Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[197-10002-10190.pdf — page 1]
# ELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSECRETNO FOREIGN DISSENCOUNTRY USSR/EAST GERMANY/EASTERN EUROPEREPORT NO. TDCS-3/886,305SUBJECT HIGHLIGHTS OF MILITARY WEEKLYSUMMARY NO. 48DATE DISTR.PRECEDENCE CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDDATE OF INFO.20-26 NOVEMBER 1963REFERENCESDATE ACQ. GERMANY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER 1963/ IN TEXT.APPRAISAL 3, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/ FIELD REPORT NO. EGK-27396THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SERVICE FROM INFORMANTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY.FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GERMAN SERVICE MILITARYWEEKLY SUMMARY NO 48/63, COVERING THE PERIOD OF 20-26 NOVEMBER 63.1. DURING THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS   OF PREPARATION FOR ATTACK BY SOVIET BLOC FORCES.2 PART A. GENERAL.LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET BLOCARMED FORCES WERE NORMAL AND WERE THUS IN KEEPING WITH THEGENERAL PACE OF TRAINING AT THIS TIME OF YEAR.SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES REACTED TO THE ASSASSINATION OFTHE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOV 22ND, WITH PRE-CAUTIONARY MEASURES OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH MAY BESECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMGROUP 1Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificationSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMDA IN 157472SECRET
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TDCS -3/308,303PGPAGE 2INTERPRETED AS A REACTION TO CORRESPONDING STAND-BYMEASURES OF THE U.S. FORCES.IT IS EXPECTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION SOVIET TACTICSIN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.3. PART B. ARMED FORCES.A. USSR/EAST GERMAN.1/ ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERTMEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG-GARRISON FOR NVAUNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS_/SEVERAL B/AF-3/.GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN INCONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. ITAPPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO THE BERLIN AREA.B. EAST GERMAN.1/ SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLEDHINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO1 KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS../SEVERAL F-3/.4. PART C. GROUND FORCES.A. SOVIET.1/ SUMMAP' GERMAN COMMENT ON TRAINING OBS!.TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND NUMEROUS DRIVINGSCHOOLS IS INDICATIVE OF RECRUIT TRAINING. FROM 16 TO 18NOVEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ANTY COACHGIEOPage 3
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EXERCISES, PRESUMBLY AT REGIMENTAL LEVEL. AT IML LETALINGERHEIDE AND ALTENGRABOW TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS.SINCE 26 NOVEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONSOF ACTIVITY OUTSIDE GARRISONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 34THARTILLERY DIV. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AS YETINDICATIVE OF EXERCISES WITH FULL UNITS PARTICIPATING.5. PART D. AIR FORCES. NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.6. PART E. NAVY.A. SOVIET.1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUTPT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. /B-2/7. PART F. LOGISTICS, AND PART G. PSYCHOLOGICAL -   NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOMEND OF MESSAGEACTION: ACCI, NAVY, AF, USA, CSDINFO: DCSOPDA IN 157472
[198-10004-10076.pdf — page 0]
198-10004-10076 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201Identification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: ARMYRECORD NUMBER: 198-10004-10076RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERSAGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: ARMYFROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.TO:TITLE:DATE: 00/00/1963PAGES: 123SUBJECTS: EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY ANDCONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBANATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBAU.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADEDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1B; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1997OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.![JFK Assassination Records]Department of the Army EO 13526Declassify Exclude ExemptAuthorityRefer ToReview Date 12/8/2015 By Komerv9.iNW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 12
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| NO. | SUBJECT                                                                                                                                                                                         | DATE      || --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- || 1   | CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 (SECRET-NOFORN)                                                                                                                                                 | 17 Jan 63 || 2   | Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)                                                                                                     | 22 Jan 63 || 3   | Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba (TOP SECRET) (in dupe)                                                                                                                | 23 Jan 63 || 4   | Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above (TOP SECRET)                                                                                                                                              | 23 Jan 63 || 5   | Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)                                                                                                              | 23 Jan 63 || 6   | DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba (TOP SECRET) | 23 Jan 63 || 7   | Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63. (TOP SECRET)                                                                                                    | 24 Jan 63 || 8   | National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Closed) (TOP SECRET)                                                                                                                             | Undtd     || 9   | Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)                                                     | 4 Feb 63  |
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SECRET - SENSITIVEFebruary 4, 1963TO : ARA - Hr. CottrellFROM : S/P - John W. FordSubject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Flaming on CubaIn accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:The Problem:Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work bed bean done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee are as followst1.  The National Security Action Hemorenda emenating from the White House.2.  The Actions of the National Security Council.3.  The Besia National Security Policy of the U.S. (now awaiting final stages of formal clearance before presentation to National Security Council).4.  The RecordsSECRET - SENSITIVE
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SECRET - SENSITIVE4.  The Records of Action of the Executive Committee    of the National Security Council as they pertain    to Cuba.5.  The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM -    during the Cuban Crisis.6.  The Resolutions of the Organization of American    States and the Punta del Este Conference.7.  Public Statements of Government Officials, in    Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy    of September 13, 1962.8.  Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministers    of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.9.  Recently Approved New Policy Statement and    Objectives as Drawn Up by the Interdepartmental    Committee of Cuban Affairs.10. Cuban Guidelines Paper.    (A guidelines paper as such does not exist on    Cuba as is the case in a majority of other    countries.)CONCLUSIONS:There are well over eight volumes of material concerned withCuba, particularly that generated during the recent October crisis.This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particularreports which may be of value to the members of your committeeas we go forward with implementation of the new policy andobjectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregatedthose National Security Council decisions and National SecurityAction Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in thefiles of the Department of State. Where action on a particularNSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXCOM, actionresponsibility on these decisions would appear now to be withinthe purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my reviewto date,SECRET - SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 5
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SECRET - SENSITIVE- 3 -to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances action responsibility on an NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexis Johnson).Attachment:List of Pending and ClosedNSC and NASAM decisionsconcerning Cuba.SECRET - SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 6
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# NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA(PENDING AND CLOSED)NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 8
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### NSC Action No.### Substance### Status483 NSC 2422m5/5/61USIA will expand L.A.program, but not initiateelectronic warfare againstCastro; means of propagandashould be madeavailableto non-US groups.(Pending)Action trans-ferred toJohnson channelPer NASAM#181.483 MSC 2422n5/5/61US military officers undergeneral guidance to beprepared by Dept of State,would discuss Castro threatto all L.A. with L.A. officers.(Closed)completed actionas of 11/28/61.483 MSC 2422o5/5/61Dept of State should preparea report on a possible newjuridical basis for effectiveanti-comunist action.(Closed)S/P paper"possible newBesis for Anti-Communist Action"7/24/61483 MSC 2422p5/5/61Robert Woodward's assumptionof responsibility of Task Forceon Cuba on announcement ofappointment.Closed.483 NSC 2422b5/5/61No US military interventionnow. Do nothing which wouldforeclose possibility militaryintervention in future.Closed.483 NSC 2422c5/5/61No naval blockade or airwaragainst Cuba.Closed.483 NSC 2422f5/5/61Detailed study to be madeby CIA with other Departmentsof possible weaknesses andvulnerabilities in elementswhich control Cuba.Closed.Bissell memo toAchilles11/21/61 re:"Situstion andProspects inCube"by ShermanKent 11/3/61.
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## SECRET| NSC Action No.          | Substance                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Status                                                                                     || ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ || 483 NSC 2422h 5/5/61    | No separate Cuban military forces should be organized in U.S. Cuban nationals would be encouraged enlist in US Armed Forces.                                                                                                 | Closed. DEF recommended to Pres.draft program be terminated 6/30/62 due to modest results. || 483 NSC 2422j 5/5/61    | No immediate trade embargo on Cuba. declaring total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.                                                                                     | Closed, with President's action of 2/3/62                                                  || 483 NSC 2422l 5/5/61    | Alliance for Progress to be strengthened.                                                                                                                                                                                    | Closed. Weekly report now from AID to White House.                                         || NASAM 194 10/2/62       | Policy Toward non-bloc ships in Cuban trade (Action US Government proposes to take with regard to shipping to Cuba.)                                                                                                         | Pending. Action trans-ferred to EXCOM.                                                     || NASAM 100 10/5/61       | Contingency Planning for Cuba.                                                                                                                                                                                               | Pending Action trans-ferred to Johnson channel.                                            || CUBA NASAM #31 3/11/61  | US Government must have ready a White Paper on Cuba and be ready to give assistance to Cuban Patriots in similar effort.                                                                                                     | Closed. Paper prepared and translated: "The Castro Regime in Cuba" 9/61                    || CUBA NASAM #181 8/24/62 | Eyes only - Limited Distribution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USecy Johnson (understand this authorized response on certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel) | Closed.                                                                                    |NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 11
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NSC Action No.SECRETSubstanceStatusCUBA NASAM 19610/22/62Establishment of NSC Executive CommitteeClosed.CUBA NASAM 20812/6/62EYES ONLYCuba Overflights. (This Presidential directive approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumption it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.)Report Submitted.CUBA NASAM 2131/8/63Interdepartmental Organization of Cuban Affairs - wich responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.Closed.
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TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTSDEPARTMENT OF STATE34January 24, 1963MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDYTHE WHITE HOUSESubject: Papers for NSC Executive CommitteeMeeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.Attached are two revised papers "Summary ofCoordinator's Recommendations" and "United StatesPolicy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted tomembers of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8for the paper entitled "United States Policy Towardthe Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmittedon January 22 remain unchanged and will also be con-sidered at the Friday meeting. They are "United StatesPolicy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."![signature of William H. Brubeck]William H. BrubeckExecutive SecretariatAttachments:As stated.Copy No. ____.TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTSNW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 14
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SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)FROM : Coordinator of Cuban AffairsSUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba## United States PolicyOn November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 15
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SECRET-2-## ObjectivesAccordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;SECRET
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SECRET-3-7.  Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;8.  Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;9.  Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.Supporting ActionsA. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further
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SECRET-4-actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may:   1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.SECRET
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SECRET-5-2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; andSECRET
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SECRET-6-d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by anydepartment of the United States frombeing shipped on vessels owned orcontrolled by persons who own orcontrol vessels engaged in the tradebetween Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of   Mission Conference January 20-30, or at   a later date dependent on the Donovan   mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or   another representative of the President   will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico   and Brazil to convey to them the importance   President Kennedy attaches to maintaining   hemispheric solidarity by their supporting   the following resolutions:a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba forits actions which continue to endangerthe peace, deploring refusal to allowinspection, condemning the presence ofSoviet troops, recommending continuedsurveillance and continued vigilanceagainst subversive activities, andterminating the invocation of the RioTreaty on the missile crisis, togetherwithb. An OAS resolution which wouldrecommend 1) extension of arms embargoto all items of trade except food andmedicine (fall back position: extensionof arms embargo to all strategic items);SECRET