FranklinWillemen/mapa_plus huggingface dataset:
It should be stressed that , according to the referring court , the rule at issue in the main proceedings is one of substantive jurisdiction : it divides the jurisdiction in relation to first instance litigation in specific cases between the WRC and the High Court .
This entails that , in the particular category of case in which a successful complaint pertaining to discrimination in the context of employment requires the disapplication of a provision of national law , the competent judicial body to consider such a case is the High Court . 74 .
It is true that , within its sphere of competence , the WRC is required to ensure compliance with employment equality legislation , including Directive 2000 / 78 .
Nonetheless , that competence is circumscribed by the rule of jurisdiction at issue in the present case . 75 .
No argument has been put forward in these proceedings that the WRC would not be able to provide an effective remedy , or to ensure full effectiveness of EU law , in cases in which it has jurisdiction ( that is to say , cases where the complaint concerns , in essence , discrimination by an employer , and not by a legislative instrument ) .
It simply does not have jurisdiction at all in cases where a successful complaint requires the disapplication of legislation . 76 .
That circumstance distinguishes in my view the present case from the case-law referred to above : the issue of whether the organ in question had jurisdiction to consider the case ( or to take a decision on a particular matter ) quite simply did not arise in those cases .
Rather , the common denominator in all those cases is that the competent court or authority was limited , not in terms of jurisdiction , but in terms of the tools which it had at its disposal to give full effect to EU law . 77 .
Certainly , it would be tempting to draw parallels with CIF .
As the Commission pointed out at the hearing , in CIF there would have been an alternative route for an individual seeking redress for a breach of EU competition rules : ordinary courts .
Those courts would , in accordance with the Court ’ s case-law , have been obliged to refrain from applying national legislation contrary to EU competition rules .
Even though in theory such an alternative existed , the Court held that the Italian competition authority was under an obligation to refrain from applying national legislation in order to ensure full effectiveness of EU competition rules . 78 .
However , it is of particular importance here that the jurisdiction of the Italian competition authority to ensure the observance of EU competition rules was not limited by national law : quite the contrary , it was the ( sole ) organ vested with the power to ensure the observance of EU competition rules .
Unlike in the present case , the substantive competence of that authority was not limited to a certain category of case .
Bearing that in mind , the need to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law did indeed require in CIF that a national competition authority could leave national legislation unapplied : in the case in question , it would have been difficult , if not impossible , for that authority to ensure observance of the EU competition rules which it was to apply , if it did not have such power . 79 .
I find it difficult to identify a similar need here . 80 .
Once a complaint potentially requiring the disapplication of national legislation has been brought before the competent body ( the High Court ) , that court can refrain from applying national legislation where deemed contrary to EU law , or to another superior norm , and provide any other remedy needed to cure the alleged discrimination .
It is also crucial to stress that no alternative avenue exists for complainants , given that jurisdiction to hear complaints involving a challenge to the validity of legislation or requiring the disapplication of legislation is vested solely in the High Court . 81 .
That is why I also cannot accept the argument that the rule of jurisdiction prevents a body such as the WRC , which has the status of a ‘ court or tribunal ’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU , ( 25 ) from ensuring that effective protection is afforded to rights deriving from EU law . 82 .
A closer look reveals the weakness of that argument : the WRC could not make a preliminary reference on the substantive issue of whether a legislative instrument breaches Directive 2000 / 78 in the first place , because consideration of such cases falls outside its jurisdiction .
By contrast , as the competent court to hear the case , the High Court could have requested a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the age restriction measure . 83 .
A corollary argument was discussed at the hearing at some length .
According to the WRC in particular , if the Court were to hold that the rule of jurisdiction is not contrary to EU law , the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU would be compromised .
The rule at issue could prevent the WRC from giving full effect to a judgment given by the Court holding that a provision of Irish legislation is contrary to Directive 2000 / 78 . 84 .
In that regard , I note that that argument presupposes that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the WRC .
However , none of the parties has been able to give a concrete example of a situation where both of the following elements are present : namely , on the one hand , that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the WRC because it does not involve a claim requiring disapplication of national law , and , on the other hand , a finding made by the Court , on the basis of a preliminary reference from the WRC , that a provision of national law is incompatible with Directive 2000 / 78 . 85 .
The difficulties encountered by the parties in devising a concrete example of a situation where the rule of jurisdiction would compromise the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU seem to have a rather simple explanation : such a situation can arise only if the WRC were either taken to have jurisdiction or if it were to exceed the limits of its jurisdiction and consider such a complaint .
( c ) An interim conclusion 86 .
There may be sound reasons that warrant the division of jurisdiction in a specific field of law between different ( judicial ) bodies . 87 .
It is increasingly common that the resolution of conflicts arising from day-to-day life , such as consumer disputes and conflicts in the workplace , are ‘ out-sourced ’ from courts to specialised bodies with ( limited ) powers to mediate and / or adjudicate expediently such disputes . ( 26 ) It is equally commonplace that , as is the case of adjudication officers at the WRC , persons resolving conflicts in such bodies do not necessarily have a legal qualification .
Arguably , such bodies are better placed than courts to provide low-cost , speedy and effective solutions to conflicts of that kind . 88 .
Nonetheless , not all disputes , in particular those raising important questions of principle with broader legal implications , are best dealt with by such bodies . 89 .
The Court has consistently held that , in the absence of EU rules governing the matter , it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction ( or , as the case may be , administrative bodies ) and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law . ( 27 ) The Member States must , however , ensure that those rights are effectively protected in each case . ( 28 ) In other words , jurisdiction in a specific field of EU law may be divided between different bodies , provided that the rights in question are adequately protected . 90 .
It is within the limits of their respective areas of jurisdiction that such organs are to give full effect to EU law by refraining , where necessary , from applying national law contrary to EU law .
In other words , an organ cannot , by dint of the primacy of EU law , simply ignore rules of jurisdiction that circumscribe its substantive competence in a particular field of law , as defined by national law . 91 .
I therefore conclude that a rule of jurisdiction such as the one at issue in the main proceedings , which divides jurisdiction in specific cases between a statutory body and an ordinary court on the basis of the complaint made , does not breach the principle of the primacy of EU law and falls within the scope of the procedural autonomy of Member States . 92 .
If the Court were to adhere strictly to the wording of the question referred , that would settle the matter .
That is because , as the question makes clear , the referring court has already made determinations concerning the compatibility of the rule of jurisdiction with the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness : indeed , the question referred is itself premised on the finding that the rule of jurisdiction at issue does not infringe those principles . ( 29 ) 93 .
It is of course true that , in the final analysis , it is for the national court to determine whether the impugned national procedural rule complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness .
Nevertheless , given the attention afforded to those principles by the parties in both their written and oral submissions , I consider it necessary to address the main arguments put forward by the parties regarding the determinations made by the referring court , in particular as concerns the principle of effectiveness . 2 .
The division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court : compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 94 .
According to the Court ’ s rich case-law on the matter , the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual ’ s rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions ( principle of equivalence ) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law ( principle of effectiveness ) . ( 30 ) ( a ) Equivalence : the search for the correct comparator 95 .
In its judgment of 15 June 2017 , the referring court considered that the rule of jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of the principle of equivalence because exactly the same regime would apply irrespective of whether the legal norm on the basis of which proceedings were brought derived from national law or EU law .
In other words , the rule of jurisdiction at issue would also apply , and confer jurisdiction on the High Court , in an action based on purely national law . ( 31 ) 96 .
I find no fault in that assessment . 97 .
Specifically , the Court ’ s case-law requires that the national rule at issue must be applied without distinction , that is , in the same way irrespective of whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from EU law or is based on an infringement of national law , where the purpose and cause of action are similar . ( 32 ) In other words , the assessment of equivalence proceeds in two steps .
First , the correct comparator must be identified .
Second , it must be assessed whether the action based on EU law is treated less favourably than the comparable action based on national law . 98 .
The first and third notice parties have suggested in this regard that the referring court has not chosen the most appropriate comparator .
In their submission , a more appropriate comparator could be found in a complaint of discrimination based on a ground falling outside the scope of Directive 2000 / 78 , or which does not involve the disapplication of national law . 99 .
In that regard , it should first of all be recalled that it is for the referring court , which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable , to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose , cause of action and essential characteristics . ( 33 ) It seems to me , therefore , that the Court may only exceptionally , where that assessment proves to be manifestly flawed , call into question a finding made by the referring court regarding the principle of equivalence . 100 .
There is no need for such a drastic measure here .
On the contrary , it seems to me that the referring court has chosen the only reasonable comparator . 101 .
As the Court has consistently held , the principle of equivalence does not require Member States to extend their most favourable rules to all actions brought in a certain field of law . ( 34 ) 102 .
As far as can be understood from their written submissions , the first and third notice parties suggest that all employment equality claims should be seen as comparable to each other , in essence because the proceedings before the WRC are less cumbersome and involve no financial risk for the complainant . 103 .
If that approach were adopted , it would in practice render the test of equivalence devoid of any real purpose .
It would entail comparing the incomparable .
As this case aptly illustrates , not all cases concerning a specific field of law are comparable : complaints of discrimination in the context of employment may differ in their purpose , cause of action and essential characteristics depending on the source of discrimination .
Redress can be sought before the WRC where discrimination stems from a practice ( typically a decision taken by an employer ) in the context of employment . ( 35 ) By contrast , an action involving a challenge to the validity of legislation or requiring the disapplication of legislation is fundamentally about the lawfulness of a legislative instrument having the authority of law .
That is in my view a crucial difference and should not be overlooked .
The differences between the procedural rules applicable to actions brought before the WRC , on the one hand , and before the High Court , on the other , are explained precisely by the inherent difference in the types of action which those bodies have jurisdiction to consider . ( 36 ) 104 .
In other words , the most appropriate comparator , as established by the referring court , must be an action brought before the High Court on the basis of purely national law .
( b ) Effectiveness : the need to bring several actions to assert rights deriving from EU law 105 .
According to settled case-law , an assessment of effectiveness must take into account the role of the provision in the procedure , its progress and its special features , viewed as a whole , before the various national instances . ( 37 ) 106 .
In its judgment of 15 June 2017 , the referring court examined inter alia the powers of the High Court to obtain evidence , the costs regime , the adversarial nature of proceedings before that court , and the power of the High Court to provide any remedy required to vindicate rights guaranteed by EU law .
After examining those features of the procedure before the High Court , the referring court came to the conclusion that the rule of jurisdiction satisfied the requirements of effectiveness . ( 38 ) 107 .
The referring court did not , however , expressly examine the procedural disadvantages that may arise from the need to split a complaint between two bodies , an issue dealt with by the Court in Impact . ( 39 ) That judgment was discussed at length at the hearing .
It seems to me therefore useful to provide some remarks on that issue . 108 .
Impact concerned a procedural rule which forced claimants to bring multiple actions in order to assert rights under Directive 1999 / 70 . ( 40 ) More specifically , Irish law provided that claims regarding fixed-term work based on the legislation transposing the directive could be presented to the Rights Commissioner ( a specialised court ) , whereas claims based directly on the directive ( that is , claims which had arisen after the deadline for transposition but before Ireland had fulfilled its obligations ) were to be initiated in the High Court . 109 .
In its judgment , the Court found at the outset that a claim based on infringement of the measure transposing the directive and a claim based directly on the directive are covered by the same form of action . ( 41 ) Notwithstanding formal distinctions as to their legal basis , both claims , sought , in other words , the protection of the same rights deriving from EU law . ( 42 ) 110 .
The Court then considered that , in circumstances where the Irish legislature had chosen to confer on a specialised court jurisdiction ( albeit optional ) to hear and determine actions based on the legislation transposing Directive 1999 / 70 , it would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness to require claimants to bring , at the same time , a separate action before an ordinary court to assert the rights which they can derive directly from that directive .
That was in particular so if such an obligation was found by the national court to result in procedural disadvantages for the individuals concerned , in terms of , inter alia , cost , duration and the rules of representation , such as to render excessively difficult the exercise of rights deriving from the relevant directive . ( 43 ) 111 .
The Court ’ s judgment in essence confirms and elaborates on a well-established line of case-law pertaining to the application of the principle of effectiveness .
The Court took issue with the procedural disadvantages of having to bring different actions in a situation where the legislature had given jurisdiction to a specialised court to consider a claim based on the national legislation transposing the directive , but where that body could not also deal with a claim based on the directive . 112 .
It is important to read the Court ’ s statement in its proper context .
The statement regarding procedural disadvantages was made in the specific context of an obligation to bring multiple actions to assert , in essence , the same rights arising from EU law ( but regarding different periods of time ) .
Bearing that specific aspect of Impact in mind , it would in my view be incorrect to read the Court ’ s dictum as to the principle of effectiveness as impugning , in a general manner , any rule of jurisdiction in a specific field of law which divides jurisdiction between different instances in which the procedural rules are not equally favourable to claimants . 113 .
Indeed , it should not be forgotten that the Court ’ s case-law requires that national procedural rules do not render the exercise of rights deriving from EU law excessively difficult .
It does not require that all cases in a specific field of law should be dealt with in the same way , by one court or body , in accordance with the rules that are procedurally most favourable for the claimant . ( 44 ) 114 .
Unlike in the circumstances underlying Impact , the WRC has not been given ( optional ) jurisdiction by the Irish legislature to hear cases ordinarily falling within the jurisdiction of the High Court .
There is instead a clear division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court . 115 .
It can be seen from the order for reference that the case pending before the referring court concerns a complaint regarding discrimination inherent in the age restriction measure , a piece of secondary legislation .
No complaint of discrimination falling within the jurisdiction of the WRC has been made in the proceedings before the referring court .
In such a case , the division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court does not in my view give rise to criticism : there is no other avenue available for the complainants than the High Court .
It seems to me that , if anything , the division of jurisdiction ensures efficient resolution of cases requiring disapplication of national law , given that the complainants do not in such cases first have to go to the WRC . 116 .
Undoubtedly , the absence of an alternative avenue for complainants who consider themselves wronged by a legislative instrument explains why the referring court has not examined the rule of jurisdiction in the light of the Court ’ s judgment in Impact . 117 .
Nonetheless , it does not seem impossible to envisage a situation in which a complainant brings a case alleging that he has been discriminated against ( contrary to Directive 2000 / 78 ) not only on the basis ofa legislative measure but also on the basis of an employer ’ s practice .
If , in such a situation , the WRC retains jurisdiction to hear some part of such a complaint , it seems to me that the statement of the Court in Impact must apply in full .
If , instead , the High Court ’ s jurisdiction trumps that of the WRC , meaning that the latter has no jurisdiction at all ( and that the High Court is taken to have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the entire complaint ) , the statement of the Court does not appear relevant . 118 .
That assessment is , however , not for this Court to undertake : determining the correct interpretation of the relevant national rules regarding the division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court in such a context is a matter for the referring court . 119 .
On that basis I conclude that a rule of jurisdiction such as the one at issue in the main proceedings , which divides jurisdiction in specific cases between a statutory body and an ordinary court ( established under the Constitution ) on the basis of the nature of the complaint made , is not precluded by EU law , provided that no concurrent jurisdiction may arise within the same complaint .
Conclusion 120 .
In the light of the foregoing considerations , I propose that the Court answer the question referred by the Supreme Court ( Ireland ) as follows : A rule of jurisdiction such as the one at issue in the main proceedings , which divides jurisdiction in specific cases between a statutory body and an ordinary court on the basis of the nature of the complaint made , is not precluded by EU law , provided that no concurrent jurisdiction may arise within the same complaint . 1 Original language : English . 2 Council Directive of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation ( OJ 2000 L 303 , p . 16 ) . 3 Judgment of 9 March 1978 , Simmenthal , 106 / 77 , EU : C : 1978 : 49 . 4 In the case pending before the referring court , the relevant acts are the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2004 and , where relevant , subsequent amending legislation . 5 As a result of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 , the relevant functions of the Equality Tribunal have now been transferred to the WRC . 6 The Garda Síochána ( Admissions and Appointments ) ( Amendment ) Regulations , 2004 ( S.I .
No . 749 of 2004 ) . 7 In fact , in addition to the order for reference of 15 June 2017 , the referring court also delivered a separate judgment on that date ( Minister for Justice , Equality and Law Reform and Others v The Workplace Relations Commission , [ 2017 ] IESC 43 ) dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the WRC from the perspective of national law .
In that judgment , the referring court also dealt with certain issues of EU law .
It considered , in particular , whether the division of jurisdiction between the WRC and the High Court complied with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness . 8 See , inter alia , judgment of 6 September 2016 , Petruhhin , C ‑ 182 / 15 , EU : C : 2016 : 630 , paragraph 20 and the case-law cited . 9 Gender discrimination constitutes an exception to this rule : in cases regarding gender discrimination , the complainant can choose to go directly to the Circuit Court . 10 See https : / / www.workplacerelations.ie / en / Complaints_Disputes / Adjudication / ( accessed on 5 July 2018 ) . 11 The judgment of 15 June 2017 , paragraphs 5.3 . and 5.6 . 12 See , in particular , judgments of 22 October 1998 , IN .
GE . ' 90 and Others , C ‑ 10 / 97 to C ‑ 22 / 97 , EU : C : 1998 : 498 , paragraph 21 .
See also Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases IN .