Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-167a
Sec. 53a-167a. Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor, except that, if such violation causes the death or serious physical injury of another person, such person shall be guilty of a class D felony.

Cited. 182 C. 242; 189 C. 1; 191 C. 433; 194 C. 347; 195 C. 668; 198 C. 43; 205 C. 456; 211 C. 389; 220 C. 38; 230 C. 400; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 214. Refusal to comply with police command to provide identification following a “Terry” stop may constitute a violation of section even if such refusal is unaccompanied by any physical force or other affirmative act; statute broadly proscribes conduct that hinders, obstructs or impedes a police officer in performance of duties, irrespective of whether offending conduct is active or passive. 280 C. 824. Re 2003 revision, Appellate Court's determination that evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction and that defendant lacked requisite intent was improper in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene, and potential applicability of Sec. 14-217 to present case does not preclude conviction under this section which was drafted expansively to encompass wide range of conduct. 285 C. 447. Evidence was not sufficient to convict defendant under section due to state's failure to pursue a theory of guilt predicated on threatening language and where the trial court did not instruct the jury on the true threat doctrine. 321 C. 729.

Cited. 1 CA 540; Id., 709; 5 CA 616. Statute meets requirement of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407. Cited. 7 CA 257; 8 CA 153; 10 CA 486; Id., 532; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 15 CA 58; Id., 161; 18 CA 104; 21 CA 326; 22 CA 10; Id., 683; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 479; 24 CA 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; Id., 598; 27 CA 49; Id., 103; 28 CA 369; 30 CA 45; 31 CA 178; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78; 37 CA 276; 38 CA 56; 40 CA 601; 42 CA 507; 43 CA 76; 45 CA 369; 46 CA 118. Broad intent is to prohibit conduct that hampers activities of police in performance of their duties, including physical resistance as well as defendant's conduct in this case, in which, after officer saw defendant in window and ordered him at gunpoint to get down and show his hands, defendant reentered building and fled through another window. 66 CA 357. Legislature did not intend failure to identify oneself instantly and voicing of declaratory statements, such as “this isn't Russia”, to constitute interference or obstruction under section. 86 CA 363. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. Id., 607. Conviction reversed in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene to bring brother to hospital because section requires physical struggle, attempt to escape or to destroy evidence and there was not sufficient evidence to support conviction under section. 93 CA 349; judgment reversed, see 285 C. 447. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for interfering with an officer. 96 CA 341. Defendant who placed arresting officer in head lock was in violation of section regardless of whether officer had probable cause for making the arrest. 98 CA 350. Under facts presented, conviction of assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(5) and interfering with officer under this section does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Text message to witness telling him not to write statement to police and to “keep [his] mouth shut” could not be construed to be fighting words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. 152 CA 590. Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under this section and assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Cited. 33 CS 4. Construed. Id., 515. Intention to interfere is necessary element of offense; charge to jury also required knowledge of officer's duty; unlawful entry by officer would not be “in the performance of his duties”, so proof of lawfulness is essential element of state's case and Sec. 53a-23 is applicable. 34 CS 531. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. Id., 549. Cited. 36 CS 89; 37 CS 767; 38 CS 364; Id., 400; Id., 665; 39 CS 347; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 221 C. 788. In order to sustain a conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Defendant acted with the intent to interfere with the performance of the officers' duties; defendant's act does not have to be successful. 1 CA 669. Cited. 5 CA 496; 9 CA 255; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 104; 21 CA 260; 23 CA 123; 24 CA 195; Id., 489; 25 CA 3, 5; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 509; 41 CA 584; 46 CA 791. There was sufficient evidence to support conviction of interfering with an officer where defendant provided police with a false name when asked for his name at crime scene and again while being booked for drug offenses at police headquarters. 110 CA 778. Conviction of both interfering with officer under Subsec. and assault of peace officer under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) constitutes double jeopardy. 119 CA 556.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-330a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-330a
Sec. 53-330a. Access to public transportation and places of public accommodation for volunteer canine search and rescue teams.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who denies the rights afforded to active individual members of a volunteer canine search and rescue team under subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor, provided such individual member complies with the applicable provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

See Sec. 46a-44 for like provisions re guide and assistance dogs.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-26 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-26
Sec. 53a-26. Misdemeanor: Definition, classification, designation.
Status: in_force

(b) Misdemeanors are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, and (5) unclassified.

(c) The particular classification of each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.

(d) Any offense defined in any section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section, but for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, shall be deemed: (1) A class A misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is one year; (2) a class B misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is six months; (3) a class C misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is three months; (4) a class D misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is thirty days; and (5) an unclassified misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is a term other than a term set forth in subdivision (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection.

See Sec. 53a-36 re sentences for misdemeanors.

See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.

Cited. 202 C. 443.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 41 CA 476; 43 CA 1.

Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-222 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-222
Sec. 53a-222. Violation of conditions of release in the first degree: Class D or Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Violation of conditions of release in the first degree is a class D felony, except that any violation of conditions of release that involve (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the conditions of release, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of the conditions of release is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-148a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-148a
Sec. 53a-148a. Failure to report bribery: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Failure to report bribery is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-217e
Sec. 53a-217e. Negligent hunting. Penalties. Fines deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. Suspension of hunting license. Forfeiture of hunting weapon. Prima facie evidence of hunting.
Status: in_force

(1) “Criminal negligence” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-3 ;

(2) “Hunting” has the same meaning as provided in section 26-1 ;

(3) “Loaded hunting implement” means (A) a rifle or shotgun with a live round in the chamber or in a magazine which is attached to such rifle or shotgun, a muzzle-loaded firearm with the percussion cap in place, or a flintlock firearm with powder in the pan, (B) a bow and arrow with an arrow notched on the bow, (C) a drawn crossbow with a bolt in place, or (D) a high velocity air gun that is charged with a projectile in the chamber or in a magazine that is attached to such air gun; and

(4) “Serious physical injury” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-3 .

(b) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the first degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the death of another person.

(2) Negligent hunting in the first degree is a class D felony.

(c) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the second degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person violates any provision of section 26-85 or discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the serious physical injury of another person.

(2) Negligent hunting in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than four hundred dollars.

(d) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the third degree when such person, while hunting, (A) discharges a firearm at a time of day when hunting is not permitted, (B) discharges a firearm from a vehicle, (C) hunts while the person's license to hunt is suspended, (D) hunts out of season or on a Sunday, or (E) discharges a firearm so as to cause the projectile to strike or enter into any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials.

(2) Negligent hunting in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars.

(e) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the fourth degree when such person, while hunting, (A) hunts without purchasing a license, permit or stamp or other permission required by law, (B) is in possession of a loaded hunting implement at a time of day when hunting is not allowed, (C) hunts with or discharges a firearm less than two hundred fifty feet from any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials, or less than one hundred twenty-five feet from any such building while hunting in tidal water areas, unless written permission of the owner of such building has been obtained, or (D) hunts from or discharges a hunting implement from or across a public highway.

(2) Negligent hunting in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(f) Any person who is convicted of a violation of any provision of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d within five years of a previous conviction for violation of this section shall be considered a persistent negligent hunter. Upon such second conviction within five years, a persistent negligent hunter shall be fined an amount that is not less than twice the minimum fine provided for the second violation and shall be subject to penalties provided for the next more serious degree of negligent hunting under subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d .

(g) Any fine imposed for a conviction under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d shall be deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215 .

(h) (1) The Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection may suspend the hunting license of any person convicted under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d for: (A) Indefinitely upon conviction of negligent hunting in the first degree or upon conviction of any violation of subsection (b) of section 53-206d ; (B) up to ten years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the second degree; (C) up to five years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the third degree; and (D) up to three years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the fourth degree.

(2) Any person arrested for a violation of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d , except as provided in section 26-85 shall surrender any firearm, bow, crossbow, bolt or high velocity air gun in the person's possession while hunting at the time of the alleged violation. Such property shall be confiscated at the time of arrest by a police officer or conservation officer. Upon nolle or dismissal of charges or acquittal of such person of such violation, such property shall be returned to the person within five business days and in the same condition as when the firearm, bow, crossbow or high velocity air gun was surrendered. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 54-33g and 54-36a , the property shall be turned over to the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection upon conviction of such person for such violation. Said commissioner shall (A) retain the property for use by personnel of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, (B) convey the property to the Commissioner of Administrative Services for sale at public auction, the proceeds of which shall be credited to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215 , or (C) destroy the property.

(i) Possession by any person of a loaded hunting implement while at or entering or leaving an area where a reasonable person would believe the objective was to take wildlife shall be prima facie evidence of hunting, except that a person may, one hour before sunrise during the regulated deer and turkey firearms hunting seasons, be in possession of a loaded rifle or shotgun, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, provided a live round is not in the chamber of the rifle or shotgun.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-191 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-191
Sec. 53-191. Motorboats on Bolton Ponds and Gardner's Lake.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who between sunset and eight o'clock in the morning operates a boat in excess of six miles per hour on Gardner's Lake in the towns of Salem, Montville and Bozrah shall have committed an infraction. The town marine officers of Salem, Montville and Bozrah may enforce the provisions of this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-54b
Sec. 53a-54b. Murder with special circumstances.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 194 C. 416; 198 C. 92; 199 C. 163; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 289; 215 C. 570; 216 C. 699; 218 C. 486; 230 C. 183; 234 C. 324; Id., 735; 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 702; 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom; murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of “heinous” and “depraved” discussed; “heinous, cruel or depraved” as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285. Trial court properly instructed jury that it could convict defendant of capital felony based upon a theory of conspiratorial liability even though defendant did not pull trigger of gun that killed victims and was not present when the shootings occurred. 271 C. 338.

Cited. 32 CA 38; 36 CA 364; 41 CA 604; 42 CA 348; 43 CA 549; 45 CA 207; Id., 390.

Cited 42 CS 426.

Subdiv. (1):

Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder for the crime of capital felony under this section; term “murder” in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been “acting within the scope of his duties”, the state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.

Subdiv. (2):

Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163. Cited. 203 C. 420. Evidence that codefendant said “I've got a job for you” and that defendant made preparations for the murder and received a snowmobile after the victim was killed was sufficient to support finding of probable cause that defendant committed murder for pecuniary gain; defendant, having been hired to kill the victim, could be held accessorily liable for capital felony under Subdiv. even if jury found that codefendant, who was not a party to any hiring relationship, was the principal actor who killed the victim; hiring element contemplates a bargained for exchange involving pecuniary gain as consideration for the commission of the murder, and the mere receipt of money or property before or after the murder is not sufficient to hold defendant liable under Subdiv. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 197 C. 436; 213 C. 388. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would provide the predicate for criminal liability under Subdiv. 263 C. 478.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 233 C. 174. State need only prove that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor. 269 C. 213.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 205 C. 298; 237 C. 694. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony; evidence indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 206 C. 213; 207 C. 374; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 213 C. 708; 218 C. 349; 221 C. 430; 229 C. 125; 233 C. 813. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under section. 238 C. 828. Cited. 241 C. 322; Id., 702; 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term “in the course of a single transaction” is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose or plan in order to be “in the course of a single transaction”; does not require murders to be at the same time in order to constitute “in the course of a single transaction”; temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite to prosecution under Subdiv. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this Subdiv. provide that conviction of intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this Subdiv. when victim is under 16, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind; knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of Subdiv.; to limit applicability of Subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the legislative intent. 265 C. 35. Legislature had rational basis for classifying intentional murder of a person under the age of 16 as a capital felony. 272 C. 106.

Cited. 38 CA 581.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-46a
Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i) of this section. Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45 ; or (C) if the jury that determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.

(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report that may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.

(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.

(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section, the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist, and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e) of this section, that at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g , or (2) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (3) the defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8 , 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.

(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a ; or (8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.

See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of “life imprisonment”.

See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.

Cited. 197 C. 436; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 221 C. 430; 225 C. 559. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183. Cited. 233 C. 813; 234 C. 735; 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely because that factor establishes something good about defendant; instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment; once sentencer has found an aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. 264 C. 1. Statutory scheme does not contemplate right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing; once one or more jurors find that defendant has proven existence of a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, entire jury, and not just those jurors who have found the existence of that mitigating factor, proceed to the weighing process; nonunanimous decision during penalty phase of a capital trial does not result automatically in sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; trial court improperly declined to instruct jury that, in order to sentence defendant to death, it must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factor or factors outweigh mitigating factor or factors and that, accordingly, it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment. 272 C. 106. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; holdings in 230 C. 183 and 238 C. 389 reaffirmed. 303 C. 71. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 296; 36 CA 364.

Subsec. (b):

Term “judges” in the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1. Provision does not preclude trial court's declaring a mistrial and impaneling new jury after original jury becomes deadlocked in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. Subdiv. (3): Defendant's decision to forgo jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be admissible under normal rules of evidence; under statute, the state like defendant only has to meet the relevancy standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579. Although defendant may offer any evidence relevant to any mitigating factor, trial court is vested with discretion to exclude irrelevant information. 272 C. 106.

Subsec. (d):

Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence; requirement for capital sentencer to consider “all the facts and circumstances of the case” is not unconstitutionally vague. 264 C. 1. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor, but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors; jury must make its determination of whether the proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 266 C. 171. “Facts and circumstances” language is a constitutionally permissible method of determining how mitigating circumstances are to be established; nowhere does statute require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 272 C. 106. Requiring fact finder to determine whether a particular mitigating factor established by the evidence is mitigating in nature as a prerequisite to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not improperly prevent mitigating evidence offered by defendant from being given full consideration and effect; not improper for three-judge panel to find cumulative factor both factually proven and to be mitigating in nature but not find any of the individual factors to be mitigating in nature although some were factually proven. 303 C. 71. Court's instruction to jury that it was permitted, but not required, to cumulate the evidence to find a mitigating factor complies with previously articulated constitutional standard; instruction describing mitigating evidence as “unique factors concerning the nature of the crime or who the defendant is” did not preclude jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence; “facts and circumstances” language does not unconstitutionally preclude sentencer from considering relevant mitigating evidence and does not unconstitutionally require that mitigating factor have some nexus to the crime; addition of weighing process in 1995 does not alter the constitutionality of allocating to defendant the burden of proving that a factor is mitigating in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Subsec. (e):

Cited. 199 C. 163. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state, and (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374.

Subsec. (f):

Cited. 199 C. 163; 208 C. 125; 237 C. 694. Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree; in light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. 266 C. 171. Three-judge panel could reasonably have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's age, troubled background and other aspects of his person were outweighed, by any amount or degree, by the cruelty, heinousness and depravity of defendant's crime. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (g):

Cited. 199 C. 163; 235 C. 206; 238 C. 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction, could have misled jury; general thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent; “mental capacity” as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense, to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conduct; legislature's intent in enacting Subsec. was to specify factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced; in order to establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. 269 C. 213.

Subsec. (h):

Subdiv. (4): Meaning of “especially cruel” must include intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258. “Same felony” means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony; that requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.

Subsec. (i):

To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6) does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. 262 C. 537. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. Subdiv. (3): In order to establish this aggravating factor, state must prove that defendant knew that in killing one person, another person would be subject to a very serious risk or danger to his or her life. Id. Subdiv. (4) requires proof that defendant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture on victim above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, and that defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain, suffering or torture or was callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on victim. 272 C. 106. Subdiv. (4): Court's limiting instruction on aggravating factor of committing offense in “an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner” that permits proof by callousness or indifference to the additional pain, suffering or torture that defendant's intentional conduct inflicted on the victim does not render aggravating factor unconstitutionally vague. 303 C. 71. Subdiv. (6): It is not a violation of the state constitution for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain, to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2); statutory language does not impose any additional temporal or premeditation requirements beyond that the expectation of compensation must be created before the murder and exist at the time of the murder. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196f — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-196f
Sec. 53a-196f. Possessing child sexual abuse material in the third degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the acts of the defendant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 53a-196h .

(c) Possessing child sexual abuse material in the third degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-62 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-62
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section, “religiously-affiliated community center” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa .

(c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony.

See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.

Cited. 175 C. 204; 182 C. 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 193 C. 602; 195 C. 636; 201 C. 115; 202 C. 343; 205 C. 262; 207 C. 565; 208 C. 689; 209 C. 34; Id., 52; 222 C. 331; 224 C. 494; 227 C. 829; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 648.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 3 CA 289; 8 CA 190; Id., 496; 9 CA 161; 14 CA 6; Id., 526; 25 CA 149; Id., 334; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 708; 31 CA 497; 33 CA 103; 40 CA 805; 41 CA 47. Words of defendant's threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of “imminent” serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.

Cited. 37 CS 664; 42 CS 574; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 581 reversed. 226 C. 601. Cited. 227 C. 153; 228 C. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403. Subdiv. (3): Statements made that “more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you” and “I'm going to be there to watch it happen”, when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, did not constitute a true threat due to subsequent apology and lack of other animosity between the parties; to ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, state must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. 313 C. 434. Imminence is only one factor for a court to consider in determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat under section, and not a requirement. 327 C. 1. Subsec. is divisible, with offenses requiring proof of an intentional mental state under Subdivs. (1) and (2) and recklessness under Subdiv. (3); threatening offense committed with reckless disregard under Subdiv. (3) does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude under Second Circuit case law and for purposes of immigration consequences. 328 C. 198.

Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 11 CA 80; 13 CA 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 CA 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306; Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 CA 515; 41 CA 584; Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face; statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case; there is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). 81 CA 248. Convictions for threatening in second degree in violation of Subdivs. (1) and (2) did not violate right against double jeopardy because each conviction arose from a different violation. 154 CA 45. Subdiv. (3): Objective standard for true threats doctrine remains valid and subdivision is constitutionally sound. 185 CA 287; judgment affirmed, see 337 C. 92. Subdiv. (2): Defendant's statements to State Marshal who had come onto his property to serve court documents on the Defendant, which included statement, “[i]f you come back, I guarantee you, you won't walk away”, were true threats. 226 CA 234.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-264 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-264
Sec. 53-264. Maintenance.
Status: in_force

State of facts not within section. 14 C. 23. Cited. 77 C. 461. Attorney may purchase judgment and sue thereon. 85 C. 267. Common law as to maintenance never adopted in this state as applied to civil actions. 100 C. 110; 106 C. 70.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-46b
Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence.
Status: in_force

(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a .

(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.

Cited. 212 C. 258. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights. 230 C. 183. Cited. 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Subsec. (b):

Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559. Prohibition against disproportionality discussed. 234 C. 735. Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. 238 C. 389. Court stayed proceedings pending review. 272 C. 674. Subsec. does not create nonwaivable right to mandatory sentence review by Connecticut Supreme Court of any and all claims that death sentence was “the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor”, regardless of the time and manner in which claim was raised; court is not required to impose moratorium on execution of death sentences whenever an unproven claim of systemic arbitrariness in administration of death penalty scheme is raised. Id., 676. Defendant's claim that his death sentence was imposed arbitrarily and capriciously because there are no uniform standards guiding prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty is contradicted by overwhelming authority and is rejected. 303 C. 71. Jury could reasonably have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole aggravating factor outweighed the numerous mitigating factors and therefore the jury's sentencing verdict was not unreasonable and the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-450 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949f / Section 53-450
Sec. 53-450. Confidentiality of videotape rental information. Cause of action. Penalty.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who has been injured by a violation of this section shall have a right of action against any person renting videotape cassettes who has committed the violation to recover damages for such injury.

(c) Any person who violates any provisions of this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127g — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127g
Sec. 53a-127g. Unlawful possession of a personal identifying information access device: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a personal identifying information access device when such person possesses an access device, document-making equipment or authentication implement for the purpose of fraudulently altering, obtaining or using the personal identifying information of another person.

(c) Unlawful possession of an access device is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-155 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-155
Sec. 53a-155. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence is a class D felony.

Cited. 214 C. 540; 236 C. 514; 237 C. 339. Section applies, no matter what stage the police have actually reached in their investigation, provided defendant believes it is probable that an official proceeding will arise; omission of the term “investigation” from section excludes situations in which defendant believes only an investigation, but not an official proceeding, is likely to take place. 314 C. 354.

Cited. 1 CA 540; 6 CA 394; 25 CA 624. Section does not require a temporal proximity between the alleged act and the subsequent official proceeding; element re pending or about to be instituted official proceeding was satisfied when defendant reasonably could have contemplated that an official proceeding was likely to arise. 147 CA 53. Subsec. (a)(1): The word “conceal” is not defined in the section or elsewhere in the Penal Code, but a commonly understood meaning is to prevent disclosure or recognition of something and a jury could reasonably find that the defendant's placing of his vehicle in a private driveway with several other vehicles after striking the victim with his vehicle was an act of concealment. 227 CA 636.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-175 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-175
Sec. 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Riot in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 32 CA 224.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-291 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-291
Sec. 53a-291. Vendor fraud in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Vendor fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-125d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-125d
Sec. 53a-125d. Telephone fraud in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Telephone fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127a
Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-344
Sec. 53-344. Sale or delivery of cigarettes or tobacco products to persons under age twenty-one. Misrepresentation of age. Presentation of driver's license or identity card to establish age. Transaction scans. Affirmative defense.
Status: in_force

(1) “Cardholder” means any person who presents a driver's license or an identity card to a seller or seller's agent or employee, to purchase or receive tobacco from such seller or seller's agent or employee;

(2) “Cigarette” has the same meaning as provided in subsection (b) of section 12-285 ;

(3) “Identity card” means an identification card issued in accordance with the provisions of section 1-1h ;

(4) “Sale” has the same meaning as provided in section 53-344b ;

(5) “Give” or “giving” has the same meaning as provided in section 53-344b ;

(6) “Deliver” or “delivering” has the same meaning as provided in section 53-344b ;

(7) “Seller” means any person engaged in the sale, giving or delivering of cigarettes or tobacco products;

(8) “Tobacco products” has the same meaning as provided in section 12-330a ;

(9) “Transaction scan” means the process by which a seller or seller's agent or employee checks, by means of a transaction scan device, the validity of a driver's license or an identity card; and

(10) “Transaction scan device” means any commercial device or combination of devices used at a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip or bar code of a driver's license or an identity card.

(b) Any person who sells, gives or delivers to any person under twenty-one years of age cigarettes or a tobacco product shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars for the first offense, not more than seven hundred fifty dollars for a second offense on or before twenty-four months after the date of the first offense and not more than one thousand dollars for each subsequent offense on or before twenty-four months after the date of the first offense. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to a person under twenty-one years of age who is delivering or accepting delivery of cigarettes or a tobacco product (1) in such person's capacity as an employee, or (2) as part of a scientific study being conducted by an organization for the purpose of medical research to further efforts in cigarette and tobacco product use prevention and cessation, provided such medical research has been approved by the organization's institutional review board, as defined in section 21a-408 .

(c) Any person under twenty-one years of age who misrepresents such person's age to purchase cigarettes or a tobacco product shall be fined not more than fifty dollars for the first offense and not less than fifty dollars or more than one hundred dollars for each subsequent offense.

(d) (1) A seller or seller's agent or employee shall request that each person intending to purchase cigarettes or a tobacco product present a driver's license or identity card to establish that such person is twenty-one years of age or older.

(2) A seller or seller's agent or employee may perform a transaction scan to check the validity of a driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder as a condition for selling, giving away or otherwise distributing cigarettes or a tobacco product to the cardholder.

(3) If the information deciphered by the transaction scan performed under subdivision (2) of this subsection fails to match the information printed on the driver's license or identity card presented by the cardholder, or if the transaction scan indicates that the information so printed is false or fraudulent, neither the seller nor any seller's agent or employee shall sell, give away or otherwise distribute any cigarettes or a tobacco product to the cardholder.

(4) Subdivision (2) of this subsection does not preclude a seller or seller's agent or employee from using a transaction scan device to check the validity of a document other than a driver's license or an identity card, if the document includes a bar code or magnetic strip that may be scanned by the device, as a condition for selling, giving away or otherwise distributing cigarettes or a tobacco product to the person presenting the document.

(e) (1) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth of the person listed on the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder; and (B) the expiration date and identification number of the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder.

(2) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall use a transaction scan device for a purpose other than the purposes specified in subsection (e) of section 53-344b , subsection (d) of this section or subsection (c) of section 30-86 .

(3) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any third party, including, but not limited to, selling or otherwise disseminating that information for any marketing, advertising or promotional activities, but a seller or seller's agent or employee may release that information pursuant to a court order.

(4) Nothing in subsection (d) of this section or this subsection relieves a seller or seller's agent or employee of any responsibility to comply with any other applicable state or federal laws or rules governing the sale, giving away or other distribution of cigarettes or tobacco products.

(5) Any person who violates this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars.

(f) (1) In any prosecution of a seller or seller's agent or employee for a violation of subsection (b) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that all of the following occurred: (A) A cardholder attempting to purchase or receive cigarettes or a tobacco product presented a driver's license or an identity card; (B) a transaction scan of the driver's license or identity card that the cardholder presented indicated that the license or card was valid and indicated that the cardholder was at least twenty-one years of age; and (C) the cigarettes or a tobacco product was sold, given away or otherwise distributed to the cardholder in reasonable reliance upon the identification presented and the completed transaction scan.

(2) In determining whether a seller or seller's agent or employee has proven the affirmative defense provided by subdivision (1) of this subsection, the trier of fact in such prosecution shall consider that reasonable reliance upon the identification presented and the completed transaction scan may require a seller or seller's agent or employee to exercise reasonable diligence and that the use of a transaction scan device does not excuse a seller or seller's agent or employee from exercising such reasonable diligence to determine the following: (A) Whether a person to whom the seller or seller's agent or employee sells, gives away or otherwise distributes cigarettes or a tobacco product is twenty-one years of age or older; and (B) whether the description and picture appearing on the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder is that of the cardholder.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-217c
Sec. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class C felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

Operability of the pistol or revolver is not essential element of the offense. 59 CA 112. Where prior felony conviction formed basis of a charge under section, violation of section could not be established without presenting proof of such conviction. 64 CA 384.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-203 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-203
Sec. 53-203. Unlawful discharge of firearms.
Status: in_force

Cited. 169 C. 309; 186 C. 574; 197 C. 602; 215 C. 739; 219 C. 363; 226 C. 497.

Cited. 24 CA 408.

Cited. 39 CS 359.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64bb — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-64bb
Sec. 53a-64bb. Strangulation or suffocation in the second degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) No person shall be found guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the second degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all three offenses upon the same information. For the purposes of this section, “unlawful restraint” means a violation of section 53a-95 or 53a-96 , and “assault” means a violation of section 53a-59 , 53a-59a , 53a-59b , 53a-59c , 53a-60 , 53a-60a , 53a-60b , 53a-60c , 53a-61 or 53a-61a .

(c) Strangulation or suffocation in the second degree is a class D felony.

The “same incident” prohibition was included by the legislature in Subsec. (b) rather than Subsec. (a) because the provision is not intended to set forth an element of the crime, but, rather, to express legislative intentions relating specifically to double jeopardy. 339 C. 452.

Prohibition on multiple convictions arising out of the same incident in Subsec. (b) does not apply when convictions stem from wholly separate criminal conduct by defendant even if committed against the same victim on the same day. 142 CA 657. Facts presented did not allow for combined convictions of strangulation in the second degree under Subsec. (b), unlawful restraint in the first degree under Sec. 53a-95 and assault in the third degree under Sec. 53a-61(a)(1). 149 CA 334.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-123 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-123
Sec. 53a-123. Larceny in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.

Cited. 173 C. 545; 182 C. 176; 183 C. 386; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 559; 194 C. 438; Id., 650; 196 C. 305; Id., 567; 197 C. 166; Id., 201; Id., 247; Id., 309; 198 C. 1; 199 C. 30; Id., 308; Id., 462; 200 C. 113; 202 C. 615; 203 C. 484; 209 C. 23; 213 C. 233; 216 C. 273; 235 C. 679; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 2 CA 537; 5 CA 113; 7 CA 326; 8 CA 125; Id., 478; 9 CA 349; 13 CA 420; Id., 576; Id., 596; 14 CA 272; Id., 472; 16 CA 433; 17 CA 460; 19 CA 495; 20 CA 271; Id., 369; 21 CA 248; 29 CA 843; 35 CA 566; Id., 714; 39 CA 810; 44 CA 187; Id., 294; 46 CA 691. Since statute's language includes both taking of property and subsequent retention of the stolen property, to charge defendant with two counts of larceny is improper; they are not separately punishable and to so charge violates defendant's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 100 CA 565.

Requisites for accepting plea of guilty. 31 CS 501. Cited. 32 CS 650; 35 CS 531; 38 CS 549.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 247; 174 C. 129; Id., 129; 178 C. 427; Id., 689; 181 C. 299; 182 C. 476; 186 C. 426; 187 C. 264; 188 C. 325; Id., 671; 190 C. 191; 191 C. 180; 195 C. 421; 196 C. 36; Id., 115; 198 C. 203; Id., 490; 200 C. 9; 201 C. 462; 206 C. 657; 207 C. 118; 208 C. 365; 210 C. 652; 211 C. 101; 212 C. 223; 213 C. 422; 215 C. 716; 219 C. 160; 220 C. 487; 223 C. 243; 232 C. 455; 233 C. 552; 235 C. 67; 238 C. 784; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (3): Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132. For defendant to be found guilty of larceny in the third degree, state must prove that defendant committed larceny by defrauding a public community. 252 C. 229. P.A. 09-138, which increased the minimum value element from $5,000 to $10,000, did not have retroactive effect. 314 C. 529.

Cited. 1 CA 270; Id., 378, 379. Subdiv. (3): Larceny from the person requires an actual trespass to the person of the victim and therefore taking a radio which was in the vicinity of the victim, but not on the victim's person, did not constitute larceny under section. Id., 642. Cited. 3 CA 126; 8 CA 491; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 239; Id., 408; Id., 685; 13 CA 12; Id., 554; 14 CA 169; Id., 493; 20 CA 513; 24 CA 697; 26 CA 52; Id., 114; Id., 279; 28 CA 306; 30 CA 606; 31 CA 47; Id., 94; Id., 312; 32 CA 21; 33 CA 468; 34 CA 250; Id., 610; Id., 699; 35 CA 740; 38 CA 643; 39 CA 579; Id., 840; 40 CA 21; 41 CA 391; Id., 584; Id., 817; 42 CA 810; 46 CA 414; Id., 616. Court found that money was “taken from the person of the victim” in case in which victim was tricked into turning over her money to defendant. 56 CA 428. Subdiv. (3): Wrongfully taking property from the person of another constitutes a trespass of the person, and such a taking from the person constitutes larceny in the second degree. 95 CA 248. Larceny in second degree under section is not ordinarily lesser included offense of robbery for purposes of double jeopardy. 109 CA 74. Subdiv. (5): Section not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and provided sufficient notice that embezzlement from an estate is prohibited even if conduct occurred after separate conservator of estate was appointed. 121 CA 190; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 592. Subsec., as amended by P.A. 09-138 to increase the value of property taken for the commission of larceny in the second degree, does not apply retroactively to defendant's case; legislature stated that the provision was effective October 1, 2009, without any express language referring to retroactivity and the legislative history does not indicate a clear or unequivocal intent for it to apply retroactively. 136 CA 427; judgment affirmed, see 314 C. 570. Subdiv. (3): Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under this Subdiv. and Secs. 53a-48(a) and 53a-124(a)(2) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 36 CS 603; 37 CS 527.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-112 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-112
Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 178 C. 67; 189 C. 228; 191 C. 636; 194 C. 617; 195 C. 600. More reasonable to conclude that legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable under statute for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled. 197 C. 158. Cited. 198 C. 92; 199 C. 389; 204 C. 769; 219 C. 605; 236 C. 375.

Term “another person” includes firefighters. 8 CA 581. Cited. 17 CA 466.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 174 C. 73; 189 C. 201; Id., 752; 195 C. 128; Id., 598; 199 C. 14; 202 C. 93; 215 C. 716.

Cited. 10 CA 422; 28 CA 9. Subdiv. (2): Holding in 99 C. 432, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82-290. 59 CA 362.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-109 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-109
Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C or class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor, except that any person found guilty under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 240 C. 708.

Cited. 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 35 CA 714.

Cited. 35 CS 555.

Subsec. (a):

Evidence that defendant entered building by not using main entrance but instead forcing open a locked door labeled with a no trespassing sign was sufficient to support conviction under section. 83 CA 377. Statute does not demand that premises be completely enclosed to fall within its purview, but they must be enclosed sufficiently to exclude intruders, namely, those who purposefully enter the property despite having no legitimate reason to do so; where entire property was enclosed by combination of concrete wall and chain link fence, save only for opening in front, which allowed pedestrian traffic to access sidewalk by way of set of steps, property was sufficiently enclosed, even with small gateless entryway, to bring it within the protections of section. 105 CA 179.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-191 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-191
Sec. 53a-191. Incest: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Incest is a class D felony.

Cited. 189 C. 321; 210 C. 244. Relationship as half-uncle and half-niece is void. 213 C. 637.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202b — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202b
Sec. 53-202b. Sale or transfer of assault weapon prohibited. Exemptions. Olympic pistols. Regulations. Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(2) Any person who transfers, sells or gives any assault weapon to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years, which shall not be suspended or reduced by the court and shall be in addition and consecutive to the term of imprisonment imposed under subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to:

(1) The sale of assault weapons to: (A) The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States; (B) a sworn and duly certified member of an organized police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the Department of Correction, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a salaried inspector of motor vehicles designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection pursuant to section 26-5 , or a constable who is certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and appointed by the chief executive authority of a town, city or borough to perform criminal law enforcement duties, pursuant to a letter on the letterhead of such department, division, commissioner or authority authorizing the purchase and stating that the sworn member, inspector, officer or constable will use the assault weapon in the discharge of official duties, and that a records check indicates that the sworn member, inspector, officer or constable has not been convicted of a crime of family violence, for use by such sworn member, inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's, inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty, (C) a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, or (D) a nuclear facility licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the purpose of providing security services at such facility, or any contractor or subcontractor of such facility for the purpose of providing security services at such facility;

(2) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d which is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive;

(3) The transfer of an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d , by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon;

(4) The sale of a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under this subdivision, and for which the purchaser signs a form prescribed by the commissioner and provided by the seller that indicates that the pistol will be used by the purchaser primarily for target shooting practice and events. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to designate semiautomatic pistols that are defined as assault weapons in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that may be sold pursuant to this subdivision, provided the use of such pistols is sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee and USA Shooting, or any subsequent corresponding governing board for international shooting competition in the United States.

Cited. 234 C. 455; 242 C. 143.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-116 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-116
Sec. 53a-116. Criminal mischief in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 236 C. 266.

Cited. 11 CA 805; 36 CA 680.

Cited. 38 CS 301.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-401 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949c / Section 53-401
Sec. 53-401. Appeal of orders. Stay of execution. Filing of orders.
Status: in_force

(b) No appeal shall be taken from such order except within seven days thereof. The effect of such order shall be automatically stayed for such seven-day period. If an appeal is taken within such seven-day period, the party taking such appeal may, within such period, file an application with the clerk of the court in which such order was issued requesting a stay of execution of such order pending such appeal, which application shall set forth the reasons for such request. A copy of such application shall be sent to the adverse party by the applicant. Upon the filing of such application, the effect of such order shall be further stayed until a decision is rendered thereon. A hearing on such application shall be held promptly. Where an appeal is taken by the defendant, such order shall be stayed if the defendant posts a bond, as provided in subsection (c) of this section.

(c) At the hearing on such application, the court shall: (1) Upon motion of a defendant who is taking the appeal, set an amount of bond with surety for the stay of such order as provided in subsection (b) of this section, which amount shall be as much as the court deems sufficient to protect the state's interest in the matter; (2) grant the stay; (3) deny the stay; or (4) condition the granting of the stay upon the giving of such bond by the defendant.

(d) The clerk of the court shall file a certified copy of any order of the court discharging or modifying a CORA lien notice on the official records wherein the CORA lien notice to which it relates is filed as soon as the time for taking an appeal from such order has elapsed or, if an appeal is taken and an application for a stay of such order is filed, as soon as a decision granting or denying such stay has been rendered. Such order shall be accompanied by a notation of the court's decision on any application for a stay relating thereto. Such filing may be accomplished by mailing a certified copy of such order to the office wherein such official records are kept, with return receipt requested. Such order of the court shall be effective upon the filing of it on such official records. No charge or fee shall be imposed for the filing of any such order in this state.

(e) No appeal taken pursuant to this section shall stay the underlying criminal prosecution under this chapter.

Cited. 206 C. 421; 229 C. 479.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-34 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-34
Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect.
Status: in_force

(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 180 C. 557; 182 C. 595; 188 C. 557; 222 C. 299.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-196a
Sec. 53a-196a. Employing a minor in an obscene performance: Class A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Employing a minor in an obscene performance is a class A felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

See Sec. 17a-47 re legal division within Department of Children and Families.

Cited. 227 C. 207. Section is not unconstitutionally vague because there is a body of caselaw that makes clear that directing a child to pose fully or partially nude for photographs in an objectively sexual manner is an exhibition or showing within the meaning of the term “nude performance” and a violation of Subsec. (a)(1); Defendant's conviction under section did not violate defendant's first amendment rights since photographs of children need not depict them explicitly engaged in sexual acts to be patently offensive and thus harmful to minors; the photographs at issue were obscene and not protected by the first amendment. 346 C. 432.

“Audience”, in Subsec. (a)(1), may consist of a single photographer of a live performance or a single person viewing photographs of the performance, whether or not any spectator was present at performance or depicted in photographs; Subsec. (a)(1) advances legislative purpose of prohibiting the exhibition and viewing of children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of the number of spectators. 135 CA 215.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-88 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-88
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty shall be fined five thousand dollars.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-211 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-211
Sec. 53a-211. Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or silencer: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to persons, firms, corporations or museums licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law to possess, control or own sawed-off shotguns or silencers.

(c) Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer is a class D felony.

See Secs. 29-35 to 29-38a, inclusive, and 53-202 to 53-206d, inclusive, re regulation of firearms and penalties imposed for firearms violations.

Cited. 190 C. 715; 198 C. 68; 201 C. 505; 207 C. 323; 224 C. 163; 233 C. 215.

Cited. 1 CA 697; 7 CA 550; 11 CA 397; 13 CA 76; 14 CA 67; 15 CA 539; 17 CA 490; 26 CA 698; 28 CA 474; 30 CA 9. Fact that the weapon in evidence had a pistol grip was of no consequence because the barrel had been sawed off and therefore weapon was a sawed-off shotgun. 99 CA 183. Defendant was not entitled to jury instruction that “mere presence in the vicinity of the firearm, however, is not enough to establish possession”. 113 CA 651.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-189a
Sec. 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class D or C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) For purposes of this section, “in plain view” does not include any view that is achieved by photographing, filming, videotaping or otherwise recording under or around a person's clothing, and “public place” means public place, as defined in section 53a-186 .

(c) Voyeurism is (1) a class D felony for a first offense, except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, (2) a class C felony for any subsequent offense, and (3) a class C felony for a first offense when (A) such person has been previously convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (f) of section 53a-29 , or (B) the intended subject of the offense is a person under sixteen years of age.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193 , no person may be prosecuted for an offense under subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section except within five years from the date of the offense, or within five years from the date the subject of the offense discovers the existence of the photograph, film, videotape or other recording that constitutes a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section, whichever is later.

The “not in plain view” element of section refers to the plain view of the public generally, meaning that a person must not be in a position where any member of the public, lawfully situated, could plainly view the person being recorded. 328 C. 219.

The perspective from which the “not in plain view” element of voyeurism must be evaluated is that of the defendant, not that of the general public. 166 CA 613; judgment reversed, see 328 C. 219.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-398 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949c / Section 53-398
Sec. 53-398. Court orders.
Status: in_force

(1) An order prohibiting the defendant from transferring, depleting or otherwise alienating or diminishing any property of his which there is probable cause to believe is subject to forfeiture under this chapter;

(2) An order appointing a receiver, in accordance with chapter 920 and the rules of court relating thereto which are not inconsistent with this chapter, over such property which there is probable cause to believe is subject to forfeiture under this chapter. Such receiver shall have all powers and obligations, subject to the supervision of the court, that exist under the statutes, the common law and the rules of court relating thereto, which are not inconsistent with this chapter, and shall be compensated with funds appropriated to the Judicial Department in an amount that the court determines is reasonable;

(3) An order permitting the defendant to transfer or deplete any property of his which there is probable cause to believe is subject to forfeiture under this chapter upon the posting by such defendant of such security as is equal to the value of the property described therein, which security shall be subject to forfeiture under this chapter to the extent that the property to which it relates otherwise would have been subject to forfeiture;

(4) Any other order, consistent with due process of law, that the court deems to be reasonable and necessary to protect the rights of any innocent person or entity or to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the right of the defendant to receive any net income or profits resulting from the use and ownership of such property belonging to him for which there is probable cause to believe is subject to forfeiture under this chapter until a final judgment of forfeiture is rendered.

Cited. 206 C. 421; 224 C. 29; 229 C. 479.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-161d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-161d
Sec. 53a-161d. Paying a kickback: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Paying a kickback is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-107 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-107
Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 204 C. 441.

Cited. 12 CA 172; 18 CA 303; 19 CA 245; 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 35 CA 714; 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.

Word “owner” must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555. Cited. 37 CS 853.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 216 C. 647; 236 C. 342. A spouse's right or privilege to enter property is not determined solely by the spouse's ownership interest in the property, or by whether the structure can be characterized as the marital home, but rather by whether the spouse had any possessory or occupancy interest in the premises at the time of entry; In general, when the marital relationship is intact and both spouses have a possessory or occupancy interest in a premises, an isolated request to leave the premises during a heated marital argument will not suffice to revoke one spouse's possessory or occupancy interest in the premises vis-à-vis the other. 334 C. 100.

Cited. 11 CA 24; 12 CA 258; 30 CA 45; 35 CA 262; 36 CA 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342. Subdiv. (2): Conviction under this section and Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of a protective order. 97 CA 72.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202k — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202k
Sec. 53-202k. Commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm: Five-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Status: in_force

Cited. 234 C. 455; 241 C. 665. Section is a sentence enhancer rather than a separate offense; a separate conviction under section is improper. 242 C. 143. When jury convicts based on an underlying felony, jury must also determine issue of whether a firearm was used in commission of the felony. 253 C. 210. Unarmed accomplice is subject to an enhanced penalty under section. 255 C. 782. Where court failed to instruct jury as to elements of statute which provided for enhancement of sentence, enhanced sentence was vacated and case remanded for trial on that issue. 256 C. 785. Based on plain language of section, its legislative history, and prior court decisions interpreting its provisions, application of sentence enhancement to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, a class B felony, does not violate double jeopardy; based on section's language and its legislative history, trial court properly applied section's sentence enhancement to defendant's split sentence. 257 C. 544. State need not prove that firearm was capable of discharging a shot to apply statute as sentence enhancement. 259 C. 799. Section imposes separate enhancements of 5 years each where defendant is convicted of multiple qualifying felonies arising from the same incident. 263 C. 136. Possession of firearm by one coconspirator is not attributable to other coconspirators for purposes of enhancement statute. 276 C. 452. State is required to prove only that defendant was guilty of being an accessory to underlying robbery and that a firearm was used in the commission of the robbery, and need not prove that defendant intended that firearm would be used during the robbery. 315 C. 500.

Cited. 43 CA 801; 44 CA 561; 48 CA 361. Since section is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, conviction under section must be vacated. 49 CA 420. Trial court improperly rendered judgment convicting defendant of the crime of commission of class A, B or C felony with a firearm because statute does not establish a separate criminal offense but is a sentence enhancement provision. 51 CA 171. Section intended to serve as sentence enhancement provision, not as a separate crime. Id., 541. Reaffirmed ruling that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 52 CA 599. Reaffirmed prior holdings that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 54 CA 18. Under section, state is not required to demonstrate that defendant actually had a gun, but that defendant represented, by words or conduct, that he was holding a gun. 60 CA 487. Failure to instruct jury re elements of statute was harmless error, since evidence against defendant was overwhelming and uncontested, and not violative of due process. 61 CA 417. Trial court determination that defendant fulfilled requirements of sentence enhancement pursuant to statute results in harmless error if jury would have, upon proper instruction, reached the same determination. 65 CA 551. Statute permits multiple enhancements. 69 CA 717. Failure of court to instruct jury that finding defendant used a firearm was harmless error where state has proven the elements necessary for sentence enhancement. 74 CA 129. Plaintiff's claim that trial court did not put issue of enhancement under statute to the jury was harmless error since verdict required finding that the murder was committed with a firearm. Id., 391. Court declines to create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the state seeks sentence enhancement pursuant to section after defendant elects a jury trial; sentence enhancement pursuant to section not treated as essential element of statute and state need only prove to jury the two elements of statute and is not required to prove that length of defendant's incarceration should be increased. 81 CA 824. Legislature's use of “shall” in section, coupled with precedent, amply supports conclusion that legislature intended sentence enhancement to apply to conviction under Sec. 53a-59(a)(5). 90 CA 445. Since section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate offense, conviction under section must be vacated. 94 CA 715. Trial court properly applied sentence enhancement provisions of section in a matter where defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled nolo contendere to section's provisions; in doing so, defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the facts with respect to that charge. 103 CA 100. Enhancement of defendant's sentence for conviction of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree was improper because section does not apply to unarmed coconspirators; where defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child only as a principal, and not as an accessory, and there was no evidence that defendant personally had used a firearm in the commission of the offense, sentence enhancement pursuant to section was not appropriate; section is not an offense. 160 CA 815. Enhancement of sentences for unarmed accomplices is permissible under section; finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm had been used in the commission of each of the crimes of which defendant was found guilty as an accessory provided sufficient basis to impose sentence enhancement pursuant to section. Id., 851. Brandishing a gun as a show of force to indicate to victims that the gun could be fired satisfies the statutory definition of firearm for sentence enhancement pursuant to section so that jury instruction regarding operability of firearm is not required. 215 CA 167.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-128d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-128d
Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of payment card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation.
Status: in_force

Cited. 204 C. 441. Convictions under Subdiv. (2) of this section, Sec. 53a-129d and Sec. 53a-125b do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 326 C. 310.

Review of legislative history of credit card crimes reveals no purpose or intent that enactment of the more specific crime of illegal credit card use precludes state from charging defendant with the more general crime of larceny. 75 CA 756. Conviction under this section and Secs. 53a-129b and 53a-129d for single course of conduct does not constitute double jeopardy. 119 CA 483.

Cited. 37 CS 527.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-119 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-119
Sec. 53a-119. Larceny defined.
Status: in_force

(1) Embezzlement. A person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.

(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses. A person obtains property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or device, he obtains from another any property, with intent to defraud him or any other person.

(3) Obtaining property by false promise. A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct. In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed.

(4) Acquiring property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of larceny if, with purpose to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to it.

(5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (F) cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or (H) use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.

(6) Defrauding of public community. A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false; or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false; or (C) as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community. For purposes of this subdivision such order or claim shall be deemed to be property.

(7) Theft of services. A person is guilty of theft of services when: (A) With intent to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable establishment, he avoids such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false; or (B) (i) except as provided in section 13b-38i , with intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service without payment of the lawful charge therefor or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains such service or avoids payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, or (ii) with intent to obtain the use of equipment, including a motor vehicle, without payment of the lawful charge therefor, or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such use which has been permitted him, he obtains such use or avoids such payment therefor by means of any false or fraudulent representation, fraudulent concealment, false pretense or personation, trick, artifice or device, including, but not limited to, a false representation as to his name, residence, employment, or driver's license; or (C) obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.

(8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner. A person who accepts or receives the use or benefit of a public utility commodity which customarily passes through a meter, knowing such commodity (A) has been diverted therefrom, (B) has not been correctly registered or (C) has not been registered at all by a meter, is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property.

(9) Shoplifting. A person is guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof. A person intentionally concealing unpurchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without paying the purchase price thereof.

(10) Conversion of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of conversion of a motor vehicle who, after renting or leasing a motor vehicle under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such vehicle to a particular place at a particular time, fails to return the vehicle to such place within the time specified, and who thereafter fails to return such vehicle to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the vehicle by registered mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement or, in the absence of such address, to his last-known address as recorded in the records of the motor vehicle department of the state in which he is licensed to operate a motor vehicle. It shall be a complete defense to any civil action arising out of or involving the arrest or detention of any person to whom such demand was sent by registered mail that he failed to return the vehicle to any place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the mailing of such demand.

(11) Obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine. A person obtains property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when such person obtains property by knowingly using in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person. In any prosecution for larceny based upon fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the machine was located. In any prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, (A) all such instances in any six-month period may be combined and charged as one offense, with the value of all property obtained thereby being accumulated, and (B) the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which a machine which was fraudulently used was located. For the purposes of this subsection, “automated teller machine” means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36a-2 .

(12) Library theft. A person is guilty of library theft when (A) he conceals on his person or among his belongings a book or other archival library materials, belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility with the intention of removing the same from the library facility without authority or without authority removes a book or other archival library materials from such library facility or (B) he mutilates a book or other archival library materials belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility, so as to render it unusable or reduce its value. The term “book or other archival library materials” includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any format, magnetic or other tape, electronic data-processing record, artifact or other documentary, written or printed material regardless of physical form or characteristics, or any part thereof, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library facility. The term “library facility” includes any public library, any library of an educational institution, organization or society, any museum, any repository of public records and any archives.

(13) Conversion of leased property. (A) A person is guilty of conversion of leased personal property who, with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person, after renting or leasing such property under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such property to a particular place at a particular time, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property or any part thereof, and who thereafter fails to return such property to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred ninety-two hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the property by registered or certified mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent address is known to the lessor. Acknowledgment of the receipt of such written demand by the lessee shall not be necessary to establish that one hundred ninety-two hours have passed since such written demand was sent. (B) Any person, being in possession of personal property other than wearing apparel, received upon a written lease, who, with intent to defraud, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property, or any part thereof, shall be prima facie presumed to have done so with the intention of converting such property to his own use. (C) A person who uses a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining such leased personal property shall be prima facie presumed to have obtained such leased personal property with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person. (D) “Leased personal property”, as used in this subdivision, means any personal property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning such property, the lessor, grants to another, the lessee, the right to possess, use and enjoy such personal property for a specified period of time for a specified sum, but does not include personal property that is rented or leased pursuant to chapter 743i.

(14) Failure to pay prevailing rate of wages. A person is guilty of failing to pay the prevailing rate of wages when he (A) files a certified payroll, in accordance with section 31-53 which he knows is false, in violation of section 53a-157a , and (B) fails to pay to an employee or to an employee welfare fund the amount attested to in the certified payroll with the intent to convert such amount to his own use or to the use of a third party.

(15) Theft of utility service. A person is guilty of theft of utility service when he intentionally obtains electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service that is available only for compensation: (A) By deception or threat or by false token, slug or other means including, but not limited to, electronic or mechanical device or unauthorized use of a confidential identification or authorization code or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (B) by tampering or making connection with or disconnecting the meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment or by manufacturing, modifying, altering, programming, reprogramming or possessing any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof or by disguising the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by a supplier of electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service, without the consent of such supplier, in order to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (C) with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service, by tampering with such meter or device or by attempting in any manner to prevent such meter or device from performing its measuring function, without the consent of the supplier of the service. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person to whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the service and to avoid making payment for the service if, without the consent of the supplier of the service: (i) Any meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment has been tampered with or connected or disconnected, (ii) any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof has been modified, altered, programmed, reprogrammed or possessed, (iii) the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by the supplier of the service have been disguised, or (iv) a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service has been tampered with or prevented from performing its measuring function. The presumption does not apply if the person to whose service the condition applies has received such service for less than thirty-one days or until the service supplier has made at least one meter or service reading and provided a billing statement to the person as to whose service the condition applies. The presumption does not apply with respect to wireless radio communications.

(16) Air bag fraud. A person is guilty of air bag fraud when such person, with intent to defraud another person, obtains property from such other person or a third person by knowingly selling, installing or reinstalling any object, including any counterfeit air bag or nonfunctional air bag, as such terms are defined in section 14-106d , in lieu of an air bag that was designed in accordance with federal safety requirements as provided in 49 CFR 571.208, as amended, and which is proper for the make, model and year of the vehicle, as part of the vehicle inflatable restraint system.

(17) Theft of motor fuel. A person is guilty of theft of motor fuel when such person (A) delivers or causes to be delivered motor fuel, as defined in section 14-327a , into the fuel tank of a vehicle or into a portable container, or into both, on the premises of a retail dealer, as defined in section 14-318 , and (B) with the intent to appropriate such motor fuel to himself or a third person, leaves such premises without paying the purchase price for such motor fuel.

(18) Failure to repay surplus Citizens' Election Fund grant funds. A person is guilty of failure to repay surplus Citizens' Election Fund grant funds when such person fails to return to the Citizens' Election Fund any surplus funds from a grant made pursuant to sections 9-700 to 9-716 , inclusive, not later than ninety days after the primary or election for which the grant is made.

Cited. 170 C. 463. Inference based on possession of recently stolen property; meaning of “possession”; mere presence of passenger in motor vehicle containing recently stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. 171 C. 127. Cited. 172 C. 571; 174 C. 338; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 163; Id., 649; Id., 689; 179 C. 576; 180 C. 662; 181 C. 172; Id., 254; Id., 299; Id., 388; 182 C. 449; Id., 476; 183 C. 299; Id., 386; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 1; Id., 426; 188 C. 671; Id., 681; 189 C. 114; Id., 383; 190 C. 104; Id., 541; 194 C. 198; Id., 223; 196 C. 115; Id., 225; Id., 567; 197 C. 17; Id., 201; Id., 247; 198 C. 1; 199 C. 207; 200 C. 310; Id., 586; 201 C. 489; 209 C. 564; 210 C. 652; 211 C. 101; 212 C. 31; 213 C. 422; 214 C. 132; Id., 161; Id., 717; 218 C. 273; 221 C. 685; 223 C. 243; 224 C. 711; 227 C. 611; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; Id., 455; Id., 740; 233 C. 527; Id., 552; 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439; Id., 702; 242 C. 666. Statutory theft under Sec. 52-564 is synonymous with larceny as provided in section; pursuant to section, a person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from the owner. 255 C. 20. Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 3 CA 633; 4 CA 544; 5 CA 599; 7 CA 1; Id., 326; Id., 532; 8 CA 125; Id., 491; 9 CA 121; Id., 141; Id., 313; Id., 373; 10 CA 447; 11 CA 102; Id., 161; 12 CA 1; Id., 163; Id., 408; 13 CA 12; Id., 576; Id., 578; Id., 596; 14 CA 88; Id., 472; 15 CA 641; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 521; Id., 695; 20 CA 513; Id., 665; 21 CA 431; 25 CA 298; Id., 646; 26 CA 52; 28 CA 469; Id., 521; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 30 CA 190; 31 CA 47; 33 CA 303; Id., 339; Id., 368; Id., 603; 34 CA 250; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 599; Id., 694; Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 566; 37 CA 482; Id., 589; Id., 619; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; 39 CA 96; Id., 579; 41 CA 584; Id., 695; 42 CA 599; 43 CA 499; Id., 801; 44 CA 294; 45 CA 6; Id., 46; Id., 369; Id., 455; 46 CA 269; Id., 414; Id., 616; Id., 691; Id., 778; 47 CA 1. Section includes “theft of services” as larceny. 66 CA 740. Employers did not commit extortion when they sought restitution of wages from employee who was found guilty of misappropriating the wages. 75 CA 319. The essential elements of larceny are (1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another, (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of the property permanently, and (3) the lack of consent of the owner; to prove the requisite specific intent, the state must show that defendant acted with the subjective desire or knowledge that his actions constituted stealing. 115 CA 295. Evidence insufficient to establish intent to commit larceny where there was no claim that defendant was not the legal owner of the money taken and evidence was presented that defendant was seeking return of defendant's specific property, albeit by force. 148 CA 684; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 338.

Cited. 32 CS 650; Id., 653; 34 CS 612; 36 CS 570; 37 CS 678. Statutory definition of larceny does not modify common law rule that proof of the identity of the owner of stolen property is not an element of the crime of larceny. Id., 809. Cited. Id., 853; 38 CS 1; Id., 593; 39 CS 27; Id., 363.

Subdiv. (1):

Cited. 178 C. 480; 199 C. 462; 203 C. 682; 208 C. 420.

Cited. 9 CA 365; 11 CA 684.

Subdiv. (2):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 177 C. 243; 194 C. 96; Id., 233; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 348; 242 C. 345.

Cited. 4 CA 69; 14 CA 88; 28 CA 306.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 237 C. 501.

Cited. 7 CA 367; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; 40 CA 151. Extortion claim that failed to allege conspirators threatened to bring lawsuit against defendants and to publicize their claims if they were not paid the money demanded held legally insufficient. 62 CA 11.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 14 CA 272; 17 CA 486; 27 CA 635; 44 CA 187.

Subdiv. (7):

Charging in the conjunctive discussed; judgment of Appellate Court in 30 CA 571 reversed. 231 C. 411.

Cited. 10 CA 486; 30 CA 571; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411; 38 CA 277.

For conviction of offense of theft of services rendered at hotel, motel, inn or comparable establishment, the state must show that accused had been transient guest thereat. 34 CS 603.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 178 C. 416. Instruction on intent unnecessary under statute. 181 C. 299. Cited. 188 C. 325. Mens rea and scienter discussed. 192 C. 405. Cited. 195 C. 421; 200 C. 113; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 1 CA 270; 5 CA 129; 8 CA 13; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 402; 25 CA 149; 26 CA 33; 31 CA 614; 37 CA 40; 43 CA 613.

Cited. 31 CS 510. Mental element required is knowledge or belief that the property probably has been stolen; there must be more than mere suspicion or conjecture; use of word “probably” as a specification of degree of certainty clarifies law. 35 CS 531. Cited. 36 CS 603.

Subdiv. (9):

Evidence insufficient to prove that defendant attempted to intentionally deprive store of its property that it exposed for sale within the store. 163 CA 810; judgment reversed in part, see 327 C. 297.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-193 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-193
Sec. 53a-193. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) Any material or performance is “obscene” if, (A) taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest, (B) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act, and (C) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or performance or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for some other specially susceptible audience. Whether a material or performance is obscene shall be judged by ordinary adults applying contemporary community standards. In applying contemporary community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community.

(2) Material or a performance is “obscene as to minors” if it depicts a prohibited sexual act and, taken as a whole, it is harmful to minors. For purposes of this subdivision: (A) “Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old as used in section 53a-196 and less than sixteen years old as used in sections 53a-196a and 53a-196b , and (B) “harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of a prohibited sexual act, when (i) it predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, (ii) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors.

(3) “Prohibited sexual act” means erotic fondling, nude performance, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, masturbation or sexual intercourse.

(4) “Nude performance” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state in any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.

(5) “Erotic fondling” means touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.

(6) “Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

(7) “Sado-masochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.

(8) “Masturbation” means the real or simulated touching, rubbing or otherwise stimulating a person's own clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is female, breast, either by manual manipulation or with an artificial instrument.

(9) “Sexual intercourse” means intercourse, real or simulated, whether genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital.

(10) “Material” means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse prurient, shameful or morbid interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation, sound or in any other manner. Undeveloped photographs, molds, printing plates, and the like, may be deemed obscene notwithstanding that processing or other acts may be required to make the obscenity patent or to disseminate it.

(11) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.

(12) “Promote” means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise, produce, direct or participate in.

(13) “Child sexual abuse material” means any visual depiction including any photograph, film, videotape, picture or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, digital, mechanical or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct, provided whether the subject of a visual depiction was a person under sixteen years of age at the time the visual depiction was created is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.

(14) “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal physical contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or with an artificial genital, (B) bestiality, (C) masturbation, (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse, or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.

(15) “Visual depiction” includes undeveloped film and videotape and data, as defined in subdivision (8) of section 53a-250 , that is capable of conversion into a visual image and includes encrypted data.

Cited. 193 C. 612. Defendant's challenge denied re prior interpretation of “live performance” and “before an audience” in Subdivs. (11) and (13), revision of 1999. 277 C. 155.

Cited. 3 CA 80; 28 CA 91; 29 CA 591.

Definition of obscenity is sufficiently explicit to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what material would be in violation of the law; definition of “obscene” contained in section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639. Cited. 38 CS 570, 574.

Subdiv. (11):

Requirement in Sec. 53a-196d, through its incorporation of Sec. 53a-193(11) and (13), that the live performance depicted in the materials be “performed before an audience” means that there must be some recording or viewing of, or listening to, a live performance, or a reproduction of a live performance, by a person or persons other than the person or persons simultaneously engaged in the performance; the number of such persons recording, viewing or listening to the performance and whether they actually are present at the live performance or depicted in reproductions of it are irrelevant for purposes of determining whether an audience exists. 252 C. 579. The use of “performance” in this subdivision does not conflict with the use of “showing” in Subdiv. (4) since a performance is an exhibition and common meaning of exhibition is to show or display outwardly; context of section concerns depicting a prohibited sexual act such as a nude performance showing certain body parts, including photographs. 346 C. 432.

Subdiv. (14):

Subpara. (E): Although they should not be rigidly or mechanically applied, the factors set forth in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, factors are helpful in cases in which probable cause depends in part on whether the description in a search warrant affidavit of possibly lascivious images supports, as part of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable inference that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. 335 C. 29.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-206h — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-206h
Sec. 53-206h. Bump stocks or other rates of fire enhancement prohibition. Notice.
Status: in_force

(b) Commencing thirty days after May 31, 2018, but prior to July 1, 2023, the commissioner shall include a written notification of the provisions of section 53-206g with: (1) (A) A permit to carry a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to subsection (b) of section 29-28 , (B) an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to section 29-36f , (C) a long gun eligibility certificate issued pursuant to section 29-37p , and (D) an ammunition certificate issued or renewed pursuant to section 29-38n or section 29-38o ; and (2) a notice of expiration mailed to a holder of such permit or certificate pursuant to (A) subsection (f) of section 29-30 , (B) subsection (e) of section 29-36h , or (C) subsection (e) of section 29-37r .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202
Sec. 53-202. Machine guns.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who possesses or uses a machine gun in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime of violence shall be imprisoned not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.

(c) Any person who (1) possesses or uses a machine gun for an offensive or aggressive purpose, or (2) notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection (h) of this section, transfers, sells or gives a machine gun to a person under sixteen years of age, including the temporary transfer of a machine gun to such person for use in target shooting or on a firing or shooting range or for any other purpose, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten years or be both fined and imprisoned.

(d) The possession or use of a machine gun shall be presumed to be for an offensive or aggressive purpose: (1) When the machine gun is on premises not owned or rented, for bona fide permanent residence or business occupancy, by the person in whose possession the machine gun was found; or (2) when in the possession of, or used by, an unnaturalized foreign-born person, or a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence in any state or federal court of record of the United States of America, its territories or insular possessions; or (3) when the machine gun is of the kind described in subsection (g) hereof and has not been registered as therein required; or (4) when empty or loaded projectiles of any caliber which have been or are susceptible of use in the machine gun are found in the immediate vicinity thereof.

(e) The presence of a machine gun in any room, boat or vehicle shall be presumptive evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying such room, boat or vehicle.

(f) Each manufacturer shall keep a register of all machine guns manufactured or handled by the manufacturer. Such register shall show the model and serial number, and the date of manufacture, sale, loan, gift, delivery or receipt, of each machine gun, the name, address and occupation of the person to whom the machine gun was sold, loaned, given or delivered, or from whom it was received and the purpose for which it was acquired by the person to whom the machine gun was sold, loaned, given or delivered. Upon demand, any manufacturer shall permit any marshal or police officer to inspect such manufacturer's entire stock of machine guns, and parts and supplies therefor, and shall produce the register, herein required, for inspection. Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars.

(g) Each machine gun in this state adapted to use projectiles of any caliber shall be registered in the office of the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection within twenty-four hours after its acquisition and, thereafter, annually, on July first. Blanks for registration shall be prepared by said commissioner and furnished upon application. To comply with this subsection, the application as filed shall show the model and serial number of the gun, the name, address and occupation of the person in possession, and from whom and the purpose for which the gun was acquired. The registration data shall not be subject to inspection by the public. Any person who fails to register any gun as required hereby shall be presumed to possess the same for an offensive or aggressive purpose. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any machine gun which has been registered under the provisions of subsection (f) and which is still in the actual possession of the manufacturer.

(h) No provision of this section shall apply to: (1) The manufacture of machine guns for sale or transfer to the United States government, to any state, territory or possession of the United States or to any political subdivision thereof or to the District of Columbia; (2) the possession of a machine gun rendered inoperable by welding of all critical functioning parts and possessed as a curiosity, ornament or keepsake; or (3) a machine gun acquired, transferred or possessed in accordance with the National Firearms Act, as amended, provided such machine gun shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section.

See Secs. 29-27 to 29-38, inclusive, re permits for pistols and revolvers.

See Sec. 54-33a et seq. re searches.

Cited. 224 C. 163; 237 C. 348.

Cited. 9 CA 330; 17 CA 556; 25 CA 433; 26 CA 698; 44 CA 40.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-303 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-303
Sec. 53a-303. Contaminating a public water supply or food supply for terrorist purposes: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section, “hazardous substance” means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health.

(c) Contaminating a public water supply or food supply for terrorist purposes is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-82 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-82
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor was a victim of conduct by another person that constitutes (1) a violation of section 53a-192a , or (2) a criminal violation of 18 USC Chapter 77, as amended from time to time.

(c) Nothing in this section shall limit a person's right to assert the defense of duress pursuant to section 53a-14 in any prosecution for an offense under this section.

(d) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.

Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade on the street. Id., 515.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-35
Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981: Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms.
Status: in_force

(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a .

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A) where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one-half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section 53a-59 (a)(1), section 53a-59a , 53a-101 (a)(1) or 53a-134 (a)(2), the minimum term shall be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c , the minimum term shall be not less than three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60b , the minimum term shall be not less than two years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a , 53a-56a , 53a-60a , 53a-70a , 53a-72b , 53a-92a , 53a-94a , 53a-102a and 53a-103a , the court shall not fix a term of less than one year.

Cited. 169 C. 263; 171 C. 278; 176 C. 270; 180 C. 557; 182 C. 595; 189 C. 114; 190 C. 327; Id., 639; 193 C. 144; 195 C. 326; 196 C. 655; 199 C. 121; 219 C. 752.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 9 CA 686; 12 CA 403; 19 CA 440; Id., 571; Id., 631; 24 CA 612; 37 CA 228. Section does not apply to crimes committed before October 1, 1971. 133 CA 458.

Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of 1 year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 231 C. 545. Subdiv. (1): Sec. 53a-35b does not apply to indeterminate life sentences imposed pursuant to Subdiv., regardless of when the sentence was imposed, but applies solely to definite life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35a. 300 C. 649.

Cited. 46 CA 450.

Subsec. (c):

Subdiv. (2)(B): Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677. Cited. 197 C. 413; Id., 485; 202 C. 343; 211 C. 591.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202l — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202l
Sec. 53-202l. Armor piercing and incendiary .50 caliber ammunition: Definition. Sale or transfer prohibited. Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(1) “Armor piercing bullet” means (A) any .50 caliber bullet that (i) is designed for the purpose of, (ii) is held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (iii) is generally recognized as having a specialized capability to penetrate armor or bulletproof glass, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M2 Armor-Piercing” or “AP”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”, “M903 Caliber .50 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator” or “SLAP”, or “M962 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator Tracer” or “SLAPT”, or (B) any bullet that can be fired from a pistol or revolver that (i) has projectiles or projectile cores constructed entirely, excluding the presence of traces of other substances, from tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass, bronze, beryllium copper or depleted uranium, or (ii) is fully jacketed with a jacket weight of more than twenty-five per cent of the total weight of the projectile, is larger than .22 caliber and is designed and intended for use in a firearm, and (iii) does not have projectiles whose cores are composed of soft materials such as lead or lead alloys, zinc or zinc alloys, frangible projectiles designed primarily for sporting purposes, or any other projectiles or projectile cores that the Attorney General of the United States finds to be primarily intended to be used for sporting purposes or industrial purposes or that otherwise does not constitute “armor piercing ammunition” as defined in federal law. “Armor piercing bullet” does not include a shotgun shell.

(2) “Incendiary .50 caliber bullet” means any .50 caliber bullet that (A) is designed for the purpose of, (B) is held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (C) is generally recognized as having a specialized capability to ignite upon impact, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M1 Incendiary”, “M23 Incendiary”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, or “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”.

(b) Any person who knowingly distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale or offers or exposes for sale or gives to any person any ammunition that is an armor piercing bullet or an incendiary .50 caliber bullet shall be guilty of a class D felony, except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Any person who knowingly transports or carries a firearm with an armor piercing bullet or incendiary .50 caliber bullet loaded shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(d) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to the following:

(1) The sale of such ammunition to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties;

(2) A sworn and duly certified member of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a police department when transporting or carrying a firearm with an armor piercing bullet or incendiary .50 caliber bullet loaded;

(3) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes such ammunition that is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court; or

(4) The transfer of such ammunition by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess such ammunition.

(e) If the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, it may order suspension of prosecution in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) of section 29-33 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-217a
Sec. 53a-217a. Criminally negligent storage of a firearm: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply if the person obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful entry to any premises by any person and, if such firearm is stolen, such firearm is reported stolen pursuant to the provisions of section 53-202g .

(c) Criminally negligent storage of a firearm is a class D felony.

Section not vague as applied to defendant's conduct; he cannot mount a facial challenge to the statute. 242 C. 211.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-275 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-275
Sec. 53a-275. Money laundering. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Monetary instrument” means coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, negotiable investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.

(2) “Equivalent property” means property that may be readily converted into, or exchanged for, United States or foreign currency or coin, including gold, silver or platinum bullion or coins, diamonds, emeralds, rubies, sapphires or other precious stones, stamps or airline tickets, or any other property that is intended to be so converted or exchanged.

(3) “Felony” means a felony under the laws of this state or a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction punishable under the laws of that jurisdiction by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

(4) “Exchange”, in addition to its ordinary meaning, means purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, deposit, withdrawal or extension of credit.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-302 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-302
Sec. 53a-302. Criminal misrepresentation: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal misrepresentation is a class C felony.

See Sec. 53a-165aa re hindering prosecution in the first degree.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-181c
Sec. 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

State was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would reasonably cause fear or emotional distress; course of conduct means two or more acts and there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed two acts with the intent to follow, lie in wait for, monitor, surveil or observe. 346 C. 432.

Cited. 46 CA 661.

Cited. 43 CS 46.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-85 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-85
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) A person “advances prostitution” when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(2) A person “profits from prostitution” when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-119a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-119a
Sec. 53a-119a. Shoplifting and library theft; detention, questioning, presumption of crime.
Status: in_force

(b) Whenever an employee or authorized agent of a library facility, as defined in subdivision (12) of section 53a-119 , has reasonable grounds to believe that a person (1) is removing or is attempting to remove, without authority, a book or other archival library materials, as defined in said subdivision (12) of section 53a-119 , from a library facility or (2) is intentionally mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials, such employee or authorized agent may question such person as to his name and address and may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such employee or agent shall promptly identify himself by name and address. For the purposes of this subsection, reasonable grounds shall include knowledge that a person (A) has concealed a book or other archival library materials while on the library facility premises or is removing such book or material from the library facility premises without authority or (B) has mutilated, defaced or destroyed a book or other archival library materials belonging to or deposited in a library facility.

(c) In any civil action by a person detained under the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section against the person so detaining him or the principal or employer of such person arising out of such questioning or detention by any such owner, agent or employee, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff was, at the time in question, committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials shall create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials.

Transgression of statute results in merchant's inability to assert statutory privilege in a civil proceeding but does not require exclusion of evidence in a related criminal prosecution. 39 CS 392.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-212 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-212
Sec. 53a-212. Stealing a firearm: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Stealing a firearm is a class C felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

Cited. 189 C. 461; 190 C. 715; 196 C. 157; 197 C. 201; 198 C. 405; 199 C. 591; 241 C. 702.

Cited. 7 CA 367; 8 CA 631; Id., 667; 9 CA 349; 19 CA 48; 20 CA 521; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 740; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; Id., 750. Fact that the weapon in evidence had a pistol grip and could not be fired from the shoulder was of no consequence because it was a weapon capable of discharging a gunshot and therefore satisfied statutory definition of firearm. 99 CA 183.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-27 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-27
Sec. 53a-27. Violation: Definition, designation.
Status: in_force

(b) Every violation defined in this chapter is expressly designated as such. Any offense defined in any other section which is not expressly designated a violation or infraction shall be deemed a violation if, notwithstanding any other express designation, it is within the definition set forth in subsection (a).

See chapter 881b re infractions.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 27 CA 225; 40 CA 762; 41 CA 454.

Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-60
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D or C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony or, if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony.

Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438. Cited. 171 C. 264; 172 C. 275; 173 C. 254; 184 C. 157; Id., 520; 193 C. 144; Id., 232; 197 C. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 C. 146; 216 C. 647; 222 C. 331; 231 C. 545; 237 C. 238.

Cited. 5 CA 590; Id., 612; 7 CA 701; 12 CA 221; Id., 320; Id., 679; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 200; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 13; 32 CA 224; 34 CA 1; 35 CA 138; Id., 431; 36 CA 59; 37 CA 338; 38 CA 598; 46 CA 486; Id., 691; Id., 741. To convict a defendant of assault in the second degree under Subsec. (a)(1), the state was required to prove that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person and, acting with such intent, the defendant caused serious physical injury to that person. 223 CA 270.

Cited. 34 CS 531.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 171 C. 395; 175 C. 155; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 574; 190 C. 143; 193 C. 48; 194 C. 119; Id., 408; 195 C. 636; Id., 651; 198 C. 405; Id., 424; 199 C. 322; 201 C. 103; Id., 289; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 207; Id., 714; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 151; 220 C. 385; 221 C. 447; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 243; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 153; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 C. 147; Id., 910; 230 C. 591; 235 C. 748; 239 C. 481.

Cited. 1 CA 584; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 701; 7 CA 27; Id., 95; Id., 377; 8 CA 35; 9 CA 161; 10 CA 50; Id., 330; Id., 462; 11 CA 665; 13 CA 386; 14 CA 463; Id., 472; Id., 493; Id., 586; 15 CA 586; Id., 704; 17 CA 226; 19 CA 245; Id., 576; Id., 618; 20 CA 27; 22 CA 586; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 502; Id., 705; 24 CA 264; Id., 563; Id., 624; Id., 685; 25 CA 104; Id., 275; Id., 565; 26 CA 114; Id., 145; Id., 242; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; 28 CA 290; Id., 645; 29 CA 262; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; Id., 448; 33 CA 647; 34 CA 691; 36 CA 641; Id., 805; 37 CA 437; 38 CA 247; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 789; 40 CA 757; 41 CA 47; Id., 333; Id., 515; Id., 565; 43 CA 205; Id., 252; 44 CA 125; Id., 307; 45 CA 591; 46 CA 24. Defendant's rights under double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment to U.S. Constitution were violated by his conviction of two counts of assault in the second degree resulting from conduct against one victim that was nonsexual, continuous, uninterrupted and close in time. 92 CA 586. Subdiv. (1): The question of intent is purely a question of fact and intent may be inferred from conduct, and whether such an inference should be drawn is a question for the jury to decide. 118 CA 315.

Cited. 39 CS 494. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-59c
Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.

(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A felony.

Only logical explanation for legislative decision to limit scope of section to fetuses that are not born alive is that legislature was well aware of the applicability of the born alive rule to infants who suffer injuries in utero but who are born alive and then die from those injuries; enactment of section reflects decision of legislature to reaffirm the applicability of the born alive rule rather than to abrogate it. 296 C. 622.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-218 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-218
Sec. 53a-218. Interference with a cemetery or burial ground: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Interference with a cemetery or burial ground is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-137 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-137
Sec. 53a-137. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Written instrument” means any instrument or article containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.

(2) “Complete written instrument” means a written instrument which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which it is contained or to which it attaches.

(3) “Incomplete written instrument” means a written instrument which contains some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument.

(4) A person “falsely makes” a written instrument when (A) such person makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, the ostensible maker or drawer did not authorize the making or drawing thereof, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(5) A person “falsely completes” a written instrument when (A) such person, by adding, inserting or changing matter, transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete written instrument, without the authority of any person entitled to grant it, so that such complete written instrument appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(6) A person “falsely alters” a written instrument when (A) such person, without the authority of any person entitled to grant it, changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter or transposition of matter or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(7) “Forged instrument” means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.

Cited. 207 C. 555; 235 C. 502.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 37 CA 72; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 34 CS 606.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-278g — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-278g
Sec. 53-278g. Gambling: Excepted activities.
Status: in_force

(b) The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, or their agents, may use and possess at any location within the state, solely for the purpose of training individuals in skills required for employment by the tribe or testing a gambling device, any gambling device which the tribes are authorized to utilize on their reservations pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; provided no money or other thing of value shall be paid to any person as a result of the operation of such gambling device in the course of such training or testing at locations outside of the reservation of the tribe. Any person receiving such training or testing such device may use any such device in the course of such training or testing. Whenever either of said tribes intends to use and possess at any location within the state any such gambling device for the purpose of testing such device, the tribe shall give prior notice of such testing to the Department of Consumer Protection.

(c) Any casino gaming facility, or its agents, may use and possess at any location within the state, solely for the purpose of training individuals in skills required for employment by the casino gaming facility or testing a gambling device, any gambling device which the casino gaming facility may use for conducting authorized games at the casino gaming facility, provided no money or other thing of value shall be paid to any person as a result of the operation of such gambling device in the course of such training or testing at locations outside of the casino gaming facility. Any person receiving such training or testing such device may use any such device in the course of such training or testing. Whenever a casino gaming facility intends to use and possess at any location within the state any such gambling device for the purpose of testing such device, the casino gambling facility shall give prior notice of such testing to the Department of Consumer Protection.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-129a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 941 / Section 53-129a
Sec. 53-129a. Defrauding secured party.
Status: in_force

(1) “Collateral” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (12) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 ;

(2) “Debtor” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (28) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 ;

(3) “Proceeds” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (64) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 ;

(4) “Security agreement” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (74) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 ;

(5) “Security interest” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (35) of subsection (b) of section 42a-1-201 ; and

(6) “Secured party” has the same meaning as specified in subdivision (73) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 .

(b) No person, with knowledge that a debtor has a duty to account to a secured party for proceeds of collateral, shall, with intent to defraud the secured party, take or secrete any of such proceeds or in any way appropriate the same to his own use or to the use of others.

(c) No person shall, with intent to defraud a secured party, remove or conceal or aid or abet the removal or concealment of any collateral which is subject to a security interest under a security agreement.

(d) No person, with knowledge that a sale, exchange or other disposition of collateral is prohibited under the provisions of a security agreement, shall sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of, or aid or abet the sale, exchange or other disposition of, such collateral without informing the person receiving such collateral that such collateral is subject to a security interest, and without informing the secured party of the sale, exchange or other disposition.

(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three months or both.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-396 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949c / Section 53-396
Sec. 53-396. Charging of incidents of racketeering activity. Sentencing on separately charged offense.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution under this chapter the court or the jury, as the case may be, shall indicate by special verdict the particular incidents of racketeering activity that it finds to have been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.

(c) In any prosecution under this chapter, the court shall impose a separate sentence on any separately charged offense of which the defendant has been found guilty notwithstanding that the offense also constitutes an incident of racketeering activity under that portion of the information charging a violation of this chapter. Any term of imprisonment imposed on the separately charged offense shall, in the discretion of the court, run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to the sentence imposed on the count charging a violation of this chapter, as provided in section 53a-27 , except, in the case in which such separately charged offense constitutes a violation of section 53-202 , 53-206 , 53a-211 or 53a-212 , such sentences shall run consecutively.

Cited. 229 C. 479. The special verdict provision does not require that the jury's finding as to the existence of an enterprise to be based solely on the evidence concerning the predicate incidents of racketeering activity specified in the special verdict that the jury has found to constitute the pattern of racketeering; the jury and a reviewing court may consider the entire record in determining whether the state has proven the existence of an enterprise. 325 C. 272.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-301 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-301
Sec. 53a-301. Computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes is a class B felony and, if such offense is directed against any public agency, as defined in section 1-200 , that is charged with the protection of public safety, five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-130 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-130
Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his or her official duties.

(c) Criminal impersonation is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 194 C. 213; Id., 233; 207 C. 109; 209 C. 23; 225 C. 650.

Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204. Cited. 18 CA 694; 32 CA 724; 40 CA 643. Does not require use of an official or real badge because statute's goal is to prohibit criminal impersonation with intent of inducing another to submit to authority that he or she does not possess. 66 CA 819.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. 194 C. 213. Cited. 198 C. 68; 199 C. 146; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 502.

Cited. 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; 37 CA 589; 45 CA 303. Statute prohibits impersonating another, not merely giving a false name. 60 CA 534.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-40b
Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release.
Status: in_force

Question of whether defendant was on release at time of the offense for which he was convicted and therefore subject to enhanced penalty was not reasonably in dispute, was conceded as fact by defendant, and did not require a jury determination. 280 C. 69. Although the state may not use the erased records to prove the basis for the sentence enhancement, the erasure provisions of Sec. 54-142a do not prohibit the imposition of a sentence enhancement pursuant to this section after the records pertaining to the charges for which defendant was on pretrial release have been erased. 319 C. 494.

Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim that sentencing court failed to articulate any reason for enhancing his sentence. 93 CA 61.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-221a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-221a
Sec. 53a-221a. Interference with a war or veterans' memorial or monument: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Interference with a war or veterans' memorial or monument is a class D felony and any person found guilty under subsection (a) of this section shall be fined five thousand dollars.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-180 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-180
Sec. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree: Class D or C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree is a (1) class D felony for a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section.

(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, if (1) a person is convicted of an offense in violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section that resulted in a large scale emergency response, (2) any agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state requests financial restitution for costs associated with such emergency response, and (3) the court finds that the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state incurred costs associated with such emergency response as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution under terms that the court determines are appropriate. In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution, the court shall consider: (A) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (B) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (C) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (D) other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state, that the court determines make the terms of restitution appropriate. If the court determines that the current financial resources of the offender or the offender's current ability to pay based on installments or other conditions are such that no appropriate terms of restitution can be determined, the court may forego setting such terms. The court shall articulate its findings on the record with respect to each of the factors set forth in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subsection. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for actual expenses associated with such emergency response. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed or directed by a written order of the court containing the amount of actual expenses associated with such emergency response, as ascertained by the court. The order of the court shall direct that a certified copy of the order be delivered by certified mail to the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state. Such order is enforceable in the same manner as an order pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28 .

Cited. 186 C. 265; 188 C. 161; 200 C. 743; 216 C. 301; 219 C. 529; Id., 557; 221 C. 93; 223 C. 635; 224 C. 627; 227 C. 1; 238 C. 588.

Cited. 14 CA 548; 19 CA 396; 29 CA 843; 36 CA 556. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict under section. 55 CA 475.

Cited. 34 CS 666.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-18
Sec. 53a-18. Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally.
Status: in_force

(1) A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, except a person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes as described in subdivision (6) of this section, may use reasonable physical force upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such minor or incompetent person.

(2) An authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.

(3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain order, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself or herself may use reasonable physical force upon such person to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to thwart such result.

(5) A duly licensed physician or psychologist, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient, provided the treatment (A) is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his or her parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his or her care and supervision, or (B) is administered in an emergency when the physician or psychologist reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

(6) A teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes may use reasonable physical force upon such minor when and to the extent such teacher or other person reasonably believes such force to be necessary to (A) protect such teacher, other person or others from immediate physical injury, (B) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance, as defined in section 21a-240 , upon or within the control of such minor, (C) protect property from physical damage, or (D) restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order.

(b) No person is justified in using force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 234 C. 455; 242 C. 211.

Cited. 8 CA 517; Id., 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390. Subsec. (a)(1): Plain language of the parental justification defense demonstrates that the defense does not apply to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child in Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 199 CA 800.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Former Subdiv. (1):

Offense of risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21(a)(1) is not logically inconsistent with defense of parental justification. 294 C. 243.

Cited. 20 CA 75. Examining plain language of risk of injury statute, Sec. 53-21(a)(1), and this Subdiv., providing for the justification defense of reasonable parental discipline, there is no apparent reason to bar application of Subdiv. to a charge under Sec. 53-21(a)(1). 99 CA 713.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-223c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-223c
Sec. 53a-223c. Criminal violation of a civil protection order: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) No person who is listed as a respondent in a civil protection order issued pursuant to section 46b-16a may be criminally liable for a violation of such order if such person causes a legal document to be served on the protected person by mail or through a third party in accordance with the law. For purposes of this subsection, “legal document” includes, but is not limited to, a notice of appearance or any other application, petition, or motion filed in good faith by such person in connection with any pending court matter, or in any court matter that may be brought subsequently.

(c) Criminal violation of a civil protection order is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-60c
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years not suspendable.
Status: in_force

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon the same information.

(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with intellectual disability, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person with intellectual disability.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Cited. 180 C. 557; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 5 CA 590.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-8
Sec. 53a-8. Criminal liability for acts of another.
Status: in_force

(b) A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3 , to another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or under circumstances in which he should know that such other person intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

Passive acquiescence or doing of innocent acts which in fact aid in commission of crime, is insufficient to support conviction under accessory statute. 169 C. 581. To establish guilt of accused as accessory under section governing criminal liability for conduct of another, state must prove criminality of intent and community of unlawful purpose. 170 C. 332. Cited. Id., 417; 172 C. 322; 174 C. 500; 175 C. 155; 176 C. 131. Propriety of a charge on aiding and abetting predicated on sufficiency of evidence heard during trial. Id., 508. Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 163; Id., 689; 179 C. 1. Jury instruction an intent under statute discussed. 182 C. 366. Cited. Id., 501; 184 C. 369; 185 C. 163; Id., 260; 187 C. 513; 188 C. 432; Id., 542; 189 C. 337; Id., 383; 190 C. 822; 191 C. 27; Id., 659; 192 C. 383; 194 C. 96; Id., 198; 195 C. 128; Id., 598; 196 C. 225; 197 C. 436; 198 C. 158; Id., 255; Id., 328; 199 C. 14; Id., 473; Id., 591; Id., 693; 200 C. 9; Id., 523; Id., 685; 201 C. 125; Id., 289; Id., 395; Id., 489; 202 C. 520; Id., 615; 203 C. 420; 204 C. 240; Id., 630; 207 C. 323; 208 C. 38; 209 C. 75; Id., 290; Id., 458; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 1; Id., 289; Id., 398; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 708; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; Id., 454; 215 C. 570; Id., 716; Id., 739; 216 C. 367; Id., 492; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 596; 220 C. 270; 221 C. 430; Id., 925; 222 C. 469; 223 C. 243; Id., 384; Id., 595; Id., 703; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 32; Id., 207; Id., 231; 228 C. 582; Id., 918; 230 C. 351; Id., 608; Id., 686; Id., 698; 231 C. 545; 232 C. 455; 233 C. 304; 234 C. 683; 235 C. 402; Id., 473; Id., 748; 236 C. 514; 237 C. 518; 238 C. 784; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 322; Id., 502; Id., 702; 242 C. 125; Id., 211; Id., 409; Id., 666. Conviction under section requires state to prove defendant's dual intent first that accessory have the intent to aid the principal and second that in so aiding he intends to commit offense with which he is charged. 252 C. 714. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. In accordance with 95 CA 362, to establish accessorial liability for manslaughter in first degree with firearm in violation of Sec. 53a-55a, state must prove that defendant, acting with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, intentionally aided a principal offender in causing the death of such person or of a third person, and that the principal, in committing the act, used, carried or threatened to use a firearm. 300 C. 490. Defendant, having been hired to kill the victim, could be held accessorily liable for capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(2) even if jury found that a codefendant, who was not a party to any hiring relationship, was the principal actor who killed the victim. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 4 CA 676; 7 CA 503; Id., 701; 9 CA 161; Id., 228; 11 CA 575; Id., 621; Id., 699; Id., 805; 12 CA 1. Being an accessory to breach of the peace is a cognizable crime. Id., 74. Cited. Id., 343; 13 CA 76; Id., 554; 14 CA 1; Id., 205; Id., 445; Id., 472; Id., 493; 15 CA 122; Id., 416; 16 CA 89; Id., 333; Id., 455; 17 CA 50; 18 CA 175; Id., 184; Id., 730; 19 CA 179; 20 CA 410; Id., 665; 22 CA 216; Id., 329; Id., 340; 23 CA 123; 25 CA 318; Id., 565; Id., 646; 26 CA 33; Id., 641; Id., 779; 27 CA 1; Id., 558; 28 CA 126; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 575; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 304; Id., 499; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; 31 CA 47; Id., 614; 32 CA 224; Id., 831; 33 CA 143; Id., 288; 34 CA 223; Id., 717, see 37 CA 509; 35 CA 138; Id., 360; Id., 527; Id., 781; 36 CA 190; Id., 454; Id., 473; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 35; Id., 40; Id., 276; Id., 509; Id., 574; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; Id., 579; 40 CA 47; Id., 470; Id., 526; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 565; 42 CA 555; 44 CA 499; Id., 790; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 269; Id., 640; Id., 778. Statute does not provide for a separate, substantive offense but provides alternate means by which the underlying substantive crime may be committed. 49 CA 121. Fact that defendant not formally charged as accessory does not preclude a conviction as such. Id., 183. State must prove that accused shared both the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with principal perpetrator of the crime. 63 CA 466. Court's charge re accessorial liability properly tracks language of section and correctly explained that acting as accessory merely is an alternative means of committing the substantive offense. 81 CA 152. When defendant is charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory, state must prove that defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury and to aid the principal in doing so, but does not have to also prove that defendant intended the use, carrying or threatened use of the firearm. 95 CA 362. There is no meaningful distinction between principal and accessory liability and defendant may be convicted as accessory even if charged as a principal. 105 CA 862. Evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish intent and defendant's identity with respect to charges stemming from drug transaction. 110 CA 70. Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree pursuant to section does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for an accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. 184 CA 24. Prohibition against double jeopardy is not always automatically violated simply because of contemporaneous convictions of the same offense as both a principal and as an accessory; double jeopardy is not implicated if a jury reasonably could find on the basis of the evidence presented that each charged offense was the result of a distinct act of independent legal significance, one committed as a principal and another as an accessory; trial court not constitutionally required to vacate defendant's conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree as an accessory because defendant's multiple punishments for assault as to each victim were premised not on a single criminal act but distinct repetitions of the same crime. 185 CA 1.

Defendant who operated boat while brother stole lobsters was criminally liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the offense. 37 CS 809. Cited. 38 CS 301; 40 CS 38.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 242 C. 485. Jury did not have to find that defendant actually wielded knife during robbery; it had to find that defendant was a participant in the robbery. 275 C. 534. Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that a defense of duress, if credited, would negate the required mental state governing accessorial liability, specific intent and duress can coexist. 282 C. 281. Statute deems the accessory to be the same as the principal for purposes of criminal liability and punishment. 336 C. 219.

Cited. 37 CA 464; 39 CA 333. To be guilty as accessory, one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with perpetrator of the crime and must knowingly and willfully assist perpetrator in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it. 77 CA 80. Although the evidence did not reveal whether it was defendant or a coparticipant who had fired the fatal shot, the jury reasonably could have determined that there was sufficient concert of action between defendant and the coparticipant to support the accessory allegation. 136 CA 197; judgment reversed in part, see 336 C. 219..
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-60d
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year. The court shall also order such person not to operate any motor vehicle that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j , for a period of two years after such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege is restored by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.

See Sec. 14-227o re discount for ignition interlock device services.

Cited. 219 C. 752; 222 C. 672; 224 C. 730; 226 C. 191; 230 C. 572. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to section to remedy an unrelated aspect changed the rule of law; judgment of Appellate Court in 33 CA 232 reversed. 232 C. 1.

Cited. 5 CA 590; 9 CA 686; 16 CA 472; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 142; 23 CA 215; Id., 720; 25 CA 282; 26 CA 805; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 232; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1; 34 CA 557; Id., 655; 36 CA 710; 38 CA 282; 40 CA 359. Nothing in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-171a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-171a
Sec. 53a-171a. Aiding escape from hospital or sanatorium: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202c — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202c
Sec. 53-202c. Possession of assault weapon prohibited. Exemptions. Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of assault weapons by: (1) The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, (2) a sworn and duly certified member of an organized police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the Department of Correction, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a salaried inspector of motor vehicles designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection pursuant to section 26-5 , or a constable who is certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and appointed by the chief executive authority of a town, city or borough to perform criminal law enforcement duties, for use by such sworn member, inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's, inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty, (3) a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, or (4) a nuclear facility licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the purpose of providing security services at such facility, or any contractor or subcontractor of such facility for the purpose of providing security services at such facility.

(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon described in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a by any person prior to July 1, 1994, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by July 1, 1994;

(2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive.

(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a by any person prior to April 5, 2013, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by January 1, 2014;

(2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon on April 4, 2013, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive.

(e) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a 2023 assault weapon by any person prior to May 1, 2024, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for such assault weapon by May 1, 2024;

(2) The person lawfully possessed such assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, and section 53-202m of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2023; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive.

(f) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a 2023 assault weapon by any person if all of the following are applicable:

(1) Such assault weapon was reclassified for federal purposes as a rifle pursuant to the amendments to 27 CFR Parts 478 and 479 published at 88 Federal Register 6478 (January 31, 2023).

(2) The person applied to register such assault weapon under the National Firearms Act, P.L. 73-474, as amended from time to time, using the form known as Form 1 published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and submitted a copy of such form to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection not later than August 1, 2023, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has approved such application, has denied such application within the past thirty days, or has not yet processed such application.

(3) The person lawfully possessed such assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, and section 53-202m of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2023; and

(4) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive.

(g) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon, or the trustee of a trust that includes an assault weapon, for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d if the assault weapon is possessed at a place set forth in subdivision (1) of subsection (f) of section 53-202d or as authorized by the Probate Court.

(h) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b that is (1) possessed and transported in accordance with subsection (f) of section 53-202d , or (2) possessed at or transported to or from a collegiate, Olympic or target pistol shooting competition in this state which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, provided such pistol is transported in the manner prescribed in subsection (a) of section 53-202f .

Cited. 234 C. 455; 242 C. 143.

Defendant's conviction did not violate his due process rights because, as a matter of law, a Maadi MISR is an “assault weapon” as defined in Sec. 53-202a. 93 CA 129.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-182a
Sec. 53a-182a. Obstructing free passage: Class C misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Obstructing free passage is a class C misdemeanor.

Cited. 28 CA 344.

Cited. 43 CS 46.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-40d
Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences.
Status: in_force

(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a , as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section 53a-35a .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-59b
Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.

See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles or probation officer.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127b
Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution under this section, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the automated teller machine was located.

(c) Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine is a class A misdemeanor.

See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-99 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-99
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-200 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-200
Sec. 53-200. Prize fighting.
Status: in_force

See chapter 532a re boxing and mixed martial arts.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-177 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-177
Sec. 53a-177. Unlawful assembly: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Unlawful assembly is a class B misdemeanor.

Cited. 32 CA 224.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-2 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 950 / Section 53a-2
Sec. 53a-2. Application and scope.
Status: in_force

Cited. 192 C. 154; 201 C. 505; 207 C. 456; 211 C. 258; 228 C. 758.

Cited. 2 CA 204; 11 CA 665; 29 CA 591.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-12 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-12
Sec. 53a-12. Defenses; burden of proof.
Status: in_force

(b) When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Cited. 186 C. 414; 191 C. 659; 196 C. 519. Instructing jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 733; 218 C. 349; 219 C. 314; 225 C. 450; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 230 C. 183; 236 C. 342.

Cited. 6 CA 701; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 665; 14 CA 511; 17 CA 200; Id., 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579.

Cited. 34 CS 612. Statute does not become constitutionally vulnerable by reason of imposing on defendants the burden of establishing affirmative defenses. 35 CS 555.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 186 C. 654; 188 C. 237; Id., 653; 194 C. 376; 203 C. 212; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 110; 220 C. 602; 228 C. 335; 231 C. 484; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; 234 C. 381.

Cited. 3 CA 289; 5 CA 338; 10 CA 643, 647; 11 CA 102; 17 CA 97; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 556; Id., 624; 29 CA 262; 31 CA 140; 33 CA 782; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 46 CA 216.

Cited. 38 CS 619.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 182 C. 388; 193 C. 695; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 733; 214 C. 540; 217 C. 648; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 229 C. 328; 230 C. 351; 233 C. 403; 236 C. 189; Id., 342; 242 C. 93. Legislature not required to expressly declare an exception to culpability to be an affirmative defense for it to operate as an affirmative defense; statute does not prohibit judicially recognized affirmative defenses. 254 C. 107.

Cited. 12 CA 32; 14 CA 511; 20 CA 342; 24 CA 678; Id., 670; 28 CA 91.

Held unconstitutional insofar as it places a burden of proof on the defense. 33 CS 28.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-188 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-188
Sec. 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Tampering with private communications is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 171 C. 524; 212 C. 195; 238 C. 692.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-214 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-214
Sec. 53a-214. Criminal lockout: Class C misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal lockout is a class C misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-205 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-205
Sec. 53-205. Loaded firearms prohibited in vehicles and snowmobiles. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(b) The enforcement officers of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection are empowered to enforce this section.

(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to members of the military departments of the government or state while on duty or while traveling to or from assignments, or to enforcement officers, security guards or other persons employed to protect public or private property while in the performance of such duties.

(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor.

See Sec. 14-379 for definition of “snowmobile”.

See Sec. 26-6a re constables for fish and game protection.

Cited. 163 C. 184; 195 C. 668; 197 C. 602.

Cited. 35 CS 659.