GenAI4ELab/papercli-papers huggingface dataset:
LOHA: Direct Graph Spectral Contrastive Learning Between Low-Pass and High-Pass Views
Authors: Ziyun Zou; Yinghui Jiang; Lian Shen; Juan Liu; Xiangrong Liu
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: Spectral Graph Neural Networks effectively handle graphs with different homophily levels, with low-pass filter mining feature smoothness and high-pass filter capturing differences. When these distinct filters could naturally form two opposite views for self-supervised learning, the commonalities between these counterparts for the same node remain unexplored, leading to suboptimal performance. In this paper, a simple yet effective self-supervised contrastive framework, LOHA, is proposed to address this gap. LOHA optimally leverages low-pass and high-pass views by embracing "harmony in diversity". Rather than solely maximizing the difference between these distinct views, which may lead to feature separation, LOHA harmonizes the diversity by treating the propagation of graph signals from both views as a composite feature. Specifically, a novel high-dimensional feature named spectral signal trend is proposed to serve as the basis for the composite feature, which remains relatively unaffected by changing filters and focuses solely on original feature differences. LOHA achieves an average performance improvement of 2.8% over runner-up models on 9 real-world datasets with varying homophily levels. Notably, LOHA even surpasses fully-supervised models on several datasets, which underscores the potential of LOHA in advancing the efficacy of spectral GNNs for diverse graph structures.
Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games
Authors: Salam Afiouni; Jakub Černý; Chun Kai Ling; Christian Kroer
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study k-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to mixed strategies with support size at most k. Finding k-sparse commitments is known to be computationally hard. We start by showing several structural properties of k-sparse solutions, including that the optimal support may vary dramatically as k increases. These results suggest that naive greedy or double-oracle-based approaches are unlikely to yield practical algorithms. We then develop a simple approach based on mixed integer linear programs (MILPs) for zero-sum games, general-sum Stackelberg games, and various forms of structured sparsity. We also propose practical algorithms for cases where one or both players have large (i.e., practically innumerable) action sets, utilizing a combination of MILPs and incremental strategy generation. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world scenarios based on security applications. In both settings, we observe that even for small support sizes, we can obtain more than 90% of the true Nash value while maintaining a reasonable runtime, demonstrating the significance of our formulation and algorithms.
A Continuous-time Tractable Model for Present-biased Agents
Authors: Yasunori Akagi; Hideaki Kim; Takeshi Kurashima
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: Present bias, the tendency to overvalue immediate rewards while undervaluing future ones, is a well-known barrier to achieving long-term goals. As artificial intelligence and behavioral economics increasingly focus on this phenomenon, the need for robust mathematical models to predict behavior and guide effective interventions has become crucial. However, existing models are constrained by their reliance on the discreteness of time and limited discount functions. This study introduces a novel continuous-time mathematical model for agents influenced by present bias.
Using the variational principle, we model human behavior, where individuals repeatedly act according to a sequence of states that minimize their perceived cost.
Our model not only retains analytical tractability but also accommodates various discount functions. Using this model, we consider intervention optimization problems under exponential and hyperbolic discounting and theoretically derive optimal intervention strategies, offering new insights into managing present-biased behavior.
Epistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations
Authors: Hannaneh Akrami; Nidhi Rathi
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness concepts in this line of work. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts, existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, thereby making the study of approximations and relaxations of EFX a natural line of research. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [2023] introduced a promising relaxation of EFX, called epistemic EFX (EEFX). An allocation is EEFX, if for every agent, it is possible to shuffle the items in the remaining bundles so that she becomes ``EFX-satisfied''. Caragiannis et al. [2023] prove existence and polynomial-time computability of EEFX allocations for additive valuations. A natural question asks what happens when we consider valuations more general than additive?

We address this important open question and answer it affirmatively by establishing the existence of EEFX allocations for an arbitrary number of agents with general monotone valuations. To the best of our knowledge, besides EF1, EEFX is the only known relaxation of EFX to have such strong existential guarantees. Furthermore, we complement our existential result by proving computational and information-theoretic lower bounds. We prove that even for an arbitrary number of (more than one) agents with identical submodular valuations, it is PLS-hard to compute EEFX allocations and it requires exponentially-many value queries to do so.
Achieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously
Authors: Hannaneh Akrami; Nidhi Rathi
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: We study the problem of computing fair divisions of a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. For the past many decades, the literature has explored various notions of fairness, that can be primarily seen as either having envy-based or share-based lens. For the discrete setting of resource-allocation problems, envy-free up to any good (EFX) and maximin share (MMS) are widely considered as the flag-bearers of fairness notions in the above two categories, thereby capturing different aspects of fairness herein. Due to lack of existence results of these notions and the fact that a good approximation of EFX or MMS does not imply particularly strong guarantees of the other, it becomes important to understand the compatibility of EFX and MMS allocations with one another. 

In this work, we identify a novel way to simultaneously achieve MMS guarantees with EFX/EF1 notions of fairness, while beating the best known approximation factors by Chaudhury et al. and Amanatidis et al. Our main contribution is to constructively prove the existence of (i) a partial allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EFX, and (ii) a complete allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EF1. Our algorithms run in pseudo-polynomial time if the approximation factor for MMS is relaxed to 2/3 - e for any constant e>0 and in polynomial time if, in addition, the EFX (or EF1) guarantee is relaxed to (1-d)-EFX (or (1-d)-EF1) for any constant d>0. In particular, we improve from the best approximation factor known prior to our work by Chaudhury et al., which computes partial allocations that are 1/2-MMS and EFX in pseudo-polynomial time.
The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control
Authors: Shiri Alouf-Heffetz; Łukasz Janeczko; Grzegorz Lisowski; Georgios Papasotiropoulos
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity perspective, we focus on minimizing overall costs, maintaining short delegation paths, and preventing excessive concentration of voting power. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of strategic control, specifically, whether external agents can change election components to influence the voting power of certain voters.
Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms
Authors: Nan An; Weian Li; Qi Qi; Liang Zhang
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: In contemporary e-commerce platforms, search result pages display two types of items: ad items and organic items. Ad items are determined through an advertising auction system, while organic items are selected by a recommendation system. These systems have distinct optimization objectives, creating the challenge of effectively merging these two components. Recent research has explored merging mechanisms for e-commerce platforms, but none have simultaneously achieved all desirable properties: incentive compatibility, individual rationality, adaptability to multiple slots, integration of inseparable candidates, and avoidance of repeated exposure for ads and organic items. This paper addresses the design of a merging mechanism that satisfies all these properties. We first provide the necessary conditions for the optimal merging mechanisms. Next, we introduce two simple and effective mechanisms, termed the generalized fix mechanism and the generalized change mechanism. Finally, we theoretically prove that both mechanisms offer guaranteed approximation ratios compared to the optimal mechanism in both simplest and general settings.
EF2X Exists for Four Agents
Authors: Arash Ashuri; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Alkmini Sgouritsa
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among a group of agents, aiming to limit the envy between any two agents. The central open problem in this literature, which has proven to be extremely challenging, is regarding the existence of an EFX allocation, i.e., an allocation such that any envy from some agent i toward another agent j would vanish if we were to remove any single good from the bundle allocated to j. Prior work has shown that when the agents’ valuations are additive, which has been the main focus of prior works, an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist for all instances involving up to three agents. Subsequent work extended this guarantee to more general valuations, like nice-cancelable and MMS-feasible. However, the existence of EFX allocations for instances involving four agents remains open, even
for additive valuations.
We contribute to this literature by focusing on EF2X, a relaxation of EFX which requires that any envy toward some agent would vanish if any two of the goods allocated to that agent were to be removed. Our main result shows that EF2X allocations exist for any instance with four agents, even for the class of cancelable valuations, which is more general than additive. Our proof is constructive, proposing an algorithm that computes such an allocation in pseudo-polynomial time.
Furthermore, for instances involving three agents we provide an algorithm that computes an EF2X allocation in polynomial time, in contrast to EFX for which the fastest known algorithm for three agents is only pseudo-polynomial.
Fair Division via the Cake-Cutting Share
Authors: Yannan Bai; Kamesh Munagala; Yiheng Shen; Ian Zhang
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the classic fair division problem of allocating m divisible items to n agents with linear valuations over the items. We define novel notions of fair shares from the perspective of individual agents via the cake-cutting process. These shares generalize the notion of proportionality by taking into account the valuations of other agents via constraints capturing envy. We study what fraction (approximation) of these shares are achievable in the worst case, and present tight and non-trivial approximation bounds as a function of n and m. In particular, we show a tight approximation bound of Θ(√n) for various notions of such shares. We show this bound via a novel application of dual fitting, which may be of independent interest. We also present a bound of O(m^(2/3)) for a strict notion of share, with an almost matching lower bound. We further develop weaker notions of shares whose approximation bounds interpolate smoothly between proportionality and the shares described above. We finally present empirical results showing that our definitions lead to more reasonable shares than the standard fair share notion of proportionality.
Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition
Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan; Siddharth Prasad; Tuomas Sandholm
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: The design of multi-item, multi-bidder auctions involves a delicate balancing act of economic objectives, bidder incentives, and real-world complexities. Efficient auctions, that is, auctions that allocate items to maximize total bidder value, are practically desirable since they promote the most economically beneficial use of resources. Arguably the biggest drawback of efficient auctions, however, is their potential to generate very low revenue. In this work, we show how the auction designer can artificially inject competition into the auction to boost revenue while striving to maintain efficiency. First, we invent a new auction family that enables the auction designer to specify competition in a precise, expressive, and interpretable way. We then introduce a new model of bidder behavior and individual rationality to understand how bidders act when prices are too competitive. Next, under our bidder behavior model, we use our new competitive auction class to derive the globally revenue-optimal efficient auction under two different knowledge models for the auction designer: knowledge of full bidder value distributions and knowledge of bidder value quantiles. Finally, we study a third knowledge model for the auction designer: knowledge of historical bidder valuation data. In this setting we present sample and computationally efficient learning algorithms that find high-revenue probably-efficient competitive auctions from bidder data. Our learning algorithms are instance adaptive and can be run in parallel across bidders, unlike most prior approaches to data-driven auction design.
Proportional Representation in Practice: Quantifying Proportionality in Ordinal Elections
Authors: Tuva Bardal; Markus Brill; David McCune; Jannik Peters
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: Proportional representation plays a crucial role in electoral systems. In ordinal elections, where voters rank candidates based on their preferences, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is the most widely used proportional voting method. STV is considered proportional because it satisfies an axiom requiring that large enough "solid coalitions" of voters are adequately represented. Using real-world data from local Scottish elections, we observe that solid coalitions of the required size rarely occur in practice. This observation challenges the importance of proportionality axioms and raises the question of how the proportionality of voting methods can be assessed beyond their axiomatic performance. We address these concerns by developing quantitative measures of proportionality. We apply these measures to evaluate the proportionality of voting rules on real-world election data. Besides STV, we consider SNTV, the Expanding Approvals Rule, and Sequential Ranked-Choice Voting. We also study the effects of ballot truncation by artificially completing truncated ballots and comparing the proportionality of outcomes under complete and truncated ballots.
Fair Division with Market Values
Authors: Siddharth Barman; Soroush Ebadian; Mohamad Latifian; Nisarg Shah
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a separate additive valuation that holds identically across all the agents. We seek allocations that are simultaneously fair with respect to the subjective valuations and under the market valuation. 

We show that an allocation that satisfies stochastically-dominant envy-freeness up to one good (SD-EF1) with respect to both the subjective valuations and the market valuation does not always exist, but the weaker guarantee of EF1 with respect to the subjective valuations along with SD-EF1 with respect to the market valuation can be guaranteed. We also study a number of other guarantees such as Pareto optimality, EFX, and  MMS. In addition, we explore non-additive valuations and extend our model to cake-cutting. Along the way, we identify several tantalizing open questions.
Multi-Robot Task Allocation Using Global Games with Negative Feedback: The Colony Maintenance Problem
Authors: Logan E. Beaver
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: In this article we address the multi-robot task allocation problem, where robots must cooperatively assign themselves to accomplish a set of tasks in their environment. We consider the colony maintenance problem as an example, where a team of robots are tasked with continuously maintaining the energy supply of a central colony. We model this as a global game, where each robot measures the energy level of the colony, and the current number of assigned robots, to determine whether or not to forage for energy sources. The key to our approach is introducing a negative feedback term into the robots' utility, which also eliminates the trivial solution where foraging or not foraging are strictly dominant strategies. We compare our approach qualitatively to existing global games, where a positive positive feedback term admits threshold-based decision making, and encourages many robots to forage simultaneously. We show how positive feedback can lead to a cascading failure in the presence of a human who recruits robots, and we demonstrate the resilience of our approach in simulation.
The Distortion of Public-Spirited Participatory Budgeting
Authors: Mark Bedaywi; Bailey Flanigan; Mohamad Latifian; Nisarg Shah
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: Participatory budgeting (PB) is an increasingly popular tool for democratically allocating limited budgets to public-good projects. In PB, constituents vote on their preferred projects via ballots, and then an aggregation rule selects a set of projects whose total cost fits within the budget. Recent work studies how to design PB ballots and aggregation rules that yield low-distortion outcomes (informally, outcomes with high social welfare). Existing distortion bounds, however, rely on strong assumptions that restrict voters' latent utilities. We prove that low distortion PB outcomes can be achieved by dropping these assumptions and instead leveraging the established idea that voters can be public-spirited: they may consider others' interests alongside their own when voting. 

Flanigan, Procaccia, and Wang (2023) prove that in public-spirited single-winner voting (the special case of PB where exactly one project can be funded) with ranking ballots, deterministic aggregation rules can achieve constant distortion. Our first contribution is to extend this analysis to PB; there, we prove that the best distortion permitted by deterministic rules with ranking ballots grows linearly in the number of projects. We find that this impossibility --- a problem in practice, where m is often large --- holds for other known ballots as well. 
Our second contribution is the design of a new PB ballot format that breaks this linear distortion barrier. This ballot asks voters to rank a predetermined set of entire feasible bundles of projects. We design multiple protocols for implementing these ballots, each striking a different trade-off between the number of bundles voters must rank and the distortion: with m bundles, we get sublinear distortion; with polynomial bundles, we get logarithmic distortion; and with pseudopolynomial bundles, we get constant distortion.
Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders
Authors: Xiaohui Bei; Pinyan Lu; Zhiqi Wang; Tao Xiao; Xiang Yan
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: The predominant setting in classic auction theory considers bidders as utility maximizers (UMs), who aim to maximize quasi-linear utility functions. Recent autobidding strategies in online advertising have sparked interest in auction design with value maximizers (VMs), who aim to maximize the total value obtained. In this work, we investigate revenue-maximizing auction design for selling a single item to a mix of UMs and VMs. Crucially, we assume the UM/VM type is private information of a bidder. This shift to a multi-parameter domain complicates the design of incentive compatible mechanisms. Under this setting, we first characterize the optimal auction structure for auctions with a single bidder. We observe that the optimal auction moves gradually from a first-price auction to a Myerson auction as the probability of the bidder being a UM increases from 0 to 1. We also extend our study to multi-bidder setting and present an algorithm for deriving the optimal lookahead auction with multiple mixed types of bidders.
Strategic Network Creation for Enabling Greedy Routing
Authors: Julian Berger; Tobias Friedrich; Pascal Lenzner; Paraskevi Machaira; Janosch Ruff
Venue: AAAI 2025 (main)

Abstract: Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents.  A key property of such communication networks is that they should be easy to navigate for routing data. For this, a common approach is greedy routing, where every device simply routes data to a neighbor that is closer to the respective destination.    

Networks of intelligent agents can be analyzed via a game-theoretic approach and in the last decades many variants of network creation games have been proposed and analyzed. 
In this paper we present the first game-theoretic network creation model that incorporates greedy routing, i.e., the strategic agents in our model are embedded in some metric space and strive for creating a network among themselves where all-pairs greedy routing is enabled. Besides this, the agents optimize their connection quality within the created network by aiming for greedy routing paths with low stretch.

For our model, we analyze the existence of (approximate)-equilibria and the computational hardness in different underlying metric spaces. E.g., we characterize the set of equilibria in 1-2-metrics and tree metrics and show that Nash equilibria always exist. For Euclidean space, the setting which is most relevant in practice, we prove that equilibria are not guaranteed to exist but that the well-known Θ-graph construction yields networks having a low stretch that are game-theoretically almost stable. For general metric spaces, we show that approximate equilibria exist where the approximation factor depends on the cost of maintaining any link.