English: Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status follows an analysis of the company ' s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state ' s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market ’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market's increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
French: Depuis lors, l ' agence semble avoir changé d ' avis en déclarant que les conclusions du creditwatch status “suit une analyse des liquidités de la société durant la fin de l'année 2003 et une revue de la participation potentielle de l'État français sur le marché des télécoms français” (p. 19). “France Télécom a bénéficié de la confiance croissante du marché que le gouvernement supportera d'une manière ou d'une autre le crédit” (p. 20).
German: Nach den Berechnungen der Deutschen Bank hätte das Verhältnis Schulden/EBITDA im zweiten Halbjahr 2002 bei 4,9 und am 31. Dezember 2002 bei 5,20 gelegen. (‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom's ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor's that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.”
Spanish: La actual calificación de FT, BBB-, parece ampliamente estar basada en mayor medida en la promesa del apoyo del Gobierno de garantizar la liquidez que en sus indicadores principales ”. Según los cálculos del Deutsche Bank, la relación deuda/EBITDA de FT parece haber sido del 4,9 el segundo semestre de 2002 y del 5,20 a 31 de diciembre de 2002.
Italian: … Pensiamo che non esista una buona risposta a queste domande, perché, se FT operasse nel mondo reale, essa, secondo noi, non potrebbe rifinanziarsi senza una conversione del debito in capitale» (p. 33; nello stesso senso v. p. 54). E ancora: «La stampa ha riferito che il governo francese sosterrà France Télécom, lasciando supporre che esso sia disposto a essere il 'prestatore di ultima istanza' della società.
Portuguese: A notação actual da FT, BBB-, parece basear-se mais na promessa de apoio do Governo para garantir a liquidez que nos elementos fundamentais da empresa. Segundo os cálculos do Deutsche Bank, a relação dívida/EBITDA da FT teria sido de 4,9 no segundo semestre de 2002 e de 5,20 em 31 de Dezembro de 2002. (‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3,5 × net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.”
Dutch: Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status „follows an analysis of the company's liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state's potential involvement in the French telecommunications market” (blz. 19); „France Télécom benefited from the market's increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit” (blz. 20); „we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided” (page 54); „However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called „implicit government support”.
Danish: Bureauet har i mellemtiden tilsyneladende skiftet mening, når det nu udtaler, at dets konklusioner vedrørende selskabets kreditværdighed »følger en gennemgang af selskabets likviditet i slutningen af 2003 og en analyse af den franske stats mulige indgriben på det franske telemarked« (s. 19). »France Télécom har nydt godt af markedets stigende tillid til, at regeringen på den ene eller den anden vis vil støtte selskabets låntagning« (s. 20). »Vi kan ikke lukke øjnene for, at den franske stat ejer hovedparten af FT og at den franske finansminister for nylig har forsikret investorerne, at likviditeten vil blive sikret« (s. 54). »Som sagt mener vi dog, at selskabet nok i sidste ende skal finde de likvide midler, som det behøver, via den angivne »implicitte støtte fra staten««.
Swedish: Det bör framhållas att S & P ursprungligen uttalat att den inte skulle ta hänsyn till extraordinärt stöd från franska staten i kreditvärderingen när den sänkte France Télécoms kreditbetyg till BBB i juni. Sedan dess tycks kreditvärderingsinstitutet ha ändrat uppfattning eftersom man uttalat att slutsatserna från creditwatch status ”följer en analys av bolagets likviditet under slutet av 2003 och en översikt av franska statens eventuella deltagande i franska telekommarknaden”(s.
Finnish: Jälkeenpäin luokituslaitos näyttää muuttaneen mielensä, sillä se ilmoittaa, että creditwatch status ”perustuu yrityksen rahavaroista vuoden 2003 lopussa laadittuun analyysiin sekä Ranskan valtion mahdolliseen osallistumiseen Ranskan televiestintämarkkinoihin” (s. 19). ”France Télécom hyötyi markkinoiden kasvavasta luottamuksesta, joka perustui siihen, että hallitus tukee luottoa tavalla tai toisella” (s. 20).
Greek: Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state’s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market (p. 19); France Télécom benefited from the market’s increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit (p. 20); we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided (page 54) However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
Czech: (‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom's ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor's that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.”
Slovak: Aktuálny rating France Télécom BBB-, je ako sa zdá, viac založený na prísľube podpory vlády vo veci zabezpečenia likvidity, než na jej vlastných základných prostriedkoch. Podľa prepočtov Deutsche Bank bol pomer dlh/EBITDA France Télécom 4,9 v druhom polroku 2002 a 5,20 k 31. decembru 2002. („… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB- ... The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a ‚stable‘ outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by ‚the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.‘ … Interestingly, S & P had initially said it was not incorporating any extraordinary support from the French government into its rating when it downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB in June. Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status ‚follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state’s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market‘ (p. 19); ‚France Télécom benefited from the market’s increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit‘ (p. 20); ‚we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided‘ (page 54) ‚However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called „implicit government support“.
Polish: Jaki jest rzeczywisty koszt dla długu 10 miliardów euro dla firmy, która nie jest naprawdę BBB- i która jest po prostu oceniana w ten sposób ze względu na wsparcie rządu? … Sądzimy, że nie ma dobrej odpowiedzi na te pytania, ponieważ gdyby FT operowała w świecie rzeczywistym, nie byłaby ona – naszym zdaniem – w stanie bez konwersji refinansować długu na kapitał”. (str. 33, w tym samym rozumieniu patrz str. 54). A także „Wzmianka w prasie, że rząd francuski wesprze France Télécom, implikująca, że zaakceptuje on rolę »pożyczkodawcy ostatniej instancji« firmy.
Hungarian: „Ugyanakkor mint ahogy azt állandóan hangoztattuk, úgy gondoljuk, hogy a vállalat az említett módon »az állam burkolt támogatásával« végül is megtalálja azokat a likvid forrásokat, amelyekre szüksége van. Ennek a formája lehet egy kölcsön, piaci feltételek mellett, amelyet bankok vagy a kormány biztosít (21. o.).
Slovenian: Po izračunih Deutsche Bank bi moralo biti razmerje dolg/EBITDA podjetja FT 4,9 v drugem polletju 2002 in 5,231. decembra 2002. (‘… on July 12, 2002, S & P … downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB- … The agency no longer expects France Télécom to hit the 3.5x net debt/EBITDA target by 2003, but did assign a “stable” outlook to the low triple B ratings. It seems that the stable outlook is anchored by “the French state … [which] has clearly indicated to Standard & Poor’s that it will behave as an aware investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face any difficulties.” … Interestingly, S & P had initially said it was not incorporating any extraordinary support from the French government into its rating when it downgraded France Télécom’s ratings to BBB in June. Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status “follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state’s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market”’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market’s increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
Latvian: Since then, the agency appears to have taken an about face in stating that the conclusions of the creditwatch status follows an analysis of the company’s liquidity position through the end of 2003 and a review of the French state ' s potential involvement in the French telecommunications market ’ (p. 19); ‘France Télécom benefited from the market's increased confidence that the French government will in one way or another support the credit’ (p. 20); ‘we cannot ignore the fact that FT is majority owned by the French State and recent comments from the French finance Ministry have reassured investor that liquidity will be provided’ (page 54) ‘However, as we have consistently mentioned, we expect that the company will ultimately find all the liquidity it needs via the so-called “implicit government support”.
Lithuanian: Be to, „spaudoje buvo užsiminta, kad Prancūzijos vyriausybė rems France Télécom, leidžiant suprasti, jog ji sutinka būti bendrovės skolintoja „blogiausiu atveju“. Ši užuomina ryškiai pagerino obligacijų ir akcijų kainą, per dvi savaites akcijos pabrango 90 %, o obligacijos 137 bazinių punktų daugiausia dėl to, kad jų pozicijas kėlė spekuliantai “ (p. 28). Pabrėžiame, kad apie FT kredito reitingo smukimą S & P neseniai telefoninės konferencijos metu pareiškė, jog apskritai bendrovė, kurios grynųjų pinigų srautų būklė yra tokia, kad jos skolos ir EBIDTA santykis yra lygus keturiems, gautų BBB- įvertinimą, žemiausią investicijų kategorijos laipsnį. Dabartinis FT reitingas BBB- atrodo yra labiau grindžiamas vyriausybės paramos pažadais užtikrinti likvidumą, o ne ekonominiais rodikliais. Deutsche Bank skaičiavimu, FT skolos ir EBIDTA santykis antrajame 2002 m. pusmetyje buvo 4,9, o 2002 m. gruodžio 31 d.-5,20.