From: kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie)
Subject: []  Re: Computerized warrant systems & mobile data terminals
Followup-To: alt.privacy
Originator: kadie@eff.org
Organization: The Electronic Frontier Foundation
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 13:20:54 GMT

[A repost - Carl]

Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:47:38 MST
From: MKIELSKY@apsc.com (MICHAEL G KIELSKY)
Subject:  Re: Computerized warrant systems & mobile data terminals

Mobile data terminals (MDT's) in police cars are nothing new around here
(Phoenix, AZ area), and have been in use for years.  My experience has ranged
from working for an organization which serviced these devices (and thus using
them in testing), thoroughly studying the computer system that works in the
background, to accompanying on-duty police officers from various departments on
many ride-alongs, and viewing the system in action.  These systems are in use
with virtually every police agency in the Phoenix area, as well as the
Department of Public Safety (Highway Patrol), but not with the sheriff's
office.

The systems are nothing more than data terminals on a radio network.  Data
traffic is NOT encrypted (risks obvious), and converting an installed base to
handle encryption is not feasible for most departments.  Log on practices vary,
with identification information ranging from officer ID, to shift/beat code,
with usually short (and few different) passwords.  The "base computer" is
connected to several databases, including the National Crime Information
Computer (NCIC), the Arizona Crime Information Computer (ACIC), and motor
vehicle records.  Information retrievable includes driving license records
(including traffic violation history), vehicle registration records (including
vehicle description), arrest warrant information, stolen motor vehicle records,
stolen firearm records, etc.  Data retrieval is notoriously slow during busy
times (Friday & Saturday night), sometimes taking as long as 30 minutes for a
license plate check.  Terminal to terminal messaging is possible.
Communication with dispatchers is also possible.  All transactions are
recorded/printed.

Accident Risks: A few years ago, the Phoenix Police Department, after
experiencing numerous problems with officer's driving and operating the
terminals at the same time, improved the ergonomics by mounting the terminal
higher and closer to the driver.  This way, the drivers eyes are not completely
averted from the road while using the terminal.

Privacy Risks: It is common practice for officers to "run" license plates on
vehicles which they observe, for no reason whatsoever, or for any trivial
reason.  Information retrieved via the computer includes name, address, SSN,
and driving license number of the current registered owner, vehicle
identification number, lien holder (usually bank/loan institution), original
lien amount, date vehicle first registered, date registration expires, vehicle
description, and whether the vehicle is stolen.  Registration violations are
most commonly found this way.  As newer officers (who often are less
techno-phobe) take to the streets, use of the system is increasing.

False Arrest Risks: Arrest warrant information obtained through the computer
(term is "CAPRI Hit") will find the listed individual in handcuffs (i.e.
existence of a computer arrest warrant record is sufficient probable cause for
arrest).  Again, we know how infallible information entered into computers is.
These computer warrant records must then be verified against the actual warrant
(on paper), before the arrestee can be arraigned (brought before a judge).
These warrants are stored in filing cabinets at the sheriff's office of the
warrant issuing jurisdiction (here it is the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office,
and I have seen the actual filing cabinets stuffed with warrants).  This
process can be slow, since there are hundreds of thousands of outstanding
warrants in these filing cabinets, some going back over half a century.

Michael Kielsky, Arizona Public Service Company, P.O. Box 53999, Phoenix, AZ
85072-3999  602-250-2897 (W)  602-919-0182 (M)  ...sunburn!overlord!mkielsky
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me.
 =kadie@eff.org, kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =
Newsgroups: alt.privacy