Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[198-10004-10076.pdf — page 20]
SECRET2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.SECRET
[198-10004-10076.pdf — page 21]
SECRET-8-B. Contigency PlanningNew opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.TOP SECRET
[198-10004-10076.pdf — page 22]
SECRET- 8 -Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.SECRET
[198-10004-10076.pdf — page 23]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1933, 10 a.m.)FROM: Coordinator of Cuban AffairsSUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations1. U. S. Policy ObjectivesThe following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, itSECRET