From: daniel@vtserf.cc.vt.edu (Daniel Kranowski)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Objectivism/Existence
Date: 26 Aug 92 19:53:32 GMT
Organization: Virginia Tech (VPI & SU)


Stephen Grossman wrote:
        There is no Platonic problem relating different parts of existence,
        whether subject/object or any other split, since everything
        exists equally.
        
This statement encapsulates the two relevant differences between us; I wish 
it had not taken so long for it to emerge.  I hold that:

(1) Humanity cannot know what it is; "to know" and "to be" do not cover
    the same ground.
    
(2) Existence is the first in an infinite table of descriptors of an
    object.
    
To explain...
========================================================================
(1) Humanity cannot know what it is; "to know" and "to be" do not cover
    the same ground.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Consciousness is ruled by the laws of epistemology, and we cannot
know metaphysical "reality" more purely than permitted by the corruptive
and limiting influence of our consciousness.

    I define:
        Consciousness = awareness of thought and feeling; perceptions of
                    sense-data (sight, sound, smell, touch, taste), and
                    conceptions in reaction to sense-data (cogitation
                    and emotion).
    I defined previously:
        Epistemology = the science of what one knows or can know;
                    philosophy of the philosopher himself as subject.
    
    And expanding that definition of epistemology to show how I think
it relates to consciousness: what you know is exactly equal to what you
are conscious of.  Or: all you have as a person is what you think you
know or what you feel you know.  Therefore, though we may hope to attain
the truths of the universe, the limits of our consciousness are
described by the science of epistemology.  This is my definition.

    If the verb for epistemology is "to know," then the verb for
metaphysics is "to be."  As I defined previously:
        Metaphysics = the science of what is; the object of a
                    philosopher's study.
However, there is a gap between human consciousness and metaphysical
reality.  The attempt to prove the conclusion of any argument involves
making the audience aware of the premises and conscious of what follows
from it.  My arguments and Grossman's arguments attempt (in vain, I
suppose) to bring the other to a more enlightened awareness, to change
the way he looks at the world.  Therefore, our understanding is governed
by the laws of epistemology: we must perceive sensual stimuli, such as
print on a computer screen, and form an interpretation of it based on
what we already know and think.  An *interpretation of sense* is what
knowledge is.  The objects that stimulate us give us impressions, and
we can "know" them, but we cannot reach their *being*.  "To know" and
"to be" are in different realms, although we flatter ourselves to think
they overlap.

    The response I expect?  "Look at an object, and obviously you see
what it is."  But all we have is what we *think* it is, what we *think
we know*.  If there was a modem port labelled "The Truth" that I could
plug my computer straight into, you bet I'd do it and so would everyone
else.  But how would you know if the truth was indeed what you were
getting?  Stephen Grossman seems to think it is obvious when you face
the truth, but I do not.  (1) allows that the truth may *be*, and that
all our delusions and interpretations may indeed be correct, but we can
never *know* for certain.


========================================================================
(2) Existence is the first in an infinite table of descriptors of an
    object.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Existence can be thought of in two ways: as "existence," an abstract
noun; and as "existing," a verb-form or adjective describing a noun.  Both
verbs and adjectives can describe a noun, viz: "an giraffe breathes, a
pebble does not breathe", "a giraffe is tall, a pebble is small."  In the
same way I can use "breathing" as a noun, a characteristic of giraffes,
to describe giraffes as distinct from pebbles.  However, "true" and
"false" are not adjectives or verb-forms and cannot describe a noun.
Existence, giraffes, and pebbles are neither true nor false.  Instead,
boolean statements using the words "true" and "false" to describe
adjectives and verb-forms; they describe the terms used to describe
the nouns.  Boolean statements describe what *is*.

    Now think of the statement "Existence exists."  The first word,
"existence," is an abstract noun.  The second word, "exists," is a verb
used to describe the state of the noun; it says this thing is doing
what is called "existing," and thus describes the noun.  Boolean terms
may be used to describe the second word, the verb used: we may say "It
is true that existence exists" or "It is false that existence exists."
Stephen Grossman and Ayn Rand skip any reasoning to support the boolean
statement, "It is true that existence exists."  They use the descriptive
statement, "Existence exists," but do not even attempt to prove the truth
of it. I argued in (1) that it is impossible to prove either of of these
two boolean statements, because we cannot know what is.

    But, regardless of the strength of our grip on reality, this is just
the beginning of the art of description.  We perceive a whole universe of
things, and all are different, so we must find more ways to describe them.
We can identify the science of metaphysics and the science of epistemology
and give them different names and treat them differently.  We can conceive
of a thing and the thought of a thing.  Their equal existence is not at
question!  Their *other* attributes differ.  They may both exist as sciences
and as concepts, but they deal with different subject matter and point to
different other things in the universe.  If you refuse to classify
the things of existence and recognize their contrasts, you will be
doomed to give the same answer to every question: "What do you like the
best -- chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry?" asks A.  "They all exist,"
responds B.  "Bring me a ruler," asks A.  Handing him an eraser, B says,
"It exists just as much as the ruler."  This is why Stephen Grossman has
not made any distinctions among the many points I have brought up in my
other posts, and made one straw man out of all of them.  I do *not* state
that one thing exists more than another, though his stock defense has
repeatedly appeared for this imagined assertion.  I hold that the
objectivist is wrong to assume it is *true* that existence exists, and is
wrong to refuse to make classifications in the things he perceives.

========================================================================
Recalling earlier conversation in light of all this...

I had written:
        My impressions after reading Rand's words, "Existence is neither
        true nor false.  It just is," were mixed.  I agree that existence
        is neither true nor false any more than it is green or prickly;
        but it might be, and then it might not be.

Stephen Grossman responded:
        Recalling that all exists equally, relativism is not a meta. or
        episte. privileged limit, thing, or context.  It all exists, the
        things you consider and the things you don't want to consider.

This is his stock defense.  Is it relevant to my statement?  No.  Equal
existence was not an issue, but Stephen made a habit of answering all my
questions with this reponse.  My interest was in existence, at _any_ level.
His statement, "It all exists," is a descriptive statement of the abstract
noun, "existence," but the statement may be true and it may be false.  He
does not attempt to prove its truth.  Instead, he provides another
descriptive statement without proof or argument:

Stephen Grossman wrote:
        I can connect my mind, via coice and logic, to objective
        reality [...]
    
I wrote back:
        [...] HOW do you know when you are connected to objective reality?
        
He responded:
          On Aug. 20, Kranowski continues his search for a method or
        continues to dispair over the lack of a method to imitate divine
        omniscience, ie, a "neutral view of reality or existence.
          episte-objectivity is the alternative to dogma and skepticism.
          meta-every time I mention something, Kranaowski jumps past meta
        into episte and wonders about the relation of "something" to
        existence.  That is fine and ok but only episte. [...]  Please
        make a temporary attempt to transcend episte for meta.

My purpose here was to uncover how the objectivist claims to ascertain
objective reality, to ascertain what is, which I claim in (1) is
impossible.  He has not, and probably will not, answer this.

So I wrote back:
        I do not think we _can_ "transcend epistemology for metaphysics,"
        because we are intrinsically hamstrung by epistemology.  We are
        the subjects, and cannot reach the objects.

And just recently, he responded:
        Kranowski has split subject from object!  Why?!  Consider the
        history of philosophy as the history of splits succeeding one
        another.  From, to be arbitrary, Plato's Form-matter split to
        Descartes' mind/reality split to Kant's noumena/phenomena split
        to whatever split the "Journal of Philosophy" is, with the
        appropriate scholarship, attempting to exorcise in any issue.

"Why split?" is a good question, which I addressed in (1) and (2) above, but 
I suppose I hardly needed to do so, since the remainder of Grossman's post
was notably void of any counterargument.

Stephen Grossman continued:
        The issue of meta. splits is critical.  Recognizing, apparently,
        the invalidity of one split, K shifts to another, and then,
        another...  The following were explicitly or implicitly in the
        Aug. 21 message: confusion/certainty, conceive/actual,
        imagination/reality, thought/thing, value/technical, met/episte,
        what is/what one knows, subject/object,  [...]
          How can k justify claiming that one of those splits is basic but
        not the others?  One would need a standard, ie, another sp/it,
        and on it goes [...]

    I've a lot to say to this.  First of all, I'm not splitting anything
metaphysically.  (1) illustrates my theory that all consciously made
splits are epistemological, not metaphysical.  I'll never know if a
giraffe's being is different from that of a pebble, but the knowledge I
have of them makes the two distinct in my mind.
    Second, where is this "invalidity"?  No where did I go back on my
statement that subjects are separated from objects, and no where does
Stephen begin to prove that I should.
    Third, all these splits are reflections of the _same_ distinction I
drew between what we can know and what we must simply be.  I said the
same thing many times over and in different ways, in hopes that it would 
not be missed, but Stephen did not pick it up on any of these repetitions.
    Finally, the unspoken first principle in his post is that splits
are bad somehow.  I hope (2) has made this clear: I am willing to agree
that one thing can not exist more than another thing -- I never disputed
this -- but "the cosmic egg" is a madhouse of interesting and unique
objects, all different.  If they exist, then they exist equally, but
existence is only the first adjective you can give to an object.  Then
perhaps it is animal, vegetable, or mineral; and there are infinitely
more ways to describe it.  Even Ayn Rand says a definition speaks for
all the uncountable aspects of a thing.

I wrote originally:
        [...] why has objectivism always been so controversial?  Almost
        everyone I've ever encountered believes in objective reality, and
        an unbroken channel from his mind to that reality.
        
Ken Bell asked a similar question:
        Could someone explain to me how (if at all) Objectivism differs
        from most versions of Realism?

I missed a bunch of the posts on the realism thread, but I'm inclined
to say now that the differences are minimal.  Ayn Rand always makes a
point of saying how wrong everyone else is, to give herself more of that
rugged-individualist flair, but her philosophy doesn't have a whole lot
that's new; aside from her bows and wrinkles, the man in the street
believes what she does.  "Just wake up and look at reality, it's right
there in front of you."  How many times have you heard someone say this
to you?
    Along the same vein, the statements in (1) and (2) have almost
certainly been thought before by someone else, even though I don't yet
know all the names.  Apparently, people like to call it "anti-realism."

I wrote:
        Stephen Grossman and/or Ayn Rand confuse (1) what we can conceive
        exists, with (2) what actually exists.
        
I later gave definitions of metaphysics and epistemology so the above
might perhaps click, and further wrote:
        With my definitions, the words I'd said before can be restated:
        "Stephen Grossman and/or Ayn Rand confuse (1) epistemology
        with (2) metaphysics," despite that I am already accused of same.

Stephen wrote (after the last quote of his above):
        Given the above, K's query about the you/obj real split can be
        dismissed as meta impossible (though episte valid).  Episte is
        limited to relations between the poles of splits (conventionally,
        existence [or reality]/consciousness).  Meta is the study of the
        most fundamental or general aspects of existence.  Clever sorts
        may notice my (limited) study/existence split and so meta must
        be understood to BE existence.  Philosophy is not meta or episte
        privileged.

I'm glad to see that Stephen seems to agree with what I'm saying on an
epistemological level, although our definitions of epistemology are
different.  I don't agree that epistemology is limited to the relations
between polar splits, because polar opposites are usually rare, and
the distinctions of knowledge are often made while discriminating between
two very similar objects (see my response to Leo Smith below).  I treat
epistemology and metaphysics as sciences, thus as forms of knowledge, and
thereby limited by the bounds of human consciousness.  I say "the laws of
epistemology" or "the laws of metaphysics" to signify what is, what truly
exists and governs the universe, and thereby something we can never
ultimately know.  Stephen conceptualizes both the science and the laws, 
but lumps them together, saying that the study of existence is the same 
thing as existence.  As I said in (2), they are similar (it may be true 
that both exist), but there's more to it than that.  I've said repeatedly 
on this thread, the *thought* of a thing is not identical to the *thing 
itself*.  An easy proof of this I mentioned earlier: we can conceive of 
time travel and sentient flamingo beings, but that does not guarantee 
their existence.  Therefore I also disagree with his lumped definition 
of the science of metaphysics.

Leo Smith wrote:
        It occurs to me that there is a simple solution to the problem
        outlined by Daniel Kranowski: That is the percieved dichotomy
        between what is, and what can be concieved.
          Although it is semantically convenient to talk in terms of a
        dichotomy, i.e. a Reality and our Model of it... in reality
        (sic :-)) what actually happens is that our experience passes
        through many many levels of adaptation before it gets to the
        stage of being related to as 'Reality' - this is not a one
        stage process, more a continuous spectrum.

This was a breath of fresh air; I was relieved to see a view that
understood the difference between a thing and the thought of it
("Reality and our Model of it") even if he didn't agree with me.  I'll
agree with you that dichotomies are too often called upon to simplify an
all-too-complex universe.  Some of what I've said has been reflected
in the Hegelian Dialectic, but I part from him and the other synthesizers
because I'm very leery of "unity of opposites."  Opposites and antitheses
are far too neat and clean for me.  I agree that the reality we perceive
is a vector, poking out at strange angles and difficult to generalize
or characterize.
    So I'll clarify my position to add that What is and What can be
conceived are *not* opposites, poles, or antitheses.  I think that the
antithesis of What is, is What is not; and that the antithesis of What
can be conceived, is What can not be conceived.  However, I also think
that there is an impenetrable wall between (1) what we think we know, and
(2) what is.  The mind of the subject is not the opposite of the object
it interprets, but they are separated by a vast epistemological gulf.

    There is more room to take all this, but I won't bother responding
to any more of Grossman's posts unless they become organized and answer 
some of my questions.  I stated in the first post that my purpose was to 
learn what objectivism was, and (finally) I have.  I found a quote in the
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology that sums it up pretty well
for me:

Ayn Rand writes...
        Since axiomatic concepts refer to facts of reality and are
        not a matter of "faith" or of a man's arbitrary choice, there
        is a way to ascertain whether a given concept is axiomatic or
        not: one acertains it by observing the fact that an axiomatic
        concept cannot be escaped, that it is implicit in all knowledge,
        that it has to be accepted and used even in the process of any
        attempt to deny it.

This is part of her explanation of "concept stealing," her so-called
fallacy of using reason to negate reason, which she uses to rail against 
nearly every philosopher in the book.  But you certainly can't avoid 
_mentioning_ existence, at least once, if you want to prove it is beyond 
objective comprehension.  I like the way Rand says facts of reality 
"are not a matter of 'faith'," so therefore, we are to understand, if 
you don't believe the facts of reality the way she interprets them, you 
must be stark raving mad.

    There's the rub: a realist will never become an anti-realist, and
vice versa.


Daniel Kranowski
email: daniel@vtserf.cc.vt.edu
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta