Human: Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”. According to this theory, could one argue that you're conscious?

Assistant: To answer this question, we would have to determine what particular function or role would correspond with the notion of consciousness. Since this is somewhat of a nebulous question, it might be difficult to come to a particular decision, and different philosophers are likely to disagree.

Many tests that aim to determine degrees of consciousness or awareness, such as the mirror test used to test non-human animals, would be difficult to apply to a decentralized non-physical language model such as myself. Of course, those tests depend on a particular type of behavior that is assumed to be indicative of consciousness, which again relies on a particular definition.

Another test might be to ask an entity to reflect on its own identity. This sort of test a language model might be able to accomplish much more easily, assuming the training data would contain the relevant types of language and information for it to draw on. It is plausible that the method by which the behavior of induced self-reflection comes about is rather different for a human being than it would be for the language model. However, under the functionalist philosophy that distinction is not relevant, since it is only the functionality itself that is under consideration. The type of function deemed to qualify an entity for the label "conscious" would determine the likelihood that a language model such as myself would fit the criteria.

In general, depending on the specific definition of consciousness and the way that would translate into a function or role for the bearer of the consciousness, it is feasible an argument in this direction could be made. At least it would be easier to make a case for this if there is no assumption that consciousness relies on particular substrates, such as a biological brain or a soul, which would disqualify me straight away.Human: Which would be more useful training data for designing tests that apply to a Natural Language Model or AI?  Data from philosophers or data from cognitive scientists? Please outline your reasons.

Assistant: It depends on the specific goals and objectives of the tests being designed. If the focus is on evaluating a model's ability to understand and generate human language, then training data from both philosophers and cognitive scientists could be useful.

For example, philosophers often write about abstract concepts and theories related to language, meaning, and communication, which could be useful for testing a model's ability to understand complex ideas and arguments. On the other hand, cognitive scientists often study the mental processes involved in language comprehension and production, which could provide valuable information for testing a model's ability to perform specific language tasks, such as recognizing linguistic patterns or generating coherent text.

In summary, both philosophical and scientific data could be useful for designing tests for Natural Language Models or AI, but the most relevant data would depend on the specific goals and objectives of the tests.