From: ccmlh@buitc.bu.edu (Mark Hayes)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Letting Someone Drown
Date: 12 Jan 93 00:50:20 GMT
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

cmk@athena.mit.edu (Charles M Kozierok) writes:
>                as to "what he should do" -- he should do whatever
>he feels is right, based on his prioritization of actions and consequences.

I reply:
 
>This is an absolute total cop-out. Hitler, presumably, felt that
>his actions were right. This is clearly not a criterion for
>moral or any other kind of acceptability.

Mr. Kozierok replies in turn:

>if you want to set up a very specific, very convoluted example, that is
>fine, but don't generalize the conclusions from it!

Sorry, but this is what is known as "philosophical argument".

My generalization is not from the example, but from your citation
of the supposed ethical principle that the criterion for "rightness"
in any given situation is one's "prioritization of actions and
consequences".

>i said "he should do what he feels is right" based on the
>particular (ludicrous) example you described. that does not mean
>this is the case in every situation.

My point is that your "principle" fails to exclude Nazism,
and is therefore unacceptable (assuming that you find Hitler's
actions morally unacceptable).

>the obligation of "Roark" (i hate it when anti-objectivists use
>the names of Rand's characters in their arguments) ...

Gee, I didn't realize this was such sacred ground... perhaps
I should have said "R*ark"?

>>But I thought selfishness was the ultimate virtue! How can
>>an "objectivist" use this term with negative connotations?

>easy -- you don't understand what the term means wrt objectivism.

So, what *does the term mean "wrt objectivms"?
 
>presumably people don't want others to die; they
>would rather suffer the financial (and time?) loss of walking over
>to get a life preserver and throwing it in than suffer the emotional
>turmoil of knowing their actions directly and simply led to the death
>of another.

Again, for the fourth or fifth time, it is beside the point that
most people, Randites included, would throw the life preserver.
This is a matter of psychology, not philosophical ethics.
My question is - why *should* they, if they don't happen to
feel like it? How can we condemn, as I believe we must, the
coldhearted bastard who *does* let the poor guy drown?

>if they feel no such turmoil, they are cold and bitter and i would
>stay far away from them.

So your particular tastes disincline you to associate with
non-life-preserver-throwers. So do mine. But why? And more
importantly, why *should* they, if in fact they should?

>[the example in question is] is so ludicrous and
>particular that nothing can be generalized from it. objectivism does
>have some weak points, but you're not going to get at them by putting
>"Howard Roark" on a yacht yawning while [the] guy goes under...

The example is intended, as are most hypothetical examples in
ethical arguments, to bring out the operative general
principles by which we would take one position or the other.
If my example is so ludicrous, then you should be able to just say,
"of *course* objectivism would dictate that Roark throw in the
life preserver, and here's why...". But all I've heard so far
are arguments to the effect that

	(1) He probably *would* throw it, so leave him alone

	(2) He *ought* to throw it because it might make him some money
and

	(3) What a stupid example

All three are somewhat less than persuasive.

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism