Mr President, Commissioner, it has taken the Commission a while to produce a final proposal on the delivery of aid to the western Balkans. As is known, a proposal was submitted back in May but we had to wait until September before there was a definitive proposal on the table. This had to do with the discussion within the Commission on the need to find an alternative way of delivering external aid. In other words, the proposal now on the table reflects this discussion, and as I see it, is also a first example of how we should do things in the future. This also means that the Commission’s new proposal was worth waiting for, because it sets out in clear and lucid terms how the European Commission proposes to deliver aid in future, both with regard to the general regulation for the Balkans and with regard to the proposal for the agency in Kosovo. To put it in a slightly grand way, perhaps it can also be deemed a kind of fresh start for the delivery of aid, based on the extraordinarily negative experiences we had in Bosnia, but also on our positive experiences in Kosovo. There is now a regulation on the table which, as I see it, equips the European Union to deliver aid in an efficient manner and on time, and to put EU funds to good use in the countries of the western Balkans. In this way, and this is very important – I will come back to it again shortly – a good balance has been struck between the Commission’s responsibility on the one hand and the need to involve the Member States in some way, on the other. It is a balance which, in my opinion, and I think also in the Commission’s view, could not always be found in the past, because all too often the Member States tried to get in on the act when it came to delivering aid. The proposals now on the table have been far more successful in striking this balance. Naturally, and I am coming now to the reports compiled by myself and by Mr Westendorp, there is room for improvement. Anyone who sees and reads the proposed reports will see that a number of improvements have been proposed to certain sections. For example, explicit attention is to be given to the construction of the civilian society, support for the media, and the important role fulfilled by education. I happened to be at a conference in Zagreb last week, when once again it became evident how important it is not to teach future generations of mini Balkans citizens – as it were – old stereotypes, or inculcate them with notions of ‘the enemy’, and instead, to made a fresh start in this respect. I think it is important for the regulation to establish that the Commission will continue to spend money on this kind of project in the future, as it does now. However, there are two key aspects of policy I would like to focus on. The first relates – and I am sorry to have to bother the Commissioner with this again – to the finances. To be perfectly honest, if we manage to deliver a sound opinion on this regulation, today and tomorrow, then we will have completed one part of our work; the first half I would say. Then we will have it down on paper how things are supposed to be done in future. However, if, when it comes to December, we do not include the funds required to implement the regulation then all we are doing today is building castles in the air. This is not a reproach directed at the Commission. The Commission has been in a position to see that I am expressly calling for the assessment of the costs carried out by the Commission – the famous EUR 5.5 billion for the next seven years – to be explicitly included in this regulation, otherwise, to be blunt about it, what we are doing is pure hypocrisy. We cannot adopt a regulation here in Parliament knowing full well that the funds required to implement it will not be available. That is why this is stage one of the battle for an effective system of delivering aid to the Balkans. Stage two will take place in December when our colleagues in the Committee on Budgets, but ultimately Parliament as a whole, will have to opt for a sound financial basis for this regulation. That being the case, it is a shame that Mr Moscovici is absent at present, because as I see it, responsibility on that point falls specifically to the Council, and to the Member States, who must be prepared to recognise that what we, and what they, want to achieve through this regulation costs money, and that this money must be found in the European Union’s budget. The second point, the general point about delivering aid, concerns the balance that must be struck – hence the need for an amendment on this point – between the need for the European Union to maintain a high profile in the Balkans, on the one hand, and the need to support smaller projects as well, on the other. The fact of the matter is – and anyone who has been to the Balkans will confirm this – that the United States is extremely good at creating the impression that it is able to do a great deal more with a good deal less money. The fact that the European Union actually spends far more money but is nothing like as high profile, has led many people to conclude that there is a need to substantially raise people’s awareness of our activities in the Balkans. I would agree with this analysis. This almost inevitably means that a great deal of money will go to the large projects, i.e. to road and bridge building projects; to projects that can fly the flag for Europe. As I said, we need to do this to raise our profile. But be warned, this must not lead to a situation where, when it comes to drawing up priorities, all kinds of smaller projects, which we have supported hitherto, are sacrificed in the process. Hence my appeal for this regulation to strike a good balance between high profile activities, i.e. large projects, on the one hand, and continued attention to projects for democracy, on the other, i.e. projects to do with security, projects that are seldom as high profile, but which are all the more necessary to guarantee stability in the Balkans. Then there is the question of the agency in Kosovo. Seen in a positive light, I sometimes think, and hope, that the agency, by the manner in which it has operated to date, and in which it is to function in the future, ought to serve as an example of how aid should be delivered to the Balkans, and also to other parts of the world. I have drawn such positive conclusions from my various visits to the agency because as I see it, despite all – and I repeat, all – the mistakes that are made there, there can be no doubt that they have found a new and effective way to deliver aid. If we then talk about increasing efficiency, which is the overall objective of this regulation, and relate this to the agency in Kosovo, then we have no choice but to reduce the involvement of the Member States. In quite concrete terms, this means reducing the influence of the Governing Board associated with the agency. In the past, we have been highly critical of the way in which the Commission delivers aid, as this is often bound up in red tape. The procedures involved are often too complex, but we must not turn a blind eye, nor must we want to – and I hope the Member States do not do so either – to their part in this. All too often the Member States have tried to get in on the act where overseas aid is concerned. All too often this has led to delays, inefficiency, and the promotion of national interests. As far as I am concerned, and this is one of the key messages in my report on the agency, the role of the Member States in aid provision will be much reduced in future because there is evidence to show that their involvement causes delays. Lastly, Mr President and Commissioner, a final point. Some of my fellow Members are inclined to want to extend the activities of the agency still further than was the case hitherto. The agency is now based in Kosovo, and the Council has decided – rightly to my mind – to extend its scope to Serbia and Montenegro. I feel we will have to call it a day at that point because we can draw a lesson from the work that the agency is doing now, i.e. physical reconstruction, with a view to carrying out the same activities to good effect in Serbia and Montenegro. Delivering aid to the Balkans within the framework of CARDS, to countries such as Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia, demands other special qualities and other capabilities. I would therefore say: let the agency do what it is good at, i.e. physical reconstruction. It will prove very difficult to do this as effectively in Serbia. Let us confine ourselves to this and not dissipate our energies by extending the agency’s capabilities beyond the borders of former Yugoslavia.

Political group: Verts-ALE