Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-149 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-149
Sec. 53a-149. Bribery of a witness: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Bribery of a witness is a class C felony.

Cited. 192 C. 98.

Cited. 12 CA 74. State not required to establish existence of official proceeding at time of defendant's offer because definitions in Sec. 53a-146 encompass future proceedings that may be held and witnesses who may be summoned, and because crime of bribery is committed as soon as offer is made and, thus, it is irrelevant whether offer was made before or after institution of official proceeding; section is specific intent crime, requiring that act be made with the intent of influencing testimony or conduct. 160 CA 251. Trial court's interpretation of the term “influence” as meaning to alter comports with the state Supreme Court's construction of the relevant statutory language. 164 CA 459.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202f — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202f
Sec. 53-202f. Transportation and transfer of assault weapon. Authorized actions of gun dealer, manufacturer, pawnbroker or consignment shop operator.
Status: in_force

(b) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of this section, who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to section 53-202d , in addition to the uses allowed in section 53-202d , may transport the assault weapon between dealers or out of the state, display the assault weapon at any gun show licensed by a state or local governmental entity or sell the assault weapon to a resident outside the state. Any transporting of the assault weapon allowed by this subsection must be done as required by subsection (a) of this section.

(c) (1) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of this section, or a federally-licensed firearm manufacturer may take possession of any assault weapon for the purposes of servicing or repair from any person to whom has been issued a certificate of possession for such weapon pursuant to sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive.

(2) Any licensed gun dealer may transfer possession of any assault weapon received pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection to a gunsmith for purposes of accomplishing service or repair of the same. Such transfers are permissible only to the following persons:

(A) A gunsmith who is in the licensed gun dealer's employ; or

(B) A gunsmith with whom the dealer has contracted for gunsmithing services, provided the gunsmith receiving the assault weapon holds a dealer's license issued pursuant to Chapter 44, commencing with Section 921, of Title 18 of the United States Code and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

(d) (1) Not later than December 31, 2013, any person who lawfully possessed an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a on April 4, 2013, which was lawful under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013, may transfer possession of the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer within or outside of this state for sale outside of this state, and may transport the assault weapon to such dealer for the purpose of making such transfer, without obtaining a certificate of possession under section 53-202d .

(2) Not later than April 30, 2024, any person who lawfully possessed a 2023 assault weapon on June 5, 2023, which was lawful under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2023, may transfer possession of the 2023 assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer within or outside of this state for sale outside of this state, and may transport the 2023 assault weapon to such dealer for the purpose of making such transfer, without obtaining a certificate of possession under section 53-202d .

(e) (1) Not later than October 1, 2013, any licensed gun dealer, pawnbroker licensed under section 21-40 , or consignment shop operator, as defined in section 21-39a , may transfer possession of an assault weapon to any person who (A) legally possessed the assault weapon prior to or on April 4, 2013, (B) placed the assault weapon in the possession of such dealer, pawnbroker or operator prior to or on April 4, 2013, pursuant to an agreement between such person and such dealer, pawnbroker or operator for the sale of the assault weapon to a third person, and (C) is eligible to possess a firearm on the date of such transfer.

(2) Any licensed gun dealer, pawnbroker licensed under section 21-40 , or consignment shop operator, as defined in section 21-39a , may transfer possession of a 2023 assault weapon to any person who (A) legally possessed the 2023 assault weapon prior to June 6, 2023, (B) placed the 2023 assault weapon in the possession of such dealer, pawnbroker or operator pursuant to an agreement between such person and such dealer, pawnbroker or operator for the sale of the assault weapon to a third person, and (C) is eligible to possess a firearm on the date of such transfer.

(f) The term “licensed gun dealer”, as used in sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, means a person who has a federal firearms license and a permit to sell firearms pursuant to section 29-28 .

Cited. 234 C. 455; 242 C. 143.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-136a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-136a
Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty.
Status: in_force

Cited. 46 CA 691. Section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, notwithstanding the requirement of proof of an additional element to establish a violation of section. 100 CA 565.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-172 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-172
Sec. 53a-172. Failure to appear in the first degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Failure to appear in the first degree is a class D felony.

Cited. 176 C. 421; 221 C. 407; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 283; 227 C. 829; 229 C. 285; Id., 529; 236 C. 112; 242 C. 296.

Cited. 4 CA 154; 6 CA 402; 12 CA 621; 13 CA 413; 17 CA 556; 20 CA 205; 24 CA 316; 25 CA 575; 27 CA 279; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 30 CA 9; Id., 190; 34 CA 191; 36 CA 691; 37 CA 437; 39 CA 816; 41 CA 47; 43 CA 142; Id., 552. In order to prove the wilful element, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant received and deliberately ignored a notice to appear or that he intentionally embarked on a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving such notice. 108 CA 772.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181k — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-181k
Sec. 53a-181k. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree is a class D felony, for which one thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (3) not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 265 C. 145.

Subdiv. (3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits only true threats, not all threats, and is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness in context of defendant's actions and words. 104 CA 46. Evidence was sufficient for jury to reasonably determine that defendant had requisite specific intent to intimidate or harass victim on basis of victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation, which evidence included statement to police replete with disparaging remarks against homosexuals and defendant's statement prior to incident that victim was homosexual. 118 CA 711.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202d — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-202d
Sec. 53-202d. Certificate of possession of assault weapon. Certificate of transfer of assault weapon to gun dealer. Circumstances where possession of assault weapon authorized.
Status: in_force

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a , for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a , on April 4, 2013, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013, or any person who regains possession of an assault weapon as defined in any provision of said subparagraphs pursuant to subsection (e) of section 53-202f , or any person who lawfully purchases a firearm on or after April 4, 2013, but prior to June 18, 2013, that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013, shall apply by January 1, 2014, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to apply by January 1, 2014, because such member is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. Any person who lawfully purchases a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b shall apply within ninety days of such purchase to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(3) Any person who obtained a certificate of possession for an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a , prior to April 5, 2013, that is defined as an assault weapon pursuant to any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a shall be deemed to have obtained a certificate of possession for such assault weapon for the purposes of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, and shall not be required to obtain a subsequent certificate of possession for such assault weapon.

(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this subdivision, any person who lawfully possesses a 2023 assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2023, or any person who regains possession of a 2023 assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (e) of section 53-202f , shall apply by May 1, 2024, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to apply by May 1, 2024, because such member is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall accept applications both in paper and electronic form, to the extent practicable, and shall not require such applications be notarized.

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases a 2023 assault weapon for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(C) Any person who lawfully possesses a 2023 assault weapon pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of section 53-202c and whose Form 1 application to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has not yet been processed may, instead of following the procedure specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, apply by May 1, 2024, to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a temporary certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. Such temporary certificate of possession shall expire on the earlier of January 1, 2027, and the date seven days succeeding a denial of the Form 1 application. When the Form 1 application is approved with respect to such assault weapon, such person may apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection to convert such temporary certificate of possession into a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. If a complete application to convert is received, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall approve the application. For the purposes of this subparagraph, a full and complete Form 1 application submitted to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection in a form and manner determined by the department shall be sufficient to constitute a complete application for a temporary certificate of possession, and a copy of the notice that a Form 1 application has been approved shall constitute a complete application to convert a temporary certificate of possession into a certificate of possession. The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall accept applications under this subparagraph both in paper and electronic form, to the extent practicable, and shall not require such applications to be notarized.

(5) Any person who obtained a certificate of possession for an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (A) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a prior to June 6, 2023, that is also a 2023 assault weapon shall be deemed to have obtained a certificate of possession for such assault weapon for the purposes of sections 53-202a to 53-202k , inclusive, and shall not be required to obtain a subsequent certificate of possession for such assault weapon.

(6) The certificate of possession shall contain a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks, the full name, address, date of birth and thumbprint of the owner, and any other information as the department may deem appropriate.

(7) The department shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish procedures with respect to the application for and issuance of certificates of possession pursuant to this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210 and 1-211 , the name and address of a person issued a certificate of possession shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed, except such records may be disclosed to (A) law enforcement agencies and employees of the United States Probation Office acting in the performance of their duties and parole officers within the Department of Correction acting in the performance of their duties, and (B) the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services to carry out the provisions of subsection (c) of section 17a-500 .

(b) (1) No assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a , possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after January 1, 1994, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f , or as provided in section 53-202e , or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(2) No assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a , possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after April 5, 2013, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f , or as provided in section 53-202e , or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(3) No 2023 assault weapon possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after June 6, 2023, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, or as provided in section 53-202e , or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(c) Any person who obtains title to an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under this section by bequest or intestate succession shall, within ninety days of obtaining title, apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession as provided in subsection (a) of this section, render the assault weapon permanently inoperable, sell the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the assault weapon from the state.

(d) Any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of an assault weapon, shall, within ninety days, either render the assault weapon permanently inoperable, sell the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the assault weapon from this state, except that any person who is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, is in lawful possession of an assault weapon and has been transferred into the state after October 1, 1994, may, within ninety days of arriving in the state, apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(e) If an owner of an assault weapon sells or transfers the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer, such dealer shall, at the time of delivery of the assault weapon, execute a certificate of transfer and cause the certificate of transfer to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. The certificate of transfer shall contain: (1) The date of sale or transfer; (2) the name and address of the seller or transferor and the licensed gun dealer, their Social Security numbers or motor vehicle operator license numbers, if applicable; (3) the licensed gun dealer's federal firearms license number and seller's permit number; (4) a description of the assault weapon, including the caliber of the assault weapon and its make, model and serial number; and (5) any other information the commissioner prescribes. The licensed gun dealer shall present such dealer's motor vehicle operator's license or Social Security card, federal firearms license and seller's permit to the seller or transferor for inspection at the time of purchase or transfer. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall maintain a file of all certificates of transfer at the commissioner's central office.

(f) Any person who has been issued a certificate of possession for an assault weapon under this section may possess the assault weapon only under the following conditions:

(1) At that person's residence, place of business or other property owned by that person, or on property owned by another person with the owner's express permission;

(2) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets;

(3) While on a target range which holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range;

(4) While on the premises of a licensed shooting club;

(5) While attending any exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms;

(6) While transporting the assault weapon between any of the places set forth in this subsection, or to any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f , for servicing or repair pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53-202f , provided the assault weapon is transported as required by section 53-202f ;

(7) With respect to a nonresident of this state, while transporting a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b , into or through this state in order to attend any exhibition, display or educational project described in subdivision (5) of this subsection, or to participate in a collegiate, Olympic or target pistol shooting competition in this state which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, provided (A) such pistol is transported into or through this state not more than forty-eight hours prior to or after such exhibition, display, project or competition, (B) such pistol is unloaded and carried in a locked carrying case and the ammunition for such pistol is carried in a separate locked container, (C) such nonresident has not been convicted of a felony in this state or of an offense in another state that would constitute a felony if committed in this state, and (D) such nonresident has in his or her possession a pistol permit or firearms registration card if such permit or card is required for possession of such pistol under the laws of his or her state of residence.

Cited. 234 C. 455; 242 C. 143.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-55
Sec. 53a-55. Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

Cited. 168 C. 610; 169 C. 309; 170 C. 81; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 192 C. 85; 193 C. 632; Id., 646; Id., 695. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 429; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; 211 C. 591; 213 C. 38; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 699; 217 C. 498; 223 C. 273; 225 C. 559; 226 C. 237; 233 C. 174; 234 C. 139; 236 C. 342. A conviction of reckless manslaughter pursuant to a robbery conspiracy is permitted under the Pinkerton doctrine because the commission of a reckless crime may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conspiracy. 292 C. 296. While manslaughter in the first degree under this section is a lesser included offense of murder under Sec. 53a-54a despite the fact that the elements of manslaughter are not included in the elements of murder, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 223; 8 CA 307; 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591; 16 CA 223; 24 CA 115; 37 CA 722; 40 CA 189; Id., 374; 41 CA 565; Id., 604; 42 CA 348; 44 CA 62; 46 CA 216.

Cited. 33 CS 28.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400. Cited. 174 C. 89; 176 C. 107. Subdiv. (3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. Id., 227. Cited. 177 C. 538; 179 C. 381. Subdivs. (1) and (3): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; 182 C. 403; 183 C. 394; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 237; Id., 653. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. 189 C. 303. Cited. 190 C. 219; Id., 576; 194 C. 119; Id., 279; Id., 376; Id., 408; 196 C. 519; 198 C. 53; Id., 209; Id., 220; Id., 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 155; Id., 383; Id., 417; 200 C. 224; Id., 453; 201 C. 534; Id., 598; 202 C. 520; Id., 520. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 203 C. 466; 204 C. 120; 205 C. 279; 206 C. 278; 207 C. 276; 209 C. 133; 211 C. 441; 212 C. 612; 213 C. 500; Id., 579; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; 216 C. 220; 218 C. 766; 219 C. 16; 220 C. 169; Id., 285; 222 C. 444; 224 C. 546; 225 C. 55; 227 C. 456; Id., 566; Id., 611; 228 C. 118; Id., 147; Id., 281; 229 C. 193; Id., 397; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 115; Id., 484; 233 C. 106; Id., 215; Id., 517; 235 C. 413; Id., 473; Id., 595; 236 C. 189; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; Id., 743; Id., 799; 241 C. 502. Motion to dismiss on grounds that Subdiv. (3) is unconstitutionally vague because legislature failed to define phrases “extreme indifference to human life” and “grave risk of death” and defendant was not given “fair warning” and statute is susceptible to “arbitrary enforcement” fails to meet burden of proof because person of ordinary intelligence would have had fair warning that defendant's actions were proscribed and was properly denied by trial court; based on established principles concerning how evidence is construed, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, evidence was sufficient to support trial court's verdict of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. 257 C. 544. Defendant who was convicted of murder pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a(a) was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Subdiv. (1). 262 C. 453. Subdiv. (1): Crime of intentional manslaughter, unlike reckless manslaughter under Subdiv. (3), or criminally negligent operation, under Sec. 53a-57(a), does not require proof of the defendant's mental state with respect to the risk of death. 342 C. 538.

Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating statute, a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 5 CA 571. Cited. 7 CA 457; Id., 656; 8 CA 273; 9 CA 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; 11 CA 425; Id., 628; 13 CA 175; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 18 CA 423; 19 CA 576; Id., 609; Id., 674; 20 CA 410; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 265; Id., 321; Id., 340; Id., 507; Id., 521; Id., 669; 23 CA 431; Id., 502; 24 CA 586; Id., 692; 25 CA 456; Id., 734; 26 CA 165; Id., 242; Id., 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; Id., 643; 28 CA 34; Id., 81; Id., 231; Id., 771; Id., 825; 29 CA 68; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566; Id., 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; Id., 394; Id., 452; Id., 533; Id., 754; Id., 773; 30 CA 26; Id., 232; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 687; Id., 854; 33 CA 116; Id., 782; 34 CA 236; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 438; 37 CA 180; Id., 404; Id., 473; 38 CA 801; Id., 815; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 151; 41 CA 831; 42 CA 41; Id., 382; 43 CA 252; Id., 488; 44 CA 790; Id., 731. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy 1-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121. To be guilty under Subsec., it must be established that defendant must have had the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 56 CA 742. Subdiv. (3): Action of defendant in entering house, after car chase, obtaining loaded shotgun, walking 100 feet to edge of driveway and shooting victim showed an extreme indifference to human life. 61 CA 463. Evidence insufficient to find that defendant demonstrated an extreme indifference to human life to support conviction of manslaughter in the first degree when defendant himself ingested fentanyl lollipops, there was no evidence that he or anyone to whom he had given the lollipops had an adverse reaction to them, risks associated with ingestion of methadose and fentanyl not commonly known by laypeople, and defendant immediately called 9-1-1 upon hearing the victim was unresponsive. 106 CA 467. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. The mens rea elements in the two provisions, namely, the “intent to cause serious physical injury” in Subdiv. (1) and “recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death” in Subdiv. (3), do not relate to the same result; the mental state elements in the two provisions - failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that your manner of operation would cause death under Sec. 53a-57(a) and an intent to cause serious physical injury under Subdiv. (1) - do not relate to the same result; the mental state element under Subdiv. (3) and under Sec. 53a-57(a) is mutually exclusive and relate to the same result, thus guilty verdicts as to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent. 191 CA 33; judgment reversed in part, see 342 C. 538. Subdiv. (1): As charged, defendant's rights to be free from double jeopardy violated as the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree under Subdiv. and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, and the offense of risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.

Cited. 44 CS 417.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-142c — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 941 / Section 53-142c
Sec. 53-142c. Manufacture, sale or distribution of records, tapes, cassettes or discs without identification marks prohibited.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-167d
Sec. 53a-167d. Assault of a prosecutor: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault of a prosecutor is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-117l — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-117l
Sec. 53a-117l. Damage to railroad property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Damage to railroad property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-247 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 945 / Section 53-247
Sec. 53-247. Cruelty to animals. Animals engaged in exhibition of fighting. Intentional injury or killing of police animals or dogs in volunteer canine search and rescue teams.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal shall, (1) for a first offense, be guilty of a class D felony, and (2) for any subsequent offense, be guilty of a class C felony. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any licensed veterinarian while following accepted standards of practice of the profession or to any person while following approved methods of slaughter under section 22-272a , while performing medical research as an employee of, student in or person associated with any hospital, educational institution or laboratory, while following generally accepted agricultural practices or while lawfully engaged in the taking of wildlife.

(c) Any person who knowingly (1) owns, possesses, keeps or trains an animal engaged in an exhibition of fighting for amusement or gain, (2) possesses, keeps or trains an animal with the intent that it be engaged in an exhibition of fighting for amusement or gain, (3) permits an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection to take place on premises under his control, (4) acts as judge or spectator at an exhibition of animal fighting for amusement or gain, or (5) bets or wagers on the outcome of an exhibition of animal fighting for amusement or gain, shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(d) Any person who intentionally injures any animal while such animal is in the performance of its duties under the supervision of a peace officer, as defined in section 53a-3 , or intentionally injures a dog that is a member of a volunteer canine search and rescue team, as defined in section 5-249 , while such dog is in the performance of its duties under the supervision of the active individual member of such team, shall be guilty of a class D felony, and shall be required to pay restitution to the law enforcement unit, entity or individual that owns such animal or dog. Such restitution may include, but need not be limited to, the cost of veterinary services for the injured animal or dog and, if such animal or dog is rendered unable to perform its duties, the costs and expenses of the purchase and training of a replacement animal or dog.

(e) Any person who intentionally kills any animal while such animal is in the performance of its duties under the supervision of a peace officer, as defined in section 53a-3 , or intentionally kills a dog that is a member of a volunteer canine search and rescue team, as defined in section 5-249 , while such dog is in the performance of its duties under the supervision of the active individual member of such team, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, and shall be required to pay restitution to the law enforcement unit, entity or individual that owned such animal or dog. Such restitution may include, but need not be limited to, the costs and expenses of the purchase and training of a replacement animal or dog.

(f) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsections (a) to (e), inclusive, of this section, at the time of a person's sentencing for a conviction under this section, the court shall order that, for the five-year period commencing from the date of such conviction or the date of such person's release from imprisonment for such conviction, whichever is later, such person (1) shall not harbor, own, possess, reside with, adopt or serve as a foster placement for any animal, and (2) shall not be employed by, or volunteer for, any entity in any position that involves care for, or regular contact with, any animal.

See Sec. 29-108a for definition of “animal”.

See Sec. 54-86n re appointment of advocate in proceeding regarding the welfare or custody of a cat or dog.

Cruelty to animals in overworking, neglecting, etc., may be alleged as a continuous offense. 54 C. 2. Information and charge under allegation of neglecting horses. 75 C. 268. It was error for the court to instruct the jury that defendant owner of animals cruelly treated by a bailee was chargeable with strict liability under section. 167 C. 434. Subsec. (a): “[U]njustifiably injures any animal” clause is plain and unambiguous and requires only a general intent when read in the context of the entirety of the subsection and within the section as a whole, and state was not required to prove that defendant possessed the specific intent to injure plaintiff's cat. 328 C. 21. Subsec. (a): The phrase “unjustifiably injures” is not unconstitutionally vague on its face as applied to defendant because defendant's conduct of shooting neighbor's cat with a BB gun because such cat was simply trespassing on defendant's property came within the unmistakable core of prohibited conduct under Subsec. Id.

Cited. 17 CA 326; 36 CA 364. Subsec. (c)(4) does not infringe on defendant's rights of freedom of association or assembly, nor does it violate defendant's right to equal protection; Subsec. (c)(4) need only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state objective, and suppression of animal cruelty is a legitimate state objective. 131 CA 388. Subsec. (a) not unconstitutionally vague because person of ordinary intelligence would know that keeping smaller breed dogs in uninsulated space with interior temperature of 30 degrees would constitute failure to provide proper protection from weather. 153 CA 449. Subsec. (a) not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of case; person of ordinary intelligence would know that conduct causing dogs to be kept in conditions in which they exhibited initial signs of hypothermia is proscribed by statute. 160 CA 734. Section was intended to protect abused or neglected animals and to criminalize misconduct by their caretakers; plaintiff town and animal control officer are not abused animals or perpetrators of criminal conduct and therefore fell outside any class protected by section and they could not rely on section as a basis for maintaining a negligence per se action against defendant. 182 CA 55. Subsec. (a): Applies when a person who has responsibility to care for an animal or who limits an animal's ability to roam by keeping it in a set location fails to provide adequate care for that animal. Id., 237. Subsec. (a): The term “any animal” attaches separate criminal liability for each mistreated animal and defendant's nineteen separate charges for the cruel treatment of nineteen different goats did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id.

The fact that defendant, a dog warden, was prosecuted for cruelly beating or unjustifiably injuring a dog, not for killing it, did not preclude him from claiming the benefit of Sec. 22-358. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 62. In determining whether defendant acted “cruelly”, the issue of justification should be carefully considered; it was not enough, for the guidance of the jury, for the court to define “cruelty” in its general sense; what is cruelty in one set of circumstances may not be cruelty in another. Id., 64.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127d
Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Cheating is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-48
Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation.
Status: in_force

(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 517; Id., 642. Generally, may prosecute and sentence defendant for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as presumption of legislative intent; exception to rule when more persons than required participate; abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. 171 C. 105. Cited. Id., 524; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 135; Id., 338; Id., 376; 176 C. 131; 177 C. 370; 178 C. 67; Id., 163; Id., 649. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 180 C. 481; 182 C. 262; Id., 595; 184 C. 369; 186 C. 426; Id., 648; Id., 696; 187 C. 109; Id., 264; Id., 513; 188 C. 515; Id., 542; Id., 671; 189 C. 201; Id., 337; 190 C. 259; 191 C. 360; 194 C. 18; Id., 361; 195 C. 128; Id., 183; Id., 598; 196 C. 115; Id., 567; 197 C. 201; Id., 326; Id., 413; Id., 644. There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result, therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1. Cited. Id., 14; 200 C. 113; Id., 310; 201 C. 489; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 240; Id., 630; 207 C. 323; 209 C. 1; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 195; Id., 387; Id., 593; 213 C. 233. Conspiracy charge against defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator; conspiracy statute as “bilateral” in nature discussed. Id., 243. Cited. Id., 422; Id., 708; 215 C. 716; Id., 739; 216 C. 801; 218 C. 349; Id., 432; 220 C. 602; Id., 765; 221 C. 447; Id., 595; 223 C. 243; Id., 384; 224 C. 322; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 1; Id., 32; Id., 207; 235 C. 397; Id., 679; Id., 748; 236 C. 176; Id., 514; 237 C. 518; 238 C. 380; 239 C. 56; Id., 481; 240 C. 210; Id., 708; 241 C. 322; 242 C. 93. The requisite evidence of an agreement between individuals accused as coconspirators may be provided by a coconspirator's conduct at the scene. 290 C. 816. Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1. To satisfy specific intent requirements for a conviction of conspiracy to distribute drugs, state must proffer evidence of an agreement to distribute drugs, in addition to mere buyer-seller relationship. 311 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 524; 3 CA 503; 5 CA 347; Id., 491; Id., 599; 8 CA 119; Id., 478; Id., 667; 9 CA 548; 10 CA 130; Id., 147; Id., 447; 11 CA 397; Id., 621; 14 CA 205; Id., 445; Id., 605; Id., 807; 15 CA 122; Id., 328; Id., 539; 16 CA 18; Id., 601; 17 CA 247; Id., 648; 19 CA 554; Id., 640; 21 CA 299; Id., 386; Id., 519; 22 CA 449; Id., 567; 23 CA 502; Id., 615; Id., 667; 24 CA 316; Id., 493; 26 CA 94; Id., 667; Id., 779; 27 CA 596; 28 CA 34; Id., 126; Id., 416; 29 CA 359; Id., 843; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; Id., 550; Id., 654; Id., 712; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 253; Id., 409; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 714; Id., 839; 36 CA 59; Id., 190; Id., 454; Id., 556; Id., 631; Id., 672; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 219; Id., 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176; 38 CA 481; Id., 536; Id., 581; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 224; Id., 333; Id., 526; Id., 550; 40 CA 515; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 147; Id., 495; 42 CA 472; Id., 500; Id., 555; Id., 687; 43 CA 142; Id., 252; Id., 555; 44 CA 338; 45 CA 110; Id., 282; Id., 455; 46 CA 684; Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under section discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223. Jury instructions on conspiracy to commit murder must indicate that state was required to prove intent to agree or conspire to commit murder and intent to cause murder. 92 CA 92. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of Sec. 53a-49 and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of this section are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Defendant's sentences on four separate conspiracy charges arising from two incidents constituted double jeopardy. 124 CA 9. Conviction for two conspiracy charges arising from same agreement constituted double jeopardy. 125 CA 307. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: The intent to agree or conspire, and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 126 CA 192. Conviction of conspiracy to possess narcotics under Sec. 21a-279(a) and conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell under Sec. 21a-277(a) constitutes double jeopardy. 137 CA 733. Conviction for conspiracy to commit false statement under Sec. 53a-157b and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence under Sec. 53a-155 pursuant to the same unlawful agreement violates constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 138 CA 420; judgment reversed in part, see 325 C. 399. Multiple sentences for 3 separate conspiracies arising out of a single unlawful agreement violates prohibition against double jeopardy. 144 CA 731; judgment affirmed, see 320 C. 781. Evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant or alleged coconspirator stole headphones, either as a substantive crime or as overt act in furtherance of conspiracy. 164 CA 25.

Cited. 29 CS 344; 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging conspiracy. 35 CS 96. Cited. 36 CS 603; 37 CS 527; Id., 853; 38 CS 301; Id., 374; Id., 593.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 243; 189 C. 752; 192 C. 383; 199 C. 389; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 289; 203 C. 420; 207 C. 118; 210 C. 78; Id., 619; 212 C. 50; Id., 485; 213 C. 243; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; 215 C. 570; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 151; 223 C. 635; 227 C. 363; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; Id., 537; 235 C. 502; 239 C. 235; Id., 467; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 296. Appellate Court in 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict, judgment of Appellate Court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354. Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587. To prove defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Subsec. and Sec. 53a-135(a)(2), state needs to prove defendant specifically agreed that there would be the display or threatened use of what was represented as a deadly weapon or dangerous object during the robbery or immediate flight therefrom. 315 C. 451.

Cited. 7 CA 701; 9 CA 313; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; Id., 688; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 245; Id., 402; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 179; Id., 195; 20 CA 665; 22 CA 340; 23 CA 602; Id., 746; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595; 25 CA 3; Id., 21; Id., 318; 26 CA 279; 27 CA 558; Id., 161; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 645; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 207; 31 CA 370; 32 CA 842; 33 CA 122; Id., 339; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 647; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 96; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 595; 35 CA 740; 36 CA 41; Id., 483; Id., 488; 37 CA 156; Id., 360; Id., 574; 38 CA 434; 39 CA 63; Id., 242; Id., 579; Id., 645; 40 CA 47; Id., 526; 43 CA 488; Id., 830; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project; the law is not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose. 73 CA 386. The nexus between defendant's role in the conspiracy and illegal conduct of his coconspirators was not so attenuated or remote that it would be unjust to hold him responsible for the criminal conduct of his coconspirators. 107 CA 413. Nothing in Subsec. requires state to prove future or past criminal acts; federal “buyer-seller exception” not applicable to charge of conspiracy to sell narcotics. 131 CA 433; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 1. Existence of formal agreement between conspirators need not be proved and may be inferred from proof of the separate acts of the alleged coconspirators and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the acts. 147 CA 53. Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under Subsec. and Secs. 53a-123(a)(3) and 53a-124(a)(2) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 44 CS 490.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 40 CA 526. Breakdown of an agreement does not end a conspiracy or disqualify previous overt acts. 131 CA 433.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-199 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 943 / Section 53-199
Sec. 53-199. Theaters and moving picture shows; seating capacity; standing room.
Status: in_force

See chapter 531 re moving pictures.

Superior Court held to have no original jurisdiction of violation in city of New Haven. 97 C. 600.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-32 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-32
Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Notice to victim or victim advocate. Arrest. Pretrial release conditions and supervision. Hearing. Disposition.
Status: in_force

(b) When the defendant is presented for arraignment on the charge of violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, the court shall review any conditions previously imposed on the defendant and may order, as a condition of the pretrial release of the defendant, that the defendant comply with any or all of such conditions in addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to section 54-64a . Unless the court, pursuant to subsection (c) of section 54-64a , orders that the defendant remain under the supervision of a probation officer or other designated person or organization, the defendant shall be supervised by the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch in accordance with subsection (a) of section 54-63b .

(c) Upon notification by the probation officer of the arrest of the defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant's probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant's own behalf. Unless good cause is shown, a charge of violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge shall be disposed of or scheduled for a hearing not later than one hundred twenty days after the defendant is arraigned on such charge, except, if the defendant is a serious firearm offender, or is on probation for a felony conviction and has been arrested for the commission of a serious firearm offense, such charge shall be disposed of or scheduled for a hearing not later than sixty days after the defendant is arraigned on such charge.

(d) If such violation is established and the violation consisted of the commission of a serious firearm offense or the defendant is a serious firearm offender, the court shall revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge, otherwise, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29 ; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.

(e) Provisions regarding release on bail of any serious firearm offender arrested pursuant to this section who is charged with a crime, or any felony offender arrested pursuant to this section for a serious firearm offense, shall be applicable to such serious firearm offender provided that, for the purpose of applying such provisions, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such serious firearm offender poses a danger to the safety of other persons.

See Sec. 54-108c re availability on Internet of information on outstanding arrest warrants for probation violations.

Cited. 165 C. 73. Defendant's right to counsel hereunder is of “constitutional dimension”, and tests of competency are met; order of probation revocation was upheld where defendant moved from receiving state of Maine to Massachusetts without reporting to Connecticut parole authorities and was convicted of possession of drugs in Massachusetts. 167 C. 639. Cited. 169 C. 223; 170 C. 118. In determining issue of “unnecessary delay”, principles applicable to sixth amendment “speedy trial” determinations may be considered. 192 C. 321. Cited. 193 C. 35; 195 C. 461; 204 C. 52; 207 C. 152; Id., 565; 219 C. 629; 222 C. 299; 226 C. 191; 228 C. 487. “Fair preponderance of the evidence” standard for determining whether probation has been violated; judgment of Appellate Court in 29 CA 801, 813 reversed. 229 C. 285. Cited. 235 C. 469; 240 C. 639; 242 C. 648. Willfulness not an element of a probation violation; state need only establish that probationer knew of the condition and engaged in conduct that violated the condition. 256 C. 412. If defendant has been convicted of criminal conduct, following either a guilty plea, Alford plea or jury trial, and defendant has pursued a timely appeal from such conviction and that appeal remains unresolved, a live controversy exists so that an appeal challenging a finding of violation of probation stemming from that conduct is not moot. 286 C. 353. Trial court may not find a violation of probation unless it finds that the predicate facts underlying the violation have been established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing; the predicate facts proved by the state in this case are insufficient, either individually or in the aggregate, to establish a violation of Sec. 53-21(a)(1), which in this case, served as the foundation for trial court's finding of a violation of probation. 303 C. 18. Re defendant who admitted violating conditions of probation but contested revocation, due process rights were not violated by admission of photographs from social media Internet websites depicting defendant committing acts in violation of terms of probation because state articulated an uncontradicted basis for determining whether each image depicted defendant before or during probation and defendant failed to contest that the photographs depicted her while on probation. Id., 304.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 6 CA 394; 7 CA 131; 9 CA 59; Id., 686; 11 CA 251; 12 CA 679; 13 CA 638; 15 CA 34; 16 CA 264; 18 CA 368; 19 CA 304; 20 CA 572; 22 CA 303; 23 CA 642; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629; 27 CA 225; Id., 780. Standard of proof needed to find a violation of probation discussed. 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285. Cited. 30 CA 346; 31 CA 278; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385, see also 37 CA 801; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 162, see also 35 CA 520; 34 CA 1; Id., 46; Id., 537; 35 CA 107. Proper standard of proof in revocation of probation proceeding is that of a fair preponderance of the evidence; previous consideration of case, 33 CA 162, remanded for reconsideration, 229 C. 916; original judgment reversed and case remanded for new probation revocation hearing. Id., 520. Cited. 36 CA 440; 37 CA 72; 38 CA 762; 39 CA 175; Id., 267; Id., 722; 40 CA 395; 42 CA 768; 45 CA 566. Reaffirmed prior holding that proper standard of proof for revocation of probation hearing proceeding is a fair preponderance of evidence and that revocation is on consideration of the whole record. 52 CA 557. A probation revocation hearing has two distinct components. 56 CA 125. In determining whether defendant's probationary status should be revoked court has broad discretion and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of court's ruling. 57 CA 743. State may amend the factual basis for an alleged probation violation prior to a hearing under section. 60 CA 515. If a specific condition of probation does not explicitly proscribe certain noncriminal conduct and cannot be reasonably interpreted to proscribe such conduct, defendant must receive actual notice that continuation of the conduct could result in a charge of violation of a condition of probation. Id., 716. Willfulness is not an element of the offense of violation of probation; court's findings that defendant violated probation were not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 367. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation and reinstating prison sentence after defendant's urine tested positive for opiate. Id., 437. Court is vested with broad discretion in determining, on basis of the entire record, whether sentence of probation should continue or be revoked, and court may require defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose a lesser sentence. 81 CA 710. Trial court properly found violations of defendant's probation and did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation. 102 CA 154. Because defendant accepted a sentence that included probation, modification of terms of probation for violation of Sec. 53-21 to include sexual offender evaluation and treatment did not violate due process as long as modified conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety. 105 CA 693. In adjudicative phase, court's finding that defendant violated condition of his probation was not clearly erroneous and, in dispositional phase, court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation after finding that the rehabilitative purpose of probation could not be fulfilled. 112 CA 40. When, subsequent to a judgment revoking probation, defendant was convicted of crimes for some of the conduct for which his probation was revoked, and Appellate Court had heard his appeal and Supreme Court had denied petition, his appeal re revocation of probation was moot as to those crimes, but was not moot as to conduct that was not at issue at criminal trial. Id., 147. Court's failure to make explicit findings of fact regarding the rationale underlying its decision to revoke probation does not, in and of itself, signify the absence of the dispositional phase. 116 CA 76. A probation revocation hearing does not require all the procedural components associated with an adversarial criminal proceeding; notice to defendant satisfied the mandates of due process. 123 CA 674. If a person is convicted of a crime, he may not claim that in a prior violation of probation hearing regarding the same course of conduct there was insufficient evidence to prove the violation. 130 CA 19.

Cited. 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

A probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding and is not subject to the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions, and the state may reinstitute a violation of probation charge at any time after dismissal without prejudice by the court provided defendant's period of probation has not expired. 301 C. 630.

Cited. 10 CA 395; 25 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299. Trial court reasonably could have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated his probation by engaging in breach of the peace and criminal mischief and thus violated criminal laws of the state. 57 CA 64. State satisfied notice requirements when it recited the charges constituting defendant's violation of probation during both defendant's arraignment and probation revocation hearing. 80 CA 75.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 178 C. 145; 225 C. 46. Court's discretion to provide right of allocution to defendant during probation revocation proceeding is identical to discretion provided at time of original sentencing. 243 C. 339. When defendant has raised a claim that trial court abused its discretion in rendering its judgment during dispositional phase, practical relief is available even when there is no live controversy as to whether defendant committed the underlying offense and, therefore, the claim is not moot. 286 C. 367.

Cited. 1 CA 70; 10 CA 395; 31 CA 660. Trial court has broad discretion in continuing or revoking sentence of probation. 50 CA 46. Provides that once a probation violation is established, court may extend period of probation if original period with any extension does not exceed periods authorized by Sec. 53a-29. 72 CA 33. Subsec. requires that violation of probation be “established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence”; this requirement is not satisfied when, as in this case, the substance that defendant possessed was readily available for laboratory analysis to determine whether it in fact contained cocaine, a narcotic, but was never subjected to such testing. 81 CA 409.

Subsec. (c):

120 day limitation establishes a directory rule, rather than a mandatory rule, and such time period is a goal, guideline and advisory. 178 CA 715.

Subsec. (d):

Use of special parole following a finding of a violation of probation is authorized within the “any lesser sentence” language of the Subsec. 192 CA 128; judgment affirmed, see 338 C. 523.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-334 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-334
Sec. 53-334. Unlawful disinterment.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 54-50 re reward for information regarding unlawful disinterment of corpse.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127e
Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Possession of a cheating device is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-54c
Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.

Cited. 171 C. 683; 176 C. 257; 177 C. 677; 178 C. 116; 179 C. 78. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599. Cited. 181 C. 151; Id., 187; 182 C. 419; Id., 580; 183 C. 299; 186 C. 1; 188 C. 542; 189 C. 346; 191 C. 636; Id., 659; 193 C. 70; Id., 144; Id., 350; 194 C. 223; Id., 279; Id., 416; Id., 530; 195 C. 505. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 197 C. 396; Id., 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 92; Id., 255; Id., 386; Id., 397; Id., 435; Id., 506; Id., 517; Id., 638; Id., 644; 199 C. 110; 200 C. 323; Id., 721; 201 C. 34; Id., 395; Id., 462; 202 C. 18; Id., 39; 203 C. 4; Id., 212; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 298; Id., 485; Id., 507; Id., 616; Id., 638; 206 C. 157; Id., 657; 207 C. 1; 208 C. 52; 209 C. 34; Id., 75; Id., 290; Id., 564; Id., 636; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; Id., 751; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 387; 213 C. 388; 214 C. 132; Id., 454; Id., 493; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; Id., 699; 218 C. 85; Id., 151; Id., 309; Id., 447; Id., 486; 219 C. 743; 220 C. 1; Id., 385; Id., 417; 221 C. 315; Id., 635; Id., 643; Id., 685; 222 C. 117; 223 C. 299; Id., 595; Id., 635; Id., 834; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 101; 229 C. 691; 230 C. 88; Id., 183; Id., 351; 233 C. 44; 234 C. 97; 235 C. 595; Id., 748; Id., 802; 237 C. 390; Id., 518; Id., 694; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93; Id., 125; Id., 409; Id., 666; 247 C. 662. It is inconsistent with purpose of statute to allow defendant who causes a death in the course of a felony to claim self-defense because victim attempted to thwart the felony. 254 C. 184. The defense of self-defense does not apply to charge of felony murder as a matter of law. Id., 202. A proper charge on felony murder predicated on an attempt crime should include an instruction on the definition of criminal attempt. 286 C. 707. Conviction of felony murder and robbery in first degree under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy. 302 C. 287. Defendant could be found guilty of felony murder if found guilty of the underlying felony robbery charge regardless of whether defendant was found guilty of the robbery charge as a principal, accessory or on the basis of vicarious liability under the Pinkerton doctrine. 303 C. 378. Felony murder is a class A felony subject to the penalties in Sec. 53a-35a(2). 308 C. 263.

Cited. 11 CA 80; 12 CA 385; 24 CA 723; 27 CA 794; 29 CA 573; Id., 771; 30 CA 381; 31 CA 771; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88; 32 CA 38; Id., 431; 33 CA 90; 35 CA 762; 36 CA 364; Id., 506; Id., 556; 38 CA 581; 41 CA 515. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472; 43 CA 61; 45 CA 32; Id., 187; Id., 390; Id., 658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798. Court rejects defendant's argument that killing of victim who resisted a robbery attempt by walking away is not committed “in the course of and in furtherance of” the attempted robbery because the attempted robbery had ceased. 64 CA 596. Felony murder conviction carries mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years imprisonment. 127 CA 718. Homicide and assault were committed “in furtherance of” conspiracy to commit robbery, because it was within defendant's contemplation that one or more of the people she intended to rob at gunpoint would be shot and injured or killed. Id., 819. Conviction of murder under Sec. 53a-54a and felony murder under this section for same offense violated prohibition against double jeopardy. 153 CA 691. Legislature intended multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying predicate offenses; conviction for kidnapping under Sec. 53a-92(a)(2) and robbery under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) do not violate double jeopardy even though they are the predicate offenses for felony murder conviction. 180 CA 371; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54.

Cited. 36 CS 141; 41 CS 385; 42 CS 426.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-253 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-253
Sec. 53a-253. Computer crime in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Computer crime in the second degree is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-70
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under sixteen years of age.

(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, a portion of which may be suspended, except as provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, or a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subsection and impose a period of supervised probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29 .

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; Id., 398; 182 C. 412; 184 C. 258; 186 C. 45; Id., 449; Id., 521; 187 C. 216; 190 C. 20; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 154; 194 C. 114; Id., 297; Id., 692; 195 C. 253; 197 C. 280; Id., 298. Does not include sexual intercourse with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of unconsciousness. 198 C. 53. Cited. Id., 190; 199 C. 121; Id., 193; Id., 281; Id., 481; Id., 693; 201 C. 115; Id., 659; 202 C. 343; Id., 676; 204 C. 98; Id., 441; Id., 571; 205 C. 61; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 210 C. 110. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132. Cited. 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 215 C. 257. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. Id., 538. Cited. 219 C. 489; 220 C. 112; Id., 345; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 180; Id., 731; 224 C. 397; Id., 656; Id., 663; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 207; Id., 616; Id., 677; 228 C. 456; 230 C. 43; 235 C. 711; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409; Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517. The plain and unambiguous language shows that the legislature intended to criminalize only single acts of sexual intercourse and not a continuing course of conduct. 345 C. 516.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 378; Id., 724; 3 CA 148; Id., 374; Id., 650; 5 CA 424; Id., 556; Id., 586; 7 CA 257; Id., 701; 8 CA 44; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 345; Id., 399; Id., 528; Id., 620; 10 CA 457; Id., 520; Id., 709. Court concluded the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102; Id., 112; Id., 236; Id., 238; Id., 316. Cited. 12 CA 585; 13 CA 413; 14 CA 333; Id., 688; 15 CA 251; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 111; 20 CA 737; 22 CA 531; Id., 562; 23 CA 1; Id., 221; Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 24 CA 13; Id., 24; Id., 295; 25 CA 334; Id., 503; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 151; Id., 433; Id., 674; 28 CA 548; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 642; 32 CA 773; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 754; 36 CA 177; 38 CA 56; Id., 777; 39 CA 267; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 604; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 548; 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74 CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25. Trial court's finding that the state had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had committed sexual assault in the first degree and thereby violated his probation was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence. 108 CA 250. Sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree; convictions under this section and Sec. 53a-73a do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because they are separate and distinct crimes and each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. 171 CA 530.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 179 C. 328; 180 C. 101; Id., 565; 182 C. 449; 185 C. 163; Id., 402; 186 C. 757; 187 C. 681; 188 C. 372; Id., 565; Id., 574; Id., 697; 189 C. 106; Id., 611; Id., 631; 190 C. 104; Id., 327; Id., 440; Id., 496; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 166; 193 C. 457; 194 C. 258; Id., 594; Id., 692; 197 C. 50; Id., 485; 198 C. 53; Id., 190; Id., 285; Id., 314; Id., 405; Id., 430; Id., 598; Id., 617; 199 C. 62; Id., 399; Id., 481; 201 C. 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 714; 206 C. 39; Id., 132; Id., 437; Id., 528; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 143; Id., 416; 210 C. 51; Id., 110; Id., 315; Id., 359; 211 C. 18; 212 C. 31; 213 C. 593; 214 C. 38; Id., 717. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. 216 C. 563; 218 C. 447; 219 C. 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 400; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 87; 223 C. 52; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 393; Id., 456; Id., 552; Id., 582; Id., 756; 229 C. 529; Id., 557; Id., 580; 230 C. 43; 231 C. 195; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145; Id., 502; Id., 659; 237 C. 284; Id., 576; Id., 694; 241 C. 784; Id., 823; 242 C. 409; Id., 445; Id., 523. Medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 724; 4 CA 514; Id., 672; 7 CA 149; Id., 489; Id., 653; 8 CA 35; Id., 148; Id., 177; Id., 387; Id., 528; Id., 620; 9 CA 208; Id., 340; 10 CA 217; Id., 709; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; Id., 673; 13 CA 60; Id., 67; Id., 76; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; Id., 657; Id., 688; Id., 710; 15 CA 222; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 525; 18 CA 134; Id., 273; Id., 643; Id., 730; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 101; Id., 193; Id., 737; 21 CA 411; Id., 467; 22 CA 329; Id., 477; 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 25 CA 243; Id., 384; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; Id., 725; 26 CA 81; Id., 395; Id., 433; Id., 574; 27 CA 279; Id., 705; 28 CA 91; Id., 195; Id., 360; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529; Id., 402; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 409; Id., 724; 30 CA 56; Id., 281; Id., 523; Id., 915; 32 CA 178; Id., 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; Id., 457; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 728; 36 CA 177; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 228; Id., 641; Id., 695; 38 CA 56; Id., 100; Id., 125; Id., 231; Id., 531; Id., 777; 39 CA 45; Id., 617; Id., 742; Id., 832; 40 CA 132; Id., 233; Id., 250; 41 CA 139; Id., 204; Id., 255; Id., 287; Id., 317; 42 CA 78; Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823; Id., 445; 43 CA 552; Id., 680; Id., 704; Id., 715; Id., 785; 44 CA 457; Id., 548; 45 CA 66; Id., 116; Id., 289; Id., 756; 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were not properly preserved for appellate review; trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv. (1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201. Subdiv. (1): Sexual assault in the second degree was not a lesser offense included within sexual assault in the first degree because it would be possible to commit the latter offense in the manner described in the information and bill of particulars without committing the former offense. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (2) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 118 CA 180. Under Subdiv. (4), state need not show that any specific or identifiable drug or intoxicating substance had been administered to the victim without her consent, only that the victim was under the influence of some drug or intoxicating substance; criminal liability under Subdiv. (4) does not require a showing that the criminal actor administered the drug or intoxicating substance at issue or that the criminal actor knew, or had reason to know, that the victim was mentally incapacitated. 136 CA 731. Subdiv. (2): The age difference of more than 2 years between the complainant and the perpetrator of the sexual assault is an essential element; where the victim of the assault was 12 years old at the time of the assault and the state provided evidence that defendant was married and the father of a 3 year old child at the time and the jury had the opportunity to view defendant, the state presented sufficient evidence of defendant's age. 160 CA 61.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 207 C. 412, 416. Issue of whether victims were less than 10 years of age was a question for jury to decide during guilt phase of trial except in this case, where court decided issue of age in sentencing process, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 271 C. 499. Under 2001 revision, as amended by P.A. 02-138, S. 5, Subdiv. (3) does not mandate that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; it provides, rather, that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must total at least 10 years. 320 C. 239. Under 2005 revision, Subdiv. (3) requires only that any period of special parole that may be imposed shall, along with the accompanying term of imprisonment, constitute a total sentence of not less than 10 years. Id., 259.

Cited. 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-215 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-215
Sec. 53a-215. Insurance fraud: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section, “statement” includes, but is not limited to, any notice, statement, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.

(c) For the purposes of this section, “insurance company” has the same meaning as provided in section 38a-1 .

(d) Insurance fraud is a class D felony.

See Secs. 53-440 to 53-443, inclusive, re health insurance fraud and abuse.

Cited. 227 C. 1.

Cited. 28 CA 9; 44 CA 294. Subsec. (a)(2): In order to establish guilt under the Subsec., the state must present evidence that defendant engaged in conduct related to the making or preparing of the insurance claim, and evidence that defendant intended to defraud the insurance company when she started a fire does not reasonably support the inference that she engaged in the making or preparation of any statement provided to the insurance company. 184 CA 595.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196i — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-196i
Sec. 53a-196i. Commercial sexual exploitation of a minor: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(1) “Advertisement for a commercial sex act” or “advertisement” means any advertisement or offer in electronic or print media which includes an explicit or implicit offer for a commercial sex act to occur in this state;

(2) “Commercial sex act” means any act of sexual contact, as defined in section 53a-65 , or sexual intercourse, as defined in section 53a-65 , for which something of value is given to or received by any person;

(3) “Depiction” means any photograph, film, videotape, visual material or printed material; and

(4) “Person” has the meaning provided in section 53a-3 , but does not include a government or a governmental instrumentality.

(b) A person is guilty of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor when such person knowingly purchases advertising space for an advertisement for a commercial sex act that includes a depiction of a minor.

(c) (1) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall not be a defense that the defendant (A) did not know the age of the person depicted in the advertisement, (B) relied on an oral or written representation of the age of the person depicted in the advertisement, or (C) relied on the apparent age of the person depicted in the advertisement.

(2) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, prior to purchasing advertising space for the advertisement, made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the person depicted in the advertisement by requiring the person depicted in the advertisement to produce a driver's license, marriage license, birth certificate or other government-issued or school-issued identity card that identifies the age of the person, provided the defendant retains and produces a copy or other record of the license, certificate or identity card used to ascertain the age of the person depicted in the advertisement.

(d) Commercial sexual exploitation of a minor is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-28 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-28
Sec. 53a-28. Authorized sentences.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as provided in section 53a-46a , when a person is convicted of an offense, the court shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73 ; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73 ; or (8) a sentence of unconditional discharge; or (9) a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole as provided in section 54-125e , except that the court may not impose a period of special parole for convictions of offenses under chapter 420b.

(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the court shall inquire on the record whether there are any requests by a victim for restitution, and if (1) a person is convicted of an offense that resulted in injury to another person or damage to or loss of property, (2) the victim requests financial restitution, and (3) the court finds that the victim has suffered injury or damage to or loss of property as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution under terms that it determines are appropriate. In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution, the court shall consider: (A) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (B) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (C) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (D) other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the victim, that the court determines make the terms of restitution appropriate. If the court determines that the current financial resources of the offender or the offender's current ability to pay based on installments or other conditions are such that no appropriate terms of restitution can be determined, the court may forego setting such terms. The court shall articulate its findings on the record with respect to each of the factors set forth in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subsection. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury. Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed or directed by a written order of the court on a form prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator containing the amount of damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury as ascertained by the court. The order of the court shall direct that a certified copy of the completed form containing the written order be delivered by certified mail to each victim and contain an advisement to the victim that the order is enforceable as a judgment in a civil action as provided in section 53a-28a . The court shall retain the original of each form containing a written order of restitution as part of such offender's court record.

(d) A sentence to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with sections 53a-29 to 53a-34 , inclusive, shall be deemed a revocable disposition, in that such sentence shall be tentative to the extent that it may be altered or revoked in accordance with said sections but for all other purposes it shall be deemed to be a final judgment of conviction.

(e) When sentencing a person to a period of probation who has been convicted of (1) a misdemeanor that did not involve the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person or (2) a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, the court shall consider, as a condition of such sentence of probation, ordering the person to perform community service in the community in which the offense or violation occurred. If the court determines that community service is appropriate, such community service may be implemented by a community court established in accordance with section 51-181c if the offense or violation occurred within the jurisdiction of a community court established by said section.

(f) When sentencing a person to a period of probation who is or has been subject to a protective order, the court may issue a protective order that is effective during such period of probation.

(g) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to section 53-247 or section 53a-73b , at the time of a person's sentencing for any conviction under said sections, the court shall order that, for the five-year period commencing from the date of such conviction or the date of such person's release from imprisonment for such conviction, whichever is later, such person (1) shall not harbor, own, possess, reside with, adopt or serve as a foster placement for any animal, and (2) shall not be employed by, or volunteer for, any entity in any position that involves care for, or regular contact with, any animal.

Cited. 172 C. 298. Court does not have sentencing options as provided in this section where Sec. 53a-36 provides for a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment. 180 C. 557. Cited. 197 C. 337; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 207 C. 270; 208 C. 420; 210 C. 519; 225 C. 46.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 30 CA 416; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Monetary obligation re insurance for victim as a special condition of probation speculative. 55 CA 28.

Person convicted under Sec. 19-481(a) required to be sentenced in accord with this chapter where sentence not inconsistent with chapter 359. 31 CS 350. Does not provide for sentence of confinement with condition restricting authority of Commissioner of Correction to award “good time”. 35 CS 545. Section contains no authority for order of restitution unless it is a condition of probation or conditional discharge. Id., 675.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 182 C. 595; 196 C. 655; 206 C. 608; 216 C. 40. Subdiv. (9): Defendant's sentence of 10 years of imprisonment followed by 10 years of special parole violated Sec. 54-128(c) and was an illegal sentence because total length of terms of imprisonment and special parole combined exceeded maximum term of imprisonment authorized for sexual assault in the second degree by Secs. 53a-35a(6) and 53a-71(b). 279 C. 527.

Cited. 8 CA 607. Subdiv. (9): The plain language of public act 18-63 clearly and unambiguously prohibits retroactive application of the amendment to Subdiv., especially when viewed in context of the related savings statutes, Secs. 54-194 and 1-1(t). 209 CA 283.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 34 CA 1. Court did not commit plain error when it did not conduct an analysis pursuant to Subsec. during sentencing because Subsec. does not apply to plea bargains in which defendant and the state have already agreed to restitution amount. 81 CA 310.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-5 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-5
Sec. 53a-5. Criminal liability; mental state required.
Status: in_force

Cited. 173 C. 35; 186 C. 45; 201 C. 505; 202 C. 520; 209 C. 75; 235 C. 477; 242 C. 211. When a statute requires state to prove that defendant intentionally engaged in the statutorily proscribed conduct, section does not require court to presume that the statute requires state to prove that defendant had knowledge of a circumstance described in the statute. 265 C. 35.

Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 686; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 609; 40 CA 643.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-167c
Sec. 53a-167c. Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel is a class C felony. If any person who is confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for assault of an employee of the Department of Correction under this section, such term shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.

(c) In any prosecution under this section involving assault of a health care employee, as defined in section 19a-490q , it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant is a person with a disability as described in subdivision (13), (15) or (20) of section 46a-51 and the defendant's conduct was a clear and direct manifestation of the disability, except that for the purposes of this subsection, “mental disability”, as defined in subdivision (20) of section 46a-51 , does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct.

See Sec. 53a-59b re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree.

Cited. 214 C. 195; 231 C. 545; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 454; Id., 633.

Cited. 3 CA 353; 10 CA 486; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 27 CA 103; 32 CA 224; 37 CA 338; 40 CA 601; 43 CA 61; Id., 76; 46 CA 118. Under Sec. 53a-23, the illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under this section which was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful; it was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to egregiously unlawful conduct–such as an unprovoked assault–by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. 86 CA 607.

Cited. 33 CS 4; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 201 C. 605; 205 C. 370; 228 C. 910; 233 C. 502. Judgment of Appellate Court in 37 CA 500 reversed in part to affirm judgment of trial court with respect to charges under section. 237 C. 633. Trial court improperly prevented defendant from offering evidence re first element of the crime, namely, whether the officer was performing his assigned duties when defendant struck him. 255 C. 581. In order to sustain conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Cited. 1 CA 709; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; Id., 447; Id., 663; 28 CA 469; 30 CA 606; 31 CA 178; 33 CA 509; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 431; Id., 699; 37 CA 500; Id., 635; 38 CA 306; 39 CA 333; Id., 657; Id., 789; 43 CA 480; Id., 578; 44 CA 264. In determining whether an assault has been committed, defendant's act does not have to be wholly or partially successful, nor must the act defeat or delay the performance of a duty in which the officer is then engaged, but instead, defendant must only have intended to prevent the officer from performing his or her duties. 112 CA 324. Conviction of both assault of peace officer under Subdiv. (1) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a(a) constitutes double jeopardy; Subdiv. (1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness re defendant's conduct because it provides fair warning that a specific intent to injure officer is not an element of the offense. 119 CA 556. Under facts presented, conviction under Subdiv. (5) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Subdiv. (1): Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under Sec. 53a-167a and assault of public safety personnel under this section does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Subsec. (b):

Legislature intended to deter all prisoners being held in Connecticut facilities, whether there temporarily or for duration of a sentence, from assaulting employees of those facilities and therefore trial court lacked discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to defendant's federal sentence. 63 CA 386.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-16 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-16
Sec. 53a-16. Justification as defense.
Status: in_force

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 188 C. 237; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75.

Cited. 3 CA 289; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 643; Id., 697; 11 CA 665; 17 CA 200; Id., 326; Id., 602; 18 CA 303; 24 CA 195; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; 45 CA 390. State did not fail to disprove defense of justification. 75 CA 80.

Cited. 38 CS 619.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-180b — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-180b
Sec. 53a-180b. Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death: Class D or C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death is a (1) class D felony for a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-181e
Sec. 53a-181e. Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Stalking in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-4 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-4
Sec. 53a-4. Saving clause.
Status: in_force

Cited. 209 C. 75; 227 C. 32; 229 C. 60; 233 C. 174; 236 C. 266.

Cited. 23 CA 615; 30 CA 470; Id., 527; 32 CA 224; 36 CA 680.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 939 / Section 53-21
Sec. 53-21. Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children. Sale of children.
Status: in_force

(b) The act of a parent or agent leaving an infant thirty days or younger with a designated employee pursuant to section 17a-58 shall not constitute a violation of this section.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 17a-101a re intentional or unreasonable interference with the making of a report of suspected child abuse or neglect.

Cited. 143 C. 604. Evidence of conversations between defendant and school authorities where child was enrolled admissible to show defendant had assumed custody of child; permissible to question child concerning his observation of activities in defendant's house as having bearing on question whether defendant had placed child in situation where morals were likely to be impaired. 149 C. 491. Legislative history discussed; voluntary intoxication is a defense in a criminal action only where specific intent is an element of crime; the second part of section does not require specific intent as an element of the crime charged; therefore intoxication is no defense. 150 C. 245. Cited. 152 C. 197. Defendant may put his character in issue but only as to specific traits of sexual morality and decency, and character witness' testimony must be as to these traits. 157 C. 99. Cited. 160 C. 366; 162 C. 123. Separability of conduct in statutory construction, discussed. 164 C. 69. Section does not require a showing that the health of the child was impaired, but only that the conduct or the acts of defendant were such that the health of the child was likely to be impaired. 165 C. 288. Cited. 172 C. 140; 176 C. 138. In light of prior opinions of court, there is sufficient warning that acts charged are proscribed by statute. 180 C. 54. Cited. 181 C. 406; Id., 426. Section is not constitutionally infirm since it clearly lays down a legislative policy on the subject legislated upon; section does not violate the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution; section does not contravene the doctrine of separation of powers because it does not represent any delegation of legislative powers. 183 C. 17. Cited. Id., 586; 185 C. 199; 186 C. 45; 187 C. 73; 188 C. 565; 189 C. 1; 190 C. 84; 191 C. 453. An act injurious to the physical well-being of a child is prohibited; statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 192 C. 37. Statute unconstitutional when applied to instances of willing and voluntary participation by a person between 15 and 16 years of age. 192 C. 154. Cited. 197 C. 666; 199 C. 47; 200 C. 734; 201 C. 211; 203 C. 506; 204 C. 187; Id., 523; Id., 683; 205 C. 27; Id., 515; Id., 528; 207 C. 233. Statute unconstitutionally vague in the circumstances of this case. Id., 456. Cited. 210 C. 51; Id., 244; Id., 359; Id., 396; Id., 582; 211 C. 185; Id., 555; 214 C. 378; Id., 717; 215 C. 653; 216 C. 699; 219 C. 283; 222 C. 331; Id., 556; 224 C. 1; Id., 656; 227 C. 207; Id., 829; 228 C. 393; Id., 552; Id., 610; Id., 795; 229 C. 580; Id., 839; 230 C. 43; 233 C. 502; Id., 813; 235 C. 659; Id., 746; 236 C. 189; Id., 342; 237 C. 321; 240 C. 766; 241 C. 823; 242 C. 211; Id., 296. Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. 248 C. 543. Medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1. State not required to prove specific intent under section and evidence re victim's injuries was sufficient to support conviction under section; this section and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id., 93. Prescribes a general liability crime and defendant cannot prevail on claim that attempt charge under section is invalid based on strict liability of crime; defendant's claim that criminalizing an attempt to commit risk of injury is like criminalizing an attempted attempt is without merit; section not unconstitutionally vague based on facts of case. 277 C. 155. State was not required to prove that child's health was actually impaired by defendant's act of taking child to another country, away from child's mother, during defendant's and mother's divorce proceedings. 280 C. 660.

Cited. 2 CA 333; 3 CA 459; Id., 607; 6 CA 150; 7 CA 46; Id., 131; Id., 653. Held to be in error for a trial court to deny request for a jury instruction on issue of consent in risk of injury case involving a 15-year-old girl. 8 CA 216. Cited. Id., 216; Id., 313; Id., 469; Id., 528. Not constitutionally infirm as being void for vagueness. 9 CA 74. Cited. 10 CA 591; 11 CA 80; Id., 236; 12 CA 288; Id., 320; Id., 403; 13 CA 368; Id., 378; Id., 667; 14 CA 244; Id., 333; 15 CA 222; Id., 251; 17 CA 174; Id., 186; Id., 447; Id., 525; 18 CA 273; Id., 297; Id., 459; Id., 477; 19 CA 44; Id., 646; 20 CA 40; Id., 75; Id., 115; Id., 193; Id., 263; Id., 288; Id., 530; Id., 572; Id., 630; Id., 694; Id., 737; 21 CA 449; 23 CA 1; Id., 241; Id., 712; 24 CA 57; Id., 146. Not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied to defendant. Id., 300. Cited. Id., 330; 25 CA 235; Id., 243; Id., 334; 26 CA 81; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 and 31 CA 452; Id., 674; Id., 758; 28 CA 91; Id., 388; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 591; Id., 683; Id., 689; Id., 724; 30 CA 527; Id., 654; 31 CA 120; Id., 497; 32 CA 84; Id., 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; Id., 773; 33 CA 133; Id., 162; Id., 205; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 34 CA 46; Id., 428; Id., 473; Id., 807; 35 CA 520; Id., 728; Id., 754; 36 CA 383; Id., 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342; Id., 525; 37 CA 21; Id., 180; Id., 388; Id., 534; 38 CA 56; Id., 125; 39 CA 267; Id., 657; Id., 702; Id., 742; 40 CA 1; Id., 132; Id., 233; Id., 395; Id., 805; 41 CA 204; Id., 287; Id., 333; Id., 701; 42 CA 147; Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823; Id., 371; Id., 382; 43 CA 142; Id., 458; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 667; Id., 715; Id., 785; 44 CA 457; 45 CA 66; Id., 116; Id., 261; Id., 512; Id., 613; Id., 756; 46 CA 24; Id., 691. Although victim must be less than 16, there is no age requirement for the actor; thus, violation can result in adjudication that defendant is a youthful offender; not unconstitutionally vague where defendant charged with consensual statutory rape had fair notice from the terms of statute and from judicial opinions. 47 CA 68. Evidence presented at trial concerning death of healthy 1-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. Id., 188. This offense and offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree under Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A) are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 49 CA 409. Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627. Statute found not to be unconstitutionally vague on its face as applied to facts of case; defendant had sufficient notice that leaving three young children unattended created a situation that endangered their physical well-being. 56 CA 395. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad with respect to the display of pornographic material to minors; not unconstitutionally vague with respect to Sec. 30-86 where defendant was merely a care provider and Department of Children and Families retained guardianship over minor in question; does not unconstitutionally interfere with rights of parents to raise children and is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of right to freedom of speech where defendant was not parent of teenaged girls and prior case law gave fair warning that conduct of showing pornographic movies to children could result in arrest; defendant's conduct was at issue, not content of pornographic movies. 69 CA 400. Evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201. Under section, relevant inquiry is whether defendant committed any act that was likely to endanger the life or limb, or impair the health, of the children, whether or not the children actually were injured; it is not necessary, to support conviction under section, that defendant be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than 16; specific intent is not a necessary requirement of section; rather, the intent to do some act coupled with reckless disregard of its consequences is sufficient to find a violation. Id., 432. Evidence was sufficient for jury to determine that defendant created a situation likely to impair victims' morals and actual injury was not required. 83 CA 452. Proof of wilful behavior that recklessly exposes a minor to injury may be sufficient to convict defendant of risk of injury even if defendant did not have specific intent to expose the child to risk of injury. 84 CA 464. Defendant who intentionally gave LSD to minor had requisite general intent to sustain conviction under section. 85 CA 575. Where there is armed robbery and unknown to defendant a child is present, statute applies even if no intent to harm child since conduct demonstrates reckless disregard of consequences of action. Id., 802. Convictions for risk of injury to a child in violation of this section, revised to 1997, and assault in the first degree in violation of Sec. 53a-59 are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 145 CA 374. As charged, defendant's rights to be free from double jeopardy violated as the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree under Sec. 53a-55(a)(1) and risk of injury to a child under section arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, and the offense of risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.

Evidence of conviction under section held not sufficient evidence to warrant a decree of divorce for the commission of an infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty. 21 CS 198. Defendant arrested and charged under section after hearing was properly bound over to Superior Court where he was charged with aggravated assault. 27 CS 429. Cited. 29 CS 187. Presentment for this crime barred by prohibition against double jeopardy where defendant had been convicted in circuit court for lesser offense for the same actions. 31 CS 28. Cited. 41 CS 229.

Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 240 C. 743. Statute does not contain an element of physical violence; nor does it require actual impairment of the health or moral values of child. 260 C. 486. “Likely”, as used in Subsec., cannot be understood fairly to encompass a meaning of either “possible” or “in all possibility” and, therefore, trial court's instructions to the contrary were improper. 269 C. 481. Subdiv. (1): In cases concerning alleged sexual misconduct, an act likely to impair a child's morals must involve physical touching of victim's person in a sexual and indecent way; such touching, however, need not involve private parts of either victim or defendant; in such cases, an act likely to impair a child's health, when committed in a sexual context, includes only those acts that involve direct touching of victim's person and are, or are likely to be, injurious to victim's physical health. 273 C. 56. First part of Subdiv. (1) prohibits creation of situations detrimental to a child's welfare, while second part proscribes injurious acts directly perpetrated on the child. Id., 138. Subdiv. (1) intended to apply to any conduct, whether or not legal, that could reasonably result in injury to a child, but where apartment was cluttered and had unpleasant odor but did not violate any statutory or regulatory standards, there was insufficient notice to defendant that conditions posed risk of injury to child's mental health. 279 C. 678. Delay in seeking medical attention, placing child in dangerous situation, can be shown by circumstantial evidence where expert witness testified that victim would have screamed for at least 15 minutes after alleged injury and mother, who arrived at home after the time of such injury, did not hear victim scream. 288 C. 290. Under 2005 revision, section and Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 291 C. 1. Offense of risk of injury to a child under Subdiv. (1) is not logically inconsistent with defense of parental justification under Sec. 53a-18(1). 294 C. 243. Subdiv. (1): Evidence of defendant's wilful failure to supervise his child inside the home does not, on its own, establish defendant's commission of the crime of risk of injury to a child; totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's actions must color the character of defendant's conduct; in determining whether parent has committed crime of risk of injury to a child by failing to adequately supervise that child in the home, factors to be considered include the gravity and character of the possible risks of harm, the degree of the accessibility of the parent, the length of time of abandonment, the age and maturity of the child, the protective measures, if any, taken by the parent, and any other circumstance that would inform the fact finder on the question whether the parent's conduct was reckless. 303 C. 18. Subdiv. (2): Defendant's right against double jeopardy not violated when convicted of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees and risk of injury to a child because the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees contain distinct elements from that of risk of injury to a child, rendering them not greater and lesser included offenses. 342 C. 489. Subdiv. (2): In enacting subsection, legislature intended to continue to criminalize both a single instance of contact as well as an ongoing course of conduct. 345 C. 421. Subdiv. (2): Statutory language in subdivision creates alternative means, not separate elements. 345 C. 516.

Subdiv. (2): Jury's finding of contact between penis and anus or buttocks area suffices as the requisite contact. 53 CA 720. Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant whose birthday is within 2 years of the victim's birthday. 61 CA 738. Conviction for risk of injury to a child based on charge that health of child was likely to be impaired reversed where evidence at trial established only that child was in the presence of unsmoked marijuana; there is no case law authority to support the proposition that being in the presence of unsmoked marijuana is inherently injurious to the health of a child. 73 CA 386. Subdiv. (1): To convict defendant of the crime of risk of injury to a child, competent evidence must be presented as to whether a situation was likely to cause harm to a child. Id., 809. Subdiv. (1): State not required to prove that defendant's general intent was to impair the health of his child; all that is necessary is the general intent to perform the act that resulted in the injury. 74 CA 736. Subdiv. (1): State did not have to prove that defendant knew of the presence of the child but simply that the child was present at the time the victim was shot. 78 CA 535. Pursuant to Subdiv. (2), risk of injury to or impairing the morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than 16 “in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child”; Sec. 53a-71, sexual assault in the second degree, contains no such similar provision; risk of injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree; legislative history supports conclusion that a conviction under both risk of injury to or impairing the morals of children and sexual assault in the second degree do not constitute multiple punishments for the same offense because the legislature intended to create a new crime. 79 CA 591. To be found guilty under the “any act” provision of section, all that is necessary is general intent to perform the act that resulted in the injury; it is unnecessary for court to instruct jury that there must be evidence that defendant intended to harm victim or knew that victim was in the area and would likely be harmed. 84 CA 263. Court's instruction that “likely” had same meaning as “possible”, while improper, did not constitute reversible error or deprive defendant of due process since court also gave proper interpretation of “probable” or “in all probability” and evidence supported the verdict. 85 CA 575. Subdiv. (1): Evidence that defendant forcibly took victim's arm and attempted to pull her toward him was insufficient to prove that defendant committed an act likely to be injurious to victim's physical health. 95 CA 332. Subdiv. (2): Although trial court erred when it defined “likely” as “possibly” in the phrase “likely to impair the health or morals of a minor child”, it was not reasonably possible that jury was misled and therefore defendant was not clearly deprived of a fair trial. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (1): Examining plain language of risk of injury statute and statute providing for the justification defense of reasonable parental discipline, Sec. 53a-18(1), there is no apparent reason to bar application of Sec. 53a-18(1) to a charge under Subdiv. Id., 713. Subdiv. (1): Mere fact that defendant does not physically touch a child while pursuing that child does not relieve defendant of criminal liability under section. 100 CA 619. Subdiv. (2): Jury's acquittal of charge under Sec. 53a-70(a)(2) did not invalidate jury's conviction under this section based on same facts. 108 CA 264. Subdiv. (1): The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant violated the “situation” prong when he engaged the victim in flirtatious conversation, grabbed her wrist and neck and attempted to pull her forcibly through his vehicle's open window, endangering her mental health or physical well-being, or engaging in the impairment of her morals. 111 CA 259. Subdiv. (1): Not void for vagueness as applied because language is sufficient to put reasonable person on notice that opening bathroom door to look at 6-year-old for voyeuristic purposes or sexual gratification is unlawful conduct. 115 CA 467. Subdiv. (1): Failure to protect a child from harm creates a situation that is violative of Subdiv., and this duty to protect logically includes a duty to supervise one's child, especially where there are known dangers that pose a risk of injury to that child; Subdiv. not void for vagueness as applied to defendant's conduct because reasonable person would recognize that allowing 2-year-old child to play unsupervised in home with unlocked door near busy street presents a foreseeable risk of injury to that child. 116 CA 1; judgment reversed, see 303 C. 18. Subdiv. (1): Defendant's actions in enticing the victim into a situation for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act were not merely incidental and necessary to his performing the sexual act, instead the actions were sufficient for independent prosecution under Subdiv. 118 CA 1. Subdiv. (2): This offense and offense of sexual assault in the first degree, Sec. 53a-70(a)(2), are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id., 180. Subsec. (a)(2) and Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A), 2003 revision, are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Id., 589. Jury reasonably could have inferred that the act of an adult man placing his tongue into the mouth of an 8-year-old girl was likely to have impaired her morals. 121 CA 75. Acquittal of risk of injury to a child under Subdiv. (1) is not inconsistent with conviction on charge of reckless driving under Sec. 14-222(a) because each offense contains different elements and an acquittal on one is not inconsistent with a conviction on the other. 122 CA 631. Subdiv. (1): Subdiv. is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant because, in addition to significant precedential authority, it provided defendant with sufficient notice that exposing himself to a 14 year old girl via his web cam and masturbating in her view was prohibited; Subdiv. requires only that defendant willfully causes or permits a child to be placed in a situation likely to impair his or her morals; Subdiv. does not require an element of coercion and does not provide that victim be an unwilling one. 127 CA 464. Subdiv. (1): Sexual speech and threatening conduct toward a minor is within situation prong of risk of injury statute. 128 CA 355. Despite defendant's claim of diminished mental capacity, she possessed the mental state required for a conviction under Subdiv. (1) because she understood the causal relationship between her acts and the risk of harm to the victim; evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support conclusion that defendant's act in giving a few drops of hot sauce to the young victim would likely endanger the life or impair the health of the victim. 131 CA 65; judgment affirmed, see 308 C. 835. Subdiv. (2) not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant who made deliberate contact with victim's intimate parts. 137 CA 152. Subdiv. (1) does not require proof of actual injury to the health or morals of a child, but prohibits conduct which is likely to do so. 139 CA 553. Subdiv. (1): Fact finder could reasonably have concluded that defendant's act of providing alcohol to a minor as a prelude to sexually assaulting her was an act to impair her health or morals despite child's not actually being impaired by the alcohol; Subdiv. not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, and defendant's act of providing alcohol to minor prior to sexually assaulting her rendered Sec. 30-86 inoperable under circumstances. 148 CA 378. To obtain conviction under situation prong of Subdiv. (1), the state was not required to prove that sexual conduct transpired or that the child in question sustained an injury. 162 CA 569. Subdiv. (2): Conviction under this Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-71(a)(1) does not violate defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy because each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not. 174 CA 172. Convictions under Subdivs. (1) and (2) based on incident with minor child were based on distinct acts and therefore do not constitute double jeopardy. 187 CA 537. Subdiv. (2): The limited exception under Sec. 54-193a for a prosecution of sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(1) cannot be expanded and applied to a risk of injury charge under this Subdiv. 213 CA 757.

Subdiv. (2): Lack of actual injury to morals of the victim is not relevant, as actual injury to morals is not an element of risk of injury offense. 48 CS 610.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 950 / Section 53a-3
Sec. 53a-3. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Person” means a human being, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation, a limited liability company, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality;

(2) “Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property;

(3) “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or pain;

(4) “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ;

(5) “Deadly physical force” means physical force which can be reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical injury;

(6) “Deadly weapon” means any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, or metal knuckles. The definition of “deadly weapon” in this subdivision shall be deemed not to apply to section 29-38 or 53-206 ;

(7) “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury, and includes a “vehicle” as that term is defined in this section and includes a dog that has been commanded to attack, except a dog owned by a law enforcement agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof or of the federal government when such dog is in the performance of its duties under the direct supervision, care and control of an assigned law enforcement officer;

(8) “Vehicle” means a “motor vehicle” as defined in section 14-1 , a snowmobile, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or sail;

(9) “Peace officer” means a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or an organized local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal while exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in the performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a conservation officer or special conservation officer, as defined in section 26-5 , a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18 , 29-18a , 29-18b or 29-19 , an adult probation officer, an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility, any investigator in the investigations unit of the office of the State Treasurer, an inspector of motor vehicles in the Department of Motor Vehicles, who is certified under the provisions of sections 7-294a to 7-294e , inclusive, a United States marshal or deputy marshal, any special agent of the federal government authorized to enforce the provisions of Title 21 of the United States Code, or a member of a law enforcement unit of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe or the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut created and governed by a memorandum of agreement under section 47-65c who is certified as a police officer by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council pursuant to sections 7-294a to 7-294e , inclusive;

(10) “Firefighter” means any agent of a municipality whose duty it is to protect life and property therein as a member of a duly constituted fire department whether professional or volunteer;

(11) A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct;

(12) A person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists;

(13) A person acts “recklessly” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation;

(14) A person acts with “criminal negligence” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation;

(15) “Machine gun” means a weapon of any description, irrespective of size, by whatever name known, loaded or unloaded, from which a number of shots or bullets may be rapidly or automatically discharged from a magazine with one continuous pull of the trigger and includes a submachine gun;

(16) “Rifle” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed metallic cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger;

(17) “Shotgun” means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single pull of the trigger;

(18) “Pistol” or “revolver” means any firearm having a barrel less than twelve inches;

(19) “Firearm” means any sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or other weapon, whether loaded or unloaded from which a shot may be discharged;

(20) “Electronic defense weapon” means a weapon which by electronic impulse or current is capable of immobilizing a person temporarily, including a stun gun or other conductive energy device;

(21) “Martial arts weapon” means a nunchaku, kama, kasari-fundo, octagon sai, tonfa or chinese star;

(22) “Employee of an emergency medical service organization” means an ambulance driver, emergency medical technician or paramedic as defined in section 19a-175 ;

(23) “Railroad property” means all tangible property owned, leased or operated by a railroad carrier including, but not limited to, a right-of-way, track, roadbed, bridge, yard, shop, station, tunnel, viaduct, trestle, depot, warehouse, terminal or any other structure or appurtenance or equipment owned, leased or used in the operation of a railroad carrier including a train, locomotive, engine, railroad car, signals or safety device or work equipment or rolling stock;

(24) “Serious firearm offense” means a violation of section 29-36 , 29-36a or 53-202w , possession of a stolen firearm or a firearm that is altered in a manner that renders the firearm unlawful, or any crime of which an essential element is that the person discharged, used or was armed with and threatened the use of a firearm; and

(25) “Serious firearm offender” means a person who has (A) two convictions for a serious firearm offense, (B) a conviction for a serious firearm offense and was previously convicted of a violation of section 29-36 , 29-36a , subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-217 or subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-217c , or (C) a conviction for a serious firearm offense and was previously convicted of two or more additional felony offenses.

Court correctly charged jury on definition of dangerous instrument. 173 C. 91. Subdiv. (3) compared to Subdiv. (4). 175 C. 204. Cited. 182 C. 501; 197 C. 574; 201 C. 505; 211 C. 258; 226 C. 514; 231 C. 545. Offense of carrying a dangerous weapon is not constitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution; defendant's threatened use of a table leg to inflict serious bodily injury against victim, in the event that victim continued to bother him, constitutes a violation of this section and Sec. 53-206 if the threat is found to be a true threat not protected by the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 287 C. 237. Evidence re use of pepper spray causing temporary blindness, chemical conjunctivitis and chemical burns constituted sufficient evidence of “serious physical injury” and “dangerous instrument” under section. 292 C. 533.

Cited. 8 CA 545; 9 CA 686; 11 CA 665; 12 CA 221; Id., 225; 14 CA 10; Id., 67; 37 CA 338. Earlier jury instruction in earlier related case defining assault as the reduced ability to act as one would have otherwise acted did not prejudice jury. 71 CA 190.

Cited. 35 CS 519; 37 CS 661; 38 CS 619; 39 CS 494; 40 CS 498; 43 CS 46.

Subdiv. (1):

“Human being” construed for purposes of murder statute in accordance with long-standing common-law principle that the term includes a fetus that has been born alive. 296 C. 622.

Cited. 17 CA 326; 25 CA 586; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492.

Subdiv. (3):

Cited. 171 C. 276; 197 C. 602.

Cited. 3 CA 353; 5 CA 612; 10 CA 330; 14 CA 586; 17 CA 226; Id., 391; 23 CA 160; 26 CA 641; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 612; 37 CA 733; 41 CA 255; Id., 565; 43 CA 76; 45 CA 591.

Subdiv. (4):

Cited. 172 C. 275; 173 C. 389; 174 C. 604; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; 186 C. 654; 189 C. 303; 197 C. 602; 202 C. 463; 211 C. 441; 213 C. 593; 225 C. 450; 231 C. 115; 237 C. 748. “Disfigurement” as defined in Sec. 31-275(8) and used in the workers' compensation statutes, applies to the Penal Code for purposes of “serious physical injury” as defined in Subdiv. 332 C. 472.

Cited. 5 CA 590; Id., 612; 6 CA 667; 8 CA 496; 10 CA 330; Id., 462; 11 CA 499; 14 CA 657; 15 CA 531; 16 CA 346; 17 CA 226; 19 CA 654; Id., 674; 21 CA 688; 23 CA 502; 25 CA 734; 26 CA 641; 28 CA 81; Id., 402; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 612; 29 CA 679; 30 CA 232; 33 CA 782; 34 CA 261; 38 CA 20; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; 41 CA 565; 42 CA 307; 45 CA 270; Id., 591. “Disfigurement” defined as that which impairs or injures beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or which renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner. 82 CA 684. Victim's testimony and medical records re injury that required surgical treatment, left victim with impairment to the use of her dominant hand and left victim's hand visibly scarred was sufficient to establish proof of serious physical injury. 116 CA 196. The jury reasonably could have concluded that scars constituted serious physical injury because they negatively affected the appearance of skin on face and abdomen. 118 CA 831.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 186 C. 654; 188 C. 653; 213 C. 593.

Cited. 8 CA 667; 16 CA 346; 25 CA 734; 30 CA 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 58.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 169 C. 683; 171 C. 277; 175 C. 569; 177 C. 379; 179 C. 576; 182 C. 262; Id., 533; 185 C. 473; 189 C. 268; 190 C. 822; 195 C. 567; Id., 651; Id., 668; 197 C. 507; 203 C. 506. If a weapon from which a shot may be discharged is designed for violence and is capable of inflicting death or serious physical injury, it is a deadly weapon regardless of whether the shot is discharged by gunpowder. 278 C. 113.

Cited. 7 CA 445; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; 21 CA 299; 25 CA 104; 29 CA 679; 31 CA 614; 33 CA 468; 39 CA 579; 45 CA 591. Trial court did not invade jury's fact-finding province when it ruled as a matter of law that BB gun in evidence was a deadly weapon under Subdiv. in this case. 110 CA 263.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 169 C. 683; 171 C. 277. Tire iron used to break into apartment is not a dangerous instrument per se; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140. Cited. 182 C. 533; 190 C. 822; 195 C. 668; 202 C. 629; 218 C. 432. A fist or other body part is not a dangerous instrument under definition. 307 C. 115.

Cited. 5 CA 40; 6 CA 667; 7 CA 27; Id., 445; 10 CA 330; 14 CA 586; Id., 657; 15 CA 586; 17 CA 226; 21 CA 299; 25 CA 171; 28 CA 612; 29 CA 262; Id., 679; 33 CA 468; 38 CA 868; 45 CA 270. Jury reasonably could have found that defendant's “feet and footwear” were a “dangerous instrument” in the manner in which they were used because of defendant's above average size, the age and delicate health of the elderly victim, the continual kicking of such victim in the area of several vital organs and the force of the kicks which was intensified by the weight of the footwear. 74 CA 545. Dangerous instrument as defined in Subdiv. is “any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used ... or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury”. 81 CA 367. Evidence was sufficient to prove that a knife or similar instrument was used thereby constituting a dangerous instrument. 98 CA 13. Jury reasonably could have concluded that being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe potentially contaminated with a blood-borne pathogen constituted a dangerous instrument. 161 CA 379. Jury reasonably could have found that a PVC pipe, under the circumstances in which it was used, was a dangerous instrument capable of causing serious physical injury. 176 CA 807.

Subdiv. (11):

Cited. 171 C. 271; 178 C. 448; 180 C. 382; 182 C. 449; 184 C. 121; 186 C. 414; Id., 555; Id., 574; Id., 654; 188 C. 515; 189 C. 383; 190 C. 219; 194 C. 258; Id., 376; 195 C. 166; 198 C. 92; 199 C. 1; 201 C. 489; 202 C. 520; Id., 629; 204 C. 1; 209 C. 290; 214 C. 77; 216 C. 585; 219 C. 16; Id., 363; Id., 489; 220 C. 285; 223 C. 595; Id., 674; 225 C. 55; Id., 114; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 62; Id., 118; Id., 281; 229 C. 328; 231 C. 115; 233 C. 215; 235 C. 274; Id., 477; 236 C. 189; 237 C. 748; 238 C. 253.

Cited. 5 CA 599; 7 CA 180; 9 CA 111; Id., 373; 11 CA 24; 16 CA 455; 19 CA 674; 24 CA 598; 27 CA 103; 28 CA 81; 34 CA 223; 35 CA 51; 36 CA 417; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; 40 CA 643; 41 CA 361; 45 CA 297. Provision dealing with intent to engage in proscribed conduct is irrelevant to a murder prosecution pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a. 48 CA 677. Meaning of acting “intentionally”. 51 CA 345. Portion of the definition of “intent” relating to intent to engage in proscribed conduct is not relevant to charge of assault in the second degree. 70 CA 855. State sufficiently proved defendant had conscious objective to cause victim's face to be scarred where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633. Although court improperly instructed jury on entire definition re attempted murder and kidnapping charge, it properly instructed that jury had to find that defendant intended to cause the death of another or intended to abduct and restrain another. 97 CA 837. Definition embraces both specific intent to cause a result and general intent to engage in proscribed conduct, and it is improper for court to refer in its instruction to entire definitional language, including the intent to engage in conduct, when the charge relates to a crime requiring only the intent to cause a specific result. 99 CA 230. Although court instructed jury regarding intent by using the full statutory definition including portion relating to general intent crimes, it was not reasonably possible that jury was misled by court's instructions because court gave numerous proper instructions regarding proper intent required for crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. 107 CA 517.

Subdiv. (12):

Cited. 182 C. 449; 203 C. 682; 223 C. 595; 235 C. 477.

Cited. 5 CA 599; 11 CA 24; 13 CA 288; 16 CA 455; 40 CA 643.

Subdiv. (13):

Cited. 171 C. 271; 180 C. 382; 182 C. 66; Id., 449; 184 C. 400; 185 C. 63; 186 C. 265; 187 C. 6; 193 C. 632; 195 C. 232; 198 C. 92; Id., 454; 199 C. 1; 202 C. 629; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 579; 214 C. 57; 216 C. 585; 219 C. 16; 222 C. 444; 225 C. 55; 226 C. 20; 228 C. 147; 231 C. 115; 233 C. 174.

Cited. 5 CA 40; Id., 571; 7 CA 180; 11 CA 24; Id., 473; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 19 CA 674; 26 CA 331; Id., 448; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 34 CA 807; 35 CA 51; 41 CA 333.

Statute applies an objective yardstick to measure the nature and degree of the risk and a subjective yardstick to measure defendant's awareness of the risk. 35 CS 570.

Subdiv. (14):

Cited. 171 C. 112; 176 C. 451; 180 C. 382; 182 C. 449; 187 C. 6; 195 C. 232; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 520; Id., 629; 204 C. 410; Id., 429; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 579; 214 C. 57; 222 C. 444; 226 C. 20; 228 C. 147; 231 C. 115; 238 C. 253; 242 C. 211.

Cited. 5 CA 40; 11 CA 473; Id., 499; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 23 CA 720; 26 CA 448; 29 CA 825; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147.

Subdiv. (18):

Cited. 195 C. 651; 196 C. 395; 197 C. 507; 205 C. 370; 231 C. 235.

Cited. 7 CA 726; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 330; 19 CA 48; Id., 111; 36 CA 805; 37 CA 672; 39 CA 502.

Subdiv. (19):

Cited. 175 C. 569; 190 C. 715; 196 C. 395. “Firearm” includes BB. gun; legislature could have restricted the term “firearm” to guns that use gunpowder to discharge their shots, and the fact that legislature elected not to do so is strong evidence that it did not intend to limit the term in that manner. 294 C. 151.

Cited. 3 CA 289; 19 CA 48; Id., 111; 21 CA 299; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 38 CA 481; 39 CA 82; Id., 502; 45 CA 591. Subdiv. does not require state to establish that ammunition recovered with handgun was capable of being discharged from the handgun, and use of other ammunition was permitted to establish that handgun was a weapon from which a shot may be discharged. 127 CA 377. Although gun was not operable at time of testing, that responding officer was able to dry fire it at time of seizure and observe that firing mechanism was functional was sufficient to prove operability. 146 CA 844.

Replica antique pistol that propelled via gunpowder a shot that mortally wounded defendant's spouse constituted a pistol, revolver or other weapon from which a shot could be discharged, as defined by Subdiv. 49 CS 248.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-45 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-45
Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
Status: in_force

(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.

Cited. 187 C. 6; 201 C. 435; 206 C. 346.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 180 C. 382; 190 C. 639; 198 C. 77; 199 C. 163; 207 C. 374. Defendant's decision to forgo a jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by a three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (c):

Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; Id., 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 193 C. 695; 195 C. 232. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 201 C. 174; Id., 368; 210 C. 78; 212 C. 593; 214 C. 57; 225 C. 55; 226 C. 237; 231 C. 115; 240 C. 727.

Cited. 7 CA 180; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 40 CA 151.

Cited. 42 CS 426.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196e — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-196e
Sec. 53a-196e. Possessing child sexual abuse material in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the acts of the defendant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 53a-196h .

(c) Possessing child sexual abuse material in the second degree is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-6 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-6
Sec. 53a-6. Effect of ignorance or mistake.
Status: in_force

(b) A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless (1) the law provides that the state of mind established by such mistaken belief constitutes a defense, or unless (2) such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of law contained in a statute or other enactment, an administrative order or grant of permission, a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.

Defendant entitled as matter of law to a theory of defense instruction when evidence of defense under section is placed before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 537; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75.

Cited. 17 CA 326.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 198 C. 454; 210 C. 132. When mistake of fact defense arises and when jury instruction re mistake of fact is required. 246 C. 268.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-278e — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-278e
Sec. 53-278e. Gambling premises as nuisance.
Status: in_force

(b) When any property or premise is determined by a court having jurisdiction to be a gambling premise, the owner shall have the duty to terminate all interest of anyone holding the same under him.

(c) When any property or premise, for which one or more licenses, permits or certificates issued by this state or any political subdivision or other public agency thereof are in effect, is determined by a court having jurisdiction to be a gambling premise, all such licenses, permits or certificates shall be void, and no license, permit or certificate so voided shall be reissued for such property or premise for a period of sixty days thereafter. All peace officers and all taxing and licensing officials of this state and its political subdivisions and other public agencies shall enforce this subsection.

(d) Any person who, as owner, lessee, agent, employee, operator, occupant or otherwise, knowingly maintains or aids or permits the maintaining of a gambling premise shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and any person who does any act in violation of this subsection within any locked, barricaded or camouflaged place or in connection with any electrical or mechanical alarm or warning system or arrangement where a lookout is used shall be guilty of a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-378 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 948 / Section 53-378
Sec. 53-378. Wearing of armed forces uniform. False representation of award of armed forces decoration, medal, badge, ribbon, button or rosette.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person who, with the intent to obtain money, property or other tangible benefit, falsely represents himself or herself, orally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by the United States Congress for the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103 , or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such armed forces, or the ribbon, button or rosette of any such decoration, medal or badge, or any colorable imitation thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

See Sec. 53a-130a re impersonation of police officer.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-251 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-251
Sec. 53a-251. Computer crime.
Status: in_force

(b) Unauthorized access to a computer system. (1) A person is guilty of the computer crime of unauthorized access to a computer system when, knowing that he is not authorized to do so, he accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system without authorization.

(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for unauthorized access to a computer system that: (A) The person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, had authorized him to access; (B) the person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have authorized him to access without payment of any consideration; or (C) the person reasonably could not have known that his access was unauthorized.

(c) Theft of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of theft of computer services when he accesses or causes to be accessed or otherwise uses or causes to be used a computer system with the intent to obtain unauthorized computer services.

(d) Interruption of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of interruption of computer services when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly disrupts or degrades or causes the disruption or degradation of computer services or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user of a computer system.

(e) Misuse of computer system information. A person is guilty of the computer crime of misuse of computer system information when: (1) As a result of his accessing or causing to be accessed a computer system, he intentionally makes or causes to be made an unauthorized display, use, disclosure or copy, in any form, of data residing in, communicated by or produced by a computer system; or (2) he intentionally or recklessly and without authorization (A) alters, deletes, tampers with, damages, destroys or takes data intended for use by a computer system, whether residing within or external to a computer system, or (B) intercepts or adds data to data residing within a computer system; or (3) he knowingly receives or retains data obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection; or (4) he uses or discloses any data he knows or believes was obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection.

(f) Destruction of computer equipment. A person is guilty of the computer crime of destruction of computer equipment when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly tampers with, takes, transfers, conceals, alters, damages or destroys any equipment used in a computer system or intentionally or recklessly causes any of the foregoing to occur.

See Sec. 53-451 re computer crimes.

See Sec. 53a-301 re computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes.

Cited. 49 CA 582.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-127f — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-127f
Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Possession of a shoplifting device is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-23 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-23
Sec. 53a-23. Use of physical force to resist arrest not justified.
Status: in_force

Cited. 170 C. 99. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 191 C. 433; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 221 C. 788. Trial court's instructions pertaining to statute virtually eliminated state's burden of proving that the police officers were acting in the performance of their duties and had effect of depriving defendant of a defense to the charges against him, in violation of his due process rights. 261 C. 553.

Cited. 1 CA 709; 5 CA 616; 8 CA 153; Id., 667; 21 CA 326; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; Id., 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; 27 CA 49; 40 CA 601; 45 CA 390. Under section, illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under Sec. 53a-167c; statute was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful; it was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to egregiously unlawful conduct, such as an unprovoked assault, by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667.

Section restricts common-law right to resist illegal arrest; not applicable to prosecution under Sec. 53a-167a; unnecessary to decide whether this section creates exception to Sec. 53a-20 or common-law right to defend premises. 34 CS 531. Cited. 38 CS 364; Id., 400.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-255 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-255
Sec. 53a-255. Computer crime in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Computer crime in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-129a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-129a
Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft defined.
Status: in_force

(b) As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual's name, date of birth, mother's maiden name, motor vehicle operator's license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-108 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-108
Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 215 C. 257. Section not applicable based on defendant's knowledge. 245 C. 657.

Cited. 12 CA 375; 19 CA 245; 20 CA 599; Id., 721; 24 CA 489; Id., 541; 31 CA 370; 35 CA 107; Id., 714.

Cited. 35 CS 555; 37 CS 755.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-54a
Sec. 53a-54a. Murder.
Status: in_force

(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person.

(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is (1) a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a , (2) murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a , or (3) murder under section 53a-54d committed by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense.

See Sec. 53a-54b re murder with special circumstances.

See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 171 C. 241; 173 C. 414; 176 C. 508; 177 C. 1; 178 C. 450; Id., 626; 179 C. 1; Id., 431; 180 C. 141. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. Id., 382. Cited. Id., 589; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; Id., 388; Id., 497; Id., 603; 185 C. 163; 186 C. 261; Id., 476; 188 C. 626; 189 C. 303; Id., 346; 190 C. 639; 191 C. 233; Id., 545; 194 C. 408; Id., 416; Id., 483; Id., 530; 195 C. 475; 196 C. 667; 197 C. 60; Id., 180; Id., 337; Id., 436; Id., 507; 198 C. 124; Id., 209; Id., 397; Id., 542; Id., 560; Id., 573; Id., 644; 199 C. 102; Id., 155; Id., 163; Id., 631; Id., 718; 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 276; Id., 368; Id., 605; 202 C. 18; Id., 75; Id., 86; Id., 316; 203 C. 212; Id., 641; 204 C. 240; 205 C. 279; Id., 298; Id., 507; Id., 616; 206 C. 182; Id., 213; Id., 323; Id., 346; Id., 512; Id., 678; 207 C. 374; Id., 646; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 225; Id., 290; Id., 622; 210 C. 78; Id., 304; Id., 519; Id., 631; Id., 652; 211 C. 215; Id., 289; Id., 441; 212 C. 325; Id., 387; Id., 612; 213 C. 97; Id., 243; Id., 388; Id., 405; Id., 579; Id., 593; Id., 708; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; Id., 118; Id., 454; Id., 476; Id., 493; Id., 616; 215 C. 231; Id., 277; Id., 570; Id., 646; Id., 695; Id., 739; 216 C. 139; Id., 188; Id., 282; Id., 301; Id., 585; Id., 699; 218 C. 349; Id., 486; Id., 714; 219 C. 16; Id., 596; Id., 721; 220 C. 169; Id., 270; Id., 285; Id., 602; Id., 765; 221 C. 58; Id., 93; Id., 109; 222 C. 506; 223 C. 273; Id., 674; 224 C. 63; Id., 168; Id., 372; 225 C. 55; Id., 114; Id., 524; Id., 609; 226 C. 20; Id., 237; Id., 497; 227 C. 231; Id., 301; Id., 417; Id., 456; Id., 566; 228 C. 62; Id., 118; Id., 281; Id., 412; 229 C. 125; Id., 193; Id., 328; Id., 691; 231 C. 43; Id., 115; Id., 235; 233 C. 44; Id., 215; 234 C. 139; Id., 324; Id., 381; Id., 683; 235 C. 206; Id., 274; Id., 397; Id., 413; Id., 473; 236 C. 189. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited; failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional disturbance was error; judgment of Appellate Court affirming judgment of trial court in 36 CA 448 reversed, Id., 342. Cited. Id., 514; 237 C. 58; Id., 339; Id., 364; Id., 518; Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances, defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of Appellate Court in 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389; Id., 588; 239 C. 56; Id., 481; 240 C. 210; Id., 727; Id., 743; 241 C. 322; Id., 502; Id., 702; 242 C. 605; Id., 666; 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1. While manslaughter in the first degree under Sec. 53a-55 is a lesser included offense of murder under this section, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 180; Id., 223; Id., 470; 10 CA 357; 12 CA 32; Id., 217; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 440; Id., 609; Id., 674; 22 CA 669; 24 CA 115; Id., 244; Id., 692; 25 CA 104; Id., 433; Id., 456; 26 CA 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; 28 CA 416; Id., 548; Id., 425; Id., 608; Id., 771; 29 CA 386; Id., 452; Id., 499; 30 CA 677; 32 CA 170; 33 CA 90; Id., 763; 34 CA 103; Id., 317; 35 CA 438; Id., 541; Id., 762; 36 CA 250; Id., 345; Id., 364; Id., 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342; Id., 473; Id., 506; Id., 516; Id., 556; 37 CA 749; 38 CA 371; Id., 434; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; Id., 242; Id., 224; Id., 632; 40 CA 151; Id., 318; Id., 387; 41 CA 604; Id., 809; 42 CA 348; Id., 555; 43 CA 61; Id., 549; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; Id., 790; 45 CA 148; Id., 207; Id., 261; Id., 584; 46 CA 216; Id., 285; Id., 578; Id., 640; Id., 684; Id., 734. Evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234. Trial court did not improperly exclude proffered evidence re defendant's claim of intoxication at time of murder. 91 CA 169. To establish crime of murder, state must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant, with intent to cause death of another, caused the death of such person or a third person; specific intent to kill is an essential element of crime of murder; to act intentionally, defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. 129 CA 1. Sentences for murder and felony murder were ancillary to capital felony conviction, thus the convictions for murder and felony murder must be vacated. 145 CA 494; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 741. Conviction of murder under this section and felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c for same offense violated prohibition against double jeopardy. 153 CA 691.

Cited. 40 CS 38; Id., 498; 42 CS 10; Id., 426; 43 CS 367.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 172 C. 65. “Extreme emotional disturbance” guidelines. 177 C. 1. Cited. Id., 487; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 268; Id., 284; 182 C. 142; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 184 C. 121; 186 C. 414; Id., 574; 187 C. 6; 190 C. 219; 191 C. 27; 192 C. 700; 193 C. 474; Id., 646; 194 C. 376; Id., 392; 195 C. 166; Id., 232; Id., 651; 196 C. 557; 197 C. 106; Id., 595; 198 C. 53; Id., 77; 200 C. 224; Id., 607; Id., 642; Id., 743. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174. Cited. Id., 244; Id., 534; 202 C. 259; Id., 429; 204 C. 207; Id., 259; 205 C. 370; Id., 578; Id., 723; 206 C. 229; Id., 300; Id., 391; 208 C. 455; 209 C. 596; 210 C. 481; Id., 619; 212 C. 258; Id., 351; Id., 593; 214 C. 122; Id., 146; Id., 161; Id., 344; Id., 540; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of defendant's extreme emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648. Cited. 218 C. 747; Id., 766; 219 C. 234; Id., 295; 220 C. 385; Id., 408; 221 C. 128; Id., 430; 222 C. 1; Id., 718; 223 C. 41; Id., 127; Id., 207; Id., 384; Id., 411; Id., 535; Id., 635; 224 C. 196; Id., 325; 227 C. 389; Id., 448; 228 C. 384; 230 C. 183; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; Id., 106; Id., 174; Id., 517; Id., 813; 236 C. 388; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; Id., 395; 241 C. 1; Id., 665; 242 C. 409; Id., 485; 243 C. 205. Term “death” as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim. 253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 261 C. 336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Sec. 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453. Statute specifically provides for intent to be transferred from the target of defendant's conduct to an unintended victim. 273 C. 393. The “born alive” rule, which prescribes that only one who has been born alive can be the victim of a homicide, was the common law of this state when Penal Code was adopted and has not been abrogated by the legislature, and therefore trial court properly determined that an infant who is born alive and who subsequently dies of injuries sustained in utero is a “person” within meaning of homicide statutes; nothing in section requires a temporal nexus between the victim's status as a person and the conduct that brings about the person's death; transferred intent provisions are equally applicable to a fetus born alive as they are to any other person. 296 C. 622.

Cited. 7 CA 367; Id., 457; 8 CA 496; Id., 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 80; Id., 628; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 801; 22 CA 199; Id., 507; Id., 521; 23 CA 692; 24 CA 624; 26 CA 242; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 643; 28 CA 231; Id., 469; 29 CA 573; 30 CA 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 438; Id., 687; Id., 759; 33 CA 122; Id., 782; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 96; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 541; 36 CA 336; Id., 417; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 252; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388; Id., 404; Id., 574; 40 CA 47; Id., 60; Id., 374; Id., 470; 41 CA 361; Id., 495; Id., 515; 43 CA 252; Id., 830; 44 CA 198; Id., 338; 45 CA 297; 46 CA 600. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734. Subsec. permits conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under Sec. 53a-55a regardless of extreme emotional disturbance defense. 86 CA 784. One who uses deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will be deemed to have intended the probable result of that act, and from such circumstance a proper inference may be drawn in some cases that there was an intent to kill. 95 CA 263. Murder is a specific intent crime and although court's instruction improperly referred to general intent to engage in proscribed conduct, the erroneous instruction was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant was not deprived of fair trial because court also properly instructed jury that it had to find defendant intended to cause victim's death. 99 CA 230. A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one which is necessarily committed in hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused defendant to brood for long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation. 104 CA 780.

Subsec. must be read without the word “affirmative”; the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on defendant. 33 CS 28. Unborn not included in definition of “person”. 40 CS 498. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.

Subsec. (b):

Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 180 C. 171; 181 C. 151; 193 C. 144; Id., 350; 194 C. 376; Id., 392; 196 C. 655; 200 C. 721; 201 C. 244; Id., 395; 205 C. 638; 214 C. 378.

Cited. 41 CA 530.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-422 — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 949d / Section 53-422
Sec. 53-422. Prohibited activities. Penalty. Recovery of damages.
Status: in_force

(1) Install and use any equipment which would allow a communications company to visually observe or listen to what is occurring in the household of an individual subscriber without the knowledge or permission of the subscriber.

(2) Provide any person or public or private organization with a list containing the name of a subscriber, unless (A) the communications company gives notice thereof to the subscriber and (B) the subscriber does not object to the disclosure of his name to such person or organization, or (C) such person or public or private organization is acting as an agent, servant or employee of the communications company.

(3) Disclose the television viewing habits of any individual subscriber without the consent of the subscriber.

(4) Install or maintain a home-protection scanning device in a dwelling as part of a communication service without the express written consent of the occupant.

(b) Any communications company which violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars for each violation. Any person who has been injured by a violation of this section shall have the right of action against any communications company which has committed the violation to recover damages for such injury. If the court awards damages, the plaintiff shall be awarded costs.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-292 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-292
Sec. 53a-292. Vendor fraud in the second degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Vendor fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-131 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-131
Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Unlawfully concealing a will is a class A misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-122 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-122
Sec. 53a-122. Larceny in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.

Inference based on possession of recently stolen property (driver versus passenger of motor van containing stolen property); meaning of “possession”. 171 C. 119. Mere presence of passenger in vehicle containing stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. Id., 127. Cited. 174 C. 253; Id., 338; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 383; 186 C. 648; 188 C. 715; 189 C. 717; 190 C. 559; 194 C. 361; 196 C. 185; 197 C. 201; Id., 247; 199 C. 30; Id., 207; 202 C. 86; 204 C. 52; 213 C. 233; 224 C. 711; 237 C. 501; 241 C. 413; Id., 439.

Cited. 3 CA 359; 5 CA 113; Id., 347; 6 CA 164; 7 CA 326; Id., 532; 9 CA 349; 12 CA 585; 14 CA 272; 20 CA 810; 21 CA 431; 29 CA 843; 34 CA 599; Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 40; 45 CA 455.

Cited. 31 CS 501.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 176 C. 239; 177 C. 243; 178 C. 427; Id., 163; Id., 416; Id., 480; Id., 649; 180 C. 182; Id., 662. 181 C. 172; Id., 254, 255; Id., 299; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 225; 185 C. 211; 188 C. 671; Id., 681; 189 C. 114; Id., 201; Id., 337; Id., 383; 190 C. 541; 192 C. 405; 195 C. 421; 196 C. 225; 197 C. 17; Id., 413; Id., 629; 198 C. 348; Id., 369; 199 C. 14; 208 C. 420; 214 C. 132; Id., 717; 218 C. 151; 219 C. 93; 221 C. 685; 227 C. 611; 232 C. 691; 233 C. 527; Id., 552; 235 C. 502; 242 C. 345. Subdiv. (2): Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of a traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.

Cited. 3 CA 633; 4 CA 251; 5 CA 129; 7 CA 292; Id., 445; 8 CA 125; Id., 376; 9 CA 121; Id., 313; Id., 365; 10 CA 447; 11 CA 684; 13 CA 576; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 402; 17 CA 50; Id., 359; Id., 486; 20 CA 354; Id., 665; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 24 CA 502; 25 CA 149; Id., 181; 26 CA 279; 28 CA 306; Id., 521; 29 CA 394; 30 CA 190; 31 CA 614; 33 CA 368; 34 CA 694; 35 CA 566; Id., 740; 36 CA 774; 37 CA 589; Id., 619; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; 39 CA 96; 41 CA 695; 43 CA 499; 44 CA 187; Id., 476; 47 CA 1. Defendant's claim that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of larceny in the first degree was unavailing; the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to sustaining verdict, was sufficient to support jury's finding that value of victim's car exceeded $10,000, as required by statute, and it was not improper for trial court to permit victim to testify as to his opinion of car's value at time of the crime. 81 CA 377. Subdiv. (3): Vehicle's owner was competent to testify as to the value of his property and that testimony was sufficient to satisfy statutory element that its value exceeded ten thousand dollars. 95 CA 248.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-183
Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.

(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.

Cited. 204 C. 4; 209 C. 52.

Cited. 4 CA 520; 5 CA 79; 8 CA 598; 43 CA 527; 44 CA 84. Section applies to communications made by means of a cellular telephone. 117 CA 493.

Cited. 39 CS 428; 43 CS 46. Internet service provider has federal immunity from tort liability for damages related to e-mail sent via provider's service. 46 CS 406.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 223 C. 731. Contrary to prior interpretations, Subsec. prohibits not only harassing or alarming conduct, but offending speech as well, that is not protected by first amendment including, in particular, true threats; defendant did not have fair warning that she could be prosecuted under Subsec. solely on basis of content of her speech, therefore conviction reversed. 310 C. 337.

Subdiv. (3): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 25 CA 503. Subdiv. (2): Section does not require state to prove defendant engaged in a direct communication with the person whom he intended to harass. 40 CA 544. Cited. 41 CA 847; 43 CA 527. Subdiv. (3): Is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to defendant's conduct. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2): Not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 49 CA 617. Subdiv. (3): Statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute prohibits purposeful telephone harassment and does not involve first amendment concerns since it proscribes conduct and not the content of calls; section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. 55 CA 475, but see 310 C. 337. Criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to Sec. 53a-110b and harassment in the second degree pursuant to Subdiv. (3) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 61 CA 118. Defendant who made 5 phone calls to victim was not placed in double jeopardy for multiple convictions of harassment under section because fact that victim listened to the messages consecutively did not transform defendant's separate offenses into one act or one offense and the phrase “a telephone call” coupled with the phrase “likely to cause annoyance” shows legislative intent to punish each call made with the requisite intent. 93 CA 582. A person's speech during a telephone call may be evidence of the person's intent in physically making the telephone call, but cannot be basis for conviction under section without implicating the person's freedom of speech rights; it is the physical act of placing the call and causing a ring at the receiving end that constitutes the actus reus under Subdiv. (3). 120 CA 330, but see 310 C. 337. Subdiv. (3): Legislature intended the standard of conduct for provision re “annoyance or alarm” to be that perceived as such by a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards; section unconstitutionally applied to defendant's speech in violation of first amendment re defendant's telephone call to the office of his ex-wife's attorney because the evidence of the harassing manner of defendant's telephone call rested entirely on the content of the speech he conveyed. 128 CA 546. Subdiv. (2): Subdiv. does not unconstitutionally prohibit certain forms of speech protected by first amendment to U.S. Constitution. 155 CA 560. Subdiv. (2): Unconstitutional as applied because conviction was dependent upon content of e-mail, rather than the manner in which it was communicated, therefore violating defendant's right to free speech. Id., 758.

Subdiv. (3): Freedom of speech subject to reasonable regulation of place and manner of exercise; not necessary to limit application of statute to “fighting words”; the prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of device readily susceptible of abuse; trespasser upon our privacy. 34 CS 689.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-110a — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-110a
Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction.
Status: in_force

(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.

Cited. 12 CA 258; 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 30 CA 45; 31 CA 370.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-125 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-125
Sec. 53a-125. Larceny in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Larceny in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 172 C. 571; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 416; 179 C. 576; 181 C. 388; 182 C. 242; 194 C. 198; 197 C. 247; Id., 396; 202 C. 443; 209 C. 34; 213 C. 233; 218 C. 273; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 4 CA 514; 5 CA 612; 7 CA 326; 9 CA 133; 12 CA 1; 14 CA 119; Id., 272; Id., 526; 15 CA 641; 20 CA 586; 22 CA 440; 26 CA 33; 29 CA 843; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; 35 CA 405; 38 CA 20. It is possible for defendant to be convicted of larceny for taking property he owns and for depriving bailee of its superior right of possession and the amount of bailee's lien interest in the motor vehicle; but the value of the theft is limited by amount of bailee's lien as secured by the property itself. 59 CA 135.

Cited. 34 CS 612; 35 CS 531; 36 CS 603; 37 CS 755; Id., 853; 38 CS 593; 39 CS 363; Id., 392.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 235 C. 502.

Cited. 3 CA 359; 6 CA 164; 7 CA 1; 11 CA 805; 31 CA 312; 38 CA 643.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-49
Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense.
Status: in_force

(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 581; 173 C. 254; Id., 317; Id., 360; 174 C. 16; Id., 142; 175 C. 398; 179 C. 1; 180 C. 481; 182 C. 207; Id., 430; Id., 595; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 157; 185 C. 163; Id., 199; 186 C. 261; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 383; 193 C. 70; Id., 602; 194 C. 233; Id., 241; Id., 408; 195 C. 611; 196 C. 36; Id., 567; 198 C. 124; 199 C. 14; Id., 155; Id., 591; 200 C. 30; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 289; Id., 605; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; Id., 520; 203 C. 445; Id., 484; 204 C. 630; 205 C. 61; Id., 616; 206 C. 213; 207 C. 1; 209 C. 34; 210 C. 519; Id., 652; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 695; Id., 716; 216 C. 585; Id., 647; 218 C. 747; 220 C. 384; Id., 765; 221 C. 109; 222 C. 117; Id., 718; 226 C. 497; 227 C. 301; 228 C. 384; Id., 393; 229 C. 125; 231 C. 235; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 397; Id., 40; Id., 469; Id., 502; Id., 748; 236 C. 266; 237 C. 501; Id., 518; Id., 748; 238 C. 389; 241 C. 1; Id., 413; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 389; Id., 648. In charge of attempt to commit sexual assault, conduct of a suspect who, for the purpose ultimately of having sex with a person whom the suspect believes to be a child, travels to a prearranged place to meet that child, is sufficient to constitute a substantial step in furtherance of the planned crime even if the person to be met is in fact an undercover officer and section is not unconstitutionally vague based on these facts. 277 C. 155. It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(2) and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of section and Sec. 53a-59(a)(1) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Cited. 1 CA 344; 2 CA 333; 3 CA 166; 6 CA 24; 7 CA 1; Id., 257; Id., 367; Id., 503; Id., 701; 8 CA 351; Id., 496; Id., 545; Id., 631; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 587; 10 CA 130; Id., 503; 12 CA 32; Id., 163; Id., 217; Id., 395; Id., 604; Id., 685; 13 CA 69; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 38; Id., 284; 17 CA 359; 19 CA 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 326; Id., 386; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 449; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; 24 CA 13; Id., 624; Id., 697; 25 CA 104; Id., 298; Id., 334; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 725; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 601; 28 CA 34; Id., 64; Id., 469; 30 CA 26; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 370; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 34 CA 103; Id., 223; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 740; 36 CA 161; Id., 336; Id., 641; Id., 680; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; Id., 733; 38 CA 777; Id., 581; 39 CA 1; Id., 18; Id., 267; Id., 333; Id., 789; Id., 810; 40 CA 60; Id., 374; Id., 483; 41 CA 515; Id., 751; 42 CA 472; 43 CA 61; Id., 252; Id., 599; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 684; Id., 691; Id., 734. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251. To be guilty of attempt, defendant's conscious objective must be to cause result which would constitute the substantive crime. 107 CA 517. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of this section and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Sec. 53a-48 are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Threats, in connection with holding knife and advancing towards victim, are sufficient evidence for jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of assault in the first degree. 127 CA 1.

Cited. 33 CS 599; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 464; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 689; 182 C. 176; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 188 C. 574; 189 C. 303; 190 C. 822; 194 C. 258; 195 C. 651; 198 C. 53; 199 C. 255; 200 C. 44; Id., 607; 205 C. 528; Id., 673; 207 C. 646; 208 C. 202; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 211 C. 18; Id., 441; Id., 555; 212 C. 31; Id., 50; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243; 220 C. 408; Id., 652; Id., 928; 221 C. 402; Id., 915; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 234; 229 C. 60; Id., 839; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 322; Id., 802; 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. An instruction on Subdiv. (1) should be given when evidence indicates that perpetrator failed to accomplish or complete all elements of a particular crime solely because attendant circumstances were not as perpetrator believed them to be, rendering commission of the crime impossible, while an instruction under Subdiv. (2) should be given when perpetrator's conduct falls short of completed offense for reasons other than impossibility; under unique circumstances of case, where information was not specific to which part of attempt statute state was alleging, evidence presented did not clarify this omission, and trial court instructed jury only on Subdiv. (1), there was insufficient evidence to convict. 293 C. 234, but see 317 C. 292. Subdiv. (2): Because there were two separate and distinct transactions, defendant could be convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree without offending the prohibition on double jeopardy. 299 C. 640. Attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1) is not limited to situation where it is impossible for defendant to commit the crime, and applied where defendant admitted to assaulting victim with intent to kill her and believed that he had killed her; substantial step provision in Subdiv. (2) criminalizes certain conduct that would not violate attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1), and both provisions ensure elimination of the impossibility defense. 317 C. 292. Determination of what conduct constitutes a substantial step focuses on what the actor has already done rather than what the actor has left to do to complete the substantive crime. 331 C. 1.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 6 CA 164; Id., 476; 7 CA 149; Id., 257; 10 CA 217; Id., 462; 11 CA 80; 12 CA 221; 13 CA 12; Id., 237; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; 15 CA 222; Id., 416; 23 CA 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; Id., 264; 26 CA 52; Id., 65; Id., 114; Id., 242; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 779; 28 CA 290; Id., 306; Id., 402; Id., 548; 29 CA 39; Id., 262; 30 CA 9; Id., 68; Id., 470; Id., 606; 31 CA 120; Id., 385; 33 CA 368; Id., 647; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 279; Id., 699; 36 CA 41; Id., 718; 38 CA 536; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 387; Id., 624; 41 CA 47; Id., 287; 42 CA 264; 43 CA 488; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 680; Id., 785; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 658; Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even though agent was not actually paid; to constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362. Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, defendant must be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111. Intent required for crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the officer from performing duties, regardless of whether injury is intended. 96 CA 634. Subdiv. (2): Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. “Circumstances as he believes them to be” language does not establish additional specific intent element necessitating proof that defendant believed one of his accomplices was armed with deadly weapon during attempted robbery. 184 CA 24. Attempted murder under this section and assault in the first degree under Sec. 53a-59(a) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 204 CA 207.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 194 C. 258; 211 C. 555.

Court rejected defendant's argument that “following” must have a predatory thrust and requires proximity in space as well as in time; the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant followed the intended victim. 105 CA 335.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 221 C. 915.

Cited. 17 CA 128. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-289e — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-289e
Sec. 53-289e. Automated ticket purchasing software. Prohibitions. Unfair or deceptive act or practice.
Status: in_force

(b) A violation of any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce pursuant to subsection (a) of section 42-110b .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-21 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 951 / Section 53a-21
Sec. 53a-21. Use of physical force in defense of property.
Status: in_force

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 226 C. 601. Section does not bar defendant from claiming that he did not commit a larceny in order to defend against a robbery charge where larceny is an element of the robbery offense. 317 C. 338.

Cited. 2 CA 617; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 8 CA 667; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 16 CA 455; 19 CA 445; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 31 CA 58; 32 CA 687; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 45 CA 390. Privilege to enter another's home to retrieve goods does not exist when defendant voluntarily gave his property to the victim. 116 CA 112. Section mandates that a defendant must use reasonable physical force upon another person to invoke defense of property; section is inapplicable to crimes involving the use of force against property. 187 CA 813; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 335 C. 720.

Cited. 34 CS 612.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-276 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-276
Sec. 53a-276. Money laundering in the first degree: Class B felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Money laundering in the first degree is a class B felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-256 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-256
Sec. 53a-256. Computer crime in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Computer crime in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-117g — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-117g
Sec. 53a-117g. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section, “tenant”, “landlord” and “premises” have the meanings provided in section 47a-1 .

(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other provision of the general statutes.

(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-321 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-321
Sec. 53a-321. Abuse in the first degree: Class C felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Abuse in the first degree is a class C felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-83 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-83
Sec. 53a-83. Soliciting sexual acts: Class A misdemeanor.
Status: in_force

(b) Soliciting sexual acts is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty shall be fined two thousand dollars.

Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994, and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit applicable to pre-October 1, 1994, sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c); determination of controlling sentence not a static concept. 261 C. 806.

Cited. 4 CA 520.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-111
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 174 C. 135; 178 C. 67; 194 C. 279; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92; 200 C. 685; 204 C. 4; Id., 769; 210 C. 519; 216 C. 678; 219 C. 605; 220 C. 796; 222 C. 469; 227 C. 829; 235 C. 679; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828.

Cited. 8 CA 581; 12 CA 32; 35 CA 527; Id., 714; 36 CA 454; 40 CA 789; 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire; injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 1; 187 C. 109; Id., 513; 191 C. 412; Id., 636; 199 C. 1; 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201; 207 C. 118; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1; 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747; 221 C. 713; 227 C. 1; 229 C. 10; 240 C. 708; 241 C. 57. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Subdiv. (4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Subdiv. (3); evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.

Cited. 10 CA 147; 12 CA 343; 28 CA 9; 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10; 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753; 37 CA 360; 39 CA 800. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent; although prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial; jury instructions were proper. 75 CA 163. Definitive expert testimony that a fire was started intentionally is not required for a conviction. 127 CA 560.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-322 — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-322
Sec. 53a-322. Abuse in the second degree: Class D felony.
Status: in_force

(b) Abuse in the second degree is a class D felony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54d — Connecticut Code / Title 53a / Chapter 952 / Section 53a-54d
Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder.
Status: in_force

Cited. 191 C. 636. Does not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection. 196 C. 655. Cited. Id., 667. When two or more persons are the victims of a single episode, there are as many offenses as there are victims. 198 C. 92. Cited. 204 C. 377; 210 C. 22; Id., 519; 211 C. 258; Id., 289; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 378; 216 C. 699; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 702.

Cited. 41 CA 476.

Cited. 42 CS 426.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-289a — Connecticut Code / Title 53 / Chapter 946 / Section 53-289a
Sec. 53-289a. Tickets to entertainment events. Disclosures. Exemption.
Status: in_force

(b) No person shall advertise the prices of tickets to any entertainment event, including, but not limited to, any place of amusement, arena, stadium, theater, performance, sport, exhibition or athletic contest given in this state for which a service charge is imposed for the sale of a ticket at the site of the event, without conspicuously disclosing in such advertisement, whether displayed at the site of the event or elsewhere, the total price for each ticket and what portion of each ticket price, stated in a dollar amount, represents a service charge.

(c) If a price is charged for admission to a place of entertainment, the operator of the place of entertainment shall print, endorse or otherwise disclose on the face of each ticket to an entertainment event at such place of entertainment (1) the price established for such ticket, or (2) if such operator, or such operator's agent, sells or resells such ticket, including at auction, the final price of such ticket.

(d) (1) Any person that facilitates the sale or resale of a ticket to an entertainment event shall (A) disclose the total price of such ticket, which total price shall include all service charges required to purchase such ticket, and (B) disclose, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to the purchaser of such ticket the portion of the total ticket price, expressed as a dollar amount, that is attributable to service charges charged to such purchaser for such ticket.

(2) The disclosures required under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be displayed in the ticket listing before the ticket is selected for purchase. The total ticket price shall not increase during the period beginning when a ticket is selected for purchase and ending when a ticket is purchased, except a reasonable service charge may be charged for delivery of a nonelectronic ticket if (A) such service charge is based on the delivery method selected by the ticket purchaser, and (B) such service charge is disclosed to such purchaser before such purchaser purchases such ticket.

(3) No disclosure required under this subsection shall be (A) false or misleading, (B) presented more prominently than the total ticket price, or (C) displayed in a font size that is as large or larger than the font size in which the total ticket price is displayed.

(e) A movie shall not be deemed to constitute an entertainment event for the purposes of this section.