Mr President, I rise to introduce my report on transatlantic relations. It is a timely debate with the rapidly changing transatlantic relationship today. As many will know, I have always been a strong supporter of closer transatlantic relations. It is logical, in an area of globalisation, for Europe and America to think of a strengthened transatlantic partnership based on shared values and common interests. But logic is not necessarily sufficient. There are real grounds for concern, the traditional transatlantic ties are now weakening, without new bridges being built; increasing numbers feel that NATO may not exist in five years' time; and certainly the NATO-Russia Council, as we see published today, is fundamentally changing our whole security relationship. I would like to examine why this is happening, what the concerns are and what we should do about it. NATO inevitably is changing, no longer is it a defensive organisation against a country which no longer exists. It is becoming more political, more international. After 11 September quite clearly one partner, America, feels that it is a nation under attack. We in Europe do not have that feeling. It gives a much clearer focus on what should be done in military matters. Finally, America perhaps is a country which is certainly not used to, and may not wish to, share sovereignty and multinational institutions, as we have become more used to in Europe. It therefore sees things in a very different light when participating in international institutions, even if it is aware that for market access global rules of governance are needed. What then are the concerns? My report is very clear on this. A number of different concerns have been raised by colleagues, of a political nature: the lack of US participation in the Kyoto Protocol, the biodiversity convention, the Ottawa Convention on land mines and, recently, the refusal to sign the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. Secondly, economic concerns. We have seen two recent instances of American action on steel and now American action to increase agricultural subsidies. In many ways, these show that they are living in a world of their own, detached from reality outside. Finally on foreign policy, where the US seems to wish to continue its ideas for action against Iraq, this is seen by many as not perhaps the best way to deal with that problem. What then should we do? The report I am submitting to the House, together with my colleague, Mrs Mann, shows that we have many good ideas, but we have perhaps not paid sufficient attention to what we should be doing. The key element of the report is that we need to continue to update NATO, update the new transatlantic agenda to develop a sustained and strengthened transatlantic partnership based on a new confidence pact and concept of mutual recognition in which our respective roles can be clearly defined. There are a lot of examples, but I will give a few here to the House. NATO remains not only the fundamental guarantee of Euro-Atlantic stability and security, it is the essential framework for coalition operations. NATO needs to respond to new global challenges, realising the form of political and military structures is shifting from collective defence to collective security. It is essential for adequate defence budgets to be combined with courageous steps towards coordination and greater rationalisation of defence procurement. Modernisation instead of marginalisation of partnership requires the US to open its defence markets and us, in Europe, to coordinate where possible. We need to develop a common and comprehensive definition and concept of security and risks to security. We also need to understand that NATO and the EU need to work closer together, by bringing together the non-military tools at the EU's disposal, combined with the decisive military capabilities available to NATO. We need a reinforced political dialogue. My colleague Mrs Mann will deal with the economic aspects, on which there are several excellent proposals. We need to engage the US in constructive multilateral dialogue and to strengthen parliamentary involvement in this whole dialogue. What does this mean? We have made one or two small steps at the EU-US summit on this positive agenda, but there is one major element missing and that is the strategic view of the long-term destination of this transatlantic partnership on which we have no real ideas. We in this House have always supported a longer-term, deeper transatlantic partnership, that is why we are calling on the Commission to produce a report. Its own communication is lacking in strategic thinking, and we need to make great progress on that issue.

Political group: PPE-DE