HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 22:40:21 GMT

In article <BURT.93Jan6093746@chirality.rsa.com>, burt@chirality (Burt Kaliski) writes:
>Sorry, U.S. persons only.

Could someone please post the copyright notices of the RIPEM and
RSAREF packages (or possibly just the code) here?

(disclaimer: before doing so, you might want to check whether it is
allowed by (including but not limited to) the U.S. government, the
authors of the copyright notices, the Iraqi government, the Chinese
government, any of the other governments of the countries in the
world, your mother, your pets if any, your computer vendor if any,
your insurance policy if any, your pension plan if any, your
highschool headmaster if any)

//Jyrki
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: Bug in RIPEM?
X-Quoted: 10%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Distribution: us
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1993 22:35:57 -0500

Thus said darrell@cse.ucsc.edu (Darrell Long):
>I'm getting "Can't allocate memory" if I use X to paste in the text of a
>message, but it works just fine from a file.

This one I can duplicate.

It looks like the problem is that RIPEM is stopping midway through
reading the message you're pasting in with X to prompt for the
passphrase (i.e. it reads the PEM headers, then fetches the passphrase,
then reads the ciphertext.)  This seems to confuse the state of the
reading of the rest of the input stream, though I can't tell exactly how.

The place it dies is:

#Before call to ReadMessage, Username=mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu
#Can't allocate memory.

Something of a strange way to fail.  It seems to happen whenever the
message is being pasted in from another source, not just from X.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted


Elm:  the mailer that makes you forget this is UNIX.
Xref: sparky alt.security.ripem:48 sci.crypt:6494
From: sean@cobra.dra.com
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Date: 7 Jan 93 12:34:21 CST
Organization: Data Research Associates, Inc.

In article <1993Jan07.075317.15435@convex.com>, hamrick@convex.com (Ed Hamrick) writes:
> I've always been a little bit curious about the silliness of restricting
> the "export" of information that's publicly available.  If our government
> actually believed that there existed public information that wasn't
> exportable/exported, I'd be quite surprised.

It is much like the difference between exporting a journal that explains
how to make gunpowder*, and exporting gunpowder.   The government isn't
blocking the "knowledge" of how to make gunpowder from being exported,
only its implmentation.

Gunpowder wasn't invented in the U.S., and lots of people outside the U.S.
are quite good at making it.  Some would say even better than those in
the U.S.  [Continue to the point of absurdity.]

*Gunpowder is just an example, replace it with any widely known thing on the
munitions list.


Software, and computers has made this distinction very fuzzy.  With computers
the software is the implementation.  The computer is just a hunk of gold-plated
junk without the software.  But then again, so is a chemical plant, until
you type in the right formula.
-- 
Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO
Domain: sean@sdg.dra.com, Voice: (Work) +1 314-432-1100
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: rob@xyzoom.info.com (Rob Lingelbach)
Subject: make errors ISC unix: help?
Organization: Altruistic Intentions, Hollywood, CA
Distribution: na
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 1993 05:05:25 GMT


Has anyone made RIPEM successfully for ISC 3.0?  I have tried doing a
"make sco" with no success (I get syntax errors in rsaref.h) ..though
the make in ../test did succeed, and rdemo appears to be work.  I'd
love to get a copy of a working .../main/makefile for ISC.
Thanks.

--Rob

-- 
Rob Lingelbach KB6CUN | 2660 Hollyridge Dr LA CA 90068 213 464 6266 (voice) 
rob@xyzoom.info.com   | "I care not much for a man's religion whose dog or 
robl@netcom.com       |  cat are not the better for it."  --Abraham Lincoln
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: the best minds of a generation, destroyed by madness
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 07:00:12 GMT
	<1993Jan07.202702.20110@convex.com> <1993Jan7.222422.11146@netcom.com>

In article <1993Jan7.222422.11146@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
   Ed Hamrick raises the new question of whether a book available at
   B. Dalton's, which contains the DES code, is exportable.
...
   If Ed wants to pursue this, an interesting and amusing experiment
   would be to call the book's publisher and ask if they will fulfill
   prepaid mail orders for that book from outside COCOM countries--say
   Iraq or Cuba or the PRC.

Stick with China for examples like this.  Cuba's a special case,
covered by the Trading With The Enemy laws, which somehow apply even
though we haven't declared war on them.  Folks who live in the Land of
the Free and Home of the Brave can't even go to visit Cuba except by
special government permission (mainly given to educational groups and
journalists) without getting thrown in jail for visiting that
totalitarian country -- if you can't legally buy one of their cigars,
selling them books about how to hide communications from governments
is not likely to be legal either, unless you work for Ollie North.

--
#				Pray for peace;      Bill
# Bill Stewart 1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
Bush's pardon of his co-conspirators shows that he is, in the end, still a wimp.
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Which headers are copied in MIC-CLEAR mode?
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Date: 11 Jan 93 19:31:03 GMT

It is my understanding that RIPEM, in its MIC-CLEAR mode copies some
of the headers of the message inside the area that is signed, in order
to prevent palyback attacks. Right now I am hacking a perl script to
integrate PGP with my e-mail/news software and would like to include
the same feature.

So my question is: which header lines are copied? Obviously, To:,
Date:, and Subject:. Possibly From:. What else?

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
From: rrichman@access.digex.com (Ray Richman)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: Happy New Year!
Date: 11 Jan 1993 06:22:20 GMT
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
NNTP-Posting-Host: access.digex.com
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3


--
.............................................................................
!!! PLEASE REMEBER THAT IN WET WEATHER ROADS ARE SLIPPERY, SO DRIVE SLOWLY !!!
..............................................................................
Ray E. Richman <rrichman@access.digex.com> | Ray <70712.3403@compuserve.com>
.....................^preferred^..............................................
** ALSO PLEASE REMEMBER THIS HOLIDAY SEASON, DO !*NOT*! DRINK AND DRIVE!!...
 ... In the DC AREA Call SOBER RIDE 703-AAA-TAXI **
...............................................................................

Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 14:09:59 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan8.065938.6024@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
>The phrase "national security" is the most you'll get. Let's
>face it -- that's the de-facto "root password" to the protections of
>the Constitution.
	This is fabulous.  It's going in my quotes file.  Of course
	there are other passwords with root privileges like 
	"drug lord".

>This may nominally be a democracy, but doesn't this type of secret
>policymaking remind you just a little of the former USSR?
	Very much so.  And now that the USSR is finished and the
	parallel government consisting of our national security
	apparatus has idle hands I fully expect a full court press
	against the remainder of our constitutional freedoms.  Fortunately, 
	I don't	think they realize how dangerous the existence of so many
	faxs, computers, modems, and cellular phones to any
	attempt to clamp down.


						smg
From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Re: Which headers are copied in MIC-CLEAR mode?
Date: 12 Jan 93 00:10:51 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
NNTP-Posting-Host: scss3.cl.msu.edu
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]

Vesselin Bontchev (bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de) wrote:
: It is my understanding that RIPEM, in its MIC-CLEAR mode copies some
: of the headers of the message inside the area that is signed...
: So my question is: which header lines are copied? Obviously, To:,
: Date:, and Subject:. Possibly From:. What else?

If the -h i option is in effect (which it normally is), *all*
headers are copied, else none are.  RIPEM isn't selective.

Mark
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: kudzu@netcom.com (Michael Sierchio)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: True Love, and Home-Grown Tomatoes
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1993 00:06:52 GMT

In article <1993Jan8.092055.5285@nntp.hut.fi> 
	jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala) writes:

>>Is it true that there's no Suomi word for toilet paper?
>
>vessapaperi (or WC-paperi in "book language")

Thanks, I was kidding -- *really*.


-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  Michael Sierchio                          1563 Solano Avenue, Suite 123 |
|  kudzu@netcom.com                                Berkeley, CA 94707-2116 |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 04:37:42 GMT


Michael Sierchio posts the RSA Readme file dated March, 1992.
It's worth mentioning that the license that comes with RSAREF
currently is dated December and supersedes all previous
licenses, statements, etc. By agreeing to the license and getting
RSAREF/RIPEM, you agree to that supersession.

The README file of the license is freely available for ftp from
rsa.com.

David
-- 
David Sternlight
RIPEM Public Key on server  --  Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
From: gardner@convex.com (Steve Gardner)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 13:57:52 GMT
Organization: Engineering, CONVEX Computer Corp., Richardson, Tx., USA
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.

In article <1993Jan7.230612.12564@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>If this is accurate, then it raises some very troubling issues,
>since foreigners who violate such laws on their way out may be
>beyond the reach of the law,
	Oh NO! Beyond the reach of US laws?!  How horrible.  I thought
	nothing and nobody was beyond the reach of US laws! 
	Don't worry yourself David, the US government has shown quite
	emphatically that no one is beyond the reach of its laws,
	even people whose alleged crimes were committed on foreign
	soil.  (e.g. Humberto Alvarez Machain and Manual Noriega)


>Ah, the challenges of the information age!
	Some of us see the "challenges" as opportunities for the 
	assertion of lost freedoms.

>In passing, a word to those who may not fully understand the U.S.
>system.
	I hope you are paying special attention Vesselin ;-) you are about 
	to get a very special and important lesson in The Planetary
	Law as decided by the democratically elected representatives
	of the OnlySuperPower(TM). ;-)  

	
>The export laws aren't the result of some anti-democratic
>Administration, but the result of laws passed by a democratically
>elected Congress, after extensive public hearings and testimony.
	If the World's OnlySuperPower (TM), democratically elected by the 
	citizens of the self same superpower want to abrogate the 
	sovereignty of any of the "lesser" states by extending
	its DemocraticallyLegislatedLaws (TM) across its borders it is not 
	only possible but democratic (by definition!) and therefore 
	an integral part of Truth-Justice-And-The-American-Way (TM).
	Only a foreigner would think otherwise. ;-)

>Even the administration of the laws isn't monolithic. Many years ago
>(in 1970-72) I worked for the U.S. Secretary of Commerce as his Deputy
>Director of the Office of Policy Development, as part of a program
>where private sector executives spent a year in the Government and
>vice versa, called the Presidential Executive Interchange Program.
	I guess Nixon had more flaws than I realized. ;-)

>Let's pursue this discussion in a collegial, not an adversarial way.
	Physician heal thyself!


						smg
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: one-time passphrases
Date: 12 Jan 1993 23:51:40 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Summary: use of RIPEM over an insecure line


I have a normal terminal at home with a normal modem.  (My company provides
them to us.)  [I'm on it at the moment.]

I would never consider using RIPEM from here because I'd have to type my
KEK passphrase.

However, I could consider having to use RIPEM for some urgent reason.

I could, conceivably, make several copies of my private key and encrypt
them under passphrases which I will never use more than once.  I could then
have RIPEM accept one of these one-time phrases, use it and destroy the
file in the same step.

The vulnerability is that someone might have a copy of the file already and
from that s/he could get my private key.  Assuming I find some way around
that vulnerability, what kind of RIPEM work might I feel free to do from
home over an insecure line?

What kind might you do from home?


[P.S.  I know -- the real answer is to spend the $25 for a PC clone :-) ]

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
-- Stratus Computer Inc.	M3-2-BKW		TEL: (508)460-2783
-- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298	FAX: (508)624-7488
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
Organization: Wimsey Information Services
Distribution: alt
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 1993 23:50:06 GMT

In article <BURT.93Jan6093746@chirality.rsa.com> burt@chirality.rsa.com (Burt Kaliski) writes:
>RSAREF is now available via anonymous FTP to 'rsa.com'. Along with
>RSAREF you can get RIPEM, Mark Riordan's RSAREF-based privacy-enhanced
>mail application, and an Emacs command interface to RIPEM. See the
>file 'README' in the FTP directory 'rsaref' for more information.
>
>Sorry, U.S. persons only.
>
>-- Burt Kaliski
>RSA Laboratories

Why not Canadians?
Considering that RSAREF has been distributed to Canadian citizens on
Canadian hosts the past, it seems strange that we are excluded
from distrubution via anonymous ftp from rsa.com

Mark
-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: Which headers are copied in MIC-CLEAR mode?
X-Quoted: 28%
Organization: Computer Science Dept, Indiana University
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 15:45:44 -0500

Thus said bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:
>It is my understanding that RIPEM, in its MIC-CLEAR mode copies some
>of the headers of the message inside the area that is signed, in order
>to prevent palyback attacks. Right now I am hacking a perl script to
>integrate PGP with my e-mail/news software and would like to include
>the same feature.
>
>So my question is: which header lines are copied? Obviously, To:,
>Date:, and Subject:. Possibly From:. What else?

RIPEM itself is not smart enough to selectively copy some headers and
not others into the plaintext; it will either copy all of them or none
of them.

The perl script I wrote, send-ripem, is more selective.  It includes all
headers except Bcc (which obviously shouldn't be included in the
plaintext) and Fcc (which is only meaningful for MH.)  You may find the
perl code in send-ripem of use; feel free to borrow from it.  (Let me
know if you don't have a copy, I'll gladly send you one.)

(Getting a mailer interface which handles Bcc properly for full-fledged
encryption is more difficult to do, but doable.)

I recommend From:, Date:, and To: at minimum; this is sufficient to
prevent replay attacks (provided the recipient pays attention), and has
the added benefit of making the plaintext an RFC 822 compliant message.
Bcc: is the only header for which I can think of a good reason *not* to
include it in the plaintext.
-- 
Marc VanHeyningen    mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu    MIME & RIPEM accepted
"I used to sing the blues when I was feelin' so down."
"What do you do now?"
"Post to sci.research.careers."
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt
From: rick@postmaster@hq.af.mil
Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem
Subject: Licensing Question on RIPEM/PGP
Date: 12 Jan 93 14:14:24 GMT
Reply-To: rick@hq.af.mil
Organization: 7TH Communications Group

I have been following some of the threads here and I am trying to discern
what the licensing differences are between RIPEM and PGP.

As I understand it PGP is not being licensed by PKP although if you
are a federal employee you can still use the software because
uncle Sam funded development. This is in the US, and these restrictions
aren't necessarily true overseas. Has any of this changed?

I have been following the RIPEM stuff for a couple of days
and it seems it is being licensed in the US. Is this true? 
If so why are  licenses being issued for RIPEM and not PGP?
Assuming the above hasn't changed.

If someone could explain this I would be thankful. 

-- 
Rick Weldon     I-NET Inc. (Pentagon, 7TH Com Group)
E-mail: rick@hq.af.mil
From: lsnyder@fig.ucsb.edu (Lowell R. Snyder,,,COMS,Undergraduate)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: Rainbow Series Telephone number anyone?
Date: 7 Jan 93 19:43:45 GMT
Organization: Wabbit Hunters of Amerwica

In article <1ie4nrINN2nv@uniwa.uwa.edu.au> ibacon@uniwa.uwa.edu.au (Ian Bacon) writes:
>Ok, ok,  call me stupid, what is the rainbow series of books about?

The rainbow series is a set of publications from the National Computer
Security Center establishing the federal standards for processing
sensitive and classified information on a computer.

These COMPUSEC documents are available from:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington DC 20402
(202) 783-3238

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This note prepared by Lowell "I'm never obnoxious" Snyder.  The opinions 
expressed here do not represent the opinions of any employers or organizations 
to which I am affiliated (and are probably not even mine to begin with!).
From: johan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl (Johan Wevers)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: VIRUS TOOLKIT
Date: 6 Jan 93 08:37:59 GMT
Organization: Department of Physics, Eindhoven University of Technology.

bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes:

> Of all the packages listed the only
>one that poses any considerable danger is PS-MPC. [...]
> PS-MPC can produce 96 signifficantly different viruses
>(each of them using a different, slightly polymorphic decryptor)

I've a few questions to the virus experts here:

Can these packages, in combination with the mutation engine, be a serious
danger for the present virus scanners? Further, I've heard of a virus
toolkit which modifies the virus so that it isn't stuck after or before a
program, but mixed through it, rebuilding the original program sequence of
the program in memory, something like this:

0100:
 jump to virus code
[Piece of the original program]
 virus code
 jump to next virus code
[Piece of the original program]
 virus code
 jump to the next virus code
   :
   :

I've read in a magazine that a combination of this principle with the
mutation engine could generate virusses which would be hard- or unpossible
to detect, even with heuristic scanning methods. Is this true? And what
about using an operating system that is not as open as DOS, e.g. linux or
OS/2. Can this give any protection?
-- 
********************************************************** 
* J.C.A. Wevers                *   The only nature of    * 
* johan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl *   reality is physics.   * 
**********************************************************
From: rick@ee.uwm.edu (Rick Miller)
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: Re: pc-mpc
Date: 10 Jan 1993 21:24:19 GMT
Organization: Just me.
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.2.33
Summary: Did I understand correctly?

In article <yk36wB1w165w@cybernet.cse.fau.edu> phase@cybernet.cse.fau.edu (Phase) writes:
> Well, an brand new version of PS-MPC is already out as of a few
>days ago. It is suposed to be a far superior Virus authoring package than
>the original.
>                   phase@cybernet.cse.fau.edu

Did I understand right?  You're talking about a tool for *developing* viruses?
Where has this come out? and how can its progeny be combatted?  Are the viruses
thus produced generic enough to catch easily? or are they gonna be trouble???

Rick Miller   <rick@ee.uwm.edu> | <rick@discus.mil.wi.us>   Ricxjo Muelisto
Occupation:  Husband, Father, WEPCo. WAN Mgr., Discus Sys0p, and  Linux fan
Newsgroups: alt.security