Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-657 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 931 / Section 52-657
Sec. 52-657. Issuance of subpoena.
Status: in_force

(2) The Office of the Chief Court Administrator, with respect to any action in the Superior Court, and the Office of the Probate Court Administrator, with respect to any action in the Probate Court, shall prescribe the form which is required to be submitted pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(b) When a party submits a foreign subpoena to a clerk of the Superior Court or a clerk of the Probate Court that complies with the requirements of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, such clerk shall, in accordance with the respective court's procedure, promptly issue a subpoena for service upon the person to which the foreign subpoena is directed.

(c) A subpoena issued under subsection (b) of this section shall:

(1) Incorporate the terms used in the foreign subpoena;

(2) Contain or be accompanied by an affidavit of the party stating the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all counsel of record in the proceeding to which the subpoena relates and of any party not represented by counsel; and

(3) Include the case caption and docket number of the matter pending in the foreign jurisdiction and shall identify the name and address of the Superior Court, or the Probate Court, as the case may be, issuing the subpoena.

(d) A subpoena issued by a clerk of the Superior Court shall be on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator. A subpoena issued by a clerk of the Probate Court shall be on a form prescribed by the Office of the Probate Court Administrator.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-91 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-91
Sec. 52-91. Pleadings; contents of complaint.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-122 re inability of this section to affect flowage petitions on certain proceedings.

See Sec. 52-519 re form of writ, affidavit and bond in replevin actions.

Practice act. Does not change law as to statute of limitations. 52 C. 145. Formal and technical objections should be made known as soon as possible. 53 C. 52; 57 C. 161; 75 C. 279. Does not apply to quo warranto; 55 C. 121; nor to criminal prosecution. 72 C. 606. Application to replevin. 77 C. 463. Rules concerning departure still in force. 60 C. 83; 85 C. 271. Purpose is to do away with artificial forms and distinctions; 56 C. 24; 63 C. 560; 73 C. 5; 83 C. 670; as between law and equity; 63 C. 559; 81 C. 402; but it goes only to matters of form; 68 C. 372; 90 C. 581; pleadings conform to equity practice. 72 C. 195. It did not profess to introduce a complete new system, but to make the old system more convenient; 71 C. 198; to distinguish between what is a defect of substance and one of form; 72 C. 449; to simplify and unify all pleadings; 71 C. 717; to bring into the record a plain statement of facts. 74 C. 702. It encourages but does not require the settlement of all controversies in one action. 79 C. 693; 80 C. 218; 81 C. 246. It enables the court to determine ultimate rights and grant all proper relief. 81 C. 552. It does not seek to bring parties to a single issue. 67 C. 377. Power of court over issues. 80 C. 223; 85 C. 434; 86 C. 561. Controversy in Probate Court not an action. 90 C. 50. Rules apply to book debt. 78 C. 645. Act has not changed substantive law; same facts give right to same redress as before and no other. 90 C. 576. Rules of pleading not applicable to hearing before judge under special statute. 95 C. 89.

Complaint. Term is applicable to action either at law or in equity. 60 C. 213. Recovery in contract may be had, if necessary facts proved, though plaintiff treated action as in tort. 68 C. 459. Necessity of counting on statute in action for statutory relief. 69 C. 210; 72 C. 159; 77 C. 569; 80 C. 434; 81 C. 626. It is better to refer to statute in prayer for relief. 75 C. 694; 84 C. 47. Compliance with all its terms must be alleged. 86 C. 568; 90 C. 527. All material facts must appear. 51 C. 433; 67 C. 378; 79 C. 255. Should not anticipate defense. 73 C. 477; 77 C. 638; 99 C. 311; 81 C. 287. Sufficient to show prima facie right; 77 C. 638; need not allege matter necessary only for complete adjudication of rights; 72 C. 86; or offsets or partial payments; 65 C. 537; in action of contract, general allegation sufficient to give notice of claim suffices. 81 C. 653. Bill of particulars after special count improper. 79 C. 257. Equitable relief should be specially demanded, unless facts show what it should be. 71 C. 251; 78 C. 497. Both legal and equitable relief may be sought. 72 C. 554; 77 C. 214. Need not allege that plaintiff was “specially damaged,” where facts show it. 66 C. 420. Broad conclusion of law insufficient if facts fail to support it. 81 C. 325. Alternative relief may be claimed against corporation or its officers according as contract made by latter is found to be authorized or not. 93 C. 479. In action on specialty, not necessary to allege a consideration. 97 C. 195. Necessary averments in complaints by trustee in bankruptcy to recover property conveyed away by bankrupt in fraud of creditors. 99 C. 310. In appeal from doings of former board of relief, no specific prayer for relief is necessary if relief desired is obvious from allegations of complaint; necessity for averment showing how plaintiff is aggrieved. 109 C. 360.

Pleas to the jurisdiction and in abatement. Plea in abatement is not favored. 69 C. 272; 73 C. 428; 74 C. 126. Must be certain. 64 C. 74; 69 C. 272; 73 C. 538; Id., 563. Will not be aided by inference. 79 C. 526. Must demand relief. 72 C. 444; 74 C. 127. In construing, ordinary import of language followed; not necessary to negative every claim contra. 64 C. 76; 85 C. 618. Proper function to state facts not appearing of record. 82 C. 483; 83 C. 677. Where facts undisputed, plea should be framed to raise question of law. 75 C. 544. Requisites to attack premature bringing of action; 70 C. 157; another action pending; 68 C. 473; 70 C. 157; absence of recognizance in injunction suit; 73 C. 538; defective service; 73 C. 559; tax appeal; 72 C. 330; failure to take appeal to Supreme Court in proper time. 79 C. 526. When plea to jurisdiction unnecessary. 72 C. 430. Defect in jurisdiction of subject matter may be taken advantage of at any time; 71 C. 270; 74 C. 265; 89 C. 200; court may act suo motu; 86 C. 351; 85 C. 517; when motion to erase proper. 79 C. 58; 90 C. 293; 97 C. 123; Id., 399. Demurrer not proper way to raise question. 85 C. 679. Certain issues may be raised either by answer, plea in abatement or plea to jurisdiction. 85 C. 263. Waiver of lack of jurisdiction where nonresident appears, answers and defends. 96 C. 266. Necessity of special appearance and plea to raise issue of jurisdiction. 97 C. 127. When one not a party defendant in trial court entered an appearance there, was treated throughout trial as a party and filed a request for a finding, his status as a party defendant may not be attacked for first time in Supreme Court on plea in abatement. 109 C. 330. Plea to jurisdiction not improper, but plea in abatement may raise any issue going to jurisdiction of court. 121 C. 347. Plea in abatement appropriate remedy for taking appeal to wrong term of court. 122 C. 153. Not necessary that Supreme Court be in session when plea in abatement to appeal filed, and defects in appeal proceedings not waived because counsel filing plea entered general appearance. 130 C. 467. Where defect of jurisdiction appears on face of record, either plea in abatement or motion to erase may be used; 131 C. 532; but plea in abatement necessary if facts are relied upon which do not appear in record, and costs are not recoverable upon granting of motion to erase but are upon sustaining of plea. 133 C. 280. Plea in abatement, defects unavoidable. 132 C. 147. Irregularity in physician's certificate in bastardy proceeding may be subject matter for plea in abatement. 147 C. 418. Plea in abatement filed in the second suit is the proper method of raising the claim of a prior action pending. Id., 482. When want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, a motion to erase held proper rather than a plea in abatement. 148 C. 336; 150 C. 588.

Judgment set aside as it did not conform to pleadings. 146 C. 639. Cited. 169 C. 646; 176 C. 401; 179 C. 406; 180 C. 223; 184 C. 569; 209 C. 526. Judgment of Appellate Court in 39 CA 608 reversed. 237 C. 758. Cited. 240 C. 576.

Cited. 1 CA 109; 15 CA 185; 30 CA 129; 39 CA 544; Id., 608; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 758; 45 CA 775.

It is not proper to plead the same matter in abatement and in bar. 1 CS 59. Mortgage creditor seeking to procure a deficiency judgment must allege facts in complaint sufficient to support a judgment in personam. 6 CS 121. Cited. 10 CS 305. Plea in abatement is not favored and should, therefore, comply strictly with the statutory requirements. 16 CS 503. Plea in abatement and to the jurisdiction which contains no prayer for judgment demurrable. 18 CS 155. Motion to erase is proper when court's lack of jurisdiction is evident on the face of the record. 21 CS 19; 156; 352. Demurrer to a plea in abatement, raising the claim that an injured plaintiff is covered by the workmen's compensation act and therefore cannot sue at common law, sustained since the matter raised is actually a matter in bar. Id., 240. Purpose of a plea in abatement is to bring before the court facts affecting the jurisdiction not apparent on the face of the record. Id., 375. Pendency of a prior suit between same parties for the same thing will abate an action unless it appears that the prior suit would be ineffectual. 23 CS 308. Application to court to examine corporate records must be made by writ, summons and complaint. 25 CS 253. Authorization by claims commission for plaintiff to sue the state was related to the amount requested under Sec. 4-147, and suit for more than that amount was abatable. 26 CS 24. Where plea in abatement specified that under a contract between the parties, a condition precedent to any right of legal action was a decision by arbitrators, plaintiff was sufficiently apprised of how the cause of abatement could have been avoided. Id., 42, 43. Where defendant claimed court had no jurisdiction of the action, a plea in abatement was proper. Id., 43. Cited. 34 CS 628; 35 CS 609; 36 CS 47; 38 CS 389; 40 CS 188.

Concurrent remedies do not conflict so as to be pleadable in abatement, even though recovery in one case may operate as bar to another. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 96. Demurrer allowed where unable to determine what causes of action were directed to defendant as individual and in her representative capacity. Id., 116. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 317. Where jurisdictional defect claimed is lack of service, the proper pleading is a plea in abatement and not to the jurisdiction. Id., 321.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-564a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-564a
Sec. 52-564a. Liability for shoplifting.
Status: in_force

(b) A conviction of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-119 , shall not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a civil action under this section.

(c) In any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, if the plaintiff does not prevail, the court may award to the defendant his costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and damages not to exceed three hundred dollars.

(d) No action shall be brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section but within two years from the date of the act complained of.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557b
Sec. 52-557b. “Good samaritan law”. Immunity from liability for emergency medical assistance, first aid or medication by injection. Immunity from liability re automatic external defibrillators. School personnel not required to render emergency first aid or administer medication by injection.
Status: in_force

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 370 or dentistry under the provisions of section 20-106 or members of the same professions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, or a person licensed as a registered nurse under section 20-93 or 20-94 or certified as a licensed practical nurse under section 20-96 or 20-97 , who operates an automatic external defibrillator to render emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from the malfunctioning of the automatic external defibrillator, which malfunctioning was not a result of such health care provider's negligence.

(b) A paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who (1) has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, and, (2) renders emergency first aid to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence. No paid or volunteer firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel who forcibly enters the residence of any person in order to render emergency first aid to a person whom such firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel reasonably believes to be in need thereof shall be liable to such person for civil damages incurred as a result of such entry. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(c) An employee of a railroad company, including any company operating a commuter rail line, who has successfully completed a course in first aid, offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering the emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(d) A railroad company, including any commuter rail line, which provides emergency medical training or equipment to any employee granted immunity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by a person or for the death of a person which results from the company's acts or omissions in providing such training or equipment or which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(e) (1) For purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” means an automatic prefilled cartridge injector or similar automatic injectable equipment used to deliver epinephrine in a standard dose for emergency first aid response to allergic reactions.

(2) Any volunteer worker associated with, or any person employed to work for, a program offered to children sixteen years of age or younger by a corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, who (A) has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, (B) has obtained the consent of a parent or legal guardian to use a cartridge injector on his or her child, and (C) uses a cartridge injector on such child in apparent need thereof participating in such program, shall not be liable to such child assisted or to such child's parent or guardian for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(3) A corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, which provides training in the use of cartridge injectors to any volunteer worker granted immunity pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by, or for the death of, a child sixteen years of age or younger who is participating in a program offered by such corporation, which injury or death results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(f) A teacher or other school personnel, on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, who has completed both a course in first aid in accordance with subsection (b) of this section and a course given by the medical advisor of the school or by a licensed physician in the administration of medication by injection, who renders emergency care by administration of medication by injection to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to the person assisted for civil damages for any injuries which result from acts or omissions by the person in rendering the emergency care of administration of medication by injection, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(g) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to require any teacher or other school personnel to render emergency first aid or administer medication by injection.

(h) Any person who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or by an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, or has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, and who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person's employment or practice, renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, or any person who is an identified staff member of a before or after school program, day camp or child care facility, as defined in section 19a-900 , and who renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.

(i) A school bus driver, on or in the immediate vicinity of a school bus during the provision of school transportation services, who renders emergency care by administration of medication with a cartridge injector to a student in need thereof who has a medically diagnosed allergic condition that may require prompt treatment in order to protect the student against serious harm or death, shall not be liable to the student assisted for civil damages for any injuries which result from acts or omissions by the school bus driver in rendering the emergency care of administration of medication with a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.

Cited. 10 CA 86.

Liability for gross negligence was not abolished by Good Samaritan Law. 48 CS 10.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-180 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-180
Sec. 52-180. Admissibility of business entries and photographic copies.
Status: in_force

(b) The writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a party's failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party's failure to show that such persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the weight of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility.

(c) Except as provided in the Freedom of Information Act, as defined in section 1-200 , if any person in the regular course of business has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of them to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is otherwise required by statute. The reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, shall be as admissible in evidence as the original in any judicial or administrative proceeding, whether the original is in existence or not, and an enlargement or facsimile of the reproduction shall be likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile shall not preclude admission of the original.

(d) The term “business” shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.

Annotations to former statute making book entries admissible in action for book debt: Statute was peculiar to this state, and was the earliest judicial proceeding in which parties were allowed to testify in their own behalf, a statute to this effect having been adopted in 1715. Book debt does not lie for articles delivered under a special contract; 9 C. 349; nor for damages; K. 289; 11 C. 206; nor on a promise of indemnity. 1 C. 78. It lies for money lent; 20 C. 260; and for goods sold to be paid for in kind if not so paid for; 11 C. 471; and for moneys withheld by an agent. 1 R. 85. Plaintiff is not required to prove charge on book, if he can account satisfactorily for not having made them. 6 C. 17. When entries must be verified by the maker if living and within the jurisdiction of the court. 41 C. 108. Entry not inadmissible because made upon information given by salesman. 47 C. 435. Where maker of entries is beyond the reach of process, or is incompetent to testify, his handwriting may be proved as if he were dead. 54 C. 217. It is not necessary that the transaction to which the entries apply should be directly between the original debtor and creditor. Id., 218. Physician's entries held admissible in pauper suit between towns. Id., 216. Shop-books admissible to prove a sale to the person to whom the goods were charged. 66 C. 162. Nature of action of book debt; entries must be charges in regular account book. 78 C. 646. Entries in account book admissible to prove payment by merchandise delivered. 77 C. 167. Cited. 111 C. 419; 137 C. 320; 138 C. 23. Where the entry in a hospital record is pertinent to the care and treatment of a patient, it is admissible. 140 C. 54.

Cited. 115 C. 230. Books of account are not the only admissible evidence; testimony of person who performed work is also admissible. 118 C. 331. Cited. Id., 453; 122 C. 382. To be admissible, court must find both that entry was made in regular course of business and that it was regular course of business to make such entry. 123 C. 60. History reviewed; statute is of much broader scope than former statute; hospital and laboratory records admissible with respect to diagnosis, treatment and condition. 125 C. 92. Establishes general rule as to admissibility of evidence applicable in criminal as well as civil cases. 127 C. 598. Written records of Visiting Nurse Association properly admitted. 134 C. 173. Testimony of supervising investigator of welfare department based on information in department files, held not hearsay. 145 C. 458. Portions of exhibit not established as made in the regular course of business, properly deleted. Id., 714. The fact that a record is generally admissible under section does not mean that everything contained in the record is necessarily admissible in a given case. 147 C. 663. That witness, employee of defendant and in charge of its books, was not in its employ at time entries were made, did not, in and of itself, render records incompetent. 149 C. 45. To be admissible, record must be based on entrant's own observation or upon information transmitted to him by observer whose duty it was to so transmit. Id., 195. History discussed. 153 C. 445, 448. Representation by purchaser on printed form beneath conditional bill of sale not admissible as a business entry but hearsay where he was not a party or a witness. 154 C. 593. Bills for extra material and labor sent to defendant in regular course of business of plaintiff were admissible entries made in regular course of business and court correctly overruled objections to them as hearsay. 156 C. 55. Plaintiff's journal, although excluded from evidence, was marked as exhibit for identification and should have been retained in custody of court clerk to be available for examination by appeals court upon appeal of ruling of exclusion. Id., 401. Where general objection to admission of police record was overruled, plaintiff could not on appeal object to specific items. 157 C. 566. Testimony of director of hospital laboratory that record of complaining witness' medical examination was kept in regular course of business made it acceptable under section as evidence in trial for rape. 158 C. 22. Statement in hospital record that plaintiff patient was driver of car in which his injury occurred, not admissible under section. Id., 281. Cited. 159 C. 397; 161 C. 6; 165 C. 288; Id., 364; 167 C. 631; 172 C. 275; 173 C. 520. Although police report of traffic accident generally admissible as business entry, statute does not require that everything in it be admitted into evidence. 175 C. 1. Admission of a party opponent in statement to investigating officer and contained in latter's report is admissible as an exception to hearsay rule. Id., 41. Cited. 176 C. 33; Id., 170; 177 C. 401; Id., 677, 733. Discussion of business records generated by computer and credentials of witness testifying to establish admissibility thereof. 179 C. 349. Trial court did not err in admitting bills and invoices based on testimony of vice-president who was not the bookkeeper at the time the records were made. 180 C. 120. Cited. 181 C. 454. Discussion of admissibility of laboratory report or similar record in face of sixth amendment objection. Id., 562. Cited. 185 C. 37; 190 C. 371; 195 C. 651; 202 C. 128; 205 C. 542; Id., 623; 206 C. 512; 211 C. 555; 214 C. 146; 215 C. 31; 217 C. 260; Id., 476; 219 C. 787; 228 C. 487; 238 C. 183. Erroneous admission of double hearsay evidence was harmless; claimant bears burden of demonstrating that error was harmful. 245 C. 640. Certain bank statements ruled admissible where testimony of bank's director of operations was sufficient to establish a foundation. 246 C. 594. Letters written for litigation purposes at plaintiff's request and summary of doctor's opinion are not business records admissible pursuant to statute. 247 C. 356. Transcription of physician's notes is admissible under the business records exception where the original document (physician's notes) is prepared contemporaneously with the acts described. 257 C. 230. Trial court improperly concluded that because hospital test satisfied Sec. 52-180, it did not need to consider whether a Porter hearing was required. 263 C. 390. Although business records are subject to redaction by trial court on grounds of relevancy, insufficient connection to “business” of department or status as inadmissible hearsay, the burden is on opponent of the evidence properly to object to any challenged portion of the records. 267 C. 686.

Cited. 1 CA 454; Id., 501; 2 CA 58; 5 CA 296; 6 CA 429; 7 CA 326; Id., 364; Id., 398; 8 CA 177; Id., 673; 9 CA 59; Id., 379; 11 CA 327; 12 CA 468; 17 CA 121; Id., 416; Id., 460; Id., 684; 18 CA 597; 21 CA 138; Id., 162; Id., 496; Id., 645; 22 CA 689; 23 CA 19; 24 CA 57; 25 CA 298; Id., 681; 28 CA 56; Id., 521; 29 CA 600; 30 CA 346; Id., 827; Id., 839; 31 CA 94; Id., 660; 33 CA 702; 34 CA 535; 35 CA 828; 36 CA 216; 37 CA 515; 38 CA 575; 39 CA 684; 40 CA 268; 41 CA 225; 44 CA 271; 45 CA 165; Id., 352; Id., 455. Attorney trial referee did not abuse discretion by admitting exhibits pursuant to business records exception to hearsay rule. 48 CA 205. Printout of loan history and affidavit of debt were properly admitted. 51 CA 733. Documents need not be prepared by the organization itself to be admissible. 55 CA 384. Trial court properly admitted defendant's blood alcohol level content test results as part of his hospital records because the records met requirements for a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule under section. 61 CA 164. Section allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay to be admissible, with certain limitations. 63 CA 72. Computer-generated maps were properly admitted because they met the three conditions set forth in section and witness laid the proper foundation for admission. 69 CA 169. Capital needs assessment offered by defendant to show type of report lenders typically rely upon in deciding whether to loan money deemed admissible under business record exception to hearsay rule, despite fact that assessment was not prepared by defendant; assessment was made in the regular course of business by an organization that had a duty to prepare assessment. 88 CA 638. In foreclosure action, plaintiff bank's former employee who held several different positions within the bank and was very familiar with bank's records and computer system but had no personal knowledge of defendant's loan or the origin of the loan document was deemed qualified to authenticate bank's records for purposes of admitting defendant's loan records into evidence as exhibits; business records exception does not require documents to have been prepared by company seeking to admit them as business records, nor is company required to establish a chain of custody for the documents or establish that witnesses have personal knowledge of their origins. 92 CA 696. Document offered through testimony of assistant vice president and manager of foreclosure department who had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances surrounding defendant's mortgage qualified as business record and testimony that document was created in regular course of plaintiff's business, having satisfied elements of trustworthiness under section, was properly authenticated. 94 CA 793. Documents admitted into evidence under business records exception to hearsay rule were properly authenticated by witness who testified that he worked for plaintiff for 3 years and was familiar with its books and records, specifically as they related to defendants, that plaintiff created the types of documents at issue in the regular course of its business, that he knew such documents were generated in the regular course of plaintiff's business and that he had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding defendant's loan and personal experience with plaintiff's general record keeping procedures. 156 CA 441. Affidavit was not sufficient to admit computer generated documents under business records exception to hearsay rule because it did not establish that the computer systems were reliable; business records that are generated by computers present structural questions of reliability that transcend the reliability of the underlying information that is entered into the computer. 163 CA 648.

Applies to entries and receipts of a bank indicating withdrawals. 9 CS 358. Autopsy and toxicological reports properly admitted as official reports made in the regular course of business. 19 CS 278. Medical report of a deceased physician as to defendant's intoxication held inadmissible, though it appeared on a mimeographed form of the police department. 24 CS 45. Requirements for admission; evidence not admissible; discussion. 31 CS 510. Business entry exception to hearsay rule must be construed to mean that all requirements for admission must be satisfied by appropriate foundation testimony before business record can be admitted into evidence. 33 CS 668. Cited. 36 CS 632; 37 CS 637; 38 CS 384; Id., 426; 39 CS 381.

Failure of finding in trial court to indicate compliance with requirements fatal. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 264. Cited. Id., 693; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 192. Appellant failed to establish that improper admission of document as business entry was harmful error. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 160–165. Police report may be admitted as business entry if it complies with rest of statute. Id., 599–601.

Subsec. (a):

Although computer printouts were arguably not made in the regular course of business, the computer information itself satisfied the three statutory conditions for admissibility. 57 CA 1.

Subsec. (b):

Failure to produce witness re reports did not affect admissibility of a payment history report, but could affect weight of the evidence. 49 CA 563. Failure to produce as witness the person who actually drew, labeled and tested defendant's blood and recorded test results in defendant's hospital records is not a bar to admission of the evidence as a business record. 61 CA 164.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-321a
Sec. 52-321a. Trust or retirement income and certain retirement, education and medical savings accounts and group annuity contracts unavailable to creditors. Exceptions for qualified domestic relations order, recovery of costs of incarceration and recovery of damages by victim of crime.
Status: in_force

(2) Any such trust, account, contract, plan or other arrangement under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be (A) conclusively presumed to be a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under the laws of this state, and (B) considered a trust which has been created by or which has proceeded from a person other than such participant or beneficiary, even if such participant or beneficiary is a self-employed individual, a partner of the entity sponsoring the Keogh plan or a shareholder of the corporation sponsoring the retirement plan.

(b) Nothing in this section shall impair the rights of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as defined in Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended. Nothing in this section or in subdivision (13) of section 52-352b shall impair the rights of the state to proceed under section 52-361a to recover the costs of incarceration under section 18-85a and regulations adopted in accordance with section 18-85a from any federal, state or municipal pension, annuity or insurance contract or similar arrangement described in subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section, provided the rights of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as defined in Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, shall take precedence over any such recovery. Nothing in this section or in subdivision (13) of section 52-352b shall impair the rights of a victim of crime to proceed under section 52-361a to recover damages awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction from any federal, state or municipal pension, annuity or insurance contract or similar arrangement described in subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section when such damages are the result of a crime committed by a participant or beneficiary of such pension, annuity or insurance contract or similar arrangement, provided the rights of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as defined in Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, shall take precedence over any such recovery.

(c) Nothing in this section shall affect the status of additions or contributions to a trust, account, contract, plan or other arrangement described in subsection (a) of this section if (1) (A) the debtor-participant or the debtor-beneficiary is a self-employed individual, partner of the entity sponsoring the Keogh plan or a one per cent or more shareholder of the corporation sponsoring the retirement plan, or in the opinion of a court of competent jurisdiction, exercises dominion and control over such proprietorship, partnership, corporation or other entity and (B) the addition or contribution is made less than ninety days before the filing of the claim on which the judgment is thereafter entered or (2) such additions or contributions are determined to be a fraudulent conveyance under applicable federal or state law.

Cited. 238 C. 778.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-50 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-50
Sec. 52-50. Persons to whom process shall be directed.
Status: in_force

(b) Process shall not be directed to an indifferent person unless authorized by statute. Any indifferent person who, knowing that he is not authorized to do so under this section or any other provision of the general statutes, serves process shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Service of motions for modification, motions for contempt and wage withholdings in any matter involving a beneficiary of care or assistance from the state and in other IV-D child support cases may be made by any investigator employed by the Commissioner of Administrative Services or the Commissioner of Social Services.

(d) Service of motions for modification, motions for contempt and wage withholdings in any matter involving child support, including, but not limited to, petitions for support authorized under sections 17b-745 and 46b-215 , and those matters involving a beneficiary of care or assistance from the state, and service of other process in IV-D support cases, as defined in subdivision (13) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231 , may be made by a support enforcement officer or support services investigator of the Superior Court.

(e) Borough bailiffs may, within their respective boroughs, execute all legal process which state marshals or constables may execute.

See Sec. 52-246 re costs for service by an indifferent person.

The indifferent person must be of full age. 2 R. 520. The oath must be administered in the words prescribed. 6 C. 138; 9 C. 206; 14 C. 84; 30 C. 392. The direction may be endorsed on the writ. 9 C. 207. The return of an indifferent person need not be sworn to. 23 C. 242, but see 74 C. 728. If improperly directed to an indifferent person, process is void; bastardy complaint. 85 C. 330. Cited. 113 C. 79; 197 C. 320; Id., 507.

Cited. 25 CA 555; 32 CA 147.

Cited. 4 CS 139; 37 CS 891.

Subsec. (a):

Service of process in accordance with Subsec. not required under Practice Book Sec. 2-38(a). 260 C. 435.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-503l — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 919 / Section 52-503l
Sec. 52-503l. Cotenant buyout.
Status: in_force

(b) Not later than forty-five days after the date on which the notice is sent under subsection (a) of this section, any cotenant except a cotenant that requested partition by sale may give notice to the court that it elects to buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale.

(c) The purchase price for each of the interests of a cotenant that requested partition by sale is the value of the entire parcel determined under section 52-503k , multiplied by the cotenant's fractional ownership of the entire parcel.

(d) After expiration of the forty-five-day period prescribed in subsection (b) of this section, the following rules apply:

(1) If only one cotenant elects to buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale, the court shall notify all the parties of that fact.

(2) If more than one cotenant elects to buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale, the court shall (A) allocate the right to buy those interests among the electing cotenants based on each electing cotenant's existing fractional ownership of the entire parcel divided by the total existing fractional ownership of all cotenants electing to buy; and (B) send notice to all the parties of that fact and of the price to be paid by each electing cotenant.

(3) If no cotenant elects to buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale, the court shall send notice to all the parties of that fact and resolve the partition action under subsections (a) and (b) of section 52-503m .

(e) If the court sends notice to the parties under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (d) of this section, the court shall set a date, not earlier than sixty days after the date on which the notice was sent, by which electing cotenants must pay their apportioned price to the court. After the court sets such date, the following rules apply:

(1) If all electing cotenants timely pay their apportioned price to the court, the court shall issue an order reallocating all the interests of the cotenants and disburse the amounts held by the court to the persons entitled to such amounts.

(2) If no electing cotenant timely pays its apportioned price, the court shall resolve the partition action under subsections (a) and (b) of section 52-503m , as if the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale were not purchased.

(3) If one or more but not all of the electing cotenants fail to pay their apportioned price on time, the court, on motion, shall give notice to the electing cotenants that paid their apportioned price of the interest remaining and the price for all that interest.

(f) Not later than twenty days after the date on which the court gives notice pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (e) of this section, any cotenant that paid may elect to purchase all of the remaining interest by paying the entire price to the court. After the twenty-day period, the following rules apply:

(1) If only one cotenant pays the entire price for the remaining interest, the court shall issue an order reallocating the remaining interest to that cotenant. The court shall promptly issue an order reallocating the interests of all of the cotenants and disburse the amounts held by it to the persons entitled to such amounts.

(2) If no cotenant pays the entire price for the remaining interest, the court shall resolve the partition action under subsections (a) and (b) of section 52-503m as if the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale were not purchased.

(3) If more than one cotenant pays the entire price for the remaining interest, the court shall reapportion the remaining interest among those paying cotenants, based on each paying cotenant's original fractional ownership of the entire parcel divided by the total original fractional ownership of all cotenants that paid the entire price for the remaining interest. The court shall promptly issue an order reallocating all of the cotenants' interests, disburse the amounts held by it to the persons entitled to such amounts, and promptly refund any excess payment held by the court.

(g) Not later than forty-five days after the date on which the court sends notice to the parties pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, any cotenant entitled to buy an interest under this section may request that the court authorize the sale as part of the pending action of the interests of cotenants named as defendants and served with the complaint but that did not appear in the action.

(h) If the court receives a timely request under subsection (g) of this section, the court, after hearing, may deny the request or authorize the requested additional sale on terms that the court determines are fair and reasonable, subject to the following limitations:

(1) A sale authorized under this subsection may occur only after the purchase prices for all interests subject to sale under subsections (a) to (f), inclusive, of this section have been paid to the court and those interests have been reallocated among the cotenants as provided in subsections (a) to (f), inclusive, of this section; and

(2) The purchase price for the interest of a nonappearing cotenant is based on the court's determination of value under section 52-503k .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278n — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 903a / Section 52-278n
Sec. 52-278n. Motion to disclose property. Order for disclosure. Substitution of surety.
Status: in_force

(b) A motion to disclose pursuant to this section may be made by attaching it to the application for a prejudgment remedy or may be made at any time after the filing of the application.

(c) The court may order disclosure at any time prior to final judgment after it has determined that the party filing the motion for disclosure has, pursuant to section 52-278d , 52-278e or 52-278i , probable cause sufficient for the granting of a prejudgment remedy.

(d) A defendant, in lieu of disclosing assets pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may move the court for substitution either of a bond with surety substantially in compliance with sections 52-307 and 52-308 , or of other sufficient security.

(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) to (d), inclusive, of this section, no party may compel disclosure of the names and addresses of clients of an individual or entity that provides professional services, as defined in subdivision (20) of section 4e-1 , when the disclosure of such names and addresses would constitute a violation of state or federal law, or the applicable rules of professional conduct governing such profession, as the case may be.

(f) Rules of court shall be enacted to carry out the foregoing provisions and may provide for reasonable sanctions to enforce orders issued pursuant to this section.

Cited. 188 C. 69; 226 C. 773.

Cited. 19 CA 256; 29 CA 48.

Cited. 38 CS 98.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-225b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-225b
Sec. 52-225b. “Collateral sources” defined.
Status: in_force

Cited. 203 C. 607; 214 C. 1; 218 C. 531; 225 C. 566; 231 C. 77; 235 C. 107. Trial court improperly applied provisions adopted in P.A. 87-227 instead of those adopted in P.A. 86-338. 247 C. 638. Social Security disability benefits are not a collateral source. 259 C. 325.

Cited. 31 CA 806; 38 CA 685; 46 CA 76.

Debts voluntarily forgiven by medical care provider and amounts paid by employer pursuant to wage continuation plan are not collateral sources. 49 CS 7.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-279 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-279
Sec. 52-279. When attachments may be granted.
Status: in_force

When fraud complaint not amendable by adding count in contract. 63 C. 370. Validity of attachment cannot control the judgment to be rendered on the facts alleged and proved. 68 C. 471; 77 C. 347. None allowed in equitable proceeding not claiming damages. 75 C. 191. History and nature of process. 84 C. 622; 85 C. 573; 90 C. 570; 109 C. 434. Offer of stranger to pay debt will not defeat right. 76 C. 515. Colorable or fraudulent transfer of property will not prevent. 68 C. 389; 84 C. 682; 85 C. 698; 101 C. 565. Attachment of body when property put out of reach. 74 C. 671; 81 C. 626; 84 C. 628. Equitable interests as subject to. 71 C. 154; 76 C. 528; 83 C. 355. But not interests so uncertain as not to be salable on execution; 71 C. 149; nor property in the hands of receiver. 66 C. 350; 71 C. 345. Law subjects all property to attachment as far as possible. 85 C. 67. But alimony is not property. 102 C. 708. Public policy does not prevent attachment of property of street railway company. 89 C. 59. Personal property sold but not delivered still subject to attachment against seller; 72 C. 509; 74 C. 146; 86 C. 372; even though sold on condition; 70 C. 505; 77 C. 38; 86 C. 372; or colorable delivery made; 68 C. 389; 86 C. 372; 101 C. 565; but rule applies only to tangible property; 87 C. 601; as to mortgaged personal property. 72 C. 510; 77 C. 370; 101 C. 565. Cited. 71 C. 154; 72 C. 159. Application of state law to procedure in federal court. 73 C. 154. Interest of tenant in common or of partner in goods is attachable. 68 C. 16; 71 C. 698. Attachment where lease gives tenant right to replace property; 80 C. 14; of stock of nonresident in local corporation. 84 C. 618. Attachment of body of one brought wrongfully within the jurisdiction is void. 85 C. 327. In divorce action; effect as regards order for periodic payments of alimony. 94 C. 284. Limitations on attachment of body. 105 C. 683. Review of history of law regarding attachment of real estate. 109 C. 434. Alimony may not be attached. 102 C. 708. History of statutes re body attachments; limited to tort actions brought under Sec. 52-562 and to contract actions specified in Sec. 52-355. 111 C. 228. Does not limit power to reduce attachments under Secs. 52-301 and 52-302. 141 C. 176. Cited. Id., 407. The word “estate” renders liable for attachment certain legal and equitable interests in property which are within the debtor's control though legal title may be in another. 142 C. 320. Attachment of joint tenancy with right of survivorship does not in itself produce a severance but the execution levy, at least upon a sale, does. 146 C. 332. Cited. 162 C. 256. Second mortgagee has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of section in attempt to invalidate attachments prior to his mortgage rights. 168 C. 43.

Cited. 28 CA 809; 32 CA 118.

Cited. 12 CS 106; 16 CS 95. Where body attachment is made, defendant cannot remain silent and later claim that officer failed to find property open to attachment. Id., 242. No distinction is to be drawn between slander and slander of title. 23 CS 282. When attachment invalid under complaint containing several causes of action. 29 CS 324. Distinguished from Sec. 52-369. 35 CS 130. Cited. 36 CS 47.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-425 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 910 / Section 52-425
Sec. 52-425. Appointment of a committee in civil actions.
Status: in_force

(b) If the action has been brought solely for the recovery of a money demand, the committee may: (1) Report simply that it finds the issue in favor of the plaintiff and that he recover a certain sum, or that it finds the issue in favor of the defendant, as the case may be, or (2) report specifically the facts relevant to the issue and established by the evidence. In all other actions, the committee shall report specifically the facts relevant to the issue and established by the evidence.

(c) Upon the acceptance of any report, judgment shall be rendered thereon according to law and the facts found.

Auditors may require the parties to furnish each other copies of their respective claims. 37 C. 428. May grant adjournments on terms. 26 C. 311. May grant a rehearing before filing report. 31 C. 368, 370. Ought not to stay at house of either party during trial. 39 C. 268. The report cannot be set aside because against the weight of evidence. 13 C. 563; 23 C. 541; 24 C. 585; 26 C. 312, but see 14 C. 362. Report may be set aside for mistake of law. 2 D. 120. Report should state facts, not evidence of facts. 20 C. 588; 23 C. 34; 26 C. 267; 30 C. 279. Certainty necessary in report. 13 C. 467, 468; 36 C. 473. Report may be set aside for admission of improper evidence; K. 353; 1 R. 268; 14 C. 71; 98 C. 562; but not if it worked no injury. 37 C. 429. Further hearing in court after return of report. 13 C. 396; 31 C. 380. Acceptance of report conditionally; 11 C. 368; or in part only. 17 C. 34; 36 C. 424. Report, if accepted, is a part of the record. 4 D. 374. Court cannot infer additional facts from the facts found and reported by the committee. 42 C. 517. Court cannot recommit the report on the ground that the finding is against the evidence. 43 C. 451. Adverse report; when party loses his right to withdraw. 47 C. 436. Certain questions of fact undecided by committee; court may recommit report for further finding upon the evidence already received. 49 C. 351. Report should not be rejected where the items allowed are so stated that the court can render an intelligible and just judgment. 51 C. 131. Court cannot find facts upon mere evidence reported by committee. 52 C. 427. Reappointment of committee not necessary at each term of court. 53 C. 328. Conclusiveness of report as to facts; 76 C. 367; Id., 484; Id., 567; Id., 654; 85 C. 237; Id., 390; 87 C. 41; Id., 70; 98 C. 566; 103 C. 283; 109 C. 216; but court may correct account where all items are found; 86 C. 199; 87 C. 241; but failure of committee properly to weigh evidence no ground for recommittal. 82 C. 460; 87 C. 241. Misconduct of committee as ground to reject report; 67 C. 347; use of form of report furnished by counsel; 74 C. 189; employing party's surveyor. 67 C. 345. Report is sufficient if necessary facts are found; surplusage will be rejected. 68 C. 113; 87 C. 70. Including in report rulings of committee and facts upon which they are made. 70 C. 429; 76 C. 84; 85 C. 237; 87 C. 241; 88 C. 431. Report of majority as report of committee. 82 C. 464. Remonstrance, its use, and procedure upon it. 76 C. 567; 80 C. 248; 85 C. 237; 87 C. 42; Id., 241; 98 C. 566. Members of committee may testify as to their doings. 76 C. 567, see 75 C. 248. Use of stenographer's notes of evidence before them discountenanced. 76 C. 567; 87 C. 241. Referring report back for failure to properly consider testimony; 82 C. 460; for error in evidence as to value. 81 C. 63. Effect of referring matter to committee before issues closed. 74 C. 189. Committee cannot pass on demurrer to complaint. 92 C. 193. Remonstrance merely stating that conclusion is against evidence is demurrable. 93 C. 146. Presumption that action of committee is proper in absence of showing to the contrary. Id., 149. Remonstrance does not lie on ground that committee mistook the weight of the evidence; when report may be recommitted. 96 C. 501; 98 C. 565. Held that legislature intended references to attorney referees under Sec. 52-434(a)(4) to conform to procedure set forth in this section to require consent of all parties. 199 C. 496. Cited. Id., 518; 210 C. 705.

Cited. 11 CA 1.

Where complaint and counterclaim contain not numerous questions of law but numerous questions of fact, the questions involved ought to be sent to a committee. 5 CS 376. Cited. 16 CS 460.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-604 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 928 / Section 52-604
Sec. 52-604. Definition of foreign judgment.
Status: in_force

“Full faith and credit” refers to a foreign judgment enforceable under laws of this state. 264 C. 498.

Cited. 6 CA 541; 14 CA 384; 45 CA 798.

Cited. 38 CS 468.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-161 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-161
Sec. 52-161. Transcript of stenographer's or court reporter's record part of official record.
Status: in_force

Notes of charge of court may be used to show issues determined by judgment. 74 C. 568. Court may have notes read or transcript submitted to jury. 82 C. 66. Notes not part of record for appeal unless made so by proper procedure. 71 C. 668; 79 C. 315; 82 C. 547; 87 C. 333; Id., 616; 89 C. 385. Cited. 165 C. 152; 208 C. 156; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 14 CS 503; 42 CS 574.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-190a
Sec. 52-190a. Prior reasonable inquiry and certificate of good faith required in negligence action against a health care provider. Ninety-day extension of statute of limitations.
Status: in_force

(b) Upon petition to the clerk of any superior court or any federal district court to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods.

(c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.

Cited. 214 C. 1. Good faith certificate is not jurisdictional. 215 C. 701. Cited. 236 C. 681; 242 C. 1. In workers compensation case where city sought to intervene in employee's negligence action against physician, the city as a would-be intervenor was not required to file a good faith certificate where employee had filed such a certificate and the city asserted no additional claims. 253 C. 429. Applies only to civil actions to recover damages and does not apply to apportionment complaints under Sec. 52-102b which seek only apportionment of liability. 269 C. 10. Section does not require plaintiffs to attach an opinion from a similar health care provider addressing causation. 292 C. 350. Claim of lack of informed consent is not a medical negligence claim and plaintiff is not required to obtain and attach an opinion from a similar health care provider under section; lay standard is applicable to actions for lack of informed consent. 300 C. 383. Improperly designated motion to strike based on failure to submit attorney's good faith certificate and opinion letters in compliance with Subsec. (a) treated as motion to dismiss under Subsec. (c) and granting of such motion is not a judgment on the merits and does not preclude a second action under the doctrine of res judicata. 308 C. 338. Opinion letter requirement does not implicate the court's jurisdiction, rules of practice and case law governing the pleading and proof of jurisdictional facts are inapplicable to a motion to dismiss, and sufficiency of opinion letter is determined solely on basis of allegations in complaint and on face of opinion letter; to extent opinion letter is legally insufficient or defective, trial court retains authority to permit amendments or supplementation of a challenged letter in response to a motion to dismiss; motion to dismiss for failure to file an opinion letter remains waivable, including by inaction. 346 C. 80.

Cited. 26 CA 497; 33 CA 378; 37 CA 105; 43 CA 397. Fall by person dependent on a wheelchair while transferring from wheelchair to an exercise mat at physical therapy facility during scheduled session, where transfers were a stated goal of therapy, is medical malpractice. 61 CA 353. If a complaint is found to sound of medical malpractice, even if plaintiff claims the complaint sounds of ordinary tort and breach of contract, then failure by plaintiff to include a good faith certificate and an opinion of a similar health care provider shall constitute grounds for dismissal. 113 CA 569. Section does not abridge common law right to pursue judicial remedy under Art. 1, Sec. 10 of Connecticut Constitution because it is merely a procedural limitation that neither eliminates nor unreasonably burdens right to legal recourse, and section does not violate due process because limitations are reasonably related to legitimate state interest of preventing frivolous or meritless medical malpractice claims. 132 CA 68. Opinion letter did not set forth sufficient information to demonstrate that its author was a similar health care provider, as defined in Sec. 52-184c, qualified to render an opinion as to the standard of care owed by defendant. 133 CA 548. Plaintiff not required to attach certificate of good faith or opinion letter from similar health care provider to complaint when claim sounds in ordinary negligence and not in medical malpractice. 145 CA 253. Regardless of the type of procedure a plaintiff elects to employ to cure a defect in an opinion letter filed in accordance with section, that procedure must be initiated prior to the running of the statute of limitations, otherwise the sole remedy available will be to initiate a new action, if possible, pursuant to Sec. 52-592. 182 CA 688.

Cited. 41 CS 169.

Subsec. (a):

A surgeon, who likely would be qualified to testify as an expert witness at the trial of a medical malpractice action against a specialist physician, but who is not a “similar health care provider” as defined in Sec. 52-184c(c), may not provide the prelitigation opinion letter that must accompany the certificate of good faith attached to the complaint. 300 C. 1. A written opinion satisfies the “detailed basis” requirement if it sets forth the basis of the similar health care provider's opinion that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence by express reference to what defendant did or failed to do to breach the applicable standard of care; written opinion need not identify the precise cause of the injury; written opinion must state the similar health care provider's opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care. 303 C. 630. Opinion letter of physician who is board certified in obstetrics meets “similar health care provider” requirement in action alleging negligence of certified nurse-midwives; good faith opinion certification required for claim against institutional defendant. 314 C. 709.

Section establishes objective criteria, not subject to the exercise of discretion, making prelitigation requirements more definitive and uniform than requirements to testify at trial and arguably sets the bar higher to get into court than to prevail at trial; as to defendant health care provider who is a physician, the similar health care provider contemplated here is one defined in either Sec. 52-184c(b) or (c). 117 CA 535. Good faith opinion submitted sufficiently addressed allegations of negligence by indicating evidence of a breach of the standard of care, was not required to address causation, and, therefore, was sufficiently detailed for purposes of Subsec. 119 CA 808. Because defendant is a board certified specialist, a similar health care provider must be one trained and experienced in same specialty as defendant and certified by appropriate American board in same specialty. 122 CA 597. Judgment against plaintiff on a motion to strike for failure to comply with requirements re certificate of good faith is a judgment on the merits subject to doctrine of res judicata. 127 CA 606; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 308 C. 338. Section requires the qualifications of the opinion letter author to be disclosed in the opinion letter in manner sufficient to determine whether author is a similar health care provider; claim of lack of informed consent against multiple providers does not trigger requirement for opinion letter. 132 CA 459. Plaintiff was required to file certificate of good faith under Subsec. for claim based on fall suffered after blood draw because claim sounded in medical malpractice, and not ordinary negligence, under test in 61 CA 353, of whether (1) defendants are sued in their capacities as medical professionals, (2) alleged negligence is of a specialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship, and (3) the alleged negligence is substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment and involved the exercise of medical judgment. 141 CA 707. Trial court's determination that certificate of good faith that was attempted to be filed in malpractice action was insufficient did not equate to determination that there was lack of probable cause to bring such action. 144 CA 100. Subsec. contains no express language prohibiting plaintiff from amending opinion letter after action is commenced; plaintiff may cure defect in original opinion letter by amending complaint to attach an amended or entirely new opinion letter within the statute of limitations. 161 CA 497. Plaintiff's author of opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under Sec. 52-184c(c) because, unlike defendant physician, the author of the opinion letter is not board certified in emergency medicine. 168 CA 47. Author of plaintiff's opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under section because, unlike defendant who is an anatomic pathologist, the author of the opinion letter is a clinical pathologist. 187 CA 555.

Detailed basis for written opinion must enable defendant to ascertain basis of claim. 50 CS 385. Exception in Sec. 52-184c(c)(2) to board certification requirement for similar health care provider who authors opinion letter does not apply unless it is alleged that defendant physician actually undertook the diagnosis and treatment of a condition not within his specialty such that his conduct should be judged against the standards of care applicable to that specialty. 52 CS 463; judgment affirmed, see 140 CA 499.

Subsec. (b):

90-day extension provided in Subsec. applies equally to both the 2-year statute of limitation and 3-year statute of repose in Sec. 52-584. 269 C. 787.

The term “filed”, for purposes of effective date of a public act, refers to the bringing of a complaint or other pleading to the clerk of the court, not a state marshal for service. 106 CA 810.

Subsec. (c):

Trial court must dismiss action if opinion letter fails to comply with Subsec. (a). 300 C. 1. When a medical malpractice action has been dismissed pursuant to Subsec. for failure to supply opinion letter by a similar health care provider required by Subsec. (a), plaintiff may commence an otherwise time barred new action pursuant to the matter of form provision of Sec. 52-592(a) only if that failure was caused by simple mistake or omission, rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence attributable to plaintiff or his attorney. Id., 33. Defendant's right to file motion to dismiss is waived if motion is not filed within time frames in rules of practice. 301 C. 388; overruled, see 346 C. 80.

Failure to comply with Subsec. renders complaint subject to motion to dismiss and not motion to strike. 106 CA 810. Action subject to dismissal not only for lack of opinion letter but also if opinion letter is not from similar health care provider or does not give detailed basis for the opinion. 117 CA 535.

Failure to provide written opinion required by Subsec. (a) does not result in automatic dismissal under Subsec. (c), but rather dismissal is discretionary and based upon facts. 50 CS 385.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-260 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-260
Sec. 52-260. Witness fees.
Status: in_force

(b) When any regular or supernumerary police officer or any regular, volunteer or substitute firefighter of any town, city or borough is summoned to testify in any criminal proceeding pending before the Superior Court or the Department of Consumer Protection and the police officer or firefighter receives no compensation from the town, city or borough by which he is employed for the time so spent by him, the police officer or firefighter shall be allowed and paid one hundred dollars, together with the mileage allowed by law to witnesses in criminal cases, for each day he is required to attend the proceedings.

(c) When any regular or supernumerary police officer or any regular or substitute firefighter is summoned to testify in his capacity as a police officer or firefighter in any court in a civil action and the police officer or firefighter receives no compensation from the municipality by which he is employed for the time he is in attendance at court, there shall be allowed and paid to the police officer or firefighter a witness fee of one hundred dollars, together with the mileage allowed by law to witnesses in criminal cases, for each day he is required to attend court. If the police officer or firefighter testifies in any such proceeding or civil action on a vacation day or compensatory day off, he shall be paid the sum of one hundred dollars, together with the mileage allowed by law, notwithstanding the fact that he is receiving compensation for such day from the town, city or borough by which he is employed.

(d) The amounts paid under subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be taxed as a part of the costs, and shall be in lieu of all other witness fees payable to such police officer or firefighter.

(e) When any person is confined in a community correctional center upon the allegation of the state's attorney that he will be a material witness in a pending criminal proceeding, he shall receive, in addition to his legal fees as a witness, two dollars for each day that he is so confined.

(f) When any practitioner of the healing arts, as defined in section 20-1 , dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a , psychologist or real estate appraiser gives expert testimony in any action or proceeding, including by means of a deposition, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, psychologist or real estate appraiser and taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees payable to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, psychologist or real estate appraiser.

(g) When any public accountant licensed under chapter 389 is subpoenaed by any party, other than the state, to testify in his capacity as a public accountant in any action or proceeding, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to the public accountant and such fee shall be paid by the party issuing such subpoena.

(h) The fees of any witness summoned by a party other than the state to testify in any action or proceeding shall be paid to the witness by such party on the day of attendance of such witness.

Cited. 188 C. 213; 219 C. 204; 236 C. 710; 239 C. 708.

Cited. 37 CA 865; 45 CA 305. Legal experts are not included within enumeration of the categories of experts entitled to discretionary award of expert witness fees. 78 CA 760. Sec. 31-51m allows for costs, but does not expressly provide for expert witness fees; therefore, general cost provisions of Sec. 52-257 and this section apply, which do not mention nontestimonial costs; accordingly, nontestimonial work performed by plaintiff's economics expert was not taxable as costs. 79 CA 501. Expert witness fees for roofing consulting firms are not enumerated under section and cannot be awarded as part of claim under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 113 CA 509. Court improperly awarded expert witness fees for construction experts in claim under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 121 CA 105.

Agreement to pay witness more than legal fees will not ordinarily be enforced; exceptional cases considered. 26 CS 463. Statute, as amended, read in conjunction with Sec. 48-12, as amended, entitled property owner to reasonable appraisal fees in condemnation proceedings. 27 CS 288.

Subsec. (f):

Fee charged by an expert for time spent in preparation for his or her deposition treated as a taxable cost. 286 C. 234. Trial court may not award costs for nontestimonial work performed by expert witness. 289 C. 61.

Nothing in legislative history indicates that legislature's use of term “costs” in either Sec. 31-51m or 31-51q was intended to authorize court to award prevailing party the cost of an economist; further, because an economist is not a listed expert witness whose cost may be reimbursed under general provisions of Subsec., plaintiff's expert economist's testimonial fees cannot be reimbursed. 79 CA 501. Invoices submitted by defendant for expert witness fees were not sufficient on their own to establish that the costs stated therein were “reasonable”. 113 CA 339.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-287 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-287
Sec. 52-287. Attachment of fixtures of telephone or electric distribution company or association.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-380b re judgment liens on certain public utility property.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-631 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-631
Sec. 52-631. Duties of owner.
Status: in_force

(1) Assist and cooperate with the receiver in the administration of the receivership and the discharge of the receiver's duties;

(2) Preserve and turn over to the receiver all receivership property in the owner's possession, custody or control;

(3) Identify all records and other information relating to the receivership property, including a password, authorization or other information needed to obtain or maintain access to or control of the receivership property, and make available to the receiver the records and information in the owner's possession, custody or control;

(4) On subpoena, submit to examination under oath by the receiver concerning the acts, conduct, property, liabilities and financial condition of the owner or any matter relating to the receivership property or the receivership; and

(5) Perform any duty imposed by court order, sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive, or the law of this state other than sections 52-619 to 52-646 , inclusive.

(b) If an owner is a person other than an individual, this section applies to each officer, director, manager, member, partner, trustee or other person exercising or having the power to exercise control over the affairs of the owner.

(c) If a person knowingly fails to perform a duty imposed by this section, the court may:

(1) Award the receiver actual damages caused by the person's failure, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and

(2) Sanction the failure as civil contempt.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-516 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-516
Sec. 52-516. Commencement of action of replevin. Prejudgment remedy.
Status: in_force

(b) An action of replevin, to the extent that it includes a prejudgment remedy as defined in section 52-278a , shall not be allowed unless the provisions of sections 52-278a to 52-278f , inclusive, are complied with.

See Sec. 51-15 re rules of procedure in certain civil actions.

Cited. 66 C. 549. Writ without complaint is a nullity; not amendable; remedy is to erase from docket; defendant has no right to plead further or to damages. 97 C. 399; 98 C. 229. Effect of returning writ to wrong court. 105 C. 673. Misdescription of property replevied; cured by provision in original conditional bill of sale permitting vendor on default to enter and take possession. Id., 675. Cited. 222 C. 361.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146p — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146p
Sec. 52-146p. Disclosure of privileged communications between marital and family therapist and person consulting such therapist prohibited. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a marital and family therapist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Marital and family therapist” means an individual certified as a marital and family therapist pursuant to chapter 383a;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a marital and family therapist or between a member of such person's family and a marital and family therapist;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges under this section, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, all communications shall be privileged and a marital and family therapist shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. In circumstances where more than one person in a family is receiving therapy, each such family member shall consent to the waiver. In the absence of such a waiver from each such family member, a marital and family therapist shall not disclose communications with any family member. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(c) Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person's communications:

(1) Where mandated by any other provision of the general statutes;

(2) Where a marital and family therapist believes in good faith that the failure to disclose such communications presents a clear and present danger to the health or safety of any individual;

(3) Where a marital and family therapist makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was receiving services from a marital and family therapist, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-112 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-112
Sec. 52-112. Insertion of names of partners in process in action by or against a partnership.
Status: in_force

(b) An attachment, in any civil action against a partnership, of the private property of any of its members shall not be valid unless the name of the member is set forth in the process at the time of the attachment.

The court may extend the time for amending. 19 C. 62. There can be no amendment by adding new names if only one was in the original writ. 24 C. 14. A writ against three as partners can be amended by adding a fourth. 32 C. 106. Cited. 61 C. 227. But plaintiff may sue partners in individual names instead of by partnership name. 103 C. 445. Cited. 117 C. 637; 192 C. 497; 194 C. 144.

Cited. 4 CA 339.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-330 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 905 / Section 52-330
Sec. 52-330. Citing garnishee to disclose.
Status: in_force

Citing administrator to disclose does not make writ invalid. 77 C. 349. Effect of disclosure. 107 C. 553.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-591 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-591
Sec. 52-591. When new action may be brought after time limited.
Status: in_force

Cited. 214 C. 464; 225 C. 13; 234 C. 169.

Section is a savings statute that is intended to promote the strong policy favoring the adjudication of cases on their merits; the use of the disjunctive “or” reflects that the legislature intended the section to be applicable when the plaintiff in the prior action sued either in a representative capacity or for the benefit of another person or entity. 221 CA 256.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-355a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-355a
Sec. 52-355a. Judgment lien on personal property.
Status: in_force

(b) The judgment lien certificate shall: (1) Be signed by the judgment creditor or his attorney or personal representative; (2) state the names and last-known addresses of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, the court in which and the date on which the judgment was rendered, and the original amount of the money judgment and the amount due thereon; and (3) describe the personal property on which the lien is to be placed.

(c) Any such judgment lien shall be effective, in the same manner and to the same extent as a similar security interest under the provisions of title 42a, for five years from the date of filing, provided the filing shall not give the judgment creditor any right to take possession of the personal property on which the lien has been placed other than by writ of execution or other judicial process. The lien may be extended for additional five-year periods in the same manner as a financing statement may be extended but shall not be extended beyond the period of enforceability of the judgment. Any such property on which a lien has been placed may be executed against and levied on by the judgment creditor in the same manner as other personal property of the judgment debtor. The fact that a judgment creditor has no right under this subsection to take possession of the personal property on which the lien has been placed other than by writ of execution or other judicial process shall not be a defense in a conversion action brought by such judgment creditor for impairment of such judgment lien.

(d) A judgment lien certificate under this section shall be recorded and indexed in the same manner as financing statements filed with the office of the Secretary of the State pursuant to title 42a. On filing, the Secretary of the State shall provide information as to and copies of any such judgment lien certificate, or any release thereof, in the same manner that information and copies are provided with respect to a financing statement. The Secretary of the State shall charge the same fees for filing, for inspection of, for release of, and for information relating to or copies of, such a judgment lien certificate as are charged with respect to a financing statement and may destroy records of lapsed liens and of releases thereof in the same manner as if such judgment lien certificate was a financing statement.

Cited. 38 CA 44.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362e — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-362e
Sec. 52-362e. Withholding federal income tax refunds in amount equal to support arrearage. Procedures. Eligibility. Regulations.
Status: in_force

(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for support of a child or children is issued, and, in IV-D support cases, the person against whom such support order is issued owes past-due support in the amount specified in subsection (c) of this section, the Department of Social Services shall submit to the Commissioner of Administrative Services the name of such person and request the withholding from refunds of state income taxes owed to such person of an amount equal to the past-due support, and payment of such withheld amount by the Commissioner of Revenue Services to the state for distribution in accordance with subsection (d) of this section.

(2) Whenever an order of the Superior Court or family support magistrate is issued against a parent to cover the cost of health insurance for a child who is eligible for Medicaid and such parent has received payment from a third party for the costs of services provided under such health coverage for such child but such parent has not used such payments to reimburse, as appropriate, either the other parent or guardian or the provider of such services, the Commissioner of Social Services shall submit to the Commissioner of Administrative Services the name of such person and request the withholding from refunds of state income taxes owed to such person of an amount necessary to reimburse the Department of Social Services for such costs under the Medicaid program, and payment of such amount shall be withheld by the Commissioner of Revenue Services and distributed to the Department of Social Services for reimbursement. However, any claims for current or past due child support shall take priority over any such claims for the costs of such services.

(c) The amount of past-due support qualifying a IV-D support case for use of the federal income tax refund withholding procedure under subsection (a) of this section or the state income tax refund withholding procedure under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section shall be: (1) One hundred fifty dollars or more in temporary family assistance cases under section 17b-112 ; and (2) five hundred dollars or more in nontemporary family assistance cases.

(d) Support collected pursuant to this section shall be distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

(e) The Commissioner of Social Services shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, setting forth procedures in compliance with federal law and regulations under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act providing for adequate notice of (1) the right to a review by Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court, (2) the right to a fair hearing before a hearing officer, (3) a list of available defenses including the defense described in section 52-362h , and (4) procedures for a fair hearing for any person who is alleged to owe past-due support and is subject to the provisions of this section.

Cited. 234 C. 194.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572f — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572f
Sec. 52-572f. Criminal conversation action abolished.
Status: in_force

The plain intent of the legislature in enacting section was to prohibit civil actions for adultery. 225 CA 415.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-196a
Sec. 52-196a. Filing of special motion to dismiss based on exercise of certain state or federal constitutional rights in connection with matter of public concern. Court procedure.
Status: in_force

(1) “Matter of public concern” means an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work;

(2) “Right of free speech” means communicating, or conduct furthering communication, in a public forum on a matter of public concern;

(3) “Right to petition the government” means (A) communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body, (B) communication that is reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of a matter of public concern by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body, or (C) communication that is reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect consideration of an issue by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body;

(4) “Right of association” means communication among individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue or defend common interests; and

(5) “Special motion to dismiss” means the motion permitted pursuant to this section.

(b) In any civil action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against an opposing party that is based on the opposing party's exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.

(c) Any party filing a special motion to dismiss shall file such motion not later than thirty days after the return date of the complaint, or the filing of a counterclaim or cross claim described in subsection (b) of this section. The court, upon a showing of good cause by a party seeking to file a special motion to dismiss, may extend the time to file a special motion to dismiss.

(d) The court shall stay all discovery upon the filing of a special motion to dismiss. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until the court grants or denies the special motion to dismiss and any interlocutory appeal thereof. Notwithstanding the entry of an order to stay discovery, the court, upon motion of a party and a showing of good cause, or upon its own motion, may order specified and limited discovery relevant to the special motion to dismiss.

(e) (1) The court shall conduct an expedited hearing on a special motion to dismiss. The expedited hearing shall be held not later than sixty days after the date of filing of such special motion to dismiss, unless, (A) the court orders specified and limited discovery pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, in which case, the expedited hearing shall be held not later than sixty days after the date on which such specified and limited discovery must be completed, (B) the parties agree to a hearing date that is beyond the sixty-day period, or (C) the court, for good cause shown, is unable to schedule the hearing during the sixty-day period.

(2) When ruling on a special motion to dismiss, the court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits of the parties attesting to the facts upon which liability or a defense, as the case may be, is based.

(3) The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing party's complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on the moving party's exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, unless the party that brought the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim and demonstrates to the court that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.

(4) The court shall rule on a special motion to dismiss as soon as practicable.

(f) (1) If the court grants a special motion to dismiss under this section, the court shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including such costs and fees incurred in connection with the filing of the special motion to dismiss.

(2) If the court denies a special motion to dismiss under this section and finds that such special motion to dismiss is frivolous and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the party opposing such special motion to dismiss.

(g) The findings or determinations made pursuant to subsections (e) and (f) of this section shall not be admitted into evidence at any later stage of the proceeding or in any subsequent action.

(h) The provisions of this section shall not: (1) Apply to an enforcement action that is brought in the name of the state or a political subdivision of the state by the Attorney General; (2) affect or limit the authority of a court to award sanctions, costs, attorney's fees or any other relief available under any statute, court rule or other authority; (3) affect, limit or preclude the right of a party filing a special motion to dismiss to any defense, remedy, immunity or privilege otherwise authorized by law; (4) affect the substantive law governing any asserted claim; (5) create a private right of action; or (6) apply to a common law or statutory claim for bodily injury or wrongful death, except the exclusion provided in this subdivision shall not apply to claims for (A) emotional distress unrelated to bodily injury or wrongful death or conjoined with a cause of action other than for bodily injury or wrongful death, or (B) defamation, libel or slander. The provisions of this subdivision shall not prohibit a plaintiff who brings a claim for bodily injury or wrongful death from filing a special motion to dismiss a counterclaim under the provisions of this section.

Nothing in section limit's a trial court's discretion to order specified and limited discovery relevant to the special motion to dismiss beyond the “good cause” standard set forth in Subsec. (d). 336 C. 332.

Res judicata and collateral estoppel are appropriate defenses to consider in context of special motion to dismiss filed under section. 204 CA 818. Right to a hearing within sixty days is subject to a plaintiff's absolute right to withdraw an action at any time prior to a hearing, as afforded by Sec. 52-80. 217 CA 191.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-151 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-151
Sec. 52-151. Custody and opening of depositions.
Status: in_force

Infraction of statute does not necessarily render deposition inadmissible. 58 C. 495. Deposition is not an exhibit, but testimony in the custody of the clerk until offered in evidence; court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit deposition in which plaintiff had been deprived of complete cross-examination. 164 C. 262. Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557
Sec. 52-557. Injury to children being transported to school.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 52-557c re standard of care applicable to school bus owners and operators.

Cited. 203 C. 317.

Cited. 42 CA 624.

Cited. 41 CS 402; 44 CS 527. Section eliminates defense of governmental immunity for personal injuries student received due to harassment on school bus. 52 CS 42; judgment affirmed, see 129 CA 682.

Subsec (a):

Subdiv. (2): City police officer's decision to drive her cruiser into the oncoming traffic lane that the plaintiff was traveling was a discretionary act that violated both city and state policies that imposed ministerial duties regarding roadblocks, the operation of police vehicles and pursuits. 337 C. 326.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59d — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-59d
Sec. 52-59d. Service of process outside country to be in accordance with treaty or convention or court order.
Status: in_force

(b) If service of process cannot be made under the applicable treaty or convention within sixty days, the Superior Court may, upon application, order service of process upon such terms as the court deems reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-233 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-233
Sec. 52-233. Certification of statutory appeals taken to a judge.
Status: in_force

See Sec. 4-183 re appeals to Superior Court from administrative proceedings.

See Sec. 51-197b re administrative appeals.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-54 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 896 / Section 52-54
Sec. 52-54. Service of summons.
Status: in_force

Married woman could not accept service under former law; 3 C. 258; nor an attorney, without special authority. 1 R. 406; 28 C. 563. In suits against joint debtors, each must be served. 4 C. 426. Copy may be left at the house of a convict who is in prison. 11 C. 234. Attachment may be served as a summons. 1 R. 54; Id., 128. Suits take effect from the time of their service upon defendant, not from the date of process. 41 C. 485. Officer cannot use force merely to identify the person to be served. 49 C. 64. Officer must personally sign return on copy left with defendant. Id., 248. A nonresident defendant attending trial here is privileged from the service of process upon him by summons in a civil action; 51 C. 595; so is a nonresident coming here to testify; 82 C. 589. One illegally brought within precinct of officer. 85 C. 333. Temporary presence of one in jurisdiction ordinarily is sufficient. 27 C. 9; 67 C. 104. Meaning of “usual place of abode”. 92 C. 57; 105 C. 569. No service of writ of summons is valid unless accompanied by complaint; 97 C. 400; purpose of requirement is to insure actual notice. 108 C. 16. Service of civil process on defendant fraudulently induced to come within its reach. 99 C. 98. Nonresident defendant in a criminal action is not exempt from service of process, even though brought within jurisdiction by force; facts held to show no such fraud. 102 C. 13. Service by leaving writ in common hall of two-family house is void. 108 C. 13. Cited. 178 C. 472; 182 C. 14; 195 C. 191; 212 C. 157.

Cited. 5 CA 556.

Unattested copy of writ left at abode of defendant not proper service; defect may be waived by general appearance. 1 CS 73. Proper method of raising issue of improper service is by motion to dismiss or motion to erase. 2 CS 105. Compared with Sec. 52-62. Id., 134. Cited. 4 CS 138. “Usual place of abode” is connotative of residence only and not domicile. 8 CS 293. Service of writ and complaint was sufficient where it was inserted under the locked front door of the usual place of abode. 10 CS 365. Cited. 11 CS 262. Service upon defendant domiciled within the state but absent from state at time of service is sufficient for a personal judgment. 15 CS 18. What constitutes “usual place of abode”. 24 CS 324. Application to court to examine corporate records must be made by writ, summons and complaint. 25 CS 253. Service made at apartment house is insufficient, must be made at individual apartment in order to be valid. 29 CS 93. Service in motor vehicle civil actions is not completely covered by statute. Id., 227. Cited. 33 CS 554; Id., 678; 40 CS 243; 41 CS 367; 43 CS 10.

Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 320. In action commenced before effective date of amendment, failure of officer to note in his return the address at which abode service was made not ground for abatement. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 468, 470, 471.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572n — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-572n
Sec. 52-572n. Product liability claims.
Status: reserved

(b) A claim may be asserted successfully under said sections notwithstanding the claimant did not buy the product from or enter into any contractual relationship with the product seller.

(c) As between commercial parties, commercial loss caused by a product is not harm and may not be recovered by a commercial claimant in a product liability claim. An action for commercial loss caused by a product may be brought only under, and shall be governed by, title 42a, the Uniform Commercial Code.

Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Sec. 52-572m et seq., product liability act, abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65; 226 C. 282; 229 C. 213; Id., 500; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 769. Product liability law discussed. 241 C. 199. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172. Section's exclusivity provision bars a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act based on allegations that medical device manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted product despite knowing it presented a substantial risk of injury. 343 C. 513.

Cited. 1 CA 48; 2 CA 308. Party has option of pleading common law theories or pleading under statute. 3 CA 230. Cited. 8 CA 642; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699.

Cited. 40 CS 74; Id., 120; 41 CS 179; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510.

Subsec. (a):

Provides an exclusive remedy; common law cause of action for claim within the scope of statute is barred. 200 C. 562. Product liability act provides exclusive remedy for such claims. 212 C. 462. Does not prevent plaintiff who seeks damages under product liability act for injuries caused by allegedly defective product from also asserting a claim under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act for damages alleged to have been caused by product seller's deceptive scheme to misrepresent and conceal the product defect. 263 C. 120. Claim that defendant breached duty to warn of dangerous and hazardous condition of rented scaffolding is barred by exclusivity provision of Subsec. 284 C. 16. Wrongful marketing claim under CUTPA did not allege product defect and, therefore, is not precluded by exclusivity provision of Subsec. 331 C. 53.

Product liability claim replaces negligence and warranty actions against product sellers only. 36 CS 137.

Subsec. (c):

“Commercial loss” does not encompass costs incurred by a commercial party in repairing or replacing a defective product or in repairing property damage caused by a defective product. 291 C. 224.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-380i — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 906 / Section 52-380i
Sec. 52-380i. (Formerly Sec. 49-48). Foreclosure of lien when plaintiff holds mortgage.
Status: in_force

Annotations to former section 49-48:

Unpaid taxes not a “first charge” within meaning of statute. 112 C. 652. Cited. 120 C. 671. Where plaintiff brought action to recover principal and interest of notes secured by mortgage but did not seek to foreclose, section did not apply and contention of defendants that cash value of mortgaged premises must be determined by court and applied to amount of indebtedness was without merit. 157 C. 44. Cited. 185 C. 579.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-321
Sec. 52-321. Liability of income of trust fund to creditors. Expenses of trustee.
Status: in_force

(a) If property has been given to trustees to pay over the income to any person, without provision for accumulation or express authorization to the trustees to withhold the income, and the income has not been expressly given for the support of the beneficiary or his family, the income shall be liable in equity to the claims of all creditors of the beneficiary.

(b) Any creditor of the beneficiary who has secured a judgment against the beneficiary may bring an action against him and serve the trustees with garnishee process, and the court to which the action is returnable may direct the trustees to pay over the net income derived from the trust estate to the judgment creditor, as the income may accrue, until the creditor's debt is satisfied.

(c) The court having jurisdiction over the fund may make such an order for payment pursuant to subsection (b) when the beneficiary is a nonresident of this state, as well as when the beneficiary is a resident, but in the case of a nonresident beneficiary notice shall be given to the nonresident of the action against him as provided in section 52-87 . The nonresidence of the beneficiary shall not deprive the court of authority to make such an order.

(d) If any such trust has been expressly provided to be for the support of the beneficiary or his family, a court of equity having jurisdiction may make such order regarding the surplus, if any, not required for the support of the beneficiary or his family, as justice and equity may require.

(e) The defendant trustee in any such action shall be entitled to charge in the administration account of the trust such expenses and disbursements as the court to which the action is brought determines to be reasonable and proper.

Cited. 72 C. 45; 96 C. 70; 147 C. 561. Does not apply to trust where trustees are to hold and expend income. 80 C. 237. Statute alone does not give jurisdiction of nonresident. 90 C. 299; 127 C. 112. Only method to create spendthrift trust; requisites. 95 C. 216; 107 C. 13; 108 C. 425. If any one of conditions is present, income is exempt from attachment; trust held a spendthrift trust. 107 C. 13; 108 C. 425. Spendthrift trust; income not assignable or attachable. 119 C. 141; Id., 508. No title to income passes to beneficiary unless and until appropriated to him by trustee. Id., 512. Trustee in determining whether to make expenditures under discretionary trust for support is entitled to take into consideration other means of support available to beneficiary. 119 C. 138; 133 C. 39. Statute does not protect trust created by settlor from his own property for his own benefit. 129 C. 222. Trustee's discretion subject to control of court only to extent abused. 133 C. 37. Fact that trust was not explicitly a spendthrift trust held not to mean that protection of beneficiary was not a purpose of the trust. 145 C. 634. Agreement of children of settlor of an irrevocable inter vivos trust, which was to be set up at settlor's death as spendthrift trusts for their benefit, to assign incomes therefrom to pay father's debts after his decease was unenforceable by executrix of father's estate; income of spendthrift trusts cannot be assigned by beneficiaries; spendthrift trusts to benefit children of settlor after his decease not changed by letter of children to third party lender who never relied thereon in making loans to settlor; spendthrift character of trust prevailed once irrevocable inter vivos trust was set up. 157 C. 315. Although section clearly permits court to order payment by trustee of creditor's claim only after claim is reduced to judgment, it does not bar equitable relief short of actual payment during pendency of action. 173 C. 276. Cited. 209 C. 15.

Cited. 32 CA 152.

Statute contemplates existing trust. 7 CS 308. Statute does not contemplate trusts where settlor is beneficiary or where settlor is one beneficiary and payments to him are interwoven with payments to the others; here the entire provision for payment was held invalid. 10 CS 147. Cited. 37 CS 566.

Burden is on plaintiff to show spendthrift trust was intended. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 402.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-251a
Sec. 52-251a. Costs, attorney's fees on small claims matter transferred to regular docket.
Status: in_force

Cited. 206 C. 542; 216 C. 85; 220 C. 162.

Cited. 12 CA 353. Standard of review of award of attorney's fees discussed; court did not abuse its discretion in determining that $3,500 covered reasonable attorney's fees in case where plaintiff's small claims action was for the payment of $2,500 in promised bonuses and plaintiff requested $20,874 in attorney's fees; section expressly limits recovery to reasonable fees, not the amount that was actually expended. 61 CA 60. Pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney's fees. 79 CA 366. Trial court award of attorney's fees to plaintiff upheld in matter that originated in small claims session but was ultimately transferred to complex litigation docket; purpose of statute is to deter defendants from transferring a case from small claims session and turning a relatively clear cut case into a pitched legal battle. 87 CA 687. Does not require that a party be more sophisticated than the opposing party or that a party prevail on every claim. 95 CA 652. Essential elements of section enumerated; section contains no requirement for a finding of identifiable misconduct warranting application thereof; whether to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 161 CA 525. Defendants' decision to transfer case to the regular docket in order to file counterclaims seeking damages in excess of five thousand dollars rather than leave matter on the small claims docket and forgo raising the counterclaims was not involuntary and, therefore, rendered section applicable. 167 CA 36.

Cited. 33 CS 609. Court abused its discretion by awarding “reasonable attorneys' fees” of $300 after finding at least 50 hours of preparation were required and that reasonable rate of compensation for legal services at that time was $40 per hour. 36 CS 619. Cited. 37 CS 574; Id., 873.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-586 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-586
Sec. 52-586. Scire facias against garnishee limited to one year.
Status: in_force

Demand on execution within 60 days is prerequisite to right to bring scire facias; statute runs from time of demand. 97 C. 398; 104 C. 280; 105 C. 427. Cited. 214 C. 464.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-555 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-555
Sec. 52-555. Actions for injuries resulting in death.
Status: in_force

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an action may be brought under this section at any time after the date of the act or omission complained of if the party legally at fault for such injuries resulting in death has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a violation of section 53a-54a , 53a-54b , 53a-54c , 53a-54d , 53a-55 or 53a-55a with respect to such death.

See Sec. 45a-448 re distribution of damages recovered for injuries resulting in death.

See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property.

See Sec. 52-594 re time limit for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to deceased person's representatives.

No action lay at common law for causing death. 25 C. 272. Right of recovery in general. 24 C. 577; 69 C. 284; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 616; 77 C. 111; 87 C. 337. Action begun by injured person in lifetime survives, not restricted to death from negligence. 87 C. 301. Action lies for death in another state. 83 C. 278. Statute is not penal. 33 C. 246. It prevents any suit for the benefit of deceased's estate generally. 34 C. 58. Action lies for instantaneous death; 30 C. 187; 69 C. 620; 72 C. 616; and substantial damages may be given. 73 C. 616; 99 C. 6. Administration proper to enforce right, though there is no estate. 36 C. 214. The law presumes that there are heirs; effect. 64 C. 482; 69 C. 272; 71 C. 286. Under former statute, sum named was limitation, not measure, of damages. 85 C. 117. Purpose of statute is not to penalize, but to give just damages. 87 C. 472. Elements and rule of damage. 29 C. 496; 33 C. 56; 61 C. 159; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 620; 75 C. 548; Id., 571; 79 C. 367; 83 C. 278; 90 C. 35; 92 C. 678; 95 C. 117; 103 C. 530; 106 C. 330; 123 C. 302; 132 C. 466. Omission to charge as to limitation not error. 87 C. 149. Necessary averments in action. 33 C. 247. Effect of default by defendant. 33 C. 252; 36 C. 155. Delay in taking out administration does not extend time limit; 90 C. 527; but the provisions of Sec. 52-592 apply. 91 C. 395; 102 C. 69. Negligence of statutory distributees is no defense. 78 C. 284. Not necessary to count on statute in complaint; applies whether death is instantaneous or not. 99 C. 6. Limit of damage covers all expenses prior to death as well as loss to estate. 103 C. 529; 106 C. 338. New York statute enforceable in our courts. 108 C. 445. No bar to action that heirs at law are defendants. Id., 649. Does not permit recovery of damages for death resulting from breach of implied warranty. 115 C. 253. History of statute. Id., 255; 122 C. 95. Whether action for death due to highway defect falls within section, quaere. Id. Employer obligated to pay compensation to deceased employee's dependents is entitled to apportionment under Sec. 31-293 of damages recovered by administratrix from third person. 116 C. 92. Statute applies in action to recover damages for death against physician for malpractice. 127 C. 380. Does not create new cause of action; administratrix of father may not sue unemancipated minor son. 129 C. 518. Cited. 111 C. 336; 127 C. 692; 131 C. 130; 142 C. 84. Section is not limited or modified by Sec. 45-210 so as to postpone the beginning of the 1-year period. 134 C. 382. Cited. 143 C. 653. Basic principles underlying act; assessment of damages; distinguished from Sec. 52-599. 144 C. 659. Computation of actuarial expectancy of child. 145 C. 622. Extensive discussion of rule for measuring damages. 146 C. 114. In such an action, the administrator does not act in his true capacity as administrator for the benefit of the estate but as agent or trustee for those beneficially interested; proceeds do not become general assets of the estate. 147 C. 233. Right of action for wrongful death and that for nonfatal personal injuries rest on substantially the same basis; administrator of unemancipated minor may sue her unemancipated minor sister for wrongful death. Id., 649. Damages for death and its direct consequences are recoverable only if, and to the extent that, they are made so by statute. 153 C. 360. Cited. Id., 633. Plaintiff stands in shoes of decedent and can recover only if he, had his injuries not proved fatal, could himself have recovered. 154 C. 432. As executor, plaintiff is empowered to sue for injuries resulting in decedent's death whether his appointment issued from a court in this state or in a foreign jurisdiction. 156 C. 115. Admission in evidence of hearsay statements by defendant's driver, although made in presence of plaintiff's decedent on date of accident, was reversible error. 159 C. 307. Injuries resulting in death held not to constitute medical malpractice. 170 C. 443. Cited. Id., 637; 183 C. 448; 187 C. 53; 192 C. 280; Id., 327; 196 C. 134; Id., 509. Suit under section not barred by Workers' Compensation Act where minor killed while illegally employed. 203 C. 34. Permits a recovery of death damages only by decedent's estate; claim for loss of ante mortem consortium distinguished from claim for loss of post mortem consortium. Id., 187. 3-year limitation is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be met to maintain action under statute and cannot be waived; statute does not violate Art. I, Sec. 10 of Connecticut Constitution. 205 C. 219. Intent is not an essential element of the cause of action. 206 C. 229. Cited. 208 C. 392; 209 C. 59; 210 C. 175; Id., 721; 212 C. 415; 213 C. 282; 221 C. 346; 226 C. 282. Elements of wrongful death cause of action under section discussed. 267 C. 539. The limitations period set forth in section must be read in conjunction with the savings statute, Sec. 52-592, such that the time limitation contained in the savings statute modifies the time limitation contained in this section. 323 C. 741. The continuing course of conduct and continuing course of treatment doctrines apply to the cause of action created by section. 330 C. 251. Section does not create a new cause of action, but rather merely allows the administrator of an estate to append to an already valid claim an additional element of damages consisting of costs associated with the decedent's death; a cause of action for wrongful death predicated on CUTPA will lie only insofar as the decedent, had he or she survived, could have satisfied all essential elements of the CUTPA claim, including the statute of limitations. 331 C. 53.

Cited. 3 CA 598; 43 CA 294; 44 CA 172. Executor who brings an action under section does so in his representative, fiduciary capacity, not as an individual plaintiff, and because it is not his own cause of action, he has no right to self-representation under Sec. 51-88(d)(2). 118 CA 211. Plaintiff's claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivative claim and cannot be brought as a freestanding claim without a predicate wrongful death action brought by the decedent's estate. 189 CA 736.

Limitation held applicable to recovery under section allowing action for death or injury against highway commissioner. 1 CS 136. History of section reviewed. Id; 11 CS 117. Action to be brought 1 year after “the neglect complained of” and not from date of death. 4 CS 32. Applicable to action where death results from malpractice of a physician. 6 CS 450. Cited. 7 CS 328; 9 CS 184. Statute does not limit the number of parties that can be sued. 10 CS 396. Proviso is not a true statute of limitations but a condition precedent to the actual ripening of a complete right of action. 11 CS 239. Parent has no cause of action to recover for loss of services of child wrongfully killed. Id., 447. Fact that person injured died more than a year after injury immaterial where original complaint was brought within statutory period. Id., 413; Id., 468. Cited. 16 CS 430; 17 CS 3. Covers both antemortem elements of damage such as pain and suffering and also for injuries resulting in death. 19 CS 487. Connecticut's wrongful death statute compared with that of North Carolina, which is based on Lord Campbell's Act. 21 CS 233. Where prenatal injuries result in death, the personal representative of the child may prosecute an action; it makes no difference whether death took place just after birth or just prior to birth. 23 CS 256. Stillborn infant, dead from injuries sustained as a viable fetus, has a cause of action; Connecticut follows the “survival” rather than the “new cause of action” theory. 26 CS 358. Damages for antemortem injuries, though required to be claimed in same action as damages for death, do not depend on this section but on Sec. 52-599, which provides that decedent's cause of action survives to his personal representative; where 1-year period of limitation with respect to those injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative, under Sec. 52-594, had year from date of death to initiate action. 28 CS 461. Wrongful death action must be brought by executor or administrator to have standing; standing acquired subsequent to statute of limitations does not cure original action. 29 CS 139. Amendment to complaint not deemed instituting new cause of action so as to be barred by section but was amplification and expansion not change of facts originally claimed. 35 CS 38. Wrongful death action is not a new and independent action created by the demise of the injured party, but rather a claim of the deceased party which survives his death; therefore decedent's spouse can attach to the wrongful death claim an independent claim for loss of consortium; loss of consortium is now legally recoverable under “just damages”; consortium is an element of a marital relationship and cannot be extended to the children of the marriage. Id., 292. Cited. 37 CS 1; 38 CS 318. Damages for loss of consortium are not recoverable under statute, which compensates losses suffered only by decedent or his estate. 39 CS 8. Cited. 40 CS 95. Read together with Secs. 45-249c and 45-249d(a), “executor or administrator” is interpreted to include a temporary administrator to be allowed to commence wrongful death action when necessary to preserve estate. Id., 451. Cited. Id., 457; 44 CS 477. Administratrix may maintain action for wrongful death on behalf of a viable unborn fetus for injuries and death. 48 CS 440. Section is sole basis upon which an action that includes as an element of damages a person's death or its consequences can be brought, and where damages for wrongful death are sought, the statute of limitations in section, rather than for torts or negligence generally, applies. 52 CS 435; judgment affirmed, see 139 CA 88.

Subsec. (a):

Plaintiff who brought a wrongful death action against the state after having previously obtained permission to sue for medical negligence from the Claims Commissioner, must comply with both the two year time limitation for a wrongful death action articulated in Subsec. and the one year time limitation on the Claims Commissioner's authorization to sue articulated in Sec. 4-160 (d). 337 C. 291.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-487 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 918 / Section 52-487
Sec. 52-487. Enforcement of corporation laws.
Status: in_force

Issuance against corporation in general; 8 C. 246; 29 C. 546; 37 C. 164; 76 C. 179; to compel calling of special meeting; 65 C. 355; to enforce right to examine books. 87 C. 487; 90 C. 638. Cited. 65 C. 355; 188 C. 531.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-198 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-198
Sec. 52-198. Disclosure; examination of officer of corporation.
Status: in_force

Cited. 212 C. 661; 229 C. 716.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-299 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 904 / Section 52-299
Sec. 52-299. Attachment of partnership property for partner's debt.
Status: in_force

Interest taken by such an attachment. 2 C. 516; 4 C. 542, 543; 10 C. 43; 13 C. 467; 14 C. 408; 21 C. 138. Cited. 58 C. 252; 68 C. 16. Provides a remedy for the attaching creditor to make his security available. 71 C. 706.

Cited. 21 CA 32.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146x — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146x
Sec. 52-146x. Disclosure of patient communication or information relating to gender-affirming health care services or reproductive health care services by covered entity prohibited. Exceptions.
Status: in_force

(b) Written consent of the patient or the patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative shall not be required for the disclosure of such communication or information (1) pursuant to the laws of this state or the rules of court prescribed by the Judicial Branch, (2) by a covered entity against whom a claim has been made, or there is a reasonable belief will be made, in such action or proceeding, to the covered entity's attorney or professional liability insurer or such insurer's agent for use in the defense of such action or proceeding, (3) to the Commissioner of Public Health for records of a patient of a covered entity in connection with an investigation of a complaint, if such records are related to the complaint, or (4) if child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual, abuse of an individual who is physically disabled or incompetent or abuse of an individual with intellectual disability is known or in good faith suspected.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impede the lawful sharing of medical records as permitted by state or federal law or the rules of the court prescribed by the Judicial Branch, except in the case of a subpoena commanding the production, copying or inspection of medical records relating to reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services, as defined in section 52-571n .
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-584b
Sec. 52-584b. Limitation of actions against attorneys in connection with title certificates or opinions and title searches.
Status: in_force

Cited. 214 C. 464.

Letter seeking approval to partition real property found not to be a title certificate or opinion within meaning of statute. 56 CA 363.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557s — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-557s
Sec. 52-557s. Liability of owner or keeper of horse, pony, donkey or mule.
Status: in_force

(b) In any civil action brought against the owner or keeper of any horse, pony, donkey or mule to recover damages for any personal injury allegedly caused by such horse, pony, donkey or mule, there shall be a presumption that such horse, pony, donkey or mule did not have a propensity to engage in behavior that would foreseeably cause injury to humans. Such presumption may be rebutted by evidence that such horse, pony, donkey or mule previously exhibited behavior that put the owner or keeper of such horse, pony, donkey or mule on notice that such horse, pony, donkey or mule had a propensity to engage in the behavior that allegedly caused such personal injury.

(c) There shall be no cause of action for strict liability brought against the owner of any horse, pony, donkey or mule to recover damages for any personal injury alleged to be caused by such horse, pony, donkey or mule.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-185 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-185
Sec. 52-185. Bond or recognizance for prosecution.
Status: in_force

(b) The recognizance may be taken in the following form:

You, C.S., as principal, and E.C., as surety, acknowledge yourselves jointly and severally bound to J.L., in a recognizance (or, as the case may be, You, E.C., acknowledge yourself bound to J.L., in a recognizance) of .... dollars, that C.S. shall prosecute the action which he has now commenced against J.L. at the Superior court to be held at H. in and for the judicial district of H., on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20.. to full effect, and that he shall pay any costs for which judgment may be rendered against him thereon.

Taken and acknowledged at H. on the .... day of ...., 20.., before me, J.W., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

(c) If a bond or recognizance is required on any writ of summons or attachment, it may be noted in the writ in the following manner:

E.C. of .... is recognized in $.... to prosecute, etc. (or words to that effect).

(d) Any party failing to comply with an order of the judicial authority to give sufficient bond or recognizance may be nonsuited or defaulted.

The person serving the writ may give bond. 1 R. 356. Liability of bondsman continues until final termination of the litigation. 7 C. 435. Death of plaintiff discharges bond. 9 C. 238. Liability of surety on bond. 14 C. 329; 30 C. 143, 144. The want of a bond is only matter of abatement. 16 C. 574. Is in itself a complete record, imports verity and is conclusive evidence of its own truth. 28 C. 534; 48 C. 380. Bond may be written out in full after suit is brought upon it. Id., 381. If nonresident plaintiff fails to give bond, the defect cannot be made good by bond afterward given in court. 51 C. 327. Ordinary bond for costs not required where replevin bond is given. 54 C. 48. Bond for costs not essential on application for an alternative writ of mandamus; failure to give bond waived by appearance. 67 C. 365, 366. Bond of surety company may be accepted. 70 C. 558. Bondsman's undertaking is that of surety, although plaintiff is not formally joined as principal. Id., 559, 560. Bond of $140 to answer all damages, etc., held sufficient; memorandum de bond at foot of injunction writ, held a compliance with statute. 73 C. 541. Mistake in memo. 74 C. 170. Of practice in general; applies to writ of error; effect of noting bond under section. 75 C. 652. Taking is ministerial act. 77 C. 184. Discretion of court as to amount. 82 C. 1. When statute applies to mandamus. 90 C. 639; 91 C. 114. Temporary residence in another state does not make one a nonresident. 92 C. 345. Statute applies only to process in actions in which costs are taxable; not to habeas corpus. 113 C. 739. Cited. Id., 772; 166 C. 174; 173 C. 408; 191 C. 201.

Trial court is authorized to exercise its discretion to waive recognizance bond requirement outright or to significantly reduce the amount of the bond for an indigent inmate upon a proper showing of the inmate's indigency and inability to find another financially responsible person willing to enter into a recognizance bond on his or her behalf. 163 CA 337; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 328 C. 248.

History and review of section. 3 CS 434. Recognizance or certificate of financial responsibility is a condition precedent to validity of writ. 4 CS 279. Cited. 6 CS 156. Applicability in divorce actions. 7 CS 88. Cited. 8 CS 398. Meaning of “substantial” discussed. 13 CS 13. Cited. Id., 441. Court cannot waive bond even in the case of an indigent plaintiff. 36 CS 37.

Where addresses of two of three plaintiffs were lacking, but subscribing authority certified as to plaintiff's financial responsibility, plea in abatement by defendant upon grounds the two plaintiffs might be nonresidents was overruled. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 235.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251b — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-251b
Sec. 52-251b. Costs and attorney's fees in action for deprivation of civil rights.
Status: in_force

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not be deemed: (1) To create a new cause of action against any individual, the state or any municipality, or against any officer, official or employee of the state or any municipality; or (2) to confer any new jurisdiction upon the Superior Court in any action against any individual, the state or any municipality or any officer, official or employee thereof.

Cited. 204 C. 17; 216 C. 85.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-519 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 921 / Section 52-519
Sec. 52-519. Form of writ, affidavit and bond.
Status: in_force

To any proper officer:

By authority of the state of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded, without delay, to cause to be replevied to A.B. of .... certain goods and chattels, to wit: .... of the value of (here insert the value as stated in the affidavit) dollars, now in the possession of C.D. of .... at .... and wrongfully detained by him, and (to attach the goods or estate of C.D., to the value of .... dollars and) him summon to appear before the superior court to be held at .... within and for the judicial district of .... on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20..; then and there to answer to A.B., in a civil action, in which the plaintiff complains and says:

(Here follows complaint.)

Hereof fail not, but make due service and return.

Dated at ...., this .... day of ...., 20..

E.F., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

Judicial district of .... ss. Town of ...., 20..

J.S., of ...., being duly sworn, deposes and says that he believes that A.B. of .... is entitled to the immediate possession of the following described goods and chattels, namely: ....; that the deponent knows the nature and value of said goods and chattels, and that their true and just value, as nearly as the deponent can estimate it, is .... dollars.

J.S.

Subscribed and sworn to before me,

E.F., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

Be it remembered that at the town of .... in .... judicial district, on the .... day of ...., 20.., there personally appear before me, A.B. of ...., as principal, and I.J. of ...., as surety, both of whom are known to be of sufficient responsibility, and acknowledged themselves jointly and severally bound to C.D. of ...., in a recognizance in the sum of .... dollars, that A.B. of ...., who brought the foregoing writ and complaint against C.D., shall prosecute his action to effect, and shall pay to C.D. any judgment that C.D. may recover in the action, and return to C.D. the goods and chattels that may be recovered under the writ, and pay to him all damages that he may sustain by the replevying thereof if A.B. shall fail to establish his right to the possession of the same in the action.

A.B.

I.J.

Signed by the obligors in the presence of

X.Y.

Subscribed and taken before me,

E.F., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

See Sec. 51-15 re rules of procedure in certain civil actions.

Form need not be literally followed; substantial compliance is sufficient. 45 C. 158, 159; 54 C. 314; 57 C. 193. Immaterial variance in copy of affidavit is not a ground of abatement. 65 C. 542. Cited. 70 C. 340. Estoppel against obligors in recognizance. 77 C. 181. Nominal damages in action on bond where defendant prevails on replevin. 96 C. 683. Service of writ without complaint constitutes fatal defect, which may not be amended. 97 C. 399; 98 C. 229. Reformation of bond denied where surety mistakenly gave bond which did not contain condition covering failure to prosecute to effect. 125 C. 440.

Cited. 6 CS 156.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-420 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-420
Sec. 52-420. Motion to confirm, vacate or modify award.
Status: in_force

(b) No motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion.

(c) For the purpose of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award, such an order staying any proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the award shall be made as may be deemed necessary. Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith by the court or judge granting the order.

Cited. 136 C. 206. Filing motion with clerk of Superior Court within time limited is sufficient though notice not given defendants until after that time. 137 C. 298. Cited. 146 C. 17. Procedure re modification of award discussed. 147 C. 139. Cited. 149 C. 691; 155 C. 278; 163 C. 327; 176 C. 401; 179 C. 678; 181 C. 449; 190 C. 323; 197 C. 26; 200 C. 376; 201 C. 50; 206 C. 113; 208 C. 352; 212 C. 83; 217 C. 110; 225 C. 339; 226 C. 475; 229 C. 359. Section does not require a movant to articulate the factual basis for a motion to vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award. 337 C. 127.

Cited. 4 CA 339; 7 CA 272; 20 CA 1, 5; 29 CA 736; 32 CA 250; 33 CA 1; 36 CA 29; 39 CA 122; Id., 444. In matter where trial court had confirmed arbitration award, and thereafter no motion to modify the judgment was filed within requisite 30-day period, trial court committed reversible error when it added requirement that plaintiff's assignment of interest in certain property to defendant was a prerequisite to granting of a bank execution in plaintiff's favor; trial court's action amounted to improper modification of arbitration award rather than effectuation of the award. 88 CA 74. Dismissal of the arbitration is not a final resolution of the underlying claim on the merits and does not conclusively resolve the rights and obligations of the parties and thus, court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application to vacate. 210 CA 788.

Fact that notice of the application was given defendants by a summons rather than by a rule to show cause is not important. 16 CS 505. Contemplates and permits procedure involving use of motions in substitution for conventional forms of pleading. 20 CS 91. Taxation of costs for such proceedings are in the discretion of the court as there is no provision otherwise in the statutes. 21 CS 331. Cited. 29 CS 25; Id., 289; 45 CS 130.

Failure to move under statute will preclude aggrieved party from seeking correction of award in circuit court. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 66.

Subsec. (a):

When the parties' dispute concerns one arbitration award, reviewing an application to vacate and an application to confirm simultaneously, in furtherance of judicial economy, is a reasonable way to “dispose of the case with the least possible delay”; language of Subsec. plain and unambiguous. 161 CA 348.

Subsec. (b):

Claim of fraud does not toll the 30-day period within which a motion to vacate arbitration award must be filed pursuant to Subsec. 264 C. 307. The 30-day filing period applies to an application to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that it violates public policy. 285 C. 278. Subsec. implicates a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and that the choice of law provision contained in parties' private agreement could neither enlarge the trial court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application nor waive the jurisdictional defect; Subsec. does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal policy to enforce arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act. 338 C. 651.

Trial court's action in setting appropriate amount of compensation essentially operated as a modification of the judgment confirming arbitration award and was improper since it came after expiration of the 30-day period. 72 CA 334. It is not necessary to file motion to vacate an award within the time frame set forth in statute in cases where the arbitration award has no legal effect due to the arbitrator's untimely award, and the parties' lack of waiver of 30-day requirement. 100 CA 373. The 30-day filing period in Subsec. applies to a motion to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that it violates public policy. 108 CA 360. Compliance with section requires timely filing of an application to vacate an arbitration award, not timely service. 165 CA 467. Parties cannot contract around, by way of choice of law provision, the subject matter jurisdictional nature of Subsec., applicable to any application to vacate arbitration award brought in Connecticut state court. 192 CA 245; judgment affirmed, see 338 C. 651. Time limitation of Subsec. does not apply in situations where arbitration award in dissolution proceeding has been obtained by fraud and made part of dissolution judgment pursuant to Sec. 46b-66(e). 228 CA 163.

Request to the arbiter for modification of an award to correct a typographical error does not toll the period within which to file an application to vacate the award. 52 CS 592; judgment affirmed, see 144 CA 77.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 901 / Section 52-240a
Sec. 52-240a. Award of attorney's fees in product liability action.
Status: in_force

Cited. 187 C. 363; 210 C. 189; 239 C. 284; 240 C. 58. “Prevailing party” defined; section permits attorneys' fees to be awarded following acceptance of an offer of judgment under Sec. 52-194. 258 C. 299.

Cited. 16 CA 558.

Cited. 39 CS 132.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146i — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146i
Sec. 52-146i. Labeling of confidential records.
Status: in_force

Cited. 169 C. 223. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 191 C. 453; 211 C. 555; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-626 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-626
Sec. 52-626. Receiver's bond; alternative security.
Status: in_force

(1) Is conditioned on the faithful discharge of the receiver's duties;

(2) Has one or more sureties approved by the court;

(3) Is in an amount the court specifies; and

(4) Is effective as of the date of the receiver's appointment.

(b) The court may approve the posting by a receiver with the court of alternative security such as a letter of credit or deposit of funds. The receiver may not use receivership property as alternative security. Interest that accrues on deposited funds must be paid to the receiver on the receiver's discharge.

(c) The court may authorize a receiver to act before the receiver posts the bond or alternative security required by this section.

(d) A claim against a receiver's bond or alternative security must be made not later than one year after the date the receiver is discharged.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-209 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-209
Sec. 52-209. Argument of counsel; time limit.
Status: in_force

Constitutional right of the accused to be heard by counsel is subject to a reasonable time limit. 47 C. 535. Party represented by two counsel in Superior Court may occupy two hours in argument, dividing the time as they may agree. 55 C. 18. Discretion of court to extend time for argument. 95 C. 79. Cited. 122 C. 611; 217 C. 671.

Where presentation of evidence lasted three and one-half days and plaintiff's counsel did not move for additional time until after the argument had begun, rule of court limiting him to one hour was not an abuse of discretion. 15 CS 305.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-597 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 926 / Section 52-597
Sec. 52-597. Action for libel or slander.
Status: in_force

Cited. 214 C. 464.

Defamation count barred by section; federal prison mailbox rule not recognized. 154 CA 138.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146t — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-146t
Sec. 52-146t. Protection from compelled disclosure of information obtained by news media.
Status: in_force

(1) “Information” has its ordinary meaning and includes, but is not limited to, any oral, written or pictorial material, whether or not recorded, including any notes, outtakes, photographs, video or sound tapes, film or other data of whatever sort in any medium; and

(2) “News media” means:

(A) Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite or other transmission system or carrier, or channel or programming service for such station, network, system or carrier, or audio or audiovisual production company that disseminates information to the public, whether by print, broadcast, photographic, mechanical, electronic or any other means or medium;

(B) Any person who is or has been an employee, agent or independent contractor of any entity specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision and is or has been engaged in gathering, preparing or disseminating information to the public for such entity, or any other person supervising or assisting such person with gathering, preparing or disseminating information; or

(C) Any parent, subsidiary, division or affiliate of any person or entity specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this subdivision to the extent the subpoena or other compulsory process seeks the identity of a source or the information described in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) No judicial, executive or legislative body with the power to issue a subpoena or other compulsory process may compel the news media to testify concerning, or to produce or otherwise disclose, any information obtained or received, whether or not in confidence, by the news media in its capacity in gathering, receiving or processing information for potential communication to the public, or the identity of the source of any such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information, unless such judicial, executive or legislative body complies with the provisions of subsections (c) to (e), inclusive, of this section.

(c) Prior negotiations with the news media shall be pursued in all matters in which the issuance of a subpoena to, or the initiation of other compulsory process against, the news media is contemplated for information described in subsection (b) of this section or the identity of the source of such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information.

(d) If the news media and the party seeking to compel disclosure of information described in subsection (b) of this section or the identity of the source of any such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information, fail to reach a resolution, a court may compel disclosure of such information or the identity of the source of such information only if the court finds, after notice to and an opportunity to be heard by the news media, that the party seeking such information or the identity of the source of such information has established by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) That (A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information obtained from other sources than the news media, there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred, or (B) in a civil action or proceeding, based on information obtained from other sources than the news media, there are reasonable grounds to sustain a cause of action; and

(2) That (A) the information or the identity of the source of such information is critical or necessary to the investigation or prosecution of a crime or to a defense thereto, or to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto, (B) the information or the identity of the source of such information is not obtainable from any alternative source, and (C) there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.

(e) A court of this state shall apply the procedures and standards specified by this section to any subpoena or other compulsory process whether it arises from or is associated with a proceeding under the laws of this state or any other jurisdiction, except that with respect to a proceeding arising under the laws of another jurisdiction, a court of this state shall not afford lesser protection to the news media than that afforded by such other jurisdiction. No subpoena or compulsory process arising from or associated with a proceeding under the laws of another jurisdiction shall be enforceable in this state unless a court in this state has personal jurisdiction over the person or entity against which enforcement is sought.

(f) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section protecting from compelled disclosure information described in said subsection and the identity of the source of any such information shall also apply if a subpoena is issued to, or other compulsory process is initiated against, a third party that seeks information concerning business transactions between such third party and the news media for the purpose of obtaining information described in said subsection or discovering the identity of a source of any such information. Whenever a subpoena is issued to, or other compulsory process is initiated against, a third party that seeks information concerning business transactions between such third party and the news media, the affected news media shall be given reasonable and timely notice of the subpoena or compulsory process before it is executed or initiated, as the case may be, and an opportunity to be heard.

(g) Publication or dissemination by the news media of information described in subsection (b) of this section, or a portion thereof, shall not constitute a waiver of the protection from compelled disclosure provided in said subsection with respect to any information that is not published or disseminated.

(h) Any information obtained in violation of the provisions of this section, and the identity of the source of such information, shall be inadmissible in any action, proceeding or hearing before any judicial, executive or legislative body.

(i) Whenever any person or entity seeks the disclosure from the news media of information that is not protected against compelled disclosure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, such person or entity shall pay the actual cost that would be incurred by the news media in making a copy of such information if a subpoena or other compulsory process was not available, and may not use a subpoena or other compulsory process as a means to avoid paying such actual cost.

(j) Nothing in subsections (a) to (i), inclusive, of this section shall be construed to deny or infringe the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution guaranteed under the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article twenty-ninth of the amendments to the Constitution of the state of Connecticut.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-127 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-127
Sec. 52-127. Process not to be drawn or filled out by officer.
Status: in_force

Cited. 4 D. 436; 2 C. 377; 5 C. 538.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-338 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 905 / Section 52-338
Sec. 52-338. Service on nonresident garnishee.
Status: in_force

What must appear to give court jurisdiction. 72 C. 433. Where served on judge of probate under Sec. 52-61, must be directed against garnishee. 88 C. 607.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-212 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 900 / Section 52-212
Sec. 52-212. Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit.
Status: in_force

(b) In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any judgment rendered or decree passed in an action for dissolution of marriage or civil union or for legal separation upon default of appearance of the defendant pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-67 may be set aside at any time and the case reinstated to the docket upon a showing of material misrepresentation in the affidavit of the plaintiff filed pursuant to said subsection.

(c) The complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.

(d) The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of the complaint or written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing the judgment or decree until the decision upon the complaint or written motion.

Refusal to open a judgment of default, upon motion, may be reviewed where the question is purely one of law; 51 C. 391; but otherwise the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 69 C. 362. Action by court where substitute complaint improperly allowed after default. 86 C. 313. Formerly, did not include nonsuit; averments in complaint. 75 C. 317. Petition for new trial may be brought after the 4-month period has elapsed. 93 C. 161. Effect of judgment of default; this only further procedure permitted. 97 C. 123. Cited. 123 C. 491. Default resulting from party's own neglect will not be opened. 138 C. 27. No abuse of discretion in denying motion when it appears defendant has no defense or has not been prevented from appearing by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. 139 C. 532. Cited. 144 C. 389. Judgment of nonsuit for failure to appear should be opened if plaintiff can show reasonable cause. 147 C. 260. A motion to open judgment which stated merely that an appearance was entered as soon as defendant's attorney received notice of the action, held not a reasonable cause for opening judgment. 148 C. 435. Cited. 150 C. 191, 195; 152 C. 699. Statement that defendant failed to secure substitute counsel because of confusion attendant upon bankruptcy proceedings did not particularly set forth the reason why defendant failed to appear; statute construed; relief under statute discretionary. 154 C. 294. Prior to 1967 amendments, last two sentences applied to written motions as well as complaints. Id., 297. Where no attempt was made to show any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause for default, there was no abuse of discretion in court's denial of motion to reopen judgment. 156 C. 6. Since, on appeal, defendant requested no finding and none was made, he failed to show cause why his motion to open default judgment against him should have been granted or to establish error in trial court's denial of motion. 159 C. 352, 358. Relief under statute ordinarily should not be granted if failure to comply with order of court resulted from moving party's own negligence. Id., 427, 432. Defendant precluded from attacking a finding as unsupported by the evidence as he failed to request a transcript of the record pursuant to Sec. 51-70a. 168 C. 184. Whether proceeding under common law or statute, action of trial court in granting or refusing application to open judgment is generally within discretion of such court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion. 172 C. 520. Cited. 176 C. 579; 179 C. 290; Id., 671; 187 C. 509, 510; 188 C. 145, 151. Continuing jurisdiction under statute not affected by provisions of Sec. 49-35c(b). Id., 253. Cited. 190 C. 679; Id., 707; 193 C. 128. Defendant's motion to open judgment was properly denied since a party must meet both parts of two prong test and defendant failed to allege any purported defense to the action. Id., 160. Cited. 196 C. 233; Id., 355; 200 C. 697; 208 C. 230; 212 C. 741; 214 C. 464; 216 C. 341; 224 C. 263; 225 C. 705; 231 C. 462; 234 C. 783; 236 C. 78. Trial court did not err in refusing to open default judgment in foreclosure action because evidence gave rise to a reasonable presumption of receipt of actual notice of the action by nonresident defendant. 278 C. 92.

Cited. 1 CA 282; Id., 298; 5 CA 230; 6 CA 504; 9 CA 320; Id., 355; 10 CA 1; Id., 160; 13 CA 223; 14 CA 172; Id., 236; 15 CA 308; 18 CA 589; 19 CA 8; 22 CA 424; 27 CA 755; judgment reversed, see 225 C. 757; 28 CA 7. Section requires date of judgment not be included in time calculation. 29 CA 465. Cited. 30 CA 541; 31 CA 634; 35 CA 236; 38 CA 506; 39 CA 253; 40 CA 404; Id., 590; 42 CA 119; 43 CA 645; 44 CA 381; Id., 724; 45 CA 137; 46 CA 5; Id., 54. Trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to open judgment filed outside the 4-month period and may refuse to consider procedurally defective motions. 51 CA 1. Negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of statute to set aside a default judgment. 63 CA 544. It is axiomatic that the right to move to open and vacate a judgment assumes that the party who is to exercise the right be given opportunity to know that there is a judgment to open; plaintiff that demonstrated it did not receive notice of entry of nonsuit in timely manner allowed to file motion to open within 4 months of receiving notice. 68 CA 68. Negligence is not sufficient reason to open a judgment of default. 78 CA 466. Court has intrinsic power, independent of statutory provision, to vacate any judgment obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake. Id., 684. Misapprehension of the effect of a second reclaim is not proper grounds for opening judgment upon default. 139 CA 683. Section did not apply to open judgment of dismissal where such judgment was rendered in response to failure of plaintiff's counsel to attend dormancy status conference. 161 CA 594. Involuntary commitment does not necessarily constitute reasonable cause for purposes of section, and trial court is not required to find reasonable cause from an involuntary commitment standing alone. 162 CA 51. Section does not contemplate that a party can file a deficient verified statement and then insist on an evidentiary hearing to correct deficiencies noted by the court. 213 CA 739.

Cited. 7 CS 250. Judgment of nonsuit not reopened to allow filing of substituted complaint where the action had been in court over a year previously and counsel did not see fit to plead over within the time provided by rules of court. 8 CS 372. Judgment in uncontested divorce action set aside where appearance of defendant's counsel by accident or inadvertence was not entered. 16 CS 111. Statute refers to a final judgment and not to judgment by default. 17 CS 118. Cited. 19 CS 288. A default is not a judgment but an interlocutory order of court, the effect of which is to preclude defendant from making any further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned; a judgment upon default, on the other hand, is the final judgment in the case which is entered after the default and after a hearing in damages; a motion to set aside a default may be filed at any time before entry of judgment, may be informal in nature and may be granted for such reason as the court sees fit. 24 CS 81. Trial court's refusal to open a default judgment because of defendant's negligence in failing to appear was not an abuse of discretion on the record. 31 CS 540. Failure of defendants to appear on date set by court order of final assignment for trial because they relied on assistant court clerk's advice the action had been reassigned to a later date, not “reasonable cause” for opening default judgment. Id., 549. Cited. 33 CS 554; Id., 775; 34 CS 501; Id., 559. In order not to frustrate the remedial purpose of statute, the time limit provisions must be construed as a limitation on the prejudiced party rather than as a jurisdictional barrier to the exercise of judicial power. 35 CS 581. Cited. Id., 598; 36 CS 626; 37 CS 676; 38 CS 731. Default judgment should not be opened where defendant received actual notice of the action but chose to ignore authority of the court. 45 CS 563.

Failure to move to open judgment resulted in waiver of claim of discharge in bankruptcy. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 386. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Mere negligence or inattention of a party is no ground for vacating a judgment on default against him. Id., 397. Where plaintiff's motion to open judgment on default was denied, he was not precluded from petitioning for a new trial; determination of motion was not res judicata. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 201. Granting motion to open judgment on default abuse of discretion where facts show failure to appear and defend due to defendant's negligence. Id., 396. Granting of motion to open judgment is interlocutory ruling, reviewable upon appeal from final judgment, and appeal was not allowed as this was not final action of circuit court. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 289. Opening judgment after default, unless based on pure error of law, lies in sound discretion of court. Id., 291.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-164 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 899 / Section 52-164
Sec. 52-164. Reports of judicial decisions of other states.
Status: in_force

If they contain conflicting decisions, that of the highest court is not necessarily controlling. 14 C. 387. Laws of other states presumed to be like our own, or the common law. 15 C. 18; 18 C. 370; 33 C. 432; 82 C. 352; 86 C. 234; Id., 243. Such reports are conclusive as to the laws of the jurisdiction from which they come. 18 C. 370, 371. Cited. 47 C. 599; 93 C. 46; 118 C. 156; 142 C. 278. Statute of another state construed in accordance with the decisions of its courts. 87 C. 463. Obviates necessity for specially pleading law of foreign state. 103 C. 505; 106 C. 688. Court need not take judicial notice of law of foreign jurisdiction under this section or Sec. 51-32 or 52-163 unless authoritative sources of the foreign law, subject to inspection or verification by opposing counsel, are made available to the court by reference or otherwise, under the usual rules of judicial notice. 152 C. 475. Court need not take judicial notice of the law of a foreign jurisdiction unless authoritative sources of the foreign law are made available to the court. 165 C. 777. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 2 CA 315.

Statutes and decisions in foreign states are only evidence of what the law may be found to be and not what the law is. 8 CS 259. Court refused to take judicial notice of foreign law where unfairly introduced by defendant, after conclusion of evidence, by motion for directed verdict and verdict for plaintiffs was properly sustained. 27 CS 508.

Parties not having established New York law with respect to matters in issue, court assumes that law is same as Connecticut. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 629. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-103 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-103
Sec. 52-103. Citation of new parties by judge.
Status: in_force

Cited. 191 C. 1; 212 C. 628.

Cited. 25 CS 315. Section may not be used by Probate Court appellant to become party to another's appeal. 28 CS 392.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 923a / Section 52-552i
Sec. 52-552i. Defenses, liability and protection of transferee.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-552h , the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (d) of this section, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against: (1) The first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made, or (2) any subsequent transferee other than a good-faith transferee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.

(c) If the judgment under subsection (b) of this section is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require.

(d) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under sections 52-552a to 52-552 l , inclusive, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to (1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; (2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or (3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.

(e) A transfer is not voidable under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e or section 52-552f if the transfer results from termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law.

(f) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e or section 52-552f against an institution of higher education, as defined in 20 USC 1001, if the transfer was made or obligation incurred by a parent or guardian on behalf of a minor or adult child in furtherance of the child's undergraduate education.

(g) A transfer is not voidable under subsection (b) of section 52-552f : (1) To the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a valid lien, (2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider, or (3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.

Plain language of section demonstrates that Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was enacted specifically to expand range of a creditor's remedies beyond the common-law property and proceeds rule. 266 C. 1.

Subsec. (b): By its plain terms, subsection bestows upon a trial court the discretion to award, as damages against the appropriate party, the lesser of the value of the asset transferred and the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. 201 CA 774.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-139 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 898 / Section 52-139
Sec. 52-139. Set-off of mutual debts; procedure.
Status: in_force

(b) No debt claimed by assignment may be set off unless the plaintiff had notice, at the commencement of the action, that the debt was due the defendant.

(c) If it appears upon the trial that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant, the court shall give judgment for the defendant to recover the balance due of the plaintiff with his costs, except that no judgment may be given against the plaintiff to recover the balance of a debt due only a part of the defendants.

See Sec. 37-2 re limitation on amount of interest, discount or damages for detention of money which may be recovered by a borrower.

“Mutual debts” defined. 7 C. 223; 8 C. 328; 81 C. 244; 88 C. 198; 108 C. 499; 114 C. 564. The debt set off must have been due and payable when the suit was brought. 32 C. 141, but see 108 C. 499. Suit by executor. 34 C. 66; 1 R. 428. Claims for unliquidated damages. 9 C. 433; 31 C. 343. Suit by receivers of bank, set-off of bills of bank disallowed. 22 C. 644. Interest on balance. 32 C. 564. Judgment debt; demand in plea for judgment for defendant. 28 C. 120. In a suit upon a partnership claim, defendant cannot set off a claim against one of the partners individually. 43 C. 80. Insolvency of savings bank; debtor cannot set off the amount of his deposit. Id., 155. Obligor in bond to a town in a criminal cause cannot set off a claim against the town. 45 C. 353. Debt against insolvent estate, barred by failure to present, may still be used as an offset. 46 C. 277. A defendant pleading set-off is virtually a plaintiff as respects that claim. 49 C. 91. Courts of equity sometimes allow a set-off where a court of law would not. Id., 569. Statutory right of set-off is reinforced and extended by practice act. 50 C. 301; 108 C. 499. Delinquent tax collector cannot set off his claim for salary. 51 C. 172. Lessee of administrator cannot set off debt of intestate against rent. 53 C. 500. Fundamental principles and tests of set-off. 55 C. 127; 108 C. 499. In an action of covenant against encumbrances, unpaid purchase notes of plaintiff may be used as a set-off. 55 C. 431. Set-off not recognized in an action for tort. 66 C. 508; 82 C. 361; 39 C. 366. In action by trustee in insolvency. 65 C. 76. Right of set-off in general; in action by receiver of bank. 88 C. 186; Id., 198. Personal debt of trustee cannot be set off in action by him as trustee. 86 C. 548. Is matter of defense. 82 C. 175. Unliquidated damages in contract may be set off in action on foreign judgment; equitable rights. 81 C. 244. In action against guarantor, he cannot set off debt owed him by plaintiff. 68 C. 525. Set-off of mutual debt not matured permitted where one of mutual debtors has been adjudicated insolvent; statute is not exclusive in its scope. 108 C. 499. Allegations of answer cannot operate as claim for set-off unless accompanied by claim for affirmative relief. 109 C. 5. Set-off between parties distinguished from an accord and satisfaction. Id., 245. Trust company may not set off its own deposits with private banker against certificate of deposit issued to private banker and deposited with State Treasurer in lieu of private banker's bond. 114 C. 560. Where no equitable considerations are involved, defendant under statute can set off debts only when they are presently due him. 117 C. 280; 128 C. 10. Set-off not allowed bank on note against maker's deposit which, before note matured, was assigned to one who paid valid consideration, neither maker nor bank being insolvent. Id., 276. Maker of note which had not matured when trust company suspended held entitled to set off deposit when receiver sued on note. 118 C. 42. Assignee of chose in action takes subject to equities and defenses arising before receipt of notice of assignment; no set-off against assignee where defendant at time of notice of assignment had no right to recover from assignor. 128 C. 4. Set-off distinguished from counterclaim; condition precedent to legal set-off is that it shall be in answer to suit on a debt. 130 C. 210. Cited. 191 C. 104; 207 C. 483.

Cited. 6 CA 106; Id., 417; 12 CA 353; 15 CA 362; 40 CA 536; 44 CA 759.

Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 427. Unliquidated assigned claim cannot be set off in action in assumpsit. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 581.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 909 / Section 52-418
Sec. 52-418. Vacating award.
Status: in_force

(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required to be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. Notwithstanding the time within which the award is required to be rendered, if an award issued pursuant to a grievance taken under a collective bargaining agreement is vacated the court or judge shall direct a rehearing unless either party affirmatively pleads and the court or judge determines that there is no issue in dispute.

(c) Any party filing an application pursuant to subsection (a) of this section concerning an arbitration award issued by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall notify said board and the Attorney General, in writing, of such filing within five days of the date of filing.

Plaintiffs were not in fact parties to the arbitration, nor were they parties through representation by the union and they had no standing to apply to have award vacated. 135 C. 10. Cited. 138 C. 65; 139 C. 514. Application to vacate award should be granted where arbitrator exceeded his powers. Id., 591. Powers of an arbitrator are limited by the agreement of submission. 140 C. 32. Cited. Id., 446. “Undue means” discussed. 142 C. 190. An award may be vacated if the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 143 C. 399. When there is no adequate remedy at law, the party claiming injury through partiality and fraud can invoke the equitable powers of a court for an appropriate remedy. 144 C. 303. Applicable to awards of Board of Mediation and Arbitration, as well as to arbitration awards generally. 145 C. 53. Power of arbitrators outlined by terms of submission. Id., 285. If dispute arose while agreement was operative, arbitrators had jurisdiction. 146 C. 17. Member of union not a party to the arbitration and therefore not entitled to apply to have the award vacated. 147 C. 139. Burden rests on party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it. Id., 524. Cited. 150 C. 547. Award properly vacated where it was made more than 60 days from date arbitrators were empowered to act. 157 C. 362. Cited. 160 C. 411; 162 C. 422; 163 C. 309; Id., 327. In deciding whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers under Subsec. (d), the court need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission. 164 C. 472. The court is bound by the arbitrator's determination unless that determination falls within the proscriptions of section or procedurally violates the parties' agreement. 167 C. 315. Board of education's agreement to submit a question to arbitrator waived any objection to the question as not being arbitrable or within matters enumerated for arbitration; arbitration is a creature of contract between the parties and its autonomy requires a minimum of judicial intrusion. 168 C. 54. Cited. 171 C. 420; Id., 493. In deciding whether to vacate arbitration award on ground that arbitrators “exceeded their powers” under section, court should examine submission and award to determine if latter conforms to former. 173 C. 287. Cited. 174 C. 583; 175 C. 24; 176 C. 401; 178 C. 557; 179 C. 184; Id., 678; 183 C. 102; 184 C. 578, 580. Where trial court vacates an arbitration award before the time “within which the award is required to be rendered” has expired, it is, under statute, empowered to order a rehearing of the matter by the arbitrators. 187 C. 228. Cited. 189 C. 16; Id., 560. A finding of arbitrability is not an award until it becomes part of an award on the merits. 190 C. 323. Cited. Id., 707; 191 C. 316; Id., 336; 195 C. 266; 196 C. 623; 197 C. 26; 199 C. 618; 200 C. 345; Id., 376; 201 C. 50; Id., 577; 203 C. 133. De novo judicial review of compulsory arbitration proceedings discussed. 205 C. 178. Cited. 206 C. 113; Id., 465; Id., 643; 208 C. 187; Id., 352; Id., 411; 209 C. 280; 210 C. 333; 211 C. 7; Id., 541; Id., 640; 212 C. 83; 213 C. 525; Id., 532; 214 C. 209; 215 C. 157; Id., 399; 216 C. 612; 217 C. 110; 218 C. 646; Id., 681; 221 C. 206; 222 C. 480; 223 C. 1; Id., 761; 224 C. 766; 225 C. 223; 226 C. 475; 229 C. 359. Judgment of Appellate Court in 31 CA 75 reversed. Id., 465. Cited. 234 C. 123; Id., 217; Id., 817; 237 C. 114; 238 C. 293; 239 C. 32; Id., 537; 272 C. 617.

Unless collective bargaining agreement provides for personal right to seek arbitration, an employee subject to the agreement is not a “party to the arbitration”; standing is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by the parties. 1 CA 154. Cited. Id., 207; Id., 219; 3 CA 250; Id., 697; 4 CA 21; Id., 577; 5 CA 61; Id., 636; 6 CA 11; Id., 438; 7 CA 286; 9 CA 396; 10 CA 292; Id., 611; 12 CA 642; 13 CA 461; 14 CA 153; Id., 257; 16 CA 486; 17 CA 280; 20 CA 67; 23 CA 24; Id., 727; 26 CA 351; 27 CA 386; Id., 635; 28 CA 337; 29 CA 484; 30 CA 157; 31 CA 73; judgment reversed; see 229 C. 465; 32 CA 289; 33 CA 1; Id., 626; Id., 737; 34 CA 27; 35 CA 338; Id., 775; Id., 804; 36 CA 29; 37 CA 1; Id., 708; 39 CA 122; 43 CA 800; 44 CA 415; Id., 506; 45 CA 237; 46 CA 520. Broad and unrestricted arbitration clauses in purchase and sale agreements that provided for arbitration “concerning any matter provided for herein or arising hereunder” gave trial court authority to determine amounts owed on each note and to direct that they be paid by defendants. 62 CA 83. Trial court's determination was proper and consistent with applicable collective bargaining agreement. 75 CA 198. Enforcement of arbitration award reducing grievant's dismissal to a 1-year suspension would violate a clearly established public policy against workplace sexual harassment. 125 CA 408. Dismissal of the arbitration is not a final resolution of the underlying claim on the merits and does not conclusively resolve the rights and obligations of the parties and thus, court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application to vacate. 210 CA 788.

When applications are commenced. 15 CS 118. Proceedings of agreement to arbitrate not affected by limitations between union and employer. Id., 391. Cited. Id., 397; 16 CS 137. Meaning of “an application to the court”. Id., 505. Cited. 17 CS 14; 18 CS 231. To vacate an award, court must find arbitrator's interpretation clearly untenable. 19 CS 71; Id., 347. Cited. 20 CS 91. The charter of an arbitrator is the submission but the provisions of the contract in question must be read as a whole. Id., 451. A labor arbitration award which contravenes public policy by its construction of a labor agreement is void. 22 CS 475. Cited. 29 CS 25; 32 CS 85. Since the parties by the agreement of submission define the scope of the arbitration, an award will not be vacated if it conforms to the submission. 36 CS 223. Cited. 38 CS 80; 40 CS 145; Id., 365; 42 CS 336; 43 CS 470; 44 CS 312; Id., 482; 45 CS 130. Absent violation of statute, courts should not interfere in arbitral decision. Id., 144.

Former Subdiv. (d):

Cited. 141 C. 514; Id., 606. The question submitted to arbitration was whether the collective bargaining agreement was violated by the company's “present operating practice”; the award, by defining a course of conduct which could be followed in the future, went beyond the submission and could not be upheld. 149 C. 687. In deciding whether arbitrators have “exceeded their powers”, as that phrase is used in Subsec., courts need only examine the submission and award to determine whether award conforms to submission. 171 C. 420. Cited. 176 C. 401; 181 C. 211; Id., 449; 183 C. 579.

Inherently inconsistent award was vacated as arbitrator acted in violation, of Subsec., imperfectly executing his powers. 27 CS 278. Since the law of the forum determines the remedy, an Iowa law prohibiting the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage was inapplicable and the arbitrator's award was confirmed. 36 CS 232. Cited. 38 CS 80.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 190 C. 14; 209 C. 579; 212 C. 368; Id., 652; 214 C. 734; 218 C. 51; 231 C. 563; 234 C. 408. Subdiv. (3): Misconduct under section may be waived; judgment of Appellate Court in 38 CA 709 reversed. 237 C. 378. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrators did not exceed their powers when they failed to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior arbitration award. 248 C. 108. Challenge to voluntary arbitration award rendered pursuant to an unrestricted submission which raises a legitimate and colorable claim of violation of public policy requires de novo judicial review. 257 C. 80. Trial court did not err in confirming arbitration award; in matters where an arbitration submission is unrestricted, arbitrator's award shall not be vacated unless award rules on constitutionality of a statute, violates clear public policy or contravenes one or more statutory prescriptions of section. 273 C. 86. Trial court correctly determined that plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence of partiality or bias by the arbitrator to justify vacatur of award under Subdiv. (2). 276 C. 599. Arbitrator's failure to consider trial testimony of defendant's employee concerning employee's bribes to plaintiff's former mayor in exchange for awards of construction contracts constituted misconduct, because evidence was not cumulative and provided additional information. 278 C. 466. Subdiv. (4): On application to vacate award on the ground that it violates public policy, applicant did not meet significant burden to demonstrate that arbitrator exercised power in manifest disregard of the law where applicant asserted that public policy of preventing sexual harassment and workplace violence overrode employee's contractual right to transfer. 287 C. 258. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrator did not exceed his authority by declining to award attorney's fees under the arbitration agreement since question is whether arbitrator had authority to reach the issue, not whether the issue was correctly decided. 293 C. 748. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrator improperly relied on employee's admission into accelerated rehabilitation program as evidence of cause for employee's discharge from employment despite clear and significant public policy that acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation is not evidence of guilt, that it cannot be used as evidence of guilt, and that it has no probative value on the issues of guilt or innocence of the charged offenses. 298 C. 824. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrator's interpretation of just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement as barring the grievant's termination of employment for sexual harassment of a coworker violated the clear, well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in this state and the award was correctly vacated. 309 C. 519. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrators did not exceed their powers as arbitration award did not violate public policy against intentional police officer dishonesty because officer's dishonesty was not egregious enough to warrant termination of employment. 315 C. 49. Subdiv. (3): Trial court improperly vacated arbitration award of appraisal panel because the court's conclusion that the appraisal panel's decision had prejudiced the substantial monetary rights of the plaintiff was the basis for the court's disagreement with appraisal panel's ultimate conclusions on the issue of valuation, and not a determination that the appraisal panel had engaged in misconduct impacting the fairness of the arbitration procedures. 326 C. 638.

Cited. 3 CA 286; 9 CA 260; 16 CA 711; 23 CA 107; Id., 107; 24 CA 254; 33 CA 669; 35 CA 638. Subdiv. (3): Once a finding of misconduct made, court required to vacate award. 38 CA 709. Cited. 44 CA 764; 45 CA 432. Subdiv. (4) is not sole source of court's power of review of arbitration. 48 CA 849. Award not definite under Subdiv. (4) where remedy remained open to negotiation and award left a specific remedy to the predilection of a party. 49 CA 33. Plaintiff has burden of establishing the award is invalid because it falls within the proscriptions of section. Id., 443. Review of unrestricted submissions discussed; arbitrators' decision conforms to submission. 53 CA 702. In the event part of arbitration award is within the scope of the submission and part of award is not, court may vacate any portion of the award that does not disturb the merits of the arbitration. 56 CA 786. When agreement is silent, arbitration board may establish standard of proof without violating requirements of notice and full and fair hearing. 57 CA 490. Subdiv. (4): Where submission was voluntary and unrestricted, court did not err in failing to vacate entire award since award conformed to submission, but court did err in failing to confirm entire award when it improperly substituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law for that of the arbitrator. 59 CA 224. Arbitration award vacated where award was open to negotiation; the fact that a failed negotiation might return to a different arbitrator did mitigate the indefiniteness, or lack of finality, of the award. 72 CA 274. It is axiomatic that any challenge to an award under Subdiv. (4), on ground that arbitrator exceeded his powers, is limited to comparison of award with submission. 80 CA 1. Party challenging arbitration award on the ground that arbitrator refused to receive material evidence must prove that, by virtue of an evidentiary ruling, he was in fact deprived of full and fair hearing before the arbitration panel. 81 CA 532. Subdiv. (4): With unrestricted submission, court's review of the award is limited to determination of whether it conforms to the submission. Id., 726. Award that is legally incorrect does not fall within exception provided in Subdiv. (4) and should not be set aside. 84 CA 826. Subdiv. (4): Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that arbitration award conformed to the submission and declining to examine arbitrator's reasoning in arriving at the award because, when submission is unrestricted, court is confined to examination of the submission and award to determine whether the award conformed to the submission. 86 CA 686. Subdiv. (4): Trial court properly denied plaintiff union's application to vacate arbitration award, plaintiff having failed to establish its claim that arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in concluding that article two of collective bargaining agreement pertaining to management rights, rather than article nine pertaining to layoffs, applied to facts of case; given arbitrator's finding that grievant was unable to perform duties of a security guard, it was not unreasonable for arbitrator to conclude that article nine did not address layoffs of individuals for being unable to perform duties of their position. 99 CA 54. Arbitration panel did not exceed and imperfectly execute its powers because its award did not conform to the parties' submission; trial court did not improperly refuse to vacate award. 102 CA 61. An arbitrator, in rendering arbitration award, may take into account grievant's acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation; there is no clear legal principle preventing arbitrator from drawing adverse inferences from fact that grievant has utilized accelerated rehabilitation and drawing of such inferences is not violation of public policy. 107 CA 321; judgment reversed, see 298 C. 824. Plaintiff did not meet burden of demonstrating arbitration award failed to conform to submission; ex parte communication between one of the arbitrators and one of the parties did not result in any harm and did not mandate vacatur of the arbitration award. 121 CA 31. Arbitrator did not exceed his authority under Subdiv. (4) because the submission asked arbitrator to determine whether employee had been terminated for just cause in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement and, if not, what the remedy should be, the plaintiff conceded that the award conformed to the submission and the record demonstrated that the arbitrator applied and interpreted the agreement. 122 CA 617. Subdiv. (4): Submission to arbitration panel was unrestricted, and panel was not limited in the remedy it could fashion once it determined that employee was terminated from employment without just cause, and panel's failure to reinstate employee cannot be construed as a failure to conform with the submission. 125 CA 225. Subdiv. (4): At most, the panel misapplied or misconstrued statutory requirements, neither of which is sufficient to support a manifest disregard of the law claim. 130 CA 556. Subdiv. (4): Under Subdiv., a court will compare the award to the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers. 132 CA 326. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrator's decision to base an award on certain legal theories amounts to only an “arguable difference” regarding the meaning or applicability of the law, not the “manifest disregard” of the law necessary for the court to overturn the arbitrator's decision. 146 CA 60. Subdiv. (1): Opposing counsel's failure to disclose certain facts during an ex parte hearing in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not amount to “corruption, fraud or undue means” as contemplated by Subdiv. Id., 768. Burden of proving evident partiality rests with party making claim and requires more than a showing of an appearance of bias, and will be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration; failure of panel to consider evidence of past disciplinary actions against defendant does not provide adequate basis to vacate decision where plaintiff did not demonstrate that the panel engaged in misconduct. 155 CA 246. Subdiv. (4): Arbitrator did not run afoul of Subdiv. as defendant failed to prove that Garrity test, 223 C. 1, was satisfied because there was no obvious error and record did not show that the arbitrator deliberately ignored the law. Id., 264. Subdiv. (4): Arbitration agreement did not reference the construction industry rules of the American Arbitration Association or any other set of rules, thus arbitrator did not exceed her authority when she did not apply those rules when arbitrating the dispute. 194 CA 519.

Subdiv. (4): Arbitration award that upheld the disciplining of a police officer for his insistence on being truthful contravenes public policy and therefore exceeds the powers of the arbitrator and is vacated as void and unenforceable. 40 CS 145. Cited. 41 CS 17; 43 CS 32; 45 CS 130. Labor union that sought to challenge an arbitration award failed to meet burden of demonstrating that the arbitration panel's award violated section. 47 CS 559. On application to vacate an award on the ground that it violates public policy, court first addresses whether an explicit public policy has been identified in the application and then whether arbitrators' award violated this clear public policy. 48 CS 38. Subdiv. (3): Application to vacate award denied where defendant failed to demonstrate that arbitrators denied request for a postponement, arbitrators misled defendant into believing its request for a postponement had been denied, or arbitrators were presented with sufficient cause for defendant to obtain a postponement. 52 CS 295.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 218 C. 51. Although it is within discretion of trial court to decide whether to submit the issues to the initial arbitrator, the court may also refer the matter to a new arbitrator. 249 C. 474. Trial court had authority to remand case to arbitration panel to clarify its decision and complete its task without vacating award. 271 C. 474.

In 1997 amendment, legislature chose to make rehearing mandatory for arbitral awards pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, irrespective of time within which award was required to have been rendered; legislature did not manifest intent to require court to remand award for new hearing by new arbitrator; text of statute does not require de novo hearing on remand. 66 CA 202.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-560a — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-560a
Sec. 52-560a. Damages for encroachment on state, municipal or nonprofit land conservation organization open space land. Attorney General enforcement. Civil action.
Status: in_force

(b) No person may encroach or cause another person to encroach on open space land or on any land for which the state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization holds a conservation easement interest, without the permission of the owner of such open space land or holder of such conservation easement or without other legal authorization.

(c) Any owner of open space land or holder of a conservation easement subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section or the Attorney General may bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district where the land is located against any person who violates the provisions of said subsection with respect to such owner's land or land subject to such conservation easement. The court shall order any person who violates the provisions of subsection (b) of this section to restore the land to its condition as it existed prior to such violation or shall award the landowner the costs of such restoration, including reasonable management costs necessary to achieve such restoration. In addition, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs and such injunctive or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

(d) In addition to any damages and relief ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court may award damages of up to five times the cost of restoration or statutory damages of up to five thousand dollars. In determining the amount of the award, the court shall consider the willfulness of the violation, the extent of damage done to natural resources, if any, the appraised value of any trees or shrubs cut, damaged, or carried away as determined in accordance with the latest revision of The Guide for Plant Appraisal, as published by the International Society of Arboriculture, Urbana, Illinois, or a succeeding publisher, any economic gain realized by the violator and any other relevant factors.

Provision permitting injunctive and equitable relief authorized trial court to order a restoration plan that went beyond restoration of the property to its condition prior to defendant's violation of conservation restriction; attorney's fees were improperly awarded for plaintiff's proceedings before the wetlands commission, but properly awarded for the declaratory judgment portion of the court action due to provision allowing for attorney's fees in any action in which relief is granted. 325 C. 737. The trial court's punitive damages award was not compliant with Subsec. (d) after the court revised the initial restoration plan because, with no evidence of the cost of the plan, the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages became unknown. Id.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-625 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 930 / Section 52-625
Sec. 52-625. Disqualification from appointment as receiver; disclosure of interest.
Status: in_force

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person is disqualified from appointment as receiver if the person:

(1) Is an affiliate of a party;

(2) Has an interest materially adverse to an interest of a party;

(3) Has a material financial interest in the outcome of the action, other than compensation the court may allow the receiver;

(4) Has a debtor-creditor relationship with a party; or

(5) Holds an equity interest in a party, other than a noncontrolling interest in a publicly traded company.

(c) A person is not disqualified from appointment as receiver solely because the person:

(1) Was appointed receiver or is owed compensation in an unrelated matter involving a party or was engaged by a party in a matter unrelated to the receivership;

(2) Is an individual obligated to a party on a debt that is not in default and was incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes; or

(3) Maintains with a party a deposit account, as defined in subdivision (29) of subsection (a) of section 42a-9-102 .

(d) A person seeking appointment of a receiver may nominate a person to serve as receiver, but the court is not bound by the nomination.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-563 — Connecticut Code / Title 52 / Chapter 925 / Section 52-563
Sec. 52-563. Liability for waste by tenant for life or years.
Status: in_force

If tenant for life cuts fruit trees, it is waste. 24 C. 357. An estate created by devise is within statute. Id., 356. Whether tenant of life estate created by will is liable for waste depends upon terms of will. 45 C. 527. Mortgagee not liable for waste. 46 C. 213. Waste by one having dower interest. 84 C. 202. Life tenant may be liable under section to pay damages to owner for either voluntary or permissive waste before termination of the tenancy. 220 C. 170.

Term “waste” relates to real estate and does not relate to personalty. 5 CS 502.