Mr President, the good name that the European Central Bank (ECB)’s mandate under Mr Duisenberg’s Presidency has earned itself is widely acknowledged, and the conviction with which this institution defends its monetary policy is admirable: it considers that policy to be best suited to revitalising the European economy in the short term. The recent changes to the Bank’s monetary strategy are, furthermore, uniformly described as very positive. They are believed to constitute real progress. Indisputably, however, there is no sign of a European economic recovery in the immediate future. Moreover, all the political changes undertaken have been anticipated by the markets and diverted towards uses and balances which can contribute little towards that recovery in the short term. In fact, it is predicted that Europe’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth will reach around 0.7% in 2003, and that Europe’s GDP will increase by only 1.6% in 2004. At a stroke, in other words, the ECB is cutting a slice out of its growth predictions equivalent to about 0.9% of GDP in 2003, and 0.8% in 2004. Faced with the false dilemma of ‘growth or stability’, the ECB cannot be content with its primary institutional strategy, price stability, and disregard the weaknesses and contradictions of those of its policies directed at other targets, such as economic growth and employment. Furthermore, national governments, the Commission and the Council cannot, for their part, be satisfied with the low initial level of coordination between their economic policies, or with the merely advisory nature of their general economic policy guidelines. To return to the Bank, there are also good reasons for believing that mistakes were made in setting the point of departure for monetary policy levels (an inflation rate of 2%) and that these are not in line with the potential growth of the European economy. The European Central Bank must, therefore, help to find answers and solutions for the following fundamental questions: have the structural reforms carried out in most European economies been sufficient? If not, what additional contribution can monetary and fiscal policies make to the fight against the current situation of economic stagnation? Are the current monetary policy restrictions and the financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, which the ECB has supported, compatible with the much-needed reform of the European social model, without calling into question its essence and the distinctive role it plays in the context of European development policy? Is the current appreciation of the euro entirely in step with the foundations of the European economy? Is it, moreover, a proactive aid to economic recovery, or could it, on the contrary, set off a severe deflationary trend? What contribution can the ECB make to overcome the lack of structural reforms necessary in order to attain the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy? Can those objectives be attained within the time limits initially set, given the monetary and fiscal policies which have been developed and the apparent preference of Member States for a minimal level of economic coordination? Faced with this economic crisis, the level of responsibility taken by the ECB and the active cooperation needed to weather the storm depend on finding a balance between the various options, and on the effectiveness of the solutions found for the problems that I have just described. Whilst acknowledging the positive balance-sheet of the Bank’s activities, which the rapporteur, Mr Blokland, does, the European Parliament should, in line with its duties and competences, draw attention to those problems that do exist and urge all the institutions to overcome them.

Political group: PSE