Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 — NE Code / Chapter 30 / Section 30-2354
View Statute 30-2354
Status: in_force

(a) A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this article, and the estate of the decedent passes as if such spouse, heir, or devisee had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of such devisee passes as if the devisee had predeceased the decedent.

(b) Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as his property and such joint tenant has no rights by survivorship. This provision applies to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety in real and personal property, joint accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and other institutions, and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents.

(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the principal obligee or the individual upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other contractual arrangement, and it becomes payable as though such beneficiary has predeceased the decedent.

(d) Real property specified for a designated beneficiary of a transfer on death deed who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the transferor who signed the transfer on death deed or any other owner of the real property shall pass as if the designated beneficiary had predeceased the transferor.

(e) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer or by one who aids and abets the killer is treated in accordance with the principles of this section.

(f) A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing or aiding and abetting therein is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of felonious and intentional killing or aiding and abetting therein, the court may determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing or aiding and abetting therein was felonious and intentional for purposes of this section.

(g) This section does not affect the rights of any person who, before rights under this section have been adjudicated, purchases, from the killer or aider and abettor for value and without notice, property which the killer or aider and abettor would have acquired except for this section, but the killer or aider and abettor is liable for the amount of the proceeds or the value of the property. Any insurance company, bank, or other obligor making payment according to the terms of its policy or obligation is not liable by reason of this section unless prior to payment it has received at its home office or principal address written notice of a claim under this section.

Laws 1974, LB 354, § 76, UPC § 2-803;

Laws 2012, LB536, § 25.

An acquittal on a charge of murder is the absence of a conviction for purposes of this section. In re Estate of Krumwiede, 264 Neb. 378, 647 N.W.2d 625 (2002).

An acquittal on a charge of murder is the absence of a conviction for purposes of this section. In re Estate of Krumwiede, 264 Neb. 378, 647 N.W.2d 625 (2002).

In probate proceedings which do not raise equitable matters, an appellate court reviews the decision of the county court for errors appearing on the record and does not conduct a de novo review of the facts. In re Estate of Krumwiede, 264 Neb. 378, 647 N.W.2d 625 (2002).

In probate proceedings which do not raise equitable matters, an appellate court reviews the decision of the county court for errors appearing on the record and does not conduct a de novo review of the facts. In re Estate of Krumwiede, 264 Neb. 378, 647 N.W.2d 625 (2002).

An action to vacate a decree of dissolution for fraud survives the death of a party whose death is the result of a homicide committed by the other party to the proceeding. Howsden v. Rolenc, 219 Neb. 16, 360 N.W.2d 680 (1985).

An action to vacate a decree of dissolution for fraud survives the death of a party whose death is the result of a homicide committed by the other party to the proceeding. Howsden v. Rolenc, 219 Neb. 16, 360 N.W.2d 680 (1985).