GenAI4ELab/papercli-papers huggingface dataset:
Approximately Envy-free and Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Items for Non-monotone Valuations
Authors: Vittorio Bilò; Martin Loebl; Cosimo Vinci
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: We revisit the setting of fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with heterogeneous, non-monotone valuations. We explore the existence and efficient computation of allocations that approximately satisfy either envy-freeness or equity constraints. Approximate envy-freeness ensures that each agent values her bundle at least as much as those given to the others, after some (or any) item removal, while approximate equity guarantees roughly equal valuations among agents, under similar adjustments.
As a key technical contribution of this work, by leveraging fixed-point theorems (such as Sperner's Lemma and its variants), we establish the existence of envy-free-up-to-one-good-and-one-chore (EF1_g^c) and equitable-up-to-one-good-and-one-chore (EQ1_g^c) allocations, for non-monotone valuations that are always either non-negative or non-positive. These notions represent slight relaxations of the well-studied envy-free-up-to-one-item (EF1) and equitable-up-to-one-item (EQ1) guarantees, respectively.
Our existential results hold even when items are arranged in a path and bundles must form connected sub-paths. The case of non-positive valuations, in particular, has been solved by proving a novel multi-coloring variant of Sperner's Lemma that constitutes a combinatorial result of independent interest. In addition, we also design a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm that computes an EQ1_g^c allocation. For monotone non-increasing valuations and path-connected bundles, all the above results can be extended to EF1 and EQ1 guarantees as well.
Finally, we provide existential and computational results for certain stronger up-to-any-item equity notions under objective valuations, where items are partitioned into goods and chores.
Understanding the Impact of Proportionality in Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections
Authors: Niclas Boehmer; Lara Glessen; Jannik Peters
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Despite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in
approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains
poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the
computational complexity of several natural problems related
to the behavior of proportionality axioms, and (ii) conducting an extensive experimental study on both real-world and
synthetic elections. Our findings reveal substantial variation
in the restrictiveness of proportionality across instances, including previously unobserved high levels of restrictiveness
in some real-world cases. We also introduce and evaluate new
measures for quantifying a candidate’s importance for achieving proportional outcomes, which differ clearly from assessing candidate strength by approval score.
Picking a Representative Set of Solutions in Multiobjective Optimization: Axioms, Algorithms, and Experiments
Authors: Niclas Boehmer; Maximilian T. Wittmann
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Many real-world decision-making problems involve optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously, rendering the selection of the most preferred solution a non-trivial problem: All Pareto optimal solutions are viable candidates, and it is typically up to a decision maker to select one for implementation based on their subjective preferences. To reduce the cognitive load on the decision maker, previous work has introduced the Pareto pruning problem, where the goal is to compute a fixed-size subset of Pareto optimal solutions that best represent the full set, as evaluated by a given quality measure. Reframing Pareto pruning as a multiwinner voting problem, we conduct an axiomatic analysis of existing quality measures, uncovering several unintuitive behaviors. Motivated by these findings, we introduce a new measure, directed coverage. We also analyze the computational complexity of optimizing various quality measures, identifying previously unknown boundaries between tractable and intractable cases depending on the number and structure of the objectives. Finally, we present an experimental evaluation, demonstrating that the choice of quality measure has a decisive impact on the characteristics of the selected set of solutions and that our proposed measure performs competitively or even favorably across a range of settings.
Putting Fair Division on the Map
Authors: Paula Böhm; Robert Bredereck; Paul Gölz; Andrzej Kaczmarczyk; Stanisław Szufa
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics of real-world allocation instances and how they compare to synthetic instances. Using dimensionality reduction, we compute a map of allocation instances: a 2-dimensional embedding such that an instance's location on the map is predictive of the instance's origin and other key instance features. Because the axes of this map closely align with the utility matrix's two largest singular values, we define a second, explicit map, which we theoretically characterize.
Probing EFX via PMMS: (Non-)Existence Results in Discrete Fair Division
Authors: Jaroslaw Byrka; Franciszek Malinka; Tomasz Ponitka
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: We study the fair division of indivisible items and provide new insights into the EFX problem, which is widely regarded as the central open question in fair division, and the PMMS problem, a strictly stronger variant of EFX. Our first result constructs a three-agent instance with two monotone valuations and one additive valuation in which no PMMS allocation exists. Since EFX allocations are known to exist under these assumptions, this establishes a formal separation between EFX and PMMS. 

We prove existence of fair allocations for three important special cases. We show that EFX allocations exist for personalized bivalued valuations, where for each agent i there exist values aᵢ > bᵢ such that agent i assigns value vᵢ({g}) ∈ {aᵢ, bᵢ} to each good g. We establish an analogous existence result for PMMS allocations when aᵢ is divisible by bᵢ. We also prove that PMMS allocations exist for binary-valued MMS-feasible valuations, where each bundle S has value vᵢ(S) ∈ {0, 1}. Notably, this result holds even without assuming monotonicity of valuations and thus applies to the fair division of chores and mixed manna. Finally, we study a class of valuations called pair-demand valuations, which extend the well-studied unit-demand valuations to the case where each agent derives value from at most two items, and we show that PMMS allocations exist in this setting. Our proofs are constructive, and we provide polynomial-time algorithms for all three existence results.
What Voting Rules Actually Do: A Data-Driven Analysis of Multi-Winner Voting
Authors: Joshua Caiata; Ben Armstrong; Kate Larson
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules. In this work, we propose a data-driven framework to evaluate how frequently voting rules violate axioms across diverse preference distributions in practice, shifting away from the binary perspective of axiom satisfaction given by worst-case analysis. Using this framework, we analyze the relationship between multi-winner voting rules and their axiomatic performance under several preference distributions, and propose a methodology for systematically minimizing axioms violations. Our results suggest that data-driven approaches to social choice can inform the design of new voting systems and support the continuation of data-driven research in social choice.
Spatial Branch-and-Bound for Computing Multiplayer Nash Equilibrium
Authors: Jakub Černý; Shuvomoy Das Gupta; Christian Kroer
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in elections or assess policy impacts in integrated assessment models. However, efficiently computing these equilibria requires games to have a carefully designed structure and satisfy numerous restrictions; otherwise, the computational complexity becomes prohibitive. In particular, finding even approximate Nash equilibria in general normal-form games with three or more players is known to be PPAD-complete. Current state-of-the-art algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in multiplayer normal-form games either suffer from poor scalability due to their reliance on non-convex optimization solvers, or lack guarantees of convergence to a true equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a novel reformulation of the Nash equilibrium computation problem and develop a complete and sound spatial branch-and-bound algorithm based on this reformulation. We provide a qualitative analysis arguing why one should expect our approach to perform better than conventional formulation, and show the relationship between approximate solution to our reformulation and that of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our algorithm substantially outperforms existing complete methods.
Exact and Approximate Maximin Share Allocations in Multi-Graphs
Authors: George Christodoulou; Symeon Mastrakoulis
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: We study the problem of (approximate) maximin share
(MMS) allocation of indivisible items among a set of agents.
We focus on the graphical valuation model, in which the 
input is given by a graph where edges correspond to items, 
and vertices correspond to agents. An edge may have 
non-zero marginal value only for its incident vertices. We 
study additive, XOS and subadditive valuations and we 
present positive and negative results for (approximate) 
MMS fairness, and also for (approximate) pair-wise 
maximin share (PMMS) fairness.
Explaining Tournament Solutions with Minimal Supports
Authors: Clément Contet; Umberto Grandi; Jérôme Mengin
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Tournaments are widely used models to represent pairwise dominance between candidates, alternatives, or teams. We study the problem of providing certified explanations for why a candidate appears among the winners under various tournament rules. To this end, we identify minimal supports—minimal sub-tournaments in which the candidate is guaranteed to win regardless of how the rest of the tournament is completed (that is, the candidate is a necessary winner of the sub-tournament). This notion corresponds to an abductive explanation for the question,"Why does the winner win the tournament?"—a central concept in formal explainable AI. 
We focus on common tournament solutions: the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Copeland rule, the Borda rule, the maximin rule, and the weighted uncovered set. For each rule we determine the size of the smallest minimal supports, and we present polynomial-time algorithms to compute them for all solutions except for the weighted uncovered set, for which the problem is NP-complete. Finally, we show how minimal supports can serve to produce compact, certified, and intuitive explanations for tournament solutions.
ElementaryNet: A Non-Strategic Neural Network for Predicting Human Behavior in Normal-Form Games
Authors: Greg d'Eon; Hala Murad; Kevin Leyton-Brown; James R. Wright
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Behavioral game theory models serve two purposes: yielding insights into how human decision-making works, and predicting how people would behave in novel strategic settings. A system called GameNet represents the state of the art for predicting human behavior in the setting of unrepeated simultaneous-move games, combining a simple "level-k" model of strategic reasoning with a complex neural network model of non-strategic "level-0" behavior. Although this reliance on well-established ideas from cognitive science ought to make GameNet interpretable, the flexibility of its level-0 model raises the possibility that it is able to emulate strategic reasoning. In this work, we prove that GameNet's level-0 model is indeed too general. We then introduce ElementaryNet, a novel neural network that is provably incapable of expressing strategic behavior. We show that these additional restrictions are empirically harmless, with ElementaryNet and GameNet having statistically indistinguishable performance. We then show how it is possible to derive insights about human behavior by varying ElementaryNet's features and interpreting its parameters, finding evidence of iterative reasoning, learning about the depth of this reasoning process, and showing the value of a rich level-0 specification.
Optimally Auditing Adversarial Agents
Authors: Sanmay Das; Fang-Yi Yu; Yuang Zhang
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Fraud can pose a challenge in many resource allocation domains, including social service delivery and credit provision. For example, agents may misreport private information in order to gain benefits or access to credit. To mitigate this, a principal can design strategic audits to verify claims and penalize misreporting. In this paper, we introduce a general model of audit policy design as a principal-agent game with multiple agents, where the principal commits to an audit policy, and agents collectively choose an equilibrium that minimizes the principal’s utility. We examine both adaptive and non-adaptive settings, depending on whether the principal's policy can be responsive to the distribution of agent reports. Our work provides efficient algorithms for computing optimal audit policies in both settings and extends these results to a setting with limited audit budgets.
EFX and PO Allocation Exists for Two Types of Goods
Authors: Vladimir Davidiuk; Yuriy Dementiev; Artur Ignatiev; Danil Sagunov
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) — an important fairness notion in fair division of indivisible goods. A central open question in this field is whether EFX allocations always exist for any number of agents. While recent results have established EFX existence for settings with at most three distinct valuations and for two types of goods, the general case remains unresolved.

In this paper, we extend the existent knowledge by proving that EFX allocations satisfying Pareto optimality (PO) always exist and can be computed in quasiliniear time when there are two types of goods, given that the valuations are positive. Our findings demonstrate a fairly simple and efficient algorithm constructing an EFX+PO allocation.
Breaking Barriers, Finding Boundaries: Not Obviously Manipulable Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
Authors: Bart de Keijzer; Guido Schäfer; Artem Tsikiridis; Carmine Ventre
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Strategyproofness has been the holy grail in mechanism design for decades, providing strong incentive compatibility guarantees under the assumption of perfectly rational agents. However, this assumption is questionable when agents exhibit bounded rationality. Moreover, strategyproofness often imposes strong impossibility results that prevent mechanisms from surpassing certain approximation barriers. We study this tension in budget-feasible mechanism design, where a designer wants to procure services of maximum value from agents subject to a budget constraint. Here, strategyproofness imposes approximation barriers of 2.41 and 2 for deterministic and randomized mechanisms, respectively. We investigate how much we can potentially gain under bounded rationality. We adopt the weaker notion of not obviously manipulable (NOM), which only prevents "obvious" strategic deviations. We fully resolve the achievable approximation guarantees under NOM: We derive a deterministic 2-approximate NOM mechanism under the general class of monotone subadditive valuations. We also show that this bound is tight (even for additive valuations). Additionally, we provide a simple randomized NOM mechanism that is approximately optimal. These results demonstrate a clear separation between strategyproof and NOM mechanisms. Our mechanisms use Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons as natural design primitives, arising from our characterization of NOM mechanisms.
Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It Is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness
Authors: Argyrios Deligkas; Eduard Eiben; Tiger-Lily Goldsmith; Dušan Knop; Šimon Schierreich
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items that, at the same time, maximize social impact. In this model,  each agent is associated with two additive functions that define their value and social impact for each item. The goal is to allocate items so that the social impact is maximized while maintaining some fairness criterion. We reveal that the complexity of the problem heavily depends on whether the agents are socially aware, i.e., they take into consideration the social impact functions.
For socially unaware agents, we prove that the problem is NP-hard for a variety of fairness notions, and that it is tractable only for very restricted cases, e.g., if for every agent valuation equals social impact and it is binary. On the other hand, social awareness allows for fair allocations that maximize social impact, and such allocations can be computed in polynomial time. Interestingly, the problem becomes again intractable as soon as the definition of social awareness is relaxed.
Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing
Authors: Argyrios Deligkas; Gregory Gutin; Mark Jones; Philip R. Neary; Anders Yeo
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph, and there is a capacity constraint on their number, k, that can benefit from the good. This means that each player makes a two-pronged decision: decide whether or not to buy and, conditional on buying, choose which k out-neighbors to share access. We examine both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in the model from the perspective of existence, computation, and efficiency. We perform a comprehensive study for these three dimensions with respect to both sharing capacity (k) and the network structure (the underlying directed graph), and establish sharp complexity dichotomies for each.
Reconfiguring Proportional Committees
Authors: Chris Dong; Fabian Frank; Jannik Peters; Warut Suksompong
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of proportional committees, where each transition involves replacing one candidate with another candidate? We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of justified representation (JR) is not always connected, and it is PSPACE-complete to decide whether two such committees are connected. On the other hand, we prove that any two JR committees can be connected by committees satisfying a 2-approximation of JR. We also obtain similar results for the stronger axiom of extended justified representation (EJR). In addition, we demonstrate that the committees produced by several well-known voting rules are connected or at least not isolated, and investigate the reconfiguration problem in restricted preference domains.
Cost-Free Neutrality for the River Method
Authors: Michelle Döring; Jannes Malanowski; Stefan Neubert
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Recently, the River Method was introduced as novel refinement of the Split Cycle voting rule. The decision-making process of River is closely related to the well established Ranked Pairs Method. Both methods consider a margin graph computed from the voters' preferences and eliminate majority cycles in that graph to choose a winner. As ties can occur in the margin graph, a tiebreaker is required along with the preferences. While such a tiebreaker makes the computation efficient, it compromises the fundamental property of neutrality: the voting rule should not favor alternatives in advance.
    
One way to reintroduce neutrality is to use Parallel-Universe Tiebreaking (PUT), where each alternative is a winner if it wins according to any possible tiebreaker. Unfortunately, computing the winners selected by Ranked Pairs with PUT is NP-complete. Given the similarity of River to Ranked Pairs, one might expect River to suffer from the same complexity.
    
Surprisingly, we show the opposite: We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing River winners with PUT, highlighting significant structural advantages of River over Ranked Pairs. Our Fused-Universe (FUN) algorithm simulates River for every possible tiebreaking in one pass. From the resulting FUN diagram one can then directly read off both the set of winners and, for each winner, a certificate that explains how this alternative dominates the others.
The River Voting Method
Authors: Michelle Döring; Markus Brill; Jobst Heitzig
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: We introduce River, a novel Condorcet-consistent voting method that is based on pairwise majority margins and can be seen as a simplified variation of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method. River is simple to explain, simple to compute even "by hand," and gives rise to an easy-to-interpret certificate in the form of a directed tree. Like Ranked Pairs and Schulze's Beat Path method, River is a refinement of the Split Cycle method and shares with those many desirable properties, including independence of clones. Unlike the other three methods, River satisfies a strong form of resistance to agenda-manipulation that is known as independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives.
Optimal Welfare in Noncooperative Network Formation Under Attack
Authors: Natan Doubez; Pascal Lenzner; Marcus Wunderlich
Venue: AAAI 2026 (main)

Abstract: Communication networks are essential for our economy and our everyday lives. This makes them lucrative targets for attacks. Today, we see an ongoing battle between criminals that try to disrupt our key communication networks and security professionals that try to mitigate these attacks. However, today's networks, like the Internet or peer-to-peer networks among smart devices, are not controlled by a single authority, but instead consist of many independently administrated entities that are interconnected. Thus, both the decisions of how to interconnect and how to secure against potential attacks are taken in a decentralized way by selfish agents.

This strategic setting, with agents that want to interconnect and potential attackers that want to disrupt the network, was captured via an influential game-theoretic model by Goyal, Jabbari, Kearns, Khanna, and Morgenstern (WINE 2016). We revisit this model and show improved tight bounds on the achieved robustness of networks created by selfish agents. As our main result, we show that such networks can resist attacks of a large class of potential attackers, i.e., these networks maintain asymptotically optimal welfare post attack. This improves several bounds and resolves an open problem. Along the way, we show the counter-intuitive result, that attackers that aim at minimizing the social welfare post attack do not actually inflict the greatest possible damage.