Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-218 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-218
View Statute 76-218
Status: in_force

Every officer within this state authorized to take the acknowledgment or proof of any conveyance, and every county clerk, who shall be guilty of knowingly stating an untruth, or guilty of any malfeasance or fraudulent practice in the execution of the duties prescribed for them by law, in relation to the taking or the certifying of the proof or acknowledgment, or the recording or certifying of any record of any such conveyance, mortgage or instrument in writing, or in relation to the canceling of any mortgage, shall upon conviction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and be subject to punishment by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding one year, and shall also be liable in damages to the party injured.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 46, p. 290;

R.S.1913, § 6250;

C.S.1922, § 5649;

C.S.1929, § 76-255;

R.S.1943, § 76-218.

Certification by an attorney of a false acknowledgment is a criminal offense justifying suspension or disbarment. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Butterfield, 169 Neb. 119, 98 N.W.2d 714 (1959).

Certification by an attorney of a false acknowledgment is a criminal offense justifying suspension or disbarment. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Butterfield, 169 Neb. 119, 98 N.W.2d 714 (1959).

County clerk, in issuing certificate of title to a motor vehicle, was not guilty of malfeasance under facts stated. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 44 N.W.2d 501 (1950).

County clerk, in issuing certificate of title to a motor vehicle, was not guilty of malfeasance under facts stated. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 44 N.W.2d 501 (1950).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-227 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-227
View Statute 76-227
Status: in_force

The acknowledgment of legal instruments, the attestation of documents, the administration of oaths and other notarial acts, heretofore or hereafter taken before any duly commissioned officer of the army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, or any other component part of the armed forces of the United States are hereby declared legal, valid and binding, and such instrument and documents shall be admissible in evidence and eligible to record in this state under the same circumstances, and with the same force and effect as if such acknowledgment, attestation, oath, affidavit, or other notarial act had been made or taken before a notary public within this state. If the signature, rank and branch of service of any such officer appear upon such instrument or document, no further proof of the authority of such officer to so act shall be required.

Laws 1919, c. 169, § 1, p. 381;

C.S.1922, § 5664;

C.S.1929, § 76-270;

Laws 1943, c. 170, § 1, p. 593;

R.S.1943, § 76-227.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.05 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.05
View Statute 76-239.05
Status: in_force

Any person, firm or corporation, the members of any firm, or the officers of any corporation, violating the provisions of sections 76-239.01 to 76-239.06 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 5, p. 2492.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.06 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.06
View Statute 76-239.06
Status: in_force

For the purposes of sections 76-239.01 to 76-239.06 , the word contractor shall include any firm, person or corporation who acts in the capacity of a prime contractor, subcontractor or supplier for the construction of improvements on real property.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 6, p. 2492.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239
View Statute 76-239
Status: in_force

(1) After the expiration of ten years from the date of maturity of any debt or other obligation secured by a deed of trust, mortgage, or real estate sale contract as stated in or ascertainable from the record of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract and, in cases where the date of such maturity cannot be ascertained from such record, after the expiration of thirty years from the date of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract, the record of any deed of trust, mortgage, or real estate contract that has been recorded shall cease to be notice of the existence and lien of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract as to subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers for value whose deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages, or other instruments shall be thereafter executed and recorded. Such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract shall be conclusively presumed to have been fully paid and discharged and the record thereof shall thereupon cease to be or constitute notice of the existence or lien thereof and shall be wholly void and thereafter shall not be construed to be any part of the public records in the office of the register of deeds as against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value.

(2) Prior to the termination of the record and notice pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the owner and holder of the deed of trust, mortgage, or contract may file for record with the register of deeds an affidavit to the effect that the deed of trust, mortgage, or contract is unpaid and is still a valid and subsisting lien. Upon the filing of such affidavit the record of the deed of trust, mortgage, or contract shall continue to exist and be valid as notice of the existence of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract and of any lien thereof, for an additional period of ten years from the date of the filing of such affidavit. The owner and holder of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract may alternatively file for record with the register of deeds a duly executed written extension agreement thereof in which event the record of the deed of trust, mortgage, or contract shall continue to exist and be valid as notice of the existence of such deed of trust, mortgage, or contract and of any lien thereof, for an additional period of ten years from the maturity of the deed of trust, mortgage, or contract debt as shown by the recorded extension agreement.

(3) Such periods of notice may be successively extended for additional periods. However, this section shall not be construed as to extend the time within which an action on any deed of trust, mortgage, or contract may be instituted, or in any manner to alter or amend the time within which any action on a deed of trust, mortgage, or contract may be brought under the general laws of this state. This section also shall not apply to mortgages or deeds of trust and instruments supplementary or amendatory thereto covering real estate as well as personal property, such property constituting a portion of property used in carrying on the business of a public utility or a gas or oil pipeline system, and executed to secure the payment of money. The lien of mortgages or deeds of trust and supplements and amendments thereto shall continue in force and effect as to any interest of the mortgagor in the real estate described therein, together with personal property, without the necessity of such renewal affidavit or extension agreement being made and filed, and notwithstanding that the same may have been on file for the period of time set out in this section. The mortgage or deed of trust or instruments supplementary or amendatory thereto shall disclose that the mortgagor or grantor therein is then carrying on the business of a public utility or a gas or oil pipeline system or the mortgagor or grantor has filed an affidavit to that effect for record with the register of deeds.

e same may have been on file for the period of time set out in this section. The mortgage or deed of trust or instruments supplementary or amendatory thereto shall disclose that the mortgagor or grantor therein is then carrying on the business of a public utility or a gas or oil pipeline system or the mortgagor or grantor has filed an affidavit to that effect for record with the register of deeds.

(4) It is the intent of the Legislature that the changes made by Laws 2005, LB 97, shall not affect or alter the status of any deed of trust, mortgage, or real estate sales contract rendered void prior to September 4, 2005.

Laws 1941, c. 154, § 2, p. 600;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-279;

R.S.1943, § 76-239;

Laws 1957, c. 138, § 2, p. 461;

Laws 2005, LB 97, § 1.

Protection is afforded only to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614, 64 N.W.2d 306 (1954).

Protection is afforded only to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614, 64 N.W.2d 306 (1954).

Protection is not afforded by this section to parties who purchase with notice. Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943).

Protection is not afforded by this section to parties who purchase with notice. Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 10 N.W.2d 249 (1943).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-246 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-246
View Statute 76-246
Status: in_force

No instrument containing a power to convey, or in any manner to affect real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and certified and recorded in conformity with the requirements of sections 76-211 to 76-245 and 76-2,126 , can be revoked by any act of the party or parties thereto until the instrument of revocation is executed, acknowledged or proved, and certified and filed for record with the register of deeds of the county in which the power is recorded.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 22, p. 285;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 17, p. 369;

R.S.1913, § 6216;

C.S.1922, § 5615;

C.S.1929, § 76-221;

R.S.1943, § 76-246;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 33.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-269 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-269
View Statute 76-269
Status: in_force

After one year from July 24, 1917, no action shall be maintained whereby to set aside, cancel, annul, declare void or invalid any deed of conveyance, mortgage, release of mortgage, or other instrument affecting the title to any real estate, which has been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county or counties in this state in which such real estate is situated for more than fifteen years prior to the commencement of such action, and purporting to be executed by any executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee, notwithstanding any defect in, or absence of, any record of the court granting authority to such executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee to execute the same. Unless such deed of conveyance, mortgage, release of mortgage or other instrument shall have been modified or set aside by an action or proceeding commenced within one year after said date or within fifteen years from the date of recording thereof, it shall be conclusively presumed that such executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee had due authority to execute the same, notwithstanding such defect in, or absence of, any record of such court. This section shall not release any such executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee from any liability or responsibility to which he is subject.

Laws 1917, c. 223, § 8, p. 549;

C.S.1922, § 5661;

Laws 1923, c. 101, § 1, p. 256;

C.S.1929, § 76-267;

Laws 1935, c. 149, § 1, p. 553;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-267;

R.S.1943, § 76-269.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-252 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-252
View Statute 76-252
Status: in_force

Section 76-2803 shall govern the mortgagee's obligation to record or cause to be recorded a release of mortgage and the liability of the mortgagee for failure to timely record or cause to be recorded a release of mortgage.

Laws 1994, LB 1275, § 5;

Laws 1995, LB 396, § 2;

Laws 2002, LB 957, § 30;

Laws 2003, LB 218, § 18;

Laws 2018, LB750, § 3.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.04 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.04
View Statute 76-275.04
Status: in_force

When any instrument affecting title to real property is required by law to be recorded in any public record in order to be valid or effective or perfected either against all persons or against any person or persons or class of persons, and when any notice or statement concerning any instrument affecting title to real property is required by law so to be recorded in order for such instrument to be so valid or effective or perfected, no reference or recital as to such instrument contained in any other recorded instrument shall be notice of it to any person not an immediate party to the instrument making the reference, or put any such person upon inquiry concerning it, unless (1) the instrument referred to, or the notice or statement thereof in the form so required by law, has been recorded as so required prior to the recording of the reference or recital, and either the reference or recital specifies the public records and place therein where the instrument, notice or statement is to be found, or the instrument, notice or statement is in the chain of record title to the real property affected within a period of twenty years prior to the recording of the reference or recital, or (2) if the reference or recital has been made before September 28, 1959, unless the instrument, statement or notice is recorded as required by law not later than one year thereafter.

Laws 1959, c. 348, § 1, p. 1234.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.03 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.03
View Statute 76-275.03
Status: in_force

After one year from May 18, 1957, when (1) all or part of an adjoining street, avenue, or alley has been duly vacated under the applicable laws that all or a portion of such vacated street, avenue, or alley reverted to the owner of the adjoining platted lot, (2) a deed or deeds executed subsequent to such vacation and covering such platted lot have been of record more than ten years, and (3) there has been filed of record no instrument purporting to establish a contrary intent, the deed or deeds to the platted lot, without describing the vacated street, avenue, or alley, shall be irrevocably deemed to constitute a conveyance of the platted lot together with the reverted portion of such vacated street, avenue, or alley.

Laws 1957, c. 317, § 1, p. 1135;

Laws 1963, c. 431, § 1, p. 1447.

For other provisions for reverter to owner, see sections 14-115 , 15-701 , 16-611 , 17-558 , and 39-1725 .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.06 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.06
View Statute 76-275.06
Status: in_force

When any plat of city or village lots in this state has been filed of record on or before January 1, 1937, and has not been vacated, it shall be conclusively presumed that the person filing such plat was, on the date of filing thereof, the owner, in fee simple, of the real estate described therein, free and clear of any liens or encumbrances of any kind unless action on any claimed lien or encumbrance is brought within one year from September 28, 1959. Whenever, after September 28, 1959, any plat of city or village lots in this state has been filed of record, accompanied by an affidavit of the person so filing setting forth the liens or encumbrances, if any, against such real estate, it shall be conclusively presumed that such person was the owner thereof, in fee simple, subject only to the liens or encumbrances disclosed by such affidavit unless, within twenty-three years after the filing thereof, an action is brought on any other claimed lien or encumbrance.

Laws 1959, c. 349, § 1, p. 1236.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-251
View Statute 76-251
Status: in_force

Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a mortgage. The person for whose benefit such deed shall be made shall not derive any advantage from the recording thereof, unless every writing operating as a defeasance, or explaining its effect as a mortgage, or conditional deed, is also recorded therewith and at the same time.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 29, p. 286;

R.S.1913, § 6223;

C.S.1922, § 5622;

C.S.1929, § 76-228;

R.S.1943, § 76-251.

1. Intent

1. Intent

2. Defeasance

2. Defeasance

3. Evidence

3. Evidence

4. Miscellaneous

4. Miscellaneous

1. Intent

1. Intent

Where deed absolute in form is intended as security for a debt, it will be construed as a mortgage. Koehn v. Koehn, 164 Neb. 169, 81 N.W.2d 900 (1957).

Where deed absolute in form is intended as security for a debt, it will be construed as a mortgage. Koehn v. Koehn, 164 Neb. 169, 81 N.W.2d 900 (1957).

Absolute deed and contract of defeasance executed as part of the same transaction should be construed together, and if it appears that the instruments were intended as security, should be given effect as a mortgage. Ashbrook v. Briner, 137 Neb. 104, 288 N.W. 374 (1939).

Absolute deed and contract of defeasance executed as part of the same transaction should be construed together, and if it appears that the instruments were intended as security, should be given effect as a mortgage. Ashbrook v. Briner, 137 Neb. 104, 288 N.W. 374 (1939).

When grantee under deed intended as security is in possession, grantor's equity of redemption may be defeated by parol settlement. Stall v. Jones, 47 Neb. 706, 66 N.W. 653 (1896).

When grantee under deed intended as security is in possession, grantor's equity of redemption may be defeated by parol settlement. Stall v. Jones, 47 Neb. 706, 66 N.W. 653 (1896).

2. Defeasance

2. Defeasance

If deed is accompanied by separate written instrument of defeasance, transaction constitutes a mortgage. Campbell v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).

If deed is accompanied by separate written instrument of defeasance, transaction constitutes a mortgage. Campbell v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).

Land contract, absolute in form, may be mortgage. Lipp v. So. Omaha Land Syndicate, 24 Neb. 692, 40 N.W. 129 (1888).

Land contract, absolute in form, may be mortgage. Lipp v. So. Omaha Land Syndicate, 24 Neb. 692, 40 N.W. 129 (1888).

Grantee in deed accompanied with defeasance in writing cannot lease. Connolly v. Giddings, 24 Neb. 131, 37 N.W. 939 (1888).

Grantee in deed accompanied with defeasance in writing cannot lease. Connolly v. Giddings, 24 Neb. 131, 37 N.W. 939 (1888).

Where defeasance is canceled, deed becomes absolute. Wamsley v. Crook and Hall, 3 Neb. 344 (1874).

Where defeasance is canceled, deed becomes absolute. Wamsley v. Crook and Hall, 3 Neb. 344 (1874).

3. Evidence

3. Evidence

Where there is evidence the parties intended the special warranty deed as security for a loan and the finder of fact determined such was true, the deed could be construed as a mortgage, and the purported forgiveness of the loan could be seen to operate as a relinquishment of the ownership interest in the home. The question then of whether the loan was forgiven is a material issue of fact as it affects the determination of title and outcome of the partition claim and, thus, summary judgment on partition is inappropriate. Humphrey v. Smith, 311 Neb. 632, 974 N.W.2d 293 (2022).

age, and the purported forgiveness of the loan could be seen to operate as a relinquishment of the ownership interest in the home. The question then of whether the loan was forgiven is a material issue of fact as it affects the determination of title and outcome of the partition claim and, thus, summary judgment on partition is inappropriate. Humphrey v. Smith, 311 Neb. 632, 974 N.W.2d 293 (2022).

Where there is evidence the parties intended the special warranty deed as security for a loan and the finder of fact determined such was true, the deed could be construed as a mortgage, and the purported forgiveness of the loan could be seen to operate as a relinquishment of the ownership interest in the home. The question then of whether the loan was forgiven is a material issue of fact as it affects the determination of title and outcome of the partition claim and, thus, summary judgment on partition is inappropriate. Humphrey v. Smith, 311 Neb. 632, 974 N.W.2d 293 (2022).

To establish absolute conveyance as instrument intended for security, testimony must be clear, convincing and satisfactory. O'Hanlon v. Barry, 87 Neb. 522, 127 N.W. 860 (1910); Wilde v. Homan, 58 Neb. 634, 79 N.W. 546 (1899).

To establish absolute conveyance as instrument intended for security, testimony must be clear, convincing and satisfactory. O'Hanlon v. Barry, 87 Neb. 522, 127 N.W. 860 (1910); Wilde v. Homan, 58 Neb. 634, 79 N.W. 546 (1899).

Parol evidence may establish deed, absolute in form, as mortgage. Morrow v. Jones, 41 Neb. 867, 60 N.W. 369 (1894).

Parol evidence may establish deed, absolute in form, as mortgage. Morrow v. Jones, 41 Neb. 867, 60 N.W. 369 (1894).

4. Miscellaneous

4. Miscellaneous

To extent that this section conflicts with Nebraska Trust Deeds Act, this section is modified by implication. Blair Co. v. American Savings Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969).

To extent that this section conflicts with Nebraska Trust Deeds Act, this section is modified by implication. Blair Co. v. American Savings Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969).

Warranty deed executed and delivered for purpose of securing an indebtedness considered a mortgage. Hanks v. Northwestern State Bank of Hay Springs, 143 Neb. 204, 9 N.W.2d 175 (1943).

Warranty deed executed and delivered for purpose of securing an indebtedness considered a mortgage. Hanks v. Northwestern State Bank of Hay Springs, 143 Neb. 204, 9 N.W.2d 175 (1943).

Record of deed is constructive notice of grantee's interest in premises. Livesey v. Brown, 35 Neb. 111, 52 N.W. 838 (1892).

Record of deed is constructive notice of grantee's interest in premises. Livesey v. Brown, 35 Neb. 111, 52 N.W. 838 (1892).

Purchaser for value without notice is protected. Kemp v. Small, 32 Neb. 318, 49 N.W. 169 (1891).

Purchaser for value without notice is protected. Kemp v. Small, 32 Neb. 318, 49 N.W. 169 (1891).

Land contracts under consideration were considered to be equal with mortgages. Ehlers v. Vinal, 253 F.Supp. 58 (D. Neb. 1966).

Land contracts under consideration were considered to be equal with mortgages. Ehlers v. Vinal, 253 F.Supp. 58 (D. Neb. 1966).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-256 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-256
View Statute 76-256
Status: in_force

The recording of an assignment of a mortgage shall not, in itself, be deemed notice of such assignment to the mortgagor, his heirs or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or either of them, to the mortgagee.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 44, p. 290;

R.S.1913, § 6229;

C.S.1922, § 5628;

C.S.1929, § 76-234;

R.S.1943, § 76-256.

Recording assignment of mortgage is not notice to mortgagor so as to invalidate payment to mortgagee. Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60 (1934).

Recording assignment of mortgage is not notice to mortgagor so as to invalidate payment to mortgagee. Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60 (1934).

Record of assignment is constructive notice to mortgagor. Bettle v. Tiedgen, 85 Neb. 276, 122 N.W. 890 (1909), rehearing on 77 Neb. 795, 110 N.W. 548 (1906).

Record of assignment is constructive notice to mortgagor. Bettle v. Tiedgen, 85 Neb. 276, 122 N.W. 890 (1909), rehearing on 77 Neb. 795, 110 N.W. 548 (1906).

Transfer of interest coupon to third person operates as assignment pro tanto. New England Loan & Trust Co. v. Robinson, 56 Neb. 50, 76 N.W. 415 (1898).

Transfer of interest coupon to third person operates as assignment pro tanto. New England Loan & Trust Co. v. Robinson, 56 Neb. 50, 76 N.W. 415 (1898).

Payment to third party is at mortgagor's risk, and must prove agency. Richards v. Waller, 49 Neb. 639, 68 N.W. 1053 (1896).

Payment to third party is at mortgagor's risk, and must prove agency. Richards v. Waller, 49 Neb. 639, 68 N.W. 1053 (1896).

Mortgagor is protected only by paying party who holds note. Bull v. Mitchell, 47 Neb. 647, 66 N.W. 632 (1896).

Mortgagor is protected only by paying party who holds note. Bull v. Mitchell, 47 Neb. 647, 66 N.W. 632 (1896).

Section has no application to holder of negotiable paper transferred before maturity. Stark v. Olsen, 44 Neb. 646, 63 N.W. 37 (1895); Eggert v. Beyer, 43 Neb. 711, 62 N.W. 57 (1895).

Section has no application to holder of negotiable paper transferred before maturity. Stark v. Olsen, 44 Neb. 646, 63 N.W. 37 (1895); Eggert v. Beyer, 43 Neb. 711, 62 N.W. 57 (1895).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-123 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-123
View Statute 76-123
Status: in_force

Sections 76-101 to 76-123 may be referred to as the Uniform Property Act.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 23, p. 599;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1023;

R.S.1943, § 76-123.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-111 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-111
View Statute 76-111
Status: in_force

Whenever property is limited upon the death of any person without heirs or heirs of the body or issue general or special, or descendants or offspring or children or any such relative described by other terms, such limitation, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, is a limitation to take effect only when such person dies not having such relative living at the time of his death or in gestation and born alive thereafter, and is not a limitation to take effect upon the indefinite failure of such relatives; nor, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, does it mean that death without such relative, in order to be material, must occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 11, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1011;

R.S.1943, § 76-111.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-215 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 64-215
64-215
Status: in_force

It is lawful for any shareholder, director, employee, agent, or any elected or appointed officer of a savings and loan association, who is a notary public, (1) to take the acknowledgment of any person to any written instrument given to or by the savings and loan association and (2) to administer an oath to any other shareholder, director, officer, employee, or agent of the savings and loan association. Acknowledgments heretofore taken of any person to any written instrument given to or by a savings and loan association, or any oath administered to any shareholder, director, employee, agent, or elected or appointed officer of a savings and loan association by any notary public who was a shareholder, director, employee, agent, or any elected or appointed officer of the savings and loan association, shall be deemed to be lawful, valid, and binding.

Laws 1957, c. 315, § 1, p. 1132;

R.R.S.1943, § 76-217.05;

Laws 1976, LB 622, § 6;

Laws 2003, LB 131, § 33.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-106 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-106
View Statute 76-106
Status: reserved

An otherwise effective reservation of property by the conveyor reserves the interest the conveyor had prior to the conveyance unless an intent to reserve a different interest is effectively manifested.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 6, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1006;

R.S.1943, § 76-106.

This section eliminates common-law technicalities and exactions regarding the language used to make a reservation in a deed; whether a provision is a reservation does not depend upon the use of a particular word but upon the character and effect of the provision itself. Walters v. Sporer, 298 Neb. 536, 905 N.W.2d 70 (2017).

This section eliminates common-law technicalities and exactions regarding the language used to make a reservation in a deed; whether a provision is a reservation does not depend upon the use of a particular word but upon the character and effect of the provision itself. Walters v. Sporer, 298 Neb. 536, 905 N.W.2d 70 (2017).

Assignment of a vendee's vested equitable interest in land, acquired by land contract, creates a privity of estate between the assignee and the original vendor, but not a privity of contract between them. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).

Assignment of a vendee's vested equitable interest in land, acquired by land contract, creates a privity of estate between the assignee and the original vendor, but not a privity of contract between them. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).

Extent of reservation of mineral rights was obscure and ambiguous, and required construction of deed. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Extent of reservation of mineral rights was obscure and ambiguous, and required construction of deed. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Interest in oil and gas rights was reserved. Elrod v. Heirs of Gifford, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952).

Interest in oil and gas rights was reserved. Elrod v. Heirs of Gifford, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-110 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-110
View Statute 76-110
Status: in_force

The creation of fees simple conditional as they existed under the law of England prior to the statute de donis is not permitted. The creation of fees tail is not permitted. The use in an otherwise effective conveyance of property, of language appropriate to create such a fee simple conditional or a fee tail, creates a fee simple in the person who would have taken a fee simple conditional or a fee tail. Any future interest limited upon such an interest is a limitation upon the fee simple and its validity is determined accordingly. Nothing herein contained shall affect the operation of sections 76-111 to 76-113 .

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 10, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1010;

R.S.1943, § 76-110.

Where an estate in fee simple is devised, an attempt by the testator to prevent alienation by attaching conditions subsequent is ineffective and void for the reason that conditions are repugnant to the estate created. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

Where an estate in fee simple is devised, an attempt by the testator to prevent alienation by attaching conditions subsequent is ineffective and void for the reason that conditions are repugnant to the estate created. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

The operation of this section must be read and considered with other sections of the Uniform Property Act. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

The operation of this section must be read and considered with other sections of the Uniform Property Act. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

Estates in fee simple conditional and fee tail are abolished. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Estates in fee simple conditional and fee tail are abolished. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-214 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-214
View Statute 76-214
Status: in_force

(1) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, every grantee who has a deed to real estate recorded and every purchaser of real estate who has a memorandum of contract or land contract recorded shall, at the time such deed, memorandum of contract, or land contract is presented for recording, file with the register of deeds a completed statement as prescribed by the Tax Commissioner. For all deeds and all memoranda of contract and land contracts recorded on and after January 1, 2001, the statement shall not require the social security number of the grantee or purchaser or the federal employer identification number of the grantee or purchaser. This statement may require the recitation of any information contained in the deed, memorandum of contract, or land contract, the total consideration paid, the amount of the total consideration attributable to factors other than the purchase of the real estate itself, and other factors which may influence the transaction. If a death certificate is recorded as provided in subsection (2) of this section, this statement may require a date of death, the name of the decedent, and whether the title is affected as a result of a transfer on death deed, a joint tenancy deed, or the expiration of a life estate or by any other means. This statement shall ask whether the affidavit described in section 76-2,141 is required with respect to the deed, memorandum of contract, or land contract and, if so, whether such affidavit has been completed. This statement shall be signed and filed by the grantee, the purchaser, or his or her authorized agent. The register of deeds shall forward the statement to the county assessor. If the grantee or purchaser fails to furnish the prescribed statement, the register of deeds shall not record the deed, memorandum of contract, or land contract. The register of deeds shall indicate on the statement the book and page or computer system reference where the deed, memorandum of contract, or land contract is recorded and shall immediately forward the statement to the county assessor. The county assessor shall process the statement according to the instructions of the Property Tax Administrator and shall, pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Tax Commissioner, forward the statement to the Tax Commissioner.

(2)(a) The statement described in subsection (1) of this section shall be filed at the time that a certified or authenticated copy of the grantor's death certificate is filed if such death certificate is required to be filed under section 76-2,126 and the conveyance of real estate was pursuant to a transfer on death deed.

(b) The statement described in subsection (1) of this section shall not be required to be filed at the time that a transfer on death deed is filed or at the time that an instrument of revocation of a transfer on death deed as described in subdivision (a)(1)(B) of section 76-3413 is filed.

(3) Any person shall have access to the statements at the office of the Tax Commissioner, county assessor, or register of deeds if the statements are available and have not been disposed of pursuant to the records retention and disposition schedule as approved by the State Records Administrator.

ocation of a transfer on death deed as described in subdivision (a)(1)(B) of section 76-3413 is filed.

(3) Any person shall have access to the statements at the office of the Tax Commissioner, county assessor, or register of deeds if the statements are available and have not been disposed of pursuant to the records retention and disposition schedule as approved by the State Records Administrator.

(4) The statement described in subsection (1) of this section shall not be required if the document being recorded is an easement or an oil, gas, or mineral lease, or any subsequent assignment of an easement or such lease, except that such statement shall be required for conservation easements and preservation easements as such terms are defined in section 76-2,111 and recreational trail easements used to qualify for the property tax exemption provided by the Recreational Trail Easement Property Tax Exemption Act.

Laws 1917, c. 224, § 1, p. 549;

C.S.1922, § 5662;

C.S.1929, § 76-268;

R.S.1943, § 76-214;

Laws 1965, c. 456, § 1, p. 1450;

Laws 1965, c. 457, § 1, p. 1451;

Laws 1981, LB 28, § 1;

Laws 1981, LB 179, § 1;

Laws 1984, LB 679, § 13;

Laws 1985, LB 273, § 37;

Laws 1986, LB 1027, § 200;

Laws 1994, LB 902, § 13;

Laws 1994, LB 1275, § 6;

Laws 1995, LB 490, § 26;

Laws 1995, LB 527, § 1;

Laws 2000, LB 968, § 21;

Laws 2007, LB334, § 12;

Laws 2008, LB965, § 1;

Laws 2009, LB348, § 1;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 29;

Laws 2014, LB780, § 1;

Laws 2016, LB725, § 1;

Laws 2017, LB535, § 2;

Laws 2024, LB1120, § 2;

Laws 2025, LB647, § 25.

Recreational Trail Easement Property Tax Exemption Act, see section 77-213 .

Violation of section, penalty, see section 76-215 .

The real property transactions eligible for inclusion in the sales file are those transactions for which the statement required by this section is filed. For those transactions initially eligible for inclusion in the sales file, the price to be included in the sales file is the total consideration paid as listed on the statement described in subsection (1) of this section. Shaul v. Lang, 263 Neb. 499, 640 N.W.2d 668 (2002).

The real property transactions eligible for inclusion in the sales file are those transactions for which the statement required by this section is filed. For those transactions initially eligible for inclusion in the sales file, the price to be included in the sales file is the total consideration paid as listed on the statement described in subsection (1) of this section. Shaul v. Lang, 263 Neb. 499, 640 N.W.2d 668 (2002).

Sales-assessment ratio study was made prior to 1965 amendment to this section. Brandeis Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 181 Neb. 750, 150 N.W.2d 893 (1967).

Sales-assessment ratio study was made prior to 1965 amendment to this section. Brandeis Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 181 Neb. 750, 150 N.W.2d 893 (1967).

Statement of consideration is prima facie evidence thereof but may be rebutted. Sampson v. Sissel, 151 Neb. 521, 38 N.W.2d 341 (1949).

Statement of consideration is prima facie evidence thereof but may be rebutted. Sampson v. Sissel, 151 Neb. 521, 38 N.W.2d 341 (1949).

Where space in deed for recital of consideration was left blank, it was a circumstance taken into consideration in determining question of estoppel. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

Where space in deed for recital of consideration was left blank, it was a circumstance taken into consideration in determining question of estoppel. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

Recitals of consideration in deeds are incompetent as evidence of value. State v. Wright, 105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921).

Recitals of consideration in deeds are incompetent as evidence of value. State v. Wright, 105 Neb. 617, 181 N.W. 539 (1921).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-266 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-266
View Statute 76-266
Status: in_force

When any conveyance of the title to, or any interest in, or any lien on real estate shall have been made prior to July 24, 1917, to any person or corporation as trustee and no beneficiary is named therein, and no declaration of the terms of the trust shall have been made in writing and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is located, and such person or corporation as trustee has thereafter conveyed said title or interest, or assigned or released said lien, it shall be presumed that such trustee had the power and authority to make such conveyance, assignment or lease. In all actions which may be brought after July 24, 1919, by any person claiming a right or interest in or to said real estate, or a lien thereon adverse to such conveyance, assignment or release by said trustee, the presumption that such trustee had power and authority to make such conveyance, assignment or release shall be conclusive.

Laws 1917, c. 223, § 6, p. 547;

C.S.1922, § 5659;

C.S.1929, § 76-265;

R.S.1943, § 76-266.

If no declaration of terms of trust have been recorded, trustee holding legal title will be conclusively presumed to have had authority to enter into lease. Bauer v. Bauer, 136 Neb. 329, 285 N.W. 565 (1939).

If no declaration of terms of trust have been recorded, trustee holding legal title will be conclusively presumed to have had authority to enter into lease. Bauer v. Bauer, 136 Neb. 329, 285 N.W. 565 (1939).

Mere insertion of trustee after name of patentee does not prevent grantee from transferring to another where trust is not disclosed. Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 286, 193 N.W. 758 (1923).

Mere insertion of trustee after name of patentee does not prevent grantee from transferring to another where trust is not disclosed. Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 286, 193 N.W. 758 (1923).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-104 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-104
View Statute 76-104
Status: in_force

An otherwise effective conveyance of property transfers the entire interest which the conveyor has and has the power to convey, unless an intent to transfer a less interest is effectively manifested. No words of inheritance or other special words are necessary to transfer a fee simple.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 4, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1004;

R.S.1943, § 76-104.

The omission of words of inheritance is of no consequence when determining if a document conveys an easement appurtenant by reason of this section. Spilker v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 211 Neb. 540, 319 N.W.2d 429 (1982).

The omission of words of inheritance is of no consequence when determining if a document conveys an easement appurtenant by reason of this section. Spilker v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 211 Neb. 540, 319 N.W.2d 429 (1982).

Purpose clause, of and by itself, does not operate to limit the estate granted by a deed. Sun Oil Co. v. Emery, 183 Neb. 793, 164 N.W.2d 644 (1971).

Purpose clause, of and by itself, does not operate to limit the estate granted by a deed. Sun Oil Co. v. Emery, 183 Neb. 793, 164 N.W.2d 644 (1971).

Conveyance by deed to city for use and benefit of citizens of the city operated to convey fee simple title. City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626, 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).

Conveyance by deed to city for use and benefit of citizens of the city operated to convey fee simple title. City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626, 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).

Deed to State of Nebraska for highway purposes conveyed all interest of grantors. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).

Deed to State of Nebraska for highway purposes conveyed all interest of grantors. Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958).

Act was enacted to modify and eliminate common law technicalities and exactions. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Act was enacted to modify and eliminate common law technicalities and exactions. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Deed executed by mortgagee in possession passed all interest of grantor in mortgage indebtedness. Campbell v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).

Deed executed by mortgagee in possession passed all interest of grantor in mortgage indebtedness. Campbell v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-260 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-260
View Statute 76-260
Status: in_force

From and after its validation by the operation of section 76-258 , such instrument shall impart notice to subsequent purchasers, encumbrancers, and all other persons whomsoever so far as and to the same extent that the same is recorded, notwithstanding such defects, irregularities or omissions; and such instrument, the record thereof, or a duly authenticated copy shall be competent evidence to the same extent as such instrument would have been competent if valid in the first instance.

Laws 1941, c. 152, § 3, p. 593;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-278;

R.S.1943, § 76-260.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-268 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-268
View Statute 76-268
Status: in_force

If any conveyance of the title to, or any right or interest in real estate, or any lien thereon, shall be made after July 24, 1917, to any person or corporation as trustee without naming any beneficiary and without any declaration of the terms of the trust having been executed and recorded in the manner prescribed by statute, in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is located, it shall be conclusively presumed that such person or corporation as trustee, has power and authority to convey the title, right and interest in such real estate which has been conveyed to him, or to assign or release such lien without any other person joining therein, and a purchaser from such trustee shall not be bound to inquire or ascertain the terms of the trust, unless before such conveyance, assignment or release has been made by such trustee, the person claiming a beneficial interest therein shall have filed a notice as provided in section 76-267 , in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which said real estate is located.

Laws 1917, c. 223, § 6, p. 547;

C.S.1922, § 5659;

C.S.1929, § 76-265;

R.S.1943, § 76-268.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-241 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-241
View Statute 76-241
Status: in_force

All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing shall not be deemed lawfully recorded unless they have been previously acknowledged or proved in the manner prescribed by statute.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 17, p. 283;

R.S.1913, § 6214;

C.S.1922, § 5613;

C.S.1929, § 76-219;

R.S.1943, § 76-241;

Laws 1973, LB 227, § 2.

Extension agreements involved were not eligible to record, but binding nevertheless on parties having actual knowledge thereof. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).

Extension agreements involved were not eligible to record, but binding nevertheless on parties having actual knowledge thereof. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).

Where instrument, through which person claimed lien was not acknowledged or proved in manner prescribed by recording acts, although recorded, it did not operate as constructive notice. Dawson County State Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605, 209 N.W. 243 (1926); Warnick v. Latta, 44 Neb. 807, 62 N.W. 1097 (1895); Keeling v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891).

Where instrument, through which person claimed lien was not acknowledged or proved in manner prescribed by recording acts, although recorded, it did not operate as constructive notice. Dawson County State Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605, 209 N.W. 243 (1926); Warnick v. Latta, 44 Neb. 807, 62 N.W. 1097 (1895); Keeling v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891).

Assignee of junior encumbrancer is given priority over senior encumbrancer only in case his assignment is in registerable form and recorded before senior encumbrancer. Rumery v. Loy, 61 Neb. 755, 86 N.W. 478 (1901).

Assignee of junior encumbrancer is given priority over senior encumbrancer only in case his assignment is in registerable form and recorded before senior encumbrancer. Rumery v. Loy, 61 Neb. 755, 86 N.W. 478 (1901).

Section applies also to assignments for benefit of creditors. Heelan v. Hoagland, 10 Neb. 511, 7 N.W. 282 (1880).

Section applies also to assignments for benefit of creditors. Heelan v. Hoagland, 10 Neb. 511, 7 N.W. 282 (1880).

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor, was fatally defective. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor, was fatally defective. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.02 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.02
View Statute 76-275.02
Status: in_force

After September 7, 1948, no action may be maintained to set aside any deed of conveyance mentioned in section 76-275.01 , which deed was executed and recorded prior to August 24, 1941, upon the ground that the grantor or grantors therein did not have the legal power and right to make a conveyance direct to such grantee and spouse or themselves in such manner.

Laws 1947, c. 248, § 2, p. 772.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-115 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-115
View Statute 76-115
Status: in_force

When any property is limited, in an otherwise effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior interests in favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor of such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 15, p. 597;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1015;

R.S.1943, § 76-115.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.04 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.04
View Statute 76-239.04
Status: in_force

In any prosecution under sections 76-239.01 to 76-239.06 of the person, firm or corporation so receiving such proceeds, when it shall be shown in evidence that the contractor had knowledge of lawful claims for labor and material existing at the time of receipt of loan proceeds and that such person, firm or corporation has not paid such lawful claims for labor and material to the extent of the funds received by him, the fact of acceptance of such proceeds without having paid the lawful claims or obtained a lien waiver within thirty days after receipt of such proceeds shall be prima facie evidence of intent to deprive or defraud on the part of the person, firm or corporation so receiving payment.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 4, p. 2492.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-206 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-206
View Statute 76-206
Status: in_force

Unless such intention is expressly negatived by the language in the instrument, a covenant in a conveyance of real property that the grantor is seized, or lawfully seized, or words to like effect, shall be interpreted as a covenant that the grantor has good title to the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to convey.

Laws 1923, c. 111, § 1, p. 269;

C.S.1929, § 76-110;

R.S.1943, § 76-206.

Grantor had good title to estate in quality and quantity. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Grantor had good title to estate in quality and quantity. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-279 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-279
View Statute 76-279
Status: in_force

All deeds of quitclaim or other conveyance of all improvements upon public lands shall be as binding and effectual in law and equity between the parties, for conveying of the title of the grantor in and to the same, as in cases where the grantor has the fee simple to the premises.

R.S.1866, c. 24, § 2, p. 187;

R.S.1913, § 6247;

C.S.1922, § 5646;

C.S.1929, § 76-252;

R.S.1943, § 76-279.

Sale of inchoate homestead and improvements is valid consideration for promissory note. Paxton Cattle Co. v. First National Bank of Arapahoe, 21 Neb. 621, 33 N.W. 271 (1887).

Sale of inchoate homestead and improvements is valid consideration for promissory note. Paxton Cattle Co. v. First National Bank of Arapahoe, 21 Neb. 621, 33 N.W. 271 (1887).

Note given for purchase price of improvements is valid. Brooks v. Hiatt, 13 Neb. 503, 14 N.W. 480 (1882); McWilliams v. Bridges, 7 Neb. 419 (1878).

Note given for purchase price of improvements is valid. Brooks v. Hiatt, 13 Neb. 503, 14 N.W. 480 (1882); McWilliams v. Bridges, 7 Neb. 419 (1878).

On failure to convey preemption claim as agreed, consideration is recoverable. Bateman v. Robinson, 12 Neb. 508, 11 N.W. 736 (1882).

On failure to convey preemption claim as agreed, consideration is recoverable. Bateman v. Robinson, 12 Neb. 508, 11 N.W. 736 (1882).

Party may recover for breaking land, irrespective of illegality of contract for conveyance of after-acquired homestead. Simmons v. Yurann, 11 Neb. 516, 9 N.W. 690 (1881).

Party may recover for breaking land, irrespective of illegality of contract for conveyance of after-acquired homestead. Simmons v. Yurann, 11 Neb. 516, 9 N.W. 690 (1881).

A contract to convey land, the title to which one of the parties is trying to acquire under homestead law, is against public policy and void. Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483 (1890), reversing Carkins v. Anderson, 21 Neb. 364, 32 N.W. 155 (1887).

A contract to convey land, the title to which one of the parties is trying to acquire under homestead law, is against public policy and void. Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U.S. 483 (1890), reversing Carkins v. Anderson, 21 Neb. 364, 32 N.W. 155 (1887).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-276 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-276
View Statute 76-276
Status: in_force

In the absence of stipulations to the contrary, the mortgagor of real estate retains the legal title and right of possession thereof. This section shall not limit or otherwise affect the creation, provision, assignment, granting, or enforcement of a security interest in rents arising from real estate pursuant to sections 52-1701 to 52-1708 .

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 85, p. 297;

R.S.1913, § 6230;

C.S.1922, § 5629;

C.S.1929, § 76-235;

R.S.1943, § 76-276;

Laws 1993, LB 14, § 9.

1. Nature of interest conveyed

1. Nature of interest conveyed

2. Rights of mortgagor

2. Rights of mortgagor

3. Rights of mortgagee

3. Rights of mortgagee

4. Assignment of rents

4. Assignment of rents

5. Miscellaneous

5. Miscellaneous

1. Nature of interest conveyed

1. Nature of interest conveyed

A mortgage is a special interest in real property consisting of a security interest for the debts or obligation, and absent stipulation to the contrary, title and right to possession remain in the mortgagor. Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb. 230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985).

A mortgage is a special interest in real property consisting of a security interest for the debts or obligation, and absent stipulation to the contrary, title and right to possession remain in the mortgagor. Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb. 230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985).

Mortgage conveys no estate, but merely creates lien. Morrill v. Skinner, 57 Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898); Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490, 72 N.W. 850 (1897); Higginbottom v. Benson, 24 Neb. 461, 39 N.W. 418 (1888).

Mortgage conveys no estate, but merely creates lien. Morrill v. Skinner, 57 Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898); Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490, 72 N.W. 850 (1897); Higginbottom v. Benson, 24 Neb. 461, 39 N.W. 418 (1888).

Mortgage is mere security in form of conditional conveyance. Barber v. Crowell, 55 Neb. 571, 75 N.W. 1109 (1898).

Mortgage is mere security in form of conditional conveyance. Barber v. Crowell, 55 Neb. 571, 75 N.W. 1109 (1898).

2. Rights of mortgagor

2. Rights of mortgagor

A mortgagee's status is that of a lienholder. Under this theory, the mortgagee is regarded as owning a security interest in real estate only and the mortgagor retains both the legal title and right of possession. 24th & Dodge Ltd. Part. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 269 Neb. 31, 690 N.W.2d 769 (2005).

A mortgagee's status is that of a lienholder. Under this theory, the mortgagee is regarded as owning a security interest in real estate only and the mortgagor retains both the legal title and right of possession. 24th & Dodge Ltd. Part. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 269 Neb. 31, 690 N.W.2d 769 (2005).

Although title and possession remain in the mortgagor, mortgagees may create a security interest in rents arising from real estate. 24th & Dodge Ltd. Part. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 269 Neb. 31, 690 N.W.2d 769 (2005).

Although title and possession remain in the mortgagor, mortgagees may create a security interest in rents arising from real estate. 24th & Dodge Ltd. Part. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 269 Neb. 31, 690 N.W.2d 769 (2005).

Mortgagor is deprived of right only by decree of foreclosure. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovitt, 10 Neb. 301, 4 N.W. 986 (1880).

Mortgagor is deprived of right only by decree of foreclosure. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovitt, 10 Neb. 301, 4 N.W. 986 (1880).

Mortgagor can convey his title by will. Renard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 449 (1878).

Mortgagor can convey his title by will. Renard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 449 (1878).

3. Rights of mortgagee

3. Rights of mortgagee

Mortgagor is entitled to rents and profits of mortgaged premises until condition broken, but after default, mortgagee has equitable lien thereon which may be enforced by proper proceedings. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganswer, 146 Neb. 635, 20 N.W.2d 689 (1945).

).

Mortgagor can convey his title by will. Renard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 449 (1878).

3. Rights of mortgagee

3. Rights of mortgagee

Mortgagor is entitled to rents and profits of mortgaged premises until condition broken, but after default, mortgagee has equitable lien thereon which may be enforced by proper proceedings. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganswer, 146 Neb. 635, 20 N.W.2d 689 (1945).

Mortgagor is entitled to rents and profits of mortgaged premises until condition broken, but after default, mortgagee has equitable lien thereon which may be enforced by proper proceedings. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganswer, 146 Neb. 635, 20 N.W.2d 689 (1945).

Right of mortgagee to possession may be stipulated in mortgage. Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 129 N.W. 1005 (1911).

Right of mortgagee to possession may be stipulated in mortgage. Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 129 N.W. 1005 (1911).

Mortgagee cannot demand more than is legally due. First Nat. Bank of David City v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N.W. 595 (1902).

Mortgagee cannot demand more than is legally due. First Nat. Bank of David City v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N.W. 595 (1902).

Stipulation for possession by mortgagee on default in payment is valid. Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 64 Neb. 335, 89 N.W. 755 (1902).

Stipulation for possession by mortgagee on default in payment is valid. Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 64 Neb. 335, 89 N.W. 755 (1902).

Mortgagee cannot maintain replevin for fixtures removed from premises. Moore v. Moran, 64 Neb. 84, 89 N.W. 629 (1902).

Mortgagee cannot maintain replevin for fixtures removed from premises. Moore v. Moran, 64 Neb. 84, 89 N.W. 629 (1902).

Mortgagee in possession is entitled to collect rents and profits. Huston v. Canfield, 57 Neb. 345, 77 N.W. 763 (1899).

Mortgagee in possession is entitled to collect rents and profits. Huston v. Canfield, 57 Neb. 345, 77 N.W. 763 (1899).

Mortgagee has insurable interest. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Neb. 743, 67 N.W. 774 (1896).

Mortgagee has insurable interest. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 48 Neb. 743, 67 N.W. 774 (1896).

4. Assignment of rents

4. Assignment of rents

Assignment of possession and rents made by mortgagor by separate instrument is enforceable. Hanks v. Northwestern State Bank of Hay Springs, 143 Neb. 204, 9 N.W.2d 175 (1943).

Assignment of possession and rents made by mortgagor by separate instrument is enforceable. Hanks v. Northwestern State Bank of Hay Springs, 143 Neb. 204, 9 N.W.2d 175 (1943).

An assignment of possession and rents by mortgagor to mortgagee, effective upon default and given as consideration for an extension of a mortgage then in default, is not against public policy and is valid and enforceable. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Katz, 139 Neb. 501, 297 N.W. 899 (1941).

An assignment of possession and rents by mortgagor to mortgagee, effective upon default and given as consideration for an extension of a mortgage then in default, is not against public policy and is valid and enforceable. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Katz, 139 Neb. 501, 297 N.W. 899 (1941).

5. Miscellaneous

5. Miscellaneous

Section applied to quitclaim deed which is in effect a mortgage. Helming v. Forrester, 92 Neb. 284, 138 N.W. 190 (1912).

Section applied to quitclaim deed which is in effect a mortgage. Helming v. Forrester, 92 Neb. 284, 138 N.W. 190 (1912).

This section does not prohibit a conveyance of legal title and right of possession to mortgagee, but states presumption in absence of express stipulation. Kirkendall v. Weatherley, 77 Neb. 421, 109 N.W. 757 (1906).

This section does not prohibit a conveyance of legal title and right of possession to mortgagee, but states presumption in absence of express stipulation. Kirkendall v. Weatherley, 77 Neb. 421, 109 N.W. 757 (1906).

Equitable estate may be mortgaged. Arlington Mill & Elev. Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N.W. 677 (1898).

press stipulation. Kirkendall v. Weatherley, 77 Neb. 421, 109 N.W. 757 (1906).

This section does not prohibit a conveyance of legal title and right of possession to mortgagee, but states presumption in absence of express stipulation. Kirkendall v. Weatherley, 77 Neb. 421, 109 N.W. 757 (1906).

Equitable estate may be mortgaged. Arlington Mill & Elev. Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N.W. 677 (1898).

Equitable estate may be mortgaged. Arlington Mill & Elev. Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N.W. 677 (1898).

Strict foreclosure will not lie when mortgagor holds legal title. South Omaha Sav. Bank v. Levy, 1 Neb. Unof. 255, 95 N.W. 603 (1901).

Strict foreclosure will not lie when mortgagor holds legal title. South Omaha Sav. Bank v. Levy, 1 Neb. Unof. 255, 95 N.W. 603 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-230 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-230
View Statute 76-230
Status: in_force

Every person served with a subpoena and tendered the fees of a witness who, without reasonable cause, refuses or neglects to appear, or appearing, refuses to answer upon oath touching the matters referred to in section 76-228 , shall forfeit to the party injured one hundred dollars and may also be committed to prison by the officer who issued such subpoena, there to remain without bail until he or she shall submit to answer upon oath as aforesaid.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 9, p. 281;

R.S.1913, § 6205;

C.S.1922, § 5604;

C.S.1929, § 76-210;

R.S.1943, § 76-230;

Laws 1991, LB 1, § 6.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-211 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-211
View Statute 76-211
Status: in_force

Deeds of real estate, or any interest therein, in this state, except leases for one year or for a less time, if executed in this state, must be signed by the grantor or grantors, being of lawful age, and be acknowledged or proved and recorded as directed in sections 76-216 to 76-237 .

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 1, p. 280;

Laws 1887, c. 61, § 1, p. 561;

R.S.1913, § 6196;

C.S.1922, § 5595;

C.S.1929, § 76-201;

Laws 1939, c. 96, § 1, p. 416;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-201;

R.S.1943, § 76-211.

1. Delivery

1. Delivery

2. Acknowledgment

2. Acknowledgment

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

1. Delivery

1. Delivery

Delivery to third person with instructions not to record until death of grantor is held sufficient to pass title to property to grantees at date of such delivery, subject to their acceptance of same. Roepke v. Nutzmann, 95 Neb. 589, 146 N.W. 939 (1914).

Delivery to third person with instructions not to record until death of grantor is held sufficient to pass title to property to grantees at date of such delivery, subject to their acceptance of same. Roepke v. Nutzmann, 95 Neb. 589, 146 N.W. 939 (1914).

Where husband and wife each execute deeds with directions to scrivener, in whose hands the deeds were deposited, not to deliver either deed except upon written order of the other, and upon death of either to place upon record the deed to the survivor, no present title passes by execution of either deed, but mutual contract may be enforced. Dunlap v. Marnell, 95 Neb. 535, 145 N.W. 1017 (1914).

Where husband and wife each execute deeds with directions to scrivener, in whose hands the deeds were deposited, not to deliver either deed except upon written order of the other, and upon death of either to place upon record the deed to the survivor, no present title passes by execution of either deed, but mutual contract may be enforced. Dunlap v. Marnell, 95 Neb. 535, 145 N.W. 1017 (1914).

If grantee is present and assents to delivery, title passes and act of grantor in obtaining possession of deed and destroying the same before it is recorded has no effect on title. Svanda v. Svanda, 86 Neb. 203, 125 N.W. 585 (1910).

If grantee is present and assents to delivery, title passes and act of grantor in obtaining possession of deed and destroying the same before it is recorded has no effect on title. Svanda v. Svanda, 86 Neb. 203, 125 N.W. 585 (1910).

Delivery is essential to render conveyance operative, but need not be delivered personally, and may be delivered to third person unconditionally for grantee. Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399, 66 N.W. 439 (1896).

Delivery is essential to render conveyance operative, but need not be delivered personally, and may be delivered to third person unconditionally for grantee. Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399, 66 N.W. 439 (1896).

2. Acknowledgment

2. Acknowledgment

Acknowledgment is essential when conveying a homestead. In re Estate of West, 252 Neb. 166, 560 N.W.2d 810 (1997).

Acknowledgment is essential when conveying a homestead. In re Estate of West, 252 Neb. 166, 560 N.W.2d 810 (1997).

Election of surviving spouse to take under statute rather than under will must be acknowledged before a judge or clerk of court, or a notary. Billiter v. Parriott, 128 Neb. 238, 258 N.W. 395 (1935).

Election of surviving spouse to take under statute rather than under will must be acknowledged before a judge or clerk of court, or a notary. Billiter v. Parriott, 128 Neb. 238, 258 N.W. 395 (1935).

A homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

A homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

A homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. Storz v. Clarke, 117 Neb. 488, 221 N.W. 101 (1928).

Between parties, unacknowledged deed of real estate, not homestead, is good. Martin v. Martin, 76 Neb. 335, 107 N.W. 580 (1906); Harrison v. McWhirter, 12 Neb. 152, 10 N.W. 545 (1881).

Between parties, unacknowledged deed of real estate, not homestead, is good. Martin v. Martin, 76 Neb. 335, 107 N.W. 580 (1906); Harrison v. McWhirter, 12 Neb. 152, 10 N.W. 545 (1881).

Acknowledgment of mortgage by agent of mortgagee is valid. Gilbert v. Garber, 69 Neb. 419, 95 N.W. 1030 (1903).

Acknowledgment of mortgage by agent of mortgagee is valid. Gilbert v. Garber, 69 Neb. 419, 95 N.W. 1030 (1903).

Office of acknowledgment is to furnish authentic evidence that instrument has been duly executed and is entitled to be recorded. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899); Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896).

Office of acknowledgment is to furnish authentic evidence that instrument has been duly executed and is entitled to be recorded. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899); Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896).

Prior to September 7, 1947, United States Commissioner was unauthorized to take acknowledgments. Interstate S. & L. Assn. v. Strine, 58 Neb. 133, 78 N.W. 377 (1899).

Prior to September 7, 1947, United States Commissioner was unauthorized to take acknowledgments. Interstate S. & L. Assn. v. Strine, 58 Neb. 133, 78 N.W. 377 (1899).

Unacknowledged mortgage is valid between parties. Holmes v. Hull, 50 Neb. 656, 70 N.W. 241 (1897).

Unacknowledged mortgage is valid between parties. Holmes v. Hull, 50 Neb. 656, 70 N.W. 241 (1897).

Acknowledgment is essential to convey homestead. Phillips v. Bishop, 31 Neb. 853, 48 N.W. 1106 (1891).

Acknowledgment is essential to convey homestead. Phillips v. Bishop, 31 Neb. 853, 48 N.W. 1106 (1891).

Acknowledgment in foreign state must satisfy laws of that state or this. Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 174 (1876).

Acknowledgment in foreign state must satisfy laws of that state or this. Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 174 (1876).

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

Easements are interests in real estate, which, to constitute constructive notice to third parties, must be recorded under this section. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).

Easements are interests in real estate, which, to constitute constructive notice to third parties, must be recorded under this section. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).

To be valid against subsequent purchasers, agreement creating lien on real estate must meet requirements of this section. Marechale v. Burr, 195 Neb. 306, 237 N.W.2d 860 (1976).

To be valid against subsequent purchasers, agreement creating lien on real estate must meet requirements of this section. Marechale v. Burr, 195 Neb. 306, 237 N.W.2d 860 (1976).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-207 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-207
View Statute 76-207
Status: in_force

Covenants of quiet enjoyment and covenants of warranty in conveyances of real property may be breached by an eviction, actual or constructive, by reason of the hostile assertion of a paramount title holder. A constructive eviction occurs in the following situations: (1) Where the covenantee is kept out of possession by the paramount title holder; (2) where the covenantee surrenders possession to the paramount title holder; and (3) where the covenantee in order to retain possession is forced to and buys off the paramount title holder.

Laws 1923, c. 111, § 2, p. 269;

C.S.1929, § 76-111;

R.S.1943, § 76-207.

Covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty were breached by the existence of a paramount right to possession which covenantee was forced to buy off. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).

Covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty were breached by the existence of a paramount right to possession which covenantee was forced to buy off. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-112 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-112
View Statute 76-112
Status: in_force

Whenever any person, by conveyance, takes a life interest and in the same conveyance an interest is limited by way of remainder, either immediately or mediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, or his issue, or next of kin, or some of such heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin, the word heirs, heirs of the body, or next of kin, or other words of like import used in the conveyance, in the limitation therein by way of remainder, are not words of limitation carrying to such person an estate of inheritance or absolute estate in the property, but are words of purchase creating a remainder in the designated heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 12, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1012;

R.S.1943, § 76-112.

Will under consideration created a life estate in child of testator, and remainder in lineal descendants by right of representation. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

Will under consideration created a life estate in child of testator, and remainder in lineal descendants by right of representation. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

Rule in Shelley's Case has application where testator's death occurred prior to effective date of the act of which this section was a part. Sandberg v. Heirs of Champlin, 152 Neb. 161, 40 N.W.2d 411 (1950).

Rule in Shelley's Case has application where testator's death occurred prior to effective date of the act of which this section was a part. Sandberg v. Heirs of Champlin, 152 Neb. 161, 40 N.W.2d 411 (1950).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-271 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-271
View Statute 76-271
Status: in_force

Affidavits explaining or correcting any apparent defect in the chain of title to any real estate, may be recorded as instruments affecting real estate, and such record shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein recited.

Laws 1913, c. 75, § 1, p. 218;

R.S.1913, § 6253;

C.S.1922, § 5652;

C.S.1929, § 76-258;

R.S.1943, § 76-271.

Variances in spelling of names may be cured by affidavit. Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 286, 193 N.W. 758 (1923).

Variances in spelling of names may be cured by affidavit. Perry v. Ritze, 110 Neb. 286, 193 N.W. 758 (1923).

Affidavit recorded in office of register of deeds is prima facie evidence of facts stated therein. Schlake v. Healey, 108 Neb. 35, 187 N.W. 427 (1922).

Affidavit recorded in office of register of deeds is prima facie evidence of facts stated therein. Schlake v. Healey, 108 Neb. 35, 187 N.W. 427 (1922).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-231 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-231
View Statute 76-231
Status: in_force

If all the subscribing witnesses shall be dead, or out of the state, such death or absence is first to be proved, and then the execution of the deed may be proved before such officer by proving the handwriting of the grantor and of any subscribing witness to such deed.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 10, p. 282;

R.S.1913, § 6206;

C.S.1922, § 5605;

C.S.1929, § 76-211;

R.S.1943, § 76-231.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-109 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-109
View Statute 76-109
Status: in_force

Any act which would be effective as a conveyance inter vivos or as a mortgage or as a testamentary disposition of property when the land or thing other than land is in the possession of the conveyor, is effective as a conveyance of the conveyor's interest therein, when the land or thing other than land is out of the conveyor's possession whether adversely held or not.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 9, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1009;

R.S.1943, § 76-109.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-278 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-278
View Statute 76-278
Status: in_force

All certificates of the register and receiver of any United States Land Office of the entry or purchase of any tract of land, and all letters patent of land from the United States lying in this state, shall be recorded in the county in which the land lies, and where any patent as above, contains descriptions of land lying in more than one county, or otherwise, it shall be lawful to record in any county the whole of the descriptions of land situated therein without recording all descriptions contained in the patent. All maps and profiles required by the government of the United States to be filed by any railroad company in any general or district land office of the United States, for the completion of the title of such company to any right-of-way granted by the United States, shall be entitled to record in the office of the register of deeds or county clerk, as the case may be, in the same manner as plats of cities and villages, and the same effect shall be given thereto as to such plats when thus filed; Provided, such record shall include all the granting or conveying part or language of such patent, and the records of such certificates and patents, and all copies thereof so recorded, duly certified by the register of deeds, shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of such certificates and patents, and conclusive evidence of the existence of such record.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 45, p. 290;

Laws 1883, c. 63, § 1, p. 264;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 25, p. 372;

Laws 1911, c. 97, § 1, p. 362;

R.S.1913, § 6246;

C.S.1922, § 5645;

C.S.1929, § 76-251;

R.S.1943, § 76-278.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-228 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-228
View Statute 76-228
Status: in_force

If the grantor dies before acknowledgment, or if for any cause his attendance cannot be procured in order to make the same, or, having appeared, he refused to acknowledge it, proof of the execution and delivery of the deed may be made by any competent subscribing witness thereto before any officer authorized to take the acknowledgment. The witness must state, upon oath, his own place of residence, that he set his name to the deed as a witness, that he knew the grantor in such deed, and saw him sign or heard him acknowledge he had signed the same. Such proof shall not be taken unless the officer is personally acquainted with such subscribing witness, or has satisfactory evidence that he is the same person who was a subscribing witness to such deed.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 7, p. 281;

R.S.1913, § 6203;

C.S.1922, § 5602;

C.S.1929, § 76-208;

R.S.1943, § 76-228.

Proof of acknowledgment may be made by subscribing witness. Podewitz v. Gering Nat. Bank, 171 Neb. 380, 106 N.W.2d 497 (1960).

Proof of acknowledgment may be made by subscribing witness. Podewitz v. Gering Nat. Bank, 171 Neb. 380, 106 N.W.2d 497 (1960).

Proof of acknowledged deed made by subscribing witness entitles deed to record. Wilson v. Wilson, 83 Neb. 562, 120 N.W. 147 (1909).

Proof of acknowledged deed made by subscribing witness entitles deed to record. Wilson v. Wilson, 83 Neb. 562, 120 N.W. 147 (1909).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-232 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-232
View Statute 76-232
Status: in_force

Any person interested in a deed that is not acknowledged, may, at any time before or during the proceedings before such officer, file, in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the lands lie, a copy of the deed, compared with the original by the register of deeds, which shall, for the space of thirty days thereafter, have the same effect as the recording of the deed, if such deed shall within that time be duly proved and recorded.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 11, p. 282;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 14, p. 368;

R.S.1913, § 6207;

C.S.1922, § 5606;

C.S.1929, § 76-212;

R.S.1943, § 76-232.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-250 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-250
View Statute 76-250
Status: in_force

On recording any will, exemplification, decree, or certificate of dissolution of marriage, the register of deeds shall index the same in the indices of deeds, and as nearly as may be as deeds are indexed, placing the name of the devisor, petitioner, or plaintiff, with the grantors, and the devisee, respondent, or defendant with the grantees.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 27, p. 286;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 20, p. 370;

R.S.1913, § 6222;

C.S.1922, § 5621;

C.S.1929, § 76-227;

R.S.1943, § 76-250;

Laws 2005, LB 361, § 35.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-253 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-253
View Statute 76-253
Status: in_force

Any mortgage shall be discharged upon the record thereof by the register of deeds in whose custody it shall be, whenever there shall be presented to him a certificate executed by the mortgagee, his legal personal representative or assignee, acknowledged or proved or certified as prescribed in sections 76-216 to 76-236 , specifying that such mortgage has been paid, or otherwise satisfied and discharged.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 32, p. 287;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 22, p. 371;

R.S.1913, § 6225;

C.S.1922, § 5624;

C.S.1929, § 76-230;

R.S.1943, § 76-253;

Laws 1963, c. 430, § 1, p. 1446.

Recording fees, see section 33-109 .

A mortgagee who releases a mortgage, as to all lands therein described, to a grantee of the mortgagor without the latter's consent, cannot hold such mortgagor personally liable for the debt secured when the actual value of the lands so released exceeds or equals the indebtedness secured by such mortgage. Petters v. Storm, 132 Neb. 542, 272 N.W. 409 (1937).

A mortgagee who releases a mortgage, as to all lands therein described, to a grantee of the mortgagor without the latter's consent, cannot hold such mortgagor personally liable for the debt secured when the actual value of the lands so released exceeds or equals the indebtedness secured by such mortgage. Petters v. Storm, 132 Neb. 542, 272 N.W. 409 (1937).

Failure to release mortgage of record may subject the mortgagee to penalties but has no effect to keep mortgage in existence when debt has been paid. Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60 (1934).

Failure to release mortgage of record may subject the mortgagee to penalties but has no effect to keep mortgage in existence when debt has been paid. Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60 (1934).

Lien is extinguished by formal release whether paid or not. Gadsden v. Johnson, 65 Neb. 447, 91 N.W. 285 (1902).

Lien is extinguished by formal release whether paid or not. Gadsden v. Johnson, 65 Neb. 447, 91 N.W. 285 (1902).

Release, acknowledging full payment, but describing only part of land, is a complete release. Gadsden v. Latey, 42 Neb. 128, 60 N.W. 322 (1894).

Release, acknowledging full payment, but describing only part of land, is a complete release. Gadsden v. Latey, 42 Neb. 128, 60 N.W. 322 (1894).

Release by mortgagee after assignment is effective as to bona fide purchaser without notice. Whipple v. Fowler, 41 Neb. 675, 60 N.W. 15 (1894); Montgomery v. Waite, 1 Neb. Unof. 144, 95 N.W. 343 (1901).

Release by mortgagee after assignment is effective as to bona fide purchaser without notice. Whipple v. Fowler, 41 Neb. 675, 60 N.W. 15 (1894); Montgomery v. Waite, 1 Neb. Unof. 144, 95 N.W. 343 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-233 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-233
View Statute 76-233
Status: in_force

Every officer, who shall take the acknowledgment or proof of any deed, shall endorse a certificate thereof signed by himself on the deed, and in such certificate shall truly and specifically set forth the matters hereinbefore required to be done, known or proved, on such acknowledgment or proof, together with the names of the witnesses examined before such officer, and their places of residence, and the substance of the evidence by them given.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 12, p. 282;

R.S.1913, § 6208;

C.S.1922, § 5607;

C.S.1929, § 76-213;

R.S.1943, § 76-233.

Fact of acknowledgment should appear from instrument itself and cannot be shown by parol testimony. Solt v. Anderson, 71 Neb. 826, 99 N.W. 678 (1904).

Fact of acknowledgment should appear from instrument itself and cannot be shown by parol testimony. Solt v. Anderson, 71 Neb. 826, 99 N.W. 678 (1904).

Mistake of notary in certificate of acknowledgment does not invalidate conveyance. Roberts v. Robinson, 49 Neb. 717, 68 N.W. 1035 (1896).

Mistake of notary in certificate of acknowledgment does not invalidate conveyance. Roberts v. Robinson, 49 Neb. 717, 68 N.W. 1035 (1896).

Certificate is impeached only by clear and satisfactory proof of falsity. Phillips v. Bishop, 35 Neb. 487, 53 N.W. 375 (1892).

Certificate is impeached only by clear and satisfactory proof of falsity. Phillips v. Bishop, 35 Neb. 487, 53 N.W. 375 (1892).

Date of acknowledgment prevails over date of deed. Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 306, 43 N.W. 110 (1889).

Date of acknowledgment prevails over date of deed. Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 306, 43 N.W. 110 (1889).

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor was fatally defective, and parol evidence to impeach notary's certificate of acknowledgment omitting to show acknowledgment of mortgagor was inadmissible. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor was fatally defective, and parol evidence to impeach notary's certificate of acknowledgment omitting to show acknowledgment of mortgagor was inadmissible. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-277 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-277
View Statute 76-277
Status: in_force

Sections 76-201 to 76-281 and 76-2,126 apply to the conveyance of all claims and improvements upon the public lands.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 35, p. 287;

R.S.1913, § 6231;

C.S.1922, § 5630;

C.S.1929, § 76-236;

R.S.1943, § 76-277;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 34.

For other provisions for conveyance of public lands and buildings, see Chapter 72.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-214 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 64-214
64-214
Status: in_force

(1) It is lawful for any stockholder, director, officer, employee, or agent of a bank, who is a notary public, to take the acknowledgment of any person to any written instrument given to or by the bank and to administer an oath to any other stockholder, director, officer, employee, or agent of the bank.

(2) Acknowledgments heretofore taken of any person to any written instrument given to or by a bank or any oath administered to any stockholder, director, officer, employee, or agent of a bank by any notary public who was a stockholder, director, officer, employee, or agent of the bank shall be deemed to be lawful, valid, and binding.

Laws 1957, c. 316, § 1, p. 1134;

R.R.S.1943, § 76-217.04;

Laws 1976, LB 622, § 5;

Laws 2008, LB851, § 26.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-122 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-122
View Statute 76-122
Status: in_force

Sections 76-101 to 76-123 shall not apply to acts which occurred or to conveyances which became effective before August 24, 1941, except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of section 76-107 .

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 22, p. 599;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1022;

R.S.1943, § 76-122;

Laws 1988, LB 657, § 2.

Savings clause does not operate to withdraw from courts the power to apply Uniform Property Act to transactions which occurred before act became effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).

Savings clause does not operate to withdraw from courts the power to apply Uniform Property Act to transactions which occurred before act became effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-257 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-257
View Statute 76-257
Status: in_force

The register of deeds shall mark upon the deed or instrument, after recording the same, the book and page or computer system reference where the same is recorded.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 37, p. 287;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 24, p. 372;

R.S.1913, § 6227;

C.S.1922, § 5626;

C.S.1929, § 76-232;

R.S.1943, § 76-257;

Laws 1984, LB 679, § 15.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-245 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-245
View Statute 76-245
Status: in_force

Deeds and other instruments relating to or affecting the title of real estate in this state shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate, or any part thereof, is situated.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 21, p. 284;

R.S.1913, § 6215;

C.S.1922, § 5614;

C.S.1929, § 76-220;

R.S.1943, § 76-245.

Recording fees, see section 33-109 .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-248 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-248
View Statute 76-248
Status: in_force

Any will of real estate, which shall have been duly proved in the county court of any county in this state, and any such will, the proof of which shall be contested in that court and carried up by appeal or otherwise and the validity of which shall be finally established, may, with the certificate of proof annexed thereto, be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county or counties where the real estate lies, in the same manner and with like effect as in case of deeds.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 25, p. 285;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 18, p. 369;

R.S.1913, § 6220;

C.S.1922, § 5619;

C.S.1929, § 76-225;

R.S.1943, § 76-248.

Recording fees, see section 33-109 .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-237 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-237
View Statute 76-237
Status: in_force

Every deed, entitled by law to be recorded, shall be recorded in the order and as of the time when the same shall be delivered to the register of deeds for that purpose, and shall be considered recorded from the time of such delivery.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 15, p. 283;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 15, p. 368;

R.S.1913, § 6212;

C.S.1922, § 5611;

C.S.1929, § 76-217;

R.S.1943, § 76-237.

Recording fees, see section 33-109 .

Mortgages are considered as recorded from the time of their delivery to the register of deeds for that purpose, but mere fact that a mortgage is recorded first does not necessarily give it priority over one recorded later, as between the parties, if they have agreed or intended otherwise. Reitz v. Petersen, 131 Neb. 706, 269 N.W. 811 (1936).

Mortgages are considered as recorded from the time of their delivery to the register of deeds for that purpose, but mere fact that a mortgage is recorded first does not necessarily give it priority over one recorded later, as between the parties, if they have agreed or intended otherwise. Reitz v. Petersen, 131 Neb. 706, 269 N.W. 811 (1936).

Mere fact that one mortgage is indexed and recorded ahead of another does not give the first mortgage priority, and where both are delivered by mail without instructions, they are to be considered recorded from time of delivery. Judkins-Davies v. Skochdopole, 122 Neb. 374, 240 N.W. 510 (1932).

Mere fact that one mortgage is indexed and recorded ahead of another does not give the first mortgage priority, and where both are delivered by mail without instructions, they are to be considered recorded from time of delivery. Judkins-Davies v. Skochdopole, 122 Neb. 374, 240 N.W. 510 (1932).

Assignment of real estate mortgage is an instrument affecting the title of real estate within meaning of Recording Acts. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929).

Assignment of real estate mortgage is an instrument affecting the title of real estate within meaning of Recording Acts. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929).

Where a deed, properly executed and acknowledged, is filed for record, it is notice to all the world even though record book containing it is destroyed. Deming v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892).

Where a deed, properly executed and acknowledged, is filed for record, it is notice to all the world even though record book containing it is destroyed. Deming v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892).

Party filing deed is not prejudiced by negligence of register. Perkins v. Strong, 22 Neb. 725, 36 N.W. 292 (1888).

Party filing deed is not prejudiced by negligence of register. Perkins v. Strong, 22 Neb. 725, 36 N.W. 292 (1888).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-236 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-236
View Statute 76-236
Status: in_force

The certificate of the proof or acknowledgment of every deed, and the certificate of the genuineness of the signature of any officer, in the cases where such last-mentioned certificate is required, shall be recorded together with the deed so proved or acknowledged; and unless the certificates be so recorded, neither the record of such deed nor the transcript thereof shall be read or received in evidence.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 14, p. 283;

R.S.1913, § 6211;

C.S.1922, § 5610;

C.S.1929, § 76-216;

R.S.1943, § 76-236.

Statute of limitations, see section 25-202 .

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor was fatally defective. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).

Acknowledgment showing appearance and acknowledgment by mortgagee but not of mortgagor was fatally defective. Troyer v. Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-121 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-121
View Statute 76-121
Status: in_force

Sections 76-101 to 76-123 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 21, p. 598;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1021;

R.S.1943, § 76-121.

Uniform act is to be construed so as to effectuate its general purpose. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Uniform act is to be construed so as to effectuate its general purpose. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-103 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-103
View Statute 76-103
Status: in_force

Any possessory or future interest, power of appointment or of revocation, which can be created in this state with regard to land, can also be created with regard to anything other than land, including choses in action.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 3, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1003;

R.S.1943, § 76-103.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.07 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.07
View Statute 76-275.07
Status: in_force

When any conveyance of a present interest in real estate is made to more than one person and the grantees are named in the disjunctive, the conveyance shall be conclusively presumed to create a cotenancy in all the named grantees.

Laws 1981, LB 96, § 1.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-102 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-102
View Statute 76-102
Status: in_force

The provisions of sections 76-101 to 76-123 apply to corporations unless the context indicates a more limited applicability.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 2, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1002;

R.S.1943, § 76-102.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-217 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-217
View Statute 76-217
Status: in_force

The acknowledgment must be made or proved, if in this state, before a judge or clerk of any court, United States Magistrate or notary public therein; but no officer can take any such acknowledgment or proof out of his territorial jurisdiction.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 3, p. 280;

R.S.1913, § 6198;

C.S.1922, § 5597;

C.S.1929, § 76-203;

R.S.1943, § 76-217;

Laws 1947, c. 244, § 1, p. 768;

Laws 1972, LB 1032, § 268.

Authority to take acknowledgments:

Deputy clerks of the district and county courts, see section 24-403 .

Notaries public, see section 64-107 .

Secretary of State, see section 84-507 .

Notaries public, generally, see Chapter 64, article 1.

Payment to county treasurer of fees of county officers for taking acknowledgments, see section 33-153 .

Certificate of an officer having authority to take acknowledgments cannot be impeached by showing that it was irregularly performed. Bode v. Jussen, 93 Neb. 482, 140 N.W. 768 (1913); Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).

Certificate of an officer having authority to take acknowledgments cannot be impeached by showing that it was irregularly performed. Bode v. Jussen, 93 Neb. 482, 140 N.W. 768 (1913); Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).

Officer is disqualified to take acknowledgment when he is interested in transaction. Banking House of A. Castetter v. Stewart, 70 Neb. 815, 98 N.W. 34 (1904); Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896); Hedbloom v. Pierson, 2 Neb. Unof. 799, 90 N.W. 218 (1902); Chadron L. & B. Assn. v. O'Linn, 1 Neb. Unof. 1, 95 N.W. 368 (1901).

Officer is disqualified to take acknowledgment when he is interested in transaction. Banking House of A. Castetter v. Stewart, 70 Neb. 815, 98 N.W. 34 (1904); Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896); Hedbloom v. Pierson, 2 Neb. Unof. 799, 90 N.W. 218 (1902); Chadron L. & B. Assn. v. O'Linn, 1 Neb. Unof. 1, 95 N.W. 368 (1901).

Certificate of acknowledgment cannot be impeached by showing that officer's duty was irregularly performed. Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. Smith, 59 Neb. 90, 80 N.W. 270 (1899).

Certificate of acknowledgment cannot be impeached by showing that officer's duty was irregularly performed. Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. Smith, 59 Neb. 90, 80 N.W. 270 (1899).

Prior to September 7, 1947, United States Commissioner was unauthorized to take acknowledgments. Interstate S. & L. Assn. v. Strine, 58 Neb. 133, 78 N.W. 377 (1899).

Prior to September 7, 1947, United States Commissioner was unauthorized to take acknowledgments. Interstate S. & L. Assn. v. Strine, 58 Neb. 133, 78 N.W. 377 (1899).

Acknowledgment may be taken by attorney of party in interest. Havemeyer v. Dahn, 48 Neb. 536, 67 N.W. 489 (1896).

Acknowledgment may be taken by attorney of party in interest. Havemeyer v. Dahn, 48 Neb. 536, 67 N.W. 489 (1896).

Act of acknowledging officer is ministerial. Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896).

Act of acknowledging officer is ministerial. Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 485 (1896).

Acknowledgment is act of one who has executed instrument going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Jenkins, 19 Neb. 209, 27 N.W. 117 (1886).

Acknowledgment is act of one who has executed instrument going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Jenkins, 19 Neb. 209, 27 N.W. 117 (1886).

County clerk is authorized to take acknowledgments. Davis v. Huston, 15 Neb. 28, 16 N.W. 820 (1883).

County clerk is authorized to take acknowledgments. Davis v. Huston, 15 Neb. 28, 16 N.W. 820 (1883).

Certificate of acknowledgment cannot be impeached except for fraud, collusion, or imposition. Boldt v. Becker, 1 Neb. Unof. 75, 95 N.W. 509 (1901).

Certificate of acknowledgment cannot be impeached except for fraud, collusion, or imposition. Boldt v. Becker, 1 Neb. Unof. 75, 95 N.W. 509 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-101
View Statute 76-101
Status: in_force

As used in sections 76-101 to 76-123 and unless a different meaning appears from the context: (a) The term property means one or more interests either legal or equitable, possessory or nonpossessory, present or future, in land, or in things other than land, including choses in action, but excluding powers of appointment, powers of sale and powers of revocation, except when specifically mentioned; (b) the term future interest is applicable equally to property interests in land and in things other than land, and is limited to all varieties of remainders, reversions, executory interests, powers of termination (otherwise known as rights of entry for condition broken), and possibilities of reverter; (c) the term conveyance means an act by which it is intended to create one or more property interests, irrespective of whether the act is effective to create such interests, and irrespective of whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation; (d) the term otherwise effective conveyance means that the conveyance in question satisfies all the requirements of law other than the particular matter dealt with in the section of sections 76-101 to 76-123 in which the term is used; and (e) an intent is effectively manifested when it is manifested by the evidence of intent admissible according to the applicable rules of law with respect to the admissibility of evidence.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 2, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1001;

R.S.1943, § 76-101.

Vendee under a land contract on real estate, holding a vested interest thereby, may generally assign such equitable interest to a third party assignee. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).

Vendee under a land contract on real estate, holding a vested interest thereby, may generally assign such equitable interest to a third party assignee. Beren Corp. v. Spader, 198 Neb. 677, 255 N.W.2d 247 (1977).

The provisions of the Uniform Property Act supersede conflicting provisions of the law of property existing prior to the effective date of the act. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

The provisions of the Uniform Property Act supersede conflicting provisions of the law of property existing prior to the effective date of the act. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

Joint tenancy in personal property could be created. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).

Joint tenancy in personal property could be created. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).

In absence of Nebraska decision construing Uniform Property Act, federal district court was required to exercise independent judgment in construing it. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).

In absence of Nebraska decision construing Uniform Property Act, federal district court was required to exercise independent judgment in construing it. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-269.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-269.01
View Statute 76-269.01
Status: in_force

On and after September 9, 1997, no action may be maintained to set aside any deed of conveyance executed by a personal representative of an estate prior to September 9, 1993, upon the grounds that the personal representative lacked authority conferred by the will of the decedent to convey real estate without court order or that a court order authorizing the sale of the real estate was invalid.

Laws 1994, LB 188, § 2.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-213 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 64-213
64-213
Status: in_force

Acknowledgments heretofore taken of any person to any written instrument given to or by an insurance company or credit union, or any oath administered to any member, director, elected officer, shareholder, appointive officer, employee, or agent of an insurance company or credit union, by any notary public, who was a member, shareholder, appointive officer, agent, or employee of the insurance company or credit union, and not a director or elected officer thereof, shall be deemed to be lawful, valid, and binding.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 3, p. 280;

R.S.1913, § 6198;

C.S.1922, § 5597;

C.S.1929, § 76-203;

R.S.1943, § 76-217;

Laws 1947, c. 244, § 1, p. 768;

Laws 1959, c. 347, § 1, p. 1233;

R.R.S.1943, § 76-217.03;

Laws 1976, LB 622, § 4;

Laws 2002, LB 1094, § 16.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-270 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-270
View Statute 76-270
Status: in_force

Where any grantee takes title to real estate in this state under a name including the word company or corporation, whether such grantee was or was not in fact a corporation, and where such grantee subsequent to the date that such title is taken conveys all of such land or part thereof, through a deed executed on behalf of such grantee by any person or persons, after ten years from the recording thereof such deed shall be as good, valid, legal and effectual as though such grantee had been at the time of receiving and conveying said land, a corporation de jure, and said deed conveying said land had been executed and acknowledged on its behalf by the officers and in the manner provided by law.

Laws 1937, c. 166, § 1, p. 634;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-275;

R.S.1943, § 76-270;

Laws 1947, c. 245, § 1, p. 769.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-264 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-264
View Statute 76-264
Status: in_force

No deed of conveyance or other instrument affecting real estate in this state, which has been executed and acknowledged or proved in any other state, territory or district of the United States and which has been executed and acknowledged or proved in accordance with the laws of such state, territory or district, shall be held invalid because of the failure of the grantor to affix thereto his private seal, although the affixing of such private seal may be required by the laws of such state, territory or district. Every such deed of conveyance or other instrument, which has been so executed and acknowledged or proved, is declared to be legal, valid and binding, and all such deeds of conveyance or other instruments, and the record thereof in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which said real estate is situated, shall be competent evidence in the courts of this state.

Laws 1917, c. 223, § 4, p. 546;

C.S.1922, § 5657;

C.S.1929, § 76-263;

R.S.1943, § 76-264.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-238.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-238.01
View Statute 76-238.01
Status: in_force

(1) Any interest in real property capable of being transferred may be mortgaged to secure (a) existing debts or obligations, (b) debts or obligations created simultaneously with the execution of the mortgage, (c) future advances necessary to protect the security, even though such future advances cause the total indebtedness to exceed the maximum amount stated in the mortgage, or (d) any future advances to be made at the option of the parties in any amount unless, except as otherwise provided under subsection (2) or (3) of this section, a maximum amount of total indebtedness to be secured is stated in the mortgage.

(2) Future advances necessary to protect the security shall include, but not be limited to, advances for payment of real property taxes, special assessments, prior liens, hazard insurance premiums, maintenance charges imposed under a condominium declaration or other covenant, and costs of repair, maintenance, or improvements. Future advances necessary to protect the security are secured by the mortgage and have the priority specified in subsection (3) of this section.

(3)(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this subsection, all items identified in subsection (1) of this section are equally secured by the mortgage from the time of filing the mortgage as provided by law and have the same priority as the mortgage over the rights of all other persons who acquire any rights in or liens upon the mortgaged real property subsequent to the time the mortgage was filed.

(b)(i) The mortgagor or his or her successor in title may limit the amount of optional future advances secured by the mortgage under subdivision (1)(d) of this section by filing a notice for record in the office of the register of deeds of each county in which the mortgaged real property or some part thereof is situated. A copy of such notice shall be sent by certified mail to the mortgagee at the address of the mortgagee set forth in the mortgage or, if the mortgage has been assigned, to the address of the most recent assignee reflected in a recorded assignment of the mortgage. The amount of such secured optional future advances shall be limited to not less than the amount actually advanced at the time of receipt of such notice by the mortgagee.

(ii) If any optional future advance is made by the mortgagee to the mortgagor or his or her successor in title after receiving written notice of the filing for record of any trust deed, mortgage, lien, or claim against such mortgaged real property, then the amount of such optional future advance shall be junior to such trust deed, mortgage, lien, or claim. The notice under this subdivision shall be sent by certified mail to the mortgagee at the address of the mortgagee set forth in the mortgage or, if the mortgage has been assigned, to the address of the most recent assignee reflected in a recorded assignment of the mortgage.

(iii) Subdivisions (b)(i) and (ii) of this subsection shall not limit or determine the priority of optional future advances as against construction liens governed by section 52-139 .

(4) The reduction to zero or elimination of the debt evidenced by the instruments authorized in this section shall not invalidate the operation of this section as to any future advances unless a notice or release to the contrary is filed for record as provided by law.

Laws 1961, c. 368, § 1, p. 1140;

Laws 1974, LB 913, § 1;

Laws 1987, LB 136, § 1;

Laws 2014, LB788, § 10.

The Legislature has fixed the priority of some optional advances at the time mortgage is recorded. Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co., 179 Neb. 134, 137 N.W.2d 241 (1965).

The Legislature has fixed the priority of some optional advances at the time mortgage is recorded. Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co., 179 Neb. 134, 137 N.W.2d 241 (1965).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-242 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-242
View Statute 76-242
Status: in_force

In all cases provided for in section 76-219 , if such acknowledgment or proof is taken before a notary public or other officer using an official seal, except a commissioner appointed by the Governor of this state, the instrument thus acknowledged or proved shall be entitled to be recorded without further authentication. In all other cases the deed or other instrument shall have attached thereto a certificate of the clerk of a court of record, or other proper certifying officer of the county, district or state within which the acknowledgment or proof was taken, under the seal of his office, showing that the person, whose name is subscribed to the certificate of acknowledgment, was at the date thereof such officer as he is therein represented to be; that he is well acquainted with the handwriting of such officer; that he believes the signature of such officer to be genuine; and that the deed or other instrument is executed and acknowledged according to the laws of such state, district or territory.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 5, p. 280;

R.S.1913, § 6201;

C.S.1922, § 5600;

C.S.1929, § 76-206;

R.S.1943, § 76-242.

The certificate of acknowledgment of a notary public in another state under his official seal is sufficient proof of the execution of a deed of lands in Nebraska for its admission in evidence in an action pending in this state. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

The certificate of acknowledgment of a notary public in another state under his official seal is sufficient proof of the execution of a deed of lands in Nebraska for its admission in evidence in an action pending in this state. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

Where instrument is acknowledged before commissioner of deeds in another state, certificate of Secretary of State is necessary. Omaha R. E. & T. Co. v. Reiter, 47 Neb. 592, 66 N.W. 658 (1896).

Where instrument is acknowledged before commissioner of deeds in another state, certificate of Secretary of State is necessary. Omaha R. E. & T. Co. v. Reiter, 47 Neb. 592, 66 N.W. 658 (1896).

No certificate of authority of notary in another state is required. Galley v. Galley, 14 Neb. 174, 15 N.W. 318 (1883); Green v. Gross, 12 Neb. 117, 10 N.W. 459 (1881).

No certificate of authority of notary in another state is required. Galley v. Galley, 14 Neb. 174, 15 N.W. 318 (1883); Green v. Gross, 12 Neb. 117, 10 N.W. 459 (1881).

Certificate is required when acknowledging officer of foreign state has no seal. Irwin v. Welch, 10 Neb. 479, 6 N.W. 753 (1880).

Certificate is required when acknowledging officer of foreign state has no seal. Irwin v. Welch, 10 Neb. 479, 6 N.W. 753 (1880).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-120 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-120
View Statute 76-120
Status: in_force

When conduct claimed to constitute waste is made the basis of a claim for damages, the claimant is limited to a recovery of compensatory damages and is not entitled to multiple damages or to declare a forfeiture of the place wasted or of the interest of the defendant in the place wasted, except in accordance with covenants, agreements or conditions binding such defendants.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 20, p. 598;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1020;

R.S.1943, § 76-120.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-238 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-238
View Statute 76-238
Status: in_force

(1) Except as otherwise provided in sections 76-3413 to 76-3415 , all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing which are required to be or which under the laws of this state may be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of delivering such instruments to the register of deeds for recording, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith without notice. All such instruments are void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice whose deeds, mortgages, or other instruments are recorded prior to such instruments. However, such instruments are valid between the parties to the instrument. The transfer of any debt secured by a mortgage shall also operate as a transfer of the security of such debt.

(2) For purposes of this section, possession of agricultural real estate or residential real estate by a party related to the owner of record of the real estate within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity shall not serve as notice to a creditor or subsequent purchaser in any case in which such party is claiming rights in such real estate pursuant to a lease (a) entered into on or after July 16, 2004; (b) purporting to extend beyond a term of one year; and (c) which has not satisfied the requirements of section 76-211 , unless the creditor or subsequent purchaser, in advance of recording a deed, mortgage, or other instrument, has received a written copy of such lease.

(3) For purposes of this section:

(a) Agricultural products includes grain and feed crops; forages and sod crops; and animal production, including breeding, feeding, or grazing of cattle, horses, swine, sheep, goats, bees, or poultry;

(b) Agricultural real estate means land which is primarily used for the production of agricultural products, including waste land lying in or adjacent to and in common ownership with land used for the production of agricultural products;

(c) Related within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity includes parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and spouses of the same and any partnership, limited liability company, or corporation in which all of the partners, members, or shareholders are related within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity; and

(d) Residential real estate means real estate containing not more than four units designed for use for residential purposes. A condominium unit that is otherwise residential real estate remains so even though the condominium development contains more than four dwelling units or units for nonresidential purposes.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 16, p. 283;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 16, p. 369;

R.S.1913, § 6213;

C.S.1922, § 5612;

C.S.1929, § 76-218;

Laws 1941, c. 154, § 1, p. 599;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-218;

R.S.1943, § 76-238;

Laws 2004, LB 155, § 6;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 32;

Laws 2018, LB750, § 2.

1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee

1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee

2. Actual knowledge

2. Actual knowledge

3. Constructive knowledge

3. Constructive knowledge

4. Possession

4. Possession

5. Priority of liens

5. Priority of liens

6. Delivery

6. Delivery

7. Miscellaneous

7. Miscellaneous

1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee

1. Subsequent purchaser or mortgagee

A good faith purchaser of land is one who purchases for valuable consideration without notice of any suspicious circumstances which would put a prudent person on inquiry. The burden of proof is upon a litigant who alleges that he or she is a good faith purchaser to prove that he or she purchased the property for value and without notice. This burden includes proving that the litigant was without notice, actual or constructive, of another's rights or interests in the land. Caruso v. Parkos, 262 Neb. 961, 637 N.W.2d 351 (2002).

would put a prudent person on inquiry. The burden of proof is upon a litigant who alleges that he or she is a good faith purchaser to prove that he or she purchased the property for value and without notice. This burden includes proving that the litigant was without notice, actual or constructive, of another's rights or interests in the land. Caruso v. Parkos, 262 Neb. 961, 637 N.W.2d 351 (2002).

A good faith purchaser of land is one who purchases for valuable consideration without notice of any suspicious circumstances which would put a prudent person on inquiry. The burden of proof is upon a litigant who alleges that he or she is a good faith purchaser to prove that he or she purchased the property for value and without notice. This burden includes proving that the litigant was without notice, actual or constructive, of another's rights or interests in the land. Caruso v. Parkos, 262 Neb. 961, 637 N.W.2d 351 (2002).

Instruments which may be but are not recorded are void as to subsequent bona fide purchasers who record first. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).

Instruments which may be but are not recorded are void as to subsequent bona fide purchasers who record first. Kimco Addition v. Lower Platte South N.R.D., 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989).

This section is designed to protect a subsequent purchaser even though there was a prior conveyance or transaction concerning the property, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first, and provided further that the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser without notice of any other claims to the property. Miller v. McMillen, 214 Neb. 244, 333 N.W.2d 887 (1983).

This section is designed to protect a subsequent purchaser even though there was a prior conveyance or transaction concerning the property, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first, and provided further that the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser without notice of any other claims to the property. Miller v. McMillen, 214 Neb. 244, 333 N.W.2d 887 (1983).

This section is designed to protect a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice even though there was a prior conveyance, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first. Karmann v. Haase, 191 Neb. 839, 218 N.W.2d 242 (1974).

This section is designed to protect a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice even though there was a prior conveyance, provided the subsequent purchaser recorded his title first. Karmann v. Haase, 191 Neb. 839, 218 N.W.2d 242 (1974).

A purchaser with notice, who purchases from one without notice, will be protected by the want of notice in his vendor. Mingus v. Bell, 148 Neb. 735, 29 N.W.2d 332 (1947).

A purchaser with notice, who purchases from one without notice, will be protected by the want of notice in his vendor. Mingus v. Bell, 148 Neb. 735, 29 N.W.2d 332 (1947).

Question as to whether mortgagee took mortgage in good faith without notice so as to render prior unrecorded deed void is properly determinable in mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).

Question as to whether mortgagee took mortgage in good faith without notice so as to render prior unrecorded deed void is properly determinable in mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).

An unrecorded deed is void as to mortgagees, whose mortgages are placed of record first and who are without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Clements v. Doak, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941).

An unrecorded deed is void as to mortgagees, whose mortgages are placed of record first and who are without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Clements v. Doak, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941).

(1943).

An unrecorded deed is void as to mortgagees, whose mortgages are placed of record first and who are without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Clements v. Doak, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941).

An unrecorded deed is void as to mortgagees, whose mortgages are placed of record first and who are without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Clements v. Doak, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941).

Assignment of real estate mortgage comes within this section. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Welch, 83 Neb. 106, 118 N.W. 1116 (1908); Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).

Assignment of real estate mortgage comes within this section. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Welch, 83 Neb. 106, 118 N.W. 1116 (1908); Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).

Where possession is taken by subsequent purchaser before recording of prior deed, he is protected, even though his deed was subsequently recorded. Kime v. Krenek, 94 Neb. 395, 143 N.W. 473 (1913).

Where possession is taken by subsequent purchaser before recording of prior deed, he is protected, even though his deed was subsequently recorded. Kime v. Krenek, 94 Neb. 395, 143 N.W. 473 (1913).

Sheriff's deed to purchaser without notice will convey superior title to deed executed by mortgagor before foreclosure proceedings, but not recorded until after recording of sheriff's deed. Richards v. Smith, 88 Neb. 444, 129 N.W. 983 (1911).

Sheriff's deed to purchaser without notice will convey superior title to deed executed by mortgagor before foreclosure proceedings, but not recorded until after recording of sheriff's deed. Richards v. Smith, 88 Neb. 444, 129 N.W. 983 (1911).

Subsequent purchaser has burden of proof of establishing purchase without notice, actual or constructive, of prior unrecorded conveyance. McParland v. Peters, 87 Neb. 829, 128 N.W. 523 (1910).

Subsequent purchaser has burden of proof of establishing purchase without notice, actual or constructive, of prior unrecorded conveyance. McParland v. Peters, 87 Neb. 829, 128 N.W. 523 (1910).

Ordinary care and diligence is required of bona fide purchaser. Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).

Ordinary care and diligence is required of bona fide purchaser. Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).

If a mortgagee enters satisfaction after a mortgage has been assigned, a subsequent purchaser who acquires title without notice of the assignment will be protected. Whitney v. Lowe, 59 Neb. 87, 80 N.W. 266 (1899).

If a mortgagee enters satisfaction after a mortgage has been assigned, a subsequent purchaser who acquires title without notice of the assignment will be protected. Whitney v. Lowe, 59 Neb. 87, 80 N.W. 266 (1899).

Subsequent mortgagee is subsequent purchaser within meaning of section. Dorr v. Meyer, 51 Neb. 94, 70 N.W. 543 (1897).

Subsequent mortgagee is subsequent purchaser within meaning of section. Dorr v. Meyer, 51 Neb. 94, 70 N.W. 543 (1897).

Holder of quitclaim deed may be bona fide purchaser. Schott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. 187, 68 N.W. 346 (1896).

Holder of quitclaim deed may be bona fide purchaser. Schott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. 187, 68 N.W. 346 (1896).

Mortgage last executed and delivered will take precedence if first filed for record and grantee took same for value and without notice. Burrows v. Hovland, 40 Neb. 464, 58 N.W. 947 (1894).

Mortgage last executed and delivered will take precedence if first filed for record and grantee took same for value and without notice. Burrows v. Hovland, 40 Neb. 464, 58 N.W. 947 (1894).

2. Actual knowledge

2. Actual knowledge

Actual knowledge of existence of a real estate mortgage is as binding as constructive notice supplied by the duly recorded instrument. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).

ted and delivered will take precedence if first filed for record and grantee took same for value and without notice. Burrows v. Hovland, 40 Neb. 464, 58 N.W. 947 (1894).

2. Actual knowledge

2. Actual knowledge

Actual knowledge of existence of a real estate mortgage is as binding as constructive notice supplied by the duly recorded instrument. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).

Actual knowledge of existence of a real estate mortgage is as binding as constructive notice supplied by the duly recorded instrument. Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937).

Actual knowledge of unrecorded lien is as binding as constructive notice. Bradford v. Anderson, 60 Neb. 368, 83 N.W. 173 (1900).

Actual knowledge of unrecorded lien is as binding as constructive notice. Bradford v. Anderson, 60 Neb. 368, 83 N.W. 173 (1900).

Purchaser takes subject to unrecorded lien, when he knows of it. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 3 Neb. Unof. 722, 92 N.W. 900 (1902).

Purchaser takes subject to unrecorded lien, when he knows of it. Michigan Trust Co. v. City of Red Cloud, 3 Neb. Unof. 722, 92 N.W. 900 (1902).

3. Constructive knowledge

3. Constructive knowledge

This section is intended to impart to a prospective purchaser notice of instruments which affect the title of land in which such purchaser is interested. Ihde v. Kempkes, 228 Neb. 433, 422 N.W.2d 788 (1988).

This section is intended to impart to a prospective purchaser notice of instruments which affect the title of land in which such purchaser is interested. Ihde v. Kempkes, 228 Neb. 433, 422 N.W.2d 788 (1988).

Recording gives priority only to instruments registerable in form. Rumery v. Loy, 61 Neb. 755, 86 N.W. 478 (1901).

Recording gives priority only to instruments registerable in form. Rumery v. Loy, 61 Neb. 755, 86 N.W. 478 (1901).

Constructive notice by record of conveyance is limited to those who must trace their title through grantor. Traphagen v. Irwin, 18 Neb. 195, 24 N.W. 684 (1885).

Constructive notice by record of conveyance is limited to those who must trace their title through grantor. Traphagen v. Irwin, 18 Neb. 195, 24 N.W. 684 (1885).

4. Possession

4. Possession

A purchaser is charged with notice of tenant's rights when the tenant is in actual possession of the real estate. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).

A purchaser is charged with notice of tenant's rights when the tenant is in actual possession of the real estate. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).

Possession cannot be notice of nonexisting fact. Burt v. Baldwin, 8 Neb. 487, 1 N.W. 457 (1879).

Possession cannot be notice of nonexisting fact. Burt v. Baldwin, 8 Neb. 487, 1 N.W. 457 (1879).

5. Priority of liens

5. Priority of liens

The lien of a judgment does not take priority over a prior unrecorded mortgage made and delivered in good faith for a valuable consideration. Omaha Loan and Building Assn. v. Turk, 146 Neb. 859, 21 N.W.2d 865 (1946).

The lien of a judgment does not take priority over a prior unrecorded mortgage made and delivered in good faith for a valuable consideration. Omaha Loan and Building Assn. v. Turk, 146 Neb. 859, 21 N.W.2d 865 (1946).

A prior unrecorded deed, if made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence over an attachment or judgment, if recorded before deed based upon such attachment or judgment. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).

A prior unrecorded deed, if made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence over an attachment or judgment, if recorded before deed based upon such attachment or judgment. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).

Prior unrecorded mortgage takes precedence over deed with no consideration. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899).

N.W. 296 (1904).

A prior unrecorded deed, if made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence over an attachment or judgment, if recorded before deed based upon such attachment or judgment. Naudain v. Fullenwider, 72 Neb. 221, 100 N.W. 296 (1904).

Prior unrecorded mortgage takes precedence over deed with no consideration. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899).

Prior unrecorded mortgage takes precedence over deed with no consideration. Fisk v. Osgood, 58 Neb. 486, 78 N.W. 924 (1899).

Ordinary judgment lien is subject to prior liens, legal or equitable. Mansfield v. Gregory, 11 Neb. 297, 9 N.W. 87 (1881); Harral v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).

Ordinary judgment lien is subject to prior liens, legal or equitable. Mansfield v. Gregory, 11 Neb. 297, 9 N.W. 87 (1881); Harral v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186, 4 N.W. 1040 (1880).

6. Delivery

6. Delivery

Third parties who acquire rights in property after recording but before actual delivery of conveyance will be protected. Barnes v. Cox, 58 Neb. 675, 79 N.W. 550 (1899).

Third parties who acquire rights in property after recording but before actual delivery of conveyance will be protected. Barnes v. Cox, 58 Neb. 675, 79 N.W. 550 (1899).

Deed becomes operative upon delivery. Brown v. Hartman, 57 Neb. 341, 77 N.W. 776 (1899).

Deed becomes operative upon delivery. Brown v. Hartman, 57 Neb. 341, 77 N.W. 776 (1899).

Delivery of duly acknowledged and recorded deed is presumed. Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N.W. 140 (1892).

Delivery of duly acknowledged and recorded deed is presumed. Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N.W. 140 (1892).

7. Miscellaneous

7. Miscellaneous

This section requires the filing of covenants and restrictions in the office of the register of deeds and it also provides that a filing is ineffective, when the statute is not followed, only as to those without notice, either actual or constructive. How v. Baker, 223 Neb. 100, 388 N.W.2d 462 (1986).

This section requires the filing of covenants and restrictions in the office of the register of deeds and it also provides that a filing is ineffective, when the statute is not followed, only as to those without notice, either actual or constructive. How v. Baker, 223 Neb. 100, 388 N.W.2d 462 (1986).

Recording act does not apply to taxes. Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 146 Neb. 240, 19 N.W.2d 148 (1945).

Recording act does not apply to taxes. Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 146 Neb. 240, 19 N.W.2d 148 (1945).

Where creditors represented by trustee in bankruptcy were each without deed, mortgage or other conveyance, mortgages were not required to be recorded, so that failure to record them more than four months before filing of petition did not give rise to illegal preference. Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639, 204 N.W. 398 (1925).

Where creditors represented by trustee in bankruptcy were each without deed, mortgage or other conveyance, mortgages were not required to be recorded, so that failure to record them more than four months before filing of petition did not give rise to illegal preference. Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639, 204 N.W. 398 (1925).

Party obtaining decree quieting title cannot obtain benefits of recording act unless exemplified copy of decree is recorded in office of register of deeds. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).

Party obtaining decree quieting title cannot obtain benefits of recording act unless exemplified copy of decree is recorded in office of register of deeds. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).

Recording acts, not law merchant, determine rights of assignee of mortgage notes. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).

Recording acts, not law merchant, determine rights of assignee of mortgage notes. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).

in office of register of deeds. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).

Recording acts, not law merchant, determine rights of assignee of mortgage notes. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).

Recording acts, not law merchant, determine rights of assignee of mortgage notes. First Nat. Bank of Falls City v. Edgar, 65 Neb. 340, 91 N.W. 404 (1902).

The purpose of the registry law is to furnish record evidence of land titles. Hare v. Murphy, 60 Neb. 135, 82 N.W. 312 (1900).

The purpose of the registry law is to furnish record evidence of land titles. Hare v. Murphy, 60 Neb. 135, 82 N.W. 312 (1900).

Unrecorded assignment of mortgage is not void as to creditors generally, but only as to creditors whose deeds, mortgages or other instruments should be first recorded. Blair State Bank v. Stewart, 57 Neb. 58, 77 N.W. 370 (1898).

Unrecorded assignment of mortgage is not void as to creditors generally, but only as to creditors whose deeds, mortgages or other instruments should be first recorded. Blair State Bank v. Stewart, 57 Neb. 58, 77 N.W. 370 (1898).

Assignee of interest coupons may foreclose mortgage after release by mortgagee. Griffith v. Salleng, 54 Neb. 362, 74 N.W. 619 (1898).

Assignee of interest coupons may foreclose mortgage after release by mortgagee. Griffith v. Salleng, 54 Neb. 362, 74 N.W. 619 (1898).

Grantee of unrecorded deed acquires title as between parties. Connell v. Galligher, 39 Neb. 793, 58 N.W. 438 (1894).

Grantee of unrecorded deed acquires title as between parties. Connell v. Galligher, 39 Neb. 793, 58 N.W. 438 (1894).

Vendor's lien is not recognized. Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265 (1877).

Vendor's lien is not recognized. Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265 (1877).

Where bankrupt executed mortgage for full present consideration more than four months prior to bankruptcy, but mortgage was recorded within four months' period, mortgage was not voidable at suit of trustee in bankruptcy as fraudulent transfer on theory that withholding mortgage from record constituted fraud on creditors. Rankin v. Cox, 71 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1934).

Where bankrupt executed mortgage for full present consideration more than four months prior to bankruptcy, but mortgage was recorded within four months' period, mortgage was not voidable at suit of trustee in bankruptcy as fraudulent transfer on theory that withholding mortgage from record constituted fraud on creditors. Rankin v. Cox, 71 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1934).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275
View Statute 76-275
Status: in_force

After one year from April 13, 1935, in all cases where before such date an interest in the fee title to any real estate in this state and an interest in a mortgage or other lien affecting the same interest have become vested in the same person and such person subsequently conveyed such fee title by deed, unless a contrary intent is expressed by the terms of such deed, it shall be presumed in favor of subsequent purchasers for value and without notice that such lien interest was merged with the fee and conveyed by such deed and that such lien was thereby released from the fee interest so conveyed. After April 13, 1936, no action shall be brought whereby to enforce such lien against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value unless the claimant of such lien shall before that date file with the register of deeds of the county where the land is located an affidavit reciting the book and page or computer system reference where the deed of conveyance is recorded and that the claimant did not intend to merge or convey such lien interest by such deed.

Laws 1935, c. 150, § 2, p. 555;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-274;

R.S.1943, § 76-275;

Laws 1984, LB 679, § 16.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-244 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-244
View Statute 76-244
Status: in_force

The copy of any record, or of any recorded deed or instrument, attested and authenticated in such manner as would by law entitle it to be read in evidence, may, on proof of the loss of the original and of the record, be again recorded, and such record shall have the same effect as the original record.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 24, p. 285;

R.S.1913, § 6219;

C.S.1922, § 5618;

C.S.1929, § 76-224;

R.S.1943, § 76-244.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.01
View Statute 76-275.01
Status: in_force

Unless action is brought before September 7, 1948, to set aside the deed upon that ground, all deeds of conveyance executed by any person to himself or herself and the spouse of such person or by married persons direct to themselves as joint tenants with right of survivorship, which deeds were executed and recorded prior to August 24, 1941, be and the same hereby are legalized and validated as though a married person had the power, prior to August 24, 1941, to convey property directly to his or her spouse in the same manner and to the same extent as if he or she were unmarried.

Laws 1947, c. 248, § 1, p. 772.

For authority of married persons to convey to themselves as joint tenants subsequent to August 24, 1941, see section 76-118 .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-210 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-210
View Statute 76-210
Status: in_force

Estates may be created to commence at a future day.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 57, p. 292;

R.S.1913, § 6194;

C.S.1922, § 5593;

C.S.1929, § 76-108;

R.S.1943, § 76-210.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-254 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-254
View Statute 76-254
Status: in_force

Every such certificate and the proof or the acknowledgment thereof shall be indexed in the order of mortgages and recorded at full length. In the record of discharge the register of deeds shall make a reference to the book and page or computer system reference where the mortgage is recorded.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 33, p. 287;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 23, p. 271;

R.S.1913, § 6226;

C.S.1922, § 5625;

C.S.1929, § 76-231;

R.S.1943, § 76-254;

Laws 1984, LB 679, § 14.

Real estate mortgages must be indexed and recorded at full length, and abstract showing release of mortgage in index but not of record, does not show good title of record. Rath v. Wilgus, 110 Neb. 810, 195 N.W. 115 (1923).

Real estate mortgages must be indexed and recorded at full length, and abstract showing release of mortgage in index but not of record, does not show good title of record. Rath v. Wilgus, 110 Neb. 810, 195 N.W. 115 (1923).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-209 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-209
View Statute 76-209
Status: in_force

When a deed purports to convey a greater interest than the grantor was at the time possessed of, any after-acquired interest of such grantor to the extent of that which the deed purports to convey shall accrue to the benefit of the grantee; Provided, however, such after-acquired interest shall not inure to the benefit of the original grantee or his heirs or assigns, if the deed conveying said real estate was either a quitclaim or special warranty, and the original grantor in any case shall not be estopped from acquiring said premises at judicial or tax sale, upon execution against the grantee or his assigns, or for taxes becoming due after date of his conveyance.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 56, p. 291;

Laws 1875, § 1, p. 91;

R.S.1913, § 6193;

C.S.1922, § 5592;

C.S.1929, § 76-107;

R.S.1943, § 76-209.

Statute has no application where grantor transfers a less interest than he possesses. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Statute has no application where grantor transfers a less interest than he possesses. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Property of grantor, acquired subsequently to making of deed, passed to grantee, and filing of transcript and the issuance of an execution, did not create a lien thereon. Trudeau v. Fischer, 96 Neb. 275, 147 N.W. 698 (1914).

Property of grantor, acquired subsequently to making of deed, passed to grantee, and filing of transcript and the issuance of an execution, did not create a lien thereon. Trudeau v. Fischer, 96 Neb. 275, 147 N.W. 698 (1914).

If mortgage deed purports to convey whole property, an after-acquired interest of mortgagor will accrue to title conveyed by the mortgage. Pulver v. Connelly, 93 Neb. 188, 139 N.W. 1014 (1913).

If mortgage deed purports to convey whole property, an after-acquired interest of mortgagor will accrue to title conveyed by the mortgage. Pulver v. Connelly, 93 Neb. 188, 139 N.W. 1014 (1913).

If grantor obtains an instrument that evidences and fortifies the estate which his deed purports to convey, such instrument inures to the benefit of the grantee. Ford v. Axelson, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N.W. 1039 (1905).

If grantor obtains an instrument that evidences and fortifies the estate which his deed purports to convey, such instrument inures to the benefit of the grantee. Ford v. Axelson, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N.W. 1039 (1905).

Title acquired by patent issued subsequent to conveyance by grantor inures to the benefit of grantee. Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).

Title acquired by patent issued subsequent to conveyance by grantor inures to the benefit of grantee. Lyon v. Gombert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).

An after-acquired title by a grantor in a deed of quitclaim does not inure to his grantee. Troxell v. Stevens, 57 Neb. 329, 77 N.W. 781 (1899); Hagensick v. Castor, 53 Neb. 495, 73 N.W. 932 (1898).

An after-acquired title by a grantor in a deed of quitclaim does not inure to his grantee. Troxell v. Stevens, 57 Neb. 329, 77 N.W. 781 (1899); Hagensick v. Castor, 53 Neb. 495, 73 N.W. 932 (1898).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-248.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-248.01
View Statute 76-248.01
Status: in_force

A certificate of dissolution of marriage executed by the clerk of the district court under section 42-372.02 may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county or counties where the real estate is located. A certificate of dissolution of marriage shall not be used in lieu of a deed or other conveyance of real estate to carry out the terms of the dissolution decree or as evidence of title.

Laws 2005, LB 361, § 24.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-267 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-267
View Statute 76-267
Status: in_force

Where any such conveyance or lien shall have been made prior to July 24, 1917, to any person or corporation as trustee and such trustee has not conveyed, assigned or released it before said date, and no declaration of the terms of the trust has been executed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is located, it shall be presumed that such person or corporation, as trustee, had power and authority to convey such right or interest in said real estate or to assign or release such lien thereon, and a purchaser in good faith from such trustee shall not be bound to inquire or ascertain the terms of the trust unless the person claiming a beneficial interest therein shall, within two years after July 24, 1917, have filed in the office of the register of deeds of the county where such real estate is located, a notice verified by his affidavit describing the real estate in which he claims an interest and stating what right or interest therein he claims, and his place of residence.

Laws 1917, c. 223, § 6, p. 547;

C.S.1922, § 5659;

C.S.1929, § 76-265;

R.S.1943, § 76-267.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-249 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-249
View Statute 76-249
Status: in_force

Any exemplification of any decree or judgment in partition on final decree in equity affecting real estate may in like manner be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in any county in which real estate described therein may be situated. Such record or exemplification thereof shall be received in evidence and shall be as effective in all cases as the original exemplification would be if produced, and shall be open to the same objection.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 26, p. 285;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 19, p. 370;

R.S.1913, § 6221;

C.S.1922, § 5620;

C.S.1929, § 76-226;

R.S.1943, § 76-249.

Recording fees, see section 33-109 .

Exemplification of decree quieting title to real estate must be recorded in office of register of deeds in order to claim benefits of recording act as against one whose instrument of title is first recorded. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).

Exemplification of decree quieting title to real estate must be recorded in office of register of deeds in order to claim benefits of recording act as against one whose instrument of title is first recorded. McCarthy v. Benedict, 90 Neb. 386, 133 N.W. 410 (1911).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-105 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-105
View Statute 76-105
Status: in_force

An otherwise effective exercise of power of appointment, a power of sale or a power of revocation, whether inter vivos or by a testamentary disposition, transfers or revokes the entire interest which the holder thereof has the power to transfer or to revoke unless an intent to transfer or to revoke a less interest is effectively manifested.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 5, p. 595;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1005;

R.S.1943, § 76-105.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-216 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-216
View Statute 76-216
Status: in_force

The grantor must acknowledge the instrument with an acknowledgment as defined in section 64-205 .

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 2, p. 280;

R.S.1913, § 6197;

C.S.1922, § 5596;

C.S.1929, § 76-202;

R.S.1943, § 76-216;

Laws 1978, LB 668, § 1.

Acknowledgment must show voluntary execution. Keeling v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891); Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Jenkins, 19 Neb. 209, 27 N.W. 117 (1886).

Acknowledgment must show voluntary execution. Keeling v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891); Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Jenkins, 19 Neb. 209, 27 N.W. 117 (1886).

Acknowledgment that it was their voluntary act was good. Spitznagle v. Vanhessch, 13 Neb. 338, 14 N.W. 417 (1882).

Acknowledgment that it was their voluntary act was good. Spitznagle v. Vanhessch, 13 Neb. 338, 14 N.W. 417 (1882).

Substantial compliance with statute is necessary and sufficient. Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 493, 9 N.W. 640 (1881).

Substantial compliance with statute is necessary and sufficient. Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 493, 9 N.W. 640 (1881).

Acknowledgment is no part of deed itself. Burbank v. Ellis, 7 Neb. 156 (1878).

Acknowledgment is no part of deed itself. Burbank v. Ellis, 7 Neb. 156 (1878).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-114 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-114
View Statute 76-114
Status: in_force

When any property is limited, mediately or immediately, in an otherwise effective testamentary conveyance, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, or to a person or persons who on the death of the conveyor are some or all of his heirs or next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by purchase and not by descent.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 14, p. 597;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1014;

R.S.1943, § 76-114.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-116 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-116
View Statute 76-116
Status: in_force

No future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall be destroyed by the mere termination, in any manner, of any or all preceding interests before the happening of the contingency to which the future interest is subject.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 16, p. 597;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1016;

R.S.1943, § 76-116.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-274 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-274
View Statute 76-274
Status: in_force

Whenever an interest in the fee title to any real estate in this state and an interest in a mortgage or other lien affecting the same interest shall become vested in the same person, and such person subsequently conveys such fee title by deed, unless a contrary intent is expressed by the terms of such deed, it shall be conclusively presumed in favor of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice, that such lien interest merged with the fee and was conveyed by such deed and that such lien was thereby released from the fee interest so conveyed.

Laws 1935, c. 150, § 1, p. 555;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-273;

R.S.1943, § 76-274.

A mortgage does not merge in the fee title where there is no identity of ownership of the mortgage and the fee title; thus, there can be no merger where a lien attaches to the entire property and the interest in the fee title was that of a joint tenant. County of Keith v. Fuller, 234 Neb. 518, 452 N.W.2d 25 (1990).

A mortgage does not merge in the fee title where there is no identity of ownership of the mortgage and the fee title; thus, there can be no merger where a lien attaches to the entire property and the interest in the fee title was that of a joint tenant. County of Keith v. Fuller, 234 Neb. 518, 452 N.W.2d 25 (1990).

Merger occurs under this section only when a person who has an interest in the fee title and an interest in a lien subsequently conveys the fee title to a third person. The action bringing about the merger is the subsequent conveyance. Whipple v. Commercial Bank of Blue Hill, 6 Neb. App. 249, 572 N.W.2d 797 (1997).

Merger occurs under this section only when a person who has an interest in the fee title and an interest in a lien subsequently conveys the fee title to a third person. The action bringing about the merger is the subsequent conveyance. Whipple v. Commercial Bank of Blue Hill, 6 Neb. App. 249, 572 N.W.2d 797 (1997).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.03 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.03
View Statute 76-239.03
Status: in_force

Nothing in sections 76-239.01 to 76-239.06 shall in any way affect the validity of the mortgage rights of the lender as provided for in section 76-238.01 , or the lien rights of such lender.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 3, p. 2492.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-235 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-235
View Statute 76-235
Status: in_force

Every deed acknowledged or proved, and certified by any of the officers named in sections 76-217 , 76-219 , 76-220 , 76-226 and 76-227 , and authorized to take acknowledgments, including the certificate specified in section 76-242 , whenever such certificate is required by law, may be read in evidence without further proof, and shall be entitled to be recorded. The record of a deed duly recorded, or a transcript thereof duly certified, may also be read in evidence with the like force and effect as the original deed, whenever by the party's oath or otherwise the original is known to be lost, or not belonging to the party wishing to use the same, nor within his control. Neither the certificate of the acknowledgment or the proof of any deed, nor the record or transcript of the record of such deed, shall be conclusive, but may be rebutted, and the force and effect thereof may be contested by any party affected thereby. If the party contesting the proof of a deed shall make it appear that such proof was taken upon the oath of an interested or incompetent witness, neither such deed nor the record thereof shall be received in evidence until established by other competent proof.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 13, p. 282;

R.S.1913, § 6210;

C.S.1922, § 5609;

C.S.1929, § 76-215;

R.S.1943, § 76-235.

1. Acknowledgment

1. Acknowledgment

2. Recording

2. Recording

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

1. Acknowledgment

1. Acknowledgment

A deed of lands situated in this state, executed in another state and acknowledged there before a notary public who attaches his official seal, is presumed to have been executed in accordance with the laws of that state and, though not witnessed, is entitled to be received in evidence in this state without other proof that the grantors therein actually executed and delivered the deed. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

A deed of lands situated in this state, executed in another state and acknowledged there before a notary public who attaches his official seal, is presumed to have been executed in accordance with the laws of that state and, though not witnessed, is entitled to be received in evidence in this state without other proof that the grantors therein actually executed and delivered the deed. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

Acknowledgment of corporation deed by president, although purporting to be his individual act, was sufficient. Powers v. Spiedel, 84 Neb. 630, 121 N.W. 968 (1909).

Acknowledgment of corporation deed by president, although purporting to be his individual act, was sufficient. Powers v. Spiedel, 84 Neb. 630, 121 N.W. 968 (1909).

Certificate of acknowledgment is not conclusive but may be rebutted by any party affected thereby. Rouse v. Witte, 81 Neb. 368, 116 N.W. 43 (1908).

Certificate of acknowledgment is not conclusive but may be rebutted by any party affected thereby. Rouse v. Witte, 81 Neb. 368, 116 N.W. 43 (1908).

A certificate of acknowledgment can be impeached only by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that the certificate is false and fraudulent. Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 220, 112 N.W. 329 (1907); McGuire v. Wilson, 5 Neb. Unof. 540, 99 N.W. 244 (1904).

A certificate of acknowledgment can be impeached only by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that the certificate is false and fraudulent. Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 220, 112 N.W. 329 (1907); McGuire v. Wilson, 5 Neb. Unof. 540, 99 N.W. 244 (1904).

Mortgage duly acknowledged is admissible in evidence without further proof. McKenzie v. Beaumont, 70 Neb. 179, 97 N.W. 225 (1903).

Mortgage duly acknowledged is admissible in evidence without further proof. McKenzie v. Beaumont, 70 Neb. 179, 97 N.W. 225 (1903).

Execution and delivery must be proved to admit in evidence unacknowledged deed. Linton v. Cooper, 53 Neb. 400, 73 N.W. 731 (1898).

04).

Mortgage duly acknowledged is admissible in evidence without further proof. McKenzie v. Beaumont, 70 Neb. 179, 97 N.W. 225 (1903).

Mortgage duly acknowledged is admissible in evidence without further proof. McKenzie v. Beaumont, 70 Neb. 179, 97 N.W. 225 (1903).

Execution and delivery must be proved to admit in evidence unacknowledged deed. Linton v. Cooper, 53 Neb. 400, 73 N.W. 731 (1898).

Execution and delivery must be proved to admit in evidence unacknowledged deed. Linton v. Cooper, 53 Neb. 400, 73 N.W. 731 (1898).

Certificate must substantially comply with statute. Maxwell v. Higgins, 38 Neb. 671, 57 N.W. 388 (1894).

Certificate must substantially comply with statute. Maxwell v. Higgins, 38 Neb. 671, 57 N.W. 388 (1894).

Certificate of authority must be in due form. Irwin v. Welch, 10 Neb. 479, 6 N.W. 753 (1880).

Certificate of authority must be in due form. Irwin v. Welch, 10 Neb. 479, 6 N.W. 753 (1880).

Acknowledged deed is admissible without evidence of authenticity of signatures. Brown v. Collins, 2 Neb. Unof. 149, 96 N.W. 173 (1901).

Acknowledged deed is admissible without evidence of authenticity of signatures. Brown v. Collins, 2 Neb. Unof. 149, 96 N.W. 173 (1901).

2. Recording

2. Recording

Recorded deed may be read in evidence without further proof. Pierce v. Fontenelle, 156 Neb. 235, 55 N.W.2d 658 (1952).

Recorded deed may be read in evidence without further proof. Pierce v. Fontenelle, 156 Neb. 235, 55 N.W.2d 658 (1952).

Where deed was entitled to be recorded, and it, or the record thereof, was receivable in evidence without further proof, and was only instrument that had been of record for many years covering land, such deed was defect in title, although not connected with chain of title from patentee. Robinson v. Bressler, 122 Neb. 461, 240 N.W. 564 (1932).

Where deed was entitled to be recorded, and it, or the record thereof, was receivable in evidence without further proof, and was only instrument that had been of record for many years covering land, such deed was defect in title, although not connected with chain of title from patentee. Robinson v. Bressler, 122 Neb. 461, 240 N.W. 564 (1932).

Whenever deed is lost, a certified transcript of the record of a deed duly recorded may be read in evidence with like force and effect of original deed. Thams v. Sharp, 49 Neb. 237, 68 N.W. 474 (1896).

Whenever deed is lost, a certified transcript of the record of a deed duly recorded may be read in evidence with like force and effect of original deed. Thams v. Sharp, 49 Neb. 237, 68 N.W. 474 (1896).

It is discretionary with trial court to admit record instead of original. Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892); Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 306, 43 N.W. 110 (1889); Delaney v. Errickson, 10 Neb. 492, 6 N.W. 600 (1880).

It is discretionary with trial court to admit record instead of original. Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892); Buck v. Gage, 27 Neb. 306, 43 N.W. 110 (1889); Delaney v. Errickson, 10 Neb. 492, 6 N.W. 600 (1880).

Record of deed may be shown without inquiry as to the original whenever evidence indicates that the original is not in the possession of or under the control of the party offering such proof. Staunchfield v. Jeutter, 4 Neb. Unof. 847, 96 N.W. 642 (1903).

Record of deed may be shown without inquiry as to the original whenever evidence indicates that the original is not in the possession of or under the control of the party offering such proof. Staunchfield v. Jeutter, 4 Neb. Unof. 847, 96 N.W. 642 (1903).

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

Deed alone does not prove title in grantor. Lesieur v. Custer County, 61 Neb. 612, 85 N.W. 892 (1901).

Deed alone does not prove title in grantor. Lesieur v. Custer County, 61 Neb. 612, 85 N.W. 892 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-229 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-229
View Statute 76-229
Status: in_force

The officer has power to issue the necessary subpoenas for the subscribing witnesses, residing in the same county, to appear before him for the purpose stated in section 76-228 .

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 8, p. 281;

R.S.1913, § 6204;

C.S.1922, § 5603;

C.S.1929, § 76-209;

R.S.1943, § 76-229.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-203 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-203
View Statute 76-203
Status: in_force

The term deed, as used in sections 76-201 to 76-281 and 76-2,126 , shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any real estate or interest therein is created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except last wills and leases for one year or for a less time.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 51, p. 291;

R.S.1913, § 6189;

C.S.1922, § 5588;

C.S.1929, § 76-103;

R.S.1943, § 76-203;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 28.

A postnuptial agreement may operate as a legal conveyance of real estate in Nebraska. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

A postnuptial agreement may operate as a legal conveyance of real estate in Nebraska. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

Assignment of real estate mortgage comes within above definition. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).

Assignment of real estate mortgage comes within above definition. Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N.W. 250 (1902).

Lease for a fixed and definite period is not a sale of real estate, and does not operate as deed. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Lease for a fixed and definite period is not a sale of real estate, and does not operate as deed. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Contract for sale of homestead was instrument which required acknowledgment. Solt v. Anderson, 71 Neb. 826, 99 N.W. 678 (1904).

Contract for sale of homestead was instrument which required acknowledgment. Solt v. Anderson, 71 Neb. 826, 99 N.W. 678 (1904).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-208 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-208
View Statute 76-208
Status: in_force

Unless such intention is expressly negatived by the language in the instrument, all covenants for title in conveyances of real property, including covenants of seisin, right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, quiet enjoyment, and warranty, when made with the grantee, run with the land and are enforceable by any assignee thereof, immediate or remote, by a suit in his own name; Provided, however, that the ultimate damage occasioned by a breach of the covenant on which suit is brought has not occurred prior to the assignment to such assignee. It shall not be a defense to the covenantor when sued by an assignee that the covenantor was a stranger to title to the whole or a part of the land the covenantor purported to convey.

Laws 1923, c. 111, § 3, p. 269;

C.S.1929, § 76-112;

R.S.1943, § 76-208.

A lessee of real estate under a written lease for twenty-five years, notice of which is recorded, is an assignee and may enforce covenants involving possessory rights contained in a prior conveyance of the real estate to his lessor. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).

A lessee of real estate under a written lease for twenty-five years, notice of which is recorded, is an assignee and may enforce covenants involving possessory rights contained in a prior conveyance of the real estate to his lessor. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-234 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-234
View Statute 76-234
Status: in_force

No acknowledgment of any conveyance shall be taken by any officer, unless the officer taking it shall know or have satisfactory evidence that the person making such acknowledgment is the person described in and who executed such conveyance.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 43, p. 289;

R.S.1913, § 6209;

C.S.1922, § 5608;

C.S.1929, § 76-214;

R.S.1943, § 76-234.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-247 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-247
View Statute 76-247
Status: in_force

A duly authenticated copy of the record of any power recorded in this state shall be entitled to record and shall operate to all intents and purposes, having the same force and effect, as the record of the original instrument. Such copy shall be duly authenticated only when there shall be attached thereto a certificate of the register of deeds under his hand and official seal, setting forth that the same is a true copy of the original record in his office, the date of the filing of the original instrument, and the volume and page where the same is recorded; Provided, it shall be unlawful for any register of deeds in this state to give a certified copy of any power of attorney which has been revoked and the revocation thereof filed in his office, without also stating the fact of such revocation in his certificate; and any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class V misdemeanor.

Laws 1883, c. 64, § 1, p. 265;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 27, p. 373;

R.S.1913, § 6217;

C.S.1922, § 5616;

C.S.1929, § 76-222;

R.S.1943, § 76-247;

Laws 1977, LB 39, § 207.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-226 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-226
View Statute 76-226
Status: in_force

If such deed be executed in a foreign country, it may be executed according to the laws of such country, and the execution thereof may be acknowledged before any notary public therein, or before any minister plenipotentiary, minister extraordinary, minister resident, charge d'affaires, commissioner, commercial agent, or consul of the United States appointed to reside therein, which acknowledgment shall be certified thereon by the officer taking the same, under his hand, and if taken before a notary public, his seal of office shall be affixed to such certificate.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 6, p. 281;

R.S.1913, § 6202;

C.S.1922, § 5601;

C.S.1929, § 76-207;

R.S.1943, § 76-226.

The word consul means any person invested by national government with functions of that office. Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).

The word consul means any person invested by national government with functions of that office. Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-119 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-119
View Statute 76-119
Status: in_force

A married person has the power to convey effectively property directly to his or her spouse in the same manner and to the same extent as if he or she were unmarried. Property so conveyed shall be subject to the rights of the grantor as spouse of the grantee in the same manner and to the same extent as property otherwise acquired by the grantee.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 19, p. 598;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1019;

R.S.1943, § 76-119.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-212 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-212
View Statute 76-212
Status: in_force

The use of private seals upon all deeds, mortgages, leases, bonds, and other instruments and contracts in writing, is abolished, and the addition of a private seal to any such instrument or contract in writing shall not affect its equity or legality in any respect.

R.S.1866, c. 49, § 1, p. 376;

R.S.1913, § 6251;

C.S.1922, § 5650;

C.S.1929, § 76-256;

R.S.1943, § 76-212.

Since abolishment of private seals, all contracts are simple contracts. Montgomery v. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N.W. 251 (1912).

Since abolishment of private seals, all contracts are simple contracts. Montgomery v. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N.W. 251 (1912).

Private seals do not affect the equity or legality of written instruments or contracts in this state. Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yds. Co., 89 Neb. 393, 131 N.W. 612 (1911).

Private seals do not affect the equity or legality of written instruments or contracts in this state. Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yds. Co., 89 Neb. 393, 131 N.W. 612 (1911).

Abolishment of seals abolished their incidents, i.e., conclusive presumption of consideration. Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1027 (1894); Richardson v. Woodruff, 20 Neb. 132, 29 N.W. 308 (1886).

Abolishment of seals abolished their incidents, i.e., conclusive presumption of consideration. Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 60 N.W. 1027 (1894); Richardson v. Woodruff, 20 Neb. 132, 29 N.W. 308 (1886).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-243 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-243
View Statute 76-243
Status: in_force

It shall be no objection to the record of a deed that no official seal is appended to the recorded acknowledgment or proof thereof if, when the acknowledgment or proof purports to have been taken by an officer having an official seal, there is a statement in the certificate of acknowledgment or proof that the same is made under his hand and seal of office, and such statement shall be presumptive evidence that the affixed seal was attached to the original certificate.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 23, p. 285;

Laws 1875, § 1, p. 90;

R.S.1913, § 6218;

C.S.1922, § 5617;

C.S.1929, § 76-223;

R.S.1943, § 76-243.

Failure of notary to write under his official signature the date when his commission will expire does not render his certificate void. Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 223, 115 N.W. 548 (1908).

Failure of notary to write under his official signature the date when his commission will expire does not render his certificate void. Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 223, 115 N.W. 548 (1908).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-219 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-219
View Statute 76-219
Status: in_force

If the instrument is executed and acknowledged or proved in any other state, territory or district of the United States, it must be executed and acknowledged or proved either according to the laws of such state, territory or district or in accordance with the law of this state, and if acknowledged out of this state it must be before some court of record or clerk or officer holding the seal thereof, or before some commissioner to take the acknowledgment of deeds, appointed by the Governor of this state, or before some notary public.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 4, p. 280;

Laws 1887, c. 61, § 2, p. 562;

Laws 1909, c. 110, § 1, p. 433;

R.S.1913, § 6199;

C.S.1922, § 5598;

C.S.1929, § 76-204;

R.S.1943, § 76-219.

A deed of lands situated in this state, executed in another state and acknowledged there before a notary public is presumed to have been executed according to the laws of that state though not witnessed, and is entitled to be received in evidence in this state, without other proof that the grantors actually executed and delivered the deed. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

A deed of lands situated in this state, executed in another state and acknowledged there before a notary public is presumed to have been executed according to the laws of that state though not witnessed, and is entitled to be received in evidence in this state, without other proof that the grantors actually executed and delivered the deed. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).

There is presumption of regularity of execution and acknowledgment in foreign state. Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68 N.W. 645 (1896); Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262, 68 N.W. 524 (1896).

There is presumption of regularity of execution and acknowledgment in foreign state. Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68 N.W. 645 (1896); Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262, 68 N.W. 524 (1896).

Acknowledgment in foreign state must satisfy laws of that state or this. Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 174 (1876).

Acknowledgment in foreign state must satisfy laws of that state or this. Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 174 (1876).

Authentication is required when officer has no seal. Hoadley v. Stephens, 4 Neb. 431 (1876).

Authentication is required when officer has no seal. Hoadley v. Stephens, 4 Neb. 431 (1876).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-259 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-259
View Statute 76-259
Status: in_force

The defects, irregularities and omissions mentioned in section 76-258 shall include all defects and irregularities in respect to formalities of execution and recording, and all defects and irregularities in, as well as the entire lack or omission of attestation, acknowledgment, certificate of acknowledgment, or certificate of recording, and shall apply with like force to instruments whether or not the real estate involved is homestead.

Laws 1941, c. 152, § 2, p. 593;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-277;

R.S.1943, § 76-259.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-204 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-204
View Statute 76-204
Status: in_force

Section 76-203 shall not be construed to extend to a letter of attorney or other instrument containing a power to convey lands as agent or attorney for the owner of such lands; but every such letter or instrument, and every executory contract for the sale or purchase of lands, when proved or acknowledged in the manner prescribed by statute, may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of any county in which the real estate to which such power or contract relates may be situated. Such an instrument, when so proved or acknowledged, and the record thereof, when recorded, or the transcript of such record, may be read in evidence, in the same manner and with the like effect as a conveyance recorded in such county.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 52, p. 291;

Laws 1887, c. 30, § 26, p. 372;

R.S.1913, § 6190;

C.S.1922, § 5589;

C.S.1929, § 76-104;

R.S.1943, § 76-204;

Laws 1973, LB 227, § 1.

Power of attorney with reference to real estate will be construed with respect to natural import of the language. Watkins v. Hagerty, 104 Neb. 414, 177 N.W. 654 (1920).

Power of attorney with reference to real estate will be construed with respect to natural import of the language. Watkins v. Hagerty, 104 Neb. 414, 177 N.W. 654 (1920).

A power of attorney is valid though not acknowledged, except to extent of conveying a homestead. Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).

A power of attorney is valid though not acknowledged, except to extent of conveying a homestead. Morris v. Linton, 61 Neb. 537, 85 N.W. 565 (1901).