From: rats@cbnewsc.cb.att.com (Morris the Cat)
Subject: Re: Gutting of the Bill of rights
Organization: AT&T
Distribution: usa
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 21:43:24 GMT
Followup-To: talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns


|Even if all of the Armed Forces and National Guard were to side 
|against the people, they would still have a _very_ hard time: All
|together, they number only about one million people, less than 0.4% of the
|US population (I think this number is combat troops, not including
|support personnel.) A real "popular uprising" would probably involve
|the support (e.g. for food, medical care, etc...) of most of the
|population, and at least 5% of the population actually fighting.
|In such a situation, government forces would be outnumbered 10 to 1 (and
|unlike many modern revolts, the rebels would all be armed.)

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Excerpts from "Defense in Depth" by Richard Oakes, August 1984 Defense
Science.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

"One way of looking at a firearm is to describe it as a platform to
hold ammunition, which is man-portable, and which has as it's purpose
the delivery of a projectile at high velocity through a tube. We can
then look to the purpose inherent in the design of a round of ammunition
and thus determine whether or not that round, and the gun that fires
it, is designed for sporting or target purposes, or on the other hand,
if it is designed to take human life or maximise casualty recovery
costs. The purpose of a military weapon is, of course, either to kill
or maximize the time and cost associated with treating and recovery
of the victim of the weapon."

"Because many weapons are in fact military weapons they are precisely
the sort that would be of use to a militia. Elaborate systems of
licensing and record-keeping would be necessary to enforce a restrictive
law. These records, we presume, would also persist in spite of
safeguards. Thus the invader would be able to discover with relative
ease those who possessed or had possessed the most useful militia
armaments."

		The Militia Structure
		
For constitutional and political reasons, the actual organization and
enrolling of militia forces would not only be ill-advised but also
illegal. The British version of a "militia-in-resistance" or *last
ditch* force would also be inappropiate here. We agree with the Swiss
notion of the "curve of collaboration," which obviates the necessity
of recruiting and organizing a militia in advance of invasion. Although
collaboration will be a necessary element in the invader's Civil
Affairs Operations, the opposite phenomena of civilian resistance will
more than overcome numerically the collaborators.

The Swiss plan makes the startling observation that the population
really has no other choice as to participate in the resistance to an
invader: "Personal danger in the 'fight of idealogies' is no longer
measured in terms of whether you belong to a resistance movement
or not. If, by virtue of profession or descent, you belong to a walk
of life looked upon unfavorably by the enemy, he will liquidate you
sooner or later either by deportation or by execution.

"To remain a 'non-participant' in the resistance movement is no longer
useful since the system of arresting hostages or mass deportation will
indiscriminately be applied to everyone, fighter or non-fighter.

"In the hour of distress nobody will help the 'non-fighter. 'As a member 
of the resistance movement you will be protected by it. It can warn you 
when the enemy intends to arrest you and help you escape."

The basic organizational unit of the Swiss resistance plan is the cell
of three to ten persons. One idealized example would include an
academic, an artist, a journalist, a labor official, a teacher, a priest,
a former policeman and a former army officer. These persons would be
clustered around a cell leader. Each of their respective constituency
contacts would generate still further compartmentalized cell until
a network of cells cover an entire area. Individual cell members would
know only  their cell leader. Each leader would know only members of
his or her own cell plus other cell leaders or cell intermediaries,
as distinguished from other cell members. The combat elements of the
resistance movement in Switzerland will be organized in the later
stages. The planned resistance movement then includes an array of
sections quite distinct from operational combat cells. Each member knows
only the bare essentials about the operations of the organization, thus
the organization cannot be compromised by the apprehension of few
persons.

Neither is it important for such an elaborate plan to remain
secret. In the introduction to the Swiss document "Resistance to the
Last" the Central Committee of the Swiss Noncommissioned Officers
Association states the proposition as follows:

	"We believe that, because of our openly demonstrated will to
	resist to the last, the enemy will have one more factor to
	consider when evaluating the 'pros' and 'cons' of planned
	'Operation Switzerland.' (The invasion of Switzerland.)
	
Included in this plan is, of course, passive resistance. The suggested
techniques of passive resistance vary from shunning the enemy occupiers
in public places to purposeful inefficiency and covert support of
guerillas and resistance forces. The indigenous infrastructure and
personnel relied upon by the occupying invader would thus become in
his view bumbling, inefficient, and enormously costly. Ultimately
industrial sabotage of both facilities and products is envisioned and
described in detail.

If we envision a guerilla war of resistance, the cost of fighting
guerilla units is difficult to estimate. We know first of all that that
cost will be quite high. If we look at the "small wars" or "low intensity
conflicts" since 1945, we observe counter-guerilla force ratios varying
from 3:1 to 10:1. As Sir Robert Thompson has put it, these wars promise
to drag on into eternity. In the extreme, the cost of countering a
guerilla force approaches the inestimable. When we add to guerilla
forces the above-suggested "militia-in-resistance," the invader's 
mathematical equilibrium wobbles, becomes disrupted, and collapses.
What was expensive under guerilla resistance and difficult to estimate
now becomes *incalculable*. The "militia-in-resistance" is both
vaporous and omnipresent.

|A more interesting question is whether or not modern weapons (tanks,
|attack helocopters, etc...), available mostly or entirely to the
|government, would be able to overcome a hostile civilian population
|and a substantial numerical disadvantage. While I'm no expert, I think
|this wouldn't call this a sure thing for the government.

Considering the number of continuous hostile engagements over a very
widespread area, I can't see how the finite number of mechanised combat
vehicles could even begin to cope with each action, considering the
time T1 to reach the engagement point and the amount of time T2 spent
in a combat operations. And when you add in breakdowns and malfunctions,
coupled with a finite spare parts supply line, your MTBF will likely
drop like a rock after the first few days of active engagement in
urban environments. Your combat effectiveness will undoubtedly by a
significant percentage under a 100%; units will begin cannibalization
of combat vehicles in order to keep other vehicles in battle.
Newsgroups: talk.politics.misc,talk.abortion,alt.politics.bush