Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-65
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Actor” means a person accused of sexual assault.

(2) “Sexual intercourse” means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal opening of the victim's body.

(3) “Sexual contact” means (A) any contact with the intimate parts of a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person, or (B) for the purposes of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-73a , any contact with the intimate parts of a dead human body, or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a dead human body, for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor.

(4) “Impaired because of mental disability or disease” means that a person suffers from a mental disability or disease which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.

(5) “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.

(6) “Physically helpless” means that a person is (A) unconscious, or (B) for any other reason, is physically unable to resist an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact or to communicate unwillingness to an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact.

(7) “Use of force” means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.

(8) “Intimate parts” means the genital area or any substance emitted therefrom, groin, anus or any substance emitted therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks or breasts.

(9) “Psychotherapist” means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service provider, hypnotist or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.

(10) “Psychotherapy” means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.

(11) “Emotionally dependent” means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist.

(12) “Therapeutic deception” means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.

(13) “School employee” means: (A) A teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator, school superintendent, guidance counselor, school counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, paraeducator or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary, middle or high school or working in a public or private elementary, middle or high school; or (B) any other person who, in the performance of his or her duties, has regular contact with students and who provides services to or on behalf of students enrolled in (i) a public elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the local or regional board of education, or (ii) a private elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the supervisory agent of such private school.

(14) “Animal” has the same meaning as provided in section 22-327 .

(15) “Sexual contact with an animal” means: (A) Any act between a person and an animal that involves contact between a sex organ or anus of one and the mouth, anus or a sex organ of the other; (B) a person touching or fondling a sex organ or anus of an animal, either directly or through clothing, without a bona fide veterinary or animal husbandry purpose; (C) any intentional transfer or transmission of semen by a person upon any part of an animal; or (D) the insertion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object into the vaginal or anal opening of an animal, without a bona fide veterinary or animal husbandry purpose, or the insertion of any part of the animal's body into the vaginal or anal opening of the person.

Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that “penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio”; it specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 187 C. 216; 191 C. 453; 192 C. 154; 198 C. 190; 210 C. 110.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; 33 CA 133; 35 CA 173. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.

Subdiv. (2):

Court properly defined the term “cunnilingus” since statute contained no specific definitions; penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 194 C. 258; 198 C. 285; Id., 617; 201 C. 211; 202 C. 509; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 18; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 618. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517. Adequate notice exists that penetration of the vagina includes penetration of the labia majora, and for purposes of the definition of “sexual intercourse”, the two acts are one and the same. 301 C. 122.

Cited. 7 CA 489; Id., 701; 14 CA 451; 23 CA 712; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656. Withdrawal of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173. Cited. 38 CA 56; 41 CA 139; Id., 287; 43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.

Subdiv. (3):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 199 C. 121; 205 C. 386; 224 C. 397; Id., 656.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 8 CA 607; 15 CA 251; 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 452.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 198 C. 53; 205 C. 386.

Uncontradicted evidence that complainant could communicate using nonverbal methods, including screeching, biting, kicking and scratching, and lack of evidence that complainant was unable to use these forms of communication at time of alleged assault, preclude finding that complainant was “physically helpless” under section. 118 CA 43; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 186. Evidence was sufficient to show victim was “physically helpless”, even though she was able to communicate during earlier stages of assault but could not physically or verbally communicate her lack of consent during later penile-vaginal intercourse. 180 CA 799.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 189 C. 611; 202 C. 509; 205 C. 386; 228 C. 552.

Cited. 7 CA 489; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; 16 CA 75; 18 CA 694; 21 CA 411; 30 CA 281.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 207 C. 456.

Cited. 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-102a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-102a
Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable.
Status: in_force

(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Cited. 188 C. 697; 190 C. 496; 199 C. 255; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 6 CA 24; 35 CA 714.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-181a
Sec. 53a-181a. Creating a public disturbance: Infraction.
Status: in_force

(b) Creating a public disturbance is an infraction.

Cited. 228 C. 795; 243 C. 115.

No right to jury trial. 9 CA 255. Cited. 12 CA 258; 24 CA 195; Id., 541; 28 CA 344; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Classification by legislature of infractions as noncriminal acts payable by fine operates as a presumption that infractions do not constitute criminal offenses for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, albeit one that is rebuttable by clear proof to the contrary; protections afforded by federal double jeopardy clause were not implicated by trial court's erroneous sua sponte dismissal of charge against defendant when trial court plainly did not evaluate the state's evidence and failed to make a determination that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. 134 CA 346.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 237 C. 613.

“Offensive conduct” defined; legislative intent to proscribe conduct which actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence. 12 CA 481. Cited. 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613. Language in Subdivs. (1) and (2) is similar to that of disorderly conduct statute in Sec. 53a-182, and therefore, based on prior court interpretations of Sec. 53a-182, is not facially vague. 134 CA 175.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344b — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-344b
Sec. 53-344b. Sale or delivery of electronic nicotine delivery systems or vapor products to persons under twenty-one years of age. Misrepresentation of age by persons under twenty-one years of age. Transaction scans. Affirmative defense.
Status: in_force

(1) “Electronic nicotine delivery system” has the same meaning as provided in section 21a-415 ;

(2) “Cardholder” means any person who presents a driver's license or an identity card to a seller or seller's agent or employee, to purchase or receive an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product from such seller or seller's agent or employee;

(3) “Identity card” means an identification card issued in accordance with the provisions of section 1-1h ;

(4) “Transaction scan” means the process by which a seller or seller's agent or employee checks, by means of a transaction scan device, the validity of a driver's license or an identity card;

(5) “Transaction scan device” means any commercial device or combination of devices used at a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip or bar code of a driver's license or an identity card;

(6) “Sale” or “sell” means an act done intentionally by any person, whether done as principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee, of transferring, or offering or attempting to transfer, for consideration, an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product, including bartering or exchanging, or offering to barter or exchange, an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product;

(7) “Give” or “giving” means an act done intentionally by any person, whether done as principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee, of transferring, or offering or attempting to transfer, without consideration, an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product;

(8) “Deliver” or “delivering” means an act done intentionally by any person, whether as principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee, of transferring, or offering or attempting to transfer, physical possession or control of an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product;

(9) “Vapor product” has the same meaning as provided in section 21a-415 ; and

(10) “Seller” means any person who sells, gives or delivers an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product.

(b) Any person who sells, gives or delivers to any person under twenty-one years of age an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product in any form shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars for the first offense, not more than seven hundred fifty dollars for a second offense on or before twenty-four months after the date of the first offense and not more than one thousand dollars for each subsequent offense on or before twenty-four months after the date of the first offense. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to a person under twenty-one years of age who is delivering or accepting delivery of an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product (1) in such person's capacity as an employee, or (2) as part of a scientific study being conducted by an organization for the purpose of medical research to further efforts in tobacco use prevention and cessation, provided such medical research has been approved by the organization's institutional review board, as defined in section 21a-408 .

(c) Any person under twenty-one years of age who misrepresents such person's age to purchase an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product in any form shall be fined not more than fifty dollars for the first offense and not less than fifty dollars or more than one hundred dollars for each subsequent offense.

(d) (1) A seller or seller's agent or employee may perform a transaction scan to check the validity of a driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder as a condition for selling, giving or otherwise delivering an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product to the cardholder.

(2) If the information deciphered by the transaction scan performed under subdivision (1) of this subsection fails to match the information printed on the driver's license or identity card presented by the cardholder, or if the transaction scan indicates that the information so printed is false or fraudulent, neither the seller nor any seller's agent or employee shall sell, give or otherwise deliver any electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product to the cardholder.

(3) Subdivision (1) of this subsection does not preclude a seller or seller's agent or employee from using a transaction scan device to check the validity of a document other than a driver's license or an identity card, if the document includes a bar code or magnetic strip that may be scanned by the device, as a condition for selling, giving or otherwise delivering an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product to the person presenting the document.

(e) (1) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth of the person listed on the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder; and (B) the expiration date and identification number of the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder.

(2) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall use a transaction scan device for a purpose other than the purposes specified in subsection (d) of this section, subsection (d) of section 53-344 or subsection (c) of section 30-86 .

(3) No seller or seller's agent or employee shall sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any third party, including, but not limited to, selling or otherwise disseminating that information for any marketing, advertising or promotional activities, but a seller or seller's agent or employee may release that information pursuant to a court order.

(4) Nothing in subsection (d) of this section or this subsection relieves a seller or seller's agent or employee of any responsibility to comply with any other applicable state or federal laws or rules governing selling, giving or otherwise delivering electronic nicotine delivery systems or vapor products.

(5) Any person who violates this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars.

(f) (1) In any prosecution of a seller or seller's agent or employee for a violation of subsection (b) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that all of the following occurred: (A) A cardholder attempting to purchase or receive an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product presented a driver's license or an identity card; (B) a transaction scan of the driver's license or identity card that the cardholder presented indicated that the license or card was valid and indicated that the cardholder was at least twenty-one years of age; and (C) the electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product was sold, given or otherwise delivered to the cardholder in reasonable reliance upon the identification presented and the completed transaction scan.

(2) In determining whether a seller or seller's agent or employee has proven the affirmative defense provided by subdivision (1) of this section, the trier of fact in such prosecution shall consider that reasonable reliance upon the identification presented and the completed transaction scan may require a seller or seller's agent or employee to exercise reasonable diligence and that the use of a transaction scan device does not excuse a seller or seller's agent or employee from exercising such reasonable diligence to determine the following: (A) Whether a person to whom the seller or seller's agent or employee sells, gives or otherwise delivers an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product is twenty-one years of age or older; and (B) whether the description and picture appearing on the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder is that of the cardholder.

(g) Each seller of electronic nicotine delivery systems or vapor products or such seller's agent or employee shall require a person who is purchasing or attempting to purchase an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product and appears to be under the age of thirty to exhibit proper proof of age. If a person fails to provide such proof of age, such seller or seller's agent or employee shall not sell an electronic nicotine delivery system or vapor product to the person. As used in this subsection, “proper proof” means a motor vehicle operator's license, a valid passport or an identity card issued in accordance with the provisions of section 1-1h .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-30
Sec. 53a-30. Conditions of probation and conditional discharge.
Status: in_force

(b) When a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the Court Support Services Division may require that the defendant comply with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) of this section which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court.

(c) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions, whether originally imposed by the court under this section or otherwise, and may extend the period, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29 . The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.

(d) The period of participation in an alternate incarceration program, unless terminated sooner, shall not exceed the period of probation authorized by section 53a-29 or two years, whichever is less.

(e) The court may require that the person subject to electronic monitoring pursuant to subsection (a) of this section pay directly to the electronic monitoring service provider a fee for the cost of such electronic monitoring services. If the court finds that the person subject to electronic monitoring is indigent and unable to pay the costs of electronic monitoring services, it shall waive such costs. Any contract entered into by the Judicial Branch and the electronic monitoring service provider shall include a provision stating that the total cost for electronic monitoring services shall not exceed six dollars per day. Such amount shall be indexed annually to reflect the rate of inflation.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 204 C. 52; 207 C. 152; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46; 240 C. 639. Trial court's imposition of restitution as additional condition of probation was not punitive in nature and therefore did not affect defendant's sentence; section does not deprive trial court of jurisdiction to impose a condition of probation subsequent to initial sentencing and prior to defendant's commencement of probation period. 283 C. 735. Section not applicable to trial court's corrected order of probation because order was a clarification, not a modification, of conditions of probation previously imposed on defendant. 294 C. 516.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 338; 14 CA 272; 19 CA 304; 22 CA 199; Id., 449; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 432; 34 CA 1; 39 CA 722; 45 CA 722. Trial court's modification of defendant's probation to include sex offender evaluation and treatment was proper; Office of Adult Probation had authority under statute to add an additional condition of probation; sexual offender treatment is clearly enumerated in Subsec. (a) and could have been imposed by sentencing court; and at any time during period of probation, after hearing and for good cause shown, court may modify or enlarge conditions of probation pursuant to Subsec. (c). 57 CA 112. Failure to deliver a written copy of conditions of probation did not excuse subsequent probation violation and did not invalidate resulting probation revocation. 58 CA 153. Condition required by Office of Adult Probation was inconsistent with those required by court. 69 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174. Under section, office had authority to include a curfew restriction on defendant at the start of his probationary period without a court hearing and a showing of good cause, and such a condition was not inconsistent with the purposes of probation. 75 CA 643. List set forth in section meant to be illustrative, and not exhaustive. 83 CA 142.

Cited. 35 CS 536. Requiring defendant to sell his gun collection was a condition reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Id., 570. Cited. 41 CS 229; 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 223; 196 C. 305; 229 C. 285. Where, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleads guilty to sexual assault in fourth degree in violation of Sec. 53a-73a and public indecency in violation of Sec. 53a-186, trial court acted within its discretion in permitting Office of Adult Probation to notify members of defendant's community. 250 C. 280. Subdiv. (4): Since damage to an unoccupied house was the “fruit” of the collective criminal trespass in which the youthful offender had participated and of which he was convicted, the damage had a nexus to the offense and accordingly the order of restitution was reasonably related to the consequence of the youth's criminal trespass and well within the discretion of the trial court even though the youth had not personally profited from the trespass or caused any physical damage to the property. 301 C. 684.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 7 CA 326; 42 CA 460; 45 CA 722. Trial court's order of sexual offender treatment was authorized because section grants the court broad authority to impose any other conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation. 57 CA 743. Court's order that defendant pay veterinary and impoundment bills incurred from defendant's failure to restrain an animal from doing injury to another animal in violation of Sec. 53-247(a) was proper because such bills met statutory requirement of “fruits” for which the court may order restitution and such order did not violate “due process” because court was justified in concluding that defendant had means of earning income during the period set for restitution. 84 CA 542. Trial court's order of specialized sex offender treatment as condition of probation was authorized under Subdiv. (17) re “other conditions reasonably related to” rehabilitation and was not prohibited due to omission from Subdiv. (12) which enumerated certain crimes meriting such treatment. 95 CA 686. Court's termination of defendant's status in accelerated rehabilitation program cannot rest solely on undisposed charge of a crime identical to the underlying charge for which defendant seeks dismissal. 98 CA 111. Subdiv. (17): In order for a condition of probation to be “reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation” pursuant to Subdiv., there must be a nexus between the condition of probation and the charge for which defendant is serving probation. 102 CA 507. Although trial court specifically ordered restitution, it did not find that any damage was caused to the victim by defendant or that defendant profited from the criminal activity, nor was any rehabilitative purpose cited, so there is no basis for the court's order. 118 CA 236; judgment reversed, see 301 C. 684.

Cited. 35 CS 675; 37 CS 853; 39 CS 504. Defendant found to have complied with terms of his accelerated rehabilitation program which required that he refrain from violating any criminal laws of the United States, this state or any other state, notwithstanding fact that defendant pled guilty to criminal charges stemming from separate events that occurred after date that he applied for entry into accelerated rehabilitation but prior to date that he was actually accepted into program. 50 CS 383.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 229 C. 285.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 33 CA 103; 42 CA 768. Office's requirement that, as part of sex offender treatment, defendant refrain from use of alcohol is consistent with terms ordered by the court and therefore properly imposed by office. 60 CA 614. Probation officer could not enter into agreement with defendant that would have been in direct contradiction to a condition of probation imposed by sentencing court. 86 CA 657.

Cited. 37 CS 853.

Subsec. (c):

Special condition on probation administration properly imposed 1 year after sentencing in exercise of court's discretion. 207 C. 152. Once defendant is discharged from probation, the conditions of his probation are no longer subject to modification or enlargement. 287 C. 478.

Cited. 33 CA 103; 37 CA 72; 42 CA 768. Probation officer did not have authority to modify original conditions of probation ordered by sentencing court. 86 CA 657. Statute mandates that a court conduct a hearing related to any decision to modify probation and the hearing must be the forum in which the court explores the issue of whether good cause exists at the time the court is considering modifying the terms of the probation; the court may not modify probation unless there is a showing of good cause. 107 CA 800; judgment reversed, see 294 C. 516. When the state enters into a plea agreement that includes a period of probation, both defendant and the state do so with the understanding that the terms of probation may be modified or enlarged in accordance with law, and that such a modification might include a reduction. 147 CA 465.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-441 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949e / Section 53-441
Sec. 53-441. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(a) “Statement” includes but is not limited to any notice, statement, invoice, account, bill for services, explanation of services, medical opinion, test result, computer generated document, electronic transmission or other evidence of loss, injury or expense;

(b) “Person” means any individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, association or any other legal entity;

(c) “Insurer” means any insurance company, health care center, corporation, Lloyd's insurer, fraternal benefit society or any other legal entity authorized to provide health care benefits in this state, including benefits provided under health insurance, disability insurance, workers' compensation and automobile insurance or any person, partnership, association or legal entity which is self-insured and provides health care benefits to its employees or governmental entity which provides medical benefits to Medicare or Medicaid recipients.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-89 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-89
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty shall be fined two thousand dollars.

Cited. 185 C. 199.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-20 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-20
Sec. 53a-20. Use of physical force in defense of premises.
Status: in_force

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 383; 203 C. 466; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 242 C. 211. Defendant's due process right to fair trial was violated when trial court failed to explicitly instruct jury that state bore burden of disproving defendant's defense of premises theory. 294 C. 399. The term “crime of violence” includes only those offenses that fall within the traditional common law definition of the term, such as arson and burglary, and do not necessarily involve the use of deadly force or infliction of great bodily harm. 314 C. 618.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 8 CA 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.

Common-law right referred to; unnecessary to decide whether Sec. 53a-23 creates an exception. 34 CS 531. Cited. 43 CS 46.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-134 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 941 / Section 53-134
Sec. 53-134. Possession of outboard motor having defaced factory or engine number.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who knowingly has in his possession any outboard motor of which the engine number, factory number, serial number or other identification number has been altered or defaced shall forthwith file with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection a sworn statement describing such motor and showing the source of his title and, if known, the reason for such alteration or defacement. If satisfied as to the facts, the commissioner may grant permission to cut, impress or emboss permanently into the motor a special identification number or mark. No person shall wilfully alter or deface or cause to be altered or defaced any engine number, factory number, serial number or other identification number or mark on or from any outboard motor.

(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both.

Cited. 19 CA 571.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-142k — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 941 / Section 53-142k
Sec. 53-142k. Organized retail theft.
Status: in_force

(1) “Retail property” means any new article, product, commodity, item or component intended to be sold in retail commerce;

(2) “Value” means the retail value of an item as advertised by the affected retail establishment, including applicable taxes; and

(3) “Retail property fence” means a person who buys retail property when such person knows or should know the property is stolen and with the intent to unlawfully distribute the property or to promote, manage, carry on or facilitate a violation of subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Any person who, for financial gain and in conjunction with one or more other persons, commits larceny by shoplifting, as defined in section 53a-119 , of retail property having an aggregate value exceeding two thousand dollars and (1) wrongfully takes such property during a period of one hundred eighty days, or (2) sells, delivers or otherwise transfers such property to a retail property fence, shall have committed the offense of organized retail theft.

(c) Any person who receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells or disposes of any retail property acquired in violation of subsection (b) of this section, with the intent to distribute the proceeds or otherwise promote, manage, carry on or facilitate a violation of said subsection, shall have committed the offense of accessory to organized retail theft.

(d) It shall not be a defense to a charge of accessory to organized retail theft in violation of subsection (c) of this section that the retail property was obtained by means other than through a violation of said subsection if the property was explicitly represented to the person charged under said subsection (c) as being obtained through the commission of organized retail theft.

(e) Any person who violates subsection (b) or (c) of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony, except that, if such person derives a financial benefit of ten thousand dollars or more as a result of such violation, such person shall be guilty of a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-101 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-101
Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Cited. 161 C. 283; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 500; 190 C. 496; 205 C. 456; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 199; 216 C. 563; 220 C. 112; 222 C. 331; 227 C. 32; 229 C. 691.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 6 CA 24; 8 CA 491; 13 CA 133; 19 CA 245; 24 CA 563; 29 CA 704; 30 CA 416; 35 CA 107; Id., 714; 46 CA 118. There was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 170 C. 162; 175 C. 398. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in Sec. 53a-3(7) to support finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140. Cited. 178 C. 564; 180 C. 481, 482; Id., 557. Subdiv. (2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599. Cited. 182 C. 366; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 599; 188 C. 372; Id., 574; 189 C. 383; Id., 611; 190 C. 104; 194 C. 241; 196 C. 157; Id., 225; 197 C. 413; 199 C. 62; 200 C. 9; Id., 586; 203 C. 159; 204 C. 714; 205 C. 61; Id., 485; 209 C. 416; 214 C. 132; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; 217 C. 419; 219 C. 269; 221 C. 430; Id., 447; Id., 685; 223 C. 41; Id., 243; Id., 299; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 32, 48; Id., 616, 622; 228 C. 234; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 802; 241 C. 702; Id., 784; 242 C. 445; Id., 523. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate “building” under statute. 252 C. 274. Trial court correctly permitted jury to consider charge of burglary in the third degree as lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree; state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for burglary in the first degree. 275 C. 192. Subdiv. (2): Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 6 CA 667; Id., 697; Id., 701; 8 CA 631; 9 CA 79; Id., 208; 10 CA 176; 12 CA 662; 13 CA 554; 14 CA 67; Id., 657; 15 CA 342; 16 CA 184; Id., 318; Id., 455; 17 CA 391; 19 CA 179; Id., 618; 21 CA 244; 23 CA 692; 24 CA 556; 25 CA 428; Id., 565; 26 CA 641; 27 CA 73; Id., 786; Id., 794; 30 CA 68; 31 CA 312; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 279; 36 CA 774; 38 CA 481; Id., 531; 39 CA 45; 40 CA 60; 41 CA 255; Id., 317; Id., 817; 42 CA 78; 44 CA 307; 45 CA 187; Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact reasonably could infer that something defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering the building. 78 CA 646. Crimes of burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (1) and burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (2) each contain an element the other does not; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (1), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and that he was armed with a dangerous instrument; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (2), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein and that in the course of committing the crime, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicted bodily injury on another person; Subsec. does not require state to prove that defendant forcibly entered the building or that defendant was in possession of stolen property. 96 CA 421. Trial court reasonably concluded that defendant injured the victim while in immediate flight from the commission of a burglary even though evidence demonstrated that defendant struck the victim beyond the property line of the residence where the burglary occurred. 132 CA 718. Subdiv. (3): Charges for burglary in the first degree, arising under Subdiv., and home invasion, under Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(1), are susceptible to separation into parts, thus defendant's conviction of both offenses did not violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 187 CA 847.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-94 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-94
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable.
Status: in_force

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Cited. 169 C. 242; 171 C. 47; 172 C. 22; 177 C. 335; Id., 637; 178 C. 549; Id., 634; 185 C. 163; 186 C. 179; 188 C. 406; 190 C. 822; 191 C. 604; 196 C. 430; 198 C. 68; Id., 190; 199 C. 537; 200 C. 586; 202 C. 343; Id., 520; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 208 C. 365; 211 C. 672; 213 C. 388; 231 C. 195. Omission of Salamon instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 302 C. 236.

Cited. 1 CA 697; 12 CA 268; Id., 613; 20 CA 437; 21 CA 411; 27 CA 786; 35 CA 740; 42 CA 768; 46 CA 486; Id., 691.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 178 C. 600; 179 C. 328; 180 C. 565; 182 C. 449; 187 C. 681; 190 C. 327; 192 C. 166; 197 C. 485; 198 C. 314; 238 C. 784. The legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. The court's repeated pronouncements that there are no minimum time or distance requirements to establish restraint within the meaning of Subsec., coupled with Subsec.'s prohibition of the act of restraint only when it is accomplished with the specific intent of preventing a victim's liberation, defeats defendant's claim that Subsec. is unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's actions. 294 C. 753. Lack of Salamon instruction was harmless because defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint. 299 C. 447.

There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697. By its plain terms, Subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142. Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the particular facts in issue because it failed to put defendant on notice that forcibly taking victim's arm but not moving her was a violation. 95 CA 332; judgment reversed, see 294 C. 753. Section not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant whose actions over a 2-hour period included using stun gun and restraints against victim and confining victim in defendant's car and home. 137 CA 29. Defendant possessed specific intent to prevent victim's liberation immediately prior to and during struggle; Subsec. not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; defendant not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; cumulative convictions of kidnapping in the second degree and attempted kidnapping in the second degree violate constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 147 CA 598.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-451 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949g / Section 53-451
Sec. 53-451. Computer crimes.
Status: in_force

(1) “Computer” means an electronic, magnetic or optical device or group of devices that, pursuant to a computer program, human instruction or permanent instructions contained in the device or group of devices, can automatically perform computer operations with or on computer data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person. “Computer” includes any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility that enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer programs, computer data or the results of computer operations to or from a person, another computer or another device.

(2) “Computer data” means any representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions that is being prepared or has been prepared and is intended to be processed, is being processed or has been processed in a computer or computer network. “Computer data” may be in any form, whether readable only by a computer or only by a human or by either, including, but not limited to, computer printouts, magnetic storage media, punched cards or stored internally in the memory of the computer.

(3) “Computer network” means a set of related, remotely connected devices and any communications facilities including more than one computer with the capability to transmit data among them through the communications facilities.

(4) “Computer operation” means arithmetic, logical, monitoring, storage or retrieval functions and any combination thereof, and includes, but is not limited to, communication with, storage of data to or retrieval of data from any device or human hand manipulation of electronic or magnetic impulses. A “computer operation” for a particular computer may also be any function for which that computer was generally designed.

(5) “Computer program” means an ordered set of data representing coded instructions or statements that, when executed by a computer, causes the computer to perform one or more computer operations.

(6) “Computer services” means computer time or services including data processing services, Internet services, electronic mail services, electronic message services or information or data stored in connection therewith.

(7) “Computer software” means a set of computer programs, procedures and associated documentation concerned with computer data or with the operation of a computer, computer program or computer network.

(8) “Electronic mail service provider” means any person who (A) is an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail, and (B) provides to end-users of electronic mail services the ability to send or receive electronic mail.

(9) “Financial instrument” includes, but is not limited to, any check, draft, warrant, money order, note, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange, credit or debit card, transaction authorization mechanism, marketable security or any computerized representation thereof.

(10) “Owner” means an owner or lessee of a computer or a computer network, or an owner, lessee or licensee of computer data, computer programs or computer software.

(11) “Person” means a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association and any other legal or governmental entity, including any state or municipal entity or public official.

(12) “Property” means: (A) Real property; (B) computers and computer networks; (C) financial instruments, computer data, computer programs, computer software and all other personal property regardless of whether they are: (i) Tangible or intangible; (ii) in a format readable by humans or by a computer; (iii) in transit between computers or within a computer network or between any devices which comprise a computer; or (iv) located on any paper or in any device on which it is stored by a computer or by a human; and (D) computer services.

(13) A person “uses” a computer or computer network when such person:

(A) Attempts to cause or causes a computer or computer network to perform or to stop performing computer operations;

(B) Attempts to cause or causes the withholding or denial of the use of a computer, computer network, computer program, computer data or computer software to another user; or

(C) Attempts to cause or causes another person to put false information into a computer.

(14) A person is “without authority” when such person (A) has no right or permission of the owner to use a computer or such person uses a computer in a manner exceeding such right or permission, or (B) uses a computer, a computer network or the computer services of an electronic mail service provider to transmit unsolicited bulk electronic mail in contravention of the authority granted by or in violation of the policies set by the electronic mail service provider. Transmission of electronic mail from an organization to its members shall not be deemed to be unsolicited bulk electronic mail.

(b) Unauthorized use of a computer or computer network. It shall be unlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network without authority and with the intent to:

(1) Temporarily or permanently remove, halt or otherwise disable any computer data, computer programs or computer software from a computer or computer network;

(2) Cause a computer to malfunction, regardless of how long the malfunction persists;

(3) Alter or erase any computer data, computer programs or computer software;

(4) Effect the creation or alteration of a financial instrument or of an electronic transfer of funds;

(5) Cause physical injury to the property of another;

(6) Make or cause to be made an unauthorized copy, in any form, including, but not limited to, any printed or electronic form of computer data, computer programs or computer software residing in, communicated by or produced by a computer or computer network; or

(7) Falsify or forge electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail through or into the computer network of an electronic mail service provider or its subscribers.

(c) Unlawful sale or distribution of software designed to facilitate falsification of electronic mail transmission or routing information. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, give or otherwise distribute or possess with the intent to sell, give or distribute software that: (1) Is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; (2) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or enable the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; or (3) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in facilitating or enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other routing information.

(d) Criminal penalty. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except that if such person's reckless disregard for the consequences of such person's actions causes damage to the property of another person in an amount exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, such person shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if such person's malicious actions cause damage to the property of another person in an amount exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, such person shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(e) Nonapplicability to provisions in certain contracts and licenses. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with or prohibit terms or conditions in a contract or license related to computers, computer data, computer networks, computer operations, computer programs, computer services or computer software or to create any liability by reason of terms or conditions adopted by, or technical measures implemented by, a Connecticut-based electronic mail service provider to prevent the transmission of unsolicited electronic mail in violation of this section.

See Sec. 52-570c re unsolicited electronic mail.

See Sec. 53a-250 et seq. re computer-related offenses.

See Sec. 53a-301 re computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-73a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-73a
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45. Cited. 192 C. 154; 204 C. 683; 205 C. 386; 210 C. 396; Id., 582; 211 C. 455; 224 C. 1.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 6 CA 150; 8 CA 607; 11 CA 80; Id., 102; 14 CA 40; 15 CA 251; Id., 289; 18 CA 459; 25 CA 270; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1. Judgment of acquittal in 26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656 reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under section. 31 CA 452. Cited. 34 CA 473; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 458; Id., 715. Reiterated previous holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538. Evidence was sufficient to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that defendant touched victim's intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating her, therefore constituting “sexual contact”. 124 CA 261. Sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree; convictions under this section and Sec. 53a-70 do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because they are separate and distinct crimes and each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. 171 CA 530.

It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment; this public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that “a person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent”; thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 586; 192 C. 37; 200 C. 440; Id., 734; 205 C. 515; 211 C. 555; 215 C. 653. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant waived claim that violation of section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1); judgment of Appellate Court in 26 CA 625 reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency. 224 C. 656. Cited. 227 C. 207; 230 C. 43. Subdiv. (1)(A) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 291 C. 1. Subdiv. (2): Consistent with other provisions of the Penal Code, sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a strict liability offense with respect to consent element and criminal negligence is the required mens rea for that element. 317 C. 482.

Cited. 12 CA 395; 18 CA 297; Id., 694; 19 CA 44; 20 CA 115; Id., 365; Id., 530; 26 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; Id., 674; 29 CA 409; 33 CA 205; 34 CA 428; 38 CA 125; 45 CA 116; Id., 289; Id., 512; Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409. There was sufficient evidence produced at trial to convict defendant of sexual assault in the fourth degree; the state proved defendant was the perpetrator of the assault and victim's testimony, although inconsistent, was credible. 110 CA 97. Subdiv. (1)(A): Under 2005 revision, trial court properly found that minor respondent acted with mental state necessary for commission of sexual assault because court's finding that respondent acted for the purpose of sexual gratification was supported by ample circumstantial evidence, not solely by evidence that respondent had contact with intimate parts of victim. 117 CA 582. 2003 revision of Subdiv. (1)(A) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 118 CA 589.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-135 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-135
Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.

Cited. 171 C. 47; Id., 105; 174 C. 142; 176 C. 270; 178 C. 287; 179 C. 576; 182 C. 207; 183 C. 156; 185 C. 260; 191 C. 506; 197 C. 309; 198 C. 158; 201 C. 125; Id., 489; 202 C. 224; 203 C. 506; 204 C. 630; 210 C. 435; 224 C. 445; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 2 CA 11; 12 CA 375; 13 CA 420; 14 CA 159; Id., 205; 36 CA 401; 37 CA 35; 39 CA 384; 43 CA 801.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 161; 173 C. 545; 176 C. 227; Id., 367; 179 C. 98; Id., 381; 182 C. 476; Id., 533; 184 C. 366; 187 C. 602; 190 C. 327; 194 C. 241; Id., 297; 197 C. 677; 199 C. 557; 200 C. 350; 209 C. 143; 211 C. 1; 229 C. 178; 230 C. 608; Id., 686; 235 C. 67; Id., 145; Id., 502.

Cited. 6 CA 247; 9 CA 656; 10 CA 330; 12 CA 239; 16 CA 264; Id., 455; 17 CA 247; 25 CA 428; 26 CA 779; 31 CA 47; 33 CA 143; Id., 184; Id., 468. Robbery in second degree pursuant to this section is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-134(a)(3). 35 CA 839. Cited. 36 CA 774; 41 CA 817. Court's failure to instruct jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree in violation of statute where there was uncontroverted evidence from two state's witnesses that the gun was inoperable constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. 71 CA 865. To prove defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Subdiv. (2), state needs to prove defendant and co-conspirator specifically had an agreement to display a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and that defendant had specific intent that such a weapon or instrument would be displayed. 138 CA 228; judgment affirmed, see 315 C. 451. Subsec. contains no language indicating the legislature's intent to bar multiple punishments for the perpetrators of single second degree robberies who, in committing such offenses, violate multiple subdivisions of section. 175 CA 566. Subdiv. (1)(B): A defendant need not have a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, but need only represent by his words or conduct that he is so armed. 203 CA 219.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-139 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-139
Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) “Drugs” as used in this section includes all drugs except controlled drugs as defined in section 21a-240 .

(c) Forgery in the second degree is a class D felony.

Cited. 201 C. 125; 207 C. 555. Defendant may be found guilty of forgery in the second degree if the state establishes that defendant, with intent to deceive another, falsely made, possessed or altered a written instrument that he or she knew to be forged. 252 C. 229.

Cited. 8 CA 342; 11 CA 161; 28 CA 521; 37 CA 72; 42 CA 790; 47 CA 1. Defendant's true identity is related directly to the crime and therefore defendant must be provided with “Miranda” warnings prior to being asked his or her identity as part of booking process. 103 CA 544. Whether the victim was in fact deceived is not an element of forgery in the second degree, belief of the victim is immaterial. 165 CA 791.

Cited. 34 CS 606.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 68; Id., 158; 199 C. 146; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 5 CA 473; 14 CA 1; 24 CA 493. Altered medical document can reasonably be found to be “other instrument” under Subdiv. (1) as such document may affect a legal right or interest; Subdivs. (1) to (4) are not mutually exclusive. 146 CA 17.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-60a
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D or C felony: One year not suspendable.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is (1) a class D felony, or (2) if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony, for which, in either case under subdivision (1) or subdivision (2) of this subsection, one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Cited. 198 C. 424; 200 C. 642; 201 C. 368; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 5 CA 590; 9 CA 648; 23 CA 502; 45 CA 591.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-10 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-10
Sec. 53a-10. Defense.
Status: in_force

(b) For purposes of this section, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.

Cited. 176 C. 451. Defendant is entitled, as matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 225 C. 270; 242 C. 409.

Cited. 22 CA 216; 40 CA 526.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-59
Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146 , and the actor knew the victim was a witness.

Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was “serious” was question of fact for the jury. 175 C. 204. Cited. 191 C. 142; 193 C. 333; 196 C. 18; 200 C. 607; 203 C. 484; 207 C. 233; 209 C. 34; 211 C. 441; 215 C. 739; 219 C. 363; 221 C. 402; 227 C. 301; 239 C. 467; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 125; Id., 389.

Cited. 3 CA 607; 5 CA 590; 8 CA 545; 11 CA 621; Id., 699; 13 CA 139; 14 CA 244; Id., 309; 17 CA 200; 19 CA 654; 20 CA 437; Id., 521; 21 CA 557; 25 CA 171; 34 CA 103; 35 CA 107; Id., 609; Id., 762; 36 CA 336; 37 CA 180; 38 CA 20; Id., 777; 39 CA 333; Id., 645; 42 CA 624; 43 CA 549; 44 CA 6; 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263. In challenge of evidence as being insufficient to prove element that appellant was “aided by two or more other persons actually present”, where appellant and another defendant assaulted the driver of a jeep while a third defendant assaulted the passenger of a jeep and a fourth defendant kept lookout, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the lookout aided in the assault by following the jeep, blocking the jeep from exiting an alleyway and acting as a lookout, and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant and other two defendants had aided each other by attacking from both sides of the jeep so that neither victim could assist the other or run for help. 111 CA 184. Re accessory liability under section, defendant only needs to have the intent to cause serious physical injury, not the intent to do so with a dangerous instrument; jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant intended to aid another to inflict serious physical injury on victim and that principal used a dangerous instrument. 136 CA 568; judgment reversed on eyewitness identification, see 314 C. 131. Convictions for assault in the first degree in violation of this section and risk of injury to a child in violation of Sec. 53-21, revised to 1997, are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 145 CA 374.

Cited. 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 428; 172 C. 94; Id., 275; 173 C. 254. Evidence victim suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the “serious physical injury” required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174 C. 16; Id., 604; 176 C. 138; 178 C. 116; Id., 448; 180 C. 481; Id., 557; 182 C. 449; Id., 501; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 400; 185 C. 63; Id., 372; 186 C. 1; Id., 17; Id., 654; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 61; Id., 303; 190 C. 219; 191 C. 12; 193 C. 48; Id., 474; Id., 632; 194 C. 89; Id., 119; Id., 408; 195 C. 475; Id., 651; 196 C. 395; 197 C. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 C. 155; Id., 322; 200 C. 642; 202 C. 259; Id., 463. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 204 C. 207; Id., 523; 205 C. 370; Id., 673; 208 C. 38; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 619; 211 C. 1; 212 C. 50; 213 C. 97; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; Id., 717; 216 C. 188; Id., 492; Id., 585; Id., 647; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 747; 219 C. 16; Id., 363; 220 C. 385; Id., 408; Id., 915; 222 C. 117; Id., 444; Id., 718; 225 C. 450; Id., 524; 227 C. 301; Id., 518; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 C. 147; Id., 234; Id., 335; 229 C. 125; Id., 178; 230 C. 608; 231 C. 235; 233 C. 502; 235 C. 473; Id., 746; Id., 748; 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances, defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of Appellate Court in 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 239 C. 481; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 665; Id., 802; 242 C. 143; Id., 485; Id., 723; Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Cited. 247 C. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding construing a common law duty to act under section; evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act; re double jeopardy claim, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act; this section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 260 C. 93. Defendant who was not perpetrator of physical assaults on child and who was neither a parent nor a legal guardian could not be criminally liable for assault in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (3); accordingly, defendant's conviction of two counts of that crime were reversed and case remanded for resentencing on remaining charge of risk of injury to a child. 274 C. 727. Sec. 53a-61(a)(2) is lesser included offense of Subdiv. (3), and court's refusal to grant related jury instruction constituted harmful error. 289 C. 742. Subdiv. (1): A fist or other body part is not a dangerous instrument. 307 C. 115. Convictions under Subdivs. (1) and (3) are not legally inconsistent because a person may intend to seriously injure a person within the meaning of Subdiv. (1) while simultaneously recklessly creating a risk of that person's death within the meaning of Subdiv. (3). 316 C. 651. Subsection's use of “serious disfigurement” evidences intent to require consideration of factors such as permanence, location, size, general appearance and visibility to others; serious disfigurement does not have to be permanent or in a location that is visible to others. 332 C. 472. Evidence insufficient to find serious disfigurement where regardless if evaluated at the time of injury or of trial, victim had two lacerations on her forearm caused by a knife that left a permanent scar of one and one-half inches which is unremarkable in appearance and does not substantially detract from her appearance. Id. Where court reversed conviction of assault in the first degree for insufficient evidence, court declined to modify the judgment to reflect the highest lesser included offense that requires only physical injury, assault in the second degree, and remanded case for acquittal and vacating of sentence for said charge. Id. Because Subdiv. (1) does not indicate unit of prosecution intended by legislature, and absent clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for violations of same criminal statute arising out of single transaction or occurrence, unit of prosecution must be resolved in favor of rule of lenity to resolve any doubt against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. 336 C. 219. Subdiv. (1): It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(2) and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-49 are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Cited. 1 CA 609; 3 CA 166; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 124; Id., 469; Id., 476; 7 CA 309; 8 CA 119; Id., 176; 9 CA 79; Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 330; 10 CA 103; Id., 176; Id., 302; Id., 462; Id., 643; 11 CA 499; 12 CA 217; Id., 655; 13 CA 12; Id., 120; Id., 237; Id., 687; Id., 824; 14 CA 1; Id., 140; Id., 493; Id., 511; 15 CA 34; Id., 416; Id., 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 184; Id., 206; Id., 346; Id., 390; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 477; 19 CA 174; Id., 618; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 688; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 610; 23 CA 28; Id., 315; Id., 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 152; Id., 264; Id., 316; Id., 556; Id., 563; Id., 624; 25 CA 243; Id., 275; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 619; 26 CA 52; Id., 114; Id., 145; Id., 331; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 641; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; Id., 654; 28 CA 34; Id., 290; Id., 402; Id., 548; Id., 825; Id., 833; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518; 29 CA 59; Id., 262; Id., 704; Id., 744; 30 CA 9; Id., 26; Id., 68; Id., 232; Id., 359; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; Id., 606; 31 CA 58; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 60; Id., 122; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 34 CA 223; Id., 261; Id., 610; Id., 691; Id., 807; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 279; Id., 699; Id., 740; 36 CA 41; Id., 473; Id., 483; Id., 506; Id., 576; Id., 695; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 21; Id., 464; Id., 749; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; Id., 563; 40 CA 60; Id., 387; Id., 483; Id., 515; Id., 624; 41 CA 515; Id., 565; Id., 831; 42 CA 307; Id., 371; 43 CA 205; Id., 488; Id., 578; 44 CA 26; Id., 231; Id., 476; Id., 499; 45 CA 270; Id., 591; 46 CA 684; Id., 734. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633. Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with “shaken baby syndrome” was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Subdiv. (1): Evidence that defendant arrived at crime scene and fired several shots at bedroom where he believed wife was staying was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant committed attempt to commit assault in the first degree which requires proof of intentional conduct constituting a substantial step toward intentionally causing victim serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. 99 CA 203. Subdiv. (5): Court's instructions to jury improperly included additional element of intent to use firearm but did not prejudice defendant because inclusion of the additional element was to the state's, and not to defendant's, detriment. 107 CA 517. The jury reasonably could have concluded that scars constituted serious physical injury because they negatively affected the appearance of skin on face and abdomen. 118 CA 831. Mandatory nonsuspendable 5 year minimum term of imprisonment for violation of Subdiv. (1) does not violate constitutional due process or equal protection rights. 130 CA 632. Scarring does not have to be on a victim's face, it can be on far less observable parts of the body to support a finding of serious disfigurement; victim suffered serious disfigurement when scar was permanent, easily seen two and one-half years after the injury, and was located on the lower part of arm. 172 CA 668; judgment reversed in part, see 332 C. 472. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-55(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. Attempted murder under Sec. 53a-49(a) and assault in the first degree under this section are not the same offense of for purposes of double jeopardy. 204 CA 207.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-253 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 945 / Section 53-253
Sec. 53-253. Notice of arrest of offender to be given.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 29-108a for definition of “animal”.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40f — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-40f
Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender. Authorized sentences.
Status: in_force

(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the influence felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-70a
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony. Any person found guilty under this section of a class B felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, five years of which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age. Any person found guilty under this section of a class A felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70 , and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subdivision and impose a period of probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29 , or may impose a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 .

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 188 C. 697; 192 C. 154; 204 C. 240; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 110; Id., 315; 211 C. 672. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. 240 C. 743.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 179; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; 35 CA 173; 36 CA 805; 43 CA 715.

Cited. 43 CS 211.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 206 C. 40; 216 C. 282; 235 C. 502. 5-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a “member” of her body for purposes of Subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.

Cited. 25 CA 725. For purposes of the offense described in Subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity, that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is “actually present”. 75 CA 578.

Subsec. (b):

Nothing in June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 suggests that special parole with 20-year maximum sentence provision applied retroactively. 153 CA 639.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-181d
Sec. 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(1) “Course of conduct” means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, (A) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates about or with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (B) interferes with a person's property;

(2) “Emotional distress” means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling; and

(3) “Personally identifying information” means:

(A) Any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, prior legal name, alias, mother's maiden name, Social Security number, date or place of birth, address, telephone number or biometric data;

(B) Any information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, financial, education, consumer or employment information, data or records; or

(C) Any other sensitive private information that is linked or linkable to a specific identifiable individual, such as gender identity, sexual orientation or any sexually intimate visual depiction.

(b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when:

(1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such specific person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; (B) suffer emotional distress; or (C) fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in possession and control of such specific person;

(2) Such person with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear that such person's employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating communication or contact to such other person's place of employment or business, including electronically, through video-teleconferencing or by digital media, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity; or

(3) Such person, for no legitimate purpose and with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, by means of electronic communication, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, discloses a specific person's personally identifiable information without consent of the person, knowing, that under the circumstances, such disclosure would cause a reasonable person to:

(A) Fear for such person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; or

(B) Suffer emotional distress.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a violation may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

Cited. 44 CA 84. Held to be not unconstitutionally vague. 46 CA 661. Proof of verbal threats or harassing gestures not essential to prove violation of section; section can be violated without defendant's uttering a syllable, writing a word or making a gesture. 121 CA 520. Section requires that any “following” be “wilful” and “repeated”, and the following must have a predatory thrust to it; section does not encompass following that is aimless, unintentional, accidental or undertaken for a lawful purpose. 139 CA 553. Defendant not guilty under section because there was no evidence of a second act directed specifically against plaintiff to satisfy the “course of conduct” element. 166 CA 844.

Constitutionality of statute under attack for vagueness or overbreadth discussed. 43 CS 46.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-64 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-64
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

Cited. 194 C. 408; 223 C. 618.

Cited. 3 CA 166; 8 CA 342; 14 CA 6; Id., 10; Id., 804; 23 CA 123; 24 CA 662; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618; 31 CA 497.

Cited. 35 CS 570; 37 CS 661; 38 CS 619; 40 CA 643. Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted “serious physical injury” in violation of statute. 46 CS 130.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-302a
Sec. 53-302a. Employment of labor on Sunday prohibited; exceptions. Sunday sales.
Status: in_force

(a) Any enterprise whose activities are conducted solely for charitable or religious purposes, or which are service organizations.

(b) Any federal, state, municipal or local governmental department or agency, or its employees, acting in an official capacity.

(c) Any person, firm or corporation performing acts necessary for the public safety or health.

(d) The sale or furnishing of any of the following items of personal property or services by any person, firm or corporation in any of the businesses enumerated in subsection (e), provided such person, firm or corporation sells such products or furnishes such services in the ordinary course of its business: (1) Drugs, medical and surgical supplies, or any object purchased on the prescription of a licensed practitioner for the treatment of a patient; (2) toilet articles or any article used for personal cleanliness and hygiene; (3) baby supplies; (4) ice; (5) newspapers, magazines, artists' supplies, films, stationery and greeting cards; (6) any food products intended for human or animal consumption; (7) gasoline, fuel additives, lubricants, antifreeze and tires; (8) emergency repair or replacement parts for motor vehicles, boats and aircraft; (9) emergency plumbing, heating, cooling and electrical repair and replacement parts and equipment; (10) cooking, heating and lighting fuel; (11) tobacco products; and (12) antiques.

(e) The operation of any of the following businesses, provided such businesses may sell only those items sold in the ordinary course of business of such businesses, unless otherwise provided in this subsection, by any person, firm or corporation: (1) (A) Retail food stores, in which no more than five persons, including the owner, if owner-operated, are employed at one time in the conduct of business and which have less than five thousand square feet not including storage facilities and ground space; (B) retail drug stores, provided such stores shall be limited to the sale of items authorized in subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, and (11) of subsection (d) of this section; and (C) servicing of motor vehicles, motorcycles, boats and aircraft, but limited to the sale of items listed in subdivision (7) and (8) of subsection (d) of this section, and emergency repairs to motor vehicles, motorcycles, boats and aircraft; and provided further, each such store shall post in such manner as to be clearly visible and easily read by customers a list of the classes of goods which may be sold in or services rendered in such establishments; (2) restaurants, cafeterias and other prepared food service organizations, whether food is prepared for consumption on or off the premises where sold; (3) hotels, motels and other lodging facilities; (4) medical services and other professional services on an emergency basis; (5) ambulances and funeral services; (6) public services and utilities, manufacturing, processing and plant operations of such public services and utilities; (7) transportation by whatever means and supporting facilities; (8) cold storage warehousing; (9) ice manufacturing and distributing; (10) necessary inspection, repair and maintenance of equipment and machinery; (11) plant and industrial protection services and janitorial services; (12) any business or industry which by its nature is required to be continuous; (13) publishing, including the distribution of magazines and newspapers; (14) motion picture theaters and the production of radio and television programs and theatrical entertainments; (15) sports, athletic events and the operation of entertainment and recreational facilities and libraries; (16) sale or rental of boats, and swimming, fishing and boating equipment; (17) scenic, historic and tourist attractions; (18) sale or lease of noncommercial property and mobile manufactured homes; (19) use by public of coin-operated laundries, of coin-operated dry cleaners, or other vending machines; (20) licensed commercial kennels or pet shops; (21) agriculture, including the operation of nurseries and dairies; (22) athletic shops associated with and on the premises of athletic facilities which operate on Sundays; (23) commercial facilities for the washing of motor vehicles, motorcycles, boats or aircraft; and (24) manufacturing, including any allied operations which are involved in the production of any product.

(f) This section shall not apply to isolated or occasional sales by persons not engaged in the sale, transfer or exchange of property as a business.

Proscription of business activities on Sunday held unconstitutional as violation of equal protection and due process. 177 C. 304. Cited. 229 C. 312.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-72b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-72b
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of ten years.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 192 C. 154; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 240 C. 743.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 715.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-262 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-262
Sec. 53a-262. Computer extortion by use of ransomware: Class E felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Computer extortion by use of ransomware is a class E felony.

(c) For purposes of this section, “ransomware” means any computer contaminant or lock placed or introduced without authorization into a computer, computer system or computer network that restricts access by an authorized person to the computer, computer system, computer network, or any data held by the computer, computer system or computer network, but does not include authentication required to upgrade or access purchased content or the blocking of access to subscription content in the case of nonpayment for such access, and “computer contaminant” means any set of computer instructions that are designed to modify, damage, destroy, record or transmit data held by a computer, computer system or computer network without the intent or permission of the owner of the data.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303d — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-303d
Sec. 53-303d. Injunction.
Status: in_force

Discussion of constitutionality of Sunday closing laws or Blue Laws. 177 C. 304.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-40
Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences; procedure.
Status: in_force

(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, assault in the first degree, home invasion, burglary in the first degree or burglary in the second degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72 , 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117 , or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9 , 53-10 , 53-11 , 53-12 to 53-16 , inclusive, 53-19 , 53-21 , 53-69 , 53-78 to 53-80 , inclusive, 53-82 , 53-83 , 53-86 , 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or

(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, assault in the first degree, home invasion, burglary in the first degree or burglary in the second degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117 , or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9 , 53-10 , 53-11 , 53-12 to 53-16 , inclusive, 53-19 , 53-21 , 53-69 , 53-78 to 53-80 , inclusive, 53-82 , 53-83 and 53-86 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.

(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72 , 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238 or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.

(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.

(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 , or section 53a-70 , 53a-70a , 53a-71 , 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October 1, 1995, a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70 , 53a-70a , 53a-71 , 53a-72a or 53a-72b .

(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times, twice convicted of the crime of larceny for violations committed during the ten years prior to the commission of the present larceny.

(f) A persistent offender for possession of a controlled substance is a person who (1) stands convicted of possession of a controlled substance in violation of the provisions of section 21a-279 , and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present possession of a controlled substance, twice convicted of the crime of possession of a controlled substance during the ten years prior to the commission of the present violation of section 21a-279 .

(g) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony other than a class D or E felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D or E felony, if such felonies were committed during the ten years prior to the commission of the present felony.

(h) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction, the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this section.

(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by the general statutes for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall (1) sentence such person to a term of imprisonment that is not (A) less than twice the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime, or (B) more than twice the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or forty years, whichever is greater, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is twice such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and (2) if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment that is not less than three times the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or more than life, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is three times such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section 53a-35b .

(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.

(m) (1) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35 , if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981, or authorized by section 53a-35a , if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, but prior to October 1, 2019.

(2) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted for a violation committed on or after October 1, 2019, may impose the sentence of (A) imprisonment for a class E felony authorized by section 53a-35a , if such person presently stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-125 , or (B) imprisonment authorized by section 53a-36 for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor authorized under section 53a-36 if such person presently stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-125a or 53a-125b .

(n) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender for possession of a controlled substance, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class E felony authorized by section 53a-35a .

(o) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(p) (1) Whenever a person is arrested for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, the prosecuting authority shall investigate and ascertain whether such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in said subsection (a) and would be eligible to be sentenced under subsection (i) of this section if convicted of such crime.

(2) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section and such person has been presented to a geographical area courthouse, the prosecuting authority shall cause such person to be transferred to a judicial district courthouse.

(3) No court shall accept a plea of guilty, not guilty or nolo contendere from a person arrested for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section unless it finds that the prosecuting authority has complied with the requirements of subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(4) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section but decides not to initiate proceedings to seek the sentence enhancement provided by subsection (i) of this section, the prosecuting authority shall state for the record the specific reason or reasons for not initiating such proceedings.

(5) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section and initiates proceedings to seek the sentence enhancement provided by subsection (i) of this section, but subsequently decides to terminate such proceedings, the prosecuting authority shall state for the record the specific reason or reasons for terminating such proceedings.

Cited. 176 C. 270; 180 C. 660; 184 C. 215; 188 C. 27; 191 C. 180; 192 C. 471; 194 C. 573; Id., 692; 195 C. 326; 197 C. 280; 198 C. 158; Id., 273; 203 C. 506; 207 C. 619; 218 C. 273; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 601; 227 C. 751; 234 C. 324; 240 C. 317; 242 C. 143. Finding by trial court, rather than jury, that imposing extended incarceration would best serve the public interest clearly violated defendant's constitutional rights under the sixth amendment to U.S. Constitution; section is unconstitutional to the extent it does not provide that defendant is entitled to have jury make a required finding that exposes defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by jury's guilty verdict. 283 C. 748.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 1; 31 CA 140; 36 CA 401; 37 CA 733; 45 CA 369; Id., 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521. Section constitutes a sentence enhancement and not an independent criminal offense. 117 CA 486. Rule in 283 C. 748 does not apply retroactively. 130 CA 435. Defendant's status as a persistent felony offender and his resulting sentence enhancements do not run contrary to the plain language of section which permits enhancement of defendant's conviction of robbery in the first degree under Subsec. (a) and of his conviction of attempt to escape from custody under Subsec. (b) and defendant's arguments that his conviction of robbery in the first degree under Subsec. (a) precludes a sentence enhancement under Subsec. (b) and that the legislature did not intend for more than one recidivist enhancement to apply to the conviction of multiple current charges because he was not afforded the opportunity to reform are without merit. 173 CA 119; judgment affirmed in part, see 330 C. 793.

Subsec. (a):

Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545. Cited. 193 C. 273. Nothing in statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326. Cited. Id., 475; 200 C. 350; Id., 453; 202 C. 509; 203 C. 81; 206 C. 621; 207 C. 276; 210 C. 573; 213 C. 97; 216 C. 220; 224 C. 445; 232 C. 455.

Cited. 17 CA 490; 19 CA 571; 29 CA 274; 37 CA 672; Id., 733; 39 CA 82; 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in Subsec. 51 CA 171.

Cited. 43 CS 77.

Subsec. (b):

Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under Subsec. 169 C. 263. Cited. 182 C. 176. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of statute not considered reversible error where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184 C. 215. Cited. Id., 369; 187 C. 264; 224 C. 397; 227 C. 711; Id., 751; 232 C. 455.

Cited. 9 CA 133; 10 CA 279; 12 CA 375; 13 CA 438; 20 CA 586; 31 CA 178; 34 CA 1; 35 CA 405; 37 CA 733; 39 CA 82; Id., 789; 45 CA 369.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 202 C. 369.

By pleading nolo contendere to charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal this issue. 4 CA 676. Cited. 14 CA 88; 21 CA 331; 37 CA 228. The word “and” in the exemption contained in subsection is used in a conjunctive manner. 168 CA 37.

Subsec. (d):

Language of section and its legislative purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent offender attaches. 240 C. 317.

Cited. 41 CA 391.

Subsec. (g) (former Subsec. (f)):

Cited. 169 C. 263; 187 C. 264; 200 C. 453; 207 C. 276. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive offense; Subsec. requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest; there is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of which defendant was convicted; nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254 C. 613.

Cited. 19 CA 571. Under plain and unambiguous language of Subsec., only class D felonies, which carry a lesser maximum punishment than unclassified felonies, are excluded as predicate felonies, the legislature having specifically chosen not to exclude unclassified felonies. 128 CA 765. When defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a sentence enhancement provision, defendant waives right to jury trial thereon, and no constitutional violation occurs where defendant's increased penalty allegedly results from trial court's, rather than jury's, consideration of factors other than defendant's previous convictions. 141 CA 814.

Subsec. (i) (former Subsec. (h)):

Under 2001 revision, section clearly reflected legislature's negative view of persistent dangerous felony offenders and the degree of punishment it wished to impose on them at the time defendant committed the offenses such that defendant was on fair notice that the substantive provision of section would apply even if certain procedural provisions were later found to be unconstitutional; text and legislative history of section indicate that the term “public interest”, as used in section, does not include the public interest in minimizing costs of incarceration. 303 C. 246.

Cited. 21 CA 331; 37 CA 228. Court followed 283 C. 748 in holding that jury and not the court must make finding of whether defendant's extended incarceration will best serve the public interest. 105 CA 278. Section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant or on its face. 121 CA 672.

Subsec. (k) (former Subsec. (j)):

Under 2007 revision, and following 283 C. 748, where defendant's guilty plea effectively waived his right to a jury finding that enhancement of his sentence as a persistent serious felony offender was in the public interest, defendant was not presumed to have waived a court finding on the public interest determination and the court was the proper entity to make such public interest determination. 143 CA 76. The applicable law for the purposes of sentencing the defendant was the law in effect at the time that the crimes were committed, which authorized the court to enhance the defendant's sentence under the public interest provision that was eliminated in 2008, since there was no language stating that the legislative amendment applied retroactively. 206 CA 209.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202a
Sec. 53-202a. Assault weapons: Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Assault weapon” means:

(A) (i) Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semiautomatic firearms: Algimec Agmi; Armalite AR-180; Australian Automatic Arms SAP Pistol; Auto-Ordnance Thompson type; Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type; Barrett Light-Fifty model 82A1; Beretta AR-70; Bushmaster Auto Rifle and Auto Pistol; Calico models M-900, M-950 and 100-P; Chartered Industries of Singapore SR-88; Colt AR-15 and Sporter; Daewoo K-1, K-2, Max-1 and Max-2; Encom MK-IV, MP-9 and MP-45; Fabrique Nationale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, or FN/FNC; FAMAS MAS 223; Feather AT-9 and Mini-AT; Federal XC-900 and XC-450; Franchi SPAS-12 and LAW-12; Galil AR and ARM; Goncz High-Tech Carbine and High-Tech Long Pistol; Heckler & Koch HK-91, HK-93, HK-94 and SP-89; Holmes MP-83; MAC-10, MAC-11 and MAC-11 Carbine type; Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion; Iver Johnson Enforcer model 3000; Ruger Mini-14/5F folding stock model only; Scarab Skorpion; SIG 57 AMT and 500 series; Spectre Auto Carbine and Auto Pistol; Springfield Armory BM59, SAR-48 and G-3; Sterling MK-6 and MK-7; Steyr AUG; Street Sweeper and Striker 12 revolving cylinder shotguns; USAS-12; UZI Carbine, Mini-Carbine and Pistol; Weaver Arms Nighthawk; Wilkinson “Linda” Pistol;

(ii) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(B) Any of the following specified semiautomatic centerfire rifles, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such rifles, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: (i) AK-47; (ii) AK-74; (iii) AKM; (iv) AKS-74U; (v) ARM; (vi) MAADI AK47; (vii) MAK90; (viii) MISR; (ix) NHM90 and NHM91; (x) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S and 86S; (xi) Poly Technologies AKS and AK47; (xii) SA 85; (xiii) SA 93; (xiv) VEPR; (xv) WASR-10; (xvi) WUM; (xvii) Rock River Arms LAR-47; (xviii) Vector Arms AK-47; (xix) AR-10; (xx) AR-15; (xxi) Bushmaster Carbon 15, Bushmaster XM15, Bushmaster ACR Rifles, Bushmaster MOE Rifles; (xxii) Colt Match Target Rifles; (xxiii) Armalite M15; (xxiv) Olympic Arms AR-15, A1, CAR, PCR, K3B, K30R, K16, K48, K8 and K9 Rifles; (xxv) DPMS Tactical Rifles; (xxvi) Smith and Wesson M&P15 Rifles; (xxvii) Rock River Arms LAR-15; (xxviii) Doublestar AR Rifles; (xxix) Barrett REC7; (xxx) Beretta Storm; (xxxi) Calico Liberty 50, 50 Tactical, 100, 100 Tactical, I, I Tactical, II and II Tactical Rifles; (xxxii) Hi-Point Carbine Rifles; (xxxiii) HK-PSG-1; (xxxiv) Kel-Tec Sub-2000, SU Rifles, and RFB; (xxxv) Remington Tactical Rifle Model 7615; (xxxvi) SAR-8, SAR-4800 and SR9; (xxxvii) SLG 95; (xxxviii) SLR 95 or 96; (xxxix) TNW M230 and M2HB; (xl) Vector Arms UZI; (xli) Galil and Galil Sporter; (xlii) Daewoo AR 100 and AR 110C; (xliii) Fabrique Nationale/FN 308 Match and L1A1 Sporter; (xliv) HK USC; (xlv) IZHMASH Saiga AK; (xlvi) SIG Sauer 551-A1, 556, 516, 716 and M400 Rifles; (xlvii) Valmet M62S, M71S and M78S; (xlviii) Wilkinson Arms Linda Carbine; and (xlix) Barrett M107A1;

(C) Any of the following specified semiautomatic pistols, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such pistols, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: (i) Centurion 39 AK; (ii) Draco AK-47; (iii) HCR AK-47; (iv) IO Inc. Hellpup AK-47; (v) Mini-Draco AK-47; (vi) Yugo Krebs Krink; (vii) American Spirit AR-15; (viii) Bushmaster Carbon 15; (ix) Doublestar Corporation AR; (x) DPMS AR-15; (xi) Olympic Arms AR-15; (xii) Rock River Arms LAR 15; (xiii) Calico Liberty III and III Tactical Pistols; (xiv) Masterpiece Arms MPA Pistols and Velocity Arms VMA Pistols; (xv) Intratec TEC-DC9 and AB-10; (xvi) Colefire Magnum; (xvii) German Sport 522 PK and Chiappa Firearms Mfour-22; (xviii) DSA SA58 PKP FAL; (xix) I.O. Inc. PPS-43C; (xx) Kel-Tec PLR-16 Pistol; (xxi) Sig Sauer P516 and P556 Pistols; and (xxii) Thompson TA5 Pistols;

(D) Any of the following semiautomatic shotguns, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such shotguns, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: All IZHMASH Saiga 12 Shotguns;

(E) Any semiautomatic firearm regardless of whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such firearm was produced, that meets the following criteria:

(i) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least one of the following:

(I) A folding or telescoping stock;

(II) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing;

(III) A forward pistol grip;

(IV) A flash suppressor; or

(V) A grenade launcher or flare launcher; or

(ii) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has a fixed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten rounds; or

(iii) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has an overall length of less than thirty inches; or

(iv) A semiautomatic pistol that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least one of the following:

(I) An ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip;

(II) A threaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor, forward pistol grip or silencer;

(III) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to fire the firearm without being burned, except a slide that encloses the barrel; or

(IV) A second hand grip; or

(v) A semiautomatic pistol with a fixed magazine that has the ability to accept more than ten rounds; or

(vi) A semiautomatic shotgun that has both of the following:

(I) A folding or telescoping stock; and

(II) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing; or

(vii) A semiautomatic shotgun that has the ability to accept a detachable magazine; or

(viii) A shotgun with a revolving cylinder; or

(ix) Any semiautomatic firearm that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013; or

(F) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, may be assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(G) Any semiautomatic firearm other than a pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun, regardless of whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such firearm was produced, that has at least one of the following:

(i) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing;

(ii) An ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip;

(iii) A fixed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten rounds;

(iv) A flash suppressor or silencer, or a threaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor or silencer;

(v) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to fire the firearm without being burned, except a slide that encloses the barrel;

(vi) A second hand grip; or

(vii) An arm brace or other stabilizing brace that could allow such firearm to be fired from the shoulder, with or without a strap designed to attach to an individual's arm;

(H) Any semiautomatic firearm that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013, that was legally manufactured prior to September 13, 1994; or

(I) A combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraph (G) or (H) of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraph (G) or (H) of this subdivision, may be assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(2) “Assault weapon” does not include (A) any firearm modified to render it permanently inoperable, or (B) a part or any combination of parts of an assault weapon, that are not assembled as an assault weapon, when in the possession of a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f , or a gunsmith who is in the licensed gun dealer's employ, for the purposes of servicing or repairing lawfully possessed assault weapons under sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive;

(3) “Action of the weapon” means the part of the firearm that loads, fires and ejects a cartridge, which part includes, but is not limited to, the upper and lower receiver, charging handle, forward assist, magazine release and shell deflector;

(4) “Detachable magazine” means an ammunition feeding device that can be removed without disassembling the firearm action;

(5) “Firearm” means a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3 ;

(6) “Forward pistol grip” means any feature capable of functioning as a grip that can be held by the nontrigger hand;

(7) “Lawfully possesses” means:

(A) With respect to an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of this section, (i) actual possession that is lawful under sections 53-202b to 53-202k , (ii) constructive possession pursuant to a lawful purchase transacted prior to or on April 4, 2013, regardless of whether the assault weapon was delivered to the purchaser prior to or on April 4, 2013, which lawful purchase is evidenced by a writing sufficient to indicate that (I) a contract for sale was made between the parties prior to or on April 4, 2013, for the purchase of the assault weapon, or (II) full or partial payment for the assault weapon was made by the purchaser to the seller of the assault weapon prior to or on April 4, 2013, or (iii) actual possession under subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, or constructive possession under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this subdivision, as evidenced by a written statement made under penalty of false statement on such form as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes; or

(B) With respect to a 2023 assault weapon, (i) actual possession that is lawful under sections 53-202b to 53-202k , inclusive, (ii) constructive possession pursuant to a lawful purchase transacted prior to June 6, 2023, regardless of whether such assault weapon was delivered to the purchaser prior to June 6, 2023, which lawful purchase is evidenced by a writing sufficient to indicate that (I) a contract for sale was made between the parties prior to June 6, 2023, for the purchase of such assault weapon, or (II) full or partial payment for such assault weapon was made by the purchaser to the seller of such assault weapon prior to June 6, 2023, or (iii) actual possession under subparagraph (B)(i) of this subdivision, or constructive possession under subparagraph (B)(ii) of this subdivision, as evidenced by a written statement made under penalty of false statement on such form as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes;

(8) “Pistol grip” means a grip or similar feature that can function as a grip for the trigger hand;

(9) “Second hand grip” means a grip or similar feature that can function as a grip that is additional to the trigger hand grip; and

(10) “2023 assault weapon” means an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (G) to (I), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of this section.

Cited. 234 C. 455; 242 C. 143.

Defendant's conviction under Sec. 53-202c did not violate his due process rights because, as a matter of law, a Maadi MISR is an “assault weapon” as defined in section; defendant's due process rights were not violated by trial court's not concluding section is vague as applied to circumstances of his case. 93 CA 129.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-341 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-341
Sec. 53-341. Use of words “physician”, “surgeon”, “medical doctor”, “osteopath” or “doctor”, or initials “M.D.”, “D.O.” or “Dr.”. Exceptions. Penalties.
Status: in_force

(b) A person who holds the degree of doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathy, but who is not licensed to practice medicine under the provisions of chapter 370, may use the initials “M.D.” or “D.O.” provided such initials are not used with the intent to represent, or in a manner that is likely to induce the belief that, the person (1) practices medicine within the state, (2) is licensed to practice medicine within the state, or (3) may diagnose or treat any injury, deformity, ailment or disease, actual or imaginary, of another person for compensation, gain or reward.

(c) Any person who violates the provisions of this section or section 20-9 , 20-12d or 20-12n shall be guilty of a class D felony. For the purposes of this section, each instance of patient contact or consultation that is in violation of chapter 370 shall constitute a separate offense. Failure to renew a license in a timely manner shall not constitute a violation of this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-392 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949a / Section 53-392
Sec. 53-392. Participation or conspiracy in use of extortionate means. Evidence.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution under this section, for the purpose of showing an implicit threat as a means of collection, evidence may be introduced tending to show that one or more extensions of credit by the creditor were, to the knowledge of the person against whom the implicit threat was alleged to have been made, collected or attempted to be collected by extortionate means or that the nonrepayment thereof was punished by extortionate means.

(c) In any prosecution under this section, if evidence has been introduced tending to show the existence, at the time the extension of credit was made, of the circumstances described in subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2) of section 53-390 , and direct evidence of the actual belief of the debtor as to the creditor's collection practices is not available, then, for the purpose of showing that words or other means of communication, shown to have been employed as a means of collection, in fact carried an express or implicit threat, the court may in its discretion allow evidence to be introduced tending to show the reputation of the defendant in any community of which the person against whom the alleged threat was made was a member at the time of the collection or attempt at collection.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-140 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-140
Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Forgery in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

Cited. 194 C. 233; 204 C. 441; 207 C. 109; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 8 CA 342; 11 CA 161; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 37 CA 72; Id., 437; 42 CA 790; 47 CA 1.

Subsec. (a):

The fact that insurer did not rely on the forged document had no bearing on question of whether defendant's conduct was sufficient for a conviction under Subsec. 119 CA 581.

Cited. 34 CS 606; Id., 656.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-39a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 939 / Section 53-39a
Sec. 53-39a. Indemnification of law enforcement unit members, certain special police and inspectors in the Division of Criminal Justice.
Status: in_force

Indemnification for attorney's fees sustained “as a result of such prosecution” does not authorize recovery of such fees sustained as a result of separate action to enforce right to indemnification under section. 186 C. 623. Court will not interpret section “to encompass indemnity for any and all criminal prosecutions of police officers for sexual assault”. 206 C. 100. Cited. 229 C. 479; 234 C. 539. Court concluded that entry of a nolle plus the passage of 13 months, which results in automatic erasure of relevant records under Sec. 54-142a, constitutes a dismissal for purposes of this section. 240 C. 590. Section waives state's sovereign immunity from suit. 258 C. 680. Although section waives immunity from liability, it does not waive immunity from suit. 263 C. 74. Police officer was entitled to recover losses from the date of the incident that led to the police investigation; employer's prearrest liability attaches only when there is a clear nexus between the economic losses and the prosecution, and section only provides for indemnification for such prearrest economic losses that are incurred by a police officer as a result of, or in anticipation of, an unwarranted police investigation or criminal prosecution that actually occurs, or that are precipitated by employer's adverse action against the officer that was taken in response to that employer's discovery of a police investigation or criminal prosecution; “economic loss” includes lost leave time attributable to a criminal prosecution. 300 C. 708. Plaintiff not required to exhaust administrative remedies under collective bargaining agreement prior to seeking indemnification; plaintiff entitled to recover for lost wages and lost employment benefits that have clear nexus to criminal prosecution; plaintiff entitled to recover economic loss during suspension resulting from defendant's administrative proceedings since suspension was because of defendant's arrest. 303 C. 1. Legislature has acquiesced in the courts' use of workers' compensation principles for interpreting the meaning of the phrase “in the course of his duty” in section. 326 C. 708. Legislature did not intend to include members of a university's special police force within the definition of “local police department”. 336 C. 420.

Cited. 25 CA 599; 40 CA 705; judgment reversed, see 240 C. 590. In applying 3-part test set forth in 25 CA 599 to determine whether conduct will be found to have occurred “in the course of his duty”, court found that since the charged crimes filed by the state against plaintiff police officer alleged that he was an active participant in an illegal drug trafficking enterprise, such illegal activities cannot be said to be fulfilling duties of a police officer or something incidental to it and are incompatible with duties of a police officer; plaintiff failed to satisfy burden of proving that he was entitled to economic indemnification under statute and court properly rendered judgment in favor of the city. 94 CA 445. Review of text of section and its relationship to other statutes does not provide a reasonable basis to conclude that a claim of indemnification by a member of a university's special police force falls within the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity provided under section. 189 CA 540; judgment affirmed, see 336 C. 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-165aa — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-165aa
Sec. 53a-165aa. Hindering prosecution in the first degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202x — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202x
Sec. 53-202x. Declaration of possession of large capacity magazine. Regulations.
Status: in_force

(2) Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, any person who lawfully possessed a large capacity magazine prior to January 1, 2014, and had not yet declared possession of such magazine as of July 1, 2023, shall apply by January 1, 2024, to declare possession of such magazine. Such application shall be made on such form or in such manner as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes. Truthful information included on a timely registration application for a large capacity magazine pursuant to this subdivision shall not be used against the defendant in any criminal prosecution for possession of such large capacity magazine.

(3) No person who lawfully possesses a large capacity magazine pursuant to subdivision (1), (2), (4) or (5) of subsection (d) of section 53-202w shall be required to declare possession of a large capacity magazine pursuant to this section with respect to a large capacity magazine used for official duties, except that any such person who retires or is otherwise separated from service who possesses a large capacity magazine that was purchased or obtained by such person for official use before such person retired or separated from service shall declare possession of the large capacity magazine within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection. No person that lawfully possesses a large capacity magazine pursuant to subdivision (6) of subsection (d) of section 53-202w shall be required to declare possession of such large capacity magazine.

(b) In addition to the application form prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the department shall design or amend the application forms for a certificate of possession for an assault weapon under section 53-202d or for a permit to carry a pistol or revolver under section 29-28a , a long gun eligibility certificate under section 29-37p , an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver under section 29-36f or any renewal of such permit or certificate to permit an applicant to declare possession of a large capacity magazine pursuant to this section upon the same application.

(c) The department may adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish procedures with respect to applications under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210 and 1-211 , the name and address of a person who has declared possession of a large capacity magazine shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed, except such records may be disclosed to (1) law enforcement agencies and employees of the United States Probation Office acting in the performance of their duties and parole officers within the Department of Correction acting in the performance of their duties, and (2) the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services to carry out the provisions of subsection (c) of section 17a-500 .

(d) Any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of a large capacity magazine shall, within ninety days, either render the large capacity magazine permanently inoperable, sell the large capacity magazine to a licensed gun dealer or remove the large capacity magazine from this state, except that any person who is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, is in lawful possession of a large capacity magazine and has been transferred into the state after January 1, 2024, may, within ninety days of arriving in the state, apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection to declare possession of such large capacity magazine.

(e) (1) If an owner of a large capacity magazine transfers the large capacity magazine to a licensed gun dealer, such dealer shall, at the time of delivery of the large capacity magazine, execute a certificate of transfer. For any transfer prior to January 1, 2014, or on or after July 1, 2023, and prior to January 1, 2024, the dealer shall provide to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection monthly reports, on such form as the commissioner prescribes, regarding the number of transfers that the dealer has accepted. For any transfer prior to July 1, 2023, and on or after January 1, 2014, or on or after January 1, 2024, the dealer shall cause the certificate of transfer to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. The certificate of transfer shall contain: (A) The date of sale or transfer; (B) the name and address of the seller or transferor and the licensed gun dealer, and their Social Security numbers or motor vehicle operator license numbers, if applicable; (C) the licensed gun dealer's federal firearms license number; and (D) a description of the large capacity magazine.

(2) The licensed gun dealer shall present such dealer's federal firearms license and seller's permit to the seller or transferor for inspection at the time of purchase or transfer.

(3) The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall maintain a file of all certificates of transfer at the commissioner's central office.

(f) Any person who declared possession of a large capacity magazine under this section may possess the large capacity magazine only under the following conditions:

(1) At that person's residence;

(2) At that person's place of business or other property owned by that person, provided such large capacity magazine contains not more than ten bullets;

(3) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets;

(4) While on a target range which holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range;

(5) While on the premises of a licensed shooting club;

(6) While transporting the large capacity magazine between any of the places set forth in this subsection, or to any licensed gun dealer, provided (A) such large capacity magazine contains not more than ten bullets, and (B) the large capacity magazine is transported in the manner required for an assault weapon under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-202f ; or

(7) Pursuant to a valid permit to carry a pistol or revolver, provided such large capacity magazine (A) is within a pistol or revolver that was lawfully possessed by the person prior to April 5, 2013, (B) does not extend more than one inch below the bottom of the pistol grip, and (C) contains not more than ten bullets.

(g) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (f) of this section shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-206d — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-206d
Sec. 53-206d. Carrying a firearm or hunting while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug prohibited.
Status: in_force

(2) Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

(b) (1) No person shall engage in hunting while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both. A person shall be deemed under the influence when at the time of the alleged offense the person (A) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, or (B) has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this subdivision, “elevated blood alcohol content” means (i) a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, or (ii) if such person is under twenty-one years of age, a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is two-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.

(2) Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(3) Enforcement officers of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection are empowered to arrest for a violation of the provisions of this subsection.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167f — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-167f
Sec. 53a-167f. Abuse of an oath document: Class D Felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Abuse of an oath document is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-117 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-117
Sec. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 184 C. 157; 190 C. 428; 194 C. 347; 221 C. 788; 227 C. 153; 229 C. 285; 236 C. 31.

Cited. 1 CA 647; 6 CA 334; 7 CA 75; 9 CA 59; 13 CA 214; 14 CA 526; Id., 804; 17 CA 326; 18 CA 303; 24 CA 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 733; 38 CA 225.

Cited. 35 CS 587; Id., 675; 36 CS 89; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 665; 39 CS 504.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-341b — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-341b
Sec. 53-341b. Sale or delivery of body armor restricted.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the sale or delivery of body armor to (1) a sworn member or authorized official of an organized local police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Correction, the Board of Pardons and Paroles or the Department of Motor Vehicles, (2) an authorized official of a municipality or the Department of Administrative Services that purchases body armor on behalf of an organized local police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Correction, the Board of Pardons and Paroles or the Department of Motor Vehicles, (3) a judicial marshal or probation officer or an authorized official of the Judicial Branch who purchases body armor on behalf of a probation officer or a judicial marshal, (4) a member of the National Guard or the armed forces reserve, (5) a federal firearms licensee, or (6) an employee of an emergency medical service organization, as defined in section 53a-3 .

(c) As used in this section, “body armor” means any item designed to provide bullet penetration resistance and to be worn on or under clothing on the body, like a vest or other article of clothing.

(d) Any person, firm or corporation that violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

See Sec. 53a-217d re criminal possession of body armor as a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-192a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-192a
Sec. 53a-192a. Trafficking in persons: Class A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) It shall be an affirmative defense in any prosecution or delinquency proceeding under this section that the defendant was under eighteen years of age and his or her participation in the offense was a result of having been a victim of conduct of another person that constitutes trafficking in persons in violation of subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Trafficking in persons is a class A felony.

See Sec. 52-571i re action for damages for violation of this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-206g — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-206g
Sec. 53-206g. Sale, possession, use or manufacture of bump stocks or other rates of fire enhancement prohibited. Class D felony or Class D misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(c) For purposes of this section, “firearm” means firearm as defined in section 53a-3 , and “rate of fire enhancement” means any device, component, part, combination of parts, attachment or accessory that: (1) Uses energy from the recoil of a firearm to generate a reciprocating action that causes repeated function of the trigger, including, but not limited to, a bump stock; (2) repeatedly pulls the trigger of a firearm through the use of a crank, lever or other part, including, but not limited to, a trigger crank; or (3) causes a semiautomatic firearm to fire more than one round per operation of the trigger, where the trigger pull and reset constitute a single operation of the trigger, including, but not limited to, a binary trigger system.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, any person who holds a valid permit to carry a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to subsection (b) of section 29-28 , a valid eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver issued pursuant to section 29-36f , a valid long gun eligibility certificate issued pursuant to section 29-37p or an ammunition certificate issued or renewed pursuant to section 29-38n or section 29-38o and possesses a rate of fire enhancement prior to July 1, 2019, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor for a first offense and shall be guilty of a class D felony for any subsequent offense.

(e) (1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of a rate of fire enhancement shall, within ninety days, render the rate of fire enhancement permanently inoperable, remove the rate of fire enhancement from this state, or surrender the rate of fire enhancement to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for destruction and, during such ninety-day period, shall not be subject to the penalties in subsection (b) or (d) of this section.

(B) Any such person who sells or offers to sell or otherwise transfers or offers to transfer, except as permitted by subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, or uses such rate of fire enhancement during such ninety-day period, shall be subject to the penalties in subsection (b) or (d) of this section, as applicable.

(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, any military personnel stationed or otherwise residing in this state who is deployed from this state on October 1, 2018, or is under deployment from this state on said date, and who was in lawful possession of a rate of firearm enhancement on September 30, 2018, shall, within ninety days of returning to this state from deployment, render the rate of fire enhancement permanently inoperable, remove the rate of fire enhancement from this state or surrender the rate of fire enhancement to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for destruction.

(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, any such military personnel who sells or offers to sell or otherwise transfers or offers to transfer, except as permitted by subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, or uses such rate of fire enhancement during such ninety-day period, shall be subject to the penalties in subsection (b) or (d) of this section, as applicable.

(f) If the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, it may order suspension of prosecution in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) of section 29-33 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-118
Sec. 53a-118. Definitions generally.
Status: in_force

(b) A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.

(c) A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.

(d) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.

Cited. 201 C. 489; 233 C. 552.

Cited. 19 CA 695; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 369; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 32 CS 650.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 186 C. 555; 196 C. 225; 212 C. 31; 223 C. 243; 242 C. 666. Word “appropriate” as defined in Subdiv. (4) is not used in its ordinary sense. 255 C. 746.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 11 CA 684; 14 CA 272; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 566; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 6; 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (5): In circumstance where owner of motor vehicle took such vehicle from bailee, the bailee had a right of possession superior to that of owner and thus, for purposes of larceny statutes, bailee was the “owner” and owner of motor vehicle was the “taker”. 59 CA 135.

Cited. 35 CS 536. Subdiv. (1): Applicability of a penal code definition to the products liability statute may be inapposite. 40 CS 120.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-92 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-92
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

Cited. 173 C. 165; 197 C. 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 225 C. 347; 227 C. 677; 235 C. 711; 236 C. 112. Court's failure to instruct jury in accordance with 287 C. 509 was harmless because restraint of victim was not incidental to additional offenses. 293 C. 435.

Cited. 8 CA 177; 24 CA 13; 39 CA 632; 46 CA 691; Id., 741.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165. Cited. 185 C. 339; 189 C. 346; 194 C. 114; Id., 692; 198 C. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 1; Id., 240; Id., 714; 205 C. 132; Id., 673; 206 C. 40; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 210 C. 110; Id., 199; Id., 315; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 388; Id., 422; 214 C. 38; Id., 89; 215 C. 173; Id., 716; 216 C. 647; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 93; Id., 160; Id., 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 270; Id., 345; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 1; Id., 153; 228 C. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 C. 195; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284. Cited. Id., 694; 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235; 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 740. Legislature intended to exclude from scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608. Holding in 287 C. 509 that to commit a kidnapping, defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime, applies retroactively to petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenges his kidnapping conviction. 299 C. 740. Where defendant was also charged with robbery and there was no evidence that victim was bound or moved physically, and victim was restrained for five minutes and released immediately after robbery was complete, the restraint alone cannot support kidnapping charge. 301 C. 77. Subdiv. (2)(A): Subpara. not unconstitutionally vague since defendant had fair warning when he committed sexual assault in 1988 that his movement of victim could support an independent kidnapping conviction. 306 C. 718. Retroactive relief is available, as long as the evidence warrants such relief, for all collateral attacks on judgments rendered final prior to the holding in 287 C. 509, irrespective of whether the kidnapping instruction was challenged in the criminal proceeding, and such challenges are not subject to the procedural default rule; omission of a Salamon instruction not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 321 C. 56. Subdiv. (2)(B): Clarifying “merely incidental to and necessary for” language used in holding in State v. Salamon , 287 C. 509, and cited in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction , 321 C. 56. 339 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 428; 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457; 34 CA 276; 36 CA 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718; Id., 774; 37 CA 360; Id., 464; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155. Kidnapping conviction reversed and matter remanded so jury could be instructed re holdings in 287 C. 509 and 288 C. 418 that it could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping unless he intended to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the underlying crime. 115 CA 166. Subdiv. (2)(A): When assessing whether a kidnapping charge is merely incidental to and necessary for another crime, trial court must make a specific factual finding whether defendant intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than what was necessary to commit the other crime; where defendant is charged with kidnapping pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(A), and no evidence is presented at trial re defendant's intention to inflict physical injury subsequent to related sexual assault, court's analysis of the kidnapping charge is limited to defendant's conduct up to the completion of the sexual assault. 118 CA 140. Subdiv. (2)(A) is a lesser offense included within the kidnapping charge of Subdiv. (2)(B) and thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted double jeopardy. Id., 831. Subdiv. (2): 287 C. 509 does not control burglary and larceny case because restraint of victim was not necessary to accomplish those crimes and restraint occurred after defendant took jewelry. 127 CA 181. Subdivs. (2)(A) and (2)(B) are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 180 CA 371; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54. Subdiv. (2)(B): In order to prevail on habeas claim that the absence of a Salamon instruction did not constitute harmless error, petitioner is not required to establish that there was insufficient evidence to convict him or that a properly instructed jury likely would find him guilty; commissioner bears burden of demonstrating that the omission of a Salamon instruction on incidental restraint did not contribute to the verdict; test to be applied by appellate court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would reach a different result. 184 CA 101; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 1.

Cited. 43 CS 46.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-38 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-38
Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment.
Status: in_force

(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.

(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.

(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.

Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124. Cited. 230 C. 17.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 33 CA 205; 45 CA 566.

Cited. 40 CS 354.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 209 C. 23; 217 C. 568; 228 C. 384. Where habeas corpus petitioner was convicted and sentenced on separate charges in April and September of same year, and the September sentence was to run concurrent to the April sentence, petitioner's September sentence began to run in September, because that is when he was “received in the custody to which he was sentenced”. 274 C. 563.

Cited. 34 CA 503.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 202 C. 343; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 220. Fundamental purpose is to afford inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility. 258 C. 394.

Cited. 30 CA 190; 39 CA 455. Proper method for calculating terms of imprisonment discussed. 90 CA 460.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-224 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-224
Sec. 53a-224. Recruiting a member of a criminal gang: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) A person is guilty of recruiting a member of a criminal gang when, with knowledge that membership or continued membership in such criminal gang is conditioned upon the commission of a criminal act, or with intent to facilitate the criminal acts of such criminal gang, such person knowingly causes, encourages, solicits, recruits, intimidates or coerces a person under eighteen years of age to join, participate in or remain a member of such criminal gang.

(c) Recruiting a member of a criminal gang is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-102 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-102
Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.

Cited. 161 C. 283; 169 C. 263; Id., 556; 175 C. 315; 184 C. 258. Instruction characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542. Cited. Id., 715; 190 C. 496; 195 C. 611; 197 C. 574; 198 C. 671; 204 C. 1; 205 C. 456; 215 C. 257; 216 C. 273; 220 C. 417; 229 C. 285; 232 C. 455; 242 C. 523; Id., 689.

Cited. 5 CA 113; 6 CA 24; 9 CA 133; Id., 349; Id., 656; 11 CA 575; 13 CA 413; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 34; 16 CA 333; 19 CA 396; 20 CA 369; Id., 586; 23 CA 201; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 31 CA 94; Id., 370; 34 CA 599; 35 CA 714; 38 CA 20; Id., 231; Id., 531; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 169; Id., 255. The crime proscribed by section is complete once there has been an unlawful entering or remaining in a dwelling, at night, with intent to commit a crime in that dwelling. 76 CA 779.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 181 C. 172; 182 C. 207; 189 C. 631; 190 C. 440; 199 C. 88; 200 C. 523; 202 C. 676; 204 C. 377; 214 C. 493; 216 C. 699; 220 C. 400; 223 C. 635; 241 C. 784.

Cited. 1 CA 260; 6 CA 697; 14 CA 710; 21 CA 260; 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 24 CA 502; 30 CA 606; 35 CA 262; 36 CA 774; 38 CA 643; 42 CA 78. Defendant's right to fair trial and unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that the jury had to find each element of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both alternate theories of liability. 59 CA 305. Jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of remaining unlawfully in victim's bedroom because whatever possible license defendant thought he had to enter bedroom, that license was withdrawn when he refused to identify himself, charged at victim, lay on top of her and attempted to kiss and touch her all over her body. 93 CA 205.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-173 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-173
Sec. 53a-173. Failure to appear in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Failure to appear in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

See Sec. 54-2e re issuance of rearrest warrant or capias for failure to appear.

Cited. 227 C. 829; 234 C. 301.

Cited. 6 CA 247; 8 CA 542; 11 CA 644; 13 CA 638; 17 CA 226; 20 CA 811; 38 CA 85; 43 CA 142; 45 CA 722. Pursuant to section, to support a conviction for failure to appear, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant received and deliberately ignored a notice to appear or that he intentionally embarked on a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving such notice. 61 CA 118.

Cited. 35 CS 587.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-143 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-143
Sec. 53a-143. Unlawfully using slugs: Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Coin machine” means a coin box, turnstile, vending machine or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle designed (A) to receive a coin or bill or token made for the purpose, and (B) in return for the insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to offer, to provide, to assist in providing or to permit the acquisition of some property or some service.

(2) “Slug” means an object or article which, by virtue of its size, shape or any other quality, is capable of being inserted or deposited in a coin machine as an improper substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token.

(3) “Value” of a slug means the value of the coin, bill or token for which it is capable of being substituted.

Cited. 11 CA 161.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-138 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-138
Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 37 CA 72; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 34 CS 606.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-278c — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-278c
Sec. 53-278c. Seizure of gambling devices. Penalties for possession, sale, etc., of gambling devices or records. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(b) No property right in any such gambling device shall exist or be recognized in any person, except the possessory right of officers enforcing sections 53-278a to 53-278g , inclusive.

(c) All furnishings, fixtures, equipment and stock, including without limitation furnishings and fixtures adaptable to nongambling uses and equipment and stock for printing, recording, computing, transporting, safekeeping or, except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of section 53-278d , communication, used in connection with professional gambling or maintaining a gambling premise, and all money or other things of value at stake or displayed in or in connection with professional gambling or any gambling device, shall be subject to seizure, immediately upon detection, by any peace officer, and shall, unless good cause is shown to the contrary by the owner, be ordered by the court to be destroyed or disposed of to a charitable or educational institution or to a governmental agency or institution, provided, if such property is money or valuable prize, it shall become the property of the state; except any such property which at the time of such order is subject to a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest shall remain subject to such mortgage, assignment, lien or security interest. The court may also order that such property be sold by sale at public auction, in which case the proceeds shall become the property of the state; provided any person who has a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest shall have the same right to the proceeds as he had in the property prior to sale. The provisions of section 54-33g shall not be applicable to proceedings under this section.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, any person who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs or transports any gambling device, or offers or solicits any interest therein, except in connection with a permit under sections 7-169 to 7-186 , inclusive, whether through an agent or employee or otherwise shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Subsection (b) of this section shall have no application in the enforcement of this subsection.

(e) Any firm or corporation may engage in the business of manufacturing gambling devices for use outside of the state, provided such firm or corporation has obtained approval for the manufacture and transportation of such devices from the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. The commissioner shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 to implement the provisions of this subsection.

(f) Any person who knowingly prints, makes, possesses, stores or transports any gambling record, or buys, sells, offers or solicits any interest therein, whether through an agent or employee or otherwise, shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and in the enforcement of this subsection direct possession of any gambling record shall be presumed to be knowing possession thereof.

Cited. 196 C. 471.

Cited. 8 CA 673.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-40e
Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal protective orders.
Status: in_force

(b) Such standing criminal protective order may include, but need not be limited to, provisions enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim. If the victim is enrolled in a public or private elementary or secondary school, including a technical high school, or an institution of higher education, as defined in section 10a-55 , the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such standing criminal protective order, or the information contained in any such order, to such school or institution of higher education, the president of any institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled and the special police force established pursuant to section 10a-142 , if any, at the institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled, if the victim provides the clerk with the name and address of such school or institution of higher education.

(c) (1) Such standing criminal protective order shall include the following notice: “In accordance with section 53a-223a of the Connecticut general statutes, violation of this order shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.”.

(2) Upon issuance of a standing criminal protective order under subsection (a) of this section, each victim protected by such order shall be given a notice that contains the following language: “If a standing criminal protective order has been issued on your behalf or on behalf of your child, you may elect to give testimony or appear in a family court proceeding remotely, pursuant to section 46b-15c . Please notify the court in writing at least two days in advance of a proceeding if you choose to give testimony or appear remotely, and your physical presence in the courthouse will not be required in order to participate in the court proceeding.”.

(d) For the purposes of this section and any other provision of the general statutes, “standing criminal protective order” means (1) a standing criminal restraining order issued prior to October 1, 2010, or (2) a standing criminal protective order issued on or after October 1, 2010.

See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.

Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of statute. 81 CA 84.

Subsec. (a):

Subsec. clearly articulates the discretionary standard for trial courts when imposing standing criminal protective orders; there is nothing in the Subsec. that suggests that a trial court's authority to issue a standing criminal protective order has a temporal element to it or is limited to when there is a change in circumstances. 221 CA 164.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-282 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-282
Sec. 53a-282. Money laundering. Presumptions.
Status: in_force

(b) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing or believing that such instrument or instruments, or the instrument or instruments or equivalent property exchanged for such criminally derived instruments, bear fictitious names, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments derived from criminal activity are in fact so derived.

(c) A person who fails to record or report a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, in circumstances under which such recording or reporting is either required by law or is in the ordinary course of business, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments are derived from criminal activity.

(d) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing that the physical condition or form of the monetary instrument or instruments makes it apparent that they are not the product of bona fide business or financial transactions, is presumed to know that they are derived from criminal activity.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-320 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-320
Sec. 53a-320. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Person” means any natural person, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, unincorporated business or other business entity;

(2) “Elderly person” means any person who is sixty years of age or older;

(3) “Blind person” means any person who is blind, as defined in section 1-1f ;

(4) “Disabled person” means any person who is physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f ;

(5) “Person with intellectual disability” means any person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g ;

(6) “Abuse” means any repeated act or omission that causes physical injury or serious physical injury to an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability, except when (A) the act or omission is a part of the treatment and care, and in furtherance of the health and safety, of the elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability, or (B) the act or omission is based upon the instructions, wishes, consent, refusal to consent or revocation of consent of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability, or the legal representative of an incapable elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability. For purposes of this subdivision, “repeated” means an act or omission that occurs on two or more occasions;

(7) “Intentionally” means “intentionally” as defined in subdivision (11) of section 53a-3 ;

(8) “Knowingly” means “knowingly” as defined in subdivision (12) of section 53a-3 ;

(9) “Recklessly” means “recklessly” as defined in subdivision (13) of section 53a-3 ;

(10) “Physical injury” means “physical injury” as defined in subdivision (3) of section 53a-3 ; and

(11) “Serious physical injury” means “serious physical injury” as defined in subdivision (4) of section 53a-3 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-106 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-106
Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 181 C. 172; 182 C. 242; Id., 366.

Cited. 5 CA 599; 6 CA 24; 11 CA 805; 28 CA 369; 35 CA 714; 37 CA 228.

Cited. 33 CS 706.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-183c
Sec. 53a-183c. Disruption of a funeral: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(1) “Funeral” means any ceremony or memorial service held in connection with the burial or cremation of an individual; and

(2) “Boundary of the location”, with respect to a funeral, means (A) in the case of a funeral that is held at a cemetery, the property line of the cemetery; (B) in the case of a funeral that is held at a mortuary, the property line of the mortuary; (C) in the case of a funeral that is held at a house of worship, the property line of the house of worship; and (D) in the case of a funeral that is held at any other type of location, the reasonable property line of that location.

(b) With respect to any funeral, no individual may engage in an activity during the period beginning sixty minutes before and ending sixty minutes after such funeral, any part of which activity:

(1) (A) Takes place within the boundaries of the location of such funeral or takes place within one hundred fifty feet of the point of the intersection between (i) the boundary of the location of such funeral; and (ii) a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from the location of such funeral; and (B) includes the individual wilfully making or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that is not part of such funeral and that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such funeral with the intent of disturbing the peace or good order of that funeral; or

(2) (A) Is within three hundred feet of the boundary of the location of such funeral; and (B) includes the individual wilfully and without proper authorization impeding the ingress to or egress from such location with the intent to impede the ingress to or egress from such location.

(c) Any individual who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-153 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 942 / Section 53-153
Sec. 53-153. Unlawful removal or alteration of records. Counterfeiting seals.
Status: in_force

Section held to give a civil remedy to party injured by unlawful alteration of records. 28 C. 210. Alteration does not include making of false entries in document. 159 C. 544. Cited. 165 C. 507; 221 C. 910; 222 C. 539.

Cited. 8 CA 351; 26 CA 286.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-60b
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
Status: in_force

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123 (a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree upon the same incident of assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all such offenses upon the same information.

(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with intellectual disability, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person with intellectual disability.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

Cited. 180 C. 557; 199 C. 146; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 223 C. 243; 230 C. 400. Subsec. (a)(1): Subdiv. is unconstitutionally overinclusive because it can be applied to assaults that have no reasonable and substantial relation to the statute's purpose of protecting those who have a diminished capacity to defend themselves or who are particularly vulnerable to injury, but Subdiv. can be constitutionally applied to an assault on a person with a physical disability that (1) diminishes the ability of the person, or a part or organ of the person, to function properly, thereby limiting the person's ability to perform life's activities, and (2) diminishes the person's ability to defend himself from assault or renders him particularly vulnerable to injury. 340 C. 463.

Cited. 5 CA 594; 13 CA 133; Id., 420; 33 CA 616; 44 CA 307.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-73b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-73b
Sec. 53a-73b. Sexual assault of an animal: Class A misdemeanor. Additional sentence.
Status: in_force

(b) Sexual assault of an animal is a class A misdemeanor.

(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, at the time of a person's sentencing for a conviction under this section, the court shall order that, for the five-year period commencing from the date of such conviction or the date of such person's release from imprisonment for such conviction, whichever is later, such person (1) shall not harbor, own, possess, reside with, adopt or serve as a foster placement for any animal, and (2) shall not be employed by, or volunteer for, any entity in any position that involves care for, or regular contact with, any animal.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-169 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-169
Sec. 53a-169. Escape in the first degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Escape in the first degree is a class C felony.

See Sec. 18-101a re consideration of prisoner's failure to return from furlough as crime of escape.

Illegal confinement is no defense to escape from correctional institution. 169 C. 438. Cited. 184 C. 157. Held constitutional as to both due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. Id., 222. Defendant's acts did not constitute violation of statute as it was amended as of date of acts as he was not then under jurisdiction of Commissioner of Correction. 185 C. 517. Cited. 216 C. 402; 226 C. 497; 234 C. 301.

Cited. 36 CA 440; 39 CA 333; Id., 407; Id., 789.

Cited. 35 CS 544.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 213 C. 38. Subdiv. (2): Proof of single failure to report insufficient to prove guilt of “escape”. 216 C. 402. Subdiv. (2): Decision of Appellate Court in 35 CA 1 overruled to the extent that it permits conviction for escape to rest solely on jury's finding that defendant repeatedly did not report to supervising officer as scheduled. 234 C. 301. Cited. 235 C. 748; 236 C. 209; Id., 266; 241 C. 322.

Cited. 29 CA 817; 35 CA 1; 36 CA 680; Id., 813, 815. Subdiv. (2) simply identifies another environment–a community residence–from which an unauthorized departure, or to which a failure to return, is possible and made culpable; escape is a general intent crime, and all that is necessary to prove the element of intent is that defendant have the general intent to perform the acts that constitute the offense. 121 CA 443.

Subdiv. (3): Equating failure to return from parole with escape held not violative of constitutional right to due process and equal protection. 36 CS 71.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196j — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-196j
Sec. 53a-196j. Harmful communication with a minor: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(1) “Minor” means any person under eighteen years of age, or who the actor reasonably believes to be under eighteen years of age;

(2) “Interactive computer service” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-90a ;

(3) “Inappropriate relationship” means a relationship that is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is a suitable relationship between an adult and a minor; and

(4) “Harmful to the minor” means communication with a minor that is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is a suitable form of communication between an adult and a minor.

(b) A person, who is twenty-five years of age or older, is guilty of harmful communication with a minor when such person uses an interactive computer service or text message to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce a minor to: (1) Share a photographic or other recorded image of the minor for the purpose of providing sexual gratification to the person who requests that the image be shared, (2) share a photographic or other recorded image of the minor, which the person who requests the image then disseminates to one or more third persons for the purpose of providing sexual gratification to such third persons, (3) engage in any communication that is part of a pattern of communication or behavior designed to form or maintain an inappropriate relationship, or (4) engage in any communication that is harmful to the minor.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a violation may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Harmful communication with a minor is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-51 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-51
Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy.
Status: in_force

Cited. 182 C. 595; 184 C. 369; 195 C. 183; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 630; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 708; 235 C. 502. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.

Cited. 8 CA 545; 10 CA 447; 21 CA 299; 22 CA 567; 29 CA 843; 33 CA 253; 36 CA 190. Legislature clearly intended attempt and conspiracy to commit a class B felony to be punished the same as a class B felony or it would have noted otherwise, as it did with class A felonies. 118 CA 35.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-22 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 939 / Section 53-22
Sec. 53-22. Psychiatric examinations.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 17a-566 re examination of certain convicted persons.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-119c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-119c
Sec. 53a-119c. Larceny of a motor vehicle: Class E felony, first offense; class D felony, second offense; class B felony, subsequent offense.
Status: in_force

(b) For purposes of this section, “motor vehicle” means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any of the above. In any prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence that (A) the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) such person possesses such motor vehicle with larcenous intent.

(c) Larceny of a motor vehicle is (1) a class E felony for a first offense, (2) a class D felony for a second offense, and (3) a class B felony for any subsequent offense.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-13 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-13
Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination thereof, unless such drug was prescribed for the defendant by a prescribing practitioner, as defined in section 20-571 , and was used in accordance with the directions of such prescription.

(2) No defendant may claim as a defense under this section that such mental disease or defect was based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

(c) As used in this section, (1) the terms mental disease or defect do not include (A) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, or (B) pathological or compulsive gambling, and (2) “gender identity or expression” means gender identity or expression, as defined in section 53a-181i .

See Sec. 54-89a re court instructions to jury.

Cited. 169 C. 13. Trial court did not err in concluding that the evidence was inadequate to raise the reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity necessary to warrant submitting the issue to the jury. 173 C. 35. Once substantial evidence tending to prove insanity is introduced, the presumption that defendant was sane loses all operative effect. Id., 140. Whether defendant has put his sanity in issue is a question of law, and once the sanity of defendant has become an issue, the state has the burden of proving defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt. 175 C. 204. Cited. 176 C. 224. State's affirmative evidence was sufficient to support conclusion that the state had established sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 178 C. 480. Contains only standard to determine insanity; previously accepted common law definitions and the “Durham” rule included in court instructions constituted harmful error. Id., 626. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 182 C. 142; Id., 603; 185 C. 402; 187 C. 73; Id., 199; 189 C. 360; 191 C. 73; Id., 636; 192 C. 571; 193 C. 70; Id., 474; 196 C. 430; 198 C. 53; Id., 77; Id., 124; Id., 314; Id., 386; Id., 598; 200 C. 607; 201 C. 190; Id., 211; 202 C. 86; 203 C. 212; 206 C. 229; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 75; Id., 416; 211 C. 151; Id., 591; 218 C. 151; Id., 349; Id., 766; 225 C. 114; Id., 450; 227 C. 448; Id., 456; 228 C. 281; 229 C. 328; 230 C. 183; Id., 400; 234 C. 139; 242 C. 605. Defendant entitled to an instruction defining “wrongfulness” in terms of societal morality when, in light of the evidence, the distinction between illegality and societal morality bears upon defendant's insanity claim. 254 C. 88.

The inclusion in the court's charge of language concerning defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong, which involved the abandoned M'Naghten test, was error. 1 CA 697. Cited. 8 CA 307; 10 CA 302; 12 CA 32; 14 CA 511; 20 CA 342; 22 CA 669; 46 CA 486; Id., 734.

State does not have to produce expert witnesses in order to sustain a conviction against a claim of insanity but may rely upon all the evidence in the case to carry its burden. 33 CS 704.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 201 C. 174. Does not violate due process prohibition against relieving state of its burden of proving every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt; court finds no constitutional requirement that sanity be considered an essential element of crime to be proved by state. 225 C. 450. Cited. 236 C. 189.

Cited. 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185; 44 CA 70. Defendant not entitled to a jury instruction that distinguishes between legal and societal standards of wrongfulness if defendant fails to present any evidence that, at the time of the killing, he was aware that his actions were illegal but believed that they did not offend societal morality. 50 CA 312.

Subsec. (b):

Court's failure to define proximate cause as it related to Subsec. did not constitute a manifest injustice to defendant that impaired the effectiveness or integrity of the trial so as to warrant plain error review. 62 CA 256.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-63 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-63
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 179 C. 617; 194 C. 408; 200 C. 607; 226 C. 497; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 648.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 3 CA 163; 8 CA 496; Id., 631; 32 CA 84; 33 CA 103; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 41 CA 47; 43 CA 578; 44 CA 6. Under section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.

Cited. 39 CS 347; Id., 359; 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 227 C. 301; 237 C. 348.

Cited. 3 CA 289; 8 CA 153; 10 CA 659; 18 CA 477; 24 CA 330; 26 CA 145; 40 CA 515; Id., 643; 42 CA 768; 45 CA 369. Defendant's conduct in pointing gun at police officers, even though gun was not racked, and struggling with them in crowded bar was sufficient to constitute reckless endangerment; danger engendered by defendant's conduct arose from distinct potential that others in bar would fire their weapons and result in serious injury to officers or bystanders. 141 CA 377; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 845.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-189
Sec. 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.

See Sec. 52-570d re prohibition on recording private telephonic communications and civil remedies for violation thereof.

Cited. 171 C. 524; 197 C. 326; 212 C. 195; 216 C. 541; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 8 CA 673; 15 CA 529.

Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-44 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-44
Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain.
Status: in_force

Cited. 231 C. 514.

Cited. 9 CA 686.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-164 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-164
Sec. 53a-164. Participation in a rigged contest: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Participation in a rigged contest is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-206j — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-206j
Sec. 53-206j. Sale, delivery or transfer of unfinished frame or lower receiver. Prohibited. Exceptions. Penalty.
Status: in_force

(b) The procedures for the purchase or receipt or sale, delivery or other transfer of an unfinished frame or lower receiver shall be the same procedures as apply to the purchase or receipt or sale, delivery or other transfer of a pistol or revolver under subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of section 29-33 , provided such purchase or receipt or sale, delivery or other transfer of an unfinished frame or lower receiver is in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) (1) No person shall sell, deliver or otherwise transfer an unfinished frame or lower receiver pursuant to subsection (b) of this section that does not have a unique serial number or other mark of identification, obtained pursuant to: (A) The serial numbering program of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, or (B) subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection.

(2) A person may obtain a unique serial number or other mark of identification for an unfinished frame or lower receiver by providing to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection any identifying information concerning the unfinished frame or lower receiver and the owner of such unfinished frame or lower receiver, in a manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. Upon receiving a properly submitted request for a unique serial number or other mark of identification for an unfinished frame or lower receiver, the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall determine if such person is prohibited from purchasing a firearm, and if not, shall issue to such person a unique serial number or other mark of identification immediately and in no instance more than (A) three business days after the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection receives such request, or (B) ten business days after the system to distribute a unique serial number or other mark of identification pursuant to section 29-36b is operational, whichever date is later.

(3) Such unique serial number or other mark of identification shall be engraved upon or permanently affixed to the unfinished frame or lower receiver in a manner that conforms with the requirements imposed on licensed importers and licensed manufacturers of firearms pursuant to 18 USC 923(i), as amended from time to time, and any regulation adopted thereunder.

(d) The provisions of subsections (a) to (c), inclusive, of this section shall not apply to the sale, delivery or transfer of any unfinished frame or lower receiver between (1) a federally licensed firearm manufacturer and a federally licensed firearm dealer, (2) a federally licensed firearm importer and a federally licensed firearm dealer, or (3) federally licensed firearm dealers.

(e) Any person may arrange in advance to deliver and transfer an unfinished frame or lower receiver to a police department or the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection.

(f) On and after October 1, 2019, no person shall possess an unfinished frame or lower receiver unless such person is eligible to purchase a firearm under state and federal law.

(g) If the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, the court may order suspension of prosecution. The court shall not order suspension of prosecution unless the accused person has acknowledged that he or she understands the consequences of the suspension of prosecution. Any person for whom prosecution is suspended shall agree to the tolling of any statute of limitations with respect to such violation and to a waiver of his or her right to a speedy trial. Such person shall appear in court and shall be released to the supervision of the Court Support Services Division for such period, not exceeding two years, and under such conditions as the court shall order. If the person refuses to accept, or, having accepted, violates such conditions, the court shall terminate the suspension of prosecution and the case shall be brought to trial. If such person satisfactorily completes such person's period of probation, he or she may apply for dismissal of the charges against such person and the court, on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss such charges. If the person does not apply for dismissal of the charges against such person after satisfactorily completing such person's period of probation, the court, upon receipt of a report submitted by the Court Support Services Division that the person satisfactorily completed such person's period of probation, may on its own motion make a finding of such satisfactory completion and dismiss such charges. Upon dismissal, all records of such charges shall be erased pursuant to section 54-142a . An order of the court denying a motion to dismiss the charges against a person who has completed such person's period of probation or terminating the participation of a defendant in such program shall be a final judgment for purposes of appeal.

(h) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class C felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine, except that any person who sells, delivers or otherwise transfers an unfinished frame or lower receiver in violation of the provisions of this section knowing that such unfinished frame or lower receiver is stolen or that the manufacturer's number or other mark of identification on such unfinished frame or lower receiver has been altered, removed or obliterated, shall be guilty of a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and ten thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine, and any unfinished frame or lower receiver found in the possession of any person in violation of any provision of this section shall be forfeited.

(i) For purposes of this section, “unfinished frame or lower receiver” means a blank, casting or machined body intended to be turned into the frame or lower receiver of a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3 , with additional machining, and which has been formed or machined to the point where most major machining operations have been completed to turn the blank, casting or machined body into a frame or lower receiver of a firearm, even if the fire-control cavity area of such blank, casting or machined body is still completely solid and unmachined. An “unfinished frame or lower receiver” is not a firearm, as defined in 18 USC 921(a), as amended from time to time.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-165 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-165
Sec. 53a-165. Hindering prosecution defined.
Status: in_force

Cited. 205 C. 17; 223 C. 595.

Cited. 7 CA 470.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-167e
Sec. 53a-167e. Aggravated assault of a public transit employee: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Aggravated assault of a public transit employee is a class C felony, except that such person shall be fined not more than twenty thousand dollars.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-213a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-213a
Sec. 53a-213a. Smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis while operating a motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis while operating a motor vehicle is a class C misdemeanor.

(c) No peace officer shall stop a motor vehicle for a violation of this section if such violation is the sole reason for such stop.