Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10131-10329.pdf — page 7]
SECRET 1-7I have done a modicum of what we call protection andwelfare work. This would usually involve being again on theroad, stopping in, for example, in a prison to see if therewas an American citizen there, to find out what the storywas, why he was there, how he was being treated and that sortof thing, and relay that information to the consular when Igot back.Actually, I have not done much consular work. I usedthe cover on several occasions, but was never emersed intothe role to the point where it interfered with my Agencyactivity.Mr. Goldsmith. Normally when somebody is acting underState Department cover, is the person required to hold downtwo jobs at the same time?Mr. Shaw.. It depends on the location of the person.As I understand it, people we have, for example, in the IronCurtain countries, or the countries of Eastern Europe, dohold down virtually 100 percent full-time State Department,Foreign Service jobs. Some of the people that I have run intoin my work as an Inspector for the Office of the InspectorGeneral, notably in the Mid-Eastern countries, have spent muchmore time on their cover work than I did.I think that it has to do basically with the permissive-ness, or lack thereof, of the operational environment thatyou are in. In Mexico, it was not necessary to spend much
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# SECRET1-8time, at least not for me, on cover duties.Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working for the Office of the Inspector General?Mr. Shaw. Since August of 1976.Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility in the writing of the 1977 Inspector General Report pertaining to the CIA's handling of the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?Mr. Shaw. None whatever.Mr. Goldsmith. Has anyone ever interviewed you before pertaining to the Mexico City situation as far as it pertained to Oswald?Mr. Shaw. Yes. It was about that time of '76, somebody interviewed me in the CIA Headquarters building, and I think it was a Senate Committee, but I amanot sure. They had some files.Mr. Goldsmith. Did you give your testimony under oath at that time?Mr. Shaw. No, not that I remember.Mr. Goldsmith. Did any CIA person ever interview you concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City and the operations of the Mexico City station?Mr. Shaw. I would have to qualify that. We discussed the subject, of course, in Mexico City at the time of the assassination, or immediately after the assassination.# SECRET
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SECRET1-9But I cannot recall that I was ever called in anywhere and asked for my account of what transpired after the assassination.Mr. Goldsmith. Headquarters never asked you to come in and give a description, for example, of Oswald's activities, to your knowledge, in Mexico City in 1963?Mr. Shaw. No. I would not have known anything about Oswald's activities anyway.Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the photograph that was taken in 1963 that was reportedly linked to Oswald and which subsequently turned out not to be a picture of Oswald?Mr. Shaw. I am familiar with a photograph that was identified by people at the station in Mexico City as possibly being an American-appearing person. I do not know that it was every considered to be Oswald.I think, if I remember correctly, what they were doing --Mr. Goldsmith. We will get into that. My question is, did anybody from Headquarters ever ask you about that particular photograph or the circumstances surrounding it?Mr. Shaw. Negative.Mr. Goldsmith. Did anybody from Headquarters ever ask you to give a statement or report as to the manner in which the surveillance operation in Mexico City were underatken in 1963?SECRET
[180-10131-10329.pdf — page 10]
SECRET 1-10Mr. Shaw. No.Mr. Goldsmith. Where were you serving in 1963?Mr. Shaw. From about the middle of April, I was serving in Mexico City in our station.Mr. Goldsmith. How long did you stay in Mexico City?Mr. Shaw. I stayed there until September of 1966.Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Station Chief in Mexico City?Mr. Shaw. Winston Scott.Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us your assessment of his competence?Mr. Shaw. Competence. It is difficult, because I was not looking from on high. He was a brilliant man. He was reputed to have a doctorate in mathematics. He had an uncanny ability to remember numbers and he carried in his head the file numbers of what we called P-files in Mexico City. P stood, I think, for personality. A P number usually was four digits or so, maybe five digits.And he carried all these numbers in his head and he could mark something for such and such a file in black ink -- he always wrote in black ink -- putting the number down. He had a very good memory for numbers.Winn and I were friendly. We were not close. We were not on the same level at all.I considered him to be, from my standpoint, a competent,
[180-10131-10329.pdf — page 11]
SECRET 1-11effective, Chief of Station.Mr. Goldsmith. What type of file-keeping system did he have in effect, without asking you to describe it in detail?By that, my question is directed towards his thoroughness and comprehensiveness.Mr. Shaw. I would say that he probably had one of the most -- let me see -- complete file systems in being in the Agency. I think that he, my personal opinion is that he went overboard, and we had so much stuff back in our files, it was hard to believe the amount of paper we had in there.His tendency was not to rely on cross-indexing. If you have a document, this piece of paper means something to you and you want to keep it and it has 15 names on it, he was quite capable of setting up 15 files for the same piece of paper. And we had a tremendous file room.I often wondered if we needed that much paper. It was very thorough. I am not a technician as far as managing files, but I do know that the people who worked in the file room were kept very, very busy.Mr. Goldsmith. Who were Mr. Scott's chief deputies?Let me rephrase the question. Upon which individuals did he tend to rely the most?Mr. Shaw. He had one Deputy who was Allen White. As far as reliance on other people, I would say he relied very heavily on Annie Goodpasture -- not in any way in a command
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1-12function, but as a Girl Friday.He also seemed to think rather highly of a former one-timeFBI agent named George Monroe.Mr. Goldsmith. What about David Phillips?Mr. Shaw. Yes. Dave Phillips ran the, what we called theCA side of the shop, covert action, mostly propaganda. I cameto Mexico City with the understanding that I was going to headup the Cuban shop. Very soon after I arrived there, DavePhillips was tapped -- it was while we were still in the oldEmbassy building.He was tapped and named the new Cuban Office Chief.Mr. Goldsmith. Did that happen in October '63?Mr. Shaw. I don't know. I do not remember. But it wasnot too long after I was there, and I was asked, I think byDave; I don't remember -- if I had any objections to continuingto serve in Cuba.I liked Dave, I respected him. I did not feel that Iwas being hurt, hurt careerwise, to step back and I was veryinterested in Cuban operations, so I did willingly, let us say,relinquish command, if you want to, of Cuban Ops and I servedDave as one more officer.Later on, after Dave left, a year or two later, I onceagain took over the Cuban Ops group.Mr. Goldsmith. You were in charge of Cuban Operations atthe beginning. Then Phillips took it over at some point and
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then, after Phillips left, you went back to that position?Mr Shaw. That is right.Mr. Goldsmith. Our review of Agency records indicates that Phillips would have assumed that position on October of '63. Would that be consistent with your recollection?Mr. Shaw. My recollection would have been, had you not told me this based on your review of the files, that it took place earlier than October, but I do not know. I really do not know.Mr. Goldsmith. My questions are going to be confined, unless I indicate to the contrary, to the period up to the end of 1963. So, from the time of your arrival in Mexico City until the end of 1963, prior to the time that Mr. Phillips assumed the position of Cuban operations --Mr. Shaw. Chief.Mr. Goldsmith. Chief would be the word, and you had those responsibilities, what did those responsibilities include?Mr. Shaw. Since it was not ratified to me upon my arrival that I was, indeed, Chief of Cuban Ops, I simply considered myself to be one more case officer working against the Cuban target. Our basic interest was in effecting penetrations of the Cuban government.What we wanted most of all were effective penetrations of the Cuban Embassy, the Cuban Intelligence Service, and some possible line-in to their communications set-up.
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1-14Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963, did you manage to place any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy or consulate?Mr. Shaw. Did I?Mr. Goldsmith. Did the station?Mr. Shaw. There were two. I did not place either one, and I think they both pre-dated 1963.Mr. Goldsmith. Were those two penetration agents within the Cuban consulate or Embassy at the time of the President's assassination?Mr. Shaw. Yes. One was in the consulate -- LITAMIL-7 was the cryptonym. L-I-T-A-M-I-L-7. And the other one was in the Embassy -- L-I-T-A-M-I-L-9.Mr. Goldsmith. What information did these people give you after the assassination pertaining to the possible involvement of the Cuban government?Mr. Shaw. I did not handle LITAMIL-7, and LITAMIL-9. I did handle,Mr. Goldsmith. Who handled LITAMIL-7?Mr. Shaw. I think that it was Ray Swider, but I am not sure. I did not meet LITAMIL-7 until Ray Swider left the country.Mr. Goldsmith. You nevertheless have had access to the information that this individual gave to Swider?Mr. Shaw. I would normally have seen copies of contact reports which were reports that we wrote --any of us who were
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1-15case officers wrote -- after station meetings, and it would have been normal for me, for example, to see any information of consequence that LITAMIL-7 produced, just like it would have been normal for any other case officer in the Cuban section to see my contact reports on meetings with LITAMIL-9.Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, do you know what information LITAMIL-7/gave concerning the Cuban government's reaction to the death of the President?Mr. Shaw. I do not recall, and I do not recall the specifics of anything. You may have something in your files with my name on it; I do not know what LITAMIL-9 produced. I do have the recollection of the sense of feeling on the part of those people that there was no exultation or jubilation or happiness whatsoever inside the Cuban Embassy at the assassination of President Kennedy.Mr. Goldsmith. Did the penetration agents ever indicate that Oswald had been to the Embassy and had stated that he was going to attempt to kill the President?Mr. Shaw. No, not that I know of.Mr. Goldsmith. Did any of those agents ever indicate that Oswald had had contact with the Agency -- with the Embassy, rather?Mr. Shaw. I whould imagine that LITAMIL-7 probably did -- I do not recall it. But since she was in the consulate, and -since it was my understanding that Oswald's contact with the
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1-16consular field rather than with the Embassy field, I should imagine, given the discussions that undoubtedly took place in the Cuban Embassy after this assassination, that she probably spoke about it. I do not know.Mr. Goldsmith. What was the name of LITAMIL-7?Mr. Shaw. I'd rather not give names.(Discussion off the record.)Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, in light of your response, I am certainly aware of the sensitivity of this issue and of your concern for sources and methods, and I would also make two points. One is that under the letter, you are free of your secrecy obligation. At the same time, I am not about to rely upon that letter to compel an answer out of you, because you are here voluntarily today to help us. And, as I said, because I understand your concern for a sensitive source in this case, I am not going to ask you to state for the record the name of either one of these individuals.Mr. Shaw. May I say something at this point?Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.Mr. Shaw. It is my understanding that both of these people are, if they are still alive, are living in Mexico and I do not want to be in a position of revealing a name which could harm either of those people. I notice here that it says --Mr. Goldsmith. You are referring now to the letter fromMr. Carlucci?
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SECRET 1-17Mr. Shaw. Yes."To provide the affected person the opportunity to receive guidance from me or my designees on the applicability of this authorization, particularly to questions which are asked."I would like to get Frank Carlucci to tell me that I would reveal two names of agents, if it is necessary -- or you can find out from the file, probably, who they are.Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, I understand your position.I want to make sure you understand mine. I am in no way forcing you to reveal a name. Once you had demonstrated a reluctance to, then, as far as I was concerned, then the matter was terminated.Mr. Shaw. No problem?Mr. Goldsmith. I will say that we will pursue this by contacting the appropriate people at the Agency.Mr. Shaw. I think if you requested the Agency for those two names, it would probably produce them. I wouldn't want to be the guy to say it.Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your position perfectly. I hope you understand mine.Mr. Shaw. I do.Mr. Goldsmith. I would not want you to go back to the Agency and say that the staff of this Committee attempted to compel an answer out of you.
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1-18Mr. Shaw. I will not say any such thing.Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.For the record, would you spell the cryptonyms of these penetration agents?Mr. Shaw. One of them was LITAMIL-7 -- L-I-T-A-M-I-L - 7. The other was LITAMIL-9.Mr. Goldsmith. Are these two agents still active?Mr. Shaw. Neither one is active. I am quite sure that neither one is active.Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, LITAMIL-7, was that agent working out of the consulate?Mr. Shaw. That agent was an employee of the consular section of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. LITAMIL-9 was an officer of the Embassy.Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, on the question of the identity of these two agents, when you go back to the Agency, could you raise this question with the appropriate individual, appropriate superior authority, and we will do the same so that some time this week we can get together on that?Mr. Shaw. I do not see any reason for us to get together.You can get it from them, I am sure. It is just that I have a rather strong feeling about protecting anybody who has cooperated with us.It is not that I consider you do not have a right to that information, if you feel that you need it. It is just that I
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SECRET1-19cannot bring myself to reveal the true name of an agent unlessI am required to do so.Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that concern. I certainly respect it.(Pause)I have been informed by my researcher, Dan Hardway, that the Agency is in the process of looking into this issue.Mr. Shaw. Okay.Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would like to get into the area of the telephone taps that were in operation in 1963 against the Cuban Embassy and consulate. My first question is, what responsibility, if any, did you have with regard to the telephone tap operation?Mr. Shaw. No responsibility. I saw the product, usually.Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the individual who was in charge of that tap?Mr. Shaw. I do not know whose responsibility it was. I rather suspect that it may have been Ann Goodpasture's, but I do not know for sure. I do not remember.There were two telephone operations, two tap operations. One of them was unilateral and one of them was joint with the Mexican government.Mr. Goldsmith. Which one was the unilateral one? By that, I mean which phones were covered by the unilateral one?
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1-20Mr. Shaw. There was a mix, and I cannot recall which were which. It may well have been that we were tapping some Cuban Embassy phones unilaterally, and some of them were being tapped jointly. I know that there was coverage on the joint tap operation, which I believe was called LIENVOY. I am not sure.Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct.You indicated that you think Ann Goodpasture may have been responsible for the telephone tap operation against the Cuban operation. What basis do you have for that?Mr. Shaw. Responsible in the sense of picking up the take.I am not sure of that, because I know she did some of that kind of work. I am not sure who did it. We used to get copies of the transcripts and I remember -- I am sure I saw some of the Cuban stuff on joint taps. And then, of course, taps that were run by the Mexican government.Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the transcripts that came in as a matter of regular routine?Mr. Shaw. Yes.Mr. Goldsmith. Did you read all of them?Mr. Shaw. No.Mr. Goldsmith. Which ones would you read?Mr. Shaw. I would have been interested primarily in the Cuban ones, and what they called the resuma -- it was sort of a Spanish word for resume -- the resuma was a distillation, if you will, of the digest of the joint tap that was prepared,
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SECRET 1-21I believe, for the Mexican President. You look at the resuma, which may be two pages, and you may have the gist of what might be a whole bunch of pages of tap.Mr. Goldsmith. Normally, you read transcripts of conver- sations that took place on telephones of the Cuban Embassy, is that correct?Mr. Shaw. Normally, I read some of that stuff. I do not remember whether I saw it all or not, because quite a bit of it was processed by other people. I do not know who they were, people on the outside, I suppose. And I read summaries of what appeared on these things, but I remember also, at times, seeing the verbatim -- Man Outside says so and so; Person Inside, Woman Inside, says such and such.Mr. Goldsmith. Sometimes you would get summary trans- criptions of the summary conversations or English and sometimes you would get verbatim translations, is that correct?Mr. Shaw. Yes. I would see them, I would not get them. They would go past me. I would see them.Mr. Goldsmith. Was it more likely that what you would see in verbatim form, conversations that took place, for example, in Russian and had to be translated before you received them?Mr. Shaw. I certainly would not see any conversations in Russian, because the Cuban Embassy did not have any Russian conversations. I cannot really answer that question. I am not really sure I fully understand it. I do remember seeing
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SECRET 1-22a variety of take, what we call take, from the various tap operations. This take sometimes was processed into English.The stuff that appeared in the resuma was in Spanish. Sometimes the conversations were typed out in Spanish and translated into English. I prefer them in Spanish, because I am at home in Spanish.Mr. Goldsmith. How many people reviewed the take from the surveillance operation of the Cuban Embassy and consular telephones?Mr. Shaw. I have no idea. I assume there were quite a few. The stuff was widely passed around.Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, how many people would review them?Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.Mr. Goldsmith. How many people were in Cuban operations?Mr. Shaw. I would guess five or six.Mr. Goldsmith. Who were they?Mr. Shaw. Dave Phillips.Mr. Goldsmith. We are talking now about the period 1963?Mr. Shaw. That is right. Dave Phillips, myself, Ray Swider. I am trying to think of the girl's name. We had various secretaries in there. I do not know who was the secretary in '63. Peggy Magert. I'm not sure she was there at that time.Of course, Allen White would see it. Winn Scott would see
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it.Mr. Goldsmith. They would not review every transcript or summary that came in, would then? Allen White or Winn Scott?Mr. Shaw. I imagine Winn Scott; I do not know about Allen White. Winn was pretty much, he tended to review almost all of the paper that came in and out of the station.Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that there was no routine procedure established for who was to review the take from the Cuban telephone surveillance operations?Mr. Shaw. I am saying that, when I got there, the case officers in Cuban Ops saw this stuff that was routed around through the station and that persisted during the time that I was there.Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure that the answer --Mr. Shaw. How that was routed, I am not sure.Mr. Goldsmith. Did you customarily see every conversation that came in?Mr. Shaw. I doubt it. I doubt it.Mr. Goldsmith. Who would have seen the conversation and decided that it was not important enough to merit your attention?Mr. Shaw. I do not know.Mr. Goldsmith. Who brought in the take from these operations to the station?Mr. Shaw. I do not know that either, but it was my
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understanding that non-official cover people on the outside picked up the tapes -- don't consider this gospel, but this is my understanding -- picked up tapes from the various listening posts, some of which had been processed by people in the listening post; some of which had not. But they, in turn, either processed those tapes or took them to people to continue the processing in case they had a foreign language in them, or something, and then turn them over to the station.Somebody went out from the station, probably with a little attache case or something, and picked up takes again. It is my understanding that the person primarily involved in that was Ann Goodpasture, but I do not know for sure.Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the first person that the transcripts would go to upon their arrival at the Embassy?Mr. Shaw. I rather suspect Winn Scott, because I remember great numbers of those white pages that came across our desk, had P numbers written on them in black ink by Winn Scott.Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many lines were being tapped at the Cuban consulate and Embassy?Mr. Shaw. I do not know.Mr. Goldsmith. You reviewed the transcripts and summaries of these conversations for two years and you have no idea how many lines were tapped?Mr. Shaw. No. This was fifteen years ago. I can give you a guess.
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SECRET 1-25Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. A best guess would be helpful.Mr. Shaw. I would guess three or four lines. The primary interest was in the Soviets. You had far more converage.That is a guess.Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.Mr. Shaw. I would guess, off-hand, two lines in the Embassy, one line in the consulate.Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if the Cuban consul's telephone was tapped?Mr. Shaw. If the consulate line was tapped --Mr. Goldsmith. It would have been his?Mr. Shaw. Probably it would have been his, but they may have had a direct line in there. I do not know.Mr. Goldsmith. How would a telephone tap actually work?I am talking now about the actual mechanics of the tap.Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I never had anything do do with them. I know they used to take some of their taps at what they call the junction boxes. These would be the boxes out in the street where lines came in to be fed into this central -- I would rather suspect that the joint operations were mostly done at the central, since the Mexican government simply could have issued orders, you will tap such and such a phone.Mr. Goldsmith. My question is oriented towards the following. Once a tap has been placed on a line, would that.SECRET