Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-204
[Effective until contingency is met. See the second version effective when contingency is met and Compiler's Notes] Sentencing for offenses punishable by death
Status: in_force

(a) Upon a trial for an offense punishable by death, should the jury find the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, it shall not fix punishment as part of the verdict, but the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or to imprisonment for life. The separate sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt, subject to the provisions of subsection (k) relating to certain retrials on punishment. (b) In the sentencing proceeding, the attorney for the state shall be allowed to make an opening statement to the jury and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such statement; provided, that the waiver of opening statement by one party shall not preclude the opening statement by the other party. (c) In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment, and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i); and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence that the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; provided, that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. However, this subsection (c) shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of Tennessee. In all cases where the state relies upon the aggravating factor that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, either party shall be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the prior conviction. Such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudice to either party. Such evidence shall be used by the jury in determining the weight to be accorded the aggravating factor. The court shall permit a member or members, or a representative or representatives of the victim's family to testify at the sentencing hearing about the victim and about the impact of the offense on the family of the victim and other relevant persons. The evidence may be considered by the jury in determining which sentence to impose. The court shall permit members or representatives of the victim's family to attend the trial, and those persons shall not be excluded because the person or persons shall testify during the sentencing proceeding as to the impact of the offense. (d) In the sentencing proceeding, the state shall be allowed to make a closing argument to the jury; and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such argument, with the state having the right of closing. (e) (1) After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i), which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. However, a reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the ground that the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not enumerated in subsection (j). (2) The trial judge shall provide the jury separate verdict forms, as specified by subdivisions (f)(1), (f)(2), and (g)(2)(B). If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child, then the jury shall be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole consideration until the defendant has served at least fifty-one (51) full calendar years of the sentence. The jury shall also be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall never be eligible for release on parole. (f) (1) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. We, the jury, therefore find that the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (2) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B), if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore: CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (B) (i) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sentence shall be imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. (ii) If imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is the sentence of the jury, then the jury shall reduce to writing the finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (iii) These findings and verdict must be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (g) (1) The sentence shall be death, if the jury unanimously determines that: (A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) (A) If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall: (i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and (ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. (B) These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF DEATH We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (h) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (h)(2), if the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment. (2) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child, but the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, then the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, then the judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment. (i) Except as provided in subdivisions (f)(2)(B) and (h)(2), no death penalty or sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed, except upon a unanimous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which are limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation. (j) In arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider, pursuant to this section, any mitigating circumstances, which shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) The offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; (4) The offense was committed under circumstances that the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the defendant's conduct; (5) The defendant was an accomplice in the offense committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; (6) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; (7) The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime; (8) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's judgment; and (9) Any other mitigating factor that is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense, at either the guilt or sentencing hearing. (k) Upon motion for a new trial, after a conviction for an offense that is punishable by death, if the court finds error in the trial determining guilt, a new trial on both guilt and sentencing shall be held; but if the court finds error alone in the trial determining punishment, a new trial on the issue of punishment alone shall be held by a new jury empaneled for that purpose. If the trial court, or any other court with jurisdiction to do so, orders that a defendant convicted of an offense that is punishable by death, whether the sentence is death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or imprisonment for life, be granted a new trial, either as to guilt or punishment, or both, the new trial shall include the possible punishments of death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or, unless the defendant is convicted of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) , or aggravated rape of a child, imprisonment for life. (l) If the jury has imposed a sentence of death, then the jury may determine whether the defendant's sentence must be expedited pursuant to this subsection ( l ), and, if the jury unanimously determines that an expediated sentence is required, return such findings to the judge upon a form provided by the court. A defendant's sentence may be expedited if the jury finds that: (1) (A) The offense involved the death of three (3) or more victims whom the defendant killed using one (1) or more deadly weapons; (B) The defendant committed the offense by using one (1) or more deadly weapons on the grounds of a public or private elementary, secondary, or postsecondary school; or (C) The defendant committed the offense by killing a first responder, as defined in § 39-13-116 , who was acting in the course of the first responder's employment at the time of the offense; and (2) The evidence presented at trial proving the defendant's guilt was incontestable, which may include, but is not limited to: (A) Video evidence depicting the defendant committing the offense; or (B) Deoxyribonucleic acid evidence linking the defendant to the offense. (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any an offense punishable by death, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 18, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 17, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 7, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 16, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 15, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 13, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 12, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 11, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 10, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 9, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 8, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 375, s 1, eff. 7/1/2023. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 528, s 5, eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 528, Secs.s 6, s 7, s 8, s 9, s 10, s 11, s 12 eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 215, s 2, eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 231, s 1, eff. 7/1/2019. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-203 ; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 3; 1993, ch. 473, §§ 2, 4-6, 13, 14; 1995, ch. 356, § 1; 1995, ch. 377, § 1; 1996, ch. 830, § 2; 1997 , ch. 139, § 1; 1997 , ch. 358, § 1; 1997 , ch. 491, § 1; 1998, ch. 712, § 1; 1998, ch. 915, § 1; 1998, ch. 916, § 1; 1999, ch. 504, § 1; 2002, ch. 849, § 2b; 2008 , ch. 829, § 1; 2009 , ch. 582, § 1; 2010 , ch. 1058, § 1; 2011 , ch. 47, § 30; 2011 , ch. 489, § 1.
(a) Upon a trial for an offense punishable by death, should the jury find the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, it shall not fix punishment as part of the verdict, but the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or to imprisonment for life. The separate sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt, subject to the provisions of subsection (k) relating to certain retrials on punishment.
(b) In the sentencing proceeding, the attorney for the state shall be allowed to make an opening statement to the jury and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such statement; provided, that the waiver of opening statement by one party shall not preclude the opening statement by the other party.
(c) In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment, and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i); and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence that the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; provided, that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. However, this subsection (c) shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of Tennessee. In all cases where the state relies upon the aggravating factor that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, either party shall be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the prior conviction. Such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudice to either party. Such evidence shall be used by the jury in determining the weight to be accorded the aggravating factor. The court shall permit a member or members, or a representative or representatives of the victim's family to testify at the sentencing hearing about the victim and about the impact of the offense on the family of the victim and other relevant persons. The evidence may be considered by the jury in determining which sentence to impose. The court shall permit members or representatives of the victim's family to attend the trial, and those persons shall not be excluded because the person or persons shall testify during the sentencing proceeding as to the impact of the offense.
(d) In the sentencing proceeding, the state shall be allowed to make a closing argument to the jury; and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such argument, with the state having the right of closing.
(e) (1) After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i), which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. However, a reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the ground that the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not enumerated in subsection (j). (2) The trial judge shall provide the jury separate verdict forms, as specified by subdivisions (f)(1), (f)(2), and (g)(2)(B). If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child, then the jury shall be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole consideration until the defendant has served at least fifty-one (51) full calendar years of the sentence. The jury shall also be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall never be eligible for release on parole.
(1) After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i), which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. However, a reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the ground that the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not enumerated in subsection (j).
(2) The trial judge shall provide the jury separate verdict forms, as specified by subdivisions (f)(1), (f)(2), and (g)(2)(B). If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child, then the jury shall be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole consideration until the defendant has served at least fifty-one (51) full calendar years of the sentence. The jury shall also be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall never be eligible for release on parole.
(f) (1) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. We, the jury, therefore find that the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (2) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B), if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore: CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (B) (i) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sentence shall be imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. (ii) If imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is the sentence of the jury, then the jury shall reduce to writing the finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (iii) These findings and verdict must be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
(1) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(1) or rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. We, the jury, therefore find that the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE
We, the jury, unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. We, the jury, therefore find that the sentence shall be imprisonment for life.
/s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
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(2) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B), if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore: CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror (B) (i) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sentence shall be imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. (ii) If imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is the sentence of the jury, then the jury shall reduce to writing the finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (iii) These findings and verdict must be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
(A) Except as provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B), if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore: CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE
We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.]
We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore:
CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY
[ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or
[ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
/s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
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(B) (i) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sentence shall be imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. (ii) If imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is the sentence of the jury, then the jury shall reduce to writing the finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (iii) These findings and verdict must be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
(i) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child and the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sentence shall be imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.
(ii) If imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is the sentence of the jury, then the jury shall reduce to writing the finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
(iii) These findings and verdict must be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
[ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.
[ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.
/s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
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(g) (1) The sentence shall be death, if the jury unanimously determines that: (A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) (A) If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall: (i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and (ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. (B) These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF DEATH We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
(1) The sentence shall be death, if the jury unanimously determines that: (A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
(A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) (A) If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall: (i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and (ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. (B) These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF DEATH We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
(A) If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall: (i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and (ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
(i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and
(ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
(B) These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows: PUNISHMENT OF DEATH We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances: [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.] We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH
We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances:
[Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.]
We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death.
/s/_________________ /s/_________________ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror /s/_________________ /s/_________________ Juror Juror
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(h) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (h)(2), if the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment. (2) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child, but the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, then the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, then the judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.
(1) Except as provided in subdivision (h)(2), if the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.
(2) If the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) or aggravated rape of a child, but the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, then the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, then the judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.
(i) Except as provided in subdivisions (f)(2)(B) and (h)(2), no death penalty or sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed, except upon a unanimous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which are limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
(1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person;
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense;
(4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;
(6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another;
(7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement;
(9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties;
(10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office;
(11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official;
(12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period;
(13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim;
(14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability;
(15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism;
(16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant;
(17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood;
(18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or
(19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
(j) In arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider, pursuant to this section, any mitigating circumstances, which shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) The offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; (4) The offense was committed under circumstances that the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the defendant's conduct; (5) The defendant was an accomplice in the offense committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; (6) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; (7) The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime; (8) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's judgment; and (9) Any other mitigating factor that is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense, at either the guilt or sentencing hearing.
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) The offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act;
(4) The offense was committed under circumstances that the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the defendant's conduct;
(5) The defendant was an accomplice in the offense committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor;
(6) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
(7) The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(8) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's judgment; and
(9) Any other mitigating factor that is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense, at either the guilt or sentencing hearing.
(k) Upon motion for a new trial, after a conviction for an offense that is punishable by death, if the court finds error in the trial determining guilt, a new trial on both guilt and sentencing shall be held; but if the court finds error alone in the trial determining punishment, a new trial on the issue of punishment alone shall be held by a new jury empaneled for that purpose. If the trial court, or any other court with jurisdiction to do so, orders that a defendant convicted of an offense that is punishable by death, whether the sentence is death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or imprisonment for life, be granted a new trial, either as to guilt or punishment, or both, the new trial shall include the possible punishments of death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or, unless the defendant is convicted of first degree murder as described in § 39-13-202(c)(2) , or aggravated rape of a child, imprisonment for life.
(l) If the jury has imposed a sentence of death, then the jury may determine whether the defendant's sentence must be expedited pursuant to this subsection ( l ), and, if the jury unanimously determines that an expediated sentence is required, return such findings to the judge upon a form provided by the court. A defendant's sentence may be expedited if the jury finds that: (1) (A) The offense involved the death of three (3) or more victims whom the defendant killed using one (1) or more deadly weapons; (B) The defendant committed the offense by using one (1) or more deadly weapons on the grounds of a public or private elementary, secondary, or postsecondary school; or (C) The defendant committed the offense by killing a first responder, as defined in § 39-13-116 , who was acting in the course of the first responder's employment at the time of the offense; and (2) The evidence presented at trial proving the defendant's guilt was incontestable, which may include, but is not limited to: (A) Video evidence depicting the defendant committing the offense; or (B) Deoxyribonucleic acid evidence linking the defendant to the offense. (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any an offense punishable by death, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
(1) (A) The offense involved the death of three (3) or more victims whom the defendant killed using one (1) or more deadly weapons; (B) The defendant committed the offense by using one (1) or more deadly weapons on the grounds of a public or private elementary, secondary, or postsecondary school; or (C) The defendant committed the offense by killing a first responder, as defined in § 39-13-116 , who was acting in the course of the first responder's employment at the time of the offense; and
(A) The offense involved the death of three (3) or more victims whom the defendant killed using one (1) or more deadly weapons;
(B) The defendant committed the offense by using one (1) or more deadly weapons on the grounds of a public or private elementary, secondary, or postsecondary school; or
(C) The defendant committed the offense by killing a first responder, as defined in § 39-13-116 , who was acting in the course of the first responder's employment at the time of the offense; and
(2) The evidence presented at trial proving the defendant's guilt was incontestable, which may include, but is not limited to: (A) Video evidence depicting the defendant committing the offense; or (B) Deoxyribonucleic acid evidence linking the defendant to the offense. (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any an offense punishable by death, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
(A) Video evidence depicting the defendant committing the offense; or
(B) Deoxyribonucleic acid evidence linking the defendant to the offense. (1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense; (4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; (6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; (7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any an offense punishable by death, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement; (9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties; (10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office; (11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official; (12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period; (13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim; (14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability; (15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism; (16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; (17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood; (18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or (19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
(1) The defendant committed murder against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person;
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim of the offense, during the offense;
(4) The defendant committed the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the offense for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(5) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;
(6) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another;
(7) The offense was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any an offense punishable by death, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(8) The offense was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement;
(9) The offense was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties;
(10) The offense was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office;
(11) The offense was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official;
(12) The defendant committed "mass murder," which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period;
(13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim;
(14) The victim of the offense was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the offense, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability;
(15) The offense was committed in the course of an act of terrorism;
(16) The offense was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally committed the offense against the victim, knowing that she was pregnant;
(17) The offense was committed at random and the reasons for the offense are not obvious or easily understood;
(18) The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder; or
(19) The victim of the offense was acting as a Good Samaritan at the time of the offense and the defendant knew that the person was acting as a Good Samaritan. For purposes of this subdivision (i)(19), "Good Samaritan" means a person who helps, defends, protects, or renders emergency care to a person in need without compensation.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 18, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 17, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 7, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 16, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 15, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 13, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 12, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 11, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 10, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 9, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 8, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 375, s 1, eff. 7/1/2023.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 528, s 5, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 528, Secs.s 6, s 7, s 8, s 9, s 10, s 11, s 12 eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 215, s 2, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 231, s 1, eff. 7/1/2019.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-203 ; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 3; 1993, ch. 473, §§ 2, 4-6, 13, 14; 1995, ch. 356, § 1; 1995, ch. 377, § 1; 1996, ch. 830, § 2; 1997 , ch. 139, § 1; 1997 , ch. 358, § 1; 1997 , ch. 491, § 1; 1998, ch. 712, § 1; 1998, ch. 915, § 1; 1998, ch. 916, § 1; 1999, ch. 504, § 1; 2002, ch. 849, § 2b; 2008 , ch. 829, § 1; 2009 , ch. 582, § 1; 2010 , ch. 1058, § 1; 2011 , ch. 47, § 30; 2011 , ch. 489, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-704 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-704
Transportation of alcoholic beverages by common carriers
Status: in_force

(a) It is unlawful for any common carrier or other person or organization to transport into this state or to transport from one (1) location to another within this state any intoxicating beverages for the purpose of resale unless licensed to do so. (b) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
(a) It is unlawful for any common carrier or other person or organization to transport into this state or to transport from one (1) location to another within this state any intoxicating beverages for the purpose of resale unless licensed to do so.
(b) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-104 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 15 / Section 39-15-104
Procedure - Enforcement
Status: in_force

(a) When complaint on oath is made to the judge of any juvenile court against a person to be charged with a violation of this part, the judge must issue a warrant requiring the arrest of the person charged and that person is to be brought before the judge for examination; provided, that if the person, being duly summoned or voluntarily appearing, acknowledges the obligation of support, the court may in its discretion enter a consent order in lieu of the issuance of a warrant. (b) No arrest warrant shall issue for the violation of any court order of support if the violation occurred during a period of time in which the person was incarcerated in any penal institution and was otherwise unable to comply with the order; provided, that this section shall not prevent the determining of arrearages under any previous order, and enforcement of the order as is consistent with the person's ability to comply. (c) It is the duty of the governor to demand the return of any person charged under § 39-15-101(d) from the governor of any other state where the person may be found, upon proper warrant being issued or indictment being returned. (d) Any court vested with jurisdiction to implement this part may enforce its orders and decrees by execution or in any way in which a court of equity may enforce its orders and decrees, including by imprisonment and fine for contempt. No property of the person, except all statutory homestead rights, shall be exempt from levy and sale under such execution or other process issued from the court. All provisions of title 36, chapter 5 that relate to child support or child support orders that include an order of spousal support and § 50-2-105 shall apply to support orders issued in these proceedings. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
(a) When complaint on oath is made to the judge of any juvenile court against a person to be charged with a violation of this part, the judge must issue a warrant requiring the arrest of the person charged and that person is to be brought before the judge for examination; provided, that if the person, being duly summoned or voluntarily appearing, acknowledges the obligation of support, the court may in its discretion enter a consent order in lieu of the issuance of a warrant.
(b) No arrest warrant shall issue for the violation of any court order of support if the violation occurred during a period of time in which the person was incarcerated in any penal institution and was otherwise unable to comply with the order; provided, that this section shall not prevent the determining of arrearages under any previous order, and enforcement of the order as is consistent with the person's ability to comply.
(c) It is the duty of the governor to demand the return of any person charged under § 39-15-101(d) from the governor of any other state where the person may be found, upon proper warrant being issued or indictment being returned.
(d) Any court vested with jurisdiction to implement this part may enforce its orders and decrees by execution or in any way in which a court of equity may enforce its orders and decrees, including by imprisonment and fine for contempt. No property of the person, except all statutory homestead rights, shall be exempt from levy and sale under such execution or other process issued from the court. All provisions of title 36, chapter 5 that relate to child support or child support orders that include an order of spousal support and § 50-2-105 shall apply to support orders issued in these proceedings.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-203
Intellectually disabled defendants - Death sentence prohibited
Status: in_force

(a) As used in this section, "intellectual disability" means: (1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) The intellectual disability must have manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age. (b) Notwithstanding another law to the contrary, a defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing an offense shall not be sentenced to death for the offense. (c) The burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the offense shall be made by the court. (d) If the court determines that the defendant was a person with intellectual disability at the time of the offense, and if the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, and if the district attorney general has filed notice of intention to ask for the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole as provided in § 39-13-208(b) , the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. Section 39-13-207 shall govern the sentencing proceeding. (e) If the issue of intellectual disability is raised at trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with intellectual disability, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to § 39-13-204(j)(8) . (f) The determination by the trier of fact that the defendant does not have intellectual disability shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the state or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial. (g) (1) A defendant who has been sentenced to the death penalty prior to April 28, 2023 and whose conviction is final on direct review may petition the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. The motion must set forth a colorable claim that the defendant is ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability. A defendant filing a motion under this subsection (g) shall serve the attorney general and reporter, who will represent the state. Either party may appeal the trial court's decision in accordance with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. (2) A defendant shall not file a motion under subdivision (g)(1) if the issue of whether the defendant has an intellectual disability has been previously adjudicated on the merits. (3) If an order is issued requiring a determination under subdivision (g)(1) to be paid on behalf of a petitioner pursuant to this part, then the payment must be made from funding provided for indigent defendants' counsel as set forth within the annual appropriations act. The payment must be made only after receipt by the administrative director of the courts of a certified copy of the order and only upon receipt of a bill from the expert. The bill must set forth the name of the petitioner, the amount of the bill, and the name and address of the expert to which payment is to be made. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 6, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 5, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 4, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 255, s 1, eff. 4/28/2023. Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 182, s 4, eff. 4/28/2023. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 399, Secs.s 1, s 2 eff. 5/11/2021. Acts 1990, ch. 1038, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 473, § 10; 2010 , ch. 734, §§ 1-3.
(a) As used in this section, "intellectual disability" means: (1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) The intellectual disability must have manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age.
(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning;
(2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and
(3) The intellectual disability must have manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) Notwithstanding another law to the contrary, a defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing an offense shall not be sentenced to death for the offense.
(c) The burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the offense shall be made by the court.
(d) If the court determines that the defendant was a person with intellectual disability at the time of the offense, and if the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, and if the district attorney general has filed notice of intention to ask for the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole as provided in § 39-13-208(b) , the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. Section 39-13-207 shall govern the sentencing proceeding.
(e) If the issue of intellectual disability is raised at trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with intellectual disability, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to § 39-13-204(j)(8) .
(f) The determination by the trier of fact that the defendant does not have intellectual disability shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the state or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial.
(g) (1) A defendant who has been sentenced to the death penalty prior to April 28, 2023 and whose conviction is final on direct review may petition the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. The motion must set forth a colorable claim that the defendant is ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability. A defendant filing a motion under this subsection (g) shall serve the attorney general and reporter, who will represent the state. Either party may appeal the trial court's decision in accordance with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. (2) A defendant shall not file a motion under subdivision (g)(1) if the issue of whether the defendant has an intellectual disability has been previously adjudicated on the merits. (3) If an order is issued requiring a determination under subdivision (g)(1) to be paid on behalf of a petitioner pursuant to this part, then the payment must be made from funding provided for indigent defendants' counsel as set forth within the annual appropriations act. The payment must be made only after receipt by the administrative director of the courts of a certified copy of the order and only upon receipt of a bill from the expert. The bill must set forth the name of the petitioner, the amount of the bill, and the name and address of the expert to which payment is to be made.
(1) A defendant who has been sentenced to the death penalty prior to April 28, 2023 and whose conviction is final on direct review may petition the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. The motion must set forth a colorable claim that the defendant is ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability. A defendant filing a motion under this subsection (g) shall serve the attorney general and reporter, who will represent the state. Either party may appeal the trial court's decision in accordance with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) A defendant shall not file a motion under subdivision (g)(1) if the issue of whether the defendant has an intellectual disability has been previously adjudicated on the merits.
(3) If an order is issued requiring a determination under subdivision (g)(1) to be paid on behalf of a petitioner pursuant to this part, then the payment must be made from funding provided for indigent defendants' counsel as set forth within the annual appropriations act. The payment must be made only after receipt by the administrative director of the courts of a certified copy of the order and only upon receipt of a bill from the expert. The bill must set forth the name of the petitioner, the amount of the bill, and the name and address of the expert to which payment is to be made.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 6, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 5, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 951,s 4, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 255, s 1, eff. 4/28/2023.
Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 182, s 4, eff. 4/28/2023.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 399, Secs.s 1, s 2 eff. 5/11/2021.
Acts 1990, ch. 1038, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 473, § 10; 2010 , ch. 734, §§ 1-3.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1504 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-1504
Sale or distribution to underage persons unlawful - Proof of age requirement
Status: in_force

(a) It is unlawful for any person to sell or distribute any tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product to another person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age or to purchase a tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product on behalf of such person under twenty-one (21) years of age. (b) It is unlawful for any person to persuade, entice, send or assist a person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase, acquire, receive or attempt to purchase, acquire or receive a tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product. This section and § 39-17-1505 do not preclude law enforcement efforts involving: (1) The use of a minor if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action; or (2) The use of an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age who is not a minor if the individual has consented to this action. (c) No person shall distribute tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product samples in or on any public street, sidewalk, or park. (d) A person engaged in the sale or distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser or recipient if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser or recipient may be under thirty (30) years of age. In the case of distribution by mail, the distributor of tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product shall obtain from the addressee an affirmative statement that the person is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, and shall inform the recipient that the person is strictly prohibited from distributing any tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product, as defined by this part, to any person under twenty-one (21) years of age. Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 810, s 3, eff. 4/8/2022. Amended by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 732, s 11, eff. 1/1/2021. Amended by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 732, s 10, eff. 1/1/2021. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 303, s 6, eff. 7/1/2019. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 303, s 5, eff. 7/1/2019. Amended by 2015 Tenn. Acts, ch. 353, Secs.s 5, s 6 eff. 7/1/2015. Amended by 2015 Tenn. Acts, ch. 353, s 4, eff. 7/1/2015. Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 319, s 2, eff. 5/13/2013. Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 4; 1995, ch. 470, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, 4; 2011 , ch. 501, § 4.
(a) It is unlawful for any person to sell or distribute any tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product to another person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age or to purchase a tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product on behalf of such person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to persuade, entice, send or assist a person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase, acquire, receive or attempt to purchase, acquire or receive a tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product. This section and § 39-17-1505 do not preclude law enforcement efforts involving: (1) The use of a minor if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action; or (2) The use of an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age who is not a minor if the individual has consented to this action.
(1) The use of a minor if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action; or
(2) The use of an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age who is not a minor if the individual has consented to this action.
(c) No person shall distribute tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product samples in or on any public street, sidewalk, or park.
(d) A person engaged in the sale or distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser or recipient if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser or recipient may be under thirty (30) years of age. In the case of distribution by mail, the distributor of tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product shall obtain from the addressee an affirmative statement that the person is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, and shall inform the recipient that the person is strictly prohibited from distributing any tobacco, smoking hemp, vapor product, or smokeless nicotine product, as defined by this part, to any person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 810, s 3, eff. 4/8/2022.
Amended by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 732, s 11, eff. 1/1/2021.
Amended by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 732, s 10, eff. 1/1/2021.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 303, s 6, eff. 7/1/2019.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 303, s 5, eff. 7/1/2019.
Amended by 2015 Tenn. Acts, ch. 353, Secs.s 5, s 6 eff. 7/1/2015.
Amended by 2015 Tenn. Acts, ch. 353, s 4, eff. 7/1/2015.
Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 319, s 2, eff. 5/13/2013.
Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 4; 1995, ch. 470, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, 4; 2011 , ch. 501, § 4.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-523
Punishment for certain sex offenders
Status: in_force

(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Aggravated rapist" means a person convicted of violating § 39-13-502 ; (2) "Child rapist" means a person convicted one (1) or more times of rape of a child as defined by § 39-13-522 ; (3) "Child sexual predator" means a person who: (A) Is convicted in this state of committing an offense on or after July 1, 2007, that is classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; and (B) Has one (1) or more prior convictions for an offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; (4) "Multiple rapist" means a person convicted two (2) or more times of violating § 39-13-503 , or a person convicted at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-502 and at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-503 ; (5) "Predatory offenses" means: (A) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504(a)(4) ; (B) Statutory rape by an authority figure under § 39-13-532 ; (C) Sexual battery by an authority figure under § 39-13-527 ; (D) Solicitation of a minor to commit a sex offense under § 39-13-528 ; (E) Solicitation of a minor to perform sex acts under § 39-13-529 ; (F) Aggravated statutory rape under § 39-13-506(c) ; and (G) Trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309 ; (6) (A) "Prior convictions" means that the person serves and is released or discharged from a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) prior to committing another predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5). (B) "Prior convictions" includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5). If a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5) in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for an offense classified as a predatory offense; and (7) "Separate period of incarceration or supervision" includes a sentence to any of the sentencing alternatives set out in § 40-35-104(c)(3)-(9) . Any offense designated as a predatory offense pursuant to subdivision (a)(5) shall be considered as having been committed after a separate period of incarceration or supervision if the predatory offense was committed while the person was: (A) On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a predatory offense; (B) Incarcerated for a predatory offense; (C) Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a predatory offense; or (D) On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a predatory offense; (b) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be required to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court undiminished by any sentence reduction credits the person may be eligible for or earn. A child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be permitted to earn any credits for which the person is eligible and the credits may be used for the purpose of increased privileges, reduced security classification, or for any purpose other than the reduction of the sentence imposed by the court. (c) Title 40, chapter 35, part 5, regarding release eligibility status and parole, shall not apply to or authorize the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court. (d) Nothing in title 41, chapter 1, part 5 shall give either the governor or the board of parole the authority to release or cause the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court. (e) (1) The provisions of this section requiring child sexual predators to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 2007. (2) The provisions of this section requiring multiple rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 1992. (3) The provisions of this section requiring aggravated rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if the required offense occurs on or after July 1, 2012. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 210, s 1, eff. 7/1/2021. Acts 1992, ch. 878, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 10; 2007 , ch. 525, § 1; 2012, ch. 1073, §§ 2 - 5.
(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Aggravated rapist" means a person convicted of violating § 39-13-502 ; (2) "Child rapist" means a person convicted one (1) or more times of rape of a child as defined by § 39-13-522 ; (3) "Child sexual predator" means a person who: (A) Is convicted in this state of committing an offense on or after July 1, 2007, that is classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; and (B) Has one (1) or more prior convictions for an offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; (4) "Multiple rapist" means a person convicted two (2) or more times of violating § 39-13-503 , or a person convicted at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-502 and at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-503 ; (5) "Predatory offenses" means: (A) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504(a)(4) ; (B) Statutory rape by an authority figure under § 39-13-532 ; (C) Sexual battery by an authority figure under § 39-13-527 ; (D) Solicitation of a minor to commit a sex offense under § 39-13-528 ; (E) Solicitation of a minor to perform sex acts under § 39-13-529 ; (F) Aggravated statutory rape under § 39-13-506(c) ; and (G) Trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309 ; (6) (A) "Prior convictions" means that the person serves and is released or discharged from a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) prior to committing another predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5). (B) "Prior convictions" includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5). If a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5) in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for an offense classified as a predatory offense; and (7) "Separate period of incarceration or supervision" includes a sentence to any of the sentencing alternatives set out in § 40-35-104(c)(3)-(9) . Any offense designated as a predatory offense pursuant to subdivision (a)(5) shall be considered as having been committed after a separate period of incarceration or supervision if the predatory offense was committed while the person was: (A) On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a predatory offense; (B) Incarcerated for a predatory offense; (C) Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a predatory offense; or (D) On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a predatory offense;
(1) "Aggravated rapist" means a person convicted of violating § 39-13-502 ;
(2) "Child rapist" means a person convicted one (1) or more times of rape of a child as defined by § 39-13-522 ;
(3) "Child sexual predator" means a person who: (A) Is convicted in this state of committing an offense on or after July 1, 2007, that is classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; and (B) Has one (1) or more prior convictions for an offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense;
(A) Is convicted in this state of committing an offense on or after July 1, 2007, that is classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; and
(B) Has one (1) or more prior convictions for an offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense;
(4) "Multiple rapist" means a person convicted two (2) or more times of violating § 39-13-503 , or a person convicted at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-502 and at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-503 ;
(5) "Predatory offenses" means: (A) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504(a)(4) ; (B) Statutory rape by an authority figure under § 39-13-532 ; (C) Sexual battery by an authority figure under § 39-13-527 ; (D) Solicitation of a minor to commit a sex offense under § 39-13-528 ; (E) Solicitation of a minor to perform sex acts under § 39-13-529 ; (F) Aggravated statutory rape under § 39-13-506(c) ; and (G) Trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309 ;
(A) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504(a)(4) ;
(B) Statutory rape by an authority figure under § 39-13-532 ;
(C) Sexual battery by an authority figure under § 39-13-527 ;
(D) Solicitation of a minor to commit a sex offense under § 39-13-528 ;
(E) Solicitation of a minor to perform sex acts under § 39-13-529 ;
(F) Aggravated statutory rape under § 39-13-506(c) ; and
(G) Trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309 ;
(6) (A) "Prior convictions" means that the person serves and is released or discharged from a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) prior to committing another predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5). (B) "Prior convictions" includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5). If a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5) in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for an offense classified as a predatory offense; and
(A) "Prior convictions" means that the person serves and is released or discharged from a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) prior to committing another predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5).
(B) "Prior convictions" includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5). If a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5) in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for an offense classified as a predatory offense; and
(7) "Separate period of incarceration or supervision" includes a sentence to any of the sentencing alternatives set out in § 40-35-104(c)(3)-(9) . Any offense designated as a predatory offense pursuant to subdivision (a)(5) shall be considered as having been committed after a separate period of incarceration or supervision if the predatory offense was committed while the person was: (A) On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a predatory offense; (B) Incarcerated for a predatory offense; (C) Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a predatory offense; or (D) On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a predatory offense;
(A) On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a predatory offense;
(B) Incarcerated for a predatory offense;
(C) Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a predatory offense; or
(D) On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a predatory offense;
(b) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be required to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court undiminished by any sentence reduction credits the person may be eligible for or earn. A child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be permitted to earn any credits for which the person is eligible and the credits may be used for the purpose of increased privileges, reduced security classification, or for any purpose other than the reduction of the sentence imposed by the court.
(c) Title 40, chapter 35, part 5, regarding release eligibility status and parole, shall not apply to or authorize the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court.
(d) Nothing in title 41, chapter 1, part 5 shall give either the governor or the board of parole the authority to release or cause the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court.
(e) (1) The provisions of this section requiring child sexual predators to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 2007. (2) The provisions of this section requiring multiple rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 1992. (3) The provisions of this section requiring aggravated rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if the required offense occurs on or after July 1, 2012.
(1) The provisions of this section requiring child sexual predators to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 2007.
(2) The provisions of this section requiring multiple rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 1992.
(3) The provisions of this section requiring aggravated rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if the required offense occurs on or after July 1, 2012.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 210, s 1, eff. 7/1/2021.
Acts 1992, ch. 878, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 10; 2007 , ch. 525, § 1; 2012, ch. 1073, §§ 2 - 5.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1352 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-1352
Suspension or revocation of license
Status: in_force

(a) The department shall suspend or revoke a handgun permit upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the permit holder: (1) Is prohibited from purchasing a handgun under applicable state or federal law; (2) Has not accurately disclosed any material information required by § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ; (3) Poses a material likelihood of risk of harm to the public; (4) Has been arrested for a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, or a felony drug offense; (5) Has been convicted of a felony; (6) Has violated any other provision of §§ 39-17-1351 - 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366 ; (7) Has at any time committed an act or omission or engaged in a pattern of conduct that would render the permit holder ineligible to apply for or obtain a permit under the eligibility requirements of § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ; (8) Has been convicted of domestic assault as defined in § 39-13-111 , or any other misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction; (9) Is subject to a current order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) ; (10) Has been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or title 33, chapter 7 or has been adjudicated as a mental defective; or (11) Is under twenty-five (25) years of age and is currently prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of having been adjudicated delinquent on or after July 1, 2024, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted one (1) or more of the following offenses: (A) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102 ; (B) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116 ; (C) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title; (D) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title; (E) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title; (F) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212 ; (G) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517 ; or (H) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm. (b) (1) It is an offense for a permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender to the department a suspended or revoked handgun permit within ten (10) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation sent to such permit holder by the department. (2) A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor. (c) (1) Upon the suspension or revocation of a permit, the department shall send notice of the suspension or revocation to the permit holder and the appropriate local law enforcement officers. The notice shall state the following: (A) That the permit has been immediately suspended or revoked; (B) That the permit holder must surrender the permit to the department within ten (10) days of the date appearing on the notice; (C) That it is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one (1) year in jail for the permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender the permit to the department within the ten-day period; (D) That if the permit holder does not surrender the suspended or revoked permit within the ten-day period, a law enforcement officer will be directed to take possession of the permit; and (E) That the permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation to request a hearing on the suspension or revocation. (2) If the permit holder fails to surrender the suspended or revoked permit as required by this section, the department shall issue authorization to the appropriate local law enforcement officials to take possession of the suspended or revoked permit and send it to the department. (d) The applicant shall have a right to petition the general sessions court of the applicant's county of residence for judicial review of departmental denial, suspension or revocation of a permit. At the review by the general sessions court, the department shall be represented by the district attorney general. (e) (1) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with burglary, a felony drug offense or a felony offense involving violence or the use of a firearm, then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit. The department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition on the felony charge against the permit holder. (2) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with any felony offense other than an offense subject to subdivision (e)(1), then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit, unless the permit holder petitions the court for a hearing on the surrender. If the permit holder does petition the court, the court shall determine whether the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public if released and allowed to retain the permit. If the court determines that the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public, it shall condition any release of the permit holder, whether on bond or otherwise, upon the permit holder's surrender of the permit to the court. Upon surrender of the permit, the court shall send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit and the department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition of the felony charges against the permit holder. (3) If the permit holder is acquitted on the charge or charges, the permit shall be restored to the holder and the temporary prohibition against the carrying of a handgun shall be lifted. (4) If the permit holder is convicted of the charge or charges, the permit shall be revoked by the court and the revocation shall be noted in the judgment and minutes of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department. (5) If the permit holder is placed on pretrial diversion or judicial diversion, the permit holder's privilege to lawfully carry a handgun shall be suspended for the length of time the permit holder is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department. (f) (1) If a permit holder is convicted of a Class A misdemeanor offense, the permit holder shall surrender the permit to the court having jurisdiction of the case for transmission to the department. (2) The permit holder shall not be permitted to lawfully carry a handgun or exercise the privileges conferred by the permit for the term of the sentence imposed by the court for the offense or offenses for which the permit holder was convicted. (g) In order to reinstate a permit suspended pursuant to subsection (e) or (f), the permit holder shall pay a reinstatement fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) with one-half (1/2) of the fee payable to the department of safety and one-half (1/2) payable to the court that suspended the permit. (1) Prior to the reinstatement of the permit, the permit holder shall have paid in full all fines, court costs and restitution, if any, required by the sentencing court. (2) Failure to complete any terms of probation imposed by the court shall be a bar to reinstatement of the permit. (3) Prior to reissuance of the permit, the department shall verify that the permit holder has complied with all reinstatement requirements of this subsection (g). Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 973,s 11, eff. 7/1/2024. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 479, s 18, eff. 1/1/2020. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 479, s 17, eff. 1/1/2020. Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 903, s 6, eff. 7/1/2018. Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 4; 1997 , ch. 476, § 2; 2009 , ch. 455, § 7; 2009 , ch. 578, § 12.
(a) The department shall suspend or revoke a handgun permit upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the permit holder: (1) Is prohibited from purchasing a handgun under applicable state or federal law; (2) Has not accurately disclosed any material information required by § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ; (3) Poses a material likelihood of risk of harm to the public; (4) Has been arrested for a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, or a felony drug offense; (5) Has been convicted of a felony; (6) Has violated any other provision of §§ 39-17-1351 - 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366 ; (7) Has at any time committed an act or omission or engaged in a pattern of conduct that would render the permit holder ineligible to apply for or obtain a permit under the eligibility requirements of § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ; (8) Has been convicted of domestic assault as defined in § 39-13-111 , or any other misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction; (9) Is subject to a current order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) ; (10) Has been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or title 33, chapter 7 or has been adjudicated as a mental defective; or (11) Is under twenty-five (25) years of age and is currently prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of having been adjudicated delinquent on or after July 1, 2024, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted one (1) or more of the following offenses: (A) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102 ; (B) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116 ; (C) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title; (D) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title; (E) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title; (F) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212 ; (G) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517 ; or (H) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm.
(1) Is prohibited from purchasing a handgun under applicable state or federal law;
(2) Has not accurately disclosed any material information required by § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ;
(3) Poses a material likelihood of risk of harm to the public;
(4) Has been arrested for a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, or a felony drug offense;
(5) Has been convicted of a felony;
(6) Has violated any other provision of §§ 39-17-1351 - 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366 ;
(7) Has at any time committed an act or omission or engaged in a pattern of conduct that would render the permit holder ineligible to apply for or obtain a permit under the eligibility requirements of § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 ;
(8) Has been convicted of domestic assault as defined in § 39-13-111 , or any other misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction;
(9) Is subject to a current order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) ;
(10) Has been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or title 33, chapter 7 or has been adjudicated as a mental defective; or
(11) Is under twenty-five (25) years of age and is currently prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of having been adjudicated delinquent on or after July 1, 2024, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted one (1) or more of the following offenses: (A) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102 ; (B) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116 ; (C) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title; (D) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title; (E) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title; (F) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212 ; (G) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517 ; or (H) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm.
(A) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102 ;
(B) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116 ;
(C) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title;
(D) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title;
(E) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title;
(F) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212 ;
(G) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517 ; or
(H) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm.
(b) (1) It is an offense for a permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender to the department a suspended or revoked handgun permit within ten (10) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation sent to such permit holder by the department. (2) A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(1) It is an offense for a permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender to the department a suspended or revoked handgun permit within ten (10) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation sent to such permit holder by the department.
(2) A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) (1) Upon the suspension or revocation of a permit, the department shall send notice of the suspension or revocation to the permit holder and the appropriate local law enforcement officers. The notice shall state the following: (A) That the permit has been immediately suspended or revoked; (B) That the permit holder must surrender the permit to the department within ten (10) days of the date appearing on the notice; (C) That it is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one (1) year in jail for the permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender the permit to the department within the ten-day period; (D) That if the permit holder does not surrender the suspended or revoked permit within the ten-day period, a law enforcement officer will be directed to take possession of the permit; and (E) That the permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation to request a hearing on the suspension or revocation. (2) If the permit holder fails to surrender the suspended or revoked permit as required by this section, the department shall issue authorization to the appropriate local law enforcement officials to take possession of the suspended or revoked permit and send it to the department.
(1) Upon the suspension or revocation of a permit, the department shall send notice of the suspension or revocation to the permit holder and the appropriate local law enforcement officers. The notice shall state the following: (A) That the permit has been immediately suspended or revoked; (B) That the permit holder must surrender the permit to the department within ten (10) days of the date appearing on the notice; (C) That it is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one (1) year in jail for the permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender the permit to the department within the ten-day period; (D) That if the permit holder does not surrender the suspended or revoked permit within the ten-day period, a law enforcement officer will be directed to take possession of the permit; and (E) That the permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation to request a hearing on the suspension or revocation.
(A) That the permit has been immediately suspended or revoked;
(B) That the permit holder must surrender the permit to the department within ten (10) days of the date appearing on the notice;
(C) That it is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one (1) year in jail for the permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender the permit to the department within the ten-day period;
(D) That if the permit holder does not surrender the suspended or revoked permit within the ten-day period, a law enforcement officer will be directed to take possession of the permit; and
(E) That the permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation to request a hearing on the suspension or revocation.
(2) If the permit holder fails to surrender the suspended or revoked permit as required by this section, the department shall issue authorization to the appropriate local law enforcement officials to take possession of the suspended or revoked permit and send it to the department.
(d) The applicant shall have a right to petition the general sessions court of the applicant's county of residence for judicial review of departmental denial, suspension or revocation of a permit. At the review by the general sessions court, the department shall be represented by the district attorney general.
(e) (1) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with burglary, a felony drug offense or a felony offense involving violence or the use of a firearm, then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit. The department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition on the felony charge against the permit holder. (2) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with any felony offense other than an offense subject to subdivision (e)(1), then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit, unless the permit holder petitions the court for a hearing on the surrender. If the permit holder does petition the court, the court shall determine whether the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public if released and allowed to retain the permit. If the court determines that the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public, it shall condition any release of the permit holder, whether on bond or otherwise, upon the permit holder's surrender of the permit to the court. Upon surrender of the permit, the court shall send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit and the department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition of the felony charges against the permit holder. (3) If the permit holder is acquitted on the charge or charges, the permit shall be restored to the holder and the temporary prohibition against the carrying of a handgun shall be lifted. (4) If the permit holder is convicted of the charge or charges, the permit shall be revoked by the court and the revocation shall be noted in the judgment and minutes of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department. (5) If the permit holder is placed on pretrial diversion or judicial diversion, the permit holder's privilege to lawfully carry a handgun shall be suspended for the length of time the permit holder is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department.
(1) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with burglary, a felony drug offense or a felony offense involving violence or the use of a firearm, then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit. The department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition on the felony charge against the permit holder.
(2) If a permit holder is arrested and charged with any felony offense other than an offense subject to subdivision (e)(1), then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit, unless the permit holder petitions the court for a hearing on the surrender. If the permit holder does petition the court, the court shall determine whether the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public if released and allowed to retain the permit. If the court determines that the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public, it shall condition any release of the permit holder, whether on bond or otherwise, upon the permit holder's surrender of the permit to the court. Upon surrender of the permit, the court shall send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit and the department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition of the felony charges against the permit holder.
(3) If the permit holder is acquitted on the charge or charges, the permit shall be restored to the holder and the temporary prohibition against the carrying of a handgun shall be lifted.
(4) If the permit holder is convicted of the charge or charges, the permit shall be revoked by the court and the revocation shall be noted in the judgment and minutes of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department.
(5) If the permit holder is placed on pretrial diversion or judicial diversion, the permit holder's privilege to lawfully carry a handgun shall be suspended for the length of time the permit holder is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department.
(f) (1) If a permit holder is convicted of a Class A misdemeanor offense, the permit holder shall surrender the permit to the court having jurisdiction of the case for transmission to the department. (2) The permit holder shall not be permitted to lawfully carry a handgun or exercise the privileges conferred by the permit for the term of the sentence imposed by the court for the offense or offenses for which the permit holder was convicted.
(1) If a permit holder is convicted of a Class A misdemeanor offense, the permit holder shall surrender the permit to the court having jurisdiction of the case for transmission to the department.
(2) The permit holder shall not be permitted to lawfully carry a handgun or exercise the privileges conferred by the permit for the term of the sentence imposed by the court for the offense or offenses for which the permit holder was convicted.
(g) In order to reinstate a permit suspended pursuant to subsection (e) or (f), the permit holder shall pay a reinstatement fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) with one-half (1/2) of the fee payable to the department of safety and one-half (1/2) payable to the court that suspended the permit. (1) Prior to the reinstatement of the permit, the permit holder shall have paid in full all fines, court costs and restitution, if any, required by the sentencing court. (2) Failure to complete any terms of probation imposed by the court shall be a bar to reinstatement of the permit. (3) Prior to reissuance of the permit, the department shall verify that the permit holder has complied with all reinstatement requirements of this subsection (g).
(1) Prior to the reinstatement of the permit, the permit holder shall have paid in full all fines, court costs and restitution, if any, required by the sentencing court.
(2) Failure to complete any terms of probation imposed by the court shall be a bar to reinstatement of the permit.
(3) Prior to reissuance of the permit, the department shall verify that the permit holder has complied with all reinstatement requirements of this subsection (g).
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 973,s 11, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 479, s 18, eff. 1/1/2020.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 479, s 17, eff. 1/1/2020.
Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 903, s 6, eff. 7/1/2018.
Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 4; 1997 , ch. 476, § 2; 2009 , ch. 455, § 7; 2009 , ch. 578, § 12.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-526 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-526
Violations of community supervision - Venue for violations
Status: in_force

(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly violate a condition of community supervision imposed upon the person pursuant to § 39-13-524 . (b) (1) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision does not constitute a criminal offense, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a misdemeanor, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor. (3) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a felony, the violation is a Class E felony. (4) Each violation of a condition of community supervision constitutes a separate offense. (c) If the violation of community supervision involves the commission of a new offense, the sentence for a violation of this section shall be served consecutive to any sentence received for commission of the new offense. (d) (1) The venue for a violation of community supervision shall be in the county where the person was being supervised at the time of the violation and this venue shall include those persons placed on supervision in this state but who are being monitored in another state. (2) For purposes of prosecuting a violation of community supervision, the probation and parole officer assigned to the person may act as the affiant when seeking an affidavit of complaint against the person. Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 1; 2009, ch. 115, § 1.
(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly violate a condition of community supervision imposed upon the person pursuant to § 39-13-524 .
(b) (1) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision does not constitute a criminal offense, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a misdemeanor, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor. (3) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a felony, the violation is a Class E felony. (4) Each violation of a condition of community supervision constitutes a separate offense.
(1) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision does not constitute a criminal offense, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a misdemeanor, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a felony, the violation is a Class E felony.
(4) Each violation of a condition of community supervision constitutes a separate offense.
(c) If the violation of community supervision involves the commission of a new offense, the sentence for a violation of this section shall be served consecutive to any sentence received for commission of the new offense.
(d) (1) The venue for a violation of community supervision shall be in the county where the person was being supervised at the time of the violation and this venue shall include those persons placed on supervision in this state but who are being monitored in another state. (2) For purposes of prosecuting a violation of community supervision, the probation and parole officer assigned to the person may act as the affiant when seeking an affidavit of complaint against the person.
(1) The venue for a violation of community supervision shall be in the county where the person was being supervised at the time of the violation and this venue shall include those persons placed on supervision in this state but who are being monitored in another state.
(2) For purposes of prosecuting a violation of community supervision, the probation and parole officer assigned to the person may act as the affiant when seeking an affidavit of complaint against the person.
Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 1; 2009, ch. 115, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-521 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-521
HIV testing of persons convicted of sexual offenses - Release of test results
Status: in_force

(a) When a person is initially arrested for violating § 39-13-502 , § 39-13-503 , § 39-13-506 , § 39-13-522 , § 39-13-531 or § 39-13-532 that person shall undergo human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing immediately, or not later than forty-eight (48) hours after the presentment of the information or indictment, with or without the request of the victim. A licensed medical laboratory shall perform the test at the expense of the person arrested. The person arrested shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary and shall be referred to appropriate counseling. (b) (1) The licensed medical laboratory shall report the results of the HIV test required under this section immediately to the victim. (2) The result of any HIV test required under this section is not a public record and shall be available only to: (A) The victim; (B) The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim; (C) The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim; (D) The department of health; (E) The department of correction; (F) The person tested; and (G) The district attorney general prosecuting the case. (c) If the arrestee is convicted, the court shall review the HIV test results prior to sentencing. (d) (1) For purposes of this section, "HIV" means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. (2) For purposes of this section, "HIV test" means a test of an individual for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus, or for antibodies or antigens that result from HIV infection, or for any other substance specifically indicating infection with HIV. The department of health shall promulgate rules designating the proper test method to be used for this purpose. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HIV in order for the court to consider it as a mandatory enhancement factor. (e) Upon the conviction of the defendant for a violation of § 39-13-513 , § 39-13-514 or § 39-13-515 , the court shall order the convicted person to submit to an HIV test. The test shall be performed by a licensed medical laboratory at the expense of the defendant. The defendant shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary. The defendant shall be referred to appropriate counseling. The defendant shall return a certified copy of the results of all tests to the court. The court shall examine results in camera and seal the record. For the sole purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to prosecute a person for aggravated prostitution under § 39-13-516 , the district attorney general may view the record, notwithstanding subdivision (b)(2). The district attorney general shall be required to file a written, signed request with the court stating the reason the court should grant permission for the district attorney general to view the record. If the test results indicate the defendant is infected with HIV, then the district attorney general may use the results of the test in a prosecution for aggravated prostitution. Acts 1991, ch. 25, § 1; 1992, ch. 948, § 1; 1994, ch. 989, § 2; 1994, ch. 995, § 1; 2002, ch. 655, § 1; 2005, ch. 353, § 13; 2007, ch. 257, § 1; 2011, ch. 269, §§ 1, 2.
(a) When a person is initially arrested for violating § 39-13-502 , § 39-13-503 , § 39-13-506 , § 39-13-522 , § 39-13-531 or § 39-13-532 that person shall undergo human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing immediately, or not later than forty-eight (48) hours after the presentment of the information or indictment, with or without the request of the victim. A licensed medical laboratory shall perform the test at the expense of the person arrested. The person arrested shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary and shall be referred to appropriate counseling.
(b) (1) The licensed medical laboratory shall report the results of the HIV test required under this section immediately to the victim. (2) The result of any HIV test required under this section is not a public record and shall be available only to: (A) The victim; (B) The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim; (C) The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim; (D) The department of health; (E) The department of correction; (F) The person tested; and (G) The district attorney general prosecuting the case.
(1) The licensed medical laboratory shall report the results of the HIV test required under this section immediately to the victim.
(2) The result of any HIV test required under this section is not a public record and shall be available only to: (A) The victim; (B) The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim; (C) The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim; (D) The department of health; (E) The department of correction; (F) The person tested; and (G) The district attorney general prosecuting the case.
(A) The victim;
(B) The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim;
(C) The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim;
(D) The department of health;
(E) The department of correction;
(F) The person tested; and
(G) The district attorney general prosecuting the case.
(c) If the arrestee is convicted, the court shall review the HIV test results prior to sentencing.
(d) (1) For purposes of this section, "HIV" means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. (2) For purposes of this section, "HIV test" means a test of an individual for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus, or for antibodies or antigens that result from HIV infection, or for any other substance specifically indicating infection with HIV. The department of health shall promulgate rules designating the proper test method to be used for this purpose. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HIV in order for the court to consider it as a mandatory enhancement factor.
(1) For purposes of this section, "HIV" means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
(2) For purposes of this section, "HIV test" means a test of an individual for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus, or for antibodies or antigens that result from HIV infection, or for any other substance specifically indicating infection with HIV. The department of health shall promulgate rules designating the proper test method to be used for this purpose.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HIV in order for the court to consider it as a mandatory enhancement factor.
(e) Upon the conviction of the defendant for a violation of § 39-13-513 , § 39-13-514 or § 39-13-515 , the court shall order the convicted person to submit to an HIV test. The test shall be performed by a licensed medical laboratory at the expense of the defendant. The defendant shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary. The defendant shall be referred to appropriate counseling. The defendant shall return a certified copy of the results of all tests to the court. The court shall examine results in camera and seal the record. For the sole purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to prosecute a person for aggravated prostitution under § 39-13-516 , the district attorney general may view the record, notwithstanding subdivision (b)(2). The district attorney general shall be required to file a written, signed request with the court stating the reason the court should grant permission for the district attorney general to view the record. If the test results indicate the defendant is infected with HIV, then the district attorney general may use the results of the test in a prosecution for aggravated prostitution.
Acts 1991, ch. 25, § 1; 1992, ch. 948, § 1; 1994, ch. 989, § 2; 1994, ch. 995, § 1; 2002, ch. 655, § 1; 2005, ch. 353, § 13; 2007, ch. 257, § 1; 2011, ch. 269, §§ 1, 2.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1303 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-1303
Unlawful sale, loan or gift of firearm
Status: in_force

(a) A person commits an offense who: (1) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly sells, loans or makes a gift of a firearm to a minor; (2) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly sells a firearm or ammunition for a firearm to a person who is intoxicated; or (3) Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence violates § 39-17-1316 . (b) It is a defense to prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) that: (1) A firearm was loaned or given to a minor for the purposes of hunting, trapping, fishing, camping, sport shooting or any other lawful sporting activity; and (2) The person is not required to obtain a license under § 39-17-1316 . (c) For purposes of this section, "intoxicated" means substantial impairment of mental or physical capacity resulting from introduction of any substance into the body. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 647,s 3, eff. 7/1/2014. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 3.
(a) A person commits an offense who: (1) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly sells, loans or makes a gift of a firearm to a minor; (2) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly sells a firearm or ammunition for a firearm to a person who is intoxicated; or (3) Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence violates § 39-17-1316 .
(1) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly sells, loans or makes a gift of a firearm to a minor;
(2) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly sells a firearm or ammunition for a firearm to a person who is intoxicated; or
(3) Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence violates § 39-17-1316 .
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) that: (1) A firearm was loaned or given to a minor for the purposes of hunting, trapping, fishing, camping, sport shooting or any other lawful sporting activity; and (2) The person is not required to obtain a license under § 39-17-1316 .
(1) A firearm was loaned or given to a minor for the purposes of hunting, trapping, fishing, camping, sport shooting or any other lawful sporting activity; and
(2) The person is not required to obtain a license under § 39-17-1316 .
(c) For purposes of this section, "intoxicated" means substantial impairment of mental or physical capacity resulting from introduction of any substance into the body.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 647,s 3, eff. 7/1/2014.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 3.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-112 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-112
False academic degrees
Status: in_force

(a) It is an offense for any person to knowingly issue, sell or manufacture a false academic degree. As used in this subsection (a), "person" includes any individual, corporation, firm, company, partnership or association. (b) It is an offense for an individual to knowingly use or claim to have a false academic degree to obtain: (1) Employment; (2) A promotion in employment; or (3) Admission to a college, university or other institution of higher learning. (c) As used in this section, "false academic degree" shall mean any degree issued that meets one of the following criteria: (1) Issued without requiring any student academic work; (2) Issued based solely on the student's life experience or portfolio without requiring any post secondary work submitted to and evaluated by faculty with appropriate academic degrees from an institution that is: (A) Accredited by a regional accrediting agency or other accrediting agency recognized by the United States department of education; and (B) Authorized to operate in Tennessee pursuant to title 49, chapter 7, part 20, relative to the authorization of post secondary institutions, or is exempted from authorization by § 49-7-2004 ; or (3) Issued using more than twenty-five percent (25%) of required credits based on the student's life experience or portfolio. (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an otherwise properly accredited and authorized institution from issuing honorary degrees recognizing distinguished individuals for service to the state, an institution or community. (e) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. (f) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C misdemeanor. Acts 2004, ch. 652, § 1.
(a) It is an offense for any person to knowingly issue, sell or manufacture a false academic degree. As used in this subsection (a), "person" includes any individual, corporation, firm, company, partnership or association.
(b) It is an offense for an individual to knowingly use or claim to have a false academic degree to obtain: (1) Employment; (2) A promotion in employment; or (3) Admission to a college, university or other institution of higher learning.
(1) Employment;
(2) A promotion in employment; or
(3) Admission to a college, university or other institution of higher learning.
(c) As used in this section, "false academic degree" shall mean any degree issued that meets one of the following criteria: (1) Issued without requiring any student academic work; (2) Issued based solely on the student's life experience or portfolio without requiring any post secondary work submitted to and evaluated by faculty with appropriate academic degrees from an institution that is: (A) Accredited by a regional accrediting agency or other accrediting agency recognized by the United States department of education; and (B) Authorized to operate in Tennessee pursuant to title 49, chapter 7, part 20, relative to the authorization of post secondary institutions, or is exempted from authorization by § 49-7-2004 ; or (3) Issued using more than twenty-five percent (25%) of required credits based on the student's life experience or portfolio.
(1) Issued without requiring any student academic work;
(2) Issued based solely on the student's life experience or portfolio without requiring any post secondary work submitted to and evaluated by faculty with appropriate academic degrees from an institution that is: (A) Accredited by a regional accrediting agency or other accrediting agency recognized by the United States department of education; and (B) Authorized to operate in Tennessee pursuant to title 49, chapter 7, part 20, relative to the authorization of post secondary institutions, or is exempted from authorization by § 49-7-2004 ; or
(A) Accredited by a regional accrediting agency or other accrediting agency recognized by the United States department of education; and
(B) Authorized to operate in Tennessee pursuant to title 49, chapter 7, part 20, relative to the authorization of post secondary institutions, or is exempted from authorization by § 49-7-2004 ; or
(3) Issued using more than twenty-five percent (25%) of required credits based on the student's life experience or portfolio.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an otherwise properly accredited and authorized institution from issuing honorary degrees recognizing distinguished individuals for service to the state, an institution or community.
(e) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(f) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C misdemeanor.
Acts 2004, ch. 652, § 1.