FranklinWillemen/mapa_plus huggingface dataset:
GE . ' 90 and Others , C ‑ 10 / 97 to C ‑ 22 / 97 , EU : C : 1998 : 228 , points 16 to 44 . 13 Judgment of 9 March 1978 , Simmenthal , 106 / 77 , EU : C : 1978 : 49 . 14 Judgment of 5 February 1963 , van Gend & Loosvan Gend & Loosvan Gend & Loos , 26 / 62 , EU : C : 1963 : 1 . 15 Judgment of 9 March 1978 , Simmenthal , 106 / 77 , EU : C : 1978 : 49 , paragraphs 21 to 24 . 16 That case-law has been reaffirmed by the Court in a multitude of cases .
See , among many , judgments of 19 June 1990 , Factortame and Others , C ‑ 213 / 89 , EU : C : 1990 : 257 , paragraphs 20 and 21 ; of 4 June 1992 , Debus , C ‑ 13 / 91 and C ‑ 113 / 91 , EU : C : 1992 : 247 , paragraph 32 ; of 2 August 1993 , Levy , C ‑ 158 / 91 , EU : C : 1993 : 332 , paragraph 9 ; and of 5 March 1998 , Solred , C ‑ 347 / 96 , EU : C : 1998 : 87 , paragraph 30 . 17 Judgment of 22 June 1989 , Costanzo , 103 / 88 , EU : C : 1989 : 256 . 18 Idem , paragraphs 31 to 33 . 19 Judgment of 9 September 2003 , CIF , C ‑ 198 / 01 , EU : C : 2003 : 430 . 20 Idem , paragraph 49 . 21 Idem , paragraph 50 . 22 Judgments of 9 March 1978 , Simmenthal , 106 / 77 , EU : C : 1978 : 49 , paragraph 21 , and of 19 June 1990 , Factortame and Others , C ‑ 213 / 89 , EU : C : 1990 : 257 , paragraph 20 .
See also judgment of 10 April 1984 , von Colson and Kamannvon Colson and Kamann , 14 / 83 , EU : C : 1984 : 153 , paragraph 26 . 23 Judgments of 9 March 1978 , Simmenthal , 106 / 77 , EU : C : 1978 : 49 , paragraph 21 , and of 22 June 1989 , Costanzo , 103 / 88 , EU : C : 1989 : 256 , paragraphs 31 to 33 . 24 See , ex multis , judgments of 16 December 1976 , Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-ZentralRewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-ZentralRewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral , 33 / 76 , EU : C : 1976 : 188 , paragraph 5 ; of 16 December 1976 , Comet , 45 / 76 , EU : C : 1976 : 191 , paragraphs 13 to 16 ; of 14 December 1995 , Peterbroeck , C ‑ 312 / 93 , EU : C : 1995 : 437 , paragraph 12 and the case-law cited ; of 13 March 2007 , Unibet , C ‑ 432 / 05 , EU : C : 2007 : 163 , paragraph 39 and the case-law cited ; and of 7 June 2007 , van der Weerd and Othersvan der Weerd and Othersvan der Weerd and Others , C ‑ 222 / 05 to C ‑ 225 / 05 , EU : C : 2007 : 318 , paragraph 28 and the case-law cited . 25 In a case falling within its jurisdiction , the Equality Tribunal has referred to the Court a case for a preliminary ruling .
See judgment of 18 March 2014 , Z . , C ‑ 363 / 12 , EU : C : 2014 : 159 . 26 These procedures fall under the broad umbrella-term of ‘ alternative dispute resolution ’ or ‘ ADR ’ ) . 27 See , for example , the case-law referred to in footnote 24 above and judgments of 15 April 2008 , Impact , C ‑ 268 / 06 , EU : C : 2008 : 223 , paragraph 44 , and of 8 September 2009 , Budějovický BudvarBudějovický Budvar , C ‑ 478 / 07 , EU : C : 2009 : 521 , paragraph 88 and the case-law cited . 28 See , for example , judgments of 9 July 1985 , Bozzetti , 179 / 84 , EU : C : 1985 : 306 , paragraph 17 ; of 18 January 1996 , SEIM , C ‑ 446 / 93 , EU : C : 1996 : 10 , paragraph 32 ; and of 17 September 1997 , Dorsch ConsultDorsch Consult , C ‑ 54 / 96 , EU : C : 1997 : 413 , paragraph 40 . 29 In the question referred for a preliminary ruling , it is stated somewhat ambiguously that the ‘ remedy provided in the courts ’ has been assessed as complying with the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness .
Nevertheless , in the light of the judgment of 15 June 2017 , it can be understood that the referring court has determined that the procedure before the High Court available for complainants , in the event that their case falls outside the jurisdiction of the WRC , complies with those principles . 30 See , inter alia , the case-law referred to in footnote 27 above . 31 Judgment of 15 June 2017 , paragraph 7.1 . 32 Judgment of 27 June 2013 , Agrokonsulting - 04 , C ‑ 93 / 12 , EU : C : 2013 : 432 , paragraph 39 and the case-law cited . 33 See , for example , judgments of 29 October 2009 , Pontin , C ‑ 63 / 08 , EU : C : 2009 : 666 , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited , and of 12 February 2015 , Baczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and Vizsnyiczai , C ‑ 567 / 13 , EU : C : 2015 : 88 , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited . 34 Judgment of 26 January 2010 , Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C ‑ 118 / 08 , EU : C : 2010 : 39 , paragraph 34 and the case-law cited .
In any event , the question of what constitutes an ‘ unfavourable ’ procedural rule is , in the final analysis , a question of perspective .
See , in that regard , judgment of 12 February 2015 , Baczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and Vizsnyiczai , C ‑ 567 / 13 , EU : C : 2015 : 88 , paragraphs 46 and 47 regarding the question of whether , on the one hand , the designation of hierarchically superior courts to deal with certain types of case and , on the other hand , the different cost regimes applicable in the procedures compared could be regarded as ‘ unfavourable ’ . 35 It is my understanding that these would typically involve , for example , a refusal to promote an employee due to one of the protected grounds of discrimination , a refusal to give a raise to an employee on a discriminatory basis or a refusal to accommodate the disability of an employee in the work-place and the tasks which that employee is required to perform . 36 It can be seen from the case-file that the procedure before the WRC is inquisitorial , whereas the procedure before the High Court is adversarial .
Moreover , the cost regimes are different : before the High Court , a complainant runs the risk of having costs awarded against him , while that is not the case before the WRC .
That is because parties may be legally represented but the adjudication officer has no power to award costs .
Moreover , adjudication officers have only limited powers to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and evidence is not given under oath .
What is more , because only limited adjudicative powers have been conferred on the WRC by statute , an adjudication officer cannot join a party who is not named in the proceedings . 37 See , inter alia , judgments of 14 December 1995 , Peterbroeck , C ‑ 312 / 93 , EU : C : 1995 : 437 , paragraph 14 ; of 13 March 2007 , Unibet , C ‑ 432 / 05 , EU : C : 2007 : 163 , paragraph 54 ; and of 8 September 2011 , Rosado Santana , C ‑ 177 / 10 , EU : C : 2011 : 557 , paragraph 92 and the case-law cited . 38 Judgment of 15 June 2017 , paragraphs 7.2 to 7.16 . 39 Judgment of 15 April 2008 , Impact , C ‑ 268 / 06 , EU : C : 2008 : 223 , paragraph 51 . 40 Council Directive 1999 / 70 / EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC , UNICE and CEEP ( OJ 1999 L 175 , p . 43 ) . 41 Judgment of 15 April 2008 , Impact , C ‑ 268 / 06 , EU : C : 2008 : 223 , paragraph 50 . 42 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Impact , C ‑ 268 / 06 , EU : C : 2008 : 2 , point 58 . 43 Judgment of 15 April 2008 , Impact , C ‑ 268 / 06 , EU : C : 2008 : 223 , paragraph 51 . 44 See , to that effect , judgment of 12 February 2015 , Baczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and VizsnyiczaiBaczó and Vizsnyiczai , C ‑ 567 / 13 , EU : C : 2015 : 88 , paragraphs 51 and 52 and the case-law cited .
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SHARPSTON delivered on 11 September 2018 ( 1 ) Case C ‑ 457 / 17 Heiko Jonny Maniero Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV ( Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof ( Federal Court of Justice , Germany ) ) ( Directive 2000 / 43 / EC — Equal treatment of persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin — Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) — Education — Scholarships awarded to students having passed the First State Law Examination ) 1 .
‘ Nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the legislator . . . but consideration must be given to the question , what constitutes education … ’ ( 2 ) 2 .
The European legislature has indeed adopted legislation in that respect , which , inter alia recognises the right to education as a fundamental right . ( 3 ) However , it has not defined the concept of ‘ education ’ .
This reference for a preliminary ruling requires the Court to give an answer to that ancient question , now raised in the context of EU law , and more precisely of Council Directive 2000 / 43 / EC . ( 4 ) What constitutes education ?
Legal framework Directive 2000 / 43 3 .
The purpose of Directive 2000 / 43 is to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin . ( 5 ) 4 .
Article 2 ( 1 ) prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin .
Article 2 ( 2 ) defines direct discrimination as occurring ‘ where one person is treated less favourably than another is , has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin ’ and indirect discrimination as occurring ‘ where an apparently neutral provision , criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons , unless that provision , criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary ’ . 5 .
Article 3 ( 1 ) defines the scope of the directive as applying ‘ within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community , … to all persons , as regards both the public and private sectors , including public bodies , in relation to : … ( g ) education … ’ .
National legislation 6 .
Directive 2000 / 43 was transposed in Germany by the Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz ( General Law on equal treatment , ‘ the AGG ’ ) . 7 .
Paragraph 1 of the AGG prohibits all discrimination on the grounds of , inter alia , race or ethnic origin .
Paragraph 2 ( 1 ) ( 7 ) , transposing Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) of Directive 2000 / 43 , defines the scope of prohibition as including discrimination in relation to , inter alia , education .
Paragraph 3 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) defines direct and indirect discrimination prohibited by that law .
Facts , procedure and the questions referred 8 .
Mr Maniero is an Italian national born and residing in Germany .
In 2013 , he obtained a Bachelor of Laws from a university in Armenia . 9 .
On 11 December 2013 , Mr Maniero contacted the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV ( German Academic Scholarship Foundation , ‘ the Foundation ’ ) , a registered association awarding scholarships , with a view to applying for a ‘ Bucerius Law Programme ’ scholarship , related to the promotion of projects of legal research and studies abroad . ( 6 ) 10 .
The Foundation responded on 17 January 2014 indicating that applicants had to have passed the First State Law Examination .
Mr Maniero replied stating that the ‘ five-year degree ’ that he obtained in Armenia was comparable to the Second State Law Examination since it qualifies the holder to hold judicial office or to act as a lawyer in that country .
He suggested that the Foundation ’ s requirement could infringe the AGG as discrimination based on ethnic or social origin . 11 .
Mr Maniero did not apply for the scholarship .
In subsequent correspondence with the Foundation , he contended that it was the Foundation ’ s negative attitude that had deterred him from doing so . 12 .
Mr Maniero brought an action before the Landgericht ( Regional Court , Germany ) requesting that the Foundation be ordered to cease and refrain from discrimination on the grounds of his age or origin and to pay him EUR 18 734.60 in damages and compensation for travel costs .
That action , as well as the appeal that followed , were dismissed . 13 .
Mr Maniero then introduced an appeal on a point of law before the Bundesgerichtshof ( Federal Court of Justice , Germany ) ( ‘ the referring court ’ ) . 14 .
The latter observes that the appeal can only succeed if the award of scholarships is covered by the concept of education in Paragraph 2 ( 1 ) ( 7 ) of the AGG , transposing Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) of Directive 2000 / 43 .
If that is the case , the next issue is whether or not the requirement to have passed the First State Law Examination constitutes indirect discrimination prohibited by Paragraph 3 ( 2 ) of the AGG , transposing Article 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) of Directive 2000 / 43 .
Against that background the referring court asks this Court the following questions : ‘ ( 1 ) Is the award by a registered association of scholarships intended to promote projects for research and studies abroad covered by the concept of “ education ” within the meaning of Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) of Directive 2000 / 43 ?
( 2 ) If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative : In the case of the award of scholarships referred to in Question 1 , does the participation requirement relating to the passing of the First State Law Examination in Germany constitute indirect discrimination against an applicant within the meaning of Article 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) of Directive 2000 / 43 where the applicant , who is a Union citizen , has indeed acquired a comparable qualification in a State which does not belong to the European Union , without the choice of this place of qualification being related to the ethnic origin of the applicant , but , on account of his residence in national territory and fluent command of German , had , in the same way as a national , the possibility of taking the First State Law Examination after studying law in national territory ?
Is any difference made by the fact that the objective pursued by the scholarship programme is , without being linked to any discriminatory characteristics , to provide law graduates in Germany with knowledge of foreign legal systems , experience of being abroad and knowledge of languages by promoting a project for research and studies abroad ? ’
Written observations were submitted by the Foundation , the German Government and the European Commission .
Mr Maniero , the Foundation , the German Government and the Commission made oral submissions at the hearing on 30 May 2018 . 16 .
As requested by the Court , I shall limit myself in this Opinion to examining the first question .
Assessment 17 .
The referring court asks whether the award of scholarships intended to promote projects for research and studies abroad by a registered association falls within the scope of Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) of Directive 2000 / 43 as being related to ‘ education ’ .
I note at the outset that this case concerns the concept of ‘ education ’ in the context of Directive 2000 / 43 and not the possible implications for recognition of diplomas or free movement of persons . 18 .
The Foundation and the German Government submit that the concept of education should be interpreted as not including the award of scholarships .
They base their arguments principally on the legislative history and the scheme of the directive . 19 .
The Commission on the other hand argues that Directive 2000 / 43 should be interpreted broadly , a submission with which Mr Maniero is in agreement .
Accordingly , the award of scholarships should be included within the scope of the word ‘ education ’ in Article 3 ( 1 ) ( g ) . 20 .
According to settled case-law , the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union .
Whilst the wording of Directive 2000 / 43 does not give specific guidance on how the term ‘ education ’ is to be understood , neither does it contain any reference to national laws as regards the meaning of that term .
It follows that ‘ education ’ must be regarded , for the purposes of the directive , as designating an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the Member States . ( 7 ) 21 .
As the Court has consistently held , the meaning and scope of a term for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language , while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part . ( 8 ) 22 .
Education is commonly perceived as ‘ the act or process of acquiring knowledge , especially systematically during childhood and adolescence ’ . ( 9 ) Illustrative definitions of ‘ education ’ are not lacking ; ( 10 ) Thus , the International Standard Classification of Education ( 2011 ) proposes ‘ the processes by which societies deliberately transmit their accumulated information , knowledge , understanding , attitudes , values , skills , competencies and behaviours across generations .
It involves communication designed to bring about learning ’ . ( 11 ) It follows that education is an intellectual process .
Education is thus composed of two aspects , the one substantial ( it is ‘ intellectual ’ ) and the other functional ( it is a ‘ process ’ ) .
Usually , but not always , education takes place at a school or at a university .
I would include research , when it takes place in an educational establishment , within the term , as the purpose of such research is to acquire and transmit knowledge rather than to further commercial objectives .
Although one thinks primarily of young persons when referring to education , it is important to emphasise that education concerns all ages .
Lifelong learning today plays an important role in the professional and personal evolution of individuals . ( 12 ) Thus , one also finds initiatives such as the ‘ université du troisième age ’ enabling those who have retired from active economic life to expand their knowledge . 23 .
From the usual meaning of the word ‘ education ’ , which is , I observe , very broad , it is not apparent that the award of scholarships is necessarily included within its scope . 24 .
I shall therefore turn to the context and the objective of the rules of which that term forms part . 25 .
The purpose of Directive 2000 / 43 is to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin , with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment . ( 13 ) It gives specific expression , in its field of application , to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin which is enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter . ( 14 ) The preamble of the directive describes protection against discrimination as a universal right and refers to that effect to various international agreements that recognise that right . ( 15 ) 26 .
Furthermore , in recitals 9 , 12 and 13 , the EU legislature sought to make clear that : ( i ) discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin may hinder the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty , in particular attaining a high level of employment and of social protection , raising of the standard of living and quality of life , and promoting economic and social cohesion and solidarity , and may also undermine the development the European Union as an area of freedom , security and justice ; and ( ii ) the prohibition of any discrimination of that type is intended , in particular , to ensure the development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin . ( 16 ) 27 .
The scope of Directive 2000 / 43 is broad .
Ratione personae , it covers all natural persons and protects them against discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin . ( 17 ) That protection applies to both the public and private sectors , including public bodies . ( 18 ) Ratione materiae , it goes beyond access to employed and self-employed activities and covers all the areas listed exhaustively in Article 3 ( 1 ) . ( 19 ) 28 .
As the Court has consistently held , in the light of the objective of Directive 2000 / 43 and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard , its scope cannot be defined restrictively . ( 20 ) That conclusion applies to the terms of the directive that define its substantive scope , such as employment , vocational guidance and training , working conditions , social protection and advantages and , of course , education . ( 21 ) 29 .
Does that broad interpretation of the term ‘ education ’ also cover the award of scholarships ?
The award of scholarships does not correspond , as such , to the intellectual process that constitutes education .
It concerns access to education . 31 .
In my view , however , access to education is an essential component of education itself , especially in the context of a legal instrument combating discrimination . 32 .
Indeed , for the purposes of combating discrimination , if access to education were omitted , what would be left in the concept of ‘ education ’ ?
In a classroom ( to take the very classic view of education ) , everyone can sit in the front and everyone can ask questions .
It would be nowadays unimaginable that a certain ethnic group has to sit at the back and is not allowed to address the teacher .
Equally self-evidently , all students should be graded according to the same criteria , according to their merits and not their race or ethnic origin ; and all students should obtain the same diploma after successfully following the same classes . ( 22 ) But the possibility to be admitted under the same conditions to all schools and to all classes corresponds to access to education .
Without that access , there can be no education .
To be clear , the word ‘ education ’ necessarily implies the words ‘ access to ’ education ; they are co-existent and co-dependent and to divorce them would denude the directive of its purpose to combat discrimination related to education . 33 .
Of course , access to education has many component parts .
It could be physical access to a building ; imposing a numerus clausus system to keep student numbers controlled ; the ability to borrow or purchase books ; the ability to pay for living expenses ( amongst many others ) .
Accordingly , schools , universities and other institutions frequently award scholarships to cover the fees of educational programmes , travel costs incurred in studying abroad or maintenance costs ( whether in money or in kind , such as the provision of free accommodation or meals ) . 34 .
Financing is an essential aspect of access to education .
Excluding a certain ethnic group from that finance means , especially for educational programmes for which the fees are very high , excluding that group from education .
That perpetuates any existing discrimination against the group in question .
As the Commission stated in its proposal for the directive , high quality education is a prerequisite for successful integration into society and equal treatment in selection procedures ( that is to say , in access to education ) should not be neglected . ( 23 ) A teleological interpretation of ‘ education ’ pleads clearly in favour of including aspects of access to education within the scope of the directive . 35 .
An analysis of the term ‘ education ’ in the more general context of EU law points to the same conclusion .
The right to education ( and access to vocational training ) as well as protection from discrimination on grounds of race or ethnic origin are fundamental rights recognised by Articles 14 and 21 of the Charter respectively .
When deciding how to interpret ‘ education ’ within the context of Directive 2000 / 43 , it is important to bear in mind that the question is situated at the crossroads of two fundamental rights . 36 .
The Court ’ s case-law has already interpreted the concept of education broadly in cases concerning equal treatment , so as to include aspects of access to education .
Thus , in proceedings brought by two German students to whom the Netherlands refused to grant study financing in the same way as for Dutch students , the Court held that the principle of equal treatment for admission to educational courses for the children of migrant workers in Article 12 of Regulation ( EEC ) No 1612 / 68 ( 24 ) refers not only to the rules concerning admission itself , but also to general measures intended to facilitate educational attendance . ( 25 ) 37 .