N.Y. PEN Law § 125.27 — New York Code / Act PEN / Part 3 / Title H / Article 125 / Section 125.27
Murder in the first degree
Status: in_force

§ 125.27 Murder in the first degree.\n  A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:\n  1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the\ndeath of such person or of a third person; and\n  (a) Either:\n  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision\n34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of\nthe killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and\nthe defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended\nvictim was a police officer; or\n  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a\nof subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or\nsixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the\ncriminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the\ncourse of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or\nreasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a\nuniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee\nof the division for youth; or\n  (ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical\ntechnician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse\ninvolved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the\ncourse of official duties, performs emergency response activities and\nwas engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant\nknew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such\nfirefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,\nphysician or registered nurse; or\n  (iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional\ninstitution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as\ndefined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who\nwas at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his\nofficial duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known\nthat the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional\ninstitution or a local correctional facility; or\n  (iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was\nconfined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody\nupon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence\ncommuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate\nterm the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of\nwhich was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing,\nthe defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving\nsuch a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or\ncustody; or\n  (v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior\noccasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the\nintended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether\nor not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended\nvictim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and\nthe killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for\nsuch prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family\nmember of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the\nkilling was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the\ntestimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate\nfamily member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal\naction or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of\nexacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used\nin this subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband, wife,\nfather, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent,\nstepchild or grandchild; or\n  (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the\nkilling pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended\nvictim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the\nreceipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or\nfrom a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of\na party to such agreement; or\n  (vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of\ncommitting or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,\nburglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first\ndegree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first\ndegree, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this title, sexual\nabuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree\nor escape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of\nimmediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime\nor in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting\nto commit the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however,\nthe victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and,\nprovided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under\nthis subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another\nperson to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to\nsection 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where\nthe defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another\npursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or\n  (viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with\nintent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional\nperson or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;\nprovided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal\ntransaction; or\n  (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted\nof murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,\nor had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if\ncommitted in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such\nsections; or\n  (x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner\npursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting\ntorture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this\nsubparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of\nextreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the\ninfliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing\ndebasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of\npleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or\n  (xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more\nadditional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions\nwithin a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar\nfashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or\n  (xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision\ntwenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the\ndefendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the\nkilling, a judge; or\n  (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as\ndefined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this\nchapter; and\n  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the\ncommission of the crime.\n  2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative\ndefense that:\n  (a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional\ndisturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the\nreasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a\nperson in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the\ndefendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall\nconstitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,\nmanslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the\nsecond degree. (ii) It shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse"\npursuant to subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's\nconduct resulted from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the\nvictim's sexual orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender\nexpression or sex assigned at birth; or\n  (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without\nthe use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.\nNothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a\nprosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second\ndegree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.\n  Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.\n