From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: Dualism
Organization: Boise State University
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 15:13:38 GMT

In article <1992Sep25.194311.138446@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>In article <Bv4B8r.FG9@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>>In article <1992Sep23.204615.86150@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>>I would make a slightly different statement here, but one I think is
>>>significant: "Consciousness *is* the physical facts".  "Is entailed by"
>>>still suggests that consciousness itself is an epiphenomenon.
>>
>>Not really.  Entailment is a logical relation, not a nomic one,
>>so that if a set of B-facts are entailed by a set of A-facts,
>>they're certainly not "further" facts in the relevant sense.  For
>>instance, the fact that I am alive, or the fact that I am six feet
>>tall, are entailed by the physical facts about me, and that
>>doesn't make them epiphenomena.
>
>My use of the word "suggests" rather than "implies" was significant.
>"Consciousness is entailed by the physical facts" is an accurate statement
>of the position (IMO), but I think it misleads.  Since the argument
>against is basically that the position is implausible, I think this is
>significant.
>
>>>If I *am* a (particular) physical system, then my experiences are part of
>>>the workings of that system as it interacts with its environment.  This
>>>seems to me to answer (in a general way) the question of why I
>>>*experience* things (qualia).  To me, the argument: "the physical
>>>events which can be shown to correspond to my consciousness don't explain
>>>why I *feel* things" amounts to "I am not a physical system, so my
>>>consciousness does not have a physical explanation".
>>
>>Whether "I" am wholly a physical system is precisely the question
>>at issue, so it can't be used as a premise in seeing whether
>>there is a physical explanation of consciousness or not.  I certainly
>>haven't used the denial of this as a premise in arguments against a
>>physical explanation of consciousness; the logic is precisely the
>>other way around.  You show me a *good* physical explanation of
>>consciousness, and I'll accept physicalism.  Right now, I don't
>>have a ghost of a clue what such an explanation would come to,
>>and neither, it seems to me, does anybody else.
>
>What I am asserting is that you are looking for (insisting on) the wrong
>kind of explanation of consciousness, and that the reason you are looking
>for this kind of explanation is that you refuse to take seriously the idea
>that you are a physical system.  If you really accept this, then an
>explanation in the form "these aspects of the system are your
>consciousness; when it gets these kinds of inputs, it reacts in this kind
>of way, which is your qualia" *is* a full explanation of consciousness. I
>don't think it is necessary to *agree* that "you are a physical system" to
>understand this; although for me personally, when I understood this point,
>my last objections to physicalism disappeared.

-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu