Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Classification(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 43 -626/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/1/78, pp. 12, 13.627/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 28.628/ See discussion above.629/ See footnote 614 above.630/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 96.631/ HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 29; HSCA De- position of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 20; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 63; David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17-23; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.632/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, pp. 76-77.633/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.634/ See Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 94-95, 77.635/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 28.636/ H. Manell and B. Manell Interview, 3/28/78, pp.14-15; HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 88-89, 84-86; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 38-39, 46.637/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. Emphasis added.638/ Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.639/ MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.640/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 96.641/ H. Manell and B. Manell Interview, 3/18/78, p. 14-45; HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 33-34; HSCA De- position of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 38-39, 46; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. See also Sec- tion III, B., above.Classification:Classified by derivation:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-- 44 --642/ Memorandum for the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, re: Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy, 10/16/63. *Emphasis added.*643/ Manell Interview, 3/28/78, p. 17644/ *Ibid.*, p. 18.645/ There are some cryptic references to the CIA Station trying to determine Oswald's whereabouts after receiving the 10/11 cable. (See Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 113.) The procedures used in this attempt and the actions that may have been taken have not been determined. If any records exist of these efforts they have not been made available to this Committee.646/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 43.647/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 61-62.648/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 29-30.649/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 44-47.650/ HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, pp. 62, 69.651/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, p. 36.652/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 111-114.653/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 75-76; See also *Ibid.*, p. 81.654/ See discussion above.655/ Phillips Interview, 8/30/78, p 5.656/ Foul Foe manuscript, pp. 268-259. *Emphasis added.*657/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 63-64.658/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 64-65.659/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 96.Classification:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled (locuments.)- 45 -659-A/See preceding section.659-B/ Ibid.659-C/ MEXI 7014, 11/22/63, para. 3.659-D/ MEXI 7203, 11/23/63, para. 3.660/ HSCA Depositin of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 53.661/ JFK Classified Document, #131.662/ Ibid.663/ ΜΕΧΙ 7029, 11/23/63, para. 1.664/ Clasified HSCA Staff Summary, 3/15/78, p. 11.665/ See Section III, B, 2, above.666/ ΜΕΧΙ 7014, 11/22/63, para. 2.667/ DIR 84802, 11/22/63; para. 1. The sequence of the cables can be determined in that they were numbered sequentially as they were sent. In this regard it should be noted that this system can indicate the order in which he cables were sent but rot the order in which they were written because, at least in Mexico, several of the Station officers were drafting and sending cables. Hence, the order of writing them may not be the same as the order in which they were sent.668/ ΜΕΧΙ 7014; see preceding paragraph.669/ DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 1.670/ Ibid., para. 2671/ Ibid., para. 3.672/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 37.Classification:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 46 -673/ David A. Phillips interview, 8/24/78, p. 16; Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 45, 87.674/ DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 2.675/ MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.676/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 6.677/ MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.678/ MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.679/ HSCA staff have wondered whether or not the Mexico City Station was entirely forthcoming of their own will with Headquarters. This speculation was based on three pieces of information. The first is the report in MEXI 7024 that Headquarters had all the available information. The second is a note from Win Scott on the Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033 which says:I had a call from Washington ( John Scelso) at 1620 hours on 23/XI. I told John Scelso at 1630 hours (our time) on 23/XI that this would be on route to him.The third is a cable reporting that on the 23rd Win Scott had an urgent call to see the President of Mexico. The cable reports that Scott expected the President to express his condolences over the assassination but "developed that (Mexican agent) had located call to Soviet Embassy of Lee Oswald made on 28 September. Believe fact that (President of Mexico) aware of this contact (from our joint operation) and passed data to COS is important." (MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, paras. 2 and 3)The Committee declines to speculate that the Mexico City Station was possibly considering not reporting all the information available to them. It was considered that this may have been contemplated in order to protect themselves from a charge about their failure to report the information prior to the assassination.Classification:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 47 -The discovery that the Mexicans were also aware of the conversations would have made holding back the transcripts perilous in that the Mexicans.could have revealed their existence to the detriment of the Station. Hence, the full report followed very shortly after the meeting between the Mexican President and Win Scott, and immediately after Scott discussed the situation with his nominal superior in Washington by telephone. Scott's superior was asked about this. He said that he did not remember the substance of his telephone call to Win Scott on the 23rd. (HSCA Deposition of John Scelsc, 5/16/78, p. 88) "I do not have any idea why (I called). I may have been ordered to call him on ary number of things." (Ibid., p. 87.) He was also asked about Scott's meeting with the Mexican Presidert.You get a psychological question. The Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of Mexico. There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador got there--no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculiar situation in Mexico whereby the Mexicar. President's primary contact with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused 10 great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.Q: Thomas Mann?A: Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, Mr. Freeman, tried to cut Win Scott out of contact with the President of Mexico, whereupon the President of Mexico called in Win Scot: and said, "I want you to send a cable to the White House telling them I am not going to deal with this jackass, I want to deal only with you."So, the result was eventually, Winston Scott and Ambassador Freeman went to the White House and talked to President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in favor of Winston Scott.Classification:NW 48327 DocId:32263889 Page 244
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)- 48 -So, Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that the President of Mexico is aware of our telephone operation.Q: He should have been since it was a liaison operation.A: Yes. But you do not always know whether he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. It is jus significant that the person calls you in and says, here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.(HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 83-84.)Win Scott indicated that he was going to write a memorandum concerning his meeting with the President of Mexico. (Routing and Record Shhet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.) If Mr. Scott wrote such a memo, it has not been made available to the HSCA. David Phillips, who after serving in Mexico, went on to accumulate quite an impressive record as a Chief of Station in several countries himself, told Committee investigators that a memorandum of this sort, along with other "sensitive" information would be the type of thing that Win Scott probably kept in his private safe. (David A. Phillips Interview, 8/24/78, p. 10.) Mr. Phillips added that he did not know what happened to Mr. Scott's safe after he died but he had heard vague stories about someone finding a lot of documents that Scott had kept. (Ibid.)680/ MEXI 7054- 11/24/63, para. 3.681/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 3.682/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 3.683/ MEXI 7023, 11/26/63, para. 2.684/ See Section II, C, 4, above.685/ For example, MEXI 7023 reports that a voice comparison was not done while MEXI 7025 implies that one was doneClassification:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 49 -and a year later Ann Goodpasture noted on a newspaper article that such a comparison was done. Note also that MEXI 7024 reported that HQ had all the available information when in fact all conversations were reported in a later cable, MEXI 7033.685/ See SectionIII, A, 1, above.686/ See Section III, A, 1, above.687/ See Section III, A, 1, above.688/ See Section III, A, l, above.689/ Note to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 444; Cable re Oswald-Duran, MEXI 7029, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 441; Raymond Rocca Chronology. WX 7241, Entry 36, November 23, 1963, CIA NC. 635.690/ Ibid.691/ See below, p.692/ Note written by Winston Scott re phone call with John Scelso, November 23, 1963; Chronology prepared by Raymond Rocca, WX7241, entry 37, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.693/ Ibid.694/ Ibid.695/ Chief of Station phone call to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 440; Flash Cable from Karamessines to Mexico City Station, November 23, 1963, DIR 84916, CIA No. 4033 Chronology of Raymond Rocca, entry 46, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 636.696/ Blind Memo re Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Duran, November 26, 1963, CIA #473..697/ Ibid.698/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7101, CIA #493.Classification:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)C. Silvia DuranTOP SECRETWhen President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the United States investigative agencies--FBI, CIA, Secret Service, etc.--were asked to investigate the assassination. When the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station remembered that Lee Harvey Oswald had visited Mexico City during late September and early October, it reviewed the electronic surveillance files and found eviderce of phone calls to the Soviet Embassy made September 27th, September 28th, and October 1st, that could have been made by Oswald. 685/Review of the electroic surveillance files also produced telephone calls on September 27, 1963 between the Russian Consul and Silvia Duran, a secretary at the Cuban Consulate, where Oswald was discussed. 686/ In addition, the Mexico City Station fourd a September 28, 1963 phone call from Silvia Duran to the Soviet Consulate where Silvia Duran stated that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. 587/ A final phone call was made on October 1, 1963 where the alleged" Oswald identified himself was also found. 663/On November 23, 1963 the Mexico City Station deter-Classification: TOP SEGRET
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 135 -TOP SECRETmined that it would request the Mexican government-- with whom it had a good relationship--to arrest Silvia Duran (as Silvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, she did not have diplomatic immunity) because she might shed some light on the circumstances surrounding the assassination. 688a/The Mexico City Station sent a note to the Gobernacion head, Luis Echevarria, with Silvia Duran's address, her mother's address, her brother's address, her license plate number, her home phone number, her place of work and a request that she be arrested immediately. 689/ The Mexico City Station also suggested that Duran he held incommunicado until she could be questioned on the matter..690/The Mexico City Station did not receive prior authorization from CIA Headquarters to request the arrest of Silvia Duran by Mexican authorities. 691/ Headquarters feared that a request to armest Ms. Duran would jeopardize the clandestine relationship between certain Mexican government officials and the CIA if it were disclosed that Americans were behind Duran's arrest. 672/ John Scelso, Chief of Western Hemisphere/3, stationed at Langley Headquarters, telephoned Winston Scott, the Mexico City Chief of Station, and requested that Stivia Duran not be arrested. 693/ Scott told Scelso that he could not rescind the request, and that Headquarters should already have paceived a can a stating that Silvia Duran hadClassification:2000902TOP SECRETClassitied by derivation:-352NW 48327 DocId:32263889 Page 248
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 186 -TOP SECRETbeen arrested. 694/ After Winston Scott's conversation with John Scelso, Scott called Luis Echevarria and stated that the Mexico City Station desired that all information received from Duran be forwarded immediately to the Mexico City Station, and that her arrest and statements not be communicated to any leftist groups. 695/On November 27, 1963, the Mexican government forwarded to the Mexico City Station a copy of Silvia Duran's ten-page signed statement. 596/ It said,"Upon learning about the assassination she and her husband speculated that President Kennedy might have been assassinated for racial reasons. When she became aware that the assassin was Lee Harvey Oswald, she ascertained that it was the same man who approximately two montas prior had been to the Cuban Consulate to solicit an intransit visa to Russia. Having taken his name from the special documentation he presented she knew that he was married to a Russian woman and belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." She checked the data in the Consulate archives and became certain that it was the same individual who was blonde, short, dressed unelegantly and whose face turned red when angry. The Consul had denied the visa because to obtain an intransit visa from the Cuban government, it was imperative that he previously obtain a visa from the Soviet Consulate. Since obtaining a visa from the Soviets took four months and Oswald's Mexican visa expired soon Oswald was advised that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office. The Soviet official told her that they would have to consuit Moscow which would take four morths. That afternoon, Oswald returned to theClassification:Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page. 249
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 18 " -Cuban Consulate and Silvia Duran confirmed that he could get a Cuban visa only after he received a Russian visa. She gave Oswald her name and business phone number but never gave him her address because she had no reason to give it to him. The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul and calling the person in charge of that office. She knew that phoning the Soviet Consulate was not one of her duties and that if she did so she did it only to help Oswald. She gave Oswald her business phone number only because he would have to call subsequently to check whether he had obtained a visa. He never called back."Silvia Duran, released on November 24, 1963, was rearrested November 27, 1963, when the Mexican government alleged that she was attempting to leave Mexico for travel to Havana. 698/According to the Mexican officials who detained Duran a second time, there was no addition to her story. 699/The Mexico City Station forwarded Duran's ten-page signed statement to Headquarters on November 27, 1963. 700/ The following day, Headquarters sent a clarification cable to the Mexico City Station seeking to insure that neither Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The cable stated, "We want the Mexican author ties to take the responsibility for the whole affair." 701/When the Central Intelligence Agency began to work with the Warren Commission, Headquarters cabled the MexicoClassification:Classified by derivation:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 188 -TOP SECRETCity Station that its plan in passing information to the Warren Commission was to eliminate mention of telephone taps in order to protect their continuing operations. 702/Headquarters cabled that it would rely on Silvia Duran's statements and on the Consular files which the Soviets gave the State Department. 703/ Headquarters stressed that exact, detailed information from LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9--penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy--on-what Silvia Duran and other officials had said about Oswald's visit and his dealings would be valuable and usable corroborative evidence. 704/When the Central Intelligence Agency forwarded to the Warren Commission a copy of Duran's signed statement.It read as follows:...she remembered...(that Lee Harvey Oswald) was the name of an American who had come to the Cuban Consulate to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in transit to Russia, the latter part of September or the early part of October of this year, and in support of his application had shown his passport, in which it was noted that he had lived ir that country for a period of three years; his labor card from the same country written in the Russian language; and letters in that same language. He had presented evidence that he was married to a Russian woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of an organization in the city of New Orleans claiming that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolutior. Accordingly, the declarant, complying with her cuties, took down all of theClassification:Classified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 251
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 189 -TOP SECRETinformation and completed the appropriate application form; ard the declarant, admittedly exceeding ter responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate, with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuarce of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswalc. However, they told her that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case, which annoyed the applicart since, according to his statement, he was in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to do so in view of his background and his loyalty and his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The declarant was unable to re- call accurately whether or not the applicant told her he was a member of the Communist Party, but he did say that his wife***was then in New York City, and would follow him,*** (Senora Duran stated) that when Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his first having obtained the Russian visa,*** he became very excited or angry, and accordingly, the affiant called Consul Ascue (sic),*** (who) came out and began a heated disucssion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Ascue telling him that "if it were up to him, he would not give him the visa," and "a person of his type was harning the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it," it being understood that in their conversation they were talking about the Russian Sccialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for requesting that his visa be issued promptly, and they were: one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia as quickly as possitle. Depsite her annoyance, the decalarant gave Oswald a paper*** in which she put down her name, "Silvia Duran," and the number of the telephone at the Consulate, which is "11-28-47" and the visa applicationClassification:Classified by derivation:
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Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 190 -![TOP SECRET stamp]was processed anyway It was sent to the Ministry of (Foreign Relations of Cuba; from which a routine reply was received some fifteen to thirty days later, approving the visa, but on the condition that the Russian visa be obtained first, although she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him. 705/The Central Intelligence Agency had relied on Duran's statements but had deleted Juran's description of Oswald as blonde and short. 706/ It had also excised Duran's statement--"The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office" which alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid at the Cuban Consulate. 707/ In addition, Ms. Duran's strong statement "He never called her back" 707a/ was changed to "she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she have him.707b/ Had the statements been included, the Warren Commission's conclusions would not have seemed as strong.The Warren Commission staff was not completely satisfied with Ms. Duran's ten page signed statement obtained by the Mexican authorities. 4. David Slawson wrote:We then discussed...the problem of (interviewing) Silvia Duran. We pointed out that our only interest ir witnesses (in Mexico) other than Duran was to get their formal testimony for authentication purposes...This was not true of Duran, towever, because she had been interviewed only by the Mexican police![2000307]![337]Classification![TOP SECRET stamp]NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 253