Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.02 — NE Code / Chapter 60 / Section 60-498.02
View Statute 60-498.02
Status: in_force

(1) At the expiration of fifteen days after the date of arrest as described in subsection (2) of section 60-6,197 or if after a hearing pursuant to section 60-498.01 the director finds that the operator's license should be revoked, the director shall (a) revoke the operator's license of a person arrested for refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood, breath, or urine as required by section 60-6,197 for a period of one year and (b) revoke the operator's license of a person who submits to a chemical test pursuant to such section which discloses the presence of a concentration of alcohol specified in section 60-6,196 for a period of one hundred eighty days unless the person's driving record abstract maintained in the department's computerized records shows one or more prior administrative license revocations on which final orders have been issued during the immediately preceding fifteen-year period at the time the order of revocation is issued, in which case the period of revocation shall be one year. Except as otherwise provided in section 60-6,211.05 , a new operator's license shall not be issued to such person until the period of revocation has elapsed. If the person subject to the revocation is a nonresident of this state, the director shall revoke only the nonresident's operating privilege as defined in section 60-474 of such person and shall immediately forward the operator's license and a statement of the order of revocation to the person's state of residence.

(2) A person operating a motor vehicle under an ignition interlock permit issued pursuant to sections 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 shall only operate a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device. All permits issued pursuant to such sections shall indicate that the permit is not valid for the operation of any commercial motor vehicle.

(3) A person may have his or her eligibility for a license reinstated upon payment of a reinstatement fee as required by section 60-694.01 .

(4)(a) A person whose operator's license is subject to revocation pursuant to subsection (3) of section 60-498.01 shall have all proceedings dismissed or his or her operator's license immediately reinstated without payment of the reinstatement fee upon receipt of suitable evidence by the director that:

(i) The prosecuting attorney responsible for the matter declined to file a complaint alleging a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section or dismissed a filed complaint alleging a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section prior to trial;

(ii) The defendant, after trial, was found not guilty of violating section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section; or

(iii) In the criminal action on the charge of a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section arising from the same incident, the court held one of the following:

(A) The peace officer did not have probable cause to believe the person was operating or in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section; or

(B) The person was not operating or in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration in violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section.

(b) The director shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations establishing standards for the presentation of suitable evidence of compliance with subdivision (a) of this subsection.

(c) If a criminal charge is filed or refiled for a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with such section pursuant to an arrest for which all administrative license revocation proceedings were dismissed under this subsection, the director, upon notification or discovery, may reinstate an administrative license revocation under this section as of the date that the director receives notification of the filing or refiling of the charge, except that a revocation shall not be reinstated if it was dismissed pursuant to section 60-498.01 .

Laws 1972, LB 1095, § 6;

R.S.Supp.,1972, § 39-727.17;

Laws 1974, LB 679, § 3;

Laws 1982, LB 568, § 7;

Laws 1986, LB 153, § 8;

Laws 1988, LB 377, § 3;

Laws 1992, LB 291, § 11;

R.S.Supp.,1992, § 39-669.16;

Laws 1993, LB 370, § 301;

Laws 1993, LB 491, § 1;

Laws 1993, LB 564, § 12;

Laws 1998, LB 309, § 16;

Laws 2001, LB 38, § 52;

R.S.Supp.,2002, § 60-6,206;

Laws 2003, LB 209, § 5;

Laws 2004, LB 208, § 6;

Laws 2008, LB736, § 3;

Laws 2009, LB497, § 2;

Laws 2010, LB924, § 1;

Laws 2011, LB667, § 25;

Laws 2011, LB675, § 2;

Laws 2012, LB751, § 21;

Laws 2013, LB158, § 1;

Laws 2021, LB302, § 1.

When the Department of Motor Vehicles provided the motorist a copy of his driver abstract before the revocation hearing and an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of his driver abstract at the revocation hearing, the requirements of due process were met. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758 (2008).

When the Department of Motor Vehicles provided the motorist a copy of his driver abstract before the revocation hearing and an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of his driver abstract at the revocation hearing, the requirements of due process were met. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758 (2008).

The administrative license revocation provisions pertaining to motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing do not violate the due process or equal protection rights of those motorists by treating them differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

The administrative license revocation provisions pertaining to motorists who refuse to submit to chemical testing do not violate the due process or equal protection rights of those motorists by treating them differently than motorists who submit to, but fail, such testing. Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).

Administrative revocation of a driver's license under this section is a civil sanction and does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. State v. Isham, 261 Neb. 690, 625 N.W.2d 511 (2001).

Administrative revocation of a driver's license under this section is a civil sanction and does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. State v. Isham, 261 Neb. 690, 625 N.W.2d 511 (2001).

Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).

Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).

The proscription that there can be no revocation of one's driver's license and operating privileges if the refusal to submit to a chemical test is reasonable under the circumstances contained in this section (formerly section 39-669.16 (Reissue 1988)), relates only to administrative license revocations by the Director of Motor Vehicles. In a criminal proceeding, however, the inquiry centers on the existence of reasonable grounds for the arresting officer to believe that an operator was driving while under the influence of alcohol. State v. Boyd, 242 Neb. 144, 493 N.W.2d 344 (1992).

The proscription that there can be no revocation of one's driver's license and operating privileges if the refusal to submit to a chemical test is reasonable under the circumstances contained in this section (formerly section 39-669.16 (Reissue 1988)), relates only to administrative license revocations by the Director of Motor Vehicles. In a criminal proceeding, however, the inquiry centers on the existence of reasonable grounds for the arresting officer to believe that an operator was driving while under the influence of alcohol. State v. Boyd, 242 Neb. 144, 493 N.W.2d 344 (1992).

This section, providing that drivers whose operator's licenses had been revoked for a period of 1 year were eligible for an employment driving permit, and section 60-4,129, providing that drivers whose operator's licenses had been revoked for a period of 90 days were eligible for an employment driving permit after a period of 30 days, are not in conflict or ambiguous. Bazar v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 17 Neb. App. 910, 774 N.W.2d 433 (2009).

This section, providing that drivers whose operator's licenses had been revoked for a period of 1 year were eligible for an employment driving permit, and section 60-4,129, providing that drivers whose operator's licenses had been revoked for a period of 90 days were eligible for an employment driving permit after a period of 30 days, are not in conflict or ambiguous. Bazar v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 17 Neb. App. 910, 774 N.W.2d 433 (2009).

Pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, a Department of Motor Vehicles regulation cannot, as a prerequisite to dismissing an administrative license revocation proceeding, require a prosecuting attorney to provide one of four particular reasons for failing to file a criminal driving under the influence of alcohol charge, as such a requirement modifies, alters, and restricts the provisions of this section. Dozler v. Conrad, 3 Neb. App. 735, 532 N.W.2d 42 (1995).

Pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, a Department of Motor Vehicles regulation cannot, as a prerequisite to dismissing an administrative license revocation proceeding, require a prosecuting attorney to provide one of four particular reasons for failing to file a criminal driving under the influence of alcohol charge, as such a requirement modifies, alters, and restricts the provisions of this section. Dozler v. Conrad, 3 Neb. App. 735, 532 N.W.2d 42 (1995).