Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance face the prospect of their unity being shattered. Even though Europe is a sad sight to behold, there is an opportunity in every crisis, and so we should not be saying that a common European foreign and security policy makes no sense, or that it has failed; rather, we have to redouble our efforts in order that our foreign and security policy may indeed be shared by all of us. Any such policy must be founded on clear analysis, that analysis being that it is Saddam Hussein who is the problem, at the head of a regime of terror founded upon crime, terror and murder. Commissioner, Iraq is in fact a rich country, but its dictator has plundered it. So anyone who sees the USA as the problem is confusing cause and effect. It is the Iraqi dictator who is the problem. (Applause) Our group is of the very decided opinion that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein are a menace to the region and imperil the peace of the world. It is under the UN's aegis that disarmament must take place; it must be peaceful if at all possible, and, if that proves impossible, military means must be employed. Responsibility for whether it happens peacefully or by military force lies solely with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. (Applause) Let us just remind ourselves of the chronology of events. At the heart of disunity within Europe and across the Atlantic is the self-isolation of the Federal Republic of Germany, for which its present Chancellor must bear responsibility. (Applause from the right, heckling) The German Federal Chancellor, by isolating Germany – whatever reasons he may have had for doing so – during a federal election campaign, in which he said, ‘No matter what the UN does, we will never take part in it!’, took the pressure off Saddam Hussein; he acted in an anti-European way, for one needs to speak first to the Europeans before coming out with utterances with such implications at public election rallies. He gave a complete repeat performance in the elections to provincial assemblies, but it brought him no success in terms of votes. We then come to the second chronological element, the Franco-German declaration at the celebrations of the Elysée Treaty. Speaking in terms of political psychology – and I do so for the benefit of our French friends in particular – this gave the false impression of the French position now being identical to the German one. The French were always much more sophisticated, but that was the political impression that was given. Then came the statement by the eight states. I am speaking for our group when I tell you that we regret this way of going about things, which bypasses the Community process, and that we cannot endorse it. In essence, the statement does meet with our approval, however. It was also necessary in order that we might send out a signal of friendship to our American partners. (Applause from the centre and from the right) We are now faced with the question of what is to happen next. I recommend that we give thought to how we understand our relationship with America. If we understand European unity in terms of opposition to the United States of America, then we are building Europe upon sand. Rather than that, we want a partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, a partnership founded on cooperation between equals and on multilateral partnership. There are also, of course, things that we demand of our American partners. We do not think it right that the American administration under President Bush tends to see the USA's relationship with Europe in bilateral terms, in other words, Washington and Paris, Washington and London, Washington and Rome, Washington and Madrid, Washington and Berlin and so on. We have to define the relationship between the USA and Europe in such a way that Europeans can take common action and also in such a way that the European institutions are the American administration's partner in negotiations. (Applause) For if we do not build this partnership of equals with America, that also goes against America's interests, as we now see, as European disunity has consequences for the North Atlantic Alliance. The American administration and President Bush should also recognise the value of European unity, which is also in the interests of the United States of America. If we in Europe were to revert to forming axes as we once did, then both our group and I would consider this a perilous road to go down. Just imagine – and I will not use the word ‘axis’ – that there were to be, as seems at present to be taking shape, something like two common positions, with Paris, Berlin and Moscow on the one side and London, Rome, Madrid and Washington on the other. If Europe were to present itself thus to the world, it would be a nightmarish sight. That is why we have to act within the framework of the Community. All the things we are doing now have to be done on a Community basis. That, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, is why our group supports your decision to call a summit meeting of the Heads of State and of Government. Let me say just a word or two on the subject of Turkey. If our Turkish partners ask us to involve them in planning and to supply them with weapons for their defence, I do not believe that we can refuse such a request, such an entreaty. I hope that we will also achieve a result on this issue. (Applause) My wish for the Presidency of the Council next Monday is for three things to be achieved: a European common position, the bridging of the deep gulf between us and the United States, and the sending of a signal to the Iraqi dictator that he must disarm. It is to be hoped he will be brought to do this by peaceful means and under the guidance of the United Nations! (Loud applause)

Political group: PPE-DE