N.Y. CPL Law § 30.30 — New York Code / Act CPL / Part 1 / Title C / Article 30 / Section 30.30
Speedy trial; time limitations
Status: in_force

§ 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.\n  1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three of this section,\na motion made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section\n170.30 or paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 of this\nchapter must be granted where the people are not ready for trial within:\n  (a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a\ndefendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a\nfelony;\n  (b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a\ndefendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a\nmisdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three\nmonths and none of which is a felony;\n  (c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the\ndefendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a\nmisdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than\nthree months and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of\nimprisonment of more than three months; or\n  (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the\ndefendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a\nviolation and none of which is a crime.\n  (e) for the purposes of this subdivision, the term offense shall\ninclude vehicle and traffic law infractions.\n  2. Except as provided in subdivision three of this section, where a\ndefendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff or the office\nof children and family services in a criminal action he or she must be\nreleased on bail or on his or her own recognizance, upon such conditions\nas may be just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in\nthat criminal action within:\n  (a) ninety days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the\ncustody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in\na criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more\noffenses, at least one of which is a felony;\n  (b) thirty days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the\ncustody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in\na criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more\noffenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a\nsentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is\na felony;\n  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the\ncustody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in\na criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more\noffenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a\nsentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none of which\nis a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three\nmonths; or\n  (d) five days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the\ncustody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in\na criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more\noffenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of which is a\ncrime.\n  (e) for the purposes of this subdivision, the term offense shall\ninclude vehicle and traffic law infractions.\n  3. (a) Subdivisions one and two of this section do not apply to a\ncriminal action wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined\nin sections 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the\npenal law.\n  (b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two of this section\nupon expiration of the specified period may be denied where the people\nare not ready for trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the\nexpiration of the specified period and their present unreadiness is due\nto some exceptional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,\nthe sudden unavailability of evidence material to the people's case,\nwhen the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such\nevidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence\nwill become available in a reasonable period.\n  (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two of this section shall\nnot:\n  (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for\nanother offense;\n  (ii) require the release from custody of any defendant who is also\nbeing held in custody pending trial of another criminal charge as to\nwhich the applicable period has not yet elapsed;\n  (iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant\nwho, after being released from custody pursuant to this section or\notherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the conditions on\nwhich he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial\nproceeding at which his presence is required or otherwise.\n  4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for\ntrial pursuant to subdivisions one and two of this section, the\nfollowing periods must be excluded:\n  (a) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings\nconcerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for\nthe determination of competency and the period during which defendant is\nincompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request for a bill of\nparticulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the\nperiod during which such matters are under consideration by the court;\nor\n  (b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the\ncourt at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or\nher counsel. The court may grant such a continuance only if it is\nsatisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into\naccount the public interest in the prompt dispositions of criminal\ncharges. A defendant without counsel must not be deemed to have\nconsented to a continuance unless he or she has been advised by the\ncourt of his or her rights under these rules and the effect of his\nconsent, which must be done on the record in open court; or\n  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or\nunavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent\nwhenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid\napprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due\ndiligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his\nlocation is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due\ndiligence; or\n  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed\nto appear when required after having previously been released on bail or\non his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on\nanother matter, the period extending from the day the court issues a\nbench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 of this chapter because of the\ndefendant's failure to appear in court when required, to the day the\ndefendant subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant\nor voluntarily or otherwise; or\n  (d) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for\ntrial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this\nsection has not run and good cause is not shown for granting a\nseverance; or\n  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in\nanother jurisdiction provided the district attorney is aware of such\ndetention and has been diligent and has made reasonable efforts to\nobtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or\n  (f) the period during which the defendant is without counsel through\nno fault of the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his\nown attorney with the permission of the court; or\n  (g) other periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,\nincluding but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a\ncontinuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the\ncontinuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence\nmaterial to the people's case, when the district attorney has exercised\ndue diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds\nto believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable\nperiod; or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district\nattorney additional time to prepare the people's case and additional\ntime is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case. Any such\nexclusion when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of\nreadiness made by the people must be evaluated by the court after\ninquiry on the record as to the reasons for the people's unreadiness and\nshall only be approved upon a showing of sufficient supporting facts; or\n  (h) the period during which an action has been adjourned in\ncontemplation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and\n215.10 of this chapter; or\n  (i) the period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for\narraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been directed to\nappear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section\n120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10 of this chapter; or\n  (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family court\nuntil such time as an accusatory instrument or indictment is filed\nagainst the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as\nsuch term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.\n  5. (a) Whenever pursuant to this section a prosecutor states or\notherwise provides notice that the people are ready for trial, the court\nshall make inquiry on the record as to their actual readiness. If, after\nconducting its inquiry, the court determines that the people are not\nready to proceed to trial, the prosecutor's statement or notice of\nreadiness shall not be valid for purposes of this section. The court may\ndeem the people not ready for trial based on the people's failure to\ncomply with the provisions of article two hundred forty-five of this\nchapter only if it finds that the people's certificate of compliance\nthat accompanied or preceded the people's statement of readiness at\nissue was invalid under section 245.50 of this chapter.\n  (b) Pursuant to section 245.50 of this chapter, the certificate of\ncompliance is deemed invalid when the court determined that the people\ndid not exercise due diligence and, in making such determination, the\ncourt looked at the totality of the prosecution's efforts to comply with\nthe provisions of article two hundred forty-five of this chapter, rather\nthan assess the prosecution's efforts item by item, and considered the\nfactors relevant to assessing due diligence, which include, but are not\nlimited to: the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the\nrequirements of article two hundred forty-five of this chapter; the\nvolume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding;\nthe complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the\nbelatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the\nexplanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response\nwhen apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated\ndiscovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily\nremedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution\nself-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court\nintervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of\ndiscovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the\ndefense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for\ntrial.\n  5-a. Upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, a statement of\nreadiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies\nthat all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the\nrequirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those\ncounts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of\nthis chapter have been dismissed.\n  6. An order finally denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to\nsubdivision one of this section shall be reviewable upon an appeal from\nan ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such\njudgment is entered upon a plea of guilty.\n  7. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be\ntried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried\nfollowing a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or\ncollateral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to the custody\nof the sheriff or the office of children and family services, if any,\nmust be deemed to have commenced on the date the withdrawal of the plea\nof guilty or the date the order occasioning a retrial becomes final;\n  (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the\ncriminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the\ndefendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the\nticket;\n  (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony\ncomplaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action\neither the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an\ninformation, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant\nto article one hundred eighty of this chapter or a prosecutor's\ninformation is filed pursuant to section 190.70 of this chapter, the\nperiod applicable for the purposes of subdivision one must be the period\napplicable to the charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated\nfrom the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,\nhowever, that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,\nexcluding the periods provided in subdivision four, already elapsed from\nthe date of the filing of the felony complaint to the date of the filing\nof the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period\napplicable to the charges in the felony complaint must remain applicable\nand continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;\n  (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony\ncomplaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action\neither the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an\ninformation, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant\nto article one hundred eighty of this chapter or a prosecutor's\ninformation is filed pursuant to section 190.70 of this chapter, the\nperiod applicable for the purposes of subdivision two of this section\nmust be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory\ninstrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new\naccusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of\nsuch period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in\nsubdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the\nfiling of the felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new\naccusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the\ncharges in the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as\nif the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.\n  (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a\nmisdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor's\ninformation is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section\n210.20 of this chapter, the period applicable for the purposes of\nsubdivision one of this section must be the period applicable to the\ncharges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of\nthe filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that\nwhen the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the\nperiods provided in subdivision four of this section, already elapsed\nfrom the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the filing\nof the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period\napplicable to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and\ncontinue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;\n  (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a\nmisdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor's\ninformation is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section\n210.20 of this chapter, the period applicable for the purposes of\nsubdivision two of this section must be the period applicable to the\ncharges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of\nthe filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that\nwhen the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the\nperiods provided in subdivision four of this section, already elapsed\nfrom the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the filing\nof the new accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period\napplicable to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and\ncontinue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.\n  8. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through seven\nof section 210.45 of this chapter with respect to a motion to dismiss an\nindictment are not applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision\ntwo of this section. If, upon oral argument, a time period is in\ndispute, the court must promptly conduct a hearing in which the people\nmust prove that the time period is excludable.\n