Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3805 — NE Code / Chapter 29 / Section 29-3805
View Statute 29-3805
Status: in_force

Within one hundred eighty days after the prosecutor receives a certificate from the director pursuant to section 29-3803 or 29-3804 or within such additional time as the court for good cause shown in open court may grant, the untried indictment, information, or complaint shall be brought to trial with the prisoner or his or her counsel being present. The parties may stipulate for a continuance or a continuance may be granted on a notice to the attorney of record and an opportunity for him or her to be heard. If the indictment, information, or complaint is not brought to trial within the time period stated in this section, including applicable continuances, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof nor shall the untried indictment, information, or complaint be of any further force or effect and it shall be dismissed with prejudice.

Laws 1984, LB 591, § 5.

1. Good cause

1. Good cause

2. Certificate

2. Certificate

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

1. Good cause

1. Good cause

Good cause means a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse, and it is a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

Good cause means a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse, and it is a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

Under some circumstances, courtroom unavailability may constitute good cause to continue a trial. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

Under some circumstances, courtroom unavailability may constitute good cause to continue a trial. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

When defense counsel requested to schedule trial for a date after the conclusion of another trial in which defense counsel was involved, such request amounted to a request for continuance, and the district court's accession to it established good cause to extend the period within which the defendant could be brought to trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).

When defense counsel requested to schedule trial for a date after the conclusion of another trial in which defense counsel was involved, such request amounted to a request for continuance, and the district court's accession to it established good cause to extend the period within which the defendant could be brought to trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).

Good cause existed to continue a trial that charged a prisoner, who was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, with making terroristic threats against a juvenile court judge, beyond the 180-day time limit in this section setting forth requirements for when the untried charges were to be brought to trial. The day after the pretrial conference setting the trial date, the juvenile court judge informed the State he would be unavailable for trial on that date, and the State came forward as soon as possible after the trial was scheduled to inform the court and opposing counsel about the conflict. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Good cause existed to continue a trial that charged a prisoner, who was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, with making terroristic threats against a juvenile court judge, beyond the 180-day time limit in this section setting forth requirements for when the untried charges were to be brought to trial. The day after the pretrial conference setting the trial date, the juvenile court judge informed the State he would be unavailable for trial on that date, and the State came forward as soon as possible after the trial was scheduled to inform the court and opposing counsel about the conflict. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

"Good cause" in intrastate or interstate detainer statutes means a substantial reason; one that affords legal excuse. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

"Good cause" in intrastate or interstate detainer statutes means a substantial reason; one that affords legal excuse. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Good cause in statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases is something that must be substantial, but also a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Good cause in statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases is something that must be substantial, but also a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Good cause under statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases encompasses a situation where a witness is unavailable. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Good cause under statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases encompasses a situation where a witness is unavailable. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Whether good cause exists for extending the time limit in this section, setting forth when untried charges are brought to trial, is a subjective, factual question within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Whether good cause exists for extending the time limit in this section, setting forth when untried charges are brought to trial, is a subjective, factual question within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

2. Certificate

2. Certificate

Form VII could not serve to trigger the 180-day period under this section, since it was only filed in the county court and not delivered to the director of the Department of Correctional Services. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

Form VII could not serve to trigger the 180-day period under this section, since it was only filed in the county court and not delivered to the director of the Department of Correctional Services. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

The certificate contemplated by this section is not restricted to one particular form. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

The certificate contemplated by this section is not restricted to one particular form. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

Whether invoked by an instate prisoner or by the prosecutor, it is the prosecutor's receipt of the statutorily required certificate from the director of the Department of Correctional Services pursuant to section 29-3803 or section 29-3804 which triggers the 180-day period for disposition of untried charges prescribed by this section. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

Whether invoked by an instate prisoner or by the prosecutor, it is the prosecutor's receipt of the statutorily required certificate from the director of the Department of Correctional Services pursuant to section 29-3803 or section 29-3804 which triggers the 180-day period for disposition of untried charges prescribed by this section. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).

3. Miscellaneous

3. Miscellaneous

If a person ceases to be a prisoner before being brought to trial and has not regained that status, he or she cannot be a prisoner at the time of trial as contemplated by this section. State v. Yzeta, 313 Neb. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).

If a person ceases to be a prisoner before being brought to trial and has not regained that status, he or she cannot be a prisoner at the time of trial as contemplated by this section. State v. Yzeta, 313 Neb. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).

The 180-day period for trial under this section ceases to run after a person who is imprisoned in a facility operated by the Department of Correctional Services is finally discharged (in other words, when he or she is no longer a Department of Correctional Services prisoner). State v. Yzeta, 313 Neb. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).

The 180-day period for trial under this section ceases to run after a person who is imprisoned in a facility operated by the Department of Correctional Services is finally discharged (in other words, when he or she is no longer a Department of Correctional Services prisoner). State v. Yzeta, 313 Neb. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).

A Nebraska prisoner sought relief under two different speedy trial statutes, but only this section, governing intrastate detainers, applied. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

A Nebraska prisoner sought relief under two different speedy trial statutes, but only this section, governing intrastate detainers, applied. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

The statutory right of a person in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services to a speedy trial on pending criminal charges in Nebraska is governed by sections 29-3801 to 29-3809. The denial of a speedy trial claim governed by these sections is a final, appealable order. State v. Tucker, 259 Neb. 225, 609 N.W.2d 306 (2000).

The statutory right of a person in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services to a speedy trial on pending criminal charges in Nebraska is governed by sections 29-3801 to 29-3809. The denial of a speedy trial claim governed by these sections is a final, appealable order. State v. Tucker, 259 Neb. 225, 609 N.W.2d 306 (2000).

Defense counsel's implicit request for a continuance did not operate as a waiver of the defendant's right to a disposition within the time limit imposed by the instate prisoner statutes; it merely extended the duration of the time period allowed for commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).

Defense counsel's implicit request for a continuance did not operate as a waiver of the defendant's right to a disposition within the time limit imposed by the instate prisoner statutes; it merely extended the duration of the time period allowed for commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).

The law and decisions under the speedy trial statutes did not apply to the instate prisoner statutes, particularly this section; therefore, defendant's various pretrial motions did not toll the time period allowed for the commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).

The law and decisions under the speedy trial statutes did not apply to the instate prisoner statutes, particularly this section; therefore, defendant's various pretrial motions did not toll the time period allowed for the commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).