Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 28]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-18-The technician discussed this problem with the case officer for the project, Robert Shaw.[^31] Mr. Shaw asked the technician to add additional photographic coverage to the basehouse so as to cover the Consulate door.[^32] On 26 September the technician tested equipment for use in the basehouse.[^33] The dispatch goes on to say:On the morning of 27 September, PARMUTH installed the VLS-2 Trigger Device at the LIERODE basehouse ard used the 500 mm lens issued with this system, one 400 mm Telyt, one reflex housing to be used with the Telyt adapted to fit the Robot Star camera, one Robot Star Camera, one solenoid release for mounting and triggering the Robot Star camera, one Kodak K-100 adapted for single or burst type exposure, one sole-noid release to be used with the K-100... one 152 mm f/4 Cine Ektar Lens, and two additional tripods.[^34]The photography agent was instructed to test each camera for four days. The report says that the results of these test days will be forwarded to the Technical Services Division at Headquarters as soon as they become available.[^35]On 7 November 1963 the Mexico City Station filed a report on the functioning of the pulse camera.[^36] This dispatch is referenced toClassification:Classified by derivation:[^31]: [^32]:[^33]: [^34]:[^35]: [^36]:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 29]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled clocuments.)-19-HMMA-22307, paragraph 5, c.37/ It says that the VLS-2 triggering device had been performing well with little false triggering. The 500 mm lens was replaced with a 6-inch lens so as to obtain wider coverage of the Consulate door.38/ During the first two weeks that the pulse camera was in operation, the VLS-2 triggered the camera anytime that anyone entered or left the Consulate door. This dual photography used an excessive amount of film, so the base agent adjusted the VLS-2 so that it only photographed people leaving the Cuban compound by the Consulate door.39/ The base agent used "the K-100 camera with the 152 mm lens for one day, turnegin 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film."40/ Samples of the photos taken "on that day" with the camera are enclosed with the dispatch.41/ The Robot Star camera that was placed in the base on September 27 broke down after four days of operation and was replaced with a second Robot Star camera.42/ This Robot Star broke down after five days of operation. At the time of this dispatch in November, a Robot Star camera was in operation.43/ Samples of this camera's photographs
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 30]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)were also sent with this dispatch.44/ Hence, between September 27, 1963 and November 7, 1963, at least three, and possibly four, cameras were used in the photo base with the VLS-2 automatic triggering device. On the 27th, the photo-technician installed two cameras, the K-100 and the first Robot Star, with the VLS-2-triggering device.45/ The K-100 was used for one day.46/ The first Robot Star worked for four days; a second Robot Star worked for five days.47/ On 11/7/63 a Robot Star was in operation at the base.48/ It is not clear whether the Robot Star which was working at the time of the November dispatch was a third camera or one of the earlier ones which could have been repaired. In any event, the Station asked that a new camera be sent to replace the Robot Star.49/On June 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters alerting them that they were sending up the negatives from the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy.50/ All available negatives and five packages of undeveloped film were sent to Headquarters by transmittal manifest #252572.51/Classification:136
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 31]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 21 -The cable apologizes for the delay in sending the negatives caused by "consolidation and dating." 52/The cable suggests that Headquarters retain possession of the negatives and informs Headquarters that the negatives will be forwarded to them on a regular basis. 53/A transmittal manifest is "unaccountable." 54/That means that the document and the material it transmits is not made part of the record and is, therefore, unretrievable. 55/The CIA made the photo-technician's monthly report for December available to the Committee on 16 November 1978. 56/ On the morring of 17 December 1963, a and 35 mm Sequence camera was installed in the base house with the VLS-2 trigger device. 57/ The installation of this Sequence camera was probably in response to the request for a replacement camera in HMMA-22433.On 22 June 1965 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a dispatch to Headquarter; to familiarize them with the details of the pulse camera operation. 58/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 32]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-22-This dispatch is intended to familiarize Headquarters with the details of the Pulse Camera operation in Mexico City, which was mounted in December 1963 and is targeted against the (Cuban) Embassy and Consulate.59/The dispatch goes on to report that a technician from Headquarters brought a pulse camera to Mexico City in mid-December 1963, installed and tested it, and instructed the technician resident in Mexico City and the base agent in the use and maintenance of the camera.60/On the basis of HMMA-22307, HMMA-22433 and MEXI 9940, the Committee believes that it is probable that the pulse camera was in operation on the days that Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. This Committee requested the photographs produced by the pulse camera by the project's cryptonym on 22 June 1978.The CIA informed a House Select Committee on Assassinations researcher on 7/20/78 that the cryptonym did not refer to a photographic project.61/ A more specific request for the photographs was made on 21 July 1978.62/On 13 October 1978 the Committee, as a result of a review of materials taken by James Angleton from Win Scott's safe at the time of his death, 63/ addressed another letter to the CIA on this matter.64/ This letterClassification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 33]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-23-said, in part:First, while admittedly there are contradictions in the Agency's written records, these records nevertheless suggest that an impulse camera was 'n operation when Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy. Such a camera would have automatically been triggered to photograph any person entering the Embassy. In addition, it has been determined by this Committee that Oswad entered and exited from the Cuban and Soviet compounds on at least five separate occasions, resulting: in a total of ten opportunities during which Oswald could have been photographed by CIA surveillance camera::. The existence of an Agency photograph of Oswald has been further corroborated by CIA personnel both in Mexico City and at Agency headquarters who claim to have seen this material.Finally, on October 6, 1978, a manuscript written by the late Win Scott, former Chief of Station of the CIA's Mexico City Station, was reviewed by a staff member of this Committee. While the criticism can be offered that Scott's manuscript has not yet been established as a true record, relevant portions of this manuscript do suggest that the contents are accurate and that photographs of Oswald were in fact obtained by the CIA's Mexico City surveillance operations. At page 273 of the manuscript, Scott wrote:These visits and conversations are not heresay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, indicatingClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 34]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-24-obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help Oswald.Scott's comments are a source of deep concern to this Committee, for they suggest your Agency's possible wthholding of photographic materials highly re evant to this investigation.Therefore, the Committee reiterates its request of May 2, including but not limited to any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Lee Harvey Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City.. In addition, the Committee requests a detailed explanation regarding the withholding of any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City.65/The CIA responded to this letter on 25 October 1978.66/ The CIA informed the Committee that it was their belief that the pulse camera was not in operation during September of 1963.67/First, there was no pulse camera...opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963... In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to Mexico City... The Consulate entrance had been closed for some time, and after it was reopered the 27th of September was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage.. Difficulty was experienced in the installation and the technicians had to machine a part forNW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 35Classification: TOPClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 35]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-25-the equipment... The technicians probably had to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance... Various difficulties were experienced with the equipment, which seems eventually to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963. There is no question about the sequence set forth above.[^68]HMMA-22307 definitely reports the installation of the two cameras and a VLS-2 trigger device on 27 September 1963.[^69] But the cameras did not function smoothly.[^70] HMMA-22433 reported that the K-100 camera broke down after one day's operation.[^71]It was replaced with the first Robot Star, which had also been installed on September 27. The first Robot Star broke down four days after its installation.[^72] A second Robot Star broke down after five days of operation.[^73] A Robot Star was working on 7 November 1963, when HMMA-22433 requested that Headquarters send a replacement camera to Mexico.[^74] In all likelihood, that request was filled with the installation of the Sequence camera on 17 December 1963 detailed in HMMA-22726.[^75] Under this interpretation of the documents, the operation would have gone into continuousClassification:[^68]: about the sequence set forth above[^69]: 27 September 1963.[^70]: function smoothly.[^71]: K-100 camera broke down after one day's operation[^72]: Star broke down four days after its installation[^73]: Robot Star broke down after five days of operation.[^74]: replacement camera to Mexico.[^75]: HMMA-22726.
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 36]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-25-operation in mid-December 1963 as claimed by the CIA.But the first pulse camera was set up on Friday, September 27, 1963. The documents do not specify the days that the original cameras functioned. HMMA-22307 says:(The base agent) was requested to test the Robot Star Camera for four days and the K-100 for another four days.[^76]HMMA-22433 says:(The base agent) used the K-100 with a 152 mm lens for one day, turning in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film... The Robot Star and the Telyt 400 mm lens are now being used with the VLS-2 on this project.... The Robot Star camera which was given to (the base agent) with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of photographing. (The technician) replaced this with another Robot. Five days later the second camera failed to advance properly.[^77]This Committee believes that it is reasonable to assume that the base agent started using the equipment immediately after it was installed.[^78] Hence, the one day that the K-100 was used would have been either the 27th (the day it was installed), the 28th (a Saturday) or the 30th (the following Monday). It is also reasonable to assume that the Robot Star was put into action the day of, or the day following, the breakdown of the K-100. This camera worked for fourClassification:[^76]: /[^77]: /[^78]: /
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 37]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-27-days. So the Consulate was probably the subject of photographic surveillance from 27 September to 1 October, assuming that the five days of coverage from the original cameras started on the day of installation and ran continuously, except for Sunday, September 30th.The base agent deve oped the film from the pulse camera and turned it over in negative form to his contact.[^79] The film was probably routinely sent to Headquarters. [^80]The technician who set up the cameras in the base house said that the objective of the operation was to get identifiable photographs of all visitors to the Cuban compound.[^81] The goals of the operation were spelled out in the 1966 Project Renewal request.Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances...[^82]Even though this was the stated objective, Ann Goodpasture testified that she was not sure, but thought that the coverage of the Cuban Consulate and Embassy would have been continuous only during office hours.[^83] This was also the recollection of DavidClassification: TOP SECRET143Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 38[^79]: [^80]:[^81]: [^82]:[^83]:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 38]
Classification:(This form is to be ised for material extracted from CIA-controlled (locuments.)-28-Phillips.84/ During September, October and November of 1963, the Cuban Consulate was open to the public from 10:00 am. to 2:00 р.п.; the Embassy was open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00p.m.85/A blind memo, dated 11/27/64, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of Embassies and info on Kostikov," implies that the coverage on the Cuban Embassy was of a continuous nature during daylight hours. This memo also implies that there was a coverage of the Cuban Consulate.86/ The technician who serviced this operation in Mexico City remembers that he tried to get full daylight coverage of the compound but that it was very difficult.87/ He said that the manual coverage was usually good lut that human error had to be taken into account when considering the manual coverage. He pointed out that it was hard for a person to maintain constant attention in such a sedentary job and, hence, some visitors would get by the manual operation.88/ The technician also remembered that he had set up the pulse camera to provide constant daylight coverage.89/ By 1965 the pulse camera wasClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 39]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)FOOTNOTESFOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITYAND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSee Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the following as exhibits:1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit 2445.)2) Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa." (Commission exhibit 31:27.)4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's office. (Commission Exhibit 2121.)5) A letter dated 11/9/63 from Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Commission Exhibit 15.)6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. This document listed a Central Intelligence Agency "release" dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)7) A memorandum dated 5/11/64 to the United States Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)Classification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 40]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-29-only working for six hours a day.90/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to determine the scope of the pulse camera coverage during September and October 1963 by examination of the production because that production, if it exists, has not been made available for review.91/The CIA has made the photographic production and logs from the manual coverage of the Embassy entrance available for House Select Committee on Assassinations review.92/ All production from the manual camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy for the months of September, October and November was examined.93/ This examination revealed that the coverage of the Embassy was fairly consistent between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on weekdays.95/ There was coverage, with a few exceptions, on every weekday.96/ There was no coverage on weekends.97/ During the three-month period examined by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, only four weekdays were not covered by the photographic surveillance operation aimed at the Cuban Embassy.98/ There was no evidence in the files of serious technical difficulties or cameraClassification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 41]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-30-problems in the manual operation during these three months.[^99]4. Disposition of Froduction from the OperatonThe photographs from the manual camera were maintained in a chronological file at the CIA station in Mexico City.[^100] These photographs were routinely shown to a penetration agent in the Cuban Embassy for identification purposes.[^101] After this agent left the employment of the Cuban Embassy in 1965, the photographs were sent to the JMWAVE Station in Miami, Florida for review by Cuban defectors such as AMMUG/1.[^102]The disposition of the pulse camera photographs in general, beyond the fact that as of 1965, and possibly earlier, the production was routinely sent to Headquarters, is unknown.[^103] The CIA denies that the pulse camera was functioning during the time Oswald was in Mexico.[^104] If the Committee's belief that the pulse camera was functioning on the days that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate is correct, then the ultimate disposition of the photographs produced on those days remains a mystery.Classification:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 42146[^99]: problems in the manual operation during these three months.[^100]: station in Mexico City.[^101]: Embassy for identification purposes.[^102]: defectors such as AMMUG/1.[^103]: to Headquarters, is unknown.[^104]: Oswald was in Mexico.
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 42]
Classification(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-31-B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound1. IntroductionThe Mexico City CIA Station maintained photographic surveillance on the Soviet, diplomatic compound in Mexico City in 1963. Three photographic sites, or bases, were used in this operation.[^1]The primary objective of the operation was to photograph people who visited the Soviet Embassy.[^2] The operation, generally, covered the main gate of the Soviet.compound between 900 and 1800 (or dark) on weekdays and from 900 to 1400 on Saturdays.[^3]2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets.[^4]Classification:[^1]: 105/[^2]: 106/[^3]: 107/[^4]: 108/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 43]
Classification: UP SEUKT(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-32-LIMITED (primary photo-base located in a 1st floor apartment)GELATILILYRIC (second photo-base located in a 2nd floor apartment)> [Figure: A hand-drawn map depicts the locations of LIMITED and LILYRIC in relation to the Soviet Compound. Streets labeled 'de Los Santos', 'TACUBAYA', and 'CHICONTEPEC' frame the locations. The Soviet Compound shows a fence, gate, embassy, and courtyard.]Classification:2000603 148Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 44
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 44]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 33 -There were three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic compound in 1963.109/ One of the bases overlooked the enclosed garden or "backyard" area of the Soviet Embassy.110/ The other two bases, of primary concern to this Committee, covered the entrance to the Soviet compound.111/ The primary base, LIMITED, was directly across the street intersection from the main Soviet Embassy gate; the secondary, or "back-up," LILYRIC base was across the street and down a little way from the main Embass) gate.112/3. Objectives of (peration and Scope of Coverage ProvidedThe purpose of this operation has also been described as being to obtain photographs of Soviet officials and their families; all foreigners (non-Latins) who visited the Embassy; and cars with foreign license plates.113/ One of the main purposes of the photographic bases that covered the Embassy gate was to obtain a photograpa of every "foreigner," or non-Latin, in contact with the Soviet Embassy.114/Classification:2000600Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 45 149
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 45]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-34-This was done in an attempt to identify possible Soviet espionage agents.My understanding of that was that it was to be used to identify those people who might be working for the Soviets as espionage agents who were U.S. citizens who went down there driving a car with a U.S. license plate on it, or people we did not know but could identify. The same procedure was also used for trying to identify people other than U.S. citizens...[^1]It is reported that the Mexican nationals who manned the photographic bases and actually took the photographs had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.[^2]The House Select Committee on Assassinations next attempted to determine the scope of the photographic coverage on the main gate of the Soviet Embassy. At a minimum, the Embassy was probably covered by the photographic operations during office hours. "The instructions were to cover the entire work day. (office hours)...".[^3] "Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates."[^4] The normal work hours of the Soviet Embassy during September and October of 1963 were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.[^5]Classification: TOP SECRETNW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 46150[^1]: 115/[^2]: 116/[^3]: 117/[^4]: 118/[^5]: 119/