FranklinWillemen/mapa_plus huggingface dataset:
Due to the refusal of the Equality Tribunal to consider the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue , the Minister sought judicial review before the High Court . 20 .
First , the Minister asked the High Court to prohibit the Equality Tribunal from proceeding with an investigation of the complaints of the notice parties .
Second , the Minister asked the High Court to declare that the Equality Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the complaints . 21 .
The High Court ruled on 17 February 2009 that the Equality Tribunal was not empowered , under national law , to proceed with the hearing , which implicitly assumed competence to overrule or disapply national legislation such as the age restriction measure . 22 .
The Equality Tribunal appealed that decision to the Supreme Court .
By the time the matter came to be considered by the Supreme Court , the Equality Tribunal had become the WRC . 23 .
The Supreme Court delivered a judgment on 15 June 2017 ( ‘ the judgment of 15 June 2017 ’ ) . ( 7 ) It confirmed the finding of the High Court that the WRC does not have jurisdiction to disapply national law .
The Supreme Court nevertheless added that cases which would ordinarily fall within the jurisdiction of the WRC , but in which that administrative body could have the obligation under national or EU law to disapply national legislation , must instead be brought before the High Court . 24 .
Entertaining doubts as to whether such a division of jurisdiction between a statutory body and a court of law is compatible with EU law , the referring court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling : ‘ Where ( a ) A national body is established by law and has a general jurisdiction conferred on it to inter alia ensure enforcement of [ EU ] law in a particular area ; and ( b ) National law would require that such body not have jurisdiction in a limited category of case where an effective remedy would require the disapplication of national legislation on the basis of national or [ EU ] law ; and ( c ) Appropriate national courts would have [ jurisdiction ] to make any appropriate order disapplying national legislation which was required to ensure compliance with the measure of [ EU ] law in question , would have jurisdiction to entertain cases in which such a remedy was necessary , would have jurisdiction in such cases to provide any remedy mandated by [ EU ] law and where the remedy provided in the courts has been assessed , in accordance with the jurisprudence of the [ Court ] , as complying with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness Must the statutory body concerned nonetheless be taken to have [ jurisdiction ] to entertain a complaint that national legislation was in breach of relevant [ EU ] law and , if upholding that complaint , disapply that legislation notwithstanding that national law would confer the jurisdiction in all cases , involving challenges to the validity of legislation on any ground or requiring the disapplication of legislation , on a court established under the Constitution rather than the body in question ? ’
Written observations have been submitted by the Minister and the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána , Ireland , the WRC , the first and third notice parties , the Czech Government and the European Commission .
Apart from the Czech Government , those parties also presented oral argument at the hearing held on 5 June 2018 .
Analysis 26 .
Before examining the question referred , I shall first briefly address an admissibility issue raised by the Czech Government .
Admissibility 27 .
In its written observations , the Czech Government argues that the request for a preliminary ruling should be declared inadmissible .
In that government ’ s view , the referring court has not specified the provision of Directive 2000 / 78 with which the national legislation in question might be in conflict : rather , the wording of the question referred is so general that it lacks any connection to the directive or other provisions of EU law . 28 .
That is indeed true .
It does not , however , mean that the request is inadmissible . 29 .
The Court will refuse to answer a question referred only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought is unrelated to the facts underlying the case pending before the referring court , or the object of those proceedings , where the problem is hypothetical , or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it . ( 8 ) 30 .
It is clear from the order for reference in the present case that the question referred does not concern the compatibility of the age restriction measure ( or the rule of jurisdiction in question ) with any specific provision of Directive 2000 / 78 .
Rather , the Court is asked to clarify a question of principle that reaches far beyond the individual provisions of the directive .
As already indicated , it concerns the compatibility with EU law of a ( constitutional ) rule that divides jurisdiction between a statutory body , the WRC , and the High Court in specific cases on the basis of the nature of the complaint made . 31 .
Moreover , the order for reference contains both the factual and legal material necessary for the Court to give a useful answer to the question referred .
That order also sets out clearly why the problem is neither hypothetical nor unrelated to the facts underlying the case pending before it . 32 .
Consequently , the request for a preliminary ruling must be declared admissible .
Substance 33 .
In determining whether the WRC had jurisdiction in cases where an effective remedy would require the disapplication of national legislation on the basis of national or EU law , the referring court held that , as a matter of Irish constitutional law , the prerogative of disapplying or setting aside a provision of primary or secondary legislation is in principle confined to ordinary courts . 34 .
That is because , unless otherwise provided for by EU law , rules of jurisdiction must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental requirement , set out in Article 34 of the Constitution , that justice be administered in courts established under the terms of the Constitution . 35 .
In that regard , the referring court also observed that , exceptionally , Article 37.1 of the Constitution allows a person or body to be authorised by law to exercise ‘ limited functions and powers of a judicial nature ’ in non-criminal matters .
Thus , under Irish law , powers of a judicial nature may be conferred by statute on a statutory body , provided that those powers are limited . 36 .
The WRC is such a statutory body with limited judicial functions .
In accordance with the Employment Equality Acts , complainants must refer to the WRC for the first instance adjudication of a complaint of discrimination in the context of employment . ( 9 ) More particularly , the WRC deals with complaints regarding breaches ( by employers and service providers ) of , and disputes as to entitlements under , employment , equality and equal status legislation .
Once a complaint is brought before the WRC , the Director General of the WRC considers at the outset whether the case can be referred to a mediation officer for mediation between the parties involved .
If the case is not suitable for mediation , the Director General will refer the complaint to an adjudication officer for adjudication . ( 10 ) 37 .
In its judgment of 15 June 2017 , the referring court found , in the context of the jurisdictional issue that had been brought before it , that the WRC has no authority , as a matter of national law , to disapply a provision of national legislation .
That is because no such authority had been conferred on the WRC by statute .
The referring court also found that no such authority could arise by implication . 38 .
The referring court thus held that , in the light of the constitutional requirements of the Irish legal order , cases requiring the disapplication of national legislation fall , as a general rule , outside the jurisdiction of the WRC .
Instead of the WRC , complainants must address their claims directly to the High Court , which does have jurisdiction to hear such cases . 39 .
The division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court is based on the potential remedy required to cure the alleged discrimination .
More specifically , the WRC does not have jurisdiction to consider a complaint where that case involves ( if the complaint were considered to be successful ) the need to disapply a measure of primary or secondary national legislation . 40 .
The High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear such cases .
Therefore , complainants , such as the notice parties , who consider themselves wronged by a legislative instrument ( or whose complaint would otherwise require disapplication of national law ) must instigate ‘ judicial review proceedings ’ before the High Court in order to obtain relief through disapplication of a provision of national law deemed contrary to a superior norm ( here : Directive 2000 / 78 ) . 41 .
But is the division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court compatible with EU law ?
42 .
That question , referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling , clearly touches upon the limits of the procedural autonomy of the Member States .
However , the question requires first and foremost consideration of the constitutional principle of the primacy of EU law , and , as an organic part thereof , the obligation of all organs of the Member State to ensure , within their respective jurisdiction , full effectiveness of EU law . 43 .
Before addressing those issues , it must be emphasised from the outset that the question referred does not explicitly seek from the Court an interpretation of the principle of procedural autonomy and of the corollary principles of equivalence and effectiveness .
On the contrary , the referring court states that it has already determined , in the light of the Court ’ s case-law , that the rule of jurisdiction complies with those principles .
The Supreme Court of Ireland therefore in essence asks the Court to clarify whether , despite compliance with those principles , the rule of jurisdiction is contrary to EU law . 44 .
Bearing in mind the division of tasks between the Court and national courts in the preliminary-ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU , it is ( first and foremost ) in that light that the question referred should in my view be examined . 1 .
The interplay between the principle of primacy and the procedural autonomy of Member States 45 .
It may certainly be so that the distinction between the act of leaving a provision unapplied and that of setting aside a provision is sometimes merely theoretical in practice .
It may also be true that , from the perspective of a specific domestic legal system , no real distinction can be drawn between the two . ( 11 ) Nonetheless , as a matter of EU law , the distinction between the obligation to refrain from applying a provision of national law ( because that provision is contrary to EU law ) in a specific case and the obligation to set aside such a provision , with the broader effect that that provision is no longer valid for any purpose ( ex tunc or ex nunc ) , is an important one . 46 .
The line of case-law devolving from Simmenthal , establishing the constitutional principle of primacy and underscoring the role of courts and administrative authorities in giving full effect to EU law , builds on that distinction . ( 12 ) That distinction is premised on the decentralised architecture of the EU legal system that leaves to each Member State the task of defining the appropriate avenues for seeking redress for breach of rights deriving from EU law , and more importantly , the institutions vested with the authority to set aside ( or invalidate ) legislation .
( a ) The need to ensure full effectiveness of EU law : the obligation of all organs of the State to refrain from applying national law that is contrary to EU law 47 .
The line of case-law devolving from the Court ’ s judgment in Simmenthal ( 13 ) concerns the disapplication of legislation , or more specifically , the obligation of the organs of the State to refrain from applying provisions of national law that are contrary to EU law , an inevitable corollary of the constitutional doctrine of direct effect established in van Gend en Loos . ( 14 ) In addition to laying the groundwork for a network of EU courts , the Court famously held in Simmenthal : [ E ] very national court must , in a case within its jurisdiction , apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it , whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule .
Accordingly , any provision of a national legal system and any legislative , administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law .
This would be the case in the event of a conflict between a provision of Community law and a subsequent national law if the solution of the conflict were to be reserved for an authority with a discretion of its own , other than the court called upon to apply Community law , even if such an impediment to the full effectiveness of Community law were only temporary . … therefore … a national court which is called upon , within the limits of its jurisdiction , to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions , if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation , even if adopted subsequently , and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means . ’ ( 15 ) 48 .
In other words , Simmenthal concerned ( among other issues of fundamental constitutional importance ) the powers of a lower court to refrain from applying a provision of national law contrary to EU law without waiting for a superior court to set aside that provision . ( 16 ) 49 .
The subsequent case-law of the Court has , however , made clear that that obligation also rests on other organs of the State , including administrative authorities .
In Costanzo , ( 17 ) the Court held that administrative authorities are under the same obligation as national courts to apply the provisions of a directive having direct effect .
The Court considered that when the conditions under which individuals may rely on the provisions of a directive before national courts are met , all organs of the administration ( including municipalities ) , are obliged to apply those provisions and to refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them . ( 18 ) 50 .
In CIF , ( 19 ) at issue was inter alia the ( contested ) jurisdiction of the Italian competition authority to disapply national legislation that required or facilitated conduct contrary to Article 81 ( 1 ) EC ( now Article 101 ( 1 ) TFEU ) .
The undertakings under investigation argued that the authority was under an obligation to apply such national legislation and could not leave it unapplied .
The competition authority itself argued that a power to do so derived from the principles of direct effect and the primacy of EU law . 51 .
In that context , the Courtreiterated that the duty to leave national legislation contrary to EU law unapplied concerns all organs of the State , including administrative authorities .
That duty entails , if the circumstances so require , the obligation to take all appropriate measures to enable EU law to be fully applied . ( 20 ) 52 .
The Court then pointed out that a national competition authority was responsible for ensuring that Article 81 EC was observed .
That provision , read in conjunction with Article 10 EC ( now Article 4 ( 3 ) TEU ) , imposed a duty on Member States to refrain from introducing measures contrary to EU competition rules .
Those rules would be rendered less effective if the national competition authority was not able to declare a national measure contrary to Article 81 EC ( and Article 10 EC ) and if , consequently , it failed to disapply that national measure . ( 21 ) 53 .
The abovementioned case-law thus makes clear that it is irrelevant whether the national legal system grants the organ of the State in question the power to refrain from applying a provision of national law that is contrary to EU law .
That organ must nevertheless do so where it is necessary in order to give full effect to EU law . 54 .
However , it must be emphasised that , in accordance with the dictum of the Court in Simmenthal , such an obligation exists only where the organ in question is acting within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon it ( as a matter of national law ) . ( 22 ) 55 .
In relation to national courts in particular , the Court has expressly held that the obligation to disapply national law is circumscribed by the jurisdiction conferred upon the national court asked to apply provisions of EU law .
That statement suggests , on the one hand , that the Court is mindful of the freedom that Member States should retain in defining , in accordance with their constitutional traditions , their judicial and administrative infrastructure .
On the other hand , it signals deference to the divergent constitutional systems that together form the foundation of the EU legal system . 56 .
In the final analysis , the case-law thus seeks to ensure that an organ of the State , acting within the judicial and / or administrative structure of the Member State concerned , can adequately protect an individual ’ s rights deriving from EU law and thus ensure full effectiveness of EU law .
( b ) The obligation to ensure full effectiveness of EU law within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon the organ in question 57 .
The WRC is the body specifically designated by the Irish legislature to ensure , in accordance with Article 9 ( 1 ) of Directive 2000 / 78 , that the obligations arising from the directive are effectively enforced .
It ordinarily has jurisdiction to deal with complaints pertaining to discrimination in the context of employment . 58 .
It could therefore be argued that the principle of primacy , introduced by the Court in Simmenthal in an , at the time , innovative manner , requires that the WRC must be able to disapply the provisions of national law which it deems contrary to Directive 2000 / 78 ( here : the age restriction measure ) .
That is essentially argued by the WRC , the first and third named notice parties and the Commission . 59 .
Such an approach has a certain appeal .
However , I am not persuaded that it is the correct one . 60 .
At this juncture , it is very important to stress that the constitutional importance of the primacy of EU law as a fundamental principle of the sui generis EU legal system cannot be overstated .
Because of its fundamental importance , the primacy of EU law does not allow for exceptions .
Indeed , allowing exceptions to primacy would be detrimental to the very bedrock on which the EU legal system is built . 61 .
Therefore , it is clear to me that any domestic rule ( constitutional or otherwise ) confining , in a general manner , the disapplication of national legislation to courts is clearly contrary to the principle of the primacy of EU law , as established by the Court in particular in Simmenthal and Costanzo .
Indeed , there is no doubt that such a rule would stand in stark contrast to the rule established by the Court according to which all organs of the administration are obliged to apply the provisions of EU law having direct effect and to refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them . ( 23 ) 62 .
On a closer assessment , however , the present case can be distinguished from the case-law devolving from Simmenthal .
Significantly , the rule of jurisdiction at issue in the main proceedings does not call into question the primacy of EU law , nor , by extension , the full effectiveness of EU law . 63 .
This case is about whether EU law mandates which judicial body ought to have jurisdiction to deal with a particular category of case . 64 .
The present case differs from the situation in which a court having substantive jurisdiction to hear a case , as in Simmenthal , or in which an authority undoubtedly having exclusive competence to take an administrative decision , as in Costanzo , are limited in their respective powers to give full effect to EU law and thus , where necessary , to provide an effective remedy in case of a breach of EU law . 65 .
The present case also differs from the situation underlying CIF ( a variation of the situation described above ) ; that is to say , a situation in which a national authority does not have explicit power to disapply national legislation that is contrary to EU competition rules , the observance of which was to be ensured by that very authority . 66 .
It should be emphasised that the situation in the present case is one where national law , as interpreted by the referring court , divides the substantive jurisdiction in specific cases between the WRC and the High Court by confining to the latter exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving a challenge to the validity of legislation or requiring the disapplication of legislation . 67 .
In that very specific procedural context , caution must in my view be exercised in drawing parallels with the line of case-law devolving from Simmenthal . 68 .
As already mentioned , the rationale of that case-law lies in ensuring full effectiveness of EU law and in particular in enabling an individual to obtain effective protection for his rights deriving from EU law before the administrative body or court that hasjurisdiction to consider the case .
To ensure such protection , all organs of the State must also have the power to refrain from applying a provision of national law , even where the national legal system does not give that organ power to do so .
It would be problematic from the viewpoint of the full effectiveness of EU law if it were first necessary to seek a declaration of incompatibility with EU law , or indeed invalidation , of the relevant provision before a ( superior ) court . 69 .
The Court ’ s case-law thus ensures that courts as well as authorities called upon to apply EU law can do so to the fullest extent within their respective areas of competence . 70 .
By contrast , the case-law does not in my view seek to interfere with the attribution of jurisdiction over cases between courts ( and / or administrative bodies ) .
It does not allow a court ( or , a fortiori , an administrative body ) to ignore rules of jurisdiction in the name of full effectiveness of EU law .
That is essentially because Member States enjoy , as a matter of principle , substantial autonomy in devising procedural rules , such as those regarding the designation of the authority or court with jurisdiction in a certain category of case , as long as the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected . ( 24 ) 71 .
As I see it , an administrative body or a court can be under an obligation to refrain from applying a provision of national law , in order to give full effect to EU law only if it has been established at the outset that that organ has substantive jurisdiction to consider the case ( or indeed , as concerns more broadly authorities , to take a decision on a particular matter ) . 72 .
All parties seem to accept that , as a matter of national constitutional law , the WRC has no such jurisdiction .
If the WRC were to consider a complaint requiring the disapplication of a provision of national law , it would no longer be acting within the limits of its jurisdiction . 73 .