From: young@serum.kodak.com
Subject: Re: Should humans assign "status"?
Originator: young@sasquatch
Reply-To: young@serum.kodak.com
Organization: Clinical Products Division, Eastman Kodak Company
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 92 17:19:02 GMT

In <Bszov2.E58@wpg.com>, Russell Lawrence writes:
> 
>Russell Lawrence writes:
>rl> I agree with you that "life" is "life".  Isn't it also true that 
>rl> pain is pain, emotions are emotions, and intentions are 
>rl> intentions?
>
>From article <1992Aug13.220741.1696@pixel.kodak.com>, by young@serum.kodak.com:
>ry> Absolutely, and a rose is a rose is a rose (thank you, Gertrude Stein,
>ry> by way of The Bard).  The point is that we humans have no inherent
>ry> right to decide arbitrarily that Bambi's life is "worth more" or of
>ry> a "higher status" than that of an alga.  Or to put it on a more
>ry> homespun basis: that the life of a cow is somehow more valuable
>ry> than that of an ear of corn.  
>
>Yet, you apparently think that your life is somehow more valuable 
>than both.  Do you have an inherent right to decide such matters 
>"arbitrarily", as you say?  

	Sure, I have an instinct to survive as does every other living
	creature.  This makes me no better or worse or more or less valuable
	to the cosmos than any other life form.  It simply means that I,
	personally, do not wish to die (although, unlike virtually all other
	living things, I know that I will).  There is no decision about
	it: I, like any other living thing, will take steps to prevent my
	demise, and to say that this makes me somehow anthropocentric is
	patently false.  I suppose you could say that I'm "Rich-opocentric"
	in that regard, and I'm sure that you're "Russ-opocentric" in that
	regard, as well.  When you present yourself to a starving grizzly
	and sacrifice your life so that it may live, then I'll give some
	credence to your argument, but not before.

>In any case, you're the one who's invoking the "life" criterion, not
>me.  It's my contention that rights, to be meaningful, must stem 
>from mental abilities rather than purely physical attributes that 
>are meaningless in themselves.  As such, I reject the "red 
>herring" claim that rights ought to be granted to humans alone or 
>otherwise extended to every single class of self-replicating 
>proteins, or even more absurd, that rights must be granted to humans
>alone or extended to every class of chemicals in the universe.

	And certainly, you're entitled to your beliefs.  I point out, however,
	that I have never said either that "rights" should be granted to
	humans alone or that "rights" should be extended to every self-
	replicating molecule in the universe.  I have merely stated that
	humans have no "right" to decide, on some arbitrary basis like
	sapience, that one life form is more valuable, or of higher "status"
	than another.

>Whereas "life" _is_ an arbitrary criterion, mental abilities form 
>the very basis of meaningful experience, without which both 
>"good" and "bad" would be meaningless words.  

	Without the "arbitrary criterion" of "life", sentience and sapience
	wouldn't exist.  How "meaningful" is that?  :-)

	And what, exactly is a "meaningful experience"?  You've been trying
	to pass this phrase off for weeks, now, without any "meaningful"
	definition of it.  Except for us humans, "good" and "bad" ARE
	meaningless words.  For most of the life on this planet, the world
	simply "is", and there is certainly no ethical and moral relevance
	attached to the events which surround us, except by our own fevered
	brains.

>To illustrate my point: would a brain-dead comatose human give
>two hoots if you were to shoot him squarely in the foot?  Probably
>not, since brain-dead men are neither sentient nor likely to
>become sentient in the future.

	The phrase "brain-DEAD" [emphasis added] sums it up quite nicely:
	he's not really "alive".  His major sensory processing center has
	ceased to function.  This is a "red herring".

[...]

>Would an ear of corn mind if you rip off a few kernels?  Probably 
>not, since corn stalks (like brain-dead humans) do not appear to 
>be sentient organisms.  

	As far as anyone knows, an ear of corn doesn't "mind" anything in
	any fashion recognizable by humans, but the corn plant is quite
	capable of responding to sensory input.

>On the other hand, would any alert, conscious mammal (whether 
>human or non-human) mind if you were to shoot one of its limbs.  

	Let's use a tree branch as an example, since an ear of corn is a
	reproductive organ and meant to be shed.  If one removes a branch
	from a tree, does the tree not "take action" to minimize the effects
	of the loss, first by closing off channels of fluid loss and then,
	often, by growing new leaves to replace the old ones and recover
	a given level of photosynthesis?  How is this fundamentally 
	different from a leg-shot animal attempting to escape further
	damage?

>Of course, you're still free to believe that sentience is purely 
>arbitrary,

	This is not my belief.  What I believe is that assignment of "status"
	BASED on sentience is arbitrary.

>[...]  ...logic still favors the view that distinctions between
>"good" and "bad" could not possibly exist in worlds that are totally 
>senseless and thoughtless.  [...]

	My point exactly.  Without the presence of our overactive human
	brains, the concepts of "good" and "bad" don't exist.  So why do
	we insist on applying these uniquely human concepts to non-human
	species?

>ry> Now, as far as sentience and sapience are concerned, it is true that
>ry> "life" which includes these capabilities is certainly more highly
>ry> organized, but it would be an unwarranted assumption to assume that
>ry> a certain level of organization automatically carries with it some
>ry> pre-determined niche of status or importance on any absolute scale.
>
>Yet, I'm sure that the absence of "absolute scales" would not 
>prevent you evaluating facts and relationships in a meaningful 
>way in accordance with meaningful criteria.  

	What are you trying to say here?

[...]

>If sentience is an arbitrary criterion, as you say, please
>explain how meaning could exist in a universe that lacks both
>sentience and sapience.

	Why does "meaning" HAVE to exist in the universe?  And to what
	"meaning" do you refer?  What is this "meaning" to which you seem
	to be so inextricably bound?

[...]

>ry> Why should the fact that humans share some specific attribute, 
>ry> such as sapience, with some other non-human life form be 
>ry> important?  
>
>It shouldn't.  It's the possession of such attributes, not the
>sharing of such attributes, that truly counts.

	Unless you are quibbling over some tiny semantic difference in 
	terminology here, I see no functional distinction between what I
	said and what you said.  Please explain.

[...]

>ry> Isn't the fact that the non-human life form is alive sufficient?  
>
>For what reason?  

	For the same reason you think sentience and sapience are necessary.

[..."much deleted" portion partially re-created below...]

	Why is my ethical standard of "life has worth" less valid than
	your standard (admittedly greatly simplified here, but no more than
	mine) of "SAPIENT/SENTIENT life has worth"?

>ry> Pain is not inherently "bad".  Your mother may have been in great
>ry> pain when you were born, was that a "bad" thing?  [I mean no flame
>ry> here, only what might be a particularly moving example.]
>
>Yes, the pain was a bad thing.  However, my mother wanted to have 
>a child and had no alternative but to endure the pain of 
>childbirth.  If you were evaluating the total event, it would be 
>reasonable to say that she regarded the childbirth as a "good" 
>thing, but in such a case, you're no longer evaluating the pain 
>per se.  Your notion that pain is good because childbirth is good
>is a good example of equivocation. [no offense]

	There is no equivocation here.  My notion, stated clearly in the
	"much deleted" section, is that pain has neither "goodness" nor
	"badness" associated with it except in context.  It would have
	been more accurate for you to say that childbirth (in the example
	given) was presumably "a good thing", and the associated pain was
	morally and ethically irrelevant.

[...]

>ry> [...] You said it yourself: the simple fact that we cannot recognize
>ry> certain capabilities in an organism does not mean that those capabilities
>ry> are not there.
>
>As you know, or ought to know, it's impossible to prove a negative.
>
>We'll never be able to prove for certain that unicorns do not 
>exist or that sidewalks cannot feel pain when we step on them.  

	Re unicorns: true, but the huge preponderance of evidence weighs
	against it, and no documented case of a unicorn sighting has ever
	been found.

	Even the simplest plants and animals show sensory capability,
	though, which makes the "can't prove a negative" argument for
	them much less convincing.  Let's be clear, however: no one is
	claiming sapience for a paramecium here, and viruses are in a class
	all to themselves where these ideas are concerned.

>However, this inability doesn't prevent us from showing that deer 
>certainly appear to suffer under certain kinds of conditions...  
>unlike sidewalks.  

	Re sidewalks: concrete isn't "alive" by any accepted measure of the
	word.  The comparison, therefore, is totally without merit.

>If you really believe that similarity of structure and function 
>is a false god, as you say, why do you advocate drug testing on 
>mammals?

	Did I say I advocated it?  [no]

	I simply do not believe that a blanket condemnation of it is
	justifiable.  Would you be less upset if I said that drug testing
	should only be done on reptiles, or arthropods, or paramecia, and
	not "on mammals"?

	By the way, why are you now trying to distract us with the subject
	of my views on drug testing?  We are talking about whether or not
	humans have the right to assign value and status to other life forms,
	not what we do with them once we've already assigned status.

>If you're going to tell us that it's reasonable to test 
>the effectiveness of analgesics on rats...  given the similarity 
>between rat brains and human brains, it won't make much sense for 
>you to turn around and pretend that rats cannot suffer and that 
>the similarity between humans and rats is a "false god".  

	Once again, you've gotten the principles confused: __my__ claim
	is that similarity of structure is no better basis for determination
	of moral and ethical relevance than any of a number of other, equally
	anthropocentric, criteria.  We are talking about assigning of
	value and status to non-human life forms, not drug testing, and in
	that context, similarity of structure is a false god.

	My claim is __NOT__ that rats do not feel pain or that they are not
	sometimes appropriate for study because of their physiological
	similarities.  Is that sufficiently clear?  When we engage in a 
	discussion about drug testing with rats, then we'll argue over
	what is appropriate or not.  For now, however, let's limit ourselves
	to the subject at hand, shall we?

	As ego-deflating as it may be, neither you nor I have any inherent
	right to classify one life form as "better", "more valuable", or of
	"higher status" than any other.  We are simply part of the continuum
	of life and have no special authority to judge.  A corn plant is
	not less valuable, but neither is it (and pay attention carefully
	here) MORE valuable.  We have the CAPABILITY to classify, but not
	the RIGHT.

	If the ARFs wish to draw their line of guilt at sapience, so be it,
	as long as it is recognized that the line is arbitrary and that other
	lines, drawn in different places, with different criteria, are
	equally valid.

-Rich Young (my opinions, not Kodak's)

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