Reference number : GC-2017-Q4-01009, amendment number : , agreement type : G, recipient legal name : Lawford, Mark (McMaster University), recipient country : CA, recipient province : nan, recipient city : Ontario, recipient postal code : nan, program name english : Collaborative Research and Development Grants - Project, program name french : Subventions de recherche et développement coopérative - projet, program purpose english : When a vehicle is designed, the car maker - the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) - makes every effort_x000D_
to ensure that the vehicle will be safe and reliable. As vehicles have increased in complexity with the addition_x000D_
of software-enabled hybrid powertrains and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, the system design and safety_x000D_
processes have had a corresponding increase in required effort and difficulty. Recently, seemingly minor_x000D_
incremental changes in the vehicle's software and/or physical design have resulted in safety recalls because of_x000D_
unforeseen subsystem interactions that have reduced vehicle safety and/or reliability to unacceptable levels. To_x000D_
help address these issues, OEMs and their suppliers collaborated to produce the standard ISO 26262 Road_x000D_
Vehicles - Functional Safety, which prescribes processes and their outputs that should be produced as part of_x000D_
the system, software and safety processes for vehicle features that require different Automotive Safety Integrity_x000D_
Levels. As OEMs and suppliers strive to be consistent with ISO 26262, an increasingly important question_x000D_
arises: when can design and safety assurance artefacts be safely reused and when do the processes and the_x000D_
resulting work products have to be redone? Automotive companies must address this key question if they want_x000D_
to remain competitive and be able to deliver ever safer vehicles at a purchase cost that the public is willing to_x000D_
pay. To help the Canadian automotive industry address this issue, this project will model the design and safety_x000D_
artefacts and their relationships with explicit safety assurance arguments known as a (safety) assurance case._x000D_
We will provide model management processes and tools to analyze the models and determine the impact of a_x000D_
design change on the assurance case. This will help engineers determine which parts of the assurance case can_x000D_
be safely reused and where it requires further engineering effort to demonstrate that the new system is_x000D_
acceptably safe. The work will be extended to manage models of safety assurance for entire product lines to_x000D_
help OEMs deal with the reality of manufacturing for global product development., program purpose french : When a vehicle is designed, the car maker - the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) - makes every effort_x000D_
to ensure that the vehicle will be safe and reliable. As vehicles have increased in complexity with the addition_x000D_
of software-enabled hybrid powertrains and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, the system design and safety_x000D_
processes have had a corresponding increase in required effort and difficulty. Recently, seemingly minor_x000D_
incremental changes in the vehicle's software and/or physical design have resulted in safety recalls because of_x000D_
unforeseen subsystem interactions that have reduced vehicle safety and/or reliability to unacceptable levels. To_x000D_
help address these issues, OEMs and their suppliers collaborated to produce the standard ISO 26262 Road_x000D_
Vehicles - Functional Safety, which prescribes processes and their outputs that should be produced as part of_x000D_
the system, software and safety processes for vehicle features that require different Automotive Safety Integrity_x000D_
Levels. As OEMs and suppliers strive to be consistent with ISO 26262, an increasingly important question_x000D_
arises: when can design and safety assurance artefacts be safely reused and when do the processes and the_x000D_
resulting work products have to be redone? Automotive companies must address this key question if they want_x000D_
to remain competitive and be able to deliver ever safer vehicles at a purchase cost that the public is willing to_x000D_
pay. To help the Canadian automotive industry address this issue, this project will model the design and safety_x000D_
artefacts and their relationships with explicit safety assurance arguments known as a (safety) assurance case._x000D_
We will provide model management processes and tools to analyze the models and determine the impact of a_x000D_
design change on the assurance case. This will help engineers determine which parts of the assurance case can_x000D_
be safely reused and where it requires further engineering effort to demonstrate that the new system is_x000D_
acceptably safe. The work will be extended to manage models of safety assurance for entire product lines to_x000D_
help OEMs deal with the reality of manufacturing for global product development., agreement title english : Safety assurance at GM and using model management to support it, agreement title french : Safety assurance at GM and using model management to support it, agreement number : CRDPJ, agreement value : 862497.0, agreement start date : 2018-02-07, agreement end date : nan, description english : nan, description french : nan, expected results english : nan, expected results french : nan, additional information english : Grant or Award spanning more than one fiscal year (2017-2018 to 2021-2022)., additional information french : Subvention ou bourse octroyée s'appliquant à plus d'un exercice financier (2017-2018 à 2021-2022)., owner organization : nserc-crsng, owner organization title : Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada | Conseil de recherches en sciences naturelles et en génie du Canada