HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: silbrmnd@acf3.nyu.edu (Darkmage)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Date: 25 Dec 92 04:46:40 GMT
Organization: New York University

orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:

>In article <1992Dec22.211814.5623@u.washington.edu> forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:
>>I hope there is no question in anyone's mind but that there exists
>>HLTs that will pass the Turing Test.

>I still have doubts, perhaps because I did not participate in the
>great HLT debate when it last swelled in this newsgroup.  In fact
>your posting exposes serious flaws in the idea of a lookup table
>passing the TT, if "passing the TT" is interpreted to mean, "can
>pass repeatedly under a variety of circumstances": different times,
>different locations, different interrogators.

If we assume that all these tests that the HLT is meant to pass in
order to pass the TT are operating under similiar time constraints,
I don't think it's that hard to imagine that somewhere there exists
a RHLT (*REALLY* humongous look-up table  :) capable of repeatably 
passing the Turing Test. 

>	Can someone explain how table lookup can account for context?
>I'm sure this was all hashed :-) over before...

I missed the official descriptions of the HLT, but I'm assuming that
conditional entries are allowed?  
  
   HLT, entry 54128145:
   Q: What time do you think it is in Seattle right now?
   A: Uh...  I think it's around {TIME_NOW - 5 HOUR /Hour Only} -ish.

I'm a newbie here, tho, so feel free to vehemently disagree w/ me.. :)

	            -Dvora Silberman

---
(.sig is currently out of order...)
silbrmnd@acf3.nyu.edu
des0699@acf.nyu.edu
From: ssrzakar@csres.cs.reading.ac.uk (M. S. Zakaria)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Subjective evaluation
Date: 23 Dec 92 12:49:36 GMT
Organization: University of Reading


I am interested in modelling subjective evaluations - eg how does one place
a value on a work of art; why does one purchase a particular brand of
product over another brand of a similar(or same) product - Why do these values
differ between individuals ? 

Any references on this subject would be most appreciated.


m.zakaria@uk.ac.reading
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 07:54:15 GMT


In article <1992Dec28.144030.23113@cs.wm.edu> ,
amdavi@cs.wm.edu (Alexander M. Davis) writes:

>It seems that the usage of phrases along the lines of "the soup  becomes
>part of me [at time x under certain circumstances]" would  entail loss of
>that identity under different circumstances. That is,  would one be
>willing to assert that "At time x, had the soup not been  introduced in
>such circumstance and therefore not become part of me, I  would not be
>'me' since in another circumstance I define 'me' as  having some part
>integral with this soup."? It all seems to depend on  the conceptual basis
>of identity: biological entity, behavioral  response network, etc. For AI
>purposes any one of these models could  be posited. Which is/are being
>asserted in this discussion? 

I plead guilty to bringing soup into the discussion, with no clear purpose
other than to explore the ramifications of Chris Malcolm's idea that
entity/environment lines can be drawn around "ownership".

My involvement in this thread started when I read Mark Rosenfelder's
comments to the effect that the entity/environment boundary should be drawn
along contours of minimum information exchange.

It seems to me there can be many shells within a functional definition of
entity across which information exchange might be minimized, so I
challenged Mark's criteria by bringing up human entities and tools, and
suggesting an extreme example of a functional definition of entity where
the boundary might be drawn along contours of maximum information exchange.

This was the point where Chris suggested the ownership criteria and I
brought in the soup.

My current view as (ramblingly) posited in <BzyK19.2B5@iat.holonet.net>
is that the entity should be defined as a core of tool operating
capability, and interchangeable tools should be thought of as sort of a
physical interface between the entity and environment.

When Mark returns from vacation, he'll probably have some counter-arguments
that will take the thread back to the issue of "grounding".

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |
From: connolly@livy.cs.umass.edu (Christopher Ian Connolly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Complexity Required for intelligence
Date: 22 Dec 92 01:26:56 GMT
Reply-To: connolly@livy.cs.umass.edu (Christopher Ian Connolly)
Organization: University of Massachusetts, Amherst


In article <BzJKxs.1L9@iat.holonet.net>, ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

|> A first pass at digital modeling of emotions would involve the concept of
|> potential fields (see article <BzHnKs.8Bs@iat.holonet.net> subject: The
|> Complexity Required for intelligence).
|> 
|> Generally an emotional state will involve the potential for interaction
|> with another entity.  Thus we must consider not only the potential for
|> change of our own position, but the change of position of the other entity
|> as well.  ...

What you describe seems related to a paper which will appear sometime next
year in Biological Cybernetics.  It describes a "potential field" theory for
the operation of the striatum, specifically with regard to motor control, but
since the caudate nucleus and putamen have such similar structure, it is
probably applicable to things like saccades, sequencing tasks, and emotional
state changes:

Connolly CI, Burns JB, A model for the functioning of the striatum.

Your "go juice" could be inhibition of tonic cholinergic activity in the striatum.
The "stop juice" is a bit more complicated.  Not an exact fit to what you're saying,
but you might be interested (or at least amused) to flip through it.

						-CC


Christopher Ian Connolly			connolly@cs.umass.edu
Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics		wa2ifi
University of Massachusetts at Amherst		Amherst, MA 01003
From: connolly@piglet.cs.umass.edu (Christopher Ian Connolly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Posting in Triplicate (was Re: The Complexity Required for intelligence)
Date: 23 Dec 92 00:28:11 GMT
Organization: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

In three articles connolly@livy.cs.umass.edu (Christopher Ian Connolly) writes:
the same damn thing.

Sorry for the triple posting - I screwed up on this end.



-- 
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Christopher Ian Connolly			connolly@cs.umass.edu
Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics		wa2ifi
University of Massachusetts at Amherst		Amherst, MA 01003
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 22:34:48 GMT

In article <C052B5.95t@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>In article <BzLCx1.JF5@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
>>Oh, THAT "Systems Reply".  Searle discusses it briefly in the Scientific
>>American article, but I don't see how that relates to the entity
>>environment boundary.  
>
>Neither does Searle, and that's precisely the problem.  Searle never seems
>to question the notion that you can determine whether understanding occurs
>in the Chinese Room by asking if the man in the room understands Chinese.
>The corollary of his position would be that if a Turing Test-passing AI
>*were* intelligent, the intelligence must lie in the *CPU*.  The Systems 
>Reply more sensibly draws the entity boundary around the computer/algorithm
>combination (and emphasizes the need to think more carefully about what 
>systems exhibit what cognitive properties).

There are two more serious problems with all this.

1).  The notion of "understanding" is itself defective if we try to
define "A understands X".  Read Chapter 30 of The Society of Mind.
A major point is that this is relative to someone's judgment, so one
really should be discussing "O agrees (thinks, believes, assumes) that
A understands (in some sense proposed by O) X.  So Joe may think Jack
understands Physics, whereas Gell-Man thinks Jack understands nothing
about it.

See also my "Reply to Searle" in that old Brain and Behavior
collection of reviews of Searle.

2) the notion of "boundary" should also be relative to some observer
with some purpose (disposition, etc).  Read Dawkins' The Extended
Phenotype for many examples of where it is bad to draw a boundary
around a particular cell, organ, or individual organism's body.  See
his discussion of Beaver-caused lakes, for example.
From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: causal powers
Date: 22 Dec 92 02:42:17 GMT

:: From: throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
:: Message-ID: <724658704@sheol.UUCP>
:: ...the difference between simulation and emulation...
:: ... is one of effect-domain. 
 
: From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
: Message-ID: <BzLBGu.J5J@iat.holonet.net>
: I'm not sure I agree with this entirely.  The effect domain of a good
: computer simulation (in the sense normally used) could be altered simply by
: changing or extending the I/O peripherals.  

Soit'ny.  A computer supplied with suitable prosthetic devices
becomes a robot, and its effect domain changes.  Just as a human
supplied with a binocular microscope and micromanipulators becomes
capable of microsurgery, because its effect domain changes.

(Of course, the two examples are unakin in some important ways,
but in the basic way having to do with "grounding", I think they
are very much akin.)

:: Of course, my point of view still leaves fuzzy areas, such as 
:: whether SHRDLU-like entities simulate or emulate. 
: If we stick to something like the traditional definition of simulate (to
: imitate by taking on an appearance) and emulate (to strive to equal or
: exceed),  I think SHRDLU could be said to emulate a robot's computational
: ability, while simulating sensory sources and motor effects.

Well, I'm really thinking of "emulate" and "simulate" in very
jargon-like ways, rather than in the dictonary meaning, but the end
result isn't much different than what Ken outlines above.  For example,
I'd say that SHRDLU simulates playing with blocks, just as a
microsurgeon might simulate microsurgery with oversized models, and if
provided with adequate prosthesis, would be "statically grounded" in
dealing with blocks, just as the microsurgeon would plausibly be
"statically grounded". 


Of course, somewhere between eyeglasses, as we pass by implanted lenses,
replaced retinas, and eventually end up with a complete replacement for
the visual cortext, or even the whole brain, we've gone from a
prosthetic device to an android brain.  But IMHO, a SHRDLU-like
AI-on-a-computer with experience in only a simulated world is nowhere
near any real region of fuzziness, and if it were provided with
prosthetics that allowed it to interact with our world, they would BE
essentially prosthetics, not a central part of the entity. 
--
Wayne Throop  ...!mcnc!dg-rtp!sheol!throopw
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
Date: Sat, 26 Dec 1992 18:43:40 GMT

In article <1hi72pINN5h2@uwm.edu> markh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark) writes:
>In article <1992Dec26.132916.7342@sophia.smith.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
>>	It ceases to be a lookup table if such hooks into the contextual
>>reality are permitted.
>
>The Lookup Table
>Question Context Answer
>Q0       C0      A0,0
>         C1      A0,1
>...
>         Cn      A0,n
>Q1       C0      A1,0
>         C1      A1,1
>...
>         Cn      A1,n
>...
>Any finite function is a de facto lookup table.

	Perhaps then what is needed is a precise delimiting of what
constitutes the input to the entity attempting to pass the TT.  From
your description above, the input would not merely be the questions
posed by the interrogator, but rather would include the context --
time, location, weather, political situation, etc.
From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld)
Subject: Re: Of idiots and fools and tools (was: Re: Searle's World and Computers)
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 15:13:35 GMT

Joke's heart is likely pure as the snow now drifting past my window,
but his attempt to avoid the pains of political incorrectness founders
on a point of ancient-Greek culture: the Athenians and their friends
viewed "idiots" -- i.e., loners -- as bad folk; as anti-community; as
willing disdainers of the core of value.  In short, they viewed them
as egregious; as idiots.
-- 
Michael Feld                  | E-mail: <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy           | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba        | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: tomh@cybernet.cse.fau.edu (Tom Holroyd)
Subject: Re: Self-Reference and Paradox (was Re: Human intelligence...)
Organization: Cybernet BBS, Boca Raton, Florida
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 05:21:48 GMT

jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas) writes:

> In article <wa1uVB2w165w@cybernet.cse.fau.edu> tomh@cybernet.cse.fau.edu (Tom
> Holroyd) writes:
> > Most phenomena that are mysterious to "classical" (i.e. newtonian)
> > physics are well understood in terms of the pattern and structure
> > forming properties of systems that are far from equilibrium, which
> > includes among other things, us.  When energy flows *through* a
> > system, it can self-organize;  this is in contrast with the closed
> > systems of classical physics.  The universe may or may not be closed,
> > but locally, it is certainly not closed, and most of the physics in
> > Penrose's book doesn't apply.
> 
> In any case, is your statement that the universe is "certainly not closed"  
> meant to imply that energy "flows *through*" the universe from high entropy  
> to low entropy the same way it flows through living creatures?  Where does  
> the energy come in and go out?  I thought the universe _was_ considered  
> closed in this way.

I said "locally, it is certainly not closed," which is true.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Of idiots and fools and tools (was: Re: Searle's World and Computers)
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 12:44:17 GMT


In article <1hmnluINN1g6@fbi-news.Informatik.Uni-Dortmund.DE> ,
heitkoet@lusty.informatik.uni-dortmund.de (Joerg Heitkoetter) writes:

>In article <Bznw6n.KJz@iat.holonet.net>, ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) 
>writes: 
|>  
>|> Taking courses is OK, but not very cost effective.  I would recommend 
>|> reading a few highly technical articles in each field, and then 
>|> spending a lot of time thinking about it and figuring out what it 
>|> really means. 

>Well, I think you're a bit to hard. If you want to know something about 
>Physics, it's useless to get the lates Physica-D and start reading, I 
>would recomment buying Feynman's lectures, as a good staring point. 

Oh yes, I forgot to add one important factor, relevance.  The beauty of
highly technical articles is they get straight to the point.  The criterion
of relevance allows one to select disciplines and topics that have some
potential meaning to an individual life.  Unfortunately this criterion
tends to exclude disciplines and topics that rely too heavily on highly
abstract counter-intuitive notions.

One problem with popularizations and many textbooks, is that along with a
small amount of useful information, you get a large dose of the author's
religion and politics, however thickly disguised.  Another problem is the
universality of the approach, too many topics tend to be introduced which
lack relevance.

>Just look at children, and how they learn...they don't have highly
>technical  knowledge of anything, but a disperse knowledge of broad
>applicability. 
 
>They build up "building blocks" (BBs), and later when growing older they 
>learn how to optimize the recombination of theses building blocks when 
>the abstract period begins (e.g. supervised learning in school). 
 
>Unfortunately when we grow older, the aquisition of such BBs is getting 
>harder and harder...

Am I the only one to see the connection here?

>All I wanted to say is "DON'T GET AN IDIOT SAVANT" (there are too many
>already...) 

???

>BTW: The term "idiot" stems from Greek "idios", which has absolutely 
>no negative timbre. It just means "someone who is alone with himself". 

I find that comforting.

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |


Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: tomh@cybernet.cse.fau.edu (Tom Holroyd)
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Organization: Cybernet BBS, Boca Raton, Florida
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 05:27:31 GMT

ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:

> The point at which the soup becomes part of me is open to debate:
> 
>      when it's in the bowl
>      when it's in the spoon
>      when it's in my mouth
>      when it's in my stomach
>      when it's been digested, and it's molecules intertwine with mine

I suggest (in a functional style):
	When the soup first modifies your behavior.
(E.g. when you spot the soup on the shelf in the market, it's part of you.
Or when you make out the shopping list, and think "I'm going to buy/cook
soup," the soup has already modified your behavior, and is part of you.)

Tom Holroyd
tomh@bambi.ccs.fau.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: colby@oahu.cs.ucla.edu (Kenneth Colby)
Subject: n
Organization: UCLA, Computer Science Department
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 92 17:08:33 GMT


What did Hillis, Minsky, Koch, and Lanier have to say contra
Weizenbaum?
		 ken colby
From: nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Easlon on emotion
Date: 25 Dec 92 19:13:57 GMT
Article-I.D.: casper.BztxFA.DG8
Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town

In <BzJKxs.1L9@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:


How does this:

>I think it's more a case of our emotional state telling us what our mind is
>currently viewing as reality, and this is subject to change with mood.

lead to this:

> but any attempt at emulating consciousness is going to have to
>take emotions into consideration.

There's a hint here of a strange breed of dualism: we being different to our
minds, wherefore we are *informed* about the perception that is carried out by
our minds. Now if this (duality) were to be, then emotions are akin to sieves
that filter parts of our mental perception through to the conscious "I". But
why then is it necessary to emulate this messenger when reproducing consciousness. Why not just focus on emulating the consciouss receptor. Or perhaps have a 
messanger that tells all, not as selective as our emotional states. 

If this apparent dualism is unintended, then your first quoted sentence implies that conscious perception preceeds emotional interference "... our emotional
state telling us what our mind is [*already*] currently viewing as reality ..."
whence the emotional states at play are secondary agents, altogether dispensible
in modelling consciousness.

Neil Horne
Cape Town
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin)
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Organization: TRW Systems Division, Fairfax VA
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 03:14:56 GMT

I must say I'm dubious, doctor. The problem with a look-up table is that
it's a digital model. I can test it in its ability to follow a chaotic
sequence and identify the level at which it discretizes the world. One
thing I'm convinced of is that the human brain maintains an effectively
continuous model of the world. Even the output of neurons is FM
superimposed on a tagging carrier wave, and so is essentially continuous.

Cheers,
-- 
Harry Erwin
Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: markh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Humongous Look-up Table revisited.
Date: 24 Dec 1992 02:18:25 GMT
Organization: Computing Services Division, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
NNTP-Posting-Host: 129.89.7.4

In article <1992Dec22.211814.5623@u.washington.edu> forbis@stein.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:
>I hope there is no question in anyone's mind but that there exists
>HLTs that will pass the Turing Test.

In article <1992Dec23.174604.9946@sophia.smith.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
>I still have doubts...
>... "can pass repeatedly under a variety of circumstances": different times,
>different locations, different interrogators.
>	Can someone explain how table lookup can account for context?
>I'm sure this was all hashed :-) over before...

Code the entire set of all questions and answers that have existed, do
exist, or ever will exist in this universe.  This requires future knowledge,
but nevertheless, the set is finite, so the table is finite.

If you don't like the idea of dealing with the Universe: code the entire
spacetime region causally connected with you during your limited lifetime
(about 100 years).  This is finite, since spacetime is not infinitely
divisible.  But it encapsulates everything that was, is, or ever will be
seen or heard by you.
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon)
Subject: Re: Subjective evaluation
Organization: HoloNet National Internet Access BBS: 510-704-1058/modem
Date: Fri, 25 Dec 1992 00:02:43 GMT


In article <ssrzakar.725114976@reading> ,
ssrzakar@csres.cs.reading.ac.uk (M. S. Zakaria) writes:

>I am interested in modelling subjective evaluations - eg how does one
>place a value on a work of art; why does one purchase a particular brand
>of product over another brand of a similar(or same) product - Why do these
>values differ between individuals ?  
 
>Any references on this subject would be most appreciated. 

Sorry, I don't have any references handy, but ever ready with the opinion
on subjective models, I offer you some of my thinking on the subject.

I think factors affecting selection undergo development over the course of
a lifetime.  Young people will most often make their selections according
to peer pressure or role models.  The main objective is to make a choice
that will be seen as intelligent, or cool, and that depends on the
standards of the group they hang out with or aspire to join.

Once a person has been exposed to varied and conflicting social standards
(different ideas about what is cool or socially responsible), he may stop
giving a damn about what other people think, and start making his decisions
on a more nearly rational basis.  Is this product the best buy for the
money, does this work of art inspire me?

And finally, when life settles down to a boring routine, it's all just a
matter of habit.  I choose this product and admire that art because I
decided a long time ago that's what I like, and I don't see any reason to
change at this late date.

In terms of a model, I would describe the above three phases like so:

(1) As a youth, my main interest is to break away from family habits and
find my own place in the world of adults.  I know where I want to go, and I
know the kinds of appearances I must make to get there.

(2) As a rational adult, I've finally made it.  I'm here, I'm accepted, I
can afford to drop some of the appearances and start doing what makes sense
to me.

(3) As a pillar of the community, I must set the standards.  I have to be
consistent to prove that the choices I've made are the correct choices.  I
can't go zig zagging around just because the world is changing.

Well anyway, there's my two cents worth.

--
Ken Easlon                | "...somebody spoke and I went into a dream..."
ken@holonet.net           |    -Paul McCartney
Pleasantly Unaffiliated   |

Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy