FranklinWillemen/mapa_plus huggingface dataset:
In August 2008 , JQ married his new partner in a civil ceremony without his first marriage having been annulled . 26 Having learned of the second marriage , IR dismissed JQ , by letter dated 30 March 2009 , with effect from 30 September 2009 . 27 JQ brought an action against the dismissal before the Arbeitsgericht ( Labour Court , Germany ) , claiming that his remarriage was not a valid ground for the dismissal .
In JQ ’ s view , the dismissal was an infringement of the principle of equal treatment because , under the GrO 1993 , the remarriage of a head of department of the Protestant faith or of no faith would not have had any consequences for the employment relationship between that person and IR . 28 IR asserted that JQ ’ s dismissal was socially justified .
Given that JQ occupied a managerial post within the meaning of Article 5 ( 3 ) of the GrO 1993 , by entering into a marriage that is invalid under canon law , he had clearly infringed his obligations under his employment contract with IR . 29 The Arbeitsgericht ( Labour Court ) upheld JQ ’ s application .
As the appeal lodged by IR against that decision was dismissed by the Landesarbeitsgericht ( Higher Labour Court , Germany ) , IR then brought an application for review on a point of law before the Bundesarbeitsgericht ( Federal Labour Court , Germany ) , which dismissed the application , by judgment of 8 September 2011 , holding , in essence , that JQ ’ s dismissal was not justified , as IR would not dismiss employees occupying the same post as JQ who were not of the Roman Catholic faith in the event of their remarriage . 30 IR brought the case before the Bundesverfassungsgericht ( Federal Constitutional Court , Germany ) .
By order of 22 October 2014 , that court set aside the judgment of the Bundesarbeitsgericht ( Federal Labour Court ) and referred the case back to the latter court . 31 The Bundesarbeitsgericht ( Federal Labour Court ) considers that the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings depends on whether JQ ’ s dismissal by IR is lawful under Paragraph 9 ( 2 ) of the AGG .
However , that court observes that that provision must be interpreted in accordance with EU law and that , consequently , the outcome of the dispute depends on the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , which was transposed into national law by Paragraph 9 ( 2 ) of the AGG . 32 More specifically , the referring court is uncertain , in the first place , whether , as a private limited company owned by the Catholic Church , IR falls within the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 and is , therefore , entitled to require its employees to act in good faith and with loyalty to the ethos of that church .
According to that court , it cannot be ruled out that EU law precludes such a company , which is established under private law , active in the healthcare sector and applies market practices , from invoking rights that are specific to the Church . 33 In that respect , the referring court is uncertain whether churches or other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief may themselves definitively determine what constitutes acting in good faith and with loyalty ‘ to the ethos of the organisation ’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , and whether in that regard they may also — as they are permitted under German constitutional law — independently impose a scale of loyalty requirements for the same managerial positions that takes into account only the denominational affiliation of the employee . 34 In the second place , the referring court notes that , after the Court has interpreted the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , it will be required , taking into account all the rules of national law and applying the interpretation methods recognised by that law , to decide whether and to what extent Article 9 ( 2 ) of the AGG can be interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 and , if that provision of national law does not lend itself to such consistent interpretation , whether that provision must be disapplied in whole or in part . 35 The referring court is uncertain whether the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief enshrined in Article 21 ( 1 ) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( ‘ the Charter ’ ) confers an individual right on a person that can be enforced by that person before the national courts and which , in disputes between private individuals , requires those courts not to apply national provisions that are incompatible with that prohibition .
While it is aware that the Charter entered into force only on 1 December 2009 and the dismissal at issue in the main proceedings occurred in March 2009 , the referring court notes that it is arguable that , prior to the entry into force of the Charter , a prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief already existed as a general principle of EU law .
In accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law , that law takes precedence over national law , including constitutional law . 36 In the third place , the referring court seeks to ascertain which criteria are to be used to determine whether the requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty is consistent with the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 . 37 In those circumstances , the Bundesarbeitsgericht ( Federal Labour Court ) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling . ‘ ( 1 ) Is the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of [ Directive 2000 / 78 ] to be interpreted as meaning that the [ Catholic ] Church can decide with binding effect that an organisation such as the defendant in the present proceedings is to differentiate , in connection with the requirement that employees in managerial positions act in good faith and with loyalty , between employees who belong to the same church and those who belong to another faith or to none at all ?
( 2 ) If the first question is answered in the negative : ( a ) Must a provision of national law , in this case Article 9 ( 2 ) of the [ AGG ] , under which unequal treatment of this kind , based on the employee ’ s religious affiliation , is justified by reference to the Church ’ s self-perception , be disapplied in these proceedings ?
( b ) What conditions apply , in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of [ Directive 2000 / 78 ] , in respect of the requirement that employees of a church or one of the other organisations mentioned in that provision act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation ’ s ethos ? ’
Consideration of the questions referred The first question and the second part of the second question 38 By its first question and the second part of its second question , which it is appropriate to consider together , the referring court asks , in essence , whether the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 must be interpreted as meaning that a church or other organisation the ethos of which is based on religion or belief and which manages a hospital in the form of a private limited company can definitively decide to subject its employees performing managerial duties to a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty that differs according to the faith or lack of faith of such employees and , if that is not the case , what criteria are to be used to determine whether , in each individual case , such a requirement is consistent with that provision . 39 In the light of the explanation provided by the referring court in connection with its first question , it is necessary to determine , in the first place , with regard to the scope ratione personae of the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , whether the fact that , in the case in the main proceedings , the entity requiring that its employees act in good faith and with loyalty is a private limited company , is sufficient to prevent that company from relying on that provision . 40 In that respect , given the general nature of the terms used in the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 to define the scope ratione personae of that provision , namely ‘ churches and other public or private organisations ’ , considerations as to the nature and legal form of the entity concerned cannot affect the applicability of that provision to a situation such as that in the main proceedings .
As is apparent from , inter alia , the clause ‘ provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with ’ , that right must be exercised in a manner consistent with the other provisions of Directive 2000 / 78 and , in particular , the criteria set out in the first subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of the directive , which must , where appropriate , be amenable to effective judicial review , as pointed out in paragraph 43 above . 47 Contrary to what is maintained by , in particular , IR and the German government , the lawfulness of a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty imposed by a church or other organisation whose ethos is based on religion or belief cannot be examined by reference only to national law , but must take into account the provisions of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 and the criteria set out therein , it not being possible to exclude the question of compliance with those criteria from effective judicial review . 48 Article 17 TFEU cannot invalidate that conclusion .
First , the wording of that provision corresponds , in essence , to that of Declaration No 11 on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations , annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam .
The fact that Declaration No 11 is expressly mentioned in recital 24 of Directive 2000 / 78 shows that the EU legislature must have taken that declaration into account when adopting the directive , especially Article 4 ( 2 ) thereof , since that provision refers specifically to national legislation and practices in force on the date of adoption of the directive .
Second , while it is true that Article 17 TFEU expresses the neutrality of the European Union towards the organisation by the Member States of their relations with churches and religious associations and communities , that article is not such as to exempt compliance with the criteria set out in Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 from effective judicial review ( see , to that effect , judgment of 17 April 2018 , Egenberger , C ‑ 414 / 16 , EU : C : 2018 : 257 , paragraphs 56 to 58 ) . 49 In the third place , with regard to the conditions for the application of the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , it is to be noted , in the light of what was stated in paragraph 46 above , that a difference of treatment in respect of the requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to the ethos of the employer , such as that at issue in the main proceedings , which the parties agree is based solely on the faith of the employees , must comply , inter alia , with the criteria set out in the first subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of that directive . 50 In that regard , the Court has found that it is clear from that provision that it is on the basis of the ‘ nature ’ of the activities concerned or the ‘ context ’ in which they are carried out that religion or belief may , in certain circumstances , constitute a genuine , legitimate and justified occupational requirement in the light of the ethos of the church or organisation concerned within the meaning of that provision .
Thus the lawfulness , in the light of that provision , of a difference of treatment on grounds of religion or belief depends on the objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned .
Therefore , it does not appear to be a genuine requirement of that occupational activity within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , which is , nevertheless , a matter for the referring court to verify . 59 The finding that adherence to that aspect of the ethos of the organisation concerned cannot , in the present case , constitute a genuine occupational requirement is corroborated by the fact , which was confirmed by IR during the hearing before the Court and referred to by the Advocate General in point 67 of his Opinion , that positions of medical responsibility entailing managerial duties , similar to that occupied by JQ , were entrusted to IR employees who were not of the Catholic faith and , consequently , not subject to the same requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to IR ’ s ethos . 60 Next , it should be noted that , in the light of the documents submitted to the Court , the requirement at issue in the main proceedings does not appear to be justified within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 .
However , it is for the referring court to verify whether IR has established that , in the light of the circumstances of the main proceedings , there is a probable and substantial risk of undermining its ethos or its right of autonomy ( see , to that effect , judgment of 17 April 2018 , Egenberger , C ‑ 414 / 16 , EU : C : 2018 : 257 , paragraph 67 ) . 61 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the answer to the first question and the second part of the second question is that the second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 must be interpreted as meaning : – first , that a church or other organisation the ethos of which is based on religion or belief and which manages a hospital in the form of a private limited company cannot decide to subject its employees performing managerial duties to a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos that differs according to the faith or lack of faith of such employees , without that decision being subject , where appropriate , to effective judicial review to ensure that it fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 4 ( 2 ) of that directive ; and – second , that a difference of treatment , as regards a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos , between employees in managerial positions according to the faith or lack of faith of those employees is consistent with that directive only if , bearing in mind the nature of the occupational activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out , the religion or belief constitutes an occupational requirement that is genuine , legitimate and justified in the light of the ethos of the church or organisation concerned and is consistent with the principle of proportionality , which is a matter to be determined by the national courts .
The prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief , now enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter , is therefore a mandatory general principle of EU law and is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right that they may actually rely on in disputes between them in a field covered by EU law ( see , to that effect , judgment of 17 April 2018 , Egenberger , C ‑ 414 / 16 , EU : C : 2018 : 257 , paragraph 76 ) . 70 Accordingly , in the main proceedings , if it considers that it is impossible for it to interpret the national provision at issue in a manner that is consistent with EU law , the referring court must disapply that provision . 71 In the light of the foregoing considerations , the answer to the first part of the second question is that a national court hearing a dispute between two individuals is obliged , where it is not possible for it to interpret the applicable national law in a manner that is consistent with Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , to provide , within the limits of its jurisdiction , the legal protection which individuals derive from the general principles of EU law , such as the principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief , now enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter , and to guarantee the full effectiveness of the rights that flow from those principles , by disapplying , if need be , any contrary provision of national law .
Costs 72 Since these proceedings are , for the parties to the main proceedings , a step in the action before the national court , the decision on costs is a matter for that court .
On those grounds , the Court ( Grand Chamber ) hereby rules : 1 .
The second subparagraph of Article 4 ( 2 ) of Council Directive 2000 / 78 / EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning : – first , that a church or other organisation the ethos of which is based on religion or belief and which manages a hospital in the form of a private limited company cannot decide to subject its employees performing managerial duties to a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos that differs according to the faith or lack of faith of such employees , without that decision being subject , where appropriate , to effective judicial review to ensure that it fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 4 ( 2 ) of that directive ; and – second , that a difference of treatment , as regards a requirement to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos , between employees in managerial positions according to the faith or lack of faith of those employees is consistent with that directive only if , bearing in mind the nature of the occupational activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out , the religion or belief constitutes an occupational requirement that is genuine , legitimate and justified in the light of the ethos of the church or organisation concerned and is consistent with the principle of proportionality , which is a matter to be determined by the national courts . 2 .
A national court hearing a dispute between two individuals is obliged , where it is not possible for it to interpret the applicable national law in a manner that is consistent with Article 4 ( 2 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , to provide , within the limits of its jurisdiction , the legal protection which individuals derive from the general principles of EU law , such as the principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief , now enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , and to guarantee the full effectiveness of the rights that flow from those principles , by disapplying , if need be , any contrary provision of national law .
Petición de decisión prejudicial planteada por el Arbeitsgericht Cottbus — Kammern Senftenberg ( Alemania ) el 2 de mayo de 2018 — Reiner Grafe y Jürgen Pohle Südbrandenburger Nahverkehrs GmbH y OSL Bus GmbH ( Asunto C - 298 / 18 ) Lengua de procedimiento : alemán Órgano jurisdiccional remitente Arbeitsgericht Cottbus — Kammern Senftenberg Partes en el procedimiento principal Demandantes : Reiner Grafe y Jürgen Pohle Demandadas : Südbrandenburger Nahverkehrs GmbH y OSL Bus GmbH Cuestiones prejudiciales ¿ Debe considerarse como traspaso de centro de actividad , a efectos del artículo 1 , apartado 1 , de la Directiva 77 / 187 / CEE , 1 una situación en la que la explotación de líneas de autobuses se transfiere de una empresa de transporte a otra , a raíz de un procedimiento de adjudicación organizado de conformidad con la Directiva 92 / 50 / CEE , 2 sobre adjudicación de contratos públicos de servicios , aunque entre las dos empresas mencionadas no se produzca una cesión de equipamiento significativo , concretamente de autobuses ?
El hecho de considerar que los autobuses , en el caso de una adjudicación temporal de servicios , ya no sean determinantes en la evaluación del valor del centro de actividad , conforme a una decisión empresarial razonable , debido a su antigüedad y a las nuevas exigencias técnicas ( datos de emisiones , vehículos de plataforma baja ) , ¿ justifica que el Tribunal de Justicia se aparte de su resolución de 25 de enero de 2001 ( C - 172 / 99 ) en el sentido de admitir que en tales circunstancias la aplicación de la Directiva 77 / 187 / CEE también pueda basarse en la transferencia de una parte significativa del personal ?
1 Directiva 77 / 187 / CEE del Consejo , de 14 de febrero de 1977 , sobre la aproximación de las legislaciones de los Estados miembros relativas al mantenimiento de los derechos de los trabajadores en caso de traspasos de empresas , de centros de actividad o de partes de centros de actividad ( DO 1977 , L 61 , p . 26 ; EE 05 / 02 , p . 122 ) .2 Directiva 92 / 50 / CEE del Consejo , de 18 de junio de 1992 , sobre coordinación de los procedimientos de adjudicación de los contratos públicos de servicios ( DO 1992 , L 209 , p . 1 ) .
Sentencia del Tribunal General ( Sala Novena ) de 21 de junio de 2018 — Haverkamp IP / EUIPO — Sissel ( Felpudo ) ( Asunto T ‑ 227 / 16 ) « Dibujo o modelo de la Unión — Procedimiento de nulidad — Registro internacional que designa la Unión Europea — Dibujo o modelo de la Unión registrado que representa un felpudo — Dibujo o modelo anterior — Motivo de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Usuario informado — Grado de libertad del autor — Prueba de la saturación de la técnica — Inexistencia de impresión global distinta — Artículo 6 y artículo 25 , apartado 1 , letra b ) , del Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 — Artículo 63 , apartado 1 , del Reglamento n.º 6 / 2002 » 1 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Dibujo o modelo que no produce en el usuario informado una impresión general distinta de la producida por el dibujo o modelo anterior — Criterios de apreciación [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , arts . 6 , ap . 2 , y 25 , ap . 1 , letra b ) ] ( véase el apartado 22 ) 2 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Divulgación por el autor o su causahabiente — Prueba de la divulgación [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , arts . 6 , ap . 1 , letra b ) , 7 , ap . 1 , y 65 , ap . 1 ; Reglamento ( CE ) de la Comisión n.º 2245 / 2002 , art . 28 , ap . 1 , letra b ) , incisos v ) y vi ) ] ( véanse los apartados 25 a 28 ) 3 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Usuario informado — Concepto [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , arts . 6 , ap . 1 , y 25 , ap . 1 , letra b ) ] ( véanse los apartados 36 y 37 ) 4 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Solicitud de registro — Requisitos — Indicación de los productos [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , art . 36 , aps . 2 y 6 ] ( véanse los apartados 38 y 39 ) 5 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Dibujo o modelo que no produce en el usuario informado una impresión general distinta de la producida por el dibujo o modelo anterior — Representación de un felpudo [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , arts . 6 , ap . 1 , y 25 , ap . 1 , letra b ) ] ( véanse los apartados 40 , 41 , 51 , 58 , 59 y 73 a 78 ) 6 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Normas de procedimiento — Examen de oficio de los hechos — Acción de nulidad — Examen limitado a los motivos invocados [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , art . 63 , ap . 1 ] ( véanse los apartados 49 y 50 ) 7 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Dibujo o modelo que no produce en el usuario informado una impresión general distinta de la producida por el dibujo o modelo anterior — Criterios de apreciación — Libertad del autor [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , arts . 6 , ap . 2 , y 25 , ap . 1 , letra b ) ] ( véase el apartado 54 ) 8 .
Dibujos o modelos comunitarios — Motivos de nulidad — Falta de carácter singular — Dibujo o modelo que no produce en el usuario informado una impresión general distinta de la producida por el dibujo o modelo anterior — Saturación de la técnica — Pertinencia [ Reglamento ( CE ) n.º 6 / 2002 del Consejo , art . 6 , ap . 1 ] ( véanse los apartados 63 y 66 ) 9 .