Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 3]
Classification: _________SECRET                                                                                  4 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice. However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterintelligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his geographical target.Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch. But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch. He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ?; (5) Far East; and the Inter-Branch.Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the United States. But the Contacts Division (00) did have a domestic mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin said he believed the agency also got information on Americans in the Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the press.Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could probably remember the names of the others in the section.I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962 when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald took place the first week of July, 1962.Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not attempt to debrief Oswald.Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and2000363Classification: _________SECRETClassified by derivation: _________
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 4]
Classification: SECRET 5 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember, 1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong year in the memo.Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American. He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Department dispatches about Oswald.He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10 American defectors came to their attention from the State Department and the military.Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers program. It involved using persons to give information about the Soviet Union who had a "very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union, such as scientists, etc.Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen the information in that form.Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Oswald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.Classification: SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 5]
Classification: SECRET6 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation, nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he is confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security facility. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in Minsk.Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Sokaloff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child. He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length for security reasons by the agency.The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the proposed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited, what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short-term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved. He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by the contact.I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including the Warren Commission, about the memo.He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He thereforeClassification: SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 6]
Classification: SECRET 7 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said he doesn't recall any such check.Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were, Balaban, a man named Richard, last name possibly (Wink)[^1] and (Charles Cox)[^2] who was the liaison with the Technical Supports Division (i.e., concealment devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in 1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help in remébering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is married to Rudolf Balaban.Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said he doesn't know that actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the persen actually being developed as an asset.Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military base at Atsugi.Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo. He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him (Oswald)."I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the 201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the notations on the form.Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification2000375Classification: SECRETClassified by derivation:[^1]: [^2]:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 7]
Classification: SECRET 8 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for. I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that. He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not have an interest in the Oswald file.I asked how he would have come across the State Department communications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circulated for information and then routed back to registry where they would be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Oswald.Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions within the agency might have in this way:> [Figure: A flowchart that shows the hierarchy of DDO. The DDO splits into Foreign, Counter-intelligence, Psychological Political, and Paramilitary. Counter-intelligence is connected to Line Divisions.]DDOForeign Counter- intelligence Psychological Political ParamilitaryLine DivisionsHe said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented, he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Oswald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot preclude that possibility.I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activitiesClassification: SECRET2000373Classified by derivation:
[180-10143-10227.pdf — page 8]
Classification: SECRET 9 of 9 pages(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believe we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the country.I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal military secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he would have been of interest for security.I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald. He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write memos about such leads which were discussed and not follow up. He does not remember preparing any such memo.2000377Classification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 0]
# Russell August fangelleSECRETRobert Genzman and Harold Sexp interviewed Russell August Langelle at C/A Readquarters on May 4, 1978. The interview yielded the following information:Langelle joined the CIA in September 1950, and worked mainly in SR9 of the Soviet Russia Division. In November 1955 he resigned from the Agency on the pretext that he was disgruntled with his assignments. His CIA files would have reflected this termination of employment. The only document to the contrary would have been a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles, stating that Langelle would retain all rights and benefits when he returned to the C/A (at present this document would probably be in his personnel file.Approximately fifteen people knew that Langelle was still with the era after his resignation in 1955. These included John Mawry (SE), Joe Bulik 03 (SR9), Quentin Johnson (Chief of Operations), George Risevaljer, Frank Levy, Ted PollingSECRET
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 1]
Genzman5-4-78SECRET 03[Jack Kindschi, (June Sworbuck)(Ed Galloway), Leonard McCoy(Reports and Requirements), Pierrede Silva (COS), and someone atthe State Department's Office ofSecurity.At the time of his resignation,Langelle applied for employmentwith the State Department. Inthe interim he worked at theHecht Company. In March 1956he started to work at theState Department as a SecurityOfficer. In September 1956 hewas sent to Vienna, where heearned a reputation for beinga strict security officer at theEmbassy. He was deliberately toughon CIA personnel who breachedsecurity, in order to build hiscover as a non-CIA foreignservice officer. His salary waspaid by the State Department.The CIA Chief of Station in Viennaand the Ambassador knew hewas with the CIA.11112575Langelle served as the SecurityOfficer at the Moscow Embassyfrom December 1957 to September1959. In addition, he was thesenior CIA officer there. TheCIA contingent in Moscowconsisted of five or six officers
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 2]
Genzman5-4-78SECRET[working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside. Inside, with deep cover, were George P. Winters (Econ Officer), FNU03 (Mahoney), FNU (Venables) and Steveos Washenko (Econ or Agric Officer).Outside were Jean Leberman (teacher at the American school) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects.[Langelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA headquarters, where it was decoded.In 1959 the Soviets declared Langelle persona non grata as a result of his involvement with P.S. Popov.[Langelle was the case officer of Popov, who worked for the GRU soviet military intelligence. [While making a contact with Popov] Langelle was detained by the KGB and was questioned for two and a half hours. The KGB attempted to recruit him, and then released him. The StateSECRET11112576
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 3]
4Genzman5-4-78Department filed a formal protest, but Langelle was told to leave the Soviet Union within three days. He left the Soviet Union in early October 1959.Langelle first became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald when he heard in a conversation that a Marine had contacted the American consular office in Moscow to renounce his citizenship. He later heard that this individual had changed his mind and was returning to the United States.He does not recall the details of these conversations, but he believes they took place in the United States.Langelle characterized Oswald's defection as a consular case to be handled by consular officers, rather than an intelligence case involving intelligence officers, who were shorthanded in Moscow at that time. He stated that the few intelligence officers in Moscow at that time were involved in specific operations, and did not perform general intelligence functions. He also stated that intelligence officers at the Embassy did not use the consular officers for intelligence purposes, and that there were
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 4]
Genzman5-4-78SECRET[no CIA people in the consular section]Langelle stated that the military intelligence people at the Embassy probably would have been contacted about Oswald's defection. The military intelligence personnel included [Leo Dulacki (Marines), Paul Adams (Nasry), John Munson (Navy), and Ted Hoffman (Army). He did not know whether Alexis Davison (Navy) was an intelligence officer or whether Davison was involved in the Penkovsky case]Langelle stated that when Oswald left the Soviet Union, he was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization service, and the FBI.When Langelle left Moscow in 1959, Winters was the senior CIA officer there. 03 (Mahoney and Leberman) were still there, and Washenkof may still have been there. Langelle's replacement as Embassy Security Officer was John Abidian [who was not with the CIA. Abidian was later replaced by Hugh Montgomery, who was Winter's successor as senior CIA officer.]SECRET
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 5]
6SECRETGenzman5-4-78Montgomery was later replaced by Paul Garfler, who became the first officially designated Chief of station in Moscow. Other CIA officers in Moscow circa 1962 included (Rodney Carlsons, Bill Horfaly, and possibly John D. Hemenway).At Headquarters the chief of the Soviet Russia Division was John Mawry, followed by Howard Osborne and then David E. Murphy.With regard to American journalists in Moscow, Langelle had no contacts with R. F. Norengold or Aline Mosby, did not know a. d. Goldberg, and was contacted by Priscilla Johnson for an interview after he was declared persona non grata.SECRET 11112579When Langelle returned to the United States, he continued working for the State Department. He resumed [his] CIA duties on a part-time basis in 1961. He dealt with communications between Washington and Moscow.In September 1961 he resumed [his] CIA duties on a full-time basis at Headquarters. He worked mainly in the Soviet Russia Division, External Operations, Africa and Europe. At present he is still with the CIA and still paid by the State Department but he plans to retire soon.3/R
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 6]
# SECRETSangelleLangelle was born on October 7, 1922.His social security number is [495-18-8800]He is married, with three children. 30Sangellejoined the CIR in September, 1950,and worked mainly in the SovietRussian Division. In November 1955 heresigned from the Agency on the pretextthat he was disgruntled with his faceassignments. His CIA files would towehave reflected his termination of employment.The only document to the contrary wouldhave been a memorandum from theDirector of Central Intelligence AllanDulles, stating that Langelle wouldretain all rights and benefits when hereturned to the CIA. (This document at present in hisApproximately fifteen people knew that he wasstill with the CIA after his resignationin 1955. These included John Maury(CSE), (Joe Bulik) (SR9), QuentinJohnson (Chief of Operations), GeorgeRisevalper (sp), Frank Levy, TedPolling, Jack Windschi, June 03Sworbuck) (Ed. Galloway), LeonardMcCoy (Reports and Requirements),Pierre de Silva (COS), andsomeone at the State Department'sOffice of Security. SECRET 11112500Lang at the time of hisresignation Langelle applied for1542x employment with the State Department.
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 7]
*SECRET*[Sangelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but coder could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA Headquarters for decoding.]11112581SECRET
[180-10143-10233.pdf — page 8]
deliberately tough on CIA personnel for security breaches in order to build his cover as a non-CIA foreign service officer. His salary was paid by the state DepartmentIn the interim he worked at the Wecht Company. In March 1956 he began started to work at the state Department as a Security Officer. He was sent to Vienna in September 1956, in September 1956 he was sent to Vienna, where he earned developed the reputation for being a strict Security Officer at the Embassy. He was CIA 27Chief of Station and the (in Vienna) and the ambassador knew he was with the CIA. He served as the Security Officer at the Moscow Embassy from December 1957 to September 1959.In addition, he was the senior CIA officer there, with five or six CIA officers working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside.Inside, with deep contact, were George P. Winters (Econ. Officer), 03 (Mahoney) (Venables) and 03.32 (Steve Vashenko (Econ. or Agric. Officer)). Outside were Joan Liberman (teacher at the American school) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects[insert]SECRETIn 1959 the Soviets declared L'Angeli persona non grata as a result of his involvement with P.S. Popov. L'Angeli was the case officer for Popov, who worked for the GRU, Soviet military intelligence. L'Angeli had been contacting whileTIP