HDTenEightyP/NetNews huggingface dataset:
From: mcs@wet.UUCP (Gil Nardo)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Unix compatible crypt utility needed
Date: 31 Aug 92 17:06:14 GMT
Organization: Wetware Diversions, San Francisco


jmount+@CS.CMU.EDU (John Mount) writes:
[ previous posters' discussing UNIX crypt deleted ]
> 
> No I don't think you understand how crypt works (or have it confused with
> the unix password encryption scheme, which is intended to be one way).  Crypt
> doesn't use DES (see below man page), it is a wimpy Enigma machine.  DES 
> IS invertible (ie. people do decrypt DES messages).
>
[ man page on crypt deleted, except ...] 
> 
> SEE ALSO
>      ed(1), makekey(8)
> 

Crypt DOES use DES through makekey(). The gist of the process goes
something like this:

 1) Pass a seed and user password to makekey() and get
    back a DES'sed password.
 2) Using the new, improved password create the rotor assembly
    for the translational encryption.
 3) Read a plaintext char from stdin and translate through rotor
 4) Spit out cyphertext char to stdout, advance rotor, do 3 till EOD.

To decrypt, the rotor "assembly" is reversed, so you are effectively
using the previous cyphertext as the plaintext in the above process.

[sensing impending doom, our author puts on a cancer causing asbestos suit]
-- 
Gil Nardo                  | mcs@wet.com
Migrant Computing Services | (415)664-1032
1032 Irving Street, #435   |-----------------
San Francisco, 94122       | Supernova = *!
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: aistmain@vntic.msk.su (Dispatcher of AIST-EuroAIST-RELCOM Boris I. Tarakanov)
Subject: NEW CIPHER-SYSTEM
Summary: NEW CIPHER-SYSTEM !
Keywords: NEW CIPHER-SYSTEM
Reply-To: aistmain@vntic.msk.su
Organization: AIST-VNTIC INFORMATION NETWORK
Date: Thu, 03 Sep 92 03:48:01 +0300

              New cipher-system

 1. When the original information is euciphered every bit is
    treaded and redundancy of this information is absent
 2. The amount of variants of eucipher may be so much great,
    for example n=10**91
 3. The quantity of encipher operations for 1 bit are <=22,
    but decipher operations are <= 9 for case n=10**91
 4. Ecodered file is deciphered in turn bit from the end  of
    the text.

    This new cipher-system may be  used  for  protection  of
    information  from   unauthorized  access  and  for  data
    communications by communication chanels.

    Relation by electronic mail.
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Wordperfect file-locking (faq?)
Keywords: WordPerfect, encryption
Date: 3 Sep 92 15:30:51 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering

In article <adamsd.715442992@crash> adamsd@crash.cts.com (Adams Douglas) writes:
>[...] Wordperfect 5.1 is easily broken.

Yup.

> Is this something that can be fixed or guarded against 
>(without actually doing something outside the program)?

Nope -- not without massive re-code.

>Why is it so easily crackable?  Were they just lazy, or what?

If not lazy, they were like other beginners in crypto.  Everybody seems to
go through the same learning curve.  At each stage, you're convinced that
your algorithm is so complex no one will be able to crack it.  Once someone
does, it's back to the drawing board.  This is why it's strongly
recommended that a person break several cryptosystems before attempting to
design one of his/her own.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Secure network: what form?
Organization: The Ohio State University Department of Computer and Information Science
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 18:37:00 GMT

I presume we all agree that we should move towards some form of secure
email and some means of exchanging public keys.  There are a number of
other cryptographic services we could ask for.  I presume we do NOT all
agree on exactly what form they should take.

How do you think we should take advantage of cryptography in the next
generation network?  What tools would you use?  What organization?  Is
there anything you want particularly to avoid?  I think it's important
for us to develop a more accurate vision of what it is that we want.
Otherwise, how will people know what to implement for us?

A laundry list of the stuff I think would be useful:

   Basic tools: RSA, DES, MD5
   Basic services:  secure mail, digital signatures, key distribution
   Additional services: untraceable mail, anonymous mail/posting,
       untraceable electronic cash, electronic contracts with legal standing,
       secure posting of announcements that are guaranteed to be seen by 
       either everyone or no one, cryptographic voting

I think it's also important that workstations become more secure, via
digital fingerprinting of files on disk and better encapsulation and
division between trusted and non-trusted software.

What is your vision of what we should be striving for?


[ Marc Ringuette | Cranberry Melon University, Cucumber Science Department  ]
[ mnr@cs.cmu.edu | 412-268-3728 |      ".surivorter erutangis a ma I"       ]
[ ripem public key:                                                         ]
[   MFkwCgYEVQgBAQICAgADSwAwSAJBALu5OFJmAZ4hhNMBXyA5YeMBQFZhbXJ7yapG        ]
[   VkAqMMGmyAx2k2A7EfLgwu9NRqDYCyTdwDXU5lvPLG7o36Lnw6UCAwEAAQ==            ]
[ ripem is unix-based, using RSA and a PEM-like format; send mail for info. ]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: schow@bqneh3.bnr.ca (Stanley T.H. Chow)
Subject: Re: Secure netnews
Organization: Bell Northern Research Ltd, Ottawa
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 18:30:18 GMT

In article <1992Aug27.131849.13130@sniap.mchp.sni.de> frank@D012S436.sniap.mchp.sni.de () writes:
>wrong.  islands of trust already exist, it's a matter of 
>building bridges between them.  
>
>my site knows me well.  Your site knows you.

Wrong. You know your site well. Your site has no knowledge of anything.
The administrator of your site probably does not know you well. There
are certainly many people who does not trust their site because they
know their site (and/or administrator) well.

>Therefore your site can certify (sign) your public key.  Mine can
>certify mine.  All that is required now is for our sites to cross 
>certify each other's keys.  

Even if you trust your site, and I believe that you trust your site
and you believe that I trust my site; you have merely moved the
problem to estrablishing trust between my site and your site.
In what way is this problem easier than establishing trust between
you and I?
--
Stanley Chow            InterNet: schow@BNR.CA
Bell Northern Research  UUCP:     ..!uunet!bnrgate!bqneh3!schow
(613) 763-2831
Me? Represent other people? Don't make them laugh so hard.
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.security.misc
From: naran@fraser.sfu.ca (Travers Naran)
Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 16:52:54 GMT

gjb@fig.citib.com (Greg Brail) writes:
>Universal Pictures will soon release (at least in the U.S.) a movie called
>"Sneakers" that purports to be an action/adventure starring a group of
>free-lance computer security consultants. The plot centers around a
>cryptographic device. For whatever reason, I bought the book (actually
>the "novel based on the screenplay"). It was already at a Barnes and Noble
>Sale Annex in Manhattan, which might indicate how well it's selling.

Hey, but the movie looks like a good one! Just remember to only watch the
characters and ignore the technical details like in "Wargames" and half-a-dozen
other 'hacker' movies.

>But let's assume someone does figure out how to trivially factor very
>large numbers. I understand that would defeat RSA. Am I correct? How about
>DES? Are other common government and commercial cryptosystems based on
>large primes? I assume that one-time pads would still be quite effective.

DES is a seperate system that doesn't rely on Factoring large numbers or large
primes (or at least that's what a friend of mine, an expert on this stuff he
claims, told me). One-time pads are so effective that according to Tom Clancy
(can he really be telling the truth?) that they have converted to using Digital
tapes that contain the 'pad'. Any tampering with the seal means all pads of
that line are destroyed. Anyways, one-time pads are really effective in short
messages and are reasonably secure on larger documents.

>And how about this "Russian codes are different" stuff? Any truth to this?
>I understand one can buy source code for DES and RSA on the streets of
>Leningrad (according to Communications of the ACM).

Russian Codes still use one-time pads. See the above paragraph.
-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travers Naran						| "We fear
Mail address: naran@fraser.sfu.ca or naran@sfu.ca       |  change. WHACK!
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada	| WHACK! WHACK!"
Cmpt. Science student wanna-be				| -Garth 
Trekker, Leaper, Red Dwarf'er, Prober, etc.		|  "Wayne's World"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal)
Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 20:44:06 GMT
Distribution: usa
Reply-To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
Organization: Could I Ask

In article <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>, copper@WATSON.IBM.COM ("Don Coppersmith") writes:
|> 
|> > There's no point in using any more key bits, because differential 
|> > cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in 2**47 operations whatever 
|> > the key length.
|> 
|> The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
|> not just that many operations.  Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
|> the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
|> that many operations on your own machine.

Sure. But I think they suggested the method of "converting" chosen
plaintext message attack inot *known* plaintext attack, with about
2**49 known plaintexts required...  They assume, that if  you have
sufficient amount of *known* plaintexts -  you'd be able to choose
from it...   Comments?  

[BTW, I can't recall the exact amount of messages needed, sorry.]
--
Regards,
Uri.		uri@watson.ibm.com
------------
<Disclaimer>
From: marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault)
Reply-To: marc@tanda.isis.org
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: User authentication
Date: Tue, 01 Sep 92 11:07:06 EDT
Distribution: na
Organization: Thibault & Friends

In article <1992Aug31.135512.16204@sniap.mchp.sni.de> 
() writes: 
           ...
> 
> What I'm trying to show you is that you will need some 
> proof that I represent IBM (I don't :-)  *before* you will 
> accept my key and set up my/our "RSA account".  The

        Not at all -- many banks provide anonomous accounts. The only
        requirement is a secure authentication mechanism that shows
        whoever is withdrawing funds is the person who opened the
        account in the first place. The usual is a number signed in
        longhand, related to, but not the same as the 'account
        number'.

> original poster was saying that unidentified keys
> are acceptable for groups - they're not, though they
> may be alright for anonymous posting type applications.

    No bank will give you money just because you belong to a depositor
    organisation. You have to be designated and they must have your
    signature on file. If they have your signature, they won't give a
    tinker's dam for your "true identity". This is functionally
    indistinguishable from having the private key to match the public
    key provided by whoever opened the account.

    You may not have noticed the last time you opened an account, but
    I'll bet no one asked you for any proof of identity.

        ,Marc

---
 Marc Thibault        |                              |  Any Warming,
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  Oxford Mills, Ontario       |  Global or otherwise,
 CIS:71441,2226       |     Canada                   |   appreciated.

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
From: wcs@cbnewsh.cb.att.com (Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 erebus.att.com!wcs)
Subject: Re: GCHQ's location. No big secret!
Organization: AT&T Bell Labs Random ReOrganization Generator
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1992 22:53:48 GMT

In article <1992Aug31.105853.17069@cas.org> jac54@cas.org () writes:
]	This pales in comparison to that legendary statement in
]	the "Spycatcher" trial when the U.K. attorney-general admitted
]	that although Sir Martin Hollis hade been head of MI6 "it did
]	not mean that the organization existed before he was director-
]	general or that it existed after he retired from the position."
]	(I paraphrase).

I forget if it's the same scandal or a similar one, but in about 1986 a
British politican was quoted as saying that his organization hadn't been lying,
but "we were being economical with the truth" :-)

-- 

				Pray for peace;      Bill
#Bill Stewart 908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs 4M312 Holmdel NJ
# Any technology distinguishable from magic is not sufficiently advanced ...
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: petry@pythagoras.math.washington.edu (David Petry)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: Synchonizing watches
Date: 4 Sep 92 19:24:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: u.1992Sep4.192408.24860
Distribution: usa
Organization: University of Washington, Mathematics, Seattle

In article <1992Sep3.172632.10776@hubcap.clemson.edu> fpst@hubcap.clemson.edu (Steve Stevenson) writes:

>I posted this problem to my news group, comp.parallel. Here are two
>solutions I've received.  ...

>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>- A Solution -
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Let the local time of A be tA, and the local time of B be tB.
>Further, let tAB be the lag between messages going from A to B,
>and let tBA be the symmetric value. Since both time pieces
>are presumable ticking at the same rate, let tB = tA + C for some
>constant C. If we can determine C, then they can synchronize their
>watches.
>
>1) A asks B the time. As s/he does, s/he notes how long it
>   takes to hear the response from B. If B answers promptly, 
>   A will now know 3 things:
>      (tA)                 (local time)
>      (tAB + tBA)          (total delay)
>      (tA + C + tAB)       (time told to A by B)

TRUE

>2) A subtracts the last value from the first two:
>      (tA) + (tAB + tBA) - (tA + C + tAB) = (tBA - C)

TRUE

>3) B now asks A the time. A hears the request at time
>   tA', notes this time and responds. B now knows:
>      (tA' + tBA)          (time told to B by A)

NO.  A tells B  tA' only, not tA' + tBA.

The  synchroniztation problem can not be solved.  It's easy to see that A and 
B can synchronize their watches in the sense that whenever A sends a message,
A will know what time B will think it is when B receives the message, and
for every message A receives, A will know what time B thought it was when
B sent it, and vice-versa, but  that's as close as they can come to having
synchronized watches.

They can NOT synchronize their watches in the sense that a third person who
is in instant communication with each of them will see that A's watch and
B's watch read the same.



David Petry
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: ZFC+~Con(ZFC)
Date: 26 Aug 92 11:44:15 GMT
Originator: jrk@sperwer.cwi.nl

In article <1992Aug20.171630.18667@ariel.ec.usf.edu> Gregory McColm,
mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. writes:
>The standard (ie, wellfounded) models all satisfy Con(ZFC)

Can someone clarify for me the term "standard model"?  Is this a concept
with a formal definition, or is a "standard model" of a theory, simply a
model which satisfies the intuitions which inspired the axioms of the
theory?

--
Richard Kennaway     SYS, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk               uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk
From: naturman@uctvax.uct.ac.za
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Modal logic
Date: 28 Aug 92 11:40:05 +0200
Keywords: modal logic
Organization: University of Cape Town

Does anyone know if the modal logic with the following axioms has been
investigated ever?

p(A & B) <=> (pA & pB)
ppA => A v pA

and with deduction rule
from A infer nA

where p is the possibilty operator and n is the necessity operator.
From: gemenis@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE (Theodor Gemenis)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Logics for empirical science.
Keywords: logic, knowledge.
Date: 31 Aug 92 14:22:17 GMT
Organization: Technische Universitaet Muenchen, Germany
Originator: gemenis@sunjessen9.informatik.tu-muenchen.de



I am interested in logics appropriate for empirical science 
(or logics for knowledge), that is logics for axiomatize theories 
such as newtonian mechanics, electrodynamics, etc. theories also 
beyond mathematics. 
I know the work of R. Carnap, P. Suppes, J. Sneed on this field 
and the work of N. Nilsson in AI (logic for knowledge representation).

I would be thankful for any indication concerning recent work
in this domain. Information on implemented systems for such logics 
is also from interest to me.

Thanks in advance,

Theodor Yemenis
-- 


_______________________________________________________________________________
 Theodor Yemenis           	       	 Forschungsgruppe KI - Intellektik
 Institut f"ur Informatik		 Lehrstuhl fuer Rechnerarchitektur
 Technische Universit"at M"unchen
 Augustenstr. 46               	      		Tel.: +49-89/521099
 D-8000 M"unchen 2			       	Fax.: +49-89/526502
 	                              Email:gemenis@informatik.tu-muenchen.de
_______________________________________________________________________________
From: cxm7@po.CWRU.Edu (Colin Mclarty)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: ZFC+~Con(ZFC)
Date: 27 Aug 92 15:46:27 GMT
Article-I.D.: usenet.1992Aug27.154627.3228
Reply-To: cxm7@po.CWRU.Edu (Colin Mclarty)
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA)


In a previous article, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) says:

>In article <1992Aug20.171630.18667@ariel.ec.usf.edu> Gregory McColm,
>mccolm@darwin.math.usf.edu. writes:
>>The standard (ie, wellfounded) models all satisfy Con(ZFC)
>
>Can someone clarify for me the term "standard model"?  Is this a concept
>with a formal definition, or is a "standard model" of a theory, simply a
>model which satisfies the intuitions which inspired the axioms of the
>theory?
>
>--
>Richard Kennaway     SYS, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk               uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk
>

	I do not know what all "standard" might mean, but in a lot of
contexts including this one it means "not non-standard" where "non-
standard" is used as in "non-standard analysis".  In short, a model is
"standard" in this sense if all the sets it takes to be finite are
actually finite.

	If a model is standard in this sense then all the sets it takes 
as codes for proofs of ZF actually are such codes, and so there is no set
taken as coding a proof ofa contradiction, so the model satisfies Con(ZF).
Of course all of this assumes there are models in the first place, so ZF
is consistent.  As a previous poster said, models of ZF+not-Con(ZF) are
just models that recognize some sets as codes for proofs of contradictions.
But what these sets code are not really finite proofs--i.e. are not
proofs at all.


 
Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Date: Wed,  2 Sep 1992 17:25:00 -0400 
From: Leslie Burkholder <lb0q+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: infinite state automaton

Suppose we allow an automaton to have an infinite rather than a finite
number of states. Is that (equivalent to) a Turing machine? References,
please.
Thanks,
Leslie Burkholder
From: dougs@tvnews.tv.tek.com (Doug Stevens)
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Synchonizing watches
Date: 1 Sep 92 23:44:52 GMT
Article-I.D.: tvnews.1992Sep1.234452.26917
Distribution: usa
Organization: Tektronix TV Measurement Systems, Beaverton, OR

------
I hope that I have the correct newsgroup. I'm looking for a solution to the
following puzzle, or proof that it cannot be solved:

A and B are two people at two ends of a very slow telephone connection. 
They are both completely cut off from the world except for their connection 
with each other.  In particular, they have no idea what time it is in the 
real world.

There is a delay AB in the transmission of what is being said by
A to B, and a delay BA in the transmission of what is being said
by B to A. The delay AB does not equal the delay BA. The delays, for the
purpose of this problem, are on the order of minutes in each direction.

Both A and B have watches. Before they begin to talk, the watches are not
set to the correct time, nor are they set to the same time.

The problem is to devise a procedure such that A and B can, via their 
telephone connection only, accurately synchronize their watches (to
within a few seconds). The watches do not have to reflect time in the
real world, but must match each other. Both A and B will know the procedure 
before the call begins, and each will know whether he is A or B.

Thanks for any help.
Newsgroups: sci.logic
From: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Logics for empirical science.
Originator: sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1992 15:45:49 GMT
Organization: SAS Institute Inc.
Keywords: logic, knowledge.


In article <1992Aug31.142217.14509@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE>, gemenis@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE (Theodor Gemenis) writes:
|> 
|> 
|> I am interested in logics appropriate for empirical science 
|> (or logics for knowledge), that is logics for axiomatize theories 
|> such as newtonian mechanics, electrodynamics, etc. theories also 
|> beyond mathematics. 
|> I know the work of R. Carnap, P. Suppes, J. Sneed on this field 
|> and the work of N. Nilsson in AI (logic for knowledge representation).
|> 
|> I would be thankful for any indication concerning recent work
|> in this domain. Information on implemented systems for such logics 
|> is also from interest to me.


Your phrases "logics appropriate for empirical science", "logics
for knowledge", and "logics [to] axiomatize theories ..." would
seem to cover pretty diverse ground and do not, to my mind,
necessarily share a meaning.

I haven't played with this stuff for a long time.  In addition to
the names you mention, the other one that comes to mind is Richard
Montague.  See, for example, "Deterministic Theories" in _Formal_
Philosophy_ (Yale University Press, 1974).  (His stuff may be dealt
with by Sneed, but memory fails me.)  I believe that Clark Glymour
(still at Pitt?) was drifting in this area (perhaps in conjunction
with the Pitt CS or AI departments).  You might contact Henry
Kyburg (kyburg@cs.rochester.edu) who is spending virtually all of
his time in the Cog. Sci. program there now instead of in philosophy.
He has been doing a lot of stuff in the area of non-deductive methods
in AI.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm