Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-214 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 15 / Section 39-15-214
Findings - Purpose
Status: in_force

(a) Findings. The general assembly finds: (1) As the Supreme Court has stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992), "Abortion is a unique act" and is "fraught with consequences...for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision." As the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) "it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." The Supreme Court has acknowledged, in Casey at 882, that the effect of an abortion on the life of the unborn child is "relevant, if not dispositive" information for the patient's decision; (2) Current standards of medical care mandate the performance of an ultrasound prior to the performance of inducing of an abortion. Determining accurate information regarding gestational development is important for purposes of informed consent, as well as making essential preparation for the procedure itself; (3) In this state ultrasounds are regularly provided to women seeking an abortion to determine if they are eligible for a medication abortion, and to review other factors related that cannot be determined prior to an examination of the patient; (4) In the forty-seven (47) years since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), there have been substantial advances in scientific methods and medical technology that have significantly expanded knowledge and understanding of prenatal life and development, and the effects of abortion on the physical and psychological health of women; (5) At conception, a new and genetically distinct human being is formed; (6) The state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the rights of all human beings, including the fundamental and absolute right of unborn human beings to life, liberty, and all rights protected by the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (7) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is medically significant because the heartbeat is a discernible sign of life at every stage of human existence; (8) An unborn child's heart begins to beat at five (5) weeks gestational age, and blood begins to flow during the sixth week; (9) Depending on what type of equipment is utilized, an unborn child's heartbeat can be detected as early as six (6) to eight (8) weeks gestational age; (10) An unborn child's heartbeat can consistently be made audible using a handheld Doppler fetal heart rate device by twelve (12) weeks gestational age; (11) A pregnancy can be confirmed through the detection of the unborn child's heartbeat; (12) By the beginning of the second trimester, physicians view the absence of a fetal heartbeat as an instance of fetal death; (13) It is standard medical practice to monitor an unborn child's heartbeat throughout pregnancy and labor to measure the heart rate and rhythm of the unborn child, which averages between one hundred ten (110) and one hundred sixty (160) beats per minute. This monitoring is used as an indicator of the health of the unborn child; (14) Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, medical professionals have expanded their understanding of life in utero to include, among other indicia, the presence of a heartbeat, brain development, a viable pregnancy or viable intrauterine pregnancy during the first trimester of pregnancy, and the ability to experience pain; (15) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is the best indicator of a viable pregnancy. The detectability of a fetal heartbeat is a strong predictor of survivability to term, especially if the heartbeat is present at eight (8) weeks gestational age or later; (16) When a fetal heartbeat is detected between eight (8) and twelve (12) weeks gestational age, the rate of miscarriage is extremely low, with approximately ninety-eight percent (98%) of naturally conceived pregnancies carrying to term; (17) At eight (8) weeks gestational age, an unborn child begins to show spontaneous movements, and reflexive responses to touch. The majority of an unborn child's body is responsive to touch by fourteen (14) weeks gestational age; (18) Peripheral cutaneous sensory receptors, which are the receptors that feel pain, develop in an unborn child at around seven (7) to eight (8) weeks gestational age. Sensory receptors develop in the palmar regions during the tenth week of gestational age, growing throughout the unborn child's body by sixteen (16) weeks gestational age; (19) An unborn child's nervous system is established by six (6) weeks gestational age. At this stage, the basic pattering of the early nervous system is in place and is the basis for tremendous growth and increased complexity built upon this basic pattern. The earliest neurons of the cortical brain, responsible for thinking, memory, and higher level functions, are established by the fourth week; (20) Synapses are formed in the seventh week, and the neural connections for the most primitive responses to pain are in place by ten (10) weeks gestation; (21) Substance P, a peptide functioning as a neurotransmitter in the transmission of pain, is present in the spinal cord of an unborn child at eight (8) weeks gestational age, while enkephalin peptides, which serve as neurotransmitters in pain modulation, are present at twelve (12) to fourteen (14) weeks gestational age; (22) There is significant evidence, based on peer-reviewed scientific studies, that unborn children are capable of experiencing pain by no later than twenty (20) weeks gestational age. Pain receptor nerves are already present throughout the human body by twenty (20) weeks gestation, and the cortex, which begins development at eight (8) weeks, has a full complement of neurons at twenty (20) weeks; (23) There is evidence that an unborn child is capable of feeling pain as early as twelve (12) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age. The scientific evidence shows that significant cortical neuronal connections are in place by ten (10) to twelve (12) weeks gestation, and that connections between the spinal court and thalamus are nearly complete by twenty (20) weeks gestation; (24) A growing body of medical evidence and literature supports the conclusion that an unborn child may feel pain from around eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age, or even as early as five and a half (51/2) weeks. At only eight (8) weeks gestation, an unborn child exhibits reflexive movement during invasive procedures resulting from spinal reflex neuro pathways, showing that the unborn child reacts to noxious stimuli with avoidance reactions and stress responses. By sixteen (16) weeks gestational age, pain transmission from a peripheral receptor to the cortex is possible. Significant evidence also shows hormonal stress responses by unborn children as early as eighteen (18) weeks; (25) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero, and providing this information to mothers who are considering abortion is an important part of empowering mothers to make a fully-informed choice on whether or not to seek an abortion; (26) Medical evidence shows that younger infants are hypersensitive to pain. Neuronal mechanisms that inhibit or moderate pain sensations do not begin to develop until thirty-four (34) to thirty-six (36) weeks gestation and are not complete until a significant time after birth. Newborn and preterm infants are hyperresponsive to pain compared to adults or older infants; (27) The recognition of fetal pain has led to improvements and changes in how physicians approach fetal surgery and fetal anesthesia. The presence of neural connections and the ability to feel pain as early as the fifteenth week now necessitate treating the unborn child as a separate patient from the mother for purposes of utilizing direct analgesia to fetal patients, who clearly elicit stress responses to pain; (28) Fetal surgeons at specialized units in St. Louis, Nashville, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Boston, and elsewhere, in response to their recognition of fetal pain, routinely use anesthesia and analgesia for unborn and premature infants undergoing surgery as young as eighteen (18) weeks gestation; (29) The leading textbook on clinical anesthesia recognizes the significant body of evidence indicating the importance of mitigating fetal stress responses to pain stimuli. It is presumed that an unborn child's ability to fully experience pain occurs between twenty (20) and thirty (30) weeks, and that the fetal experience of pain may be even greater than that of term neonate or young children due to the immaturity of neurodevelopment that helps inhibit pain; (30) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero; (31) The infliction of unnecessary pain upon a living being is generally prohibited by state and federal law. The legislature has prohibited the unnecessary infliction of pain on living beings in a variety of circumstances in an effort to protect the innocent from harm; (32) The life of an unborn child is recognized and protected from violence by federal law and by the laws of most states. The killing of an unborn child is considered homicide in thirty-eight (38) states, with at least twenty-eight (28) of those states criminalizing the act from conception. Nearly every state and the District of Columbia have wrongful death statutes that allow for liability and recovery for the death of an unborn child or subsequent death of an infant who is born and later dies because of injuries caused while in utero; (33) The United States Supreme Court created the viability standard for evaluating abortion-related laws and regulations in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and reaffirmed this approach in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); (34) At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, the court recognized that viability was not likely until approximately twenty-eight (28) weeks gestational age; (35) Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, advances in science, technology, and treatment methods have resulted in children surviving and thriving at younger preterm ages than ever before; (36) In recent years, scientific advances and advances in neonatal care of lowered the gestational limits of survivability well into the second trimester; (37) The age at which a preterm infant can survive has decreased from twenty-eight (28) weeks to less than twenty-two (22) weeks. Survival of preterm infants has increased significantly over time assuming physicians provide active care for the young infants, lowering the age of survival from twenty-eight (28) weeks to twenty-four (24) weeks. Moreover, infants born as early as twenty-two (22) weeks can survive with the provision of care and treatment. The youngest preterm infant to survive was born at only twenty-one (21) weeks and four (4) days; (38) In 1978, the first infants weighing less than seven hundred fifty (750) grams were successfully ventilated; (39) By the 1990s, survival of infants born weighing between five hundred (500) and seven hundred (700) grams, roughly between twenty-four (24) to twenty-six (26) weeks, became possible; (40) Technological developments in the 1980s and 1990s, such as improved tracheal instillation of surfactant for respiratory distress syndrome and antenatal corticosteroids, resulted in survival of infants born between twenty-three (23) to twenty-four (24) weeks; (41) In recent years, resuscitation and survival of infants born weighing less than four hundred (400) grams, or approximately twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) weeks gestational age, has further decreased the age of viability; (42) The provision of active prenatal and postnatal care has significantly increased the number of prematurely born children who survive until hospital discharge; (43) Abortions performed at any gestational age pose a risk to the mother. Abortion increases the risks of subsequent preterm birth and placenta previa, life-threatening hemorrhage, postpartum hemorrhage, and cesarean delivery; (44) Abortions performed later in pregnancy pose an even higher medical risk to the health and life of women, with the relative risk increasing exponentially at later gestational ages after eight (8) weeks gestational age; (45) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age is between three (3) and four (4) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (46) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age is almost fifteen (15) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (47) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at sixteen (16) to twenty (20) weeks gestational age is almost thirty (30) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (48) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at twenty-one (21) weeks gestational age or later is more than seventy-five (75) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (49) Women who have an abortion suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at a rate slightly higher than veterans of the Vietnam war. Women who have an abortion have an eighty one percent (81%) increased risk of mental trauma after an abortion. Abortion has been shown to correlate with many other mental health disorders as well; (50) The United States is one of only seven (7) countries in the world that permits elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks; (51) Only seventeen (17) countries permit abortion without any restriction beyond week twelve (12) weeks gestational age; (52) The United States is an outlier within the international community related to the regulation of abortion. Of the countries that permit elective abortion, nine (9) limit elective abortion before the twelfth week of gestation, thirty-six (36) limit elective abortion at twelve (12) weeks gestation, six (6) limit elective abortion between twelve (12) and twenty (20) weeks gestation, and only seven (7) permit elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks or have no gestational limit; (53) The historical development of abortion is undeniably tied to bias and discrimination by some organizations, leaders, and policies towards impoverished and minority communities, including the imposition of forced sterilization of the intellectually disabled, poor, minority, and immigrant women. These historic policies should be rejected and left on the ash heap of history; (54) As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019), "the use of abortion to achieve eugenic goals is not merely hypothetical." This historical practice of abortion was rooted not in equality but in discrimination based on age, sex, and disability; (55) In the early twentieth century, the eugenics movement had grown popular across elite institutions in the United States, with many distinguishing between so-called fit and unfit individuals along racial lines and expressing concern over the increased birth-rate among non-white populations. Such abhorrent distinctions were also made between able-bodied persons and persons eugenicists referred to as "feeble-minded," "deformed," "diseased," blind, deaf, or "dependent," a term used to included orphans and the poor. Laws were adopted prohibiting marriages between the disabled and other "unfit" individuals and requiring their sterilization. More than sixty thousand (60,000) people were involuntarily sterilized between 1907 and 1983; (56) Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger argued in the early twentieth century that birth control would open the way to the eugenicist. Sanger argued that birth control could be used to reduce the "ever increasing, unceasingly spawning class of human beings who never should have been born at all; (57) This argument was later adopted by abortion advocates, such as Planned Parenthood President Alan Guttmacher, who endorsed abortion for eugenic purposes. Guttmacher argued in the 1950's that abortion should be used to prevent the birth of disabled children. Legal scholar Glanville Williams, whose book was cited in the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, argued in a book published in the 1950's that a "eugenic killing by a mother ...cannot confidently be pronounced immoral; (58) Some continue to support the goal of reducing undesirable populations through selective reproduction; (59) Today, the individualized nature of abortion creates a significant risk that prenatal screening tests and new technologies will be used to eliminate children with unwanted characteristics; (60) There is substantial evidence from across the globe and in the United States that the elimination of children with unwanted characteristics is already occurring. The abortion rate for children diagnosed with Down syndrome in utero approaches one hundred percent (100%) in Iceland, ninety-eight percent (98%) in Denmark, ninety percent (90%) in the United Kingdom, and seventy-seven percent (77%) in France. Even in the United States, the abortion rate for children with Down Syndrome is sixty-seven percent (67%). Widespread sex-selective abortions in Asia have led to as many as one hundred sixty (160) million "missing" women. In India, as a result of the abortion of 300,000-700,000 female unborn children each year over several decades, there are currently about fifty (50) million more men than women in the country. Recent evidence also suggests that sex-selective abortions of girls are common among certain populations in the United States; (61) Sex-selective abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio imbalance that can impede members of the numerically predominant sex from finding partners, encourage the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and create other societal harms. Sex-selective abortion also reinforces discriminatory and sexist stereotypes toward women by devaluing and dehumanizing females; (62) In this state, from 2008 through 2017, the rate of abortion per one thousand (1,000) women was nearly four (4) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with a rate of 7.6 on average for all women, 4.6 for white women, and 16.0 for nonwhite women. The ratio of abortions to one thousand (1,000) live births in this state from 2008-2017 was nearly three (3) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with an average of 138.2 for all women, 85.1 for white women, and 294.4 for nonwhite women; (63) The use of abortion as a means to prefer one (1) sex over another or to discriminate based on disability or race is antithetical to the core values equality, freedom, and human dignity enshrined in both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The elimination of bias and discrimination against pregnant women, their partners, and their family members, including unborn children, is a fundamental obligation of government in order to guarantee those who are, according to the Declaration of Independence, "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" can enjoy "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness"; (64) This state has historically protected its interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession by enacting a comprehensive statutory framework for ensuring the integrity of the medical profession in title 63; (65) The general assembly first adopted an act creating the Board of Medical Examiners in 1901, with the mission to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and to ensure the highest degree of professional conduct; (66) As the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)), "the government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession." Under U.S. Supreme Court precedents, it is clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession; (67) Physician involvement in medical practices that cause fetal pain has been rejected by the international community; (68) Physician involvement in medical practices that facilitate discrimination is antithetical to the United States and Tennessee constitutions' affirmation of equal protection under the law; (69) The integrity and public respect of the medical profession are significantly harmed by physician involvement in practices that have been rejected by the international community, facilitate discrimination, or otherwise create a disdain for life; (70) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in valuing and protecting unborn children; (71) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the physical and mental health of the mother; (72) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in promoting human dignity; (73) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion; (74) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in safeguarding an unborn child from the serious harm of pain by an abortion method that would cause the unborn child to experience pain; (75) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in resolving untenable inconsistencies and incongruities in state law which permits some unborn children to be killed by abortion, while requiring that unborn children be protected and valued in non-abortion circumstances including, but not limited to, criminal provisions related to the infliction of harms against persons, state programs intended to aid prenatal healthcare, and state sponsored healthcare for unborn children; (76) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, including by prohibiting medical practices that might cause the medical profession to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including the life of the unborn child; and (77) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination. (b) Purpose. (1) The purpose of this section is to provide legislative intent and reasoning underlying the enactment of laws to protect maternal health, and to preserve, promote, and protect life and potential life throughout pregnancy, including, but not limited to, §§ 39-15-215 - 39-15-217. (2) The unique nature of abortion and its potential physical and mental health risks, as well as the ultimate result of the death of an unborn child, necessitates that this state ensure every woman considering an abortion is provided with adequate comprehensive information before deciding to obtain an abortion. The mandatory provision of an ultrasound prior to the abortion substantially furthers this compelling state interest. (3) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is a medically significant indicator of life and the potential successful development of an unborn child. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting unborn children warrants the restriction of abortion in cases where the heartbeat is detectable. (4) The unnecessary infliction of pain upon the life of an unborn child is inconsistent with Tennessee law that would otherwise protect the life and health of an unborn child, undermines the integrity of and public trust in the medical profession, and conflicts with the this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women. Therefore, it is necessary to enact protections against the infliction of pain, and death, upon an unborn child who is capable of experiencing pain. (5) Advances in science and medical practice have decreased the gestational age of an unborn child's viability to survive. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women require the enactment of a series of gestational age restrictions on the provision of an abortion. (6) The historical use of abortion as a means to discriminatory ends is fundamentally objectionable and conflicts with this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination and discriminatory practices. Therefore, it is necessary for this state to enact protections that prevent sex, racial, and disability discrimination against unborn children. (7) Life begins at conception, and nothing in chapter 764 of the Public Acts of 2020 shall be interpreted or construed to suggest that it is the intent or purpose of the legislature to condone abortion of an unborn child at any time after conception. The legislature specifically acknowledges the provisions of § 39-15-213 that will prohibit all abortion effective on the thirtieth day after issuance of a judgment overruling, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, or adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, restoring state authority to prohibit abortion. Added by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 764, s 2, eff. 7/13/2020.
(a) Findings. The general assembly finds: (1) As the Supreme Court has stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992), "Abortion is a unique act" and is "fraught with consequences...for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision." As the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) "it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." The Supreme Court has acknowledged, in Casey at 882, that the effect of an abortion on the life of the unborn child is "relevant, if not dispositive" information for the patient's decision; (2) Current standards of medical care mandate the performance of an ultrasound prior to the performance of inducing of an abortion. Determining accurate information regarding gestational development is important for purposes of informed consent, as well as making essential preparation for the procedure itself; (3) In this state ultrasounds are regularly provided to women seeking an abortion to determine if they are eligible for a medication abortion, and to review other factors related that cannot be determined prior to an examination of the patient; (4) In the forty-seven (47) years since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), there have been substantial advances in scientific methods and medical technology that have significantly expanded knowledge and understanding of prenatal life and development, and the effects of abortion on the physical and psychological health of women; (5) At conception, a new and genetically distinct human being is formed; (6) The state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the rights of all human beings, including the fundamental and absolute right of unborn human beings to life, liberty, and all rights protected by the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (7) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is medically significant because the heartbeat is a discernible sign of life at every stage of human existence; (8) An unborn child's heart begins to beat at five (5) weeks gestational age, and blood begins to flow during the sixth week; (9) Depending on what type of equipment is utilized, an unborn child's heartbeat can be detected as early as six (6) to eight (8) weeks gestational age; (10) An unborn child's heartbeat can consistently be made audible using a handheld Doppler fetal heart rate device by twelve (12) weeks gestational age; (11) A pregnancy can be confirmed through the detection of the unborn child's heartbeat; (12) By the beginning of the second trimester, physicians view the absence of a fetal heartbeat as an instance of fetal death; (13) It is standard medical practice to monitor an unborn child's heartbeat throughout pregnancy and labor to measure the heart rate and rhythm of the unborn child, which averages between one hundred ten (110) and one hundred sixty (160) beats per minute. This monitoring is used as an indicator of the health of the unborn child; (14) Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, medical professionals have expanded their understanding of life in utero to include, among other indicia, the presence of a heartbeat, brain development, a viable pregnancy or viable intrauterine pregnancy during the first trimester of pregnancy, and the ability to experience pain; (15) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is the best indicator of a viable pregnancy. The detectability of a fetal heartbeat is a strong predictor of survivability to term, especially if the heartbeat is present at eight (8) weeks gestational age or later; (16) When a fetal heartbeat is detected between eight (8) and twelve (12) weeks gestational age, the rate of miscarriage is extremely low, with approximately ninety-eight percent (98%) of naturally conceived pregnancies carrying to term; (17) At eight (8) weeks gestational age, an unborn child begins to show spontaneous movements, and reflexive responses to touch. The majority of an unborn child's body is responsive to touch by fourteen (14) weeks gestational age; (18) Peripheral cutaneous sensory receptors, which are the receptors that feel pain, develop in an unborn child at around seven (7) to eight (8) weeks gestational age. Sensory receptors develop in the palmar regions during the tenth week of gestational age, growing throughout the unborn child's body by sixteen (16) weeks gestational age; (19) An unborn child's nervous system is established by six (6) weeks gestational age. At this stage, the basic pattering of the early nervous system is in place and is the basis for tremendous growth and increased complexity built upon this basic pattern. The earliest neurons of the cortical brain, responsible for thinking, memory, and higher level functions, are established by the fourth week; (20) Synapses are formed in the seventh week, and the neural connections for the most primitive responses to pain are in place by ten (10) weeks gestation; (21) Substance P, a peptide functioning as a neurotransmitter in the transmission of pain, is present in the spinal cord of an unborn child at eight (8) weeks gestational age, while enkephalin peptides, which serve as neurotransmitters in pain modulation, are present at twelve (12) to fourteen (14) weeks gestational age; (22) There is significant evidence, based on peer-reviewed scientific studies, that unborn children are capable of experiencing pain by no later than twenty (20) weeks gestational age. Pain receptor nerves are already present throughout the human body by twenty (20) weeks gestation, and the cortex, which begins development at eight (8) weeks, has a full complement of neurons at twenty (20) weeks; (23) There is evidence that an unborn child is capable of feeling pain as early as twelve (12) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age. The scientific evidence shows that significant cortical neuronal connections are in place by ten (10) to twelve (12) weeks gestation, and that connections between the spinal court and thalamus are nearly complete by twenty (20) weeks gestation; (24) A growing body of medical evidence and literature supports the conclusion that an unborn child may feel pain from around eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age, or even as early as five and a half (51/2) weeks. At only eight (8) weeks gestation, an unborn child exhibits reflexive movement during invasive procedures resulting from spinal reflex neuro pathways, showing that the unborn child reacts to noxious stimuli with avoidance reactions and stress responses. By sixteen (16) weeks gestational age, pain transmission from a peripheral receptor to the cortex is possible. Significant evidence also shows hormonal stress responses by unborn children as early as eighteen (18) weeks; (25) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero, and providing this information to mothers who are considering abortion is an important part of empowering mothers to make a fully-informed choice on whether or not to seek an abortion; (26) Medical evidence shows that younger infants are hypersensitive to pain. Neuronal mechanisms that inhibit or moderate pain sensations do not begin to develop until thirty-four (34) to thirty-six (36) weeks gestation and are not complete until a significant time after birth. Newborn and preterm infants are hyperresponsive to pain compared to adults or older infants; (27) The recognition of fetal pain has led to improvements and changes in how physicians approach fetal surgery and fetal anesthesia. The presence of neural connections and the ability to feel pain as early as the fifteenth week now necessitate treating the unborn child as a separate patient from the mother for purposes of utilizing direct analgesia to fetal patients, who clearly elicit stress responses to pain; (28) Fetal surgeons at specialized units in St. Louis, Nashville, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Boston, and elsewhere, in response to their recognition of fetal pain, routinely use anesthesia and analgesia for unborn and premature infants undergoing surgery as young as eighteen (18) weeks gestation; (29) The leading textbook on clinical anesthesia recognizes the significant body of evidence indicating the importance of mitigating fetal stress responses to pain stimuli. It is presumed that an unborn child's ability to fully experience pain occurs between twenty (20) and thirty (30) weeks, and that the fetal experience of pain may be even greater than that of term neonate or young children due to the immaturity of neurodevelopment that helps inhibit pain; (30) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero; (31) The infliction of unnecessary pain upon a living being is generally prohibited by state and federal law. The legislature has prohibited the unnecessary infliction of pain on living beings in a variety of circumstances in an effort to protect the innocent from harm; (32) The life of an unborn child is recognized and protected from violence by federal law and by the laws of most states. The killing of an unborn child is considered homicide in thirty-eight (38) states, with at least twenty-eight (28) of those states criminalizing the act from conception. Nearly every state and the District of Columbia have wrongful death statutes that allow for liability and recovery for the death of an unborn child or subsequent death of an infant who is born and later dies because of injuries caused while in utero; (33) The United States Supreme Court created the viability standard for evaluating abortion-related laws and regulations in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and reaffirmed this approach in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); (34) At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, the court recognized that viability was not likely until approximately twenty-eight (28) weeks gestational age; (35) Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, advances in science, technology, and treatment methods have resulted in children surviving and thriving at younger preterm ages than ever before; (36) In recent years, scientific advances and advances in neonatal care of lowered the gestational limits of survivability well into the second trimester; (37) The age at which a preterm infant can survive has decreased from twenty-eight (28) weeks to less than twenty-two (22) weeks. Survival of preterm infants has increased significantly over time assuming physicians provide active care for the young infants, lowering the age of survival from twenty-eight (28) weeks to twenty-four (24) weeks. Moreover, infants born as early as twenty-two (22) weeks can survive with the provision of care and treatment. The youngest preterm infant to survive was born at only twenty-one (21) weeks and four (4) days; (38) In 1978, the first infants weighing less than seven hundred fifty (750) grams were successfully ventilated; (39) By the 1990s, survival of infants born weighing between five hundred (500) and seven hundred (700) grams, roughly between twenty-four (24) to twenty-six (26) weeks, became possible; (40) Technological developments in the 1980s and 1990s, such as improved tracheal instillation of surfactant for respiratory distress syndrome and antenatal corticosteroids, resulted in survival of infants born between twenty-three (23) to twenty-four (24) weeks; (41) In recent years, resuscitation and survival of infants born weighing less than four hundred (400) grams, or approximately twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) weeks gestational age, has further decreased the age of viability; (42) The provision of active prenatal and postnatal care has significantly increased the number of prematurely born children who survive until hospital discharge; (43) Abortions performed at any gestational age pose a risk to the mother. Abortion increases the risks of subsequent preterm birth and placenta previa, life-threatening hemorrhage, postpartum hemorrhage, and cesarean delivery; (44) Abortions performed later in pregnancy pose an even higher medical risk to the health and life of women, with the relative risk increasing exponentially at later gestational ages after eight (8) weeks gestational age; (45) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age is between three (3) and four (4) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (46) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age is almost fifteen (15) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (47) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at sixteen (16) to twenty (20) weeks gestational age is almost thirty (30) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (48) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at twenty-one (21) weeks gestational age or later is more than seventy-five (75) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier; (49) Women who have an abortion suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at a rate slightly higher than veterans of the Vietnam war. Women who have an abortion have an eighty one percent (81%) increased risk of mental trauma after an abortion. Abortion has been shown to correlate with many other mental health disorders as well; (50) The United States is one of only seven (7) countries in the world that permits elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks; (51) Only seventeen (17) countries permit abortion without any restriction beyond week twelve (12) weeks gestational age; (52) The United States is an outlier within the international community related to the regulation of abortion. Of the countries that permit elective abortion, nine (9) limit elective abortion before the twelfth week of gestation, thirty-six (36) limit elective abortion at twelve (12) weeks gestation, six (6) limit elective abortion between twelve (12) and twenty (20) weeks gestation, and only seven (7) permit elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks or have no gestational limit; (53) The historical development of abortion is undeniably tied to bias and discrimination by some organizations, leaders, and policies towards impoverished and minority communities, including the imposition of forced sterilization of the intellectually disabled, poor, minority, and immigrant women. These historic policies should be rejected and left on the ash heap of history; (54) As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019), "the use of abortion to achieve eugenic goals is not merely hypothetical." This historical practice of abortion was rooted not in equality but in discrimination based on age, sex, and disability; (55) In the early twentieth century, the eugenics movement had grown popular across elite institutions in the United States, with many distinguishing between so-called fit and unfit individuals along racial lines and expressing concern over the increased birth-rate among non-white populations. Such abhorrent distinctions were also made between able-bodied persons and persons eugenicists referred to as "feeble-minded," "deformed," "diseased," blind, deaf, or "dependent," a term used to included orphans and the poor. Laws were adopted prohibiting marriages between the disabled and other "unfit" individuals and requiring their sterilization. More than sixty thousand (60,000) people were involuntarily sterilized between 1907 and 1983; (56) Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger argued in the early twentieth century that birth control would open the way to the eugenicist. Sanger argued that birth control could be used to reduce the "ever increasing, unceasingly spawning class of human beings who never should have been born at all; (57) This argument was later adopted by abortion advocates, such as Planned Parenthood President Alan Guttmacher, who endorsed abortion for eugenic purposes. Guttmacher argued in the 1950's that abortion should be used to prevent the birth of disabled children. Legal scholar Glanville Williams, whose book was cited in the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, argued in a book published in the 1950's that a "eugenic killing by a mother ...cannot confidently be pronounced immoral; (58) Some continue to support the goal of reducing undesirable populations through selective reproduction; (59) Today, the individualized nature of abortion creates a significant risk that prenatal screening tests and new technologies will be used to eliminate children with unwanted characteristics; (60) There is substantial evidence from across the globe and in the United States that the elimination of children with unwanted characteristics is already occurring. The abortion rate for children diagnosed with Down syndrome in utero approaches one hundred percent (100%) in Iceland, ninety-eight percent (98%) in Denmark, ninety percent (90%) in the United Kingdom, and seventy-seven percent (77%) in France. Even in the United States, the abortion rate for children with Down Syndrome is sixty-seven percent (67%). Widespread sex-selective abortions in Asia have led to as many as one hundred sixty (160) million "missing" women. In India, as a result of the abortion of 300,000-700,000 female unborn children each year over several decades, there are currently about fifty (50) million more men than women in the country. Recent evidence also suggests that sex-selective abortions of girls are common among certain populations in the United States; (61) Sex-selective abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio imbalance that can impede members of the numerically predominant sex from finding partners, encourage the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and create other societal harms. Sex-selective abortion also reinforces discriminatory and sexist stereotypes toward women by devaluing and dehumanizing females; (62) In this state, from 2008 through 2017, the rate of abortion per one thousand (1,000) women was nearly four (4) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with a rate of 7.6 on average for all women, 4.6 for white women, and 16.0 for nonwhite women. The ratio of abortions to one thousand (1,000) live births in this state from 2008-2017 was nearly three (3) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with an average of 138.2 for all women, 85.1 for white women, and 294.4 for nonwhite women; (63) The use of abortion as a means to prefer one (1) sex over another or to discriminate based on disability or race is antithetical to the core values equality, freedom, and human dignity enshrined in both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The elimination of bias and discrimination against pregnant women, their partners, and their family members, including unborn children, is a fundamental obligation of government in order to guarantee those who are, according to the Declaration of Independence, "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" can enjoy "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness"; (64) This state has historically protected its interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession by enacting a comprehensive statutory framework for ensuring the integrity of the medical profession in title 63; (65) The general assembly first adopted an act creating the Board of Medical Examiners in 1901, with the mission to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and to ensure the highest degree of professional conduct; (66) As the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)), "the government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession." Under U.S. Supreme Court precedents, it is clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession; (67) Physician involvement in medical practices that cause fetal pain has been rejected by the international community; (68) Physician involvement in medical practices that facilitate discrimination is antithetical to the United States and Tennessee constitutions' affirmation of equal protection under the law; (69) The integrity and public respect of the medical profession are significantly harmed by physician involvement in practices that have been rejected by the international community, facilitate discrimination, or otherwise create a disdain for life; (70) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in valuing and protecting unborn children; (71) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the physical and mental health of the mother; (72) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in promoting human dignity; (73) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion; (74) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in safeguarding an unborn child from the serious harm of pain by an abortion method that would cause the unborn child to experience pain; (75) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in resolving untenable inconsistencies and incongruities in state law which permits some unborn children to be killed by abortion, while requiring that unborn children be protected and valued in non-abortion circumstances including, but not limited to, criminal provisions related to the infliction of harms against persons, state programs intended to aid prenatal healthcare, and state sponsored healthcare for unborn children; (76) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, including by prohibiting medical practices that might cause the medical profession to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including the life of the unborn child; and (77) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination.
(1) As the Supreme Court has stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992), "Abortion is a unique act" and is "fraught with consequences...for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision." As the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) "it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." The Supreme Court has acknowledged, in Casey at 882, that the effect of an abortion on the life of the unborn child is "relevant, if not dispositive" information for the patient's decision;
(2) Current standards of medical care mandate the performance of an ultrasound prior to the performance of inducing of an abortion. Determining accurate information regarding gestational development is important for purposes of informed consent, as well as making essential preparation for the procedure itself;
(3) In this state ultrasounds are regularly provided to women seeking an abortion to determine if they are eligible for a medication abortion, and to review other factors related that cannot be determined prior to an examination of the patient;
(4) In the forty-seven (47) years since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), there have been substantial advances in scientific methods and medical technology that have significantly expanded knowledge and understanding of prenatal life and development, and the effects of abortion on the physical and psychological health of women;
(5) At conception, a new and genetically distinct human being is formed;
(6) The state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the rights of all human beings, including the fundamental and absolute right of unborn human beings to life, liberty, and all rights protected by the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
(7) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is medically significant because the heartbeat is a discernible sign of life at every stage of human existence;
(8) An unborn child's heart begins to beat at five (5) weeks gestational age, and blood begins to flow during the sixth week;
(9) Depending on what type of equipment is utilized, an unborn child's heartbeat can be detected as early as six (6) to eight (8) weeks gestational age;
(10) An unborn child's heartbeat can consistently be made audible using a handheld Doppler fetal heart rate device by twelve (12) weeks gestational age;
(11) A pregnancy can be confirmed through the detection of the unborn child's heartbeat;
(12) By the beginning of the second trimester, physicians view the absence of a fetal heartbeat as an instance of fetal death;
(13) It is standard medical practice to monitor an unborn child's heartbeat throughout pregnancy and labor to measure the heart rate and rhythm of the unborn child, which averages between one hundred ten (110) and one hundred sixty (160) beats per minute. This monitoring is used as an indicator of the health of the unborn child;
(14) Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, medical professionals have expanded their understanding of life in utero to include, among other indicia, the presence of a heartbeat, brain development, a viable pregnancy or viable intrauterine pregnancy during the first trimester of pregnancy, and the ability to experience pain;
(15) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is the best indicator of a viable pregnancy. The detectability of a fetal heartbeat is a strong predictor of survivability to term, especially if the heartbeat is present at eight (8) weeks gestational age or later;
(16) When a fetal heartbeat is detected between eight (8) and twelve (12) weeks gestational age, the rate of miscarriage is extremely low, with approximately ninety-eight percent (98%) of naturally conceived pregnancies carrying to term;
(17) At eight (8) weeks gestational age, an unborn child begins to show spontaneous movements, and reflexive responses to touch. The majority of an unborn child's body is responsive to touch by fourteen (14) weeks gestational age;
(18) Peripheral cutaneous sensory receptors, which are the receptors that feel pain, develop in an unborn child at around seven (7) to eight (8) weeks gestational age. Sensory receptors develop in the palmar regions during the tenth week of gestational age, growing throughout the unborn child's body by sixteen (16) weeks gestational age;
(19) An unborn child's nervous system is established by six (6) weeks gestational age. At this stage, the basic pattering of the early nervous system is in place and is the basis for tremendous growth and increased complexity built upon this basic pattern. The earliest neurons of the cortical brain, responsible for thinking, memory, and higher level functions, are established by the fourth week;
(20) Synapses are formed in the seventh week, and the neural connections for the most primitive responses to pain are in place by ten (10) weeks gestation;
(21) Substance P, a peptide functioning as a neurotransmitter in the transmission of pain, is present in the spinal cord of an unborn child at eight (8) weeks gestational age, while enkephalin peptides, which serve as neurotransmitters in pain modulation, are present at twelve (12) to fourteen (14) weeks gestational age;
(22) There is significant evidence, based on peer-reviewed scientific studies, that unborn children are capable of experiencing pain by no later than twenty (20) weeks gestational age. Pain receptor nerves are already present throughout the human body by twenty (20) weeks gestation, and the cortex, which begins development at eight (8) weeks, has a full complement of neurons at twenty (20) weeks;
(23) There is evidence that an unborn child is capable of feeling pain as early as twelve (12) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age. The scientific evidence shows that significant cortical neuronal connections are in place by ten (10) to twelve (12) weeks gestation, and that connections between the spinal court and thalamus are nearly complete by twenty (20) weeks gestation;
(24) A growing body of medical evidence and literature supports the conclusion that an unborn child may feel pain from around eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age, or even as early as five and a half (51/2) weeks. At only eight (8) weeks gestation, an unborn child exhibits reflexive movement during invasive procedures resulting from spinal reflex neuro pathways, showing that the unborn child reacts to noxious stimuli with avoidance reactions and stress responses. By sixteen (16) weeks gestational age, pain transmission from a peripheral receptor to the cortex is possible. Significant evidence also shows hormonal stress responses by unborn children as early as eighteen (18) weeks;
(25) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero, and providing this information to mothers who are considering abortion is an important part of empowering mothers to make a fully-informed choice on whether or not to seek an abortion;
(26) Medical evidence shows that younger infants are hypersensitive to pain. Neuronal mechanisms that inhibit or moderate pain sensations do not begin to develop until thirty-four (34) to thirty-six (36) weeks gestation and are not complete until a significant time after birth. Newborn and preterm infants are hyperresponsive to pain compared to adults or older infants;
(27) The recognition of fetal pain has led to improvements and changes in how physicians approach fetal surgery and fetal anesthesia. The presence of neural connections and the ability to feel pain as early as the fifteenth week now necessitate treating the unborn child as a separate patient from the mother for purposes of utilizing direct analgesia to fetal patients, who clearly elicit stress responses to pain;
(28) Fetal surgeons at specialized units in St. Louis, Nashville, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Boston, and elsewhere, in response to their recognition of fetal pain, routinely use anesthesia and analgesia for unborn and premature infants undergoing surgery as young as eighteen (18) weeks gestation;
(29) The leading textbook on clinical anesthesia recognizes the significant body of evidence indicating the importance of mitigating fetal stress responses to pain stimuli. It is presumed that an unborn child's ability to fully experience pain occurs between twenty (20) and thirty (30) weeks, and that the fetal experience of pain may be even greater than that of term neonate or young children due to the immaturity of neurodevelopment that helps inhibit pain;
(30) Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero;
(31) The infliction of unnecessary pain upon a living being is generally prohibited by state and federal law. The legislature has prohibited the unnecessary infliction of pain on living beings in a variety of circumstances in an effort to protect the innocent from harm;
(32) The life of an unborn child is recognized and protected from violence by federal law and by the laws of most states. The killing of an unborn child is considered homicide in thirty-eight (38) states, with at least twenty-eight (28) of those states criminalizing the act from conception. Nearly every state and the District of Columbia have wrongful death statutes that allow for liability and recovery for the death of an unborn child or subsequent death of an infant who is born and later dies because of injuries caused while in utero;
(33) The United States Supreme Court created the viability standard for evaluating abortion-related laws and regulations in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and reaffirmed this approach in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
(34) At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, the court recognized that viability was not likely until approximately twenty-eight (28) weeks gestational age;
(35) Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, advances in science, technology, and treatment methods have resulted in children surviving and thriving at younger preterm ages than ever before;
(36) In recent years, scientific advances and advances in neonatal care of lowered the gestational limits of survivability well into the second trimester;
(37) The age at which a preterm infant can survive has decreased from twenty-eight (28) weeks to less than twenty-two (22) weeks. Survival of preterm infants has increased significantly over time assuming physicians provide active care for the young infants, lowering the age of survival from twenty-eight (28) weeks to twenty-four (24) weeks. Moreover, infants born as early as twenty-two (22) weeks can survive with the provision of care and treatment. The youngest preterm infant to survive was born at only twenty-one (21) weeks and four (4) days;
(38) In 1978, the first infants weighing less than seven hundred fifty (750) grams were successfully ventilated;
(39) By the 1990s, survival of infants born weighing between five hundred (500) and seven hundred (700) grams, roughly between twenty-four (24) to twenty-six (26) weeks, became possible;
(40) Technological developments in the 1980s and 1990s, such as improved tracheal instillation of surfactant for respiratory distress syndrome and antenatal corticosteroids, resulted in survival of infants born between twenty-three (23) to twenty-four (24) weeks;
(41) In recent years, resuscitation and survival of infants born weighing less than four hundred (400) grams, or approximately twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) weeks gestational age, has further decreased the age of viability;
(42) The provision of active prenatal and postnatal care has significantly increased the number of prematurely born children who survive until hospital discharge;
(43) Abortions performed at any gestational age pose a risk to the mother. Abortion increases the risks of subsequent preterm birth and placenta previa, life-threatening hemorrhage, postpartum hemorrhage, and cesarean delivery;
(44) Abortions performed later in pregnancy pose an even higher medical risk to the health and life of women, with the relative risk increasing exponentially at later gestational ages after eight (8) weeks gestational age;
(45) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age is between three (3) and four (4) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
(46) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age is almost fifteen (15) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
(47) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at sixteen (16) to twenty (20) weeks gestational age is almost thirty (30) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
(48) The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at twenty-one (21) weeks gestational age or later is more than seventy-five (75) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
(49) Women who have an abortion suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at a rate slightly higher than veterans of the Vietnam war. Women who have an abortion have an eighty one percent (81%) increased risk of mental trauma after an abortion. Abortion has been shown to correlate with many other mental health disorders as well;
(50) The United States is one of only seven (7) countries in the world that permits elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks;
(51) Only seventeen (17) countries permit abortion without any restriction beyond week twelve (12) weeks gestational age;
(52) The United States is an outlier within the international community related to the regulation of abortion. Of the countries that permit elective abortion, nine (9) limit elective abortion before the twelfth week of gestation, thirty-six (36) limit elective abortion at twelve (12) weeks gestation, six (6) limit elective abortion between twelve (12) and twenty (20) weeks gestation, and only seven (7) permit elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks or have no gestational limit;
(53) The historical development of abortion is undeniably tied to bias and discrimination by some organizations, leaders, and policies towards impoverished and minority communities, including the imposition of forced sterilization of the intellectually disabled, poor, minority, and immigrant women. These historic policies should be rejected and left on the ash heap of history;
(54) As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019), "the use of abortion to achieve eugenic goals is not merely hypothetical." This historical practice of abortion was rooted not in equality but in discrimination based on age, sex, and disability;
(55) In the early twentieth century, the eugenics movement had grown popular across elite institutions in the United States, with many distinguishing between so-called fit and unfit individuals along racial lines and expressing concern over the increased birth-rate among non-white populations. Such abhorrent distinctions were also made between able-bodied persons and persons eugenicists referred to as "feeble-minded," "deformed," "diseased," blind, deaf, or "dependent," a term used to included orphans and the poor. Laws were adopted prohibiting marriages between the disabled and other "unfit" individuals and requiring their sterilization. More than sixty thousand (60,000) people were involuntarily sterilized between 1907 and 1983;
(56) Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger argued in the early twentieth century that birth control would open the way to the eugenicist. Sanger argued that birth control could be used to reduce the "ever increasing, unceasingly spawning class of human beings who never should have been born at all;
(57) This argument was later adopted by abortion advocates, such as Planned Parenthood President Alan Guttmacher, who endorsed abortion for eugenic purposes. Guttmacher argued in the 1950's that abortion should be used to prevent the birth of disabled children. Legal scholar Glanville Williams, whose book was cited in the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, argued in a book published in the 1950's that a "eugenic killing by a mother ...cannot confidently be pronounced immoral;
(58) Some continue to support the goal of reducing undesirable populations through selective reproduction;
(59) Today, the individualized nature of abortion creates a significant risk that prenatal screening tests and new technologies will be used to eliminate children with unwanted characteristics;
(60) There is substantial evidence from across the globe and in the United States that the elimination of children with unwanted characteristics is already occurring. The abortion rate for children diagnosed with Down syndrome in utero approaches one hundred percent (100%) in Iceland, ninety-eight percent (98%) in Denmark, ninety percent (90%) in the United Kingdom, and seventy-seven percent (77%) in France. Even in the United States, the abortion rate for children with Down Syndrome is sixty-seven percent (67%). Widespread sex-selective abortions in Asia have led to as many as one hundred sixty (160) million "missing" women. In India, as a result of the abortion of 300,000-700,000 female unborn children each year over several decades, there are currently about fifty (50) million more men than women in the country. Recent evidence also suggests that sex-selective abortions of girls are common among certain populations in the United States;
(61) Sex-selective abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio imbalance that can impede members of the numerically predominant sex from finding partners, encourage the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and create other societal harms. Sex-selective abortion also reinforces discriminatory and sexist stereotypes toward women by devaluing and dehumanizing females;
(62) In this state, from 2008 through 2017, the rate of abortion per one thousand (1,000) women was nearly four (4) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with a rate of 7.6 on average for all women, 4.6 for white women, and 16.0 for nonwhite women. The ratio of abortions to one thousand (1,000) live births in this state from 2008-2017 was nearly three (3) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with an average of 138.2 for all women, 85.1 for white women, and 294.4 for nonwhite women;
(63) The use of abortion as a means to prefer one (1) sex over another or to discriminate based on disability or race is antithetical to the core values equality, freedom, and human dignity enshrined in both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The elimination of bias and discrimination against pregnant women, their partners, and their family members, including unborn children, is a fundamental obligation of government in order to guarantee those who are, according to the Declaration of Independence, "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" can enjoy "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness";
(64) This state has historically protected its interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession by enacting a comprehensive statutory framework for ensuring the integrity of the medical profession in title 63;
(65) The general assembly first adopted an act creating the Board of Medical Examiners in 1901, with the mission to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and to ensure the highest degree of professional conduct;
(66) As the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)), "the government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession." Under U.S. Supreme Court precedents, it is clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession;
(67) Physician involvement in medical practices that cause fetal pain has been rejected by the international community;
(68) Physician involvement in medical practices that facilitate discrimination is antithetical to the United States and Tennessee constitutions' affirmation of equal protection under the law;
(69) The integrity and public respect of the medical profession are significantly harmed by physician involvement in practices that have been rejected by the international community, facilitate discrimination, or otherwise create a disdain for life;
(70) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in valuing and protecting unborn children;
(71) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the physical and mental health of the mother;
(72) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in promoting human dignity;
(73) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion;
(74) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in safeguarding an unborn child from the serious harm of pain by an abortion method that would cause the unborn child to experience pain;
(75) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in resolving untenable inconsistencies and incongruities in state law which permits some unborn children to be killed by abortion, while requiring that unborn children be protected and valued in non-abortion circumstances including, but not limited to, criminal provisions related to the infliction of harms against persons, state programs intended to aid prenatal healthcare, and state sponsored healthcare for unborn children;
(76) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, including by prohibiting medical practices that might cause the medical profession to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including the life of the unborn child; and
(77) This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination.
(b) Purpose. (1) The purpose of this section is to provide legislative intent and reasoning underlying the enactment of laws to protect maternal health, and to preserve, promote, and protect life and potential life throughout pregnancy, including, but not limited to, §§ 39-15-215 - 39-15-217. (2) The unique nature of abortion and its potential physical and mental health risks, as well as the ultimate result of the death of an unborn child, necessitates that this state ensure every woman considering an abortion is provided with adequate comprehensive information before deciding to obtain an abortion. The mandatory provision of an ultrasound prior to the abortion substantially furthers this compelling state interest. (3) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is a medically significant indicator of life and the potential successful development of an unborn child. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting unborn children warrants the restriction of abortion in cases where the heartbeat is detectable. (4) The unnecessary infliction of pain upon the life of an unborn child is inconsistent with Tennessee law that would otherwise protect the life and health of an unborn child, undermines the integrity of and public trust in the medical profession, and conflicts with the this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women. Therefore, it is necessary to enact protections against the infliction of pain, and death, upon an unborn child who is capable of experiencing pain. (5) Advances in science and medical practice have decreased the gestational age of an unborn child's viability to survive. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women require the enactment of a series of gestational age restrictions on the provision of an abortion. (6) The historical use of abortion as a means to discriminatory ends is fundamentally objectionable and conflicts with this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination and discriminatory practices. Therefore, it is necessary for this state to enact protections that prevent sex, racial, and disability discrimination against unborn children. (7) Life begins at conception, and nothing in chapter 764 of the Public Acts of 2020 shall be interpreted or construed to suggest that it is the intent or purpose of the legislature to condone abortion of an unborn child at any time after conception. The legislature specifically acknowledges the provisions of § 39-15-213 that will prohibit all abortion effective on the thirtieth day after issuance of a judgment overruling, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, or adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, restoring state authority to prohibit abortion.
(1) The purpose of this section is to provide legislative intent and reasoning underlying the enactment of laws to protect maternal health, and to preserve, promote, and protect life and potential life throughout pregnancy, including, but not limited to, §§ 39-15-215 - 39-15-217.
(2) The unique nature of abortion and its potential physical and mental health risks, as well as the ultimate result of the death of an unborn child, necessitates that this state ensure every woman considering an abortion is provided with adequate comprehensive information before deciding to obtain an abortion. The mandatory provision of an ultrasound prior to the abortion substantially furthers this compelling state interest.
(3) The presence of a fetal heartbeat is a medically significant indicator of life and the potential successful development of an unborn child. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting unborn children warrants the restriction of abortion in cases where the heartbeat is detectable.
(4) The unnecessary infliction of pain upon the life of an unborn child is inconsistent with Tennessee law that would otherwise protect the life and health of an unborn child, undermines the integrity of and public trust in the medical profession, and conflicts with the this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women. Therefore, it is necessary to enact protections against the infliction of pain, and death, upon an unborn child who is capable of experiencing pain.
(5) Advances in science and medical practice have decreased the gestational age of an unborn child's viability to survive. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women require the enactment of a series of gestational age restrictions on the provision of an abortion.
(6) The historical use of abortion as a means to discriminatory ends is fundamentally objectionable and conflicts with this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination and discriminatory practices. Therefore, it is necessary for this state to enact protections that prevent sex, racial, and disability discrimination against unborn children.
(7) Life begins at conception, and nothing in chapter 764 of the Public Acts of 2020 shall be interpreted or construed to suggest that it is the intent or purpose of the legislature to condone abortion of an unborn child at any time after conception. The legislature specifically acknowledges the provisions of § 39-15-213 that will prohibit all abortion effective on the thirtieth day after issuance of a judgment overruling, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, or adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, restoring state authority to prohibit abortion.
Added by 2020 Tenn. Acts, ch. 764, s 2, eff. 7/13/2020.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-710 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 11 / Section 39-11-710
Rights of interest holders and owners
Status: in_force

(a) Nothing in this part shall limit or restrict the right of an interest holder in real property that was of record, prior to the filing of the notice of lien lis pendens, to enforce its deed of trust, or to take any other action permitted under its deed of trust as long as prior notice is given to the court and the attorney general who filed the notice in accordance with this section. (b) (1) Pending any proceeding to forfeit real property, an interest holder who desires to take action under the mortgage or deed of trust shall give notice to the attorney general who filed the lis pendens of any action to be taken under the mortgage or deed of trust. (2) If the state has stipulated to the interest holder's exemption from forfeiture of its interest and a judgment has been entered, then the interest holder may proceed to foreclose, in accordance with its mortgage or deed of trust, subject to the approval or conditions of the court. (3) When no judgment has been entered exempting the interest holder's interest from forfeiture, the interest holder may not exercise its right to foreclose its deed of trust on the property, unless it gives the official who filed the lis pendens written notice at least twenty (20) days prior to the date of a foreclosure sale and indicates the time, date and place of sale and the balance owing on the debt. Upon receipt of the notice of foreclosure the official who filed the lis pendens may petition the court where the forfeiture action is pending to require that the foreclosure sale be subject to the approval or conditions of the court. Upon notice to the interest holder, the court may grant the request and upon those conditions as it deems just. (c) The court may enjoin any foreclosure sale when probable cause exists that the interest holder is a co-conspirator or accessory to the conduct giving rise to forfeiture. (d) Upon completion of a foreclosure sale of real property pending forfeiture, the interest holder or the interest holder's trustee shall give written notice of the intended distribution of the proceeds of the sale to the official who filed the lis pendens. The interest holder shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending all proceeds from the foreclosure sale in excess of the debt and fees and expenses secured by its deed of trust. If, however, the court has ordered that the sale be conducted under conditions or subject to the approval of the court, the interest holder shall file with the court proof under oath that those conditions were met and any proceeds of the sale ordered to be deposited with the clerk. If no objection is filed by the official who filed the lien lis pendens, then the court shall approve the sale and distribution of proceeds. (e) Pending any proceeding to forfeit any personal property, an owner or interest holder may petition the court exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding for possession of the property, unless the property is needed as evidence. The court shall permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property upon the execution of a bond in favor of the state of Tennessee and for payment of the appraised value of the property at the time of the hearing, the sureties for the bond to be approved by the court. The court shall, upon approval of the bond, permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property unless it is needed for evidence. (f) If the state has filed a stipulation that an interest holder has an interest that is exempt from forfeiture, the court may release personal property for sale, to be leased, rented or operated, when the property used for collateral is depreciating in value or when justice dictates, and upon the posting of a bond to ensure compliance with this subsection (f), unless the property is needed for evidence. Upon the court's release for public sale or lease, the interest holder shall dispose of the property but only by a commercially reasonable public sale or lease and, within ten (10) days of disposition, shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending the amount received at disposition, less the amount of the interest holder's encumbrance and reasonable expenses incurred by the interest holder in connection with the sale or disposal, including the costs of the bond. For purposes of this subsection (f), "commercially reasonable" is a sale or disposal that would be commercially reasonable under § 47-9-610 . (g) If an indictment, information, or arrest warrant is filed against an owner claiming return of property that is subject to a forfeiture action filed under this part and the criminal action alleges the same conduct as the conduct giving rise to forfeiture in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the court in the civil proceeding shall stay civil discovery against the criminal defendant and against the state until the defendant's criminal action is completed. Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 10; 2000, ch. 846, § 26.
(a) Nothing in this part shall limit or restrict the right of an interest holder in real property that was of record, prior to the filing of the notice of lien lis pendens, to enforce its deed of trust, or to take any other action permitted under its deed of trust as long as prior notice is given to the court and the attorney general who filed the notice in accordance with this section.
(b) (1) Pending any proceeding to forfeit real property, an interest holder who desires to take action under the mortgage or deed of trust shall give notice to the attorney general who filed the lis pendens of any action to be taken under the mortgage or deed of trust. (2) If the state has stipulated to the interest holder's exemption from forfeiture of its interest and a judgment has been entered, then the interest holder may proceed to foreclose, in accordance with its mortgage or deed of trust, subject to the approval or conditions of the court. (3) When no judgment has been entered exempting the interest holder's interest from forfeiture, the interest holder may not exercise its right to foreclose its deed of trust on the property, unless it gives the official who filed the lis pendens written notice at least twenty (20) days prior to the date of a foreclosure sale and indicates the time, date and place of sale and the balance owing on the debt. Upon receipt of the notice of foreclosure the official who filed the lis pendens may petition the court where the forfeiture action is pending to require that the foreclosure sale be subject to the approval or conditions of the court. Upon notice to the interest holder, the court may grant the request and upon those conditions as it deems just.
(1) Pending any proceeding to forfeit real property, an interest holder who desires to take action under the mortgage or deed of trust shall give notice to the attorney general who filed the lis pendens of any action to be taken under the mortgage or deed of trust.
(2) If the state has stipulated to the interest holder's exemption from forfeiture of its interest and a judgment has been entered, then the interest holder may proceed to foreclose, in accordance with its mortgage or deed of trust, subject to the approval or conditions of the court.
(3) When no judgment has been entered exempting the interest holder's interest from forfeiture, the interest holder may not exercise its right to foreclose its deed of trust on the property, unless it gives the official who filed the lis pendens written notice at least twenty (20) days prior to the date of a foreclosure sale and indicates the time, date and place of sale and the balance owing on the debt. Upon receipt of the notice of foreclosure the official who filed the lis pendens may petition the court where the forfeiture action is pending to require that the foreclosure sale be subject to the approval or conditions of the court. Upon notice to the interest holder, the court may grant the request and upon those conditions as it deems just.
(c) The court may enjoin any foreclosure sale when probable cause exists that the interest holder is a co-conspirator or accessory to the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
(d) Upon completion of a foreclosure sale of real property pending forfeiture, the interest holder or the interest holder's trustee shall give written notice of the intended distribution of the proceeds of the sale to the official who filed the lis pendens. The interest holder shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending all proceeds from the foreclosure sale in excess of the debt and fees and expenses secured by its deed of trust. If, however, the court has ordered that the sale be conducted under conditions or subject to the approval of the court, the interest holder shall file with the court proof under oath that those conditions were met and any proceeds of the sale ordered to be deposited with the clerk. If no objection is filed by the official who filed the lien lis pendens, then the court shall approve the sale and distribution of proceeds.
(e) Pending any proceeding to forfeit any personal property, an owner or interest holder may petition the court exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding for possession of the property, unless the property is needed as evidence. The court shall permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property upon the execution of a bond in favor of the state of Tennessee and for payment of the appraised value of the property at the time of the hearing, the sureties for the bond to be approved by the court. The court shall, upon approval of the bond, permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property unless it is needed for evidence.
(f) If the state has filed a stipulation that an interest holder has an interest that is exempt from forfeiture, the court may release personal property for sale, to be leased, rented or operated, when the property used for collateral is depreciating in value or when justice dictates, and upon the posting of a bond to ensure compliance with this subsection (f), unless the property is needed for evidence. Upon the court's release for public sale or lease, the interest holder shall dispose of the property but only by a commercially reasonable public sale or lease and, within ten (10) days of disposition, shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending the amount received at disposition, less the amount of the interest holder's encumbrance and reasonable expenses incurred by the interest holder in connection with the sale or disposal, including the costs of the bond. For purposes of this subsection (f), "commercially reasonable" is a sale or disposal that would be commercially reasonable under § 47-9-610 .
(g) If an indictment, information, or arrest warrant is filed against an owner claiming return of property that is subject to a forfeiture action filed under this part and the criminal action alleges the same conduct as the conduct giving rise to forfeiture in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the court in the civil proceeding shall stay civil discovery against the criminal defendant and against the state until the defendant's criminal action is completed.
Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 10; 2000, ch. 846, § 26.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-154 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 14 / Section 39-14-154
Actions by home improvement services provider that constitute offense
Status: in_force

(a) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Contract for home improvement services" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a person performing home improvement services and a residential owner, and includes all labor, services, and materials to be furnished and performed under such agreement; (2) "Home buyer" means a person who intends to enter into a new home construction contract on behalf of any person; (3) "Home improvement services" means the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to any residential property, and includes, but is not limited to, the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, landscaping, fences, fall-out shelters, and roofing; (4) "Home improvement services provider" means any person or entity, whether or not licensed pursuant to title 62, chapter 6, who undertakes to, attempts to, or submits a price or bid or offers to construct, supervise, superintend, oversee, schedule, direct, or in any manner assume charge of home improvement services for a fee. Home improvement services provider specifically includes, but is not limited to, a residential contractor as defined in § 62-6-102 when such contractor is performing home improvement services and a home improvement contractor as defined in § 62-6-501 ; (5) "New home contractor" means any person who offers or provides new home construction services as a general contractor or a subcontractor, including, but not limited to, an architect or engineer; (6) "New home construction" means the erection, installation, design work, engineering work, permitting through a governmental entity, architectural design, obtaining construction financing, or construction of a dwelling on a fixed foundation on land which is owned or purchased by a home buyer; (7) "New home construction contract" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a new home contractor and a home buyer whereby the new home contractor agrees to provide new home construction services in exchange for tender of money or other consideration of value by a home buyer or by any lending institution on behalf of the home buyer to a new home contractor as part of a new home construction contract; (8) "Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management of residential property, but shall not include occupancy of residential property through a lease or rental agreement; (9) "Residential owner" means a person who has legal possession of residential real property, including any person authorized by such residential owner to act on the residential owner's behalf; and (10) "Residential property" means the building structure where a person abides, lodges, resides, or establishes a living accommodation, or where a home buyer or residential owner intends to abide, lodge, reside, or establish a living accommodation following the completion of new home construction or home improvement services made pursuant to a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services, and includes the land on or adjacent to such building structure. (b) It is an offense for a new home construction contractor or home improvement services provider with intent to defraud to: (1) (A) Fail to refund amounts paid under a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services within ten (10) days of: (i) The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached; (ii) The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or (iii) The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address; (B) A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is an offense only if: (i) No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request; (ii) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and (iii) A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general; (2) Deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in any material respect that are contained in a new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; provided, that the home buyer or residential owner did not provide written consent for the new home contractor or home improvement services provider to deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in the contract and such deviation or disregard caused substantial damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property in that the value of the new construction was less than the value had it been built in accordance with the plan and contract. Such deviation includes, but is not limited to: (A) The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract; or (B) The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials. (c) (1) A violation of subsection (b) is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105 . Value for a violation of subsection (b), shall be determined by the monetary amount of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services that is paid, minus the value of any work performed, plus the cost to repair any damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property caused by the new home contractor or home improvement services provider. (2) If a person is convicted of a violation of subsection (b), the court may order the person to make restitution to any home buyer or residential owner that has suffered injury resulting from the crime. Vehicles used to commit this offense are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures used for forfeitures set out in chapter 11, part 7 of this title. (3) All fines collected as a result of a violation of subsection (b) shall be allocated as follows: (A) First to remaining unpaid court costs assessed in the case; (B) Then to restitution ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision (c)(2); and (C) Any remaining money shall be transmitted to the state board of licensing contractors for purposes of carrying out § 62-6-139 . (4) In addition, such a violation shall be construed to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice affecting the conduct of trade or commerce under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and as such, the private right of action remedy under that act shall be available to any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated as a result of such violation. (d) Upon a conviction for a violation of this section, the court shall notify the state board of licensing contractors of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's conviction. If the new home contractor or home improvement services provider is licensed by the board, the board shall revoke the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's license pursuant to § 62-6-118 . (e) Prosecution under subsection (b) shall not bar prosecution under any other applicable criminal statute nor shall it bar the commencement of any applicable civil cause of actions, including, but not limited to, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 or title 62, chapter 6. (f) The district attorney general in conjunction with any law enforcement agency shall have the authority to investigate and to institute criminal proceedings for any violation of subsection (b) regardless of any actions taken or not taken by the board of licensing contractors. Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 547,Secs.s2, s3 eff. 7/1/2018. Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 547,s 1, eff. 7/1/2018. Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 310,s 1, eff. 7/1/2017. Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1; 2012, ch. 802, § 1.
(a) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Contract for home improvement services" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a person performing home improvement services and a residential owner, and includes all labor, services, and materials to be furnished and performed under such agreement; (2) "Home buyer" means a person who intends to enter into a new home construction contract on behalf of any person; (3) "Home improvement services" means the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to any residential property, and includes, but is not limited to, the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, landscaping, fences, fall-out shelters, and roofing; (4) "Home improvement services provider" means any person or entity, whether or not licensed pursuant to title 62, chapter 6, who undertakes to, attempts to, or submits a price or bid or offers to construct, supervise, superintend, oversee, schedule, direct, or in any manner assume charge of home improvement services for a fee. Home improvement services provider specifically includes, but is not limited to, a residential contractor as defined in § 62-6-102 when such contractor is performing home improvement services and a home improvement contractor as defined in § 62-6-501 ; (5) "New home contractor" means any person who offers or provides new home construction services as a general contractor or a subcontractor, including, but not limited to, an architect or engineer; (6) "New home construction" means the erection, installation, design work, engineering work, permitting through a governmental entity, architectural design, obtaining construction financing, or construction of a dwelling on a fixed foundation on land which is owned or purchased by a home buyer; (7) "New home construction contract" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a new home contractor and a home buyer whereby the new home contractor agrees to provide new home construction services in exchange for tender of money or other consideration of value by a home buyer or by any lending institution on behalf of the home buyer to a new home contractor as part of a new home construction contract; (8) "Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management of residential property, but shall not include occupancy of residential property through a lease or rental agreement; (9) "Residential owner" means a person who has legal possession of residential real property, including any person authorized by such residential owner to act on the residential owner's behalf; and (10) "Residential property" means the building structure where a person abides, lodges, resides, or establishes a living accommodation, or where a home buyer or residential owner intends to abide, lodge, reside, or establish a living accommodation following the completion of new home construction or home improvement services made pursuant to a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services, and includes the land on or adjacent to such building structure.
(1) "Contract for home improvement services" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a person performing home improvement services and a residential owner, and includes all labor, services, and materials to be furnished and performed under such agreement;
(2) "Home buyer" means a person who intends to enter into a new home construction contract on behalf of any person;
(3) "Home improvement services" means the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to any residential property, and includes, but is not limited to, the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, landscaping, fences, fall-out shelters, and roofing;
(4) "Home improvement services provider" means any person or entity, whether or not licensed pursuant to title 62, chapter 6, who undertakes to, attempts to, or submits a price or bid or offers to construct, supervise, superintend, oversee, schedule, direct, or in any manner assume charge of home improvement services for a fee. Home improvement services provider specifically includes, but is not limited to, a residential contractor as defined in § 62-6-102 when such contractor is performing home improvement services and a home improvement contractor as defined in § 62-6-501 ;
(5) "New home contractor" means any person who offers or provides new home construction services as a general contractor or a subcontractor, including, but not limited to, an architect or engineer;
(6) "New home construction" means the erection, installation, design work, engineering work, permitting through a governmental entity, architectural design, obtaining construction financing, or construction of a dwelling on a fixed foundation on land which is owned or purchased by a home buyer;
(7) "New home construction contract" means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a new home contractor and a home buyer whereby the new home contractor agrees to provide new home construction services in exchange for tender of money or other consideration of value by a home buyer or by any lending institution on behalf of the home buyer to a new home contractor as part of a new home construction contract;
(8) "Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management of residential property, but shall not include occupancy of residential property through a lease or rental agreement;
(9) "Residential owner" means a person who has legal possession of residential real property, including any person authorized by such residential owner to act on the residential owner's behalf; and
(10) "Residential property" means the building structure where a person abides, lodges, resides, or establishes a living accommodation, or where a home buyer or residential owner intends to abide, lodge, reside, or establish a living accommodation following the completion of new home construction or home improvement services made pursuant to a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services, and includes the land on or adjacent to such building structure.
(b) It is an offense for a new home construction contractor or home improvement services provider with intent to defraud to: (1) (A) Fail to refund amounts paid under a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services within ten (10) days of: (i) The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached; (ii) The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or (iii) The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address; (B) A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is an offense only if: (i) No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request; (ii) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and (iii) A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general; (2) Deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in any material respect that are contained in a new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; provided, that the home buyer or residential owner did not provide written consent for the new home contractor or home improvement services provider to deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in the contract and such deviation or disregard caused substantial damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property in that the value of the new construction was less than the value had it been built in accordance with the plan and contract. Such deviation includes, but is not limited to: (A) The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract; or (B) The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials.
(1) (A) Fail to refund amounts paid under a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services within ten (10) days of: (i) The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached; (ii) The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or (iii) The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address; (B) A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is an offense only if: (i) No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request; (ii) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and (iii) A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general;
(A) Fail to refund amounts paid under a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services within ten (10) days of: (i) The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached; (ii) The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or (iii) The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address;
(i) The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached;
(ii) The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or
(iii) The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address;
(B) A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is an offense only if: (i) No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request; (ii) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and (iii) A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general;
(i) No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request;
(ii) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and
(iii) A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general;
(2) Deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in any material respect that are contained in a new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; provided, that the home buyer or residential owner did not provide written consent for the new home contractor or home improvement services provider to deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in the contract and such deviation or disregard caused substantial damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property in that the value of the new construction was less than the value had it been built in accordance with the plan and contract. Such deviation includes, but is not limited to: (A) The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract; or (B) The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials.
(A) The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract; or
(B) The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials.
(c) (1) A violation of subsection (b) is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105 . Value for a violation of subsection (b), shall be determined by the monetary amount of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services that is paid, minus the value of any work performed, plus the cost to repair any damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property caused by the new home contractor or home improvement services provider. (2) If a person is convicted of a violation of subsection (b), the court may order the person to make restitution to any home buyer or residential owner that has suffered injury resulting from the crime. Vehicles used to commit this offense are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures used for forfeitures set out in chapter 11, part 7 of this title. (3) All fines collected as a result of a violation of subsection (b) shall be allocated as follows: (A) First to remaining unpaid court costs assessed in the case; (B) Then to restitution ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision (c)(2); and (C) Any remaining money shall be transmitted to the state board of licensing contractors for purposes of carrying out § 62-6-139 . (4) In addition, such a violation shall be construed to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice affecting the conduct of trade or commerce under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and as such, the private right of action remedy under that act shall be available to any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated as a result of such violation.
(1) A violation of subsection (b) is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105 . Value for a violation of subsection (b), shall be determined by the monetary amount of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services that is paid, minus the value of any work performed, plus the cost to repair any damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property caused by the new home contractor or home improvement services provider.
(2) If a person is convicted of a violation of subsection (b), the court may order the person to make restitution to any home buyer or residential owner that has suffered injury resulting from the crime. Vehicles used to commit this offense are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures used for forfeitures set out in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
(3) All fines collected as a result of a violation of subsection (b) shall be allocated as follows: (A) First to remaining unpaid court costs assessed in the case; (B) Then to restitution ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision (c)(2); and (C) Any remaining money shall be transmitted to the state board of licensing contractors for purposes of carrying out § 62-6-139 .
(A) First to remaining unpaid court costs assessed in the case;
(B) Then to restitution ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision (c)(2); and
(C) Any remaining money shall be transmitted to the state board of licensing contractors for purposes of carrying out § 62-6-139 .
(4) In addition, such a violation shall be construed to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice affecting the conduct of trade or commerce under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and as such, the private right of action remedy under that act shall be available to any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated as a result of such violation.
(d) Upon a conviction for a violation of this section, the court shall notify the state board of licensing contractors of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's conviction. If the new home contractor or home improvement services provider is licensed by the board, the board shall revoke the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's license pursuant to § 62-6-118 .
(e) Prosecution under subsection (b) shall not bar prosecution under any other applicable criminal statute nor shall it bar the commencement of any applicable civil cause of actions, including, but not limited to, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 or title 62, chapter 6.
(f) The district attorney general in conjunction with any law enforcement agency shall have the authority to investigate and to institute criminal proceedings for any violation of subsection (b) regardless of any actions taken or not taken by the board of licensing contractors.
Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 547,Secs.s2, s3 eff. 7/1/2018.
Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 547,s 1, eff. 7/1/2018.
Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 310,s 1, eff. 7/1/2017.
Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1; 2012, ch. 802, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-423 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-423
Counterfeit controlled substances
Status: in_force

(a) It is an offense for a person to: (1) Sell; (2) Deliver; or (3) Distribute a substance that is represented to be a controlled substance and which is substantially similar in color, shape, size, and markings or lack thereof, to a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance as classified in §§ 39-17-406 - 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance. (b) It is an offense for a person to manufacture for sale or exchange any substance with the intent that the substance substantially imitate in color, shape, size, and markings or lack of markings, the physical appearance of a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance, as classified in §§ 39-17-406 - 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance. (c) A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class E felony. (d) It is an offense for a person to be the recipient of a sale or exchange of a substance set forth in this section. A violation of this subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. In addition to the penalties set forth in this section, the court may impose a mandatory drug rehabilitation program. (e) This section shall not apply to: (1) Any person who manufactures or sells a substance for use as a placebo by a licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse acting under the direction of a physician, dentist, or pharmacist; (2) A licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse who sells, dispenses, administers or otherwise distributes a placebo to a patient of the physician or dentist for purposes of the medical care or treatment of the patient; (3) A noncontrolled substance that was introduced into commerce prior to the introduction into commerce of the controlled substance that it is alleged to imitate; (4) A substance that may be legally purchased at a drug or grocery store without a prescription; provided, that the substance is not represented by the seller to be a controlled substance; and (5) A substance that is packaged and labeled in accordance with appropriate rules and regulations of the United States food and drug administration shall create a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer or wholesaler of the substance is exempted from this section. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
(a) It is an offense for a person to: (1) Sell; (2) Deliver; or (3) Distribute a substance that is represented to be a controlled substance and which is substantially similar in color, shape, size, and markings or lack thereof, to a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance as classified in §§ 39-17-406 - 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance.
(1) Sell;
(2) Deliver; or
(3) Distribute a substance that is represented to be a controlled substance and which is substantially similar in color, shape, size, and markings or lack thereof, to a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance as classified in §§ 39-17-406 - 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance.
(b) It is an offense for a person to manufacture for sale or exchange any substance with the intent that the substance substantially imitate in color, shape, size, and markings or lack of markings, the physical appearance of a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance, as classified in §§ 39-17-406 - 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance.
(c) A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class E felony.
(d) It is an offense for a person to be the recipient of a sale or exchange of a substance set forth in this section. A violation of this subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. In addition to the penalties set forth in this section, the court may impose a mandatory drug rehabilitation program.
(e) This section shall not apply to: (1) Any person who manufactures or sells a substance for use as a placebo by a licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse acting under the direction of a physician, dentist, or pharmacist; (2) A licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse who sells, dispenses, administers or otherwise distributes a placebo to a patient of the physician or dentist for purposes of the medical care or treatment of the patient; (3) A noncontrolled substance that was introduced into commerce prior to the introduction into commerce of the controlled substance that it is alleged to imitate; (4) A substance that may be legally purchased at a drug or grocery store without a prescription; provided, that the substance is not represented by the seller to be a controlled substance; and (5) A substance that is packaged and labeled in accordance with appropriate rules and regulations of the United States food and drug administration shall create a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer or wholesaler of the substance is exempted from this section.
(1) Any person who manufactures or sells a substance for use as a placebo by a licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse acting under the direction of a physician, dentist, or pharmacist;
(2) A licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse who sells, dispenses, administers or otherwise distributes a placebo to a patient of the physician or dentist for purposes of the medical care or treatment of the patient;
(3) A noncontrolled substance that was introduced into commerce prior to the introduction into commerce of the controlled substance that it is alleged to imitate;
(4) A substance that may be legally purchased at a drug or grocery store without a prescription; provided, that the substance is not represented by the seller to be a controlled substance; and
(5) A substance that is packaged and labeled in accordance with appropriate rules and regulations of the United States food and drug administration shall create a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer or wholesaler of the substance is exempted from this section.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-422 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-422
Inhaling, selling, giving or possessing glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, gases for unlawful purposes
Status: in_force

(a) No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, elation, dizziness, excitement, stupefaction, paralysis, or the dulling of the brain or nervous system, or disturbing or distorting of the audio or visual processes, intentionally smell or inhale the fumes from any glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes; provided, that nothing in this section shall be interpreted as applying to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes, or to the use of nitrous oxide to implement the distribution of beverages or other foodstuffs for commercial purposes. (b) No person shall, for the purpose of violating subsection (a), use, or possess for the purpose of so using, any glue containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes. (c) No person shall sell, or offer to sell, or deliver or give away, to any person any tube or other container of glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or any other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes, if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that the product sold or offered for sale, or delivered or given away, will be used for the purpose set forth in subsection (a). (d) As used in this section, "glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes" means and includes any glue, cement, paint, gasoline, aerosol, or any other substance of whatever kind containing one (1) or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone, an acetate, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene or any group of polyhalogenated hydrocarbons containing fluorine and chlorine. (e) Nothing contained in this section shall be considered applicable to the sale of a hobby or model kit containing as a part of the kit a tube or other container of glue, nor shall this section be considered applicable to the sale of a tube or other container of glue immediately in conjunction with the sale of a hobby or model kit requiring the use of approximately the quantity of glue for the assembly of a model. Nothing contained in this section shall be applicable to the transfer of a tube or other container of glue from a parent to the parent's own child, or from a guardian to the guardian's own ward. (f) (1) A violation of subsection (a), (b) or (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) A violation of subsection (c) is a Class E felony. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 154, §§ 1, 2.
(a) No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, elation, dizziness, excitement, stupefaction, paralysis, or the dulling of the brain or nervous system, or disturbing or distorting of the audio or visual processes, intentionally smell or inhale the fumes from any glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes; provided, that nothing in this section shall be interpreted as applying to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes, or to the use of nitrous oxide to implement the distribution of beverages or other foodstuffs for commercial purposes.
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of violating subsection (a), use, or possess for the purpose of so using, any glue containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes.
(c) No person shall sell, or offer to sell, or deliver or give away, to any person any tube or other container of glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or any other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes, if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that the product sold or offered for sale, or delivered or given away, will be used for the purpose set forth in subsection (a).
(d) As used in this section, "glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes" means and includes any glue, cement, paint, gasoline, aerosol, or any other substance of whatever kind containing one (1) or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone, an acetate, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene or any group of polyhalogenated hydrocarbons containing fluorine and chlorine.
(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be considered applicable to the sale of a hobby or model kit containing as a part of the kit a tube or other container of glue, nor shall this section be considered applicable to the sale of a tube or other container of glue immediately in conjunction with the sale of a hobby or model kit requiring the use of approximately the quantity of glue for the assembly of a model. Nothing contained in this section shall be applicable to the transfer of a tube or other container of glue from a parent to the parent's own child, or from a guardian to the guardian's own ward.
(f) (1) A violation of subsection (a), (b) or (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) A violation of subsection (c) is a Class E felony.
(1) A violation of subsection (a), (b) or (d) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A violation of subsection (c) is a Class E felony.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 154, §§ 1, 2.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-1314
Preemption of local regulation of firearms, ammunition, and knives - Actions against firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer - Party adversely affected by local regulation
Status: in_force

(a) Except as otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b), the general assembly preempts the whole field of the regulation of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof including, but not limited to, the use, purchase, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, carrying, sale, acquisition, gift, devise, licensing, registration, storage, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government law, ordinances, resolutions, enactments or regulation. No county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government nor any local agency, department, or official shall occupy any part of the field regulation of firearms, ammunition or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof. (b) A city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government is expressly authorized to regulate by ordinance, resolution, policy, rule or other enactment the following: (1) The carrying of firearms by employees or independent contractors of the city, county, town municipality or metropolitan government when acting in the course and scope of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313 ; (2) The discharge of firearms within the boundaries of the applicable city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government, except when and where the discharge of a firearm is expressly authorized or permitted by state law; (3) The location of a sport shooting range, except as otherwise provided in §§ 39-17-316 and 13-3-412 . To the extent that a city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government has or enforces any regulation of privately owned or operated sport shooting ranges, the city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government shall not impose greater restrictions or requirements on privately owned or operated ranges than are applicable to any range located within the same unit of local government and owned or operated by a government entity. A party may challenge any regulation of a sport shooting range that violates this subdivision (b)(3) in the manner described in subsection (g); and (4) The enforcement of any state or federal law pertaining to firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof, except as prohibited by § 38-3-115 . (c) The general assembly declares that the lawful design, marketing, manufacture and sale of firearms and ammunition to the public are not unreasonably dangerous activities and do not constitute a nuisance per se. (d) (1) The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer by or on behalf of any state entity, county, municipality or metropolitan government for damages, abatement or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state. (2) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall be construed to prohibit a county, municipality, or metropolitan government from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by such county, municipality, or metropolitan government. (3) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude an individual from bringing a cause of action for breach of a written contract, breach of an express warranty, or for injuries resulting from defects in the materials or workmanship in the manufacture of the firearm. (e) Subsections (c) and (d) shall not apply in any litigation brought by an individual against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer. (f) It is the intent of the general assembly that this part is preemptive with respect to the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives and no city, county, or metropolitan government shall occupy any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives. (g) (1) (A) Notwithstanding title 29, chapter 20; title 9, chapter 8; and § 20-13-102 , a party may file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any of the persons or entities listed in subdivisions (g)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), if the party is adversely affected by: (i) An ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section; or (ii) The creation or maintenance of a record, database, registry, or collection of records, in violation of § 39-17-1305 , by a state or local government entity, official, employee, or agent. (B) The adversely affected party may seek: (i) Declaratory and injunctive relief; and (ii) Damages, as provided in subsection (i). (2) This subsection (g) shall apply to any ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced on or after July 1, 2017, or any record, database, registry, or collection of records that is made or maintained on or after July 1, 2021. (h) As used in subsection (g), a party is "adversely affected" if: (1) The party is an individual who: (A) Lawfully resides within the United States; (B) May legally possess a firearm under Tennessee law; and (C) Is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment or was included as an entry on a database, registry, or collection of records, that is the subject of an action filed under subsection (g). An individual is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment if the individual is or was physically present within the boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason; or (2) The party is a membership organization that: (A) Includes two (2) or more individuals described in subdivision (h)(1); and (B) Is dedicated in whole or in part to protecting the rights of persons who possess, own, or use firearms for competitive, sporting, defensive, or other lawful purposes. (i) A prevailing plaintiff in an action under subsection (g) is entitled to recover from the county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan, state, or local government entity the following: (1) The greater of: (A) Actual damages, including consequential damages, attributable to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, enactment, database, registry, or collection of records; or (B) Three (3) times the plaintiff's attorney's fees; (2) Court costs, including fees; and (3) Reasonable attorney's fees; provided, that attorney's fees shall not be awarded under this subdivision (i)(3) if the plaintiff recovers under subdivision (i)(1)(B). Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 554, Secs.s4, s5, s6 eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 554, s 3, eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 444, s 4, eff. 5/13/2021. Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 223, s 1, eff. 7/1/2019. Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 467, s 1, eff. 7/1/2017. Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 822, s 1, eff. 4/29/2014. Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 418, s 1, eff. 7/1/2013. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1999, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 2009 , ch. 428, § 3.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b), the general assembly preempts the whole field of the regulation of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof including, but not limited to, the use, purchase, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, carrying, sale, acquisition, gift, devise, licensing, registration, storage, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government law, ordinances, resolutions, enactments or regulation. No county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government nor any local agency, department, or official shall occupy any part of the field regulation of firearms, ammunition or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof.
(b) A city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government is expressly authorized to regulate by ordinance, resolution, policy, rule or other enactment the following: (1) The carrying of firearms by employees or independent contractors of the city, county, town municipality or metropolitan government when acting in the course and scope of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313 ; (2) The discharge of firearms within the boundaries of the applicable city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government, except when and where the discharge of a firearm is expressly authorized or permitted by state law; (3) The location of a sport shooting range, except as otherwise provided in §§ 39-17-316 and 13-3-412 . To the extent that a city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government has or enforces any regulation of privately owned or operated sport shooting ranges, the city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government shall not impose greater restrictions or requirements on privately owned or operated ranges than are applicable to any range located within the same unit of local government and owned or operated by a government entity. A party may challenge any regulation of a sport shooting range that violates this subdivision (b)(3) in the manner described in subsection (g); and (4) The enforcement of any state or federal law pertaining to firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof, except as prohibited by § 38-3-115 .
(1) The carrying of firearms by employees or independent contractors of the city, county, town municipality or metropolitan government when acting in the course and scope of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313 ;
(2) The discharge of firearms within the boundaries of the applicable city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government, except when and where the discharge of a firearm is expressly authorized or permitted by state law;
(3) The location of a sport shooting range, except as otherwise provided in §§ 39-17-316 and 13-3-412 . To the extent that a city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government has or enforces any regulation of privately owned or operated sport shooting ranges, the city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government shall not impose greater restrictions or requirements on privately owned or operated ranges than are applicable to any range located within the same unit of local government and owned or operated by a government entity. A party may challenge any regulation of a sport shooting range that violates this subdivision (b)(3) in the manner described in subsection (g); and
(4) The enforcement of any state or federal law pertaining to firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof, except as prohibited by § 38-3-115 .
(c) The general assembly declares that the lawful design, marketing, manufacture and sale of firearms and ammunition to the public are not unreasonably dangerous activities and do not constitute a nuisance per se.
(d) (1) The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer by or on behalf of any state entity, county, municipality or metropolitan government for damages, abatement or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state. (2) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall be construed to prohibit a county, municipality, or metropolitan government from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by such county, municipality, or metropolitan government. (3) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude an individual from bringing a cause of action for breach of a written contract, breach of an express warranty, or for injuries resulting from defects in the materials or workmanship in the manufacture of the firearm.
(1) The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer by or on behalf of any state entity, county, municipality or metropolitan government for damages, abatement or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state.
(2) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall be construed to prohibit a county, municipality, or metropolitan government from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by such county, municipality, or metropolitan government.
(3) Nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude an individual from bringing a cause of action for breach of a written contract, breach of an express warranty, or for injuries resulting from defects in the materials or workmanship in the manufacture of the firearm.
(e) Subsections (c) and (d) shall not apply in any litigation brought by an individual against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer.
(f) It is the intent of the general assembly that this part is preemptive with respect to the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives and no city, county, or metropolitan government shall occupy any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives.
(g) (1) (A) Notwithstanding title 29, chapter 20; title 9, chapter 8; and § 20-13-102 , a party may file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any of the persons or entities listed in subdivisions (g)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), if the party is adversely affected by: (i) An ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section; or (ii) The creation or maintenance of a record, database, registry, or collection of records, in violation of § 39-17-1305 , by a state or local government entity, official, employee, or agent. (B) The adversely affected party may seek: (i) Declaratory and injunctive relief; and (ii) Damages, as provided in subsection (i). (2) This subsection (g) shall apply to any ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced on or after July 1, 2017, or any record, database, registry, or collection of records that is made or maintained on or after July 1, 2021.
(1) (A) Notwithstanding title 29, chapter 20; title 9, chapter 8; and § 20-13-102 , a party may file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any of the persons or entities listed in subdivisions (g)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), if the party is adversely affected by: (i) An ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section; or (ii) The creation or maintenance of a record, database, registry, or collection of records, in violation of § 39-17-1305 , by a state or local government entity, official, employee, or agent. (B) The adversely affected party may seek: (i) Declaratory and injunctive relief; and (ii) Damages, as provided in subsection (i).
(A) Notwithstanding title 29, chapter 20; title 9, chapter 8; and § 20-13-102 , a party may file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any of the persons or entities listed in subdivisions (g)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), if the party is adversely affected by: (i) An ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section; or (ii) The creation or maintenance of a record, database, registry, or collection of records, in violation of § 39-17-1305 , by a state or local government entity, official, employee, or agent.
(i) An ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section; or
(ii) The creation or maintenance of a record, database, registry, or collection of records, in violation of § 39-17-1305 , by a state or local government entity, official, employee, or agent.
(B) The adversely affected party may seek: (i) Declaratory and injunctive relief; and (ii) Damages, as provided in subsection (i).
(i) Declaratory and injunctive relief; and
(ii) Damages, as provided in subsection (i).
(2) This subsection (g) shall apply to any ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced on or after July 1, 2017, or any record, database, registry, or collection of records that is made or maintained on or after July 1, 2021.
(h) As used in subsection (g), a party is "adversely affected" if: (1) The party is an individual who: (A) Lawfully resides within the United States; (B) May legally possess a firearm under Tennessee law; and (C) Is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment or was included as an entry on a database, registry, or collection of records, that is the subject of an action filed under subsection (g). An individual is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment if the individual is or was physically present within the boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason; or (2) The party is a membership organization that: (A) Includes two (2) or more individuals described in subdivision (h)(1); and (B) Is dedicated in whole or in part to protecting the rights of persons who possess, own, or use firearms for competitive, sporting, defensive, or other lawful purposes.
(1) The party is an individual who: (A) Lawfully resides within the United States; (B) May legally possess a firearm under Tennessee law; and (C) Is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment or was included as an entry on a database, registry, or collection of records, that is the subject of an action filed under subsection (g). An individual is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment if the individual is or was physically present within the boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason; or
(A) Lawfully resides within the United States;
(B) May legally possess a firearm under Tennessee law; and
(C) Is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment or was included as an entry on a database, registry, or collection of records, that is the subject of an action filed under subsection (g). An individual is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment if the individual is or was physically present within the boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason; or
(2) The party is a membership organization that: (A) Includes two (2) or more individuals described in subdivision (h)(1); and (B) Is dedicated in whole or in part to protecting the rights of persons who possess, own, or use firearms for competitive, sporting, defensive, or other lawful purposes.
(A) Includes two (2) or more individuals described in subdivision (h)(1); and
(B) Is dedicated in whole or in part to protecting the rights of persons who possess, own, or use firearms for competitive, sporting, defensive, or other lawful purposes.
(i) A prevailing plaintiff in an action under subsection (g) is entitled to recover from the county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan, state, or local government entity the following: (1) The greater of: (A) Actual damages, including consequential damages, attributable to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, enactment, database, registry, or collection of records; or (B) Three (3) times the plaintiff's attorney's fees; (2) Court costs, including fees; and (3) Reasonable attorney's fees; provided, that attorney's fees shall not be awarded under this subdivision (i)(3) if the plaintiff recovers under subdivision (i)(1)(B).
(1) The greater of: (A) Actual damages, including consequential damages, attributable to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, enactment, database, registry, or collection of records; or (B) Three (3) times the plaintiff's attorney's fees;
(A) Actual damages, including consequential damages, attributable to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, enactment, database, registry, or collection of records; or
(B) Three (3) times the plaintiff's attorney's fees;
(2) Court costs, including fees; and
(3) Reasonable attorney's fees; provided, that attorney's fees shall not be awarded under this subdivision (i)(3) if the plaintiff recovers under subdivision (i)(1)(B).
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 554, Secs.s4, s5, s6 eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 554, s 3, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 444, s 4, eff. 5/13/2021.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 223, s 1, eff. 7/1/2019.
Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 467, s 1, eff. 7/1/2017.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 822, s 1, eff. 4/29/2014.
Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 418, s 1, eff. 7/1/2013.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1999, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 2009 , ch. 428, § 3.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-404 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 16 / Section 39-16-404
Misuse of official information
Status: in_force

(a) A public servant commits an offense who, by reason of information to which the public servant has access in the public servant's official capacity and that has not been made public, attains or aids another to attain a benefit. (b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
(a) A public servant commits an offense who, by reason of information to which the public servant has access in the public servant's official capacity and that has not been made public, attains or aids another to attain a benefit.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-717 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 11 / Section 39-11-717
Supplement to other laws - Retroactive application
Status: in_force

This part does not supersede any other statute or law relating to forfeiture of property and may be used in conjunction with administrative forfeiture laws. This law pertaining to the forfeiture of property is remedial and shall be liberally construed to effect its purpose. This part shall apply retroactively to all proceeds acquired or received prior to June 27, 1998, if the conduct giving rise to forfeiture constituted a criminal offense at the time of the acquisition of the property. Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 17.
This part does not supersede any other statute or law relating to forfeiture of property and may be used in conjunction with administrative forfeiture laws. This law pertaining to the forfeiture of property is remedial and shall be liberally construed to effect its purpose. This part shall apply retroactively to all proceeds acquired or received prior to June 27, 1998, if the conduct giving rise to forfeiture constituted a criminal offense at the time of the acquisition of the property.
Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 17.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-117 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 13 / Section 39-13-117
Grave torture
Status: in_force

(a) Grave torture is the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder, in violation of § 39-13-202 , and accompanied by three (3) or more of the following: (1) The defendant also commits against the victim the offense of especially aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-534 ; aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-502 ; especially aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-535 ; or aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-531 ; (2) The defendant also commits the offense of kidnapping, as defined in § 39-13-303 , or false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302 , against the victim; (3) The defendant has, at the time of the commission of the offense, more than one (1) prior conviction for a sexual offense or a violent sexual offense, as those terms are defined in § 40-39-202 ; (4) The defendant mutilates the victim during the commission of the offense; (5) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act, and the defendant is armed with a weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon; (6) The defendant's commission of the offense involved more than one (1) victim; or (7) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is: (A) Mentally defective; (B) Mentally incapacitated; (C) Physically helpless; or (D) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501 . (b) Grave torture is a Class A felony and shall be punished as follows: (1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense, then the sentence must be from Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35; and (2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the commission of the offense, then the defendant shall be punished by: (A) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or (B) Death; provided, that a punishment of death shall not be imposed until at least the thirtieth day following the occurrence of either of the following circumstances: (i) The issuance of the judgment in a decision of the United States supreme court overruling, in whole or in relevant part, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), thereby allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment for an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim; or (ii) The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States approving the use of the death penalty as punishment for the conviction of an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim. (c) A person may not be convicted of both a violation of this section and a violation of § 39-13-534 , § 39-13-535 , § 39-13-502 , or § 39-13-531 if the facts supporting the prosecution arise out of the same criminal conduct. Added by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1062, s 3, eff. 7/1/2022.
(a) Grave torture is the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder, in violation of § 39-13-202 , and accompanied by three (3) or more of the following: (1) The defendant also commits against the victim the offense of especially aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-534 ; aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-502 ; especially aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-535 ; or aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-531 ; (2) The defendant also commits the offense of kidnapping, as defined in § 39-13-303 , or false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302 , against the victim; (3) The defendant has, at the time of the commission of the offense, more than one (1) prior conviction for a sexual offense or a violent sexual offense, as those terms are defined in § 40-39-202 ; (4) The defendant mutilates the victim during the commission of the offense; (5) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act, and the defendant is armed with a weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon; (6) The defendant's commission of the offense involved more than one (1) victim; or (7) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is: (A) Mentally defective; (B) Mentally incapacitated; (C) Physically helpless; or (D) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501 .
(1) The defendant also commits against the victim the offense of especially aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-534 ; aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-502 ; especially aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-535 ; or aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-531 ;
(2) The defendant also commits the offense of kidnapping, as defined in § 39-13-303 , or false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302 , against the victim;
(3) The defendant has, at the time of the commission of the offense, more than one (1) prior conviction for a sexual offense or a violent sexual offense, as those terms are defined in § 40-39-202 ;
(4) The defendant mutilates the victim during the commission of the offense;
(5) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act, and the defendant is armed with a weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon;
(6) The defendant's commission of the offense involved more than one (1) victim; or
(7) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is: (A) Mentally defective; (B) Mentally incapacitated; (C) Physically helpless; or (D) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501 .
(A) Mentally defective;
(B) Mentally incapacitated;
(C) Physically helpless; or
(D) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501 .
(b) Grave torture is a Class A felony and shall be punished as follows: (1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense, then the sentence must be from Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35; and (2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the commission of the offense, then the defendant shall be punished by: (A) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or (B) Death; provided, that a punishment of death shall not be imposed until at least the thirtieth day following the occurrence of either of the following circumstances: (i) The issuance of the judgment in a decision of the United States supreme court overruling, in whole or in relevant part, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), thereby allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment for an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim; or (ii) The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States approving the use of the death penalty as punishment for the conviction of an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim.
(1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense, then the sentence must be from Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35; and
(2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the commission of the offense, then the defendant shall be punished by: (A) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or (B) Death; provided, that a punishment of death shall not be imposed until at least the thirtieth day following the occurrence of either of the following circumstances: (i) The issuance of the judgment in a decision of the United States supreme court overruling, in whole or in relevant part, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), thereby allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment for an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim; or (ii) The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States approving the use of the death penalty as punishment for the conviction of an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim.
(A) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or
(B) Death; provided, that a punishment of death shall not be imposed until at least the thirtieth day following the occurrence of either of the following circumstances: (i) The issuance of the judgment in a decision of the United States supreme court overruling, in whole or in relevant part, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), thereby allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment for an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim; or (ii) The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States approving the use of the death penalty as punishment for the conviction of an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim.
(i) The issuance of the judgment in a decision of the United States supreme court overruling, in whole or in relevant part, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), thereby allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment for an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim; or
(ii) The ratification of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States approving the use of the death penalty as punishment for the conviction of an offense involving the infliction of severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victim with the intent to perpetrate first degree murder that does not result in the death of the victim.
(c) A person may not be convicted of both a violation of this section and a violation of § 39-13-534 , § 39-13-535 , § 39-13-502 , or § 39-13-531 if the facts supporting the prosecution arise out of the same criminal conduct.
Added by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1062, s 3, eff. 7/1/2022.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-505 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-505
Possession of gambling device or record - Forfeiture
Status: in_force

(a) (1) A person commits an offense who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs, transports, prints, or makes any gambling device or record. (2) It is not an offense for a person to own or possess in this state a lottery ticket originating from a state in which a lottery is lawful, if the ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale. (3) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is owned, manufactured, possessed, bought, sold, rented, leased, stored, repaired, transported, printed or made pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1 and part 6 of this chapter. (4) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is for the purpose of conducting an annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter. (5) (A) It shall not be an offense for a manufacturer of gambling devices to knowingly own, manufacture, assemble, design, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record solely intended for gambling outside of this state and in compliance with the laws of the United States. The requirement that the manufacturing, selling or leasing of gambling devices be intended solely for gambling outside of the state shall not restrict uses of the gambling devices by the manufacturer that are ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business, including, but not limited to, using the gambling devices for research and development, employee training, compliance program initiatives, testing and quality assurance processes, showroom display, leasing or purchasing or selling of gambling devices or parts or equipment, storage or warehousing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, maintenance or refurbishing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, and safekeeping of gambling devices or parts or equipment for future litigation. Also considered ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business shall be the use or operation of computers, computer servers, and similar electronic devices, hardware and software, and all gambling records, data or information owned, maintained or stored thereupon, or produced, generated, created, printed, transported or transmitted therefrom, whether paper, electronic or otherwise, in conjunction with legal gambling and in compliance with the laws of the United States. Ancillary or accessorial uses shall not include use of the gambling devices or records that would allow persons physically present in this state to place gambling bets. This subdivision (a)(5) shall not apply unless the manufacturer meets or exceeds federal government requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and any regulations promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and provides the secretary of state with a copy of the request for registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1173 , together with copies of each gambling license or permit issued by any regulatory authority, including but not limited to any state, country, federally recognized tribe or United States territory, and pays a ten-thousand-dollar fee prior to January 1 of that year. Additionally, the manufacturer shall provide the secretary of state with proof of annual registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1173 with the office of the United States attorney general within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereof. (B) The fee imposed by subdivision (a)(5)(A) shall not apply to nonprofit corporations licensed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and certified by the department of human services to provide vocational rehabilitation job training programs that otherwise qualify for the exemption under subdivision (a)(5)(A). (6) (A) It is not an offense for a person to own, possess, buy, or sell an antique coin machine if: (i) The antique coin machine is not used for gambling purposes; and (ii) Members of the public are not permitted to operate any antique coin machine that is displayed in public. (B) A person selling an antique coin machine shall indicate to all prospective buyers that the antique coin machine is not to be used for gambling purposes. (b) (1) Any gambling device or record is contraband and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture in accordance with the forfeiture provisions, compiled in chapter 11, part 7 of this title. (2) After a gambling device or record has been forfeited to the state pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title, the court hearing the criminal charges resulting in the forfeiture shall order the destruction of the device or record. If the district attorney general or law enforcement agency does not believe that a gambling device or record should be destroyed in a particular case, the district attorney general shall petition the court for an alternate disposition of the record or device. If the court finds that the proposed alternate disposition reasonably ensures that the device will not be used in an unlawful manner in this state, the court may grant the petition and order the disposition of the device or record in accordance with the petition. (c) Possession of a gambling device or record is a Class B misdemeanor. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 65,s 2, eff. 7/1/2021.
(a) (1) A person commits an offense who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs, transports, prints, or makes any gambling device or record. (2) It is not an offense for a person to own or possess in this state a lottery ticket originating from a state in which a lottery is lawful, if the ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale. (3) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is owned, manufactured, possessed, bought, sold, rented, leased, stored, repaired, transported, printed or made pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1 and part 6 of this chapter. (4) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is for the purpose of conducting an annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter. (5) (A) It shall not be an offense for a manufacturer of gambling devices to knowingly own, manufacture, assemble, design, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record solely intended for gambling outside of this state and in compliance with the laws of the United States. The requirement that the manufacturing, selling or leasing of gambling devices be intended solely for gambling outside of the state shall not restrict uses of the gambling devices by the manufacturer that are ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business, including, but not limited to, using the gambling devices for research and development, employee training, compliance program initiatives, testing and quality assurance processes, showroom display, leasing or purchasing or selling of gambling devices or parts or equipment, storage or warehousing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, maintenance or refurbishing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, and safekeeping of gambling devices or parts or equipment for future litigation. Also considered ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business shall be the use or operation of computers, computer servers, and similar electronic devices, hardware and software, and all gambling records, data or information owned, maintained or stored thereupon, or produced, generated, created, printed, transported or transmitted therefrom, whether paper, electronic or otherwise, in conjunction with legal gambling and in compliance with the laws of the United States. Ancillary or accessorial uses shall not include use of the gambling devices or records that would allow persons physically present in this state to place gambling bets. This subdivision (a)(5) shall not apply unless the manufacturer meets or exceeds federal government requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and any regulations promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and provides the secretary of state with a copy of the request for registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1173 , together with copies of each gambling license or permit issued by any regulatory authority, including but not limited to any state, country, federally recognized tribe or United States territory, and pays a ten-thousand-dollar fee prior to January 1 of that year. Additionally, the manufacturer shall provide the secretary of state with proof of annual registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1173 with the office of the United States attorney general within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereof. (B) The fee imposed by subdivision (a)(5)(A) shall not apply to nonprofit corporations licensed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and certified by the department of human services to provide vocational rehabilitation job training programs that otherwise qualify for the exemption under subdivision (a)(5)(A). (6) (A) It is not an offense for a person to own, possess, buy, or sell an antique coin machine if: (i) The antique coin machine is not used for gambling purposes; and (ii) Members of the public are not permitted to operate any antique coin machine that is displayed in public. (B) A person selling an antique coin machine shall indicate to all prospective buyers that the antique coin machine is not to be used for gambling purposes.
(1) A person commits an offense who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs, transports, prints, or makes any gambling device or record.
(2) It is not an offense for a person to own or possess in this state a lottery ticket originating from a state in which a lottery is lawful, if the ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale.
(3) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is owned, manufactured, possessed, bought, sold, rented, leased, stored, repaired, transported, printed or made pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1 and part 6 of this chapter.
(4) It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is for the purpose of conducting an annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter.
(5) (A) It shall not be an offense for a manufacturer of gambling devices to knowingly own, manufacture, assemble, design, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record solely intended for gambling outside of this state and in compliance with the laws of the United States. The requirement that the manufacturing, selling or leasing of gambling devices be intended solely for gambling outside of the state shall not restrict uses of the gambling devices by the manufacturer that are ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business, including, but not limited to, using the gambling devices for research and development, employee training, compliance program initiatives, testing and quality assurance processes, showroom display, leasing or purchasing or selling of gambling devices or parts or equipment, storage or warehousing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, maintenance or refurbishing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, and safekeeping of gambling devices or parts or equipment for future litigation. Also considered ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business shall be the use or operation of computers, computer servers, and similar electronic devices, hardware and software, and all gambling records, data or information owned, maintained or stored thereupon, or produced, generated, created, printed, transported or transmitted therefrom, whether paper, electronic or otherwise, in conjunction with legal gambling and in compliance with the laws of the United States. Ancillary or accessorial uses shall not include use of the gambling devices or records that would allow persons physically present in this state to place gambling bets. This subdivision (a)(5) shall not apply unless the manufacturer meets or exceeds federal government requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and any regulations promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and provides the secretary of state with a copy of the request for registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1173 , together with copies of each gambling license or permit issued by any regulatory authority, including but not limited to any state, country, federally recognized tribe or United States territory, and pays a ten-thousand-dollar fee prior to January 1 of that year. Additionally, the manufacturer shall provide the secretary of state with proof of annual registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1173 with the office of the United States attorney general within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereof. (B) The fee imposed by subdivision (a)(5)(A) shall not apply to nonprofit corporations licensed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and certified by the department of human services to provide vocational rehabilitation job training programs that otherwise qualify for the exemption under subdivision (a)(5)(A).
(A) It shall not be an offense for a manufacturer of gambling devices to knowingly own, manufacture, assemble, design, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record solely intended for gambling outside of this state and in compliance with the laws of the United States. The requirement that the manufacturing, selling or leasing of gambling devices be intended solely for gambling outside of the state shall not restrict uses of the gambling devices by the manufacturer that are ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business, including, but not limited to, using the gambling devices for research and development, employee training, compliance program initiatives, testing and quality assurance processes, showroom display, leasing or purchasing or selling of gambling devices or parts or equipment, storage or warehousing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, maintenance or refurbishing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, and safekeeping of gambling devices or parts or equipment for future litigation. Also considered ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business shall be the use or operation of computers, computer servers, and similar electronic devices, hardware and software, and all gambling records, data or information owned, maintained or stored thereupon, or produced, generated, created, printed, transported or transmitted therefrom, whether paper, electronic or otherwise, in conjunction with legal gambling and in compliance with the laws of the United States. Ancillary or accessorial uses shall not include use of the gambling devices or records that would allow persons physically present in this state to place gambling bets. This subdivision (a)(5) shall not apply unless the manufacturer meets or exceeds federal government requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and any regulations promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and provides the secretary of state with a copy of the request for registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1173 , together with copies of each gambling license or permit issued by any regulatory authority, including but not limited to any state, country, federally recognized tribe or United States territory, and pays a ten-thousand-dollar fee prior to January 1 of that year. Additionally, the manufacturer shall provide the secretary of state with proof of annual registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1173 with the office of the United States attorney general within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereof.
(B) The fee imposed by subdivision (a)(5)(A) shall not apply to nonprofit corporations licensed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and certified by the department of human services to provide vocational rehabilitation job training programs that otherwise qualify for the exemption under subdivision (a)(5)(A).
(6) (A) It is not an offense for a person to own, possess, buy, or sell an antique coin machine if: (i) The antique coin machine is not used for gambling purposes; and (ii) Members of the public are not permitted to operate any antique coin machine that is displayed in public. (B) A person selling an antique coin machine shall indicate to all prospective buyers that the antique coin machine is not to be used for gambling purposes.
(A) It is not an offense for a person to own, possess, buy, or sell an antique coin machine if: (i) The antique coin machine is not used for gambling purposes; and (ii) Members of the public are not permitted to operate any antique coin machine that is displayed in public.
(i) The antique coin machine is not used for gambling purposes; and
(ii) Members of the public are not permitted to operate any antique coin machine that is displayed in public.
(B) A person selling an antique coin machine shall indicate to all prospective buyers that the antique coin machine is not to be used for gambling purposes.
(b) (1) Any gambling device or record is contraband and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture in accordance with the forfeiture provisions, compiled in chapter 11, part 7 of this title. (2) After a gambling device or record has been forfeited to the state pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title, the court hearing the criminal charges resulting in the forfeiture shall order the destruction of the device or record. If the district attorney general or law enforcement agency does not believe that a gambling device or record should be destroyed in a particular case, the district attorney general shall petition the court for an alternate disposition of the record or device. If the court finds that the proposed alternate disposition reasonably ensures that the device will not be used in an unlawful manner in this state, the court may grant the petition and order the disposition of the device or record in accordance with the petition.
(1) Any gambling device or record is contraband and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture in accordance with the forfeiture provisions, compiled in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
(2) After a gambling device or record has been forfeited to the state pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title, the court hearing the criminal charges resulting in the forfeiture shall order the destruction of the device or record. If the district attorney general or law enforcement agency does not believe that a gambling device or record should be destroyed in a particular case, the district attorney general shall petition the court for an alternate disposition of the record or device. If the court finds that the proposed alternate disposition reasonably ensures that the device will not be used in an unlawful manner in this state, the court may grant the petition and order the disposition of the device or record in accordance with the petition.
(c) Possession of a gambling device or record is a Class B misdemeanor.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 65,s 2, eff. 7/1/2021.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418 — TN Code / Title 39 / Chapter 17 / Section 39-17-418
Simple possession or casual exchange
Status: in_force

(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess or casually exchange a controlled substance, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice. (b) It is an offense for a person to distribute a small amount of marijuana not in excess of one-half (1/2) ounce (14.175 grams). (c) (1) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) (A) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the thirty (30) day minimum. (B) (i) The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services or another licensed treatment program. (ii) Any person participating in such a court or program may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A). (iii) For persons sentenced under subdivision (c)(2)(A) with clinical assessment results indicating the need to participate in a drug or recovery court or treatment program, the court shall strongly consider ordering service of the sentence through participation in a drug or recovery court or program permitted under subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i) instead of through confinement, unless the court determines the person is not suitable for, or otherwise cannot participate in, such a court or program. (d) A violation of subsections (a) or (b), where there is casual exchange to a minor from an adult who is at least two (2) years the minor's senior, and who knows that the person is a minor, is punished as a felony as provided in § 39-17-417 . (e) A violation under this section is a Class E felony where the person has two (2) or more prior convictions under this section and the current violation involves a Schedule I controlled substance classified as heroin. (f) (1) In addition to the other penalties provided in this section, any person convicted of violating this section for possession of a controlled substance may be required to attend a drug offender school, if available, or may be required to perform community service work at a drug or alcohol rehabilitation or treatment center. (2) Any person required to attend a drug offender school pursuant to this subsection (f) shall also be required to pay a fee for attending the school. If the court determines that the person, by reason of indigency, cannot afford to pay a fee to attend the school, the court shall waive the fee and the person shall attend the school without charge. The amount of fee shall be established by the local governmental authority operating the school, but the fee shall not exceed the fee charged for attending an alcohol safety DUI school program if such a program is available in the jurisdiction. All fees collected pursuant to this subsection (f) shall be used by the governmental authority responsible for administering the school for operation of the school. (g) Notwithstanding any other subsection to the contrary, a violation of subsection (a) with respect to tianeptine and any salt, sulfate, free acid, or other preparation of tianeptine and any salt, sulfate, free acid, compound, derivative, precursor, or other preparation thereof that is substantially chemically equivalent or identical with tianeptine is a Class A misdemeanor. Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1135, s 2, eff. 7/1/2022. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 409, Secs.s 4, s 5 eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 409, s 3, eff. 7/1/2021. Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 876, s 12, eff. 7/1/2016. Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 970,s 2, eff. 7/1/2014. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 992, § 3; 1993, ch. 456, §§ 1, 2.
(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess or casually exchange a controlled substance, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice.
(b) It is an offense for a person to distribute a small amount of marijuana not in excess of one-half (1/2) ounce (14.175 grams).
(c) (1) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (2) (A) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the thirty (30) day minimum. (B) (i) The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services or another licensed treatment program. (ii) Any person participating in such a court or program may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A). (iii) For persons sentenced under subdivision (c)(2)(A) with clinical assessment results indicating the need to participate in a drug or recovery court or treatment program, the court shall strongly consider ordering service of the sentence through participation in a drug or recovery court or program permitted under subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i) instead of through confinement, unless the court determines the person is not suitable for, or otherwise cannot participate in, such a court or program.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) (A) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the thirty (30) day minimum. (B) (i) The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services or another licensed treatment program. (ii) Any person participating in such a court or program may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A). (iii) For persons sentenced under subdivision (c)(2)(A) with clinical assessment results indicating the need to participate in a drug or recovery court or treatment program, the court shall strongly consider ordering service of the sentence through participation in a drug or recovery court or program permitted under subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i) instead of through confinement, unless the court determines the person is not suitable for, or otherwise cannot participate in, such a court or program.
(A) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the thirty (30) day minimum.
(B) (i) The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services or another licensed treatment program. (ii) Any person participating in such a court or program may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A). (iii) For persons sentenced under subdivision (c)(2)(A) with clinical assessment results indicating the need to participate in a drug or recovery court or treatment program, the court shall strongly consider ordering service of the sentence through participation in a drug or recovery court or program permitted under subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i) instead of through confinement, unless the court determines the person is not suitable for, or otherwise cannot participate in, such a court or program.
(i) The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services or another licensed treatment program.
(ii) Any person participating in such a court or program may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A).
(iii) For persons sentenced under subdivision (c)(2)(A) with clinical assessment results indicating the need to participate in a drug or recovery court or treatment program, the court shall strongly consider ordering service of the sentence through participation in a drug or recovery court or program permitted under subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i) instead of through confinement, unless the court determines the person is not suitable for, or otherwise cannot participate in, such a court or program.
(d) A violation of subsections (a) or (b), where there is casual exchange to a minor from an adult who is at least two (2) years the minor's senior, and who knows that the person is a minor, is punished as a felony as provided in § 39-17-417 .
(e) A violation under this section is a Class E felony where the person has two (2) or more prior convictions under this section and the current violation involves a Schedule I controlled substance classified as heroin.
(f) (1) In addition to the other penalties provided in this section, any person convicted of violating this section for possession of a controlled substance may be required to attend a drug offender school, if available, or may be required to perform community service work at a drug or alcohol rehabilitation or treatment center. (2) Any person required to attend a drug offender school pursuant to this subsection (f) shall also be required to pay a fee for attending the school. If the court determines that the person, by reason of indigency, cannot afford to pay a fee to attend the school, the court shall waive the fee and the person shall attend the school without charge. The amount of fee shall be established by the local governmental authority operating the school, but the fee shall not exceed the fee charged for attending an alcohol safety DUI school program if such a program is available in the jurisdiction. All fees collected pursuant to this subsection (f) shall be used by the governmental authority responsible for administering the school for operation of the school.
(1) In addition to the other penalties provided in this section, any person convicted of violating this section for possession of a controlled substance may be required to attend a drug offender school, if available, or may be required to perform community service work at a drug or alcohol rehabilitation or treatment center.
(2) Any person required to attend a drug offender school pursuant to this subsection (f) shall also be required to pay a fee for attending the school. If the court determines that the person, by reason of indigency, cannot afford to pay a fee to attend the school, the court shall waive the fee and the person shall attend the school without charge. The amount of fee shall be established by the local governmental authority operating the school, but the fee shall not exceed the fee charged for attending an alcohol safety DUI school program if such a program is available in the jurisdiction. All fees collected pursuant to this subsection (f) shall be used by the governmental authority responsible for administering the school for operation of the school.
(g) Notwithstanding any other subsection to the contrary, a violation of subsection (a) with respect to tianeptine and any salt, sulfate, free acid, or other preparation of tianeptine and any salt, sulfate, free acid, compound, derivative, precursor, or other preparation thereof that is substantially chemically equivalent or identical with tianeptine is a Class A misdemeanor.
Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1135, s 2, eff. 7/1/2022.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 409, Secs.s 4, s 5 eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 409, s 3, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 876, s 12, eff. 7/1/2016.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 970,s 2, eff. 7/1/2014.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 992, § 3; 1993, ch. 456, §§ 1, 2.