From: vzhivov@alfred.carleton.ca (Vladimir Zhivov)
Newsgroups: soc.history
Subject: Re: _Target Hitler_ a book review
Date: 7 Jan 93 20:11:51 GMT
Organization: Carleton University

In <1993Jan7.191800.4471@island.COM> fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:

>In article <vzhivov.726381282@cunews> vzhivov@alfred.carleton.ca (Vladimir Zhivov) writes:
>>In <13828@optilink.COM> cramer@optilink.COM (Clayton Cramer) writes:
>>
>>>In article <1993Jan5.191211.5333@island.COM>, fester@island.COM (Mike Fester) writes:
>>>> Also, when the war was winding down (read: it was clear the Germans were going 
>>>> to get their tails kicked), Hitler insisted on providing all necessary supplies for his death-camps, even at the expense of the war effort. Surely, this cannot have been lost on the generals. 

>>>However, the principal plotters were involved and organized by
>>>1938, when their actions can only be read as a principled opposition
>>>to Hitler's madness.  Many attempts were made by them in 1942 and
>>>1943, but for a variety of reasons, the results were not discovered.

>>I truly disagree. There was opposition in 1938 because the generals
>>thought that Hitler would plunge the unprepared Wehrmacht into a war
>>with France, England, USSR, and Czechoslovakia - there would only be 6
>>divisions to man the West Wall and many of the generals were
>>pessimistic about being able to dispose of the Czechs. However, by
>>1940-41 the majority of the "opposition" seems to have melted away.
>>Buyoed by the conquest of France and Central/Eastern Europe the
>>military commanders were quite eager to grapple with the Soviet Union.

>I DO remember reading that quite a few commanders had qualms about taking
>on the Russians while Britain remained unconquored. I also remember
>reading that, among Hitler's blunders, his one-month invasion of Greece (to
>bail out Benito) may have proved, if not decisive, at least significant in
>keeping the Germans from taking Moscow before the Russian winter set in.


I agree with you on the Greece/Yugoslavia mistake; my point is that
the German commanders were no less enthusiastic then Hitler about
taking on the Russians. The reasons for this were faulty intelligence
on the part of the Germans (they grossly underestimated the size of
the Soviet Army and Air Force), racism ("a German is worth several
Russians"), overconfidence based on the triumphant march through
Europe and the Eastern Front experience of WW I.


>>Since the war many former Wehrmacht officers have claimed that
>>Barbarossa was Hitler's greatest mistake, and that they could not
>>dissuade him. What a pile of crap! I extensively researched this, and
>>I found no hint of caution or opposition on the part of the officer
>>corps. They were sure that Russia was a "house of cards", "colossus
>>with feet of clay" that would be smashed within six weeks. The only
>>notes of caution came form the German military attache in Moscow (I'm
>>sorry - the name escapes me). Certainly there were some who opposed

>Given the unpopularity of Stalin among his countrymen, there is (IMO) good
>reason to believe the USSR was a "house of cards"; not due to any weakness
>in the Russian people, but had the Germans behaved toward the conquored 
>Russians as they did towards the French, the Russians may not have been 
>galvanized into such an heroic war effort just to save their dictator's *ss.

This is reasonable to a certain extent; the non-Russian nationalities
did look to the Germans, but the same cannot be said of ethnic
Russians. That's not why the Germans thought it to be a "house of
cards" anyway - it was more based on the Army Purge of 1937-38 and
racism.


>>Hitler on moral grounds, but they were too few and insignificant to be
>>referred to as "opposition" (mostly they were civilians from the old
>>Prussian aristocracy - von Moltke and so on). It was not until 1943-44
>>after Stalingrad, El Alamein, "Torch", Kursk, and the bombing campaign
>>that pointed to the inevitable German defeat that officers of the
>>German armed forces became "opponents" of Hitler.
>>          In conclusion, the military men may have disliked Hitler for
>>his manner, his origins, his violence or whatever, but the point is
>>they stuck with a winner until the writing was on the wall. Germany's
>>greatness was more important to them than moral qualms about the
>>slaughter of Jews, Soviet POW's or Slavic peoples.

>Kind of poetic justice that the barbaric behavior of the Germans/Nazis was
>certainly instrumental in their defeat.

>Mike

>PS- I wouldn't be TOO hard on those generals; it is difficult to organize any
>coup attempts on a leader who is commanding a winning war effort. No doubt,
>there were more plots against Stalin when he was losing the war than when he
>was winning.

I am not criticizing them for failing to oppose Hitler, surprising as
that may sound - what I object to is the post-war fabrications and
self-effacing excuses. I can respect (perhaps that is the wrong word,
"understand" would be better) someone who says he believed in
his country wrong or right and did not feel that he could undermine
the war effort because of moral qualms. But don't start saying after
the war that everything was Hitler's fault and that you were in
opposition to him all along. Just disappear into oblivion like so many
other nazis did, and keep your mouth shut.

                                                  Vladimir
Newsgroups: soc.history,alt.war.civil.usa