, but, once the first 
objectives had been taken, and so long as no threat appeared from 
the west, the French armored unit could have turned east to 
support the main attacks if necessary.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
             Gene Kennedy - Ham Radio Operator, N5ABI -
                         gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Eric Chiang <schiangkw01@cc.curtin.edu.au>
Subject: Re: Ranks & Stuff
Organization: Curtin Information Systems
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 16:19:13 GMT


From Eric Chiang <schiangkw01@cc.curtin.edu.au>

>> * What are the ranks in the different branches?
> 
> For officers, the Army, Air Force, and Marines ranking (from lowest to 
> highest) are:
> 2nd Lieutenant, 1st Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Leutenant Colonel, Colonel,
> Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, and General
> 
> For the Navy and Coast Guard the ranking in the same order is:
> Ensign, Lieutenant (Junior Grade), Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander, Commander,
> Captain, Rear Admiral (Lower Grade), Rear Admiral (Upper Grade), Vice Admiral,
> and Admiral

What about the SEALs. Do they come under the Navy ranks?..

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: 2120158@hydra.maths.unsw.EDU.AU ()
Subject: Re: Type of armor
Organization: school of Mathematics UNSW
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:27:16 GMT


From 2120158@hydra.maths.unsw.EDU.AU ()

In article <Bxyuuu.FFw@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ketil@ii.uib.no (Ketil M. Malde) writes:
>
>From ketil@ii.uib.no (Ketil M. Malde)
>
>>>>> oahvenla@snakemail.hut.fi (Osma Ahvenlampi) said:
>
>>>>>> sdoran@sam.ksu.ksu.edu (Steven Marcotte) writes:
>
>Steven> There is a type of armor that is make by placing a piece
>Steven> of aluminum on a ceramic tile.  The combination is then heated
>Steven> and the al. is absorbed into the ceramic.  From what I have heard
>Steven> this makes REALLY good armor.  What is the name for this type of
>Steven> armor?
>
>Osma> Sounds like Chobham(sp?), the one used in for example M-1 Abrams tank.
>
>I always thought that chobham armor was some sort of metal laminate
>(several layers of various hardness and toughness).  I thought the
>ceramic armor was more of a fututistic thing...
>
>SUpposedly, ceramics would be effective against HEAT, as they have a
>very hich melting point, and also against saboted armor piercing
>rounds, that would just pulverize the ceramic locally instead of
>piercing through it.  
>
>This is much (a bit educated) guesswork, so feel free to show me (and
>others) the light,
>
>--
> = Ketil Malde

  I once read that Chobham was a "sandwich" of different materials to defeat
all (not now though) known AT weapons.

The layers are (in unknown order):
                       A layer of ceramics to defeat HEAT,
                       A area of vacuum to defeat Squash head weapons,
                       And a layer of alloy to defeat APDS.

 I am unable to give numbers on how thick the layers are (or what exactly that 
last layer is made of) , but this combination is eqiv. to much thicker steel
armour (the M-1's armour is equiv. to approx 60 cm of steel).

   And to my knowledge the only warhead able to penetrate this is the new
APDS-T (Armour Piecing Discarding Sabot - Tracer). (And maybe the Block 2 TOW).

[And off to one side, I was wondering if anyone out there would be able to tell
me if there are any other tanks out there that use chobham apart from the M-1
and Challanger. (What about the new french tank, the Le Clerc, will it have
chobham?)]

Later,
Matthew.



Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Mike Fester <island!fester@uunet.uu.net>
Subject: Re: The Cessna In Red Square
Organization: /usr/local/rn/organization
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 13:56:02 GMT


From Mike Fester <island!fester@uunet.uu.net>

In article <BxvFwG.9Gr@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Jeffrey Casterline <jlc@u.washington.edu> writes:
>
>From Jeffrey Casterline <jlc@u.washington.edu>
>
>
>Several days ago a poster to the net, when talking about the
>utility of a 747 vs a B52 vs a B1, noted that perhaps the
>FSU air defenses weren't up to what we thought they were, and
>cited the Cessna landing in Red Square as an example of that
>fact.
>
>I thought that this wasn't a failure of air defenses, per se,
>but rather more a problem with the senior decision-makers.  They had
>a plan for dealing with an obvious threat (like a NATO aircraft
>penetrating their air space), but did not know what to do with a situation
>like this.  That is, they followed the plane throughout its flight, but
>couldn't decide what to do about it.

I wasn't aware that the plane was actually monitored in flight. Had it been, 
there is little doubt they would have shot it down. 

As I recall, the incident took place on "Revolution Day" (not really sure what
they call the anniversery of the revolution), and that many of the border guards
and other monitors of the airspace were quite simply:

DRUNK.

Any verification/derisions on this?

Mike

-- 
Disclaimer - I'm only doing what the little voices tell me to do. 

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Steven.Schultz <Steven.Schultz@mixcom.mixcom.com>
Subject: Re: Former Soviet Navy Posting Number 7: 'Yankee I' class SSBN
Organization: Milwaukee Internet Xchange BBS, Milwaukee, WI U.S.A.
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 14:43:42 GMT


From Steven.Schultz <Steven.Schultz@mixcom.mixcom.com>

There are 10 Yankee I-class remaining in service. Some have been
converted to SSN, SSGN, and Notch SSGN. Yankees have seen a lot of
service, and some mishaps. A Yankee suffered a missile propellant
explosion while submerged 600 miles east of Bermuda in October 1986.
The sub surfaced, and after ventilation failed, the crew was removed
by a merchant ship and the subs was taken in tow. The sub sank on
October 6. The Soviets said three crewman were killed, and several
injured.

-- 
Steve Schultz     Steven.Schultz@mixcom.com

Newsgroups: sci.military
From:     Eugene Heiss (GWD) <heiss@brl.mil>
Subject:  M16A2
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 16:25:52 GMT


From     Eugene Heiss (GWD) <heiss@brl.mil>



>From Geoff Miller <ghm@sserve.cc.adfa.oz.au>


>Fine, but let's try to be honest about this, shall we?  The M-16A2
>was tested against _prototypes_ of new weapons systems. 
  So what!   

>These tests
>did not include more recent designs which are in production, such as 
>the SA-80, the FAMAS or the Steyr AUG.  

The goal of the Advanced Combat Rifle Program was to double the hit 
probability of the rifleman using the M16A2 rifle.  No weapon in production
could achieve this goal.  The ACR test was to test concepts which may have
the possibility of achieving this goal.  Industry was solicited for 
proposals to meet this goal.  The most promising were funded for the 
development of sufficently mature prototypes to undergo operational testing.
Of these, only four weapon systems could be delivered in time for the 
operational test.


>The selection of the former 
>two rifles for the UK and France respectively may have had as much
>to do with national pride as with the intrinsic merits of the weapons,

You better believe it!


>but the Steyr design has now won out over the M-16 in a lot of 
>countries.

Oh, is that right?  How many?  Name them?







Newsgroups: sci.military
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Genie AIR-2A
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 15:26:38 GMT


From henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)

>From Mike Campbell <mike@aloysius.equinox.gen.nz>
>Carrried by F-86J, F-101B, F-106 and CF-101B (hang on - isn't that
>Canadian??)

Correct; Canadian fighters carried Genie for a while, as part of NORAD.
Canada also had nuclear-armed Bomarc heavy SAMs, and free-fall nuclear
bombs for CF-104 strike aircraft in Europe.

In all cases, the nuclear warheads were US-owned and under US control
until released for combat.  This sort of setup wasn't restricted to
Canada; the Luftwaffe likewise is set up to fly with US nuclear weapons.

This was never especially popular in Canada.  The relevant weapons
systems have all been phased out in the Canadian Armed Forces, and I
don't believe any of them have been replaced.
-- 
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s.      | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
              -Hal W. Hardenbergh (1985)|  henry@zoo.toronto.edu  utzoo!henry

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>
Subject: Re: Jutland
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 14:43:56 GMT


From "Edward J. Rudnicki" (FSAC-SID) <erudnick@pica.army.mil>


Markus Stumptner writes:
#I did find it quite interesting at the time that Keegan, who started
#out on psychological issues of warfare, ended up analyzing Jutland in
#terms of number of hits to be repaired.

My gripe with the Jutland section of "The Price of Admiralty" is that
Keegan keeps emphasizing that ships such as those at Jutland had never
fought before, and that everything was new to all the players. In fact,
much of Jutland was mirrored in Tsushima. If Makarov commanded the
Second Pacific Squadron the end result might have been similar too.

As a subpart of this, Keegan criticizes the presence of the British
armored cruisers, implying that they should have known better. In fact
they didn't. One of the incorrect lessons learned from Tsushima was 
that armored cruisers could engage battleships successfully. Even with
the general level of incompetence of the Russians, some of Kamimura's
cruisers took a substantial pounding; if the Russians knew what they were
doing the Japanese might have lost a few. Anyway, the Germans learned
the folly of sending armored cruisers against dreadnoughts at Dogger
Bank. If Coronel is forgotten, the British never learned that lesson,
and paid for it with 3 ships at Jutland.


Ed Rudnicki     erudnick@pica.army.mil     All disclaimers apply
"War must be looked upon as a business, and subject, like any other business,
to business principles. War is the business of destruction of life and
property of an enemy.....The most deadly and destructive implements of war
are the most humane, and the producers of them may justly be looked upon as
humanitarians."     ----- Hudson Maxim (the other Maxim)

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: eriks@lin.foa.se (Erik Svensson FOA2)
Subject: Re: Discussion Of Shallow Water ASW
Organization: FOA, Linkoping, Sweden
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 17:24:49 GMT


From eriks@lin.foa.se (Erik Svensson FOA2)

>From Paul Podvig <ppl@athena.mit.edu>

>My understanding is that there are no convergence zones in shallow water.
>Long towed array is useful when you can deploy it. Given that length of
>the thing is up to 2 miles, I doubt if you can operate it in shallow water
>(though surface ships probably could deploy it with little difficulty).

As this thread started out about swedish asw I'd like to add a comment about
towed arrays in coastal waters. A great part of the ASW is done in the 
archipelago. There's no possibility of using a 2 mile array. It would end up
wound round some skerry or another. I doubt there's 2 miles of open water in a
straight line. 

>>Some forms of active sonar do very well in shallow water (medium freq. hull 
>>mount I think).  Again a lot would depend on the geography.  It is probably 
>>a lot easier to find a submarine in the perisan gulf than off the coast of 
>>Norway.

>Agree. Though you are still going to have a lot of problems with reflections
>from the bottom and the surface. And again, if you are on submarine, you
>wouldn't like to use your active sonar--you will be detected first.

One problem in the archipelago is that the sub can lay still on the bottom,
which makes it very hard to classify the echo as a sub rather than say a 
underwater crag. Also, there's lot of pits and chasms where the sub can go down
to the bottom making it even harder to find.


--
Erik Svensson			Research Officer
Guided Weapons Division		National Defense Research Establishment (FOA)
Stockholm			Sweden

net.address: 	eriks@fenix.lin.foa.se

"Another casualty of applied meta-physics!" -- Hobbes

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: mjr@decuac.DEC.COM (Marcus J. Ranum AXP)
Subject: Re: Austers, Biggles and Brit War Comics
Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Washington ULTRIX Resource Center
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:37:13 GMT


From mjr@decuac.DEC.COM (Marcus J. Ranum AXP)

>Speaking of all these things, what do people think of the Flashman books?
>The history in them seems to be right on, and often can begin to justify
>reading them, at least until your wife takes a look at one...:-)

	Fraser's a pretty scrupulous historian, and the way he works
flashy into the charge at Balaclava is a true delight. You've got to
be careful to read the notes, where he inserts little bits here and
there to indicate what is true, and what he's playing games with. A
clue is when he makes a remark such as "blah blah blah in 18blah but
Flashman claims it occurred in 18blah+1 - clearly Flashman is mistaken."

	Hard to find in the US but *VERY* worth it if you can get them
are Fraser's stories of his time in a highland regiment (would you guess?) ;)
and some of the unique characters and events of that time. They are so
funny that I find myself nearly incapable of reading them without whooping
for air.
	"McAuslan in the rough"
	"The sheikh and the dustbin"
	"The general danced at dawn"

	Especially not to be missed are the fond memories of the pipe
major's practicing "Johnny Cope" under the subaltern's windows at 5:00AM
every morning...

mjr.

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: bphdarcy@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Sean J. Roc D'Arcy)
Subject: Re: desert storm operations
Organization: University at Buffalo
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 15:29:57 GMT


From bphdarcy@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Sean J. Roc D'Arcy)

In article <BxvFrA.9Ar@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, dpe@inel.gov (Don Palmrose) writes...
>The AAA threat being sooo great over Bagdad was the reason why only the F-117
>and Tomahawks were used on that city.  I do not know of any other aircraft
>flying into Bagdad, please correct me if I am wrong.
> 

Maybe.  I'm not sure either but, I remeber seeing shots of Bagdad that came 
from F-111s and I thought some of the Wild Ws were also in the area.  Also, 
didn't the one A-6 (7) pilot that got shot down get caught over Bagdad.

SJRD

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: David Emery <emery@dr-no.mitre.org>
Subject: Re: desert storm operations
Organization: The Mitre Corp., Bedford, MA.
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 17:34:02 GMT
Full-Name: News Service


From David Emery <emery@dr-no.mitre.org>

>o  The Iraqi artillery using the South African G5 155mm guns had
>   the means to do far more damage to coalition ground forces than
>   they did.  The only reason we can conclude they held their fire 
>   when we came thru the breaches at 0 hour was they wanted to 
>   surrender as quickly as possible.  

This is due to a significant effort to target Iraqui artillery.  Both
the air campaign and ground operations before the start of the ground
war targeted artillery.  You may remember some of the pictures of the
USMC M198 howitzer raids before the start of the ground war.  Besides
this, there were MLRS raids and similar efforts to take out Iraqui
artillery.  Besides targeting the guns, we also hit their command and
control pretty badly.  It's hard for artillery to shoot when no one
tells them the target...

Part of this is helped by the ability of our Q-36 and Q-37 radars to
'talk' directly to the fire control centers digitally.  With MLRS,
it's easy for a radar to spot the incoming rounds, calculate their
source point, send a message to the MLRS, and have MLRS counterfire in the
air before the enemy rounds land.  (With trained people, this should
take about 1 minute total...)

The bottom line (as reported by POW interviews) was that the Iraquis
were often too scared to fire, as they knew they'd get waxed in
return.  

				dave

Newsgroups: sci.military
From: Michael Joseph Edelman <mje@pookie.pass.wayne.edu>
Subject: Re: BLU-82/B What sort of bomb is it ?
Organization: Wayne State University
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 17:36:06 GMT


From Michael Joseph Edelman <mje@pookie.pass.wayne.edu>

In article 6JG@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM, moroney@ramblr.enet.dec.com writes:
    [...]
> |>    ALso known as the Daisy Cutter or Big Blue 82, thsi is a cast steel
> |>case filled with 12,600 lbs. of DBA-22M, an aqueous mixture of ammonium
>                                                                  --------
> |>nitrate, aluminum powder, and polystyrene soap as a binder.  It produces
>   -------
> |>an explosion of a size and intensity that observers have described as "the
> |>closest thing to a nuclear bomb" and is used not only for mine clearance
> 
> With this description, why did this book include the BLU-82 with fuel-air
> explosives?  With ammonium nitrate, it would not be a fuel-air explosive.
> 
> -Mike
> 
There explosion takes place in two stages. The first is an ammonium nitrate 
explosion that disperses the aluminum and polystyrene. I believe that the 
polystyrene also acts as a reducing agent with respect to the aluminum at
this point, reducing any oxides. In the second stage the finely-dispersed
aluminum spontaneously combusts with atmospheric oxygen. Ergo, fuel-air.
                       --mike





Newsgroups: sci.military