Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2485 — NE Code / Chapter 30 / Section 30-2485
View Statute 30-2485
Status: in_force

(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:

(1) Within two months after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with sections 25-520.01 and 30-2483 , except that claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred in this state. If any creditor has a claim against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent and which was not presented within the time allowed by this subdivision, including any creditor who did not receive notice, such creditor may apply to the court within sixty days after the expiration date provided in this subdivision for additional time and the court, upon good cause shown, may allow further time not to exceed thirty days;

(2) Within three years after the decedent's death if notice to creditors has not been given in compliance with sections 25-520.01 and 30-2483 .

(b) All claims, other than for costs and expenses of administration as defined in section 30-2487 , against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:

(1) A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four months after performance by the personal representative is due;

(2) Any other claim, within four months after it arises.

(c) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:

(1) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of the estate; or

(2) To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he or she is protected by liability insurance.

Laws 1974, LB 354, § 163, UPC § 3-803;

Laws 1991, LB 95, § 1;

Laws 2009, LB35, § 20.

1. Scope

1. Scope

2. Miscellaneous

2. Miscellaneous

1. Scope

1. Scope

Under the Nebraska Probate Code, the first statute of limitations to apply will accomplish a bar. Sparks v. Mach, 314 Neb. 724, 993 N.W.2d 119 (2023).

Under the Nebraska Probate Code, the first statute of limitations to apply will accomplish a bar. Sparks v. Mach, 314 Neb. 724, 993 N.W.2d 119 (2023).

For purposes of this section, a demand against the trust assets is not a claim against the decedent's estate. In re Estate of Giventer, 310 Neb. 39, 964 N.W.2d 234 (2021).

For purposes of this section, a demand against the trust assets is not a claim against the decedent's estate. In re Estate of Giventer, 310 Neb. 39, 964 N.W.2d 234 (2021).

Because the Nebraska Probate Code requires that all claims, whether absolute or contingent, be presented within certain time periods or be barred against the estate, a contingency's unfulfilled status does not automatically defeat a claim. In re Estate of Ryan, 302 Neb. 821, 925 N.W.2d 336 (2019).

Because the Nebraska Probate Code requires that all claims, whether absolute or contingent, be presented within certain time periods or be barred against the estate, a contingency's unfulfilled status does not automatically defeat a claim. In re Estate of Ryan, 302 Neb. 821, 925 N.W.2d 336 (2019).

A court cannot extend the time for filing a claim that arose after death. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).

A court cannot extend the time for filing a claim that arose after death. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).

The 3-year limitations period of subsection (a)(2) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim because the personal representative failed to send notice to the department within 5 days of the date on which notice to creditors was first published, as required by sections 30-2483 and 25-520.01. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

The 3-year limitations period of subsection (a)(2) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim because the personal representative failed to send notice to the department within 5 days of the date on which notice to creditors was first published, as required by sections 30-2483 and 25-520.01. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

Time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim, because under the section, under which the claim was made, section 68-919, the indebtedness to the department arose during the lifetime of the recipient. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

Time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim, because under the section, under which the claim was made, section 68-919, the indebtedness to the department arose during the lifetime of the recipient. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

A claim against a decedent's estate which is excepted from the time limitations of this section remains subject to the statute of limitations governing the underlying claim. Babbitt v. Hronik, 261 Neb. 513, 623 N.W.2d 700 (2001).

A claim against a decedent's estate which is excepted from the time limitations of this section remains subject to the statute of limitations governing the underlying claim. Babbitt v. Hronik, 261 Neb. 513, 623 N.W.2d 700 (2001).

Claims for reimbursement of medical expenses made pursuant to section 68-1036.02 arise at or after death and, therefore, are subject to the limitations period imposed by subsection (b)(2) of this section. In re Estate of Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 620 N.W.2d 757 (2001).

Claims for reimbursement of medical expenses made pursuant to section 68-1036.02 arise at or after death and, therefore, are subject to the limitations period imposed by subsection (b)(2) of this section. In re Estate of Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 620 N.W.2d 757 (2001).

Pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section, a judgment lien on the proceeds from a sale is not a claim subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. A judgment lien is not a claim and is not subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. McCook Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 248 Neb. 567, 537 N.W.2d 353 (1995).

Pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section, a judgment lien on the proceeds from a sale is not a claim subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. A judgment lien is not a claim and is not subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. McCook Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 248 Neb. 567, 537 N.W.2d 353 (1995).

The purpose of the nonclaim statute is facilitation and expedition of proceedings for distribution of a decedent's estate, including an early appraisal of the respective rights of interested persons and prompt settlement of demands against the estate. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).

The purpose of the nonclaim statute is facilitation and expedition of proceedings for distribution of a decedent's estate, including an early appraisal of the respective rights of interested persons and prompt settlement of demands against the estate. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).

The requirements of this section are mandatory, and where a claim is not filed within the time provided in the statute, it is barred. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).

The requirements of this section are mandatory, and where a claim is not filed within the time provided in the statute, it is barred. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).

The defense of recoupment is not barred by this section. In re Estate of Massie, 218 Neb. 103, 353 N.W.2d 735 (1984).

The defense of recoupment is not barred by this section. In re Estate of Massie, 218 Neb. 103, 353 N.W.2d 735 (1984).

The time limits under this section for presentation of claims are not applicable when the recovery sought is solely limited to the extent of insurance protection. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

The time limits under this section for presentation of claims are not applicable when the recovery sought is solely limited to the extent of insurance protection. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

This section does not allow the institution of proceedings against a discharged personal representative while the estate is closed. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

This section does not allow the institution of proceedings against a discharged personal representative while the estate is closed. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

2. Miscellaneous

2. Miscellaneous

A widow's suit for $100,000 and a camper was not subject to the requirements of this section, because under the terms of a premarital agreement, her suit did not involve a "claim" against the decedent's estate as defined in subsection (4) of section 30-2209. White v. White, 316 Neb. 616, 6 N.W.3d 204 (2024).

A widow's suit for $100,000 and a camper was not subject to the requirements of this section, because under the terms of a premarital agreement, her suit did not involve a "claim" against the decedent's estate as defined in subsection (4) of section 30-2209. White v. White, 316 Neb. 616, 6 N.W.3d 204 (2024).

Although identifying the amount of a claim is not statutorily required, doing so advances the purpose of this section. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).

Although identifying the amount of a claim is not statutorily required, doing so advances the purpose of this section. In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 908 N.W.2d 381 (2018).

An award of interest commencing approximately 7 months after the decedent's death was improper because under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the time for the original presentation of the Department of Health and Human Services' claim expired 3 years after the decedent's death, and interest would not commence until 60 days thereafter, pursuant to section 30-2488(e). In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

An award of interest commencing approximately 7 months after the decedent's death was improper because under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the time for the original presentation of the Department of Health and Human Services' claim expired 3 years after the decedent's death, and interest would not commence until 60 days thereafter, pursuant to section 30-2488(e). In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).

Subsection (a)(1) of this section applies to all creditors who may ask the county court for an extension of time to file a claim, but subsection (a)(2) of this section applies only to creditors who do not receive notice. Therefore, both subsections (a)(1) and (2) of this section apply to creditors who do not receive notice. In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 606 N.W.2d 750 (2000).

Subsection (a)(1) of this section applies to all creditors who may ask the county court for an extension of time to file a claim, but subsection (a)(2) of this section applies only to creditors who do not receive notice. Therefore, both subsections (a)(1) and (2) of this section apply to creditors who do not receive notice. In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 606 N.W.2d 750 (2000).

The creditor bears the burden of proving that it filed a claim within the required period. Katskee v. Nevada Bob's Golf of Neb., 238 Neb. 654, 472 N.W.2d 372 (1991).

The creditor bears the burden of proving that it filed a claim within the required period. Katskee v. Nevada Bob's Golf of Neb., 238 Neb. 654, 472 N.W.2d 372 (1991).

Good cause within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) of this section envisions a claimant proceeding diligently toward presenting a claim against the decedent's estate, but the presentation of the claim is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, unavoidable misfortune, or excusable neglect. In re Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983).

Good cause within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) of this section envisions a claimant proceeding diligently toward presenting a claim against the decedent's estate, but the presentation of the claim is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, unavoidable misfortune, or excusable neglect. In re Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983).

A claimant who has a claim for the proceeds of a decedent's liability insurance under subsection (c)(2) of this section is entitled to have the estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in the civil action filed to establish liability and liability insurance coverage. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

A claimant who has a claim for the proceeds of a decedent's liability insurance under subsection (c)(2) of this section is entitled to have the estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in the civil action filed to establish liability and liability insurance coverage. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

Before suit can be filed, a closed estate, with a discharged personal representative, must be reopened and a personal representative appointed (or reappointed) even when seeking only liability insurance proceeds. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

Before suit can be filed, a closed estate, with a discharged personal representative, must be reopened and a personal representative appointed (or reappointed) even when seeking only liability insurance proceeds. Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).

A claim by the Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support for reimbursement of medical assistance benefits pursuant to section 68-1036.02 is one that necessarily falls within the provisions of subsection (b) of this section as arising "at or after" the death of the decedent who is a recipient of those benefits. In re Estate of Tvrz, 9 Neb. App. 98, 608 N.W.2d 226 (2000).

A claim by the Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support for reimbursement of medical assistance benefits pursuant to section 68-1036.02 is one that necessarily falls within the provisions of subsection (b) of this section as arising "at or after" the death of the decedent who is a recipient of those benefits. In re Estate of Tvrz, 9 Neb. App. 98, 608 N.W.2d 226 (2000).

Subsection (c) of this section does not provide for a direct action against an insurer, but, rather, an action against the estate of an alleged tort-feasor with the award being limited to the amount of available liability insurance. Robertson v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 8 Neb. App. 758, 602 N.W.2d 27 (1999).

Subsection (c) of this section does not provide for a direct action against an insurer, but, rather, an action against the estate of an alleged tort-feasor with the award being limited to the amount of available liability insurance. Robertson v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 8 Neb. App. 758, 602 N.W.2d 27 (1999).

Administration expenses, including attorney fees, are only excepted from the time-bar provisions for bringing claims. Administration expenses may be brought under the probate claims procedure. Kerrigan & Line v. Foote, 5 Neb. App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837 (1997).

Administration expenses, including attorney fees, are only excepted from the time-bar provisions for bringing claims. Administration expenses may be brought under the probate claims procedure. Kerrigan & Line v. Foote, 5 Neb. App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837 (1997).

Subsection (c)(2) of this section provides an exception to the general time-bar provisions of the probate code, and establishes a potential creditor's right to have an estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in a civil action to establish liability and liability insurance coverage, but this section does not authorize a suit against a former personal representative who has already been discharged for the purpose of establishing liability and insurance coverage. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).

Subsection (c)(2) of this section provides an exception to the general time-bar provisions of the probate code, and establishes a potential creditor's right to have an estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in a civil action to establish liability and liability insurance coverage, but this section does not authorize a suit against a former personal representative who has already been discharged for the purpose of establishing liability and insurance coverage. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).