Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-81
Sec. 46b-81. (Formerly Sec. 46-51). Assignment of property and transfer of title.
Status: in_force

(b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52-500 . When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties.

(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.

See Sec. 17b-743 re direction of payments under support order to Commissioner of Administrative Services or local welfare department.

Annotations to former section 46-51:

Court has broad discretion in awarding alimony. 163 C. 345. Imposition of a duty of support pendente lite only on a husband not unconstitutional as a form of sex discrimination; based on common law principle of husband's duty to support wife and on the legislature's concept of family relationships. 165 C. 190. Sec. 46-21 is very broad and gives the court wide discretion. Id., 777, 784. Cited. 166 C. 380; 168 C. 579; Id., 619; 171 C. 23, 28; Id., 278; 172 C. 269; Id., 316; Id., 361; 173 C. 397. Court has authority to assign husband's interest in marital home to wife despite wife's failure to specifically claim such interest. 174 C. 1. Cited. Id., 361; Id., 602; 176 C. 222; 178 C. 212; 179 C. 213. Discussion of ante nuptial agreements relating to property rights upon dissolution of the marriage. 181 C. 482. Cited. 183 C. 433.

Alimony award after judgment invalid. 29 CS 507. Alimony for women only. 30 CS 111. Social custom of woman to change name upon marriage, recognized. Id., 385. Assignment of property. 33 CS 44, 46.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 177 C. 465; 178 C. 308; Id., 377; 179 C. 174; Id., 568; Id., 622. Since the “estate” of the parties comprehends the aggregate of the property and liabilities of the parties, trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning to defendant sole responsibility for the parties' joint liabilities. 180 C. 184. The fault of a party in causing a marital dissolution is material to the issue of an assignment of property. Id., 212. Portion of dissolution judgment which gave wife option to purchase husband's interest in jointly owned home was an assignment of property and not subject to modification. Id., 285. Court is not required to give equal weight to each of the specified items it considers when assigning property. Id., 528. Court improperly delegated its judicial power by directing the family relations division to divide parties' personal property in the event of their inability to do so. Id., 532. Assignment of property in a marital dissolution rests in the sound discretion of the court. Id., 533. Cited. Id., 705; 181 C. 492; Id., 622; 183 C. 35. Trial court's transfer of out-of-state realty discussed. Id., 490. Cited. Id., 512; 184 C. 406; 185 C. 141; Id., 156; Id., 275; Id., 491; 186 C. 167; Id., 191; Id., 211; Id., 709; 187 C. 70; Id., 249; 188 C. 232; Id., 385; Id., 736; 190 C. 173; Id., 491; Id., 657; Id., 813; 191 C. 468; 197 C. 1. Award to defendant of a share of plaintiff's expectancy cannot be sustained as a permissible transfer of property under statute; judgment of Appellate Court reversed. 204 C. 224. Cited. 207 C. 217; 211 C. 485; 213 C. 686; 214 C. 713; 218 C. 801; 220 C. 372; 221 C. 698; 222 C. 32; 224 C. 776; 226 C. 219. Order to pay mortgage installments and taxes was intended by trial court to constitute a division of property. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 854 reversed. 228 C. 85. Judgment of Appellate Court in 34 CA 930 reversed and case remanded to trial court to assign appropriate valuation to pension benefits and reconsider its financial orders. 234 C. 783. Court need not make explicit references to statutory criteria it considered in its decision resolving property and alimony disputes in a dissolution of marriage action; judgment of Appellate Court in 40 CA 178 reversed. 240 C. 79. Advanced degree (medical degree) is not property subject to distribution upon dissolution of marriage but is properly classified as an expectancy rather than as presently existing property interest; definition of “property” discussed. 244 C. 158. Based on the evidence, unvested stock options were properly distributed as property under section; in accord with prior cases, in distributing property in dissolution proceeding, court must consider all statutory criteria, and no single criterion is preferred over others, but court has latitude to vary weight placed on each item; right to purchase contents of defendant's rented apartment was properly subject to distribution under section; date of dissolution of marriage is date on which to value the parties' assets in accordance with prior cases. 245 C. 508. Plaintiff's personal injury award is a property interest subject to equitable distribution under statute. 247 C. 356. Unvested pension benefits are property subject to equitable distribution, which court may value on a case-by-case basis among the present value method, the present division method of deferred distribution, and any other valuation method that it deems appropriate in accordance with Connecticut law. 258 C. 733. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by including in the marital property estate the entire amount received by defendant in an employment case. 265 C. 669. For purposes of determining an equitable distribution of property, the court may consider evidence that a spouse dissipated marital assets prior to the couple's physical separation as long as the actions constituting dissipation occur either in contemplation of divorce or separation, or while the marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable breakdown. 287 C. 491. The portion of defendant's state employment retirement benefit under Sec. 5-192p attributable to actual years of service is distributable, while the portion attributable to the additional amount received as a consequence of being disabled is not distributable. 292 C. 597. Parties to a dissolution of marriage proceeding must disclose all potentially distributable retirement or employment benefits and may not decide for themselves whether such benefits constitute property subject to disclosure; when reviewing a dissolution of marriage judgment that pre-dates 258 C. 733, courts must consider what impact, if any, the knowledge of unvested pension benefits would have had on the outcome of the proceeding. 312 C. 428. Section and rules of practice provide significant remedies when a party to a dissolution action has been found to dissipate assets, and Connecticut does not recognize a separate cause of action against a party to a dissolution action for failing to take affirmative steps to recover marital assets from a third party. 317 C. 223.

Cited. 1 CA 158; Id., 604; 2 CA 179; Id., 425; Id., 635; 3 CA 249; 4 CA 275; Id., 575; Id., 611; Id., 663; 5 CA 198; 6 CA 143; Id., 471; Id., 632; 8 CA 356; 9 CA 240; Id., 432; 11 CA 195; Id., 369; Id., 610; Id., 653; 12 CA 525; 13 CA 185; Id., 270; Id., 300; Id., 651; 14 CA 195; Id., 296; Id., 541; 15 CA 292; 16 CA 193; Id., 412; Id., 680; 17 CA 480; 18 CA 166; Id., 333; Id., 622; 19 CA 65; 20 CA 812; 22 CA 136; Id., 248; Id., 337; Id., 392; Id., 410; Id., 806; 23 CA 330; 24 CA 509; 25 CA 41; Id., 595; 26 CA 527; 27 CA 364; 28 CA 208; Id., 854; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 85; 30 CA 292; Id., 443; Id., 560; 31 CA 736; 32 CA 152; Id., 465; Id., 537; 33 CA 214; Id., 536; 34 CA 328; Id., 641; Id., 785; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 45; 36 CA 305; 37 CA 397; 39 CA 57; 40 CA 178; judgment reversed, see 240 C. 79; Id., 533; Id., 562; Id., 697; 41 CA 716; Id., 728; Id., 861. In determining parties' relative contributions within meaning of statute, court should consider nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions; court not required to make explicit reference to statutory criteria considered in arriving at decision or to make express findings as to each statutory factor. 48 CA 732. Court has authority to order distribution of property even if neither party requested such order in its prayer for relief. 54 CA 304. Personal injury award in name of both spouses is a property interest within meaning of “property” under section; section authorizes one party to assume joint liabilities of the parties. 57 CA 165. Although court must consider all statutory criteria when determining appropriate property distribution, it need not give equal weight to or explicitly address each factor. 59 CA 167. Stock options taken as incentive for future services to be performed after final separation not a marital asset. Id., 452. Reaffirmed previous holdings that date of separation may be significant in determining value of assets at date of dissolution; no presumption under Connecticut Constitution Art. I, Sec. 20 that property be equally divided between the spouses. Id., 656. Section provides court with jurisdiction to divide the parties' property. 60 CA 337. Court properly classified defendant's business and share bank accounts as “property”. 61 CA 791. Court not required to assign a present value to defendant's pension before distributing it. 69 CA 472. Not error for court to award plaintiff a portion of defendant's retirement benefits. Id., 482. Although court has jurisdiction to assign property in connection with section, that assignment is not modifiable. 70 CA 212. Court does not have continuing jurisdiction over property distributed at the time of dissolution. Id., 772. Pension benefits subject to equitable distribution. 74 CA 120. Assignment of property may only be made at the time of the marital dissolution and is not thereafter subject to modification as are periodic orders. 77 CA 9. Statute authorizes court to issue orders respecting marital property only at the time of dissolution; it does not authorize postjudgment orders for the division of marital property. 79 CA 812. Financial orders cannot be logically inconsistent with factual findings. 82 CA 378. Court did not abuse discretion by awarding plaintiff a portion of stock that vested in defendant after the date of separation. 83 CA 53. Trial court's order requiring sale of marital home and barring parties from purchasing the home was equitable and did not exceed court's statutory authority under section. 84 CA 495. Trial court's order allowing defendant up to fifteen years to pay plaintiff for his share of the marital residence was not abuse of discretion or violation of statutory considerations. 92 CA 678. Trial court properly determined plaintiff did not own the inventory in his antiques business. 102 CA 74. Court did not improperly rely on section in dividing the net partition proceeds. 108 CA 184. Nothing in section prohibits court from mending its erroneous personal property orders. 119 CA 120. Although the court has leeway in determining value of assets in a marital dissolution, a market value approach to valuation, nevertheless, necessarily requires an examination of marketability of the asset being appraised. 121 CA 659. It was within the court's authority to order defendant to repay loans and promissory notes made to plaintiff during course of their marriage and to award interest on any wrongfully withheld moneys. 123 CA 146. Court's second order altered the original property distribution from an award of the qualified domestic relations order to an award of a fixed sum to be paid out of the funds in the qualified domestic relations order as well as the sale of assets and constituted an improper postjudgment modification that exceeded court's powers under section. 125 CA 441. Nothing in section forbids a court from awarding periodic alimony to one spouse when the court has made an equitable distribution of the other spouse's closely held business. 129 CA 171. Court order requiring defendant to release plaintiff and hold him harmless from pending civil action was not error because the pending civil action was “property” subject to distribution under section and section does not require transfer of title or ownership of property in all cases. 148 CA 837. Plaintiff's interest in a limited liability company, i.e., an enforceable right to $520,000 credit for plaintiff's transfer of land to the LLC, was properly characterized as distributable property for purposes of section. 160 CA 708. Based on plain language, there is no presumption that marital property should be divided equally prior to applying the statutory criteria; the specified criteria are not exhaustive, and court properly may consider other equitable factors when crafting property distribution and alimony orders. 167 CA 138. Vested pension benefits in pay status at time of dissolution constitute property for the purposes of equitable distribution. 180 CA 64. The wilful dissipation of assets by defendant did not constitute exceptional intervening circumstances for not entering an order distributing the value of a marital asset as of the date of the original judgment of dissolution. 189 CA 353. Potential future unvested stream of income is a mere expectancy, and too speculative to be categorized as property for purposes of equitable distribution. 217 CA 530.

Unliquidated personal injury action is subject to award under section. 41 CS 115. Cited. 43 CS 400; 44 CS 431.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 181 C. 248; 216 C. 673; 236 C. 582.

Cited. 3 CA 25; 17 CA 431; 18 CA 589; 39 CA 162; 46 CA 87. Principal payments defendant received on purchase money mortgage he held on real estate awarded to him pursuant to dissolution decree is merely an exchange of assets and may not be included in calculation of his income in postdissolution modification proceeding. 53 CA 378. Court rendering a dissolution judgment may order one party to assume joint liabilities of both parties. 57 CA 807. Court was within its discretion, as part of the overall equitable distribution of assets, to divide defendant's 401(k) equally between the parties even if part of it had accrued prior to the marriage. 97 CA 122. Trial court's award of marital residence and 100 per cent of equity in the residence to plaintiff wife did not constitute abuse of discretion where defendant husband was not ordered to pay alimony and retained his pensions free from any claim of plaintiff wife. 101 CA 106. Court does not have authority to modify division of property once the dissolution becomes final; court's subsequent modification of arbitrator's decision and award concerning transfer of property and court's order to defendant to pay a specific monetary amount rather than to transfer the actual stock and options that had been previously awarded to plaintiff was improper. 132 CA 291.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 185 C. 180.

Ascribing a current value to the home, in combination with an order to sell the home, is neither absurd nor prohibited by section. 99 CA 145.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 183 C. 96; 184 C. 36; Id., 513; 186 C. 311; Id., 709; Id., 773; 187 C. 142; Id., 144; 189 C. 570; 190 C. 126; 197 C. 1; 206 C. 150; 210 C. 170; 231 C. 168; 236 C. 582. Appellate Court's conclusion that trial court improperly relied on total length of parties' relationship in crafting its financial orders was supported by record; under this Subsec. and Sec. 46b-82(a), a court shall consider length of parties' marriage, which does not include prior marriages or cohabitation preceding marriage. 280 C. 632. “Dissipation” is the antithesis of “preservation”, and a party that dissipates assets detracts from the preservation of those assets, and a trial court has the authority to consider a spouse's dissipation of marital assets when determining the nature and value of property to be assigned to each respective spouse. 287 C. 491.

Cited. 2 CA 416; 3 CA 25; Id., 704; 4 CA 504; 5 CA 185; Id., 484; Id., 681; 7 CA 41; Id., 119; 12 CA 596. “Contemplates nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions.” 13 CA 300. Cited. 15 CA 318; 17 CA 431; 20 CA 145; 22 CA 310; 23 CA 111; Id., 287; 25 CA 693; 26 CA 386; Id., 720; 39 CA 162. Court must consider all statutory criteria but is free to accord whatever weight it determines appropriate to each statutory factor. 86 CA 665. Prior marriage and cohabitation between parties before their remarriage to each other are not to be included when calculating “length of the marriage” in remarriage divorce proceedings. 93 CA 618. Although court must consider all statutory criteria in dividing property in a dissolution action, it does not need to make an express finding as to each criterion. 97 CA 122. Defendant's annual bonus constituted an “amount and source of income” that court should have considered when determining division of marital property and awarding alimony and child support, and matter should be remanded for recalculation of all awards even though child support award was calculated correctly. 98 CA 706. There is no language of presumption in statute that marital property should be divided equally prior to applying statutory criteria. 99 CA 326.

In dissolution of marriage case, in which plaintiff wife sought greater share in distribution of $25,840 in cash wedding gifts on basis that bride's side had more family and friends in attendance than groom's side, and where there was insufficient evidence of donor's intent, court adopted New York rule for classifying wedding gifts that where there is inadequate evidence of donor's intent, wedding gift is intended as a joint gift unless the gift is appropriate for the use of only one spouse or is earmarked for one particular spouse and because Connecticut is an all property state, money received at wedding is “marital property” within meaning of statute, regardless of the donor. 50 CS 11.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-22a — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815e / Section 46b-22a
Sec. 46b-22a. Validation of marriages performed by unauthorized justice of the peace or family support referee.
Status: in_force

(b) All marriages celebrated before June 24, 2015, otherwise valid except that the family support referee joining such persons in marriage did not have explicit statutory authority to solemnize marriages in this state, are validated, provided the family support referee who joined such persons in marriage represented himself or herself to be a duly qualified family support referee and such persons reasonably relied upon such representation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-13n — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813a / Section 46a-13n
Sec. 46a-13n. Confidentiality of information.
Status: in_force

(b) No state or municipal agency or any agency or entity providing publicly funded services shall discharge, or in any manner discriminate or retaliate against, any employee who in good faith makes a complaint to the Child Advocate or cooperates with the Office of the Child Advocate in an investigation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-216 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 816 / Section 46b-216
Sec. 46b-216. (Formerly Sec. 17-321). Support of surviving husband or wife by heirs.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 17-321:

Cited. 127 C. 506.

Cited. 11 CS 295; 33 CS 44.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-45 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-45
Sec. 46b-45. (Formerly Sec. 46-36). Service and filing of complaint and appearance. Waiver of service.
Status: in_force

(b) Any person entitled to service of process of a summons and complaint that commences an action for an annulment, a dissolution of marriage, a dissolution of civil union or a legal separation may waive such service by (1) executing a written waiver of service on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, and (2) filing an appearance with the court. Upon filing of both the waiver of service and the appearance of the person waiving such service, the action shall proceed as consistent with the provisions of this chapter.

(c) If any party is an inmate who is (1) committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, and (2) a patient in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities, a copy of the complaint shall be served on the Commissioner of Administrative Services personally or by registered or certified mail. If any party is confined in an institution in any other state, a copy shall be so served on the superintendent of the institution in which the party is confined.

See Sec. 46b-10 re reconciliation attempts ordered by court in action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.

Annotations to former section 46-36:

Cited. 173 C. 161.

Cited. 31 CS 188.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 181 C. 225; 185 C. 249; Id., 491; 208 C. 329; 224 C. 749.

Cited. 35 CA 449.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-124 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-124
Sec. 46b-124. (Formerly Sec. 51-305). Confidentiality of records of juvenile matters. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(b) All records of cases of juvenile matters, as provided in section 46b-121 , except delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, and all records of appeals from probate brought to the superior court for juvenile matters pursuant to section 45a-186 , shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, including bona fide researchers commissioned by a state agency, only upon order of the Superior Court, except that: (1) Such records shall be available to (A) the attorney representing the child, including the Division of Public Defender Services, in any proceeding in which such records are relevant, (B) the parents or guardian of the child until such time as the child reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated, (C) an adult adopted person in accordance with the provisions of sections 45a-736 , 45a-737 and 45a-743 to 45a-757 , inclusive, (D) employees of the Division of Criminal Justice who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, (E) employees of the Judicial Branch who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, (F) another court under the provisions of subsection (d) of section 46b-115j , (G) the subject of the record, upon submission of satisfactory proof of the subject's identity, pursuant to guidelines prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, provided the subject has reached the age of majority or has been emancipated, (H) the Department of Children and Families, (I) the employees of the Division of Public Defender Services who, in the performance of their duties related to Division of Public Defender Services assigned counsel, require access to such records, (J) judges and employees of the Probate Court who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, and (K) members and employees of the Judicial Review Council who, in the performance of their duties related to said council, require access to such records; and (2) all or part of the records concerning a youth in crisis with respect to whom a court order was issued prior to January 1, 2010, may be made available to the Department of Motor Vehicles, provided such records are relevant to such order. Any records of cases of juvenile matters, or any part thereof, provided to any persons, governmental or private agencies, or institutions pursuant to this section shall not be disclosed, directly or indirectly, to any third party not specified in subsection (d) of this section, except as provided by court order, in the report required under section 54-76d or 54-91a or as otherwise provided by law.

(c) All records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section and section 46b-124a .

(d) Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings shall be available to (1) Judicial Branch employees who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, (2) judges and employees of the Probate Court who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, and (3) employees and authorized agents of municipal, state or federal agencies involved in (A) the delinquency proceedings, (B) the provision of services directly to the child, (C) the delivery of court diversionary programs, or (D) the evaluation of a proposed transfer of a firearm to a person under the age of twenty-one in this state or any other state, as required by Title II, Section 12001 of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Public Law 117-159, as amended from time to time. Such employees and authorized agents include, but are not limited to, law enforcement officials, community-based youth service bureau officials, state and federal prosecutorial officials, school officials in accordance with section 10-233h , court officials including officials of both the regular criminal docket and the docket for juvenile matters and officials of the Division of Criminal Justice, the Division of Public Defender Services, the Department of Children and Families, if the child is under the oversight of the department's administrative unit pursuant to section 17a-3b , provided such disclosure shall be limited to information that identifies the child as residing in a justice facility or incarcerated, or, if the child is committed pursuant to section 46b-129 , provided such disclosure shall be limited to (i) information that identifies the child as the subject of the delinquency petition, or (ii) the records of the delinquency proceedings, when the juvenile court orders the department to provide services to said child, the Court Support Services Division and agencies under contract with the Judicial Branch. Such records shall also be available to (I) the attorney representing the child, including the Division of Public Defender Services, in any proceeding in which such records are relevant, (II) the parents or guardian of the child, until such time as the subject of the record reaches the age of majority, (III) the subject of the record, upon submission of satisfactory proof of the subject's identity, pursuant to guidelines prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, provided the subject has reached the age of majority, (IV) law enforcement officials and prosecutorial officials conducting legitimate criminal investigations, as provided in subsection (o) of this section or orders to detain pursuant to section 46b-133 , (V) a state or federal agency providing services related to the collection of moneys due or funding to support the service needs of eligible juveniles, provided such disclosure shall be limited to that information necessary for the collection of and application for such moneys, (VI) members and employees of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and employees of the Department of Correction who, in the performance of their duties, require access to such records, provided the subject of the record has been convicted of a crime in the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court and such records are relevant to the performance of a risk and needs assessment of such person while such person is incarcerated, the determination of such person's suitability for release from incarceration or for a pardon, or the determination of the supervision and treatment needs of such person while on parole or other supervised release, and (VII) members and employees of the Judicial Review Council who, in the performance of their duties related to said council, require access to such records. Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except that information contained in such records may be disclosed in connection with bail or sentencing reports in open court during criminal proceedings involving the subject of such information, or as otherwise provided by law.

(e) Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, may be disclosed upon order of the court to any person who has a legitimate interest in the information and is identified in such order. Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except as specifically authorized by a subsequent order of the court.

(f) Information concerning a child who is the subject of an order to take such child into custody or other process that has been entered into a central computer system pursuant to subsection (i) of section 46b-133 may be disclosed to employees and authorized agents of the Judicial Branch, law enforcement agencies and the Department of Children and Families, provided the information is limited to a child who has been committed pursuant to section 46b-129 , in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Chief Court Administrator.

(g) Information concerning a child who has absconded, escaped or run away from, or failed to return from an authorized leave to, a juvenile residential center or a residential treatment facility in which the child has been placed by a court order in a delinquency case, or for whom an arrest warrant has been issued with respect to the commission of a felony may be disclosed by law enforcement officials.

(h) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any person employed by the Judicial Branch from disclosing any records, information or files in such employee's possession to any person employed by the Division of Criminal Justice as a prosecutorial official, inspector or investigator who, in the performance of his or her duties, requests such records, information or files, or to prohibit any such employee of said division from disclosing any records, information or files in such employee's possession to any such employee of the Judicial Branch who, in the performance of his or her duties, requests such records, information or files.

(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a party from making a timely objection to the admissibility of evidence consisting of records of cases of juvenile matters, or any part thereof, in any Superior Court or Probate Court proceeding, or from making a timely motion to seal any such record pursuant to the rules of the Superior Court or the rules of procedure adopted under section 45a-78 .

(j) A state's attorney shall disclose to the defendant or such defendant's counsel in a criminal prosecution, without the necessity of a court order, exculpatory information and material contained in any record disclosed to such state's attorney pursuant to this section and may disclose, without a court order, information and material contained in any such record which could be the subject of a disclosure order.

(k) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, any information concerning a child that is obtained during any mental health screening or assessment of such child, shall be used solely for planning and treatment purposes and shall otherwise be confidential and retained in the files of the entity performing such screening or assessment. Such information may be further disclosed only for the purposes of any court-ordered evaluation or treatment of the child or provision of services to the child, or pursuant to sections 17a-101 to 17a-101e , inclusive, 17b-450 , 17b-451 or 51-36a , or to the Court Support Services Division and its contracted quality assurance providers, for program evaluation purposes. Such information shall not be subject to subpoena or other court process for use in any other proceeding or for any other purpose.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, any information concerning a child that is obtained during any detention risk screening of such child shall be used solely for determining the child's risk to public safety as required by subsection (e) of section 46b-133 . The information obtained and results of the detention risk screening shall be used for the purpose of making a recommendation to the court regarding the detention of the child and shall otherwise be confidential and retained in the files of the person performing such screening, but shall be disclosed to any attorney of record upon motion and order of the court. Any information and results disclosed upon such motion and order shall be available to any attorney of record for such case. Such information and results shall otherwise not be subject to subpoena or other court process for use in any other proceeding or for any other purpose.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, any information concerning a child that is obtained during any risk and behavioral health screening of such child shall be used solely for determining the child's eligibility for community diversion and nonjudicial handling. The information obtained and results of the risk and behavioral health screening shall be used for the purpose of identifying appropriate treatment and interventions and shall otherwise be confidential and retained in the files of the person performing such screening, but shall be disclosed to any attorney of record upon motion and order of the court. Any information and results disclosed upon such motion and order shall be available to any attorney of record for such case. Such information and results shall otherwise not be subject to subpoena or other court process for use in any other proceeding or for any other purpose.

(l) Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, containing information that a child has been adjudicated as delinquent for a violation of subsection (e) of section 1-1h , subsection (c) of section 14-147 , subsection (a) of section 14-215 , section 14-222 , subsection (b) of section 14-223 , subsection (a), (b) or (c) of section 14-224 , section 14-227a , section 14-227g , subsection (d) of section 21a-267 , section 21a-279a , section 30-88a or subsection (b) of section 30-89 , shall be disclosed to the Department of Motor Vehicles for administrative use in determining whether administrative sanctions regarding such child's motor vehicle operator's license are warranted. Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed.

(m) Records of cases of juvenile matters involving adoption proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be confidential and may only be disclosed pursuant to sections 45a-743 to 45a-757 , inclusive.

(n) Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings shall be available to a victim of the delinquent act in accordance with the provisions of section 46b-124a .

(o) A law enforcement official conducting a legitimate criminal investigation may have direct electronic access to the following information concerning a child who is subject to such investigation: (1) Pending juvenile delinquency charges; and (2) any suspended detention orders or prior juvenile adjudications during the ninety days prior to the initiation of such investigation.

Annotation to former section 17-57a:

Cited. 33 CS 599.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 195 C. 303; 211 C. 151; 214 C. 454. History and policy discussed; confidentiality statute cited. 216 C. 563. Cited. 221 C. 447; 227 C. 641; 229 C. 691; 235 C. 595; 237 C. 364.

Cited. 21 CA 654; 36 CA 345. Section provides an exception to confidentiality provision for child's parent but only until the child reaches the age of majority; while statute does not create a statutory privilege against disclosure of juvenile records for family members of child who is the subject of proceedings in juvenile matters, it is appropriate to consider the nature of the information generally contained in juvenile records to decide whether the records should remain confidential. 76 CA 730. Although protection of statute, which provides in general for confidentiality of records in delinquency proceedings and directs that any records released by court not be further disclosed, may be waived by juvenile, the record here was unclear as to whether respondent in fact had done so given certain procedural irregularities that occurred at trial regarding trial court's appointment of guardians ad litem for the three minor children, it being unclear from the record whether those guardians had standing to object to the requested disclosure and whether they had objected to the disclosure on basis of best interests of the children or on their interpretations of statute; accordingly, case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether respondent waived protections of statute. 88 CA 511.

Cited. 36 CS 352; 40 CS 316; 41 CS 23; Id., 145; Id., 229; Id., 505; 42 CS 562; 43 CS 38; Id., 108; Id., 211; Id., 367; 44 CS 101; Id., 235; Id., 437; Id., 468; Id., 527; Id., 551.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 215 C. 739.

Cited. 1 CA 584; 45 CA 508. Court abused its discretion by ordering that attachment of a copy of its memorandum of decision in a termination of parental rights case be appended to any future requests by child's foster parents for a restraining order to prevent respondent father from contacting them. 56 CA 55.

Subsec. (b):

With respect to private and sensitive health information, a just and rational result in reconciling highly protective state and federal statutes with disclosure provisions in Subsec. requires that statutes be read together and construed harmoniously; trial court erred by not providing respondent a full hearing re claims that his and his children's privacy interests were being violated by disclosure of court-ordered psychological evaluation report to juvenile probation officer under Subdiv. (1)(E) and by allowing juvenile probation officer to retain copies of the evaluation report. 162 CA 811.

Subsec. (d):

Victim not permitted to use actual documents released by juvenile court in civil action for damages but may use information in documents to uncover admissible evidence. 45 CS 315.

Subsec. (e):

Extent to which court may release juvenile records to victim of a delinquent act and whether child required to be adjudicated a delinquent before victim entitled to release of information. 45 CS 315.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-10a — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813 / Section 46a-10a
Sec. 46a-10a. Connecticut protection and advocacy system. Provision of services.
Status: in_force

(b) The Connecticut protection and advocacy system shall provide the following:

(1) Protection and advocacy services for people with disabilities, as provided under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 USC 15001, as amended from time to time; and

(2) A client assistance program, as provided under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 USC 732, as amended from time to time.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-54 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-54
Sec. 46a-54. (Formerly Sec. 31-125). Commission powers.
Status: in_force

(1) To establish and maintain such offices as the commission may deem necessary;

(2) To organize the commission into a division of affirmative action monitoring and contract compliance, a division of discriminatory practice complaints and such other divisions, bureaus or units as may be necessary for the efficient conduct of business of the commission;

(3) To employ legal staff and commission legal counsel as necessary to perform the duties and responsibilities under section 46a-55 . Each commission legal counsel shall be admitted to practice law in this state;

(4) To appoint such investigators and other employees and agents as it deems necessary, fix their compensation within the limitations provided by law and prescribe their duties;

(5) To adopt, publish, amend and rescind regulations consistent with and to effectuate the provisions of this chapter;

(6) To establish rules of practice to govern, expedite and effectuate the procedures set forth in this chapter;

(7) To recommend policies and make recommendations to agencies and officers of the state and local subdivisions of government to effectuate the policies of this chapter;

(8) To receive, initiate as provided in section 46a-82 , investigate and mediate discriminatory practice complaints;

(9) By itself or with or by hearing officers or human rights referees, to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance, administer oaths, take the testimony of any person under oath and require the production for examination of any books and papers relating to any matter under investigation or in question;

(10) To make rules as to the procedure for the issuance of subpoenas by individual commissioners, hearing officers and human rights referees;

(11) To require written answers to interrogatories under oath relating to any complaint under investigation pursuant to this chapter alleging any discriminatory practice as defined in subdivision (8) of section 46a-51 , and to adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, for the procedure for the issuance of interrogatories and compliance with interrogatory requests;

(12) To utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services of private individuals, agencies and organizations as may from time to time be offered and needed and with the cooperation of such agencies, (A) to study the problems of discrimination in all or specific fields of human relationships, and (B) to foster through education and community effort or otherwise good will among the groups and elements of the population of the state;

(13) To require the posting by an employer, employment agency or labor organization of such notices regarding statutory provisions as the commission shall provide;

(14) To require the posting, by any respondent or other person subject to the requirements of section 46a-64 , 46a-64c , 46a-81d or 46a-81e , of such notices of statutory provisions as it deems desirable;

(15) To require an employer having three or more employees to (A) post in a prominent and accessible location information concerning the illegality of sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment; (B) provide, not later than three months after the employee's start date with the employer, a copy of the information concerning the illegality of sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment to each employee by electronic mail with a subject line that includes the words “Sexual Harassment Policy” or words of similar import, if (i) the employer has provided an electronic mail account to the employee, or (ii) the employee has provided the employer with an electronic mail address, provided if an employer has not provided an electronic mail account to the employee, the employer shall post the information concerning the illegality of sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment on the employer's Internet web site, if the employer maintains such an Internet web site. An employer may comply with the requirements of this subparagraph, by providing an employee with the link to the commission's Internet web site concerning the illegality of sexual harassment and the remedies available to victims of sexual harassment by electronic mail, text message or in writing; and (C) provide two hours of training and education to employees within one year of October 1, 2019, provided any employer who has provided such training and education to any such employees after October 1, 2018, shall not be required to provide such training and education a second time. An employer having (i) three or more employees, shall provide such training and education to an employee hired on or after October 1, 2019, not later than six months after the date of his or her hire, provided the commission has developed and made available such training and education materials in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (8) of subsection (a) of section 46a-56 ; or (ii) less than three employees shall provide such training and education to all supervisory employees within one year of October 1, 2019, and to all new supervisory employees within six months of their assumption of a supervisory position, provided any employer who has provided such training and education to any such supervisory employees after October 1, 2018, shall not be required to provide such training and education a second time. Any supervisory employee hired on or after October 1, 2019, by an employer having less than three employees, shall receive such training and education not later than six months after the date of his or her hire, provided the commission has developed and made available such training and education materials in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (8) of subsection (a) of section 46a-56 . Such training and education shall include information concerning the federal and state statutory provisions concerning sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment. If an employee has received in-person training provided by the commission or has taken the no cost online training provided by the commission on its Internet web site in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (8) of subsection (a) of section 46a-56 while employed by a different employer within the two years preceding the date of hire, an employer may consider such prior training to satisfy the training requirements of this subdivision. An employer who is required to provide training under this subdivision shall provide periodic supplemental training that updates all supervisory and nonsupervisory employees on the content of such training and education not less than every ten years. As used in this subdivision, “sexual harassment” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (8) of subsection (b) of section 46a-60 and “employer” includes the General Assembly and “employee” means any individual employed by an employer, including an individual employed by such individual's parent, spouse or child;

(16) To require each state agency that employs one or more employees to (A) provide a minimum of three hours of diversity training and education (i) to all supervisory and nonsupervisory employees, not later than July 1, 2002, with priority for such training to supervisory employees, and (ii) to all newly hired supervisory and nonsupervisory employees, not later than six months after their assumption of a position with a state agency, with priority for such training to supervisory employees. Such training and education shall include information concerning the federal and state statutory provisions concerning discrimination and hate crimes directed at protected classes and remedies available to victims of discrimination and hate crimes, standards for working with and serving persons from diverse populations and strategies for addressing differences that may arise from diverse work environments; and (B) submit an annual report to the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities concerning the status of the diversity training and education required under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision. The information in such annual reports shall be reviewed by the commission for the purpose of submitting an annual summary report to the General Assembly. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, if a state agency has provided such diversity training and education to any of its employees prior to October 1, 1999, such state agency shall not be required to provide such training and education a second time to such employees. The requirements of this subdivision shall be accomplished within available appropriations. As used in this subdivision, “employee” includes any part-time employee who works more than twenty hours per week;

(17) To require each agency to submit information demonstrating its compliance with subdivision (16) of this section as part of its affirmative action plan and to receive and investigate complaints concerning the failure of a state agency to comply with the requirements of subdivision (16) of this section;

(18) To enter into contracts for and accept grants of private or federal funds and to accept gifts, donations or bequests, including donations of service by attorneys;

(19) To require each state agency to provide a minimum of one hour of training and education related to domestic violence and the resources available to victims of domestic violence (A) to all employees hired prior to January 1, 2023, not later than July 1, 2023, and (B) to all employees hired on or after January 1, 2023, not later than six months after their assumption of a position with a state agency. Such training and education shall include information concerning (i) domestic violence, abuser and victim behaviors; (ii) how domestic violence may impact the workplace; and (iii) the resources available to victims of domestic violence. The requirements of this subdivision shall be accomplished within available appropriations using the training and education materials made available by the commission in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (10) of subsection (a) of section 46a-56 ; and

(20) To require an employer having three or more employees to post in a prominent and accessible location information concerning domestic violence and the resources available to victims of domestic violence in Connecticut.

See Sec. 4a-60g re commission's duties re set-aside program for small contractors, minority business enterprises, individuals with disabilities and nonprofit corporations.

Annotations to former section 31-125:

Regulations promulgated under section cited. 153 C. 172. Cited. Id., 173; 163 C. 327.

Cited. 35 CS 565.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 202 C. 601; 236 C. 681.

Cited. 3 CA 464; 18 CA 126.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-127 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-127
Sec. 46b-127. (Formerly Sec. 51-308). Transfer of child charged with a felony to the regular criminal docket. Transfer of youth aged sixteen or seventeen to docket for juvenile matters.
Status: in_force

(2) A state's attorney may, at any time after such arraignment, file a motion to transfer the case of any child charged with the commission of a class B felony or a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70 to the docket for juvenile matters for proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

(3) No case of any child charged with the commission of a violation of section 53a-55 , 53a-59b , 53a-71 or 53a-94 , subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-101 , section 53a-112 , 53a-122 or 53a-129b , subdivision (1), (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-134 , section 53a-196c , 53a-196d or 53a-252 or subsection (a) of section 53a-301 shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, except as provided in this subdivision. Upon motion of a prosecutorial official, the superior court for juvenile matters shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the case of any child charged with the commission of any such offense shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. The court shall not order that the case be transferred under this subdivision unless the court finds that (A) such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fifteen years, (B) there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which the child is charged, and (C) the best interests of the child and the public will not be served by maintaining the case in the superior court for juvenile matters. In making such findings, the court shall consider (i) any prior criminal or juvenile offenses committed by the child, (ii) the seriousness of such offenses, (iii) any evidence that the child has intellectual disability or mental illness, and (iv) the availability of services in the docket for juvenile matters that can serve the child's needs. Any motion under this subdivision shall be made, and any hearing under this subdivision shall be held, not later than thirty days after the child is arraigned in the superior court for juvenile matters.

(b) Upon motion of a prosecutorial official, the superior court for juvenile matters shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. The court shall not order that the case be transferred under this subdivision unless the court finds that (1) such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fifteen years, (2) there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which the child is charged, and (3) the best interests of the child and the public will not be served by maintaining the case in the superior court for juvenile matters. In making such findings, the court shall consider (A) any prior criminal or juvenile offenses committed by the child, (B) the seriousness of such offenses, (C) any evidence that the child has intellectual disability or mental illness, and (D) the availability of services in the docket for juvenile matters that can serve the child's needs. Any motion under this subdivision shall be made, and any hearing under this subdivision shall be held, not later than thirty days after the child is arraigned in the superior court for juvenile matters.

(c) If a case is transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section or subsection (b) of this section, or if a case is transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the charge in such case is subsequently reduced to that of the commission of an offense for which a case may be transferred pursuant to subdivision (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section or subsection (b) of this section, the court sitting for the regular criminal docket may return the case to the docket for juvenile matters at any time prior to the court or jury rendering a verdict or the entry of a guilty plea for good cause shown for proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

(d) Upon the effectuation of the transfer, such child shall stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if such child were eighteen years of age, subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section and section 54-91g . Such child shall receive credit against any sentence imposed for time served in a juvenile facility prior to the effectuation of the transfer. A child who has been transferred may enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense if the court finds that such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Any child transferred to the regular criminal docket who pleads guilty to a lesser offense shall not resume such child's status as a juvenile regarding such offense. If the action is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for which such child was transferred or of any lesser included offenses, the child shall resume such child's status as a juvenile until such child attains the age of eighteen years.

(e) Any child whose case is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court who is detained pursuant to such case shall be in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction upon the finalization of such transfer. A transfer shall be final (1) upon the arraignment on the regular criminal docket until a motion filed by the state's attorney pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is granted by the court, or (2) upon the arraignment on the regular criminal docket of a transfer ordered pursuant to subsection (b) of this section until the court sitting for the regular criminal docket orders the case returned to the docket for juvenile matters for good cause shown. Any child whose case is returned to the docket for juvenile matters who is detained pursuant to such case shall be in the custody of the Judicial Department.

(f) The transfer of a child to a Department of Correction facility shall be limited as provided in subsection (e) of this section and said subsection shall not be construed to permit the transfer of or otherwise reduce or eliminate any other population of juveniles in detention or confinement within the Judicial Department.

(g) Upon the motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, the case of any youth age sixteen or seventeen, except a case that has been transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, which is pending on the youthful offender docket, regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or any docket for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle matters, where the youth is charged with committing any offense or violation for which a term of imprisonment may be imposed, other than a violation of section 14-227a , 14-227g or 14-227m or subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n , may, before trial or before the entry of a guilty plea, be transferred to the docket for juvenile matters if (1) the youth is alleged to have committed such offense or violation on or after January 1, 2010, while sixteen years of age, or is alleged to have committed such offense or violation on or after July 1, 2012, while seventeen years of age, and (2) after a hearing considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the prior history of the youth, the court determines that the programs and services available pursuant to a proceeding in the superior court for juvenile matters would more appropriately address the needs of the youth and that the youth and the community would be better served by treating the youth as a delinquent. Upon ordering such transfer, the court shall vacate any pleas entered in the matter and advise the youth of the youth's rights, and the youth shall (A) enter pleas on the docket for juvenile matters in the jurisdiction where the youth resides, and (B) be subject to prosecution as a delinquent child. The decision of the court concerning the transfer of a youth's case from the youthful offender docket, regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or any docket for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle matters shall not be a final judgment for purposes of appeal.

See Sec. 18-65a re confinement of young and teenage women and female children.

See Sec. 18-73 re confinement of male children and youths.

Annotation to former section 17-60b:

Cited. 42 CS 426.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 195 C. 303; 206 C. 323. Section required transfer of defendant back to juvenile matters after it had been found that there was no probable cause to believe he had committed murder. Id., 346. Cited. 207 C. 270; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 151; Id., 289; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 277; 218 C. 714; 220 C. 162; 221 C. 109; 224 C. 29; 226 C. 497. Requirements of section for adjudication of juvenile matter are not contemporaneous with procedural requirements of Sec. 54-46a. 229 C. 691. Cited. 233 C. 44. 1994 amendment affects substantive rights and therefore applies prospectively; judgment of Appellate Court reversed. 237 C. 364. Section must be read to authorize the same sentence for those children convicted of lesser included offenses after a full trial as for those who plead guilty to lesser included offenses. 240 C. 727. Cited. Id., 743. Section, as amended by Sec. 2 of P.A. 86-185, does not apply retroactively. 258 C. 621. Transfer of the petitioner's criminal case to the regular criminal docket for a crime he committed when he was fourteen years and his subsequent sentencing do not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in the Connecticut constitution. 333 C. 480.

Cited. 20 CA 321; 24 CA 244; 28 CA 608; 29 CA 499; Id., 573; Id., 771; 30 CA 381; 32 CA 431; Id., 759; 33 CA 90; 36 CA 364; 46 CA 545.

Cited. 42 CS 426. Court allowed full participation of both state's attorney and state's advocate in transfer hearing. 43 CS 38. Cited. Id., 367.

Subsec. (a):

Statute does not create vested liberty interest in juvenile status and therefore procedural due process is not denied by transferring juvenile to criminal docket without notice, hearing or the assistance of counsel; nor does statute violate juvenile's rights to substantive due process and equal protection of the law or violate principle of separation of powers. 245 C. 93. P.A. 15-183 is procedural in nature and changes to automatic transfer provisions under section are presumptively to be applied retroactively to all pending cases. 323 C. 290. State bears burden to prove defendant's age at time of underlying criminal conduct for which a jury has returned a guilty verdict once defendant challenges ability of court to convict and sentence defendant as adult. 323 C. 785.

Subsec. (b):

Defendant not entitled to hearing in juvenile court prior to transfer to adult criminal court, but due process requires that child be entitled to hearing before judge of the criminal docket court prior to that court's decision to accept case for criminal docket. 300 C. 104. Rule in 300 C. 104 applies retroactively to this case, therefore defendant was not entitled to a hearing in juvenile court prior to transfer to criminal court docket. 302 C. 39. Transfer order made pursuant to discretionary transfer provision is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. 313 C. 99.

Transfer of juvenile matter to regular criminal docket did not meet requirements of due process because Subsec. creates a liberty interest and due process requires opportunity for a hearing at which the juvenile court judge considers argument as to whether the case should be transferred to adult criminal court. 115 CA 180; judgment reversed, see 300 C. 104.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-44 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-44
Sec. 46b-44. (Formerly Sec. 46-35). Residency requirement.
Status: in_force

(b) Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and 46b-83 at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

(c) A decree dissolving a marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree; or (2) one of the parties was domiciled in this state at the time of the marriage and returned to this state with the intention of permanently remaining before the filing of the complaint; or (3) the cause for the dissolution of the marriage arose after either party moved into this state.

(d) For the purposes of this section, any person who has served or is serving with the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103 , or the merchant marine, and who was a resident of this state at the time of his or her entry shall be deemed to have continuously resided in this state during the time he or she has served or is serving with the armed forces or merchant marine.

Annotations to former section 46-35:

Jurisdiction for legal separation and divorce, under former Secs. 46-15 and 46-29, interrelationship of sections. 166 C. 476. Under section, a showing of residence by one party is, without showing of domicile, sufficient to establish jurisdiction for purposes of granting alimony or support pendente lite. 171 C. 433.

Cited. 4 CA 581.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 208 C. 329; 226 C. 1.

Cited. 3 CA 679; 4 CA 581; 10 CA 566; 13 CA 632; 27 CA 142; 41 CA 382.

Cited. 41 CS 258.

Subsec. (a):

Residency requirement is met where complaint for dissolution is filed while plaintiff is a resident of the state. 133 CA 250.

Subsec. (c):

Connecticut has subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution action brought by nonresident against Indian tribe member residing on a reservation in Connecticut. 243 C. 255.

Cited. 22 CA 410; 33 CA 214. Plaintiff deemed to be domiciled in the state for the 12 months before filing the complaint where plaintiff had been continuously residing in the state for 7 years before filing the complaint and, at the time the complaint was filed, had the intent to remain in the state for at least 12 months, despite the fact that plaintiff was temporarily living in Sweden at the time she filed a motion to restore the case, which was previously withdrawn, to the regular docket. 133 CA 250.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-337 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-337
Sec. 46b-337. Pleadings and accompanying documents.
Status: in_force

(b) The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-138 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-138
Sec. 46b-138. (Formerly Sec. 51-319). Summoning of witnesses. Conversation privileged.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 17-67:

Cited. 135 C. 516; 158 C. 439.

Cited. 26 CS 316.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 2 CA 132.

Cited. 41 CS 505.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38g — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815e / Section 46b-38g
Sec. 46b-38g. Programs for children impacted by domestic violence.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 54-216 re restitution services for victims of domestic violence and their families and children who witness domestic violence.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-378 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-378
Sec. 46b-378. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered support order.
Status: in_force

(b) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.

(c) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time and place of the hearing.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-11e — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813 / Section 46a-11e
Sec. 46a-11e. (Formerly Sec. 19a-458d). Appointment of legal representative. Plan of protective services. Commencement of services pending full report in certain cases.
Status: in_force

(b) The commissioner, shall, not later than fifteen calendar days after the completion and submission of the evaluation report, provide a written plan of services.

(c) If the commissioner commences an investigation and finds that the person with intellectual disability is seriously in need of immediate protective services, the commissioner shall not delay the commencement of protective services pending the completion of the evaluation report. If the commissioner's proposed action involves the removal of a person with intellectual disability from his or her home and such person is under legal representation or is competent and does not voluntarily consent to his or her removal, the commissioner shall follow the procedures mandated under section 17a-274 .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-482 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-482
Sec. 46b-482. Procedure for recission.
Status: in_force

(1) Sixty days after the effective date of the acknowledgment under section 46b-478 ; or

(2) The date of the first hearing before a court in a proceeding, to which the signatory is a party, to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes support.

(b) If an acknowledgment of parentage is rescinded under subsection (a) of this section, the Department of Public Health shall notify the person who gave birth to the child that the acknowledgment has been rescinded. Failure to give the notice required by this subsection shall not affect the validity of the rescission.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141d — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-141d
Sec. 46b-141d. Credit for presentence detention.
Status: in_force

The plain language of section does not provide credit for predisposition detention when a juvenile offender is ordered committed to a period of confinement. 136 CA 373.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-56
Sec. 46b-56. (Formerly Sec. 46-42). Orders re custody, care, education, visitation and support of children. Best interests of the child. Access to records of minor child by noncustodial parent. Orders re therapy, counseling and drug or alcohol screening.
Status: in_force

(b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a ; (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions regarding the child's health, education and religious upbringing; (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child; or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.

(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the child's cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1 , has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120 ; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b . The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate the basis for its decision.

(d) Upon the issuance of any order assigning custody of the child to the Commissioner of Children and Families, or not later than sixty days after the issuance of such order, the court shall make a determination whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her parents prior to the issuance of such order and, if such efforts were not made, whether such reasonable efforts were not possible, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, including the child's health and safety.

(e) In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46b-84 .

(f) When the court is not sitting, any judge of the court may make any order in the cause which the court might make under this section, including orders of injunction, prior to any action in the cause by the court.

(g) A parent not granted custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.

(h) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, when a motion for modification of custody or visitation is pending before the court or has been decided by the court and the investigation ordered by the court pursuant to section 46b-6 recommends psychiatric or psychological therapy for a child, and such therapy would, in the court's opinion, be in the best interests of the child and aid the child's response to a modification, the court may order such therapy and reserve judgment on the motion for modification.

(i) As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child.

Annotations to former section 46-42:

Cited. 171 C. 433; 172 C. 341. Decision of trial court with respect to custody and care of minor children must stand unless court has abused its discretion. 173 C. 161. Discussion of ante nuptial agreements relating to property rights upon dissolution of the marriage. 181 C. 482.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 177 C. 47. Court has no authority to issue an order of support against a husband as neither the biological nor adoptive parent of the child. 180 C. 114. Court did not exceed its authority by setting aside certain personal property for the use of the minor children. Id., 528. Cited. 182 C. 545; 183 C. 353. Restrictions on visitation rights discussed. 184 C. 36. Cited. 185 C. 275. Until entry of final decree, the court has discretion to modify custody without first finding material change of circumstances since previous award. 186 C. 118. Cited. Id., 191; Id., 709; 190 C. 345. Statute read together with Secs. 46b-61 and 46b-93 provide that it is permissible under certain circumstances to award child support even though child is not within this jurisdiction. 191 C. 92. Cited. 196 C. 10; Id., 260; 201 C. 50; Id., 229; 207 C. 217; 212 C. 441. Temporary custody order is final judgment for purposes of appellate review; Appellate Court's dismissal of appeal reversed. 224 C. 749. Cited. 236 C. 582; 239 C. 336. Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to order pendente lite child support, regardless of whether child at issue is considered a “child of the marriage”. 248 C. 487. In order to uphold constitutionality of section, court imposed a standing requirement that a third party allege a parent-like relationship with the child for third party custody awards and third parties seeking intervention in existing custody proceedings. 285 C. 24.

Cited. 2 CA 472; 4 CA 94; 8 CA 50; 13 CA 300; 14 CA 296; 18 CA 622; 19 CA 146; 22 CA 802; 25 CA 693; 35 CA 421; 37 CA 397; 41 CA 716; 42 CA 583; Id., 651. Substantial modification of visitation order requires evidentiary hearing to determine best interest of child. 54 CA 50. Court had sufficient evidence to modify custody order even without the benefit of prejudgment psychological evaluation of defendant. 61 CA 175. Trial court properly decided parental relocation with child pursuant to statutory best interest of child standard because the interests and circumstances of the parties at the postjudgment stage differ from those existing at time of the dissolution. 68 CA 173. Central to courts' review of modifications of custody orders under section is the concept that courts must be guided by best interests of the child. 72 CA 528. Although both parties to marital dissolution action agreed to unrestricted authority of the arbitrator-attorney for the minor children in the event of a controversy by binding arbitration with no express language restricting the breadth of issues, no reservation of explicit rights and no contingency for court review, the very limited review runs afoul of statute which requires that court exercising its equitable jurisdiction re custody assure itself that its judgment will serve best interests of the child and was an improper delegation of judicial authority. 83 CA 115. Custody order properly modified where court stated that original joint custody order was unworkable and that determination was made pursuant to standard enunciated in Subsec. (c), although court did not expressly state that changed circumstances warranted modification of the custody order. 139 CA 10.

Cited. 35 CS 237; 38 CS 37; 41 CS 258; Id., 429. Does not confer parents, acting as grandparents, whose son's parental rights have been terminated, the authorization to bring a habeas corpus petition to seek custody of a grandchild. 47 CS 273.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 185 C. 249. In a custody proceeding pursuant to section, the third party must prove by a fair preponderance standard that the party has a parent-like relationship with the child, parental custody would be detrimental to the child and third party custody would be in the child's best interest. 285 C. 24.

Joint custody discussed. 5 CA 649. Cited. 7 CA 745; 41 CA 861; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 490; 43 CA 327. Trial court properly determined that in the absence of controversy before the court involving custody or care of minor children, section does not provide an alternative statutory basis to Sec. 46b-59 so as to allow grandparents to pursue an action for visitation. 103 CA 125. Subsec. does not automatically grant subject matter jurisdiction over a properly domesticated foreign child custody judgment but, rather, expressly and unambiguously requires the trial court to examine the enabling legislation, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Sec. 46b-115 et seq., in order to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to modify a foreign child custody order. 199 CA 761.

Subsec. (b):

Court not obligated to interview each child before decision on custody. 178 C. 254. Cited. 179 C. 287. Court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to mother in accordance with 13-year-old child's wish despite mother's failure to appear at the hearing. 180 C. 132. While the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be considered, it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child which must control the decision of the court. Id., 533. Statute which vests discretion in trial court to determine the best interest of a child in awarding custody without objective guidelines is not unconstitutionally vague. Id., 705. Neither applicable statutes nor case law recognize any presumption in custody matters. 181 C. 622. Cited. 207 C. 48; 212 C. 63; 224 C. 776; 235 C. 82; 241 C. 767.

Court must resolve issue of custody in the best interests of the child whatever agreements have been made between the parents. 1 CA 356. Cited. 23 CA 509; 24 CA 426; Id., 804; 38 CA 263. Visitation by respondent mother was not in child's best interest when respondent had not been consistent in maintaining visitation with the child, scheduled visits had not gone well, the child had become attached to her aunt and uncle, respondent had not related naturally or interacted appropriately with the child and respondent's visits had been upsetting to the child. 63 CA 493. Court improperly incorporated parties' prior stipulated agreement into its final decree without making a best interests determination re children 17 months later at time of final decree. 98 CA 63.

Subsec. (c):

Plain meaning of section, read within context of related statutes within Ch. 815j, makes clear that Subsec. is intended to apply only in dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment actions. 103 CA 746. The language of Subsec. does not compel the consideration of any particular factor or factors when determining the best interest of a child; rather, the court is free to consider the factors it determines to be most appropriate given the facts of each individual case. 108 CA 813. Subdiv. (12) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of case because it is clear that the core meaning of Subdiv. permits a court to consider a disability or health issue when making a custody determination, as long as such disability or health issue is not determinative, or to use such disability or health issue as a determinative factor if it is in the child's best interests to do so. 130 CA 411. Subdiv. (7) authorizes court to consider parental alienation syndrome, specific acts of coercion and manipulation on part of defendant when making or modifying an order pursuant to section. 135 CA 337. The portion of the order pertaining to the defendant's visitation is an improper delegation of the court's judicial authority because the court effectively delegated to the plaintiff the authority to suspend or terminate the defendant's visitation and its attendant obligation to consider the best interest of the child pursuant to Subsec. 219 CA 716.

Subsec. (g):

Court order conferring authority with the children's therapeutic counselors to determine whether the defendant was allowed to have access to the children's private therapy records was an improper delegation of judicial authority, and under the plain and unambiguous language of the Subsec., the defendant, as the noncustodial parent, was statutorily entitled to have access to the children's private therapy records, subject only to the court's denying him right of access to the records for good cause shown. 218 CA 818.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-416 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-416
Sec. 46b-416. Grounds for rendition.
Status: in_force

(b) The governor of this state may (1) demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual found in the other state who is charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee; or (2) on the demand of the governor of another state, surrender an individual found in this state who is charged criminally in the other state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee.

(c) A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, applies to the demand even if the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled therefrom.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-231 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 816 / Section 46b-231
Sec. 46b-231. Definitions. Family Support Magistrate Division. Family support magistrates; appointment, salaries, powers and duties. Orders. Appeal. Attorney General; duties re actions for support. Department of Social Services; powers.
Status: repealed

(b) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Chief Family Support Magistrate” means the family support magistrate designated by the Chief Court Administrator as provided in subsection (g) of this section;

(2) “Child support enforcement services” means the services provided by the IV-D agency or an agency under cooperative or purchase of service agreement therewith pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, including, but not limited to, location; establishment of parentage; establishment, modification and enforcement of child and medical support orders and the collection and distribution of support payments;

(3) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Social Services or a designee or authorized representative;

(4) “Office of Child Support Services” means a division within the Department of Social Services established pursuant to section 17b-179 ;

(5) “Department” means the Department of Social Services or any bureau, division or agency of the Department of Social Services;

(6) “Family Support Magistrate Division” means a division of the Superior Court created by this section for the purpose of establishing and enforcing child and spousal support in IV-D cases and in cases brought pursuant to sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, utilizing quasi-judicial proceedings;

(7) “Family support magistrate” means a person appointed as provided in subsection (f) of this section to establish and enforce child and spousal support orders;

(8) “Foster care cases” means cases in which children are receiving foster care under part I of chapter 319a or part I of chapter 815t, but does not include cases in which children reside in detention facilities, forestry camps, training schools or other facilities operated primarily for the detention of children adjudicated as delinquent;

(9) “Law” means both statutory and common law;

(10) “Obligee” means any person to whom a duty of support is owed;

(11) “Obligor” means any person owing a duty of support;

(12) “IV-D agency” means the Office of Child Support Services within the Department of Social Services, established pursuant to section 17b-179 and authorized to administer the child support program mandated by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act;

(13) “IV-D support cases” means cases in which the IV-D agency is providing child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act pursuant to (A) an application under subsection (h) of section 17b-179 , or (B) referral of a (i) temporary family assistance case under section 17b-112 , which for the purposes of this section may be referred to as “TFA”, (ii) a Medicaid case under section 17b-261 , or (iii) a foster care case under section 46b-130 ; and

(14) “Support order” means a judgment, decree or order, whether temporary, final or subject to modification, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or another state's administrative agency of competent jurisdiction, for the support and maintenance of a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state, or of the parent with whom the child is living, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages or reimbursement, and which may include related costs and fees, interest and penalties, income withholding, attorneys' fees and other relief.

(c) The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedy.

(d) There is created the Family Support Magistrate Division of the Superior Court for the purpose of the impartial administration of child and spousal support.

(e) Repealed by P.A. 91-190, S. 8, 9.

(f) (1) (A) The Family Support Magistrate Division shall include nine family support magistrates who shall, (i) prior to January 1, 2017, be appointed by the Governor to serve in that capacity for a term of three years, and (ii) on and after January 1, 2017, be nominated by the Governor and appointed by the General Assembly to serve in that capacity for a term of five years, except that each family support magistrate serving on December 31, 2016, shall continue to serve in that capacity on and after January 1, 2017, until the expiration of such magistrate's three-year term, unless removed from office pursuant to this subsection. A family support magistrate may be nominated by the Governor for reappointment. If a family support magistrate continues to serve after the expiration of such three-year term and such family support magistrate is nominated by the Governor for reappointment, the family support magistrate's five-year term shall begin on the date that the General Assembly approves the nomination for reappointment pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection.

(B) To be eligible for nomination as a family support magistrate, a person shall have engaged in the practice of law for five years prior to appointment and be experienced in the field of family law. The family support magistrate shall devote full time to the duties of a family support magistrate and shall not engage in the private practice of law. A family support magistrate may be removed from office by the Governor for cause and is subject to admonishment, censure, suspension and removal from office as provided in chapter 872a.

(2) Each nomination made by the Governor to the General Assembly for a family support magistrate shall be referred, without debate, to the committee on the judiciary, which shall report thereon within thirty legislative days from the time of reference, but not later than seven legislative days before the adjourning of the General Assembly.

(3) Each appointment of a family support magistrate shall be by concurrent resolution. The action on the passage of each such resolution in the House of Representatives and in the Senate shall be by vote taken on the electrical roll-call device. No resolution shall contain the name of more than one nominee. The Governor shall, within five days after the Governor has notice that any family support magistrate nomination has failed to be approved by the affirmative concurrent action of both houses of the General Assembly, make another nomination to such office.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4-19 , no vacancy in the position of a family support magistrate shall be filled by the Governor when the General Assembly is not in session unless, prior to such filling, the Governor submits the name of the proposed vacancy appointee to the committee on the judiciary. Within forty-five days, the committee on the judiciary may, upon the call of either chairperson, hold a special meeting for the purpose of approving or disapproving such proposed vacancy appointee by majority vote. The Governor shall not administer the oath of office to such proposed vacancy appointee until the committee has approved such proposed vacancy appointee. If the committee determines that it cannot complete its investigation and act on such proposed vacancy appointee within such forty-five-day period, it may extend such period by an additional fifteen days. The committee shall notify the Governor in writing of any such extension. Failure of the committee to act on such proposed vacancy appointee within such forty-five-day period or any fifteen-day extension period shall be deemed to be an approval.

(5) Prior to a public hearing on a family support magistrate, the committee on the judiciary may employ a person to investigate, at the request of the chairpersons of said committee, any family support magistrate nominee with respect to the suitability of such nominee for magisterial office. Such investigator shall report his or her findings to said committee and any such report shall be confidential and shall not be subject to public disclosure. Such person shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by the Joint Committee on Legislative Management for each day such person is engaged in his or her duties as an investigator.

(g) A Chief Family Support Magistrate shall be designated by the Chief Court Administrator of the Superior Court from among the nine family support magistrates appointed pursuant to subsection (f) of this section. Under the direction of the Chief Court Administrator, the Chief Family Support Magistrate shall supervise the Family Support Magistrate Division and perform such other duties as provided in this section.

(h) (1) On and after July 1, 2022, the Chief Family Support Magistrate shall receive a salary of one hundred sixty-four thousand nine hundred thirty-two dollars, and other family support magistrates shall receive an annual salary of one hundred fifty-six thousand nine hundred seventy-three dollars.

(2) On and after July 1, 2023, the Chief Family Support Magistrate shall receive a salary of one hundred sixty-nine thousand eight hundred eighty dollars, and other family support magistrates shall receive an annual salary of one hundred sixty-one thousand six hundred eighty-two dollars.

(3) On and after July 1, 2024, the Chief Family Support Magistrate shall receive a salary of one hundred seventy-four thousand nine hundred seventy-six dollars, and other family support magistrates shall receive an annual salary of one hundred sixty-six thousand five hundred thirty-three dollars.

(i) (1) Family support magistrates shall be included under the provisions of chapters 65 and 66 regarding retirement and disability of state employees. Each such individual shall receive full retirement credit for each year or portion thereof for which retirement benefits are paid while serving as a family support magistrate.

(2) Any family support magistrate may elect to be included within the provisions of sections 51-49 , 51-49a , 51-49b , 51-49c , 51-49d , 51-49h , 51-50a and 51-50b , or to continue to be subject to the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection. Any family support magistrate who has so elected may revoke such election and elect to be included in the provisions of chapters 65 and 66 regarding retirement and disability of state employees. Thereupon any payments transferred from the State Employees Retirement Fund to the Judges, Family Support Magistrates and Administrative Law Judges Retirement Fund shall be transferred from the Judges, Family Support Magistrates and Administrative Law Judges Retirement Fund to the State Employees Retirement Fund.

(j) The Chief Court Administrator shall designate assistant clerks for the Family Support Magistrate Division to serve in judicial districts created pursuant to section 51-344 and such other assistant clerks and other employees as may be necessary for the operation of the Family Support Magistrate Division. The administrative judge for each judicial district may also assign clerks or administrative clerks for the judicial district to serve as assistant clerks or administrative clerks in his judicial district for the Family Support Magistrate Division.

(k) The Chief Court Administrator shall arrange for the recording of all hearings before the family support magistrate by contract or otherwise.

(l) The judges of the Superior Court shall adopt rules of procedure in accordance with the provisions of section 51-14 for the handling by magistrates of IV-D support cases and in cases brought pursuant to sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive. Such rules of procedure shall conform when applicable to rules adopted for the Superior Court.

(m) The Chief Family Support Magistrate and the family support magistrates shall have the powers and duties enumerated in this subsection.

(1) A family support magistrate in IV-D support cases may compel the attendance of witnesses or the obligor under a summons issued pursuant to section 17b-745 , 46b-215 or 46b-570 , a subpoena issued pursuant to section 52-143 , or a citation for failure to obey an order of a family support magistrate or a judge of the Superior Court. If a person is served with any such summons, subpoena or citation issued by a family support magistrate or the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division and fails to appear, a family support magistrate may issue a capias mittimus directed to a judicial marshal to the extent authorized pursuant to section 46b-225 , or any other proper officer to arrest the obligor or the witness and bring the obligor or witness before a family support magistrate. Whenever such a capias mittimus is ordered, the family support magistrate shall establish a recognizance to the state of Connecticut in the form of a bond of such character and amount as to assure the appearance of the obligor at the next regular session of the Family Support Magistrate Division in the judicial district in which the matter is pending. If the obligor posts such a bond, and thereafter fails to appear before the family support magistrate at the time and place the obligor is ordered to appear, the family support magistrate may order the bond forfeited, and the proceeds thereof distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

(2) (A) Family support magistrates shall hear and determine matters involving child and spousal support in IV-D support cases including petitions for support brought pursuant to sections 17b-81 , 17b-179 , 17b-745 and 46b-215 , applications for show cause orders in IV-D support cases brought pursuant to subsection (a) of section 46b-570 , and actions for interstate enforcement of child and spousal support and parentage under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, and shall hear and determine all motions for modifications of child and spousal support in such cases.

(B) In all IV-D support cases, family support magistrates shall have the authority to order any obligor who is subject to a plan for reimbursement of past-due support and is not incapacitated to participate in work activities which may include, but shall not be limited to, job search, training, work experience and participation in the job training and retraining program established by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section 31-3t .

(C) A family support magistrate shall not modify an order for periodic payment on an arrearage due the state for state assistance which has been discontinued to increase such payments, unless the family support magistrate first determines that the state has made a reasonable effort to notify the current recipient of child support, at the most current address available to the IV-D agency, of the pendency of the motion to increase such periodic arrearage payments and of the time and place of the hearing on such motion. If such recipient appears, either personally or through a representative, at such hearing, the family support magistrate shall determine whether the order in effect for child support is reasonable in relation to the current financial circumstances of the parties, prior to modifying an order increasing such periodic arrearage payments.

(3) Family support magistrates shall review and approve or disapprove all agreements for support in IV-D support cases filed with the Family Support Magistrate Division in accordance with sections 17b-179 , 17b-745 , 46b-215 , 46b-570 and subsection (c) of section 53-304 .

(4) Motions for modification of existing child and spousal support orders entered by the Superior Court in IV-D support cases, including motions to modify existing child and spousal support orders entered in actions brought pursuant to chapter 815j, shall be brought in the Family Support Magistrate Division and decided by a family support magistrate. Family support magistrates, in deciding if a spousal or child support order should be modified, shall make such determination based upon the criteria set forth in sections 46b-84 and 46b-215b . A person who is aggrieved by a decision of a family support magistrate modifying a Superior Court order is entitled to appeal such decision in accordance with the provisions of subsection (n) of this section.

(5) Venue for proceedings to establish parentage in IV-D support cases shall be in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) of section 46b-461 . The matter shall be heard and determined by a family support magistrate in accordance with the provisions of chapter 815y.

(6) Agreements for support obtained in IV-D support cases shall be filed with the assistant clerk of the family support magistrate division for the judicial district where a parent of the child resides, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 46b-570 , and shall become effective as an order upon filing with the clerk. Such support agreements shall be reviewed by a family support magistrate who shall approve or disapprove the agreement. If the support agreement filed with the clerk is disapproved by a family support magistrate, the reason for disapproval shall be stated in the record and such disapproval shall have a retroactive effect. Upon such disapproval, the clerk shall schedule a hearing for the purpose of determining appropriate support amounts and shall notify all appearing parties of the hearing date.

(7) Family support magistrates shall enforce orders for child and spousal support entered by such family support magistrate and by the Superior Court in IV-D support cases by citing an obligor for contempt. Family support magistrates, in IV-D support cases, may order any obligor who is subject to a plan for reimbursement of past-due support and is not incapacitated, to participate in work activities which may include, but shall not be limited to, job search, training, work experience and participation in the job training and retraining program established by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section 31-3t . Family support magistrates shall also enforce income withholding orders entered pursuant to section 52-362 , including any additional amounts to be applied toward liquidation of any arrearage, as required under subsection (e) of said section. Family support magistrates may require the obligor to furnish recognizance to the state of Connecticut in the form of a cash deposit or bond of such character and in such amount as the Family Support Magistrate Division deems proper to assure appearance at the next regular session of the Family Support Magistrate Division in the judicial district in which the matter is pending. Upon failure of the obligor to post such bond, the family support magistrate may refer the obligor to a community correctional center until he has complied with such order, provided the obligor shall be heard at the next regular session of the Family Support Magistrate Division in the court to which he was summoned. If no regular session is held within seven days of such referral, the family support magistrate shall either cause a special session of the Family Support Magistrate Division to be convened, or the obligor shall be heard by a Superior Court judge in the judicial district in which the matter is pending. If the obligor fails to appear before the family support magistrate at the time and place he is ordered to appear, the family support magistrate may order the bond, if any, forfeited, and the proceeds thereof distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and the family support magistrate may issue a capias mittimus for the arrest of the obligor, ordering him to appear before the family support magistrate. A family support magistrate may determine whether or not an obligor is in contempt of the order of the Superior Court or of a family support magistrate and may make such orders as are provided by law to enforce a support obligation, except that if the family support magistrate determines that incarceration of an obligor for failure to obey a support order may be indicated, the family support magistrate shall inform the obligor of his right to be represented by an attorney and his right to a court-appointed attorney to represent him if he is indigent. If the obligor claims he is indigent and desires an attorney to represent him, the family support magistrate shall conduct a hearing to determine if the obligor is indigent. If, after such hearing, the family support magistrate finds that the obligor is indigent, the family support magistrate shall appoint an attorney to represent the obligor.

(8) Agreements between parties as to custody and visitation of minor children in IV-D support cases may be filed with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division. Such agreements shall be reviewed by a family support magistrate, who shall approve the agreement unless he finds such agreement is not in the best interests of the child. Agreements between parties as to custody and visitation in IV-D support cases shall be enforced in the same manner as agreements for support are enforced, pursuant to subdivision (7) of this subsection.

(9) Agreements between the parties as to the modification or enforcement of support orders in IV-D support cases may be filed with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division for the judicial district where the mother or father of the child resides and where the parties have submitted to a motion for modification or an application for contempt of an existing child or spousal support order. Such agreements may be approved by the family support magistrate after an inquiry into the financial needs, resources and the respective abilities of the parties. The inquiry required pursuant to this subdivision may take place on the record at a hearing, or may be made on the basis of an affidavit from each party, made under oath, stating that (A) each party has the financial resources and other facts satisfying any requirement of the inquiry in question, and (B) that no restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c , between the parties is in effect or pending before the court. If each party so attests, a family support magistrate may (i) determine whether the agreement between the parties as to modification or enforcement of a support order is fair and equitable under all the circumstances, and (ii) make any other findings required by this section.

(10) Whenever an obligor is before a family support magistrate in proceedings to establish, modify or enforce a support order in a IV-D support case and such order is not secured by an income withholding order, the family support magistrate may require the obligor to execute a bond or post other security sufficient to perform such order for support, provided the family support magistrate finds that such a bond is available for purchase within the financial means of the obligor. Upon failure of such obligor to comply with such support order, the family support magistrate may order the bond or the security forfeited and the proceeds thereof distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

(11) In any proceeding in the Family Support Magistrate Division, if the family support magistrate finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the family support magistrate shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.

(12) A family support magistrate may dismiss any action or proceeding which the family support magistrate may hear and determine.

(13) A family support magistrate may order parties to participate in the parenting education program in accordance with the provisions of section 46b-69b .

(14) Family support magistrates may issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum in IV-D support cases for persons in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.

(15) A family support magistrate may, upon the filing of a motion to modify an existing support order based on the fact that the Social Security Administration, or a state agency authorized to award disability benefits has determined that the obligor qualifies for disability benefits under the federal Supplemental Security Income Program and the filing of an affidavit by a support enforcement officer: (A) Modify the existing support order to zero dollars without a hearing; (B) schedule the motion for a hearing; or (C) deny the motion without a hearing. The support enforcement officer's affidavit shall state: (i) The date that the child support obligor qualified for benefits under the federal Supplemental Security Income Program; (ii) that the support enforcement officer confirmed such benefits with the federal Social Security Administration or another federal agency with access to Social Security Administration applicant and benefit information; (iii) that a diligent search failed to identify any other income or assets that could be used to satisfy the child support order; (iv) that support enforcement services provided notice to the custodial party in accordance with section 52-57 or by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the proposed modification, that the custodial party had the right to object to the proposed modification, and that support enforcement services must receive any objection to the proposed modification not later than fifteen calendar days after the date that the custodial party received such notice; and (v) that support enforcement services did not receive an objection from the custodial party. Any support order modified pursuant to this subdivision may be later modified upon a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. Nothing in this subdivision shall preclude a family support magistrate from modifying an existing support order under any other section of the general statutes.

(n) (1) A person who is aggrieved by a final decision of a family support magistrate is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this section.

(2) Proceedings for such appeal shall be instituted by filing a petition in superior court for the judicial district in which the decision of the family support magistrate was rendered not later than fourteen days after filing of the final decision with an assistant clerk assigned to the Family Support Magistrate Division or, if a rehearing is requested, not later than fourteen days after filing of the notice of the decision thereon. In a IV-D support case, such petitions shall be accompanied by a certification that copies of the petition have been served upon the IV-D agency as defined in subsection (b) of this section and all parties of record. Service upon the IV-D agency may be made by the appellant mailing a copy of the petition by certified mail to the office of the Attorney General in Hartford.

(3) Within fourteen days after the filing of the petition, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, the Family Support Magistrate Division shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceeding appealed from, which shall include the decision of the family support magistrate. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.

(4) The aggrieved party shall file with his appeal a statement that no transcript is required for the purpose of determining the issues raised on appeal or a statement that he has ordered a transcript. A transcript may be filed by any party to an appeal and shall be filed within thirty days from the filing of said appeal unless the time for filing such transcript is extended by order of the Superior Court or the family support magistrate. Costs of preparing the transcript shall be paid by the party ordering the preparation of the transcript.

(5) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the Superior Court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the family support magistrate, the Superior Court may permit additional evidence be taken before it upon conditions determined by the court.

(6) The appeal shall be conducted by the Superior Court without a jury and shall be confined to the record and such additional evidence as the Superior Court has permitted to be introduced. The Superior Court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.

(7) The Superior Court may affirm the decision of the family support magistrate or remand the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

(8) Any order entered by the court pursuant to an appeal under this subsection may be retroactive to the date of the original order entered by the family support magistrate.

(9) Upon all such appeals which are denied, costs may be taxed in favor of the prevailing party at the discretion of the Superior Court, but no costs shall be taxed against the state.

(10) In any case in which any party claims that he cannot pay the costs of an appeal or defending an appeal under this section, he shall, within the time permitted for filing the appeal, or the time permitted for filing of a transcript of testimony if preparation of such transcript is required, file with the clerk of the superior court to which the appeal is to be taken an application for waiver of payment of such fees, costs and necessary expenses. The application shall conform to rules adopted pursuant to section 51-14 . After such hearing as the Superior Court determines is necessary, the Superior Court shall enter its judgment on the application, which judgment shall contain a statement of the facts the Superior Court has found, with its conclusions thereon. The filing of the application for the waiver shall toll the time limits for the filing of an appeal until such time as a judgment on such application is entered.

(o) Upon final determination of any appeal from a decision of a family support magistrate by the Superior Court, there shall be no right to further review except to the Appellate Court. The procedure on such appeal to the Appellate Court shall, except as otherwise provided herein, be in accordance with the procedures provided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments rendered by the Superior Court unless modified by rule of the judges of the Appellate Court. There shall be no right to further review except to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of section 51-197f .

(p) The filing of an appeal from a decision of a family support magistrate does not affect the order of support of a family support magistrate, but it shall continue in effect until the appeal is decided, and thereafter, unless denied, until changed by further order of a family support magistrate or the Superior Court.

(q) When an order for child or spousal support has been entered against an obligor by the Superior Court in an action originating in the Superior Court, such order shall supersede any previous order for child or spousal support against such obligor entered by a family support magistrate and shall also supersede any previous agreement for support executed by such obligor and filed with the Family Support Magistrate Division.

(r) Orders for support entered by a family support magistrate shall have the same force and effect as orders of the Superior Court, except where otherwise provided in sections 17b-81 , 17b-93 , 17b-179 , 17b-743 , 17b-744 , 17b-745 , and 17b-746 , 46b-55 , 46b-59a , 46b-86 and 46b-570 , this chapter, subsection (b) of section 51-348 , section 52-362 , subsection (a) of section 52-362d , subsection (a) of section 52-362e and subsection (c) of section 53-304 , and shall be considered orders of the Superior Court for the purpose of establishing and enforcing support orders of the family support magistrate, as provided in sections 17b-81 , 17b-93 , 17b-179 , 17b-745 , 52-362 , 52-362d , 52-362e and 53-304 , except as otherwise provided in this section. All orders for support issued by family support magistrates in any matter before a magistrate shall contain an order for withholding to enforce such orders as set forth in section 52-362 .

(s) Support enforcement officers of Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court shall:

(1) Supervise the payment of any child or spousal support order in IV-D support cases and cases under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive. Supervision of such orders is defined as the utilization of all procedures available by law to collect child or spousal support, or enforce medical support including (A) issuance and implementation of income withholdings ordered by the Superior Court or a family support magistrate pursuant to section 52-362 , (B) issuance of an order requiring any party to appear before a family support magistrate on an action to modify a support order pursuant to subdivision (4) of this subsection, (C) issuance of a capias mittimus directed to a proper officer to arrest an obligor or witness and bring such obligor or witness before a family support magistrate if such obligor or witness is served with a summons, subpoena, citation or order to appear issued by a family support magistrate, the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division or a support enforcement officer and fails to appear, (D) if necessary, bringing an application for contempt to a family support magistrate and, in connection with such application, issuing an order requiring the obligor to appear before a family support magistrate to show cause why such obligor should not be held in contempt for failure to pay an order for child or spousal support entered by the Superior Court or a family support magistrate, (E) issuance of a National Medical Support Notice in accordance with section 46b-88 , and (F) taking of acknowledgements of parties to agreements incident to the duties under subdivision (4) of this subsection;

(2) In non-TFA cases, have the authority to bring petitions for support orders pursuant to section 46b-215 , file agreements for support with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division, and bring applications for show cause orders pursuant to section 46b-570 , and in IV-D support cases and cases under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, enforce foreign support orders registered with the Family Support Magistrate Division pursuant to sections 46b-364 to 46b-372 , inclusive, and file agreements for support with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division;

(3) In connection with any order or agreement entered by, or filed with, the Family Support Magistrate Division, or any order entered by the Superior Court in a IV-D support case, upon order, investigate the financial situation of the parties and report findings to the family support magistrate regarding: (A) Any pending motion to modify such order or agreement; or (B) any request or application for modification of such order or agreement made by an obligee;

(4) Review child support orders (A) in non-TFA IV-D support cases (i) at the request of either parent or custodial party subject to a support order, or (ii) upon receipt of information indicating a substantial change in circumstances of any party to the support order, (B) in TFA cases, at the request of the Office of Child Support Services, or (C) as necessary to comply with federal requirements for the child support enforcement program mandated by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and initiate an action before a family support magistrate to modify such support order if it is determined upon such review that the order substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . A requesting party under subparagraph (A)(i) or (B) of this subdivision shall have a right to such review every three years without proving a substantial change in circumstances, but more frequent reviews shall be made only if such requesting party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent or more from the guidelines is substantial. Modification may be made of such support order without regard to whether the order was issued before, on or after May 9, 1991. In determining whether to modify a child support order based on a substantial deviation from such child support guidelines, consideration shall be given to the division of real and personal property between the parties set forth in any final decree entered pursuant to chapter 815j and the benefits accruing to the child as the result of such division. No order for periodic payment of support may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the family support magistrate may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a pending motion for modification of a support order from the date of service of notice of such pending motion to the opposing party pursuant to section 52-50 ; and

(5) In proceedings before the Family Support Magistrate Division under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (A) perform clerical, administrative and other nonjudicial functions on behalf of the Family Support Magistrate Division; (B) maintain a registry of support orders and judgments; and (C) assist the IV-D agency in performing its functions under sections 46b-398 to 46b-410 , inclusive.

(t) The Attorney General shall:

(1) Represent the interest of the state in all actions for child or spousal support in all cases in which the state is furnishing or has furnished aid or care to one of the parties to the action or a child of one of the parties;

(2) In interstate support enforcement under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, provide necessary legal services on behalf of the support enforcement agency in providing services to a petitioner; and

(3) Represent the IV-D agency in providing support enforcement services in non-TFA IV-D support cases pursuant to sections 17b-179 , 17b-745 and 46b-215 .

(u) (1) The Department of Social Services may in IV-D cases (A) bring petitions for support orders pursuant to section 46b-215 , (B) obtain acknowledgments of parentage, (C) bring applications for show cause orders pursuant to section 46b-570 , (D) file agreements for support with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division, (E) issue withholding orders entered by the Superior Court or a family support magistrate in accordance with subsection (b) of section 52-362 , and (F) upon notice to the obligor and obligee, redirect payments for the support of any child receiving child support enforcement services either to the state of Connecticut or to the present custodial party, as their interests may appear, for distribution in accordance with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, provided neither the obligor nor the obligee objects in writing within ten business days from the mailing date of such notice, and provided further that any such notice shall be sent by first class mail to the most recent address of such obligor and obligee, as recorded in the state case registry pursuant to section 46b-218 , and a copy of such notice shall be filed with the court or family support magistrate if both the obligor and obligee fail to object to the redirected payments within ten business days from the mailing date of such notice.

(2) The Department of Social Services shall provide notice not less than once every three years to the parents subject to a support order in a IV-D case informing the parents of their right to request a review under subdivision (4) of subsection (s) of this section.

See Sec. 52-56(d) re execution or service of capias mittimus in any precinct by state marshal of any precinct.

Cited. 213 C. 373; 222 C. 799; 229 C. 178.

Cited. 31 CA 114; 36 CA 138; 46 CA 1. Although Subsec. (q) authorizes Superior Court to intervene in a matter pending before family support magistrate, Superior Court does not have authority to vacate orders issued by family support magistrate in the absence of notice to the affected parties or an appeal filed pursuant to Subsec. (n). 103 CA 276. Trial court erred in determining that the family support magistrate division had the inherent authority to open the acknowledgment on the basis of the best interests of the child. 182 CA 22.

Cited. 42 CS 126; Id., 562.

Subsec. (m):

Cited. 37 CA 105. Right to jury trial. 52 CA 431.

Court has continuing power to enforce premajority support orders when child reaches age of majority. 45 CS 169.

Subsec. (n):

Subdiv. (2): Court declined to address defendant's claim that section is unconstitutional; party cannot seek the relief provided in an ordinance or statute and later in the same proceeding raise the question of its constitutionality. 41 CA 803. Subdiv. (1): State's appeal to Superior Court was premature because there was no appealable final decision since family support magistrate had not yet rendered decision on motion to open or on child's standing to file the motion. 78 CA 848. Court was within its discretion to deny plaintiff's motion to introduce evidence relevant only to the original child support order in 1996 when the matter before the court concerned a later period. 83 CA 398.

Cited. 44 CS 145.

Subsec. (s):

Support enforcement services have statutory authority to assist defendant in seeking enforcement of support order. 286 C. 291.

Subsec. (t):

State has statutory authority to provide legal services to support enforcement services. 286 C. 291.

Cited. 41 CA 803.

Duties imposed by section upon Attorney General and in Sec. 17b-179 upon Commissioner of Social Services provide standing for Department of Social Services in a probate appeal. 47 CS 42.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81o — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-81o
Sec. 46a-81o. Sexual orientation discrimination: Reports to Governor by state agencies.
Status: in_force

(b) Such reports shall cover both internal activities and external relations with the public or with other state agencies and shall contain other information as specifically requested by the Governor.

(c) The information in the annual reports required under the provisions of this section shall be reviewed by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of sections 46a-81h to 46a-81n , inclusive.

Cited. 236 C. 453.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-483 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-483
Sec. 46b-483. Challenge after expiration period for recission. Procedure for challenge.
Status: in_force

(b) Every signatory to an acknowledgment of parentage shall be made a party to a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment.

(c) By signing an acknowledgment of parentage, a signatory submits to personal jurisdiction in this state in a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment, effective on the filing of the acknowledgment with the Department of Public Health.

(d) During the pendency of a challenge to the acknowledgment of parentage, any responsibilities, including the duty to pay child support, arising from the acknowledgment shall continue except for good cause shown.

(e) If the court or family support magistrate determines that the challenger has met the challenger's burden of proof under subsection (a) of this section, the acknowledgment of parentage shall be set aside only if such court or family support magistrate determines that doing so is in the best interest of the child, based on the relevant factors set forth in section 46b-475 .

(f) If the court or family support magistrate determines that the requirements of subsections (a) and (e) of this section are satisfied, the court or family support magistrate shall order the Department of Public Health to amend the birth record of the child to reflect the legal parentage of the child.

(g) In cases involving a child who is or has been supported by the state, whenever the court or family support magistrate finds that the person challenging the acknowledgment of parentage is not a parent because such person has met the burden of proof under subsections (a) and (e) of this section, the Department of Social Services shall refund to such person any money paid by such person to the state during any period such child was supported by the state.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38c — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815e / Section 46b-38c
Sec. 46b-38c. Family violence response and intervention units. Local units. Duties and functions. Electronic monitoring program. Pretrial family violence education program; fees. Training program.
Status: in_force

(b) The Court Support Services Division, in accordance with the agreement between the Chief State's Attorney and the Judicial Department, shall establish within each geographical area of the Superior Court a local family violence intervention unit to implement sections 46b-1 , 46b-15 , 46b-38a to 46b-38f , inclusive, and 54-1g . The Court Support Services Division shall oversee direct operations of the local units.

(c) Each such local family violence intervention unit shall: (1) Accept referrals of family violence cases from a judge or prosecutor, (2) prepare written or oral reports on each case for the court by the next court date to be presented at any time during the court session on that date, (3) provide or arrange for services to victims and offenders, (4) administer contracts to carry out such services, and (5) establish centralized reporting procedures. All information provided to a family relations counselor, family relations counselor trainee or family services supervisor employed by the Judicial Department in a local family violence intervention unit shall be used solely for the purposes of preparation of the report and the protective order forms for each case and recommendation of services and shall otherwise be confidential and retained in the files of such unit and not be subject to subpoena or other court process for use in any other proceeding or for any other purpose, except that a family relations counselor, family relations counselor trainee or family services supervisor employed by the Judicial Department:

(A) Shall disclose to the court and the prosecuting authority for appropriate action information that the victim has indicated that the defendant holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, possesses one or more firearms or possesses ammunition;

(B) Shall disclose to an employee of the Department of Children and Families information that indicates that a defendant poses a danger or threat to a child or a custodial parent of the child;

(C) May disclose to another family relations counselor, family relations counselor trainee or family services supervisor information pursuant to guidelines adopted by the Chief Court Administrator;

(D) May disclose to a bail commissioner or an intake, assessment and referral specialist employed by the Judicial Department information regarding a defendant who is on or is being considered for pretrial release;

(E) May disclose to a law enforcement agency information that indicates that a defendant poses a danger or threat to another person;

(F) May disclose, after disposition of a family violence case, to a probation officer or a juvenile probation officer, for purposes of determining service needs and supervision levels, information regarding a defendant who has been convicted and sentenced to a period of probation in the family violence case;

(G) May disclose, after a conviction in a family violence case, to a probation officer for the purpose of preparing a presentence investigation report, any information regarding the defendant that has been provided to the family relations counselor, family relations counselor trainee or family services supervisor in the case or in any other case that resulted in the conviction of the defendant;

(H) May disclose to any organization under contract with the Judicial Department to provide family violence programs and services, for the purpose of determining program and service needs, information regarding any defendant who is a client of such organization, provided no information that personally identifies the victim may be disclosed to such organization; and

(I) Shall disclose such information as may be necessary to fulfill such counselor's, trainee's or supervisor's duty as a mandated reporter under section 17a-101a to report suspected child abuse or neglect.

(d) In all cases of family violence, a written or oral report that indicates whether the parties in the family violence case are parties to a case pending on the family relations docket of the Superior Court and includes recommendation of the local family violence intervention unit shall be available to a judge at the first court date appearance to be presented at any time during the court session on that date. A judge of the Superior Court may consider and impose the following conditions to protect the parties, including, but not limited to: (1) Issuance of a protective order pursuant to subsection (e) of this section; (2) prohibition against subjecting the victim to further violence; (3) referral to a family violence education program for persons who commit acts of family violence; and (4) immediate referral for more extensive case assessment. Such protective order shall be an order of the court, and the clerk of the court shall cause (A) a copy of such order to be sent to the victim, and (B) a copy of such order, or the information contained in such order, to be sent by facsimile or other means within forty-eight hours of its issuance to the law enforcement agency for the town in which the victim resides and, if the defendant resides in a town different from the town in which the victim resides, to the law enforcement agency for the town in which the defendant resides. If the victim is employed in a town different from the town in which the victim resides, the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such order, or the information contained in such order, to the law enforcement agency for the town in which the victim is employed not later than forty-eight hours after the issuance of such order. If the victim is enrolled in a public or private elementary or secondary school, including a technical education and career school, or an institution of higher education, as defined in section 10a-55 , the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such order, or the information contained in such order, to such school or institution of higher education, the president of any institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled and the special police force established pursuant to section 10a-156b , if any, at the institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled, if the victim provides the clerk with the name and address of such school or institution of higher education.

(e) (1) A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect the victim from threats, harassment, injury or intimidation by the defendant, including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from (A) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim, (B) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting or sexually assaulting the victim, or (C) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim. A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the victim including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from injuring or threatening to injure such animal. Such order shall be made a condition of the bail or release of the defendant and shall contain the following notification: “In accordance with section 53a-223 of the Connecticut general statutes, any violation of this order constitutes criminal violation of a protective order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both. Additionally, in accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or both. Violation of this order also violates a condition of your bail or release, and may result in raising the amount of bail or revoking release.” Every order of the court made in accordance with this section after notice and hearing shall be accompanied by a notification that is consistent with the full faith and credit provisions set forth in 18 USC 2265(a), as amended from time to time. The information contained in and concerning the issuance of any protective order issued under this section shall be entered in the registry of protective orders pursuant to section 51-5c .

(2) Each person who receives an order of the court in accordance with this subsection shall be given a notice that contains the following language: “If a protective order has been issued on your behalf or on behalf of your child, you may elect to give testimony or appear in a family court proceeding remotely, pursuant to section 46b-15c . Please notify the court in writing at least two days in advance of a proceeding if you choose to give testimony or appear remotely, and your physical presence in the courthouse will not be required in order to participate in the court proceeding.”.

(f) The Judicial Department shall establish a program within each judicial district for the purpose of using electronic monitoring in accordance with this subsection. Under the program, the court may order that any person appearing in such judicial district who is charged with the violation of a restraining order or a protective order, and who has been determined to be a high-risk offender by the family violence intervention unit, be subject to electronic monitoring designed to warn law enforcement agencies, a state-wide information collection center and the victim when the person is within a specified distance of the victim, if the court finds that such electronic monitoring is necessary to protect the victim. If the court orders that such person be subject to electronic monitoring, the clerk of the court shall send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of the order, or the information contained in any such order, to the law enforcement agency or agencies for the town in which the person resides. The Judicial Branch shall establish the program within each judicial district not later than October 1, 2025.

(g) (1) In cases referred to the local family violence intervention unit, it shall be the function of the unit to (A) identify victim service needs, (B) assess offenders for the purpose of identifying appropriate services, (C) monitor compliance with program requirements by offenders who are allowed to participate in the pretrial family violence education program described in subsection (h) of this section, and (D) monitor offenders who have been referred to pretrial services or programs.

(2) The Judicial Department may contract with victim service providers to make available, either directly or through referral, appropriate services that include, but are not limited to, the provision of trauma-informed care, as defined in subsection (f) of section 46b-38b .

(3) The Judicial Department may contract with service providers to provide domestic violence offender treatment programs for offenders referred by the court. Such treatment programs shall comply with the domestic violence offender program standards promulgated under section 46b-38 l . The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to the pretrial family violence education program described in subsection (h) of this section.

(h) (1) There shall be a pretrial family violence education program for persons who are charged with family violence crimes. At a minimum, such program shall inform participants of the basic elements of family violence law and applicable penalties. The court may, in its discretion, invoke such program on motion of the defendant when it finds: (A) That the defendant has not previously been convicted of a family violence crime which occurred on or after October 1, 1986; (B) the defendant has not had a previous case assigned to the family violence education program; (C) the defendant has not previously invoked or accepted accelerated rehabilitation under section 54-56e for a family violence crime which occurred on or after October 1, 1986; and (D) that the defendant is not charged with (i) a class A or class B felony, (ii) a class C felony, except in the case of a person charged with a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 and good cause is shown, (iii) an unclassified felony carrying a term of imprisonment of more than ten years, or (iv) unless good cause is shown, (I) a class D felony, (II) an unclassified offense carrying a term of imprisonment of more than five years, or (III) an offense that involved the infliction of serious physical injury, as defined in section 53a-3 . Participation by any person in the accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program under section 54-56e prior to October 1, 1986, shall not prohibit eligibility of such person for the pretrial family violence education program under this section. The court may require that the defendant answer such questions under oath, in open court or before any person designated by the clerk and duly authorized to administer oaths, under the penalties of perjury as will assist the court in making these findings.

(2) The court, on such motion, may refer the defendant to the family violence intervention unit, and may continue the defendant's case pending the submission of the report of the unit to the court. The court shall also give notice to the victim or victims that the defendant has requested assignment to the family violence education program, and, where possible, give the victim or victims opportunity to be heard. Any defendant who accepts placement in the family violence education program shall agree to the tolling of any statute of limitations with respect to the crime or crimes with which the defendant is charged, and to a waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Any such defendant shall appear in court and shall be released to the custody of the family violence intervention unit for such period, not exceeding two years, and under such conditions as the court shall order. If the defendant refuses to accept, or, having accepted, violates such conditions, the defendant's case shall be brought to trial. If the defendant satisfactorily completes the family violence education program and complies with the conditions imposed for the period set by the court, the defendant may apply for dismissal of the charges against the defendant and the court, on finding satisfactory compliance, shall dismiss such charges.

(3) Upon dismissal of charges under this subsection, all records of such charges shall be erased pursuant to section 54-142a .

(i) A nonrefundable application fee of one hundred dollars shall be paid to the court by any person who files a motion pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (h) of this section to participate in the pretrial family violence education program, and a fee of three hundred dollars shall be paid to the court by any person who enters the family violence education program, except that no person shall be excluded from such program for inability to pay any such fee, provided (1) the person files with the court an affidavit of indigency or inability to pay and the court enters a finding thereof, or (2) such person has been determined indigent and eligible for representation by a public defender who has been appointed on behalf of such person pursuant to section 51-296 . The court shall not require a person to perform community service in lieu of payment of such fee, if such fee is waived. All such fees shall be credited to the General Fund.

(j) The Judicial Department shall establish an ongoing training program for judges, Court Support Services Division personnel, guardians ad litem and clerks to inform them about the policies and procedures of sections 46b-1 , 46b-15 , 46b-38a to 46b-38f , inclusive, and 54-1g , including, but not limited to, the function of the family violence intervention units and the use of restraining and protective orders. Such training program shall include an examination of the factors that contribute to a family being at risk for episodes of domestic violence within the family. The Judicial Branch may consult with organizations that advocate on behalf of victims of domestic violence in order to ensure that the training includes information on the unique characteristics of family violence crimes.

Cited. 219 C. 752. The trial court may issue a criminal protective order at defendant's arraignment after consideration of oral argument and the family violence intervention unit's report; the trial court is required to hold, at defendant's request at arraignment, a subsequent hearing within a reasonable period of time at which the state will be required to prove the continued necessity of the order by a fair preponderance of the evidence, which may include reliable hearsay testimony, and defendant will have an opportunity to proffer relevant evidence; legislature did not intend for this section and Sec. 54-63c(b) to entitle defendant to an evidentiary hearing beyond consideration of parties' arguments and unit's report prior to the initial issuance of a criminal protective order at arraignment, which may occur within hours of the alleged incident of family violence. 294 C. 1.

Cited. 45 CA 722. Writ of error challenging the constitutionality of this statute was improper where Sec. 54-63g provides exclusive remedy of petition for review of an order concerning release. 110 CA 653.

Ability to issue a protective order, which is a restriction on defendant's liberty, is not punitive but is meant to protect victims of family violence, and the state has a legitimate and significant interest in doing so; creation of a class of victims and defendants does not affect prosecution of any crime, does not afford victim greater rights with regard to defendant's prosecution, and is a legitimate classification, being neither arbitrary nor irrational, and thus does not violate equal protection rights; defendant's due process rights were not violated by issuance of a protective order without an adversarial hearing; issuance of a protective order is not in the nature of a trial, so defendant was not denied right to an impartial tribunal; summons for disorderly conduct and report from an officer is sufficient information to find beyond a preponderance of the evidence that a protective order should be issued; there is no right against self-incrimination since information was not used in defendant's criminal case, but only to determine whether to issue a protective order. 46 CS 598.

Subsec. (e):

Nothing in Subsec. prohibits state from bringing charges for other criminal acts in addition to violation of protective order. 151 CA 590.

Subsec. (g):

Subsec. does not provide for automatic dismissal of criminal charges on completion of program's educational classes because Subsec. provides that defendant “may apply”, and “satisfactory compliance” necessarily requires that the court retain at least some discretion to determine if defendant has met conditions of program. 116 CA 788.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 816 / Section 46b-215
Sec. 46b-215. (Formerly Sec. 17-320). Relatives obliged to furnish support. Attorney General and attorney for town as parties. Orders.
Status: in_force

(2) Any such support order in a IV-D support case shall include a provision for the health care coverage of the child. Such provision may include an order for either parent or both parents to provide such coverage under any or all of subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this subdivision.

(A) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to name any child as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance or benefit plan carried by such parent or available to such parent at a reasonable cost, as defined in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. If such order requires the parent to maintain insurance available through an employer, the order shall be enforced using a National Medical Support Notice as provided in section 46b-88 .

(B) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to: (i) Apply for and maintain coverage on behalf of the child under the HUSKY Plan, Part B; or (ii) provide cash medical support, as described in subparagraphs (E) and (F) of this subdivision. An order under this subparagraph shall be made only if the cost to the parent obligated to maintain coverage under the HUSKY Plan, Part B, or provide cash medical support is reasonable, as defined in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. An order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be made only if insurance coverage as described in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision is unavailable at reasonable cost to either parent, or inaccessible to the child.

(C) An order for payment of the child's medical and dental expenses, other than those described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (E) of this subdivision, that are not covered by insurance or reimbursed in any other manner shall be entered in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a .

(D) Health care coverage shall be deemed reasonable in cost if: (i) The parent obligated to maintain such coverage would qualify as a low-income obligor under the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a , based solely on such parent's income, and the cost does not exceed five per cent of such parent's net income; or (ii) the parent obligated to maintain such coverage would not qualify as a low-income obligor under such guidelines and the cost does not exceed seven and one-half per cent of such parent's net income. In either case, net income shall be determined in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . If a parent obligated to maintain insurance must obtain coverage for himself or herself to comply with the order to provide coverage for the child, reasonable cost shall be determined based on the combined cost of coverage for such parent and such child.

(E) Cash medical support means (i) an amount ordered to be paid toward the cost of premiums for health insurance coverage provided by a public entity, including the HUSKY Plan, Part A or Part B, except as provided in subparagraph (F) of this subdivision, or by another parent through employment or otherwise, or (ii) an amount ordered to be paid, either directly to a medical provider or to the person obligated to pay such provider, toward any ongoing extraordinary medical and dental expenses of the child that are not covered by insurance or reimbursed in any other manner, provided such expenses are documented and identified (I) specifically on the record, or (II) in an affidavit, made under oath, that also states that no restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c , between the parties is in effect or pending before the court. Cash medical support, as described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph, may be ordered in lieu of an order under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision to be effective until such time as health insurance that is accessible to the child and reasonable in cost becomes available, or in addition to an order under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, provided the total cost to the obligated parent of insurance and cash medical support is reasonable, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision. An order for cash medical support shall be payable to the state or the custodial party, as their interests may appear, provided an order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be effective only as long as health insurance coverage is maintained. Any unreimbursed medical and dental expenses not covered by an order issued pursuant to clause (ii) of this subparagraph are subject to an order for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this subdivision.

(F) Cash medical support to offset the cost of any insurance payable under the HUSKY Plan, Part A or Part B, shall not be ordered against a noncustodial parent who is a low-income obligor, as defined in the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a , or against a custodial parent of children covered under the HUSKY Plan, Part A or Part B.

(3) Proceedings to obtain orders of support under this section shall be commenced by the service on the liable person or persons of a verified petition, with summons and order, of the husband or wife, child or any relative or the conservator, guardian or support enforcement officer, town or state, or any selectmen or the public official charged with the administration of public assistance of the town, or in IV-D support cases, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231 , the Commissioner of Social Services. The verified petition, summons and order shall be filed in the judicial district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or does business, or if filed in the Family Support Magistrate Division, in the judicial district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or does business.

(4) For purposes of this section, the term “child” shall include one born to parents married to each other whose alleged genetic parent has acknowledged in writing parentage of such child or has been adjudged the parent by a court of competent jurisdiction, or a child who was born before marriage whose parents afterwards intermarry.

(5) Said court or family support magistrate shall also have authority to make and enforce orders directed to the conservator or guardian of any person, or payee of Social Security or other benefits to which such person is entitled, to the extent of the income or estate held by such fiduciary or payee in any such capacity.

(6) Said court or family support magistrate shall also have authority to determine, order and enforce payment of any sums due under a written agreement to support against the person liable for such support under such agreement.

(7) (A) The court or family support magistrate may also determine, order and enforce payment of any support due because of neglect or refusal to furnish support for periods prior to the action. In the case of a child born out of wedlock whose parents have not intermarried, a parent's liability for such support shall be limited to the three years next preceding the filing of a petition or written agreement to support pursuant to this section.

(B) In the determination of support due based on neglect or refusal to furnish support prior to the action, the support due for periods of time prior to the action shall be based upon the obligor's ability to pay during such prior periods, as determined in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . The state shall disclose to the court any information in its possession concerning current and past ability to pay. If no information is available to the court concerning past ability to pay, the court may determine the support due for periods of time prior to the action as if past ability to pay is equal to current ability to pay, if current ability is known. If current ability to pay is not known, the court shall determine the past ability to pay based on the obligor's work history, if known, or if not known, on the state minimum wage that was in effect during such periods, provided only actual earnings shall be used to determine ability to pay for past periods during which the obligor was a full-time high school student or was incarcerated, institutionalized or incapacitated.

(C) Any finding of support due for periods of time prior to an action in which the obligor failed to appear shall be entered subject to adjustment. Such adjustment may be made upon motion of any party, and the state in IV-D cases shall make such motion if it obtains information that would have substantially affected the court's determination of past ability to pay if such information had been available to the court. Motion for adjustment under this subparagraph may be made not later than twelve months from the date upon which the obligor receives notification of (i) the amount of such finding of support due for periods of time prior to the action, and (ii) the right not later than twelve months from the date of receipt of such notification to present evidence as to such obligor's past ability to pay support for such periods of time prior to the action. A copy of any support order entered, subject to adjustment, shall state in plain language the basis for the court's determination of past support, the right to request an adjustment and to present information concerning the obligor's past ability to pay, and the consequences of a failure to request such adjustment.

(8) (A) The judge or family support magistrate shall cause a summons, signed by such judge or magistrate, by the clerk of said court or Family Support Magistrate Division, or by a commissioner of the Superior Court to be issued requiring such liable person or persons to appear in court or before a family support magistrate, at a time and place as determined by the clerk but not more than ninety days after the issuance of the summons. Service may be made by a state marshal, any proper officer or any investigator employed by the Department of Social Services or by the Commissioner of Administrative Services. The state marshal, proper officer or investigator shall make due return of process to the court not less than twenty-one days before the date assigned for hearing. Upon proof of the service of the summons to appear in court or before a family support magistrate at the time and place named for hearing upon such petition, the failure of the defendant or defendants to appear shall not prohibit the court or family support magistrate from going forward with the hearing. If the summons and order is signed by a commissioner of the Superior Court, upon proof of service of the summons to appear in court or before a family support magistrate and upon the failure of the defendant to appear at the time and place named for hearing upon the petition, request may be made by the petitioner to the court or family support magistrate for an order that a capias mittimus be issued.

(B) In the case of a person supported wholly or in part by a town, the welfare authority of the town shall notify the responsible relatives of such person of the amount of assistance given, the beginning date thereof and the amount of support expected from each of them, if any, and if any such relative does not contribute in such expected amount, the superior court for the judicial district in which such town is located or a family support magistrate sitting in the judicial district in which such town is located may order such relative or relatives to contribute to such support, from the time of the beginning date of expense shown on the notice, such sum as said court or family support magistrate deems reasonably within each such relative's ability to support such person.

(C) The court, or any judge thereof, or family support magistrate when said court or family support magistrate is not sitting, may require the defendant or defendants to become bound, with sufficient surety, to the state, town or person bringing the complaint, to abide such judgment as may be rendered on such complaint. Failure of the defendant or defendants to obey any order made under this section may be punished as contempt of court and the costs of commitment of any person imprisoned for contempt shall be paid by the state as in criminal cases. Except as otherwise provided, upon proof of the service of the summons to appear in court or before a family support magistrate at the time and place named for a hearing upon the failure of the defendant or defendants to obey such court order or order of the family support magistrate, the court or family support magistrate may order a capias mittimus be issued and directed to a judicial marshal to the extent authorized pursuant to section 46b-225 , or any other proper officer to arrest such defendant or defendants and bring such defendant or defendants before the Superior Court for the contempt hearing. When any person is found in contempt under this section, the court or family support magistrate may award to the petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee and the fees of the officer serving the contempt citation, such sums to be paid by the person found in contempt.

(9) In addition to or in lieu of such contempt proceedings, the court or family support magistrate, upon a finding that any person has failed to obey any order made under this section, may: (A) Order a plan for payment of any past-due support owing under such order, or, in IV-D cases, if such obligor is not incapacitated, order such obligor to participate in work activities which may include, but shall not be limited to, job search, training, work experience and participation in the job training and retraining program established by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section 31-3t ; (B) suspend any professional, occupational, recreational, commercial driver's or motor vehicle operator's license as provided in subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of section 46b-220 , provided such failure was without good cause; (C) issue an income withholding order against such amount of any debt accruing by reason of personal services as provided by sections 52-362 , 52-362b and 52-362c ; and (D) order executions against any real, personal, or other property of such person which cannot be categorized solely as either, for payment of accrued and unpaid amounts due under such order.

(10) No entry fee, judgment fee or any other court fee shall be charged by the court or the family support magistrate to either party in proceedings under this section.

(11) Any written agreement to support which is filed with the court or the Family Support Magistrate Division shall have the effect of an order of the court or a family support magistrate.

(b) The Attorney General of the state of Connecticut and the attorney representing a town shall become a party for the interest of the state of Connecticut and such town in any proceedings for support which concerns any person who is receiving or has received public assistance or care from the state or any town. The Attorney General shall represent the IV-D agency in non-TFA IV-D support cases if the IV-D agency determines that such representation is required pursuant to guidelines issued by the Commissioner of Social Services.

(c) The court or a family support magistrate shall direct all payments on orders of support in IV-D cases to be made to the state acting by and through the IV-D agency. In IV-D support cases, the IV-D agency or a support enforcement agency under cooperative agreement with the IV-D agency may, upon notice to the obligor and obligee, redirect payments for the support of any child receiving child support enforcement services either to the state of Connecticut or to the present custodial party, as their interests may appear, provided neither the obligor nor the obligee objects in writing within ten business days from the mailing date of such notice. Any such notice shall be sent by first class mail to the most recent address of such obligor and obligee, as recorded in the state case registry pursuant to section 46b-218 , and a copy of such notice shall be filed with the court or family support magistrate if both the obligor and obligee fail to object to the redirected payments within ten business days from the mailing date of such notice. All payments made shall be distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

(d) No order for support made by the court or a family support magistrate shall be stayed by an appeal but such order shall continue in effect until a determination is made thereon upon such appeal; if however as a result of such appeal or further hearing, the amount of such order is reduced or vacated, such defendant shall be credited or reimbursed accordingly.

(e) Except as provided in sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, any court or family support magistrate, called upon to enforce a support order, shall insure that such order is reasonable in light of the obligor's ability to pay. Except as provided in sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, any support order entered pursuant to this section, or any support order from another jurisdiction subject to enforcement by the state of Connecticut, may be modified by motion of the party seeking such modification upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or upon a showing that such support order substantially deviates from the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a , unless there was a specific finding on the record at a hearing, or in a written judgment, order or memorandum of decision of the court, that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate, provided the court or family support magistrate finds that the obligor or the obligee and any other interested party have received actual notice of the pendency of such motion and of the time and place of the hearing on such motion. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent or more from the guidelines is substantial. Modification may be made of such support order without regard to whether the order was issued before, on or after May 9, 1991. No such support orders may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court or family support magistrate may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a pending motion for a modification of an existing support order from the date of service of the notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party pursuant to section 52-50 . In any hearing to modify any support order from another jurisdiction the court or the family support magistrate shall conduct the proceedings in accordance with sections 46b-384 to 46b-387 , inclusive.

(f) In IV-D support cases, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231 , a copy of any support order established or modified pursuant to this section or, in the case of a motion for modification of an existing support order, a notice of determination that there should be no change in the amount of the support order, shall be provided to each party and the state case registry within fourteen days after issuance of such order or determination.

See Sec. 46b-88 re National Medical Support Notice.

See Sec. 46b-219 re child's freedom from responsibility to support a deserting parent.

See Sec. 51-348a re prosecution for nonsupport.

See Sec. 52-56(d) re execution or service of capias mittimus in any precinct by state marshal of any precinct.

See Sec. 53-304 re procedures when support not provided and penalties for failure to provide support.

Annotations to former section 17-320:

Relatives by affinity not liable. K. 155; 1 R. 250; 3 C. 553. Relatives not liable for past expenses. 3 C. 553; 7 C. 57; 32 C. 142. Action at common law does not lie against relatives. 1 R. 60; 3 C. 507. Not responsible to a town in which the pauper has no settlement. 3 C. 553. If supplies are furnished parent at request of children, they are liable in assumpsit. 32 C. 142. Not necessary for town to exhaust the remedies provided by this statute before taking a parent or pauper into custody under Sec. 17-276. 35 C. 538. A wife whose husband neglects to support her may bring an action against him for contribution towards her maintenance. 72 C. 157. Nature of remedy; costs. 73 C. 607. “Neglect to provide” is condition precedent to action. 78 C. 650; 124 C. 522. Place of support. 73 C. 607; 82 C. 611. Measure of support. 78 C. 650; 82 C. 611; 103 C. 6; 124 C. 524; 127 C. 506. When state should be a party plaintiff. 103 C. 6. A minor may properly be made a defendant and judgment rendered against him. Id., 3. A proceeding under statute is entirely different from a criminal prosecution for nonsupport. 91 C. 10. Application to question of dependency of mother on minor son under workmen's compensation act. 105 C. 420. Although statute may have no extraterritorial effect when neither party is resident of state, equitable relief allowed where property of defendant was subject to the jurisdiction. 111 C. 124. Held not necessary to meet precise terms of statute in equitable action for support, nor was husband's duty limited by his income or to the amount public authorities required by statute to provide. 114 C. 575; 127 C. 503. Medical payment under workmen's compensation act. 117 C. 282. Statute applies only to those whom it would be duty of town to support if not furnished by relatives. 123 C. 338. “Neglect to provide” imports more than a mere omission; it imports an omission accompanied by some kind of culpability. 124 C. 518; 128 C. 192. Mere ownership of property by relatives does not necessarily mean they are “able to provide” support. Id., 193. If working at gainful occupation might shorten life span, one is not precluded from seeking support. 134 C. 58. Mere failure on husband's part to provide wife with support is not controlling on question of his liability; the test being the legal justification of his refusal. 144 C. 21. Action against father of supervising relative for needs of such relative. 145 C. 458. Imposition of obligation to support adult does not empower person so obligated to determine place where support shall be furnished. 152 C. 55. State policy has long been when a person is unable to support himself, support be provided for him by members of his family and is now expressed in this statute and Sec. 17-324. 156 C. 199. Once a child reaches 18, parents no longer have a legal duty to support the child. 168 C. 144. Cited. 175 C. 527.

Demurrer in support action on ground that cause not brought where plaintiff resides, overruled where no indication that plaintiff wife relied on statute. 6 CS 87. The purpose of statute is to protect the public purse; and therefore, since no township is concerned with the support of a nonresident, the right of a nonresident to sue his relatives disappears. 7 CS 60. Married woman, living apart from her husband, may voluntarily for sufficient consideration relinquish her right to maintain an action for support. 14 CS 64; Id., 123. Essentially an equitable proceeding; plaintiff not entitled to jury trial. Id., 482. One who has a pecuniary interest which may be injuriously affected by the decree is an aggrieved person within statute. 15 CS 177. Existence of other remedies not ground for denying relief in an equitable action for support. 16 CS 68. In an action for support, obligation of defendant husband is limited to what he can afford to pay. Id., 465. Restrictions in will against widow of testator providing for support of their son void as against public policy. 19 CS 93. Cited. 31 CS 271. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is liable. 32 CS 156. Cited. 33 CS 44; 34 CS 284.

Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 688.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 191 C. 468; 196 C. 403; 216 C. 85; 219 C. 28; 222 C. 699; 231 C. 1; 234 C. 194; 236 C. 582.

Cited. 2 CA 251; Id., 270; 9 CA 327; 25 CA 563; 26 CA 174; Id., 737; 31 CA 214.

A condition precedent to granting an order for payment of support under statute is the neglect or refusal to furnish necessary support to the minor child by the parents. 39 CS 35. Cited. 40 CS 6; Id., 349.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 235 C. 82, 88. Calculation of retroactive child support order is based on obligor's ability to pay during that period, not actual cost of support. 309 C. 390.

Cited. 31 CA 761. Subdiv. (4) does not explicitly or implicitly require that the written acknowledgment of paternity be submitted as evidence in order for a magistrate to proceed on a support petition. 175 CA 632.

Court has continuing power to enforce premajority support orders when child has reached age of majority. 45 CS 169.