Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-121 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-121
Sec. 46b-121. (Formerly Sec. 51-302). “Juvenile matters” defined. Authority of court.
Status: in_force

(2) (A) Juvenile matters in the criminal session include all proceedings concerning delinquent children within this state and persons eighteen years of age and older who are under the supervision of a juvenile probation officer while on probation supervision or probation supervision with residential placement, for purposes of enforcing any court orders entered as part of such probation.

(B) A juvenile who has been placed on probation supervision is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be subject to other reasonable court-ordered restrictions or conditions and required to participate in a variety of appropriate programmatic services.

(C) A juvenile who has been placed on probation supervision with residential placement is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be subject to other reasonable court-ordered restrictions or conditions and required to participate in a variety of appropriate programmatic services.

(b) (1) In juvenile matters, the Superior Court shall have authority to make and enforce such orders directed to parents, including any person who acknowledges before the court parentage of a child born to parents not married to each other, guardians, custodians or other adult persons owing some legal duty to a child therein, as the court deems necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of a child subject to the court's jurisdiction or otherwise committed to or in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. The Superior Court may order a local or regional board of education to provide to the court educational records of a child for the purpose of determining the need for services or placement of the child. In proceedings concerning a child charged with a delinquent act, records produced subject to such an order shall be maintained under seal by the court and shall be released only after a hearing or with the consent of the child. Educational records obtained pursuant to this section shall be used only for dispositional purposes. In addition, with respect to proceedings concerning delinquent children, the Superior Court shall have authority to make and enforce such orders as the court deems necessary or appropriate to provide individualized supervision, care, accountability and treatment to such child in a manner consistent with public safety, deter the child from the commission of further delinquent acts, ensure that the child is responsive to the court process, ensure that the safety of any other person will not be endangered and provide restitution to any victim. The Superior Court shall also have authority to grant and enforce temporary and permanent injunctive relief in all proceedings concerning juvenile matters.

(2) If any order for the payment of money is issued by the Superior Court, including any order assessing costs issued under section 46b-134 or 46b-136 , the collection of such money shall be made by the court, except orders for support of children committed to any state agency or department, which orders shall be made payable to and collected by the Department of Administrative Services. If the Superior Court after due diligence is unable to collect such moneys within six months, the court shall refer such case to the Department of Administrative Services for collection as a delinquent account. In juvenile matters, the Superior Court shall have authority to make and enforce orders directed to persons liable hereunder on petition of the Department of Administrative Services made to the court in the same manner as is provided in section 17b-745 , in accordance with the provisions of section 17b-81 or 17b-223 , subsection (b) of section 17b-179 or section 17a-90 , 46b-129 or 46b-130 , and all of the provisions of section 17b-745 shall be applicable to such proceedings.

(3) In the enforcement of the court's orders, in connection with any juvenile matter, the court may issue process for the arrest of any person, compel attendance of witnesses and punish for contempt by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months.

Annotations to former sections 17-59 and 51-302:

If Superior Court could take jurisdiction of charge of rape against child under 16, proceedings must first be had in juvenile court. 115 C. 589. Cited. 158 C. 439; 171 C. 630.

Superior Court may not make orders for support prior to termination of juvenile court commitment. 19 CS 371. Possible for juvenile court, Superior Court and Probate Court to have concurrent jurisdiction concerning the proper custody of a child and fact that Superior Court originally awarded custody in a divorce action does not mean that it retains exclusive jurisdiction over custody of the child. 21 CS 73.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 195 C. 303; Id., 344; 199 C. 693; 206 C. 323; 211 C. 289; 216 C. 563; 223 C. 384; 224 C. 263. The allegations do not satisfy the jurisdictional predicate of the juvenile matters provision of this section as the court could not reasonably infer from such allegations that the minor child likely would be neglected within this state because she is present in this state only because of another state's action to remove her from her parents' state of residence. 335 C. 745.

Cited. 1 CA 584; 13 CA 626; 22 CA 656; 36 CA 345. In a termination of parental rights proceeding, a court has the authority under section to order the substitution of parties if the court deems substitution necessary to protect the welfare of a child. 167 CA 428.

Section carefully contains some exceptions in grant of jurisdiction over children and youths to Superior Court; these exceptions do not include reservation of mental health commitment power to Probate Court; Probate Court is without jurisdiction to entertain and determine matters involving the mental health commitment of children or youths since the Superior Court for juvenile matters has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. 35 CS 241. Cited. 43 CS 367.

Subsec. (b):

Subdiv. (1): Trial courts have authority pursuant to Subdiv. to consider motions for posttermination visitation within the context of a termination proceeding and can order such visitation if necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of the child. 336 C. 545. Subdiv. (1): The proper standard for deciding motions for posttermination visitation is the “necessary or appropriate” standard. 343 C. 642.

Trial court has the power to find in contempt those persons who violate orders pertaining to juvenile matters. 64 CA 55. Subdiv. (1): Plain language of Subdiv. authorizes orders directed at parents whenever their children are subject to the court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the children have been committed to or are in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. 155 CA 624. Subdiv. (1): Failure of a reviewing committee to abide by the time frames established under Subsec. and Practice Book Sec. 2-35 does not divest trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary action. 206 CA 572; judgment reversed in part, see 343 C. 642. Subdiv. (1): Although Subdiv. endows the court with broad authority to issue orders that are necessary and appropriate for the welfare, protection, proper care, and suitable support of a child committed to the care of the petitioner, nothing in the text of Subdiv. indicates that such authority supersedes the department's mandate under Sec. 17a-111b to make reasonable reunification efforts. 221 CA 59.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-150b — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-150b
Sec. 46b-150b. Order of emancipation.
Status: in_force

Cited. 38 CS 503; 39 CS 35; 40 CS 349; 44 CS 437.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-76 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-76
Sec. 46a-76. (Formerly Sec. 4-61i). Discrimination in allocation of state benefits prohibited.
Status: in_force

(b) No state agency may provide grants, loans or other financial assistance to public agencies, private institutions or organizations which discriminate.

See Sec. 1-1f for definitions of “blind” and “physically disabled”.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-144 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-144
Sec. 46b-144. (Formerly Sec. 51-325). Religious faith. Service of commitment process.
Status: in_force

Annotation to former section 17-71:

Cited. 132 C. 202.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-532 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-532
Sec. 46b-532. Effect of gestational surrogacy agreement.
Status: in_force

(b) If a child was conceived by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy agreement that shall not comply with sections 46b-522 to 46b-524 , inclusive, the court shall determine the rights and duties of the parties to the agreement, taking into account evidence of the intent of the parties at the time of execution of the agreement. Each party to the agreement and any person who at the time of the execution of the agreement was a spouse of a party to the agreement has standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate an issue related to the enforcement of the agreement.

(c) Except as expressly provided in a gestational surrogacy agreement or subsection (d) or (e) of this section, if the agreement is breached by the person acting as gestational surrogate or one or more intended parents, the nonbreaching party is entitled to the remedies available at law or in equity.

(d) Specific performance is not a remedy available for breach by a person acting as gestational surrogate of a provision in the agreement that the person acting as gestational surrogate be impregnated, terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical procedures.

(e) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, if an intended parent is determined to be a parent of the resulting child, specific performance is a remedy available for:

(1) Breach of the agreement by a person acting as gestational surrogate that prevents the intended parent from exercising immediately upon birth of the child the full rights of parentage; or

(2) Breach by the intended parent that prevents the intended parent's acceptance, immediately upon birth of the child conceived by assisted reproduction under the agreement, of the duties of parentage.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-60 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-60
Sec. 46b-60. (Formerly Sec. 46-55). Orders re children and alimony in annulment cases.
Status: in_force

See chapter 815p re Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

See Sec. 17b-743 re direction that payments under support order be made to Commissioner of Administrative Services or local welfare department.

Cited. 207 C. 48; 236 C. 582.

Cited. 41 CA 861; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 490.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215e — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 816 / Section 46b-215e
Sec. 46b-215e. Initial or modified support order when child support obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated. Procedure in IV-D support cases when child support obligor is incarcerated for more than ninety days.
Status: in_force

(b) In IV-D support cases, as defined in section 46b-231 , when the child support obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated for more than ninety days, any existing support order, as defined in section 46b-231 , shall be modified to zero dollars effective upon the date that a support enforcement officer files an affidavit in the Family Support Magistrate Division. The affidavit shall include: (1) The beginning and expected end dates of such obligor's institutionalization or incarceration; and (2) a statement by such officer that (A) a diligent search failed to identify any income or assets that could be used to satisfy the child support order while the obligor is incarcerated or institutionalized, (B) the offense for which the obligor is institutionalized or incarcerated was not an offense against the custodial party or the child subject to such support order, and (C) a notice in accordance with subsection (c) of this section was provided to the custodial party and an objection form was not received from such party.

(c) Prior to filing an affidavit under subsection (b) of this section, the support enforcement officer shall provide notice to the custodial party in accordance with section 52-57 or by certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice shall state in clear and simple language that: (1) Such child support order shall be modified unless the custodial party objects not later than fifteen calendar days after receipt of such notice on the grounds that (A) the obligor has sufficient income or assets to comply with the support order, or (B) the obligor is incarcerated or institutionalized for an offense against the custodial party or the child subject to such support order; and (2) the custodial party may object to the proposed modification by delivering a signed objection form, or other written notice or motion, indicating the nature of the objection or grounds of the motion, to the support enforcement officer not later than fifteen calendar days after receipt of such notice. Upon receipt of any objection or motion, the support enforcement officer shall promptly arrange with the clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division to enter the appearance of the custodial party, set the matter for a hearing, send a file-stamped copy of the objection or motion to the IV-D agency of the state to whom the support order is payable, and notify all parties of the hearing date set. The court or family support magistrate shall promptly hear the objection or motion and determine whether the child support order should be modified in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.

(d) A support order that is modified in accordance with subsection (b) of this section shall be reinstated to the prior support amount ninety days after the obligor is released from such institutionalization or incarceration, provided a support enforcement officer files an affidavit in the Family Support Magistrate Division that provides: (1) The date such obligor was no longer institutionalized or incarcerated; and (2) a statement by such officer that notice, in accordance with subsection (e) of this section, was provided to the child support obligor, and an objection form was not received from such obligor.

(e) Prior to filing an affidavit under subsection (d) of this section, the support enforcement officer shall provide notice to the child support obligor in accordance with section 52-57 or by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by first class, postage prepaid mail to the Connecticut correctional facility in which the obligor is incarcerated. The notice shall state in clear and simple language that: (1) Such child support order shall be reinstated to the previous support amount effective ninety days after the date of the obligor's release unless the obligor objects prior to the ninetieth day to such reinstatement on the grounds that the obligor has insufficient income or assets to comply with the support order; and (2) the obligor may object to the proposed reinstatement by delivering a signed objection form, or other written motion, indicating the nature of the objection or the grounds for the motion, to the support enforcement officer prior to the ninetieth day after the obligor's release date. Upon receipt of the objection or motion, the support enforcement officer shall promptly arrange with the clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division to enter the appearance of the obligor, set the matter for a hearing, send a file-stamped copy of the objection or motion to the IV-D agency of the state to whom the support order is payable, and notify all parties of the hearing date set. The court or family support magistrate shall promptly hear the objection or motion and determine whether the child support order should be reinstated or otherwise modified in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . Any objection filed in accordance with this section shall constitute a proper motion to modify a child support order.

Downward modification of child support obligation not prohibited when obligor was incarcerated for criminal offenses against a child of the custodial parent who was the sibling of the child subject to the support order because, although obligor's conduct was trauma tizing to the custodial parent and child subject to the support order, they were not victims of the criminal offenses for which obligor is incarcerated. 130 CA 332.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-102 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-102
Sec. 46a-102. Civil action for discriminatory practice: Statute of limitations.
Status: in_force

Cited. 236 C. 681.

Cited. 44 CA 446. Plaintiff's amended complaint, which alleged age discrimination, related back to date of the original complaint, which alleged racial discrimination and which was based on the same facts, and was properly dismissed for failure to bring action within 2 years of filing the original complaint, as required by section. 123 CA 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-517 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-517
Sec. 46b-517. Assisted reproduction: Order of parentage.
Status: in_force

(1) Declaring that the intended parent or parents are the parent or parents of the resulting child immediately upon birth of the child and ordering that parental rights and responsibilities vest exclusively in the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child; and

(2) Designating the contents of the birth certificate and directing the Department of Public Health to designate the intended parent or parents as the parent or parents of the resulting child.

(b) A proceeding under this section may be commenced before or after the date of birth of the child, though an order issued before the birth of the resulting child does not take effect unless and until the birth of the resulting child. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the court's authority to issue other orders under any other provision of the general statutes.

(c) Neither the state nor the Department of Public Health shall be a necessary party to a proceeding under this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56f — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-56f
Sec. 46b-56f. Emergency ex parte order of custody.
Status: in_force

(b) The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath which includes a statement (1) of the conditions requiring an emergency ex parte order, (2) that an emergency ex parte order is in the best interests of the child, and (3) of the actions taken by the applicant or any other person to inform the respondent of the request or, if no such actions to inform the respondent were taken, the reasons why the court should consider such application on an ex parte basis absent such actions.

(c) The court shall order a hearing on any application made pursuant to this section. If, prior to or after such hearing, the court finds that an immediate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to the child exists, the court may, in its discretion, issue an emergency order for the protection of the child and may inform the Department of Children and Families of relevant information in the affidavit for investigation purposes. The emergency order may provide temporary child custody or visitation rights and may enjoin the respondent from: (1) Removing the child from the state; (2) interfering with the applicant's custody of the child; (3) interfering with the child's educational program; or (4) taking any other specific action if the court determines that prohibiting such action is in the best interests of the child. If relief on the application is ordered ex parte, the court shall schedule a hearing not later than fourteen days after the date of such ex parte order. If a postponement of a hearing on the application is requested by either party and granted, no ex parte order shall be granted or continued except upon agreement of the parties or by order of the court for good cause shown.

(d) The applicant shall cause notice of the hearing and a copy of the application, the applicant's affidavit, and the ex parte order, if issued, to be served on the respondent not less than five days before the hearing on the application.

Subsec. (b) does not require the court to hear from respondent before granting the application for emergency ex parte order of custody and issuing appropriate ex parte orders; Subsec. (c) provides that a hearing must be scheduled no later than fourteen days after the ex parte emergency order is issued, it does not provide that the hearing must be scheduled and completed within that time period. 177 CA 578.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-133g — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-133g
Sec. 46b-133g. Detention risk screening instrument.
Status: in_force

(b) When a child is presented before the court and it appears from the available facts there is probable cause to believe the child has violated a valid court order, the court, after administering the detention risk screening instrument, may order the child to participate in nonresidential programs for intensive wraparound services, community-based residential services for short-term respite or other services and interventions the court deems appropriate.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-336 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-336
Sec. 46b-336. Duties of state information agency.
Status: in_force

(b) The state information agency shall (1) compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, and any support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state information agency of every other state; (2) maintain a register of names and addresses of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from other states; (3) forward to the appropriate tribunal in this state in which the obligee who is an individual or the obligor resides, or in which the obligor's property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, received from another state or a foreign country; and (4) obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the obligor's property within this state not exempt from execution, by such means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address from employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the extent not prohibited by other law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses and Social Security.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-86 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-86
Sec. 46b-86. (Formerly Sec. 46-54). Modification of alimony or support orders and judgments.
Status: in_force

(b) In an action for divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment brought by a spouse, in which a final judgment has been entered providing for the payment of periodic alimony by one party to the other spouse, the Superior Court may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party. In the event that a final judgment incorporates a provision of an agreement in which the parties agree to circumstances, other than as provided in this subsection, under which alimony will be modified, including suspension, reduction, or termination of alimony, the court shall enforce the provision of such agreement and enter orders in accordance therewith.

(c) When one of the parties, or a child of the parties, is receiving or has received aid or care from the state under its aid to families with dependent children or temporary family assistance program, HUSKY A, or foster care program as provided in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, or when one of the parties has applied for child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act as provided in section 17b-179 , such motion to modify shall be filed with the Family Support Magistrate Division for determination in accordance with subsection (m) of section 46b-231 .

See Sec. 17b-743 re direction that payments under support order be made to Commissioner of Administrative Services or local welfare department.

Annotations to former section 46-54:

Cited. 171 C. 215; 172 C. 11; Id., 192. Absent express legislative authorization, section does not authorize retroactive modification of alimony. 173 C. 397. Cited. Id., 397. Questions involving modification of alimony and support depend not only on conditions as they exist at the time of the hearing but upon proof of substantial change in circumstances of either party. 174 C. 3. Payment of accrued arrears of alimony does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances as to justify modification downward of spouse's current alimony obligations. Id., 279. Cited. 176 C. 323; 183 C. 443.

Cited. 15 CA 745.

Any final order of alimony may be set aside unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party. 32 CS 92. Modification of alimony. 33 CS 44. Cited. 34 CS 628; 43 CS 400.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 179 C. 277; Id., 685. Future alimony orders are ordinarily subject to modification in the event of a substantial change of circumstances. 180 C. 211. Trial court erred in deciding that, as a matter of law, the loss of child support payments could not constitute a substantial change in circumstances permitting modification of alimony. Id., 218. Since some alimony was awarded ($1.00 per year), with no preclusion of modification, a change can be obtained in the future if circumstances warrant. Id., 533. Cited. 181 C. 111; 183 C. 253; 185 C. 141; 186 C. 387; 187 C. 380; 188 C. 385; 190 C. 126; Id., 132; 191 C. 468; 194 C. 25; 200 C. 202; 204 C. 224; 210 C. 462; 211 C. 648; 213 C. 373; 214 C. 99; 216 C. 673; 218 C. 801. As amended applies retrospectively to orders entered prior to effective date. 219 C. 703. Cited. 220 C. 372; 221 C. 698; 222 C. 799; 224 C. 263; 227 C. 505; 228 C. 85; Id., 729; 231 C. 1; 234 C. 783; 236 C. 582. Payments that are made regularly and consistently to former spouse are to be considered by trial court in setting financial orders; there is no legal distinction between how to treat income between former spouse who pays support and former spouse who receives support. 262 C. 360. When a court has based a financial award on a party's earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party's earning capacity. 309 C. 105. When the only substantial change in circumstances after an alimony award has been made is an increase in the income of the paying spouse, a modification of the alimony award is ordinarily not justified if the original award was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill the original purpose for which it was made; when determining whether an alimony award should be modified when the only change in circumstances is an increase in the supporting spouse's income, the trial court may consider factors such as length of marriage, cause of the divorce, and other factors presumptively considered in determining the purpose and amount of the initial alimony award and that have not changed since that time, only to shed light on the intent of the initial award, and such reasons should not be considered as reasons for changing the purpose of the initial award. 315 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 172; Id., 337; 2 CA 472; 3 CA 25. Continuing jurisdiction of Superior Court to set aside, alter or modify support orders under statute does not deprive underlying adjudication of finality for purposes of res judicata. Id., 322. Cited. 9 CA 498; 13 CA 330; 14 CA 541; 15 CA 745; 16 CA 412; 18 CA 166; Id., 622; 19 CA 146; 22 CA 367. No authorization for retroactive modification of unallocated alimony and support pendente lite. 24 CA 219. Cited. 25 CA 555; 26 CA 737; 28 CA 208; Id., 483; Id., 632; Id., 794; 29 CA 368; Id., 436; 30 CA 324; Id., 516; 31 CA 40; Id., 561; Id., 761; 32 CA 147; Id., 733; 37 CA 194; Id., 397; 38 CA 349; 39 CA 258; 40 CA 298; 41 CA 861; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 490; 43 CA 541; 46 CA 87. Speculation as to future financial circumstances of parties is insufficient to support modification of alimony or support order; party seeking modification has burden of proving substantial change in circumstances. 47 CA 354. Modification of alimony award based on party's cohabitation discussed re judgment that precluded modification for any reason other than remarriage or death. 49 CA 529. Section governs modification of child support order after date of a dissolution judgment; regulations interpreted. 53 CA 1. Capital gains generated by asset distributed in the dissolution decree do not fall within purview of section. 70 CA 772. Award of alimony that is substantially modified, in discretion of Superior Court, and reflects de novo consideration by the court, after notice and hearing, of all relevant statutory criteria, is not abuse of trial court's discretion and is binding on Appellate Court absent a finding by Appellate Court of a clearly erroneous standard of review by trial court. 93 CA 186. Trial court did not improperly fail to reduce alimony award on basis of a substantial change in circumstances. 110 CA 57. Evidence of a 15 per cent reduction in defendant's income was, alone, insufficient to require the court to modify unallocated alimony and support order. 156 CA 53.

Cited. 40 CS 250; 41 CS 110; Id., 429; 42 CS 562; 43 CS 400.

Subsec. (a):

Removal of children by custodial parent to foreign country did not constitute substantial change of circumstances so as to justify noncustodial parent withholding support payments. 177 C. 232. Cited. Id., 259. Portion of dissolution judgment which gave wife option to purchase husband's interest in jointly owned home was an assignment of property and not subject to modification; exercise of option was contemplated by parties at time of judgment and does not constitute substantial change of circumstances warranting modification of alimony. 180 C. 285. Cited. 181 C. 145; 185 C. 7; Id., 42; Id., 573; 187 C. 464; Id., 537; 190 C. 784; 191 C. 447; 192 C. 443. Statute not designed to change common law and permit divorcing parents, by stipulation incorporated into divorce decree, to contractually limit their children's right to support. 196 C. 260. Amendment applied prospectively. 210 C. 462. Cited. 212 C. 117; Id., 441; 217 C. 394; 226 C. 219. Court concluded as a matter of common law rather than of statutory construction that alimony orders should be treated similarly to the way that child support orders are now required to be treated pursuant to P.A. 90-213, Sec. 46. Id., 505. Cited. 235 C. 45; 237 C. 481. Appellate Court incorrectly found that trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to modify an order under statute. 247 C. 724. Defendant deemed to have waived claim for support modification by not claiming that trial court abused its discretion in unjustified deviation from child support guidelines in support order. 248 C. 487. Statute permits court to alter order for alimony only in absence of nonmodification clause that would extend to bar requested change. 285 C. 687. In cases in which primary physical custody is transferred from the party receiving the unallocated alimony and support payments to the party making the payments, a nonmodification provision in the parties' separation agreement does not prevent the modification of the unallocated order in an amount attributable to child support; to the extent that the application of the specific language of Sec. 46b-224 to suspend or modify a support order that purports to preclude modification appears to conflict with the general language of this Subsec., Sec. 46b-224 must prevail. 305 C. 539. When considering a motion for modification under Subsec., court must first determine whether moving party has established a substantial change in circumstances, and, in making such determination, if party's voluntary action gave rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification, court must assess motivations underlying the voluntary conduct in order to determine if there is culpable conduct of the party to preclude a determination of substantial change in circumstances; crux of inquiry is culpability not voluntariness. 310 C. 665. Holding in 315 C. 1 does not apply to child support orders; plaintiff not required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in defendant's income to justify modification of child support award under section. 321 C. 323. Trial court had authority to entertain and determine plaintiff's claim seeking a modification of a dissolution judgment which authority was derived from court's plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution actions and its authority under Sec. 46b-81(a) to assign to either spouse all or any part of the marital estate. 328 C. 376.

Cited. 1 CA 138; Id., 356; Id., 400; 2 CA 160; Id., 239; 3 CA 261; 4 CA 275; Id., 398; Id., 489; Id., 663; 5 CA 85; Id., 198; Id., 355; 6 CA 98. In the absence of an express, unambiguous statement in the decree precluding modification, statute permits modification under circumstances set forth. Id., 253. Cited. 7 CA 92; Id., 624; Id., 720; 8 CA 76; Id., 114; Id., 356; 10 CA 391; Id., 576; 12 CA 113; Id., 521; Id., 616; 13 CA 512; Id., 681; 14 CA 195; 16 CA 114; Id., 134; Id., 193; 19 CA 161; Id., 534; 21 CA 5; 23 CA 58; 24 CA 509; 25 CA 82; Id., 231; Id., 563; Id., 595; Id., 693; 27 CA 724; 28 CA 854; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 85; 32 CA 465; 34 CA 785; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 45; 35 CA 228; 36 CA 794; 37 CA 209; 39 CA 669; 41 CA 382; Id., 716; 44 CA 99; 45 CA 737; 46 CA 327; 49 CA 536. Trial court has authority to determine, sua sponte, whether an award is alimony or support, or a property settlement; trial court may find that an obligation was intended as property settlement made pursuant to Sec. 46b-81 and therefore nonmodifiable pursuant to this Subsec., despite the fact that a judgment has conditions attached terminating the obligation, or that there is a later stipulation modifying the obligation. 54 CA 142. Retroactive modification of alimony pendente lite orders by the pendente lite court prior to dissolution judgment held not improper. Id., 304. Child support award found not to be modifiable even though it exceeded presumptive amount set by the child support guidelines in case in which defendant's gross earnings did not increase and the parties had agreement that limited modification to a change in circumstances reflecting an increase in gross earnings in excess of a specified amount. 56 CA 459. Alimony may be suspended under statute where there is a distinct separation agreement. 59 CA 628. Statute deprives Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment providing for assignment of property of one party to the other party under Sec. 46b-81; court improperly applied the law and abused its discretion by modifying child support order without first finding that there was a substantial change in the circumstances of one of the parties. 70 CA 212. “Pending motion” as used in Subsec. means “remaining undecided”. 88 CA 246. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate, as required by the consent to judgment, that defendant was gainfully employed and therefore there was no substantial change in circumstances; trial court was effectively precluded from granting plaintiff any relief. 102 CA 1. Court may increase plaintiff's alimony based on motion to increase alimony under Subsec. despite defendant's motion to reduce or terminate alimony under Subsec. (b). 124 CA 472. Court abused its discretion in failing to find the presumptive amount of child support pursuant to the guidelines and in issuing the combined child support order without justifying a deviation from the guidelines. 132 CA 291. Court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff's motion to modify alimony when plaintiff's employment situation had not changed since the original judgment of dissolution and court could not reasonably find that there was a decrease in plaintiff's earning capacity that constituted a substantial change in plaintiff's financial circumstances. Id., 339. Defendant failed to meet burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances that was not tainted by his culpable conduct of commingling his assets with those of his new spouse and making large gifts to his new spouse and to his children without consideration. 136 CA 210. If a party makes a preliminary showing that an affidavit submitted at the time of dissolution was inaccurate, that the error was not intentional or misleading, and that it would be inequitable to rely only on the mistaken information, a postdissolution court may consider factors other than the financial affidavit to determine if there has been a substantial change of circumstances. 156 CA 739. Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter postdissolution orders modifying property distribution provisions in a judgment of dissolution even when parties submitted a stipulation requiring that the court modify the order. 157 CA 587; judgment reversed, see 322 C. 757. To the extent that Sec. 46b-224 conflicts with general provisions of Subsec. precluding retroactive modification of child support unless service of process requirement in Sec. 52-50 is satisfied, Sec. 46b-224 must prevail; while child support portion of unallocated support award was subject to retroactive modification, court lacked authority to retroactively modify alimony portion of unallocated support award or supplemental bonus alimony award due to defendant's failure to provide plaintiff with proper service of motion to modify in accordance with Sec. 52-50. 161 CA 271. Provisions for the payment of child care costs are part of an order of child support and are subject to the prohibition against retroactive modification under section. 164 CA 665. Subsec. does not require court to make a modification retroactive to the date of service of the motion for modification. 172 CA 767. Subsec. limits court discretion to modify a support order with retroactive effect to the date upon which the motion to modify was served upon the opposing party. 176 CA 658.

Cited. 41 CS 100; 44 CS 431.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 185 C. 42; 186 C. 167; 191 C. 328. Trial court cannot on its own initiative consider alimony termination under statute; notice required by a written motion. Id., 468. Cited. 192 C. 443; 237 C. 481. Despite a divorce dissolution judgment that provided for termination of alimony upon recipient's “cohabitation” with an unmarried male, trial court was properly guided by statute's requirement that there be a change in financial circumstance prior to termination of alimony. 247 C. 715. Plaintiff had to demonstrate that defendant's remarriage had a financial impact pursuant to the dissolution judgment, even though statute only references cohabitation; legislative intent has no bearing on whether parties or dissolution court can invoke statute for a different purpose in an agreement or decree. 276 C. 491.

Without written notice, the court has no authority to terminate periodic alimony under statute. 1 CA 356, 361. Cited. 4 CA 165; 5 CA 198; 7 CA 92; Id., 361; 8 CA 356; 17 CA 291; 32 CA 147; 40 CA 570; 41 CA 716; 46 CA 327. Judgment of dissolution provision supersedes statutory provision re payment of alimony. 47 CA 729. Although plaintiff established that defendant was cohabiting with another person, he failed to show that defendant's financial needs had been altered as a result of the cohabitation, thus trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to modify or terminate periodic alimony. 67 CA 628. Once court finds cohabitation and a change in financial needs of the party receiving alimony and cohabitating, court must consider factors listed in Sec. 46b-82. 91 CA 840. Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that his cohabitation with another woman served as a proper ground for modification of alimony as to term. 102 CA 90. When court, in setting alimony award pursuant to Sec. 46b-82, quantifies person's financial needs in terms of dollar amounts at time of dissolution, proper way for court to subsequently determine whether such person's financial needs have changed as a result of cohabitation is to quantify such person's financial needs in terms of dollar amounts during period of cohabitation. 109 CA 316. Subsec. does not require a court to reduce alimony if a party proves that the other party's financial circumstances have changed as a result of his or her choice to live with another person; there is no language in Subsec. to preclude a party who is receiving alimony from pursuing a motion to increase alimony. 124 CA 472. Divorce judgment requiring payment of alimony only until date of cohabitation required court to terminate alimony as of that date despite discretion under section to modify or amend in other cases. 144 CA 319; judgment affirmed, see 316 C. 182. Trial court interpreted Subsec. too narrowly by focusing on lack of proof of financial contributions made by defendant's boyfriend, with whom she was living, to the exclusion of defendant's savings as a result of moving in with boyfriend. 181 CA 716.

Cited. 45 CS 94.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-68c — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-68c
Sec. 46a-68c. Contractors required to file affirmative action plan. Review and approval of plan by executive director or designee. Certificate of compliance issued by executive director or designee. Revocation.
Status: in_force

(b) When the executive director or the executive director's designee approves an affirmative action plan pursuant to this section, the executive director or the executive director's designee shall issue a certificate of compliance to the contractor. Such certificate shall be prima facie proof of the contractor's eligibility to bid or be awarded contracts for a period of two years from the date of the certificate. Such certificate shall not excuse the contractor from monitoring by the commission or from the reporting and record-keeping requirements of sections 46a-68e and 46a-68f . The executive director or the executive director's designee may revoke the certificate of a contractor if the contractor does not implement its affirmative action plan in compliance with this section and sections 4a-60 , 4a-60g , 46a-56 , 46a-68b , 46a-68d , and 46a-68e to 46a-68k , inclusive.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-572 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-572
Sec. 46b-572. (Formerly Sec. 46b-174). Enforcement and modification of prior orders and agreements.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 52-442c:

Cited. 165 C. 33.

Cited. 34 CS 281.

Annotations to former section 46b-174:

Cited. 188 C. 354.

Cited. 3 CA 322.

Cited. 35 CS 679; 37 CS 891.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38j — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815e / Section 46b-38j
Sec. 46b-38j. Domestic Violence Criminal Justice Response and Enhancement Advisory Council. Duties. Membership. Annual report.
Status: in_force

(b) The council shall consist of the following members:

(1) One appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives;

(2) One appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate;

(3) One appointed by the majority leader of the House of Representatives, who shall be a municipal police officer with experience in domestic violence training;

(4) One appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, who shall be a representative of a community-based organization that provides group counseling or treatment to persons who have committed acts of domestic violence;

(5) One appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(6) One appointed by the minority leader of the Senate;

(7) One appointed by the Governor;

(8) The chairperson of the Police Officer Standards and Training Council, or the chairperson's designee;

(9) The Chief State's Attorney, or the Chief State's Attorney's designee;

(10) The Chief Public Defender, or the Chief Public Defender's designee;

(11) The Victim Advocate, or the Victim Advocate's designee;

(12) Two appointed by the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, one of whom shall be a representative of the Division of State Police with experience in domestic violence training and one of whom shall be commanding officer in the Division of State Police;

(13) Four appointed by the Chief Court Administrator, one of whom shall be a judge of the Superior Court assigned to hear criminal matters, one of whom shall be a family relations counselor or supervisor within the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch, one of whom shall be an administrator within the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch and one of whom shall be an administrator of the Office of Victim Services within the Judicial Branch;

(14) Four appointed by the chief executive officer of the Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Inc., one of whom shall be a victim of domestic violence, one of whom shall be a victim advocate with courtroom experience in domestic violence matters, one of whom shall be an executive director of a community-based organization that provides direct services to persons impacted by domestic violence and one of whom shall be a representative of the Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Inc.;

(15) One representative of the Connecticut Police Chiefs Association, appointed by the president of the association;

(16) The Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management, or the secretary's designee;

(17) The chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or the chairperson's designee;

(18) The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, or the commissioner's designee; and

(19) The Commissioner of Correction, or the commissioner's designee.

(c) Any member of the council appointed under subdivision (1), (2), (5) or (6) of subsection (b) of this section may be a member of the General Assembly.

(d) All members of said council shall be appointed on or before July 1, 2012, and quadrennially thereafter, to serve for a term of four years. Any member may be reappointed, and any member may continue to serve until such member's successor is appointed and qualified. Any vacancy shall be filled by the appointing authority.

(e) The members of the council shall select two chairpersons of the council from among the members of the council. Said chairpersons shall be responsible for scheduling the meetings of the council.

(f) The administrative staff of the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary shall serve as administrative staff of the council.

(g) Not later than January 15, 2013, and annually thereafter, the council shall submit a report in accordance with section 11-4a to the joint standing committees of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary and public safety. The report shall include any recommendations for statutory or policy changes within the purview of the council, including any recommended updates or amendments to the model law enforcement policy on family violence for the state, established in section 46b-38b , or the domestic violence offender program standards, established in section 46b-38m .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-525 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-525
Sec. 46b-525. Effect of subsequent change of marital status of surrogate.
Status: in_force

(1) (A) The marriage of a person acting as surrogate after the surrogacy agreement is signed by all parties shall not affect the validity of the surrogacy agreement, (B) the consent of the spouse of the person acting as surrogate is not required, and (C) the spouse of the person acting as surrogate is not a presumed parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under the surrogacy agreement; and

(2) The divorce, dissolution, annulment, declaration of invalidity, legal separation or separate maintenance of the person acting as surrogate after the surrogacy agreement is signed by all parties shall not affect the validity of the surrogacy agreement.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-99 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-99
Sec. 46a-99. (Formerly Sec. 4-61l). Discriminatory state practice: Cause of action; relief.
Status: in_force

Annotation to former section 4-61 l :

The issuance of an injunction requires allegations and proof that plaintiffs are aggrieved and that their aggrievement constitutes a justiciable interest in the controversy in question. 165 C. 516, 521.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 196 C. 208; 236 C. 453; 243 C. 1.

Cited. 4 CA 423; 5 CA 643; 44 CA 446. The provisions of section do not constitute a waiver of state's sovereign immunity with respect to claims for money damages. 104 CA 547.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-417 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-417
Sec. 46b-417. Conditions of rendition.
Status: in_force

(b) If, under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, or a law substantially similar to sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, the governor of another state makes a demand that the governor of this state surrender an individual charged criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.

(c) If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to honor the demand if the individual is complying with the support order.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-115k — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815p / Section 46b-115k
Sec. 46b-115k. Initial child custody jurisdiction.
Status: in_force

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the child custody proceeding;

(2) This state was the home state of the child within six months of the commencement of the child custody proceeding, the child is absent from the state, and a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in this state;

(3) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) or (2) of this subsection, the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence, and there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships;

(4) A court of another state which is the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q or section 46b-115r , the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence, and there is substantial evidence available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships;

(5) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection have declined jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine custody under a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115q or section 46b-115r ; or

(6) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under subdivisions (1) to (5), inclusive, of this subsection.

(b) Subsection (a) of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.

(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

Because the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on our courts, but instead determines whether our courts may exercise existing jurisdiction or must defer to another state's jurisdiction, this section provides no impediment to statutes, such as section 46b-121, that determine the scope of jurisdiction and this court giving effect to section 46b-121 does not nullify any provision of said act. 335 C. 745.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-115p — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815p / Section 46b-115p
Sec. 46b-115p. Simultaneous proceedings.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n , the court shall, after review of relevant information provided to it, determine whether a child custody proceeding has been commenced in another state. If such proceeding has been commenced, the court in this state shall take appropriate action to communicate with the other court and to resolve which court shall have jurisdiction. If the court of this state determines that the court of the other state has jurisdiction pursuant to a provision substantially similar to section 46b-115k , 46b-115 l or 46b-115m , the court of this state shall stay its proceeding while the court of the other state determines whether the court of this state is the more appropriate forum. If the court of the other state determines that the court of this state is not a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n , the court, in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, shall after review of relevant information provided to it, determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If the court determines that such enforcement proceeding has commenced, the court may (1) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of the court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; (2) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or (3) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in section 46b-115n , the court, in a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination, shall proceed, with regard to simultaneous proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of section 46b-115z .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81e — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-81e
Sec. 46a-81e. Sexual orientation discrimination: Housing.
Status: in_force

(1) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of sexual orientation or civil union status.

(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of sexual orientation or civil union status.

(3) To make, print or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on sexual orientation or civil union status, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.

(4) (A) To represent to any person because of sexual orientation or civil union status, that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available. (B) It shall be a violation of this subdivision for any person to restrict or attempt to restrict the choices of any buyer or renter to purchase or rent a dwelling (i) to an area which is substantially populated, even if less than a majority, by persons of the same sexual orientation or civil union status as the buyer or renter, (ii) while such person is authorized to offer for sale or rent another dwelling which meets the housing criteria as expressed by the buyer or renter to such person and (iii) such other dwelling is in an area which is not substantially populated by persons of the same sexual orientation or civil union status as the buyer or renter. As used in this subdivision, “area” means municipality, neighborhood or other geographic subdivision which may include an apartment or condominium complex.

(5) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular sexual orientation or civil union status.

(6) For any person or other entity engaging in residential-real-estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of sexual orientation or civil union status.

(7) To deny any person access to or membership or participation in any multiple-listing service, real estate brokers' organization or other service, organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings, or to discriminate against him in the terms or conditions of such access, membership or participation, on account of sexual orientation or civil union status.

(8) To coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this section.

(b) Nothing in this section limits the applicability of any reasonable state statute or municipal ordinance restricting the maximum number of persons permitted to occupy a dwelling.

(c) Nothing in this section prohibits a person engaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to take into consideration factors other than sexual orientation or civil union status.

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, complaints alleging a violation of this section shall be investigated within one hundred days of filing and a final administrative disposition shall be made within one year of filing unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities is unable to complete its investigation or make a final administrative determination within such time frames, it shall notify the complainant and the respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so.

(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor.

Cited. 232 C. 91; 236 C. 453.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-51
Sec. 46a-51. (Formerly Sec. 31-122). Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Blind” refers to an individual whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or whose visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees;

(2) “Commission” means the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities created by section 46a-52 ;

(3) “Commission legal counsel” means a member of the legal staff employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54 ;

(4) “Commissioner” means a member of the commission;

(5) “Court” means the Superior Court or any judge of said court;

(6) “Discrimination” includes segregation and separation;

(7) “Discriminatory employment practice” means any discriminatory practice specified in subsection (b), (d), (e) or (f) of section 31-51i or section 46a-60 or 46a-81c ;

(8) “Discriminatory practice” means a violation of section 4a-60 , 4a-60a , 4a-60g , 31-40y , subsection (b), (d), (e) or (f) of section 31-51i , subparagraph (C) of subdivision (15) of section 46a-54 , subdivisions (16) and (17) of section 46a-54 , section 46a-58 , 46a-59 , 46a-60 , 46a-64 , 46a-64c , 46a-66 or 46a-68 , sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive, sections 46a-70 to 46a-78 , inclusive, subsection (a) of section 46a-80 , sections 46a-81b to 46a-81o , inclusive, sections 46a-80b to 46a-80e , inclusive, sections 46a-80k to 46a-80m , inclusive, or section 19a-498c ;

(9) “Employee” means any person employed by an employer but shall not include any individual employed by such individual's parents, spouse or child. “Employee” includes any elected or appointed official of a municipality, board, commission, counsel or other governmental body;

(10) “Employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions thereof and means any person or employer with one or more persons in such person's or employer's employ;

(11) “Employment agency” means any person undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees or opportunities to work;

(12) “Labor organization” means any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment;

(13) “Intellectual disability” means intellectual disability as defined in section 1-1g ;

(14) “Person” means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and the state and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof;

(15) “Physically disabled” refers to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device;

(16) “Respondent” means any person alleged in a complaint filed pursuant to section 46a-82 to have committed a discriminatory practice;

(17) “Discrimination on the basis of sex” includes but is not limited to discrimination related to pregnancy, child-bearing capacity, sterilization, fertility or related medical conditions;

(18) “Discrimination on the basis of religious creed” includes but is not limited to discrimination related to all aspects of religious observances and practice as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that the employer is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business;

(19) “Learning disability” refers to an individual who exhibits a severe discrepancy between educational performance and measured intellectual ability and who exhibits a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in a diminished ability to listen, speak, read, write, spell or to do mathematical calculations;

(20) “Mental disability” refers to an individual who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”;

(21) “Gender identity or expression” means a person's gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person's physiology or assigned sex at birth, which gender-related identity can be shown by providing evidence including, but not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the gender-related identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender-related identity or any other evidence that the gender-related identity is sincerely held, part of a person's core identity or not being asserted for an improper purpose;

(22) “Veteran” means veteran as defined in subsection (a) of section 27-103 ;

(23) “Race” is inclusive of ethnic traits historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles;

(24) “Protective hairstyles” includes, but is not limited to, wigs, headwraps and hairstyles such as individual braids, cornrows, locs, twists, Bantu knots, afros and afro puffs;

(25) “Domestic violence” has the same meaning as provided in subsection (b) of section 46b-1 ; and

(26) “Sexual orientation” means a person's identity in relation to the gender or genders to which they are romantically, emotionally or sexually attracted, inclusive of any identity that a person (A) may have previously expressed, or (B) is perceived by another person to hold.

Annotations to former section 31-122:

Cited. 153 C. 173; 163 C. 327. A corporation is not privileged under chapter to do what an individual is precluded from doing; segregating employment opportunity advertisements into sex classifications constitutes discrimination. 168 C. 26.

Court cannot substitute its own discretion for that reposed by statute in hearing tribunal. 18 CS 125. Cited. 28 CS 472.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 188 C. 44; 195 C. 226; 220 C. 307; 226 C. 670; 231 C. 328; 236 C. 96; 237 C. 209. Plaintiff who testified at trial that he had sustained a knee injury during course of his employment that required surgery and resulted in his receiving worker's compensation benefits and a disability rating for his knee satisfied statutory definition of being “physically disabled” under Subdiv. (15). 278 C. 692. Appellate Court properly applied the federal “remuneration test” rather than Connecticut's common-law “right to control” test to determine whether individual was an employee under section. 322 C. 154.

Cited. 3 CA 464; 35 CA 474. Subdiv. (10) does not evince an intent by General Assembly to grant small businesses a license to discriminate, but instead evidences intention to exempt small businesses from the other burdens of act, not from its antidiscrimination policy. 64 CA 573. Subdiv. (15): Definition does not extend to those who may be regarded or perceived as disabled by their employers. 137 CA 446. Re definition of “employee”, common law “agency” or “right of control” test alone is insufficient in determining whether an individual is an employee; only if federal “remuneration” test is satisfied would a court apply common law “agency” or “right of control” test; courts may look to federal precedent for guidance in enforcing antidiscrimination statutes. 156 CA 239; judgment affirmed, see 322 C. 154. Court reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff was not suffering from a mental disorder defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but rather from a more general lack of requisite temperament. Id., 597. The United States Supreme Court's definition of “supervisor” in the case of Vance v. Ball , 570 U.S. 431-432, that is used by courts in Title VII cases, is the appropriate definition for distinguishing between the coworker and supervisor theories of liability for hostile work environment claims brought under CFEPA. 219 CA 1.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-504 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-504
Sec. 46b-504. Confidentiality of genetic testing.
Status: in_force

(b) A person who intentionally releases an identifiable specimen of another person collected for genetic testing under sections 46b-497 to 46b-512 , inclusive, for a purpose not relevant to a proceeding regarding parentage, without a court order or written permission of the person who furnished the specimen, shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-133 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-133
Sec. 46b-133. (Formerly Sec. 51-314). Arrest of child. Notice of arrest. Release or detention of arrested child. Alcohol or drug testing or treatment as condition of release. Admission of child to juvenile residential center. Entry of take into custody order or other process into central computer system. Duration of order to detain.
Status: in_force

(b) Whenever a child is brought before a judge of the Superior Court, which court shall be the court that has jurisdiction over juvenile matters where the child resides if the residence of such child can be determined, such judge shall immediately have the case proceeded upon as a juvenile matter. Such judge may admit the child to bail or release the child in the custody of the child's parent or parents, the child's guardian or some other suitable person to appear before the Superior Court when ordered. If there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the acts alleged, the court may consider if the child should be assessed for services. Such assessment shall be held not later than two weeks after the child is arraigned and such child shall have the right to counsel at such assessment. If detention becomes necessary, such detention shall be in the manner prescribed by this chapter, provided the child shall be placed in the least restrictive environment possible in a manner consistent with public safety.

(c) (1) Upon the arrest of any child by an officer, such officer may (A) release the child to the custody of the child's parent or parents, guardian or some other suitable person or agency, (B) at the discretion of the officer, release the child to the child's own custody, or (C) using the form prescribed pursuant to section 46b-133p , seek a court order to detain the child in a juvenile residential center. No child may be placed in a juvenile residential center unless a judge of the Superior Court determines, based on the available facts, that (i) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the acts alleged, (ii) detention of the child is more reasonable than an appropriate less restrictive alternative, and (iii) there is (I) probable cause to believe that the level of risk that the child poses to public safety if released to the community prior to the court hearing or disposition cannot be managed in a less restrictive setting, (II) a need to hold the child in order to ensure the child's appearance before the court or compliance with court process, as demonstrated by the child's previous failure to respond to the court process, or (III) a need to hold the child for another jurisdiction. No child shall be held in any juvenile residential center unless an order to detain is issued by a judge of the Superior Court. If any such judge declines to detain a child, such judge shall articulate the reasons in writing, upon the form submitted in accordance with subparagraph (C) of this subdivision, for not holding the child in a juvenile residential center.

(2) A judge of the Superior Court may order any child who is released into the custody of his or her parent or guardian or some other suitable person or agency after being charged with a second or subsequent delinquency offense involving a motor vehicle, as defined in section 46b-133j , or property theft, to be electronically monitored by using a global positioning system device until such child's case is disposed of or earlier upon order of the court. Any failure by the child to adhere to the judge's order concerning electronic monitoring may result in immediate detention of such child.

(d) When a child is arrested for the commission of a delinquent act and the child is not placed in a juvenile residential center or referred to a diversionary program, an officer shall serve a written complaint and summons on the child and the child's parent, guardian or some other suitable person or agency. If such child is released to the child's own custody, the officer shall make reasonable efforts to notify, and to provide a copy of a written complaint and summons to, the parent or guardian or some other suitable person or agency prior to the court date on the summons. If a child is arrested for a firearms offense or a motor vehicle offense, the court date shall be scheduled for the next business day following the date of the child's arrest for such offense. If any person so summoned wilfully fails to appear in court at the time and place so specified, the court may issue a warrant for the child's arrest or a capias to assure the appearance in court of such parent, guardian or other person. If a child wilfully fails to appear in response to such a summons, the court may order such child taken into custody and such child may be charged with the delinquent act of wilful failure to appear under section 46b-120 . The court may punish for contempt, as provided in section 46b-121 , any parent, guardian or other person so summoned who wilfully fails to appear in court at the time and place so specified.

(e) When a child is arrested for the commission of a delinquent act and is placed in a juvenile residential center pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, such child may be detained pending a hearing which shall be held on the business day next following the child's arrest. No child may be detained after such hearing unless the court determines, based on the available facts, that (1) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the acts alleged, (2) there is no less restrictive alternative available, and (3) through the use of the detention risk screening instrument developed pursuant to section 46b-133g , that there is (A) probable cause to believe that the level of risk the child poses to public safety if released to the community prior to the court hearing or disposition cannot be managed in a less restrictive setting, (B) a need to hold the child in order to ensure the child's appearance before the court or compliance with court process, as demonstrated by the child's previous failure to respond to the court process, or (C) a need to hold the child for another jurisdiction. Such probable cause may be shown by sworn affidavit in lieu of testimony. No child shall be released from a juvenile residential center who is alleged to have committed a serious juvenile offense except by order of a judge of the Superior Court. The court may, in its discretion, consider as an alternative to detention a suspended detention order with graduated sanctions to be imposed based on the detention risk screening for such child, using the instrument developed pursuant to section 46b-133g . Any child confined in a community correctional center or lockup shall be held in an area separate and apart from any adult detainee, except in the case of a nursing infant, and no child shall at any time be held in solitary confinement. No such child may be held for a period that exceeds six hours, except such child may be held for a period that does not exceed eight hours in a case where an officer has submitted an application for an order of detention and the judge has not yet ruled on such application, or if such officer has been unable to contact such child's parent or guardian. When a female child is held in custody, she shall, as far as possible, be in the charge of a woman attendant.

(f) The police officer who brings a child into detention shall have first notified, or made a reasonable effort to notify, the parents or guardian of the child in question of the intended action and shall file at the juvenile residential center a signed statement setting forth the alleged delinquent conduct of the child and the order to detain such child. Upon admission, the child shall be administered the detention risk screening instrument developed pursuant to section 46b-133g , and unless the child was arrested for a serious juvenile offense or unless an order not to release is noted on the take into custody order, arrest warrant or order to detain, the child may be released to the custody of the child's parent or parents, guardian or some other suitable person or agency in accordance with policies adopted by the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Department pursuant to section 46b-133h .

(g) In conjunction with any order of release from detention, the court may, when it has reason to believe a child is alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent as defined in section 46b-120 , and where necessary, reasonable and appropriate, order the child to participate in a program of periodic alcohol or drug testing and treatment as a condition of such release. The results of any such alcohol or drug test shall be admissible only for the purposes of enforcing the conditions of release from detention.

(h) The detention supervisor of a juvenile residential center in charge of intake shall admit only a child who: (1) Is the subject of an order to detain or an outstanding court order to take such child into custody, (2) is ordered by a court to be held in detention, or (3) is being transferred to such center to await a court appearance.

(i) Whenever a child is subject to a court order to take such child into custody, or other process issued pursuant to this section or section 46b-140a , the Judicial Branch may cause the order or process to be entered into a central computer system in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Chief Court Administrator. The existence of the order or process in the computer system shall constitute prima facie evidence of the issuance of the order or process. Any child named in the order or process may be arrested or taken into custody based on the existence of the order or process in the computer system and, if the order or process directs that such child be detained, the child shall be held in a juvenile residential center.

(j) In the case of any child held in detention, the order to detain such child shall be for a period that does not exceed seven days or until the dispositional hearing is held, whichever is shorter, unless, following a detention review hearing, such order is renewed for a period that does not exceed seven days or until the dispositional hearing is held, whichever is shorter.

(k) For purposes of subsections (c) and (e) of this section, a child may be determined to pose a risk to public safety if such child has previously been adjudicated as delinquent for or convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere to two or more felony offenses, has had two or more prior dispositions of probation and is charged with commission of a larceny under section 53a-119c .

See Sec. 51-286 l establishing and implementing a training program on a uniform process for seeking juvenile detention orders.

Annotations to former sections 17-65 and 51-314:

Cited. 115 C. 591; 154 C. 644, 648. Under circumstances of the apprehension, and in view of fact that offices of juvenile court were closed, it was not practicable to turn plaintiff over to appropriate officials immediately after arrest, and 10-hour detention was not unreasonable. 171 C. 683, 689.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 206 C. 323; Id., 346; 211 C. 289; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 739.

Cited. 46 CA 545.

Cited. 43 CS 211.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-62 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-62
Sec. 46b-62. Orders for payment of attorney's fees and fees of guardian ad litem in certain actions. Limitations on orders for payment of fees to counsel or guardian ad litem for a minor child. Methodology for calculating fees on sliding-scale basis.
Status: in_force

(b) If, in any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743 , 17b-744 , 45a-257b , 46b-1 , 46b-6 , 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, 47-14g , 51-348a and 52-362 , the court appoints counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child, the court may not order a parent or an intervening party, individually or in any combination, to pay the reasonable fees of such counsel or guardian ad litem from a college savings account, including any account established pursuant to any qualified tuition program, as defined in Section 529(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, that has been established for the benefit of the minor child. If the court determines that a parent or an intervening party does not have the ability to pay such reasonable fees, the court shall not order that such reasonable fees be paid by such persons through the use of a credit card. In addition, any order for the payment of such reasonable fees shall be limited to income or assets that are not exempt property under sections 52-352a and 52-352b .

(c) In any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743 , 17b-744 , 45a-257 , 46b-1 , 46b-6 , 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, 47-14g , 51-348a and 52-362 , in which the court appoints counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child, the court may order that the fees to be paid to such counsel or guardian ad litem be calculated on a sliding-scale basis after giving due consideration to the income and assets of the parties to the proceeding.

(d) The Judicial Branch shall develop and implement a methodology for calculating, on a sliding-scale basis, the fees owing to counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child appointed in any proceeding under this chapter and sections 17b-743 , 17b-744 , 45a-257 , 46b-1 , 46b-6 , 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, 47-14g , 51-348a and 52-362 .

Annotations to former section 46-59:

Cited. 171 C. 218; 172 C. 202; Id., 316; 174 C. 602; 183 C. 433.

Annotations to present section:

Trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees since evidence warranted no award of alimony and that same evidence must be considered for the award of attorney's fees. 180 C. 376. Where, because of other orders, both parties are able financially to pay their own counsel fees, trial court erred in ordering payment of counsel fees. 181 C. 492. Cited. Id., 622; 183 C. 35; 184 C. 36. A definitive award of counsel fees should not ordinarily be made until after a trial where evidence relating to the criteria set forth in Sec. 46b-82 has been presented. Id., 513. Cited. 185 C. 42; Id., 156; Id., 275; 186 C. 311; 188 C. 232; 189 C. 129; 190 C. 26; Id., 36. In awarding counsel fees, the focus of the inquiry is not on the payor-spouse but rather on the total financial resources of the parties in light of the statutory criteria. Id., 173. Cited. Id., 269; Id., 491; 191 C. 46; Id., 81; 193 C. 261; 194 C. 25; Id., 312; 207 C. 48; 210 C. 462; 211 C. 485; Id., 648; 218 C. 801; 222 C. 32; 225 C. 185. Trial court had authority under section to award attorney's fees to plaintiff without first finding defendant in contempt; judgment of Appellate Court in 41 CA 861 reversed. 241 C. 490. Present case distinguishable from 222 C. 32 because here record supports finding that plaintiff either lacked liquid assets to pay attorney fees or such fees would undermine effect of the other financial orders. 245 C. 508. Section does not authorize an award of attorney's fees against grandparents or other third parties petitioning for visitation under Sec. 46b-59. 294 C. 484. Section only allows for the payment of fees for the attorney for the minor child; the fact that section only includes language allowing for the payment of fees for the attorney for the minor child indicates that the legislature did not intend to allow payment for counsel hired by the attorney for the minor children. 312 C. 600.

Cited. 1 CA 158; Id., 400; Id., 686; 2 CA 141; Id., 425; Id., 472; 3 CA 25; 4 CA 504; Id., 645; 5 CA 95; 6 CA 632; 7 CA 41. Must be construed to permit the award of attorney's fees in child support actions filed on behalf of illegitimate children. 8 CA 50. Cited. 9 CA 486; 10 CA 22; Id., 466; Id., 570. Language of this section and Sec. 46b-82 does not provide for consideration of status of legal services rendered, whether private or nonprofit, in awarding attorney's fees. 11 CA 150. Cited. Id., 268; Id., 610; 12 CA 626; 13 CA 300; Id., 512; 14 CA 541; 16 CA 193; Id., 412; 18 CA 622; 19 CA 146; 21 CA 200; 22 CA 136; Id., 392; 23 CA 98; 24 CA 343; 25 CA 41; 26 CA 527; 28 CA 854; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 85; 30 CA 292; Id., 443; 31 CA 561; Id., 582; Id., 761; 32 CA 537; Id., 733; 34 CA 462; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 750; 35 CA 246; 36 CA 305; Id., 322; 39 CA 162; 41 CA 716; Id., 861; 44 CA 605; 46 CA 87. Court can award attorney's fees for appeal of case it dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 48 CA 645. Trial court properly found that defendant was liable for plaintiff's attorney's fees but improperly awarded a dollar amount for such fees without an appropriate evidentiary showing to determine the reasonableness of such award. 54 CA 634. Trial court's discretion should be guided so that its decision regarding attorney's fees does not undermine its purpose in making any other financial award. 57 CA 165. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering plaintiff to pay $4,000 in counsel fees to defendant to defend the appeal. 69 CA 146. Reiterated previous holdings that specific finding concerning award of attorney's fees not required if record would support a finding that the party to whom attorney's fees are charged does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay such fees or that failure to award such fees would undermine other financial orders of the court. 79 CA 783. Trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff counsel fees of $100,000 because court could not reasonably have concluded that plaintiff was financially unable able to pay her counsel fees or that the failure to award such fees would undermine court's other financial orders. 82 CA 41. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined plaintiff lacked funds to defend appeal and ordered defendant to pay a set fee to plaintiff's attorney. 83 CA 478. Trial court judgment awarding attorney's fees award must be reversed because court's basis for award was improper. 102 CA 1. Trial court improperly decided issue regarding who drafted agreement and therefore award of counsel fees was improper. Id., 96. Although the order for payment of guardian ad litem fees requires consideration of the financial resources of both parties and the criteria set forth in Sec. 46b-82, postdissolution fault is not a factor included among those enumerated in said section, and there is no requirement that the court consider any additional factors or evidence deemed relevant by any of the parties. 107 CA 488. Court did not abuse its discretion when it considered party's litigation misconduct to form part of the basis of an award of attorney's fees for an appeal. 110 CA 798. Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering plaintiff to pay fees and counsel for guardian ad litem because section makes clear the court has power to order payment of reasonable fees regardless of whether there is a written contract or retainer agreement. 117 CA 304. Trial court not authorized to choose from which of defendant's assets fees shall be paid. 159 CA 167. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the defendant because the consideration of ample liquid assets pertains to the party requesting fees, not to the party opposing the award. 168 CA 141.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-134 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-134
Sec. 46b-134. (Formerly Sec. 51-315). Investigation by probation officer prior to disposition of delinquency case. Physical, mental and diagnostic examination.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 17-66:

Cited. 135 C. 515; 136 C. 494; 158 C. 439. Failure to complete required investigation and juvenile court's failure to consider facts that might have been brought to light upon completion of investigation had no bearing on that court's ultimate decision under former Sec. 17-60a to transfer defendant's case to regular criminal docket, because defendant's age mandated transfer of his case to regular criminal docket. 276 C. 633.

Cited. 19 CS 374; 26 CS 316.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 211 C. 151; 216 C. 563.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-71 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-71
Sec. 46b-71. Filing of foreign matrimonial judgment; enforcement in this state.
Status: in_force

(b) Such foreign matrimonial judgment shall become a judgment of the court of this state where it is filed and shall be enforced and otherwise treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court in this state; provided such foreign matrimonial judgment does not contravene the public policy of the state of Connecticut. A foreign matrimonial judgment so filed shall have the same effect and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner as any like judgment of a court of this state and is subject to the same procedures for modifying, altering, amending, vacating, setting aside, staying or suspending said judgment as a judgment of a court of this state; provided, in modifying, altering, amending, setting aside, vacating, staying or suspending any such foreign matrimonial judgment in this state the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction shall be controlling.

Cited. 189 C. 129; 191 C. 92.

Cited. 1 CA 578; 6 CA 541; 17 CA 544; 30 CA 821; 33 CA 417; 35 CA 246.

Construction of section that would confer the same personal jurisdiction of decree-rendering state upon Connecticut courts would violate fundamental due process and the minimum contacts standards. 41 CS 429.

Subsec. (b):

When modifying foreign matrimonial judgment, Connecticut trial court's failure to apply substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction constitutes plain error. 47 CA 146.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-11a — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813 / Section 46a-11a
Sec. 46a-11a. (Formerly Sec. 19a-458). Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Abuse” means the wilful infliction of physical pain or injury or the wilful deprivation by a caregiver of services which are necessary to the person's health or safety;

(2) “Neglect” means a situation where a person with intellectual disability either is living alone and is not able to obtain the services which are necessary to maintain such person's physical and mental health or is not receiving such necessary services from the caregiver;

(3) “Caregiver” means a person who has the responsibility for the care of a person with intellectual disability as a result of a family relationship or who has assumed the responsibility for the care of the person with intellectual disability voluntarily, by contract or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The legal representative of a person with intellectual disability need not be such person's caregiver;

(4) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Developmental Services, or such commissioner's designee;

(5) “Evaluation report” means the written documentation of an investigation of abuse or neglect conducted by the Abuse Investigation Division of the Department of Developmental Services that includes, but is not limited to, the report of an allegation of abuse or neglect, evaluations, findings and recommended actions;

(6) “Facility” means any public or private hospital, nursing home facility, residential care home, training school, regional facility, group home, community companion home, school or other program serving persons with intellectual disability;

(7) “Legal representative” means a plenary guardian or limited guardian of a person with intellectual disability appointed pursuant to sections 45a-669 to 45a-683 , inclusive, or a conservator of the person or a conservator of the estate appointed pursuant to sections 45a-644 to 45a-662 , inclusive;

(8) “Person with intellectual disability” means a person who: (A) Has intellectual disability, as provided in section 1-1g , (B) is at least the age of eighteen and under the age of sixty, except, for purposes of subsection (b) of section 46a-11c , is eighteen years of age or older, and (C) is substantially unable to protect himself or herself from abuse and includes all such persons living in residential facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department of Developmental Services;

(9) “Person who receives services from the Department of Social Services' Division of Autism Spectrum Disorder Services” means an individual eighteen years of age to fifty-nine years of age, inclusive, who receives funding or services from said division; and

(10) “Protective services” means services provided by the state or any other governmental or private organization or individual which are necessary to prevent abuse or neglect. Such services may include the provision of medical care for physical and mental health needs; the provision of support services in the facility, including the time limited placement of department staff in such facility; the relocation of a person with intellectual disability to a facility able to offer such care pursuant to section 17a-210 , 17a-274 or 17a-277 , as applicable; assistance in personal hygiene; food; clothing; adequately heated and ventilated shelter; protection from health and safety hazards; protection from maltreatment, the result of which includes, but is not limited to, malnutrition, deprivation of necessities or physical punishment; and transportation necessary to secure any of the above-stated services, except that this term shall not include taking such person into custody without consent.

Cited. 240 C. 766.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-401 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-401
Sec. 46b-401. Initiation by IV-D agency of support proceeding under Convention.
Status: in_force

(b) The following support proceedings are available to an obligee under the Convention: (1) Recognition or recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order; (2) enforcement of a support order issued or recognized in this state; (3) establishment of a support order if there is no existing order, including, if necessary, determination of parentage of a child; (4) establishment of a support order if recognition of a foreign support order is refused under subdivisions (2), (4) or (9) of subsection (b) of section 46b-405 ; (5) modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and (6) modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.

(c) The following support proceedings are available under the Convention to an obligor against which there is an existing support order: (1) Recognition of an order suspending or limiting enforcement of an existing support order of a tribunal of this state; (2) modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and (3) modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.

(d) A tribunal of this state may not require security, bond, or deposit, however described, to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in proceedings under the Convention.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-116d — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815q / Section 46b-116d
Sec. 46b-116d. Required notice to Indian parent, Indian custodian, Indian tribe of state foster care, termination of parental rights proceedings involving Indian child.
Status: in_force

(b) In any involuntary proceeding in a Probate Court in which a party is seeking adoption or termination of parental rights where the party knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the court shall notify the parent in accordance with the provisions of section 45a-716 of the pending proceedings, which shall include notice of the right of intervention by the Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe. The court shall notify the Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe by registered or certified mail with return receipt requested. If the identity or location of the Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given, in like manner, to the Secretary or Bureau of Indian Affairs Regional Director in the case of an Indian child of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or the Commissioner of Children and Families in the case of an Indian child of an Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut, who shall have fifteen days after receipt of such notice to provide the requisite notice to the Indian custodian and the tribe.

(c) No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of the notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe, the Secretary, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Regional Director or the Commissioner of Children and Families, provided the parent, Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-56 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-56
Sec. 46a-56. Commission duties.
Status: in_force

(1) Investigate the possibilities of affording equal opportunity of profitable employment to all persons, with particular reference to job training and placement;

(2) Compile facts concerning discrimination in employment, violations of civil liberties and other related matters;

(3) Investigate and proceed in all cases of discriminatory practices under this chapter and noncompliance with the provisions of section 4a-60 or 4a-60a or sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive, provided, the commission, whenever it has reason to believe that a person who is a party to a discriminatory practice case has engaged or is engaged in conduct that constitutes a violation of part VI, of chapter 952, may refer such matter to the Office of the Chief State's Attorney and said office shall conduct a further investigation as deemed necessary;

(4) From time to time, but not less than once a year, report to the Governor as provided in section 4-60 , making recommendations for the removal of such injustices as it may find to exist and such other recommendations as it deems advisable and describing the investigations, proceedings and hearings it has conducted and their outcome, the decisions it has rendered and the other work it has performed;

(5) Monitor state contracts to determine whether they are in compliance with sections 4a-60 and 4a-60a , and those provisions of the general statutes which prohibit discrimination;

(6) Compile data concerning state contracts with female and minority business enterprises and submit a report annually to the General Assembly concerning the employment of such business enterprises as contractors and subcontractors;

(7) Develop and include on the commission's Internet web site a link concerning the illegality of sexual harassment, as defined in section 46a-60 , and the remedies available to victims of sexual harassment;

(8) Develop and make available at no cost to employers an online training and education video or other interactive method of training and education that fulfills the requirements prescribed in subdivision (15) of section 46a-54 ;

(9) Develop, in conjunction with organizations that advocate on behalf of victims of domestic violence, and include on the commission's Internet web site a link concerning domestic violence and the resources available to victims of domestic violence; and

(10) Develop, in conjunction with organizations that advocate on behalf of victims of domestic violence, and make available at no cost to each state agency an online training and education video or other interactive method of training and education that fulfills the requirements prescribed in subdivision (19) of section 46a-54 .

(b) The commission may, when it is deemed in the best interests of the state, exempt a contractor from the requirements of complying with any or all of the provisions of section 4a-60 , 4a-60a , 46a-68c , 46a-68d or 46a-68e in any specific contract. Exemptions under the provisions of this section may include, but not be limited to, the following instances: (1) If the work is to be or has been performed outside the state and no recruitment of workers within the limits of the state is involved; (2) those involving less than specified amounts of money or specified numbers of workers; (3) to the extent that they involve subcontracts below a specified tier. The commission may also exempt facilities of a contractor which are in all respects separate and distinct from activities of the contractor related to the performance of the contract, provided such an exemption shall not interfere with or impede the effectuation of the purposes of this section and sections 4a-60 , 4a-60a , 4a-60g and 46a-68b to 46a-68k , inclusive.

(c) If the commission determines through its monitoring and compliance procedures that a contractor or subcontractor is not complying with antidiscrimination statutes or contract provisions required under section 4a-60 or 4a-60a or sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive, the commission may issue a complaint pursuant to subsection (c) of section 46a-82 . Such complaint shall be scheduled for a hearing before a human rights referee appointed by the chief referee to act as a presiding officer. Such hearing shall be held in accordance with chapter 54 and section 46a-84 . If, after such hearing, the presiding officer makes a finding of noncompliance with antidiscrimination statutes or contract provisions required under section 4a-60 or 4a-60a or sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive, the presiding officer shall order such relief as is necessary to achieve full compliance with any antidiscrimination statute and required contract provisions. The presiding officer may: (1) (A) In the case of a state contract, order the state to retain two per cent of the total contract price per month on any existing contract with such contractor that the state withheld pursuant to section 46a-68d and transfer the funds to the State Treasurer for deposit in the special fund described in subsection (e) of this section, or (B) in the case of a municipal public works or quasi-public agency contract, order the municipality or entity to retain two per cent of the total contract price per month on any existing contract with such contractor; (2) prohibit the contractor from participation in any further contracts with state agencies or any further municipal public works contracts or quasi-public agency project contracts, as applicable until: (A) The expiration of a period of two years from the date of the finding of noncompliance, or (B) the presiding officer determines that the contractor has adopted policies consistent with such statutes, provided the presiding officer shall make such determination not later than forty-five days after such finding of noncompliance; (3) publish, or cause to be published, the names of contractors or unions that the presiding officer has found to be in noncompliance with such provisions; (4) notify the Attorney General that, in cases in which there is substantial violation or the threat of substantial violation of section 4a-60 or 4a-60a , appropriate proceedings should be brought to enforce such provisions, including the enjoining of organizations, individuals or groups that prevent, or seek to prevent, compliance with section 4a-60 or 4a-60a ; (5) recommend to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Department of Justice that appropriate proceedings be instituted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or related laws when necessary; (6) recommend to the appropriate prosecuting authority that criminal proceedings be brought for the furnishing of false information to any awarding agency or to the commission; (7) order the contractor to bring itself into compliance with antidiscrimination statutes or contract provisions required under section 4a-60 or 4a-60a or sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive, not later than a period of thirty days after the issuance of such order or, for good cause shown, within an additional period of thirty days, and, if such contractor fails to bring itself into such compliance within such time period and such noncompliance is substantial or there is a pattern of noncompliance, recommend to the awarding agency that such agency declare the contractor to be in breach of the contract and that such agency pursue all available remedies or, in the case of a municipal public works or quasi-public agency project contract, recommend the municipality or entity to make such a declaration and pursue all available remedies; (8) order the awarding agency or, in the case of a municipal public works or quasi-public agency project contract, the municipality or entity, to refrain from entering into further contracts, or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any noncomplying contractor, until such contractor has satisfied the commission that such contractor has established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with antidiscrimination statutes and section 4a-60 or 4a-60a and sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f , inclusive; or (9) order two or more remedies or other relief designed to achieve full compliance with antidiscrimination statutes and required contract provisions. The commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this section.

(d) If the commission determines, through its monitoring and compliance procedures, that, with respect to a state contract, municipal public works contract or quasi-public agency project contract, a contractor, subcontractor, service provider or supplier of materials has (1) fraudulently qualified as a minority business enterprise, or (2) performed services or supplied materials on behalf of another contractor, subcontractor, service provider or supplier of materials knowing (A) that such other contractor, subcontractor, service provider or supplier has fraudulently qualified as a minority business enterprise in order to appear to comply with antidiscrimination statutes or contract provisions required under section 4a-60 or 4a-60a , and (B) that such services or materials are to be used in connection with a contract entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of section 4a-60g , the commission may issue a complaint pursuant to subsection (c) of section 46a-82 . Such complaint shall be scheduled for a hearing before a referee assigned by the chief referee to act as a presiding officer. Such hearing shall be held in accordance with chapter 54 and section 46a-84 . If, after such hearing, the presiding officer makes a finding that a contractor, subcontractor, service provider or supplier of materials has violated this subsection, the presiding officer shall assess a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars upon such contractor, subcontractor, service provider or supplier of materials.

(e) The Attorney General, upon complaint of the commission, shall institute a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford to recover any penalty assessed pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. Any penalties recovered pursuant to this subsection shall be deposited in a special fund and shall be held by the State Treasurer separate and apart from all other moneys, funds and accounts. The resources in such fund shall, pursuant to regulations adopted by the commission in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, be used to assist minority business enterprises. As used in this section, “minority business enterprise” means any contractor, subcontractor or supplier of materials fifty-one per cent or more of the capital stock, if any, or assets of which is owned by a person or persons: (1) Who are active in the daily affairs of the enterprise; (2) who have the power to direct the management and policies of the enterprise; and (3) who are members of a minority, as defined in subsection (a) of section 32-9n .

See Sec. 4a-60g re commission's duties re set-aside program for small contractors, minority business enterprises, individuals with disabilities and nonprofit corporations.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-13l — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813a / Section 46a-13l
Sec. 46a-13l. Child Advocate's duties. Child fatality review panel. Reports to the Governor and the General Assembly. Investigations.
Status: in_force

(1) Evaluate the delivery of services to children by state agencies and those entities that provide services to children through funds provided by the state;

(2) Review periodically the procedures established by any state agency providing services to children to carry out the provisions of sections 46a-13k to 46a-13p , inclusive, with a view toward the rights of the children and recommend revisions to such procedures;

(3) Review complaints of persons concerning the actions of any state or municipal agency providing services to children and of any entity that provides services to children through funds provided by the state, make appropriate referrals and investigate those where the Child Advocate determines that a child or family may be in need of assistance from the Child Advocate or that a systemic issue in the state's provision of services to children is raised by the complaint;

(4) Pursuant to an investigation, provide assistance to a child or family who the Child Advocate determines is in need of such assistance including, but not limited to, advocating with an agency, provider or others on behalf of the best interests of the child;

(5) Periodically review the facilities and procedures of any and all institutions or residences, public or private, where a juvenile has been placed by any agency or department;

(6) Recommend changes in state policies concerning children including changes in the system of providing juvenile justice, child care, foster care and treatment;

(7) Take all possible action including, but not limited to, conducting programs of public education, undertaking legislative advocacy and making proposals for systemic reform and formal legal action, in order to secure and ensure the legal, civil and special rights of children who reside in this state;

(8) Provide training and technical assistance to attorneys representing children and guardians ad litem appointed by the Superior Court;

(9) Periodically review the number of special needs children in any foster care or permanent care facility and recommend changes in the policies and procedures for the placement of such children;

(10) Serve or designate a person to serve as a member of the child fatality review panel established in subsection (b) of this section;

(11) Take appropriate steps to advise the public of the services of the Office of the Child Advocate, the purpose of the office and procedures to contact the office;

(12) Prepare an in-depth report on conditions of confinement, including, but not limited to, compliance with section 46a-152 , regarding children twenty-one years of age or younger who are held in secure detention or correctional confinement in any facility operated by a state agency. Such report shall be submitted, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-4a , to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to children not later than March 1, 2017, and every two years thereafter; and

(13) Present to the advisory committee, established pursuant to section 46a-13r at least three times each year, a report on the goals of and projects undertaken by the Office of the Child Advocate, within available appropriations, that are consistent with the responsibilities of the Child Advocate.

(b) There is established a child fatality review panel composed of thirteen permanent members as follows: The Child Advocate, or a designee; the Commissioners of Children and Families, Public Health and Public Safety, or their designees; the Chief Medical Examiner, or a designee; the Chief State's Attorney, or a designee; a pediatrician, appointed by the Governor; a representative of law enforcement, appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate; an attorney, appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; a social work professional, appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; a representative of a community service group appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives; a psychologist, appointed by the majority leader of the House of Representatives; and an injury prevention representative, appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. A majority of the panel may select not more than three additional temporary members with particular expertise or interest to serve on the panel. Such temporary members shall have the same duties and powers as the permanent members of the panel. The chairperson shall be elected from among the panel's permanent members. The panel shall, to the greatest extent possible, reflect the ethnic, cultural and geographic diversity of the state.

(c) The panel shall review the circumstances of the death of a child placed in out-of-home care or whose death was due to unexpected or unexplained causes to facilitate development of prevention strategies to address identified trends and patterns of risk and to improve coordination of services for children and families in the state. Members of the panel shall not be compensated for their services, but may be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.

(d) On or before January 1, 2000, and annually thereafter, the panel shall issue an annual report which shall include its findings and recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly on its review of child fatalities for the preceding year.

(e) Upon request of two-thirds of the members of the panel and within available appropriations, the Governor, the General Assembly or at the Child Advocate's discretion, the Child Advocate shall conduct an in-depth investigation and review and issue a report with recommendations on the death or critical incident of a child. The report shall be submitted to the Governor, the General Assembly and the commissioner of any state agency cited in the report and shall be made available to the general public.

(f) Any state agency cited in a report issued by the Office of the Child Advocate, pursuant to the Child Advocate's responsibilities under this section, shall submit a written response to the report and recommendations made in the report to the Governor and the General Assembly not later than ninety days after receipt of such report and recommendations. The General Assembly shall submit a copy of such response to the Office of the Child Advocate immediately upon receipt.

(g) The Chief Medical Examiner shall provide timely notice to the Child Advocate and to the chairperson of the child fatality review panel of the death of any child that is to be investigated pursuant to section 19a-406 .

(h) Any agency having responsibility for the custody or care of children shall provide timely notice to the Child Advocate and the chairperson of the child fatality review panel of the death of a child or a critical incident involving a child in its custody or care.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-536 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-536
Sec. 46b-536. Effect of nonvalidated genetic surrogacy agreement.
Status: in_force

(b) If all parties agree, a court may validate a genetic surrogacy agreement after assisted reproduction has occurred but before the date of birth of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under the agreement if, upon examination of the parties, the court finds that:

(1) Sections 46b-522 to 46b-524 , inclusive, are satisfied; and

(2) All parties entered into the agreement voluntarily and understand its terms.

(c) A person who terminates a genetic surrogacy agreement under section 46b-534 shall file notice of the termination with the court, provided that a person may not terminate a genetic surrogacy agreement validated under this section if a gamete or embryo transfer has resulted in a pregnancy. On receipt of the notice, the court shall vacate any order issued under subsection (b) of this section. A person who shall not notify the court of the termination of the agreement shall be subject to sanctions.

(d) If a child conceived by assisted reproduction under a genetic surrogacy agreement that is not validated under section 46b-533 or subsection (b) of this section is born, the person acting as genetic surrogate is not automatically a parent and the Probate Court shall adjudicate parentage of the child based on the best interest of the child, taking into account the factors set forth in subsection (a) of section 46b-475 and the intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the agreement.

(e) The parties to a genetic surrogacy agreement have standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under this section.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-13k — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 813a / Section 46a-13k
Sec. 46a-13k. Office of the Child Advocate established.
Status: in_force

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, the Child Advocate shall act independently of any state department in the performance of the advocate's duties.

(c) The Child Advocate may, within available funds, appoint such staff as may be deemed necessary provided, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1996, and June 30, 1997, such staff shall not exceed one and one-half full-time positions or the equivalent thereof. The duties of the staff may include the duties and powers of the Child Advocate if performed under the direction of the Child Advocate.

(d) The General Assembly shall annually appropriate such sums as necessary for the payment of the salaries of the staff and for the payment of office expenses and other actual expenses incurred by the Child Advocate in the performance of his or her duties. Any legal or court fees obtained by the state in actions brought by the Child Advocate shall be deposited in the General Fund.

(e) The Child Advocate shall annually submit, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-4a , to the Governor, the joint standing committees of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary, children and human services and the advisory committee established pursuant to section 46a-13r a detailed report analyzing the work of the Office of the Child Advocate.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-62 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-62
Sec. 46a-62. (Formerly Sec. 31-126a). Statutes re discrimination in compensation on the basis of sex not affected.
Status: in_force

Annotation to former section 31-126a:

Cited. 27 CS 141.

Annotation to present section:

Cited. 195 C. 226.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-302 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-302
Sec. 46b-302. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Child” means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual's parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent.

(2) “Child support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state or foreign country.

(3) “Convention” means the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, concluded at The Hague on November 23, 2007.

(4) “Duty of support” means an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse or former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to provide support.

(5) “Foreign country” means a country, including a political subdivision thereof, other than the United States, that authorizes the issuance of support orders and (A) which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country; (B) which has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state as provided in section 46b-334 ; (C) which has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive; or (D) in which the Convention is in force with respect to the United States.

(6) “Foreign support order” means a support order of a foreign tribunal.

(7) “Foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child. The term includes a competent authority under the Convention.

(8) “Home state” means the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other period.

(9) “Income” includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support under the law of this state.

(10) “Income-withholding order” means an order or other legal process directed to an obligor's employer or other payer of income, as defined by section 52-362 , to withhold support from the income of the obligor.

(11) “Initiating tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country from which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded or in which a petition or comparable pleading is filed for forwarding to another state or foreign country.

(12) “Issuing foreign country” means the foreign country in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child.

(13) “Issuing state” means the state in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child.

(14) “Issuing tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country that issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child.

(15) “Law” includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regulations having the force of law.

(16) “Obligee” means (A) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child has been issued; (B) a foreign country, state, or political subdivision of a state to which the rights under a duty of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support; (C) an individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the individual's child; or (D) a person that is a creditor in a proceeding under sections 46b-398 to 46b-410 , inclusive.

(17) “Obligor” means an individual, or the estate of a decedent that (A) owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support; (B) is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child; (C) is liable under a support order; or (D) is a debtor in a proceeding under sections 46b-398 to 46b-410 , inclusive.

(18) “Outside this state” means a location in another state or a country other than the United States, whether or not the country is a foreign country.

(19) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality or any other legal or commercial entity.

(20) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(21) “Register” means to file in a tribunal of this state a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child issued in another state or a foreign country.

(22) “Registering tribunal” means a tribunal in which a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child is registered.

(23) “Responding state” means a state in which a petition or comparable pleading for support or to determine parentage of a child is filed or to which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded for filing from another state or a foreign country.

(24) “Responding tribunal” means the authorized tribunal in a responding state or foreign country.

(25) “Spousal support order” means a support order for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor.

(26) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands or any territory or insular possession under the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian nation or tribe.

(27) “Support enforcement agency” means a public official, governmental entity or private agency authorized to (A) seek enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of support; (B) seek establishment or modification of child support; (C) request determination of parentage of a child; (D) attempt to locate obligors or their assets; or (E) request determination of the controlling child support order.

(28) “Support order” means a judgment, decree, order, decision or directive, whether temporary, final or subject to modification, issued in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support. The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney's fees and other relief.

(29) “Tribunal” means a court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-83 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-83
Sec. 46b-83. (Formerly Sec. 46-50). Alimony, support and use of family home or other residential dwelling unit awarded pendente lite. Voluntary leaving of family home by one parent.
Status: in_force

(b) In any proceeding brought under section 46b-45 , 46b-56 or 46b-61 involving a minor child, if one of the parents residing in the family home leaves such home voluntarily and not subject to court order, and if the court finds that the voluntary leaving of the family home by such parent served the best interests of the child, the court may consider such voluntary leaving as a factor when making or modifying any order pursuant to section 46b-56 .

See Sec. 17b-743 re direction that payments under support order be made to Commissioner of Administrative Services or local welfare department.

Annotations to former section 46-50:

Cited. 171 C. 433.

Alimony. 33 CS 44.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 183 C. 230; 194 C. 312; 211 C. 801.

Cited. 18 CA 622; 24 CA 219; 41 CA 861; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 490. In accordance with 220 C. 307, reasonable cause standard requires commission to consider all reliable probative evidence, including evidence unfavorable to complainant, and investigator and commission may make findings on disputed issues of material fact. 116 CA 776. Distribution of property is not authorized under section; trial court order amounted to an impermissible pendente lite property distribution. 163 CA 517.

Cited. 41 CS 258; 42 CS 562.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-37 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815e / Section 46b-37
Sec. 46b-37. (Formerly Sec. 46-10). Joint duty of spouses to support family. Liability for purchases and certain expenses. Abandonment.
Status: in_force

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be liable for: (1) The reasonable and necessary services of a physician or dentist; (2) hospital expenses rendered the husband or wife or minor child while residing in the family of his or her parents; (3) the rental of any dwelling unit actually occupied by the husband and wife as a residence and reasonably necessary to them for that purpose; and (4) any article purchased by either which has in fact gone to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a spouse who abandons his or her spouse without cause shall be liable for the reasonable support of such other spouse while abandoned.

(d) No action may be maintained against either spouse under the provisions of this section, either during or after any period of separation from the other spouse, for any liability incurred by the other spouse during the separation, if, during the separation the spouse who is liable for support of the other spouse has provided the other spouse with reasonable support.

(e) Abandonment without cause by a spouse shall be a defense to any liability pursuant to the provisions of subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of subsection (b) of this section for expenses incurred by and for the benefit of such spouse. Nothing in this subsection shall affect the duty of a parent to support his or her minor child.

Annotations to former section 46-10:

Not necessary to first obtain judgment against husband, and have execution returned unsatisfied; plaintiff may sue on implied promise created by statute. 52 C. 406. Father not obliged to support child unlawfully detained by mother. 68 C. 256. Liability of husband for goods purchased for family not limited to those necessary or reasonable. 77 C. 390; 93 C. 453; Id., 515. Husband is liable for wife's reasonable apparel even though he has not abandoned her. 93 C. 515. That goods were purchased by wife in foreign country is immaterial. Id., 516. “While abandoned by her husband” qualifies next preceding clause only. Id., 515; 94 C. 267. If goods in fact went to support of family, husband's prior notice to seller not to extend credit to wife is no defense. Id., 267. Whether a plastic surgery operation to improve husband's facial appearance is a “reasonable and necessary” expense depends on all circumstances. 100 C. 168. Common law liability to provide necessaries to wife exists independently of statute; scope thereof. 102 C. 705. Necessary allegations in action on statute. Id., 706. Cited. 108 C. 730. Wife is not jointly responsible for every business obligation husband undertakes. 111 C. 306; 115 C. 295; 131 C. 156; 134 C. 332; 142 C. 375; Id., 553; 143 C. 443; 144 C. 21. There must be a direct relationship between article purchased and the family benefit. 121 C. 663; 124 C. 249. Under former statute, it was immaterial that husband supported wife. 112 C. 64. “Family” includes wife. Id.; 131 C. 156. In tort action, husband entitled to medical expenses for wife's injuries, both past and future. 122 C. 338. Statute does not make wife guarantor but may make her liable on an implied promise; husband has primary obligation to support and may be liable to wife for past support; her claim is legal rather than equitable and 6-year limitation applies. 124 C. 251. Payment by husband did not toll statute of limitations as to wife. 125 C. 202. However, in suit by wife against husband, she may recover such expenses if creditors look to her for payment. 126 C. 146. Her claim not defeated by reason of having private means. 132 C. 80. Three bases of recovery when creditor sues husband for goods furnished wife. Id., 77. If wife lives apart without justification, husband's obligation to support is suspended. 136 C. 685. Husband and wife cannot make contract with each other concerning maintenance or custody of child which court is compelled to enforce. 137 C. 74. Undertaker's services are not included in those purchases to which statute applies. Id., 450. Does not modify common law determining conditions excusing husband from obligation to support wife or child. 138 C. 6. Plaintiff not entitled to recover where her estate had not been depleted in any way and she had not expended money of her own for support. Id., 701. Husband must provide for his wife and child within the reasonable limits of his ability. 142 C. 553. Wife's doctors' bills cannot be recovered from husband as damages in tort action. 145 C. 663. Cited. 155 C. 545. In action by wife for indemnification of money paid out by her for support of herself and children, it is immaterial whether second ground for divorce was found where it was proved defendant had committed adultery and wife was fully justified in living apart from and divorcing him for that reason. 156 C. 628. Cited. 162 C. 546. Section does not exempt wife from any legal obligation towards family; husband has primary duty to support family, but wife is also liable for family expenses. 170 C. 258. Cited. 175 C. 527.

Circumstances under which indemnity is available to wife under section. 3 CS 211. Cited. 4 CS 144. There is no statute of limitations affecting this claim. 5 CS 459. Recovery by wife for expenditures for support of the family allowed only for payments actually made. 7 CS 153; 17 CS 208. Wife's right to indemnity is not defeated because she has private means. 13 CS 474; 17 CS 189; 20 CS 9. Cited. 14 CS 128. Liability of husband and wife for medical and hospital expenses rendered a minor child living with them does not exclude a minor married child. 16 CS 84. Conditions under which wife living apart entitled to sums expended and to be expended by her for reasonable necessities for support of family. Id., 235. Cited. 17 CS 189. Where wife left husband without just cause and where her return to him was not in good faith, he was justified in living apart and equitable support was denied wife. 23 CS 221. In absence of divorce, husband has primary obligation of paying for support, medical care and burial of wife, and person advancing money for those purposes can recover from husband; such person has legally protected interest adversely affected by purported divorce decree and may therefore attack decree. Id., 306. Judgment against wife leaves unaffected right to indemnification from husband. 30 CS 593. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is liable. 32 CS 156. Liability for certain expenses. 33 CS 44.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 186 C. 167; 200 C. 290. Abandonment is a defense to liability. 206 C. 31. Cited. 234 C. 194; 235 C. 82.

Cited. 3 CA 392; 21 CA 200; 26 CA 737.

Cited. 44 CS 169; 45 CS 84.

Subsec. (b):

Subdiv. (4): Spousal liability does not include nursing home expenses or services or expenses associated with nursing home care, including food and medicine consumed by a nursing home resident. 299 C. 819.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-577 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-577
Sec. 46b-577. (Formerly Sec. 46b-179a). Registry of foreign parentage judgments. Filing of certified copy and certification of final judgment.
Status: in_force

(b) The party shall file a certified copy of the foreign parentage judgment and a certification that such judgment is final and has not been modified, altered, amended, set aside or vacated and that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed or suspended. Such certificate shall set forth the full name and last-known address of the other party to the judgment.

Annotation to former section 46b-179a:

Cited. 203 C. 380.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-327 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-327
Sec. 46b-327. Proceedings under act.
Status: in_force

(b) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under sections 46b-301 to 46b-425 , inclusive, by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state or a foreign country which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-153 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814e / Section 46a-153
Sec. 46a-153. Recording and annual compilation of use of restraint and seclusion. Review of annual compilation by state agencies. Reports.
Status: in_force

(b) If the use of such restraint or seclusion results in physical injury to the person, the institution or facility shall report the incident to the commissioner of the state agency that has jurisdiction or supervisory control over the institution or facility. The commissioner receiving a report of such an incident shall report any incidence of serious injury or death to the executive director of the nonprofit entity designated by the Governor in accordance with section 46a-10b to serve as the Connecticut protection and advocacy system, as required by the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 USC 15041 et seq., as amended from time to time, and any regulations promulgated thereunder, and as required by the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 USC 10801 et seq., as amended from time to time, and any regulations promulgated thereunder, and, if appropriate, to the Child Advocate of the Office of the Child Advocate.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-115aa — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815p / Section 46b-115aa
Sec. 46b-115aa. Expedited enforcement of child custody determination.
Status: in_force

(b) A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination shall state: (1) Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was; (2) whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this chapter and, if so, identify the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding; (3) whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to family violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; (4) the present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known; (5) whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorneys' fees are sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials, and, if so, the relief sought; and (6) if the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed under section 46b-115w , the date and place of registration.

(c) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing, the time and place of which shall be specified, and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The order shall advise the respondent that at the hearing, the court will order that the petitioner take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs and expenses under section 46b-115ee , and any other relief that the court may deem appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes that: (1) The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w and (A) the court issuing the order for which enforcement is sought did not have jurisdiction under section 46b-115k , 46b-115 l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections; (B) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under sections 46b-115k to 46b-115t , inclusive; or (C) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice of the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought was not given in accordance with section 46b-115g or in a manner reasonably calculated to provide actual notice; or (2) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed pursuant to section 46b-115w , but has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under section 46b-115k , 46b-115 l or 46b-115m or a provision substantially similar to said sections. The hearing must be held on the next business day after service of the order unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The court may extend the date of the hearing at the request of the petitioner.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-59 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-59
Sec. 46a-59. (Formerly Sec. 53-35a). Discrimination in associations of licensed persons prohibited. Penalty.
Status: in_force

(b) Any association, board or other organization which violates the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars.

Annotation to former section 53-35a:

Cited. 160 C. 226.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-524 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-524
Sec. 46b-524. Requirements of gestational or genetic surrogacy agreement: Content.
Status: in_force

(1) A person acting as surrogate agrees to attempt to become pregnant by means of assisted reproduction.

(2) Except as provided in sections 46b-531 , 46b-535 and 46b-536 , the person acting as surrogate and the spouse or former spouse, if any, of the person acting as surrogate have no claim to parentage of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under the surrogacy agreement.

(3) The spouse, if any, of the person acting as surrogate shall acknowledge and agree to comply with the obligations imposed on the surrogate by the surrogacy agreement.

(4) Except as provided in sections 46b-529 , 46b-532 , 46b-535 and 46b-536 , the intended parent or, if there are two intended parents, each one jointly and severally, immediately upon birth of the child shall be the exclusive parent or parents of the resulting child, regardless of the number of children born or the gender or mental or physical condition of each child.

(5) Except as provided in sections 46b-529 , 46b-532 , 46b-535 and 46b-536 , the intended parent or, if there are two intended parents, each parent jointly and severally, immediately upon birth of the resulting child shall assume responsibility for the financial support of the child, regardless of the number of children born or the gender or the mental or physical condition of each child.

(6) The surrogacy agreement shall provide for payment by the intended parent or parents of reasonable legal, medical and ancillary expenses, including: (A) Premiums for a health insurance policy that covers medical treatment and hospitalization for the person acting as surrogate unless otherwise mutually agreed upon by the parties, pursuant to the terms of the surrogacy agreement; (B) payment of all uncovered medical expenses; (C) payment of legal fees for the legal representation of the person acting as surrogate; (D) payment of life insurance premiums; and (E) any other reasonable financial arrangements mutually agreed upon by the parties, including any applicable reimbursement and compensation schedule, pursuant to the terms of the surrogacy agreement.

(7) The intended parent or parents are liable for the surrogacy-related expenses of the person acting as surrogate, including expenses for health care provided for assisted reproduction, prenatal care, labor and delivery and for the medical expenses of the resulting child that are not paid by insurance. This subdivision shall not be construed to supplant any health insurance coverage that is otherwise available to the person acting as surrogate or an intended parent for the coverage of health care costs. This subdivision shall not change the health insurance coverage of the person acting as surrogate or the responsibility of the insurance company to pay benefits under a policy that covers a person acting as surrogate.

(8) The surrogacy agreement shall not infringe on the rights of the person acting as surrogate to make all health and welfare decisions regarding the person, the person's body and the person's pregnancy throughout the duration of the surrogacy arrangement, including during attempts to become pregnant, pregnancy, delivery and post-partum. The surrogacy agreement shall not infringe upon the right of the person acting as surrogate to autonomy in medical decision making by, including, but not limited to, requiring the person acting as surrogate to undergo a scheduled, nonmedically indicated caesarean section or to undergo multiple embryo transfer. Except as otherwise provided by law, any written or oral agreement purporting to waive or limit the rights described in this subdivision are void as against public policy.

(9) The surrogacy agreement shall include information about each party's right under sections 46b-521 to 46b-538 , inclusive, to terminate the surrogacy agreement.

(b) A surrogacy agreement may provide for: (1) The intended parent or parents to pay reasonable compensation to the person acting as surrogate; and (2) the intended parent or parents to pay for or reimburse reasonable expenses, including, but not limited to, medical, legal or other professional or necessary expenses related to the surrogacy agreement, including reimbursement of specific expenses if the agreement is terminated under sections 46b-521 to 46b-538 , inclusive.

(c) A right created under a surrogacy agreement is not assignable and there is no third-party beneficiary of the agreement other than the resulting child.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-576 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-576
Sec. 46b-576. (Formerly Sec. 46b-179). Foreign parentage judgments.
Status: in_force

Annotation to former section 46b-179:

Cited. 203 C. 380.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-116a — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815q / Section 46b-116a
Sec. 46b-116a. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Adoptive placement” means the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption. “Adoptive placement” does not include placement based upon an act, which if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to either parent.

(2) “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding that includes an adoptive placement, foster care placement, preadoptive placement or termination of parental rights. “Child custody proceeding” does not include placement based upon an act, which if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to either parent.

(3) “Foster care placement” means any action removing an Indian child from such child's parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated. “Foster care placement” does not include placement based upon an act, which if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to either parent.

(4) “Extended family member” means a person defined by the law or custom of an Indian child's tribe as an extended family member, or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin or stepparent.

(5) “Indian” means any person who is (A) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, (B) an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as defined in 43 USC 1606, or (C) a member of an Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut.

(6) “Indian child” means any unmarried person who is under the age of eighteen and (A) is either a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or an Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut, or (B) is eligible for membership in such tribe and is the biological child of a member of such tribe.

(7) “Indian child's tribe” means (A) the federally recognized Indian tribe or Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut of which an Indian child is a member or is eligible for membership in, or (B) in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has more significant contacts.

(8) “Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut” means the (A) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, (B) Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Tribe, and (C) Schaghticoke Tribe.

(9) “Indian custodian” means any Indian person (A) who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under state law, or (B) to whom temporary physical care, custody and control has been transferred by the parent of such child.

(10) “Indian organization” means any group, association, partnership, corporation or other legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, as defined in this section, or a majority of whose members are Indians.

(11) “Preadoptive placement” means the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement. “Preadoptive placement” does not include placement based upon an act, which if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to either parent.

(12) “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Interior of the United States.

(13) “Federally recognized Indian tribe” means any Indian tribe, band, nation or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in 43 USC 1602(c).

(14) “Parent” means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. “Parent” does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.

(15) “Reservation” means Indian country as defined in 18 USC 1151 and any lands, not covered under such law, title to which is either held by the United States or a state in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States against alienation.

(16) “Termination of parental rights” means any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship. “Termination of parental rights” does not include placement based upon an act, which if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to either parent.

(17) “Tribal court” means a court with jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and which is either (A) a Court of Indian Offenses, (B) a court established and operated under the code or custom of a federally recognized Indian tribe or an Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut, or (C) any other administrative body of a federally recognized Indian tribe or an Indian tribe recognized by the state of Connecticut which is vested with authority over child custody proceedings.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-116p — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815q / Section 46b-116p
Sec. 46b-116p. Preferences for preadoptive, foster care placement of Indian child. Required setting, proximity to child's home.
Status: in_force

(1) A member of the Indian child's extended family;

(2) A foster home licensed, approved or specified by the Indian child's tribe;

(3) An Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or

(4) An institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization that has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-521 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 818 / Section 46b-521
Sec. 46b-521. Surrogacy agreements. Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Genetic surrogate” means a person who is not an intended parent and who agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using that person's own gamete, under a genetic surrogacy agreement as provided in sections 46b-521 to 46b-538 , inclusive.

(2) “Gestational surrogate” means a person who is not an intended parent and who agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using gametes that are not that person's own, under a gestational surrogacy agreement as provided in sections 46b-521 to 46b-538 , inclusive.

(3) “Surrogacy agreement” means an agreement between one or more intended parents and a person who is not an intended parent in which such person agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction and which provides that each intended parent is a parent of a child conceived under the agreement. Unless the context otherwise requires, “surrogacy agreement” includes an agreement with a person acting as a gestational surrogate and an agreement with a person acting as a genetic surrogate.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-47 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-47
Sec. 46b-47. (Formerly Sec. 46-40). Complaint for dissolution of marriage on ground of confinement for mental illness; procedure.
Status: in_force

(b) If the conservator does not appear in court, or if the adverse party has no conservator, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the adverse party.

(c) On motion of either party, the court shall appoint two or more psychiatrists who are diplomates of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and who are not on the staff of any state hospital for mental illness, who shall investigate the mental status of such person. Within a reasonable time thereafter, the psychiatrists shall report to the court the facts found by them together with their opinion as to the probability of further indefinite prolonged hospitalization for the mental illness. The testimony of no psychiatrists other than those appointed by the court shall be received upon the trial of such action.

(d) The fees and expenses of the psychiatrists and of the guardian ad litem shall be fixed by the court and shall be paid by the plaintiff.

Annotations to former section 46-19:

Cited. 4 CS 249. When defendant confined outside state, both superintendent and commissioner of welfare must be served. 17 CS 410.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-219 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 816 / Section 46b-219
Sec. 46b-219. (Formerly Sec. 17-326). No liability for support of deserting parent.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 17-326:

Cited. 31 CS 271; 33 CS 769; 34 CS 284.

“Wilful desertion” means intentional desertion; parental responsibility is obligation to furnish protection, education and support; where defendant's mother was divorced by his father with whom he lived and, despite her history of alcoholism and drug addiction, she attempted to obtain his custody on several occasions, trial court could conclude there was no desertion under statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 643.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-82a — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815j / Section 46b-82a
Sec. 46b-82a. Prohibition on court order of temporary or permanent alimony from injured spouse to a spouse convicted of committing certain crimes against the injured spouse.
Status: in_force

(b) The existence of any conviction for a crime set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall preclude a court from ordering an award of attorney's fees from an injured spouse to a spouse convicted of such crime.

(c) Any order of temporary or permanent alimony entered by a court from an injured spouse to a spouse subsequently convicted of a crime set forth in subsection (a) of this section against the injured spouse shall be terminated by the court upon a motion to terminate alimony based upon the conviction filed by the injured spouse.

(d) As used in this section, “injured spouse” means the spouse who has been the victim of a crime set forth in subsection (a) of this section, irrespective of whether physical injury occurred in the commission of such crime.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815t / Section 46b-120
Sec. 46b-120. (Formerly Sec. 51-301). Definitions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Child” means any person under eighteen years of age who has not been legally emancipated, except that for purposes of delinquency matters and proceedings, “child” means any person who (A) is at least ten years of age at the time of the alleged commission of a delinquent act and who is (i) under eighteen years of age and has not been legally emancipated, or (ii) eighteen years of age or older and committed a delinquent act prior to attaining eighteen years of age, or (B) subsequent to attaining eighteen years of age, (i) violates any order of the Superior Court or any condition of probation ordered by the Superior Court with respect to a delinquency proceeding, or (ii) wilfully fails to appear in response to a summons under section 46b-133 or at any other court hearing in a delinquency proceeding of which the child had notice;

(2) (A) A child may be adjudicated as “delinquent” who has, while under sixteen years of age, (i) violated any federal or state law, except a first or second offense under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21a-279a , or except section 53a-172 , 53a-173 , 53a-222 , 53a-222a , 53a-223 or 53a-223a , or violated a municipal or local ordinance, (ii) wilfully failed to appear in response to a summons under section 46b-133 or at any other court hearing in a delinquency proceeding of which the child had notice, (iii) violated any order of the Superior Court in a delinquency proceeding, or (iv) violated conditions of probation supervision or probation supervision with residential placement in a delinquency proceeding as ordered by the court;

(B) A child may be adjudicated as “delinquent” who has (i) while sixteen or seventeen years of age, violated any federal or state law, other than (I) an infraction, (II) a violation, (III) a motor vehicle offense or violation under title 14, (IV) a violation of a municipal or local ordinance, (V) a violation of section 51-164r , 53a-172 , 53a-173 , 53a-222 , 53a-222a , 53a-223 or 53a-223a , or (VI) a first or second offense under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21a-279a , (ii) while sixteen years of age or older, wilfully failed to appear in response to a summons under section 46b-133 or at any other court hearing in a delinquency proceeding of which the child had notice, (iii) while sixteen years of age or older, violated any order of the Superior Court in a delinquency proceeding, or (iv) while sixteen years of age or older, violated conditions of probation supervision or probation supervision with residential placement in a delinquency proceeding as ordered by the court;

(3) “Family with service needs” means a family that includes a child who is at least seven years of age and is under eighteen years of age who, according to a petition lawfully filed on or before June 30, 2020, (A) has without just cause run away from the parental home or other properly authorized and lawful place of abode, (B) is beyond the control of the child's parent, parents, guardian or other custodian, (C) has engaged in indecent or immoral conduct, or (D) is thirteen years of age or older and has engaged in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is thirteen years of age or older and not more than two years older or younger than such child;

(4) A child may be found “neglected” who, for reasons other than being impoverished, (A) has been abandoned, (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child;

(5) A child may be found “abused” who (A) has been inflicted with physical injury or injuries other than by accidental means, (B) has injuries that are at variance with the history given of them, or (C) is in a condition that is the result of maltreatment, including, but not limited to, malnutrition, sexual molestation or exploitation, deprivation of necessities, emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment;

(6) A child may be found “uncared for” (A) who is homeless, (B) whose home cannot provide the specialized care that the physical, emotional or mental condition of the child requires, or (C) who has been identified as a victim of trafficking, as defined in section 46a-170 . For the purposes of this section, the treatment of any child by an accredited Christian Science practitioner, in lieu of treatment by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts, shall not of itself constitute neglect or maltreatment;

(7) “Delinquent act” means (A) the violation by a child under the age of sixteen of any federal or state law, except a first or second offense under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21a-279a , the violation of section 53a-172 , 53a-173 , 53a-222 , 53a-222a , 53a-223 or 53a-223a , or the violation of a municipal or local ordinance, (B) the violation by a child sixteen or seventeen years of age of any federal or state law, other than (i) an infraction, (ii) a violation, (iii) a motor vehicle offense or violation under title 14, (iv) the violation of a municipal or local ordinance, (v) the violation of section 51-164r , 53a-172 , 53a-173 , 53a-222 , 53a-222a , 53a-223 or 53a-223a , or (vi) a first or second offense under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21a-279a , (C) the wilful failure of a child, including a child who has attained the age of eighteen, to appear in response to a summons under section 46b-133 or at any other court hearing in a delinquency proceeding of which the child has notice, (D) the violation of any order of the Superior Court in a delinquency proceeding by a child, including a child who has attained the age of eighteen, or (E) the violation of conditions of probation supervision or probation supervision with residential placement in a delinquency proceeding by a child, including a child who has attained the age of eighteen, as ordered by the court;

(8) “Serious juvenile offense” means (A) the violation of, including attempt or conspiracy to violate, section 21a-277 , 21a-278 , 29-33 , 29-34 , 29-35 , subdivision (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 , 53-80a , 53-202b , 53-202c , 53-390 to 53-392 , inclusive, 53a-54a to 53a-57 , inclusive, 53a-59 to 53a-60c , inclusive, 53a-64aa , 53a-64bb , 53a-70 to 53a-71 , inclusive, 53a-72b , 53a-86 , 53a-92 to 53a-94a , inclusive, 53a-95 , 53a-100aa , 53a-101 , 53a-102a , 53a-103a or 53a-111 to 53a-113 , inclusive, subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-122 , subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-123 , section 53a-134 , 53a-135 , 53a-136a or 53a-167c , subsection (a) of section 53a-174 , or section 53a-196a , 53a-211 , 53a-212 , 53a-216 or 53a-217b , or (B) absconding, escaping or running away, without just cause, from any secure residential facility in which the child has been placed by the court as a delinquent child;

(9) “Serious juvenile offender” means any child adjudicated as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense;

(10) “Serious juvenile repeat offender” means any child charged with the commission of any felony if such child has previously been adjudicated as delinquent or otherwise adjudicated at any age for two violations of any provision of title 21a, 29, 53 or 53a that is designated as a felony;

(11) “Alcohol-dependent” means a psychoactive substance dependence on alcohol as that condition is defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”;

(12) “Drug-dependent” means a psychoactive substance dependence on drugs as that condition is defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”. No child shall be classified as drug-dependent who is dependent (A) upon a morphine-type substance as an incident to current medical treatment of a demonstrable physical disorder other than drug dependence, or (B) upon amphetamine-type, ataractic, barbiturate-type, hallucinogenic or other stimulant and depressant substances as an incident to current medical treatment of a demonstrable physical or psychological disorder, or both, other than drug dependence;

(13) “Pre-dispositional study” means a comprehensive written report prepared by a juvenile probation officer pursuant to section 46b-134 regarding the child's social, medical, mental health, educational, risks and needs, and family history, as well as the events surrounding the offense to present a supported recommendation to the court;

(14) “Probation supervision” means a legal status whereby a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent is placed by the court under the supervision of juvenile probation for a specified period of time and upon such terms as the court determines;

(15) “Probation supervision with residential placement” means a legal status whereby a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent is placed by the court under the supervision of juvenile probation for a specified period of time, upon such terms as the court determines, that include a period of placement in a secure or staff-secure residential treatment facility, as ordered by the court, and a period of supervision in the community;

(16) “Risk and needs assessment” means a standardized tool that (A) assists juvenile probation officers in collecting and synthesizing information about a child to estimate the child's risk of recidivating and identify other factors that, if treated and changed, can reduce the child's likelihood of reoffending, and (B) provides a guide for intervention planning;

(17) “Secure-residential facility” means a hardware-secured residential facility that includes direct staff supervision, surveillance enhancements and physical barriers that allow for close supervision and controlled movement in a treatment setting;

(18) “Staff-secure residential facility” means a residential facility that provides residential treatment for children in a structured setting where the children are monitored by staff; and

(19) “Juvenile residential center” means a hardware-secured residential facility operated by the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch that includes direct staff supervision, surveillance enhancements and physical barriers that allow for close supervision and controlled movement in a treatment setting for preadjudicated juveniles and juveniles adjudicated as delinquent.

Annotations to former section 17-53:

Cited. 154 C. 644; 158 C. 439.

“Uncared for” is not limited to “uncared for by each living biological parent”, but can include being cared for by close relative with the consent of biological parent. 33 CS 100.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 187 C. 431; 189 C. 276; 195 C. 303; Id., 344; 199 C. 693; 204 C. 630; 206 C. 323; Id., 346; 207 C. 270; Id., 725; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 151; Id., 289; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 277; Id., 739; 221 C. 903; 223 C. 492; 229 C. 691; 237 C. 364; 240 C. 727; Id., 743. In predictive neglect proceedings, trial court must find with respect to each parent who has entered a plea contesting the neglect petition and who has expressed a willingness to care for the child independently of the other parent, if the child were to remain in that parent's independent care, the child would be denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally or would be permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child; if the parents indicate they intend to care for the child jointly or if a court discredits a claim that a parent will care for the child independently, the court may treat the parents as a single unit. 305 C. 633. Definition of “abused”, when applied to teacher's cheek-pinching and name-calling behavior toward student, is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness because teacher had fair notice that such conduct constitutes emotional abuse. 312 C. 393.

Cited. 1 CA 378; 2 CA 705; 3 CA 158; Id., 194; 9 CA 98; 10 CA 428; 11 CA 507; 18 CA 806; 23 CA 410. Where statutory requirements are met, a mother's prenatal conduct can be basis of a finding of neglect or termination of parental rights. 25 CA 586; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 492. Cited. 29 CA 600; 32 CA 759; 36 CA 146; 40 CA 216; 45 CA 606; 46 CA 545; 47 CA 64. It is not a constitutional right, but rather a statutory right, to be considered a juvenile. 51 CA 117. Adjudication of neglect may be based on potential risk of harm. 58 CA 119. In a substantiation of abuse hearing, if it is shown that child has sustained a nonaccidental injury as result of parent administered corporal punishment, hearing officer must determine whether the punishment was reasonable and whether parent believed the punishment was necessary to maintain discipline or to promote child's welfare. 86 CA 290. Although no actual harm was done to child, child was neglected within definition of section because the father was not taking his medication as required to remedy his known mental health condition and neither he nor respondent understood, or attempted to learn, extent of the risk that father may have posed to the child in his unmedicated state. 98 CA 797. An adjudication of neglect relates to the status of the child and is not necessarily premised on parental fault, and a finding that a child is neglected is different from finding who is responsible for child's condition of neglect. 121 CA 292; 123 CA 103. Plaintiff-teacher could not have been on notice that his cheek-pinching and name-calling behavior toward a student amounted to child abuse within the meaning of “abused” as interpreted by Department of Children and Families regulations, and as such, the definition of “abused” was unconstitutionally vague as to plaintiff's conduct and placement of plaintiff's name on child abuse and neglect registry based on such definition was unconstitutional. 134 CA 288; judgment reversed, see 312 C. 393. Read together with Sec. 46b-129, sections vest court with authority to enter interim orders that are in the best interests of children. 155 CA 624.

Cited. 35 CS 241; 39 CS 490; Id., 514; 41 CS 23; Id., 505; 42 CS 562; 43 CS 108; Id., 211; Id., 367.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-15 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 815a / Section 46b-15
Sec. 46b-15. Relief for victim of domestic violence. Application. Court orders. Duration. Service of application, affidavit, any ex parte order and notice of hearing. Copies. Expedited hearing for violation of order. Other remedies.
Status: in_force

(b) The application form shall allow the applicant, at the applicant's option, to indicate whether the respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition. The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath which includes a brief statement of the conditions from which relief is sought. Upon receipt of the application the court shall order that a hearing on the application be held not later than fourteen days from the date of the order except that, if the application indicates that the respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition, and the court orders an ex parte order, the court shall order that a hearing be held on the application not later than seven days from the date on which the ex parte order is issued. The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the court sees fit. In making such orders ex parte, the court, in its discretion, may consider relevant court records if the records are available to the public from a clerk of the Superior Court or on the Judicial Branch's Internet web site. In addition, at the time of the hearing, the court, in its discretion, may also consider a report prepared by the family services unit of the Judicial Branch, provided the person who prepared such report is available to testify at the hearing and is subject to cross examination. The report may include, as available: Any existing or prior orders of protection obtained from the protection order registry; information on any pending criminal case or past criminal case in which the respondent was convicted of a violent crime; any outstanding arrest warrant for the respondent; and the respondent's level of risk based on a risk assessment tool utilized by the Court Support Services Division. The report may also include information pertaining to any pending or disposed family matters case involving the applicant and respondent. Any report provided by the Court Support Services Division to the court shall also be provided to the applicant and respondent. Such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights, and such relief may include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant. Such order may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the applicant including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from injuring or threatening to injure such animal. If an applicant alleges an immediate and present physical danger to the applicant, the court may issue an ex parte order granting such relief as it deems appropriate. If a postponement of a hearing on the application is requested by either party and granted, the ex parte order shall not be continued except upon agreement of the parties or by order of the court for good cause shown. If a hearing on the application is scheduled or an ex parte order is granted and the court is closed on the scheduled hearing date, the hearing shall be held on the next day the court is open and any such ex parte order shall remain in effect until the date of such hearing. If the applicant is under eighteen years of age, a parent, guardian or responsible adult who brings the application as next friend of the applicant may not speak on the applicant's behalf at such hearing unless there is good cause shown as to why the applicant is unable to speak on his or her own behalf, except that nothing in this subsection shall preclude such parent, guardian or responsible adult from testifying as a witness at such hearing. As used in this subsection, “violent crime” includes: (A) An incident resulting in physical harm, bodily injury or assault; (B) an act of threatened violence that constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, including, but not limited to, stalking or a pattern of threatening; (C) verbal abuse or argument if there is a present danger and likelihood that physical violence will occur; and (D) cruelty to animals as set forth in section 53-247 .

(c) If the court issues an ex parte order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and service has not been made on the respondent in conformance with subsection (h) of this section, upon request of the applicant, the court shall, based on the information contained in the original application, extend any ex parte order for an additional period not to exceed fourteen days from the originally scheduled hearing date. The clerk shall prepare a new order of hearing and notice containing the new hearing date, which shall be served upon the respondent in accordance with the provisions of subsection (h) of this section.

(d) Any ex parte restraining order entered under subsection (b) of this section in which the applicant and respondent are spouses, or persons who have a dependent child or children in common and who live together, may include, if no order exists, and if necessary to maintain the safety and basic needs of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, in addition to any orders authorized under subsection (b) of this section, any of the following: (1) An order prohibiting the respondent from (A) taking any action that could result in the termination of any necessary utility services or necessary services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant, (B) taking any action that could result in the cancellation, change of coverage or change of beneficiary of any health, automobile or homeowners insurance policy to the detriment of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, or (C) transferring, encumbering, concealing or disposing of specified property owned or leased by the applicant; or (2) an order providing the applicant with temporary possession of an automobile, checkbook, documentation of health, automobile or homeowners insurance, a document needed for purposes of proving identity, a key or other necessary specified personal effects.

(e) At the hearing on any application under this section, if the court grants relief pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and the applicant and respondent are spouses, or persons who have a dependent child or children in common and who live together, and if necessary to maintain the safety and basic needs of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, any orders entered by the court may include, in addition to the orders authorized under subsection (b) of this section, any of the following: (1) An order prohibiting the respondent from (A) taking any action that could result in the termination of any necessary utility services or services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant, (B) taking any action that could result in the cancellation, change of coverage or change of beneficiary of any health, automobile or homeowners insurance policy to the detriment of the applicant or the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, or (C) transferring, encumbering, concealing or disposing of specified property owned or leased by the applicant; (2) an order providing the applicant with temporary possession of an automobile, checkbook, documentation of health, automobile or homeowners insurance, a document needed for purposes of proving identity, a key or other necessary specified personal effects; or (3) an order that the respondent: (A) Make rent or mortgage payments on the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant and the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, (B) maintain utility services or other necessary services related to the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant and the dependent child or children in common of the applicant and respondent, (C) maintain all existing health, automobile or homeowners insurance coverage without change in coverage or beneficiary designation, or (D) provide financial support for the benefit of any dependent child or children in common of the applicant and the respondent, provided the respondent has a legal duty to support such child or children and the ability to pay. The court shall not enter any order of financial support without sufficient evidence as to the ability to pay, including, but not limited to, financial affidavits. If at the hearing no order is entered under this subsection or subsection (d) of this section, no such order may be entered thereafter pursuant to this section. Any order entered pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to modification and shall expire one hundred twenty days after the date of issuance or upon issuance of a superseding order, whichever occurs first. Any amounts not paid or collected under this subsection or subsection (d) of this section may be preserved and collectible in an action for dissolution of marriage, custody, paternity or support.

(f) (1) Every order of the court made in accordance with this section shall contain the following language: (A) “This order may be extended by the court beyond one year. In accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree. This is a criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars or both.”; and (B) “In accordance with section 53a-223b of the Connecticut general statutes, any violation of subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-223b constitutes criminal violation of a restraining order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Additionally, any violation of subparagraph (C) or (D) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-223b constitutes criminal violation of a restraining order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.”.

(2) Each applicant who receives an order of the court in accordance with this section shall be given a notice that contains the following language: “If a restraining order has been issued on your behalf or on behalf of your child, you may elect to give testimony or appear in a family court proceeding remotely, pursuant to section 46b-15c . Please notify the court in writing at least two days in advance of a proceeding if you choose to give testimony or appear remotely, and your physical presence in the courthouse will not be required in order to participate in the court proceeding.”.

(g) No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be extended by the court upon motion of the applicant for such additional time as the court deems necessary. If the respondent has not appeared upon the initial application, service of a motion to extend an order may be made by first-class mail directed to the respondent at the respondent's last-known address.

(h) (1) The applicant shall cause notice of the hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and a copy of the application and the applicant's affidavit and of any ex parte order issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section to be served on the respondent not less than three days before the hearing. A proper officer responsible for executing such service shall accept all documents in an electronic format, if presented to such officer in such format. The cost of such service, including mileage pursuant to section 52-261 , shall be paid for by the Judicial Branch. No officer or person shall be entitled to a fee for service pursuant to this section if timely return of service is not received by the court, absent a court order authorizing such fee. For the purposes of this subsection, timely return includes, but is not limited to, transmitting by facsimile or other means, a copy of the return of service to the court prior to the hearing followed by the delivery of the original return to the court within a reasonable time after the hearing.

(2) When (A) an application indicates that a respondent holds a permit to carry a pistol or revolver, an eligibility certificate for a pistol or revolver, a long gun eligibility certificate or an ammunition certificate or possesses one or more firearms or ammunition, and (B) the court has issued an ex parte order pursuant to this section, the proper officer responsible for executing service shall, whenever possible, provide in-hand service and, prior to serving such order, shall (i) provide notice to the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served concerning when and where the service will take place, and (ii) send, or cause to be sent by facsimile or other means, a copy of the application, the applicant's affidavit, the ex parte order and the notice of hearing to such law enforcement agency, and (iii) request that a police officer from the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served be present when service is executed by the proper officer. Upon receiving a request from a proper officer under the provisions of this subdivision, the law enforcement agency for the town in which the respondent will be served may designate a police officer to be present when service is executed by the proper officer.

(3) Upon the granting of an ex parte order, the clerk of the court shall provide two copies of the order to the applicant. Upon the granting of an order after notice and hearing, the clerk of the court shall provide two copies of the order to the applicant and a copy to the respondent. Every order of the court made in accordance with this section after notice and hearing shall be accompanied by a notification that is consistent with the full faith and credit provisions set forth in 18 USC 2265(a), as amended from time to time. Immediately after making service on the respondent, the proper officer shall (A) send or cause to be sent, by facsimile or other means, a copy of the application, or the information contained in such application, stating the date and time the respondent was served, to the law enforcement agency or agencies for the town in which the applicant resides, the town in which the applicant is employed and the town in which the respondent resides, and (B) as soon as possible, but not later than two hours after the time that service is executed, input into the Judicial Branch's Internet-based service tracking system the date, time and method of service. If, prior to the date of the scheduled hearing, service has not been executed, the proper officer shall input into such service tracking system that service was unsuccessful. The clerk of the court shall send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of any ex parte order and of any order after notice and hearing, or the information contained in any such order, to the law enforcement agency or agencies for the town in which the applicant resides, the town in which the applicant is employed and the town in which the respondent resides, within forty-eight hours of the issuance of such order. If the victim, or victim's minor child protected by such order, is enrolled in a public or private elementary or secondary school, including a technical education and career school, or an institution of higher education, as defined in section 10a-55 , the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such ex parte order or of any order after notice and hearing, or the information contained in any such order, to such school or institution of higher education, the president of any institution of higher education at which the victim, or victim's minor child protected by such order, is enrolled and the special police force established pursuant to section 10a-156b , if any, at the institution of higher education at which the victim, or victim's minor child protected by such order, is enrolled, if the victim provides the clerk with the name and address of such school or institution of higher education.

(i) A caretaker who is providing shelter in his or her residence to a person sixty years or older shall not be enjoined from the full use and enjoyment of his or her home and property. The Superior Court may make any other appropriate order under the provisions of this section.

(j) When a motion for contempt is filed for violation of a restraining order, there shall be an expedited hearing. Such hearing shall be held within five court days of service of the motion on the respondent, provided service on the respondent is made not less than twenty-four hours before the hearing. If the court finds the respondent in contempt for violation of an order, the court may impose such sanctions as the court deems appropriate.

(k) An action under this section shall not preclude the applicant from seeking any other civil or criminal relief.

(l) For purposes of this section, “police officer” means a state police officer or a sworn member of a municipal police department and “law enforcement agency” means the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or any municipal police department.

See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

Section requires a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury. 104 CA 20; Id., 26. Trial court did not exceed its statutory authority when it ordered alcohol abuse counseling since it could reasonably have concluded that such counseling was necessary for the protection of the family, and did not exceed its statutory authority by extending restraining order to protect adult daughter since section allows orders appropriate for the protection of other persons as the court sees fit. 127 CA 586. Provision that “the court may impose such sanctions as the court deems appropriate” is ambiguous, and incarceration was not an appropriate sanction in a civil contempt proceeding for violation of a domestic restraining order where incarceration would not allow a contemnor to avoid or lessen the sentence of incarceration by purging himself of the contempt. 143 CA 1. The word “stalking” is to be construed according to its commonly approved usage, as opposed to the narrower definitions of stalking found in the Penal Code; trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding in the context of all of the evidence that defendant's conduct in driving past plaintiff's home, turning around, and driving past the home a second time constituted an act of stalking. 150 CA 105. Because section is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard applies for the granting of a civil restraining order. 191 CA 850. Although a court may consider the subjective reaction of an alleged victim, the court must apply an objective standard in assessing a pattern of threatening. 214 CA 821. Extension of ex parte restraining order to parties' children was not appropriate for the protection of the children pursuant to Subsec. (b) absent any request to do so from plaintiff and absent any statements that defendant had engaged in any conduct related to the children; definition of “stalking” in section is not limited, but, rather, is broader than, the definition of stalking provided in Sec. 53a-181d and defendant's conduct in driving near plaintiff's home and sitting in her vehicle in two different locations over the course of a forty-five minute time period was sufficient to constitute an act of stalking pursuant to section. 220 CA 212.

Cited. 44 CS 235.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-80 — Connecticut Code / Title 46a / Chapter 814c / Section 46a-80
Sec. 46a-80. (Formerly Sec. 4-61o). Denial of employment based on conviction information. Inquiry re prospective employee's conviction information. Dissemination of records and information prohibited.
Status: in_force

(b) Except for a position for which any provision of the general statutes specifically disqualifies a person from employment by the state or any of its agencies on the basis of that person's conviction information, no employer, as defined in section 46a-80a , shall inquire about a prospective employee's conviction information until such prospective employee has been deemed otherwise qualified for the position in accordance with the provisions of section 31-51i .

(c) A person may be denied employment by the state or any of its agencies, or a person may be denied a license, permit, certificate or registration to pursue, practice or engage in an occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business on the basis of that person's conviction information if, after considering (1) the nature of the crime and its relationship to the job for which the person has applied; (2) information pertaining to the degree of rehabilitation of the convicted person; and (3) the time elapsed since the conviction or release, the state or any of its agencies determines that the applicant is not suitable for the position of employment sought or the specific occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which the license, permit, certificate or registration is sought. In making a determination under this subsection, the state or any of its agencies shall give consideration to a provisional pardon issued pursuant to section 54-130e , or a certificate of rehabilitation issued pursuant to section 54-108f or 54-130e , and such provisional pardon or certificate of rehabilitation shall establish a presumption that such applicant has been rehabilitated. If an application is denied based on conviction information for which the applicant has received a provisional pardon or certificate of rehabilitation, the state or any of its agencies, as the case may be, shall provide a written statement to the applicant of its reasons for such denial.

(d) If conviction information is used as a basis for rejection of an applicant, such rejection shall be in writing and specifically state the evidence presented and reasons for rejection. A copy of such rejection shall be sent by registered mail to the applicant.

(e) In no case may erased criminal history record information, as defined in section 46a-80a , nonconviction information, as defined in section 54-142g , or criminal history record information, as defined in section 54-142g , apart from conviction information, be used, distributed or disseminated by the state or any of its agencies in connection with an application for employment or for a permit, license, certificate or registration.

(f) Nothing in this section shall permit any employer to discriminate on the basis of erased criminal history record information in violation of section 31-51i or section 46a-80e .

Cited. 43 CS 13.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-339 — Connecticut Code / Title 46b / Chapter 817 / Section 46b-339
Sec. 46b-339. Costs and fees.
Status: in_force

(b) If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal of this state may assess against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney's fees, other costs and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee's witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs or expenses against the obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or responding state or foreign country, except as provided by other law. Attorney's fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney's own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has priority over fees, costs and expenses.

(c) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a proceeding under sections 46b-370 to 46b-394 , inclusive, a hearing is presumed to have been requested primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without change.