From: predrag@isy.liu.se (Predrag Pucar)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.yugoslavia
Subject: HW-report on B-H part 2
Date: 29 Dec 92 09:45:57 GMT
Reply-To: predrag@isy.liu.se (Predrag Pucar)
Organization: Dept of EE, University of Linkoping

specify how the boundaries of each ethnic canton would be drawn.
Moreover, the plan failed to take into account that some areas were
so ethnically intertwined that a simple division was not easily
possible [footnote 2].
          
Neither side was satisfied with the EC arrangement. Serbian
representatives opposed Bosnia-Hercegovina's sovereignty while
Muslim delegates remained wary of cantonization [footnote 3]. On
March 17, Serbian leaders presented Cutilheiro with a map of the
proposed ethnic division of Bosnia-Hercegovina in which Serbs --
who represent 31.3 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's population --
claimed 70 percent of the country's land [footnote 4]. According to
the Serbian plan, the remaining 30 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's
territory would be divided between Muslims and Croats, who comprise
43.7 and 17.3 percent of the population, respectively [footnote 5].

Since the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina in April, Muslim
and moderate Croatian representatives have continued to reject
efforts to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina into ethnic cantons.
Serbian forces continue to support such an arrangement. The
position of radical Croatian forces is similar to the Serbian view.
The current positions of the various parties to the conflict are
described below. 

----------- footnotes ---------
    
[2] Judy Dempsey, "Bosnian Carve-Up in the Making," The Financial
Times, July 8, 1992. 
    
[3] Ibid. 

[4] Ibid.

[5] In June 1991, Helsinki Watch representatives interviewed
Radovan Karadzic, President of Bosnia-Hercegovina's Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS) and primary representative of Bosnian Serbs
at the EC conference on Yugoslavia. During the interview, Helsinki
Watch representatives inquired about the status of the political
and civil rights -- especially freedom of the press -- of Serbs in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Karadzic did not answer the question but
proceeded to delineate those municipalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina
which he sought to claim for Serbs. His calculations in June 1991,
were identical to the map presented to EC representatives in March
1992. 
------- end of footnotes ------------
                                   40

The Bosnian Position

        
In general, Muslims, Croats not from Hercegovina and portions of
the Serbian population support an independent, multi-ethnic and
democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina. This position is best represented by
the current government of President Alija Izetbegovic. The Party of
Democratic Action (SDA) and the liberal/moderate faction of the
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), formerly led by Bosnian Vice
President Stjepan Kljujic, also support this position. 



The Croatian Position


        
The positions of Bosnian Croats, of Croats in Croatia proper and
among members of the government of the Republic of Croatia are
seriously divided, in particular, about the status of western
Hercegovina, a predominantly Croatian region of Bosnia_ A total of
752,068 Croats lived in Bosnia-Hercegovina, only 266,815 (or
approximately 35 percent) of them in Hercegovina. Approximately 65
percent (485,253 persons) of the republic's Croatian population
lived outside Hercegovina [footnote 6].
 
On the one hand, liberal and moderate Croatian elements support an
independent Bosnia-Hercegovina; their views are similar to the
Bosnian position, set forth above. Generally, most Croats who live
outside of Hercegovina support this position, which is best
exemplified by Stjepan Kljujic, the former head of the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ) of Bosnia-Hercegovina and current Vice
President of the Bosnian government. Other prominent Bosnian
Croats, including Bosnian Defense Minister Jerko Dogo, support
Klujic's position. On the other hand, a conservative wing of the
HDZ in Bosnia-Hercegovina seeks autonomy for the predominantly
Croatian area of western Hercegovina from Bosnia. It is widely
believed that this wing of the HDZ seeks the secession of western
Hercegovina and its union with neighboring Croatia. This
irredentist position is best represented by Mate Boban, the current

------------ footnotes ---------
    
[6] These figures were calculated by Helsinki Watch representatives
on the basis of results from the 1991 census. They reflect the
Croatian population in the western (predominantly Croatian) and
eastern (predominantly Serbian) halves of Hercegovina.
Approximately 7,300 Croats lived in eastern Hercegovina. 

--------- end of footnotes ---------
                                                   41
leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) of Bosnia-Hercegovina
[footnote 7].

Kljujic was elected by Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina to represent
them in the republic's 1990 elections. At a HDZ party congress in
January, conservative elements of the HDZ, most of whom were from
western Hercegovina, forced Kljujic from office and replaced him
with Mate Boban as a leader of the party. At the congress, Kljujic
delivered his resignation saying he was opposed to Bosnia's
partition along ethnic lines [footnote 8]. It is widely believed
that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman engineered Boban's accession
as a head of the HDZ of Bosnia-Hercegovina and that Boban remains
beholden to Tudjman [footnote 9].

The position of the Croatian government with regard to the
partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina has been contradictory. On the one
hand, Croatia recognized the independence and territorial integrity
on Bosnia-Hercegovina on April 7 and in subsequent public
statements. Also, Croatia joined a formal military alliance wit
Bosnia-Hercegovina on June 16, in which Croatia reaffirmed Bosnia-
Hercegovina's independence. However, statements made by President
Tudjman and actions taken by Mate Boban would indicate that Croatia
may have plans to divide Bosnia-Hercegovina with Serbia. In March
1991, Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic met secretly
in the town of Karadjordje. The topic of their discussion was never
disclosed but many have speculated that the two spoke of dividing
Bosnia-Hercegovina between Serbia and Croatia [footnote 10]. On May
6, 1992, a meeting between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadzic,
President of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, took place in the Austrian City of Graz. Because Boban
and Karadzic are widely regarded to be lackeys, respectively, of
Tudjman and Milosevic, it is widely believed that the meeting was
engineered by the Croatian and Serbian presidents to discuss

------- footnotes --------

[7] John F. Burns, "Croats Claim Their Own Slice of Bosnia," The
New York Times, July 6, 1992.

[8] Judy Dempsey, "Bosnian Carve-Up in the Making," The Financial
Times, July 8, 1992.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

------ end of footnotes ----------
                                            42
further the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 11]. The
Croatian government has discounted such "speculations," claiming
that the meeting between Boban and Karadzic was one in a series of
meetings between the various parties to the conflict in Bosnia-
Hercegovina [footnote 12]. The Croatian government claims that such
meetings were encouraged by the EC and "must be seen as part of the
bilateral discussions within the framework" of the EC-sponsored
Conference on Yugoslavia [footnote 13].
        
On July 3, 1992, Mate Boban proclaimed a quasi-independent Croatian
state within Bosnia-Hercegovina which would include the remaining
third of Bosnia's territory which was not occupied by Serbian
forces. The new republic is to be called "The Community of Herceg-
Bosna" and is to function as an autonomous Croatian territory
within the republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The territory claimed by
Mate Boban for the new Croatian republic is composed primarily of
a region about 80 miles long and up to 70 miles wide and includes
most of Hercegovina, the Posavina region in northeast Bosnia and a
section of Sarajevo called Stup [footnote 14]. Although
predominantly Croatian, this area incorporates towns and villages
where Muslims and Serbs form a majority [footnote 15].
 
In declaring the "Community of Herceg-Bosna," Boban is widely
thought to have acted on behalf of Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman, who has made no secret of his territorial ambitions in
Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 16]. President Tudjman denies that
Croatia has designs on 

------------------ footnotes ---------

    
[11] Blaine Harden, "Serbs, Croats, Agree to Carve-Up Bosnia," The
Washington Post, May 8, 1992. 

[12] "Croatian President Replies to US Senator [Robert Dole] on
Croat-Serb Talks on Bosnia-Hercegovina," Ministry of Information,
Republic of Croatia, Press Release no. 246, May 9, 1992; and "Don't
Lump Croatia with Serbia" Letter to the Editor by Frane V. Golem,
Authorized Representative of the Republic of Croatia in the United
States, The Washington Post, May 16, 1992. 

[13] Ibid.

[14] John F. Burns, "Croats Claim Their Own Slice of Bosnia," The
New York Times, July 6, 1992.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

---------- end of footnotes ------------
                                               43

Bosnian land. Rather, he points out that the "Republic of Croatia
has recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 17]." Tudjman claimed
that, in the opinion of the Croatian government, "the crisis in
Bosnia-Hercegovina can be solved only by organizing Bosnia-
Hercegovina as a community of three constituent nations on a
cantonal basis as proposed by the European Community at its
conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 18]." 
        
Indeed, Boban and Tudjman have made repeated statements that would
indicate that the Croatian government is laying claim to territory
controlled by Croatian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such
statements seriously call into question the role of the Croatian
army (HV), Croatian paramilitary groups (HOS) and the Croatian
Defense Council (HVO) in Bosnia-Hercegovina, all of which operate
there under the pretext that they are aiding Bosnian troops and
defending that republic from attacks by Serbian and Yugoslav
forces. Recent statements by Boban and Tudjman seem to indicate
that the primary role of such troops is to secure territory to be
annexed to Croatia.  Prior to the declaration of a Croatian state
in Bosnia, Tudjman put pressure on Bosnian President Izetbegovic to
commit Bosnia-Hercegovina to a confederation with Croatia.
Izetbegovic's resistance to this idea was met by what amounted to
an ultimatum from Boban: Izetbegovic would join with Tudjman and
proclaim a confederation or Croatian forces stationed near Sarajevo
would not come to the aid of the city [footnote 19]. Moreover,
during most of June and July, Boban increased pressure on the
Bosnian government "by blocking delivery of arms that the Sarajevo
government, working around a United Nations embargo on all
shipments to the former Yugoslavia, has secretly bought [footnote
20]." On July 21, President Izetbegovic met with President Tudjman
and apparently persuaded the latter to resume shipments of arms and
ammunition to 

--------- footnotes -----------

   
[17] "Tudjman Sends Letter to Izetbegovic," Zagreb Radio broadcast
on July 6, 1992, as reported in FBIS, July 7, 1992. 

[18] Tudjman News Conference on Current Issues," Zagreb Radio
broadcast on July 6, 1992, as reported in FBIS, July 7, 1992. 

[19] Ibid. 

[20] Ibid.

---------- end of footnotes -----------
                                               44

Bosnian forces, particularly around Sarajevo [footnote 21].
Although Bosnia and Croatia have resumed their military
cooperation, Croatia's territorial ambitions in Bosnia, and the
potential for human rights problems associated with such a
partition, remain deeply troubling. 
        
The partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina remains a particularly divisive
issue among Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia. Government
officials who are liberal and moderate members of the ruling party
(HDZ) and/or other political parties generally oppose the partition
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Franjo Greguric (Croatia's Prime Minister),
Milan Ramljak (Vice-President of the Croatian Government) and
Zdravko Tomac (former Vice-President of the Croatian Government and
current Ambassador to the Republic of Slovenia) have all voiced
reservations about the dismemberment of Bosnia-Hercegovina. On the
other hand, it is widely believed that Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman and Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak (himself from
Hercegovina) are the main figures in the Croatian government who
support Hercegovina's union with Croatia. 

Many opposition parties, the independent press and a substantial
portion of the population in Croatia oppose the dismemberment of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is widely understood throughout Croatia that
the Croatian government cannot condemn and call for the return of
Serbian-occupied territory in Croatia and, at the same time, seek
to annex territory belonging to another state i.e., Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Moreover, prominent Bosnian Croats, such as Stjepan
Klujic, have vowed to overturn Boban's proclamation of an
independent Croatian state in Bosnia [footnote 22]. If sustained,
the proclamation, coupled with a similar declaration made by
Serbian nationalists in May, would result in the effective
partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina between groups whose eventual aim
is to annex portions of the republic to Croatia and Serbia
[footnote 23].
 
Helsinki Watch takes no position on the territorial or political
construction of the former Yugoslav republics. Our only concern is
that 

---------- footnotes -------------
    
[21] John F. Burns, "UN Resumes Relief Flights to Sarajevo," The
New York Times, July 22, 1992. 

[22] John F. Burns, "Croats Claim Their Own Slice of Bosnia," The
New York Times, July 6, 1992. 

[23] Ibid.

--------------- end of footnotes ---------
                                             45


the human rights of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic,
national, religious, political or other affiliation, be respected.
Serbian efforts to annex territory in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina have resulted in thousands of human rights abuses and
violations of the rules of war in both republics. Helsinki Watch is
gravely concerned that steps by Croatia to partition Bosnia-
Hercegovina further will lead to additional violence in a conflict
already marked by its extreme brutality.


The Serbian Position,

       For the most part, Serbs living in predominantly Serbian
areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina oppose Bosnian independence and are
generally in favor of union or close association with Serbia. Many
such Serbs are affiliated with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
of Bosnia-Hercegovina and claim that their rights would be
endangered in an independent Bosnian state. According to SDS leader
Radovan Karadzic, "It is impossible for Serbs to live together with
other peoples in a unitary state [footnote 24]." Karadzic and his
followers believe that an independent Bosnian state would be a
unitary entity in which a combined Muslim and Croatian majority
would persecute a Serbian minority. These Serbs justify
their fear of persecution by pointing to history, especially the
alliance between Croats and Muslims with the Axis powers during
World War II. Some Serbs also claim that they fear the
fundamentalist policies of a Muslim government footnote 25].

       The Serbian position also holds that all Serbs have the
right to live in one state. Serbs emphasize that nationalities, not
republics, have the right to secede from Yugoslavia. They contend
that, insofar as other nationalities have sought to secede from
Yugoslavia, the Serbs also have the right to secede from Croatia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, or any other Yugoslav republic. Because many
Serbs reside on territory belonging to one of the secessionist
states, the political and military strategies of Serbian forces in
Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia have been to assume control over
areas of republics in which Serbs constitute a

-------------- footnotes ---------

[24] John F. Burns, "Understanding, and Letting Loose, Dark
Distrusts in the Balkans," The New York Times, June 28, 1992.

[25] lbid.

-------- end of footnotes -----------

                                                 46

majority or substantial minority and to fuse those regions with the
new Yugoslavia.
       
Karadzic denies that he and his supporters seek to annex Bosnian
territory and become part of a "Greater Serbia [footnote 26]."
Rather, he contends that they support the division of Bosnia-
Hercegovina into communal cantons which would function as
autonomous entities under the control of the majority national
group in each canton. The cantons would share some responsibilities
at the Bosnian level but most government power would be
concentrated at the canton level. Under such an arrangement,
Karadzic and his followers believe that Serbian-controlled cantons
should include 70 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory despite
the fact that Serbs constitute only 31 percent of Bosnia's
population. SDS leaders justify such disparity by claiming that
Serbs own property on 70 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's land and
therefore are entitled to those areas.  Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic claims that neither he nor his government have in any way
intervened, nor are responsible for, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Milosevic asserts that the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a
"civil war" between various groups, none of which include forces
from Serbia. Moreover, Milosevic has claimed that neither the JNA
nor the Serbian government have a "single soldier on the soil of
Bosnia-Hercegovina and that [they] are not supporting any military
action." Rather, he claims, Serbia is supplying indigenous Serbian
forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina only with "food and clothes and other
things for survival" but not with military support [footnote 28]. 
Nevertheless, it is well known that the government of Yugoslavia,
and in particular, the government of the Republic of Serbia, have
provided economic, military and political support to Bosnian Serbs 

--------- footnotes ------------

    
[26] See Karadzic's letter to U.S. President George Bush, dated
July 3, 1992, as transcribed by Reuters Information Services, July
3, 1992. See also "Statement by Karadzic to Belgrade Television,"
April 16, 1992, as reported in FBIS, April 17, 1992, pp. 34-35. 

[27] Cable News Network (CNN) Interview with Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic, initially broadcast on CNN at 3:00 p.m. EST on
June 26, 1992; as transcribed by Reuters Information Services, June
26, 1992. 

[28] lbid.

----------- end of footnotes -------------
                                          47

fighting against the forces of Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 29].
Many foreign and domestic observers believe that Karadzic, the
leader of the SDS in Bosnia-Hercegovina, closely coordinates his
actions with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic [footnote 30].
The Serbian government has openly supported the political and
military aims of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The Serbian government also has condoned, and in some
cases supported, the formation of at least five paramilitary groups
in Serbia which operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 31].
Lastly, evidence would suggest that the JNA continues to take part
in military operations throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina [footnote 32].
For example, despite claims by the Yugoslav government that it
ceased all military intervention in Bosnia on May 19, air attacks
against Sarajevo and other areas continued thereafter. One such air
attack on Sarajevo occurred on June 10 According to Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Gray, a UN military observer from New Zealand who
watched the attack from a window, a Yugoslav army jet "dropped a
cluster bomb on a Muslim-controlled hill" near central Sarajevo
[footnote 33]. Serbian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina have no
aircraft capable of such an attack [footnote 34]."

It is important to note that some Bosnian Serbs, primarily those
living in multi-ethnic cities such as Sarajevo, do not support the
militant position of Milosevic, Karadzic or their followers. Many
Serbs, including Jovan Divjuk, deputy commander of Bosnian forces,
and Nenad Kecmanovic and Mirko Pejanovic, Serbian members of
Bosnia's collective 

----------- footnotes ---------

    
[29] See above section regarding Serbian/Yugoslav parties to the
conflict. See also Milos Vasic "Plan RAM u akciji: Naoruzavanje
Bosne," Vreme, March 1991. 

[30] John F. Burns, "Cease-Fire Brings Bit of Calm but No
Confidence to Sarajevo," The New York Times, May 14, 1992. 

[31] See previous section concerning Serbian and Yugoslav parties
to the conflict. 

[32] Ibid.

[33] Blaine Harden, "Sarajevo Greets UN Peace-Keepers," The
Washington Post, June 12, 1992.

[34] Ibid.

------ end of footnotes ---------
                                        48

Presidency, support the Bosnian position as stated above. Moreover,
some Serbs also are members of Bosnia's police force and its
territorial defense units and are actively engaged in defending
Bosnian territory from militant Serbian and Yugoslav attacks. 
        
Also, portions of the population of Serbia are opposed to the war
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In particular, Serbs in the province of
Vojvodina and among independent academic, press and cultural
circles in Belgrade have long been opposed to the Serbian
government's and JNA's involvement in the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Recent demonstrations in Belgrade, which the
Serbian Orthodox church has supported [footnote 35], attest to the
degree of popular dissatisfaction and opposition many Serbs feel
toward Milosevic and his policies [footnote 36].

------- footnotes ----------
    
[35] Laura Silber, "Serb Regime Rebuked by Church," The Washington
Post, May 29, 1992, and Michael T. Kaufman, "Thousands Protest
Against Serbian President," The New York Times, June 15, 1992. 

[36] Chuck Sudetic, "Tens of Thousands Call for Removal of Serbia's
Leader," The New York Times, June 1, 1992; Nikola Antonov, "Big
Anti-Milosevic Rally in Belgrade," Reuters Information Service,
June 28, 1992; Blaine Harden, "100,000 Serbs Demand Ouster of
Milosevic," The Washington Post, June 29, 1992. 

----- end of footnotes ------
                                   49

         VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF WAR



Summary Executions of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat


        
Helsinki Watch has documented cased in which civilians are being
summarily executed as part of an "ethnic cleansing" campaign which
is being implemented by Serbian forces. Many of the displaced
persons who have fled from occupied villages and who could possibly
provide further information about such atrocities remain encircled
in besieged areas such as Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo.
Helsinki Watch has also received reports that Serbian civilians may
have been executed in the municipalities of Sarajevo. However, to
date we have not received any evidence that would confirm such
reports. 



Zaklopaca (municipality of Vlasenica) [footnote 1]


On May 16, 1992, at least 83 Muslims were summarily executed by
Serbian paramilitaries in the village of Zaklopaca [footnote 2]. At
least 11 children (ranging in age from 6 to 16) and 16 elderly
persons (over 60) were among those killed [footnote 3], according
to eyewitnesses to and survivors of 

---------- footnotes ------------
    
[1] Of the 33,817 inhabitants of the municipality of Vlasenica,
55.5 percent were Muslim and 42.5 percent Serbs. 

[2] According to survivors, approximately 200 people lived in the
almost exclusively Muslim village of Zaklopaca. 

[3] On the basis of survivors' accounts, volunteer workers at
Zagreb's mosque compiled a list of those killed in Zaklopaca. Most
of the names on the list were recounted by eyewitnesses during
individual interviews with Helsinki Watch representatives on June
5, 1992. According to the list, 30 members of the Hodzic family,
nine members of the Hamidovic family, eight members of the
Salihovic family, nine members of the Selimovic family, seven
members of the Avdic family and seven members of the Nuskic family
were among those killed. The Hreljic family lost three members and
the Dugalic, Music and Berbic families each lost two family
members. Mustafa Mahmutovic, Rasim Fetahovic and Himzo Vejzovic and
Bajro Djuric also were killed. 

-------- end of footnotes ----------
                                   50

the execution [footnote 4]. The village of Zaklopaca is bordered by
the predominantly Serbian villages of Gornji Zalkovik, Podbirac,
Milosevine, Bakice, Vukovici, Raici and Milici. At the end of March
and the beginning of April, Serbian women, children and elderly
persons were evacuated from most of these villages. According to
Najla Hodzic:

When we asked our Serbian neighbors where and why they were
leaving, they refused to tell us. Some made excuses about having to
visit relatives but most refused to talk about it at all. After the
Bosnian referendum [February 29-March 1, 1992], local Serbs started
carrying AK-47s in public. At the same time, businesses began to
close, the hospital was temporarily closed and Muslims were being
fired from their jobs. For example, 33 Muslim electricians were
fired from the Elektrodistribucija plant in Vlasenica and Muslim
miners from the Boksita transport plant in Milici also were laid
off. Eventually, even the school was closed. During the last week
of March, the Serbs erected barricades around their villages. In
early May, armed Serbs entered our village searching for weapons
but found nothing and left peacefully. 


        On May 16, at approximately 5:00 a.m., a busload of Serbian
soldiers drove through Zaklopaca. According to Sena Hodzic:


The bus was coming from the direction of Milici and was headed
toward Gornji Zalkovik. It was full of men in Yugoslav army
uniforms who were wearing Cetnik symbols on their hats. At first,
they only drove through Zaklopaca but, once they got to the
outskirts of our town, they surrounded it. It was quiet until about
noon, when our village was attacked from the Serbian positions
which 

---------- footnotes ----------

[4] On June 5, 1992, in Zagreb, Croatia, Helsinki Watch
representatives interviewed four women who had survived the
killings. Helsinki Watch representatives were not able to interview
a fifth eyewitness, who was hospitalized due to shock.

------------ end of footnotes -----------
                                          51

had been assumed earlier that morning and from those Serbian
villages that encircled ours. 


        The women claim that no heavy artillery was used; they say
they heard only gunfire. The shooting was brief and by mid-
afternoon the villagers cautiously began to come out of their
homes. Sena Hodzic remembers:


We were scared but we had work to do and I had to till the
soil. At approximately 4:30 p.m., I was working my plot and a large
automobile passed by me. The car was white but had
"massacre" (pokolj) written across it in large blue letters. The
man who was driving the car was Milomir Milosevic from
Kljestana. Several Cetniks with beards also were in the car. 


A second witness, Zerina Hodzic, confirmed the above account:


I was taking my cows to pasture when I saw the Cetniks. I
immediately went into my house from where I saw that three
Cetniks had gotten out of the car and others were entering the
village on foot. About 100 Cetniks came from the direction of
Zalkovik. Each Cetnik had two AK47s, ammunition strapped
across his chest and belt and all were dressed in JNA uniforms but
had a Cetnik symbol on their hats. Many wore gloves on
their hands and stockings over their heads. They broke off
into groups that started going from house to house. 


According to Najla Hodzic: 


They came to my house first because it is the first one at the
entrance to the village. Four or five of them came toward my house.
It was sometime around 4:30 p.m.. My brother-in-law, Haso Hodzic
(age 39) was outside, in front of the house when the Cetniks
approached. They started calling him an Ustasa. My brother-in-law
started to walk toward them and they told him to give up his
weapons. He told them that he did not have any weapons 


                                               52

but that they could take his cows. Then one of the Cetniks opened
fire and killed him.      


        The murdered man's wife, Nevresa Hodzic, confirmed her
sister-in-law's account:


After they killed my husband, we let out a scream and they
sprayed our house with bullets and then machine-gunned the
entire village. They kept shooting for several minutes all
over the village despite the fact that no one was shooting
at them. 


        Similarly Sena Hodzic's husband, Ibrahim, (age 39), was
killed as she and her eight- and ten-year-old sons looked on.


Three Cetniks approached our home. A neighbor from the area,
Milomir Milosevic was with them. My husband, my children and I were
trying to flee when we saw them approaching the house. They
surrounded us and we hovered in a corner near the house. We were
terrified. One of the Cetniks motioned to my husband with his index
finger to walk toward him. My husband obeyed and started to walk in
his direction, only to be sprayed with gunfire by the Cetnik. 


Zerina Hodzic's family faced a similar fate. 


I was hiding in the barn with my husband Rifet [age 35] and our two
daughters [ages 13 and 7]. Five Cetniks found us and pointed their
index fingers at my husband and beckoned him toward them. One of
the Cetniks shot him without ever having uttered a word. 


        Each of the four women interviewed by Helsinki Watch
claimed to have seen approximately 30 men from the village rounded
up into one group and killed by machine-gun fire. Many others were
killed individually, usually in front of their homes.


                                  53

        
During the shooting, those who had survived had hidden in three
homes belonging to Haso Hodzic, Alija Hamidovic, and Hasko
Hamidovic. After their husbands had been killed, the four women hid
in their family home with 11 other people. In all, approximately 45
people are known to have survived. 

After approximately 15 minutes of shooting and killing, several of
the paramilitaries headed back toward the village of Milici in
their car. The rest of the paramilitaries walked to the other
surrounding Serbian villages. When the fighting stopped and the
paramilitaries withdrew, the survivors emerged from the houses to
find their dead relatives scattered about the village. Several
houses had been set on fire. The women interviewed by Helsinki
Watch said they had identified the bodies of the following five
families: 


o Saban Avdic, his two sons, his wife, daughter-in-law and her two 
  children;

o Ibis Hozdic, his wife, their two sons, two daughters-in-law and 
  four grandchildren;


o Enisa Hozdic, her two children, her three sisters, her father,  
  mother and another man they could not identify;


o Fatima Berbic and her husband.


        
According to Zerina Hozdic:                       


We emerged from the house where we had been hiding only to see dead
bodies strewn about the village. We remained in the village for a
short period of time and I covered my husband, who was lying dead
on the ground. Flies were descending over the corpses. 


        The four women said that the survivors did not bury their
dead, fearing another attack by the Serbian paramilitaries. Rather,
they headed toward the town of Vlasenica. Because they were afraid
of taking the main road, they travelled in the rain through the
forest, where they remained for three days without food. Zerina
Hodzic continued:

When the Serbian paramilitaries noticed something moving in the
bushes, they shot in our direction. When we got near the village of
Damcici, one of the children from our group wandered to the
perimeter of the forest only to confront a Cetnik. The Cetnik asked
him where the others were but the child did not answer. The Cetnik
then shot the boy. His mother ran out of the bushes and another man
ran after her. They were both shot dead by the Cetnik. I do not
know the names of the people but I recognized them as having been
from our area. 


        
According to the women, shortly after the child had been killed,
some time between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., they saw the village
of Damcici burning. The women believe that the Cetniks set fire to
the village. They eventually arrived at Vlasenica and went to the
Serbian command center to get permits to travel to Kladanj, a
predominantly Muslim town.
         According to Zerina Hodzic:


At first they refused to issue the permits and told us to go back
to Zaklopaca but we refused. They put us on a bus and, when we got
to the Serbian village of Luke, we were stopped by about 20
Cetniks. They were lined up on both sides of the road, with their
guns pointed at us. They told us to get out of the bus and walk
along the white line in the center of the road, in a single column.
There were approximately 30 of us, including an elderly woman who
had been wounded and many children. We walked for two hours in the
rain and finally came to the Muslim village of Ravne, from where we
were transported to Kladanj. After ten days, we had to leave
Kladanj because there was no food left in the town. We went to the
village of Zivinica, near Tuzla, where we stayed for two days but
we were forced to leave because the Serbs started attacking the
area. We were driven to Odzak and then to Slavonski Brod in
Croatia. Mortars were falling on Slavonski Brod but the locals made
every effort to get us some food. When the fighting subsided we
were brought here, to Zagreb. 


                                55

Vlasic Plateau (municipality of Travnik) [footnote 5]


        
Evidence gathered by Helsinki Watch strongly points to the summary
execution of at least 15 disarmed combatants probably by members of
the military police of the JNA on May 15, 1992. Two of five
survivors, Stjepan Drazetic [footnote 6] and Nikola Marjanovic
[footnote 7], were interviewed separately by Helsinki Watch
representatives. According to both men, approximately 70 to 100
members of the Bosnian Territorial Defense (TO), the Croatian
Defense Council (HVO) and the Bosnian reserve police force were on
guard at Vlasic, a plateau on a hill near the city of Travnik. The
Bosnian and Croatian troops were armed with AK-47s and other
machine guns. Four mortar launchers also were in the vicinity.
Fighting between the Croatian/Bosnian and Serbian forces broke out
some time between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m.
          According to Nikola Marjanovic:


Some sporadic fighting between our forces and their troops broke
out but quickly subsided. Approximately 20 of us [most of whom were
HVO soldiers] then took shelter in a nearby barn of sorts. The
structure had concrete walls but a wooden make-shift roof. We were
preparing something to eat and because it was dark, we couldn't see
anyone approaching the barn, but we heard someone coming forward.
They told us that they were HVO, but, in fact, they were Cetniks.
As they approached the door, we saw them aim their guns from the
door and then they opened fire. Nikica Milic, who was wounded,
yelled out to them to stop shooting and told them that we would
surrender. They stopped shooting and told us to put our hands in
the air while we laid down on the 

----- footnotes -------


[5] Of the 70,402 inhabitants of the municipality of Travnik, 45.3
percent were Muslims, 36.9 percent Croats, 11.0 percent Serbs, and
5.2 percent Yugoslavs.

[6] Interviewed in the hospital in Travnik, on June 12, 1992.

[7] Interviewed in the village of Ovcarevo (municipality of
Travnik) on June 12, 1992.

--------- end of footnotes -----
                                   56

floor. Slavko Didak tried to escape but he was shot and killed.


        Marjanovic said that the JNA soldiers subsequently set fire
to the building where the shooting had taken place and that Slavko
Didak's body was burned as a result. Stjepan Drazetic, who had been
wounded in the thigh from the shooting said that a second HVO
soldier, Mirko Rimac, also was shot but that, unlike Didak, he was
not trying to flee. Drazetic recounted what happened after their
surrender:


They told us to form a single column and crawl on our stomachs to
a plain on the hill, where we remained on the ground for
approximately 15 minutes. We were then told to strip to our
undergarments and to crawl for another 15 minutes. 


        Drazetic claims that a JNA soldier had come to tell their
captors that one of their men had been killed during the earlier
battle with the Bosnian and Croatian forces. This news supposedly
caused the other soldiers to turn violent. According to Marjanovic:


After we had crawled approximately 30 meters, we were told to lie
on our stomachs with our hands behind our heads and to put our
faces in the dirt. They kicked and beat us while we were in that
position and I heard some shooting; it's possible that someone was
killed but I couldn't see who that might have been because my face
was in the dirt. I only know that our commander, Zoran Domic, had
been killed because I later saw his body nearby. 


Marjanovic continued: 


At one point, one of the soldiers yelled "Don't kill all of them;
we need a few prisoners for exchange purposes." They then told us
to get up. Five of us stood up, including Nikica Zilic who had been
wounded earlier. Stjepan Drazetic also was wounded, but he managed
to 


                               57
stand up, as did Pero Djepina and Zdravko Brkic [footnote 8]. The
rest of the men were either dead, crying out or moaning on the
ground.


Thirteen corpses were subsequently found on Vlasic plateau.     
Autopsies were performed on May 23, 1992, in the morgue at the
upper cemetery in Travnik. Medical reports [footnote 9] indicate
that the autopsies were performed eight days after the time of
death. The autopsy and medical records of the men -- all HVO
soldiers from the municipality of Travnik - showed many injuries
and the causes of death. The reports were as follows: 


o Mirko Rimac, from the village of Sipovika, was shot in the legs 
  and subsequently died from blows inflicted to the head by a
  wooden or metal object.


o The body of Slavko Didak, from the village of Kraljevica, the   
  aforementioned man who was shot when trying to escape, was
  burned.

o Slavo Babic, from the village of Paklarevo, was beaten to death 
  with a solid object. Most of the blows were inflicted to the face.


o Ivo Sotjak, from the village of Paklarevo, was killed after
  having been shot in the chest, specifically the heart and
  lungs.


o Perica Lukic, from the village of Paklarevo, was shot five times 
  in the heart, lung, and stomach. He died from blows
  inflicted to the head and excessive blood loss.

------- footnotes -----------

    
[8] The five men were later taken to various places of detention
and mistreated. See section concerning mistreatment in detention
below. 

[9] Helsinki Watch representatives reviewed medical records and
autopsy reports of the 13 men at the hospital in Travnik on June
12, 1992. Also, doctors, including one of the attending forensic
pathologists who conducted the autopsies, were interviewed.


                                   58

o Stipo Jerkic, from the village of Ricica, was shot three times in
  the chest and subsequently beaten with a solid on the head.


o Dragan Kimec, from Travnik, was shot twice in the chest, twice  
  in the upper right arm, and twice in the front of the left thigh.
  He also suffered blows to the head.


o Mato Babic, from Travnik, was killed by bullets fired at his
  head, specifically the right side of his forehead and his right
  ear. The upper portion of his head and right eye also were
  bruised, but doctors concluded that the bruises were caused after
  Babic fell to the ground once he had been shot.


o Zarko Meljancic, from the village of Ovcarevo, was shot twice in 
  the chest, near the right lung. He also was shot in the forehead.
  The upper portion of the man's skull was cracked and the bones
  in his nose were shattered into many fragments.


o Slavko Bendes, from Travnik, was shot near the right ear and in 
  the right side of his face. His facial bones and crown of the skull
  were shattered into multiple fragments.


o Tadija Marjanovic, from the village of Skulji, was shot below the 
  right eye. An open wound in the back of his neck was a result of
  his being beaten with a solid object. The upper section of his
  spine was crushed.


o Luka Babic, from the village of Paklarevo, was shot at the base 
  of the nose. The bones in the upper skull, around the eyes and
  the nose were broken into many fragments.


o Zoran Domic, from the village of Paklarevo, was shot in the chest 
  three times. The bones in the upper skull, face and lower jaw and
  his teeth were broken into many fragments.


        
The autopsy reports conclude that many of these men died from shots
fired to the head or chest at relatively close range. They also
indicate that most of the beatings were inflicted after the men had
been killed or while they were unconscious. 



                                   59

Skelani (municipality of Srebrenica)[footnote 10] 


        
According to eyewitnesses interviewed by Helsinki Watch
representatives footnote 11], men in the village of Skelani were
summarily executed after the village fell to Serbian forces on May
7. Vahida, Tima and Malida Selimovic were married to three brothers
-- Azem (age 42), Kemo (age 31) and Rizo (age 27) -- and had a
total of seven children. According to each of the three women,
Serbs in the area declared Skelani to be a Serbian village on May
1. On the same day, the Serbs demanded that all Muslims relinquish
any arms in their possession by 3:00 p.m. that afternoon or risk
being attacked. The Muslims complied and relinquished
any guns -- mostly hunting rifles -- in their possession.

        On May 7, 1992, Vahida Selimovic went to work in
Bajina Basta, a village across the Drina River, in neighboring
Serbia. She told Helsinki Watch:


As on every other day, I crossed the bridge to go to work in Bajina
Basta. However, armed Serbs almost didn't let me cross over; they
told me that I needed some type of permit. Those in [the village]
of Bajina Basta were all armed with knives, guns and hand grenades.
When I returned to Skelani in the afternoon, they wanted to see my
passport and I barely got home. There were hordes of armed men on
the Bosnian side of the bridge when I crossed over. We were scared
of these men so we spent the night in our basement. 


In the morning, buses belonging to the Raketa bus company in Serbia
came into Skelani and all the Serbs in the village left. The buses
had brought Cetniks from Serbia and they wore hats with Cetnik
symbols, helmets and gloves. In our part of Skelani there are 29
houses. The Cetniks surrounded those houses and tank and 

----------- footnotes ------


[10] Of the 37,211 inhabitants of Srebrenica, 72.9 percent were
Muslims and 25.2 percent Serbs.


[11] Interviewed in Novi Pazar, in the Sandzak region of Serbia,
Yugoslavia, on June 20, 1992.


                                   60

       [To be continued...]