Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-362d
Sec. 52-362d. Lien against property of obligor for unpaid child support. Securing, releasing or foreclosing lien. Notice of lien and opportunity for hearing. Information re unpaid support reported to participating consumer reporting agency. Offset for child support arrearage against money payable by state to obligor. Notification by Connecticut Lottery Corporation. Hearings re alleged arrearages. Regulations.
Status: in_force

(b) On October 1, 1991, and monthly thereafter, the Department of Social Services shall compile a list of all obligors who owe overdue support in the amount of one thousand dollars or more accruing after the entry of an initial court order establishing a child support obligation. Any overdue support in an amount of one thousand dollars or more shall be subject to the reporting provisions of this section. The state shall report to any participating consumer reporting agency, as defined in 15 USC 1681a(f), information regarding the amount of such overdue support owed by an obligor if the amount of such overdue support is one thousand dollars or more, on a computer tape in a format acceptable to the consumer reporting agency. Such information shall be reported by the department only after notice has been sent by the department to such obligor of the proposed action, and such obligor is given an opportunity for a hearing before a hearing officer of the department to contest the amount of the alleged arrearage. Any such notice sent to such obligor shall contain a telephone number and address of the Department of Social Services and shall contain the following language in bold type: “If you are no longer in arrears or have received this notice in error, please contact the department at the following address or telephone number.” On a monthly basis, the Department of Social Services shall provide to each consumer reporting agency informed of the original arrearage of an obligor updated information concerning any such obligor and the status of payments, including a list of obligors who no longer owe overdue support, in such acceptable computer format. The department shall designate one or more persons in the department to receive telephone or other requests from an obligor or a consumer reporting agency regarding verification of information supplied to a consumer reporting agency. The department shall respond to any such request within five working days of its receipt. Upon satisfactory verification that an obligor is no longer in arrears, the department shall send a statement to such obligor, and such statement shall constitute proof to a creditor that such obligor is no longer in arrears as of the date of the statement. A participating consumer reporting agency which receives such updated information from the department that an obligor no longer owes any overdue support shall record such information within thirty days of receipt of such notification unless the information was in a format which was unusable by the agency or contained an error which prevented the agency from matching the updated information to previously supplied data. Any consumer reporting agency which negligently or wilfully fails to use reasonable efforts to comply with any requirement imposed under this subsection with respect to an obligor shall be liable to such obligor in an amount equal to the sum of (1) any actual damages sustained by the obligor as a result of such failure, and (2) a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.

(c) When any person redeems a winning lottery ticket worth five thousand dollars or more at the central office of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation, the Connecticut Lottery Corporation shall check the name and other identifying information of such person against a list of obligors supplied by the Commissioner of Social Services. If such person is included on the list of obligors, the Connecticut Lottery Corporation shall request confirmation from the Commissioner of Social Services that such person is in fact an obligor, and upon notification by the Commissioner of Social Services that money is due from any such person as a result of a claim for support which has been assigned to the state pursuant to section 17b-77 , or is to be paid to the state acting by and through the IV-D agency, the Connecticut Lottery Corporation shall withhold from any lottery winnings payable to such person under the provisions of chapter 226 or chapter 229a the amount of such claim for support owed to an individual for any portion of support which has not been assigned to the state and then the amount of such claim for support owed to the state, provided the Connecticut Lottery Corporation shall notify such person that (1) lottery winnings have been withheld as a result of the amount due for such support, and (2) such person has the right to a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the Commissioner of Social Services if such person contests the amount of the alleged claim for support. The Connecticut Lottery Corporation shall pay any such person in accordance with any decisions of the hearing officer or the court upon appeal of the hearing officer's decision.

(d) Whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate of this state, or an order of another state that has been registered in this state, for support of a minor child or children is issued and such payments have been ordered through the IV-D agency, and the obligor against whom such support order was issued owes overdue support under such order in the amount of five hundred dollars or more, the IV-D agency, as defined in subdivision (12) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231 , or Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court may notify (1) any state or local agency or officer with authority (A) to hold assets or property for such obligor including, but not limited to, any property unclaimed or presumed abandoned under part III of chapter 32, or (B) to distribute benefits to such obligor including, but not limited to, unemployment compensation and workers' compensation, (2) any person having or expecting to have custody or control of or authority to distribute any amounts due such obligor under any judgment or settlement, (3) any financial institution holding assets of such obligor, and (4) any public or private entity administering a public or private retirement fund in which such obligor has an interest that such obligor owes overdue support in a IV-D support case. Upon receipt of such notice, such agency, officer, person, institution or entity shall withhold delivery or distribution of any such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds until receipt of further notice from the IV-D agency.

(e) In IV-D cases in which a notice is sent pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the IV-D agency shall notify the obligor that such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds have been withheld as a result of overdue support in a IV-D support case in accordance with an order of the Superior Court or family support magistrate of this state, or an order of another state that has been registered in this state. The IV-D agency shall further notify the agency, officer, person, institution or entity to whom notice was sent pursuant to subsection (d) of this section as follows: (1) Upon expiration of the time for requesting a hearing specified in section 17b-60 , to make payment to the state from any such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds withheld in accordance with subsection (d) of this section provided, in the case of retirement funds, such payment shall only be made in accordance with a withholding order issued under section 52-362 when the obligor is entitled to receive retirement benefits from such fund; (2) upon payment of such overdue support by such obligor, to release or distribute, as appropriate, such property, benefits, amounts, assets or funds to such obligor; or (3) upon issuance of a decision by the hearing officer or the court upon appeal of such officer's decision, to take such other action as may be ordered by such officer or such court, and such agency, officer, person, institution or entity shall forthwith comply with such notice received from the IV-D agency.

(f) Support collected pursuant to this section shall be distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

(g) The Commissioner of Social Services shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, setting forth procedures providing for adequate notice of (1) the right to a hearing before a hearing officer, and (2) procedures for a fair hearing for any person alleged by the commissioner to owe past-due or overdue child support to the state, or to an individual when the payments have been ordered payable to the state acting by and through the IV-D agency, if the commissioner has filed a lien on the property of such person or claimed an offset against money payable by the state to enforce a claim for payment of such past-due or overdue support, or intends to seize any benefits, amounts, assets or funds withheld in accordance with subsection (d) of this section or report such overdue support to a consumer credit agency.

Cited. 234 C. 194.

Procedures provided in Subsecs. (d) and (e) for notice and opportunity for hearing after obligor's assets withheld, rather than before, not in violation of right to procedural due process. 47 CS 492. Section applies when orders of support are to be paid to state by and through the Title IV-D agency and the obligor owes past due support of $500 or more; statute is separate and distinct from Sec. 17b-93 and any Sec. 17b-93 lien would be in addition to a lien for past due support obligations. Id., 583.

Subsec. (d):

Notification of a claimant's delinquent child support arrearages to any person having authority to distribute amounts to a support obligor under Subsec. is not limited solely to an IV-D agency; payors can acquire this information through alternative means. 106 CA 802.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-550 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 923 / Section 52-550
Sec. 52-550. Statute of frauds; written agreement or memorandum.
Status: in_force

(b) This section shall not apply to parol agreements for hiring or leasing real property, or any interest therein, for one year or less, in pursuance of which the leased premises have been or are actually occupied by the lessee, or any person claiming under him, during any part of the term.

In general. The contract, if within statute, is not void, but the remedy only is denied. 23 C. 17; 36 C. 45; 81 C. 438; 110 C. 395. Advantage can be taken of statute under general denial; Practice Book, Sec. 116; 121 C. 403; but not upon demurrer. 2 R. 146. Demurrer permissible when from pleadings it appears impossible to offer competent evidence of necessary memorandum. 83 C. 120; 114 C. 542. Fraud will take case out of statute. 2 R. 163; 50 C. 491. A beneficial statute and not to be narrowed by rigid construction. 15 C. 403. Consideration is necessary whether promise is within statute or not. 22 C. 321; 31 C. 102. But consideration need not be expressed in the writing. 6 C. 87; 8 C. 10. A contract within statute, while executory, is of no legal effect. 25 C. 191. “Special promise” is actual, not one implied by law. 1 R. 150; 6 C. 85. Oral acceptance of bill of exchange is not a “special promise.” 46 C. 91. Parol proof of special contract of endorser of nonnegotiable note is admissible; but not to prove a mere collateral suretyship. 16 C. 234. If executed on one side, contract is thereby taken out of statute. 7 C. 226. Buildings, crops and earth itself, sold as separate from land, are personal property. 19 C. 165; 88 C. 3. Right to erect building upon land is an “interest” therein. 25 C. 240. The contracting vendor, as well as the vendee, is entitled to specific performance. 58 C. 21. Statute does not extend to trusts arising by operation of law. 59 C. 196. Plaintiff cannot rectify writing by oral testimony and then enforce the contract as thus rectified; but defendant may stand upon the writing simply in defense. 19 C. 73. There can be no recovery at law for the breach of a contract within statute. 18 C. 231. In equity, plaintiff may prove the oral agreement to show fraud, actual or constructive. 60 C. 54. Contract in statute cannot be used in defense. 80 C. 267, but see 83 C. 37. It may be used to show that services performed were not intended to be gratuitous. 83 C. 37; 101 C. 58. Memo may be typewritten and signed with rubber stamp. 73 C. 346. Letter saying that lease referred to is “all right” sufficient. 75 C. 679. Several writings may be connected by mutual reference. 76 C. 229. Record of vote of corporation signed by secretary held sufficient. 72 C. 66. Oral evidence is admissible to explain words or identify papers referred to; memo need not be intended for other party. 83 C. 120; 87 C. 90. If agreement is made with agent, subject to principal's approval, approval must be shown in writing. 83 C. 120. Modifications of contract must be in writing. 82 C. 297. Statute regards promises, not their consideration. 83 C. 688. Letter referring to prior oral agreement and agreement to be construed together. 85 C. 421. Use of contract as evidence, not as basis of action. 87 C. 80. Printed signature may suffice; its position on the paper does not matter. 91 C. 29. When demurrer lies to complaint setting out written memo. 83 C. 120. Memo must show all terms of agreement; 81 C. 575; and be signed by all concerned. 83 C. 120. Action for damages does not lie on contract within statute. 91 C. 29; 92 C. 416. Estoppel to set up statute. Id.; 124 C. 512. Equity cannot reform contract and then enforce it. 95 C. 211; 103 C. 297. But where defendant induces plaintiff to spend money in reliance on former's promise of parol lease, plaintiff may recover for amount so spent even though lease was within statute. 97 C. 533. Whether agreement restricting use of land creates an interest in land. 106 C. 246. One who has rendered services under an unenforceable agreement to receive compensation by devise of land may sue for the services rendered. 116 C. 111. Statute does not prevent proof of oral agreement modifying written contract when fully performed. 121 C. 186. Later oral contract, modifying instrument within statute, is not enforceable unless a complete contract and not within statute. 129 C. 682. Parol evidence admissible to prove inducement to enter into contract by misrepresentation of material facts. 145 C. 694. Defense of statute of frauds may be raised by demurrer. 148 C. 153. Need not be specially pleaded. 150 C. 8. Cited. 150 C. 481. Even if enforcement is precluded by statute, recovery can be had under quasi-contract. Id., 680. Unless there existed written memorandum satisfying requirements of statute of frauds, evidence indicating agreement is not legally sufficient to support court's conclusion that such agreement did exist. 159 C. 453. Oral agreements concerning interest in land are unenforceable. 164 C. 56. Conveyance of property held to be full performance by one party to contract so as to take that contract out of state of frauds regarding individual liability of party conveying property. 169 C. 389; 172 C. 210; 174 C. 535; 176 C. 442; 177 C. 22. A description of property in a listing agreement need not be as definite as in a contract for sale of land since contract employing a broker to sell land is not within statute of frauds. Id., 515. Cited. Id., 569; 178 C. 1; Id., 215; 179 C. 704. Lower court in error in allowing possible impact of unessential terms to invalidate a written memorandum that states essential terms with reasonable certainty. 181 C. 434. Cited. 182 C. 193; Id., 448; 184 C. 228; 185 C. 47; Id., 328; Id., 463; 186 C. 86; 188 C. 1; 190 C. 481; 197 C. 101; 200 C. 713; 201 C. 570; 202 C. 190; Id., 566; 204 C. 303; 207 C. 555; 208 C. 352; 214 C. 641; 215 C. 316; 216 C. 509; 218 C. 512; 232 C. 294; 237 C. 123. Trial court improperly instructed jury on statute of frauds when it instructed jury that it could find that an exception to statute of frauds applied if it found that plaintiffs had proved either part performance of contract or detrimental reliance induced by defendant; although this court has occasionally used the terms interchangeably, it never intended that doctrines of equitable estoppel and of part performance operate as independent exceptions to statute of frauds; part performance is an essential element of the estoppel exception to statute of frauds. 274 C. 33. Statute of frauds, which governs disputes between parties to a contract, not applicable to case involving oral lease agreement because it did not involve a “contractual dispute”. 278 C. 660. Re action for specific performance on option to purchase real property where no written agreement existed for purchase price because cost of environmental remediation had not been determined, part performance of parties did not remove option from statute of frauds and did not provide remedy for specific performance. 293 C. 287.

Cited. 1 CA 566; Id., 634; 3 CA 34; 4 CA 46; 5 CA 358; Id., 394; 6 CA 595; 11 CA 375; Id., 439; 13 CA 677; 16 CA 240; 18 CA 581; 20 CA 58; 23 CA 522; 26 CA 305; 28 CA 739; 33 CA 662; 35 CA 31; 38 CA 420; Id., 772; 40 CA 261; 42 CA 413; Id., 712; 44 CA 402. Court rejected argument that partial payment of contract price is an act of part performance making contract enforceable regardless of statute of frauds; trial court's finding that contract satisfied statute of frauds was not clearly erroneous where trial court found that description of the land had been made sufficiently definite through reference to two contracts, a map attached to the contract, other maps and descriptions, plus testimony placed in evidence at trial. 49 CA 751. Statute of frauds requires that any modification to the note and mortgage be in writing. 62 CA 138.

Contract for sale of land not specific as to subsequent lien, void. 30 CS 30. Cited. 34 CS 107; Id., 620; 35 CS 24; 37 CS 27; Id., 579; Id., 698; 39 CS 95. Compliance with statute of frauds discussed. 41 CS 545.

In oral contract for sale of two building lots, plaintiff buyer could recover money held in escrow by attorney upon basis it would be unjust enrichment if defendant could retain it when conditions of escrow were not met. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 687. Statute of frauds is not good defense if promise was an original undertaking. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 112, 117. Oral contract for $1,000 to induce third person to sell land is not within statute of frauds, since subject matter of contract is not land or any interest therein. Id., 488.

Nature and requisites of memorandum. Advertisement of terms of sale, etc., held sufficient as against vendor. K. 15. Letter explaining purpose of deed, held sufficient memo of contract. 1 R. 171. Consideration need not be expressed in writing. 6 C. 87; 8 C. 10. Must contain subject matter, terms and names of parties. 10 C. 198; 108 C. 687. Must disclose name of vendor. 10 C. 199; 56 C. 105. What description of subject matter is sufficient. 10 C. 199. Written vote of corporation, held a sufficient memorandum. 26 C. 109; 72 C. 66. Assumption of firm debts by succeeding corporation, held valid. 26 C. 109. Whether the acceptance of a deed poll may not be a sufficient compliance with statute, quaere. 36 C. 55; 42 C. 254. Oral negotiation followed by written offer and answer “to proceed” sufficient. 40 C. 522. Memorandum signed and dated back by repudiated agent insufficient. Id., 455. Signature of auctioneer is a sufficient signing. 56 C. 105. Plaintiff may enforce contract against signers though he himself failed to sign. 58 C. 18; 102 C. 479. Description of real estate held sufficiently definite. 58 C. 19. Special case; facts held not to show a sufficient signature by defendant. 63 C. 118, 119. General description of the land held too indefinite to comply with statute. Id., 118; 105 C. 413. Whether such description could be applied to the land intended, by extrinsic evidence, quaere. 63 C. 118. All terms of contract must be stated; 90 C. 193; time of delivery. 81 C. 575. Two papers may be read together. 75 C. 679; 101 C. 329. What constitutes signature. 91 C. 29. Making certain its terms by parol evidence. 92 C. 636. Memo of sale of goods which names parties, subject matter, price and place of delivery is sufficient. 93 C. 211. Requisites of memo for sale of real estate; sufficient to describe city property by street and number alone; parol proof may explain but not supplement its terms. 96 C. 541; 105 C. 413. Part of memorandum may be below signature. 101 C. 330. Defendant's signature under word “accepted” on nonnegotiable bill of exchange sufficient. 102 C. 558. “All my property, one house and two lots 100 x 100” held insufficient. 105 C. 413. Memorandum not naming nor describing purchaser insufficient. 99 C. 542. Memorandum held insufficient for failure to give details of mortgage; Id.; so where duration of purchase money mortgage is not disclosed. 101 C. 166; 105 C. 636. Map incorporated by reference in mutual deeds held a sufficient memorandum. 108 C. 540. Requisites of memorandum for sale of real estate; memorandum held insufficient in stating time of completion and payment. Id., 688. Power of attorney to A to convey land is not sufficient memorandum of agreement that A was to be owner. 114 C. 539. Memorandum not specifying how balance of purchase price of land was to be paid is not sufficient. 115 C. 721. “$8500 net” is sufficiently definite statement of price of real estate. 131 C. 290, 291. Exclusive agency contract by defendant with brokers is not memorandum for sale to plaintiff. 133 C. 573. Total purchase price and amount of purchase money mortgage indefinite; agreement held not sufficient; requisites of memorandum. 145 C. 669.

Agreement to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. Rule stated for determining whether a given promise is within statute or not. 60 C. 76; 83 C. 686; 93 C. 265; 99 C. 163; 107 C. 51; 112 C. 389. If promise is merely collateral to the original debt, it must be in writing, whatever the consideration. 60 C. 81. Statute is just as binding in courts of equity as in courts of law. Id., 53. A contract void under statute is void for all purposes. Id., 367. Applies to special promise made by the executor or administrator to pay, out of his own estate, what he is already liable to pay in his representative capacity. Id., 75. Agreement in statute will not be implied. 82 C. 178. If there is new benefit to promisor and act is done on his request and credit, original undertaking ordinarily arises. 112 C. 391. Oral contracts or promises held within statute: For appearance of another or payment of debt. 1 R. 57. To pay loss if suit against another failed. 2 D. 457. By discharged endorser, to pay note if maker was not sued. 4 C. 122, 130. Promise by administrator without assets; 22 C. 323; aliter, when administrator has assets. 22 C. 323. Promise to A to pay his debts due others, within statute as to A's creditors; 31 C. 100; but not as to A. 22 C. 325. Promise made to one to whom another is answerable. Id.; 26 C. 109. Undertaking by one not before liable to perform same duty for which party for whom undertaking was made continues liable. 35 C. 350; 41 C. 196; 60 C. 71; 125 C. 500. Contracts of surety and guaranty. 31 C. 101; Id., 362. To answer for deficiency of tax collector. 41 C. 196. By third person to save endorser harmless. 52 C. 473. By third person to pay tax if collector would forbear to levy; 60 C. 76; aliter if arrangement releases original debtor. Id., 76, 77. Of owner of building to pay subcontractor if contractor did not. 60 C. 471. Agreement by officer of corporation personally to pay its debt in certain contingency; 76 C. 43; by corporation to pay for services rendered to another corporation which former organizes. 82 C. 178. A promise to indemnify promisee for becoming surety for a third person at the request of promisor is not within statute. 147 C. 1. Undertaking, by party not before liable, for purpose of securing, or for performance of, a duty for which party for whom undertaking is made continues liable is within statute as special promise to answer for debt, default or miscarriage of another; defense of statute of frauds need not be specially pleaded; unless X company was relieved of its obligation to pay plaintiff for work, oral promise by defendant to pay plaintiff for it constituted a collateral, rather than an original, undertaking and was within statute of frauds. 150 C. 8. Oral contracts or promises held not within statute: To pay for boarding son. 1 R. 90. Of principal to indemnify agent acting properly. 1 C. 522. By administrator to submit claim of estate to arbitration. 2 C. 691. Undertaking of assignee accepting trust. 3 C. 277. Of A to pay B one-half C might recover of D. 16 C. 553. Of A to pay for such articles as B should furnish C. 17 C. 119, 121. Contract of bailee under officer's receipt. 20 C. 494. Special agreement of contractor de erection of church. 23 C. 557. Of administrator to pay costs of suit. 28 C. 550. Accommodation paper. 31 C. 362. Promise which discharges debtor and assumes new obligation. 35 C. 349. By grantee in deed to assume mortgage debt. 42 C. 254. Promise to pay another with funds of promisee. 53 C. 181. Oral agreement to pay funds received of promisee to his creditor. 60 C. 80. By defendant to pay plaintiff his commissions for securing actors, out of actors' salaries, assented to by them. 62 C. 54–56. By owner, after failure of original contractor, with subcontractor for completion of work. Id., 86. Promise to indemnify surety. 64 C. 273; 83 C. 686; 122 C. 26. Promise of president of corporation to pay for supplies to its employees held to be his independent agreement. 92 C. 587. Promise made to debtor to pay his debts. 93 C. 576. Performing services for contractor of building on owner's promise to pay, if contractor did not. 94 C. 502. Promise to pay for doctor's services to child injured by promisor's automobile. 99 C. 163. A father who ratifies his daughter's purchase of a fur coat and orally promises to pay for it; contract is enforceable. 107 C. 51. Oral agreement by seller of stock to repurchase at selling price if buyer became dissatisfied within 1 year is not within statute though stock was sold for over $100. 109 C. 598. Promise of agent that he would assume entire responsibility and give personal attention to shipment from principal. 112 C. 385. Agreement by original purchaser of truck to see that payments would be made after it was transferred to another. 124 C. 383. Direct promise of mortgagee to pay for rebuilding stores. 126 C. 579. Oral agreement of sale though not enforceable under statute may entitle broker to commission. 144 C. 555. A promise to indemnify the promisee for becoming surety for a third person, at the request of the promisor, is not within statute. 147 C. 1.

Agreement for the sale of real estate. “Agreement” contemplates a transfer of some portion of the title. 61 C. 483. Stipulations collateral to the contract of sale, but contained therein, may be enforced, if the action does not tend to enforce the sale or purchase of the interest in land. 62 C. 46; 109 C. 525. Sufficiency of memorandum in general; admissibility of parol evidence to explain it. 87 C. 90. Land must be described with reasonable certainty. 90 C. 281; 91 C. 29. Law applies as well to action by vendee for damages as to one for specific performance. Id. Any modification of original agreement must be in writing. 82 C. 293. Promisor estopped to set up statute by improvements made by promisee in reliance on oral agreement to reconvey. 124 C. 507. Recital of valuable consideration in an absolute deed is sufficient to rebut a claim of a resulting trust by oral agreement. 113 C. 470; 121 C. 159. Contracts or promises held within statute: Of grantor to pay grantee for any lack of agreed acreage; K. 24; aliter; 1 R. 74; 62 C. 45. Grantee's promise to pay more if land should exceed estimated acreage. 1 D. 23. To build and rent store with wharf for 3 years. 18 C. 228. Right to perpetually divert water upon land cannot be acquired by oral license. 23 C. 223. Agreement to dispose of equitable interest in land. 27 C. 316. Oral promise to devise real estate to plaintiff. 60 C. 50. Oral agreement to convey land in consideration of services rendered. 62 C. 373. Oral promise to will one's property to another, in consideration of the latter's services and companionship, is within, if promisor leaves real as well as personal estate; 63 C. 536; 83 C. 34; but not if he leaves only personal estate; 82 C. 652; but action of quantum meruit lies and agreement may be admissible in evidence. 82 C. 648; 83 C. 34. Express trust of real estate; 66 C. 499; 75 C. 1; 84 C. 560; 124 C. 144; 130 C. 294; but see where trust arose in another state and claim was for proceeds of land sold. 81 C. 436. Offer of mortgagee at auction sale of property to let certain sum “remain” on land. 70 C. 92. Approval of principal, where land sold to agent subject to it. 83 C. 120. Agreement for release of mortgage. 92 C. 416. Contracts or promises held not within statute: The conditions attending the delivery of a deed in escrow may, as between the parties, be proved by parol. 2 R. 81, 82. Promise to pay what land was reasonably worth for its use and occupation. 2 R. 150. Not to use land in certain manner. 3 D. 484. Agreement for sale of fixtures capable of separation. 3 D. 484. Statute only requires that the agreement on which the action is brought should be in writing. 2 C. 304. Collateral conditions are provable by parol. 2 C. 304. Agreement to share profits of land speculation. 4 C. 573. Implied trust de purchase and ownership of land is provable by parol. 16 C. 401; 35 C. 169; 59 C. 199. Also an express trust if partially performed. 16 C. 401. Oral partition of division fence. 29 C. 429. That builder should own building erected on promisor's land. 34 C. 523. Oral agreement not to carry on a particular kind of business on premises sold. 61 C. 483. Oral promise by grantor to repay grantee the difference in value between actual frontage and the frontage stated in deed. 62 C. 45. Agreement with real estate broker for his services. 76 C. 308; 79 C. 297; 131 C. 378; 133 C. 209, 210. Obligation of water company to sell plant to town, arising under legislative act. 80 C. 646. Oral promise to account for money received from sale of land. 81 C. 433; 109 C. 525. Implied obligation of owner of land to refund money paid under contract for future sale after he has sold land to a third person. 82 C. 383; 90 C. 281. Agency to sell land and execute memorandum. 83 C. 120. Agreement to buy land jointly, build house and share profits. 86 C. 453. Agreement for arbitration of boundary dispute. 87 C. 678. Sale of building to be removed. 88 C. 1; 90 C. 289. Surrender of land by vendee in possession, on default in payments due under contract. 90 C. 555. Authority to sell land and sign contract may be created by parol. 96 C. 84. Absolute deed may be construed as mortgage. 91 C. 571; 93 C. 61; 97 C. 196; 109 C. 525. Memorandum not naming or describing purchaser held insufficient. 99 C. 542. Agreement held insufficient as to mortgage details; Id.; so where duration of purchase money mortgage is not disclosed. 101 C. 166; 105 C. 636. Executed parol agreement for division fence not within statute. 101 C. 290. Oral agreement to release blanket mortgage from lot as soon as house erected thereon is unenforceable. 108 C. 30. Memorandum held insufficient for lack of statement as to time of payment and completion. Id., 688. Where an oral agreement is executed as to that part relating to realty, balance of agreement may be proved by parol. 109 C. 525. Power of real estate agent to enter written agreement to sell. 144 C. 541. Oral agreement of sale though not enforceable under statute may entitle broker to commission. Id., 555. Total purchase price and amount of purchase money mortgage indefinite; agreement held not sufficient. 145 C. 669. Agreement to sell did not specify conditions of repayment in regard to a purchase money mortgage; held to violate the statute of frauds. 148 C. 153. Agreement calling for total purchase price of $30,000 with stipulation as to payments totaling only $25,000 held unenforceable. 149 C. 236. Cited. 150 C. 481.

Lease of real estate. Oral agreement to lease for a term of years is within statute. 1 R. 549; 21 C. 403; 22 C. 403; 80 C. 263; 82 C. 413. The terms of such an agreement admissible in evidence as bearing on amount of rent due. 22 C. 433; 23 C. 59. Status of an oral lease which is within statute. 23 C. 312; 80 C. 455; 82 C. 414; 86 C. 34. Agreement defining terms of existing tenancy is in statute; 80 C. 507; so one for possession of premises until a controversy is settled; 80 C. 504; and one not to be performed in year. 86 C. 32. Letter saying lease is “all right” held sufficient memorandum; 75 C. 681; but agreement failing to state length of term is insufficient. 80 C. 267. Agreement for lease for 2 years is in statute; receipt for rent may constitute sufficient memorandum. 92 C. 226. Agreement for extension of lease on notice does not require new lease or written notice. 95 C. 454. Defectively executed lease for more than 1 year is binding between parties if evidenced by memorandum sufficient under statute of frauds. 102 C. 479. Statute not applicable to oral modification of lease, reducing rent, where reduced rent has actually been accepted. 120 C. 572. Entry and payment of rent under a lease may constitute such part performance as to estop lessor from setting up statute. 128 C. 619. Option to purchase decedent's homestead excepting “the houselot of about one acre, together with the house and garage situated thereon” too uncertain to satisfy statute. 156 C. 175.

Memorandum of agreement for sale of real property complies with statute when buyer seeks to charge seller with specific performance and seller's agreement was definite and enforceable, although buyer-plaintiff's agreement was conditional on his obtaining a mortgage. 28 CS 114.

Written agreement to purchase land whose extent and price were left to future determination held on demurrer not to satisfy statute of frauds. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 439.

Partial performance and its effect. An oral agreement respecting real estate, executed in part, will be specifically enforced. K. 400; 2 R. 163, 165; 2 D. 225; 5 D. 71; 7 C. 348; 13 C. 491; 14 C. 122; 16 C. 401; 18 C. 229; 26 C. 373; 27 C. 341; 29 C. 429; 35 C. 181; 36 C. 55, 56; 80 C. 267; 85 C. 635; 88 C. 547; 91 C. 651; 92 C. 416; 98 C. 318. Acts of performance admissible before contract is specifically proved. 16 C. 402. What acts constitute part performance. 18 C. 229; 37 C. 14; 98 C. 319; 101 C. 328; 108 C. 690; 112 C. 429; 113 C. 301. What acts are insufficient. 1 R. 59; 19 C. 74; 63 C. 539–545; 108 C. 690. The acts relied upon as part performance must afford satisfactory evidence of the original contract. 2 R. 165. Mere payment in part execution is insufficient. 27 C. 316; 108 C. 690. Agreement will not be taken out of statute at law, unless performance is complete. 18 C. 231; 122 C. 510. Reason for specifically enforcing an oral contract which is partially performed. 19 C. 74. Acts must be inexplicable on any theory save that of agreement; 75 C. 1; and this presents question of law. 69 C. 104. Payment is not a part of performance. 88 C. 548; 108 C. 690. Estoppel to claim under statute. 92 C. 416; 124 C. 512. True basis of part performance is estoppel. 124 C. 516. Estoppel against setting up statute need not be pleaded. Id., 510. Entry and payment of rent under a lease may constitute such part performance as to estop lessor from setting up statute. 128 C. 619. Buyer's possession as part performance; 98 C. 315; 101 C. 323, 328; 110 C. 392; 112 C. 427. Buyer's use of uncompleted house for storage of furniture plus seller's declaration that house was sold. 101 C. 328. Part performance of agreement not to be performed within a year. 106 C. 243. Part performance to make effective an oral agreement must be referable to it and consistent with its terms. 113 C. 475. Giving of power of attorney to A not part performance of oral agreement to convey to him. 114 C. 539. Doctrine of part performance is purely equitable; not available in action for damages for breach of contract within statute. 122 C. 507. Acts relied upon by plaintiff must be acts done by himself. 124 C. 148.

Allegations in complaint that plaintiff fulfilled obligations under a forbearance agreement by executing and delivering a note and mortgage and executing a guarantee were sufficient to bring case within the doctrine of part performance and preclude application of section. 151 CA 549.

Agreement upon consideration of marriage. Contract to marry is not within statute. 20 C. 508. Antenuptial promise based on forbearance to sue is not within statute, although made in contemplation of marriage. 25 C. 159.

Agreement not to be performed within 1 year. Oral agreement to let mill for 3 years, furnish dyestuffs, etc., within. 1 R. 549. Oral lease for more than 1 year, within. 22 C. 403. If performance may take place within 1 year, as an agreement to labor for 1 year, contract is not within; 12 C. 460, 461; 61 C. 484; 101 C. 57; aliter if services are not to begin at once. 16 C. 250. Oral agreement to build store within 6 months and lease it for 3 years, not within. 18 C. 232. Mere expectation of nonperformance within a year does not bring the case within statute. 20 C. 508. The terms of an oral contract for labor, within statute, are admissible as tending to prove what the services were reasonably worth. 25 C. 191, 401. Contract of apprenticeship to continue more than 1 year is within. 18 C. 341. Contract for employment for a year to begin at subsequent day is within statute; 85 C. 421; but not a mere agreement for an increase of salary “per year”. 87 C. 79. Contract to bequeath in consideration of care until death is not within statute; depends upon continuance of life. 101 C. 57. Part performance as taking out of statute. 106 C. 243.

Agreement for sale of personal property. Performance on one side takes case out of statute. 2 R. 191, 387. Shares of stock of corporation within; 15 C. 403; 50 C. 491; 99 C. 172; but not agreement by seller to repurchase if unsatisfactory. 109 C. 598. Delivery of stock certificates a sufficient symbolical delivery of shares. 50 C. 491. Buildings, crops and earth itself, sold as separate from land, are personal property. 19 C. 165; 88 C. 3. Oral, to manufacture and deliver special article, not within. 20 C. 53. Delivery of bill of sale is vendor's execution of contract. 26 C. 374. Facts held to show a sale and not a contract to manufacture. 29 C. 511. If part of entire contract is within, the whole is within; delivery at a distance from place of sale does not take case out of statute. Id., 515. Executed contracts de division of personalty not within. Id., 429. Oral, that builder should own structure erected on promisor's land, not within; but a sale after erection must be in writing. 34 C. 523. Subsequent tender and acceptance have same effect as original delivery. 44 C. 139. Includes sale of house to be severed from land; 88 C. 1; 90 C. 289; so sale of shares of stock. 90 C. 342. Agreement to enter jointly into purchase and sale of goods held not in statute. 93 C. 580. Agreement need not fix time of delivery or payment, as reasonable time will be implied. 96 C. 88. Interest in corporation where no stock certificates issued. 100 C. 60. Contract to supply and install plumbing fixtures, for a single price which included labor and incidental materials, not within statute. 110 C. 241. Memorandum held inadequate. 134 C. 376. Memorandum held sufficient. Id., 469. Resulting trust may be proved by parol evidence. 135 C. 378. Option to purchase satisfied statute. 136 C. 41. Where relationship of parties gives rise to constructive trust. Id., 352. Letter offering property, his lease, his occupation of property and other facts provide sufficient description. 138 C. 227. Allegations of complaint held sufficient to enable plaintiff vendor to produce evidence of acts of part performance. Id., 605.

Delivery, acceptance and receipt. What constitutes sufficient acceptance to take contracts out of statute; 13 C. 332; is question of fact. 90 C. 193. Goods set apart, and verbal delivery to vendee standing by, sufficient; such delivery not symbolical. 17 C. 173. Subsequent tender and acceptance have same effect as original delivery. 44 C. 139. Delivery of stock certificate sufficient delivery of shares. 50 C. 491. Acceptance by vendee must be an actual receiving on his part of the whole or part of the property sold; acceptance may be sufficient to pass title and yet insufficient to remove case from statute; facts held insufficient to show such an acceptance as would remove case from statute. 60 C. 366. Where no actual change of possession, it must clearly appear that continued possession of vendor is that of bailee for vendee. 75 C. 377; 76 C. 232. What constitutes acceptance. 90 C. 342. Constructive delivery and acceptance; shares of stock. Id.; 99 C. 173. Receipt of part of one shipment as taking case out of statute. 93 C. 580; Id., 639; 102 C. 634. Direction of seller to buyer to purchase shares in open market held part performance because creating agency. 99 C. 173. But seller's oral agreement with buyer to repurchase shares of stock at any time within 1 year if buyer becomes dissatisfied is enforceable. 109 C. 598. Efforts of defendant to sell stock after delivery as indicative of acceptance. 113 C. 761.

Contract unenforceable as one which could not be performed within 1 year. Doctrine of part performance not applicable to such contracts. 137 C. 488. Full performance by one party to a contract takes it out of statute. 138 C. 94.

Oral promise to make a bequest in consideration of marriage made after marriage held within the prohibition of section. 1 CS 1; Id., 26. What plaintiff may prove by extrinsic evidence. Id., 61; 13 CS 78; 14 CS 454; 15 CS 60; Id., 190. Effect of failure to show that agreement could not be performed in 1 year. 3 CS 102. Effect of oral renewal of lease; renewal and continuance distinguished. Id., 146. Oral promise to reimburse town for relief furnished to one of its inhabitants not within statute of frauds. 11 CS 295. What is a sufficiently definite description. 13 CS 78. Not essential that promisee sign memorandum. Id., 456; 15 CS 57. The written memorandum must state all the essential terms of the agreement with such certainty that there is no need to recourse to parol evidence. 13 CS 420; 14 CS 356; Id., 367. Provision “the buyer to have first refusal” is too indefinite as to terms to satisfy statute of frauds. 13 CS 459. Cited. 14 CS 273. Equitable estoppel may be invoked against one claiming the benefit of statute. Id., 351. The essential terms of a sales contract are that the sale has been made and the name of the purchaser. Id., 356. Demurrer will lie if it appears impossible to produce any competent evidence of a memorandum. Id., 426. Plaintiff is entitled to prove by extrinsic evidence that defendant owned a single piece of land in Lakeville where memorandum read for “my Lakeville property”. Id., 454. Cited. 15 CS 447; 16 CS 51; 17 CS 273; 18 CS 177. Oral representation by developer that lots would be same size and shape as delineated on map not enforceable. 19 CS 6. Where subcontractor induced to complete work on owner's promise, “I'll see that you get your money”, it was not enforceable under section. Id., 98. Cited. Id., 355. What constitutes part performance of a contract for the sale of land so as to remove it from statute of frauds. 21 CS 88. Where plaintiff gave defendant $1,000 down payment for land on promise of defendant to return it if plaintiff couldn't get mortgage and where the agreement to buy the land was oral, held defense of statute of frauds was unavailable to defendant and plaintiff was entitled to have the deposit back. 23 CS 442. Agreement with real estate broker is for personal services and not within statute of frauds. 26 CS 193. Administrative regulation prescribing form for such agreement held not to alter statute of frauds. Id., 194. Cited. 32 CS 511. Where goods were sold to corporation on personal credit of sole stockholder and principal officer, without personal or direct benefit to him, conclusion that oral agreement to pay was unenforceable held error. 33 CS 528.

Where written agreement for sale of land provides that portion of purchase price shall be secured by mortgage, agreement must fix time mortgage is to run. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 85. Statute is not defense to action for recovery of value of improvements to property made by lessee in reliance upon oral agreement to sell property so improved. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 437, 439, 440.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (5): Contract of indefinite duration is not subject to “one year” provision. 202 C. 190. Subdiv. (5): Oral contract that does not say in express terms that performance is to have a specific duration beyond 1 year is the functional equivalent of a contract of indefinite duration for purposes of statute of frauds and thus is unenforceable as outside of statute's prescription. 220 C. 569. Cited. 221 C. 236. Contract did not violate statute of frauds re Subdiv. (4) interest in real property or Subdiv. (5) agreement not to be performed within 1 year. 245 C. 640.

Cited. 5 CA 240; 13 CA 527; 23 CA 579; 33 CA 662; 38 CA 329; Id., 333; Id., 420; Id., 772; 42 CA 413; 45 CA 466. In the absence of case law construing Subdiv. (6), it is deemed appropriate to apply its provisions in accordance with limitations and caveats that have been engrafted on the other Subdivs. of Subsec. 63 CA 832. Agreement between parties not barred by statute of frauds. 69 CA 366. Due to lack of proof re existence and essential terms of an oral agreement, the alleged oral agreement violated statute of frauds. 70 CA 692. Subdiv. (4): Contract for sale of real estate that does not contain any designation of seller fails to satisfy statute. 85 CA 503. Statute did not apply to circumstances of case because contract governing son's debt had been fully performed and it is well-established that full performance by both parties to an oral contract will operate to remove a contract from the provisions of statute, and cause of action concerned property owners' default on their mortgage loan rather than an action to enforce property owners' promise to pay part of son's debt. 89 CA 200. Subdiv. (4): Although part performance may be sufficient to take a contract out of statute of frauds, plaintiffs' maintenance of city landscaping on the land was evidence of an agreement between plaintiffs and the city, not evidence of an agreement between plaintiffs and defendant to sell the land. 99 CA 294. Subdiv. (4): Because claim for negligent misrepresentation sounds in tort and not in contract, statute of frauds does not bar such claim. 116 CA 483. Subdiv. (5): Primary purpose of statute of frauds is to provide reliable evidence of the existence and terms of the contract, but an oral settlement agreement within framework of original lawsuit that was placed on the record before the trial judge and assented to by counsel for the parties is binding, as if the agreement were in writing and signed by the party to be charged, regardless of whether the agreement could be performed within a year. 132 CA 209. Subdiv. (4): Plaintiffs maintaining a civil action challenging the discretionary determination of the common interest association under Subdiv. are precluded from asserting the statute of fraud because section operates as a special defense to a civil action and accordingly may only be asserted as a shield to defeat a cause of action and not as a sword to seek a judicial remedy for a wrong. 174 CA 18. Subdiv. (6): Credit card agreement does not constitute a loan as contemplated by the statute of frauds. 174 CA 472.

Cited. 39 CS 188.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278j — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 903a / Section 52-278j
Sec. 52-278j. Dismissal or withdrawal of prejudgment remedy.
Status: in_force

(b) If an application for a prejudgment remedy is denied and the plaintiff, within thirty days thereof, does not serve and return to court the writ of summons and complaint for which the prejudgment remedy was requested, or if a date for a hearing upon a prejudgment remedy is scheduled by the clerk and such hearing is not commenced within thirty days thereof, except as provided in section 52-278e , the court shall order the application to be considered as having been withdrawn.

(c) An application for a prejudgment remedy or a prejudgment remedy which is granted but not served may be withdrawn in the same manner as a civil cause of action.

Cited. 186 C. 295; 188 C. 69.

Cited. 34 CA 303. Nothing in section implicates jurisdiction of the court to continue to hear a civil matter in which plaintiff has been granted a prejudgment remedy but failed to comply with Subsec. (a); rather the mandate in Subsec. (a) is best viewed as a sanction to prevent plaintiff from unduly encumbering assets of defendant by delaying initiation of the civil action in which the parties' dispute can be fully and fairly litigated. 156 CA 17. When plaintiff failed to serve defendant and return plaintiff's civil action to court within thirty days after the denial of his application for a prejudgment remedy, the only action required of the court was to consider the application, not the civil action, withdrawn. 163 CA 663. Requirements set forth in section are inapplicable to proceedings pursuant to Sec. 52-422. 204 CA 471.

Cited. 38 CS 98.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-402 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 907 / Section 52-402
Sec. 52-402. Procedure. Auditors' fees.
Status: in_force

(b) If the defendant refuses to attend at the time and place appointed and to produce his books and render his account, the auditors shall receive from the plaintiff his statement of the account and award to him the whole sum he claims to be due.

(c) If the parties appear and produce their books, the auditors shall hear the parties and their witnesses and shall examine the books. If either party refuses to be sworn or to answer any proper questions respecting his account, the auditors may commit him to a community correctional center, there to continue until he consents to be sworn and answer all proper interrogatories.

(d) After hearing, the auditors shall adjust the accounts, find the balance due and immediately report to the court. The fees and expenses of the auditors, as fixed and allowed by the court, shall be paid by the party in whose favor the report is made and the court shall render judgment that the party in whose favor it was made shall recover the sum found to be due, with costs, including the fees and expenses of the auditors.

Accounts should be settled, down to the date of the report. 11 C. 366; 24 C. 195. Auditors may report a balance as due to defendant. 2 R. 122. Notice of counterclaim required. 18 C. 186. No formal judgment quod computent is required, unless an issue is tendered on that point; 37 C. 428; otherwise, if an issue be tendered. 24 C. 103. Nothing can be pleaded before the auditors which might have been pleaded in bar. Id., 194. A report that defendant had fully accounted is erroneous. 2 D. 120. Auditors may require each party to file a bill of particulars. 37 C. 428. Improper joinder of defendants. 53 C. 41. Equity will not grant, where business is against public policy. 64 C. 211. Judgment for accounting is final as regards appeal. 74 C. 11; 102 C. 122. Report of committee. 82 C. 424. Power of court to correct account where committee finds all items. 86 C. 199; 87 C. 241. Costs to be paid by prevailing party; when counterclaim is unnecessary. 93 C. 150. Plaintiff must allege and prove demand and refusal to account. 100 C. 690.

Cited. 5 CA 457.

Subsec. (d):

Trial court did not improperly apply Subsec. to facts of the case so as to hold defendant liable for payment of entirety of auditor's fees incurred from accounting; party seeking accounting has obtained report in that party's favor when report has established that at least some of amounts alleged to be due are in fact owed to the party; court properly determined that all accountant's fees were chargeable to defendant. 91 CA 619.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-219 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-219
Sec. 52-219. Claim for damages and equitable relief; separate trials.
Status: in_force

Former practice. 73 C. 486. Applied to creditor's bill; 78 C. 595; where relief is sought against person making and person receiving fraudulent assignment. 83 C. 112; 100 C. 718. Cited. 97 C. 719. Applied and explained. 100 C. 248. Defendant filing cross complaint in foreclosure action, raising some legal issues, not entitled to jury trial as of right. 130 C. 211. Cited. 134 C. 333. Where essential right asserted in cross complaint is equitable in its nature, and claim for damages is merely supplemental to equitable relief sought, plaintiff had no right to a jury trial. 135 C. 558. Cited. 223 C. 419; 227 C. 175.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-361a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-361a
Sec. 52-361a. Execution on wages after judgment.
Status: in_force

(b) Issuance. On receipt of the application, a clerk of the Superior Court shall issue a wage execution against the judgment debtor, directed to a levying officer, to enforce payment of the judgment.

(c) Contents. The wage execution shall state (1) the names and last-known addresses of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, (2) the court in which and the date on which the money judgment was rendered, (3) the original amount of the money judgment and the amount due thereon, (4) any limitation on the execution ordered by the court pursuant to a motion for modification thereof, (5) the portion of the judgment debtor's earnings which are subject to levy thereunder, or the information necessary to determine such portion, and (6) any information which the judgment creditor provides to identify the judgment debtor's employer. The wage execution shall notify any employer of the manner prescribed by this section for complying with the execution and shall be accompanied by a notice of judgment debtor rights and a claim form as prescribed by section 52-361b .

(d) Levy. The levying officer shall levy on all earnings which are due or become due to the judgment debtor to the extent specified in the wage execution plus the levying officer's fee and any actual postage costs incurred in accordance with this section, until the judgment is satisfied, or the execution is modified or set aside, by serving the employer with the wage execution, the required notice of rights and the claim forms. On receipt thereof, the employer shall forthwith deliver a copy thereof to the judgment debtor, or mail such copy postage prepaid to the judgment debtor at his last-known address. On service of the wage execution on the employer, the wage execution shall automatically be stayed for a period of twenty days and shall thereafter immediately become a lien and continuing levy on such portion of the judgment debtor's earnings as is specified in the wage execution, provided if a claim is filed in accordance with subsection (d) of section 52-361b within twenty days of such service on the employer, the stay shall continue until determination of the claim. If the levying officer has served the employer of the judgment debtor in accordance with this section, and the debt is later satisfied in whole or in part by payment directly to the creditor or creditor's agent instead of the levying officer, the creditor or the creditor's agent is responsible for payment of the levying officer's fee or portion thereof, and any actual postage costs incurred in accordance with this section. Any service of process or other notice required under this section may be made in accordance with section 52-57 or by certified mail, return receipt requested, provided a levying officer may make such service by mail to (1) an address within such officer's precinct or extension of precinct in accordance with section 52-56 , or (2) in a case involving an employer whose payroll address is outside the state, to the out-of-state payroll address designated by the employer. When service is made by the serving officer by certified mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to this subsection, the officer may under the levy first collect the actual postage costs incurred.

(e) Service and return. A wage execution shall be served within one year from its issuance and returned within thirty days from the satisfaction of the judgment.

(f) Amount subject to levy. The maximum part of the aggregate weekly earnings of an individual which may be subject under this section to levy or other withholding for payment of a judgment is the lesser of (1) twenty-five per cent of his disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed forty times the higher of (A) the minimum hourly wage prescribed by Section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, USC Title 29, Section 206(a)(1), or (B) the full minimum fair wage established by subsection (i) of section 31-58 , in effect at the time the earnings are payable. Unless the court provides otherwise pursuant to a motion for modification, the execution and levy shall be for the maximum earnings subject to levy and shall not be limited by the amount of the installment payment order. Only one execution under this section shall be satisfied at one time. Priority of executions under this section shall be determined by the order of their presentation to the employer.

(g) Employer responsibilities. Any employer served with a wage execution, including the state and any municipality, shall, upon expiration of the automatic stay of execution and subject to any further stay pursuant to a claim, pay over to the levying officer such portion of the judgment debtor's nonexempt earnings as the execution prescribes until the judgment is satisfied or the execution modified or set aside. The payments to the levying officer in compliance with the execution shall bar any action against the employer for such payments. If the employer fails or refuses to pay the earnings levied against to the levying officer, the employer may be subjected to a turnover order pursuant to section 52-356b and, on a finding of contempt, may be held liable to the judgment creditor for any amounts which he has so failed or refused to pay over. Any amount so recovered by the judgment creditor shall be applied toward payment of the judgment.

(h) Modification. Either party may apply at any time to the court which issued the wage execution for a modification of the execution. After notice and hearing or pursuant to a stipulation, the court may make such modification of the execution as is reasonable.

(i) Assignment of earnings. Any assignment by an employee of his earnings shall be void except (1) payments due for support in public welfare cases and payments pursuant to a family support judgment, and (2) deductions for union dues and initiation fees in accordance with the terms of a duly executed contract between an employer and his employees or a collective bargaining agent or in accordance with a duly executed authorization signed by the employee for the payment of such dues or initiation fees or both to such collective bargaining agent.

(j) Unlawful discipline, suspension or discharge. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes to the contrary, no employer may discipline, suspend or discharge an employee because of any wage execution against the employee unless the employer is served with more than seven wage executions against the employee in a calendar year. An employer who violates this subsection shall be liable to the employee for all earnings and all employment benefits lost by the employee from the time of the unlawful discipline, suspension or discharge to the time of reinstatement.

(k) Status of defendant. Notwithstanding any provision of law, the remedy provided by this section shall be available to any judgment creditor and the status of the defendant as an elected or appointed official of any branch of the government of this state may not be interposed as a defense.

Postjudgment execution statutes do not provide specific exemption from further execution of a judgment debtor's residual, postgarnishment wages held in third party's bank account, and Sec. 52-367b does not extend this section's exemption to wages disbursed to the debtor. 324 C. 228.

Cited. 22 CA 260; 33 CA 365; 34 CA 816.

Subsec. (h):

Power to modify pursuant to section does not include the power to vacate. 33 CA 395.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-620 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-620
Sec. 52-620. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Affiliate” means:

(A) With respect to an individual:

(i) A companion of the individual;

(ii) A lineal ancestor or descendant, whether by blood or adoption, of (I) the individual; or (II) a companion of the individual;

(iii) A companion of an ancestor or descendant described in subparagraph (A)(ii) of this subdivision;

(iv) A sibling, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, first cousin, niece, nephew, grandniece or grandnephew of the individual, whether related by the whole or the half blood or adoption, or a companion of any of them; or

(v) Any other individual occupying the residence of the individual; and

(B) With respect to a person other than an individual:

(i) Another person that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the person;

(ii) An officer, director, manager, member, partner, employee or trustee or other fiduciary of the person; or

(iii) A companion of, or an individual occupying the residence of, an individual described in subparagraph (B)(i) or (B)(ii) of this subdivision.

(2) “Companion” means the spouse of an individual.

(3) “Court” means the Superior Court.

(4) “Executory contract” means a contract, including a lease, under which each party has an unperformed obligation and the failure of a party to complete performance would constitute a material breach.

(5) “Governmental unit” means an office, department, division, bureau, board, commission or other agency of this state or a subdivision of this state.

(6) “Lien” means an interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation.

(7) “Mortgage” means a record, however denominated, that creates or provides for a consensual lien on real property or rents, even if the record also creates or provides for a lien on personal property.

(8) “Mortgagee” means a person entitled to enforce an obligation secured by a mortgage.

(9) “Mortgagor” means a person that grants a mortgage or a successor in ownership of the real property described in the mortgage.

(10) “Owner” means the person for whose property a receiver is appointed.

(11) “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, instrumentality or other legal entity.

(12) “Proceeds” means the following property:

(A) Whatever is acquired on the sale, lease, license, exchange or other disposition of receivership property;

(B) Whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, receivership property;

(C) Rights arising out of receivership property;

(D) To the extent of the value of receivership property, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the property; or

(E) To the extent of the value of receivership property and to the extent payable to the owner or mortgagee, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the property.

(13) “Property” means all of a person's right, title and interest, both legal and equitable, in real and personal property, tangible and intangible, wherever located and however acquired. “Property” includes proceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits of or from the property.

(14) “Receiver” means a person appointed by the court as the court's agent, and subject to the court's direction, to take possession of, manage and, if authorized by sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive, or court order, transfer, sell, lease, license, exchange, collect or otherwise dispose of receivership property.

(15) “Receivership” means a proceeding in which a receiver is appointed.

(16) “Receivership property” means the property of an owner which is described in the order appointing a receiver or a subsequent order. “Receivership property” includes any proceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits of or from the property.

(17) “Record”, used as a noun, means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored on an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(18) “Rents” means:

(A) Sums payable for the right to possess or occupy, or for the actual possession or occupation of, real property of another person;

(B) Sums payable to a mortgagor under a policy of rental-interruption insurance covering real property;

(C) Claims arising out of a default in the payment of sums payable for the right to possess or occupy real property of another person;

(D) Sums payable to terminate an agreement to possess or occupy real property of another person;

(E) Sums payable to a mortgagor for payment or reimbursement of expenses incurred in owning, operating and maintaining real property or constructing or installing improvements on real property; or

(F) Other sums payable under an agreement relating to the real property of another person which constitute rents under the law of this state other than sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive.

(19) “Secured obligation” means an obligation the payment or performance of which is secured by a security agreement.

(20) “Security agreement” means an agreement that creates or provides for a lien.

(21) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:

(A) To execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or

(B) To attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol or process.

(22) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-114 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-114
Sec. 52-114. Pleading of contributory negligence.
Status: in_force

Prior to statute, burden was on plaintiff to establish due care. 118 C. 531. Statute does not apply in action to recover damages under Secs. 13a-111 and 13a-149 for injury caused by breach of statutory duty. 119 C. 479; 133 C. 246; 147 C. 149. Even if statute not applicable, defendant alleging contributory negligence must bear burden of proof. 115 C. 664. Presumption under statute contrasted with other presumptions. 118 C. 58, 64; 130 C. 188. By pleading decedent's lack of contributory negligence, plaintiff waived right to benefit of presumption that decedent exercised due care. 119 C. 339; 123 C. 463. Trial court need not refer to statute or charge in terms that there is presumption of due care by deceased if it makes clear the effect of statute. 123 C. 28. Statute procedural, does not change substantive law that plaintiff cannot recover if his own negligence materially contributed to produce his injuries. 118 C. 537. Presumption does not affect plaintiff's burden of establishing defendant's negligence and that his conduct was proximate cause of injury. 129 C. 385. Where plaintiff alleged due care by intestate and defendant did not affirmatively plead contributory negligence, burden of proof is on plaintiff. 118 C. 471; 129 C. 29. But under such pleading, it is erroneous to charge that contributory negligence need not be considered. 126 C. 398. Plaintiff cannot complain of charge that defendant has burden of proving contributory negligence, without charging re quantum of proof required. 118 C. 212. Charge that burden of proving contributory negligence is on defendant by statute is sufficient when court also charges that party having burden of proof on any issue must meet it by fair preponderance of evidence. 119 C. 278. Where person charged with negligence also died as result of accident, plaintiff has burden of proving his decedent's freedom from contributory negligence. 117 C. 273. Statute not so limited in scope as to apply only to period immediately incident to accident. 118 C. 135. Application of statute to cellar explosion; 118 C. 128; malpractice; Id., 471; burning rubbish; 129 C. 26; drowning; 130 C. 309; collision between vehicles; 117 C. 271; 123 C. 49; 126 C. 396; 129 C. 11; Id., 378; 132 C. 461; pedestrian; 116 C. 150; Id., 716; 118 C. 210; 119 C. 699; 123 C. 25; 128 C. 53; Id., 605; 132 C. 420; 133 C. 329; motorcycle officer; 117 C. 484; policeman; 128 C. 332; highway worker; 126 C. 27; minor; 119 C. 277; 125 C. 526; 127 C. 297; 128 C. 182. Not inaccurate to charge that doctrine of last clear chance need not be considered unless jury found defendant had maintained burden of proving contributory negligence. 130 C. 316. Mere production of evidence tending to prove contributory negligence does not cause burden of proof to revert to plaintiff. 132 C. 465, overruling 131 C. 540. How to charge jury on statute. 133 C. 590. Cited. 134 C. 692. If defendant offers no evidence or fails to prove by a fair preponderance of evidence that plaintiff was negligent, plaintiff is entitled to prevail. 136 C. 171. Court may disregard evidence offered by defendant or hold it insufficient to sustain burden. Id., 550. Cited. 137 C. 551; 138 C. 313; Id., 381; Id., 508. Defendant must plead and prove contributory negligence. Id., 557. No contributory negligence as matter of law under circumstances. Id., 712. Cited. 139 C. 228; Id., 350; Id., 527; 140 C. 274; Id., 319; 141 C. 250; 142 C. 521. Burden of proof as to contributory negligence rests throughout on defendant. 145 C. 146. Application of statute in automobile collision case. 147 C. 540. Cited. 148 C. 447. Trier's conclusion on contributory negligence should stand unless the conduct involved is contrary to that of a reasonably prudent man. 154 C. 490. Where action by administrator of decedent's estate for negligently causing death in collision was tried together with action by defendant against administrator for personal injuries, both parties were entitled to benefit of statutory presumption, original charge to jury re effect of presumption was adequate and court's failure to repeat effect in response to plaintiff's oral request to charge was not error. 156 C. 40. Cited. 159 C. 507; 174 C. 200; 179 C. 406; 188 C. 607; 217 C. 12; 225 C. 637. Appropriate method for conveying effect of section to a jury is to articulate the burdens that it imposes upon the parties; those burdens are that plaintiff must prove defendant's negligence, and defendant must prove plaintiff's contributory negligence if defendant has pleaded it. 281 C. 29. Defense of contributory negligence applies to claims of negligent service of alcohol to minor. 312 C. 184.

Cited. 11 CA 1; Id., 348; 15 CA 668; 17 CA 268; 29 CA 552; Id., 791; 33 CA 714; 43 CA 294. Presumption of plaintiff's reasonable care is proper for jury to consider only when defendant affirmatively pleads contributory negligence. 86 CA 310. A defense that plaintiff's conduct was the sole cause of plaintiff's injury is not a special defense of contributory negligence that must be affirmatively pleaded. 140 CA 444.

Cited. 4 CS 224; 8 CS 110; 12 CS 239. Where plaintiff alleged that she exercised due care, she assumed the burden of proof on that issue and section did not apply. 14 CS 232. History reviewed. 16 CS 144. When section not applicable. 18 CS 124. Presumption does not affect the obligation of plaintiff to sustain burden of establishing negligence of defendant and that the conduct complained of was the proximate cause of injury. Id., 247. Although New York rule requires plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence, in suit instituted in Connecticut resulting from accident in New York, plaintiff was not required to so plead. 20 CS 382. Cited. 21 CS 282; 23 CS 132; Id., 134. In suit brought against municipal employee under Sec. 7-465, burden of alleging and proving contributory negligence remains with employee in accordance with this section. Id., 228. Burden of proof, in the sense of risk of nonpersuasion, is on defendant, although in some instances, as where the facts raise a presumption of negligence, plaintiff may have the burden of going forward with the evidence. Id., 435. When plaintiff fails to show negligence, question of contributory negligence becomes moot. 25 CS 164. After defendant had affirmatively pleaded contributory negligence of plaintiff and all evidence had been presented she could not move for directed verdict upon claim that Rhode Island law controlled and plaintiff had burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence. 27 CS 508. Section, establishing presumption of due care on part of injured person, is applicable to suit against town and its employee under Sec. 7-465, which imposes indemnification liability on municipality. 28 CS 506. Cited. 29 CS 75; Id., 518.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 217. Jury could reasonably conclude negligence of defendant was proximate cause of injury to plaintiff when plaintiff lit the pilot in defendant's bake oven which defendant had wrongfully assured him was free of gas. Id., 563.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-333 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 905 / Section 52-333
Sec. 52-333. Liability of garnishee for not appearing.
Status: in_force

Return that garnishee “failed to disclose that he was indebted” will not prevent award of costs to him. 81 C. 622.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-405 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 907 / Section 52-405
Sec. 52-405. Appeal in action demanding an accounting.
Status: in_force

Cited. 68 C. 61; 82 C. 425. If judge makes finding on judgment for accounting, need not make one as to same facts after account is taken. 87 C. 400. Appeal lies from interlocutory judgment refusing to order an accounting. 102 C. 122. Cited. 185 C. 320; 222 C. 331.

Cited. 5 CA 457.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-505 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 920 / Section 52-505
Sec. 52-505. Receivers for certain associations, communities or corporations.
Status: in_force

(b) The court shall have power, if it deems necessary and proper, to appoint a receiver of all the property of the association, community or corporation, and vest all the property in the receiver, by decree or otherwise, to provide that the property shall be managed and used for the benefit and support of the members, in such manner as the court finds to be best for the protection of the town and the members, and to grant such other relief as is necessary for that purpose and to protect the interests of the town and the members, according to the practice and proceedings of courts of equity.

(c) No application may be brought under this section by the selectmen until the matter has been submitted to the town at a special meeting called for that purpose and until the town has approved of the application by vote at the meeting.

Joint bond of two receivers construed. 79 C. 470.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-584
Sec. 52-584. Limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-190a re automatic ninety-day extension to allow reasonable inquiry in malpractice action.

See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.

See Sec. 52-594 re time limits for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to representatives of a deceased person.

Cited. 34 C. 58. In case of death, failure to appoint administrator will not stop statute running. 77 C. 110. Includes all corporations. Id., 529. Demurrer cannot raise question of statute, as date of injury is immaterial. 81 C. 284; 82 C. 579; 83 C. 503. “Injury” means hurt; statute applies to action by husband for negligent injury to wife. 83 C. 505. Action for damage to goods from fall of leased building held to be in section. 82 C. 578. Negligence of telegraph company in changing order for goods not within section. 91 C. 35. Applied to action against surgeon for negligence in treatment; but not against him in contract. 103 C. 719, but see 119 C. 507. Cited. 114 C. 732. Applies to actions against nonresidents begun under Sec. 52-62. 116 C. 648. History of section. 119 C. 502. Applies to all actions to recover for personal injuries whether due to negligence or not. Id., 507. Cited. 123 C. 648. In malpractice action, statute runs from act if injury was then complete, from termination of treatment if injury arises from a course of treatment. 127 C. 385. Cited. 128 C. 108. Statute held applicable to action here under N.J. workmen's compensation law, although right of action thereunder did not arise until after expiration of the 1-year period. 131 C. 665. Ignorance that damage has been done does not prevent running of statute, except where there is something tantamount to fraudulent concealment of cause of action. 135 C. 176. Does not apply to cause of action founded on absolute liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cannot be construed as embodying an exception by implication in favor of an unemancipated minor. 139 C. 218. Action for injury to the person is governed by 1-year statute of limitations only if the injury is caused by negligence, by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice. 142 C. 452. Enactment of a statute which may bar an action even before the cause of action accrues is not beyond the power of the legislature and is consonant with the purpose of a statute of limitations which is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which the persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution; the 1-year period of limitation starts to run at the date when defendant negligently does the act which results in damages to plaintiff. 144 C. 170. Cited. Id., 282. When the act or omission complained of was not merely selling a defective cartridge but permitting it to be available for future use without indicating its potential danger, such claim was not an act or omission completed at the time of the sale but of conduct continuing to the time of the injury. Id., 316. Cited. 148 C. 327. Running of statute of limitations suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. 153 C. 255. Cited. 154 C. 708. Does not apply to action by riparian owners against water company for diversion of waters. 155 C. 477. Defense of statute of limitations is not proper matter for plea to jurisdiction. 159 C. 416. Cited. 168 C. 329. Action based on negligence must, by section, be brought within 1 year of injury complained of but in any event within 3 years “of the act or omission complained of”. 170 C. 289. Cited. 185 C. 390; 186 C. 632; 188 C. 301; 190 C. 8; 192 C. 327; Id., 451; Id., 497; Id., 732; 198 C. 660; 199 C. 683; 200 C. 562; 201 C. 39. Lack of informed consent is malpractice under statute. 205 C. 1. Cited. Id., 255; Id., 741; 206. C. 229; 207 C. 204; Id., 496; Id., 599; 209 C. 437; 211 C. 199; 212 C. 509. Application of 3-year bar with respect to negligence occurring prior to that period does not infringe upon Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Connecticut Constitution. 213 C. 282. Cited. 214 C. 242; Id., 464; 215 C. 377; 216 C. 412; 218 C. 531; 219 C. 363; 225 C. 238. “Continuous treatment” and “continuing course of conduct” doctrines discussed. 229 C. 256. Cited. 232 C. 527; 237 C. 25; 238 C. 800; 239 C. 265; 242 C. 1. Statute of limitations was tolled; judgment of Appellate Court in 42 CA 324 reversed. Id., 236. Statute of limitations was tolled when employer received notice of an employee's timely filed action against a third party tortfeasor and intervened within 30-day period prescribed by Sec. 31-293. 246 C. 156. Where improvements to real property contemplated by architect's or engineer's services are not completed because of defect complained of, Sec. 52-584a, and not this section, applies to plaintiff's cause of action. 247 C. 293. Mental suffering constitutes injury, even if unaccompanied by physical trauma to the body. 248 C. 21. Precondition of continuing course of conduct doctrine is that defendant must have committed an initial wrong upon plaintiff. 252 C. 193. Since there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the 3-year repose section contained in statute was tolled by defendant's alleged ongoing failure to warn plaintiff of his concern for cancer thus triggering the continuing course of conduct doctrine, it was improper for trial court to have concluded that there was no continuing course of conduct as a matter of law and to have granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id., 363. Allegations in amended complaint presented a new and different set of facts and were barred by statute of limitations since new facts did not relate back to original complaint. 257 C. 58. Does not impose a duty on plaintiff to investigate, instead, it requires jury to consider all the facts and circumstances in order to determine date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered; does not impose a heightened standard of discovery on health care professionals regarding discovery of actionable harm. 262 C. 797. Correct legal standard by which to evaluate timeliness of causes of action in negligence restated; limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on date when injury is first discovered or in exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. 268 C. 723. 90-day extension provided in Sec. 52-190a(b) applies equally to both the 2-year statute of limitation and 3-year statute of repose in this section. 269 C. 787. Legislature's purpose in distinguishing “injury or actionable harm” from “the act or omission complained of” and providing a 3-year statute of repose, was to avoid “draconian effect” of running the 2-year limitation period from the date of defendant's negligence in cases in which plaintiff is unable to bring an action because he could not discover an essential jurisdictional fact, despite the exercise of reasonable care; 2-year statute of limitations set forth in statute does not begin to run until plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known the identity of the tortfeasor; plaintiff's ignorance of tortfeasor's identity will not excuse plaintiff's failure to bring a negligence action within 3 years of the date of the act or omission complained of. 271 C. 284. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that two isolated contacts with two different radiologists at same hospital over the course of 3 years constituted a continuing course of conduct or treatment so as to toll the statute of limitations set forth in section for the purpose of allowing plaintiff to pursue a medical malpractice claim against the hospital for failing to discover her brain tumor. 279 C. 312. Plaintiff parents' claims against gynecologist delivering their infant were barred by the 3-year repose provision in statute; there was no genuine issue of material fact that gynecologist was not under a continuing duty to warn plaintiff parents of potential complications associated with respiratory distress syndrome because gynecologist ceased to be infant's treating physician after his birth; responsibility for infant's care and treatment after his birth was assumed by another physician who diagnosed infant as having the syndrome, and any legal duty that gynecologist had re infant prior to delivery concluded upon date of his birth; imposition on delivering hospital of a continuing duty to inform plaintiff parents of all potential complications associated with infant's diagnosis regardless of his treating physician's actual knowledge would nullify the 3-year repose provision established by legislature for medical malpractice actions; continuing course of conduct doctrine did not toll such repose provision. 280 C. 190. Continuous treatment doctrine did not apply to bar statute of limitations. 282 C. 745. Action was not time barred because there were disputed facts sufficient to warrant the invocation of continuing course of conduct doctrine. 287 C. 158. Evidence that defendant should have been aware or that defendant deviated from the standard of care does not amount to actual knowledge to impose a continuing duty on defendant so that the period of repose is tolled under continuous course of conduct doctrine; evidence must be submitted to prove the existence of a physician-patient relationship or ongoing course of treatment by defendant in order to properly toll the period of repose under continuing treatment doctrine. 290 C. 347. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Routine postoperative appointments for the purposes of tracking the progress of plaintiff's condition and postoperative complications, if any, constitute continuing course of treatment for any identified medical condition that was caused by the surgery. 321 C. 637. The relation back doctrine applies to a proposed new or changed allegation of negligence when it falls within the scope of the original cause of action, which is the transaction or occurrence underpinning plaintiff's legal claim against defendant. 325 C. 198. The plaintiff's knowledge of the causal connection between the defendants' alleged negligence and her physical harm is a material fact because it begins the accrual of statute of limitation; legislative history supports conclusion that “injury” as used in statute was intended to mean a legally recognized injury, not just physical hurt or loss. 342 C. 103.

Cited. 1 CA 7; Id., 123; Id., 652. Provides no exceptions for minors or insane persons. 3 CA 602. Cited. 6 CA 212; 11 CA 156; 14 CA 178; 16 CA 108; 18 CA 515; 19 CA 16; 21 CA 524; 22 CA 610; 24 CA 239; 25 CA 665; 29 CA 392; 31 CA 235; Id., 569; 32 CA 187; Id., 205; 33 CA 6; Id., 378; Id., 422; Id., 673; 34 CA 395; 38 CA 458; Id., 829; 42 CA 324; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 236; 43 CA 397; 45 CA 775; 46 CA 712. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply after plaintiff discovers the harm. 59 CA 311. Service of prejudgment remedy document did not toll the running of section, even though contained the words “the institution of this action” and included unsigned proposed writ of summons and complaint, since unsigned writ and complaint does not have effect of commencing a civil action; court declined to adopt rule that section is tolled when prejudgment remedy documents are served. 61 CA 234. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity, the 2-year statute of limitations applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under Sec. 52-593 for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Statute of limitations not tolled by continuous course of conduct doctrine where pathology group failed to diagnose plaintiff's disease, because to expect pathology group to provide follow-up treatment or to instruct patient on follow-up care after a negative diagnosis when there is no awareness that the diagnosis is wrong and there is no ongoing relationship is beyond the expectation of public policy. 66 CA 518. Because plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate that defendant physician had an awareness of risk to plaintiff subsequent to the surgical sterilization procedure, plaintiff could not establish that defendant had a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. 67 CA 565. Although genuine issue of material fact existed re defendant's initial alleged negligence, trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant physician was aware of a risk to plaintiff that would have triggered a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute. Id., 576. Statutes of limitation are not tolled by an automatic bankruptcy stay; pursuant to federal law, if the statute of limitations expires during the automatic bankruptcy stay, plaintiff has 30 days from notice of termination or expiration of the stay within which to commence an action. 68 CA 79. Where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property as belonging to another, the case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore statute of limitations in section applies rather than the 3-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. 79 CA 290. Doctrines of continuous treatment and continuing course of conduct apply, as a matter of law, only to 3-year limitation period and do not apply to toll time period for discovery portion of statute. 82 CA 396. Claim cast in contractual language subject to 3-year period of statute because, in light of noneconomic relief sought, it more closely resembles claim based on tortious conduct arising out of negligent performance or nonperformance of contractual duty than claim for breach of contract. 84 CA 1. Sheriff's attempt to serve defendant with process before he fled and subsequent service in defendant's mailbox were sufficient to constitute good faith efforts at compliance when defendant was clearly evading service. 93 CA 76. Once plaintiff became aware of her injuries on date of fall, statute of limitations began to run and, because the statute was not tolled, plaintiff was required to bring action within 2 years from date of discovery. 141 CA 282. Statute of limitations not tolled by common-law holiday rule for service of process to state marshals, as they are independent contractors and not state employees subject to mandatory closure on state holidays. 153 CA 563. “Foreign object exception” to statute of repose not recognized in Connecticut; statute of repose does not violate open courts provision of Connecticut Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10. 154 CA 1. When the original complaint alleges negligence, an amended complaint relating back to the original complaint and specifying the manner in which defendant was allegedly negligent is not considered a new theory of negligence for the purposes of section. 158 CA 66; judgment affirmed, see 325 C. 198.

Cited. 1 CS 142. Includes personal injuries whether or not due to negligence, citing 119 C. 500, 507. 3 CS 417. Injury means physical injury. 4 CS 293. Action for malpractice whether founded on tort or contract must be brought within one year. 6 CS 92, but see 11 CS 180. Cited. 8 CS 93; 9 CS 312. Cause of action otherwise barred by statute of limitations is not saved because it is asserted as a counterclaim. Id., 387. Cited. 10 CS 6. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted in the complaint. Id., 419; 17 CS 1. Cited. 11 CS 119. Section carves out an action ex contractu resulting from tortious or negligent conduct which caused a breach of contract. 12 CS 286. Withholding service for the purpose of allowing insurance company to adjust claim will not estop statute from tolling if insurance company is not a party defendant. 14 CS 418. Legal damage and apparent damage distinguished. Id., 464. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution is not limited by this section but by Sec. 52-577. 15 CS 434. Cited. 17 CS 62. Where amendment to complaint made more than 2 years after accident was based on nuisance, it was not barred since it is a question of fact whether nuisance resulted from positive act or negligence. Id., 114; 20 CS 36. Cited. 18 CS 225. Section controls limitation on action for damage to plaintiff's fence caused by the crumpling of a stone ledge on defendant's property near the common boundary. Id., 308. Under former statute, claimed negligence against manufacturer from expulsion of automobile tire while being mounted on rim held barred by statute because manufacture took place more than a year before action was begun; former statute compared. 19 CS 293. Defendant employer and its insurer not required to intervene within the 1-year period. 20 CS 31. Former statute compared. Id., 34. When wrong sued upon consists of continuing course of conduct, statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed. 22 CS 46. Statute of limitations bars plaintiff from amending his complaint in a personal injury action to add a claim for property damage more than 1 year after the collision. Id., 472. Where the action is seasonably brought so far as section is concerned, the legislature did not intend that section qualify the right of the employee under Sec. 31-293 to join as a plaintiff within 30 days thereafter. 23 CS 106. Counterclaim more than a year after the occurrence is barred unless it may be allowed under exception; held that pleadings had been finally closed on the filing of a reply when they terminated in an issue of fact decisive of the merits of the case; that the court might reopen the pleadings at any time to permit amendment did not mean that they were not closed within the intendment of statute. Id., 139. Cited. Id., 367; 24 CS 321. Where complaint is broad enough to permit proof of causes in tort and contract, demurrer merely reaching tort action is insufficient. Id., 459. Where plaintiffs alleged only negligence in their complaint, their motion to amend by charging defendant with wanton misconduct stated a new cause of action and could not be granted since statute of limitations had run. 25 CS 363. Section does not apply to the “Dog Injury” statute, which is governed by Sec. 52-577. 26 CS 294. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Motion to amend complaint to expand or amplify original allegations does not change cause of action and is not barred by statute of limitations. Id., 60. Cited. 28 CS 162. Where 1 year period with respect to antemortem injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative under Sec. 52-594 had year from date of death to institute action. Id., 461. Ordinarily, statute of limitations does not commence to run against defendant (third-party plaintiff) and in favor of third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against defendant. 29 CS 9. Statute of limitation suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. Id., 246. Time does not begin to run in a case involving a failure to warn of a foreign object in a patient's body until the object is discovered, unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered it earlier. 32 CS 118. Cited. 34 CS 22. Provisions of section should not be extended to allow codefendant to interpose cross claim when statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's cause of action. Id., 247. Statute of limitation is tolled upon the death of a tortfeasor until a fiduciary of his estate is properly appointed and qualified. 36 CS 121. Cited. Id., 269; 37 CS 735; Id., 899; 38 CS 318; 40 CS 266; 42 CS 187; 44 CS 148; Id., 527; 45 CS 136. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to the 2-year limitation; term “injury” in statute requires an actionable harm. Id., 154. Plaintiff's claim fails to toll statute; defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case. 46 CS 386. Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, occurring 21 years before filing of suit, made against named defendant for failure to have valid certificate of occupancy or to design, construct, operate or properly maintain property in accordance with building and fire codes, were not barred as untimely by tort statute of limitations so as to warrant granting of defendants' motion to strike those counts so alleging; facts demonstrated continuous course of conduct that tolled time limitations of section. 50 CS 28. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.

Action based on claim physician broke contract to achieve certain result from operation is not malpractice action; malpractice defined. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135. Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 not governed by 1-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379. Defendant may be estopped by his agreement, conduct, representations or fraud from asserting the bar of statute, provided plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence upon which the judge can base such a finding. Id., 686, 689. In a small claims action, according to the Practice Book, Secs. 900, 901, statute of limitation stops running when the case is entered in court even though the service of notice is not made within the statutory period. Id., 690, 697. Where pleadings showed plaintiffs knew at date of accident they had substantial injuries, they had not met burden of demonstrating an exception to usual running of statute and defendant's motion for summary judgment was correctly granted. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 85. Defendant insurer's discussions of settlement did not estop it from pleading statute as defense to plaintiff's action where there was no fraud on its part and final offer had been made 4 months before statute barred action. Id., 127. When defendant accepted plaintiff's offer of settlement of her cause of action for personal injuries, statute became inoperative as defense as contract had been made between the parties. Id., 274. Cited. Id., 488.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-86 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 897 / Section 52-86
Sec. 52-86. When creditor may appear and defend. Costs. Prohibited defenses.
Status: in_force

(b) If the plaintiff recovers his whole claim, costs shall be taxed against the defendant to the time of the appearance of the creditor, and the creditor shall be liable upon his bond for the remainder of the costs. If only a part of the plaintiff's claim is recovered, the whole costs shall be taxed against the defendant, and the creditor shall not be liable for the same. If judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, costs shall be taxed in his favor against the plaintiff, but the court may order that the judgment and execution therefor shall belong to the creditor.

(c) A creditor appearing pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be permitted to plead in abatement, to plead or give in evidence the statute of limitations, to plead that the contract was not in writing according to the requirements of the statute, or to plead any other statutory defense consistent with the justice of the plaintiff's claim.

Does not impair any right of attaching creditor, but affords him an additional remedy. 25 C. 362. Cited. 151 C. 611.

Garnishment of a debt due a nonresident defendant is in the nature of a proceeding in rem; no service of process on defendant is required. 20 CS 293. Cited. 25 CS 274.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-400b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-400b
Sec. 52-400b. Penalty for failure to comply with certain court orders.
Status: in_force

(b) No capias shall issue against a person who has failed to comply with a discovery, turnover or protection order unless the court finds that such person has been served with a subpoena ordering him to appear in court and he has failed to so appear.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-270 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 903 / Section 52-270
Sec. 52-270. Causes for which new trials may be granted.
Status: in_force

(b) An affidavit signed by any party or his or her attorney shall be presumptive evidence of want of actual notice.

See Sec. 52-268 re new trial when judge, stenographer or court reporter dies or is incapacitated and review of errors is not possible.

In general. History of power to grant. 65 C. 278; 94 C. 505. Wholly governed by statute; procedure and burden of proof. 75 C. 576; 76 C. 538. Petition for, is part of original proceeding. 75 C. 576. Petition for injunction against collection of judgment not petition for new trial; 44 C. 193; when it lies; 108 C. 17. Rules same in civil and criminal action. 65 C. 278; 69 C. 186; 72 C. 109; 74 C. 638; 79 C. 481. Not to be readily granted; but if cause can be shown under petition, demurrer does not lie. 72 C. 270. Harmless or technical error, or one where party himself is at fault not ground for. 11 C. 358; 18 C. 320; 19 C. 373; 21 C. 236; 31 C. 383; 72 C. 109; 80 C. 314; Error should not be granted where matter in dispute is trivial; 17 C. 486; 29 C. 123; 39 C. 306; or where lapse of time makes new trial ineffectual. 5 D. 335. Action of judge suo motu harmless where motion is later made. 83 C. 445. Discretion of court, and review in general; 2 R. 80; 12 C. 226; 51 C. 395; 72 C. 109; 80 C. 314; 84 C. 518; 85 C. 611; 87 C. 363; discretion means a legal discretion. 12 C. 154; 17 C. 539. “The usual rules” are rules of law and decision may be reviewed. 58 C. 67. New trials may be granted nisi. 9 C. 371; 12 C. 486; 30 C. 343; 31 C. 62. Petition may be brought at any time within 3 years, though judgment was by default. 93 C. 160. Trial court may grant for erroneous instructions. 94 C. 443. Discretion of court and its review. Id., 506. Affords remedy to party aggrieved by default judgment. 97 C. 123. Petition for new trial not independent proceeding but ancillary to original action. 112 C. 591. After expiration of term during which action was withdrawn, remedy of plaintiff if any would be by petition for new trial or proceeding in equity, but not by motion to restore. 123 C. 172. Insufficiency of declaration held no ground; 5 D. 230; 6 C. 83; 8 C. 242; nor error in pleading; 3 C. 294; but where administrator erred in pleading, beneficiaries were granted new trial; 73 C. 404; if party, having opportunity to amend, neglects to do so, no new trial. 83 C. 474; 85 C. 595. Where party had no notice of pendency of action. 46 C. 604; 55 C. 182. Does not lie where judge was exercising a discretion. 36 C. 460. Misconduct of juror. 50 C. 307; 72 C. 109; 80 C. 314; 84 C. 518; 87 C. 363; 90 C. 79. Equitable grounds; where application is to be made. 71 C. 432. Death of judge before appeal can be perfected. 76 C. 538; 87 C. 608. If under his petition plaintiff can prove a reasonable cause, demurrer does not lie. 72 C. 270. Since 1893, “other reasonable cause” includes a verdict against the evidence. 64 C. 61. Improper argument of counsel; 72 C. 202; Id., 252; 74 C. 638; Id., 700; 79 C. 477; 83 C. 160; Id., 183; Id., 652; 86 C. 100; improper conduct of counsel. 83 C. 702. Lack of opportunity to make, or prevention from making, defense. 93 C. 160. Existence of good defense must be proved to obtain new trial because of lack of opportunity to present it. 111 C. 103. Champertous agreement not a ground for new trial when fraudulent testimony not given. 100 C. 110. Death of stenographer, if it prevents raising questions on appeal, is ground. 105 C. 719. Allowing exhibits, prejudicial to party, wrongfully to be taken into jury room. 109 C. 726. Perjury on the part of plaintiff should be raised by defendant by motion for new trial. Id., 328. Review of scope of statute. 105 C. 713. Misconduct on part of trial judge may be sufficient “reasonable cause”. 114 C. 736. Must prove that mispleading came about through fraud, accident or mistake. 116 C. 699. Is an additional safeguard to prevent injustice where remedy by appeal does not lie, or where appeal is prevented by fraud, accident or mistake. 137 C. 58. Other reasonable cause includes cause for which equity could grant a new trial, such as, fraud, accident or mistake. 140 C. 464; 144 C. 389. Insanity which deprives appellant of right to consult with counsel on appeal, held not to constitute grounds for new trial under section. 145 C. 11. Discretion of court to grant a new trial is not an absolute but a legal one; can be set aside for misconception as to limits of its power, error in its preliminary proceedings or for a clear abuse of its discretion. 146 C. 608. Where a judgment has been rendered after a default and there was no fraud, unfair dealing or misconduct on the part of defendant leading to the entry of the default judgment, section would support the exercise of discretion to grant a new trial only if there had been, despite the exercise of due diligence, no reasonable opportunity to defend and a just defense in whole or in part existed. 150 C. 188. Cited. 115 C. 42; 118 C. 230; Id., 294; 119 C. 220; 121 C. 379; 124 C. 644; 134 C. 483; 136 C. 364; 141 C. 202; Id., 214; 142 C. 27; Id., 676; 151 C. 716; 154 C. 294; Id., 314; 156 C. 72; 162 C. 318; 163 C. 166; 179 C. 246; Id., 415; 181 C. 58; 185 C. 495; 188 C. 281; 189 C. 573; 190 C. 667; Id., 707; Id., 774; 194 C. 510; 202 C. 429; Id., 561; 209 C. 143; 212 C. 387; 223 C. 834; 229 C. 397; 230 C. 427; 231 C. 745; 237 C. 576; 242 C. 125. Appellate Court erred in concluding trial court had abused its discretion in denying a requested continuance and a motion for a mistrial; judgment of Appellate Court in 41 CA 317 reversed. Id., 445.

Newly discovered evidence. New trial not granted if evidence could have been secured on former trial with reasonable diligence; K. 282; 18 C. 493; 20 C. 310; 43 C. 191; 81 C. 325; 86 C. 684; 89 C. 401; 96 C. 254; 111 C. 115; nor if it be merely cumulative; 20 C. 310; 43 C. 193; 68 C. 50; 77 C. 15; 83 C. 477; 106 C. 6; 138 C. 717; 139 C. 690; cumulative defined; 96 C. 258; nor for mere afterthought of witness; 45 C. 266; 75 C. 576; 77 C. 15; 96 C. 254; nor if it be merely for impeachment; 32 C. 369; 58 C. 60; nor where result would not be changed. 68 C. 50; 80 C. 157; 86 C. 684; 89 C. 401; 91 C. 23; 96 C. 258. New evidence must be sufficient to turn scale, must not be cumulative, and ordinarily must do more than impeach the reputation of a witness. 94 C. 142. Where evidence held insufficient; 45 C. 266; held sufficient; 53 C. 360. Such evidence cannot be proved by mere ex parte affidavit. 45 C. 266. Rules same in criminal, even capital, case. 48 C. 92. Discretion of court. 75 C. 576; 77 C. 15; 83 C. 477; 86 C. 688; 89 C. 401; 91 C. 23; 96 C. 258. Pleading. 43 C. 188; 75 C. 576; 80 C. 157; 81 C. 325. Amendment of petition. 83 C. 477; 91 C. 23. Making proceedings on former trial part of petition. 75 C. 31; 86 C. 684. Applies, by analogy, to motion before compensation commissioner to open and modify his award. 106 C. 5. In such a proceeding, diligence is not as essential as in a petition for a new trial in a court. Id.; 107 C. 167. Not abuse of court's discretion to require plaintiff first to show that evidence as not discovered or discoverable by due diligence prior to or during trial of original action. 124 C. 670. Conditions under which new trial should or may be granted for false testimony by material witness. 131 C. 682; 146 C. 149. Absence of allegation that newly discovered evidence will probably produce a different result makes petition demurrable. 137 C. 642. New trial not ordinarily granted because of discovery of additional impeaching or discrediting testimony. 139 C. 249; 152 C. 512. Evidence not newly discovered which related to actions of accused himself. Id., 317. Where claimed newly discovered evidence would merely affect credibility of a witness, it is not ground for a new trial unless it is reasonably probable that on a new trial there would be a different result. 147 C. 566. To grant a new trial, the evidence must be newly discovered, material to the issue on a new trial and such that it could not have been discovered and produced on the former trial by the exercise of due diligence. 152 C. 511. Evidence which is cumulative only and designed to attack the credibility of a witness is not ordinarily a ground for a new trial and is never such a ground unless it appears reasonably certain that injustice has been done and that the result of a new trial will probably be different. Id., 512. Fair opportunity to appeal is a “reasonable cause” for a new trial, but late notification of judgment does not prevent appeal and therefore is not cause for a new trial; petition for new trial is not a substitute for or alternative to ordinary appeal. 164 C. 212. Cited. 168 C. 541. Failure of state to comply with mailing provision of Sec. 19-483(b) did not require granting of new trial under this section. 172 C. 16, 17. Cited. 173 C. 334. Distinctions between a petition and a motion for a new trial examined. 180 C. 141.

Cited. 1 CA 298; 2 CA 355; 3 CA 235; Id., 322; Id., 633; 10 CA 503; 14 CA 88; 15 CA 222; Id., 312; Id., 367; Id., 502; 18 CA 166; 19 CA 76; 25 CA 318; 29 CA 722; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 122; 34 CA 103; 36 CA 59. Final judgment is a condition precedent to proper filing of petition for new trial pursuant to section. 69 CA 760. Exercise of due diligence is a condition precedent to finding of reasonable cause. 72 CA 692. Plaintiffs' did not meet burden of proving they exercised due diligence to discover evidence prior to trial. 75 CA 63. Pro se plaintiffs' mistaken interpretation of rules of practice, which led to their failure to file petition for certification to appeal, did not entitle them to a new trial under “reasonable cause” provision. 86 CA 147.

When petition for new trial is fatally defective. 1 CS 83. As there is no specific method of petitioning for a new trial, a demurrer is within the intent of statute. 14 CS 102. Petition is the established procedure for claiming new trial. Id., 505. Cited. 17 CS 325. Under a proper showing, the loss of all exhibits might be a “reasonable cause” for the granting of a new trial. 20 CS 469. New trial denied as claimed new evidence existed at date of original trial, and would probably not change the result if new trial were granted. 31 CS 296. Cited. 32 CS 349. Actual knowledge of pendency of action which may be inferred from personal service precludes granting relief from default judgment. 33 CS 572. Cited. 36 CS 53; 37 CS 645; Id., 891. Statute of limitations did not run since plaintiff was originally barred from action under this statute by Sec. 46b-172 which barrier was subsequently removed when it was declared unconstitutional. 38 CS 534. Cited. Id., 537; Id., 718; 41 CS 454. Death of judge while post-trial motions pending does not constitute reasonable cause for new trial since death does not affect ability to appeal or prevent defendants from pursuing appeal because of fraud, mistake or accident. 46 CS 650. Newly discovered evidence of criminal activity of “uncharged misconduct” witnesses failed to meet fourth prong of Asherman standard that the evidence is likely to produce a different result in a new trial. 52 CS 69.

Motion for new trial not equivalent to petition for new trial. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 387. Defendant's remembrance after trial of previously forgotten facts does not constitute newly discovered evidence; lack of diligence is shown by a failure to make inquiry of persons who are likely to know the facts in question. Id., 651, 654. Where plaintiff's motion to open judgment on default was denied, he was not precluded from petitioning for new trial; determination of motion was not res judicata. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 201. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 531.

Subsec. (a):

Although trial court found that newly discovered evidence consisting of statements inculpating third parties satisfied minimum threshold for admission as declarations against penal interest, it was not divested of its authority and responsibility to evaluate credibility of the evidence in order to decide properly whether a new trial would produce a different result. 295 C. 447. Legislature did not intend to vest the Superior Court with the exclusive authority to grant new trials within that court's sole discretion, and thereby limit the scope of any appellate review to a determination of whether that court abused its discretion. 328 C. 84.

“Other reasonable cause” includes every cause for which a court of equity could grant new trial, such as, for example, fraud, accident and mistake. 59 CA 291. Habeas court not barred under doctrine of collateral estoppel from determining that petitioner's trial counsel was not ineffective; issues of due diligence on petition for a new trial and adequate performance on claim of ineffective assistance are similar but not identical. 100 CA 94.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 903a / Section 52-278a
Sec. 52-278a. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(a) “Commercial transaction” means a transaction which is not a consumer transaction.

(b) “Consumer transaction” means a transaction in which a natural person obligates himself to pay for goods sold or leased, services rendered or moneys loaned for personal, family or household purposes.

(c) “Person” means and includes individuals, partnerships, associations, limited liability companies and corporations.

(d) “Prejudgment remedy” means any remedy or combination of remedies that enables a person by way of attachment, foreign attachment, garnishment or replevin to deprive the defendant in a civil action of, or affect the use, possession or enjoyment by such defendant of, his property prior to final judgment but shall not include a temporary restraining order.

(e) “Property” means any present or future interest in real or personal property, goods, chattels or choses in action, whether such is vested or contingent.

Cited. 172 C. 577; 176 C. 432; 178 C. 393; 181 C. 524; 184 C. 85; 188 C. 69; 196 C. 359; 208 C. 13; 220 C. 904; 222 C. 361; Id., 541; 238 C. 172.

Cited. 4 CA 510; 5 CA 296; 6 CA 591; 14 CA 579; 19 CA 256; 28 CA 809; 29 CA 48; 32 CA 118; 46 CA 399.

Self-help repossession is not covered by prejudgment remedies act. 31 CS 152. Cited. 38 CS 98.

Subdiv. (d):

“Combination” of prejudgment remedies limited to combination of the four remedies enumerated in definition of “prejudgment remedy”. 261 C. 721.

May not be extended to include a temporary injunction so as to permit appeal of an injunction under Sec. 52-278 l . 25 CA 28.

Meaning of “final judgment” discussed; prejudgment remedy available to prevailing plaintiff while case on appeal. 35 CS 49.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-484 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 917 / Section 52-484
Sec. 52-484. Action in nature of interpleader.
Status: in_force

Is a remedial statute and to be favorably construed; its purpose is to secure a determination of every right, title or interest that can by possibility be set up. 72 C. 93. Trustee whose title is attached may throw his outlay in defending it directly on the fund. Id., 92. Judgment to interplead properly entered after issues found for plaintiff. 73 C. 568. Defendant, sued as maker of note by endorsee, cannot compel plaintiff to interplead with one who has garnisheed original debt. 74 C. 234. So far as statute affirms common law right, action under it is not proper to go to jury. 79 C. 263. Gives broader remedy than common law; 103 C. 343; lies by depositor in bank against it and adverse claimant to deposit. 80 C. 422. Allowance to stakeholder of counsel fees and expenses upheld. 72 C. 322; 80 C. 431. Action cannot be maintained in common pleas court by judgment debtor against assignee of judgment and one who has garnisheed it in action in Superior Court. Id., 593. Proper remedy of claimant to money paid into hands of clerk of court in such action. Id., 603. Action not proper where sole question is was plaintiff's decedent a member of fraternal benefit society at time of his death; 84 C. 363; nor to determine whether trustee in trust deed should pay part of principal to grantor; Id., 497; nor by garnishee, against attaching creditor and other claimant of fund; 85 C. 575; 74 C. 234; nor to determine ownership of several deposits in different banks; 88 C. 161; nor where controversy can have but two sides; 90 C. 63; nor by administrator to determine who are entitled to legacies, though certain of them have been garnisheed. 84 C. 323; 91 C. 446. Lies by railroad to determine rights to money due for destruction of building by fire. 83 C. 690. Judgment where court finds neither claimant entitled to fund. 87 C. 644. Fraternal benefit society, by bringing interpleader against claimants of fund, does not waive noncompliance with its bylaws. 91 C. 121. Where personal liability of plaintiff is involved, counsel fees should not be allowed to him. 92 C. 477. Decree that one defendant has no right does not establish right of other. 93 C. 308. Judgment debtor who is garnisheed cannot interplead garnisheeing plaintiffs. 94 C. 193. Under a cross complaint claiming an interpleader, all claims, legal and equitable, to the bank deposit in suit are to be considered. 96 C. 333. Plaintiff may make claim in his own behalf in statutory action; otherwise at common law. 103 C. 347. By carrier to determine to whom delivery should be made. 104 C. 347. Interpleader is governed by equitable principles. 115 C. 199. Cited. 118 C. 526. In absence of evidence of conflicting claims, no basis for interpleader action exists. 120 C. 279. Court may in its discretion tax costs against prevailing party. 125 C. 583. Allowance to an interested party not a stakeholder proper. 139 C. 346. Proceeds from death action attached by creditor of estate; interpleader possible remedy. 147 C. 233. Two of three claimants to escrow fund failed, after judgment, to perfect their garnishment of fund and therefore had only status of unsecured judgment creditors; third claimant which did garnish fund, obtained judgment for greater amount than it contained, and did perfect its garnishment pursuant to Sec. 52-328, was the only secured creditor and is entitled to balance of fund to exclusion of other claimants. 159 C. 368. Cited. 188 C. 69; 211 C. 648; 240 C. 287.

Cited. 10 CA 22; 11 CA 308; 38 CA 134; 43 CA 471. Statute allows an action by an interested nonpossessor in which all claimants, including an interested possessor, as defendants, seek all or a portion of the amount being held by one of the defendants. 55 CA 238.

Matters which may be settled by interpleader; statute creates no new grounds of interpleader and is governed by the rules of equitable interpleader. 5 CS 441. Cited. 6 CS 285. Suit of interpleader is not only for those who claim to be entitled to property but those who claim to be interested in it. 9 CS 368. A judgment debtor against whom suit has been brought by an assignee of the judgment, and who has been garnisheed in actions against the original judgment creditor, may not resort to interpleader to safeguard himself in making payment. Id., 480. Cited. 12 CS 158. What conditions are necessary to entitle a stakeholder to maintain a bill of interpleader. Id., 210. Cited. Id., 213. Where plaintiff union sued in its own name, defendant bank was not entitled to an interpleader between union officers to determine which was legally authorized to handle union funds. 15 CS 321. Once rights of parties are determined in an interpleader action under section, court must release funds. 31 CS 529. Federal tax lien takes precedence over counsel fees provided for by section. 35 CS 79. Cited. 39 CS 470. Statutory requisite to interpleader is that plaintiff have money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons; because plaintiff is not a stakeholder but a contract debtor and its liability is not limited to the stake that it identifies but is, theoretically, unlimited, interpleader is inappropriate under these circumstances. 45 CS 235.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-163 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-163
Sec. 52-163. Judicial notice of special acts, regulations of state and municipal agencies and municipal ordinances.
Status: in_force

Statutes not printed by public authority, no evidence. 2 R. 250; Id., 300. Construction given by the state where the statute was enacted will be followed by the courts of this state. 47 C. 599. Cited. 65 C. 214; 69 C. 390, 391; Id., 650; 73 C. 181; 79 C. 585; 88 C. 681; 93 C. 46; 114 C. 74; 142 C. 278. Applies to judge performing judicial function. 78 C. 2. Supreme Court will notice foreign statute overlooked by trial judge. 81 C. 152, 164; 87 C. 251. But birth certificate properly authenticated under statute of state where issued is inadmissible here unless under great seal of foreign state, or under seal of foreign secretary of state attesting seal and official character of official signing. 99 C. 277. Court will not take judicial notice of orders of a city board of health even in a Connecticut city. 100 C. 102. Statute obviates necessity of specially pleading law of a foreign state. 103 C. 505; 106 C. 688. Court does not take judicial notice of zoning regulations. 145 C. 735. Court need not take judicial notice of law of foreign jurisdiction under this section or Sec. 51-32 or 52-164, unless authoritative sources of the foreign law, subject to inspection or verification by opposing counsel, are made available to the court by reference or otherwise, under the usual rules for judicial notice. 152 C. 475. Cited re town ordinances. 164 C. 175. Court need not take judicial notice of the law of a foreign jurisdiction unless authoritative sources of the foreign law are made available to the court. 165 C. 177. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 2 CA 315. Statute permits courts to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances which include zoning regulations. 5 CA 455, 457. Cited. 13 CA 124. Scope of statute not extended to include rules and procedures of a local housing authority. 23 CA 366. Cited. 24 CA 49.

Cited. 8 CS 257; 27 CS 514; 33 CS 562.

Where law of New York applicable by stipulation of parties applied to case, and parties failed to establish what that law is, court will assume it is same as Connecticut law. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 629. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557g — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557g
Sec. 52-557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as provided in section 52-557h , an owner of land who, either directly or indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner.

(c) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.

Cited. 204 C. 435. Applies to all municipal and private landowners. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Cited. 226 C. 446; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.

Cited. 7 CA 164. Void for vagueness doctrine does not require prior warning of civil immunity to potential claimants. 10 CA 86. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities; municipality's immunity under section extends to its employees. 24 CA 592. Cited. Id., 832; 39 CA 280; 45 CA 17.

State enjoys same immunity from suit as private persons as long as it makes its land available for recreational purposes free of charge. 52 CS 562.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146k — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146k
Sec. 52-146k. Privileged communications between victim and domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor.
Status: in_force

(1) “Domestic violence agency” means any office, shelter, host home or agency offering assistance to victims of domestic violence through crisis intervention, emergency shelter referral and medical and legal advocacy, and which meets the Department of Social Services criteria of service provision for such agencies.

(2) “Domestic violence counselor” means any person engaged in a domestic violence agency (A) who has undergone a minimum of twenty hours of training which shall include, but not be limited to, the dynamics of domestic violence, crisis intervention, communication skills, working with diverse populations, an overview of the state criminal justice system and information about state and community resources for victims of domestic violence, (B) who is certified as a counselor by the domestic violence agency that provided such training, (C) who is under the control of a direct service supervisor of a domestic violence agency, and (D) whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counsel and assistance to, and the advocacy of the cause of, victims of domestic violence.

(3) “Confidential communication” means information transmitted between a victim of domestic violence or a victim of a sexual assault and a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than any person who is present to further the interests of the victim in the consultation or any person to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or for the accomplishment of the purposes for which such counselor is consulted, and includes all information received by, and any advice, report or working paper given or made by, such counselor in the course of the relationship with the victim.

(4) “Rape crisis center” means any office, institution or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault and their families through crisis intervention, medical and legal advocacy and follow-up counseling.

(5) “Sexual assault counselor” means (A) any person engaged in a rape crisis center who (i) has undergone a minimum of twenty hours of training which shall include, but not be limited to, the dynamics of sexual assault and incest, crisis intervention, communication skills, working with diverse populations, an overview of the state criminal justice system, information about hospital and medical systems and information about state and community resources for sexual assault victims, (ii) is certified as a counselor by the sexual assault center which has provided such training, (iii) is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis center, and (iv) whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling and assistance to, and the advocacy of the cause of, victims of sexual assault, or (B) any member of the armed forces of the state or the United States who is trained and certified as a victim advocate or a sexual assault prevention coordinator in accordance with the military's sexual assault prevention and response program.

(6) “Victim” means any person who consults a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a mental, physical or emotional condition caused by domestic violence or a sexual assault.

(b) On or after October 1, 1983, a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor shall not disclose any confidential communications made to such counselor at any time by a victim in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding unless the victim making the confidential communications waives the privilege, provided under no circumstances shall the location of the domestic violence agency or rape crisis center or the identity of the domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor be disclosed in any civil or criminal proceeding. Any request made on or after October 1, 1983, by the defendant or the state for such confidential communications shall be subject to the provisions of this subsection.

(c) When a victim is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the guardian of the victim or the executor or administrator of the estate of the victim may waive the privilege established by this section.

(d) A minor may knowingly waive the privilege established by this section. In any instance where the minor is, in the opinion of the court, incapable of knowingly waiving the privilege, the parent or guardian of the minor may waive the privilege on behalf of the minor, provided the parent or guardian is not the defendant and does not have a relationship with the defendant such that the parent or guardian has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.

(e) The privilege established by this section shall not apply: (1) In matters of proof concerning chain of custody of evidence; (2) in matters of proof concerning the physical appearance of the victim at the time of the injury; or (3) where the domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor has knowledge that the victim has given perjured testimony and the defendant or the state has made an offer of proof that perjury may have been committed by the victim.

(f) The failure of any party to testify as a witness pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not result in an inference unfavorable to the state's cause or to the cause of the defendant.

Cited. 199 C. 693; 200 C. 734; 201 C. 211; 202 C. 259; 204 C. 259; 211 C. 555; 230 C. 43; 240 C. 658; 242 C. 1.

Cited. 8 CA 216; 10 CA 103; 23 CA 509.

Subsec. (b):

Defendant's communication with her counselor made before effective date of act held erroneously admitted at her trial held after the effective date. 204 C. 259.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-575 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-575
Sec. 52-575. Entry upon land to be made within fifteen years.
Status: in_force

(b) If any person who has such right or title of entry into any lands or tenements is, at the time of the first descending or accruing of such right or title, a minor, non compos mentis or imprisoned, he and his heirs may, notwithstanding the expiration of such fifteen years, make such entry and serve and record such notice at any time within five years next after full age, coming of sound mind or release from prison, or his heirs shall, within five years after his death, make such entry and serve and record such notice, and take benefit of the same.

Section is substantially copied from the English statute, 21 Jac. 1, Ch. 6, Sec. 1, except that it reduces the time for reentry from 20 to 15 years; history of statute. 75 C. 533. Right of entry does not accrue to, nor statute begin to run against, the heirs of a femme covert, during the life of her husband, if tenant by the curtesy. 3 C. 193; 5 C. 235, 236; 29 C. 136, see 1 R. 547. In barring rights of entry, actions of ejectment are barred; 2 R. 512; and also bills to redeem a mortgage. 2 R. 512. If one of the several tenants who are disseized is within the statutory exceptions, it does not avail the others. 4 D. 273; Id., 466; 5 D. 218. Disabilities accruing after right of entry accrues are not within the exceptions. 2 C. 27. The 5 years, allowed in case of disability, may sometimes be part of the 15 years. 3 C. 244. Statute runs against private right of owner of land within an alleged highway. 50 C. 213, 214. A statute of limitation does not run against the state. 56 C. 517. Statute begins to run when owner is in fact disseized whether under a disability or not, but additional time is allowed after removal of disability. 74 C. 111, 112. When right to redeem a mortgage barred. 76 C. 146; Id., 227; 81 C. 442; 84 C. 56. Applied by analogy to right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Section will ordinarily be followed, by analogy, in foreclosure actions. 131 C. 39. Cited. 112 C. 368; 132 C. 622; 182 C. 272; 214 C. 464.

Adverse possession. Rules strictly construed. 29 C. 398. Gives fee simple after 15 years, unless one of exceptions of statute apply. 5 C. 298; 14 C. 290; 19 C. 475. Constructive possession will not satisfy requirement of actual possession; 8 C. 443; as where it is by license; 5 D. 187; 38 C. 520; or under a contract. 1 R. 245. As between husband and wife; 76 C. 223; mortgagor and mortgagee; 47 C. 496; 76 C. 146; Id., 223; principal and agent; 77 C. 578; life tenant and reversioner; 70 C. 349; 76 C. 595; one entitled to dower, to whom it is not assigned, and heirs. 90 C. 133. Disability from infancy. 74 C. 111. Does not run against the state; 56 C. 517; but that state has claim to land of no consequence between individual claimants; 95 C. 619; nor against assessment lien; 79 C. 38; nor against public, but public may abandon right; 73 C. 581; and the same rule applies to railroad right-of-way. 86 C. 275. Necessary elements. 74 C. 107; 84 C. 569; 101 C. 412; 104 C. 605; 105 C. 355; 119 C. 287; 137 C. 40; 142 C. 398; 148 C. 158. If title of another is recognized, possession no longer adverse. 81 C. 547. Adverse user is use as one's own. 83 C. 627. Possession under belief that one is owner may suffice. 81 C. 133. No necessity of claiming title. 74 C. 111; 84 C. 569; 108 C. 5. Presumption of knowledge by owner from possession. 74 C. 107; 82 C. 437. Mere exclusive possession not enough. 78 C. 128; 75 C. 522; 82 C. 653. When possession under oral gift is sufficient. 13 C. 235; 21 C. 416; 39 C. 96; 103 C. 354. Effect of deed subsequently given, conveying less than fee. 81 C. 539; 83 C. 360. Possession under void deed; 3 C. 246; 35 C. 437; 39 C. 97; 90 C. 241; effect of terms of deed. 81 C. 546. Possession under oral exchange. 82 C. 437. As applied to cornice jutting over land; 75 C. 663; 78 C. 405; to division wall. 79 C. 457. Occupation and use of land as evidence; 74 C. 107; 77 C. 28; 85 C. 159; erection of building, fence or wall; 69 C. 15; 71 C. 254; 86 C. 545; 88 C. 688; 109 C. 452; payment of taxes; 80 C. 338; color of title; ancient deeds. 71 C. 555; 88 C. 521. Accepting lease as rebutting claim of adverse user. 79 C. 493. Tacking together rights of successive disseizors; 3 D. 259; 31 C. 531; but they must be in same chain of title. 86 C. 699. A casual or stealthy reentry will not avail owner. 32 C. 498. Is ordinarily a question of fact. 83 C. 500; 89 C. 359; 90 C. 133; 99 C. 67; 105 C. 725, but see 95 C. 619. By an heir, as against right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Disclaimer. 92 C. 546. By one cotenant against others; of island little visited. 95 C. 619. Possession under subsisting contract for purchase of title, when adverse. 106 C. 301. Adverse possession of fee must be against everyone; of easement, only against general public. 105 C. 728. Church society maintaining horse sheds on disputed land held to have acquired it by adverse possession. 103 C. 336. Applies only to the acquiring of title to land by adverse possession. 136 C. 277. Claim of right and an intent by possessor to use property as his own are among essential elements. 137 C. 40. Entry must be made within 15 years and an action must be commenced and prosecuted to effect within 1 year after entry. Id., 205. Plaintiff alleged title by adverse possession; defendant's demurrer stated cause of action barred by statute; demurrer without merit because plaintiff alleged he remained in possession to date of complaint. 138 C. 102. Conclusion of court that title by adverse possession had not been proved, sustained. Id., 690. Cited. 139 C. 220; 141 C. 198. Exclusive possession not met if dominion over property is shared with other users. 154 C. 194. Where deeds of claimant and his predecessors in title expressly excepted strip of land claimed and neither his grantor nor predecessor grantor had orally conveyed excepted strip, connection between successive adverse claimants necessary to successful acquisition of title by tacking successive adverse possessions held lacking. 155 C. 327. Sporadic trespasses should not be construed as ousting the owner-neighbor of possession, especially where there was no open and notorious possession. 158 C. 510. Adverse possession against cotenants and daughters; may be based on fraudulently obtained, void probate decree; nature of possession required, role of “color of title”; section discussed. 171 C. 149. Two permits granted to defendant authorizing construction of a dock did not vest title in defendant or defendant's predecessors or allow defendant to bypass the requirements of adverse possession in section, nor did they render futile defendant's ability to assert a claim of right to adversely possess plaintiff's littoral area. 300 C. 297.

Prescription. Statute applies by analogy; nature of prescriptive right. 2 C. 607; 75 C. 522. Cannot give right to maintain nuisance. 69 C. 668; 72 C. 531; 83 C. 417. Community cannot acquire, to right-of-way. 78 C. 130. By city for sewer. 81 C. 137. Implies grant. 78 C. 132. User under deed cannot be basis for; 72 C. 188; but user may originate in contract or equitable right. 8 C. 137; 90 C. 241. Whether user is under license or claim of right question of fact. 78 C. 156; 89 C. 359; 96 C. 680; 105 C. 725. Must be reasonable. 83 C. 424. Elements. Id., 624; 90 C. 241; 105 C. 725. Imputing knowledge to owner. 81 C. 137; 87 C. 31. Building or eaves jutting over land. 75 C. 664; 78 C. 401; 87 C. 31; 89 C. 359. Diversion of water. 69 C. 668; 83 C. 611. Right to discharge surface water, not lost by 10 years' use of intercepting ditch. 83 C. 59. Right to acquire lateral support by, quaere. 82 C. 126. Cannot be acquired as to secret tunnel beneath way. 87 C. 31. Fire escapes jutting over line. 92 C. 546. Underground sewer. 96 C. 676. Loss of easement by prescription; elements. 104 C. 140, 596. Abutter on highway cannot acquire prescriptive right to maintain encroachments therein. Id., 619. Right-of-way cannot be acquired over route of public highway unless discontinued or abandoned. Id., 391. Adverse user need be only exclusive as against public; change of user from horse-drawn to motor driven vehicles does not break period. 105 C. 728. User must be sufficiently open to put owner on notice. 108 C. 24. Lessee in possession cannot prescribe in himself; unless lease is effective to cover right-of-way, lessee's adverse use of the way cannot enure to lessor's benefit. 121 C. 638.

Cited. 3 CA 602; 6 CA 187; 10 CA 669; 13 CA 518; 15 CA 458; 35 CA 398. When not claimed under color of title, adverse possession is limited to the area of land actually possessed; it can only extend as far as the claimant has actually occupied and possessed the land in dispute. 121 CA 748.

Cited. 15 CS 467.

Driveway openly used in common by adjoining property owners for more than 15 years resulted in prescriptive right of plaintiff to such use and defendants were ordered to remove a newly installed fence. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 360.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-593a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-593a
Sec. 52-593a. Action not lost where process served after expiration of limitation period.
Status: in_force

(b) In any such case, the officer making service shall endorse under oath on such officer's return the date of delivery of the process to such officer for service in accordance with this section.

Cited. 170 C. 5; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464. “Process to be served” must be delivered to marshal within applicable limitations period, and such delivery is not complete until marshal is given instruction to effectuate service. 294 C. 673. Endorsement requirement in Subsec. (b) is directory rather than mandatory, and Subsec. (a) embodies the substance of section. 328 C. 172. Subsec. (a): Successfully faxing process to the state marshal for service satisfies the personal delivery requirement and is consistent with the section's remedial purpose. 335 C. 138.

Cited. 10 CA 14; 43 CA 397. Action commences on date that process was delivered to sheriff for service, if defendant is served within 15 days of delivery to the sheriff. 53 CA 725. Delivery by mail is not precluded under section, the purpose of which is to ensure that process is received on time by the officer, but the determinative standard under section is when the marshal receives the process, not when it is mailed. 136 CA 67. Action saved from dismissal because marshal had original summons and complaint in his possession the day before the statute of limitations expired and process was served within 30 days of delivery; failure of marshal to include date of delivery in the return was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. 154 CA 146. Section applies to civil actions and not probate appeals. 173 CA 788. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that process was “personally delivered” to state marshal when transmitted to marshal's office by fax machine. 174 CA 285; judgment reversed, see 335 C. 138. Section is not implicated in habeas actions because, in a habeas action, service of process does not occur until after a petition is filed in court for a preliminary review, the court determines that the petition pleads a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief can be granted and over which the court has jurisdiction, and the writ issues. 212 CA 628.

Appeal to court from decision of administrative agency is cause of action within meaning of section. 33 CS 172. Service of process which came into hands of deputy sheriff by mail was personally delivered to him within meaning of section. Id., 677. Cited. 34 CS 565; 40 CS 299; 41 CS 425; 42 CS 187.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-141 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-141
Sec. 52-141. Set-off in action for trespass or tort.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) This section shall not apply to a civil action for damages for taking property exempt from execution.

(2) No debt which was acquired by a defendant by purchase or assignment after the accruing of the cause of action upon which the judgment is rendered may be allowed as a set-off under this section.

(3) An assignment of the judgment by the plaintiff shall not affect the right of set-off and any such assignment shall be taken subject to the right of set-off.

(4) Any such set-off shall be claimed by filing a complaint in the court in which the judgment has been rendered within twenty-four hours after final judgment.

(5) No set-off may be allowed in cases where the defendant had the right of set-off on the trial of the case.

(c) (1) The court shall make any proper set-off immediately if the debt claimed is admitted by the plaintiff or evidenced by judgment.

(2) If a claimed set-off is not admitted or evidenced by judgment and is denied by the plaintiff, it shall not be allowed unless the defendant has instituted a suit therefor prior to the rendition of judgment in the original action. If any such suit is pending at the time of rendition of judgment for the plaintiff in the original action, the court rendering judgment shall stay execution thereon until the final termination of the suit. Upon termination of the suit, the court shall allow the set-off in the original action in accordance with the amount adjudged to be due on the set-off claim in the suit.

No set-off can be allowed in trespass for levying on exempt property, though part of it was not exempt. 33 C. 236. Construction of clause de “taking” property exempt from execution. 45 C. 567. Set-off in tort actions generally. 66 C. 500; 82 C. 362. Unless procedure followed, right is waived; but equitable principles governing in receiverships may require set-off to be allowed. 78 C. 443; Id., 450. Cited. 221 C. 912; 225 C. 146; 233 C. 460.

Cited. 26 CA 322.

Cited. 5 CS 146.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-605 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 928 / Section 52-605
Sec. 52-605. Filing of foreign judgment; certification; effect; notice.
Status: in_force

(b) Such foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

(c) Within thirty days after the filing of the judgment and the certificate, the judgment creditor shall mail notice of filing of the foreign judgment by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the judgment debtor at such judgment debtor's last-known address. The proceeds of an execution shall not be distributed to the judgment creditor earlier than thirty days after filing of proof of service with the clerk of the court in which enforcement of such judgment is sought.

Cited. 192 C. 10; 225 C. 102.

Cited. 14 CA 157; Id., 384. Modification of a domesticated foreign judgment does not automatically require refiling in the domestication state. 86 CA 617. Judgment is a valid final judgment, the enforcement of which has not been barred and which implicates neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction. 87 CA 337.

Cited. 38 CS 468.

Subsec. (b):

Where enforcement in this state of an out-of-state judgment is challenged under the provision of Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act that purports to subject the foreign judgment to same defenses as may be raised against an in-state judgment, only those defenses that claim absence of personal or subject matter jurisdiction in the issuing court, which are permissible under full faith and credit clause of federal constitution, may be raised. 76 CA 814. Interpreting provision to allow judgment debtor to raise substantive defenses to continuing validity of a domesticated foreign judgment would put statute into conflict with full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. 86 CA 617. Because trial court ordered that interest be paid on domesticated judgment, the interest order was postjudgment. 87 CA 337.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572d
Sec. 52-572d. Interspousal immunity abrogated in motor vehicle negligence actions accruing out of state.
Status: in_force

Court will not interpret statute to apply before its enactment or qualify decision of court by it. 160 C. 563. Cited. 201 C. 632.

Cited. 29 CS 326; 33 CS 44.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-76 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 897 / Section 52-76
Sec. 52-76. Actions by and against voluntary associations.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-57(e) re service of process upon presiding officer, secretary or treasurer of voluntary association.

See Sec. 52-292 re attachment in actions against voluntary associations and their members.

See Sec. 52-365 re demand on execution against voluntary association.

Voluntary association cannot, as such, hold real estate. 44 C. 260. When individual members liable for goods purchased. 55 C. 111. Prior to amendment of 1893, a member could not sue the association. 61 C. 227. Association may give note to compromise suit pending against it. 70 C. 636. Includes action for damages for wrongful expulsion of member. 76 C. 649. Quo warranto against “pretended town”. 77 C. 265. Reasons for denying to member of a voluntary unincorporated association a cause of action in negligence against the association do not apply in the case of intentional torts; statute, however, is procedural and creates no substantive right; if the acts of which plaintiff complains occurred in the course of a labor dispute, it is necessary to determine the effect of Sec. 31-114 in determining whether plaintiff has a substantive right of action which he can enforce against the union. 150 C. 266. Cited. 186 C. 725.

A labor union may sue in its own name. 15 CS 321. Cited. 42 CS 336.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-70 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-70
Sec. 52-70. Endorsement on process for fees. Penalty for exacting illegal fees.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-356a(e) re statement of levying officer's fees before return of satisfied or partially satisfied execution.

This is a penal statute and inapplicable to criminal proceedings. 23 C. 240. When officer not limited to statutory fees. 54 C. 5. Under statute prior to revision, defendant in the original action could not sue the officer. 74 C. 241.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-434 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 910 / Section 52-434
Sec. 52-434. State referees.
Status: in_force

(2) Each judge of the Circuit Court who has ceased to hold office because of retirement other than under the provisions of section 51-49 and who is an elector and a resident of this state shall be a state referee for the remainder of such judge's term of office as a judge and shall be eligible for appointment as a state referee during the remainder of such judge's life in the manner prescribed by law for the appointment of a judge of the court of which such judge is a member, to whom the Superior Court may, with the written consent of the parties or their attorneys, refer any case pending in court in which the issues have been closed and which the judges of the Superior Court may establish by rule to be the kind of case which may be heard by such referees who have been appointed judge trial referees pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. The judge trial referee shall hear any such case so referred and report the facts to the court by which the case was referred.

(3) Each judge of the Juvenile Court who ceases or has ceased to hold office because of retirement other than under the provisions of section 51-49 and who is an elector and a resident of this state shall be a state referee for the remainder of such judge's term of office as a judge and shall be eligible for appointment as a state referee during the remainder of such judge's life in the manner prescribed by law for the appointment of a judge of the court of which such judge is a member, to whom a judge before whom any juvenile matter is pending may, with the written consent of the child concerned, either of such child's parents, or such child's guardian or attorney, refer any juvenile matter pending, provided such referee has been appointed a judge trial referee specifically designated to hear juvenile cases pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. The judge trial referee shall hear any matter so referred and report the facts to the court for the district from which the matter was referred.

(4) In addition to the judge trial referees who are appointed pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection, the Chief Justice may appoint, from qualified members of the bar of the state, who are electors and residents of this state, as many state referees as the Chief Justice may from time to time deem advisable or necessary. No appointment of a member of the bar may be for a term of more than three years. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, state referees appointed by the Chief Justice from members of the bar shall receive such reasonable compensation and expenses as may be determined by the Chief Justice. The Superior Court may appoint a state referee pursuant to this subdivision to take such evidence as it directs in any civil, nonjury case including, but not limited to, appeals under section 8-8 . Any such state referee shall report on such evidence to the court with any findings of fact. The report shall constitute a part of the proceeding upon which the determination of the court shall be made.

(b) Judge trial referees. The Chief Justice may designate, from among the state referees, judge trial referees to whom criminal and civil cases and juvenile matters may be referred. Criminal cases and civil cases of an adversary nature shall be referred only to state referees who are designated as judge trial referees, and proceedings resulting from a demand for a trial de novo pursuant to subsection (e) of section 52-549z shall be referred only to judge trial referees who are specifically designated to hear such proceedings. On or before October first of each year, the Chief Court Administrator shall publish the list of the judge trial referees specifically designated to hear such proceedings. Juvenile matters shall be referred only to judge trial referees who are specifically designated to hear juvenile cases. No designation pursuant to this subsection may be for a term of more than one year.

(c) Hearing rooms. Each hearing by a judge trial referee shall be held in a suitable room, to be provided by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, in a courthouse in the judicial district where the case is pending unless the parties or their attorneys stipulate in writing that the hearing may be held elsewhere.

(d) Attendance of judicial marshal. Each judge trial referee may have the attendance of a judicial marshal at any hearing before such trial referee. The judicial marshal shall receive the same compensation provided for attendance at regular sessions of the court from which the case was referred and such compensation shall be taxed by the state referee in the same manner as similar costs are taxed by the judges of the court.

(e) Attendance of witnesses. Contempt of power. Each judge trial referee may compel the attendance of any witness summoned to appear before such trial referee at any hearing, in the same manner as the attendance of any witness may be compelled in the Superior Court, and may punish for any act of contempt committed in such trial referee's presence while engaged in the hearing in the same manner and to the same extent as judges of the Superior Court.

(f) Compensation. Each judge trial referee shall receive, for acting as a referee or as a single auditor or committee of any court or for performing duties assigned by the Chief Court Administrator with the approval of the Chief Justice, for each day the judge trial referee is so engaged, in addition to the retirement salary: (1) (A) on and after July 1, 2022, the sum of two hundred eighty-five dollars, (B) on and after July 1, 2023, the sum of two hundred ninety-four dollars, and (C) on and after July 1, 2024, the sum of three hundred two dollars; and (2) expenses, including mileage. Such amounts shall be taxed by the court making the reference in the same manner as other court expenses.

(g) Participation in alternative dispute resolution program approved by STA-FED ADR, Inc. A judge trial referee may participate in an alternative dispute resolution program approved by STA-FED ADR, Inc. in any year commencing July first provided such referee performed the duties of a judge trial referee or a senior judge for at least seventy-five days during the preceding year, except that (1) for the year commencing July 1, 1993, a judge trial referee may participate in said alternative dispute resolution program without having performed the duties of a judge trial referee or senior judge for seventy-five days during the preceding year, and (2) a judge trial referee may participate in said alternative dispute resolution program from the date such referee assumes such status, through the completion of the year commencing July first following such date without having satisfied the seventy-five-day requirement. Any judge trial referee who participates in said alternative dispute resolution program pursuant to subsection (f) of section 51-50c without having satisfied the seventy-five-day requirement set forth in said subsection shall not be eligible to participate in said program pursuant to this subsection without having satisfied the seventy-five-day requirement set forth in this subsection.

See Conn. Const. Art. V, S. 6 re powers of state referees.

Report of referee stands before court as would a report from a committee. 58 C. 374. Cited. 136 C. 82; 158 C. 16; Id., 291. History, nature and jurisdiction of state trial referees; Sec. 51-29, limiting time for decision, is inapplicable to state trial referees. 164 C. 360. Cited. 172 C. 362; 176 C. 391. Statute is not unconstitutional by allowing retired judges to exercise judicial power; although party did not consent to a hearing before referee, her attorney consented and a client is bound by the acts of her attorney. 177 C. 173. Cited. 181 C. 217. The written consent of parties provided for in statute not applicable to cases referred to referee under Sec. 46b-9. Id., 225. Cited. Id., 492; 186 C. 211; 199 C. 496. Consent to referral to referee implicit with failure to object to referral in timely fashion. 203 C. 246. Cited. Id., 364; 222 C. 799; 226 C. 475; 229 C. 627, see also 36 CA 270; 238 C. 839; 241 C. 423.

Cited. 2 CA 351; 7 CA 136; 15 CA 150; 20 CA 148; 31 CA 723; 43 CA 397. At the time of jury selection, the senior judge had retired from full-time service but had not attained the age of 70; he continued to have the power to preside over jury selection as well as every other power of a Superior Court judge; he did not need to obtain consent of the parties. 108 CA 156. Judge trial referees exercise the same jurisdiction as judges of the Superior Court, and any limitation contained in general statutes or rules of practice regarding the types of cases that judge trial referees may be involved in do not implicate the jurisdiction of judge trial referees to hear certain of those cases, but, rather, concern their authority to do so. 165 CA 737.

Superior Court has no power to refer any matter to a state referee unless all parties consent. 16 CS 460. Cited. 30 CS 354; 31 CS 392; 33 CS 560.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (4): Not in conflict with Art. V, Secs. 2 and 6 of the Connecticut Constitution; not in violation of due process. 199 C. 496. Subdiv. (4): Statute not void for vagueness under due process. Id., 518. Cited. 200 C. 38; 210 C. 705; 241 C. 423.

Cited. 5 CA 104; 9 CA 87; 11 CA 1; 12 CA 190. Subdiv. (4): Limitation under Sec. 52-549n is not applicable to references made pursuant to this section. Id., 348. Cited. Id., 527; 15 CA 696; Id., 817; 17 CA 294; 20 CA 425; 21 CA 359; 25 CA 308; 31 CA 728; judgment reversed in part, see 229 C. 817; 32 CA 133; 34 CA 584; 35 CA 353; 38 CA 491; 41 CA 594. Not necessary for all parties to consent to judge trial referees' participation in pretrial decisions made before the pleadings are closed. 144 CA 79.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-361b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-361b
Sec. 52-361b. Notification of judgment debtor's rights. Claim for exemption or modification.
Status: in_force

(b) A wage execution shall be accompanied by a conspicuous notice in clear and simple language of judgment debtor rights, on a prescribed exemption claim form containing (1) a checklist and description of the most common classes of earnings which are exempt from execution, with a citation to the statutory authority for each class, and a statement of the procedure, pursuant to this section, for claiming such an exemption, (2) a statement of the specific dollar amount of the statutory exemption of earnings from execution pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (f) of section 52-361a and a statement that the weekly amount of the levy may not exceed twenty-five per cent of the employee's weekly disposable earnings, (3) notice to the judgment debtor that he may seek modification of the execution as provided by subsection (d) of this section, and (4) notice that pursuant to section 52-212 a judgment debtor may, for reasonable cause, move that the judgment be set aside within four months of rendition.

(c) The form for initial interrogatories prescribed by section 52-351b shall be accompanied by a conspicuous notice of rights in clear and simple language, (1) notifying the person served that with respect to assets, he is required to reveal information concerning the amount, nature and location of the judgment debtor's assets up to an amount clearly sufficient in value to ensure full satisfaction of the judgment with interest and costs and that pursuant to section 52-400a he may apply to the court for protection from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, and (2) containing a list and description of the most common classes of personal property which are exempt from execution, with a citation to the statutory authority for each class.

(d) Except as provided in section 52-367b , a judgment debtor may claim an exemption as to property or earnings sought to be levied on, or may seek a modification of a wage execution, in a supplemental proceeding to the original action by return of a signed exemption claim form, indicating the property or earnings claimed to be exempt or the nature of the claim for modification being made, the class of any exemption claimed, and the name and address of any employer, or other person holding such property or earnings, to the Superior Court. Any claim with respect to a personal property execution under section 52-356a shall be returned within twenty days after levy on such property. On receipt of the claim, the clerk of the court shall promptly schedule the matter for a hearing and give notice of the exemption or modification claimed and the hearing date to all parties and to any employer or other third person holding such property or earnings.

(e) Pending the hearing, the execution against the property shall be stayed. Such property, other than earnings, shall continue to be held by the person in possession subject to the determination of the court. No earnings claimed to be exempt or subject to a claim for modification may be withheld from any employee until determination of the claim.

(f) The court shall promptly hear and determine all such claims.

(g) Failure by a judgment debtor to file a claim under this section shall not relieve the judgment creditor or levying officer from liability for return of any exempt property which has been levied on or for payment to the judgment debtor of any proceeds realized from the sale thereof, provided title to any such exempt property sold at an execution sale shall remain in any bona fide purchaser thereof.

(h) If a levying officer is in doubt as to whether certain property necessary to satisfy a judgment is exempt, he may certify the question of exemption to the court for a hearing and determination pursuant to this section.

Cited. 33 CA 395. Returning of exemption claim form by judgment debtor is essential part of process, thus requirement under Subsec. (d) is not directory but mandatory, and it is judgment debtor's burden to return exemption claim form in order to claim an exemption. 193 CA 251.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-121 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-121
Sec. 52-121. Pleading may be filed after expiration of time fixed, but prior to hearing on motion for default judgment or nonsuit. Judgment or penalty for failure to plead.
Status: in_force

(b) No judgment of nonsuit or default, in any case in which appearance has been entered by the defendant, may be entered by the clerk of any court for failure to plead within the time fixed by statute, or by any rule of any court, until an order for it has been passed by the court after reasonable notice to the opposing counsel and hearing thereon.

(c) No penalty for failure to plead within the time provided by any rule relating to the filing of any pleading may be imposed upon any party to any action unless the failure is a violation of an order or judgment made by the court after notice and hearing thereon.

Granting motion for judgment which was not for judgment by default or nonsuit for failure to plead violates statutory guaranty of right to plead further. 131 C. 266. Judgment by default invalid where court refused to hear counsel. 133 C. 696. Cited. 181 C. 607.

Cited. 22 CA 4; 39 CA 306.

Time for filing plea in abatement not extended; 3 CS 312; not applicable to pleadings of the same kind as others which have been disposed of. 8 CS 511. Cited. 10 CS 304; 15 CS 35; 17 CS 46; 19 CS 116. Defendant's right to plead over after a demurrer has been sustained continues until the court has heard a proper written motion for default for failure to plead. 20 CS 17. Cited. 21 CS 352. Inapplicable to motions for disclosure of defense and judgment. 32 CS 581.

Subsec. (a):

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding third-party defendant from filing special defenses where trial court finds prejudice and possible delay. 53 CA 72. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to set aside the default which was filed, with defendant's answer, more than 2 years after the return date. 78 CA 590. In determining whether filing of amended complaint following finding of default effectively extinguished the default and afforded defendant an opportunity to plead in response, the dispositive inquiry is whether the amendment reflected a substantial change to the pleadings in effect at the time that the default was entered. 178 CA 727.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146c
Sec. 52-146c. Privileged communications between psychologist and patient.
Status: in_force

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Psychologist” means an individual licensed to practice psychology pursuant to chapter 383;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a psychologist or between a member of such person's family and a psychologist;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in civil and criminal actions, in juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings, in proceedings preliminary to such actions or proceedings, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, all communications shall be privileged and a psychologist shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(c) Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person's communications:

(1) If a judge finds that any person after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made the communications to a psychologist in the course of a psychological examination ordered by the court, provided the communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the person's psychological condition;

(2) If, in a civil proceeding, a person introduces his psychological condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after a person's death, his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person, and the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and psychologist be protected;

(3) If the psychologist believes in good faith that there is risk of imminent personal injury to the person or to other individuals or risk of imminent injury to the property of other individuals;

(4) If child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual or abuse of an individual who is disabled or incompetent is known or in good faith suspected;

(5) If a psychologist makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was in fact receiving psychological services, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services; or

(6) If the communications are disclosed to a member of the immediate family or legal representative of the victim of a homicide committed by the person where such person has, on or after July 1, 1989, been found not guilty of such offense by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 , provided such family member or legal representative requests the disclosure of such communications not later than six years after such finding, and provided further, such communications shall only be available during the pendency of, and for use in, a civil action relating to such person found not guilty pursuant to section 53a-13 .

Cited. 191 C. 453; 203 C. 641. Erroneous denial of psychiatrist-patient privilege does not infringe upon right of any person other than the one to whom the privilege is given. 208 C. 683. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 18 CA 273; 23 CA 98; Id., 330; 24 CA 287. Court did not violate statute by ordering disclosure of substance abuse and psychiatric treatment records of parents in case involving termination of their parental rights. 48 CA 563.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-335 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 905 / Section 52-335
Sec. 52-335. Service of garnishee process on corporation.
Status: in_force

“Resides” means official residence, or the town where the secretary or clerk performs his duties as such. 46 C. 322.

There is a difference in the methods of service on a corporation of process generally and service on a corporation in a garnishment proceeding. 9 CS 473.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-80 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 897 / Section 52-80
Sec. 52-80. Nonsuits and withdrawals; costs.
Status: in_force

After nonsuit, the cause cannot be reinstated without notice to, or consent of, both parties. K. 361. Entry for costs to be made during the term. Id., 269; 35 C. 4. Proof of withdrawal. 14 C. 174. Petition cannot be withdrawn after judgment pronounced; K. 273; but may be after report of committee is known, though not filed. 25 C. 136. Right to withdraw suit or to be nonsuited, not affected by plea of set-off and claim of judgment thereon. 43 C. 61. After case has been heard and reported by committee, it cannot be withdrawn. 47 C. 436. Judgment treated as rendered at time of withdrawal and not when costs are taxed. 48 C. 301. Withdrawal of justice suit after return of writ cannot deprive defendant of his right to a judgment for costs. 57 C. 270. Nonsuit proper for failure of plaintiff to plead over; 72 C. 257; or to produce evidence; discretion of court; 75 C. 314; or to prosecute action. 71 C. 339. Withdrawal after filing of counterclaim or set-off. 76 C. 530; 80 C. 218. Plaintiff may withdraw actions without knowledge of attorney; and in vacation. 78 C. 659. Withdrawal after answer filed as creating estoppel. 80 C. 504. Of right of withdrawal in general. 85 C. 673. Cited. 123 C. 18. Case withdrawn may be restored to docket by court on proper showing during term at which withdrawal filed. Id., 166. After commencement of hearing, it is within discretion of court to deny motion to withdraw cross complaint. 125 C. 472. Cited. 142 C. 713; 152 C. 699; 154 C. 289. Petition for winding up is “action” to which section applies. 171 C. 699, 701. Right of plaintiff to withdraw action terminates not with completion by appraiser of his report, but with commencement of procedures to be followed in arriving at appraisal. Id., 699, 703. Since appraiser never appraised value of plaintiff's shares in corporation or value of real estate as of appropriate date, and in absence of any specific order specifying power and authority of appraiser pursuant to Sec. 33-384, determination of value of corporation's real estate did not amount to “hearing of an issue of fact” as would terminate plaintiffs' right to withdraw their action. Id., 700, 704. Cited. 194 C. 400.

Cited. 5 CA 101; 13 CA 150; 24 CA 93; 26 CA 426; 37 CA 515; 44 CA 771. Trial court improperly restored case to docket; trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because no appraiser had been appointed to assess the value of the corporation, and thus no fact-finding had occurred. 54 CA 384. In a habeas action, the court erred in determining that a hearing on the merits, for purposes of section, commences immediately upon the judge taking the bench on the day of the trial and, on the basis of this erroneous construction, improperly denied petitioner's request to withdraw petition without prejudice; with respect to a hearing on the merits, a party's right to unilaterally withdraw an action or petition ceases when the presiding authority begins or initiates formally a proceeding in which it will make a substantive determination concerning the legal or factual issues in the case. 162 CA 23. Broad authority granted to plaintiff pursuant to section to unilaterally withdraw action prior to hearing on the merits does not automatically extend to plaintiff the additional right to commence an essentially identical action following that withdrawal if primary purpose for doing so is to undermine a court order rendered in the prior litigation or if withdrawal and subsequent refiling implicates a substantial right that vested in another party to the litigation and that likely will be jeopardized should plaintiff proceed with the new action; in either instance, if seasonably requested by defendant or other third party, the court should exercise its discretion to restore the original action to the docket. 163 CA 100.

Cited. 4 CS 165; 6 CS 195. Withdrawal of divorce action with respect to alimony and support payments discussed. 16 CS 88. Section applicable to condemnation proceedings. Id., 230. Plaintiff failed to make a timely claim for a jury trial so case withdrawn and a new suit immediately commenced for same cause of action; on motion of defendant, the original case was restored to the docket. 21 CS 371. Court has continuing jurisdiction to determine any claim of a vested right acquired during the pendency of an action and prior to its withdrawal, but it must first reinstate it on the docket before granting the relief sought. Id., 497.

Plaintiff's move to withdraw action denied where memorandum of decision had previously granted defendant judgment on his demurrer. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 439. Where case has been voluntarily withdrawn, court does not have jurisdiction to entertain motion to reopen until steps are taken to restore case to docket. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 91, 92. Trial court alone has power to open, set aside, vacate or modify judgment, and exercise of that power is unaffected by taking of appeal; if case has gone to judgment, motion to withdraw cannot be entertained until after judgment is opened and vacated. Id., 168, 169.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-581 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-581
Sec. 52-581. Action on oral contract to be brought within three years.
Status: in_force

(b) This section shall not apply to causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.

Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for nonperformance of executory contracts. 52 C. 146. Cited. 56 C. 25. When applied to suit against surgeon for breach of implied contract to use reasonable care and skill. 103 C. 720; 119 C. 507; 127 C. 386; 134 C. 259. Applied to oral agreement to pay wages during incapacity and to reemploy in consideration of waiver of right to damages for injury. 114 C. 732; 134 C. 259. Does not apply to action by employee to recover overtime pay and liquidated damages under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 246. History of section. Id., 258. Distinguished from Sec. 52-576; this section is restricted to executory contracts. Id., 259. Proof of existence and performance of contract unenforceable because of statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to defense of statute of limitations by showing that no action brought earlier could be maintained. Id., 536. Since contract was executed and all that remained was to pay plaintiff, section does not bar action. 134 C. 585. Applies only to executory contracts. Id.; 135 C. 179. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. When plaintiff's performance on oral contract has been completely executed, Sec. 52-576 and not this section establishes applicable limitation period. 170 C. 243. Cited. 210 C. 734; 214 C. 464; 217 C. 340.

Cited. 17 CA 159; 18 CA 525; 33 CA 702; 39 CA 289. Section's 3-year statute of limitations applies only to executory contracts and, therefore, did not apply to executed oral contract; 6-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-576 applied. 76 CA 599. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690. Granting of motion for summary judgment in legal malpractice action on ground that action was commenced beyond the applicable statute of limitations was proper because statute of limitations began to run despite pendency of an appeal. 110 CA 679.

When statute begins to run. 3 CS 209. Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for nonperformance of executory contracts. 8 CS 264. Cited. 9 CS 401; Id., 522. History and scope discussed. 13 CS 174. Statute is tolled from incurrence of legal not apparent damage. 14 CS 464. Applies to suits based upon oral contract of employment under Fair Labor Standards Acts of 1938. 15 CS 3. Cited. 17 CS 61. Procedure required herein cannot be circumvented to avoid the 3-year limit set. 31 CS 434. Application restricted to executory contracts only, in contrast to application of Sec. 52-576 to contracts where party has fully performed. 37 CS 735. Cited. 39 CS 458.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367.

Subsec. (a):

Permits statutory requirement of a contract in writing to be satisfied by juxtaposition of two documents, each denoting the agreement of one of the parties, but not juxtaposition of two inconsistent documents; assumes existence of an underlying contractual commitment and addresses only the requirement of a written memorial thereof. 83 CA 715.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-598a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-598a
Sec. 52-598a. Limitation of action for indemnification.
Status: in_force

Cited. 41 CA 686; 46 CA 699.

Cited. 44 CS 207.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-466 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 915 / Section 52-466
Sec. 52-466. Application for writ of habeas corpus. Service. Return.
Status: in_force

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus claiming illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty, made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland.

(b) The application shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant for the writ alleging that he truly believes that the person on whose account the writ is sought is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.

(c) The writ shall be directed to some proper officer to serve and return, who shall serve the same by putting a true and attested copy of it into the hands of the person who has the custody of the body of the person who is directed to be presented upon the writ. If the officer fails to make immediate return of the writ, with his actions thereon, he shall pay fifty dollars to the person so held in custody.

(d) Any judge of the Superior Court to whom an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made may make the writ returnable before any other judge of the court, the consent of the other judge being first obtained; and the other judge shall thereupon proceed with the matter with the same authority as though the application had been originally presented to him.

(e) If the application is made to a judge, the judge may certify the proceedings into court and the case shall thereupon be entered upon the docket and proceeded with as though the application had originally been made to the court.

(f) A foster parent or an approved adoptive parent shall have standing to make application for a writ of habeas corpus regarding the custody of a child currently or recently in his care for a continuous period of not less than ninety days in the case of a child under three years of age at the time of such application and not less than one hundred eighty days in the case of any other child.

See Sec. 51-186 re hearings on petitions for writ of habeas corpus held at Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers.

Annotations to former statute:

Imprisonment on mesne process of one fraudulently decoyed from another state for the purpose is illegal, and the debtor may be released on this writ. 32 C. 589. Mere irregularities of procedure or the sufficiency of evidence are not reviewable on such a writ. 59 C. 386; 67 C. 349. Demurrer to return, and also an answer raising an issue of fact, cannot be pending at the same time. Id., 358. Where answer to return sets up facts upon which jurisdiction is claimed and demurrer is filed, court will determine jurisdiction on facts so alleged. 93 C. 361. As applied to determination of custody of child; 69 C. 291; 91 C. 156; 97 C. 442; 100 C. 207; detention of person for extradition; bail. 78 C. 150. Trial court may admit to bail pending appeal from decision dismissing writ. 100 C. 296. Habeas corpus will not lie as between coordinate courts while court first taking jurisdiction has power, upon same representations, to discharge prisoner; truth of jurisdictional recitals in judgment of court of general jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally on writ of habeas corpus claiming judgment a nullity. Id., 499. Bond or recognizance for costs not required. 113 C. 740.

Court of common pleas is possessed of power in habeas corpus proceedings to consider matters affecting the custody of minor children. 10 CS 275. Where defendant father from whom custody of a nonresident child is sought is not resident in this state, court has no jurisdiction under section. 20 CS 1. Writ of habeas corpus should not be used as substitute for appeal of an original action, or for a writ of error, or for a petition for a new trial. 21 CS 73.

Annotations to present section:

Where no showing of law of Norway re modification of custody orders, court entitled to assume Norwegian law same as ours; where there is material change in circumstances, custody order could be modified. 151 C. 172. Not violation of full faith and credit to Rhode Island custody decree where shown, under that forum's law, that court lost jurisdiction. Id., 315. Where defendant had moved to erase support order entered in habeas corpus proceeding brought by plaintiff to determine custody of minor children, claiming lack of jurisdiction, held that motion was properly denied since habeas corpus proceeding is by its nature equitable and the court, having assumed jurisdiction to do complete justice, had jurisdiction to enter the order of support. 152 C. 464, 465. Where plaintiff's appeal under section was taken after he had served his sentence and had been released from jail and the original period of probation had expired, held that, since he is no longer “confined or deprived of his liberty”, the issues he sought to raise are moot and the appeal should be dismissed. 153 C. 206, 207. Where information charging defendant as a second offender was correct except for a mistake in naming the crime committed and he pleaded guilty to the charge, raising no claim of error, held he established no right to relief by habeas corpus in the absence of a showing that he had suffered prejudice or injustice. Id., 599, 602. Habeas corpus to review 11-year-old conviction upon grounds it resulted from unlawfully obtained evidence and incriminating statements denied; rules in 384 U.S. 436 and 367 U.S. 643 not retroactive. 155 C. 316. Cited. 156 C. 205; 183 C. 383; 184 C. 366; 198 C. 138; 230 C. 459; 234 C. 51. History and purpose of writ of habeas corpus establish that habeas court lacks power to act on habeas petition absent petitioner's allegedly unlawful custody and therefore custody requirement in section is jurisdictional, and petitioner whose conviction has expired fully prior to filing of habeas petition is not in “custody” on that conviction within meaning of section, despite alleged existence of collateral consequences flowing from that conviction. 274 C. 507. Habeas court lacked jurisdiction over petition for writ of habeas corpus because petitioner was not in custody, as defined by statute, when he filed his petition; the challenged convictions had expired completely by the time he filed his petition and deportation proceedings that resulted from expired larceny conviction were collateral and insufficient to render him in custody. 280 C. 514. Custody qua custody does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of section; petitioner must be in custody on the conviction under attack at the time the habeas petition is filed. 298 C. 690.

Cited. 31 CA 400; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 459; 34 CA 129; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 51; 43 CA 176. To satisfy custody requirement, petitioner must be under some legal restraint, e.g. imprisoned or paroled, at the time petition is filed. 83 CA 10. Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear petition filed when petitioner was no longer in custody with respect to the challenged conviction. 107 CA 507. Holding in 515 U.S. 39, that defendant satisfied “in custody” requirement for a habeas challenge to an expired sentence because he was still serving a consecutive sentence, should not be extended to nonconsecutive enhanced sentences that petitioner is serving for commission of later unrelated crime. 117 CA 727. Although custody requirement has been construed liberally, petitioner cannot bring habeas claim on the basis of an expired conviction despite remaining in custody for a different conviction pursuant to a concurrent sentence, and merger concept of Sec. 53a-38(b) does not alter fact that concurrent sentences remain separate terms of imprisonment that the legislature has permitted to be served at one time. 139 CA 173. Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, which held that before an alien criminal defendant pleads guilty to a criminal offense for which he is subject to deportation, his defense attorney must advise him of the deportation consequences of his plea and resulting conviction, did not eliminate the custodial requirement for habeas corpus jurisdiction. 150 CA 68.

Cited. 23 CS 298. Claim of brutal treatment of a prisoner may not be considered in a habeas corpus proceeding. 25 CS 519. Habeas corpus does not lie when petitioner is out on bail as he is presently at liberty. 26 CS 430. Habeas corpus is available to challenge illegality of confinement under unchallenged judgment of criminal conviction, as when petitioner has been deprived of constitutional rights beyond those curtailed by judgment. 34 CS 89. Probationer does fit within the second prong of section because to reach a contrary conclusion would be to totally deprive person whose sentence consists solely of a period of probation of the right to file a habeas petition attacking that conviction and that could not have been legislature's intent in enacting section. 48 CS 470.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2): Judgment of the Appellate Court determining that habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed on the ground that amendment to Subdiv., enacted as part of Public Act 06-152, was technical in nature and not intended to overrule the court's precedent holding that a petitioner whose conviction has expired fully prior to the filing of a habeas petition is not in custody on such conviction within the meaning of section despite the alleged existence of collateral consequences flowing from the conviction and, therefore, the question of whether to expand the custody requirement of this section, in this area where the legislature has spoken, is one of public policy and for the legislature to determine. 334 C. 636.

P.A. 06-152, Sec. 5, which modified Subdiv. (2), did not eliminate 274 C. 507 “in custody” requirement. 117 CA 740. Subdiv. (1) unequivocally authorizes a person, not an animal, to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus, thus elephants do not have standing in first instance to allow petitioner to satisfy the prerequisites for establishing next friend standing. 192 CA 36. Mere fact that petitioner in present matter was incarcerated at the time he filed the habeas petition is not sufficient to satisfy custody requirement for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. 200 CA 296.

Cited. 40 CS 251.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407ww — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407ww
Sec. 52-407ww. Vacating of award by court.
Status: in_force

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

(2) There was: (A) Evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (B) corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;

(3) An arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 52-407oo so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;

(4) An arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;

(5) There was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under subsection (c) of section 52-407oo not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or

(6) The arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section 52-407ii so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.

(b) A motion under this section must be filed within thirty days after the movant receives notice of the award pursuant to section 52-407ss or within thirty days after the movant receives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to section 52-407tt , unless the movant alleges that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means, in which case the motion must be made within thirty days after the ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable care would have been known by the movant.

(c) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section, it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section, the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in subdivision (3), (4) or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, the rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award or the arbitrator's successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the same time as that provided in subsection (b) of section 52-407ss for an award.

(d) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award unless a motion to modify or correct the award is pending.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-45a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-45a
Sec. 52-45a. (Formerly Sec. 52-89). Commencement of civil actions. Contents and signature of process.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-48 re return day for process in civil action.

Annotations to former section 52-89:

The residence of the parties must be stated; 9 C. 480; and in justice writs, the hour for appearance. 16 C. 44. Writs must be brought to the next term of court before which there is time to serve them. 1 R. 315. May be brought to adjourned term. 10 C. 488. A writ in favor of a town may be signed by a magistrate who is one of its inhabitants. 1 R. 175. Established practice allows 1 hour of grace to parties in appearing in actions brought before justices of the peace; but this limit is not inflexible. 44 C. 273. A magistrate cannot sign process in his own case nor in favor of the firm of which he is a member. 47 C. 316; overruled, see 222 C. 541, see also 60 C. 426. Petitions under the flowage act are to be served by citation. 49 C. 347. Issuance of process by de facto magistrate. 77 C. 184. Complaint must accompany writ; proper way to take advantage of such defect is by motion to erase from docket for want of process. 97 C. 400. Cited. 126 C. 607; 132 C. 515; 141 C. 407. The signing of a writ by a lawyer as a commissioner of the Superior Court is not a mere ministerial act; a writ of mandamus to compel the signing will not be granted. 142 C. 411. Privilege of using fictitious names discussed. 147 C. 48. Cited. 149 C. 218; 162 C. 255; 166 C. 102; Id., 174. Writ of attachment now issued only after compliance with chapter 903a. 167 C. 623.

Cited. 8 CS 398. Attachment is no part of the original process and cannot affect the judgment to be rendered thereon. 14 CS 357. Cited. 16 CS 143. True name of plaintiff has no reason to appear in the complaint; the proper place is in the writ. 18 CS 446. Application to court to examine corporate records must be made by writ, summons and complaint. 25 CS 253. Cited. 36 CS 47. Rule against plaintiff attorney signing writ in his own case not violated when his partner signed writ. Id., 69. Cited. 38 CS 389.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 207 C. 547; 210 C. 721; 217 C. 520. Statute does not on its face exclude attorney from signing a writ in his own case; improperly executed writ does not affect subject matter jurisdiction; 47 C. 316 overruled and judgment of Appellate Court reversed. 222 C. 541. Cited. 223 C. 68; 225 C. 13; 236 C. 330; 239 C. 265.

Cited. 13 CA 223; 18 CA 508; 19 CA 203; 22 CA 625; 25 CA 543; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 541; 27 CA 333; Id., 621; 31 CA 155; 34 CA 579; 36 CA 635; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 330; 38 CA 555. Plaintiff's failure to properly execute her writ did not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, merely personal jurisdiction over defendants unless waived. 53 CA 84. Action not “commenced” within meaning of section by prejudgment remedy documents lacking a signed writ of summons and complaint. 61 CA 234. Because trade name is not an entity with legal capacity to sue, corporation had no standing to litigate the merits of case when it brought an action solely in its trade name, without corporation itself being named as a party. 87 CA 474. Plaintiff's attorney's failure to sign civil summons form was a circumstantial defect that did not deprive court of personal jurisdiction over defendants because the attorney directed a process server to serve defendants. 96 CA 320.

Listing the address of property that was subject of zoning appeal in the citation and complaint, rather than street address of plaintiff as required by preprinted form, was a circumstantial defect under common law whether or not ameliorative statutes apply and did not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction. 50 CS 513.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407ee — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407ee
Sec. 52-407ee. Application for judicial relief.
Status: in_force

(b) Unless a civil action involving the agreement to arbitrate is pending, notice of an initial motion to the court under sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive, must be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in a civil action. Otherwise, notice of the motion must be given in the manner provided by law or rule of court for serving motions in pending cases.