From: Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>
Subject: Re: WWII: Why Japan didn't invade Hawaii
Followup-To: sci.military
Summary: Diary entry looks pretty bad
Organization: Statistics, Pure & Applied Mathematics, University of Adelaide
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 17:35:16 GMT


From Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>


In article <Bx3p1M.3oo@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us (Gene A. Kennedy) writes:

>From "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>

>Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au> writes:

>> From Joseph Askew <jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>

>> In article <Bwqp32.J5x@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us (Gene A. Ke

>> >From "Gene A. Kennedy" <gak@n5abi.hou.tx.us>

>> >> From jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew)

>> "To embargo oil to Japan would be as popular move in all parts of the country
>> as you could make. There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan
>> such a situation as woulld make it, not only possible but easy, to get into
>> this war in an effective way. And if we should thus be indirectly brought in,
>> we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic
>> Russia"  From Harold Ickes, the Interior Secretary as reprinted in Toland pg

> Note that this quote doesn't define what "war" Ickes is talking
>about.
>His call for an embargo against
>Japan was partly as a way of easing the burden on U.S. consumers,
>although he did advocate harsher restrictions on Japan.

Which war could it have been about? Further it specifically says "we would
avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia"
Russia was not at War with the Japanese, they were only at War with Germany
at the time. Therefore the War Ickes is referring to must be (and can only
be) the War in Europer against Germany.
Also he is not talking about any consumer burden, he is talking about
War. He is also linking the War with the embargo explicity, whatever
he was saying in public for PR reasons he was very clear in his private
communications with his boss.

> The U.S. had also shifted some units of the Pacific fleet to the
>Atlantic during that summer and when Ickes was questioned abuot
>this by the Governor of Hawaii (Hawaii wasn't a state so was under
>the interior department), Ickes said "Oh, you people need not be
>alarmed whatever. There is going to be no attack on Hawaii. It is
>too far away. The battle is on the Atlantic." (August 1941). It
>would seem Ickes didn't consider Japan a real threat.

I have no doubt that the attack on Pearl Harbour came as a complete
suprise to everybody in America from the White House down. I do not
believe I have said otherwise. My argument is not that Ickes wanted
or knew about the attack on Pearl but that he wanted to go to war
with Japan and created a situation whereby Japan was forced to do
something stupid. I also don't doubt that Ickes greatly underestimated
the Japanese from racial (among others) reasons. Thus if he didn't
expect Hawaii to be attacked that says nothing about wanting War with
the Japanese.

>> Whatever Roosevelt intended we can judge both these citations by the subseque
>> events. The oil embargo *did* lead to War with Japan. The US *was* indirectly
>> brought into the War. Japan *did* fire the first shot without warning. I woul
>> say there is a strong correlation between what the Adminstration was saying
>> privately and what happened. If these are taken out of context then perhaps
>> someone might like to quote the rest of the material that makes the backgroun
>> clear. I would be happy to hear what you think these two quotes are really
>> saying. They seem pretty clear to me and I can't think of a contextg in which
>> they wouldn't look like they do.

> As I noted above, there were other reasons for the imbargo, and

Hang on, the reasons for the embargo are so feeble as to be silly. Are
you really saying that the US imposed oil sanctions and attached
unacceptable demands to them solely to provide oil for Britain? I
really have a problem seeing this!!!

>the comments in Stimson's diary have been given a number of
>interpretations. Some says Stimson was reflecting on the
>"offensive" nature of the Japanese forces and a need that in any
>confrontation, the roles of who was "attacker" and who was
>"defender" needed to be kept straight without undue danger to U.S.
>forces. Stimson was also a "politician" concerned with public
>opinion.

I have seen a number of interpretations too, none that make any
real sense. Let me just repeat the quote

"...[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked
perhaps next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for
making an attack without warning, and the question was...what should
we do. The question was how we should maneuver them into a position of
firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It
was a difficult proposition"

I certainly think that Stimson wanted the perception of who was the
attacker and defender to be very clear :-) Would you please explain
to me how "maneuver[ing] them into a position of firing the first shot"
somehow corresponds to keeping the roles of attacker and defender clear?

>  BTW, I don't consider Toland a "useless" source. I have read
>much of what he wrote, and find much of his research very
>interesting. I just don't agree with his conclusions.

My reaction entirely!! I also don't like the fact that he let some
of the Japanese written about to check over at least part of the text
for 'inaccuracies'.

>> It was not true of Tojo either. Tojo was loud and frequent in his opposition
>> to the war. He wasn't even told about the attack on Pearl Harbour until very
>> late. I can look through the sources I have and send you a quote or two if yo
>> like.

> Yes, by all means! The only "quote" I have seen attributed to
>Tojo indicating he was opposed to war is a vague comment
>remembered by a woman friend, and not documented. He was, however,
>"loud and frequent" in his condemnation of the U.S. If your
>referin to his "not being told" about the planning of the attack,
>very few were in on the planning and it wasn't until very late in
>this planning that it was even certain that the attack could be
>carried out (the problems with tropedos in Pearl Harbor). There
>was no reason to advise Tojo of a contengency plan that might
>never be used.

Well Tojo was the Prime Minister and suppsoedly responsible for policy
making so perhaps he shoudl have been told :-)
Anyway I do not want to get into a defense of the indefensible (or Tojo
for that matter) but here are a few quotes I found in Toland

"I am praying to the Gods that some way we'll come to am agreement with
America"

"If there is the slightest hope of success, I believe we should conduct
the negotiations"

Speaking to Finance Minister Kaya

"I intent to bring a peaceful solution if possible. I have no desire
for war."

To quote Toland himself

Personally he [Tojo] added, he was hoping that diplomacy would bring peace


Plenty of others if you read Toland, all these are of course removed from
their context and Tojo was an extremist (and hence said many other things).
Tojo did in fact become more peaceable omce he was appinted Prime Minister.

>> Before 1941 the US *was* in the war to all
>> intents and purposes - lend lease springs to mind as hardly the action
>> of a neutral. Granted that supporting Britain was popular in  the US do
>> you really think the US could have gone to war with Japan alone?

> I can't buy the idea that Japan and Germany were considered the
>same at the time. After Pearl, *no* Germans were interned for the
>duration of the war as the Japanese were.

Internment is a racial matter. The Japanese were racially inferior
and measures against them in America (and Australia) predate WW2
They don't have much bearing on this issue.

>The hatred for Japan
>after Pearl is well documented. The hatred for Hitler came later,
>after the holocost was documented. Right after Pearl, there was no
>supprot (to speak of) for Japan in the U.S., but there was still
>an active support for Germany, even if somewhat small. In fact,
>this was one of the major reasons we were not already at war with
>Germany.

Roosevelt's opponent in the 1940(?) elections Wendel Wilkie campaigned
on a platform of more supprot for Britain and entry into the War. What
degree of antiWar feeling there was was clearly marginal to mainstream
politics.

> Yes, I think that if Hitler had publically condemed the attack on
>Pearl, the U.S. could have been left at war with Japan *only*.
>That might have changed later, but it also might have changed the
>course of the war to some extent.

Again I would say that Ickes didn't think that WAr with Japan was
not immediately war with Germany as you can see from his memo. The
analogy is with the Cold War. Because America was at war (sort of)
with Russia this meant war with other Communists in China Vietnam
Angola etc etc. Same with the Fascist states. I do not believe that
anyone could seriously expect the US to go to War with Japan alone.
It is really beyond belief.


Joseph Askew


-- 
Joseph Askew, Gauche and Proud  At dawn with staff in hand I climbed the crags,
jaskew@spam.maths.adelaide.edu  At dusk I made my camp amoung the mountains.
Disclaimer? Sue, see if I care  Only a few peaks rise as high as this house,
One China One Korea One Eire32  Facing the crags, it overlooks winding streams.

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