Reference number : GC-2017-Q1-03065, amendment number : , agreement type : G, recipient legal name : Vetta, Adrian (McGill University)|Vetta, Adrian (Université McGill), recipient country : CA, recipient province : nan, recipient city : Quebec|Québec, recipient postal code : nan, program name english : Discovery Grants Program - Individual, program name french : Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles, program purpose english : This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. 
For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses., program purpose french : This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. 
For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses., agreement title english : Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks., agreement title french : Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks., agreement number : RGPIN, agreement value : 170000.0, agreement start date : 2017-05-10, agreement end date : nan, description english : nan, description french : nan, expected results english : nan, expected results french : nan, additional information english : Grant or Award spanning more than one fiscal year. (2017-2018 to 2022-2023), additional information french : Subvention ou bourse octroyée s'appliquant à plus d'un exercice financier. (2017-2018 à 2022-2023), owner organization : nserc-crsng, owner organization title : Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada | Conseil de recherches en sciences naturelles et en génie du Canada