From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Dualism
Date: 13 Oct 92 20:25:51 GMT
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

In article <Bw1B2J.IuC@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7670@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Sep18.172123.14367@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>
>>>Either you are talking about a different net, or your interpretation of
>>>people's statements is very different from mine.  I see relatively few
>>>people who claim that TT is all we should count as evidence, or who
>>>claim that functional organization does not matter. 
>>
>>Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization 
>>(or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
>>anti-Searle side says they agree? 
>
>This is silly.  You've said this a number of times now, and it's
>just wrong. 

Well, I've made that sort of point about "how it works" in
disagreements with a number of people over the years (going back
before I rejoined the discussion in 91-92), and I can't remember
many who have replied with "I agree" or "that's right".  Of course, 
it may be that they -- or some other people -- do in fact agree, 
but how can I tell?

> As far as I can tell, most of the most sophisticated
>defenders of the "strong AI" positions on the net don't put any
>special weight on the Turing Test or behavior; rather, it's the
>organization of internal causation that counts.  Certainly I have
>disavowed the Turing Test a number of times, as has Drew McDermott.

You've got a total of two people here!  Indeed, I remembered you
and McDermott and was taking both of you into account.

On the other hand, I didn't have in mind only "sophisticated"
defenders of AI.  Why should I?  My point was about the net, 
or rather (I suppose) about those who post to certain newsgroups.

But the views I'm complaining about are in fact widespread.
Why just the other day I read someone comparing your views to
vitalism and arguing against vitalism (and by implication you)
on the verificationist grounds that there were no consequences. 
And even someone like Steven Harnad, who thinks the Chinese Room
works against the TT, and who must surely count as sophisticated,
will argue in favor of the TT as follows (from Comp.ai.philosophy
and SIGART):

  So if the pen-pal TT is enough to allow us to correctly infer that a
  real person has a mind, then it must by the same token be enough to
  allow us to make the same inference about a computer,

>The only sophisticated defender of strong AI who I've seen defend
>the behaviorist position is Daryl McCullough, but at least he does
>it in a sophisticated way.  Certainly there are some people who
>have a knee-jerk TT response, but you don't need to pay attention
>to everybody out there.

There's a certain, precisely identified, position that only he
defends.  True.  But I already addressed this point.  There are
a number of people who have similar views or views related in
certain ways.  They don't, of course, have absolutely identical
views.  

>Opponents of strong AI tend for some reason to assume that the
>Turing Test is at the logical foundation of the strong AI
>position, and fixate upon it.  This is simply not the case.

That isn't something I assume, or even conclude.  Sure, it would
simplify things if I were ignorant of AI or (as someone implied
a short while back) of computing.  But it happens not to be
the case.

-- jd