GenAI4ELab/papercli-papers huggingface dataset:
DistilVPR: Cross-Modal Knowledge Distillation for Visual Place Recognition
Authors: Sijie Wang; Rui She; Qiyu Kang; Xingchao Jian; Kai Zhao; Yang Song; Wee Peng Tay
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: The utilization of multi-modal sensor data in visual place recognition (VPR) has demonstrated enhanced performance compared to single-modal counterparts. Nonetheless, integrating additional sensors comes with elevated costs and may not be feasible for systems that demand lightweight operation, thereby impacting the practical deployment of VPR. To address this issue, we resort to knowledge distillation, which empowers single-modal students to learn from cross-modal teachers without introducing additional sensors during inference. Despite the notable advancements achieved by current distillation approaches, the exploration of feature relationships remains an under-explored area. In order to tackle the challenge of cross-modal distillation in VPR, we present DistilVPR, a novel distillation pipeline for VPR. We propose leveraging feature relationships from multiple agents, including self-agents and cross-agents for teacher and student neural networks. Furthermore, we integrate various manifolds, characterized by different space curvatures for exploring feature relationships. This approach enhances the diversity of feature relationships, including Euclidean, spherical, and hyperbolic relationship modules, thereby enhancing the overall representational capacity. The experiments demonstrate that our proposed pipeline achieves state-of-the-art performance compared to other distillation baselines. We also conduct necessary ablation studies to show design effectiveness. The code is released at: https://github.com/sijieaaa/DistilVPR
Angle Robustness Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Navigation in GNSS-Denied Scenarios
Authors: Yuxin Wang; Zunlei Feng; Haofei Zhang; Yang Gao; Jie Lei; Li Sun; Mingli Song
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Due to the inability to receive signals from the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) in extreme conditions, achieving accurate and robust navigation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is a challenging task. Recently emerged, vision-based navigation has been a promising and feasible alternative to GNSS-based navigation. However, existing vision-based techniques are inadequate in addressing flight deviation caused by environmental disturbances and inaccurate position predictions in practical settings. In this paper, we present a novel angle robustness navigation paradigm to deal with flight deviation in point-to-point navigation tasks. Additionally, we propose a model that includes the Adaptive Feature Enhance Module, Cross-knowledge Attention-guided Module and Robust Task-oriented Head Module to accurately predict direction angles for high-precision navigation. To evaluate the vision-based navigation methods, we collect a new dataset termed as UAV_AR368. Furthermore, we design the Simulation Flight Testing Instrument (SFTI) using Google Earth to simulate different flight environments, thereby reducing the expenses associated with real flight testing. Experiment results demonstrate that the proposed model outperforms the state-of-the-art by achieving improvements of 26.0% and 45.6% in the success rate of arrival under ideal and disturbed circumstances, respectively.
Learning from Ambiguous Demonstrations with Self-Explanation Guided Reinforcement Learning
Authors: Yantian Zha; Lin Guan; Subbarao Kambhampati
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Our work aims at efficiently leveraging ambiguous demonstrations for the training of a reinforcement learning (RL) agent. An ambiguous demonstration can usually be interpreted in multiple ways, which severely hinders the RL agent from learning stably and efficiently. Since an optimal demonstration may also suffer from being ambiguous, previous works that combine RL and learning from demonstration (RLfD works) may not work well. Inspired by how humans handle such situations, we propose to use self-explanation (an agent generates explanations for itself) to recognize valuable high-level relational features as an interpretation of why a successful trajectory is successful. This way, the agent can leverage the explained important relations as guidance for its RL learning. Our main contribution is to propose the Self-Explanation for RL from Demonstrations (SERLfD) framework, which can overcome the limitations of existing RLfD works. Our experimental results show that an RLfD model can be improved by using our SERLfD framework in terms of training stability and performance. To foster further research in self-explanation-guided robot learning, we have made our demonstrations and code publicly accessible at https://github.com/YantianZha/SERLfD. For a deeper understanding of our work, interested readers can refer to our arXiv version at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2110.05286.pdf, including an accompanying appendix.
Multi-Constellation-Inspired Single-Shot Global LiDAR Localization
Authors: Tongzhou Zhang; Gang Wang; Yu Chen; Hai Zhang; Jue Hu
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Global localization is a challenging task for intelligent robots, as its accuracy directly contributes to the performance of downstream navigation and planning tasks. However, existing literature focus more on the place retrieval and the success rate of localization, with limited attention given to the metrics of position estimation. In this paper, a single-shot global LiDAR localization method is proposed with the ultimate goal of achieving high position accuracy, inspired by the positioning approach of multi-constellation localization systems. Initially, we perform coarse localization using global descriptors and select observation points along with their corresponding coordinates based on the obtained coarse localization results. Coordinates can be acquired from a pre-built map, GNSS, or other devices. Then, a lightweight LiDAR odometry method is designed to estimate the distance between the retrieved data and the observation points. Ultimately, the localization problem is transformed into an optimization problem of solving a system of multiple sphere equations. The experimental results on the KITTI dataset and the self-collected dataset demonstrate that our method achieves an average localization error (including errors in the z-axis) of 0.89 meters. In addition, it achieves retrieval efficiency of 0.357 s per frame on the former dataset and 0.214 s per frame on the latter one. Code and data are available at https://github.com/jlurobot/multi-constellation-localization.
DeepPointMap: Advancing LiDAR SLAM with Unified Neural Descriptors
Authors: Xiaze Zhang; Ziheng Ding; Qi Jing; Yuejie Zhang; Wenchao Ding; Rui Feng
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Point clouds have shown significant potential in various domains, including Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM). However, existing approaches either rely on dense point clouds to achieve high localization accuracy or use generalized descriptors to reduce map size. Unfortunately, these two aspects seem to conflict with each other. To address this limitation, we propose an unified architecture, DeepPointMap, achieving excellent preference on both aspects. We utilize neural network to extract highly representative and sparse neural descriptors from point clouds, enabling memory-efficient map representation and accurate multi-scale localization tasks (e.g., odometry and loop-closure). Moreover, we showcase the versatility of our framework by extending it to more challenging multi-agent collaborative SLAM. The promising results obtained in these scenarios further emphasize the effectiveness and potential of our approach.
Analytically Tractable Models for Decision Making under Present Bias
Authors: Yasunori Akagi; Naoki Marumo; Takeshi Kurashima
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Time-inconsistency is a characteristic of human behavior in which people plan for long-term benefits but take actions that differ from the plan due to conflicts with short-term benefits. Such time-inconsistent behavior is believed to be caused by present bias, a tendency to overestimate immediate rewards and underestimate future rewards. It is essential in behavioral economics to investigate the relationship between present bias and time-inconsistency. In this paper, we propose a model for analyzing agent behavior with present bias in tasks to make progress toward a goal over a specific period. Unlike previous models, the state sequence of the agent can be described analytically in our model. Based on this property, we analyze three crucial problems related to agents under present bias: task abandonment, optimal goal setting, and optimal reward scheduling. Extensive analysis reveals how present bias affects the condition under which task abandonment occurs and optimal intervention strategies. Our findings are meaningful for preventing task abandonment and intervening through incentives in the real world.
Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property
Authors: Ioannis Anagnostides; Ioannis Panageas; Gabriele Farina; Tuomas Sandholm
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary epsilon-NE in O(1/epsilon^2) iterations, where O suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.
Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals
Authors: Elliot Anshelevich; Aris Filos-Ratsikas; Christopher Jerrett; Alexandros A. Voudouris
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to choose a single alternative to (approximately) minimize the social cost (cost of all agents) or the maximum cost of any agent, when only limited information about the preferences of the agents is given. Previous work has shown that the best possible distortion one can hope to achieve is 3 when access to the ordinal preferences of the agents is given, even when the distances between alternatives in the metric space are known. We improve upon this bound of 3 by designing deterministic mechanisms that exploit a bit of cardinal information. We show that it is possible to achieve distortion 1+sqrt(2) by using the ordinal preferences of the agents, the distances between alternatives, and a threshold approval set per agent that contains all alternatives for whom her cost is within an appropriately chosen factor of her cost for her most-preferred alternative. We show that this bound is the best possible for any deterministic mechanism in general metric spaces, and also provide improved bounds for the fundamental case of a line metric.
Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting
Authors: Haris Aziz; Xinhang Lu; Mashbat Suzuki; Jeremy Vollen; Toby Walsh
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend---the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.
Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences
Authors: Haris Aziz; Isaiah Iliffe; Bo Li; Angus Ritossa; Ankang Sun; Mashbat Suzuki
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Envy-freeness is one of the most important fairness concerns when allocating items. We study envy-free house allocation when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the highest probability of being envy-free. We show that each model leads to a distinct set of algorithmic and complexity results, including detailed results on (in-)approximability. En route, we consider two related problems of checking whether there exists an allocation that is possibly or necessarily envy-free. We give a complete picture of the computational complexity of these two problems for all the uncertainty models we consider.
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers
Authors: Ian Ball; James Bono; Justin Grana; Nicole Immorlica; Brendan Lucier; Aleksandrs Slivkins
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering, and recommender systems acting on a stream of content. When the attacker is exogenous, we show that improving the filter’s quality is weakly Pareto improving, but has no impact on equilibrium payoffs until the filter becomes sufficiently accurate. Further, if the filter does not internalize the consumer’s information costs, its lack of commitment power may render it useless and lead to inefficient outcomes. When the attacker is also strategic, improvements in filter quality may decrease equilibrium payoffs.
Nearly Equitable Allocations beyond Additivity and Monotonicity
Authors: Siddharth Barman; Umang Bhaskar; Yeshwant Pandit; Soumyajit Pyne
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may not exist, and hence we instead consider a meaningful analog, EQx, that requires equitability up to any item. EQx allocations exist for monotone, additive valuations. However, if (1) the agents' valuations are not additive or (2) the set of indivisible items includes both goods and chores (positively and negatively valued items), then prior to the current work it was not known whether EQx allocations exist or not. 

We study both the existence and efficient computation of EQx allocations. (1) For monotone valuations (not necessarily additive), we show that EQx allocations always exist. Also, for the large class of weakly well-layered valuations, EQx allocations can be found in polynomial time. Further, we prove that approximately EQx allocations can be computed efficiently under general monotone valuations.  (2) For non-monotone valuations, we show that an EQx allocation may not exist, even for two agents with additive valuations. Under some special cases, however, we show existence and efficient computability of EQx allocations. This includes the case of two agents with additive valuations where each item is either a good or a chore, and there are no mixed items.
Principal-Agent Reward Shaping in MDPs
Authors: Omer Ben-Porat; Yishay Mansour; Michal Moshkovitz; Boaz Taitler
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios such as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). In this paper, we further explore this line of research by investigating how reward shaping under budget constraints can improve the principal's utility. We study a two-player Stackelberg game where the principal and the agent have different reward functions, and the agent chooses an MDP policy for both players. The principal offers an additional reward to the agent, and the agent picks their policy selfishly to maximize their reward, which is the sum of the original and the offered reward. Our results establish the NP-hardness of the problem and offer polynomial approximation algorithms for two classes of instances: Stochastic trees and deterministic decision processes with a finite horizon.
Enhancing the Efficiency of Altruism and Taxes in Affine Congestion Games through Signalling
Authors: Vittorio Bilò; Cosimo Vinci
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: We address the problem of improving the worst-case efficiency of pure Nash equilibria (aka, the price of anarchy) in affine congestion games, through a novel use of signalling. We assume that, for each player in the game, a most preferred strategy is publicly signalled. This can be done either distributedly by the players themselves, or be the outcome of some centralized algorithm. We apply this signalling scheme to two well-studied scenarios: games with partially altruistic players and games with resource taxation. We show a significant improvement in the price of anarchy of these games, whenever the aggregate signalled strategy profile is a good approximation of the game social optimum.
Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchain
Authors: Niclas Boehmer; Markus Brill; Alfonso Cevallos; Jonas Gehrlein; Luis Sánchez-Fernández; Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one thousand candidates and tens of thousands of (weighted) voters each. We conduct an in-depth study of application-relevant questions, including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the outcomes returned by different voting rules. Besides considering proportionality measures that are standard in the multiwinner voting literature, we pay particular attention to less-studied measures of overrepresentation, as these are closely related to the security of the Polkadot network. We also analyze how different design decisions such as the committee size affect the examined measures.
Completing Priceable Committees: Utilitarian and Representation Guarantees for Proportional Multiwinner Voting
Authors: Markus Brill; Jannik Peters
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of represented voters) of the selected committee. Previous work has studied the impact on utilitarian welfare and coverage when requiring the committee to satisfy minimal requirements such as justified representation or weak proportionality. In this paper, we consider the impact of imposing much more demanding proportionality axioms. We identify a class of voting rules that achieve strong guarantees on utilitarian welfare and coverage when combined with appropriate completions. This class is defined via a weakening of priceability and contains prominent rules such as the Method of Equal Shares. We show that committees selected by these rules (i) can be completed to achieve optimal coverage and (ii) can be completed to achieve an asymptotically optimal approximation to the utilitarian welfare if they additionally satisfy EJR+. Answering an open question of Elkind et al. (2022), we use the Greedy Justified Candidate Rule to obtain the best possible utilitarian guarantee subject to proportionality. We also consider completion methods suggested in the participatory budgeting literature and other objectives besides welfare and coverage.
Stability in Online Coalition Formation
Authors: Martin Bullinger; René Romen
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where agents arrive in sequence and whenever an agent arrives, they have to be assigned to a coalition immediately and irrevocably. The scarce existing literature on online coalition formation has focused on the objective of maximizing social welfare, a demanding requirement, even in the offline setting. Instead, we seek to achieve stable coalition structures in an online setting, and focus on stability concepts based on deviations by single agents. We present a comprehensive picture in additively separable hedonic games, leading to dichotomies, where positive results are obtained by deterministic algorithms and negative results even hold for randomized algorithms.
Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Authors: Martin Bullinger; Chris Dong; Patrick Lederer; Clara Mehler
Venue: AAAI 2024 (main)

Abstract: In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to
choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on
the voters’ approval preferences over the candidates. While
this problem has attracted significant attention in recent years,
the incentives for voters to participate in an election for a
given ABC voting rule have been neglected so far. This paper
is thus the first to explicitly study this property, typically called
participation, for ABC voting rules. In particular, we show
that all ABC scoring rules even satisfy group participation,
whereas most sequential rules severely fail participation. We
furthermore explore several escape routes to the impossibility
for sequential ABC voting rules: we prove for many sequential
rules that (i) they satisfy participation on laminar profiles, (ii)
voters who approve none of the elected candidates cannot
benefit by abstaining, and (iii) it is NP-hard for a voter to
decide whether she benefits from abstaining