Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, Commissioner, the human suffering in Afghanistan has lasted for decades and precludes a cynical approach to these deliberations, although such would be a very tempting option. It must be clear to us that the years since the Soviet invasion saw a country that was poor in any case progressively smashed to pieces, only then for it to tear itself apart in a civil war, before the Taliban finished off what was left. The removal of the Taliban regime has now provided the opportunity for reconstruction. The question arises, however, of to what extent both the military victors and the present government have the authority to achieve real stability and get reconstruction underway. We cannot fail to observe that the stability needed to get real aid efforts to the whole of the country is not in place. Are we not deceiving ourselves when much of the reconstruction work is going on only in Kabul? In Kabul, non-governmental organisations are falling over each other in their efforts to get projects going in that city, the reason being that other locations are too dangerous, and so aid soon becomes concentrated on projects that do not help rebuild the country as a whole. If, though, it proves impossible to stabilise the whole country, we can organise as many conferences of donors and so on as we like, but we will not get business to put its hands in its pocket and come up with private-sector funds for investment. The fact is that private-sector funds for investment are forthcoming only when there is a degree of certainty, founded upon both military security and firm legal policies, that these funds can continue to be put to work and that they will not be lost. I believe this to be a reason why this issue has to be examined in a very critical light, so that we do not end up engaging in the sort of activism that looks good but helps nobody. The country as a whole needs aid to be provided quickly, but it must then be distributed fairly. It seems to me that there is as yet no guarantee, for example, of the Pashtuns, who make up the majority of Afghanistan's population, having a share equal to that of others in political decision-making in Kabul, or in other beneficial things. If they do not, it appears to me that there will be a grave danger of a nascent resistance movement that new warlords could use for their own ends, so that, in spring or summer, new internal conflicts could flare up and make it even more difficult to guarantee the entire region's stability, to attract investment, and organise aid – with the country thus ending up in another vicious circle, and with us in a situation in which we can achieve even less. The fact that soldiers from my own country are working together with others in taking charge of Afghanistan means that I am very aware of the implications when I say that the situation could indeed arise in which these conditions make things far more dangerous for individual soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan than does anything currently being planned in Iraq. This is also a point of view that it is not wise to express openly. Even though it is not politically correct to make this connection, I fear that this is the case or, at least, that the danger is real. Anyone who knows Afghanistan's history will be aware that foreign troops have never felt at home there for long. When I see how even the United States of America can no longer guarantee the safety of its troops, and how they are now starting to set up camps in certain areas into which they can withdraw at night, it reminds me of other examples. It is for this reason that I wish to ask you to join with us in considering these facts in an open debate, in order to bring about real improvements on that basis, rather than merely giving the impression that money is being poured away even while we know it will not solve the problem in the long term. (Applause) IN THE CHAIR: MR PACHECO PEREIRAVice-President

Political group: PPE-DE