Ark. Code Ann. § 16-117-305 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 117 / Subchapter 3 / Section 16-117-305
Receiver to convert property into money
Status: in_force

As soon as the receiver shall have taken the property into his or her custody, he or she shall proceed under the direction of the court, or of the judge, in vacation, to convert the property into money. Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 4, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5888; Pope's Dig., § 7610; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-204.

As soon as the receiver shall have taken the property into his or her custody, he or she shall proceed under the direction of the court, or of the judge, in vacation, to convert the property into money.

Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 4, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5888; Pope's Dig., § 7610; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-204.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-107 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 108 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-108-107
Award
Status: in_force

(a) (1) The arbitrators and umpire, if there is one, shall meet at such convenient times and places as may be necessary, of which the parties shall have reasonable notice. They shall hear such evidence as either party may adduce. (2) They shall have power to administer oaths. (3) They shall make their award in writing, stating therein the time when it is made, and shall sign it. (4) When the award is made out, one (1) copy shall be delivered to each of the contending parties. The original shall be returned to the court, and on it the arbitrators shall note the time of delivering a copy to each party. (b) If the award is made out and returned, and copies delivered ten (10) days before the term of court next succeeding the delivery, the award shall be entered of record and made the judgment or decree of the court unless, on exceptions filed, the award shall be set aside. (c) No award shall be set aside for the want of form. However, courts shall have power over awards on equitable principles as heretofore. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 424-426; Pope's Dig., §§ 461-463; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-507 -- 34-509.

(a) (1) The arbitrators and umpire, if there is one, shall meet at such convenient times and places as may be necessary, of which the parties shall have reasonable notice. They shall hear such evidence as either party may adduce. (2) They shall have power to administer oaths. (3) They shall make their award in writing, stating therein the time when it is made, and shall sign it. (4) When the award is made out, one (1) copy shall be delivered to each of the contending parties. The original shall be returned to the court, and on it the arbitrators shall note the time of delivering a copy to each party.

(1) The arbitrators and umpire, if there is one, shall meet at such convenient times and places as may be necessary, of which the parties shall have reasonable notice. They shall hear such evidence as either party may adduce.

(2) They shall have power to administer oaths.

(3) They shall make their award in writing, stating therein the time when it is made, and shall sign it.

(4) When the award is made out, one (1) copy shall be delivered to each of the contending parties. The original shall be returned to the court, and on it the arbitrators shall note the time of delivering a copy to each party.

(b) If the award is made out and returned, and copies delivered ten (10) days before the term of court next succeeding the delivery, the award shall be entered of record and made the judgment or decree of the court unless, on exceptions filed, the award shall be set aside.

(c) No award shall be set aside for the want of form. However, courts shall have power over awards on equitable principles as heretofore.

Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 424-426; Pope's Dig., §§ 461-463; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-507 -- 34-509.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-132 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 21 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-21-132
The Eleventh Judicial District-East
Status: in_force

The Eleventh Judicial District-East shall be a Division A Judicial District. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2003, No. 765, § 1.

The Eleventh Judicial District-East shall be a Division A Judicial District.

Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2003, No. 765, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-100-209 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 100 / Subchapter 2 / Section 16-100-209
Costs and fees
Status: in_force

(a) The mental health specialty court may order the mental health specialty court program participant to pay: (1) Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305 ; (2) Healthcare and treatment costs not otherwise covered by the health insurance of the mental health specialty court program participant; (3) Drug testing costs; (4) A mental health specialty court program user fee; (5) Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees; (6) Any fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) that are to be paid to the Division of Community Correction; (7) Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and (8) Continual alcohol monitoring fees. (b) (1) The mental health specialty court shall establish a schedule for the payment of costs and fees. (2) The cost for health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers respectively and made part of the order for payment of the mental health specialty court. (3) Mental health specialty court user fees shall be set by the mental health specialty court. (4) Health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision costs or fees shall be paid to the respective providers. (5) Fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) shall be paid to the division. (6) (A) All court costs and mental health specialty court program user fees assessed by the mental health specialty court shall be paid to the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable, for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313 . (B) All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307 . (C) Mental health specialty court program user fees shall be credited to a fund to be known as the "mental health specialty court program fund" and appropriated by the quorum court for the county in which the mental health specialty court program participant committed the offense for which he or she is charged for the benefit and administration of the mental health specialty court program. (7) Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the mental health specialty court program participant with mental health specialty court monitoring until fully paid. (c) All costs and fees under this section may be fully or partially waived by the mental health specialty court upon a showing of indigency. Amended by Act 2019, No. 385,§ 2, eff. 7/24/2019. Added by Act 2017, No. 506,§ 1, eff. 8/1/2017.

(a) The mental health specialty court may order the mental health specialty court program participant to pay: (1) Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305 ; (2) Healthcare and treatment costs not otherwise covered by the health insurance of the mental health specialty court program participant; (3) Drug testing costs; (4) A mental health specialty court program user fee; (5) Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees; (6) Any fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) that are to be paid to the Division of Community Correction; (7) Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and (8) Continual alcohol monitoring fees.

(1) Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305 ;

(2) Healthcare and treatment costs not otherwise covered by the health insurance of the mental health specialty court program participant;

(3) Drug testing costs;

(4) A mental health specialty court program user fee;

(5) Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees;

(6) Any fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) that are to be paid to the Division of Community Correction;

(7) Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and

(8) Continual alcohol monitoring fees.

(b) (1) The mental health specialty court shall establish a schedule for the payment of costs and fees. (2) The cost for health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers respectively and made part of the order for payment of the mental health specialty court. (3) Mental health specialty court user fees shall be set by the mental health specialty court. (4) Health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision costs or fees shall be paid to the respective providers. (5) Fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) shall be paid to the division. (6) (A) All court costs and mental health specialty court program user fees assessed by the mental health specialty court shall be paid to the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable, for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313 . (B) All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307 . (C) Mental health specialty court program user fees shall be credited to a fund to be known as the "mental health specialty court program fund" and appropriated by the quorum court for the county in which the mental health specialty court program participant committed the offense for which he or she is charged for the benefit and administration of the mental health specialty court program. (7) Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the mental health specialty court program participant with mental health specialty court monitoring until fully paid.

(1) The mental health specialty court shall establish a schedule for the payment of costs and fees.

(2) The cost for health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers respectively and made part of the order for payment of the mental health specialty court.

(3) Mental health specialty court user fees shall be set by the mental health specialty court.

(4) Health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision costs or fees shall be paid to the respective providers.

(5) Fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) shall be paid to the division.

(6) (A) All court costs and mental health specialty court program user fees assessed by the mental health specialty court shall be paid to the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable, for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313 . (B) All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307 . (C) Mental health specialty court program user fees shall be credited to a fund to be known as the "mental health specialty court program fund" and appropriated by the quorum court for the county in which the mental health specialty court program participant committed the offense for which he or she is charged for the benefit and administration of the mental health specialty court program.

(A) All court costs and mental health specialty court program user fees assessed by the mental health specialty court shall be paid to the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable, for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313 .

(B) All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307 .

(C) Mental health specialty court program user fees shall be credited to a fund to be known as the "mental health specialty court program fund" and appropriated by the quorum court for the county in which the mental health specialty court program participant committed the offense for which he or she is charged for the benefit and administration of the mental health specialty court program.

(7) Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the mental health specialty court program participant with mental health specialty court monitoring until fully paid.

(c) All costs and fees under this section may be fully or partially waived by the mental health specialty court upon a showing of indigency.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 385,§ 2, eff. 7/24/2019.

Added by Act 2017, No. 506,§ 1, eff. 8/1/2017.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-119-104 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 119 / Section 16-119-104
Restoration of destroyed judgments - Procedural conditions
Status: in_force

No reinstating order, sentence, or decree shall be rendered by the court, unless: (1) The petition is verified by affidavit and has been filed in the office of the clerk of the court thirty (30) days previous to the term of the court at which the application is intended to be made; and (2) Due notice of the intended application, setting forth, in a brief manner, the object and intent of the application, is given to the adverse party or parties, either by personal service, by delivering a copy of the notice in writing at least thirty (30) days before the first day of the term of court at which the intended application is to be made, or by publication in some newspaper published in the county for two (2) consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least six (6) weeks before the first day of the term of the court at which the intended application is to be made. However, if there is no newspaper printed in the county, then the publication shall be made in some newspaper printed in Little Rock, Arkansas. Acts 1855, § 1, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8344, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10939, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-403, 16-411, 16-412.

No reinstating order, sentence, or decree shall be rendered by the court, unless:

(1) The petition is verified by affidavit and has been filed in the office of the clerk of the court thirty (30) days previous to the term of the court at which the application is intended to be made; and

(2) Due notice of the intended application, setting forth, in a brief manner, the object and intent of the application, is given to the adverse party or parties, either by personal service, by delivering a copy of the notice in writing at least thirty (30) days before the first day of the term of court at which the intended application is to be made, or by publication in some newspaper published in the county for two (2) consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least six (6) weeks before the first day of the term of the court at which the intended application is to be made. However, if there is no newspaper printed in the county, then the publication shall be made in some newspaper printed in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Acts 1855, § 1, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8344, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10939, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-403, 16-411, 16-412.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-106 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 46 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-46-106
Access to medical records for legal proceedings, adjustment of insurance claim, or processing and underwriting of life insurance policy application - Definitions
Status: in_force

(a) In contemplation of, preparation for, or use in any legal proceeding, adjustment of an insurance claim, or the processing and underwriting of a life insurance application a person who is or has been a patient of a medical provider is entitled to obtain access, personally or through another person authorized to request the patient's medical records, to the patient's medical records, through a written request, and shall be furnished copies of all requested medical records after paying the relevant expense as provided in this section. (b) (1) A photocopy of a medical record shall not cost more than fifty cents (50¢) per page for the first twenty-five (25) pages and twenty-five cents (25¢) for each additional page. (2) (A) A labor charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) may be charged for each request for medical records under subsection (a) of this section, and the actual cost of any required postage may also be charged. (B) However, in the alternative to the labor charge described in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, a reasonable retrieval fee for stored, printed, or written medical records that do not exist in an electronic format may be added to the photocopy charges described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section if the requested medical records are stored at a location other than the location of the medical provider. (C) If the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be notarized or certified, an additional fee of two dollars ($2.00) may be charged. (D) This subsection does not apply to medical records that exist in an electronic format or copies of an X-ray. (c) (1) If the medical records requested under subsection (a) of this section exist in an electronic format, the medical provider shall furnish the medical records in an electronic format, including without limitation through secure electronic transmission to the extent consistent with federal law. (2) A medical provider is not required to produce medical records in a specific electronic format under this subsection unless a specific electronic format is required by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or the court if the request is for use in a legal proceeding. (3) Medical records requested that exist in electronic format shall be produced within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request unless a different deadline is established under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or by the court. (4) (A) The fee for producing medical records under this subsection is seventy-five dollars ($75.00), and the actual cost of postage, if any postage is required, may be charged in addition to the fee for producing medical records. (B) The fee and postage charges allowed under subdivision (c)(4)(A) of this section are the only fees and charges allowed for producing medical records under this subsection. (d) This section does not prohibit reasonable fees for narrative medical reports or medical review when performed by a medical provider subject to the request for medical records under this section, but only if a narrative medical report or medical review is requested by the person or entity requesting the records. (e) (1) If a doctor believes a patient should be denied access to his or her medical records for any reason, the doctor must provide the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney a written determination that disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the individual's health or well-being. (2) (A) At such time, the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney may select another doctor in the same type of practice as the doctor subject to the request to review such information and determine if disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the patient's health or well-being. (B) If the second doctor determines, based upon professional judgment, that disclosure of such information would not be detrimental to the health or well-being of the individual, the medical records shall be released to the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney. (3) If the determination is that disclosure of such information would be detrimental, then it either will not be released or the objectionable material will be obscured before release. (4) The cost of this review of the patient's record will be borne by the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney. (f) (1) This section does not preclude the existing subpoena process. (2) If a patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records is compelled to use the subpoena process in order to obtain access to, or copies of, the patient's medical records after reasonable requests have been made and a reasonable time has expired, then the court issuing the subpoena and having jurisdiction over the proceedings shall grant the patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs of court against the medical provider. (g) This section does not apply to the Department of Corrections. (h) (1) If a request for the patient's own medical records is submitted by the patient or a person authorized to request the patient's medical records under this section, then access shall be provided according to all the requirements of the patient access regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023. (2) The standards stated in subdivision (h)(1) of this section, with the exception of the fee provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023, apply regardless of whether the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be sent to: (A) The patient; (B) A person authorized to request the patient's medical records; (C) An attorney; or (D) Another third party. (i) As used in this section: (1) "Medical provider" means a doctor, hospital, ambulance provider, medical healthcare provider, or other medical institution that provides medical care; (2) "Person authorized to request the patient's medical records" means a person or entity who presents a properly executed medical records authorization; and (3) (A) "Photocopy" means a photographic copy of printed or written material in a physical form. (B) "Photocopy" does not include an electronically stored record that has not been printed into a physical form. Amended by Act 2023, No. 765,§ 1, eff. 8/1/2023. Amended by Act 2019, No. 910,§ 855, eff. 7/1/2019. Acts 1991, No. 767, §§ 1, 2; 1995, No. 708, § 1; 1999, No. 333, §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 662, § 1.

(a) In contemplation of, preparation for, or use in any legal proceeding, adjustment of an insurance claim, or the processing and underwriting of a life insurance application a person who is or has been a patient of a medical provider is entitled to obtain access, personally or through another person authorized to request the patient's medical records, to the patient's medical records, through a written request, and shall be furnished copies of all requested medical records after paying the relevant expense as provided in this section.

(b) (1) A photocopy of a medical record shall not cost more than fifty cents (50¢) per page for the first twenty-five (25) pages and twenty-five cents (25¢) for each additional page. (2) (A) A labor charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) may be charged for each request for medical records under subsection (a) of this section, and the actual cost of any required postage may also be charged. (B) However, in the alternative to the labor charge described in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, a reasonable retrieval fee for stored, printed, or written medical records that do not exist in an electronic format may be added to the photocopy charges described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section if the requested medical records are stored at a location other than the location of the medical provider. (C) If the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be notarized or certified, an additional fee of two dollars ($2.00) may be charged. (D) This subsection does not apply to medical records that exist in an electronic format or copies of an X-ray.

(1) A photocopy of a medical record shall not cost more than fifty cents (50¢) per page for the first twenty-five (25) pages and twenty-five cents (25¢) for each additional page.

(2) (A) A labor charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) may be charged for each request for medical records under subsection (a) of this section, and the actual cost of any required postage may also be charged. (B) However, in the alternative to the labor charge described in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, a reasonable retrieval fee for stored, printed, or written medical records that do not exist in an electronic format may be added to the photocopy charges described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section if the requested medical records are stored at a location other than the location of the medical provider. (C) If the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be notarized or certified, an additional fee of two dollars ($2.00) may be charged. (D) This subsection does not apply to medical records that exist in an electronic format or copies of an X-ray.

(A) A labor charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) may be charged for each request for medical records under subsection (a) of this section, and the actual cost of any required postage may also be charged.

(B) However, in the alternative to the labor charge described in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, a reasonable retrieval fee for stored, printed, or written medical records that do not exist in an electronic format may be added to the photocopy charges described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section if the requested medical records are stored at a location other than the location of the medical provider.

(C) If the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be notarized or certified, an additional fee of two dollars ($2.00) may be charged.

(D) This subsection does not apply to medical records that exist in an electronic format or copies of an X-ray.

(c) (1) If the medical records requested under subsection (a) of this section exist in an electronic format, the medical provider shall furnish the medical records in an electronic format, including without limitation through secure electronic transmission to the extent consistent with federal law. (2) A medical provider is not required to produce medical records in a specific electronic format under this subsection unless a specific electronic format is required by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or the court if the request is for use in a legal proceeding. (3) Medical records requested that exist in electronic format shall be produced within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request unless a different deadline is established under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or by the court. (4) (A) The fee for producing medical records under this subsection is seventy-five dollars ($75.00), and the actual cost of postage, if any postage is required, may be charged in addition to the fee for producing medical records. (B) The fee and postage charges allowed under subdivision (c)(4)(A) of this section are the only fees and charges allowed for producing medical records under this subsection.

(1) If the medical records requested under subsection (a) of this section exist in an electronic format, the medical provider shall furnish the medical records in an electronic format, including without limitation through secure electronic transmission to the extent consistent with federal law.

(2) A medical provider is not required to produce medical records in a specific electronic format under this subsection unless a specific electronic format is required by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or the court if the request is for use in a legal proceeding.

(3) Medical records requested that exist in electronic format shall be produced within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request unless a different deadline is established under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or by the court.

(4) (A) The fee for producing medical records under this subsection is seventy-five dollars ($75.00), and the actual cost of postage, if any postage is required, may be charged in addition to the fee for producing medical records. (B) The fee and postage charges allowed under subdivision (c)(4)(A) of this section are the only fees and charges allowed for producing medical records under this subsection.

(A) The fee for producing medical records under this subsection is seventy-five dollars ($75.00), and the actual cost of postage, if any postage is required, may be charged in addition to the fee for producing medical records.

(B) The fee and postage charges allowed under subdivision (c)(4)(A) of this section are the only fees and charges allowed for producing medical records under this subsection.

(d) This section does not prohibit reasonable fees for narrative medical reports or medical review when performed by a medical provider subject to the request for medical records under this section, but only if a narrative medical report or medical review is requested by the person or entity requesting the records.

(e) (1) If a doctor believes a patient should be denied access to his or her medical records for any reason, the doctor must provide the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney a written determination that disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the individual's health or well-being. (2) (A) At such time, the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney may select another doctor in the same type of practice as the doctor subject to the request to review such information and determine if disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the patient's health or well-being. (B) If the second doctor determines, based upon professional judgment, that disclosure of such information would not be detrimental to the health or well-being of the individual, the medical records shall be released to the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney. (3) If the determination is that disclosure of such information would be detrimental, then it either will not be released or the objectionable material will be obscured before release. (4) The cost of this review of the patient's record will be borne by the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.

(1) If a doctor believes a patient should be denied access to his or her medical records for any reason, the doctor must provide the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney a written determination that disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the individual's health or well-being.

(2) (A) At such time, the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney may select another doctor in the same type of practice as the doctor subject to the request to review such information and determine if disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the patient's health or well-being. (B) If the second doctor determines, based upon professional judgment, that disclosure of such information would not be detrimental to the health or well-being of the individual, the medical records shall be released to the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.

(A) At such time, the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney may select another doctor in the same type of practice as the doctor subject to the request to review such information and determine if disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the patient's health or well-being.

(B) If the second doctor determines, based upon professional judgment, that disclosure of such information would not be detrimental to the health or well-being of the individual, the medical records shall be released to the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.

(3) If the determination is that disclosure of such information would be detrimental, then it either will not be released or the objectionable material will be obscured before release.

(4) The cost of this review of the patient's record will be borne by the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.

(f) (1) This section does not preclude the existing subpoena process. (2) If a patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records is compelled to use the subpoena process in order to obtain access to, or copies of, the patient's medical records after reasonable requests have been made and a reasonable time has expired, then the court issuing the subpoena and having jurisdiction over the proceedings shall grant the patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs of court against the medical provider.

(1) This section does not preclude the existing subpoena process.

(2) If a patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records is compelled to use the subpoena process in order to obtain access to, or copies of, the patient's medical records after reasonable requests have been made and a reasonable time has expired, then the court issuing the subpoena and having jurisdiction over the proceedings shall grant the patient or the person authorized to request the patient's medical records a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs of court against the medical provider.

(g) This section does not apply to the Department of Corrections.

(h) (1) If a request for the patient's own medical records is submitted by the patient or a person authorized to request the patient's medical records under this section, then access shall be provided according to all the requirements of the patient access regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023. (2) The standards stated in subdivision (h)(1) of this section, with the exception of the fee provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023, apply regardless of whether the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be sent to: (A) The patient; (B) A person authorized to request the patient's medical records; (C) An attorney; or (D) Another third party.

(1) If a request for the patient's own medical records is submitted by the patient or a person authorized to request the patient's medical records under this section, then access shall be provided according to all the requirements of the patient access regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023.

(2) The standards stated in subdivision (h)(1) of this section, with the exception of the fee provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as they existed on January 1, 2023, apply regardless of whether the patient or person authorized to request the patient's medical records requests that the medical records be sent to: (A) The patient; (B) A person authorized to request the patient's medical records; (C) An attorney; or (D) Another third party.

(A) The patient;

(B) A person authorized to request the patient's medical records;

(C) An attorney; or

(D) Another third party.

(i) As used in this section: (1) "Medical provider" means a doctor, hospital, ambulance provider, medical healthcare provider, or other medical institution that provides medical care; (2) "Person authorized to request the patient's medical records" means a person or entity who presents a properly executed medical records authorization; and (3) (A) "Photocopy" means a photographic copy of printed or written material in a physical form. (B) "Photocopy" does not include an electronically stored record that has not been printed into a physical form.

(1) "Medical provider" means a doctor, hospital, ambulance provider, medical healthcare provider, or other medical institution that provides medical care;

(2) "Person authorized to request the patient's medical records" means a person or entity who presents a properly executed medical records authorization; and

(3) (A) "Photocopy" means a photographic copy of printed or written material in a physical form. (B) "Photocopy" does not include an electronically stored record that has not been printed into a physical form.

(A) "Photocopy" means a photographic copy of printed or written material in a physical form.

(B) "Photocopy" does not include an electronically stored record that has not been printed into a physical form.

Amended by Act 2023, No. 765,§ 1, eff. 8/1/2023.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 910,§ 855, eff. 7/1/2019.

Acts 1991, No. 767, §§ 1, 2; 1995, No. 708, § 1; 1999, No. 333, §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 662, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-411 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 22 / Subchapter 4 / Section 16-22-411
Judgment
Status: in_force

(a) In all cases of conviction, the court shall pronounce judgment of removal or suspension, according to the facts found. (b) Every judgment of removal or suspension made in pursuance of this subchapter shall operate, while it continues in force, as a removal or suspension from practice in all the courts of this state. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, §§ 23, 26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 621, 624; Pope's Dig., §§ 661, 664; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-412, 25-415.

(a) In all cases of conviction, the court shall pronounce judgment of removal or suspension, according to the facts found.

(b) Every judgment of removal or suspension made in pursuance of this subchapter shall operate, while it continues in force, as a removal or suspension from practice in all the courts of this state.

Rev. Stat., ch. 15, §§ 23, 26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 621, 624; Pope's Dig., §§ 661, 664; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-412, 25-415.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-124-103 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 124 / Section 16-124-103
Liability in general
Status: in_force

(a) A person may recover damages under this chapter for injury resulting from the use of an illegal drug by that person. (b) A person who knowingly participates in the illegal drug market is liable for civil damages as provided for in this chapter. (c) (1) A law enforcement officer or agency, the state, or a person acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency of the state, is not liable for participating in the illegal drug market, if the participation is in furtherance of an official investigation. (2) A third party, including an insurance company, shall not be required to pay damages awarded under this chapter, nor shall any person be vicariously liable for the act of another, nor shall a third party be made a party to any action brought under this chapter. Acts 1995, No. 896, §§ 3, 6.

(a) A person may recover damages under this chapter for injury resulting from the use of an illegal drug by that person.

(b) A person who knowingly participates in the illegal drug market is liable for civil damages as provided for in this chapter.

(c) (1) A law enforcement officer or agency, the state, or a person acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency of the state, is not liable for participating in the illegal drug market, if the participation is in furtherance of an official investigation. (2) A third party, including an insurance company, shall not be required to pay damages awarded under this chapter, nor shall any person be vicariously liable for the act of another, nor shall a third party be made a party to any action brought under this chapter.

(1) A law enforcement officer or agency, the state, or a person acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency of the state, is not liable for participating in the illegal drug market, if the participation is in furtherance of an official investigation.

(2) A third party, including an insurance company, shall not be required to pay damages awarded under this chapter, nor shall any person be vicariously liable for the act of another, nor shall a third party be made a party to any action brought under this chapter.

Acts 1995, No. 896, §§ 3, 6.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-1113 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 17 / Subchapter 11 / Section 16-17-1113
Reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2021
Status: in_force

(a) (1) Beginning January 1, 2021, the following cities and counties that are currently served by local district courts pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as state district courts and served by state district court judges as assigned. (2) The new state district court judgeships created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2021, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2020 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district. (3) The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106 , effective January 1, 2021. (b) (1) The Seventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Franklin and Johnson. (2) The Seventh District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Charleston; (B) One (1) located in Ozark; (C) One (1) located in Altus; (D) One (1) located in Clarksville; (E) One (1) located in Coal Hill; and (F) One (1) located in Lamar. (3) The Seventh Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Seventh Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Seventh Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (c) (1) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Randolph, Sharp, and Lawrence. (2) The Eleventh District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Pocahontas; (B) One (1) located in Ash Flat; (C) One (1) located in Cherokee Village; (D) One (1) located in Walnut Ridge; (E) One (1) located in Hoxie; (F) One (1) located in Black Rock; and (G) One (1) located in Portia. (3) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Eleventh Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Eleventh Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (d) (1) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Logan, Yell, and Conway. (2) The Twelfth District shall have nine (9) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Morrilton; (B) One (1) located in Menifee; (C) One (1) located in Oppelo; (D) One (1) located in Paris; (E) One (1) located in Booneville; (F) One (1) located in Magazine; (G) One (1) located in Danville; (H) One (1) located in Plumerville; and (I) One (1) located in Dardanelle. (3) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Twelfth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Twelfth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (e) [Repealed.] (f) [Repealed.] (g) (1) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Jackson and Woodruff. (2) The Fifteenth District shall have eight (8) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Newport; (B) One (1) located in Diaz; (C) One (1) located in Swifton; (D) One (1) located in Tuckerman; (E) One (1) located in Augusta; (F) One (1) located in Cotton Plant; (G) One (1) located in McCrory; and (H) One (1) located in Patterson. (3) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Fifteenth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Fifteenth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (h) [Repealed.] (i) (1) The Seventeenth District is composed of the counties of Clay and Greene. (2) The Seventeenth District has five (5) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Paragould; (B) One (1) located in Marmaduke; (C) One (1) located in Corning; (D) One (1) located in Piggott; and (E) One (1) located in Rector. (3) The Seventeenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Seventeenth District judge is elected districtwide. (5) The Seventeenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction. (j) (1) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Scott, Polk, and Montgomery. (2) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall have three (3) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Waldron; (B) One (1) located in Mena; and (C) One (1) located in Mt. Ida. (3) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (k) (1) The Twenty-Fifth District is composed of the counties of St. Francis and Cross. (2) The Twenty-Fifth District has six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Forrest City; (B) One (1) located in Madison; (C) One (1) located in Palestine; (D) One (1) located in Wynne; (E) One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and (F) One (1) located in Parkin. (3) The Twenty-Fifth District is served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Twenty-Fifth District judges are elected districtwide. (5) The Twenty-Fifth District courts have districtwide jurisdiction. (l) (1) The Thirtieth District shall be composed of Lonoke County. (2) The Thirtieth District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Cabot; (B) One (1) located in Ward; (C) One (1) located in Austin; (D) One (1) located in Lonoke; (E) One (1) located in England; and (F) One (1) located in Carlisle. (3) The Thirtieth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Thirtieth District court judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Thirtieth District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (m) (1) The Thirty-First District is composed of the counties of Pulaski and Perry. (2) The Thirty-First District has twelve (12) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Jacksonville, to be known as "Jacksonville District Court"; (B) Four (4) located in Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "Little Rock District Court - First Division"; (ii) "Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (iii) "Little Rock District Court - Third Division"; and (iv) "Pulaski County District Court"; (C) One (1) located in Maumelle, to be known as "Maumelle District Court"; (D) Two (2) located in North Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "North Little Rock District Court - First Division"; and (ii) "North Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (E) One (1) located in Sherwood, to be known as "Sherwood District Court"; (F) One (1) located in Wrightsville, to be known as "Wrightsville District Court"; (G) One (1) located in Cammack Village, to be known as "Cammack Village District Court"; and (H) One (1) located in Perryville, to be known as "Perryville District Court". (3) The Thirty-First District shall be served by eight (8) state district judges. All the following judges shall be elected districtwide and shall have districtwide jurisdiction: (A) The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (B) The Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (C) The Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (D) The Little Rock District Court - Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (E) The North Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (F) The North Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (G) The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (H) The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and (I) The Perryville District Court shall be served by one (1) of the district court judges listed under subdivisions (m)(3)(A)-(H) of this section. (n) (1) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Ouachita and Columbia. (2) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Magnolia; (B) One (1) located in Waldo; (C) One (1) located in Camden; (D) One (1) located in East Camden; (E) One (1) located in Bearden; (F) One (1) located in Chidester; and (G) One (1) located in Stephens. (3) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction. (o) (1) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be composed of Garland County. (2) The Forty-First Judicial District shall have one (1) department located in Hot Springs. (3) (A) (i) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (ii) One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1 and one (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2. (B) The assignment of judges to divisions under subdivision (o)(3)(A)(ii) of this section shall be determined by mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Forty-First Judicial District. (4) The Forty-First Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Forty-First Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction. Amended by Act 2021, No. 825,§ 2, eff. 7/28/2021. Amended by Act 2019, No. 909,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019. Amended by Act 2019, No. 868,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019. Amended by Act 2019, No. 868,§ 2, eff. 7/24/2019. Amended by Act 2019, No. 814,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019. Amended by Act 2019, No. 935,§ 2, eff. 7/1/2019. Added by Act 2015, No. 1081,§ 3, eff. 7/22/2015.

(a) (1) Beginning January 1, 2021, the following cities and counties that are currently served by local district courts pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as state district courts and served by state district court judges as assigned. (2) The new state district court judgeships created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2021, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2020 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district. (3) The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106 , effective January 1, 2021.

(1) Beginning January 1, 2021, the following cities and counties that are currently served by local district courts pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as state district courts and served by state district court judges as assigned.

(2) The new state district court judgeships created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2021, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2020 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district.

(3) The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106 , effective January 1, 2021.

(b) (1) The Seventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Franklin and Johnson. (2) The Seventh District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Charleston; (B) One (1) located in Ozark; (C) One (1) located in Altus; (D) One (1) located in Clarksville; (E) One (1) located in Coal Hill; and (F) One (1) located in Lamar. (3) The Seventh Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Seventh Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Seventh Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Seventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Franklin and Johnson.

(2) The Seventh District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Charleston; (B) One (1) located in Ozark; (C) One (1) located in Altus; (D) One (1) located in Clarksville; (E) One (1) located in Coal Hill; and (F) One (1) located in Lamar.

(A) One (1) located in Charleston;

(B) One (1) located in Ozark;

(C) One (1) located in Altus;

(D) One (1) located in Clarksville;

(E) One (1) located in Coal Hill; and

(F) One (1) located in Lamar.

(3) The Seventh Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Seventh Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Seventh Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(c) (1) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Randolph, Sharp, and Lawrence. (2) The Eleventh District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Pocahontas; (B) One (1) located in Ash Flat; (C) One (1) located in Cherokee Village; (D) One (1) located in Walnut Ridge; (E) One (1) located in Hoxie; (F) One (1) located in Black Rock; and (G) One (1) located in Portia. (3) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Eleventh Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Eleventh Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Randolph, Sharp, and Lawrence.

(2) The Eleventh District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Pocahontas; (B) One (1) located in Ash Flat; (C) One (1) located in Cherokee Village; (D) One (1) located in Walnut Ridge; (E) One (1) located in Hoxie; (F) One (1) located in Black Rock; and (G) One (1) located in Portia.

(A) One (1) located in Pocahontas;

(B) One (1) located in Ash Flat;

(C) One (1) located in Cherokee Village;

(D) One (1) located in Walnut Ridge;

(E) One (1) located in Hoxie;

(F) One (1) located in Black Rock; and

(G) One (1) located in Portia.

(3) The Eleventh Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.

(4) The Eleventh Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Eleventh Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(d) (1) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Logan, Yell, and Conway. (2) The Twelfth District shall have nine (9) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Morrilton; (B) One (1) located in Menifee; (C) One (1) located in Oppelo; (D) One (1) located in Paris; (E) One (1) located in Booneville; (F) One (1) located in Magazine; (G) One (1) located in Danville; (H) One (1) located in Plumerville; and (I) One (1) located in Dardanelle. (3) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Twelfth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Twelfth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Logan, Yell, and Conway.

(2) The Twelfth District shall have nine (9) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Morrilton; (B) One (1) located in Menifee; (C) One (1) located in Oppelo; (D) One (1) located in Paris; (E) One (1) located in Booneville; (F) One (1) located in Magazine; (G) One (1) located in Danville; (H) One (1) located in Plumerville; and (I) One (1) located in Dardanelle.

(A) One (1) located in Morrilton;

(B) One (1) located in Menifee;

(C) One (1) located in Oppelo;

(D) One (1) located in Paris;

(E) One (1) located in Booneville;

(F) One (1) located in Magazine;

(G) One (1) located in Danville;

(H) One (1) located in Plumerville; and

(I) One (1) located in Dardanelle.

(3) The Twelfth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Twelfth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Twelfth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(e) [Repealed.]

(f) [Repealed.]

(g) (1) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Jackson and Woodruff. (2) The Fifteenth District shall have eight (8) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Newport; (B) One (1) located in Diaz; (C) One (1) located in Swifton; (D) One (1) located in Tuckerman; (E) One (1) located in Augusta; (F) One (1) located in Cotton Plant; (G) One (1) located in McCrory; and (H) One (1) located in Patterson. (3) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Fifteenth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Fifteenth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Jackson and Woodruff.

(2) The Fifteenth District shall have eight (8) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Newport; (B) One (1) located in Diaz; (C) One (1) located in Swifton; (D) One (1) located in Tuckerman; (E) One (1) located in Augusta; (F) One (1) located in Cotton Plant; (G) One (1) located in McCrory; and (H) One (1) located in Patterson.

(A) One (1) located in Newport;

(B) One (1) located in Diaz;

(C) One (1) located in Swifton;

(D) One (1) located in Tuckerman;

(E) One (1) located in Augusta;

(F) One (1) located in Cotton Plant;

(G) One (1) located in McCrory; and

(H) One (1) located in Patterson.

(3) The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Fifteenth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Fifteenth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(h) [Repealed.]

(i) (1) The Seventeenth District is composed of the counties of Clay and Greene. (2) The Seventeenth District has five (5) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Paragould; (B) One (1) located in Marmaduke; (C) One (1) located in Corning; (D) One (1) located in Piggott; and (E) One (1) located in Rector. (3) The Seventeenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Seventeenth District judge is elected districtwide. (5) The Seventeenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Seventeenth District is composed of the counties of Clay and Greene.

(2) The Seventeenth District has five (5) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Paragould; (B) One (1) located in Marmaduke; (C) One (1) located in Corning; (D) One (1) located in Piggott; and (E) One (1) located in Rector.

(A) One (1) located in Paragould;

(B) One (1) located in Marmaduke;

(C) One (1) located in Corning;

(D) One (1) located in Piggott; and

(E) One (1) located in Rector.

(3) The Seventeenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Seventeenth District judge is elected districtwide.

(5) The Seventeenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.

(j) (1) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Scott, Polk, and Montgomery. (2) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall have three (3) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Waldron; (B) One (1) located in Mena; and (C) One (1) located in Mt. Ida. (3) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Scott, Polk, and Montgomery.

(2) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall have three (3) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Waldron; (B) One (1) located in Mena; and (C) One (1) located in Mt. Ida.

(A) One (1) located in Waldron;

(B) One (1) located in Mena; and

(C) One (1) located in Mt. Ida.

(3) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(k) (1) The Twenty-Fifth District is composed of the counties of St. Francis and Cross. (2) The Twenty-Fifth District has six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Forrest City; (B) One (1) located in Madison; (C) One (1) located in Palestine; (D) One (1) located in Wynne; (E) One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and (F) One (1) located in Parkin. (3) The Twenty-Fifth District is served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Twenty-Fifth District judges are elected districtwide. (5) The Twenty-Fifth District courts have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Twenty-Fifth District is composed of the counties of St. Francis and Cross.

(2) The Twenty-Fifth District has six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Forrest City; (B) One (1) located in Madison; (C) One (1) located in Palestine; (D) One (1) located in Wynne; (E) One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and (F) One (1) located in Parkin.

(A) One (1) located in Forrest City;

(B) One (1) located in Madison;

(C) One (1) located in Palestine;

(D) One (1) located in Wynne;

(E) One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and

(F) One (1) located in Parkin.

(3) The Twenty-Fifth District is served by two (2) state district court judges.

(4) The Twenty-Fifth District judges are elected districtwide.

(5) The Twenty-Fifth District courts have districtwide jurisdiction.

(l) (1) The Thirtieth District shall be composed of Lonoke County. (2) The Thirtieth District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Cabot; (B) One (1) located in Ward; (C) One (1) located in Austin; (D) One (1) located in Lonoke; (E) One (1) located in England; and (F) One (1) located in Carlisle. (3) The Thirtieth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (4) The Thirtieth District court judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Thirtieth District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Thirtieth District shall be composed of Lonoke County.

(2) The Thirtieth District shall have six (6) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Cabot; (B) One (1) located in Ward; (C) One (1) located in Austin; (D) One (1) located in Lonoke; (E) One (1) located in England; and (F) One (1) located in Carlisle.

(A) One (1) located in Cabot;

(B) One (1) located in Ward;

(C) One (1) located in Austin;

(D) One (1) located in Lonoke;

(E) One (1) located in England; and

(F) One (1) located in Carlisle.

(3) The Thirtieth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.

(4) The Thirtieth District court judges shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Thirtieth District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(m) (1) The Thirty-First District is composed of the counties of Pulaski and Perry. (2) The Thirty-First District has twelve (12) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Jacksonville, to be known as "Jacksonville District Court"; (B) Four (4) located in Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "Little Rock District Court - First Division"; (ii) "Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (iii) "Little Rock District Court - Third Division"; and (iv) "Pulaski County District Court"; (C) One (1) located in Maumelle, to be known as "Maumelle District Court"; (D) Two (2) located in North Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "North Little Rock District Court - First Division"; and (ii) "North Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (E) One (1) located in Sherwood, to be known as "Sherwood District Court"; (F) One (1) located in Wrightsville, to be known as "Wrightsville District Court"; (G) One (1) located in Cammack Village, to be known as "Cammack Village District Court"; and (H) One (1) located in Perryville, to be known as "Perryville District Court". (3) The Thirty-First District shall be served by eight (8) state district judges. All the following judges shall be elected districtwide and shall have districtwide jurisdiction: (A) The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (B) The Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (C) The Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (D) The Little Rock District Court - Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (E) The North Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (F) The North Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (G) The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (H) The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and (I) The Perryville District Court shall be served by one (1) of the district court judges listed under subdivisions (m)(3)(A)-(H) of this section.

(1) The Thirty-First District is composed of the counties of Pulaski and Perry.

(2) The Thirty-First District has twelve (12) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Jacksonville, to be known as "Jacksonville District Court"; (B) Four (4) located in Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "Little Rock District Court - First Division"; (ii) "Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (iii) "Little Rock District Court - Third Division"; and (iv) "Pulaski County District Court"; (C) One (1) located in Maumelle, to be known as "Maumelle District Court"; (D) Two (2) located in North Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "North Little Rock District Court - First Division"; and (ii) "North Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (E) One (1) located in Sherwood, to be known as "Sherwood District Court"; (F) One (1) located in Wrightsville, to be known as "Wrightsville District Court"; (G) One (1) located in Cammack Village, to be known as "Cammack Village District Court"; and (H) One (1) located in Perryville, to be known as "Perryville District Court".

(A) One (1) located in Jacksonville, to be known as "Jacksonville District Court";

(B) Four (4) located in Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "Little Rock District Court - First Division"; (ii) "Little Rock District Court - Second Division"; (iii) "Little Rock District Court - Third Division"; and (iv) "Pulaski County District Court";

(i) "Little Rock District Court - First Division";

(ii) "Little Rock District Court - Second Division";

(iii) "Little Rock District Court - Third Division"; and

(iv) "Pulaski County District Court";

(C) One (1) located in Maumelle, to be known as "Maumelle District Court";

(D) Two (2) located in North Little Rock, to be known as: (i) "North Little Rock District Court - First Division"; and (ii) "North Little Rock District Court - Second Division";

(i) "North Little Rock District Court - First Division"; and

(ii) "North Little Rock District Court - Second Division";

(E) One (1) located in Sherwood, to be known as "Sherwood District Court";

(F) One (1) located in Wrightsville, to be known as "Wrightsville District Court";

(G) One (1) located in Cammack Village, to be known as "Cammack Village District Court"; and

(H) One (1) located in Perryville, to be known as "Perryville District Court".

(3) The Thirty-First District shall be served by eight (8) state district judges. All the following judges shall be elected districtwide and shall have districtwide jurisdiction: (A) The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (B) The Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (C) The Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (D) The Little Rock District Court - Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (E) The North Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (F) The North Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge; (G) The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; (H) The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and (I) The Perryville District Court shall be served by one (1) of the district court judges listed under subdivisions (m)(3)(A)-(H) of this section.

(A) The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;

(B) The Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;

(C) The Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;

(D) The Little Rock District Court - Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;

(E) The North Little Rock District Court - First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;

(F) The North Little Rock District Court - Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;

(G) The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;

(H) The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and

(I) The Perryville District Court shall be served by one (1) of the district court judges listed under subdivisions (m)(3)(A)-(H) of this section.

(n) (1) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Ouachita and Columbia. (2) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Magnolia; (B) One (1) located in Waldo; (C) One (1) located in Camden; (D) One (1) located in East Camden; (E) One (1) located in Bearden; (F) One (1) located in Chidester; and (G) One (1) located in Stephens. (3) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge. (4) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Ouachita and Columbia.

(2) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall have seven (7) departments as follows: (A) One (1) located in Magnolia; (B) One (1) located in Waldo; (C) One (1) located in Camden; (D) One (1) located in East Camden; (E) One (1) located in Bearden; (F) One (1) located in Chidester; and (G) One (1) located in Stephens.

(A) One (1) located in Magnolia;

(B) One (1) located in Waldo;

(C) One (1) located in Camden;

(D) One (1) located in East Camden;

(E) One (1) located in Bearden;

(F) One (1) located in Chidester; and

(G) One (1) located in Stephens.

(3) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.

(4) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(o) (1) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be composed of Garland County. (2) The Forty-First Judicial District shall have one (1) department located in Hot Springs. (3) (A) (i) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (ii) One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1 and one (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2. (B) The assignment of judges to divisions under subdivision (o)(3)(A)(ii) of this section shall be determined by mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Forty-First Judicial District. (4) The Forty-First Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide. (5) The Forty-First Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

(1) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be composed of Garland County.

(2) The Forty-First Judicial District shall have one (1) department located in Hot Springs.

(3) (A) (i) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (ii) One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1 and one (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2. (B) The assignment of judges to divisions under subdivision (o)(3)(A)(ii) of this section shall be determined by mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Forty-First Judicial District.

(A) (i) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges. (ii) One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1 and one (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.

(i) The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.

(ii) One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1 and one (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.

(B) The assignment of judges to divisions under subdivision (o)(3)(A)(ii) of this section shall be determined by mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Forty-First Judicial District.

(4) The Forty-First Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide.

(5) The Forty-First Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

Amended by Act 2021, No. 825,§ 2, eff. 7/28/2021.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 909,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 868,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 868,§ 2, eff. 7/24/2019.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 814,§ 1, eff. 7/24/2019.

Amended by Act 2019, No. 935,§ 2, eff. 7/1/2019.

Added by Act 2015, No. 1081,§ 3, eff. 7/22/2015.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-605 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 123 / Section 16-123-605
Rules of construction
Status: in_force

(a) This subchapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of free exercise of religious beliefs, to the maximum extent permitted by the Arkansas Constitution and the United States Constitution. (b) (1) The protection of free exercise of religious beliefs and moral convictions afforded by this subchapter is in addition to the protections provided under federal law, state law, the Arkansas Constitution, and the United States Constitution. (2) This subchapter does not: (A) Preempt or repeal any state or local law that is equally or more protective of free exercise of religious beliefs or moral convictions; (B) Narrow the meaning or application of any state or local law protecting free exercise of religious beliefs; or (C) Prevent state government from providing, either directly or through an individual or entity not seeking protection under this subchapter, any benefit or service authorized under state law. (c) This subchapter applies to, and in cases of conflict supersedes, each: (1) Statute of the state that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter, unless a conflicting statute is expressly made exempt from the application of this subchapter; and (2) Any ordinance, rule, regulation, order, opinion, decision, practice, or other exercise of state government's authority that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter. (d) If any provision of this subchapter or any application of a provision of this subchapter to any particular person or circumstance is held to be invalid under law, the remainder of this subchapter and the application of this subchapter's provisions to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected. Added by Act 2023, No. 733,§ 5, eff. 8/1/2023.

(a) This subchapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of free exercise of religious beliefs, to the maximum extent permitted by the Arkansas Constitution and the United States Constitution.

(b) (1) The protection of free exercise of religious beliefs and moral convictions afforded by this subchapter is in addition to the protections provided under federal law, state law, the Arkansas Constitution, and the United States Constitution. (2) This subchapter does not: (A) Preempt or repeal any state or local law that is equally or more protective of free exercise of religious beliefs or moral convictions; (B) Narrow the meaning or application of any state or local law protecting free exercise of religious beliefs; or (C) Prevent state government from providing, either directly or through an individual or entity not seeking protection under this subchapter, any benefit or service authorized under state law.

(1) The protection of free exercise of religious beliefs and moral convictions afforded by this subchapter is in addition to the protections provided under federal law, state law, the Arkansas Constitution, and the United States Constitution.

(2) This subchapter does not: (A) Preempt or repeal any state or local law that is equally or more protective of free exercise of religious beliefs or moral convictions; (B) Narrow the meaning or application of any state or local law protecting free exercise of religious beliefs; or (C) Prevent state government from providing, either directly or through an individual or entity not seeking protection under this subchapter, any benefit or service authorized under state law.

(A) Preempt or repeal any state or local law that is equally or more protective of free exercise of religious beliefs or moral convictions;

(B) Narrow the meaning or application of any state or local law protecting free exercise of religious beliefs; or

(C) Prevent state government from providing, either directly or through an individual or entity not seeking protection under this subchapter, any benefit or service authorized under state law.

(c) This subchapter applies to, and in cases of conflict supersedes, each: (1) Statute of the state that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter, unless a conflicting statute is expressly made exempt from the application of this subchapter; and (2) Any ordinance, rule, regulation, order, opinion, decision, practice, or other exercise of state government's authority that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter.

(1) Statute of the state that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter, unless a conflicting statute is expressly made exempt from the application of this subchapter; and

(2) Any ordinance, rule, regulation, order, opinion, decision, practice, or other exercise of state government's authority that impinges upon the free exercise of religious beliefs protected by this subchapter.

(d) If any provision of this subchapter or any application of a provision of this subchapter to any particular person or circumstance is held to be invalid under law, the remainder of this subchapter and the application of this subchapter's provisions to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected.

Added by Act 2023, No. 733,§ 5, eff. 8/1/2023.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-404 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 10 / Subchapter 4 / Section 16-10-404
Duties - Records
Status: in_force

(a) The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall initiate or shall receive information, conduct investigations and hearings, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning: (1) Allegations of judicial misconduct; (2) Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring leave or involuntary retirement; and (3) Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability. (b) (1) Investigatory records, files, and reports of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded, or oral, received or developed by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission in the course of an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a judge shall be made except as follows: (A) Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings; (B) Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges; (C) In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations; (D) Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority; (E) Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information; (F) Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission; (G) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession; (H) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or (I) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. (2) All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open to the press and to the public, except that following the completion of the introduction of all evidence, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may convene to executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive session, the final action of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be announced in an open and public session. (3) The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission is authorized to request the appropriate prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in § 16-43-601 et seq. Amended by Act 2015, No. 1152,§ 1, eff. 7/22/2015. Amended by Act 2013, No. 1115,§ 2, eff. 8/16/2013. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 1078, § 1.

(a) The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall initiate or shall receive information, conduct investigations and hearings, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning: (1) Allegations of judicial misconduct; (2) Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring leave or involuntary retirement; and (3) Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability.

(1) Allegations of judicial misconduct;

(2) Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring leave or involuntary retirement; and

(3) Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability.

(b) (1) Investigatory records, files, and reports of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded, or oral, received or developed by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission in the course of an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a judge shall be made except as follows: (A) Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings; (B) Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges; (C) In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations; (D) Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority; (E) Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information; (F) Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission; (G) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession; (H) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or (I) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. (2) All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open to the press and to the public, except that following the completion of the introduction of all evidence, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may convene to executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive session, the final action of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be announced in an open and public session. (3) The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission is authorized to request the appropriate prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in § 16-43-601 et seq.

(1) Investigatory records, files, and reports of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded, or oral, received or developed by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission in the course of an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a judge shall be made except as follows: (A) Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings; (B) Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges; (C) In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations; (D) Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority; (E) Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information; (F) Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission; (G) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession; (H) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or (I) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney.

(A) Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings;

(B) Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges;

(C) In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations;

(D) Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority;

(E) Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information;

(F) Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission;

(G) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession;

(H) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or

(I) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney.

(2) All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open to the press and to the public, except that following the completion of the introduction of all evidence, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may convene to executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive session, the final action of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be announced in an open and public session.

(3) The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission is authorized to request the appropriate prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in § 16-43-601 et seq.

Amended by Act 2015, No. 1152,§ 1, eff. 7/22/2015.

Amended by Act 2013, No. 1115,§ 2, eff. 8/16/2013.

Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 1078, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-804 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 90 / Subchapter 8 / Section 16-90-804
Departures from the voluntary presumptive sentence range
Status: in_force

(a) (1) At a bench trial, a court may depart from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 in reliance on one (1) or more aggravating factors by providing a justification in the record of: (A) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (B) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 . (2) (A) The justification regarding an aggravating factor shall be entered into the sentencing order. (B) The sentencing order shall also reflect whether the sentence is the result of an original charge or whether an original charge was nolle prosequi. (b) (1) (A) When sentencing is done by the court following a trial before the court, either party or both parties may present evidence to justify a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 . (B) The court may allow argument either during the sentencing phase of a trial or at a separate hearing on the matter of departing from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 if the court finds that argument would be helpful. (C) (i) When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record. (ii) After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable. (2) (A) If both parties agree on a recommended sentence, the court may choose to accept or reject the agreement based upon the facts of the case and whether the facts support the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 or a departure different from any recommendation. (B) (i) If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 , the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission. (ii) The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include: (a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 . (C) If the court rejects the agreement under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the offender shall be allowed to withdraw his or her plea. (c) The following is a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 : (1) While falling short of a defense, the victim played an aggressive role in the incident or provoked or willingly participated in the incident; (2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the commission of the current offense; (3) Before detection, the offender compensated or made a good faith effort to compensate the victim for any damage or injury sustained by the victim; (4) The current offense was principally accomplished by another person, and the offender manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the safety or well-being of the victim; (5) The offender or the offender's children suffered a continuing pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the current offense, and the current offense is a response to the physical or sexual abuse; (6) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purpose of this chapter; (7) If the current offense is a sexual offense, before detection in the sexual offense, the offender has voluntarily admitted the nature and extent of the sexual offense and has sought and participated in professional treatment or counseling for the sexual offense; (8) Upon motion of the state stating that the offender has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the circumstances listed below may be weighed as mitigating factors with respect to the offender's offense: (A) The timeliness of the offender's assistance; (B) The nature and extent of the offender's assistance; and (C) The truthfulness, completeness, and demonstrable reliability of any information or testimony provided by the offender; and (9) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as a mitigating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was a downward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included. (d) The following is a nonexclusive list of aggravating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 : (1) The offender's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim exhibited by degrading, gratuitous, vicious, torturous, and demeaning physical or verbal abuse, unusual pain, or violence in excess of that necessary to accomplish the criminal purpose; (2) The offender knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health; (3) The current offense was a major economic offense or series of offenses, as identified by a consideration of any of the following factors: (A) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim; (B) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense; (C) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; (D) (i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense. (ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or (E) The offender has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions; (4) (A) The current offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual controlled substance offense. (B) The presence of two (2) or more of the following circumstances is an aggravating factor with respect to the current offense: (i) The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance; (ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense; (iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement; (iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy; (v) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or (vi) The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance; (5) (A) The current offense is a felony and the offender employed a firearm in the course of or in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony. (B) The factor described under subdivision (d)(5)(A) of this section does not apply to an offender convicted of a felony, an element of which is: (i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon; (ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon; (iii) Possessing a deadly weapon; (iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or (v) Carrying a deadly weapon; (6) The current offense was a sexual offense and was part of a pattern of criminal behavior with the same or different victims under eighteen (18) years of age manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time; (7) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter; (8) The current offense was committed in a manner that exposed risk of injury to persons other than the victim or victims, including without limitation shooting a firearm into a crowd of people; (9) The current offense was a violent or sexual offense committed in the victim's zone of privacy, including without limitation the victim's home or the curtilage of the victim's home; (10) The offender attempted to cover or conceal the current offense by intimidation of witnesses, destruction or tampering with evidence, or purposely misleading authorities; (11) The current offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (12) If the current offense is related to a vehicular homicide, the offender did not have the minimum insurance required by law; and (13) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as an aggravating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was an upward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included. (e) This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial court. Amended by Act 2023, No. 736,§ 13, eff. 8/1/2023. Amended by Act 2017, No. 423,§ 15, eff. 1/1/2018. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 3; 1993, No. 550, § 3; 1995, No. 1170, §§ 8, 9; 2005, No. 186, § 1.

(a) (1) At a bench trial, a court may depart from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 in reliance on one (1) or more aggravating factors by providing a justification in the record of: (A) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (B) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 . (2) (A) The justification regarding an aggravating factor shall be entered into the sentencing order. (B) The sentencing order shall also reflect whether the sentence is the result of an original charge or whether an original charge was nolle prosequi.

(1) At a bench trial, a court may depart from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 in reliance on one (1) or more aggravating factors by providing a justification in the record of: (A) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (B) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 .

(A) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and

(B) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 .

(2) (A) The justification regarding an aggravating factor shall be entered into the sentencing order. (B) The sentencing order shall also reflect whether the sentence is the result of an original charge or whether an original charge was nolle prosequi.

(A) The justification regarding an aggravating factor shall be entered into the sentencing order.

(B) The sentencing order shall also reflect whether the sentence is the result of an original charge or whether an original charge was nolle prosequi.

(b) (1) (A) When sentencing is done by the court following a trial before the court, either party or both parties may present evidence to justify a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 . (B) The court may allow argument either during the sentencing phase of a trial or at a separate hearing on the matter of departing from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 if the court finds that argument would be helpful. (C) (i) When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record. (ii) After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable. (2) (A) If both parties agree on a recommended sentence, the court may choose to accept or reject the agreement based upon the facts of the case and whether the facts support the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 or a departure different from any recommendation. (B) (i) If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 , the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission. (ii) The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include: (a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 . (C) If the court rejects the agreement under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the offender shall be allowed to withdraw his or her plea.

(1) (A) When sentencing is done by the court following a trial before the court, either party or both parties may present evidence to justify a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 . (B) The court may allow argument either during the sentencing phase of a trial or at a separate hearing on the matter of departing from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 if the court finds that argument would be helpful. (C) (i) When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record. (ii) After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable.

(A) When sentencing is done by the court following a trial before the court, either party or both parties may present evidence to justify a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 .

(B) The court may allow argument either during the sentencing phase of a trial or at a separate hearing on the matter of departing from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 if the court finds that argument would be helpful.

(C) (i) When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record. (ii) After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable.

(i) When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record.

(ii) After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable.

(2) (A) If both parties agree on a recommended sentence, the court may choose to accept or reject the agreement based upon the facts of the case and whether the facts support the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 or a departure different from any recommendation. (B) (i) If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 , the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission. (ii) The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include: (a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 . (C) If the court rejects the agreement under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the offender shall be allowed to withdraw his or her plea.

(A) If both parties agree on a recommended sentence, the court may choose to accept or reject the agreement based upon the facts of the case and whether the facts support the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 or a departure different from any recommendation.

(B) (i) If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 , the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission. (ii) The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include: (a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 .

(i) If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 , the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission.

(ii) The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include: (a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and (b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 .

(a) A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and

(b) A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 .

(C) If the court rejects the agreement under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the offender shall be allowed to withdraw his or her plea.

(c) The following is a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 : (1) While falling short of a defense, the victim played an aggressive role in the incident or provoked or willingly participated in the incident; (2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the commission of the current offense; (3) Before detection, the offender compensated or made a good faith effort to compensate the victim for any damage or injury sustained by the victim; (4) The current offense was principally accomplished by another person, and the offender manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the safety or well-being of the victim; (5) The offender or the offender's children suffered a continuing pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the current offense, and the current offense is a response to the physical or sexual abuse; (6) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purpose of this chapter; (7) If the current offense is a sexual offense, before detection in the sexual offense, the offender has voluntarily admitted the nature and extent of the sexual offense and has sought and participated in professional treatment or counseling for the sexual offense; (8) Upon motion of the state stating that the offender has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the circumstances listed below may be weighed as mitigating factors with respect to the offender's offense: (A) The timeliness of the offender's assistance; (B) The nature and extent of the offender's assistance; and (C) The truthfulness, completeness, and demonstrable reliability of any information or testimony provided by the offender; and (9) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as a mitigating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was a downward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(1) While falling short of a defense, the victim played an aggressive role in the incident or provoked or willingly participated in the incident;

(2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the commission of the current offense;

(3) Before detection, the offender compensated or made a good faith effort to compensate the victim for any damage or injury sustained by the victim;

(4) The current offense was principally accomplished by another person, and the offender manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the safety or well-being of the victim;

(5) The offender or the offender's children suffered a continuing pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the current offense, and the current offense is a response to the physical or sexual abuse;

(6) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purpose of this chapter;

(7) If the current offense is a sexual offense, before detection in the sexual offense, the offender has voluntarily admitted the nature and extent of the sexual offense and has sought and participated in professional treatment or counseling for the sexual offense;

(8) Upon motion of the state stating that the offender has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the circumstances listed below may be weighed as mitigating factors with respect to the offender's offense: (A) The timeliness of the offender's assistance; (B) The nature and extent of the offender's assistance; and (C) The truthfulness, completeness, and demonstrable reliability of any information or testimony provided by the offender; and

(A) The timeliness of the offender's assistance;

(B) The nature and extent of the offender's assistance; and

(C) The truthfulness, completeness, and demonstrable reliability of any information or testimony provided by the offender; and

(9) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as a mitigating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was a downward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(A) Any other compelling reason.

(B) If any other compelling reason is used as a mitigating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was a downward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(d) The following is a nonexclusive list of aggravating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 : (1) The offender's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim exhibited by degrading, gratuitous, vicious, torturous, and demeaning physical or verbal abuse, unusual pain, or violence in excess of that necessary to accomplish the criminal purpose; (2) The offender knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health; (3) The current offense was a major economic offense or series of offenses, as identified by a consideration of any of the following factors: (A) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim; (B) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense; (C) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; (D) (i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense. (ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or (E) The offender has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions; (4) (A) The current offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual controlled substance offense. (B) The presence of two (2) or more of the following circumstances is an aggravating factor with respect to the current offense: (i) The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance; (ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense; (iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement; (iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy; (v) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or (vi) The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance; (5) (A) The current offense is a felony and the offender employed a firearm in the course of or in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony. (B) The factor described under subdivision (d)(5)(A) of this section does not apply to an offender convicted of a felony, an element of which is: (i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon; (ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon; (iii) Possessing a deadly weapon; (iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or (v) Carrying a deadly weapon; (6) The current offense was a sexual offense and was part of a pattern of criminal behavior with the same or different victims under eighteen (18) years of age manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time; (7) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter; (8) The current offense was committed in a manner that exposed risk of injury to persons other than the victim or victims, including without limitation shooting a firearm into a crowd of people; (9) The current offense was a violent or sexual offense committed in the victim's zone of privacy, including without limitation the victim's home or the curtilage of the victim's home; (10) The offender attempted to cover or conceal the current offense by intimidation of witnesses, destruction or tampering with evidence, or purposely misleading authorities; (11) The current offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (12) If the current offense is related to a vehicular homicide, the offender did not have the minimum insurance required by law; and (13) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as an aggravating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was an upward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(1) The offender's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim exhibited by degrading, gratuitous, vicious, torturous, and demeaning physical or verbal abuse, unusual pain, or violence in excess of that necessary to accomplish the criminal purpose;

(2) The offender knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health;

(3) The current offense was a major economic offense or series of offenses, as identified by a consideration of any of the following factors: (A) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim; (B) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense; (C) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; (D) (i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense. (ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or (E) The offender has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions;

(A) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim;

(B) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense;

(C) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time;

(D) (i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense. (ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or

(i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense.

(ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or

(E) The offender has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions;

(4) (A) The current offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual controlled substance offense. (B) The presence of two (2) or more of the following circumstances is an aggravating factor with respect to the current offense: (i) The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance; (ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense; (iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement; (iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy; (v) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or (vi) The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance;

(A) The current offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual controlled substance offense.

(B) The presence of two (2) or more of the following circumstances is an aggravating factor with respect to the current offense: (i) The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance; (ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense; (iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement; (iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy; (v) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or (vi) The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance;

(i) The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance;

(ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense;

(iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement;

(iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy;

(v) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or

(vi) The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance;

(5) (A) The current offense is a felony and the offender employed a firearm in the course of or in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony. (B) The factor described under subdivision (d)(5)(A) of this section does not apply to an offender convicted of a felony, an element of which is: (i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon; (ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon; (iii) Possessing a deadly weapon; (iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or (v) Carrying a deadly weapon;

(A) The current offense is a felony and the offender employed a firearm in the course of or in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony.

(B) The factor described under subdivision (d)(5)(A) of this section does not apply to an offender convicted of a felony, an element of which is: (i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon; (ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon; (iii) Possessing a deadly weapon; (iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or (v) Carrying a deadly weapon;

(i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon;

(ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon;

(iii) Possessing a deadly weapon;

(iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or

(v) Carrying a deadly weapon;

(6) The current offense was a sexual offense and was part of a pattern of criminal behavior with the same or different victims under eighteen (18) years of age manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time;

(7) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter;

(8) The current offense was committed in a manner that exposed risk of injury to persons other than the victim or victims, including without limitation shooting a firearm into a crowd of people;

(9) The current offense was a violent or sexual offense committed in the victim's zone of privacy, including without limitation the victim's home or the curtilage of the victim's home;

(10) The offender attempted to cover or conceal the current offense by intimidation of witnesses, destruction or tampering with evidence, or purposely misleading authorities;

(11) The current offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody;

(12) If the current offense is related to a vehicular homicide, the offender did not have the minimum insurance required by law; and

(13) (A) Any other compelling reason. (B) If any other compelling reason is used as an aggravating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was an upward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(A) Any other compelling reason.

(B) If any other compelling reason is used as an aggravating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was an upward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(e) This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial court.

Amended by Act 2023, No. 736,§ 13, eff. 8/1/2023.

Amended by Act 2017, No. 423,§ 15, eff. 1/1/2018.

Acts 1993, No. 532, § 3; 1993, No. 550, § 3; 1995, No. 1170, §§ 8, 9; 2005, No. 186, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-1403 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 13 / Subchapter 14 / Section 16-13-1403
Judges and chancellors
Status: in_force

(a) The qualified electors of the Sixth Judicial District shall elect: (1) Six (6) circuit judges; (2) Four (4) chancellors; (3) One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and (4) Two (2) circuit-chancery judgeships. (b) (1) In the Sixth Judicial District, there is created one (1) additional circuit judgeship and two (2) additional chancery judgeships. (2) The circuit judges and chancery judges subject to this subsection may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district. (c) (1) Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district. (2) Further, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement not more than two (2) of the chancery judges who shall serve as judges of the juvenile division of chancery court in addition to the circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section. (3) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits. (4) Of the judgeships created by subdivision (a)(4) of this section within the Sixth Judicial District, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall include conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff and may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall be to perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. Each of these judges shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate courts as time permits. (d) (1) There is hereby created in the Sixth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate. (2) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1987, No. 846, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1; 1993, No. 283, § 1.

(a) The qualified electors of the Sixth Judicial District shall elect: (1) Six (6) circuit judges; (2) Four (4) chancellors; (3) One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and (4) Two (2) circuit-chancery judgeships.

(1) Six (6) circuit judges;

(2) Four (4) chancellors;

(3) One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and

(4) Two (2) circuit-chancery judgeships.

(b) (1) In the Sixth Judicial District, there is created one (1) additional circuit judgeship and two (2) additional chancery judgeships. (2) The circuit judges and chancery judges subject to this subsection may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district.

(1) In the Sixth Judicial District, there is created one (1) additional circuit judgeship and two (2) additional chancery judgeships.

(2) The circuit judges and chancery judges subject to this subsection may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district.

(c) (1) Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district. (2) Further, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement not more than two (2) of the chancery judges who shall serve as judges of the juvenile division of chancery court in addition to the circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section. (3) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits. (4) Of the judgeships created by subdivision (a)(4) of this section within the Sixth Judicial District, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall include conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff and may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall be to perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. Each of these judges shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate courts as time permits.

(1) Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.

(2) Further, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement not more than two (2) of the chancery judges who shall serve as judges of the juvenile division of chancery court in addition to the circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section.

(3) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

(4) Of the judgeships created by subdivision (a)(4) of this section within the Sixth Judicial District, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall include conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff and may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall be to perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. Each of these judges shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate courts as time permits.

(d) (1) There is hereby created in the Sixth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate. (2) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

(1) There is hereby created in the Sixth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.

(2) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1987, No. 846, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1; 1993, No. 283, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-152 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 21 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-21-152
The Twenty-first Judicial District
Status: in_force

The Twenty-first Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District. Acts 1995, No. 900, § 6; 1997, No. 865, § 1.

The Twenty-first Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

Acts 1995, No. 900, § 6; 1997, No. 865, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 81 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-81-113
Warrantless arrest for domestic abuse - Definitions
Status: in_force

(a) (1) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed acts which constitute a crime under the laws of this state and which constitute domestic abuse as defined in subdivision (b)(1) of this section against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) The arrest of the person shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer when evidence indicates that domestic abuse has occurred in addition to a violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code, § 5-1-101 et seq. (2) (A) When a law enforcement officer receives conflicting accounts of an act of domestic abuse involving family or household members, the law enforcement officer shall evaluate each account separately to determine if one (1) party to the act of domestic abuse was the predominant aggressor. (B) (i) When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation: (a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses; (b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse; (c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or (d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer. (ii) A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor. (3) (A) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person that is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the person who was the predominant aggressor with or without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) (i) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (ii) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (4) Any law enforcement officer acting in good faith and exercising due care in making an arrest for domestic abuse shall have immunity from civil liability. (b) As used in this section: (1) (A) "Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two (2) individuals which shall be determined by examining the following factors: (i) The length of the relationship; (ii) The type of the relationship; and (iii) The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship. (B) "Dating relationship" shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary fraternization in a business or social context between two (2) individuals; (2) "Domestic abuse" means: (A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or (B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state; and (3) "Family or household member" means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity, any child residing in the household, persons who have resided or cohabited together presently or in the past, persons who have or have had a child in common, and persons who have been in a dating relationship together presently or in the past. (c) (1) Any person arrested under the provisions of this section shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. (2) The judicial officer shall conduct a pretrial release inquiry of the person. (d) The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of factors relevant to the release decision such as: (1) The person's employment status, history, and financial condition; (2) The nature and extent of his or her family relationships; (3) His or her past and present residence; (4) His or her character and reputation; (5) Persons who agree to assist him or her in attending court at the proper times; (6) The nature of the charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty; (7) The person's prior criminal record, if any, and if he or she previously has been released pending trial, whether he or she appears as required; (8) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the person is released without restrictions; and (9) Any other facts tending to indicate that the person has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court. (e) The judicial officer may impose one (1) or more of the following conditions of release: (1) Placing the person under the care of a qualified person or organization agreeing to supervise the person and assist him or her in appearing in court; (2) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, associations, and residences of the person; and (3) Imposing any other reasonable restrictions to ensure the appearance of the person at future judicial hearings. Acts 1991, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1550, § 1; 2001, No. 1421, § 1; 2001, No. 1678, § 3; 2005, No. 1875, § 3; 2007, No. 204, § 1.

(a) (1) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed acts which constitute a crime under the laws of this state and which constitute domestic abuse as defined in subdivision (b)(1) of this section against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) The arrest of the person shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer when evidence indicates that domestic abuse has occurred in addition to a violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code, § 5-1-101 et seq. (2) (A) When a law enforcement officer receives conflicting accounts of an act of domestic abuse involving family or household members, the law enforcement officer shall evaluate each account separately to determine if one (1) party to the act of domestic abuse was the predominant aggressor. (B) (i) When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation: (a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses; (b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse; (c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or (d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer. (ii) A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor. (3) (A) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person that is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the person who was the predominant aggressor with or without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) (i) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (ii) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (4) Any law enforcement officer acting in good faith and exercising due care in making an arrest for domestic abuse shall have immunity from civil liability.

(1) (A) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed acts which constitute a crime under the laws of this state and which constitute domestic abuse as defined in subdivision (b)(1) of this section against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) The arrest of the person shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer when evidence indicates that domestic abuse has occurred in addition to a violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code, § 5-1-101 et seq.

(A) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed acts which constitute a crime under the laws of this state and which constitute domestic abuse as defined in subdivision (b)(1) of this section against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(B) The arrest of the person shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer when evidence indicates that domestic abuse has occurred in addition to a violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code, § 5-1-101 et seq.

(2) (A) When a law enforcement officer receives conflicting accounts of an act of domestic abuse involving family or household members, the law enforcement officer shall evaluate each account separately to determine if one (1) party to the act of domestic abuse was the predominant aggressor. (B) (i) When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation: (a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses; (b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse; (c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or (d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer. (ii) A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor.

(A) When a law enforcement officer receives conflicting accounts of an act of domestic abuse involving family or household members, the law enforcement officer shall evaluate each account separately to determine if one (1) party to the act of domestic abuse was the predominant aggressor.

(B) (i) When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation: (a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses; (b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse; (c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or (d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer. (ii) A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor.

(i) When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation: (a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses; (b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse; (c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or (d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer.

(a) Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses;

(b) The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse;

(c) Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or

(d) Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer.

(ii) A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor.

(3) (A) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person that is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the person who was the predominant aggressor with or without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (B) (i) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (ii) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(A) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person that is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the person who was the predominant aggressor with or without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(B) (i) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer. (ii) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(i) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(ii) When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102 , even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.

(4) Any law enforcement officer acting in good faith and exercising due care in making an arrest for domestic abuse shall have immunity from civil liability.

(b) As used in this section: (1) (A) "Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two (2) individuals which shall be determined by examining the following factors: (i) The length of the relationship; (ii) The type of the relationship; and (iii) The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship. (B) "Dating relationship" shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary fraternization in a business or social context between two (2) individuals; (2) "Domestic abuse" means: (A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or (B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state; and (3) "Family or household member" means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity, any child residing in the household, persons who have resided or cohabited together presently or in the past, persons who have or have had a child in common, and persons who have been in a dating relationship together presently or in the past.

(1) (A) "Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two (2) individuals which shall be determined by examining the following factors: (i) The length of the relationship; (ii) The type of the relationship; and (iii) The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship. (B) "Dating relationship" shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary fraternization in a business or social context between two (2) individuals;

(A) "Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two (2) individuals which shall be determined by examining the following factors: (i) The length of the relationship; (ii) The type of the relationship; and (iii) The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship.

(i) The length of the relationship;

(ii) The type of the relationship; and

(iii) The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship.

(B) "Dating relationship" shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary fraternization in a business or social context between two (2) individuals;

(2) "Domestic abuse" means: (A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or (B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state; and

(A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or

(B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state; and

(3) "Family or household member" means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity, any child residing in the household, persons who have resided or cohabited together presently or in the past, persons who have or have had a child in common, and persons who have been in a dating relationship together presently or in the past.

(c) (1) Any person arrested under the provisions of this section shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. (2) The judicial officer shall conduct a pretrial release inquiry of the person.

(1) Any person arrested under the provisions of this section shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.

(2) The judicial officer shall conduct a pretrial release inquiry of the person.

(d) The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of factors relevant to the release decision such as: (1) The person's employment status, history, and financial condition; (2) The nature and extent of his or her family relationships; (3) His or her past and present residence; (4) His or her character and reputation; (5) Persons who agree to assist him or her in attending court at the proper times; (6) The nature of the charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty; (7) The person's prior criminal record, if any, and if he or she previously has been released pending trial, whether he or she appears as required; (8) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the person is released without restrictions; and (9) Any other facts tending to indicate that the person has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.

(1) The person's employment status, history, and financial condition;

(2) The nature and extent of his or her family relationships;

(3) His or her past and present residence;

(4) His or her character and reputation;

(5) Persons who agree to assist him or her in attending court at the proper times;

(6) The nature of the charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty;

(7) The person's prior criminal record, if any, and if he or she previously has been released pending trial, whether he or she appears as required;

(8) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the person is released without restrictions; and

(9) Any other facts tending to indicate that the person has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.

(e) The judicial officer may impose one (1) or more of the following conditions of release: (1) Placing the person under the care of a qualified person or organization agreeing to supervise the person and assist him or her in appearing in court; (2) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, associations, and residences of the person; and (3) Imposing any other reasonable restrictions to ensure the appearance of the person at future judicial hearings.

(1) Placing the person under the care of a qualified person or organization agreeing to supervise the person and assist him or her in appearing in court;

(2) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, associations, and residences of the person; and

(3) Imposing any other reasonable restrictions to ensure the appearance of the person at future judicial hearings.

Acts 1991, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1550, § 1; 2001, No. 1421, § 1; 2001, No. 1678, § 3; 2005, No. 1875, § 3; 2007, No. 204, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-203 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 44 / Subchapter 2 / Section 16-44-203
Videotaped deposition of alleged victim under 17 years of age in sexual offense prosecution
Status: in_force

(a) As used in this section, the term "videotaped deposition" means the visual recording on a magnetic tape, together with the associated sound, of a witness testifying under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding, upon oral examination and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination in the presence of the defendant and intended to be played back upon the trial of the action in court. (b) In any prosecution for a sexual offense or criminal attempt to commit a sexual offense against a minor, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to the opposing counsel, the court may, for good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of seventeen (17) years. The videotaped deposition shall be taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's attorneys. Examination and cross-examination of the alleged victim shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence. (c) Any videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this section shall be admissible at trial and received into evidence in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. However, neither the presentation nor the preparation of such videotaped deposition shall preclude the prosecutor's calling the alleged victim to testify at trial if that is necessary to serve the interests of justice. (d) Videotapes which are a part of the court record are subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the alleged victim. Acts 1981, No. 368, §§ 1-3; 1983, No. 407, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2035 -- 43-2037.

(a) As used in this section, the term "videotaped deposition" means the visual recording on a magnetic tape, together with the associated sound, of a witness testifying under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding, upon oral examination and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination in the presence of the defendant and intended to be played back upon the trial of the action in court.

(b) In any prosecution for a sexual offense or criminal attempt to commit a sexual offense against a minor, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to the opposing counsel, the court may, for good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of seventeen (17) years. The videotaped deposition shall be taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's attorneys. Examination and cross-examination of the alleged victim shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence.

(c) Any videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this section shall be admissible at trial and received into evidence in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. However, neither the presentation nor the preparation of such videotaped deposition shall preclude the prosecutor's calling the alleged victim to testify at trial if that is necessary to serve the interests of justice.

(d) Videotapes which are a part of the court record are subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the alleged victim.

Acts 1981, No. 368, §§ 1-3; 1983, No. 407, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2035 -- 43-2037.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-106 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 61 / Subchapter 1 / Section 16-61-106
[Repealed]
Status: repealed

Repealed by Act 2013, No. 1148,§ 27, eff. 8/16/2013. Civil Code, §§ 53, 54; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1118, 1119; Pope's Dig., §§ 1334, 1335; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-830, 27-831.

Repealed by Act 2013, No. 1148,§ 27, eff. 8/16/2013.

Civil Code, §§ 53, 54; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1118, 1119; Pope's Dig., §§ 1334, 1335; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-830, 27-831.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-220 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 108 / Subchapter 2 / Section 16-108-220
Change of award by arbitrator
Status: in_force

(a) On motion to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an award: (1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ; (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award. (b) A motion under subsection (a) must be made and notice given to all parties within twenty days after the movant receives notice of the award. (c) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any objection to the motion within ten days after receipt of the notice. (d) If a motion to the court is pending under § 16-108-222 , § 16-108-223 , or § 16-108-224 , the court may submit the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award: (1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ; (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award. (e) An award modified or corrected under this section is subject to § 16-108-219(a) and §§ 16-108-222 - 16-108-224 . Acts 1969, No. 260, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-519; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

(a) On motion to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an award: (1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ; (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award.

(1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ;

(2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or

(3) to clarify the award.

(b) A motion under subsection (a) must be made and notice given to all parties within twenty days after the movant receives notice of the award.

(c) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any objection to the motion within ten days after receipt of the notice.

(d) If a motion to the court is pending under § 16-108-222 , § 16-108-223 , or § 16-108-224 , the court may submit the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award: (1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ; (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award.

(1) upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3) ;

(2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or

(3) to clarify the award.

(e) An award modified or corrected under this section is subject to § 16-108-219(a) and §§ 16-108-222 - 16-108-224 .

Acts 1969, No. 260, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-519; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-1603 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 21 / Subchapter 16 / Section 16-21-1603
Reimbursement of expenses to Prosecuting Attorney of Eleventh Judicial District-East
Status: in_force

(a) The Quorum Court of Arkansas County shall furnish the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District-East reasonable reimbursement for secretarial hire, part-time deputy hire, social security and unemployment matching expenses, and for office supplies, in-state travel, telephone and other utilities, and office equipment rental and upkeep, as may be necessary for the operation of the office, in an amount not less than twenty-five thousand nine hundred sixty-one dollars ($25,961) per annum, or such additional amount as may be provided by the quorum court of the county. (b) The prosecuting attorney shall file claims monthly for reimbursement of authorized items of expense incurred during the previous month, but in no event shall the amount of the reimbursement during any month be greater than one-twelfth ( 1 / 12 ) of the amount authorized in this section or such additional annual amount as may be approved by the quorum court. Acts 1983, No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.10a.

(a) The Quorum Court of Arkansas County shall furnish the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District-East reasonable reimbursement for secretarial hire, part-time deputy hire, social security and unemployment matching expenses, and for office supplies, in-state travel, telephone and other utilities, and office equipment rental and upkeep, as may be necessary for the operation of the office, in an amount not less than twenty-five thousand nine hundred sixty-one dollars ($25,961) per annum, or such additional amount as may be provided by the quorum court of the county.

(b) The prosecuting attorney shall file claims monthly for reimbursement of authorized items of expense incurred during the previous month, but in no event shall the amount of the reimbursement during any month be greater than one-twelfth ( 1 / 12 ) of the amount authorized in this section or such additional annual amount as may be approved by the quorum court.

Acts 1983, No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.10a.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 — AR Code / Title 16 / Chapter 31 / Section 16-31-102
Disqualifications
Status: in_force

(a) The following persons are disqualified to act as grand or petit jurors: (1) Persons who do not meet the qualifications of § 16-31-101 ; (2) Persons who are unable to speak or understand the English language; (3) Persons who are unable to read or write the English language, except that the circuit judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, may waive these requirements when the persons are otherwise found to be capable of performing the duties of jurors; (4) Persons who have been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned; (5) Persons who are: (A) Not of good character or approved integrity; (B) Lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information; (C) Intemperate; or (D) Not of good behavior; (6) Persons who, by reason of a physical or mental disability, are unable to render satisfactory jury service, except that no person shall be disqualified solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight in any degree; and (7) Persons who are less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time they are required to appear. (b) Except by the consent of all the parties, no person shall serve as a petit juror in any case who: (1) Is related to any party or attorney in the cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; (2) Is expected to appear as a witness or has been summoned to appear as a witness in the cause; (3) Has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter in controversy which may influence his or her judgment; (4) May have a material interest in the outcome of the case; (5) Is biased or prejudiced for or against any party to the cause or is prevented by any relationship or circumstance from acting impartially; or (6) Was a petit juror in a former trial of the cause or of another case involving any of the same questions of fact. (c) Nothing in this section shall limit a court's discretion and obligation to strike jurors for cause for any reason other than solely because of sight or hearing impairment. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 2, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-102, 39-105; Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 1.

(a) The following persons are disqualified to act as grand or petit jurors: (1) Persons who do not meet the qualifications of § 16-31-101 ; (2) Persons who are unable to speak or understand the English language; (3) Persons who are unable to read or write the English language, except that the circuit judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, may waive these requirements when the persons are otherwise found to be capable of performing the duties of jurors; (4) Persons who have been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned; (5) Persons who are: (A) Not of good character or approved integrity; (B) Lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information; (C) Intemperate; or (D) Not of good behavior; (6) Persons who, by reason of a physical or mental disability, are unable to render satisfactory jury service, except that no person shall be disqualified solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight in any degree; and (7) Persons who are less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time they are required to appear.

(1) Persons who do not meet the qualifications of § 16-31-101 ;

(2) Persons who are unable to speak or understand the English language;

(3) Persons who are unable to read or write the English language, except that the circuit judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, may waive these requirements when the persons are otherwise found to be capable of performing the duties of jurors;

(4) Persons who have been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned;

(5) Persons who are: (A) Not of good character or approved integrity; (B) Lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information; (C) Intemperate; or (D) Not of good behavior;

(A) Not of good character or approved integrity;

(B) Lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information;

(C) Intemperate; or

(D) Not of good behavior;

(6) Persons who, by reason of a physical or mental disability, are unable to render satisfactory jury service, except that no person shall be disqualified solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight in any degree; and

(7) Persons who are less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time they are required to appear.

(b) Except by the consent of all the parties, no person shall serve as a petit juror in any case who: (1) Is related to any party or attorney in the cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; (2) Is expected to appear as a witness or has been summoned to appear as a witness in the cause; (3) Has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter in controversy which may influence his or her judgment; (4) May have a material interest in the outcome of the case; (5) Is biased or prejudiced for or against any party to the cause or is prevented by any relationship or circumstance from acting impartially; or (6) Was a petit juror in a former trial of the cause or of another case involving any of the same questions of fact.

(1) Is related to any party or attorney in the cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;

(2) Is expected to appear as a witness or has been summoned to appear as a witness in the cause;

(3) Has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter in controversy which may influence his or her judgment;

(4) May have a material interest in the outcome of the case;

(5) Is biased or prejudiced for or against any party to the cause or is prevented by any relationship or circumstance from acting impartially; or

(6) Was a petit juror in a former trial of the cause or of another case involving any of the same questions of fact.

(c) Nothing in this section shall limit a court's discretion and obligation to strike jurors for cause for any reason other than solely because of sight or hearing impairment.

Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 2, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-102, 39-105; Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 1.