From: jwindley%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Jay Windley)
Subject: Re: Oaths & Fervor
Date: 11 Apr 92 18:43:41 MDT
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept

kilroy@gboro.glassboro.edu (Dr Nancy's Sweetie) writes:
>
>I do not think one can be malicious without intent; save for that detail, we
>agree.

Well, I'm all too happy to retract that detail.  I mulled that phrase
over in my mind and left it as is, against my better judgement.
Maliciousness certainly does imply intent, and one cannot clearly say
that violation of a pact (depending upon the interpretation of the
pactor) is universally wrong.

The point I'm trying to get at is that simply saying "I thought I was
doing the right thing" doesn't alleviate whatever adverse effects may
have arisen from that "right thing."  One hopes that the adverse
effects may be replaced by a benefit (because the cause was just), but
in this case it is not quite so easy.

If we look at a more clear-cut case it may help to illustrate my
point.  Most people would look upon invasive surgery as an adverse
circumstance.  But supposing that a greater good, say the health of
the patient, existed then the adversion would be justified:  to the
patient, because he wants to get well; to the doctor, because he sees
the alternative to be increased pain and suffering; and to some
disinterested third party, who can put himself the patient's position.

But if we trivialize the same principle, I can, for instance, say that
I firmly believe that wearing clothing is against the will of God.
Now suppose that motivates me to accosting people on the street,
forcibly disrobing them, and destroying their clothes.  In my own mind
I am justified, but will that justification be shared by those whom I
disrobe?  (Probably not)  And will it be shared by innocent passersby?
(Probably not -- they would hate to see themselves disrobed in public).

Now even if I mounted an eloquent apology for the necessity of nudity
for salvation and managed to convince a few people, it is highly
unlikely that I would be able to convince all of them, even though I
a firmly believe in my position and consider all my actions to be
justified.

But in order to base a course of action with obviously deleterious
results on any conviction, the desired benefit must be as strong as
possible.  Hopefully it is close to universal.  But if it is simply an
opinion (e.g., temple-going Mormons are going to burn in hell), then I
don't think you can make universal (or near-universal) justification
for an act which is universally (or nearly so) harmful (e.g.,
trying to embarrass people).

You see, I can accept that our authors think they are justified in
their actions.  But *I* don't agree with their premise, so *I* don't think
their actions are justified.  That may sound like a simple conflict of
subjectivities, but the actions are harming me, and I see no impending
benefit therefrom.  So as a result, I don't think they are justified
in their actions, and choose to be vocal in my expression of such.

Despite your earlier hypothetical gymnastics, there simply isn't
anything in the temple ceremony which might be universally considered
bad.  That doesn't mean there aren't those who object, but it does, in
my opinion, place a higher burden of justification on whatever harmful
acts are motivated by that objection.  It also means that objections
are far more likely to be simply differences of opinion.

I'm sure we would all agree that embarrassing a group of people,
misrepresenting their position, and possibly breaking their most
sacred promises is bad.  And when the justification of those actions
is based simply upon a difference of opinion, I don't think it's right
to universally justify their actions.

>On his earlier postings about homosexuals, Mr Windley wrote:
>
>> I realized that even though I disagreed with their lifestyle I had no right
>> to judge them for it, nor was it my position to accuse them.  I was wrong, I
>> admitted it, and made amends. I make no attempt to justify my improprieties.
>
>If you have made such errors, how can you have no patience with others who do
>the same things?

Again, this is probably guilt by association, but it's pertinent.  The
people who write this literature (of which I have read most) view the
objections to their methods as a sign they are doing the right thing.
Whether this is true in this specific case cannot be determined, but
the trend speaks clearly, and serves for applicable conjecture in
absence of fact.

When people starting objecting to me in that instance, I viewed it as
a sign that perhaps I was doing the wrong thing, or at the very least
going about something the wrong way.

Now I can with some justification speculate on the motives of the
authors.  As I explained to Charles Hedrick, they have misrepresented
certain portions of the temple ceremony so that they "facts" they
presented would fit with their conclusion.  When all the facts are in
place, the authors' conclusions are seriously weakened, and the LDS
conclusion is strongly supported.  I consider witholding pertinent
facts to constitute intent to deceive.

If our authors' motives are truly noble (saving us Mormons from hell),
then why would they need to lie to make their point?
--------------------------------+---------------------------------------
Jay Windley                     | jwindley@asylum.utah.edu
Department of Computer Science  +---------------------------------------
Univ. of Utah, Salt Lake City   | "I have detailed files."  -- T2
Newsgroups: talk.religion.misc