HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
	<MARTINC.92Aug11215203@grover.cs.unc.edu>
	<1992Aug12.121000.14661@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1992Aug12.190132.15285@javelin.sim.es.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 19:56:31 GMT

In article <1992Aug12.190132.15285@javelin.sim.es.com> biesel@javelin.sim.es.
com (Heiner Biesel) writes:

   >In a strict interpretation Goedel's results could be said to be limitative.

  Which of Godel's results do you have in mind? Not, I suspect, the
completeness theorem for first order logic, lately mangled in the group.
The incompleteness theorems? His work in set theory? The Dialectica
interpretation?
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Huh?!?
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1992 19:12:11 GMT

In article <1992Aug12.185711.9520@gecko.uucp> josh@Tekelec.gecko.uucp 
(Josh Barinstein) writes:

   >Say what???

  I take it you haven't learned Kocabas-speak yet. It will come to you.
Just relax, and let your eyes look in opposite directions.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.logic,sci.math
From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence (was re: The Use of Philosophy)
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 21:15:55 GMT

In article <1992Aug11.144438.14629@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>In article <Bsrszn.BwE@unx.sas.com>
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Aug9.020648.14556@husc3.harvard.edu>,
>>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
[...]
>certainly be acknowledged at the same time.)  Quine's theoretical
>influence, by contrast (I can almost hear Randall Holmes beginning to
>steam), has been largely negative; by mentioning him, you are committing
>yourself to the inclusion of such best-selling skeptics as Thomas
Kuhn.

I was relaxing and enjoying the demolition of the person with the
interesting definition of "contemporary philosophy", and felt that
joining in would be excessive, but now I guess I MUST say something.
You should all be aware that I am NOT a philosophical disciple of
Quine.  I am a mathematician who happens to work on a set theory which
Quine defined.  At the time I started working on NF, I thought that
Quine was a nominalist (and so, of course, anathema); since then, I
have discovered that his philosophical views are similar to mine in
some ways.  But my views are independent of his; perhaps you sense the
common influence of my actual philosophical mentor, Bertrand Russell
(my views are not very similar to his, but neither were his various
schemes to each other, as someone just pointed out).  I just read
_Word and Object_ and some volumes of Quine's essays for the first
time a few weeks ago!

[...]

>"The whole of Anglo-Saxon philosophy has undergone Russell's influence, for
>better or worse.  This is, moreover, the only living philosophy.  It is
>sufficient praise of an author to state that a philosophy that ignores him
>is a dead philosophy."

I'm just another example of this phenomenon, not the local Quinean.

>
>CO: (Charles Onstott)
>>>> AS for GM:  The external-representational thesis has actually 
>>>>undergone a lot of attack, and has been shown to be rather impotent.
>>>>It is a now dead theory, in my opinion, that is best left behind and
>>>>forgotten so that we might actually make some real philosophical
>>>>advances.  Read Heidegger to find out why.
>
>GM:
>>If these advances occurred, it must have been when I wasn't watching
>>very closely.

I couldn't say it better...

>>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
>
>cordially,
>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>who will be in Paris two weeks from today!

Watch out; that's a _bad_ neighborhood.  Au revoir, et bonne chance!

>"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Subject: Objectivism/Existence
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 20:47:47 GMT

	On Aug. 20, Kranowski
	continues his search for a method or continues to dispair over the lack
of a method to imitate divine omniscience, ie, a "neutral view of reality or
existence. 
	episte-objectivity is the alternative to dogma and skepticism.
	meta-every time I mention something, Kranaowski jumps past meta into
episte and wonders about the relation of "something" to existence. That is 
fine and ok but only episte. Move up to the meta. level where aman can breathethat clean stuff. All these things, my concern and your concerns and all other
concerns exist. They exist. whatever their limit or context, they exist.
Your perspective exists just as much as the object of your perspective. You 
can busy yourself about some favored state of consciousness or experience but
it exists noi more than some unfavored state (for you, objectivity). Please
consider that ALL criticism is limited to some specific limit or context
and each limit existsas much as any other. Your concern with imagination as 
a method for "criticizing" objectivity exists. So?! I'm not insulting you. 
This is a serious technical issue. Things exist. Please make a temporary 
attempt to transcend episte for meta. Or, if you don't value existence then
be explicit about limiting yourself to subjectivity (or convention) and 
don't claim it as privileged, a la Plato, etc. Be careful in replying to
limit yourself to existence rather than relations. Existence exists. It is a 
concept of course, but idealism is limited. Existence is also real, 
objectively real.
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Objectivism/Existence
Date: 18 Aug 92 00:08:19 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Aug17.200820.14832
Organization: The Phallogocentric Cabal

In article <1992Aug17.203645.26278@cis.umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>    This is a follow-up to my Aug. 12 message to Leo Smith's Aug. 4 message:

> [blather omitted]

> [...]	 Now, my critics know why it was childishly easy to debate the
>creatures who inhabit university "philosophy" departments.      

Your "critics" are still awaiting the full details of these legendary
engagements, without which there is nothing to distinguish you from any
other inarticulate and incoherent, yet boastful and garrulous randroid twit.

>o    

a very meaningful icon, that...

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: ag@sics.se (Anders G|ransson)
Subject: Re: Wittgensteins Logic Contributions
Organization: GRAMMA
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 1992 22:47:56 GMT

>>>>> In article <9208211931.AA14264@lenny.kaman.com>, rob@KAMAN.COM (Rob Vienneau) writes:

rob> Recently, there has been a debate about Wittgenstein's contributions
rob> to logic and its philosophy. Are not the following important
rob> contributions from the Tractatus?

rob> Invention of truth tables.
  ... 
e t c
  ...

Supposing W could tell a tautology from a contradiction.





--


        Dawn points, and another day
      Prepares for heat and silence.

      
      (T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: Bijan.Parsia@bbs.oit.unc.edu (Bijan Parsia)
Subject: Re: Obj, Exist
Organization: Extended Bulletin Board Service
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 1992 06:08:31 GMT


--
   The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
     North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
        Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
           internet:  bbs.oit.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen)
Subject: Re: Wittgensteins Logic Contributions
Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista
Date: Sat, 22 Aug 1992 10:20:46 GMT

In article <9208211931.AA14264@lenny.kaman.com> rob@KAMAN.COM (Rob Vienneau) writes:

   >Recently, there has been a debate about Wittgenstein's contributions
   >to logic and its philosophy.

  Not in this group, surely.

   >Are not the following important contributions from the Tractatus?

  Wittgenstein's remarks about truth tables and tautologies were no doubt
the result of original thinking, but they don't appear to have been very
significant in the history of logic. In Post's dissertation, "Introduction
to a general theory of elementary propositions", Wittgenstein is not
mentioned. About truth tables, it is said in a footnote: "Truth values, truth
functions, and our primitive truth tables are described in Whitehead and
Russell, 1910, pp. 8 and 120, but the general notion of truth table is not
introduced. This notion is quite precise with Jevons and Venn, and has its
foundation in the formula for the expansion of logical functions first
given by Boole. For the relation to Schroder, see footnote 7."


   >For an interesting presentation of an interpretation of W's later
   >philosophy using a mathematical example, see Saul Kripke's
   >_Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language_.

  What do you mean by "using a mathematical example"?
--
"When I said autumn, autumn broke."
From: bcushman@lust.reed.edu (Ben Cushman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: WHAT IS LOVE?
Date: 21 Aug 92 00:01:52 GMT
Article-I.D.: reed.1992Aug21.000152.10763
Organization: Reed College, Portland, OR

In article <1992Aug20.221402.12691@news.eng.convex.com> cash@convex.com  
(Peter Cash) writes:
> >> WHAT IS LOVE? 
> >> Can somebody give me a convincing answer?
> 
> What kind of love? As any classical scholar knows, the ancients had  
several
> different words that are today regrettably subsumed under the same  
English
> word. For example, "eros" was quite different from "caritas"--only in
> modern times does one use the same word for teenagers who are smitten by
> one another and for Mother Theresa's regard for humanity: we call both
> "love". No wonder we're confused, and puzzle about the meaning of  
"love".
> 

	I beleive that the reading list that I posted accounts for a large  
number of these varieties of love.  For instance, Kierkegaard's and Saint  
Teresa's works focus on Christian love, while the stuff on courtly love  
focuses on just that.  Further, the list includes some works on the  
history of the word and concept of love, including the background of the  
subsumption of all of love's varieties under the word "love".

	What I would like to primarily address is Mr. Cash's assertion  
that this subsumption is "regrettable."  I believe that the conflation of  
teenage infatuation and saintly faith captures a real unity to the  
passions that the ancients negelected in their treatment of love in its  
varieties.  In fact, from our modern perspective, we are uniquely  
empowered in our use and treatment of love as a concept.  If we want to be  
precise, and deal only with (for instance) sexual or romantic love, we can  
use the word "eros."  Further, when we want to deal with love in its  
multiform unity, we can use the word "love".  This turn is language is far  
from regrettable, it is empowering.

					Ben Cushman
					Reed College
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Nazism
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1992 18:12:47 GMT

In article <1992Aug19.203638.2596@cis.umassd.edu> pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>
>	From Kant to Heidegger to Hitler the evil of nihilism spread thru Ger-
>many. See "Ominous Parallels" by Leonard Peikoff, 1983(?). And it's spreading
>here. Kant was a nihilist who opposed values for duty, sacrifice as an end in
>itself. Ergo, deathcamps.


Aw, that's not true.  Kant certainly saw a duty against deathcamp, and
I think the German liberals were right in saying that with the triumph
of Hitler, Hegel had finally died.  I say this as an opponent of
Kantian moral theory, and as yet another of those baffled by Hegel.
Want a precursor villain?  Try Holderin and the wave of Germanic
romantics, anti-reason to the core.
-- 
Michael Feld                         | E-mail:  <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy                  | FAX:     (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba               | Voice:   (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada	                     
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Subject: Objectivism, Aug.4
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 20:44:36 GMT

	Sorry for delay (partly due to recent electrical storm) replying to 
Leo Smith (Aug.4; shaman@cix.compulink.co.uk) replying to my Aug.3 message
on Objectivism and Existence. Also, I'm in university library on hot day with
huge windows, no ventilation, and air conditioner that emits noise. This is
very abstract topic, my collaborator (on essay) hasn't arrived, and reasoning
not encouragd in this context. I plow on...
	Smith says, "...the point is whatever Existence may or not be, in ordr to talk about itdddd
in order to talk about it..." 
	This is important, that even very briefly, Smith has corrupted metaphys-ics w/epistemology. Forget about "point" or "talk" as they are mere epistemolo-
gy. Metaphysics or existence just exists. It exists. Existence exists. And 
existence is:all of the things it is, including points, talk, beer, logic, 
metaphors, a priori, whole, bits, god, math, good, mental structures, etc.
All those things exist, they all exist equally (no meta. privilege), and they
are what they are (existence is identity). 
	Meta. minus episte. is NOT monism, the mystical one, etc. Metaphysics   
is everything, literally. Monism has no meta. privilege relative to, I pre- 
sume, the meta. under privileged dualism. 
	NOTE: while Objectivism is radical relative to mainstream philosophy, 
Existence is radical relative to Objectivism so this is not standard but
better, more systematic use of Objectivism. Known only to my collaborator
and I. You are epistemologically privileged to know our wisdom. Our 1985
essay, "Existence 2," is available thru net.
	Objectivity exists and I remain within its limit. Subjectivism or
Kantian nihilism exists also, and just as much (w/o implying relativism), 
but mainstream philosophy typically transcends its limits w/o knowing it
does. Chaos (which also exists, within limits). Curb your philosophy. Know
your limit, be it Objectivism or linguistic analysis. You can use linguistic
analysis to criticize Objectivism but so what???!!! Objectivism does not
accept other standards. Know your limit. The criticism of Obj. by another
philosophy remains within THAT limit. So what? Obj. is a concern with exist-
ence as known by reason and remains within that limit. If you like existence  
as known by linguistic analysis, deconstructionism, etc, that is fine, but
don't think that you have some out-of-context absolute, neutral criticism 
of Objectivism. It's in a context (meta., a limit), its in some context. 
Identify your context and remain within its limit.
	Library closing. Tomorrow exists. Stephen Grossman
Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.meta:1499 sci.math:10172
From: thomasc@hypatia.geom.umn.edu (thomasc)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta,sci.math
Subject: Re: Philosophical Influence & Goedel
Date: 12 Aug 92 19:21:58 GMT
Organization: Geometry Center, University of Minnesota

In article <MARTINC.92Aug11215203@grover.cs.unc.edu> martinc@grover.cs.unc.edu (Charles R. Martin) writes:
>
>I dunno, MZ... the overwhelming importance of Goedel-Roesser and via
>them Turing on philosophy I think would be hard to overestimate.  (I
>agree with you about Heidegger et al -- I suspect that by 2092 they'll
>be about as well known as the Thomists and neo-Platonists, but no longer
>an active influence.) 
>--
>Charles R. Martin/(Charlie)/martinc@cs.unc.edu/(ne crm@cs.duke.edu) 

Get this crap off of sci.math and back onto sci.philosophy.analytic.only.because.phenomonologists.have.the.cooties where it belongs!

-Thomas C
From: amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Is There a Set of All Truths?
Date: 20 Aug 92 07:58:50 GMT
Organization: University of Helsinki

In article <1992Aug19.194436.4924@sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:
>In article <1992Aug19.172735.6787@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
>FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>
>  >Call it what you like.  I only care about the ideas not the label.
>
>  I don't call it anything; it was you who prefaced your comments with
>the statement that "on a realist reading of mathematical truth, a
>proposition such as Fermat's Last Theorem is either true or false",
>which suggested that those remarks had something to do with
>mathematical realism as ordinarily understood.
>
>   >If there is no set of all truths and we think of the universe as the
>   >physical manifestation of a set-theoretical possible world (ie. a set of
>   >true propositions such that no proposition may be added to it without
>   >precipitating a contradiction) then there is no universe as a totality;
>   >the universe is, as Grim says, somehow incomplete or open.  Metaphysical
>   >realism seems to include the thesis that the universe is complete and
>   >whole -- in the sense of ,say, the opening lines of the _Tractatus_ 
>   >"The world is all that is the case."
>
>  I have no idea what you mean by "thinking of the universe as the
>physical manifestation of a maximal consistent set of true
>propositions", nor what "a universe as a totality" is supposed to
>convey. It appears that "metaphysical realism" in your terminology is
>a very obscure doctrine.  I take it you are not saying that the
>existence of a "set of all truths" is presupposed e.g.in mathematical
>realism?

I guess that depends on what you mean by 'mathematical realism'.  The
only person around these days who's developed such a thing in any detail 
is Penelope Maddy.  As I haven't yet been able to acquire her latest
book _Realism in Mathematics_ I must defer judgement on this point to
those more familiar with her work.

Thinking more about your question, I also think that the existence of a
set of all truths is related to the Popperian idea of verisimilitude
(what Niiniluoto calls 'truthlikeness') -- of how close a scientific
theory is to the Whole Truth about the world as a Peircean ideal end of
inquiry.  Someone who believes in the objectivity of science (notice I
didn't say 'realist' this time) could claim that if there is no set of
all truths then problems emerge about the aims of scintific inquiry.

Finally, there is also Unger's book where he claims that the only way
to escape Cartesian skepticism is for there to be a Whole Truth about
the world (since if there is no such object, a non-existent object
cannot have parts -- which are what everyday limited truths like 
'China is bigger than India' are).

Marko Amnell
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Heidegger and the Nazis
Date: 18 Aug 92 15:51:20 GMT
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Hitler, Racism and logic.
Summary: 
Expires: 
Followup-To: 
Distribution: 
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Keywords: 
>
>  Third, as I have already said, and as one who has studied Heidegger
>for a while, nothing within the writings of Heidegger would support
>nazism; in fact, it would tend to be contrary to the ideas of Nazism.
>
>> 
>> I would be interested to hear from the Heidegger-volken why it is
>> that Heidegger seems so attractive to those with a religious
>> perspective.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
You might like to read (or re-read) _Heidegger_ in the "Modern
Masters" series for a taste of just how Heidegger's nazi-ism tied
intimately to his metaphysics.
As to the tie to religion (and I steal this inspiration from the same
text), substitute "God" for "Being" throughout _Being and Time_, and see
how little difference it makes.
-- 
Michael Feld                         | E-mail:  <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy                  | FAX:     (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba               | Voice:   (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
From: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Objectivism/Existence
Date: 19 Aug 92 20:02:55 GMT
Reply-To: pmsc13sg@UMASSD.EDU
Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.



    


	 Now, my critics know why it was childishly easy to debate the
>>creatures who inhabit university "philosophy" departments.      
>
>Your "critics" are still awaiting the full details of these legendary
>engagements, without which there is nothing to distinguish you from any
>other inarticulate and incoherent, yet boastful and garrulous randroid twit.

    We can have engagements now should you comment upon the various messages 
on philosophy I've sent to this group. Despite the psycho-epistemological dis-
integration of Harvard you may request my 1985 essay, "Existence 2."
    As British rocker Marianne Faithfull so tartly sang, "We've been trying to
 get high without having to pay." 



>cordially,
>mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
>"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: josh@Tekelec.gecko.uucp (Josh Barinstein)
Subject: Huh?!?
Originator: josh@reliant
Organization: Tekelec Inc
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 18:57:11 GMT


In article <78535.2249223057@kcbbs.gen.nz> Hakki_Kocabas@kcbbs.gen.nz 
(Hakki Kocabas) writes:

   >I don't know what you mean, tell me exactly what you mean, or else
   >I may be cheated.
   >I need to know how it is used, do you know how to use it ?
   >When do you need to ask "Is truth good?" ?

torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

>  But how do you ask this and when? Why, Man! Why you need to know when
> what we say when is not or is it? How much of use is this?

Say what???

-----
Josh Barinstein - josh@Tekelec.com

Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
From: tucker@maestro.mitre.org (William Tucker)
Subject: The real stuff
Keywords: The real stuff
Reply-To: tucker@maestro.mitre.org (William Tucker)
Organization: The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Va
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 20:42:17 GMT


     "Is truth good?" or "Is good truth?" and Re:
 and
      Objectivism, Aug.4 and Re:

 and 
      Having to belive (by Leo Smith) props I-V.

  Thankyou for the thoughts.

  Wm T.

.standard disclaimer