Mr President, we all know that euro notes and coins are to be brought into circulation on 1 January of next year. Twelve of the national currencies of the Member States are to disappear and be successively replaced by the new common currency. The names of Mr Kohl and Mr Delors ought to be mentioned in this context. It is odd that not all Member States have yet realised that the internal market cannot be fully efficient in the long term if it is fragmented in terms of a number of different national currencies. We are all familiar with the advantages of the single currency, that is to say economic and monetary cooperation. The Europe-wide use of the euro has already brought economic stability and a variety of other advantages. It has encouraged economic growth, increased consumption and investment and led to the creation of new jobs. I believe that the single currency will stimulate increased mobility to the extent of leading to a completely new Europe in ten years’ time. With the euro, European integration is taking a giant step forward. The euro will become one of the most significant and most important currencies in international trade. In a few years’ time, 300 million people will have this new national currency which will be used outside the EU as commonly as the dollar is today and with which it will be possible to make payments directly, with no need for currency conversion. The euro is already an international reserve and transaction currency and will in future be so to a much greater extent. The importance and significance which the euro will acquire as an international currency will, unfortunately, also mean that it will become attractive to organised counterfeiting organisations. There is evermore sophisticated equipment available for such activity, which means that counterfeiting is nowadays much less complex than it used to be. Against that background, it is important to have comprehensive and effective protection against counterfeiting in place in good time before the euro comes into circulation. There will be huge scope for disseminating the euro, extending beyond all frontiers, both within the European Union and between the EU and the outside world. Hence, the arrangements for protecting the euro against counterfeiting must take this new dimension into account and also be equipped with a legal framework involving all the EU Member States, institutions and bodies and also relevant international organisations. The three legislative proposals for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting with which this report is concerned are mutually complementary. Unfortunately, they have their legal bases in two different pillars, the first and the third. In the long run, it would be desirable if measures based upon Article 29 of the EU Treaty could be included in Title IV of the EC Treaty so that appropriate decisions for the settlement of issues for which other kinds of measures are unsuitable could be adopted in a unitary fashion. The first proposal is an Initiative by the Government of the French Republic and is based on Title VI of the EC Treaty. It is concerned, then, with protection under criminal law and with Europol units having to receive the information and intelligence they need in order to perform their tasks. The amendments are largely aimed at incorporating wordings that have been forgotten about and left out, as well as at correcting a number of unclear terminological and other points. The second legislative proposal, which in a way is more interesting, contains the Council’s guidelines on the protection of the euro against counterfeiting and is based on Article 123(4) of the EC Treaty. This legal basis enables the scope of the Regulation to be extended only to those Member States which have adopted the euro as a single currency. The proposal is based on the establishment of a system for the exchange of information and for cooperation and mutual assistance. My most important amendments are about the necessity of having a Counterfeiting Analysis Centre at EU level and a national centre in each Member State. The advisability of setting up a permanent European Technical and Scientific Centre for the analysis and the classification of counterfeit coins is also referred to and, especially, the need for entities engaged in the daily handling of notes and coins for their clients to carry out suitable checks on the authenticity of these. Otherwise, it is citizens who are affected, and the latter are completely unprotected when they receive counterfeit coins and notes. There is no way in which they can offset such a loss anywhere else. How can citizens be expected to carry detection equipment the same size as a large PC around with them? Even if someone is prepared to pay for the equipment – which does not cost a great amount, but costs approximately the same as a PC – it is not practically possible. I therefore think it is much more appropriate for notes and coins to be analysed before they leave the exchange entity. This is a position which Parliament definitely ought to adopt in order to protect people. The third legislative proposal is based on Article 308 of the EC Treaty and is aimed at taking care of those Member States which have not adopted the single currency, namely Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden. In fact, they too must of course be covered by the security regulation we are now developing. Otherwise, this will not work. I am convinced that people in these countries realise that they too must participate in these decisions. They must also realise, however, that, if they are not members of the club, they cannot participate in the decisions on the same conditions as the members. However, those who adopt the euro can be party to decisions on the same conditions as other members. Those who do not adopt the euro do not, unfortunately, have the same influence. The decision as to whether or not to adopt the euro is one requiring strength, and on this point I would call upon my own country, Sweden, to try to summon up the strength to take this decision as quickly as possible. It is about nothing other than political leadership. For example, we can draw a comparison with France which, at the time of approving the Maastricht Treaty, approved the latter with a smaller majority than Sweden. In spite of this, France nonetheless managed to take the decision it did. The fact that Sweden, in contrast, did not is something I deeply regret. I want to conclude by stating that the proposals in the Council’s guidelines are aimed at guaranteeing effective protection of the euro, and I therefore welcome the proposal in its entirety.

Political group: PPE-DE