Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-356a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-356a
Sec. 52-356a. Execution against certain nonexempt personal property. Fees.
Status: in_force

(2) The property execution shall require a proper levying officer to enforce the money judgment and shall state the names and last-known addresses of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, the court in which and the date on which the money judgment was rendered, the original amount of the money judgment and the amount due thereon, and any information which the judgment creditor considers necessary or appropriate to identify the judgment debtor. The property execution shall notify any person served therewith that the judgment debtor's nonexempt personal property is subject to levy, seizure and sale by the levying officer pursuant to the execution and, if the judgment debtor is a natural person, shall be accompanied by a notice of judgment debtor rights as prescribed by section 52-361b and a notice to any third person of the manner, as prescribed by subdivision (4) of this subsection, for complying with the execution.

(3) A property execution shall be returned to court within four months after issuance. The untimely return of a property execution more than four months after issuance shall not of itself invalidate any otherwise valid levy made during the four-month period.

(4) The levying officer shall personally serve a copy of the execution on the judgment debtor and make demand for payment by the judgment debtor of all sums due under the money judgment. On failure of the judgment debtor to make immediate payment, the levying officer shall levy on nonexempt personal property of the judgment debtor, other than debts due from a banking institution or earnings, sufficient to satisfy the judgment, as follows:

(A) If such nonexempt personal property is in the possession of the judgment debtor, the levying officer shall take such property into his possession as is accessible without breach of the peace;

(B) With respect to a judgment debtor who is not a natural person, if such personal property, including any debt owed, is in the possession of a third person, the levying officer shall serve that person with a copy of the execution and that person shall forthwith deliver the property or pay the amount of the debt due or payable to the levying officer, provided, if the debt is not yet payable, payment shall be made when the debt matures if within four months after issuance of the execution;

(C) With respect to a judgment debtor who is a natural person, if such personal property, including any debt owed, is in the possession of a third person, the levying officer shall serve that person with two copies of the execution, required notices and claim forms. On receipt of such papers, the third person shall forthwith mail a copy thereof postage prepaid to the judgment debtor at the last-known address of record with the third person and shall withhold delivery of the property or payment of the debt due to the levying officer or any other person for twenty days. On expiration of the twenty days, the third person shall forthwith deliver the property or pay the debt to the levying officer provided (i) if an exemption claim has been filed in accordance with subsection (d) of section 52-361b , the property shall continue to be withheld subject to determination of the claim, and (ii) if a debt is not yet payable, payment shall be made when the debt matures if within four months after issuance of the execution.

(5) Levy under this section on property held by, or a debt due from, a third person shall bar an action for such property against the third person provided the third person acted in compliance with the execution.

(6) If the levying officer cannot remove any property on which he seeks to levy without the danger of injury thereto, he may levy on and take possession of the property by posting on or adjacent to the property a conspicuous notice of the levy.

(7) Subject to the provisions of section 52-328 , if the property to be executed against is already subject to an attachment, garnishment or judgment lien of the judgment creditor as security for that judgment, the priority of the execution shall hold from the date of perfecting of the attachment, garnishment or other lien. A sale pursuant to the execution forecloses any interest acquired as a result of the attachment, garnishment or judgment lien.

(8) If the judgment debtor has left the state prior to service of the execution or if he cannot otherwise be found with reasonable effort at his last-known address in this state, the levying officer shall proceed with the levy after (A) making demand for payment at such last-known address and on any agent or attorney of the judgment debtor of record with the clerk of the Superior Court, and (B) making a reasonable effort to ascertain and provide notice of the execution at any forwarding address.

(b) Sale. (1) The judgment debtor's interest in personal property levied on pursuant to an execution, other than any money so obtained, shall be sold by the levying officer, or by an indifferent person deputed to act on his behalf, or by such other levying officer as the court in which the money judgment was rendered directs, in accordance with subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection. The sale shall be held at such time and place and in such manner as is commercially reasonable. The sale shall be subject to, and shall not affect, any secured interests, including any such liens, that are senior in right to the execution. No sale may be made to any levying officer, or to his agent or associate. The property shall be present and within view of those attending the sale unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(2) Notice of the time and place of sale and of the name and address of the levying officer shall be (A) sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the judgment debtor and to each holder of a lien or other secured interest in the property at their last-known addresses and (B) posted in the office of the town clerk in the town where the property is to be sold. On application of the judgment debtor or any other party in interest, the court may order further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise.

(3) Notice shall be given at least twenty days prior to the date of sale unless the property is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value. If the property is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value, the court, on application of any party or of the levying officer, may, ex parte, order shorter notice.

(c) Advertisement of sale. In addition to the notice of sale required by this section, the judgment creditor or levying officer may advertise in the legal or classified advertising section of any publication and recover any reasonable costs therefor. The judgment debtor may advertise the sale at his own expense.

(d) Distribution of sale proceeds. All amounts received from the sale, and all other money received, shall be distributed subject to the supervision of the court according to the following priorities: (1) To all reasonable and necessary costs of sale; (2) to other legal costs of levy including the levying officer's fees of fifteen per cent of the amount realized; (3) to payment of the judgment creditor pursuant to the judgment under which the sale was held or the money received; (4) to payment of any subordinate secured parties or lienors who make a written demand to the levying officer prior to the sale, according to their respective interests, and to any other judgment creditors presenting an execution to the levying officer, in the order of presentation; and (5) to payment to the judgment debtor.

(e) Statement of officer's fees. Prior to return of a satisfied or partially satisfied execution, a levying officer shall sign and give the judgment debtor, on demand and without fee, an itemized statement of his fees. On his failure to comply with this provision, the levying officer shall forfeit to the judgment debtor three times the amount of his fees.

(f) Record of satisfaction. On return of an execution, the clerk of the court shall note on the record of the judgment whether, or to what extent, the judgment was satisfied.

(g) Completion of levy. Any levy commenced prior to the expiration of the levying officer's term of office may be completed notwithstanding the expiration of that term.

Cited. 217 C. 507; 225 C. 705.

Negotiated settlement with two defendants after judgment of strict foreclosure renders it inequitable to allow plaintiff to execute on defendant's property. 50 CA 289.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-220 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-220
Sec. 52-220. Hearing in damages: When to jury.
Status: in_force

Not retroactive nor applicable to action pending when statute was enacted. 59 C. 365. A default, and a neglect to answer after demurrer overruled, are not the same in legal effect. 63 C. 261. Notice of intention to suffer a default is not itself a default. 64 C. 487. Cited. 73 C. 684. Justification of entry of judgment; time of filing. 78 C. 289. Liability of defendant not in issue unless notice of intent to contest liability has been given. 138 C. 29. Cited. Id., 35. Defendant who suffers a default is entitled to a hearing in damages in accordance with the statutes and rules of the court. 148 C. 435. Where one defendant defaulted, plaintiffs were not required to proceed to hearing in damages as to him but could properly wait until pleadings had been closed as to remaining defendants and court followed proper procedure in proceeding to trial of all issues raised by appearing defendants. 149 C. 458. Cited. 156 C. 6. When defendant has been defaulted for nonappearance at trial of case which was regularly assigned for trial, court may proceed forthwith to assessment of damages; such case is to be distinguished from one when defendant defaults at point other than at trial of action. 159 C. 352.

Cited. 9 CA 1.

No jury granted for hearing in damages resulting under Sec. 17-320. 14 CS 482.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-489 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 918 / Section 52-489
Sec. 52-489. Issue of writ of ne exeat.
Status: in_force

Practice as to the issue of this writ. 21 C. 199.

Difference between appearance bond and performance bond discussed. 7 CA 11.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-128 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-128
Sec. 52-128. Amendment of pleadings by plaintiff; costs.
Status: in_force

Statutes allowing amendments to be liberally construed; 32 C. 108; 39 C. 535; 75 C. 541; apply in U.S. courts. 101 U.S. 263. History and extent of right in general. 73 C. 10; Id., 585. Oral waiver of damages is not an amendment. 69 C. 440. Ordinarily, allowance rests in court's discretion. 10 C. 472; 11 C. 386; 13 C. 471; 39 C. 535; 68 C. 375; 74 C. 62; Id., 126; 75 C. 45; Id., 308; 76 C. 680; 83 C. 417; Id., 477; 85 C. 271. Refusal to allow amendments as insufficient in law; 72 C. 167; 76 C. 329; 77 C. 15; 78 C. 310; 79 C. 401, 405; Id., 458; 86 C. 327; 91 C. 23; if it would lay the basis for no evidence not otherwise admissible, its refusal would be harmless; 82 C. 479; but it is error to refuse an amendment whereby plaintiff is prevented from presenting his real case. 86 C. 561. Amendment not adding any material allegation properly refused; 91 C. 84; so one not altering real effect of pleading. 93 C. 65. Amendment cannot set up new cause of action; 60 C. 398; thus common counts cannot be replaced by cause of action not generally alleged in them. 86 C. 308. If one count of amendment is proper, others may be added. 72 C. 172; 73 C. 17; Id., 585. Amendments considered with relation to identity of cause of action. 18 C. 387; 21 C. 180; 24 C. 39; 26 C. 201; 30 C. 309; 32 C. 376; 33 C. 337; 39 C. 356; Id., 534; 63 C. 369; 66 C. 500; 71 C. 623; 81 C. 702. Question is, is real object the same. 81 C. 433. Distinction between defective statement of cause of action, and statement of defective cause of action. 87 C. 634. Amendment not possible, if there is no original pleading, as where writ is served without complaint. 97 C. 399. At law, matters subsequent to the bringing of the action cannot be brought in. 71 C. 418; 73 C. 385. As to equitable action. 76 C. 292. When amendment to avoid variance allowable. 63 C. 166. Tribunal lacking jurisdiction cannot allow amendment setting it up. 85 C. 517; Id., 530. Amendment destroying jurisdiction after defendant's appearance. 75 C. 621. Amending prayer for relief. 72 C. 201. Appeal from disallowance of claim against insolvent estate. 72 C. 167; 73 C. 582; 81 C. 433. Condemnation proceedings. 69 C. 469. Petition for new trial. 83 C. 477; 91 C. 23. Is allowable at any time before final judgment. 69 C. 554; 83 C. 417. Is of right within 30 days of return day; 75 C. 544; after demurrer sustained is of right; 92 C. 277; thereafter is in court's discretion. 70 C. 700; 81 C. 474. After demurrer sustained. 75 C. 308; 91 C. 25. After plea in abatement. K. 5; 2 R. 525. After report of committee. 25 C. 528. On trial. 2 R. 406; 3 D. 315; 64 C. 556; 69 C. 264; Id., 404; 74 C. 62; 76 C. 680; 82 C. 343; Id., 479; 83 C. 311; Id., 417; Id., 634; Id., 671; 85 C. 90; 91 C. 453. On trial where cross-examination of defendant shows falsity of account he had rendered and plaintiff had accepted. 94 C. 313. Amendment is of right during trial to accord to proof, but requires opportunity to defendant to amend answer. 96 C. 394. Amendment after default judgment; 86 C. 308; after hearing in damages; 69 C. 554; after argument of case; 90 C. 283; after judgment of accounting; 76 C. 292; after motion in arrest; K. 344; 13 C. 471; 31 C. 447; 39 C. 357; on new trial; 51 C. 398; 74 C. 689; 75 C. 42; 77 C. 677; 86 C. 55; after Supreme Court has given its advice on a reservation; 27 C. 470; 60 C. 85; where it grants new trial nisi; 89 C. 255; after stay of action under bankruptcy law; 74 C. 616; after repeated amendments over long space of time; 81 C. 451; after several demurrers have been sustained. 66 C. 284. Refusal 2 weeks after final argument is in discretion of court. 90 C. 281. When too late to bring new action. 4 D. 42; 10 C. 473. Effect of amendment as relating back to beginning of action. 5 C. 590; 22 C. 232; 32 C. 207; 69 C. 554; 105 C. 642; 109 C. 524. Right of defendant to alter plea. 52 C. 4; 45 C. 299; 61 C. 577; 69 C. 555. Discretion of court as to costs; 43 C. 201; cannot be recovered back on final judgment. 50 C. 521. On filing substitute, when original pleading drops out of case. 67 C. 377; 71 C. 424; 74 C. 128. Amendment waives right to review rulings on original. 75 C. 643; 79 C. 79; 80 C. 348; Id., 549; 81 C. 415; Id., 474; 90 C. 261; 93 C. 479. Consent to filing not waiver of defects. 72 C. 257. Immaterial amendment no excuse for refiling defense once held insufficient. 92 C. 342. Application of section to filing of substitute complaint in place of common counts. 93 C. 357. In action for recovery of money obtained by undue influence, another count asking recovery for money loaned may be allowed by way of amendment. 98 C. 206. Amendment may be allowed after appeal from judgment of city court to court of common pleas for judicial district of Waterbury. 104 C. 298. Allowance of amendment to pleading, already sufficient before amendment, is no abuse of discretion if it does not surprise other party. 109 C. 303. Relates back to beginning of action and so may cure errors in admission of evidence under pleadings as they stood before amendment. Id., 524. As special count alleging goods sold and delivered to defendant's wife could have been joined with common counts, joining it later by amendment was allowable. 112 C. 64. Permissible to amend complaint to make pleadings conform to proof, where cause of action for negligence not changed. 120 C. 599. Not abuse of discretion to disallow amendment offered after arguments, when case tried on theory opposed to that of amendment. 124 C. 10. Nor to allow during trial a far-reaching amendment as to damages where defendant given choice of mistrial or continuance. 131 C. 232. Fact that court could have permitted amendment to cure defect does not deprive adverse party of right to take advantage of defect by plea in abatement. 131 C. 658. Cited. 133 C. 73. Court may in its discretion allow the filing of amendments to pleadings before, during and after trial. 135 C. 170. Filing of supplemental complaint after demurrer sustained held to waive any claim of error by court in sustaining demurrer; amended complaint may or may not have the effect of stating a new cause of action. 145 C. 579. Cited. 147 C. 153; 173 C. 408; 187 C. 180; 191 C. 201. In conjunction with Sec. 52-130, court held intent of legislature for this statute to apply only when trial has not commenced at time amendment is offered. 192 C. 553. Cited. 205 C. 413.

Cited. 5 CA 101. Cited. 19 CA 203; 23 CA 188. Because plaintiff may amend “any defect, mistake or informality” of a pleading within 30 days of return date, an amendable summons or complaint should not be rejected by Superior Court clerk. 53 CA 725. Section is a curative provision allowing party to amend defective writ or complaint, permits award of costs in limited instances and makes no reference to sanctions; “costs” defined. 85 CA 66.

Cited. 6 CS 181; Id., 381. Plaintiff entitled to amend by substituting a new defendant, where defendant originally named was an individual having the same name as the corporate defendant substituted, and such individual defendant was an executive officer and principal stockholder of defendant corporation. 9 CS 307. Where the defect is that the sheriff of one county is named in the writ but it was served to the sheriff of another county, defendant cannot attack this collaterally if he was in fact served. 14 CS 375. Where case is on appeal in Superior Court, motion to amend complaint in Probate Court is superfluous. 24 CS 494. Cited. 38 CS 712.

Fact that ad damnum would be increased by amendment sought by plaintiff, necessitating transfer to another court, no reason to deny motion to amend. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 347.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-215 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-215
Sec. 52-215. Dockets. Jury cases. Court cases.
Status: in_force

Appeal from doings of commissioners; time within which case must be placed on the jury docket. 54 C. 523. The 10 days run from the joinder of an issue of fact. 72 C. 96. Time de placing case on jury docket applies to bastardy proceedings. 73 C. 248. Historical review of right. 75 C. 218. In statutory action to remove cloud from title; 78 C. 100; 90 C. 133; in eminent domain. 76 C. 435. No jury trial proper in proceedings to remove municipal officer; 81 C. 585; or appeal from probate; 90 C. 49; or book debt. 78 C. 649. Of claiming cases in general. 72 C. 96; 75 C. 608; 80 C. 493. Applies to bastardy action. 73 C. 247. Claiming after decision on demurrer causing delay; 74 C. 475; after 30-day period but before issue joined; 80 C. 493; cannot be claimed after Supreme Court orders new trial. 91 C. 703. Where no claim properly made, opponent has absolute right to court trial. 81 C. 451. If issue joined within 30 days, time not extended by 10-day provision. 75 C. 609. If equitable issues tried to court are conclusive, jury trial of legal issues may be refused. 73 C. 486. Former provision requiring notice as to issues to be tried to jury. 83 C. 109; 85 C. 162; 89 C. 212; 90 C. 133; Id., 633; 91 C. 217. Discretion of court to order issues to the jury. 90 C. 624. Allowance of amendment after trial begun, merely changing date, does not give further right to claim case for jury; waiver of right. 95 C. 576. Case entered upon jury docket can be tried by court only by agreement of counsel or, in part, by discretion of court. 97 C. 718. When legal issues should be tried first; use of special interrogatories to enable jury to determine issues of fact. 98 C. 222. Cited. 113 C. 609; 114 C. 231. Contractor who had filed claim in receivership action not entitled to jury trial on cross complaint by receiver for balance of stock subscription. 117 C. 445, 454. Court has no greater latitude in testing justification for verdict in appeal from probate than in ordinary case where right to jury is constitutional. 126 C. 296. Jury may be claimed within 10 days after issue joined on complaint amended after original pleadings had been closed. 127 C. 332. Where essential basis of action is such that the issues are properly cognizable at law, either party has right to have legal issues tried to jury, even though equitable relief is asked; as where controlling issue is based on claimed legal title to real estate. 128 C. 307. Action for declaratory judgment is special statutory proceeding within section; where in reality complaint seeks advice of court of equity as to duties of trustees, no right to jury. 131 C. 312. Actions for declaratory judgments were created by statute in 1921 and should be entered upon the court docket. 135 C. 294. Test is not whether issue is statutory but if it is of same nature or such as prior to 1818 would have been triable by a jury. 143 C. 159. Whether a party has waived his right to a jury trial presents a question of fact for the trial court. 147 C. 153. Cited. Id., 423. Since claim for trial by jury made after time permitted but prior to joining issues in the third party action, there was continuing authority to the clerk to place the cause on the jury docket when the issues therein were joined. 165 C. 729. Cited. 169 C. 66. Court order denying motion to strike case from jury docket has same effect as having cause entered on jury docket by court order pursuant to section. 171 C. 5, 7. Running of 10-day period after issue of fact is joined discussed. 195 C. 333. Cited. 197 C. 34; 200 C. 482; 211 C. 370; 214 C. 464; 216 C. 40; 218 C. 386; 230 C. 148; 233 C. 905; 238 C. 282. Inverse condemnation action has no common law analogue that was triable to a jury prior to 1818, its nearest historical analogue, eminent domain, gives rise to a proceeding in equity, therefore there is no right to jury trial for cause of action based on inverse condemnation. 262 C. 45.

Cited. 1 CA 511; 6 CA 576; 15 CA 297; 23 CA 287; 28 CA 693; 37 CA 162; 40 CA 261. Court did not improperly deny jury trial as to an interpleader. 87 CA 337. Section is not unconstitutional in denying right to trial by jury in summary process cases. 135 CA 831. Having failed to comply with either of the time periods set out in section, plaintiff waived right to claim her original action to the jury docket, and defendant acquired the right to have the parties' dispute decided by the trial court, subject to the court exercising its discretion to order a jury trial; court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to restore original action to the docket where plaintiff withdrew original action and filed a second identical action to avoid her failure to comply with section and to undo her waiver of right to have matter placed on jury docket. 163 CA 100.

Action for accounting should be tried to court and not to jury notwithstanding issues of law are presented. 6 CS 193. Allowance of amendment does not enlarge period in which a case may be claimed for the jury docket. 8 CS 32, but see 12 CS 218. Jury trial is authorized in an appeal from the doings of commissioners on a solvent estate of a deceased person. 10 CS 1, but see 15 CS 415. Action by state for care and treatment of a patient is a special statutory proceeding which came into existence after January 1, 1880, and should be entered on the jury docket. Id., 369. Cited. 12 CS 218; 14 CS 410. If plaintiff claims an indebtedness which could be determined in an action at law, case cannot be stricken from jury docket. 18 CS 173. Claims of undue influence and incapacity in execution of a deed are triable by jury as of right in ejectment. 20 CS 13. Cited. 21 CS 160; 23 CS 145. A plea in abatement is not a “civil action” but a procedural part thereof and therefore may not be heard by a jury. 32 CS 245. Since any liability of a town for hospital services is statutory and did not exist prior to January 1, 1880, an action should be entered on the docket as a court case. Id., 272. Cited. 35 CS 549. If a new issue of fact is joined, either by amended complaint or amended answer or special defense, it should revive a right of election for jury trial. 36 CS 343. Cited. 37 CS 883; 44 CS 411.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407uu — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407uu
Sec. 52-407uu. Remedies, fees and expenses of arbitration proceeding.
Status: in_force

(b) An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding.

(c) As to all remedies other than those authorized by subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an arbitrator may order such remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate under the circumstances of the arbitration proceeding.

(d) An arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, must be paid as provided in the award.

(e) If an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief under subsection (a) of this section, the arbitrator shall specify in the award the basis in fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award and state separately the amount of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557m — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557m
Sec. 52-557m. Immunity from liability of directors, officers and trustees of nonprofit tax-exempt organizations.
Status: in_force

Cited. 214 C. 1; 228 C. 375; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.

Section provides greater protections to director, officer or trustee of nonprofit organization than does federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 and so is not preempted by said act. 140 CA 40.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-102b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-102b
Sec. 52-102b. Addition of person as defendant for apportionment of liability purposes.
Status: in_force

(b) The apportionment complaint shall be equivalent in all respects to an original writ, summons and complaint, except that it shall include the docket number assigned to the original action and no new entry fee shall be imposed. The apportionment defendant shall have available to him all remedies available to an original defendant including the right to assert defenses, set-offs or counterclaims against any party. If the apportionment complaint is served within the time period specified in subsection (a) of this section, no statute of limitation or repose shall be a defense or bar to such claim for apportionment, except that, if the action against the defendant who instituted the apportionment complaint pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is subject to such a defense or bar, the apportionment defendant may plead such a defense or bar to any claim brought by the plaintiff directly against the apportionment defendant pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

(c) No person who is immune from liability shall be made an apportionment defendant nor shall such person's liability be considered for apportionment purposes pursuant to section 52-572h . If a defendant claims that the negligence of any person, who was not made a party to the action, was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or damage and the plaintiff has previously settled or released the plaintiff's claims against such person, then a defendant may cause such person's liability to be apportioned by filing a notice specifically identifying such person by name and last-known address and the fact that the plaintiff's claims against such person have been settled or released. Such notice shall also set forth the factual basis of the defendant's claim that the negligence of such person was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or damages. No such notice shall be required if such person with whom the plaintiff settled or whom the plaintiff released was previously a party to the action.

(d) Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitation or repose, the plaintiff may, within sixty days of the return date of the apportionment complaint served pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, assert any claim against the apportionment defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original complaint.

(e) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a person not a party to the action to be brought in as an apportionment defendant under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendant to do so.

(f) This section shall be the exclusive means by which a defendant may add a person who is or may be liable pursuant to section 52-572h for a proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages as a party to the action.

(g) In no event shall any proportionate share of negligence determined pursuant to subsection (f) of section 52-572h attributable to an apportionment defendant against whom the plaintiff did not assert a claim be reallocated under subsection (g) of said section. Such proportionate share of negligence shall, however, be included in or added to the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom the plaintiff seeks recovery, including persons with whom the plaintiff settled or whom the plaintiff released under subsection (n) of section 52-572h , when comparing any negligence of the plaintiff to other parties and persons under subsection (b) of said section.

Significance of appeal undermined by legislation; certification to appeal was improvidently granted; appeal dismissed. 239 C. 798. Apportionment complaint seeking to add a person who may be liable to plaintiff under Sec. 52-572h may not be filed against an unidentified person. 253 C. 516. Defendant may assert under a general denial that the negligence of an employer who is not a party to the action is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 287 C. 20.

Cited. 46 CA 18. Reaffirmed previous holdings that section implicates personal jurisdiction and not subject matter jurisdiction and applies to legal malpractice claims against apportionment defendants. 85 CA 655.

Subsec. (a):

Time limitation on bringing apportionment complaint is substantive and mandatory and implicates personal jurisdiction. 269 C. 10. Although compliance with the 120-day limit is mandatory, equitable reasons may excuse compliance, and fact that legal basis for apportioning liability arose only after the 120-day limit had expired constitutes an equitable reason justifying excusal from compliance with the limit. 281 C. 112.

Subsec. (d):

Because language of Subsec. does not include a provision for a nonappearing party, the rules of practice control and plaintiff could not accomplish service through the mail but was required to serve the new claim on the nonappearing party in the same manner as an original complaint is served. 112 CA 28.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-308 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-308
Sec. 52-308. Form of attachment bond.
Status: in_force

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That .... of .... as principal, and .... of .... as surety, are holden and firmly bound jointly and severally unto .... of .... in the penal sum of .... dollars, to which payment well and truly to be made, we hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, firmly by these presents. THE CONDITION of this obligation is such that, whereas the said .... has brought an action against the said ...., said action being returnable to the .... court for .... judicial district on the first Tuesday of ...., 20.., demanding .... dollars damages, the writ being dated at ...., on the .... day of ...., A.D. 20.., and signed by .... as ...., and by direction of said writ an attachment has been placed upon property of the said .... as follows: .... Now, Therefore, if the said .... shall pay any judgment that may be recovered against him in such action not exceeding the amount of .... dollars (the amount of damages demanded by said writ), or in default of such payment, shall pay to the officer having the execution issued on such judgment, on demand, the actual value of the interest, not exempt from attachment and execution, of the said .... in said attached property at the time of said attachment, not exceeding said amount of .... dollars, then his bond shall be void, but otherwise in full force and effect.

Dated at .... this .... day of ...., 20...

.... L.S.

.... L.S.

In suit on bond, value of the property at the time the bond was given is controlling; 45 C. 356; the obligors are estopped from denying the attachable interest of original defendant; 58 C. 429; but may prove the want of any interest or ownership in mitigation of damages. 74 C. 174; 86 C. 615. Cited. 72 C. 159. Error in noting recognizance may be overlooked. 74 C. 171. Necessity of attempt to levy and of demand before suit on. 86 C. 615; 104 C. 281. Nature and effect of bond in general. 84 C. 334. Though in statutory form, not under statute if not ordered by court. 86 C. 621; 90 C. 507; 91 C. 132; 94 C. 91. Limit of liability under; joint bond of two defendants. 85 C. 83. Effect of bankruptcy of debtor on liability of surety. 84 C. 331. Nature of bond and effect of bankruptcy; that it was voluntarily given, nil. sig. 95 C. 551; 101 C. 543. Extent of surety's liability. 95 C. 713. Effect of bond; surety entitled to benefit of payments made to plaintiff by company insuring defendant's liability. 97 C. 20. Whatever destroys attachment destroys bond; necessity for demand on garnishee within 60 days where bond given to release foreign attachment. 104 C. 281. Common law bond is a new security entirely disconnected with attachment lien. 127 C. 354. Bond in statutory form, given to release an attachment, is a substitute for the property and not a substitute for the lien of the attachment; defendant is not estopped to prove that defendant in original action had no interest in car. 136 C. 66. Surety is liable only to extent of actual value of interest of principal in property released. 138 C. 428. Cited. 141 C. 675; 209 C. 15.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572b
Sec. 52-572b. Alienation of affections and breach of promise actions abolished.
Status: in_force

The Heart Balm Act does not affect common law principles governing actions for the return of property transferred in reliance on fraudulent representations. 180 C. 369, 370. Cited. 240 C. 549.

When legislature enacted section, it expressed its intent to abolish common law actions seeking damages for a particular type of conduct, regardless of the name that plaintiff assigns to that conduct, and in determining whether an action is barred under section, court will consider underlying conduct alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 80 CA 180.

Action for criminal conversation is not barred in this state by section, which specifically prohibits actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise. 28 CS 487.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146o — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146o
Sec. 52-146o. Disclosure of patient communication or information by physician, surgeon or health care provider prohibited.
Status: in_force

(b) Consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative shall not be required for the disclosure of such communication or information (1) pursuant to any statute or regulation of any state agency or the rules of court, (2) by a physician, surgeon or other licensed health care provider against whom a claim has been made, or there is a reasonable belief will be made, in such action or proceeding, to the physician's, surgeon's or other licensed health care provider's attorney or professional liability insurer or such insurer's agent for use in the defense of such action or proceeding, (3) to the Commissioner of Public Health for records of a patient of a physician, surgeon or health care provider in connection with an investigation of a complaint, if such records are related to the complaint, or (4) if child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual, abuse of an individual who is physically disabled or incompetent or abuse of an individual with intellectual disability is known or in good faith suspected.

Cited. 225 C. 700; 240 C. 658. A duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of that relationship gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the health care provider, unless the disclosure is otherwise allowed by law. 327 C. 540. Court cannot conclude that any disclosure of medical records in response to a subpoena complies with Subsec. (b) because a subpoena, without a court order, is not a statute, regulation of a state agency, or rule of the court. Id.

Statutory privilege for medical records does not apply to criminal proceedings. 74 CA 633.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-53 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-53
Sec. 52-53. State marshal may make special deputation.
Status: in_force

The person deputed may belong to a defendant town. K. 237. Section to be strictly construed; deputation must appear on copy. 83 C. 276. Authority of sheriff to deputize city clerk to post notice on town signposts is doubtful. 184 C. 483.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-172 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-172
Sec. 52-172. Declarations and memoranda of deceased persons.
Status: in_force

Statute is comprehensive and does not exclude any memoranda left by decedent. 26 C. 92; 32 C. 518; 42 C. 153. Applies only in favor of those who sue or defend either as personal representatives, heirs and distributees, or purchasers by will; it does not embrace purchasers by contract. 32 C. 509; 56 C. 338; 71 C. 252; 109 C. 311. Statement in will held admissible under statute. 43 C. 123. Endorsement of interest on note by payee, held admissible but insufficient to prove an acknowledgment of indebtedness. 49 C. 495. Cited. 54 C. 243. “Representatives of deceased persons” construed; declaration held inadmissible. 56 C. 106; 109 C. 311. Declaration by testator as to the meaning of his will is inadmissible. 56 C. 167; 91 C. 49. Account books of decedent in his own handwriting are admissible; their weight is for the jury. 57 C. 479. Entries need not refer in terms to the matter in controversy, but may be shown to be relevant aliunde. 63 C. 313. The generality of an oral statement touching the question affects only its weight. Id., 315. An appeal from the probate of a will is not an “action” within the meaning of statute. Id., 413. Statute applies to a suit continued by original plaintiff's executor. Id., 417. Memoranda and declarations inadmissible if decedent has given a deposition covering the case. Id., 419. Declarations must be testified to by one who heard them, and cannot be supplied by evidence of the declarations of another person, since deceased, as to what the intestate said to him. 71 C. 581. Declarations of deceased landowner de his continued ownership, held admissible. 72 C. 479. Does not apply where neither estate nor legal representatives are interested; 80 C. 446; as where question is as to gift made during life; 89 C. 321; or conveyance made during lifetime. 109 C. 311. Purpose of statute includes appeal from allowance of account. 84 C. 662. Applies to statements made after action brought; so makes all statements written or oral admissible, even though deceased could not testify to them, if alive. 86 C. 474. Does not include declarations made to deceased. 87 C. 341. Declaration of deceased landowner admissible in support of title of devisee. 81 C. 219, 228. Statements of one killed by negligent act admissible in action by his administrator. 86 C. 422; 91 C. 728; 109 C. 238. When admissible; not for purchaser by contract. 71 C. 246; 72 C. 693; 109 C. 311. Statement must be relevant and material. 78 C. 337. Declarations of testamentary intent not ordinarily admissible. 91 C. 47. Statements of deceased agent of party are not admissible in his behalf. 95 C. 159. Applicable to workmen's compensation act hearings. 98 C. 649. Discretionary with trial court whether to specifically call attention of jury in charge to declarations of deceased. 99 C. 482. Statute does not apply in contest as to title of property between alleged grantee of deceased and grantee of her administrator in carrying out contract of deceased to sell land. 109 C. 311. Incompletely executed will signed by defendant's intestate and conversation he had with plaintiff admissible as written memorandum and oral statements relevant to issue of whether plaintiff's services were gratuitous. 110 C. 217. But communications between deceased and attorney and unsigned draft of new will inadmissible as privileged in suit by person not claiming under deceased. 112 C. 521. Statement by deceased contradictory to another statement by him not admissible solely to impeach his credibility, but both statements admissible in proof of facts stated. 110 C. 540. Cited. 116 C. 729; 119 C. 551; 126 C. 605. Diary of deceased containing detailed entries but lacking mention of sickness relevant to contradict allegations of plaintiff claiming compensation for nursing services. 124 C. 52. Declaration is evidence of facts stated but weight is ordinarily for jury. 135 C. 248. Letter written by decedent containing statements laudatory of plaintiff, including quotation from words of another, is admissible. 138 C. 398. A letter was held not to be admissible because the writer was not a party to the litigation. 142 C. 558. Statute broad enough to include a motion of the head of decedent. 146 C. 129. The fact that a statement contains an opinion does not necessarily make it inadmissible; statute calls for a liberal interpretation; oral declarations of deceased are admissible under statute. 148 C. 510. Cited. 153 C. 603; 154 C. 507, 511. Wife of deceased defendant permitted to testify to statements by deceased about the accident in issue. 175 C. 97. Cited. Id., 297; 183 C. 41; 202 C. 609; 211 C. 555; 217 C. 260; 218 C. 220; 237 C. 209. Overruled earlier holding that declarant must be representative of a decedent; statute does allow a third party who is not an heir or other representative of decedent's estate to invoke statute to testify as to decedent's statements. 279 C. 558.

Cited. 3 CA 111; 13 CA 101; 30 CA 305; 38 CA 73; 46 CA 620. To deny decedent the benefit of an evidentiary rule, such as the exclusions of offers of compromise, defeats purpose of statute. 50 CA 405. Out of court statement of decedent not admissible when the action was not brought by official representative of deceased person. 58 CA 19. Applicability of “dead man's statute” discussed. 70 CA 477.

Hearsay declaration of deceased person must be examined with care; trier to decide weight to be accorded it. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 148, 154. Declaration admissible under life insurance contract, not under annuity contract. Id., 676.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-423 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-423
Sec. 52-423. Appeal.
Status: in_force

Cited. 197 C. 26; 200 C. 91; Id., 376; 201 C. 50; 206 C. 113; 208 C. 352; 223 C. 761. Defendant may not appeal trial court's order to remand case to arbitration panel because court did not vacate award and hence order does not constitute appealable final judgment under section, nor does order meet Curcio test for appeal of an interlocutory order. 271 C. 474.

Section has been recognized as authoritative source of law concerning appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of arbitration appeals. 66 CA 202. In appeal arising in the context of a municipal collective bargaining agreement, trial court's order vacating arbitration award and remanding matter for rehearing is an appealable final judgment under section. 224 CA 237.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-228a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-228a
Sec. 52-228a. Appeal from order of remittitur or additur.
Status: in_force

Cited. 208 C. 82. Legislature provided explicit right to appeal under section not as replacement for Sec. 52-228b right to reject the additur, but as alternative recourse for plaintiff; this section and Sec. 52-228b are not inconsistent with one another. 246 C. 170.

Cited. 2 CA 174; 35 CA 850. A party, having accepted an additur, lacks standing to appeal from the order granting that additur. 72 CA 327. When court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff on same day she accepted additur, it essentially denied defendant opportunity to respond to additur by the deadline it previously had ordered; that denial contravenes provisions contained in Sec. 52-228b which allow parties a reasonable time in which to accept the additur; because court rendered judgment before allowing defendant either to accept or reject the additur, court acted improperly. 93 CA 309.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-195a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-195a
Sec. 52-195a. (Formerly Sec. 52-256). Unliquidated damages; tender.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 52-256:

General issue and tender repugnant; costs. 67 C. 74. Waiver of defects in tender. Id., 585; 76 C. 705. Tender bars costs. 80 C. 233; 87 C. 158. Not now necessary to pay money into court. Id., 157. Tender of money due on contract excused where other party cannot perform. 88 C. 64.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-511 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 920 / Section 52-511
Sec. 52-511. Receiver entitled to control of partnership property.
Status: in_force

That statute “vests” the partnership property in the receiver on his appointment does not alter the nature of the application. 66 C. 359; 87 C. 369.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-176 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-176
Sec. 52-176. Promise to pay barred debt to be in writing.
Status: in_force

Statute applies to claims presented against estates. 68 C. 305, 306. Signature to letter made by stenographer by means of a rubber stamp, held a sufficient compliance with statute. 73 C. 346. Unequivocal acknowledgment enough; reference to extraneous papers. 80 C. 415. Letters of administrator as such though sole heir, held not to remove bar. 84 C. 54. Effect of act of executor in charging debt in his account. Id., 137. In action on insurance policy, assignment by deceased to secure debt made after debt barred, held sufficient evidence. 88 C. 544. Cited. 129 C. 544. Statute applies where action commenced prior to death of executrix' decedent. 178 C. 529. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 17 CS 222.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-137 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-137
Sec. 52-137. Amendment changing the relief sought.
Status: in_force

Cited. 60 C. 400; 99 C. 216. Court may in its discretion allow the filing of amendments to pleadings before, during and after trial. 135 C. 170. Cited. 163 C. 7.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-210 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-210
Sec. 52-210. Motion for nonsuit.
Status: in_force

Does not impair right of trial by jury. 24 C. 468. Cannot be granted because suit was brought without authority. 26 C. 529. Cases of nonsuit. 23 C. 485; 24 C. 40; Id., 207; 30 C. 492. When to be granted. 93 C. 96; 97 C. 312. Refusal to nonsuit not reviewable on application of defendant. 51 C. 512. Nonsuit should not be granted where there is substantial evidence to support plaintiff's claim. 58 C. 279; 70 C. 74; 71 C. 29. Nor on a jury trial upon the ground that the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would not support a judgment. 66 C. 196. Nor because the court is satisfied that the witnesses are not credible. Id., 206. Statute salutary. 76 C. 41. If law applied to facts proved does not make out case, nonsuit is proper; 77 C. 321; so, where plaintiff's evidence brings case within statute of limitations; 64 C. 430; 71 C. 24; or statute of frauds; 82 C. 293; or plaintiff fails to make out prima facie case; 66 C. 313; 104 C. 78, 746; or bases case on surmise or conjecture; 82 C. 403; 83 C. 231; 84 C. 401; 86 C. 509; Id., 546; or offers no substantial evidence. 70 C. 74; 84 C. 403. But not proper if plaintiff makes out prima facie case; 71 C. 24; 104 C. 78; or offers substantial evidence; 82 C. 236; 83 C. 261; though it is weak; 83 C. 20; or evidence is conflicting; 70 C. 505; or issue involves determination of credibility of witness; 94 C. 350; 96 C. 230; 116 C. 69; or reasonable men might differ. 87 C. 119. Sufficiency of allegations of complaint not in question. 82 C. 236. Court must construe evidence most favorably to plaintiff. 83 C. 20; 116 C. 69. Motion need not specify grounds. 77 C. 559. Proper as to one of several defendants. 79 C. 379; 82 C. 685. Court may permit reopening of case to supply proof. 68 C. 33. Discretion of court in refusing to grant. 77 C. 136; Id., 334; Id., 462; 79 C. 266; Id., 379; 80 C. 298; 106 C. 13. Form motion takes immaterial if no evidence offered which could sustain recovery. 90 C. 617. Grant carries costs but does not determine issues; form of judgment file. 94 C. 80. Has no place on hearing in damages after default. Id., 244. Rules same in court and jury cases. 96 C. 230. All inferences to be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Id., 222. Only evidence considered is that offered by plaintiff to support complaint, not that pertinent to affirmative defense. 97 C. 312; 100 C. 42. Nature of nonsuit; is entirely different from erasure or dismissal for want of jurisdiction. 98 C. 231. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Denial of motion for nonsuit serves no other purpose than to establish fact that prima facie case is made. 132 C. 402. Upon a motion for nonsuit, unless it appears that no relief could be granted under the pleadings, their legal sufficiency is not open to question. 134 C. 502. Cited. 140 C. 643. Nonsuit may be granted only when plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. 143 C. 230. Cited. 145 C. 99; 147 C. 260; 152 C. 699; 185 C. 1. Where granting of nonsuit must depend in any appreciable degree upon court's passing on credibility of a witness, nonsuit should not be granted. Id., 195.

Cited. 30 CA 664; 43 CA 83.

Motion for dismissal is unknown to Connecticut law. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407cc — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407cc
Sec. 52-407cc. Applicability of chapter.
Status: in_force

(1) (A) All the parties to the proceeding agree in a record to be governed by sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive, and (B) the agreement under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision is permitted by a law of this state other than sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive; or

(2) The proceeding is governed by sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive, pursuant to a law of this state other than sections 52-407aa to 52-407eee , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-249 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-249
Sec. 52-249. Costs and attorney's fees in actions for foreclosure and substitution of bond.
Status: in_force

(b) In any foreclosure judgment when a lis pendens had been recorded after a title search of real property, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid for the search and tax it as part of the costs.

In foreclosure, costs thrown on defendant only if he seeks to redeem. 81 C. 442. Cited. 216 C. 85.

Cited. 19 CA 8; 22 CA 468. According to statute, plaintiff must argue for attorney's fees during foreclosure action; thus, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under statute is a question of law for court to decide in the foreclosure action; because it is a question of law, attorney trial referee cannot decide the issue. 70 CA 404. Attorney's fees under section include fees incurred on appeal as well as at the trial level. 118 CA 367. Trial court may consider the legal work performed by plaintiff's counsel in defending a counterclaim in the calculation of the award of attorney's fees under section if such legal work is necessary to plaintiff's ability to prove its substantial performance as part of the underlying foreclosure claim. 145 CA 316.

Plaintiff not entitled to counsel fees for protracted trial on plaintiff's claims for contract prices of two jobs and on defendant's counterclaims of offsets against contract price; there never was a hearing on form of the judgment or the time of redemption as required under statute. 49 CS 405.

Subsec. (a):

In action to foreclose mechanic's lien, plaintiff is not entitled to duplicate attorney's fees under this section and Sec. 42-150aa but rather may collect under Sec. 42-150aa for contract aspects of action and under this section for equitable relief. 86 CA 767. Award of attorney's fees proper where court entered judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff, regardless of whether plaintiff prevailed. 122 CA 686. Subsec., by its plain language, contemplates a hearing with regard to specific aspects of the foreclosure proceeding; because trial on the mechanic's lien foreclosure claim was bifurcated from the trial on plaintiff's other claims sounding in breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and thus was not pursued at the trial on the latter claims, that latter trial cannot reasonably be considered the hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation of time for redemption contemplated by Subsec. 158 CA 766; reversed on other grounds, see 325 C. 14. In action to foreclose a judgment lien, requirement that a hearing as to the form of judgment under Subsec. was satisfied and trial court had authority to award attorney's fees and costs to plaintiff following a hearing during which plaintiff's counsel presented a property appraisal for entry into evidence and the court made a factual finding as to the fair market value of the property. 179 CA 721.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-367c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-367c
Sec. 52-367c. Execution against lottery and pari-mutuel winnings.
Status: in_force

(b) The Connecticut Lottery Corporation may establish a reasonable fee for any administrative expenses associated with executions made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, including the cost to the Connecticut Lottery Corporation of any fee that may be imposed by the clerk of the court. The amount of the fee shall reflect the direct and indirect costs of processing the executions by said corporation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-450 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 912 / Section 52-450
Sec. 52-450. Reassessment of damages by jury; addition by court.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 13a-64 re reestimate of damages and benefits by jury in cases concerning highway construction.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-564 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-564
Sec. 52-564. Treble damages for theft.
Status: in_force

See chapter 952, part IX, re larceny, robbery and related offenses.

In a public prosecution for theft, the court will not on conviction award treble damages to the owner. 6 C. 105. Plaintiff not bound to prove his case “beyond a reasonable doubt”. 30 C. 103. Rules of evidence are the same as in any civil suit. Id., 556. Not a penal statute. 74 C. 135; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Statutory treble damages discussed. 188 C. 36. Cited. 206 C. 125; 216 C. 200; 236 C. 582; 241 C. 678. Statutory theft under section is synonymous with larceny as provided in Sec. 53a-119; statutory theft requires that defendant wrongfully take, obtain or hold property of another. 255 C. 20. Preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to statutory theft claims brought under section. 297 C. 26. The litigation privilege applies to bar plaintiff's statutory theft claim. 341 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 303; 8 CA 96; 11 CA 161; 18 CA 20; 33 CA 303; 37 CA 7; 42 CA 599; 43 CA 1; 45 CA 46; Id., 324. Statute synonymous with larceny under Sec. 53a-119. 47 CA 517. Liability for conversion is a precondition to finding of liability for treble damages under section. 86 CA 527. Because count of plaintiff's complaint alleging civil theft is devoid of any factual assertion that defendants acted with the requisite intent to permanently deprive plaintiff of her property, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for civil theft, and count is legally insufficient. 99 CA 719. Plaintiff is required to prove the actions alleged by clear and convincing evidence in order to be entitled to an award of treble damages. 112 CA 160; judgment reversed in part, see 297 C. 26. In order to prove liability under section, plaintiff only had to show that defendant engaged in conduct that was synonymous with larceny, and was not required to show that the funds had been stolen by defendant or anyone else; given defendant's knowledge concerning source and disposition of funds in question, his continued failure to return funds constituted an intentional decision on his part to deprive plaintiff of its use of funds. 136 CA 99. The essential elements plaintiffs must prove to obtain treble damages for civil theft are the same as the elements to prove larceny: (1) An intent to do the act complained of, (2) the act was done wrongfully, and (3) the act was committed against an owner. 138 CA 695. Benefit on behalf of defendant is not an element of statutory theft; an intent to deprive plaintiff of funds could be inferred from fact that defendant withdrew funds that were not used for the benefit of the beneficiary and the trust had been exhausted. 139 CA 794. Injunctive relief is not a remedy available under section and since plaintiffs have made no tuition payments there is no loss of property; no theft can occur absent the loss of property. 191 CA 360. A claim for civil theft of funds must be for specific identifiable money and cannot arise from an implied contract of unjust enrichment. 196 CA 583. There is no basis for precluding the application of absolute immunity to a statutory theft claim that does not challenge the underlying purpose of the litigation but, instead, challenges the alleged misconduct of the defendant in his role as an attorney on behalf of his client; Public policy does not support permitting claims of statutory theft against attorneys, as it would inhibit participation and candor in judicial proceedings, and have a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship and on an attorney's zealous representation of his or her client. 198 CA 197; judgment affirmed, see 341 C. 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-225i — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-225i
Sec. 52-225i. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Approval.
Status: in_force

(1) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents;

(2) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing; and

(3) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority.

See Sec. 52-225 l re transfer agreements to which applicable.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-643 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-643
Sec. 52-643. Effect of enforcement by mortgagee.
Status: in_force

(1) Make the mortgagee a mortgagee in possession of the real property;

(2) Make the mortgagee an agent of the owner;

(3) Constitute an election of remedies that precludes a later action to enforce the secured obligation;

(4) Make the secured obligation unenforceable; or

(5) Limit any right available to the mortgagee with respect to the secured obligation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-193 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-193
Sec. 52-193. Offer of compromise by defendant.
Status: in_force

Not applicable to foreclosure suits. 27 C. 146. Statute construed. 33 C. 217. Cited. 163 C. 445; 192 C. 301; 239 C. 708.

Cited. 17 CA 219.

Cited. 10 CS 166.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-504 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 920 / Section 52-504
Sec. 52-504. Application for receiver; orders of judge.
Status: in_force

Appointment is merely auxiliary to equitable relief; creditor may act. 73 C. 587. Judgment appointing is not final judgment. 74 C. 652. Some equity must appear, but final merits of case not to be determined before temporary appointment; appointment in chambers. 76 C. 252. Appointment to hold property pending an appeal affecting its disposition. 81 C. 116. Appointment to receive rents pending action to quiet title. 85 C. 434. In determining jurisdiction, ancillary and permanent appointments stand on same ground. 91 C. 92. When national bank may be receiver. 94 C. 648. Appointment of receiver operates as a breach of an executory contract unless receiver adopts and carries out contract. 98 C. 414. When foreign receiver may sue in Connecticut as matter of right, and when as matter of comity. 104 C. 670. Receiver is officer of court. 109 C. 335. Cited. 195 C. 218.

Cited. 1 CA 397; 16 CA 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-493 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 918 / Section 52-493
Sec. 52-493. Order in the nature of prerogative writs.
Status: in_force

Appeal lies from denial of writ. 96 C. 718. Cited. 97 C. 428; 124 C. 645; 228 C. 106.

Cited. 46 CA 486.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-252 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-252
Sec. 52-252. Costs for nonappearance of party giving notice of deposition.
Status: in_force

Decree of Probate Court not an “action” within meaning of statute. 271 C. 531.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 915 / Section 52-470
Sec. 52-470. Summary disposal of habeas corpus case. Determination of good cause for trial. Appeal by person convicted of crime.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) After the close of all pleadings in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court, upon the motion of any party or, on its own motion upon notice to the parties, shall determine whether there is good cause for trial for all or part of the petition.

(2) With respect to the determination of such good cause, each party may submit exhibits including, but not limited to, documentary evidence, affidavits and unsworn statements. Upon the motion of any party and a finding by the court that such party would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the exhibits at that stage of the proceedings, the court may consider some or all of the exhibits in camera.

(3) In order to establish such good cause, the petition and exhibits must (A) allege the existence of specific facts which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief under applicable law, and (B) provide a factual basis upon which the court can conclude that evidence in support of the alleged facts exists and will be presented at trial, provided the court makes no finding that such evidence is contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. If the petition and exhibits do not establish such good cause, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether such good cause exists. If, after considering any evidence or argument by the parties at such preliminary hearing, the court finds there is not good cause for trial, the court shall dismiss all or part of the petition, as applicable.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2017; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction.

(d) In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. For the purposes of this section, the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same conviction shall not constitute a judgment. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction. Nothing in this subsection shall create or enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a subsequent petition under applicable law.

(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner's counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which materially affects the merits of the case and which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of this section.

(f) Subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of this section shall not apply to (1) a claim asserting actual innocence, (2) a petition filed to challenge the conditions of confinement, or (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed under section 53a-46a .

(g) No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person's release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.

The judgment may be reversed on error. 33 C. 328. Applicant may demur to the return, deny it or confess and avoid its effect. 67 C. 358. Cited. 111 C. 251; 151 C. 746; 153 C. 75; Id., 673. “In a summary way” construed. 117 C. 265. Constitutionality of out-of-state conviction and punishment not proper subjects for review in Connecticut upon a writ of habeas corpus. 146 C. 509. Where defendant had been represented by a special public defender who failed to proceed with appeal on grounds that he could not do so conscientiously and court denied motion for appointment of other counsel, his rights have been violated under equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution and there was no error in habeas corpus proceeding directing that he be discharged from prison unless, at his further request, counsel is appointed and necessary extensions of time to perfect the appeal are granted. 152 C. 504–507. In latter case, plaintiff cannot demand that other counsel be appointed if new counsel also concludes that there is no substantial error which he can assign on appeal. Id., 505. Where on habeas corpus, it has been properly determined that a right of appeal required by federal constitution has been denied, any rule restricting an appeal because of lapse of time is inapplicable. Id., 508. Petitioner may collaterally raise federal constitutional claims in habeas corpus proceeding even though he has failed to appeal his federal constitutional claims if he alleges and proves that he did not deliberately bypass direct appeal. 154 C. 363. Review allowed where plaintiff claimed conviction based on unlawfully obtained evidence and incriminating statements; plaintiff permitted to pursue appeal in forma pauperis. 155 C. 316. Cited. 156 C. 341. Mere occurrence of constitutional violation is not sufficient to render plea of guilty involuntary and subject to nullification in habeas corpus proceeding; court's finding that plaintiff voluntarily pleaded guilty because his photograph was taken and his companion informed and not because his room had been illegally searched was supported by the record. 157 C. 143. Cited. Id., 400. Where there is complete lack of merit to plaintiff's claim, case should not be certified for review. 158 C. 45. Appellee's direct challenge to late filing of appeal can only be made pursuant to Sec. 697 of Practice Book within 10 days from time of filing appeal and may not be effectively challenged by motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id., 486. Cited. 159 C. 150; 161 C. 337. Plaintiff's petition for certification of appeal to Supreme Court denied. 168 C. 254. Cited. 170 C. 121; 178 C. 207. Section serves only to delineate the proper scope of a hearing if one is legally required; does not address whether a hearing is, in the first instance, legally required. 180 C. 153. Cited. 187 C. 109. Writ of error, not habeas corpus, is appropriate method to review a summary, criminal contempt citation. 189 C. 663. Cited. 191 C. 142; 194 C. 510. Habeas court has no discretion to consider untimely petition for certification to appeal. 222 C. 254; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 689 and Id., 723. Cited. 226 C. 757; 229 C. 178; Id., 397; 230 C. 608; 234 C. 139. A request for an order to show cause why a habeas petition should be permitted when the petition was filed outside the two-year limitation period is governed by Subsec. (e), rather than Subsec. (b), and the habeas court has discretion to determine when it should act on the request. 329 C. 711. A habeas court's determination of whether a petitioner has satisfied the good cause standard under Subsecs. (d) and (e) is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion; although the legislature contemplated a petitioner's lack of knowledge of a change in the law as potentially sufficient to establish good cause under Subsecs. (d) and (e), the legislature did not intend for a petitioner's lack of knowledge of the law, standing alone, to establish that a petitioner has met the evidentiary burden of establishing good cause. 343 C. 424. Ineffective assistance of counsel is an objective factor external to the petitioner that may constitute good cause to excuse late filing of habeas petition under totality of the circumstances pursuant to Subsecs. (c) and (e). 348 C. 333.

Cited. 10 CA 520; 23 CA 559; 29 CA 274; 36 CA 695; 39 CA 473; 42 CA 17; 46 CA 486. Petitioner's inability to obtain transcripts of prior proceedings despite due diligence nor his ignorance of the law does not constitute good cause for delay in commencing habeas proceeding. 185 CA 528. The absence of a detailed statutory definition of the good cause standard indicates that the legislature intended the habeas corpus court to exercise significant discretion in making determinations regarding “good cause”; to rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay in section, petitioner generally will be required to demonstrate that something outside the control of petitioner or habeas counsel caused or contributed to the delay, including, but not limited to (1) whether external forces outside the control of petitioner had any bearing on the delay, (2) whether and to what extent petitioner or petitioner's counsel bears any personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for the untimely filing, (3) whether the reasons proffered by petitioner in support of a finding of good cause are credible and supported by evidence in the record and (4) how long after the expiration of the filing deadline did petitioner file the petition, and no single factor necessarily will be dispositive and the court should evaluate all relevant factors in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances presented. 202 CA 21; judgment affirmed, see 343 C. 424.

Does not preclude any right of appeal. 15 CS 274. Right of indigent accused to appeal to Supreme Court cannot be defeated by time limitations if he was deprived of federal constitutional right at his trial. 28 CS 464. Cited. 42 CS 371.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 230 C. 88. Section required defendant be granted specific performance of plea agreement; judgment of Appellate Court in 35 CA 374 reversed. 235 C. 413.

Cited. 29 CA 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; 39 CA 485; 41 CA 515; 46 CA 689. Habeas court abused its discretion when it denied petition for writ of habeas corpus without holding an evidentiary hearing for petitioner, even though she had finished serving her sentence. 110 CA 134.

Subsec. (b):

Section places the burden on the habeas petitioner who wants to avoid dismissal pursuant to Subsec. (b) to (1) state a legally cognizable claim in the petition for writ of habeas corpus, including the allegation of specific facts that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief, and (2) submit documentary exhibits sufficient to demonstrate evidence in support of the alleged specific facts. 178 CA 299.

Subsec. (d):

“Prior petition” unambiguously refers only to state habeas petitions. 348 C. 396.

The term “prior petition” is silent as to whether it includes a federal petition, but given the text of the section and that it occurs within a statutory framework concerning state procedures for state habeas petitions, it is plain and unambiguous because the only reasonable interpretation of the section is that such term is limited to a prior state petition and does not include a federal petition. 202 CA 503.

Subsec. (e):

Ineffective assistance of counsel is an objective factor external to the petitioner that may constitute good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition under the totality of the circumstances. 223 CA 562.

Subsec. (g) (former Subsec. (b)):

Cited. 193 C. 439; 200 C. 553; 213 C. 38; Id., 97; 218 C. 479; 222 C. 87; 223 C. 180; Id., 411; 227 C. 124; Id., 147; 229 C. 193; 235 C. 82; 240 C. 708. 10-day limitation on filing for certification to appeal from judgment does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction; judgment in 222 C. 254, to the extent it conflicts with this decision, overruled. 242 C. 689. Judgment of Appellate Court reversed in accordance with decision in 242 C. 689. Id., 723. In absence of demonstrable prejudice, legislature did not intend terms of the habeas court's grant of certification to be limitation on specific issues subject to appellate review. 245 C. 132. There is no exception to the requirement that a habeas petitioner expressly allege and explain in his brief how habeas court abused discretion in denying certification when the petitioner is self-represented. 341 C. 508. Subsec. did not restrict court's authority to review unpreserved claims under plain error doctrine or Golding following habeas court's denial of petition for certification to appeal. 347 C. 335.

Cited. 5 CA 277; 6 CA 518; 12 CA 343; 19 CA 686; 23 CA 63; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 112; 26 CA 48; 28 CA 195; 31 CA 771; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88; 33 CA 902; 35 CA 762; 40 CA 553; 43 CA 374; Id., 698. Subsec. intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals. 61 CA 350. Petitioner's claim that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying a petition for certification to appeal must be predicated on an issue that was an underlying claim in the habeas petition. 68 CA 1. Petitioner's claims that he was being treated as a slave and a prisoner at war were frivolous. 125 CA 220. Subsec. prevents reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following denial of certification of appeal unless petitioner establishes that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 159 CA 537. Subsec. does not restrict a reviewing court's authority to review unpreserved claims under the plain error doctrine or “Golding” following a habeas court's denial of a petition for certification to appeal, so long as the appellants' claims challenge the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding itself and the appellant fulfills his or her burden of establishing that the unpreserved claims are nonfrivolous, raising a colorable claim of plain error or the violation of a constitutional right due to the actions or omissions of the habeas court. 225 CA 234.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-60 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-60
Sec. 52-60. Judge of probate as attorney for nonresident fiduciary. Service of process.
Status: in_force

(b) Such person shall agree in the certificate that any such process which is served on the judge of probate shall be of the same force and validity as if served on himself, subject to the applicable provisions of sections 52-87 and 52-88 , and that the appointment of the judge of probate to be his attorney shall continue in force as long as any liability remains outstanding against him as a fiduciary and as long as he has any estate in his possession as a fiduciary.

(c) Copies of the certificate of appointment, certified by the judge or the clerk of the court of probate, shall be sufficient evidence of appointment and agreement.

(d) Service upon the judge of probate as attorney for the nonresident fiduciary shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident fiduciary, and shall be made by leaving an attested copy of the process with such judge of probate or with the probate court that appointed the nonresident fiduciary, and such judge or court shall forthwith give notice thereof to such executor, administrator, conservator, guardian or trustee.

(e) The judge of probate shall keep a record of all process served upon him which shall show the day and hour when service was made.

See Sec. 45a-206 re right of foreign corporation to be executor or trustee.

Cited. 147 C. 561; 195 C. 191.

Cited. 18 CS 441.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-68 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-68
Sec. 52-68. Notice to nonresident adverse or interested parties and interested parties unknown to plaintiff.
Status: in_force

(b) Such notice, having been given and proved by the affidavit of the officer who served the notice or by other competent evidence, shall be deemed sufficient service and notice, and the court may proceed to a hearing, unless otherwise provided by law, or may order further notice as it deems reasonable.

See Sec. 52-52 re orders of notice of legal or judicial proceedings.

Effect of service by publication. 89 C. 221. Cited. 108 C. 175. Sufficient notice given. 139 C. 506. Does not apply to actions under Sec. 46-28. 142 C. 173. Cited. 147 C. 561. Properly applies to an annulment action against nonresident defendant where plaintiff is domiciled in Connecticut. 152 C. 160. Action for declaratory judgment to determine title of property in another state not an in rem action and personal service is required. Id., 228. Cited. 182 C. 14; 190 C. 48; 195 C. 191; 212 C. 157.

Cited. 31 CA 569.

Cited. 39 CS 198.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-568 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-568
Sec. 52-568. Damages for groundless or vexatious suit or defense.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 1-241 re court action against persons who bring frivolous, unreasonable or harassing appeals to the Freedom of Information Commission.

See Sec. 52-226a re request for special finding.

Action lies at common law; 11 C. 586; but cannot be joined with count on statute. Id., 587. Joinder of plaintiffs. K. 146. Both malice and want of probable cause must be proved. 21 C. 515; 102 C. 444; 107 C. 294; 108 C. 40. “Malice” defined; may be inferred. 9 C. 313. Evidence of want of probable cause. 3 D. 432. Special damages. 2 D. 211. Excessive damages. 9 C. 313. Action for vexatious suit will lie against a private corporation. 22 C. 535. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Not a penal statute. 87 C. 468. Judgment in original action against plaintiff conclusive that it was not vexatious. 75 C. 637. Malice as a necessary element; evidence to prove; 69 C. 512; 86 C. 6; Id., 250; 91 C. 448; 102 C. 439; 105 C. 177; 107 C. 294; advice of counsel as rebutting. 70 C. 235; 107 C. 295. Damages. 69 C. 512; 84 C. 111; 86 C. 249; 91 C. 448; 102 C. 439. Various matters of evidence considered. 90 C. 545; 105 C. 177. Probable cause a defense; what constitutes. 93 C. 475; 105 C. 177; 107 C. 295. May not base action on statute for malicious prosecution of suit in New York. 110 C. 534. Whether particular facts constitute probable cause is always a question of law; conclusion of trier is reviewable on appeal. 132 C. 571. Cited. 176 C. 353; 205 C. 255; 214 C. 1; 220 C. 225; 224 C. 29. Statute applies equally to claims against private litigants and attorneys and does not suggest any basis for treating probable cause differently depending on the type of defendant against whom the action is brought, and therefore in a vexatious litigation action against a law firm, the presence or absence of probable cause should be judged by the general objective standard. 281 C. 84. Congress has occupied the field of penalties and sanctions for abuse of the bankruptcy process, implicitly preempting state law CUTPA and vexatious litigation claims; in field of bankruptcy law, the federal interest is so dominant that federal law is assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the subject, and even though state law actions are not in conflict with federal law, the former are still preempted under conflict preemption analysis because they are an obstacle to accomplishing Congress' purposes within the Bankruptcy Code. 333 C. 1.

Cited. 43 CA 1. Discussed re District Court ruling on evidence of reasonableness in pursuing a claim and “advice of counsel” defense. 49 CA 582. Plaintiff's vexatious litigation claim based on defendant's filing of an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court is preempted by federal bankruptcy law that provides sanctions for filing frivolous and malicious pleadings. 86 CA 596. Court adopted Indiana Court of Appeals' articulation of objective standard of probable cause: Standard which should govern the reasonableness of attorney's action in instituting litigation for a client is whether claim merits litigation against defendant in question on the basis of facts known to the attorney when suit is commenced; on the basis of the facts known to the law firm, a reasonable attorney familiar with the law of this state would believe that applicable statutes of limitation could be tolled by fraudulent concealment on the part of Retirement Centers. 89 CA 459. Prejudgment remedy is not a civil action for purposes of vexatious litigation. 100 CA 63. Statutory action for vexatious litigation differs from a common-law action only in that a finding of malice is not an essential element, but will serve as a basis for higher damages; trial court properly concluded that law firm did not have a proper purpose in filing a shareholder litigation suit pursuant to Sec. 33-948 to permit inspection of corporate records, where stock repurchase offer had expired prior to filing of suit. 103 CA 20. Vexatious litigation counterclaim by defendant was premature where the original lawsuit had not yet been terminated in defendant's favor at the time of pleading. 110 CA 511. Trial court's determination that certificate of good faith that was attempted to be filed in malpractice action was insufficient did not equate to determination that there was lack of probable cause to bring such action; court's finding of blatant and egregious conduct did not collaterally estop party from litigating in vexatious litigation action the question of whether there was probable cause to bring malpractice action against hospital. 144 CA 100. All counts of the underlying action must be favorably terminated for a vexatious litigation claim to be ripe. 148 CA 176. Subdivs. (1) and (2) do not constitute two separate and distinct causes of action; to prevail under either Subdiv., plaintiff must prove four elements by preponderance of evidence. 156 CA 854. There is no indication that the use of the term “defense” was intended to have a technical or special meaning and, as such, it will be given its common usage which includes a denial. 227 CA 347.

Elements of a vexatious suit. 14 CS 293. In an action for vexatious suit, plaintiff must show that the suit complained of terminated in his favor and that there was want of probable cause; where defendants showed they had knowledge of facts sufficient to justify reasonable men in the belief that there were reasonable grounds for commencing and prosecuting the original action, there was no want of probable cause. 22 CS 272. Section relates only to vexatious suit and has no application to malicious prosecution. 24 CS 256. Complaint in action for vexatious suit must contain allegation prior suit terminated in plaintiff's favor. 31 CS 305.

Vexatious suit may be brought as cause of action created by statute in which treble damages may be awarded or may be instituted under common law in which case damages must be compensatory only. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 666.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-217 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-217
Sec. 52-217. Violation of statute by minor.
Status: in_force

Cited. 146 C. 10. Minor child may be liable to her minor sister for damage caused by negligence. 147 C. 649. Cited. 148 C. 459. Boy 14 years old entitled to have jury measure his conduct by that reasonably to be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience. 151 C. 434. Cited. 154 C. 644; 165 C. 251.

Cited. 38 CS 426.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-529 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-529
Sec. 52-529. Burden of proof. Evidence. Damages and costs.
Status: in_force

When judgment for return of property a mere formality. 51 C. 176. Plaintiff entitled to full costs, although he fails to prove title to all the articles. 54 C. 83. Plaintiff cannot prove a “general or special property” in goods which are not distinguishable from others of like kind. Id., 317. Plaintiff not bound to prove that property which was not replevied was in this state when wrongfully detained. 66 C. 546. Defendant not obliged to claim damages; may recover them subsequently in suit on replevin bond. 70 C. 340; 71 C. 86; 74 C. 392; Id., 553; 101 C. 417. Damages where lunch wagon is replevied and defendant prevails. 74 C. 552. Judgment of return and for costs proper where a plea to the jurisdiction is sustained. 64 C. 74. Nature of judgment for return of goods. 70 C. 605. Judgment as an estoppel in action on bond. 71 C. 698. Remittitur required as condition of not going to new trial. 81 C. 101. Effect of judgment for plaintiff on general issue. 69 C. 450. Costs recoverable. 40 C. 111; 48 C. 133; 54 C. 83. All the issues should ordinarily be tried together. 91 C. 319. Obligee entitled to nominal damages on bond where return of goods and payment of damages is refused, though subsequently made; 76 C. 683; so where third party, owner of goods, had taken them and suit was for expenses. 96 C. 683. No damages can be given in replevin action unless counterclaimed by defendant; elements of damage. 101 C. 61. Judgment for nominal damages on counterclaim deprives defendant of right to sue again on replevin bond; res judicata. Id., 416. Cited. 118 C. 476. Plaintiff must prevail by strength of his title and not by weakness of defendant's. 128 C. 198; Id., 508. Proof merely of actual possession by plaintiff of vehicles registered in another's name not sufficient. Id. Replevin is a purely statutory action. 152 C. 695.

Cited. 18 CA 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-577c
Sec. 52-577c. Limitation of action for damages caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant.
Status: in_force

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-555 , 52-577 and 52-577a , no action to recover damages for personal injury, death or property damage caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant released into the environment shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury or damage complained of is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.

(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to an action brought against (1) any municipal waterworks system established and operated under chapter 102 or any special act, (2) any regional water authority established under any general statute or special act, or (3) any water company as defined in section 16-1 .

Cited. 205 C. 219; 214 C. 464; 228 C. 905; 230 C. 12; 238 C. 800. Subsec. (b) does not preempt Sec. 52-555. 277 C. 337.

Cited. 31 CA 824.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-152 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-152
Sec. 52-152. Depositions of persons in armed forces.
Status: in_force

(b) The deposition shall be taken by interrogatories on the part of the party taking the deposition, of which reasonable notice shall be given to each adverse party, and by cross-interrogatories by each adverse party, with like notice to the other side. The commission, with the interrogatories and cross-interrogatories, shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall make return of his proceedings to the court, under seal, addressed to the clerk of the court, if there is one, otherwise to the judge.

Cited. 146 C. 252; 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1.

Cited. 23 CS 249.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362f — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-362f
Sec. 52-362f. Enforcement of child support orders by income withholding.
Status: in_force

(1) “Agency” means the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services of this state and, when the context requires, means either the court or agency of any other jurisdiction with functions similar to those defined in this section, including the issuance and enforcement of support orders.

(2) “Child” means any child, whether above or below the age of majority, with respect to whom a support order exists.

(3) “Court” means the Superior Court of this state, including the Family Support Magistrate Division, or the court or agency of any other jurisdiction with functions similar to those defined in this section, including the issuance and enforcement of support orders.

(4) “Income” means earnings as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 52-362 .

(5) “Income derived in this jurisdiction” means any earnings, the payer of which is subject to the jurisdiction of this state for the purpose of imposing and enforcing an order for withholding under section 52-362 .

(6) “Jurisdiction” means any state or political subdivision, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(7) “Obligee” means any person or entity which is entitled to receive support under an order of support and shall include an agency of another jurisdiction to which a person has assigned his or her right to support.

(8) “Obligor” means any person required to make payments under the terms of a support order for a child, spouse, or former spouse.

(9) “Payer” means any payer of income.

(10) “Support order” means any order, decree, or judgment for the support, or for the payment of arrearages on such support, of a child, spouse, or former spouse issued by a court or agency of another jurisdiction, whether interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, parentage or paternity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise.

(b) The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies.

(c) When a support order has been issued in this state and the obligor has earnings subject to income withholding in another jurisdiction, (1) the agency shall on application of a resident of this state, (2) Support Enforcement Services shall on behalf of any client for whom Support Enforcement Services is providing services, (3) an obligee or obligor of a support order issued by this state may, or (4) an agency to whom the obligee has assigned support rights may, promptly request the agency of another jurisdiction in which the obligor of a support order derives income to enter the order for the purpose of obtaining income withholding against such income. The agency or Support Enforcement Services, as the case may be, shall compile and transmit promptly to the agency of the other jurisdiction all documentation required to enter a support order for this purpose. The agency or Support Enforcement Services also shall transmit immediately to the agency of the other jurisdiction a certified copy of any subsequent modifications of the support order. If the agency or Support Enforcement Services receives notice that the obligor is contesting income withholding in another jurisdiction, it shall immediately notify the individual obligee of the date, time and place of the hearings and of the obligee's right to attend.

(d) When a support order is issued in another jurisdiction and the obligor has income subject to withholding in accordance with the provisions of section 52-362 , Support Enforcement Services shall, upon receiving a support order of another jurisdiction with the documentation specified in this subsection from an agency of another jurisdiction, or from an obligee, an obligor or an attorney for either the obligee or obligor, file such support order and documents in the registry maintained by Support Enforcement Services. Documentation required for the entry of a support order for another jurisdiction for the purpose of withholding of income shall comply with the requirements of section 46b-371 . If the documentation received by Support Enforcement Services does not conform to those requirements, Support Enforcement Services shall remedy any defect which it can without the assistance of the obligee or requesting agency or person. If Support Enforcement Services is unable to make such corrections, the requesting agency or person shall immediately be notified of the necessary additions or corrections. Support Enforcement Services shall accept the documentation required by this subsection as long as the substantive requirements of this subsection are met.

(e) A support order registered under subsection (d) of this section shall be enforceable by withholding in the manner and with the effect as set forth for registered support orders of another jurisdiction pursuant to section 52-362 . A support order from another jurisdiction filed under this section shall not be subject to modification by a court or other agency of this state except as provided in sections 46b-384 to 46b-387 , inclusive. Entry of the order shall not confer jurisdiction on any court of this state for any purpose other than withholding of income.

(f) Upon registration of a support order from another jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, Family Support Magistrate Division or Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court acting on its behalf shall proceed as provided in section 46b-377 .

(g) An income withholding order under this section shall direct payment to the Office of Child Support Services or its designated collection agent. The office or its designated agent shall promptly distribute payments received pursuant to an income withholding order or garnishment based on a support order of another jurisdiction entered under this section to the agency or person designated pursuant to subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of section 46b-371 . A support order entered pursuant to subsection (d) of this section does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court of this state pursuant to any other section of the general statutes or a support order made by a court of any other state. Amounts collected by any withholding of income shall be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for any period under any support orders issued either by this state or by another jurisdiction.

(h) The agency or Support Enforcement Services, upon receiving a certified copy of any amendment or modification to a support order entered pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, shall file such certified copy with the clerk of Support Enforcement Services, and Support Enforcement Services shall amend or modify the order for withholding to conform to the modified support order.

(i) If the agency or Support Enforcement Services determines that the obligor has obtained employment in another state or has a new or additional source of income in another state, it shall notify the agency which requested the income withholding of the changes within ten days of receiving that information and shall forward to such agency all information it has or can obtain with respect to the obligor's new address and the name and address of the obligor's new employer or other source of income. The agency or Support Enforcement Services shall include with the notice a certified copy of the order for withholding in effect in this state.

(j) Any person who is the obligor on a support order of another jurisdiction may obtain a voluntary income withholding by filing with the agency a request for such withholding and a certified copy of the support order issued by such jurisdiction. The agency shall file such request for a voluntary withholding with the certified copy of the support order from the jurisdiction that entered such order with the clerk of Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court and Support Enforcement Services, acting on behalf of the Family Support Magistrate Division, shall issue an order for withholding. Any order for withholding thus issued shall be subject to all applicable provisions of this section.

Cited. 234 C. 194.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-45b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-45b
Sec. 52-45b. (Formerly Sec. 52-90). Forms for commencement of civil action.
Status: in_force

(1) Summons for appearance before the Superior Court.

To any proper officer:

By authority of the state of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to summon A.B. of .... (list address or last known address) to appear before the superior court for the judicial district of .... on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20.., the appearance not to be in person but to be made by A.B. or his attorney by filing a written statement of appearance with the clerk of the court whose address is ...., (include street number and town) on or before the second day following the return date then and there to answer to C.D. of .... in a civil action, in which the plaintiff complains and says: ....

I, J.W., the subscribing authority, hereby certify that I have personal knowledge as to the financial responsibility of the plaintiff, and deem it sufficient; or, E.F. of .... is recognized in $.... to prosecute, etc.

Of this writ with your actions thereon make due return.

Dated at .... the .... day of ...., 20..

J.W., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

(2) Writ of attachment before the Superior Court.

To any proper officer:

By authority of the state of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to attach to the value of .... dollars the real or personal property of A.B. of .... (list address or last known address) and him summon to appear before the superior court for the judicial district of .... on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20.., the appearance not to be in person but to be made by A.B. or his attorney by filing a written statement of appearance with the clerk of the court whose address is ...., (including street number and town) on or before the second day following the return date then and there to answer to C.D. of .... in a civil action, in which the plaintiff complains and says: ....

I, J.W., the subscribing authority, hereby certify that I have personal knowledge as to the financial responsibility of the plaintiff, and deem it sufficient; or, E.F. of .... is recognized in $.... to prosecute, etc.

Of this writ with your actions thereon make due return.

Dated at .... this .... day of ...., 20..

J.W., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

See Sec. 52-185 re bond for prosecution.

See Sec. 52-279 re conditions required for granting an attachment.

Annotations to former section 52-90:

A writ in an action at law for damages is fatally defective if it contains no ad damnum clause; 47 C. 19; but see as to appeal from commissioners on an insolvent estate; 83 C. 34; and as to appeal from board of relief. 109 C. 360. Cited. 113 C. 79; 132 C. 515; 162 C. 255. Attachment by writ must comply with chapter 903a. 167 C. 623.

Cited. 6 CS 156; 35 CS 237; 36 CS 47; 38 CS 389.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 207 C. 547; 225 C. 13.

Language in citation in zoning appeal that required defendant to appear and answer but did not state that appearance need not be in person and could be made by filing a written statement was defective, but the defect was circumstantial and dismissal was not warranted. 50 CS 513.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-415 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-415
Sec. 52-415. Arbitrators may ask advice of courts.
Status: in_force

Cited. 163 C. 327; 189 C. 16. Language of statute militates against availability of any appellate review. 197 C. 26. Cited. 199 C. 618; 208 C. 411; 218 C. 646; 223 C. 761.

Cited. 1 CA 207; 5 CA 61; 16 CA 711; 28 CA 270; Id., 337.

Cited. 17 CS 427. Court dismissed application where advice on issue of insurance coverage was tantamount to using a declaratory form of action. 25 CS 504.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-414 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-414
Sec. 52-414. Additional arbitrator. Rehearing. Oath.
Status: in_force

(b) If any party fails to appear before the arbitrators or an umpire after reasonable notice, the arbitrators or umpire may nevertheless proceed to hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence which is produced before them.

(c) If a written agreement to arbitrate provides that two or more arbitrators therein designated or referred to may select or appoint a person or persons as an additional arbitrator or arbitrators or as an umpire, or if a person or persons are selected or appointed as a substitute arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire and any such selection or appointment is made after evidence has been taken in the arbitration, the matters shall be reheard, unless a rehearing is waived in the written agreement to arbitrate or by subsequent written consent of the parties.

(d) Before hearing any testimony or examining other evidence in the matter, the arbitrators and umpire shall be sworn to hear and examine the matter in controversy faithfully and fairly and to make a just award according to the best of their understanding, unless the oath is waived in writing by the parties to the arbitration agreement.

(e) Any arbitrator or an umpire may administer oaths to witnesses.

See Sec. 1-24 re officers who are authorized to administer oaths.

After reasonable notice, arbitrators may proceed to hear and determine controversy ex parte. 138 C. 57. Cited. 142 C. 193. Decision rendered after ex parte hearing held valid. 152 C. 276. Cited. 157 C. 363; 163 C. 327; 171 C. 493. Waiver and estoppel discussed. 175 C. 24. Cited. 187 C. 228. Does not impose additional oath-taking requirements. 200 C. 91. Cited. 208 C. 352; 218 C. 646.

Oath provision of statute does not apply to members of State Board of Mediation and Arbitration. 3 CA 590. Cited. 16 CA 486; 26 CA 418; 28 CA 270; 32 CA 250.

Cited. 17 CS 15; 20 CS 47. Arbitrator can hear no testimony until he has been sworn. 19 CS 387.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-525 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-525
Sec. 52-525. Statement of title.
Status: in_force

(b) If the right of action or defense rests upon a right of possession by virtue of a special property interest, the pleading shall set forth the facts upon which the special property interest depends so as to show that, at the time when the action was commenced or the goods were replevied, as the case may be, the party pleading or the third person was entitled to the possession of the goods.

(c) The defendant may, by answer, defend on the ground that a third person was entitled to the possession of the goods without connecting himself with the latter's title.

Cited. 128 C. 198. Does not alter rule that plaintiff alleging general property and right to immediate possession must prove it to prevail. Id., 508. Where right of action rests upon a right of possession by virtue of a special property, the complaint must set forth the facts. 135 C. 517.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-251c
Sec. 52-251c. Limitation on attorney contingency fees in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions. Waiver of limitation by claimant.
Status: in_force

(b) In any such contingency fee agreement such fee shall be the exclusive method for payment of the attorney by the claimant and shall not exceed an amount equal to a percentage of the damages awarded and received by the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant as follows: (1) Thirty-three and one-third per cent of the first three hundred thousand dollars; (2) twenty-five per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (3) twenty per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (4) fifteen per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; and (5) ten per cent of any amount which exceeds one million two hundred thousand dollars.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a claimant may waive the percentage limitations of said subsection if the claim or civil action is so substantially complex, unique or different from other wrongful death, personal injury or property damage claims or civil actions as to warrant a deviation from such percentage limitations. Factors that may indicate that a claim or civil action is substantially complex, unique or different from other wrongful death, personal injury or property damage claims or civil actions include, but are not limited to, if the claim or civil action (1) involves complex factual medical or legal issues, (2) involves serious permanent personal injury or death, (3) is likely to require extensive investigation and discovery proceedings, including multiple depositions, or (4) requires independent expert witness testimony. For the purposes of this subsection, “independent expert witness testimony” means testimony, whether at trial or in a deposition, from an expert who has not participated in the care of the claimant and has not participated in any official investigation of the incident involved.

(d) Prior to a claimant entering into a contingency fee agreement that provides for a fee that exceeds the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section, the attorney shall (1) explain the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section to the claimant and the reasons the attorney is unable to abide by those limitations; (2) advise the claimant of the claimant's right to seek representation by another attorney willing to abide by the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section; and (3) allow the claimant a sufficient period of time to review the proposed contingency fee agreement and, if the claimant wishes, seek representation by another attorney prior to entering into such agreement.

(e) No waiver of the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section shall be valid unless the contingency fee agreement (1) is in writing, (2) sets forth in full the fee schedule of subsection (b) of this section, (3) contains a conspicuous statement, printed in boldface type at least twelve points in size, in substantially the following form: “I UNDERSTAND THAT THE FEE SCHEDULE SET FORTH IN SECTION 52-251c OF THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES LIMITS THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PAYABLE BY A CLAIMANT AND THAT THE STATUTE WAS INTENDED TO INCREASE THE PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT THAT WAS ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY A CLAIMANT. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING THAT FEE SCHEDULE WAS TO CONFER A BENEFIT ON A CLAIMANT LIKE MYSELF, I KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THAT FEE SCHEDULE IN THIS CLAIM OR CIVIL ACTION.”, and (4) is signed and acknowledged by the claimant before a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments.

(f) If a claimant waives the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section pursuant to this section, in no event shall (1) the total fee under the contingency fee agreement exceed thirty-three and one-third per cent of the damages awarded and received by the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant, and (2) the claimant be required to repay any costs that the attorney incurred in investigating and prosecuting the claim or civil action if there is no recovery.

(g) No fee shall be payable to any attorney who seeks a fee that exceeds the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section unless the claimant has waived such limitations pursuant to this section and the contingency fee agreement complies with the requirements of subsection (e) of this section.

(h) For the purposes of this section, “damages awarded and received” means in a civil action in which final judgment is entered, that amount of the judgment or amended judgment entered by the court that is received by the claimant; “settlement amount received” means in a claim or civil action in which no final judgment is entered, the amount received by the claimant pursuant to a settlement agreement; and “fee” shall not include disbursements or costs incurred in connection with the prosecution or settlement of the claim or civil action, other than ordinary office overhead and expense.

Cited. 214 C. 1; 223 C. 786; Id., 484; Id., 786; 231 C. 77; 235 C. 107. Plaintiff's failure to comply with section does not preclude him from recovering under doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, regardless of whether bad faith by the successor attorney or client's waiver of section has been established. 255 C. 390.

Cited. 28 CA 693; 43 CA 184; 45 CA 237. Section intended to regulate the attorney-client relationship in order to protect plaintiffs from excessive legal fees, and defendant insurer may assert section as a special defense in action by an attorney for interference with a contractual relation. 48 CA 699. Complaint filed by counsel against hospital was a civil action that sought recovery of damages resulting from personal injury which falls within the ambit of section; fee cap does not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to contract. 139 CA 147. Attorney who is barred from contract recovery because of fee agreement's failure to comply with section cannot recover from client under doctrine of quantum meruit. 163 CA 273.

Benefits of section can be waived. 42 CS 526.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-192 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-192
Sec. 52-192. Precedence of other cases in order of trial.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 49-39 re privileged status of action to foreclose a mechanics' lien with respect to order of trial.

Cited. 63 C. 307; 179 C. 415; 229 C. 634; 230 C. 828.

Subsec. (a): Statute requires that an offer of compromise be filed while claims remain pending against a defendant in the trial court and prior to the time judgment has been rendered for that defendant. 224 CA 501.

Privilege given to “persons” over 65 years of age does not extend to corporate entities in existence over 65 years; legislative intent construed. 22 CS 156.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-407tt — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-407tt
Sec. 52-407tt. Modification or correction of award by arbitrator.
Status: in_force

(1) Upon a ground stated in subdivision (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 52-407xx ;

(2) Because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or

(3) To clarify the award.

(b) A motion under subsection (a) of this section shall be made and notice given to all parties within twenty days after the movant receives notice of the award.

(c) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any objection to the motion within ten days after receipt of the notice.

(d) If a motion to the court is pending under section 52-407vv , 52-407ww or 52-407xx , the court may submit the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award:

(1) Upon a ground stated in subdivision (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 52-407xx ;

(2) Because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or

(3) To clarify the award.

(e) An award modified or corrected pursuant to this section is subject to subsection (a) of section 52-407ss and sections 52-407vv to 52-407xx , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-576 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-576
Sec. 52-576. Actions for account or on simple or implied contracts.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action.

(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions upon judgments of any court of the United States or of any court of any state within the United States, or to any cause of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.

See Sec. 17b-122 re reimbursement of town by pauper.

Statute of limitations does not apply to continuing trusts. 33 C. 76; 102 C. 302; 104 C. 189. It applies to collecting agents. 32 C. 540. A book debt, if not recoverable in an action of book debt, by reason of statute, is not recoverable at all; 5 C. 342; unless there has been a new accounting. 6 C. 248. Where action at law is barred, one in equity will generally be also. 32 C. 538. Day on which note matures should be excluded in computing the 6 years. 43 C. 57. Note made by life legatee to testator and distributed to maker is not barred; his continued life use amounts to a payment of interest. 46 C. 443, 444. Section applies to money demand on executed simple contract. Id., 142. Statute begins to run against demand note from its date. Id., 437. Suit seasonably commenced but abated by defendant's death arrests running of statute. Id., 440. Implied trusts are within statute. 33 C. 77; 59 C. 156. Payment of interest on mortgage keeps claim alive, although the mortgage is afterward discovered to be invalid. 53 C. 180. Statute will not begin to run until there is someone who can sue and be sued; parties cannot defer the running of statute by their own laches. 61 C. 451. Action against guarantor of a nonnegotiable note is governed by this section and not by Sec. 52-573. 66 C. 461. It is a good defense to a claim made as a set-off, that it is barred by statute. 49 C. 92. If claim be barred, mechanic's lien to secure it cannot be enforced. 50 C. 271. Statutes de settlement of estates supersede general statutes of limitation. Id.; 52 C. 141. Does not run in favor of husband as statutory trustee of wife. 55 C. 221. When claim barred by statute may still be used in recoupment. Id., 432. Laches not to be imputed to one who sues within statutory period. Id., 578. When statute runs against a resulting trust. 62 C. 408. A domestic judgment is not included in section. 74 C. 656. Statute runs against claim for services to decedent rendered more than 6 years before death unless rendered on promise to pay by will. 80 C. 19; 82 C. 651; 83 C. 38. Where deceased promised to pay for services by will, right of action does not accrue until death, even where suit is on quantum meruit; 121 C. 97; same where deceased promised only heir to pay by not making will. 96 C. 384. When statute begins to run on demand note. 75 C. 431; 78 C. 267; 84 C. 55. A tax is not within section. 85 C. 378. Effect of failure to get order limiting time to present claims against an estate, where debtor dies. 75 C. 408. Action on endorsement of note not an action on note. 66 C. 457. In action on implied contract for use of land, treating possession as tenancy from year to year will not remove bar. 77 C. 7. When action for breach of contract accrues; 86 C. 494; advances by partner; 68 C. 459; settlement of partnership accounts; 68 C. 457; where payments are credited on account. 70 C. 434; 125 C. 199. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 114 C. 170. Each item of a series of charges for services may be separate debt for purposes of statute. 129 C. 541; 134 C. 259. When applied to suit against surgeon for breach of implied contract to use reasonable care and skill. 103 C. 720, see 119 C. 507; 127 C. 386; 134 C. 259. Cited. 110 C. 414; 112 C. 368; 137 C. 691; 139 C. 220; 149 C. 326. Right of action on demand note accrues upon its execution and delivery. 116 C. 559. Due bill barred by section. 124 C. 294. Statute applies to wife's claim for support. 124 C. 547. Applies to action by employee to recover overtime pay and liquidated damages under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 246. Distinguished from Sec. 52-581; this section applies to executed parol contracts. Id., 259. Does not apply to action by municipality to recover assessment of benefits. 131 C. 50. Nor to statutory action by one town against another for reimbursement of expense of educating children. 132 C. 203. But applies to action by policeman against city to recover salary withheld. 134 C. 260. History of statute. Id., 266. Proof of existence and performance of contract unenforceable because statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to defense of statute of limitations, by showing that no action brought earlier could be maintained. Id., 536. Applies to executed contracts. Id., 585. Ignorance that damage has been done does not prevent running of statute, except where there is something tantamount to fraudulent concealment of cause of action. 135 C. 176. Court's finding that debt was barred, not supported by evidence. 136 C. 187. An unconditional promise to pay will not be implied if the acknowledgment of indebtedness, even though unequivocal, is accompanied by a conditional promise to pay; in such a situation the indebtedness remains barred until the condition has been met. 144 C. 403. Burden of proof on plaintiff to remove bar of statute; defense can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of debt or payment on account. 145 C. 300. Statute of limitations was tolled because, although defendant stopped making specified payments provided for in support contract, he did provide money for the child's support which he intended to go toward the fulfillment of his contractual obligation. 153 C. 671. Cited. 165 C. 410. When plaintiff's performance of oral contract has been completely executed, this section and not Sec. 52-581 establishes applicable limitation period. 170 C. 243. Amended complaint which did not allege a new cause of action related back to date of complaint and thus claims therein were not barred by statute. 177 C. 191. Statute not applicable where plaintiff's attorney was legally incapable of bringing action; applies only to the contractual party. Id., 281. Cited. 178 C. 258; Id., 529; 184 C. 558; 191 C. 150; Id., 194; 192 C. 732; 196 C. 509; 199 C. 683; 205 C. 219; 210 C. 734; 214 C. 464; 228 C. 436; 233 C. 474; 239 C. 284; 240 C. 287. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Statute of limitations for tort action and not breach of contract action applies to claims against defendant law firm where complaint contained no allegation that defendant breached specific contract provision and relied on language typically used in negligence cases. 311 C. 282.

Cited. 1 CA 7. Statute is not tolled pending appointment of an administrator or executor. Id., 535. Creditor is entitled to compensation under an insurance policy loss payable clause even though his right to bring suit against debtor has been extinguished by running of statute of limitations. Id., 595. Where plaintiff filed an amended complaint listing additional defects in construction of new house, the identity of the cause of action remained the same so that the 6-year contract statute of limitations applied and the court properly allowed the amendment in its discretion. Id., 652. Cited. 3 CA 250; Id., 602; 5 CA 293. Right of action accrued upon completion of services rendered. Id., 465. Cited. 6 CA 212; 11 CA 375; 12 CA 529; 17 CA 159; 30 CA 803; 33 CA 702; 34 CA 395; Id., 732; 39 CA 289; 42 CA 426; 43 CA 435; 45 CA 466. Section's 6-year statute of limitations applied to executed oral contract, as opposed to 3-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-581 which applies only to executory contracts. 76 CA 599. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690.

Time when statute begins to run. 3 CS 209. Cited. 5 CS 205. “I will take care of it as soon as I can” takes debt out of statute. 7 CS 48. Cited. Id., 145. Applies to action for recovery of loan not evidenced in writing and loan not signed by borrower. 8 CS 264. Cited. Id., 363. The law of the locus rather than the forum governs statute of limitations. 9 CS 399. A payment to toll statute of limitations must be made or authorized by the debtor. 10 CS 371. Claim of physician not barred by statute of limitations because it was found to be an open running account. Id., 494. Payment of interest and principal by grantee of the equity of redemption does not keep statute of limitation from tolling against the liability of the mortgagor on the note. 11 CS 461. Cited. 12 CS 286. Does not apply to a town's right to reimbursement under Sec. 10-253; history. 13 CS 58. Cited. Id., 174. When services have been rendered by police officers, an implied contract to pay them arises and statute of limitations for contracts is applicable. 14 CS 130. Distinction between legal damage and apparent damage. Id., 464. Cited. 17 CS 61. There is no statute of limitations regarding domestic judgments; the prima facie presumption of payment, which arises after 20 years, presents the only limitation of time to the collection of a domestic judgment. Id., 134. Where plaintiff alleges promise by defendant's intestate during his lifetime to pay for services out of his estate, cause of action does not accrue until intestate's death. 18 CS 133. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer to complaint unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted in complaint. 19 CS 85. Institution of arbitration proceedings not the bringing of “action” under statute. 25 CS 76. Cited. 28 CS 162; 29 CS 501. Applied retroactively, absent express intent to the contrary. 30 CS 596. Mental incompetence does not toll the 6-year limitation, but imprisonment may. 31 CS 46. Cited. 34 CS 22; 35 CS 199. Applicable where plaintiff's performance was completely executed, in contrast to applicability of Sec. 52-501 to executory contracts. 37 CS 735. Cited. 39 CS 458; 42 CS 348; 44 CS 207. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi does not operate to exempt state from statute of limitations. 51 CS 265.

In order for statute of limitation to be available as a defense, it must be pleaded; if a party fails to plead it, he is deemed to have waived it and plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding that the period has run. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 569, 571. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 366, 367.

Subsec. (a):

Statute of limitations does not begin to run on claim for underinsured benefits until tortfeasor's liability limits have been exhausted. 251 C. 106. Re claim for uninsured motorist benefits, statute of limitations does not begin to run until plaintiff knew or should have known the tortfeasor was uninsured, and in this case plaintiff could not have known the tortfeasor was uninsured until she received answers to her interrogatories which thereby put her on notice there was no insurance coverage for the accident. 255 C. 601. Claims that defendant breached its contractual duties under condominium association's bylaws by failing to repair foundations were governed by the six-year limitation period prescribed by statute and such claims accrued at the time defendant ceased its efforts to repair. 348 C. 726.

Where arbitration clause in insurance policy meant underinsured motorist claimant could not maintain an action against provider until all underlying insurance was exhausted, right of action did not accrue, and statute of limitations did not begin, until that time. 49 CA 653. Accrual date or date that plaintiff properly could have maintained an action against defendant was date when plaintiff was notified of lack of insurance coverage and not date of the accident. 54 CA 724. In a claim for attorney's fees, where plaintiff attorney continued to represent defendant client's interests, statute of limitations did not begin to toll until attorney's motion to withdraw his appearance had been granted. 72 CA 158. Waiver of statute of limitations included as a delay in enforcement clause at the inception of a mortgage note is void and unenforceable. 84 CA 675. Continuous representation doctrine not applicable to contract for architectural services; statute not tolled where contract divided payment into monthly segments and breach of contract occurred at the time of each nonpayment. 148 CA 728. An action on a third-party guarantee agreement accrues on the date the third-party guarantee agreement becomes due and payable. 198 CA 136.

When debtor defaults on obligation payable in installments, statute of limitations on installments due in the future does not run until installment becomes due or irreversible acceleration of the debt occurs. 45 CS 325.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-148b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-148b
Sec. 52-148b. Notice of taking of deposition.
Status: in_force

(b) An order of the court is not required for the taking of a deposition by the party initiating a civil action or probate proceeding if the notice (1) states that the person to be examined is about to go out of this state, or is bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless his deposition is taken before expiration of the twenty-day period, and (2) sets forth facts to support such statements. The attorney for the party seeking to take the deposition shall sign the notice, and his signature constitutes a certification by him that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief the statement and supporting facts are true.

(c) Whenever the whereabouts of any adverse party is unknown, a deposition may be taken pursuant to section 52-148a after such notice as the court, in which such deposition is to be used, or, when such court is not in session, any judge thereof, may direct.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 216 C. 483; 229 C. 716.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571k — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-571k
Sec. 52-571k. Action for equitable relief or damages resulting from deprivation of equal protection of the laws of the state committed by a police officer.
Status: in_force

(1) “Law enforcement unit” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-294a ; and

(2) “Police officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-294a .

(b) No police officer, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, shall deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state, including, without limitation, the protections, privileges and immunities guaranteed under article first of the Constitution of the state.

(c) Any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (b) of this section may bring a civil action for equitable relief or damages in the Superior Court. A civil action brought for damages shall be triable by jury.

(d) (1) In any civil action brought under this section, governmental immunity shall only be a defense to a claim for damages when, at the time of the conduct complained of, the police officer had an objectively good faith belief that such officer's conduct did not violate the law. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of a trial court's denial of the application of the defense of governmental immunity. Governmental immunity shall not be a defense in a civil action brought solely for equitable relief.

(2) In any civil action brought under this section, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from a police officer's deliberate failure, in violation of section 29-6d , to record any event that is relevant to such action.

(e) In an action under this section, each municipality or law enforcement unit shall protect and save harmless any such police officer from financial loss and expense, including legal fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand or suit instituted against such officer by reason of any act undertaken by such officer while acting in the discharge of the officer's duties. In the event such officer has a judgment entered against him or her for a malicious, wanton or wilful act in a court of law, such municipality shall be reimbursed by such officer for expenses it incurred in providing such defense and shall not be held liable to such officer for any financial loss or expense resulting from such act.

(f) In any civil action brought under this section, if the court finds that a violation of subsection (b) of this section was deliberate, wilful or committed with reckless indifference, the plaintiff may be awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

(g) A civil action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced not later than one year after the date on which the cause of action accrues. Any notice of claim provision set forth in the general statutes, including, but not limited to, the provisions of subsection (d) of section 7-101a and subsection (a) of section 7-465 shall not apply to an action brought under this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-530 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-530
Sec. 52-530. Damages for property not replevied. No costs against common carrier.
Status: in_force

Recovery of damages where goods are detained out of state. 66 C. 549. Judgment on verdict giving no damages set aside; 100 C. 99; and also one on verdict awarding excessive damages. Id., 97.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-142 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-142
Sec. 52-142. Joint debtors; discharge; set-off.
Status: in_force

Effect of statute. 39 C. 575. Declaration against one joint debtor sufficient. 48 C. 43. Cited. 89 C. 84.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549o — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922b / Section 52-549o
Sec. 52-549o. Assignment of fact-finders. Hearings.
Status: in_force

Cited. 199 C. 496.

Cited. 20 CA 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-380d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-380d
Sec. 52-380d. (Formerly Sec. 49-46a). Release of judgment lien on real or personal property. Form.
Status: in_force

(b) A release of a judgment lien on real property is sufficient if (1) the release specifies the names of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, the date of the lien, and the town and volume and page where the judgment lien certificate is recorded, and (2) the signature of the lienholder, attorney or personal representative is acknowledged and witnessed in the same manner as a deed on real property. The town clerk with whom the lien was recorded shall note such release as by law provided and shall index the record of each such release under the name of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, except that a manual notation of such release shall not be required if such town clerk provides public access to an electronic indexing system that combines the grantor index and the grantee index of the town's land records.

(c) A release of a judgment lien filed on personal property pursuant to section 52-355a is sufficient if it contains a description of the property released, the name and address of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, and the file number of the judgment lien certificate in the office of the Secretary of the State. On presentation of such a statement of release to the filing officer in the office of the Secretary of the State, the filing officer shall mark the statement with the hour and date of filing and shall note the same on the index. The release shall be on a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State. On filing, the Secretary of the State may charge the fee prescribed by section 42a-9-525 for filing and indexing a termination statement.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-593 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-593
Sec. 52-593. Action against wrong defendant; allowance of new action.
Status: in_force

Where defendant in second suit is a street railway company upon whom no process was served in original action, statute does not cure lack of statutory notice. 105 C. 96. New action may be brought within 1 year regardless of originally applicable statute of limitations. Id., 94; 109 C. 460. New action may set up different allegations if cause of action remains the same. 108 C. 444. Appeal from architectural examining board not a “civil action” within meaning of section. 153 C. 124. Cited. 169 C. 646; 183 C. 504; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464; 225 C. 13; 234 C. 169. Where only one right person is named as defendant, failure to name all defendants from whom recovery is possible does not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant. 276 C. 1. Action was untimely and savings provision does not apply in municipal liability action under Sec. 52-557n because plaintiff could have recovered from defendants in original action, based on the factual allegations and causes of action in the original complaint. 315 C. 821.

Cited. 18 CA 515; 22 CA 625; 42 CA 345. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity under Sec. 4-165, the 2-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under this section for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as result of defendant's alleged negligence could not be saved from being time barred by statute because plaintiff named the proper party in his previous action which was not dismissed for failure to name the proper party but was stayed pending resolution in arbitration; statute applies only in circumstances in which plaintiff's original action failed by reason of naming the wrong defendant and such naming was the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact as to identity of the truly responsible individual. 67 CA 668. Plaintiff could not avail herself of statute's savings clause because dismissal of her first action was for dormancy, not for failure to name the right person as defendant. 72 CA 302. Plaintiff not eligible for relief under section since she withdrew her action in favor of a settlement and did not obtain judgment in the original action. 83 CA 843. Plaintiff's initial failure to name all presumptively factually correct defendants, whom plaintiff eventually did name, did not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant under section. 123 CA 583; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 306 C. 107. No exception to the principles of res judicata for an action brought under section. 165 CA 857.

Effect of section on statute of limitations where proper party was sued in corporate rather than individual name. 9 CS 307. The original action was terminated at the date judgments of nonsuit were rendered and not at the date of determination of later motions to set aside. 31 CS 302. Cited. 33 CS 176; 40 CS 266.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-264 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 902 / Section 52-264
Sec. 52-264. Judges of Supreme Court to make rules for appeals and writs of error.
Status: in_force

Cited. 111 C. 75; 122 C. 464; 123 C. 655; 135 C. 267; Id., 412; 159 C. 481.

Cited. 15 CS 273.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362j — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-362j
Sec. 52-362j. “Past-due support”, “overdue support”, defined.
Status: in_force

(1) “Past-due support” means any one or a combination of the following: (A) Court-ordered current support or arrearage payments which have become due and payable and remain unpaid; (B) unpaid support which has been reduced to a judgment or otherwise found to be due by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not presently payable; (C) support due for periods prior to an action to establish a child support order.

(2) “Overdue support” means a delinquency accruing after the entry of an initial court order establishing a child support obligation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-424 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-424
Sec. 52-424. Reference of pending actions to arbitration.
Status: in_force

It is a waiver of objections going to the personal disability of plaintiff to sue. 2 R. 429. Whether the disqualifications of judges apply to such arbitrators, quaere. 14 C. 29. Such submission does not put an end to the action. 21 C. 537.

Cited. 38 CA 555.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-565 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-565
Sec. 52-565. Double damages for forgery.
Status: in_force

See Secs. 53a-137 to 53a-140, inclusive, re forgery.

Not a penal statute. 1 D. 100; 74 C. 136; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Cited. 205 C. 93; 236 C. 582.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 41 CA 659; 43 CA 1.

An agent may commit forgery by making or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. 24 CS 498.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552g — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 923a / Section 52-552g
Sec. 52-552g. When transfer is made or obligation is incurred.
Status: in_force

(1) A transfer is made: (A) With respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and (B) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under sections 52-552a to 52-552 l , inclusive, that is superior to the interest of the transferee;

(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1) of this section and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under sections 52-552a to 52-552 l , inclusive, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action;

(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee;

(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred;

(5) An obligation is incurred: (A) If oral, when it becomes effective between the parties, or (B) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-473 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 916 / Section 52-473
Sec. 52-473. Injunctions may be granted immediately or after notice.
Status: in_force

(b) No temporary injunction may be granted without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears from the specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that irreparable loss or damage will result to the plaintiff before the matter can be heard on notice. It shall be sufficient, on such application for a temporary injunction, to present to the court or judge the original complaint containing the demand for an injunction, duly verified, without further complaint, application or motion in writing.

See Sec. 52-481 re temporary injunction to abate nuisance created by a manufacturer.

Ex parte injunction without bond disapproved. 77 C. 402. Discretion of court in granting ex parte injunction; review. 80 C. 430. Cited. 153 C. 661. In divorce or separation action, husband cannot be punished for civil contempt unless final judgment itself awards damages for such civil contempt. 157 C. 470. Tenants of a building where sewage disposal system was causing water pollution were not adverse parties requiring notice. 180 C. 568. Cited. 181 C. 492; 186 C. 725.

Cited. 29 CA 105.

Cited. 26 CS 290.

Stipulation entered into between parties that breach of their agreement by defendant would result in issuance of injunction forthwith is sufficient grounds for ex parte issuance of injunction sought; no jury trial was required where defendant was charged with civil contempt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 724. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 105.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-658 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 931 / Section 52-658
Sec. 52-658. Service of a subpoena.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of sections 52-148a to 52-152 , inclusive, and sections 52-156 to 52-157 , inclusive, shall apply to a subpoena issued under section 52-657 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-200a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-200a
Sec. 52-200a. Defendant's insurance liability policy limits and insurer's duty to indemnify subject to discovery.
Status: in_force

Cited. 212 C. 661; 229 C. 716.

Statute is not unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial department; public policy often requires legislation to facilitate administration of justice. 28 CS 32. Applies to pending cases at its enactment and is not unconstitutional infringement on judiciary rule making power. 29 CS 195.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-555c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-555c
Sec. 52-555c. Statute of limitations. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse contingent upon proof of facts for wrongful death.
Status: in_force

(b) Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse arising out of the claim or cause of action for the wrongful death of the other spouse shall be contingent upon proof of facts sufficient to establish recovery for the claim or cause of action for wrongful death. Nothing in sections 52-555a to 52-555d , inclusive, shall limit the assertion of any defenses against the claim or cause of action for loss of consortium that would be available against the claim or cause of action for wrongful death.

Cited. 44 CA 172.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-231a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-231a
Sec. 52-231a. Filing of affidavit re other custody proceedings; visitation rights.
Status: in_force

Cited. 212 C. 63.

Cited. 41 CS 258.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-642 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-642
Sec. 52-642. Receivership in another state; ancillary proceeding.
Status: in_force

(1) The person or nominee would be eligible to serve as receiver under section 52-625 ; and

(2) The appointment furthers the person's possession, custody, control or disposition of property subject to the receivership in the other state.

(b) The court may issue an order that gives effect to an order entered in another state appointing or directing a receiver.

(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, an ancillary receiver appointed under subsection (a) of this section has the rights, powers and duties of a receiver appointed under sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557v — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557v
Sec. 52-557v. Immunity from liability of the state, political subdivisions and employees for emergency administration of epinephrine cartridge injector.
Status: in_force

(b) The state or any political subdivision thereof that (1) has acquired and maintains a supply of epinephrine cartridge injectors, and (2) employs a person who (A) is trained in the use of an epinephrine cartridge injector in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 19a-909 , and (B) provides or administers an epinephrine cartridge injector to an individual whom the person believes in good faith is experiencing anaphylaxis during the course of such person's employment, shall not be liable to such individual for civil damages for any personal injuries that result from acts or omissions by such person in using an epinephrine cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection shall not apply to wilful or wanton misconduct or acts or omissions constituting gross negligence.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-448 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 912 / Section 52-448
Sec. 52-448. Not to interfere with existing dams or millsites.
Status: in_force

This protects waterpower near a mill, held by the mill owner with the intention at some future time to use it for the mill; 35 C. 496; 36 C. 310; although purchased with the knowledge that the petitioner was negotiating for the right to flow it. Id., 319. An abandoned millsite may be flowed. 35 C. 159. Setting up small mills, simply to protect the privilege from condemnation, and of no practical use, will be of no avail. Id., 513. A mill is a “lawfully existing” one, notwithstanding the dam may be a little higher than it should be, whereby land of the petitioner is overflowed. 40 C. 43. Continuance of intent to build on millsite is a question of fact. 49 C. 350. The question of the existence of and injury to a millsite and dam is one of fact. 52 C. 462. Cited. 92 C. 221.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552h — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 923a / Section 52-552h
Sec. 52-552h. Remedies of creditors.
Status: in_force

(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

Plain language of section demonstrates that Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was enacted specifically to expand range of a creditor's remedies beyond the common-law property and proceeds rule; section does not vest court with unfettered discretion to award damages to creditors who have failed to avail themselves of all the protections afforded under the act. 266 C. 1.

Cited. 46 CA 199. Trial court's order of relief allowing plaintiff to attach defendants' property and levy execution thereon was well within court's authority to grant under section after finding of liability for a fraudulent transfer. 201 CA 774.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-553 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 924 / Section 52-553
Sec. 52-553. Wagers and wagering contract void. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

A wager is illegal at common law. 15 C. 30. All wagering contracts are void by statute and money deposited with stakeholder is recoverable. Id.; 40 C. 336; 49 C. 128; 70 C. 490. What constitutes gaming contract in margin transactions in stocks; distinguished from speculating contracts. 48 C. 127; 63 C. 198. Contract of insurance upon another's life may amount to mere wagering contract. 69 C. 511; 70 C. 647. Speculative stock transactions, where there is an option to demand delivery. 77 C. 508; Id., 518; 84 C. 694. Cited. 125 C. 120. Gambling on credit is the vice at which this statute and Sec. 52-554 are particularly directed. 189 C. 591. Parties' contract is not unenforceable under section because it would be contrary to the statutory scheme as a whole to conclude that agreement to share the spoils of legal wagering is illegal and unenforceable. 293 C. 17.

Section is not applicable to written agreement where parties agreed to share equally in any winnings they received from various forms of legalized gambling. 105 CA 663; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 293 C. 17.

Where plaintiff sued to recover indebtedness from defendants, which claim arose from winnings from a bet made in violation of Sec. 53-298, held the court will not aid party to an illegal contract in enforcing his claim and, since all the parties were in pari delicto, judgment should be rendered for defendants. 26 CS 238. Cited. 33 CS 170; 35 CS 522.

Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 682.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146e — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146e
Sec. 52-146e. Disclosure of communications.
Status: in_force

(b) Any consent given to waive the confidentiality shall specify to what person or agency the information is to be disclosed and to what use it will be put. Each patient shall be informed that his refusal to grant consent will not jeopardize his right to obtain present or future treatment except where disclosure of the communications and records is necessary for the treatment.

(c) The patient or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the person or office in which the original consent was filed. Withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications or records disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

Cited. 169 C. 223. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 190 C. 813; 191 C. 453; 192 C. 166; 197 C. 326; 199 C. 693. Before privilege is applied, court should conduct voir dire for purpose of determining existence of impeaching evidence in order to protect constitutional right of confrontation. 201 C. 211. Cited. Id., 244; 205 C. 386; 211 C. 555; 212 C. 50; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 85; 221 C. 447; 223 C. 450; 225 C. 450; Id., 700; 228 C. 1; 230 C. 43; 235 C. 185; Id., 595; 236 C. 514; Id., 625; 238 C. 313; 242 C. 666. Statute reflects public policy against suit by patient's former spouse. 250 CA 86. Legislative intent was not to give courts discretion to override privileged communication. 254 C. 321. Broad sweep of statute covers not only disclosure to defendant or his counsel, but also disclosure to a court even for the limited purpose of an in camera examination; section does not impose an obligation on the holder of privilege to state expressly to whom the records cannot be disclosed, rather, statute indicates that the holder of privilege must state in writing to whom the documents may be disclosed and for what purpose; there is no authority to support the proposition that defendant has a right, even when the complaining witness' credibility is central to the case, to have her confidential records produced directly to him. 289 C. 411. Medical and dental records created by an inpatient mental health facility during the treatment of a patient are exempt from disclosure under section. 318 C. 769. A trial court, in certain circumstances, may be constitutionally required to review in camera privileged psychiatric records of a homicide victim to determine whether information contained therein supports accused's claim of self-defense, provided the accused first demonstrates a compelling need for the privileged records, predicated on the relevance of the records to the self-defense claim, the potential significance of the records in establishing that defense, and the unavailability of alternative sources of information. 326 C. 742.

Psychiatric patient privilege and defendant's right to confrontation discussed. 1 CA 384. Cited. 8 CA 216; 10 CA 103. Psychiatrist-patient privilege cannot be overridden by provisions of Sec. 19a-14(a)(10). 14 CA 552. Cited. 15 CA 222; 17 CA 174; 18 CA 273; 19 CA 304; 20 CA 101; 24 CA 287; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 253; Id., 647; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Need for information to institute claim creates compelling countervailing interest that requires disclosure of limited information. 50 CA 694. Cited. 52 CA 408.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922a / Section 52-549d
Sec. 52-549d. List of names of commissioners to conduct hearings. Compensation.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as provided in section 52-549c , no commissioner may receive compensation or reimbursement for any expense incurred or for any services performed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and section 51-15 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-159 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-159
Sec. 52-159. Deposition may be used in another action.
Status: in_force

Rule before section was enacted. 80 C. 140; 86 C. 583. Cited. 211 C. 555.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-549p — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 922b / Section 52-549p
Sec. 52-549p. Appointment of fact-finders. Compensation. Powers.
Status: in_force

(b) Each fact-finder shall receive one hundred dollars for each day he is assigned to a courthouse facility to conduct hearings as a fact-finder, and an additional twenty-five dollars for each finding of fact filed with the court. In difficult or extraordinary cases the Chief Court Administrator may, in his discretion, make a further allowance not to exceed two hundred dollars for services rendered attendant to but not part of the hearing.

(c) Such fact-finders shall have the power to: (1) Issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of books, papers and other evidence, such subpoenas to be served in the manner provided by law for service of subpoenas in a civil action and to be returnable to the fact-finders; (2) administer oaths or affirmations; and (3) determine the admissibility of evidence and the form in which it is to be offered.

Cited. 199 C. 496.

Cited. 12 CA 190; 20 CA 420.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-204 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-204
Sec. 52-204. Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent.
Status: in_force

Cited. 117 C. 686. Damages due to incapacity of wife by reason of personal injury are recoverable by her and not her husband; but right to recover sums actually paid by husband because of her incapacity is in him. 125 C. 390. In absence of endorsement on writ by husband, wife may recover expenditures if it is not reasonably probable that husband would have to pay them but probable that she will be called upon to do so. 129 C. 361. When a minor child is injured by the negligent act of a third party, two independent causes of action spring into existence; first, the right of action by the child for personal injuries; second, a right of action by the parent for consequential damages. 147 C. 333. Cited. 153 C. 363; 165 C. 490; 200 C. 290.

Husband must endorse his consent upon the complaint prior to service on defendant. 4 CS 147. Transfer by parent of his right of action for consequential damages has all the attributes of an assignment. 7 CS 480. Cited. 19 CS 480. Vicarious contributory negligence or concurring negligence of parent does not bar plaintiff's recovery of consequential damages. 28 CS 493. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is legally liable. 32 CS 156.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-236 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-236
Sec. 52-236. Actions on contract; evidence of damages since suit.
Status: in_force

Applies to damage set up under a counterclaim. 64 C. 563. Has no application to a cause of action nonexistent when the suit was begun. 71 C. 425. Applied to action for breach of covenant in deed by lease not expiring until after action brought. 87 C. 169. Cited. 225 C. 804.

Cited. 7 CS 247. Action for damages for breach of lease not within scope of a “debt or liquidated demand in money”; authorities reviewed. 17 CS 35. Cited. 37 CS 840.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 284.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-191c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-191c
Sec. 52-191c. Precedence of actions involving terminally ill persons.
Status: in_force

(b) The judges of the Superior Court may, in accordance with the provisions of section 51-14 , adopt rules for the precedence of actions pursuant to this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557c
Sec. 52-557c. Standard of care applicable to owners and operators of school buses.
Status: in_force

Duty of carrier is to provide its passengers with a reasonably safe place to alight. 180 C. 302.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-261a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-261a
Sec. 52-261a. Fees and expenses of officers and persons serving process or performing other duties for the Judicial Department or Division of Criminal Justice.
Status: in_force

(1) Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, each officer or person who serves process shall receive a fee of not more than fifty dollars for the service of such process on a person and an additional fee of fifty dollars for the service of such process on each additional person, except that such officer or person shall receive an additional fee of twenty dollars for each subsequent service of such process at the same address.

(2) Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, in addition to the fee set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection, each officer or person who serves process shall receive, for each mile of travel, the same amount per mile as provided for state employees pursuant to section 5-141c , to be computed from the place where such officer or person received the process to the place of service, and thence in the case of civil process to the place of return, provided, if more than one process is served on one person at one time by any such officer or person, the total cost of travel for such service shall be the same as for the service of one process only, except that in the case in which an officer or person is requested or required to effectuate in-hand personal service, such officer shall also receive the fee set by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each mile of travel for each round trip traveled while attempting to effectuate in-hand personal service, to be computed from the place where the process was received to the place of attempted service, and if multiple trips to effectuate service are made, back to the place where process was received and then to the place of the subsequent attempt at service, and thence in the case of civil process to the place of return, provided the officer or person shall state in the return of service that in-hand personal service was requested or required and that multiple trips were necessary to effectuate in-hand personal service. The officer or person requesting the receipt of such round trip travel shall make out a bill reciting the dates, times and results of each trip the officer or person traveled while attempting to effectuate in-hand personal service. The officer or person requesting the receipt of such attempted round trip travel shall receive such travel fees for attempted service only when in-hand personal service of process is effectuated. Such travel fees paid may be limited to three round trips, provided nothing in this section shall limit payment of a greater amount to an officer or person serving process.

(3) Each officer or person who serves process to enforce the obligation of an attorney pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 51-81d shall receive the fee set by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each mile of travel, to be computed from the place where such officer or person received the process to the place of service, and thence to the place of return. If more than one process is served on one person at one time by any such officer or person, the total cost of travel for the service shall be the same as for the service of one process only.

(4) Each officer or person who serves process shall also receive the moneys actually paid for town clerk's fees on the service of process.

(5) Each officer or person who serves process shall also receive the moneys actually paid for fees for the disclosure or search of records of the Department of Motor Vehicles in connection with the service of process.

(6) Any officer or person required to summon jurors by personal service of a warrant to attend court shall receive for the first ten miles of travel while so engaged, such mileage to be computed from the place where such officer or person receives the process to the place of service, twenty-five cents for each mile, and for each additional mile, ten cents.

(7) For summoning any juror to attend court otherwise than by personal service of the warrant, such officer or person shall receive only the sum of fifty cents and actual disbursements necessarily expended by such officer or person in making service thereof as directed.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, for summoning grand jurors, such officer or person shall receive only such officer's or person's actual expenses and such reasonable sum for services as are taxed by the court.

(c) The following fees shall be allowed and paid: (1) For taking bail or bail bond, one dollar; (2) for copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of endorsements, one dollar per page; (3) for endorsements, fifty cents per page or fraction thereof; (4) for service of a warrant for the seizure of intoxicating liquors, or for posting and leaving notices after the seizure, or for the destruction or delivery of any such liquors under order of court, one dollar; (5) for the removal and custody of such liquors so seized, reasonable expenses and one dollar; (6) for levying an execution, when the money is actually collected and paid over, or the debt secured by the officer to the acceptance of the creditor, fifteen per cent on the amount of the execution; (7) on the levy of an execution on real property and on application for sale of personal property attached, to each appraiser, for each half day of actual service, two dollars, to surveyors when necessarily employed, four dollars per day and to each chain bearer necessarily employed, two dollars per day, which sums, with those paid to the town clerk, shall be, by the officer levying the execution, endorsed thereon, together with such officer's own fees; (8) for causing an execution levied on real property to be recorded, fees for travel and fifty dollars; (9) for services on an application for the sale of personal property attached, or in selling mortgaged property foreclosed under a decree of court, the same fees as for similar services on executions; (10) for committing any person to a community correctional center, in civil actions, the fee set by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each mile of travel, from the place of the court to the community correctional center, in lieu of all other expenses; (11) for summoning and attending a jury for reassessing damages or benefits on a highway, three dollars a day; and (12) for any recording for which the recording fee is not otherwise prescribed by law, fifty dollars, costs and the fee set by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each mile of travel.

(d) The court shall tax as costs a reasonable amount for the care of property held by any officer under attachment or execution. The officer serving any attachment or execution may claim compensation for time and expenses of any person, in keeping, securing or removing property taken thereon, provided such officer shall make out a bill. The bill shall specify the labor done and by whom, the time spent, the travel, the money paid, if any, and to whom and for what. The compensation for the services shall be fixed on the basis of two dollars per hour and the amount of expenses and shall be taxed by the court with the costs.

(e) The following fees shall be allowed and paid, except to state employees in the classified service: (1) For each arrest in criminal cases, one dollar and fifty cents; (2) for any necessary assistants in making criminal arrests, a reasonable sum, the necessity of such assistance to be proved by the oath of the officer; (3) for travel with a prisoner to court or to a community correctional center, forty cents a mile, provided (A) if more than one prisoner is transported at the same time, the total cost of travel shall be forty cents per mile for each prisoner transported up to a maximum of two dollars per mile, regardless of the number of prisoners transported, and (B) if a prisoner is transported for commitment on more than one mittimus, the total cost of travel shall be the same as for the transportation of one prisoner committed on one mittimus only; (4) for holding a prisoner in custody upon criminal process for each twelve hours or fraction thereof, to be taxed as expenses in the case, one dollar; (5) for holding a prisoner in custody by order of court, one dollar a day; (6) for keepers, for every twelve hours, in lieu of all other expenses, except in special cases to be approved by the court, five dollars; (7) for executing a mittimus of commitment to the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, for each prisoner, one dollar and fifty cents; (8) for transporting any prisoner from a community correctional center to the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, or for transporting any person under commitment from a community correctional center to the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire, twenty-five cents a mile, to be taxed as expenses, provided, if more than one prisoner or person is transported, the total cost of travel shall be twenty-five cents per mile for each prisoner or person transported up to a maximum of one dollar per mile, regardless of the number of prisoners or persons transported; (9) for taking samples to a state chemist by order of court, two dollars, and for each mile of travel in going and returning, ten cents; and (10) for producing any prisoner, held by criminal process, in court or before a judge under habeas corpus proceedings, twenty-five cents a mile travel and two dollars and fifty cents a day for attendance, to be taxed and allowed by the court or judge.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-81 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 897 / Section 52-81
Sec. 52-81. Costs taxable on withdrawal.
Status: in_force

Applies to cases withdrawn before, as well as to those withdrawn after, the return day. 70 C. 380. The right to costs, if it exists, rests on some statute or authorized rule of court. 73 C. 614. Cited. 123 C. 168; 240 C. 58.

Cited. 20 CA 218.

Cited. 16 CS 88.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-259b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-259b
Sec. 52-259b. Waiver of fees and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party.
Status: in_force

(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, “public assistance” includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.

(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process, or (2) denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process when the court finds that (A) the applicant has repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters, (B) such filings establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have been without merit, (C) the application sought is in connection with an action before the court that is consistent with the applicant's previous pattern of frivolous filings, and (D) the granting of such application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application. Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket.

(d) Any person aggrieved by a decision, after hearing, denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee for the cost of commencing a civil action or habeas action in the Superior Court or the cost of service of process for commencing such an action in the Superior Court may file a petition to the Appellate Court for review of such order. There shall be no fee required for the filing of such a petition.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-148d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-148d
Sec. 52-148d. Requirements for taking of depositions. Party subject to taking of deposition.
Status: in_force

(b) The authority taking a deposition shall: (1) Attest the subscribing of the deposition and oath of the person deposed, (2) certify whether each adverse party or his agent was present and notified, (3) certify the reason for taking the deposition, and (4) seal the deposition and direct it to the court where it is to be used and deliver it, if requested, to the party at whose request it was taken.

(c) The party on whose behalf the deposition of an adverse party is taken shall be subject to having his deposition taken on behalf of such adverse party. The party on whose behalf a deposition is taken shall at his expense provide a copy of the deposition to each adverse party.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-216a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-216a
Sec. 52-216a. Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-572e re release of joint tortfeasor.

Cited. 176 C. 245; Id., 383; 179 C. 269. Found unconstitutional as violating the right to trial by jury by permitting trial court to interfere with fact-finding function of jury. 186 C. 337. Cited. 187 C. 1. Statute as amended by public act 82-406, S. 3 held constitutional. 196 C. 53. Statute codifies proper procedure with regard to out-of-court settlements of joint tortfeasors. 196 C. 341. Cited. 203 C. 607; 206 C. 16; 208 C. 82; 211 C. 67; 212 C. 509; 219 C. 314; 223 C. 786; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 795; 231 C. 500; 234 C. 660; 239 C. 144. Section provides a directive to trial court that if defendant rejects the additur, trial court must set aside verdict and order a new trial, because initial verdict was necessarily inadequate as a matter of law; there is no irreconcilable conflict between Secs. 52-228b and 52-216a mandating that one be accepted and the other abandoned. 246 C. 170. Trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue; that decision should be made, not on the assumption that jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that jury did exactly what it intended to do. 252 C. 174. Statute inapplicable to an action brought pursuant to defective highway statute in which municipality is the sole tortfeasor because express language of statute applies solely to actions in which there are, or could be, joint tortfeasors. 258 C. 574. Under section, a trial court may, in exercise of its discretion, reduce a jury award to account for pretrial settlement payments; however, before doing so, the court first must determine that the settlement payments, when added to the jury award, render that award excessive as a matter of law, a threshold that is met only when the total amount received so far exceeds what is fair and reasonable as to be unconscionable. 284 C. 645. Because section merely codified the pre-existing common law standards, there is no reason to conclude that the legislature intended to modify the established abuse of discretion standard of review. 331 C. 777.

Cited. 8 CA 407; Id., 642; 26 CA 509; 31 CA 584; 38 CA 685; 43 CA 475. It is not the size of the verdict but, rather, whether it falls within the uncertain limits of just damages or shocks the sense of justice so as to lead to the conclusion that the jury was improperly influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. 136 CA 224.

Statute does not preclude an allegation of payments from a joint tortfeasor as a special defense. 40 CS 263.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-499 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 919 / Section 52-499
Sec. 52-499. Sale of land to promote the interest of beneficiaries.
Status: in_force

(b) Any application for sale shall be made to the superior court for the judicial district within which the probate district where the will was admitted to probate is situated.

(c) The court shall order the fund realized from the sale to be invested by the trustee, for the benefit of the parties interested in the trust, in such investments authorized by law to be made by the savings banks of this state as to the court seems advisable.

Cited. 63 C. 135; 108 C. 265; 120 C. 86; 123 C. 256.

Cited. 5 CA 142.

Cited. 29 CS 465; 31 CS 93.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572g — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572g
Sec. 52-572g. Defenses against holder in due course of instrument in consumer goods credit transaction.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of this section “consumer services” includes any supply of accommodations, exercise and health club programs, instruction or education, including any type of training course in any field such as personality improvement, self motivation, salesmanship and similar fields, or any work, repair or other services rendered for personal, family or household purposes.

Subsec. (a): “the amount of indebtedness outstanding” is the amount of indebtedness outstanding at the time of the buyer's written demand on seller, and assignee can avoid liability under this section only if the promissory note, contract or other instrument is reassigned back to the seller prior to the buyer making such demand; further, where a retail installment contract includes FTC holder rule language mandated by 16 CFR 433.2, the assignee's liability is cumulative to its liability under this section. 338 C. 803.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-69 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-69
Sec. 52-69. Notice to “representatives and creditors”, “widow” or “widower and heirs”.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-87 re continuance of action because of absent or nonresident defendant.

Judgment void if defendant dead when action begun. 117 C. 47. Defect in naming parties rendered it improper for Superior Court to make judgment construing will. 151 C. 598.

Cited. 1 CA 535.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-224 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-224
Sec. 52-224. Special verdicts. Jury to assess damages.
Status: in_force

If the law be so in such a point, then we find for the plaintiff;

but if the law be otherwise, then we find for the defendant.

(b) When the jury finds a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, they shall assess the damages which he shall be entitled to recover.

Verdict apportioning the damages between defendants held illegal. 48 C. 521. Generally. 75 C. 220; 81 C. 601; 82 C. 597. General verdict on several counts proper, in absence of request for special verdict; 76 C. 680; so, general verdict for defendant failing to answer special interrogatories by him based on verdict for plaintiff. 81 C. 601. Request that jury find special facts on which conclusion based not proper. 82 C. 485. Special interrogatories in connection with general submission. 83 C. 109. Discretion of court to refuse to submit. Id., 183; 90 C. 626; 96 C. 2; 97 C. 182, but see 94 C. 690; 100 C. 493. Proper to submit, where verdict might be based on one of several grounds. 85 C. 459. Interrogatories should be recorded as part of verdict. 88 C. 558. Procedure under statute preferable where both legal and equitable remedies are sought. 90 C. 626. Except as here provided, no special form of verdict required. 91 C. 673. Addressing oral questions to jury on return of verdict improper. 97 C. 182. Purpose; when to be allowed. 95 C. 499. Special verdict or interrogatories proper where complaint states cause of action at common law and one under statute permitting damages to be doubled. 93 C. 247. If two or more issues are presented in one count, interrogatories are proper; if in separate counts, separate verdicts may be had. 94 C. 690. Defect in interrogatories which are consistent with general verdict disregarded. 93 C. 446. Answers may be limited by context; 94 C. 168; and should be construed so as to be consistent. 97 C. 337. Proper procedure. 95 C. 499; 97 C. 189. Practice as to receiving answers. 96 C. 2. When complaint contains two or more counts, or two or more issues in one count, court must, on request, submit properly framed interrogatories. 100 C. 494; 104 C. 525. Trial court's refusal to set aside verdict of damages as inadequate was sustained where only permanent injuries were body scars on child and verdict awarded $6,000 to plaintiff child and $4,000 special damages to father of child. 156 C. 635.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571n — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-571n
Sec. 52-571n. Action to recover damages for judgment entered against a person where liability is based on alleged provision, receipt or assistance in provision or receipt of gender-affirming health care services or reproductive health care services. Definitions. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Gender-affirming health care services” means all medical care relating to the treatment of gender dysphoria as set forth in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” and gender incongruence, as defined in the most recent revision of the “International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems”;

(2) “Reproductive health care services” includes all medical, surgical, counseling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including, but not limited to, services relating to pregnancy, contraception or the termination of a pregnancy; and

(3) “Person” includes an individual, a partnership, an association, a limited liability company or a corporation.

(b) When any person has had a judgment entered against such person, in any state, where liability, in whole or in part, is based on the alleged provision, receipt, assistance in receipt or provision, material support for, or any theory of vicarious, joint, several or conspiracy liability derived therefrom, for reproductive health care services and gender-affirming health care services that are permitted under the laws of this state, such person may recover damages from any party that brought the action leading to that judgment or has sought to enforce that judgment. Recoverable damages shall include: (1) Just damages created by the action that led to that judgment, including, but not limited to, money damages in the amount of the judgment in that other state and costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees spent in defending the action that resulted in the entry of a judgment in another state; and (2) costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action under this section as may be allowed by the court.

(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a judgment entered in another state that is based on: (1) An action founded in tort, contract or statute, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought by the patient who received the reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services upon which the original lawsuit was based or the patient's authorized legal representative, for damages suffered by the patient or damages derived from an individual's loss of consortium of the patient; (2) an action founded in contract, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought or sought to be enforced by a party with a contractual relationship with the person that is the subject of the judgment entered in another state; or (3) an action where no part of the acts that formed the basis for liability occurred in this state.

See Sec. 54-155b prohibiting use of public resources in furtherance of an interstate investigation or proceeding concerning the provision, seeking or receipt of or assistance with reproductive health services or gender-affirming health care services.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-175a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-175a
Sec. 52-175a. Negligence action, construction of acts of blind person.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 1-1f for definitions of “blind” and “physically disabled”.

Cited. 211 C. 555.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-514 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 920 / Section 52-514
Sec. 52-514. Receivership; dissolution of attachment and levy of execution; costs.
Status: in_force

(b) If the property is subsequently taken from the receiver so that it cannot be made subject to the orders of the court in the settlement of the affairs of the corporation or partnership or if the receivership is terminated by order of the court pending the settlement of the affairs of the corporation or partnership, the attachments and levies of execution shall revive. The time from the commencement of the proceedings to the time when the receiver is dispossessed of the property, or to the time when the court finds that the property is not subject to the orders of the court, or to the time when the trust is terminated, shall be excluded from the computation in determining the continuance of the lien created by the attachment.

(c) Attaching or levying creditors shall be allowed the amount of their legal costs, accruing before the time of the appointment of a receiver, as a preferred claim against the property of the corporation or partnership, if their respective claims upon which the attachments are founded are allowed, in whole or in part.

Creditor's rights to attach or levy are suspended by the appointment. 66 C. 359; 70 C. 232; 106 C. 165. Statute has no application to legal proceedings in other states. 71 C. 353. Statute applies to suits commenced in the federal as well as in the state courts. 73 C. 154, 155. Action may, however, be pursued. 85 C. 278.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-123 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-123
Sec. 52-123. Circumstantial defects not to abate pleadings.
Status: in_force

Section was originally enacted as a separate act, applicable both to civil and criminal procedure, and so remained until the revision of 1821, when it was incorporated into the present title; it does not affect the right to demur. 40 C. 158. It will help out a plea in abatement. 34 C. 180; 45 C. 479; 60 C. 371. Pleas in abatement in the inferior courts must be filed at an early stage. 21 C. 510. Defendant in an action on contract may plead in abatement the want of service on codefendant. 45 C. 477; 76 C. 628. Plea in abatement will not lie for immaterial variance between writ and copy. 65 C. 539. Error in date of summons not a ground of abatement. 70 C. 351. Appeal from former board of relief; form of process. 72 C. 329. Appealing from justice court to wrong return day. 77 C. 38. Allowance by clerk of appeal from judge as special statutory tribunal. 68 C. 418. Change of return day after issuance of writ. 74 C. 38. Failure of indifferent person making arrest in bastardy to make sworn return. 85 C. 327. In Supreme Court; appeal to term already past; 67 C. 19; not stating time and place of sitting; 70 C. 329; 82 C. 386; to wrong return day; 74 C. 438; 77 C. 38; 83 C. 134; 85 C. 618; taken after time fixed by law; 79 C. 526; 82 C. 376; referring to county, not district; 79 C. 710; defect of parties; 73 C. 432; failure of request for finding to include claims of law. 66 C. 551. Applicable to bastardy complaint addressed to a justice of the peace but in fact presented and sworn to before a commissioner of the Superior Court. 104 C. 126. Cited. 115 C. 705; 122 C. 154; 178 C. 472; 211 C. 78. Limited in application to defects in the writ. Id., 431. Provides relief from defects in texts of writs such as designations of transportation commissioner as transportation commission. 212 C. 381. Cited. 217 C. 520. Designation of Department of Transportation in the summons rather than the commissioner is a misnomer falling within purview of statute. 228 C. 343. “Circumstantial error” discussed. 232 C. 392. Purpose of section is to afford relief from defects found in text of writ itself. 268 C. 541. Section is applicable to pleadings in summary process actions, and where notice to quit in summary process action provided wrong year for date to quit, trial court properly determined that defect was circumstantial and that defendant had received actual notice in accordance with Sec. 47a-23(a). 292 C. 381.

Cited. 3 CA 566; 5 CA 540; 23 CA 188; 31 CA 260. Case remanded for determination of whether naming former plaintiff in motion for deficiency judgment constituted circumstantial defect. 47 CA 459. Correction of the name of substitute plaintiff falls within category of circumstantial errors that can be cured pursuant to section. 56 CA 161. Section is a remedial statute and therefore “must be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit.” 81 CA 486. Because trade name is not an entity with legal capacity to sue, corporation had no standing to litigate merits of case when it brought an action solely in its trade name, without corporation itself being named as a party. 87 CA 474. Use of incorrect docket number is a circumstantial defect and does not deprive court of jurisdiction; statute applies to petitions for continued commitment. 92 CA 143. Plaintiff's attorney's failure to sign civil summons form was a circumstantial defect that did not deprive court of personal jurisdiction over defendants because the attorney directed a process server to serve defendants. 96 CA 320. Because named plaintiff used a fictitious name for itself when commencing the action, plaintiff was a fictitious entity and resulting error was not circumstantial and could not be saved under section. 136 CA 683. Section not available to save action where plaintiff conflated her legal capacity as executrix and as an individual and where plaintiff's motion under this section was filed more than 30 days after period for amendment under Sec. 52-128 had run and after action was dismissed. 137 CA 397. Plaintiff's use of trade name, unlike its legal name, when commencing action was not a circumstantial defect that could be cured under section. Id., 514. A scrivener's error such as an incorrect docket number will not deprive the court of jurisdiction, as it constitutes merely a circumstantial defect. 194 CA 727.

The omission of the name of the issuing authority is not an error to abate the pleading. 1 CS 21. Cited. 6 CS 183; 24 CS 295. Savings clause of section does not save from a demurrer a plea in abatement which fails to pray for judgment. 34 CS 251. Cited. 38 CS 712. Listing address of property that was the subject of the zoning appeal in the citation and complaint, rather than plaintiff's business address, was a circumstantial defect even under common law and did not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction. 50 CS 513. Absence of a recognizance or a defective one in citation is circumstantial defect. Id.

Failure to set out address of defendant in writ is mere circumstantial defect and does not go to jurisdiction of court. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 468, 470, 472. Where defendant was served personally, failure to set out his address in writ is circumstantial defect and does not go to jurisdiction of court. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 235.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-583 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-583
Sec. 52-583. Limitation of action against sheriff, state marshal or constable for neglect or default.
Status: in_force

When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Assumpsit for money collected on execution, not within statute. 1 R. 303. Action against sheriff for default of deputy; deputy's suit on receipt held to constitute acknowledgment of continuing liability which prevented the running of statute. 38 C. 195. Action against officer for neglecting to make demand of garnishee, accrues at the expiration of the 60 days allowed for that purpose. 50 C. 526. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. Cited. 214 C. 464.

Limited suits on former Sec. 18-49 as to time of commencement. 7 CS 328.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-580 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-580
Sec. 52-580. Settlement of partnership or joint accounts.
Status: in_force

Same rule applies in actions of book debt; 1 D. 250; but not, ordinarily, in other cases. 9 C. 365.

Cited. 13 CS 175.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-506 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 920 / Section 52-506
Sec. 52-506. Receiver to give bond.
Status: in_force

Does not apply to trustees winding up corporation. 96 C. 83.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-122 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-122
Sec. 52-122. Procedure in certain actions not changed.
Status: in_force

Flowage petitions may still be served by citation. 49 C. 348. Cited. 54 C. 319. Quo warranto. 55 C. 121. Cited. 66 C. 512; 69 C. 22; Id., 498; 104 C. 294. Summary process. 131 C. 531. Cited. 134 C. 435; 217 C. 52.

Listed sections have nothing to do with appellate procedure. 15 CS 273. Cited. 17 CS 34; 36 CS 47; 38 CS 389.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-472 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 916 / Section 52-472
Sec. 52-472. Bond on issue of temporary injunction.
Status: in_force

Penalty rests in discretion of judge. 38 C. 123. Ex parte injunctions without bond disapproved. 77 C. 402. Only actual damages recoverable; 83 C. 418; 82 C. 153; not both damages and penalty. 79 C. 670. When bond is satisfied, or may be cancelled. 81 C. 715. Meaning of “prosecute the action to effect”. Id., 719. Court concluded that board of arbitration had not exceeded its authority under Sec. 7-472 and had made its services available to proper parties. 171 C. 420. Cited. 186 C. 725; 189 C. 539; 191 C. 201.

Cited. 29 CA 105.

It is not customary for the court to require bond on injunctions in aid of attachment of corporate stock. 6 CS 37. Cited. 11 CS 411; 12 CS 174. Requires surety bond, satisfactory to court, be posted to indemnify party seeking injunction for any breach by enjoined party. 29 CS 66. Cited. 42 CS 460.

Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 105.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-365 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-365
Sec. 52-365. Demand on execution against voluntary association.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-57 (e) re service of process against presiding officer, secretary or treasurer of voluntary association.

Cited. 70 C. 637.

Cited. 42 CS 336.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-166 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-166
Sec. 52-166. Orders of state officials.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-163 re judicial notice of regulations of state agencies.

Court could take judicial notice of regulation of public utilities commission, copy of which was placed before it under certificate of commission's secretary. 113 C. 416. Where regulations cover broad field, proper procedure is to ask court to take judicial notice of applicable portion only and regulations in entirety should not be admitted as exhibit in evidence. 149 C. 192. Cited. 186 C. 370; 204 C. 507; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 23 CA 366.

Cited. 42 CS 602.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-228c — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-228c
Sec. 52-228c. Remittitur when noneconomic damages in negligence action against health care provider determined to be excessive.
Status: in_force

If the legislature, presumably aware of the Connecticut Supreme Court's remittitur jurisprudence, had wanted to ensure that remittitur decisions made pursuant to this section would be reviewed de novo, it could have expressly so required. 331 C. 777.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-558 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-558
Sec. 52-558. Liability for placing obstructions in highway.
Status: in_force

Open sewer box on sidewalk not an obstacle. 91 C. 255. Allowing water to flow from building and freeze on sidewalk. 104 C. 508. Gasoline from abutter's filling station making sidewalk unsafe. 108 C. 198. Imposes liability upon an abutting owner who, while not placing an obstruction in a highway, allows it to remain there. 134 C. 322.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 923a / Section 52-552d
Sec. 52-552d. Value.
Status: in_force

(b) For the purposes of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e and section 52-552f , a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust or security agreement.

(c) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.