Mr President, nuclear weapons are the weapons of the Cold War, but in spite of the fact that the Cold War is over, nuclear weapons are still there. Thousands of these weapons are to be found on aircraft, on aircraft carriers and on land, ready for firing, despite the fact that there are no threats to use nuclear weapons. To have nuclear weapons ready for immediate firing is a very dangerous situation, mainly because nuclear weapons can be released by mistake. This has come close to happening on a number of occasions. As recently as 1995, the Russians mistook a Norwegian test rocket for American nuclear weapons and went onto a full-scale war footing in Russia. Mr Yeltsin had to be woken up in the middle of the night but, very fortunately, the mistake was discovered before he decided to fire any nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war by mistake was one of the reasons for the Canberra Commission’s proposal that no nuclear weapons should any longer be held in readiness for firing. This view was promoted in particular by the man formerly responsible for the United States’ strategic nuclear weapons, General Lee Butler, who himself literally had his finger on the nuclear button for many years. He knew how near we had been to unleashing a nuclear war by mistake. The second demand we made in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war was to the effect that all nuclear weapons should be separated from their weapon carriers so that sufficient time might be made for serious political deliberations. These two demands ought to be put into effect immediately. The reasons are that computer errors in nuclear weapons systems precisely at the turn of the millennium can by mistake lead to nuclear war. The early warning systems, which consist of a complex network of satellites, infra-red detectors and horizontal radar rely mainly upon the commercial electricity network. Even if the Pentagon has double-checked millions of computer components, full safety cannot be guaranteed; nor can it be guaranteed in Russia. Because of these serious defects in its early warning system, Russia cannot detect American intercontinental missiles for a period of three hours per day. Nuclear power too relies upon the commercial electricity network in order, for example, to maintain the supply of cooling water and to cool down the radioactive core and the spent nuclear fuel. If only a part of this protective network is knocked out because of computer errors, an estimated 100 metric tons of heavy uranium core in the reactor will melt down within two hours if the two reserve diesel generators do not function. Unfortunately, these reserve diesel generators are only 85 per cent reliable. What must happen now is for the world’s nuclear powers no longer to have their nuclear weapons primed for firing and for them to separate the warheads from the weapon carriers, at least for the period of the turn of the millennium. Great Britain has already taken the decision to do this. Nuclear power stations too must be temporarily closed down or supplied with protective mechanisms at the turn of the millennium. It is this with which the resolution is concerned. A decision no longer to have any nuclear weapons primed for firing and to remove their warheads (that is to say, to separate the nuclear weapons from the weapon carriers) may at the same time be the beginning of serious nuclear disarmament.

Political group: PSE