Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 63]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-52-6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance OperationsThe Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure whereby the functioning of the photographic base and the electronic intercept base could be coordinated. If the listening post monitor heard something that would lead him to believe that there was someone at one of the Embassies that should be photographed, he would alert the CIA technician in the listening post who would then alert Ann Goodpasture.[^1] Ms. Goodpastire could then alert Thomas Keenan who would then notify the photographic base.[^2] The reporting to Headquarters of information generated by the photographic surveillance operation and the electronic operation was also coordinated.[^3] The Station was able to go back to the photographic chronological file to check for photographs of people that were picked up on the tap operation when the transcripts were reviewed.[^4] It was a matter of routine to check the photographic production when reporting information developed from the tap operationClassification:Classified by derivation:[^1]: [^2]:[^3]: [^4]:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 64]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-53-that indicated a contact with an Embassy that was subject to photosurveillance.185/A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage ..sometimes there was a U.S. automob le license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.186/C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 19631. ExistenceThe Soviet and Cuban compounds were, in 1963, the targets of a multiple line telephone intercept operation.187/ This operation was run in liaison with the highest officials of the Mexican Government.188/2. Responsibilitya. GeneralWin Scott, the Chie of the Mexico City Station, was, nominally, the case officer for the telephoneClassification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 65]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-54-surveillance project.189/ Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/ An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/ Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/ With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base were staffed by Mexican Army officers.194/ This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.195/b. Analysis and Reporting of Information ObtainedMr. Herbert Manell was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by Barbara Manell. Mrs. Manell wouldClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 66]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-55-bring conversations of interest or importance to Mr. Manell's attention.[^1]Mr. Manell was also responsible for reporting the information developed from the Soviet wiretaps. He indicated that the reports were usually written by himself or Barbara Manell.[^2] These reports were usually in the form of cables or dispatches to CIA Headquarters.[^3] The Manells also usually handled the notification of representatives of various other United States government organizations in Mexico City when the information warranted such notification.[^4]David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who was stationed in Mexico City in 1963, testified that information from the taps would be reported if the information was important, if it was useful to another Agency component, or if it was something that should "go in the record."[^5] Mr. Phillips said that only a small amount of the information developed from the taps would be formally reported to CIA Headquarters and that the information that was reported was generally something more important than the usual conversations that were routinely intercepted.[^6]Classification:NW 48327 DocId:32263889、Page 67[^1]: 197/[^2]: 198/[^3]: 199/[^4]: 200/[^5]: 201/[^6]: 202/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 67]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-56-It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination to the intelligence community.[^1]3. Telephone Lines CoveredThis Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:[^2]14-42-37 Cuban Embassy14-92-14 Cuban Embassy25-07-95 Cuban Embassy14-13-26 Cuban Embassy15-60-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.[^3] The monthly report for October says thatClassification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 68[^1]: 203/[^2]: 204/[^3]: 205/
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 68]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-57-there has not been any change in the lines covered since September.206/A review of the transcripts produced by this operation revealed that the CIA has transcripts on file from the two-month period of interest.to this Committee from three Cuban lines: 14-42-37, 14-13-26, and 25-09-14.207/. It is noted that the last telephone line was not listed in the monthly reports.208/A review of the Soviet transcripts revealed that the five lines listed in the monthly reports were tapped on 27, 28 and 30 September.209/ Only two of the lines, 15-61-55 and 15-60-55, were covered on Sunday, 29 September.210/The House Select Committee on Assassinations has found some indications in testimony given before this Committee and CIA documents that more Cuban lines were tapped at that time.211/ This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty whether three lines (the number of lines on file in the transcripts), two lines (the number given by the contemporaneous monthly report), or five lines (the number given by some witnesses and documents) were
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 69]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-58-subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:14-42-37. The Ambassador's private telephone25-07-95 The Chancery14-13-26 The Chancery25-09-14 The Commercial Office11-28-47 The CorsulateOne CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.4. Production from OperationThe intercept listering post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 70]
# Classification: Lull(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-59-Thirty recording machines that were impulse activated every time a tapped telephone was used taped the surveilled conversations.216/ In addition, the intercepted conversations were monitored by personnel in the listening post.217/a. TypesThe production from this listening post was broken down into three categories for the purposes of handling the tapes and transcripts: (1) intercepts of interest to the Mexican officials (these included such groups as the Movimento de Liberacion Nacional, individual Communists, the Mexican Directorate of Federal Security); (2) Cuban intercepts; and (3) Soviet and bloc country intercepts.218/b. Handling Procedures.(1) ResumaA summary of the conversations deemed of sufficient interest by the listening post monitors was prepared as they were monitored.219/ These summaries were called "resuma."220/ The resuma were given to
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 71]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-60-Ann Goodpasture by the technician early in the morning the day after they were prepared.[^221] Ms. Goodpasture had the previous day's resuma on Win Scott's desk by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the day after they were prepared.[^222] Win Scott marked these resuma for action by his case officer: before routing them through the Station.[^223] This Committee has requested copies of these resuma from the C A but they have not been made available for review.[^224]The resuma covered all thirty lines that were covered by the intercept operation.[^225] Only important conversations were included in the resuma.[^226] The monitors made the decision as to which conversations were important.[^227] After the resuma were prepared, the tapes from the lines of interest to the Mexicans were held for approximately ten days and were then reused.[^228] The resuma were maintained in a chronological file at the listening post.[^229](2) Cuban TapesThe Cuban tapes (tapes produced by taps on the Cuban telephones) were left on the machines untilClassification: TOP SECRET[^221]: [^222]:[^223]: [^224]:[^225]: [^226]:[^227]: [^228]:[^229]:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 72]
# Classification: UP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-61-the reel was used up.230/ When the reels were full, they were removed and transcribed in the listening post.231/ The transcripts would be turned over to Ms. Goodpasture at the same time as the resuma.232/ The tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post.233/ There was a special rack for those tapes in the technician's workshop, which was situated on the floor above the room in which the listening post was located.234/ This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a separate slot, with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room; i.e., the tapes from the Cuban intercept were held for thirty days prior to reuse.235/ The tapes were not turned over to Ms. Goodpasture unless she requested a specific tape.236/(3) Soviet Tapes(a) General HandlingThe Soviet tapes were removed daily from the machines.237/ The Spanish language portions of the tapes would then be transcribed in the listening
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 73]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-62-post.238/ The transcripts and tapes from the Soviet lines were then routinely turned over to Ann Goodpasture along with the resuma and Cuban transcripts.239/ Ms. Goodpasture then turned the tapes over to Robert Zambernardi, who then delivered them to Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription of the Russian language portions of the tape.240/(b) Retention and Reuse of TapesThere is some question about how long the Soviet tapes were retained before reuse. There are indications that the tapes were routinely held for two weeks and then reused.241/ The technician who ran the listening post could not state with certainty what the practice regarding retention and reuse of the Soviet tapes was. He said that he did not hold the tapes at all once they were returned to him by Ms. Goodpasture.242/ He stated that he assumed that some of the tapes were retained by either the station or the Russian translator because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling.243/ The tapes were not retained by the translator.244/ It is possibleClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 74]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-63-that the tapes were held for two weeks in the station before they were erased and sent back to Arehart for reuse.245/ Robert Zambernardi remembers that Thomas Keenan spent a lot of time in the Station erasing tapes on a special machine for that purpose.246/One of the main sources for the two-week period being ascribed to retention of the Soviet tapes is DIR-88680, which says:Upon receipt you may resume usual practice of keeping Cuban and Soviet tapes two weeks and then erasing.247/This Committee has not found any evidence that would contradict the above-quoted statement in regard to the Soviet tapes..There was a procedure whereby the tapes could be held for longer than two weeks if someone thought that the tape should be preserved as well as the transcript.248/ The interested officer could make a note on the transcript or he could notify Ann Goodpasture, orally or by rote, that he wanted the tape preserved.249/ There were no written rules or regulations governing this procedure.250/Classification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 75]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-61-(c) English Language ConversationsThere are some indications that English language conversations were transcribed at the listening post. The Tab F Draft says:Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location [other than the listening post] for translation and typing. 251/Goodpasture's notes say:Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of the conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed. 252/But, in her testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in executive session on 4/13/78, Ms. Goodpasture said:The transcribers, on the transcription that I picked up, the transcribers were working at the same place with the Spanish text. If the language were other than Spanish, it would have to be taken to another location to be transcribed. The material that was picked up the day after the date on which it occurred was in the Spanish language, normally. 253/It is clear that the reels of tape with conversations in the Russian language were delivered to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription. 254/Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 76]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-65-Mr. Tarasoff has testified that he was also responsible for the transcription of the English language conversations although his wife, Anna Tarasoff, usually did the actual transcribing.255/ This testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Anna Tarasoff.256/ Arehart, the technician in the listening post, could not clearly remember whether or not any of his Mexican transcribers did the English language conversations.257/ He remembered that these tapes were usually sent to the Station.258/ He said that he did remember that monitors would often come to his workshop and ask him to come downstairs to listen to a conversation ir English.259/All of the conversations in the Spanish transcripts are in Spanish.260/ It appears that all of the conversations in Spanish were transcribed in Spanish.261/ It is doubtful that the listening post transcribers, who were Mexican nationals, would have translated an English conversation into Spanish and then transcribed it. In light of this, Tarasoff's recollection and Arehart's recollection, it is probable that all the English language conversations were sent to theClassification:Classified by derivation:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 77]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-66-Tarasoffs for transcriptior.(d) Handling by TarasoffsAlong with the reels of tape that contained Russian language conversatons (and probably English language conversations), Mr. Tarasoff received a copy of the Spanish transcripts.262/ When the Tarasoffs received the tapes, they transcribed only those conversations that were denoted on the Spanish transcript as being in Russian.263/Mr. Tarasoff routinely received the tapes the day after they were made.264/ Mr. Tarasoff testified that he would then immediately transcribe the tapes and turn over the completed tapes and transcripts to his contact the next morning.265/Mr. Tarasoff said that the volume of work the transcripts were always finished in one day.266/ "Sometimes there was so little work in transcribing the Russian portion of the tape that I was just hanging around doing nothing."267/ Ann Goodpasture, at one time, put the time lag for completion of theClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 78]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-67-Russian transcription at approximately one week.268/In her testimony before this Committee, Ms. Goodpasture stated that it generally took Mr. Tarasoff one or two days to complete the translations and transcriptions.269/(e) Expedited Procedure forEnglish Language Conversationsor other Conversations ofSpecial InterestThere was a procedure whereby Mr. Tarasoff's transcription could be expedited if there was a special interest in a particular conversation.270/ When the monitor in the listening post encountered something he considered important enough to require expedited transcription, it was possible for him to bring this quickly to the Station's attention.-271/ Although Arnold Arehart was not the Tarasoffs' contact in September or October of 1963, he did serve as such at one time.272/ When he was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Arehart was asked whether there was a process whereby transcription of important conversations in EnglishClassification: TOP SECRET
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 79]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled clocuments.)-68-or Russian could be expedited.273/ He explained that there would not have been such a process-for a Russian conversation, sirce the importance of the conversation could not be judged due to the fact that no one in the listening post could understand that language.274/ Arehart. did say that there was such a procedure for English language conversations.275/ When one of the Mexican monitors encountered a conversation in English, he would ask Arehart to listen to that conversation.276/ After listening to the conversation, Arehant would decide whether or not it warranted special atention.277/ If he deemed that it was important enough, he would mark the tape"Urgent," put it in a box, and deliver it to Ms. Goodpasture.278/Mr. Arehart's recollection was confirmed by an examination of the project files for this operation. One of the monthly project reports explains this procedure and its purpose:Classification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 80184
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 80]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-69-Headquarters (is) nct well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from (this operation). The outside staff agent, Arnold Arehart has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to (Ann Good-pasture) inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk...(Good-pasture) meets Arehart within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases s information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval.[^279]If the tape was from a Sov et installation, the tape would have been delivered the same day to the Tarasoffs by Mr. Zambernardi.[^280] A ong with the tape, the Tarasoffs would receive a note indicating which conversation was to be transcribed on a priority basis. The Tarasoffs wouli then immediately transcribe that conversation and return it to their regular contact that same day.[^281] It should be noted that the monthly report says that the Soviet transcripts would be delivered to the case officer responsible for the target installation.[^282] In the case of theClassification: TOP SECRETClassified by derivation:NW 48327 DocId: 32263889 Page 81[^279]: /[^280]: /[^281]: /[^282]: /
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 81]
Classification:(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled cocuments.)-70-Soviet target, that case officer would have been Mr. Herbert Manell.283/ Mr. Manell testified that he had nothing to do with transporting the transcripts to or from the Tarasoffs except in rare instances when no one else was available to do the job.284/ Mrs. Tarasoff testified that the "urgent" tapes were delivered and picked up by their regular contact.285/(f) Handling in the StationAll of the transcripts were brought into the Station to Ms. Goodpasture. 286/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the copies of the transcripts and retained one copy for her own file.287/ One copy of all of the Soviet transcripts was put on Barbara Manell desk by Ann Goodpasture the morning they were received.288/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the Cuban transcripts to either Robert Shaw or David Phillips.289/ One copy of all the transcripts eventually went into a chronological.file.290/ One copy of the Soviet transcripts was cut and pasted onto separate sheets of paper and filed in appropriate subject or personality files.291/ The resuma were also maintainedClassification:
[180-10110-10484.pdf — page 82]
Classification: TOP SECRET(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)-11-in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/(g) Format of TranscriptsThe format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above.294/ Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/ Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:"Previously transcriped" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.298/Classification:Classified by derivation: