From: bakc@giraffe.ru.ac.za (MR KR COMAN)
Subject: Re: Was RADARs' impact on the Battle of Britain overstated?
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 1993 07:52:23 GMT

In article <1993Jan4.191812.25928@cbnewsi.cb.att.com> acura@cbnewsi.cb.att.com (james.r.feeney) writes:
>From: acura@cbnewsi.cb.att.com (james.r.feeney)
>Subject: Was RADARs' impact on the Battle of Britain overstated?
>Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1993 19:18:12 GMT
>A friend was telling me about a book he read that described the exploits of the
>British code-breakers during WW2. One of the things he said was that this 
>group had broken most of the German codes including the first generation
>ENIGMA by the end of the battle for France (a substantial amout of help came
>from anti-nazi German military personnel). This was such a closely guarded
>secret that the British went to great lengths to conceal it from the Germans.

Broadly correct.  The "Ultra Secret" was revealed publically for the first 
time in 1972.  In the interim, there have been a number of sequals as those
most closely involved 'came out of the closet', whilst historians have 
followed up with "rewriting the history of WW2 in the light of the existence 
of Ultra intelligence".    What is important to keep in mind is that in 1940
the code-breaking systems based on Ultra were still VERY much in their 
infancy.   The only Enigma machine in the UK was one smuggled out from 
Poland:  Polish Intelligence were in fact the originators of the entire Ultra
scheme from as early as 1939 or 1938.  After the fall of Poland, the chaps
concerned went to France, and after Dunkirk, to England.


>Apparently once the Battle of Britain began the British were intercepting 
the>very attack plans that the German bomber crews were getting, including
>evasion and diversion tactics. 

Up to a certain very limited point. During the time of the BoB Enigma-based
intelligence was highly spotty and usually available "after the fact".  In
reality, Ultra code-breakers were concentrating on the Luftwaffe's radio
signals simply because the German air force signallers were relatively lax
in terms of their cyphering procedures.  The German Navy, however, was the
most stringent, whilst for obvious reasons much of the Army's signal traffic
was sent via landline.

In 1940, Ultra decrypts of Luftwaffe signals were usually very slow to 
emerge, it wasn't until later that the process was speeded up by the 
development and upgrading of the Polish-designed electro-mechanical "
computers" used to search for Enigma code patterns.  Another fact was that
at that time, code-breakers' "situational awareness" was still growing: 
hours/days of time might be spent trying to crack a Luftwaffe signal only to 
find that it concerned Air Mechanic Hans' sick leave request.

>This was what allowed the British fighter
>groups to attack so efficiently. The quality of the RADAR at that time did
>not provide anywhere near the definition required for the precise defence
>tactics that the British used. However the RADAR network was given exclusive
>credit as a cover to the real source of information. This is one reason why
>the German attempts to confuse the British to the targets selected usually
>met with failure.

There can be no question that radar played a key role in the successful 
conclusion of the BoB -- for a host of reasons that have been well-ventilated
over the past 50 years.  However, it was not radar alone that "won the 
battle".   Credit in full measure must be given to:

1.
The superb system of fighter deployment and ground control.  The point is 
that radar was *fully integrated* into a fighter defense system that itself
was calculated to do full justice to the capabilities of the then radar
technology.   (An excellent radar system would have meant nothing without
the greater air defense infrastructure.)

2.
Radio intercept.  This was an area which has sadly recieved very little 
attention.  In essence, simply listening in on German radio signals (whether
coded or not) provided many useful insights.  Volume and timing patterns in
radio traffic were important; e.g. 3 hours before a raid these went up 
dramatically as German bomber crews tested their radio sets.  Similarly, 
skilled RAF personnel (most often women!) quickly came to recognize the voice
patterns of particular German airmen -- so if Fritz the fighter pilot was 
doing a radio check at St Omer.......
	Also as regards radio intercept, this service was the first to
pick up the German radio direction finding signals that were deployed for 
the late 1940 night bombing attacks.   (The issue of finding the
RDF beams intersecting over Coventry and Churchill deciding not to forewarn
the local civil defense authorities  in case this leaked out to the 
Germans remains a matter of controversy ---- to the point of becoming a 
wartime urban legend.)

	In summary, Enigma intelligence did play a role in 1940 albeit a
very limited one (at least that is what can be deduced from the facts in the 
public domain) -- Ultra really started to move into high gear a year later.

Cheers,
Keith Coman





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