FrancophonIA/DGT-Translation_Memory huggingface dataset:
English: Assignment (FIA_ATD.1.1) List of security attributes:
Danish: Tilordning (FIA_ATD.1.1) Liste over sikkerhedsattributter:
English: USER_GROUP VEHICLE_UNIT, NON_VEHICLE_UNIT,
Danish: USER_GROUP: VEHICLE_UNIT, NON_VEHICLE_UNIT,
English: USER_ID Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) and registering Member State Code (USER_ID is known for USER_GROUP = VEHICLE_UNIT only).
Danish: USER_ID: Køretøjets indregistreringsnummer (VRN) og den registrerende medlemsstats kode (USER_ID kendes kun for USER_GROUP = VEHICLE_UNIT).
English: User authentication
Danish: Ægthedsbekræftelse af bruger
English: Assignment (FIA_UAU.1.1) List of TSF mediated actions:
Danish: Tilordning (FIA_UAU.1.1) Liste over operationer formidlet af sikkerhedsfunktioner:
English: Driver and Workshop cards: export user data with security attributes (card data download function),
Danish: Fører- og værkstedskort: Eksportere brugerdata med sikkerhedsattributter (dataoverførsel fra kort),
English: Control card: export user data without security attributes except cardholder identification data.
Danish: Kontrolkort: Eksportere brugerdata uden sikkerhedsattributter undtagen kortindehavers identifikationsdata.
English: Authentication of a vehicle unit shall be performed by means of proving that it possesses security data that only the system could distribute.
Danish: Ægthedsbekræftelse af en køretøjsenhed skal udføres ved at eftervise, at den indeholder sikkerhedsdata, som kun systemet kan have distribueret.
English: Selection (FIA_UAU.3.1 and FIA_UAU.3.2): prevent.
Danish: Valg (FIA_UAU.3.1 and FIA_UAU.3.2): Forebygge.
English: Assignment (FIA_UAU.4.1) Identified authentication mechanism(s): any authentication mechanism.
Danish: Tilordning (FIA_UAU.4.1) Identificerede mekanismer til ægthedsbekræftelse: Enhver mekanisme til ægthedsbekræftelse.
English: The Workshop card shall provide an additional authentication mechanism by checking a PIN code (This mechanism is intended for the vehicle unit to ensure the identity of the card holder, it is not intended to protect workshop card content).
Danish: Værkstedskortet skal tilvejebringe en supplerende mekanisme til ægthedsbekræftelse gennem PIN-kode-kontrol. (Hensigten med denne mekanisme er, at køretøjsenheden skal garantere kortindehaverens identitet, ikke at mekanismen skal sikre indholdet af værkstedskortet.)
English: Authentication failures
Danish: Svigt af ægthedsbekræftelse Følgende tilordninger beskriver kortets reaktion på hver enkelt fejlslagen ægthedsbekræftelse af brugeren.
English: The following assignments describe the card reaction for each single user authentication failure.
Danish: Tilordning (FIA_AFL.1.1) Nummer: 1, liste over hændelser i forbindelse med ægthedsbekræftelse: Ægthedsbekræftelse af en kortlæser. Tilordning (FIA_AFL.1.2) Liste over operationer: - advare den tilsluttede enhed, - regne brugeren for en NON_VEHICLE_UNIT.
English: Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.1) Number: 1, list of authentication events: authentication of a card interface device.
Danish: Følgende tilordninger beskriver kortets reaktion ved fejlslagen gennemførelse af den ekstra ægthedsbekræftelsesmekanisme, som kræves i UIA_302. Tilordning (FIA_AFL.1.1) Nummer: 5, liste over hændelser i forbindelse med ægthedsbekræftelse: PIN-kontrol (værkstedskort).
English: Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.2) List of actions: - warn the entity connected,
Danish: Tilordning (FIA_AFL.1.2) Liste over operationer:
English: assume the user as NON_VEHICLE_UNIT.
Danish: advare den tilsluttede enhed,
English: The following assignments describe the card reaction in the case of failure of the additional authentication mechanism required in UIA_302. Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.1) Number: 5, list of authentication events: PIN checks (workshop card). Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.2) List of actions: - warn the entity connected,
Danish: spærre PIN-kodekontrollen, så ethvert efterfølgende PIN-kodeforsøg vil slå fejl,
English: block the PIN check procedure such that any subsequent PIN check attempt will fail, - be able to indicate to subsequent users the reason of the blocking.
Danish: kunne angive grunden til spærringen over for efterfølgende brugere.
English: During end-usage phase of its life cycle, the tachograph card is the subject of one single access control security function policy (SFP) named AC_SFP.
Danish: I anvendelsesfasen af sin levetidscyklus er fartskriverkortet genstand for ét sæt sikkerhedsfunktionsregler for adgangskontrol, som benævnes AC_SFP.
English: Assignment (FDP_ACC.2.1) Access control SFP: AC_SFP.
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_ACC.2.1) Sikkerhedsfunktionsregler for adgangskontrol: AC_SFP.
English: Access control functions
Danish: Adgangskontrolfunktioner
English: Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.1) Access control SFP: AC_SFP.
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_ACF.1.1) Sikkerhedsfunktionsregler for adgangskontrol: AC_SFP.
English: Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.1) Named group of security attributes: USER_GROUP.
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_ACF.1.1) Benævnt gruppesikkerhedsattributter: USER_GROUP.
English: Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.2) Rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects:
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_ACF.1.2) Regler for adgangsstyring for kontrollerede personer og kontrollerede objekter, som anvender kontrollerede operationer på kontrollerede objekter:
English: GENERAL_READ: User data may be read from the TOE by any user, except cardholder identification data which may be read from control cards by VEHICLE_UNIT only.
Danish: GENERAL_READ: Brugerdata kan læses fra det evaluerede system af enhver bruger, bortset fra kortindehaverens identifikationsdata, som alene kan læses fra kontrolkortene af VEHICLE_UNIT.
English: IDENTIF_WRITE: Identification data may only be written once and before the end of phase 6 of card's life-cycle.
Danish: IDENTIF_WRITE: Identifikationsdata kan kun skrives én gang og inden slutningen af fase 6 i kortets levetidscyklus.
English: No user may write or modify identification data during end-usage phase of card's life-cycle.
Danish: Ingen bruger kan skrive eller ændre identifikationsdata i anvendelsesfasen af kortets levetidscyklus.
English: ACTIVITY_WRITE: Activity data may be written to the TOE by VEHICLE_UNIT only.
Danish: ACTIVITY_WRITE: Kun VEHICLE_UNIT kan skrive til det evaluerede system.
English: SOFT_UPGRADE: No user may upgrade TOE's software.
Danish: SOFT_UPGRADE: Ingen bruger må opgradere programmellet i det evaluerede system.
English: FILE_STRUCTURE: Files structure and access conditions shall be created before end of phase 6 of TOE's life-cycle and then locked from any future modification or deletion by any user.
Danish: FILE_STRUCTURE: Filstruktur og adgangsbetingelser for applikations- og datafiler skal være etableret før slutningen af fase 6 i levetidscyklussen for det evaluerede system og skal derefter være spærret for enhver efterfølgende ændring eller sletning foretaget af nogen bruger.
English: The TOE shall hold permanent identification data.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal indeholde permanente identifikationsdata.
English: There shall be an indication of the time and date of the TOE's personalisation.
Danish: Der skal være en angivelse af dato og klokkeslæt for personaliseringen af det evaluerede system.
English: This indication shall remain unalterable.
Danish: Denne angivelse må til stadighed ikke kunne ændres.
English: The TOE must monitor events that indicate a potential violation of its security.
Danish: Området under evaluering skal overvåge hændelser, som tyder på en eventuel trussel mod dets sikkerhed.
English: Assignment (FAU_SAA.1.2) Subset of defined auditable events:
Danish: Tilordning (FAU_SAA.1.2) Subsæt af definerede reviderbare hændelser:
English: cardholder authentication failure (5 consecutive unsuccessful PIN checks),
Danish: mislykket ægthedsbekræftelse af kortindehaver (5 på hinanden følgende fejlslagne PIN-kodeforsøg),
English: self test error,
Danish: selvtestfejl,
English: activity data input integrity error.
Danish: integritetsfejl i indlæste aktivitetsdata.
English: Assignment (FDP_SDI.2.2) Actions to be taken: warn the entity connected,
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_SDI.2.2) Nødvendige tiltag: Advar den tilsluttede enhed.
English: Basic data authentication
Danish: Ægthedsbekræftelse af basisdata
English: Assignment (FDP_DAU.1.1) List of objects or information types: activity data.
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_DAU.1.1) Liste over objekter eller informationstyper: Identifikationsdata.
English: Assignment (FDP_DAU.1.2) List of subjects: any.
Danish: Tilordning (FDP_DAU.1.2) Liste over personer: En vilkårlig.
English: Selection (FPT_TST.1.1): during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation.
Danish: Valg (FPT_TST.1.1): Ved den indledende opstart, og periodisk under normal drift.
English: during initial start-up means before code is executed (and not necessarily during Answer To Reset procedure).
Danish: "Under den indledende opstart" vil sige: Før programkoden eksekveres (og ikke nødvendigvis under proceduren svar på nulstilling).
English: The TOE's self tests shall include the verification of the integrity of any software code not stored in ROM.
Danish: Selvtest for det evaluerede system skal omfatte integritetskontrol af al programkode, som ikke ligger i læselageret.
English: Upon detection of a self test error the TSF shall warn the entity connected.
Danish: Ved konstatering af en selvtestfejl skal sikkerhedsfunktionen advare den tilsluttede enhed.
English: After OS testing is completed, all testing-specific commands and actions shall be disabled or removed.
Danish: Når prøvning af styresystemet er gennemført, skal alle prøvningsspecifikke kommandoer og operationer sættes ud af kraft eller fjernes.
English: It shall not be possible to override these controls and restore them for use.
Danish: Det må ikke være muligt at tilsidesætte disse styreredskaber og genetablere dem til senere brug.
English: Command associated exclusively with one life cycle state shall never be accessed during another state.
Danish: Når en kommando udelukkende er knyttet til én tilstand i levetidscyklussen, må der aldrig være adgang til kommandoen i nogen anden tilstand.
English: There shall be no way to analyse, debug or modify TOE's software in the field.
Danish: Programmellet for det evaluerede system må ikke på nogen måde kunne analyseres eller fejlrettes i marken.
English: Power supply
Danish: Strømforsyning
English: The TOE shall preserve a secure state during power supply cut-off or variations.
Danish: Ved afbrydelse eller uregelmæssigheder i strømforsyningen skal det evaluerede system opretholde en sikker tilstand.
English: If power is cut (or if power variations occur) from the TOE, or if a transaction is stopped before completion, or on any other reset conditions, the TOE shall be reset cleanly.
Danish: Ved afbrydelse eller styrkevariationer af strømforsyningen til det evaluerede system, ved standsning af en transaktion, før den er fuldført, samt ved enhver anden nulstillingsbetingelse skal det evaluerede system nulstilles fuldstændigt.
English: Data exchange with a vehicle unit
Danish: Dataudveksling med en køretøjsenhed
English: The TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of data imported from a vehicle unit.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal efterprøve integritet og ægthed af data, som er importeret fra en køretøjsenhed.
English: Upon detection of an imported data integrity error, the TOE shall:
Danish: Ved konstatering af en integritetsfejl på importerede data skal det evaluerede system:
English: warn the entity sending the data,
Danish: advare den enhed, der sender de pågældende data,
English: The TOE shall export user data to the vehicle unit with associated security attributes, such that the vehicle unit will be able to verify the integrity and authenticity of data received.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal afgive brugerdata til køretøjsenheden med tilknyttede sikkerhedsattributter, som sætter køretøjsenheden i stand til at verificere integritet og ægthed af de modtagne data.
English: Export of data to a non-vehicle unit (download function)
Danish: Eksport af data til andet end en køretøjsenhed (downloading-funktion)
English: The TOE shall be able to generate an evidence of origin for data downloaded to external media.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal generere oprindelsesdokumentation for data overført til eksterne medier.
English: The TOE shall be able to provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of downloaded data to the recipient.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal være i stand til at verificere oprindelsesdokumentationen for data overført til modtageren.
English: The TOE shall be able to download data to external storage media with associated security attributes such that downloaded data integrity can be verified.
Danish: Det evaluerede system skal overføre data til eksterne lagermedier med tilhørende sikkerhedsattributter, som gør det muligt at verificere integriteten af de overførte data.
English: If the TSF generates cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes.
Danish: Hvis sikkerhedsfunktionen genererer kryptografiske nøgler, skal dette ske i overensstemmelse med foreskrevne algoritmer til generering af kryptografiske nøgler og foreskrevne kryptografiske nøglestørrelser.
English: Generated cryptographic session keys shall have a limited (TBD by manufacturer and not more than 240) number of possible use.
Danish: Genererede kryptografiske sessionsnøgler skal have et begrænset antal (antallet angives af fabrikanten og må højst være 240) mulige anvendelser.
English: If the TSF distributes cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key distribution methods.
Danish: Hvis sikkerhedsfunktionen distribuerer kryptografiske nøgler, skal dette ske i overensstemmelse med foreskrevne metoder til distribution af kryptografiske nøgler.
English: All other security mechanisms are to be defined by the TOE manufacturer.
Danish: Alle øvrige sikkerhedsmekanismer skal fastlægges af fabrikanten af området under evaluering.
English: Claimed minimum strength of mechanisms
Danish: Påberåbt minimumstyrke af mekanismer
English: The minimum strength of mechanisms for the Tachograph Card is High as defined in (ITSEC).
Danish: Den mindste styrke af fartskriverkortets sikkerhedsmekanismer er Høj i henhold til ITSEC.
English: The target level of assurance for the Tachograph Card is ITSEC level E3, as defined in (ITSEC).
Danish: Målet for fartskriverkortets sikkerhedsniveau er ITSEC-niveau E3, som defineret i henvisningen til ITSEC.
English: The following matrixes give a rationale for the additional SEFs by showing:
Danish: Følgende matricer giver et rationale for ekstra sikkerhedsfunktioner ved at angive:
English: which SEFs counteract which threats,
Danish: hvilke sikkerhedsfunktioner der modvirker hvilke risici,
English: Appendix 11
Danish: Tillæg 11
English: COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS
Danish: FÆLLES SIKKERHEDSMEKANISMER
English: This appendix specifies the security mechanisms ensuring:
Danish: Dette tillæg foreskriver de sikkerhedsmekanismer, som sikrer:
English: the mutual authentication between VUs and tachograph cards, including session key agreement,
Danish: den gensidige ægthedskontrol mellem køretøjsenheder og fartskriverkort, herunder aftale om sessionsnøgle,
English: the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data transferred between VUs and tachograph cards,
Danish: fortrolighed, integritet og ægthed af data overført mellem køretøjsenheder og fartskriverkort,
English: the integrity and authentication of data downloaded from VUs to external storage media,
Danish: integritet og ægthed af data overført fra køretøjsenheder til eksterne lagermedier,
English: the integrity and authentication of data downloaded from tachograph cards to external storage media.
Danish: integritet og ægthed af data overført fra fartskriverkort til eksterne lagermedier.
English: SHA-1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Danish: SHA-1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
English: FIPS Publication 180-1: Secure Hash Standard.
Danish: FIPS Publication 180-1: Secure Hash Standard.
English: April 1995
Danish: April 1995
English: PKCS1 RSA Laboratories.
Danish: PKCS1 RSA Laboratories.
English: PKCS
Danish: PKCS
English: RSA Encryption Standard.
Danish: RSA Encryption Standard.
English: Version 2.0.
Danish: Version 2.0.
English: October 1998
Danish: Oktober 1998
English: TDES National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Danish: TDES National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
English: FIPS Publication 46-3: Data Encryption Standard.
Danish: FIPS Publication 46-3: Data Encryption Standard.
English: Draft 1999
Danish: Udkast 1999
English: TDES-OP ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation.
Danish: TDES-OP ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation.
English: ISO/IEC 7816-4 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 4: Interindustry commands for interexchange.
Danish: ISO/IEC 7816-4 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 4: Interindustry commands for interexchange.
English: First edition: 1995 + Amendment 1: 1997
Danish: Første udgave: 1995 + Ændring 1: 1997
English: ISO/IEC 7816-6 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 6: Interindustry data elements.
Danish: ISO/IEC 7816-6 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 6: Interindustry data elements.
English: First edition: 1996 + Cor 1: 1998
Danish: Første udgave: 1996 + Cor. 1: 1998
English: ISO/IEC 7816-8 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 8: Security related interindustry commands.
Danish: ISO/IEC 7816-8 Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 8: Security related interindustry commands.
English: First edition 1999
Danish: Første udgave 1999
English: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Information Technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash function.
Danish: ISO/IEC 9796-2 Information Technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash function.
English: First edition: 1997
Danish: Første udgave: 1997
English: ISO/IEC 9798-3 Information Technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication mechanisms - Part 3: Entity authentication using a public key algorithm.
Danish: ISO/IEC 9798-3 Information Technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication mechanisms - Part 3: Entity authentication using a public key algorithm.
English: Second edition 1998
Danish: Anden udgave 1998
English: ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles - Tachograph systems - Part 3: Motion sensor interface.
Danish: ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles - Tachograph systems - Part 3: Motion sensor interface
English: Notations and abbreviated terms
Danish: Notation og forkortelser
English: The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:
Danish: I dette tillæg bruges følgende notation og forkortelser:
English: (Ka, Kb, Kc) a key bundle for use by the triple data encryption algorithm
Danish: (Ka, Kb, Kc) Et nøglebundt til brug for den tredobbelte datakrypteringsalgoritme
English: CA Certification authority
Danish: CA Certificeringsmyndighed (/Certification authority)
English: CAR Certification authority reference
Danish: CAR Henvisning til certificeringsmyndighed (/Certification authority reference)
English: CC Cryptographic checksum
Danish: CC Kryptografisk kontrolsum
English: CG Cryptogram
Danish: CG Kryptogram
English: CH Command header
Danish: CH Kommandoheader
English: CHA Certificate holder authorisation
Danish: CHA Certifikatindehavers autorisation (/Certificate holder authorisation)
English: CHR Certificate holder reference
Danish: CHR Henvisning til certifikatindehaver (/Certificate holder reference)
English: D Decryption with DES
Danish: D Dekryptering med DES
English: DE Data element
Danish: DE Dataelement
English: DO Data object
Danish: DO Dataobjekt
English: d RSA private key, private exponent
Danish: d Privat RSA-nøgle, privat eksponent
English: e RSA public key, public exponent
Danish: e Offentlig RSA-nøgle, offentlig eksponent
English: E Encryption with DES
Danish: E Kryptering med DES
English: EQT Equipment
Danish: EQT Udstyr (/Equipment)
English: Hash hash value, an output of hash
Danish: Hash Sætte hash-værdi på et Hash-resultat
English: Hash hash function
Danish: Hash Hash-funktion
English: KID Key identifier Km TDES key.
Danish: KID Nøgleidentifikator (/Key identifier)
English: Master Key defined in ISO 16844-3
Danish: Km TDES-nøgle, hovednøgle defineret i ISO 16844-3
English: Kmvu TDES key inserted in vehicle units
Danish: KmVU TDES-nøgle indsat i køretøjsenheder
English: Kmwc TDES key inserted in workshop cards
Danish: KmWC TDES-nøgle indsat i værkstedskort
English: m message representative an integer between 0 and n-1
Danish: m Repræsenterer en meddelelse, heltal mellem 0 og n-1
English: n RSA keys, modulus
Danish: n RSA-nøgler, modulus
English: PB Padding bytes
Danish: PB Udfyldningsbytes (/Padding bytes)
English: PI Padding indicator byte (for use in cryptogram for confidentiality DO)
Danish: PI Udfyldningsindikatorbyte (til brug i kryptogram til fortrolighedsdataobjekt)
English: PV Plain value
Danish: PV Ordinær dataværdi (/Plain value)
English: s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1
Danish: s Repræsenterer en underskrift, et heltal mellem 0 og n-1
English: SSC Send sequence counter
Danish: SSC Sendesekvenstæller (/Send sequence counter)
English: SM Secure messaging
Danish: SM Sikker meddelelsesoverførsel
English: TCBC TDEA cipher block chaining mode of operation
Danish: TCBC TDEA-kryptografering med blokkædningsfunktion (/TDEA cipher block chaining mode of operation)
English: TDEA Triple data encryption algorithm
Danish: TDEA Algoritme til tredobbelt datakryptering (/Triple data encryption algorithm)
English: TLV Tag length value
Danish: TLV Mærkatlængde (/Tag length value)
English: VU Vehicle unit
Danish: VU Køretøjsenhed (/Vehicle unit)
English: the certificate of user X issued by a certification authority
Danish: Certifikat for bruger X, udstedt af en certificeringsmyndighed
English: X.CA a certification authority of user X
Danish: X.CA Certificeringsmyndighed for bruger X
English: X.CA.PKoX.C the operation of unwrapping a certificate to extract a public key.
Danish: X.CA.PKoX.C Operation, som består i at udpakke et certifikat for at uddrage en offentlig nøgle.
English: It is an infix operator, whose left operand is the public key of a certification authority, and whose right operand is the certificate issued by that certification authority.
Danish: Der er tale om en operator af infix-typen, der som venstre operand har certificeringsmyndighedens offentlige nøgle og som højre operand certifikatet udstedt af den pågældende certificeringsmyndighed.
English: The outcome is the public key of the user X whose certificate is the right operand,
Danish: Resultatet er den offentlige nøgle for brugeren X, hvis certifikat er den højre operand
English: X.PK public key of a user X
Danish: X.PK Offentlig RSA-krypteringsnøgle for bruger X
English: X.PK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the public key of user X
Danish: X.PK[I] RSA-krypteringen af en vilkårlig oplysning I ved hjælp af den offentlige nøgle fra bruger X
English: X.SK RSA private key of a user X
Danish: X.SK Privat RSA-nøgle for bruger X
English: X.SK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the private key of user X
Danish: X.SK[I] RSA-kryptering af en vilkårlig oplysning I ved hjælp af den private nøgle fra bruger X
English: 'xx' a Hexadecimal value
Danish: 'xx' Hexadecimal værdi
English: concatenation operator.
Danish: Sammenkædningsoperator
English: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS
Danish: KRYPTOGRAFISKE SYSTEMER OG ALGORITMER
English: Cryptographic systems
Danish: Kryptografiske systemer