HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jhull@thor.NoSubdomain.NoDomain (   Joseph F. Hull)
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - what is an appropriate key length?
Organization: Martin Marietta Astronautics, Denver
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1992 17:51:26 GMT

In article <1992Sep28.202620.25342@linus.mitre.org> 
lewis@aera8700.mitre.org (Keith Lewis) writes:

|> >If you have somebody's N and E, and you somehow factor N into P and Q, you
|> >must then find a D that works in the above equality (a non-trivial task, I
|> >think).  Then you can decrypt his/her messages.


In article <1992Sep28.215845.10593@Princeton.EDU>, 
mgflax@ernie.Princeton.EDU (Marshall G. Flax) writes:

|> Suppose you know P, Q, and E.  Then D is the multiplicative inverse of E
|> modulo (P-1)(Q-1).  Finding multiplicative inverses is in fact a trivial
|> operation if one keeps track of the quotients and remainders generated
|> while applying the Euclidean algorithm in GCD(E,(P-1)(Q-1)), but I'll
|> leave that as an exercise to the reader!
 
Finding D, given N, P, Q and E, is computationally feasible, although not
quite trivial.

However, finding P and Q, given N and E, is not presently computationally
feasible.  This fact is the *entire* basis for security of RSA.


-- 
	   _   _
    /_    / ) / ) Jeff Hull          jhull@den.mmc.com
   //_) -/- -/-   1544 S. Vaughn Cir
/_/ \_/ /   /	  Aurora, CO 80012   303-977-1061
From: mitch@cirrus.com (Mitch Wright)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: pgp2.0 - signing text files
Date: 29 Sep 92 07:50:06 GMT
Followup-To: poster
Organization: Cirrus Logic Inc.


/* wwe@aifb.uni-karlsruhe.de (Wolfgang Weitz) writes: */

>I'd like to use pgp2.0 to sign UseNet messages and mail so that
>
> (1). *everybody* can read my postings/mails (even without pgp) and 
> (2). those who do have it can also check the signature.
>
>My problem is that ``pgp -s text'' adds the signature in 'binary' form so that
>I can't send the resulting ``text.pgp'' as ordinary mail [...]

I've been thinking about this myself lately.  If you could rule out nasty
message altering sites, it might be easiest to just take a checksum of
of the message (sans header and pgp signature) and sign that.  If one is
truely interested in making sure the sender was "real", just take the
checksum of the message and check it against the signed result.  Not 100%
reliable, but then again, few things are.  But what you are really trying
to gain is "confidence" that the message is from who it says it is and this
method should be descent enough for USENET or other public forums.

   ~mitch
From: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 29 Sep 92 15:21:07 GMT

I think people are coming down too hard on Terry Ritter, who
is just trying to alert people to problems with using public
keys without validation.  He is getting all these sarcastic
comments just because people don't like to hear the things he
is saying.

Actually, one of the big advances in PGP 2.0 is to make it easy
to distribute _signed_ keys.  That was one of the main points in
making changes to the data structures.  People should use this
capability and try to collect signatures for their keys.  By
distributing signed keys the hope is that the person you want to
communicate with can verify your key, at least to the extent that
the signer vouches for you.

If you don't know anybody else who is using PGP, you need to do
as Terry suggests and use some other channel to validate their
keys.  Call each other up, read your keys over the phone, and if
they check out, sign them.  This is probably safe enough today,
in my opinion.  This way you can get legitimate signatures on your
keys which can improve the security of the whole system, as Terry
says.

Also, Terry is absolutely right about the need to change keys
periodically.  The longer a key is used, the more chances someone
has to discover your secret key, and also the more it is worthwhile
for someone to spend money to try to find your key.  The PGP 2.0 key
data structures actually have an expiration field in them.  This
is not implemented in this version but it would be good to see this
feature used in a later version.

The idea would be that each key would have a fixed lifetime, maybe
one year or two years.  After that time the key would expire.  Any
attempt to use an expired key would lead to a strong warning from
the program.  A few weeks before the key expires, you create a new
key, sign it with the old one, and distribute it.  By signing it
with the old one you don't lead to an opportunity for someone to
easily fake a new key from you.

(This is all for the case of a "normal" key transition.  Switching
keys when you know your private key has been discovered will require
more drastic measures.  Key revocation certificates are another feature
which should be implemented in future versions of PGP.)

Hal Finney

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.01

mQCNAiqsNkwAAAEEAMKWM52m5EWi0ocK4u1cC2PPyHT6tavk9PC3TB5XBYDegf3d
sldRpnjJj1r+aO08FFO+QLEI9wtBqvf1PPP5iLX7sD2uIVlJH14MPtyVtjm9ZKb8
JMtCW74045BgtHBC9yQ3V7vXNV5jM6dE2ocnH4AI/pBFrGLJPKgTA69YIUw3AAUR
tCZIYWwgRmlubmV5IDw3NDA3Ni4xMDQxQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPokAlQIFECqu
M1Tidd4O/2f3CwEByrUD/3uoV2y+Fuicrrd2oDawgOw9Ejcx6E+Ty9PVPqKvflLs
0zYyGfeFVSgBbTSDP3X91N3F68nydl9J9VA6QRCGelHM1cZRukCJ0AYbKYfpwUN0
xjEGHsDrd2gT5iWlB3vBZvi+6Ybs4rSq+gyZzVm1/+oRrMen32fz2r0CLgUtHok2
=fF6Z
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle)
Subject: Re: Using genetic engineering for exhaustive DES key search
Keywords: exhaustive, DES, genetic engineering
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
Distribution: na
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1992 03:04:34 GMT

lou@Cadence.COM (Louis K. Scheffer) writes:
>The basic approach would be to build a bacteria that acts as a DES key search
>machine.  Each bacteria generates keys at random, decrypts the encrypted block 
>with the key, and compares the result with the plaintext.  If there is a match,
>it generates lots of a string of DNA that contains the key and a specific
>marker that binds to an antibody, and excretes the result.  Otherwise it
>just keeps trying keys.

       This is a truly wierd idea.  Genetic engineering is still some ways
from the design of bacteria with arbitrary functionality, but can anyone
familiar with the field say this concept is fundamentally unworkable?

					John Nagle

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Paranoia over Spoofing
Keywords: Spoofing, public keys
Date: 27 Sep 92 18:43:16 GMT
Distribution: na
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest)

I believe that the intelligence agencies only manage to crack a small percentage
(maybe less than 1%) of all traffic. I have heard they save all traffic,
and that it takes a freight-car of tape per day.

It is not possible that they are intercepting all interesting traffic, even
though foreign military and intelligence traffic is a small percentage
(again less than 1%) of the interesting traffic of the world.

Now, Internet is in its infancy. It is already lots of megabytes per day.
If we include the private versions, certainly it is many 1000s of megabytes
per day.

So, at the time the world gets serious about networks, it will have gotten
serious about data and line security. All comm lines will be separately
encrypted. All mail, etc. will use at least one level of sophisticated
encryption.

From a cracker's point of view, this is horrid. They have to expend a lot of
effort to determine where files begin and end (due to the data link encryption),
and lots of those files are copies of the latest pinup sloshing around the
net.

I believe that no intelligence agency can handle the logistics. SPoofing is
supposed to be a way of circumventing these logistical problems, but even
sorting out the interesting traffic from all the chaf isn't going to
be easy.

Logistics also protects against spoofing, which has to be complete, or
even lousy security measures will detect it. There are thousands of nodes
on Internet. There will be millions when we get serious. The network will
be extremely dynamic. So, we only need a Consumer Report type group (or
perhaps several) to give a daily update of the number of attempted spoofs
against their test sites and mail to/from cooperating users. Once
procedures are published to test for spoofs, lots of people will do it
occassionaly and lots of internal security organizations will test
systematically.

So, IMHO, spoofing is something to be concerned about, but it is just another
annoying environmental factor, like viruses (both biological and computer).

Lew
-- 
Lew Glendenning		rlglende@netcom.com	408-245-7488

"Perspective is worth 80 IQ points."	Nils Bohr (or somebody like that).
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: shawnb@ecst.csuchico.edu (Shawn Brown)
Subject: Introductory reading and the sci.crypt archive
Organization: California State University, Chico
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 07:03:27 GMT

Can anyone reccomend a reading list of commonly available texts on
cryptography? 

Also, what is the address of the sci.crypt archive site? I have misplaced
it somewhere. 

Thanks.

shawnb@cscihp.ecst.csuchico.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.security.pgp
From: etllnfr@eddie.ericsson.se (Lyndon Fletcher)
Subject: pgp2.0 -  Any chance of the source being posted???
Organization: Ericsson Cellular Division
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 11:39:19 GMT

I've loved reading all these posts about the new PGP program. Unfortunately
some of us don't have FTP access and so cann't download it.

Can someone uuencode the source and post it either in this news group or one
of the Binary/source newsgroups. It's a little difficult understanding the
technicalities of a program you haven't seen!

Fletch
From: Robert.Warren@switchboard.UUCP (Robert Warren)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Paranoia over Spoofing
Date: 5 Oct 92 02:00:46 GMT

Robert Lewis Glendenning writes:

 > I believe that the intelligence agencies only manage to crack a small
 > percentage
 > (maybe less than 1%) of all traffic. I have heard they save all
 > traffic,
 > and that it takes a freight-car of tape per day.

I won't comment on the figures (Where did you get them?), but remember that agencies usually target specific groups or individuals. It narrows down the bandwidth a tad.

 > It is not possible that they are intercepting all interesting
 > traffic, even
 > though foreign military and intelligence traffic is a small
 > percentage
 > (again less than 1%) of the interesting traffic of the world.

I depends on who _they_ are, there isn't only the famous acronym companies out there, there are industrial spy's and a zillion other  "intrested" parties. When you think about it, you end up with a sizable population.

 > From a cracker's point of view, this is horrid. They have to expend a
 > lot of
 > effort to determine where files begin and end (due to the data link
 > encryption),
 > and lots of those files are copies of the latest pinup sloshing
 > around the
 > net.

I disagree, crackers trive on challenge, if there's a way to crack it, they'll find it. _Nothing_ is more powerfull than time itself. And as for the datalinks, there will still be "markers" and protocols. Encryption is nice, but according to your model certain standarts will have to exists for everyone to talk to each other. And for the looks of the United State's congress, it won't be that advanced.

You also think about the main communication trunks, but what about the idividual's lines? At one point, there _has_ to be a dedicated line to a perticular person/organisation. _That_ is where the weakness lies. A steel reinforced trunk line can't help your security if your junction box is open to any card waving techky.

 > So, IMHO, spoofing is something to be concerned about, but it is just
 > another
 > annoying environmental factor, like viruses (both biological and
 > computer).

On that point I agree, but what I'm babbling about is that all the security in the world won't help you if you aren't carefull. How does the line go? The only secure system is an unplugged system in a vault with no ventilation shaft?

Regards,
        Robert Warren
        Warren@switchboard.UUCP
        Warren%switchboard@cam.org
        Warren@cam.org (Use if mail bounces)

Comments welcome.
 > Lew
 > --
 > Lew Glendenning      rlglende@netcom.com 408-245-7488

 > "Perspective is worth 80 IQ points." Nils Bohr (or somebody like
 > that).

 > ---
 >  * Origin: switchboard - PatchNet-UseNet gateway (514)334-7883
 > (191:514/0.0)
 > SEEN-BY: 514/0
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Subject: Re: Pocket calculators (was Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible)
Reply-To: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Organization: U of Cambridge, England
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 10:04:34 GMT

In <PHR.92Sep30185509@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com writes:

> >  I've often thought the No Such Agency could do the following:
> > 
> >    - write encryption/decryption code that runs in an embedded
> >      micro of the kind found in calculators.
> > 
> >    - go to favorite defense contractor that also makes calculators
> >      (e.g. TI), and say "we want you to make a new model of simple,
> >      consumer calculator, priced so lots of people will buy them
> >      (here's some $$$ to make it profitable), and by the way, when
> >      the user types this undocumented 20-keystroke sequence, it should
> >      run this code that we'll supply (from previous step).

There's a commercial product from Racal which actually functions as a pocket
calculator until you activate it with your secret code. It will then work
out one-time passwords to let you into a system.

But the funniest covert function I came across was in one of the Olivetti
2000 series ATMs. There was a long keystroke sequence which would cause a
`test dispense', ie spit out 10 banknotes without your having to put in a
card or anything tedious like that.

One large, ponderous and bureaucratic banking organisation duly recorded
this fact in their branch operations manual. Nothing happened for three years
and then suddenly all the Olivetti ATMs in a particular town started going
out of balance. 

Ross
From: cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne)
Subject: Various Tangents (was Re: PGP *2.0* available)
Organization: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Ottawa
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 92 19:28:56 GMT

Would it not be appropriate for people to at least change the subject
line once in a while?

PGP *2.0* has now been "available" for a while, and the subject line
"PGP *2.0* available" really ought to be applied to messages
concerning the availability of the program.  It would be relevant to
messages where new FTP sites are announced; it would be relevant to
questions like "Where can I get it?"

Many of the discussions that have gone under this subject line REALLY
should fall under a subject like: "Key Transmission."

And I think a good point has been brought up:

For most of the people playing with PGP, the actual security of the
system is really not ALL that important.

If someone is REALLY interested in security, it is because there are
two or more people that have some CRITICAL communications.  And
they'll be willing to put the time and effort in to use the key system
exactly as it was designed; they'll use some system of key exchange
that is sufficiently independent that they WON'T have spoofing
problems.  They will NOT be using finger to check the key!

They'll dictate armour code numbers over the telephone if they have
to; they'll more likely send a printout/disk containing the keys
through the mail.  Since the data is IMPORTANT, and they NEED to send
it safely, they'll KNOW one another sufficiently well that TRUST won't
be quite the same issue that it is for those that would like to send
encrypted email around for fun.

What's important for most of the people around here is that playing
with PGP is FUN.  

- It's FUN to feel that you get to "fool" sundry government agencies
- It's FUN to try to figure out ways of breaking the system
- It's FUN to try to figure out ways of strengthening the system

There may be a few professionals around this group; most of the people
here probably aren't, at least with respect to cryptology.

Now can we start putting just a little bit of the creativity into the
subject lines?  Thanks!

-- 
Christopher Browne
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca
University of Ottawa
Master of System Science Program
From: casper@fwi.uva.nl (Casper H.S. Dik)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSA claims 33 and 37 of U.S. patent 4,405,829
Date: 6 Oct 92 23:18:09 GMT
Organization: FWI, University of Amsterdam

rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:

>It has been pointed out to me that Julius Ceasar used the polynomial

>	C = M+1(mod n)

>where M are the alphabet message chunks and n is the size of the
>alphabet.  For english n=26 which is the composite of the two primes
>2 and 13 so I believe that prior art (very prior) has been established.
>Any comments?

You cannot take a patent apart claim by claim. The patent
is the combination of the claims, not a mere collection.

If I combine several well known things for the first time
and the things have never been used in that combination before,
I can patent it.

Casper
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: erc@unislc.uucp (Ed Carp)
Subject: Re: Steganography and SECURITY
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Organization: Unisys Corporation SLC
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1992 21:11:35 GMT

Ross Anderson (rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk) wrote:

: I believe I did mention in my original posting that the spooks did this 
: during the war. If they saw a telegram saying `father is deceased' they'd 
: change it to `father is dead'; if they got lucky, a dumb spy would query, 
: `is father dead or deceased?' (This is all in Kahn's book.)

Ton Clancy wrote about this in one of his books.  The CIA used it to discover
who had leaked what to the press by generating slightly different memos and
distributing them.  Each memo was slightly different, and no two were alike.
They were written in such a way that they all said the same, yet a quote
taken from one would immediately identify which copy was leaked.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG     erc@apple.com                801/538-0177
"This is the final task I will ever give you, and it  goes  on  forever.   Act
happy, feel happy, be happy, without a reason in the world. Then you can love,
and do what you will."           -- Dan Millman, "Way Of The Peaceful Warrior"
From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP *2.0* available
Date: 27 Sep 92 22:23:27 GMT
Organization: IR

Terry, you keep talking about ``security'' and ``validation'' and
``trust'' without saying what these words _mean_.

A security violation is, by definition, a violation of the applicable
security policy. When there is no policy, there can be no violations. If
you're going to claim that a system is not ``secure,'' Terry, please
point out the security policy which has been violated. (Note that a
policy need not be a formal policy.)

Only the interpretation of a message can be valid or invalid. A message,
absent any interpretation, is neither valid nor invalid. If you're going
to claim that something has not been ``validated,'' Terry, please point
out what interpretation is in question.

``I trust T when he says X'' means that if T says X then I believe X.
Trust, absent any definition of T or X, is meaningless. If you're going
to claim that something is not ``trustworthy,'' Terry, please point out
who T is and what X is.

Now, Terry, why do you claim that MagNet is insecure? You say that its
keys are not ``validated'': what interpretation of the keys are you
talking about?

---Dan
From: gordon@sneaky.lonestar.org (Gordon Burditt)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: PGP 2.0 and USENET
Date: 27 Sep 92 21:51:11 GMT
Organization: Gordon Burditt

> It seems to me that there are only two really different schemes
> on the list:  Telephone Verification, and all the rest.  What the

Telephone verification doesn't work too well for *SOMEONE YOU MET
ON USENET*.  Actually, even meeting in person with exchange of ID,
fingerprinting, genetic samples, retinal eye patterns, dental work
analysis, etc. the first time doesn't work very well, either.  What are 
you going to compare the results to?  Unless you have access to some 
government's fingerprint files, and that person is IN the files, what 
have you accomplished? The second time, all it proves is that it's 
the same impostor as the first time.

On Telephone Verification:  you weren't going to believe that phone
number your friend sent you by email, were you?  So you look it up in 
the phone book.  You won't find me in the phone book.  You will find
a fake name with my phone number (one which means, to me, "the caller
asking for him is a scummy telephone solicitor").  It's probably hard 
to spoof my copies of the telephone directory quickly (but they do change
something like every year or two, and you could probably get away with
a realistic-looking but fake book delivered a few weeks before the real
one), but spoofing a name in the "new listings" section on Directory 
Assistance is probably trivial, provided you have a place in the area 
to connect a phone.

In-person meetings and postal mail verification have much the same
problem.  Of course, if you've met the person before and recognize
him, THEN you've proved something, but now you're requiring a
pre-existing relationship beyond "net persona".  Of course, if
whatever you're doing requires real trust (like exchange of large
amounts of money, or conspiring together to do something seriously
illegal), you probably don't want to do it with someone you don't 
know that well.  They might be a thief or a law enforcement official.

					Gordon L. Burditt
					sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: S_TITZ@iravcl.ira.uka.de (Olaf Titz)
Subject: Re: Every Spy Should Carry a Bible
Organization: Fachschaft Informatik, Uni Karlsruhe
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 1992 19:20:00 GMT
X-News-Reader: VMS NEWS 1.23

In <PHR.92Oct2170309@napa.telebit.com> phr@telebit.com writes:

>...  
>  He doesn't have to wait for it to break.  He enters the enemy country
>  without carrying the calculator through customs, and buys one after
>  he gets there.  If he thinks he might get searched soon, he throws
>  the calculator away and buys another one when he has some traffic
>  to encrypt.
>  
>     How do you know TI or HP or Casio haven't already done it?  :-)
>  
>  How do *you* know that I don't know if they've done it?  :-)
>  
>     Thanks for contributing some new material to this group, rather
>     than rehashing the current discussions about what precautions
>     rabidly paranoid people should take to prevent Big Brother from
>     spoofing ALL their communication with everyone on every possible
>     subject in real time.
>  
>  But spies might have to worry about Big B. reprogramming the calculators
>  in the local office supply store... :-)

You don't trust your calculator, do you??

You don't use a Japanese-manufactured one, do you??

You know that Japanese companies have conspirated to reprogram all
exported calculators to give wrong results that may be destroying the
Western civilization, don't you??

:-) :-) :-) :-)

[And of course, if you really like that conspiracy rubbish, you can
replace 'Japanese' by just everyone you want: the CIA, NSA, BND
(German version of the CIA), your system manager, my neighbour's dog
etc., as you know that - nobody knows the internals of his calculator
and - custom chips are widely available, even under the condition that
the design be kept secret under all cirumstances :-)]


MfG,
        Olaf
-- 
    o     Olaf Titz - comp.sc.student - univ of karlsruhe - germany
 _ /<_    s_titz@iravcl.ira.uka.de - uknf@dkauni2.bitnet - praetorius@irc
(_)>(_)   +49-721-60439 - did i forget something?
Real Programmers don't eat Cache!