GreatNorthCollective/greatnorth-canada-federal-laws-text huggingface dataset:
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 117
Temporary safe refuge 117 (1) The operator must ensure that the installation is equipped with a temporary safe refuge that will, in the case of an emergency, including an accidental event, (a) provide sufficient space to accommodate all persons who may need to use the refuge until they have been evacuated, the accidental event has been brought under control or the emergency otherwise ends; (b) protect the persons referred to in paragraph (a) from fire, gas release and explosion hazards for as long as they are in the refuge; (c) provide the means for communication and command and, if applicable, for the monitoring and control of the accidental event for as long as persons are in the refuge; and (d) provide signage and lighting to enable safe evacuation from the refuge. Areas required to remain safe (2) The operator must ensure that the accommodations area, main control centre and any other area of an installation that is required to remain safe for persons to occupy during an emergency, including the temporary safe refuge, are (a) designed to prevent ingress of hazardous substances; and (b) designed and located to enable occupation for the time required to implement emergency and evacuation procedures. Periodic verification (3) The operator must verify on a periodic basis that the temporary safe refuge meets the requirements set out in subsections (1) and (2) and must record the findings resulting from the verification.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 118
Exits, access and escape routes 118 (1) An operator must ensure that (a) in any area where persons are normally present on an installation, there are at least two exits, each connected to an escape route that provides safe, direct and unobstructed access to temporary safe refuges, muster areas, embarkation stations and evacuation points; and (b) there are means for persons to descend to the water. Exception (2) Despite paragraph (1)(a), if an area referred to in that paragraph has an area less than 20 m 2 or is a passage less than 5 m in length, the operator must ensure that there is at least one exit as described in that paragraph in that area. Distancing — exits (3) The operator must ensure that the exits referred to in paragraph (1)(a) are separated as far apart from each other as possible to increase the likelihood that at least one exit and its connected escape route will be passable during an accidental event. Location of escape routes (4) The operator must ensure that the installation has escape routes on two of its sides. Safe evacuation (5) The operator must ensure that all escape routes from an accommodations area or a temporary safe refuge to a muster area, embarkation station or evacuation point are clearly marked and illuminated and provided with fire protection to allow for the safe evacuation of persons in a time frame determined in the safety studies referred to in section 116 . Size of escape routes (6) The operator must ensure that each escape route is of sufficient size to enable the efficient movement of the maximum number of persons who may need to use it, as well as unrestricted manoeuvring of firefighting equipment and stretchers, taking into account the maximum number of persons who can be accommodated on the installation.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 120
Installation designed for removal 120 (1) An operator must ensure that an installation is designed to facilitate its removal from the offshore area at the end of its design service life and to reduce any risks to safety, adverse effects on the marine environment and interference with navigation and other uses of the sea that may occur during and after its removal. Exception (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the Board has approved, in the development plan, the abandonment or an alternative use of the installation.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 121
Transportation and positioning 121 (1) An operator must ensure that an installation, or any part of it, is transported and positioned (a) in a manner that does not compromise safety or the protection of the environment; (b) in a manner that minimizes interference with and hazards to other activities in proximity to that installation; (c) under the supervision of a competent third party; (d) in the case of a self-elevating mobile offshore platform, with the legs of the platform secured in accordance with the rules of the classification society that issued the certificate of class required under section 140 ; and (e) with the support of vessels that are classified in accordance with section 177 . Risk assessment (2) Before an installation, or any part of it, is transported and positioned, the operator must ensure that the following requirements are met: (a) a risk assessment must be conducted that takes into account (i) personnel requirements, (ii) the towing vessels that will be used, the towing plan, including towing arrangements, and the operating limits of the towing equipment’s components, (iii) the processes and control measures to be implemented to ensure safety and the protection of the environment, (iv) physical and environmental conditions and the ability to reliably forecast those conditions, and (v) any contingency measures to be taken in the event of adverse physical and environmental conditions or the occurrence of any other foreseeable adverse event during transportation and positioning; and (b) a transportation and positioning plan must be prepared that takes into account any requirements of the competent third party referred to in paragraph (1)(c) and, if the installation is a floating platform, the plan must be prepared in accordance with the rules of the classification society that issued the certificate of class required under section 140 .
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 122
Electrical system 122 (1) An operator must ensure that any electrical system on an installation is designed to avoid any abnormal conditions and faults that may endanger the installation or, if it is not possible to avoid them, to provide alerts of those conditions and faults and mitigate their effects. Safety and reliability (2) The operator must ensure that all electric motors, lighting fixtures, electrical wiring and other electrical equipment on an installation are safe and reliable under all foreseeable operating conditions. Device for monitoring insulation level to earth (3) If a primary or secondary distribution system for electrical power, heating or lighting with no connection to earth is used on an installation, the operator must ensure that the system is equipped with a device that continuously monitors the insulation level to earth and produces an audible or visual alarm to indicate abnormally low insulation values. Main electrical power supply (4) The operator must ensure that the main electrical power supply on, or to, an installation (a) ensures continuous availability of power generation and distribution; (b) includes at least two power plants or other power supply sources, not including emergency power plants; (c) is capable of supporting all normal operations without recourse to the emergency electrical power supply required under subsection 126 (1); and (d) is capable of supporting all operations, other than drilling and production, if one of the power plants is out of operation. Primary circuit shutdown (5) The operator must ensure that the primary circuits from a power plant serving an installation are capable of being shut down from at least two separate locations, one of which must be the site of the power plant.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 123
Control system 123 (1) An operator must ensure that a control system is designed in accordance with the measures referred to in clauses 9 (2)(b)(v)(D) and 10 (2)(b)(v)(D) that are described in the operator’s safety plan and environmental protection plan, respectively. Requirements (2) The operator must ensure that the control system is designed to meet the following requirements, taking into account human factors: (a) controlled equipment must not be capable of being inadvertently activated; (b) controlled equipment must not create a safety or environmental hazard in the event of system failure or shutdown; (c) the system must have basic diagnostic capability; and (d) the system must be capable of being operated simultaneously from multiple control stations without compromising safety. Protection of hardware (3) The operator must ensure that control system hardware is protected from circumstances, including excessive vibration, high electromagnetic field levels, electrical power disturbances and extreme temperatures or humidity levels or other physical and environmental conditions, that could cause mechanical damage to or degradation of the hardware or that could otherwise adversely affect the performance of the system. Wireless remote control system (4) The operator must ensure that any wireless remote control system includes (a) a means for error checking to prevent the controlled equipment from responding to corrupt data; and (b) a means for identification coding to prevent a transmitter other than the designated transmitter from operating the equipment. Alternative means of control (5) The operator must ensure that all control system functions that are required to ensure safety and are dependent on wireless communication links have an alternative means of control that can be activated without delay and without modification to the control system. Inspection and testing (6) Equipment that is to be operated by a new, repaired or modified control system must not be put into operation until the operator ensures that the control system has been inspected and tested to confirm that it functions as intended. Documentation (7) The operator must ensure that documentation containing an up-to-date description of the design, installation, operation and maintenance of the control systems is readily accessible for consultation and examination.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 124
Integrated software-dependent control system 124 (1) An operator must ensure that an integrated software-dependent control system whose failure or malfunction would cause a hazard to safety or the environment is maintained to ensure its reliability, availability and security. Control measures (2) The operator must ensure that control measures are implemented to protect the integrated software-dependent system from any threat, including unauthorized access.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 125
Safety-critical software 125 (1) The operator must ensure that any software that is a safety-critical element is (a) secure, reliable and capable of being updated; (b) designed, commissioned and updated by competent persons; and (c) demonstrated to be fit for the purposes for which it is to be used through a testing and validation process that takes into account (i) all foreseeable operating conditions and emergency situations, and (ii) system complexity, dependencies and interactions between systems, software failure modes and the level of risk associated with system failure or malfunction. Modification to features (2) The operator must ensure that no modification to the features of the software is implemented unless (a) the modified software has undergone the testing and validation process referred to in paragraph (1)(c); and (b) the necessary internal approvals for the modification have been obtained, including the approval of the installation manager.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 126
he mechanically driven generator has redundancy in its starting capabilities and a dedicated fuel source. Design and maintenance (3) The operator must ensure that the emergency electrical power supply together with any transitional source of electrical power and self-contained battery system with which the installation may be equipped are designed and maintained such that (a) they are able to provide the systems and equipment referred to in subsection (1) with an emergency power supply of sufficient capacity, taking into account starting currents and the transitory nature of electrical loads, and sufficient duration to ensure that the systems and equipment can function as intended and to allow for effective management of the installation during an emergency, including (i) to allow for the complete shutdown and evacuation of the installation, (ii) to facilitate emergency response and the safe escape, refuge and evacuation of persons or to maintain the integrity of the installation, (iii) to ensure sufficient power so that systems that must operate simultaneously can do so, (iv) in the case of a floating platform, to maintain the flotation and stability of the platform, and (v) to bring a well to a safe state and to maintain it in that state; (b) their capacity to provide power to essential systems is not compromised during their maintenance; (c) they have sufficient redundancy to ensure their reliability and, as far as is practicable, to ensure their functional and physical independence from other essential systems or, if that is not practicable, they are arranged so as not to adversely affect or be adversely affected by the operation of those systems; and (d) they are readily accessible. Protection from damage (4) The operator must ensure that the emergency electrical power supply, transitional source of electrical power and self-contained battery system referred to in subsection (3) are arranged — or are otherwise protected from mechanical damage and damage caused by fire, explosion and physical and environmental conditions to which they may be exposed — so that they remain capable of fulfilling their intended functions under all foreseeable operating conditions, including, in the case of a floating platform, under the static and dynamic angles of inclination referred to in subsection 136 (7). Alert (5) The operator must ensure that, in the event of a failure of the main electrical power supply, all control centres are alerted by means of an audible and visual signal that the installation is being powered by the emergency electrical power supply.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 127
Lights and sound-signalling appliances 127 An operator must ensure that an installation is equipped with the lights and sound-signalling appliances that are required by the Collision Regulations as if that installation were a Canadian vessel to which those Regulations apply, unless compliance with the height and distance requirements of those Regulations is not possible, in which case the lights and appliances must be installed to maximize their audible and visual alerting capabilities for collision avoidance.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 128
Radar 128 An operator must ensure that an installation other than an unattended installation is equipped with radar for identifying hazards in proximity to the installation and that the radar is continuously monitored.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 129
Communication system 129 (1) An operator must ensure that an installation is equipped with a communication system that has built-in redundancy and is capable of communicating continuously, including in an emergency, with (a) external emergency response teams; (b) all persons, individually or collectively, at an operations site; (c) all persons who are in transit to or from an operations site; (d) all support craft; (e) all onshore support centres; (f) nearby vessels and aircraft; and (g) nearby installations. Radiocommunication system (2) An operator must ensure that an installation other than an unattended installation is equipped with a radiocommunication system in respect of which the following requirements are met: (a) the system must comply with Part 2 of the Navigation Safety Regulations, 2020 as if the installation were a Canadian vessel to which those Regulations apply; (b) a technical acceptance certificate must have been issued in respect of the system under the Radiocommunication Act ; and (c) a continuous listening watch and radio log must be maintained. Radiocommunication system — unattended installation (3) An operator must ensure that any radiocommunication system on an unattended installation meets the requirements referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) and (b).
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 130
General alarm system 130 (1) An operator must ensure that an installation is equipped with a general alarm system that is capable of alerting persons on the installation of any hazards to safety or the environment other than fire or gas. Additional requirements (2) The operator must ensure that the general alarm system is (a) operational at all times other than when the system is being inspected, maintained or repaired; (b) flagged as being subject to inspection, maintenance or repair, as required; and (c) designed to prevent tampering. Alternative means of alert (3) If a general alarm system is being inspected, maintained or repaired, the operator must ensure that there is an alternative means of alerting persons of the hazards referred to in subsection (1).
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 131
Gas release system 131 (1) An operator must ensure that an installation that includes process tanks, process vessels and piping is equipped with a gas release system that has a flaring system, a pressure relief system, a depressurizing system or a cold vent system. Risk assessment — design (2) The operator must ensure that the design of the gas release system is based on the results of the risk assessment conducted under subsection 107 (1). Design (3) The operator must ensure that the gas release system is designed to (a) release gas and combustible liquid from an installation in a controlled manner without creating a hazard to safety; (b) reduce pressure in the entire process system as quickly as possible while ensuring a safe and controlled release of pressure; (c) minimize the effect on the environment; (d) be activated from the main control centre and from control stations that meet the requirements set out in subsection (5); and (e) ensure that oxygen cannot enter the system during normal operations. Location — system (4) The operator must ensure that the gas release system is designed and located taking into account factors, including physical and environmental conditions, that affect the safe and normal flaring or emergency release of combustible liquid, gases or vapours so that when the system is in operation it does not damage the installation — or any other installation, vessel or support craft in proximity to it — or injure any person. Control stations (5) The operator must ensure that the control stations from which the gas release system is activated are located and spaced so that they remain protected and accessible for safe operation of the system. Flaring systems (6) The operator must, in respect of any flaring system, ensure that (a) if an unlit release of gas could produce toxic gas concentrations or gas concentrations of more than 50% of the lower explosive limit of the released gas, (i) the system has an automatic igniter system that has redundancy in its ignition capabilities, and (ii) in the case of an open flare system, the system and any associated equipment are designed to ensure a continuous flame; and (b) the system and any associated equipment are designed to (i) withstand the radiated heat at the maximum flaring rate, (ii) prevent flashback, and (iii) withstand all loads to which they may be subjected. Risk minimization — vents (7) The operator must ensure that any vent that is used to release gas into the atmosphere without combustion is designed and located in accordance with the measures referred to in clause 9 (2)(b)(vi)(A) and subparagraph 10 (2)(b)(vi) that are described in the operator’s safety plan and environmental protection plan, respectively. Liquid removal (8) The operator must ensure that any liquid, other than water, that cannot be safely and reliably burned at the flare tip of a gas release system is removed from the gas before it enters the flare.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 132
maintenance activities must not impair the system beyond what is necessary to undertake those activities and must not impede its functioning. Work permit (7) A work permit is required for the testing and maintenance of the fire and gas detection system. Management of override effects (8) The work permit must set out measures to be taken to manage the effects of overriding the fire and gas detection system. Leak repair (9) The operator must ensure that any leak of gas that is detected by the fire and gas detection system or by means of an auditory, olfactory or visual method — including the observation of the dripping of hydrocarbon liquids from an equipment component — is repaired (a) immediately, if the repair is necessary for the purposes of safety or the conservation of petroleum resources; or (b) as soon as the circumstances permit, in any other case.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 133
e applied for the shortest amount of time possible and with as few as possible being applied simultaneously; and (b) the testing and maintenance activities must not impair the system beyond what is necessary to undertake those activities and must not impede the system’s functioning. Work permit (7) A work permit is required for the testing and maintenance of the emergency shutdown system. Management of override effects (8) The work permit must set out the measures to be taken to manage the effects of overriding the emergency shutdown system. Closure — subsurface safety valve (9) In the case of a production installation, the operator must ensure that, if the emergency shutdown system is activated, any subsurface safety valve closes not later than two minutes after the tree safety valve has closed unless a longer delay is justified by the mechanical or production characteristics of the well.
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Operations Framework Regulations — 135
 the authorized inspector who conducted the inspection or who conducted or directed the test stating that the boiler or pressure system is fit for the purposes for which it is to be used, (vi) any recommendations regarding the need for modifications to the maintenance program established under section 159 , and (vii) any other observation relevant to safety; and (f) a description of each repair or modification made to the boiler or pressure system. Marking (13) The operator must ensure that a boiler or pressure system is marked with any information that is necessary for its safe installation and operation, including an identifier that permits reference to the documents and records referred to in subsection (6) and the information referred to in paragraphs (12)(e) and (f). Verification (14) The operator must ensure that all operating procedures developed in accordance with subsection (9) and the register referred to in subsection (12) are periodically verified by the certifying authority. Non-application (15) This section does not apply to any of the following: (a) a heating boiler that has a heating surface of 3 m 2 or less; (b) a pressure system that is installed for use at a pressure of one atmosphere of pressure or less; (c) a pressure vessel that (i) has a capacity of 40 L or less, or (ii) has an internal diameter of (A) 152 mm or less, or (B) more than 152 mm but not more than 610 mm if the pressure vessel is used for the storage of hot water or is connected to a water pumping system containing compressed air that serves as a cushion; (d) a refrigeration plant that has a refrigeration capacity of 18 kW or less; or (e) a domestic water and plumbing system.