Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 187]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 176 -a visa along with the fact that Mr. Phillips was not in Mexico at the time that the first cable was sent, 654/ could possibly be an indication that he is recalling a second cable. When asked about this, Mr. Phillips stated that he had no knowledge of a second cable sent prior to the assassination. 655/Some corroboration of Ms. Manell's assertions were found in the materials from Win Scott's safe.Scott wrote:"...*(0)*n page 777 of (the Warren) report the erroneous statement was made that it was not known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination! Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U. S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by Memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable; and included in each and every one of these reports was the conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known. These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets. 656/If the cable was sent it is not in the files made available to the HSCA by the CIA.The head of the Mexico Branch admitted that the information should have been reported and that, if it had been, the Oswald case would have been handled differently, at least as far as the dissemination of information about him was concerned.Classification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 188]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 177 -Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been 'handled in any different manner?A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.Q: How would the dissemination have been treated differently?A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got. 657/It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters.He replied:No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.Classification: TOP SECRETNW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 189
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 189]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 178 -I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time--absolutely enormous.We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 651/Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would :haracterize that handling:"At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the AssassinationA. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery ManEven though some people in the Station clearly disassociated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 659A from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending copies of only visitor to.Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 190]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 179 -Sovemb 28 Oct who could be identical with Oswald." 658/ 659C/ The date was later corrected to read 1 October. 659/ 659D/Mr. Scott was not the only person in the Mexico Station who still thought that the photo could possibly be Oswald. Mr. Manell testified on this pointx:Q: As of the day of the assassination, you thought that there was still a possibility that there was a photograph of Oswald?A: Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As it turned out it wasn't necessary to send it. But that was our intention. 660/The photograph was sent to Dallas where Special Agent Odum of the FBI showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald on 23 November 1963. 661/ Mrs. Oswald would later claim it was a photograph of Jack Ruby, 662/ beginning a period of controversy and uncertainty about this photograph that has continued to this day. The interaction of the Warren Commission and the CIA on this question is detailed in another section of this report. On 23 November Mexico informed Headquarters that "At obvious photos sent to Dallas were not iden with Lee Oswald." 663/ Since the time of the assassination, this man has been identified as Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalev, a Soviet 〈GB officer. The identification is unconfirmed and comes from only one source. 664/Classification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 191]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 180 -In any case, it is unlikely that this man had any connection with Oswald outside of the mistaken belief of several CIA officers in Mexico. 665/B. Reporting of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from the electronic intercept operation aimed at the Soviet EmbassyThe first cable that Mexico sent to Headquarters after the assassination referred Headquarters to the cable traffic concerning Oswald that had occurred prior to the assassination. 666/ Headquarters replied that they had also noted the "correction." 667/The cable traffic on the day of the assassination, and the early traffic from the following day, deal almost exclusively with the photograph of the person who later became known as the Mexico Mystery Man. The first cable 668/ obviously referred to the October 1 contact and brought it to Headquarters' attention by referring Headquarters to MEXI 6453. The first cable that specifically refers to the transcripts occurred on the following day. Headquarters cabled Mexico that it was important that the station review all transcriptsClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 192]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)- 181 -"since 27 September to locate all material possibly pertinent." 669/ The cable went on to instruct the station to send the full transcripts and original tapes to Headquarters by special courier. 670/ The cable also asks if the original tapes are still available. 671/This Committee has not been able to determine how the CIA Headquarters knew, on 23 November 1963, that a review of the tap material should begin with the production from 27 September, the day Oswald first appeared at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. There is no recrd that Headquarters had been informed of the 9/27 visits prior to this cable having been sent. It is possible, as some witnesses have suggested, that his information was provided to CIA Headquarters by the FBI in Washington. 672/ If that is the case then it merely shifts the question. This may indicate that the CIA Headquarters was aware of the 9/27 visits prior to the assassination. An even stronger inference is that they were aware of those visits at least by the day after the assassination. The manner in which they learned of these visits by that date has not been determined. It is possible that Headquarters was informedClassification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 193]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 18 -by telephone. Even though witnesses generally denied that there was telephone communication between Mexico City and Headquarters at the time of the assassination, there is strong evidence that there was such communication on at least two instances. 673/As will become evident, the transcripts were cabled to headquarters that same day. It is not clear why Headquarters asked that the transcripts and tapes, if they existed, be sent to Headquarters by special courier as opposed to cabling the transcripts which would have been faster. 674/ There is no record that indicates that these transcripts of Oswald'; calls were sent to Headquarters by special courier.On the 23rd, the Mexico City Station reported all of the substantive Oswald conversations to Headquarters by cable. Logically, one would expect that since the circumstantial evidence indicates that these conversations were linked to Oswald orior to the assassination, that they would all have been reported in one cable, especially in light of the request from Headquarters in DIR 84886. 675/ At this point, according to the files and records made available to the HSCA staff by the CIA, the Mexico City Station had informed Headquarters ofClassification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 194]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 18 -only the 9/28 and the 10/1/10:45 conversations. It should be noted that the 10//10:45 conversation makes reference to the fact that Oswald was also at the Embassy on 9/28. The next cable that Mexico City sent to Headquarters said, in part, 'Other than Info already sent re Oswald's connection with Sov and Cuban Embs, no other info available."[^675] The next cable reports a literal transcription of the 9/28 and 10/1/10:45 conversations. [^677] The next cable that refers to the transcripts of Oswald's conversations reports the 9/27/ 10:30 call, the 9.27/4:05 call, the 9.27/4:26 call, the 10/1/10:31 call, and the 10/3 call. [^678] With this cable Mexico City informed Headquarters of all the substantive information available from the Soviet Embassy electronic surveillance. [^679]Mexico City also informed Headquarters on 11/24/64 that the tapes from the period in which Oswald had visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies had been erased. [^680] A cable on the previous day had informed Headquarters that it was "probable" that the Oswald tapes had been erased. [^681] An earlier cable that same day reported that "Station unable compare voice as first tape erasedClassification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 195[^675]: A[^677]: 677/[^678]: 678/[^679]: 679/[^680]: 680/[^681]: 681/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 195]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 184 -prior receipt of second call "682/ This would imply that the tape of the 28 September conversation, which may not have been received at the station until the 30th or the 1st of October, was destroyed before the tape of the conversation on the 1st of October was received in the station on tha same day. In light of the standard operating procedures in effect in the station at that time, that possibility is highly unlikely. 683/In view of what is now known about the standard operating procedures and about the Station's actions prior to the assassination, the Station's confusing and somewhat contradictory reporting after the assassination is strange. 684/ It is possible that these confusions and contradictions arose out of the crisis atmosphere at the station and the rush to report information. This Committee has not found any solid evidence that there were sinister qualities in the reporting after the assassination.Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 196]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled ciocuments.)FOOTNOTESFOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITYAND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY1/ See Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the following as exhibits:1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Ambassado: in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit 2445.)2) Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa." (Commission exhibit 3127.)4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's office. (Commission Exhibit 2121.)5) A letter dated 11/9/63 from Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.. (Commission Exhibit 15.)6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. This document listed a Central Intelligence Agency. "release" dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)7) A memorandum dated 5/14/64 to the United States Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by Derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 197]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)9) A letterhead memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Hours of Work at the Cuban and Soviet Consulates." (Commission Exhibit 2568.)2/ Warren Commission Report, p. 305.3/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, un- dated, pp. 1-2; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; HSCA Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321; Thomas Keenan Inter- view, 3/24/78, p. 2; Robert Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.4/ Robert Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.5/ See JFK Exhibit F-438, reprinted at page.6/ Ibid.7/ Ibid.8/ Ibid.9/ Ibid.; see also Section II, A, 3, below.10/ See JFK Exhibit F-438 and Section II, A, 3, below. A pulse camera is a camera equipped with a device that automatically triggers the shutter of the camera thereby exposing the film.11/ Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 4.312/ Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)," p. 5. Hereinafter cited as Tab F Draft.13/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p.123; Ann Good- pasture Testimony, 4/13/18, p. 44.14/ Ibid.15/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 43.Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 198]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 3 -16/ Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321.17/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.18/ Ibid.19/ Ibid.20/ Ibid., p. 3.21/ Ibid.22/ Ibid.23/ Ibid., p. 4. CF: Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108 and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46 in which Zambernardi is said to have printed the contact sheets.24/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2.25/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.26/ Ibid., para. 5, c. There were two common means of communication between the CIA Mexico City Station and CIA Headquarters: cables and dispatches. A dispatch from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "HMMA." A dispatch from Headquarters to Mexico City always has the letter prefix "HMMW." A cable from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "MEXI." A cable from Headquarters always has the letter prefix "DIR."27/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.28/ Ibid.29/ See JFK Exhibit F-438.30/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.31/ Ibid. There is general agreement that Robert Shaw was the case officer for this operation. The only personClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 199]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)- 4 -who takes exception to that characterization of Mr. Shaw's role in the projec:: is Mr. Shaw. (See: Phillips. Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46; Zambe nardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 6. But see: Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 34.)32/ ΗΜΜΑ 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.33/ *Ibid*.34/ *Ibid*.35/ *Ibid*. The Committee decline; to assume that there had been no production by the time of this dispatch in October. The handling of the production, i.e., when it was picked up and taken to the Station, when it was developed, etc., is not known. But as the following analysis will show, there is a strong likelihood that the pulse camera was operating in late September and early October 1963.36/ ΗΜΜΑ 22433, 11/7/63.37/ *Ibid*.38/ *Ibid*., para. 1.39/ *Ibid*., para. 2.40/ *Ibid*., para. 3.41/ *Ibid*., attachment B.42/ *Ibid*., para. 3.43/ *Ibid*.44/ *Ibid*., Attachment C.45/ ΗΜΜΑ 22307, 10/18/63, para 5, c.46/ ΗΜΜΑ 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.47/ *Ibid*.Classification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 200]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 5 -48/ *Ibid*.49/ *Ibid*., para. 4.50/ MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.51/ *Ibid*.52/ *Ibid*.53/ *Ibid*.54/ HSCA Classified notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78.55/ *Ibid*.56/ HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, CIA #4098.57/ *Ibid*., para. 5, g.58/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.59/ *Ibid*., para. 1.60/ *Ibid*., para. 3.61/ HSCA Classified Notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78. The cryptonym vas changed on 8 July 1964. (HMMW 12725, 7/8/64.)62/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/21/78.63/ See Sections III, A, 5 and 6 below.64/ JFK Classified Document #142.65/ *Ibid*.66/ JFK Classified Document #146.67/ *Ibid*.68/ *Ibid*.Classification:Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 201
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 201]
Classification: F(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled clocuments.)- 6 -69/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, с.70/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.71/ Ibid., para. 3.72/ Ibid.73/ Ibid.74/ Ibid., and para. 4.75/ HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, para. 5, g.76/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, с.77/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.78/ This assumption is considered reasonable in light of the desire of the Mexico City Station to establish coverage of the newly reopened Cor sulate entrance. See HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.79/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 3.80/ See MEXI 9440, 6/19/64; HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.81/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3,78, p. 4.82/ 1966 LIONION Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66. "LIONION" was the CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound.83/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 43-44.84/ HSCA Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321.85/ MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.86/ See discussion of this memo in Section II, B, below.Classification:Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 202
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 202]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)- 7 -87/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/18, p. 2.88/ Ibid., p. 4.89/ Ibid.90/ ΗΜΜΑ 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.91/ See pages 24-27, above.92/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2.93/ Ibid.94/ Ibid.95/ Ibid.96/ Ibid.97/ Ibid.98/ Ibid.99/ Ibid.100/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 47.101/ Robert Shaw Testimony, 5/16/78, p. 35; HΜΜΑ 26006, 4/30/65, para. 8.102/ Ibid.: HMMW 13645, 5/13/65; ΗΜΜΑ 26160, 5/21/65, paras. 1 and 2.103/ See MEXI 9440 and HMMA 26411.104/ JFK Classified Document #142.105/ Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff, re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets (Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)", 2/10/77, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as Goodpasture Notes. See also: Tab F Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture festimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.Classification:Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 203
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 203]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-- 8 --106/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979, 11/18/60; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.107/ HMMA-23343, 4/30/64, para. ?. It is possible that the Saturday coverage was more extensive in 1963 during Oswald's visit. See following discussion of Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-15979, 11/18/60;Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61; Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-20052, 10/18/62; Reivew of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMIMA-22387, 10/25/63; and Section B. 4, following. "LIEMPTY" is the CIA cryptonyn referring to the overall photo-surveillance operation aimed at the Soviet diplomatic compound.108/ Sketch based on HMMA-4300, 3/12/56 with attachments; Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3; Goodpasture Exhibit #1, 11/20/78.109/ Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.110/ Ibid.111/ Ibid.112/ Ibid. See Map above. Even though LIMITED is referred to as the "primary" base because it was the first to be put into operation, the LILYRIC base produced the best photographs. (HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3)113/ Tab F Draft, pp. 2 and 5; H:SCA Executive Session Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 13; HSCA Staff Interview of Thomas Keenan, 3/24/78, p. 3.114/ Ibid. on all preceeding; HSCA Staff Interview of Herbert and Barbara manell, 3/20/18, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 18-19; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.115/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 13.Classification: