Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 2]
0933Π ΗΜΜΑ 22452 also cites othercables that reported Americans in contact withthe Cuban embassy.Mexi6591 reported w billfrom Herb Provost Boronhas Vegas claiming to bea student working withthe Cubemb. The dispatchsays: "Further dissemi-nation was left to Head-quarters." Mexi 6615 reportedcontact between NYT writerHerbert Matthews andthe Cubemb. The dispatchsays: "No investigative actionwas taken by the MexicoStation."π HMMA-22678, 1/2/64 isthe first monthly opera-tional report for LIENVOYafter the assassination.Under "exploitation..." thedispatch says: "The mostsignificant informationprovided by LIENVOY wasrecord of contact by Lee
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 3]
4Oswald with the Cubanand soviet Embassiesin Mexico prior to theassassination of PresidentKennedy. Oswald's contacthad been cabled to Head-quarters on 8 October 1963for investigation byODENVY (MEXI-645-3).Under the "liaison" headingthe dispatch says:"[illegible] of the LIENVOY operation.Since it was necessary for Curtis to request his assistance in investiga-ting a highly sensitive lead in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy; This has been reported in detail to Headquarters via other channels."9T HMMA 22788-1/24/64 says:93 "There is attached one copy of the Cuban Embassy traffic
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 4]
095covering the period from 16 January through 23 January 1964. HMMA-22959 2/24/2/11 to 2/21. HMMA 23019,3/4/64 transmits the take for 2/22 to 3/2. My examination of the dispatch traffic between 10/16 and 11/26 shows that the Cubemb take was transmitted to HQ routinely on a weekly or bi-weekly basis also during that period. There are some "transcripts" in this file. They are yellow carbons in Spanish. They cover the period 1/16/64 to 1/23/64. These are the only ones in the file.
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 5]
096Volume II, DevelopmentAND PLANS.TT Memorandum for DD Pre:"Request for Renewal ofthe LIENVOY Project," fromJ.C. King, C/WHD (signed byR.W. Herbert, 1/21/64. Thismemo states the objectivesof the operation as being A.) the provision oftelephone tap unit andB) provision forUnder "Effectiveness" thememo says: "This centerrecords an average of 525reels per month, fromwhichTT HMMA-22679, 12/31/63transmitting Mexi copyof Project Renewal request.TT HMMW 12220, 12/30/63 trans-95 mitting paper on LIENVOY/
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 6]
7LIFEAT by Paul V.Levister,P. 11 reference to Scott's notation onresume.P. 5. reason for cuttingout and Tapping DFSP. 12 liaison procedurere Soviet tapes.P. 10 MEXI [UNILATERA] TAPCAPAbilityP. 16 quality of monitorwork /RESUME /RETENTIONof tapesP. 17 Monitor who speaks EnglishP. 18-19 Procedure RE Notice tostationP. 20 LP FilesP. 22. Arehart + scope22+ 23 equipment25. MEXI[UNILATERALS]32+33 deliver34+35 reporting + reports officers37 Cuban coverage40 Transcription V. SUMMAY.42 STATION REVIEW.44 SPECIAL Situ. + ODENVY
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 7]
* HMMA24229, 9/3/64  the reporting american contact2. couriers in operation.Proyect Renewal request1/11/65. 14mm25-141 1/15/-65 (?)1. relationship and roles.3. HMMS + HMMT - NON-RECORD.3. copy of Archant's monthly load log and list of targets4. general nature of contests on phone lines. Can we get a 1963 phone book.5. Chart of operation.
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 8]
9Volume 3 / Support9T HMMA-19804, 9/12/62 has a floor plan of LP9T MEXI 5412, IN81732, 7/17/63 re HORSFALL'S transfer to Mexico.9T DIR 56443, 7/24/63 Transcripts V SUMMARIES.9T MEXI 55-70, 7/31/60 Tarasoff's Abilities.Vol. VI / OPERATIONS.T HMMA 19153, 6/5/62 photo of LP attatched9T. HMMA-19729, 8/30/62 1. timing of transcription/inside proceedure.GIT HMMA - 22540 6/13/63 resumen attachedaT Mexi 5498 IN877822, 7/26/43 SAME subject As DIR56443
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 9]
гO0100ат HMMA-21845, 7/1/63June monthly report.1.  Tarasoff / Horsfall + Backlog.2.  U.S. Citizens IN Contact.3.  Tarasoff CONTACT4.  Arehart + Leads of interest5.  RETENtion of SUMMARIES.ат HMMWV-11831; 8/6/63Station follow-ups on am. contactат HMMA-22005 8/23/631. forwarding of Cub. take2. HORSFALL & FIENGLASS3. Arehart + Am. Contactsат letters to Scott +written from LEVISTERRE: his TDY in Mexiат HMMA-22135, 9/13/631. Horsfallат Memo to Ch/FI, 10/2/63"TDY to Mexico City."29
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 10]
110101AT HMMA-22135 9/13/631. [target lines] for sept.2. delivery3. [Levister] visit.100
[180-10143-10113.pdf — page 11]
50-8-10Soviet Official Representationin Mexico.100-5-1Soviet Intelligencia Servicesin the USA.101-102000102
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19928/17/76[AMERICAN EMBASSY/PARIS] Box 28 Folder 13 #31973 RETIREDNOV 63 SAT IN PARISNO GOT COVERGOV OPSSEPT. 62 ARRIVEDTHIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.DEFENSE DOER AS BRANCH 6 CHIEFTWO YRS IN SEC 6SEPT 1960 ASSIGNEDPARISNOT INFREQ CONTACTEV 2½ wksMADE ON OUTSIDE BY TELE TO OFF COVER PERSON W/NEVER WRITTEN COMMSEL 6SUPPORTOP RES OF SR DIVREPOSING INFO IN SUPPORT OF SR DIV - CLASSICAL ESPIONAGE W/ USSRPENETRATION OF PURPS OF ESPIONAGECARTODEMOGSOCIOLOGISTSSU, POL INFO PERSONSIT WAS IN DOWN PHASE AT THE TIME20-25 WHEN HE CAME IN[JAPAN]FEB 1955 - JUNE 1960CHIEF OF SOU BASE OF N. ASIA COMMAND
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 1]
ATTACHED TO FAR EASTERN COM OF ARMED FORCESONE OF FOUR BASES: THEY WERE TARGETSSOU BALO BUT NOT AGAINST JAPANSOU, JAPAN, KOREA, RIINA9 OR 10 IN SOU BASEASSIGNED AS HEAD IN 1955TIPES OF OPS FROM SOU BASEESPIONAGELOU OPS - PSYCHO WARFARE, RAD O TRANS-MISSION TO INTERNAL SOU AUDIENCEESP - SOU NAVAL & INDUSTRIAL TARGETS IIV.SOV PORTES USING MAINLY JAPANESE OPERATIVESEXTREMEL LIM WORK WI MILITARYWOULD BRIEF MILITARYTHED TO WORK W/ CLANDESTINE UNITS OFARMY. NAVY HAD NOVEвит преч HAD WW DEGRGE OF PROFESSIONAUSMMILITARY SAID WAS RUNNING OPS BUT IT WASNEVER CONFIRMEDMILITARY INTELL PERSOCAPT PEREZ OSIJONN & SCAULTY ARMY HEADOP. SUPP. WAG PROVIDED BY NAVYI.E. CQUER FOR PERSONS CONTACTING SOVIETSCANNOT RECALL SPECIFIC INFO ABOUT MILI. USINGAM. MILITARYEXCEPT ROMERS OF TRAFFICKINGTHE IND. INTELL AGENCIES WOULD HAVE HANDLED
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 2]
3NO CONCRETE INFO OF ANY CONTACT CAME TO HIGH ATTENTION W/ SOUSSUPERIORS CHIEF OF N. ASIA COMM: 1955: RETIRED VICE ADM. O.THEN HARRY LITTLE 1957HIS COMMUNICATIONS WERE GENERALLY BACK TO HQN. ASIA COMM AT TIME WAS TIED UP W/ KOREA + JAPANDOES NOT KNOW WHO HAD OVERSIGHT FOR U-2WAS WELL COMPARTMENTEDNEVER LEARNEDASSUMED IT WAS PARAMILITARYN. ASIA BASE RAN NO PARAMILITARY OPS.MOST SMALLER STATIONS DID NOTDOESN'T RECALL DISCUSSING USING ANY DEFECTORS TO 1ST CHIEF DIRTHOUGHT KGB WOULD SUSPECT NUM FROM BEGINNINGI KNOW A LOT ABOUT KGBFROM DISPLACEMENT OF CITIANY ESP INTEREST WAS MUCH MORE SHORT RANGE AS TO PRECLUDE PROGRAMNOT IN ANY WAY OF DOING THINGSLESSENING OF TENSIONS DID ALLOW SOME SHALLOW PENE: SHORT TERM TOURISTS, FOREIGBUT NO DIRECT & OBVIOUS EFFECT
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 3]
435-173-ADOES REMEMBER MEN0DUE OF HIS CONTACTSLAMPRELL = HOY RBT. SINCLAIR D. OF CANCER FEW`YR. AGO; WAS SR. OFF IN SOU. OFF OF PARIS STATION (#2 MAN)`WALTER HALTIGAN =JAMES FLINT WAS HIS NORMAL CONTACTDOESN'T KNOW WHY TIME DELAYASSUMES HALTIGAN WASIN'T AVAILABLE(RECALLS)WROTE MEMO SPONTANEOUSLY BECAUSE OF NEWS CASTWHEN HE HEARD INFO ABOUT MINSK, [MARRYING][FOR EIGNER,] REMEMBERED STATE DEPT. INFOREDWOOD: CLAND OPS/CHIEF OF SR WAS RESPONSIBLEAS OPPOSED TO REDCAP: TARGETS AGAINST SOUS OUT OF USSR.[CI WAS STAFF REVIEW, BUT SUPPOSEDLY NO COMMANDVOICE; BUT THEY DID HAVE THEIR OWNCLOSELY HELD OPS]THEY GAVE OP APPROVAL FOR EVERY OPERATIONPOSSIBLE OR PROBABLE THAT THEY FIU OPS INHIS GEO. TARGETRESEARCH WAS AN OP FUNCTION OF THE 6 BRANCHCANNOT REMEMBER RESEARCH'S EXACT MANDATEBRANCH1 SCANDINAVIA 5 FAR EAST2  INTER BRANCH3 MIDD + LATIN
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 4]
5RESEARCH WOULD GET INFO FROM DEFECTORS ABOUTREALITIESSOV. DEFECTORS, GETTING DETAILS ABOUT SOVIETLIFEWOULD “NORMALLY” PUMP PERSON LIKE O. ABOUTLIFE IN USSRDOESN'T PERSONALLY KNOW OF DEFECTOR BEINGUSED AS SOURCE IN HIS BRIEF TIME INSOV. UNIONAGENCY BENEFITED FROM FBI DEBRIEFINGScarasDIV/00 HAD MANDATE IN USBELIEVES [FIELDS FROM CZECNOS] WAS DEBRIEFEDBELIEVES HE GOT INFO ON AMER IN SOV UNION.FROM STATE DEPT VISAS OR FROM PRESS[6 RESEARCH SECCHIEF: CANNOT REMEMDEP.CHIEF: OLDER WOMAN AT ACT OF RETIREMENTRODOLFBALABAN (UKR-AMER.) CAN REMEMBER NAMES][DATE OF DISCU:LAST DAYS OF WORK: 300 OR 4TH WK OF JULY 1962SO DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE I]ASSUMED HE HAD BEEN SENT OUT BY KGB SO DIDNOT DEBRIEFSUMMER 1960 - 6/25 LEFT JAPAN, TRAVELLEDTHRU EUROPE ON LEAVE W/ FAMILY UNTIL SEPT.COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 1960.USED WRONG YR IN THE MEMU
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 5]
6KUJUMP: PS DIV; NAD CONTACTS DIV FOR DE-BRIEFING[ SUIT CHANNGOS: INS, FBI ]HAD RECD ONE STATE DEPT DISPATCH ON RETURNING AMIF HE GAVE UP PASSPORT HAD TO APPLY IN. SAME WAY TO RETURNBELIEVES AM HAD CONTACTS INITIATED BY HIMKNEW WHATEVER WAS IN STATE DEPT DISPATCH ABOUT HIMO LOOKS ODD.CIA'S OWN EVALUATION BECAUSE HE WAS ALLOWED TO LIVE IN + MARRYCONTROLLED STATION COULD TALK & CONTACT IN PERFUNCTORY MANNER1945-60DOESN'T BELIEVE MORE THAN 10 CAME TO THEIR ATTENTION FROM STATEMILIREDSKIN = LEGAL TRAVELLERS PROGRAM. VERY LEGIT PRESENCE IN USSRDEBRIEFING AGENCY WOULD WRITE INFO & PASS IT ON. HE BELIEVES HE WOULD HAVE KNOWN
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 6]
BELIEVES IT INCONCEIVABLE O WOULD HAVE BEENOPERATIVENO INFOKGB OPERATIONS MADE IT CONC HE COULD HAVEBEEN LAY LOW OPERATIVEMINSKHAD SOME SPECIAL DESIGN PLANTS OF INTERESTAVIATIONNUCLEAR ENERGYBACTERIO. WARFARECAN'T REMEM WHICH WERE IN MINSKANYONE NEAR THEM WAS OF INTERESTCONFIDENT O WAS NOT WORKING IN SUCH.A SECURITYWAS NOT CLEARLY MILI OR SECURITY AREABELIEVES THEY HAD ENGIC INFO ON *THE* RADIO FACTORYIN OFF. OF RESEARCH & REPORTINGWASN'T AWARE OF KGB FAR IN MINSKLEGAL TRAV PROGHEADED BY ALEXANDER SOKALOFF SR DIVBEGAN PRE 1960 AS LESSENING OF TENSIONSBEGANSOK CAME OUT AS CHILD W/ RUSSIAN PARENTSDEFS WERE KEPT AT ARMS LENGTHMEANT HAD RELA WELL BEFORE HIS TRIP
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 7]
8KNEW WHAT NEED BE DOING, COULD GIVERED'TSC. WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ITC WAS OPPOSED BECAUSE IT WAS TOO SHORT TERMIN TIME OF RESOURCES, RISKCOVER MAY HAVE BEEN USED BY AGENCY, BUTDOESN'T KNOW, SAID NO BOUNCES TO GET'DBE TOLDHARVEY STORYMUST HAVEMORE CONNEC CRYPTONIM HE WAS USING AT STORY[PONDERS ?]WOULD HAVE TO HAVE PROMPTING OF MEMORYDOUBTS IT WOULD BE SOMEBODY'S TRUE NAME.NEVER CONTACTED BY ANYBODY ABOUT O ORMEMOO. INTEREST WAS JUST A LEAD - NO FOLLOW UPNOT UNUSUALO'S GOING TO USSR WAS UNUSUAL LEFT HIMOPEN TO CONTACT BY KGB- BUT HE WAS THEREFORE OF MARGINAL IN-TERESTNORMAL TO NOT MAKE CHECK FOR 201ONCE THEY DECIDED NOT TO USE HIMIT'S POSS A[ COLLEAGUE ]COULD HAVECHECKED, BUT DOESN'T RECALL ANY
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 8]
SUBORDINATESBALABANRICHARD [WINK]?CHARLES COX LIAISON W/ TECH SUPPORTS DIU(I.e. CONISALMENT DEVICEL)DEPUTIES: CHACIKA VADZE, DAVID IN 1960 FOR 3-4 MOS.AVERILLA.T. STEWART, STAYED ON - COULDREMEMBER MORE DETAILSBECKY BALABAN201: INDICATION THAT RED FIKO BEEN MADEFOR PROV. OP. APPPDUAL: WOULD INDICATEOP. USET INTEREST; WOULD REFERDOESN'T KNOW CRITERIA FOR OPENING 201'SMANY #'S ROMAINED OPON W/O BEING ASSETSAGENT PROPS WERE ASSIGNED [TO ATSUGI]OSWALDWHATEVER I MEANT BY HARVEY HAD NOTHINGTO DO WY HIMCI = COUNTER-INTSIG: SIGNAL INTELL, BUT NOT SURENSA OR MILL MIGHT HAVE PICKED NAMEUP IN TRANSMISSION IF HE HADACCESS TO SUCH.
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 9]
201 SEU OFREGISTRY COULD ANSWER QUES OF ENTRIESAG: DOESN'T KNOW[ CROSSES & ENTRIES:] DOESN'T KNOWBELIEVES PERUNA CARGO MEANS STAY IN REGISTRY w/ NO OP SIGNIFICANCEWOULD BE ROUTINE IF SIMILARLY OPENED ON OTHER DEFECTORS[ BRANCH 6 ] DIDN'T HAVE INTERESSTATE DIST WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED ON FOR INFO & BACK TO REGISTRY UND KEPT IN DOCSBELIEVES FROM MEMO HE SAW SEVERAL DISP WOULD BE NORMAL TO SEE CONSECU SERIES``````    DDO/ |  \FOREIGN CI PSYCH POL. PARAMILITARY|LINE DIVISIONS```BELIEVES DOC IS PASSIVE & NOT OPERATIONALTHEY GOT VISAS TOO EASILY"UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR":DEFECTION; REASONS UNKNOWN, DISORIENTED (DOESN'T THINK HE WAS SENT BACK ON MISSION, BUT DOESN'T EXCLUDE POSS.).MARRIED RUSSIAN```
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 10]
DOESNIT BELIEVE WE WERE ABLE TO MONITOR NM IN SOV. U - HOULD HAVE BEEN TOO RISKYHIS REVEALNO MILI SECRETS WOULD HAVE BEEN OF INTEREST
[180-10143-10152.pdf — page 11]
WOULD MEMO HAVE EXISTED ABOUT HIS INTEREST IN LHODOESN'T THINK YO NOR REMEEM DOING SONOT CUSTOMARYWHAT WAS FIRST [UDACID] DISPATCH REC'DNOTE: C'S MEMO OF 11/25/63 PRESUPPOSES A LOT OF EARLY INFO ON O'S ACTIVITIES IN MINSK.12
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETFILE REVIEWOFFICE OF SECURITYCLAUDE BARNES CAPEHARTBUSTER BARNES CAPEHARTINCL. DATES 1963-1975TERMINATION SEC. AGREEMENT9 JULY 1975WITNESS: JOHN F. McNAMARANAME & ADDRESS OF AFFILIATION: GLOBAL MARINE,LOS ANGELES, CA.REMARKS: MATADORSPECIAL PROJECT SEC. AGREEMENT[AGREEMENT] 1/30/75I UNDERSTAND THAT NO CHANGE IN MY EMPLOYMENT... WILL RELIEVE ME OF MY OBLIG. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.I HAVE BEEN ADV. OF THE PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR ACCESS TO THIS PROJ., THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF HAZARD INVOLVED IN TRAVEL TO A FOREIGN AREA OR TO RESOLVE ANY OTHER QUES. WHICH MAY ARISE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.11112730PROJECT: MATADORWITNESS: B E SAVAGENAME & ADJ. OF AFF.: GLOBAL MARINE, INC.LA.SECRETDERIVATIVE CL.BY 007472DECL X REVW ON 18 DEC. 1998DERIVED FROM 9c(1), 9c(3.15)180 10143-10171
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 1]
SECRETMEMO 17 JAN 74TO: HQFROM : NPRE ST. LOUISRECORDS DESTROYED IN FIRE OF 12 JULY 1973AGREEMENT10/30/73PROJ, AZORIAN & T.O.WITNESS: PAUL H. ITOPHASE: IIIGLOBAL MARINE, INC.REQ. FOR SEC. ACCESS APPROVAL 1 AUG 73POSITION: CRANE OPERATOR/ DRILLERPROJ. AZ PHASE IIIJUSTIFICATION: PERFORM DUTIES ON BOARD SSPRE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEWEMPLOYMENT APP.VISA PARTICULARS FORMBIO. DATA 9 AUG 7311112731BORN OKEMAH, OKLA.RESIDENCES SEPT. 72- N.J.2/66-9/72 NEV.9/64-2/66- NEV.3/55-9/64- CALIF.SECRET
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 2]
SECRETMILI. 9/43-7/46: USARUY, SARG. #39145469EMP. 9/72-6/73 NY3/72-9/72 REYNOLDS HEAT ING.,LAS VEGAS2/72-3/72 MECK SERVICES, LAS VEGAS11/71-2/72 UNEMPLOYED11/67-11/71 REYNOLDS HEAT ING.,LAS VEGASMEMO:DATE:TO:FROMREF.: NOS LTR DTDCSC COMPL. BT 1 DEC. 1965 REFLECTS.COV:EMPLOY: NEV. CA. TEXAS.REFS.: NEV CANEIGY. NEV. CA.P+C: NEV. CA, TEXASMIGC.. MPRC - MO.11112732CC: NYFOMAREA } CROSSEDOUTSREDS }SENT 9/25/[73]SECRET
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 3]
SECRETSPOUSE: ROBERTA MART CAPENARTNEE BALTEY B. 2 DEC 22, WINSBORO, LA.CHILDREN: NEAL HENRY CAPENART B. 11 AUG. 53, BAKERSFIELDADDRESS: BOX 7011 RENO, NEV.HP. LETTER OF ASSIGNMENT & INVEST. TRANS-MITTAL 9/73SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:COVERT CASE: NO GOVT. INTEREST TO BE SHOWNMARINE GLOBAL APP. FOR EMPLOYMENT OFFSHORE DRILLING & OCEAN TECHNOLOGY LOS ANGELES - HOUSTON - LONDONADD. 4425 STACEY AVE. LAS VEGAS.PHONE 702 648 6074CRANE OPERATOR - DRILLERBR. HAIRBR. EYES 11119733-6'HT.210 LBS.REFERRED BY TOM WILLIAMS, GMI EMPLOYEESECRET
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 4]
SECRETEMP. 10/63-12/63MONOLITH PORTLAND CEMENT CO..327 TROPICANA AVG. LAS VEGASTRUCK DRIVERLEFT TO RETURN TO MERCURY3/153-10/0ろWHEELER TRUCKING337550 POLARIS AVE., LAS VEGASDEIT OF LABOR DISPUTEREFSFRANCIS NOFFSINGER L.V. 878 5301EVERETT L. YOUNG 8702281OSCAR SLLAYTOIN 452 1945VIM STIVER 6429368LETTER 6/20173FROM PERINI NORTH RIVER ASS.NY, NY9/72-6/73 DRILL BARGE SUPEREQUEST FUEL SEC. ACCESS APPROVAL 11 NOV. 63ORG. MONOLITH PORTLAND CEMENT CO.SEC. ACCESS APR OF SUBJECT TO PROJECTR PHASE I IS REP.END JUSTIFICATION REF. IS LISTED].TO CHIEF I.D FOR ACTION 11112734APPROVED 12/20/63 SECRET
[180-10143-10171.pdf — page 5]
SECRETBUND PAGE "UODT-1764PAGE 12 of 61"LISTS CAP GTART PAR MONOLITH.ARRIVED KW CEILING: 9 OCT. 196311112735SECRET
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 0]
# Classification: SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASINAUGUST 17, 1978AMERICAN EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCEBy Surell BradyCasasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived in Paris in September, 1962.He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned [defense cover] as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section 6.Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he never made written contact with the station.Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division; he characterized that work as classical espoinage work against the USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionag and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the fields of science and political science. He stated that the section was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only 20-25 persons.Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command of the Armed Forces. He explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target. The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage. The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 1]
Classification: SECRET 2 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clandestine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military operations.Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B. Stanley, Army head.Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational support for his base. It consisted of providing [cover] for persons running operations against the Soviets.Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the military was using American military personnel in any of its operations He said, however, that there was occasional rumors that an American serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases. He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American contact with the Soviets.Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral and that his last name began with the letter "О." Harry Little succeeded that person in 1957.Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Command at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsibility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such smaller units usually did not.Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the FirstClassification: SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 2]
Classification: SECRET 3 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience with displaced persons from the communist bloc.Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking precluded such programs.Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo. I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was William Rober Sinclair) he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's contacts in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was James Flint) was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations; the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operation against Soviets outside of the USSR.Casasin explained the relationship of the CounterintelligenceClassification: SECRETClassified by derivation: