HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
X-Quoted: 62%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1992 00:21:15 -0500

Thus said strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight):
>Arthur Rubin discusses the possibility of PKP going after end users.
>It's worth noting that in such a case, they can ask for legal fees
>as well, and if they win, the result could be very damaging to some
>who think their only exposure is PKP's loss measured as the
>Mailsafe or ripem licensing fee.

What RIPEM licensing fee?
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted


All .signature quotes are false.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: RSA Question (was Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality)
Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
Date: 16 Dec 92 02:25:46

    >    For the record I am going to publish a number I
    >    want to keep secret.  I am going to raise it to the power of
    >    three modulo 91 which is the product of two primes.  The
    >    result is 34.  My wife knows the factors of 91 and will be able
    >    to decode this message.  

    Please excuse my ignorance, but, how can "your wife" decode the message
    knowing 34, 91, 7, and 13?

    i.e. I have a number
      (X^3) moulo 77 (product of two primes) = 48
    what is my number? and how did you get the answer?


Generally, given x^3 mod N = y, knowing the factors N = pq,
recover x by the following:
  1. Compute phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1).  For number theorists, this is
     the number of elements of Z^*_N, the (multiplicative mod N) group
     of integers relatively prime to N.
  2. Use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (see Knuth vol. 2, etc.)
     to compute t, so that 3t == 1, mod phi(N).  This means that
     x^(3t) mod N will be equal to x.
     This is because x^(phi(N)) mod N == 1, from Lagrange's theorem.
  3. Now to decrypt y, simply compute x = y^t mod N.

In the case of N=77 and N=91, phi(N) is a multiple of 3 so no
suitable t exists.  You have to have picked your original primes
p and q to make this not happen.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Sorcerer's Apprentice Cleaning Services
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 05:20:27 GMT
	<1992Dec12.192210.10839@netcom.com>

In article <1992Dec12.192210.10839@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
   Derek Atkins says there are plans in the works to produce a "de novo"
   version of PGP using RSAREF, starting with the PGP interface specs.

   If that product is to be usable in the U.S., whoever does this is
   going to have to import IDEA legally, under the munitions act. Otherwise
   one would not be able to decrypt messages sent with the non-U.S. version,
   PGP 2.x.

I'm not a lawyer (though I play a politician on TV :-), but there's a
difference between crypto *software*, which may be covered by the
munitions export/import laws, and the mathematical *algorithms*,
which probably aren't - they can be published in the Federal Register (e.g. DES) 
or technical journals and imported and exported without restrictions.
So all we'd need to do would be implement IDEA in software in the US.
On the other hand, do the folks who own the patent for IDEA in Switzerland
also have patent protection here?
--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
# Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Nov 12 - Anniversary of Indonesian massacre in East Timor, 1991
# Indonesia first invaded in 1975, and about 1/3 of the people have been killed.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: dorsey@lila.com (Bill Dorsey)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Reply-To: dorsey@lila.com
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 05:05:38 GMT

David Sternlight replies to Eben Moglen's article on the reality of the
situation regarding PGP legality.  He clearly believes that his own idea
of ethics is absolute when he says, "Using PGP in the US. is wronging the
patent holders and violating the Munitions Act." (sic)

He continues his tirade by bringing up hypothetical situations with no
basis in fact about how using PGP could impact one's life/career in a
negative manner.  Naturally, he leaves out the hypothetical situations in
which it could impact one's life/career in a positive manner.

Next he begins his feeble attempt to discredit Eben Moglen's ethical and
professional standing.  He makes a ridiculous comparison between Moglen's
suggestion that one might use PGP until one receives notification from PKP
directly that one is in violation of their patent and "to saying commit a
crime, and if the police catch you, then you can decide what you want to do
about it." (sic)  This comparison seems to imply that he doesn't understand
the difference between patent law and criminal law.  I'm not a lawyer, so I
would encourage anyone that uses PGP to check with an attorney, but my under-
standing of the law is that a patent holder must notify anyone they believe
is in violation of their patent before pursuing remedies under the law.  This
sentiment seems to be echoed in Moglen's posting.

His attack on Moglen continues when he questions Moglen's statement, "I very
much doubt that PKP really believes that the domestic circulation of PGP violates
the ITARs"  He claims Moglen is "winging it" by making this statement.  He
doesn't seem to consider the possibility that Moglen is basing this statement
on his knowledge of the ITAR and the assumption that PKP's attorneys possess
similar knowledge and are likely to draw similar conclusions based on legal
experience rather than wishful thinking.

He concludes his attack on Moglen by suggesting that Moglen's characterization of
PKP's attempt to protect their property rights as a "temper tantrum" shows that
Moglen must be a party at interest.  This seems improbable at best.  In fact,
as Brutus' once said, "Methinks thou doest protest too loudly."  In fact, Mr.
Sternlights motives are drawn into question by his lengthly exposition on "The
Ethical and Legal Reasons not to use PGP in the US."  He backs up this possibility
when he concludes, "I've been in communication with Jim Bidzos [of PKP] on a
regular basis..."

Not everyone shares Sternlight's opinion that "RSA has patents on a wonderful
invention and they are entitled to the fruits of their work."  See esp. the FSF's
position on algorithmic patents for an opposing view.

---
Bill Dorsey      "Most people mistake law for justice and authority for
dorsey@lila.com   liberty.  You will hear them talk of 'liberty under law,'
ripem public key  and they are content to see it so deep under the law that
on request        it is completely obliterated." -- Herbert Spencer

Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5625 alt.society.civil-liberty:6879
From: jgk@osc.COM (Joe Keane)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.society.civil-liberty
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Summary: Key registration sucks.
Keywords: corruption
Date: 10 Dec 92 04:28:18 GMT
Reply-To: Joe Keane <jgk@osc.com>
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Organization: Versant Object Technology, Menlo Park, CA
Weather: rain, high 55, low 46
Moon-Phase: full

In article <1992Dec4.181819.26504@grebyn.com> sgs@grebyn.com (Stephen G.
Smith) writes:
>The thing we are worried about is letting the gov't have access to *all*
>encrypted data at any time without notifying the owner of the data.  This is
>equivalent to legalized burglary.

No, it's usually pretty obvious when you've been burglarized.

--
Joe Keane, amateur mathematician
jgk@osc.com (uunet!amdcad!osc!jgk)
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5636 alt.security.pgp:155
From: boyd@acsu.buffalo.edu (Daniel F Boyd)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: 13 Dec 92 16:57:08 GMT
Organization: UB

In article <1992Dec13.063111.26607@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com
(David Sternlight) writes:
> As I understand it, the details of the S-boxes were not [published
> in the Federal Register] (though they can, I suppose be gotten via
> decompiling or examining source code), yet without them one could
> not implement DES and thus they are an essential part of the
> algorithm, in Bill's terms.

You're right in the particulars, but very wrong in general.

The Federal Register is the listing of all the regulations that the
government has made.  When they change the food-labeling laws so that
"Monosodium Glutamate" must always be written in 12-point Palatino
Bold -- the Federal Register is where it gets listed.  They wouldn't
publish DES there in any case because it's not where it goes.

The DES algorithm is published in a FIPS PUB, which you can get from
the government printing office.  And the GPO will send it anywhere,
worldwide.  They would send it out even if the address is "KGB
Headquarters, Lubyanka, Moscow" (assuming the KGB's check doesn't
bounce -- possibly an unwarranted assumption).

There is NO need to disassemble software or examine microchips under a
microscope in order to reimplement DES.  You can look it up in any
technical library -- probably even the Moscow University library.
It's a PUBLIC algorithm.

Why it's still illegal to export DES chips is a mystery to me; the
ones you buy all say "Malaysia" on them anyway...



-- 
Daniel F. Boyd -- boyd@cs.buffalo.edu         -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x))) 
 (quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: jgd@dixie.com (John De Armond)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 10:15:34 GMT
Organization: Dixie Communications Public Access.  The Mouth of the South.

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

>Hugh Miller's article is filled with so many inaccuracies it's hard to
>know where to start, so I'll treat only a few; the remainder is left
>to others as it's pretty late at night. I'm going to digest, since the
>message is so long.

>He then decides to interpret Bidzos' comments as "threats" instead
>of statements of fact about Bidzos' interpretation of the PKP patents
>and the Munitions Act. 

I thought Miller's arguments well thought out and pragmatic.  Fact is
Bidzos IS saber rattling.  If he thought he had a case, he'd prosecute
it and forget about the munitions act angle.  Patent law gives overwhelming
bias toward the holder  including early injuctive relief.  Bidzos and
PKP know that they are likely to lose the whole shebang if they 
press the case.  Statistics alone play against them if my patent
attorney is accurate in stating that about 75% of all patent validity 
challenges succeed.  RSA is neither particularly novel nor unobvious
to one engaged in the trade.  That alone should do the trick without even
delving into the legal issues involved with algorithm patents.  Lastly,
they stand a great chance of losing by virtue of lack of due dilligence
in protecting their patent.  PGP has been out, what, 2-3 years?
No suits yet.  Appears they don't care too much.

Bidzos is trying a package deal.  One part to scare those who fear a patent
suit and to get the rest, he throws in a specious Munitions Act 
threat.  Saber rattling at its finest.

John
-- 
John De Armond, WD4OQC               |Interested in high performance mobility?  
Performance Engineering Magazine(TM) | Interested in high tech and computers? 
Marietta, Ga                         | Send ur snail-mail address to 
jgd@dixie.com                        | perform@dixie.com for a free sample mag
Need Usenet public Access in Atlanta?  Write Me for info on Dixie.com.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Here, beside the rising tide
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 00:28:05 GMT
	<Bz7J39.8tD@acsu.buffalo.edu> <1992Dec13.192149.8211@netcom.com>

In article <1992Dec13.192149.8211@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
   My latest state of understanding (but I'm open to even more) is that
   DES was published. More than that, it's that there's a footnoted
   exemption in the Export List (Commerce Dept.? State Dept.?) for
   technological exports which have been published in scholarly
   journals (the explanation I was given has something to do with
   the conflict between the Munitions Act and the First Amendment).

   It's also been claimed by one correspondent that a)IDEA has been
   published and b)the above footnote exemption would mean that
   the IDEA component of PGP wouldn't provide a basis for proceeding
   against PGP under the Munitions Act.

If I'm the correcpondent you mean, I *didn't* say that the IDEA
component of PGP wouldn't provide a basis for government action against it -
I said there's a difference between algorithms 
(which the government doesn't seem to currently class as munitions)
and *implementations* of algorithms (which unfortunately they do),
and that if we wanted a legal-for-use-in-USA version of PGP,
we could use the IDEA algorithm but we'd have to implement it here.
(And, of course, we'd have to find out if the Swiss patent owners
have a patent in the US or would be nice enough to let us use it free.)


.... so we'll need to find a paper journal article, or have it posted
in alt.journals.scholarly.obscure from some site in Finland .... :-)
--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
# Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Nov 12 - Anniversary of Indonesian massacre in East Timor, 1991
# Indonesia first invaded in 1975, and about 1/3 of the people have been killed.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 1992 23:27:04 GMT

In article <1992Dec17.223042.15115@news.eng.convex.com> gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner) writes:

>	The only intelligence collection damaged by secure cryptography
>	in the hands of citizens is intelligence collection that shouldn't
>	be done.  You make it seem as if other governments would be deterred.
>	Of course not.  Governments, which are the "legitimate" targets of
>	our spies can use secure cryptography with ABSOLUTELY NO FEAR OF
>	PROSECUTION.  It is the unfortunate citizens of our incipient
>	police state that have to fear prosecution.  The war being conducted
>	these days is not against foreign powers but against the citizens.
>	Anything that gives the citizen an edge in that war is GOOD.

I'm afraid this is an oversimplification. There are many whom
the government has reason to collect intelligence on who cannot
use secure cryptography with no fear of prosecution.

I sympathize with the desire for honest citizens to have secure
cryptography. I count myself in that number. To believe this
does not, however, mean that one should deny governments'
legitimate interest in this matter, and their taking of
cryptographic violations of munitions laws much more seriously
than the building of airplane models.

David
From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 01:31:49 -0500
Organization: InterCon Systems Corporation
Distribution: world
Reply-To: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
NNTP-Posting-Host: chaos.intercon.com
X-Newsreader: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.1b22

karl@ddsw1.mcs.com (Karl Denninger) writes:
> Therefore, if the keys are not compromised you can, with certainty, 
> prove whether or not it was written by the individual in question. 

However, proving that a given key has *not* been compromised seems 
problematic.  Any evidence would by its very nature have to be 
circumstantial...



Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation
From: bartjan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl (Bartjan Wattel)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Enlarging key size of the DES algorithm
Summary: What about DES modifications that use enlarged key sizes ?
Keywords: DES, key size
Date: 15 Dec 92 15:26:06 GMT
Organization: MCGV Stack, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands.
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Hi,

I'm currently working on a project which involves the design of a DES cryto-
chip. When reading some papers on this subject, it appeared to me that there
is a great need for enlarging the number of bits used in the cipher key. I read
about an implementation of the DES with a cipher key of 768 bits in the paper
of T.Kropf, J.Fr"ossl, W.Beller and T.Giesler: A hardware implementation of a
modified DES-algorithm, in North-Holland Micorprocessing and Microprogramming
30, 1990.

Questions:

  1)  Does anybody know the reason(s) for the number of circular left shifts
      which are performed on the cipher key each iteration in the original
      DES algorithm ?
  2)  Does anybody know of other modifications concerning the key size ?
  3)  Do modifications exist which have been published or proposed by the
      NBS, or do other (de facto) standard modifications exist ?

I surely hope someone is able to answer my questions. Thanks in advance,


Bartjan Wattel at Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands
(Email: bartjan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     "Why is it that we rejoice at a birth and grieve at a funeral?  It is
                    because we are not the person involved"
                                      -- Mark Twain
Xref: sparky sci.crypt:5785 alt.security.pgp:234
From: mathew <mathew@mantis.co.uk>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: RIPEM vs. PGP
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 15:12:19 GMT
Distribution: world
Organization: Mantis Consultants, Cambridge. UK.

weaver@kuttner.sfc.sony.com (Eric Weaver) writes:
> How about someone "out there" making a RIPEM-compatible system  rather in
> the spirit of PGP, so we can get about exchanging our private mail, rather
> than grousing about the legality of PGP?

We have a perfectly legal public-key cryptosystem.  PGP.

If you have some problem with that because of your laws, then I'm
afraid it's up to you to do something about it.  

>                                            I shall be happy to send U.S. $20
> in support of this effort, and I encourage Messrs. Sternlight, Ellison, Bouch
> and all others in this brouhaha to do the same once a volunteer comes forth.

Well, if you want to pay us to re-implement cryptographic software,
then that's a different matter.  Long live US export restrictions!
:-)


mathew
-- 
Lung cancer and arteriosclerosis.
For people who like to smoke.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: jkapson@ad-29.Naitc.Com (John Kapson)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: AC Nielsen Co., Bannockburn IL
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 23:01:44 GMT


Would someone please email me when this group stops talking about law
and politics and starts talking about the science of cryptography again?
Thanks.  Until then, consider me unsubscribed.

Ciao!

+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
|      John Kapson      | "Americans have a right and advantage of being  |
| NRA               ILA | armed -- unlike the citizens of other countries |
| jkapson@nis.naitc.com | whose governments are afraid to trust the       |
|                       | people with arms."      - James Madison,        |
|                       | The Federalist Papers No. 46 at 243-244.        |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
|                  PGP Public Key available via email                     |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Organization: /usr/local/lib/news/organization
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 01:33:27 GMT

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>
>Bill Stewart argues that the IDEA algorithm isn't covered by the
>Munitions Act provisions. Though I hope he's right, I'm not so
>sure. I think the Munitions Act covers cryptographic methods.

This can't be the case. I can travel to Europe, learn about IDEA, then
come to the US and hold a public speech on how the algorithm works. In
order to prohibit the "importation of cryptographic algorithms", as
opposed to cryptographic implementations, it would be necessary to
forever ban anyone who learned about any cryptographic system abroad
from ever reentering the US because having legitimately learned of the
system abroad no US law could prevent him from describing the system
to others, given that the first amendment would prohibit such a
restraint on speech.

It is, in fact, impossible to prohibit the export of unclassified
cryptographic algorithms (but not unclassified cryptographic software)
for exactly the same reason -- it would be necessary to prohibit
anyone who had ever read the DES specs, say, from leaving the US
without a license.

As we all know that the distinction between an algorithm and an
implementation in actual software is just a matter of effort that
educated programmers around the world can readily accomplish, it is
easily seen why the entire notion of export/import controls on
cryptography is idiotic. However, idiocy has never stopped the
government in the past, so there is little expectation it will stop it
in the future.

--
Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
--
"They can have my RSA key when they pry it from my cold dead fingers."
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: PKP/RSA comments on PGP legality
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 21:48:03 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1992Dec18.154947.26478@coop.com> felixg@coop.com (Felix Gallo) writes:
>You're accidentally interpreting a missive from the government as
>a code of ethics.  Ethics come from the inside.  I consider it
>unethical to, for instance, monitor or record day-to-day communications
>without a warrant or reason to suspect criminal activity -- yet the
>NSA [reportedly] does this frequently.  I also consider it unethical
>to support dictatorial regimes, to trade American and Iraqi lives for
>oil, to wage undeclared wars using illegally-obtained funds, and
>to sell weapons of mass destruction on the global market.  I do not
>consider it unethical to communicate in a private fashion.
	Bravo!!  Thank you for saying it.

>No, the law that states
>that mathematical algorithms can be patented is not a realistic nor
>a fair law.  No, the law that states that security of information is
>limited to the government only is not a realistic nor a fair law.
	Bravo again.


>We as individuals posting to these newsgroups are not, in general,
>presidents of major international corporations or wealthy cryptoanalysis
>enthusiasts.  We're students, programmers, systems analysts, and computer
>specialists.  
	Just regular people.  The people that we were mistakenly told
	own this country.  Let's make sure we make our government live
	up to its promise.  That, to me, takes more courage and more
	patriotism than dropping bombs on children in Iraq or Panama.


>As such, we lack both the resources and the time to 
>challenge the government in the areas in which it is wrong; perhaps by
>ignoring its unenforceable policies, we'll be able to build a groundswell
>which will eventually overcome the ignorance evident in the high places
>of our country.
	This needed saying so badly.   Thank you.



						smg

	
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp