Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01 — NE Code / Chapter 60 / Section 60-498.01
View Statute 60-498.01
Status: in_force

(1) Because persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol present a hazard to the health and safety of all persons using the highways, a procedure is needed for the swift and certain revocation of the operator's license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a health and safety hazard (a) by driving with an excessive concentration of alcohol in his or her body or (b) by driving while under the influence of alcohol.

(2) If a person arrested as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 refuses to submit to the chemical test of blood, breath, or urine required by section 60-6,197 , the test shall not be given except as provided in section 60-6,210 for the purpose of medical treatment and the arresting peace officer, as agent for the director, shall verbally serve notice to the arrested person of the intention to immediately confiscate and revoke the operator's license of such person and that the revocation will be automatic fifteen days after the date of arrest. The arresting peace officer shall within ten days forward to the director a sworn report stating (a) that the person was arrested as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 and the reasons for such arrest, (b) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (c) that the person refused to submit to the required test. The director may accept a sworn report submitted electronically.

(3) If a person arrested as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 submits to the chemical test of blood or breath required by section 60-6,197 , the test discloses the presence of alcohol in any of the concentrations specified in section 60-6,196 , and the test results are available to the arresting peace officer while the arrested person is still in custody, the arresting peace officer, as agent for the director, shall verbally serve notice to the arrested person of the intention to immediately confiscate and revoke the operator's license of such person and that the revocation will be automatic fifteen days after the date of arrest. The arresting peace officer shall within ten days forward to the director a sworn report stating (a) that the person was arrested as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 and the reasons for such arrest, (b) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (c) that the person submitted to a test, the type of test to which he or she submitted, and that such test revealed the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196 . The director may accept a sworn report submitted electronically.

(4) On behalf of the director, the arresting peace officer submitting a sworn report under subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall serve notice of the revocation on the arrested person, and the revocation shall be effective fifteen days after the date of arrest. The notice of revocation shall contain a statement explaining the operation of the administrative license revocation procedure. The peace officer shall also provide to the arrested person information prepared and approved by the director describing how to request an administrative license revocation hearing or apply for an ignition interlock permit or a 24/7 sobriety program permit. A petition for an administrative license revocation hearing must be completed and delivered to the department or postmarked within ten days after the person's arrest or the person's right to an administrative license revocation hearing to contest the revocation will be foreclosed. The director shall prepare and approve the information form, the application for an ignition interlock permit, and the notice of revocation and shall provide them to law enforcement agencies.

If the person has an operator's license, the arresting peace officer shall take possession of the license and issue a temporary operator's license valid for fifteen days. The arresting peace officer shall forward the operator's license to the department along with the sworn report made under subsection (2) or (3) of this section.

(5)(a) If the results of a chemical test indicate the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196 , the results are not available to the arresting peace officer while the arrested person is in custody, and the notice of revocation has not been served as required by subsection (4) of this section, the peace officer shall forward to the director a sworn report containing the information prescribed by subsection (3) of this section within ten days after receipt of the results of the chemical test. If the sworn report is not received within ten days, the revocation shall not take effect. The director may accept a sworn report submitted electronically.

(b) Upon receipt of the report, the director shall serve the notice of revocation on the arrested person by mail to the address appearing on the records of the director. If the address on the director's records differs from the address on the arresting peace officer's report, the notice shall be sent to both addresses. The notice of revocation shall contain a statement explaining the operation of the administrative license revocation procedure. The director shall also provide to the arrested person information prepared and approved by the director describing how to request an administrative license revocation hearing and an application for an ignition interlock permit. A petition for an administrative license revocation hearing must be completed and delivered to the department or postmarked within ten days after the mailing of the notice of revocation or the person's right to an administrative license revocation hearing to contest the revocation will be foreclosed. The director shall prepare and approve the ignition interlock permit application and the notice of revocation. The revocation shall be effective fifteen days after the date of mailing.

(c) If the records of the director indicate that the arrested person possesses an operator's license, the director shall include with the notice of revocation a temporary operator's license which expires fifteen days after the date of mailing. Any arrested person who desires an administrative license revocation hearing and has been served a notice of revocation pursuant to this subsection shall return his or her operator's license with the petition requesting the hearing. If the operator's license is not included with the petition requesting the hearing, the director shall deny the petition.

(6)(a) An arrested person's operator's license confiscated pursuant to subsection (4) of this section shall be automatically revoked upon the expiration of fifteen days after the date of arrest, and the petition requesting the hearing shall be completed and delivered to the department or postmarked within ten days after the person's arrest. An arrested person's operator's license confiscated pursuant to subsection (5) of this section shall be automatically revoked upon the expiration of fifteen days after the date of mailing of the notice of revocation by the director, and the arrested person shall postmark or return to the director a petition within ten days after the mailing of the notice of revocation if the arrested person desires an administrative license revocation hearing. The petition shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which the person is relying to prevent the revocation from becoming effective. The hearing and any prehearing conference may be conducted in person or by telephone, television, or other electronic means at the discretion of the director, and all parties may participate by such means at the discretion of the director.

(b) The director shall conduct the hearing within twenty days after a petition is received by the director. Upon receipt of a petition, the director shall notify the petitioner of the date and location for the hearing by mail postmarked at least seven days prior to the hearing date. The filing of the petition shall not prevent the automatic revocation of the petitioner's operator's license at the expiration of the fifteen-day period. A continuance of the hearing to a date beyond the expiration of the temporary operator's license shall stay the expiration of the temporary license when the request for continuance is made by the director.

(c) At hearing the issues under dispute shall be limited to:

(i) In the case of a refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood, breath, or urine:

(A) Did the peace officer have probable cause to believe the person was operating or in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section; and

(B) Did the person refuse to submit to or fail to complete a chemical test after being requested to do so by the peace officer; or

(ii) If the chemical test discloses the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196 :

(A) Did the peace officer have probable cause to believe the person was operating or in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section; and

(B) Was the person operating or in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration in violation of subsection (1) of section 60-6,196 .

(7)(a) Any arrested person who submits an application for an ignition interlock permit in lieu of a petition for an administrative license revocation hearing regarding the revocation of his or her operator's license pursuant to this section shall complete the application for an ignition interlock permit in which such person acknowledges that he or she understands that he or she will have his or her license administratively revoked pursuant to this section, that he or she waives his or her right to a hearing to contest the revocation, and that he or she understands that he or she is required to have an ignition interlock permit in order to operate a motor vehicle for the period of the revocation and shall include sufficient evidence that an ignition interlock device is installed on one or more vehicles that will be operated by the arrested person. Upon the arrested person's completion of the ignition interlock permit application process, the department shall issue the person an ignition interlock permit, subject to any applicable requirements and any applicable no-drive period if the person is otherwise eligible.

(b) An arrested person who is issued an ignition interlock permit pursuant to this section or a 24/7 sobriety program permit under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act as a condition of bail shall receive day-for-day credit for the period he or she has a valid ignition interlock permit or valid 24/7 sobriety program permit against the license revocation period imposed by the court arising from the same incident.

(c) If a person files a completed application for an ignition interlock permit, the person waives his or her right to contest the revocation of his or her operator's license.

(d) A person subject to administrative license revocation under sections 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 shall be eligible for a 24/7 sobriety program permit.

(8) Any person who has not petitioned for an administrative license revocation hearing and is subject to an administrative license revocation may immediately apply for an ignition interlock permit or a 24/7 sobriety program permit under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act to use during the applicable period of revocation set forth in section 60-498.02 , subject to the following additional restrictions:

(a) If such person submitted to a chemical test which disclosed the presence of a concentration of alcohol in violation of section 60-6,196 and has no prior administrative license revocations on which final orders have been issued during the immediately preceding fifteen-year period at the time the order of revocation is issued:

(i) The ignition interlock permit will be immediately available fifteen days after the date of arrest or the date notice of revocation was provided to the arrested person, as long as he or she is otherwise eligible for an ignition interlock permit, upon completion of an application process for an ignition interlock permit; or

(ii) If such person is enrolled in a 24/7 sobriety program under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act and has not violated any program conditions for drugs or alcohol after thirty consecutive days of testing, such person may apply for a 24/7 sobriety program permit as a condition of bail under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act. Such permit shall expire at the same time as the later of any administrative license revocation being served as determined by section 60-498.02 ;

(b) If such person submitted to a chemical test which disclosed the presence of a concentration of alcohol in violation of section 60-6,196 and has one or more prior administrative license revocations on which final orders have been issued during the immediately preceding fifteen-year period at the time the order of revocation is issued:

(i) The ignition interlock permit will be available beginning fifteen days after the date of arrest or the date notice of revocation was provided to the arrested person plus forty-five additional days of no driving, as long as he or she is otherwise eligible for an ignition interlock permit, upon completion of an application process for an ignition interlock permit; or

(ii) If such person is enrolled in the 24/7 sobriety program under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act and has not violated any program conditions for drugs or alcohol after thirty consecutive days of testing, such person may apply for a 24/7 sobriety program permit as a condition of bail under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act any time after the expiration of the forty-five day no driving period referred to in subdivision (8)(b)(i) of this section;

(c) If such person refused to submit to a chemical test of blood, breath, or urine as required by section 60-6,197 :

(i) The ignition interlock permit will be available beginning fifteen days after the date of arrest plus ninety additional days of no driving, as long as he or she is otherwise eligible for an ignition interlock permit, upon completion of an application process for an ignition interlock permit; or

(ii) If such person is enrolled in the 24/7 sobriety program under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act and has not violated any program conditions for drugs or alcohol after thirty consecutive days of testing, the person may apply for a 24/7 sobriety program permit as a condition of bond under the 24/7 Sobriety Program Act any time after the expiration of the ninety-day no driving period referred to in subdivision (8)(c)(i) of this section. Such permit shall expire at the same time as the later of any administrative license revocation being served as determined by section 60-498.02 ; and

(d) Any person who petitions for an administrative license revocation hearing shall not be eligible for an ignition interlock permit or a 24/7 sobriety program permit unless ordered by the court at the time of sentencing for the related criminal proceeding.

(9) The director shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to govern the conduct of the administrative license revocation hearing and insure that the hearing will proceed in an orderly manner. The director may appoint a hearing officer to preside at the hearing, administer oaths, examine witnesses, take testimony, and report to the director. Any motion for discovery filed by the petitioner shall entitle the prosecutor to receive full statutory discovery from the petitioner upon a prosecutor's request to the relevant court pursuant to section 29-1912 in any criminal proceeding arising from the same arrest. A copy of the motion for discovery shall be filed with the department and a copy provided to the prosecutor in the jurisdiction in which the petitioner was arrested. Incomplete discovery shall not stay the hearing unless the petitioner requests a continuance. All proceedings before the hearing officer shall be recorded. Upon receipt of the arresting peace officer's sworn report, the director's order of revocation has prima facie validity and it becomes the petitioner's burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence grounds upon which the operator's license revocation should not take effect. The director shall make a determination of the issue within seven days after the conclusion of the hearing. A person whose operator's license is revoked following a hearing requested pursuant to this section may appeal the order of revocation as provided in section 60-498.04 .

(10) Any person who tampers with or circumvents an ignition interlock device installed pursuant to sections 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 or who operates a motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device required pursuant to such sections or otherwise is in violation of the purposes for operation indicated on the ignition interlock permit under such sections shall, in addition to any possible criminal charges, have his or her revocation period and ignition interlock permit extended for six months beyond the end of the original revocation period.

(11) A person under the age of eighteen years who holds any license or permit issued under the Motor Vehicle Operator's License Act and has violated subdivision (3)(b) or (c) of section 28-306 , subdivision (3)(b) or (c) of section 28-394 , or section 28-1254 , 60-6,196 , 60-6,197 , 60-6,197.06 , or 60-6,198 shall not be eligible for an ignition interlock permit or a 24/7 sobriety program permit.

Laws 1972, LB 1095, § 5;

R.S.Supp.,1972, § 39-727.16;

Laws 1992, LB 872, § 4;

Laws 1992, LB 291, § 9;

R.S.Supp.,1992, § 39-669.15;

Laws 1993, LB 370, § 300;

Laws 1996, LB 939, § 3;

Laws 1998, LB 309, § 15;

Laws 2001, LB 38, § 51;

R.S.Supp.,2002, § 60-6,205;

Laws 2003, LB 209, § 4;

Laws 2004, LB 208, § 5;

Laws 2011, LB667, § 24;

Laws 2012, LB751, § 20;

Laws 2019, LB269, § 2;

Laws 2021, LB271, § 9.

24/7 Sobriety Program Act, see section 60-701 .

1. Constitutionality

1. Constitutionality

2. Refusal to submit to test

2. Refusal to submit to test

3. Rules and regulations

3. Rules and regulations

4. Procedure

4. Procedure

5. Venue

5. Venue

6. Sworn report

6. Sworn report

7. Miscellaneous

7. Miscellaneous

1. Constitutionality

1. Constitutionality

The administrative license revocation provisions pertaining to motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing do not violate the due process or equal protection rights of those motorists by treating them differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

The administrative license revocation provisions pertaining to motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing do not violate the due process or equal protection rights of those motorists by treating them differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

The due process rights of a motorist who refuses to submit to chemical testing are not violated by this section even though the statutory scheme does not operate to reinstate the motorist's administratively revoked driver's license if he or she is acquitted of the criminal refusal charge. Kenley v. Neth, 271 Neb. 402, 712 N.W.2d 251 (2006).

The due process rights of a motorist who refuses to submit to chemical testing are not violated by this section even though the statutory scheme does not operate to reinstate the motorist's administratively revoked driver's license if he or she is acquitted of the criminal refusal charge. Kenley v. Neth, 271 Neb. 402, 712 N.W.2d 251 (2006).

This section does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions by treating motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Kenley v. Neth, 271 Neb. 402, 712 N.W.2d 251 (2006).

This section does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions by treating motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Kenley v. Neth, 271 Neb. 402, 712 N.W.2d 251 (2006).

Although this section does not allow a motorist to challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop, it does not violate due process because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable in civil license revocation proceedings. Chase v. Neth, 269 Neb. 882, 697 N.W.2d 675 (2005).

Although this section does not allow a motorist to challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop, it does not violate due process because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable in civil license revocation proceedings. Chase v. Neth, 269 Neb. 882, 697 N.W.2d 675 (2005).

This section does not create an unconstitutional classification between those who submit to urine tests and those who submit to blood and breath tests pursuant to this section. Kalisek v. Abramson, 257 Neb. 517, 599 N.W.2d 834 (1999).

This section does not create an unconstitutional classification between those who submit to urine tests and those who submit to blood and breath tests pursuant to this section. Kalisek v. Abramson, 257 Neb. 517, 599 N.W.2d 834 (1999).

Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).

Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).

The Legislature intended administrative license revocation to be a civil sanction, and the sanction is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intent; therefore, administrative license revocation for failure to submit to a chemical test does not violate double jeopardy. State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).

The Legislature intended administrative license revocation to be a civil sanction, and the sanction is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intent; therefore, administrative license revocation for failure to submit to a chemical test does not violate double jeopardy. State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).

The purpose of administrative license revocation is to protect the public from the health and safety hazards of driving and to deter drunk driving. Criminal prosecution and punishment following a hearing under this section do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Young, 249 Neb. 539, 544 N.W.2d 808 (1996).

The purpose of administrative license revocation is to protect the public from the health and safety hazards of driving and to deter drunk driving. Criminal prosecution and punishment following a hearing under this section do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Young, 249 Neb. 539, 544 N.W.2d 808 (1996).

2. Refusal to submit to test

2. Refusal to submit to test

The sworn report of the arresting officer must indicate (1) that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2) and the reasons for the arrest, (2) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (3) that the person refused to submit to the required test. Nothnagel v. Neth, 276 Neb. 95, 752 N.W.2d 149 (2008).

The sworn report of the arresting officer must indicate (1) that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2) and the reasons for the arrest, (2) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (3) that the person refused to submit to the required test. Nothnagel v. Neth, 276 Neb. 95, 752 N.W.2d 149 (2008).

Failure to produce an adequate breath sample constitutes a refusal to submit to breath test. Porter v. Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d 511 (1986).

Failure to produce an adequate breath sample constitutes a refusal to submit to breath test. Porter v. Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d 511 (1986).

A motorist's subsequent offer to take a blood alcohol test previously refused does not nullify or cure such driver's initial refusal to take the test requested by the arresting officer. Hoyle v. Peterson, 216 Neb. 253, 343 N.W.2d 730 (1984).

A motorist's subsequent offer to take a blood alcohol test previously refused does not nullify or cure such driver's initial refusal to take the test requested by the arresting officer. Hoyle v. Peterson, 216 Neb. 253, 343 N.W.2d 730 (1984).

Adoption of this section did not change rule that refusal to submit to test may be shown in prosecution for driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972).

Adoption of this section did not change rule that refusal to submit to test may be shown in prosecution for driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972).

3. Rules and regulations

3. Rules and regulations

When the applicable rules and regulations are not strictly complied with, the Department of Motor Vehicles cannot obtain the benefit of a presumption that all facts recited in the sworn report are true. Morrissey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Neb. 456, 647 N.W.2d 644 (2002).

When the applicable rules and regulations are not strictly complied with, the Department of Motor Vehicles cannot obtain the benefit of a presumption that all facts recited in the sworn report are true. Morrissey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Neb. 456, 647 N.W.2d 644 (2002).

Due process is denied where the rules and regulations governing the administrative license revocation procedure were not on file with the Secretary of State for at least 5 days at the time of the arrest. Dannehl v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 3 Neb. App. 492, 529 N.W.2d 100 (1995).

Due process is denied where the rules and regulations governing the administrative license revocation procedure were not on file with the Secretary of State for at least 5 days at the time of the arrest. Dannehl v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 3 Neb. App. 492, 529 N.W.2d 100 (1995).

4. Procedure

4. Procedure

Although this section limits the issues under dispute, it does not prohibit evidence pertinent to the issue of enhancement after those issues have been resolved. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758 (2008).

Although this section limits the issues under dispute, it does not prohibit evidence pertinent to the issue of enhancement after those issues have been resolved. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758 (2008).

The failure to hold a hearing within the time provided in subsection (6)(b) of this section does not invalidate the administrative license revocation proceeding unless the motorist can show that he or she was prejudiced by the delay. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

The failure to hold a hearing within the time provided in subsection (6)(b) of this section does not invalidate the administrative license revocation proceeding unless the motorist can show that he or she was prejudiced by the delay. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

A report that does not contain the affirmation of an "arresting peace officer" that the facts recited in the report are true is not a proper "sworn report" as required by this section. Arndt v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 270 Neb. 172, 699 N.W.2d 39 (2005).

A report that does not contain the affirmation of an "arresting peace officer" that the facts recited in the report are true is not a proper "sworn report" as required by this section. Arndt v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 270 Neb. 172, 699 N.W.2d 39 (2005).

An arresting officer's sworn report must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this section in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke an operator's license. Hahn v. Neth, 270 Neb. 164, 699 N.W.2d 32 (2005).

An arresting officer's sworn report must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this section in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke an operator's license. Hahn v. Neth, 270 Neb. 164, 699 N.W.2d 32 (2005).

Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the administrative license revocation process must be based on a valid arrest, because the sworn report which triggers the administrative license revocation must be prepared by an "arresting peace officer" who has "validly arrested" a driver. Young v. Neth, 263 Neb. 20, 637 N.W.2d 884 (2002).

Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the administrative license revocation process must be based on a valid arrest, because the sworn report which triggers the administrative license revocation must be prepared by an "arresting peace officer" who has "validly arrested" a driver. Young v. Neth, 263 Neb. 20, 637 N.W.2d 884 (2002).

The burden is upon the state to make a prima facie case for revocation before the director. Mackey v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975).

The burden is upon the state to make a prima facie case for revocation before the director. Mackey v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975).

The law enforcement officer handwrote the defendant's name in the box at the top of the sworn report form designated "Driver Name," and the preprinted text stated that "the above-named driver was arrested pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,197." The law enforcement officer's reasons for arrest indicated that the defendant was inside his own vehicle when the officer "observed" him on a named street near a specified intersection. Considering the sworn report in its totality, a reasonable inference could be made from the sworn report that the defendant operated or was in actual physical control of his vehicle while intoxicated at the designated location; accordingly, the sworn report conveyed jurisdiction upon the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke the defendant's driver's license. Nelson v. Lahm, 32 Neb. App. 35, 992 N.W.2d 508 (2023).

The law enforcement officer handwrote the defendant's name in the box at the top of the sworn report form designated "Driver Name," and the preprinted text stated that "the above-named driver was arrested pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,197." The law enforcement officer's reasons for arrest indicated that the defendant was inside his own vehicle when the officer "observed" him on a named street near a specified intersection. Considering the sworn report in its totality, a reasonable inference could be made from the sworn report that the defendant operated or was in actual physical control of his vehicle while intoxicated at the designated location; accordingly, the sworn report conveyed jurisdiction upon the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke the defendant's driver's license. Nelson v. Lahm, 32 Neb. App. 35, 992 N.W.2d 508 (2023).

There are two components to the reasons for arrest that must be included in a sworn report: (1) driving or actual physical control of a motor vehicle and (2) doing so while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Nelson v. Lahm, 32 Neb. App. 35, 992 N.W.2d 508 (2023).

There are two components to the reasons for arrest that must be included in a sworn report: (1) driving or actual physical control of a motor vehicle and (2) doing so while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Nelson v. Lahm, 32 Neb. App. 35, 992 N.W.2d 508 (2023).

Pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section, the arresting officer may participate in the hearing and any prehearing conference by telephone, television, or other electronic means at the discretion of the director. Penry v. Neth, 20 Neb. App. 276, 823 N.W.2d 243 (2012).

Pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section, the arresting officer may participate in the hearing and any prehearing conference by telephone, television, or other electronic means at the discretion of the director. Penry v. Neth, 20 Neb. App. 276, 823 N.W.2d 243 (2012).

When the motorist made no showing in support of the need for a continuance and refused to request one himself, it was not a violation of his due process rights for the Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer not to grant a continuance on her own motion so that the motorist could obtain a stay of revocation under subdivision (6)(b) of this section. Kriz v. Neth, 19 Neb. App. 819, 811 N.W.2d 739 (2012)

When the motorist made no showing in support of the need for a continuance and refused to request one himself, it was not a violation of his due process rights for the Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer not to grant a continuance on her own motion so that the motorist could obtain a stay of revocation under subdivision (6)(b) of this section. Kriz v. Neth, 19 Neb. App. 819, 811 N.W.2d 739 (2012)

This section requires the director to conduct the administrative license revocation hearing, but allows the director to appoint a hearing officer to preside at the hearing, and thus, the hearing officer serves as the director's agent. Hashman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 951, 797 N.W.2d 275 (2011).

This section requires the director to conduct the administrative license revocation hearing, but allows the director to appoint a hearing officer to preside at the hearing, and thus, the hearing officer serves as the director's agent. Hashman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 951, 797 N.W.2d 275 (2011).

For purposes of subsection (5)(a) of this section, the test results are "received" on the date they are delivered to the law enforcement agency by which the arrest was effectuated and the arresting peace officer has 10 days thereafter to forward the sworn report to the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

For purposes of subsection (5)(a) of this section, the test results are "received" on the date they are delivered to the law enforcement agency by which the arrest was effectuated and the arresting peace officer has 10 days thereafter to forward the sworn report to the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

The 10-day time period for submitting a sworn report under subsection (5)(a) of this section is mandatory, and if the sworn report is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

The 10-day time period for submitting a sworn report under subsection (5)(a) of this section is mandatory, and if the sworn report is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

If a sworn report falling under subsection (5)(a) of this section is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Murray v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394 (2009).

If a sworn report falling under subsection (5)(a) of this section is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Murray v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394 (2009).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (3) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Murray v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394 (2009).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (3) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Murray v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394 (2009).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (2) of this section, which states that an arresting officer shall forward a sworn report to the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, is directory rather than mandatory. Walz v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 891, 773 N.W.2d 387 (2009).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (2) of this section, which states that an arresting officer shall forward a sworn report to the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, is directory rather than mandatory. Walz v. Neth, 17 Neb. App. 891, 773 N.W.2d 387 (2009).

Under subsection (5)(a) of this section, the 10-day time period for submitting a sworn report is mandatory, and if the sworn report is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Stoetzel v. Neth, 16 Neb. App. 348, 744 N.W.2d 465 (2008).

Under subsection (5)(a) of this section, the 10-day time period for submitting a sworn report is mandatory, and if the sworn report is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person's driver's license. Stoetzel v. Neth, 16 Neb. App. 348, 744 N.W.2d 465 (2008).

The last sentence of subsection (5)(a) of this section modifies only the preceding sentence and does not apply to the other subsections. Thomsen v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Neb. App. 44, 741 N.W.2d 682 (2007).

The last sentence of subsection (5)(a) of this section modifies only the preceding sentence and does not apply to the other subsections. Thomsen v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Neb. App. 44, 741 N.W.2d 682 (2007).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (3) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Thomsen v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Neb. App. 44, 741 N.W.2d 682 (2007).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (3) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Thomsen v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Neb. App. 44, 741 N.W.2d 682 (2007).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (2) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Forgey v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Neb. App. 191, 724 N.W.2d 828 (2006).

The 10-day time limit set forth in subsection (2) of this section is directory rather than mandatory. Forgey v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Neb. App. 191, 724 N.W.2d 828 (2006).

When an arrested driver is released before the results of blood alcohol content testing are known to the arresting officer, then under subsection (5)(a) of this section (60-6,205 (Reissue 1993)) the arresting officer is "unable to serve" notice, and the statutory provision allowing service by certified mail by the Department of Motor Vehicles becomes operative. Kuebler v. Abramson, 4 Neb. App. 420, 544 N.W.2d 513 (1996).

When an arrested driver is released before the results of blood alcohol content testing are known to the arresting officer, then under subsection (5)(a) of this section (60-6,205 (Reissue 1993)) the arresting officer is "unable to serve" notice, and the statutory provision allowing service by certified mail by the Department of Motor Vehicles becomes operative. Kuebler v. Abramson, 4 Neb. App. 420, 544 N.W.2d 513 (1996).

5. Venue

5. Venue

For purposes of subsection (6)(a) of this section, an administrative license revocation hearing is held at the location of the hearing officer. Gracey v. Zwonechek, 263 Neb. 796, 643 N.W.2d 381 (2002).

For purposes of subsection (6)(a) of this section, an administrative license revocation hearing is held at the location of the hearing officer. Gracey v. Zwonechek, 263 Neb. 796, 643 N.W.2d 381 (2002).

Pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section, generalized objections directed to the method by which a license revocation hearing was being held are not objections to venue. Davis v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 504, 641 N.W.2d 37 (2002).

Pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section, generalized objections directed to the method by which a license revocation hearing was being held are not objections to venue. Davis v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 504, 641 N.W.2d 37 (2002).

Subsection (6)(a) of this section is a venue statute. Reiter v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 277, 640 N.W.2d 19 (2002).

Subsection (6)(a) of this section is a venue statute. Reiter v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 277, 640 N.W.2d 19 (2002).

Subsection (6)(a) of this section, establishing the location for administrative license revocation hearings, is a venue statute. A telephonic hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act pertaining to license revocation is subject to the terms of subsection (6)(a) of this section. Muir v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 260 Neb. 450, 618 N.W.2d 444 (2000).

Subsection (6)(a) of this section, establishing the location for administrative license revocation hearings, is a venue statute. A telephonic hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act pertaining to license revocation is subject to the terms of subsection (6)(a) of this section. Muir v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 260 Neb. 450, 618 N.W.2d 444 (2000).

6. Sworn report

6. Sworn report

A sworn report does not need to state or support an inference that the individual arrested drove or controlled a motor vehicle on property open to public access. Hoppens v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 Neb. 857, 852 N.W.2d 331 (2014).

A sworn report does not need to state or support an inference that the individual arrested drove or controlled a motor vehicle on property open to public access. Hoppens v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 Neb. 857, 852 N.W.2d 331 (2014).

An arresting officer's sworn report triggers the administrative license revocation process by establishing a prima facie basis for revocation. The sworn report must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this section in order to confer jurisdiction. Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010).

An arresting officer's sworn report triggers the administrative license revocation process by establishing a prima facie basis for revocation. The sworn report must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this section in order to confer jurisdiction. Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010).

The Department of Motor Vehicles has the power, in an administrative license revocation proceeding, to evaluate the jurisdictional averments in a sworn report and, if necessary, solicit a sworn addendum to that report if necessary to establish jurisdiction to proceed. Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010).

The Department of Motor Vehicles has the power, in an administrative license revocation proceeding, to evaluate the jurisdictional averments in a sworn report and, if necessary, solicit a sworn addendum to that report if necessary to establish jurisdiction to proceed. Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010).

An acknowledgment on a sworn report which does not set forth the name of the individual making the acknowledgment, i.e., the arresting officer, does not substantially comply with the requirements of Nebraska law. Johnson v. Neth, 276 Neb. 886, 758 N.W.2d 395 (2008).

An acknowledgment on a sworn report which does not set forth the name of the individual making the acknowledgment, i.e., the arresting officer, does not substantially comply with the requirements of Nebraska law. Johnson v. Neth, 276 Neb. 886, 758 N.W.2d 395 (2008).

Sworn reports in administrative license revocation proceedings are, by definition, affidavits. Johnson v. Neth, 276 Neb. 886, 758 N.W.2d 395 (2008).

Sworn reports in administrative license revocation proceedings are, by definition, affidavits. Johnson v. Neth, 276 Neb. 886, 758 N.W.2d 395 (2008).

The arresting officer's sworn report triggers the administrative license revocation process by establishing a prima facie basis for revocation. Nothnagel v. Neth, 276 Neb. 95, 752 N.W.2d 149 (2008).

The arresting officer's sworn report triggers the administrative license revocation process by establishing a prima facie basis for revocation. Nothnagel v. Neth, 276 Neb. 95, 752 N.W.2d 149 (2008).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in subsection (3) of this section in order to confer jurisdiction. Snyder v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 168, 736 N.W.2d 731 (2007); Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in subsection (3) of this section in order to confer jurisdiction. Snyder v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 168, 736 N.W.2d 731 (2007); Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in the applicable statute in order to confer jurisdiction. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007); Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in the applicable statute in order to confer jurisdiction. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007); Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

A sworn statement containing the recitations required by this section establishes a prima facie case under the provisions of the administrative license revocation statutes. McPherrin v. Conrad, 248 Neb. 561, 537 N.W.2d 498 (1995).

A sworn statement containing the recitations required by this section establishes a prima facie case under the provisions of the administrative license revocation statutes. McPherrin v. Conrad, 248 Neb. 561, 537 N.W.2d 498 (1995).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this subsection in order to confer jurisdiction. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

In an administrative license revocation proceeding, pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the sworn report of the arresting officer must, at a minimum, contain the information specified in this subsection in order to confer jurisdiction. Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 592, 790 N.W.2d 218 (2010).

When a person submits to a chemical test of breath, the required recitations in the sworn report are (1) that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2)—reasonable grounds to believe such person was driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or drugs—and the reasons for such arrest, (2) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (3) that the person submitted to a test, the type of test to which he or she submitted, and that such test revealed the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196. Teeters v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 585, 790 N.W.2d 213 (2010).

When a person submits to a chemical test of breath, the required recitations in the sworn report are (1) that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2)—reasonable grounds to believe such person was driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or drugs—and the reasons for such arrest, (2) that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and (3) that the person submitted to a test, the type of test to which he or she submitted, and that such test revealed the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196. Teeters v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 585, 790 N.W.2d 213 (2010).

Where a sworn report identifies two arresting officers and, as submitted, conveys the information required by the applicable statute, the omission of the second arresting officer's signature of the report is a technical deficiency that does not deprive the Department of Motor Vehicles of jurisdiction. Law v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 18 Neb. App. 237, 777 N.W.2d 586 (2010).

Where a sworn report identifies two arresting officers and, as submitted, conveys the information required by the applicable statute, the omission of the second arresting officer's signature of the report is a technical deficiency that does not deprive the Department of Motor Vehicles of jurisdiction. Law v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 18 Neb. App. 237, 777 N.W.2d 586 (2010).

Despite the officer's failure to check the box next to "Submitted to a blood test," the information contained under this heading clearly shows that a blood test was performed and that the results of the blood test were in a concentration above the statutory amount, which conveys the information required by subsection (3) of this section. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

Despite the officer's failure to check the box next to "Submitted to a blood test," the information contained under this heading clearly shows that a blood test was performed and that the results of the blood test were in a concentration above the statutory amount, which conveys the information required by subsection (3) of this section. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

Subsection (3) of this section requires a sworn report to state that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2), the reasons for such arrest, that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and that the person submitted to a test, the type of test to which he submitted, and that such test revealed the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

Subsection (3) of this section requires a sworn report to state that the person was arrested as described in section 60-6,197(2), the reasons for such arrest, that the person was requested to submit to the required test, and that the person submitted to a test, the type of test to which he submitted, and that such test revealed the presence of alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

The test used to determine whether an omission from a sworn report becomes a jurisdictional defect, as opposed to a technical one, is whether, notwithstanding the omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by the applicable statute. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

The test used to determine whether an omission from a sworn report becomes a jurisdictional defect, as opposed to a technical one, is whether, notwithstanding the omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by the applicable statute. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the failure of the notary to include the expiration date of his or her commission on the sworn report does not render such sworn report invalid because the presence of a notarial seal and the notary's signature serves as presumptive evidence of the performance of the notary's duty. Valeriano-Cruz v. Neth, 14 Neb. App. 855, 716 N.W.2d 765 (2006).

Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the failure of the notary to include the expiration date of his or her commission on the sworn report does not render such sworn report invalid because the presence of a notarial seal and the notary's signature serves as presumptive evidence of the performance of the notary's duty. Valeriano-Cruz v. Neth, 14 Neb. App. 855, 716 N.W.2d 765 (2006).

Once the arresting officer's sworn report is received, the case for revocation has prima facie validity and it becomes the petitioner's burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence grounds upon which the operator's license revocation should not take effect. Scott v. State, 13 Neb. App. 867, 703 N.W.2d 266 (2005).

Once the arresting officer's sworn report is received, the case for revocation has prima facie validity and it becomes the petitioner's burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence grounds upon which the operator's license revocation should not take effect. Scott v. State, 13 Neb. App. 867, 703 N.W.2d 266 (2005).

Although this section requires the "sworn report" required by subsection (2) of this section to include the "reasons for [the] arrest," an arresting officer need not specifically delineate on the sworn report all of the information contained on an attached probable cause form, so long as the sworn report provides adequate notice that one is being accused of driving under the influence and/or failure of a chemical test. Taylor v. Wimes, 10 Neb. App. 432, 632 N.W.2d 366 (2001).

Although this section requires the "sworn report" required by subsection (2) of this section to include the "reasons for [the] arrest," an arresting officer need not specifically delineate on the sworn report all of the information contained on an attached probable cause form, so long as the sworn report provides adequate notice that one is being accused of driving under the influence and/or failure of a chemical test. Taylor v. Wimes, 10 Neb. App. 432, 632 N.W.2d 366 (2001).

7. Miscellaneous

7. Miscellaneous

Under subsection (6)(c)(i)(A) of this section, a peace officer must have probable cause prior to revoking a driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test. State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).

Under subsection (6)(c)(i)(A) of this section, a peace officer must have probable cause prior to revoking a driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test. State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, after January 1, 1993, a person who agrees to submit to a chemical test and fails it is subject to automatic administrative license revocation. Smith v. State, 248 Neb. 360, 535 N.W.2d 694 (1995).

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, after January 1, 1993, a person who agrees to submit to a chemical test and fails it is subject to automatic administrative license revocation. Smith v. State, 248 Neb. 360, 535 N.W.2d 694 (1995).

The oath to an affidavit is not required to be administered with any particular ceremony, but the affiant must perform some corporal act whereby he consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath. Moore v. Peterson, 218 Neb. 615, 358 N.W.2d 193 (1984).

The oath to an affidavit is not required to be administered with any particular ceremony, but the affiant must perform some corporal act whereby he consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath. Moore v. Peterson, 218 Neb. 615, 358 N.W.2d 193 (1984).

This section simply forestalls a forcible taking of a specimen. Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).

This section simply forestalls a forcible taking of a specimen. Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).

This section is pari materia with section 39-727.03 (transferred to section 60-6,197), and other sections mentioned in opinion. Stevenson v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 295, 207 N.W.2d 680 (1973).

This section is pari materia with section 39-727.03 (transferred to section 60-6,197), and other sections mentioned in opinion. Stevenson v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 295, 207 N.W.2d 680 (1973).

The nonpunitive purpose of this section is to protect the public health and safety by revoking the license of persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol, because they have shown themselves to be a safety hazard. State v. Moody, 26 Neb. App. 328, 918 N.W.2d 26 (2018).

The nonpunitive purpose of this section is to protect the public health and safety by revoking the license of persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol, because they have shown themselves to be a safety hazard. State v. Moody, 26 Neb. App. 328, 918 N.W.2d 26 (2018).

This section has an alternative, nonpunitive purpose of the protection of the public health and safety by revoking the license of persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol, because they have shown themselves to be a safety hazard. Any deterrent purpose is merely secondary to this section's stated, nonpunitive purpose. State v. Moody, 26 Neb. App. 328, 918 N.W.2d 26 (2018).

This section has an alternative, nonpunitive purpose of the protection of the public health and safety by revoking the license of persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol, because they have shown themselves to be a safety hazard. Any deterrent purpose is merely secondary to this section's stated, nonpunitive purpose. State v. Moody, 26 Neb. App. 328, 918 N.W.2d 26 (2018).

Nebraska law grants the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles jurisdiction to administratively revoke the license of a person found to be driving while under the influence of alcohol. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).

Nebraska law grants the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles jurisdiction to administratively revoke the license of a person found to be driving while under the influence of alcohol. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).