From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Free Will and Morality (longish)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 15:43:30 GMT
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za

In article <1992Nov10.182841.17003@ulrik.uio.no> solan@smauguio.no
(Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:

>However, by which standards are "right" and "wrong", "good" and "evil",
>and all the other principles evaluated?

Ho hum.  This sounds a  bit like the `Algorithmic thought' thread,  where it
was quite rightly pointed out that not every instance of rule-guidedness was
one of rule application, or that  sometimes we `just act,' and that  the al-
leged regress of illusory.  If every standard is evaluated only in terms  of
some other standard, then there are no final standards and Solan's  argument
is valid.  I  think, however, that the  assumption is unjustified, and  that
the existence of real `goods' would  mean that no further evaluation is  re-
quired.

>Part II: Let us consider an action evaluated according to a certain
>standard to be one that I "should". What the heck is supposed to motivate
>me to do it in the first place, if not that I have an INNER drive to
>perform this action?

>If morality is to be more than a game of words including "wrong", "right",
>"good", "evil" and "ought"\"should", we clearly need to get a connection
>between the inner drive and the moral command\advice.

>So, if morality is not describtive in the sense of advising on what we
>ought to do if our inner motivation is to be satisfied, what4s the use?
>For me, an "it4s your duty" moves me no more than "it4s a crow".

If you are  so constituted that  you can see,  or find out,  what is good in
some  situation,  then  that  understanding  should  probably  be motivation
enough.  Recall that in the _Republic_  to see the good, to love it,  and to
be motivated to do it all come together.  I think there is a lot to be  said
for a Platonistic view of moral life.   In such a view what is  `good' would
be related to our place as a part of the world, and the path of good  action
would be one which was attentive to this.  Morality is both a kind of knowl-
edge, and a kind of literacy.

Further to the motivation thing, and by  way of analogy:  When I realise  at
some point `I am hungry' it does not require any additional cognitive effort
to come up with the proposition `I  want food' or `I should get some  food',
that's what it _is_ to be hungry.  Likewise when I realise/find out/see that
`This is a good thing to do' there is no step between that and `I should  do
that', that's what it _is_ to know what the good is.

[Deletions]

>Morality is just a set of guiding lines tieing back to "good"\"bad"
>_for_me_. When it comes to a situation in which the moral advice no
>longer serves its purpose, namely that of benefitting me, I just
>dissolve it, i.e. take away its moving power, sever its link to my
>action.

[Deletions]

You acknowledge the _value_ of  self-benefit, which, in terms of  your post-
ing, seems to  be your own  ultimate good.   That is not  the same as saying
there are _no_ goods at  all.  It is thus  possible for you and I  to have a
conversation about our  respective conceptions of  the good, perhaps  to the
mutual advantage of both.  I would like to see someone who has no values  at
all to join this thread in an intellectually valuable manner, _then_ we  can
have us some fun.

>>>When we still retain Morality, it must be because we find
>>>some reason to let it continue its existence. Bu
>>
>> How about it's impossible not to retain it?  What more reason do we need
>> than that? What about the question of its being a matter of the true
>> understanding of the world?
>
>[I see a lot of my message is lost.]
>
>How should it be impossible not to retain it?

It would be impossible, at the risk of labouring the point, if our  consitu-
tion and situation  in the world  was such that  we were beings  with an in-
trinsic (if empiricism encrusted)  moral aspect.  Then  it would be no  more
possible  to  do  away  with  than  our  temporality  (which  also  confused
empiricists to hell & back, see my follow post to your `Being and Time.').

>Also, as Hume showed, with a certain view of reason, reason cannot be
>what moves into action. If reason says "Goddammit! If I don4t run now,
>I will die" after a [short] analysis of the situation, it has produced
>an excellent syllogism, but no MOTIVE for running, unless some other
>agent with moving force catches this, and does not want to die.

[Deletions]

I've already looked at motivation, but  think I should add here that  Hume's
excellent project  of taking  empiricism to  the limit  tells us rather more
about the limits of empiricism than those of morality.

>Regards, Solan

Returning head on to the title issue  of `Free Will and Morality' for a  mo-
ment, and further to my first  posting to this thread, the link  between the
two can be very economically expressed thus:

1) I am only morally responsible where I am responsible at all.

2) If determinism is true then all my `acts' are the consequence of the  ac-
   tion of the laws of nature upon the initial state of the universe.

3) I am not responsible for the laws of nature.

4) I am not responsible for the initial state of the universe.

5) Therefore if determinism is true I  am not responsible for any of my  so-
   called `acts'.

6) Therefore if determinism is true I am never morally responsible.

This has  the additional  consequence (since  if the  argument works it will
work for  everyone) that  _nobody_ is  ever morally  responsible, hence that
morality has nothing to do with the world.

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
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