Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10131-10324.pdf — page 114]
# TOP SECRET138for the record or making any statement he so desires, and I want to at this time afford you that five minute period to make such a statement, if you so desire.Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I consider my appearance, invitation to appear at Committee, as I told also the same applies before, my meetings with the staff of the Committee, I consider it honor, great honor for me. I will try to answer whatever I remember, whatever I know as only truth, and but the truth. And you would like to see me appear at any time, I am at your disposal and I will try to give you the only things what I know.The Chairman. Thank you.That is the completion of your statement, sir?Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, on behalf of the Committee and the United States Congress, I want to express our appreciation to you for having appeared here and having given this Committee the benefit of your testimony. At this time I would remind you of the terms of your agreement to work with our staff and provide further information to the Committee, that you will continue under the oath administered to you by this Committee.Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.The Chairman. Thank you very much for your appearance here.Mr. Nosenko. Thank you, sir.
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TOP SECRET1391 The Chairman. You are excused.2 At this time, there being no further business to come3 before the Committee, the meeting is adjourned subject to the4 call of the Chair.5 (Whereupon, at 10:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee was6 adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)TOP SECRETALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
[180-10131-10325.pdf — page 0]
180-10131-10325 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 10/19/20Agency InformationAGENCY: HSCARECORD NUMBER: 180-10131-10325RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONYAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014725Document Info: mationORIGINATOR: HSCAFROM: TOVAR, BERNARD HUGHTO:TITLE: DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR..DATE: 06/29/1978PAGES: 48SUBJECTS: CIA, METHODOLOGYTOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TEST IMONY BEFORE THECOMMITTEEOSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO ), DEFECTION TO RUSSIADOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: Top SecretRESTRICTIONS: 3CURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/26/1997OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Box 5v9.1NW 48331 DocId:32277210 Page 1
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IUF DEGREEICONTENTSTESTIMONY OF:PAGEBernard Hugh Tovar2NW 48331 DocId: 32277210 Page 2TOP SECRET
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AFRANCE:msl                                                                                                              1                                                       TOP SECRET                                   ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDYThursday, June 29, 1978U. S. House of Representatives,John F. Kennedy Subcommittee ofSelect Committee on Assassinations,Washington, D. C.Deposition of:BERNARD HUGH TOVARcalled for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370,Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at2:00 o'clock p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Publicin and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalfof the respective parties:For the Subcommittee:MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff CounselELIZABETH WOLFFor the Deponent:(There was representation by counsel)NW 48331 DocId: 32277210 Page 3                                                                                       TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETTESTIMONY OF HUGH TOVARMr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record.Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is Bernard Hugh Tovar.Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith, Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I have been designated by the Committee to take your deposition today. You are here voluntarily today?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. You have the right to have counsel present. Do you waive that right?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read a copy of the Committee's supporting resolution?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read Rule Number 4?Mr. Tovar. I have.Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the transcript of a deposition to be made available to a witness and actually be delivered for retention by any witness that gives the Committee a statement. However, by virtue of the arrangement that the Committee has worked out with the CIA, the Agency has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.
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The reason for that is because the transcript frequently will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for that information to be kept in our secure area here. So I would like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you will be given a right to review the transcript for accuracy, to make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional statement.Mr. Tovar. I agree.Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court reporter will provide you with a transcript and the transcript will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and true record of all the testimony that you give here today.Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that correct?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. I had given you earlier a copy of a letter dated 23 March 1978 from Mr. Carlucci to the Chairman of this Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter?Mr. Tovar. I have.Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it?Mr. Tovar. I understand it.Mr. Goldsmith. Then I think we are ready to proceed to the substance of the questioning. What is your present position with the CIA?Mr. Tovar. I am the Chief of the Counterintelligence
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Staff of the Directorate of Operations.Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working in that capacity?Mr. Tovar. Ever since a year ago April.Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the Agency?Mr. Tovar. Thirty years.Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assignement prior to becoming Chief of the CI Staff?Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I was Station Chief in Bangkok and three years before that, Chief of the Station in Laos.Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief of the CI Staff had you had extensive experience in the area of counterintelligence?Mr. Tovar. No, not particularly. We don't as a rule specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider myself a counterintelligence expert.Mr. Goldsmith. During the years 1959 to '63 what position did you occupy with the Agency?Mr. Tovar. In 1959 I was Chief of Station in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.In 1920, I came back and I was originally Deputy Chief and then Chief of the Branch in Far East Division which controls operations in the Phillipires, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia,
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TOP SECRET1 New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.2 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review CIA3 document number 1817 and the pages that follow it?4 Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these.5 They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.6 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling us that today is the first7 chance you had to read them?8 Mr. Tovar. I did not read them this time. They went to9 you, to the Committee but I have since read them.10 Mr. Goldsmith. They were prepared by whom?11 Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations. They12 were signed by him, not prepared by him. They would have been13 originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not14 sure which. I think Kowalski almost certainly.15 Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No.16 1817 was a response by the Agency to an inquiry by the17 Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for18 the Agency to debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors.19 I believe it is fair to say by way of summary that the memo20 says that it was not in fact standard operating procedure21 during the years 1959 to '63 to debrief such individuals. Is22 that correct?23 Mr. Tovar. Insofar as I understand it. My knowledge is24 limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this25 period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know whatTOP SECRET
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the current policy was then.What I have been told since by those who should know is that there was no policy as set forth here.Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the criteria were for selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed?Mr. Tovar. No. I think someone mentioned the other day that the names were incorporated in a memorandum I think originionally by the FBI but would not certify to that.Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and, for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions pertaining to that document:. I would like to request that you communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the actual direct preparation of the document so that I could spend some time with him.Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature, so I stand behind the document. I am responsible for what was said there. If it is uncorrect then I am incorrect in leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand knowledge of the research he did to arrive at the conclusion here which he presented to me and I endorsed. I am prepared to stand behind it but I will give you his name.Mr. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about the
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7document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to the USSR between 1959 and 63 and since returned to the United States. Is that correct? '58 to '63?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review the statement under the name Thomas Morridian M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you read that paragraph, I will state for the record that the way the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard operating procedure to debrief such individuals, that of 117 people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed. Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were debriefed.I have now requested Mr. Tovar to read the first summary which is right next to the name of the first person who was debriefed.Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.Mr. Goldsmith. When did that individual defect?Mr. Tovar. 1947 is the year he went to the USSR. I assume that is the year he defected, if that is the term.Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?Mr. Tovar. That is correct.Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the next individual under B, Joseph Marshall.
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8Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.Mr. Goldsmith. When did Mr. Marshall defect?Mr. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in 1897. He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921. There is no indication whence he went to the USSR.Mr. Goldsmith. There :s no indication he defected between '58 and '63?Mr. Tovar. No. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945. Conceivably he might have defected after that.Mr. Goldsmith. The letter "C", Tommaro S-G-O-V-I-O. Would you please read that section and tell us when this individual defected?Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the USSR in 1960. No way of telling.Mr. Goldsmith. This individual did not defect between '58 and '63?Mr. Tovar. At last we have no indication he did. One would assume to the contrary.Mr. Goldsmith. Letter "D", Mary Mackler, will you please read the first summary and tell us when she defected?Mr. Tovar. There is ro indication when she defected. She went to the USSR with her parents in 1931. Sometime after, married a Soviet.Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between
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9'58 and '63?Mr. Tovar. No.Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look at letter "E". Sonia and Fred A-S-I-N-I-A-N. When did they defect?Mr. Tovar. They renounced their US citizenship in 1948.So I assume that is the operative year.Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at the letter "F" now?Mr. Tovar. Jack Kuralski.Mr. Goldsmith. When did he defect?Mr. Tovar. He recounced his US citizenship in '34 and departed USSR I assume in 1934.Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is that the memo responding to the Committee's inquiry makes reference to ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and '63. Itothen proceed to provide us with ten names. But in fact, if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period. Some of them did return ducing that time period.Mr. Tovar. And were lebriefed.Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed.Mr. Tovar. Contacted.Mr. Goldsmith. Of the ten, perhaps three or four returned during the relevant time period. I asked those questions mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response given was not really --
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Mr. Tovar. -- precisely what you wanted?Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed or contacted? In some cases they hit one out of three, in other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the best correlation with your criteria that they could.Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then that the introductory sect:on should not have stated that these were people in 1958 and '63 when in fact they were not.Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement.Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state- ment.Mr. Goldsmith. Here is the letter dated April 6, 1978 which I show you just for your information to show you what the Committee was requesting from the Agency. If you will look under number two.Mr. Tovar. Then this would appear to correlate with that. You asked to indicate whether the AGency from '58 to '63 interviewed or debriefed former American defectors. So, the time they defected is not the operative consideration.Mr. Goldsmith. No, it was not.Mr. Tovar. The time of the debriefing --Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus.
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11Mr. Tovar. So these would be at least consistent with that.Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that is true. I would like also forpurposes of further clarifcation, to have you read the letterdated May 12, 1978 starting with the second full paragraph.It is not `numbered.Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your backgroundpurposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event,I would appreciate having the name of the individual whoprepared the memo passed along to the Office of the LegislativeCounsel.Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to theCommittee indicates that the CIA had no standard precedure fordebriefing returning US defectors. What was the basis for thatpolicy or actually for the absence of the policy?Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate only -- nothaving been there and not having any involvement -- I don'tknow what mentality of those in charge was at that time.Mr. Goldsmith. What would your specilation be?Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with anddebriefing, in effect the supervision of Americans in thatcategory would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rulewould not have had any basc interest or reason to be involvedunless there were a specific counterintelligence concern.
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Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Agency today have a policy of, as a matter of routine operating procedure, debriefing returning defectors?Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.Mr. Goldsmith. Again would you say you relied on the FBI to conduct those interviews?Mr. Tovar. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any coordination between the Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone in fact is returning?Mr. Tovar. On American defectors, the type you are speaking of here?Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated.Mr. Tovar. I know of no case where they would be interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of a case of returning Americans, Say we learned it from an overseas station and it seemed of interest, we would probably refer it directly to the FBI by letter.I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contactingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector?Mr. Tovar. Not that am aware of.Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be aware of such a procedure?
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13Mr. Tovar. Berween the Soviet-East European Division and CI Staff we should be aware of it. The two were most primarily concerned with the USSR. I think one or the other of us would inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The Americans, even when they have been naughty boys, having gone to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily a professional interest in that type of person.Mr. Goldsmith. What is the responsibility of the CI Staff within the CIA?Mr. Tovar. In a couple of sentences it is a little difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has two principal areas of activity. We are first of all a staff.Are you familiar with the staff as opposed to the division?.Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of DDO?Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.Mr. Tovar. You know generally how we are organized?Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.Mr. Tovar. The main set of components of the Directorate is divisions and staffs. The divisions operate a function over-seas. We are staff and that is in the military sense we support the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one another in an advisory capacity and in various ways. So, we are not an operating component. We don't run spies. We have
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TOP SECRET14a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not in the true sense of the term an operating element.So, having said that, the primary field of activity for the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other, what we refer to as operations coordination. Now, that is sort of the term which does not -- research and analysis is clear.We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not scrutinizing people. We are looking at intelligence operations, old and current, primarily things that are not terribly current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the analytic sense. We take old cases and look them over to see if mistakes were made, to see if we can derive lesssons from mistakes made in the past. We publish papers for the Agency's community at large, all in the R&A field.On the other side we function in the sense of a true staff. We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas. We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being spooky but we simply read the correspondence. We are given normal distribution of most: correspondence coming back from overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence activities abroad.To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency on operational activity across the board. So, we are generally aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a positionNW 48331 DocId: 32277210 Page 16 TOP SECRET
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15to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance, the kind of activity conducted, the quality, the proper or improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf of DDO.Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?Mr. Tovar. Yes, totally.Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with counterintelligence threats: domestically?Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the responsibility of the Bureau?Mr. Tovar. Absolutely.Mr. Goldsmith. Now, Lee Harvey Oswald returned from the Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Sovietion Union he worked as a worker in a radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there was someone concerned about his being a counterintelligence threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you leading questions but would it be fair to say that would be more the responsibility of the Bureau rather than the Agency upon his actual return?Mr. Tovar. Yes, the question whether or not he was, let us say, a counterintelligence threat.Mr. Goldsmith. KGB agent?Mr. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question
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16about that.Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet Union to the United States?Mr. Tovar. You are speaking of what the Agency might have done in '63 or '62?Mr. Goldsmith. '62.Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the intelligence of the men who were in charge then. Today I would like to think we would be interested in what he is doing. At the time I don't know. I would think, why not. On the other hand, I couldn't say they would or should be interested. It was not their primary precise prerogative. I think if they could, as I assume they did, the Bureau would discharge its responsibilities vis-a-vis any American of questionable propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the Bureau.Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the aspect of Oswald where there was a concern taht he posed a counterintelligence threat. What about the fact that Oswald may have had positive intelli- gence information that would have been helpful to the Agency?That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau?Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been appropriate for the Agency, if the assumed the point you made, to seek an interview with him. I think the appropriate
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17vehicle for that would have been the Domestic Contact Division which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this memorandum.Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic Contact Division?Mr. Tovar. They are responsible for intelligence that can be checked properly and legally in the United States normally through American businessmen or American persons and nonofficials who travel abroad and acquire intelligence of interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any other country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and debrief on a vluntary basis, if they so choose to respond, Americans who return from overseas.Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors was routed to your staff, CI Staff. When the memo was prepared by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought of representing the entire agency or just the CI Staff?Mr. Tovar. It is difficult for us to presume to speak for the entire Agency. I think on this matter we are speaking for the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which I was concerned anyway, Directorate of Operations.Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing, which might be construed as having an interest in this type