From: Daniel Shoham <shoham@ll.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: The German V-2 Rocket
Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 1992 14:30:31 GMT


From Daniel Shoham <shoham@ll.mit.edu>

In article <BuBLLC.GB3@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> rlwst8+@pitt.edu (Robert L Williamson) writes:
>
>From rlwst8+@pitt.edu (Robert L Williamson)
>
>
>I have read a lot of articles about the V-2 rocket.  Wow!  I can't believe 
>those Germans could acquire space age technology.  I read articles about the
>mass destruction it did to London.  Why didn't the Germans just concentrate 
>all of their production efforts to building the V-2 and attacking London as
>opposed to even getting involved with a situation like the Battle of Britain.
>
>
>				Rob  
>

Not so fast. The V-2 did not do THAT much damage. 

Nazi Germany use of V-2s toward the end of World War II (9/44-5/45) introduced
the tactical ballistic missile. At this stage of the war, the remnants of the
Luftwaffe, the German air force, would have had difficulties penetrating
allied air defenses, and were needed on the continental fronts anyway. Together
with over 17,000 V-1 cruise missiles 3,500 V-2s are estimated to have killed
12,000 civilians, mostly in England. The allies responded to the V-2 challange
with a massive air strikes against research, production, and launch sites.
However, V-2s continued to rain on England until the launch areas were
physically occupied by allied ground forces.

The concept of the V-2 was born, not as a weapon for bombarding cities but as
a field missile with a radius of action (275km) exceeding that of long range
artillery. The final product, however, cannot properly be a called a tactical
weapon, since it has no bearing on battlefield engagement. Nor can it seriously
be called strategic, since the inaccurate delivery of its 1000 kg explosive
warhead cannot cause serious and systematic damage to vital installations. In
fact, one might argue that the V-2 has no military justification. The V-2s
_raison d'etre_ was as a psychological or terror weapon. Its very name -
Vergeltungswaffe (retaliation weapon) number two - bears its psychological
motivation. Still, one might be surprised that a nation losing a total war
would engage in the "luxury" of expensive psychological weapons. Even more
surprising is the considerable allied air effort to counter the V-2s. Even a
year before the first V-2 landed in London, in just one attack, 645 aircraft
were launched against the Peenemunde Rocket Establishment. One might expect
Blitz (bombers) hardened Londoners not to be impressed by the weaker firepower
of the V-2s. In light of the allied response, the V-2 may have proved
militarily usefull after all. German use of mobile launchers and extensive
reliance on natural tree cover made allied counter-V-2 air operations difficult.

The enormous expense spent on V-2 rockets and on counter-V-2 operations can
only be explained if the damage the rockets did was far more significant to
the war effort than the objective physical damage, or at least so it was
believed.

After WWII, the major powers quickly acquired ballistic missiles and then
equipped them with nuclear warheads making them into true strategic weapons.
However, since no war broke out between the major powers (perhaps thanks to
such weapons), ballistic weapons did not see any action until acquired by
third world nations. Lacking nuclear weapons, the situation reverted back to
that of the V-2 days. In fact the most popular tactical ballistic missile in
the third world, the soviet designed Scud-B is almost identical to the V-2 in
range (300 km vs 275), warhead (1000kg), guidance (simplified inertial), and
overall design. (In fact, it is believed that captured German engineers from
Peenemunde - in East Germany - were forced to design the Scud).


Sources:
W. S. Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World
K. Gatland, Missiles and Rockets
The Random House Dictionary

Dan Shoham
shoham@ll.mit.edu

The opinions above are not necessarily those of my employer, etc.

Newsgroups: sci.military