Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-205 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-205
View Statute 76-205
Status: in_force

In the construction of every instrument creating or conveying, or authorizing or requiring the creation or conveyance of any real estate, or interest therein, it shall be the duty of the courts of justice to carry into effect the true intent of the parties, so far as such intent can be collected from the whole instrument, and so far as such intent is consistent with the rules of law.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 59, p. 292;

R.S.1913, § 6195;

C.S.1922, § 5594;

C.S.1929, § 76-109;

R.S.1943, § 76-205.

1. Rules of construction

1. Rules of construction

2. Rule in Shelley's Case

2. Rule in Shelley's Case

3. Joint tenancy

3. Joint tenancy

4. Life estates

4. Life estates

5. Wills

5. Wills

6. Trusts

6. Trusts

7. Leases

7. Leases

8. Antenuptial contracts

8. Antenuptial contracts

9. Restraints on alienation

9. Restraints on alienation

10. Easement

10. Easement

11. Condition subsequent

11. Condition subsequent

12. Boundaries

12. Boundaries

13. Deeds generally

13. Deeds generally

14. Miscellaneous

14. Miscellaneous

1. Rules of construction

1. Rules of construction

The true intent of the parties will be instrumental when construing instruments creating interests in real property. Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb. 230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985).

The true intent of the parties will be instrumental when construing instruments creating interests in real property. Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb. 230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985).

This section created no peculiar rule of law but merely codifies what has always been the common law rule of construction. This section does not enlarge, limit, or modify any rule of substantive law. Sterner v. Nelson, 210 Neb. 358, 314 N.W.2d 263 (1982).

This section created no peculiar rule of law but merely codifies what has always been the common law rule of construction. This section does not enlarge, limit, or modify any rule of substantive law. Sterner v. Nelson, 210 Neb. 358, 314 N.W.2d 263 (1982).

This section provides a rule of construction and does not have the effect of enlarging, limiting, or modifying any rule of substantive law that existed at the time of its passage or has thereafter been created. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

This section provides a rule of construction and does not have the effect of enlarging, limiting, or modifying any rule of substantive law that existed at the time of its passage or has thereafter been created. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce T. & S. Assn., 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).

Where intention expressed in an instrument is obscure, resort may be had to surrounding circumstances. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Where intention expressed in an instrument is obscure, resort may be had to surrounding circumstances. Gettel v. Hester, 165 Neb. 573, 86 N.W.2d 613 (1957).

Intent statute does not have effect of changing substantive law. Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953).

Intent statute does not have effect of changing substantive law. Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953).

True intent must be ascertained from whole instrument. Elrod v. Heirs of Gifford, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952).

True intent must be ascertained from whole instrument. Elrod v. Heirs of Gifford, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952).

In the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in course of the same transaction, are, in the eyes of the law, one instrument, and will be read and construed together as if they were as much one in form as they are in substance. Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 5 N.W.2d 99 (1942); Thompson v. Jost, 108 Neb. 778, 189 N.W. 169 (1922).

cate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in course of the same transaction, are, in the eyes of the law, one instrument, and will be read and construed together as if they were as much one in form as they are in substance. Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 5 N.W.2d 99 (1942); Thompson v. Jost, 108 Neb. 778, 189 N.W. 169 (1922).

In the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in course of the same transaction, are, in the eyes of the law, one instrument, and will be read and construed together as if they were as much one in form as they are in substance. Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 5 N.W.2d 99 (1942); Thompson v. Jost, 108 Neb. 778, 189 N.W. 169 (1922).

This section relates only to rules of construction, and does not enlarge, limit or in any way modify any rule of substantive law. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

This section relates only to rules of construction, and does not enlarge, limit or in any way modify any rule of substantive law. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

It is the duty of the court to determine from the whole instrument the true intent of the parties and to carry that intent into effect. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940).

It is the duty of the court to determine from the whole instrument the true intent of the parties and to carry that intent into effect. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940).

The intention of the parties to a deed must be gathered from the whole instrument itself. Langan v. Langan, 135 Neb. 229, 280 N.W. 903 (1938).

The intention of the parties to a deed must be gathered from the whole instrument itself. Langan v. Langan, 135 Neb. 229, 280 N.W. 903 (1938).

Instrument will be construed to create vested rather than contingent remainder, if possible. DeWitt v. Searles, 123 Neb. 129, 242 N.W. 370 (1932).

Instrument will be construed to create vested rather than contingent remainder, if possible. DeWitt v. Searles, 123 Neb. 129, 242 N.W. 370 (1932).

Duty of court is to give to each word and sentence in the conveyance such significance as will carry into effect the true intent of the parties thereto. In re Darr's Estate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925); Moran v. Moran, 101 Neb. 386, 163 N.W. 315 (1917); Benedict v. Minton, 83 Neb. 782, 120 N.W. 429 (1909); Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904); Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892).

Duty of court is to give to each word and sentence in the conveyance such significance as will carry into effect the true intent of the parties thereto. In re Darr's Estate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925); Moran v. Moran, 101 Neb. 386, 163 N.W. 315 (1917); Benedict v. Minton, 83 Neb. 782, 120 N.W. 429 (1909); Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904); Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892).

Power of attorney with reference to real estate will be construed with respect to natural import of language thereof. Watkins v. Hagerty, 104 Neb. 414, 177 N.W. 654 (1920).

Power of attorney with reference to real estate will be construed with respect to natural import of language thereof. Watkins v. Hagerty, 104 Neb. 414, 177 N.W. 654 (1920).

What this section requires to be consistent with the general rules of law is not the construction of the instrument, but the intent of the parties. Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904).

What this section requires to be consistent with the general rules of law is not the construction of the instrument, but the intent of the parties. Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904).

When by any reasonable interpretation, the granting clause and the habendum clause can be reconciled, effect must be given to both. Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892).

8 N.W. 29 (1904).

What this section requires to be consistent with the general rules of law is not the construction of the instrument, but the intent of the parties. Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904).

When by any reasonable interpretation, the granting clause and the habendum clause can be reconciled, effect must be given to both. Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892).

When by any reasonable interpretation, the granting clause and the habendum clause can be reconciled, effect must be given to both. Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 53 N.W. 598 (1892).

2. Rule in Shelley's Case

2. Rule in Shelley's Case

Where two words are used interchangeably, one of which indicates limitation and the other purchase, the one which indicates purchase must be accepted, and the one indicating limitation must be considered as descriptio personae. Salmons v. Salmons, 142 Neb. 66, 5 N.W.2d 123 (1942).

Where two words are used interchangeably, one of which indicates limitation and the other purchase, the one which indicates purchase must be accepted, and the one indicating limitation must be considered as descriptio personae. Salmons v. Salmons, 142 Neb. 66, 5 N.W.2d 123 (1942).

Though granting clause in a deed, if considered alone, would convey fee, it may be shown that by construing the whole instrument in order to give effect to expressed intention of parties that life estate only was conveyed. Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

Though granting clause in a deed, if considered alone, would convey fee, it may be shown that by construing the whole instrument in order to give effect to expressed intention of parties that life estate only was conveyed. Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

If will contains language coming within rule in Shelley's Case, the intent statute does not control. Sutphen v. Joslyn, 111 Neb. 777, 198 N.W. 164 (1924).

If will contains language coming within rule in Shelley's Case, the intent statute does not control. Sutphen v. Joslyn, 111 Neb. 777, 198 N.W. 164 (1924).

Devise for life with remainder to lawful heirs vests fee. Myers v. Myers, 109 Neb. 230, 190 N.W. 491 (1922).

Devise for life with remainder to lawful heirs vests fee. Myers v. Myers, 109 Neb. 230, 190 N.W. 491 (1922).

Rule in Shelley's Case is not abrogated by statute requiring court to give expressed intent of parties. Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 178 N.W. 262 (1920).

Rule in Shelley's Case is not abrogated by statute requiring court to give expressed intent of parties. Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 178 N.W. 262 (1920).

On rehearing, statement in original opinion that intent statute partially abrogates rule in Shelley's Case is withdrawn. Moran v. Moran, 101 Neb. 386, 163 N.W. 315 (1917), remanded on rehearing 101 Neb. 390, 163 N.W. 1071 (1917).

On rehearing, statement in original opinion that intent statute partially abrogates rule in Shelley's Case is withdrawn. Moran v. Moran, 101 Neb. 386, 163 N.W. 315 (1917), remanded on rehearing 101 Neb. 390, 163 N.W. 1071 (1917).

Use of word heirs will not defeat the emphatically expressed intent of testator, and convert what he plainly designed as a life estate into a fee. Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904).

Use of word heirs will not defeat the emphatically expressed intent of testator, and convert what he plainly designed as a life estate into a fee. Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904).

3. Joint tenancy

3. Joint tenancy

Prior to passage of the Uniform Property Act, a conveyance by one spouse to another direct could not create joint tenancy. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

Prior to passage of the Uniform Property Act, a conveyance by one spouse to another direct could not create joint tenancy. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

1904).

3. Joint tenancy

3. Joint tenancy

Prior to passage of the Uniform Property Act, a conveyance by one spouse to another direct could not create joint tenancy. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

Prior to passage of the Uniform Property Act, a conveyance by one spouse to another direct could not create joint tenancy. Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595 (1941).

Where deed shows mutual agreement to create estate of survivorship, court must apply rule as evidenced by conveyance. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215 N.W. 117 (1927).

Where deed shows mutual agreement to create estate of survivorship, court must apply rule as evidenced by conveyance. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215 N.W. 117 (1927).

Right to create title in real estate by joint tenancy, with right of survivorship clearly expressed, has never been abridged in this state. Sanderson v. Everson, 93 Neb. 606, 141 N.W. 1025 (1913).

Right to create title in real estate by joint tenancy, with right of survivorship clearly expressed, has never been abridged in this state. Sanderson v. Everson, 93 Neb. 606, 141 N.W. 1025 (1913).

4. Life estates

4. Life estates

Under intent statute, devise of property to wife for her own use and benefit and at her death all property remaining to children conveyed a life estate only, with power to dispose of and use the principal only so far as might be reasonably necessary for her support. Annable v. Ricedorff, 140 Neb. 93, 299 N.W. 373 (1941).

Under intent statute, devise of property to wife for her own use and benefit and at her death all property remaining to children conveyed a life estate only, with power to dispose of and use the principal only so far as might be reasonably necessary for her support. Annable v. Ricedorff, 140 Neb. 93, 299 N.W. 373 (1941).

Where will devised to son life use of property, without power to mortgage or sell, a mortgage executed by son was void. Nebraska Nat. Bank v. Bayer, 123 Neb. 391, 243 N.W. 115 (1932).

Where will devised to son life use of property, without power to mortgage or sell, a mortgage executed by son was void. Nebraska Nat. Bank v. Bayer, 123 Neb. 391, 243 N.W. 115 (1932).

Deed conveying land to grantee for life, remainder in fee simple to the heirs begotten of the body of said grantee, creates a life estate in grantee only. Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 178 N.W. 262 (1920).

Deed conveying land to grantee for life, remainder in fee simple to the heirs begotten of the body of said grantee, creates a life estate in grantee only. Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 178 N.W. 262 (1920).

It was obvious from context that word heirs was used as equivalent to children, and grantees received life estates. Grant v. Hover, 103 Neb. 730, 174 N.W. 317 (1919).

It was obvious from context that word heirs was used as equivalent to children, and grantees received life estates. Grant v. Hover, 103 Neb. 730, 174 N.W. 317 (1919).

Devise was construed to convey a life estate to A with remainder over to his wife and children, even though the provisions of first part of will, if it stood alone, would be sufficient to devise an estate in fee simple. Kluge v. Kluge, 103 Neb. 534, 172 N.W. 756 (1919).

Devise was construed to convey a life estate to A with remainder over to his wife and children, even though the provisions of first part of will, if it stood alone, would be sufficient to devise an estate in fee simple. Kluge v. Kluge, 103 Neb. 534, 172 N.W. 756 (1919).

5. Wills

5. Wills

A patent ambiguity in a will must be removed by interpretation of the intention of the testator as found within the four corners of the will. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

A patent ambiguity in a will must be removed by interpretation of the intention of the testator as found within the four corners of the will. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

A patent ambiguity in a will must be removed by interpretation of the intention of the testator as found within the four corners of the will. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

A patent ambiguity in a will must be removed by interpretation of the intention of the testator as found within the four corners of the will. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

Intent is determined from language of will, and does not include an entertained but unexpressed intention. Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).

Intent is determined from language of will, and does not include an entertained but unexpressed intention. Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).

Court will place itself in the position of testator in construing will. Bodeman v. Cary, 152 Neb. 506, 41 N.W.2d 797 (1950).

Court will place itself in the position of testator in construing will. Bodeman v. Cary, 152 Neb. 506, 41 N.W.2d 797 (1950).

Court must give effect to true intent of testator. Olson v. Lisco, 149 Neb. 314, 30 N.W.2d 910 (1948).

Court must give effect to true intent of testator. Olson v. Lisco, 149 Neb. 314, 30 N.W.2d 910 (1948).

Statutory law designates rule for construing or interpreting wills. In re Estate of Lewis, 148 Neb. 592, 28 N.W.2d 427 (1947).

Statutory law designates rule for construing or interpreting wills. In re Estate of Lewis, 148 Neb. 592, 28 N.W.2d 427 (1947).

Bequest of all interest in and to the Hub Bar conveyed interest in bank deposit of the business conducted under that name. In re Estate of Zents, 148 Neb. 104, 26 N.W.2d 793 (1947).

Bequest of all interest in and to the Hub Bar conveyed interest in bank deposit of the business conducted under that name. In re Estate of Zents, 148 Neb. 104, 26 N.W.2d 793 (1947).

It is the duty of the court to give effect to the true intent of the testator so far as it can be collected from the whole will, if such intent is consistent with rules of law. Lacy v. Murdock, 147 Neb. 242, 22 N.W.2d 713 (1946).

It is the duty of the court to give effect to the true intent of the testator so far as it can be collected from the whole will, if such intent is consistent with rules of law. Lacy v. Murdock, 147 Neb. 242, 22 N.W.2d 713 (1946).

Testator did not intend fee simple title to pass. Hulse v. Tanner, 142 Neb. 406, 6 N.W.2d 618 (1942).

Testator did not intend fee simple title to pass. Hulse v. Tanner, 142 Neb. 406, 6 N.W.2d 618 (1942).

In construing a will, court is required to give effect to true intent of testator, if possible. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 140 Neb. 823, 2 N.W.2d 23 (1942).

In construing a will, court is required to give effect to true intent of testator, if possible. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 140 Neb. 823, 2 N.W.2d 23 (1942).

In the construction of a will, court is required to give effect to the true intent of the testator so far as it can be collected from the whole instrument, and in this connection, circumstances relating to the will may be considered. Martens v. Sachs, 138 Neb. 678, 294 N.W. 426 (1940).

In the construction of a will, court is required to give effect to the true intent of the testator so far as it can be collected from the whole instrument, and in this connection, circumstances relating to the will may be considered. Martens v. Sachs, 138 Neb. 678, 294 N.W. 426 (1940).

In construing wills, the court must not give undue weight to a single clause but must construe instrument as a whole to ascertain true intent of testator. Graff v. Graff, 136 Neb. 543, 286 N.W. 788 (1939).

In construing wills, the court must not give undue weight to a single clause but must construe instrument as a whole to ascertain true intent of testator. Graff v. Graff, 136 Neb. 543, 286 N.W. 788 (1939).

In construing will, court may consider circumstances relating to will to aid in determining and giving effect to testator's intent. Lehman v. Wagner, 136 Neb. 131, 285 N.W. 124 (1939).

(1939).

In construing wills, the court must not give undue weight to a single clause but must construe instrument as a whole to ascertain true intent of testator. Graff v. Graff, 136 Neb. 543, 286 N.W. 788 (1939).

In construing will, court may consider circumstances relating to will to aid in determining and giving effect to testator's intent. Lehman v. Wagner, 136 Neb. 131, 285 N.W. 124 (1939).

In construing will, court may consider circumstances relating to will to aid in determining and giving effect to testator's intent. Lehman v. Wagner, 136 Neb. 131, 285 N.W. 124 (1939).

Court in construing a will must first ascertain the intent and purpose of testator as disclosed by language of will and then give effect thereto if not contrary to law. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nuernberger, 135 Neb. 743, 284 N.W. 266 (1939).

Court in construing a will must first ascertain the intent and purpose of testator as disclosed by language of will and then give effect thereto if not contrary to law. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nuernberger, 135 Neb. 743, 284 N.W. 266 (1939).

Intention of testator controls in construction of a will, if it is consistent with rules of law. Woelk v. Luckhardt, 134 Neb. 55, 277 N.W. 836 (1938).

Intention of testator controls in construction of a will, if it is consistent with rules of law. Woelk v. Luckhardt, 134 Neb. 55, 277 N.W. 836 (1938).

A provision of a will which directs the sale of real estate for the payment of certain legacies operates as an equitable conversion effective at death of testator. In re Estate of Hunter, 132 Neb. 454, 272 N.W. 318 (1937).

A provision of a will which directs the sale of real estate for the payment of certain legacies operates as an equitable conversion effective at death of testator. In re Estate of Hunter, 132 Neb. 454, 272 N.W. 318 (1937).

Four warranty deeds executed by testator together with his will, were construed together in light of surrounding circumstances and showed clear intent of testator that certain sons should receive no further part of inheritance. Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 130 Neb. 789, 266 N.W. 644 (1936).

Four warranty deeds executed by testator together with his will, were construed together in light of surrounding circumstances and showed clear intent of testator that certain sons should receive no further part of inheritance. Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 130 Neb. 789, 266 N.W. 644 (1936).

The intent of testator is to be ascertained from a liberal interpretation and comprehensive view of all the provisions of the will. Lancaster County Bank v. Marshel, 130 Neb. 141, 264 N.W. 470 (1936).

The intent of testator is to be ascertained from a liberal interpretation and comprehensive view of all the provisions of the will. Lancaster County Bank v. Marshel, 130 Neb. 141, 264 N.W. 470 (1936).

This section applies to construction of wills. In re Estate of Zimmerman, 122 Neb. 812, 241 N.W. 553 (1932).

This section applies to construction of wills. In re Estate of Zimmerman, 122 Neb. 812, 241 N.W. 553 (1932).

Rules of law in this section does not mean rules of construction in conflict with testator's intent. Court will ascertain intent and, if lawful, enforce it without regard to canons of construction. Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929), 67 A.L.R. 1311 (1929).

Rules of law in this section does not mean rules of construction in conflict with testator's intent. Court will ascertain intent and, if lawful, enforce it without regard to canons of construction. Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929), 67 A.L.R. 1311 (1929).

Statute is applicable alike to wills, deeds and contracts to convey. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928); Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

Statute is applicable alike to wills, deeds and contracts to convey. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928); Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929), 67 A.L.R. 1311 (1929).

Statute is applicable alike to wills, deeds and contracts to convey. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928); Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

Statute is applicable alike to wills, deeds and contracts to convey. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928); Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928).

Intent of testator, as gathered from will as whole, controls in construction of same if no rule of law is violated. Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928); Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 22, 201 N.W. 670 (1924).

Intent of testator, as gathered from will as whole, controls in construction of same if no rule of law is violated. Reuter v. Reuter, 116 Neb. 428, 218 N.W. 86 (1928); Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 22, 201 N.W. 670 (1924).

Cases involving construction of wills devising real estate are applicable to construction of deeds. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215 N.W. 117 (1927).

Cases involving construction of wills devising real estate are applicable to construction of deeds. Arthur v. Arthur, 115 Neb. 781, 215 N.W. 117 (1927).

Will was construed to devise to testator's wife estate without limitation, except if she died without issue, one-half of property remaining unconveyed by her passed to testator's brothers and sisters. In re Darr's Estate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925).

Will was construed to devise to testator's wife estate without limitation, except if she died without issue, one-half of property remaining unconveyed by her passed to testator's brothers and sisters. In re Darr's Estate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925).

Testator's will did not vest devisee with power to devise realty by will. Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 22, 201 N.W. 670 (1924).

Testator's will did not vest devisee with power to devise realty by will. Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 22, 201 N.W. 670 (1924).

No particular words or conventional forms of expression are necessary to make testamentary disposition. The court will place itself in testator's position, ascertain his will and enforce it. Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899).

No particular words or conventional forms of expression are necessary to make testamentary disposition. The court will place itself in testator's position, ascertain his will and enforce it. Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899).

6. Trusts

6. Trusts

Will was construed to have created ten-year trust, child acquiring defeasible estate in trust and trust income, which interest upon child's death passed to remaining children. Hulse v. Tanner, 142 Neb. 406, 6 N.W.2d 618 (1942).

Will was construed to have created ten-year trust, child acquiring defeasible estate in trust and trust income, which interest upon child's death passed to remaining children. Hulse v. Tanner, 142 Neb. 406, 6 N.W.2d 618 (1942).

Where owner of property gratuitously transfers it and properly manifests an intention that transferee should hold it in trust, but the trust fails, transferee holds the property upon a resulting trust for transferor or his estate, unless the transferor properly manifested an intention that no resulting trust should arise or the intended trust fails for illegality. In re Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52, 267 N.W. 196 (1936).

Where owner of property gratuitously transfers it and properly manifests an intention that transferee should hold it in trust, but the trust fails, transferee holds the property upon a resulting trust for transferor or his estate, unless the transferor properly manifested an intention that no resulting trust should arise or the intended trust fails for illegality. In re Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52, 267 N.W. 196 (1936).

gratuitously transfers it and properly manifests an intention that transferee should hold it in trust, but the trust fails, transferee holds the property upon a resulting trust for transferor or his estate, unless the transferor properly manifested an intention that no resulting trust should arise or the intended trust fails for illegality. In re Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52, 267 N.W. 196 (1936).

Where property is devised to trustee, with direction to the trustee to use his judgment and discretion as to time of sale of property, it is contrary to intent of testator to permit involuntary partition. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928).

Where property is devised to trustee, with direction to the trustee to use his judgment and discretion as to time of sale of property, it is contrary to intent of testator to permit involuntary partition. Heiser v. Brehm, 117 Neb. 472, 221 N.W. 97 (1928).

7. Leases

7. Leases

The purpose of rules of construction are to arrive at and give effect to the intention of the parties from a review of the entire instrument, rather than to select particular words for the purpose of interpreting a particular provision. Leases are construed from the four corners of the instrument to arrive at the true intention of the parties. B Town, Inc. v. Albright, 209 Neb. 819, 311 N.W.2d 908 (1981).

The purpose of rules of construction are to arrive at and give effect to the intention of the parties from a review of the entire instrument, rather than to select particular words for the purpose of interpreting a particular provision. Leases are construed from the four corners of the instrument to arrive at the true intention of the parties. B Town, Inc. v. Albright, 209 Neb. 819, 311 N.W.2d 908 (1981).

The intent of the parties to a lease is to be determined from the whole instrument and is controlling if consistent with rules of law. Omaha Country Club v. Dworak, 186 Neb. 336, 183 N.W.2d 264 (1971).

The intent of the parties to a lease is to be determined from the whole instrument and is controlling if consistent with rules of law. Omaha Country Club v. Dworak, 186 Neb. 336, 183 N.W.2d 264 (1971).

In construing ninety-nine year lease, court must give effect to intention of parties as gathered from entire instrument, if consistent with law. Towle v. Morrell, 129 Neb. 398, 261 N.W. 827 (1935).

In construing ninety-nine year lease, court must give effect to intention of parties as gathered from entire instrument, if consistent with law. Towle v. Morrell, 129 Neb. 398, 261 N.W. 827 (1935).

Section applies to construction of lease for term of five years. Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897).

Section applies to construction of lease for term of five years. Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897).

8. Antenuptial contracts

8. Antenuptial contracts

The intent of parties to an antenuptial agreement was that, upon the death of one party, the property vest absolutely in the survivor subject to the claims of creditors. Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446, 194 N.W. 447 (1923).

The intent of parties to an antenuptial agreement was that, upon the death of one party, the property vest absolutely in the survivor subject to the claims of creditors. Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446, 194 N.W. 447 (1923).

Conditions and circumstances surrounding antenuptial contract should be considered. Tiernan v. Tiernan, 107 Neb. 563, 186 N.W. 369 (1922).

Conditions and circumstances surrounding antenuptial contract should be considered. Tiernan v. Tiernan, 107 Neb. 563, 186 N.W. 369 (1922).

9. Restraints on alienation

9. Restraints on alienation

ditors. Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446, 194 N.W. 447 (1923).

Conditions and circumstances surrounding antenuptial contract should be considered. Tiernan v. Tiernan, 107 Neb. 563, 186 N.W. 369 (1922).

Conditions and circumstances surrounding antenuptial contract should be considered. Tiernan v. Tiernan, 107 Neb. 563, 186 N.W. 369 (1922).

9. Restraints on alienation

9. Restraints on alienation

Where the owners of an interest in real property convey the same but by agreement contained in the instrument of conveyance retain an interest in the premises such interest will support the imposition of a restriction on alienation where it is reasonably necessary to protect the interest retained. Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943).

Where the owners of an interest in real property convey the same but by agreement contained in the instrument of conveyance retain an interest in the premises such interest will support the imposition of a restriction on alienation where it is reasonably necessary to protect the interest retained. Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943).

A devise of real estate to a designated person and his heirs forever without power to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber, vests a fee simple estate in the person designated, the restraints on alienation being void. State Bank of Jansen v. Thiessen, 137 Neb. 426, 289 N.W. 791 (1940).

A devise of real estate to a designated person and his heirs forever without power to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber, vests a fee simple estate in the person designated, the restraints on alienation being void. State Bank of Jansen v. Thiessen, 137 Neb. 426, 289 N.W. 791 (1940).

Creditors of grantee are required to take notice of reservations made by grantor in deed placed of record. McGuire v. Stimbert, 129 Neb. 383, 261 N.W. 685 (1935).

Creditors of grantee are required to take notice of reservations made by grantor in deed placed of record. McGuire v. Stimbert, 129 Neb. 383, 261 N.W. 685 (1935).

10. Easement

10. Easement

Purchaser of land burdened with open visible easement is charged with notice. Arterburn v. Beard, 86 Neb. 733, 126 N.W. 379 (1910).

Purchaser of land burdened with open visible easement is charged with notice. Arterburn v. Beard, 86 Neb. 733, 126 N.W. 379 (1910).

Words with appurtenances are not necessary to pass an easement appurtenant to land. Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 124 N.W. 921 (1910).

Words with appurtenances are not necessary to pass an easement appurtenant to land. Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 124 N.W. 921 (1910).

Use of roadway under naked license cannot ripen into prescriptive right. Bone v. James, 82 Neb. 442, 118 N.W. 83 (1908).

Use of roadway under naked license cannot ripen into prescriptive right. Bone v. James, 82 Neb. 442, 118 N.W. 83 (1908).

Where contract of conveyance by fair construction of the whole instrument gives notice of an easement permanent in its nature, such as right-of-way of railroad company, purchaser takes title subject to such easement. Schafroth v. Ross, 289 F. 703 (8th Cir. 1923).

Where contract of conveyance by fair construction of the whole instrument gives notice of an easement permanent in its nature, such as right-of-way of railroad company, purchaser takes title subject to such easement. Schafroth v. Ross, 289 F. 703 (8th Cir. 1923).

11. Condition subsequent

11. Condition subsequent

County substantially complied with condition subsequent imposed by deed with respect to erection and maintenance of court house. Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934).

County substantially complied with condition subsequent imposed by deed with respect to erection and maintenance of court house. Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934).

ndition subsequent

County substantially complied with condition subsequent imposed by deed with respect to erection and maintenance of court house. Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934).

County substantially complied with condition subsequent imposed by deed with respect to erection and maintenance of court house. Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934).

When land is devised upon condition subsequent, heirs of testatrix can maintain action to recover property upon failure of devisee to comply with the condition attached to gift within a reasonable time. Marble v. City of Tecumseh, 103 Neb. 625, 173 N.W. 581 (1919).

When land is devised upon condition subsequent, heirs of testatrix can maintain action to recover property upon failure of devisee to comply with the condition attached to gift within a reasonable time. Marble v. City of Tecumseh, 103 Neb. 625, 173 N.W. 581 (1919).

12. Boundaries

12. Boundaries

Fixed monuments govern both courses and distances in field notes. Hurn v. Alter, 80 Neb. 183, 113 N.W. 986 (1907); Knoll v. Randolph, 3 Neb. Unof. 599, 92 N.W. 195 (1902).

Fixed monuments govern both courses and distances in field notes. Hurn v. Alter, 80 Neb. 183, 113 N.W. 986 (1907); Knoll v. Randolph, 3 Neb. Unof. 599, 92 N.W. 195 (1902).

13. Deeds generally

13. Deeds generally

Each word and provision of a conveyance of oil and mineral rights must be given effect. Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138 N.W.2d 18 (1965).

Each word and provision of a conveyance of oil and mineral rights must be given effect. Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138 N.W.2d 18 (1965).

Deed will not be construed to create an estate upon condition unless language to that effect is so clear as to leave no room for other construction. Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943).

Deed will not be construed to create an estate upon condition unless language to that effect is so clear as to leave no room for other construction. Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943).

Instruments executed at same time are to be construed together. Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 5 N.W.2d 99 (1942).

Instruments executed at same time are to be construed together. Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 5 N.W.2d 99 (1942).

An undelivered deed may be incorporated in a will by reference, if the terms of the will, assisted by the surrounding circumstances, are sufficient to identify the deed and to show the intention of giving effect to it. In re Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942).

An undelivered deed may be incorporated in a will by reference, if the terms of the will, assisted by the surrounding circumstances, are sufficient to identify the deed and to show the intention of giving effect to it. In re Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942).

Deed to grantee and then to her children did not limit estate to grantee for life. Aynes v. Bantz, 114 Neb. 226, 206 N.W. 754 (1925).

Deed to grantee and then to her children did not limit estate to grantee for life. Aynes v. Bantz, 114 Neb. 226, 206 N.W. 754 (1925).

Deed was sufficient to convey all the interest of wife in the premises. Watkins v. Harrison, 110 Neb. 439, 194 N.W. 435 (1923).

Deed was sufficient to convey all the interest of wife in the premises. Watkins v. Harrison, 110 Neb. 439, 194 N.W. 435 (1923).

Upon breach of covenants in deed, right of action accrues at once. Webb v. Wheeler, 80 Neb. 438, 114 N.W. 636 (1908).

Upon breach of covenants in deed, right of action accrues at once. Webb v. Wheeler, 80 Neb. 438, 114 N.W. 636 (1908).

Deed to half unsubdivided quarter section conveys quantitative half. Kirkpatrick v. Schaal, 77 Neb. 661, 110 N.W. 730 (1906).

Deed to half unsubdivided quarter section conveys quantitative half. Kirkpatrick v. Schaal, 77 Neb. 661, 110 N.W. 730 (1906).

14. Miscellaneous

14. Miscellaneous

ch of covenants in deed, right of action accrues at once. Webb v. Wheeler, 80 Neb. 438, 114 N.W. 636 (1908).

Deed to half unsubdivided quarter section conveys quantitative half. Kirkpatrick v. Schaal, 77 Neb. 661, 110 N.W. 730 (1906).

Deed to half unsubdivided quarter section conveys quantitative half. Kirkpatrick v. Schaal, 77 Neb. 661, 110 N.W. 730 (1906).

14. Miscellaneous

14. Miscellaneous

While intent statute does not have the effect of changing substantive law, it is declaratory of a rule of construction long adopted by the Supreme Court. Bauer v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177, 141 N.W.2d 837 (1966).

While intent statute does not have the effect of changing substantive law, it is declaratory of a rule of construction long adopted by the Supreme Court. Bauer v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177, 141 N.W.2d 837 (1966).

Assignment of school land lease did not obligate assignee to pay irrigation taxes. Beltner v. Carlson, 153 Neb. 797, 46 N.W.2d 153 (1951).

Assignment of school land lease did not obligate assignee to pay irrigation taxes. Beltner v. Carlson, 153 Neb. 797, 46 N.W.2d 153 (1951).

Covenant against encumbrances does not run with land. Sears v. Broady, 66 Neb. 207, 92 N.W. 214 (1902).

Covenant against encumbrances does not run with land. Sears v. Broady, 66 Neb. 207, 92 N.W. 214 (1902).

Upon a conveyance subject to encumbrance, no personal obligation is imposed on grantee. Lexington Bank v. Salling, 66 Neb. 180, 92 N.W. 318 (1902).

Upon a conveyance subject to encumbrance, no personal obligation is imposed on grantee. Lexington Bank v. Salling, 66 Neb. 180, 92 N.W. 318 (1902).

Deed absolute in form may be a mortgage. Decker v. Decker, 64 Neb. 239, 89 N.W. 795 (1902); Riley v. Starr, 48 Neb. 243, 67 N.W. 187 (1896).

Deed absolute in form may be a mortgage. Decker v. Decker, 64 Neb. 239, 89 N.W. 795 (1902); Riley v. Starr, 48 Neb. 243, 67 N.W. 187 (1896).

Assumption by grantee to pay mortgage is binding. Garneau v. Kendall, 61 Neb. 396, 85 N.W. 291 (1901); Martin v. Humphrey, 58 Neb. 414, 78 N.W. 715 (1899).

Assumption by grantee to pay mortgage is binding. Garneau v. Kendall, 61 Neb. 396, 85 N.W. 291 (1901); Martin v. Humphrey, 58 Neb. 414, 78 N.W. 715 (1899).

Description by metes and bounds passes land, though not of acreage stated. Pohlman v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Church, 60 Neb. 364, 83 N.W. 201 (1900).

Description by metes and bounds passes land, though not of acreage stated. Pohlman v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Church, 60 Neb. 364, 83 N.W. 201 (1900).

Reservation in deed cannot create title in stranger. Burchard v. Walther, 58 Neb. 539, 78 N.W. 1061 (1899).

Reservation in deed cannot create title in stranger. Burchard v. Walther, 58 Neb. 539, 78 N.W. 1061 (1899).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-213 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-213
View Statute 76-213
Status: in_force

All deeds, mortgages, or other instruments in writing, for the conveyance or encumbrance of real estate, or any interest therein, which have been made and executed without the use of a private seal are declared to be legal and valid in all courts of law and equity in this state and elsewhere.

R.S.1866, c. 49, § 2, p. 376;

R.S.1913, § 6252;

C.S.1922, § 5651;

C.S.1929, § 76-257;

R.S.1943, § 76-213.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-202 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-202
View Statute 76-202
Status: in_force

The term purchaser, as used in sections 76-201 to 76-281 and 76-2,126 , shall be construed to embrace every person to whom any real estate or interest therein shall be conveyed for valuable consideration and also any assignee of mortgage or lease or other conditional estate.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 50, p. 291;

R.S.1913, § 6188;

C.S.1922, § 5587;

C.S.1929, § 76-102;

R.S.1943, § 76-202;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 27.

Holder of ninety-nine year lease was not purchaser of real estate from county, and lease by county board was valid. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Holder of ninety-nine year lease was not purchaser of real estate from county, and lease by county board was valid. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Lease of school lands for purpose of removing minerals therefrom is void. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918).

Lease of school lands for purpose of removing minerals therefrom is void. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918).

Second mortgagee is a purchaser. Dorr v. Meyer, 51 Neb. 94, 70 N.W. 543 (1897).

Second mortgagee is a purchaser. Dorr v. Meyer, 51 Neb. 94, 70 N.W. 543 (1897).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-215 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-215
View Statute 76-215
Status: in_force

Any person who fails to obey the provisions of subsection (1) of section 76-214 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than ten dollars nor exceeding five hundred dollars.

Laws 1917, c. 224, § 2, p. 550;

C.S.1922, § 5663;

C.S.1929, § 76-269;

R.S.1943, § 76-215;

Laws 1965, c. 456, § 2, p. 1450;

Laws 1965, c. 457, § 2, p. 1452;

Laws 1994, LB 1275, § 7;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 30.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-212 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 64-212
64-212
Status: in_force

It shall be lawful for a member or shareholder, an appointive officer, elective officer, agent, director, or employee of an insurance company or a credit union who is a notary public to take the acknowledgment of any person to any written instrument executed to or by the insurance company or credit union and to administer an oath to any shareholder, director, elected or appointed officer, employee, or agent of such insurance company or credit union.

Laws 1947, c. 247, § 1, p. 771;

Laws 1949, c. 221, § 1, p. 622;

Laws 1951, c. 253, § 1, p. 873;

Laws 1957, c. 315, § 2, p. 1133;

R.R.S.1943, § 76-217.02;

Laws 1976, LB 622, § 3;

Laws 1976, LB 704, § 1;

Laws 2002, LB 1094, § 15.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-258 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-258
View Statute 76-258
Status: in_force

When any instrument of writing, in any manner affecting or purporting to affect the title to real estate, has been, or may hereafter be recorded for a period of ten years in the office of the register of deeds of the county wherein such real estate is situated, and such instrument, or the record thereof, because of defect, irregularity or omission, fails to comply in any respect with any statutory requirement or requirements relating to the execution, attestation, acknowledgment, certificate of acknowledgment, recording or certificate of recording, such instrument and the record thereof shall, notwithstanding any or all of such defects, irregularities and omissions, be fully legal, valid, binding and effectual for all purposes to the same extent as though such instrument had, in the first instance, been in all respects duly executed, attested, acknowledged and recorded.

Laws 1941, c. 152, § 1, p. 593;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-276;

R.S.1943, § 76-258.

Defects in execution of deed are cured after passage of ten-year period. Bailey v. Karnopp, 170 Neb. 836, 104 N.W.2d 417 (1960).

Defects in execution of deed are cured after passage of ten-year period. Bailey v. Karnopp, 170 Neb. 836, 104 N.W.2d 417 (1960).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-275.05 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-275.05
View Statute 76-275.05
Status: in_force

When any reference or recital is made in any recorded instrument as to any restriction, agreement, easement, mortgage or other encumbrance of any kind affecting real property, customarily created by recorded instrument or instrument of which a notice or statement provided by statute is recorded, or as to any such encumbrance in general terms, and the reference or recital does not specify the public records and place therein where the instrument creating the encumbrance or such notice or statement of it is to be found, the reference or recital shall unless a contrary intent clearly appears be construed to refer only to encumbrances, if any, of the kind therein described created by instruments included, or of which such a notice or statement is included, in the chain of record title to the real property affected within a period of twenty years prior to the recording of the reference or recital, and the fact that there are none within the period shall not be construed to indicate a contrary intent.

Laws 1959, c. 348, § 2, p. 1234.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-217.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-217.01
View Statute 76-217.01
Status: in_force

No deed, mortgage, affidavit, power of attorney or other instrument in writing shall be invalidated because of any defects in the wording of the seal of the notary public attached thereto.

Laws 1945, c. 145, § 12, p. 494.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.01 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.01
View Statute 76-239.01
Status: in_force

Any person, firm or corporation lending money for the purpose of financing the construction of improvements on real property, to be secured by a mortgage filed of record, is hereby required, before the disbursement of any proceeds under such loan, to notify the borrower in writing, separate from any written application, mortgage note, or any other loan document between the lender and the borrower, that it is the responsibility of the borrower or the borrower's contractor, if disbursements are to be made to such contractor, to apply the loan proceeds to the payment of lawful claims for labor and material furnished for such improvements and that failure of the borrower or his contractor to pay all lawful claims for labor and material could result in the filing of construction liens against the property. It shall be the duty of the contractor to whom any such disbursement is made to make such application of the loan proceeds.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 1, p. 2491.

Any corporation lending money for financing construction to be secured by a mortgage of record is required to notify the borrower in writing that it is the responsibility of the borrower or his contractor to apply the loan proceeds to payment of lawful claims for labor and materials furnished for improvements. Westland Homes Corp. v. Hall, 193 Neb. 237, 226 N.W.2d 622 (1975).

Any corporation lending money for financing construction to be secured by a mortgage of record is required to notify the borrower in writing that it is the responsibility of the borrower or his contractor to apply the loan proceeds to payment of lawful claims for labor and materials furnished for improvements. Westland Homes Corp. v. Hall, 193 Neb. 237, 226 N.W.2d 622 (1975).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-201 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-201
View Statute 76-201
Status: in_force

For purposes of sections 76-201 to 76-281 and 76-2,126 , the term real estate shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and as embracing all chattels real, except leases for a term not exceeding one year.

R.S.1866, c. 43, § 49, p. 290;

R.S.1913, § 6187;

C.S.1922, § 5586;

C.S.1929, § 76-101;

R.S.1943, § 76-201;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 26.

School land leases are chattels real. Beltner v. Carlson, 153 Neb. 797, 46 N.W.2d 153 (1951).

School land leases are chattels real. Beltner v. Carlson, 153 Neb. 797, 46 N.W.2d 153 (1951).

Wife's homestead right in lands owned by husband occupied by family is real estate. Mead v. Polly, 119 Neb. 206, 228 N.W. 369 (1929).

Wife's homestead right in lands owned by husband occupied by family is real estate. Mead v. Polly, 119 Neb. 206, 228 N.W. 369 (1929).

Lease for ninety-nine years is a chattel real and therefore real estate. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Lease for ninety-nine years is a chattel real and therefore real estate. Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851 (1928).

Grain elevator erected on leasehold with privilege of removal is real estate so as to make amount of insurance in policy conclusive value thereof. Calnon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 (1925).

Grain elevator erected on leasehold with privilege of removal is real estate so as to make amount of insurance in policy conclusive value thereof. Calnon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765 (1925).

Term real estate includes lease for purpose of removing minerals. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918).

Term real estate includes lease for purpose of removing minerals. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918).

A 99-year leasehold is not real estate, but is personal property and passes to residuary heirs. In re Estate of Smatlan, 1 Neb. App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992).

A 99-year leasehold is not real estate, but is personal property and passes to residuary heirs. In re Estate of Smatlan, 1 Neb. App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992).

An oil lease is a chattel real. Shoaff v. Gage, 163 F.Supp. 179 (D. Neb. 1958).

An oil lease is a chattel real. Shoaff v. Gage, 163 F.Supp. 179 (D. Neb. 1958).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-108 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-108
View Statute 76-108
Status: in_force

The subjection to the claims of creditors of a future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not prevented or avoided on the sole ground that such interest is future or contingent.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 8, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1008;

R.S.1943, § 76-108.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-118 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-118
View Statute 76-118
Status: in_force

(1) Any person or persons owning property which he, she, or they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming himself, herself, or themselves and another person or persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect as to whether it creates a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (2) Any two or more persons owning property which they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming one, or more than one, or all such persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect, as to whether it creates a separate ownership, or a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property, to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (3) Any person mentioned in this section may be a married person, and any persons so mentioned may be persons married to each other. (4) The conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or herself as grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the joint tenancy expressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint tenancy.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 18, p. 598;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1018;

R.S.1943, § 76-118;

Laws 1980, LB 694, § 11.

A deed which purportedly conveyed all of the interest of one joint tenant, wherein he is both grantor and grantee, is not an act which will sever the joint tenancy. Krause v. Crossley, 202 Neb. 806, 277 N.W.2d 242 (1979).

A deed which purportedly conveyed all of the interest of one joint tenant, wherein he is both grantor and grantee, is not an act which will sever the joint tenancy. Krause v. Crossley, 202 Neb. 806, 277 N.W.2d 242 (1979).

Common law rule as to joint tenancies was modified by this section. White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).

Common law rule as to joint tenancies was modified by this section. White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).

Joint tenancies have been approved by the Legislature. DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).

Joint tenancies have been approved by the Legislature. DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).

Owner of property can convey to himself and another and create joint tenancy. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).

Owner of property can convey to himself and another and create joint tenancy. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953).

Prior to adoption of this section, four unities were requisite to creation of joint tenancy. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).

Prior to adoption of this section, four unities were requisite to creation of joint tenancy. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).

Under public policy announced by Uniform Property Act, conveyance direct by husband to wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship was effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).

Under public policy announced by Uniform Property Act, conveyance direct by husband to wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship was effective. United States v. 12,800 Acres of Land in Hall County, 69 F.Supp. 767 (D. Neb. 1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-113 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-113
View Statute 76-113
Status: in_force

When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made in favor of a person and his children, or in favor of a person and his issue, or by other words of similar import designating the person and the descendants of the person, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance creates a life interest in the person designated and a remainder in his designated descendants, unless an intent to create other interests is effectively manifested.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 13, p. 597;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1013;

R.S.1943, § 76-113.

A devise of an interest in real estate for the use of a child of the testator during his life and upon death of the child to his lineal descendants creates a life estate in the child and a remainder in his lineal descendants. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

A devise of an interest in real estate for the use of a child of the testator during his life and upon death of the child to his lineal descendants creates a life estate in the child and a remainder in his lineal descendants. Hauschild v. Hauschild, 176 Neb. 319, 126 N.W.2d 192 (1964).

A devise to a person and his descendants creates a life estate in such person and a contingent remainder in his descendants as a class. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

A devise to a person and his descendants creates a life estate in such person and a contingent remainder in his descendants as a class. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Will manifested an intention to create other interests. Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).

Will manifested an intention to create other interests. Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-117 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-117
View Statute 76-117
Status: in_force

When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made to two or more persons as tenants in common for life or for a term of years which is terminable at their deaths, with an express remainder, whether effective or not, (a) to the survivor of such persons, or (b) upon the death of all the life tenants to another person or persons, such conveyance, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, creates cross limitations among the several tenants in common, so that the share of the one first dying passes to his cotenants to be held by them in the same manner as their original shares, and the shares of the second and others dying, in succession, are similarly treated until the time when the property is limited to pass as a whole to the remainderman.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 17, p. 597;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1017;

R.S.1943, § 76-117.

Where language in a will shows a different intention, this section is not applicable. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).

Where language in a will shows a different intention, this section is not applicable. Gaughen v. Gaughen, 172 Neb. 740, 112 N.W.2d 285 (1961).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-272 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-272
View Statute 76-272
Status: in_force

All such instruments now appearing of record in the chain of title to any real estate, are legalized; and they shall have the same force and effect as those herein provided for.

Laws 1913, c. 75, § 2, p. 219;

R.S.1913, § 6254;

C.S.1922, § 5653;

C.S.1929, § 76-259;

R.S.1943, § 76-272.

Affidavit recorded in office of register of deeds is prima facie evidence of facts stated therein. Schlake v. Healey, 108 Neb. 35, 187 N.W. 427 (1922).

Affidavit recorded in office of register of deeds is prima facie evidence of facts stated therein. Schlake v. Healey, 108 Neb. 35, 187 N.W. 427 (1922).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-280 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-280
View Statute 76-280
Status: in_force

All contracts, promises, assumpsits or undertakings, either written or verbal, which shall be made in good faith and without fraud, collusion or circumvention, for sale, purchase or payment of improvements made on the lands owned by the government of the United States shall be deemed valid in law or equity, and may be sued for and recovered as in other contracts.

R.S.1866, c. 24, § 1, p. 186;

R.S.1913, § 6248;

C.S.1922, § 5647;

C.S.1929, § 76-253;

R.S.1943, § 76-280.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-107 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-107
View Statute 76-107
Status: in_force

(1) The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent, except that possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent shall not be alienable or devisable.

(2) Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of reentry for breach of condition subsequent relating to any property, whether created on, before, or after July 9, 1988, when the condition has not been broken, shall be valid for a longer period than thirty years from the date of the creation of the condition or possibility of reverter or right of reentry. If such possibility of reverter or right of reentry is created to endure for a longer period than thirty years, it shall be valid for thirty years. This subsection shall not apply to personal property which has been conveyed to a library or museum for the purpose of public display.

(3) Any cause of action arising from any possibility of reverter or right of reentry for breach of condition subsequent which existed prior to July 9, 1988, shall be commenced within a period of one year following July 9, 1988.

Laws 1941, c. 153, § 7, p. 596;

C.S.Supp.,1941, § 76-1007;

R.S.1943, § 76-107;

Laws 1961, c. 367, § 1, p. 1139;

Laws 1988, LB 657, § 1.

The plain language of this section shows that conditions subsequent expire either upon the attempted transfer of the possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry, or 30 years after the creation of the condition subsequent. State v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 241 Neb. 675, 490 N.W.2d 461 (1992).

The plain language of this section shows that conditions subsequent expire either upon the attempted transfer of the possibilities of reverter or rights of reentry, or 30 years after the creation of the condition subsequent. State v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 241 Neb. 675, 490 N.W.2d 461 (1992).

Creation of contingent future interests is recognized. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).

Creation of contingent future interests is recognized. Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-239.02 — NE Code / Chapter 76 / Section 76-239.02
View Statute 76-239.02
Status: in_force

Any such contractor receiving such loan disbursements and any funds of the borrower in addition to such loan disbursements shall be deemed to have consented to comply with the requirements of section 76-239.01 as to the application of such proceeds, and shall be deemed to be the agent of the borrower for so much of such proceeds as are necessary for the payment of such lawful claims for labor and material; Provided, that the foregoing provisions shall not apply where the contractor and the borrower are one and the same person. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the contractor to keep such proceeds in a separate account or accounts or to prorate payment of such proceeds to such lawful claims for labor and materials.

Laws 1969, c. 612, § 2, p. 2491.