Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10110-10100.pdf — page 25]
Phillips, page 20.American businessman in Havana.COMMITTEE SENSITIVEMr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names. He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher people, "I was fairly socially active at the time and the name of the company is familiar to me."Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations clients during that time. He could recall only the man who owned Ambar Motors and the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although he can not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did in return.Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a big guy because they were in a little theatre group together and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.Phillips said that he did not know Roberto Vale.Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of the country on covert operations. He said he always traveled out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He would have other documentation on him for use with his alias when he arrived in the country. He said that's the way it was always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a "very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.COMMITTEE SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 26
[180-10110-10100.pdf — page 26]
Phillips, page 21.COMMITTEE SENSITIVE"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added that he had never had a phoney passport.Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon) once when't they were in college. He said that he had not seen him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall, he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober. He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban Aid Relief operation in Miami.Phillips said that the debriefing centers. in Miami were under the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those centers.COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 10/21/20Agency InformationAGENCY: HSCARECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10121RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILESAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 151-JFKDocument InformationORIGINATOR: HSCAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 06/02/1978PAGES: 7SUBJECTS: OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TOMEXICOCIADOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARYCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1BCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/07/1997OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Box 5.v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32263526 Page 1
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 1]
KENNEDY000044SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONSName Arnold Arehart (psydo)Address Mexico CityDate 6/2/78 Time 2:00 pmPlace American Embassy, MexicoInterview:Mr. Arehart was interviewed by HSCA Staff members Gary Cornwell, Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez, and Harold Leap. He was shown a copy of the CIA omnibus release letter and stated that he understood that it released him of any secrecy agreement he may have signed while employed by the CIA.Mr. Arehart was assigned to Mexico City as a technician in 1960. Mr. Arehart worked continuously on one project until his retirement after Phillip Agee's revelations compromised his project. Mr. Arehart worked outside the U.S. Embassy under deep cover. He worked inside of the base that monitored and taped the telephones that were subject to the CIA/Mexican liaison tapping operation. His specific duty was to do all technical work required in the base and to keep the equipment in working order.Mr. Arehart stated that the base monitored 30 telephones, i.e., there were thirty incoming lines and thirty tape machines to record the conversations. He stated that he was not sure where the taps were placed or how many taps were in what locations. Mr. Arehart was in contact, routinely, with Anne Goodpasture and Win Scott. He said that there wasInterviewer SignatureTyped Signature dan Hardway (more)Date transcribed 6/19/78By: Form #4-A
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 2]
PAGE TWO. 000045counterpart to him in the base in that he represented the Americans and his counterpart represented the Mexicans. He said that the counterpart's name was fnu Coseo. Coseo's father was the Mexican official in charge of the Mexican's involvement in the operations. Mr. Arehart was not at all clear about the role of Coseo Sr.The tapeing equipment was impulse activated in that a call coming into or going out of the tapped phone would automatically activate the recorders.Mr. Arehart said that he was the only American in the base. He said that there were 6 to 8 Mexicans who monitored the conversations and transcribed the tapes. As the Mexicans monitored the conversations they would make summaries of the important conversations. It was up to the monitors to decide which conversations were important enough to summarize. Arehart was not aware of any instruction that was provided the Mexican monitors on which conversations should be deemed important. In addition to the summaries, the tapes from the Cuban taps and the Spanish language portions of the tapes from the Soviet tapes were transcribed in the base. Arehart turned the summaries, Cuban transcripts, Russian (Spanish) transcripts, and the Russian tapes, over to his contact. He stated that his routine contact was Anne Goodpasture and that he just assumed that she was the case officer for the project.even though he claims that he received his orders directly from Win Scott by telephone. Summaries were always delivered very early in the morning the day after a conversation occured. The transcripts were literal transcriptions.Mr. Arehart said that sometimes, if the Mexican monitors felt something was really important, tapes and transcripts were passed immediatelyNW 50955 DocId:32263526 Page 3
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 3]
PAGE THREE.000046to Ms. Goodpasture.Mr. Arehart stated that he believed that the summaries would have been maintained at the station, probably in a chronological file.Mr. Arehart was questioned extensively about the retention and erasure of tapes used in the listening post. Mr. Arehart said that the tapes produced at the base would fall into three catagories:1) tapes produced by taps on Cuban related phones;2) tapes produced by taps on Soviet related phones;3) tapes produced by taps on other phones such as Mexican radicals, politicians, etc.Mr. Arehart said that the tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post. He said that he had a special rack for these tapes in his workshop which was on the floor above the room in which the listening post was situated. This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a seperate slot with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room, i.e. the tapes from the Cuban tapes were held for thirty days before reuse. Mr. Arehart said that he routinely got requests for delivery of specific Cuban tapes from Ann Goodpasture but that the tapes were not routinely given to her unless she asked for them.Mr. Arehart said that the Russian tapes were routinely given to Ms. Goodpasture so that she could get them to the Russian transcribers. He said that not all of these tapes were returned to him. He said that he knew this because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling. He assumes, while claiming no actual knowledge, that tapes were routinely retained by either the Russian translator or someone in the Station. He does not know which because he claims to have no :
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 4]
PAGE FOUR.000047knowledge about what happened to the tapes after they left his possession and before they were returned to him. He said that the tapes were returned to him already erased and ready for use.Tapes from the third catagory were not held for very long and were routinely re-used, usually within a day or so after they were taped.Mr. Arehart said that he was not aware of any other surveillance operations in Mexico City. He said that he assumed that there was photo- graphic surveillance since the Agency would not be fulfilling their obligations if they did not have it. Mr. Arehart said that there was a process whereby the station could be notified that an interesting individual, or an individual whom the station was interested in, was at, or was going to be at, one of the Embassies. Mr. Arehart said that in such a situation the monitor would bring it to his attention and he would then call Ms. Goodpasture and alert her. Mr. Arehart stated that his second duty at the base was to alert the station to anything important.Mr. Arehart said that he did not know what happened to the Soviet tapes. He did say that for a short time he was responsible for delivering the tapes to Boris Tarasoff in order to expedite the process. Mr. Arehart said that he did remember a man named "Rudy" but he did not remember what he did or what he looked like.Mr Arehart said that it was possible that one of the Mexican agents transcribed English language conversations. He said that these convesations (tapes) were usually sent to the Embassy. He was not at all certain on these points. He said that on English conversations thatNW 50955 DocId:32263526 Page 5
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 5]
PAGE FIVE.000048he remembers that a Mexican would often come to the second floor andask him to come and listen to the conversation.Mr. Arehart was questioned about whether there was a processwhereby transcription of important conversations in English or Russiancould be expedited. He explained that there would not be such aprocess for a Russian conversation since they could not judge theimportance of the conversation due to the fact that no one in thebase understood Russian. He said that there was such a procedure forEnglish conversations. He siad that after listening to the conversationand deeming it important.he would Mark the tape "Urgent" and wouldput it in a box and deliver it.Mr. Arehart said that when he worked with Tarasoff that hewould pick up the tapes to reuse as well as drop them off for trans-cription. He said that he did not pick up the transcripts from Tarasoffand has no idea about what happened to them. Mr. Arehart said thathe did not receive all of the tapes back and just assumed that theyhad been retained because of interest in the conversations contained onthem. He said this was routine. After getting the tapes back, eitherfrom Tarasoff or Goodpasture depending on the time period, he wouldput them back into the working order. The tapes were not retained afterthey were returned to the base.Mr Arehart said that the tape machines were activated atapproximately 7:00 a.m. They were turned off at 11:00p.m.Mr. Arehart said that the Russian tapes were taken off themachines on a daily basis for delivery to Goodpasture or Tarasoff.The Cuban tapes were left on the machines until the reel was full.They were then removed and transcribed.
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 6]
PAGE SIX.                                                                         000049Mr. Arehart said that Lee Harvey Oswald never came to his attentionprior to the assassination. He does not know whether or not he wasever asked to retain, or turn over to the station, any tape containingOswald's voice. He explained that such requests would be made tohim by giving him the tape number and that he never knew what wason any particular tape that was requested from him. He has neverheard of a tape of Oswald existing nor has he heard that suchtapes did not exist; he has simply never discussed it.Mr. Arehart stated that there was a file of transcriptsmaintained at the base of the transcripts that were produced at thebase. He remembered that after the assassination someone requestedthat those files be checked. Mr. Arehart said that he was not certainbut thought that they had located one short conversation either byor about Oswald. Mr. Arehart could not remember the details of thatconversation. He stated that he does not know what happened to thefiles that were maintained at the base station after his retirement.Mr. Arehart said that we were the first people to ever talkto him about these events. He said that he has never talked to any-one from the CIA about these things. He confirmed that he had neverbeen contacted by anyone from the IG staff in regards to the assassinnation or Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico. Mr. Arehart said thathe had never discussed the case with anyone in the Mexico CIA station,either at the time or since then.Mr. Arehart said that he did not get along with Anne Good-pasture. He said that she was a "show must go on type" that wouldget angry if she tried to contact him and he happened to be out to
[180-10110-10121.pdf — page 7]
# PAGE SEVEN.Mr. Arehart said that Ann was so efficient that it was often very irratating. He said that Win Scott was also very efficient.Mr. Arehart said that he believed that the listening post used Ampex 701's to tape the conversations they intercepted. He said that the calls were monitored by the three or four of the employees as they came in. These employees prepared the log sheets and the resumen (summary). The reels were then given to the transcribers who fixed the times and reel footage cite numbers to the specific conversations on the transcripts. Mr. Arehart said that the times on the transcripts would be accurate, usually, within 15 minutes more or less.Mr. Arehart was shown transcripts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassy taps. These transcripts were in the Spanish language. He identified them as transcripts produced in the base.
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification Form Date: 10/16/20Agency InformationAGENCY: HSCARECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10484RECORD SERIES: REPORT ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S TRIP TO MEXICO CITYAGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: HSCAFROM:TO:TITLE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD THE CIA AND MEXICO CITYDATE: 00/00/1978PAGES: 393SUBJECTS: CIACIA, METHODOLOGY, PHOTOSURVEILLANCESOVIET EMBASSYOSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICOCUBAN EMBASSYDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 3CURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Redacted and declassified.Box 1.v9.1NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 1
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 1]
# Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled clocuments.)OUTLINE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD, THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY.Part I.I. Introduction.014972A. Issues Addressed. (p. 1.)B. Differences Between the Warren Commission In- vestigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City and the House Select Committee on Assassinations' Investigation. (p. 3.)C. Conclusions. (p. 5.)D. Structure and Relevancy. (p. 10.)II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in Mexico City in September and October 1963.A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound. (p. 12.)1. Introduction. (p. 12.)2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets. (p. 12.)3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided. (p. 13.)4. Disposition of Production from the Operation. (p. 30.)B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound. (p. 31.)1. Introduction. p. 31.)2. Physical Positoning of Surveillance Bases and Targets. (p. 31.)3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage: Provided. (p. 33.)4. Procedure and "iming Involved in Processing Production from the Operation. (p. 45.)5. Responsibility for the Operation. (p.47.)6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations. (p. 52.)C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 1963. (p. 53.)1. Existence. (p. 53.)2. Responsibility. (p. 53.)   a. General. (2.53.)   b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained. (p. 54.).3. Telephone Lines Covered. (p. 56.)Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 2]
# Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Outline: Page Two.4. Production from Operation. (p. 58.)   a. Types. (p. 59.)   b. Handling Procedures. (p. 59.)   (1) Resuma. (p. 59.)   (2) Cuban Tapes. (p. 60.)   (3) Soviet Tapes. (p. 61.)   (a) General Handling. (p. 61.)   (b) Retention and Reuse of Tapes. (p. 62.)   (c) English Language Conversations. (p. 64.)   (d) Handling by Tarasoffs. (p. 66.)   (e) Expedited Procedure for English Language Coversations or other Conversations of Special Interest. (p. 67.)   (f) Handling in the Station. (p. 70.)   (g) Format of Transcripts. (p. 71.)   c. Voice Comparisons. (p. 72.)III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that. Information.A. Information that was Available. (p. 72.)   1. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office. (p. 73.)      a. September 27, 1963, Friday. (p. 73.)      b. September 28, 1963, Saturday. (p. 76.)      c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday. (p. 78.)      d. October 3, 1963, Thursday. (p. 79.)   2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters. (p. 80.)   3. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound. (p. 81.)   4. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Photographic Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds. (p. 81.)   5. Possibility that Additional Information from the Electronic Surveillance on the Soviet Compound was Available to the Mexico City Station. (p. 82.)
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 3]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Outline: Page Three.6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 90.)   a. Missing Materials. (p. 91.)   b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation would have Missed Oswald. (p. 91.)   c. Reports of the Existence of a Photograph. (p. 93.)   (1) Phillip Agee Allegation. (p. 93.)   (2) Daniel Stanley Watson Allegation. (p. 97.)   (3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation. (p. 99.)   (4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation. (p. 102.)   (5) Statements of Dan Niescuir. (p. 105.)   d. HSCA Investigation of the Possibility that the Mexico City Photosurveillance Operation Produced a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 107.)   (1) Introduction. (p. 107.)   (2) Investigation of the Allegations. (p. 108.)B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.   1. Introduction. (p. 115.)   2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 116.)   3. When were the intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald? (p. 120.)   4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man. (p. 122.)IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station an Head-quarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Cityizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City. (p. 123.)E. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to the Assassination. (p. 124.)V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination...A. Reporting of Information Concerning the PhotographClassification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 4]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Outline: Page Four.of the Mexico Mystery Man. (p. 178.)B. Reporting of Information Concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from the Electronic Intercept Operation Aimed at the Soviet Embassy. (p. 180.)PART IIC. Silvia Duran. (p. 184.)VI. Information Not Available at the Time of the Warren Commission Investigation.A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran). (p. 191.)1. House Select Committee on Assassinations 6/6/78 Interviewo of Silvia Tirado. (p. 191.)2. CIA Informatior Not Available at the Time of the Warren Commission Investigation. (p. 194.)   a. LIRING/3 Allegation. (p. 194.)   b. Possibility that Silvia Duran was an Agent for either American, Mexican or Cuban Intelligence. (p. 197.)   (1) Was Silvia Duran an Agent, Asset, or Source for Mexican or American Intelligence? (p. 197.)   (2) Was Silvia Duran a Cuban Intelligence Agent? (p. 201.)B. The Cubans. (p. 202.)1. Eusebio Azcue Lopez. (p. 202.)2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. (p. 205.)C. Elena Garro de Par.. (p. 206.)1. Elena's Story as Reported October 5, 1964. (p. 206.)2. October 12, 1964, CIA Memo for the Record. (p.208.)3. November 24, 1964, CIA Informant Report. (p. 209.)4. November 24, 1964, Elena Garro Meeting with Mexico City Legal Attache Officers. (p. 210.)Classification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 5]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Outline: Page Five.5. Charles Thomas Meeting with Elena Garro on December 10, 1965. (p. )6. Charles Thomas' Meeting with Elena Garro on December 25, 1965. (p. 216.)7. December 27, 1965, Legal Attache Memo to the United States Ambassador re Elena Garro. (p. 221.)8. CIA Investigation of Elena's Allegation that She Created a Disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963. (p. 223.)9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 Memo to the United States Ambassador Regarding Elena Garro's Allegation. (p. 225.)10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re Elena's Allegation that She Had Stayed at the Hotel Vermont from the Day After the Assassination Until November 30, 1963. (p. 225.)11. Charles Thomas' September 30, 1969, Letter to State Department and Legal Attache's Response. (p. 226.)12. House Select Committee on Assassination's Investigation of Elena Garro's Allegations. (p. 228.)D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue. (p. 235.)VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City.A. Introduction. (p. 240.)B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Imposter Contact the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico City? (p. 242.)C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City? (p. 250.)D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald Alone, While He Travelled to Mexico? (p. 259.)Appendix I: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Cuba Trip 1. (p. 261.)Appendix II: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 1. (p. 265.)
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 6]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)Outline: Page Six.Appendix III: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 2. (p. 273.)Appendix IV: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Cuba Trip 2. (p. 287.)Appendix V: Biography: Elena Garro de Paz. (p. 297.)Appendix VI: Glossary of Terms Used in Report. (p. 301.)Appendix VII: Listing of CIA Documents Cited. (p. 305.)Classification:Classified by derivation: