Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 121]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)- 110 -six samples when reviewed by the HSCA did not include a photograph of Oswald. 461/Ms. Scaletti was asked about the allegations, how- ever, her memory of 22 November 1963 is not good:.Q: When was the next time after you sent a cable to Mexico City Station and you teletyped thoese other agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?A: I don't remember. The only thing I can say is that based on what is in the file that I must have heard about it when the Station came in and asked--well, if there was nothing else in the file the name popped up again, I just don't remember about the assassination or whenever.Q: Would the testimony be that to the best of your recollection the next time you heard the name was when you heard about the assassination?A: Probably.Q: At that time did the name Oswald ring a bell? Did you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?A: I just don't krow. When he was assassinated, I don't even remember how long it was before they got the name of Oswald.Q: Oswald was picked up within two hours after the assassination and the name was made public.A: Immediately?Q: Yes.A: If I were in the office unless I had the radio on--we didn't have a radio in the office neces-Classification: ![TOP SECRET]Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 122]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-- 111 --sarily--I would not have heard the name Oswald until the next day probably. I would assume this was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in. I am sure the first thing they would have done is make a name trace when they came up with that name and they would come up with a 201 file all over again.Q: Do you recall where you were on Friday, November 22, 1963?A: The only thing I remember about it is going home and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV and talking about it. I probably was at the office but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I must have been at the office.Q: Do you remember bringing John Scelso the Oswald file on that day?A: I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I probably did. It would have been natural for me to if I did. I just don't know.Q: Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald at CIA Headquarters?A: I don't remember ever finding an Oswald photograph.Q: Right around the time of the assassination?A: I don't remember it.Q: Did you find a photograph of someone whom you thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?A: I don't remember that either.Q: Do you know Philip Agee?A: Yes.Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 123]
Classification: `TOP SECRET`(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 112 -Q: Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone you thought to be Oswald?A: I did not know Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico City and Phil I only saw when I was in Mexico, and we ford with him at Headquarters. I would have no reason to say that.Q: So your answer to the question is no?A: I don't recall it and I don't see that I would have any reason.Q: I guess for the purpose of clarification I would like to ask the question one more time. Did you ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you thought to be Oswald?A: Not that I can recall. 462/At the time of the assassination the CIA's 201 personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald was in the possession of the Mexico City Desk. 463/ That desk had had possession of the file from 10 October 1963 when it had received a report that a man claiming to be Lee Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. 464/Fortunately, Ms. Scaleti's supervisor had a better memory of the events that transpired at CIA Headquarters on the day that President Kennedy was assassinated. He said:A: ...I do not know how long after the actual shooting it was that Oswald's name becameClassification: `TOP SECRET`
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 124]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 113 -known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within minutes after that, they were out with the cables in their hands.Q: Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the radio, an officer came in with Oswald cables?A: Yes.Q: Who was that officer?A: I believe it was Mrs. (Elsie Scaleti) who was the, sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects.Q: Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the Oswald cables so quickly?A: No, I know where she would have gotten them. We have copies of them right in our Branch.Q: At that time, did she also have a photograph of Oswald?A: No, I do not think so.Q: Do you know whether (Elsie Scaleti) ever discovered a photograph of Oswald at CIA Headquarters?A: I do not think so... I do not remember any photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the assassination, or even later. I do remember our asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one. It could be that later on she found one, but I don't recall.[^1][^1]: 465/Classification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 125]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 114 -The chief of the Mexico Branch quoted above was alsc responsible for the initial CIA investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy. [^466]Mr. Scelso also testified that, at the time of the assassination, the name of Lee Harvey Oswald did not ring a bell with him because "thousands of names were crossing my desk every month." [^467] He was asked why Ms. Scaleti, who came across as many names as he did, would have remembered Oswald whereas when he had not. He replied:She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She has a fantastic memory (Elsie Scaleti) in her job as the manager of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her fitness reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that time. Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees. [^468]Material removed from Win Scott's safe now in possession of the CIA provides critically important circumstantial evidence that the CIA photo-surveillance operations obtained photographs of Oswald:"(Oswald's) visits and conversations are not hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit." [^469]This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance inClassification:[^466]: 466/[^467]: 467/[^468]: 468/[^469]: 469/
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Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)Mexico. There are allegations that such a photo was found; there is testimony that such a photo should have been obtained. These and other factors the CIA's withholding of materials, Ms. Scaleti's strange lapse of memory regarding the events of 11/22/63, and Mr. Scott's manuscripts these things, in the Committee's view, --would tend to indicate that a photo of Lee Harvey Oswald was obtained. On the other hand, the consistent testimony that a photo was not obtained in Mexico, the absence of any record of transmittal of the photo to Headquarters (The weight of this consideration is mitigated by the fact that there were methods of communication available that were not incorporated into the CIA's record keeping systems.) and the testimony of Ms. Scaleti and Mr. Scelso that a photo was not discovered would tend to indicate that, in fact, the allegations that Ms. Scaleti found a photo of LHO are false.III. B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.1. IntroductionThis study has demonstrated that the information from the Soviet Embassy taps and from Headquarters was available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency acknowledged information, there is a distinct possibility thatClassification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 127]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 16 -the Station had available to it one additional telephonic intercept transcript, and one or more surveillance photographs.This Committee has made an attempt to determine when the available information was linked to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee has also made an attempt to determine whether all the intercepted telephone calls were in fact connected with Oswald or involved Oswald. It should be pointed out, however, that this analysis can only be directed at that information now known to have been available to the México City Station. This information will be discussed briefly in the following section. In addition, the question of whether Oswald or an Oswald imposter visited the embassies and made the phone calls, along with the possibility that Oswald was not alone in Mexico City, will be dealt with in greater detail in the final section of this report.2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald.The Mexico City Station possessed nine intercepted telephone conversations that may have dealt with Oswald. The conversations are summarized below for easy reference.470/ In the following discussion the conversations will be referred to by date and time of occurrence.Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 128]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled ciocuments.)- 117 -| DATE    | TIME     | SUMMARY                                                                                  || ------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 9/27/63 | 10:30 AM | Man calls. Soviet Military Attache regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish.)               || 9/27/63 | 10:37 AM | Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)                        || 9/27/63 | 1:25 PM  | Man calls the Soviet Consulate and asks for the Consul. (Spanish)                        || 9/27/63 | 4:05PM   | Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Consulate. (Spanish)                                       || 9/27/63 | 4:26PM   | Soviet Consulate calls Duran (Spanish)                                                   || 9/28/63 | 11:51AM  | Duran calls Soviet Consulate and puts a man on the phone. (Spanish Russian and English.) || 10/1/63 | 10:31AM  | Man calls Soviet Military Attache. (Russian)                                             || 10/1/63 | 10:45 AM | Man calls Soviet Consulate identifying himself as Lee Oswald. (Russian and English)      || 10/3/63 | ?        | Man calls the Soviet Military Attache. (Spanish and English.)                            |Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 129]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 118 -After the assassination the CIA's Mexico City Station passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to the U. S. Embassy Legal Attache.471/ The 9/27/ 10:30 and the 9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this dissemination.472/ The cover memorandum states:Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts of all conversations from technical operations of this office which are possibly pertinent in this case.473/The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum. While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37 call is included in the memorandum.At the bottom of each attachment page to the Scott memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided.474/The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the seven calls presented in the mrmorandum. The summary of the 10/3 call says:By the context of other conversations by Oswald and the fact that this called (sic) spoke in broken Spanish and English rather than Russian which he used previously, it is probable that this caller is not Osvald.475/(Ibid., p.9.)A judgement that this call did not pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald could be based on the following facts:-Classification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 130]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 19 -1) the caller spoke broken Spanish; 2) the caller did not have the number of the Consulate; 3) the caller did not know that visas were issued at the Consulate; and 4) the caller states that he is seeking a visa, not that he is checking on an application already made. The majority of the evidence indicates that Lee Harvey (swald could not speak Spanish.[^476]In light of Delgado's assertions, it is possible that Oswald had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It should be noted that the 10/3 transcript listed above indicates that the caller spoke initially in broken Spanish. [^477] The fact that this conversation was in Spanish, should not by itself rule out the possibility that Oswald made the phone call. This is especially true in light of Delgado's allegations and the 9/27 10:30, 9/27 10:37 and 9/27 1:25 calls which were also in Spanish.[^473]The record reflects that Oswald had the phone numbers of both the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache in his notebook.[^479] It can not be determined when Oswald entered the numbers in the notebook. Since Oswald had previously called the Consulate it is likely that he had the number prior to 3 October. It is also clear that Oswald knew that the Consulate was responsible for issuing visas due to his prior dealings with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates. Thus, it is probable that the 10/3 conversation did not pertain to Oswald.Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 131
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 131]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 120 -The 10/1 10:45 call is clearly relevant because the caller identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" The 10/1 10:31 conversation is probably relevant due to the similarity with the 10/1 10:45 call and the marginal notations about the quality of the Russian spoken by the caller, The 9/28 11:51 call is clearly relevant, again due to the marginal notations and the involvement of Silvia Duran. Duran's calls on 9/27 clearly related to Oswald due to the substantive information discussed in those calls.In summary, the above listed calls contain the substance of the information available to the CIA MCS prior to the assassination from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. The first three calls on 9/17/63 and the one on 10/3/63, if they were indeed Oswald, add little of substance to the information that was available from the other calls.3. When were the Intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald.HSCA staff researchers reviewed the transcripts from the liaison wiretaps on the Soviet Embassy. The chronological production from this operation is on microfilm at CIA Headquarters. 480/ In addition to the choronological file, numerous copies of the transcripts that pertain to Oswald were found throughout the CIA's files on Lee Harvey Oswald.It is obvious that the Mexico City Station linked theClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 132]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 121 -10/1 10:45 call to Lee Harvey Oswald because Oswald identified himself in the call and the Mexico City Station reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy to Headquarters on 10/8/63. On this transcript the translator added the notation:... the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian.482/The transcript from the 9/28 11:51 call also bears marginal notations from the translator. "MO (man outside) takes the phone and says in broken Russian ... speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian."484/ The first copy of this transcript in Oswald's Mexico City "p" file485/ also bears routing indications that show that the transcript was sent to Win Scott, Ann Goodpasture and Robert Shaw.486/ These routing indications were made by Barbara Manell.487/ Mrs. Manell testified that these routing indications would have been made when she first saw the transcript.488/ Mrs. Manell also wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in the "Soviet Contacts" file at the same time.489/ The 9/27 4:05 transcript also bears Mx.. Manell's routing and file instructions490/The 9/27 4:26 transcript also bears Ms. Manell's routing and filing instructions.491/ In addition, this transcript also bears a notation, from Win Scot which says "Is it possible to identify?"492/ Herbert Manell wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in Oswald's "p" file.493/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 133]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 122 -The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27 and 9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information that was available to the Mexico City station on Oswald from the Soviet electronic intercept operation., These conversations were not linked to Oswald prior to 8 October 1963 when MEXI 6453 was sent to Headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, 1963.[^494]The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee Harvey Oswald by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico City tation opened it's "P" file on Oswald.[^495] The process by which, and the events leading up to, the linkage of Oswald to the intercepted calls will be discussed in the following section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the Oswald case prior to the assassination.4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man.A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to Oswald prior to the assassination.[^496] The manner in which this mistake was made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's actions prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 134[^494]: [^495]:[^496]:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 134]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 123 -Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Citizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City.The Central Intelligence Agency has claimed that no investigation of Oswald was made in Mexico prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. For this reason, the Agency claimed, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy was not discovered until after the assassination:It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 (ctober 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt 10 obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official request from those agencies having investigative responsibility requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 5 October for a photograph of Oswald. 497/Neither of the above assertions is accurate. An analysis of the information available will show that the first assertion of the above quote, that the Station did not learn of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate andClassification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 135
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 135]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 124 -the fact that he was seeking a visa until after the as-sassination is incorrect. 498/CIA's IG Report inaccurately implies that no action would have been taken by the Mexico City Station with respect to an American in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico other than merely reporting the contact unless the Station had received a specific request from an interested U.S. government agency. The IGR's implication is inaccurate because, as will become apparent in the following discussion, the CIA had an understanding with the FBI regarding this class of cases and often did more that just report without any specific interest being expressed by any other agency of the United States government. 499/ In fact, the station often monitored and mounted operations against Americans in contact with Bloc Embassies. 500/ At a minimum they attempted to collect as much information as possible on Americans in contact with the Embassies. This was routine, it was also the case with Lee Harvey Oswald.B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to The AssassinationOn 27 September 1963 Silvia Duran contacted the Soviet Consulate on behalf of Lee Harvey Oswald. 501/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 136]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)- 12 -Later that same day, the Soviet Consulate returned Ms. Duran's call. 502/ Under normal procedures, these transcripts would have been in the CIA Station by the first of October and Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the Station on that morning and put them on Ms. Manell's desk. 503/ Ms. Manell recognized the transcripts as containing information of a possible counterespionage or counter-intelligence interest and routed them to Mr. Shaw, Ms. Goodpasture and Win Scott (in reverse order.) 504/ Mr. Scott wrote, at the top of the 9/27/4:26 call, "Is it possible to identify?" 505/.This was the first interest in Oswald recorded by the Mexico Station even though the caller was as yet unidentified. It indicates a routine interest in an American who is in contact with the Soviet Embassy. After the transcripts were routed they were filed in a general subject file. 506/The 9/28/ call was probably received at the CIA Station on Monday, 30 September 1963. The routing and filing instructions indicate that it was handled in much the same way as the 9/27 conversations. [Cite?]On 1 October 1963 a conversation in which an English speaking person identified himself to the SovietClassification: TOP SECRET