Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-59b
Sec. 52-59b. Jurisdiction of courts over nonresident individuals, foreign partnerships and foreign voluntary associations. Service of process.
Status: in_force

(b) Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this section, an appearance does not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in this section.

(c) Any nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or the executor or administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, over whom a court may exercise personal jurisdiction, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State as its attorney and to have agreed that any process in any civil action brought against the nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or the executor or administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, may be served upon the Secretary of the State and shall have the same validity as if served upon the nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association personally. The process shall be served by the officer to whom the same is directed upon the Secretary of the State by leaving with or at the office of the Secretary of the State, at least twelve days before the return day of such process, a true and attested copy thereof, and by sending to the defendant at the defendant's last-known address, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, a like true and attested copy with an endorsement thereon of the service upon the Secretary of the State. The officer serving such process upon the Secretary of the State shall leave with the Secretary of the State, at the time of service, a fee of fifty dollars, which fee shall be taxed in favor of the plaintiff in the plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff prevails in any such action. The Secretary of the State shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.

See Sec. 52-57a re service of process beyond state borders upon persons domiciled or subject to jurisdiction of Connecticut courts.

Not retroactive to judgments rendered before effective date of passage. 160 C. 53. Cited. 170 C. 567, 578; 182 C. 14. The term “transacts any business” embraces a single purposeful business transaction; the execution of a warranty deed in Iowa concerning property in Connecticut constitutes transacting business within the state. 184 C. 471. Cited. 189 C. 162; 190 C. 48; 195 C. 191; 197 C. 34; 206 C. 125; Id., 374; 212 C. 311; 224 C. 730; 230 C. 472; 236 C. 602.

Cited. 1 CA 123; 16 CA 619; 23 CA 287; 31 CA 569; 46 CA 799. Where defendant was hired to practice law in New York, accepted contract in New York, and had no personnel, offices or assets in Connecticut, there was no conduct demonstrating a business transaction within the state. 121 CA 366. Out-of-state defendant signed and mailed contract with personal check to plaintiff in this state and purposefully entered into a contract with a Connecticut business that was to perform and deliver services to defendant from this state, therefore contract constituted business in this state. 146 CA 341. Subsec. (c) does not require that defendant receive the documents constituting process in order for service to be effective. 175 CA 757.

Cited. 30 CS 16. Under section, jurisdiction obtained by service on the executor of a Florida estate is valid where the nonresident decedent, were he alive, would be subject to personal jurisdiction. 31 CS 417. Service pursuant to section upon a nonresident who was a resident at the time he rendered the services complained of held valid. Id., 429. A Maryland business trust cannot be served as an entity, but it can be sued through service upon its officers and agents. 32 CS 124. Cited. 33 CS 562; 40 CS 15; Id., 327; 42 CS 25; 44 CS 400. Defendant's initiation of and engagement in numerous telephone conversations with plaintiff for its services in obtaining Super Bowl tickets constituted transaction of business within Connecticut for purpose of vesting court with personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to state long arm statute, notwithstanding plaintiff's actual delivery of tickets to defendant in Florida. 47 CS 476.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): Preparation of Connecticut income tax return, along with New York and federal income tax returns, is not sufficient to provide court with personal jurisdiction over New York accountant who performed services exclusively in New York, especially since claim against accountant relates to negligent preparation of New York income tax returns; plaintiff seeking personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual must present evidence satisfying the “substantial revenue” requirement of Subdiv. (3)(B). 282 C. 109. In action to recover on a commercial note, where defendant's wife arranged for forwarding of mail and defendant is amenable to service of process under statute, statute of limitations was not tolled by defendant's absence from the country. 287 C. 379. Subdiv. (1): A host agreeing to provide lodging and transportation to guests previously unknown to her in return for money from the guests constitutes a purposeful business transaction. 303 C. 737.

Subdiv. (1): The phrase “transacts any business” embraces a single purposeful business transaction. 108 CA 731. The general long arm jurisdiction provisions of section apply to foreign limited liability companies, rather than the corporation specific long arm jurisdiction provisions in Sec. 33-929. 149 CA 513. “Substantial revenue” requirement of Subdiv. (3)(B) means enough revenue to indicate a commercial impact in the forum. 174 CA 368.

Subdiv. (1): Although copies of contract attached to complaint showed requirement of out-of-state acceptance, complaint need not contain all facts and circumstances bearing on its allegation of “transacting business in this state”, so motion to erase based on Sec. 33-397(b)(5) should have been denied; plea in abatement would allow proper formulation of issue. 33 CS 628. Subdiv. (2): Conclusion of trial court that allegation of false representation stated cause of action for “tortious act” was equally applicable to allegation of deceptive trade practice under Sec. 42-115d(a) and allegation based on confusion caused by use of corporate name; fact that these acts involved formation of contract in no way mitigates their tortious character. Id. Subdiv. (1) does not incorporate a “fiduciary shield doctrine” that protects individual from personal jurisdiction if his dealings in the forum state were solely in a corporate capacity. 47 CS 319. Personal jurisdiction under Subdiv. (2) existed because the posting by a nonresident of a threatening Internet video specifically targeting a Connecticut resident can be deemed a tortious act committed in this state, and such personal jurisdiction does not violate due process. 51 CS 212.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572w — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572w
Sec. 52-572w. Agreement exempting caterer or catering establishment from liability for negligence void as against public policy.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of this section shall apply to any covenant, agreement or understanding made or entered into on or after January 1, 2001.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407aa — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407aa
Sec. 52-407aa. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Arbitration organization” means an association, agency, board, commission or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors or administers an arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.

(2) “Arbitrator” means an individual appointed to render an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.

(3) “Court” means the Superior Court.

(4) “Knowledge” means actual knowledge.

(5) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality, public corporation or any other legal or commercial entity.

(6) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in a perceivable form.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572h
Sec. 52-572h. Negligence actions. Doctrines applicable. Liability of multiple tortfeasors for damages.
Status: repealed

(b) In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. The economic or noneconomic damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section.

(c) In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for such party's proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages except as provided in subsection (g) of this section.

(d) The proportionate share of damages for which each party is liable is calculated by multiplying the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages by a fraction in which the numerator is the party's percentage of negligence, which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, and the denominator is the total of the percentages of negligence, which percentages shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, to be attributable to all parties whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage to property including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. Any percentage of negligence attributable to the claimant shall not be included in the denominator of the fraction.

(e) In any action to which this section is applicable, the instructions to the jury given by the court shall include an explanation of the effect on awards and liabilities of the percentage of negligence found by the jury to be attributable to each party.

(f) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall specify: (1) The amount of economic damages; (2) the amount of noneconomic damages; (3) any findings of fact necessary for the court to specify recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages; (4) the percentage of negligence that proximately caused the injury, death or damage to property in relation to one hundred per cent, that is attributable to each party whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage to property including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section; and (5) the percentage of such negligence attributable to the claimant.

(g) (1) Upon motion by the claimant to open the judgment filed, after good faith efforts by the claimant to collect from a liable defendant, not later than one year after judgment becomes final through lapse of time or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs later, the court shall determine whether all or part of a defendant's proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate such uncollectible amount among the other defendants in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. (2) The court shall order that the portion of such uncollectible amount which represents recoverable noneconomic damages be reallocated among the other defendants according to their percentages of negligence, provided that the court shall not reallocate to any such defendant an amount greater than that defendant's percentage of negligence multiplied by such uncollectible amount. (3) The court shall order that the portion of such uncollectible amount which represents recoverable economic damages be reallocated among the other defendants. The court shall reallocate to any such other defendant an amount equal to such uncollectible amount of recoverable economic damages multiplied by a fraction in which the numerator is such defendant's percentage of negligence and the denominator is the total of the percentages of negligence of all defendants, excluding any defendant whose liability is being reallocated. (4) The defendant whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution pursuant to subsection (h) of this section and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.

(h) (1) A right of contribution exists in parties who, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section are required to pay more than their proportionate share of such judgment. The total recovery by a party seeking contribution shall be limited to the amount paid by such party in excess of such party's proportionate share of such judgment.

(2) An action for contribution shall be brought within two years after the party seeking contribution has made the final payment in excess of such party's proportionate share of the claim.

(i) This section shall not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.

(j) This section shall not impair any right to indemnity under existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnitee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnitor is not entitled to contribution from the indemnitee for any portion of such indemnity obligation.

(k) This section shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.

(l) The legal doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished.

(m) The family car doctrine shall not be applied to impute contributory or comparative negligence pursuant to this section to the owner of any motor vehicle or motor boat.

(n) A release, settlement or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the total award of damages is reduced by the amount of the released person's percentage of negligence determined in accordance with subsection (f) of this section.

(o) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action created by statute based on negligence including, but not limited to, an action for wrongful death pursuant to section 52-555 or an action for injuries caused by a motor vehicle owned by the state pursuant to section 52-556 .

See Sec. 52-102b re addition of person as defendant for apportionment of liability purposes.

See Sec. 52-225a re reduction in economic damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions for collateral source payments.

See Sec. 52-225d re payment of damages in lump sum and periodic installments in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions.

Cited. 175 C. 112; Id., 477. Section did not abrogate common law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors, related only to modification of contributory negligence doctrine and of the doctrines of abolition, last clear chance and assumption of risk. 176 C. 523. Cited. 179 C. 372; Id., 425; 181 C. 515; Id., 650; 182 C. 236; Id., 125; 183 C. 473; 184 C. 205; Id., 594; 186 C. 370; 187 C. 339; 188 C. 607; 189 C. 601; 190 C. 285; 193 C. 15; 194 C. 645; 196 C. 341; 203 C. 607; 208 C. 82; 212 C. 509; 214 C. 1; 216 C. 200; 222 C. 775; 225 C. 566; 228 C. 441; 231 C. 77; 232 C. 559; 234 C. 660; 235 C. 107; 236 C. 625; Id., 670; Id., 820; 239 C. 798; 240 C. 694; 241 C. 399; 242 C. 169. Plain language of section provides that only negligent persons may be cited in by defendant for apportionment for liability purposes and, therefore, a person whose conduct was reckless, willful and wanton is not liable pursuant to section and cannot be added for purposes of apportionment; Supreme Court extended section as matter of common law to permit apportionment between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor. 246 C. 223. Apportionment principles of section do not apply where apportionment complaint rests on any basis other than negligence, including strict liability, of which product liability is simply a form. 253 C. 787. By enacting P.A. 99-69, Sec. 1(o), legislature merely clarified section to preclude a common law right to apportionment between a negligent and intentional tortfeasor. 263 C. 358. Because statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, as indicated by Sec. 52-572o, the simpler and less confusing approach to cases where jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to plaintiff's injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing defendants to raise a defense of superseding cause. Id., 424. Defendant may assert under a general denial that the negligence of an employer who is not a party to the action is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 287 C. 20.

Cited. 6 CA 383; 11 CA 1; 14 CA 561; 15 CA 371; Id., 392; 24 CA 446; 26 CA 220; Id., 509; 27 CA 471; 30 CA 327; 31 CA 584; 35 CA 301; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 107; 37 CA 453; Id., 515; 38 CA 685; 41 CA 61; Id., 373; Id., 856; 43 CA 453; 46 CA 18; Id., 377; Id., 391. Enactment of statute did not render general verdict rule inapplicable. 53 CA 399. Trial court should instruct jury that if it is unable to determine how much of plaintiff's damages is attributable to each of the three tortfeasors from separate motor vehicle accidents, jury may make a rough apportionment and if unable to do so, jury must apportion the damages equally among each party whose negligent actions caused injury to the plaintiff. 57 CA 134. Statute applies only to negligence actions and not to claims based on recklessness. 86 CA 728. Purpose of apportionment statute is to prevent any defendant from paying more than his or her share of award and permits inclusion on verdict form of defendant who has received a directed verdict in his favor, allowing jury to apportion liability to him even though he is relieved of obligation to pay. 90 CA 766.

Comparative negligence statute does not alter Connecticut doctrine as to proximate cause and thus does not affect the rule that failure to use a seat belt is not contributory negligence. 32 CS 89. Cited. 33 CS 187. No contribution among joint tortfeasors where both parties are negligent. 35 CS 268. Cited. 37 CS 574; 38 CS 597; 39 CS 20. Public policy concerning comparative negligence applied to Sec. 31-293 discussed. Id., 222. Cited. 40 CS 214; 43 CS 168; 44 CS 510. “Damage to property” does not include purely commercial losses. 47 CS 166.

Subsec. (b):

When plaintiff's conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, the assumption of risk doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence embodied in statute should apply. 190 C. 791. The mere availability of comparative negligence under section does not negate application of the wrongful conduct rule which precludes a plaintiff from recovering for injuries sustained as a direct result of his or her own illegal conduct of a serious nature. 311 C. 370. Defense of contributory negligence applies to claims of negligent service of alcohol to minor. 312 C. 184.

Subsec. (c):

Discussed re applicability of Subsec. (g) to actions against the state under Sec. 52-556. 247 C. 256. P.A. 86-338 replaced common-law rule of joint and several liability and provisions dealing with apportionment of liability were not repealed by P.A. 87-227. Id., 638. Provides for apportionment of liability only among those parties from whom plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. 249 C. 634. Adoption of alternative liability rule. 333 C. 206.

Subsec. (f):

Subdiv. (4): Jury entitled to attribute and divide percentage of negligence only among parties to the action. 33 CA 714.

Subsec. (g):

State, when sued pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity under Sec. 52-556, is not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to Subsec. 247 C. 256.

Whether defendant made “good faith efforts” is a subjective, factual determination, and the phrase “good faith” is clear and unambiguous. 132 CA 146.

Subsec. (k):

Provision of Subsec. re impairment of right to indemnity applies to section, but not to suits under product liability act, Sec. 52-572m et seq. 205 C. 694.

Subsec. (n):

Trial court required to instruct jury to apportion liability where plaintiff had settled with named uninsured motorist carrier and defendant who had been found liable for damages. 257 C. 718. Trial court properly determined that withdrawal of the action against one of defendants did not constitute a “release, settlement or similar agreement” within meaning of statute, so as to permit an apportionment complaint by remaining defendant; a release and settlement represents a surrender of a cause of action pursuant to an agreement; a withdrawal shares few of the essential characteristics of a settlement and release and may be accomplished unilaterally and unconditionally; court construed “similar agreement” to mean an agreement having the same essential characteristics of a release or settlement, and presumed that had legislature intended for apportionment to apply to withdrawn parties, it would have used term “withdrawal” in addition to, or in lieu of “similar agreement”. 283 C. 412.

Subsec. (o):

Contributory negligence is not defense to recklessness; even if jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff's conduct was a contributory cause of accident, once jury determines that defendant's conduct was reckless, there is no apportionment of liability and damages between the parties. 266 C. 822. Apportionment under Subsec. is allowed for cause of action sounding in negligence against municipal defendant for failure to inspect pool after notice fell under negligence exception of Sec. 52-557n(b)(8). 344 C. 86.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-189 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-189
Sec. 52-189. Surety company bond acceptable.
Status: in_force

It seems that bonds of surety companies for costs were lawful before statute. 70 C. 558. Rule of construction favoring surety does not extend to surety company. 78 C. 702; 109 C. 266.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407zz — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407zz
Sec. 52-407zz. Jurisdiction.
Status: in_force

(b) An agreement to arbitrate providing for arbitration in this state confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to enter judgment on an award under sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-225e — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-225e
Sec. 52-225e. Notice of settlement in excess of ten thousand dollars by insurer to claimant.
Status: in_force

(b) The notice required pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be mailed to the last-known address of such claimant as furnished by such claimant's attorney or representative at the time of settlement.

(c) Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall (1) create any cause of action or proceeding for any person or entity against an insurer based upon a failure to provide notice as required by this section or defective notice, or (2) establish a defense for any party to any cause of action based upon a failure to provide notice as required by this section or defective notice.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-401 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 907 / Section 52-401
Sec. 52-401. Court to settle terms of accounting.
Status: in_force

Court may find that building erected by husband on land owned by him and his wife is vested in them as cotenants. 82 C. 424. Concurrent jurisdiction of Superior Court and Probate Court in claim of cestui que trust for accounting. 102 C. 121; 104 C. 190. Refusal to order account is a final judgment from which an appeal lies. 102 C. 122. Lies to compel husband to account for wife's funds given him for investment. 104 C. 187.

Cited. 5 CA 457. Role of auditor is as a trier of fact. 121 CA 96.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-632 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-632
Sec. 52-632. Stay; injunction.
Status: in_force

(1) To obtain possession of, exercise control over or enforce a judgment against receivership property; and

(2) To enforce a lien against receivership property to the extent the lien secures a claim against the owner which arose before entry of the order.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the court may enjoin an act, action or proceeding against or relating to receivership property if the injunction is necessary to protect the property or facilitate administration of the receivership.

(c) A person whose act, action or proceeding is stayed or enjoined under this section may apply to the court for relief from the stay or injunction for cause.

(d) An order under subsection (a) or (b) of this section does not operate as a stay or injunction of:

(1) An act, action or proceeding to foreclose or otherwise enforce a mortgage by the person seeking appointment of the receiver;

(2) An act, action or proceeding to perfect, or maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in receivership property;

(3) Commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding;

(4) Commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding, or enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment in an action or proceeding, by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power; or

(5) Establishment by a governmental unit of a tax liability against the owner or receivership property or an appeal of the liability.

(e) The court may void an act that violates a stay or injunction under this section.

(f) If a person knowingly violates a stay or injunction under this section, the court may:

(1) Award actual damages caused by the violation, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and

(2) Sanction the violation as civil contempt.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-56 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-56
Sec. 52-56. Service of process outside of officer's precinct.
Status: in_force

(b) If there are two or more defendants, any of whom reside outside of the precinct of the officer commencing service or, in any action in case of attachment of property or in case of foreign attachment or garnishment, if any defendant or garnishee resides outside of the precinct of the officer commencing service, any officer may serve the process upon such of the defendants or garnishees as reside within his precinct, and may then (1) complete the service himself upon any defendant or garnishee residing outside his precinct, or (2) deliver the process to an officer of another precinct for service upon any defendant or garnishee residing in the other precinct and each officer serving the same shall endorse his actions thereon. The officer completing the service shall include in his endorsement a copy of the endorsement upon the writ of the officer commencing service and shall return the process to court.

(c) In any action where process is permitted to be served upon the Secretary of the State, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the Attorney General, the Insurance Commissioner or the Comptroller, service of such process may be made by any officer of any precinct having such process in his hands for service. Service by an officer upon the Secretary of the State, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the Attorney General, the Insurance Commissioner or the Comptroller pursuant to this subsection shall constitute the commencement of service within such officer's precinct and such officer may then complete service as provided in subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

(d) The execution or service of any capias issued pursuant to section 52-143 or 54-2a or any warrant or capias mittimus issued by a court or family support magistrate in a family support matter may be made in any precinct in the state by any state marshal of any precinct or any special policeman appointed under section 29-1g , having such capias, warrant or capias mittimus, or a copy thereof made by any photographic, micrographic, electronic imaging or other process, which clearly and accurately copies such original document, in his hands for service.

(e) Any state marshal of any precinct may serve any person confined in any correctional institution or community correctional center in this state.

Constable, having attached goods in the town in which he lives, may leave a copy with defendant in another town. 20 C. 377. Cited. 196 C. 233.

Completion of service outside precinct forbidden if apprehension was wrongful within it. 4 CS 456. Statute does not require sheriff to effect commencement of the action by service within in his own precinct before being authorized to serve papers outside his own county, but only to commence service in good faith in his home county. 45 CS 336.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-352d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-352d
Sec. 52-352d. Exempt property of farm partnership.
Status: in_force

(b) The farm animals and livestock feed which are reasonably required by a farm partnership in the course of its occupation shall be exempt. All moneys due the farm partnership from any insurance company on any insurance policy issued on such property shall also be exempt to the same extent that the property was exempt.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-362
Sec. 52-362. Income withholding and unemployment compensation for support.
Status: in_force

(1) “Dependent” means a spouse, former spouse or child entitled to payments under a support order, provided Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court or the state acting under an assignment of a dependent's support rights or under an application for child support enforcement services shall, through an officer of Support Enforcement Services or the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services or an investigator of the Department of Administrative Services or the Attorney General, take any action which the dependent could take to enforce a support order;

(2) “Disposable earnings” means that part of the earnings of an individual remaining after deduction from those earnings of amounts required to be withheld for the payment of federal, state and local income taxes, employment taxes, normal retirement contributions, union dues and initiation fees, and group life and health insurance premiums;

(3) “Earnings” means any debt accruing to an obligor by reason of such obligor's personal services, including any compensation payable by an employer to an employee for such personal services whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise, including unemployment compensation if a purchase of service agreement between the Commissioner of Social Services and the Labor Commissioner is in effect pursuant to subsection (e) of section 17b-179 ;

(4) “Employer” means any person, including the Labor Commissioner, who owes earnings to an obligor;

(5) “Income” means any periodic form of payment due to an individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to, disposable earnings, workers' compensation and disability benefits, payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program and interest;

(6) “Issue” means: (A) Complete the withholding order form prescribed under subsection (q) of this section and serve such form on the employer or other payer of income, or (B) in the case of an income withholding order served electronically in accordance with subsection (h) of this section, transmit electronic data sufficient to implement the withholding to an employer that has agreed to receive electronic transmission of income withholding orders and notices;

(7) “Obligor” means a person required to make payments under a support order;

(8) “Support order” means a court order, or order of a family support magistrate including an agreement approved by a court or a family support magistrate, that requires the payment to a dependent of current support, cash medical support, a specific dollar amount of child care costs or arrearage payments;

(9) “Unemployment compensation” means any compensation payable under chapter 567, including amounts payable by the administrator of the unemployment compensation law pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance or allowances with respect to unemployment.

(b) The Superior Court and any family support magistrate shall enter an order for withholding pursuant to this section against the income of an obligor to enforce a support order when the support order is entered or modified or when the obligor is before the court in an enforcement proceeding. The court shall order the withholding to be effective immediately or may, for cause or pursuant to an agreement by the parties, order a contingent withholding to be effective only on accrual of a delinquency in an amount greater than or equal to thirty days' obligation. Any finding that there is cause not to order withholding to be effective immediately shall be based on at least (1) a written determination that, and explanation by the court or family support magistrate of why, implementing immediate income withholding would not be in the best interests of the child, and (2) proof of timely payment of previously ordered support in cases involving the modification of such support. Before the court or family support magistrate enters an order for withholding which is effective immediately against an obligor who is before the court or a family support magistrate, it shall inform the obligor of the minimum amount of income which is exempt from withholding under state and federal law, of such obligor's right to claim any applicable state or federal exemptions with respect thereto and of such obligor's right to offer any evidence as to why a withholding order effective immediately should not enter. If the court or family support magistrate enters an order for withholding to be effective immediately against a nonappearing obligor, notice shall be served subsequently upon the obligor in accordance with section 52-57 or sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the obligor's last-known address, informing such obligor: (A) That a support order has been entered to be enforced by an income withholding order, (B) that an income withholding order has been entered effective immediately as part of the support order, (C) of the minimum amount of income exempt from withholding under state and federal law and of such obligor's right at the hearing on the support order to claim any other applicable state or federal exemptions with respect thereto, (D) of such obligor's right to a hearing, upon motion to the court, to offer any evidence as to why the withholding order effective immediately should not continue in effect, (E) of the amount of income received by such obligor which formed the basis for the support order against such obligor, and (F) of such obligor's right to move to modify the support order if such obligor's income has changed substantially or if the support order substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a .

(c) (1) If an obligor is delinquent on support payments on any prior order of support in an amount greater than or equal to thirty days' obligation, whether or not such order is subject to a contingent income withholding, such obligor shall become subject to withholding and the dependent shall cause a delinquency notice to be served on such obligor. The delinquency notice shall include a claim form and be in clear and simple language informing the obligor that (A) such obligor is delinquent under the support order in a specified amount and any additional amounts accruing until the effective date of the withholding order, (B) a withholding order has become effective against such obligor's income, (C) such obligor has fifteen days to request a hearing before the court or family support magistrate, and at such hearing such obligor may contest the claimed delinquency and the imposition of the income withholding, seek modification of the withholding order, and claim any lawful exemption with respect to such obligor's income, (D) such obligor has a right to seek modification of the support order by a proper motion filed with the court or family support magistrate, (E) eighty-five per cent of the first one hundred forty-five dollars of disposable income per week are exempt, and (F) the amount of the withholding order may not exceed the maximum percentage of disposable income which may be withheld pursuant to Section 1673 of Title 15 of the United States Code, together with a statement of such obligor's right to claim any other applicable state or federal exemptions with respect thereto. The claim form shall contain a checklist identifying the most common defenses and exemptions such that the obligor may check any which apply to the obligor and a space where the obligor may briefly explain the claim or request a modification of or raise a defense to the support order.

(2) An obligor shall become subject to withholding to enforce a prior order of support upon the request of the dependent regardless of any delinquency, and whether or not such order is subject to a contingent income withholding. In such cases, the dependent shall cause a notice to be served on such obligor which notice shall comply in all respects with the delinquency notice required under subdivision (1) of this subsection except that such notice shall not be required to allege a delinquency.

(d) An obligor may claim a defense based upon mistake of fact, may claim an exemption in accordance with subsection (e) of this section with respect to the withholding order, or may file by motion a modification or defense to the support order being enforced by the withholding, by delivering a signed claim form, or other written notice or motion, with the address of the obligor thereon, indicating the nature of the claim or grounds of the motion, to the clerk of the Superior Court or the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division within fifteen days of receipt of notice. On receipt of the claim or motion, the clerk shall promptly enter the appearance of the obligor, schedule the matter for a hearing, send a file-stamped copy of the claim or motion to the person or agency of the state to whom the support order is payable and notify all parties of the hearing date set. The court or family support magistrate shall promptly hear and determine the claim or motion and notify the obligor within forty-five days from the date of the notice required under subsection (c) of this section of its determination. Unless the obligor successfully shows cause why the withholding order should not continue in effect, the court or family support magistrate shall order that the outstanding withholding order continue in effect against the nonexempt income of the obligor to the extent provided under subsection (e) of this section. The order shall be a final judgment for purposes of appeal. The effect of the withholding order shall not be stayed on appeal except by order of the court or a family support magistrate.

(e) A withholding order shall issue in the amount necessary to enforce a support order against only such nonexempt income of the obligor as exceeds the greater of (1) eighty-five per cent of the first one hundred forty-five dollars per week of disposable income, or (2) the amount exempt under Section 1673 of Title 15 of the United States Code, or against any lesser amount which the court or family support magistrate deems equitable. Subject to subsection (d) of section 46b-88 , the withholding order shall secure payment of past and future amounts due under the support order and an additional amount computed in accordance with the child support guidelines established in accordance with section 46b-215a , to be applied toward liquidation of any arrearage accrued under such order, unless contested by the obligor after a notice has been served pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, in which case the court or family support magistrate may determine the amount to be applied toward the liquidation of the arrearage found to have accrued under prior order of the court or family support magistrate. In no event shall such additional amount be applied if there is an existing arrearage order from the court or family support magistrate in a IV-D support case, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231 . Any investigator or other authorized employee of the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services, or any officer of Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court, may issue a withholding order entered by the Superior Court or a family support magistrate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and shall issue a withholding order pursuant to this subsection when the obligor becomes subject to withholding under subsection (c) of this section. On service of the order of withholding on an existing or any future employer or other payer of income, and until the support order is fully satisfied or modified, the order of withholding is a continuing lien and levy on the obligor's income as it becomes due.

(f) Commencing no later than the first pay period in the case of an employer, or the date of periodic payment in the case of a payer of income other than an employer, that occurs after fourteen days following the date of service of an order for withholding and within seven business days of the date the obligor is paid thereafter, an employer or other payer of income shall pay sums withheld pursuant to the withholding order to the state disbursement unit, as required by subsection (p) of this section. The employer or other payer of income (1) shall specify the dates on which each withholding occurred and the amount withheld for each obligor on each such date, and (2) may combine all withheld amounts into a single payment to the state disbursement unit with the portion thereof which is attributable to each individual obligor being separately designated. If an employer or other payer of income fails to withhold from income due an obligor pursuant to an order for withholding or fails to make those payments, such employer or other payer of income is liable to such person for the full amount of income not withheld since receipt of proper notice in an action therefor, and the amount secured in the action shall be applied by such person toward the arrearage owed by the obligor. Such employer or other payer of income shall be subject to a finding of contempt by the court or family support magistrate for failure to honor such order for withholding, provided service of the order is made in accordance with section 52-57 or by certified mail, return receipt requested.

(g) All orders for withholding issued pursuant to this section shall take precedence over any execution issued pursuant to section 52-361 of the general statutes revised to 1983, or section 52-361a . Two or more orders for withholding may be levied concurrently under this section, but if the total levy in any week exceeds the maximum permitted under this section, all sums due shall be allocated by the state disbursement unit in proportion to the amount of such orders, giving priority in such allocation to current support.

(h) Service of any process under this section, including any notice, may be made in accordance with section 52-57 , or by certified mail, return receipt requested. If service is made on behalf of the state, it may be made by an authorized employee of Support Enforcement Services, by an investigator or other officer of the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services, by an investigator of the Department of Administrative Services or by the Attorney General. Service of income withholding orders by Support Enforcement Services or by an investigator or other officer of said office upon an employer under this section may be made in accordance with section 52-57 , by certified mail, return receipt requested, by first class mail or electronically, provided the employer agrees to accept service made electronically.

(i) An applicant for employment or an employee subject to an order for withholding issued pursuant to this section shall have the same protection from discipline, suspension or discharge by an employer as provided in section 52-361a .

(j) There shall be a fine of not more than one thousand dollars imposed on any employer who discharges from employment, refuses to employ, takes disciplinary action against or discriminates against an employee subject to an order for withholding issued pursuant to this section because of the existence of such order for withholding and the obligations or additional obligations which it imposes upon the employer.

(k) The employer shall notify promptly the dependent or Support Enforcement Services as directed when the obligor terminates employment, makes a claim for workers' compensation benefits or makes a claim for unemployment compensation benefits and shall provide the obligor's last-known address and the name and address of the obligor's new employer, if known. When the obligor makes a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the employer shall include a copy of any order for withholding received by the employer for the obligor with the employer's first report of occupational illness or injury to the employer's workers' compensation benefits carrier, and such benefits carrier shall withhold funds pursuant to the withholding order and pay any sums withheld as required by subsection (f) of this section.

(l) When an obligor who is subject to withholding under this section is identified as a newly hired employee pursuant to subsection (d) of section 31-2c , the state agency enforcing the obligor's child support order shall, within two business days after the date information regarding such employee is entered into the state directory of new hires, issue a withholding order to the employer of the employee in accordance with subsection (e) of this section.

(m) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedy available at law to enforce or punish for failure to obey a support order.

(n) When a support order is issued in another state and the obligor has income subject to withholding derived in this state, such income shall be subject to withholding in accordance with the provisions of this section, upon registration of the support order in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection or as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection.

(1) An income withholding order issued in another state and registered in this state shall be subject to the procedures for registration, choice of law, notice to the nonregistering party, contest and confirmation of such order in sections 46b-370 to 46b-380 , inclusive.

(2) An income withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in this state shall be subject to the procedures in sections 46b-358 to 46b-364 , inclusive. Such employer shall, in addition to following the procedures in said sections, immediately provide to the obligor a copy of the notice and claim form provided by the Department of Social Services pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this subdivision.

(A) The Department of Social Services shall make available to all employers in this state a standard notice and claim form, written in clear and simple language, which shall include (i) notice that money will be withheld from the employee's wages for child support and health insurance; (ii) notice of the amount of disposable earnings that are exempt from the income withholding order; (iii) notice that the amount of the income withholding order may not exceed the maximum permitted by federal law under 15 USC 1673, together with a statement of the obligor's right to claim any other applicable state or federal exemptions; (iv) notice of the right to object to the validity or enforcement of such income withholding order in a court in this state and of the right to seek modification of the underlying support order in the court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction; (v) notice of the right to seek the assistance of the Office of Child Support Services of the Department of Social Services and the toll-free telephone number at which the office can be contacted; and (vi) a claim form which shall include (I) a list of the most common defenses and exemptions to such income withholding order in a manner which allows the obligor to check any of the defenses and exemptions which apply; (II) a space where the obligor may briefly explain the obligor's claim or defense; (III) a space where the obligor may initiate a request for services to modify the support order, and the address of the Office of Child Support Services of the Department of Social Services to which such request may be sent; (IV) a space for the obligor to provide the obligor's address and the name of the town in which the obligor principally conducts the obligor's work for the employer; (V) a space for the obligor to sign the obligor's name; (VI) the address of Support Enforcement Services to which the claim form is to be sent in order to contest the validity or enforcement of the income withholding order; and (VII) space for the employer to state the date upon which the form was actually delivered to the obligor.

(B) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in this state by following the procedures in section 46b-363 or by mailing to Support Enforcement Services the claim form delivered to the obligor pursuant to this subdivision. Such form shall be signed by the obligor and contain the obligor's address. A copy of the income withholding order shall be included.

(C) Upon receipt of a claim form contesting the validity or enforcement of an income withholding order, Support Enforcement Services shall: (i) Give notice of the contest to (I) the support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee; (II) each employer that has directly received an income withholding order relating to the obligor; (III) the person designated to receive payments in the income withholding order; and (IV) if the obligee's address is known, the obligee; (ii) file the claim form and a copy of the income withholding order on behalf of the obligor with the Family Support Magistrate Division; and (iii) notify the person or agency that sent the income withholding order to file not less than ten days before the scheduled hearing (I) two copies, including one certified copy of the underlying support order, including any modification of such order; and (II) a sworn statement showing the amount of any arrearage together with the last court determination of an arrearage and an accounting of the arrearage since such determination.

(D) Upon receipt of a claim form filed by Support Enforcement Services on behalf of the obligor in accordance with subparagraph (C) of this subdivision, the clerk shall promptly enter the appearance of the obligor, schedule a hearing, and give notice of the hearing to the obligor, Support Enforcement Services, the party initiating the income withholding order, and, if the obligee's address is known, the obligee. The family support magistrate shall promptly hear and determine the claim and enter the family support magistrate's determination within forty-five days from the date of the filing of the claim form. The family support magistrate shall utilize the procedures set forth in sections 46b-342 to 46b-344 , inclusive, to obtain additional evidence and information as needed for a prompt determination on the claim. If the person or agency that sent the income withholding order fails to file the documents described in subparagraph (C) (iii) of this subdivision or fails to comply with a reasonable request for information or documents made under section 46b-343 or 46b-344 , the family support magistrate may (i) continue the hearing for a period of not more than an additional forty-five days and direct Support Enforcement Services to provide such notice as may be appropriate; (ii) order a temporary or partial stay of income withholding for a period not to exceed forty-five days; or (iii) sustain the obligor's objection to the validity or enforcement of the income withholding order and enjoin the employer from complying with such order. In addition to any notice given by the clerk, upon entry of the decision of the family support magistrate on the claim, Support Enforcement Services shall give notice of the decision to each employer that has directly received an income withholding order related to the obligor, the party initiating the income withholding order, the obligor and, if the obligee's address is known, the obligee.

(E) If the claim form requests services to modify the support order, the Office of Child Support Services shall assist the obligor to file a motion for modification with the appropriate tribunal of the state of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the law of that jurisdiction. The receipt of the request for modification shall constitute a request for Title IV-D services, but the office may require the making of a formal application. Such assistance shall include, but is not limited to, providing the obligor with information about how such a motion is filed, contacting the state of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction on behalf of the obligor to obtain appropriate forms, and transmitting such forms and applicable information to the appropriate tribunal in such state.

(F) Venue for contested claims under this section shall be the Family Support Magistrate Division of the Superior Court in the judicial district in which the obligor resides, provided (i) if the obligor does not reside in this state, venue shall be in the judicial district of the employer who is subject to the income withholding order, and (ii) if there is an existing action concerning support of the child or children who are the subject of the income withholding order, the claim shall be filed in that action.

(o) An employer who withholds the income of an obligor pursuant to a withholding order issued under subsection (e), (l) or (n) of this section that is regular on its face shall not be subject to civil liability to any individual or agency for conduct in compliance with such order.

(p) All withholding orders issued under this section shall be payable to the state disbursement unit established and maintained by the Commissioner of Social Services in accordance with subsection (j) of section 17b-179 . The state disbursement unit shall ensure distribution of all money collected under this section to the dependent, the state and the support enforcement agencies of other states, as their interests may appear, within two business days. Each dependent who is not receiving child support enforcement services, as defined in subsection (b) of section 46b-231 , shall be notified upon the issuance of a withholding order pursuant to this section, that such services are offered free of charge by the State of Connecticut upon application to the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services.

(q) The judges of the Superior Court may adopt any rules they deem necessary to implement the provisions of this section and sections 46b-69a , 46b-575 and 52-361a and such judges, or their designee, shall prescribe any forms required to implement such provisions.

See Sec. 46b-69a re executions and earning assignments available in actions for dissolution of marriage, annulment and legal separation.

Amount of execution against pension benefits to be calculated under this section rather than Sec. 52-361 where it is for family support; court included this section with Sec. 52-361 by implication in exemption exception referenced in Sec. 52-352c(d). 178 C. 675. Cited. 240 C. 623.

Cited. 28 CA 794; 33 CA 395.

Payments from pension trust fund are susceptible to wage execution under section and notification to trustees of such action is not required, and therefore trustees need not be made parties. 37 CS 566. Cited. Id., 840.

Subsec. (b):

Court must provide notice to the party of party's statutory rights to claim exemptions or to present evidence that a withholding order should not issue immediately; court must then issue withholding order immediately unless cause exists for contingent wage withholding order. 51 CA 530.

Subsec. (d):

Doctrine of laches and equitable estoppel may apply under Subsec. and obligor in this case was entitled to assert doctrine of laches to stop wage withholding order where defendant had left state with child and not forwarded address as required by court order, and waited 10 years to file any motion re support, and where obligor had made unsuccessful attempts to locate and contact the child. 108 CA 376.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-447 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 912 / Section 52-447
Sec. 52-447. Petition to be heard by committee, unless parties agree.
Status: in_force

Certainty in report. 34 C. 86. Committee need not fix the height at precisely that asked for. 33 C. 552. Flowage law recognizes mills and manufacturing establishments as being for public use. 41 C. 91. Distinction as to taxation between land taken for profit and for a town water supply. 44 C. 371. Petitions are to be served by citation, as were bills in equity before the practice act. 49 C. 348. Evidence that petitioners are pecuniarily unable to avail themselves of the right sought is inadmissible. Id., 349. Specific issue held not to involve effect of flowage upon the public health. 52 C. 459. Statutes authorizing the taking or flowage of land by compulsory process should be strictly construed. 65 C. 323. Whether a law empowering riparian owners to create ice ponds on the land of others, against their will, can be supported, quaere. Id., 234. Cited. 69 C. 435.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-57
Sec. 52-57. Manner of service upon individuals, municipalities, corporations, partnerships and voluntary associations.
Status: in_force

(b) Process in civil actions against the following-described classes of defendants shall be served as follows: (1) Against a town, upon its clerk, assistant clerk, manager or one of its selectmen; (2) against a city, upon its clerk or assistant clerk or upon its mayor or manager; (3) against a borough, upon its manager, clerk or assistant clerk or upon the warden or one of its burgesses; (4) against a school district, upon its clerk or one of its committee; (5) against a board, commission, department or agency of a town, city or borough, notwithstanding any provision of law, upon the clerk of the town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the board, commission, department or agency; (6) against any other municipal or quasi-municipal corporation, upon its clerk or upon its chief presiding officer or managing agent; and (7) against an employee of a town, city or borough in a cause of action arising from the employee's duties or employment, upon the clerk of the town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the employee.

(c) In actions against a private corporation, service of process shall be made either upon the president, the vice president, an assistant vice president, the secretary, the assistant secretary, the treasurer, the assistant treasurer, the cashier, the assistant cashier, the teller or the assistant teller or its general or managing agent or manager or upon any director resident in this state, or the person in charge of the business of the corporation or upon any person who is at the time of service in charge of the office of the corporation in the town in which its principal office or place of business is located. In actions against a private corporation established under the laws of any other state, any foreign country or the United States, service of process may be made upon any of the aforesaid officers or agents, or upon the agent of the corporation appointed pursuant to section 33-922 .

(d) In actions against a partnership, service of process may be made by personally serving any process within the state upon any one of the partners or, if none of the partners are residents of the state, service may be made upon the Secretary of the State; provided, prior to the return date, the officer serving the writ shall mail a copy of the writ and the complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last-known address of every partner named in the writ not personally served. A statement of such mailing and receipt therefor shall be included in the officer's return.

(e) In actions against a voluntary association, service of process may be made upon the presiding officer, secretary or treasurer. If all of such officers are not residents of the state and the voluntary association is doing business, acting or carrying out its operations or its functions within the state, the voluntary association shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State as its attorney and to have agreed that any process in any civil action brought against it may be served upon the Secretary of the State and that the process shall have the same validity as if served personally upon the presiding officer, secretary or treasurer of the voluntary association. The process shall be served by any officer to whom the process is directed upon the Secretary of the State by leaving with, or at the office of, the Secretary of the State, at least twelve days before the return day of the process, a true and attested copy thereof, and by sending to the defendant at its last-known address by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, a like true and attested copy with an endorsement thereon of the service upon the Secretary of the State. The officer serving the process upon the Secretary of the State shall leave with the Secretary of the State, at the time of service, a fee of fifty dollars, which fee shall be taxed in favor of the plaintiff in the plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff prevails in the action. The Secretary of the State shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.

(f) When the other methods of service of process provided under this section or otherwise provided by law cannot be effected, in actions concerning the establishment, enforcement or modification of child support orders other than actions for dissolution of marriage, including, but not limited to, such actions under sections 17b-122 , 17b-124 to 17b-132 , inclusive, 17b-136 to 17b-138 , inclusive, 17b-194 to 17b-197 , inclusive, 17b-222 to 17b-250 , inclusive, 17b-263 , 17b-340 to 17b-350 , inclusive, 17b-689b , 17b-743 to 17b-747 , inclusive, and 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, and chapters 815, 815p, 815t, 815y and 816, and actions to implement garnishments for support under section 52-362 , service of process may be made upon a party to the action by one of the following methods, provided proof of receipt of such process by such party is presented to the court in accordance with rules promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court:

(1) By certified mail to a party to the action addressed to the employer of such party. Any service of process so sent shall include on the outside envelope the words “To be delivered to the employee in accordance with subsection (f) of section 52-57” ;. The employer shall accept any such service of process sent by certified mail and promptly deliver such certified mail to the employee; or

(2) When a party to an action under this subsection is employed by an employer with fifteen or more employees, by personal service upon an official of the employer designated as an agent to accept service of process in actions brought under this subsection. Each employer with fifteen or more employees doing business in this state shall designate an official to accept service of process for employees who are parties to such actions. The person so served shall promptly deliver such process to the employee.

See Sec. 4a-17 re service of process on mentally ill or mentally deficient persons.

See Sec. 33-663 re service of process on registered agent for stock corporation.

See Sec. 33-1053 re service of process on registered agent for nonstock corporation.

See Sec. 52-335 re service of garnishee process on a corporation.

See Sec. 54-240 l re service of process on participant in address confidentiality program.

Action against U.S. corporations. 5 C. 105. Secretary de facto. 6 C. 528. Service at selectman's house. 12 C. 92. A foreign corporation, a portion of whose stockholders reside in this state, held not liable to suit by writ of summons in our courts. 14 C. 301. Service when there are no officers and but one stockholder. 20 C. 447. Place where corporation, etc., exercises its powers. 40 C. 70. Appearance as waiving defects in service. 67 C. 366; 70 C. 329; 77 C. 382; 90 C. 293; 4 Cranch 421. Effect of acceptance of service by nonresident out of state. 89 C. 215. House in this state where one habitually spent 3 days a week held his usual place of abode. 92 C. 55. Service by registered mail not sufficient to make nonresident claimant of bank deposit a party to action by trustee in bankruptcy against bank to recover it. 97 C. 307. Requirements of jurisdiction by foreign attachment stated. 107 C. 554. Service pursuant to section sufficient to give jurisdiction in bastardy action. 118 C. 304. Cited. 121 C. 312; 127 C. 57. Service at door of S's apartment is not service at “usual place of abode” of F; officer's return may be contradicted and facts shown to be otherwise. 138 C. 343. Due to legislative history, words “aforesaid officers or agents” construed to permit service upon a resident director of a foreign corporation. 144 C. 212. Court does not have jurisdiction if service is improper; when persons upon whom service may be made are designated by statute, service upon any other person as a representative of the corporations is inadequate. 145 C. 24. In the case of a defendant domiciled in, but absent from, the state, abode service in the state is ordinarily sufficient to give the court in personam jurisdiction; section is applicable to divorce and legal separation actions. 150 C. 15. Cited. Id., 190; 181 C. 225. Without a finding that plaintiff had no notice in fact, the attack on statute permitting abode service failed. 185 C. 495. Cited. 192 C. 1; Id., 497; 196 C. 233; 206 C. 125; Id., 374; 212 C. 157; 214 C. 1; 219 C. 204; 226 C. 1; 227 C. 909; 232 C. 392.

Cited. 1 CA 123; 4 CA 339; 6 CA 43; Id., 390; 10 CA 201; 13 CA 1; 21 CA 339; 25 CA 637; 31 CA 155; Id., 629; 34 CA 18; Id., 634; 44 CA 225.

Cited. 4 CS 139; 9 CS 473; Id., 520. Must be read as though there was a comma between the word “agent” and the concluding phrase “or upon any director resident in this state” to denote that the qualifying phrase “resident in this state” refers only to directors. 12 CS 97. Service handed to a clerk at a desk in a hotel lobby held void. 14 CS 400. Writ to which was added names of two additional garnishees after service is abatable. 16 CS 143. Service at home of defendant while he was hospitalized held “at usual place of abode”. 17 CS 432. Attempted service on corporation by leaving copy of complaint with porter invalid where no showing that the officers could not be found. 18 CS 108. Service of process upon the secretary of a foreign corporation who is in this state does not give our courts jurisdiction over the corporation unless it has exposed itself to such jurisdiction by doing business in this state. Id., 387. Service of process at a residence owned by defendant and occupied by a tenant, and in which defendant had an office, was not at defendant's usual place of abode and was a nullity. 22 CS 288. What constitutes “usual place of abode”. 24 CS 324. Writ placed halfway under door was service at “usual place of abode”. Id., 488. Personal service need not have been made in a legal separation action where a proper constructive attachment of the property involved was made at the outset of the action. 26 CS 284, 290. Cited. 27 CS 395. Service by leaving process at house which defendant had vacated 3 months previously and put up for sale, herself moving out of state, was not service at her “usual place of abode, in this state”. 28 CS 284. Defendant's former residence, still his family's residence and listed as his voting and licensure address was no longer his place of abode when he had for over 2 years worked and lived in England. Id., 359. Cited. 33 CS 554; Id., 562; 34 CS 501; 35 CS 297. Hotel room may be defendant's usual place of abode, particularly where he receives actual notice of the action. 36 CS 335. Cited. 37 CS 790; 41 CS 367; 42 CS 187.

Service on Connecticut travel agency to secure jurisdiction over foreign hotel corporation whose only contact with state was travel agency selling tickets for tour on which hotel was regular stop, held ineffective. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 403. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 470. Personal service of writ conferred in personam jurisdiction over defendant although writ did not specify defendant's address by street and number. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 235. Requirement of statute for “abode” service is to be strictly construed as it is a departure from common law requirement of manual delivery for in personam service; service of writ by leaving it in mail box in hallway outside defendant's apartment is so haphazard and uncertain as to fail to meet statutory requirements. Id., 580. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 54.

Subsec. (a):

In foreclosure action, service of process at residential address when defendant was incarcerated constituted service at place of abode because family of defendant continued to live at address and defendant returned there after release from prison. 288 C. 568.

Abode service is not effective if it is left at address that is not the usual address of the party to be served. 78 CA 456. In light of facts that front door of defendants' home was inaccessible, that marshal affixed the process to property's main entryway, and that the property is a single-family residence and defendants actually received notice of the action, the service of process effected by the marshal was reasonably likely to achieve personal notice and constituted proper abode service pursuant to section. 98 CA 852. Unlike Sec. 52-64(a), this Subsec. only applies when a state employee is sued in his or her individual capacity; phrase “Except as otherwise provided” does not allow service of process on a state employee in his or her individual capacity by serving process on the Attorney General at the Office of the Attorney General because such process is not specifically enumerated in section. 163 CA 337; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 248.

Subsec. (b):

Court properly dismissed suit against board of education as a result of improper service of process under Subdiv. (4), as service of process to board secretary should have been made under Subdiv. (5) and served upon the clerk of town, city or borough. 191 CA 280.

Subdiv. (5): Although citation commanded the marshal to serve only one copy on clerk, not the two copies required by Subdiv., the marshal did leave two copies, and thus defect is formal and circumstantial and will not cause dismissal of the appeal. 50 CS 513.

Subsec. (c):

In action against foreign corporation, service of process may be made on vice president and court acquired personal jurisdiction over defendant corporation by service on vice president made in accordance with Subsec. 113 CA 845. Service on general manager constituted proper service in action against automobile dealer. 142 CA 14.

Subsec. (d):

Service on secretary does not fulfill requirements of statute. 40 CS 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-148a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-148a
Sec. 52-148a. Taking of depositions. When court order necessary.
Status: in_force

(b) If the party initiating the action or proceeding seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of twenty days after the return day in civil actions or prior to twenty days after service of the notice of deposition in a probate proceeding, he shall obtain an order of the court, except such order shall not be required (1) if an adverse party has served a notice of taking a deposition or otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if special notice has been given as provided in subsection (b) of section 52-148b .

(c) The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by an order of the court on such terms as the court prescribes.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 216 C. 483; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 126.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-52 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-52
Sec. 52-52. Orders of notice of legal or judicial proceedings.
Status: in_force

(b) To prove publication of any legal notice, either the return of any officer authorized to serve process or the affidavit of any person showing that the publication was made as directed shall be sufficient. A copy of the prescribed notice, instead of the original order, may be left with the newspaper for publication purposes, and each original order shall be left with or returned to the clerk of the court in which the proceeding is pending or returnable.

(c) When proof of compliance with the order is filed with the clerk, he shall note such fact upon the docket, and such proof and order shall be preserved as part of the case file.

See Sec. 52-68 re notice to nonresident adverse or interested parties and interested parties unknown to plaintiff.

No statutory requisites requiring clerk or assistant clerk of the Probate Court to attest copies of appeal papers. 20 CS 137.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-63 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-63
Sec. 52-63. Service of civil process upon Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in lieu of owner or operator of motor vehicle, authorized when.
Status: in_force

(b) Service of civil process may be made on a motor vehicle operator who (1) is licensed under the provisions of chapter 246, or (2) is unlicensed and has a last-known address in this state by leaving a true and attested copy of the writ, summons and complaint at the office of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles at least twelve days before the return day and by sending such a true and attested copy at least twelve days before the return day, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return receipt requested, to the defendant at his or her last address on file in the Department of Motor Vehicles if (A) it is impossible to make service of process at the operator's last address on file in the Department of Motor Vehicles, and (B) the operator has caused injury to the person or property of another.

(c) Service of civil process may be made on the owner of a motor vehicle who (1) has registered such motor vehicle in this state under the provisions of chapter 246, or (2) has not registered such motor vehicle in this state and whose last-known address is located in this state by leaving a true and attested copy of the writ, summons and complaint at the office of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles at least twelve days before the return day and by sending such a true and attested copy at least twelve days before the return day, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return receipt requested, to the defendant at his or her last address on file in the Department of Motor Vehicles if (A) it is impossible to make service of process at the owner's last address on file in the Department of Motor Vehicles, (B) the owner has loaned or permitted his motor vehicle to be driven by another, and (C) the motor vehicle has caused injury to the person or property of another.

(d) If service of process is made at the office of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to subsection (b) or subsection (c) of this section, the officer making such service shall certify on the process that such officer has made a diligent effort to obtain service at the address of the owner or operator on file in the Department of Motor Vehicles and has been unable to make such service.

(e) Service of process pursuant to this section shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction of any such action upon the court to which the process is returnable. The court may proceed to determine the issues in the action and render final judgment but the court may, in its discretion, require further order of notice to the operator or owner.

(f) The officer serving such process upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall leave with the commissioner, at the time of service, a fee of fifty dollars, which fee shall be taxed in favor of the plaintiff in his or her costs if the plaintiff prevails in the action. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.

Cited. 182 C. 14; 195 C. 191; 206 C. 374; 236 C. 89.

Where defendant was resident of Connecticut at time of accident in Maine but before action commenced established his residence and domicile in Maine although retaining his Connecticut operator's license and continuing the Connecticut registry of his automobile, service under section in Connecticut held invalid. 20 CS 195. Under former statute, defendant who was a resident of Connecticut at the time of the accident, but who moved out of the state before suit was begun, must be served as a nonresident in an in personam action. Id., 406. Section existing in derogation of common law must be strictly complied with to secure its benefits; under section prior to 1967 amendment, a road within a privately owned shopping center was not a “public highway” within the meaning of section. 26 CS 508. Operator whose license has expired and who subsequently moved to another state is subject to service through commissioner. 29 CS 227.

Deficiencies in sheriff's return were jurisdictional as section was not complied with; hence cause was erased from docket. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.

Subsec. (b):

“Impossibility” does not require that absolute physical impossibility exists but includes factual situations where personal or abode service has little likelihood of happening or being accomplished. 78 CA 456.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-192a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-192a
Sec. 52-192a. Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest.
Status: in_force

(b) In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the plaintiff may, not earlier than three hundred sixty-five days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and, if the offer of compromise is not accepted within sixty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled.

(c) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount, except in the case of a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132 , the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on the difference between the amount so recovered and the sum certain specified in the counterclaim plaintiff's offer of compromise. The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action or application under section 8-132 was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint or application. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint or application, the interest shall be computed from the date the offer of compromise was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.

Cited. 188 C. 213. In the context of statute, reference to “verdict” incorporates a recovery awarded by the court; prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 C. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648; 225 C. 146; 227 C. 914; 228 C. 206; 229 C. 525; 231 C. 745; 234 C. 169; 239 C. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802; 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799; 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314. Under 2005 revision, the legislative grant of authority to courts under section to award offer of judgment interest after a trial reasonably cannot be construed to mean “after a settlement” even if the parties agree to treat settlement as a verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor for purposes of section. 294 C. 719. Amendment to section in 2007 evidences legislature's understanding that an amendment was necessary to bring condemnation appeals within the ambit of section, and prior to 2007, legislature did not intend for section to be applicable to condemnation appeals. Id., 803. Substitution of plaintiff under Sec. 52-109 did not render previously filed offers of judgment invalid and unenforceable, rather, the seemingly divergent principle of this section, which is punitive in nature, and Sec. 52-109, which is highly remedial, must be reconciled and leads to conclusion that substitution of plaintiff validated the offers of judgment such that interest began to accrue as of date of substitution. 297 C. 105.

Cited. 3 CA 111; Id., 570; 8 CA 254; 13 CA 712; 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff's offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state. 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67; 26 CA 231; Id., 322; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 806; 32 CA 118; 33 CA 662; Id., 842; 35 CA 504; 36 CA 653; 38 CA 685; 42 CA 239; Id., 712; 43 CA 645; 44 CA 154; 45 CA 165; Id., 543; 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294. Court properly awarded offer of compromise interest on basis of defendants' having rejected plaintiff's offer; defendants' offered no authority for proposition that inadequate performance of the party making an offer of compromise precludes the statutorily prescribed remedy. 102 CA 23. The court upheld award of judgment interest in accordance with 1999 revision of section and rejected defendant's argument that defendant's conditional acceptance of plaintiff's offer of judgment is an exception permitted under statute, since such conditional acceptance was a counteroffer and defendant's interpretation ignores the punitive aspect of section. 111 CA 287. Plaintiff failed to meet “sum certain” and “equal to or greater than” requirements of Subsecs. (a) and (c) where relief requested was $500,000 with interest, appraisal and other fees expended up to $20,000 and all necessary land use certificates and approvals, and relief recovered was $899,480 with interest and no such certificates and approvals. 163 CA 190. Although marital dissolution action is civil action, it is not an action based on contract or an action seeking money damages and section does not apply to marital dissolution cases. 222 CA 560.

Subsec. (a):

Although the required attorney's signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney's law partner with attorney's permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596. Plaintiff is not required to state in an offer of judgment the period of time that defendant has to accept the offer; including reference to the acceptance period in offer of judgment is a courtesy, done in order to save defendant from having to consult language of statute. 103 CA 20.

Subsec. (b):

Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1. Where trial court granted defendant's motion for remittitur due to limit of plaintiff's underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Sec. 38a-336, interest awarded pursuant to section is to be based on judgment amount, rather than verdict amount. 288 C. 38.

Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney's fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under Subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459.

Subsec. (c):

Where jury award of $4.2 million in dram shop action was reduced by court to $250,000 pursuant to Sec. 30-102, trial court properly found that plaintiff had “recovered” $250,000 for purposes of calculating interest under this Subsec., and interest award under this Subsec. did not undermine legislative purpose of limiting recoverable damages under Dram Shop Act. 136 CA 805. Trial court properly awarded interest under section to plaintiffs because the combined jury verdict exceeded the unified offer of compromise and, where there are two plaintiffs and the claim of one of them is derivative of the other, offer of compromise interest based on the full jury award achieves the purpose of section. 156 CA 453.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549r — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922b / Section 52-549r
Sec. 52-549r. Rules of evidence to apply to fact-finding proceedings. Finding of fact. Award.
Status: in_force

Cited. 199 C. 496.

Cited. 20 CA 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-367a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-367a
Sec. 52-367a. Execution against debts due from financial institution. Judgment debtor other than individual.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) Execution may be granted pursuant to this section against any debts due from any financial institution to a judgment debtor which is not an individual. If execution is desired against any such debt, the plaintiff requesting the execution shall make application to the clerk of the court. The application shall be accompanied by a fee of one hundred five dollars payable to the clerk of the court for the administrative costs of complying with the provisions of this section which fee may be recoverable by the judgment creditor as a taxable cost of the action. The clerk shall issue such execution containing a direction that the officer serving such execution shall make demand (A) upon the main office of any financial institution having its main office within the county of the serving officer, (B) if such main office is not within the serving officer's county and such financial institution has one or more branch offices within such county, upon an employee of such a branch office, such employee and branch office having been designated by the financial institution in accordance with regulations adopted by the Banking Commissioner, in accordance with chapter 54, or (C) only upon demand of a financial institution which does not have any main office or branch office in this state, by certified mail, return receipt requested, for the payment of any debt due to the judgment debtor, and, after having made such demand, shall serve a true and attested copy thereof, with the serving officer's actions thereon endorsed, with the financial institution upon whom such demand is made. When service is made by the serving officer by certified mail pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this subdivision, the serving officer may collect the actual postage costs incurred, in addition to the serving officer's fee, from the amount removed from the judgment debtor's account, if any, pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. The serving officer shall not serve more than one financial institution execution per judgment debtor at a time, including copies thereof. After service of an execution on one financial institution, the serving officer shall not serve the same execution or a copy thereof upon another financial institution until receiving confirmation from the preceding financial institution that the judgment debtor had insufficient funds at the preceding financial institution available for collection to satisfy the execution. The financial institution shall provide the serving officer a response to the service of such execution in accordance with subdivision (2) of this subsection.

(2) Not later than the seventh business day after the service of an execution upon a financial institution, the financial institution shall send to the serving officer by first class mail, postage prepaid, (A) if the financial institution has removed funds from the judgment debtor's account pursuant to the execution and this section, a notice stating the amount of funds removed from the judgment debtor's account and referencing the docket number, if provided by the judgment creditor on the execution form, or (B) if the judgment debtor is not indebted to the financial institution or if the financial institution has not removed funds from the judgment debtor's account pursuant to the execution and this section, a complete set of all the documents served on the financial institution by the serving officer, including the cover page of the serving officer, with endorsements from other financial institutions, as the case may be, and the original true and attested copy of the execution served on the financial institution. The response of the financial institution pursuant to subparagraph (B) of this subdivision shall include a notation on the serving officer's cover page, or at the financial institution's option, on a separate document prepared by the financial institution, to the effect that the judgment debtor does not have an account with the financial institution or that no funds were removed from the account, provided that such separate document be affixed to, or enclosed contiguous to the financial intuition's return of a particular execution to the serving officer pursuant to this subsection. The financial institution shall maintain reasonable procedures to prevent the resubmission of a response provided to the serving officer pursuant to subparagraph (B) of this subdivision. As used in this section, “business day” has the same meaning as provided in section 36a-330 .

(c) If any such financial institution upon which such execution is served and upon which such demand is made is indebted to the judgment debtor, the financial institution shall remove from the judgment debtor's account the amount of such indebtedness not exceeding the amount due on such execution. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the financial institution shall immediately pay to such serving officer the amount removed from the judgment debtor's account, which amount shall be received and applied on such execution by such serving officer. Such financial institution shall act upon such execution according to section 42a-4-303 before its midnight deadline, as defined in section 42a-4-104 . Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect any other rights or obligations of the financial institution with regard to funds in the judgment debtor's account.

(d) If the deposit account is subject to a security interest of a secured party, other than the financial institution upon which such execution is served and upon which such demand is made, pursuant to a control agreement between the financial institution and such secured party under article 9 of title 42a, and if any funds are removed from the judgment debtor's account pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the financial institution shall forthwith mail a copy of the execution when received from the serving officer, postage prepaid, to the judgment debtor and to such other secured party at the last-known address of such parties with respect to the affected accounts on the records of the financial institution. The financial institution shall hold the amount removed from the judgment debtor's account pursuant to subsection (c) of this section for twenty days from the date of the mailing to the judgment debtor and such other secured party, and during such period shall not pay the serving officer.

(e) To prevent the financial institution from paying the serving officer, as provided in subsection (h) of this section, such other secured party shall give notice of its prior perfected security interest in such deposit account, by delivering to the clerk of the court that issued the execution a written claim for determination of interests in property pursuant to section 52-356c and by delivering a copy of such claim to the financial institution upon which such execution is served.

(f) Upon receipt of a written claim for determination of interests in property made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the clerk of the court shall enter the appearance of the secured party with the address set forth in the written claim. The clerk shall forthwith send file-stamped copies of the written claim to the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor and the financial institution upon which such execution was served with a notice stating that the disputed funds are being held until a court order is entered regarding the disposition of the funds. The judgment creditor shall thereafter send a copy of such written claim to the serving officer.

(g) If a written claim for determination of interests in property is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the financial institution shall continue to hold the amount removed from the judgment debtor's account until a court order is received regarding disposition of the funds.

(h) If no written claim for determination of interests in property is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the financial institution shall, upon demand, forthwith pay the serving officer the amount removed from the judgment debtor's account, and the serving officer shall thereupon pay such sum, less such serving officer's fees, to the judgment creditor, except to the extent otherwise ordered by a court.

(i) If a written claim for determination of interests in property is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the clerk of the court, after a judgment or order is entered pursuant to section 52-356c , shall forthwith send a copy of such judgment or order to the financial institution. Such judgment or order shall be deemed to be a final judgment for the purposes of appeal. No appeal shall be taken except within seven days of the rendering of the judgment or order. The judgment or order of the court may be implemented during such seven-day period, unless stayed by the court.

(j) If records or testimony are subpoenaed from a financial institution in connection with a hearing conducted pursuant to section 52-356c on a written claim for determination of interests in property made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the reasonable costs and expenses of the financial institution in complying with the subpoena shall be recoverable by the financial institution from the party requiring such records or testimony, provided the financial institution shall be under no obligation to attempt to obtain records or documentation relating to the account executed against that are held by any other financial institution. The records of a financial institution as to the dates and amounts of deposits into an account in the financial institution shall, if certified as true and accurate by an officer of the financial institution, be admissible as evidence without the presence of the officer in any hearing conducted pursuant to section 52-356c to determine the legitimacy of a claim of an interest in property made under subsection (e) of this section.

(k) If such financial institution fails or refuses to pay over to such serving officer the amount of such debt, not exceeding the amount due on such execution, such financial institution shall be liable in an action therefor to the judgment creditor named in such execution, and the amount so recovered by such judgment creditor shall be applied toward the payment of the amount due on such execution.

(l) Except as provided in subsection (k) of this section, no financial institution or any officer, director or employee of such financial institution shall be liable to any person with respect to any act done or omitted in good faith or through the commission of a bona fide error that occurred despite reasonable procedures maintained by the financial institution to prevent such errors in complying with the provisions of this section.

(m) Nothing in this section shall in any way restrict the rights and remedies otherwise available to a judgment debtor or to any such secured party at law or in equity.

Cited. 181 C. 125; 230 C. 486; 232 C. 167; 240 C. 343.

Requirements and obligations imposed by statute do not apply to any portion of depositor's account that does not represent a debt due from bank to the depositor. 67 CA 588.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-223 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-223
Sec. 52-223. Jury may be three times returned to consider verdict.
Status: in_force

Embraces actions for a statutory penalty. 1 R. 493. New trial may be granted for wrong instructions given in returning jury. 9 C. 112. But not for expressing opinion in favor of a different verdict. 4 D. 406; 99 C. 416. Cited. 64 C. 65. When jury may be returned; discretion of court; instructions. 74 C. 584; 90 C. 262; 99 C. 416; 105 C. 530; 106 C. 728; 113 C. 254. Where jury is called in for further instructions or comes in to ask a question. 82 C. 618. If verdict returned a third time, it must be accepted. 89 C. 241. Discretion of court. 90 C. 276; 98 C. 462; 108 C. 553. Instructing jury as to duty to agree. 90 C. 385. Judge need not announce verdict returned because not in proper form. 72 C. 141. Verdict may be returned for addition of interest. 82 C. 615. Court may return jury where verdict is clearly inadequate; 90 C. 93; or where in homicide case, it doubts correctness of first degree verdict. 93 C. 244. Court should ordinarily permit clerk to read aloud verdict returned in proper form; affidavits of jurors that they understood and weighed charge cannot be used to support motion in arrest of judgment where court returned jury thinking they had not understood the charge. 105 C. 530. Proper for court to tell jury why they are returned; no error in remark that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, amount was inadequate. 117 C. 436. Nor in comment that, if jury believed plaintiff's evidence concerning special damages, court felt inadequate amount had been allowed for general damages. 128 C. 56. Not a verdict until accepted by court, but court's silence when clerk proclaims verdict is acceptance. 120 C. 537. Court may return jury even though verdict not so unreasonable that if accepted it would have to be set aside. 133 C. 686. Not error for court to accept verdict on first count in murder case and return jury for further consideration of counts on which they could not agree. 134 C. 114. Cited. 143 C. 31. If jury's decision is unintelligible, court should direct jury, with appropriate instructions, to reconsider its verdict. 147 C. 72. Court may return jury for reconsideration of a verdict if it feels it is excessive; before jury is returned for reconsideration, its verdict should be read by the clerk and assented to by the foreman. Id., 191. Section did not apply where jury made 3 reports of disagreement to court; report of disagreement merely serves to inform court of inability of jury to reach a verdict and is not a verdict. 156 C. 159. Cited. 173 C. 183. Exercise of court's power in returning jury to reconsider verdict is not conditioned on verdict being so unreasonable that it would have to be set aside if accepted. 175 C. 230. Cited. 189 C. 1; 225 C. 238; Id., 420; 232 C. 480.

Cited. 28 CA 449; 38 CA 447; 45 CA 571.

The court may, in returning the jury, submit any issue save that of damages. 10 CS 99. Cited. 22 CS 41; 38 CS 400, 404.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-147 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-147
Sec. 52-147. Written statements in actions to recover damages for personal injuries.
Status: in_force

Provides only for recovery of damages for personal injuries and does not apply in an action to recover for breach of contract. 143 C. 372. Retroactive effect should not be given to 1959 amendment re name and address of person taking statement. 148 C. 447. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Work-product privilege is accorded only to product of lawyers; hence statement obtained by claims adjuster of defendant's insurer from defendant operator was ordered produced upon plaintiff's motion for disclosure and production. 28 CS 212.

A printed form sent by defendant's liability insurer to plaintiffs and filled out by them was properly excluded from evidence in personal injury action of named plaintiff because no copy was given to him as required by section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 366.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-634 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-634
Sec. 52-634. Use or transfer of receivership property not in ordinary course of business.
Status: in_force

(b) With court approval, a receiver may use receivership property other than in the ordinary course of business.

(c) With court approval, a receiver may transfer receivership property other than in the ordinary course of business by sale, lease, license, exchange or other disposition. Unless the agreement of sale provides otherwise, a sale under this section is free and clear of a lien of the person that obtained appointment of the receiver, any subordinate lien and any right of redemption, but is subject to a senior lien.

(d) A lien on receivership property which is extinguished by a transfer under subsection (c) of this section attaches to the proceeds of the transfer with the same validity, perfection and priority the lien had on the property immediately before the transfer, even if the proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy all obligations secured by the lien.

(e) A transfer under subsection (c) of this section may occur by means other than a public auction sale. A creditor holding a valid lien on the property to be transferred may purchase the property and offset against the purchase price part or all of the allowed amount secured by the lien, if the creditor tenders funds sufficient to satisfy in full the reasonable expenses of transfer and the obligation secured by any senior lien extinguished by the transfer.

(f) A reversal or modification of an order approving a transfer under subsection (c) of this section does not affect the validity of the transfer to a person that acquired the property in good faith or revive against the person any lien extinguished by the transfer, whether the person knew before the transfer of the request for reversal or modification, unless the court stayed the order before the transfer.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-240
Sec. 52-240. Effect of damages on costs.
Status: in_force

(b) If the title to property, or a right-of-way, or to the use of water, is in question, or if the damages were reduced so as not to exceed fifty dollars by reason of an act of the defendant pending the action, the plaintiff shall recover full costs.

(c) Judgment for nominal damages upon a hearing after a default or a demurrer overruled shall entitle the party in whose favor damages are given to the full taxable costs of the action.

See Sec. 47-41 re consideration of notice as disturbance of right.

The title or right must be so brought in question that the record may show that it was decided. 1 R. 525; 18 C. 394; 52 C. 255; 54 C. 57, 58. If brought up under a plea and notice, it may be sufficient. 21 C. 80. Trespass qu. cl. fr. 21 C. 80; 25 C. 249. Case for diversion of water. 36 C. 151. Payment, pending suit. 19 C. 529; 39 C. 462. Return of property, pending suit. 1 R. 136. Retrospective law. 30 C. 326. “Default” and “demurrer overruled” have different meanings. 63 C. 266. Applied where count in tort beyond jurisdiction of court was added to count in tort and verdict was rendered for $1 damages; 79 C. 305; and to action on statute for killing registered dog; 80 C. 435; or for bite of dog. 86 C. 710. Though charter of city gives its court same powers as justices of the peace, section applies. 80 C. 437. Amendment of 1907 held to apply to pending case. 81 C. 216. Nominal damages. 119 C. 496. Cited. 218 C. 309.

Tort defined. 7 CS 521.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-517 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-517
Sec. 52-517. Replevin for property attached.
Status: in_force

Replevin lies by a trustee for trust property which was attached as his own individual property. 36 C. 13; Id., 105. Prior to 1878, the attaching plaintiff alone could be sued in replevin. 45 C. 157. Statutory remedy was unquestionably within the legislative power. 68 C. 9. Parties to action; judgment against officer as estoppel. 70 C. 340; 74 C. 397. Not maintainable by conditional vendor involved in conspiracy to defraud vendee's creditors. 128 C. 199. Nor by husband to recover vehicles attached in suit against wife which he had registered in her name to prevent attachment by his creditors. Id., 506. Only statutory method for recovery of exempt property. 136 C. 641.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-225f — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-225f
Sec. 52-225f. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights prior to October 1, 2003.
Status: in_force

(1) “Annuity issuer” means an insurer that has issued any insurance contract used to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement;

(2) “Expenses” means all broker's commissions, service charges, application or processing fees, closing costs, filing or administrative charges, legal fees, notary fees and other commissions, fees, costs and charges payable by the payee in connection with the proposed transfer or deductible from the gross consideration that would be paid to the payee in connection with the transfer;

(3) “Interested parties” means, with respect to any structured settlement, the payee, any beneficiary designated to receive payments following the payee's death or, if the designated beneficiary is a minor, the designated beneficiary's parent or guardian, the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor;

(4) “Payee” means an individual who is receiving payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make a transfer of payment rights thereunder;

(5) “Structured settlement” means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages established by settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim or for periodic payments in settlement of a workers' compensation claim;

(6) “Structured settlement obligor” means, with respect to any structured settlement, the party that has the continuing periodic payment obligation to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or under an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of Section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended;

(7) “Structured settlement payment rights” means rights to receive periodic payments, including lump sum payments, under a structured settlement, whether from the settlement obligor or the annuity issuer;

(8) “Transfer” means any sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation or other form of alienation or encumbrance made for consideration;

(9) “Transfer agreement” means the agreement providing for transfer of structured settlement payment rights from a payee to a transferee; and

(10) “Transferee” means any person receiving structured settlement payment rights resulting from a transfer.

(b) No transfer of structured settlement payment rights, either directly or indirectly, shall be effective by any payee domiciled in this state or by any payee entitled to receive payments under a structured settlement funded by an insurance contract issued by an insurer domiciled in this state or owned by an insurer or corporation domiciled in this state and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of any such transfer unless (1) not less than ten days prior to the date on which the payee entered into the transfer agreement, the transferee provided to the payee a written disclosure statement setting forth (A) the amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred; (B) the aggregate amount of the payments; (C) the gross amount of all expenses; (D) the amount payable to the payee, net of all expenses, in exchange for the payments; (E) the discounted present value of all structured settlement payments to be transferred and the discount rate used in determining such discounted present value; and (F) a statement that the payee may be subject to adverse federal and state income tax consequences as a result of the proposed transfer; and (2) such transfer has been approved by a court pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

(c) (1) Prior to any transfer, the payee entitled to receive payments under such structured settlement shall commence a declaratory judgment action under section 52-29 for a determination as to whether the transfer of such structured settlement payment rights is in the best interests of the payee and is fair and reasonable to all interested parties under all of the circumstances then existing. The annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor shall be made parties to such action. If the court determines, after hearing, that such transfer should be allowed, it shall approve such transfer upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.

(2) The court in which the original action was or could have been filed or the court which has jurisdiction where the applicant resides shall have jurisdiction over any such action.

(3) The payee shall cause notice of the action to be served on all interested parties by a proper officer or other person lawfully empowered to make service. The notice of the action shall include (A) a copy of the payee's application to the court for approval of the transfer, (B) a copy of the disclosure statement required under subsection (b) of this section and (C) notice of the hearing.

(4) The payee may seek an order setting the deadline for the filing of written objections. The payee shall give notice to all interested parties of the deadline for filing objections whether such deadline has been established by court order or by operation of the general statutes or court rule. Notice shall be mailed to all interested parties at least ten days before such deadline.

(5) The court shall hold a hearing on the application. The payee shall give notice of the hearing to all interested parties.

(d) Nothing contained in this section shall imply that any transfer under a transfer agreement dated prior to October 1, 1998, is binding upon any interested party or that any annuity issuer or structured settlement obligor is under any obligation to make transferred payments to the transferee of any such prior transfer.

(e) The provisions of this section may not be waived.

(f) The provisions of this section shall be applicable to transfer agreements executed on and after October 1, 1998, and prior to October 1, 2003.

Section does not abrogate the common law right to include an antiassignment provision in a structured settlement agreement or annuity issued pursuant to such agreement. 254 C. 259.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-293 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-293
Sec. 52-293. Sale of attached livestock and perishable property.
Status: in_force

“Perishable” and “expensive” defined. 31 C. 495. Cited. 47 C. 577; 99 C. 591.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-638 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-638
Sec. 52-638. Notice of appointment; claim against receivership; distribution to creditors.
Status: in_force

(1) Deposit for delivery through first class mail or other commercially reasonable delivery method to the last-known address of each creditor; and

(2) Publication as directed by the court.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, the notice required by subsection (a) of this section must specify the date by which each creditor holding a claim against the owner which arose before appointment of the receiver must submit the claim to the receiver. The date specified must be at least ninety days after the later of notice under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section or last publication under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section. The court may extend the period for submitting the claim. Unless the court orders otherwise, a claim that is not submitted timely is not entitled to a distribution from the receivership.

(c) A claim submitted by a creditor under this section must:

(1) State the name and address of the creditor;

(2) State the amount and basis of the claim;

(3) Identify any property securing the claim;

(4) Be signed by the creditor under penalty of perjury; and

(5) Include a copy of any record on which the claim is based.

(d) An assignment by a creditor of a claim against the owner is effective against the receiver only if the assignee gives timely notice of the assignment to the receiver in a signed record.

(e) At any time before entry of an order approving a receiver's final report, the receiver may file with the court an objection to a claim of a creditor, stating the basis for the objection. The court shall allow or disallow the claim according to the law of this state other than sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive.

(f) If the court concludes that receivership property is likely to be insufficient to satisfy claims of each creditor holding a perfected lien on the property, the court may order that:

(1) The receiver need not give notice under subsection (a) of this section of the appointment to all creditors of the owner, but only such creditors as the court directs; and

(2) Unsecured creditors need not submit claims under this section.

(g) Subject to the provisions of section 52-639 :

(1) A distribution of receivership property to a creditor holding a perfected lien on the property must be made in accordance with the creditor's priority under the law of this state other than sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive; and

(2) A distribution of receivership property to a creditor with an allowed unsecured claim must be made as the court directs according to the law of this state other than sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146g — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146g
Sec. 52-146g. Access to communications and records by persons engaged in research.
Status: in_force

(b) The communications and records shall not be removed from the mental health facility which prepared them. Coded data or data which does not identify a patient may be removed from a mental health facility, provided the key to the code shall remain on the premises of the facility.

(c) The mental health facility and the person doing the research shall be responsible for the preservation of the anonymity of the patients and shall not disseminate data which identifies a patient except as provided by sections 52-146d to 52-146j , inclusive.

Cited. 169 C. 223. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 191 C. 453; 211 C. 555; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-67 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-67
Sec. 52-67. Service in actions on joint contracts.
Status: in_force

This is true although after such service the nonresidents become residents. 1 D. 141. Judgment may be rendered at the first term. 3 C. 474. Service on a nonresident, while temporarily here, is sufficient. 27 C. 9. Cited. 195 C. 191.

Cited. 2 CS 18; 3 CS 85. Authority to “maintain the suit against all the defendants” means all the defendants over whom the court has jurisdiction. 21 CS 156.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-356d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-356d
Sec. 52-356d. Installment payment order.
Status: in_force

(b) In the case of a consumer judgment, the court may provide that compliance with the installment payment order, other than with an order for nominal payments pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall stay any property execution or foreclosure pursuant to that judgment, provided such a stay is reasonable considering the nature of the debt and the financial circumstances of the judgment debtor. In the case of a judgment arising out of services provided at a hospital, the court shall provide that compliance with the installment payment order shall stay any property execution or foreclosure pursuant to that judgment, including, but not limited to, execution on wages, execution on bank accounts, and execution on or foreclosure of real property.

(c) Notwithstanding the hearing requirement of subsection (a) of this section, on motion of the judgment creditor for an order of nominal payments, the court shall issue ex parte, without hearing, an order for nominal installment payments. The amount which shall constitute an order of nominal payments shall be set by the judges of the Superior Court. Such an order for nominal payments may be modified on motion of either party after hearing and consideration of the judgment debtor's financial circumstances.

(d) An installment payment order shall not be enforced by contempt proceedings, but on the judgment debtor's default on payments thereon, the judgment creditor may apply for a wage execution pursuant to section 52-361a .

(e) Interest on a money judgment shall continue to accrue under any installment payment order on such portion of the judgment as remains unpaid.

(f) On motion of either party and after notice and hearing or pursuant to a stipulation, the court may make such modification of an installment payment order as is reasonable.

Use of term “order” discussed. 246 C. 183.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 33 CA 395.

Court may consider other factors beyond debtor's weekly salary when entering an installment payment order. 47 CS 291.

Subsec. (e):

Subsec. does not provide for automatic accrual of postjudgment interest on all judgments in which an installment payment order has been entered by the court. 304 C. 348.

Postjudgment interest does not accrue automatically when installment payments have been ordered, but judgment creditor may request postjudgment interest on a money judgment pursuant to Sec. 37-3a and such interest, if awarded, shall continue to accrue on the unpaid portion of a money judgment where installment payments have been ordered by the court. 127 CA 813.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-97 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-97
Sec. 52-97. Union of legal and equitable causes of action; limitation.
Status: in_force

The facts on which both legal and equitable relief is sought may be stated in a single count. 52 C. 197; 90 C. 285; 99 C. 216; 107 C. 208. Several installment notes for one purchase price may be joined in one count. 54 C. 86. Separate and independent causes of action in favor of distinct and separate persons cannot be joined. 60 C. 399. Amended claim held not to arise from the same transaction as that originally stated. 62 C. 375. Two causes of action, one for breach of contract to take and pay for machines, and one for a conversion of the machines, may properly be joined. 63 C. 560. When use of single count charging fraud and also breach of contract proper. 73 C. 460. Practice act abolishes old forms distinguishing legal and equitable relief. 81 C. 402. Court will give whatever relief party shows himself entitled to. 77 C. 383; 81 C. 552. That several judgments or separate trials necessary, no objection to joinder. 78 C. 575. Legal and equitable relief may be sought in same count. 68 C. 204; 80 C. 685; 107 C. 208. Causes of action by creditor of corporation for unpaid balance of stockholder's subscription, and for capital wrongfully paid to him proper. 74 C. 474; 78 C. 575. Money improperly retained and bonds converted. 80 C. 100. Proper to enforce claim against estate for funds misappropriated, and to secure refund from distributees. 83 C. 75. Judgment for debt and equitable relief to enforce it. 77 C. 214. Damages for fraud and reconveyance of property. 83 C. 109. Damages for trespass and injunction. 72 C. 554; 85 C. 159. Personal injury and failure to keep contract of employment. 73 C. 423. Fraud and breach of contract of exchange. 73 C. 459. Recovery for fees illegally charged on several writs may be sought in one count. 74 C. 243. Claims for wages earned and for breach of contract of employment. 90 C. 695. Prayer for equitable relief by way of cancellation of deed and reconveyance in action of ejectment. 93 C. 370. Several defects in highway. 72 C. 667. Replevin does not lie against two parties claiming different goods. 86 C. 372. Negligence, fraud and breach of warranty not affecting all parties. 82 C. 580. Remedy for misjoinder is demurrer. 79 C. 670. Of joinder in general. 71 C. 369; 73 C. 459. Use of unnecessary counts discountenanced. 71 C. 245; Id., 717; 72 C. 196; 73 C. 100; Id., 182; 73 C. 423; Id., 428; 74 C. 304; Id., 498. Each count should be complete in itself. 76 C. 674. Prayer for relief should follow last count. 71 C. 245; Id., 418. Distinct obligations maturing at different times should be stated separately. Id. Cancellation of deed based on support of grantor, and claim of damages for nonsupport. 91 C. 215. Not necessary to use two counts where relief is claimed in the alternative against one or the other of two defendants. 93 C. 479. Where common law and statutory obligations are claimed to arise out of the same facts, one complaint and one count is proper. 94 C. 227. Action for money obtained by undue influence and for money loaned may be set up in separate counts in one complaint if they arise out of same transaction. 98 C. 205. Scope of legal and equitable relief which may be granted under declaratory judgment act. Id., 803. Action by third party beneficiary of contract. 99 C. 216; 101 C. 647; 105 C. 156; 106 C. 696; 109 C. 259. Not necessary to allege no adequate remedy at law in complaint seeking equitable relief. 105 C. 84. General prayer for equitable relief will support such equitable relief as is required. 106 C. 420. Facts stating cause of action for breach of contract and one for specific performance of contract held properly set up in a single count. 107 C. 208. Cited. 110 C. 24; Id., 214; 139 C. 147; 142 C. 325. Statute does not make equitable doctrine of part performance available in action at law for breach of contract within statute of frauds. 122 C. 507. Proper to join cause of action for foreclosure of mortgage and one to set aside claimed fraudulent conveyances; plaintiff may move for trial on issues presented by second cause of action after judgment of foreclosure granted. 126 C. 688. It is only when the causes of action, that is, the groups of facts upon which plaintiff bases his claims for relief, are separate and distinct that separate counts are necessary or desirable. 134 C. 428. Examples of joinder. Id., 439. No misjoinder because first count alleged title in A's estate and second in L's where two causes arise out of transactions connected with same subject of action. 138 C. 102. Counterclaim not allowed where the liability which it seeks to enforce does not arise out of the written contract which is relied upon in the complaint but out of a tort flowing from the neglect of the landlord to keep the portion of the premises used in common by all the tenants in a reasonably safe condition. 143 C. 708. Torts committed in different states but all parts of an entire course of conduct may be joined, as they arise from the same transaction. 145 C. 709. Counterclaim connected with same transaction must be allowed. 158 C. 364. Cited. 196 C. 359; 217 C. 57; Id., 95.

In action based on absolute guaranty, there is no obligation on part of creditor to first proceed against principal debtor; two causes of action not improperly joined. 2 CS 153. Consolidation of action discussed. 3 CS 168. A transaction is something quite apart from a “right of action” and something more comprehensive than a “cause of action”; it is something which has taken place whereby a cause of action has arisen. 5 CS 174. Cited. Id., 391. Joinder of tort and contract action in one complaint permitted. 6 CS 488. Proper joinder of a negligence action against two defendants and a conspiracy to defraud action against three. 7 CS 45. Cited. 8 CS 218. Cause of action upon events culminating in the execution and delivery of a deed and an action arising from a trespass on the same real estate cannot properly be joined. 12 CS 306. Separate causes of action arising out of the same transaction must be stated in separate counts. 13 CS 314. Joinder of two separate causes of action, each against a different defendant, not permitted. Cited. 14 CS 29; Id., 350. Action for divorce and one for property conveyed in consideration of marriage are properly joined. 15 CS 78. Action for annulment on grounds of insanity and one for divorce on grounds of insanity are properly joined. Id., 89. Quaere whether action for declaratory judgment of illegitimacy may be joined with an action for divorce. 16 CS 70. Where two defendants sold cosmetic preparations to plaintiff who was injured thereby and it appeared in the complaint that plaintiff was unable before trial to determine the harm caused by the product sold by one or the other, there was proper joinder; breach of warranty is based “upon contract, express or implied”. 17 CS 32. Action against city under statute for defective sidewalk and against another defendant for nuisance can be joined but claim must be in alternative. 22 CS 74, 76. Cited. Id., 474. Subdiv. (2): Applies to a plaintiff in the singular. Id.; 23 CS 94. Subdiv. (7): Remedy for misjoinder of causes is taken by demurrer. Id., 93. Claims for a divorce under complaint and cross complaint, each on the ground of intolerable cruelty, and claim for past support under proposed amendment to the cross complaint arise out of the same transaction, namely, the marital relationship of the parties. Id., 352. There was a misjoinder of causes of action where plaintiff, in two counts of malpractice, alleged the negligent performance of two unrelated operations a year apart. 25 CS 404, 405. Terms of section inapplicable to special statutory proceeding, such as tax appeal under Sec. 12-118, but misjoinder may apply to such statutory appeals. 32 CS 140. Cited. 36 CS 47; Id., 56; 38 CS 389.

Court held it not permissible to join action concerned with vilification by plaintiff's agent in attempting to collect on a promissory note with action on note as not arising out of same transaction. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 218. Joinder of second count, under implied contract or for reasonable value of services rendered to defendant, to complaint based on express contract was permissible under Subdivs. (1) and (7) where parties were same and causes of action arose out of same transaction. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 542.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-577
Sec. 52-577. Action founded upon a tort.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.

See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice.

When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Applies to action for a fire communicated by a locomotive engine. 56 C. 24. Statute runs in favor of bank directors who have been negligent in control of bank. 89 C. 475. Action by lower riparian proprietor for pollution of stream is within section. 80 C. 185. History of section. 82 C. 580. When statute begins to run in favor of an administrator. 90 C. 569. Relation of this section to Sec. 52-584. 91 C. 36. Prior to barring of alienation of affections action, recovery could be had for loss of consortium occurring within statutory period. 117 C. 213; 133 C. 662, 663. Applied to action for fraudulent confinement. 123 C. 651. Action against officer and director of corporation for breach of duty to corporation and stockholders is within statute. 129 C. 674. Under Sec. 52-590, limitation begins to run when defendant moves into state. 131 C. 675. Cited. 149 C. 326. Limitation applicable to all actions founded upon a tort which do not fall within those causes of action enumerated in Sec. 52-584 or another section; tort of invasion of plaintiffs' usufructuary and property rights in diversion of waters of stream is within limitation. 155 C. 477. Cited. 159 C. 502; 162 C. 247; 168 C. 329. Action based on strict liability must, by section, be brought within 3 years of date of sale of product claim to be defective, and an allegation of continuing failure to warn of product's claimed danger does not alter that requirement. 170 C. 289. Cited. 178 C. 258; 180 C. 230; 183 C. 504; 189 C. 162; 190 C. 8; 191 C. 150; 192 C. 327. Must be pleaded as a special defense. 197 C. 9. Cited. 198 C. 660; 202 C. 57; Id., 234; 204 C. 303; 205 C. 1; Id., 93; 207 C. 204. Applies to common law fraudulent conveyance actions. 209 C. 437. Cited. 212 C. 509; 214 C. 464; 218 C. 512; 219 C. 363; 221 C. 384; 223 C. 436; 224 C. 483; 226 C. 652; 229 C. 256; 232 C. 527; 235 C. 559; 238 C. 800. Statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice case was tolled under newly adopted continuous representation doctrine. 263 C. 588. In the case of an action for malicious prosecution brought pursuant to 42 USC 1983, the appropriate limit is the 3-year limitations period applicable to tort actions. 286 C. 384. Section is an occurrence statute and its limitation period does not begin when plaintiff discovers an injury but rather the date when the conduct of defendant occurs. 289 C. 383. The existence of an original duty is not necessary to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 301 C. 575. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Statute of limitations for tort action and not breach of contract action applies to claims against defendant law firm where complaint contained no allegation that defendant breached specific contract provision and relied on language typically used in negligence cases. 311 C. 282. Claimed violations of the Common Interest Ownership Act relating to the construction process alleged only statutory, as opposed to contractual, violations and as such were subject to the three-year limitation period prescribed by statute and would have commenced at the time the units were purchased. 348 C. 726.

Annotations to former statute limiting action for trespass or slander. In trespass for mesne profits, they will not be awarded for over 3 years. 2 R. 440. Action of trespass is not the appropriate one to recover for a fire communicated by a railway locomotive. 56 C. 24. In case of continuing trespass, recovery may be had for damages accruing for 3 years next preceding the action. 76 C. 316. History of section. 82 C. 581. Section applies where cause of action is founded on absolute liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cited. 139 C. 222; 142 C. 452. Such defense must be pleaded. 143 C. 31. The date of the act or omission complained of is the date when the negligent conduct of defendant occurs and is not the date when plaintiff first sustains damages. 144 C. 170.

Cited. 1 CA 123; Id., 550; Id., 652; 2 CA 322; 5 CA 473. The nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines applicability of statute of limitations. 6 CA 187. Cited. 15 CA 458; Id., 677; 18 CA 525; 25 CA 360; 31 CA 235; Id., 750; 32 CA 384; Id., 786; 33 CA 422; Id., 842; Id., 702; 35 CA 31; 39 CA 183. Statute as applied to plaintiff not unconstitutional. Id., 289. Cited. 40 CA 449; 42 CA 712; 45 CA 554; 46 CA 199. In the case of special relation between attorney and client who were family, malpractice in deeds and escrow acts not barred by 3-year limitation since continuing course of conduct and special relationship. 65 CA 813. Court properly concluded that tolling claim was not barred by collateral estoppel doctrine where defendant was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the earlier cause of action; continuing course of conduct and continuous representation doctrines may apply in a legal malpractice action to toll statute of limitations. 69 CA 151. Applicable to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 78 CA 865. Does not apply to case where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property as belonging to another, but rather such case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies. 79 CA 290. Pendency of a first action did not toll statute of limitations for a second action arising from the same wrong. 83 CA 442. Limitation period begins with date of the act or omission complained of, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 85 CA 145. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by the alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, the statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690. Section applies to, and bars, defendant's fraudulent conveyance counterclaim since claim was filed more than 3 years after date of property transfer; section is an occurrence statute, meaning that the time period within which plaintiff must commence an action begins to run at moment the act or omission complained of occurs, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 95 CA 436. Each distinct cause of action arising from the same wrong is governed by the statute of limitations appropriate to it and therefore plaintiff's second and third counts, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy, respectively, and are unquestionably tort actions, are governed by section. Id., 454. In a matter involving plaintiff investor who alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by defendant investment professionals, trial court properly refused to extend the continuous representation doctrine to all fiduciary relationships. 112 CA 441. For malicious prosecution claim, 3-year limitation period starts to toll from date criminal matter is dismissed, not date of arrest. 113 CA 131. For continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply to toll statute of limitations, a duty must have existed at time of original wrong and trial court improperly applied doctrine in context of an alleged duty arising simply because of the existence of a relationship between the parents of minor children. 115 CA 404; judgment reversed, see 301 C. 575. The 3-year period begins on date the act or omission complained of occurs, not date the cause of action accrues or date the injury occurs. 117 CA 129. Legal malpractice claim which sounds in tort is governed by the 3-year statute of limitations. 134 CA 785; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 282. Statute of limitations is tolled where attorney, in legal malpractice action, breached continuing duty to his clients to apprise them of his negligence in drafting deed and to cure problems resulting from such negligence while the opportunity existed. 142 CA 97. In time barred situation involving legal malpractice claims, burden is on plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. 167 CA 691.

Cited. 4 CS 222; Id., 293; 8 CS 302. Application of statute of limitations is that of the forum and not where the cause of action arose. 12 CS 477. Sec. 22-357, making the owner or keeper of a dog liable for any damage to person or property done by the dog, is controlled by a 3-year statute of limitations for an action founded upon a tort. 14 CS 428; 26 CS 294, 296. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution by fraud falls within 3-year statute of limitations. 15 CS 434. Where action charges breach of contract for failure to procure insurance coverage against damage to plaintiff's property, cause of action is in tort but is not one for injury to property under Sec. 52-584. 17 CS 62. Cited. 17 CS 114; Id., 407; 18 CS 225; Id., 310. Cause of action based on nuisance when not arising from negligence based on 3-year statute of limitations. 20 CS 35. Cited. 22 CS 300. Controlling statute of limitations for parents sued under Sec. 52-572. 24 CS 320. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations; claim against manufacturer for injuries caused by defective skates held tort liability, not breach of implied warranty under Sec. 42a-2-725 of Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Statute of limitations for tort actions applies to personal injury action based on breach of warranty. 28 CS 160. Action for tort limited to 3-year statute of limitations. 29 CS 71. Cited. Id., 72. Mental incompetence does not toll the time limitation, but imprisonment may. 31 CS 46. Cited. 34 CS 22; Id., 643, 646. 3-year statute of limitations for tort actions applies to fraud or deception action. 36 CS 277. Cited. Id., 357; 39 CS 458; 44 CS 207; Id., 477; Id., 527. Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege fraudulent concealment to toll statute; defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case; plaintiff failed to allege intent to conceal as is required to toll statute. 46 CS 386. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.

Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 is governed by 3-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549t — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922b / Section 52-549t
Sec. 52-549t. Failure to appear. Payment of fees of fact-finder. Dismissal of action.
Status: in_force

(b) If all parties fail to appear at the hearing, the fact-finder shall file a request with the court to dismiss the action. If the court does not dismiss the action it may be heard by the fact-finder upon order of the court. Such order may provide for the payment by any party to the court of an amount not greater than one hundred dollars.

Cited. 199 C. 496.

Cited. 12 CA 190; 20 CA 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-500 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 919 / Section 52-500
Sec. 52-500. Sale or equitable distribution of real or personal property owned by two or more persons. Life estate.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of this section shall extend to and include land owned by two or more persons, when the whole or a part of the land is vested in any person for life with remainder to his heirs, general or special, or, on failure of the heirs, to any other person, whether the land, or any part thereof, is held in trust or otherwise. A conveyance made pursuant to a decree ordering a sale of the land shall vest the title in the purchaser thereof, and shall bind the person entitled to the life estate and his legal heirs and any other person having a remainder interest in the lands. The court issuing the decree shall make such order in relation to the investment of the proceeds of the sale as it deems necessary for the security of all persons having any interest in such land.

Section is not unconstitutional. 23 C. 94; 51 C. 61. It does not authorize the sale of mortgaged lands, free of the mortgage, on petition of a cotenant of the equity of redemption. 36 C. 342. No sale can be ordered unless it appears to be for the interest of the parties; if most of them oppose it, it would presumably not be for their interest. 40 C. 474, but see 98 C. 395. If any of them refuse their assent, the case must be a strong one to justify the court in ordering a sale. 39 C. 62. The compulsory sale of one's property without his consent is warranted only in clear cases. 41 C. 12. “Sale will better promote the interests of the owners,” held to mean sale rather than a partition; one asking a sale assumes burden of proving a partition impracticable. 49 C. 517; 98 C. 395. Jurisdiction to be determined by value of property sought to be sold. 50 C. 258. Complaint lies only by the owner of the property. 60 C. 379. Cited. 65 C. 379; 123 C. 256; 134 C. 177. Of act in general; unity of possession necessary. 78 C. 420. Court need not find actual division impracticable. 79 C. 277. Judgment is in rem. 89 C. 214. Holder of recorded, unexpired option to purchase interest of one of several tenants in common is a proper party defendant. 97 C. 517. Sale granted though some of joint owners opposed, and demanded partition. 98 C. 395. Although broad, Sec. 52-495 and this section should be read as not intended to include a sale by partition in lieu of a sale by a trustee empowered to do so. 110 C. 527. To lose right to partition, a cotenant must have been ousted of possession. 133 C. 428. Though plaintiff had only equitable title, the parties are joint owners within the meaning of statute. 135 C. 584. The two modes of relief within the power of the court are partition by division of real estate and partition by sale. 143 C. 218. For land title purposes, the possibility of a person having issue is never extinct as long as the person lives. 147 C. 34. Ordinarily, court accepts claims of parties as to interests held in the property in connection with the distribution of proceeds, but here court had to determine whether the owner of a one-half interest was also a lessee; plaintiff by asking for partition shows intent to sever all contractual relationships and therefore cannot now demand compliance with notice provision required by contract. Id., 411. Right to compel partition by sale only available when life tenant holds the estate either in cotenancy or in severalty “with remainders to his heirs ... or, on failure of such heirs, to any other person”. 175 C. 463. Cited. 178 C. 503; 181 C. 251; Id., 533; 185 C. 180; 189 C. 490; 195 C. 368; 208 C. 318; 224 C. 219. In a partition action, one joint tenant or tenant in common cannot dispossess another except by partition in kind or partition by sale pursuant to section and Sec. 52-495, and trial court did not have authority to order defendant to execute a quitclaim deed to plaintiff in exchange for the payment of money; partition by sale and trial court proceedings in partition action discussed. 255 C. 47.

Cited. 2 CA 456; 5 CA 142; 7 CA 522; 17 CA 4; 20 CA 492; 23 CA 460. Section confers authority on Superior Court to order partition and sale upon the complaint of any person interested. 50 CA 132. Trial court may order plaintiff to execute a quitclaim deed to defendant and defendant to pay money damages to plaintiff. 54 CA 444. Where intergenerational transfer of family real property at end of grantor's life, court has discretion to order private or public sale. 65 CA 813. Based on clear and unambiguous language of section, remedy available only where party seeking partition holds a minimal interest in property and plaintiff's joint tenancy did not constitute minimal interest in property. 141 CA 825. Subsec. (b) expressly contemplates the partition by sale of a property subject to a life estate. 156 CA 215.

Partition by sale is matter of discretion. 9 CS 136. Cited. 13 CS 131; 14 CS 169; Id., 386. Wife's special defense to plaintiff husband's partition action of premises alleged to be in possession of both as joint tenants that the parties are separated, divorce action is pending and that by agreement defendant and children are in possession pending entry of final judgment in divorce action is not subject to demurrer. 28 CS 230. Power to order sale of jointly owned property rests on same ground as power to order partition and operative unity of possession must be proved to warrant partition or sale. Id., 381. Cited. 29 CS 465; 42 CS 36.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 654.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-57a
Sec. 52-57a. Service of process without state upon persons domiciled or subject to jurisdiction of courts in state.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-59b re jurisdiction of courts over nonresidents, foreign partnerships and foreign voluntary associations.

Cited. 222 C. 906. Order of notice under Sec. 46b-46 is permissive, not mandatory; is not a condition precedent to effective in-hand service in another state pursuant to this section. 226 C. 1.

Cited. 27 CA 142; 31 CA 569.

Meaning of “same manner” provision of section is that methods of service of process under Sec. 52-57 may be used to serve process on defendant outside state. 33 CS 562. Cited. 39 CS 198.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-413 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-413
Sec. 52-413. Hearing; time and place; adjournment.
Status: in_force

Cited. 138 C. 63. Fact that some of the parties, after due notice, ignore hearing does not affect validity of hearing or right of arbitrators to decide the dispute upon the evidence submitted. 146 C. 17. Taken with Sec. 52-416, this section permits parties to extend by writing time in which arbitrators must make their awards. 157 C. 362. Cited. 163 C. 327; 171 C. 493; 211 C. 541; 218 C. 646.

Cited. 27 CA 386; 28 CA 270.

Cited. 17 CS 14. Statutory requirements must be followed when parties to an arbitration agreement seek to extend the period. 20 CS 183.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571j — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-571j
Sec. 52-571j. Action for interference with a person taking still or video images of police officer in the performance of duty.
Status: in_force

(b) An employer of a peace officer who interferes with any person taking a photographic or digital still or video image of such peace officer or another peace officer acting in the performance of such peace officer's duties shall be liable to such person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

(c) An employer of a peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-62 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-62
Sec. 52-62. Service upon nonresident in action for negligent operation of motor vehicle.
Status: in_force

(b) The death of such a nonresident, whether before or after the commencement of a civil action, shall not operate to revoke the appointment by the nonresident of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as his attorney for service of process. If the process is served upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and a true and attested copy thereof is sent to the administrator, executor or other legal representative of the deceased nonresident in accordance with the provisions of this section, the service shall have the same validity as if made upon the administrator, executor or legal representative personally.

(c) Process in such a civil action against a nonresident shall be served by the officer to whom the process is directed upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles by leaving with or at the office of the commissioner, at least twelve days before the return day of the process, a true and attested copy thereof, and by sending to the defendant or his administrator, executor or other legal representative, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, a like true and attested copy, with an endorsement thereon of the service upon the commissioner, addressed to the defendant or representative at his last-known address. The officer serving the process upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall leave with the commissioner, at the time of service, a fee of twenty dollars, which fee shall be taxed in favor of the plaintiff in his costs if he prevails in the action. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.

(d) For the purposes of this section, the term “nonresident” includes a person who is a resident of this state at the time a cause of action arises and who subsequently moves to another jurisdiction.

Statute constitutional, to be read in connection with Sec. 52-87; copy of writ should be mailed forthwith to defendant; “last-known address” means that known by those who under ordinary circumstances of life would know it. 113 C. 74; Id., 756; 116 C. 48. Actions begun under section must be brought within 1 year of injury; Sec. 52-584 applies, Sec. 52-590 does not. Id., 643. Permits service on nonresident defendant in action by nonresident plaintiff. 117 C. 683. Does not confer jurisdiction against administrator of estate of deceased nonresident. 126 C. 92. Cited. 190 C. 774; 195 C. 191; 206 C. 374.

Cited. 10 CA 393. Service on commissioner has same validity as service on nonresident defendant personally and action commenced when service timely made on commissioner. 179 CA 546.

Service of nonresidents under section a necessity. 2 CS 105. Service on commissioner not on defendant is no service at all; motion to erase proper. Id., 134. Service through commissioner is equivalent of personal service whether instituted by resident or nonresident. 3 CS 65. Late return of service on commissioner of no effect. Id., 160. Statute broad enough to constitute commissioner attorney for service; constitutionality. 7 CS 42. Cited. 14 CS 349. Plaintiff hurt by defendant's parked car may serve commissioner. Id., 496. Statute is in derogation of the common law and is to be strictly construed; prior to 1967 amendment, where injury by motor vehicle occurred on private property, service on nonresident invalid because vehicle not being operated on the public highways when the accident occurred. 18 CS 290. Where both parties are nonresidents and service is made upon commissioner at his office, venue is established in Hartford county; the personal residence of commissioner is immaterial. Id., 442. Cited. 19 CS 287. Section applies to an operator who, at the time of an accident, is a nonresident of this state. 20 CS 406. Under statute prior to 1961 amendment, the death of a nonresident who caused a motor vehicle to be operated in this state revoked the statutory appointment of commissioner as his agent for service of process. 21 CS 490. No jurisdiction in personam may be acquired under section of a defendant who resided in this state at the time of the accident. 26 CS 508. Cited. 27 CS 395. Statute does not apply to now nonresident operator who held Connecticut license at time of accident. 29 CS 228. Where copy of process was mailed to “last known” address of defendant and was received by father at defendant's new address in same town and forwarded to insurer, held purpose of statute was fulfilled. 31 CS 370. Cited. 33 CS 574.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-526 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-526
Sec. 52-526. Judgment.
Status: in_force

Plea of lien by attachment. 14 C. 116, 117. Attachment dissolved. Id., 434; 16 C. 573; 18 C. 558; 31 C. 119. Informality in avowry; judgment on avowry for a taking damage feasant. 4 D. 144. Presumption to support judgment on general issue. 36 C. 115. Judgment of return, on plea in abatement. 17 C. 242. Time of filing disclaimer rests in the discretion of the trial court. 41 C. 580. Wrongful detention not in issue unless disclaimer is filed with a general denial. 69 C. 451. Notice filed with the general issue is to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader. Id., 498, 499. Evidence admissible under the general issue. 70 C. 16. General issue alone does not raise issue as to demand for goods. 74 C. 23, see 71 C. 93. New trial given where defendant had damages without counterclaim in violation of section; limitation as to elements of damage. 101 C. 61. Cited. 118 C. 225.

Where defendant simply filed general denial, court could not direct plaintiff to return a washing machine to defendant which defendant purchased under a conditional sales contract. 11 CS 334. Cited. 14 CS 458.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-476 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 916 / Section 52-476
Sec. 52-476. Continuance pending appeal.
Status: repealed

“Upon final hearing” does not refer to decision on motion to dissolve temporary injunction, but to final judgment. 128 C. 294. Order dissolving temporary injunction is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. Id., 295. Cited. 134 C. 362; 140 C. 267. Provisions of Ch. 562 are such that section is not applicable as regards injunctions in labor disputes, and to that extent has been impliedly repealed. 134 C. 622. Cited. 186 C. 725; 230 C. 622; Id., 641.

Cited. 29 CA 105.

Not inconsistent with Secs. 661, 662 and 663 of Practice Book; purpose of section discussed. 15 CS 272.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549z — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922b / Section 52-549z
Sec. 52-549z. Appeal. Trial de novo.
Status: in_force

(b) A decision of the arbitrator shall become null and void if an appeal from the arbitrator's decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed in accordance with subsection (d) of this section.

(c) For the purpose of this section the word “decision” shall include a decision and judgment rendered pursuant to subsection (a) of section 52-549y , provided the appeal is taken by a party who did not fail to appear at the hearing, and it shall exclude any other decision or judgment rendered pursuant to said section.

(d) An appeal by way of a demand for a trial de novo shall be filed with the court clerk not later than twenty days after the date on which (1) notice of the arbitrator's decision is sent electronically to the parties or their counsel, or (2) the arbitrator's decision is deposited in the United States mail, whichever is later, and shall include a certification that a copy thereof has been served on each party or counsel of record, to be accomplished in accordance with the rules of court. The decision of the arbitrator shall not be admissible in any proceeding resulting after a claim for a trial de novo or from a setting aside of an award in accordance with section 52-549aa .

(e) The Superior Court may refer any proceeding resulting from the filing of a demand for a trial de novo under subsection (d) of this section to a judge trial referee without the consent of the parties, and said judge trial referee shall have and exercise the powers of the Superior Court in respect to trial, judgment and appeal in the case, including a judgment of fifty thousand dollars or more.

Right to trial by jury preserved by section. 13 CA 189. Section does not require notice of arbitrator decision be sent both electronically and by mail, it merely recognizes that notice may be sent by two possible methods and then dictates how the twenty day period is to be calculated with respect to each method, the phrase “whichever is late” is applicable only in circumstances in which notice is sent both electronically and by mail. 211 CA 458.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-216c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-216c
Sec. 52-216c. Failure to call a witness. Jury instruction prohibited; argument by counsel permitted.
Status: in_force

Legislature intended not only that there be advance notice of counsel's intent to invite jury to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call a witness, but also that there be an advance ruling by trial judge that counsel has provided some evidentiary basis entitling him or her to do so. 72 CA 359. Defendant was properly permitted to present in closing argument that the jury could draw an adverse inference from plaintiff's decision not to call his wife as a witness. 123 CA 555. Trial court properly cautioned defendants' counsel from making further comment on plaintiffs' decision not to call a witness to testify because counsel had not established the witness's availability or informed the court he would be making an argument that the jury should draw an adverse inference from plaintiffs' failure to produce the witness. 156 CA 453.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-117 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-117
Sec. 52-117. Action on probate bond.
Status: in_force

(b) The judgment rendered in any such action shall not, in any future proceedings, by scire facias or otherwise, bar or conclude the rights of other persons interested in the bond.

See Sec. 45a-144 re action on probate bond by aggrieved person.

See Sec. 52-74 re action on foreign probate bond.

Amount of recovery is limited to possible right of person for whose special benefit action is brought. 120 C. 346.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146n — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146n
Sec. 52-146n. Disclosure of confidential communications between Judicial Department employee and employee assistance program counselor prohibited. Information re participation in employee assistance program.
Status: in_force

(1) “Employee assistance program counselor” means any person engaged in directing or staffing any employee assistance program which may be established by the Supreme Court upon recommendation of the Chief Court Administrator for the employees of the Judicial Department;

(2) “Confidential communications” means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between an employee of the Judicial Department and an employee assistance program counselor in the course of their relationship in the employee assistance program and all records prepared by the counselor in the course of that relationship with such employee; and

(3) “Employees of the Judicial Department” means full-time and part-time employees of the Judicial Department including judges of the Supreme Court, Appellate Court and Superior Court but excluding the employees and judges of the probate courts.

(b) No employee assistance program counselor shall disclose any confidential communications to any third person, other than a person to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes for which such counselor is consulted, or in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, unless the employee making the confidential communication waives the privilege.

(c) No person in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding may request or require information from any employee of the Judicial Department relating to an employee's participation in an employee assistance program, including whether or not such employee at any time participated in such employee assistance program.

Cited. 211 C. 555.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-145 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-145
Sec. 52-145. Certain witnesses not disqualified. Credibility.
Status: in_force

(b) A person's interest in the outcome of the action or his conviction of crime may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility.

Wife may testify for husband. 3 D. 57; 20 C. 354. The conviction must be of an infamous crime; a petty offense is not sufficient. 57 C. 432; 104 C. 124. Record of a judgment of conviction vacated by appeal is insufficient. 57 C. 432. Cited. 58 C. 64. Particular instances of untruthfulness inadmissible to affect credit of witness. 72 C. 204. Attorney trying case cannot ordinarily be witness therein; Id., 437; 80 C. 531; 81 C. 350; otherwise, if he is also a party; 68 C. 206; 85 C. 211; and he may be called by adverse party. 81 C. 344. Insolvent debtor may testify as to knowledge of insolvency when transfer was made. 75 C. 17. Incapacity to manage his affairs does not disqualify witness. 76 C. 406. Where accused becomes witness for himself, usual rules as to attacking credit apply. 67 C. 290; 76 C. 94; 87 C. 22; 89 C. 417. Evidence of arrest alone not sufficient. 76 C. 92; 86 C. 262. Party to action is ordinarily competent. 79 C. 478. Members of a commission may testify as to proceedings before it; 75 C. 248; 76 C. 567; so judge, as to claims of law made on trial. 82 C. 51. Evidence that witness has incurred expenses which he must pay if party producing him loses is admissible. 74 C. 555. Nature of crimes conviction of which may be shown. 95 C. 501; 104 C. 124; Id., 264; 106 C. 350. When a child is competent. 100 C. 570. Improper reference to statute held cured by instruction of judge. 108 C. 192. Statement of witness that he has scruples against taking oath must be taken as true; belief in supreme being does not destroy witness's right to take affirmation instead of oath. 109 C. 712. Purpose of statute to remove common law disqualification of witness because of conviction of crime. 121 C. 678. For purpose of affecting credibility, conviction of crime may be shown by questions on cross-examination. Id.; 132 C. 574, overruling 72 C. 205 and 97 C. 452. Owner is competent witness to location of bounds and occupancy of own land when within his personal knowledge. 125 C. 333. Where plaintiff administrator was questioned on direct as to decedent's health and financial standing, question on cross as to whether he expected to share in recovery in case was proper. 131 C. 515. Cited. 136 C. 106. Fact that conviction was 10 years before went to weight, not to admissibility. 137 C. 140. Conviction of Sec. 53-246 “intoxication” is not infamous crime to attack credibility of a witness. 140 C. 39. Cited. 149 C. 125. A plea of guilty by one of several persons charged with a crime can be no more than hearsay as to others so charged; therefore, while the plea may be used to attack the credibility of the one so pleading if he testifies as a witness for or against the others, it is not admissible on the trial of the others to establish that the crime was committed. 150 C. 195. The conviction of a crime, whether or not denominated a felony by statute, is admissible in evidence to affect credibility under section only if the maximum permissible penalty for the crime may be imprisonment for more than 1 year, and the presence or absence of moral turpitude is not a consideration affecting admissibility. 152 C. 472. Where defendant chose to take stand on his own behalf, question on cross-examination as to prior conviction was properly asked of him in his capacity as a witness, but court does not consider whether defendant could raise his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 153 C. 30. Use of defendant's answer, over his objection, in second part of information, brought under habitual criminal statute, was a violation of his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id., 34, 35. Cited. Id., 208; 154 C. 68, 74. Writ, summons and complaint in another action brought by plaintiff admissible to affect credibility insofar as testimony in present action is inconsistent with prior claim; on redirect, plaintiff should be allowed to show extent of his knowledge of allegations in prior writ. 155 C. 197. Cited. 158 C. 156. Where statement of witness was offered to show bias against defendant, it was properly excluded where it related to criminal activity of witness for which he had not been convicted. Id., 536. Judge's discretion to exclude evidence as prejudicial. 160 C. 47. Court's instructions to jury as to historic common law background and purpose of statute does not raise any federal constitutional questions. Id., 171, 175. Cited. Id., 378. Impeachment of witness on the basis of misconduct accomplished only by proof of felony convictions; specific acts of misconduct to show lack of veracity cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence. 164 C. 145. Cited. 165 C. 559; 166 C. 226, 230. Credibility of a witness may be impeached by proof of convictions of crimes for which imprisonment may be more than 1 year. 167 C. 539. Cited. 182 C. 207; 185 C. 372; 186 C. 654; 187 C. 513; 188 C. 259; Id., 515; 189 C. 631; 190 C. 20. Prudent course where trial court faced with decision on admission as evidence of credibility prior convictions for crimes not directly reflecting on credibility is to allow prosecution to mention that defendant was convicted of unspecified crime or crimes carrying a penalty of more than 1 year. 194 C. 1. Cited. Id., 297. Where a prior charge resulted in a determination that defendant was a youthful offender and not in a criminal conviction, it was not admissible for impeachment purposes under statute. 196 C. 122, 128. Cited. 198 C. 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 255; 201 C. 74; 202 C. 224; 210 C. 359; 211 C. 555; 227 C. 389; Id., 417; Id., 711; 228 C. 412. Trial court abused discretion in barring evidence of victim's prior felony conviction for larceny since outcome of case depended upon relative credibility of victim and defendant, and state was allowed to impeach credibility of defendant with a prior felony conviction. 245 C. 351.

Cited. 3 CA 459; Id., 684; 6 CA 189; 7 CA 217; Id., 377; Id., 445, 451; Id., 601; 10 CA 71; 16 CA 346; 20 CA 6; 22 CA 610; 23 CA 479; Id., 692; 26 CA 157; Id., 758; 27 CA 279; 32 CA 773; 34 CA 823; 37 CA 722; 38 CA 815; 40 CA 151; 42 CA 810; 44 CA 280; Id., 790; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 285.

Credit of witness may not be attacked by showing his conviction of a crime which is not infamous, that is, for which maximum penalty cannot be more than 6 months in jail. 23 CS 294. Cited. 33 CS 586; 36 CS 89.

Conviction of crime of trespass inadmissible under statute. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 391. Any question about previous arrests is improper because statute allows questions about convictions only in establishing credibility and reputation of witness. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 441.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-309 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-309
Sec. 52-309. Return of application, bond or certified copy of lien and proceedings.
Status: in_force

Defect in certificate. 74 C. 171. Failure of judge to perform clerical acts cannot invalidate judgment. 123 C. 382. Cited. 209 C. 15.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-259 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-259
Sec. 52-259. Court fees.
Status: in_force

(b) The fee for the entry of a small claims case and for filing a counterclaim in a small claims case shall be ninety-five dollars. If a motion is filed to transfer a small claims case to the regular docket, the moving party shall pay a fee of one hundred twenty-five dollars.

(c) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court by any party who requests that a matter be designated as a complex litigation case the sum of three hundred thirty-five dollars, to be paid at the time the request is filed.

(d) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court by any party who requests a finding of fact by a judge of such court to be used on appeal the sum of twenty-five dollars, to be paid at the time the request is filed.

(e) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of seventy-five dollars for a petition for certification to the Supreme Court and Appellate Court.

(f) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court for the appointment of a commissioner of the Superior Court, two dollars; for recording the commission and oath of a notary public or certifying under seal to the official character of any magistrate, ten dollars; for issuing a certificate that an attorney is in good standing, ten dollars; for certifying under seal, two dollars; for exemplifying, twenty dollars; for making all necessary records and certificates of naturalization, the fees allowed under the provisions of the United States statutes for such services; and for making copies, one dollar per page. Any fee set forth in this subsection shall be payable in accordance with subsection (n) of this section.

(g) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court for a copy of a judgment file a fee of twenty-five dollars, inclusive of the fees for certification and copying, for a certified copy and a fee of fifteen dollars, inclusive of the fee for copying, for a copy which is not certified; and for a copy of a certificate of judgment in a foreclosure action, as provided by the rules of practice and procedure, twenty-five dollars, inclusive of the fees for certification and copying. Any fee set forth in this subsection shall be payable in accordance with subsection (n) of this section.

(h) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of one hundred eighty dollars at the time any application for a prejudgment remedy is filed.

(i) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of six hundred twenty dollars at the time any motion to be admitted as attorney pro hac vice is filed.

(j) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of two hundred five dollars at the time any counterclaim, cross complaint, apportionment complaint or third party complaint is filed.

(k) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of three hundred fifty dollars at the time any application for a dissolution of lien upon the substitution of a bond with surety is filed pursuant to subsection (a) of section 49-37 , subsection (b) of section 49-55a , subsection (a) of section 49-61 , subsection (a) of section 49-92b or subsection (b) of section 49-92h .

(l) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court a fee of one hundred dollars at the time of the request for the issuance of a foreign subpoena pursuant to section 52-657 .

(m) A fee of twenty dollars for any check issued to the court in payment of any fee which is returned as uncollectible by the bank on which it is drawn may be imposed.

(n) Any recording or copying performed under subsection (f) or (g) of this section may be done by photograph, microfilm, as defined in section 51-36 , computerized image or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original. The fees required under subsections (f) and (g) of this section for recording and copying shall be payable regardless of the method by which the recording and copying is done.

(o) The tax imposed under chapter 219 shall not be imposed upon any fee charged under the provisions of this section.

Cited. 135 C. 412; 194 C. 43; 223 C. 68; 237 C. 758.

Cited. 15 CA 185.

Cited. 8 CS 31.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-350a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-350a
Sec. 52-350a. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Conspicuous” means conspicuous as defined in section 42a-1-201 .

(2) “Consumer debt or obligation” means a debt or obligation incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes.

(3) “Consumer judgment” means a money judgment of less than five thousand dollars against a natural person resulting from any consumer debt or obligation.

(4) “Disposable earnings” means that part of the earnings of an individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of amounts required to be withheld for payment of federal income and employment taxes, normal retirement contributions, union dues and initiation fees, group life insurance premiums, health insurance premiums, and federal tax levies.

(5) “Earnings” means any debt accruing by reason of personal services, including any compensation payable by an employer to an employee for such personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise.

(6) “Employer” means any person owing a debt accruing to the judgment debtor by reason of personal services.

(7) “Family support judgment” means a judgment, order or decree of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for payment of a legal obligation for support or alimony to a spouse, former spouse or child and includes any such order for periodic payments whether issued pendente lite or otherwise.

(8) “Financial institution” means a financial institution as defined in section 36a-41 .

(9) “Installment payment order” means the fixing by the court of a sum to be paid periodically by the judgment debtor until satisfaction of a money judgment.

(10) “Judgment creditor” means a person in whose favor a money judgment was rendered, or any person succeeding to such rights.

(11) “Judgment debtor” means a person against whom a money judgment was rendered.

(12) “Levying officer” means a state marshal or constable acting within such marshal's or constable's geographical jurisdiction or in IV-D cases, any investigator employed by the Commissioner of Social Services.

(13) “Money judgment” means a judgment, order or decree of the court calling in whole or in part for the payment of a sum of money, other than a family support judgment. Money judgment includes any such money judgment of a small claims session of the Superior Court, any foreign money judgment filed with the Superior Court pursuant to the general statutes and in IV-D cases, overdue support in the amount of five hundred dollars or more accruing after the entry of an initial family support judgment.

(14) “Person” includes an individual, a partnership, an association, a limited liability company or a corporation.

(15) “Postjudgment procedure” means any procedure commenced after rendition of a money judgment, seeking or otherwise involving a discovery procedure, a placing of a lien on property, a modification or discharge of a lien, a property execution under section 52-356a , a turnover order, an installment payment order, a wage execution, a modification of a wage execution, a compliance order, a protective order or a determination of exemption rights.

(16) “Property” means any real or personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest which he could assign or transfer, including (A) any present or future right or interest, whether or not vested or liquidated, (B) any debt, whether due or to become due, and (C) any cause of action which could be assigned or transferred.

Cited. 211 C. 485; 240 C. 35; Id., 343.

Cited. 15 CA 718; 33 CA 359. A judgment of foreclosure by sale is not a money judgment and the proceedings following a judgment of foreclosure by sale are not postjudgment proceedings for the purposes of section. 108 CA 134. Although facial inconsistencies exist between this section and Secs. 46b-84(a) and 52-350f, P.A. 03-130 was intended to enable a party to address the default of a final order for child support or alimony through use of the postjudgment procedures in Ch. 906. 146 CA 79.

Subdiv. (5):

Definition of term “earnings” discussed. 232 C. 216.

Although second phrase of definition does not apply to defendant because she is an independent contractor and not an employee, the commissions defendant receive as real estate salesperson are earnings because they are debts accruing by reason of her personal service. 50 CS 460.

Subdiv. (13):

Marital dissolution judgment regarding child's educational expenses did not order payment of a sum certain and cannot be characterized as a money judgment. 99 CA 347.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146
Sec. 52-146. Wife as a witness against her husband.
Status: in_force

Cited. 190 C. 813; 211 C. 555.

Statute applies only when agreement does not specify time within which award must be rendered. 80 CA 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557r — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557r
Sec. 52-557r. Immunity from liability of fire department for installation or delivery of smoke and carbon monoxide detectors.
Status: in_force

(b) A fire department that delivers to, or installs at, residential premises a device or batteries for such a device shall not be liable for civil damages for personal injury, wrongful death, property damage or other loss, provided (1) such installation was done in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, and (2) such installation or delivery was in such department's official capacity.

(c) Any device delivered or installed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be new and shall meet all applicable current safety and manufacturing standards.

(d) Any fire department that delivers or installs a device in accordance with this section shall keep records documenting every such delivery or installation for not less than five years after such delivery or installation.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the obligations and duties of the owner or occupier of the residential premises receiving such delivery or installation services.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-434a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 910 / Section 52-434a
Sec. 52-434a. Powers of referees.
Status: in_force

(b) In condemnation proceedings in which the assessment fixed by the condemning authority exceeds the sum of two hundred thousand dollars the court may, at the request of either party, or on its own motion, refer the proceedings to the Chief Court Administrator for referral to a committee of three such referees who, sitting together, shall hear and decide the matter. In such matters in which the fees payable to a referee are to be paid by the state, each such referee shall be reimbursed as provided in section 52-434 .

(c) The power conferred by this section may be exercised by any such state referee, whether acting in his capacity as a state referee, or as an auditor, or as a committee of one, or by any committee composed of not more than three such state referees, with respect to any civil matter referred to him or to it, the provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding.

Cited. 158 C. 16; Id., 291; 162 C. 79; 163 C. 15; Id., 259; 164 C. 360; 172 C. 341; Id., 362; 173 C. 161; 182 C. 193; 203 C. 364; 221 C. 736. Procedural provisions of statutes that are inconsistent with this section are superseded by it insofar as such statutes limit authority of judge trial referee to render judgment on his or her own findings. 263 C. 155.

Cited. 7 CA 136; 20 CA 148; 21 CA 359; 31 CA 723; 35 CA 9; 43 CA 397. Judge trial referees exercise the same jurisdiction as judges of the Superior Court, and any limitation contained in general statutes or rules of practice regarding the types of cases that judge trial referees may be involved in do not implicate the jurisdiction of judge trial referees to hear certain of those cases, but, rather, concern their authority to do so. 165 CA 737.

Cited. 30 CS 354.

Subsec. (a):

Judge trial referees have same powers and jurisdiction as judges of the court from which proceedings have been referred to them, and thus may preside over motions for contempt. 140 CA 64.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 172 C. 234. Judgment of a majority of a committee composed of three state referees is not invalid for lack of unanimity. 176 C. 391. Cited. 181 C. 217; 192 C. 377.

Subsec. (c):

In enacting Subsec., legislature made clear its intention to vest judge trial referees with all powers of Superior Court judges in civil matters referred to them. 263 C. 155.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-235 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-235
Sec. 52-235. Reservation of questions of law.
Status: reserved

(b) The court or judge making the reservation shall, in the judgment, decree or decision made or rendered in such cases, conform to the advice of the Supreme Court or the Appellate Court.

Questions depending on inferences of fact cannot be reserved. 20 C. 292; 27 C. 278; 35 C. 482, but see 38 C. 301. No question not particularly reserved will be considered. 23 C. 621; 35 C. 509. No advice will be given as to a point not final in its effect on the case; 27 C. 271; 36 C. 197; or one of procedure, not affecting substantive rights. 91 C. 241. Same questions cannot be reserved twice. 26 C. 117; 27 C. 462; 35 C. 222. Questions heard on reservation will not be heard again on motion in error. 43 C. 255; 44 C. 391; 71 C. 584. Reservation not affecting the merits of the case will not be entertained. 46 C. 240. Nature of advice where complaint is radically defective. 47 C. 376. Advice contingent upon an amendment and further finding. 52 C. 274. The lower court cannot give the Supreme Court jurisdiction merely by reserving the case for its advice. 58 C. 66. Nature and effect of reservation. 65 C. 119. The “consent” of the parties who chose to appear in the trial court is sufficient. 67 C. 320. Finding of facts necessary; transcript of evidence not enough; 68 C. 318; 77 C. 214; ultimate facts should be found. 74 C. 36. Only facts within issues of pleadings considered. 69 C. 392; 77 C. 214. Power of court to grant new trial because verdict against evidence may be considered. 64 C. 61. Issues open on reservation in quo warranto. 66 C. 300. Court can consider facts agreed upon but not on record. 75 C. 505. Necessity that decision should finally determine issues; 80 C. 71; filing of stipulation to that effect; 77 C. 327; 80 C. 318; 87 C. 362; but court sometimes disregards rule. 80 C. 646. Questions affecting parties not of record not ordinarily decided, but may be. 86 C. 565; 88 C. 207. Should involve only substantive rights, not motion to correct finding of compensation commissioner. 95 C. 160. Court will not pass on academic questions. Id., 161. Requirement as to stipulation; question whether on facts plaintiff entitled to recover not proper. 96 C. 568. Advice must be such that court from which reservation comes can properly apply it in deciding issues before it when reservation was made. 136 C. 49. An application for dissolution of attachment, though ancillary to main action, may be reserved for advice of Supreme Court. Id., 641. Cited. 318 U.S. 46; 142 C. 431. When court will hear a reservation even though the case is not ready for final judgment. 147 C. 22. The court cannot, in the first instance, draw conclusions of facts from primary facts and cannot be compelled by reservation to do so. 150 C. 387. In the case of actions praying for a declaratory judgment, since remedy sought is prospective, right to such relief is determined by the situation which has developed at the time of trial and not by that existing at the time the action was begun. 152 C. 323. Cited. 156 C. 253; 157 C. 4; 187 C. 451; 192 C. 327; Id., 671. Interpreted as not requiring that case be at final judgment stage when the reservation is brought, where issues raised are of critical importance to the proceedings and court's advice will further the interests of simplicity, directness and judicial economy. Id., 671. Cited. 201 C. 598; 202 C. 583; 211 C. 51; 236 C. 681; 237 C. 332.

Cited. 1 CA 22; 25 CA 673; 28 CA 622; 35 CA 72.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-633 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-633
Sec. 52-633. Engagement and compensation of professional.
Status: in_force

(1) The identity and qualifications of the professional;

(2) The scope and nature of the proposed engagement;

(3) Any potential conflict of interest; and

(4) The proposed compensation.

(b) A person is not disqualified from engagement under this section solely because of the person's engagement by, representation of, or other relationship with the receiver, a creditor or a party. Sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive, do not prevent the receiver from serving in the receivership as an attorney, accountant, auctioneer or broker when authorized by law.

(c) A receiver or professional engaged under subsection (a) of this section shall file with the court an itemized statement of the time spent, work performed and billing rate of each person that performed the work and an itemized list of expenses. The receiver shall pay the amount approved by the court.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146d
Sec. 52-146d. (Formerly Sec. 52-146a). Privileged communications between psychiatric mental health provider and patient. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Authorized representative” means (A) a person empowered by a patient to assert the confidentiality of communications or records which are privileged under sections 52-146c to 52-146i , inclusive, or (B) if a patient is deceased, his or her personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a patient is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the patient, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the patient's nearest relative;

(2) “Communications and records” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition between the patient and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between a member of the patient's family and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between any of such persons and a person participating under the supervision of a psychiatric mental health provider in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis and treatment, wherever made, including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility;

(3) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the patient or his authorized representative;

(4) “Identifiable” and “identify a patient” refer to communications and records which contain (A) names or other descriptive data from which a person acquainted with the patient might reasonably recognize the patient as the person referred to, or (B) codes or numbers which are in general use outside of the mental health facility which prepared the communications and records;

(5) “Mental health facility” includes any hospital, clinic, ward, psychiatric mental health provider's office or other facility, public or private, which provides inpatient or outpatient service, in whole or in part, relating to the diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition;

(6) “Patient” means a person who communicates with or is treated by a psychiatric mental health provider in diagnosis or treatment;

(7) “Psychiatric mental health provider” means a physician specializing in psychiatry and licensed under the provisions of sections 20-9 to 20-12 , inclusive, an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 378 who is board certified as a psychiatric mental health provider by the American Nurses Credentialing Center, a person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of psychiatry or a person reasonably believed by the patient to be so qualified.

Case decided before effective date of statute. 150 C. 689. Cited. 152 C. 510, 512. Psychiatrist-patient privilege does not extend to records relative to drug-dependency treatment. 169 C. 223. Psychiatric-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Purpose of statutory privilege is to protect a therapeutic relationship; communications that bear no relationship to the purpose for which privilege was enacted are admissible subject to normal rules of evidence. 190 C. 813. Cited. 191 C. 453; 199 C. 693; 201 C. 211; 203 C. 641; 208 C. 365; Id., 683; 211 C. 555; 212 C. 50; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 85; 219 C. 314; 223 C. 450; 225 C. 700; Id., 450; 228 C. 1; 235 C. 185; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313. Statute reflects public policy against suit by patient's former spouse. 250 C. 86. Evidence of conversation between defendant and third party overheard by mental health worker not protected by privilege provided for under section. 254 C. 694. Medical and dental records created during a patient's inpatient treatment at a mental health facility are mental health records exempt from disclosure under Sec. 52-146e. 318 C. 769. Subdiv. (2): The legislative history and purpose of Subdiv. results in the conclusion that the phrase “including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility” is not intended to create a freestanding category of confidential communications and records unique to mental health facilities but, instead, was intended as an illustrative application of the phrase ‘wherever made’ and, as such, all communications and records thereof prepared in a mental health facility that identify a patient are not privileged under Sec. 52-146e(a) without a consideration of whether they were communications between the individuals identified in the three categories of communicants delineated in Subdiv. 347 C. 675.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 253; Id., 647; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Subdiv. (2): Communications and records relating to diagnosis and treatment of an alcohol-related disorder falls within ambit of a “mental condition”; phrase “including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility” interpreted as an illustrative application of phrase “wherever made”, not as a limitation on its scope; therefore, trial court improperly concluded that plaintiff was required to establish that treatment facility located in Maine was a mental health facility as defined in Subdiv. (5) as a condition precedent to invocation of statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege. 54 CA 663. Nursing assessment containing consent form in which defendant consented to “mental health assessment and treatment” and conducted by nurse under supervision of psychiatrist is a mental health record that is privileged under Secs. 52-146d to 52-146f. 73 CA 150.

Cited. 28 CS 57.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-228 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-228
Sec. 52-228. Judgment too large; remittitur; correction.
Status: in_force

Otherwise before statute. 4 C. 311. Applies where judgment exceeds damages claimed. 75 C. 255; Id., 263; 82 C. 619. Court may order; 69 C. 652; 71 C. 23; 78 C. 296; 81 C. 101; so Supreme Court may direct new trial unless part of damages remitted; 83 C. 278; 85 C. 24; Id., 611; 86 C. 319; 87 C. 686; so trial court may direct verdict to be set aside on same condition; 82 C. 171; and when court takes that course, party cannot take advantage of it after appeal. 89 C. 712. Where damages assessed as of wrong date, Supreme Court remanded case, with directions to set verdict aside unless remittitur filed. 93 C. 123. Court may in its discretion either order excessive verdict set aside unless remittitur filed or set it aside unconditionally. 126 C. 571. Action of trial court in ordering remittiturs will not be reversed unless the broad legal discretion vested in the trial court was abused. 147 C. 719. An obviously erroneous judgment can be corrected to conform to the finding of the trial court. 148 C. 504. Excessive judgment must be assigned as error on appeal. 154 C. 179. Cited. 230 C. 795.

Cited. 26 CA 231; 32 CA 617; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 795.

When court will set aside a verdict as excessive. 21 CS 233.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-157 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-157
Sec. 52-157. Taking of deposition may be adjourned.
Status: in_force

Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-161b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-161b
Sec. 52-161b. Subpoenaing of crime victim by pro se litigant. Court authorization required.
Status: in_force

(b) A pro se litigant who has been convicted of said family violence crime or a violation of any of said sections shall not issue a subpoena summoning a victim of the crime for which such litigant was convicted to appear and testify at a court hearing or deposition in any civil matter, including a habeas corpus proceeding, unless a court authorizes the issuance of such subpoena in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Whenever such pro se litigant intends to issue a subpoena to any such victim, such litigant shall provide the clerk of the court with notice of such intention. Upon receipt of such notice, the clerk of the court shall schedule a hearing and provide notice to the pro se litigant of the date, time and place of such hearing. At such hearing, the pro se litigant shall make an offer of proof as to the content of the testimony expected to be given by the victim. If the court finds that the testimony expected to be given by the victim is relevant and necessary to the civil matter, the court shall authorize the pro se litigant to issue such subpoena to such victim. The scope of such litigant's examination of the victim shall be limited in accordance with the court's findings on the offer of proof.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557p — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557p
Sec. 52-557p. (Formerly Sec. 52-577p). Assumption of risk by person engaged in recreational equestrian activities, when.
Status: in_force

Protection granted by statute does not permit operator of horseback riding facility to avoid liability entirely for its negligence or its employees' negligence; the release plaintiff signed broadly indemnifying facility's operators from liability for damages resulting from operators' own negligence was a contract of adhesion and invalid as it violates public policy and is not in the public interest. 280 C. 153.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-486 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 918 / Section 52-486
Sec. 52-486. Mandamus. Return. Judgment for costs.
Status: in_force

The return, if sufficient, must be found to be untrue, before a peremptory mandamus can issue. 40 C. 381. Method of procedure under statute. 44 C. 390. Where action is brought by state to enforce a public duty, costs may not be taxed against the state. 111 C. 432. Costs may be taxed in favor of the state as prevailing party. 112 C. 665. Plaintiff obtaining judgment may not recover costs where no return was made and hearing had. 115 C. 101.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572k — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572k
Sec. 52-572k. Hold harmless clause against public policy in certain construction contracts.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of this section shall apply to covenants, promises, agreements or understandings entered into on or after the thirtieth day next succeeding October 1, 1977.

Legislature, in specifically outlawing hold harmless agreements in the construction industry, showed intention that such a practice not be deemed against public policy in other situations; had legislature intended to outlaw all such provisions, it could have said so. 1 CA 54. Waiver of subrogation provision in contract was not an agreement to hold harmless or to indemnify. 77 CA 167.

Enforcing an “additional insured” clause does not violate the provisions of section. 50 CS 563.